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The Movement-image of the Movement-machine

Deleuze, Cinema and the London Underground
This thesis addresses the London Underground in the light of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy of cinema. The first chapter gives an overview of the aspects of Deleuze's philosophy, which are of particular interest in the context of architectural theory. The main postulates of transcendental empiricism are explained, followed by the four major concepts: space, time, image and event. The second chapter deals with Deleuze's understanding of the cinematic frame. The relationship between the frame and the content of framing is shown as possibly inherently dynamic. A description of the major points regarding the Underground corridor follows, with the explanation of the condition of the walking body and its relation to the surrounds. Finally, the notion of the cinematic frame and acts of framing are utilised for the conceptualisation of the Underground corridor, showing the notion of movement to be of crucial importance. Chapter three regards the platform event in relation to the cinematic shot, which is explained to be a matter of conversion of movement. The specificity of the Underground platform is related, and the relationship between the body and the moving object of the train explained. The conjunction between the platform and the shot is then proposed, to show that the platform stands at a point of conversion of movement, transforming body's relationship to its environment. Chapter four is the discussion of the Underground carriage, and its understanding in the light of Deleuze's conceptualisation of the cinematic close-up. The close-up is shown to represent a specific, qualitative transformation, which marks the shift of movement in the direction of expression. The concept of any-space-whatever is then related as an example of Deleuze's transformation of the close-up of the face to the object and then to a spatial figure. The specifics of the Underground carriage are related, introducing the notion of the motionless body inside a moving confinement, as well as the presentation of 'facialisation.' The third part of the chapter sees the explanation of the carriage event in the light of the close-up/affection-image, and it pays special attention to the transformation of movement into expression. Finally, Chapter Five sees the discussion of the Underground in general, and its relation to the city. Deleuze's understanding of the concept of montage is explained; in particular its relationship to time and construction of continuities and wholes across ruptures. The Underground is discussed as an urban system and its relation to the city that harbours it addressed. Finally, a particular understanding of urban montage is proposed, one wholly dependent on the presence of the Underground system.
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# Acknowledgements

# Introduction

## 1.0.0 Deleuze, Philosophy, Architecture
- 1.1.0 Deleuze and Architecture
- 1.2.0 Deleuze and Philosophy
  - 1.2.1 Transcendental Empiricism
  - 1.2.2 Time
  - 1.2.3 Space
  - 1.2.4 Image
- 1.3.0 Intersecting parallels
  - 1.3.1 Method, Content, Structure
- 1.4.1 Writing
  - 1.4.2 Writing: Example 1
  - 1.4.3 Writing: Example 2
  - 1.4.4 Writing: Order-word
  - 1.4.5 Writing: Conclusion

## 2.0.0 Frame, Corridor
- 2.1.0 Frame
- 2.1.0 Corridor
- 2.3.0 Frame + Corridor

## 3.0.0 Shot, Platform
- 3.1.0 Shot
- 3.2.0 Platform
- 3.3.0 Shot + Platform

## 4.0.0 Close-up, Carriage
- 4.1.0 Close-up
- 4.2.0 Carriage
- 4.3.0 Close-up + Carriage

## 5.0.0 Montage, Underground
- 5.1.0 Montage
- 5.2.0 Underground
- 5.3.0 Montage + Underground

# Conclusion

# Bibliography
[He says:]

This is how I come back to London: there is a plane flight; suspended above clouds, I look at the landscape of white. Or, if the sky is clear, I look at the landscape further below, the surface of Earth, and looking from above, I anticipate the moment of contact. With the surface – but even more, with the place. The city.

The plane lands. Passport checks, customs. And then down to the Underground platform. The train I board comes out of the station and is already on the surface. I am in the landscape now, and my viewpoint is lower; I am passing woods, grass, houses. There are windows, punctures in the brick walls I am travelling by (my body motionless) and they are dark when I face them. Sometimes I imagine the lives on the other side of the glass.

After several stations, the train dives under the surface. The windows I was looking through just a moment ago are now opening onto darkness, in motion, and I am slowly having to focus on my body, the bodies of others, here, inside the carriage. The carriage slowly fills up. And then, suddenly, it all becomes familiar – and only then I know I am back in London. Later on I might go out and walk down the familiar streets, and sit in my favourite cafe; but London will seep back into these sights only slowly. In the Tube, the sense of presence is immediate. This must be the place, I think, and chuckle – since I know this thought is actually a quote.

The thought pursued in this thesis developed simultaneously along several different directions of interest. Firstly, there was the London Underground, which seemed to be a hugely understudied urban occurrence, one that I found to be of great interest. Having grown up in a city with no metro system of any kind, my sense of urbanity and experience of urban living was dramatically altered when I moved to London. Suddenly, every journey within the city was inherently a journey into the city’s outside, or its underside, under-the-ground, through the realm of shared urbanity which was, nevertheless, significantly different from the ‘surface’ experience of the city itself. Consequently, all knowledge of the city was fragmented through the use of the Underground system – the continuity of built environment was inextricably linked with the literal disappearance of the urban ‘surface’ from sight/perception/experience. This resulted in a fragmented mental map of the city, one that relied less on recognisable continuous routes within the city, and more on contentious foci of ‘urban growth,’ growth
of my knowledge of the city. On the other hand, the everyday experience of the city became a seamless double, and the experiential line of accessing/travelling/living became particular in the way my body – and consciousness – were confronting the city. The overwhelming majority of Londoners are familiar with the Underground system, and it inevitably colours their experience and understanding of what urban environment is. And yet, very little theoretical investigation has been done to address this.

It was during the MSc in Architectural History course at the Bartlett School of Architecture in 1999/2000 that I, quite literally, ran into a not particularly obvious way of theoretically approaching the phenomenon of the London Underground, as I was rushing down the platform in the opposite direction from an incoming train. I was walking right down the yellow line which delineates the edge of the platform and, as the train rushed into the station and the mass of this fast-moving object pushed past me, directing wind in my face, I had a sensation of having become part of a cinematic situation. However, this conjunction was not simply narrative in character – I was not fancying myself as Gwyneth Paltrow in the 1999 film *Sliding Doors*, with my life about to take a dramatic turn by the timing of closing carriage doors; instead, I had a distinct intimation that there was something in the way I was experiencing this moving object inside its assigned platform space, its appearance from the dark mouth of the tunnel, the sensation of wind blowing in my face and the noise that accompanied it – as well as, more than anything, the shifting perception of my body walking in the opposite direction from this overwhelming moving presence – all these, experienced simultaneously, seemed to me somehow, inexplicably, to be essentially cinematic experiences. I wasn't in a dark room, motionless, looking at the 'silver' screen, at the moving image, the motion picture; and yet, I was in the movies.

None of the theories of film I was coming in contact with at the time seemed to offer me a way of thinking this connection, especially not the ones making conjunctions between cinema and architecture: the studies were either focusing on social interpretations, or on the visual aspect of cinema, the 'reading' of its 'image'; psychoanalysis had its own agenda, which had nothing to do with my initial intuited connection, since it was always ultimately regressing to its own obsessive 'vocabulary' of signification; when combined with linguistics it would advance even further away from my field of interest, introducing the problematic metaphor of language into, what felt to me like, two non-linguistic
signifying modes (film and architecture). Social theories, which seemed to abound, were of no interest to me, because I believed that what I was experiencing, and was ultimately interested in, was not a question of ideologies in any sense of the term; it wasn't about capitalism, nor consumerism; it had nothing to do with my gender, nor my sexuality. My skin colour or political heritage of late Twentieth Century Balkans, where I'd come from to have my cinematic intimation on the London Underground, couldn't have seemed further away in, what I believed, was an intriguing experience of what it means to be part of the city. More than anything – what I wanted to observe was not negative. I had no desire to point out problems or flaws of any kind. Finally, it seemed that all the connections I was making were very much about the built environment, inextricable from it, and yet not the most common questions posed in relation to architectural design, or its object, or the concept of space, that much beloved property of architects.

In that respect, the link between my experience and film seemed all the more important: if I thought that I was experiencing something that was of significance in the life of the city, yet all the directions of investigation seemed to miss that particular sense of it – as I had come to witness it – the intuited cinematic quality of the experience seemed of importance and worth pursuing.

At about the same time I was advised to take a look at Gilles Deleuze's cinema books – and it took only a couple of pages for me to realise that this was someone who was speaking a language which, even when difficult, sounded to me to be somehow true. I had, before me, a theory of film which did not see it as a language constructed in still images and then assembled in neat little packages of 24 frames per second – that often used, and utterly unimaginative, charm-less take on film – but rather, a theory of film which was proclaiming the medium to be one of durations irreducible to charts, a theory of signs of time and movement, theory in which body-consciousness-perception-image-space-time all represented elements in an intricate web of existence, conceptually constructed in, what seemed as, a much more appealing way, a way which I thought to be related to my intuited experience of what it meant to be there, to be part of that routine, everyday experience of the metro-polis.

This thesis, then, stands at a particular intersection of two 'disciplines' – film and architecture – but it also stands very much as the site of confrontation between two very
particular realms, which belong to those two disciplines: that of the Underground, and of
the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. As such, the study is about the construction of
theoretical connections between architecture and film; but it is also much more particular
than that, which should make it, potentially, much more useful in the broader context of
architectural theory, since it bypasses some of the more commonly addressed theoretical
categories.

Finally, seeing as the arena of this encounter was the written word, and, in Deleuze's
philosophy, cinema so utterly irreducible to either language or still image, this thesis also
became a site of experimentation in the realm of writing and its accompanying
representations.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter presents an overview of Gilles
Deleuze's philosophy and how it has been addressed in relation to architectural theory. It
opens with an overview of the Deleuze conference that took place in London's Tate
Modern in 2002, locating some of the contentious issues regarding the study of Deleuze
and the application of his philosophy to various 'practical' disciplines, and architecture in
particular. Then in proceeds to describe what was deemed the most important
characteristics of Deleuze's philosophy, focusing firstly on the notion of transcendental
empiricism, as the philosophical proposition that might open interesting territories in
relation to architecture. What follows are discussions of some of the crucial concepts for
this investigation: these are the concepts of time, space, image and event. There are
also explanations of how the relationship between cinema and architecture is to be seen
methodologically and, finally, the discussion on the writing method used in the thesis,
and its relation to Deleuzian concept of order-word. This last aspect encompasses a
description of case studies utilised.

The four chapters that follow (Chapters 2-5) represent the four 'events' of the
Underground under scrutiny, which are observed in parallel with four distinct cinematic
concepts, as they were developed by Deleuze. The events are those of the Underground
corridor, platform, carriage and finally the Underground itself in its relation to the city,
whereas the corresponding cinematic concepts are those of frame, shot, close-up and
montage, respectively. The structure of these four main chapters is always tripartite:
every chapter opens with a discussion of the cinematic concept that is to be utilised in it
(frame, shot, etc.), then moves on to a general description of the Underground event on hand (corridor, platform, etc.) and finishes with the proposed conjunction between the two. The first parts of each chapter are interlinked with fictional descriptions of cinematic material that is juxtaposed with the text as an illustration, whereas the second parts comprise directives for the execution of situations/actions that are supposed to test out some of the propositions made. These serve as a parallel illustrative or representative discourse, one that would usually be constructed through imagery. The specifics and reasons behind such a set-up are explained in more detail in Chapter 1.

Finally, the conclusion provides the summary of major points arrived at in the chapters and proposes a view on what the theoretical contributions of this thesis are in the context of architectural theory.
Deleuze, Philosophy, Architecture
Deleuze and architecture

A two-day conference on Gilles Deleuze titled 'Immanent Choreographies: Deleuze and Neo—aesthetics,' held in September 2001 at Tate Modern in London, confirmed the split between two major approaches to Deleuze, which are inherently linked to two types of practice and two accompanying theoretical fields— and almost three years later, there seems to be little, if any, change. On the one hand, the conference saw presentations on a number of, what could be termed as, strictly philosophical themes and approaches, those that dealt with Deleuze's philosophical premises. These ranged from the question of the nature of light that the plane of immanence is made of, and its resulting potential cancellation of being, to the question of total and pure critique, as established by Kant and appropriated by Deleuze, and its relevance to the practice of critical writing. The other end of the scale saw a number of presentations whose theoretical basis was a relatively straightforward appropriation of Deleuze (and most commonly of Deleuze's collaborations with Guattari, almost exclusively A Thousand Plateaus), which was then, with more or less success, related to some artistic or other practice, in an attempt to establish a link between philosophy and the 'concrete' — the relation much implied as absolutely crucial by Deleuze himself. This second group comprised of a dancer, whose presentation included a piece of video art, a composer, whose work was played live, and finally — architects.

Apart from polarising the conference and providing a scope questionable in terms of depth but valuable in terms of variety, the character of the conference also displayed the very problems that experts on Deleuze (whatever that term might imply) are facing: how to be inventive (as Deleuze himself urged philosophers of the concrete to be) and at the same time 'Deleuzian.' More generally, the key question seemed to be what it might

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1 Oganised by Barbara M. Kennedy, lecturer at Staffordshire University, England, and author of Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation, Edinburgh University Press 2000, Edinburgh
2 Peter Hallward, 'Creation or Innovation?: Deleuze's Cinema Books'
3 Ian Mackenzie, 'Total and Absolute Critique in Kant and Deleuze'
5 Cristina Caprioli, a dancer and choreographer based in Stockholm, Sweden
6 Pascale Criton, composer, with Didier Aschour on guitar
7 Andres Kurg, Manuel de Landa, Helen Stratford
mean to be philosophical and practical at the same time. In other words, how to practice Deleuze's philosophy of the concrete, his transcendental empiricism, and not end up in either approaching his work as yet another academic dogma – which would be precisely what he was desperately trying to avoid – or to simply produce art, music, film, architecture: produce something allegedly more concrete, and then make general and ultimately (unfortunately) quite arbitrary connections back to his philosophy.

It seemed, and it comes as no surprise, that those in the field of film turned out to be the most fortunate ones – Deleuze himself produced two volumes of philosophy on cinema alone, and just following what had been written seemed to offer enough space, both for philosophical enquiry and the development of utterly concrete cinematic theory, as well as practice.

Architecture, both in this conference and in relation to Deleuze in general, finds itself in an extremely promising but in equal measure uneasy position. In Plato's ideal hierarchies, with the world of ideas as the measure of absolute and immaterial perfection, architecture can be assumed to represent the slightest of arts, most tainted by matter (unlike music, for instance) and therefore of least value. The history of European philosophy, and cultural theory in general, rooted as it is deeply in ancient Greece, has carried this hierarchical system up to today, leaving architecture and its proponents in that shady area, in which value is to be assigned to a practice according to the measure in which it answers to a value systems outside itself.

The 'reversed Platonic' nature of Deleuze's project has been, as Ian Buchanan points out, often over-emphasised and taken to be the ultimate and unquestionable foundation of Deleuze's philosophy. Still, the scope and ambition of Deleuze's intervention regarding the fundamentals of 'Western' thought should not be easily dismissed, for it plays too important a role in the process of dismantling some of the most entrenched

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10 David Rodowick, Astrid Soderbergh Widding, Ian Buchanan
12 On Plato and Aristotle see: Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*, chapters 1 and 8
14 Ian Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, Chapter 1
preconceptions in our understanding and definition of culture, and with it, architecture as well. And if Deleuze is offering a system of thinking and acting which might give architecture a freedom to explore and judge itself according to its own, irrefutably material systems of reference, he should be taken much more seriously – equally by those who build and those who write architecture (the bricks that words are\textsuperscript{15}). In fact, although Deleuze’s writings (and this seems most unfortunate) do not delve much into any particular architectural or urban theory, there is a passage in \textit{What is Philosophy?} in which he pronounces architecture to be the highest ranking art of them all\textsuperscript{16} – precisely because of its inevitably concrete character, its constant link with matter, with dirt, with the concrete and experiential in the corporeal sense.

Consequently – and the presentation of this is one of the major aims of this thesis – Deleuze represents the philosopher and cultural theorist of the 20th century who potentially offered architecture the theoretical space it needed, and is still in need of. The great legacy of the century is rooted on the one hand in semiology, that is, semiotic systems of Saussurean orientation, which, in their modelling on linguistics, ever prove to offer an interesting and potentially fruitful – but ultimately misleading background, reducing every system of signification (such as architecture) to that of spoken/written language;\textsuperscript{17} on the other hand, there is psychoanalysis, whose conception of the human subject always seems to fall short of answering for some of the more dynamic aspects (and those are numerous) of the ever-changing world of urban conditions and human experience of these conditions.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, there is the Marxist critique of social modes of production and its manifold legacy, the development of which, apart from having at times ambiguous, yet indisputable relation to the Hegelian models of thinking (the critique of which was Deleuze’s ongoing project, similar in scope and connected to the anti-Platonic strand in his work), has also been criticised by Deleuze, among other things, in terms of the understanding of the notion of desire.\textsuperscript{19} This wider critique and the proposal for a different understanding of desire (and its consequent influence on how we experience

\textsuperscript{15} Roberto Calasso, \textit{Ka}, London: Vintage, 1999, p.27
\textsuperscript{16} Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, \textit{What is Philosophy?}, London and New York: Verso, 1994, p.186
\textsuperscript{17} In reference to film, see: Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne, Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, \textit{New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics: Structuralism, Post-structuralism and Beyond}, London and New York: Routledge, 1998
\textsuperscript{18} Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, London, The Athlone Press, 1988
\textsuperscript{19} Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, \textit{A Thousand plateaus}, \textit{Capitalism and Schizophrenia}
\textsuperscript{20} Ian Buchanan, \textit{Deleuzism}, Chapter 1
reality), developed as it was in *Anti-Oedipus*, although seemingly unconnected to the issues of architectural theory, represents a potentially quite interesting theme.\(^2\) That is, not just in terms of the critique of ongoing theoretical practices, but also in terms of its relevance for the understanding of the human subject involved in the urban experience, which will be discussed in more detail later.

Simply put, and this is a very general and simplified application of the critique of these theories that Deleuze proposed, architecture should be seen as more than just a sign language and as tightly related to the issues of time, both of which are Deleuze's great themes, and both of which are particularly relevant when architecture is taken to be of, and about, urban phenomena. It is of importance to note at this point that, in Deleuze, these two themes were most developed in relation to cinema, which is one of the major reasons for his cinematic theory to be looked into in more detail.

To go back to the Deleuze conference, and the awkwardness of the position in which architecture finds itself in relation to Deleuze's philosophy, it also became apparent that the territory architecture was supposed to cover was the least clear one, making it prone to adopting misconceptions and giving rise to misapprehension. Partly related to the problem of positioning architectural theory relative to its 'practice' in the first place, papers on architecture and Deleuze (and this is not restricted only to the conference in question) seem to fall into one of the two major categories: they either revolve around a restricted insight into Deleuze, and therefore the conclusions drawn are incorrect in the context of Deleuze's general philosophical project, or fail to recognise the inadequacy of the theoretical (and ultimately, although that might not appear so on the surface, philosophical) models which are supposed to represent architecture – however opaque the definition of the field itself might be. In either case, the result is too often lacking in the ability to provide any crucial insight, either in the potential benefits of the use of proposed Deleuzian concepts, or in architecture and its corresponding phenomena, urban or other.

The paper presented in the conference by Andres Kurg titled 'How to Build Diagrams? The Moebius House' falls into the first category: elaborating on the Deleuzian notion of
the *diagram* as that abstract tool which can be said to relate the plane of immanence (the abstract philosophical event-field of sorts) and the world of the 'concrete,' it tackles a very important theme, and quite rightfully chooses it as one of the more engaging themes in Deleuze, utterly relevant to architecture, both in terms of how it is theorised and what modes of representation it employs. However, the paper seems to fail in making a clear distinction between the Deleuzian notion of diagram and diagram as understood in its more traditional sense – as an ideal representation. The nature of such a reduction is that it presupposes a hierarchical system in which the diagram (most commonly) denotes the presumed essence of the object it represents, positioned as it is on the scale a step away from the concrete and closer to the ideal and the pure. Apart from invoking a hierarchy which is in no way absolute, and certainly not part of Deleuze's philosophical system, this kind of misapprehension also fails to recognise the difference in Deleuze's concept of the abstract, as neither hierarchical nor essential, but rather concrete itself, the point which will be dealt with in more detail in the section on transcendental empiricism. The result is that the relationship between a particular building, its plan and distribution of functions, and the notion of abstract diagrams, as potential operational tools in any creative process such as the design one, presents itself as any other representational relation, bringing into question the very necessity for Deleuze's philosophy, as well as its often difficult language. It is worth noting that the link between Deleuze's concept of the diagram and the Moebius house was implied by the architects themselves, which made Kurg's discussion relevant; but the connection remains highly problematic.

Manuel de Landa's paper, on the other hand, falls into the second category of partly misconceived Deleuzian projects, relying as it does on a very rigid and long abandoned definition of architecture. After introducing the notion of essentialism as the great philosophical burden Deleuze's project has released creative thinking from, it proceeds to relate it to architectural design and, more particularly, to the invention of CAD software used in the process of design itself. Coupled with the notion of thinking in and of multiplicities (as taken from Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*), de Landa proposes a new way of seeing the object and objective of architecture and of using digital technologies to arrive at new and different solutions in the creation of it. A valiant

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proposal, except that it relies on a rather dated understanding of architecture as comprising of stylistic and structural (and above all physical) elements, the formal understanding and ordering of which is, so to speak, all there is to it – reducing ultimately architecture and its design to the process of reshuffling of pre-given (physical) objects. The outcome is disappointing, since de Landa’s basic theme is an intriguing and potentially fruitful one (often neglected by philosophy proper and philosophers who write on Deleuze): the proposition that Deleuze be read literally. De Landa argues (and not just in this paper22), that Deleuze, as a transcendental empiricist, needs to be taken literally, physically as it were, since any other reading dangerously verges on misapprehension of Deleuze’s idea of the abstract. This notion relies actually on an unspoken cancellation of the idea of metaphor (in language and outside it), which will be dealt with in more detail later.

Finally, the third paper, presented at the conference as part of the architecture session, was by Helen Stratford on the notion of Deleuzian ‘order-word,’ which regarded Deleuze’s notion of language as an order-giving apparatus,23 and the relevance of such a concept in architectural practice, theory and education. The paper also represented a rare conference attempt to address the process and mode of writing itself in a less orthodox (academic) manner and, potentially, in line with Deleuze’s own understanding of invention in the use of language. The paper was divided in several distinct ‘voices’ and delivered by three speakers rather than just one. Two main problems seemed to emerge from the approach. Firstly, the text was referential, in that it was displacing the object of its investigation outside itself – a design project and its presentation – which were not explained in detail in the paper itself. Rather, they represented a general direction to hint at, but never actually to be revealed. The result was a tantalisingly engaging but opaque display of approaches to a problem – which never seemed to be naming itself. The second problem emerged from the first, and indicated a broader issue regarding the use of Deleuze, not just in architectural but in any applied theory: there was a certain obscurity arising from the attempt to engage with the Deleuzian mode of thinking and writing. Consequently, it was not just the subject matter of investigation that found itself outside the discourse; it was the audience, which was, quite deliberately in a sense,

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22 Manuel de Landa, ‘Immanence in the Transcendence in the Genesis of Form,’ in Buchanan, A Deleuzian Century?
23 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand plateaus, Chapter 4
displaced from it as well. A text, which was erasing its own footsteps, hiding where it was coming from, and who it might have been leading to.

Now this, more than any other approach, seemed to have a true ring in one conference on Deleuze, and it indicated a much wider problem within the field: how to be Deleuzian without approaching his work as a body of 'knowledge' to be taken for granted and transformed into academic dogma – which was one of his main fears. Differently put: how to read Deleuze and not turn his words into order-words. As far as architecture goes, this paper also underlined the problematic in distinguishing between the 'theory' of architecture and its 'practice,' terms that, in their very a priori distinction, are deeply in contradiction with Deleuze's understanding of what it means to create. The result might have seemed difficult to access, but it actually indicated a route towards a more interesting use of Deleuze and a more engaging one for those who write architecture, which was emphasised by the choice of the topic. In deciding to write about words and their power to command orders, Stratford tackled a theme crucial for a lot of the practice that takes place around the process of design itself.

From these, in a sense incidental yet exemplary cases, it is possible to define three major problems architecture seems to be facing when confronted with Deleuze: the lack of expertise on Deleuze; existence of preconceptions on what architecture in the first place might be; and finally, the problematic role of architectural theory in relation to its practice (a wider problem admittedly, but one surfacing in a particularly interesting way in the presence of Deleuze's philosophy). Some aspects of this meeting of Deleuzian philosophy and architecture, and the papers that exist on them, will be discussed in more detail later. However, it would prove useful at this point to examine two more examples, not related to the Tate Modern Deleuze conference.

There exists currently only one book devoted solely to exploring possible connections between Deleuze's writings and architecture, John Rajchman's Constructions, published in 1998. This volume approaches the problem through a number of separate themes, with a chapter dedicated to each, and is substantially related to the only book Deleuze ever published which addressed the issue of architecture in some detail, The Fold.
The Fold is an investigation of baroque (including its architecture) and of the ways of thinking and the creation of concepts characteristic for the baroque 'style.' It has served as one of the more obvious starting points for architectural theorists (A Thousand Plateaus and its mostly political themes aside), not least because of its interest in the problematic of form, not just in the physical sense of the word, but also in relation to writing and thinking. In Constructions, Rajchman discusses several issues in a series of insightful, imaginative essays, which, as Elizabeth Grosz points out, do not just apply in dry academic manner Deleuze to architecture, but attempt to practice Deleuze's own art of invention of concepts, making for a particularly interesting read, one abundant with suggested theoretical links and connections.

Rajchman opens with the notion of 'construction,' as the operation characteristic for Deleuze's approach to philosophy, which enables it to be finding its aims and creating new territories along the way, as it were - pragmatically. Rajchman's point being that there is an architecture already at work in Deleuze - it is the very process by which he arrives at his philosophy. Rajchman proceeds to investigate several themes and concepts, some of which are taken from Deleuze directly, such as the very notion of the fold or of light and lightness, and some, such as the issue of a virtual house, are Rajchman's own proposed lines of rethinking architecture in the context of Deleuze.

One particularly interesting aspect of Rajchman's collection of essays is the point of convergence between the Deleuzian theory and the contemporary practice of design and building production. In a series of inquiries, Rajchman takes Eisenman's Rebstock design and meditates its Deleuzian reading of design strategies at work (based partly on Eisenman's own writing on Deleuze in the context of the project), in an attempt to show that, for instance, there is an understanding of the 'fold' at work in a particular design solution. As brave as this direct confrontation with contemporary architectural production is, there is a sense of a rather problematic operation at work, for several reasons. Firstly, there is the issue of representation - what Rajchman proposes is that the space of design and design itself represent some kind of underlying theory, more

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26 Rajchman, Constructions, p.2  
27 Rajchman, Constructions, p.2
particularly a particular concept – that of the fold, inevitably implying a certain form of representational hierarchy which places the design itself on the side of the result rather than cause. Furthermore, and this is a problematic this thesis is facing as well, there is a danger to which Dorothea Olkowski dedicated a whole volume (*Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*) as well as a memorable comment at the Deleuze conference, the problem of objects (of art, or other) ending up with 'tags' of abstract concepts that they are supposed to represent. In other words, in Olkowski's opinion, there always has to exist a process of *undoing* of representational categories at work, in order for something to actually be performing a process which is truly Deleuzian, and this is her view of Mary Kelly's work,28 which serves her as the testing device for the theory she is developing. To pose this question differently, how is a design for a building to be Deleuzian and not be thought of representing this or that Deleuzian concept? The problem at hand deserves closer attention; suffice to say, the answer does not seem to lie in the gesture of the designer, but rather in the much 'thicker' network of concrete relations that include, but also go way beyond, the act of design itself.

The second problem regarding Rajchman's book lies in the very notion of construction it employs, in the sense that it does not make clear what (if any) distinction there is between what Jean-Clet Martin has defined as that between thinking in metaphorical and concrete terms. The issue of the very space and formal character of Deleuze's language is another great theme that has only seldom been touched upon. In an essay called 'From Multiplicities to Folds: On Style and Form in Deleuze,'29 Tom Conley discusses the notions of style and form in Deleuze's writing, and their possible connections to the very political specificities of Deleuze's philosophy. Political context aside, there is undoubtedly a very strong – and peculiar – notion of spatiality and form in Deleuze's writing, not just as the subject matter (and he was ever propagating the importance of style and its inseparability from content) but also as the very operation performed on and in the language itself. Unfortunately, it was not in the scope of this thesis to investigate the character of the spaces which Deleuze's writing creates, with the aim of showing not just that there are some very particular consequences of this spatial vocabulary on the philosophy and development of concepts they are employed for, but that the really

29 Buchanan, *A Deleuzian Century?*
interesting question would be in what measure the spaces and forms employed in language can actually start informing back the philosophy itself? In other words, Deleuze's use of language has its particular characteristics regarding the form and space of its style\textsuperscript{30}, but could experimentation and creativity in the very form itself actually result in new concepts and ways of thinking? This is a question related to that of Deleuzian diagrams, which will be mentioned in the chapter on relations between London and its Underground system, and the 'maps' that are taken to represents some of these relations. The project of excavation of the Deleuzian space of through, however, has to be left for another occasion.

The other title, which seems to be treading more carefully but still on utterly exciting ground, is Elizabeth Grosz's \textit{Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space}, published in 2001. Not devoted specifically to Deleuze, and representing a collection of essays similar to Rajchman's, this book discusses with great clarity some of the possible benefits architecture (both as theory and practice) would gain if approached from a Deleuzian philosophical position. Revolving around the general notion of the 'outside',\textsuperscript{31} both as an obvious reference to Grosz's position as a philosopher writing in the field of architecture, and as an invocation of a particular Deleuzian concept, the book poses several crucial questions regarding, most notably, architecture's relationship with time. These two themes, although Grosz does not pay closer attention to the fact, are most closely examined in Deleuze's cinema books, \textit{Cinema 1: The Movement-image} and \textit{Cinema 2: The Time-image}. This is an important distinction to be made, since there is a difference in the understanding of concepts as derived from a strictly philosophical inquiry, and derived from the concrete and applied material, as in Deleuze's philosophy of cinema. The problematic and definition of concepts as well as Deleuzian empiricism will be dealt with in more detail in the following parts of this introductory chapter.

However, it is important to note that the kind of inquiry which would be relating philosophy proper (in the more mundane and categorical understanding of the field) to the field of architecture exists; both Rajchman's and Grosz's book testify convincingly to that. It is the aim of this thesis to show that there might exist (or subsist) an approach which still seems to be mostly neglected, and one which might prove to be more adequate to the study of Deleuze and indeed architecture. Simply put, it would consist of

\textsuperscript{30} Particularly clear representative of this is the style employed in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}

\textsuperscript{31} Grosz, \textit{Architecture from the Outside}, Introduction
taking philosophy as already 'applied,' of using quite specific concepts already developed from and for a certain 'practice' (as it is understood to differ from 'theory'). In the case of this thesis, for various reasons (to be mentioned later), it will be the field of cinema and its corresponding Deleuzian theory or philosophy. In this way it might become possible to bypass the gap between the realms of the 'theoretical' and the 'practical,' and give a possible direction of approach to what Grosz refers to as the folding of the architectural 'outside,' its re-linking to its own diverse aspects as well as other, previously unknown or seemingly foreign territories of thought.
Deleuze and philosophy

Gilles Deleuze claimed that every author should be read in entirety – that is, the whole body of work should be seen as one flow, in which some ideas are tested, some reworked, some paths taken that do not lead to solutions; but there is always particular 'image of thought' present, and there are things to be found only when the whole of the work is considered.32

This is particularly true in the case of Deleuze's work itself, for several reasons. Firstly, Deleuze was a philosopher and, as such, referred all his investigations, even the most applied ones, to philosophy. His writings are always dependent on previously developed philosophical constructs, and these span decades. Bergsonism, for instance, was published in 1966, the first of the cinema books33 in 1985 and both are concerned with Bergson's conceptualisations of time, matter and memory – and as such, need to be read in conjunction with each other.

Secondly, the terminology Deleuze developed in his philosophy can be perceived as difficult,34 and is somewhat problematic, for two particular reasons. On the one hand, the developing of concepts, which is, in Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, seen to be the main aim of philosophy, inevitably gives rise to particular linguistic solutions and invention of new terms, or new and specific employment of old ones (see the multitude of constructed words in the cinema books). On the other hand, at a point in his career, and emphatically in his collaborations with Felix Guattari (A Thousand plateaus is a prime example of this), Deleuze started developing a particular approach towards language and writing itself, which was to become a necessary part of his philosophical enquiries. This issue will be dealt with in more detail later, suffice to say that the mode of writing becomes less clearly academic (in the traditional sense of the word) and veers into a more ambiguous territory of deliberately complex relationships between thought and

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32 Deleuze, Negotiations, Chapter on Foucault, also see Ian Buchanan's approach to Deleuze in the first chapter of Deleuzism
33 Deleuze, Cinema1
34 As has been mentioned before, a particularly clear representative of this is the style employed in A Thousand Plateaus
signification. The language generated can seem to be metaphorical in ways not expected in philosophical discourse; as such, it is often misunderstood.

Both of these reasons have led to significant amount of misapprehension and, consequently, misapplication of Deleuze. Nowhere is this more apparent than in disciplines considered to be 'practical,' which, in their urge to form quick, clear and easily applicable relationships between cultural theories and their 'concrete' fields, tend to extract Deleuze's writing from its generative philosophical context, take it at best at its political level, and proceed to use that, which has been referred to by some theorists as the 'lingo,' Deleuzo-Guattarian. Surely, transcendental empiricism, as such, invites the formation of strong links between what is traditionally seen as creative practices and theoretical enquiries (philosophy included), but it is only through the process of addressing the basic philosophical postulates that it becomes possible to conceive the possible value such a marriage (in this particular case) would be able to offer.

This leads to the second issue, that of language. Since Deleuzian concepts, as well as terms, are not in wide academic use (and when they are they are usually only vaguely understood and too often misapprehended), the position of anyone writing about, and after Deleuze, becomes an interesting challenge – everything needs to be 'explained' from scratch, and literally spelled out. The benefit of such a process is that it offers the possibility to question the basics and translate them, as it were. In cultural studies, a concept like 'gaze' has, by now, become an a priori, and it does not seem to be necessary to explain it, or even refer to its origins.35 This, in turn, marks the process of naturalisation of sorts of the concept itself (and the term that is used to denote it), which ends in both the theory that engendered it and the term itself being taken for granted, never questioned in their basic origins and consequently inherent rules of use.

The following chapters attempt to explain some of the basics of Deleuzian philosophical thought, while employing a rather straightforward style and language. The themes discussed were chosen as relevant for the creation of an understanding of Deleuze in the context of architectural theory, and they are: the issue of transcendental empiricism as philosophical approach; time, as that great theme in which most Deleuzian critique is

35 See, for example, Beatriz Colomina's writing on Adolf Loos' design for the Josephine Baker house, in Beatriz Colomina, ed. Sexuality and Space, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992
founded; space, as the concept architecture identifies itself with; image, as the perceptual and, consequently, corporeal determinant; and finally, the notions of event, as well as language and style, which are employed in Deleuze's philosophy, as well as this thesis.
Transcendental empiricism

Deleuze's philosophy is termed transcendental empiricism. As was mentioned earlier, the importance of becoming acquainted with its basic premises is related to the problem of making correct assumptions and applications of Deleuze's theoretical apparatus. Moreover, expertise in Deleuzian philosophical methods represents an indispensable instrument in the overall critique of cultural and architectural theory, comprising as it does of a number of profoundly challenging critical interventions in virtually all of the major theories produced in the 20th century.

Seemingly unjustifiable in its grandeur, this critical approach relies on the process of questioning some of the most basic premises constitutive of the theories under consideration. Relying, as they do, without reservation upon these premises, applied theories can only cover clearly delineated and therefore restricted grounds. The most outstanding example of this process is Deleuze's challenging of Platonic concepts — such as transcendence — to which most of 'Western' philosophical heritage is irreversibly indebted and, consequently, a significant portion of critical theory as well.

One such great theme is the definition of the human subject. Most commonly addressed in psychoanalytic terms (when addressed in cultural theory), the problem of conception of the subject seems to be rendered irrelevant in some of the other theories, if questioned at all. This chapter attempts to show the crucial importance of this problem relative to the aims of critical theory, as well as the huge impact Deleuzian definition of the subject could have on some of the prevailing contemporary queries regarding the relationship between the practical and that which is not deemed so.

As Ian Buchanan comprehensively explains in Deleuzism: A Metacommentary, the traditional historical understanding of the term has empiricism standing for the process of

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36 For a detailed account see Buchanan, Deleuzism and Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, London and New York: Routledge, 2002
37 To be found mostly in their developed versions in his earlier philosophical writings, such as Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense, or Bergsonism.
deriving knowledge from experience.\(^{39}\) This knowledge is not based on experience as starting point only; it is understood to be derived from it completely, which defines knowledge as the sum total of acquired experience. Deleuze puts forward a critique of this along two major lines through his assessment and interpretation of Hume.\(^{40}\)

The first line of critique questions the definition of knowledge as given by traditional empiricism. According to Deleuze, the crucial problem represents the understanding of knowledge as goal in itself, for knowledge, he states, is tightly related to some practical activity as means to achieving it.\(^{41}\) This is the first and quite fundamental proposition that casts a different kind of light on the problem of knowledge in any activity considered to be 'practical' in contrast to its own 'theory' such as architecture: there is no knowledge outside its relevance for an ensuing action; experiencing, and consequently knowing, irrepressibly leads to acting. Or: to know and not to have action related to the known is not possible\(^{42}\).

The importance of such a tight link between knowledge and action lies in the subsequent erasure of clearly demarcated lines of separation between the realm of the theoretical (knowledge) and practical (action), which alone can be understood to be a potentially fertile\(^{43}\) philosophical manoeuvre beneficial for any form of critical theory, be it cultural, architectural or other.

Secondly, according to Deleuze, the traditional historical understanding of empiricism neglects the role of relations. Being founded on experience solely, it is oblivious to the relational aspect of phenomena, conceiving of relations as inherent\(^{44}\) in the phenomena, presupposing a 'synthesis whose source is the same as the source of relations.'\(^{43}\) For Deleuze, the only possible definition of empiricism should be the one that posits relations as 'external to their terms.'\(^{44}\) In other words, relations created between things are not inherent in the things themselves; they not already 'inside' them, as seen by Kant's critical philosophy, but are rather external, and inhabit a space of their own.

Consequently, Deleuze conceives of an empiricism defined by relations and not by

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\(^{39}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, Chapter 3
\(^{40}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.83
\(^{41}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.83
\(^{42}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.84
\(^{43}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.84
\(^{44}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.84
experience alone. The ultimate outcome of such a philosophical proposal is that the 'experience of the world is meaningful only insofar as we institute relations between perceptions' and the act of understanding takes place precisely through this process of amalgamating different experiences through the relations that are formed between them.

In turn, the clear distinction between experiences themselves and relations that are established between them, formulates the distinction between experience itself and our way of experiencing, our 'apparatus for cognition.' The importance of this proposition, according to Buchanan, is that it gives rise to the subject of transcendental empiricism, providing an answer to the classical empiricist question of how a subject constituted by the given could be able at the same time to transcend the given. The relations, which are constitutive of the subject, are separated from experience, which is of the given; this immerses the subject in the given, retaining nonetheless a clear distinction between the two. As Buchanan puts it:

> It is this 'solution,' as it were, that gives rise to transcendental empiricism, for what it does is flatten the ascension of the transcendental term so that the synthetic process is rendered as a movement across a surface instead of a rising-up.

It is interesting to note the way Buchanan describes the philosophical consequences of this proposal in the quoted passage. Instead of being located 'outside' and 'above' the proposed plane of 'reality,' the human subject is within it, and so are the relations it constructs with it. Instead of a Platonic transcendental schema in which this 'rising-up' ultimately leads to the constitution of the 'beyond,' the 'meta-,' that which is behind and above, hidden and higher up in the hierarchy of things, Deleuze's transcendence is rendered horizontal, effectively cancelling any notion of an established hierarchy of the terms in question. Of equal importance and distinct in their existence, there subsist the given, the subject and the relations. It is of particular importance in the context of architectural theory that this description possesses a curiously distinct spatial quality.

45 Buchanan, Deleuzism, p.84
46 It is important to note that although perception itself can be taken to be relational (perceptions being understood as relations), it is the relations between already formed perceptions themselves that Buchanan addresses here; a question of relations different in kind that are formed between certain perceptual relations.
47 Buchanan, Deleuzism, p.85
48 Buchanan, Deleuzism, p.85
with the image of reality taking on a form of a plane or plateau, which seems in no way co-incidental. Plane is a conceptual form prominent in *A Thousand Plateaus*, figuring as one of the basic descriptive figures, and offering a model for a number of processes, as observed by Deleuze and Guattari. It is also a quite curious and particular form to be used in the shaping of a philosophy, and, as was mentioned earlier, bears consequences on the very philosophy it explains. The problem of this 'spatiality' of text is closely related to Deleuze's definition of abstract diagrams; at this point it is sufficient to draw attention to the existence of a distinct sense of spatiality in the construction of Deleuzian thought and language, and its potential (and quite justifiable in the context of transcendental empiricism) counter-influence on the constrictions and potentials of the very philosophy that engenders them.

According to Buchanan, there are several consequences of this process of rendering relations external to their terms.\(^{49}\) Firstly, ideas are not accountable for the operations that are performed on them – there is a 'space' separate from that of ideas, in which these operations dwell, and this is the site of the very formation of the human subject.\(^{50}\) Secondly, this formation of the subject is executed through the explanation of one particular relation, the one indicating the principles of association, which govern the handling of experience. Thirdly, the mentioned association is in a dynamic relationship with imagination, from which it differs but which it affects, ultimately rendering it possible for the subject to be at the same time in the given and transcending it.\(^{51}\) Association 'guides' and at the same time 'constrains' imagination, rather than being just a product of it, which in turn transforms imagination into the defining point of human nature:

>The mind, having become nature, [and this comment is in relation to the classical empiricist formula of the subject] has acquired now a tendency.\(^{52}\)

This 'tendency' of the mind is a dynamic and, quite importantly, *temporal* feature. The ability to take action from within the realm of the given and at the same time not just re-

\(^{49}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.85
\(^{50}\) The notion of 'formation' of the subject here implies that the act of formation is separate from (or precedes) the act of conceptualisation (of the subject).
\(^{51}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.85
\(^{52}\) Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.85
act to the given but offer a creative input, represents the positive space assigned to the subject by Deleuze, not to be found in any other single ontology.53

Importantly, as has been mentioned in connection with the issue of plateau-styled imagery of thought, this subject transcends itself, in that it transcends the given from which it arises, but is not a transcendental subject – it is not 'outside that which it organises or makes cohere.'54 In Deleuze's words:

Empirical subjectivity is constituted in the mind under the influence of the principles affecting it; the mind therefore does not have the characteristics of a pre-existing subject.55

This notion bears profound consequences by insisting on placing relational nature at the core of the human subject. The subject does not precede 'reality,' it comes to be through (and in) the process of forming relations; it is constituted of relations. As such, Deleuze's subject is excessively more fluid and positively durational in comparison with the phenomenological and psychoanalytic ones.

Furthermore:

It [the subject] transcends itself to the extent the mind becomes a subject. [...] The subject, therefore, can only be apprehended via its constitutive principles – which must be external or they could not be apprehended in themselves – and chief among these is habit.56

The issue of habit is curiously relevant to this particular thesis and its topic. As will be mentioned in the course of the thesis, the London Underground is an urban environment that fosters habit, and is highly dependent upon it: the acquiring of the ticket as well as its repetitive and strictly designated relationship with the barrier; the process of continuous, rhythmic walking down the Underground corridors and the corporeal regime it establishes; the highly coded inter-personal communication routine that seems to follow rules of conduct particular to the Underground and not to be found in the same form elsewhere; the constant reign of signs and coded messages as a way of establishing the

53 The relations between Deleuze and various 'non-western' philosophies still needs to be addressed, as there is only one general volume tackling the issues of religion in Deleuzian context.
54 Buchanan, Deleuzism, p.86
55 Buchanan, Deleuzism, p.86
56 Buchanan, Deleuzism, p.86
relationship between bodies and the general notion of urban space – these are just some of the possible aspects, the list of which is a long and peculiar one. All these form a regime of (and it would not be inappropriate in this respect to talk about a process of *stylisation*) a highly controlled existence, utterly immersed in habit. This habit is what gives rise to a form of spiritual automatism, the way Bergson conceived it and Deleuze appropriated it for the cinema of the movement-image. One of the aims of the thesis is also to investigate precisely this automatic, habitual aspect of the Underground experience, seeing as the interesting question it poses is one of extreme urban circumstances and the ways of the subject (the ways in which subject can be) they give rise to. Some questions, which are only briefly addressed in the cinema books (for the simple reason that cinema as subject-matter did not give rise to them to such an extent) might actually come to be resolved in architectural theory in a manner that would shed light on the very notion of habit itself – as one curious relation formed between the subject and the world.

On a more general note, Buchanan concludes that this is of great importance for cultural studies, since it is this 'paradoxical figuration of the subject' that constitutes it as that which 'invents the very norms and general rules it lives by,' placed as it is directly in the context of its own environment. According to Buchanan, this very question of the subject transcending the given stands as the main practical point from which cultural studies can develop some useful tools; presumably, it is the matter of abandoning the established ones in search for the ones that would operate right across the existing divisions.

Empiricism [...] is a theory of relations which are external to their terms, and if cultural studies is ever to make full use of Deleuze it is in this 'theory' which it must come to terms with.

Regardless of such a particular point, it seems obvious that this definition of the subject gives quite a different starting point for any kind of critical inquiry, given that it conceives of a conceptual schema dissimilar to those proposed by other major critical theories of the twentieth century. The subject which is not shaped by the given but enters into a productive, creative interaction with it (the given) and, ultimately, fashions the

57 Deleuze, *Cinema1*
58 Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.86
59 Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, p.86
60 Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, pp.84–5
environment it is operating in from within, is quite a major change in conceptualising the very notion of the human subject, and a change that is highly appropriate for inquiries into the kind of practice as is architecture. And surely, the very definitions of practical and creative become, with the introduction of a model of the subject as proposed in Deleuze's reading of Hume, eventually obsolete, rendering every activity intrinsically practical and creative.
The notion of the subject transcending itself in the direction of relations it establishes is Deleuze's first major proposal for the understanding of being and thinking; the second one ensues from the problematic of time and its conceptualisation. This theme could be seen as yet another Deleuzian challenge to the prevailing understanding of one of the great themes of philosophy which, once again, goes back to the basic assumptions firmly embedded in the history of Western philosophy. Relying on the philosophical theses developed around the beginning of the 20th century by another French philosopher, Henri Bergson, the understanding of time lies at the core of Deleuzian ontology, introducing the notion of subject temporally fragmented in a fashion quite unlike that of the psychoanalytic theory. Significantly, although tackled early on in Deleuze's career in Bergsonism, this theme was to reoccur a couple of decades later as the great main theme of Deleuze's famous (and infamous) reinvention of cinematic theory, as presented in his two books on film, Cinema 1: The Movement–Image and Cinema 2: The Time–Image.

Deleuze published Bergsonism in 1966, reviving an interest in a philosopher whose work had, by that time, after having been widely read at the beginning of the twentieth century, fallen completely out of fashion. Being one of his early books, it helped Deleuze begin the claim to a very distinct position within the mainstream of French philosophy at the time. It was also the first book in which he conceived the process which was to mark his approach towards the history of philosophy in general, which he referred to as:

a kind of buggery, or, what comes to the same thing, immaculate conception. I imagined getting myself onto the back of an author, and giving him a child, which would be his and which would at the same time be a monster.

In this fashion, Deleuze went through the major conceptual traits of Bergson's philosophy and started the long process of reworking them for his own purposes, which was going to continue throughout his career. This is especially true of that great Bergsonian theme of

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62 See translators' introduction to Deleuze, Bergsonism, p.8
time and duration, which is so closely tied, both in Bergson's philosophy and philosophy in general, with the notion of space, and various ways in which it can be conceptualised.

Almost two decades later this interest in Bergson, and the appropriation of his famous three theses on time, resulted in the creation of a 'philosophy of cinema'\(^{63}\) represented in *Cinema1* and *Cinema2*. Deleuze's cinema books, and philosophical inquiry pursued in them, are the main source of Deleuzian thought employed in the second part of this thesis, the one engaging with the problematic of conceptualising the experience of the London Underground. It will therefore be tackled more comprehensively in conjunction with the development of particular theoretical instances arising from the Underground investigation. Nevertheless, some aspects of this great theory of time will be discussed presently, in an attempt to establish an understanding of this very particular Deleuzian 'temporal adventure',\(^{64}\) which constructs a different understanding not only of subject-formation, but also of our understanding of the process of thinking through which we engage with the world, shedding light on a problem addressed in any theoretical enquiry, that of critique.\(^{65}\)

This theme is discussed in the fifth chapter of D. N. Rodowick's *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, one of the major comprehensive titles dedicated to Deleuze's cinema books, and the philosophy of cinema that was worked out in them. In chapter 'Critique, or Truth in Crisis,' Rodowick opens with the explanation of difference in two major models of time. In the case of the former, time is seen to be quantitative and as such subordinated to space through a linear, uniformly charted out diagram.\(^{66}\) It is the model which positions the present between the past that it is constantly passing into, and future, that continually replaces it. The scale is uniform, leading in a linear manner away from the point of the present in both directions. The second model, developed on Bergson's theses and indicated by Deleuze to exist in the form of the cinematic time-image, represents a qualitative understanding of time, in which time is taken to be force, non-linear and non-homogenous, forming a complex relationship with movement.\(^{67}\) This relationship

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63 For the understanding of Deleuze's insistence on his theory being called a philosophy, see the conclusion in *Cinema2*
64 Or, as D.N.Rodowick terms it, the invention of Deleuze's 'time machine'
66 Also see: Deleuze, *Cinema1*
67 Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p.122
between movement and time, which is to be one of direct correlation in the case of the former model of time, will be of special concern in relation to the creation of parallels between The London Underground and cinematic image and as such addressed more specifically in the second part of the thesis. The second model will be explained presently in more detail, since it contains a number of unorthodox propositions regarding the concept and experience of time.

Time, as conceived through this model, stands for force crucial for the process of thinking. Importantly, time as force (and time-image as direct sign of time) 'does not represent, much less represent thought,'68 but rather 'provokes' thought, or 'forces' the thinking. Kant's contribution to the discussion of subordination of time unto space — as well as the notion of 'time out of joint,'69 time that is not seen as uniform and homogenous — was of great importance for Deleuze. This operation gave rise to the introduction of Kantian notion of critique, granting thinking, as it did, with space necessary for critical action. Following from Kant, but re-developing some of the basics of his philosophy, Deleuze proposed a system of conceptualising critical thinking as tightly related to the operations of time in ways Kant never pursued.

The main practical questions presenting themselves as the result of this particular conceptualisation, according to Rodowick, are the time's forms of being known, the replacement of the forms of the True by the powers of the false, and the effect that the time-image has on the way we think.70 These issues, when investigated in more detail, reveal that such a conceptualisation of time — as a force and not as a spatial aspect — is accountable for the creation of a very particular subject, one which needs to be taken into account in any kind of critical or theoretical inquiry. Bergson developed some very particular concepts in Matter and Memory, and Deleuze appropriated them to help tackle these questions. They include the themes of duration, memory, the passing present and passive synthesis of time.71

68 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.122
69 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.122
70 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.123
71 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.123
As Rodowick explains, *durée* is for Bergson the transcendental form of time, 'whose reality is an indivisible, ceaseless, and ever-changing flow.' Mapping out this duration, according to Bergson, is ultimately impossible for any kind of art to perform, but this duration can be hinted at, as it were, providing important guidance for perception to form an intuition of the time flow, which can in turn only be deepened, in Bergson's view, through philosophy. In Deleuze's appropriation of this schema, cinema can for the most part provide only an indirect, movement-bound sense of duration, hinting at time's mobility and constant change. However, the apprehension of a direct image of time requires that 'the image must be released from the sensory-motor situation and freed from the elaboration of wholes.' In other words, the direct encounter with duration is neither achieved through the constant sense of movement (sensory-motor schema refers to the link between perception and action where action is the result of, and a follow-up to, perception, directly linking the world with the responses of that which is in it) nor can it arise from the structures of closed, hierarchically determined systems of thinking. The cinematic image, corresponding to both of these aspects, is the cinema of movement-image, where every action is physical and closely linked to perception.

The next possibility presents itself when 'movement becomes an act of memory.' In the first case, time is being measured or charted out by physical movement and action in space. In the second, time -- the transcendental image of time, the *durée* -- is hinted at through the 'mental' movement, as Rodowick terms it, or the very act of recollection. According to Bergson, this act is a process in which a particular displacement from the present takes place in order for the past to be accessed, and a very particular 'area' of the past at that. As Bergson puts it in *Matter and Memory*:

> Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act *sui generis* by which we detach ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain region of the past -- a work of adjustment, something like a focusing of a camera.

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72 Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p. 123
73 Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, pp. 123–4
74 Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p. 124
75 Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p. 124
The very diagrammatic spatiality of this, although hugely interesting, will not be considered here. Suffice to say, this kind of movement (this displacement in search of some particular spaces of the past) represents the second, less physical (in the traditional sense of the word) kind of movement, 'hinting' at the pure duration of time. Its corresponding cinematic image, according to Deleuze, is the time-image, and it gives rise to the cinema of subjectivity and consciousness. The signs of this cinema are those of dreams and recollections, but they are still arising from sensory-motor links and situations, regardless of how different this movement might seem from the physical and corporeal one.76

As Rodowick puts it, there is more to the direct image of time than the 'voyages of memory or dream.'77 It is neither 'a passage in space nor a drama of memory'78 but the very conceptualisation of time passing and the relations that the present, past and future form. This third sense in which it is possible to discuss the movement of time is its very passing. Since the present is in constant transformation into past, it (the present) precisely is this shift or act of passing. It is impossible to distinguish the two because, Bergson argues, the whole idea of conceptualising time as linear flow is inadequate:

> This passage is neither linear not chronological because time is continuously forking, splitting off in one direction toward an undetermined future while disappearing into another, the absolute past.79

This is what Deleuze termed as the 'most fundamental operation of time:'80 every moment is constantly undergoing division into present, that passes, and past, that is being preserved. Simultaneously, through the nature of this operation, every moment is also being doubled — the past is coexisting with the present (that it once was) and it is also being preserved 'as a nonchronological time, a virtual archive of the past in general.'81

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76 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.124. These two types of temporal modelling are also to be found, according to Deleuze, in particular post-WW2 cinematic movements.
77 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.124
78 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.124
79 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, pp.125-6
80 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.126
81 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.126
In this way, time is forming the 'incommensurable division' between the actual and the virtual, between perception and memory. Actual, in this case, is the present, whose past is being transformed into a virtual image. This virtuality is coexisting with the present and, according to Bergson, it is responsible, as such, for the sense of constant doubling of the present as, on the one hand, a matter of perception and, on the other hand, a matter of recollection. Herein lies the key to the concept of the subject constantly split by time:

Whoever becomes conscious of the continual duplicating of his present into perception and memory...will compare himself to an actor playing his part automatically, listening to himself and beholding himself play.82

This is achieved through, what is termed as, the three passive syntheses of time. The first synthesis is the one just described: moments 'contract' into three incommensurable points – the passing present, the conserved past and the indeterminate future. It is the founding of time. The second synthesis is the one of the preservation of the past into 'nonchronological strata'83 and it constitutes time as virtuality – that which is co-present but still not actualised, since it still needs to be drawn out, as it were, by the present when needed. Finally, the third synthesis of time is the point of what Deleuze calls the 'unfounding'84 of non-chronological time, and it represents the site of the constitution of the subject. As Rodowick argues, this is where Deleuze's reading of Bergson becomes transformed and enriched by ideas of two other philosophers prominent in Deleuze's philosophical investigations – Kant's critique of pure reason and Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return.85

Firstly, although Bergson has, in the history of philosophy, been accused of constructing a subjective interiority, Deleuze shows that the notion of durée, as that which establishes the relationship between perception and memory, is contrary to any such simplistic dualism as mind and body, or inside and outside. He proceeds to claim that:

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82 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.126
83 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.127
84 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.127
85 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.127. It is characteristic for Deleuze to be appropriating several philosophers' ideas in arriving at a concept.
The only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round.86

Secondly, Bergson’s philosophical subject, as founded on the splitting and doubling of time, is the subject divided, but not statically (spatially), the way psychoanalysis splits the subject into the conscious and the subconscious, or into id, ego and superego, but temporally, linking the very process of thinking to this temporally induced split. It is interesting, in the context of the previously mentioned notion of habit and its relevance to the study of the Underground, that Bergson suggested this kind of forking of time induces a sort of spiritual automatism – outlining the notion of an acting subject of sorts, the one ‘listening to himself and beholding himself play.’87 As will be shown later, the concepts of the spiritual automaton, the actor and the face can prove to be very suggestive of some of the Underground events and the subsequent development of concepts arising from the study of the Underground.

This spiritual automaton of Bergson’s can also be described in terms of ‘I becoming the other,’88 which, Rodowick argues, is where the originality of Deleuze’s reading of Kant presents itself. In short, the two ‘perspectives’ on time, one passively immersed in the constant change and the other which understands the un-changeability of change, as it were, through transcendental synthesis, are the root of the division of the subject into a passive ego and an active I. The ego is in time and constantly changing, whereas the ‘I’ constantly performs an active synthesis of time, splitting it into the past, present and future. As Rodowick points out:

When Deleuze asserts that ‘I am separated from myself by the form of time’ [Rodowick quoting Deleuze], he is arguing that the ego cannot constitute itself as a unique and active subject. Rather, it is a ‘passive ego which represents to itself only the activity of its own thought; that is to say, the I, as an Other which affects it.’89

It is this sense of time that, in Deleuze’s opinion, invests us in Kant’s philosophy with a form of interiority, which does not mean just that time is internal to us, but that this interiority also constantly splits us in two. Space, on the other hand, no longer defined as

86 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, p.127
87 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, p.126
88 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, p.128
89 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, p.129
coexistence, takes on a sense of exteriority. This overturn of the Cartesian cogito into an 'I' fractured in its thinking by time, is also the reason behind the impossibility of knowing time in itself. As Rodowick writes, once intuited, time 'divides, branches and slips away.'\(^{90}\) Finally, thought itself – the contemplation of it – is neither in the 'I' nor in the ego; it is, rather, 'in the division that constitutes them both in the impersonal form of time.'\(^{91}\)

The consequences of such a conceptualisation of the subject are immense, and still need to be properly confronted with any kind of 'identity' theory, given that they can prove to be of great importance to it, and its problem of conceptualising composite or fluid identities.\(^ {92}\) It is also the aim of this thesis to show that such a conceptualisation can be offered an indirect testing of sorts against the abstracting backdrop of the Underground tunnels.

Moreover, this subject, which is constantly being split by time without the splitting ever finally taking place, is the starting point of a more particular investigation, one related to the act of thinking in time and with time, namely that of critique and critical theory. This particular theme is of great importance, dealing as it does with some of the more basic assumptions and modes of practice when so-called 'theoretical writing' is concerned, marking the character of a great deal of cultural studies. As Rodowick states, this is the point where Deleuze's Bergsonian project meets his rewriting of Kant and Nietzsche, in an attempt to offer a different conceptualisation of the concept of Truth and, consequently, of any sort of critique, and it is really important to note (in the context of critical theory) that it is the level of philosophical thinking, defined as it is by Deleuze to be that territory where the creation of concepts as pragmatic derivations takes place, that is ultimately the only space where such a project can be pursued if any sense of invention is expected.

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\(^{90}\) Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.129  
\(^{91}\) Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.129  
\(^{92}\) The very notion of identity as static and differing from something that it is not is the basic Aristotelian presumption of categories and challenged in Deleuze as early as Difference and Repetition. In it Deleuze develops the notion of difference relative to the differing of the same rather than in relation to something it is not, which eventually gives rise to the inclusion of time in the notion of 'identity' and development of the concept of becoming in opposition to the ontology based on the notion of being.
Rodowick writes that, with temporality conceived in terms of the mentioned subject-splitting paradox, every notion of Truth, as changeless and self-identical, is necessarily eradicated:

What used to be called the 'laws' of thought (the principles of identity, of contradiction, and of the excluded middle) are effectively overthrown.93

In Kant's philosophy, which was the one to open up this chasm in the identity of thought and, as Deleuze put it, accomplish placing time 'out of joint,'94 judgement is ultimately made teleological, which consequently closes up the productive space. In Nietzsche, however, seeing as the forms of truth are temporal, the 'passive' role of discovering truth is abolished and possibility of inventing along the way is truly opened up. It is in this tradition of Nietzsche, Rodowick argues, that Deleuze's understanding of criticism and interpretation lies, leading him, ultimately, to link film and philosophy through the negotiation of concepts of time and thinking.95

Any critique, and this argument Deleuze developed in Nietzsche and Philosophy, is formed from two activities: interpretation and evaluation. Interpretation is seen as the act of determining what kind of force lies behind something, 'gives sense to it,' whereas evaluation, presented in Nietzschean terms, is determining what 'will to power' gives that thing value.96 In other words, critique is formed where the formative logic behind something meets the power that gives that something its value. The force in question, Rodowick explains, is understood as sets of relationships, which lie behind 'events, phenomena, propositions.'97 In this way, interpretation becomes a matter of determining not what something means, but rather, what makes meaning in something. On the other hand, the act of 'revealing' what will to power is behind the value system is related to what Deleuze termed as the 'powers of the false,' which represent the way of opening up the space for the very question of, as Rodowick puts it, 'Who wants the truth and what do they will in wanting it?'98 And this is possible, and even provoked by, the very notions of present always forking and passing and being always actually becoming:

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93 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.130
94 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, pp.121-2
95 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, pp.130-1
96 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.131
97 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.131
98 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.133
The present moment is not a moment of being or of present 'in the strict sense,' [...] it is the passing moment, [it] forces us to think of becoming, but to think of it precisely as what could not have started, and cannot finish, becoming.99

The whole ontology of becoming will not be dealt with here, but it is clear that the subject formed (through the process of constant unmaking) by time, is not a subject that is (being) but rather a subject that constantly becomes (becoming). And this, in turn, means that thinking is not a matter of determination but of affirmation – it is the affirmation of forces that 'put thought in movement or make thought an act.'100

In a couple of illuminating passages at the end of the chapter,101 Rodowick elaborates on what exactly the powers of the false are, and how they could be related to the notion of truth and, ultimately, critique. For the truth to exist, the world needs to be static and unchanging. According to Deleuze, this world does not exist given that it is actually always in change, and if it did exist, it would be inaccessible and 'impossible to describe.'102 If describing the world were ultimately possible, there would be no life left in it – life would dissolve into a set of static signs. The powers of the false, on the other hand, describe precisely this, revealing the sources of the will to Truth and opening spaces for the creation of the new – new concepts and new forms of expressing them.

To say that 'truth is a creation,' [...] implies that truth is produced by a series of processes that shape its substance; literally, a series of falsifications... [All truths] falsify pre-established ideas – a reflected series with two terms, or a series of several terms, or a complicated series with bifurcations [Negotiations 126, 172]103

And the direct image of time is what helps conceive this, since it is precisely the revealing of time's undoing of truth that is at the bottom of this process of falsification. As Rodowick writes:

99 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.133
100 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.133
101 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, pp.135-6
102 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.134
103 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.136
The force of time puts truth into crisis, then, because in these images it is no longer possible to think a direct relationship between truth and the form of time.\textsuperscript{104}

Rodowick concludes by stating that this is where Deleuze rewrote Bergson’s ontology following Nietzsche – the split between perception and memory caused by time is what actually opens up the space for the creative thinking and freedom of choice. The powers of the false and all the values associated with them are not ‘new principles of thinking, but rather the measure of that which has not yet become thought’\textsuperscript{105} – in a sense, where truth was the goal, the powers of the false are the means. And, it is Deleuze’s point, focusing on them is going to reveal the ways to creation, which, since it is always of the new, means creation in time, with time.

\textsuperscript{104} Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, p.137
\textsuperscript{105} Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, p.138
Closely linked to the concept of time is another equally fundamental one, that of space. Commonly understood as self-evidently relevant to the issues of architectural theory, the notions of space and spatiality are in Deleuze to be found seemingly less developed, owing mostly to the emphasis that tends to be put in the study of Deleuze on his development of notions of becoming, duration and difference. However, space and time are to be seen here as concepts absolutely interdependent in the creation of Deleuze's philosophy and his interpretation of Bergson.

The binary opposition between time and space can be seen in Bergson as part of a larger project, that of the development of what Bergson himself termed 'intuition as method,' which represents a process comprising of various stages through which Bergson aimed to accomplish a method of thinking in general and posing philosophical problems in particular, which would free us from philosophical imprecision and generalisation, and enable us to use our immediate knowledge (and this is how intuition is to be understood in Bergson) in the creation of knowledge in general. The mediations involved in this process eventually result in knowledge which is not immediate, but which—and this is crucial for the understanding of Bergson's approach—needs to be arrived at from the immediate knowledge.

One of the mediations in question is the problem of discovery of the so-called 'genuine differences in kind,' including the problem of the time/space dialectic, posed as it is by Bergson as the question of distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative differences. Bergson's main critique of the terms in question represents a consequence of the proposal that without the methodical use of immediate (intuitive) knowledge, it becomes impossible to distinguish between occurrences that are genuinely qualitatively different. Space and time, seen to be such an example, are not different as a matter of

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106 The interesting concepts of smooth and striated space developed in *A Thousand Plateaus* and their political connotations will not be discussed here.
107 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p.13
108 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, pp.13-4
109 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p.14
110 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p.14
degree, the way philosophy as well as science tended to conceptualise the relation between space and time, but as a matter of quality. Bergson/Deleuzian critique of the understanding of time as the fourth dimension of space, and its consequent reduction to a chronological, homogenous model (corresponding to the homogenous representational model of space), implies that the result of such a misapprehension is the impossibility of making a finer distinction between the presence of duration and of spatial extensity, forcing them into a composite referred to, most commonly, as 'space-time.'

Furthermore, and this is of importance for the critical theory based on Deleuze and consequently Bergson, this composite is our *representation* of space and time and, as such, detached from the immediate presence of the components that are the very object of intuitive cognition. As Deleuze states, posing the problem in terms of differences in degree and kind helped Bergson make a fundamental critique of metaphysics, in that it is seen to acknowledge only a difference in degree between a spatialized time and eternity, represented as they are on a single linear scale.

Leaving the more general philosophical inquiry aside, it is important to note that the result of such a conceptualisation of difference allowed Bergson to make an important distinction between space as representation and space as physical extension on the one hand, and between space as basically quantitative concept and time as the qualitative one.

Simply put, the first distinction, that between space as representation and space as extension, is derived from the very idea that the experience of space and what we *conceptualise* as space are not one and the same, and, more importantly, are not a matter of degree – adding up immediate spaces of extension does not result in creation of space as totalising representation. In other words, the immediate corporeal experience cannot be simply multiplied and magnified, to reach, at the very end of the scale, the state of 'general' representational space.

The second distinction separates space and time as not only qualitatively different, or different in kind, but actually places a special emphasis on the role of time in the creation

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111 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p.22
112 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p.23
113 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, pp.22-4
of all differences in kind, maintaining that it is time alone that is the site of all conceptualisation of difference in kind itself (inseparably tied to the very act of thinking as it is), whereas space represents mainly that side where the only difference taking place is one of degree. In fact, in Deleuze's view, this constitutes a difference between time and space as one not of kind, since all difference of kind lie on the side of time. This is also the ultimate move that enabled Bergson to tie intuition as method irreversibly to time. However, this does not mean, and Deleuze sees this as a process that was slowly emerging in Bergson's writing, that space is only to be reduced to an illusion of homogeneity that we are the sole source of - instead, space (as a representational construct) develops in his philosophy to be seen as a different tendency or direction equally immanent to being as time.

Conversely, the question of extensity is tied to the question of perception. As was mentioned, the idea of perception in Bergson, and consequently Deleuze, is closely connected to the concept of the self and its relation to (or identity with) matter. As Deleuze concisely puts it, in Bergson:

Perception puts us at once into matter, is impersonal, and coincides with the perceived object.

The resulting difference between the perception of matter and matter itself is therefore only one of degree. It is this kind of understanding that enables the conceptualisation of very tight and particular relationship between the body, in its sensation of extensiveness - that is, its immediate experience of spatiality - and the environment, which is usually misleadingly referred to as external to the body. This is, once again, a philosophical turn that makes the established notions of interior/exterior essentially redundant.

In her book Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation, Dorothea Olkowski notes that it is this kind of misconception of bodies as solids located within space as void that

114 Deleuze, Bergsonism, p.33
115 Deleuze, Bergsonism, pp.27-9
116 Deleuze, Bergsonism, p.25
117 Deleuze, Bergsonism, p.24-5
serves as the basic logic or model in our understanding of both bodies and space.\textsuperscript{118} Olkowski claims (following a long strand of feminist literature and enriching its discourse with proposed Deleuzian concepts) that it is precisely this kind of modelling of space that ultimately robs the body of all its more fluid characteristics confining it to a clearly delineated and 'filled' interior, in opposition to the exterior void. Her argument serves her both to address the issue of conceptualisation (and eventually oppression) of the female body through such a model,\textsuperscript{119} and to make a more general point about the actual overthrow of all hierarchies of representation, not just those involving living, experiencing bodies, but the very hierarchies that are at the core of the notion of representation.

Bergson's method of intuition as immediate knowledge has one other particular characteristic: after having clarified the differences in kind that exist in particular tendencies, method eventually comes back to its monist state, where the two elements (in this case space and time) are interconnected again.\textsuperscript{120} In order to explain the sense of duration Bergson needed to conceptualise memory and recollection, and in the process (which will not be explained here in detail) went from making a qualitative distinction between perception and recollection, to showing that there can eventually be no artificially established line of division between the two. This is an important operation since it explains the method as well as importance of the particular distinction for the understanding of space.

Firstly, intuition as method can be said to have as one of its postulates the moment of returning to the state in which the pre-established differences in kind are obliterated. However, this can only happen \textit{after} the inclusion of experience into the equation, as it were. Consequently, the composite state is not the one found (as in the case of space and time) but rather one tested through experience, coming, in Deleuze's words, \textit{from the other side} of the turn in experience.\textsuperscript{121}

Secondly, this means that, in the case of space, extensity has been equated not just with perception, but has actually been re-linked to duration, given that duration is understood:

\textsuperscript{118} Olkowski, \textit{Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation}, Chapter 3

\textsuperscript{119} For her feminist critique, see: Olkowski, \textit{Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation}, Chapters 1, 2 and 3

\textsuperscript{120} Deleuze, \textit{Bergsonism}, pp.29-31

\textsuperscript{121} Deleuze, \textit{Bergsonism}, p.73
to be the contraction of the extended, which is the very operation of memory.\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Bergsonism}, p.75} Without getting too deep into the problematic of the relationship between matter and memory as posed by Bergson in his seminal book of the same title, it is important to point out that this 'turn' in the logic of the method has enabled the re-linking of extension with duration, showing how perception

\begin{quote}
Makes space available to us 'in the exact proportion' in which we have time available.\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Bergsonism}, p.75}
\end{quote}

In short, the corporeal (and indeed there could not exist any other, within this system) experience of space has different rules to those of space as representation, given that it (space as extension) is \textit{immediately} connected to the experience of duration. In this sense, the starting point of the 'badly made composite' of time and space, in which space is considered as a 'ready-made' with time as its fourth dimension, has been replaced with the notion of space as perceived, lived, in a word – as an experienced extensity, tied to duration, but without having duration subordinate to spatial terms and rules.\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Bergsonism}, p.75}

The very difference of the two models, to put it briefly, lies in the fact that space as extension of matter can never ultimately be reduced to space as representation, since space in the latter case looses the link with duration, which, intuition as method tells us, is incorrect, posing the problem as it does regardless of immediate experience.

To go back to Olkowski, this kind of conclusion seems to be particularly interesting not just for its overthrow of hierarchical systems of representation, but also for its relevance for any kind of theory of architecture and urban occurrences. It offers a \textit{corporeal} model different to the still present notion of space as uniform void, the division of which is a matter of degree and subservient to the logic of solids; it offers a radically different way of establishing the conceptual link between bodies and space. The real significance of Deleuze's theory, in this respect, is that the model he offers (based on Bergson's philosophy, in this case) evades all the inevitable problems of conceptual systems that are ultimately rooted in Platonic conception of transcendence.
As far as architectural and urban theories go, through his introduction of Bergsonian concepts into a wider cultural context, Deleuze offered a theoretical model which could serve as the basis for the developing of an understanding of space sensitive both to the issues of corporeal immediacy, in a way representations of space by definition cannot grasp, and to the issues of space and time as intertwined in ways which do not rely on the notion of reductive homogeneity.

In *Architecture from the Outside*, Elizabeth Grosz engages with this notion of space as predominantly understood as homogenous medium and time as the differentiating one, and poses a series of questions regarding the notions of actuality and virtuality of time, as represented in Bergson’s understanding of the workings of memory. Following the proposition that past coexists with the present as a virtual, yet highly present and influential force, responsible for the disturbance of any sort of static homogeneity and for the formation of qualitative differences, Grosz asks whether it would be possible to conceive of space as complex and as productive as this Bergsonian notion of time, as uneven and as folded with virtualities. In appropriating temporal models and applying them to space, Grosz seems to be contradicting the basic logic of the process of differentiation and subsequent reconciliation of the two as outlined by Deleuze. In other words, if space and time were to be given equal potential force, force to create in variation, they would not be seen as two distinct problems (related to two distinct sets of experiences). However, Grosz does seem to be indicating a direction of inquiry that would be perfectly in keeping with Deleuze and yet propel it towards two new inquiries. The first of these would be the question of the exact quality of this experience of Bergsonian spatial extensity, related as it is closely to duration, and its consequential questioning of the concept of space and spatiality itself. Secondly, and consequently, what kind of representation of this newly formed thing (that we might still call space) could we see to be arising from this kind of overthrow of spatial reign over time? In other words, apart from offering an understanding of our immediate spatial experience in all its intrinsic temporality, does this theory of space (tied to the experience of time as it is) offer a way of forming a new and different form of representation of space as well, regardless of the supposed overthrow of representation? And if so, what consequences would such

125 Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*, pp. 109-130
a representation of space bear on the theories of space, as well as, and maybe more interestingly even, on the design processes?

The notion of space as extension that this thesis will be addressing in more detail, will be tested against the example of the London Underground, not just for the convenience of the chosen subject, but as a substantial inquiry in Deleuzian methods which governed the choice of an 'architecture' in the first place. In an environment physically removed from the urban context, which is nevertheless a crucial component of urban experience, in conditions where every notion of space, represented as well as experienced, is brought to the fore and tested, it seems possible to find a situation extreme in qualities, and yet highly 'everyday.' Conversely, the notion of space as representation seems to resonate interestingly with the experience of this particular urban 'space' placed in stark contrast with the formation of its own exceedingly diagrammatic representations as manifest most obviously in the Underground 'map.'

It is also worth noting here that Deleuze developed other understandings of the term space, most notably with Guattari in *A Thousand plateaus*. These are predominantly political, and have been used as such as part of architectural theory's shift towards the notion of social space. These will not be addressed in this thesis; the aim here was to bring back the notion of space to the world of the physical, of matter, and of corporeality. The concept of space-as-extension seemed the perfect tool for such an undertaking, and is tested against the Underground experience in the four main chapters.
Photography, if there is photography, is already snapped, already shot, in the very interior of things and for all the points of space (Movement–Image 60). If this is the case, what, then, is an image?
(Deleuze on Bergson, via Rodowick: Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine)

The last great Deleuzian theme that will be discussed in this introductory chapter, important for the understanding of the cinema books and highly relevant for a number of architectural issues, is the one revolving around the concept of 'image.' Cinema 1: The Movement-image and Cinema 2: The Time-image offered a great theory of cinema based on these two generally distinct concepts: not just of the 'image-that-moves' and 'image-that-is-time,' as these two are most generally to be understood, but rather, of that something (denoted by its dual name), which is simultaneously image and movement and, in the case of the latter, image and time. In other words, the way to think these two particular concepts is not by taking the first term – image – to be somehow immersed in the other immaterial term (movement or time) as an object, but rather, to think of image as being of the same substance as its seemingly opposed partner in the construction of the concept. Such a conceptualisation is, as was shown, perfectly in keeping with transcendental empiricism as philosophy – where Platonic laws of the immaterial, ideal world, as distinct from the world of matter, are no longer valid, the merging of the two is presented with no obstacles. What needs to be inquired about, then, is the very notion of 'image' in such a world, and it is going to prove to be quite different from the Cartesian perspectivelist126 or, for that matter, any other based on systems of thinking rooted in Plato's 'poisonous gift of transcendence.'

When writing about the relation between image and movement, Deleuze explains that to the cinematic image 'movement is not appended or added'127 – it is, on the contrary, 'the immediate given'128 that belongs to it, and this image, that he terms as the 'intermediate

126 For a detailed account of this history of visual perception see Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 20th Century French Thought, University of California Press, 1993
127 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.22
128 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.22
image\textsuperscript{129} in order to distinguish it from the 'real' image cinema represents, is the object of attention, from which he will come to a different understanding of image in general.

This reliance on the immediate visual material as perceived is, for one, not phenomenological, as Rodowick argues, since it introduces the 'mechanical eye' of the camera lens as that mediating device, which displaces the image from its position of the 'naturally' perceived, the way phenomenology establishes it.\textsuperscript{130} Secondly, this cinematographic apparatus represents, in Deleuze's view, a commentary and critique, correction even, of the experiential one. This is possible, according to him, since the mental activity that accompanies the process of perception represents the site of fragmentation introducing the split between image and movement – in other words, we think the difference between image and movement but we perceive the two as one, which is precisely what the cinematographic apparatus enables us to realise. The camera cannot see the difference between the two simply because it does not think.

Rodowick reports on this, but finds that:

[Deleuze] forges a curious identity between movement and image that resonates problematically throughout the cinema books.\textsuperscript{131}

A comment somewhat problematic itself, in the light of the postulates of transcendental empiricism which call for the creation of concepts composite in relation to the expected categories. Certainly, he is right to question the possibly quotidian character of cinematic image in Deleuze, but the crucial question does not seem to be one of determining the measure of objectivity or subjectivity in the lens or the eye respectively. What Deleuze seems to be insisting on is the recognition of difference between the two.

If the cinematic image helps think the relationship between image and movement, as Deleuze suggests, there is also the relationship between image and light that it questions and redefines. There is an understanding in Deleuze, stemming once again from his interpretation of Bergson, that there exists a relation of identity between matter and

\textsuperscript{129} Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.22
\textsuperscript{130} Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.22
\textsuperscript{131} Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.22
light. This kind of identity Rodowick does not find hard to accept, finding it easier to understand it in the light of Einstein's equation between matter and energy, overlooking the fact that image can be movement as well, precisely when seen as that matter which stands for energy (as is the case with light). In both cases, what is thought of as material (the image) can, with the help of this scientific model, be understood to be immaterial (it is movement as much as it is light, particles, waves, etc.), underlining once again the nature of Deleuze's project as rooted in reversed Platonism.

As is often mentioned, it was in the eighteenth century that the firm identity of image as that which only represents rather than is matter was established and, as Rodowick points out, regardless of the philosophical standpoint in question, the notion of knowledge was divorcing the mind from both time and matter. It is in Bergson that, for the first time since the eighteenth century, the idea of matter, consciousness and time being interconnected rather than separate categories is put forward within a philosophical framework.

With Bergson, there is luminosity inherent in all matter and all matter is image – there is no inside that the image is the outside shell of, illuminated from its own outside by an external light source. This Bergsonian conception of image renders it 'universal and immanent in matter' and possible to distinguish from the second kind of image, the one defined by the limits of the human body, limited and defined as it is by the character of human perception. The former is the one Bergson has in mind when proposing that all photography is already taken in the things themselves. Consequently, the whole universe consists of images in their first, immanent sense, and these images are interconnected through all of their surfaces, communicating in a numerous number of planes. Obviously, the first thing this kind of image of the 'image' requires, is a different understanding of the spatiality of image itself – it is no longer a flat, two-dimensional surface, but rather a spatially complex entity independent of a single view-point. Secondly, the consequence of this is that, as Rodowick points out, the notions of interior and exterior lose their expected sense – they become a way of 'relating' images amongst themselves, they are relational tools as it were. Finally, and this point is of great importance for the understanding of what kind of image Deleuze is dealing with, when conceiving

132 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.28
133 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.28
134 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.28
movement- and time-images, there is no sense in taking images to be either outside or inside us, as much as there is no sense in taking them to be formed in consciousness, supplied by perception.

As Rodowick puts it:

What I see and the act of seeing are part of the same network of actions and reactions passing between and through myself and what I perceive.\(^{135}\)

And this represents the breakdown of the line dividing the subject from the object – object is indistinguishable from its image and both are performing the same sort of establishing of connections and interactions as the body and brain. All of them receive and react to the received, and the only difference between the images that are matter, and those that are perception, is that the latter are 'referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body,'\(^{136}\) as Bergson puts it. In other words, perception-images are, as it were, of the body, whose action they are related to – unlike images that are matter and that interact with the body through the perception-image. Also, this is the point where it becomes obvious that image can be conceived at the same time as equated with movement and with light. Conclusively,

For Bergson and for Deleuze, the basic philosophical problem is not one of subject and object or inside and outside, but rather, how these two terms of images interact, how they are woven together in a perceptual and/or epistemological event.\(^{137}\)

This kind of position of the subject redefines the meaning of luminosity of matter, divorcing it from the human eye as that necessary receptor which testifies to its existence, and consequently replaces the idea of solid bodies – human or other – with a model the key of which is the flow of energy. This flow of light happens, in Deleuze's view, across the whole of what he refers to as the plane of immanence, giving rise to the notion of it being entirely made up of light. As far as 'seeing' goes, it is the interruption of this flow of light that enables it, defining the eye (as well as the brain) just as a screen onto which light is constantly being projected – a model positioned far away from any

\(^{135}\) Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p.29

\(^{136}\) Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p.29

\(^{137}\) Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p.30
kind of subjective, eye-centred (Cartesian or other) system of conceptualising image, vision and perception. The most prominent model, that of phenomenology, is hence completely overturned. Phenomenological anchoring of consciousness in subject's 'existential co-ordinates,' defined as they are by perception, is here abolished, placing consciousness, as Rodowick puts it:

In relation to the durée as on open Whole, or as a state of matter in movement without centres of reference or points of anchorage.139

There are two themes in this way of conceiving perception: firstly, the problem of creation of fixed views (related to framing in cinema) – those 'special images' related to bodies – and the idea of constant flux, which shifts and dissolves the positioning of these centres of determination. And, in Deleuze's opinion, this is evident in cinema precisely because it has a possibility of doing away with the centred system which is in phenomenology assigned only to the so-called natural consciousness. In other words, although it can seem to be an eye, the camera lens is the eye in the matter itself and reveals itself as such through the way it operates. As far as the difference between phenomenological consciousness and Bergsonian one goes, it is the difference between the beam of light illuminating objects and luminosity flooding the subject. The brain is a screen.

The third great defining relation is that between image and time; and here again, it is possible to distinguish two specific ways of addressing the issue: on the plane of immanence these movement-images equal time in its form as change, as universal variation. The other perspective on time, so to speak, is the one related to the eye and the brain, in a word, the body-related concept of time.

The subject, in this interchange of energy, is defined as a 'centre of indetermination,' operating as a gap in the flow; this obstruction of flow (the way the screen obstructs the flow of light) is subtractive and registers or frames only what it needs, and it is, importantly, a spatial obstruction in the flow of time. Images on the plane of immanence act and react on all their sides constantly, whereas this interval 'produces an image.

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138 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.31
139 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.32
140 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.33
141 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, p.34
with only two sides\textsuperscript{142} – the reductive, selective reception which is spatial in its scope and introduces a temporal delay, and action which, since it has come after the temporal gap, is no more the external action absolutely conducted, but rather one which has been transformed, changed, and made potentially innovative. The movement that entered the gap exits it changed, marking the formation of a provisional 'centre in an acentered'\textsuperscript{143} state of things. As Rodowick puts it, 'perception involves the formation of contingent and partial picturings of matter, not as snapshots but as samplings of a continuous flow.'\textsuperscript{144} The same way the flow of light was being sampled through these mechanics of the gap, the record of time comes to be.

Finally, image, as related to time and proposed by Deleuze to be captured by cinema, is either going to be movement-image, which charts out time through movement, offering an indirect image of time and indirect representation of duration, or the direct image of time, time-image, which accomplishes to open up directly onto duration, avoiding, consequently, the slip into chronological models of time. Both of these, however, are discussed in more detail as part of Deleuze's cinema project in relation to the London Underground, and are the founding concepts of his philosophy not just of cinema but also of time itself, representing the point of his departure from Bergson.

This conceptualisation of image as closely related to matter, light and time, seems to be quite at odds with any kind of prevailing theoretical model used not only in architectural, but in any theory even vaguely concerned with the issues of vision and perception. Mainly unexplored, with the exception of a few essays such as John Rajchman's 'Lightness,' published in 'Architectural Design' and consequently as a chapter in \textit{Constructions}, this Bergson-Deleuzian notion of image might offer quite a substantially different way of addressing some pressing issues architectural theory keeps battling with.\textsuperscript{145}

Firstly, the prevailing notion of visual perception in architecture still seems to be deeply rooted in the phenomenological understanding of the subject, reaffirming the problematic

\textsuperscript{142} Rodowick, \textit{Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine}, p.34
\textsuperscript{143} Rodowick, \textit{Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine}, p.35
\textsuperscript{144} Rodowick, \textit{Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine}, p.35
\textsuperscript{145} Rajchman, \textit{Constructions}, Chapter 3
of inferiority and exteriority and forcing the discourse along the lines of clearly delineated dialectics. Some interesting urban problems that seem to have been occupying the attention of theoreticians do not seem to respond to this simplistic dualism, leading to theoretical solutions which can never quite overcome the initial dialectic that gave rise to them, consequently failing in their attempt to offer a substantially different insight into the subject on hand. In other words, the inside/outside dualism, and its corresponding understanding of image as externally perceived surface, will never be able to be an adequate model attempting to describe (if not explain) contemporary urban phenomena.

Closely connected to this is the notion of perception of architecture, and by perception, architecture still mostly means: vision. The understanding of the image is still in a lot of architectural writing firmly anchored in a very particular notion of perception, one ever revolving around the eye and its perspectivalist regimes. Consequently, every theory relying on the visual description of its architectural object of inquiry is inevitably going to be retracing already established routes of thinking (and looking), reaffirming the notion of architecture as constructed of solids within a void, uniform space, and perceived by a detached, observant eye.

Thirdly, the process of architectural design is still unquestioningly associated with visual modes of representation, offering an understanding of image manifest in the rigid schema that ties together the human body as an eye-carrier with the external world as object of observation represented through a perspectival drawing, or, when more experimental in practice, not having any corresponding theory to rely on, and draw new propositions from. This aspect in itself represents a hugely interesting and utterly unexplored territory, the investigation of which could bear a great impact on the very basic understanding of what is most commonly referred to as the issue of architectural representation.

Finally, regarding the object of inquiry this thesis focuses on, Deleuzian understanding of the image could prove to offer some quite unexpected and exciting results if related to an urban occurrence as particular and as important in its influence on the city as is the London Underground. On one hand, the Underground (and this is an inquiry that was

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146 For more, see: Jay, Downcast Eyes
pursued in the development of the earlier MSc report) is a highly visual environment, with a particular corporeal regime and fostering of strict visual communication both with the immediate environment and, in a very particular way, with the city (its inhabitants as well as its self-image as represented within the Underground). On the other hand, the very cinematic notion of imagery and vision as ultimately decentred and impersonal phenomena, highly fluid in their temporality, might be able to offer not only answers regarding the experience of the Underground itself, but also to constructing a productive connection between two seemingly separate territories, those of architectural and cinematic theories. Cities become filmic procedures, with films as temporal realities.
Intersecting parallels

There is one particular point regarding the whole project of theorising or conceptualising the London Underground that needs to be further clarified in the context of Deleuzian theory, and that is the seemingly odd choice of conceptualising not with the help of Deleuze's philosophy in general, but conceptualising through the lens of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema.

The supposed oddity of such a methodological system is that it appears to be over-defined, comprising one too many defining elements, as it were. It seems that it would be perfectly plausible and, in fact, quite preferable, to employ Deleuze in general, as the source of theoretical models, and then just carefully outline what kind of benefits the application of such a system of philosophical thinking has on the study of such an urban phenomenon as the Underground — and maybe also on urban or architectural theory in general. Also, it seems that some crucial categories at work have been mixed up — cinema represents reality, whereas the Underground is reality, which is a fine enough distinction if the whole method is to revolve around modes of representation. In other words, the immediate answer to why the two are confronted is that one represents a metaphor of and for the other. There are several reasons why this is not the case, and they shed light on the more general aims of this work.

Firstly, as discussed, transcendental empiricism, as a set of philosophical propositions, invites constant and clear linking of any theoretical inquiry with its concrete object of investigation, in an attempt to avoid slipping into Platonic systems of representation and metaphysical transcendence and abstraction. In this process, all pre-established categories of identity (such as those that distinguish between what is thought of as reality and what only as representation of it) are being cancelled.

Secondly, and consequently, the whole philosophy of cinema, as developed by Deleuze, was conceived to show that cinema does not represent reality, that it is reality. Furthermore, it is the kind of reality that helps think some aspects of reality in more detail,

147 See the conclusion to the cinema books in Deleuze, Cinema2
such as the fine distinction between the movement-image and time-image, or, differently put, between the invocation of direct and indirect sense of time and/or duration. In a revealing statement, Deleuze claimed that Bergson invented a kind of universe as meta-cinema; actually, Deleuze himself invented a way of conceptualising cinema to serve as a meta-universe, especially in questions regarding time. The brain is a screen, and universe is an endless, breathing flow of flickering images, in all places and for all conceivable eyes. A multiplex cinema of the highest order – except that this is not a metaphor.

Thirdly, and this is an issue worth giving more attention, there is the notion of metaphorical language and thinking that needs clarifying, especially since it touches upon some crucial issues when the appropriation of Deleuze is in question.

In an essay titled 'Deleuze's Philosophy of the Concrete,' Jean-Clet Martin discusses some aspects of Deleuze's empiricism, in particular how the notion of the concrete figures in it and what kind of thinking and operations in language this kind of reliance on the complexities of the concrete, immediate 'material' of reality consequently gives rise to. Martin argues that there is a very important distinction to be made between the scope and meaning of the term metaphor and of, what he refers to as, the concrescence of things. Concrescence, as a word, is rooted in the Latin meaning of the word concretio (from which concrete is derived), referring amongst other things to assemblages, the word prominent in so much of Deleuze's writing. A concrescence, then, represents an assemblage of concrete relations or forces and is, as such, used in botany for instance, to denote situations in which different species are mixing in such a way that the result is outside the boundaries demarcating characteristics of either, forming a new thing, such as a mule or a mandarin.

Now, the difference between a concrescence and a metaphor would be rooted in the fact that metaphors (and this is also buried in the very formation of the word in classical Greek) always relate to categories, that is, pre-given categories: they are the means of bridging gaps and forming relations between clearly defined territories, performing what Martin calls 'categorical errors,' or 'categorical transgression that simply introduces a

148 Deleuze, *Negotiations*, chapters on cinema
149 Jean-Clet Martin, 'Deleuze’s Philosophy of the Concrete,' in: Buchanan, *A Deleuzian Century*?
deviation relative to a preestablished logical order. They might be vehicles of translation, but the very creation of completely new categories is outside their grasp by default. Consequently, in the case of the metaphor, the operation at work is always, in Martin's opinion, a dialectical one, whereas concrescence has the ultimate character of a becoming, the character and key-word of invention, and is the 'site of heterogenesis' between two separate series.

Deleuze's use of this sort of operation was developed in The Logic of Sense, the book that served him for the formation of a different kind of logic that he was establishing in a wish to side-step Platonic and Aristotelian orders and categories. The meaning that was being transposed from one side of the line to the other, in the case of a metaphor, is here obsolete, since concrescence works in complete disregard of the very logic relative to the categories in question. The example that Martin takes from Deleuze (who uses it in reference to Michel Faucault's own example) and discusses, is that of a phrase formed by the positioning of fingers onto a (French) keyboard (AZERT is the five letters that the left hand covers in top row). He compares it then to a typical metaphor, that of the 'evening of life,' in order to show the difference in mechanisms that bring about meaning in the two cases. Suffice to say, in the case of the keyboard experiment, sense is produced not through the notion of resemblance (and therefore transfer of meaning) that is being carried out in a metaphorical operation, but through the combination of different dimensions, as it were. Meaning is created not prior to any concrete action and only enacted through it; it is generated through the concrete itself, concrete which is completely oblivious to the formation of meaning as such and therefore derives or creates meaning from itself. Hand to keyboard; keyboard as language; language that is meaning – the transition is one from experiment in matter to non-material signification.

The most interesting aspect of this proposed notion of concrescence is an understanding (derived from the example on hand) of the body standing at a point of intersection with abstract modes of signification; non-corporeal system of signs (language) comes into contact with matter (keyboard), and this object-matter is engaging with the body (typing hand). The assemblage of these realms results in an associative invention, a new thought and, possibly, new concept.

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150 Martin, "Deleuze's Philosophy of the Concrete," in: Buchanan, A Deleuzian Century? p.243
151 Martin, "Deleuze's Philosophy of the Concrete," in: Buchanan, A Deleuzian Century? p.243
This conceptual scheme (diagram itself) becomes extremely interesting in the context of architectural theory, not only for its introduction of the notion of fluidity of connection between different realms, most notably in the way it cuts across the differences that separate animate and inanimate, abstract and living, but also for the fact that, in order for this transition to have taken place, the body had to be directly engaged in a way that simply eludes any sense of reduction to signification. The body is *interference in the solidified state of signification* and, as such, terminally repositions all construction of meaning. In a sense, the body can be seen as direct introduction of matter into the construction of new meaning; and because matter is ultimately defined by its inexhaustible potential for injection of anti-significatory interference, it is through the acts of the body that architecture is interminably being re-established. It is repetitively constructed and re-constructed, prior to any possible construction of its meaning.

Hence the notion of concrescences is not simply utilised as a claim to cancellation of metaphorical operations (*Underground is film, not like film*). If operation of metaphor were defined as transition of meaning from one realm to another, the comparison between the Underground and cinema is going to be metaphorical. Furthermore, if Deleuze's definition of the concept in philosophy sees it as located inside the plane of immanence, the transition from one realm to another via a concept is always going to be possible. But more than this relative cancellation of metaphorical operations, the notion of concrescence draws out the ultimate act of short-circuiting of signification – through the introduction of the *material hand* (the body). In other words, when body interferes, all relationships of meaning are potentially rearranged, and can be established anew.

In the concrete case of the relationship between the Underground and cinema, it becomes apparent that new meaning arises from this physical confrontation between the body and the environment – and it is this ultimately ever-new act of experience *through matter*, that allows for the bypass from one realm of signification to another to be made.

Importantly, Martin states that:
It is just this type of semiotic that governs the constitution of cultural formations and geohistorical mentalities.\(^{152}\)

The meaning that is being created in the confrontation of cinema and the Underground is not a metaphorical one: Underground and cinema might be said to resemble each other in this or that aspect, but it is not this transport of underlying meaning that represents the aim that is to be achieved, it is the very creation of an assemblage between different 'dimensions,' as Martin puts it, that is to create a space for productive thinking. As was mentioned earlier, what is thought of categorically as reality (Underground) and representation of reality (cinema) is in such a move forced to form a very concrete theoretical relationship, one formed not on the basis of resemblance solely. Ultimately, what this method is supposed to produce is an act of theory, which is not to be dialectical, although it relies on deriving meaning from two seemingly opposed objects of investigation. Surely, as Buchanan argues in *Deleuzism*,\(^ {153}\) a lot could be gained from taking Deleuze dialectically but it seems more challenging not to; ways of thinking and conceptualising are in this way, at least in theory, offered a space for the invention of that which is beyond the categorical.

Furthermore, there is a consequence of this that is informing the method and the language in use and it regards the existence and putting in use of some pre-established categories, namely art and architecture. The same way that Deleuze always takes cinema to be something particular, investigated in and for itself, and very rarely ventures into generalisations about artistic practices of all sorts (although it is occasionally quite clear from the written where his preferences and value systems lie), it seems also possible to take some urban occurrences and have them closely observed just in themselves and not as representatives of a wider category which they supposedly belong to, in this case architecture.

Unquestionably, the London Underground System is of and about London; it is therefore relevant to what might be referred to as 'urban conditions,' both in terms of reflecting and influencing a set of characteristics and relations typical for urban environments in general and London in particular. The ground level seems to be, however, less clear when it

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\(^{152}\) Martin, 'Deleuze's Philosophy of the Concrete,' in: Buchanan, *A Deleuzian Century?* p.243

\(^{153}\) See Buchanan's Introduction and Chapter 1 in *Deleuzism*
comes to assigning the Underground to architecture, or rather, drawing conclusions from the Underground to be applied to the whole of architectural practice, design and use alike. This seems to be not just a source of potential imprecision but also of a certain reductionism. Taking, in other words, the Underground to be something called architecture, can lead to conclusions derived not from the observation of the system itself but from some pre-existing postulates and classifications, both in terms of the object of architecture and its theory.

Had cinema been discussed in terms of its given place in the system of cultural practices in use, Deleuze never would have been able to generate the vision of it in the scope he did\textsuperscript{154} – he simply would never have been able to see it as more important than it was at the time as an artistic practice. Similarly, it seems that taking the Underground only as a very particular something, a singularity, can make it possible to develop it as a concept as well as conceptual field that can generate answers which have not been given in advance. As Deleuze himself puts it in \textit{Bergsonism}, the aim of philosophy (and here he is explaining Bergson but at the same time agreeing with him) is not to be giving answers constantly to already posed questions – since questions that have been formulated necessarily already inhere their respective answers\textsuperscript{155}. It is the very posing of questions, the discovery of the question itself, there where it seemed that everything was clear and answered for (even if not in detail), that constitutes a true philosophical or, for that matter, any other inquiry.

Finally, regarding the questions of language and writing, there is one particular aim of this thesis, which is to serve as a tool for translation of sorts, not just in terms of different disciplines (for which it would be necessary to imply a linguistic guise, in order for the process of 'translation' to operate in the first place) but actually literally, in terms of avoiding the use of the Deleuzian 'lingo' as much as possible. Obviously, the problem lies not in the particular vocabulary employed, but in the invention of concepts themselves, and Deleuze's insistence on new words is only justifiable. In order to give rise to a new concept, he either chose to invent words (and this is not a characteristic of his philosophy only) or to make seemingly odd conjunctions, including in one term several seemingly

\textsuperscript{154} The weakest points of the whole cinema project seem to be precisely moments of generalisation (i.e. the 'authorship')

\textsuperscript{155} Deleuze, \textit{Bergsonism}, Chapter 1
opposed ones, as is the case with the 'time-image,' for instance. Otherwise, the possibility of misappropriation would have been too great. Unfortunately, what happens at the other end of the scale is that this new term is only too prone to be misapprehended and misused, since it only seemingly implies what it is suggesting. With Deleuze, it is never enough simply to take a word for what it suggests to be implying. Assemblage, for instance, is a term that has often been used in connection to Deleuze (and especially his collaborations with Guattari) and invoking a vague notion of what operation is implied to be at play. However, it is necessary to investigate in detail what Deleuze actually means when he writes 'assemblage' and this is the step that seems to be lost too often, not just because of the careless use of the concept in question, but also as part of an operation of appropriation by an audience, academic or not. Simply put, when 'assemblage' as term is used, it inevitably takes a life of its own, becoming a word, a sign, a representation of the concept. In this split between the concept and the word used to denote it lies the danger of misapprehension.

Finally, it is precisely this 'dirty,' concrete nature of all operation in this world that Deleuze wanted to bring philosophy closer to, and in a sense, concepts need to be rendered concrete for Deleuze's transcendental empiricism to be what it is. This is the process of language, and some writers (Manuel de Landa for one) have been propagating literal reading of Deleuze — everything that seems concrete is actually truly concrete and to be taken as such. However, there seem to be several ways in which this can be done, and it seems that it is sometimes better to take the longer route, one that runs through description rather than naming. This route would describe the elements and relations involved in the formation of a given assemblage, for instance, rather that insist on inscribing a whole, the one inherent in the process of pronouncing a name, the name of the assemblage, and this is the route that will be followed as closely as possible whenever necessary in this thesis.

On the other hand, there is the problem of metaphorical language, which is seemingly so prominent in Deleuze's writing and which poses the question of language used for any kind of writing related to his work: how does Deleuze's transcendental empiricism

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156 See: de Landa, 'Immanence in the Transcendence in the Genesis of Form,' in Buchanan, A Deleuzian Century?
manifest itself in writing and what path is to be taken if this route is to be followed — if, indeed, it is to be followed at all? This issue touches upon a more general question, one that has been preoccupying the Deleuze experts (if there is such a thing in the first place): how does one go about being Deleuzian without following in his footsteps literally, seeing as that would be the most non-Deleuzian thing of all?

One of the major critiques not just of academic thinking but of thinking in general that Deleuze put forward was his claim that we are not yet thinking at all. Part of a wider discussion related to power and society, this argument is based on the proposition that to think is to think anew, to think differently, inventively. Instead of following already given paths of though, we are asked to tread into that zone where the obvious, the logical and the safe are all being questioned, since, and this is Deleuze's argument, it is not possible to be inventive when on familiar ground and invention is the very essence of life. So when writing on Deleuze, one confronts the constant dilemma between whether his work is to be taken as any other product on the market of academic thought (which is Ian Buchanan's argument, which led him to take Deleuze dialectically157) or to try and be Deleuzian in the widest possible sense of actually doing something quite different not just to what has been done before, but what has been done by him as well. This latter choice, it seems, has been followed very seldom, if at all — Deleuze's work seems to be transforming precisely into the kind of body of knowledge to be taken for granted and then applied, which, eventually, is against his very doctrine. An operation needs to take place, it seems, which would at the same time include Deleuze and displace him from sight, as it were, turning him into a virtual, never named presence, governing action without turning it into its own. This thesis will not attempt to go that far, if only for the more immediate question of how such a project would operate within the academic framework in the first place. It will however, try to perform that distinctive gesture of going at least one step past the edge of the given, not just in the way it will confront cinema and the London Underground, but also in the very mode and language of writing.

157 Buchanan, Deleuzism, Chapter 1
As was stated, there is one characteristic of almost all of the work that has been published up to date on Deleuze and the possible benefits from the introduction of his philosophy to the discourse of architectural theory, which is the absence of concrete examples of 'architecture' under investigation. Closely linked to this is one particular feature of all writing on Deleuze, the absence of concrete foci of attention in any field apart from film theory, the existence of which seems to depend on one rather mundane reason – the fact that Deleuze himself established a 'Deleuzian' theory or philosophy of cinema.

Following from this, it is possible to establish two major bodies of work, one about film and the other on practically most of the rest of the theoretical production (exceptions such as Dorothea Olkowski's work on art notwithstanding). Seemingly coinciding with the split between theory and practice, or the philosophical and art related writing, as proposed in relation to the Tate Modern conference, this schism indicates a different problematic, that of concreteness of the very objects of investigation. It is commonplace to find in Deleuzian film theory writings on particular films; in architecture, on the other hand, there exist (almost exclusively) only discussions on architecture in general. As was pointed out, the most prominent problem in this is the lack of consensus on what the definition of the term, as well as the field it denotes, might be, leading the investigation easily into the territories of unvoiced underlying presumptions. When there are exceptions to this rule of generality of inquiry, it is contemporary architectural production that the writers seem to occupy themselves with, falling prey to a very particular set of problems, which, without it being recognised, shift the very scope of inquiry in question. Consequently, apart from recognising the existence of the strictly philosophical enquiry as opposed to the art (or any other practice) related one, there is also the seldom mentioned importance of distinguishing between engaging with the field in general and with a very particular, singular occurrence, one taken to belong to the field, but not necessarily an obvious example to represent it.

158 Rajchman's investigation of the Rebstock project seems to be one of the rare ventures into specificity.
The importance of this distinction seems to gain weight in the context of Deleuze's definition of the relationship between the concrete and the abstract, as seen to form a major theme in his philosophy of transcendental empiricism, which will be dealt with in more detail later in this introduction. In short, Deleuze's philosophy is one of reversed Platonism – it does not recognise the existence of an ideal, metaphysical (beyond-the-physical) world; consequently, it is immersed in the concrete and the particular. It is also anti-Aristotelian, (only in so far) as it cancels the a priori categories and hierarchies of identity which give rise to the existence of the notion of 'architecture' itself, as a strict, clearly delineated theoretical territory. Finally (and there are other characteristics that will be mentioned later), Deleuze's arguably greatest project, that of the invention of philosophy that cinema gives rise to, is based upon the understanding that philosophy itself, as practice, is an act of creation of concepts, which can only be deduced from the concrete and the particular – in other words, philosophy and indeed thinking at its most general, are not external to the world.

All these distinctions might seem arbitrary, or at best irrelevant to the study of architecture, were it not for the fact that all of the philosophical ground that Deleuze covers is inherent in the very way architecture is conceived, thought and practiced today. Displacing architectural theory from its practice (a distinction that is so often taken for granted and, furthermore, insisted upon among practitioners), or philosophy from architectural theory (since there still exists an understanding that it is possible to do 'theory' without it being in any way already a 'philosophy'), only misguides and prevents any deeper engagement with the field and its subject matter. Only once these lines of distinction are truly made redundant (and not simply overcome in dialectic or any other fashion that still acknowledges them) will it be possible to offer a truly different approach to what we still like to call (and through the process of naming unnecessarily and for all the wrong reasons glorify) – Architecture.

The method (or a method), that this thesis will therefore attempt to employ, is one based upon two main propositions. Firstly, if the main aim is taken to be the bringing together of Deleuze and architecture, the inquiry will not be guided towards an idea of architecture per se but will be taking an example of a something that is commonly understood to be

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159 See: Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? Chapter 1
architecture. Such an operation will hopefully be teasing out conclusions about architecture in general only incidentally, avoiding any potential misunderstanding involved in the process of generalisation itself. In the case of this thesis, the object of attention is the London Underground. Secondly, in keeping with Deleuze’s understanding of philosophy, the conceptual field utilised will not (for most part) be appropriated from Deleuze’s philosophy in general — as a set of principles — but rather, in its applied form. Which brings about the choice of Deleuze’s film theory as the main conceptual ground. This, in turn, should hopefully prevent both the use of Deleuze’s writings as a philosophical dogma encrusted in strict and formally rigid language, and, consequently, open routes different from the usual, well trotted ones, leading to an understanding both of the aims of his work and of the potential role of philosophy in general.

Certainly, these are not the only reasons behind the choice of the London Underground and cinema, respectively. Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema does not represent just a useful example of his applied philosophy; as has been mentioned earlier, it also employs and develops Deleuze’s conceptualisation of time (as derived from Bergson’s), which is one important theme this thesis is attempting to question in the context of architectural theory. Similarly, the London Underground is a very specific choice: underground systems have in general been rather neglected in the study of urban phenomena — in their cultural and experiential aspects — and the London Underground is not just an interesting example of the type, but also the oldest network of the kind in the world, comprising of diverse sets of characteristics and, literally, network sections. It is all the more surprising then, to find the amount of theory written on the London Underground rather thin; the investigations, when conducted, have often been aimed at the Underground map and its relationship to the ‘real’ topography of the city,160 (in the context of the issues of representation, which are more commonly dealt with in architectural theory) and only seldom have any attempts been made to ‘theorise’ the experience of the Underground itself, and the influence this experience might bear on that of the whole city.

This thesis represents a continuation of an enquiry that was set up in the MSc in Architectural History report titled 'Bull’s Eye' (The Bartlett School of Architecture, UCL, 1999/2000), which established a set of relations between a number of aspects relevant for the creation of cinematic image, and several particular elements characteristic for the experience of the London Underground. Following loosely from the structure of the report, this thesis is to comprise of two major parts, distinct in aim and approach, and divided in six basic chapters.

The first part – this one – provides an introduction to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, explaining its fundamentals and its potential benefits for architectural theory. It is divided in two chapters, establishing on the one hand an understanding of the position Deleuze studies are currently holding within the field of architectural theory, and on the other, explaining in more detail some of the Deleuzian concepts crucial for the understanding of the basic premises of his writings. Part Two of the thesis consists of four chapters, which form the core of the thesis, representing the main body of work in which the links between Deleuze and architecture, as well as architecture and film, are being tested.

These four chapters correspond to four major themes. The first one establishes the event of the Underground corridor as conceptualised through and against the notion of framing, the operation that, in Deleuze’s cinema books, is the operation of formation of sets and relative cinematic enclosures, as ever changing wholes. It discusses the notion of corporeal movement and its specific manifestation in the Underground corridor. The second chapter explores the Underground platform, as the site of exchange and transformation of movement between the train and the body, relating it to the notion of the cinematic shot, and the subsequent introduction of the cut. The third chapter represents an investigation of the carriage event, relative to Deleuze’s concept of cinematic close-up, as well as faciality and affection-image. It delineates the transformation of corporeal movement into the micro-movements of expression, and the general externalisation of movement in reference to the body. Finally, the discussion focuses on the most general level, the one where Underground is observed as part of the general urban condition, introducing the notion of urban montage, as well as the most general relationship between movement, as the generative force of and within the Underground, and the body.
The choice of these particular instances is the result of several factors, and there are a number of possible choices that could have been taken into consideration, sometimes equally as interesting and thought provoking, such as the staircases and elevators, storage and plant rooms, areas inaccessible to the general public, stations which are out of use etc. The main reason for the exclusion of the mentioned is the obvious limitations in size of this thesis, as well as the insistence on user's experiential 'perspective.' Consequently, the choice had to be made to encompass what could be seen as the most characteristic instances, hence the three major themes. Similarly, the choice of Deleuzian cinematic concepts was partly the result of coordination with the chosen Underground phenomena, and partly an attempt to introduce the crucial premises of this philosophy of film. A detailed explanation of the choice of Underground 'events' is offered later in the first part of the thesis. Suffice to say, this notion of the 'event' is used not just to signify the obvious temporal nature of phenomena described, but also for its place as concept developed by Deleuze in *The Fold*. In short, event is not something – anything – that happens. It is actually the sense that we make of what happened, which means that there is a particular interactive involved, which distills from the overwhelming sea of 'data' the characteristics that are of interest to us. In this respect, the aim of this thesis is to show that the Underground offers a network of experiences particularly prone to being eventful, and some of those are discussed in more detail.

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I have, it's true, spent a lot of time writing about this notion of the event: you see, I don't believe in things.\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Negotiations}, p.160}

In the developing of the thesis there was one particular question to be addressed regarding the 'objects,' 'spaces' or 'situations' that were under scrutiny, and the question was in many ways posed before any possible answer could be given, through the very approach to the Underground as \textit{that-which-is-written-about}. The choice to write about the corridor, the platform and the Underground carriage preceded any clear articulation of what exactly these three terms were taken to represent; and instead of taking a route by which the observed material would be regarded through the lens of a particular pre-given category, as would have been the case with treating them as spatial constructs or, alternatively, through the discussion of the Underground as a system of architectural 'objects,' – to name but a couple of possible routine approaches – the decision was made to try and address the issues of urban experience in a way which would go past the static, representational temporality of 'states' and past the subject/object dialectic. Instead, a concept was sought, which would involve consciousness, the body, architectural or other environment, lived duration and, above all, \textit{a sense of something taking place}, something of importance, something that presented itself on occasion to the (removed) subject of this writing, inspiring the initial conjunctive investigation of the Underground as a cinematic machine. In short, there was a belief in the uniqueness of the \textit{event} of both architecture and thought, and a belief in the two being inseparable.

Deleuze's claim that he, 'you see,' does not believe in things,\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Negotiations}, p.160} is telling in more than one way: it invites notions of duration as much as it speaks against the object or the 'thing' itself; it indicates the idea of things being of importance only when understood to be taking part in events, in complex sets of relations – which change, which require an understanding of time to be understood themselves, which are presentation of thought that is itself an event, and which ultimately obliterate, or at least quite significantly (qualitatively) transform, the elements that form the relations in question. There is no
such thing as architecture – as a distinct ‘thing; there is no clear object; there is no understandable subject if it is not a relation already external to the notion of 'subjectification;' there are no spaces that have not been transgressed in their very spatiality; there are no states of any of these non-extant terms listed above, except as possible formative forces of the flux leading to the event, that are the event.

As such, Deleuze’s notion of the event proves to be extremely interesting to regard in the context of architectural theory, since it radically negates most of the routine conceptual premises (coming, as it does, from Deleuze’s wider philosophical project and its general redefinition of some of the most basic traditions of thought) and, at the same time, offers ways of engaging with them all simultaneously, only in radically different constellations, and with a different understanding of given terms. And so, that which was ‘perceived,’ and considered worthy of further thought in the case of the Underground (or differently put: intuited as worthy of attention), seemed suitable to address with the help of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘event’ from the very outset.

Deleuze developed the concept of the event primarily from his reading of Stoic philosophy, relying on their understanding of the idea of the event. He addressed the issue in a number of books, most notably in The Logic of Sense in 1969. The basic premise, developed by the Stoics, was that events were ‘incorporeal singularities’ operating on the ‘surface’ of bodies, and that they needed extracting from the concrete situations they were taking place in. In other words, the definition of the event was located in the realm of the virtual, and the singular. The hunt for the event was then, for Deleuze, the hunt for sense, for that which is neither the experience itself, nor its representation, neither the process of thought, nor the ‘concepts or even signifying essences.’ It is this location of the event outside all of the mentioned that places it in a space of its own, leading to the moral aspect of the Stoic understanding of the term (event), as external to the person experiencing it. And, as such, it always comes as a double (and here it is possible to recognise once again the outline of Deleuze’s general philosophical project): it is actualised ‘in bodies or a state of affairs,’ but simultaneously

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165 Marks, Gilles Deleuze, p. 39
166 Marks, Gilles Deleuze, p. 40
retains its virtual aspect. For ethics, this means that the event is external and that we take it unto us, becoming its 'quasi-cause.'

The ethics of the event, understood in this manner, could be discussed in more detail with regards to the set of decisions that lead to the particular approach in the writing of the thesis; suffice to say, it was this understanding of the event as always both virtual and external to subjectification of any kind, that lead to the abandoning of a number of possible theoretical routes. The discourse was never going to become one of the 'I;' it was never to be seen as a result of a particular social category of experience; it was never to be understood as subjectively particular, and therefore limited. It is the belief in the event being of 'impersonal and pre-individual nature, beyond the general and the particular, the collective and the private,' that triggered the series of attempts to outline the events of the corridor/platform/carriage as events released from considerations of the viewpoint of any particular user — unlike the bracketing Marc Augé submits his position to in *In the Metro* (tellingly called in the original *Ethnologue dans le métro*), claiming his own position to be limited by being one of an 'ethnologue.' If nothing else, Deleuze's understanding of the event shows at this point (in relation to its ethics) to be of extreme importance for any kind of 'theoretical' thought and writing, and not just architectural: it offers a space for a shift in position, quite outside the prevailing understandings of both the subject and the object of writing.

As Marks points out in his chapter on event in *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity*, apart from the great theme of ethics, there is also the notion of indirect discourse as closely linked to Deleuze's particular understanding of the event, in what he terms as the 'fourth person' — truly beyond any notions of subjectivity or individuation of discourse: 'the pure event wherein it dies in the same way that it rains.' (This is, in a way, the 'it sees' of the camera lens, as the 'eye in the matter."

Another important aspect of the event is that it is not simply the moment of the spectacle — it is inseparable from the periods when 'nothing happens,' and Deleuze argues that it is these periods of 'emptiness' of action (as spectacle) that make participation in the event possible in any remotely constructive way (as opposed to the event of the media which is

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167 Marks, *Gilles Deleuze*, p. 40
168 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p.148, as quoted in: Marks, *Gilles Deleuze*, p.40
always about spectatorship or even voyeurism). Most interestingly, the claim is that the
viewer (of the event, and in this case Deleuze is, interestingly enough, discussing
cinematic examples of Ozu and Antonioni), who is not excluded from the emptiness of
the non-happening, actually becomes allowed to become a 'visionary.' The importance of
this lies in the fact that the whole of the thesis aims to do exactly this: unwrap the neat
packaging of reductive viewpoints, and offer a space for the reader *construct a sense of
vision*, rather than simply witness and observe.

Furthermore, in quoting Groethyisen's claim that events always actually take place when
nothing is happening, Deleuze's theory offers a way of explaining why this thesis did
not engage with cinematic or fictional representations of the Underground, which always
rely on the spectacular aspect of the event(s) of the Underground. That which is
perceived to be significant with regards to the Underground inevitably becomes
transformed into event-as-spectacle: the murder and exoticism of Tobias Hill's novel
*Underground*; the event of sliding doors which marks the creation of parallel universes in
the film *Sliding Doors*; the autonomy of the linguistic signifier which plays itself out in Neil
Gaiman's novel *Neverwhere*, and the BBC series created after it - to name but a few. In
a sense, it might be said that, in Deleuze's world, the representational is always already
in the realm of the spectacle, rather than event proper, located, as it is, exclusively in the
realm of the actualised.

Why, then, were the particular events of the corridor, platform and carriage chosen?

The construction of this particular theory of the Underground revolves around three
distinct Underground events, and a fourth, most general one. The choice of the corridor,
the platform and the carriage might seem arbitrary. The Underground escalator seems to
deserve its own chapter. The staircases represent a peculiarity in the system, not to
mention the lifts and the affective intensity of their interiors. Then there are the dark,
hidden, almost accessible, or visually but not physically accessible spaces, which seem
to branch off corridors; there are doors always locked. Certainly, there are ways to break
down the Underground experience into events distinct from the named three, and there
are other events that could be deemed to be almost equally important. But the decision

169 Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p.160
to bring these to the fore was one based on a number of observations and conceptual propositions.

Conceptually, the events are not to be taken as a hierarchical sequence that is assumed to build the Underground experience, although they do come in the given order – there can be no access to the carriage that would exclude or pre-date the event of the platform; what constructs the platform is its confrontation with the train, and it is not the same event before boarding the train and after getting off it. Similarly, there is always a set of corridors to negotiate before the contact with the train has been made, leading to the event of the carriage, which stands at the heart of the Underground. (The event of the carriage is the event of the Minotaur: the confrontation with the other being). The events can be taken as points of rhizomatic development, points around which the fabric of experienced, in time and in numerous spaces, comes to be. These are to be seen as formative of the Underground.

On the other hand, these particular events have been chosen because there is a certain sense of uniqueness to them: what happens on the escalator, or in an elevator, can ultimately be reduced to one of the event characteristics of the given occurrences. The lift represents a version of the carriage, not only on the Underground, but in any urban situation, except that it is less extreme, diluted, shorter in duration and intensity. The staircase always takes an aspect of the corridor event onto itself as well; although quite different since it relates verticality and quite uniquely different from the rest of the Underground if spiral, it is nevertheless ultimately reducible to the event of the corridor, with its corporeal action and linearity of movement. Similarly, in a sense, the escalator can be seen to represents a combination of the carriage and corridor events, with its introduction of the moving mechanism/object and the forced act of facing. However, it never reaches the intensity of closure of the carriage or the exclusive presence of mobility – or enforcement of motionlessness.

The issue of verticality itself has not been touched upon; although it bears great significance in the act of removal of the Underground system from the surface of the city, it is nevertheless relatively negligible once it presents itself in the three main events. If the train changes direction or dives, there is a change in the perception of the linearity of the journey, but never cancellation of named linearity, or of corporeal regimes. If a
corridor is at an angle, or sloped so as to become a ramp, it still carries forward the major characteristics of the corridor.

Finally, it is the three conditions of the body/environs relationship that really make the three chosen events stand out: the enclosed, walking body in the corridor; the waiting body encountering external movement on the platform; and the still, expressive body immersed in the moving environment of the train carriage. These are deemed to be the formative elements in the construction of the movement-machine of the Underground.
The writing mode and structure of the thesis came about in response to several questions that needed addressing, one of which was the notion of representation: how is a theoretical discourse to be adequately illustrated, if its aim is to establish a dynamic, temporal and above all corporeal understanding of the phenomenon on hand? Furthermore, in what relation to its object of study should the text (that-which-is-written) stand, when the object of study is an urban occurrence, whereas the theory applied is that of cinema?

The still prevailing standard procedure sees visual material accompanying the written; be it static or motion image, the text is expected to be related to visual material, to be explained and clarified by it, especially in the context of architecture and its long present relationship with visual means of representation. The discussed subject becomes thus related in more detail through the use of material that is to be accessed sensorially, and the sense still presumed to be most illustrative (of architecture at least) is that of vision. Therefore, the options were the following: either to produce a body of photographic material, which would serve as a set of indicators, static, but concrete and identifiable; or to offer filmic material that would illustrate the more dynamic aspects of the material on hand, while simultaneously employing the very medium the conceptual framework has been derived from.

This would have presented two problems: the 'illustration' would either have been completely in contradiction with the medium and issues discussed, as would have been the case with photography, which, especially in Deleuze's understanding of cinema, stands qualitatively different to the medium of film; or it would have included film as medium, which would have made for a complex set of relationships between the object and method of study. Firstly, the notion of video, that would have to be used, although similar in character to cinema, would not necessarily encompass all the aspects of cinematic 'image.' Secondly, and more importantly, the act of illustrating the written text through film would quite significantly blur the difference between the everyday corporeal experience of the Underground (which was taken as the starting point for the theoretical investigation of the Underground) and cinema as the conceptual model utilised. The illustration, if made as film, would already have included in its own body of material the
aspects of cinema that were to be argued as present in the everyday. In other words, the illustration, which is meant to provide an alternative, somewhat external and more 'objective,' seemingly direct route to the urban experiences discussed, would render it difficult to discuss the conceptual framework and object of study separately. This, in itself, might well prove a productive hybridisation; but in this case it would seem to forge an uneasy relationship, one that might find itself too dependent on the literal equation between the camera lens and the eye of the Underground commuter. The underground experience is not to be taken as the rendition of corporeality cinematic, at least not in the sense of camera=body type of equation — the way a filmic illustration might suggest.

The choice taken was neither of the two mentioned. The route that evolved during the course of research suggested the possibility of having an illustration to the theoretical discourse from within the medium it already employs — the written text. As the writing of the thesis progressed, it became increasingly evident that some of the issues discussed seemed not to yield to the standard mode of academic discourse. Instead, a very particular tone of writing started presenting (voicing) itself, in a series of passages which seemed to be aiming to re-create the experiences which triggered a particular thought or understanding of the situation (occurrence, event) examined, reclaiming it for the one who is writing and presenting it to the one who is reading — in a manner which would attempt to locate both subjects directly in the experience. ‘Directly’ meaning: corporeally, but via memory and through text.170

The particular understanding of the link between cinema and the London Underground had its own sources and events of thought-creation; but the form and tone of writing also had its precedents, which were not deliberately utilised but seemed, on the contrary, to surface and present themselves as crucial influences during the process of writing itself. These were two: the opening sequence of Lars Von Trier’s 1991 film ‘Europa’ and the song titled ‘Walking and Falling,’ by conceptual artist/musician Laurie Anderson, part of her United States Live series of performances, which marked the beginning of the 1980s, and taken from the subsequently released music record ‘Big Science.’

170 This can be discussed in more detail through the distinction Deleuze himself makes between the so-called indirect discourse and literature (or philosophy and art in general).
Writing: Example 1

'EUROPA'
Dir. Lars Von Trier, Denmark 1991
Narrator: Max Von Sydow

You will now listen to my voice.
My voice will help you and guide you still deeper into Europa.
Every time you hear my voice, with every word and every number, you will enter a still deeper layer, open, relaxed and receptive.
I shall now count from one to ten. On the count of ten you will be in Europa.

I say: one.
And as you focus your attention entirely on my voice, you will slowly begin to relax.
Two.
Your hands and your fingers are getting warmer and heavier.
Three.
The warmth is spreading through your arms to your shoulders and your neck.
Four.
Your feet and your legs get heavier.
Five.
The warmth is spreading to the whole of your body.
On six I want you to go deeper.
I say: six.
And the whole of your relaxed body is slowly beginning to sink.
Seven.
You go deeper and deeper... and deeper.
Eight.
On every breath you take you go deeper.
Nine.
You are floating.
On the mental count of ten you will be in Europa.
Be there at ten.
I say:
Ten.

You are listening to the noise of rain, beating against a large metal drum.
Go closer.
There's a fence and you have to stop.
You're walking across the rail yard.
And you've been travelling by train from Braemerhafen.
And before that on a ship from New York.
You are in Germany.
The year is 1945.

The opening sequence of 'Europa' is a single shot taken with static camera fixed at the front of a moving train, pointing downwards. It is nighttime and the frame consists of a dark, moving image of rail tracks, partially lit by the train's lights. The train is moving and the shot is a continual, uniform and repetitive flow of tracks and pebbles that lie between them. A rhythmic, pulsating soundtrack, consisting of a continuous underlying tone and a staccato rhythmic sequence in strings, mirrors the hypnotic repetition of visual material.
Then a male voice is introduced (Max Von Sydow) opening the narrative with the sentence: "You will now listen to my voice."

This is, in more than one way, a session with a hypnotist: Von Sydow's instructions directed at the (for the moment) invisible anti-hero of the film are, quite literally, the proverbial count from one to ten, which, accompanied by the instructions given, is meant to induce a particular state in the listener, and enable them to access an alternative reality. The character is supposed to arrive in post-WW2 Germany, but this direct addressing is also aimed at the viewer of the film. There are no introductions, the object of hypnotism is invisible and unidentified, and in an act of subtle subversion, this opening sequence actually introduces the film to its viewer. Rather, it introduces the viewer to the film, since the film and its historical and geographical location are implied to pre-exist the viewer. We need to be hypnotised in order to access an alternative but utterly legitimate reality.

There are several instances worth noting here: the synchronicity between the visual and the aural material, and their relationship to narration; the connection between hypnotism, repetition and a particular kind of corporeality; and finally, the character of language or direct speech which is used to accomplish the aim.

The soundtrack accompanying the visual material is a track in more than one way: it is a simple and therefore highly effective construct of continuous (legato) and discreet (staccato) rhythmic patterns, concurrently developed through melodic themes. This is quite literally the same rhythmic structure that defines the visual material at hand: the continuous shot of the tracks is at the same time extremely monotonous, linear, indicating sameness and continuity, and broken down into series of separate elements of the actual rail tracks, which enter and very quickly exit the frame. Furthermore, there is certain duality to be experienced here as well, in that the act of watching the scene seems to operate (at least in the case of this viewer) quite literally, through the mechanics of the eye and observing, as a constant shift of attention from the continuity of flow of the image (leading to its utter abstraction in movement), to the focused following of discreet elements which constitute this flow (pebbles, etc.) In other words, there is a sense of series constructed through continual repetition of elements which are always of the same kind, but never actually, individually, the same pieces; and this both in the
visual and the aural material (image and music). This is then overlaid with the voice of 
the narrator, the hypnotist, the unknown (male) person, who is in control of the situation –
in control of the character, as well as the viewer. And, as was shown, the text spoken by
this enigmatic figure is also of repetitions (the counting, the states to be induced in the
listener), accompanied by an evenness of tone, which lends the basis for an undisturbed 
transformation of the psychic state of the listener, who is the subject of hypnosis.

This combination of sound, image and meaning, all coded in similar repetitive manner, is
significantly linked to the notion of corporeality. The hypnotised body is the body of an
automaton, of a zombie, a somnambulist; all its operative powers have been reduced to
a certain sense of being static, even if there is movement involved. This was then, the
kind of body that was both observed to be constitutive of the Underground experience
(the eternal sleepwalkers walking repetitively down endless corridors of an invisible city),
and that was to be induced in the reader; the reader was to be hypnotised into
experiencing the Underground the way the writer (the narrator, endowed with the ultimate
power of shaping reader's thoughts) finds fit – which was ultimately conceived as the
simple acknowledgement of the position of the one who is offering a vision of a certain
experience. Needless to say, there is also a certain sense of equation between this
corporeality of the Underground and the given film sequence, that is also mirrored in the
experience of cinema generally: the bodies that constitute a cinematic audience could be
said to be in more than one way hypnotised bodies of somnambulists and automata; this
aspect, however, will not be addressed here in more detail.

Finally, there is the question of direct speech. All the aforementioned elements (rhythm,
repetition, narration as creation of corporeality) could have been used alongside indirect
speech, the way it has been done by Resnais, for instance, in his film 'Last Year in
Marienbad.' The juxtaposition of visual material ('images') with sound, with the voiceover
engaged in indirect speech, can also be said to induce a sense of hypnotic state; but in
the case of Von Trier (as well as Anderson), the narrator addresses the listener/viewer
directly, rendering the relationship extremely individual, not in the sense of literal
individual characters of the figures of the listener and the narrator, but as singular
entities: the voice is present in its unquestionable individuality, and the listener is
addressed directly, not just offered a material (textual), but actually directly addressed –
the way a hypnotist (or a therapist, for that matter) would. This kind of forceful allocation
of the listener/reader/viewer as a body and a consciousness seems to offer a particularly strong sense of being inducted as well as controlled, and it seemed like the most fitting way of both instructing the reader how to interpret an experience, as everyday and mundane as that of being on the Underground, and at the same time reveal the process of offering a theoretical interpretation as one impossible to divorce from a certain position of power.

*I am telling you how to experience the Underground, and how to think about the Underground. It is my eyes that you need to have in order to see it the way I see it, and my mind to think it the way I want you to think it. And you have to obey me, or leave.*
Writing: Example 2

Laurie Anderson

Walking and Falling

'Big Science' 1980

I wanted you. And I was looking for you.
But I couldn't find you.
I wanted you. And I was looking for you all day.
But I couldn't find you. I couldn't find you.

You're walking. And you don't always realize it,
But you're always falling.
With each step, you fall forward slightly.
And then catch yourself from falling.
Over and over, you're falling.
And then catching yourself from falling.
And this is how you can be walking and falling
At the same time.

There are two parts to the song. In the first part, the narrator is addressing an unnamed person, the listener, the 'you,' (personal pronoun that individualises otherness) stating that she has been trying to find him/her, without success. This is simultaneously an act of establishing a contact (the act of addressing) and the acknowledgement of loss, of absence. The person was not to be found. As such, this statement is directional, an act of addressing, but the direction leads to void. It is an open 'you,' undefined, non-specific, and it does not respond to narrator's initiative (has not 'been found.')

The second part is a description of action, but one that happens on behalf of the listener, the generic other, the 'you.' The action is that of simple walking and, what Anderson exposes, is the act of falling inherent in the act of walking. As if a series of ruptures were made in the automatic (unconscious) flow of movement that is called 'walking,' exposing the ultimate fracture hidden inside it: the fact that every step always also comprises an inherent act of falling, of termination. And so, the logic of walking has been inverted: instead of being an action of deliberate advancement, every single step becomes a necessary, unavoidable prevention of the act of falling, which has been imposed on the body. You keep falling and all you can do is catch yourself from falling.

Unlike the Von Trier narrative voiced by Von Sydow, this is an act of order-giving of a different kind. Whereas the male voice in Europa was one of a hypnotist, Anderson's soft
tone (delivered in female voice) is much more ambiguous in its relation to power – at least on the surface. She can’t even locate the missing person she is addressing. But the act of order-giving is located at a more hidden level: it is an induction how to think differently. It is a subversion of the expected, the automatic and automated, and as such – it represents an introduction of thought, of consciousness, into the uninterrupted, blissfully unaware action of corporeal movement.

Importantly, both of the examples share a number of common traits: they represent a voice addressing an invisible other, effectually the listener; both are aiming to induce a change of state in the listener through the use of voice and language of directing (which is a particular form of order-giving); and finally, both work on the change of state of consciousness through the change in listener’s corporeal state. But in Anderson’s case, the relationship to power has shifted: she gives an order, but she cannot locate the person she is addressing; she announces the state of things, but does not make claim to other's body or thoughts. Instead, she is inducing a state of consciousness itself in the reader. 'Look,' she says. 'This is how you can see things differently, this is how you can change the ways of the automatic body.' She is offering a way of looking and by doing so, releasing herself, as much as the other, from the position of power.

This is how you can be walking and falling, at the same time.
The elementary unit of language – the statement – is the order-word.\footnote{Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.76}

Language is an order, and about giving orders. Deleuze and Guattari begin the chapter on linguistics in 1000 plateaus with the figure of the teacher, and the teacher figure is hidden behind these lines as well, quite literally, encased in the form of academia, its thought and mode of communicating. Von Trier's hypnotist and Anderson's storyteller are both teaching figures, they give an order about how to understand a particular thing, situation, phenomenon. They also quite literally order the listener – the 'you' – what to do, what corporeal action to take. By taking this stance, the inherent condition of language, the one Deleuze insists on, is ultimately revealed: language is not primarily about communication or information; it is about establishing and issuing orders.

Language is neither informational nor communicational. It is not the communication of information but something quite different: the transmission of order-words, either from one statement to another or within each statement, insofar as each statement accomplishes an act and the act is accomplished in the statement.\footnote{Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.79}

It is not about conveying a message: it is about acting out the message, and this not only because you might literally be performing (or acting) it, as is the case with Anderson and Von Sydow, but because language itself carries an inherent act within, it is always an order-word. Which is in the case of my two examples also their content: issuing order, establishing order, giving a password, and a clear slogan.

It is of importance to note that in French the phrase used – mot d'ordre – also means slogan and password (in military terms) and so, apart from being used both as the word of order giving (command) and order establishing (systematisation) it also bears the connotation of a slogan, a codified statement, as well as a code which enables passage through the system of power (military), all of which should be implied in the understanding of the (English) phrase order-word.
The theories of the performative, Deleuze claims, render it impossible to see language either as code (which would presuppose the possibility of decoding) or as communicational tool, since:

To order, question, promise, or affirm is not to inform someone about a command, doubt, engagement, or assertion but to effectuate these specific, immanent, and necessarily implicit acts.\(^{173}\)

Use of language implies effectuating certain acts (the ones implicit in the address). This is an interesting proposal, since it cancels the distance between that which is to be said (content) and the very act of saying: words do not represent as so much as they do. In a sense, the very act of enunciation becomes the direct tapping into the one who is at the receiving end, in a way that bypasses 'understanding' of the code or the communicated.\(^{174}\) It is precisely this heightened performativity of language that is being utilised both in Anderson and Von Trier. Both are underlining this ultimate operative feature of language by engaging with the 'you' and with the corporeal realm. (Not to mention that performativity breaks down, in Deleuze and Guattari's opinion, the distinction between language and speech: 'the meaning and syntax of language can no longer be defined independently of the speech acts they presuppose.'\(^{175}\)

The inherent value in this proposition lies in the fact that the order-word already encompasses release; not just as resistance, but also as an intrinsic feature. Furthermore, the more language becomes 'major,' the more it will be veering towards its own 'minorness' through its variation. That is to say, every slogan is, through its own tightness, its order-giving character and its major status, simultaneously the site of an intense inherent minor gesture, a release, a password. And only by using the order-word to its full, can the password be utilised as well, offering release, flight. Hence the writing method of this thesis.

\(^{173}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.77

\(^{174}\) The 'understanding' implied here is the conveying of material which is not actualised – it is about the use of language to point at the intuited, rather than the 'known'. The performative aspect of language plays an important role in this, as it is understood to carry a 'meaning' of its own.

\(^{175}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* p.78
But the order-word is also something else, inseparably connected: it is like a warning cry or a message to flee. It would be oversimplifying to say that flight is a reaction against the order-word; rather, it is included in it, as its other face in a complex assemblage, its other component.176

Deleuze and Guattari claim that indirect discourse taps into this social assemblage, bypassing the 'I.' But what these examples show is that the use of the very subjectified but utterly elusive 'you' can indicate more clearly this inherent character (or function) of language as order-word and, by doing so, make a subversion, open up a space for operational release from the order itself.

And if there ever is an order-giving discourse, it is the writing within the normative academic format – which is the reason behind the adoption of the particular tone and mode of writing of parts of the thesis. There is always an act of trying to convey an understanding, a viewpoint, a position, and it is always about ordering a certain complex structure of thought as well as ordering the reader/listener to reposition themselves so as to be aligned with the position of the writer/speaker. They need to inhabit author's position, locate themselves in mind, as well as (especially in the case of this thesis) the body of the writer/speaker/thinker. But importantly, it is not about the 'I' of the one who initiates thought, it is not about their clearly articulated position of the individuated subject; it is about the possible inhabitation of the generic 'you' that the text offers. The whole gesture relies on the constant process of other's becoming the subject, without ever reaching the status – an exponential mathematical function, a folding gesture that needs to be taken by the very 'subject' who initiated the process as well.

176 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.107
Writing: Conclusion

In the order-word life must answer the answer of death, not by fleeing, but by making flight act and create. There are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that pass, words that are components of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or organized, stratified compositions. A single thing or word undoubtedly has this twofold nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other – to transform the compositions of order into components of passage.177

The final product took shape along two separate directions. On the one hand, a direct discourse was developed, which was to be taken as the embodiment of order-word in its primary, order-giving aspect, as it is located in the voice of the hypnotist, of the analyst, the ‘voice of authority’ as Anderson puts it. This became the passages which quite literally give an order what to do: the reader is told to perform a set of very particular corporeal exercises, the purpose of which is to serve as testing ground, to make the reader place themselves quite literally in the body of the one who is writing, talking, ordering an understanding – and so access the experience described, from which the arguments have been derived. As was shown in the examples of ‘Europa’ and 'Walking and Falling,' there is a direct relation between the order-giving language and its need to be accessed corporeally, or embodied.

The other mode of writing was shaped as a sequence of (linguistic) descriptions of cinematic material, which is seen to capture the force, or state of the discussed. These stand as focal points of initial fascination or interest, the original sites of intuition, which fuelled the argument and served as sounding boards for any theoretical argument developed after them. Also, the notion of describing a nonexistent film seemed interesting for its obvious and yet utterly logical slippage: the filmic material was not to be found and experienced by the reader/viewer themselves; all that was of interest was to be drawn out in language by the one who is writing, in another act of order-giving, one less obvious than the first one. A seemingly objective description of something that does not actually exist draws attention not only to the fact that the material described is only of interest to the one who is describing it (the film) and therefore extremely selective, but it also underlines the ultimate fictionalisation or act of construction (order-making) which is invariably present in every interpretation that belongs to the so-called indirect discourse.

177 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.110
Frame, Corridor
In Cinema 1: The Movement-image, Deleuze commences his analysis of the cinematic image with a series of definitions of its formative elements. The first is the definition of the frame:

We will call the determination of a closed system, a relatively closed system which includes everything which is present in the image – sets, characters and props – framing.¹

This simple initial definition of the frame establishes the frame as a determining aspect of a system, which renders the system closed, albeit only relatively so. The frame itself is defined, from within, by its content or – the way Deleuze puts it: by everything that is inside the image. It is important to notice two things about this definition. Firstly, Deleuze defines the cinematic frame in a way which is deliberately removed from the strict confinements of cinematic theory. Frame, for Deleuze, is not simply a set of physical properties of the fragment of matter that is to be thought of as film. Frame, and the act of framing, is defined here in a much broader sense: as the determination of a system that effectively renders the system closed (or rather very relatively and particularly closed, as will be shown shortly). By doing so, Deleuze successfully produces a definition of framing that can be taken to be an open, inclusive one; it is the definition of the concept of framing, at its most abstract. In his cinematic investigations, this enables him to avoid a sort of cinematic determinism, and to discuss filmic material from the perspective of philosophical creation of concepts; but the important consequence of such a theoretical route is also the detachment of the very concept from the material it had been derived from, lending itself to interrogation under the light of potentially diverse occurrences and theoretical fields.

¹ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.12

[film sequence]
A shot of an empty, straight corridor. It is one minute long, during which time nothing happens. It is impossible to see the end of the corridor. It is impossible to tell whether the shot is actually a still.
Secondly, Deleuze's definition of framing is inseparable from his understanding of the cinematic (or any other) image: that which is framed is not a surface, it is matter, image as matter, and in matter. This is underlined by his statement that the set, which is defined by, and formative of, the frame, consists of a number of parts, all of which are 'themselves in image.' In other words, this kind of understanding of framing is taking the definition away from the strict hierarchy that would define the frame as a (almost non-dimensional) enclosure, imposed onto a set of (solid) objects, taking instead the whole of the multidimensional field of the image to be inseparable from its frame, to be of the same matter, as it were. This does not merely provide a definition of framing which makes it impossible to determine from the outset whether the frame forms the set, or the character of the set dictates the formation of the frame (as will be shown to be possible both ways) but also, significantly, introduces the notion that the act of framing itself can be observed in much wider context than would be expected from a simple geometric analysis of a two-dimensional fragment of celluloid tape.

[film sequence]
The framed image of the corridor remains still. The light inside the frame is dimming, until there is only a vague sense of image still having content. Then the whole frame is taken over by blackness.

In an act of reaction against the at the time prevailing, and still in many fields present, use of linguistic models of semiotic understanding of image, Deleuze emphasises that the frame should not be thought of as analogous to a phoneme (the way Pasolini discussed it, for example), i.e. not a matter of inherent enunciation; according to Deleuze, framing has more in common with information systems than linguistic ones. It is interesting that, through this gesture away from all linguistic signification, Deleuze (albeit very loosely and only in suggestion) turns towards information systems. The importance and potential inherent in information systems as possible models for or metaphors of signification is not to be discussed here; however, it might be worth noting that, unless defined very flexibly (and creatively), information systems are going eventually to prove to be as reductive as linguistic ones, if not as misleading. The importance of Deleuze's definition of framing is not in its refusal to accept the prevailing linguistic model of cinematic signification; it is in its potential to open up a space for an

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2 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.12
3 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.12
understanding of different regimes of signification. That is to say, Peircian semiotics is not to be reduced to an informational system analogy; its potential use is much broader.

Deleuze proceeds to note that, if the frame is observed as a data system, it can be said to develop along two lines of tendency, either towards saturation or rarefaction. He discusses this in terms of data presented within a frame: there can either be a multiplicity of information (action, object, colour/light quality and consequently meaning) or a process and state of reduction, the extreme case of which is the blank, or completely dark screen, screen which holds no visual information, no data, and acquires meaning only in the context of the shot - a sequence of frames.

The next distinction Deleuze proposes questions the formative logic of the frame and again finds two alternatives: the geometric or the physical frame. The first one, according to Deleuze, is one formed according to a set of predetermined co-ordinates. These are formed geometrically (hence the name) and the frame is the result of a series of purely geometric considerations, which 'preexists that which is going to be inserted within it.' In other words, the dynamic, variable aspect of the frame (of its elements) yields to its strict geometric logic. The second variant of the frame is derived from a selection of variables, which can be characters or objects, or even a particular theme that forms the image that is the frame.

In any case, framing is limitation. But, depending on the concept itself the limits can be conceived in two ways, mathematically or dynamically: either as preliminary to the existence of the bodies whose essence they fix, or going as far as power of existing bodies goes.

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4 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.12
5 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.13
6 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.13
7 Deleuze sees Michelangelo Antonioni as the director who pushed this concept furthest, which is interesting in the light of Antonioni's special ability to powerfully portray architecture in his films.
8 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.13
What is particularly interesting to note in this explanation or definition, is the understanding of the relationship between that which is perceived and conceived to be a limit (in this case the frame) and its content. It might seem that the cinematic frame (a film frame) is determined according to the logic of the medium itself, that is, the physical properties of film. Its basic geometry is rectangular, the formative logic of which lies in the sequencing of frames into shots for the purpose of dynamic perception of moving images, 24 frames per second. However, Deleuze points out that this frame is directly linked, inseparable from that which it is framing, from the image. In other words, the image and the frame are one, what forms the limitation is also the content that is being limited. In the eye of perception, so to speak, it could not be any other way. Furthermore, it is particularly important to observe the second variant: the dynamic frame. The first kind, the geometric frame, is 'preliminary to the existence of the bodies whose essence they fix;'\textsuperscript{9} the frame is a static formation, born from the act of 'fixing.' The dynamic frame is 'going as far as power of existing bodies goes,' which is of huge importance in the conception of a frame dynamically related to its inherently dynamic content. In other words, a frame might be a static fixture, but what forms it is not only the immediate static projection of its content, the 'essence' of its content – it is also its inseparable location within the essentially dynamic (movement-bound) character of the rest of the film (as a medium and particular material), the dynamic carrier of which, finds itself located within the frame itself. This conceptual operation represents a very precise device for divorcing film from the misconception of being an essentially static medium, a series of stases that never amount to movement, let alone time. If the formation of the most static aspect of film, its frame, is inseparably linked to the dynamism of its open (transformational) totality, then it starts becoming apparent that the conceptual cinematic material on hand, as set up by Deleuze, is much richer than expected; even more importantly, it transcends its purely cinematic framework. It is a something, a concept, an object-related concept, but even more broadly, a matter-related concept. And this is the stuff architecture is made of, at the intersection of the object and the body.

\begin{quote}
\textit{The image of the empty corridor starts dimming again. It slowly darkens, and the corridor seems to be dissolving in the darkness of its own vanishing point. As the frame becomes completely black, the light of the real image suddenly flicks back on. After a pause, it starts fading slowly, until the last}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{9} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.13
Also, to go back to the definition, this second variant is one of 'the limits [...] going as far as power of existing bodies goes.'\textsuperscript{10} At closer inspection, this definition of the second way a limit can be defined shows striking similarity to Deleuzian notion of movement as the limit of perception. The importance of conceptual operation at work in both of these definitions lies in the fact that Deleuze presents the notion of a \textit{dynamic} limit, that is, not an enclosure that would be formative of an ultimately static fixture of an 'essence'\textsuperscript{11} of that which it limits or defines. On the contrary, the limit itself is defined through the inherent dynamic tendency of that which is being limited. It is as if the limit were an aspect or quality inherent in the very freeing dynamism of the object, body, or simply 'image' framed. In other words, this conception of the limit presents it as \textit{completely in accord with the force which keeps releasing itself from any sort of limitation}. This is an ever-generating, transformable limit, one intrinsically at ease with the notion and manifestations of duration. It is an \textit{open} limit.

\textbf{[film sequence]}
\begin{quote}
The camera starts slowly tracking down the corridor. Its progress is marked by the regularly distributed marks in wall finish.
\end{quote}

Deleuze proceeds to refine the definition by explaining that:

\begin{quote}
The frame is also geometric or physical in another way – in relation to the parts of the system that it both separates and brings together.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

That is, there is an internal system of 'parts' or elements, which are organised, in relation to one other, either geometrically or dynamically. In the first case, the elements of the frame are said to be arranged in a clear, geometrically ordered manner; the second variety is, in a sense, less clear or delineated, since the distinction operates through zones, which are less fixed, and the sets which form the frame are 'imprecise.'\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.13
\textsuperscript{11} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.13
\textsuperscript{12} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.13
\textsuperscript{13} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.14
The frame is no longer the object of geometric divisions, but of physical gradations.¹⁴ Deleuze states that the parts of the set are "intensive,"¹⁵ that is – the set is a mixture, sub-defined through intensities, rather than delineations. It is as if the division between sub-elements or sets of the frame is, in the case of the geometric frame, defined through their outer limits, whereas they are formed as distinct only through the 'inner' formative intensities, which are not concerned with the context of the entity they are defining. In the first case, the entity is defined by and through its difference from what it is not; the second, the case of entity self-formative at the dynamic level, is the level of 'force.' The set of the dynamic frame:

Cannot divide into parts without qualitatively changing each time: it is neither divisible nor indivisible, but "dividual"¹⁶

Which, Deleuze observes, goes for the geometric frame as well, except that this qualitative change is rendered in the dynamic frame extremely obvious.

[film sequence]
The tracking down the corridor continues until it becomes apparent that the rhythmic passage of ceramic tiles on the walls seems to represent the repetition of the same frame.
It seems like the camera is not actually moving.

Now, the next issue Deleuze discusses represents a particularly interesting investigation in the context of the corporeal experience of the Underground: it is the relation between the frame and the angle of framing. The importance of the angle of framing in the designation of the frame is due to the fact that:

The closed set is itself an optical system which refers to a point of view on the set of parts¹⁷

This notion of point of view 'on the set of parts'¹⁸ is the logical consequence of the fact that the positioning of the camera lens is going to result in specificity of visual material present within the frame. In that respect, Deleuze discusses the possible options and

¹⁴ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.14
¹⁵ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.14
¹⁶ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.14
¹⁷ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.15
¹⁸ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.15
their respective uses in the construction of the cinematic image, pointing out that there is — more often than not — a reason for the particular positioning of frame, most obviously when it serves a narrative function. However, what Deleuze only hints at in the relatively short discussion on the angle of framing, is the fact that sometimes these particular solutions are not arrived at with a 'pragmatic justification'19 in mind; which, Deleuze claims, only goes to show that ‘the visual image has a legible function beyond its visible function.’20 In other words, frame as image (in its most complex Deleuzian sense), formed and released through its constitutive limitation, is material itself, regardless of any possible pragmatic (in the most direct sense) logic behind its creation; to put it conversely, the act of framing can exist regardless of intention - which is commonly presumed to be the necessary prerequisite. This kind of absence of reason for the existence of a frame in Deleuze’s conceptual proposition, this ability to recognise the potential force of framing in any image, in any materiality, is what opens a series of interesting possibilities for the discussion of framing in non-cinematic contexts. Ultimately, this proposition opens the possibility of image/matter summoning the frame into existence, inducing the frame, rather than vice versa. Which, in the case of the frame as defined to be inseparable from its content of framing, only makes sense.

[film sequence]
The tracking camera veers towards one of the walls. The perspective down the corridor shifts slightly.
Then the camera draws back to the centre of the corridor and keeps moving.

Finally, the last aspect of framing is the notion of the out-of-field. Deleuze explains that the out-of-field is not a simple negation; it is not simply all that is not within the frame. Also, it is not purely an indication of that which is outside the confines of the frame, accomplished through the divergence between the visual and the aural frames.

The out-of-field refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present.21

19 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.15
20 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.15
21 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.16
This seemingly cryptic statement actually indicates that the out-of-field does not stand for an obvious act of exclusion, exclusion inherent in the act of framing, and detectible in the framed material on hand; the material within the frame, that is the frame, has nothing to do with the image that is the frame, but all to do with the very act of framing. The fact that something is framed can itself produce this presence, which is divorced from the content of the frame. This, according to Deleuze, is most evident in frames which constantly pursue creation of sets which are part of larger sets, therefore repeatedly introducing the notion of the partial set. However, he claims that the tighter the set, the more it will be opening onto an out-of-field. This interesting proposal, that the more encapsulated something is, the more it presents that which is not encapsulated, can be traced back to Deleuze's investigation of Leibniz's *Monadology*, in which he developed the truly radical (and utterly non-symmetrical) understanding of the binary 'opposition' between the concepts of inside and outside. And so, the next annex to the initial definition of the frame is that:

All framing determines an out-of-field.

Therefore, the out-of-field can come in different modes or aspects, but it always remains present as the inevitable consequence of the act of framing itself.

[film sequence]

The camera comes to a halt. The view on the corridor is undisturbed.

Nothing happens for a while.

Then the image disappears.

Deleuze sees this as an effect of the existence of a number of sub-sets that form the frame, and the fact that the set of the frame is also inevitably linked to various larger sets, which makes it impossible to conceive the closure of the frame as definite. In fact, this presupposes a dynamic reading of the frame on Deleuze's part, and rightly so, since it seems adequate to the nature of the filmic material, especially when it is understood as inherently dynamic. In that sense, Deleuze claims that:

Every closed system also communicates.

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22 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.16
23 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.16
And this communication across sets is, in Deleuze's view, continuous and homogenous, never forming a whole but retaining the quality of an open system. The very notion of the 'whole' is here redefined not to represent a closure, but rather a 'thread,'\(^2\) which 'traverses sets.'\(^2\) This interesting Deleuzian concept, this spatial figure of sorts, simply attempts to explain that, to understand the frame in the context of the supposed whole of the film, implies not to see it as fragment, static and isolated from the finite, wholesome unity – that it eventually, inevitably, amounts to. On the contrary, understanding the frame requires this particular understanding of interaction or continuity of frames and their sets, as something that happens in a space of its own, in a dimension which is set apart from the act of framing in its most obvious, confining and reductive character:

\[\text{A closed system in never absolutely closed; but on the one hand it is connected in space to other systems by a more or less 'fine' thread, and on the other hand it is integrated or reintegrated into a whole which transmits a duration to it along this thread.}\]^2

This, it would be safe to say, is a startling image created by Deleuze, which itself suffices to show that the representational modes in his writing and thinking are of a more sophisticated nature, indicating an interesting area of investigation to be pursued in itself elsewhere. It should be noted that there is an act of equation between the whole and duration – the whole can only be established through a destructive, dynamic force which prevents its closure and solidification in the first place.

\[\text{[film sequence]}\]

\textit{The image of the corridor is framed once again. Nothing happens in it, for as long as the viewer is presented with it. It lasts a very long time. It shows the corridor.}

Practically, it is not the case of a binary opposition of the real and the imaginary spaces of the frame, as perceived; rather, Deleuze claims that this spatial logic represents only one aspect of frame's openness, the other one being the presence along the same 'line,'

\(^2\) Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.16
\(^2\) Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.16. It is worth noting that the whole is represented here as a thread, a linearity, not as surface occurrence.
\(^2\) Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.16
\(^2\) Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.17
which 'opens on to a duration which is immanent to the whole universe, which is no longer a set and does not belong to the order of the visible.'

Deleuze describes this second variety as something that does not 'exist,' but rather 'insists' or 'subsists.' In other words, it is once again the case of presence of something not articulated and individuated, not actualised, but present and detectible as virtual.

Importantly, it is a:

More radical Elsewhere, outside homogenous space and time.

It is an opening, an 'elsewhere,' which cannot be reduced to its spatial dimension, can never be mapped, since it belongs on the outside of space and time as homogenously conceived. And so, in the first case, the clearer linking between the sets, the more 'mappable' the whole spatial construct of interlinking frames will be; but the less clear this spatial line of connection is, the more frame will close in that particular sense, only to open even more onto this alternative 'dimension,' one of, and about, duration. And in Deleuze's view, since the frame is never to be thought of as closed (which brings about in his theory the understanding of non-static cinema, cinema that cannot be reduced to a state of static representation), this second aspect of the out-of-field is to be its ultimate function – the introduction of 'the transspatial and the spiritual into the system which is never perfectly closed.'

[film sequence]

A shot of the sky.

There are clouds slowly drifting against the pale blue.

New shapes keep replacing old ones.

This particular notion of spirituality represents, for Deleuze, the aspect which follows the advent of time, and is inseparable from it, seeing that it is time as force which opens the
'space' for thought;\textsuperscript{33} if time is the fourth dimension, spirit is the fifth,\textsuperscript{34} except that these are not dimensions in any conceivably representational – hierarchical and traceable (map-forming) way. This movement of thought through the introduction (presence) of time is practically what transforms the (cinematic) image 'into a mental image.'\textsuperscript{35} Mental image is constructed through a 'play of relations'\textsuperscript{36} which are themselves thought, and which 'weave a whole,'\textsuperscript{37} this very particularly conceived notion of the whole. It is for this reason as well, that the notion of the out-of-field bears the dual character it does: the 'actualisable'\textsuperscript{38} aspect, which stands for frame's link with other sets, actualisable since the transition of sets takes place logically, hierarchically and eventually; and the virtual aspect, one which always brings it back to the whole, links the frame to the whole down the route which cannot be charted out, always virtually present but never actually manifest. They subsist, rather than exist, (as everything that is to be termed as virtual does, in Deleuze's philosophy) as the image of thought, a mental image, a play of relations.

This brings the discussion on cinematic framing directly to an understanding of consciousness – and right out of the film theory.

\textsuperscript{33} This is discussed in the opening chapter, in particular in the section discussing the relationship between time, thought and critique.
\textsuperscript{34} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.17
\textsuperscript{35} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.18
\textsuperscript{36} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.18
\textsuperscript{37} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.18
\textsuperscript{38} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.18
What if the space of the body is really abstract? What if the body is inseparable from dimensions of lived abstractness that cannot be conceptualised in other than topological terms?  

The walking body is urban body – in that the specificity of the corporeal act is inseparable from the experience of the city. As long as the concept of the city does not stand for a completely automated, body-redundant entity, and until the urban events of transportation are transformed in ways which would make the moving body itself completely redundant, urban experience will remain inextricably linked with the immediate movement of limbs against surfaces/objects – that represents the act of walking.

It is the walking body that encounters the shift in urban fabric that is to characterise the experience of the Underground; and, unlike the urban experience of the Overground – which is to be seen as a series of shifts between various modes of movement and the consequent diversity in types of corporeal involvement in it – this shift to the Underground is ultimately and invariably pedestrian. In most cases of Underground stations, there still exists a clear demarcation line between the outside, the Overground, and the world under the surface, the world of various forms of tubes and the Tube. And this transition, this moment of access, the gateway, is a matter of the particular corporeal figure of movement that we call: walking.

[voiceover]
You are walking down the street. At the end of it you can see the Underground logo. That is your target.
When you reach the station entrance, walk inside. Notice the change of light: it gets dimmer, and daylight is replaced by the green glow of artificial lighting. Keep walking until you have reached the barriers.
Now slow down and take your ticket out of your pocket.
Run it through the machine.
The barriers open, letting off a sound.

40 It is important to remember that this discussion refers to the London Underground solely. Still, this rule is relatively characteristic for any underground transportation system.
Consequently, if the quality of corporeal movement on the Underground is examined in more detail, at least in its most basic (for the moment), it becomes apparent that there are two possible conditions, body in motion and static body, the latter being immersed in movement rather than 'producing' it. This is, doubtless, characteristic of the Overground experiences as well; also, this duality of body-invested motion (action), and one external to it, comes on the Underground in various guises, as it were. However, the specificity of the Underground experience lies in its simplicity, its reduced and reductive character; and this ultimate reduction takes place in two distinct sets of circumstances, or events, which are (respectively) the event of the corridor and the event of the carriage. It is indicative that the two also define the major, commonly used distinction between being in the Tube (the corridor) and on the Tube (the train/carriage).

The body of the corridor is exclusively a walking body; the event of the corridor is construed precisely out of the walking body and its relationship to its surrounds. It is also this relationship, this particular corporeality of a environment, that dictates the specificity of this event and separates it in character from any other event, under the ground or above it. It is important to bear in mind that this relationship is inherently rooted in an understanding both of the body and the object (the city), which transgresses any expected notions of clear binary distinction; as has been pointed out in the first chapter, Deleuzian understanding of corporeality is one much more fluid than the notion of solid objects in void spaces could ever represent. It is therefore impossible to state that the mobility inherent in the body, as it becomes an element in the corridor event, is either innately inherent in the body only (which it is), nor that it is induced by the environment (in this case the corridor, in all its specificity). Mentioned aspects, and some which will be discussed shortly, all form an indivisible core of the event, the set of interacting and distinguishing occurrences which would, otherwise, remain unspecified.

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41 As it becomes clear in the carriage/close-up chapter, this difference between the 'static' and 'mobile' is not absolute, but a matter of different manifestations of movement (what Deleuze terms as molecular and molar realms).
42 The escalator; the elevator; the various manifestations of movement inherent in the event of the platform, the entrance hall, the staircase, as opposed in its specificity to the corridor, etc.
43 The instances when this rule is breached (begging, basking) only confirm it.
You are walking down the corridor now. This corridor leads to the platform, and everyone is walking the same direction as you. Take a look at the walls; they are blank, painted a pale cream colour. They are also curved and you get the sense that you are inside a tube. Keep walking down the tube.

Firstly, there is the notion of the body, whose movement has been invested by the aim. This is the level at which the whole of the Underground, as metropolitan movement-machine (quite literally movement, as well as machine) functions. It is the movement invested in bridging the gap between points A and B, the ultimately abstract (or abstracted) notion of goal and arrival, rather than the journey, that shapes the mobile corporeality of the corridor, the mobile corporeality inextricable from the construction of the event of the corridor. Secondly, there is the corporeal specificity of this movement, the fact that movement takes shape in the body of walking — shapes the body, and is shaped by it, as a walking entity. Thirdly, if the event of the corridor is observed from the side of its other tendency, that of the object (architecture), it is possible to discern several specificities, which can be addressed through the notions of dimension and shape. These two are not to be discussed through the lens of mapping or spatial representation, but rather as concepts derived from object’s relationship to the body, redefined to reclaim the discourse as relative to the site in which the edge condition(s) of the body are to be observed as formative of particular experiences.

The first question is one of aim or tendency, of mobility and force. The Underground (as was mentioned in other chapters) is quite literally an urban machine, one devised for, and shaped by, the most general notion of movement. At the mundane level, it is an urban device enabling commuting and re-distribution of bodies across the city. This corporeal flux is embodied in a multitude of individual elements, individual bodies/selves, and it is driven by forces which can be seen to cut through a number of recognizable categories: individual, social, political, economic, cultural, etc. In that sense, the Underground represents a site of urban structure/content sublimation as movement. The Underground’s abstract outside is always one which motivates the mobile forces within it. And so it comes to pass that every body and every event of the Underground are
profoundly invested with this particular tendency, to move, to arrive. The Underground induces force and simultaneously, inherently, is force.

[voiceover]
You are still walking down the corridor. Pay attention to the people walking around you. They walk at different speeds; some try to pass you by, others keep to the walls. No one speaks and all you hear is a shuffle of clothes. All you see is backs of people's heads and the perspective of the corridor.
Keep looking ahead.

The second aspect, that of the moving body, is a manifestation of this force at the direct corporeal level: the force is invested and manifest in the body, and there is not a single occurrence (under or above the surface) where this would be more acutely apparent than in the corridor. More particularly, this dual character of force as action implied (suggested) and also acted (willed) is embodied through walking. The specificity of the act of walking is one of the basic functions of the human body, tightly linked to the body's defining verticality and primary corporeal manifestation of movement. It is a function that defines the internal relations between body's sub-elements (limbs as extensive tools vs. the main corpus and head as the loci of main, sustaining functions) and as such represents a mobile limit, formative of the corporeal interface with the environment. In other words, walking is the corporeal act through which the body defines itself against everything it is not, dynamically and temporally. Far from being formed simply through a simple act of negation (it is what it is not in a given state), its defining relationship with its exterior is a gesture of repeated testing or reiteration (to use a linguistic metaphor), ultimately subject to constant testing and questioning.

[voiceover]
You are still walking down the corridor.
Now look down at your feet.
Watch them move, one in front of the other. Feel your hips move.
Feel your shoulders move in counter rhythm to your feet.
Keep walking.

44 Again, the exceptions to this rule are confirmative of it (see later analysis).
The importance of this act of walking in the construction of the event of the corridor is, therefore, to be seen on the one hand as a very particular manifestation of the inherent tendency (force) of the Underground, and on the other as a general corporeal act, whose importance is only brought to the fore in its isolation. This notion of isolation comes from the other aspect of the specificity of the corridor (the third on the discussed list), which is that of the characteristics of the corridor itself, the characteristics which make it possible to conceive the concept of the corridor in the first place.

Also, in the context of discussions of various urban phenomena, as well as perception and representation of cities, walking has been addressed as a particular mode of experiencing the city. From the notion of the urban flaneur, to the various modes of situationist tactics, walking has been utilised to theoretically address the issues of corporeal specificity in self’s engaging with the urban environment; however, all these seem to be dependent on a specific concept of walking, which shapes it as a self-specific, predominantly psychic act, in contrast to the rigid notions of visual perception and its static representation. Such a notion of walking differs from the one utilised here, specific to the event of the corridor, in a number of ways, which eventually make it possible to define the corridor as an event, rather than simply a time-related concept of walking. That is to say, the specificity of the act of walking inherent in the Underground corridor is one of the key features that elevate the Underground corridor to the status of an event. Furthermore, this 'walking' in and of the corridor, draws itself to attention in a way utterly different to the act of walking, which relates the body to the city. It induces awareness of body’s very existence, presents itself at the forefront of consciousness, and simultaneously - and in a sense consequently - acquires a mechanistic quality. This is Deleuze’s spiritual automaton, always aware of the gap between perception and action, and time’s role in its creation as such.

[voiceover]
You are still walking down the corridor.
Watch yourself move, feel yourself move.
You are still walking down the corridor.
Watch your feet move.
You are still walking down the corridor.
Keep walking.
The aspect of the corridor event that is derived from the characteristics of the corridor irrespective of the body’s interaction with it can be broken down into what could (cautiously) be called dimension and shape. The cautiousness implied here is one related to the issue of representation: discussing ‘dimensions’ and ‘shapes’ as terms, and consequently philosophical concepts, is laden with meaning and rules of representation. Moreover, it is (most ordinarily) the kind of Euclidian space as homogenous and evenly distributed void that is recalled with the use of the named terms. This mode of representation is a highly contentious issue in Deleuze, regardless of the exact object of representation – be it spaces, bodies, or objects. However, the terms will be used here, if only to be discarded afterwards; and in a sense, this mode of representation might prove useful in paving the way to its own questioning and subsequent redefinition, as well as an indication of processes characteristic for the event of the corridor and the Underground as a whole.

What constitutes a corridor, any corridor, is its relative mono-dimensionality: in order for the act of passage (spatial, corporeal) to become literally one of the corridor, it is necessary for one horizontal axis (x,y) to become significantly dominant over the other one; the construction of the corridor is one of transformation of planes into lines and consequently (and significantly) from indeterminacies to directionality. Whereas plane, as figure, inherently carries within it possibilities and choices (for the body, for the spirit, to use Deleuze’s vocabulary), line is innately hierarchical, divisive, a matter of binary opposition (at best), if not direct reduction to a single option and single possible choice. The issue of figuration and spatiality in Deleuze remains to be addressed separately; at this point it suffices to state that planes in Deleuzian philosophy are prominent for a reason: the notion of the rhizome, for one, in its simultaneity and multiplicity, is one predominantly of planes, unlike the hierarchy of growth through convergence, which is ultimately linear and therefore, according to Deleuze, ordered as such never to be able to offer the possibility for real multiplicity and introduction of externality which is not already included in the system. And so, the directionality of the corridor is not derived solely from the force or the tendency of the Underground, but is also mirrored in the directionality derived from the linearity of the corridor itself.

46 The notion of linearity in relation to the whole of the Underground will be discussed in relation to the Underground ‘map’ in a more general manner, in comparison with cinema.
You are walking down the corridor, but there is no one around you.

Start running down the corridor.

Keep your eyes on the end of the corridor, although it is far.

Keep running until you run out of breath. Then slow down and go back to walking.

You are still inside the corridor.

The second aspect, which complements the linearity of the corridor, is its other 'horizontal dimension,' its 'width' – which places it in direct physical relation to the body. Differently put, it is the corporeality of the corridor itself. If the longitudinal direction is one of tendency and force, the transversal is the direction in which the body meets its physical limit. As is often the case inside the Underground, this corporeal limitation is drawn out through the notion of proximity, be it one of other bodies or objects; it is also emphasised through the broader gesture of 'removal from the open,' in that this confinement (as discussed in more detail in the chapter on the Underground carriage) represents also a manifestation of the sense/knowledge of enclosure. This transversal limit of the corridor is an aspect of any corridor; but it is particularly emphasised in the Underground corridor, because of its absolute, exterior denying enclosure. Notably, since Underground corridors vary in dimensions and types of use, this aspect is most prominent in a narrow corridor, the use of which is determined to be mono-directional; character of the Underground corridor discussed here is valid for all variations on the theme, but it is the simplest, most reduced corridor, that makes it possible to recognise the process that takes place. And so it will be, that what takes place in corridors with posters on walls, in corridors with railings which divide them in two lanes, in corridors which change angle or curve, is already inscribed in them on the basis of the simplest corridor, narrow, straight, horizontal, with walls in monochrome and, significantly, of circular profile.

You are all alone in the corridor. You are not moving. Stop and observe.

Walk left and touch the wall. Now walk to the right and do the same.

Lie down. Take several deep breaths.

Stand up. Lean on the wall. Try and make your body fit the curve of it.
The first aspect, the narrowness of a corridor, is one that defines the limit of the body itself through the limit of its possible, projected movement. It is the virtual vibration of the body that has been reduced, and then, quite literally, channelled along the longitudinal axis, further emphasising the aspect of force and tendency it already carries. The second mentioned characteristic, that of the profile or shape of the corridor, finally defines this inscribed linearity: the basic underground corridor is one circular in section; that is, it resists the establishment of any further hierarchic spatial (co-ordinate) stratification, beyond its simple directional tendency. Tellingly enough, this profiling is the result of a perfectly 'practical' consideration, that of reduced pressure of the surrounds onto the corridor walls; however, this is mirrored in the less technical proposition that the corridor shapes itself reductively, minimally, due to its confrontation with the dark, the unknown, the inaccessible – everything that is inherent in, and definitive (in ways of contrasting) of the very concept of the corridor. The corridor, eventually, is an oscillation along the longitudinal axis, compressed into intensity, into a line. The stronger the compression, the more force will be manifest and employed to 'drill' the corridor, literally channelling its 'void,' and its void-specific concept. And this is a very specific void, one utterly filled, the vessel and the content of movement – corporeal and spiritual (of-the-psyche, as Deleuze utilizes the word).

[voiceover]

You are walking down the corridor.
Empty your mind of all thought and keep walking.

In a series of essays that compile the book Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, and particularly in the essay 'Strange Horizon: Buildings, Biograms and the Body Topologic,' Brian Massumi negotiates the notion of this particular corporeal space and spatiality of the body. He starts off with the notion of orientation, developing it around a particular personal experience: while working at the Canadian Centre for Architecture, Massumi would enter the building, walk up to his office and spend the better part of the day in it, only to realise after two months, that the view he thought he was seeing through the window, was not of the street he was actually overlooking. That is, his innate sense of orientation overrode the perceptual material on hand and kept convincing him of being in, and looking at a space, that was not actually there. Significantly, at the very outset Massumi notes that the experience of these two orientation systems was allowed to be
short-circuited, since it involved walking through the 'tunnel-like bowels of the building,' which were, in his view, responsible for bringing to the fore one particular faculty of the body, the self-referential proprioceptive operation:

It appears I had been operating on two separate systems of reference: a predominantly proprioceptive system of self-reference operating in the tunnel-like bowels of the building and a predominantly visual system of reference for the vistas outside.

This discussion is hugely relevant for the whole of the Underground system. And as Massumi notes himself:

The idea that this is not as unusual a situation as my initial concern might have suggested came to me in the subway on the way home. If you have ever ridden a subway, it is likely that you have had a similarly jarring experience when surfacing to the street level.

Now, the discussion of the notion of proprioception in the context of an urban experience inclusive of the Underground will be addressed in the fifth chapter, in relation to the general level of interaction between the city and the Underground as system. Therefore, the notion of 'surfacing' will be dealt with at a later stage. However, this idea of a particular concept of corporeal orientation is crucial for the understanding of the proposed concept of the corridor event, since it relies heavily on a very particular understanding of the body, its abilities and its *modus operandi*. In addressing the issue of orientation, Massumi clearly places the moment of displacement, or proprioceptive faculty override, in the space of the 'tunnel-like bowels.' That is: the tunnel-like environment is what brought up or enabled this very particular aspect of corporeality to present itself. And so, the question presenting itself is actually not one of external mapping or mapping of external spaces (street, window, room, the first and the last position in the process of transition from outside to inside); it is the very event of the 'tunnel-like bowels,' the *event of the corridor*, that represents the crucial site of a certain corporeal transformation.

[voiceover]
There is a body walking down the corridor – and it is not you.

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46 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, p.179
47 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, p.179
48 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, p.179
Keep following this body.

Now look at the walls of the corridor. They don't look like the walls you have just been walking past. They have changed and you are wondering what is on the other side of the walls. You can see no clues.

The other body keeps walking and it seems to know where it is headed, so keep following it.

Proprioception is itself a term that was created to explain some particularities observed in human 'orientation in space.' As Massumi recounts, instead of relying on (predominantly) visual cues, which are then read in order to locate the self - the body - in its context, it surfaced in experiments, that our sense of orientation becomes stronger with the absence of any such material/data. That is, the 'emptier' the environment (space), the better orientation. But, as Massumi asks, what is this 'empty space'? He points out that it is indeterminate itself, but that what determines it, and ourselves in it, is the very movement we perform, and its rhythm; in other words, movement in its inextricable bond with time.

The studies were suggesting that the proprioceptive self-referential system – the referencing of movement to its own variations – was more dependable, more fundamental to our spatial experience than the exoreferential visual-cue system.

And as Massumi points out, the philosophical consequences of this are huge: movement itself, as concept, stops being dependent on position; it is not something derived from a set of fixed marks, it is not a collection of static elements experienced in succession. On the contrary, 'position emerges from movement, from a relation of movement to itself.' And with this, we are in the territory of Deleuzian cinematic concepts of movement and time, and even beyond that, directly in the Bergsonian understanding of movement as independent of stasis and directly tied to the durée. Movement has been conceptualised, and furthermore, experimentally observed, to be a non-divisible complexity unto itself. And, as Massumi only hints, the site of recognition of this is in the tunnel.

49 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p.180
50 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p.180
51 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p.180
52 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p.180
Massumi's discussion will be readdressed later in relation to the notion of cognitive mapping, the way he sees it to come only after orientation proper (proprioception), and its function within the Underground system of internal signification (signs, symbols, texts). For now, though, the attention should be kept on the fact that the corridor, as described, represents an environment, an event, which is definitive of, and itself defined by, the body; and not just any body, but the moving body.

Secondly, Massumi also paves in his essay the way to a useful conjunction of perception and mapping through the notion of synesthesia, which might be utilised to point at a crucial formative aspect of the corridor. Synesthesia is a conjunction, a synchronic use and understanding of the senses, and in that respect, Massumi shows that the two aspects of orientation, cognitive mapping and proprioceptive operation can be seen to represent a 'synesthetic interfusion.' Even more interestingly, for some people synesthesia is a literal summoning of the experiential towards the senses and, in particular, to the visual. When it manifests itself as such (as clinically observed and defined), 'other-sense dimensions become visible,' in other words, it is what Massumi calls other senses coming 'at the hinge' with vision, and being registered from the aspect of vision. Importantly, as Massumi points out, these forms are dynamic, and they are not representational in the sense that they are the property of thought; they are literal perceptions, not mental constructs. And as such – dynamic. Which, as Massumi states, results in them being experienced as events.

This conceptual and experiential area seriously questions any presupposed notion of corporeal experience in opposition to the representational, cognitive act of mapping, and leads to a more synthetic understanding of the body, space, movement and experience. More particularly, its importance for the understanding of the event of the corridor lies precisely in the fact that it offers a way of engaging with the corridor as an event, dynamic and simultaneously representational and lived. It is not to say that the experience of the corridor, or any other 'space' is synesthetic in itself (in the clinical sense of the term) but rather, that the concept of synesthetic experience could unlock

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53 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, p.180
54 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, p.186
55 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, p.186
56 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, p.186
some extremely interesting ways of understanding any 'everyday' experience, one whose synesthetic character seems to be hidden, conceptually and historically.

Massumi continues to make an important point, and offer an appropriate term for this:

> Although synesthetic forms are often called 'maps,' they are less cartographic in the traditional sense than 'diagrammatic' in the sense now entering architectural discourse. They are lived diagrams based on already lived experience, revived to orient further experience. Lived and relived: biograms might be a better word for them than 'diagrams.'

Thus the notion of the biogram offers itself as particularly engaging in discussions on the identity of mapping and living. As has been stated, this is an issue relevant for the whole of the Underground; however, what makes the Underground experience particular in character is largely given it through what the corridor itself represents. And it is in the corridor that this identity of the biogram comes to be perceived most and in its most extracted, purified form.

[voiceover]
Now I want you to focus on your body and the corridor at the same time.
Now add to that the memory of having walked down the corridor up to this point, and think of the steps in front of you.
I want you to try and mould all of these images into one.

There is one aspect of the description of the biogram that is of special interest in this case: the fact that the biogram, as Massumi suggests, is to be understood as a hypersurface, that is, a multi-dimensional surface of perception, even further, of event-perception, since there is no detachment from time.

> Biograms are more-than visual. They are event-perceptions combining senses, tenses, and dimensions on a single surface.

And so if a biogram is a lived diagram which embodies all the named aspects, it also has one final characteristic of interest here: it is directional.

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57 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, p. 186-7
58 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, p. 187
Face it. That is to say, you are always facing it. Wherever you are, whoever you are, whatever day or year it is, the biogram is in front of you. [...] This means a biogram is a one-sided topological surface.59

There are two things of interest in this description of the biogram as given by Massumi: its directionality (in front of you, you are facing it, etc.) and its dynamic tendency (event-perceptions, combining tenses and dimensions). It is a dynamic arrest of single-sidedness; a mobile, temporal single surface; surface with a directional tendency.

This facing of the spatial dimension, which is inherently temporal and dynamic in corporeal terms, is strangely resonant with the given description of the corridor, and Deleuze’s definition of the cinematic frame. Could it be that the Underground corridor gives us an insight into how we operate through its particular reductivism, or at least draws out some important aspects of it out more than others? Aspects that are otherwise given the whitewash of routine and the habitual?

[voiceover]
Keep walking. Eventually, you will reach the end of the corridor. I am waiting there for you.

59 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p.188
As was shown in the first part of this chapter, Deleuzian conceptualisation of framing is one more complex than might be expected in the context of film studies, and certainly more general. It discloses a way of conceiving frame as a cinematic occurrence of interest, but also offers an extremely useful way of conceptualising (spatially, diagrammatically) the very notion of enclosure and closure, inherent in the concept of the frame.

This notion of frame as enclosure can be discussed in relation to the whole of the Underground, or indeed to anything even loosely considered to be an architectural or urban occurrence; closure and enclosure, and the notion of interiority these terms invoke, are practically in wide use in any kind of architectural discourse, in their physical sense, but equally as an abstract or (most commonly) social category. Similar is valid for the term 'framing,' in its most commonly used meaning, irrespective of any particular cinematic applications it might be partaking in; notably, in architectural theory, framing is primarily understood to be a visual determinant, dependent on, and derived from, this one sense – vision.

As for the idea of (en)closure, the Underground system represents a highly adequate example for its discussion on an urban scale: there is not a single other urban occurrence of intent, scope or size, which could be in its entirety discussed as an act or gesture of (continuous) enclosure. For, as much as the Underground system is transient in purpose, it nevertheless represents a vessel, holding, enclosing and framing its subject.

However, the event of the Underground corridor shows some particularities, which might be seen to render it the ultimate Underground (or even urban) site of framing. This use of Deleuze's cinematic concept of framing in the context of the Underground corridor, in all its conceptual openness, could, in return, lead to the creation of an understanding of it that would be far removed from the static and predominantly visual ones prevailing in architectural theory. Therein lies also one of the reasons, as well as justifications, for this conjunction of Deleuzian cinematic theory and that which might be considered an urban
event: both the event of the city and of cinema are to be understood *dynamically*, which is one of the major contributions Deleuze makes in his definition of the cinematic frame. In other words, as was discussed in the first part of the chapter in more detail, Deleuze constructs the concept of the frame as a dynamic one, far from being a simple static fragment of the larger whole of the film. Deleuzian frame is simply not a still. And the proposition here is that the event of the Underground corridor, inherently dynamic as it is, is one of exactly such an act of framing.

Going back to the initial Deleuzian definition, the frame is established as the determination of a system, which renders the system closed, albeit relatively so. Of what relevance might this be in the context of the Underground corridor, conceptualised as an event? If the corridor is to be seen as a *transient* closure, a closure whose relationship to itself and its own context (the one that it is defined against) is fluid, dynamic and transformable, it becomes apparent that Deleuze's open-ended definition of the frame, the relativity of closure it facilitates the system with, can be utilised to discuss a number of possible ways in which the Underground corridor is closed - frame-like - and a number of different 'openings' or transgressions within the material it is framing or enclosing.

Firstly, it is possible to indicate the literal spatial/corporeal openness of the system, in that the Underground corridor represents a site of walking *through*, of transition, which is to be seen as a spatial act as much as it is temporal, since it is derived from, and indicative of, corporeal action. This proposition stems from the notion of the Underground as conductive, rather than static or focal: the very system has been formed as an act, and an answer, to force that arises in the most basic corporeal scaling of the city, inseparable from the experience of the city in movement. This aspect is one of motives and force, and it becomes manifest in the direct, hierarchically logical and embodied sense of various spatial sets, as they are described to be interlinked in Deleuze's explanation of relationships between visible sets within the frame. Secondly, the relative closure of the corridor can be seen to be a manifestation of an incorporeal link or thread, which relates an instance inside the corridor to the outside - or the city - itself. This is the question of the incorporeal, yet actualised; of that which could be said to be the issue.

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60 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.12
of inclusion of the urban (the outside) into the Underground. This might be manifest in the physicality of a poster, or a less material notion of social interaction, which nevertheless inhabits the corridor itself, in a very actualised manner. Finally, there is the opening most virtual, derived from what could be termed as the urban out-of-field, and which is a figure utterly beyond any manifestation but nevertheless utterly present. This is the aspect of perception of duration and consequent formation of thought. All of these will be discussed in more detail.

But before that, it is important to discuss the basic premises that allow for this particular understanding of the frame and its potential application. One of the crucial premises is the proposition that the frame is not a mono-dimensional (in more ways that just Cartesian) and external imposition on the material that is being framed. This was mentioned as the aspect of Deleuze's conceptualisation of the cinematic frame, which establishes it as an integral part of the object of framing and not as an action external to the material it is taken to. The relevance of this is considerable, since it actually helps divorce the notion of cinematic framing from its cinematic, as well as seemingly static character. In Deleuze, the frame is the image it frames; it is induced by the image and, more importantly, is seen to be susceptible to the dynamic flux of the image itself. As such, it determines the sets constitutive of the image, as much as being determined by them. That is to say, what is inside the frame is in constant dynamic relationship with the act of framing itself.

The relevance of this for the comparison with the London Underground lies primarily in the fact that the Deleuzian notion of image is one that goes past any distinctions between cinema and reality; as was discussed in the opening chapter of the thesis, in Deleuze's philosophy all reality is constituted of images, and cinematic images are just one type of image. Secondly, the dynamic understanding of the frame, as put forward by Deleuze, places it at constant interface with the image, with the 'internal' material of the image. Why is this to be linked to the Underground corridor in particular?

The experience of the Underground corridor is one which can be thought of as a continuous act of treading between action and stasis, between the closure of framing and the very basic repetition of the act of closure. In that sense, it facilitates exactly the delineation of ambiguity between the static and the mobile. The characteristic of any
Underground corridor is the sense of repetition, induced by the synchronicity between
the repetition of corporeal movement (walking) and the uniformity of the environment.
The typical corridor is one that necessarily repeats itself — both as a corridor and as a
gesture of framing. Furthermore, the very uniformity of it brings forward the acute sense
of movement which is charted out. And this is precisely the way Deleuze discusses the
formation of the movement-image.

The next important stage is Deleuze's distinction between the geometric and the physical
frame, with the former being derived from predetermined (externally applied) co-
ordinates and the latter from the internal set of variables, from the image itself. Now,
Deleuze observes these two as different frames, or types of frames to be found in
cinematic material, a distinction based on differences in their formative logic; however,
these should actually to be seen as different aspects of the concept of framing itself. That
is, the concept of the frame is not to be thought of as either the former or the latter type,
but rather as a concept that can take on itself both of the indicated sets of characteristics.
The importance of this becomes apparent when the two definitions are observed more
closely. The first case, that of geometric frames, is, as Deleuze states, 'preliminary to the
existence of the bodies whose essence they fix.' This is quite evidently the notion of
framing derived from the logic of mapping, of Cartesian space of representation. The
frame is an almost completely abstract imposition on matter, divorced from it, from its
possible form and content. The frame comes first and everything it might come to frame
will have to conform to the logic of the frame.

This instance of framing as assignment of pre-given enclosures can easily be related to
the Underground corridor for two reasons: firstly, the corridor is not simply an enclosure,
very particular and emblematic (as has been shown in the previous part of the chapter); it
is also directional, which is to say — it gives strong preference to perceptual surfaces or,
indeed, screens. The content of framing (image-body-matter) is not simply enclosed, but
enclosed with a planar (surface-like) tendency. Instead of becoming a cell, the enclosure
of the corridor becomes a frame primarily for its perceptual and experiential directionality.
The identity with the cinematic frame is especially brought to the fore if the dynamism of
both occurrences is taken into account: walking down the corridor is always a passage

\[61\] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.13
through a set of transversal limits, frames, always identical, always repetitive, and so is the series of film frames — although in both cases that is not the sole defining characteristic. This is not the dynamic frame; this is the geometric frame that has been formed prior to its content, from the outside, and literally so, since it is at least partially formed in response to the contrasting outside; but what it channels, nevertheless, is the dynamism of its internal content.

This 'perceptual directionality' is an experiential cipher, and is as much the result of corporeal mobility as it is of the senses; but it is the sense of vision, the visual aspect or side of the experience, that makes the comparison between the cinematic frame and the Underground corridor particularly evident. The aptness of the geometric aspect of framing, or the geometric frame, is equally revealed through its visual content, revealing the common underlying formative logic in both.

As was stated, being inside the Underground corridor, implies a distinct sense of directionality, of bodily movement and of its corresponding mode of perception. The walking body has been channelled and though this act the channelling of perception becomes directional as well; all its variation is ultimately reduced to a single longitudinal direction or aspect. There are three general reasons for this: the aim that motivates action lies ahead; the moving body is navigated by its senses, which need to be in synchronicity with the action of the body itself; and finally, there is an absence of any potentially distracting transversal aim — the corridor walls are bare, impenetrable, useless. Consequently, there are only a limited number of 'conditions' of the eye; it is always facing forward, and always repeating the same longitudinally polarised field of vision. And this is exactly the case with the sense of vision a camera lens tends to convey. It is the restricted field of vision, which makes the whole experience of the Underground cinematic in the first place. It is an abstract horizon, a dynamic surface, always externally, a priori restricted, with its limits and possible positions always already imposed, always framed. Therein lies the reason behind the title of the best-seller about the London Underground, written by Christopher Ross: Tunnel Visions. The sense of vision in the 'Tube' is always and inevitably one of tunnel vision, the same way the frame of the camera lens always stands for the framed visual closure. It is as if being allowed,

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62 The presence of advertising posters can be seen as emphasising this claim when it occurs.
in experiencing the Underground corridor, to walk inside the confines of a cinematic frame, which, incidentally, is the case with many film makers' construction of the frame—it is conceived and physically set up in advance, for the bodies to inhabit it in a predetermined, clear and precise geometric manner. And this is what Deleuze terms the geometric frame.

This is obviously a matter tackled by Deleuze in his discussion of the angle of framing and its relevance to the object of framing. What becomes apparent in the Underground corridor, though, is that this angle of framing—if understood as the vantage point inseparable from the body—has been reduced, so as not to offer any possible differentiation of the angle of framing. In body's reduced operational space (narrowness) and clear directionality (linear motion) lies the act of a single frame being inscribed over and over again, with the same material or object of perception, which renders our sense of seemingly (spatially) limitless field of perception utterly controlled and therefore, in more than one way, cinematic. The body is erect, it faces only one direction and it is moving. It simply keeps reiterating its ability to frame—to act as 'the determination of a closed system.'

The dynamic frame or act of framing, on the other hand, is completely governed by its content, and is accordingly flexible and prone to transformation, always accompanying and tracing the dynamic force of the image, and within the image. As Deleuze puts it, the frame is 'going as far as power of existing bodies goes.' In this definition of the second variant of the frame, the term 'bodies' does not automatically imply human bodies; it refers to the content of the image, and implies movement-carrying objects or element, inherent in the set and in the image. However, when thought of in the context of the Underground corridor, this statement indicates a particular aspect of Deleuze's concept as potentially useful: the fact that a body, the body, can be seen to be literally equated with the framed image, image-as-matter, and the logic of limiting or framing can be of use in thinking through the corridor. Furthermore, this does not take place in any conceivable static sense, but through the body's inherent dynamic force, its power.

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63 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.12
64 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.13
If his proposition is to be taken in such a manner, then the question ceases to be simply one of the Underground corridor being shaped by its aim or directional force, as was suggested earlier. What is of far more consequence, is the aspect of Deleuze’s proposition which links the body (any body, but potentially also human body) with the image, in a way which sees the former, through its conclusively dynamic power, as formative of the latter, in its dynamic form. In other words, the fact that the dynamism of the body is conceived to be formative of the image (in its Deleuzian sense) and its limits, paves the way for the creation of the concept of enclosure – any enclosure and any frame, cinematic or other – as responsive to the body.

Certainly, this aspect of environmental responsiveness is not to be seen in the corridor in any kind of literal form; the corridor will not change its direction, or its formal physical properties, in accordance with the impulse invested by the body operating from within it (the corridor). In that sense, the corridor is a decidedly geometric frame: it precedes the body, frames it in the most external way, and dictates the logic of corporeal dynamics. Nevertheless, it might be of interest to think this reverse relationship on the Underground as an aspect that reflects the coincidence between the corporeal power (on its individual level) and its environs (the Deleuzian image, which is also all of reality). Since, although the corridor might be said to precede the body experientially, it has nevertheless been formed to serve its dynamic impetus; furthermore, the most individualised, actualised corporeal level is one that renders it possible to perceive and feel, to embody, exactly this sense of spatiality of the image – as dynamically dictated by the body’s own power. While walking, there can arise an awareness of an act of ‘drilling;’ and although the walls cannot be moved, the body penetrates the city.

Both of these aspects of framing, or types of cinematic frame (as proposed by Deleuze), indicate the ability of the concept of framing to take onto itself both of the discussed meanings; both of these conceptual propositions, taken together, represent the frame:

depending on the concept itself the limits can be conceived in two ways [...] either as preliminary to the existence of the bodies whose essence they fix, or going as far as power of existing bodies goes.65

65 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.13
And so it becomes apparent that the Deleuzian notion of framing, as concept, holds two complementary aspects useful for thinking the Underground corridor, helping explain not only the notion of enclosure or limit, but of a dynamic limit, and furthermore, dynamic limit which is not simply a confinement, but a site of realisation of corporeal power/force as well. This power is, ultimately, the power of body's movement; a body in motion.

The important notion of transgression of the imposed limit of the frame, and the subsequent opening of it onto other spaces, is discussed in Deleuze's cinema books through the example of the out-of-field, which represents one of the more engaging propositions, mirroring as it does the overall image of Deleuze's philosophical project. As was related in the opening part of this chapter, the out-of-field does not stand for anything manifest in the realm of the visible, nor for the invisible but audible, arising from the division between the visual and the aural frames; it is also not a presence of something physically removed, since, according to Deleuze, it stands for a much more complex operation, delineating the distinction between the actual and the virtual. The out-of-field is not an actualised otherness or absence, for which there is an actual proof or sign; it is the presence of something ultimately incomprehensible, yet sensed. It is:

neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present.66

This 'incomprehensible' of the out-of-field is to be seen as the innate aspect of the act of framing, and derived from Deleuze's particular understanding of the relationship between the inside and the outside. With this introduction of an outside located beyond any conceivable grasp, the act of framing — the creation of enclosures — becomes an act of very specific spatiality, one far removed from being enclosure proper or exclusive; on the contrary, it becomes an opening, a way of opening, the force of which becomes stronger the tighter the grip on it, the tighter the tendency towards closure. But the opening is one onto a radical otherness.

This understanding of the out-of-field can be employed in discussions of any architectural or urban theme, if nothing for its redefinition of the inside/outside binary opposition, so prominent in architectural thinking. In the context of the Underground, it is possible to see how the notion of cinematic frame is to be related to the enclosure of the corridor and its

66 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.16
direct, obvious, linear and directional opening of sets, and onto series of successive frames. And so, it would be relatively easy to conceive the out-of-field as either the visible of the literal outside, the Overground or the city, lying outside the confinements of the Underground corridor. Alternatives are numerous - what lies outside of the corridor is: darkness and dirt; the city; aspects material as well as occupying the realm of signification. But it is important to remember that the Outside of the out-of-field is incomprehensible; and therefore, none of the (literally) obvious solutions will ultimately do, although all of them do work on a certain level.

In Deleuze's philosophy of cinema, this open quality is one of duration, that is: of time as the ultimate force, always preventing closure and, as Deleuze claims, the tighter the closure of the frame, the more it will open onto the aspect of duration. What is of particular interest here is the fact that Deleuze's philosophy links duration with thought; without duration there would be no thought, and the world would be a static, frozen, lifeless sign. This connection has been discussed in more detail in the opening chapters of the thesis, in particular the one describing Deleuze's appropriation of Bergson's concept of duration and its relevance both for philosophy and film theory.

If the enclosure of the frame is what opens the out-of-field, and the out-of-field is an opening onto duration, than it is safe to assume that the possible understanding of the concept of framing is to be understood as crucial in the rise of thought: it is the prerequisite space (in the non-representational sense of the word), the necessary opening, which allows the consciousness to take place. Rather than the passage of image into image in a direct chain of action and reaction, it is the place and space of the gap, in which consciousness becomes aware of itself. And so the Underground corridor is not simply the locus of the inversion and re-introduction of the city that is above the ground; it is the place which, through its gap, allows for the conscious, the thought, to emerge. Quite literally, the Underground corridor is thought provoking. The walking body, the walking consciousness of the corridor, is Deleuze's spiritual automaton.
Let us go back, now.
I want you to remember all the journeys you can, all the times you walked off the street and into the
darkened halls of Underground stations, down escalators and through endless corridors.
Can you remember the number? Can you remember all the journeys?
I thought so.
Pay close attention now to what I am saying:
They are under your skin. In your body.

'Don't worry,' the screen displays, in Arial Bold font.
'Your body remembers them all for you.'
Then the screen is dark for a while, until you can read the message:
'THE CORRIDOR IS YOUR BODY.'

This is the sequence, then: it is a continuous, long shot of a corridor.
It is framing the empty corridor, and moving down it.
Now the frame is overlapped with another one, in which you see bodies walking down the corridor, all in
the same direction, walking fast, almost running. The bodies are faded, ghost-like, due to the overlap with
the first shot.
Then the second one is taken out and the camera is once again moving down the empty corridor.
The corridor is straight.

What happens next is a series of overlapping shots, all of which show different corridors.
Due to the difference in shape of corridor walls, and since some of the corridors are turning angles at
different times than others, the overall effect of the moving image is of a series of enclosed spaces
converging onto one another, always shifting from the main direction, and still, always returning to the main
frame.
The outline of the corridor and its centre become the blurred, yet distinct focus of the frame.
If you narrow your eyes, if you squint just a bit, you see what forms the frame: the constant movement, the
repeating of change itself.

The screen becomes as blurred as if your eyes are half closed still.
You open them wide, but the image is still blurred.

Suddenly, people are brought back into the image, and the frame loses its continuous gliding quality.
You can almost feel the person holding the camera walk.
But you can't see them.
Shot, Platform
In his description of the main formative elements of film, after having discussed the concept of framing, Deleuze continues to discuss the notion of the cinematic shot and its relation to movement. Although the concept of the frame proved to be in Deleuze's interpretation considerably more than the mere static fragment of a flux, it is through the concept of the shot that he develops a more fundamental understanding of cinema's relation to movement and duration, introducing the notion of montage as an intrinsic aspect of the shot. Deleuze opens the discussion on the shot with a straightforward initial definition:

\textit{Cutting [découpage] is the determination of the shot, and the shot, the determination of the movement which is established in the closed system.}\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Cinema1}, p. 18}

This definition proposes two separate aspects of the cinematic shot. On one hand there is the notion of cutting, which is said to be the determination of the shot. At the conceptual level, this means that shot is inevitably defined through the introduction of ruptures or disruptions in an apparent continuum. On the other hand, the shot itself determines the very movement that is inherent and manifest in a 'closed system,' by which Deleuze implies the set and elements that compose it. In other words, the act of shooting and shot itself are defined by the limit imposed on the shot's own movement-bound territory and, in turn, this limits and establishes the character of movement within the shot itself. The reason for this somewhat ambiguous tone of the initial definition of the shot lies in the fact that Deleuze acknowledges the existence of a different aspect or kind of movement, one which is traversal, in that it is concerned with the whole, 'qualitatively different from the set\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Cinema1}, p. 18} and opening directly onto duration. As he writes:

\textit{Thus movement has two faces, as inseparable as the inside and the outside, as the two sides of a coin: it is the relationship between parts and it is the state [affection] of the whole.}\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Cinema1}, p. 19}
In this peculiarly geometric figure, movement is the key element that, as concept, is to be understood dually — both as the relative movement of sub-elements, or parts of the set, and the absolute notion of change that affects the whole and stands for an inextricable part of it. In the first case, it is the immobile sections of movement that are inherent in the elements of the set, in their detectable change. Simply put, the first aspect of movement is actualised and therefore detectable in the set ('relative modification'); the second is immersed in duration, which is the force of the open whole ('absolute change'). And, according to Deleuze, both of these aspects of movement are always present in the shot itself, defining it as the conceptual site of this dual presentation or operation of movement.

[film sequence]
This is a shot of the platform. The camera is static.
There are several people on the platform, most of which are motionless. There are two women seated, talking in hushed tones.
One man is walking to and from the camera. He is looking at his own feet, his hands in his pockets.

This, in fact, presents an interesting conceptual scheme (typical gesture of thought in Deleuzian philosophy), developed with the sole aim of explaining that the cinematic shot cannot be considered only from its immediate material (set and its elements), linearly and reductively, but rather, as constantly having one eye on the whole (of the film). That is to say, the sense of reason that lies behind the formation of the whole is always informing the shot as much as the immediate action within the set does, except that this might be less obvious; and this 'reason' is one of movement.

Because of this, Deleuze sees the shot as ever suspended between the acts of framing and montage, taking unto itself both of these aspects (more of one than the other — depending on the case) but never actually representing a clear state or act. The shot practically always oscillates between the (perceptible) clarity of stasis, as it can be observed in the frame, and determination of the whole, which is embodied in the act montage. Importantly, Deleuze assigns the two aspects the characters of space and time, that is: the subtraction and static representation — which is intrinsically spatial — is opposed to the transformational force of duration.

4 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.19
5 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.19
The shot is like the movement which continuously ensures conversion, circulation. It divides and subdivides duration according to the objects which make up the set; it reunites objects and sets into single identical duration.6

The shot is the movement of circulation and of conversion. It is the constant act of division and unification. It is an asymmetrical acknowledgement of binary oppositions as well as their redistribution. Once again, as was the case with the frame, and the subsequent analysis of the Underground corridor, Deleuze establishes an understanding of a dynamic limit, albeit of a different kind to that of the frame, which conceptually surpasses the cinematic material it has been derived from.

[film sequence]
The static shot of the platform is interrupted and a reverse shot of the same man walking back and forth is introduced. The yellow line at the edge of the platform is now to his left. He is walking away from the camera. Then a cut, and the frame is back with the initial position of the camera. The man seems to be walking closer and closer.

Next, Deleuze takes this philosophical proposition to its important conclusion: it is consciousness itself that makes these ‘divisions and reunions,’7 making the shot representative of consciousness precisely insofar as it works as the constantly active, dynamic device, negotiating oppositions. And in keeping with his overall philosophical project, Deleuze emphasises that this is not human consciousness, be it that of the person on screen or in front of it, but rather the consciousness of the camera, ‘sometimes human, sometimes inhuman or superhuman.’8 Consciousness is a split, and this split keeps being registered and re-enacted by the shot; furthermore, the shot is this split.

[film sequence]
The shot cuts to a close-up of the yellow line and the frame is filled with worn-out letters along the line. It reads: 'mind the gap,' in perspective. The word gap is closest to the camera and appears the biggest.

6 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.20
7 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.20
8 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.20
This split is not a split conceptualised as *state*; the dynamism of this act of splitting is carried through by movement, and is manifest in movement. It is movement, which lies as the key to this understanding of consciousness as divisive and unifying, that also makes this conceptual transformation *shot-like*. And in relation to this, another specificity arises:

One could say that either the division is between two wholes, or the whole between two divisions.\(^9\)

Once again, Deleuze presents a seemingly paradoxical proposition: it becomes possible to conceive not only of divisions as separating two entities, and consequently forming them into wholes (which is the more obvious understanding of the term), but also to think of wholes as gestures which lie *transversally*, as it were, ensuring unity to that which is actually transgressing the very notion of division.

And so, "it is movement itself which is decomposed and recomposed"\(^10\) in the shot. This means, in keeping with the understanding of the concepts of division and the whole, that a shot can delineate and divide movement into very concrete, quite perceptible separate movements; but also, that it will simultaneously always remain linked to the general notion of movement, becoming 'recomposed'\(^11\) as a totality, utterly indivisible and overriding any divisions which give character to separate instances of movement. The notion of movement in cinematic shot is therefore to be seen as omnipresent, informing the character of the whole, *being* the whole, and not just a simple perceptible movement of entities within sets.

These are the two aspects of the same movement. And this movement is the shot, the concrete intermediary between a whole which has changes and a set which has parts, and which constantly converts the one into the other according to its two facets.\(^12\)

Importantly, at this point Deleuze also makes the ultimate link relating the concept of the shot to the most general notion of movement-image as 'the mobile section of duration,'\(^13\) thus reconfirming the role of the shot in the construction of the whole, in that it relates

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\(^9\) Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.20
\(^10\) Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.20
\(^11\) Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.21
\(^12\) Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.22
\(^13\) Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.22
movement to the whole, which changes. It is interesting to think this particular cinematic device, the shot, as possibly embodying the ultimate operation that characterises the movement-image, thus enabling easy access to a single distinctive conceptual feature. If the shot is movement-image, then it becomes much easier to understand Deleuze's proposition regarding movement-image in the first place, rendering it, in turn, possible to locate its conceptual basis.

[film sequence]
The man walking down the corridor has walked all the way to the camera and the frame shows his legs.
He stops walking. The commotion on the platform is now taking place in the background.
Cut to a train already in the station, moving with great noise.
Then cut back to the silent shot of the empty platform, with only a couple of people standing, motionless.

Crucially, in discussing various modes of construction of the shot, Deleuze addresses the mobility of the camera as the vehicle of great importance in our understanding and perception of movement. For him, the camera – in its mobility – represents an 'equivalent' of all means of 'locomotion' which it represents and uses; in other words, the moving camera is a device which renders apparent operations and processes characteristic of all mobility, especially mobility manifest in mechanical devices, and among these Deleuze mentions – the metro:

In other words, the essence of the cinematographic movement-image lies in extracting from vehicles or moving bodies the movement which is their common substance, or extracting from movements the mobility which is their essence.

As Deleuze comments at this point, this is exactly what Bergson aimed to construe in relation to movement, but could not, at the time, recognise it happening in cinema itself, partly because of his focusing on the knowledge of the mechanical process of filming (rather than the perception of the moving image) and partly because cinema, at the time, was still not pushing forward its own ability to render direct images of time (as it would

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14 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.22
15 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.22
16 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.22
17 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.22
18 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.23
come to pass most obviously after the Second World War, according to Deleuze). To come back to the previous quote, movement-image has as its 'essence' the ability to be 'extracting' from objects in motion, in other words from movement, the very essential notion of mobility inherent in it, as it is carried in, and through, the bodies that are its vehicles.

And so, for Deleuze, cinema bears the ability to be a seemingly simple mechanical device for the extraction of movement, at its most general level. This, especially when related to his own mentioning of the metro system and the inquiry of this thesis, invites the question: outside of cinema's own particularities, what kind of movement extraction could be said to be taking place in other (urban?) constructs, which are inseparable from the mechanical presentation of movement?

[film sequence]
This is a sequence of shots, all of the same train rushing into the platform. It is recorded with several cameras, and the shot cuts between various viewpoints.
The first camera is positioned at eye level. The second one is at the beginning of the platform and the train is rushing away from it as it enters the station. The third is from one of the CCTV cameras, and it is a grainy black and white image, from a high vantage point. In all three, the train is rushing into the station. The shot goes back to the first camera as the train starts slowing down.

This ability of the shot to produce 'a mobile section of duration' is counterbalanced by its utter concreteness, or applicability, of movement itself, which removes it from the realm of 'pure' movement and places it in a very concrete context, dividing movement along the lines/bodies of numerous carriers and conveyors, which in turn form various relations of movement among themselves. This concretisation, according to Deleuze, enables constant change within the system, opening it up as a construct:

It is because pure movement varies the elements of the set by dividing them up into fractions with different denominators -- because it decomposes and recomposes the set -- that it also relates to a

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19 Deleuze, Cinema, p.23
20 Deleuze, Cinema, p.23
21 Deleuze, Cinema, p.23
fundamentally open whole, whose essence is constantly to 'become' or to change, to endure; and vice versa.\textsuperscript{22}

It is through this, that Deleuze establishes the difference between the cinematic image and the photographic image: photography leads to a solidified state of equilibrium; cinematic image keeps establishing points of anchorage and then shifting them, forming stasis and then moving over the peak of it, and past it. And this essential dynamism of the cinematic image is \textit{visibly embodied} in the cinematic shot.

The next segment Deleuze develops represents a more detailed discussion of the issue of movement, as embodied in the mobility of the camera itself. It also addresses montage as a tool that, although seemingly of a different operational level, stands nevertheless included in the shot, since the continuity of the shot can be constructed across the seeming ruptures of montage.

The first example Deleuze provides is that of a static camera. In this case, there is one fixed set within the frame, and all the shot registers is movement inside the frame, concrete and embodied in bodies/elements. It can, therefore, never provide the 'extraction' of movement (as Deleuze phrases it) and remains concrete. Deleuze claims that the shot represents in this case 'a uniquely spatial determination,' indicating a 'slice of space.'\textsuperscript{23} There is no communication between various sets, all spatiality is fixed and, in a sense, \textit{made known}. Hence, Deleuze continues to state that if we are interested in how this act of extraction of movement can come to pass (if it is not present in the case of an immobile camera), it becomes possible to detect it in two basic occurrences or acts. Firstly, it is through the movement of the camera itself. The moment the camera has started moving, the whole perception on and of movement changes. The other possible action is that of montage – which connects shots into \textit{continuity}, shots which, otherwise, 'could perfectly well remain fixed.'\textsuperscript{24} And so, in the second case, it becomes possible to extract 'pure mobility' from the movement of elements (objects, characters) inside the shot, with little or no camera mobility at all.

\textsuperscript{22} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema1}, p.23
\textsuperscript{23} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema1}, p.24
\textsuperscript{24} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema1}, p.25
This is a very short shot recorded by a camera tracking down the platform, in the opposite direction of the advancing train. The proximity of the train and the direction of its movement in relation to the movement of the camera make the train seem faster.

And so, Deleuze establishes a very particular understanding of the shot (agreeing, as he states, with Jean Mitry's definition of it):

The word 'shot' can be reserved for fixed spatial determinations, slices of space or distances in relation to the camera.

Setting aside the possible interest in this insistence on spatiality for the moment, and its relationship to the camera, it becomes possible through such a conceptual act to state that it is sequence of shots, which renders it possible to indicate pure movement — and relate the shot to duration itself. In other words, shots:

As immobile spatial determinations, are perfectly capable of being, in this sense, the multiplicity which corresponds to the unity of the shot, as mobile section or temporal perspective.25

That is to say, the shot itself, as a concept and a unified entity, represents at its very outset a multiplicity: it is always the result of a series (of gestures, of acts) — a series whose elements are still present in their multiplicity, and whose presence enables the release of 'pure mobility' from its concrete context and carriers. It is, once again, the fact that continuity has been disrupted that enables the creation of unity, and what creates unity (and is, at the same time, through this act of creation displaced, or extracted from it) is the 'pure' notion of mobility (or pure movement) itself.

The camera is static as the train rushes next to it and past it in the direction of the depth of the frame. As the train is slowing down, the camera starts moving parallel to the train and in the same direction. These two relative speeds are set off against the movement of people who are slowly approaching the edge of the platform.

Deleuze observes this kind of inherent multiplicity of the shot in several different concrete constellations. Firstly, there is the continuity of camera movement, which cuts across

25 Deleuze, Cinema1, pp.25-6
different angles or points of view – as is the case of the tracking shot. Secondly, two or more shots can be unified through the 'continuity of connection'; although there are several distinct shots present, they have been rendered continuous and therefore unified through their very link. The third one is what Deleuze calls the 'long-duration' (fixed or mobile) shot, or sequence shot as it is commonly known in cinematic vocabulary. This shot can include several different spatial depths; it can range from close-up to long distance, but remains unified, once again owing to the continuity of movement. The second variant of sequence shot sees the cancellation of depth and return to the two-dimensional character of the image, placing all content at the front, at a single surface, whose multiplicity is inherent in its constant 'reframings.' Importantly, all these should be seen as unities of shots (or the shot as unity of a series):

It is a unity of movement, and it embraces a correlative multiplicity which does not contradict it.

The unity of shot is, in this case (and in keeping with a number, if not all of Deleuze's conceptual gestures), a matter of connecting laterally, so to speak; it is, once again, an external thread (in this case of movement) that unifies a number of disparate elements. Furthermore, they remain disparate since the act and means of unification lie on the outside of their own defining terms.

The consequence of such an understanding of unity is of crucial significance for Deleuze's theory of cinema: it is at this junction, with the shot, which represents the bridge and an introduction of discontinuity as manifest in montage, that one of the most important conceptual notions has been revealed, that of unification across boundaries through movement, and through (and in spite of) ruptures. In establishing this, Deleuze practically introduces two different notions of wholeness:

Therefore the whole must renounce its ideality, and become the synthetic whole of the film which is realised in the montage of the parts; and, conversely, the parts must be selected, coordinated, enter into connections and liaisons which, through montage, reconstitute the virtual sequence shot or the analytic whole of the cinema.

26 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.26
27 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.26
28 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.27
29 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.27
30 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.27
And these are the two poles, always present in the shot, as Deleuze proposes: different sets and their parts enter into what he terms as 'relative continuities'; but there are also the inevitable 'breaks and ruptures' and these only go to show that the unity of the whole is 'not here.' The whole belongs and is formed in the space outside, not here, but somewhere there; out-there. This whole cannot be identified with ruptures themselves any more than it can be identified with those more apparent continuities. Once again, it is the function of duration, as the real force of change. The whole 'appears in false continuities,' which, for Deleuze, represent 'an essential pole of the cinema.' In other words, what is most significant about cinema, the characteristic that defines it, around which all revolves and in which everything is rooted, grounded – is this notion of false continuity.

False continuity is neither a connection of continuity, nor a rupture or a discontinuity in the connection.

And also:

False continuity is in its own right a dimension of the Open, which escapes sets and their parts.

There is always continuity and it is always false, since it is always of series. This is a notion that will prove to be of great interest in the discussion of multiplicities of movement on the Underground, as manifest in the platform event, and the general relationship between the Underground and the city.

[film sequence]
This is one tracking shot that has been cut into a series of separate shots. The camera is following the advancement of the train along the platform, but it has been cut in several places and there are parts of the tracking missing. Shots that remain chart out the progress of the train but with every cut

31 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.27
32 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.27
33 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.27
34 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.28
35 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.28
36 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.28
37 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.28
the camera seems to have advanced closer to the tunnel, regardless of its own movement. The jumps end in the camera stopping just before the tunnel.
The condition of the platform, and its event, stand at a distinct point of corporeal transformation of the Underground, especially in relation to movement. The platform begins there where the automatic walking of the corridor-body stops; the aim of arriving back into the city has not yet been reached, nevertheless a transformation is about to occur. There is a gap to be crossed in more than just the spatial way – it is a transformation of the moving body to another level, that of the feeling (affective) body, and the gap of the platform represents the beginning of this transformation, as well as the zone in which a very peculiar relationship between the body and time is forged, time as representation, as well as duration. Therefore, the platform can be seen to be defined by: its difference from the corridor, as a shift in corporeal perception and action; its difference from what is to ensue, the state of movement being transformed into tactility and expression, which constitute the body once it has become part of the carriage event (to be discussed in the following chapter); and by the characteristics of transformation of movement, which constitutes the event of the platform itself, culminating in the encounter between the body and the moving train.

The Underground corridor has been shown to be the site of the repetitive act of walking which, placed against the backdrop of reduction that is the corridor itself, constitutes a particular corporeal condition in respect to body's relation to its surrounds. From the perspective of the walking body, the first defining characteristic of the platform is the release from the spatial (and other) confines of the 'bowel-like tunnels' of the corridor, and the encounter both with the notion of the spatial void (as manifest in operational space of the platform, as well as the void relegated to the train) and the notion of the anticipating body.

[voiceover]
You have been walking down the corridor. It ends now, and you are entering a platform.
Observe the open space around you. Look at the yellow line at the edge of the platform, and the tracks below it. You are still walking but you are gradually slowing down now.
Now stop. Look at the dark hole of the tunnel. Wait.
The act of walking out of the corridor onto a platform is an act of opening; it is an introduction of a different corporeal sense of space, of change in body's relation to other bodies, and of new possibilities. Ultimately, where movement is in question, the momentum and motivation are taken out of the body, as it is introduced to the state of waiting or anticipation. It is important to note that the experience of the Underground is constantly bound in movement, be it corporeal or of the object/mechanism/environment. Unlike the corridor, the escalator, elevator and even the carriage, the platform caters for suspension of movement, a waiting and anticipation of movement. The platform itself is the gap in the constant movement and action that is so characteristic of the Underground experience. Movement has truly ceased to be informed by a global purpose, there is nothing to do but wait for the continuation of action and, if acted out, walking represents the ultimately futile action of bridging the gap between movements.

This extraction of motivated corporeal movement - since there is possibility of movement, but it remains purposeless until the arrival of the train - is accompanied by the release of extensive spatial intensity: located between two confinements, of the corridor and the carriage, the platform is a quasi-open space. This caters for an increase in the sense of choice, of possibility of movement; and yet, all movement is rendered aimless, since the only act of the platform is the waiting itself. This aspect is tightly related to the notion of temporal representations.

38 This generalisation, although not cancelled, can be significantly undermined once the Underground line surfaces; but this situation is strictly speaking outside the experience of the "Underground" as such.
[voiceover]

You are still looking at the tunnel. Nothing is happening.

Turn around towards the platform display. Read what is written on it. There should be some numbers.

Observe how the numbers replace one another. See how the figure 2 replaces 3. And then 2 turns into 1.

Look at the tunnel opening. Now.

The Underground forges a curious relationship between mobile inactivity and the notion of time, and this is most acutely evident in the platform event. Seeing that the reason for the Underground lies in conveyance and embodiment of movement, every instance of cancellation of movement is going to contradict its operative mode, and will hence be likely to produce a certain kind of disruption in the sense of the Underground as an event on the whole. This kind of interruption of the operational regime is evident in the mentioned cancellation of movement within the platform event. However, it is made specific by the fact that the conceptual relationship between movement and time is proposed in a way that makes it (the connection) extremely graphic: there is a direct visual sign of it - the countdown display.

As was discussed in the introductory chapter in reference to Deleuze's appropriation of Bergson's understanding of time as lived duration and time as representation, Deleuze finds the clock to represent the most direct illustration of subordination of time unto space: the clock hand charts out even spatial segments and assigns them the value of charted-out time; it fragments duration reducing it to a quantifiable representation, which, according both to Bergson and Deleuze, negates its qualitative, representation-eluding character.

Deleuze does not discuss (and seeing that Bergsonism was written in the 1960s it is not too surprising) the difference between an analogue clock and a digital one, and it would be, no doubt, an interesting issue to address the highly hierarchical and numerically coded sign regime of the digital representation of time; however, this lies outside the immediate interest of this enquiry. What is of relevance here is that fact that the platform event conjures its intrinsic character of a waiting place with the temporal representation of waiting; it displays the absence of movement and aims to bridge the gap between
movements; and it does so through a representation of temporality in its most charted out, least durational manifestation: as relative, and in reverse.

The displays, inseparable from platforms as they are, carry two kinds of information: the ultimate destination of the train, and the time left before train's arrival at the platform. Displaying the destination represents a direct sign of Underground's link with the city above it (the 'Overground') and a sign of the ultimate motivation of movement within the system: to reach the target destination, to be inside the city again. The time accompanies the information on destination by clearly (spatially) charting out this territory of suspended motion that has arisen. Minutes become uniform units separating movement from movement, and reducing whatever subsists between the two to a visual representation eventually reducible to zero, to nothing. A gap has presented itself and the system is trying its best to bypass it; time has found itself uncharted by movement, and whatever is left once there is no movement to serve as indicator of time passing ('movement is a mobile section of duration') needs to be controlled, confined and ultimately – erased.

This phase of waiting is interesting for its corporeal regime: as was mentioned, the body has lost its aim of action and is now in state of suspense. Simultaneously, corporeal action shifts in the direction of perception. In the corridor, the body was moving and there was neither the 'time,' nor the opportunity, nor material for perception; now, with the immediate action taken out of the body, perception of the surrounds presents itself with more force. It is this state of waiting that attracts the advertising on the walls of the platform – it is not simply that there is more space; it is that the body is waiting or anticipating, which is an obvious figure of perception. The space has seemingly opened, changing the mode of the body from the more automatically mobile to the more perceptive. This shift is at another level simply another slip into a different kind of automatism, in that the act of waiting itself does not represent a total release. The journey, the continual action, has been only temporarily paused; and significantly, there is the constant countdown, the situation of charted out time, time as representation, which takes over the automatism of walking. Instead of automatic walking the body is in automatic waiting, with a constant countdown (time in reverse) being displayed on the screens along the platform.
The waiting mode (of the body) is terminated with the arrival of the train, which heralds the return of movement. However, the crucial transformation that took place was the transformation of movement into non-human and non-corporeal; the waiting body becomes, with the arrival of the train, ready to make the transition from moving itself to being moved (in more than one sense of the word), and this is marked by the crossing of the gap separating the train from the platform.

This return of movement in a radically different form – the arrival of the moving object – presents the body with a set of particular circumstances, and it does not mark the end of the platform event, but its core. This takes place through a series of occurrences, all of which indicate the transformation particular for the event, worth relating in more detail; the transformation is one of movement, but manifest in the corporeal regime. The arrival of the train represents the site of transformation of movement: crossing (cutting) from body to machine as its vehicles, the movement releases the body and enters the machine. This is a metropolitan condition, the ultimate dynamic interface between the subject and the man-made object – between the human and that which can be called: the architectural.

This is the regime of the platform before the arrival of the train: movement has been extracted from the body, not least in the sense of paused global movement within the Underground system, in relation to the city as movement's own motivating force. The ensuing suspension of action (the wait) is underlined by the emergence of quantifiable temporal representation (the display countdown), the aim of which is cancellation of any sense of time as duration. The corporeal regime is, therefore, already one of heightened perception or anticipation.

[voiceover]

Look closely at the mouth of the tunnel.
Nothing is happening. Then, you start hearing an almost imperceptible hum, somewhere in the distance. The sound is slowly getting louder. Suddenly, you can see lights reflected on the steel rails inside the tunnel. The lights are moving, changing location, catching different parts of the tracks, getting closer and closer.

Then a sudden rush of air reaches your face, starts pressing into your skin, and blowing in your hair. It is getting stronger by the second; so is the sound. You can clearly see the lights of the advancing train and then, suddenly, it rushes into the station, against the platform, the current of air hitting you.

Then the front carriage runs past you and wind diminishes and the carriages are becoming separate and distinct as the train is slowing down.

The transformations that occur are brought about by signs heralding the arrival of the train; this is the condition of anticipation coming to an end, but not ending. Once the train has rushed into the station and started slowing down, the gist of the occurrence observed is over. This ‘essence’ of the event is located between the arrival and the waiting that anticipates it, and represents an **embodiment** of this anticipation, in that it facilitates for the corporeal manifestation of signs of anticipation.

The signs of the train are also the signs of movement and also of continuation of movement as it is manifest both in the moving body and in the overall journey of the Underground. The approaching train causes movements of the senses rather than the body: it is the vibration of sound, the liminal condition of light and the tactility of air-currents. These three are invariably connected to the tunnel and are located in another sign, the external sign of anticipation: the dark hole of the tunnel. This impenetrable, dark surface is the zone of contact between the tunnel and the platform, the interface between the two, and a screen for the projection of anticipation.

The presentation of signs varies according to individual situations (stations) and the order in which they might come is variable. The first one to be mentioned is the least obviously tactile light, the light flashed by the train, reflected off the rails and carried ahead of the movement of the train. The second one is sound, the equally distant hum of the moving machine. Far from being particular and easily recognisable, the sound is at its beginning as illusive and abstract as the light – a sign of something, not yet known. Finally, there is the advancement of air, which starts equally imperceptibly, but presents
itself with more physical force than any of the other, since it reaches the body on the platform in the most obviously tactile manner, pushing against it.

The three signs of movement (of emergence of movement) delineate, in effect, corporeal perception: they are the recreation of the senses, in their link with movement and yet outside (before) movement has been made manifest in the object (train), and after it had been enacted by the body (corridor). There is a shift in what the body is, and this is embodied in the introduction of tactility, in a way that hasn't operated up to that point. The body will then go on to become tactile in a more complex sense inside the carriage. But at this point, it is a very special condition of perception that presents itself: the body has been awakened.

[voiceover]

As the train is slowing down, the faces inside the carriages become distinct.

Then the train stops and the doors open right in front of you.

You can see a face staring right back at you.
As was shown in the opening part of the chapter, Deleuze's definition of the shot sees it as definitive of movement, in that it particularises movement and assigns it a concrete manifestation. Furthermore, the relationship between the shot and movement is inseparable from the notion of the cut, which becomes immersed in (as well as a gesture of) movement and serves to enable its continuity, regardless of apparent spatial discontinuities it introduces, instigating the notion of movement of the whole. The cut, or interruption, positions the cinematic shot between the acts of framing and montage, which further underlines the conceptual importance of the shot. The cut is seen as a particular formative limit, which is the limit of the shot, but also of movement that the shot relates.

How is this to be placed in the context of the event of the platform? This investigation focuses on one crucial aspect of the platform event: the manifestation of movement. The platform is to be seen as the site of confrontation between two different regimes of particularisation of movement, and the key act is the crossing from one regime to the other – manifest in the body and the object/mechanism, respectively – as it offers an understanding of continuity of movement, regardless of the successive alteration of vessels that carry or embody it. The relationship forged between the body and its environs, with respect to the movement they both convey, is crucial for the understanding of the most general notion of 'Underground movement;' ultimately, it addresses the act of cinematic montage (as envisioned by Deleuze) in relation to the Underground as the metropolitan movement-machine. This relationship has its most critical manifestation in the confrontation between the body and the moving object of the Underground train.

As discussed in the first chapter, the Underground corridor represents a very specific event of the body: the character of corporeal mobility that forms it, the repetitiveness of bodily action and the body/environment construct it suggests, delineate a specific corporeal condition in reference to mobility and notions of movement in general. On the other hand, the event of the Underground carriage (which is to be discussed in detail in the following chapter) represents the site of corporeality, from which movement has been
extracted – at least at the level of the body as the mobile whole (i.e. the level of what Deleuze terms as 'molar') and, as such, represents a radically different condition to that of the corridor event, both in terms of the condition of corporeality and manifestations of movement itself. The carriage represents the site of movement of the object/environment, as well as transformation of bodily movement into expression, both of which overthrow the regime established in the corridor event.

Located between these two clearly defined and, in respect to movement, radically opposed conditions of corporeality, lies the event of the Underground platform, with its own specificities, one of which is the notion of rupture or cutting, and its relation to the specific vehicles/conduits/manifestations of movement. This transition is delineated by a literal cut, one located in the gap separating the platform from the carriage, a rupture that, although resolved in the space of a single step, is nevertheless perfectly present as a site of transformation; but the formation of the cut takes place in a much more complex set of occurrences, which are all to be located in, and on the surface of, the body.

The cinematic shot, for Deleuze, always involves the tracing of concrete movements manifest in the elements of the set, as well as movement crossing from one set to the next. But the shot also relates the more abstract movement of the whole, and this aspect of change is drawn into the cinematic image through the operation of cutting. In the chapter on the Underground corridor, it was shown that there is always the concrete movement of bodies inside the Underground system, but also the more general notion of movement within the city, which the Underground facilitates for; the imperceptible movement of the whole system, movement as reason behind the system.

The latter aspect of movement is manifest in a particular regime of temporal representation characteristic for the platform event, and made visible in the platform display: there is an attempt to replace the lived experience of time (duration) by its representation (time as movement in space), and one that reduces this 'excess' time to nothingness. The continuity of embodied movement has been interrupted, and time, without movement to chart out and represent it – cannot be shown to exist. However, this understanding of the totality of movement within the city, and its concrete interruption in the platform event – which consequently gives rise to the presence of a sense of duration
is only the most obvious understanding of the notion of movement external to the body, movement not to be detected directly in the 'image.'

The notion of divisions and subdivisions of sets through movement, on the other hand, relates to the fact that the platform represents a conversion of two manifest operational modes of mobility. These operational modes are linked to change in the condition of corporeal movement itself (from the corridor to the platform) but are, also, the consequence of the existence of movement manifest in the train. The presence of the moving object actually represents the introduction of non-corporeal movement, movement of the body that is not human, but mechanical. This makes the operation of conversion of movement twofold. Firstly, there is the very change of movement of the body: as described in the previous part of the chapter, having reached the platform, the body loses the status of a walking entity, constantly in movement; this opens up the 'space' necessary for the advance of perception. The body anticipates the arrival of the object, and the object simply presents another manifestation of movement – except that it eventually serves the purpose of extracting movement from the human body.

This is a very concrete conversion of movement from the movement of the body to that of the object (or environs) – which, in itself, introduces a new understanding of movement. The shot is seen by Deleuze to ensure 'conversion, circulation. It divides and subdivides duration,' which means that it relates concrete manifestations of duration, embodied in movement, charting time out (mobile section of duration); movement, in turn, is charted out, or subdivided, by the bodies that carry it. In the case of the Underground platform, the variety of concrete manifestations of movement become the point of corporeal realisation of the presence of movement outside the body itself, both as the moving object/environment, and as the very act of extraction of movement. This act of extraction can be said to happen on the surface of the body, introducing the experience of the carriage that is to ensue, and ensure the qualitative transformation of movement into expression.

This 'act of extraction of corporeal movement' manifests itself through acts constitutive of the very presentation of the train - the visual, aural and tactile signs of the advancing

39 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.20
train, which confront the waiting and anticipating body on the Underground platform as the train enters the platform. They represent perceptible signs of the existence of movement outside the multiplicity, constancy and uniformity of movement evident in human bodies, so representative of much of the Underground experience. Furthermore, the signs do not simply denote the moving object of the train; they are also, quite literally, an act of movement, physically affecting the body. Perception of signs is inherently dynamic, in that it is perception of movement. Unlike the movement of the body, which stands as the 'limit of perception,' where the object of perception can be taken as static itself (as in the corridor), the movement has now been taken to reach the body through perception, while the body is in its waiting, anticipating, perceptive mode. Movement, in this case quite literally, is the limit of perception; except that it comes the other way round, from the direction of material perceived. This, in itself, is the gesture of extraction: no more the sole property of the body – which has been moving through the context of static space/objects – movement is now presented to the body as an external property. But since it comes first as the advent of corporeal, mobile signs of the movement of the object (train), the externalisation of movement is firstly accomplished through the act of its extraction from the body. Only then will the moving object make itself known.

Deleuze's cinematic discussion becomes more particular when it comes to the question of mobility of the shot itself (as opposed to mobility within the shot), which comes to pass with the very mobility of the camera. Depending on the relationship between movement of the viewpoint of the shot and the movement of the material within it, Deleuze distinguishes several possible formations, which can in turn engender their own subclassifications, leading ultimately to the inclusion of montage as a device which, although an act of cutting and therefore disruption of spatial continuities, enables, nevertheless, the establishing of a different kind of shot continuity, one that cuts across several seemingly separate shots.

As was related in more detail in the first part of the chapter, the most basic relationship between the two movements (that of the camera and the elements of the set) is represented in a static camera: there is nothing but the movement of elements within the set; without the movement of elements, there can be no (apparent) movement within the shot. The second possibility comes with the introduction of camera movement: regardless of whether the set is static or mobile, there is a certain specific notion of
movement and change that presents itself once the camera (that is – the viewpoint on the set) starts moving. Third possibility is that of montage, which introduces a specific continuity of the shot, which can unify several shots into one through the notion of continuity of movement, regardless of movement of one of these shots themselves, which can remain fixed. This third variant can come itself in three modes: as a tracking shot (unity of movement overriding difference in viewpoints); as a series of shots unified by the way in which they are connected (in movement); and the sequence shot (or long-duration shot as Deleuze calls it), which either unifies different spatial depths or emphasises single depth (2-dimensionality of the image) through the use of constant reframings. In all of the cases, the shot is conceived as a multiplicity of constitutive aspects, a multiplicity unified across various ruptures and discontinuities through the very notion of continuity of movement. Importantly, the elements that together constitute multiplicities, reveal the primary characteristic of the shot – it’s identity with the spatial determination established in relation to the camera. Simply put, shot is determined through the spatial relationship between the camera and its object of attention, whereas all continuity formative of the shot is located in the continuity of movement, in the logic of mobility.

Practically, this means that Deleuze offers a very simple conceptual scheme, which ties together: a viewpoint (of the camera, on the set); a spatial determination of the relationship between the viewpoint and the set; and movement, as action which can run across seeming ruptures. This represents a very clear conceptual framework, based on three aspects: the localisation of perception in general; its particular spatial relationship with its surrounds; and movement as the force which enables creation of continuities, regardless of apparent changes of viewpoint and its spatial relations with the set.

Seeing as the event of the platform holds its specificity precisely in the fact that it represents a transition from one form of corporeal movement to another, as well as the transition of movement from the body to the object (train), this conceptual scheme becomes extremely useful, for it offers a way of discussing the continuity of action (movement, mobility) across the apparent division between the human body and the mechanical object of the Underground train. The importance of this lies not only in the explanation of the relationship between the two; much more importantly, this conceptual model offers a way of discussing the mobility of the relationship established between the
human, and the urban environment. In other words, such an approach, in making a
breach with the static notions of body/space or subject/object, paves a way of thinking
urban phenomena in their indisputable yet conceptually neglected dynamism.

One of the more intriguing aspects of Deleuze’s proposition arises precisely at this point,
and regards the relation between movement and consciousness. For Deleuze, it is
consciousness that performs the acts of conversion and circulation of the two indicated
aspects of movement; furthermore, this is not human consciousness, but consciousness
of the camera itself. This consciousness of the camera, in a sense, represents a process
of rendering conscious world/realitiy; it is the presentation of mind in the matter. For
Deleuze, this operation of camera placement, of acts of framing and creation of shots,
stands as a constant process of rendering conscious the very material the camera lens is
seemingly only visually describing or representing, and this makes cinema, in Deleuze’s
philosophy, the perfect vehicle for the presentation of the notion of continuity between
matter and consciousness.

Furthermore, and importantly for this discussion, Deleuze sees the camera as equivalent
to all means of locomotion, naming the metro system as one of the devices of locomotion
which are camera-like. For Deleuze, the mechanical eye of the camera is consciousness
itself, and a case of ‘the eye in the matter.’ But more than offering just a record of
movement, and a mechanical, indirect chart of, the camera is also immersed in
movement itself, which is where Deleuze locates the parallel with systems of locomotion.
It is through the shot, as the determination of movement, that the ‘mobile section of
duration’ is provided. In the case of the camera, it is evidently visual; but that is only one
possible device of extraction of movement. Cinematic movement-image is a sublimation
of movement extraction through image and the camera is its vehicle.

The mentioned ‘perception being brought forward’ means that the anticipation of the train
has been made manifest in a crisp, clear-cut choreography of the senses – visual, aural
and tactile. The ‘choreography’ casts the body into its (body’s) perceptual mould; it veils
the body in its perceptual self. It is as if the body was made to bring into focus its own
ability to be a perceptive device; and by doing so, made to acknowledge the passing of
movement, from itself to the object, in an intensified manner. A device of perception,
switched on to record movement, to extract movement from the ‘image’ of reality on hand
the way of the camera. It embodies a viewpoint, and establishes a spatial relation to the 'set' around it. But more than anything else, by extracting movement from the body and assigning it to the mobile object of the train, the event of the platform constructs the meeting point of consciousness with matter, of the human and the non-human.

Possibly the most interesting aspect of the Underground platform is that it locates the body at this edge between the mechanism and consciousness; the body is simultaneously turned into an automaton subservient to movement, and the locus of conscious conversion of movement's various states through consciousness (consciousness itself being directly linked to duration). The body is pushed towards the mechanical, then its perception brought forward (first sign of movement extraction) and finally its mobility, seemingly so inherent, is taken over by the movement of the object/mechanism. It is in this sense, that the Underground is cinematic – it pushes the lived regime of the body towards the mechanical regime of movement and perception, characteristic for the camera, and then takes out all the movement from the body to assign it to the moving mechanical object. This choreographed series of acts brings the body to its mobile limit, confronts it with where it becomes the non-human, the object, the world; and by doing so, in a sense – it immerses consciousness in matter.

The main question that this comparison raises is the following: if cinema is, in Deleuze's hands, to be taken as a device which makes apparent this aspect of reality, renders the movement-image quite literally visible (and at the same time, the camera that enables it is seen by Deleuze himself to be simply another form of locomotion device) – isn't it then most intriguing to think about the possible occurrences which reveal the same operations of consciousness and of reality, but which are not made apparent through the mechanics of movement-image? In other words, cinematic image is the movement-image that has isolated, purified the experience of movement and duration; but is it possible to recognise an 'architectural,' urban example of the same conceptual operation characteristic of reality, without it being so obviously isolated (the way it is in cinema)? Or differently yet, if cinematic image is a movement-image on a screen, is it not possible to see it brought forward (and experienced) in a much less isolated form and situation? Such an operation, which is attempted here, would then pave the way not only to a different understanding of architecture and its numerous aspects in a (hopefully liberating)
Deleuzian manner, but actually show that what Deleuze finds isolated in cinema can be already said to be a crucial metropolitan operation. This would eventually go to show that the urban condition of the Underground is already a cinematic condition (and that is why the two seem to converge time and again without any remotely satisfying theory developed to explain what it is that links them) and furthermore, that it is not 'world as a cinema,' but rather as *Metropolis*.

As is the case with film, and the shot especially, the Underground – and the platform as its crucial event – serves as a (urban) movement-extractor; and where the Underground becomes more intriguing than cinema, is that it does not cross the line of what can be seen (outside Deleuze's philosophy) as representation: it never abandons any of the senses, or, at least, does not transform their relation to the body the way film does. How is this to be understood as such, if the camera is crucial for this operation? It is by rendering the human body partly inhuman, by automating it, by making it mechanical, by making it *camera-like*. It is not simply that the sense of vision has been made camera-like; it is the whole of the body that has been pushed to the edge of being partly inhuman, which in turn makes it able to access aspects of reality it otherwise does not access directly. Not Kino-ok. Kino-bod.

This is the proposition, then: when partaking in the platform event (body-space-object, tied together in/by movement) human consciousness can be said to be charting out the Deleuzian notion of consciousness of the camera, as the placement of mind in matter. This 'charting out' is a transitional sequence, a movement itself, which puts into relation, and converts, the global notion of movement to its local manifestation, as well as the movement of the body in contrast to the movement of the object. This event of the 'consciousness of the camera' is shot-like precisely because the shot itself stands, in Deleuze's theory of cinema, as the ultimate tool of conversion of movement; conversion of movement is the act of consciousness of the camera; and the consciousness of the camera is a transition sequence, a *movement* of mind into matter.

On the platform, the mechanics of the walking body have come to a halt; the absence of movement is rendered absolute; the presentation of movement of matter itself (manifest in the object) is taking over from the body through perception, through the act of *drawing*
the mind itself to the surface of the body, by the object, and into the object. The event of the Platform has become a shot, an event of cinema – yet fully inhabited.
The frame is still. It is a view down an empty Underground platform, focusing on the mouth of the tunnel. The tunnel is a simple, impenetrably dark, curved surface of blackness. The image is so still, as to appear not to be film at all, but a photograph.

After a while, the camera starts to zoom-in on the tunnel, almost imperceptibly. The parts of the platform space are very slowly disappearing at the edges of the frame, and the dark surface in the middle of the frame is getting bigger and bigger. The zooming stops just before the edges of the tunnel have disappeared. Most of the screen is dark now, but it is possible to tell that this is an image of the round-shaped tunnel entry.

The image remains still.
The image remains still.
Then it goes into fade out.

The screen is blindingly white.
Your eyes are trying to adjust to the unexpected brightness, but there is nothing to hold on to.
So you just keep blinking into the empty white image, waiting for something to happen.

Fade-in.
The pale of the screen is slowly filling with grey; then shapes start appearing inside this grey surface, density of shadow grouping in some areas more than others. Soon, it becomes apparent that the darkest part of the screen is going to be its middle and, almost simultaneously, you realise that this is the same frame of the tunnel mouth.
The image is restored.

Now, a zoom-out begins, much faster than the initial zooming-in.
More and more of the platform becomes quickly revealed, and it seems to be populated by people. Some are standing, some sitting, one is pacing up and down the platform. The person pacing is a man with curly hair. He is looking at his feet, and seems abstracted. He stops, his back to the camera, and lifts his head to face the tunnel.

The tunnel is blank, and black.

You are watching the man's hair start to move. Then the sleeves of his shirt.
Something is going on in the darkness of the tunnel, but it is impossible to say what.
The man is lowering his head, preparing.
Wind seems to be getting stronger judging by his stance. He is leaning forward slightly.

Then the screen splits.
You can see several images simultaneously.
One is a quick zoom onto the tunnel mouth and the tiny lights appearing inside it. The other is a close-up of the man’s hair. You can see individual hairs and they all seem to be moving, away from the face. 

There is an extreme close-up of his eye, the part that is possible to see from the position of the camera, and the eyes are narrowed. He seems to be squinting.

Then the images freeze. But the sounds remains, and it becomes possible to observe the angles of the man and the mouth of the tunnel, frozen, eventless, while the hum of the train is slowly turning into a roar.

At the moment when the sound of the incoming train has become an overpowering presence, the images start moving; as the train enters the platform, it is possible to see four different angles of it, and of the man confronting it.

Cut.

Back to the platform before the arrival of the train. The man is standing, his head lowered, and he is peering into the tunnel. As the sound starts rising, the man starts moving, walking in the direction of the tunnel. The sound is getting louder, and the man is walking faster and faster. As the train rushes into the station with the sound of a whistle, the man feels the impact of the moving train, the impact of air current pushed ahead of the train. The blow is significant, and, with his hair flying, he stops for a moment to regain his balance, smiling to himself, and then keeps walking past the train as it is moving into the station and slowing down.

Cut.

This is the footage of the CCTV cameras on the platform. The image is black and white, and grainy. It is possible to discern individual bodies, but not the faces. There is no sound. There are several cameras along the platform, and it is possible to see the train arrive and slow down from a number of positions along the platform. The footage is left at your disposal.
Close-up, Carriage
CLOSE-UP

The affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face....

In a world consisting of images, a world that is images, we are just one type of image. What differentiates us, is a certain gap: while other images interconnect to form a chain of continual action and reaction, the image that is mind is inseparable from the notion of disruption of this ceaseless movement. Before the perceived is transformed into the acted, a gap subsists. It is the space necessary for the presentation of thought; it is also the locus of the affectual. In Deleuze's philosophy of cinema, this is the location of the affection-image, suspended between perception-image and action-image as it is.

This conceptual outline serves Deleuze as an axis around which to develop an understanding of the cinematic close-up. Chapter 6 of Cinema 1 opens with the following statement: 'The affection-image is the close up, and the close-up is the face...' only to be immediately followed by Deleuze's acknowledgement of Eisenstein's proposition that the close-up does not represent 'merely one type of image among others,' but rather, serves as the main cinematic vehicle for the conveyance of the affective aspects of the film. Working from these two initial inputs, Eisenstein's and Bergson's, Deleuze constructs a theory of the close-up that assigns it a special role in the creation of cinematic image, enabling a perspective on it that opens onto territories wider than might be expected.

The affect, Deleuze elaborates, develops along the following directions or sides: the 'sensitive nerve,' which is on the side of perception, and the 'motor tendency,' which leads to action. In a sense, there is already a tendency within the affect itself in the direction of territories that lie outside it, and Deleuze's question is: if one aspect of this system is being suppressed in favour of the other, what will the consequences be?

[film sequence]

Hand-held camera framing the corridor moves down it.

Inside the frame there are bodies walking, in the same direction as the camera, facing away from it.

All the bodies in the frame are faceless, and there is a display of backs, necks, shoulders.

The frame captures hair: black, blond, short; a bold head.

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1 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.87
2 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.87
The backdrop to all the bodies is the corridor, in perspective. The walls are curved and the view of its end obstructed by the moving bodies. Its direction is evident in its shape, length and the order of tiling on its walls.

It's a long sequence shot, since the corridor itself is long, and the frame keeps rocking from side to side. Then the corridor ends with a sharp turn to the left and the frame is filled with a frontal image of the train tunnel wall; a diagram of the train line occupies the centre of the frame. It is a vertical black line, with series of letters along it.

The frame is now static and, after several seconds a train rushes into the image, a blur of colours and fast repetition of windows that open onto lit interiors. This succession of window frames starts slowing down until a single window is inside the film frame – and there is one face of a person sitting, facing the camera, looking directly into the lens.

This is initially how Deleuze conceives the face: in the bi-polar arrangement between perception and action (input/output) the balance is disturbed in favour of the perceptive tendency. Since action does not vanish (there can be no state of inaction in Bergson's universe) it means that it just takes on a different guise. Deleuze claims that it changes scale and consequently quality, transforming into micro-movements, which in turn enter intensive series. These intensive series are qualitatively different to movement that preceded them, in that the two belong to substantially different realms (what Deleuze terms in this case the molar and the molecular). In effect, movement has been transformed into expression:

When a part of the body has had to sacrifice most of its motoricity in order to become the support for organs of reception, the principal feature of these will now only be tendencies to movement or micro-movements which are capable of entering into intensive series, for a single organ or from one organ to another.3

The most prominent example of such a transformation is – the face itself:

It is this combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements which constitute the affect. But is this not the same as a Face itself?4

3 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.87
4 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.87
The camera is positioned as if it were a body seated in a carriage seat. Straight in front of the camera there is a person seated, and the frame captures their upper body, the slumped head and a fragment of moving darkness beyond the window behind it. The eyes are downcast.

There is a slow zoom-in onto the face. When the frame is filled with the head, leaving only a fragment of the backdrop, the head moves slightly up, exposing the face. Then the eyelids lift and the eyes focus on the lens.

More than merely seeing it as representative of a notion or a process, Deleuze suggests that it is the face itself that is the initial site of this process as much as it is the process itself:

Each time we discover these two poles in something – reflecting surface and intensive micro-movements – we can say that this thing has been treated as a face [visage]: it has been ‘envisaged’ or rather ‘facefied’ [visageifiee], and in turn it stares at us [devisage], it looks at us...even if it does not resemble a face.  

There is a long take of the face in close-up while it is looking back at the lens; then the moving image advances to double speed. The minute changes in expression become apparent: the blinking is fast and the time between individual blinks shortened; the twitching of muscles constant, spreading across the surface of the face in waves; the lips are moving and occasionally slightly parting; the position of the head is always changing, supported by the neck, framed by the limit of the lens.

Naming the face does not provide only a useful example serving to explain a number of occurrences (as in: it resembles a face...); it also serves as a basis for the creation of the concept that deals with the transformation of action into expression, which will be called upon in the final part of this chapter. In other words, the issue is not one of representation – where Face, as physical entity, is taken to represent an embodiment of a metaphysical process.

5 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.87
Note: ‘facefied,’ in the case of this translation of Cinema 1 by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam is in 1000 plateaus translated as ‘facialized.’ In both cases it is supposed to mean: rendered face-like, and the term used will be the latter.
Consequently, Deleuze is proposing that the face is the same as the close-up, and as the affection image, and there is no hierarchy imposed that would render one of the aspects more significant or responsible for the formation than another. All three lie in the same plane. There is no such thing as a close-up of the face any more than there is a face of the close-up; similarly, the affection-image is not to be taken to represent the metaphysical 'face' of the physical image. As Deleuze himself puts it:

There is no close-up of the face, the face is in itself close-up, the close-up is by itself face and both are affect, affection-image.6

The consequence of this overturn of the expected order of relations (established between concepts and physical entities that are supposed to embody them) is one that directly influences this investigation. If there can exists a hierarchical plane which transgresses or transcends the very notion of vertical transcendence (and such an existence is summoned to being in Deleuze's project at the most general level of transcendental empiricism), then it might just be possible to investigate incidents that would comfortably populate this topography without it becoming in any sense overdetermined (crowded) or contradictory in its terms of logic. The notion of Face as that which is close-up, and is the close-up, only invites the question of potential inclusions in this conceptual chain. And, as will be shown shortly, this process of slow carving and revealing of unexpected layers is one employed by Deleuze himself, leading to a different conceptualisation of space in relation to the notion of framing on which close-up ultimately depends.

The second important proposition ascertains the distinction between two possible directions along which the face can develop its traits. Deleuze suggests that it is two sets of questions that bring out this distinction, questions which are posed to the face and which are also inherent in the face. This particular operation is significant in the light of Deleuzian notions of critique, and the relations established between critique as the process of 'releasing' questions and time as the force responsible for the introduction of openness into the closures of already established systems of thinking. In a sense, the act or event of posing a question (to the face) enables Deleuze to draw out of the face the outline of its potential scope.

6 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.88
The two questions directed at the face are: "What is it thinking?" and "What is it sensing, feeling?" — thus delineating what Deleuze terms as the 'signs of the bi-polar nature of the face.' Significantly, these signs are to be seen to form an image (the affection-image) of the face rather than being characteristic of the individuated self. Face is an expressive plane populated by signs and signs follow their own rules of conduct.

[film sequence]
There is a very short and fast sequence. The face fills the frame and flickers at great speed, dense with series of different expressions that traverse its surface, leaving no trace. The effect is that of shots of nature (sky filled with clouds, sea surface) shot at extremely slow speed, which span a day in a couple of tens of seconds when played.

The 'thinking' face is one whose formative value is ascertained 'above all through its surrounding outline,' and is characterised by a sense of reflecting unity that encircles and ties all the parts of the face together. This unity owes its existence to the presence of an outline which distinguishes the face in relation to its outside — and this unity is also manifest in the face itself.

[film sequence]
The camera pans ninety degrees to the left; the frame fixes the profile of the person in the next seat. The face is static, the outline of the profile distinct against the perspective of the carriage, which sharply loses focus with depth of field.
The camera pans back to the face opposite. The face is frontal and its expression one of detachment. Then the expression becomes one of intense awareness of the environment. The eyes avoid meeting the lens and in doing so, show acute awareness of its location.

The sensing face, on the other hand, gains value through 'intensive series that its parts successively traverse,' allowing for each of the parts (of the signifying configuration that the face is) to acquire a state of momentary independence. In opposition to the notion of unifying outlines formed in confrontation with the outside, this face is to be seen working from the inside, oblivious to the notion of pre-established outer limits, representing consequently the site of serial occurrences rather than static unifications.

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7 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.89
8 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.89
9 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.89
An extreme close-up of a face. The expression slowly changes from blankness to a slight alertness of the eyes, which slowly spreads across the face onto the cheeks and the mouth. There is a glimpse of teeth.

Where, therefore, is the criterion of distinction? In fact, we find ourselves before an intensive face each time that the traits break free from the outline, begin to work on their own account, and form an autonomous series which tends toward a limit or crosses a threshold [...] This is why this serial aspect is best embodied by several simultaneous or successive faces, although a single face can suffice if it puts its different organs or features into series. Here intensive series discloses its function, which is to pass from one quality to another.¹⁰

There is a relatively fast succession of various facial close-ups forming a sequence. An expressionless face. A face reading a book. A smiling face. A face with the lips moving, facing another face, profile to the lens. A face of a child. In every face there are eyes; some are looking straight ahead, some are downcast; some are out of focus, or closed.

This facial topography of the sensing face is that of intensities coming in series; the existing outline distinguishes the 'inside' of what the face is, whereas the 'outside,' that which is distinctly not the face, is rendered irrelevant. In other words, the dialectic of that which gains identity by differentiating itself from what it is not, is abandoned in favour of transformations drawn out in the process of change characteristic for self-referential series. The intensive face commences there where the unifying outline is transgressed, not through its acknowledgement but through the introduction of an opening onto a different dimension. Practically, this is the moment (quite literally a function of temporality) seized for the escape the imposed limits (never confronted and therefore violated outside their own terms) and access to the territory of the Open.

On the other hand, we are before a reflexive or reflecting face as long as the features remain grouped under the domination of a thought which is fixed or terrible, but immutable and without becoming, in a way eternal.¹¹

This static, 'eternal' quality of the reflexive face, is precisely that – a quality. It stands for the very definition of quality, successfully painting a territory clearly defined, oblivious to

¹⁰ Deleuze, Cinema¹, p.89
¹¹ Deleuze, Cinema¹, p.88-9
change, particular in its character and identity, and subsequently possible to represent (in Deleuzian terms) spatially but not temporally.

In short, the reflective face is not content to think about something. Just as the intensive face expresses a pure Power — that is to say, is defined by a series which carries us from one quality to another — the reflexive face expresses a pure Quality, that is to say a 'something' common to several objects of different kinds.¹²

[film sequence]

There is a long static shot of a face in close-up, expressionless. The eyes are glazed. After a while the colour of the film starts fading, turning the image grey, and the face starts resembling the face of a statue. Then the frame freezes.

Having established this distinction between powers on one hand and qualities on the other, as two aspects of the affect, Deleuze has made it possible to tackle both the issues of what the expressive potential of the face might be, and of the idea of affect being more than just the expressed — that it can, in fact, be an entity in its own right.

The next important distinction Deleuze makes is relevant for the understanding of spatial continuity linking the close-up with its neighbouring shots.

The close-up does not tear away its object from a set of which it would form part, of which it would be a part, but on the contrary it abstracts it from all spatio-temporal co-ordinates, that is to say it raises it to the state of Entity. The close-up is not an enlargement and, if it implies a change of dimension, this is an absolute change: a mutation of movement which ceases to be translation in order to become expression.¹³

Contrary to common assumption present in film theory (manifest both in psychoanalytic and linguistic approaches) Deleuze claims that the object of the close-up does not represent a partial object, one torn away from the set it is supposed to be a part of. In such an understanding (that of the partial object) the assumption is that there are still links tying the object to the set it originated from, or rather, the links have been severed by they can still be traced back to the whole of the set. However, Deleuze claims that the transformation occurring is one of a different kind (in Bergsonian terms quite literally a

¹² Deleuze, Cinema¹, p.90
¹³ Deleuze, Cinema¹, p.95-6
difference in kind): it is not that the object has been torn away from its surroundings carrying part of them with it, it is the fact that it escapes the notion of mapping altogether – 'it [the close-up] abstracts it [the object] from all spatio-temporal co-ordinates.'\(^{14}\) Instead of the operation of tearing, we are facing the act of slipping – the object has slipped through the Cartesian (innately orthogonal) net of co-ordinates. No longer subject to mapping, the object in (and of) the close-up has risen\(^ {15}\) to the level of Entity, having become altogether different, and should therefore no longer be associated with where it had come from.

Apart from eluding the notion of mapping, Deleuzian close-up also implies a different understanding of movement. If the change of scale involved in the creation of the close-up has been bypassed by the transformation of an object into entity, then the very motion involved has ceased to be one of translation. The close-up is no more understood to have come into being though a simple gesture of closing in on the object along a linear trajectory. The movement has become expression, and the change in scale has become 'absolute,' that is – a change not in degree but in kind.

This is what Epstein was suggesting when he said: this face of a fleeing coward, as soon as we see it in close-up, we see cowardice in person, the 'feeling-thing,' the entity. If it is true that the cinematic image is always deterritorialised, there is therefore a very special deterritorialisation which is specific to the affection-image.\(^ {16}\)

This understanding of the close-up as tool of object's abstraction from spatio-temporal co-ordinates, based on Deleuze's interpretation of Balasz's theory, bears huge consequences on the understanding of spatiality.

"Faced with an isolated face, we do not perceive space. Our sensation of space is abolished. A dimension of another order is opened to us."\(^ {17}\)

\[\text{film sequence}\]

A close-up of a single face. The shot is long, and the whole frame is filled with the visual signs that the face is. All the other fragments of the frame are abstracted beyond recognition.

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\(^{14}\) Deleuze, *Cinema1*, p.95-6

\(^{15}\) The 'rising' implied is not one of vertical transcendence – it is, once again, an outward motion, a gesture of transgression of given boundaries and rules.

\(^{16}\) Deleuze, *Cinema1*, p.95

\(^{17}\) Balasz, quoted in Deleuze, *Cinema1*, p.96
This Deleuzian definition opens a possibility of conceptualising spatial changes in kind, or rather, of conceiving a qualitative change potentially inherent in motion (physical and spatial to start with), which would otherwise, observed through the lens of traditional (and naturalised) logic of space as representation, be impossible to conceive and therefore, literally – observe. Importantly, this is a question of space as 'perceived' and 'sensed,' not represented, and the 'opening' which takes place is one of substantial displacement, property of a 'dimension of another order.'\(^{18}\)

Similarly, another effect of this operation is the rise of object's expressiveness, transforming and effectively replacing movement with expression. In other words, the close-up of an object transforms the very notion of space, pushing it inevitably from the realm of representation into the state of expression, which will prove of great interest for this investigation.

For Balasz, the close-up of the face is the sole site of this kind of transformation and abolishment of spatiality of sorts. At this point, however, Deleuze parts from Balasz and proceeds to question face's unique position in the formation of the close-up and consequently establishes a much more complex and conceptually challenging (especially in spatial terms) understanding of it.

According to Deleuze, there cannot be any substantial difference between the close-up of a face and of any other object since it denies inanimate objects their expressive potential. He states that any object, when in close-up, will lose its spatio-temporal coordinates, and 'call forth the pure affect as the expressed.' In a sense, what the close-up of any object reveals is its face, its ability to rise to the level of pure expression, of an expressive Entity. Deleuze claims that a clock or a hand is no more inherently spatio-temporal than a face, and he marks this expressiveness of the object as its 'facialization.' Close-up is the face, no matter what its object might be.

\[^{18}\text{Deleuze, }\text{Cinema1, p.96}\]
The hand is not placed on it, but the more blown-up the image of it becomes, the more information it seems to be conveying.

Then the zooming stops and the frame is filled with the red plastic of the armrest. It reflects some of the light from the lights above. The texture of the multicoloured fabric covering the seat beneath it is vivid.

It looks like as if it could be touched – and felt.

The conceptual construction of the Deleuzian close-up is located within a broader territory of signification and governed by a regime of signs, which is in Deleuze’s philosophical project dependent on a very specific understanding of the relationship between the expression and the expressed. In short, unlike the more clear-cut understanding of the signifier and the signified as two distinct but linked entities, Deleuze conceives of a state in which the distinction is still not to be found – the expression cannot be distinguished from what it is supposed to be expressing. Once again, the notion of representation has been bypassed, since that which is one with the expression of its own self cannot be said to be represented, and this will be discussed shortly in relation to Deleuze’s appropriation of C.S. Peirce’s semiotic constructs.

It is also worth mentioning that Deleuze started developing the discussion of facial signifiance and/or facialisation with Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Chapter 7, Year Zero: Faciality). Themes developed in that chapter overlap with his cinematic project; the notion of the face is given a more politicised slant in *A Thousand Plateaus*, but nevertheless holds most of the same premises that were developed in the cinema books. On the question of this complex system of facial coding, decoding and recoding, he (or, in the case of that particular book, they) states that “it is not the individuality of the face that counts but the efficacy of the ciphering it makes possible, and in what cases it makes it possible.”19 In other words, it is this utter openness to coding that makes a face such a strong ‘screen’ for the projection or formation of the actualised, and not its obvious individuation or subjectification. Deleuze emphasises that there are situations or circumstances that make this ultimate facial aspect present itself, or situation that at least enhance it – and it is only in the cinema books that he gets round to actually developing one of this instances in which the face shows itself as a face. It is the case of the cinematic close-up, as that ultimate image-presentation of the notion of faciality.

19 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.175
In the case of the close-up, Deleuze chooses to use the term 'icon' to indicate this particular condition of the face and/or close-up:

The affect is the entity, that is Power or Quality. It is something expressed: the affect does not exist independently of something which expresses it, although it is completely distinct from it. What expresses it is a face, or a facial equivalent (a faceified object) or, as we will see later, even a proposition. We call the set of the expressed and its expression, of the affect and the face, 'icon.'

The next step Deleuze takes leads outside the limits of the established terms, tracing clearer outlines of these seemingly vague territories.

The affection-image is power or quality considered for themselves, as expresseds. It is clear that powers and qualities can also exist in a completely different way: as actualised, embodied in states of things.

In order to define this state of expression of power and quality, that he claims exists 'before' their actualisation, Deleuze examines quite the opposite: their 'embodied' state. Two important characteristics are brought to the fore when the expressed becomes actualised: firstly, time and space become determinate and subject to mapping. A system of co-ordinates can be recognised in them (or veiled over them). Secondly, the qualities or powers expressed become concrete, leading to the formation of those aspects of the face which are not affection-image, that is: 'the face becomes the character or mask of the person.' When actualised, a particular power or quality become embodied (given a body) in a particular face, contributing to its exact 'character or mask.' Individuation possesses the face, masking or clothing the bareness of affection-image. In doing so, the face leaves the territory of the affection-image, which was located where space (and time) had no grasp over it. Affection-image no more 'abstracts the face from the person to which it belongs' and can therefore no longer be taking place.

[film sequence]
A total of the interior of the carriage.
There are people talking and laughing; one man has slumped in his seat and seems asleep. A young woman is reading a book. In the background, someone stands up, preparing to get off the train.

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20 Deleuze, Cinema, p.97
21 Deleuze, Cinema, p.97
In order to explain with more precision this state that precedes things actual (but which itself is in no way imaginary or unreal), Deleuze employs C.S. Peirce's semiotic distinction between 'firstness' and 'secondness,' as Peirce termed the basic terms of semiotic distinction. Deleuze's affiliation with Peirce is not accidental; one of the major distinctions that determine his approach, not just in the cinema books but also in his wider philosophical project, is the distinction between systems of signification modelled on language (as Ferdinand de Saussure's) and those which presuppose an understanding of signs more closely related to their own media. In film studies, this semiotic line had been, prior to Deleuze's cinema books, quite neglected – as it has been the case with the most of cultural studies, seeing that the prevailing understanding of signification has throughout the century been modelled predominantly on language. It is in this context that Deleuze's implications of firstness and secondness seem particularly interesting, allowing for an understanding of signs, which might be more intricate, and certainly less misleading – seeing that it does not presuppose operations of metaphorical equation (image as word, shot as sentence, etc.).

In Peirce's semiotic system, secondness stands for the actual, for the embodied. It also always presupposes a binary structure, bearing, as it does, relevance to something else, defining the character of a thing and, in doing so, distinguishing it categorically from something else. "It is the category of the Real, the actual, the existing, of the individuated," with space and time determinate. For Deleuze, this is the realm of the action-image proper. Firstness, on the other hand, eludes such clear-cut binary logic, "It is not a sensation, a feeling, an idea, but the quality of a possible sensation, feeling or idea;" in other words – something not yet embodied, not yet given shape, but nevertheless present – real, but not actualised yet. And this is exactly what Deleuze claims the affection-image to be: it is that which enables the awareness of a possibility, it is a 'potentiality considered for itself as expressed.' Consequently, and this is of great importance: 'The corresponding sign is therefore expression, not actualisation.'

Through such a move, Deleuze is capable of delineating a territory of signification that inhabits the in-between space indicating the presence (and consequent awareness) of

22 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.98
23 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.98
24 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.98
25 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p.98
something which is not yet actually there. And that is Deleuze's affection-image. Even the phrase 'the in-between space' constitutes an impossibility, since affection-image is that which is not yet spatio-temporally fixed, or located.

In short, affects, quality-powers, can be grasped in two ways: either as actualised in a state of things, or as expressed by a face, a face-equivalent or a 'proposition.' This is Peirces secondness and firstness.26

It is important to note that for Deleuze face as concept is not to be understood as an actualisation of qualities and powers – it is the affect, as it is inseparable from the expression of it. However, outside of this initial understanding of the face, lie the possibilities of its transformation and participation in different roles, of which Deleuze recognises three: that of individuation, through which each person is made distinguishable and particular; that of socialising, which manifests the social role of a face; and finally, there is the relational or communicational role of the face, which, according to Deleuze, does not imply interpersonal communication solely, but also 'the internal agreement' between the character of a person and their social role.

However, all these roles of the face, found ordinarily in it (or on it) are in the case of the close-up cancelled. When in close-up, the social role of the face is abandoned, communication no longer the primary directive – the face is 'struck by an almost absolute muteness'27 – and even renounces individuation, a 'strange resemblance'28 to the others is established in character, 'a resemblance by default or by absence.'29

Effectively, Deleuze claims that the face in close-up invariably becomes a face, any face (any-face-whatever?) moving into the area where the limits of identity and all communicational and various social roles it ordinarily assumes are blurred, made undistinguishable.

The close-up has merely pushed the face to those regions where the principle of individuation ceases to hold sway. They are not identical because they resemble each other, but because they

26 Deleuze, Cinema, p.99
27 Deleuze, Cinema, p.99
28 Deleuze, Cinema, p.99
29 Deleuze, Cinema, p.99
have lost individuation no less than socialisation and communication. [...] The close-up does not divide one individual, any more than it reunites the two: it suspends individuation.30

In other words, it is impossible to claim that this face, the one 'exposed' in the close-up, represents just a segment of what the face is, just one of its components (the one that would presumably in such a set up be the non-individual one) since it is not divisible (it is a singularity); similarly, Deleuze makes it clear that it would be wrong to think of resemblance as the operation at work, since that would represent a question of characteristics, identities and categories, which singularities by definition elude. Simply, the close-up 'suspends individuation.' The very notion of individuation ceases to be relevant, to make sense within the context:

The facial close-up is both the face and its effacement.31

In other words, the close-up is the face, but not the face of individuation, socialisation and communication. And also:

It absorbs two beings, and absorbs them in void.32

Interestingly, it is this cancellation of the individuated being that Deleuze sees as resulting in fear as the only remaining affect, 'the fear of the face confronted with its nothingness,' an existential horror of sorts.

[film sequence]

There is a long static shot of a face in close-up, expressionless.

After a while, the image seems to become a series of impenetrable signs constructed in light. A meaningless surface; spilling into the eye of the viewer.

Deleuze goes on to summarise that affects (powers/qualities) can be found either 'actualised in an individuated state of things,'33 which includes particular space-time, characters and objects, or 'as expressed for themselves,'34 outside spatio-temporal co-ordinates, with own singularities and with an ability to form virtual conjunctions, as

30 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.100
31 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.100
32 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.100
33 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.103
34 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.103
opposed to real connections of those which are actualised. And although affects are not
individuated, they are still singular, and can enter as such virtual conjunctions and
constitute complex entities. It will be argued in the final part of this chapter that this
proposition should be addressed and challenged in relation to the event of the
Underground carriage in order to show that, although not literally a cinematic close-up
but a (seemingly) actualised state of affairs, the carriage event should be thought in
terms of the affection-image.

As Reda Bensmaia argues in 'Appropriating terms: Any-Space-Whatevers,' the
developing of the concept of close-up bears all the characteristics typical for Deleuzian
philosophical constructions: starting from a very clearly defined position, Deleuze
accomplishes through a series of moves which in themselves represent a function of
zooming in and out and readjustment of focus, to arrive at a place (and term) more
general than the opening one. It is through such an operation, that the notion of any-
space-whatever is introduced, leading away from the face – and closer to it.

Deleuze explains that the close-up has its own internal relationships, which are
established between its constitutive elements; it also builds external relationships with
other types of shots and images, and there can sometimes be no clear distinction
between the two, be it the result of joining of consecutive close ups, or of several faces
forming one close-up. This kind of lack of demarcation can even, as Deleuze argues,
include a concrete space-time, 'as if it [the close-up] had torn it [space-time] away from
the co-ordinates from which it was abstracted.'35 In other words, Deleuze proposes that,
as a consequence of the power of the close-up (in the process of formation of its
expressive material, its virtual conjunctions), a particular space-time can be pulled into
the close-up, not quite dissolving in it, but losing its spatio-temporal connections and
coordinates. This is the result of the affect being expressed as entity, through its absolute
dimension or function, and is manifest in the indiscernibility between the big close-up,
close-up, close shot, and even two-shot.

[film sequence]
A slow zoom-out starting from an extreme close-up of a face.

35 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.104
The frame gradually fills with more and more elements of the surrounds. The background to the face becomes obvious first, the window of the carriage and the moving darkness of the tunnel beyond it. Then more of the body fills the frame, the seat, the neighbouring seats as well. All the while the eyes that the close-up started with remain fixed on the lens; the girl is smiling. Further zoom-out reveals most of the interior of the carriage, and other seated bodies. The only face that is exposed to the camera lens is the one with which the shot started. There is a crumpled newspaper on the floor.

Effectively, this proposition opens the possibility of the affection-image (equalled as it was at the very outset with the close-up and the face) presenting itself in much less clearly (in formal terms of framing) defined cinematic material. Consequently, the close-up is redefined according to the possible conjunctions of its internal relationships and said to comprise the following elements: the expressed complex entity, which includes more than one singularity, the face or faces which express it, the space of the virtual conjunction between the singularities, and the turning away of the face, which 'opens and describes this space...'

The expressed – that is, the affect – is complex because it is made up of all sorts of singularities that it sometimes connects and into which it sometimes divides. This is why it constantly varies and changes qualitatively according to the connections that it carries out or the divisions that it undergoes. This is the Dividual, that which neither increases nor decreases without changing qualitatively. What produces the unity of the affect at each instant is the virtual conjunction assured by the expression, face or proposition.

It is 'expression, face or proposition' that form the unity constitutive of the affect. But is it possible, Deleuze asks, for space to be pulled into this constellation and actually replace the face or even the proposition as the constitutive force (and formative material) of the affect, leading to the presentation of affect divorced not only from the face but also from the close-up?

[film sequence] Starting with a close-up of the newspaper lying on the floor of the carriage, there is a zoom-out that is to incorporate the whole interior. The location of the camera is in the corner, and the interior is given in off-centre perspective.

36 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.104
37 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.105
38 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.105
The carriage is empty of people.

The main characteristic that Deleuze finds to be definitive of this space – the space pulled into the close-up, which nevertheless retains its spatio-temporal characteristics, if not links with the context - is that it is fragmented. This seems to be accomplished through the use of deframings, which replace long shots, representative of space, with continuity shots, which construct a closure each time – but a closure which is happening to infinity. Consequently, the external world is rendered, in Deleuze’s words, ‘cell-like.’

Space itself has left behind its own co-ordinates and its metric relations. It is a tactile space.40

Also:

The spiritual affect is no longer expressed by a face and space no longer needs to be subjected or assimilated to a close-up, treated as a close-up.41

There are two aspects of this conceptual manoeuvre which are important to note: firstly, by defining space as capable of being ‘affective,’ Deleuze makes it possible to place the very term ‘space’ in the context of the discussion, bridging the gap that has been opened through his appropriations of Bergson, whose understanding of space has it always on the side of the quantitative and representational, as opposed to time which is to be thought of as the force responsible for qualitative transformations and disruptions of representational hierarchies. It is through this notion of tactile space, which is divorced from all mapping, that the potential arises for an understanding of space, which would bypass problems of representation and simultaneously release the very concept of space from the negative stigma of subordination to time.

Secondly, this release of the affect both from the face and the close-up enables a less confined understanding of the affect in the context of cinematic material, making it possible for the affect, and consequently close-up and face as well, to be investigated under more general terms and therefore used as conceptual tool in circumstances of

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39 The example used is that of Bresson’s *The Trials of Joan of Arc*
40 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.109
41 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.109
greater complexity (which is the case with the Underground, which is neither a film, nor a face).

[film sequence]
A long, static shot of the interior of an empty carriage.
The frame is rocking slightly and the only motion inside it is the almost imperceptible movement of the dark walls of the tunnel.

Finally, borrowing the term from Pascal Augé, but redefining it (in trademark 'Deleuzian' fashion), Deleuze concludes that this space is no longer a particular, defined space, but actually any-space-whatever. The way Deleuze conceives this space is not as an abstract, universal space, potentially present in all places, valid at all times. Any-space-whatever is quite singular in every case, but what it lacks is internal homogeneity, connections between its parts, so that it becomes possible to link and re-link its elements in an infinite number of ways. It is as if the components of this space were constantly on display.

It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. What in fact manifests the instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a space, is its richness in potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all actualisation, all determination.42

The phrase 'locus of the possible' indicates that this space represents a site where the comprehension of possibility itself is possible. It is because of this lack of internal link that any-space-whatever, rather than being an actualisation and therefore a closure, opens onto potential, the not yet seen, the unexpected, where the new can emerge, the invention take place. Any-space-whatever is a (spatial) figure of becoming.

In this way, Deleuze is able to expand the definition of the affection-image, to state that there are two kinds of signs related to it, or two 'figures' of firstness: on the one hand the power-quality expressed by a face or an equivalent; but on the other hand the power-quality presented in any-space-whatever.43 Deleuze also proposes that the second is a subtler variant, less obvious in its extraction the affect. Also:

42 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.109
43 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.110
The affection-image would be like the perception-image: it would also have two signs, one of which would be merely a sign of bipolar composition, and the other a genetic or differential sign. The any-space-whatever would be the genetic element of the affection-image.

Deleuze also names these two aspects of the affection-image:

To use Peirce’s terms, these two signs of the affection-image would be designated as follows: icon, for the expression of a power-quality by a face, Qualisign (or Potisign) for its presentation in any-space-whatever.

The final thing that Deleuze proceeds to do is ask how any-space-whatever can be constructed, how it can be extracted from a determinate space. The first way, and it is important to bear in mind that Deleuze is conducting a filmic enquiry, is through shadows: ’a space full of shadows, or covered with shadows, becomes any-space-whatever.’ This is the issue of depth, and for Deleuze there is always in this set-up an inherent struggle between what is to sink into the shadows and what to present itself in light, and release itself. This, Deleuze states, was most characteristic of Expressionist cinema, with its constant use of light/dark contrasts, which were consequently the tool for the creation of expressionism’s particular character.

The second most general way is what he terms as the lyrical abstraction, and which depends on the relationship between light and white, and is therefore not a matter of conflict or struggle, the ’struggle of the spirit with darkness,’ as it was the case in Expressionism. The shadows that are involved in the creation of this type of any-space-whatever do not extend to infinity (and therefore cancel depth) but rather express alternative states of things, through the negotiation of more complex systems of similarities in conditions of light. This kind of shadow:

No longer extends a state of things to infinity, it will, rather, express an alternative between the state of things itself and the possibility, the virtuality, which goes beyond it.

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44 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.110
45 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.110
46 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.111
47 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.112
48 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.112
Terms become alternatives rather than oppositions, spiritual choices rather than struggles.

For Deleuze, this also represents a difference not in terms of terms, so to speak, but in choice between the modes of existence:

The spiritual choice is made between the mode of existence of him who chooses on the condition of not knowing it, and the mode of existence of him who knows that it is a matter of choosing. It is as if there was a choice of choice or non-choice.49

This is a very peculiar move, but all too essential for Deleuze’s cinema project: he is on a quest to find a philosophy of cinema. In re-linking the treatment of light, shadow (and later colours) to the questions of choice-existence-thought, and through Pascal, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, he makes a straight line from the utterly concrete (cinematic image) to philosophy as the site of invention.

Finally, Deleuze goes back to relate this to the formation of any-space-whatever, and states that:

*Space is no longer determined, it has become any-space-whatever which is identical to the power of the spirit, to the perpetually renewed spiritual decision: it is the decision which constitutes the affect, or the 'auto-affection,' and which takes upon itself the linking of parts.*50

How these themes, and especially the concept of any-space-whatever, relate to the Underground in general and the carriage event in particular, will be discussed in the following two segments.

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49 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p. 114
50 Deleuze, *Cinema*, p. 117
As was discussed in previous chapters, the whole of the Underground represents a very particular figure of corporeal space; it is a space of particular, movement-related corporeal regimes, and a space whose relation to mapping, co-ordinates and internal metric relations has been significantly altered in comparison with the urban space of the 'Overground.' Nevertheless, there are several aspects that make the carriage event most extreme and, in some ways, most representative Underground event. The discussion developed in this chapter attempts to show the link between it and the cinematic affection-image. This proposition can be established along several lines of investigation, all of which have a particular understanding of the body at their root. This corporeality is discussed in terms of movement (of the body) and of the senses and leads to an understanding of the interplay between perception and action, the interplay that constitutes and locates the concept of affection-image. Furthermore, it is the notion of movement reaching a point of qualitative transformation into expression, that is invoked in the carriage event, leading to an understanding of the Underground as a system truly constructed in various embodiments of movement.

In Deleuze's philosophy, movement is conceptually redefined to fit the larger philosophical picture, as has been shown in relation to the definitions of the Self, the interior/exterior opposition, etc. It is taken to be omnipresent, inasmuch as there can never be any real state of stasis; and as was shown in the opening part of the chapter, such an understanding leads to, among other things, an understanding of the link between movement and expression, embodied as corporeal transformations.

As was mentioned, the Underground, as an urban network of experience, represents a system devised for the purpose of transportation (corporeal movement); it was conceived as such and its primary reason lies in this enabling of a particular kind of movement, involving also voluntary movement of bodies inside it. In other words, observed from the perspective of the city, the whole of the Underground system is one complex movement-machine, conceived to serve the purpose of faster, more efficient transportation of people within the city. Owing to the fact that this urban gesture represents an operation of quite literal, physical removal from the city and placement under its surface (it is
movement without the city) it is not surprising that, due to this specific and utterly particular isolation constructed in the senses of the-one-that-commutes, the formative logic of the system is emphasised and brought to the fore. Hence the series of events that constitute the experience of the Underground is inevitably bound up in awareness of the system's main raison d'être, its formative force - movement.

Secondly, the notion of movement is not present in and on the Underground solely as a manifestation of total movement within the city (which is enabled through the system as such) but also in the more direct corporeal movement implied in the experiential scaling of the city. In other words, the Underground does not facilitate corporeal passivity, although it can include it; it involves the necessity for voluntary corporeal participation in movement (as a lived concept) and a great deal of commuting on the Underground implicates the notion of walking (as was discussed in the chapter on the event of the corridor). Furthermore, this very process of active bodily movement represents a direct (mobile) link with the corporeal experience of the 'Overground;' it is through the act of 'walking' that the entry to the Underground is attained; 'walking' embodies movement (making it literally movement-of-the-body) through the barriers; 'walking' leads down and across the platform and into the train. It is therefore of great significance that the main characteristic of the carriage event, in respect to movement, is the removal of that very mobility of the body, its extraction from the body. Instead, the body has been exposed to movement, immersed in it, and movement as such has been (at this particular level) - externalised. Travelling through darkness, across the city, motionless. This change in corporeal regime bears significance, marking, as it does, the point of transformation in the very experience and perception of/in the Underground; and this shift in movement makes the event of the carriage particular; the event of the carriage is this transformation of movement into an altogether qualitatively different entity.

[voiceover]
You are walking down the corridor. Your legs are moving, one in front of the other. Your arms are moving at your sides, following the movement of your legs; so are your shoulders.
You have walked onto the platform, paced up and down, stopped in front of a poster. You look at it.
You turn your face away from the poster. There are lights in the tunnel, then the train arrives, and the doors open.
You walk in and sit down. Your bag is in your lap now, your shoulders against the seat. Arms placed on armrests. Legs in front of you, knees bent.
Certainly, the carriage is not the only instance of bodies being rendered comparatively motionless on the Underground; a body can be motionless on an escalator, as much as it can be so on the platform, in the lift, etc. However, the particularity of this event is the fact that body is denied movement – there is nowhere to move, and this notion of nowhere is not only literal either. The escalators comprise of two lanes, one of which is assigned to the bodies set in motion. The platform is a confinement-as-edge, a liminal space that indicates and foretells a transition and opening. The train, on the other hand, is a confinement which (even when violated through possible transversal movement of bodies across carriages, which, in any case is not a standard commuting experience) enforces the sense of being rendered physically static, not least for the fact that movement, so crucial for the Underground as a whole, has been taken over by the train itself. Moreover, apart from the act of rendering bodies motionless, there is also an emphasis on the lack of operational space for corporeal movement – and both of these aspects come in extreme form. The ultimate motionlessness is that of a seated body, whereas the ultimate confinement that of a full train in which the limit of the body is defined by the proximity of another body.

[voiceover]
There are bodies around you, seated and standing. Imagine they are motionless, like in an episode of Star Trek – all the characters are frozen, except for one; and so you know that the character is in a different time-frame. Everything around the character has been slowed to a halt, and they can investigate without being disturbed, without ever being noticed. That is you now. Observe the space left for your body to move in. Observe the seated bodies, the faces facing your face. Observe the one sitting next to you. Now get up from your seat, stand up now. Try walking around the carriage. Do not touch the bodies, and especially not the faces. Try walking between the old woman and the dog on the floor. Step over the dog; it can't bite. Walk between the people standing in-between the sets of doors. There is a vertical yellow pole in the middle of this space, defining it. There are several hands holding the pole; faces, however, are directed away from the centre. Try walking between bodies, try walking below the arms, stretched to hold onto the high horizontal holds.
I will leave you now.

What I want you to do is to spend some time investigating all the possible positions your body can occupy in the carriage.

Don't worry, they won't start moving.

When you are done, go back to your seat.

This self-referential corporeal limitation mechanism is mirrored (made physical, literally objectified) in the presence of seats, which inscribe this tight immediate territory that a single body inhabits. The limit inscribed (the seat, the armrest) is also another site of the possible rise of expressiveness and affect – the seats are embodied diagrams of corporeal confinement, simultaneously solidifying more fluid spatial extensiveness of the body and providing a playground, a physical medium for the playing out of some of the expressive processes involved. It is as if the very extraction of movement from bodies has resulted in subsequent solidification of environment into a set of physical signs of movement's absence – the inside of the carriage has virtually settled into stasis. The carriage seating is also indicative of another important aspect of the event: the mutual facing of commuters and consequent emphatic construction of faciality, which will be mentioned later.

And so, the carriage is to be understood as defined through a particular condition of movement: part of all the movement that is the Underground, carriage event abandons direct corporeal movement, translating it, on one hand, in the movement of the carriage itself, and on the other, to the transformation of the (predominantly molar) bodily movement to ‘molecular’ movement – which itself is a qualitative transformation into movement of expression, closely linked as it is to the concept of faciality. The first transformation, that of corporeal movement into the movement of object/environment, represents a significant shift in the establishing of the relationship between the body and its environs, highly ‘urban’ as they are in this case, and might serve as a basis for the development of an understanding of this relationship which would surpass its application to the Underground (as was shown in the chapter on the platform event). The second transformation of movement, which sees the creation of expression in its stead, comes as the result of suppression of molar corporeal movement, and state of seeming motionlessness.
In both cases, a seemingly non movement-bound notion of spatial confinement (more easily recognised as part of the architectural theoretical scope) can be utilised to discuss the specificities of the carriage event. More than any other Underground-specific space, the carriage is a definite interior, a capsule, a confinement. And it might be useful to draw upon this extensive spatial aspect to indicate some of the characteristics of the carriage.

The whole of the Underground system operates as a spatial embodiment of confinement; it is one huge enclosure, an interior, and it is also a series of interiors. However, what differentiates the carriage from the rest of these events, is the fact that all of the rest are transient; that is, they accommodate body's transition. From entrance to the barrier; from the barrier to the corridor; through the corridor and onto the platform; from the platform into the carriage. The carriage is the point after which the order will be repeated, only in reverse. And in a sense, the carriage represents the moving, constantly (by default) dislocated, transient centre of the labyrinth that is the Underground. The centre which is transient itself, but in which the body is rendered not so much static, as passive.

The notion of interiority or confinement is ultimately one of limits; also, the limits in question are spatial in a corporeal way, and one useful way of observing the body/environment relationship might be through the notion of extensiveness, since it seems to be crucial for Deleuze’s construction of the concept of space, in its ultimate, intensely corporeal nature.51

[voiceover]
There is a face in front of you. There is another face to your side.
You can’t move.
Occasionally you find it hard to breathe.

51 The issues discussed here are addressed through the concept of extensiveness, for it is closely related to Deleuze’s reworking of Bergson in relation to space; but the same issue could similarly have been approached with a concept such as depth, which itself is more commonly understood to belong the scope of vocabulary used in architecture (practice as well as theory). To operate with the concept of depth would then represent a project much in keeping with John Rajchman’s understanding of Deleuzian imperative to construct concepts particular to investigated fields – hence his development of concepts which are claimed to be the sole property of cinema, and Rajchman’s attempt at acting in similar fashion when writing about architecture. The danger of such an undertaking might be that the notion of depth is commonly related to static representational models, and often taken to be a question of measure, distance, and mapping, and therefore utterly quantitative in nature (or quantifiable), whereas Bergsonian extensiveness stands defined as an essentially qualitative figure. The notion of extensiveness has therefore been kept as the most appropriate solution.
Your body is gently rocking and the dark walls are passing by.

An important aspect of confinement is the intensification of physical proximity, which manifests the question of limits and spatial extensiveness (combined in the case of the Underground carriage with corporeal passivity/motionlessness). Furthermore, the notion of physical proximity is given its most direct manifestation in tactility, that figure of space-as-extension, which is important for Deleuze's understanding of the term and is also of importance for his definition of cinematic any-space-whatever.

A carriage body is forced to touch upon other bodies, be it the case of standing bodies on a full carriage, or seated bodies, with their strictly yet easily violated assigned individual locations.

As was mentioned, the second case is particularly interesting, for it has been assigned a physical, object-bound manifestation: the seat. The seat is an assigned corporeal limit; it indicates the presence of corporeal limitation, and they also provide the space for the playing out of the tactile aspect of corporeal limits. Movement-as-tactility.

[voiceover]
You are back in real-time.
There is a person next to you, and their arm is placed at the armrest.
So is yours.
Now try moving your arm, slightly, almost imperceptibly, towards the other arm.
Move, then pause for a while. There is time, don't worry. Take it slow.
Now move the arm again.
When you have reached comforting proximity, when you can feel the warmth of the other body through the clothes they are wearing, when you can tell if they moved their arm even the slightest bit, then stop.
And now wait and see what will happen.
When the person moves, when contact is lost, I want you to do the same thing on the other side of your body.
Yes, for this exercise you will need to sit in the middle of the row. There isn't much point in feeling the glass.

Another aspect of confinement, the one most removed from literal tactility, is the visual confirmation of enclosure, and double enclosure at it, since the tunnel represents the close outer shall only marginally removed from the inner shell of the carriage; and
secondly, there is the knowledge of the fact that what lies past this second shell is not another void, but rather, a solid; a space the physical body cannot access and therefore cannot know. It is not merely a limit, this surface, it is a limit after which nothing is, nothing can be. The possibility of a body finding itself outside is simply cancelled.

[voiceover]
Imagine now the carriage empty. There are no bodies around, no eyes to confront, just your seated figure and the empty space of the carriage.
The carriage is moving, the dark walls flying past your eyes, blurred, the light inside it pale and even.
Stand up now, and walk over to one of the doors.
Press your palm against the curved glass surface of the door.
Look at the walls moving on the other side.
They are very close but you can't cast shadow on them.

Finally, there is the notion of faciality, which, in the most evident manner, leads back to the concept of the close-up and its initial derivation from the face. Quite literally, the carriage event is one that enforces commuters' confrontation with other faces, and with face as concept in Deleuzian terms; and this comes to pass due to a number of reasons. Firstly, as was mentioned earlier in this segment of the chapter, all of the seating arrangements on the Underground carriage comprise of facing of rows of seats. To understand the significance of this, it is sufficient to draw a comparison between this arrangement and those in other forms of transport (to stick to the category for the moment). Busses, trains, airplanes, cars – most, if not all the seating arrangements to be found in these, come in rows that, more often than not, collectively face the direction of movement, consequently displacing direct confrontation. This situation, in its intersubjective significance, could be assigned to the event of the corridor. The Underground carriage, on the other hand, forces confrontation; it brings the importance of the face into focus.

This physical arrangement of objects/seats in a 'pro-facial' constellation is accompanied and further emphasised by a number of factors: firstly, there is no outside, no exterior which could be faced, only the blackness and blankness of tunnel walls. Once again, it might suffice simply to translate the situation to the closest possible occurrence, in order to draw out the significance in this: an overland train might have a similar initial
arrangement of space/objects/events, but it includes the enormously important presence of an outside, both in its most literal and abstract sense. The window of an overland train is an almost physical passage of escape from the interior and from face(s); it is a device of displacement and dissipation of confrontation. Furthermore, it conceptualises the passivity of the corporeal journey, relating it to the all to real environment within which the journey is being acted out. The Underground train tunnel is, on the other hand, a confirmation of interiority divorced from any notions of exteriority; it represents the second skin of the carriage, black and blank, tightly wrapped around the carriage itself, and further smoothened (excluded from the possibility of being interacted with in its specificity) by its very mobility.

This, then, is the formula specifying the carriage: motionless bodies are confined to an interior, made to face each other, and placed against darkness.

[voiceover]
I want you to imagine yourself on a very ordinary day, taking the most ordinary Tube ride.
Find a seat; don't read a book. If you had the headphones on – take them off.
Take a deep breath in and imagine there is a 'record' button for your memory.
Press it now.
Record.

Directly from the fusion of these occurrences the most striking characteristic of the Underground Carriage arises: the specificity of social interaction. The exchange of gaze, one of the theoretically more used concepts in discussions of non-verbal (or corporeal) communication; exclusion from the realm of the social through reading; advertising as means of engaging commuters' attention in their escape from each other's proximity; the Metro daily newspaper, as a mode of disengaging and simultaneously sharing the common experience in an indirect way – all these are but a selection of routine everyday experiences that characterise the Underground carriage, and could, as such, be discussed separately and in more detail. However, the route chosen here – and developed in the final part of the chapter – attempts to develop an argument which would bypass the more commonly utilised social theoretical constructs and arrive at an understanding of the carriage event from a quite particular angle, one believed to connect the issues on hand via a more inclusive route.
In order for the proposed equation between the carriage event and the close-up to be constructed in more detail, it might be necessary to go in the opposite direction from that taken by Deleuze in *Cinema 1*, and start at the end, with his definition of any-space-whatever. In this way it becomes possible to develop the conceptual framework of the carriage event firstly through aspects easily recognisable within the framework of architectural theory. This entails discussing space as a figure of corporeal extension and its tight connection with the senses, as it is manifest in the link between the notion of light and perception of space that it is formative of. This aspect takes the inquiry into the more openly philosophical territories, leading to some more complex conceptual transformations, which would eventually bring into focus the features common for the Underground carriage and the cinematic close-up. In doing so, the role of the face in the presentation of affection-image is readdressed, indicating the potential or power present in the carriage event, which render it equivalent to the cinematic close-up.

As was discussed in the first section of the chapter, Deleuzian concept of any-space-whatever can be defined through one particular aspect: it is a fragmented space. The interior links have been severed, and the external world rendered cell-like:52

Space itself has left behind its own co-ordinates and its metric relations. It is a tactile space.53

Deleuze observes that this process is accomplished in film through *deframings*, the effect of which is construction of closures each time a shot is employed. The shot in question has changed from being a long shot, which Deleuze sees as representative of space (a matter of space-as-representation) to continuity shot, which results in closure, but one that 'happens to infinity,' that is – stands outside the notion of totality; it is a function of series and an opening onto a different dimension.

52 (Interesting to link this to the notion of monad, because it is about the EXTERIOR world being rendered CELL like, which also means that the interior/exterior opposition is bypassed).
53 Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.109
How is this to be understood in terms of non-cinematic experience, which is not a matter of deframings (at least not literal cinematic ones)? The key to understanding conditions Deleuze describes lies in the terms 'co-ordinates,' 'metric relations' and 'tactility.' The fragmentation of space Deleuze implies is one in which individuated actual space has had its coordinate system cancelled. This, practically, means that here is no external or representational tool (which is what co-ordinates are), which would serve as means of establishing space as totality and finite closure. As Deleuze states, the 'metric relations' that describe space have been lost – it has become impossible to construct a clear, uniform and ultimately modular ('metric') image of the space in question. This transformation manifests itself within the image/space constructed in the shot; it is, nevertheless, also responsible for the construction of the more general notion of space that eludes the totality of representation and, as such, indicates the loss of conceivable links with any space exterior to the image. In other words, space itself – be it understood as internal or external to the image – has undergone a transformation.

This primary aspect of any-space-whatever – its anti-representational tendency – becomes of interest in relation to the general erasure of exteriority that happens on the Underground, most notably in the carriage event, as described in the previous section. The relationship between the concepts of inferiority and exteriority, intrinsically binary as it is, becomes disrupted and consequently redefined through the mere removal of one of the two aspects from experience. In other words, the erasure of the physical outside from direct corporeal experience indicates severed spatial links necessary for the sense of spatial continuity; there is a cancellation of direct contextualisation, which is a crucial aspect of representation. Direct, continuous links within the spatial context have, in the context of the carriage, been removed, leaving the interior without direct links with the exterior. In effect, there is no exterior to speak of – the link between the two has become a jump through hyperspace, a gesture of short-circuiting in the creation of spatial continuity, which is inseparable from the process of spatial mapping. And with the cancellation of mapping, the space of representation, space as representation, is abolished. This last aspect is, up to a point, characteristic of the Underground as a whole – the absence of concrete urban exterior is the general feature of the whole system. However, the sense of spatial encapsulation is nowhere as acutely present as in the interior of the carriage. It is an interior constructed as closure, to infinity; a cell-like space.
This is so for several reasons. Firstly, the lack of spatial context is not simply manifest in the removal of the urban spatial context, as it is the case with the whole of the Underground; the Underground carriage literally lacks a spatial outside, seeing as the exterior of the carriage interior is simply another tight fitting interior – that of the tunnel. Spatial context negated since there is no conceivable inhabitation of the outside of the carriage. As far as the body goes, the space beyond the carriage (the tunnel, the earth) is uninhabitable and therefore unknowable. As such, it cannot be corporeally mapped. The only relatively direct opening of the carriage onto its spatial context is through another carriage, down the tunnel, along the axis of movement.

Secondly – and consequently – one of the main aspects differentiating the carriage from the rest of the Underground is its relation to movement. The discussed loss of co-ordinates becomes manifest in the ultimate passivity of the body, which is exposed to movement inside this outside of the city, and movement becomes the force of separation from the possibility of contextualisation. The fact that the carriage is constantly in movement positions it literally outside any possible locus, or fixed position; experientially, from within, the carriage is, due to being immersed in motion, constantly eluding coordination with any concrete external context – the immediate material context of the tunnel is always experienced in motion itself.

This, in effect, means that the spatial context, the outside of the carriage, is missing as a wider urban context; is it then erased through the act of spatial reduction, since the outside of the carriage is another immediate enclosure, beyond which there is nothing; finally, there is the introduction of movement, which quite literally rips the cell-like interior space of the carriage from its immediate spatial context, and constantly keeps relocating it.

Total, unifying image of space – space as representation – is therefore cancelled. What kind of space subsists once the representational aspect has been cancelled? It is tactile space, space perceived and conceived through the senses, directly arising from the body as an extension. Here, once again, it is possible to build upon Bergson's distinction between space as representation and space as corporeal extension, employing the named concepts in order to draw out a very particular difference present in certain spatial
experiences. What it enables is the conception of the space of the senses, and Deleuze's discussion of any-space-whatever defines it exactly as tactile space.

It is important to note that this proposition does not imply an absolute impossibility of representation of such a space; it is, rather, that the proposition sees the carriage event enabling the sense of spatial tactility and extensiveness, bringing these aspects of spatiality to the fore. In other words, the carriage event does not stand for a space beyond any conceivable representation; but it, by its eccentric character, suggests an understanding of this extensive aspect of spatiality. A body placed inside the Underground carriage is pushed into realising extensive space.

When does space become tactile? If spatial tactility is conceived as corporeal extensiveness, it becomes apparent that to think space as sense-bound is inevitably going to stand for a gesture of spatial reduction, a convergence of any strictly speaking exterior space onto the body. And although the notion of tactility of space – or space of the senses – is more complex than to imply a body as a tactile yet clear-cut solid positioned within the wider context external to it, the sense of touch does stand as the most easily recognisable frontier of extension. As such, it is directly related to the semi-permeable membrane that is skin, and defined by what can be referred to as (physical) proximity.

What makes the carriage specific, though, is the fact that the limit of tactility/extensiveness is not simply to be found at the intersection of the body with an object, but also between bodies: the mentioned armrest of the seat is as much a site of interaction of bodies, as it is of a body with the object (the seat or the armrest themselves). It is the tactility in which the body encounters another body, and this, as will be discussed further later, makes a perfect set-up for the heightening of the affective potential.

Ultimately, it is the sense of expanding interior that defines the state of space as extension, in a way that establishes the notion of interiority quite outside any binary opposition it might be seen to be defined through, in relation to exteriority. Simply put, the body folds the supposed exterior onto itself in a continuous complex curvature, or put the other way round, unfolds itself into space and onto the world. The Deleuzian concept of
the fold and its relation to the disruption of the binary opposition of interior/exterior is a
much broader theme that will not be addressed here. At this point it is simply necessary
to take note of the notion of spatial expansion as tightly related to the experience of
interiority and hence confinement, both in relation to the object/space and to other
bodies.54

The other aspect that Deluze sees as formative of any-space-whatever is the loss of
internal connections – apart from spatial contextualisation, which enables mapping and
therefore general representation, there is also an understanding in Deleuze’s definition of
any-space-whatever that describes it as internally fragmented, with its internal metric
relations cancelled. It is an image of space, which brings it out as a quality. This happens
simultaneously with the rise of awareness of spatial tactility or extensiveness; it is the
intensity of tactile space that renders it qualitative, instead of quantitative and therefore
representative.

Any-space-whatever’s internal fragmentation is constituted or defined through the
presentation of ‘richness in potentials or singularities.’ In other words, the situation on
hand is a collection of elements which do not seem to have a definite formative reason
for being grouped together; elements as singularities could be found elsewhere, they
could enter a different assemblage. They can interact but never enter a definite,
actualised, individuated state. It is the potential, the virtuality, the presence of that which
can be sensed but not seen, real but not yet actual.

The notion of codification of a set of signs employed in the construction of any
architectural situation is tightly related to notions of individuation and identity – and
indeed of singularity. It is an aspect present, to an extent, in every environment that has
been given the whitewash of the identifiable and repetitive, and in architectural terms,
this is valid for a variety of situations. The theories concerned with such examples are

54 In the cinema books, which were written some two decades after Bergsonism first came out, Deleuze
never resorts to using Bergsonian terminology of ‘space as extension’ as opposed to ‘space as
representation;’ but it seems that, in many ways, this is the same distinction that he invokes in his
description of any-space-whatever as ‘tactile’ and ‘unmappable.’ In other words, any-space-whatever is
that which is left once the representational aspect is taken away. This is precisely the distinction Deleuze
makes when he insists that the close-up is not a space taken out of its context (structuralist understanding
of the object in the close-up) but rather, a space which negates the very possibility of mapping,
contextualisation or representation. The experienced space is therefore not a spatial map, but a spatial
diagram, in the Deleuzian sense of the word, as was discussed in the case of the corridor.
usually conducted in the light of these environments’ lacks: lack of identity, lack of specificity. The general problem with such an approach, which this thesis has tried to avoid altogether, is its primary negativity; it is altogether too easy to discuss the Underground in the light of its lack of certain expected characteristics/qualities, as opposed to an act of enhancement or contribution. It would be easy to observe the Underground as a set of absences, and the question of codification of the set of signifiers employed in it – and these range from the Underground logo, via all manner of linguistic and other signs, to the more ‘architectural’ elements of its constructed environment – would become part of the negative critique of the system. Multiplication and repetition of recognisable or even identical elements would then be seen as an erasure of identity, with identity itself being the ultimate value.

This question of repetition and absence of concrete identity in most of the formative elements of the Underground can be, on the other hand, seen to contribute to a rise of certain awareness, an awareness of potentials. Every element of the carriage could be used somewhere else; in fact, every element is used somewhere else, and some of these serial repetitions are on display in the very carriage. The repetition of handles, seats, bars, signs; ultimately, this is mirrored and underlined in the very repetition of people. And this does not apply only to obviously distinct (and in this case clearly individuated) 'objects.'

This is valid for the whole of the Underground; nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the notion of repetition comes, in the case of the Underground carriage, in two particular guises. Firstly, the confined cell of the carriage is itself multiplied into a series of moving objects that, taken together, constitute the body of the train, that literal Underground movement-machine. This multiplication of 'units of inferiority' is experienced from within the carriage itself, since there is a visual connection between individual carriages. The inside of a carriage appears to be a fixed set, but the uniqueness of this set is instantly questioned through the presence of the carriage preceding it, and another one following it. This multiplication is manifest in the multiplication of interiors themselves, and this includes the bodies that effectuate them. Secondly, the notion of multiplication is, within the carriage itself, most prominent in the

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55 For a typical example of this approach see: Marc Augé's Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity, London and New York: Verso, 1995.
multiplication of seats. The formative point of the carriage is the housing of static bodies as they traverse the urban realm in movement. The carriage is, then, a container of multiplicities of identical objects; furthermore, this multiplicity of identical objects is directly constructed in material (physical) relation to the bodies inside it — and multiplicities of bodies at that. The seat is a mould of the body; it defines its realm and the zone of its extensiveness; but also, on the carriage, it intrinsically defines both the body and the carriage itself, in its relative wholeness, as a multiplicity. The carriage is the ultimate Underground enclosure around corporeal extensiveness of the individuated — which is simultaneously multiplied implying the point of erasure of its own specificity.

Importantly, singularities in the cinematic image are not concrete and actualised; whereas all the elements of the carriage described here are utterly actual. However, it seems that the repetitiveness and lack of overall individual character brings out the possibility of understanding the notion of transition from virtual to real. 'Rich in potentials,' is how Deleuze defines any-space-whatever, and it is exactly what is produced: a concrete situation and a concrete set of undoubtedly singular objects are made so overwhelmingly unspecific, repetitive and non-individual, that the overall effect is suggestive of virtual potentials, rather than real possibilities. And in a sense, this is why even an empty carriage can operate as a qualisign, that is, any-space-whatever — and therefore affection image:

It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. What in fact manifests the instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a space, is its richness in potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all actualisation, all determination.56

The next important aspect of the concept of any-space-whatever that Deleuze discusses is the question of light, and this is an intriguing topic in the context of the Underground, and the carriage especially. In Deleuze, light has an intricate philosophical meaning; the plane of immanence is made of light and light is seen to be in, and of all things. This understanding of light is crucial for the concept of image, and the understanding of light in Deleuze's philosophy indicates the reason for the concept of image to permeate all aspects of reality. It is a very particular understanding of light and, even more so, a

56 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.109
particular conceptual definition of image, which is derived from it (see the chapter on image in the introductory part of the thesis).

Therefore, discussing light on the Underground implies a discussion of far-reaching conceptual scope, one tied to cinema as a medium and, more particularly, to the concept of any-space-whatever on hand. When Deleuze discusses the notion of light in the construction of filmic space, it is easy to trace the links between the medium of film as constructed entirely of, and in light, and the significance in the use of light for the construction of cinematic space. However, the understanding of light is much broader; everything is made of light, and everything present in reality is an image (of light). Film itself is just a particular kind of light-image, one in no respect divorced from the rest of reality; and film, for Deleuze, works in the same way reality operates in general – hence his statement that ‘universe is a meta-cinema.’ To discuss light in the context of architectural/urban enquiries is, therefore, much more than an investigation into an externally applied spatial quality, possible, but not crucial for the very notion of space. In fact, the way any-space-whatever is constructed through the use of light in film, takes place also in ‘reality.’ And the Underground – the carriage in particular – offers an interesting view on this.

Deleuze states that the key to constructing any-space-whatever is light, and there are two alternatives present. Firstly, there is the question of contrast between light and darkness, and in this case, any-space-whatever is constructed through shadows. The dominant feature of this process is struggle: there is a constant struggle between ‘what is to sink into the shadows and what to free and present itself in light;’ in other words, there is a clear binary opposition at work, dictating the transformation of concrete space into any-space-whatever, space that goes beyond the specific.

The question of light on the Underground is a rather curious one; like many of the Underground features, it bears a distinctly simplified character and is constituted through a reduced number of possibilities. There are the lit spaces and there are dark ones, claimed by shadows. Furthermore, the light is constant and even and, in a sense, eternal. What is dark, remains so. What is lit, likewise. On the carriage, there are two

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57 This claim is related originally to Deleuze's assessment of Bergson's general conceptual framework.
58 As was more than adequately shown in John Rajchman's *Constructions*, in the chapter titled 'Lightness.'
distinct conditions: the interior of the carriage is always evenly lit, whereas the exterior of the carriage, which is nevertheless an internal element of the experience of it, is darkness: the colour of the tunnels is black and they are (for most part) not lit, which represents a distinct light/dark binary opposition. The oddity of such a set-up becomes apparent when attention is drawn to the existence of windows: the interior space, at least nominally (visually) opens onto an exterior - except that the exterior is a constant shadow.\textsuperscript{59}

The key specificity here lies in the fact that the carriage is neither an interior opening onto an exterior, nor an interior without the exterior (and this is a matter of the experienced as perceived). It is an interior, which defines itself in opposition to an exterior, which is not really an exterior, but a tight fitting interiority itself, an enclosure constructed all of shadows and enveloped in darkness, darkness visual and of knowledge - knowledge of that which would be beyond. Partly, the oddity lies in this subversion of the expected; it is not simply an enclosure, it is one which opens onto nothingness and defines itself against nothingness. And a heavy one at it: it is the notion of darkness much denser than darkness that would come to be through the removal of light; it is darkness embodied, physical and heavy. It is because of this reason that the equation between the darkness within a filmic frame and the darkness of the tunnel is possible. An open space, a void, be it covered in shadows or not, if perceived (and known) as void (that is, corporeally accessible), cannot invoke a sense of such contrast as the shadow within a film frame can. Quite simply, the visual absence of light within the frame is total, since there is, strictly speaking, no corporeal depth in the first place – once there is no light, there is no filmic image. Similarly, in the case of corporeally accessible space, the notion of depth – as accessibility – is the crucial one: the carriage (and those who inhabit its interior) is travelling through something it cannot, in an absolute manner, penetrate at all. In both cases it is the question of depth, the cancellation of depth through the notion of darkness.

\textsuperscript{59} One situation not discussed here is of a motionless train inside the tunnel. This is the instance when the displacing power of movement of the object is cancelled; this is also the site of presentation of particularities within the walls of the tunnel – it becomes apparent that the tunnel walls are not perfectly black and that there are very specific aspects of the engineering system of the tunnel to be noticed. However, the removal of these two aspects only highlights the third one, which becomes more powerful than ever – the sense of perfect enclosure, sense of no escape. The tunnel is impenetrable – and therefore ultimately blank. This is emphasised by the absence of sound (of movement), leading to a shift of focus onto faces themselves.
Deleuze makes an interesting observation that the contrasting method of light/dark has always been the major characteristic of expressionist cinema (German expressionism and onwards). It is tempting to see a link between the expressionist drama manifest in so much fiction and cinema on the subject of the Underground – the ultimate shift towards expressive tools and the horror genre, which might not be linked purely to the notions of interiority and confinement, but also to this constant contrast with the dark, in its most direct light sense as well as in the non-physical materiality it carries with it.

The second perspective on the condition of light inside the Underground carriage is the question of internal light, the presence of light inherent in the carriage and also formative of the full image of light, so characteristic of the event. That is, the only source of light, and one against which the existence of a contrasting external darkness of the eye (and the mind) is possible, is the light of the carriage itself; the light inside the carriage is the only light of the carriage event.

If the encapsulation of the interiority of the carriage was formed against its exterior, then the lighting of the interior is of a different order. This lighting is one that does not work through contrasts, but rather, through evenness: the entire interior of the carriage is evenly lit; the sources of this light are linear, dispersed, the light spectrum is cold. It is an even, evenly distributed light, which, although the direction of the source is polarised (it comes 'from-the-above') distributes, nevertheless, light in a fashion that practically cancels the possibility of any distinct shadow. Bright enough, dispersed enough, the light of the interior provides a whitewash effect. What is inside is given to be seen, clearly, directly, in its entirety. Outside, there is darkness; inside only light. Everything can be seen, and known.

The effect of this arrangement is the introduction of a certain sense of flatness in the interior itself, in what it is, and what it holds. This evenness is then, in a sense, highly reminiscent of Deleuze's second example of light as constitutive of any-space-whatever: the contrast not between light and dark, but between light and white. In other words, what Deleuze discusses is the possibility of similarity rather than contrast, transition rather than polarisation. What is particularly interesting is that Deleuze links these light conditions with possible choices, and these are choices for action. Whereas the first example is one of struggle, one which sees light as constantly trying to release itself from
the surrounding (clearly defined) darkness, the second example, that of white against light, is one of choices; this image of light is a thought-forming diagram of possibilities and multiplicities; it is the image of variation.

Significantly, this image of variation is inherently superimposed onto the variation that the bodies inside the carriage are, that faces are. The bodies and the faces, the handles and signs, the individual elements (and the not-yet-individuated singularities) are all cast in evenness which makes them more of the similar, rather than mutually contrasted. Flattened in multiplicity by the evenness of light, bodies (and faces) become serial, prevented from contrasting each other individually but rather working as a series of variations of the same; at the same time, they are contrasted (as series) against the exterior darkness of the tunnel, made internally further, as a series, variable, interchangeable, similar; a matter of choice. The light of the carriage bathes them (faces and elements that consequently also become faces) in evenness of variation; the exterior darkness condenses them into a group, a single series, a oneness of that particular, open, variable kind.

It is this conjunction of interior seriality and its contrasting exterior, that colours the Underground carriage event and establishes it, together with the introduction of spatial tactility, as any-space-whatever; differently put, this character of simultaneous contrasting and variation is what might be said to constitute a very particular case of conjunction of two types of qualisigns, formative of the affection-image and carried through the vessel that Deleuze calls: any-space-whatever. Still, this would not be enough to render the event of the carriage unique; the contrasting of these two particular sets of signs can be found in other occurrences and events.

The moment this event forms (and seais) its uniqueness is the presence of the second sign of affection-image: the icon. It is at this point that the event of the carriage establishes itself not only as unique, but as the ultimate equivalent of a close-up, relying not only on the presence of the qualisign (any-space-whatever) but overlapping it with the other sign of affection-image: the icon. As was discussed in the first part of the chapter, icon is the primary sign of affection-image, closely related to the face, of which it is constructed. Alternatively, it is a 'faceified' object, and both the face and the object are affection-image, which presents itself through the operation of the close-up.
The presence of the face, or series of faces, is one of the most general urban features; the existence of faces permeates every facet of the urban realm and cannot be said to be in any sense specific to the Underground, or the carriage. However, the way the face (individuated and in series) presents itself in the carriage event is quite specific. As mentioned, for the face to be experienced, there needs to exist an operation of *facing*, that is, a particular set of organisational specifics needed for the face to present itself (as a sign), as evidently does not happen in the event of the corridor or the platform. This first factor is inscribed in the event of the carriage through two previously mentioned factors, corporeal proximity and orientation. Inscribed in seats, the bodies face each other – *face the face*. The potential for the creation of icon as a sign is established, yet this still does not constitute the icon, nor the close-up, nor the affection-image, although potential (or 'potentiality') itself is a characteristic of affection-image. Faces are present and facing one another, facing all of the other.

The next step in this establishment of the close-up of the carriage through the presence of the icon is the discussed fact that these faces, as parts of bodies, are rendered motionless. The operation at work here is manifold: firstly, this static fixing of the face will enable it to create a set of its own with its surrounds; that is, the placement of the face in the context *statically*, fixes it, albeit temporarily, into a set with whatever it is that is not the face (and for a number of possible experiential 'viewpoints'). In other words, it becomes possible to form relative closures, *frame-like* closures, which unite the face with its surrounding elements. Parallel to this, there is the second operation at work, which is the very *faceification* of the body itself. Rendered motionless, the body transforms movement into micro-movements (in a manner described in the first section of the chapter), which means that there is an absolute change taking place from movement to expression. This expression, in the case of the body that is forming (and is formed by) the Carriage event, manifests itself not simply through the sense of vision – that is, it is not only detectable through the visual component of perception, but also through tactility, which is, once again, induced through the notion of corporeal proximity. This tactility, significantly, is mirrored in the tactile character of the concept of any-space-whatever, as a conceptual figure of space as extension (as was mentioned in the second part of the chapter). The faces are isolated as icons, contrasted against their surrounds, while the
bodies become facialised. In a sense, the whole of the body is becoming a unique facial cipher, an iconic image.

Thirdly, the backdrop to all the faces, and the backdrop to individual seated faces is darkness; it is shadow, and as such, could be seen to be constitutive of any-space-whatever, as has been discussed in relation to the notion of the qualisign and the event of the carriage in general. However, this general potential becomes apparent (actualised in a sense) in the placement of faces (and the Face) against the darkness of the tunnel. It is this meeting of the icon and Underground's general tendency towards the qualisign, that forms the affection-image of the carriage event. This relates primarily to (and is most evident in) the seated face; this is the face facing other faces, and its backdrop is formed of shadows – and these shadows are in motion as well, ever dislocated, ever unspecified. The body carrying the face has been rendered motionless, its movement has been transformed into serial micro-movements, and it has been facialised, since micro-movements against a 'reflective surface' are constitutive of the face and any (every) occurrence following this pattern, according to Deleuze, is a facial equivalent.

Each time we discover these two poles in something – reflecting surface and intensive micro-movements – we can say that this thing has been treated as a face [visage]: it has been 'envisaged' or rather 'facefied' [visageifiee], and in turn it stares at us [devisage], it looks at us...even if it does not resemble a face.60

It is this combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements which constitute the affect. But is this not the same as a Face itself?61

The most striking feature of this proposed convergence of Deleuze's theory of cinema with the Underground carriage, one that locates the carriage event in the overall context of the Underground, is this transition of movement into expression. As was shown in previous segments of this chapter, the transformation of molar into molecular movement (as Deleuze terms the two realms) is a transformation not simply quantitative in nature – a transformation in scale, a translation from larger to smaller – but a qualitative one. Once movement is taken to the realm of the 'molecular,' it is no longer movement, but becomes transformed into expression. In Deleuze, this is valid for movement in general,

60 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.88
61 Deleuze, Cinema1, p.87
but is made especially graphic in the example of the body – with the removal of overall corporeal movement, the body is transformed into an expressive entity, with face presenting itself both as the ultimate site of corporeal expression, and the key to understanding the process of expressive rise of the body as totality, the process of body's 'facialisation.'

The fact that the Underground, as a system, represents a veritable urban site – as well as mechanism – of movement, city's 'movement-machine,' locates the movement-bound carriage at its very core; simultaneously, the carriage, immersed in motion as it is, stands for the ultimate locus of corporeal inactivity on the Underground. It should, then, be of no surprise to discover that one of the major characteristics of the experience of the Underground carriage, the experience of the carriage event, is its extreme insistence on corporeal and, above all, facial expression. In a sense, the ultimate testing of Deleuze's understanding of expression as qualitative transformation of movement is not to be found in cinematic material: it is perfectly present in the expressive rise of the face (and faces) within the confined world of the Underground carriage. The fact that this rise of expression is located at the core of the urban movement-machine should by no means be taken to be accidental. Indeed, this is the very point of the overall scope of the project pursued in this thesis: movement cuts through the Underground so thoroughly, that it reaches the point of qualitative transformation. The expression, and all manner of facial presentations (from the individuated, communicative face, to the pure 'horror' of facial blankness that Deleuze describes in relation to the close-up) is not a manifestation of a different order: it is precisely the uninterrupted flow of movement, its urban, metropolitan avatar.62

62 'I am ready for my close-up,' exclaims actress Gloria Swanson as she descends the staircase in the very last scene of Billy Wilder's Sunset Boulevard. And, in a sense, she is definitely headed for that carriage that is to take her under the ground, her face disappearing in the blur of an extreme close-up.
Let's go backwards.
Let this shot be a continuous one and let it go back.
The face in the close-up is burning. It is burning the frame with sheer light, with its unbearable lightness.

(Deleuze says: It is the non-human. It is the fear. It is everything once formed, being dismantled now; it is the force, the power, the quality.)

The frame is burning. It is a close-up and it is literally burning. Slowly, the yellows are turning to whites, and they are starting at the eyes, then appearing at the mouth; they are radiating from the myriad tiny lines that traverse the face. And then this map is becoming lighter and the lines are becoming whole territories, and the mouth is slowly opening and the eyes are slowly widening and just as the expression is to change, just when the mouth seems to opening to let a sound out, the face burns the frame and everything is awash in light.

Pause.

And now, backwards. Out of the white, lines are starting to emerge. Vague shapes are slowly materialising out of nothingness, growing darker and clearer, denser, flooding the pale surface. Taking shape in this landscape is a face and it is growing clearer, its expression almost clear; then the lightness in the eyes and around the mouth slowly subsides and the expression is slowly changing, the features softening; the look in the eyes is becoming more focused; the mouth is firmly closed and the eyes move, infinitely slowly they are turning, and focusing while turning.
And then comes the moment when the eyes simply fall into place, the look that is in the eye has clocked: on you.
You are in front of the eyes and they are looking at you.
A light smile appears at the mouth.
The eyes.

We are zooming slowly out, now.
The face is smiling gently, and then it is looking away and then there is no smile any more.
Other faces appear around that one face. And there are arms and hands, and shoulders, over which fabric is hanging. There is a wristwatch; a handbag, there is a glimpse of a shirt and lower still, legs.
And all these entangled and fragmented limbs, all these faces – a field.
Gently rocking.

And the dark, ever moving background.

Further away, further backwards, further zoom-out.
There is the change from the overlaid, complex field of vision to perspective proper, to the vanishing point, to depth traceable. And there are lines along this perspective and they are all shooting into the distance, shooting to vanish.

Along this view there are bodies, there are seated bodies, and legs bent and feet aiming at other feet, the ones that are across. There are profiles, and there are downcast eyes; there are glasses and there are books they meet.

At the centre of the frame, at the bottom of the perspective, there is another frame: it is the window of the carriage and there is another window beyond it, and another carriage the inside of which the window is framing. And every time the invisible tracks (the never-ending lines of steel) start curving, the two frames start shifting and framing fragments of each other and fragments of the inside of the carriage and fragments of people that think: we are inside. We are on the inside.

And then the frames (that are openings cast in glass) rearrange their positions and realign with each other. They keep framing.

There are series of such frames and there are series of faces inside these frames, moving in and out of them, filling them and emptying them.

(What do the frames do when all the faces go away?)

And then, the eye turns to the doors – and the station is there. There are faces on the outside of this inside (which are nevertheless on the inside as well) and they are drawn to the doors.

The rocking stops, the doors open, voices penetrate the air; the voices outside, the voices inside (all of them on the inside).

The bodies are moving out, other ones moving in, two fluxes filtering through one another.

You walk out of the carriage, and the spell has ended.
Montage, Underground
Deleuze opens the chapter on montage with the following definition:

Montage is the determination of the whole [...] by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities.¹

With this, Deleuze is not only developing his own understanding of the notion of montage but also relying on a number of cinema practitioners, such as Sergei Eisenstein, who have discussed montage as the main element in the construction of the cinematic whole. It is through montage that the whole of the film is assembled, or the 'Idea' of the film; montage, in other words, is a very specific form of assembling a series of discreet elements into a whole, and, as such, produces a set of particularities in the whole itself. In the situation where the main characteristic (at least at the most obvious level) is the introduction of ruptures or cutting, which is the defining principle of montage, this whole of the film is to be assembled across ruptures, through certain continuities across ruptures as well as false continuities, which subvert the apparent logic of continuity itself.

© Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.29
There is the whole of the film, which represents the site of change, the transformation that takes place between the beginning and the end of the film. But this whole, as Deleuze states, can be apprehended only indirectly; that is, the whole, which in itself is change or transformation, is also duration, a lived sense of time. Through montage, duration is apprehended only indirectly, through the notion of movement-image, which is radically different from the time-image, the direct piping into duration through image. Time-image itself is to be found in cinema, it is as much the material of cinematic image as is the movement-image. But the operation of montage is defined through ruptures, which are always definitive of the movement-image only; and the whole constructed inevitably presents duration only indirectly. As Deleuze puts it:

Montage is the operation which bears on the movement-images to release the whole from them, that is, the image of time. It is necessarily indirect image, since it is deduced from movement-images and their relationships.\(^2\)

Through this Deleuze simply confirms the main characteristic of the movement-image, its ever-indirect relation to duration. But if an incision is made, if a cut is introduced, what will start bleeding into images is the very time-bound nature of the whole. It might offer only an indirect image of time, but it nevertheless offers a sense of duration, defining the whole of the film.

[film sequence]

*A static shot of a train rushing into a station.*

*Cut to a corridor full of people walking fast, their heads lowered.*

*Cut to a carriage moving fast, people rocking in their seats in silence.*

Deleuze proceeds to trace the history of montage, starting with its utilisation by Griffith, which in effect introduced its possibilities. His analysis establishes four major methods of montage, all of which were articulated before WW2: American, Soviet, French and German school.

Griffith is said to have been the first filmmaker to utilise montage as means of forming the whole of the film and giving it the major role in organising the film, in making it an organic unity. All elements of film are set in binary relationships, which, according to Deleuze,

\(^2\) Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.29
form parallel alternate montage, which imposes specific kind of order on the sequence of images that construct a film, and according to certain rhythm. Inserting a close-up into a scene in this method, for instance, recreates the set in a miniature version (apart from giving the existing set more detail) and also, in the case of close-up, lends subjectivity to the objective set. Deleuze sees three different forms of montage, three forms of 'rhythmic alternation':\(^3\) alternation of different parts, of relative dimensions and of convergent actions. Without going into more detail about these different aspects of it, it is possible to note that this parallel alternate montage, basic and, in a sense, inherent in all manner of montage practices, indicates a general binary operation which always works as an act of disruption and reorganisation of the set: the stability of the whole is threatened, only to be subsequently re-established. And this is the basis Deleuze sees as formative of American cinema: there always persists an organic notion of the whole (the whole of the film, the whole that is the film); there is a 'general situation'\(^4\) which reaches the state of a 'transformed situation'\(^5\) through an action, a 'convergence of actions,'\(^6\) as Deleuze terms it (since it is always a binary operation.) Significantly, it is this dynamic aspect of ordering, rather than the narrative structure, that Deleuze sees as primary to what can loosely be classified as American cinema; narration always only follows this initial, binary rhythmic pattern.

This operation of montage sees time as defined through movement, indicated and traced by, and with, movement. Deleuze sees two aspects of this, which stand as chronosigns or the signs of time: the first aspect is the unity of time, what he terms as time's great spiral, the totality of which 'draws together the set of movement in the universe,' creates a set that is a *totality of all movement*; on the other hand there is the aspect of time that is the interval, the smallest unit of action – of movement. The totality of time as a whole represents the notion of past and future, of the grand temporal scale of things (easily recognisable in American cinema even today); the interval is the 'variable present,' and, as Deleuze puts it, it is accelerated. Each aspect, if dilated or contracted (respectively), can become the other; present blown up to become all of time - and all history of time zoomed-out to become a single moment. But it is this indirect image of time that is

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\(^3\) Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.31
\(^4\) Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.31
\(^5\) Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.31
\(^6\) Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.31
constructed through the act of montage (of movement images), and it stands for the idea of the film, for its whole.

[film sequence]
A long shot of an empty platform. It frames the mouth of the tunnel, which is completely black.
A long shot from inside a black cab, driving down the streets. It frames the drivers back and the view of the city through the windshield. It lasts ten minutes.

The Soviet school, on the other hand, construed the notion of dialectical montage, with Sergei Eisenstein as its leading figure. As Deleuze shows, Eisenstein’s critique of Griffith’s method represents a critique of an underlying ideology or narration, which can be recognised in Griffith, but also, more importantly, implies a critique of the method itself; the parallel development of categories which are to be seen as opposed without taking into account their genesis or development. That is to say, there is a state of the whole and it is understood in terms of binaries and collections of parts – as opposed to Eisenstein's understanding of the whole as organic, in the sense that there is an underlying logic of development, to be arrived at, rather than negated by an empirical noting of the given set of elements. In this method, the image is, therefore, a spiral – rather than a set of parallel lines – and it is dialectical. There is the same 'situation/transcendence-of-oppositions/transformed-situation' pattern, but in the case of dialectical approach, the transcendence leads to a creation of the new, developed state of unity.

In short, montage of opposition takes the place of parallel montage, under the dialectical law of the One which divides itself in order to form the new, higher unity.7

Dialectical montage, as Deleuze continues to explain, includes not only the organic aspect, which is of genesis and growth, but also the 'pathetic' aspect (as he terms it), which is characteristic of development:

There is not simply the opposition of earth and water, of the one and the many; there is the transition of the one into the other, and the sudden upsurge of the other out of the one.8

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7 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.34
8 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.35
This 'pathetic' aspect is a transition from one term to the other (as the two form the dialectical opposition), but also the creation of a new quality, a third element, 'born from the transition.'

Furthermore, this aspect of qualitative change is exactly the operation of consciousness, of transformation characteristic of the creation of consciousness, 'the transition from Nature to man and the quality which is born from the transition which has been accomplished.'

Both the notion of the temporal interval and the whole, although remaining closely tied to the movement-image, bear, in the case of dialectical montage, a different meaning: the interval is to be seen as a qualitative rather than simply a quantitative leap, and the whole is a totality 'in which the parts are produced in each other in their set and the set is reproduced in the parts, so that this reciprocal causality refers back to the whole as cause of the set and of its parts.'

In other words, the transformations and exchange taking place between the elements, sets and the whole are more complex and less linear than in the case of parallel montage, leading to (and being derived from) an act of montage whose transformations take place both at the level of content and of form, creating a more organic whole than the one of linear binaries of the parallel montage. Simply out, the notion of qualitative transformation, when introduced into the process, leads to a whole which functions as an organism rather than a device of mechanical contrasting.

And so we are offered two similar, yet significantly different, methods of montage: one which will always contrast its propositions in symmetrical, parallel and ultimately static ways (parallel montage) and the other, which contrasts oppositions, only to arrive, through an act of overcoming of oppositions, to an organic third state (dialectical montage). Both of these should be noted as conceptual methods of interest, embodied in the act, or procedure, of montage.

Deleuze proceeds to explain that the dialectic aspect of montage can be understood in a number of ways, along a number of transformations that delineate its dialectic passage.

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9 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.35
10 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.36
11 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.37
of transformation. One aspect of the dialectical operation is the notion of quantitative process and qualitative leap; it is the arrival at the new quality via a quantitative procedure. The other is the hierarchical notion of the whole and its sets, and the parts that form the sets. Then there is the dialectic of the One and its opposition, of its dividing into two and arrival at the new – and these aspects are to be seen, according to Deleuze, to form the core of the Soviet school, tying together different directors' work. Pudovkin is said to be interested in the qualitative upsurge of consciousness; Dovzhenko is seen as operating primarily at the level of the relationship between the parts, the sets and the whole. Eisenstein is seen by Deleuze to be engaged with the notion of the One which becomes two, forming a new unity, 'reuniting the organic whole and the pathetic interval.' All three are said to treat Nature as dialectical only through its integration into the whole of the human realm; Nature as dialectical only in relation to Man. It is Dziga Vertov's work, which, in this sense, offers a significantly different angle - he engages with the 'dialectic of matter in itself.' And this approach might prove to be of special interest in the context of this thesis.

Deleuze claims that Vertov, even when integrating man into nature, was constantly taking all systems, be they living or not, in precisely that sense - as systems. Every system was material (of matter) and, as such, seen and represented as part of a continual process of inter-action. Movement is ever-present, and it is received, channelled, and transmitted through the system, with a significant change in direction and its inherent order, bringing about change in the process.

It is not that Vertov considered beings to be machines, but rather machines which had a 'heart' and which 'revolved, trembled, jolted about and threw out flashes of lightning,' as man could also do, using other movements under other conditions, but always in interaction with each other.

This notion is of particular interest for the study of the Underground, addressing as it does the relationship between the human and the mechanical (in this case machine-like) in a way which brings them into close proximity, with movement performing the translation from one realm to the other: 'What Vertov discovered in contemporary life was [...] the material woman and child, as much as systems which are called mechanisms or

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12 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.39
13 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.39
14 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.39
machines.¹⁵ It is the materiality of Man, not just of nature, that is drawn forward in
Vertov; however, as Deleuze states, there is still the ‘variable interval’¹⁶ separating the
two, preventing the conceptual flattening of the two into a continuous surface. And for
Vertov, in Deleuze’s eyes, perception is the aspect that marks this interval. More
specifically, it is the sense of vision, the act of looking (the glance), and it is the eye as
the vehicle of vision. But Deleuze emphasises that it is not the human eye, for its mobility
is reduced, the law of its access strict. It is the eye of the camera, eye in matter and as
matter, extending from the beginning of action to the limit of reaction. It is montage itself,
finally, that ‘adapts the transformations of movements in the material universe to the
interval of movement in the eye of the camera: rhythm.’¹⁷ Montage is an act of
coordination between movement and perception.

But montage, as operation, is already present in the choice of material, preceding the act
of filming; it is in filming itself, in the intervals of the ‘camera-eye;’ finally, it comes after
the film, in the editing, as well as in the audience, in its act of comparison between life ‘as
it is’ and film. In other words, Deleuze shows that in Vertov’s case, the operation of
montage is not to be understood strictly as cinematic act, but also as a more general
one, a dialectic operation (as it is understood in this particular case of the Soviet school).
For Vertov, this was the only real way of engaging with the dialectic of composing
movement-images, one which would be beyond the readily accepted notion of organic
Nature and ‘pathetic’ Man. It is this comparative complexity in the understanding of the
distinctions and roles of the two that makes his brand of dialectic montage particularly
interesting in the light of this thesis. The whole is an infinite set of matter and the interval
is the Camera, the ‘eye-in-matter.’ As Deleuze points out, instead of nature-man
opposition, Vertov deals with the matter-eye one.

[film sequence]

A man is walking down the corridor.
Cut to a train entering the platform.
Cut back to the man, still walking alone down the corridor.
Cut to the train slowing down.
Cut back to the man walking. The end of the corridor is appearing. The man starts running.

¹⁵ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.39
¹⁶ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.39
¹⁷ Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.40
Cut to the interior of the carriage. The frame is filled with the back of the carriage, and through the window, it is possible to see the carriage behind. People inside it are talking. One man is leaning over the aisle and waving his hand at the person sitting opposite.

The third school of montage Deleuze discusses is the French one. It developed along the lines of breaking up with organic composition of parallel montage like the Soviet school, except that the main concern of French filmmakers, according to Deleuze, was the sheer quantity of movement, and the ways to define it through a set of metrical relations. It is because of that, that Deleuze terms the French school of montage as Cartesian. The debt to Griffith was in this case equally great, but organic montage was avoided, as was the dialectic one of the Russian school. Instead, the French were concerned with building 'vast mechanical composition of movement images.'

It is interesting that Deleuze notes two ways in which French cinema utilised the notion of machine to build up a mechanical composition of movement-images. Firstly, there is the automaton as an avatar of the machine, be it an actual machine, a clock mechanism or even a geometrical configuration that operates as a machine; it transforms movements in homogenous space, with identifiable relationships forming between them. Unlike the automaton of German expressionism, this one is not representative of menace, threat or darkness:

Rather, it illustrates a clear mechanical movement as law of the maximum for a set of images which brings together things and living beings, the inanimate and animate, by making them the same.

In other words, it is the mechanical movement – which characterises the set of movement-images – that is brought to the fore, evening everything out, be it alive or dead. The mechanical movement is the main principle. Deleuze sees the presence of multiplicities of elements as formative of this mechanical movement, and that is of particular interest for this thesis: he writes of puppets and bodies, as well as their shadows, which constantly interact to form a system of mechanical movements:

Subtle relationships of reduplication, alternation, periodical return and chain reaction [...] constitute the set to which the mechanical movement must be attributed.

18 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.41
19 Deleuze, Cinema 1, pp.41-2
According to Deleuze, all of this is motivated by a concrete object of desire, which acts as a 'motor,' triggering mechanical movements. These movements are carried by a number of elements, which appear in homogenised space (charting space out), creating a 'expanding mechanised set'\textsuperscript{21} of sorts. The key to all this is the individual (person, element). The other kind of machine is the engine:

\begin{quote}
The powerful energy machine which produces movement out of something else, and constantly affirms a heterogeneity whose terms it links - the mechanical and the living, the inside and the outside, the engineer and the force - in a process of internal resonance of amplifying communication.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

The difference between French 'obsession' with machines and the Russian one, is that the latter one was a dialectic transformation of man and machine leading to a condition of the two intertwined, whereas the French approach is to be seen as dealing with the movement aspect, be it literal physical movement in a machine or the movement of, what Deleuze refers to as, the human soul, leading to the overcoming of the difference between man and nature not through a dialectical unity but through the notion of Passion - a cipher of the affect (which won't be discussed here in detail).

\begin{film_sequence}
The man who was waving his hand stands up right in front of the person in the seat opposite.
Cut to a train disappearing into the tunnel.
The air current that was moving an empty chocolate bar wrapping along the platform settles.
For a long time nothing happens. Then the noise of a distant train starts getting louder and louder.
\end{film_sequence}

Finally, there is the German school, \textit{German Expressionism}, which revolves around the expressive power of light, and its contrast with darkness. This binary couple does not belong to a dialectic because there is no third state to arrive at, there is no unity, and especially not an organic one: light always needs darkness to oppose and define itself against, remaining in strict opposition to it. As such, light becomes an intensive quality, intensity against its own negation - and all these principles do not belong only to the image but are definitive of montage as well. The main principle through which

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{20} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.42
\textsuperscript{21} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.42
\textsuperscript{22} Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.42
\end{footnotes}
Expressionism opposes organic montage of Griffith or the Soviet school is not the notion of movement and its fluidity, but a certain reduction of everything to the *non-organic life of things,*\textsuperscript{23} as Deleuze terms it; it is light and darkness as the limits of everything living, limits that dissolve existence into the non-organic state of things. It is not the mechanical that contrasts the organic, it is the notion of matter, which can raise itself to the state of life and life which is always plunged into the world of matter: 'The animal has lost the organic, as much as matter has gained life.'\textsuperscript{24} Finally, the geometry is no longer a matter of metrical order and co-ordinates, as it was in the French school – but a matter of space 'constructed,'\textsuperscript{25} rather than described; it is a matter of space as extension and accumulation.

\begin{quote}
[\textbf{film sequence}]
\par
\textit{Four static shots in quick succession.}
\par
\textit{Park scenery, bright daylight. Leaves are moving in the breeze.}
\par
\textit{Empty Underground platform. An empty plastic bag moves of its own accord across the floor.}
\par
\textit{Nighttime, coloured lights from shop windows reflected in the glistening pavement, wet after the rain.}
\par
\textit{Empty corridor, the overhead light tinting the walls green.}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, pp.50-1}
\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.51}
\footnote{Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, p.51}
\end{footnotes}
This particular story of the Underground came from a set of personal experiences – as all stories in one way or another do. In his book on the Parisian underground train system, *Ethnologue dans le Métro* (translated in English as *In the Metro*, and including an essay by Tom Conely, a 'Deleuzist' himself), Marc Augé poses the question of the possibility of describing the experience of an underground system, without actually remaining within the confinements of the subjective (and by this he mostly implies: social) position of the author himself. The similar problem was faced here: how to try and write about an occurrence as if the experience of it were generic, and thus avoid getting into the narrowness of given social categories and their implied positions, while at the same time avoid overlooking the specificity of personal position. Deleuze's understanding of the subject and the use of his cinematic theory provided enough space to take a stand outside any particular social category or viewpoint; but at this stage, when discussing the most general notion of the Underground and its relation to the city, it might prove useful to offer a viewpoint on the personal experience, a viewpoint of *this moving body*, which contributed to the development of *this* particular understanding of the Underground – as a cinematic urban event, and series of events.

[voiceover]

*You are in an empty room, sitting in a chair.*

*Your back is straight and hands placed on your knees.*

*Look right in front of you. Don't move.*

To live a life of 25 years without knowing the Underground; and then to move cities and find your whole experience and understanding of living in an urban environment radically altered and subject to adaptation of the everyday routine, in a way that necessitates the accommodation of a set of particular, repetitive operative procedures – is an experience that introduces space where there was none (under the ground); introduces new modes of walking and seeing (previously nonexistent); constructs an *image* of the city which is, at closer inspection, radically different from the image of the city, any city, city as *entity*, already known. This, it is worth noting, is not a case of difference between urban environments as such, and quite definitely not the case of quantitative differences
between smaller and larger urban conglomerates (although the issues of size and quantity might have been influential in the creation of the Underground system), but a qualitative leap in the understanding of an urban environment, a shift of experience and perception of the city substantial enough to transform it into a different entity altogether. The experience of the Underground, it is argued here, is the experience definitive of the metropolis.

[voiceover]

Now stand up and make one step forward.

Stop there, put your hands on your back and wait for my next word.

Until then, concentrate on your breathing.

Unlike Marc Auge’s Parisian Metro, the Underground stands for an operation of going under, of flipping and reversing the established order, of being on the other side, and of alternating. This is, at least, how its name operates. It is also the oldest system of its kind, developed at the outset of modernity, and an index of sorts of metropolitan acts formative of that very modernity. Starting with the name, and continuing into the everyday urban experience it denotes, it is possible to construe the Underground as in constant state of juxtaposition with the city itself. But far from being a polar opposite of the city, it is a literal part of it, and remains always simultaneously an urban outside, and the very essence of urbanity. There could be a number of ways to discuss the relationship between the Underground and the city, and the relative separation, as well as unity, of the two; but the route proposed in this thesis (and arguably one quite close to the everyday corporeal experience of it) sees the two to form much more than a straightforward binary opposition: it is a relationship of asymmetry and complex spatial overlapping – spatial in more than one sense of the word.

[voiceover]

Take a deep breath. On an exhalation, I want you to say: ‘Under. Ground.’


Say them!

Good.

Now go back to the chair and sit down again. Take five deep breaths.
As was indicated in the development of all the chapters on crucial Underground events, the two major keys for unravelling the experience of the Underground are the notions of corporeality and movement. The body travels through the city, on foot or with the aid of mechanical devices; the perceptual and affectual events that mark this journey define it as much as body's physical regimes, and their relationship with the surrounds; and when observed through the lens of Deleuze's philosophical ideas, these diverse aspects become fluidly interconnected – most obviously through the notion of movement.

If movement is the thread smoothly connecting the urban experience of the city with its Underground system, and body the complex, dynamic knot marking this thread – the cipher of movement and its perceptual locus – then there is also the abstraction of the two, the static representation that inhabits the other end of the spectrum – manifest in the Underground map and its depiction of the relationship between the two realms. In a sense, the map represents the act of body's erasure from the city, and its introduction to a condition of urbanity more abstract than an ordinary 'surface' experience could ever be.

[voiceover]
Get up from the chair and quickly take your position in front of it. Now start walking.
Walk straight ahead, and as you are doing so, concentrate on the movements of your body.
Feel your legs move. Coordinate your breathing with your steps. Keep walking.
Around you there is only empty whiteness. A comfortable nothing.
Find your pace and keep walking.

The Underground seems always to exist opposed to the 'Overground' in two different ways: on the one hand, it is other to the city, since it can be seen to oppose the very character of the city, and contrast it by the sheer force of displacement from its (physical) context, as well as by the set of implicit rules that locate the Underground's purpose in the accommodating of urban aspects which the city itself cannot accommodate. On the other hand, the Underground is literally the city itself, both in that the occurrences within it can be seen to signify everything that is utterly urban, and in that the Underground represents an operative extension to the city, one the experiencing of which cannot be taken to lie outside the experience of the city itself. This ultimately asymmetrical juxtaposition of the Underground with the city that formed it (whose needs it was created to answer), this coupling which should be seen as much more than a simple dialectic
opposition, seems to function at the same time as a totality and a rupture, as will be discussed in relation to Deleuze's concept of cinematic montage.

This asymmetrical binary relationship is reflected, and can be discussed, along the lines of corporeal experience (and its referential notion of *space as extension*), and the representations of the Underground/City (which relates to the notion of *space as representation*). The questions of representation, as well as knowledge of the city, constructed as they are from repetitive, recurring, daily experience of it, are related to the notion of the *image* of the city, that is – a relatively unifying presentation as well as representation of it. To have an image of a city in mind would be, in the context of Deleuzian theory of the visual, to imply much more than a representational snapshot of it, or a map. Similar to the way Deleuze discusses the *image of thought*, which would be a set of idiosyncrasies that involve the notions of perception and light as much as the concept of the human subject, it might be possible to discuss the formation of the *image of the city*. This open totality of urban experience, which, in this case, is to be discussed as crucially interlinked with the experience of the urban underground system, is, with the use of the notion of image, usefully brought closer to the notions of general representation of any environment, inviting discussions on the notion of mapping. And this is of interest in the context of the Underground 'map,' as much as it is in the context of the process of individual, abstract mapping of the city, once it has been transformed through the introduction of the Underground. Hence the issue of constructing a city image is simultaneously a question of external, representational mapping, and mapping as direct corporeal experience (which is closely linked to the notion of orientation).

[voiceover]
You are still walking. I want you now to count your next ten steps, from ten to zero.
When you reach zero, take a sharp turn to your right. Try and turn at a right angle to your current direction.
Remember that there is nothing around you to look at. You can close your eyes if you want.
Start counting now.

Even when the body inside the city is not a walking body, when knowing the city becomes an exercise in scaling the city through other means of transport, there is always the direct sensorial connection with the context: you can see, and you can smell, you can even tell the time of the day. Contrary to this, to enter the Underground means to remove
one's body from the urban context and at the same time immerse it naked into a different kind of urbanity. The body's nakedness lies in its singularity, and its direct contact with the environment – walking is inescapable, and the transport which takes over from walking (the train) is utterly mechanised and isolated, forming a moving envelope, a moving world around the body.

The point of transition or rupture is crucial here: how does one become the other, how does the city transform itself into the Underground, and what does this transformation mean? There is an Underground station (not to be named) that represents one of the extreme examples of the contact zone between the city and the Underground. Situated in the middle of a quiet residential area, surrounded exclusively by two-storey family houses, with no commercial or other public programmes, the station entrance inhabits a simple white cube of a building, and is marked by a big Underground sign, which covers most of the surface of the building above the entrance itself. From the side of the city, this entrance into the Underground reads as a pure sign: there is nothing to indicate the transition from one into the other apart from the coded message of the Underground logo. The city seems not to be acknowledging its presence at all; the opening onto the otherness of the Underground functions in the most literal way as a puncture. The patterning of the urban fabric has been disturbed by a simple 'hole,' which leads into the Tube, invoking the image of rabbit's hole in Alice in Wonderland. It is this, the most rudimentary of all examples, which indicates the formative logic, the generic aspects of the transition: it is a rupture. Instead of representing a transitional experience, the shift from being Over-ground to being Under-ground is an almost instantaneous one, and is performed by the body as the only legitimate carrier of this urban conversion: you have to walk into a hole in the wall and find yourself in the realm that belongs to that which is under-the-ground.

This example also indicates another extremely important aspect of the rupture in the urban fabric: the fact that the transformation of the urban environment can be significant when the action starts bleeding into the city from this other realm. The walking crowds disappear into cuts in the continuity of the urban surface, only to reappear at a different point in the mapped space-time of the metropolis. The unexpectedness of the rupture and presentation of seemingly illogical continuity of action elsewhere indicates the immensity of rupture created in the surface of urban continuity.
[voiceover]
You took your turn. Could you estimate the angle?

Keep walking now. You can see now a disturbance in the even whiteness around you. As you get closer, you realize that there is a gate of sorts in front of you, perfectly aligned with the direction of your walking. The gate itself is a simple dark frame. If you look at it you cannot tell what it is made of.

Look at it as you are approaching it, but don’t stop walking.

When you reach it, just walk through it. Remember: once you have passed through it, don’t look back.

Just keep walking.

The main issue to be discussed here is the altered perception of the city with the introduction of the Underground; the sense of urban continuity simply cannot be the same as it was without the transformation of the urban experience once the body has made its fragile, exposed, pedestrian transition into ‘the other world,’ and has come back (to tell). From the experience of the body, the city becomes the flicker of urban light (this is not simply a matter of literal daylight) alternating as it does with the darkness of the Underground (darkness which sometimes reveals more about the a priori light of urbanity above the ground). The city becomes a perceptual, corporeal, experiential line, which alternates between the two worlds, one of which seems to be completely in service of the other, and which feels the need to erase itself, to make its existence as imperceptible as possible, spatially and temporally, asking to be abandoned (exited) as fast as possible. Everything is about the efficacy with which the city itself is to be re-entered, and the non-city of the Underground abandoned and erased, so that ‘life’ can continue – because life happens above, not under.

The other aspect, the one that covers urban space as representation and not as corporeal extension, is the notion of urban mapping: what kind of whole of the city is being constructed through such a process of serial ruptures? On one hand there exists, what could be seen as, the diagram (in the Deleuzian sense of the term) of the city and the Underground, which implies a lived, corporeally constructed experiential map, which eludes notions of representation; on the other hand, there is the Underground map as it stands, a sublimation of representation, with all the subsequent peculiarities of the map itself and the way it feeds back into the experience of the system and the city itself.
[voiceover]

Now: stop!

Can you remember where you came from?

Point in the direction of the chair, and then sit on the floor.

Bring your knees to your chest and hold them. Rest your head on them.

Choose whether you will place your left or your right cheek down and then remain in that position.

Think!

The existing Underground map gives a revealing view both on the Underground itself and on its relation to the city above. Setting aside the question of exact terminology that could be used to denote what is commonly referred to as the Underground map, the representation of the system is constructed through a set of lines and points, accompanied by text (station names) and coded in colour (train lines). As for how this abstract map represents the Underground, it is abundantly clear that the main gesture is one of reduction: the route itself is made linear, property of a single dimension, and as straight as possible. The locations of stations are reduced to single points, transformed into singular, circular loci of importance along the undistinguished black route-lines. The backdrop to all this is an empty surface of white, a nothingness. This reductive act locates its obvious reason in the utilitarian value of 'simplicity;' the simpler the map, the easier to use. But this reductive gesture is only made possible by the very character of the system it represents: it verifies the fact that the only aspect of the system deemed to bear significance (and therefore be signified) is its set of portals opening onto the city above. The rest is to be moved through without stopping.

The other aspect of the Underground map is the representation of the relationship between the Underground system and the city: the map itself bears no topological reference to the physical configuration of the city above; it locates points of interest in relation to one another in accordance to their own interrelations and the logic of the map/diagram itself, which removes it significantly from the notion of direct topological or geographical representation. Consequently, the only aspect of the urban world above that seems of importance — when observed through the lens of the Underground map — are the very point of contact, the portals back into it. Other than that, the city it has been erased, leaving only a trail of signifiers, names of real places. All that the Underground map acknowledges is the route through nothingness, which is to be as abstract and
simplified as possible, with locations anchored to the city as the only aspects of value.
The stations are the city.

[voiceover]
You are walking down the street, it is early morning, air is chill but the light is bright. You have no memory of how you came to be here. You are looking around you, trying to recognise the street but nothing seems familiar. Houses, cars, people. Everything seems perfectly ordinary, yet nothing seems specific. So you keep walking.
You finally reach a corner and look at the name of the street.
The words mean nothing. You can read them, but they don’t seem to conjure any recognisable image in your mind.
You feel lost, and you keep walking.

From the viewpoint of the body, then, the urban experience is a constant alteration between two modes, between moving over and moving under the surface, the 'plateau' constitutive of the city. This is an experience inseparable from the concrete as well as abstract movement, which, in its wake, constructs an image of city, dynamic and temporal. From the viewpoint of representation, the system aims at its own erasure: it interrupts and wants to re-establish the continuity of that which it has ruptured. It maps space, but reduces it to blankness and externalised goals; it charts out time, but it is always suppresses it to zero value. Somewhere between these two regimes, in the confrontation of the image of movement with the lived duration of urban spatiality, lies the total experience of the city – with the Underground as the metropolitan machine of cinematic montage.
As was shown at the beginning of the chapter, Deleuze's definition of cinematic montage is concerned with two main aspects. Firstly, montage is tied to the notion of the whole, meaning that it should invariably be seen as concerned with the creation of various kinds of relatively totalised and relatively finalised entities. In Deleuze's case, the main object of investigation is the creation of the whole of the film but, as was shown, the understanding of the whole and the creation of its continuity, as well as its relative closure, is a construction of a philosophical concept and, as such – inherently abstract enough to become inclusive. Moreover, the operation of montage is seen, by Deleuze, to act as the tool of 'determination' of the whole; that is to say, the specificity of the act of montage is to be seen as responsible for the creation and delineation of the very concrete character of the whole (of the film), determining not only the relative boundaries of the whole, but also its specific manifestation. This definition, however, can be taken conversely: if there is such a thing as the whole of the film, it could only have been reached through the act of montage, whatever its manifestation. Since montage is inherently an act of series, even a single sequence shot would, arguably, be able of constituting montage. Although this proposition might seem misleading, it serves to offer a useful insight into the nature of Deleuze's definition: the act of montage is to be taken as one and the same as the act of whole-creation – it presupposes an inseparable connection between the idea of closure and an inherently serial act of cutting.

This brings to the surface the second aspect of Deleuze's definition, the formative acts in the construction of montage: the notions of continuity, cutting and false continuity. The way Deleuze proposes these concepts (continuity, false continuity) and acts (cutting), is once again to be taken in much broader terms than the cinematic ones. What Deleuze offers is an understanding of the notion of the whole as concept, created of ruptures and continuities, which themselves are determined by cuts. This conceptual framework might have been derived from cinematic montage, but stands as a much more general proposition regarding possible understanding of the structure of any given whole.

If there is to be an understanding of the urban environment as a whole, and this urban environment has been totalised into a whole thanks to (and regardless of) ruptures and
false continuities it harbours, then it might be possible to claim the presence of montage, in the sense Deleuze defined it to stand for. To say that an urban environment has been made into a totality because of the ruptures it includes, is to define rupture as the act which enables the interconnecting force to arise, which is, in the case of the Underground as the connecting device, practically self-explanatory. On the other hand, the totality exists regardless of ruptures – they do not only help establish continuity, but also depend on the act of annihilation of the presence of the rupture through the act of an overriding continuity. The continuity is of movement, and of time.

Urban environment can be understood (as much as it can be termed and named) in a number of ways; the whole of the city can be seen to incorporate a myriad of ruptures, and the creation of urban continuity can be said to take place in a number of modes (plains, plateaus) which, themselves, represent ciphers of various other theoretical determinants of thought itself. Indeed, this is the very question of whether an urban environment (be it termed metropolitan or not) can be seen to form a whole, whether it can be discussed in terms of wholes, past the act of nominal signification (naming), which declares limits to the city (London) and separates it from what it is not.

These questions are addressed through the following propositions: firstly, the rupture in the city is an introduction of a system (abstract territory) which serves it, but refuses to merge with it, remaining always other to it, an opening onto a substantial outside. This outside is defined simultaneously through physical displacement (under-the-ground) and removal of autonomous sense of purpose (the city assigns it use – renders it useful). This leads to the creation of an urban outside completely autonomous and, at the same time, utterly subordinate to the urban ‘inside.’ Secondly, both the continuity and perception of ruptures within the fabric of the city are traced by the body and are enacted on the body's surface; furthermore, this ‘outside’ envelops the body, hence displacing the very context of the ‘inside’: the body is required to exit the city in order to reach it again and, in the process, forms a close relationship with its outside, whose inherent gesture is one of folding onto the body. Finally, and consequently, the notion of totality – or wholeness – of the city is to be understood simultaneously as the binary amalgamation of two realms and a unity of interruption – rather than an exclusive opposition. In the case of the Underground, the initial logic of continuation of movement through acts of displacement – a twofold act of rupture and restoration of continuity through movement –
is what brings the whole of the city within the realm of Deleuzian understanding of cinema and cinematic montage. Distinct and separate, yet interlinked to the point of complete annihilation of one in the absence of the other, the city and the Underground construct a whole through various manifestations of movement, while the very reason for their separation into distinct entities has been derived from movement itself.

As mentioned, Underground itself is simultaneously connected with the city and the very cut in urban fabric and, as such, to be seen as non-dimensional. It represents discontinuity itself of the very city that harbours it, which is manifest in its representations; but it is also an experiential entity, to be accessed directly — by the body. The body, therefore, becomes the key cipher in the equation: it is the physical particle (a mind/matter particle) that cuts through the realm of the abstract, of the otherworldly. The body is the key to passage. This was shown in the analysis of the main Underground events: the walking body of the corridor, the platform body constructed in the encounter with the moving object, as well as the immobile, expressive body of the Underground carriage, all reveal the inherent link between Deleuze's theory of movement-image (cinema in general) and the movement-machine of the Underground. More specifically, it is through the notion of the 'eye in matter,' as Deleuze describes the film camera, that the Underground body forms itself — as ever interlinking the world of the human and the mechanical (and machinic), in movement.

The understanding of urban montage, as proposed here to be enacted through the Underground, can be traced more closely in the notion of continuity relative to spatial sets. The Underground disrupts the experiential continuity of the city, with every act of 'surfacing' re-assembling it differently, which in itself executes an operation of montage — in that the spatial continuity of 'image' has been disrupted. Sets, as Deleuze sees them, enable direct spatial continuity; one set opens logically onto the next, and so forth, potentially ad infinitum. Once the visible spatial continuity of sets has been broken up by a cut (that primary act of montage), the process of constructing the continuity of the whole is diverted into having to be assembled through movement, rather than obvious spatial continuity of image. This argument relies on the notion of cinematic movement-image rather than direct image of time or time-image.
perception, the city becomes recreated, and is ready to be re-entered. But it is the obvious lack of any conceivable experiential (spatial) continuity of the urban image that indicates a spatial rupture of ever-adjoining sets; the logical succession of spatial sets has been terminated by the intrusion of the Underground, by the act of removal from the spatial plateaux of the city.

The whole of the city has been interrupted and then reassembled, and its image has, therefore, become ultimately fragmented. But there is also the whole of the body's trajectory, the journey of the body, which can never be quite abstract, yet never quite concrete either – for it has been externalised from the city itself, and subjected to a particular regime of movement, to automatism and automatisation. It is Alice's journey down the Rabbit hole as well as the journey into outer space, a body immersed in the otherworldly, in blankness that forms itself in answer to the body, while encouraging a mechanism-like state in it. Hence the re-connection of disrupted spatial sets of the city is acted out through the continuity of movement, and movement itself is manifest in the body, as well as the machine; movement transforms both, and indicates the tendency for the two to become almost interchangeable; and movement is also the driving force delivering the Underground unto the city.

If the Underground is taken to be a device for production of disruptions in the spatial continuity of the city, it is possible to see how the continuation of movement through the Underground, and consequent arrival at a different image of the city itself, propose an understanding of the Underground as a cut itself in the fabric of the city. The cut has been by-passed though movement, and this movement reconstitutes the whole of the image that is the city, rendering the experience movement-image-like. This reduction of the whole of the experience of the Underground to a simple spatial interruption, bypassed through movement, is evident in Underground's reductive character, its insistence on the continuation of movement (the corridor, the carriage), and the subjection of time unto space (the platform display). But the Underground is more than that: it is also an experience of its own time and space, which is where its most interesting aspect lies – it is inseparable from the lived experience of duration, since, unlike the cinematic cut, it never abandons the totality of the corporeal experience. It is an inhabitable cut. One meant to be moved through, and as fast as possible – but nevertheless, inhabited.
The whole itself is to be understood as change and transformation in Deleuze, and it is a function of time, of duration, which, in the case of montage, Deleuze claims is indirect: the notion of duration is always already mediated, hinted at, rather than directly experienced. It is the movement-images and their relationships that the image of time is created from, rather than time-image itself; the operation of montage is the operation of movement. This kind of distinction makes for an intriguing reading in the context of this proposed cinematic understanding of the Underground.

Firstly, the link between movement-image, as function of movement, and the discussed movement-bound character of the Underground, proposes a connection between the utilisation of movement and its consequence on the perception of time: movement-image is one charting out time through movement, indicating duration itself only indirectly. Hence, the movement-bound construction of the Underground body can be understood as an act of bringing to the fore the non-durational aspect of corporeality. Moving mechanically and, as it were, repeating itself, the body becomes itself a movement-image, a movement-bound chart of time - rather than its direct intuition. This corporeal tendency is more than underlined by the aspects of temporal representations on the Underground, which were mentioned in relation to the platform event. Secondly, if a parallel is to be made between the act of montage of the city (embodied as it is in the introduction of the Underground), and montage as tool of indirect representation of time, it might just become possible to discuss the time of the city itself. If montage is a function of movement-images, and the city is being montaged through the Underground while the Underground itself is a movement-image operation, then the city itself has been introduced to a very particular experience of duration. Certainly, the intimation of duration is an act of consciousness, and as such, is to be related to the notions of self and body; to speak of the 'time of the city' implies an understanding of temporality that is already representational and, most likely, metaphorical. Nevertheless, there are certain implications to be drawn from this.

The most logical equation here would be that time, to follow Deleuze's (Bergsonian) distinction, can be conceptualised as either directly intuited as duration, which is an operation inseparable from the existence of consciousness, or represented, by being reduced to a spatial (indirect) construct. As such, the time of the city is obviously going to
be the lived time of the body, which means it will always be the time of consciousness, which infinitely catches itself operate, and *embodies* duration. On the other hand, there will always exist time as represented, but it will always be — a map, a chart, in a word, a mechanical, evened out and spatialised reduction. The question therefore is this: is it possible to claim a shift in the perception of time in a montaged city, city of the Underground? Can consciousness itself, in a montaged city, be seen to shift so as to form a much more complex relationship with duration, transforming itself beyond the expected confines? Is there such a thing as time of the city and can it be said to alter *perception of time itself* — transforming it into an operation of movement-images?

More than anything, this question could be addressed through the very notion of image — as it is conceptualised in Deleuze's philosophy — and its relation to movement; this could be a way of conceptualising the *image of the city*, both experienced directly (in the senses) and constructed in the mind, and drawn to a representation. Movement-image is image informed by movement and dependent on an act of indirect, montaged, assemblage of the whole through the introduction of ruptures. The urban body experiencing the city of the Underground (the metropolitan condition) can be said to undergo a process of creation of movement-images, and is therefore encouraged to construct a 'montaged' image of the city — a whole whose closure and totality is achieved only indirectly, outside the spatially continuous experience of the body. This might just imply the abstract notion of the 'time of the city' as one of ever-imposed movement-images, bringing to the forefront of consciousness precisely the spiritual automatism of the splitting of time — the durational nature of consciousness. Nevertheless, the further discussion of the image of the city, it's potential construction through the operation of movement-image and therefore montage, as well as its consequent relation to time and its ultimate 'screen' — consciousness — will not be pursued further here. Suffice to say, the question of 'wholeness' of the Metro-polis is intriguingly linked to the understanding not only of spatial continuities (film sets, urban bodies), but of presentation and understanding of time, since it is inseparable from that which defines, in this case, continuity: movement.

Now, the various kinds of montage that Deleuze discusses become of more interest when divorced from the concrete cinematic material they have themselves been derived from, and discussed as abstract operations in their own right. The resulting material
represents a set of solutions, which consider the possible relationships between assembled elements, cut and montaged. That is to say, once an incision (cut) has been made on the continuous fabric of film there is a whole number of ways in which the relationship between elements can be understood, and finally – the very character of the cut itself. Whereas the notion of montage is derived from cinema and transformed into a philosophical concept, the subdivisions into different ways of montage might seem more specific to the medium of cinema itself. Nevertheless, Deleuze does note some interesting aspects of the operation itself, which could be useful for the construction of the parallel between the Underground and the cinematic medium. Importantly, all the examples of various ‘schools’ of montage belong to the period and methods of movement-image and, as such, draw particular attention to the movement-related mechanics not only of montage, but also of film itself – and hence image, in its broadest sense.

Griffith was the first one to use montage in a way that would make it a method for the creation of the cinematic whole; the parallel organic montage that he devised is the most general way of discussing the notion of binary confrontation of two elements (and series of elements) through the introduction of the cut. What is particularly interesting about Griffith’s method is that Deleuze sees it historically to be inherent in the methods of various national schools that came after it. In other words, parallel organic montage, with its implications of binary contrasts, represents the basic way of conceptualising movement-bound assemblage of images across seemingly interruptive cuts.

This is also the most general way in which the relationship between the city and the Underground can be seen: as a parallel, contrasting motion, which constructs a stable, static whole. One is above, the other below; one immersed in natural light, the other in artificial; one liveable, the other not, etc. What connects these into a whole is movement itself – and it is also the movement of the city through the cut of the Underground. Far from a simple spatial duality, the relationship is one of dynamic exchange between realms, through cuts as conduits of motion in their own right.

The dialectical montage of the Soviet school forms, as Deleuze states, a spiral rather than an image of parallels – since the major characteristic of dialectic is the formation of the third principle, which has been achieved through the confrontation of the two
opposites. There is a sense of development and movement in this, and it leads to an always-new sense of unity. In other words, this model of montage is interesting for it suggests that there can be a creation of new qualities in transition from one to the other, from darkness to light, from over to under; it is a model which suggests that the two opposites of the metropolitan condition that are drawn forward with the presence of the Underground, are to be seen as dynamic and creative in the act of experiencing. That is to say, the two are seen not only as opposites, but opposites which form qualitative transformations in the understanding of the whole with each new experiential confrontation. Under and above are no longer always at the same distance, but formative of the new third, the metropolis, which is not a composite of the two but a radically new entity. And the interval between the two is a qualitative one and not simply quantitative, indicating the very operation of consciousness. Although seemingly self-evident, this comparison is an invitation how to think two opposing aspects, particularly interesting when it becomes evident that it is the cut itself, as a gesture of dividing any two principles, be they nominally or ‘spatially’ separated, is the real site of conceptual transformation.

One particular filmmaker of the Soviet school could be seen to be of great interest in the context of the Underground – Dziga Vertov. As was mentioned in the first part of the chapter, Deleuze sees a number of different aspects of dialectical montage and links them to several prominent directors of the Soviet school. Each one put emphasis on a particular way of engaging with the dialectic, and Vertov's specific angle was, according to Deleuze, the dialectic of matter itself. Unlike the examples of other Soviet directors, Vertov's cinema never quite functions as the act of juxtaposition of man and nature, but rather, brings them both to the level of material systems, of matter. And there is always movement and interaction that cuts across differences, cuts through matter, and embodies the dialectical process. Neither is reduced to the other, but they are nevertheless connected. The interval that separates them, though, is in the case of Vertov – perception.

And with this a very interesting conceptual model is offered: Deleuze, in effect, proposes that Vertov emphasises the materiality of all things, living or dead, and all material systems correspond through movement; the interval that distinguishes the human aspect from all else is simply perception. Now, this might be a helpful construct to discuss the
Underground, since it is exactly this kind of interconnectedness and interdependence through movement that is suggested to exist in the relationship between the Underground and the human body, as well as consciousness it 'houses.' It is the continuity of movement that is proposed to be of most significance; but not just that, the model Deleuze spots in Vertov is dependent on perception, or rather, the relationship between movement and perception. The movement of the body on the Underground and the movement of the train inside the Underground are both movements of matter; they are also both observed to be in some respect mechanical. The perception in question, in this conceptual proposition, is also not quite the perception of the human eye, as Deleuze claims: it is the eye of the camera (Kino-ok) that Vertov insists upon, the eye in the matter itself. Montage, finally, is the key to coordinating perception with movement. As Deleuze points out, instead of man/nature, we have eye/matter dialectic in Vertov – which opens a hugely interesting way of thinking the relationship between the human and the architectural realms, the body and the tunnel and the train within it. It is the dialectic of the eye and matter, traversed through movement, which offers an excellent model to explain the exclusiveness of the set of events that the Underground offers.

The French school, on the other hand, offers another interesting proposition (in the way Deleuze conceives it): it is Cartesian, in that is concerns itself with metrical relations, and is to be seen as prone to constructing a 'mechanical composition' of movement images. In other words, French cinema employed the notion of machines in order to assemble cinematic wholes, which created its particular character. The movement-images that are the film are measured, metrically organised, rendered hierarchical, assembled into a mechanical whole, mechanical since it is governed by the movement it also conducts. It is this kind of 'Cartesian' character that Deleuze sees in French cinema, that is interesting in its relation to modes of spatial representation: Cartesian notions of space are those which see it as easily reduced to clear hierarchies of representation. These are the images of movement and time charted out, and space evenly distributed and measured.

The concept of French school of montage is interesting for tends to engage with two particular aspects: automata and engines. Now these two almost iconic manifestations

27 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-image*, p.41
(or representations) of machines are of interest in this investigation, since they indicate the crucial aspects of the Underground: the engine that is at the core of the very logic of transportation that gave the Underground *raison d'être*, and the notion of automata is a direct implication of automated bodies. It is, therefore, the idea of mechanical movement that is seen as bringing together the whole, and cutting across the binary oppositions (living/dead, animate/inanimate, etc.); and this movement is most evident in puppets and bodies which are participating in mechanical movement – and the characteristics of this movement are reduplication, alternation, periodical return, chain reaction. All these terms Deleuze uses in the connection to the use of automata in French cinema, but through it he actually indicates the general characteristics of automated movement and those are to be found in exactly the same form on the Underground. The cipher of the engine, which is the second aspect, only makes this whole process evident, literally assigning it the body of the machine.

And so, there are two different aspects to be observed in the Russian dialectic montage (especially Vertov) and French montage: the first one insists on the linking of the man and the machine (in the case of Vertov, perception is the measure distinguishing the two), and in French cinema, it is the insistence on movement and its mechanical aspect. Both of these represent highly relevant conceptual propositions in the context of the Underground.

Finally, there is the German expressionist cinema and its montage. As is the case with this particular cinematic tradition in general, Deleuze sees its practice of montage as revolving around light and its juxtaposition with darkness. The binary opposition here is one of light as intensity and its annihilation, embodied in darkness. It is not a case of symmetry, but of presence and absence of intensity. Light, in this case is seen as the limit of being, as that principle into which being dissolves, as the tool for annihilation of being – and so is darkness. All that is life is reduced to inorganic life (which is the reason for expressionism's narrative themes and was developed to match these themes – horror, fear, etc.). It is the matter which cuts through everything, living or not. Most interestingly, the 'geometry' of this kind of cinema is not metrical, but constructed; it is not a matter of representation and description, which inevitably rely on metrical aspects, but on the contrary a space which is extension and accumulation.
This aspect of space which becomes extensive at the limit where light takes over being was discussed in more detail in the chapter on close-up, where it was mentioned as the intensive limit of being, of faciality, of individuation. But it is also the most primary distinction between the city and its Underground: the Underground is always removed from daylight, it is the artificially, and therefore dubiously, lit existence inside the overwhelming darkness of being under-the-ground.

And so, these three basic types of montage, characteristic for the creation of movement-image as they are, point to three of the most prominent ways of thinking the Underground: as the locus where the interval between the human and the matter is filtered through perception; as the mechanical assemblage of movement embodied in mechanisms and automata; and finally, as the ever-dark world of artificial illumination, forever in its true avatar, removed from the surface, from the light of 'nature.'

The Underground is what the body cuts through, constructing, along the way, an edited image of the city. But the Underground is also a cut itself, the 'open' through which the movement of the city needs to make a leap, a leap that will bring the human and the non-human that much closer, outlining consciousness in its passage through time.
This is the film then.

The people walking down the streets, memories inscribed in their faces. The camera recording their expressions; cutting to crowded bodies in the streets on warm nights, glasses in hands; cutting to extreme close-ups of eyes, lights reflected in the moist film that covers them.

There is the river and there is the cityscape, which, on gloomy days, looks like a cut-out carelessly glued onto an even, expressionless surface of grey. There are bridges and the railing that is never touched by hands, until a tourist leans on it and points the camera away from the body.

There is a long sequence shot from the back of a black cab, and the framed images of the city that can be seen through the glass seem to go on for ever; this is the angle of the seated body. But there is also the camera giving a viewpoint on the person sitting and their face seems to reflect light, although the interior of the cab is relatively dark. The image is that of a bright face and streets filled with light. The back window of the cab seems to frame the face. The eyes are wide open, but never meet the camera lens.

Cut. It is dark outside now. It has been raining and the streets are wet, reflecting neon signs and brightly lit shop windows. The cab pulls over and the person inside it opens the door and walks out. The camera leaves the cab and, instead of following the person, keeps moving down the street. There is a sign on one of the buildings, the big red circle, cut in half by a horizontal red line. The camera swerves away from the buildings, back towards the cab, and the person who was taking the ride turns away from the cab, placing the wallet in the back pocket; the window is closing.

Passing the camera by, the person walks into the Underground station, past people walking in the opposite direction. Someone is laughing somewhere out of the frame, and the sounds inside the building grow louder.

We are walking now, camera and I. You can see me inside your frame, although I occasionally slip out of it. I am walking towards the barriers. I am pulling the wallet out of my pocket, I press it against the yellow disc and you can hear a sound and the barriers open to let me in and I walk through, and so do you, so does the camera lens, together, with me.

We are going down now, you and I.

Down the escalator, I am running down the left-hand side, I am passing people by, and I am keeping an eye on the people on the other escalator, the one leading back up. I catch some of their glances, even when I am not watching.
Down the corridor now. I don't need to look at the signs any more; I know this station, I know where I am going and I know what these walls would feel like if my fingers touched them. There are people in front of me, as the corridor is closing in on us, and we are all walking in the same direction, fast.

Cut to an image of slowly moving clouds across a pale sky.

I am walking and thinking about my steps, my body, the feet, the knees bending.
I scratch the back of my neck.
I keep walking.

Cut to the platform. Cut to the train leaving the station. Cut to an empty station.
I know all the images you are seeing now, I have seen them before.
I am waiting for the train.
I am looking inside the tunnel.
It is black.
I keep looking.

A close-up.
A pair of eyes opening.
CONCLUSION

The chapter focused on the Lincoln Underground as a significant event in the history of the United States. The underground railroad played a crucial role in the abolition of slavery and the struggle for freedom. The complex network of tunnels and safe houses provided a means for escaping from slavery and reaching freedom in the North. The story of Harriet Tubman and other conductors of the underground railroad is a testament to the courage and determination of those who risked everything to help others.

In conclusion, the Lincoln Underground represents a powerful symbol of the struggle against slavery and the fight for equality. It serves as a reminder of the courage and resilience of those who dared to challenge the oppressive systems of their time. As we commemorate the legacy of the Lincoln Underground, we must continue to cherish the values of freedom, justice, and human rights, and work towards a world where all people are treated with dignity and respect.

The chapter also examined the broader historical context in which the Lincoln Underground operated. It highlighted the importance of understanding the social, political, and economic forces that shaped the period, as well as the ways in which individuals and communities resisted oppression. The chapter concluded with a reflection on the enduring relevance of the Lincoln Underground in contemporary times, as a source of inspiration and a call to action for those who seek to advance the cause of justice and equality.

In summary, the Lincoln Underground is a significant chapter in the history of the United States, and its legacy continues to inspire and challenge us today. As we honor the memory of those who worked tirelessly to bring freedom and equality to all, we must remain steadfast in our commitment to the values that they fought for and continue to fight for today.
This thesis represented an attempt to address the London Underground in the light of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy of cinema. The first chapter showed that Deleuze's philosophy offers a number of propositions, which can be interesting in the context of architectural theory. The main postulates of transcendental empiricism were explained, leading to an understanding of transcendence that does not lead to metaphysics, a transcendence that is always inherently concrete. This in itself can be seen as the basis of an architecture-friendly theory, one that could help address the various aspects of architecture without their mutual exclusion; the basic premise of transcendental empiricism posits it as inherently 'pragmatic' - knowledge is always related to action and cannot be goal in itself - which leads to an understanding of theory as inseparable from practice. Thought and knowledge are, therefore, a matter of praxis, as it were, and architecture, as a practice of thinking in matter, can benefit from this invitation to think theories as concrete, action-bound practices.

Four major concepts were explained in the first chapter: space (with special emphasis on the notion of space as corporeal extension), time (in its irreducibility to space and its durational character that positions it outside all representation), image (as a dynamic, light-bound aspect that permeates all reality) and event (as a possible way of bridging the gap between body/consciousness and object/architecture). The importance of these four concepts lies in their use in architectural discourses (at least from the onset of modernism). It is of particular interest that Deleuzian philosophical appropriation of Bergson implies an interconnected understanding of space and time, not as abstractions, but as lived, corporeal realities. Since architecture stands at the intersection of the (human) body and the object, as well as, more generally, of mind and matter, this philosophical invitation to think space, time, perception (image) and action (event) as corporeally inseparable, seems worth following. It is through this last aspect – action and its significance in the construction of the event – that an exciting option for architectural theory lies, since Deleuzian event stands for a much more complex concept than has previously been discussed in architecture. Far from being something that takes place in architecture/space, Deleuzian event is one that denies the ability to extract bodies from space, or perception from action. It offers a way of thinking architecture as a simultaneity of all its aspects at the intersection of man with the man-made.
In the second chapter, the first of the proposed Underground events was discussed. It was shown that Deleuze's understanding of the frame offers an intriguing way of conceptualising closures and enclosures, and that the relationship between the object of framing and the frame itself can be thought in ways which render the two almost indistinguishable or, at any rate, inseparable. The relationship between the frame and the content of framing was also shown as possibly inherently dynamic. Architectural theory traditionally (predominantly) discusses the concepts of closure, enclosure and framing in static terms: the notion of framing is one of static framing of (possibly) dynamic contents. Deleuze's conceptualisation of the cinematic frame shows that the two cannot be thought separately, and that this kind of conceptualisation leads to an understanding of framing as event itself. That is to say, the coming together of the frame and its content in an ultimately indivisible unity.

A description of the major points regarding the Underground corridor follows this discussion of the cinematic frame, offering a description of the condition of the walking body and its relation to its surrounds. This relationship is informed by the overall sense of movement and direction so characteristic for the Underground as system; it is also inherently corporeal, in tight physical relationship to the body itself. The issue of self-referential corporeal orientation is tackled, and its relevance in the context of the Underground corridor. To walk through a corridor, any corridor, is to take part in a displacement of a specific kind, displacement from context. This leads to a self-referential notion of orientation in space. The body is its own spatial reference and contextualises itself spatially through the character of its own inherent movement. The importance of this proposition for the Underground corridor lies in the fact that this instance of the corridor condition is quite unlike any other: the whole of the Underground system represents a series of interconnected corridors, immense in length and experiential continuity. Furthermore, these corridors reach their limit of purpose in serving as conductors of movement. This extremity of situation leads to an extreme condition of orientation, which in turn offers an understanding of the body as coming to limit with its own orientation system. Ultimately, this means that the body becomes the corridor; the content of framing and the frame itself display a synchronicity which transforms a situation of body-in-architecture into body-and-architecture, treating the two as one operational mechanism, defined through movement, immersed in movement.
Finally, the notion of the cinematic out-of-field is used to address some questions regarding the construction of the frame/enclosure of the corridor, and its relation to its external context: to utilise Deleuze's notion of the cinematic out-of-field means to think the relationship with an outside which is more peculiar than a possible concrete absence within the frame. To think the enclosure of the corridor would be, with the help of Deleuzian understanding of the out-of-field, to think intense presence of that which is missing; the stronger the closure of framing, the more present the missing aspects make themselves. This does not apply only to the missing exterior (any concrete outside), or the city (as a particular outside); the closure of framing, in the presentation of the out-of-field invites the rise of thought itself. It is at this juncture that the notion of cinematic framing and out-of-field seems most intriguing – when understood to be an act of consciousness, act that draws consciousness to focus on its own operational modes, and it is intriguing to think architecture as a possible locus of specific presentation of awareness of thought.

Chapter three regards the platform event in relation to the cinematic shot. The shot is explained to be a matter of conversion of movement in Deleuze's philosophy of cinema: it stands at the junction between framing and determination of sets on the one hand, and montage on the other, which it can, in Deleuze's theory, begin to incorporate. Several major types of shot are explained, and their respective differences detailed, indicating some of the most significant ones. Importantly, shot is a figure of movement-image: it is what Deleuze refers to as the mobile section of duration, whether it establishes itself through the movement of the camera, or movement across cuts (which can tie several shots into a single shot). The shot is also a multiplicity itself, and so the cinematic whole always appears in false continuities.

The second segment of the chapter relates the specificity of the Underground platform, the relationship between the body and the moving object of the train. It shows that the platform represents a site of transformation of corporeal movement, as well as an introduction of movement of the object/environment to the experience established in the corridor event. This transformation of movement is delineated through a series of corporeal/perceptual transformations, which bring the body and the train into greater proximity, effectively showing that movement itself, which is the main feature of the
Underground, can be seen to be extracted from the body, through a set of sensorial transformations, and assigned to the (now moving) object.

In the third part, the conjunction between the platform event and Deleuze's notion of the cinematic shot is proposed, to show that the platform itself stands at a point of conversion of movement – from being contained/manifested corporeally, it becomes transformed into the movement of the object (in this case, the train) transforming body's relationship to its environment through the heightening of the perceptual tendency. The importance of such an undertaking lies in the fact that the question of movement-image as mobile section of duration becomes addressed within an architectural context. If there is to be a limit of this conversion of movement through its various guises, it becomes possible to claim that the experiential line leading to the Underground platform and its event is one constructing the mechanism of the movement-image.

The conversion of movement that takes place as part of the platform event is drawn to its conclusion in chapter four, in the discussion of the Underground carriage, and its understanding in the light of Deleuze's conceptualisation of the cinematic close-up. Firstly, close-up is shown to represent a specific, qualitative transformation, which marks the shift of movement in the direction of expression, which is related to Deleuze's conceptualisation of the human face. The cinematic close-up, in Deleuze's philosophy of cinema, is construed as specific cinematic material, qualitatively different to any other: rather than a simple change in scale – or quantitative transformation in proximity – it is to be understood as a qualitative leap. That is to say, once a close-up is employed, it cannot be claimed any more that the material of and in the image is the same material that might have been present in a different type of shot. With the act of 'closing-up', cinematic material stops conveying movement and starts indicating expression. The notion of the face (and facialisation) that Deleuze employs serves as the converging point for this kind of understanding: the face is an expressive entity and all the movements that might have marked the body as a whole are on the surface of the face, as it were, transformed into expressiveness or expression. This is a crucial development in Deleuze, since it clearly delineates not just any qualitative leap, but a leap which leads to the presentation (and construction) of affective aspects of film. If movement can become expression, then there are always going to be shots which are going to be responsible for the creation of affective material within the cinematic whole. And these
affective images might be embodied in faces, but they can also be embodied in objects—when they are in close up; finally, and most interestingly, the expressive power of the close-up can also be found outside the more easily recognisable material of facial and object-bound closing-up, in what Deleuze terms as any-space-whatever. The concept of any-space-whatever is an example of Deleuze's transformation of the close-up of the face to the object and then to a spatial figure, all of which, nevertheless, retain the expressive characteristics of the close-up, or constitute the affection-image. Any-space-whatever is, simply put, space which has escaped the notion of representation and operates as a tactile space within the image. Deleuze shows that every time we have space which has become impossible to map, locate and (spatially) contextualise, we are actually entering the territory of spatial tactility, or space as extension. And this space is as expressive as face or object in close-up, since the shift to space as extension is exactly the same qualitative leap into the realm of the virtual.

The second part of the chapter shows the specifics of the Underground carriage, introducing the notion of the motionless body inside a moving confinement, as well as the presentation of faces and (the act of) facing, and these are shown to have specific character in relation to expression. The conjunction of the motionless body with the moving carriage is an event substantially different to the rest of the experience of the Underground. It represents a shift from corporeal mobility to seeming corporeal passivity; except that this passivity is actually to be understood simply as change in activity, its transformation—it is change in kind of corporeal movement. This change is significant in the context of the Underground in that it represents an experiential shift from the act of walking, as well as moving-within-the-city to a state of seeming passivity; and it is also accompanied by the movement of the object (the train). The specific arrangement that accompanies this general transformation of movement is the presentation of facing faces, and their isolation from any conceivable immediately present (urban) context: faces are positioned against 'blankness'—darkness in more than just the literal sense. Faces are located in nothingness, which is constructed in darkness, impenetrability of environment, but also movement itself - the fact of train's own motion, and of carriage as its capsule.

This understanding of the overall transformation of movement within the carriage event is said in the final part of the chapter to be an affective transformation from movement into
expression; the carriage event is seen as an act of 'closing-up', of forwarding of the notion of the face and faciality with all its implications, as well as creation of any-space-whatever – a tactile, affective, expressive space, one that ultimately resists notions of spatial representation. In a sense, this step ties in with the opening notion of the Underground corridor as the event site of proprioceptive override: of biograms. The abstract linearity of the biogram is, in the case of the carriage, forced into a qualitative transformation to tactile space. Both are manifestations of this specific shift away from representational space. And in the case of the carriage, this shift leads to the presentation of the affective.

Finally, Chapter Five sees the discussion of the Underground in general, and its relation to the city. Deleuze's understanding of the concept of montage is interesting in particular for its relationship to time and construction of continuities and wholes across ruptures. Montage is an operation of cuts and false continuities; and even in the event of absence of cuts (if film is constructed of a single shot), the multiplicity within the shot itself stands for an act of discontinuity. And yet, the continuity of the film is established across these ruptures, leading to the construction of the cinematic whole. This cinematic whole of the film is achieved through montage, which means that time is apprehended indirectly, as change in the whole. As such, montage is responsible for the creation of movement-image; unlike time-image, it is only an indirect presentation of duration, duration as transformation, duration as change. Deleuze's explication of different types of montage and its various utilisations shows the variety of focuses and methods applied historically; what is of particular interest for his discussion is the understanding of relationships between contents as well as conditions of light in the image itself.

The second part is a discussion of the Underground as an urban system and its relation to the city that harbours it. It is shown that the relationship between the two is more complex than might be thought, and that there is a very specific notion of the urban whole that the presence of the Underground introduces to an urban environment. The Underground is an intervention in the urban fabric that redefines it (the urban realm) radically. The experience of the city, as well as its subsequent understanding and mapping – or the creation of the 'image' of the city – is redefined in ways impossible to ignore.
Finally, the two parts are brought together, to propose a particular understanding of urban montage, wholly dependent on the presence of the Underground system. The whole of the city, of the urban environment, is to be seen as montaged in a way which is inherently dynamic and specific to movement, and especially movement that takes shape in corporeal transformations.

What are the possible contributions of the approach and subject matter of this thesis?

The London Underground – or any other Underground or Metro system for that matter – has almost never been investigated in any depth as a corporeal urban experience of movement. As was mentioned, there are occasional social studies, studies of representation (posters, map, logo) or historical overviews of the built architecture of Underground stations. What is pointedly missing in existing studies is the dynamic corporeality of the experience and this study redresses this question. The corporeality in question is taken to be a complex interweaving of various aspects of the body itself and so the issues addressed cover the body as an entity in motion, closely tied to the notion of consciousness and consequently to the questions of perception, space and time. The questions of movement, time and thought, as inseparable as they are in Deleuze’s philosophy, are utilised here to show a specific way of approaching architectural theory.

In focusing on the body, this thesis makes an attempt to reclaim the territory within the architectural discourse, territory that is in many ways its intrinsic and therefore crucial aspect. The relationship between the body and manmade environment (object/building/city) seems the most self-evident aspect of life taking place; it is nevertheless significantly absent in many approaches within the field of architectural theory. The particular benefit of approaching this question from the framework of Deleuze’s philosophy lies in the fact that the arguably most significant relationship in architecture – the one forged between the body and the object – cannot be defined statically, or indeed as a matter of clear distinction between the two terms. In Deleuze, the body is of and in matter; as such, it is seen as inextricably architectural – it cannot be separated from its environment. Ultimately, to utilise the Deleuzian notion of ‘mind in matter’ opens the door for thinking the architectural and the human as one.
One of the main, if not the main problematic that architectural theory encounters when approaching the relationship forged between the corporeal and the architectural realms, is the question of space. Once the Cartesian/Euclidian understanding of space is undermined, social theories of space step in; however, this transition often sees a reduction of many of the corporeal/physical/material aspects of space. Furthermore, both of these general approaches seem to rely on the exclusion of the other, which corresponds to a more general theoretical problem of conceptualising a transition (rather than an act of layering of disparate realms) from the social to the physical. *Spaces of transformation* remain overlooked, in a way in which they are lived – without clearly established lines of demarcation. This thesis, through its discussion of Underground events, attempts to redress this: each discussed event represents a crystallised stepping up to a particular spatial regime; each of the events sheds light on a certain transformation of one spatial order to another.

Deleuze's appropriation and transformation of Bergson's notion of corporeal aspects of space as *spatial extension* offers a direct theoretical link between consciousness, perception and space-as-extension, leading to an understanding of body and space as substantially and inextricably interlaced. Space as extension, as opposed to space as representation, sees the concept of space as derived from, and therefore impossible without, the body. As such, it enables a significant rethinking and repositioning of the relationship between the body and *everything it is seemingly not*. Simply put, once space and architecture are constructed from the body, as it were – rather than seen as external concepts, always ultimately on the body's outside – a certain possibility for reconfiguring of relationships arises; furthermore, the very notion of architecture, its definition, can be addressed anew, which potentially leads to new understanding and reconfiguration of elements that comprise that which is deemed to be architecture. Deleuze's definition of the event, as applied to the London Underground, does exactly that – shows that there are ways of thinking the very fabric of architecture as spatial in ways which are directly corporeal.

This thesis has shown that the notion of perception and its related problematic of representation – as manifest in the conceptual understanding of the image – whether observed in the context of space or more generally, stands for one of the inescapable themes of architectural theory. The history of architecture is also the history of
architectural representation and the relationship between the two is predominantly visual, or image-bound. Deleuzian concept of perception in general, and image in particular, most notably developed in his philosophy of cinema as they are, present a theory that renders image, as concept, simultaneously dynamic and non-representational. Whilst the full potential of such an overthrow of representation-as-stasis has yet to be fully realised in the context of architecture – its theory, as well as practice – this thesis nevertheless goes some way toward offering one possible way of engaging with just such notions of image and representation in architecture.

The relationship between film and architecture is therefore tackled in a way which bypasses the seemingly insurmountable problematic of representation, within the realm of which the majority of theory written on the relationship between these two disciplines operates. Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema opens the door for a different understanding of corporeality of film and, consequently, realigns its relationship with the notions of space and architecture. Only once the relationship between film and architecture is understood as other than mono-directionally depictive, will it be possible to understand how we can think the two in parallel. Contemporary film theory, especially when addressing questions relevant to architecture, is still predominantly representational: architecture, cities and space are seen to be represented in and by films. There is still only a reduced body of work in the emerging field of film studies which questions this basic premise and discusses film as sensual, spatial, tactile medium, one which is as ‘real’ as any architecture – rather than simply a representative tool for the depiction of reality.

Movement, as that crucial aspect to have spontaneously arisen in the process of writing of this thesis, is just one such way of understanding the link between architecture and film, in that the two are not a static manmade object and a series of still images (respectively), but rather – that both stand for intrinsically dynamic processes. The role of the body and consciousness as dynamic, mobile and time-bound concepts is therefore crucial. Equally so, the notion of the moving object of the Underground, or the movement-machine of the city as it is termed in this thesis, represents an act of nearing the architectural object to the body. In this case, movement (as force and as time) has been identified as the crucial concept useful in the act of delineating the coming together of corporeal and urban aspects. As such, movement becomes the defining cipher of
metropolitan urbanity, and is also the point of convergence of the urban with the cinematic.

The thesis also contributes to the debate in the realm of textual representation – seeing as the medium used was language, some less orthodox methods of depiction were developed. In using different modes of writing, an attempt was made to simultaneously point out the constructed, relative character of the argument (and the material it is derived from) and to test out different ways of developing the argument itself. Such tactics were justified primarily in relation to the subject matter of the thesis: Deleuze's philosophy of cinema insists on treating film as the medium of time, not of linear sequencing of still images. For that reason, both of Deleuze's cinema books come without a single illustration, regardless of extensive reference film material. But this served only as a starting point – the most important aspect of the question of textual representation was tied to the very development of thought and argument. The so-called 'fictional' sequences, which served as textual illustrations and/or guidelines to approaching the object of study (as well as the argument itself), were of extreme importance in the development of that same argument. They were developed in parallel to the main body of text and frequently served to anchor the initial intuition of conceptual conjunctions relevant to the various aspects of the Underground; these other 'voices' also helped articulate certain arguments, in that quite a few moment of thought-crystallisation happened precisely in this mode. Simply, the trail of conceptual conjunction was warmer when voiced in the form of a concrete perception of affect. For Deleuze, philosophy is the practice of invention of concepts; art and literature are modes of 'capturing' percepts and affects. In this thesis, the short fictional passages served precisely as tools for capturing all that might be sense-bound and pre-conceptualised. In that respect, these passages are simultaneously illustrations (in that they are purported to describe instances of interest) and abstract maps of the process of the development of the argument itself.

Finally, the most general idea behind the thesis was to bring the study of Gilles Deleuze's philosophical thought to architectural theory in a way that hadn't been done. The last decade has seen a proliferation of texts that utilise Deleuze's concepts in the field of architectural theory. However, most of them still seem to be locked in the initial stages of getting acquainted with the basic premises of Deleuze's philosophy and are almost
exclusively reliant on a set of basic Deleuzian concepts: territorialization and
deterritorialisation, rhizomatic growth, smooth and striated space, etc. What seems to be
missing is an approach to Deleuze which would be more ambitious, slightly less
tentative. After all, Deleuze was known for his thinking outside the canon, as well as his
own admission of striving to twist a certain philosopher's concept until it performs to his
satisfaction. In bringing Deleuze's philosophy of cinema directly into architectural theory,
I wanted to disturb quite a number of set categories, both in terms of fields of study and
thought-development tactics. To discuss frame, shot, montage, but perhaps most of all,
close-up as potentially architectural concepts, was simultaneously an act of rebellion
against Deleuze's original intention of developing concepts specific to concrete practices,
and a nod to his general project – in that the creation of new thought, in his own
philosophy, is never to come from an already foreseeable direction. Thinking outside the
box or, in this case – well inside the Tube.
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