THE IMPACT OF SULLA
ON ITALY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

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Abstract

This Ph.D. thesis is a study of the role of the general and statesman Lucius Cornelius Sulla (138-78 BC) in the making of the Roman Empire.

The first chapter describes the crisis of Roman imperial strategy that became apparent in the age of Sulla, leading to two subsequent wars, the Social War in Italy and the Mithridatic War in the Greek East, then followed by a Civil War at Rome. In both contexts large sectors of the local elites nearly succeeded in bringing Roman hegemony to an end. After defeating their attempt, Rome had to redefine her relationship with them. Sulla played a crucial and often overlooked role in this phase.

The second chapter deals with Sulla’s contribution to the administration of the Empire. He brought about a fiscal reform in the province of Asia that created enormous difficulties for the local communities, the direct consequence of which was to compel them to seek the patronage or the support of members of the senatorial elite. In Italy, Sulla severely punished the communities that opposed his rise to power. In this case too they had to seek the support of members of the Roman governing class in order to limit the impact of Sulla’s retaliation.

The third chapter deals with the ideological aspect of the history of this period. Sulla made an important contribution to the ideology of Roman imperialism, and he made innovative use of some aspects of Roman religion. In the Greek East he portrayed himself and the Romans as descendants of Aphrodite/Venus, suggesting an interesting pattern where affinity and difference between Greeks and Romans coexisted and interacted. In Italy he developed this connection with Venus by representing himself as a new founder of Rome, a theme that is echoed in several piece of evidence.
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List of Abbreviations

AE     L'Année épigraphique, Paris 1888-.

CIL    Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, consilio et auctoritate Academiae litterarum regiae Borussicae editum, Berlin 1863-.

FD     Fouilles de Delphes, Paris 1902-.

HRR²   H. Peter, Historiorum Romanorum reliquiae, Leipzig 1914².


IG     Inscriptiones Graecae, Berlin 1873-.

IGR    Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes, Paris 1906-1927.

ILLRP  A. Degrassi, Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae (Biblioteca di Studi Superiori 40), Florence 1963.


MAMA  Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua, Manchester-London 1928-.


RE  Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart 1893-.


SEG  Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, Amsterdam 1923-.


Editorial Note
I have consistently Latinised Greek toponyms (e.g. Pergamum instead of Pergamon), except when the Greek toponym is used in Latin too (e.g. Claros, Delos), or there is no Latin equivalent for it (e.g. Akraiphia). On the other hand, I have not altered the Greek personal names known from inscriptions (e.g. Menippos, Medeios, Diodoros Pasparos, etc.), as they are usually quoted by modern scholars in their original form.
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There are some more personal debts that deserve to be recalled here. Valerie Arvelo, Andrew Burpitt, Jessica Hughes, and Pete Lalvani helped me to make my English more acceptable. Silvia Ferrara was the most ferocious (and affectionate) sparring-partner I could possibly hope for. My friends Cecco, Ciro and Francesco provided me with crucial practical help at various stages — not to speak of loads of good humour. The wit, warmth and wisdom of Alessandro and Vic have been a constant and most precious support.

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Introduction

Research on Sulla and his age is by no means a new undertaking. At least ten biographies have been published in the last century alone. Many accounts of the age of Sulla have also been written, and no reference work ignores its importance in the final crisis of the Roman Republic. Most students of the Roman Revolution have tried to provide an interpretation of this character, of his policies and of his aims. Sulla's most prominent enemies, Gaius Marius, Cinna and Mithridates Eupator, have received considerable scholarly attention too.

Biography is often a very useful form of historical enquiry. Yet, I do not intend to concentrate on Sulla as an individual. My aim is to focus on his role in the making of the Roman Mediterranean Empire. Sir Ronald Syme famously spoke of the 'example' of Sulla, which not even his constitutional reforms could prevent from influencing the later development of the late Republican history. In this thesis, I will try to show that Sulla's impact was not limited to Roman internal politics. Sulla also played a crucial role in the reconstruction of the Empire, after a long and dangerous crisis that culminated with the First Mithridatic War, and in the organisation of Italy that followed the enfranchisement of the Allies.

Sulla's contribution to the development of the Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean world was made possible by his victory against Mithridates Eupator and by the reconquest of Greece and Asia Minor. It is true that he did not defeat Mithridates completely, and that Rome's definitive victory was only ensured by Pompey's campaign in the Sixties. However, after Sulla victory the threat diminished

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1 Zacharia 1834; Gerlach 1856, 25-48; Leutwein 1920; Levi 1924; Baker 1927; Berve 1931; Kahrstedt 1931; Lanzani 1936 (cf. Lanzani 1931); Carcopino 1947; Valiglio 1956; Volkmann 1958; Badian 1970a; Keaveney 1982a; Hinard 1985b; Letzner 2000; Hölkeskamp 2000; Brizzi 2002; Christ 2002.
beyond all recognition. After 84 BC, there was a wide awareness in the Greek East that Roman rule was an irreversible reality, as the refusal of the cities of Asia Minor to join Mithridates in the Third Mithridatic War shows most clearly. The success of Sulla had a fundamental consequence, the importance of which, although noted by economic historians, has however not been acknowledged in the standard accounts of the period: fiscal stability was never again to be seriously put into question down to end of the Republic.5

The resettlement of the province of Asia was the pivotal feature of this process. Resuming the revenue flow from the Greek East to Italy was the preliminary condition that enabled the Roman elite to restart the competition for supremacy soon after Sulla quit the scene. For this very reason, the age of Sulla may be viewed as the period that provided the essential foundation for the eventual decline of the Republic and the parallel consolidation of the Mediterranean Empire. As we learn from an important passage of Cicero, the close links between Italian and Eastern matters were already apparent in Sulla's day.6 The importance of the reorganisation of the Roman presence in Asia Minor is indisputable, but it cannot be fully appreciated without the realisation that the main goal of Sulla, after defeating Mithridates, was to make his way back to Italy as soon as possible to fight the Civil War.

Of course, devoting a study to a character whose political agenda was strongly focused on internal issues does not necessarily mean adopting a Romano-centric outlook. This will already be implicit in the choice not to devote much attention to the development of Roman politics in the generation of Sulla — a topic that has been studied at length. A great share of Sulla’s efforts was concentrated on Italy. The choice was a necessary one. Central and Southern Italy were the battlefields of both the Social and the Civil War, and the aftermath of the victory implied new decisions on the destiny of many members of the Italian elite and on the political status of numerous communities.

The extent of Sulla’s interest in Italy as the centre of the Empire and as a base for his personal power became clear after the victory in the Civil War, with the

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6 Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 7.19: deinde, quod nos eadem Asia atque idem iste Mithridates initio belli Asiatici docuit, id quidem certe calamitate docti memoria retinere debemus. nam tum, cum in Asia res magnas permulti amiserant, scimus Romanas solutione impedita fidem concidisse. non enim possunt una in civitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere ut non pluris secum in eandem trahant calamitatem.
proscriptions and the settlement of his veterans. A major reorganisation of the governing class was brought about, not just in Rome, but also in the Italian communities. The ‘political death’ of hundreds of people gave way to new individuals to participate in the competition for power, which is partly reflected in the composition of the Senate after Sulla’s reforms, although not to the extent that one would expect at a first glance.

At the same time, it triggered a massive redistribution of wealth and land. The foundation of veteran colonies was an essential part of this process, as was the outcome of the confiscations suffered by individuals and communities who had opposed Sulla. This political phenomenon can, and must, be studied as a crucial aspect of the social history of late Republican Italy. However, it cannot be fully understood without looking at its political dimension, a factor that ultimately explains the incomplete success of Sulla’s initiatives in some areas of Italy, especially in Etruria. As is the case with the study of the Greek East, dealing with the impact of Sulla on Italy implies understanding why some of his policies were not completely successful, and what Sulla decided not to do, leaving it for the following generations to deal with.

However, when Sulla decided to be a private citizen again, in 79 BC, after resigning from the dictatorship in 81 BC and holding his last consulship in 80 BC, he probably felt that he had successfully performed his essential tasks.\(^7\) The influence of the *populares* on Roman political life was at its lowest since the death of Gaius Gracchus. Roman rule in the East had been restored, although not extended to new territories. The enfranchisement of the Italian allies had been carried out without subverting the usual balance of Roman politics. A range of constitutional reforms left ground for hope that a reaction of the *populares* would not be successful. This is the established picture usually offered by handbooks of Roman history. Challenging it, or corroborating it is not the purpose of this study. The assumption underlying the methodological approach of this thesis, in fact, is that such an approach is not enough. The aim is to look at what Sulla did, or failed to do, on a level that is usually uncritically taken for granted: that of the Empire, with its centre and its peripheries.

To do so, I will organise the discussion in three parts. In the first chapter, I will look at the most powerful factor of crisis that Rome had to come to terms with.

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\(^7\) I follow the chronology suggested by Badian 1962b, 230 and Badian 1970b, 8-14; also see Hinard 1999 and Keaveney 2005. The slightly later chronology (abdication from dictatorship at the beginning of 79, after holding the consulship in 80) suggested in Vervaet 2004, 60-68 is unconvincing.
between 90s and the 80s BC: the sudden and deep strain in her relations with local elites, both in Italy and in the Greek East. Between the Social and the First Mithridatic Wars, a considerable part of the leading groups in these two crucial regions became enemies of Rome. Some actively worked for the destruction of the Empire, especially in the East, while others engaged in a conflict whose apparent end was sharing some of the advantages of the Empire — namely, Roman citizenship. The main achievement of Sulla and of his close associates is to have reversed this process, and to have regained the friendship, or at least the cooperation of local elites for the consolidation of the Roman imperial project.

To attain this result, winning both wars Rome had been compelled to fight was definitely not enough: a major political operation was necessary. In his study on Augustus and the Greek world, G. W. Bowersock pointed out that by the end of the first century BC the unity of the Empire was guaranteed by a powerful network of personal relationships among Roman and local elites. What he said of the Greek East is true, mutatis mutandis, of Italy too. In the first section of this thesis, I will therefore try to study the beginning, or rather the new beginning, of this process after the major traumas of the wars against the Italian allies and Mithridates, and I will try to show Sulla’s contribution to it.

A new balance between Rome and local elites required, especially after a phase of great conflict, a clear system of rewards for those who had kept their loyalty and a range of sanctions for those who had refused to accept the Roman hegemony. The discussion outlined in the first chapter must therefore be complemented by the analysis of the administrative development of the Empire. The second chapter of this study will therefore be devoted to the systems of rewards and punishment that Sulla brought about in Italy and in the Greek East, and to its impact on the administration of the Empire. In the East, distinguishing between friends and foes was quite easy: support for Mithridates was the basic criterion for identifying those who deserved

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8 On the use of the category of ‘elite’ in modern historiography on the Roman Empire, see Campanile 2003b.

9 Mouritsen 1998 is a strong challenge to the idée reçue that the aim of the Italian Allies was obtaining Roman citizenship; a similar approach in Pobjoy 2000. The best presentation of the traditional view, for which I still encline in many respects, is Brunt 1988, 93-130.

10 Bowersock 1965, 6-13.
punishment. On the other hand, the situation in Italy was more complex, as the Social War had been followed by a civil war, in which what was at stake was no longer loyalty to Rome or to Mithridates, but loyalty to Sulla or to his enemies. The consequences of Sulla’s initiatives on the making of Roman Italy were very significant, as the proscriptions and the colonisation both show.

Rebuilding consensus for, and even confidence in the Empire also required a strong emphasis on ideology. Modern scholarship has long recognised the importance of religious motifs in Sulla’s political discourse and propaganda. It appears, however, that the weight of religion in his imperial strategy has not adequately been assessed. The use that Sulla made of the kinship between Venus and Rome in his relations with the Greek East is extremely significant, and must be studied as a crucial aspect of Sulla’s contribution to the consolidation of the Empire. This theme also played an important role in the aftermath of the Mithridatic War, when Sulla tried to represent himself as a new founder of Rome. Its influence on other prominent figures of the late Republic, namely Pompey and Caesar, is indisputable.

I will approach Sulla’s contribution to the making of the Roman Empire from three different points of view, which may complement each other in many ways: the evolution of political and social relations, the administration of the Empire, and the religious aspects of the imperial ideology. On the one hand, I will try to assess the importance of Sulla on each of these levels. On the other, I will try to show their interconnections. Like all Empires, the Roman Empire is by definition many-fold, and even labyrinthine. This study is an attempt to make sense of it in a very specific phase of its development, by taking the remarkable contribution of an individual as a starting point.

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11 The distinction made in Bernhardt 1985, 57 between the cities who chose to follow Mithridates and those who were compelled to do that was irrelevant from Sulla’s point of view.
1.

Punishment and Rewards.
Sulla, the Empire and its Elites

Between the Nineties and the Eighties of the first century BC, the Roman Empire went through its most severe crisis between the Second Punic War and Late Antiquity. Two almost contemporaneous wars, the Social War in Italy and the Mithridatic War in the Greek East, put its very survival into question, and compelled the Roman governing class to an articulate reaction. The crisis triggered by these two conflicts had major consequences on internal political life too, and ultimately led to a civil war, from which the general and former consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the winner of the Mithridatic War, emerged as the winner, and assumed full powers, undertaking a series of constitutional reforms.

The aim of this study is to identify Sulla's role in the organisation and in the consolidation of the Empire after such a deep crisis. The discussion will be devoted to the geographical areas where Sulla operated, namely Italy and the Greek East, which, at that stage, were the most important regions of the Empire. Italy was the political centre of the Empire already before the extension of Roman citizenship to the Allies. Asia Minor was the most remunerative Roman province, so important for the financial stability of the Empire. The stability of Greece was very significant for the Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean too.

The most striking aspect of the crisis Rome managed to make her way through is that many of the local elites became enemies of Rome, and actively plotted to destroy her Empire. A few decades after the victory of Sulla, however, the traces of this difficult phase were barely noticeable. A political process had taken place, which had led the Roman and the local elites to interact much more closely than in the past, and the Empire to derive new vigour from such cooperation.

I will try to show that Sulla's contribution to this process was quite substantial, although it is usually underrated by current scholarship. As I have specified in the introduction, the first step to be taken in doing so is to study how the elites in Italy and in the Greek East took part in the crisis of the Roman Empire. I am aware of the profound differences between the societies, and the elites, I am going to deal with. I am certain that these differences will emerge quite strongly from my discussion too.
However, I believe that some similar patterns, both in the way the elites acted and in the methods that Sulla chose to deal with them, will be apparent from the discussion of different contexts.

I will discuss the Greek East first, and Italy immediately afterwards. This is a chronological order, but it is a logical one too. I believe that some of the strategies Sulla used in Italy may be better understood in the light of what he had done and learnt in the East.

1.1. A silent crisis, a noisy collapse

As handbooks often remind us, Sulla poses the same paradox common to all radical conservatives. Apparently, his aim was to bring Roman politics to the balance of power that preceded the Gracchan crisis, but he was prepared to seize supremacy using the most traumatic ‘political method’, even by marching on Rome and organising the elimination of his opponents. Furthermore, many initiatives of Sulla are so difficult to interpret because we do not know a single line of his autobiography or of his speeches.

On the other hand, what we know from the literary tradition about Sulla’s behaviour and attitude is quite extraordinary, already from the very beginning of his career. As I shall try to show, his exceptional personality interestingly fits into the context of a general crisis of Roman imperial strategy. We know that he belonged to a patrician family, which had completely tarnished its political credibility five generations before him, and that he had to build himself a political position on his own efforts. We are told about the first important moment of his career by a famous section of Sallust’s Bellum Jugurthinum, in which he enters the narrative as he reaches to Africa from Latium, probably in 106, leading a contingent of equites in support of Marius. The exceptional importance of this source prompts a detailed discussion.

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1 On the concept of ‘political method’ in late Republican history, see Meier 1965 and Meier 1966.
2 Plut. Sull. 1.1-2. About the decline of Sulla’s family, see Katz 1982. About the possible connections between the Sullae and the Sibyl, see Gabba 1975, 13-14; contra, RRC, 250. The first thirty years of the life of Sulla are almost completely unknown: a tentative discussion in Keaveney 1980b; Keaveney 1982a, 6-12. Shatzman 1975, 145, 152, 268-269, argues that Sulla’s career was delayed by the poor finances of his father; cf. Reams 1984, arguing, on economic grounds, that Sulla’s poverty is in fact a myth.
3 Sall. Jug. 95.1; also cf. Val. Max. 6.9.6 and Plut. Sull. 3.1-6.
The description provided by Sallust, who could make use of a rich tradition on that period, typically fits the model of the 'paradoxical portrait', whose importance in Roman historiography does not need to be restated here. Besides having an undisputable literary value, this description may be used as an interpretation of a certain phase of the Roman imperial strategy and as the symptom of a broader crisis, which will be dealt with more fully later in this chapter. It also is an important assessment of the role played by Sulla in this process, and in this respect it requires to be considered attentively.

Sallust says that, when he first joined the Jugurthan campaign, Sulla was an inexperienced commander. However, he soon managed to gain a remarkable expertise. Besides being extremely ambitious, he was prepared to respect his commander-in-chief Gaius Marius and to keep his loyalty to him. At the same time he knew how to obtain respect and obedience from his soldiers through using his comitas with them, sharing their labour and their daily efforts. Significantly, the portrait of Sulla emerges in a narrative whose central argument is the crisis of the Roman governing class, paralysed and blinded by its internal divisions and factional disputes. Marius, the commander-in-chief of the Roman army, despite being a homo novus, was already part of this world and shared all its limits. On the other hand, Sulla proved himself capable of a different approach. He was much more than Marius' alter ego. He knew how to lead his soldiers, how to motivate them and to retain their loyalty; at the same time, he knew how to be ruthless, if necessary. His negotiations with the local dynast Bocchus, leading to the treacherous capture of Jugurtha, were the clearest example of his qualities, which already appeared to go beyond the military field. However, although the merit of the victory was largely to be credited to him, Sulla did not hesitate in handing the prisoner to Marius, thus enabling him to enjoy his triumph and most of the political dividends of the success.

It is quite safe to argue that Marius and Sulla were still on good terms at this stage of their careers, and that their cooperation continued unabated until the

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2 Sall. Jug. 96.1-4: see Paul 1984, 238.
3 Cf. C. Kraus 1999, 221, 241-242; also see Harris 1979, 257; Paul 1984, 236-237.
4 On the negotiations between Sulla and Bocchus before the capture of Jugurtha, see Sall. Jug. 105-112. On Jugurtha's capture, see Sall. Jug. 113; Diod. 35.39; Plut. Sull. 3; id. Mar. 10.
campaign against the Cimbrians. Sallust stresses Sulla’s loyalty: *neque interim, quod prava ambitio solet, consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere, tantummodo neque consilio neque manu priorem alium pati, plerosque antequenire.* This is a very significant point, as it features in a work written by an author who was notoriously close to the *populares* and had no sympathy whatsoever for Sulla and his later achievements.

In a time when the Roman governing class as a whole is proving itself inadequate to face the role of Rome as a world-power, and is losing cohesion in a fierce competition for political supremacy, Sulla stands out as a new politician, a special kind of *homo nouus*, embodying the old patrician virtues (*Sulla gentis patriciae nobilis fuit... animo ingenti, cupidus voluptatum, sed gloriae cupidior*) and, potentially, an innovative model of leadership too (*facundus, callidus et amicitia facilis, ad simulanda negotia altitudo ingeni incredibilis, multarum rerum ac maxime pecuniae largitor*).

Of course, Sallust’s portrait of Sulla is not to be taken as completely reliable evidence. It was certainly influenced by a favourable tradition, and perhaps even more importantly, it had to fit the broad historiographical and literary agenda of the monograph. Sallust may have had a point in stressing Sulla’s new relationship with his soldiers: *milites beneigne appellare, multis rogantibus aliis per se ipse dare beneficia, inuitus accipere, sed ea properantius quam ase mutuum reddere, ipse ab nullo repetere, magis id laborare ut illi quam plurumi deberent; ioca et serie cum humillumis agere... breui Mario militibusque carissimus factus.* However, he was certainly inaccurate in depicting him as a figure who confined his ambition only to the field of military value: *neque interim, quod prava ambitio solet, consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere, tantummodo neque consilio neque manu priorem alium pati, plerosque antequenire.*

In fact, the special relationship Sulla built with Bocchus before the capture of Jugurtha was soon to have significant political consequences in Rome. Plutarch says that Sulla did not hesitate to portray the scene of Jugurtha’s capture on his seal and, more importantly, that Bocchus himself financed a statue of Sulla to be put on the

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9 Sall. *Jug.* 95.4: *atque illi feliciissimo omnium ante civisrem victoriam numquam super industriam fortuna fuit, multique dubitauerent, fortior an felicior esset. nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudet an pigeat magis disserere.* See Paul 1984, 237.

Capitol, celebrating this military achievement. Its political consequences were quite predictable. Plutarch's evidence is clearly at odds with Sallust's narrative.

Sulla's career ambitions, however, do not concern us. What matters to our purposes is that Sallust stressed the importance of a figure like Sulla, emerging in a critical moment for the Empire. He was more than a skilled commander: he had a great potential as a political leader, capable to build relationships that could turn useful both for himself and for Rome. It is on this aspect that I intend to concentrate my discussion.

As Sallust knew all too well, the war against Jugurtha, in which Sulla played such a decisive role, was one of the symptoms of a much wider crisis. The conflict in Northern Africa derived from a sudden strain in the relations between Rome and a local dynast who used to be on very good terms with the Romans until some time before. It was soon followed by the attack of the Cimbrians from the north, which had completely independent causes, and derived from the persisting weakness of Rome in Transalpine Gaul. However, the development of the conflict shows that Roman presence in Cisalpine Gaul was not strong enough either, in spite of the extensive colonisation brought about in the second century BC. The fragmentary evidence for this period suggests that the involvement of Rome in the area did increase after the German wars.

The most serious threats to the consolidation and the stability of the Empire, however, came from the East. The creation of the province of Asia, following Attalus III's bequest of his kingdom to Rome in 133 BC, had not stabilised the region. The most immediate danger for Roman interests came from piracy, which was remarkably strong in the region somewhat loosely defined as Cilicia.

On the seal, see Plut. Sull. 3.8-9; Plut. Mar. 10.8; Val. Max. 8.14.4; Plin. 38.9. On the statue, see Plut. Sull. 6.1-2 and Mar. 32.4; on the possible dating of the so-called 'Bocchus' monument', see infra, ch. 3. On the connection between Sulla and Bocchus, also cf. Sen. brev. 13.6: num et hoc caiquam curare permittes quod primus L. Sulla in ciro leones solutos dedit, cum ab eo quisque ara potentior, ad confessiendi eos missis a rege Boccho iuventibus?

On the deteriorating relationship between Marius and Sulla, see Epstein 1987, 50.

Cf. however Justin 38.3.6, mentioning talks between Mithridates Eupator, the Cimbrians and other Gallic populations, which probably took place in 103, soon after the beginning of the war.

The best discussion is Badian 1966, 907-910; also see Hardy 1916b, 63-68; Cary 1920; Ewins 1955, 73-76.

Sherwin-White 1977a, 66 rightly stresses how remarkable and unexpected the annexation of the Kingdom was, 'though historians generally take it for granted'.
The military craft of the *maritimi praedones* had become a serious political problem. After being intensively exploited by Rome to supply her slave market, it had got out of control. Moreover, another regional power was gaining an increasingly important role in the Greek East. The kingdom of the Mithridatids in northeast Asia Minor, inaccurately called ‘Pontus’ in modern scholarship, was steadily increasing its power and influence under the lead of the King Mithridates VI Eupator.\(^{16}\) Seemingly, the Kingdom’s good relations with Rome were not yet in any doubt, although its activism certainly did not contribute to the stability of the region from a Roman point of view.

Mainland Greece appears to have been a less critical front, but some external threats were at work nearby too. There is evidence that, at the very end of the second century, the Thracian Chersonesus was under pressure from a barbarian population, the Caeni, and that the governor of Macedonia Titus Didius was assigned the task of dealing with them by expanding the usual boundaries of his (already fairly wide-ranging) *provincia*.\(^{17}\) We owe this information to a legal document whose importance for the understanding of this period can hardly be underestimated: a statute voted probably in 100/99 BC, preserved by two inscriptions found in Delos and Cnidus, and known as the *lex de provinciis praetoris*.\(^{18}\) It was this statute that provided the basis for the administration in the Greek East provinces in the early years of Sulla’s career.

One of its aims was to favour the reorganisation of the Roman presence in the East by redefining the *provinciae* of the governors deployed in the area. The clause on the Thracian Chersonesus is a symptom of an important aspect of the crisis that the statute tried to tackle. Rome had an inadequate number of magistrates with *imperium* in

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\(^{16}\) See the recent survey in de Callataj 2003, 223-229. On Mithridates’ imperialistic policies in Asia Minor and the Black Sea region before the war against Rome, see Just. 37.1.7, with Salomone Gaggero 1979; Shelov 1982; McGing 1986, 43-88; Boffo 1989; Avram 2005, 169-175. The concepts of ‘Pontic kingdom’ and ‘Pontic ethnicity’ are anachronistic, as they derive from the name of the Roman province of Pontus: see Mitchell 2002.

\(^{17}\) Cf. Obseq. 43, recording a victory over the Thracians in 104 BC.

\(^{18}\) The statute is now edited, with a new commentary, by M. H. Crawford, J. M. Reynolds, J.-L. Ferrary and P. Moreau in RS, no. 12, 230-270; also cf. *IsKnidos* 31. For a discussion of the history of text, with special regard to the debate following the publication of the Cnidus copy, see RS, 231-237. The relevant passage of the statute is Cnidus copy, col. IV, 5-30; for an historical discussion, see Hassall-Crawford-Reynolds 1974, 213 and RS, 264. The name of the statute accepted here, proposed by Ferrary 1977, seems preferable to *lex de piratis persequendis*, or to *lex de Cilicia et Macedonia provinciis*, suggested by Kallet-Marx 1995, 226 and Dmitriev 2005b, 85.
charge of provincial administration in the East. This was a serious disadvantage in such a turbulent context and, indeed, it was an important factor in the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War.19

Even under the new statute, the governor of Macedonia had to stretch his field of action up to Thrace. Until the first assignment of the Cilician command, probably decided in 103/102, the governor of the province of Asia had been the only Roman official entrusted with fighting piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome's direct involvement in the Greek East was still inadequate if compared to her role in the Mediterranean world and to the demands of her Empire. This caused serious problems, which had been debated at least since Pydna and were also a matter of interest for Sallust's Bellum Jugurthinum: to what extent Rome was prepared to get directly involved in the East, how her governing class should face such a challenge, and how the decision-making process in Roman foreign policy should work.

The lex de provinciis praetoris was an attempt to deal with some of these matters, and it marked some substantial developments. It was not just a law aiming at the consolidation of Roman supremacy in the Mediterranean. Its very existence implied a less prominent role for the Senate in the administration of the Empire. By this statute, the people intervened in the provincial administration and made innovative choices such as refusing to send senatorial legates to the Caenic Chersonese, which was an exception to the usual procedure that led to the inclusion of a new territory under Roman rule.20 Moreover, the statute was inspired by the need to defend Roman interests in the Mediterranean, certainly with an eye to the demands of Roman negociatores and their need for security. These groups tended to be loyal to Marius and to the populares, although their interests were surely not in conflict with those of the majority of the senators.21

Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the lex de provinciis praetoris is the evidence it provides for the emergence of a new dimension in Roman legislative texts: a concept which one may call, with modern terminology, 'Roman interest'. The section of the statute dealing with the provincia Cilicia specifies that its function was to

19 On the background of Mithridates' strategy, see Sherwin-White 1977a, 72-73.
20 About the political significance of this statute, see Hassall-Crawford-Reynolds 1974, 219 and Ferrary 1977, 654-660.
ensure that ‘the citizens of Rome and the allies and the Latins, and those of the foreign nations who enjoyed the friendship with the Roman people, may sail in safety’. The explicit reference to Roman citizens and allies operating in the East is an aspect of the wider problem of mobility within the Empire and, specifically, of the mobility of people to and from Italy, the political centre of the Empire.

Migration from Italy had been an important aspect of the consolidation of Roman presence and rule in the Greek world from the mid-second century BC. Its impact on the economic and social history of Italy was equally prominent. The experience shared by Roman and Italian negotiatores in the Greek East created the perception of Italian unity long before the enfranchisement of the Allies, virtually eliding the status distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. It showed more and more clearly that the discrimination between the Romans and their socii was anachronistic in the context of the Mediterranean empire, and it ensured that the need for the involvement of the Allies in the administration and the full exploitation of the Empire would be treated as an urgent issue. In a way, this background aspect of the Social War may already be noticed between the lines of the lex de prouinciis praetoriis too. The increasing importance of the Italian presence in the Greek East had compelled the Roman governing class to revise its strategies accordingly.

However, there was another important aspect about this crisis, on which the text of this statute unsurprisingly fails to shed light. Roman rule in the Greek East was not building any consensus and not even any bond of trust. On the contrary, it was failing to reward its subjects in any way, and to ensure the protection they needed. The pressure of the tax-collectors on the economy of Asia Minor was unrestrained, and favoured by corrupt officials. Piracy was poorly contrasted by the Roman fleet, and kept the coasts of Asia Minor under constant threat. Ultimately, the presence of Rome was worsening the position of the communities, and it was causing a huge loss of trust among the local elites. The conditions for Mithridates’ breakthrough were gradually being prepared.

22 Cnidus Copy, col. III, l. 31-37: ἐν ἐπιμελείαι τοὺς | πολέτας Ῥωμαίων καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους Λα- | πίνου τε τῶν τε ἐκτὸς ἔθνων, διήνε ταῖ | τῷ φιλίᾳ τούτῳ Ῥωμαίων εἰσίν, μετ’ ἄλλος τούτων πλοῖον διέσωσθαι τὴν τοῦ Κλᾶ- | καὶ διὰ τούτῳ τὸ πράγμα κατὰ τοῦτον τῶν νόμων ἐπαρχεῖαν στρατηγικὴν πεποιθήσεις.

Sulla’s career started in this critical phase of Roman imperialism, and he soon had to deal with difficult situations. After his praetorship, probably in 96 BC, he was sent to the East.\(^24\) At first glance, the literary sources are not very clear even about the exact denomination of his *provincia*.\(^25\) Appian is quite explicit: in the famous speech he addresses to Mithridates during the conference of Dardanus, Sulla explicitly claims to ‘have brought Ariobarzanes back to Cappadocia, while I was governing Cilicia.’\(^26\)

As in many discussions of the making of the Roman Empire, the original meaning of the word *provincia* (a mission, rather than a territory, a magistrate is entrusted with) must be borne in mind.\(^27\) Since 103/102, Rome had begun appointing promagistrates to the *provincia Cilicia*, also recorded in the Greek text of the *lex de provinciis praetoriis* as ἐπαρχεῖα Κύλλικα.\(^28\) As recalled above, the purpose of this command was to fight piracy, and explicit evidence survives for the victory obtained in 102 by Marcus Antonius, the famous orator, on *maritimis praedones, id est piratas*.\(^29\)

Thanks to the statute, we also know that it was a military command, entrusted to a

\(^{24}\) Brennan 1992, 144-158; cf. Brennan 2000, 358. This view is accepted by de Callataj 1997, 209, 273; Ferrary 2000a, 168, 193; Letzner 2000, 100; Christ 2002, 73. There has been intense discussion about the date of Sulla’s Cilician command, started by Badian 1959 (= Badian 1964, 157-168), who dated it to 96-95 BC; a reconstruction accepted, on the whole, by Gruen 1966a, 51-52 and Keaveney 1980a, 149-157. *Contrā*, cf. Sordi 1973, 374-377, who postpones the command to 91 BC, Sherwin-White 1977b and Sumner 1978a, who make the case, with different arguments, for a dating to 94 BC. I am not convinced by Amaud 1991, who uses a passage of Sidonius Apollinaris (*Paneg. Asit.* 79-82) as evidence for a campaign of Sulla against Tigranes, and dating the praetorship to 93 BC and the Cilian command to 92 BC: see Keaveney 1995. For a full overview of the scholarly literature on these problems, see Hatscher 2001. About the spectacles Sulla organised at Rome during his praetorship, see Plin. 8.16.53 and Sen. *brev. vit.* 13.6.

\(^{25}\) Plut. *Sull.* 5.6; Liv. *Per.* 70.6; App. *b. c.* 1.77.350; *Mithr.* 57.231; *vir. ill.* 75.4.

\(^{26}\) *App. Mithr.* 57.231: ἐς μὲν Καππαδοκίαν ἐγὼ κατήγαγον Ἀριστεράζανθαν, Κύλλιας ἄρχων.

\(^{27}\) See Crawford 1990, 91; about the *provincia Cilicia*, see Syne 1939b, 302 (= Syne 1979, 123); Sherwin-White 1984, 97-101; Freeman 1986. The arguments of Bertrand 1989, who claims that the word *provincia* had originally a territorial connotation, are not supported by the evidence. Dmitriev 2005b, 90 wrongly claims that, according to the *lex de provinciis praetoriis*, Cilicia was a *provincia* of the governor of Asia: see RS, 262-263.

\(^{28}\) Cnidus Copy, col. III, l. 35-37.

\(^{29}\) Liv. *Per.* 68; also see Obs. 44. Sherwin-White 1976, 4 argues that Antonius led operations in the mainland, but there is no evidence supporting this claim.
praetor at the end of his mandate, with an explicit and well-identified target.\textsuperscript{30} It must be stressed that the statute does not ratify any territorial annexation in this area. In fact, there is no evidence for the establishment of the command as a permanent one, nor that a Roman governor was already present in Cilicia when the statute was voted in Rome.\textsuperscript{31}

Sulla is the first known magistrate to whom the \textit{provincia Cilicia} was entrusted after Marcus Antonius. Plutarch gives his views about Sulla’s actual task in a passage with an interestingly Thucydidean flavour: he ‘was sent to Cappadocia, with the ostensible purpose of the expedition being to restore Ariobarzanes on his throne, but with the real purpose to stop Mithridates, who was restless and was about to add to his dominion a territory not smaller than that he had inherited’.\textsuperscript{32}

Therefore, Sulla was formally ordered to restore the authority of a king who was a friend and an ally of the Romans and had asked for their support; in fact, however, the issue had a broader political relevance. Mithridates was unwilling to comply with the deliberations of the Senate, which had declared the freedom of Cappadocia and then accepted the appointment of a new king, but he was careful not to get directly involved in the conflict. Ariobarzanes was dethroned by Mithridates’ friend Gordius, but the troops of the King apparently were not in the region during Sulla’s command, and did not fight against the Romans – unless the clash between Sulla and Archelaus briefly mentioned by Frontinus took place during Sulla’s Cilician

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Επαρχεία στρατηγική} certainly does not mean \textit{provincia militaris}, as suggested by Sherwin-White 1976, 7, but ‘praetorian province’: see Brennan 2000, 358, with further bibliography. Bertrand 1989, 194-195 misses the point by stating that the province was not ‘ectoplasmique’ by 100 BC: even so, it still was not closely related to an identifiable territory.

\textsuperscript{31} See the commentary \textit{ad loc.} in RJ, 261-262. The treatment provided by Liebmann-Frankfort 1969b, 447-457, esp. 447-450 (accepted by Merola 1996, 292-296) is misleading: see Crawford 1990, 106.

\textsuperscript{32} Plut. \textit{Sull.} 5.6. This passage may derive from Sulla’s autobiography, whose fragments and \textit{testimonia} are edited in \textit{HRR}\textsuperscript{2}, 1.195-204 and in Chassignet 2004, 171-184. There is a vast bibliography on Sulla’s memoirs: Vitelli 1898 (providing a useful survey of earlier literature); Leo 1914, 164-166 (= Leo 1960, 252-254); \textit{HRR}\textsuperscript{2}, 1.CCLXX-CCLXXX; Calabi 1950; Pascucci 1975; Valiglio 1975; Lewis 1991b; Behr 1993, 9-113; Suerbaum 2002; Chassignet 2004, XCIX-CIV, 240-247. Of course, the whole literary tradition on the Sullan age did not escape positivistic \textit{Quellenforschung} see e.g. Klebs 1876; Lely 1879, 3-17; Linden 1896, 5-27; Ensslin 1926.
At any rate, Plutarch's account implies that a war against Mithridates could not be formally declared. According to the *lex de provinciis praetoriis*, Cilicia was a province for the policing of the Eastern Mediterranean. However, we do not have any evidence for a military confrontation with the pirates during Sulla's mission. The victory of Marcus Antonius in 102/101 had not been definitive, of course. The extent of this success is unclear, while the incidence of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean and its survival on a large scale until the beginning of the Second Civil War are well-known. The lack of evidence does not rule out that some confrontation actually took place between the pirates and Sulla. The actual link between the fight against piracy and the restoration of Ariobarzanes, however, is usually overlooked in modern scholarship. Rather than postulating that Sulla had prioritised the solution of the dynastic crisis over the fight against the pirates, it may be argued that they just were the two faces of the same coin. From Rome's point of view, stopping Mithridates' aggressive plans may have seemed a way to contrast piracy more effectively too.

The first contact he had with an envoy of the King of Parthia may also be seen as part of a strategy seeking to stabilise the area, which of course included the fight against piracy. It seems certain that the Senate ratified the treaty, probably after Sulla came back to Rome. It contained a clause defining the respective areas of influence:

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33 Front. Strat. 1.5.18: *idem adversus Archebalaum praefectum Mithridati in Cappadocia, iniquitate locorum et multitudine hostium pressus, fecit pacis mentionem interpositaque tempore etiam indutiarum et per haec auocata intentione adversariorum quasi.*

34 On Mithridates' opportunism in this phase, see Glew 1977b, 381-390; Harris 1979, 273 downplays his role in the outbreak of the war; de Callatay 2000, 355-359 argues on numismatic grounds that he did not start preparing an open confrontation with Rome until April 89.

35 Tac. ann. 12.62 is not relevant, *pace* Dmitriev 2005b, 92.

36 Plut. Sull. 5.8-10. There is a number of informed treatments of Rome's early relations with the Parthians: see Dobias 1931, 218-221 (probably still the best discussion available); (Liebmann-)Frankfort 1963, 183-184; Ziegler 1964, 20-24; Badian 1968a, 55-56; Liebmann-Frankfort 1969a, 172-176; Cimma 1976, 250-252; Keaveney 1981a, 195-199; Wirth 1982, 399; Bulin 1983, 44-48; Dabrowa 1983, 21-22; Sonnabend 1986, 159-161; Campbell 1993, 214; Frézouls 1995, 481-482; E. Winter-Dignas 2001, 26, 28.

37 See Keaveney 1981a, 198. Campbell evidence for a treaty of *amicitia* in Liv. Per. 70.7: *Parthorum legati a rege Arsaces missi uenerunt ad Syllam, ut amicitiam populi Romani peterent et Fest. Brev. 15.2: primum a Lucio Sulla praeside Arsaces, rex Parthorum, missa legationem amicitiae populi Romani rogavit ac meruit.* Cf. Vell. 2.24.3. I do not think that the later marriage between Mithridates of Parthia and Tigranes' daughter is as a symptom of a hostile attitude towards Rome, caused by Sulla's diplomatic recklessness, as suggested by Debevoise 1938, 46-47. Although Mithridates' envoy Pelopidas told the Romans that Arsaces was a
the Euphrates was agreed to be the frontier between the area controlled by the Romans and their friend Ariobarzanes, and the territory in the hands of the Parthians and their ally Tigranes. Parthian neutrality was to prove quite significant in the near future, during the crisis triggered by the First Mithridatic War.

Brennan has persuasively suggested that Sulla remained in Cappadocia for three years, by an ordinary system of prorogation that the lack of competition for the *provincia Cilicia* made it easy to enact. Marcus Antonius, who had operated in the area for a short time, appears not to have obtained remarkable or lasting results. His experience must have warned against adopting hasty solutions. The magistrates in charge of the province of Cilicia no doubt controlled—albeit informally—some territory, which was functional to the development of military operations and to the policing of the hinterland. The bulk of the province was Pamphylia, although Lycaonia, usually a part of Asia, was occasionally included in it. The *lex de provinciis praetorii* makes it clear that Lycaonia already belonged in the *provincia Asia* in 100/99 BC, while, a few years later, Sulla and Oppius appear to have controlled it as part of the *provincia Cilicia*, since a mission to Cappadocia required the passage of troops through Pamphylia and Lycaonia.

Little is known, however, about the scope of Sulla’s mission, and this makes an assessment of its impact quite difficult. Apparently, he could not use a large Roman contingent: the lack of *δυνάμεις* was compensated by the contribution of a part of the Cappadocian communities and of other *συμμαχοι* προδότων—a kind of ‘coalition of the willing’, which certainly included Rhodes. An honorific inscription celebrating the diplomatic achievements of a Rhodian notable—unfortunately anonymous—includes a reference to Sulla (*IG* 12.1.48 = *Syll.* 745, l. 1-2): [--

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1 'friend' of the King (App. *Mithr.* 15.54), there is no evidence that Mithridates ever received military support from the Parthians.

38 See Brennan 1992, 137-144, who does not share the extreme, and untenable, view of Cagniart 1991, 297-303, whereby Sulla was a marginal political figure until his successful command in the Social War in 89.


41 *Plut.* *Sull.* 5.7. It seems however excessive to argue, with Brunt 1971, 434, that he had only a ‘personal escort of Romans’.
Lucius Cornelius L. fil., whose cognomen was engraved on a missing part of the stone, should almost certainly be identified with Sulla, who is the first of a list of Roman magistrates with whom the dedicatee had diplomatic relations. Among the others officials mentioned in the text, L. Licinius Murena, L. Licinius Lucullus and Murena’s legate A. Terentius Varro are identifiable with certainty. Each magistrate seems to be referred to with the function he had when he met the anonymous Greek, and the order in which they are listed is clearly chronological. Murena is called ἱμπράτορα — a title he assumed in 83/82, before coming back to Rome in 81 to celebrate his triumph — while Lucullus is called ἀντιταμίαν, having been left in Asia by Sulla at the end of the war as a pro-quaestor. Sulla is called στραταγὸν ἀνθύπατον Ῥωμαίων, a title corresponding to the rank of a propraetor with a proconsular imperium. Moreover, the absence of any reference to Sulla’s military achievements and to his proclamation as imperator during the First Mithridatic War make it very probable that the text refers to the Cilician command. The parallel reference to Murena’s title, obtained during the same conflict, would otherwise be difficult to explain.

The political context which is referred to in Syll. 745 need to be discussed by looking at the development of the relations between the island and Rome. An important passage of Polybius, mainly devoted to the account of the speech delivered to the Senate by the Rhodian ambassador Astymedes, is evidence for the new alliance concluded with Rome in 164 BC, after the crisis of three years earlier. Rather than on a military basis, it was founded on a mutual declaration of friendship and on a formal commitment on the part of the Rhodians to comply with the requirements of Rome. After failing to confront piracy effectively, when it could present a danger to the

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42 See Magie 1905, 10, 84.
43 Ferrary 2000a, 181; contra, Wosnik 1963, 77-79 and Berthold 1984, 222, fn. 24, who date the text to the period of the First Mithridatic War. Murena is called ἱμπράτορα in an inscription from Messene too (IG 5.1.1454: on the Sullan connections in the Peloponnesus, see Accame 1946, 139). Eilers 1996 convincingly suggests, on the basis of IsPrine 121, that Murena held a proquaestorship in Asia Minor in 100 BC ca.; see Ferrary 2000a, 171-172. Eilers is surely right in saying, at 182, that this may have influenced Sulla’s decision to put Murena in charge of the province of Asia after the Mithridatic War.
44 Pol. 30.31.
Seleucids, Rhodes chose to take part in the fight undertaken by Rome.\textsuperscript{45} An important factor may be identified in the interests of the small, although rather influential Italian community in the island.\textsuperscript{46}

A passage of the \textit{lex de provinciis praetoriis} shows that Rhodian ambassadors were given the right to obtain audiences \textit{extra ordinem} by the Senate, in order to receive messages addressed to 'the kings'.\textsuperscript{47} They played the role of intermediaries between Rome and the Hellenistic kingdoms that took part in the fight against pirates. Certainly, Rome did not ignore the issue of naval safety even when a Cilician command was not assigned to a magistrate. The loyalty of the island would remain unfailing even during the Mithridatic War, as was the case with neighbouring Caria. Sulla duly rewarded Rhodes' loyalty at end of the conflict with the confirmation of freedom and autonomy. The Senate later endorsed it, after receiving a delegation led by the orator Apollonius Molon.\textsuperscript{48} Rhodes, however, remains an exception, as much as Caria. As mentioned above, it is in these very years that strong anti-Roman feelings spread throughout the Greek East. As soon as Mithridates saw the chance for a successful attack, he found the unreserved support of most Greek communities in Asia Minor, and eventually in Greece.

It is clear that, as far as the fight against piracy was concerned, Sulla’s Cilician command brought no discontinuity with the past. From a strategic point of view, the results of the expedition were quite poor: the dynastic crisis in Cappadocia was temporarily solved, but it was soon to be reopened by the military activity of Mithridates, which caused the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War. Sulla himself was aware of the persisting problems in the area even after the reorganisation of Asia and,

\textsuperscript{45} About Rhodes' non-belligerance towards the pirates as part of an anti-Seleucid strategy, see Wiemer 2002, 127-130.

\textsuperscript{46} Any significant role of the Italian community in Rhodes in the Republican Period was denied by Hatzfeld 1919, 153-157 and Wilson 1966, 136, arguing that the local community limited the presence of foreign \textit{negotiatores} until the Empire, and viewing this as a symptom of Rhodian resistance to Romanisation; cf. however the recent discussion by Bresson 2002, 147-156, which offers a more complex outline of the interaction between Rhodians, Romans and Italians.

\textsuperscript{47} Delphi copy, block B, l. 12-20.

\textsuperscript{48} See Cic. \textit{Brut.} 90.312: \textit{eodem tempore Moloni dedimus operam; dictator enim Sulla legatus ad senatum de Rhodiorn praemii aenerat.} Molon addressed the Senate in Greek: Val. Max. 2.2.3, with Wallace-Hadrill 1998, 82-83. The embassy is likely to have taken place in 81 BC: the Senate probably confirmed the deliberations taken by Sulla, issuing a \textit{senatusconsultum} in which the privileges of the Rhodian community were listed, as in those for Stratonicea or Tabae.
when in power, he fostered the appointment of other promagistrates to Cilicia: Cn. Cornelius Dolabella in 80-79 and Servilius Isauricus in 78-74.49 The intrinsic limits of Sulla's proœincia must be taken into account too. He was entrusted with a complex mission without receiving adequate military support, having to rely on Rome's allies in the region. However, by the end of his mission, Sulla, after building his experience in the Roman army and in the competition for magistracies at Rome, had at least gained valuable first-hand knowledge of the Greek East. It is hard to say whether he imagined that, in a world that was changing year by year, such an experience would be of crucial importance to him in less than a decade's time.50 In the light of what he achieved some years later, the importance of this background becomes apparent.

The increasingly precarious balance of the Roman East would collapse a few years after Sulla's mission to Cilicia. Mithridates' victorious campaign brought Rome's Mediterranean hegemony to the verge of collapse. Sulla's experience in Cilicia and — more importantly perhaps — his excellent record in the Social War, to which I will come later, were no doubt important factors in earning him the consulship for 88 BC. It was no easy year to hold the supreme magistracy. The Social War was over, but the question of how to include the Italian allies in the citizen body and in the system of tribes was still open. Most alarmingly, the offensive led by Mithridates in the Greek East was at its highest peak. Not only was he in control of the whole Roman province of Asia, where many Greek cities had greeted him as a liberator and thousands of Roman citizens had been killed in the so-called 'Asiatic Vespers'.51 Greece was affected by Mithridates' attack too and its cultural centre, Athens, was among the most enthusiastic supporters of the King. The phase in which the Empire had been under serious threat from various sides was over. By then, the Eastern part of the Empire was simply no longer in Roman hands.


50 Badian 1958, 245 stresses Sulla's 'ability to learn, especially from his enemies' — although he refers to those he had in Rome.

The war against Mithridates was not one of the many _diapontioi polemoi_ that Rome had sustained over the last century. It was a war in which the survival of the Empire was at stake, and the winner would obtain an extraordinary legitimisation to achieve prominence in Roman politics, if not complete supremacy. More importantly, the victorious general would be in a position to satisfy the greed of his army by exploiting the booty obtained from the reconquest of the Greek East. The soldiers' loyalty would be ensured for some years to come. When he decided to march on Rome, Sulla was surely aware of that.

The details of the controversy on the Mithridatic command do not even need to be recalled here. The task was entrusted to Sulla at the beginning of his consulate, but it was later revoked by a vote of the _comitia_ and assigned to Marius. Sulla reacted by marching on Rome with the legions quartered in Nola. The prompt support of his soldiers — not paralleled by that of the army senior officials, save for one quaestor — shows their awareness of how significant the booty of the campaign could be.

1.2. A complex strategy: Sulla between Attica and Boeotia

The level of the military threat that Mithridates posed to Rome must not be overrated. The victories that the so-called 'king of Pontus' obtained at the beginning of the conflict were largely owed to the limited presence of the Roman army in Asia Minor and Greece and to the parallel commitment in the Social War, rather than to

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52 On the 'transmarine wars', cf. Pol. 18.35.1: ... πρύτερου ἵ τοῖς _diapontioi polemoi_ αὐτῶς ἐγχείρησα πολέμους. ἄθεος ἐπὶ τῶν ἑδων ἑθων καὶ νομίσων ἐμένου. On the exceptional gravity of the crisis opened by the First Mithridatic War, see e. g. Ferrary 1998, 825.


54 His reaction had probably better legal grounds than has often been assumed: see Levick 1982. For a summary of ancient negative views on Sulla, see Dahlheim 1993, 97-98.

55 I am still inclined to believe that the quaestor who did not abandon Sulla (App. b. c. 1.57.253) was Lucullus, as suggested by Badian 1962a, 54-55 (= Badian 1964, 220) and, independently, by Wosnik 1963, 52. Cf. Thonemann 2004, arguing that Lucullus was quaestor in 87 BC: also cf. Tauber in Sayar-Siewert-Tauber 1994, 118-119. The argument is based on an excessive confidence in the accuracy of the official titulature used in inscriptions.
the qualities of his forces.\textsuperscript{56} As soon as Rome decided to intervene directly, the armies led by Sulla, which soon included the contingent taken to Asia by Flavius Fimbria, quickly got control of the situation.\textsuperscript{57} According to Appian, Mithridates realised that defeat was close immediately after Sulla’s arrival in Greece. Hence, he ruthlessly chose to ravage Asia Minor, aware that he would not manage to keep it for long.\textsuperscript{58} It is the political strategy chosen by the King, however, that deserves to be considered more carefully here. His initiatives, although not supported by an adequate military force, were founded on an understanding of the economic aspects of Roman supremacy, based on the circulation of silver coinage, fiscal revenues and goods among the different areas of the Mediterranean. In this system, Asia Minor played a pivotal role: for about five years, Mithridates effectively stopped the flow of revenues from \textit{provincia Asia} to the Roman West (those from Greece were comparatively almost irrelevant), undermining the financial stability of Italy.\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, his alliance with the pirates, however unclear to us in its details, was making the Eastern Mediterranean inaccessible to Roman ships and trade.\textsuperscript{60}

Although his background was Persian, Mithridates was able to talk to the Greeks like a Hellenistic king.\textsuperscript{61} In Athens, for instance, he accepted to be elected

\textsuperscript{56} Although widely accepted in modern literature, the definition is inaccurate, as ancient sources never speak of a ‘kingdom of Pontus’: Mitchell 2002, 51. Also see \textit{ibid.}, 39, dealing with more general problems of ethnic identity: ‘\textit{Pontikos} was a term coined by outsiders’.

\textsuperscript{57} Broughton 1938, 569; cf. Sherwin-White 1977a, 73-74, stressing the exceptional skills of Sulla’s legions, which had just fought the Social War. Mithridates was already going through some difficulties before Sulla’s arrival: McGing 1986, 125. On Fimbria’s victories in Asia Minor, see Liv. \textit{Per.} 83.1-2; Memn. \textit{FGrHist} 434 § 24; \textit{vitr. ill.} 70.2-4. On the betrayal of his army, see Liv. \textit{Per.} 83.8; \textit{vitr. ill.} 75.4; Vell. 2.24.1; discussions in Badian 1962a, 57 (= Badian 1964, 225-226) and De Michele 2005, 283-284.

\textsuperscript{58} App. \textit{Mitbr.} 92.416; cf. Liv. \textit{Per.} 82.5.

\textsuperscript{59} The importance of Asia Minor for the whole Empire is pointed out most forcefully in Cicero, \textit{Quint. fr.} 1.1.34: \textit{simul et illud Asia cogitet, nullam ab se neque belli externi neque domesticarum discordiarum calamitatem ajuturam esse, si hoc imperio non teneretur. id autem imperium cum reiteri sine sectigalibus nullo modo possit, aequo animo parte aliqua suarum fructuum pacem ibi sempiternam redimat atque otium.} On its significance for the financial stability of Italy, cf. Cic. \textit{imp. Cn. Pomp.} 7.19.

\textsuperscript{60} See Ormerod 1924, 209-214; Maroti 1970, 481-486; Marasco 1987, 135-143; Pohl 1993, 139-140; Tramonti 1994, 37-41; Monaco 1996, 102-103; De Souza 1999, 116-118.

\textsuperscript{61} On the Persian background of the Mithridatids, see Bosworth-Wheatley 1998; Mitchell 2002, 50-59; Mitchell 2005b, 528-529. See Reinach 1887, 107-108 and Reinach 1888, 450 on the presence of Pegasus on Mithridates’ coinage, a typically Persian feature that the King used during the expansion of Asia Minor, and later abandoned, probably after he had to flee Pergamum. On the philhellenism of
eponymous archon for 88/87 BC, using a traditional device of the Hellenistic dynasts in an explicitly anti-Roman key. At the same time, his whole strategy was innovative. He aimed at the unification of Asia Minor under his rule. No one had ever attempted, or attained, this goal since the day of Alexander the Great, and which was then made possible, at least theoretically, by the crisis of the Seleucid kingdom and by the end of Macedonia as an independent State. What remains of Mithridates' propaganda in the Greek cities of Asia Minor shows his attempt to foster a common Asiatic identity, involving both the Greek and the non-Greek elements. He carefully handled the matter of local and civic identities, especially when they could be used in open polemic against Rome. His decision not to abolish the Moukieia, the festival which the cities of the province of Asia organised in honour of Publius Mucius Scaevola, a governor who successfully limited the abuses of the publicani in the Nineties, is quite instructive in this respect.

Indeed, the main question unveiled by Mithridates' attempt was the deep crisis in the relationship between Rome and the local elites in the East. Mithridates had been actively supported by most of the cities he had to come to terms with, whose elites, usually without evidence of internal clashes being left on the record, were happy to take the newcomer's side. Rome had to pursue a double plan: winning the war, and then rebuilding a constructive relationship with those she had just defeated and brought back under its rule. It was Sulla who was expected to carry it out successfully. The complexity of the situation appeared quite clearly as soon as he arrived in Greece.


63 Mithridates' propaganda has received considerable attention: see Matthews Sanford 1950, 33-35; Salomone Gaggero 1977; Glew 1977a; Rizzo 1980 (less persuasive); McGing 1986, 89-108; Desideri 1990; Vial 1995, 139-143; Muccioli 2004, 151-158.

64 Cic. Verr. 2.2.51: Mithridates in Asia, cum eam provinciam totam occupasset, Mucia non sustulit. On Scaevola's outstanding record in Asia, see Diod. 37.5; Cic. fam. 1.9.26; Cic. Att. 5.17.5; Cic. Att. 6.1.15; Val. Max. 8.15.6; cf. Badian 1972, 89-92. On the date of his governorship, cf. Balsdon 1937; Badian 1956, 104-112; B. A. Marshall 1976; Sumner 1978b, 146-147; Kallet-Marx 1989; Ferrary 2000a, 163-165, 192. The latter's solution, dating it between 99 and 97, is the most convincing one.
Greece was necessarily the first step of Sulla’s campaign, both for geographical and strategic reasons: it was on his way to Asia Minor – the core of the conflict and of Mithridates’ influence – and it was a region where Rome could still rely on a number of allied communities, which could be of great help in starting a reaction to the attack. According to Plutarch, all the cities except Athens sent envoys to Sulla declaring or confirming their loyalty to Rome as soon as he arrived in Greece. According to Appian, however, some regions had been reached by Mithridates’ offensive. Before Sulla’s arrival, Archelaus had earned himself the support of Achaeans and Laconians. Most Boeotian communities had joined Mithridates too. Thespiae, traditionally a pro-Roman city, remained loyal from the start and was besieged by the Mithridatic army. Only the actions of the legatus pro quaestore Bruttius Sura, sent there by the governor of Macedonia, Sentius, avoided a deeper penetration of Archelaus into Boeotia. An inscription celebrates Sura’s worthy actions in favour of the city. It was not difficult for Sulla, however, to regain the support of this region as soon as he passed by. The military weakness of the cities in the area certainly avoided him any serious problem.

In Attica things were more complicated. Athens had enthusiastically backed Mithridates early in 88 BC, as soon as the news of Roman defeat in Asia Minor reached the city. An embassy was sent to the King, led – it is unclear in what capacity – by the Aristotelian philosopher Athenion, who came back bringing Mithridates’ equally enthusiastic friendship and alliance. The Athenians welcomed him with a magnificent procession. The influential corporation of the artists of Dionysus joined this manifestation of enthusiasm, and performed sacrifices in honour of the new strong man of Athenian politics – or the ‘intruder’ (παρέγγραφος), as Posidonius

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65 Plut. Sull. 12.1: τὰς μὲν ἄλλας πόλεις... ταῖς δ’ Ἀθηναίοις.
66 App. Mithr. 29.113; cf. Memm. FGrHist 434 § 22; Flor. 1.40.8. There is no evidence that Sparta supported Mithridates: see Cartledge-Spawforth 1989, 94-95; contra, Deininger 1971, 258.
67 Plut. Sull. 11.5; App. Mithr. 29.114.
68 Published in Plassart 1949, 830-832, no. 11. Thespiae already had a record of strong loyalty to Rome before the Mithridatic War: see the prosopographical study in C. P. Jones 1970. According to Strab. 9.2.5 = C 403, Thespiae was, along with Tanagra, the only reasonably wealthy city in Boeotia: see Wallace 1972, 71-72, Alcock 1997, 294.
69 App. Mithr. 30.117.
70 Posidonius, FGrHist 87 F 253 (= Athen. 5.211d-215b): see Desidéri 1973, 249-258; Bernhardt 1985, 45-46; Kidd 1989, 41-46; Bringmann 1997 (quite speculative); Mastrocinque 1999a, 79-86. Cf. Liv. Per. 81, Vell. 2.23.2; Plut. Sull. 12.1; App. Mithr. 30.116-122; Flor. 1.40.10; Paus. 1.20.5-6; Oros. 6.2.5.
calls him.\textsuperscript{71} The allegiance of the city was confirmed by the eventual appointment of Athenion to the hoplite generalship and by the capture and murder of the Roman citizens based in Attica.\textsuperscript{72} Athens seemed eager to start a new phase of independence from Rome, under a democratic constitution and the benevolent patronage of a philhellenic dynast. Its decision to join Mithridates was certainly influenced, to some extent, by the King’s self-representation as a new Dionysus.\textsuperscript{73} It would be rash to define this revolt as a victory of democracy. Pausanias was simplifying things saying that only the ‘turbulent element’ of the Athenian people (τὸ τραχοῦδες τοῦ δήμου) supported Mithridates, while the ‘respectable’ ones (’Αθηναῖοι ὄν τὸς λόγος) left the city and joined the Romans.\textsuperscript{74} The victory of Athenion certainly was, however, a defeat for the aristocracy that had been controlling Athenian politics for the last decades.

There are several reasons why it was simply unacceptable to Rome and her commander, and the immediate reconquest of the city was an absolute priority of the campaign. To sketch a summary list: the strategic position of Athens, its commercial importance, its wealth and, perhaps most importantly, its huge cultural prestige, unrivalled in the Greek world. Undertaking a reconquest of the Greek East without getting hold of its main intellectual centre was simply unthinkable.\textsuperscript{75} Plutarch makes an odd comment on this aspect. He dismisses Sulla’s commitment to seize the city before

\textsuperscript{71} It remains to be properly explained how Athenion managed to be entrusted with the embassy to Mithridates, if Medeios was still in power: Kallet-Marx 1995, 207.

\textsuperscript{72} About this appointment of Athenion, see Sarikakis 1951, 44-45. The election of Athenion to hoplite general and the later developments of the war make it hard to agree with Kallet-Marx 1995, 211-212, who suggests that Athens did not commit herself to supporting Mithridates after the embassy to the King.

\textsuperscript{73} On the choice made by the Athenian Dionysus’ technitai in this crisis, see Breglia Pulci Doria 1983, 240-243; Ferrary 1988, 521; Tamura 1988; Le Guen 2001, 1.336-337, summing up earlier bibliography; Aneziri 2003, 49-51. Cf. the different attitude towards Sulla of the technitai of Ionia and Hellespont, whom he even rewarded them with fiscal immunity after the war. An inscription found at Cos (RDGE 49) contains a letter to the technitai confirming their privileges and one inviting the city to respect them: see Segre 1938 (= Segre 1993, 16-17, ED 7); Sherk 1966; RDGE, 263-266 (no. 49); Le Guen 2001, 1.284-288 (TE 56) and Aneziri 2003, 247-248, 394-395 (D18 a-b).

\textsuperscript{74} Paus. 1.20.7; see Bernhardt 1985, 40-42; Bultrighini 1990, 25-26. Candeloro 1965, 135-145, 158-167 is an unconvincing attempt to explain the choice of Athens as an upheaval of the lower classes, who were unhappy with the ‘agreement’ (141) between Rome and the local aristocracy.

\textsuperscript{75} See Gabba 1999, esp. 78-80.
moving on with the campaign as a ‘fight against the shadows’ (13.1: σχιαμαχειν); he could not be more wrong. There were tangible reasons why the Greek East just could not be regained without Athens. Her cultural prestige was perhaps the most prominent one, and Sulla was perfectly aware of that.

The pro-Mithridatic revolt came at the end of a period of political tension in Athens. The speech given by Athenion as he returned from his talks with Mithridates, reported by Posidonius and included in Athenaeus’ antiquarian work *Deipnosophistae*, contains the implicit message that Mithridates’ alliance will put an end to ‘anarchy in which the Roman Senate has decided that we should live in until it has decided how we should be ruled’. Here ‘anarchy’ surely does not mean ‘absence of archons’ as in other cases of Athenian history, since the magistracy of Medeios, who was eponymous archon for three years in a row (91/90, 90/89, 89/88), is safely attested for 89/88. It probably means that an archon who has served for three consecutive years is not a proper archon, and that new ones were not being elected any more. The political implications of Mithridates’ message, however, were very clear, and Athenion’s speech – basically, the only literary source for this period that is not openly pro-Roman – is immensely useful in this respect. Mithridates was keen to offer Athens his patronage. In a Greek East controlled by the King, Athens would keep its leading cultural role, and it would also return to a complete political autonomy, possibly even with a hint of democracy in its institutions. The Romans would simply disappear, both from Attica and – more importantly – from Delos.

Athenion’s speech is also significant because it shows that the King was prepared to seek the loyalty of the city by using appealing economic arguments. The message he addressed to the *demos* included a commitment to solve the problem of debt – a typical device of would-be tyrants throughout Greek history, and a symptom

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76 Athen. 5.51.213. = *FGrHist* 87 F 36: τί οὖν, εἴπε, συμβουλεύω, μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τῆς ἀναρχίας ἢ γὰρ Ῥωμαίων σύγκλητος ἐπισχετήρια πεποίηκεν, ἐκὼ ἀν αὐτὴ δοκιμάσῃ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσῃ δεῖ.


78 The scepticism of Sherwin-White 1980, 1995 is unjustified.
of the importance of the matter in first-century Athens. The evidence, unfortunately, does not reveal much about the identity of the creditors. It would be interesting, and perhaps not surprising, if some Roman citizens were amongst them. The position of the Roman citizens resident in Attica during this period is however largely unknown, because evidence is lacking. Although we know a number of individuals, nothing is known about the political influence of their community in the city, if any.²⁹ Not very much is recorded for this period about the large community of Italians who were based in Delos either.³⁰ The construction of the slave market known as the ‘agora des Italiens’, datable to 100 BC ca., bears the traces of a considerable wealth.³¹ The Italians based on the island certainly had a crucial function in the development of the conflict by contributing to keep Delos on the side of the Romans.³² At any rate, the island refused to join Athens in her pro-Mithridatic choice, and the attack of the contingent sent by Athenion, led by Apellicon of Teos, was repealed.³³ A new front of resistance to Mithridates, Archelaus and their associates was unexpectedly opened in a crucial position, giving Sulla some more time to refine his strategy. Despite their different choices, however, the destinies of Athens and Delos were inevitably linked to each other in this crisis.

No doubt, the reaction of Delos to Mithridates and to the attack launched by his Athenian associate is also to be explained by the role of the part of the Athenian elite, which had interests there and was interested in keeping good relations with Rome and the Roman business community on the island.³⁴ The links between Athenian leading families and Delos are confirmed by the comparative study of evidence from the island and of an inscription from Athens, dating to the very end of

²⁹ Habicht 1997.
³⁰ The evidence for the Italians in Athens and Delos is discussed in Hatzfeld 1919, 41-44 and Wilson 1966, 96-98, 113-119. Hatzfeld 1912 provides a full prosopography of the Italians attested at Delos; cf. the updated list in Ferrary 2002b.
³¹ Excavation report in Lapalus 1939. See Coarelli 1982b, 124-133; Bruneau 1975 unconvvincingly denies that the Agora was actually a slave market. On Delos’ central function in the Mediterranean slave market, see Strab. 14.5.2 = C 668, with Ferrary 1978, 783-784.
³³ Athen. 5.214b-215b = Posid. FGrHist 87 F 36. See Roussel 1916, 315-327; Baslez 1982, 52-58; Kallet-Marx 210-211.
the second century BC and containing the list of the contributors to seven celebrations of the Pythais, a procession from Athens to Delphi whose organisation required a financial effort on the part of Athenian leading families. Some members of the Athenian elite did business there, some others frequented the local gymnasium, others held priesthoods or the office of Epimeletes of the island.

In Athens, on the other hand, the emergence of the pro-Mithridatic faction was sudden, and it followed the same pattern of most τάξεως: Medeios and his associates were compelled to leave power, without any resistance on their part being left on the record. Some of them were immediately killed, others were captured by Athenion's men while they were trying to escape and executed. Only a part of the pro-Roman Athenians managed to leave the city, and there is no evidence that any of them reached Delos. On the other hand, some Athenians are known to have been with Sulla during the siege and to have begged him not to destroy the city after the conquest. Sulla's decision not to ravage the city had, of course, a strong political significance, which needs consideration, especially in the light of the dramatic siege that preceded it. It must be borne in mind, however, that a sack took place and that no doubt it made an impressive impact on the city.

The version of the conquest of Athens provided by the literary sources is the typical piece of history written by the winners; there is nothing comparable to Posidonius' account for the final part of the conflict. The extant tradition largely mirrors a Roman point of view. The Athenians are depicted as undisciplined, opportunistic, even unable to negotiate an honourable agreement before the beginning of the siege. The incarnation of Athenian inconstistency is the 'tyrant' Aristion, who succeeded to Athenion at some point during the war and was killed as the Roman

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86 Tracy 1979, 217-220, 229-231.
88 Plut. Sull. 14.9. Their names were Midias and Kalliphon; it has been argued that Midias should be read as Medeios, and is in fact the former archon: see Ferguson 1911, 451; Habicht 1995, 305, fn. 24. This 'Midias' might also be Medeios' son, who however became archon only in 65 BC. These suggestions are quite problematic, as Midias was a common name, made familiar to all educated Greeks by Demosthenes' speech Against Midias. On Sulla's 'clemency', see Barden Dowling 2000, esp. 336-340.
troops stormed into the city. Plutarch reports the talks that preceded the siege in a very condensed fashion. Sulla dismissed Aristion’s envoys as soon as they started to celebrate the past glories of the city, claiming that his only aim was to defeat the rebels. A. Chaniotis has rightly noticed that the evocation of the past was a typical feature of Athenian political discourse and diplomacy, but he has gone too far in arguing that Sulla misinterpreted this rhetorical strategy. It is safer to suggest that he was not interested in any kind of negotiation and that he needed a pretext to stop the talks. In fact, as noted above, his only aim, at that stage, was to conquer Athens. That was the only strategy that could put an end to all hopes of Mithridatic control of Greece. Moreover, it was a chance to give his troops a first reward, allowing them to get their hands on the booty of a city that still had much to offer.

The extent of the devastations perpetrated by the Sullan army can be appreciated more through the archaeological record than by the literary tradition. As so often in Sulla’s military career, conquering Athens was largely about enforcing a detailed and rational plan of action, which he did with the assistance of his legatus C. Scribonius Curio. In his case, the steps to be taken were quite predictable: to organise an effective sack of the city and to ensure that a new political situation was brought about. A recent study by M. C. Hoff has shown that destructions safely datable to the beginning of the first century BC are attested in the Agora, especially in the southwest and northwest side. The neighbouring streets also bear traces of a sack, involving structures like the Tholos and the Stoa Basileos, from all sides of the Agora. The Acropolis and the Erechtheion appear not to have escaped the devastation either, and the latter is, in fact, the monument that suffered the heaviest damage. To the list

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90 There is a vast bibliography on the problem of the correct identification of Aristion and Athenion. The case for the separatist position was first made in Niese 1887, Ferguson 1911, 444-451 and Wilamowitz 1921 (= Wilamowitz 1923, 204-219); Bugh 1992 has conclusively confirmed it. Also see Ferrary 1988, 477-479; Dorandi 1989; Goulet 1989b; Habicht 1994, 240-241. See Bugh 1992, 111-112, fn. 8 for a full summary of the scholarly production on this problem.

91 Plut. Sull. 13.5.


93 On Curio, see Plut. Sull. 14.11; App. Mithr. 39 and 60; Paus. 1.20.6.
must be added the Arsenal at the Peiraeus, a magnificent building which was completely destroyed after the defeat of the Mithridatic troops.  

While he surveys the monumental landscape of the capital of Greek culture, Pausanias cannot help but detect the traces of an ancient sack, which represents, to his eyes, the definitive consolidation of Roman presence in its crudest form. As he famously puts it, ‘the behaviour of Sulla towards the majority of the Athenians was more cruel than that which a Roman would conceivably adopt’. Such a judgement implies a criticism of Sulla and, on the other hand, a not entirely unfavourable assessment of Roman policies in Greece as a whole. Sulla is portrayed as a regrettable exception, definitely not as the rule: other Roman officials proved capable of governing Greece fairly. As has been rightly noted, they do not deserve to be compared to the Macedonians, who Pausanias recurrently blames for having vexed Greece and humiliated its culture.  

The awe that the sack of Athens caused was probably increased by the long time the reconstruction took to be accomplished. Most of the damaged buildings and monuments were not rebuilt or refurbished before the Augustan age, with only some minor interventions being brought about in the meantime. This is a symptom of economic weakness, if not of an open crisis, in post-Sullan Athens. In many ways, this is not surprising. The Peiraeus was heavily damaged; Delos had been ravaged by Archelaus and was gradually losing ground to its Italian competitor Puteoli. In 69, it was affected even more severely by the attack of the pirates who joined Mithridates in his third war against Rome. From the early Sixties on, it went through an even steadier commercial decline, as Rome started to fight piracy more effectively and to use

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94 Phut. Sull. 14.13; App. Mithr. 41.157; Strab. 9.1.15 = C 396, 14.2.9 = C 654; Front. Strat. 1.11.20; Flor. 1.40.10. The reference discussion is Hoff 1997, esp. 38-43; for the presumable chronology of the restorations, see ibid., 42. Arafat 1996, 100-102 rightly notes that Pausanias’ account is focused on Sulla’s actions against the Athenians, rather than on the destruction of the monuments.  

95 Paus. 1.20.7: Σύλλαδα δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀγχωτέρα ἢ ὡς ἄνδρα εἰκός ἢν ἐργάσασθαι Ῥωμαίοιον.  


98 Hoff 1997, 42.  

99 Direct commercial relations between Asia Minor and Italy became more intense after the defeat of Mithridates: see e.g. Rostovtzeff 1941, 959; Zalesskij 1982, 49. On Archelaus’ sack, Baslez 1982, 57-58.
different sources for her slave market, such as the Balkans. The Athenian elite that had weighty interests at Delos could not avoid facing serious economic difficulties.

From the political point of view, however, Athens did not lose much ground from the years preceding the war. Its territory appears to have kept its integrity. Sulla had no interest in depriving the city of its sphere of influence, traditionally reaching out to territories like Imbrus, Lemnis, Scyrus, and Delos of course. It has long been thought that Athens lost control of Salamis at some point soon after the Sullan conquest, but no evidence seriously supports this claim, as shown by C. Habicht. Sulla appears to have been very mild towards Athens in this respect, and not to have undermined its supremacy in Attica. The adoption of this stance surely influenced the later development of his relationship with the city, as I will show in the third chapter.

It is worth stressing the importance of the support that a part of the Athenian elite decided to give to Sulla. This was not an exclusively Athenian phenomenon, as notables proved prepared to cooperate with Rome throughout Greece during and immediately after the war. The best explanation is probably that resentment against Rome was less intense than in Asia Minor, because the publicani had not operated there, and the fiscal pressure was not comparable to that imposed on the province of Asia. The main reason why Mithridates met a great success in Greece is surely his emphasis on the motif of Greek autonomy.

The stabilisation of Athenian internal politics that took place in the aftermath of the war seems to have been quick and relatively smooth. Sulla’s role in this process should not be overrated. Appian says, somewhat misleadingly at first sight, that Sulla restored ‘completely similar laws to those previously decided by the Romans’. This

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100 As pointed out by the discovery of hoards of Roman denarii in the lower Danube basin: see Crawford 1977b, esp. 120-123; Ferrary 1978, 781; Ste. Croix 1981, 230. Bruneau 1968, 679-685, 688-689 argues that the destruction was less devastating than the literary sources suggest. Hoff 1989, 7 suggests that, conversely, Athens’ function as a trade centre became more prominent in the late Republic and in the Early Empire.

101 On the role of Athens at Delos after the war, see Ferrary 1980, 40-41 and Baslez 1982, 65-66.


103 Significantly, in the Dardanus talks Sulla would blame Mithridates for having violated the freedom of the Greeks: App. Mithr. 58.237. After 145 BC, Greece had lost the fiscal immunity, the ἰδιοφορολογία, but it was still largely independent from a political point of view (ἀυτονομία-δημοκρατία), and there were no Roman contingents on its soil (ἀπορροφεία): see Ferrary 1988, 209.

persuaded some scholars to speak of a ‘Sullan constitution’ given to Athens after the reconquest, for which there is no evidence whatsoever.\textsuperscript{105} Touloumakos is surely right in arguing that Appian is here translating the Latin expression \textit{leges imponere}, meaning something like enforcing the peace conditions, by imposing the same context that was at work before the beginning of the war.\textsuperscript{106}

In Greek terms, perhaps, it would not be inaccurate to say that the \textit{πολιτεία} of Athens changed again with the coming of Sulla, although a constitutional reform was not brought about. A new political situation emerged and a more firmly pro-Roman section of the elite came to power. The evidence, however, is very scarce. There is no record of the activity of the Boule throughout more than three decades after the war, as the first decree we have dates to 49/48.\textsuperscript{107} We know that the traditional magistracies remained in vigour, and the hoplite generalship remained the most prominent one.\textsuperscript{108} The broader context suggests that after the conquest of Sulla an oligarchic \textit{πολιτεία} was not just the choice of the Romans or, for that matter, of the Athenians, but was to a large extent related to the economic and social impact of the reconquest on the city.\textsuperscript{109}

After his victory, Sulla eliminated only the closest supporters of Aristion, forgiving ‘the living ones for the sake of the dead’, as he put it.\textsuperscript{110} The ‘respectable citizens’, as Pausanias brands the pro-Roman coalition, just came back to power as soon as the city was safe for them again. It was not easy, however, to come back to


\textsuperscript{106} Touloumakos 1967, 89, fn. 3: ‘Friedensbedingungen stellen’, usefully referring to several occurrences in Livy; cautiously accepted by Kallet-Marx 1995, 218, fn. 105.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{IG} 2\textsuperscript{2}.1047. See Touloumakos 1967, 87; Rhodes 1972, 257; Habicht 1995, 317.


\textsuperscript{109} Oliver 1972, 101-102 and Geagan 1979, 376-377 tried to interpret \textit{SEG} 26.120 as evidence for a return to democracy in 70/69 BC; cf. Geagan 1971, 101-108 and Oliver 1980 (= Oliver 1983, 52-55). However, the inscription is most likely to date to the age of Athenion: see the sound arguments in Badan 1976, 116-117; Ferrary 1988, 217-218; Habicht 1995, 320-321.

\textsuperscript{110} Plut. \textit{Sull.} 13.9; App. \textit{Mithr.} 39; Licin. 35.61 Criniti. Cf. Strab. 9.1.20 = C 398: ... τὴν πόλιν ἐκ πολεμίων ἐλών Σύλλας, δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμόν. τῇ δὲ πόλει συγγενῶν ἐνοικίζεται καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ τιμῆ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. Strabo clearly minimizes the gravity of Sulla’s misdeeds: see Desideri 2000, 36. However, K. Bradley 1989, 91 is no doubt wrong in claiming that Sulla reduced into slavery ‘the remaining population of Athens'.
the status quo that preceded the war. The families that had supported the oligarchic regime before the emergence of Athenion were certainly weakened by the crisis Delos went through, and it is likely that they suffered losses during the revolt led by Athenion. The evidence we have for the names of the holders of the archonship is hard to interpret. However, at least from the Sixties, when the names of the magistrates recorded in the inscription include the mention of the patronymic and of the name of the deme, a picture is conveyed of the persisting influence of a narrow circle of families. Some of them belonged in the elite of the old oligarchic regime, such as the son of Medeios from Piraeus, who was eponymous archon in 65 BC. Others were exponents of families that emerged only after the crisis, like the family from Marathon to which the archon Pammenes in 83/82, the archon Zenon in 54/53, the hoplite general Pammenes (the second) after 24 BC, and probably the archon Zenon (the fourth) in 13/12 BC belonged. This family emerged in Athenian politics soon after the war, without having had a prominent role before. In a critical phase for the Athenian political establishment, its low political profile and low involvement in the revolt appear to have played an important role in ensuring its political success.

At any rate, Sulla seems to have had little, or no direct role in the selection of the post-war new governing class. It is significant that the literary sources, after dealing with the siege of Athens at great length, are uninterested in the settlement of Athenian internal affairs after the reconquest. Such a choice probably mirrors the priorities of Sulla himself. After the city was conquered and the most dangerous elements were eliminated, there was no need for Rome to intervene directly in the affairs of the city. The financial burden of the reconstruction and the crisis deriving from the sack of Delos compelled the city magistrates to seek the support and the patronage of members of the Roman governing class, developing the pattern that had already been inaugurated during and soon after the siege, when several senators were asked to persuade Sulla to avoid the destruction of the city.

Moreover, the city was safe for wealthy Roman citizens, like the young T. Pomponius Atticus, and for the Athenian philosophers, like Philon from Larissa, who had fled the city when Athenion reached power and would be a great encouragement

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112 Geagan 1992, 43-44.
for the youngsters of the Roman aristocracy to spend a part of their education in Athens. The ties between Athens and Rome could only get closer. The stabilisation of the city, however, took several years. As I will try to show in the third chapter, it was probably accomplished only in 84/83, during Sulla's second stay in the city, on his way back to Italy. In 86, the first aim of Sulla was to be in control of Athens and its port, so that he could concentrate on Boeotia, the other front of the conflict in mainland Greece, whose importance had increased during the siege of Athens, since a new contingent of Mithridatic troops had reached Greece from Thrace.

The case of Athens and her elite shows that the political history of Greece in this period was more complex than some sources would lead one to believe. The war was a very divisive issue, which changed the profile of the Greek elites, and many communities paid a high price for it. As mentioned above, Plutarch plainly says that all the cities except Athens followed Rome as soon as Sulla arrived in Greece. He does not say much, however, about what led them to change their attitude, and what sort of debate there was within the Greek world during this period. In the biography of Sulla he even fails to discuss the position of his hometown Chaeronea. In the prologue to the Lives of Cimon and Lucullus, however, he suggests that things were quite complicated there. At the outbreak of the Mithridatic War a Roman garrison was occupying the city. A revolt led by a local young aristocrat, Damon, soon attempted to expel the Romans from the city. Only the wise intervention of Lucullus, then in Greece as quaestor of Sulla, avoided the destruction of the city. For this very reason, as he makes it clear, Plutarch decided to devote one of his Lives to the philhellenic commander, as a sign of lasting gratitude.

According to his version, the reason for the revolt was the intemperance of the commander of the Roman garrison placed in Chaeronea, who was attracted to Damon and was prepared to use any means to satisfy his lust. Therefore, Damon organised a conspiracy with sixteen comrades, and killed the official and his escort.

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114 On Philo’s escape to Rome, see Cic. Brut. 89.306, with Touloumakos 1967, 88. It is uncertain whether Antiochus from Ascalona fled to Rome in the same period: see Ferrary 1988, 447-448, fn. 43. At any rate, the Mithridatic War had a heavy impact on the Academy: see ibid., 447-448. On the other hand, the head of the Epicurean school, Zenon of Sidon, did not leave Athens in 88, but he was probably compelled to do that, if briefly, after the Sullan reconquest: ibid., 479-482.


When his fellow citizens sentenced him to death, he was already on the run. Some time later, Damon’s gang took another revenge, broke into Chaeronea and killed the city magistrates who had proposed their death sentence — again leaving unharmed soon after the deed. Lucullus was then resuming the command of the Roman troops quartered in the region by Sura. He visited the city, acknowledged the responsibilities of the Roman official who had caused Damon’s reaction and ordered the Roman garrison to join the rest of the army, which was then heading for Attica.

So far, the story may well fit the pattern of a ‘crime of passion’ with some serious, albeit temporary consequences. Its late developments, however, point to a different conclusion. Damon, after spending some time ravaging the countryside with his associates, was suddenly forgiven by his fellow citizens, who sent embassies to him and invited him to return to Chaeronea. He heeded the call and was soon elected to the local gymnasiarchy. Yet, some time later, he was stabbed in the public baths. Plutarch argues, and actually appears to believe, that Damon’s murder was the outcome of a sophisticated plan aiming at the elimination of a dangerous public enemy. This interpretation largely prevailed until some recent studies independently pointed towards a different conclusion.\footnote{Ma 1994, 68; McKay 2000b; Thornton 2001.}

A more straightforward interpretation can be suggested simply by looking at the development of the conflict and at the sequence of events in Chaeronea. Damon’s hostility was addressed, in equal measure, to the Romans and to the Chaeroneans who were supporting them, especially the local magistrates who convicted him. He appears to act as the leader of a group with a clear political agenda. Moreover, an inscription from Chaeronea confirms that the presence of foreign troops could be indeed a problem and a potential threat for the city. Amatokos, the commander of the Thracian auxiliary contingent which joined the Romans in the war and was deployed in Chaeronea in the winter of 88/87, won the gratitude of the city for having restrained the greed of his soldiers.\footnote{Published and discussed by Holleaux 1919 (= Holleaux 1938, 143-159); cf. FD, III.3, 143, fn. 3. Thracian troops took part in the Mithridatic War, both on the side of the Romans and of Mithridates: see Salomone Gaggero 1978 (about Amatokos, see 304-305) and Danov 1979, 113-115.}

The actions of Damon must be considered in the context of a militarily weak and not wealthy town, involved in a war for supremacy in the Greek East and fighting for survival. After the murder of the Roman official, his presence in town was
impossible until the garrison left the city for Attica. Then, the pro-Roman faction became weaker. It lacked any protection from the Romans, and must face the restless brigandage of Damon and his associates in the countryside. The elimination of the magistrates made a later agreement between the pro-Roman faction and the insurgents quite unlikely.

Rather than postulating a Machiavellian stratagem on the part of the Chaeronean magistrates, it is easier to make sense of the story by arguing that in fact Damon was not leading a criminal gang, but a group that opposed Roman presence in Boeotia, and targeted the part of the local elite that sought a modus vivendi with the invaders. Some hints in this sense can be detected in Plutarch’s account too. We are told that Damon’s family enjoyed some prestige: in the second century AD, some of his descendants were known to live in the area of the Phokian city of Stiris. More importantly, Plutarch says that Damon descended directly from a soothsayer called Peripolitas, not otherwise known in the literary tradition, who led the mythical migration of the Boeotians from Thessaly. Peripolitas’ descendants settled in Chaeronea after defeating the local inhabitants, who Plutarch dismissively brands as ‘barbarians’. When Damon decided to lead a revolt against Rome, the weight of his family tradition must have been apparent to his fellow citizens. His was all but an act of brigandage, and more than an uprising against the conquerors. It was a military and political action directed by the descendant of a prominent family, whose history was deeply linked to the foundation myth of the city.

The aftermath of Damon’s death too may be read as a symptom — perhaps the clearest one — of the political relevance of the incident. Soon after the end of the war, the city of Orchomenus paid a Roman informer (συκοφάντης) to accuse the Chaeroneans of the murder of the Roman officer and soldiers killed by Damon. The case was heard by the highest authority in mainland Greece, the governor of Macedonia, probably Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, who held the province from 80 to 78.

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120 It is likely that local historiography was influenced by a tradition favourable to Damon, which still influenced Plutarch: cf. Cim. 1.2, for his remarks on Damon’s beauty (σωμάτως κάλλος) and spiritual vigour (ψυχής φρόνημα).

121 It is worth noting that his provincia still extended to Greece proper even after the Mithridatic War, pretty much as was the case when the loc de provinciis praetoris was voted. Kallet-Marx 1995, 280-282
Only a written statement by Lucullus, discharging the city from all responsibilities, could ensure acquittal to Chaeronea, avoiding a likely punishment, and perhaps even destruction. The allegations brought by Orchomenus may be explained by the intention to harm a neighbouring city, and by the hope of gaining some new territory. On the other hand, the prospect of creating closer relations with the elite of the city may have been a further reason for Lucullus’ support. Possibly, he also intended not to cause an irreversible crisis in a context already affected by a long war.

On the whole, Boeotia’s attitude towards Rome during the Mithridatic War was inconsistent. Plutarch provides a detailed narrative of the conflict, but in some respects he does not deserve unconditional trust. He systematically represents his hometown as loyal to Rome, failing to refer to any differences of approach within the local elite. A similar attitude applies to the rest of the region. After the Chaeronea battle, Sulla decided to celebrate his victory at Thebes, with a lavish session of games. All Greek cities were represented, and appear keen to offer their judges for the competition. Plutarch says that only Thebes was excluded, because of its inconsistent attitude during the conflict. As recalled above, however, Appian says that Sulla decided to punish Boeotia as a whole straight after the second, decisive battle of Chaeronea, just before heading for Thessaly and preparing the army for the expedition to Asia Minor, ‘because it had lightly changed field’. Perhaps significantly, this phase of the conflict is completely ignored by Plutarch, who focuses on the talks between Sulla and Archelaus, preparing the Dardanus agreement.

Pausanias recollects the resentment of Sulla towards Thebes, which he judged guilty of having followed Rome only after the invasion of Greece. According to his version, Sulla was eager to punish Thebes from the outset of the conflict, and finally views the Damon affair as evidence for the little ability of the governors of Macedonia to deal with Greek affairs, even after the First Mithridatic War.

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122 Ma 1994, 64-66.
123 Plut. Sull. 19.11-12.
124 App. Mithr. 51.203: ἑως μετατηθεμένην. Also cf. ibid., 29.113 and 30.117.
125 Plut. Sull. 23.9-10. Also cf. App. Mithr. 54.215-216; Licin. 35.71-77 Criniti; Memn. FrGrHist 434 § 24. Cf. however Plut. Sull. 26.7, recording the destruction of three Boeotian cities, Anthedon, Larymna and Halae, after the battle of Orchomenus. Possibly he wanted to prevent Archelaus from using their harbours, but it is likely that it was also a retaliation for having supported Mithridates. There are no archaeological traces of the destruction of Anthedon, whose harbour came back in use in Late Antiquity: Schlager-Blachman-Schäfer 1968, 91.
126 Paus. 9.7.4-6.
found a pretext in his need to provide compensation to the panhellenic sanctuaries, Olympia, Epidaurus, and Delphi, where he had gathered most of the resources for the first part of the campaign. Half of the territory of the city was given to the sanctuaries – unfortunately, we are not told what proportions were used. A steady and irreversible decline started for the city, which Pausanias describes as reduced in its dimensions and quite poor still in his day. However, his odd statement on Athens going through an uninterrupted crisis from the age of Sulla to Hadrian should invite readers to be cautious about his accuracy on these matters. Pausanias claims that, at some point, Rome decided to give the lost territories back to the city. Improved relations with the members of the Roman elite may explain this choice, although this piece of information is made less useful by the absence of any chronological reference.

1.3. After a great blunder: the elites of Asia Minor

There is good evidence for the overwhelming support that Mithridates received from the Greek cities at the beginning of the invasion. In Athens, the supporters of the King could be accused of being an unrestrained and uncivilised crowd that unseated 'the good ones'; in Asia Minor, such an allegation was never put forward, not even by the Romans. The support of the cities for the King appears to have been widespread at the beginning of the war. The fiscal exemption that he promised was an appealing message for all classes, after decades of reckless exploitation on the part of the Romans. Significantly, the richest documentary evidence for the Asian elites and their political choices in this period comes from cities that kept supporting Rome even in her most difficult hour. In fact, the highest output

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127 Paus. 1.20.7: 'Αθήναι μὲν οὖτος ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου κακωθήσαι τοῦ Ῥωμαίων αὕτης Ἀδριανοῦ βασιλεύστως ἴμμεθαν. See already Day 1942, 120-126, 169-174. Of course, the opposite claim that Athens became 'the city of culture and art' once again immediately after the reconquest (Lanzani 1910, 523) is equally untenable.

128 There is no evidence supporting the claim made by Kahrstedt 1954, 93 that the land was soon given back to Thebes.

129 Such a measure was surely made possible by the extensive depredations that he had inflicted on the Roman residents at the beginning of the campaign: Magie 1950, 217-218; Sartre 2003, 226. Although he generously granted privileges and exemptions to the cities, Mithridates does not seem to have respected their autonomy: de Callatay 2003, 229-230.
of sources is from Caria, the region whose loyalty to Rome was the staunchest in the whole of Asia Minor.

As I shall try to show in more detail in the third chapter, religion played a very important part indeed in the interaction between Sulla and elites in the Greek East. This becomes apparent in the relations between Sulla and Boeotia, which also involved the Panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi, and it is perhaps even clearer in his dealings with some cities of Caria, a region that kept a consistent loyalty towards Rome during the war and that was duly rewarded for it. That special relationship dated back to the Hellenistic age, and was largely determined by the protection from the influence of Rhodes, which Rome had guaranteed to Caria from 167 BC.130

The community of Aphrodisias enjoyed an especially privileged status, which is powerfully demonstrated by the episode of the Delphic response received by Sulla at the end of the war, and in general by the magnificent epigraphic dossier published a couple of decades ago by J. M. Reynolds.131 Strabo still calls it a πόλις some decades after the Sullan age.132 It was only in the Augustan age, with the decisive intervention of the local notable Zoilus, that Aphrodisias' impressive urban development took place; however, in the early Eighties the city could already afford to send envoys to Sulla and/or to Delphi so that the oracle mentioned its shrine of Venus.133 The inscriptions show that Aphrodisias was a city in its own right throughout the first century BC, playing a consistently important function in the local context of Caria. In fact, it is a distinct possibility that the sympoliteia of Aphrodisias and Plarasa attested epigraphically dates back to the first half of the second century BC, following the liberation of the region from the influence of Rhodes.134

The loyalty of several Carian communities during the Mithridatic War is safely attested by a number of sources: the case of Aphrodisias, albeit very significant, was not isolated. There is at least one similar situation, whereby the allegiance to Rome involved both a city and a neighbouring sanctuary. The loyalty to Rome of Stratonicea in Caria was rewarded with an impressive series of privileges, acknowledged first by Sulla himself in 85/84 BC, before leaving Asia for Italy, and then ratified by a

130 Errington 1987, 103-114.
131 App. b.c. 1.97.453; Reynolds 1982.
132 Strab. 12.8.13 = C 576: however, the text has a lacuna.
133 On the development of Aphrodisias at the end of the first century BC, see Ratté 2002, 7-14.
senatusconsultum in 81 BC. This document is made of several parts, going backwards in time. It is opened by a letter of Sulla to the city, restating the merits of the communities in the fight against Mithridates and the gratitude of the Romans, and followed by the text of the senatusconsultum, listing all the eleven clauses of privileges that Rome acknowledged to Stratonicea. Among them, there was the confirmation of the asylia of the temple of Hecate at Lagina. The declaration occupies just one line (l. 113), but the citizens of Stratonicea must have viewed it as a very important feature of their new status.

Indeed, the sanctuary was becoming a central aspect of the city’s identity, as much as was the case at Aphrodisias. The awareness of its importance has perhaps prompted unilateral and somehow schematic interpretations of the evidence. The northern frieze of the temple, for instance, has long been viewed as a powerful symbol of the renewed alliance between Stratonicea and Rome following the Mithridatic War. Its central scene, portraying a warrior and an Amazon shaking hands, has been seen as the most explicit symbol of the new strategic situation as the Stratoniceans saw it. In a recent paper, still unpublished, R. van Bremen has suggested a persuasive re-interpretation of the frieze, largely based on a comparative discussion of its iconography with contemporary evidence from Asia Minor. According to her reconstruction, the frieze appears to be dated not earlier than the last quarter of the second century BC, and it must rather be explained by a development of closer relations among the Carian communities than by the aftermath of the Mithridatic War.

In fact, there is no need to endorse the traditional interpretation of the frieze to recognise the importance of the link between the Sullan declaration of asylia and the importance of the sanctuary of Hecate Lagina. The special status of the temple was certainly viewed by the local inhabitants as the clearest symptom of the city’s persistent importance and of the friendship between Rome and Stratonicea. Sulla’s decision must certainly be viewed against this background. It is significant that the text of the senatusconsultum was then for everyone to look at on the wall of the temple’s naos.

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The history of Stratonicea’s excellent relations with Rome is closely linked to the development of the religious life of the city. The cult of Hekate was not the only one in the Stratonicean territory. From the early third century BC a significant function was played by the sanctuary of Zeus Karios at Panamara, one of the most important among the hilltop sanctuaries that were such a conspicuous feature of the Carian landscape in antiquity.137 The dossier about the Stratonicean sanctuaries provides the background for attempting to answer some more general questions. Stratonicea enjoyed impressive development and wealth after the coming of Rome, supported by her excellent relationship with a number of magistrates and emperors, and not interrupted even after the devastating earthquake of AD 139.138 Connections with Rome were indeed a peculiar aspect of the life of the city. A citizen of Stratonicea, Hermias, was with Sulla during the Greek campaign, and he persuaded him not to sack Daulis, a city in Phocea. An honorific inscription put up for him in Delphi duly records his patronage of the city. From it we learn that he was also given proserenia, honorary citizenship, fiscal immunity and asyilia.139 The loyalty of the city must have been very strong indeed, and its relationship with Rome quite exceptional, if the advice of a Stratonicean could be received so well by Sulla.

The impact of the conflict on civic finances was nevertheless considerable, as is shown by Appian (Mithr. 21.82) and, indirectly, by two clauses of the senatusconsultum, which order Roman magistrates to support the city in recovering the goods which had been lost during the conflict (l. 60-63, 114-118) and in supervising the release and the return of the prisoners of war (l. 63-64, 118-122). Such a disposition was part of the range of privileges and rewards that Rome granted to the free cities at the end of a conflict in which they had proved their loyalty.140 In this respect, a contemporary inscription from Asia Minor, the senatusconsultum de Tabenis


138 The Aristonicus war was perhaps an exception, as some evidence suggests that the would-be King chose Stratonicea as his capital in the year preceding his defeat: see Coarelli 2005, 226-229, with earlier bibliography. On the history of the city in the Imperial age, see Özgan 1999, 9-11; Mert 2002. Little archaeological work has been done on the site of Stratonicea: Mitchell 1998/1999, 157-158; Debord 2002, 158-162.

139 SEG 1.175, esp. l. 9-12. See Daux 1936, 402-405; Accame 1946, 205; Campanile 1996, 154-155.

140 For a survey of modern scholarship on civic freedom in the Roman East, see Boffo 2003.
shows the spirit of the times quite clearly.\textsuperscript{141} The town of Tabae, after supporting Rome and sustaining Mithridates' retaliation, was awarded freedom by Sulla and later by the Senate, following the same procedure followed for Stratonicea. This document is unfortunately the only surviving evidence for its political history.\textsuperscript{142}

The record of another Carian city, Laodicea on the Lycus, was less consistent. When Mithridates first invaded the area, the city resisted briefly, as it was controlled by Q. Oppius, then in charge of Cilicia, but ended by delivering the Roman magistrate to Mithridates.\textsuperscript{143} Its status after the Sullan settlement is unknown, and it is quite likely that Rome decided to punish the defection by putting it under direct rule. A bilingual inscription found on the Quirinal, in which the people of Laodicea express their gratitude to Rome, was dated by Mommsen and Chapot to 83 BC. However, it is perhaps preferable to accept Mellor's hypothesis, viewing it as a re-inscription of a text, originally written in the late second century BC after the acquisition of Attalus' legacy and later restored by Sulla, after the Capitolium burnt in 83 BC.\textsuperscript{144}

Unlike Laodicea, Aphrodisias kept excellent relations with Oppius. An inscription contains a letter sent by Oppius from Cos after the end of the war, in which the Roman magistrate expressed his gratitude to the cities of Aphrodisias and Plarasa, then merged into a single political community, for their military support during the siege of Laodicea. Oppius also agreed to become their patron, after the explicit request of the two cities' ambassadors.\textsuperscript{145} With such a distinct record of loyalty, and with the prominent role it played in the making of the 'Euacj>p68lTOS'-motif (which I will deal with in the third chapter), Aphrodisias surely had no difficulty to

\textsuperscript{141} OGIS 442 = RDGE 17; the best text is in Crawford-Reynolds 1974.

\textsuperscript{142} See Magie 1950, 1112-1113, fn. 9. For an overview of the region and of the history of the city in antiquity, J. and L. Robert 1954, 17-53, 72-95 is still invaluable. Also see Ma 2000, 362.

\textsuperscript{143} Ferrary 2000a, 169. On the Mithridatic attack against Laodicea, see Bernhardt 1985, 50.

\textsuperscript{144} See respectively Mommsen 1887b, 213-214 (= Mommsen 1906, 75); Chapot 1904, 37-38; Mellor 1975, 203-206; Mellor 1978, 323-324. See also Lintott 1978, 143-144; Ramage 1991, 108; Mitchell 2005a, 231. The low date has been proposed, with new though unpersuasive arguments, by Ameling 1988, 20-21, also suggesting that Laodicea was already the capital of a conuentus in Aquillius' organisation (18-19); accepted by Corsten 1997, 2.

\textsuperscript{145} This detail is conveniently stressed by Canali De Rossi 2001, 53 and Eilers 2002, 24-25; also see Campanile 2001, 147-150. From the Augustan age onwards, the Roman documents systematically refer only to Aphrodisias: about the history of the joint community, see Reynolds 1985 and Reynolds 1987, 107-108.
obtain a declaration of freedom from Sulla at the end of the war.\textsuperscript{146} The status appears to have been revoked some time in the late Republic, but Augustus ultimately confirmed it in 39 BC.\textsuperscript{147} On the other hand, it seems quite hard to believe that Laodicea managed to be granted freedom in 84 BC. It must have taken the city an important time to regain the favour of Rome, which certainly played an important part in helping the city to become, under the Empire, one of the most important centres of Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{148}

A comparable impression of wealth and indeed of luxury is conveyed by Strabo's brief account of life in Alabanda, the third important centre of Caria he deals with, after Mylasa, whose history in this period is almost unknown, and Stratonicea.\textsuperscript{149} Carian epigraphy is quite abundant for the Sullan period, and there is important evidence from this city too. It is the honorific decree for an important citizen, Pyrrha[kos], who distinguished himself in several delicate diplomatic missions: two were addressed to Rome, the third one to an unmentioned king (l. 32), probably Mithridates Eupator.\textsuperscript{150} During the latter mission, the notable died, and his fellow citizens duly commemorated his achievements.\textsuperscript{151} Pyrrha[kos] managed to negotiate successfully the autonomy of the city by renewing friendship with Rome and, in a second mission to the Roman Senate, he also obtained fiscal immunity by effectively recalling the merits of Alabanda towards Rome (l. 28-32). There has been some disagreement about the dating of the text. The first editors thought it referred to the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{146} Cf. Chaniotis 2003, 74-75.
\bibitem{147} Reynolds 1982, 4-5.
\bibitem{148} On the history of Laodicea under the Empire, see des Gagniers 1969, 3-4 and Dräger 1993, 87-89, 198-200, 307-311.
\bibitem{149} Strab. 14.26 = C 660-661. Cf. however Cic. fam. 13.56.1 and 3.1, mentioning the debts contracted by Alabanda and Mylasa to the Roman negotiator Cluvius. \textit{InMylasa} 109 records the contacts between the city and the governor of Asia M. Iunius Silanus, called \textit{στρατηγὸν, πάτρων τῆς πόλεως} (l. 15). The inscription is usually dated to 76 BC ca.: Eilers 2002, 247-248; Dmitriev 2005a, 8; Dmitriev 2005b, 104. An earlier chronology for Iunius Silanus' governorship (about 100 BC) cannot however be excluded: Ferrary 2000a, 172-173, 192. The history of Mylasa between 50 BC and the age of Augustus is better known, and symptoms of economic decline have been noticed: Delrieux-Ferrés 2004.
\bibitem{150} First published by Diehl-Cousin 1886, 299-306; emended by Holleaux 1898, 258-266; see Canali De Rossi 1997, 219-221 and Gauthier 2005, 85-89. The supplement of the name is suggested in Holleaux 1898, 260. Cf. Canali De Rossi 1992/1993, arguing that the king mentioned here was Eumenes II.
\end{thebibliography}
early relations of Alabanda with Rome in the first half of the second century BC; Willrich later suggested that the historical development outlined in the inscription was compatible with a dating to the aftermath of the First Mithridatic War, and this interpretation seems preferable to me.\textsuperscript{152}

Pyrrha[kos] was a prominent member of the Carian elite who displayed remarkable diplomatic skills and became a friend of Rome. He was not alone in that mission; other notables prepared themselves for the coming of Sulla. Chaeremon of Nysa even organised military support for Rome, drawing upon himself Mithridates’ hatred. The King wrote twice to Leonippos, the satrap he had put in charge of Caria, explicitly ordering his capture for having collaborated with the ‘common enemy’\textsuperscript{153}. The letters also provide some information about Chaeremon’s moves: he helped some Romans to flee to Rhodes, and he apparently was very careful about the safety of his sons, whom he twice brought to secret refuges. He probably lost his life in the upheaval that took place in Nysa during Mithridates’ breakthrough. When his sons went back to their home town, at the end of the conflict, they recovered a prominent role, and chose to celebrate the deeds of their father by displaying the letters of Mithridates along with an honorific dedication and a letter of C. Cassius, proconsul in Asia in 89/88, acknowledging Chaeremon’s generosity towards the Roman army.\textsuperscript{154}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Willrich 1899, accepted by Holleaux 1899, 359-360, n. 1; Chapot 1904, 114; Marek 1988, 294-302. Bikerman 1937, 221, 239 (= Bickerman 1985, 147, 165) and Kallet-Marx 1995, 268, n. 32 still follow the hypothesis of Diehls and Cousin. Canali De Rossi 1992/93 and Canali de Rossi 2002, no. 169, 109-113 identifies the king with Eumenes II, and dates the inscription to 164 BC. His argument (Canali De Rossi 2002, 112-113) that Antiochus III, or Mithridates Eupator would have never respected an order of the Senate decreeing the freedom of Alabanda simply misses the point. Gruen 1984, 733-735 and Habicht 1999, 20, do not take a stand on this problem.

\item RC, nos. 73/74. Leonippos has the title of ‘satrap’ (no. 73, l. 1), by which Mithridates referred to the officials in charge of the territories he conquered at the beginning of the first war: cf. App. Mithr. 21.81. On Mithridates’ use of the expression ‘common enemies’ (no. 74, l. 6-7), see Robert 1969, 59 and Erskine 1994, 81-82; on the expression ‘common benefactors’ referred to the Romans, see Wehrli 1978. \n
\item See MRR II, 34; Ferrary 2000a, 193. On Chaeremon’s family, see RC, 297; Campanile 1996, 172-173. On his wealth, Rostovtzeff 1941, 819, 821; Quaß 1993, 130. Rigsby 1988, 149-153; Rigsby 1996, 399-404, no. 185 attributes to Mithridates Eupator the letter acknowledging the aṣyā of the local temple of Pluto and Kore, which in 1 BC the governor of Asia Cn. Lentulus Augur allowed to be displayed on the wall of the shrine along with an analogous message from Seleucus I. However, the argument that the declaration was exposed to imply that ‘even Mithridates’ had respected the inviolability of the temple is far-fetched, and it is safer to attribute the letter to a Hellenistic king, e. g. Antiochus III.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Had he survived, Chaeremon might have been granted privileges similar to those awarded to Asclepiades from Clazomenae, Polystratos from Karystos and Meniskos from Miletus by the famous *s.c. de Asclepiade sociisque*, voted in 78 BC. The case of these three men is quite exceptional, although there surely were precedents to it.\(^{155}\) They had supported the Roman navy in the Social War, and they were rewarded with the grant of the rank of ‘friends of the Roman people’ and complete fiscal immunity, both from ordinary and extraordinary taxation.\(^{156}\)

Their case suggests that Rome lacked any strategy of inclusion of non-Italians into the citizen body at this stage. Asclepiades and his friends were not granted Roman citizenship, unlike Ariston from Massilia, or the mysterious *Gaditani* who were included in the citizen body for military merits by Sulla himself.\(^{157}\) The position of the three notables from Asia Minor is more similar to that of the *technitai* of Dionysus resident in Cos, who were collectively granted fiscal immunity by the dictator, and had to defend it from the attempts of the polis to undo it. Apparently, in the aftermath of the Mithridatic War, it was unthinkable to extend Roman citizenship even to the most loyal individuals from Asia Minor.\(^{158}\)

This remained true even for exceptional situations like Caria, where there is no evidence for tensions within the local elites about the decision to support Rome. As noted above, the region’s impressive record of loyalty to Rome throughout the Mithridatic crisis was no doubt rooted in its Hellenistic background. Not even the creation of the province of Asia had put its autonomy into question. After 133 BC as well as in the Sullan age, Rome showed no interest in controlling Caria directly, and relying on the loyalty of some free cities and on the power to police the area was enough for her purposes.\(^{159}\) The problem of the grant of freedom to individual cities

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\(^{155}\) Cf. the references to οἱ κατ’ ἄνδρα κεκρίμενοι ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ρωμαίους φίλαι in OGIS 438 and 439, with Ferrary 2005, 53-54.

\(^{156}\) The standard edition of the senatusconsultum is RDGE 22; also see A. J. Marshall 1968b and Raggi 2001. On the fiscal aspects of this document, see Raggi 2001, 89-92.

\(^{157}\) Cic. Balb. 50. The text is quite tormented: quid? Cn. Pompeius pater rebus Italicis bello maximis gestis P. Caesii, equitem Romanum, suorum bonum, qui nixit, Ravennatem foederato ex populo non ciuitate donauit... quid? Massiliensem Aristionem L. Sulla? quid? quoniam de Gaditanis aquis, idem + eros novem Gaditanos? Various readings have been suggested: seruos novem Gaditanos (Reid), homines novem Gaditanos (Wrampelmeyer); Hannonem Gaditanum (Garatoni); iuris novem Gaditanos does not seem unlikely either. See Sherwin-White 1973, 294.


\(^{159}\) Marek 1988; cf. Baronowski 1996 (earlier bibliography at 241-242); Dmitriev 2005a, 8, 249-250.
has often been treated along with that of the extension of the boundaries of the province. In fact, discussion is made almost impossible by the lack of clear evidence on this point.

When he summoned the representatives of the Asiatic cities to Ephesus, after the end of the war, Sulla granted freedom to a small number of communities. For most of them this decision was a reward for their loyalty during the war against Mithridates, which was the outcome of a specific background, in which the central role was played by the previous relations with Rome and the development of the civic identity in the Roman context.\textsuperscript{160} The most reliable picture of what civic freedom implied in this period is the \textit{lex Antonia de Termessibus}, a statute passed in 68 BC, which deals with the status of a city formerly included into the province of Cilicia, and declared free after the Third Mithridatic War.\textsuperscript{161} There is no reason to believe that the terms of civic freedom had changed substantially from the end of the first conflict. A free city was recognised friend and ally of the Roman people, and its citizens were allowed to live according to the laws of their community. Roman garrisons and soldiers may not be quartered in its territory. The local authorities were entitled to dispose freely of the properties of the city, and to levy taxes and customs at their own discretion — although at Termessus Roman publicani were exempted from any sort of taxation (1.34-35).

Free cities, however, were the exception in the Roman province of Asia, especially after Sulla. The status of the so-called subject cities deserves special attention. The most significant factor of discrimination was not political, but economic: namely, the different fiscal treatment to which they were subjected. The implications of the subject status could vary even to a considerable extent from city to city. The great majority of the communities lost their freedom in the Sullan reorganisation. Moreover, even for those who managed to keep it, it was a gracious and always revocable concession on the part of Rome, which had to be supported by

\textsuperscript{160} Of course, civic freedom had fiscal implications, but Kienast 1967, 360-364 and Bernhardt 1980, 196-207 have rightly warned against considering the notion of civic freedom as a synonym of complete fiscal immunity. The oscillations in the use of expressions like φιλικαί λειτουργίαι, usually viewed as occasional 'contributions' of an allied city to Rome, show that their meaning often shifted to that of φόροι, 'taxes'; also see Ferrary 2001a, 103-104.

good relations with members of the senatorial elite.\textsuperscript{162} Even so, from the First Mithridatic War to the end of the Civil War, most urban communities of Asia Minor went through very hard times.\textsuperscript{163}

Even a ‘friend and ally’ of Rome like Ilium, for instance, went through hard times before and after the war. The price of the war against Aristonicus (133-129 BC) had already been heavy. Some recently excavated buildings in the southern edge of the Lower City show signs of destruction by fire dating back to that period, and the area was not reoccupied until the Augustan age.\textsuperscript{164} At the end of the Eighties, the city had to borrow money from the sanctuary of Athena Ilias to organise the common festival in honour of the goddess. The city finances were in a serious emergency, while the sanctuary appeared to have kept a relative stability deriving from its privileged relationship with the Attalids. The poor state of the city budget cannot be attributed to the burden of taxation imposed by Sulla, since Ilium was declared free. The destruction perpetrated by Fimbria surely is surely to blame.\textsuperscript{165} Whatever its reason may have been, however, the communities of the Troad did not recover quickly after Sulla’s freedom grant.\textsuperscript{166} In 77 BC, they were compelled to ask for a reduction of their debt: the matter was negotiated in the presence of a Roman magistrate, and the final solution was the cancellation of all the arrears and a substantial reduction of the interest rate imposed by the sanctuary.\textsuperscript{167} Such negotiations involved the temple, the representatives of the federated cities (at least seven: besides Ilium, Dardanus, Scepsis, Assus, Alexandria, Abydus, Lampasacus) and the quaestor Lucius Julius Caesar, whose family had close connections in the Troad even before the Sullan period.\textsuperscript{168} Of course,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{162} In general on the unequal relations between Rome and the cities, see Ferrary 1991; Quaß 1993, 179-195; Doukellis 1996, esp. 265-268. The best discussion of Roman patronage of Greek communities is now Eilers 2002; also cf. Canali De Rossi 2001. Ferrary 1997b remains an excellent introduction. The importance of patronage in the Greek East is underrated by Touloumakos 1988, 319, who views it as a typically Roman institution, which was never accepted, or understood, by the Greek world; see the sound critique in Ferrary 1997a, 210-211.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} Kallet-Marx 1995, 275-276.
  \item \textsuperscript{164} See Aylward 1999, esp. 161, 176; Mitchell 2003, 27. On the role of the cities of Asia Minor in this war, see the dossier collected by Brun 2004.
  \item \textsuperscript{165} See Mitchell 1998/1999, 138; Hertel 2003, 263-266.
  \item \textsuperscript{166} Magie 1950, 239, 1119-1120; \textit{contra}, Preuner 1926, 117. The sanctuary was entirely renovated only in the early imperial age: see the recent discussion by Rose 2002, esp. 40-41.
  \item \textsuperscript{167} \textit{Ilios}, no. 10, esp. ll. 1-19 (block A). See Bellinger 1961, 10; Tenger 1999, 162.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Cf. the elegant ‘triangular model’ outlined in Dignas 2002, esp. 271-278.
\end{itemize}
the gens Julia claimed descent from Venus and Aeneas, but its members could do good services to Athena as well. In 89, during his censorship, the homonymous father of the quaestor of 77 had acted in Rome to obtain a declaration of immunity for the land owned by the sanctuary from the activity of the publicani.\(^{169}\) The text of *Illiion* 71 is very clear on this matter, also from a technical point of view: ἀποκαταστή - | σαῦτα τὴν ἱερὰν | χώραν τῇ Ἀθήναι | τῇ Ἰλίᾳ καὶ ἐξελόμενον | αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς δημοσιωνίας (l. 5-9). The benefits obtained from the censor were so remarkable that a statue was dedicated to his daughter Julia too.\(^{170}\) The financial stability of the sanctuary ultimately derived from L. Caesar’s decision. *Illiion* 10 makes it clear that the common festival was to go on through the years without any variation (bl. B, l. 21-23).

The case of Ilium reflects a more general pattern. Asian sanctuaries went through their most difficult phase during the Second Civil War, rather than in the Sullan period. Despite Plutarch’s allegations of impiety, essentially based on the expropriations of the land of the panhellenic sanctuaries in mainland Greece, for which he later offered compensation, Sulla appears to have usually respected the inviolability of temples and sacred lands.\(^{171}\) That the last years of the Republic were a hard time for sanctuaries is implicitly confirmed by the declarations of *asylia* that can be attributed to Augustus.\(^{172}\)

In the Sullan period, the major threat to the region was piracy, whose incidence seems then to have reached one of its highest peaks ever. The honorific inscription for Nikandros from Poemaneum, of 80 BC, shows that pirates were then seriously threatening the city, and also were a great cause of concern for Rome, as the


\(^{172}\) See Rigsby 1996, 177-178 (the sanctuary of Apollo at Miletus); 391-393, no. 183 (the Artemision at Ephesus); 426-427, no. 211, with Tac. ann. 3.62.2 (the sanctuary of Zeus at Panamara, near Stratonicea); 429-430, no. 212 (Aphrodisias); 447-448 (Δεζανι). Also see RDGE 61, from Kyme, providing a practical demonstration of Augustus’ concerns about the respect of sacred ownership. Cf. *res gestae* 24.1: in templis omnium civitatum pro[n]que Asiae victor ornamenta repausit, quae spoliatis templis is, cum quo bellum gesserum, privati[i]m possederat. A good discussion in Dignas 2002, 119-128; Dignas 2005, 209-210.
proconsul C. Claudius Nero's direct interest in the solution of the crisis shows. The recently published inscription of the monument put up in 62 BC at Ilium in honour of Pompey, celebrating his victory against Mithridates and the pirates is further indirect evidence for the difficult situation which Asiatic communities experienced after the coming of Sulla.

The documentation is scarce, of course, but it shows important economic processes at work, and it reveals the talent of the city elite in building profitable relations with the Roman representatives. The immediate aftermath of the First Mithridatic War shows that very clearly. It is usually assumed that Ilium kept its loyalty to Rome during the war, and that freedom was a consequence of this attitude. Yet, a coin issue struck by the moneyer Menephron son of Menephron bore the symbol of the drinking Pegasus, certainly related to Mithridates Eupator. Apparently, during the successful attack of the King, the local elite made some efforts to come to terms with him. However, even if the local notables had not been adamantly loyal during the war, declaring the freedom of the city may have appeared an almost inevitable course of action for Sulla, who claimed descent from Venus and Aeneas so forcefully in his relations with the Greek world. With such a favourable attitude on the part of the Romans, the civic elite surely found it easy to reassert its loyalty to them.

Caria and Ilium, however, remain exceptional cases. It is a safe guess that regaining a positive relationship with Rome was much more difficult for the Asiatic cities than the Greek ones. A traumatic event like the Asiatic Vespers had created too huge a divide between Romans and Greeks not to claim its toll in the aftermath of the war. Rebuilding a constructive dialogue with Rome required the initiatives of a number of distinguished and exceptionally skilled characters. The inscriptional evidence offers several significant examples.

Pergamum certainly lost its freedom in 85, when Sulla chose to punish the openly pro-Mithridatic stance it had taken at the beginning of the war. The well-
known dossier about Diodoros Pasparos, which C. P. Jones persuasively dated to the aftermath of the Sullan settlement, records a series of initiatives taken by a local notable, which closely recall those of the ambassadors of the Ilian koinon, and also fit the economic context outlined by the Aphrodisian text discussed above.\textsuperscript{178} In an embassy to Rome, Diodoros denounced the intolerably high interest rates which made it impossible for the cities to pay back the debts they had contracted with the moneylenders in order to meet the requirements of Roman taxation.\textsuperscript{179} Moreover, he complained about the abuses perpetrated by the Roman army in the Pergamene territory. His mission was certainly successful, although the extent of Roman concessions is unknown. The impressive honours received by Diodoros are, of course, strong elements pointing to the importance of his diplomatic achievements.

Along with his political skills, Pasparos offered a part of his considerable wealth to his community by sponsoring the restoration of the local gymnasium, which had been seriously damaged during the First Mithridatic War and still had not returned to use at the beginning of the Third War.\textsuperscript{180} Soon after 69 BC, the gymnasium was reopened, and the twenty-ninth celebration of the local feast of the Nikephoria could finally take place there. For this great achievement, Diodoros was rewarded with a new honorific decree, in which his whole career found a celebration and which is the ultimate, if controversial, source for the chronology of his deeds.

With good reason, such a belated recovery of an important public building is often cited as clear evidence for the serious financial crisis that affected the Asiatic cities after the conflict and the Sullan resettlement. The accomplishment of this public work, however, was a major step in the reconstruction of civic religious identity after the traumatic experience of the war, as the gymnasium was the natural scene of the


\textsuperscript{179} IGR 4.292, l. 3-6: the terms used here are ἐλαφροτοκία, l. 4, and μεγάλους τόκους, l. 6.

\textsuperscript{180} IGR 4.293, col. 1, l. 13-23. See Radt 1988, 143-144; Quaß 1993, 206.
Nikephoria, the city festival created by Attalus I in the late 220s. It soon became much more than a celebration of the monarchy, and it acquired a prominent function in the identity of the city that would survive for a long time after the creation of the Roman province. It is not surprising, therefore, that the refurbishment of the gymnasium offered Diodoros the opportunity to receive an exceptional honour. His fellow citizens dedicated a statue to him and put it in the new gymnasium itself.

The set of awards and public celebrations offered to this benefactor on his return from the embassy to Rome (IGR 4.292) are indeed very close to those which an inscription from Pergamum attributes to Attalus III, after his return from a war whose context and chronology are unfortunately unclear (OGIS 332): a golden crown, two public statues, the perpetual celebration of the day of his return to the city. Besides this parallel between Attalus III and Diodoros, the deep link of Pergamum with the memory of the monarchy must be stressed. The cult of the Attalid monarchs remained a fundamental feature of the local identity even after the Mithridatic Wars and the definitive consolidation of Roman rule: its revival is duly recorded among Diodoros' merits. There is no evidence for Mithridates' attitude towards it; on the other hand, Rome's toleration before and after the war is well-known. The parallel cult of M.' Aquillius as civic benefactor made clear that the Attalid cult was not an implicit attack on Roman rule.

However, questions arise about the way in which Pergamene religious identity reshaped itself in Diodoros' days. After the Sullan reorganisation of the province, the city lost his free status, and the severe punishment and later crisis it went through make it hard to believe that there was no resentment against Rome. Of course, the clear pro-Roman stance taken by the cities of Asia Minor in the Third Mithridatic War shows that, after Rome's effective reaction to Mithridates' first attack, they were not

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deluding themselves any more about their chances to regain complete autonomy.\textsuperscript{184} Pergamum was no exception in this respect. The cult of M.’ Aquillius was revived: the magistrate who had first organised the Roman province of Asia was honoured along with Diodoros Pasparos, who did so much to limit the impact of Roman rule.\textsuperscript{185} Moreover, no critical remark on the Romans or on Roman rule can be detected in the documents referring to Diodoros’ \textit{res gestae}. At the same time, however, these texts are far from expressing satisfaction with the consolidation of Roman rule. In a way, their existence itself is a symptom of difficulty. They were put up to express gratitude to a local notable who contributed the make the burden of the war and the reorganisation of the province less intolerable for the city. At the same time, the strong emphasis put on the local cults and on the cult of the dynasty which had made Pergamum its capital suggests that the identity of the city was still something deeply un-Roman, and a sphere Romans were not supposed to interfere with.

A similar link between the defence of a city’s prerogatives and the identity of a community emerges from another epigraphic dossier, that from the sanctuary of Claros, near Colophon, covering from the immediate aftermath of the creation of the province down to the rise to power of Augustus.\textsuperscript{186} Although Sulla is not explicitly mentioned in any of these texts, their general importance prompts to include them in this discussion. While it is certain that Colophon enjoyed freedom before the First Mithridatic War, there is no evidence for its status in the later period.\textsuperscript{187} The decrees in honour of two local notables, Polemaios and Menippos, are perhaps the most explicit example of the efforts which even free communities had to make in order to keep their status.\textsuperscript{188} The two characters, already active in the last phase of the Attalid period, are praised for having persuaded some influential members of the Roman governing

\textsuperscript{184} None of the communities that supported Mithridates was Greek: see App. \textit{Mithr.} 69.291-294.

\textsuperscript{185} Virgilio 1993, 70.

\textsuperscript{186} Published in J. and L. Robert 1989, with a detailed commentary. The best historical discussion of the dossier is Ferrary 1991. New editions of both texts, with commentary, have been provided by Lehmann 1998 and Canali De Rossi 2002, 138-149, no. 178 (Menippos) and 150-161, no. 179 (Polemaios). New texts from Claros have been recently published in Ferrary 2000b. For a survey of the archaeological context of the sanctuary, see de laGenière 1993; de la Genière 1998; Ferrary-Verger 1999.

\textsuperscript{187} Ferrary 1991, 558.

\textsuperscript{188} See Ferrary 1991, esp. 573-577; cf. Ferrary 1999. Ma 1999, 150-178 provides a useful background by discussing the equally complex relationship between a Hellenistic ruler and the cities of Western Asia Minor.
class to become patrons of Colophon. Menippos also hosted the governor Quintus Mucius Scaevola and his staff during his stay in the area.189

This familiarity was just an aspect of a more important and complex strategy. Their diplomatic activity led them to visit the Roman Senate with impressive frequency: Menippos at least five times, Polemaios at least twice. The best-known embassies were carried out by Menippos. On one occasion, he asked the Senate to solve a controversy with the city of Metropolis, which was part of the province of Asia. The Roman governor must have taken a stance in the dispute, as the Senate, after hearing Menippos' plea, reasserted that governors had no right to interfere with the organisation of free cities.190 In different moments, they successfully defended the jurisdictional autonomy of the city.191

The chronology of the texts cannot be fully established, and the decree in honour of Polemaios is especially elusive in this respect. It is even uncertain whether the careers of the two characters ever overlapped.192 At any rate, Menippos and Polemaios shared the same civic background and a very similar education, which the dedications duly emphasise. The overtone of the decrees makes it clear that, besides their political achievements, the fellow citizens of Menippos and Polemaios aimed at celebrating the model they embodied as spokesmen of the city towards Rome. Their typically Hellenistic paideia, rooted in the context of civic gymnasia and in the study of rhetoric, had given them the opportunity to influence the Roman Senate and to gain Roman patrons for Colophon. The most important moments of their education are therefore recalled in the honorific decrees, as the necessary background of their achievements, and a central aspect of the identity of the whole community.193

189 The identification of this Quintus Mucius is uncertain: he may be Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur, who was governor of Asia in 120/119 BC, or Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, who was in the region during the early Nineties. A full discussion in Eilers 2002, 127-132, who thinks that there is no decisive element to solve the problem.


191 Menippos, col. 1, l. 27-31, 40-49; Polemaios, col. 2, l. 51-57. Menippos obtained a ruling of the Senate decreeing that a Colophonian could not be judged at Rome for a capital offence: Mitchell 2005a, 199-202, with a summary of earlier bibliography.

192 A hypothesis which was taken for granted by J. and L. Robert 1989, 104, and has recently been questioned by Eilers 2002, 133-137.

193 See, for Polemaios, I, l. 1-46 (education in the local gymnasium, journeys to Rhodes and Smyrna); for Menippos, I, l. 1-10 (journey to Athens). See J. and L. Robert 1989, 39-40; Gauthier 1993, 225-228;
Later epigraphic material from Colophon also includes a series of dedications to the Roman patrons of the city, which are even more interesting for our purposes. An equestrian statue was dedicated to the proconsul Gaius Valerius Flaccus in 95 BC at the latest, while another one was dedicated to his brother Lucius a few years later.\(^{194}\) In the late Sixties, the Valerii Flacci still had important connections in town. The dedication of a statue in honour of L. Valerius Flaccus, praetor in 63 and governor of Asia in 62/61, stresses his action of inherited (διά προγόνων) patronage.\(^{195}\) It is worth noting how the wording of these texts often reflects some substantial change. After the Sullan settlement, the emphasis is on the role of the patrons in making the burden of taxation less heavy. Lucullus, who enforced the Sullan settlement in a way that was quite favourable to the Asian cities, is called ‘benefactor and saviour of the city’.\(^{196}\) Some time later, it shifts to the defence of the city from external threats: Pompey is called ‘guardian of the land and the sea, benefactor and patron of the Ionians’.\(^{197}\) The emphasis on the \textit{beneficia}, which strongly affected the economic life of the city, returns some years later, in the honorific inscription for Q. Tullius Cicero, proconsul of Asia between 61 and 59 BC, ‘benefactor of the Greeks and patron of the people’.\(^{198}\)

As I will try to show more fully in the second chapter, the spread of Roman patronage of Greek communities after the Mithridatic War is perhaps the strongest symptom of the difficult phase the Asiatic cities went through at the beginning of the first century BC. In a way, it was an attempt to find a solution to the same state of tension and discontent that had persuaded many Asiatic cities to support the King.\(^{199}\) The success of this model of political relationship in the first century BC is probably the clearest trace of the central role which urban communities still played in Roman

\(^{194}\) Respectively \textit{SEG} 49.1506 and 1507 = Ferrary 2000b, 334-338, nos. 1-2.

\(^{195}\) \textit{SEG} 49.1510 = Ferrary 2000b, no. 5, l. 4: according to Eilers 2002, 79, the clearest case of inherited patronage of a community. Also see Coarelli 1982a, 437-440.

\(^{196}\) \textit{SEG} 49.1508 = Ferrary 2000b, 339-340, no. 3, l. 3-4: \textit{ευεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα} | τῆς πόλεως.

\(^{197}\) \textit{SEG} 49.1509 = Ferrary 2000b, 341-345, no. 4, l. 4-7: \textit{γῆς τε καὶ θαλάσσης} | \textit{ἐπόστην, τῶν εὐεργέτης} | \textit{την καὶ πάτρων τῶν} | \textit{Ἰώαν.}

\(^{198}\) \textit{SEG} 49.1511 = Ferrary 2000b, 351-353, no. 6, l. 5-8: \textit{εὐεργέτην δύτα} | \textit{τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ} | \textit{πάτρων τοῦ δῆμου} | μου.

\(^{199}\) Eilers 2002, 143. In this phase of economic crisis, patronage was often related to the construction of new public buildings: E. Winter 1996a, 19.
Asia Minor after Sulla's reorganisation. It is certainly true that the resettlement of the province was based on the inclusion of many previously autonomous cities under Roman rule. However, this is only one side of the coin. The administrative reorganisation carried out by Sulla was still founded on the cities. The decisions taken in favour of the cities at the end of the Seventies by Sulla's closest associate, Lucullus, show that their crucial role did not escape the Roman governing class. Weak cities and weak urban elites would have deprived the Empire itself of the strength it needed.

1.4. Warfare and politics: Sulla in Italy

In Italy, as well as in Asia Minor, local elites were a crucial aspect of the balance of the Empire. The nearly fifteen years between the end of the Social War and the death of Sulla presented them with numerous problems, and difficult choices. As pointed out above, in Italy Rome was facing a similar problem to that it had to confront in the East. The vast majority of the local elites had decided to manifest its hostility to Rome, and had managed to create a serious danger to her hegemony. The motives of the Italian allies, however, are not as straightforward to account for as those of the communities of the Greek East. It may be argued that the ultimate project of some of the Italian communities was to put an end to Roman rule. This is probably true of a part of the Samnite elites, for instance. Others, however, only intended to be allowed to share the profits of the empire, and wanted to obtain Roman citizenship— which Rome ultimately did grant at the end of the conflict. At any rate, the position of the Italian elites is by no means comparable to that of the Greek ones. The Roman presence and influence were much more usual for them than was the case with the Greeks. Their familiarity with Rome was incomparably greater, in all respects.

The inclusion of the Italians in Roman political life was a complex process, which took several decades from the enfranchisement to be accomplished. It was not started by Sulla, but by his enemies, and namely by Cornelius Cinna, who had a crucial role in carrying out the enfranchisement of the Allies. It was not accomplished in his day either, since the inclusion of all the potential new citizens into the citizen body

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201 The Social War, of course, was caused mainly by the initiative of the Italian elites, and not by the lower classes: Salmon 1962.
required a censorial lustrum. Sulla's contribution was incomplete in this respect, and it was related to his decision not to perform the census in 81 BC.\footnote{Until the census took place, the new citizens could therefore vote in the comitia tributa, but not in the centuriate assembly: Wiseman 1969, 61-62, 65-66. Also see Gabba 1956, 135-138 (= 421-424); Harris 1971, 236; Crawford 1994, 415, 417.}

This, however, does not mean that Sulla had no interest in profitable relations with the Italian elites. Several aspects of his policies deserve attention: the ways he dealt with the communities that supported him and those that contrasted him, the criteria he apparently used to appoint the new senators, and the way in which the proscriptions were carried out. The efforts of Sulla towards the reorganisation of Italy were deployed after two major traumas like the Social War and the Civil War. I intend to show that Sulla's skilful management of his relations with the Italian elites certainly played an important role in ensuring him the final victory in the conflict for supremacy in Rome. Like it was the case in the East, his military experience did contribute to ensure him the final success. His moves in the Social War are quite instructive.

Some time after his return from Cilicia, after escaping prosecution from his political foe C. Marcius Censorinus, Sulla was included among the Roman commanders in the Social War.\footnote{About Censorinus, see David 1992, 112, 768-769; Reams 1993.} Appian lists him among the generals who were entrusted with the command of a part of the army (b.c. 1.178-9): the consuls for 90 BC, L. Julius Caesar and P. Rutilius Lupus, supervised the operations all over Italy and coordinated the actions of a number of senior generals, acting in local contexts and entrusted with the rank of legatus, probably pro praetore.\footnote{Brennan 1992, 157.} There is evidence for Sulla's initiatives in an area corresponding to the territory of the Marsi and, later, to inland Campania. Again, we are told that he operated in close contact with C. Marius, possibly even under his authority. Appian mentions the important support given by Sulla to Marius in a crucial fight against the Marsi, although its location is unspecified by the numerous sources that report the episode.\footnote{App. b. c. 1.46.201-202, with the provisos of Gabba 1956, 141-142. Cf. Plut. Mar. 33.3 ; Liv. Per. 73.6; Oros. 5.18.15 ; Eutr. 5.3.2. Sulla in action near Aesemia, the Latin colony which the Allies had started to besiege from the beginning of the conflict: Frontin. Strat. 1.5.17.}
What we know of Sulla’s command in Campania, where he led operations in 89 BC, is more interesting. The focus of his activity appears to have been Pompeii, where his opponent was the Campanian commander Lucius Cluentius, then in charge of a strong contingent. Sulla also relied on the support of Italian forces led by Minatius Magius, a notable from Aeclanum who was to be rewarded for his loyalty to Rome with an individual citizenship grant. We know from an isolated piece of information provided by Pliny the Elder that Sulla conquered and destroyed Stabiae on 30 April. The sack was so devastating that Stabiae could not be defined as an oppidum any more after the Roman reconquest, but had become something like a rural centre. Along with Norba, which was conquered in the Civil War, Stabiae is the only Italian city we know to have been destroyed by Sulla. Unfortunately, there is not further evidence for these events.

We are, of course, considerably better informed about Pompeii. The siege of this city must have either preceded or, more probably, followed the conquest of Stabiae. The development of the campaign, however, suggests that Sulla’s forces could not have been exiguous, as during the siege of Pompeii they had to face a sudden extension of the conflict. Sulla camped in the area, and soon afterwards Cluentius decided to camp at a very short distance from him. This prompted a Roman reaction and the beginning of hostilities. Cluentius’ soldiers were defeated and ran away from Pompeii, heading for the neighbouring city of Nola, which was ready to shelter them. Sulla chased the enemies, and killed most of them, including Cluentius. It was a crucial moment of the Social War. One of the strongest Italian contingents

206 See, in general, Liv. Per. 75.2 and 7.
207 Vell. 2.16.1-3: quippe multum Minatii Magii, atut mei, Aeclanensis, tribuendum est memoriae, qui nepos Decii Magii, Campanorum principis, celeberrimi et fidelissimi viri, tantam hoc bello Romanis fidel praestitit, ut cum legione, quam ipse in Hirpinis conscripsisset, Herculaneum simul cum T. Didio caperet, Pompeios cum L. Sulla oppugnaret Compasamque occuparet: causis de virtutibus cum aliis, tum maxime dilutis Q. Hortensius in annalibus suis retulit... illi piisati plenam populos Romanus gratiam restituit ipsum uiritim ciuitate donando. See, on this passage, the valuable remarks in Sumner 1970, 258-261: nepos is probably to be corrected with pronepos.
208 Plin. 3.70: nunc in uillam abit. A new smaller settlement was built on the site of the city (modern Poggio di Varano: Miniero 1988, 233), but the whole ater Stabianus appears to have been put under the jurisdiction of Nuceria (Miniero 1988, 261)
209 App. b. c. 1.50.217-221.
was severely defeated, and had to concentrate its forces in the safe stronghold of Nola.\textsuperscript{210}

We lack explicit evidence for the chronology of the seizure of Pompeii, which must be dated at some point in the spring of 89, after the victory against Cluentius. Of course, the siege went on even when Sulla was leading the attack near Nola. A passage of Orosius suggests that the \textit{legatus} Postumius Albinus, \textit{vir consularis}, was in charge of it during Sulla's absence. However, his \textit{superbia} soon alienated him the sympathy and support of the soldiers, who ended up by starting a revolt and stoning him. According to this version, which certainly derives from Livy, Sulla cleverly exploited the incident to encourage them to expiate their guilt by defeating the enemies, and his appeal was successful: in the subsequent battle, 18.000 Samnites were reportedly killed.\textsuperscript{211} Sallust's remark about the talent Sulla had in dealing with his troops finds further confirmation here. Whatever one decides to make of Orosius' account, the development of the operations shows that the army led by Sulla was quite skilled and strong, and that it was able to sustain a complex military effort on at least two fronts.\textsuperscript{212}

The most significant details of the conquest of the city, however, remain mysterious. We do not know how traumatic it was, whether the choice of the city to oppose Rome was unanimous or not, and how many people lost their lives in the attack.\textsuperscript{213} Ignorance on these matters prevents from establishing which factors linked

\textsuperscript{210} It is probably at this stage of the war that Sulla received the \textit{corona graminea}. Plin. 22.12 (= \textit{HRR} 10 = Chassignet 10).

\textsuperscript{211} Oros. 5.18.22-23: cf. Liv. \textit{Per}. 75.1; Plut. \textit{Sull}. 6.9; Polyæn. 8.9.1. Orosius' narrative is clearly flawed at least on two respects: the siege is dated to \textit{anno ab Urbe condita DCLXI} (93 BC), and Sulla is called \textit{consul}. Amidani 1994 speculates that Sulla was so mild towards the soldiers because he already knew that their support would be essential for him to obtain the Mithridatic command.

\textsuperscript{212} Gabba 1958, 151 speculates that the legate Aulus Postumius Albinus, who was supporting Sulla with a fleet, may have been responsible for it.

\textsuperscript{213} There is some archaeological evidence for the Sullan siege of Pompeii. The northern side of the walls had to be refurbished thoroughly: Van Buren 1925; Van Buren 1932; Coarelli 2002a, 52. On the fortification of Pompeii immediately before the Social War, see Mauri 1929, esp. 163-167, 183-184, 223-224; Chiaramonte Tréret 1986, 30-31; Guzzo 2000, 113. The so-called \textit{elituni} inscriptions (Ve 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 = \textit{ST} Po 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39), no doubt the best known feature of Oscan epigraphy in Pompeii, certainly deal with the organisation of the resistance against Sulla, but their interpretation remains obscure on a number of matters: see Pococeti 1988, esp. 320-327; Coarelli 2002a, 53. Several Latin graffiti bear the name of Sulla: they are on the wall of the tower no. 3 (\textit{CIL} 4.5385 = \textit{ILLRP} 346: \textit{L. Sula}), on that of the tower no. 10 (\textit{CIL} 12.2709 = \textit{ILLRP} 347), and on the grave of the aedilis C.
the Sullan conquest to the decision Sulla took in 80 BC, when he founded a colony in the territory of the city. The parallel example of the complete destruction faced by the neighbouring city of Stabiae suggests that Pompeii may have had a more pragmatic attitude towards the Roman army. In fact, the siege had a relatively mild conclusion: the city was conquered, but not destroyed. No widespread bloodshed is known to have taken place either.214

Pompeii benefited from the extension of Roman citizenship and, for nearly a decade, was a municipium.215 It was only in 80 BC that a colony was created and a new institutional system imposed upon the city.216 However, there is no evidence to believe that Pompeii's conduct in the Social War was the factor that caused the foundation of a Sullan colony in 80 BC. The colonisation of Pompeii must have had different reasons, and to have been unrelated to the conquest of the city in 89 BC.217 It is surely significant, however, that Sulla had a direct familiarity with the area, which may have played a part in deciding and organising the colonial settlement.

A similar link between the Social War and the aftermath of Sulla's victory for supremacy in Rome may be found in another Campanian community, Aeclanum. After defeating Cluentius, he moved towards the territory of the Hirpini and besieged the city, then in the hands of the insurgents.218 Aeclanum refused to surrender, and was punished with the destruction of the walls, which were still made of wood, and a sack. Again, as Appian makes it clear, this case was exceptional. All other cities of Hirpinia decided to surrender, and escaped the sack. Sulla's attitude during the Social War appears to have been consistent in this respect, and it probably was an unavoidable strategy, in a war where time and speed were crucial factors.

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Vestorius Priscus (CIL 6.9161 = ILLRP 348: L. Sulla Cornelius). The archaeological context of the latter suggests that it may date to the age of Claudius: see Weber 1966.

214 Castrén 1975, 50.
215 Castrén 1975, 51 argued, on epigraphical grounds, that some interreges may have ruled the city in the early phase of the municipium. the argument is convincingly refuted in Crawford 1998, 45-46.
216 On the chronology, see Weber 1975, 182-187. There is no evidence that the colony and the old municipium coexisted for a short period, as claimed by Onorato 1951: cf. Mouritsen 1988, 71-75, 86-88.
218 App. b.c. 1.222: see Gabba 1958, 152. An episode of the campaign against the Hirpini is perhaps mentioned in Gell. 20.6.3: see Keaveney 1981b, 294-296.
In the aftermath of the war, however, Sulla apparently created some useful connections at Aeclanum. M. Magius Surus gained the supreme magistracy of the city. He was son of that Minatius Magius who had played such an important part in supporting the Romans before the conquest of Pompeii. An inscription found near the eastern gate of the walls of Aeclanum, sheds light on the aftermath of the war in the town, soon after the creation of the municipium, and strikingly links Sulla’s involvement in the Social War to his dominatio. Two of the quattuorviri – Magius Surus and an otherwise unknown Patlacius – and the patronus municipi Quinctius Valgus built portas turriis moirors/ turresasque aequas qum moiro. The walls burnt by Sulla were replaced by an imposing stone structure, which is still the most prominent feature of the site of Aeclanum in contrada Grotte near modern Mirabella Eclano. The devastations of the war were therefore followed by a reasonably prompt reconstruction, jointly funded by the municipium and by a privatus, who was not a local magistrate, and not even a citizen of Aeclanum. Quinctius Valgus was one of the richest landowners of post-Sullan Italy, who owed his wealth to the confiscations that

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219 It cannot be ruled that there was a pro-Roman faction at Aeclanum even during the Social War. Salmon 1989, 232-233 attributes to the presence of a pro-Roman element in town the inclusion of the community into the tribe Cornelia, instead of the Galeria, where all other Hirpinian cities belonged. It has been argued that Abellinum is a Sullan colony, but the evidence is inconclusive: Colucci Pescatori 1991, 119 (earlier bibliography: ibid., 111, fn. 122).

220 Again, we are well-informed about his family thanks to his descendant Velleius Paterculus (2.16.3):

\[c(\text{aius} \ [\text{cap. of Minatius Magius}] \ i(\text{lli}) \ p(\text{iast}) \ p(\text{lenum} \ p\text{opulus} \ R\text{omanus} \ g\text{ratiam} \ r\text{ettudit} \ p\text{opsum} \ u\text{iritum} \ c\text{imilata} \ d\text{onando}, \ d\text{uos} \ f\text{ilia} \ e\text{ius} \ c\text{reando} \ p\text{raetores,} \ c\text{um} \ s\text{eni} \ a\text{dsum} \ c\text{reaentur}. \] This passage implies that his sons held the praetorship some time between 88 and 82, before the Sullan reform of the magistracy. It is therefore quite likely that they were followers of Marius: Gabba 1954a, 101 (= Gabba 1973, 268). Surely for this reason Harvey 1973, 90, fn. 28 states that Marcus Magius was a third son of Minatius Magius. It cannot be ruled out, however, that he actually joined the populares, became a praetor, and was eventually pardoned by Sulla (see Sumner 1970, 260-261 and fn. 22). In general on Minatius’ role of pro-Roman agent, see Brunt 1988, 108-109. Taylor 1960, 310 and Harvey 1973, 90, fn. 28 are surely wrong in suggesting that the quattuorvir C. Marius C. f. mentioned in CIL 12.1721 = CIL 9.1138 = ILLRP 522 is Marius the Younger, cos. 82. There is a stemma of the Velleii in Cébeillac-Gervasoni 1982, 84.

221 CIL 1.1230 = CIL 9.1140: C(\text{aius} \ Q\text{uintius} \ C(\text{ai}) f(\text{ilious}) \ V\text{alguus}) \ p\text{atronus} p\text{opul} / M\text{arius} M\text{agius} \ M\text{inis} f(\text{ilious}) \ S\text{uras} A(\text{nulas}) \ P\text{altacius} Q\text{uintius} f(\text{ilious}) / I\text{llisuir} d(\text{e}) s\text{enatus} s\text{ententia} \ p\text{ortas} \ t\text{urreis} \ m\text{oires} / t\text{urreisque} \ a\text{equas} \ q\text{um} \ m\text{oiro} / f\text{aciundem} \ c\text{oiuvertunt}.

followed the Civil War. Significantly, Cicero mentions his properties in agro Hirpino.223

As we shall see in due course, Acclanum was only one of the fronts for the activities of this character. Although we do not know how he reached this position, it is no doubt significant that Valgus became patron of a city that had fallen into Sulla’s range of action already during the Social War. His cooperation with Magius Surus, son of an Italian notable who supported Sulla in a crucial moment of the war must be no coincidence either.

Already in the Social War Sulla was prepared to interact with, and even to reward the Italian elites that did not oppose his plans. During the Civil War, Sulla was keen to build good relations with the communities and the members of the local elites that were prepared to accept his supremacy and to support his rise to Rome. His first act after his return to Italy is very instructive in this respect. In the summer of 83, he arrived with his fleet to the former Latin colony, by then municipium, of Brundisium. Appian says that he was welcomed in town, with no opposition to his arrival.224 The port was granted some form of fiscal immunity, which Appian calls ∆τέλεια, stating that it still existed in his own day. Since Brundisium was a community of Roman citizens, where the tributum was not levied, and the most important harbour of the Italian Adriatic coast, it is safe to assume that the immunity was granted from the portorium.225

Sulla's decision was a sign of benevolence and goodwill towards Italy as a whole.226 The exemption of 83 BC generated clear advantages to the trade to and from Italy, and specifically to Brundisium. Moreover, it is likely that Sulla himself or his associates enjoyed their own share in the economic bonanza that followed this

223 Cic. leg. agr. 3.28. The identification between this C. Quinctius Valgus and the Valgus mentioned in Cic. leg. agr. 3.3, the father-in-law of the tribune Rullus, is convincingly suggested in Dessau 1883 and in Harvey 1973; cf. leg. agr. 3.8, 3.13-14, with Drummond 2000, 138-139, 144-145. Also see Scuderi 1989, 124-127.

224 App. b.c. 1.364.

225 Brundisium was included in the tribe Maceia: on the municipalisation of Apulia, see Pani 1988, 21-30, esp. 26-27. On the harbour of Brundisium and its strategic importance, see Uggeri 1988, 50-55 and 60-64; on its relationship with the ager of the city, see Uggeri 1998, 49-51. The archaeological evidence for the development of the city in the Republican period is summarised in Uggeri 1988, 55-59 and Carito 1988. Portoria are known to have been abolished all over Italy in 60 BC by the lex Cancilia de vectigalibus (see Rotondi 1912, 386); cf. however Suet. Rhet. 1. See B. W. Henderson 1897, 254-255; De Laet 1949, 58, fn. 2; Gabba 1958, 213; Laudizi 1998, 36.

226 On Sulla’s agenda after the return to Italy, see the magisterial discussion in Frier 1971, 595-604.
decision. Already before Sulla, Brundisium was an important centre for the production of the so-called 'Apulian' amphorae, actually produced on the whole Adriatic coast with a wide circulation in the East. At least two sites in the territory of Brundisium, contrada Apani and contrada Giancola, are known to have been important centres for the production of amphorae in this period. Amphorae stamps found in both areas have revealed the direct involvement in the production of amphorae of Tarula, one of Sulla's closest associates. A freedman of Sulla himself, probably of Thracian origin, he was among those who took most profit out of Sullan confiscations and enriched themselves thanks to the favours they had offered to the winner of the war. He is mentioned in a famous passage of Sallust's Historiae, the Oratio Lepidi, where he is numbered among the most detestable figures of the Sullan regime: nam praetor satellites conmaculatos quis eadem uolt, aut quis non omnia mutata praeter uictoriam? silecit milites quorum sanguine Tarulae Scirtoque, pessumis servorum, diuitiae partae sunt. A stamp found at Apani reads TARVLAE SVLLAE L, whereas another one from Giancola reads TARVLA L SVL. They are explicit evidence that Tarula invested some of his patrimony in workshops in the territory of Brundisium.

It is unlikely that Tarula was still a slave when he owned amphorae workshops. Surely he had been enfranchised by then, and the stamps are to be supplemented with L(iber)ius, rather than with L(uce). The chronology of the amphorae is to be placed, on archaeological grounds, somewhere between the end of

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227 In fact, they must be called 'Lamboglia 2': Volpe 1988, 81-87; Manacorda 1988, 94-96; Cipriano-Carre 1989, 68-74; Manacorda 1989, 446-447; for an attempt to define the 'Brundisian' amphora type, see Desy 1989, 12-13.

228 See Manacorda 1994, 9-10 on their different characteristics and functions. Also cf. ibid., 7-9 about the neighbouring site of Masseria Marmorelle. On the Apani site, see Desy 1989, 14-15 (14: 'sans doute le plus riche de tout le bassin méditerranéen en timbres amporiques'). For a survey of the amphorae types found at Apani, see Palazzo 1988 and Palazzo 1989. About Giancola, see Desy 1989, 16 and Manacorda 2004.

229 Sall. Hist. 1.55.21.

230 Cf. CIL 9.6079.9. Overall, there are seven exemplars of stamps bearing Tarula's name, six from Apani and one from Giancola: Desy 1989, 95, nos. 654-656; 105, no. 751. They are present mainly in the ager Brundisinus: see Palazzo 1996, 50, with earlier bibliography. On the function of these stamps, see Manacorda 1989, 448-450.

231 Marangio 1978; Silvestrin 1996a, 34; Palazzo 1996, 49-50; contra, arguing that Tarula was a servus cum peculio, Manacorda 1985, 146; Manacorda 1988, 101 and Manacorda 1989, 458; Santoro 1993, 512-3; Aubert 1994, 252-253; Manacorda 1994, 15-16 (more cautious); Manacorda 2004, 186.
Eighties and the early Seventies, after the proscriptions. Nothing certain can really be said, however, about the sources of the capital used by Tarula. Sallust's emphasis on Tarula's wealth makes it quite unlikely that he was just administering his patron's money at Brundisium.

Among the stamps produced in the territory of Brundisium, there are several bearing the name EPICADVS too (cf. CIL 6079.24). The name is probably Illyrian, and another freedman of Sulla inevitably comes to mind: Cornelius Epicadus, who was very close to his patron and to his son Faustus Sulla, and was entrusted to complete the memoirs that death had prevented the great man from completing. However, the idea of a direct involvement of this Epicadus in the workshops near Brundisium is probably far-fetched: it should be explained, first of all, why Epicadus would not state his relationship with Sulla, as Tarula does.

However, Tarula was not the only outsider who was involved in financial enterprises in the ager Brundisinus in the first century BC. Another amphora stamp shows the name of an ORESTE(S) LENTULO(RUM). This Orestes is surely a freedman, or a slave supplied with peculium, of some members of the Lentuli family. His patroni must have been L. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, consul in 57 BC (RF: 238) and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, consul in 49 BC (RF: 218). Their political position was all but consistent, as they cautiously kept close both to Pompey and to Caesar, and it sheds little light on the reasons of their presence at Brundisium. Even their relationship with the gens Cornelia should not be viewed as an immediate reason of their involvement in Brundisian pottery workshops. Their involvement in the area is the symptom of a wider phenomenon. The exemption from the portorium decided by Sulla determined the economic expansion of the territory of Brundisium, and some members of the Roman elite took advantage of this favourable situation, replacing the local producers who had been operating there until the beginning of the first century BC.

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232 Desy 1989, 76-77, nos. 482-486 (from Apani); 109, no. 793 (from Santa Rosa); 115, no. 842 (unknown, though certainly Brundisian workshop).


235 Syme 1939a, 44-45.

236 Cipriano-Carre 1989, 73. C. Visellius Varro, a cousin of Cicero, may have owned a workshop at Giancola: Manacorda 2004, 186.
As he moved towards Rome along the Appian Way, Sulla found no significant hostility from the local communities. Velleius Paterculus stresses how exceptionally peaceful the passage of Sulla through Calabria and Apulia was: *putares Sullam uenisse in Italiam non belli uindicem, sed pacis autorem: tanta cum quiete exercitum per Calabrian Apuliamque cum singulari cura fragum, agrorum, hominum, urbiu perduxit in Campaniam.*

Velleius should be taken seriously here, rather than simply dismissed as an uncritical follower of the pro-Sullan tradition. Sulla’s most dangerous enemies were elsewhere: near Capua, in Latium, and in Etruria, where the decisive phase of the conflict would take place. Moreover, it is safe to assume that he had already gathered the resources he needed for his campaign from the extraordinary levy that he had imposed on the cities of Asia Minor, and could exploit the political advantages that would derive from a mild treatment of the Italian population. Finally, it is not unlikely that the senators who had left Rome and joined Sulla during his Eastern campaign, forming the *σχημα βουλής* mentioned by Plutarch, exploited their connections in Southern Italy for the sake of their friend and patron, the winner of the Mithridatic War.

Sulla was prepared to make some substantial political concessions on various fronts. Between Cales and Teanum, after the victory in the battle near the Tifata Mount, he held talks with the consul L. Scipio Asiagenus, in which he proved himself prepared not to affect the rights of the Italian communities, while Scipio gave reassurances about his intention to respect the prerogatives of the Senate. Some time later, as he was getting closer to Rome and to the final clash with Marius, he negotiated directly with the Italians, and struck a deal with them, reported by the Epitome of Livy: *Sylla cum Italics populis, ne timeretur ab his uelut erupturus duitatem et suffragii ius nuper datum, foedus percussit.* By that time, it was clear that Sulla’s power was

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237 Vell. 2.25.1. On Velleius’ typical interest in Italian matters see Mazzarino 1966, 433-438.

238 Sulla’s hostility to the Samnites should not be exaggerated, and there is no good reason to believe that the Samnites were excluded from the enfranchisement; *contra*, Salmon 1964, 75-79.

239 Salmon 1967, 382.


242 Liv. *Per.* 86.3.
bound to replace those of his enemies. Livy reports that he was visited by litigators who presented their *vadimonia* to him. He answered them to present their claims at Rome, where he would deal with them in due course. He clearly felt that the final victory was very close. The local Italian elites must have realised it too.\footnote{The best discussion of this phase is Frier 1971, 601-602. On Sulla’s decision to confirm the enfranchisement of the Allies, Gabba 1954a, 102-104 (= Gabba 1973, 270-272) remains invaluable. Dahlheim 1993, 111-112 hastily dismisses Sulla’s pledge as a merely tactical measure; Keaveney 1987, 187, 205-206 emphatically celebrates it as the turning-point in the making of Roman Italy. Brunt 1971, 286-287 is probably too pessimistic.}

### 1.5. Retaliation and politics: the proscriptions

In all the narratives of the Civil War the portrait of Sulla *quasi uindex libertatis*, who gets back to Italy and reassures the Italians about his intentions, is closely followed by the proscriptions and the dictatorship. There is no intrinsic contradiction between these two moments, which are in fact different aspects of the same strategy.

After his arrival in Italy, Sulla showed his talent in building fruitful relations with the communities that were prepared to second his interests. The booty he had obtained in the East allowed him to restrain his greed, at least for the first part of the campaign. Overall, he kept quite consistent with this policy, as far as his relations with communities were concerned.\footnote{Pompey conquered and sacked Sena Gallica in Picenum: App. b. c. 1.88.401.} Retaliation affected only the staunchest enemies. Praeneste and Norba, which had become the core of the anti-Sullan resistance and sheltered the most prominent Marians, were sacked.\footnote{See Coarelli 1982c, 265-271. The archaeological evidence shows that the city went through a prosperous phase between the Second Punic War and the Civil War: Quilici Gigli 2003. On Norbanus’ possible connection with Norba, see Linden 1896, 56, fn. 20; Münzer 1936, 926-927. Rawson 1978, 149 and Hinard 1985a, 385-386 are more cautious.} Norba was even abandoned, and the area was reoccupied only in the Middle Ages, when the city of Norma was founded on a neighbouring site.\footnote{See Flor. 2.9.28: *nam Sulmonem, vetus oppidum socium atque amicum – facinus indignum – non expugnat aut obsidet iure belli; sed quo modo morte damnati ducis inventur, sic damnatam civitatem iussit deleri.* Possibly, the destruction was limited to the fortifications of the city. See Gabba 1970/1971, 462-463 (= Gabba 1973, 363-367); Wiseman 1971, 26.} Other cities, as I will show in more detail in the next chapter, were punished with the settlement of veterans, and an unclear number of communities, which certainly included Arretium.

\footnote{Brunt 1971, 286-287 is probably too pessimistic.}
and Volaterrae, were deprived of Roman citizenship. Other Etruscan cities, like Telamon, Vetulonia and Saturnia, suffered heavy destructions, which may be due to a Sullan attack.\footnote{Harris 1971, 207 (on Telamon, with earlier bibliography); \textit{ibid.}, 258; Pfiffig 1966, 56 (on Vetulonia); Rendini 2003, 333-334 (on Saturnia, for which the evidence is less clear). Telamon had sheltered Marius in 87 BC: Plut. \textit{Mar.} 41.3-4; App. \textit{b. c.} 1.67.304; Licin. 35.7 Criniti.} It is however with the punishment of hundreds of individuals that Sulla earned himself the reputation of blood-thirsty tyrant which lingered on in the ancient tradition. His heaviest contribution to the making of the Italian elite are indeed the proscriptions, which were the final act of the Civil War, and the most extraordinary one, especially because they were unprecedented.

As soon as Sulla returned to Rome, after the destruction of Norba, Sulla started to settle the political affairs in the city. Appian reports a speech which he gave to an ‘assembly’, surely a\textit{ contio}, where he outlined his intentions for the immediate future.\footnote{App. \textit{b. c.} 1.95.441-444.} He anticipated an ambitious plan of constitutional and political reforms, and asked for complete obedience. Moreover, he announced that all the magistrates who had opposed him after his return from the East and his negotiations with Scipio would be severely punished. After this speech, the proscriptions started.\footnote{The best modern discussion on the Sullan proscriptions is Hinard 1985a, 18-223, followed by a catalogue of the victims at 329-411. My debt to this contribution will often be apparent. For a survey of the modern debate on the proscriptions, see Calore 1995, 34-40.} The\textit{ contio} mentioned by Appian was probably held the day after a Senate assembly that took place in the temple of Bellona on 2 November 82 BC, in which Sulla outlined the project of the proscriptions.\footnote{Plut. \textit{Sull.} 30.3; Dio 33-35, fr. 109.5. See Gabba 1958, 254; the chronology is convincingly outlined by Hinard 1985a, 108-110. Cf. Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 39, 147; on the Bellona temple, see \textit{ibid.}, 151-160.} According to Plutarch, this meeting of the Senate coincided with the actual beginning of the massacres and the confiscations.

The speech reported by Appian is the most thorough and diffused justification of the mass slaughter that is widely known as the Sullan\textit{ proscriptiones}. The elimination of the leading exponents of the\textit{ populares} was, of course, an essential aspect of the proscriptions, but it would be wrong to view it as the only, or perhaps even the main one. The history of the word\textit{ proscriptio} reveals the complexity of such a process, and its political importance. The term had long belonged in part of the technical vocabulary of Roman law and it was commonly used to designate a procedure
whereby something was put up in a public place (pro-scribere), and presented to the whole community. A list of candidates or people deemed suitable for a magistracy could be the object of a proscriptio, but the most frequent use of the word belongs in the area of announcement of public sales. A public sale, or an auction of the goods belonging to an individual was usually called proscriptio. The word had an explicitly negative connotation, as the sale affected the household of someone in a state of insolvency, and the publicity it was given was at the same time a denunciation of his conduct, and a sanction of his infamia. To a large extent, the proscriptions decided and enacted by Sulla were a novelty, something which had never taken place in Roman history, although his decision to declare hostes publici twelve leading populares, in 88 BC, is, to an extent, a precedent. At the same time, they must be described and explained in the light of this legal and ideological background.

Technically, the proscriptio was the inclusion of a person in a list of the addressees of a range of provisions, adopted unilaterally by Sulla. We are told by the literary sources that the list was displayed in the Roman Forum, and periodically updated by the insertion of new names. A reference made by Cicero in his speech in defence of Roscius from Ameria makes it clear that the final deadline for the inclusion of new names was fixed as the 1st June 81 — about seven months after Sulla's speeches to the people and the Senate.

It has often been argued that the list of proscriptions was set up to restrain the massacres and limit the number of victims. The evidence we have for many arbitrary and politically unjustified crimes perpetrated in the season of the proscriptions is a warning against accepting these arguments. It is the set of legal consequences for those included on the list, however, that points to a quite different conclusion. Strictly

252 The best discussion of the legal background of the proscriptions is Hinard 1985a, 17-29. About proscriptio as an aspect of civil law, see Kaser 1996, 388-401. On the proscriptio (public sale) of a debtor's goods in the age of Sulla, see Cic. Quint. 6.25. Also cf. ibid. 24.76: see Heinze 1960, 93-98 and Hinard 1975 on the subtle political implications of this speech.

253 App. b. c. 1.60.271-272; Plut. Sull. 10.1; Cic. Brut. 168; Liv. Per. 77; Val. Max. 3.8.5; Flor. 2.9.8. See Pais 1916; Bauman 1973; Katz 1975, 105-115; Hinard 1985a, 108-109 (Sulla presented his aims to the Senate and to a contio, like he did before the proscriptions).

254 J. Henderson 1998, 15-18 is an excellent, if brief discussion in this sense.

255 App. b. c. 1.443. See Cicero's definition of the proscription in dom. 17.43 (opinor poenam in cives Romanos nominatum sive iudicio constitutam), with Sambito 1963, 37.

256 Cic. Rusc. Amer. 128.

257 Cf. Plut. Sull. 31.2-4; Flor. 2.9.25; Oros. 5.21.2-3.
speaking, a proscription was not a sentence to death. Most of the people on the list were killed, of course, although some managed to flee Rome and Italy, and either spent the rest of their lives in exile, or joined the forces of Sertorius in Spain. The murder of the proscribed was of course the most frequent outcome, since immunity was granted to the executioner and those who helped the proscribed were liable to be killed, although not proscribed. However, this was not the central aspect of the proscriptions, which were focused on the loss of political status and on the confiscations. In fact, they also concerned some enemies of Sulla who had already died during the war, after 83, whose heirs suffered the consequences of the proscriptions.

The immediate effects of a proscription were both political and financial. The proscribed received an *interdictio*, a legal provision that excluded the victim from citizenship, and therefore deprived him of any right, including that of personal safety, and meant that his patrimony was entirely confiscated by the State. Soon afterwards, all his properties were sold in a public auction, usually at a considerably lower price than the real value of the goods. It is also well known that the *interdictio* was extended to the children of the proscribed, mainly to make any legal challenge to the confiscation impossible. The punishment inflicted by Sulla on a part of the Roman, and Italian elites that had opposed him was not meant to be exhausted over the course of one generation. Moreover, the effects of the proscriptions had to be shielded from the likely legal challenges, or open revenge of the descendants of the victims.

Even this cursory glance at the provisions relating to the proscriptions shows that the intention to limit the number of the victims was hardly the reason which led Sulla to reinvent the *proscriptio* and transform it into a political matter. Firstly, a massive

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258 See Hinard 1985a, 35-36.
260 Hinard 1985a, 84-85. It is the clause of the law on the proscriptions quoted by Cicero, *Rass. Amer.* 126: *ut aut eorum bona vaneant qui proscripsit sunt... aut eorum qui in adversariorum praesidiis occisi sunt*. Having died fighting with the *populares* was enough to receive a posthumous punishment; such a clause, of course, substantially increased the number of the potential victims.
261 Sall. *Cat.* 37.9; Liv. *Per.* 89.4; Vell. 2.28.4; Plin. 7.117; Sen. *ira* 2.34.2. See Vedaldi Iasbez 1981 (with a tentative list at 184-207); Hinard 1985a, 87-100. Velleius' statement that *senatorum filii et onera ordinis sustinere et urae perdere* is probably an anachronism: see Hinard 1985a, 99-100; contra, Vedaldi Iasbez 1981, 170-176.
process of expropriation and reallocation of resources needed some form of legal recognition, which only the creation of public lists of victims made possible. Secondly, Sulla needed to convey the weight of the *infamia* that he inflicted on his enemies by adopting a completely new form, which was nevertheless immediately understandable to the Roman public. It had to be the political death of the sectors of the Roman and Italian elites that had opposed him. Re-using an aspect of private law in the political domain was, in some respects, a stroke of genius. No doubt, its close link with the concept of *infamia* and the effectiveness of the provisions played a major part in bringing about the climate of terror that several sources mention in their accounts of life in Rome after the victory of Sulla.\(^{263}\)

The proscription of an individual was, first of all, a legal decision, but there was of course a political dimension to it. It is certain that the proscriptions were decided by an edict and later ratified by a law. Like it is the case with other aspects of this problem, our information depends on the correct interpretation of a passage of Cicero's speech *pro Roscio Amerino*.\(^{264}\) Cicero defended the son of a partisan of Sulla, who was unduly included in the proscription list and killed by two fellow citizens. Chrysogonus, an influential freedman of Sulla, eventually bought Roscius' properties for a very low price. A global interpretation of the speech is made quite difficult by the constraints which Cicero had to face when he gave it: the case was heard in 80 BC, when Sulla was still in Rome, holding the consulship. However, the *pro Roscio Amerino* teaches us a lot about the legal aspects of the proscriptions and the way in which they were enforced. It is therefore quite surprising that, at some point, Cicero refers to a passage of the law showing some uncertainty about its name (128): *qui potuerunt ista ipsa legem quae de proscriptione est, siue Valeria siue Cornelia — non enim nosi nec scio — verum ista ipsa legem bona Sex. Rosci venire qui potuerunt?* Seemingly, there should be no room for doubt on such a matter, especially in a plea made by a lawyer in such an important trial, and later revised for publication.\(^{265}\)

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\(^{263}\) Hinard 1985a, 135-143; cf. J. Henderson 1998, 32 ("Sullan proscription always bleeds into the bloodstream of 'putting on public record' — 'noticing the terms of political existence'"). Cf. the dreadful treatment inflicted upon the corpses of the victims: Hinard 1984b.

\(^{264}\) There are useful discussions of this speech in Stroh 1975, 55-79 (on which cf. Kinsey 1981); Kinsey 1980; Diehl 1988, 43-117; Dyck 2003.

\(^{265}\) Diehl 1988, 46 suggests that the written version of the speech followed closely the plea given at the trial; an opposite view, which I tend to favour, in Berry 2004.
The doubt that Cicero expresses here is probably explainable as a reference to the legal procedure which led to the beginning of Sulla’s dictatorship.266 A law presented by L. Valerius Flaccus, who acted as an interrex in the months immediately following the end of the Civil War, provided the legal background to Sulla’s accession to the supreme magistracy.267 With this law, all Sulla’s acta between 88 and 82, including the first proscriptiones, were ratified, and the way was paved for the dictatorship.268 The proscriptions were then dealt with in more detail in a lex Cornelia. The existence of this law is confirmed by a passage of the Verrines (2.1.123), which refers to a specific clause, quae proscriptum iuuari uetaret. In the pro Roscio Amerino, Cicero’s intention is to de-politicise the trial by downplaying the role of Sulla in the rise of Chrysogonus; at any rate, his case was already forceful enough in itself.269 By implying that the proscriptions were not just a result of Sulla’s policy, but had ultimately been made possible by a law presented by a former opponent of the dictator, like Flaccus, Cicero did a good service to the agenda of his harangue, if not to the cause of historical accuracy.270

It is therefore likely that the definitive legal framework of the proscriptions was provided by a lex Cornelia, voted by the comitia during the dictatorship. Although the full name of the law is not stated, it was probably a lex Cornelia de proscriptione or de proscriptis, which determined the interdictio of a number of enemies of Sulla.271 It set the

266 Cf. Diehl 1988, 92-95, viewing it as an indirect reference to the unlawfulness of Roscius’s murder and of the ensuing confiscation.


268 On the ratification of Sulla’s acta, see Cic. leg. agr. 3.5: omnium legum inequissimam dissimillimam legem esse arbitravam quam L. Flaccus interrex de Sulla tulit, ut omnia quaecumque illi facisset essent rata. About the background and scope the lex Valeria, see Vervaet 2004; on its legitimacy, see Castello 1956. Also cf. Gabba 1958, 255; Wosnik 1963, 93; Hurler 1993, 30-50; Sandberg 2002, 80.

269 Heinze 1960, 101-102.

270 Flaccus, cos. 100 was appointed princeps senatus in 86 BC: Liv. Per. 83.4. Cf. however Buchheit 1975a, arguing that Cicero’s negative views about Sulla are already apparent in the pro Roscio Amerino, albeit skillfully concealed by a clever use of irony; on a similar line Diehl 1988, 85-117, esp. 86-88. On the portrait of Chrysogonus as a tyrant, see Buchheit 1975b. The opposite view of Hinard 1979, that Cicero deliberately politicised the case of Roscius by overstating Chrysogonus’ power, is unsupported by the evidence. The speech is probably to be dated to the beginning of 80 BC: see Kinsey 1967. It is unlikely that Cicero left Rome for Athens because he feared Sulla’s anger (Plut. Cic. 3.6). It is more likely that he left because of poor health, as Cicero himself says in Brut. 314 (see Kinsey 1967, 67).

271 Hinard 1985a, 74-77 envisages a lex Cornelia de hostibus rei publicae.
rules for the confiscation and the sale of the household of the proscribed, withdrew the political rights of the children of the proscribed, granted immunity to the murderers of those who had not died in the Civil War, fixed the temporal limit for the inclusion of new names on the proscription list to 1 June 81 BC, it probably contained the first list of the victims of the proscriptions, which was created after the Colline Gate and included the most prominent opponents of Sulla. However, such a list was certainly not exhaustive, as murders and expropriations were still possible after June 81, as is shown by the case of Roscius Amerinus, who was killed three months after the deadline set in the law on the proscriptions.

It seems clear that Sulla himself compiled the lists, and that he had a direct role in organising the confiscations and the new allocations of properties. As he made clear in the speech reported by Appian, the first targets were the magistrates that had led, or followed, the *populares* during the last phase of the Civil War. Some of them, like Marius the Younger and the praetor Damasippus, had already died during the conflict, while other leaders of the *populares*, captured after the battle at the Colline Gate, were executed soon afterwards. Their supplice was dreadful: they were beheaded, and their heads were taken to Praeneste and exposed in front of the walls of the besieged town. The grisly spectacle was meant to persuade the citizens of Praeneste to surrender.

The punishment of Praeneste is an episode of the proscriptions too, showing an important aspect of the political plan which prompted Sulla’s vengeance. To his eyes, not only did the members of Roman political elite deserve to be punished for their infidelity, but so too the exponents of the Italian elite that had supported the Marians. The male population of the *municipium* of Praeneste was decimated. It is likely that a part of the local elite was put on the proscription list. The subsequent foundation of a colony was probably preceded by a series of individual confiscations, rather than by the confiscation of the whole territory of the *municipium*. Praeneste was no exception in this respect. As Appian says, the partisans of Sulla brought about specific and detailed investigations all over Italy, in most local contexts, constantly

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274 See Gabba 1987, 117-119: the punishment of entire communities decided by Sulla show that the political importance of the Italian cities had increased remarkably.
adding names to the first list that Sulla had produced in Rome.\textsuperscript{275} Sanctions could be decided, without trial, if one was believed guilty of one of the charges listed by Appian: for having held a command or having served in the armies of the Marians, or even for having financed Sulla’s opponents.\textsuperscript{276}

Another speech of Cicero, the \textit{pro Cluentio}, shows the authors of the proscriptions at work in a \textit{municipium} of Central Italy, Larinum, soon after the end of the War. The client of Cicero was accused by his mother Sassia of having poisoned his stepfather Oppianicus, whom his advocate had every reason to depict as a dangerous thug and a profiteer of the Sullan regime. Many other people, according to the reconstruction he provided in his plea, may have had interest in killing him.\textsuperscript{277} His active role in the proscriptions is a central feature of the memorably hostile portrait of the victim. Oppianicus arrived suddenly in Larinum, with a group of armed thugs, entrusted by Sulla with a specific mission. His tasks were clear: unseating the quattuorviri of the municipium, no doubt followers of Marius; becoming a member of the new \textit{collegium} of city magistrates; ‘proscribing and killing’ four local notables (\textit{proscribendos interficiendosque curaret}).\textsuperscript{278} It is apparent that the proscriptions and the murders were two different steps in the same process, although not immediately

\textsuperscript{275} App. \textit{bc.} 1.96.446.

\textsuperscript{276} Cf. Cic. \textit{Rosc. Amer.} 127. Gabba 1958, 258 suggests that Appian closely followed the text of Sulla’s disposition. Hinard 1983, 327 argues that copies of the proscription list may have been displayed in the \textit{municipia} too.

\textsuperscript{277} Cic. \textit{Cluent.} 8.25: \textit{post illam autem fugam, sceleris et conscientiae testem, numquam se iudiciis, numquam iuribus, numquam inermium inimicis committere ausus est, sed per illam L. Sullae uia victoriae Larinum in summo timore omnium cum armatis aduolauit. quattuoruiros, quos municipes fecerant, sustulit, se a Sulla et tres pratera factos esse dicit, et ab eodem sibi esse imperatum ut A. Aurium, illum qui sibi delationem nominis et Capitis periculum ostentaret, et alterum A. Aurium et eius L. filium et Sex. Uibium, quo sequestrum in illo indice corrupiendo dioebatur esse usus, proscribendos interficiendosque curaret, itaque illis crudelissime interfexitis non mediocri ab eo veteri proscriptions et mortis metu ienebantur.} About Oppianicus, see David 1992, 740. The speech is an invaluable source for the family alliances and rivalries within the elite of Larinum: Moreau 1983; Silvestrini 1996b, 269-272. On the economic aspects of the speech, see Moreau 1986.

\textsuperscript{278} M. R. Torelli 1973, 341-343 conveniently links Oppianicus’ misdeeds to an inscription from Larinum that mentions \textit{Sulla Felix dictator as patronus} of the city (\textit{AE} 1975, 219); cf. Moreau 1997, 137-139 and Fezzi 2003, 31-33. Crawford 1998, 33 argues that Oppianicus supervised a new \textit{constitutio} of the \textit{municipium}, undoing the provisions taken after the enfranchisement of the city. Two tribes are attested at Larinum, the Voltinia and the Clustumina; Folcando 1997, 54-55 speculates that Sulla assigned the inhabitants were assigned to two different tribes, as he wanted to punish the part of the elite that had supported Marius.
related to each other. The physical elimination of the enemy may have followed his 'legal death', the infamia and the confiscations, but it was not automatically implied by the proscription. Oppianicus claimed that he was acting on behalf of Sulla, from whom he had received explicit instructions: the following lines make it apparent that the executions had taken place, and that the threat of more was still impending. After Oppianicus had proved so ruthless and effective, the people at Larinum feared that the proscription list could be extended, should Oppianicus be attracted by the wealth of some other citizens: non mediocri ab eo ceteriproscriptionis et mortis metu tenebantur.

It is hard to believe that the deeds of Oppianicus were not paralleled elsewhere. Unfortunately, there are no other examples on the record, but this passage probably unveils an important aspect of the proscriptions. It is significant that Oppianicus, after performing the task he had been entrusted with by Sulla, was entitled to proscribe other individuals. As his case suggests, the atrocity of the proscriptions must not overshadow an important point: they were a political process, whose explicit aim was to destroy a part of Italian governing class and replace it with new elements that had proved their loyalty to Sulla. The first list set up by Sulla included only the most prominent supporters of the populares, those holding senior positions in Roman and Italian politics. Yet, it remained open to the inclusion of people whose prominence did not go beyond their local community, signalled by the Sullan envoys that had been sent to other cities. For the misdeeds of Oppianicus and the like to be perpetrated without being punished, there was time at least until 1 June 81, as the pro Roscio Amerino makes clear.

In Appian's account, the punishment of the individuals – the proscriptions – chronologically precede the retaliation that Sulla decided against some communities which had supported Marius. This is true for the colonies that were founded in Italy by Sulla himself, but not necessarily for the Italian municipia. In Larinum, for instance, the elected magistrates were proscribed by the envoys of Sulla. The status of the community did not change, but a strong interference in its political life took place. Indeed, the proscriptions and the political normalisation of local contexts were two facets of the same dossier, which took place in a close sequence, soon after the victory in the Civil War.

279 He may have also freed the slaves of his victims, like Sulla did at Rome: see the mysterious case of the Martiales, a group of (former?) slaves Oppianicus wanted to grant freedom to (Cic. Cluent. 15.43-44, with Moreau 1997).
1.6. Sulla's infamous associates

Numerous victims of the Sullan proscriptions are known, although they number considerably less than the tally of victims of the triumviral proscriptions.\(^{280}\) We are not equally well informed about those who claimed and obtained their properties. On the other hand, it is well known that the land confiscations related to the proscriptions affected the most diverse areas of Italy, from Beneventum to Casinum, from the Campanian coast to Albae.\(^{281}\)

Besides the short, if colourful accounts provided by Appian and Plutarch, it is Cicero that provides the most detailed narratives of how a proscription was decided and enforced. The first account he gives concerns the misdeeds of Oppianicus, as we have seen, while the other is contained in the first chapters of the \textit{pro Roscio Amerino}. In fact, according to Cicero, Roscius' \textit{proscriptio} was illegal. The father of Cicero's client, a keen partisan of Sulla and a client of several prominent aristocratic families, was murdered in Rome. Cicero insinuates that two of the victim's fellow citizens, T. Roscius Capito and T. Roscius Magnus, were involved in the murder. They then told Chrysogonus, an influential freedman of Sulla, of the value of Roscius' patrimony, and suddenly the name of the victim appeared on the proscription list: \textit{nomen referitur in tabulas Sex. Rosci, hominis studiosissimi nobilitatis}. According to Cicero, the operation obeyed no political rationale; its only purpose was to favour a bunch of profiteers by damaging an honest and unsophisticated farmer from an Umbrian \textit{municipium}.\(^{282}\) Moreover, it was unacceptable from a legal point of view. Q. Roscius had no relationship whatsoever with the \textit{populares}, and he was included in the proscription list \textit{aliquot post menses} since the final date set for the proscriptions and the sale of the

\(^{280}\) See the catalogue in Hinard 1985a, 327-411.

\(^{281}\) On Beneventum, see Cic. \textit{Verr.} 2.1.38. On Casinum, see Cic. \textit{leg. agr.} 3.14. On Marius' Campanian villa, bought for a ridiculous price by Sulla's daughter Cornelia, see references and discussion in Badian 1973, esp. 121-125, 130-132. On Alba Fucens, see Plut. \textit{Sull.} 31.11-12. \textit{ILLRP} 146 might be evidence for land assignment to the veterans of Metellus Pius in its territory after the Civil War: Gabba 1979. It is possible that the city took part in Lepidus' revolt, and that this was a reaction to the confiscations: see Oros. 5.22.16-17, with Coarelli 1998. Plut. \textit{Crass.} 6.6 is no evidence for land confiscations at Tuder, \textit{pace} Gabba 1986, 98 (= Gabba 1994a, 205).

confiscated properties was 1 June 81 BC. Unfortunately, the only internal evidence we have for a precise dating of the presumably illegitimate confiscation has no parallel elsewhere. When the enemies of Roscius told Chrysogonus about the potential operation, he was at Volaterrae, then besieged by Sulla (7.20: res ad Chrysogonum in castra L. Sullae Volaterras defertur). Little is known about the date of the conquest of this last Marian stronghold: it is beyond doubt, however, that it fell during Sulla’s dictatorship.283

It is because of his manifold tasks that, according to Cicero, Sulla could not have known about the fraudulent behaviour of his protégé. The role of Chrysogonus, however, remains a problem, as much as his relationship with Sulla, and one certainly cannot be satisfied with the clever rhetorical move of Cicero, who needed to depoliticize the case, if he wanted to stand any chance to win it. If Cicero’s speech consistently downplays the connection between the dictator and his freedman, a passage of Pliny the Elder’s *Naturalis Historia* is much more explicit on Chrysogonus’ actual role and influence.284 He opens a list of freedmen who managed to enrich themselves thanks to the favour of their patrons, whom Pliny mentions in contrast with other freedmen who distinguished themselves in the literary field. Chrysogonus is presented as the first example of a group of influential freedmen, who acquired a prominent function in the late Republic. The allegation of having made illicit gains from the proscriptions applies to most of the freedmen mentioned by Pliny. Catulus, Lucullus and Pompey were all close associates of Sulla, and it is likely that they profited, personally and with the help of their freedmen, from the sales that followed the first proscription.

It is to Pliny, therefore, that we owe explicit evidence for the connection between Chrysogonus and Sulla. By referring to Chrysogonus as a *seruus*, Cicero makes it clear that he was a freedman, but fails to uncover the real nature of his connection

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with the dictator. What Cicero portrays most effectively is the privileged status that Chrysogonus achieved after Sulla’s victory. Despite his relatively young age, he became one of the most influential figures in Rome, *adulescens uel potentissimus hoc tempore nostrae ciuitatis*. Over a short time he gathered an impressive wealth, which Cicero forcefully portrays before starting his final peroration (13.135). He lives on the Palatine, the most exclusive area of the Urbs, unashamedly showing off his wealth. His house is full of precious objects and it is not even his only property, as he owns a country-house near Rome and many farms (*habet animi causa rus amoenum et suburbanum, plura praeterea praedia neque tamen ullam nisi praeclarum et propinquum*). When he walks into the Forum, a crowd of clients follows him; his house is often visited by artists and musicians, an unwelcome presence for the neighbours. After such an unsympathetic portrait, Cicero restates his support for Sulla and his reforms, but cannot resist a bitter remark: the rise of people like Chrysogonus raises some doubts about the true extent of the victory of the *nobilitas* that Sulla claimed to have ensured.

For most of his speech, however, Cicero does not push his political critique of Sulla too far. His purpose was just to make the case for his client, using legal arguments and depicting him as a peaceful and honest farmer. He was confident that his still unprominent position would enable him to escape an involvement in any serious political controversy. He remained consistent with this strategy down to the end of the speech, with the exception of the last paragraph, dealing with the rights of the children of the proscribed, and possibly added just before the publication of the speech.

With such a detailed reconstruction of the events, Cicero provides a crucial insight into the way proscriptions worked. Although the proscription of Roscius'
properties was apparently illegal, the picture described can be seen as quite a typical one. Chrysogonus claimed he had bought the properties of Roscius from Sulla himself: *de uiro fortissimo et clarissimo L. Sulla, quem honoris causa nomino, duobus milibus nummum sese dicit emisse* (2.6). When the case was heard, the confiscation had already taken place, and Cicero claims repeatedly that his purpose is just to save Roscius from a conviction for murder, not to contest Chrysogonus' right to hold his properties. According to his reconstruction (6.21), Chrysogonus obtained the property as soon as Roscius' name appeared in the list: *nomen refertur in tabulas Sex. Rosci, hominis studiosissimi nobilitatis; manceps fit Chrysogonus.* After acquiring the properties, Chrysogonus sent T. Roscius Magnus as a personal envoy to his new *fundí,* while Roscius Capito, who had played an important part in identifying Roscius as a possible target, was rewarded with three *praedia.* Cicero claims that Sulla was not aware of such an operation, but Chrysogonus argued the contrary. It is surely significant that Cicero brings no evidence to support his assumption. The speech itself tells us that that Chrysogonus fostered the inclusion of Roscius in the list while he was taking part in the siege of Volaterrae, and that he could do that *because* he was a member of Sulla's entourage. It is unlikely that he and his associates could have put their hands on a substantial patrimony like Roscius' without the connivance of Sulla.\(^{289}\)

As Cicero's account forcefully shows, taking possession of a property after the proscription of the owner was not a simple operation. One had to be prepared to use violence, and eventually to face opposition and even resistance. Acting quickly and ruthlessly was therefore essential. Soon after buying Roscius' properties for a shamefully low price – an aspect I will soon come back to – Chrysogonus sent his associate Magnus to America, with the precise task of claming of the properties: Cicero calls him Chrysogonus' *procurator* (8.23), and his arrival in Umbria as an *impetus* (8.21). Surely, he knew that he would find some resistance on the part of the city of America. Indeed, a delegation of the *decuriones* was soon sent to Volaterrae, and tried unsuccessfully to obtain a hearing with Sulla. Imposing the rule of the new master in the *fundí* of Roscius, however, must not have been too difficult. Later in the speech, Cicero refers to the popularity which Chrysogonus had earned among the slaves formerly owned by Roscius. Some of them even joined his entourage and had a close relationship with their new master (28.77: *apud eum sunt in honore et in pretio*). Surely,

\(^{289}\) Roscius' wealth was considerable: see Shatzman 1975, 20; Frederiksen 1981, 270; Lomas 2004, 104-106.
Cicero is insinuating here that Chrysogonus’ origins made it easy for him to mingle with slaves.

The mission of the decuriones shows that the citizens of Ameria viewed the confiscation of Roscius’ properties very unfavourably, to say the least. They must have felt like the citizens of Larinum did after the coming of Oppianicus, fearing that their names would appear in the proscription list any day soon. We do not know of the stance taken by Ameria during the Civil War. The composition of the council of the decuriones, however, shows that some followers of Sulla were sitting in it. Roscius Capito was among the decuriones sent to Volaterrae. His involvement in the confiscation, and probably in the assassination of Roscius, was already clear, as he had been the first to announce the murder to his fellow citizens, and his presence in the delegation shows that there was no unanimity within the elite of Ameria about opposing the confiscation. In order to carry out the confiscation, Chrysogonus needed the support of some insiders to identify the property, and to make sure that the local community would not react too unfavourably. Capito played exactly this role, by misleading the fellow-members of the council about Chrysogonus’ real intentions, and he was rewarded with the grant of three praedia.

I have already pointed out that proscriptions were important political operations, which required a high level of sophistication and complexity to implement. Cicero’s account of the proscription of Roscius confirms this impression. The proscriptions were decided at a central level, in Rome, where a list of the victims was displayed, and the relevant law was certainly voted. However, they needed local knowledge and local support. In some cases caution was required too, and this is the best explanation for the death of many victims of the proscriptions, whom their depredators thought it sensible to eliminate so that they would not create problems in the future. Cicero’s pro Rocio Amerino is an invaluable source for the actual dynamics of the proscriptions, as it provides useful insight into a specific case, whilst giving some general views on this chain of events. Cicero’s arguments are made slightly less credible by the assumption that Sulla could not be aware of the abuses of his associates. That something went wrong in the process, he concedes, non placet, sed necesse est (45.131). The political importance of the proscriptions, and the accounts of some literary sources both show that Sulla himself encouraged his associates to be

\[290\] The evidence for land confiscations in Umbria is very episodic: G. Bradley 2000, 236.

\[291\] Cicero states it repeatedly: see Cic. Rosc. Amer. 2.6; 8.21; 9.26; 38.110, 45.130.
ruthless and greedy. He even exempted some of the profiteers from paying the price that had agreed upon at the public auctions for the properties of the proscribed. Only in 72 BC was a statute passed, preceded by a senatusconsultum, which compelled them to pay at least the ridiculous sums of money they owed to the aerarium.

However, rather than insisting on the alternative between Sulla’s alleged crudelitas and the greed of his associates, more relevant for our purposes is the wider problem of identifying the beneficiaries of the proscriptions. Some of them were members of the political faction that supported Sulla during the war, either benefitting directly, or using procurators to manage the properties on their behalf. This is how Chrysogonus achieved the wealth so bitterly criticised by Cicero. Sulla certainly trusted him, and used him as a political and financial agent. He was not the only freedman who enjoyed the dictator’s trust. The completion of his memoirs was entrusted to Epicadus, an educated libertus, who provided the narrative of the last days of Sulla’s life. Other freedmen of his, however, were entrusted with much more practical tasks, which earned them a place among the Sullan profiteers strongly condemned by the popularis tradition. However, nothing is known about him, or about the Vettius Picens who is mentioned after him in the same passage, and for whom one can just guess an Italian origin. We have better luck with Tarula: the name of this wealthy freedman mentioned by Sallust some lines below (21) appears on some amphorae from Brundisium, which I have discussed above. Sallust’s reference to his exceptional wealth makes all the more sense considering that his activities were diversified, and that some landed property coexisted with an entrepreneur-like activity. Perhaps a similar explanation applies to the case of the last freedman mentioned in Lepidus’ speech, Scirtus, but, again, nothing else is known about this character.

What is striking about these characters is not just their special relationship with their patron, or its political significance. It is the trust and responsibilities that Sulla gave to them, enabling them to take part in a crucial political process like the proscriptions. This would become a frequent feature in the late Republic, with all the leading political personalities giving important tasks to their freedmen, from Pompey to Cicero. Sulla, however, was the first to use the freedmen in such a way, and he

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292 Cf. e.g. Sall. Cat. 11.5-7; Plut. Sull. 12.9-14.; Luc. 7.3.
293 See Cic. Verr. 2.3.81; Sall. Hist. 4.1 (= Gell. 18.4.4.). Hinard 1985a, 187-188 rightly notes that the statute was the final legitimisation of the profiteers’ rights on the bona proscriptorum.
appears to have had a strategy in this respect. A hint at the role of freedmen in the devastation of the Sullan period is noticeable in a passionate passage of Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (6.2.46): *qui expulsiones uicanorum qui latrocinia in agris, qui cum servis cum libertis cum clientibus societates, qui possessiones uacuas qui proscriptiones locupletium qui caedes municipiorum qui illam Sullani temporis messem recordetur, qui testamenta subiecta, tot qui sublatos homines...*

Of course, this is a rhetorical overstatement, but the *societates* including slaves, freedmen and clients were certainly an important element of the Sullan coalition at work after the victory. After all, the three characters that expropriated and proscribed Roscius were a *societas* created by a freedman of Sulla and two obscure Umbrian followers. Such a pragmatic *modus operandi* could prompt, of course, the dramatic rise of some otherwise unremarkable figures, asides from the former slaves. This is the case, for instance, with the *primipilarius* (and later praetor) L. Fufidius, who is defined *ancilla turpis* in the *Oratio Pepidi,* and who suggested, according to some literary sources, that the proscriptions should be organised to eliminate the enemy more efficiently.

An important passage of Appian shows that the social promotion of people like Chrysogonus or Tarula was not an isolated choice involving just a handful of individuals. Being in charge of the whole proscription process, Sulla took possession of the slaves which formerly belonged to the proscribed. With thousands of slaves under his control, Sulla exploited this enormous potential for his own sake, and decided to enfranchise 'the youngest and fittest' ones, including them into the citizen body, and adding a powerful contingent of new clients to the already impressive number of his associates. According to Appian, more than 10,000 slaves were disenfranchised. Sulla was not interested in more electoral support, but rather in having a group of people ready to support and defend him, should the need arise.

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295 About Fufidius, see Sall. *Hist.* 1.55.22 Maurenbrecher; Plut. *Sull.* 31.4; Flor. 2.9.25; Oros. 5.21.3 (who calls him *Furidius*). It is possible that he had a role in planning the proscriptions, although it is unlikely that he actually expressed his views in the Senate: cf. Wiseman 1971, 232, no. 184.

296 App. b. c. 1.101.469; 104.489.


298 Cf. Liv. *Per.* 77.1, 8, with Treggiari 1969, 50-51: in 88 Sulla scrapped Sulpicius' law distributing freedmen throughout all the thirty-five tribes. There is no evidence that they were given a land allotment too, *pax* Gerlach 1856, 46 and Jonkers 1963, 51.
Rightly, Appian saw the political importance of this decision, and chose to discuss it along with the enlargement of the Senate and the foundation of new colonies.

We do not know of any individual *liberti Corneli* certainly enfranchised after the proscriptions. It is likely that the freedmen mentioned by the literary tradition among the profiteers of the *Sullanum tempus* were enfranchised before the end of the Civil War, and were already with Sulla during the conflict with Mithridates. The freedmen mentioned by Appian are a group that emerged later with a clear political agenda. When Sulla retired to Campania, his position was made safe by the presence of the *Cornelii* in Rome, who ensured that no subversive initiative would take place (b. c. 1.104.489, *kata to dottu*).²⁹⁹

Doubts about the accuracy of Appian's account are however prompted by an inscription found near the site of ancient Minturnae, in southern Latium, bearing a dedication to Sulla put up by a group of freedmen: *L. Cornelio L. f. / Sullae Feleici / dictatori / leiberteini.*³⁰⁰ The absence of any specific identification of the freedmen led scholars to view it as an honorific inscription offered by a *collegium* of former slaves of the proscribed.³⁰¹ The hypothesis is supported by two elements. Firstly, the inscription was found at Minturnae, where Marius had strong *clientelae* and found shelter in the most critical phase of his political career. Marius' slaves must have been included in the enfranchisement, and their presence at Minturnae may be explainable by the connection of their former patron with the city.³⁰² The existence of a *collegium*, a formal organisation of the *liberti Corneli* is probably attested by a fragment of Cicero conserved by the scholiast Asconius in his commentary to the *Pro Corneli*. Making the case for his client, Cicero claims that he was not the owner of the slave Phileros: Cornelius is a very common name, as Phileros is among slaves. The reference to a *collegium* of Corneli comes in this context, as part of a rhetorical question: *quid ego nunc*

²⁹⁹ After the Sullan reform, the urban plebs could not count on the *frumentationes* any more, or any public subsidy in food supply: this may have been seen as a potential danger. On the abolition of the corn distributions by Sulla, see Rickman 1980, 165 and Vanderbroeck 1987, 121-123. They were reintroduced in 73 BC by the *lex Terentia Cassia*: sources in Rotondi 1912, 366.

³⁰⁰ *CIL* 10.6028 = *ILS* 871 = *ILLRP* 353.


³⁰² The slave of a C. Marius mentioned in an inscription from the so-called temple A at Minturnae is not relevant for the present discussion, as there is no evidence compelling to consider him a slave of the enemy of Sulla. The text is edited in Johnson 1933, 46-47, no. 27; a sound discussion in Badian 1973, 121-124. There is no evidence for Sullan land assignments at Minturnae, *pace* Chouquer 1987, 174-175.
If we had not Asconius' commentary, this could seem an ironic reference, a hyperbole used by Cicero to undermine the argument of his counterpart. Yet, the scholiast takes the reference seriously, and specifies that there were many collegia in Republican Rome, sometimes fuelling political violence. At some point, several laws and senatusconsulta outlawed most of them, allowing only those with a recognisable public function, such as professional association like those of carpenters and potters. This reconstruction usefully integrates what we know about Sulla's aims when he chose to enfranchise the slaves. The collegium of the Comelii was then a tool available to the enemies of the populares, which could still play a role in Roman politics more than ten years after the death of the dictator.

The Sullan regime has evocatively been blended as 'a reactionary regime based on mass consensus', adapting the category that P. Togliatti used to define Fascism. In this vision, the exploitation of the freedmen is the most revealing symptom of this approach. However, the evidence is too scarce to enable to make good use of this generalisation. The reference made by Cicero in the Corneliana is interesting, but it is too fragmentary to allow any conclusion. Moreover, the value of the inscription from Minturnae is undermined by the absence of any clear archaeological context. Its historical interpretation, therefore, remains problematic; Mommsen suggested, without offering any supporting argument, that the leibertini mentioned here are the liberti Comelii, and that the stone had been carried from Rome to the Campanian shore in the Middle Ages. The latter is hard to believe, and my guess is that the freedmen of the proscribed, enfranchised by Sulla himself, would have probably recorded their gratitude to the dictator more explicitly. Appian refers to them twice, and both times they are called Ἐρυθρίλλοι, which suggests that they were collectively referred to in that way. This is hard to prove anyway, as we lack further and more detailed evidence.

303 Ascon. in Cornelian. p. 75.
305 Canfora 1980, 428.
306 See the commentary to CIL.6.1298.
307 App. b. c. 1.100.469; 1.104.489.
However, an alternative suggestion could be made, accepting the possibility that the freedmen of the Minturnae inscription actually owed their status to Sulla. It may be argued that not all the Cornelii were based in Rome, and that Appian’s κατὰ τὸ ἀγέρ Ῥωμαίος is a reference to the ager Romanus, or even to Latium. Minturnae had been a steadfast supporter of Marius, and keeping some loyal supporters in the area could be a sensible operation.

The evidence shows that the social promotion of some freedmen was part of a complex political operation undertaken by Sulla after his victory. The Civil War had to be followed by a process of political ‘normalisation’. Sulla needed to prevent the possibility of the emergence of a new opposition for many years to come. The proscriptions ensured this aim by affecting the legal status of a number of members of the Roman elite, and by transferring their property under the direct control of Sulla and his associates. This operation was not limited to the traditional Roman governing class and to the elite based in Rome. Italy was heavily involved in it, as much as it had played an important part in the development of the Civil War. Moreover, as the case of Roscius shows, a proscription, especially when it was taking place out of Rome, needed some people supervising it and carrying it out. For this purpose, Sulla had some agents who could do the job on his behalf, were rewarded for that, and were allowed to enjoy part of the profits deriving from the confiscation. Hostile tradition focuses on several freedmen, but other free people with an apparently unprominent background, like Fufidius, L. Luscius, and the centurio Sullanus grandfather of the jurist Ateius Capito apparently had similar roles.308

Indeed, the victory of Sulla was the chance for a redistribution of wealth in Roman Italy, and it also led to a redistribution of political influence, and prestige. It did not just offer to many members of the nobility the chance of becoming even richer than they already were. It also rewarded a group of new men, who fought in the Sullan camp and had their share of power in the aftermath of the Civil War. Some of them, like Oppianicus, gained prominence at a municipal level. Others, like the rich freedmen of Sulla, unexpectedly achieved wealth and influence. It is now worth

\[308\] Luscius is called infitians in Cicero’s lost speech in toga candida, and briefly mentioned by Asconius, p. 90 Stangl: notus centurio Sullanus diuesque ex victoria factus (nam amplius centies possederat), damnatus erat non multo ante quam Cicero dicit. objectae sunt ei tres caedes proscriptorum. The grandfather of Capito surely gathered a remarkable wealth, as his son managed to reach the praetorship: see Tac. ann. 3.75.1 (Capito Ateius, de quo memorawi, principem in ciuitate locum studiis civilibus adscivit, sed aucto centurione Sullan, patri praetorio).
discussing how the Senate, the assembly where the Roman political elite gathered, went through the changes that the age of Sulla brought about.

1.7. Was there ever a ‘Sullan’ Senate?

Sulla’s most evident, if not most important, contribution to the remaking of Roman governing class was the opening of the Senate to 300 hundred new members, all belonging to the equestrian order. The quality and importance of this initiative are undoubtedly more significant than the measures taken about the slaves of the proscribed, although they are not completely unrelated to it. Appian rightly saw it, and outlined it soon before mentioning the massive enfranchisement of the liberti Cornelii. In his view, both decisions were steps of the ‘conservative’ revolution attempted by Sulla, which intended to make a new Civil War impossible. Moreover, they were both consequences of the proscriptions. The senators who fell victim of the proscriptions were replaced, and their slaves were enrolled among the citizens. The memory of their political role and their dignitas was erased for good – for all practical purposes, at least.

There is some reason to doubt that the liberti Cornelii were actually 10.000, as stated by Appian: that figure is often suspect when it features in a Greek historical source. The parallel figure of 120.000 colonists settled by Sulla all over Italy seems quite doubtful too. On the other hand, the figure of 300 new senators is more credible. Appian states that Sulla had already presented a proposal for the extension of the Senate to 300 new members in 88, during his first consulship. If this information is not a doublet of a later decision, it may be seen as a response to the extension of Roman citizenship to the Italian allies. Moreover, other sources, surely deriving from Livy, state that almost 200 senators were killed in the Civil War. Even without a reform of the Senate, the assembly needed to be taken back to its original size. Involving a part of the equestrian families in the process was a necessary, and probably an obvious choice too. The administrative settlement that Sulla brought about in the East, confirming the presence of publicani and moneylenders in the province, shows that he was perfectly prepared, and seriously interested, to have the equites on his side.

309 App. b. c. 1.104.489.
310 App. b. c. 1.59.267: see Hardy 1916a; Gabba 1958, 173; Katz 1975, 117-120.
311 Oros. 5.22.4; Eutr. 5.9.4.
The list of the 'Sullan senators', as they have often been called, has been compiled various times since Willems, predictably with some differences among the authors who dealt with the problem.\textsuperscript{312} The appendix contains a new one, whose guidelines I will summarise here. Until Sulla, the Senate had roughly 300 members. The limit was not strict, and there is evidence that it was exceeded, but it was consistently kept as a reference point.\textsuperscript{313} The Social War, and especially the Civil War caused the death of an unprecedented number of senators. The proscriptions were the highest and last peak of a long process. It is safe to state that, at the end of the war, only about 150 senators were alive, and this figure is already quite optimistic.\textsuperscript{314} Soon after his victory Sulla had some tools available to bring the Senate back to its usual size.\textsuperscript{315} The most obvious one was not the series of exceptional appointments mentioned by Appian, but the promotion to the senatorial rank of those who had held the lower magistracies after 86, when the last censorial lectio took place. No doubt, most of these people had supported Cinna and the populares, and were therefore punished in the proscriptions. It is certain, however, that some of the people who had fought with the populares managed to be rehabilitated when Sulla came back.\textsuperscript{316}

Sulla used a second method to increase the number of senators. He intervened on a structural feature of Roman magistracy system by increasing the number of the praetors from six to ten and that of the quaestors from eight to twenty.\textsuperscript{317} This reform

\textsuperscript{312} Hill 1932; Gabba 1951, 262-270 (= Gabba 1973, 159-172); Nicolet 1966, 573-591; also cf. Willems 1878, 401-415 and Gruen 1974, 190-191. Hawthorn 1962 is not very instructive. Willems 1878, 427-543 is an attempt to list the members of the Senate in 55 BC, when many senators appointed by Sulla were of course still alive: Gabba refers to it systematically.

\textsuperscript{313} See 1 Macc. 8.15 (320 senators in the mid-second century BC), with Cornell 2000, 88.

\textsuperscript{314} Cf. Evans 1983, stressing the extraordinarily high mortality rate among the consulares in this period.

\textsuperscript{315} Gabba 1956, 124-130 (= Gabba 1973, 407-415) is still invaluable.

\textsuperscript{316} Badian 1962a, 59-61 (= Badian 1964, 228-232); Hinard 1985a, 120-125.

\textsuperscript{317} About the increase of the number of praetors, see Dio 42.51 and Pompon. Dig. 1.2.2, with the general discussion in Brennan 2000, 389-392 and the sobering remarks in Cloud 1988. About the Sullan reform of the quaestorship, see Tac. ann. 11.22.6; also cf. the fragment of the lex Cornelia de quaestoribus in RS, no. 14, 293-300 (edited by E. Gabba and M. H. Crawford), with Gabba 1983, 488-489 and Purcell 2001, 650-654. Against this background, it is significant that a reorganisation of the treasury appears to have taken place in the Sullan period: see Plut. Cat. Min. 18.8, with Crawford 1985, 187. It is conceivable, however, that the number of the quaestores had already been increased before 81 BC to meet the needs of provincial administration (Harris 1976; Gabba 1983, 487, with earlier bibliography), but there is no evidence for this: Badian 1983, 167-169.
increased the number of the people eligible to join the Senate, and it ensured a gradual growth of the membership. A potential input of twenty new members per year has been calculated.\textsuperscript{318} It inevitably had important political consequences. Provincial administration benefited from this decision, as governors had more staff available to support them in their duties. This is no doubt consistent with Sulla’s commitment to consolidate Roman rule in the Greek East, where he made his largest contribution to the development of provincial administration. On the front of internal politics, more people were given the chance to have access to an important magistracy, and to enter the Senate. Consequently, competition was bound to become even stronger for higher magistracies, such as the praetorship and the consulship. It must not be overlooked, however, that Sulla’s reforms left the tribunate in a much less prominent position than ever. This magistracy is likely to have been snubbed until the counter-reform sponsored by Pompey, and competition was conversely stronger for the quaestorship.

According to Appian, the third strategy adopted by Sulla was the appointment of three-hundred new senators. Appian provides two important details: the senators were chosen ‘among the 18 equestrian centuries’, and their appointment was confirmed by a vote of the \textit{comitia tributa}.\textsuperscript{319} The latter point is unproblematic. Sulla prepared the list, and then asked for a vote of the tribes confirming it, barely more than a formal endorsement of his \textit{acta}. The reference to the presence of the \textit{equites} is somewhat trickier. The possession of the \textit{equus publicus}, and therefore the inclusion into the \textit{ordo equester}, was common to all the young members of the \textit{nobilitas} who had not held a curule magistracy and were not part of the \textit{ordo senatorius}. Therefore, Appian’s passage just means that Sulla opened up the Senate to three-hundred younger members of the Roman elite, who normally would not have been eligible to join it yet. They were not necessarily members of what has anachronistically been called the ‘Roman middle class’.\textsuperscript{320} Most of them would have become senators anyway, and they can hardly be defined ‘Sullan senators’. Such a conclusion is well supported by the scarce and episodic evidence for the Senate after Sulla’s dictatorship.

\textsuperscript{318} See Hopkins 1983, 47-48; cf. Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 719. By the end of the second century BC, the membership of the Senate was a tangible prospect for all quaestors and most tribunes, although the final decision remained a prerogative of the censors: Cornell 2000, 89

\textsuperscript{319} Cf. Liv. \textit{Per.} 89.4: \textit{senatum ex equestri ordine supplevit}.

Some of the senators appointed by Sulla are likely to have held the quaestorship soon before 81, or even in 81 BC, when the reform came into force. At any rate, the evidence we have for their praetorships makes clear that they waited at least nine years before acceding to the next magistracy. Some of them may well have owed their election to the endorsement of Sulla and his associates. Others, namely those who held the praetorship in the late Seventies, may have earned the quaestorship after being admitted into the Senate by Sulla. Only the senators who managed to continue the *cursus honorum* after 81 BC have left a trace in our records, and they appear to have been a tiny minority of the new senators known for this period. Many of them were quaestors between 86, the year of the last census, and 81 BC, who then never managed, or tried, to be elected to higher magistracies. Others may well have been outsiders of the Roman, or Italian, political scene who were happy to keep their place in the Senate without committing themselves too actively.

To create the fullest list that could conceivably be written, one has therefore to go beyond the close reading of the Fasti, and consider other kinds of evidence. The speeches of Cicero contain references to members of the Senate, who are not known to have held any magistracy. This is the case with the judges in Cluentius’ trial for the murder of Oppianicus, mentioned by Cicero in his speech, who are the bulk of the group of the known Sullan appointees: M. Iuventius Pedo, L. Caulius Mergus, M. Basilus, C. Caudinus, L. Cassius, Cn. Heius, P. Saturius.321

Cicero celebrates, with similar words, the probity and accuracy of P. Balbus and Q. Octavius Considius, two other members of the jury that convicted Oppianicus in 74. As C. Nicolet has proved, the judges mentioned here were members of the Senate when the case of Cluentius was heard, but their experience as judges dated even further back.322 They had already served in the equestrian courts, before the reform decided by Sulla: *in iudiciis publicis florente re publica floruerunt*. They were almost certainly appointed by Sulla, who chose them from the part of the *ordo equester* that did not support Marius in the Civil War. One of them, P. Balbus, may even have taken

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part in the Colline Gate battle as praefectus equitum of the Sullan army.\textsuperscript{323} Considius was probably from Clusium, where a Q. Considius is mentioned in an inscription as a quattuorvir.\textsuperscript{324}

The judges of the pro Cluentio, with their vetus disciplina, are actually the most considerable group of senators who owed their presence in the Senate to a Sullan appointment, recorded by the extant sources. Another passage of Cicero mentions two obscure brothers who attained the quaestorship in the Sullan period, at an unspecified date, from an obscure Italian background: C. L. Caepasii fratres fuerunt, qui multa opera, ignoti homines et repentini, quaestores celeriter facti sunt, oppidano quodam et incondito genere discendi.\textsuperscript{325} The reference he makes in the de officiis to a scriba who reached the quaestorship in the Caesarian age, after earning a modest public role in the Sullan period, is much less clear.\textsuperscript{326} This character is possibly the scriba Cornelius mentioned by Sallust in the oratio Lepidi, unless Sallust is referring in a derogatory way to Cornelius Epicadus, the freedman who accomplished Sulla’s memoirs after his death.\textsuperscript{327} At any rate, there is no ground to argue that this Cornelius ever sat in the Senate before reaching the quaestorship in the Forties.

In a passage of the pro Caecina Cicero attacks the senator C. Fidiculanius Falcula, by implicitly comparing his peculiar name and questionable reputation with the glory of the ordo senatorius.\textsuperscript{328} In this context, Cicero has to be disparaging towards

\textsuperscript{323} Plut. Sull. 29.3.

\textsuperscript{324} CIL 11.7123 = ILLRP 569. Cf. CIL 11.2117, with a C. Considius quattuorvir. There is a C. Considius at Volsini too (CIL 11.2757). See Wiseman 1971, 46, fn. 4. The citizens of Clusium put up an honorific inscription for Sulla during his dictatorship (CIL 11.2102 = ILLRP 356).

\textsuperscript{325} Brut. 242. Cf. a brief reference to their eloquence for Sulla during his dictatorship (CIL 11.2102 = ILLRP 356).

\textsuperscript{326} Cic. off. 2.29: nec vero unquam bellorum civilium semen et causa derit, dum homines perditi hasset illam cruciamentum et meminerint et sperabunt, quam P. Sulla cum ubrasset dictatore proquinqua suo, idem secto tricenximo anno post a selenatores hacta non recessit, alter autem, qui in illa dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus.

\textsuperscript{327} Sall. Hist. 1.55, 17 M. This obscure character was probably a freedman of Sulla: see Treggiari 1969, 154. Cf. Badian 1989, 584, no. 6 and 586-589, suggesting that Cornelius may have been a freedman of L. Scipio Asiiagenus and that he joined Sulla’s staff only after the Civil War.

\textsuperscript{328} Cic. Caec. 10.28: decimo vero loco testis expectatus et ad extremum resurrexit dicit, senator populii Romani, splendor ordinis, decus atque ornamentum iudiciorum, exemplar antiquae religionis, Fidiculanius Falcula, qui cum ita ubrmenus avrpmque senisset us non modo Caecinam perierit suo lacerit sed etiam mihi uidetur irasci, ista cum placidum mollumque reddidit, ut non auderet, sicut meministis, iterum dicere quot milia fundus suus abesset ab urbe. nam cum dixisset minus ies, populus cum risu addexasuit ipsa esse. meminerant enim omnes, quantum in Albiano iudicio accepisset.
Falcula, because he is testifying against his client. This is one of those cases in Cicero’s career where he had to contradict what he had said on a previous occasion. In 74 A. Cluentius Avitus prosecuted his stepfather Statius Albius Oppianicus for having tried to poison him, and Fidiculanius was among the judges who condemned him, allegedly obtaining a reward for his support. Some years later, however, Cluentius was put on trial with the charge of having corrupted the judges, and chose Cicero as his advocate.\footnote{There are several important studies of the \textit{pro Cluentio}: Stroh 1975, 194-242 (also see the bibliography at 312); Classen 1985, 15-119; Burnand 2004. The client of Cicero was a typical member of the new Italian elite: about his family, which is attested at Larinum until the Severan age, see Buonocore 1997. Pietrantonio 1997, 216-217 argues that his father was that Cluentius who fought against Sulla in the Social War; \textit{contra}, Salmon 1958, 175-176. On Cicero’s connections at Larinum, see Lomas 2004, 108-110.} In his new role, Cicero had no difficulty in providing a complete reappraisal of Falcula, by stressing his unreserved acquittal at a trial \textit{de repetundis}, held some time before.\footnote{Cic. \textit{Cluent.} 37.103-104. See esp. 104: \textit{cuius erat ordinis? senatorii. qua legge in eo genere a senatore ratio repeti solet, de pecuniis repetundis, ea legge accusatus honestissime absolutus. acta est enim causa more maiorum sine ui, sine metu, sine periculo, dicta et exposita et demonstrata sunt omnia.} See Willems 1878, 412-414 and Frier 1985, 8, 132, 235.} It seems beyond doubt that Falcula came from an equestrian family, and that he owed his seat in the Senate to Sulla.\footnote{He is probably the owner of the slave mentioned by the text of a \textit{tessera nummularia} from Rome (ILLRP 1027): \textit{Eunus / Fidiculani C. s(erus) / sp(ectavit) a.d.VI id(us) Qui(ntile) / D. Sil(ani), L. Mur(ena).} See Shatzman 1975, 341; Rawson 1978, 150.}

Inscriptions, both containing legal documents, record the names of two otherwise unknown senators of this period, who may have owed their appointment to Sulla. The \textit{s.c. de Asclepiade sociisque} mentions among the \textit{testatores} an otherwise unknown senator, \textit{L. Faberius L. f. Serg.} (l. 4): again, it is likely that he was in the list of Sulla’s new appointees. A Q. Faberius who corresponded with Cicero in the late Forties owned properties in the area of Pompeii and Nola, where, as we shall see in the next chapter, the impact of the Sullan campaign was probably stronger than anywhere else in Italy, and Sulla’s connections dated back to the Social War.\footnote{On his relationship with Cicero, see \textit{Att.} 13.8.} The \textit{s.c. de Oropiis agris} also mentions, among the members of the \textit{consilium} that ruled on the controversy...
between the sanctuary and the publicans, a certain L. Voluscius, otherwise unknown, who may have been enlisted among the new members appointed in 81 too (no. 90).\textsuperscript{333}

A survey of the scarce evidence for the senators of the age of Sulla prompts some general remarks. First, the names of most of the Sullan appointees are unknown to us, and have left no trace either in the literary or in the inscriptional record. This leads to the conclusion that most of the people whom Sulla admitted to the Senate did not have any appreciable impact on the Roman political scene. They may have provided useful support for their political benefactor during the war and his dictatorship, but after his death they joined the rank of the \textit{senatores pedarii} who never dared to express their views in the assembly and voted by silently joining a group of colleagues.\textsuperscript{334}

The presence of a considerable number of non-entities was a predictable corollary of the enlargement of the Senate, and it has been long recognised in all the modern histories of the Roman Senate.\textsuperscript{335} However, a fundamental distinction can be made in the crowd of the Sullan \textit{pedarii}. A first group was appointed in the \textit{lectio} of 300 senators recorded by Appian, whose purpose, according to Appian, was to restore the Senate to an adequate number of members, and to make it a reliable tool in his control. Some of these senators tried to continue their career by starting their \textit{cursus honorum}, no doubt finding the first step easier because of the increase of the number of quaestors. Some others, however, did not begin such a career, either out of choice or because the intense competition in the Roman elite prevented them from gaining access to the magistracies. The second group of uninfluential senators was made of those who joined the Senate after 81 and the reform of quaestorship: their admission was, in a way, a direct consequence of the Sullan reform. In this context it is predictable that many of those who followed this career did not leave any trace, and did not manage to make their way through the bottleneck of the competition for higher magistracies.

\textsuperscript{333} He was probably a former \textit{aedile}: Taylor 1960, 267; \textit{RDGE}, 137. The list of the \textit{consilium} contains the names of other Sullan senators, who however are often uncertain: see Taylor 1960, 176, and the appendix.

\textsuperscript{334} Ancient definition of the \textit{pedarii}: Cic. \textit{Att.} 1.19.9 and 1.20.4; Tac. \textit{ann.} 3.65; Gell. 3.18; Fest. 259 L. Cf. Gruen 1974, 508: 'The pedarii are those who entered the senate after Sulla's dictatorship and did not rise beyond the quaestorship (so far as is known) before 49'.

However, a great number of the senators who joined the assembly after Sulla's reform were members of the Roman *nobilitas* who pursued a political career even after the dictator left the scene. Most of them belonged to well-known families of the Roman political establishment, and their appointment is a symptom of Sulla's close relations with the Roman *optimates*, who were the key supporters of his rush to power and the most obvious backers of his policies. Sulla let them join the Senate earlier than would have been the case under normal circumstances, and he may have supported some of them in their first campaigns, by endorsing their candidatures. It is clear, however, that people of such condition would have pursued a political career anyway. Their presence in the *ordo senatorius* is no surprise at all.

One would be interested in the traces of the presence in the 'Sullan' Senate of two categories: the *equites* who were not young members of senatorial families, and the notables of the newly enfranchised Italian communities. From this point of view, the results of the enquiry are quite disappointing. Only a dozen senators belonging to equestrian families are safely in this period, and several of them are the members of the jury that tried Cluentius. Three of them are portrayed in quite unfavourable ways by the sources. This is the case with characters like C. Verres, Fidiculanius Falcula, and L. Fufidius, whom I mentioned above and whose position seems by far the most interesting one. His equestrian background seem beyond doubt: some members of his family are known to have been active in the business world.\(^3\) Sallust, however, portrays Fufidius in the most hostile way, as the typical profiteer who won a position of undeserved prominence by serving the new master of Roman political scene. It is worth summing it up, in order to find out when Fufidius paved the way to his success.

Two sources mention the active role played by Fufidius in suggesting the strategy of the proscriptions to Sulla. According to Plutarch, he proposed the method of the proscription list in a Senate meeting in 81; Orosius reports the same incident, but calls him *primipilaris*.\(^3\) Plutarch also says that in 80 Fufidius fought against Sertorius in Spain with the rank of *δραχμα* *τῆς* *Βαυτικῆς*, which could be seen as a kind of promagistracy, probably a pro-praetorian command.\(^3\) It can be argued that he obtained a quaestorship in 82 or 81, and then joined the Senate, however not in time

\(^3\) Wiseman 1971, 232.

\(^3\) See respectively Plut. *Sull.* 31.4 and Oros. 5.21.3.

to take part in a debate over the proscriptions. The emphasis that sources put on Fufidius' role aims to convey the impression that the Sullan regime was rooted in a background of violence and war. Our sources show Fufidius having an influential position in the entourage of Sulla, making the case for a systematic elimination of the enemies of the winning party. What made him memorable was not what he did or said, but the status and the power that he reached, which would have been simply unthinkable without the Civil War.

Although a discussion of Roman internal politics in this period is not among the purposes of this study, a few remarks must be made on this subject. A large part of the Roman nobility chose Sulla as its leader during the Civil War, while another part of it managed to coexist with the *populares* when Sulla was in the East, as shown by E. Badian.\(^{339}\) It is clear, however, that Sulla's victorious campaign in Italy led to a progressive isolation of his opponents at Rome, who had to look for support among outsiders, such as the Samnite and the Etruscan elites. For this reason, a large part of the nobility was spared by the proscriptions, which hardly killed more than 100 out of 300 members of the Senate.\(^{340}\) Sulla was perfectly prepared to include the youngsters of many aristocratic families in his *lectio* of new senators.

However, his power a complete novelty, built on the victory in a Civil War and strengthened by a dictatorship that could not be paralleled with the extraordinary and temporary magistracy of the traditional Republican system.\(^{341}\) One need not accept the speculative interpretation of J. Carcopino, who argued that the nobility prevented the dictator from fulfilling his monarchical ambitions, to be prepared to recognise that Sulla's power was not easily accepted by the Roman establishment.\(^{342}\) Most difficult to

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\(^{339}\) Badian 1962a, 51-54.

\(^{340}\) Hinard 1985a, 116-120 shows that a precise calculation is impossible: he suggests an overall figure of 520 victims, including senators and knights (based on Plut. *Sull.* 31.5). Predictably, given their social prominence, the senators are as twice as many in the list of the known victims as the *equites*, who however must have been affected much more heavily.

\(^{341}\) There are many valuable discussion of Sulla's dictatorship and the constitutional problems related to it: Wilcken 1941, 7-12; Wosnik 1963, 96-111; Nicolet 1982; Wittman 1984; Hinard 1988; Hurlet 1993, 29-83 (with an excellent survey of earlier scholarship); Sordi 1993; Hinard 1995. Mancuso 1983, 139 unconvincingly argues that Sulla held the same *imperium* as the kings.

\(^{342}\) Carcopino 1947; see Worthington 1992. For an opposite interpretation, cf. e. g. Stockton 1966 and Wooliscroft 1992. Hahn 1975 is probably right in saying that the monarchical interpretations of Sulla are all indebted to *App. b.c.* 1.99.463, where the Sullan age is defined as the beginning of the *basileia* and the end of the Republic. It is unclear what the Byzantine erudite Theodosius the Deacon meant by saying
accept were the ruthless methods used by Sulla to ensure his supremacy: the proscriptions, of course, and even more the social promotion and influence that he enabled some of his supporters to reach despite their low origins.

Sallust blames Sulla for this reason, by showing a direct link between Sulla's generosity towards his associates and the greed of the urban plebs on the eve of the Catiline's conspiracy. The agenda of the conspirators is likely to find a receptive audience for a number of reasons. Rome was filled with insolvent debtors, criminals and parasites, and many remembered the victory of Sulla, and the great chance it had offered to create a big wealth from nothing. The children of the victims of the proscriptions were eagerly awating the opportunity to regain their former position. Moreover, the Senate had many enemies, who were prepared to do anything to undermine its supremacy. Rome was getting bigger and more crowded, and therefore more vulnerable to moral corruption: not a new argument in ancient political thought. In such an unhealthy environment, Sulla's 'example' was potentially devastating, as it prompted the need for a new revolution. The reference to senators chosen among the lowest ranks of the army (ex gregariis militibus... senatores) can be explained by the single case we know, that of Fufidius. The ruthless freedman Chrysogonus, with his domus on the Palatine, is a perfect example of the regal life-style criticised by Sallust. However, these are just prominent cases which are known to us through some important, although scarce, pieces of literary evidence. Surely, in Sallust's account there is some propagandistic deformation, although the point it stresses cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Nor it can be overlooked that there is a striking difference between this source and the extant list of those who entered the Senate in the age of

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343 Sall. Cat. 37.5-10: primum omnium, qui ubique probro atque petulantia macuam praestabant, item ali per dedeona patrimonios amisitis, postremo omnes, quos flagitatione aut facinus domo expulerat, si Romam sicut in sentinam confecerant. deinde multi memores Sullanae victoriae, quod ex gregaris militibus alios senatores idebant, alios ita disite, ut regio invicta atque culta aestatem agerent, sibi quisque, si in armis foret, ex victoria talia speraret. quo minus mirandum est hunc egerint, ut libertatis imminuitum erat, haud sane alio animo belli eventum expectabant. ad hoc qui quoniam aliarum atque senatus partium errant, conturbati rem publicam quam minus salere ipse malebant. Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.17-23, with Yavetz 1963.

344 A similar critique of Sulla's new senators in Dion. Hal. 5.77.5: βουλήν τε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτυχῶν ἀνδρῶν συνέστηκε.
Sulla. The names of the senators of low origin have almost entirely disappeared from the record. This requires some explanation.

As suggested above, most of the Sullan senators may not have earned any mention in the literary record because their career was inconspicuous, and because many of them found it hard to go beyond the quaestorship. Moreover, the literary sources closer to the *optimates*, such as Livy, or more sympathetic to the *populares*, like Sallust, were probably uninterested in acknowledging their role at any rate. The loss of Sisenna’s work is regrettable, in this respect as well as in many others. It must be pointed out that Sisenna joined the Senate thanks to Sulla’s support, although his position cannot be compared to that of the *gregarii milites* mentioned by Sallust.

A second, equally important element should be taken into account. We owe to the Epitome of Livy an important piece of information, dealing with the *lectio* carried out by the censors of 70 BC: *Cn. Lentulus et L. Gellius censores asperam censuram egerunt IIII et LX senatus motis. a quibus lustro condito censa sunt civium capita DCCCC.*\(^{345}\) The sixty-four senators excluded by the censors included some figures involved in the trial of Oppianicus, and other characters like Q. Curius (quaest. 71), P. Lentulus Sura (cos. 71) and C. Antonius (cos. 63), all excluded on grounds of indignity. The total figure, however, remains remarkably high. This may be explained by the exclusion of the senators appointed by Sulla who had failed to reach the quaestorship by that year, and therefore owed their presence in the assembly solely to the appointment of the late dictator. Their position was somewhat anomalous, and the censors had the power to sanction it. Although the evidence is not explicit, this seems the best way to make sense of the figure given by Livy’s *Perioche*. If we count that 20 quaestors per year were elected from 81 to 70, we reach a number of 240 senators, leaving out of the number approximately 60 senators of the 300 appointed by Sulla. It is true that the figure of the senators who never reached a magistracy, of course, may well have been even higher than that, as people who were not members of the Senate may have reached the quaestorship between 81 and 70. There is ground to believe, however, that the rationale followed by Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and L. Gellius Publicola was to exclude from the senate those who had not held the quaestorship by then.\(^{346}\) Their

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\(^{345}\) Liv. *Per.* 98.2-3.

\(^{346}\) Willems 1878, 419-420; Syme 1938, 11.
close relationship with Pompey can be easily reconciled with such a policy, which eliminated the most obvious legacies of the Sullan regime.\textsuperscript{347} The chronological coincidence with the approval of the law that handed back the function of proposing bills to the tribunes, which Sulla had virtually abolished, is striking, and Pompey's support for this reform of the tribunate – anti-Sullan \textit{par excellence} – is well-known. In 70 BC a wider reaction to the Sullan programme appears to have taken place. A law allowing the return of the children of the proscribed was voted in that year, probably along with the measures that allowed the return of the followers of Lepidus and Sertorius.\textsuperscript{348} The status of the \textit{liberi proscriptorum} would be left unchanged to 49 BC, when Caesar put forward a law that restored all their rights.\textsuperscript{349} Until then, they were assured the \textit{incolumitas}, but they were not allowed to stand for public offices, and were not given the opportunity to recover their properties.\textsuperscript{350} Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, the census of 70 BC is likely to have undone the effects of the withdrawal of citizenship inflicted by Sulla on some communities after the Civil War. The expulsion of the senators appointed by Sulla who had not reached any magistracy would then fit quite well in the political situation of that year.

At the beginning of this section, I raised the question whether a Sullan Senate ever existed. It is in fact doubtful that the concept of 'Sullan senators' can be helpfully used. A close scrutiny of the evidence has shown that most of the senators who joined the assembly in the age of Sulla developed their career independently from their earlier political allegiance to the dictator. Scarce evidence for social and economic mobility may be detected in the study of the proscriptions, but Sulla had not much impact on the social composition of the Senate. Of course, the total membership was increased,

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\textsuperscript{348} Cic. \textit{Verr.} 2.5.151-152; Cic. \textit{fam.} 12.5.2; cf. Suet. \textit{Iul.} 5.2. It was probably a \textit{lex Plautia}; see Hinard 1985a, 162-186; Hinard 1990, 569. Cicero was sceptical about the full rehabilitation of the \textit{liberi proscriptorum}; see Hinard 1980, 208-210.
\textsuperscript{349} Suet. \textit{Iul.} 41.3; Plut. \textit{Caes.} 37.2; Dio 41.18.2; cf. Vell. 2.43.4. It was a \textit{lex Antonia}; see Hinard 1985a, 217-223. Caesar’s difficult relationship with Sulla has attracted wide interest: see e.g. Macr. 2.3.9; cf. Canfora 1999, 3-4 and Ridley 2000.
\textsuperscript{350} Cic. \textit{Pis.} 4 is explicit about the risk of giving the \textit{ius honorum} to the children of the proscribed: \textit{adulescentis bonos et fortis, sed uos ea condicione fortunae, ut, si essent magistriatus adopti, rei publicae statum consulatur uiderentur.}
and the criteria for admission were revised, but this did not have any serious consequence on the profile of the membership. No doubt, as the outcome of the censorship of 70 shows, a part of the Roman nobility did its best to neutralise the potential impact of the new men introduced by Sulla. The position of most of the equestres appointed by Sulla remains unclear. Namely, it is hard to know how many members of equestrian families actually entered the Senate and started to play a substantial role in the Roman political elite. There is reason to believe that membership of the Senate was cautiously opened to some members of the Italian elite who had been loyal to Sulla. However, the presence of Italian senators usually remains to be guessed on onomastic grounds, rather than from independent evidence.\footnote{Suffixes like \textit{-enus, -ienus} and \textit{-idius} suggest an origin from Central Italy: cf. the names of Sullan senators like Fufidius, Staenius, Vatienus, Caepasius, Aufidius Orestes, Considius, Calidius (see the appendix). The best discussion remains Syme 1938, 23-24 (= Syme 1979, 111-112); also cf. Syme 1939a, 90-91. Cf. Appendix I.}

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The study of the structure of the Senate after Sulla's reform has provided fragmentary, although not uninteresting results. There never was such thing as a 'Sullan Senate'. Sulla opened the assembly to new members, and made it a more accurate representation of the Roman elite, where even some reliable Italian domi nobiles were allowed. The three-hundred (or so) members he personally appointed were certainly loyal to him, although they had not all fought in his army. During Sulla's dictatorship, the Senate did not stand in the way of the strongman. After his death, however, the political allegiances of its members, both old and new ones, had to be quickly renegotiated.

The Sullan enlargement of the Senate must now be considered in the broader framework of the discussion developed so far. This chapter is founded on two basic assumptions: that the role of the local elites was crucial in the age of Sulla, and that an important aspect of Sulla's imperial policy was rebuilding constructive relations with the local elites that were interested in cooperating with Rome again. Of course, in Sulla's case the need of serving the interest of the Empire was combined with the necessity of gathering support for the Civil War, and with that of providing rewards to his associates after the final victory. The interference and the confusion between
general and personal interests are apparent especially in Italy, and they are probably most striking in the direct link between the proscriptions and the enlargement of the Senate.

I have set out to show how complex the attitude of Sulla to the local elites was, and how central it consistently was to his policies. The Greek East and Italy could not have been more different worlds, and the strategies chosen by Sulla had to change accordingly. However, a similar concern can be consistently detected throughout his political activities: ensuring to Rome the loyalty of as large a part of the local elites as possible, and concentrating repression on a limited number of enemies. This is what he did in the East, by sparing most of the Greek cities from destruction, and in Italy, where he confirmed the enfranchisement of the Allies. At the same time, of course, he decreed several exemplary sanctions. In Asia he reorganised the fiscal administration of the Roman province bringing about a draconian system that led the cities to the verge of economic collapse, while in Italy he confiscated the land of hostile communities and individuals, and used it to found new veteran colonies. At the same time, he did not fail to reward his most loyal supporters, even ruthlessly, and regardless of their social standing, as the cases of the freedmen Chrysogonus and Tarula show. More than anything else, the Sullan proscriptions were a massive redistribution of wealth in the aftermath of a civil war.

We know little about Sulla's political conceptions, and it is uncertain what place he expected the Roman nobility to have in the organisation of the State. His hostility to the *populares* does not necessarily imply that he imagined a central role of the Senate. At any rate, it is apparent that he viewed the role of the elites as a central feature of the Empire, at all levels. In this respect he was by no means revolutionising the practices of Roman imperialism. However, he did pursue his aims in a much more consistent and effective fashion than had been the case in the previous decades. In the next chapter I will show that a similar rationale is apparent from his contribution to provincial administration and to the organisation of Italy after the Civil War. Sulla's interest in promoting the local elites' loyalty to Rome was the most powerful factor linking the initiatives he took in the Greek East to those he took in Italy. More generally, it is a crucial aspect of the history of the late Republic.
2.

Between War and Peace.

Sulla and a New Organisation for the Empire

The aim of the previous chapter was to stress the importance of the local elites in the age of Sulla, and to show in what respects Rome had to come to terms with them after going through a critical phase of her imperial project. The topic of this chapter is in many ways close to that of the previous one. The discussion will be devoted to the provisions of Sulla for the political and administrative reorganisation of Italy and the Greek East, and the role of the elites, of course, will sometimes reappear quite prominently. So far I have tried to show that Sulla put in place a system of rewards and punishment for the communities and the local notables he dealt with, which enabled him to serve his own purposes and to contribute to the consolidation of the Empire. In this chapter, I will try to show that Sulla aimed to place his decisions within a more stable institutional framework. The case of the settlement of Asia Minor shows this aspect of Sulla’s policies most clearly. This is, after all, his most important contribution to the organisation of the Empire, since Sulla did not reorganise the Roman presence in Greece, and it is indeed from this contribution that my discussion will start.1

2.1. Resettling the province of Asia

In the winter of 85/84 BC Sulla made important decisions about the organisation of the province, which he announced to the representatives of the cities

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1 Sulla took decisions on the status of several communities and sanctuaries: see the case of the Amphiaraeum (RDGE 23) and that of the island of Thasus, which had been besieged by Mithridates’ troops, but not conquered. The bravery of its inhabitants was rewarded by a senatusconsultum voted in 80 BC, in which a range of privileges were granted: see RDGE 21, with Dunant-Pouilloy 1958, 36-55; O. Picard 1989; Brunet 2004, 85-86. Maronea too supported the Romans, and was apparently destroyed by Mithridates’ army: see Clinton 2003, esp. 385-389. I do not think, however, that SEG 35.823 dates to the Sullan age, pace Canali de Rossi 1999c and Worrle 2005, 148. The presence of the publicani is attested in the province of Macedonia after the Mithridatic War, and they seem to have been in charge of the collection of the portorium: Cic. Pisc. 87, with Accame 1946, 102-104 and Kallet-Marx 1995, 279. Syll. 748, from Gytheum, shows that the free cities of mainland Greece were not immune from extraordinary επιφόροι: Accame 1946, 131-133; Migeotte 1984, 90-96.
who were summoned in Ephesus for that purpose. It is often assumed that Ephesus
was the capital of the province from 129 BC. Generally speaking, there would be no
contradiction between such a status and the award of freedom to the city included in
Attalus' testament. Several milestones, found in different areas of the province,
mention M. Aquillius and show that Ephesus was their caput niae. Hence, they have
been interpreted as evidence that Ephesus was the administrative centre of the
province in that time. The mileage of other milestones, however, has shown that
Pergamum was in fact the starting point of the road to Side, and that the road system
of the province had therefore two capita uiarum. At a close scrutiny, the evidence
available for this period gives no reason to believe that Ephesus was the capital of the
province in its early history. Until the Mithridatic War there is no ground to say that
the centre of the Roman administration was moved from Pergamum, the former
capital of the Attalids. It is quite likely that it was Sulla himself to decide the move of
the capital to Ephesus.

Sulla's provisions, of course, were a contribution to an administrative system
that had been in place for the last five decades. A senatorial commission of five

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2 On Ephesus' freedom in the earliest phase of the province, see Rigsby 1979; Adams 1980, esp. 311-

3 See French 1980, 707, 714. The case for Ephesus enjoying the status of capital from the creation of the province is made by Rigsby 1979, 47 and Rigsby 1988, 137-141, oddly overlooking the evidence of the milestones; contra, Knibbe 1980, 757, suggesting that it was a decision of Octavian. Also cf. Bernhardt 1999, 59-60. Haensch 1997, 312-315 states that it is impossible to determine when Ephesus became the provincial capital. There is evidence for intense building activities in the first century BC: Alzinger 1980, 813-814. Hueber 1997, 47-49 wrongly assumes that Ephesus became the capital of Asia in 29 BC.

4 The milestones of Aquillius are listed and discussed in Mitchell 1999, 19-20. About the road from
Pergamum to Side, see French 1988, nos. 266, 279, 294 and 295, and French 1991. A portion of the
road built by Aquillius to link Pamphylia with Pisidia has been located and surveyed in the Döşeme
system was the first initiative taken by Aquillius in Asia Minor. This is quite likely, although I do not
think that the legend om. /URITOS on the milestones means necessarily that Aquillius built them while
he was still a consul Campanile 2003a argues that this public work was contemporaneous to the
the administration of the province.

5 As shown in C. P. Jones 2000, 12-14, criticising Rigsby 1988, 137-141; accepted by Gordon 2003, 224
and Dmitriev 2005b, 126-127.
members, led by P. Scipio Nasica, was sent to Pergamum probably already in late 133, soon after the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, in order to ensure the creation of the province.\(^6\) A recently discovered inscription from Pergamum, certainly dating after 125 BC and celebrating the merits of the local notable Menodoros, refers to the mission of the Roman delegation by mentioning its negotiations with the βουλευτήριον of Pergamum, which had Menodoros among its members.\(^7\) The inscription significantly calls the mission of the five ambassadors a Ῥωμαϊκὴ νομόθεσις. The term indicates that its task was to create the first institutional structures of the province, and that it required negotiations with the communities of the former Attalid kingdom.\(^8\) In 132, a senatus consultum (RDGE 11), the so-called s. c. Popilianum – from the name of the consul Gaius Popillius Laenas who chaired that session of the Senate – ratified the decision of the committee and confirmed that all the dispositions of the Attalids were to remain valid under Roman rule.\(^9\) Pergamum was the former capital of the kingdom, and indeed it kept a prominent role in the later history of the Roman province. In such a context, it is therefore not surprising that Mithridates chose Pergamum as his residence in the short period which followed his conquest of Asia Minor.

The Ephesians, however, followed him quite promptly, as it is apparent from their prominent role in the massacre of the Italians, and the King put a satrap called

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\(^6\) Contra, cf. Coarelli 2005, 215, dating the arrival of the Roman envoys to Pergamum to mid-132. The commission appears to have had both civilian and military functions: C. P. Jones 2004, 481-485. The debate on the exact date of the creation of the province is summarised in Dmitriev 2005a, 7.

\(^7\) SEG 50.1211; the first edition is Wörle 2000, followed by an invaluable historical commentary.

\(^8\) The inscription speaks of Menodoros ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν νομοθεσίαν βουλευτῶν τέρειον γενόμενος (l. 13-14): Wörle 2000, 569 is probably right in giving a temporal meaning to κατὰ (cf. Wörle 1988, 96, fn. 95). Ferrary 1987/1989, 212; Crawford 1990, 112-113 and Dmitriev 2005a, 302-303 view this passage of the inscription as evidence for a lex provinciae setting rules for the composition of city councils, therefore suggesting to translate the two lines as 'having been in the council created according to the Roman dispositions'. This is a perfectly acceptable translation: unfortunately, a solution to this problem can hardly be determined until new parallel evidence becomes available.

Eventually, they made a desperate attempt to regain the favour of the Romans when the defeat appeared inevitable, as is shown by a famous civic decree calling the Ephesians to the war against the King (IvEph 8). Their effort was unsuccessful, and Ephesus was severely punished at the end of the conflict with the loss of freedom and the imposition of a fine, like most Asiatic cities. However, it was with Sulla that Ephesus gained a central role in the administration of the province, when the victorious general summoned the representatives of the Asiatic cities there.

The meeting was the crucial moment of the Sullan resettlement of the Greek East, whose importance goes beyond the boundaries of the provincia Asia. Immediately after defeating Fimbria, Sulla united his troops with those who had revolted against his defeated enemy, restored Nicomedes on the throne of Bithynia and Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia, and sent an embassy to the Senate. Then, he started to deal with the organisation of Asia. After listing the communities to whom freedom was awarded or confirmed (Rhodes, Chius, the Iliadic, Lycian and Carian cities, Magnesia on the Sipylus, and some other unspecified, presumably minor centres), as a reward to their loyalty to Rome and to Sulla himself, he explicitly stresses the dominant feature of the Sullan reorganisation: ‘to the other cities he sent the army, without exceptions’ (έσ δὲ λαοῖα πάντα στρατιάν περιεπέμπε). The presence of Roman troops was perhaps the clearest sign of the loss of freedom and of the inclusion of a community under the direct rule of Rome.

The economic dimension to Sulla’s decisions, however, was even more significant than the political one. The provisions taken in Ephesus had a huge impact

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11 See App. Mithr. 61.252. It seems hard to maintain that Ephesus was a ciuitas libera after the Sullan reorganisation, or that its freedom was more than formal: see Guerber 1995, esp. 390-391, 407-409; contra, cf. Dahlheim 1977, 233. About the history of the city in the late Republic, cf. Canali De Rossi 1999b. CIL 1.588 = 1.727, in which the Ephesians thank the Romans for having allowed them to keep maiorum suam libertatem (1.2) probably refers only to the conservation of the ancient democratic constitution of the city, but does not rule out its inclusion in the province: Degrassi 1951/1952, 24 (= Degrassi 1962, 420).
12 App. Mithr. 61.250: ΄Αυτήν δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν καθιστάμενος. He also appears to have put on trial and executed some of the keenest supporters of Mithridates. See Licin. 35.82 Criniti: Ephesii causis cognitiis principes beli sicur necat; ciuitates pacium multat, oppida impacata redigit in suam potestatem, with Hinard 1985a, 44. Bernhardt 1985, 62 stresses that Sulla did not chose to take revenge for the massacre of the Italians by ordering a mass slaughter.
on the fiscal organisation of the province and on its economic history in the following decades. Plutarch mentions a collective fine of 20,000 talents imposed by Sulla on the Asiatic cities.\(^{13}\) Its devastating effect was increased by the serious losses inflicted to private households, and by the request made to rich families to host a Roman soldier indefinitely. The fine imposed on the cities deserves to be considered carefully, as it may reveal some interesting aspects of the political and military agenda of Sulla, as well as of the fiscal reorganisation that he carried out.

Appian reports the angry and resentful speech that Sulla delivered to the city representatives, blaming the Asiatic communities for the stance they took in the war. At the end of his harangue, he declared that the just punishment for their disloyalty could be exactly quantified (62):

\[\text{μόνονς ἵμαν ἐπιγράψω πέντε ἐτῶν φόρους ἐσενεγκέιν αὐτίκα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου δαπάνην, δοσὶς τε γέγονε μοι καὶ ἔσται καθισταμένω τὰ ὑπόλοιπα.}\]

The sanction imposed on the cities consisted therefore of a fine, or rather an extraordinary contribution that the Roman general claimed as a refund in the treacherous conduct. It was also meant to be a rich booty for the victorious army and—quite explicitly indeed—an indispensable support for Sulla’s return to Italy and imminent fight for supremacy in Rome. Besides this extraordinary contribution, however, the cities had to pay to the Roman treasury the taxes they had been exempted from over the last five years, on account of their adherence to Mithridates’ cause. Indeed, Mithridates’ attack started in 89 BC, compelling Aquilius to flee to Pergamum and then to Rhodes. Most of the Asiatic cities, which had welcomed the coming of the new philhellenic master, were therefore compelled to put a remedy to the financial loss they had caused to Rome over the last five years.

This aspect of Sulla’s decisions stresses two relevant issues. First, such a systematic and well-targeted reaction can be better explained if one bears in mind that the fiscal exploitation of the area was already well established before the war, and that resuming it was among the priorities of Sulla’s mission—as well as Fimbria’s and Flaccus’.\(^{14}\) At the same time, the ferocity of some communities against the Italians in

\(^{13}\) Plut. Sull. 25.4.

\(^{14}\) However, Attalus’ testament declared the cities of the kingdom free and immune from taxation. The publicani operated only in the χώρα βασιλικῆ until 122 BC, when the lex Sempronia de vectigalibus Asiae was passed. This is confirmed by App. b. c. 5.4.17 (Antony addressing the representatives of the cities):

\[\text{ὑμᾶς ἴμαν, ἵνα ἀνέφερον Ἑλλήνες, Ἀτταλος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢμῖν ἐν διαθήκαις ἀπέλυτε, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀμείνονες ἢμῖν ἴμεν Ἀττάλῳ οὗς γὰρ ἐτελεῖτε φόρους Ἀττάλῳ, μεθήκασεν.}\]
the early phase of the Mithridatic War must be explained by the hardships that the Asiatic communities had suffered at the hands of the Roman publicani. The Sullan fiscal reorganisation was not a Copernican revolution, but a reform that stabilized an already existing system.

Moreover, Sulla cleverly identified his personal interest — gathering resources in view of the final civil clash — with the public interest of Rome. The collection of the fine and that of the arrears were two distinct, yet closely related aspects of the same agenda. For this to be achieved, a reorganisation of the province had to be carried out. The final passages of the speech reported by Appian make this point quite clear: Διαμηνήσω δὲ ταῦθ' ἐκάστοις ἐγὼ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τάξις προθεσμίαν ταῖς ἐσφοραῖς. The collection of such a huge sum was therefore to be undertaken by following a subdivision of the province into fiscal districts based on the territories of the cities.

As Appian points out, Sulla ‘divided the fine among the representatives and sent envoys to collect the money’ (ἐπιδιήρει τοῖς πρέσβεσι τὴν ζημίαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐπεμπεν). The cities themselves were put in charge of the collection of the fine. The enforcement of Sulla’s orders would however be ensured by the garrisons of Roman soldiers deployed in the province, which had been explicitly ordered by Sulla to punish the cities which would not comply with the requirements (καὶ τοῖς οὐ φυλάξασιν ἐπιθήσω δίκην ὡς πολεμίως). According to Plutarch, Sulla imposed the burden of the maintenance of his troops on the communities. Each family was obliged to offer a daily meal to a Roman soldier and to any guest he might invite, to pay for his clothes and to offer him four tetradrachms a day for his private necessities. Plutarch notoriously likes to focus on these picturesque details, and his statement that this decision of Sulla was devastating for private households (τοὺς οἰκοὺς ἐξετριφεν) may well be exaggerated. We do not know how long this imposition was kept up, nor if it was systematically applied in the whole province, and it seems unlikely that it was part of an official provision. However, serious consequences on private households, along with the extraordinary financial burdens on communities, are hardly surprising in the aftermath of a war, and of the Sullan resettlement.


15 Plut. Sull. 25.4-5.
In this early phase of the reorganisation of the province the publicani certainly played no part in the collection of taxes. The reason for their temporary absence, as argued by P. A. Brunt, is surely the unprecedented lack of human and financial resources that their *societates* suffered after the outbreak of the Mithridatic War.\(^{16}\) For several years, until the publicani were ready to return to Asia, possibly not until the end of the Civil War, the Roman army was to provide the backbone of an embryonic form of fiscal administration, entrusted with the collection of the fine. Licinius Lucullus, the proquaestor whose remarkable skills had proved decisive in the early phases of the conflict, was entrusted with the task of coordinating it, while the *legatus pro praetore* Licinius Murena was assigned some military tasks, such as the mission against Moagetes, the ‘tyrant’ of Cibyra.\(^{17}\) Lucullus, himself a loyal partisan of Sulla, played no direct part in the Civil War, as the delicate task he was in charge of compelled him to stay in Asia. Yet, it may quite safely be argued that his efficiency in ensuring the revenue flow from Asia to the Sullan treasury (the *aerarium* was then in control of the enemies of Sulla) had a crucial role in the development of the conflict.\(^{18}\)

Plutarch provides another important piece of information, the exact taxation imposed by Sulla: 20.000 talents, which he seems to consider part of the fine only.\(^{19}\) It is more likely, however, as mentioned above, that such a sum included the arrears too. Broughton, by working on the figures suggested by Böttcher, calculated that the annual revenues from Asia were approximately 2.400 talents, and that the arrears

\(^{16}\) Brunt 1956 (= Brunt 1990, 1-8, 481) ; see already Ivanov 1910, 101-102. On the role of the *equites* in the Sullan project, see Laffi 1967a, 188-203; Badian 1972, 94-95; Shatzman 1975, 204-205; Brunt 1988, 159-160; Lepore 1990, 751. Wulff Alonso 2002, 97-100 is misleading. Delplace 1977, 246-247 argues that the publicani did not cease their activities in Asia Minor between 84 and 80, but this hypothesis overlooks the impact of the massacre of the Italians. There is no evidence supporting the claim of Merola 2001b, 460 that Sulla aimed at excluding the publicani from levying the taxes.

\(^{17}\) Strab. 13.4.17 = C 631. Murena also gathered a fleet to fight piracy, sensibly financing it with the revenues of ordinary taxation (Cic. Verr. 2.1.89: *decem enim nauis iussu L. Murenae populus Milesius ex pecunia vectigali populo Romano fecerat, sicut pro sua quaerit parte Asiae quaeque civitatis*). His deeds earned him the gratitude of Caunus (Tuchelt 1979, 153); possibly, the citizens of Messene called him ‘benefactor’ for the same reason (*IG* 5.1.1454, with Accame 1946, 139). See Kallet-Marx 1995, 274-275, esp. fns. 55 and 57; de Callatay 1997, 331-335; Mastrocinque 1999a, 94-99.

\(^{18}\) Lucullus was also ordered to strike coinage (Plut. *Luc.* 4.2) and he appears to have produced a large amount of cistophori: de Callatay 1997, 356-359.

\(^{19}\) Plut. *Sull.* 25.4: τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐσημεύσας ταλαντὸς εἴσημίωσε.
could be quantified in the sum of 12,000 talents.\textsuperscript{20} If this reconstruction is correct, the fine was therefore of 8,000 talents, more than triple the annual fiscal burdens usually imposed on the cities, and four times more than the fine imposed on Mithridates after the agreements of Dardanus.\textsuperscript{21} Such severity is to be explained by the intention to punish in an exemplary way the communities that had revolted against Roman rule, whose disloyalty was even less acceptable than the aggressive policy of a foreign king.\textsuperscript{22} The figures themselves make it clear how heavy, and virtually impossible to comply with, the demands imposed by Sulla were.

We owe the little we know about the actual organisation of the reformed system to a later author, not very familiar to the students of the late Republic. A laconic passage in Cassiodorus' \textit{Chronica} records that, in 84 BC, \textit{Asia in XLIII regiones Sylla distribuit}.\textsuperscript{23} This piece of information is almost certainly derived from Livy, who is the main source for the 'Republican' section of this work. Cassiodorus' decision to refer to the reorganisation of Asia as the major event of 84 BC suggests that his source portrayed it as a very significant event. The other events Cassiodorus briefly refers to, interrupting his list of \textit{fasti}, are all crucial moments, even authentic watersheds of Republican history, like the death of Hannibal, the conquest of Numantia, and the Gracchan reform of the criminal courts. Moreover, this short note provides a new, although not entirely clear detail about the Sullan reorganisation. The province was divided into forty four districts, which are here called \textit{regiones}. Quite predictably, their function has been much debated.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} 2,000 talents according to Plut. \textit{Sull.} 23.9; 3,000, according to Memnon, \textit{FGrHist} 434 F 25.2. Although Badian 1968a, 33 and Cimma 1976, 202, fn. 38 call it a 'treaty', the so-called Peace of Dardanus was never ratified by the Roman Senate; on the diplomatic consequences of this choice, see Glew 1981. Sartre 2003, 228 wrongly claims that the fine imposed by Sulla on the city was 'about the same amount' as the tax arrears.
\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Ferrary 2002a, 145-146. That Mithridates asked the Chians 2,000 for talents is not an objection (App. \textit{Mithr.} 48.184-186): it was actually meant to bring the city to ruin, it required people to take the friezes of the temples, and it was the immediate background for the mass deportation of the citizens.
\textsuperscript{23} Cassiodorus, \textit{Chron.} p. 130 Mommsen. There is no reason to question this figure, \textit{pace} Rostovzeff 1932, 260, fn.1.
\textsuperscript{24} See Merola 2001a, 108-109, 177-179, with full bibliography.
They have often been linked to the judicial districts, the so-called conuentus or οἰκονομεῖς.\(^{25}\) They were the main unit for the administration of justice in Asia, and for the Roman provincial system as a whole, and an extremely important feature in the administration of the provincia Asia throughout the late Republic and the Imperial age.\(^{26}\) The evidence for the district system in the early history of the province, however, is quite scarce. It has been suggested that there was strong continuity between the Attalid and the Roman administration, at least in the early phase of the province. Several scholars have also related the subdivision into conuentus-οἰκονομεῖς to the very organisation of the Attalid kingdom: the hypothesis, originally put forward by Wilamowitz, has from time to time been revived with different arguments.\(^{27}\) Most recently, C. Mileta has argued that the conuentus as a direct evolution of the τόποι, the units of the Attalid administration, small districts built around an important city, most often a centre of a mint where cistophoric coinage was struck.\(^{28}\) In fact, there is no solid evidence for the transition between the two regimes and the date of the creation of the conuentus system remains unknown.

Some explicit details about the creation of the Asiatic conuentus in the late Republic are however provided in a passage of Strabo, dealing with the vexing problem of the boundaries between the regions of Asia Minor.\(^{29}\) According to the

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\(^{25}\) Cf. Ramsay 1895, 265, arguing that the conuentus system was created by Sulla; Nicolet 1994a, 159 states that it did not exist yet in the age of Sulla. Full bibliography in Merola 2001a, 143, fn. 1.

\(^{26}\) The best discussion is Mitchell 1999, 22-29. On the terminology, see Burton 1975, 92, 94-97. The word iurisdiccion may be used instead of conuentus: Habicht 1975, 67-68.

\(^{27}\) Wilamowitz thought that the semantic equivalence of διοικηταί and conuentus mirrored an historical continuity. Apparently, he made this suggestion to his pupil A. Schulten, who accepted it, perhaps with some reluctance, in his dissertation: Schulten 1892, 12, fn. 2; 129. For further bibliography, see Magie 1950, 1059, fn. 41 and Merola 2001a, 172, fn. 116.

\(^{28}\) Mileta 1990; Dreyer-Engelmann 2003, 24-25 (with further bibliography at fn. 56). Contra, see Magie 1950, 1059, fn. 41; Campanile 2003a, 278-282. According to Mileta's reconstruction, the conuentus-capitals may have been cities like Pergamon, Ephesus, Tralles, Sardes-Synnada, Apamea. The fundamental introduction to the cistophoric coinage, a typical feature of the Attalid age and a prominent aspect of its legacy, remains F. S. Kleiner-Noe 1977.

\(^{29}\) Strab. 13.14.12 = C 628: ὅστε καὶ τὰ Φρυγία καὶ τὰ Καρικὰ καὶ τὰ Λόδια καὶ ἕτε τὰ τῶν Μυσίων δυσαδράκτα ἑίναι, παραπήπτοντα εἰς ἅλληλα· εἰς τὴν σύγχυσιν ταύτην οὕτω μικρὰ συλλαμβάνει τὸ τούς Ῥωμαίοις μὴ κατὰ φύσιν διελεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἅλλα ἔτερον τρόπον διατάξαι τὸς διοικητῆς, ἐν αἷς τὸς ἁγοραίος ποιοῦται καὶ τὰς ἀκριτοκοινίας ('the Phrygian and the Carian and the Lydian parts, as also those of the Mysians, since they merge into one another, are hard to distinguish. To this confusion no little has been contributed by the fact that
geographer, who was from Asia Minor and had a wide (though not impeccable) historical knowledge, the Romans were responsible for the organisation of the new system, which probably fitted their need for a rational organisation of the territory, but ignored the ethnic and cultural boundaries of the region. The point is made very clearly, and continuity between Attalid and Roman organisation seems quite hard to maintain in the light of this passage. If there had been any, Strabo would have surely specified that. Moreover, this passage cannot be used as evidence for a subdivision of the Attalid kingdom into φυλαγα, or for any hypothesis about the organisation of the kingdom.

Strabo is quite explicit about the functions of the capitals of the conuentus: they were the places where local assemblies gathered, justice was dispensed, Roman magistrates performed their duties and, at the same time, the local elites still had a share of responsibilities in the management of the region. It is not by chance, then, that the earliest attestations of the conuentus system in Asia Minor are related to the provincial koinon, the plenary assembly of the communities included in the province. I will come back later to the function of this assembly in the first half of the first century BC.

The assize districts, at any rate, were so important for the organisation of Roman Asia that they are likely to have been in place from its creation. The earliest list of conuentus of the Roman province of Asia is known from the so-called Monumentum Ephesenum, the customs law (lex portorii provinciae Asiae) discovered in 1976, published in 1989 and discussed ever since with relentless attention. The text was issued and published by Nero in 62 BC, but it was the outcome of the stratification of legal texts dating back to different periods. The earliest part of the document was issued by the Romans did not divide them according to tribes, but with a different method they organised their jurisdictions, within which they hold their popular assemblies and their courts', transl. by H. L. Jones, modified). This passage is the starting point of the invaluable discussion of the Asiatic conuentus system in Magie 1950, 171-173, 1059-1063. Also cf. Strab. 14.1.38 = C 646.

30 On Strabo's familiarity with the history of, and the historiography on, Asia Minor, see Ambaglio 2000. The conuentus-system tended to dismantle the unity of the ancient ethno, and to give the Hellenised poleis a more prominent role: see Salmieri 2004, 204.


32 SEG 39.1189 (edited by H. Pleket): first published by Engelmann-Knibbe 1989; the edition in SEG usefully distinguishes the different sections of the text according to their different chronology. A
consuls of 75 BC, L. Octavius and C. Aurelius Cotta, almost certainly using dispositions that were contemporary to the creation of the Roman province; other sections were added later.\(^{33}\) The section drafted in Nero’s day was at the end of the text, on the part of the stone that is not preserved. In a part of the document added by the consuls of 17 BC, there is a clause involving the free cities, which cannot be fully interpreted because of the fragmentary state of the text.\(^{34}\) In order to designate clearly what makes a city free, it is specified that it must not be part of any of the *conuentus*, and a list is provided, valid both for 17 BC and AD 62, including the districts of Ephesus, Miletus, Halicarnassus, Smyrna, Pergamum, Adramyttium, Hellespontus, Sardis, Cibyra, Apamea, Synnada and Lycaonia.\(^{35}\)

It is possible that Sulla compiled a list of the *conuentus*, but the argument is bound to remain speculative until new evidence emerges. If the assize districts ever existed in the Sullan age, however, they are likely not to have been as many as they were in later periods, about a dozen.\(^{36}\) They are definitely not to be confused, at any rate, with the *regiones* mentioned by Cassiodorus, which were related to the collection of the extraordinary tribute imposed in the Ephesus conference. The province of Asia was an intensely urbanised area, and the forty four Sullan *regiones* may thus have been quite large fiscal districts, each organised around an important city, providing the

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\(^{33}\) See Mitchell 2003, 24, remarking that the law clearly defines the ports of entry of the province, where tolls may be paid, and suggests that the boundaries of the province were set already in its early history; cf. Nicolet 1993, 757 (= Nicolet 2000, 383).

\(^{34}\) See the tentative discussion by Merola 2001a, 164-171.

\(^{35}\) Γάλιος Φώφινος, Σειλανδύς ὑποτι προσέθηκαν: αἵτινες πολείτειαι | [...] ὥν καὶ ἀἵτινες δημοτοὶ εἶσιν ἐξω διοικήσεως Ἑφέσου καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Μέιλησις καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Ἁλικαρνασσοῦ καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Περγαμοῦ καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Χαλκησίδος καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Κυσίμης καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Παμφυλίας καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Μυκηναῖς καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Συμμακικής καὶ ἐξω διοικήσεως Λυκαιακής εἰ [...] αὐταί ἁγοραὶ εἰσιν | [...] (l. 88-91, ed. Engelmann-Knibbe). The list is opened by Ephesus: Merola 2001a, 162 argues that this is because Ephesus was the provincial capital.

\(^{36}\) It has been suggested that the forty four regions were the outcome of the division into four districts of the eleven *conuentus* then existing: Magie 1950, 1116-1117; Gray 1978, 971-973; Mitchell 1999, 29-30. The number of the *conuentus* is however inferred from slightly later evidence (see Mitchell 1999, 23). Sources on the later developments of the system: *RDGE* 52, 1. 43-47; Plin. 5.95, 105, 106, 109, 111, 120, 122, 123; *IvDidyma* 148, l. 12-21, with Robert 1949. A useful recapitulation in Campanile 2004.
necessary framework for a well-ordered collection of the tribute. This system appears
to have lasted for several decades, probably until the age of Caesar. Unfortunately, its
later development remains unclear. It is likely that the fiscal *regiones* were abolished at
some point in the early Imperial age, and that their function was replaced by the
judicial *conuentus*.*\ΔΟΧΟΥ ΧΩΙΟΣ.* The inscription from Ephesus published by C. Habicht
in 1975 shows beyond doubt that, by the Flavian age at the very latest, the *conuentus*
were used for fiscal purposes too.\(^37\)

It has often been stated that the forty four *regiones* should be viewed as the
outcome of a decision made with a view to ensuring a quick and efficient levy of the
tribute.\(^38\) Since the classic treatment of the question by F. Frölich, the assumption
underlying some discussions is that the new system was just meant to provide a
solution to an emergency, just before Sulla’s departure from Asia to Italy, where the
final clash for power was about to take place.\(^39\) In fact, there are reasons to question
that. There is no evidence for the phase in which the Sullan system was replaced by a
new fiscal subdivision of the province. At the end of his mission to Asia Minor
Pompey was mainly busy creating the province of Pontus-Bithynia. No substantial
change in the fiscal administration of the province of Asia can be dated to his Eastern
command.

Cicero says that in 62/61 BC the propraetor Lucius Valerius Flaccus, then in
charge of Asia, raised a fleet to fight the pirates, and ordered the cities to contribute to
the expense according to the subdivision decided by Sulla, which Pompey had slightly
revised: *discripsit... pecuniam ad Pompei rationem, quae fuit accommodata L Sullae discriptioni.*\(^40\)

\(^37\) *IvEph* 13. First published in Habicht 1975: see especially the commentary at 67-71 on the likely
development of the assize system in Asia and the conclusions at 90-91. The inscription contains a list of
communities who were expected to pay some kind of tax, whose nature and destination remain unclear.
As a matter of fact, however, the list was created by grouping the communities according to the
*conuentus* where they belonged. Drager 1993, 53-54 dates the inscription to the age of Vespasian; for an
overview of the evidence for the development of the *conuentus* system, see *ibid.*, 25-26, 263-265.

\(^38\) Cic. *Quint.* fr. 1.1.33 suggests that each *regio* had to contribute the same amount of money, in the same
proportion: *(scil.: the Greeks of Asia Minor)* *nomen autem publicani aspernari non possunt, qui pendere ipsi
necigal sine publicano non poterint quad iiis anqualiter Sulla discriptionat,* see Bertrand 1978, 803. Merola 2001a,
54-55 ignores this problem; however, she rightly argues that the publicani mentioned in the passage
must have been Roman, not Greek (*ibid.*, 54, fn. 193).

\(^39\) Fröhlich 1900, col. 1543-1544; Magie 1950, 1116-1118, fn. 17; Merola 2001a, 53-54, 179; Dmitriev

\(^40\) Cic. *Flacc.* 14.32.
The scheme was not just useful for the purposes of ordinary taxation, but it could also be used to raise exceptional tributes. Flaccus’ policy too was consistent with the settlement of 85/84 BC: *qui cum in omnis Asiae cives pro portione pecuniam discripsisset [scil: Sulla], illum rationem in imperando sumptu et Pompeius et Flaccus secatus est.* Cicero’s testimony makes it clear that the Sullan reform went far beyond the scope of an emergency arrangement, and was based on the extensive knowledge of the territory, and on a preliminary assessment of the fiscal capacities of the communities. Its sophistication might also presuppose a familiarity with the administration of the province, which decades of Roman presence had made possible. If not a fair solution for the cities, it certainly was an efficient tool for the needs of Roman administration.

The model chosen by Sulla provided a blueprint for later administrative developments. The radical reform undertaken by Caesar, who entrusted the collection of direct taxes to the cities, thereby depriving the publicani of their role in the fiscal administration of the province, was based on the same principle as the Sullan organisation. The territory was divided in a number of districts, each one referring to a major urban centre and being assigned a fixed sum of money to be paid to the Roman administration. Sulla certainly ended the war without attempting a final and definitive victory over Mithridates, as events imposed a different agenda. However, the survival of his organisation of the province in the following decades does not allow us to consider it as a mere post-war Blitz. Sulla intended to bring about a more rational system for the exploitation of Asia Minor, and he managed to do so.

Curiously enough, modern scholars have rarely asked themselves in which kind of legal framework the deliberations taken by Sulla on the provincial organisation of Asia were formulated. Several *senatusconsulta* declaring the free status of some loyal communities have long been known and studied, but the position of the punished communities has hardly been considered as it deserves. At least since Mommsen’s day, it has been repeatedly argued (or rather postulated) that Sulla’s main contribution to provincial administration was a *lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis*, issued in the years of his dictatorship, as part of a broader constitutional reform. The key aspects of this

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11 Bertrand 1978, 803-804 argues that this may explain why the subdivision was carried out so quickly. Crawford 1985, 160 speculates that after the creation of the province the Romans just used the fiscal system of the Attalids.


13 On the emergence of this theory see Giovannini 1983, 97-101.
law, in Mommsen’s reconstruction, were the total bar on consuls and praetors from holding any military command during their mandate, and the abolition of any distinction between consular and praetorian provinces. After the decisive refutation proposed in the early 1980s by A. Giovannini, who persuasively listed and discussed an impressive series of exceptions to Mommsen’s supposed rule, there is no need to reconsider this matter in any detail. No lex Cornelia de provinciis was ever issued, and the problems posed by the references made in ancient sources to a lex Cornelia dealing with the administration of Asia Minor can be more satisfactorily discussed without viewing them as evidence for a piece of general legislation. Some may refer to the lex Cornelia de maiestate, others to the decisions that Sulla took at Ephesus. It is worth reconsidering them briefly.

One of the epigraphic documents recording the introduction of the new calendar in the province of Asia, in 9 BC, from Priene, fixing the beginning of the year to the 23 September, the date of the birth of Augustus, refers to a Κοπήσττος νόμις. The dispositions for the elections of the civic magistrates formulated in that Sullan law were not to be modified with the advent of the new system. This lex Cornelia may

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44 Mommsen 1857, 29-36 (= Mommsen 1906, 118-124); Mommsen 1887a, 94-97, 214-219; cf. Marquardt 1884, 523-525. However, Mommsen developed and codified an interpretation that was already well established in his day: cf. e.g. Vockestaert 1816, 179-182 and Zacharia 1834, 114-116. There are lengthy discussions of this law and of Sulla’s contribution to provincial administration in Betti 1982, 251-267; Cobban 1935, 72-76; Valgiglio 1956, 124-144; Hantos 1986, 89-120; also cf. Rotondi 1912, 53 and Biscardi 1951, 170.

45 See Giovannini 1983, 75-101, also providing full references to all relevant passages of Mommsen’s Staatsrecht. The existence of a Sullan law de provinciis ordinandis had already been questioned by several scholars: see Zumpt 1868, 385, 440; Balsdon 1939, 58-65; Evola Marino 1974, 115-123; cf. Pelham 1895, 216, fn. 2; Pelham 1911, 67, fn. 4; Arnold 1914, 51, fn. 1; Badian 1986, 81-84. Giovannini’s theory has been widely accepted: see Girardet 1987, 292-293; Girardet 1990, 90-91, n. 4; Nicolet 1992; Girardet 1992, 178-179; Ferrary 2001b, 28-29; Ferrary 2001c, 103. Schulz 1997, 48-51 and Baltrusch 2002, 248, 252 still take the lex Cornelia de provinciis for granted; Sandberg 2002, 39-40, 157 tends to believe that it existed. For a better understanding of some historiographical matters underlying Giovannini’s theory, see Giovannini 1992.

46 My debt to the discussions of Crawford 1990, 113-114 and Ferrary 2001b, 28-29 will be apparent. To my knowledge, a Sullan lex provinciis for Asia was first suggested in Zumpt 1868, 362-363; also cf. Arnold 1914, 29.


48 RDGE 65.D = Iv Priene 105, l. 82-84: γείνεσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὰ ἀρχαία ἡμέρας μὴ δεκάτῳ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Κοπήσττος νόμῳ γέγραπται, ἐντὸς | δεκάτης ἰσταμένου (l. 82-84). Laffi 1967b, 70
well be a text dealing specifically with Asia. The reference to a provincial law is somewhat clearer in a fragmentary text from Thyatira, in which a διάταξις 'written according to the lex Cornelia' is mentioned (I. 5-6): ...ωι γράφασα κατὰ τὸν Κορηνίαν νόμον διάταξιν | ἀπαρίτα χρόνον ἐπεσφαγμισμένον πάσιν τε θεῶν ἐπωφεῖτο.49 The meaning of διάταξις in this context is unclear: it could be 'financial regulation', or even 'testament'. In the first case, the reference to a lex provinciae would be unproblematic. If the second hypothesis is to be preferred, it is not unlikely that such matters were dealt with in a provincial law, reflecting the concerns that provided the background to the lex Cornelia de falsis issued by Sulla during his dictatorship.50

A third source has been used as evidence for the existence of a provincial law on Asia. In a letter written from Laodicea in April 50 BC to Appius Claudius Pulcher, his predecessor as governor of Cilicia who was then facing charges de maiestate, Cicero deals with the problem of limiting the expenses of the embassies sent by the cities to Rome.51 In an earlier letter, Appius voiced the suspicion that Cicero was preventing the delegates of some Cilician cities from going to Rome to witness in his favour, on the grounds of the excessive expenses that their mission would have required. Cicero replies by claiming that he has always managed the matter sensibly, and recalls a conversation he had with a delegation from an unspecified city of Phrygia Epictetus, or Minor Phrygia (fam. 3.10.6): ad me adire quosdam memini, nimirum ex Epiceto, qui dicerent nimis magnos sumptus legatis decerni. quibus ergo non tam imperauit quam censui sumptus legatis quam maxime ad legem Corneliam decernendos, atque in eo ipso me non perseuerasse testes sunt rationes ciuitatum, in quibus, quantum quaeque voluit, legatis tuis datum induxit. The lex Cornelia viewed it as a reference to a lex Cornelia de provinciis; similarly Wörle 1988, 92 and Müller 1995, 53, fn. 108; Rhodes-Lewis 1997, 546 rightly speak of 'a lex Cornelia of Sulla for the province of Asia'. A treatment of the cult of Augustus in Asia is in S. Price 1984, 54-56.

49 IGR 4.1188 = TAMA 5.2, 856. Published in Conze-Schuchhardt 1899, 234, no. 74; see Dmitriev 2005, 303, fn. 68.

50 Contra, Wörle 1988, 92-93, fn. 77, arguing that the inscription refers to the lex Cornelia de provinciis.

There is a vast bibliography on the lex Cornelia de falsis: for an introduction, see Grierson 1956, 242-244; Santalucia 1982; Crook 1987.

51 Cic. fam. 3.10. It was a difficult moment in the relationship between Cicero and Appius, whose prosecutor was Cicero's future son-in-law P. Cornelius Dolabella: see Constans 1921, 93-102 and Campanile 2001, 252-259.
Cicero refers to here was long thought to be the law on provincial administration.\textsuperscript{52} A clause of the Flavian \textit{lex Imitana}, however, shows that the amount of money paid to the embassies could be decided on a local level: \textit{legatis singulis diariorum nomine Iluir tantum dato, quantum / dandum esse decurion[es]\ conscriptis\ censuerint} (ch. H).\textsuperscript{53} It is not unlikely, therefore, that a provincial law set a limit on the expenses to be met by civic delegations. In this case, Cicero probably decided to use in his own province, Cilicia, a regulation that Sulla had set for Asia. In his capacity of provincial governor, he chose to refer to the guidelines provided by the law of a neighbouring territory, which probably had already proved its effectiveness in the previous decades.\textsuperscript{54}

Cicero’s letter interestingly shows how financial provision for local delegations was viewed by Rome as a relevant problem in the organisation of provincial life. As I have argued in the first chapter, a clever use of diplomacy on the part of the cities that could be a fundamental strategy for the improvement of the status of the communities.\textsuperscript{55} As Cicero’s suggestion makes clear, the contents of this \textit{lex Cornelia} were not to be interpreted restrictively. A flexible interpretation could be of some use and convenience for both interested parties.

It seems therefore quite safe to conclude that Sulla reorganised the province of Asia by issuing a law, surely a \textit{lex data}, which covered the major aspects of the organisation of political and institutional life. It was probably included in the \textit{lex Valeria} of 82 BC, which legalised all the initiatives taken by Sulla during his Eastern command.\textsuperscript{56} It probably contained the guidelines of the new fiscal system and it

\textsuperscript{52} See Liebenam 1900, 84; \textit{contra}, Crawford 1990, 114. Campanile 2001, 254-255 argues that it may be a clause of the \textit{lex Cornelia de maiestate}, cf. Ridley 1975, 100, suggesting the \textit{lex Cornelia de repetundis} and Keaveney 1983c, 199-202, suggesting the \textit{lex Cornelia de provincis}. Coudry 2004, 549 takes no stance.

\textsuperscript{53} See the brief commentary on this clause in Gonzalez 1986, 212.

\textsuperscript{54} Excellent discussion in Zumpt 1868, 362-363.

\textsuperscript{55} If the reference is to the Sullan law, the clause can be explained by the Romans’ interest to compel the cities to concentrate their resources on the fulfillment of their fiscal duties: Ferrary 2001b, 29, fn. 57. At any rate, setting a limit to the resources available to foreign envoys was an issue already before the Sullan settlement: cf. the \textit{senatusconsultum} voted in 94 BC, prohibiting loans to the representatives of the provincial communities to Rome (Ascon. in \textit{Cornelian}, p. 57C Stangl).

\textsuperscript{56} See Cic. \textit{leg. agr.} 3.2.5: \textit{omnium legum iniquissimam dissimilissimamque legis esse arbitror eam quam L. Flacus interrex de Sulla tulit, ut omnia, quaecumque ille fecisset, essent rata}, with MRR 2.66; the doubts of Kallet-Marx 1995, 268-269 are excessive. On the ratification of \textit{leges datae}, see Frederiksen 1965, 189; Hoyos 1973, 50-53 (focusing on provincial laws); Sandberg 2002, 102-103. The doubts about the legal grounds of
provided a set of rules about the election of city magistrates, although apparently not on the membership of the city assemblies. There is no evidence that it went into minute details about the organisation of civic life, like the law issued by Pompey for Bithynia two decades later. The former Attalid kingdom, after all, had a much stronger background of urbanism and local autonomy than its neighbour.\footnote{Hamon 2005, 132-135. The fullest discussion of the lex Pompeia de provincia Bithynia is now Fernoux 2004, 129-146; Sherwin-White 1966, 525-555 (esp. 525-529, on the financial administration of the cities) and Marek 1993, 26-46 remain very useful. It is unnecessary to suggest, as Fernoux does (129-130), that the lex Pompeia mentioned by Pliny the Younger was not a proper law, but just a series of decreta. On the rules set by Pompey about city magistracies, see A. J. Marshall 1968a; Ameling 1984; Mitchell 1984, 121-125. Murphy 1993 does not add much to the discussion. On the impact of the Empire on the economic life of the province, see Salmeri 2005.} It certainly did not deal with the introduction of the Sullan era, which many cities adopted without following any input on the part of the Romans, at different moments and mostly independently from each other.\footnote{Leschhorn 1993, 216-221; 420-423. The dossier of the cities using the Sullan era must now include Aizanoi too, as proved by Wörrle 1995a, correcting Leschhorn 1993, 234-244. \textit{Pax} Sartre 1995, 120, there was never such a thing as the era of the provincia Asia. see Rigsby 1979.}

As all provincial laws, this \textit{lex Cornelia} must have been accompanied and complemented by the \textit{formula provinciae}, the list of the communities included into the province, and to which the law was actually applicable.\footnote{Marquardt 1884, 500-502; Crawford 1990, 115. Contra, Lintott 1981, 58-61.} When Sulla delivered his speech to the representatives of the cities, announcing what he had decided about the status of the communities, he must have presented something resembling the content of the \textit{formula provinciae}. The position of cities to which he confirmed or awarded freedom would be dealt with in a \textit{senatusconsultum} after his return to Rome. The vast majority of the communities were punished by the deprivation of freedom and the downgrading to the status of subject cities, under the direct control of the provincial governor.\footnote{A. H. M. Jones 1971, 62-64 is still a good discussion; also cf. Bernhardt 1985, 49-65. Bernhardt 1971, 115, 120-132 fails to see the significance of Sulla's intervention in the history of Roman Asia Minor; Kallet-Marx 1995, 289-290 wrongly views the Sullan reorganisation as the moment in which many Asiatic communities were first included under direct Roman rule, and underrates the impact of Roman domination on Asia Minor in the early history of the province. A similar approach in Dmitriev 2005b, 75-80; a sound critique in Ferrary 2002a, 133-134.} The fact that Sulla still had to gain political supremacy in Rome, and then

Sulla's decisions expressed in Schleussner 1978, 78-79, fn. 259 seem excessive to me. See however the stimulating discussion on the Sullan resettlement of the province and its ratification at \textit{ibid.}, 78-81.
to obtain the full legal confirmation of his acts is no obstacle to this account of the events.

The available evidence and the large number of cities included in the territory of the province of Asia make a reconstruction of the formula set up in the Sullan law impossible. The development of the status of many communities is unknown. The institutional history of a city is known in some detail only in a few cases, like that of Aphrodisias. However, as far as our sources tell us, the status subdivision of the Asiatic communities decided by Sulla was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free cities</th>
<th>Subject cities already before the war</th>
<th>Subject cities, under Sulla’s decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhodes</td>
<td>Clazomenae</td>
<td>Ephesus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Lycian koinon$^{61}$</td>
<td>Phocea</td>
<td>Pergamum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chius$^{62}$</td>
<td>Synnada</td>
<td>Miletus$^{56}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilium</td>
<td>Thyatira</td>
<td>Mytlene$^{67}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyzicus</td>
<td>Tralles$^{65}$</td>
<td>Samus$^{68}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampsacus 63</td>
<td></td>
<td>Termessus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesia on the Sipylus$^{64}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Caunus (assigned to Rhodes)$^{69}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strattonicea</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Tabae</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alabanda</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astypalaea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{61}$ Cf. the extremely fragmentary s.c. from Cormus, in eastern Lycia (RDGE 19), where the name of Sulla is legible. Friendship between the Lycian commune and Rome was confirmed by the treaty of 46 BC recently published in Mitchell 2005a. The relations with Rome were already very good since 167 BC, as is shown by the dedications of the Lycian koinon to Jupiter Capitolinus and the Roman people found on the Capitol (ILLRP 174 and 175): Behrwald 2000, 105-113; Kolb 2002, 209-210; Mitchell 2005a, 231-232. Kolb 2002, 209, fn. 17 announces the discovery of another inscription containing a treaty between Rome and the Lycian koinon, from Tyberissus, which will soon be published.

$^{62}$ On Chius' loyalty to Rome, see App. Mithr. 46-47.180-186. This text and RDGE 70 show that some Roman citizens owned land in its territory. A number of Roman citizens started acquiring substantial
Doubtful: Byzantium  
Doubtful: Colophon  
Doubtful: Laodicea on the Lycus

portions of land soon after the creation of the province of Asia: see Broughton 1934, 209-212; Bussi-Foraboschi 2001, 450-451. The Sullan s.c. stressed that Roman citizens resident in Chius were subject to local laws (cf. l. 17-18): A. J. Marshall 1969 convincingly suggests that the clause refers only to civil cases, especially those concerning property law.

63 Lampsacus was certainly free in 80, when Verres operated in Asia Minor: Cic. Verr. 2.1.81: circumcessus es. a quibus? a Lampsacenis. barbaris hominibus, credo, aut iis qui populi Romani nomen contemnerant. immo uero ab hominibus et natura et consuetudine et disciplina lenissimis, porro autem populi Romani condicione sociis, fortuna servis, voluntate supplicibus. See Magie 1950, 1111, fn. 5.

64 Liv. Per. 81.2: Magnesia, quae sola in Asia ciuitas in fide manserat, summa uirtute aduersus Mithridaten defensa est. Cf. Strab. 13.3.5 = C 621, with Mastrocinque 1999c, 189, fn. 151 and Goukowsky 2001, 149-150, fn. 199. Dr P. Kinns kindly informs me that a silver didrachm of Magnesia on the Maeander, showing a grazing stag on the reverse, appeared for the first time in 2003. The grazing stag replaced the grazing Pegasus as as the reverse type of the tetradrachms of Mithradates VI in 88/87. It seems now clear that the city had a Mithridatic allegiance, and that the Magnesia rewarded by Sulla was that on the Sipylus. The moneyer of this issue was Maiandrios son of Artemidoros, already known from Syl1 695, l. 93.


66 On Miletus, see Haussoulier 1921, 58; Robert 1937, 427-428, arguing that the city did not start its recovery until the late Sixties; Campanile 1996, 171.

67 The Mytilenians had surrendered the legate M.' Aquillius to Mithridates in 88: on the traditions about Aquillius' death, see Amiotti 1979. Lucullus carried out the siege and the reconquest of Mytilene (Plut. Luc. 4.2-3; also see Suet. Iul. 2). He tried not to destroy the city, but was compelled to besiege and punish it because its inhabitants 'were prey to a bad demon' (κακοδαιμονιοῦντας). Cichorius 1888, 5-6 is still fundamental.

68 In 86 BC, Lucullus organised an expedition against Samus, with the support of Chius and Cnidus: see Plut. Luc. 3.3, with Transier 1985, 37-38.

69 See Cic. Qunt. fr. 1.1.33: non esse autem leniores in exigendis uectigalibus Graecos quam nostrumae publicanos biec intelligi potest quod Caunii nuper omnesque ex insulis quae erant a Sulla Rhodiis attributae conjugarent ad senatum, nobis at potius uectigal quam Rhodiis penderent. On this attributio, see Schmitt 1957, 182; Laffi 1966, 48-49; Bertrand 1992, 155. Kallet-Marx 1995, 276 uses this passage and the s.c. de Stratonicensibus to argue that 'as a rule' all the free cities were given new territories, but the evidence is too sparse to allow safe conclusions.

70 Byzantium was an ally of Rome (perhaps since the Second Macedonic War: see Grzybek 1980) and certainly fought against Mithridates, as attested by the Byzantine ambassadors who visited the Senate in
After summarising the political dimension to Sulla’s decisions, it is worth coming back to the economic consequences of the Sullan reorganisation, about which we are better informed. Some well-known passages of Appian and Plutarch show how burdensome the demands of Sullan taxation were for the cities. As argued above, Sulla did not aim to exclude the publicani from the collection of the taxes. In fact, his policy was quite favourable to that sector of the equestrian order, since it offered the Italian moneylenders the chance for an unprecedented intervention in Asiatic economic life by increasing the number of the subject cities. Moreover, as Appian makes clear, the cities were in desperate need for financial resources, and they would soon start borrowing resources from the Roman moneylenders.75

Plutarch’s narrative, although not immune from a similar rhetorical undertone, provides some factual detail. Lucullus, serving as a proquaestor in Asia in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, tried not to exact from the cities more than they


71 Some recent funerary inscriptions from Sardis (SEG 41.1027, 1029, 1030) attest the existence of a Συλλατικης tribe: such an attestation may be related to an award of freedom. The existence of a homonymous phyle has been tentatively proposed for Saettae too: see SEG 41.1019.

72 The honours for Sulla στρατηγὸς ἀνθύπατος recorded in ILS 8771 (l. 4-7: ἐπαίνον, χρυσό | ὁτεφάλῳ ἀριστείῳ καὶ εἰκόνι | Χαλκὴ ἀρετῆς ἐνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας | καὶ ἐνέργειας) may be explained in the light of a freedom grant following the Mithridatic War.

73 Cic. Flacc. 71: cur ergo unus tu Apollonidensis amantissimos populi Romani, fidéssimos socios, misieriores habes, quam aut Mithridates aut eiam pater tuis habuit unquam? The same passage records that the city was attacked by Mithridates, and it is likely that Sulla rewarded its loyalty with a freedom grant: see A. H. M. Jones 1971, 62.

74 Smyrna supported Mithridates, as its coinage shows: Kinns 1987, 109-110. However, Sulla is known to have acknowledged the support of the city to the Romans in the war against Aristoricus: see Tac. ann. 4.56.2 and Ael. Arist. 41.766 (Ἐπιστολὴ περὶ Σμύρνης), with Lewis 1991a; cf. Cadoux 1938, 157 and Lintott 1976, 490-491, dating the episode to the winter of 85/84. This led to believe that he granted freedom to the city. Mastrocinque 1999b, 89-93 speculates that Smyrna was one of the cities that bribed Sulla in order to obtain the grant (Cic. off. 3.87 and Plut. Compar. Lyg. Sull. 3.4), despite its disloyalty during the war. It is possible that Rutulus Rufus, a longtime resident of the city, made the case for it with Sulla: ibid., 91-92. According to Dmitriev 2005a, 249-250 the evidence is inconclusive.

75 App. Mithr. 63.261: ἀποροῦσι τε καὶ δανειζόμεναι μεγάλων τόκων, αἱ μὲν τὰ θέατρα τοῖς δανείζομαι, αἱ δὲ τὰ γυμναῖα ή τείχος ή λυμένας ή εἰ τι δημόσιον ἄλλο, σὺν ὑβρεῖ στρατιωτῶν ἐπειγόντων ὑπετίθεντο.
could actually afford. However, the Asiatic cities soon contracted enormous obligations with the moneylenders, which interest rates soon made unsustainable. From the 20,000 talents of the original fine, the overall debt of the cities had grown to 120,000 talents. When governor of Asia, in 70 BC, Lucullus took the sensible decision to cut interest rates, limit the income of the moneylenders to a quarter of the overall capital, and forbid them to compound the interest on the capital. Such measures represented a fatal blow for Lucullus's political future, but were to provide decisive relief for the cities, which extinguished their debts within four years, after paying 40,000 talents – double the original fine, but considerably less than the debt which they had contracted.

A watershed in the economic and fiscal history of the province of Asia can therefore be located between 66 and 65 BC. Although there is evidence that some communities started contracting debts soon afterwards, the cities never went through another crisis comparable to that following the Sullan settlement. The impact of the fine imposed on them in 84 BC took two decades to overcome. In the meantime, from the creation of the province of Asia, both free and subject cities had experienced four wars, the uninterrupted threat represented by piracy, a dramatic economic crisis, and the greed of the publicani. It is no wonder, therefore, that Lucullus was honoured in various and different contexts for his achievements and, more importantly, for his moderation. According to Plutarch, the Asiatic koinon honoured him with great manifestations of gratitude on his arrival in Ephesus. The ΛΟΥΚΟΛΛΕΙΑ, a new panasiatic celebration that closely recalls the ΜΟΥΚΑΛΕΙΑ, were established in his

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76 Plut. Luc. 4.1: οὔ μόνον καθαρὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πράον.
79 See Cic. Quint. 1.1.25, written in 59 BC (nullum aeternum novum contrabi civitatis, vetere autem magno et gravi multas abs te esse liberatas), with Migeotte 1984, 342-343. Piracy, as well as the ruthlessness of the governor L. Valerius Flaccus, had surely played a significant part. Cf. the situation Cicero found in Cilicia in 50 BC: Cic. Att. 6.2.4-5 (his ego duobus generibus facultatem ad se aere alieno liberandas aut levandas dedi, uno quod omnino nullus in imperio meo sumptus factus est).
honour.80 A similar decision was taken some time earlier, at the beginning of the Third Mithridatic War, by the citizens of Cyzicus, who instituted the Λουκούλλαεια in gratitude for having been freed from the siege of Mithridates: apparently, the festival was still celebrated in Appian’s day.81 Some epigraphic evidence also survives for this period of Lucullus’ administrative activity in Asia Minor. He was called ευεργέτης and σωτήρ in an inscription from Claros, and πάτρων and ευεργέτης in a text from Andros. He became patron of important centres like Ephesus and Synnada.82 As W. Ameling has persuasively suggested, a dedication in his honour was probably put up in the free city of Chius too, and a relationship of patronage may be suggested in this case.83

Lucullus is the most representative exponent of a part of the Roman governing class that understood the importance of a rational and sensible exploitation of Asia. One may wonder whether there is an open contradiction between the vision of Sulla and that of Lucullus. No doubt, Sulla bore serious responsibilities for the bad state of civic finances, which his friend and associate had to deal with when he assumed the governorship of the province. However, the decisions taken by Sulla are precisely explainable in the light of his military needs, and can hardly be considered as the symptom of broader conceptions of the function of Roman rule. Indeed, Sulla made a serious effort towards a stable fiscal organisation, and he did not increase the yearly burden of taxation. What was exceptional, and actually impossible to implement, about his decisions are the collection of the arrears and the parallel imposition of a fine. There is little doubt that Sulla was uninterested in the consequences that a deep economic crisis could have on the cities. Such an attitude may be explained by a deep distrust towards most of the Asiatic communities after their warm support for Mithridates’ cause. Such a feeling that must have been quite widespread among the Romans, and quite persistent too, as Cicero heavily relied on it still in 59 BC, when he

80 Plut. Lnc. 23.1.
81 App. Mitbr. 76.331. See Magie 1950, 327-330; 1111, fn. 4; Bernhardt 1971, 134. In general on the festivals organised by the Asiatic cities in honour of provincial governors during the late Republic, see Erkelenz 1999.
82 See respectively InvEph 2941 (= Eiler 2002, C89) and MAMA 4.52 (= Eilers 2002, C134).
83 SEG 35.929: theoretically, the dedicatee could also be Murena, who is not known to have been the patron of any community. See Ameling 1989, also discussing (at 99-100) other evidence for Lucullus’ relations with the cities.
delivered the *pro Flacco*. In many ways, it reflected an exceptional moment, in which Sulla’s priority was to show the importance of being loyal to the Empire, the advantages that such loyalty could bring, and Rome’s determination to punish all rebels. Lucullus had a different agenda, not least because at the time of his second service in Asia Minor the cities had already shown their lack of interest in Mithridates’ new attempt. His decisions must then be viewed as an attempt to bring life in the province back to a normal state, by ending a transition that had proved too long, and ultimately exhausting.

It should be borne in mind, however, that after the extinction of the debts the framework of the renewed, gradually pacified life of the province was still provided by the *lex Cornelia* issued at Ephesus in 85/84. Moreover, everything we know about Sulla’s contribution to the redefining of Roman rule in the province of Asia reveals a strong interest in placing – or rather keeping – the cities at the centre of the administrative life of the province. There is no evidence that the Sullan law dealt with the *koinon* of the cities of the *provincia Asia* and set rules for its membership. It is beyond doubt, however, that Sulla informed the representatives of the cities of his decisions in a meeting which must have had similar composition and functions to those of the *koinon*. Although there was a heavy intervention of the army to ensure its enforcement, his fiscal reform was based on a network of cities and required their cooperation.

Many factors suggest that he still viewed communities as the backbone of the Roman province. Indeed, the decision to reward some cities for their loyalty to Rome and to punish others for having joined Mithridates is based on the assumption that the Roman presence itself was unconceivable without a preliminary assessment of the cities’ behaviour towards Rome and of the needs of the Roman presence. The core of the Sullan reorganisation of Asia Minor was neither a more direct intervention in the internal business of the cities nor a centralisation of the provincial administration.

Sulla did not undertake anything comparable to Pompey’s organisation of Bithynia in

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84 Cf. e.g. Cic. *Flac. 11.24* (ne hominibus licitate Graecis, crudelitate barbaris cimem ac supplicium uestrum dedereitis); *16.37* (testis ipse... licitatem totius Asiae protulit, de qua nos et lobenter et facile concedimus); and especially *25.60-61* (quae quidem a me si, ut dicenda sint, dicerentur, gravius agerem, iudices, quam adhibu eg i, quantam Asiaticis testibus fidem habere vos comuenerint; renuercem animos uestrux ad Mithridatici belli memoriam...) and *27.64-65*. See Vasaly 1993, 198-205 and Steel 2001, 54. On Cicero’s attitude towards Greeks and Greek culture, see Crawford 1978, 198-199.

85 On Mithridates’ forces at the beginning of the war, see App. *Mitbr. 69.292-293.*
66 BC. With its solid background of urbanism and of sophisticated political and constitutional organisation, the province of Asia just did not require that approach. On the contrary, the solution to the crisis was provided by two crucial choices: a stable military presence of Rome in the region, made possible by the presence of three legions formerly led by Fimbria and later surrendered to Sulla, and a strategy compelling the local elites to embark on closer relations with Rome. \(^{86}\)

Sulla’s harsh measures did not just prove to the Greek world the scale of its defeat. They also compelled it to react by negotiating a new position towards Rome, and by accepting an active role in an Empire that was changing its shape. The fine decided by Sulla was a potentially deadly punishment for the cities of Asia Minor. It had been imposed in a phase of serious economic crisis, after a war, with piracy still in control of the Ionian Sea. Most of the bronze coinage struck in the province immediately after the war, including that produced by Lucullus, bears traces of overstriking and countermarking. This led to a devaluation that was a form of supplementary taxation itself. \(^{87}\) Moreover, the involvement of the Roman moneylenders made the prospect of emancipation from debts even less realistic.

In such a situation, the local elites had one choice left: seeking the support of the members of the Roman elite who were prepared to defend the interests. The rise of foreign clientelae, of course, dates back to much earlier than the Sullan period, and cases of relations between some Asiatic cities and members of the Roman elite are recorded already before the Mithridatic age. However, the available evidence suggests that it became a more widespread tendency only after the Sullan resettlement. It was Sulla himself who offered a blueprint for this change, by displaying his closeness to some cities that had demonstrated their unstinting loyalty to Rome, such as Aphrodisias, Stratonicea, Delos and perhaps Ilium. Moreover, he created close ties with other cities whose position in the Mithridatic War was probably quite unclear, but which managed to build good relations with the winner, such as Smyrna and Halicarnassus. \(^{88}\)

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\(^{86}\) The decision to deploy legions in Asia Minor was unprecedented: Mitchell 1993, 29.


\(^{88}\) Some cities are said to have bribed Sulla in order to be granted freedom, and his decision about their status was reversed in 77 BC by the initiative of the princeps senatus L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91, cens. 86; see Paterson 1985, 24, 40, fn. 11). See Cic. off. 3.87: *non igitur utilis illa L. Philippi Q. f. sententia, quas civitates L. Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberavit, ut eae rursus vestigales essent, neque iis pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant, redderemus. ei senatus est assassus.* Also cf. Plut. Compar. Lys. Sull. 3.4.
The measures decided by Lucullus did not solve the crisis the province of Asia had been fighting for several decades with. The slow recovery of the region was favoured by the defeat of Mithridates and the pirates, finally brought about by Pompey in the Sixties, and by the political stabilisation ensured by the creation of the provinces of Cilicia and Bithynia as permanent commands. Most importantly perhaps, things started to change when the Asiatic cities realised how to deal with Rome and her elite. For the heirs of characters like Chaeremon of Nysa and Pyrrh[akos], who had kept their loyalty during the Mithridatic War, garnering favour at Rome was no hard task. However, the majority of the Greek world had a different record and were compelled to follow a different strategy. Murena, Lucullus and Pompey would eventually play an even more active part in this context than Sulla did.

The list of Roman patrons of Greek cities provided by C. Eilers shows a pattern that cannot be explained as mere chance. Before the Mithridatic War, only a handful of cities honoured, and created ties with Roman magistrates operating in Asia Minor. Most of them have already been mentioned here: Aphrodisias of course, Synnada, Ephesus, Ilium. Cities like Colophon and Alabanda had already started to send envoys to the Roman Senate to discuss issues related to their status before the conflict. Samus, which later followed Mithridates, had gained the patronage of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 96 BC) and C. Iulius Caesar (praet. 92 BC). In Greece, Delos, before gaining Sulla’s favour, had established ties with M. Antonius, proconsul in Cilicia in 102, and with C. Julius Caesar, governor of Asia in the Nineties. Other monuments were probably destroyed during the war, when the enemies of Rome prevailed throughout the Greek East.

From the end of the Eighties, however, the Roman patronage of Greek communities came into play again, and became even more widespread. The list provided by Eilers contains fifty-three patrons (out of 141 whose chronology is known) that can safely be dated between the aftermath of the First Mithridatic War and the battle of Actium. With the beginning of the principate, the patronage of

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89 See respectively IGR 4.968 (= Eilers 2002, C51) and IGR 4.970 (= Eilers 2002, C53); cf. Transier 1985, 36-37 and Ferrary 1997, 209, with further bibliography.
90 ID 1700 (M. Antonius) and 1701 (Julius Caesar): see Baslez 1982, 55-57.
communities starts to go through a gradual and irreversible decline, which would be accomplished by the age of Claudius.\textsuperscript{92}

Patronage, however, was mainly a prerogative of the free cities, which had stronger relations with Rome, and a slightly better financial situation than the subject cities. For these communities a very significant function was played by the \textit{koinon} of the province of Asia, the assembly where the cities met regularly and discussed current affairs. The inscriptional evidence suggests that its role of the \textit{koinon} became more significant in the years that followed the Sullan reorganisation. The assembly of the cities had the function of organising the panhellenic festivals already from the Nineties.\textsuperscript{93} After the First Mithridatic War it became more involved in the administration of the province, and became the context when formal consultations between the cities and the Roman governor took place.

The \textit{koinon} also provided the members of the Greek elites with excellent chances to build networks of cooperation and alliance with their peers. An important inscription from Aphrodisias, probably dating to the Seventies, shows that a free city could exploit the credit it had earned with Rome on behalf of the whole province. The texts shows the representatives of the Asiatic cities complaining about the difficult state of their finances, due to the action of the publicani and to other unfavourable, and unspecified, circumstances – perhaps, the unaffordable interest rates imposed by the moneylenders, who came into action when Asiatic cities had to gather the resources to pay the fine imposed by Sulla.\textsuperscript{94} The assembly decided to send two envoys to the Roman Senate, formally charged to ask for a remedy against the abuses of the publicani. Interestingly, the designated ambassadors, Dionysius and Hierocles, were citizens of Aphrodisias, thus a city which was not under direct Roman rule in this period. Aphrodisias was not a part of the province in this period, and the text makes it clear that the two brothers also held the citizenship of Tralles. They may have been chosen for their diplomatic skills, or more probably because of the excellent relations between their hometown and Rome.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} Eilers 2002, 145-146.
\textsuperscript{93} See Erkelenz 1999, 50 and Ferrary 2001b, 26-27. About the later developments of the tasks of the \textit{koinon}, see Campanile 1994, 13-17.
\textsuperscript{94} Transcribed by Erim 1969, 94-95; edited by Drew-Bear 1971, 286-288; Drew-Bear 1972, 443-471; Reynolds 1982, 26-32, no. 5.
The tasks of the *koinon* in this period are quite unclear, as there is little evidence available.\textsuperscript{96} Nothing, however, compels us to believe that it was directly related to the organisation of the province brought about in 129. It was surely set up later, perhaps under the governorship of Mucius Scaevola, and it was probably reorganised after the Sullan settlement.\textsuperscript{97} Some documents attest a role of the *koinon* in the organisation of games, or in the collection of money for ceremonies in honour of Roman magistrates.\textsuperscript{98} Its first attestation is indeed a letter of Q. Mucius Scaevola to the cities of the province, dealing with the organisation of games in his honour.\textsuperscript{99} In 62/61, the League unsuccessfully tried to gather money to organise games in honour of the former provincial governor L. Valerius Flaccus, whose son also happened to be the governor in that very moment.\textsuperscript{100} The Roman governing class did not have ties only with the notables of the free cities, and the situation of the provincialized cities was not completely static, without any chance of success in influencing Roman attitudes. What we know about the history of the *koinon* of Asia shows that it played a crucial function in the interaction between the elites of the province and Rome.

There were therefore two different processes at work in the relations between Rome and the elites of the province of Asia, involving both free and subject cities, for which a common explanation may be suggested. It was the Sullan settlement which compelled the cities of the province to embark on closer relations with the Romans.

\textsuperscript{96} Listed by Drew-Bear 1972, 460-463 and Dmitriev 2005b, 105-115, 129; also cf. Deininger 1965, 14-16; Bernhardt 1985, 189-191; Bowersock 1990, 412; Vial 1995, 129-130. Herrmann 2002b, 239 appears to believe that Ionian *koinon* ceased its activities in the last century of the Republic and that it was revived only in the Augustan age, but the inscription put up by the *koinon* at Claros in honour of Pompey, 'guardian of the land and the sea, benefactor and patron of the Ionians' (*SEG* 49.1509), proves the contrary.

\textsuperscript{97} Ferrary 2001b, 29 suggests that the *koinon* was first organised by Lucullus, between 85 and 80, after he was left in charge of the organisation of the province by Sulla.

\textsuperscript{98} The evidence is gathered and discussed by Drew-Bear 1972, 460-466. On the historical explanation for the panhellenic overtone of some texts, see Ferrary 2001b, 29-35.

\textsuperscript{99} *OGIS* 437 = *RDGE* 47. On the *Σωτηρία καὶ Μοναχεία* and the role of the cities in their organisation, also see *OGIS* 438 (from Poemaneum) and 439 (from Olympia). Rigsby 1988, 141-149 argues that the festival in honour of Mucius later developed into the *Euergesia*, but the evidence is inconclusive: Ferrary 2001b, 26, fn. 43. On the significance of 'provincial memory' in the history of Roman Asia Minor, see C. P. Jones 2001a.

\textsuperscript{100} Cic. *Flacc.* 52-59, with Erkelenz 1999. The money was gathered at Tralles, and Flaccus was a patron of the city (Cic. *Flacc.* 52).
Some cities sought the patronage of Roman notables, others voiced their concerns and needs in the provincial koinon. Sulla’s demands were just not affordable, as we have seen. The efforts that the cities made to start paying the fine had put them in an even worse position, as they were compelled to borrow money from the Roman moneylenders. Disaster may be avoided only by obtaining the support of members of the Roman elite who were prepared to defend their interests, formally or informally, avoiding further punishment, extending deadlines for payments, or even making the case for a radical change in the requirements set by Rome, like Lucullus did.

The consequences of such a process were not just political or economic. The main effect of the spread of patronage was to bring the Roman and the Greek elites closer. Their interaction became progressively more frequent and more intense, and mutual understanding surely improved. The language of the inscriptions recording relations of patronage is very interesting in this respect, with all its emphasis on concepts like ‘benefaction’, ‘protection’, ‘loyalty’, or gratitude, which truly conveys the impression of an increasingly sophisticated strategy of ‘role assignment’ between the Roman and the local elites.101 The network of personal and political relationships between members of these two elites, which G. W. Bowersock masterfully portrayed in *Augustus and the Greek World*, took shape in these decades.102 A traumatic event like the decisions taken by Sulla at the end of the First Mithridatic War decisively influenced its emergence.

The Sullan reorganisation certainly ensured that the resources necessary for the Civil War were gathered quickly and effectively. There were, however, two aspects of more general importance to it. First, it provided a substantial contribution to the organisation of the province, which would be used for several generations to come. Secondly, it generated a decisive acceleration in a political and social process that would be of crucial importance for the life of the Empire for three centuries to come. Sulla surely did not predict the lasting impact of his measures. But he certainly

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101 This use of the concept of the ‘role assignment’ strategy is owed to Ma 1999, 211-214, who usefully insists on its importance in the study of the relationship between an Hellenistic ruler like Antiochus III and the cities of Asia Minor. Unfortunately, the documentary evidence for the early history of Roman rule in this region is incomparably less rich than that for the Seleucid presence: cf. de Callatay 2003, 219.

expected them to compel the Greek East and its elites to get closer to Rome, and to start building their future knowing that there would be no prospect without Rome.

In the following part of this chapter I will seek to show that some of the initiatives that Sulla took in Italy – which in many respects was a completely different world to Asia Minor and the Greek East – may be explained under a similar light.

2.2. Statesmanship and retaliation: between Capua and Praeneste

Italy, of course, could not be treated as a Roman province: it was the centre of the Empire. It is true that a considerable part of it had revolted against Rome and her hegemony, but after the enfranchisement of the Allies it had become clear that Italy would share the profits of the Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean, and that the Italian elites would play a more significant role in Roman politics. In this section I will try to show how Sulla contributed to increase the political role of the Italian elites, ultimately by compelling them to build closer relations with the Roman governing class, as was the case in the Greek East. This process would be accomplished only with Augustus, but it is with Sulla that it started. The punitive measures he took against his opponents had a decisive role in it.

The end of the Civil War prompted the redefinition of the status of several communities, and the foundation of a number of colonies of veterans is Sulla's main contribution to the administrative history of Roman Italy. Rewarding the soldiers with land was an inevitable consequence of the proletarisation of the army that had become an established reality since the end of the second century BC. Apparently, Sulla planned to found twelve colonies in 87, before leaving for the East.¹⁰⁵ Surely this was a clever move to ensure the loyalty of his soldiers. It was not, however, a new idea. Marius rewarded his soldiers with viri tane assignments in Italy and in Africa, although he undertook the foundation of only one colony proper, the Colonia Mariana in Corsica.¹⁰⁴ Widespread opposition prevented him from embarking on a series of colonial foundations, although his alliance with Saturninus and Glauca strongly suggests that he had that aim. His followers tried to imitate him by planning a new

¹⁰³ Liv. Per. 77.7: *L. Sylla civitatis statum ordinauit, exinde colonias deduxit.*

¹⁰⁴ Plin. 3.80. Like Gaius Gracchus, Marius founded his colony overseas – unless it was actually founded by his followers after his death and named after him. See Gabba 1951, 221-222 (= Gabba 1973, 108); Salmon 1969, 129, 192-193; Brunt 1988, 279-280.
settlement on the border of the *ager Campanus*, at Capua, whose abortive development was closely related to the history of the Civil War.

The foundation of the colony was promoted in the Eighties by a certain Marcus Brutus, and Cicero visited the settlement soon after its creation.\footnote{Cic. leg. agr. 2.34.92-93: *nam et ipse qui deducit, et qui magistratum Capuae illo creante ceperunt, et qui aliquam partem illius deductionis, honoris, munieris attigerunt, omnis acerbissimas impiorum poenas pertulerunt. et quoniam M. Brutus atque illius temporis feci mentionem, commemorabo id quod ego meti iuici, cum semissim Capuam, colonia iam deducta L. Consio et Sec. Salvio, quem ad medium ipsi loquuntur, *praetoribus*, ut intellegatis quantum locus ipse adfert superbiam, quae paucis diebus quibus illo colonia deducta est perspicui atque intelligi potuit. Also see ibid., 33.89. On the reasons why Consio must be preferred to Considio or Consilio, see Harvey 1981, 299-301.} The colony was probably founded between the end of 84 BC and the beginning of 83 BC, by the tribune M. Brutus, a member of the *populares*, and was governed by two magistrates, called *praetores*. At least one of the two *praetores* mentioned by Cicero, L. Consius, certainly had Campanian origins.\footnote{Harvey 1981, 302-311. Cf. Beloch 1879, 305-306; Rudolph 1935, 139-141. On the history of the *ager Campanus*, see Beloch 1879, 360-374.} The function of a colonial settlement in that area is quite clear: that part of the *ager Campanus* was both fertile and strategically crucial. The revenue flow from the Greek East to Italy, interrupted by the Mithridatic War and by the victory of Sulla, had to be offset by intensifying the exploitation of that part of Campania.\footnote{Harvey 1982, 156-167 is fundamental on these points; cf. Minieri 2002, 252-256. On Cicero’s characterisation of Capua in the speeches *de lege agraria*, see Fontanella 2005, 179-183.}

Brutus, however, did not have much time to develop the settlement. He may have assigned some land allotments, but it is unlikely that he managed to go any further. After the battle on the Mount Tifata, Sulla’s control of the area was unrivalled. The colony was certainly dismantled. Some of the land of Capua was later assigned to the Sullan veterans without a new colony being founded on the site.\footnote{Lib. col. 232.1. The position of the neighbouring colony of Urbana is uncertain, but I tend to believe that it was not founded in the *ager Campanus* (see infra).} Another part of the land that had been assigned (or was bound to be assigned) to the settlers was given to the Diana sanctuary of the Mount Tifata. What was a reward to the temple, after the victory Sulla had obtained in its vicinities. This decision had a great political relevance, comparable to a declaration of *asylia* in the Greek East, and its solemnity was confirmed by the means that Sulla chose to represent it. According to Velleius, he put up two inscriptions: a dedication to the goddess (*gratiae religionis memoriam*), and a bronze table, displayed inside the temple, which probably contained a list of the

\[105\] Cic. leg. agr. 2.34.92-93: *nam et ipse qui deducit, et qui magistratum Capuae illo creante ceperunt, et qui aliquam partem illius deductionis, honoris, munieris attigerunt, omnis acerbissimas impiorum poenas pertulerunt. et quoniam M. Brutus atque illius temporis feci mentionem, commemorabo id quod ego meti iuici, cum semissim Capuam, colonia iam deducta L. Consio et Sec. Salvio, quem ad medium ipsi loquuntur, *praetoribus*, ut intellegatis quantum locus ipse adfert superbiam, quae paucis diebus quibus illo colonia deducta est perspicui atque intelligi potuit. Also see ibid., 33.89. On the reasons why Consio must be preferred to Considio or Consilio, see Harvey 1981, 299-301.


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\[108\] Lib. col. 232.1. The position of the neighbouring colony of Urbana is uncertain, but I tend to believe that it was not founded in the *ager Campanus* (see infra).
territories put under the control of the sanctuary.\textsuperscript{109} Augustus later carried out a proper reassessment of the jurisdiction of the sanctuary, and he is said to have given it a proper cadastral structure \textit{(forma)}, confirmed by Vespasian.\textsuperscript{110} The modern centre of Sant’Angelo in Formis, whose Basilica has annexed the foundations of the temple, may owe its name to this ancient administrative decision.\textsuperscript{111} Assigning new territory to a community, and especially to a sanctuary, was a sign of extraordinary favour.\textsuperscript{112}

Such a decision was aimed to reassure all Campanian communities about Sulla’s intentions, and to show the rewards that loyalty to him could bring: a practical example of the self-penned sentence which, according to Plutarch, he wanted to be written on his tombstone, and whose accuracy he had so often shown in the Greek East.\textsuperscript{113} The sanctuary was pleased to show its gratitude adding to the list of prodigies in honour of Sulla. The restless fight of two goats on the Tifata, which had occurred some time before Sulla’s departure from Greece, was promptly interpreted, most presumably \textit{post euentum}, as a premonition of the battle he fought against Norbanus.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{109} Vell. 2.25.4. See Beloch 1879, 361-362; De Franciscis 1959, 340; Harvey 1982, 169-170. Bodei Gigioni 1977, 38 argues that Sulla gave land to the sanctuary after using its treasure, as he had done in Greece, but the evidence does not support the claim. I do not think that the land assignments to the sanctuary contradict Cicero’s statement that \textit{L. Sulla... agrum Campanum attingere ausus est (leg. agr. 2.29.81)}, as claimed in Laffi 1966, 100: Cicero refers to viritane assignments, or to the foundation of colonies of veterans. Franciosi 2002, 244-248 adds little to the discussion.


\textsuperscript{111} See Beloch 1879, 15; De Franciscis 1959, 307-308 revives the argument of the eighteenth-century erudite F. M. Pratilli that the toponym may derive from the coincidence of two meanings of the Latin word \textit{forma}: ‘cadastral asset’ and ‘aqueduct’. About the remains of the sanctuary and the Basilica, see De Franciscis 1959, 314-343, 352-353; Kirsten 1975, 574-583.

\textsuperscript{112} See Frederiksen 1984, 265: the temple had already been in control of some territory for a long time. Scheid 2006, 78-79 stresses how important it was for Sulla that the sanctuary was autonomous, or ‘autrement dit dépendant de Rome seule’. The inscription on the pavement of the Basilica of S. Angelo (\textit{CIL} 10.3935 = \textit{AE} 1996, 429 = \textit{AE} 1997, 316) is not relevant to our discussion: the best text is in Pobjoy 1997, with a full survey of earlier bibliography; also cf. Batino 1996.

\textsuperscript{113} Plut. \textit{Sull.} 38.6: \textit{τό δ’ ἐπιγραμμᾶ ἄσθιν αὐτόν ὑπογραφάμενον καταλπεῖν, ὦ κεφάλαιων ἐστιν ὡς ὃτε τῶν φιλῶν τις αὐτόν εἰ ποιών ὁδε τῶν ἐξήρων κακῶς ὑπερβάλετο.}

\textsuperscript{114} Plut. \textit{Sull.} 27.8.
Sulla's dismantling of the Marian colony at Capua represented a novel way to demonstrate his interest in, and gain control over, a strategic area. Supporting a sanctuary whose identity was inextricably linked to the city was no doubt a sign of benevolence. Assigning it territory which the Marians had allotted to Roman colonists was a sign of his utmost respect for its autonomy and special status. This is perhaps the most important example of that ‘political warfare’ which appears to have been the distinctive trademark of Sulla’s conduct in Italy after the Social War. Sulla’s strategy required a widespread use of violence, but always with a clear political agenda, whereby war was exploited as a chance to reshape the status of a territory and the balance of power within it.

The attitude shown by Sulla against the communities that had opposed him or sheltered his enemies was completely different. I have already touched upon the clearest case, that of Praeneste, whose conquest was to some extent the prologue to the proscriptions and the political (and often physical) annihilation of the defeated. Sulla’s wrath did not just target the individuals, but also led to an exemplary punishment for the city.

After the victory obtained by Sulla at the Colline Gate, the destiny of Praeneste was clear to anybody. The city surrendered, and, after a failed attempt to flee it, Marius the Younger, who had fled there, took his own life. Sulla himself returned to Praeneste and supervised the slaughter of those who had taken part in the resistance. However, the city was not destroyed, nor was its famous sanctuary, dedicated to Fortuna Primigenia, one of the most important religious centres of ancient Italy. Some time later, a colony was founded in the city, as part of the broader plan of the Sullan veteran settlements. Two crucial consequences of Sulla’s victory in Italy, the physical elimination of the adversaries and the reorganisation of the territory by the foundation of a colony feature very prominently in the context of Praeneste.

The history of the city is inextricably linked to that of the great sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia, and the Sullan age is no exception. The systematic excavations of the sanctuary started in 1944, and the discoverers of the site distinguished two of its main elements: an ‘upper sanctuary’ and a ‘lower sanctuary’, divided by a series of terraces. In their view, the upper sanctuary dating back to 150 BC ca., and the lower one bore the traces of a Sullan intervention, which must have been part of a

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115 Fernique 1880, 53-56 is still an excellent account; on the siege, also see Gardner 1920 and Lewis 1971.
restoration of the whole sanctuary. Such a chronology was a salutary reaction to the widespread opinion, established long before the beginning of any serious archaeological research on the site, dating the whole sanctuary to the age of Sulla.

This *idea regae* was based on a passage of Pliny the Elder's *Naturalis Historia*, which mentions an intervention of Sulla on the architecture of the sanctuary. Referring to the different kinds of floor decorations, Pliny states: *lithostrota coepit aere iam sub Sulla, parvulis certis existat hodie quod in Fortunae delubro Praeneste fecit* (36.189). F. Zevi persuasively showed how the antiquarian tradition took this passage as solid evidence that Sulla undertook a major renovation of the sanctuary, and how deeply this ill-founded conviction has influenced scholarly discussions of this complex site. In fact, Pliny just referred to the restoration of the floor in the temple of Fortuna, and especially to the presence of mosaic for decoration purposes, apparently unprecedented in the Republican period.

The interpretation of the archaeological evidence from the site opened further problems. A closer study of the two 'sanctuaries' revealed a set of significant differences between them, which suggest that the structures are actually independent from each other. The so-called 'lower sanctuary' is in fact not a religious building, reproducing the functions of the upper temple, but rather a public structure. This interpretation, forcefully put forward by Coarelli and Zevi, is now widely accepted, and it has two main advantages. First, its interpretation of the sanctuary of Praeneste is consistent with what we know about the other main sanctuaries of Latium: the duplication of a religious building within the same sanctuary is unparalleled. Moreover, it leads to a much more convincing reconstruction of the urban development of Praeneste. Since Praeneste is, along with Pompeii, the only Sullan colony for which there is some significant archaeological evidence, it is worth devoting some attention to it.

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116 Fasolo-Gullini 1955, 301-323; Kähler 1958; Gullini 1991, 497-498, 511-513. For a critique of this approach, see Coarelli 1987, 62-63; about the negative influence of the 'myth of Sulla' on archaeologists, see Coarelli 1977, 9.


118 The scholarly debate on this passage is summarised in Lavagne 1988, 238-255, also speculating that Sulla may have introduced the cult of Isis to Praeneste.

The so-called 'upper sanctuary' must be regarded as the actual sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia, built in the second century BC, taking up the legacy of a cult that existed already in the third century BC. An obvious source of funding for its construction were the resources gathered by the affluent negotiatores from Praeneste, whose presence is well attested in the Greek East, and who kept a significant role in their native community.\textsuperscript{120} Below the 'upper sanctuary', clearly separated by a series of three terraces, there was a public space, occupied by an 'aula absidata' that had long been thought to be the delubrum Fortunae whose pavement was refurbished by Sulla.\textsuperscript{121} The complex must be seen as a whole structure, closely integrated with the area now occupied by Piazza Regina Margherita and the Church of S. Agapito. In this site F. Zevi recognised the traces of an archaic temple, unrelated to the sanctuary, which is to be identified with the centre of the civic cult of Iuppiter.\textsuperscript{122}

Before the siege and the bloody sack that changed its history, Praeneste was therefore organised around two independent poles, the sanctuary and the forum.\textsuperscript{123} The development of the city therefore proceeded by a gradual diffusion from the hilltop. Republican Praeneste, however, was almost entirely enclosed within the city walls and there is evidence only for a very limited development of the settlement in the flat land at the foot of the hill. A drastic change occurred after the Sullan conquest and with the later foundation of the colony. It is in this area, rather than in the sanctuary, that the traces of Sulla's presence must be looked for.\textsuperscript{124}


\textsuperscript{121} Sulla's direct interventions on the sanctuary were in fact very limited: Coarelli 1976, 339; Coarelli 1987, 66. About the topography of the 'aula absidata', see the informed discussion in Lavagne 1988, 228-231, whose interpretation seems however untenable to me.

\textsuperscript{122} Zevi 1989, 41-46. Cf. the dedication to Iuppiter Optimus Maximus by M. Aeficius and A. Saufeius (AE 1989, 133): the dating and the archaeological context are unknown, but it is not unlikely that it is later than the foundation of the Sullan colony (Granino Cecere 1989, 150-151).

\textsuperscript{123} There are important discussions on the differences and the relations between the 'world of Fortuna' and the 'world of Iuppiter' in Brellich 1976, 17-55 and Champeaux 1982, 97-101, 437-446. On the analogies between the religious identities of Rome and Praeneste, see M. Torelli 1989.

\textsuperscript{124} For the lower city, see in general Quilici 1980, dealing with topographical problems, and Quilici 1989, focusing on the architectural features of the buildings of the colony; a survey of recent excavations in S. Gatti 2003. Cf. Quilici 1982 on the discovery of a mosaic with the judgment of Paris in the area of the Sullan settlement.
The task is made considerably harder by the recent history of modern settlement in modern Palestrina. After the Second World War, the town experienced uncontrolled building activity, involving many areas that had not been occupied for centuries and which probably corresponded to the site of the Sullan colony. Such a disaster was possible even although public authorities had duly forbidden any intervention in many areas, especially in that known as the Quadrilatero. Its effect was to make any future survey of the urban structure of ancient Praeneste much more difficult. No effective counter-measures were taken until the Seventies. Only then was a systematic study of the extent and of the impact of this devastation undertaken, and serious investigations were carried out.

L. Quilici provided a convincing picture of the urban development of Praeneste. In his reconstruction, the lower city is a later development of an earlier settlement built around the civic temple whose site is now occupied by S. Agapito, of course related to the Sanctuary of Fortuna, situated on the upper part of the hill. The lower city is an expansion of this earlier settlement, whose boundaries actually go beyond the area of the Quadrilatero usually identified as the site of the Sullan 'military colony'. Archaeological evidence has now confirmed beyond any doubt that it was not an outcome of Sullan colonisation. The first bulk of the lower city was built in the second half of the second century, the most likely period of the construction, or rather monumentalisation, of the sanctuary. In this period, Praeneste was at the peak of its wealth, and it is not surprising that a reorganisation of the lower city was carried out some time before the coming of Sulla. The grid of the Sullan city clearly overlaps with that of an earlier settlement, partly adapting itself to its structure, and partly introducing a different orientation.

Although the model of a strong caesura between a pre-Sullan and a post-Sullan Praeneste is no longer tenable, as far as the urban structure is concerned, some particular features of the Sullan settlement are however recognisable. The houses of the new settlers show some innovative features. A new material, the semi-reticulated limestone, a technique typically used in the post-Sullan period, is clearly recognisable in many buildings. However, it was not used everywhere, and the houses of the families which survived the Sullan sack are distinguishable because they do not feature

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125 Quilici 1979.
it. Moreover, traces of an ancient subdivision of the land, following a grid pattern, have recently been detected in the southwestern area of the *ager*.

Many details of the structure of the Sullan colony, however, are unknown. It appears that the old city forum, located in the area of the Cathedral, ceased to be in use after the foundation of the colony. A later forum has tentatively been located in the area of the church of the Madonna dell’Aquila, but its exact location has not been determined yet. Other public buildings have been excavated, but a full report is still pending.

Other kinds of evidence, both literary and documentary, do not reveal much about the structure of the Sullan colony either. Land assignments are mentioned in a controversial passage of Florus, along with other cities that probably were not colonies at the time, and by a tangential reference made by Strabo. Moreover, Cicero explicitly calls Praeneste a *colonia*. Two inscriptions, almost identical in content, refer to a fountain, offered *colonis incol[is hospitibus* by the generosity of a local magistrate (*CIL* 14.2978 and 2979). An inscription records the refurbishment of a public bath by the *duoviri* of the colony Q. Vibuleius and L. Statius. The stone appears to have been found in the same area of the lower city where the public baths, dating to the Imperial age, have been located (*CIL* 14.3013). Although it does not have a clear archaeological context, there is reason to believe that the text does not date much later than the foundation of the colony.

If his veterans were to settle there, it was certainly in Sulla’s interest to contribute to the recovery of a community that his conquest had so deeply affected. A number of inscriptions show that other interventions were carried out in the sanctuary soon after the foundation of the colony. Two fragments of travertine discovered on the site bear traces of the word *reficiendum* and, even more significantly, a third one shows the name of *Varro Lucullus*. It has been argued that it is a fragment of a

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127 Muzzioli 1993.
128 Flor. 2.9.27: *municipia Italiæ splendidissima sub hasta venierunt, Spoletium Interamnium, Praeneste, Florentia, Strab. 5.3.11 = C 239.
129 Cic. *Cat.* 1.4.8. Praeneste reobtained the municipal status under Tiberius (Gell. 16.13.5: *Praenestinos autem refert maximo opere a Tiberio imperatore potisse onasque, ut ex colonia in municipii statum redigentur, idque ilis Tiberium pro ferenda gratia tribuisse, quod in eorum finibus sub ipso oppido ex capitali morbo renuauisset*). On Florus’ passage, see Gabba 1970/1971 (= Gabba 1973, 361-367), and infra.
130 See Dessau’s commentary in *CIL* 10.
column of a porticus built in the sanctuary by Marcus Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73), brother of L. Licinius Lucullus and quaestor in Greece during the Mithridatic campaign.\(^ {132}\) He was a prominent figure of the Sullan camp: he was entrusted with striking the so-called Lucullan coins, loyalty supported of Sulla during the Civil War, and he probably was one of the deductores of the colony of Praeneste.\(^ {133}\)

It is conceivable that other restorations took place after the sack of the city, and they were probably due to the initiatives of the new settlers, and of their political protectors. Not very much is known, however, of the history of Praeneste until the war between Octavianus and Antonius, or of its economic and social history in the last decades of the Republic. Moreover, we have a poor knowledge of local magistracies in the decades following the birth of the colony. This is an aspect of a more general problem. Little is known about the composition of the population of the colony, and consequently about the distribution of political power, property and wealth within the new community.

According to Appian, Sulla decided to spare the lives of the populares besieged in Praeneste, whom Appian loosely calls ‘Ῥωμαῖοι’.\(^ {134}\) As mentioned above, all the male citizens of the municipium, on the contrary, were exterminated, along with the Samnites who had come to support the resistance against Sulla.\(^ {135}\) Only women and

\(^ {132}\) Degrassi 1969, 119 (= Degrassi 1971, 11).


\(^ {134}\) App. b. c. 1.94.436-438: λοικρήτιος δ’ ἐπεὶ Πραινεστῶν ἐλεῖ, τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἐνταῦθα Μαρίῳ στρατηγοῦντων τοὺς μὲν αὐτίκα ἀνήκει, τοὺς δ’ ἐς φυλακὴν ἐσέβαλεν· ὅς ὁ Σόλλας ἐπέλθηκεν ἀνίκει. καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πραινεστῶ προσέβαλε, ἤλθον προελθὲν ἀπαντησέν τὸ πεδίον καὶ προελθὼν τὸς μὲν ἐστὶν τὸ Χρώματος γενομένος, ὁλίγοις πάμπας, ἔσεθεν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐκέλευσεν ἐς τρία ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων διαστήματα., Ῥωμαῖοι τε καὶ Σαυνίταις καὶ Πραινεστῶς· ἐπεὶ δὲ διεστημάτησαν, τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίοις ἐπεκήρυξαν, ὅτι καὶ ἄδει ἄλλατον διεθώρασι, καὶ συγγνώμην ἔδωκαν ὄμοις, τοὺς δ’ ἐτέρους κατηγούσεν ἀπαντησέν γίνωσκαί δὲ αὐτῶσ καὶ παιδία μεθὲν ἀπαθεῖς ἀπεδόναι. καὶ τὴν πόλιν διήρησε, πολυχρῆμαν ἐν τοῖς μάλλιστα τότε ὠίσαν. Of course, Marius the Younger was on the proscription list from the start: Hinard 1985a, 60, 375-377.

\(^ {135}\) Sulla certainly punished a part of the Samnite elites, but there is no evidence that he ever envisaged, or carried out any retaliation on the Samnites as an ethnic group. His impact on Samnium has been
children were spared. Strabo often exaggerates his statements about the impact of wars on a community or a people. However, his account cannot be entirely dismissed, and there is no reason to rule out that Sulla actually decided an exemplary punishment for a city that had strongly supported his enemies. Even if we assume that some local families escaped the slaughter thanks to their connections at Rome, the impact of Sulla's decision on the demography of Praeneste is still hard to deny. The colonists arrived in a city that was depopulated, and this probably concurs to explain why we do not have any evidence for tensions between 'old' and 'new' citizens like it is the case, for instance, with Pompeii.

Confirmation of the picture given by Appian has been sought in the inscriptive evidence from the only necropolis of Republican Praeneste known so far, that of La Colombella. A. Degrassi calculated that, out of the 138 gentes attested in the Republican age by the inscriptions from the Colombella necropolis, only twenty are still attested after 82 BC.\textsuperscript{136} This led him to argue for a steady decrease in the presence of the names of the old gentes in the local magistracies, and to draw an analogy with another Sullan colony, that of Pompeii, where local families appear to have recovered political influence only in the Augustan age. The argument, however, is not convincing. The context of Praeneste is altogether different in an important respect, since the exclusion of the traditional families from political life argued by Degrassi would be an effect of the elimination of most of their members, which does not

\textsuperscript{136} Degrassi 1969, 114-116 (= Degrassi 1971, 5-7), developing a point made by H. Dessau in CIL XIV, p. 289. According to this reconstruction, the figure could be even lower, as some names may be those of new families which came to Praeneste after the foundation of the colony and happened to be homonymous to older ones. Degrassi's interpretation was accepted by Harvey 1975, 41-48; Coarelli 1976; Gros 1978, 50-51; Coarelli 1987, 62-65; Cébeillac-Gervasoni 1996, 200, 259-260. Harvey 1975, 50-52 argues that several Praenestan families appear to have held magistracies soon after the Sullan conquest and in the Augustan age, but underrates the risk of homonymity (of which he is however aware: ibid., 51, fn. 49).
appear to have taken place in Pompeii. However, there is an even stronger objection to this reconstruction. As M. Clauss has pointed out, the evidence used by Degrassi is from just one necropolis, which was used only in the third and in the second century BC. The necropolis (or necropoleis) in use immediately before and during the Sullan period has (or have) never been unearthed.\textsuperscript{137} In this context, there is no room for a serious statistical survey.

The epigraphic evidence being so unhelpful, one is compelled to make sense of the literary evidence, however unclear it may be. Even if one views Appian’s claim that ‘all the male citizens’ of Praeneste were killed as excessive, it remains beyond dispute that Praeneste is the only Sullan colony where a slaughter of the inhabitants is known to have taken place before the coming of the settlers. On the other hand, it must be considered that Sulla’s revenge may well not have affected all the members of prominent families. More importantly, the survival of the children allowed continuity, and several nomina of the old Praenestan aristocracy re-emerged some decades after the foundation of the Sullan colony.\textsuperscript{138} The quantitative size of the new civic elite represented by the colonists is hard to establish too. We are slightly better informed, however, about the impact of the colony on the economic and social structures of Praeneste.

Making the case for the repeal of the agrarian reform presented by the tribune Rullus, in 63 BC, Cicero warned the Roman people against the risk implied by that bill. He claimed that the aim of a fairer distribution of the land was not to be achieved by that kind of law, which only favoured a privileged number of profiteers, usually involved in the crucial process of assigning the land allotments. That this would be the outcome of Rullus’ law is confirmed by some recent examples, among which Cicero chose Praeneste.\textsuperscript{139} According to his account, property concentration was made possible in the Sullan colonies by the unfair choices of the deductores, who assigned

\textsuperscript{137} Clauss 1977, 132-133; cf. the vehement and unpersuasive critique of Coarelli 1987, 63-65, who claims that the local elite of the early first century BC stopped using the necropolis and started to use monumental graves. Coarelli 1992, 259 appears to consider the disappearance of onomastic evidence from private inscriptions as a symptom of the rise of evergetism and the higher number of public inscriptions.

\textsuperscript{138} Harvey 1975, 48-49: the Dindii and the Magulnii certainly did.

\textsuperscript{139} Cic. leg. agr. 2.78: non agrum quidem Campasnum quem webs estantant ipso concipierunt; deducunt suas, quorum nomine ipsi teneant et fuanitur, coement preterea, ists dina ingera continuavunt. nam si dicent per legem id non licere, ne per Cornelium quidem licet, ut uidemus, ut longinquam mittamus, agrum Praenestinum a pauis possideri.
land to people who would entrust the allotments to other people to administer on their behalf, although the *lex Cornelia* that dealt with the foundation of new colonies explicitly forbade the settlers to sell the lots they had been assigned. Praeneste was the first example at hand, for Cicero was speaking to a Roman audience about a bill that would affect Campania. His words, however, make it clear that this was definitely not an exception.

Two decades after the Sullan foundation, Cicero stated that the territory of Praeneste was controlled by a small group of families, who surely had both wealth and political influence. Of course it may be argued that Cicero deformed reality, possibly for rhetorical reasons, or just because of ignorance. It is significant that, in this part of the speech, he did not attack Sulla or his projects. This should encourage to see this piece of information as reasonably accurate. However, the actual composition of this group of *pauci* remains unclear. P. Harvey is probably right in arguing that they included both successful colonists who had coped well with the demands of their new life and members of some Praenestan families that Sulla had spared from the massacre, such as the Saufeii or the Samiarii, who are known from late Republican inscriptions, but it is impossible to go further.

The history of post-Sullan Praeneste sums up various aspects of Sulla’s policies in Italy, and is strongly related to the two most important initiatives that Sulla took in Italy: the proscriptions and the colonisation. The conquest of Praeneste was the moment that triggered these two parallel processes, and that best shows how deeply linked they were. In the next section I will try to show this relationship in more detail.

### 2.3. Sullan colonisation in Italy: back to the basics

Cicero’s passage prompts more general questions about the economic and social consequences of Sullan colonisation. To discuss them in more detail, it is now worth dealing with the evidence we have for the colonial foundations decided by Sulla.
after the Civil War. Unfortunately, it is incomparably less rich and less detailed than that for the triumviral or Augustan colonial programme.\textsuperscript{142}

Appian says that Sulla settled 120,000 veterans throughout Italy.\textsuperscript{143} It seems certain that they belonged to twenty-three legions, as the same source records, and they were assigned ‘a large amount of land in the territories of the cities, some of it being still undivided, and some of it being withdrawn from the cities as a punishment’.\textsuperscript{144} The sources of the land used for these assignments are clearly identified by Appian: the \textit{ager publicus} and some of the \textit{ager} of the cities that Sulla punished for their stance during the Civil War.\textsuperscript{145} It is quite safe to argue that Sulla used some of land belonging to the victims of the proscription, which he could dispose of in his capacity of dictator.\textsuperscript{146}

It is significant that Appian does not explicitly mention the foundation of colonies. Since we know that Sulla created at least a dozen colonies, this passage could seem odd, or inaccurate. In fact, it simply provides an interpretation viewing the foundation of the colonies as part of a wider process, whereby Sulla assigned land to his soldiers in many areas of Italy, not necessarily accompanying the assignment with

\textsuperscript{142} Keppie 1983, 49-86.

\textsuperscript{143} App. \textit{b. c.} 1.104.489: ἀμφὲς δὲ τὴν Ἰταλίαν διώδεκα μυρίαδες ἀνδρῶν ἔσαυ. On the reliability of the figure, see Krawczuk 1960, 53-56 and Keppie 1983, 39; the scepticism of Hirschfeld 1913 is probably excessive (Krawczuk 1960, 54, fn. 14). Kromayer 1914, 160 reckons that 100,000 veterans were settled; Brunt 1971, 305 argues that they were 80,000. Chouquer 1987, 382 suggests that the Sullan land division covered between 100,000 and 300,000 iugera, but see Gabba 1989 (= Gabba 1994a, 197-201) on the unreliability of this kind of estimates.

\textsuperscript{144} App. \textit{b. c.} 1.100.470: τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐπινοῶν τέλεσα τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ στρατευσαμένους τραυ καὶ ἑκοσιον ἐπένειμεν, ὡς μοι προείρηται, πολλὴν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γῆν, τὴν μὲν ἔτι οὕσαν ἀνέμητον, τὴν δὲ τὰς πόλεις ἀφαιρώμενος. The figure of twenty-three legions is certainly more reliable than that of forty-seven given in Liv. \textit{Per.} 89.12: \textit{XLVII legiones in agros captos deducit et eos his dimitit}. This \textit{XLVII} may well be a corruption of \textit{XXIII}: Krawczuk 1960, 54-55; Harmand 1967, 445, fn. 43; 471-472, fn. 243. It is interesting however, that Livy’s emphasis is on the land assignments, rather than on the foundation of colonies. Brunt 1971, 305 speculates that each legion was settled in a different colony, and that the Sullan colonies may actually be 23 in total.

\textsuperscript{145} The exploitation of the \textit{ager publicus} is denied in Rudolph 1935, 161, fn. 1, but there is no evidence supporting the claim: Krawczuk 1960, 56, fn. 26. Caesar’s claim in App. \textit{b. c.} 2.94.395, where he blames Sulla for having supported his settlement programme only with the confiscations, is surely inaccurate.

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. Cic. \textit{Verr.} 2.3.81: (Sulla) \textit{tantum animi habuit ad audaciorem ut dicere in contione non dubitaret, bona cismum Romanorum cum uenderet, se praeudam suam uenderre}. See Hinard 1985a, 189-191.
the foundation of a colony. Moreover, all the known Sullan colonies, except Urbana in Campania and Aleria in Corsica, were founded on the territories of already existing communities. It is surely significant that Cicero once referred to the Sullan colonies with the verb *constituerunt*, normally used for the *municipia*, instead of *deducrent*.

For the sake of clarity, I will organise the list of the communities affected by Sulla's colonial programme in four categories.

**A.** Here follows a list of the certain Sullan colonies, in alphabetical order.

*Aleria.*

*Corsica...abest a Vadis Volaterranis LXII, civitates habet XXXII et colonias Marianam, a C. Mario deductam, Aleriam, a dictatore Sulla* (Plin. 3.80.). Nothing else is known about this community, certainly founded as a response to the Colonia Mariana, which, however, appears not to have been dismantled after the defeat of the *populares.*

*Arretium.*

Cicero mentions settlers of the colonies of Arretium and Faesulae among the followers of Catiline in Mur. 49: *Catilinam interea alacrem atque laetum, stipatum choro iuventutis, nullatum indicibus atque sicaris, inflatum cum spe militum <tum> conlegae mei, quem ad modum dicebat ipse, promissis, circumfluentem colonorum Arrelinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu; quam turbam dissimilimo ex genere distinguebant homines perculsi Sudani temporis calamitate.* Apparently, the communities had different names too, as Pliny distinguishes three groups of Arretini (3.52): *Arretini Uetens, Arretini Fidentions, Arretini Iulienses.* The *coloni Fidentiores* are also attested by CIL 11.6675.

*Capitolum.*

*lege Sullanae est deductum (lib. col. 232.20).* The verb *deducrent* points to a colonial foundation. Nothing else is known about the history of this town in this period.

*Faesulae.*

Along with Cic. Mur. 49, the presence of Sullan veterans is referred to by Licinianus (36.36-37): *Faesulani irruperunt in castella veteranorum Sullanorum.*

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147 Cic. Cat. 2.20: *hi sunt homines ex eis coloniis quas Sulla constituit.*

148 Cf. the lists in Mommsen 1883, 164-175 (= Mommsen 1908, 205-214); Gabba 1951, 270-272 (= Gabba 1973, 172-174); Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62); Krawczuk 1960, 57-62; Hinrichs 1974, 67-68.


150 It is unclear why Beloch 1880, 5, 8 used the same passage as evidence for a Sullan colony at Cortona. Pliny simply mentions the *Cortonenses* in a list of the Etruscan communities that is opened by Arretium.
Pompeii.

The foundation and the political life of the colony are dealt with in Cicero’s Pro Sulla (21; 60-62). The full name of the colony, Colonia Veneria Cornelia Pompeianorum is still attested epigraphically for the age of Nero and is to be explained by a Sullan foundation.  

Praeneste.

As seen above, in 63 Cicero called it a colony (Cat. 1.3.9), and implicitly referred to the presence of Sullan settlers in its territory (agr. 2.28.78). Also see CIL 14.2978 and 2979; cf. Flor. 2.9.27 and Strabo 5.3.11 = C 239.

Suessula.

Suessula: oppidum: lege Sullanae est deducta: ager eius veteranis limitibus Sullanis in ingeribus est adsignatus (lib. col. 237.5). The use of the verb deducere suggests that the city was a colony. The presence of the duoviri seems to confirm it.  

Urbana.


Vibinum.

A recently published inscription shows that the city had a colonial status between 195 and 197 AD, when it dedicated an inscription to Caracalla. It is significant that its official name contains no reference to Caesar, or to Augustus. It is quite likely that the colony was Sullan, and that it was created to ensure a better control of an area traditionally controlled by the Samnites. Unfortunately, no systematic archaeological investigation of the territory has ever been undertaken.

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151 Abellinum had the same epithet, but there is no evidence that it was a Sullan colony: Chouquer 1987, 168-169.
152 See CIL 10.3764 and 3765.
153 The contributio probably dates to the age of Vespasian, a phase of apparent demographic contraction for Urbana: see Laffi 1966, 106-109, with earlier bibliography. Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) argues, against the evidence, that Urbana ‘seems to have been founded on part of the territory of Capua’.
155 Pani 1991, 128.
Although it has long been considered a Sullan colony, Clusium must be excluded from the list. Pliny the Elder mentions the existence of Clusini novi and Clusini veteres (3.52), and this coexistence of two separate communities has been compared to the situation of Arretium, where a Sullan settlement is certain. Moreover, the importance of the city in the Civil War and its ties with the Marians are well-known.\(^{157}\) A dedication to Sulla Felix dictator has been seen as further evidence for the existence of a colony.\(^{158}\) However, a new survey of the epigraphy from Clusium has shown that all the inscriptions mentioning the quattuorviri appear to date back to the first century BC, whereas the duoviri are safely attested only in post-Augustan texts.\(^{159}\) It is much safer, therefore, to rule out a Sullan foundation, as well as the coexistence of a Doppelgemeinde of municipes and Sullan colonists, with two different magistracy systems. The Clusini novi mentioned by Pliny are probably Augustan veterans. During the First Civil War, Clusium was an important front for the military operations. After the conflict, the local aristocracy managed to build some connections with Sulla, and to avoid a heavy punishment.

B. For other communities there is some evidence that they had a colonial status in the period between Sulla and the triumviral foundations, although there is no explicit record of a Sullan colonisation.

Abella.

In 73 BC, the troops of Spartacus launch an attack in colonos Abellanos praesidentes agros suos (Sall. Hist. 3.97).\(^{160}\) Since we do not know of any earlier foundation, they are likely to have been Sullan settlers.\(^{161}\) It cannot be ruled out that it

\(^{157}\) On the importance of Clusium in the war, see App. b. c. 1.89.408 and 412; 1.92.425-426.

\(^{158}\) CIL. 11.2102. See Fell 1924, 165-166; Harris 1971, 263; contra, Pfiffig 1965, 279-280; Pfiffig 1966, 61-62; Pfiffig 1979, 146-147. Luchi 1981, 419 speculates that the depopulation of the ager Clusinus was a consequence of the colonisation.

\(^{159}\) Pack-Paolucci 1987, 164-173, with AE 1987, 364; Mansuelli 1993 restates that the Clusini Novi were Sullan colonists, completely overlooking the inscriptions evidence. The city walls were renovated in the first century BC, but there is no evidence that this was related to a Sullan colonisation: Borghi 2002, 87-88. On the local aristocracy in the Hellenistic period, see Massa-Parlault 1990.

\(^{160}\) Cf. CIL. 11.1210; CIL. 10, p. 136.

\(^{161}\) De Neeve 1984, 38, fn. 39, with earlier bibliography.
was a foundation of the *populares*, but, in that case, it remains obscure why Sulla did not overthrow, as was the case at Capua.\footnote{Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) fails to do that.}

Interamna Praetuttiorum.

Apparently, the city received a settlement of Sullan colonists. There is good epigraphical evidence for the presence of duoviri from the first century BC, and Florus ranks the city among the *florentissima municipia* punished by Sulla (2.9.27).\footnote{About the duoviri, see *CIL* 1².3296 and 1905; *CIL* 9.5067, 5074 and 5075, with Buonocore 1998, 466-467.} The inscriptional references to *municiipes et coloni* (*CIL* 1².1904; *CIL* 9.5074 and 5075) are no evidence for the existence of a *Doppelgemeinde* of natives and Sullan veterans. They just have an ‘antiquarian’ meaning, and convey the memory of the foundation of the colony following the creation of the *municipium*.\footnote{Buonocore 1998, 466; cf. Keppie 1983, 103, fn. 13, suggesting that there was ‘some uncertainty over nomenclature and terminology in the opening years of the new settlement’. *Contra*, Rudolph 1935, 92, fn. 2; Gehanke 1983, 482-485. The colonisation appears to have led to the emergence of a wealthy local elite: Guidobaldi 2001, 89.}

Nola.

*muro ducta colonia Augusta. Vespasianus Aug. deducit. iter populo debetur ped. CXX. ager eius limitibus Sullanis militi fuerat adsignatus, postea intercessuis mensuris colonis et familiae est adiudicatus (lib. col. 236.4).*\footnote{See Beloch 1879, 391; Gabba 1951, 236 (= Gabba 1973, 127); Hinrichs 1974, 73; Keppie 1983, 152; Campbell 2000, 422-423, fn. 132. A similar titulature, *[Colonia Iulia Felix Augusta Capua]*, was used for *Capua*: *CIL* 10.3832. There is virtually no archaeological evidence for the period following the coming of the Sullan settlers to Nola: Kirsten 1975, 611.} The official name of the city under the Empire was *Felix Augusta Nola* (*CIL* 10.1244). Although it is unclear when the names were adopted, the stance taken by the city in the Civil War makes the foundation of a Sullan colony more likely than a simple distribution of land.\footnote{Cf. Chouquer 1987, 225-226, with earlier bibliography.}

Spoletium.

Nothing is known about this community, which opens Florus’s list (2.9.27): *municipia Italiae splendidissima sub hasta venierunt, Spoletium, Interamnium, Praeneste, Florentia*. As is the case with Florentia, the foundation of a colony cannot be excluded.
However, the lack of epigraphic evidence makes it safer to argue that only land assignments took place.\(^{167}\)

C. Other cities were affected by Sullan viritane land assignments, without a colony being founded on their territories. Livy and Appian stress the close relation between the colonisation and the viritane assignments, and it appears that they both were dealt with by a general law.

Capua.

*mutu ducto colonia Iulia Felix, iussu imperatoris Caesaris a viginti uiris est deducta. iter populo debetur ped. C. ager eius lege Sullana fuerat adsignatus: postea Caesar in uigeribus militi pro merito dividi iussit* (lib. col. 232.1).\(^{168}\) The epithet *Iulia Felix* could have been given by Caesar, and it may be explained by the presence of Sullan land assignments, rather than with the foundation of a colony.\(^{169}\)

Forum Corneli.

In the *Passio Sancti Cassiani Forocomeliensis*, Prudentius says that the city was founded by Sulla (*Peristephanon* 9.1-2):

*Sylla Forum statuit Cornelius; hoc Itali urbem fuocant ab ipso conditoris nomine.* Although this piece of information is unparalleled, there is reason to accept it, if cautiously, as Prudentius may have used a local tradition. There is no ground to argue that the settlement was a Sullan colony, but the foundation of the *forum* may have been accompanied by some land assignments.\(^{170}\)

Tusculum.

*Tusculi oppidum muro ductum. iter populo non debetur. ager eius mensura Syllana est adsignatus* (lib. col. 238.11). The northern part of the wall dates back to the early first century BC, and may well be Sullan.\(^{171}\)

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\(^{167}\) See however *ILLRP* 668, listing the *ioudices* of the colony, and mentioning a *P. Claudius C. f. tri(bunus)* who is explicitly said not to be a local. The same character was perhaps *Iuvin de senatus sententia* at Paestum (*CIL* 10.480), and he may have been sent to Spoletium to supervise the land assignments: Wiseman 1971, 46.


\(^{170}\) The most reliable discussion is Geraci 2000, 58-65; cf. Susini 1957a, 101-102, 105-106. Brunt 1971, 573 is more cautious: the area was inhabited from the first half of the second century BC, although there are no traces of urbanisation before the late Republic. For further speculation about possible Sullan interventions between Faventia and Ravenna, see Susini 1957b, 30-33.

\(^{171}\) Quilici-Quilici Gigli 1993, 258.
Venusia.

Horace (Sat. 1.6.71-75) gave a famous portrait of the *pueri magnis e centurionibus orti* who used to attend the local school with him. E. Fraenkel revived Niebuhr’s fascinating theory that they were the children of Sullan veterans settled in the territory of the city.\(^{172}\) Venusia had been controlled by the Marians, and was reconquered by Metellus.\(^{173}\)

Volaterrae.

The city was the last stronghold of the *populares*, and it was conquered only in 79 BC (Licin. 36.8 Criniti). There is evidence that Sulla deprived its inhabitants of Roman citizenship and that he planned some land distributions in its territory, but that they were never carried out (Cic. *Att.* 1.19.4: *more infra*).

Florentia is one of the *florentissima municipia* that, according to Florus (2.9.27), were affected by the Sullan settlements or land assignments. We lack any positive information about the history of this community until the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey. The foundation of Faesulae makes it less likely that a colony was founded at such a close distance, especially if the colonies are to be seen as settlements with a strategic function. Florus’ statement, however, is very explicit and cannot be lightly dismissed. The development and the misfortunes of the colony of Faesulae may also be related to the foundation of another colony, that of Florentia, in the immediate neighbourhood. Again, the evidence for this problem is quite elusive. Florentia is one of the four *municipia Italiae splendidissima* that, according to Florus, paid a high toll in the Sulla assignments.\(^{174}\) The foundation of a Sullan colony has often been suggested, as a sort of anticipation of a triumviral, or Caesarian settlement, which, on the contrary, is safely attested. The only support for this argument has been found in the archaeological evidence. The remains of some private houses show a different orientation from that of the later colony. The aspect of the walls is compatible with a

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\(^{173}\) App. b. c. 1.52-53.229-231, with Gabba 1958, 157-158.

\(^{174}\) I am not convinced by Keppie 1983, 175-176, arguing that Florus’ passage may contain an anachronism and refer to assignments of land that later became *ager Florentinus*. 
dating to the Sullan age, as well as the building technique used for the Capitolium.\textsuperscript{176} None of these elements, however, is decisive.

The first to suggest that Florentia was a Sullan colony was Mommsen.\textsuperscript{176} His authority, however, cannot overshadow that Florus calls it a splendidissimum municipium. Such a definition would be justified only if a pre-existing community had been enfranchised after the Social War and later colonised by Sulla; moreover, the archaeological evidence does not suggest a great wealth. The strongest argument against Sullan colonisation, however, is that Florentia never appears in the ancient accounts of Catiline’s conspiracy, unlike Faesulae and Arretium.\textsuperscript{177} Although we do not know anything about the earlier history of the city, it seems quite gratuitous to suggest the existence of a Sullan colony, and there is no ground to say that any land assignment was carried out in its territory. Hence, until new epigraphic or archaeological evidence emerges, Florentia may not be included in a list of the Sullan colonies.

D. The correct interpretation of other passages of the Liber coloniarum, which Mommsen used as evidence for more possible Sullan colonies, is more doubtful. Seemingly, they all refer to the construction of walls around some small centres of Latium.

Aricia.

\textit{oppidum: lege Sullana est munita, iter populo non debetur, ager eius in pravisuris est adsignatus} (lib. col. 230.1). It was a municipium in the age of the Second Civil War: Cic. Phil. 3.6.15.

Bobillae.

\textsuperscript{175} Degrassi 1949, 293-294 (= Degrassi 1962, 114). On the Capitolium, see Cagiano de Azevedo 1940, 28-30 (the dating of the Capitolium of Faesulae is more controversial: 30).

\textsuperscript{176} See Mommsen 1883, 176 (= Mommsen 1908, 218); accepted by Degrassi 1949, 293-294, esp. fn. 103 (= Degrassi 1962, 114); Gabba 1970/1971, 460-461 (= Gabba 1973, 362); Keaveney 1982b, 524-525. Beloch 1926, 511-512 argues that the veterans settled in the territory of Faesulae founded a colony on the site of Florentia.

\textsuperscript{177} Excellent discussion in Harris 1971, 261, 342-343. Hardie 1965 makes the case for a Caesarian foundation; also see Pfiffig 1966, 72.

Castrimoenium.


Gauis.

oppidum lege Sullana munitum. Ager eius militi ex occupatione censitus est. Iter populo non debetur (lib. col. 234.15). Definitely a municipium: CIL 14.2799; 2802; 2807.180

It is likely that the aim of this lex Sullana was not just to allow some towns to build fortifications. Of course, the mention of walls is quite significant in itself, as the creation of proper defensive structures fits well in the phase of extraordinary building activities and urbanistic renewal that took place in Italy throughout the last century of the Republic, and which was one of the trademarks of this period.181 In this specific case, the new walls may be viewed as evidence for the transformation of these communities into municipia, as part of the reorganisation of the administrative structure of the ager Romanus, which Sulla may have started and which would not to be accomplished until the age of Augustus.182 Suggesting virilane assignments, complemented by the construction of some fortifications, seems however a more economical hypothesis.183 Moreover, recent archaeological research has unveiled the traces of a centuriation that may be dated to the age of Sulla.184 At any rate, the evidence for the municipal status of some of these communities in the first century

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178 Beloch 1926, 504.
179 Beloch 1926, 504. Note the term occupatio, which is usually related to a military conquest: Chouquer 1987, 94, fn. 10.
180 Beloch 1926, 501.
181 On this process, see esp. Gabba 1972a, 84-106 (= Gabba 1994a, 74-96); Gabba 1976a (= Gabba 1994a, 105-117); Gros 1990, 831-843; Cornell 1995; Lomas 1997; Lomas 2003, 28-33.
182 See Laffi 1973, 43-44 (= Laffi 2001, 121-122); Sherwin-White 1973, 166; Dahlheim 1993, 114. There is no ground to argue, with Hinrichs 1974, 68, 74-75, that the Sullan intervention in these communities was related to the proscriptions, and not to the colonisation.
183 Keaveney 1982b, 527; Campbell 2000, 414, fn. 92, stressing the use of deducere.
184 Chouquer 1987, 87, 92-94, 286.
BC disqualifies these passages as further evidence for the foundation of new colonies.\footnote{ Cf. however Keppie 1983, 8-12, rightly stressing that the \emph{liber} is often unreliable, as far as the status distinction between \textit{municipium} and \textit{colonia} is concerned.}

The safely attested settlements, on the contrary, are mostly concentrated in Campania and in Etruria, and the impression that Sulla's efforts were purposefully focused on these very areas is no doubt correct. The impact of Sullan colonisation on the two regions, however, was quite different.

2.4. Pompeii and \textit{Campania felix}

On the whole, little is known about the internal life of the colonies founded by Sulla. The evidence is quite sparse and often unhelpful. There is, however, the notable exception of Pompeii, which inevitably plays a central role in most discussions of Sullan colonisation. In this respect, the present one can hardly be an exception.

Sulla conquered the city during the Social War, and the role of this community in the Civil War is unclear. The foundation of a colony, however, suggests a Marian allegiance. Pompeii had a considerable Oscan cultural and linguistic background, and the extension of Roman citizenship did not revolution its identity in less than a decade's time. However, not a single Oscan public inscription is known for the period following the colonial foundation. It is likely that the presence of the veterans generated tensions with the native community. This safe guess has sometimes led to unilateral interpretations of the archaeological evidence.

It is now widely assumed that the veterans prevalently found their home in the \textit{ager} of Pompeii, outside the walls, in the fertile land between the city and the Vesuvius.\footnote{ Zevi 1996a, 126-136, largely basing the argument on Mingazzini 1949; Zevi 1995, 21; Lo Cascio 1996, 120-121.} In some cases, they settled in new farms, built after the foundation of the colony and the new subdivision of the territory. In some other cases, they occupied old Oscan properties, promoting drastic refurbishments that obliterated the traces of earlier architectural styles. The clearest remains of these settlements have been identified in the area near the Porta Ercolano and the Via dei Sepolcri, and their most prominent example is the famous Villa dei Misteri.\footnote{ On the chronology of the Villa, see Maiuri 1967, 44-45 and Johannowsky 1976, 283; for an historical contextualisation, see Zevi 1996a, 134-135.}
According to this model, therefore, the veterans settled in a remunerative part of the city territory. It is striking that they hardly managed to make their way into the core of Pompeii, within the walls. Conversely, the native Pompeiani settled within the city walls, and reasserted their identity by imposing some clearly Samnite features to their residences. Many Pompeian houses preserved Samnite features, both structural and decorative ones, long into the Roman period: the most prominent example of this is the so-called Casa del Fauno. These architectural choices have therefore been viewed as symptoms of a broader political and social process.

The case for this interpretation is not very strong. Overall, the evidence is quite fragmentary, and the scenario of a forced inurbation of the Pompeiani does not seem realistic. It is inaccurate, at any rate, to argue that the colonisation had an impact only on the ager. Even if we accept that most of the veterans settled in the outskirts of Pompeii, it is undeniable that their arrival prompted some major interventions in the monumental aspect of the town. Some public buildings were renewed, of course in a recognisably Roman style. The temple in the Forum was redesigned and dedicated to Jupiter. The Apollo temple was partly refurbished too, as demonstrated by an inscription recording the names of the quattuorviri who supervised the work, all definitely Roman. A new temple was dedicated to Venus, at some point after the foundation of the colony, possibly on the very site of an earlier

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188 Zevi 1996a, 132-134. The Casa del Fauno is probably the most prominent example of the persistence of Samnite elements in the Pompeian architecture, which remained virtually intact down to the eruption of AD 79; see Zevi 1998, esp. 62-65 for its broader historical meaning (63: ‘der Wohnsitz eines großen Verlierers, das Symbol einer Niederlage’) and Zevi 2000, esp. 126-127.

189 Good discussion in Savino 1998, 458-459. It is likely that some of the natives rented land allotments assigned to the veterans: ibid., 454.


191 Cagiano De Azevedo 1940, 19-21.

192 CIL 10.800: M. Poncius M. f., L. Sexstilis L. f., Cn. Cornelius Cn. f., A. Cornelius A. f., IIIvir(i), d(e) d(ecurionum) s(ententia) f(iscorum) l(ocarum). The quattuorviri also feature in CIL 10.938: (…) Cestius, M. Loreius, L. Septumius, D. Claudius. Pompeii was however ruled by the duoviri, supported by two aediles: Sartori 1953, 73. The hypothesis of two couples of duoviri collectively called quattuoviri dates back to Mommsen, CIL 10, p. 93; see Chiavia 2002, 101-102, summing up earlier bibliography. Any link between the quattuoviral system and the pre-Roman one is convincingly ruled out by Letta 1979, 74-75. On the public works at Pompeii in this period, see Zevi 1996a, 126-128 (with further bibliography).
temple of the Oscan goddess Mefitis. The cult of the so-called Italic Venus, the *Venus Fisica*, was of course already established at Pompeii. The coming of the veterans may have encouraged it even more, especially since Sulla had made such a heavy use of his association with Venus in the Mithridatic campaign. In Italy he referred to Venus less extensively, although the goddess is portrayed on a coin issue (RRC 359) that was struck at the beginning of the Civil War and widely circulated in Southern Italy.

The monumental landscape of post-Sullan Pompeii inevitably poses the problem of the coexistence of two different communities in the aftermath of the foundation. The colonists asserted their presence by renewing old public spaces and by creating new ones, which were usually juxtaposed to the existing structures, and imposed themselves with their size. The gemination of several public spaces is a curious trademark of Pompeii in this period, and it is tempting to explain it with the presence of two *genera ciuim*. The so-called Terme Stabiane were refurbished in the early Sixties by magistrates whose names suggest a local origin, while new baths were built in the Forum soon after the foundation of the colony. A new, smaller theatre (*theatrum tectum*) was built by the colonists next to the great theatre that already existed in the area near the Porta di Stabia. The difference in size has been explained by postulating that the newcomers were less numerous than the natives. This is certainly true, but it reveals nothing about the actual function of the building. It is just

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193 Coarelli 2002b, 86 suggests that the Venus cult replaced that of Apollo. The temple is currently being excavated by a mission of the Università della Lucania, directed by E. Curti.

194 In the inscriptions the goddess is often called *Venus Fisica*. The epithet may have an Oscan origin, and it is surely related to the Latin *fides*: Sogliano 1931/1932; Coarelli 2002b, 88-89. On the relations between the Oscan and the Roman Venus, see Lejeune 1964.

195 On RRC 359, see the more detailed discussion in the next chapter. Cf. Marx 1890, 122-123; Marx 1899, 544-545; Pais 1910 (= Pais 1918, 227-251); Lanzani 1927, 46-50, all failing, to a different extent, to draw a proper distinction between the Italian and the Eastern contexts of the Venus cult. Zevi 1996a, 128-129 is more balanced, although I do not believe that such thing like a 'divinità personale' del dittatore' ever existed.

196 On the refurbishment of the Terme Stabiane by the duoviri C. Vulius and P. Aninius see *CIL* 10.829; on those of the Forum, see *CIL* 10.819. For a global discussion, see Zevi 1996a, 129-130.

197 About the great theatre, see Tosi 2003, 164-166; about the new theatre, improperly called *Odeion*, see Tosi 2003, 166-167.

198 The figure of 4,000/5,000 settlers suggested by Lepore 1950, 150-151 and accepted by Jongman 1988, 144 is highly conjectural: it derives from the assumption that the 47,000 veterans settled by Sulla
conjectural to argue that it served as a gathering place in the early phase of the settlement. Moreover, even the total number of the colonists remains unknown.\(^{199}\)

We are on a somewhat safer ground when we turn to the institutional and political life of the city. The foundation of the colony was carried out by a *collegium* of three *deductores*, among whom there was P. Sulla, the nephew of the dictator, whose heavy involvement in Pompeian affairs down to the Sixties neatly emerges from the speech Cicero gave in his defence in 62 BC.\(^{200}\) Details on the institutional life of the city in the later period are known to us only from the epigraphic evidence, where Oscan disappears from all public inscriptions since the foundation of the colony. Information can be gleaned from the electoral *programmata* painted or scratched on the walls of the city, and the record of the interventions of city magistrates or patrons is even more interesting. The construction of the smaller theatre was directly supervised by two local magistrates with recognisably Latin names: *C(aius) Quinctius C(ai) f(ilius) Valg(us) / M(arcus) Porcius M(arci) f(ilius) / duovir(i) dec(urionum) decr(eto) / theatrum tectum / fac(iundum) locar(unt) eidemq(ue) prob(arunt).*\(^{201}\) The value of the inscriptions mentioning Porcius and Valgus goes beyond the record of their magistracy. It also sheds light on the completion of an important public work like the theatre of the colony and on the construction of a new roof for it.\(^{202}\) Along with the amphitheatre of Telesia, the little theatre of Pompeii is the most important monument built in Campania during the Sullan age.\(^{203}\) Its typically Roman design and the emphasis placed by the dedicatory inscription on the function of the building make its political significance quite explicit.

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\(^{200}\) On P. Sulla, see Münzer 1900: his exact kinship relationship with the dictator has been proved by Reams 1986/1987 and Berry 1996, 320-321. On the case discussed by Cicero, see David 1992, 77-78, 131-133, 785-786; Berry 1996, 14-42.

\(^{201}\) *CIL* 10.844.

\(^{202}\) Castrén 1975, 88-91; Scuderi 1989, 126-127.

\(^{203}\) On the amphitheatre of Telesia, see Quilici 1966, 99-100; Tosi 2003, 303.
Both the magistrates that promoted its construction played a prominent role in the early history of the Sullan Pompeii. M. Porcius, a member of the quattuorviral collegium in charge of the refurbishment of the Apollo temple (CIL 10.800, see above), is one of the duoviri in the inscription of the new theatre. His colleague is no obscure figure either: the well-known C. Quinctius Valgus, the associate of Sulla who financed the reconstruction of the walls at Aeclanum and became a patron of the city. The magistracy he held in Pompeii shows that he was, or rather became, a citizen of the Sullan colony. Valgus probably served in the Sullan army during the Civil War, and possibly even in the East. When the war was over, he became directly involved in the political life of several Campanian communities, although there is no evidence that he was originally from this region.

Valgus and Porcius also carried out the construction of the amphitheatre in the southwestern part of the city, capable of hosting about 20,000 people. It is the first public work that was realised for the sake of the whole body of citizens since the foundation of the colony – i.e., without a ‘twin amphitheatre’ being built in town. Again, an inscription acknowledges Valgus and Porcius’ role in the enterprise (CIL 10.852): C. Quinctius C. f. Valgus / M. Porcius M. f. duoviri / quinquennales coloniae honoris / causas spectacula de sua / pecunia faciundae / et colonis / locum in perpetuum dedere. As argued by Zevi, the mention of the coloni is not a reference to the Sullan veterans, but to the whole community, where any official distinction between old and new inhabitants is elided. The full name of the colony, Colonia

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204 He had built his wealth on the wine trade with Gallia Narbonensis, as is shown by the discovery of a series of amphorae with his name stamped on them: Castrén 1975, 89 (summing up earlier bibliography at fn. 2). It is impossible to prove that he profited from the Sullan confiscations.

205 The evidence on this character is gathered and convincingly discussed in Harvey 1973, esp. 80-84; also cf. Wiseman 1971, 46.

206 Valgus is mentioned as duovir quinquennalis in an inscription from Frigento (JILLRP 598: it is unclear what community it refers to), again as the promoter of major public works: C. Quinctius C. f. Valgus / L. Septimius L. f. quinquennalis / murum, portas, forum, porticus, curia(m) / cisternae(m) / de discursuum i(nventoria) / facie(nsibus) curarunt / eisdemque probarunt. He probably renounced to the citizenship of his former community to join the new colony of Pompeii.

207 Harvey 1973, 90.


209 Zevi 1996a, 131-132. They were the first quinquennales of the colony: Castrén 1975, 90. It is surely excessive to argue that the integration did not take place before the census of 70 BC, like Zevi 1996a,
Cornelia Veneria Pompeianorum, known from later inscriptions, accurately represents its composition.\textsuperscript{210} *Cornelia* explicitly refers to Sulla and his *gens,* *Veneria* pays tribute to the cult and patronage of Venus, a goddess traditionally worshipped in the Italian world, supposed ancestor of the Romans, and such an important presence in Sulla’s Eastern campaigns; *Pompeianorum* does justice to the role of the indigenous Oscan community.

The situation, however, was not necessarily peaceful. Cicero’s *pro Sulla* sheds some light on the problems posed by the coexistence of the former occupiers of the city and the new settlers into the same institutional framework. The speech was given in defence of Publius Sulla, a relative and associate of the dictator, who, after a remarkable political career, which led him to the election to the consulship for 65 BC, was charged of having taken part in the conspiracy of Catiline. With his outstanding record in its repression, Cicero took Sulla’s case and pleaded for his acquittal. P. Sulla had been one of *deductores* of the colony of Pompeii, and that this enabled him to be among its patrons, to whom the resolution of disputes between the colonists and the earlier inhabitants was entrusted.\textsuperscript{211} This was relevant to the trial, because Sulla was accused of having tried to summon the natives to revolt by enhancing the conflict with the colonists, and with the ultimate purpose of taking hold of the city and use it as a stronghold in the Civil War. In order to show that P. Sulla was still trusted by the whole city body, Cicero brought to court a delegation including both old and new inhabitants.\textsuperscript{212}

In Cicero’s words, the conflict between the natives and the new settlers had become a chronic problem (*inueterassei*). The patrons were asked to intervene only ‘many years’ after the dispute had started. An exact chronology is not possible, although it seems safe to date the intervention of the patrons to the years which immediately preceded the conspiracy, i.e. 65/64 BC. If Cicero is accurate, the controversy at Pompeii may have started immediately after the foundation of the

\textsuperscript{132} On the possible effects of this *lectio* and its relationship with the emergence of the *quinquennales,* see Castrén 1975, 90-91; Castrén 1976, 359; Gehrke 1983, 488-489.


\textsuperscript{211} *Cic.* *Sull.* 21.60-62.

\textsuperscript{212} *Cic.* *Sull.* 21.61.
Cicero sums up the issues at stake with a formula that has long been discussed: *de ambulatione et de suffragiis.* The reference to the *suffragia* is quite straightforward. Dissent involved the voting procedures and, most probably, the electoral weight of the two *genera ciiium.* Even after the 'reconciliation' with the natives, the colonists must have kept a dominant position thanks to a favourable organisation of the electoral districts. If it is true that their settlement was concentrated in the *ager,* this area may have had more weight than the area within the city walls, where the Pompeians are supposed to have kept their residence. However, until our knowledge of Pompeian topography improves substantially, all attempts to give a more precise account of this supremacy are bound to remain speculative.

The meaning of *ambulatio,* moreover, is still unclear. It is not unlikely that the text is corrupt, and that it should in fact be emended as *ambitio,* meaning 'electoral campaign.' The Sullan veterans may have profited an advantageous subdivision of the electoral constituencies, which gave more weight to the districts where they settled as opposed to those inhabited by the natives. Colonists, moreover, may have enjoyed more favourable rules for managing the campaign, such as better spaces to advertise their candidates, or more resources to invest in the competition.

Cicero's testimony is probably unreliable in an important respect, i.e. the actual success of the intermediation of the patrons. Since Sulla is accused of having had a strong bias for the Pompeiani, it is in Cicero's interest to depict his intervention as a fair one, having the only aim of reconciling the whole community. The presence of groups of Pompeians and Sullan veterans at the trial, supporting P. Sulla's case, can hardly be used as solid evidence. It is Cicero himself who refers to them, surely with some exaggeration.

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213 See Gehrke 1983, 485-487; Lo Cascio 1996, 117-121. However, Andreau 1973, 226-231 must be mentioned as a salutary reaction to the interpretations that denied the existence of political and social tensions in Pompeian society.


215 There is some guesswork on the boundaries of the electoral constituencies in Coarelli 2000, 97-110.

216 See Lo Cascio 1996, 117-118, with earlier bibliography; cf. Savino 1998, 457-460. I am not convinced by Wiseman 1977 and Laurence 1994, 23 (cautiously accepted by Berry 1996, 255-256), who argue that the passage refers to some prohibition for the indigenous population to walk in certain designated areas, called *ambulationes.* If this is the case, why does Cicero mention it even before the *suffragia?* Coarelli 2000, 98-99 reads *de ambulatione et de suffragiis* as a hendiadys ('an *ambulatio* that determines the *suffragia*) and relates it to the structure of the *sancta* discovered near the forum, but the evidence is inconclusive. For further bibliography, see Chiavia 2002, 105-112.
The actual proportions of natives and colonists in the Pompeian Fasti may then be figured out from the epigraphic evidence, i.e. from the inscriptions mentioning city magistrates, and from the electoral inscriptions, the so-called programmata. A great amount of scholarship has been produced on this front, and a general conclusion has been safely drawn. The rich evidence available for the city magistracies until the age of Augustus shows a rapid disappearance of the natives from the Fasti of the colony in favour of the new settlers. Even if one assumes that the intervention of the patrons had some actual impact on the political life of the city, it still does not appear to have brought about a fair distribution of the suffragia.

The onomastic evidence for the city magistrates gathered by P. Castrén shows that for at least three decades the Sullan veterans and their descendants had a clear supremacy. It is equally well-established that the re-emergence of the natives as an influential part of the populus Pompeianus, capable of making its way into the ordo of the city, did not start before 50-40 BC. The increasing influence of the natives can best be explained by some improvement of their financial condition, which is however difficult to contextualise in the aftermath of the Sullan confiscations. Even the extent of the confiscation of private properties is unknown, as well as the number of the Sullan colonists who moved to Pompeii. It cannot be ruled out that some of the veterans settled on land allotments that belonged to the city, and not to private citizens. If this was the case, the impact of the confiscations on the local owners may have been less devastating than has been thought and the subordination of the natives mainly a political, rather than an economic problem. The possibility that the Pompeiani could have profited from the possession of parts of the ager publicus, or their involvement in the increasing fortunes of the port of Puteoli are not to be excluded too.

The organisation of the city territory might reveal something about the impact of the Sullan settlement on Pompeii. It seems likely that the town area was divided into four or five electoral districts, probably called vic. In a context that is uncertain

218 Castrén 1975, 92-98.
219 Andreau 1980, 194-196, challenging the established opinion that Sullan colonisation had not any lasting effect on Pompeii's social and economic structures: see e.g. Gordon 1927; Day 1932, 187-199; Lepore 1950, 151-156.
220 A survey of the necropoleis, for instance, has been inconclusive: see Kockel 1987, esp. 195.
in so many respects, it seems at least sure that the *pagus Felix suburbanus*, known from the inscriptive evidence, was related to the Sullan settlement. It was governed by a *collegium of magistri*, it had some financial autonomy, and it also contributed to the refurbishment of the amphitheatre. In the Augustan age it was renamed as *pagus Augustus Felix suburbanus*. This change of its official denomination is probably to be explained by the coming of more veterans.

However, some decades after the colonisation a gradual integration between the community of the colonists and that of the natives took place. A number of developments must have contributed to making this possible. The reappearance of Oscan names among the local magistrates is chiefly due to wider economic and social change, and the impact of intermarriage cannot be completely overlooked either. The creation of kinship relations between families of different origin and status may well have been accompanied by the transferral of properties from the new landowners to the old ones, and may have also encouraged mobility. Descendants of the Sullan settlers still were in the *ordo decurionum* in the Augustan age.

The wealth of Pompeii and the involvement of some of its citizens in overseas trade in the first half of the first century BC may perhaps be explained in the light of the crisis which the port of Naples seems to have gone through, along with the rest of the city, after the conquest of Sulla. In fact, however, little is known about Pompeii’s strategic function in this part of Campania. It is also doubtful whether it is a representative example of the Sullan colonies founded in the region. A clue may be obtained by devoting some attention to Sulla’s choice to retire in Campania after resigning from dictatorship in 79 BC. He certainly enjoyed spending time in the region, and a passage of Cicero portrays him walking in the streets of Naples dressed in a

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222 CIL 10.814 and 853. There is no evidence that it had an electoral function: Coarelli 2000, 108.

223 They certainly settled in Pompeii by 7 BC, when the *ministri pagi Augusti Felicis suburbani* are attested (CIL 10.924): see Lo Ciamo 1996, 120, fn. 39. The reconstruction proposed in Gatti 1974/1975, 174-178 is untenable.


in Greek fashion. His decision, however, was not determined only by the charm of the Campanian coastal environment, already quite popular among earlier generations of Roman aristocrats. The presence of a considerable number of Sullan colonies and land allotments possessed by the Sullan veterans in the area may suggest a different explanation.

It is significant that a string of Sullan settlements can be identified between Urbana, Pompeii, Nola, Abella and Suessula. The evidence is quite unsatisfactory, but such a high concentration of settlements was almost certainly unparalleled in Italy. When he chose the resort where he would spend his last years, Sulla surely took into account the presence of thousands of loyal soldiers. Although no one dared to ask him to give account of his misdeeds, after his resignation from dictatorship, the political situation in Rome was far from stable when Sulla left, as the attempt of Lepidus made clear only a year later. The winner of the Civil War still needed protection and armed support, even some years after his victory and in the declining phase of his life, possibly affected by a life-threatening disease, which might have been the crucial factor in his decision to leave power.

The exact location of the buen retiro of the former dictator is not precisely known. The territory of Cuma is the likeliest candidate: Appian speaks of a move ες

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226 Cic. Rab. post. 10.26-27: delectarum causa et voluptatis non modo cives Romanos, sed et nobilis adolescentis, sed quosdam eis satis, summo loco natos, non in hortis et suburbanis suis, sed Neapoli, in celeberrimo oppido + maedapella saepe uideri + *** chlamydatum ilium L. Sullam imperatorem. Sulla's presence at Neapolis is beyond doubt: D'Arms 2003, 47. On the function of the city as a sea resort and a cultural centre in the late Republic, see D'Arms 2003, 49-68 (also dealing with the immediate neighbourhood of the city); Leiwo 1995, 27-30, 33-41.

227 See D'Arms 2003, 44-47. It is inaccurate, however, to claim that 'Sulla could scarcely have retired anywhere [in Central or Southern Italy] without having some of his former soldiers in settlements nearby' (ibid., 45).

228 On the strategic function of Urbana, see Laffi 1966, 101-102. I see no reason to claim that Surrentum was a Sullan colony, as argued in Beloch 1879, 254.

229 The arguments used by Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) to downplay the importance of Sullan colonisation in Campania are unconvincing. The claim that 'most of the settlements were in the north, especially in Etruria' (Badian 1958, 246) is even less acceptable. However, Badian is right in saying that Campania was not as consistently loyal to the populares as Etruria was.

230 On Sulla's resignation, see Plut. Sull. 34.6; App. b. c. 1.103.480-484; Oros. 5.22.1; vir. ill. 75.12. Lafon 2001, 133 rightly remarks that the relatively short distance between Campania and Rome must have influenced Sulla's decisions. On Lepidus' initiatives after Sulla's death, see App. b.c. 1.107; Licin. 36.33-45 Criniti; Flor. 2.11; Oros. 5.22.16-18.
κυμαίνω, and an interesting passage of a letter of Cicero, sent from his estate called Cumanum, refers to his encounter with Faustus Sulla, the son of the dictator.\textsuperscript{231} In 55 BC, the two Roman gentlemen, who happened to be neighbours, met on various occasions, and Cicero had the opportunity to browse through the magnificent collection of books of his friend, which no doubt owed something to Sulla’s depredations in the Greek East.\textsuperscript{232} The villa of Cicero was in the eastern part of the territory of Cuma and at a short distance from the harbour of Puteoli, in the immediate vicinity of the boundary between the two cities. It is likely that Sulla’s villa was in a similar position.\textsuperscript{233} An alternative hypothesis has been suggested, which views Puteoli as the place of Sulla’s exile and is supported by Valerius Maximus and the \textit{de viris illustribus liber}, ultimately deriving from Livy.\textsuperscript{234}

Confusion on this matter was surely generated by an incident that immediately preceded the death of the former dictator, and shows that his political influence was not over even in his last days.\textsuperscript{235} The community of Puteoli was going serious tensions: the \textit{princeps coloniae} Granius was having a dispute with the \textit{ordo decurionum} and refused to pay the money that the council had already offered for the refurbishment of the Capitolium. According to Valerius Maximus, Sulla went to Puteoli and censored Granius’ behaviour so furiously that anger caused him an apoplectic stroke, and led him to death.\textsuperscript{236} The position of Granius is made even clearer by Plutarch, who states

\textsuperscript{231} Cic. \textit{Att.} 4.10.1 (\textit{ego hic passor bibliotheca Fausti}). Cf. Flor. 2.11; Oros. 5.22.16-18.

\textsuperscript{232} On Faustus Sulla’s wealth, see Shatzman 1975, 336-337, no. 133. On his political positions, all but easy to define, see the interesting (although speculative at times) remarks in B. A. Marshall 1984. Besides being a good friend of Faustus Sulla, Cicero owned a villa that had belonged to the dictator himself, in the territory of Tusculum: Plin. 22.12 (= \textit{HRR} 210 = Chassignet 10).

\textsuperscript{233} The discussion in D’Arms 2003, 42-44 (with fn. 53) is entirely convincing, except for one detail: I see no reason to question the accuracy of Cicero’s terminology here, and to keep considering Puteoli an option. Also cf. Lafon 2001, 191-192, comparing Sulla’s \textit{buen retiro} with that of Scipio Africanus at Liternum, and stressing that his choice was a model for future generations of the Roman nobility; a different view in D’Arms 2003, 44. Granius was surely related in some way to the two Granii declared \textit{hostes publici} in 88 BC (App. b. c. 1.60.271); two Granii are known to have been Caesarian (Plut. \textit{Caes.} 16.8; Caes. b. c. 3.71.1). However, Sulla would have hardly tolerated a ‘notoriously Marian’ city magistrate at Puteoli, \textit{pace} Syme 1939a, 90. Also see Camodeca 1982, 128.

\textsuperscript{234} Val. Max. 9.3.8; \textit{vir. ill.} 75.12. See Angeli Berrinelli 1997, 414.

\textsuperscript{235} Keaveney 1982a, 204-213.

\textsuperscript{236} Val. Max. 9.3.8. Granius was related the Granius mentioned in the \textit{lex Puteolana}: Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1996, 13. He certainly was a \textit{duouir}: Sartori 1953, 64; Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1996, 33-34.
that the city magistrate did not intend to use the money already paid by his fellow citizens, as he knew that Sulla’s death was imminent. According to this version, Granius was summoned to the residence of Sulla and strangled by the slaves of the former dictator, who then had a fatal crisis soon after the murder.

In Plutarch’s account the role of Sulla emerges as something much more conspicuous than that of the hysterical former-warlord who responds to the challenge of a local notable. Ten days before his death, according to his version, Sulla put an end to the stasis which was tearing apart the Puteolan community by drafting a new constitution, and promoting reconciliation among the citizens. Plutarch’s text should be taken literally: Sulla intervened to stop the civil strife in the city, possibly using the deterrent force of the veterans settled in the area. Puteoli accepted Sulla's proposal, which may have contained some guidelines regarding the use of public finances and the relations between the magistrates and the ordo decurionum. Then, new tensions arose when Granius refused to fulfil what he was required to do, and paid with his life.

I have repeatedly stressed the relationship between Sulla’s military achievements and his need to punish, or to reward, the Italian communities involved in the conflict. In this period there was a close relation between warfare and politics, between conflict and political settlement. War and peace appear to be parts of the same process, to some extent influencing each other. The initiatives of Sulla in Campania show this very effectively. Sulla fought a part of the Social War in this

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237 Plut. Sull. 37.5-6.

238 Rotondi 1912, 492: lex Puteolanis data. Sartori 1953, 61-62 speculates that the Sullan law may have merged the Roman colony of Puteoli and the praefectura mentioned by Fest. 262 L. Keaveney 1982b, 520-522 suggests, with no evidence, that Puteoli was a Sullan colony. Bispham 2000, 58-59 rightly links the Sullan provisions to the status of autonomy of the city referred to in Cic. leg. agr. 2.86: Puteolanus vero qui nunc in sua potestate sunt, suo iure libertateque utuntur, cf. Steuernagel 2004, 41. There is no reason to believe, with Angeli Bertinelli 1996, 35, that Sulla just ‘advised’ the Puteolani on their constitution, since he did not hold the imperium to impose a law.

239 There is no ground to assume that Puteoli was affected by Sullan colonisation: Gabba 1954b, 286-287 (= Gabba 1973, 603-605).

240 See Val. Max. 9.3.8: Puteolii enim ardens indignatione, quod Granius princeps eius coloniae pecuniam a decurionibus ad refectionem Capitolii promissam cunctantius dare, cf. Plut. Sull. 37.5. M. H. Crawford, however, argues that the money gathered by the decuriones was supposed to finance the reconstruction of the Capitolium at Rome, and not at Puteoli: see Bispham 2000, 59, fn. 91.
region, came back some years later at the beginning of the Civil War, founded some colonies, and even decided to spend the final years of his life there.

Arguments *e silentio* are always quite risky, but the choice of Sulla to retire in Campania may be seen as a symptom of the success of his veteran settlements in the region. The emphasis that the hostile tradition puts on Sulla’s dissolute lifestyle and questionable company in his last years must not overshadow the political importance of his actions in that period. In Campania he created a network of colonies and rural settlements, which made possible a control of the region from the centre, with Urbana, founded on the border of the *ager Campanus*, down to the coast, through the land assigned in the territory of Nola and the colony of Pompeii. Puteoli’s harbour was bound to become even more important after the destruction that Sulla brought about at Naples, and direct control was kept on the political life of this community.

Leisure, of course, may have been among the reasons that prompted Sulla’s interest in the area, but even that was, to some extent, a politically, and socially oriented choice. The popularity of Campania with the Roman elite had been consolidated since the second century BC, and it was inevitable that some of properties confiscated in the proscriptions were in that area. However, the case of the villa owned by C. Marius at Misenum, eventually bought for a ridiculous price by Cornelia, the daughter of Sulla, and later by Sulla’s associates Scribonius Curio and Licinius Lucullus, is as well-known as it is unparalleled in our scarce evidence. Campania was, at any rate, the most important area of Roman Italy Sulla had to come to terms with in the aftermath of the conflict, both for strategic and economic reasons. In many ways, Campania was a special place for the Romans, and an important pole in the making of Roman Italy. This must be borne in mind when one sets out to study the impact of Sullan colonisation on Etruria, its second major front.

As I will try to show in the next section, the success of the Sullan settlement was much less conspicuous in Etruria, where there is evidence for much stauncher opposition. Campania was a rich and attractive region, with strong ties with Rome. The anti-Sullan resistance was effectively defeated and dismantled there. The development of Sulla’s campaign in 83 suggests that it had already been less strong and widespread than in Central Italy.

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2.5. Etruria: a contrasting picture

The successful development of Sulla’s campaign, with major efforts being concentrated on two fronts – Campania and Praeneste – was made possible only by the contemporaneous parallel successes of the Sullan generals on other fronts. In northern Etruria and in Aemilia Metellus faced the attacks of Carbo, while Pompey and Crassus obtained crucial victories against Carbo himself and the propraetor Carrinas. Sulla’s direct involvement on this front appears to be limited to a single military confrontation with Carbo, near Clusium.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^2\)

This city was certainly loyal to the Marians, who used it as a pivotal point for the movements of their troops. The allegiance of the Etruscan cities to the anti-Sullan coalition is widely accepted, and confirmed by the available evidence, which however fails to be satisfactory in many respects. It is safe to say that the connections of the *populares* in Etruria were very strong from the age of Marius. It has been argued that Cinna managed to obtain the support of the elites, while the lower classes wholeheartedly supported Marius, perhaps attracted by the prospect of serving in his army.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^3\) The evidence, however, is almost non-existing, and we also lack any information about the dissensions that may have arisen within the Etruscan elites about their attitude towards Sulla. It is beyond dispute, however, that some groups of the aristocracy managed to reach an agreement with the winner as soon as the outcome of the war became clear.

After the Colline Gate battle, what was left of the army of the *populares* was disbanded in Etruria. The war, however, continued on several fronts, as the literary sources on one hand, and the archaeological evidence from a number of sites on the other show. From the literary accounts of the war, it is apparent that Clusium and Arretium had an important role in the development of the operations. Populonia was besieged and sacked, almost certainly by Sulla. The Acropolis, which had gone through an impressive renovation in the last decades of the second century BC, was abandoned since then.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^4\) The site still looked almost depopulated in the early fifth

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\(^{2\text{a}}\) Liv. Pers. 88.1; App. Bc. 1.89.412; cf. Vell. 2.28.1.


Telamon, which however was not a *municipium*, was ravaged, and traces of a sack, followed by a prompt reconstruction, have been recently discovered at Saturnia. The extent of violence and human losses finds further confirmation in the four coin hoards datable to the late Eighties that have been discovered in Etruria.

Volaterrae came into play at a late stage of the war, as the last stronghold of the diehard enemies of Sulla, both Etruscans and Roman victims of the proscriptions. It was, along with Nola, one of the last fronts Sulla had to deal with, before concentrating all his energies on his programme of reforms. From a passage of the *pro Roscio Amerino*, we know that he was still besieging the city in the first months of 81 BC, soon after the beginning of the proscriptions. A passage of Licinianus, whose importance was rightly stressed by A. Krawczuk, dates the final conquest to 79 BC, during the consulship of Appius Claudius and Servilius Vatia. A number of proscribed were still in the city, and left just before the besiegers arrived. However, they were promptly caught, and eliminated. The siege of Volaterrae is therefore a significant exception in Italy, which was altogether pacified after 82 BC. For three years, possibly until Sulla's abdication from dictatorship, an important Etruscan city was still held by a contingent of rebels. There is no reason to disbelieve Licinianus in this respect. That the situation at Volaterrae was unparalleled in Italy is apparent from several pieces of evidence. Nola, the other main anti-Sullan city, was conquered about two years before, in 81, and its *ager* was promptly assigned to the Sullan

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245 See Rutil. Nam. 1.401-414, with Krawczuk 1960, 13-21; Doblhofer 1977, 189-190.  
246 Rendini 1998, esp. 113-116; Rendini 2003, 333-339. There is no evidence, however, for a settlement of veterans, *pace* Rendini 2003, 337.  
247 Such a concentration of hoards in a specific area is unparalleled in this period: see Crawford 1967 and Crawford 1969a, nos. 258 (Capalbio), 260 (Carrara), 262 (San Miniato al Tedesco), 266 (Montiano, near Telamon); cf. Harris 1971, 258. On the relation between coin hoards and violence in the late Republic, see Crawford 1969b.  
249 Licin. 36.8 Criniti: see Krawczuk 1960, 16-17. It is likely that the siege was not followed by a sack, as there are no archaeological traces of destruction on the Acropolis: Bonamici 2003, 83-84.  
250 See Massa-Pairault 1985, 222-223 on speculation on some indirect (and indeed doubtful) references to the Sullan siege in the Volaterran art of the first century BC. In general on the impact of Roman art in northern Etruria, see M. Torelli 1976 and Cristofani 1976.
veterans. On the contrary Volaterrae attracted all sorts of anti-Sullan partisans because of its strategically invaluable position, and it remained a critical front for a longer period.

What we know about the countermeasures taken by Sulla also shows that the situation was exceptional. While there is no direct evidence for a project to found a colony after the conquest of the city, we know that Sulla decided, or at least tried to enforce, an exemplary punishment: the withdrawal of Roman citizenship of the municipium. The information derives from a passage of Cicero’s de domo sua, where Sulla is said to have deprived some communities – it is unclear how many – of citizenship, along with part of their territories. This decision was included in a law voted by the comitia centuriata. Cicero argues that the land confiscations were legitimate, since it was in the people’s power to decide about that matter. Citizenship, however, could not be affected under any circumstances, and hence Sulla’s measure was illegal. For this reason, according to Cicero, that part of Sulla’s provisions was not enforced even when Sulla was alive, and the Volaterrani soon regained their rights.

Cicero is rarely a neutral or innocent source; he certainly is not here. The primary reason why he recalled this particular Sullan initiative in this case was to support his personal position in a difficult moment of his political career. He gave this speech after the end of his exile, with the aim to reassert his claim on his house confiscated by Clodius. His point was a general one, and it addressed the nature of Roman citizenship. There was, however, a specific reason why the position of

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251 On the conquest of Nola, see Liv. Per. 89.11-12 and Licin. 36.9 Criniti, with Keaveney-Strachan 1981. There is no reason to argue that the resistance of the city was a response to Sulla’s decision to found a colony: contra, Harris 1971, 258.

252 There is no evidence to agree with Dahlheim 1993, 114 that the measure affected communities in ‘Samnium, Lucania or Etruria’.

253 Cic. dom. 30.79: populus Romanus L. Sulla dictator forent comitiis centuriatis municipiis ciuitatem ademit; ademit eisdem agros; de agris ratum est, fuit enim populi potestas; de ciuitate ne tam diu quidem ualuit, quam diu illa Sullani temporis arma ualuerunt; an uero Volaterranis, cum etiam tum essent in armis, L. Sulla victor re publica reciperrata comitiis centuriatis ciuitatem eripere non potuit, bodique Volaterrani non modo ciues, sed etiam optimi ciues fruuntur nobiscum simul hab ciuitate.

254 Other sources on Volaterrae in this period: Liv. Per. 89.13 and Licin. 36.8 Criniti.

255 Wirszubski 1950, 30. Cicero, however, knew well that citizenship had been withdrawn in the past: cf. the case of Hostilius Mancinus in 137, mentioned in Cic. orat. 1.181 (P. Rutilius, M. filius, tribunus plebis, de senatu inscit educi, quod cum ciuem nogeret esse; quia memoria sic esset prodition, quem pater suus, aut populus vendidisset, aut pater patratus dedidisset, ei nullium esse postminium).
Volaterrae was so familiar to him: he was a patron of that community. Soon after the death of Sulla, the Volaterrani challenged the legitimacy of the law, and Cicero played an important part in supporting them.

The most important source for these problems is the final section of Cicero's *pro Caecina*, which raises the issue of citizenship and that of the status of the Etruscan communities punished by Sulla. This case is the clearest proof that the issue of the rights of the communites punished by Sulla was definitely not solved soon after the former dictator's death. The client of Cicero, Aulus Caecina, from Volaterrae, was a member of one of the most distinguished Etruscan families. In 69 BC he was involved in a complex civil litigation over the ownership of a *fundus*. The key argument of his opponent was that the Volaterrani were not entitled to accept legacies from Roman citizens, like Caecina had done, because Sulla had deprived them of the right of citizenship. Cicero challenged the argument on two grounds.

First, citizenship could never be withdrawn, unless one renounced to it by becoming citizen of a Latin colony. This was, according to Cicero's interpretation, an established principle, closely linked to the correlation between *ciuitas* and *libertas*. Secondly, there was already a precedent that made Sulla's measure legally unacceptable. Cicero claims to have taken a tough stance against these measures already in the early phases of his career, when he discussed a case whereby the issue of

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256 Cf. Cic. *Jam.* 13.4.1, written to Q. Valerius Orca between 46 and 45: *cum municipibus Volaterraneis mihi summum necessitudo est. magni enim meo beneficio adjecti cumulatissime mihi gratiam resterunt; nam nec in honoribus mei nec laboribus unoquam defuerunt. Cf. ibid.: *summo studio p. R. a me in consulatu meo defensi sunt*. Also cf. Cic. *Jam.* 13.5.2, written to the same addressee soon afterwards. See Brunt 1988, 397; Deniaux 1991; Deniaux 1993, 340-343, 354-360, 374. Cic. *Jam.* 11.20.3, written in June 43 by D. Iunius Brutus Albinus, cos. des. 42, suggests that even in the Forties there were plans to use the land which Sulla had not managed to assign: *quattuor legionibus is, quibus agros donos consueitis, video facultatem fore ex agris Sullanis et agro Campano*. The text, however, is not certain.


258 The background of the case is summarised in Frier 1985, 20-27. Also see Gelzer 1962, 305-311; Stroh 1975, 80-103; Fotheringham 2004.


260 On the close link between *ciuitas* and *libertas*, see Dessertaux 1907; Wirszubski 1950, 3-4; Ste. Croix 1981, 366-368; Brunt 1988, 296-297, 518-519.
citizenship played a decisive role. The case dealt with the *libertas* of a *mulier Arretina* who had been somehow reduced into slavery. It was heard *Sulla uixi*, and Cicero's opponent, C. Cotta, supported the claim that Arretium had been deprived of the citizenship by Sulla, like Volaterrae, and that the woman, lacking the *ciuitas*, was not entitled to the acknowledgement of her freedom. Cicero overthrew the argument and, according to his own reconstruction, he persuaded the jury of the inalienability of citizenship.

The case of the woman from Arretium is mentioned first in the list of the precedents, no doubt because of Cicero's interest in celebrating his merits, and it is the only one derived from the discussion of a judicial case. Although it is presented as a very straightforward one, the issue was admittedly often discussed in the law courts (*98: quaeri hoc solere non praeterit*). Although no evidence remains for it, a debate certainly took place among Roman lawyers and politicians since the Sullan law on the withdrawal of the political rights was voted. As Cicero's digression proves, the controversy continued through the following years, when new attempts to enforce the law were carried out. We do not know whether the law on citizenship involved other communities. If this was the case, however, it would not be surprising at all. Significantly, the case for Caecina's opponent, Sex. Aebutius, was made by a former associate of Sulla, C. Calpurnius Piso, who certainly supported the Sullan law from a political point of view too.

According to Cicero, the case against his client was obviously flawed, even if one left aside doubts about the legitimacy of the law. Sulla, by changing the status of Volaterrae, did not affect some rights of its citizens: *quod Sulla ipse ita tulit de ciuitate ut non sustulerit horum nexa atque hereditates*. The right to sell goods and to inherit was still acknowledged, since Sulla decided to change the status of the punished communities from citizenship *optimo iure* into the so-called *ius XII coloniarum*, or *ius Ariminensium*. *Iubet enim eodem iure esse quo fuerint Ariminenses; quos quis ignorat duodecim coloniarum et a ciuibus Romanis hereditates potuisse?* The origin and implications of this juridical status are far from clear, but they do not concern us here. Cicero does not spend many words

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261 Cic. *Caec.* 34.97. With good arguments, Frier 1985, 100 suggests that in *Caec.* 95-102 Cicero exploited the same arguments he had used in the plea for the woman from Arretium.

262 A false claim, according to Brunt 1988, 518-519, fn. 1.

263 Frier 1985, 102-103, with earlier bibliography.

264 It is unclear whether the *ius XII coloniarum* was more or less advantageous than the status of the Latin colonies. A number of (mostly unsuccessful) attempts to reach safer conclusions have been made: see
on this matter because he is interested in stressing his decisive objection, which is
focussed on the inalienability of citizenship. However, even if someone still wanted to
second a restrictive interpretation of the law, and consider the withdrawal of the
citizenship sufficient to prevent the Volaterrani from inheriting and doing business
with Roman citizens, Caecina would still deserve special consideration, because he is a
worthy and decent man, and a friend of Rome.\textsuperscript{265} Behind this skillful discussion, the
tension and the conflicting interpretations of a complex legal issue are recognisable.\textsuperscript{266}

Cicero’s own position in the affair deserves to be stressed again. The two cases
that he accepted to take, in which the issue of citizenship played such a prominent
role, show that he had good connections in at least two strongly anti-Sullan cities of
northern Etruria. It is very significant that the cities heavily punished by Sulla were
interested in obtaining the support of members of the Roman elite and in trying to
make their position more advantageous. The plea for Roscius Amerinus made Cicero
a credible candidate for the defense of the individuals, and potentially of the
communities, that had been affected by Sulla’s retaliation.

The law on citizenship was just an aspect of what Sulla intended to achieve in
Etruria. It was accompanied and complemented by a plan of land assignments that was
carried out only in part. Significantly, it is again a passage of Cicero’s correspondence
which sheds light on what happened to the land of Volaterrae and Arretium. In a
letter to Atticus written on 15 March 60, Cicero summarises the main episodes of
current political life, and mentions his efforts towards the introduction of some
changes to an agrarian bill presented by the tribune Flavius and supported by
Pompey.\textsuperscript{267} Cicero sought consensus to prevent the enforcement of the law on the \textit{ager publicus}
(according to the boundaries of 133, before the first Gracchan reform), to
confirm the rights of the ‘Sullan men’ (\textit{Sullani homines}, the veterans) on the land

\textsuperscript{265} Cic. \textit{Caec.} 35.102: ... \textit{omnes boni quaereremus, quem ad modum spectatisimun
pudentissimumque hominem, summo consilio, summa virtute, \textit{summa auctoritate domestica praeeditum, lenatum injuria
cuem retinere possemus}. The argument is put forward in other Ciceronian speeches too, such as the \textit{pro Archia} and the
\textit{pro Balbo}: Steel 2001, 78.

\textsuperscript{266} Frier 1985 is an admirable discussion of the importance of this case in the development of Roman
civil law and in the emergence of Roman jurisprudence. On the specific issue of Roman citizenship, see
97-104.

\textsuperscript{267} Cic. \textit{Att.} 1.19. See Gruen 1974, 396-397.
allotments they had been assigned, and to exempt Volaterrae and Arretium from the implementation of the law.\(^{268}\) Sulla had singled out the territories of these communities as possible targets of new assignments. For some reason, however, after Sulla had already planned them, they did not take place, although the threat remained incumbent on the communities for some time.\(^{269}\) The former owners kept occupying the land formally confiscated as *possessoris*. Cicero, as a Roman patron of these Etruscan communities, made sure that they were not affected by any land distribution. The aim was achieved, rather than by Cicero and his talent in gathering the consensus of the *boni*, mainly because of the opposition of a large portion of the Senate, which feared the possible implications of an agrarian law whose enforcement was left in Pompey’s hands. The rights of the *possessoris* from Arretium and Volaterrae were later confirmed by the *lex Iulia agraria* of 59 BC too.\(^{270}\)

Cicero’s reference to the *agri* of the Etruscan cities, however, is interesting for several reasons. First, it is evidence for an incomplete side of the Sullan colonial plan. An important project of the dictator, certainly conceived in the aftermath of the Civil War and aimed against two strongholds of the resistance, could not be fully implemented.\(^{271}\) We do not know if it was the only one, as Cicero shows an exclusive interest in the cities which he protected.

Cicero’s letter bears some traces of the tense political atmosphere of the decades that followed Sulla’s hegemony, in which the agrarian problem resurfaced

\(^{268}\) Cic. *Att.* 1.19.4: *agaria lex a Flauto tribuno pl. ubeementer agiabatur auctore Pompeio, quae nihil popularis habebat praeter auctorem. ex hac ego legi secunda contentis voluntate omnia illa tollebam quae ad privatorum incommum pertinebant; liberabam agrum eum qui P. Mucio L. Calpurnio consulibus publicus fuisse; Sullanorum hominum possessiones confirmabam; Volaterranos et Arretinos, quam agrum Sulla publicarat meque diviserat, in sua possessione retirabam; unam rationem non reiciatam, ut ager hac aduentia pecunia emeretur quae ex nouis vectigalibus per quinquennium recipierit.* Cicero never intended to affect the interests of the Sullan veterans, and the attacks on the Sullan *possessoris* in the third speech *de legi agraria* are no evidence for a hostile attitude to them: see Drummond 2000, esp. 144-146.

\(^{269}\) Zambianchi 1978, 124 argues that Sulla decided not to affect the interests of the Etruscan aristocracy and refused to carry out his earlier plan; in fact, there is no evidence explaining why the assignments were not brought about.

\(^{270}\) Cic. *Jam.* 13.4.2: *cum tribuni plebi legem iniquissimam de eorum agris promulgasset, facile senatus populoque R. persuasit ut eos eiusque fortuna perpetuaret salus esse vellet. hanc actionem meam C. Caesar primo suo consulatu legi agrariae comprobavit agrumque Volaterranum et oppidum omni periculo in perpetuum liberavit.* See Drummond 2000, 151-152.

\(^{271}\) Cf. Harris 1971, 262-263.
now and again, never to find a proper solution. Thanks to his speeches _de lege agraria_,
we are much better informed about Rullus’ bill than we are about Flavius’, although
the information Cicero gives is definitely misleading in various respects. The
argument put forward by Cicero is identical in both cases. Although the sponsors of
the bill claim that it was _popularis_, it did not serve the interests of the people. Leaving
propaganda aside, however, an important difference can be noticed. Rullus planned
some interventions in the _AGER CAMPANUS_, which no one had ever dared touch ever
since — although the accuracy of this statement is far from certain. The bill
presented in 60 BC was more wide-ranging, and it probably concentrated the
assignments in central Italy, which had been invested both by Sullan colonisation and
by the recruitment carried out by Catiline.

There is ground to believe that the land assignment in Etruria was not always
as unsuccessful as it appears to have been in the territories of Volaterrae and
Arretium. Moreover, there probably was a significant difference between these two
cities. We have no evidence that a colony was founded at Volaterrae, while Pliny’s
reference to the _Arretini Fidentiores_ (‘the more loyal ones’) is safe evidence for a Sullan
settlement. No doubt, besides being included in the community, these colonists
were given some land. However, Cicero’s mention of some land of Arretium and
Volaterrae having been _divisa_, but not _publicata_ implies that the project of settlement
was not fully implemented. The colony had definitely been founded, but probably

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272 See Drummond 2000, with special reference to the third speech _de lege agraria_.
273 Cic. _leg. agr._ 1.7.21: _praetermittit... eum... nos agrum... concessisse, qui ager ipse per sese et Sullanae dominationi et
Chouquer 1987, 217, fn. 8 is more sceptical and refers to Licin. 28.35-37 Criniti: (P. Lentulus) _AGRN
Campanum inter privatos divisum publicavit et eun indicito pretio locavit. multo plures agros... recognitioni praepositus
reciperavit formamque agrorum in aes incisam ad Libertatis fiscam reliquit, quam postea Sulla corrupit_.
See Scardigli 1983, 43; Fezzi 2003, 33-36. Sulla, however, founded Urbana on the very border the _AGER
CAMPANUS_: see Beloch 1879, 17; Laffi 1966, 101-102; Chouquer 1987, 187-188, fn. 342; Minieri 2002,
256 (earlier bibliography at fn. 22).
274 Cf. Cic. _Mur._ 49: _circumfuentem colonorum Arretinorum et Fatisulanorum exercitu_. About Arretium, see
Pfiffig 1966, 66; Harris 1971, 261-263.
275 Cic. _Att._ 1.19.4: _Volaterranos et Arretinos, quorum agrum Sulla publicarat neque diviserat, in sua possessione
reading _Arteimos_ (given by many manuscripts) instead of _Arretinos_. In her view, sporadic finds near
modern Artimino points to the existence of an ancient community in the area. Moreover, Arretium had
too much land had been confiscated, and there were not enough settlers available to get hold of it. In the meantime, the earlier possessores kept occupying it. Later they managed to find the support of some members of the Roman elite, who opposed the completion of the programme and the coming of more settlers.

The situation is quite different, although by no means less interesting, further north. The foundation of a Sullan colony at Faesulae is certain, as it is the violent opposition to the new settlement. Licinianus records a revolt of the inhabitants of Faesulae against the colonists, which apparently took place in 78 BC and aimed to restore the situation that preceded the coming of Sulla. According to Licinianus, Faesulani i r r e p e r u n t in castella u e t e r a n o r u m S u l l a n o r u m et c o m p l u r i b u s a c c i s i a g r o s s u o s r e c e p e r u n t . e t i n s e n a t u d e f e n d e b a n t , q u o d u n l u g s a g r e s t e d o m o q u e e x t o r r e e x c o a c t u m e s s e t . e t c o n s u l e s d a t o e x e r c i t u i n E t r u r i a m p r o f e c t i s u n t , u t s i t u m < ... > These few fragmentary lines contain several important pieces of information. First, they tell something about the form of the settlement, which apparently was organised around fortified sites. The word castellum makes it unlikely that the veterans lived within the city walls. They settled in the ager, forming a separate community and following a pattern similar to that suggested by some archaeologists for Pompeii, with the natives living in the oppidum and the colonists controlling their land in the outskirts, protected by some kind of fortifications (the castella). After a few years, the local population managed to launch a successful attack on the newcomers, which led to a bloodshed, and to the (probably temporary) recovery of the confiscated properties.

Moreover, the Faesulani were bold enough to defend their actions in the Senate, and to openly make the case against the legitimacy of the Sullan assignments. Licinianus does not say how the Senate dealt with the envoys of the city, but if they could afford to be so confrontational they probably had some support within that

not quite the same position as Volaterrae, as it certainly was a colony. The reconstruction is ingenious, but it cannot be accepted unless solid evidence about the would-be ancient site of Arteminum emerges.

276 Harris 1971, 262.
277 Licin. 36.36-37 Criniti. The text is quite tormented: I accept the reading of the Bonn edition recuperunt, instead of reddiderunt, which is given by the manuscript and accepted by Criniti. On this passage, see Scardigli 1983, 129-131.
278 Cf. App. b. c. 1.96.448; see Brunt 1971, 308-309 and De Neeve 1984, 131.
279 I do not agree with Scardigli 1983, 129, arguing that the veterans were compelled to explain their defeat to the Senate; Mazzarino 1957, 120 is certainly wrong in saying that they forgave the rebels and defended them in the Senate.
assembly. Significantly, both consuls were sent to put an end to the revolt, but one of them, M. Aemilius Lepidus would soon join the insurgency himself.280

2.6. The Sullan veterans and Catiline’s conspiracy

Unfortunately, there is no literary evidence for what happened in Etruria between the revolt of 78 and Catiline’s conspiracy. It remains unclear, first of all, what happened at Faesulae after Lepidus and the rebels were defeated.281 No doubt, a considerable group of Sullan settlers did not leave the area, as Cicero refers twice to the presence of colonists from Faesulae in Catiline’s army.282 Probably their position remained difficult, and was further complicated by the losses suffered in the attack. It would be useful to know what measures, if any, were taken by Rome to protect the colonists and avoid further attacks, or even to restore some of them on the allotments re-occupied by the Faesulani.

The incidents at Faesulae suggest that something about the Sullan settlement plans in Etruria was flawed. Soon after the arrival of the veterans, the local population managed to react successfully.283 This was, to our knowledge, unparalleled in the rest of Italy. It is impossible to establish what triggered the offensive, or rather what led the inhabitants to believe that an attack could be successful. The riots were possibly related to contemporary events in other areas of Etruria. As we have seen, the land assignments at Volaterrae and Arretium were stopped after the death of Sulla. However, the strongest element suggesting that Sullan colonisation in Etruria was not a success is the participation of a contingent of veterans in the conspiracy of Catiline. This may be explained both by local factors, and by the impact of wider processes that involved Italy as a whole.

It is significant that the bulk of the Sullan colonists who followed Catiline was from Arretium and Faesulae, where the settlement programme knew some significant

280 See Licin. 36.38 Cn. and Sall. 1.66 M, with Labruna 1975, 46-51, 156-158.
281 Harris 1971, 268 argues that the land given up by the veterans was a ‘temporary concession’, and that it was recovered after Lepidus’ revolt.
282 See Cic. Cat. 3.6.14; Mar. 24.49.
283 Harris 1971, 267-271 is too optimistic about the success of the Sullan settlement in the area.
drawbacks. They had endured hostility, open attacks, and isolation. They were prevented from increasing the size of their properties by adding unoccupied land (like that which had been *publicata*, but not *divisa*) to the allotments they already had. There is reason to believe that these scattered groups of veterans posted to a hostile territory still communicated with each other. Figures like Gaius Manlius and Publius Furius, both mentioned in Cicero’s Catilinarian speeches promoted the adhesion to the conspiracy.\(^{284}\) Cicero’s metaphorical reference to a *colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitus* cannot be lightly dismissed.\(^{285}\) The typical accusation launched against the supporters of Catiline is to have tried to revive the *licentia* of the early Sullan period after squandering the fortunes earned by the proscriptions and the mass murders.\(^{286}\) This may be true of Catiline and of other leading figures of the conspiracy.

The main reason why Catiline was so successful among the Sullan veterans, however, is that many of them became considerably poorer less than two decades after the Sullan colonisation. A satisfactory explanation for this development is still to be provided, and it probably is not within reach. It would be far-fetched, for instance, to view it as a consequence of the scarce talent of the Sullan veterans for agriculture, as has often been claimed. There is no reason to believe that they were less skilled than the average Italian peasant. Most of them certainly had a rural background before joining the army, and it is conceivable that they were prepared to return to their earlier condition after Sulla’s victory.\(^{287}\) It is true that many Sullan veterans tried to sell their properties soon after the land was assigned, and not just in Etruria, as Cicero says.\(^{288}\) However, this may be better explained by the economic conditions of Italy at the end of the Eighties than by their inability to cope with rural life.

It is hard to establish whether the difficulties met by the Sullan veterans in Etruria had more to do with local dynamics or with wider economic processes. From

\(^{284}\) Cic. Cat. 3.6.14: *in P. Furium, qui est ex eis colonis quos Vessulas L. Sulla deduxit*, Cic. Cat. 2.6.14: *Manlius iste centurio, qui in agro Faesulanu castra posuit, bellum populo Romano suo nomine indicit* and 2.9.20: *quo ex genere iste est Manlius, cui nunc Catilina succedit*, *ibi sunt homines ex eis coloniis quas Sulla constituit*.

\(^{285}\) Cic. Mar. 49: *Catinanum interea alacrem atque laetum, stipatam choro insuntuitis, wallatum indicibus atque sicariis, infatam cum spe militum <tum> conające mei, quem ad modum dicebat ipse*, *promissis, circumfluentem colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu*.

\(^{286}\) Cf. Sall. Cat. 16.4 (*plerique Sullani milites, largius suo uisi, rapinarum et victoriae veteris memores civile bellum ecopathant*); Cat. 28.4.

\(^{287}\) Brunt 1971, 309-310.

\(^{288}\) Cic. *leg. agr*. 2.78.
the outbreak of the Mithridatic War Italy went through a serious financial crisis, triggered by the interruption of the revenue flow from the province of Asia. The bankruptcy of the bank of Fulcinius, which took place at Volaterrae between the Mithridatic and the Civil Wars and is mentioned in Cicero’s pro Caecina, fits well this scenario, and was certainly not unparalleled. In 86 BC the consul Valerius Flaccus put forward a law reducing debts by three-fourths, which received significantly wide support. At the same time, circulation of false and debased coinage was a serious issue. The edict of the praetor Marius Gratidianus of 85 BC and the lex Cornelia de falsis of 81 BC show similar concerns on the part of the government, regardless of factional politics.

Moreover, the losses of the Social and the Civil Wars had considerable economic impact. Evidence like the coin hoards from Etruria that were buried in the Eighties and never recovered afterwards suggests that money supply diminished considerably in the aftermath of the Civil War. The outcome was more widespread indebtedness. Huge military expenses had exhausted the Roman aerarium, and they were bound to grow in the future, as the enfranchisement of the Allies exempted them from any contribution to the financing of the army. Besides, despite Sulla’s reorganisation of the province of Asia, the public budget was definitely not stabilised, and it would not be until Pompey’s Eastern campaign in the Sixties. In 82, the Senate was compelled to use resources taken from the temples to pay the troops; the

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290 See Sall. Cat. 33.2 (as noniusse memoria nostra propter magnitudinem aeris alieni solentibus omnibus bonis, argentum aer solatum sst); Vell. 2.23. 2 (Ualerius Flaccus, turpissimae legis auctor, qua creditoribus quadrantes solvi inuenierat). See Frank 1933, 56-57; Bulst 1964, 330-337; Nicolet 1971, 1220-1221; Lo Cascio 1979, 234-235; Barlow 1980, 215-217.


293 Cf. Catilina’s pledge for tabulae novae. Sall. Cat. 21.2 (cum Catilina polliceri tabulas novas, proscriptionem locupletum, magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas, alia omnia, quae bellum atque lubido victorum fert).

reconstruction of the Capitol was accomplished only in 69 BC. It is conceivable that these critical factors influenced the situation of the Sullan foundations in Etruria, but it is unclear to what extent. Colonisation in Campania was an overall success: there is no evidence that the veterans became poorer, all the confiscated land appears to have been assigned, and the opposition to the new foundations is not known to have been violent. Such a contrast is a warning against attempting to identify the economic difficulties of Italy as the main explanation for the situation of Etruria. On balance, it is preferable to put more emphasis on local factors.

Colonisation in Etruria started later than in Campania. As we have seen, although a lex Cornelia on the colonial foundations may have covered all the new settlements at once, military activities were not over before 79 BC, with the conquest of Volaterrae. Sulla may have played a role, if indirect, in the foundation of a colony like Pompeii. He certainly did not in the land assignments near Volaterrae and Arretium. There is ground to argue that the settlement of the veterans in this region was not accurately organised. Unfamiliarity with the territory, and perhaps haste might have led some of the newcomers to settle in not very productive land. The hostility of the local population and the subsequent campaign of Lepidus made it even harder for them to cope with their new situation. There is also evidence that the colonists spent huge resources in building activities, and that this further compromised their financial position. Some of the veterans became impoverished, and joined Catiline's attempt. It should be noted, however, that not all the Sullan settlers made that choice. The colonies of Faesulae and Arretium survived even after that crisis.

Although many crucial aspects remain unclear, the background of the Catilinarian crisis sheds light on the importance of some crucial aspects of the policies that Sulla adopted in Italy, and the impact which they had on Italian economy and society. They need to be briefly summarised at the end of this discussion on Sulla and Etruria. As seen above, the proscriptions and the foundation of veteran colonies were

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296 Cic. Cat. 2.20: hi dum audiscnt tamquam brevi, dum praeiti lectis, familiis magnis, conuiuiis apparatis delectantur, in tantum aet alienum insidierunt, ut, si salui esse velint, Sulla sit iis ab inferis excitandus. See Gabba 1976a, 323 (= Gabba 1994a, 114).
the main features of Sulla's policy in Italy. Their background was provided by the needs of the power struggle and of internal politics, but the consequences were much deeper. Although they were part of the same project, they largely appear to have operated on two different levels.

The proscriptions affected parts of the *ordo senatorius* and of the *ordo equester*, and they were a major chance for other sectors of the same *ordines* to increase their wealth. Some close associates of Sulla built huge fortunes out of the proscriptions, which in some cases would enable them to pursue a successful political career.297 M. Licinius Crassus was so eager to accumulate the goods of the proscribed in Bruttium that he irritated even Sulla, who isolated him from the political scene.298 The list of the beneficiaries includes as diverse characters as L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Catiline and C. Verres.299 Concentration of properties must have been the rule, rather than the exception, if even Quinctius Valgus, who apparently was not a senator, got control of vast estates in the territory of Casinum and in Hirpinia.300 The list of the known profiteers is not very long: a couple of dozen people in total. From the available evidence, the first proscription appears to have been advantageous only for those who had, in various capacities, a close relationship with Sulla. The great fortunes accumulated by freedmen like Chrysogonus and Tarula, which enraged the traditionalists, are to be explained as the outcome of personal affiliations. Local associates of Sulla, like Oppianicus at Larinum or Capito at Ameria, who had an important function in carrying out some confiscations, had their share of the booty.

The proscriptions generated new great estates, more absentee ownership, and more unoccupied or underexploited land. At the same time, however, Sulla settled his veterans in areas of Italy that were fertile and strategically significant. Colonisation responded to two basic needs: rewarding the soldiers that had won two wars, and

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299 On Domitius, see Dio 41.11.1, with Hinard 1985a, 201, fn. 200; on Catiline, see Sall. *Cat.* 5.2; Q. Cic. *Comm. Pet.* 9-10; Ascon. 84, 91 C; Plut. *Sull.* 32.3; Plut. *Cic.* 10.3. Verres’ properties were concentrated in the territory of Beneventum: Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.38.

300 Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.14: *denique eos fundos quos in agro Casinati optimos fructuosissimosque continuerat, cum usque eo uicinos proscriberat quoad angulos conformando ex multis praedaem unam fundi regionem normamque perferret, quos nunc cum aliqua metu tenet, sine uilla cura possidebit.* On Valgus’ estates in Hirpinia, see Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.8, and supra. He was therefore a great landowner whose properties were scattered in different regions: Gabba 1994b, 438-439 (= Gabba 1994a, 226-227).
punishing the communities which had opposed Sulla’s rise to power.\textsuperscript{301} In Campania there is no evidence that the settlements of the Sullan veterans ever went through a critical phase, or that their survival was ever threatened. The situation in Etruria was not equally straightforward. In some communities like Volaterrae and perhaps Florentia, there were just land assignments to the Sullan veterans, without a colony being founded. At Faesulae, the local population attacked the veterans, and they managed to regain their land, although it is unclear to what extent and how long. At Arretium, the Sullan \textit{deductores} made some mistakes: part of the land that had originally been destined to the assignments was never used for that purpose, because enough settlers could not be found.

The ancient accounts of the Catilinarian conspiracy are not immune from propaganda and from rhetorical bias, but they cannot be dismissed when they portray the Sullan veterans fighting next to the descendants of the victims of the proscription. These two groups may have fought each other in the past, but they apparently shared the same problem at the end of the Sixties: they were impoverished and in search of new sources of wealth. The reason why the proscribed may have been in that position is apparent. The poverty of the veterans is harder to account for, as I have tried to show above.

\textit{*} \hspace{1cm} \textit{*} \hspace{1cm} \textit{*}

The veterans of the Etruscan colonies were the weakest link of the large constituency of the supporters of Sulla who were rewarded after his victory. The political importance of their presence in the region, however, must not be overlooked. Although their settlement may not have been organised very competently, it played a significant part in the history of Etruria during the late Republic. The coming of the veterans was not just a price that had to be paid to the victorious army, but it was the clearest signal of an epoch-making defeat. It followed a series of impressive destructions, and it was accompanied by a law that withdrew Roman citizenship of several anti-Sullan communities.

\textsuperscript{301} Chouquer 1987, 245-247 speculates that in some areas \textit{centuriatio} was first carried out in the Sullan age: the territory immediately south-east of Rome, around Castrimoenium, Bovillae and Gabii, a part of the \textit{ager Campanus}, and the \textit{ager Nolanus}. 
The response of some sectors of the Etruscan elite to this situation is extremely interesting: they started seeking the patronage of the part of the Roman elite that was prepared to support their agenda, and to defend the interests of their communities. As I have argued above, the Faesulani who went to the Senate to defend their attack on the veterans would not have spoken as boldly as reported by Licinianus if they had lacked any support in that assembly. The Arretini and the Volaterrani, downgraded to the mysterious *ius XII coloniarum*, would have hardly regained their rights if they had not found support among the Roman notables that were interested in exploiting their loyalty.

Finding informal ways to interact with the Roman elite was a problem that was common to all the Italian Allies in the period between the enfranchisement and the actual inclusion into the citizen body. For some Etruscan communities this may have been even harder, as they had been deprived of full citizenship. Fortunately, we are quite well informed about their position because they chose such a vocal patron as Cicero.\(^{302}\) The status problem of the Volaterrani was probably solved not long after Caecina’s case and Cicero’s successful plea in his favour. It is likely, in fact, that the census that started in 70 BC put this anomaly to an end and included the Volaterrani and the other communities back into the citizen body.\(^{303}\) That was the success of Caecina and of the members of the Etruscan elite who, like him, had proved prepared to accept the victory of Rome without reservations, and negotiate a new role for themselves.\(^{304}\) About ten years before, that very elite had taken part in a war against Sulla and a large part of the Roman political establishment. Sulla’s great victory was probably to have found the most direct way to compel the Etruscan to become, politically speaking, Roman.\(^{305}\) As soon as the well-to-do Volaterrani lost full citizenship, it became clear to them that they could not afford isolation, or sterile opposition anymore. They had to look for Roman patrons, and it is significant that they found one in Cicero, who was by no means a *popularis*. Sulla’s retaliation had compelled them to renegotiate their relations with the Roman elite.

\(^{302}\) The best discussion of this relationship is Deniaux 1991.


\(^{304}\) The talent of the Volaterran elite in building profitable relations at Rome and the central role of the Caecinae are stressed by Terrenato 1998, 107-109; Terrenato 2001, 61. Cf. however Berrendonner 2003, 59 remarking that the case of a prominent family like the Caecinae must not necessarily be considered the rule.

\(^{305}\) Cf. Piotrowicz 1930, 337-338.
The attempt to change the status of Volaterrae and Arretium is of great significance for an assessment of Sulla's policies on the Empire. It reflects more general patterns of his contribution to the making and the consolidation of the Empire, and it suggests analogies with other events that I have discussed in this chapter. The land confiscations and the withdrawal of Roman citizenship that Sulla inflicted on some hostile communities were an extraordinarily harsh punishment, which may be compared to the fine he imposed on the cities of the province of Asia at the end of the Mithridatic War. The effects of these two measures are remarkably similar to each other. In both cases retaliation enabled Sulla to gather a significant amount of wealth, either in cash, as was the case in Asia Minor, or in land, as happened in Italy. This was of course crucial in the development of the Civil War, as it enabled Sulla to finance his Italian campaign, and to reward some of his veterans after the victory. However, it also had a considerable effect in the longer term, as it significantly affected the administrative organisation of some crucial regions of the Empire, and compelled the local elites to redefine their position towards Rome.

At the end of both wars he fought in the Eighties, Sulla put in place a clear system of rewards and sanctions, whose scope went beyond his personal interest, and which reveals his interest in contributing to the organisation of the Empire. As I have shown in the first part of this chapter, the fine decided by Sulla in Asia Minor was part of a wider programme, whereby the whole administration of the province was reorganised, probably by a lex provinciae. In Italy Sulla has a similar approach: he confirmed the enfranchisement of most allied communities, and took revenge only on a handful of cities whose resistance had been particularly staunch during the Civil War. Some of them were punished with the substitution of the local magistrates with pro-Sullan ones, as happened at Larinum; others had part of their territory confiscated and assigned to the Sullan veterans, like Praeneste and Pompeii; others suffered the confiscations and the downgrading from the civitas optimo iure to the ius XII coloniarum.

The response of the local elites too was strikingly similar in the Greek East and in Italy. Some chose to join and support Sulla from the beginning, and had their loyalty rewarded. Those who did not, and were consequently punished, embarked on a process that gradually enabled them to find support, and sometimes patronage, among members of the Roman governing class. For the cities of Asia Minor it was crucial to limit the impact of the financial impositions decided by Sulla, and to ensure that a limit was set to the greed of the Roman moneylenders. As I have shown above, two
strategies were adopted: the search of Roman patrons, which was prevalently used by
the free cities, and active participation in the assembly of the cities of the province of
Asia, the koinon, which dealt with Roman governors on a regular basis. In both cases,
the outcome was a progressively closer cooperation between Greek and Roman elites,
whose importance for the development and the stabilisation of the Empire in the
longer term was crucial. In Italy, the local elites that managed to survive Sulla’s
revenge soon committed themselves to a similar process, and sought the support of
members of the Roman elite. It is quite fortunate for the student of this period that
Volaterrae and Arretium found such a vocal patron and supporter in Cicero, who
often recorded his special relationship with the Etruscan cities. As I have remarked
above, it is even more significant that the descendants of the Volaterran aristocrat
Aulus Caecina defended by Cicero managed to enter the Senate in a couple of
generations’ time, providing us with an impressive example of the ultimate
consequences of the strategy that Sulla’s punishment had compelled their ancestors to
adopt.

At the end of an analysis of Sulla’s contribution to the administration of Italy
and Asia Minor, his strong interest in the role of the elites, which emerged already in
the first chapter, finds full confirmation. At the same time, the widely held stereotype
portraying Sulla as a bloodthirsty and greedy general, exclusively interested in
eliminating his enemies and building personal power, is decisively undermined. Of
course he was driven to create a personal supremacy in Rome, but this is a reductive
way to consider his role in the history of the late Republic. The age of Sulla cannot be
fully understood without considering his efforts towards the consolidation of the
Empire, and his considerable achievements in this respect.

In the following chapter I will try to discuss the ideological aspects of this
operation by studying the use Sulla made of some religious motifs in various moments
of his imperial strategy. Some similarities between the initiatives he took on the two
sides of the Empire are recognisable on this level too. Again, both in the East and in
Italy, Sulla’s emphasis on the ideology of the Empire was part of a broader effort to
involve the local elites in the new phase. Although his use of religion was on various
fronts, his first interlocutors were the domi nobiles, the local elites. Sulla realised that his
efforts to strengthen the Empire, both in Italy and in the East, were likely to turn into
failure without a complex ideological operation supporting them. It is now time to
consider it in detail.
3. Sulla, Religion, and the Empire

In the previous chapters the focus has been kept on the consequences that the initiatives of Sulla had on the administration of the Empire, and on its economic and social history. There is a third level, however, that deserves to be taken into consideration, as it complements the other two: religion. Sulla did not just substantially contribute to the development of the Empire in the Greek East and to the development of Roman Italy by winning wars and compelling the local elites to redefine their attitude and position towards Rome. He also made a very significant contribution to the development of Roman imperial ideology: to the way in which the Romans made sense of their global power, and to the way in which the Greek world viewed the role of the Romans. Sulla’s operation was rooted in the context of the Mithridatic War and in the developments of the Greek campaign and, as I shall show in more detail, it was based on restating the kinship and the special relationship between Venus and Rome. Sulla managed to exploit this old theme, which had been circulating in the East for several generations, for the sake of his own political agenda, and to transform it into a ‘political theology of victory’. Back in Italy, he aimed to represent himself as a new founder of Rome, who came to rescue the Republic from a deadly crisis. The theme of the mythical kinship with Venus would be of great importance for this strategy of self-representation, and would represent an ideal bridge between Sulla’s agenda in the East and in the West. The aim of this chapter is therefore to explore the two sides of Sulla’s approach to religion, and to show the importance that religion had in both the contexts where he operated.

3.1. Why ‘Sulla Epaphroditos’?

A good starting point for the discussion is provided by the events that took place in Boeotia during and immediately after the Mithridatic War. The literary sources indeed offer many interesting, if isolated elements, which may be viewed as symptoms of more widespread patterns. What matters most to this discussion, however, is that the history of the region in this period is closely linked to the panhellenic sanctuaries,

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1 The definition is derived from Gallini 1970, 127, whose discussion of Sulla’s attitude to religion (127, 140-141) is however misleading.
a front of the Sullan campaign in Greece, which turned out to be decisive in his
relations with the Greek world as a whole.

Sulla’s depredation of the Greek sanctuaries is reported by Plutarch, who links
the siege of Athens directly with Sulla’s need for fresh resources. He interestingly
stresses an aspect of Sulla’s conduct before and after the conquest of Athens: his
striking, even appalling indifference towards Greek religious institutions and
sanctuaries. According to Plutarch, when Sulla sent Caphis of Titheora, a Greek
member of his entourage, to collect the treasure of the Delphic Amphictyony, his
envoy was extremely wary and ended by bursting into tears in front of the priests of
Apollo, fearing the possible consequences of such an impious act. When he wrote to
Sulla claiming that he had witnessed some unfortunate presages, he received a
mocking reply and was ordered to withdraw the treasure at any rate. Plutarch makes it
clear that only political convenience — largely determined by the need to keep the
favour of his army — mattered to Sulla at that stage. Piety could happily be left aside
and rediscovered after the victory. Allegations of impiousness, however, could turn
out to be a political problem in the meantime.

The negotiations between Caphis and the Amphictyones show how important
a factor religion could be in the relations between Sulla and the Greek world since the
beginning of the Mithridatic War. The record of the Roman general was both
inconsistent and controversial in this respect. No doubt, some episodes did not help
him to earn a good reputation. In Athens, he was blamed for hunting Aristion down
to the temple of Athena, where the former tyrant had fled after the Romans had
stormed in the city. According to Pausanias, who has a consistently negative bias

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2 Plut. Sull. 12.5.
3 Plut. Sull. 12.6-8. The chronology of the episode cannot be determined: Daux 1936, 399. About
Caphis, see Plut. Sull. 15.5, with Robert 1960, 82-84; C. P. Jones 1971, 41-42 argues that Plutarch was
told about Caphis’ deeds by his friend Soclarus, who was from Titheora himself.
4 Duff 1999, 165-168, 193-200 is an excellent discussion of Sulla’s portrait in Plutarch.
5 The crime committed by the victorious general was so awful that Pausanias viewed it (1.20.7) as the
cause of his horrible death, caused by the same disease which had caused the death of the philosopher
39.151 and Plut. Sull. 14.11-12. A list of other famous characters killed by the same illness as Sulla is
provided by Plutarch too (Sull. 36.5). Some attempts to establish the cause of the death of Sulla and to
relate it with his abdication from the dictatorship have been made by modern scholarship: see
Carney 1961b; Africa 1982; Schamp 1991; Jenkins 1994; Gilliers-Retief 2000. According to
Keaveney-Madden 1982, 94-95 both Pherecydes and Sulla suffered from scabies, although of course their deaths were
against Sulla, but whom there is no reason to disbelieve on this matter, he was also responsible for the sack of at least two Greek temples.\(^6\)

At Orchomenus, he stole from the Myniae sanctuary a standing statue of Dionysus, made by Myron, which he later dedicated again on Helicon, where many other statues of the gods and the muses were on display. Pausanias bitterly remarks that Sulla's behaviour is the most vivid illustration of a Greek proverb, 'to worship gods with other people's incense' (θυμίαμασιν ἄλλοτροις τὸ θεῖον σέβεσθαι) — a judgement combining heartfelt contempt of the Roman commander with an implicit, yet quite proud reassertion of the peculiarity of Greek religious identity.\(^7\) Pausanias is the only source mentioning hostile actions of Sulla against Orchomenus. A destruction of the city can safely be ruled out, as the story of Damon shows the local elite actively plotting against Chaeronea in the immediate aftermath of the war. In fact, the eventual attempt of the Orchomenians to damage Chaeronea by questioning its loyalty to Rome is probably to be explained in the light of a crisis they suffered at Sulla's hands. According to another passage of the *Periegesis*, Sulla's misdeeds caused a severe crisis for the city, comparable to that which other Greek associates of Mithridates experienced: 'Sulla's treatment of the Athenians was fierce and alien to the character of the Romans, but it was consistent with his treatment of the Thebans and the Orchomenians'.\(^8\)

In Pausanias' view, however, this misdeed was not Sulla's greatest fault. The Boeotian village of Alalcomenae had in its territory an important sanctuary of Athena, which Sulla profaned by stealing the image of the goddess. The shrine was soon abandoned, because the goddess was widely believed 'not to live there any more'.\(^9\) Sulla, however, was cursed by the gods, his fortune started to decline and he died of caused by other diseases. In Sulla's case, the likeliest cause of death was liver failure; also see Bondeson 1997, 52-55.

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\(^6\) On the booty that Sulla gathered in the Greek East, see Pape 1975, 21-22; Waurick 1975, 44, 46. The shipwreck discovered near Mahdia, in modern Tunisia, has been viewed as a that of the ship carrying part of the booty that Sulla gathered at Athens (on which see Luc. *Zeux. 3*). There is, in fact, no way to prove that, and a dating to 100 BC ca. is most likely: Hellenkemper-Salies 1994.


\(^8\) Paus. 9.33.6; Σύλλα δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἐς Ἀθηναίους ἀνήμερα καὶ ἡθοὺς ἄλλοτρα τοῦ Ρωμαίων, ξεκότα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐς Ἐθῆμεν τῇ καὶ Ὀρχομένειος. As we have seen in the first chapter, Sulla deprived Thebes of a considerable part of its territory, which he gave to the Panhellenic sanctuaries as compensation: Paus. 9.7.4-6.

\(^9\) However, the village was not destroyed: Strab. 9.2.36 = C 413. Cf. Kahrstedt 1954, 87-88.
scabies – the just punishment for such a misdeed. With his explanation of Sulla's death Pausanias confirms that a strong tradition, overtly hostile to Sulla, had developed in the Greek world, which still found a place in the historical debate in the second century AD. There is some ground to believe, however, that Sulla tried to counter this vision, and to give credit to a different representation of his in the Greek world, especially when the defeat of Mithridates seemed at hand. I intend to suggest that this was a crucial part of his political agenda.

In fact, the portrait of an impious Sulla is challenged by several interesting episodes. Back in the Nineties, during his propraetorship in Cilicia, he had confirmed the asylia of the sanctuary of Isis and Serapis at Mopsuhestia, which had already been acknowledged by the Seleucid kings. The grant was later renewed by Lucullus in the late Eighties, and endorsed by Sulla during his dictatorship, as is shown by the inscription that records it. As Sulla arrived in Greece, the oracle of Trophonius, near Lebadea, predicted that he would obtain great victories in Greece and in Asia Minor. In the tenth book of his Memoirs, he recalled that a Roman businessman based in Greece, Q. Titius, came to him immediately after the first victory of Chaeronea, announcing that the oracle had predicted another one in the near future, and a soldier called Salvienus reported another oracle foreseeing the victory in the Civil War.

At some point during the war, Sulla granted the sanctuary of Amphiaraius near Oropus, on the border between Boeotia and Attica, complete fiscal immunity, and even gave it new land – a remarkable sign of favour in itself. Later, in 80 BC, a senatus consultum confirmed the decision. The circumstance is recorded by a controversy which arose some years later and required the arbitration of the Roman Senate. In

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10 SEG 44.1227. First published in Sayar-Siewert-Taeuber 1994; also see Rigsby 1996, 465-472, no. 217. Lucullus explicitly refers to the asylia decreed by other Roman magistrates before him (l. 15-6). The reference is to the magistrates who, since 102, had been in charge of the provincia Cilicia. The extant fragment of l. 2, where Sulla's accompanying letter was, reads [σεως τῆς], which the editors supplement as ἀνακεφαλαίωσεν τῆς: it is possible that Sulla is here referring to the renewal of a privilege awarded by himself (Rigsby 1996, 469). Buraselis 2003, 156-157 speculates that the grants of Sulla and Lucullus extended the asylia of the sanctuary to the city, implying that Rome would protect it from the pirates. On the history of Mopsuhestia and its sanctuary under the Seleucids, see Boffo 1985, 60-63.


12 Plut. Sull. 17.2-3. It is significant that both responses were reported to Sulla by Roman citizens. The Trophonius oracle already had a record of responses consistently favourable to the Romans: Radke 1939, 684. Cf. Arafat 1996, 98-99; Bonnechere 2003, 31-32. It is significant that the local festival of the Basileia was resumed straight after the Mithridatic War: Gossage 1975, 123-124.
74/73 BC, Sulla's decision was challenged by the publicani, who tried to levy taxes from the sanctuary. Somewhat curiously, their argument was a religious one: Amphiaras was a hero, not a god, and his sanctuary did not deserve immunity. A new senatusconsultum, however, was voted (DGRE 23) confirming the decisions of Sulla, and the asylia of the sanctuary was respected down to the age of Augustus, when the publicani left Greece. In that very period, the Amphiaraeum returned under Athens' sphere of influence, where it used to belong before the intervention of Sulla. The intention to harm Athenian interests may have had a role in the decision to reassert the autonomy of the sanctuary. At any rate, the episode casts doubt on the stereotype of an impious Sulla, holding Greek religious tradition in low regard, and encourages us to adopt a more nuanced perspective. But there is much more. The strategy adopted by Sulla to present himself in the aftermath of his victory against Mithridates and Archelaus offers very interesting evidence to the discussion.

Plutarch provides important information about the way in which Sulla celebrated his crucial victory at Chaeronea. He erected two trophies in the territory of the city, both bearing dedications 'to Ares, Nike and Aphrodite'. Plutarch could certainly see them in his own day. At first sight, the choice of the three gods seems quite transparent, for once: Nike-Victoria is a goddess one would expect to see mentioned in such a context, Ares-Mars was the god to whom the patronage of Roman warfare was entrusted, and Aphrodite-Venus a goddess with whom both the Romans and Sulla as an individual claimed a special relationship. The language in which the dedications of the trophies were written is a less straightforward problem. Plutarch remarks that the monument built on the top of a hill called Thurium bore the names of Omolochos and Anaxidamos, two Chaereonean notables who led the

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13 On the immunity of the Amphiaraeum, cf. Cic. nat. deor. 3.49. On the economic history of the area, see Kahrstedt 1954, 59. The inscriptions evidence suggests that the local festival in honour of Amphiaras, the Amphiarata, kept flourishing after 80 BC: Gossage 1975, 117-121. Also see Dignas 2002, 118-119.

14 The decision on the status of the Amphiaraeum is viewed in an anti-Athenian light by Cosmopoulos 2001, 79, who supports the argument by stressing the emergence of local pottery in the first century BC.


16 Plut. Sull. 19.9; cf. Plut. mor. 318d; Paus. 9.40.7.
contingent of fellow citizens which took part in the battle, written 'in Greek letters'. The mention of the two notables and the monument itself was confirmed some time ago by the lucky discovery in the neighbourhood of Chaeronea of an inscription bearing their names, which appears to be, in all likelihood, part of the trophy erected after the battle. Unfortunately, the archaeological context of the find does not enable us to determine how this Greek inscription related to the rest of the monument and its overall structure. Plutarch's specifying that the inscription was in Greek alphabet suggests that the first monument and possibly a part of the second monument were inscribed in Latin. At any rate, in another passage of the biography Plutarch says that Sulla's name also appeared in Greek, and that it was followed by a Greek epithet, 'Επαφρόδιτος: αὐτὸς δὲ τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς γράφων καὶ χρηματίζων, έαυτόν 'Επαφρόδιτον ἀνθυγορευέ, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς τροπαίοις οὕτως ἀναγέγραπται: Λεύκιος Κορινθίας Σύλλας 'Επαφρόδιτος (Sull. 34.4: 'When he wrote to the Greeks or had political relations with them, he called himself 'Επαφρόδιτος, and in our region one can read this on the trophies: 'Lucius Cornelius Sulla' Επαφρόδιτος').

It is beyond doubt that Plutarch is here referring to the Chaeronean trophies, but the importance of his remark goes way beyond the boundaries of Boeotia and concerns Sulla's relations with the Greek world as a whole. Very early on during his campaign of reconquest, certainly soon after the first decisive victory against

18 Published and discussed in Camp 1992; cf. the sceptical, though unconvincing arguments of McKay 2000a. The international press has reported that the other trophy erected by Sulla, in the spot where Archelaus' troops started withdrawing towards the Molum (Plut. Sull. 19.10), has recently been discovered near Orchomenus by a local peasant, and its first edition is currently being prepared by the Ephor of Classical Antiquities for Boeotia, Vassili Aravantinos.
19 No surviving document from Asia Minor shows us Sulla using Latin; all the messages addressed by him or by the Roman Senate are in Greek, though often translated from Latin original versions. There is a handful of Latin inscriptions of the Sullan period from Greece: two from Delos, ID 1850 (= ILLRP 349): L. Cornelius L. f. Sulla pro co(n)s(ule) and ID 1852 (= ILLRP 350): L. Cornelius L. f. Sulla pro co(n)s(ule) / de pignania quam conlegia / in commune conlatam; also see CIL 12.2507; and, more interestingly, from the Peloponnesian city of Sicyon, where he dedicated a statue to Mars, on the southern side of the Artemis temple. The dedication, probably dating to the aftermath of the victory over Archelaus, reads L(ucius) C(ornelius) L(uci) f(ilius) Sulla imper(ator) Mart(e) AЕ 1939, 43 = ILLRP 224; briefly discussed by Accame 1946, 158 and Griffin 1982, 89. Sicyon was definitely a free city in 60 BC: Cic. Att. 1.19.9, with Peppe 1988, 47–49, 55–56. Schörner 2003, 172 stresses that dedications to Ares are rarely attested in Greece in this period. On the connection between Mars and Venus Victrix, see Galinsky 1969, 233–234.
Archelaus (if not earlier, as we shall see), Sulla decided to deal with the Greek world using an epithet, 'Επιβροδίτως, that suggested a close relationship between him and Aphrodite, and soon became part of his name. The numismatic evidence confirms the importance of this process, and prompts further interest in the background of the epithet.

At the end of his campaign to the East, Sulla struck his own coinage, which he used to finance his army and had a wide circulation in the Italian regions where his conquest was easiest, like Apulia, Campania and Southern Latium. The mint travelled with him, and resources had been gathered on the way. In Greece, they derived from the conquest of Athens and, even more, from the depredation of the panhellenic sanctuaries. In 84/83 BC, at the end of the Mithridatic War, on his way back to Italy, Sulla struck a coin issue, produced both in aurei and denarii, that looks like a perfect epitome of the ideological agenda of his imperialistic effort. RRC 359 has, on the recto, a head of Venus and the name of Sulla and, on the verso, the legend IMPERATOR ITERV(M), accompanied by a jug and a lituus, two symbols that are related to the augurate and to the concept of imperium, and surrounded by two trophies which have long been identified with those he erected at Chaeronea.

Discussion has involved various aspects of this coin, such as the meaning of the symbols referring to the augurate and the mention of the double proclamation of the title of imperator, which almost certainly refers to the victories in Cilicia and at

20 The hoards containing Sullan coins from the years of the Civil War have been found in Southern Italy, where the penetration of the Sullan army found no opposition: see Crawford 1964, 150.
21 On the emphasis on the title of imperator, see Cesano 1945/1946, 188; Deininger 1972, 985-986. On the jug and the lituus, see RRC, 373-374 and Keaveney 1982c, 154-161, linking Sulla’s ‘claim to imperium’ to the hostis-declaration pronounced by his enemies while he was in the East. This coin issue has often been discussed in modern studies on the priesthoods that Sulla held, or may have held. On this, see the polemic between B. Frier, arguing that Sulla was an augur from 88 BC and claimed back the priesthood in 84/83 BC (Frier 1967, Frier 1969; cf. Cesano 1945/1946, 204; Luce 1968, 27), and E. Badian, claiming that he was a pontiff instead (Badian 1968b, Badian 1969); cf. Alfoldi 1976, 156 and Martin 1989, 43. RRC, 374 argues that Sulla reached the augurate only in 82, replacing L. Scipio Asiagenus; same position in Rüpke 2005, 926-927. Fears 1977, 104-105, 109-110 speculatively argues that the lituus is a symptom of exceptional divine favour and personal charisma, both in the Sullan coinage and in late Republican issues as a whole; also see Fears 1981, 785 and Wistrand 1987, 29. The discussion in G.-C. Picard 1957, 174-181 is entirely misleading.
Chaeronea. It is indisputable that the two trophies are a reference to the victory on Mithridates. Their importance was so great that Sulla referred to them on the first coin issue he ever produced, on his way back from the Greek East. They were the visual celebration of his crucial victory in the campaign for the reconquest of Greece.

The stress on the battle at Chaeronea is hardly surprising, if one considers the actual development of the campaign. It was, in fact, the most important military confrontation that Sulla had with the army of Mithridates. When he won it, he probably knew already that he would seek an appeasement of Mithridates ensuring the status quo ante and enabling him to leave for Italy in the near future. The victory had to be celebrated for what it actually was: the most important moment of the war, the event that threw Mithridates' army out of Greece for good and prepared its final defeat. In this light, it is not surprising that the trophies also feature, in small size, on several coin issues struck in Athens after the reconquest. The theme of the double victory may also occur in the so-called Bocchus' monument, found at Rome near the church of Sant'Omobono, where two trophies feature, and the palm branch in the eagle's beak clearly has two wreaths. It is possible that the monument was built in 91 BC, as a base for the statue portraying the capture of Jugurtha by Sulla, and

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22 See the commentary in RRC, nos. 359-360, with earlier bibliography; also cf. RRC, 732. It is possible, however, that the first proclamation took place in 89 BC, after the victory on the Samnites near Nola, when Sulla received the corona graminea. Plin. 22.12 (= HRR 10 = Chassignet 10). Wosnik 1963, 14-31 and Martin 1989 argue that RRC 359 was actually struck at the end of the Civil War, and that Sulla was hailed as imperator for the second time after the victory of the Colline Gate: I find it unlikely, since that was the final act of the Civil War (cf. Val. Max. 2.8.7). Zehnacker 1973, 573-575 and Pera 1977, 244 wrongly claim that Venus was a 'personal' goddess of Sulla.


24 On Bocchus' monument, see Bertoldi 1968; Giuliani 1968 (both dating it to the second century BC); Hölscher 1980, 357-371 (= Hölscher 1994, 60-74, 228-233); Hölscher 1984, 17-18, 78 (= Hölscher 1994, 149-151, 255); Schäfer 1989, 74-83; Sehlmeyer 1999, 192-197. Cf. Hafner 1989, suggesting an unconvincing dating to the age of Scipio Africanus; Behr 1993, 126-127 takes no stance on the problem. Iconography suggests that the monument celebrates Sulla and Rome at the same time: Hölscher 1980, 365 (= Hölscher 1994, 67). The presence of two trophies may be explained by the need for symmetry rather than by a dating after the victory on Mithridates: Schäfer 1989, 78. If this is the case, it is however harder to explain why the palm branch in the eagle's beak has two wreaths: RRC, 373; Hölscher 1980, 366, fn. 106 = Hölscher 1994, 67-68, 231, fn. 106. Ramage 1991, 112-113 argues that the relief is part of monument built after the Eastern campaign and located next to the statue offered by Bocchus. The arguments of Schäfer 1989, 78 are unsatisfactory, as they give too much importance to the corona graminea that Sulla received in the Social War.
demolished by Marius in 87 BC. Sulla may have rebuilt it after he returned from the East, bringing about some significant iconographic changes.\(^\text{25}\)

At any rate, in Sulla’s intentions Chaeronea was to be remembered as the beginning of the new phase of the history of Roman Greece, and the moment in which the threat posed by Mithridates was defeated. The powerful message of RRC 359 is complemented by the presence of Venus, next to Sulla’s name.\(^\text{26}\) The reference to the goddess is extremely significant, especially in the aftermath of the first victory against Mithridates. The importance of Sulla’s allusion to his special relationship with Venus in the definition of his imperial strategy has probably not been stressed adequately so far. Scholars have often tended to view it as a feature of his personal propaganda and as a claim to be used mainly in the Roman political arena. I believe, on the contrary, that the claim to Venus’ favour played a very prominent role in Sulla’s relations with the Greek world, whereas it was less intensively exploited on the Italian front. It is significant that the fourth name that Sulla adopted in Italy was not ΕΠΑΦΡΩΔΙΤΟΣ, but Felix, which has nothing to do with Venus.\(^\text{27}\) The evidence of RRC 359, if very precious, is not conclusive. Luckily, it can be usefully supplemented by a literary source.

A passage of Appian’s Civil Wars, which conveniently, although not always clearly, deals with the meanings of Sulla’s ‘fourth names’, records the time when Venus appears to have become part of Sulla’s Selbstdarstellung in the Greek East. At some point during the Greek campaign, Sulla consulted an oracle, no doubt that of Delphi (1.97.453-455).\(^\text{28}\) Despite the strong criticism he attracted in the Greek world for having deprived the panhellenic sanctuaries of their treasures, Sulla was very interested in acknowledging the function of religious institutions, partly because of his personal beliefs, and partly because he was aware of their political value. The oracle

\(^\text{25}\) Hölscher 1980, 368-369 = Hölscher 1994, 70-71. According to Schäfer 1989, 74-75, 78, the material the monument is made of is definitely from Numidia: this suggests an earlier dating. The importance of Jugurtha’s capture for Sulla’s propaganda is confirmed by the coin issue struck by his son Faustus Sulla in 56 BC: see RRC no. 426.1 and Hölscher 1994, 56-60, 227-229 (with bibliography).

\(^\text{26}\) On the portraits of Sulla known from coins and statues, see Strocka 2003 and Ganschow 2003.

\(^\text{27}\) Contra, Zieske 1972, 45-46. Passerini 1935 very usefully stresses the differences between the two epithets; a similar approach in Castagnetti 1996. Also see Ericsson 1943, 82: Felix does not mean ‘favoured of Fortuna’, but ‘favoured of the gods’.

\(^\text{28}\) Gabba 1958, 265-267. Also see Marinoni 1987, 193-209 (an excellent contribution); Scardigli 2003, 586-587. The episode is surprisingly overlooked by Daux 1936.
gave him a very interesting response, based on three points, which it is worth quoting here.

Πειθώ μοι, Ῥωμαῖε, κράτος μέγα Κύπρις ἐδωκεν Ἀινείου γενή μεμελημένη, ἀλλά σὺ πᾶσιν ἄθανάτοις ἐπέτεια τίθει, μὴ λήθει τῶν ἔτη. Δέλφοις διώρα κόμιζε. Καὶ ἔστι τις ἀμβαίνουσι Ταύρου ὑπὸ νυφέυτος, ὅπου περιμήκετον ἄστυ Καρῶν, οἱ ναίουσιν ἐπώνυμον ἔξε Ἀφροδίτης· ἥ πέλεκυν θέμενος λήψῃ κράτος ἀμφιλαφές σοι.

‘Believe me, Roman. Cypris gave great power to the offspring of Aeneas, which she protects. But offer yearly gifts to all the immortals. Do not forget that! Bring gifts to Delphi. And there is a god, for those who climb under the snowy Taurus, where there is a high city inhabited by the Carians, which they name after Aphrodite; dedicate an axe to her and you will obtain enormous power.’

The oracle acknowledged that, as a Roman, Sulla was a descendant and a protégé of Aphrodite: this was in itself a great strength, and implied precise religious duties. For this very reason, the oracle ordered him to send gifts to Delphi and to honour the shrine of Aphrodite in the Carian city of Aphrodisias by offering an axe. These pious actions would ensure him a great power. Sulla was happy to comply with the order and sent the axe and a golden crown to the sanctuary, accompanied with an epigram in which he remembered having dreamed of the goddess leading the Roman army with the signs of Mars. There is no evidence to say whether Sulla himself went to Aphrodisias at some point during his stay in Asia Minor; however, this is issue has a relative importance.

What matters to the present discussion is the apparent political agenda of the oracle’s response. A descendant of Venus was asked to put a remedy to his guilt towards the most important Greek sanctuary, and to pay tribute to a sanctuary of Aphrodite, situated in the region of Asia Minor that had been most loyal to Rome.

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29 App. b. c. 198.455: τῶν οὖν ὁιν ἀυτοκράτωρ Σίλλας ἄνέθηκε, Ἀφροδίτῃ ἔστι ἅπαξ ἐλεύθερος κατὰ ἄνειρον ἀνὰ στρατηίᾳ διέποικαν ς τοῖς Ὀρεοῖς μαρτυρημένην ἐνοπλοῦ.
doubt that was the outcome of some 'discreet diplomacy' involving at least three parties: Sulla, Delphi, and Aphrodisias — then the sanctuary of a not-so-prominent community in a region of Asia Minor that resisted Mithridates' attack most staunchly. Sulla's reference to his dreaming of Aphrodite suggests that the vision dated back to the night before a battle fought in the Greek campaign. It is striking, and no doubt significant, that Sulla's dream referred both to Aphrodite and to Ares, who are mentioned in the inscription of the Chaeronea trophy.

His visit to the Delphic oracle probably dates to the aftermath of the victory. Surely, it was the most appropriate occasion to compensate the sanctuary for the expropriation of its treasury at the beginning of the campaign. The gift to the Aphrodisias sanctuary must date to the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea at the very earliest, when Sulla had already reconquered mainland Greece and was preparing the final stage of the war in Asia Minor. The order to make gifts to Delphi would be quite easily explainable in this context. There had been a crisis in the relations between the Roman commander and the sanctuary, which needed to be solved by reasserting full respect on the part of the Romans. Therefore, Sulla decided to offer the territorial compensation to Delphi, Epidaurus and Olympia. The second part of the response, suggesting Sulla to honour to the shrine of Aphrodisias, is certainly engrained in the context of his Eastern campaign. As Mithridates' success shows, Greece and Asia Minor had closer ties than is usually assumed. The descendants of Aphrodite were ordered to pay their respect to a temple of the goddess in the Greek East, which deserved gratitude and recognition for the firmly pro-Roman stance taken in the Mithridatic War, and shared by other Carian communities.

As far as Sulla's special relationship with Aphrodite is concerned, the phrasing of the oracle shows that it was rooted in the way in which the Greek world was used

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30 Appian is not explicit about the chronology of the episode. Although it cannot be ruled out that Sulla visited the oracle on his way back to Italy, the prominence of the Epaphroditos-motif in his relationship with the East makes it quite unlikely. Scholars have tended to date the visit to 87 or 86 BC, and usually before the Chaeronea battle: a summary of the most significant positions in Marinoni 1987, 223-226. I am inclined to think that the oracle was consulted in 86 BC, after the victory at Chaeronea and soon before the move to Asia. There is no reason to believe, with Lanzani 1927, 32-33, that the appeasement between Sulla and Delphi must have taken place 'non breve tempo' after the victory at Chaeronea and the restitution of the sanctuary's land properties.

31 See Marinoni 1987, 232-235. About the iconography of the Carian Aphrodite, which had some influence on Roman art, see Fredrich 1897 and Galinsky 1969, 217 (with further bibliography at fn. 90).
to view and to represent the Romans. He was the military commander of a people whose mythical kinship with the goddess was universally acknowledged by the end of the first century BC (‘the offspring of Aeneas’, Ἀἰνείου γενεῆς, as the oracle calls the Romans). This was not controversial for any of the parties involved: the Greeks were prepared to acknowledge it, and Sulla was ready to exploit its political significance.

The actual genesis of the epithet 'Ἐυαφροδίτος', however, is less straightforward. It certainly is a development of the kinship theme developed by the oracle. It is hard to go beyond the conclusions reached, more than fifty years ago, by E. Fränkel and J. P. V. D. Balsdon, showing that it is etymologically connected with Aphrodite and it relates to her qualities, but it cannot be interpreted simply as the ‘favoured of Venus’, as has repeatedly been suggested. Sulla, or even one of his associates must have found the name (or rather the word) still in use in the first century BC Greek, they were attracted by it, and they decided to use it in order to stress the connection with the goddess. 'Ἐυαφροδίτος' had been used, as an adjective, since Herodotus, and may be translated as ‘fascinating, charming’: a charm deriving, of course, from the most charming goddess, Aphrodite. In his memoirs Sulla made it clear how much he liked to think of himself as a person with extraordinary, almost charismatic qualities since the beginning of his career. The charm he emanated was the

32 Breglia Pulci Doria 1983, 265-279 has suggested that the Trojan liberator, the Τροίς mentioned in the Sybilline oracle recorded by Phlegon of Tralles (FGrHist 257 F 36.3) is Sulla, and that this is a development of the theme of the kinship between Aphrodite and Rome that he reasserted during the Mithridatic War. It must be noted, however, that the Cornelii were not among the familiae Troiani (Galinsky 1969, 165, fn. 66): this may be an obstacle to Breglia’s argument.


alleged source of his famous fortune, and it became widely known and highly rated in Rome at the end of his life.\(^{35}\)

It was only after contact with the Greek world, however, that Sulla found the way to develop this aspect and to exploit it within the framework and the needs of the Roman imperial project. It was only during the Mithridatic War that the theme of his special relationship with the gods could be best exploited if it was combined with the evocation of a kinship between Rome and an individual goddess, of course Venus. The official correspondence between 'Επαφρόδιτος and Felix was ratified by a senatusconsultum voted in 82 BC, and Felix was added to Sulla’s tria nomina.\(^{36}\) Appian claims, perhaps stretching the imagination, that the epithet was used by the many adulators of the new strong man and later passed into official use. He goes on to say that in Rome Sulla was also called Faustus and ‘the name can be very similar to αἰσιός or to ἔπαφροδίτος’ (1.97.452: δύναται δὲ τοῦ αἰσίου καὶ ἔπαφροδίτου ἁγχοτάτῳ μάλιστα εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα). Appian is making at least one mistake: Sulla never adopted the cognomen Faustus, but rather introduced it among Roman praenomina by giving it to his children.\(^{37}\) The confusion may derive from a linguistic matter: in Appian’s day, 'Επαφρόδιτος apparently meant ‘propitious’ too, as he somewhat misleadingly related it to the Latin name Faustus. Moreover, there is no etymological connection between Faustus or Felix, and 'Επαφρόδιτος, which is of course explicitly linked to Aphrodite. They may well have been used by, and referred to, the same person, but their origin was clearly different.

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\(^{35}\) Cf. Plut. Sull. 35.5-11: a woman, passing by his seat while he was sitting in a theatre, touched his toga, justifying her deed with the intention to get some of Sulla’s fortune by that quick contact: on this episode, see Wagenvoort 1954, 321-322 (= Wagenvoort 1980, 81-83). Front. Strat. 1.11.11 remarked that claiming a special relationship with the gods could be very useful for a general: L. Sulla, quo paratiorem militem ad pugnandum haberet, praedici iibi a diis futura simulavit.

\(^{36}\) On the chronology, see Vell. 2.27.5: occiso... demum eo [the younger Marius] Felixis nomen adsumpsit and vir. ill. 75.9. Appian tries to convey the impression of the great power which Sulla enjoyed in Rome by mentioning a statue of his erected in the Forum, bearing a dedication which probably read, in Latin, as Comedo Sullae Felia imperatori (1.97.451). On this statue, also see Cic. Phil. 9.13; Vell. 2.61.3; Suet. Caes. 75.4; Dio 42.18; cf. RRC 381. See Gabba 1958, 263; Wosnik 1963, 32-37; Ramage 1991, 104-105; Sehlmeyer 1999, 204-209, 231-232.

\(^{37}\) Plutarch loosely states that both his children were given the names of Faustus and Fausta, as a further honour of the leading force of the goddess Fortuna (Sull. 34.5). The twins were probably born in 87-86: see Angeli Bertinelli 1997, 403-404.
The decision was unprecedented in Roman Republican history, and it certainly involved the systematic use of the Greek name too, which is consistently used in the Greek documents. If one looks at the meanings of the two adjectives, their analogy is not ill-founded: they both refer to a range of meanings involving personal fascination, good luck, divine favour, and exceptional ability to influence people and situations. As Plutarch says, Sulla used to acknowledge a fundamental role to Τύχη — ‘fate’, ‘destiny’, ‘fortune’. He saw it as a prominent force — although not as a goddess — integrating and completing his virtues. To his mind, none of his victories would have been possible without his exceptional value, and without the support and the protection afforded by fate. Any direct relationship between the cult of Fortuna and that of Aphrodite must however be ruled out. In fact Sulla never aimed to depict himself as a protégé of Fortuna. The origins of Felix and Επαφρόδιτος are independent from each other, and must be explained by different contexts and political agendas. However striking the similarities between the outcomes of these two processes may be, they should not conceal the profound differences.

The epithet Επαφρόδιτος is used in several official acts that Sulla produced in the Greek East, both in Greece and in Asia Minor. The senatusconsultum about the Amphiaraeum at Oropus, for instance, refers to Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Επαφρόδιτος (l. 52). This document, however, does not contain a message issued by Sulla himself, as it is a confirmation of decisions taken by Sulla when he was in Greece: the name Επαφρόδιτος is used only once, while Sulla is mentioned five more times. The senatusconsultum confirming freedom for the city of Tabae, in Caria, calls Sulla Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας αὐτοκράτωρ (l. 9-10), while the much lengthier s.c. de Stratonicius speaks of [Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Αἰεικίου [μός] Σύλλας Επαφρόδιτος] δικτάτωρ (l. 1-2). The difference must be explained by the

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38 Plut. mor. 318c-d.
40 Plut. mor. 318c-d must be interpreted in this light. See Marx 1890, 121-122; Marx 1899, 543-545; Ericsson 1943, 77-82; Erkell 1952, 72-79; Weinstock 1961, 208-209 (criticising Latte 1960, 279-280); Zieske 1972, 43-44; Champeaux 1987, 216-236; Wistrand 1987, 27-28; Ver Eecke 2005, 182-184. There are some entirely misleading discussions too: Poplawski 1927, 317-328; Lanzani 1927, 50-55; Levi 1980.
41 RDGE 18, l. 74, 103, 125 (s. c. de Stratonicius); RDGE 20, col. IId, l. 7 and He, l. 4-5 (s. c. de Thaissi); RDGE 23, l. 52 (s. c. de Oropiis); RDGE 49, l. 2-3 (the letter to the artists of Dionysus).
different contexts in which Sulla is mentioned. In the text addressed to Tabae, the Senate confirms the privileges granted by Sulla in his capacity of victorious commander, at the end of the conflict, when 'Επαφρόδιτος was not part of his full name. In that for Stratonicea, the dictator Sulla 'Επαφρόδιτος is addressing a letter to the assembly and the people of the Carian city introducing them to the context and the negotiations which led to the approval of the s. c., whose text follows immediately afterwards. However, only the first lines of the s. c. de Tabenis, not visible on the stone, would enable us to reach safer conclusions.

The background and the use of the epithet chosen by Sulla for his relations with the Greek world are not mere technicalities. On the contrary, they can help to understand some aspects of Sulla's self-representation as an epoch-making leading figure in Roman history, who even found it acceptable to expand his name. Most importantly for our purposes, they reveal how communicating with the Greek world in a personal and innovative way was important to his global strategy, and how interested he was in exploiting the opportunities offered by the religious dimension of Greek culture.

Sulla's main aim in the Greek East was to resume its exploitation compelling at the same time, the local elites to get closer to Rome and to resume full cooperation with it. To do so, he did not limit himself to confront them with excessive demands, which left the Asian cities with no choice but to look for Roman patrons. He also tried to persuade the Greeks that, to an extent, they shared the same legacy as the Romans. The Romans descended from the daughter of Zeus, the goddess who presided over love and social coexistence. At the same time, they were the descendants of the Trojans, who fought against the Greeks, but had long been widely regarded as very similar to them. The potential of such an ambiguous identity were obvious. Rome was somehow part of the Greek world, and still irretrievably different to it. She had a right to interfere in Greek affairs, and at the same time could present

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42 See Ericsson 1943, 78; Balsdon 1951, 1: 'a far advance from such specific cognomina as 'Numidicus' or 'Africanus'; Ramage 1991, 101; Behr 1993, 150-152.

43 Galinsky 1969, 187-188, helpfully remarks that the legend of the Trojan ancestry of Rome was used by the Roman elite, and that it never became a 'living popular tradition'. Cf. ibid., 188-190, showing how the legend was used by Rome to mobilise the Sicilian Greeks against Carthage. The foundation of Rome, and Aeneas' role in it, started to intrigue Greek scholars by the end of the fourth century: see Cornell 1975, 23-27, with earlier bibliography.

44 On the 'Grecization' of the Trojans from the fourth century BC, see Galinsky 1969, 161-162.
herself as an independent power, and an external force. These themes had been lingering in the Roman religious discourse for nearly two centuries, but it is with Sulla that they were first used for an explicit political purpose, on the wider scene of the Empire.

3.2. A new founder for Rome

By exploiting the theme of the kinship between Rome and Venus in the aftermath of the Mithridatic War, Sulla also managed to make it part of his own political discourse, which was a global one, and went beyond the boundaries of the Greek East. There is not much direct evidence for Sulla's use of religion after his return to Italy. It seems quite clear, however, that he gave to several of his actions the trademark of those of the 'new founder' of Rome after more than decade of turmoil and civil war. The theme was of course related to the kinship with Venus, although it had a largely independent development.

That the theme of the 'refoundation' of Rome was so prominent in Sulla's agenda must have been known to some quarters of the Greek world too, as the behaviour of the Athenian elite seems to suggest. Sulla came back to Athens on his way back to Italy, in 84 BC. He took several important initiatives during his stay in the city, and he received considerable honours too. Athens had betrayed Rome, of course, and Sulla showed his generosity by sparing it from destruction. His attitude towards the city could not be as positive as that he adopted towards the cities that he had declared free. However, he showed he was prepared to deal with the pro-Roman elites in a relatively amicable way. That is what he did in Athens, by spending some time in the city and accepting pledges of loyalty from the local elite. Of course, he could afford to behave as if he was in perfect control of the situation, with a victorious army protecting him during his stay and plenty of time to rest from the hardship of war. No doubt Sulla 'had fun' during his second stay in Athens — but he acted with a political agenda too. Even after the Mithridatic War and the complete submission of the Greek world to Rome, Athens was not, and could not be a city like all others.

First and foremost, Athens was still a major cultural centre. Even Sulla intended to exploit the opportunities it offered. According to Plutarch, during his stay in town he put his hands on the library of Apellicon of Teos, a former supporter of

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Athenion, who owned many works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Moreover, in Plutarch's words, he was 'initiated' (μνησίας). Although K. Clinton has rightly noticed that Plutarch is not explicit here about the initiation received by Sulla, it is likely that he actually refers to the most prominent Athenian mysteries, those of Eleusis. Sulla's interest in or respect for Athenian culture, however, still went hand in hand with more ruthless attitudes. Pliny the Elder records that he used some columns from the temple of Olympian Zeus in the reconstruction on the Capitol. It is unlikely that the columns of the Olympieion that were already in place were dismantled. Moreover, the temple had been left unfinished after Antiochus IV's death in 164 BC, and it was accomplished only under Hadrian. Pliny probably means that Sulla took to Rome some columns that were meant to be used in the construction of the temple.

Some insessional evidence shows that the Athenians paid tribute to Sulla with a statue (IG 2².4103) and, more importantly, by creating new civic games in his honour, called *Sylleia*. The chronology of these games is far from certain: it is safe to assume, however, that they were discontinued some time after his death, although they were almost certainly still held in 79/78 BC, under the archonship of Apollodorus, who is mentioned in an inscription praising the ephebes who served in the games.

A. Raubitschek has demonstrated that the holding of the *Sylleia* was not an entirely original event in the Athenian liturgical calendar. In fact, they bear striking similarities with the *Theseia*, the games in honour of the mythical founder of the city, which required the participation of the ephebes as in the *Sylleia*, consisting of a torch race. It


47 Clinton 1989, 1503: moreover, I see no serious reason to suggest that the text is corrupt.

48 Plin. 36.45: *columnis demum utebantur in templo*, nec *lautilias causa* — *nondum enim ista intelligebantur* — *sed quis firmiores aliter statui non poterant. sic est inchoatum Athenis templum Iouis Olympii, ex quo Sulla Capitoliinis aedibus aduexerit columnas*.

49 Cf. Boëthius 1962, 31; Gjerstad 1962, 39-40; Abramson 1974a, 8-23; Abramson 1974b. I find no reason to doubt that the columns were used in Rome: contra, Heilmeyer 1970, 34 and Gros 1990, 844. On the history of the Olympieion, see Travlos 1971, 402-403. Cf. Wycherley 1964, 170-171 (with earlier bibliography), speculating that Sulla did not carry columns, but smaller decorative elements, such as capitals.

50 IG 2².1039, with SEG 22.110. Cf. the dedication to a winner of the *Sylleia*, SEG 13.279. Kallet-Marx 1995, 214-215 rightly argues that the *Sylleia* cannot have been abolished too quickly: C. Scribonius Curio, who played such an important part of the reconquest of Athens, was consul in 76 BC and proconsul of Macedonia between 75 and 72.
is reasonable to believe that the short-lived games established in honour of Sulla were probably celebrated along with the *Theseia*, pretty much reproducing the same ritual.

This is not the only festival that we know to have been organised in the honour of Sulla: there is a parallel at Rome. The similarity between the *Theseia* and the *ludi victoriae*, which Sulla annually organised by Sulla at Rome from 1st November 81 BC, is quite striking.\(^5\) The festival he created in Rome were part of a strategy of self-celebration that aimed to portray him as a saviour and second founder of Rome. The dictatorship, and decisions like the enlargement of the Senate were surely justified with a parallel with Romulus, which appears to have influenced the antiquarian tradition on early Rome too.\(^5\) The motif was to be used polemically by Sulla's political foes too: in his speech recorded by Sallust, Lepidus significantly called him *sceuos iste Romulus*.\(^5\) By renaming the *Theseia* after Sulla, the Athenians showed that they were aware of the image Sulla was trying to portray, and they chose a parallel strategy to that he adopted at Rome. There is no need to insist on the meaning of the analogy between Theseus and Romulus, which must have been apparent to everyone.\(^5\) The Athenians were

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\(^5\) Vell. 2.27.6; Ascon. *ad* Verr. 1.10.31 (p. 217 Stangl). On these *ludi*, see Keaveney 1983c, 189-191; Behr 1993, 136-143; on Sulla's use of the cult of Victoria, see Hölscher 1967, 142-147. Weinstock 1971, 102 rightly notes that the adjective *Sullanae* was added only later, probably to distinguish the Victoria celebrated by Sulla from the *Victoria Caesaris*. Cf. RRC 445-446, no. 421, with the monetalis Sufenas celebrating his ancestor S. Nonius, *praetor* [Audos] *victoriae* [primus] *ludos*. Apparently, Nonius was the first magistrate to preside over the celebration of the ludi. Mattingly 1956 argues that *pra* must be supplemented with *praeneste*, and that the Sullan ludi celebrated Fortuna Primigenia. This is surely far-fetched, but it appears, however, that some ludi were organised at Praeneste by the Roman quaestors: Cic. *Planc.* 63 and *Att.* 12.2.2, with Veyne 1975 (who does not refer to Mattingly).


\(^5\) A theme unfortunately overlooked in a recent collective book on the relations between the myths of Theseus and Romulus: Greco 2005. The parallel drawn by Behr 1993, 141 between the *ludi victoriae*
capable of using it in the most straightforward way, exploiting this equivalence and
restoring the traditional calendar after Sulla had left the scene and his legacy had
become controversial in Rome.

It is in the light of this analogy between Theseus, Romulus, and Sulla that the
transfer of the columns from the Athenian Olympieion to Rome must be seen. Back
in Rome, Sulla had to deal with the reconstruction of a central sanctuary of Roman
public religion and, indeed, of the city’s very identity. Therefore, he decided to use
some material from a temple he was certainly very familiar with, after the long period
spent in Athens, and which was dedicated to the same god. In this process, which
redefined the identity of Rome as centre of the Empire and of Sulla as maker of the
Empire itself, both the cult of Zeus Olympius and the foundation myth of Athens
play an important function in their own right.

Sulla’s propagandistic genius extended itself to the Olympic games, the
panhellenic competition organised in honour of Zeus himself. According to Appian,
during the 175th Olympics, i.e. in 80 BC, Sulla summoned ‘the athletes and the other
attractions’ of the Olympic games to Rome. For this reason, no one took part in the
competitions at Olympia, and only the chariot races were held in the stadium where
the Games usually took place. As V. J. Matthews has shown, Sulla’s decision was not
about giving a new home to the Olympic Games, but rather about offering the Roman
people a major celebration of his victory. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
best athletes of the Greek world were involved in the celebration of the ludi victoriae
Sullanae, probably on 1st November 80. They may have found it impossible to take part
both in the Olympics and in the Sullan celebrations at Rome, and for this reason the
Sullanae and the áγορας and θυσίαι organised at Oropus ὑπὲρ τῆς ἤλεγον τοῦ δήμου τῶν
Ῥώμαιων (I. 48-49) is therefore misleading. The ludi victoriae and the Sylleia were much more than the
celebration of a military success. Their parallel must be explained in the light of the analogy between the
two city founders. Ver Eecke 2005, 114-129 has interesting thoughts about Mithridates Eupator’s anti-Romulism, which was an important aspect of his anti-Roman propaganda in the Greek world.

55 App. b. c. 1.99.463-464: 'Ῥωμαίοι... άνθις ἐπειρώθη βασιλείας, ολυμπιάδων οὐσίων ἐν
"Ελλήσιν ἐκατὰν ἐβδομήκοντα πέντε καὶ οὐδένος ἐν Ὁλυμπίᾳ τούτῳ ἀγωνίσματος πληρ
στάδιον δρόμων γεγομένου· τούς γάρ ἀξιωματίς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεάματα πάντα ὁ Ἴλλας
ἐξ Ἡρώμην μετεκέκλητο ἐπὶ δέκη τῶν Μεθρίδατέων ἐργῶν ἢ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν. πρόφασις δ’
γάρ οὔκ ἤδει ἔγονον, Ὁλλά χαίτας εἰς Ἡρώμην μεταπεμφαμένου.

Olympic races were a complete fiasco. Only the chariot races were unaffected by Sulla's competition, because they were deeply linked to the stadium of Olympia and to the religious dimension of the Games: the winner was usually granted the privilege of lighting the fire at the altar of Zeus.

Appian claims that Sulla organised these lavish games at Rome with the sole aim to please the people and make them forget the distress caused by decades of wars and instability. The parallel evidence we have for the dismantling of the Athenian Olympieion and for the creation of the *Sylleia* at Athens suggests that things were more complex than that. The temporary importation of the Olympic races to Rome was a feature of a broader process, which aimed at representing Rome as the centre of an Empire that irreversibly included the Greek world. The response of the Delphic oracle had been important in acknowledging Rome's kinship with Venus and pointing to the special relationship with Aphrodisias. Carrying parts of the shrine of Olympian Zeus was much more than a contribution to Roman architecture: it was a step in the process of re-thinking Rome as the centre of the Greco-Roman world. Of course, this new image of Rome could not be conceived without renegotiating the role of Athens itself. The city whose reconquest had made possible the victory against Mithridates and the return of Rome into the Hellenistic world was then to contribute to the reconstruction of a crucial part of Rome itself—a symbolically much more demanding and complex task, after years of civil strife and open warfare throughout Italy.

Sulla never became a patron of Athens or, at least, there is no evidence suggesting an explicit relationship of patronage with the city. However, the Athenians had some reasons to be grateful to Sulla and the ties he created with the city were certainly unusual. Sulla's attitude after the war was no doubt an example to the Greek world that cooperating with Rome and her representatives could only be profitable. A story like that of the *Sylleia* is a clear indication of the ultimate success of Sulla's strategy in the Greek East. After Sulla had won the war and demonstrated the strength of Rome and the potential virulence of her revenge, the Greek elites were compelled to accept Roman rule and to take active part in the reorganisation of the Empire. It was Sulla, with the systematic repression of anti-Roman dissent and the promotion of civic autonomy within the framework of Roman rule, who paved the way for the emergence of a consistently pro-Roman Greek elite, which quickly learned how to interact with the Romans and to put its weight in the diplomatic relations with the only super-power left in the Mediterranean world.
Back in Italy, Sulla did not need to exploit the myth of the kinship with Venus as intensively as he did in the East. In fact, only the colony of Pompei is safely known to have received the name _Veneria_, which may have something to do with the cult of earlier Italic cults. Significantly, the Venus-motif disappeared from the coin issues he struck in Italy during the Civil War, probably in 82 BC (RRC 367 and 368), to be replaced by the helmeted head of Rome on the recto of one issue and by the customary laureate head of Janus on the recto of the other assis. The echo of the use that Sulla had made of the kinship between Rome and Venus reached Italy thanks to the circulation of RRC 359, and it contributed to this aspect of Sulla’s self-representation.

On the other hand, Sulla recovered some of the religious eclectism that he had shown before putting Venus at the core of his self-representation strategy, and which is evidence of a continuous interest in religion. At Tarentum, he performed a sacrifice, whereby the liver of the victim turned out to have the shape of a crown: interestingly, the sacrifice was performed by Aulus Postumius, the same haruspex who had celebrated another sacrifice for him during the siege of Nola, in the Social War. Soon afterwards, at Silvium, he was visited by the slave of a certain Lucius Pontius, who appeared to be in a mystical frenzy and declared to be a messenger from Bellona, charged to announce his victory. Sulla manifested his devotion to this goddess on other occasions too. Just before the march on Rome of 88 BC, he claimed that the goddess had appeared in his dreams, put a thunder in his hand and made him smite all his enemies, who of course had all fallen and vanished. It is perhaps significant the Senate meeting in which he presented the project of the proscriptions.

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57 Cf. Lambrechts 1952 about the discovery of two statues of Venus at Alba Fucens, in an area that may be dated to the Sullan age: see however De Ruyt 1982, 79-83, dating the statue to the end of the first century BC at the earliest. The territory of the city is known to have been affected by the proscriptions: Plut. _Sull._ 31.11.

58 See Luce 1968, 26-28; Zehnacker 2006, 56-57.

59 See Wosnik 1963, 80; Ramage 1991, 106.

60 Cf. the evidence for Sulla’s devotion to Apollo, which never gained the public prominence of that to Venus: Front. _Strat._ 1.11.11; Val. Max. 1.2.3; Stat. _Silv._ 4.6; Plut. _Sull._ 29.11-13, with Gagé 1955, 434-436.


63 Plut. _Sull._ 9.7-8.
took place in the temple of Bellona. Sulla’s generous grant of land and privileges to
the Diana sanctuary of the Mount Tifata has already been discussed in the previous
chapter. Back in Rome, he showed a great attachment to Hercules. He paid tribute to
the hero before celebrating the triumph over Mithridates, by devolving one tenth of
his patrimony to him. He also appears to have supported the cult of Hercules by
financing the refurbishment of the shrine of Hercules Custos near the Circus
Flaminius.

Sulla’s main aim at the time was to portray himself as the legitimate
representative of Rome and the only true defender of the res publica, who came to Italy
to bring order after reconquering the East. The verso of RRC 367 bears an image of
the goddess Victoria in a quadriga, with a caduceus in her hand, accompanied by a
reference to L. S U L L A I M P E ( r a t o r ) (or IMP): a celebration of the past victory and an
anticipation of the imminent one, both reported in the name of Rome. At the end of
the Civil War, the cause of the Republic was in the forefront. Sulla was by then
interested in representing himself as a victorious refounder of Rome.

His role in the reconstruction of the Capitol, which was however
accomplished only a decade after his death, was of course part of such a programme.
His veneration for Hercules is probably to be seen as a claim to a special relationship
with Iuppiter too. However, the extension of the pomerium was the most significant
element of this strategy. It is self-explanatory that, after the foundation, it was
decided only by him and by Augustus. Sulla had several reasons to consider himself a

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64 Plut. Sull. 30.3; Dio 33-35, fr. 109.5; cf. RRC 480.1. However, the role of Bellona in Sulla’s religious
discourse has sometimes been overrated: Alféödi 1956, 82-83; Palmer 1975; Alféödi 1976, 149-158.
65 See Plut. Sull. 35.1 and Ov. fast. 6.209-212, with Coarelli 1996. On Sulla’s surplus of wealth after the
Civil War, see Shatzman 1975, 272.
66 For a full analysis of these coin issues, see Frier 1971, 602-603 (the whole article is very important);
RRC, 1.386-387 and 2.732. Cf. RRC 1.369-371. Also see Zehnacker 1973, 574 (earlier bibliography at
fn. 4). Victoria is not an equivalent of Concordia here, pace Richard 1963, 312-313.
67 Val. Max. 9.3.8; Plin. 7.138; Tac. hist. 3.72.3; Plut. Publ. 15.1. Not much is known about the works
that Sulla carried out in the Forum, although some changes certainly took place in this period: see Van
Dem an 1922 and Coarelli 1985, 134-135, 190-209.
68 On the Sullan extension of the pomerium, Sen. brev. 13.8; Tac. ann. 12.23; Gell. 13.4.4; Dio 43.50.1 and
44.49.1; cf. Dion. Hal. 4.13.3. See Alféödi 1951, 205; Badian 1968a, 34; Gros 1978, 60; Sordi 1987; Gros
1990, 843-844; Ramage 1991, 119-120; Giardina 1995, 135-136 (= Giardina 1997, 126); Giardina 2000,
30-31.
new founder of Rome, like Romulus and Servius Tullius. He had regained control on the Empire, and he had put an end to more than a decade of civil strife and war in Italy. Italy was now pacified, and the body of citizens had been considerably extended. It is perhaps in this light that the extension of the *pomerium*, the sacred boundary of the city, must be explained.

Sulla surely knew very well that the age of Rome as a city-state with a hegemonic function in the Mediterranean was over for good. An Empire was taking shape, and Roman religion had to contribute to the definition of a new strategy, by going back to the very origin of Rome. The use of the cult of Venus of the East was a first contribution to the confrontation with the Greek culture. In Rome, the same theme could be exploited as far as it involved the theme of foundation, and to the extent in which Venus was seen as the daughter of Iuppiter, whose most sacred temple had been destroyed during the Civil War. Sulla’s interest in Hercules may be explained in a similar way, as part of an upsurge of devotion for Iuppiter, father of the hero.

Sulla’s religious legacy was soon taken up by Pompey, who had Venus and Hercules as his favoured gods, and appeared to view them mainly as divinities presiding over victory. Sulla’s son-in-law C. Memmius, the dedicatee of Lucretius’s *de rerum natura*, showed a similar devotion for Venus, as the prologue of the poem strongly suggests. Moreover, his was one of the *familiae Troianae*. With Caesar, of course, Venus gained an even more central role at the intersection between religion and politics, and the Trojan myth would be revived and further developed throughout the Augustan age.

Sulla’s contribution was inevitably overshadowed, and the dictator was remembered by the authors of the Imperial age more for his *felicitas* than for his

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69 The importance of the model of Servius Tullius is stressed by Ver Eecke 2005, 187-200.
70 A brief, but very accurate discussion of Pompey’s approach to religion in RRC, 450-451.
72 The reference discussion remains Weinstock 1971, 80-132.
relationship with Venus.\textsuperscript{73} The importance of his role in the development of the cult of his goddess, however, can hardly be denied. It was he who first managed to unite the theme of the kinship between Venus and Rome with the theme of a new foundation of Rome and her Empire. That was perhaps the most fascinating achievement of a political life that had been restlessly engaged on two fronts of the Empire, Italy and the Greek East.

Sulla's experience showed that the similarities between these two worlds could be as striking as the differences. In the next, concluding section I will try to summarise the main aspects of Sulla's imperial policies. It will be apparent that Sulla often used similar methods, and had similar aims in the diverse contexts where he operated. Narrative histories usually overlook this aspect. It is one of the aims of this study to bring it to light and to stress its importance.

\textsuperscript{73} On Cicero's views on Sulla's \textit{felicitas}, see Diehl 1988, 111-115; on Seneca's representation of Sulla, see Mazzoli 1977; on Sulla in Lucan, see Bagnani 1955. In general on Sulla's literary portraits from Sallust to Augustine, see Laffi 1967a, 274-277; Lanciotti 1978, 195-210; Barden Dowling 2000, 313-336.
Concluding remarks

So far, I have discussed the contexts in which Sulla deployed his initiatives in parallel. I have mainly used a contrastive approach to deal with Sulla's attitude to the local elites, his contribution to the development of Roman administration, and his development of several ideological motifs. During the late Republic, Italy and the Greek East were in several respects completely different worlds, and it was important to do justice to their differences.

It is undeniable, however, that at the beginning of the first century BC there was an increasing extent of interdependence within the Empire. This was especially the case with Italy, the centre of the Empire, and the East, its richest part. Cicero posed this problem most forcefully in a memorable passage of the *De imperio Cn. Pompei* which I have already referred to in the introduction: if taxes are not regularly levied in Asia Minor, the financial stability of Italy is bound to collapse in a short time.1 The years preceding the Mithridatic War showed this economic relationship most impressively, and Cicero made the case for Pompey's extraordinary command in 66 BC precisely by claiming that Rome could not afford such a crisis to occur again.

In concluding my discussion, I will set out to stress the relations between the initiatives that Sulla took in the East and those that he took in the West. There are two possible approaches to this problem. The first is the biographical one, which I have intentionally avoided in this study, even if some narrative sections have inevitably been included at various stages. The most obvious factor that links the impact of Sulla on the Greek East to the impact he had in Italy is of course the relation between the Mithridatic War and the Civil War. Had he not been compelled to head back to Italy to face the final fight for supremacy, Sulla may well have chosen to defeat Mithridates completely, and possibly conquer his kingdom. Instead, he offered him a peace deal that left the geo-political situation in Asia Minor as it was before the war. Moreover,

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1 Cic. *imp. Cn. Pompei* 7.19: *deoinde, quod nos eadem Asia atque idem iste Mithridates initio belli Asiatici docuit, id quidem certe calamitate docti memoria retinere debemus. nam tum, cum in Asia res magnas permulti amiserant, scimus Rornas solutione impedita sidem concidisse. non enim possunt una in ciiitate multi rem as fortunas amittere ut non pluris secum in tandem trahant calamitatatem.*
when he was back in Italy, Sulla certainly took advantage of the experience he had gained in the East, especially in his relations with the local communities.

There are, however, several substantial factors linking the destinies of these two areas of the Mediterranean world even more strongly than the chronological and biographical ones. It is on these aspects that I would like to focus here. The central element is the economic and financial relationship between Italy and Asia Minor, which became very close after the creation of the province of Asia in 129 BC. Its development can shed light on many crucial developments that took place before and after Sulla. When Asia came under the control of Rome, the senatorial elite soon realised the importance of the event. Not only was it an advantageous source of revenue, but it represented a formidable chance for the Roman elite too. The nobility used it to finance its internal competition by ruthlessly exploiting the new province, while the members of the *ordo equester* who were involved in the revenue collection took advantage of their public contracts to increase their wealth and influence. As I have argued at the beginning of the first chapter, it was this very model of exploitation that alienated much of the support for Rome in the Greek East by the end of the second century BC, and ultimately determined the overwhelming support of the Asiatic cities to Mithridates.

When he was sent to fight Mithridates, Sulla had the crucial task to restore the revenue flow from the East to Italy, and he brilliantly achieved that. For this reason some attention has been here devoted to the reorganisation of the province of Asia Minor, which implied a range of fiscal measures. The effects of this reorganisation, however, were not the solution to all problems. The increasing economic ties between Italy and the East started to pose a new range of complications. The extension of Roman citizenship to the Italian allies, for instance, implied a different distribution of costs for the maintenance of the Roman army. As soon as the former *socii*, then citizens, were not expected to finance their contingents any more, the Roman army had to be paid for with new resources.

This enhanced the need for further Roman expansion in Asia Minor. Moreover, piracy had not been defeated yet, and apparently the Roman governing class did not intend to consider her relations with Mithridates as a settled issue. The Senate's decision not to ratify the Dardanus agreement was a clear hint that more Eastern campaigns were not being ruled out already in the Eighties. It was in fact with Pompey's victory in the Third Mithridatic War and the creation of the province of
Pontus-Bithynia that this phase of the Roman expansion in Asia Minor was accomplished. The role of Sulla in this process of increasing integration and exploitation is of course significant, as it reversed a phase of crisis for the Roman imperial strategy, and also because it led to the emergence of a new compromise between Rome and the Greek elites.

The attention I have devoted to the local elites may be explained by recalling Rome's well-known attitude to a close relationship with the *domi nobiles*. Sulla is no exception in this respect, although I have tried to show that his position is quite remarkable, as he lived in a period when many local elites became openly hostile to Rome. He was extraordinarily ruthless in punishing the enemies of Rome, and in punishing his personal enemies too. The same pattern occurs in the Greek East, as well as in Italy. In both contexts, retaliation involved both individuals and communities, as two binary strategies. One of the central arguments of this study is that the punishment he chose was part of a precise political plan, as much as the rewards he offered to those who supported him.

In Asia Minor he sentenced the Greek leaders of the revolt to death, and he severely punished the formerly pro-Mithridatic cities by imposing a fine and by claiming back the tax arrears of the previous five years. The result of this measure was to consolidate and spread the interest of the Greek communities in acquiring the patronage of Roman magistrates and notables. The evidence offered by the inscriptions shows that the first cases of Roman patronage to Greek cities of Asia Minor are recorded in the Nineties, and that nearly fifty of cases of patronage are recorded between the victory of Sulla and Actium. There is no steady increase, but this model of relationship definitely becomes more widespread and common after the Sullan settlement. This can hardly be mere chance, as I have argued above. The increasing importance of the *koinon* of the province of Asia after Sulla is further confirmation of how important the interaction between Rome and the local elites became in this period.

In Italy Sulla punished the hostile communities with land confiscations and, in some cases, with the withdrawal of Roman citizenship. The land assignments were usually carried out as planned, although there is evidence that they were not accomplished in the territories of some cities, such as Volaterrae and Arretium. The impact of the law on citizenship was predictably more devastating, and the communities affected — Volaterrae, Arretium, and probably others — were compelled
to seek support and patronage from members of the Roman elite. The effects of such measures, which were certainly no longer enforced after 69 BC, were therefore comparable to those taken in Asia. The local elites who had fought Sulla and supported his foes were compelled to change their attitude towards Rome and to seek new allegiances. Sulla may have wanted them to stay out of the game for a while, but his retaliation had the ultimate effect of persuading them to play an active part in Roman Italy.

As his relations with the elites show, Sulla’s career was often played on the double front of personal ambitions and the promotion of Rome’s interest. The political use of religious motifs that he made at various stages of his life has often been regarded as part of his personal propaganda. In the third chapter, I have tried to view Sulla’s attitude to religion, and especially to a goddess like Venus, in the context of his imperial strategy and of his relations with the local elites. In the Greek East he developed the theme of the kinship between Venus and Rome, while in Italy he tended to represent himself as a new founder of Rome. In this respect, his link with Venus was largely functional to support his claim to be an ideal successor of Romulus, and possibly of Servius Tullius too. On both sides of the Empire, Sulla’s aim was to convey the idea of a new beginning, a new era of order and stability, in which the extension of Roman citizenship to Italy coexisted with a new relationship, based both on affinity and difference, between Rome and the Greek world.

The central aim of this study was to show that the attempt to stabilise the Empire was central in Sulla’s agenda. To some extent, his effort was successful. He reached a stabilisation of the Mediterranean Empire and he brought about the political integration of Italy. His constitutional reforms, which I have deliberately not discussed in this study, show a similar concern as that underlying his imperial strategy. They were an impressive attempt to stabilise the internal situation in Rome, also by enforcing traumatic, and in some cases unprecedented measures.

The stabilisation that Sulla appears to have envisaged, however, was not bound to last long. The financial costs of integrating new citizens, the growing Roman presence in the East, and the increasing competition within the senatorial elite made a further expansion of the Empire an absolute necessity. After Lucullus and Pompey’s victories, it became clear that the stakes were much higher than before – and than previously expected. The consequence was a new ferocious competition for the
political supremacy, leading to a new civil war, in which local elites would play a considerable role.

The outcome of decades of conflict was not just a new political settlement. It is only after Actium that the Empire started to go through a phase of economic stability and growth. In this respect too the situation of Italy was quite similar to that of the Greek East already in Sulla’s day. Both regions paid the price of a lasting economic crisis, which had causes as diverse as endemic warfare, the cost of the enfranchisement of the Allies, or piracy. From the early first century BC until the age of Augustus, their economic history is scattered with moments of crisis, and there is evidence for shortage of resources in the cities’ budgets, indebtedness, and devaluation of currency, which I have discussed in the second chapter. If this is more apparent in Asia Minor and Greece, it is a distinctive feature of several periods of Italian history too, from the years preceding Catiline’s conspiracy to the debt crisis of 49 BC. Sulla was too busy fighting his many enemies to attempt a definitive solution to this critical phase. However, he managed to achieve stability on a number of crucial fronts, and to create some preliminary conditions that made the solution of the crisis somewhat more feasible. His greatest achievement in this respect, as I have tried to show in the second chapter, was the reorganisation of the province of Asia – the greatest beneficium that the Italian elites could possibly hope for at the end of the Eighties.

With the proscriptions and the constitutional reforms Sulla unsuccessfully tried to make a new civil war impossible. In fact, the background of the wars fought in the Forties and in the Thirties is closely related to the legacy of his imperial strategy. It is certainly true that the ‘example’ of Sulla had crucial consequences in Roman political history. To a great extent it triggered the final dissolution of the Roman Republic, and it certainly inspired all the protagonists of this process. I hope to have shown, however, that the ways in which Sulla took part in the consolidation and the development of Rome’s hegemony over Italy and the Mediterranean world was an even more substantial contribution to the painstaking process of re-definition and regeneration of the Roman Empire that we have been taught to call the Roman revolution.
Appendix I
The 'Sullan Senators'

a) A new list

The list provided by Gabba includes 102 possible new members of the Senate in the Sullan age.\(^1\) It carefully distinguishes those whose presence in the Senate can be safely argued from those whose *cursus honorum* is less certain. This list, even after the corrections proposed by Nicolet, remains the starting point for any discussion, as well as the conclusions that Gabba derives from his prosopographical enquiry. The method chosen in its compilation is interesting in itself, as it is a warning against using the concept of 'Sullan senators' loosely. The list includes all those who are known to have held the aedileship, the praetorship, or the consulship after 81, after holding the quaestorship before 81, and entering the Senate after the Sulla's decision to open its membership to all the former quaestors. The *terminus ante quem* used for this list is derived from the new *lex annalis* voted under Sulla, which determined a fixed order for the tenure of the most important magistracies (quaestorship – praetorship – consulship), forbidding their iteration before an interval of ten years and determining minimum ages for the accession to the magistracies (probably 30 for the quaestorship, 40 for the praetorship and 42 for the consulship).\(^2\) Therefore, one must therefore include in the list the praetors up to 70 BC, and the consuls up to 66 BC, allowing about ten years from the death of Sulla. Of course, not all the former magistrates who ran for a higher office may have won their election in the first possible year. I have not included the senators who were persecuted by Cinna, joined Sulla and lost their seat for all practical purposes during the Civil War.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) The main points of the law are outlined by App. b. c. 1.100.466: νόμων τε ἐξέλευ καὶ ἐτέρους ἐτίθετο· καὶ στρατηγεῖν ἀπείπε, πρὶν ταμεῦσαι, καὶ ὑπατεύειν, πρὶν στρατηγῆσαι, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν αὐτὴν αὖθας ἀρχεῖν ἐκώλυσε, πρὶν ἄτι δέκα διαμεινθῇ. On the limits to the iteration of magistracies, cf. Cic. *leg.* 3.3.9: everyem magistratum, ni interfuerint decem anni, ne quis capitie; *aeuitem annals lege servante.* The law was not famously not enforced when Pompey stood for the consulship in 71 BC without having hold neither the quaestorship nor the praetorship and being only thirty-four-years old: see App. b. c. 1.121.560 and Cic. *imp. Cn. Pompe.* 62. There are invaluable discussions of the Sullan law, of its contents and its aims in Fraccaro 1934, esp. 493-503 (= Fraccaro 1957, 224-234) and Gabba 1958, 342-343; cf. Hantos 1986, 33-45.

\(^3\) On this group, see Hill 1932, 174.
If one is to provide a complete list of the known Sullan senators, a first group must be identified, including those who owed their appointment to the Sullan reform that allowed the former quaestors to join the Senate even if they had not held other magistracies before 81 BC. These are the people that can safely be numbered among them:

1. C. Claudius Marcellus (quaest. 87; praet. 80);
2. L. Licinius Lucullus (quaest. 87; aed. 79; praet. 78; cos. 74);
3. C. Scribonius Curio (trib. pl. 90; leg. Sullae in the Greek campaign; praet. 80; cos. 76);
4. Hirtuleius (quaest. 86): uncertain;
5. M. Terentius Varro (quaest. 85);
6. M. Fonteius (quaest. urb. 84, praet. 75);
7. M. Iunius Silanus (quaest. 84, praet. 76);
8. C. Verres (quaest. 84, praet. 74);
9. M. Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus (quaest. 83; praet. 72; cos. 61);
10. P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura (quaest. 81; praet. 75, cons. 71);
11. C. Tarquitius Priscus (quaest. 81; leg. Sertorii 76-72);
12. L. Valerius Triarius (quaest. urb. 81);
13. C. Caepasius (quaest. by 81?);
14. L. Caepasius (quaest. by 81?).

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4 See Gabba 1951, 262-263 (= Gabba 1973, 160-161). The Sullan lex de XX quaestoribus is published in Gabba-Crawford 1996. Also see Tac. Ann. 11.22.6: post lege Sullae viginti creati supplicando senatui, cui iudicia tradiderat. Et quamquam equestes iudicia recuperassissent, quaestura tamen ex dignitate candidatorum aut facilitate tribunitium gratuito concedebatur.
5 Paterson 1985, 23; David 1992, 750-751.
6 He might be either Lucius or Quintus Hirtuleius, who eventually were proscribed and joined Sertorius: Hinard 1985a, 358, nos. 30-31. However, two more Hirtulei are attested, both operating at the beginning of the first century BC.
7 Hill 1932, 175.
8 Nicolet 1966, 585.
9 Paterson 1985, 24.
10 Hill 1932, 174; David 1992, 761.
12 David 1992, 782.
There is firm evidence that these people held the quaestorship by 81 BC, joined the Senate thanks to Sulla’s reform, and later pursued a political career. As the exigency of the list shows, these straightforward cases are a tiny minority.

A second group, considerably more numerous, includes the senators whose *cursus honorum* suggests, but does not explicitly record, that they were *quaestorii* by 81. It is therefore based on indirect, although sometimes very clear evidence. According to the reconstruction of the *lex Cornelia annalis* outlined above, the list includes two groups of individuals: those who reached the quaestorship between 91 and 81, and those who became praetors by 71 BC. I also include, very doubtfully, some characters who reached the praetorship between 71 and 68 BC, as they may have owed their election to the quaestorship to Sulla’s support, back in the early Seventies:13

| 15. | P. ? Burrienus (praet. urb. 83) |
| 16. | A. Terentius Varro (leg. 82; praet. 78?); |
| 17. | L. Fufidius (praet. 81?);14 |
| 18. | C. Claudius Nero (praet. 81; procos. 80-79); |
| 19. | Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (praet. 81; procos. 80-79); |
| 20. | Sex. Nonius Sufenas (praet. 81); |
| 21. | A. Gabinius (trib. mil. 86; leg. 81); |
| 22. | M. Domitius Calvinus (praet. 80);15 |
| 23. | M. Fannius (praet. 80); |
| 24. | C. Cosconius (praet. 79; procos. 78-76); |
| 25. | L. Manlius (praet. 79?; procos. 78); |
| 26. | Cn. Octavius (praet. 79?; cos. 76) |
| 27. | M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (aed. 79; praet. 76; cos. 73); |
| 28. | Cn. Aufidius Orestes (aed. 79; praet. 77; cos. 71); |
| 29. | C. Aurelius Cotta (praet. 78; cos. 75); |
| 30. | L. Cornelius Sisenna (praet. 78);16 |

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13 When an individual position is uncontroversial, I implicitly refer to MRR for the primary evidence; further references are provided for the uncertain cases.

14 Nicolet 1966, 584.

15 Hill 1932, 175.
31. L. Octavius (praet. 78 ?; cos. 75);
32. C. Valerius Triarius (praet. 78 ?);
33. Aquinus (leg. 78): very uncertain;\(^\text{17}\)
34. M. Aurelius Cotta (praet. by 77, cos. 74)
35. Sex. Peducaeus (praet. 77?)
36. C. Staicus (quaest. 77)
37. C. Cassius Longinus (praet. 76 ?; cos. 73)
38. M. Iuncus (praet. 76 ?)
39. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus (praet. 75 ?; cos. 72);\(^\text{18}\)
40. M. Caesius (praet. 75)
41. L. Furius (praet. 75 ?)
42. L. Turius (praet. 75 ?);\(^\text{20}\)
43. C. Licinius C. f. Sacerdos (praet. urb. 75);\(^\text{21}\)
44. C. Iunius (aedil. 75)
45. M. Antonius (Creticus) (praet. 74)
46. Q. Caecilius Metellus (Creticus) (praet. 74; cos. 69);\(^\text{23}\)
47. L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (praet. 74);\(^\text{24}\)
48. P. Coelius (praet. 74)
49. Q. Arrius (praet. 73);\(^\text{25}\)
50. C. Claudius Glaber (praet. 73)
51. L. Cossinius (praet. 73 ?)
52. M. Licinius Crassus Dives (praet. 73 ?; cos. 70, 55);\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{16}\) Hill 1932, 175; Rawson 1978, 150; David 1992, 761-762. On the personality of Sisenna and his historical work, see Candiloro 1963; Perutelli 2004, 10-49. The fragments and testimonia of Sisenna's work are edited in HRR\(^2\), 1.276-297 and Chassignet 2004, 49-88.

\(^{17}\) A senator for Hill 1932, 176; contra, Nicolet 1966, 582, as his son appears to be a homo novus.

\(^{18}\) Hill 1932, 172; David 1992, 760-761.


\(^{21}\) Hill 1932, 175-176.

\(^{22}\) Shatzman 1975, 296-297, no. 90.

\(^{23}\) Hill 1932, 174.

\(^{24}\) David 1992, 759-760.

53. P. Valerius (praet. 73?);
54. P. Varinius Glaber (praet. 73);
55. Cassius Barba (leg. Luculli 73);\(^{27}\)
56. M. Cassius (praet. by 73);
57. L. Lartius (aedil. by 73);\(^{28}\)
58. T. Maenius (quaest. by 73);\(^{29}\)
59. Q. Hortensius Hortalus (aed. 75, praet. 72, cos. 69);
60. Cn. Manlius (praet. 72);
61. L. Afranius (praet. 71; cos. 60): uncertain\(^{30}\)
62. L. Caecilius Metellus (praet. 71; cos. 68);
63. Q. Marcius Rex (praet. 71?; cos. 68);
64. M. 'Acilius Glabrio (praet. 70; cos. 67);\(^{31}\)
65. C. Antistius Vetus (praet. 70): uncertain;\(^{32}\)
66. L. Aurelius Cotta (praet. 70; cos. 65);
67. C. Calpurnius Piso (praet. 70; cos. 67);\(^{33}\)
68. A. Manlius Torquatus (praet. 70?);\(^{34}\)
69. M. Mummius (praet. 70);
70. P. Sulpicius (quaest. 69);\(^{35}\)
71. M. 'Aemilius Lepidus (proquaest. by 78; praet. 69; cos. 66);
72. Q. Manlius (trib. pleb. 69);
73. L. Volcatius Tullus (praet by 69; cos. 66);
74. P. Cornelius Sulla (praet. by 68; cos. design. 65);\(^{36}\)
75. T. Aufidius (praet. 67 ca);\(^{37}\)

\(^{26}\) Hill 1932, 174.
\(^{27}\) Hill 1932, 176.
\(^{28}\) Rawson 1978, 150.
\(^{29}\) Taylor 1960, 228.
\(^{31}\) David 1992, 757.
\(^{32}\) A Sullan senator for Nicolet 1966, 582.
\(^{33}\) David 1992, 782-783.
\(^{34}\) David 1992, 789-790.
\(^{35}\) He was still a simple senator in 70 BC, but he was elected quaestor for the year following the lection and had to resign from the jury of Verres' trial: see Cic. Verr. 1.30 and Nicolet 1966, 585.
\(^{36}\) David 1992, 785-786.
76. M. Petreius (held magistracies and public offices from 92 to 63). 38

For some others the date of the first magistracy is unclear, but there is literary or inscriptional evidence that they joined the Senate in the late Eighties or in the early Seventies, either by Sulla’s appointment or after holding a magistracy:

77. L. Procilius (senator by 80): uncertain
78. L. Faberius (senator by 78); 39
79. Q. Petillius (senator by 78);
80. T. Manlius Torquatus (senator by 78); 40
81. C. Velleius (senator before 77): uncertain
82. C. Luscius Ocrea (senator by 76); 41
83. L. (Octavius) Ligus (senator by 75);
84. M. Octavius Ligus (senator by 75);
85. P. Popillius (senator before 74); 42
86. C. Fiduculanius Falcula (senator by 74);
87. Ti. Gutta (senator by 74); 43
88. M. Iuventius Pedo (senator by 74); 44
89. L. Caulius Mergus (senator by 74); 45

38 Sall. Cat. 59.6: C. Antonius… M. Petreio legato exercitum permittit… homo military, quod amplius annos triginta tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus aut praetor cum magna gloria in exercitu fuerat. See Hill 1932, 176; Nicolet 1974, 976-977 (no. 267).
39 The name is unparalleled in the ordo senatorius: Nicolet 1966, 584.
40 David 1992, 790.
41 Syme 1964, 119 (= Syme 1979, 597); Wiseman 1971, 239. Perhaps related to the Sullan centurion Luscius, who gathered a huge wealth in the proscriptions, but was convicted in 64 BC (Ascon. tog. cand. 81).
43 Nicolet 1966, 586 doubts that he was a Sullan senator.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>M. Basilus (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^46 A former equestrian judge, then included in the Sullan lectio. Nicolet 1966, 585.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>C. Caudinus (senator by 74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>L. Cassius (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^47 Nicolet 1966, 587; Nicolet 1974, 828-829 (no. 84).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>P. Saturius (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^49 Nicolet 1966, 588; Nicolet 1974, 1012 (no. 312); David 1992, 773-774.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>P. Octavius Balbus (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^50 Possibly, he is the same Balbus who served as praefectus equitum in the Collina Gate battle (Plut. Sull. 20.3): no. 43 in PW, no. 49 of Gabba's list; Hill 1932, 176.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Q. Octavius Considius (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^51 A former equestrian judge appointed to the Senate by Sulla: Hill 1932, 175; Nicolet 1966, 583-584.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>M. Atliius Bulbus (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^52 Nicolet 1966, 586; Nicolet 1974, 1015-1016 (no. 316); Deniaux 2002, esp. 30-31. His family, apparently of Paelignian origin, had strong interests at Delos. His descendants never managed to join the ordo senatorius until the end of the Augustan age (ibid., 38).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Cn. Egnatius (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^54 Cic. Cluent. 47.130.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>M. Seius (aed. cur. 74)</td>
<td>^55 Cic. Cluent. 48.135.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>P. Septimius Scaevola (senator by 74)</td>
<td>^56 Nicolo 1966, 586: 'homo novus. Rien de sûr' ; Rawson 1978, 150.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>L. Voluscius (aedilis by 73)</td>
<td>^57 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis; Taylor 1960, 203.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>C. Octavius (quaest. ca. 73)</td>
<td>^58 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis, l. 12-13; Taylor 1960, 197.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>L. Claudius (senator by 73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>C. Annaeus Brocchus (senator by 73)</td>
<td>^59 Wiseman 1971, 246.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Q. Axius (senator by 73)</td>
<td>^60 Friend of Varro and Cicero: see RE, no. 4; Wiseman 1971, 61; Shatzman 1975, 308, no. 100.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Q. Pompeius Rufus (senator by 73)</td>
<td>^61 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis, l. 12-13; Taylor 1960, 197.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
108. Aulus Cascellius (senator by 73);\textsuperscript{62}
109. Q. Minucius Thermus (senator by 73);\textsuperscript{63}
110. M. Publicius Scaeva (senator by 73);\textsuperscript{64}
111. L. Claudius (senator by 73);\textsuperscript{65}
112. Q. Rancius (senator by 73);\textsuperscript{66}
113. Calidius (senator by 73-71);\textsuperscript{67}
114. C. Verres (senator by 72);\textsuperscript{68}
115. C. Popilius (senator by 70);\textsuperscript{69}
116. Q. Titinius (senator by 70);\textsuperscript{70}
117. C. Antonius Hybrida (senator by 70);\textsuperscript{71}
118. C. Aquillius Gallus (senator by 70);\textsuperscript{72}
119. Statius (senator after 87).\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{62} Known from the \textit{s. c. de Oropiis}, l. 13. Rawson 1978, 150; David 1992, 784.
\textsuperscript{63} Known from the \textit{s. c. de Oropiis}, l. 14; Taylor 1960, 236.
\textsuperscript{64} Known from the \textit{s. c. de Oropiis}, l. 14-15.
\textsuperscript{65} Known from the \textit{s. c. de Oropiis}, l. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{66} Nicolet 1966, 586. He was expelled from the Senate in 70 BC, for unknown reasons: Cic. \textit{Cluent.} 135.
\textsuperscript{67} Hill 1932, 177.
\textsuperscript{68} Father of the corrupt governor: Cic. \textit{Verr.} 1.8.23. See Wiseman 1971, 272, no. 479; Nicolet 1966, 585; Nicolet 1974, 1068-1069, no. 382. There is no ground to argue whether he became a senator before or after the Civil War.
\textsuperscript{69} See Cic. \textit{Verr.} 1.39.
\textsuperscript{71} Expelled by the censors: \textit{comm. pet.} 2.8; Ascon. 75 p. 84C. He was the youngest son of the orator M. Antonius, and he had served in Greece under Sulla: \textit{multos in Achaia spoliam ant nem de exercitu Sullano equitum turmas} (Ascon. 75 p. 84C). Also cf. Plut. \textit{Caes.} 4.2-3. See Shatzman 1975, 295-296, no. 89; B. A. Marshall 1985, 282, 293-294.
\textsuperscript{72} Doubtful, of equestrian origin: David 1992, 779-780.
\textsuperscript{73} It is unclear when this Samnite notable, \textit{πολέμῳ κατεργασάμενος} (\textit{App. b. c. 4.25.102}) joined the Senate: with Sulla, or even earlier, in 88 or 86. Cf. Gabba 1954a, 101 (= Gabba 1973, 268); Wiseman 1971, 263; Hinard 1985a; Magnino 1998, 175. He may be \textit{gn. staatis l. klar.}, the \textit{medidix tuticus} mentioned in an Oscan inscription from the temple of Pietrabbondante (\textit{ST Sal}13): La Regina 1975; La Regina 1976, 244-245; Torelli 1982a, 182. According to Crawford 1983, 50 he may well be Campanian, and not Pentrian.
For some other characters who supported Sulla in his military campaigns the appointment to the Senate may cautiously be suggested, although there is little, or no evidence for their later *cursus honorum*:

120. L. Minucius Basilus (leg. L. Sullae 88, tr. mil. 86);\(^{74}\)
121. Q. Bruttius Sura (leg. in Macedonia in 87);\(^{75}\)
122. Munatius (Plancus?) (leg. L. Sullae 87);
123. L. Hortensius (propraet. in 87);\(^{76}\)
124. A. Gabinius (trib. mil. 87);\(^{77}\)
125. Eucius (official with Sulla at Chaeronea);\(^{78}\)
126. (Sulpicius) Galba (a *legatus* of Sulla at Chaeronea);\(^{79}\)
127. Cn. Manlius Agrippa (probably a *legatus* in the Greek campaign);\(^{80}\)
128. (Vibius) Pacia(e)cus (leg. L. Sullae 81);\(^{81}\)
129. C. Visellius Varro (trib. mil. 80-79; quaest. by 73);
130. L. Marcius (leg. Luculli 74-72);\(^{82}\)
131. Sornatius (leg. Luculli 74-68).

Finally, there are several individuals who reached the quaestorship by the end of the Seventies, and who might have been appointed to the Senate by Sulla some years earlier. It is therefore worth including them in the list, although their position remains quite unclear:


\(^{75}\) Plut. *Sull.* 11.6-7, 15.4-6; 17.7; 19.1-3. See Keaveney 1984, 122.


\(^{77}\) Plut. *Sull.* 16.15; 18.1: Sulla put him in charge of a contingent of Chaeroneans. Perhaps he must be identified with the prosecutor of Q. Roscius Amerinus: Nicolet 1974, 870, fn. 3; Shatzman 1975, 272-273; David 1992, 264, 762-763. It remains to be explained, however, why Cicero does not refer to his senatorial rank.


\(^{79}\) One of the dedicatees of three honorific inscriptions put up in the Agora of Messene, along with Sulla and Murena: Dohnicht-Heil 2004.

\(^{80}\) Plut. *Sert.* 9.2; Plut. *Crass.* 4.2, 32.2.

\(^{81}\) Wiseman 1971, 240.
A fragment of Varro's *Saturae Menippeae* (453 Bücheler-Heraüs = 455 Cèbe) has been used as evidence for the existence of another Sullan senator: *noster Atticus rivalis, homo item lectus in curiam cum macesebat.* In fact, there are no elements to discuss the identity of this character, whom we only know to have a rural background and never to have got used to his new position. There is certainly no reason to claim that he is T. Pomponius Atticus, whom appears never to have become a senator.91

**b) The geographical provenance**

The origin of most of the Sullan senators is hard to establish. Here follows a list of those whose provenance may be guessed:

M.' Acilius Glabrio

Ostia92

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83 There is no direct evidence, but his wife was a Cornelia L. Scipionis f., perhaps daughter of Scipio Asiagenus (which would make a Sullan allegiance unlikely): *CIL* 1.2.821, with Syme 1956, 208 (= Syme 1979, 320); Wiseman 1971, 270.
84 Wiseman 1971, 251, no. 319.
87 Wiseman 1971, 223.
88 Wiseman 1971, 227: from a wealthy equestrian family.
89 Syme 1964, 114 (= Syme 1979, 592); Wiseman 1971, 251, no. 320; David 1992, 794-795.
92 Taylor 1960, 325; Syme 1964, 110-111 (= Syme 1979, 587-588); Shatzman 1975, 293. Licordari 1982, 35 is more cautious.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L. Afranius</td>
<td>Cupra Maritima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Annaeus Brocchus</td>
<td>Forum Novum?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Antistius Vetus</td>
<td>Gabii?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. Arrius</td>
<td>Formiae? Capua?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At(t)idius</td>
<td>Central Apennines?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axius</td>
<td>tribus of Varro; Reate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Basilus</td>
<td>Cupra Maritima?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. Caecilius Niger</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Caepasius</td>
<td>Clusium?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Caepasius</td>
<td>Clusium?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Caesius</td>
<td>Praeneste, Pompeii, Arpinum?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cn. Egnatius</td>
<td>Capena?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Faberius</td>
<td>Etruria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Fonteius</td>
<td>Tusculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fufidius</td>
<td>Arpinum?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Gabinius</td>
<td>Campania?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Gutta</td>
<td>Campania?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cn. Heius</td>
<td>Cumae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirtuleius</td>
<td>Cures? Trebula Mutuesca?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Iuventius Pedo</td>
<td>Tusculum?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Lartius</td>
<td>Castrum Novum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luscius Ocrea</td>
<td>Lanuvium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

94 Taylor 1960, 190.
95 Taylor 1960, 192; Licordari 1982, 28-29.
97 Taylor 1960, 211. Cébeillac-Gervasoni 1982, 85 stresses that there is no ground to relate this Egnatius with the Egnatii attested in Campania.
101 Cf. the Marian Gutta, who was from Campania: App. b.c. 1.90.416, with Badian 1958, 247.
102 Lomas 1993, 158-159, listing the relevant evidence.
103 Cf. Taylor 1960, 221.
104 Licordari 1982, 49.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L. Marcilius</td>
<td>Aesernia(^{106})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Minucius Basilus</td>
<td>Cupra Maritima(^{107})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munatius (Plancus?)</td>
<td>Tibur(^{108})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex. Nonius Sufenas</td>
<td>Trebula Suffenas(^{109})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Octavius</td>
<td>Velitrae(^{110})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. (Octavius) Ligus</td>
<td>Liguria?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Octavius Ligus</td>
<td>Liguria?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paciacus</td>
<td>Spain?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Papius</td>
<td>Lanuvium(^{111})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Petreius</td>
<td>Aricia?(^{112})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Plaetorius</td>
<td>Tusculum (or Praeneste)(^{113})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaetorius Cestianus</td>
<td>Tusculum (or Praeneste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Procius</td>
<td>Lanuvium(^{114})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Pupius Piso Frugi</td>
<td>Velitrae?(^{115})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rancius</td>
<td>Umbria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Seius</td>
<td>Paeligni(^{116})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sornatius</td>
<td>Picenum(^{117})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statius</td>
<td>Samnium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarquitius Priscus</td>
<td>Tarquinii? Caere?(^{118})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Terentius Varro</td>
<td>Reate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Terentius Varro</td>
<td>Reate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. Titinius</td>
<td>Minturnae(^{119})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{105}\) CIL 14.2119; Eph. Epigr. 7.1237; Syne 1964, 119 (= Syne 1979, 597); Licordari 1982, 31.

\(^{106}\) A Q. Marcilius L. f. was *duovir* in Aesernia: ILLRP 526.

\(^{107}\) Taylor 1960, 235; Gasperini-Paci 1982, 227-228.

\(^{108}\) Licordari 1982, 43.

\(^{109}\) Licordari 1982, 45.

\(^{110}\) Licordari 1982, 51.

\(^{111}\) Licordari 1982, 32.


\(^{113}\) Licordari 1982, 49-50.

\(^{114}\) Taylor 1960, 248-249.

\(^{115}\) Cf. Taylor 1960, 249.

\(^{116}\) Not listed in Torelli 1982a.


\(^{118}\) Torelli 1982b, 296 assigns him to Caere, against Wiseman 1971, 264.
Appendix II
Sulla in the Epigraphical Evidence

Here follows a list of the known inscriptions in which the name of Sulla is recorded. The titulature is mentioned for all the cases where it is attested.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{SEG 44.1227} Mopsuhestia: \textit{asylia} grant to the temple of Serapis, accompanied by a letter of Sulla dictator.
\item \textit{Syll.} \textsuperscript{3} 745 Rhodes: honorific dedication to a local notable, who met a number of Roman magistrates, including Lucius Sulla \textit{στραταγὸν ἀνθισπατὸν Ῥωμαίων}.
\item \textit{Plut. Sull.} 19.9-10; 34.4 Chaeronea: inscriptions on two trophies put up after the battle of 86 BC; at least one mentioned \textit{Λεύκιος Κορυνήλιος Ἐπαφρόδιτος}.
\item \textit{RDGE 17} Tabae: \textit{s.c de Tabenis}, passed in 81-80 BC, mentioning \textit{Λεύκιος Κορυνήλιος Ἐπαφρόδιτος} (but voted during the dictatorship).
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{119} Licordari 1982, 35.
\textsuperscript{120} Licordari 1982, 28.
\textsuperscript{121} Licordari 1982, 33.
\textsuperscript{122} Taylor 1960, 264.
\textsuperscript{123} Taylor 1960, 266.
\textsuperscript{124} Cf. the haruspex Vulcatius (or Vulcanius) in Serv. \textit{ad Ecl.} 9.46, with Rawson 1978, 146, 150.
\textsuperscript{125} Taylor 1960, 267.
Lagina Sanctuary, Stratonicea: s.c. de Stratonicensibus, passed in 81 BC, mentioning Λεύκιος Κορνηλίος Αμυκίου [υίος] Σύλλας ἔπαφροδίτος | δικτάτωρ.

Cormus: s.c. de Cormis, mentioning Σύλλας (very fragmentary).

Thasus: s.c. de Thasii, passed in 80 BC, mentioning Λεύκιος Κορνηλίος Σύλλας ἔπαφροδίτος ὑπατος.

Thasus: letter of the proconsul Cn. Cornelius Dolabella to the city, mentioning an earlier decision of Sulla.

Cos: two letters of Sulla ἔπαφροδίτος δικτάτωρ to the city, dealing with the status of the artists of Dionysus.

Chius: letter of a proconsul to the city, mentioning an earlier decision of Sulla δεύτερον ὑπατος.

Halicarnassus: dedication to Sulla στρατηγὸς ἀνθύπατος.

Delos: dedication to Sulla proconsul.

Delos: dedication of the collegia to Sulla proconsul.

Akraiphia: dedication to Sulla ἱμπεράτωρ, σωτήρ, εὐεργέτης

Sicyon: dedication of Sulla imperator to Mars.

Athens: dedication of a statue to Sulla (very fragmentary)

Cos: Sulla's epistle on the status of the artists of Dionysus.

Pompeii: graffito (L. Sull/α)

Pompeii: graffito (L. Cornelius Sulla).

Pompeii: graffito (L. Cornelius Sulla).

Suessa: dedication to Sulla imperator.

Larinum: dedication to Sulla dictator, patronus of the city.

Vicus Laci Fundani, Rome: dedication to Sulla Felix dictator.
ILLRP 353  Minturnae: dedication to *Sulla Felix dictator* from a group of freedmen.

ILLRP 355  Alba Fucens: dedication to *Sulla Felix dictator*.

ILLRP 356  Clusium: dedication to *Sulla Felix dictator*.

RDGE 23  Oropus: *s.c. de Orpui, passed in 73 BC*, referring to earlier decisions of Λεύκιος Κόρμηλος Σύλλας.
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