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Lost in Translation?

An Examination of the Implementation of Problem-oriented Projects

Karen Anne Bullock

University College London
Declaration

I, Karen A. Bullock confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Karen A. Bullock
Abstract

Problem-oriented policing is an approach to policing within which primacy is attached to preventing the recurrence of problem behaviours which fall within the remit of the police rather than merely reacting to individual calls for service as and when they occur. This study was born of weaknesses in existing accounts of the delivery of problem-oriented projects. Framed almost entirely in top-down conceptions of project implementation, existing studies tend to neglect the behavioural features that shape what projects deliver and the links between the behavioural and structural features of them. This study will examine the legitimacy of the dominant top-down approach to studying patterns of implementation and whether top-down and bottom-up approaches are sufficient to explain the implementation of problem-oriented projects. Drawing on evidence from in-depth case studies of two problem-oriented projects, it identifies the factors that shaped their execution. Top-down features of leadership, resources, theory, guidance, accountability and management all played a role in shaping what the projects achieved but bottom-up features of practitioner re-negotiation of aims, values, routines and conflict were also present.

The study concludes that neither approach is sufficient for explaining the delivery of problem-oriented projects. Both top-down and bottom-up factors play a role and there are strong dependencies and relationships between them. An alternative approach to conceiving implementation is proposed, drawing on a broad theoretical framework developed by Giddens (1984). First, it is contended that the structural and behavioural features of projects are mutually dependent. Project structures both transform and are transformed by their interaction and reproduction by practitioners. Second, it is suggested that there may be limits to the nature of constraint in project settings as formal systems of project management may have limited authority unless they are sanctioned and mobilized by the very people they are trying to monitor and control. Third, projects are inserted into organisational contexts where there are existing taken-for-granted sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices.
New project structures interact with these and are likely to transform and be transformed by interaction with them. As such they are not likely to be implemented in a straightforward manner. Fourth, project structures change over time as they are re-negotiated by practitioners and are influenced by unanticipated events and unintended consequences of actions.
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Chapter one

Introduction

The basic premise of problem-oriented policing is that the primary focus of the police service should be to prevent problems from reoccurring rather than reacting to criminal events as they occur (Goldstein, 1979; 1990). The aim is to reduce demand on the police service through developing tailor-made responses to systematically identified crime problems that are a matter of community concern (Goldstein, 1990). The principles of problem-oriented policing have been adopted explicitly by increasing numbers of police services in the UK and they underpin a range of policy developments. Despite its prominence in the rhetoric of policing policy and practice, however, studies have shown that whilst in principle problem-oriented policing is promising as a means of reducing crime there have been difficulties in delivering it on the ground. There remains a need to better understand the difference between what Goldstein envisaged and what is implemented in the name of problem-oriented policing in practice (Knutsson and Clarke, 2006).

This study was born of weaknesses in existing accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented projects. Accounts of the delivery of problem-oriented policing are strongly framed in top-down conceptions of implementation. Existing studies tend to identify a gap between what projects aimed to achieve and what was delivered in practice on the ground. This gap is explained almost entirely in terms of the organisational and technical features of the police service. However, understanding the wider role of behavioural and contextual factors that influence projects is important if the implementation of problem-oriented policing is to be properly understood. Evidence from the field of policing more generally suggests that it is not only technical and organisational issues that impact on the behaviour of police officers, and studies have pointed to a number of characteristics of police officers and the police context that appear to have an impact on efforts to affect change within the organisation (discussed in more detail in chapter three). In the field of public policy more widely, studies have pointed to weaknesses in top-down approaches to analysing and understanding implementation. Studies have shown that the bottom-up features of
practitioner routines, values, interaction and conflict can all shape patterns of implementation and others have pointed to a need to draw elements of top-down and bottom-up approaches together (discussed further in chapter three).

This study is thus concerned with examining the legitimacy of the dominant top-down approach to studying the implementation of problem-oriented policing within the police service. In particular it is concerned with examining whether either top-down or bottom-up approaches can sufficiently explain the delivery of problem-oriented projects.

This introductory chapter briefly discusses the meaning of implementation in the context of problem-oriented policing. It charts and examines the extent and nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing in the UK. It goes on to discuss the weaknesses in existing studies of implementation and sets out the rationale for and the aims of this study. It finishes by describing the agenda for the forthcoming chapters.

**Implementation and problem-oriented policing**

‘Implementation’ has been described as the activity that occurs between policy expectations and (perceived) policy outcomes (Hall and Hupe, 2002). Hill and Hupe (2002) argued that the process of implementation presupposes a decision to act. Implementation presupposes the formulation of series of actions and/or outcomes that need to be accomplished and a decision to act upon that. Analysis of implementation has to be connected to specific policies as particular responses to specific problems (Hill and Hupe, 2002). There needs to be a starting point and an end to implementation with a goal to work towards as the implementation of a project or policy cannot succeed or fail without a goal against which to judge it (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Implementation research has, however, tended to have a dual character. It is concerned with describing and explaining what happens as programmes and projects are implemented but also is concerned with setting out how these programmes ought to be implemented (Hill and Hupe, 2002). It thus has tended to have a descriptive and a normative focus.
In the context of this study the concern is then to examine and account for the patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing within the UK police service. Problem-oriented policing is associated with the implementation of four main processes: the identification and analysis of a problem; understanding what causes it; the development and implementation of appropriate responses based on that analysis and insight; and, an evaluation of the impact of those responses (this process is discussed in detail in chapter two). This study, then, seeks to examine what happens after a decision has been made to implement the processes of problem-oriented policing to address a specific crime problem.

**Problem-oriented policing in practice**

There is a fairly long history of accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing in the UK and beyond. Implementation of the concepts was first attempted in the early 1980s in Madison, Wisconsin in the US (see Goldstein 1990). In the UK, Surrey Constabulary similarly began experimenting with the ideas in the early 1980s, followed by London’s Metropolitan Police Service and Thames Valley Police. By the mid-1990’s, Northumbria, Thames Valley, West Yorkshire and Merseyside police services were all associated with the implementation of problem-oriented policing (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Large-scale experiments were set up in Leicestershire and Cleveland Constabularies and evaluated by the Home Office research directorate (Leigh et al., 1996; 1998). Today Lancashire Constabulary probably has the most mature form of problem-oriented policing anywhere in the UK (Bullock and Tilley, 2003).

Problem-oriented principles also underpin a number of national developments in policing policy and practice. These have included the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, the National Intelligence Model and the plans for the roll out of Neighbourhood Policing. Indeed problem-oriented policing has become widely considered to be an appropriate means through which policing should be done (Crawford, 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000). There are very many examples of successfully implemented problem-oriented projects which have reduced crime and other problems locally and evidence suggests that the implementation of problem-oriented principles can reduce specific crime problems. In their international review of what works in reducing crime
published in 1997, Sherman and colleagues concluded that problem-oriented policing generally was promising as a means of crime reduction (Sherman et al., 1997).

However, authors have typically agreed that whilst the language of problem-orientation is routinely spoken in the police service, recurrent problems are observed in its implementation (Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Laycock and Webb, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006). Mainstreaming of the principles throughout whole police services is indeed rare (Knutsson and Clarke, 2006). Problem-oriented policing in the UK is probably best conceived as a series of individual projects, many of which are associated with highly motivated individuals rather than a mainstream policing activity (Kirby and Reed, 2004). Even so, many of these individual projects bear little resemblance to problem-oriented policing as it was originally conceived (Goldstein, 2003). There remains a need to better understand the difference between what Goldstein envisaged and what is implemented in the name of problem-oriented policing in practice (Knutsson and Clarke, 2006).

**Accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing**

Despite its current prominence in the rhetoric of policing policy and practice the implementation of problem-oriented policing has not been straightforward. In addition, there are weaknesses in existing accounts of implementation which means that there remains a need to better understand the delivery of problem-oriented projects. These shortcomings are briefly outlined in the following sections and discussed in more detail in chapter three.

First, existing studies explaining the implementation of problem-oriented policing contain methodological weaknesses. These accounts are not typically based on systematic data collected for the purpose in hand. For example, The Home Office report, *Not Rocket Science? Problem-solving and Crime Reduction*, published in 2000 by Read and Tilley is an important British text that examines the extent and nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing across England and Wales. This report however, was based on data collected as part of an inspection of problem-oriented policing in England and Wales by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.
(HMIC). As an official inspection, the data collection for this was based on an examination of the extent to which police services were implementing the principles of problem-oriented policing as part of the government's performance management framework and did not seek to understand the nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing more broadly. In addition, some existing accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing have been based largely on the commentaries of experts on implementation of problem-solving. For example, the US Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services published *Problem-oriented Policing: Reflections on the first 20 years* by Scott in 2000. However, this text is based, largely, on the commentaries of experts on problem-oriented policing in the academic and policing arena and not on detailed observations of implementation in practice. It was (to a degree) based on perceptions on the nature of implementation by those responsible for studying it or managing it rather than on systematic observations of the actual experiences of those who implemented it in practice.

Second, as it has been noted already, most accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing are strongly framed in top-down conceptions of project implementation. Top-down approaches to understanding project implementation are typically concerned with what policy makers or managers are trying to achieve (Barrett and Fudge, 1981). Policy making is considered to be made at the top of an organisation and translated into actions for practitioners to implement. Implementation is seen as a process of setting aims and objectives and gearing practitioners towards delivering them. For the top-down approach key to implementing a new project is the provision of adequate resources, the development of instructions to guide practitioners in how to implement interventions and clear lines of management and authority to ensure that practitioners comply with the project aims and minimise deviation from them. The analysis of implementation should start at the top of an organisation, with what the policy maker or manager is trying to achieve. The extent to which this has been realised in practice is examined and the gap between the two explained. Explanations are usually framed in terms of the organisational and technical factors that influence patterns of delivery and the implication is that through providing adequate resources, tightening up rules and
procedures, the gap between what was intended and that which was delivered could be minimised.

Studies of the implementation of problem-oriented policing are strongly framed in terms of explaining the perceived gulf that exists between the ideal of problem-oriented policing as envisaged by Goldstein and the realities that are found as it operates in practice on the ground. Accounts have looked to see how the implementation of Goldstein's model has deviated in practice from what was intended (see for example, Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Braga, 2002; Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006). They have tended to describe patterns of implementation, note the differences between what was planned and what was implemented and provide suggestions and guidance (sometimes in the forms of checklists) which police managers or policy makers could use to improve implementation (see for example, Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock et al., 2002; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006). Existing research in this area has overwhelmingly sought to explain the nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing through top-down conceptions. Explanations focus on the organisational (for example, organisational structures, leadership, performance management, training, project management) and the technical (for example, the availability of data, analytic and evaluation capacity) aspects that facilitate or hinder its execution. The implication of this is that the implementation of problem-oriented policing would be enabled if these organisational or technical constraints were attended to. They are focused therefore primarily on providing management guidance about how to improve the implementation of problem-oriented policing in practice rather than on developing understanding of how the concepts come to be implemented on the ground. There is nothing wrong with explanations that provide practical organisational and management responses to the problems of project implementation: they can help to tighten up organisational processes; offer more control and help for project managers; and, help policy makers to think about the reasons for implementation problems and what to do about them (Stone, 1980; Gunn, 1984). Checklists are indeed useful for monitoring programme implementation and understanding it (Sabatier, 1986). However, whilst these accounts can be useful other accounts suggest that they may be partial because they neglect the non-organisational and non-technical aspects of implementation. In particularly they neglect to account for bottom-up features that
influence implementation and any overlap between top-down and bottom-up features of implementation.

Studies have indeed questioned top-down assumptions and focused on the importance of understanding individual and organisational behaviour and interaction in approaching the analysis of implementation (Lipsky, 1980; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjem and Porter, 1981). They have been labelled 'bottom-up' approaches to understanding implementation. These accounts have tended to be critical of the view that policy makers or managers can and should control the political, organisational and technological processes that influence project implementation on the ground and this is seen as a key conceptual flaw to top-down approaches. Practitioners have a level of discretion to make choices about what to do on a day-to-day basis. For a number of reasons, professionals can skew delivery as they implement interventions in ways that were not intended (Elmore, 1979). Generally, practitioners may adopt coping or diversionary mechanisms in order to get the job done or to twist implementation towards their own ends (Lipsky, 1980). The implementation of projects is considered to be dynamic and changing and the relationship between project aims and what is eventually implemented is an interactive one. In contrast to top-down approaches it is argued instead that practitioners have discretion and that this discretion inevitably creates modification of project aims and objectives. Power, vested interest, individual motivation and human behaviour are all key to bottom-up approaches to understanding patterns of implementation. In terms of understanding implementation then, analysis should start with the practitioners responsible for delivering interventions. These issues are clearly important not just for analysing and understanding implementation but also for seeking to develop means to improve implementation: if the causes of implementation problems are not technical or not rooted in organisational features, then they are likely to require rather different solutions (Stone, 1980). Others have pointed to need to pull together aspects of top-down and bottom-up approaches in understanding implementation (e.g. Sabatier, 1986).

It is contended that the dynamics of project implementation and the role played by the action and interaction of practitioners in determining what gets done and why in practice have been overlooked in the existing literature examining the delivery of
problem-oriented policing. This would seem to be important in understanding implementation in the field of policing. The police service is highly resistant to change and reluctant to change its predominately reactive culture to a proactive one (Goldstein, 1990; 2003). Other research has shown that police officers enjoy high degrees of professional discretion in their day-to-day activities which has proved difficult to control (Reiner, 2000). In addition, as will be discussed in detail, inter-agency working is important for problem-oriented policing but the nature of inter-agency working has been shown to be problematic (Hough, 2006). These issues will be examined in further detail in chapter three.

Top-down and bottom-up approaches are summarised and compared in Box 1.1 (below).
Box 1.1: Top-down and bottom-up approaches compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Bottom-up</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Starting point for analysis of implementation</strong></td>
<td>The aims of policy makers/managers</td>
<td>Implementation structures and interaction of practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identification of main players in implementation</strong></td>
<td>Start at the ‘top’ (those who design initiatives)</td>
<td>Start at the ‘bottom’ (those who implement initiatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective setting</strong></td>
<td>Objectives are set at the top and followed by practitioners</td>
<td>Question policy makers’ ability to set clear goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location of policy making</strong></td>
<td>Policy makers views are key</td>
<td>Policy making is dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control of implementation</strong></td>
<td>Through the provision of adequate resources, setting clear objectives and exercising controls, practitioners will implement policy</td>
<td>Policy makers cannot control the environment in which programmes are implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of discretion</strong></td>
<td>Through setting up accounting systems and holding practitioners to account, the impact of discretion can be minimised</td>
<td>Policy makers cannot control the impact of practitioner discretion because implementation is a low visibility activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of conflict</strong></td>
<td>Conflict is dysfunctional and can be co-ordinated to ensure that practitioners achieve common aims</td>
<td>Conflict is an inevitable result of practitioners conceiving implementation in different ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluative criteria</strong></td>
<td>Focus is on the extent to which the programme objectives are attained</td>
<td>Much less clear. Anything that is relevant to the policy issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall focus</strong></td>
<td>How can processes be steered towards the implementation of a programme’s objectives</td>
<td>The interaction of practitioners</td>
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To summarise the argument so far, existing explanations of the implementation of problem-oriented policing are limited because:

- key accounts have not been based on data collected for the purpose in hand and sometimes based on participant commentaries from key individuals who have the benefit of hindsight rather than on systematic examination of the implementation of projects;
- existing studies are framed in a primarily top-down approach;
- there is an over focus on explaining the implementation of problem-oriented policing in terms of organisational structures and technological issues;
- the impact of patterns of practitioner behaviour and contextual issues are neglected;
- they are focused on providing guidance for improving implementation, rather than on understanding implementation; and,
- explanations are not framed in existing theories that seek to orient the analysis and understanding of implementation.

This study

There remains a need to examine the legitimacy of the top-down assumptions that dominate approaches to analysing and understanding the implementation of problem-oriented policing. This study examines in detail the implementation of two problem-oriented projects which sought to address very different problems: one based in Manchester and another based in Cambridge. In doing so this study aimed to examine whether the dominant top-down approach is sufficient for understanding patterns of implementation of problem-oriented projects and to investigate whether a bottom-up approach might be more appropriate. It also aimed to consider whether a different means of approaching the implementation of problem-oriented projects might better explain observed patterns of implementation.

In particular then it seeks to examine the following two hypotheses.
1. That top-down approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.

2. That bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.

Overview of the report

The following chapter discusses the rational for implementing a problem-oriented approach in the police service. It sets out its basic concepts in terms of the identification and analysis of problems, developing and implementing responses to them, and evaluating the effectiveness of new responses. It examines the existing evidence pertaining to the nature of implementation of the processes of problem-oriented policing within the police service arguing that there have been difficulties at all stages.

Chapter three develops this further reviewing the existing explanations of implementation of problem-oriented approaches. It examines the role played by existing police organisational structures, leadership and management, performance management structures, analytical skills, the availability of data and appropriate analysis skills, training, project management skills and the police organisational culture in shaping the implementation of problem-oriented projects. It then sets out weaknesses of existing explanations of the implementation of the problem-oriented approach in the police service. It highlights the over-emphasis on organisational and technical explanations, the inattention to behavioural and contextual ones and the neglect of wider theories that seek to explain the implementation of projects in the field of public policy. In doing so, this chapter finishes by setting out in detail the rationale for and the aims and objectives of the study.

Chapter four sets out the justification for and implementation of the research design to meet the study's aims. It discusses the research design in detail, examining the role of
qualitative research, the case study and triangulation in the social sciences and discusses the limitations of the approach. It then describes the rationale for the primary methods employed (interviews, document analysis and observations). It discusses the practicalities of implementing the research design in terms of negotiating access to the case studies, ethics and researcher roles. It sets out the practical arrangements for collecting and analysing the data in detail. It ends by reviewing the link between the project aims and the research design employed to address them and sets out the framework for the following results chapters.

Chapter five is the first results chapter and it is concerned with describing and examining the interventions that the two case studies planned to implement, the processes and structures through which implementation was conducted and the interventions, outputs and outcomes that the projects finally managed to deliver in practice. As such, this chapter starts by describing the funding arrangements for the two projects. It goes on to examine the profile of the problems that the projects were trying to tackle focusing on the crime (and other) data which the projects used to understand the problems that they were tackling. The development of the responses in the two projects is charted. The implementation structures, staffing and management arrangements that were set in place in order to deliver them are then examined. This chapter sets out in detail the projects' aims and objectives and examines the main outputs of the two projects and the difference between what was planned and what was actually achieved in practice. This chapter provides the basis for the following two results chapters which seek to use top-down and bottom-up principles to explain the patterns of implementation of the two projects.

Chapter six is concerned with those top-down factors that shaped the implementation of the two projects. As the literature review will set out in detail top-down analysis of implementation of projects is concerned with identifying what managers or policy makers were trying to achieve and examining the extent to which this was realised in practice. Subsequent understanding of project implementation is conceived primarily in terms of the organisational and technical factors that shape implementation. Framed by the literature review but grounded in the evidence collected from the case studies, this chapter sets out the role played by leadership, resources, project theory,
objectives and guidance, management and accountability in shaping the implementation of the two projects.

In contrast chapter seven examines the bottom-up factors that help to explain the implementation of the case studies. As will be set out in detail, bottom-up approaches are concerned primarily with how practitioners experience and understand implementation and the interaction between individuals and organisations. In particular, this chapter examines the role played by practitioners’ negotiation of project aims, the nature of inter-agency working and the role played by day-to-day routines, values and conflict in shaping project implementation.

Chapter eight draws on evidence from the study to examine the extent to which top-down and bottom-up approaches help to explain the nature of implementation in the two projects. It examines what the projects planned to achieve and what was actually achieved and draws on the top-down and bottom-up literature to explain this. It goes on to argue that whilst these top-down and bottom-up explanations can be useful in orienting analysis and understanding implementation, they are limited. As such, the chapter finishes by setting out an alternative way that project implementation could be conceived framed by the work of Anthony Giddens, drawing on evidence from the study.

The final chapter returns to the original aims of the study, reviews the evidence in relation to them and provides final conclusions.
Chapter two

The concepts of problem-oriented policing and their implementation in the UK police services

Introduction

This chapter reviews the main concepts of problem-oriented policing. It starts by setting out Goldstein’s rationale for problem-oriented policing and describes its basic elements: the identification and understanding of problems, development and implementation of responses and the evaluation of the impact. It then reviews the evidence relating to the nature of implementation of these processes in the UK police services. In doing so, it provides the basis for chapter three which examines existing dominant explanations for the nature of the implementation of problem-oriented policing in detail.

The rationale for problem-oriented policing

Problem-oriented policing was developed by Herman Goldstein, an American academic and former advisor to the police service and described in an article published in 1979 and later in a monograph published in 1990. Goldstein was critical of the way that the police service focused on maximising organisational efficiency to the detriment of focusing on what he believed should be its core outcome: reducing problems that concern local people.

Goldstein described a number of characteristics of modern policing that shaped the development of the problem-oriented approach. First, he argued that traditionally the police service has concentrated investment in their internal organisational processes rather than in developing more effective ways of dealing with key crime problems. Goldstein argued that over-focus on the organisational processes was a problem for all bureaucracies but was particularly acute in the police service. Goldstein believed that
the police service management has assumed that through attending to organisational processes demand on the service would be reduced but he argues that this assumption is questionable. Second, Goldstein was critical of the primarily reactive way that the police deal with incidents. The police spend most of their time reactively responding to requests for help from the public. This, Goldstein argued, consumes vast resources, fosters the view that this is the key role of the police (within and outside the service) and encourages superficial responses as it does not solve problems or prevent them from resurfacing. As such the dominant reactive approach fails to provide the best service to the public. A further consequence of this is that it encourages narrow performance management systems that focus on response times and officers therefore concentrate on responding to problems but not on preventing them. Third, Goldstein argued that the community has not been fully engaged in policing. This, he felt, is a waste of resources because the police service relies on the involvemement of the public for information about problems and crimes to provide an adequate service and as such the impact that the police can have on problems is in part related to the relationship that it builds with the community. Fourth, Goldstein argued that the police service does not make best use of its rank and file officers. Police resources have been allocated to making more efficient use of officer time rather than to maximising exploration and development of their talents and creativity. Goldstein argued that giving police officers more freedom would improve the quality of responses to problems and would result in greater job satisfaction. Through adopting a problem-oriented approach, officers would also feel that they were accomplishing more because they would not merely be repeatedly responding to incidents but would be preventing them from occurring in the first place. Goldstein believed that change in the police service has been hampered by failure to address cultural issues. Like others, Goldstein noted the power of police subculture and the effect that it has had on attempts to affect change in the police service and he argued that the strength of police subculture needs to be addressed. Fifth, Goldstein believed that the police service has failed to address problems holistically. In implementing problem-oriented policing Goldstein argued that the police service should outline a plan for doing so but also to set out the implications that this would have for the police organisation. As well as calling for more direct focus on the substance of policing ‘...the problems that constitute the business of the police and how they handle them’ (Goldstein, 1990: 32),
he called for a change in the predominately reactive direction of police effort and the following sections spell out the basic elements of problem-oriented policing.

The basic elements of problem-oriented policing

In its very broadest sense, problem-oriented policing describes a framework that aims to improve the way that the police service operates and problem-oriented policing has been described as a scientific approach to improving the way that the police do business (Scott, 2000). Its basic premise is that the core of policing should be to understand and prevent problems recurring rather than to react to criminal events as they occur. The concept involves four main processes: scanning (identifying) then analysing a problem; developing responses to the problem; and, evaluating the impact of that response.

Scanning and analysing problems

The purpose of scanning is to identify problems and to specify them appropriately in order to develop responses to tackle them. Scanning, in the context of problem-oriented policing, is about identifying and homing in on patterns of recurring incidents that are open to intervention:

The first step in problem-oriented policing is to move beyond handling incidents. It calls for recognising that incidents are often merely overt symptoms of problems. This pushes the police in two directions (1) it is required that they better recognise the relationships between incidents (similarities of behaviour, location, persons involved, etc.); and (2) that they take a more in-depth interest in incidents by acquainting themselves with some of the conditions and factors that give rise to them.

Goldstein, 1990: 33

Goldstein (1990) described problems as clusters of similar, related or recurring problems that represent a substantive community concern and which constitute police business. Problems could be identified in different ways including through routine analysis of police calls for service data or analysis of information from other parts of the police organisation or other agencies. Problems may, of course, also be brought to the attention of the police by the community or by rank and file police officers.
Goldstein also gave examples of how identified problems might be prioritised for analytic attention. These included: the impact that a problem was having on a community in terms of its size and cost; the presence of life-threatening conditions; community interest and the likelihood of support for it; the degree to which the problem threatened police/community relations; the interest and support of rank and file officers; and, the potential for progress with dealing with the problem (Goldstein, 1990: 78).

Once a patterned problem has been identified, systematic information about that problem should be gathered in order to analyse it and describe it in detail. Scott (2000) stated that:

> Goldstein's ideal model of problem-oriented policing calls for analysis that is systematic, thorough, insightful, discriminating, and honest; that is, the analysis should provide the most comprehensive understanding of the problem possible. Scott, 2000: 59

Goldstein called for '...a broad inquiry, uninhibited by past perspectives'. This inquiry should reach out to answer a range of questions about the nature of the recurring problem and in doing so should utilise a range of data sources and references. These could include: examination of data from police files; capturing the knowledge of rank and file officers; interviews with victims and offenders; enquiries with the wider community including surveys; examination of information that other agencies may hold; and, reviews of available literature. Goldstein argued that the collection and analysis of these data sources needed to be rigorous but noted that the extent of methodological rigour might reasonably be limited because of time and cost constraints, the lack of the skills required to conduct thorough analysis of problems within the police service and police officer aversion to long quantitative reports (Goldstein, 1990: 91).

The purpose of analysis in the context of problem-oriented policing is to identify 'pinch points'. These refer to the points at which practical interventions that have a real chance of reducing the identified problem can be identified and responses
targeted. Ultimately a tight definition of a problem is important if effective responses are going to be developed from them. Goldstein argued that statutory criminal justice labels are normally too broad to facilitate the development of responses, perpetuate the view that problems are police problems and in any case police labels should be used cautiously since they may turn out to be wrong:

At the most elementary level, citizens, as well as the police and others who work within the criminal justice system, overuse miscellaneous terms such as 'crime', 'street crime', 'disorder', 'delinquency' and 'violence'. Surprisingly, many police agencies continue to use generic terms to categorise portions of their business. Researchers interested in specific types of police calls are often still required, in this day of elaborate computer capacities, to 'dig out' by hand those cases that constitute a substantial, distinctive portion of a police agencies regular work load. Overly broad categorisations of incidents impede efforts to gain insight into discrete substantive problems. Goldstein, 1990: 39

**Developing and evaluating responses**

After identifying problems, the aim is to develop tailor made responses to them, to initiate ‘...an uninhibited search for a tailor made response’ and to identify ‘far-reaching and imaginative’ responses to problems which go beyond the criminal justice system (Goldstein, 1990:43):

Once police break out of the mould of looking only within the criminal justice system for solutions, large vistas are open to exploration. Problem-oriented policing includes, as one of its key elements, taking full advantage of this opportunity by encouraging a far-reaching and imaginative search for alternative ways in which to respond to commonly recurring problems, un-curtailed by prior thinking. Goldstein, 1990: 44

Goldstein (and others) pointed to the very many possible responses that could be explored as means of tackling problems other than relying on criminal justice interventions. As well as use of the criminal or civil law to control behaviour Goldstein noted the following: targeting attention at repeat victims and repeat offenders; connecting with services provided by other government agencies;
mediation and negotiation between victims and offenders; conveying information about how to reduce the chances of victimisation; mobilising the community to take action to prevent crime; mobilising existing forms of social control within communities or families; altering the physical environment to reduce the opportunities for crime to occur; increasing regulation; and, developing new forms of authority. In addition, Goldstein (1990) argued that a tailor-made response is likely to consist of a range of interventions. The nature of that response would much depend on the analysis, the factors considered when weighing up alternatives and the values attached to them.

Developing responses is not, then, a sterile exercise. Analysis could lead to a wide range of possible alternatives that need to be assessed and the values reflected in the ultimate choice of responses would vary. Goldstein argued that there are, nevertheless, a fairly uniform set of factors that should be considered when selecting alternatives, which included:

- the potential that the response has to reduce the problem;
- the specific impact that the response will have on the most serious aspect of the problem (or those social interests deemed most important);
- the extent to which the response is preventative in nature, thereby reducing recurrence or more acute consequences that are difficult to handle;
- the degree to which the response intrudes into the life of individuals and depends on legal sanctions and the potential use of force;
- the attitude of the different communities most likely to be affected by adoption of particular interventions;
- the legality and civility of the response, and the way in which it is likely to affect overall relationships with the police;
- the financial costs;
- the availability of police authority and resources; and,
- the ease with which the response can be implemented.

(Goldstein, 1990: 143)

The final stage of the problem-oriented process is to evaluate the impact of the response. The aim of evaluation in this context is: to guard against one ineffective
response replacing another; to ensure that a response is effective over time; and, to ensure that the response does not revert back to its reactive, traditional form.

Goldstein (1990) pointed out that evaluation is not a straightforward task and called for the development of evaluation skills within police services. Like others, Goldstein noted that this is challenging and suggested that the police service should develop relations with universities, where the skills to evaluate responses are typically found and should look to government and other funding bodies for financial assistance for this.

The basic elements of problem-oriented policing are summarised in box 2.1.

**Box 2.1 Basic elements of problem-oriented policing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification and understanding of substantive problems</th>
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| A problem should be a matter of community concern | • Problems should not be administrative or internal matters of the police service unless that is facilitating problem-oriented policing  
• Rank and file police officers should be involved in identifying problems  
• The community should be involved in identifying problems |

| Incidents should be grouped and systematically analysed; seek to identify links between incidents to identify pinch points at which interventions could be targeted | • Events that constitute a problem should be similar in some way (place, time, characteristics of offenders or victims etc.)  
• If there is no grouping then it is not problem that should be tackled with a problem-oriented approach  
• Police recorded crime systems should be the starting point of analysis  
• Other forms of data to analyse problems could include talking to victims and offenders  
• The range and depth of analysis dependent on |
the size and magnitude of the problem
• Assessment of what is already known about
  the nature of the problem and whether more
  needs to be known

Development of tailor-made responses

Analysis of nature of existing response
• Interviews with police officers
• Observation of current responses

Review of existing evidence about the problem
• An examination of available literature and other evidence

The development of tailor-made solutions that go beyond law enforcement
• For example, use of civil law, attention to situation features, mobilising the resources of other agencies etc.

Evaluation of the impact

Review of implementation of responses
• To prevent one ineffective response being replaced by another and to guard against responses reverting to traditional approaches
• Extent of evaluation task should be linked to nature and scope of problem being tackled
• Evaluation is a specialist and potentially expensive undertaking

Implementing problem-oriented policing

Goldstein’s 1979 article stimulated a number of experiments in police agencies who attempted to put the principles into practice and triggered debate regarding how best to implement the approach (Sherman, 1992). As set out in the introduction there is now a relatively long history of problem-oriented policing in the UK and elsewhere and interest in the principles of problem-orientation has exploded.

Whilst studies have referred to the seemingly ‘simple,’ ‘sensible’ and ‘common sense’ nature of problem-oriented policing (Sherman, 1992; Leigh et al., 1996; Read and Tilley, 2000) most agree that high quality, broad-based problem-oriented policing is
rare (Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006; Scott, 2006). Despite its prominence in current policing policy and practice, implementing problem-oriented policing in police services has proved to be difficult (Laycock and Webb, 2003). The early efforts to implement problem-oriented policing in the UK and the US reported mixed successes and implementation problems. At the time of writing, problem-oriented policing is probably best conceived as a series of projects often associated with highly motivated individuals rather than a mainstream police activity (Kirby and Reed, 2004). Even so, Goldstein argued that many of these projects barely resemble problem-oriented policing as it was conceived (Goldstein, 2003).

The following sections review the existing evidence relating to the implementation of the main processes of problem-oriented policing, in terms of:

• analysing and understanding problems;
• developing and implementing tailor made interventions; and,
• evaluating problem-oriented responses.

**Analysing and understanding crime problems**

High quality analysis of problems is the driver of high quality problem-oriented responses. However, studies have pointed to shortcomings in the police service’s capacity to analyse crime problems. A number of problems in the analysis for problem-oriented policing have been identified: it is often missed out entirely; is superficial and lacks rigour when it is conducted; focuses overly on police data; and, is not sufficiently disaggregated to facilitate the development of targeted responses. These issues are discussed in the following sections.

First, studies have argued that it is not uncommon for the analysis stage of problem-oriented policing to be missed out all together (Capowich and Roehl, 1994; Cordner, 1998; Sampson and Scott, 2000; Bullock *et al.*, 2002; Bullock *et al.*, 2006). In an examination of 100 proposals for funding for problem-oriented projects from the governments Targeted Policing Initiative, Bullock *et al.*, (2002) found that 13 per cent contained no analysis about the nature of the problem that they were seeking to tackle. More recently, in an analysis of 150 Tilley Award projects Bullock *et al.*, (2006)
similarly found little or no quantitative analysis in 22 (15%) of the projects. Because of its central role in identifying appropriate interventions if the analysis section is missed, the problem will not be properly understood, the response will not be properly tailored to the nature of the problem and in all likelihood the problem will persist (Sampson and Scott, 2000).

Second, studies have pointed to how analysis of problems can be basic and lacking in rigour and specificity (Clarke, 1998; Scott, 2000; Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock et al., 2006). Scott (2000) stated that Goldstein's ideal of analysis which is '... systematic, through, insightful, discriminating and honest' is rarely achieved in practice (Scott, 2000:59). For example, in their examination of 266 problem-oriented projects Read and Tilley (2000) found limited used of data. In answer to the question 'please outline the original problem that prompted the initiative' only three percent of the projects presented any hard data. Twelve per cent provided data in answer to the question 'what conclusions were drawn about the nature and extent of the problem' and five per cent included data in response to the question 'summarise the main findings of the analysis using data as appropriate' (Read and Tilley, 2000:8). Bullock et al. (2002) similarly found that the extent of analysis presented in 100 proposals received for funding from the Targeted Policing Initiative varied greatly. Judged on the extent to which proposals identified crime specific problems; used appropriate data; focused on the problem; and, demonstrated an understanding of the problem, over three-quarters (77%) of the proposals received were judged as containing insufficient analysis. More recently, Bullock et al. (2006) noted the simplistic data analysis that characterised the entries to the Tilley Awards. They found that almost half of the 150 projects that they examined presented only simple counts of crime, incidents or survey responses, and for 44 per cent of these (n=32) this was the only type of analysis carried out.

Third, it has been seen that Goldstein highlighted the potential for utilising a range of data from other sources and stressed that police data should only be the starting point for understanding problems (Goldstein, 1990). Other sources of data could include those held by other statutory agencies, surveys of the public and from interviews with offenders. Utilising a range of data is then clearly considered to be important for problem analysis but studies have identified that problem-oriented policing tends to
focus predominately on police data (Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Lamm Weisel, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006). For example Leigh et al. (1998) found that officers in Cleveland largely relied heavily on their own knowledge and that which they had picked up from other officers in identifying problems. Officers were asked to name at least one impetus for their initial conclusion that there might be a problem. Of the 257 sources cited, 105 (41%) were ‘own knowledge’ or ‘from contact with other officers’ (Leigh et al., 1998: 28). In their examination of 266 questionnaires pertaining to problem-oriented projects UK-wide, Read and Tilley (2000) similarly highlighted the reliance on police data to analyse problems. They found that the data most commonly used to analyse problems was recorded crime data (61%), followed by command and control incident data (39%), force intelligence (25%), and local authority information (22%). They found that other sources of information and data were used very rarely (Read and Tilley, 2000). Similarly in their examination of 100 proposals received for funding from the Targeted Policing Initiative, Bullock et al. (2002) found that most of the proposals relied on police recorded crime statistics to analyse problems. Only one-third of the proposals scrutinised contained information from agencies other than the police. In their examination of 150 Tilley Award entries, Bullock et al. (2006) similarly found that relatively few data were presented and used in the analysis from sources other than the police, and what were used did not appear to be particularly well utilised. For example, they found that 82 of the projects (55%) used police recorded crime data in the analysis of the problem, and in 23 of these (29%) this was the only source of data for the analysis. They found little use of data from local authorities, health authorities, the probation service or other emergency services.

Lastly, it has also been argued that a discrete problem focus is essential if officers are to understand why a problem recurs and develop responses to it (Goldstein, 1990). It is common for problems to be inadequately defined and disaggregated for the purpose of analysis (Clarke, 1998; Scott 2000; Eck 2001). Broadly defined problems are a common feature of the implementation of problem-oriented policing and this has led to poorly focused responses that are too ambitious (Clarke, 1998). Scott (2000) similarly argued that characterising problems with broad labels such as ‘drugs’, ‘violence’, ‘disorder’, ‘neighbourhood decline’ or ‘juveniles’ without specifying what the behaviour actually is ‘...often results in simplistic analysis of the problem and,
consequently, to hopelessly inadequate responses' (Scott, 2000: 49). The lack of
discrete focus and broadly defined problems creates difficulties for the
implementation of projects because problems are conceived on too large a scale to
manage in a practical sense (Scott, 2000). Eck (2001) similarly noted inadequate
problem definition in problem-oriented projects and argued that problems need to be
better specified and defined if responses are to be properly focused. He suggested that
at the very least problems needed to be specified in terms of:

- the nature of the problematic behaviour and this should be in terms of the actions
  of individuals rather than in terms of their status;
- the harm that a problem is causing;
- evidence of the repetitive nature of the problem; and,
- an assessment of how the problem is seen through the eyes of the public.

The tendency to conceive problems in terms of broad categories has indeed been
noted by empirical studies. For example, Leigh et al. (1998) noted the use of broad
categories such as 'general disorder' or 'crime and general disorder' in their study of
the implementation of problem-oriented policing in the Cleveland police service.

Developing and implementing tailor-made interventions

Studies have suggested that the development and implementation of problem-oriented
responses has not been straightforward. Problems have related to: refining data into
information that is useful for developing responses; knowing what to do when
problems have been identified; developing a range of alternative responses; working
in partnership; and, adequately targeting responses.

Collecting information and then refining it into data that are useful for the
development of responses has not been straightforward. Very generally, studies have
suggested that whilst information may be available to orient responses it is not always
clear that police officers make use of it (Leigh et al., 1998). For example in their
study of the implementation of problem-oriented policing in Cleveland Constabulary,
Leigh et al. (1998) noted that an Information Unit Sergeant routinely gave data to
police officers for the purpose of developing responses to problems but the police
officers preferred to rely on their own knowledge about problems and information picked up from other officers (Leigh et al., 1998).

Research has also highlighted that there have been difficulties in developing tailor-made solutions to problems once they have been identified. Some authors have suggested that police officers do not appear to routinely take account of the literature on crime reduction when developing responses to problems (Clarke, 1998; Tilley, 1999). Indeed, in their examination of 266 problem-oriented initiatives, Read and Tilley (2000) found that the commonest source of advice in developing new responses to problems was from colleagues in the same force (42%) or a different force (43%). Townsley et al. (2003) argued that there is more help available for officers seeking to develop problem-oriented responses (they noted the Home Office Tool Kits available at www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits) but argued that it is not clear if these are actually being used. They referred to a small scale survey of officers that they had conducted and found that 58 per cent (n=not stated) had not read a Home Office report in the six months prior to the survey. In their review of 150 entries to the UK Tilley Award by Bullock et al. (2006) similarly found that projects rarely indicated that they had made use of existing literature about how to address problems when developing their projects. In total, 41 of the 150 projects analysed referred to research or literature that provided additional information. It may, of course, be the case that projects had referred to the literature when searching for appropriate solutions to the problem identified but did not reference it in the project submission. However, this finding certainly concurs with that of other studies.

It has been seen that Goldstein (1990) pointed to the need for officers to develop a range of alternatives to criminal justice system responses for tackling problems and to recognise that there are many ways of tackling problems. Despite the wide range of potential alternatives available for tackling problems, research has shown that police officers continue to rely on conventional policing responses such as high visibility policing, arrests and incapacitation in addressing problems (Clarke, 1998; Leigh et al., 1998; Cordner, 1998; Scott, 2000; Matassa and Newburn, 2003). Leigh et al. (1998) for example found that direct police-led actions against alleged offenders were most favoured by officers: 40 per cent of all the actions recorded by Cleveland and Leicestershire police services were traditional police responses of patrol,
observations, surveillance, warrants, arrests and warnings. In addition, a tendency to revert to traditional police responses has been noted (Leigh et al., 1998; Matassa and Newburn, 2003). In a study of the implementation of problem-oriented hate crime projects in the Metropolitan Police Service, Matassa and Newburn (2003) pointed to how police officers perceived deficiencies in the ability of partner agencies to implement interventions and so they tended to resort to traditional policing methods of improved high visibility patrol and surveillance of offenders.

Very closely related to the previous point, Goldstein stressed the need for the police service to search for the best response to problems which would not necessarily be enforcement of the law. The implication of this is that, where appropriate, the police service should seek to draw in the resources of other agencies to deliver responses to problems. Generally it has been well recognised that the police service has to get others on board in implementing problem-oriented policing and that it had not always happened (Pollard, 1996). Studies of the implementation of problem-oriented policing suggest that the involvement of other agencies in delivering responses has been limited (Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Matassa and Newburn, 2003; Townsley et al., 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Scott, 2006). In their study based on the implementation of problem-oriented policing in all 43 police services in England and Wales, Read and Tilley (2000) argued that opportunities to engage partners were being missed and concluded that:

Notwithstanding the emphasis on partnership, problem-solving was not always deemed to need the full involvement of partners at all stages. Partnership involvement in deciding what to do was seen sometimes to lead to fudging of schemes as partnerships lose focus accommodating the varying interests, and ideologies of partners are satisfied at the expense of clear thinking and targeted action.
Read and Tilley, 2000: 31

More specifically, Leigh et al. (1998) noted that just under one third (31%) of the responses implemented in Cleveland Constabulary were implemented by the police service alone. Bullock et al.'s 2006 review of the Tilley Award entries similarly showed that the projects were strongly associated with the police service: of the 150
problem-oriented projects examined, the police were wholly responsible for half of them.

Lastly, and on a more practical level, inadequate targeting of responses has been highlighted by a range of studies (Clarke 1998; Scott 2000; Bullock et al. 2002). In order to be targeted, the preventive ‘grease’ of an intervention must get to the crime ‘squeak’ (Farrell and Pease, 1993; Hough and Tilley, 1998). This means that interventions must not merely focus on a high crime rate area or a given crime but on an identified and significant aspect or attribute of that problem (Bullock et al. 2002). It might, for example, within geographical hotspots, make sense to target repeat victims, hot products, or known repeat offender. Unless well targeted, an intervention is unlikely to use resources effectively or to channel measures to the specified problem and its identified causes (Bullock et al., 2002). Empirical studies have identified inadequate targeting in problem-oriented projects. For example, the reviewing by Bullock et al. (2002) of 100 problem-oriented projects plans submitted to the government’s Targeted Policing Initiative found that it was common for analysis to be inadequately used to inform the identification of an appropriate intervention and as a result many proposals were not sufficiently targeted. For example, they scored only two of the 100 proposals examined as being very well targeted.

**Evaluating problem-oriented policing projects**

Evaluation of problem-oriented policing projects is required to avoid replacing one ineffective response with another and to guard against a response reverting to its previous form (Goldstein, 1990). There is generally consensus in the literature that whilst evaluation of problem-oriented projects is important it is rarely well done (Bazemore and Cole, 1994; Read and Tilley 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock et al. 2006).

It is not uncommon for evaluation to be omitted altogether (Capowich and Roehl, 1994; Clarke, 1998; Cordner, 1998; Tilley, 1999; Read and Tilley, 2000). In their study of the implementation of problem-oriented policing in England and Wales, Read and Tilley (2000) for example noted that:
Evaluation continues to be a weakness, and raises doubts about the status of self-assessed successes. There is relatively little systematic evaluation. What there is is generally weak. Few evaluations are independent. Evidence is used selectively. There is little undue satisfaction with reduction as an indicator that the initiative was effective without attention to alternative explanations, or to possible side effects. There is little attention paid to how initiatives may have had their effects.

Read and Tilley, 2000: 9

Difficulties associated with evaluation include the measurement of processes (measurements of practitioner activity and outputs), outcomes (the impact that the initiative had on the specified problem) and costs (Scott, 2000).

Process evaluation then involves documenting the actions taken in implementing a project and assessing whether the interventions were implemented as intended (Scott, 2000). When assessing the overall effectiveness of an intervention it is important to know whether it has been implemented as intended and what else may have been going on in the same place at the same time in relation to a specific problem. Scott (2000) argued that generally there was a tendency to measure processes and to neglect outcomes of problem-oriented projects:

Evaluator misconstrue process evaluation for outcome evaluation; that is, they limit their inquiry to determining how well and to what degree the police and others actually implemented their plan of action. While this information is vitally important, it cannot be substituted for some inquiry about what effect the plan of action, however well implemented, had on the problem.

Scott, 2000: 90

There is some empirical evidence to suggest that measurement of processes in problem-oriented projects may be more prevalent than measurement of outcomes. Read and Tilley (2000) for example found that of the 266 initiatives that they examined, 85 per cent were monitored compared with 69 per cent that were evaluated.

Notwithstanding a possible preference for process measurement over outcome measurement, studies have identified practical difficulties in conducting process evaluations in the context of problem-oriented policing. Practitioners have not always
understood the need to maintain detailed records which they may see as time-consuming, labour intensive and only peripheral to their day-to-day job (Bullock et al., 2002). Bullock et al. (2002) also noted that the collection of detailed activity data can be seen as intrusive by practitioners who do not always understand the need to collect such detailed information. Forrest et al. (2005) similarly argued that quite detailed record keeping by practitioners is required if sufficient information is to be collected to allow processes to be linked to ultimate outcomes and that this can be difficult to achieve in practice. A related issue is that (important as monitoring processes and assessing outcomes might be) practitioners might find the assessment of projects to be boring, expensive, pointless and possibly even threatening once they believe that the original problem has been resolved and as a result, they may overlook it (Bullock et al., 2002).

As Scott (2000) stated it is certainly the case that there are particular problems with outcome assessment in problem-oriented projects. As has been seen, Read and Tilley (2000) identified little independent evaluation, selective use of evidence in outcome evaluation and little consideration of the effectiveness of the project or the possibility of alternative explanations for results in the projects that they examined. Read and Tilley (2000) concluded that not one of the 266 projects that they had assessed had unequivocally been able to show that any reductions in the size of problems were due to the intervention or identified and measured plausible side effects. More recently Bullock et al. (2006) identified weaknesses in outcomes measurements in their review of 150 entries for the UK Tilley Awards. Where some form of evaluation had been conducted (before-and-after designs in two-thirds of the projects) they nevertheless noted a range of problems about the evaluation design including variable length of before-and-after periods (which were often too short) and non-equivalent before-and-after periods.

Lastly, Scott (2000) argued that assessment of costs was important as part of the evaluation of problem-oriented initiatives. He stated that few problem-oriented projects included any economic assessment of the problem. Indeed Bullock et al. (2006) found very little use of cost data in the evaluation of the 150 projects that they examined. Generally assessment of cost effectiveness of policing programmes and interventions is considered to be important but it is very rarely conducted (Roman and
Farrell, 2002). Whilst it is the case that economic assessment in the police service has become more important, it is in its infancy.

Summary

This chapter has set out the principles of problem-oriented policing. It has been argued that problem-oriented policing is widely considered to be a common sense way of conducting policing. However, the implementation of the processes of problem-oriented policing is very clearly problematic. Box 2.2 (below) summarises the main problems associated with the implementation of the principles of problem-oriented policing. The following chapter reviews the existing literature that seeks to explain the persistence of these problems in delivering problem-oriented policing.

Box 2.2: Summary of implementation problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element of problem-oriented policing</th>
<th>Implementation problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Identifying, analysing and understanding problems | • Often missed out altogether  
• Superficial or limited  
• Rarely look towards understanding why problems reoccur |
| Developing and implementing tailor made responses | • It is not clear that analysis is used to inform interventions  
• The focus is on providing descriptive statements rather than inferences  
• The use of broad categories has resulted in a lack of focus  
• Not clear that police officers are aware of alternatives to the criminal justice system  
• Focus on police type response  
• Failure to involve the community  
• Poor targeting |
| Evaluation of responses | • Not uncommon to be missed altogether |
- Rarely well done
- Something of an after thought
- Failure to measure processes, difficulties in attributing outcomes, failure to conduct cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analyses
Chapter three

Explaining the delivery of problem-oriented policing in the police service

Introduction

The preceding chapter provided a review of the evidence relating to the implementation of the key stages of problem-oriented policing. There are problems associated with all the main processes. This chapter examines the dominant explanations of the nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing and the observed implementation problems. For focus, it largely draws on evidence related specifically to the implementation of problem-oriented policing rather than on wider evidence related to implementing new programmes in the police service more generally. It looks at the role played by: leadership and management, enthusiastic advocates, organisational structures, performance management structures, analytical skills, data and analysis, training, project management skills and police culture in explaining patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing.

It goes on to describe weaknesses in existing accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing. In particular it questions the dominance of top-down approaches to analysing and understanding the implementation of problem-oriented policing and its emphasis on facilitating its delivery through attention to organisational and technical issues. It draws attention to the likely importance of behavioural and contextual (bottom-up) issues in examining implementation in the policing and crime reduction environment. In doing so it draws on wider theories that seek to explain the implementation of projects in the field of public policy. The chapter then reviews the rationale for and the aims and objectives of the study and sets out the link between the study’s theoretical orientation, aims and research design.
Factors shaping the delivery of problem-oriented policing

Leadership

Very many studies have argued that leadership plays an important role in the delivery of problem-oriented policing (Maguire and John 1995; De Paris, 1997; Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Cohen, 2001; Scott, 2006). In general terms it has been argued that committed, enthusiastic and involved leadership facilitates implementation of problem-oriented policing ‘...clearly support for the concept of problem-solving by senior officers will encourage it. More than that, though, problem-solving seemed to be commoner the more knowledgeable and directly involved the senior managers were in the work of their staff’ (Read and Tilley, 2000: 26).

Leadership is considered to be important in shaping the nature of implementation because it facilitates access to the resources that are required to implement problem-oriented projects and sends important messages to the organisation regarding how policing should be done. Goldstein (1990) for example argued that the role of chief officers is central and that change from a reactive towards a problem-oriented organisation depends a lot on ability to enlist the support of leadership. Scott (2006) similarly argued that because the delivery of problem-oriented policing challenges the prevailing reactive status quo the authority to implement the new style is required. The full engagement of senior police staff will also raise the capacity of the police service to invest in the rigorous research and analysis that is so important for problem-oriented responses (Goldstein, 2003; Scott, 2006).

Read and Tilley (2000) found that those forces where there was a clear commitment to problem-oriented policing at a senior level were more developed in terms of implementing problem-oriented policing. Bullock et al. (2006) also identified that strong leadership had been a key factor in facilitating the implementation of problem-oriented policing in Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies. In both police services the drive from the top of the organisation facilitated access to resources to implement interventions and sent powerful messages about how officers were supposed to be doing their jobs (Bullock et al., 2006)
On a slightly different note it has been argued that the implementation of problem-oriented policing has been characterised by the presence of committed and enthusiastic individuals (Kirby and Reed, 2004). This certainly resonates with Read and Tilley (2000) who argued that implementation of problem-oriented policing was facilitated by the presence of committed and enthusiastic leaders. Bullock et al. (2006) also noted that the presence of committed and enthusiastic staff has characterised the implementation of problem-oriented policing in Lancashire and this was seen by many officers to have facilitated its implementation over time. However, in the longer term this reliance on the enthusiasm of committed individuals in maintaining momentum for the delivery of problem-oriented policing might be problematic. Scott (2000) argued that it presents a longer-term risk for the future health of problem-oriented work when those committed staff move on. Kirby and Reed (2004) similarly argued if implementation continues to be associated with key individuals problem-oriented policing will never become a mainstream policing activity:

At present, the delivery of problem solving in the UK is best characterised as being based on isolated pockets of good practice generated by a small number of highly motivated individuals. If this remains the case then problem solving will never reach the organisational mainstream and, as a consequence, policing in the UK will face significantly more difficulties when tackling the wide range of current and future challenges. Further, failed attempts not only consume resources but sap motivation and affect the reputation of the forces who attempt this approach.

Kirby and Reed, 2004:2

Organisational structures

At a broad level, studies have pointed to how the organisational structure of a police service can influence how problem-oriented policing is implemented. As was seen in the preceding chapter, Goldstein (1990) argued that organisational issues in the police service are important only in so far as they relate to the goal of addressing community problems. However, it has been suggested that a dominant style of policing cannot be replaced by another without attention to the organisational processes that orient an agency and the actions of its staff (Brown and Sutton, 1997). It has been argued that
the hierarchical nature of the police service is structured largely to facilitate reactive policing and does not suit the implementation of problem-oriented policing. Very generally a number of authors have pointed to how the bureaucratic nature of the police service and particularly the formalised accounting systems that are associated with it are unsuited to facilitating change within the organisation (Wilkinson and Rosenbaum, 1994; Brown and Sutton, 1997; De Paris, 1997). Police organisational structures have typically been hierarchical, based on semi-military lines and organised to facilitate reactive, emergency-driven policing (Goldstein, 1990; Brown and Sutton, 1997). This hierarchy with centralised policy making and top-down, risk averse management structures have been considered to conflict with the more flexible kinds of structures which are required to facilitate the delivery of problem-oriented policing (Eck and Spelman, 1987; Leigh et al., 1996). For example, Leigh and colleagues concluded in 1996 that ‘...management structures of forces in England and Wales are not well adapted to the bottom-up approach that characterises problem-oriented policing’ (Leigh et al., 1996: 39).

Closely related to organisational structure, it has been argued that performance management structures influence the delivery of problem-oriented policing. It has then been suggested that there is a need for managers to reassess the traditional tasks and strategies of police officers if problem-oriented policing is to be implemented more effectively (Brown and Sutton, 1997). Fielding (1994) argued that performance measurement of individuals in the police service has been based on arrests in particular and this is inappropriate for measuring individual performance in problem-oriented policing.

Conventional policing performance management systems tend to be based on response times, arrests and detection rates but authors have suggested that these are not effective for holding officers to account for success in dealing with community based problems and for implementing problem-oriented policing:

Performance measurement systems based on response time, clearance rates, and numbers of arrests offer little aid in the evaluation of police efforts to address community needs and problems. Measurement systems based entirely on these indictors offer no way to hold police departments externally accountable for
addressing community concerns and for engaging in community problem-solving activities.
Braga, 2002: 120

Braga (2002) went on to argue that the police service needs to account for the quality of processes in dealing with problems and not just on outputs and outcomes:

In policing, there are may important reasons to pay attention to processes as well as to outcomes, Society as a whole has expectations about how the police will do their work, as well as what the results of the work will be. This is particularly true when discussing how the police use the authority of their officers: the powers to stop, to detain, to arrest and to use force to accomplish these goals
Braga, 2002: 119

Metcalf (2001) argued that good implementation of problem-oriented policing rests on having easy-to-understand and recognisable organisational values that are reflected in a commitment to performance. She suggested that this does not fit well with the police service which is top-down and directional in its management approach. Like others, Metcalf (2001) agreed that the police service is primarily concerned with the achievement of measurable objectives (such as numbers of arrests or detections) rather than in the processes of how policing is conducted, which she argued is key for implementing problem-oriented policing. Metcalf (2001) argued that whilst there has been an acknowledgement that policing styles would have to change to facilitate problem-oriented policing; this has not happened in practice. This might be because it is easier for police supervisors to measure outputs such as arrests rather than the flexibility and creativity called for in solving problems (Metcalf, 2001). Goldstein (1990) similarly argued that routinised jobs are easier to supervise than those that require flexibility and creativity. The unstructured nature of problem-oriented policing makes it difficult to manage and maintain (Metcalf, 2001). However in the absence of suitable performance measurement indicators, it is difficult to motivate officers to change the way that they conduct policing (Braga, 2002). Indeed, implementation of problem-oriented policing in the Metropolitan Police Service in the early 1980s appeared to have petered out because their management structure was out of step with the approach and adopting it would have involved taking more risks and abandoning
some of the traditional expectations of line management (Leigh et al. 1996, drawing on Hoare et al., 1984).

Some studies have also pointed to how the development of specialist 'structures' within police services plays a role in shaping implementation. Read and Tilley (2000) argued very generally that the development of structures (such as tasking and filing systems to co-ordinate problem-oriented responses) can facilitate the implementation of problem-oriented policing though they said very little about what these might look like. Additionally the provision of dedicated teams, which had the capacity to look in detail at problems and develop responses, facilitated implementation, although again not much detail was provided about these (Read and Tilley, 2000). Bullock et al., (2006) also noted the role played by specialist structures in their examination of implementation in Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies. In Hampshire, for example, a small dedicated central team was attempting to foster problem-oriented work through proving specialist advice and practical support for problem-oriented projects. This team and the day-to-day leadership and management and support that it provided was considered by officers to have played an important role in developing problem-oriented policing across the police service.

On a slightly different note, some studies have suggested that the availability of rewards more generally might facilitate implementation and some police services have attempted to encourage and develop problem-oriented policing through offering rewards. Leigh et al. (1998) noted an attempt to encourage the implementation of problem-oriented policing in Cleveland through a competition, the prize for which was a trip to an annual American problem-oriented policing conference. Read and Tilley (2000) also noted that in some of the police services that they visited problem-oriented work appeared to be incentivised through commendations for particularly good work. Similarly Bullock et al. (2006) found that a strong internal award scheme was seen by officers to provide an incentive to conduct problem-oriented work in Lancashire Constabulary and that winning the UK Tilley Award was a considerable source of pride amongst officers. In contrast, they found that in Hampshire, senior police officers accepted that performance in problem-oriented policing needed to be rewarded to encourage officers but acknowledged that presently this is not occurring systematically. That said, a very successful problem-oriented project (which had won
the American equivalent of the Tilley Award) evidently had a wide impact throughout the Constabulary and had been influential in making officers think differently about the role of analysis and about what can be achieved through the implementation of a problem-oriented policing approach (Bullock et al., 2006).

**Analytical skills, analysts and data**

Given the key role of analysis in implementing problem-oriented responses, the analytic capacity of police services has been shown to be important in shaping the nature of implementation. Studies have suggested that there are limitations in the analytic capacity of the police service and in the availability of suitable data which has had an impact on what has been achieved and these help to explain some of the problems identified in the previous chapter.

Limitations in the analysis stages of problem-oriented policing are often attributed to the general analytic capacity of the police service. Studies have pointed to a shortage of analysts which has inevitably limited the police service’s capacity (Goldstein, 1990; HMIC, 2000; Read and Tilley, 2000; Irving and Dixon, 2002). Read and Tilley (2000), for example, argued that low salaries combined with poorly developed career prospects for analysts, results in high turnover of staff. It has been noted that analytic skills of this kind are in demand and people with these skills can find better paid jobs within the private sector. Others have pointed generally to the need for a career structure to develop the analyst role within the police service and to encourage people into the profession (HMIC, 2000; Irving and Dixon, 2002).

In addition to general shortages of analysts, studies have pointed to how analysts can be misused within the police service and this limits the role that they can play in delivering problem-oriented policing. Read and Tilley (2000) argued that the role of crime analysts within police services was not usually to inform the development of problem-oriented responses and it was likely to be confined to producing routine management data displaying performance in crime trends. In their review of the implementation of problem-oriented policing in Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies, Bullock et al. (2006) found that although crime analysts were employed in both Constabularies, in practice they were largely at the disposal of
senior officers and were mostly used for performance management monitoring and for servicing the requirements of the National Intelligence Model.

As well as limitations in the overall analytic capacity to understand problems, studies have pointed to issues related to the availability and quality of data which has had an impact on the quality of problem-oriented work. This limits what can realistically be achieved. Scott (2000), for example, argued that good analytic systems were often lacking within the police service and that understanding of data within the police service was generally poor. Indeed police databases are often not designed with analysis in mind and this limits sophisticated analytical work (Irving and Dixon, 2002). Irving and Dixon (2002) argued that standard police datasets are incomplete and inaccurate and this limits what can be achieved with them. Braga (2002) similarly argued that official crime data have shortcomings. Arrest and investigations data are subject to underreporting and an enforcement bias and calls for service data (whilst not so affected by police discretion) are influenced by underreporting (Braga, 2002).

Bullock et al. (2002) described a range of problems associated with the utilisation of other police databases for problem-oriented policing. First, there are problems with routine record keeping which include: data not being collected or recorded at all; being kept only in an aggregated form; or, being kept as paper records. Second, data are sometimes wrongly entered into data bases by police officers and other staff. Fields may be left blank for example, or entered incorrectly or entered into the wrong fields. Third, data can be entered in a way that makes them difficult to work with. For example, sometimes more than one variable is entered in the same column on a spreadsheet and this makes manipulation of the data hard. Fourth, changes in recording practices (for example Home Office ethical recording standards which were introduced in April 2002, see Home Office, 2000) have also caused difficulties for comparing crime trends over time. Lastly, the police service uses an array of systems, which may not be compatible with standard software such as Excel or SPSS, which creates problems in extracting data from systems.

Studies have shown that there have been difficulties in sharing information between agencies which help to explain the observed reliance on police data in the analysis stages of problem-oriented policing. A persistent practical issue hindering exchange
of data has been the interpretation of data protection legislation by practitioners (Bullock et al., 2002; Irving and Dixon, 2002). Drawing on a 2001 study, Irving and Dixon (2002) argued that, the provisions of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act notwithstanding, data sharing within the community safety arena is in its infancy. Bullock et al. (2002) summarised other standard practical data sharing difficulties. There have been practical difficulties exchanging data between different computer systems because crime and incidents are not coded to a specific point or are geo-coded to different boundaries. For example police data are usually organised around beats and basic command unit areas whilst local authority data are often organised by electoral wards. Also, they pointed to a failure to collect and/or record information and a failure to code and/or enter information in standard ways.

Teaching the principles and developing skills
Studies have pointed to the importance of training for officers who may find it hard to translate the concepts of problem-oriented policing into everyday practice. Goldstein (1990) argued that a commitment to problem-oriented policing should pervade all training and that there should also be an attempt to hire people with the relevant skills and abilities to match those associated with problem-oriented policing, using affirmative action if necessary. There is some evidence to suggest that training can improve an officer’s ability to conduct problem-oriented policing. The District Audit Northern Region (1999), for example, showed that the divisions in Lancashire Constabulary where most progress had been made in implementing problem-oriented policing were those with active training for officers (Norris, 1999). Read and Tilley (2000) also argued that in the police service areas where problem-oriented policing was most developed, officers were trained in the principles.

However, the availability for training in problem-oriented policing appears to be variable and a lack of training may be a barrier to the implementation of problem-oriented policing. Read and Tilley (2000) found that across the UK the provision of training was very variable with some police service areas offering training in problem-oriented policing for all officers and some offering none at all. With this variation in availability of training it is perhaps not surprising that evidence suggests that officers struggle to understand the principles of problem-oriented policing within the police service which inevitably influence what is delivered in practice.
Dissemination of knowledge

In the previous chapter it was suggested that the development of problem-oriented responses may be hampered by an officer's lack of knowledge about how to deal with crime problems more widely. Studies have shown that officers preferred to rely on their own knowledge and that of their colleagues and on conventional policing methods rather than look more widely for solutions to problems. It has been argued that this tendency to rely on traditional police responses occurs, at least partly, because police officers do not have the capacity and experience to develop and implement other kinds of responses. For example, Brown and Sutton (1997) argued that officers found it hard to see law enforcement as just one of a potential range of responses to problems. Eck (2003) similarly argued that, whilst not necessarily ineffective, conventional law enforcement responses to problems (such as arrests and prosecution) are probably overused because police officers are unclear about what the alternatives are.

Many authors have pointed generally to the importance of a collective body of knowledge on how to tackle crime problems as a means of facilitating the delivery of problem-oriented responses (Hoare et al., 1984; Scott, 2000; Irving and Dixon, 2002; Eck, 2003; Goldstein 2003; Townsley et al., 2003). Goldstein (1990) argued that police officers do not have access to a body of evidence about the behaviours and problems that they are expected to deal with and that in these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the police often do not know what to do when dealing with problems. Scott (2000) similarly noted that there is not an organised body of knowledge about how to deal with the problems to which the police are called. This, he suggests, is partly because there is not enough evidence about effective ways of dealing with specific problems:

While there is more relevant research on some community problems than many police officers realize, it is far less than one might expect given how common many problems are and how many public resources are spent trying to address them. There simply isn't enough quality research conducted to reliably inform the police about what does and does not work with respect to most crime and disorder problems. Outside of a few specialized areas that have received substantial research interest, the
body of applied research on crime and disorder problems is not large. Again, compared to the body of literature in most other professions, the amount of published research about common community problems seems miniscule.

Scott, 2000: 64

Local co-ordination and project management skills
Co-ordination and project management skills at the local level have been identified as playing a role in how problem-oriented projects are delivered (Hope and Murphy, 1983; Sutton, 1996; Braga, 2002; Brown, 2006). General issues related to the availability of suitable staff for problem-oriented work have been highlighted. These include difficulties in recruiting and retaining project managers and other staff to implement project interventions once they have been developed (Brown, 2006). Brown (2006) argued that project management is an essential element in the implementation of problem-oriented projects but there have been problems which include shortages of project management skills, difficulties in recruiting suitable individuals (which are often related to unattractive short-term contracts) and the time that it can take to recruit in the public services. Bullock et al. (2002) similarly argued that a high level of turnover of personnel in problem-oriented projects was common. They argued that this reduces enthusiasm and momentum for projects, promotes a lack of ownership and, on a practical note, creates delays as time is spent trying to recruit new staff. Delays and time-consuming obstacles are common problems in the delivery of project interventions and have included technical difficulties and problems installing equipment (Hope and Murphy, 1983). Braga (2002) noted that many responses (such as demolishing buildings and changing the use of public space) are time-consuming because of the time that it can take to identify and contact property owners and plan the specifics of such works. Technical issues stem from the time that it can take to procure and install equipment and the rules and regulations associated with purchasing it (Braga, 2002; Bullock et al., 2002; Brown, 2006).

Engaging partners
Studies suggest that there have been difficulties engaging partner agencies in problem-oriented work and this inevitably impacts on the range of project interventions which could realistically be delivered. Accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing have pointed to problematic relationships between
partners. Braga (2002) argued that the development of partnerships with other agencies was one of the least discussed and least well implemented elements of problem-oriented policing. He argued that whilst the development of partnerships to tackle problems was essential they can be difficult to setup and maintain in practice (Braga, 2002). Townsley et al. (2003) stated that effective partnership work in a problem-oriented context is rare. They suggested that this might be because the motivation for working in partnership becomes strained when partner agencies are unable or unwilling to match the speed at which the police service is able to respond to problems. Matassa and Newburn (2003) noted problematic relationships between partners in their study of the implementation of problem-oriented hate crime reduction projects in London. They suggested that these were caused by differences in working practices and cultures, differing interpretations of the purpose of the initiatives and differing levels of commitment to the implementation of the projects, but they did not elaborate on the nature of these. Similarly, Scott (2006) noted that problem-oriented work conducted in partnership is rare and like Matassa and Newburn (2003) suggested that this might be related to the different procedural and cultural parameters within which practitioners work. He went on to state that the tendency of agencies to engage with problem-oriented work might be dependent on how closely their aims and objectives align with those of the police service (Scott, 2000). The issue of interagency working in the crime reduction arena more generally is returned to in chapters seven and eight.

**Police organisational culture**

A number of studies have pointed to the role played by police ‘culture’ in explaining the nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing. In this context, this refers to the influence of the dominant reactive police organisational culture and the inherent difficulties of changing this to a proactive problem-oriented one. It has already been argued that the police task has come to be seen as that of providing rapid responses to incidents as they arise. A number of studies have indeed pointed out the potential this has for influencing the nature of the implementation of problem-oriented policing (Bennett and Kemp, 1994; Leigh et al. 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Goldstein, 2003; Townsley et al., 2003; Bullock et al., 2006). Bennett and Kemp (1994) noted very generally that a change in the dominant police culture was required for implementing problem-oriented policing but that this is time-consuming and needs constant
reinforcement from senior managers. Leigh et al. (1998) found a tendency for police officers to revert to reactive policing styles where they were not pushed by managers to do otherwise. They argued that police management had to give constant and consistent messages about the need to change towards a problem-oriented organisation and what that change will mean in practice. Townsley et al. (2003) similarly noted that police officers tend to be primarily driven to responding reactively to emergencies. They suggested that the broader problem-oriented ways of thinking advocated by policy makers and academics may appear unattractive to officers who may feel that adopting such an approach might result in them becoming less operationally competent. In their study of problem-oriented policing in Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies, Bullock et al. (2006) also argued that aspects of the dominant reactive police culture obstructed some efforts to implement problem-oriented policing. They concluded that despite the efforts to affect change in Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies, the pressure was still for providing immediate responses to incidents as they occur; that police officers found it very difficult to move away from the traditional police interest in perpetrators of crime rather than thinking about different ways of solving problems; and, that because of their preference for practical action, problem-oriented policing was resisted by some as being bureaucratic, academic, and about filling in forms.

**Summary**

Those factors that have been mooted as explaining the implementation of problem-oriented policing are summarised in Box 3.1 below:

**Box 3.1: Summary of factors in the implementation of problem-oriented policing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and management skills</td>
<td>• Have not always enlisted key personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of clearly stated commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resources not used to build capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inflexible management styles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nature of the police organisation</td>
<td>• The police service is resistant to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There is not sufficient clarity about the role and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Organisational structures            | - Structures can be inflexible  
- Highly hierarchical organisation  
- Resistant to risk taking         |
| Analysis                             | - Weaknesses in analytic skills  
- Access to data  
- Practical constraints to sharing data  
- Making use of data                |
| Performance management and incentives| - Success in problem-oriented policing is not rewarded  
- Management structures typically based on arrests  
- Over focus on the outputs of policing rather than on the processes |
| Training the principles and developing the skills | - Insufficient training of principles  
- Lack of understanding of the concepts, purpose and how they contribute |
| Local project management skills      | - Difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff locally  
- Time-consuming delays caused by, for example, the time it takes to procure equipment |
| Dissemination of knowledge           | - No collective body of information about how to resolve specific problems |
| Police organisational culture        | - The time and effort that it takes to change the dominant reactive police culture  
- Focus on offenders rather than other ways of tackling problems  
- Aversion to form filling          |
Weaknesses in existing accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing

Studies have, then, pointed to a range of factors that explain the implementation difficulties identified in chapter two. The following sections of this chapter provide a detailed discussion of the weaknesses in the existing explanations of the implementation of problem-oriented policing which can be summarised as follows.

- Key accounts have not been based on data collected for the purpose in hand and sometimes on participant commentaries from key individuals who have the benefit of hindsight.
- Existing studies are framed in a primarily top-down approach to project implementation.
- There is an over-emphasis on explaining the implementation of problem-oriented policing in terms of organisational and technological issues.
- Accounts are focused on providing guidance for improving implementation rather than on understanding implementation.
- The impact of patterns of practitioner behaviour and contextual issues are neglected.
- Explanations have not been framed in existing theories that seek to orient the analysis and understanding of implementation from the wider field of public policy.

Methodological weaknesses

Existing studies explaining the implementation of problem-oriented policing have inherent methodological weaknesses.

In some cases the accounts are not based on systematic data collected in order to understand patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing. *Not Rocket Science?* (Read and Tilley, 2000) was based on data collected as part of a thematic inspection of the implementation of problem-solving in England and Wales (Beating Crime, 2000). It was aimed primarily at checking that the police service were implementing problem-solving as it was intended as part of the government’s performance management framework. The same applies to Scott’s 2000 review of the
implementation of problem-oriented policing in the US, which was based primarily on a review of existing accounts and on discussions with experienced practitioners and academics rather than on systematic analysis of implementation of the processes as understood by those who implemented them.

Related to the above, accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing have tended to focus on providing guidance for how to improve implementation rather than to provide explanations of implementation. Generally, studies have described observed weaknesses in problem-oriented policing, implementation problems and provided guidance (including checklists) which police managers or policy makers could use to improve implementation. This includes both the Read and Tilley (2000) and Scott (2000) reviews. These key accounts, then, have focused primarily on providing guidance about how to improve the implementation of problem-oriented policing rather than to produce specific understanding of how the concepts are implemented. As was pointed out in the introduction, there is nothing inherently wrong with explanations that provide practical responses to the problems of implementation. In the context in which the Read and Tilley and Scott reports were produced (by the UK Home Office and US Department of Justice respectively) which was to help improve the delivery of problem-oriented policing, it is not surprising that they focus on these issues. However, the result of this is that there remains a gap in the literature and a need to understand better the patterns of implementation rather than to examine the extent to which implementation mirrors Goldstein's ideal, and to propose solutions to observed implementation problems.

**Focus on top-down approaches to implementation**

Whilst perhaps not explicitly so, accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing are strongly framed in top-down conceptions of project implementation. As has been seen, many recent studies of the implementation of problem-oriented policing examine the difference between the ideal described by Goldstein in 1979 and 1990 and what is actually found when the principles are implemented in an operational setting. Studies tend to identify a gulf between Goldstein's ideal and what is going on in practice in the name of problem-orientation and chapter two sets out in detail the nature of the problems that are observed. The preceding sections of this chapter show that existing studies have overwhelmingly sought to explain this gulf in
terms of the organisational (for example, structures, performance management, leadership, training and project management) and technical (especially availability of data and analytic capacity) aspects that facilitate or hinder its implementation at an operational level. Examples of the top-down focus of accounts are discussed in the following sections.

Read and Tilley (2000) examined the extent of problem-oriented policing in the UK and identified weaknesses in its implementation. It concluded that there were only two police services systematically implementing problem-oriented policing at the time of the study. It goes on to describe those factors that the authors considered facilitated implementation and provides general ‘lessons’ for the delivery of problem-oriented work. These exclusively focus on the staffing, training, software, structures and rewards that would improve implementation. As has been seen the report also provides checklists against which implementation could be monitored.

Scott (2000) similarly focuses almost exclusively on how the police service (and other agencies) should react to the challenges of implementation that it identifies rather than on examining and understanding the patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing. In particular, Scott (2000) focuses on how problem-oriented principles should be taught within the police service, the ways that analysis improved and new knowledge about effective ways of dealing with crime problems transferred.

Braga (2002) dedicated a chapter of his book (*Problem-oriented Policing and Crime Prevention*) to how the delivery of problem-oriented policing could be facilitated. He suggested three main areas where attention should be focused to improve implementation: raising the capacity of the police service to conduct crime analysis; the measurement of performance; and, the engagement of partners. Braga’s views on how performance in problem-oriented policing should be measured have already been noted in this chapter. In terms of engaging partners, he suggested that this could be facilitated through developing and distributing guides which set out what each agency does and how these services could be accessed. Braga (2002) also noted that there are other internal and external administrative arrangements required to facilitate the implementation of problem-oriented policing (including redefining the role of line-
level police officers, the importance of leadership, improving line-level management of officers and decentralising authority in the police service).

A more recent edited collection examining the implementation of problem-oriented policing and situational crime prevention (*Putting Theory to Work: Implementing Situational Prevention and Problem-oriented Policing*) edited by Knutsson and Clarke (2006) focuses (almost) exclusively on the organisational and technical factors that explain implementation. Two chapters examine the implementation of problem-oriented projects. In his chapter, *Implementing crime prevention: lessons learnt from problem-oriented policing projects*, Scott reviews the literature that examines those factors that help to explain whether or not problem-oriented projects get implemented. Again, these are framed almost exclusively in organisational and technical terms. Scott’s chapter especially highlights the importance of the characteristics, skills and actions of project managers and highlights the role of leadership, support of key senior individuals, continuity of staffing, ownership, communication of objectives and the professional capacity of key individuals. The availability and flexibility of resources for the delivery of problem-oriented responses was also stressed.

In the same volume Brown discusses implementation failure in problem-oriented projects almost solely in relation to project management. Whilst Brown acknowledges that other factors are at play in shaping the implementation of projects (although he does not state what they are) he stresses the importance of the qualities and capacity of staff, the senior support for projects and access to resources and project management. Brown argues that good project management is essential for implementing projects but that there are weaknesses in this area which include shortages of skilled staff and problems recruiting and retaining skilled project managers. He goes on to make specific recommendations about how project management could be improved to minimise implementation failure.

Many recent studies have focused primarily on identifying the difference between what Goldstein envisaged and what was delivered in practice and examining the organisational and technical reasons why problem-oriented projects often fall short of Goldstein’s ideal. Throughout these texts, then, the implication has been that through providing the appropriate organisational structures (such as leadership, structures and
project management) and through addressing capacity and technical issues the delivery of problem-oriented projects will be improved.

It is, however, contended that these organisational and technical explanations are unlikely to fully explain observed patterns of implementation. Although they have not been well-developed in the context of explaining the delivery of problem-oriented projects it has already been seen that the dominant reactive police culture and the problematic nature of partnership working have resulted in some of the difficulties that have been encountered.

More widely, studies have pointed to a number of characteristics of the police service, police officers and the crime reduction context that appear to have an impact on efforts to affect change. For example, studies have suggested that the police service is highly resistant to change and this has impeded efforts generally to implement new programmes and practices within the service (Hanmer, 2003). Related, police officers have a high level of discretion to make decisions about their day-to-day activities because in practice they operate away from the immediate gaze of their management. It has been argued that there has been an assumption that because of the hierarchical nature of the police service, change can be imposed from the top of the organisation through the tightening of rules and regulations but that this assumption is questionable because of this discretion (Chan, 1997). Perhaps most importantly in the context of this study, partnership working in the criminal justice arena has not been without problems and there is currently some sense that the difficulties of doing so have been underplayed (Hough, 2006). Engaging agencies in partnership working has not been straightforward. It has been harder to engage some agencies in partnership working with the police service than it has others. In particular it has been noted that the probation service has been hard to engage (HMIC, 2000) as has the health service (Irving et al., 2001; Philips et al., 2002). Studies have pointed to practical problems which have impacted on what partnerships can achieve when they get together. Byrne and Pease (2003), for example, pointed to a high ratio of talk to action and lengthy delays in implementing decisions in a partnership setting. Gilling (2005) (drawing on Phillips et al., 2002) summarised practical problems as being related to data sharing, technical capacity, expertise in crime auditing and consultation and setting targets. However, explanations for the difficulties associated with partnership working have
also been shown to relate to wider ideological and cultural factors. Partnerships draw together agencies with different cultures, ideologies and traditions as well as different working routines and as such conflicts exist between these organisations when they work together (Crawford, 1998). These issues are discussed in greater detail in chapters seven and eight.

There would then seem to be reasons to infer that approaching the analysis of implementation primarily in terms of top-down features is limited because it does not do enough to account for the potential for practitioner behaviour and the wider features of the police organisation and wider crime reduction context to affect patterns of implementation. Indeed, in the field of public policy there has been a wider debate about how the analysis of implementation of programmes and projects should be approached. As was seen in the introduction, this has fallen primarily into two camps (top-down and bottom-up) which conceive implementation rather differently. This debate has challenged the legitimacy of a top-down approach to understanding the execution of projects and programmes.

The following sections of this chapter examine the wider literature from the field of public policy that has shaped approaches to the analysis of implementation of projects. It discusses the top-down approach in detail and the bottom-up challenge to its claim to be able to explain the implementation of programmes and projects. It then examines those proposals that advocate drawing elements of top-down and bottom-up approaches together to understand implementation. It finishes by setting out how these top-down and bottom-up approaches to conceiving implementation will be used to frame this study.

Understanding project implementation

In the field of public policy there has been a long debate concerning how implementation of programmes and projects should be approached and understood. These debates started in the early 1970s following the publication of Pressman and Wildavsky’s influential study, *Implementation*, published in 1973, and continued into the 1980s when they started to peter out (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Peck and Perri 6, 2006).
As was discussed in the introduction to this study the debate about implementation has been characterised by two broad approaches ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. Bottom-up and top-down approaches have differing descriptive and normative characters. They seek to describe implementation in rather different ways and consequently the implications for explaining the delivery of projects are different, as are the implications for how projects should be implemented. These approaches are discussed in the following sections.

**Top-down approaches to understanding implementation**

Top-down approaches to understanding programme implementation are concerned primarily with what the policy makers or managers are trying to achieve and examining the difference between what managers intended and what was realised in practice (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Barrett and Fudge, 1981).

> How would you know if a programme had been implemented well or poorly? – by observing the difference between intended and actual consequences and this can be used to alter programmes and/or their modes on the basis of this.
> Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xv

The top-down approach starts by identifying a policy objective; it looks at the extent to which the actions of practitioners were consistent with that objective, the main factors that shaped the patterns of implementation and how policy is reformed on the basis of those factors (Sabatier, 1986).

Despite their primary interest in examining implementation from the point of view of the policy maker or manager, top-down approaches are not naïve about the potential for programmes to deviate from their planned paths as they are delivered on the ground ‘...programmes are altered by their environments and organisations are affected by their programmes, mutual adaptation changes both the context and the content of what is implemented’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:xv). Indeed in their study of programme implementation Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) pointed to the wide range of participants involved, the numbers of decisions that needed to be made...
and the consequent negotiation with a wide range of participants, which, they argued, made ultimate successful implementation very difficult and time-consuming:

What is apparently simple and straightforward is really complex and convoluted. We did not appreciate the numbers of steps involved, the numbers of participants whose preferences have to be taken into account, the number of separate decisions that are part of what we think of as a single one. Least of all we appreciate the geometric growth over time where each negotiation involves a number of participants with decisions to make, whose implications ramify over time.

Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973

However, top-down approaches consider that the impact of this can be minimised through setting management controls to limit the extent of deviation and to control the environment so ‘...the worst aspects can be alleviated’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xviii).

Particularly important for top-down approaches has been the development of project theory based on clear, well understood sequences of cause and effect and setting clear project objectives. Top-downers have argued that project or programme interventions should be based on clear and well understood theories of cause and effect because new projects might just be bad ideas (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). In addition to this, the sequences of cause and effect should be as short and as direct as possible because long sequences of cause and effect are considered to be more likely to break down over time and so interventions less likely to be successful (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Setting clear objectives is important to facilitate the development of project guidance. Top-down analysts have argued that in practice project objectives might be vague, ambitious and conflictual but that this is problematic because where objectives are not discretely laid out then neither is the means of achieving them:

In most policies of interest, objectives are characteristically multiple (because we want many things not just one), conflicting (because we want different things) and vague (because that is how we can agree to move on without having to agree on what exactly to do). So if the objectives are not uniquely determined, neither are the modes of implementation for them.

Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 168
In addition to setting clear objectives and having a project theory based on clear cause and effect mechanisms, the establishment of systems of accountability through which the activities and outputs of practitioners can be monitored are considered to be important for minimising deviation from project plans (Parsons, 1999; Berman, 1978). The assumption is that the project theory, objectives and guidance should be clearly set out and top-down systems of communications, practitioner management and systems of accountability set up to in order to minimise deviation and avoid implementation problems, and the moral is that policy makers should not promise change if the conditions for implementing new programmes are not right (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).

The focus on setting out the conditions under which project deviation and implementation problems could be minimised has led authors to develop models that describe the ideal implementation conditions against which those responsible for implementation could make decisions about how projects and programmes might be implemented in practice (for example, Hood, 1976; Mountjoy and O'Toole, 1979; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Again, it is important to stress that these authors are not suggesting that ideal conditions are necessarily present or necessarily can be, only that they need to be for comparative purposes. Indeed, in order to avoid charges of naivety in respect to whether these conditions could be achieved in practice, they tend to be framed in terms of arguments about the unattainability of such perfect implementation in complex situations (Hupe and Hill, 2002).

In his book, *The Limits to Administration*, Hood (1976) set out such conditions for perfect administration as follows.

1. The administrative system has to be unitary with a single line of authority.
2. Norms and rules enforcement are uniform – objectives are clearly given and are actionable by officials.
3. There is perfect obedience or administrative control.
4. There is perfect communication and co-ordination between administrative units.
5. There are no time pressures.
Mountjoy and O'Toole (1979) argued that there are two key elements for successful implementation of policy: the provision of resources and adequate instruction. They considered that since breaking established routines is expensive, agencies should be given proper resources and instruction to facilitate implementation. They stated four regimes in which policies could be implemented and the consequences for implementation.

1. New resources with vague instructions: practitioners will interpret policy in ways which may not be the same as the policy makers.
2. New resources with specific instructions: the goals of individuals within organisations are less important and implementation relatively straightforward.
3. No resources and vague instructions: would result in voluntary activity which could not be anticipated.
4. No resources and specific instructions: practitioners would prioritise according to their own judgements.

For Mountjoy and O'Toole (1979), then, implementation problems are largely concerned with the extent to which policy makers can exercise control. This is especially in relation to control of the environment in which policies are made, control of the practitioners and the extent to which they adapt policies in the process of implementation.

This was developed into more detailed assumptions of perfect implementation by Hogwood and Gunn (1984) as below.

1. That circumstances external to implementing agencies do not impose crippling constraints: these are factors that the implementers cannot control (could be either physical or political). Generally however, it is thought that little that can be done about this.
2. That adequate time and resources are available: time constraints can be related to external constraints and the common problem of managers expecting too much too soon.
3. That the required combination of resources is available: it is not just the case that resources are required. They are required at the right stages of programme implementation. Resources do not simply refer to the availability of money but also to the availability of capable staff and capacity generally, e.g. equipment.
4. The programme must be based on a valid theory of cause and effect: the new programme might just be a bad idea and/or based on inadequate understanding of a problem.

5. That the relationship between cause and effect is direct and there are few if any intervening links: policies based on long sequences of cause and effect are more likely to break down.

6. That dependency links are minimal: where implementation is reliant on single agencies, success is more likely. Where implementation requires agreement at different stages it is less likely to be implemented.

7. That there is understanding and agreement of objectives: there needs to be agreement at all stages and just because something was initially agreed does not mean that it will always be agreed. Objectives need to be clearly understood and communicated.

8. That tasks are fully specified in the correct order: there needs to be detail of who is doing what and when and there is a managerial task to ensure that it is all followed through.

9. That there is perfect co-ordination and communication: there needs to be good communication amongst the elements responsible for implementation and this is unlikely to be sustainable.

10. That those in authority have perfect compliance: this is unlikely to be achieved as there may be conflicts of interest and disputes, there may be a lack of formal powers to demand compliance and where management of change is involved it becomes even harder.

**Bottom-up critique**

Rather than focusing on what policy makers were trying to achieve, bottom-up approaches have focused on the importance of individuals and groups of individuals interacting in analysing and understanding programme implementation and as such they offer a different descriptive and normative approach to analysing and understanding implementation of programmes.

In his study, *Street-level Bureaucrats*, published in 1980, Lipsky argued that practitioners have high levels of discretion which, for a variety of reasons, is difficult to control. This discretion allows street-level bureaucrats to develop routines through...
which they deal with the complexity of their day-to-day tasks and make choices about action and inaction. This discretion and these routines both facilitate their work but also help to explain why the outcomes of programmes and policies sometimes diverge from what was intended by managers and policy makers. Lipsky argued that lower-level workers often do not share the perceptions and preferences of their managers and so they cannot be assumed to be working towards common goals. Practitioners may not consider orders from above to be legitimate and the means that managers have of making practitioners comply may not be sufficient to ensure that they do so.

This deviation is possible because of the discretion that practitioners have to cope with the complexity that they face in their day-to-day tasks. The discretion of practitioners is difficult to control because they have some resources to resist directives from managers. These resources include the difficulties of sacking staff in the public sector, but also include the practitioner's wealth of expertise and information which makes organisations dependent on them. In addition, for Lipsky, the relationship between practitioners and their managers is difficult because they may have conflicting goals. Practitioners aim to process clients and maximise their day-to-day autonomy to do so, and managers tend to honour workers' day-to-day preferences if they (the managers) are rewarded in work performance. This is unlike a top-down conception of the relationship between managers and practitioners '...compliance with agency objectives may still be the managerial problem but it is complicated by the ability of street-level bureaucrats to resist organisational pressures with their own resources (Lipsky, 1980: 25).

More, Lipsky argued that the individual action of practitioners does, in effect, constitute policy '...the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out' (Lipsky 1980: xii). For Lipsky then, policy is not made at the top of the organisation, it is made at the bottom and this is where analytical effort should be concentrated. The implication is that tightening mechanisms of controlling practitioners will not impact on implementation and that other ways would have to be found to meet the expectations of local people and politicians. Lipsky was, in fact, not very optimistic about the chances of reforming institutions although he does offer some suggestions including encouraging greater
client autonomy and helping street-level bureaucrats become better proponents of change, through, for example, greater professionalisation and self-regulation.

Hjem and Porter (1981) also adopted a bottom-up approach to analysing programme implementation. They were particularly interested in the interaction between different agencies in understanding programme implementation. They framed their analysis in terms of implementation structures which are formed within pools of organisations and through processes of self-selection. Like others, Hjem and Porter noted the wide range of individuals involved in the implementation of programmes and looked for a way to analyse the many individuals and organisations who participate in programme implementation. ‘Implementation structures’ found within ‘pools of organisations’ are their key unit of analysis. Implementation structures comprise subsets of members of organisations through which purposeful actions to implement programmes are taken. These individuals are likely to be self-selected and the programmes and projects themselves are informed by the initiative of those individuals who have selected them. These individuals adjust parts of the programmes in which they participate to meet organisational needs. Hjem and Porter, like Lipsky, argued that professional discretion is required in order that practitioners can manage the complex and diverse situations that practitioners have to deal with and because of that it is difficult to set up rules to direct practitioners towards specific forms of behaviour. In terms of analysing implementation, they make the case for a phenomenological approach. Again, like Lipsky they suggest analysis of implementation should start with the line-level practitioner and concern should be with understanding the motives of those who participate in projects, their understanding of the programme or projects and their behaviour.

Barrett and Fudge (1981) also argued that the view that policy is made at the top of an organisation and is translated into practitioner action via a series of rules and procedures that guide practitioner behaviour on the ground is misleading. This, they argued, downplays the role played by power relationships, conflicting interests and values in shaping the nature of implementation. In addition, they suggest that it cannot be assumed that there is a compliant relationship between those at the top of an organisation and those at the bottom. They argued that organisations and practitioners are very often autonomous or semi-autonomous and, like Lipsky, they argued that
practitioners may pursue their own interests and priorities rather than those set at the
top of an organisation. This problem of the management control of practitioners exists
even in unitary hierarchical organisations but where multiple organisations are
involved the implications are multiplied. For Barrett and Fudge (1981)
implementation of projects and programmes should be conceived in terms of:
ideological commitment that practitioners have to certain ways of working; the
organisation context in which practitioners have to certain ways of working; the
organisation context in which practitioners deliver interventions; and, in power
relations between agencies:

From this perspective, implementation (or action) may be regarded as a series of
responses: to ideological commitment, to environmental pressures, or to pressures
from other agencies (groups) seeking to influence or control action.
Barrett and Fudge, 1981:13

They saw implementation as a process of establishing a consensus through
negotiation. This consensus will be shaped by the extent to which different actors and
agencies share value systems and objectives to support particular policies or
programmes. Policy cannot be considered to be fixed but negotiated over time:

Policy cannot be defined as fixed but as a series of interactions around which
bargaining takes place and which may be modified as each set of actors attempts to
negotiate to maximise its own interests and priorities.
Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 24

Barrett and Fudge also rejected the assumption that practitioner compliance and
control are administrative and managerial issues. Lack of control is also a deliberate
reaction to authority. Like Lipsky, Barrett and Fudge argued that it can be assumed
that practitioners will try and avoid interference with their freedom and autonomy.
Implementation of new policies or programmes requires negotiation, compromise and
bargaining with those who are responsible for enacting them.

The implications for Barrett and Fudge (1981) are that it is important to observe what
is happening in practice and why when understanding implementation. This focuses
attention on the behaviour of practitioners in explaining implementation and forces an
examination of the way that individual action can play a role in shaping implementation.

Comparing top-down and bottom-up approaches
Bottom-up approaches differ from top-down approaches in terms of their descriptive and normative assumptions (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Peck and Perri 6, 2006). First, they question the top-down perspective on the location of policy making and in particular whether analysis of programme and project implementation should begin with what the policy maker was trying to achieve. They question the top-down assertion that the study of implementation should focus on the difference between what a manager was trying to achieve and what was realised in practice. Instead, the role that the interaction of practitioners plays in determining implementation is emphasised and therefore the case for starting analysis of implementation at that level is made. As a consequence, bottom-up approaches have tended to start by identifying the individuals and groups involved in implementation and have asked about goals, strategies, activities and contacts and as such they provide a mechanism for moving from the bottom to the top in understanding programme implementation (Sabatier, 1986).

Second, top-down and bottom-up approaches differ normatively in their views of how implementation ought to be conducted. In particularly, the top-down argument that aspects of the technological and organisational environment can be manipulated to improve the implementation of programmes and projects has been questioned. Bottom-up accounts tend to be pessimistic about the possibility of changing practitioner behaviour and authors vary in their views about how this might be achieved (Peck and Perri 6, 2006). For example, Hjern and Porter (1981) pointed to the wide variety of consumer and producer groups involved in implementing programmes and suggested that they should have significant and perhaps equal influence on the nature of implementation as, say, an elected representative. Lipsky (1981) on the other hand, framed the question differently, his main concern being how best to run services and initiatives whether or not they are reminiscent of the original ideas of the policy maker.
Box 3.2 below summarises and compares top-down and bottom-up approaches to understanding implementation.

**Box 3.2 Comparison of top-down and bottom-up approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Top-down</strong></th>
<th><strong>Bottom-up</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Starting point for analysis of</td>
<td>The aims of policy makers/managers</td>
<td>Implementation structures and interaction of practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of main players in</td>
<td>Start at the top</td>
<td>Start at the bottom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective setting</td>
<td>Objectives are set at the top and followed by practitioners</td>
<td>Question policy makers ability to set clear goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of policy making</td>
<td>Policy makers determine policy and delivery</td>
<td>Policy making is dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of implementation</td>
<td>Through the provision of adequate resources, setting clear objectives and exercising controls practitioners will implement policy</td>
<td>Policy makers cannot control the environment in which programmes are implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of discretion</td>
<td>Through setting up accounting systems and holding practitioners to account, the impact of discretion can be minimised</td>
<td>Policy makers cannot control the impact of practitioner discretion because implementation is a low visibility activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of conflict</td>
<td>Conflict is dysfunctional and can be managed to ensure that practitioners achieve common aims</td>
<td>Conflict is an inevitable result of practitioners conceiving implementation in different ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication for implementation</td>
<td>Managers should seek to maximise compliance from practitioners</td>
<td>Varies. Ultimately that practitioners should implement what they feel appropriate using funds and human</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative criteria</th>
<th>Focus is on the extent to which the programme objectives are attained</th>
<th>Much less clear anything that is relevant to the policy issue. Certainly does not require careful analysis of policy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall focus</td>
<td>How can processes be steered towards the implementation of a programme's objectives</td>
<td>The interaction of practitioners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Sabatier, 1986

**Strengths and weaknesses of top-down and bottom-up approaches**

Top-down models provide useful practical responses to the problem of programme and project implementation. They can help to tighten up organisational processes, offer more control over practitioners, can help managers and policy makers to think about reasons for implementation failure and for identifying ways of addressing it (Stone, 1980; Gunn, 1984). Similarly they are useful for creating checklists against which implementation could be monitored and understood (Sabatier, 1986). On the other hand, if the causes of implementation problems are not technical, then they are likely to require rather different solutions (Stone, 1980). Although they do not discount the possibility of deviation from project plans, top-down approaches can overlook the dynamics of implementation and the role of the practitioners in shaping what is achieved. This means that they can ignore the coping or diversionary mechanisms that practitioners may adopt to get the job done or to twist implementation towards their own ends. Additionally, the top-down emphasis on clear and consistent objectives is generally considered to be mistaken because so few programmes contain them (Sabatier, 1986). Generally, they may overstate the role of management in determining what projects and programmes deliver in practice.

Bottom-up approaches are primarily concerned with the interaction between practitioners and so are much more likely to be able to identify the role of those individuals involved in implementation and the processes through which programmes...
are implemented. They are much better able to identify how practitioners delivered project interventions and their motives. As such, these approaches may be able to identify the relative roles and the relative importance of, say different agencies and individuals. They are particularly appropriate where there are a lot of organisations and actors involved in implementation. Similarly, through the focus on individuals rather than programme aims, these approaches are much better able to identify unintended consequences of projects. However, bottom-up approaches may underplay the role played by managers in shaping the nature of implementation and the extent to which practitioners are able to frustrate their wishes and it may not be desirable for the role of managers to be considered so marginal in implementing projects.

These are summarised in box 3.3 below.

**Box 3.3: The strengths and weaknesses of top-down and bottom-up approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Bottom-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Useful frameworks for analysing</td>
<td>• Identifies and accounts for the role and motivation of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation and making</td>
<td>individuals and organisations in programme implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>predictions about the nature of</td>
<td>• Particularly useful where a number of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation</td>
<td>agencies are involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frameworks manageable for the</td>
<td>• Better able to identify unintended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>purposes of evaluation</td>
<td>consequences of policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Particularly useful where there is no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dominant legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Programmes often do not have well</td>
<td>• It is difficult to argue that management should play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stated objectives</td>
<td>no role in determining the nature of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Underplays the role of the</td>
<td>implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practitioner</td>
<td>• May overstate the impact that</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The case for synthesis

Since the mid-1980s a general acknowledgement of the weaknesses associated with top-down and bottom-up approaches has led a preference for synthesising elements of both rather than focusing exclusively on one or the other within the field of public policy analysis (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Peck and Perri 6, 2006). Studies tend to adopt elements of both as a methodological framework to guide analysis of implementation. However, as has been seen, approaches to implementation tend to be characterised by both descriptive and normative concerns. Reflecting this, some synthesisers have gone beyond concern about how to approach the analysis of implementation and have identified features of programmes and the local context that indicate what implementation might look like. As such, they have attempted to offer a means of helping policy makers and practitioners determine the circumstances in which either top-down or bottom-up approaches to implementing projects would be the most appropriate. There has been no dominant synthesis, just an acknowledgment that the study of implementation should address the concerns of both top-down and bottom-up approaches. In the interests of completeness the following sections briefly examine key studies which have integrated top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Elmore (1980) advocated a process of forward and backward mapping which was primarily aimed at determining what sort of policy instruments should be used to implement programmes on the basis of an analysis of existing organisational context and practitioner preferences. Forward mapping involves setting out the stated objectives, outputs and outcomes of a proposed policy (the top-down features) and backward mapping involves examining and specifying the features of the local organisational context and practitioner behaviour and preferences (the bottom-up features) that need to be addressed to implement those stated objectives and outcomes. Elmore suggested that the local conditions that would need to be addressed to achieve those objectives should be described and this should be repeated over time until middle ground between the policy makers’ aims and what is realistic within the specified organisational context was reached. This may mean, of course, that policies or programmes are altered over time to suit local circumstances. This approach has
been considered useful because it offers policy makers and practitioners a means of thinking about how to approach implementation over time; however, it does not provide general explanations for how projects or policies are implemented (Matland, 1995).

In a similar vein, Berman (1980) attempted to bring elements of top-down and bottom-up approaches together and set out the circumstances in which adopting one approach to implementation might be more appropriate than the other. Berman argued that a policy needs to be matched to the context in which it is being implemented because the effectiveness of implementation depends on how a proposed policy interacts with an existing organisational context. Implementation could be conceived in either top-down or bottom-up terms depending on the policy context and situational parameters. Berman (1980) set out five broad parameters that shaped the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use one or the other approach. These related to: the scope of change; the certainty over the effectiveness of project technology or project theory; the level of conflict over project goals; the nature of the organisational setting; and, the stability of the organisational environment. Berman argued that where the scope of change is high, there is a high level of conflict over project aims or where an organisational setting is highly flexible and unstructured and/or the environment unstable, a bottom-up approach to implementing the project would be most appropriate. That is to say, practitioners should have more flexibility to transform project aims to suit local circumstances and individual and organisational preferences. In contrast, where there is a high degree of certainty over the technology or project theory top-down approaches (where practitioners are expected to follow the objectives set out at the top of an organisation) might be more appropriate.

Sabatier (1986) developed what has perhaps become the most influential attempt to bring elements of top-down and bottom-up approaches together. Sabatier advocated using the bottom-up unit of analysis (the practitioners and groups of practitioners responsible for implementing a project or programme) rather than the top-down unit of analysis of what managers were trying to achieve. This bottom-up approach is however combined with the top-down concern of understanding and controlling the socio-economic and legal conditions which constrain practitioner behaviour:
Synthesis adopts bottom-up units of analysis and combines them with the various strategies employed by relevant actors in both the private and public sectors at various levels of government as they attempt to deal with the issue consistent with their objectives.

Sabatier, 1986: 39

Sabatier was thus concerned with understanding the role played by the economic and other structural conditions that constrain and shape implementation. However, he also advocated understanding practitioners' attempts to manipulate the processes of implementation to achieve their own preferences, as well as examining practitioners' efforts to improve their understanding of a policy or programme as they learn from experience and how implementation changes over time as a result.

Goggin and colleagues (1990) developed a model that attempted to integrate elements of top-down and bottom-up concerns into a methodological framework. In their book, *Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation*, (1990) Goggin et al. (1990) described a dynamic 'communication model' which is concerned primarily with understanding how patterns of implementation differ between areas (in their case American states) based on the discretion that local areas have to make choices about how to implement a policy. They argued that implementation is shaped by inducements and constraints from the top (in their case federal) level and these include the nature and the clarity of the policy, the extent of agreement about the policy and the resources made available to implement it (top-down features).

However, they contended that the local context also plays a role in shaping implementation (bottom-up features). They argued that practitioners interpret the messages about policies or programmes which are communicated from the top and there is scope for distortion of those messages. They argued that there was great variation in the local contexts in which policies are implemented because political and interest groups and practitioners vary between areas. Because of these variations it can be expected that policies will be received, interpreted and implemented differently in different areas. The concern of this model is primarily focused on understanding communication between layers of government (and is especially relevant to the US) as such, the model does not have universally applicable explanatory or descriptive power (Hill and Hupe, 2002).
More recently, Matland (1995) developed a model which attempted to set out what patterns of implementation might look like in accounting for differences in the nature of the policy and the organisational setting. Matland (1995) set out four types of implementation which, he argued, would be determined by the level of ambiguity about the policy and conflict, between those responsible for implementing it. First, where there is low ambiguity and low conflict assuming that there are the necessary resources to implement it, the outcome desired by policy makers or managers is likely to be achieved. Second, where there is low policy ambiguity but high conflict about the policy, the nature of implementation will be determined by practitioners locally as it is renegotiated on the basis of power relations and hence likely to vary between areas. Third, where there is high policy ambiguity but low policy conflict, implementation will largely depend on the contextual conditions locally and again is likely to vary between areas. Fourth, where there is high policy ambiguity and high policy conflict the nature of implementation will be determined by local level coalitions and particularly by the strength of professional values and allegiances and again will vary. This approach is considered to be potentially useful and points to how the nature of implementation is influenced by the nature of the policy or programme. However, the simplicity of the categorisation of types of policy has been questioned as has whether it is indeed possible to label policies in such a way (Hill and Hupe, 2002).

Synthesis thus comprises a series of attempts to bring features of top-down and bottom-up approaches together. Some have gone further and pointed to how the nature of a policy decision and the local context give indications about whether top-down or bottom-up approaches to implementation would be most advisable. This discussion of approaches to synthesis would seem to be useful in orienting this study. Whilst there is no dominant means of synthesising the two, weaknesses in approaching implementation wholly in terms of one or the other strongly points to value in drawing together aspects of both top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Drawing on this literature review, the following sections set out the rationale for the study and the link to methodological approach.
This study: linking theory with methods

It has been argued that there are weaknesses in the existing literature examining the implementation of problem-oriented policing. The existing literature has tended to start from the point of view of what management was trying to achieve and on identifying the extent to which patterns of implementation realised in practice differed from Goldstein's vision. Whilst perhaps not explicitly so, existing studies of problem-oriented policing have then been framed in a top-down conceptualisation of implementation. Corresponding explanations of the observed differences between the ideal of problem-oriented policing and what was delivered in practice have overwhelmingly focused on the technological and organisational features that are considered to influence the implementation of problem-oriented projects. Existing studies have tended to neglect the impact that practitioner behaviour, action and interaction has on implementation or the possible interaction between the organisational and technical features and those behavioural ones.

This study seeks to examine the following two hypotheses.

1. That top-down approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.

2. That bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.

Recognising the weaknesses of utilising one or the other, this study seeks to examine the implementation of problem-oriented policing projects through drawing on both top-down and bottom-up approaches, to compare the extent to which they can explain patterns of implementation and to understand the potential interaction of the two. A between method case-study design has been chosen for examining the hypotheses. These case studies focus on the detailed analysis of the implementation of two problem-oriented projects: one based in Cambridge and the other in Manchester. As will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, case study designs enable social
life to be studied in a naturalistic setting and they preserve its complexity and context (Punch, 1998). This approach was chosen because it enables the examination of the implementation of the two projects in their entireties and so facilitates examination of both top-down and bottom-up concerns. It facilitates an examination of any difference between what the project management originally planned to achieve in terms of their stated aims and objectives and what was actually achieved in terms of project outputs and outcomes and so addresses top-down concerns. However, case study designs are also sensitive enough to capture the interaction and social relationships between organisations and individuals within them, thereby facilitating a bottom-up understanding of project implementation. This kind of approach to understanding implementation was expressly recommended by the bottom-up approaches of Hjern and Porter (1981) and Barrett and Fudge (1981).

Drawing on a top-down approach, the study will then examine what the two problem-oriented projects aimed to achieve and identify the extent to which the interventions that were delivered in practice deviated from what was planned. It will seek to examine the role played by the top-down concerns of setting objectives, guidance and systems of management and accountability in orienting implementation and explaining any deviation from project plans or implementation problems. The study will also draw on bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation. It will examine patterns of implementation from the point of view of the practitioners and will look at the role those practitioners and groups of practitioners played in explaining the delivery of interventions. It will examine how practitioners negotiate project aims, the role of their routines and values and conflict in shaping patterns of implementation.

The relationship between the theoretical orientation and research design is shown diagrammatically in Box 3.4.
Box 3.4: Theory orientation and research design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical orientation</th>
<th>Descriptive concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top-down</strong></td>
<td>Difference between what policy intended and subsequent outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational and technical factors that oriented staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bottom-up</strong></td>
<td>Renegotiation of aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction of practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Day-to-day routines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discretion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case study design

To preserve wholeness, complexity and context of project implementation

The detailed design for this and the specific methodologies employed are described in detail in the following chapter.
Chapter four

Research design and methodology

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the development and implementation of the research design to meet the study's aims. The previous chapter set out how the theoretical approaches driving this study link to the research design. This chapter begins by examining the rationale for the research design in detail. In doing so it discusses the justification for the case study design, the role of qualitative research and of triangulation in the social sciences, the reasons why they were used to meet the study's aims and the limitations of the approach.

It goes on to describe the basis for the methods employed, namely interviews, document analysis and observation. It then sets out the practicalities of implementing the research design in terms of gaining access to the cases, ethics and researcher roles and the practical arrangements for the collection and analysis of the interviews, observations and documents. The chapter ends with a review of the link between the project aims and the research design employed to address them and sets out the framework for the following results chapters.

The case study as a research design

A 'case' is a basic unit of analysis. Almost anything could be a case, from an individual to a programme or an agency or organisation; it could be an event or a decision or a process (Punch, 1998). Feagin et al. (1991) described the case study as an "... in depth, multi-faceted investigation, using qualitative research methods of a single social phenomenon. The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data sources" (Feagin et al., 1991: 2).
The case study design is commonly used in qualitative research and this study consists of two case studies of the implementation of problem-oriented projects. One which aimed to reduce the problem of bicycle theft in Cambridge and the other which aimed to reduce the specific problem of gang-related violence in Manchester.

The aim is to understand a case in detail in its natural setting, recognising its complexity and context (Punch, 1998). The great variation associated with case study research make it difficult to define. Nevertheless Punch (1998) described four broad characteristics of the case study. First, each case should have tight 'boundaries' that are precisely described in the research. Second, the cases should be clearly identified to give clarity and focus to the research. Third, attempts should be made to preserve the wholeness of the cases (though focus is specified in the aims). Lastly, a triangulation of data collection techniques should be applied.

These features have been replicated in this study. First, the boundaries of the cases are defined as two specific projects tackling specific crime problems. Second, they are cases of problem-oriented policing projects. Third, attempts have been made to analyse the projects in their entirety over time. Fourth, they make sure of multiple data sources (interviews, observation and documentary analysis).

These are summarised in box 4.1, below:

**Box 4.1: Characteristics of the case study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Definition of characteristic</th>
<th>Characteristic as it applies to this study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bounded system</td>
<td>The boundaries of the cases should be clearly identified and described</td>
<td>• The implementation of a problem-oriented policing programme designed to reduce bicycle theft in Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The implementation of a problem-oriented policing programme designed to reduce gun related violence in Manchester</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Case of what?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case of what?</th>
<th>What specifically, are the cases of?</th>
<th>Holistic</th>
<th>Triangulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|               | - The implementation of a problem-oriented policing projects | - The implementation of the whole project has been studied | - Interviews  
- Observation  
- Documentary analysis |

Case studies are useful because they generate large quantities of rich and valid information about particular social processes and produce comprehensive understanding of the groups under study (Becker, 1970). They are particularly useful for understanding phenomena in depth when there is access to rich information to facilitate this (Patton, 1987). The particular advantages depend on the conditions under which the research is conducted and the research questions themselves (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) argued that they are particularly useful when studies are looking to address 'how' or 'why' type questions. These questions are likely to be explanatory in nature and case studies are useful in these circumstances because they can deal with the operational links that need to be traced over time (Yin, 2003). Case studies are also particularly useful where the researcher does not have any control over events (for example, when it would not be possible to conduct experiments) and where events are contemporary rather than historical as case study research requires direct observation of events and interviews with people who were involved.

Feagin et al. (1991) pointed to a range of main advantages of using case studies. Like Becker (1970) and Yin (2003), Feagin et al. (1991) argued that they tend to produce valid data, as typically individuals are studied in their natural settings. This brings the benefit of being able to observe action and interaction as it actually occurred, rather than relying on a second hand interpretation of it. Case studies facilitate an understanding of the motives of individuals in enacting specific decisions and events. They allow the examination of social action in its most complete form. In addition
one can examine complex decision making over time. This is in contrast to, say, a quantitative survey which would normally examine a situation at one point in time.

Case studies can then help examine the ebb and flow of social life over time as they allow a historical dimension to the study. Feagin et al. (1991) also argued that case studies facilitate theoretical generation and generalisation. They suggested that this involves proposing new interpretations and concepts or re-examining earlier ones in major or innovative ways. Punch (1998) concluded that case study research plays an important role in the social sciences in the following ways. First, we can learn from them in their own right, especially where knowledge is fragmented. Second, a case study may be important in understanding a new or persistently problematic area. Third, cases can be important where they accompany other methods; they could, for example, add flesh to the bones of the results of a survey.

In this research, a case study design was used for a number of reasons. First, because case studies produce valid data which are rich in detail. As has been described, this study seeks to investigate whether using top-down and bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding project implementation can help to explain the recurrent problems identified in the delivery of problem-oriented projects. To achieve this, detailed information was required about the behaviour and actions of practitioners and their motivations. It was also important to understand how the practitioners themselves sought to understand the projects and how they were implemented, and to understand the context and circumstances into which the two projects were being implemented. This richness of detail would have been difficult to achieve using other research designs, such as a survey or a social experiment. Examining and explaining human interaction are hard to achieve without using qualitative methods. In particular, it would be difficult to achieve the detail and depth required for examining the nature of implementation over time using other methods, as already suggested, surveys, for example, tend to describe a situation at a particular point in time.

Second, the area of study is persistently problematic. The literature examined in chapter two clearly showed that problems are commonly experienced in the implementation of problem-oriented projects and there are weaknesses in existing explanations of the causes of these. As such, it is necessary to go beyond describing
implementation problems and to look at events in depth to examine the patterns of implementation. This is facilitated by the detail that can be gained from case study research.

Third, there were practical reasons for using a case study approach. There was relatively easy access to the information rich cases (access is discussed in further detail in subsequent sections). It was possible to implement this research design within the time available as the projects were being funded for approximately two years making it fit neatly into the time period for this study.

The selection of the cases
As has been seen, this study makes use of two case studies of the implementation of problem-oriented projects. One aimed at reducing the specific problem of bicycle theft in Cambridge and another aimed at tackling the problem of gang-related violence in Manchester. Yin (1984) described the particular advantages and disadvantages of multiple case studies compared to single ones. Single cases can be useful as ‘critical’ cases when testing a well-developed theory or in order to challenge, expand or confirm that theory; one case may be enough. A single case might also be used where that case is thought to be particularly extreme or unique, for example, where an event or phenomenon was so rare it was considered to be of interest in itself. Conversely, where a case is thought to be representative of all cases one might be enough. In contrast, the evidence generated from multiple cases is often considered to be more compelling than that generated by a single one. It also enables the researcher to make comparisons between them. The disadvantage is that it is clearly more time-consuming to examine multiple cases.

Box 4.2: Advantages and disadvantages of single vs. multiple cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Particularly useful as ‘critical’ cases</td>
<td>• Limited ability to generalise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where the case is extreme or unique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where one case is thought to be</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multiple cases

- Evidence considered to be more compelling
- Improved reliability of the research
- Can make comparisons

- Time-consuming

Adapted from Yin, 1984

The two projects were partly selected as case studies for this study because of their contrasting qualities. First, they were tackling very different kinds of problem types: bicycle theft and gang related crime respectively. Second, the two projects were structurally very different. As will be described fully in chapter five, the Manchester project brought together a wide range of practitioners from different agencies to implement the project interventions in a new setting. The Cambridge project involved only one project manager who facilitated implementation primarily through negotiating with other agencies to deliver interventions. Third, the two were seeking to implement very different types of interventions. It will be shown that the Manchester project consisted of wide-ranging social and rehabilitative interventions with young people. The Cambridge project was, in the main, a situational crime reduction project looking primarily to reduce the vulnerability of bicycles.

There were also pragmatic reasons for selecting these cases. The projects were being evaluated for the Home Office primarily to assess their crime reduction outcomes. They were part of a wider Crime Reduction Programme which funded, under similar criteria, a series of projects to increase the evidence base about what works in crime reduction (described in more detail in chapter five). I (with colleagues) was responsible for the evaluation of area of this work (the Targeted Policing Initiative). However, the programme and the two projects generated vast quantities of data, most of it beyond the immediate interest of the Home Office sponsor of the programme, who was primarily interested in crime reduction outcomes.

That the projects formed part of a wider programme of grant funding (the Crime Reduction Programme) is not inappropriate in the context of this study. Problem-
oriented projects are often reliant on grant funding because police budgets tend to be set some time in advance and it can be difficult to release funding for unanticipated demands (Scott, 2006). Thus, that these two projects were funded from a specific pool of grant funding is not considered to be unusual in the field of problem-oriented policing generally. There are important questions to be asked about the role the central grant programmes play in facilitating (or otherwise) the planning and delivery of local problem-oriented projects, but they are not the focus of this study. The reasons for using a case study design are summarised in Box 4.3.

**Box 4.3: Summary of reasons for selecting a multiple case study design**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Produces rich and valid data</td>
<td>• The necessary detail and depth looking at implementation over time would be hard to achieve using other methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of study persistently problematic</td>
<td>• Implementation failure is a commonly documented problem but not enough is known about why it happens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Why’ and ‘how’ questions</td>
<td>• Aim to try to understand how problem-oriented policing is implemented and how it could be improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little researcher control over the environment</td>
<td>• Little that could be done to influence what was implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary events</td>
<td>• Improving ability to collect detailed information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical concerns</td>
<td>• Possible within tight time constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Easy access to information-rich cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple studies more compelling</td>
<td>• Greater reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can make comparisons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Qualitative social research

Qualitative research draws on the interpretative paradigm (ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology) in sociology and is concerned with how human beings experience and understand the social world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Qualitative analysis involves an interpretative and naturalistic approach to examining the social world. This involves, then, conducting research in the setting in which social life occurs and attempting to make sense of it or interpret it in terms of the meanings that those individuals bring to it (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The aim is to describe people’s routines and the meanings that they bring to them. In particular it is concerned with analysing peoples’ points of view, the constraints of everyday life and in securing a rich description of the ebb and flow of social life (Becker, 1986). In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative research is concerned with the quality of processes rather than in quantifying them; the stress is on how social experience is created and the aim is to give it meaning (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).

Qualitative analysis draws on an epistemology that requires research to be flexible and sensitive to the social contexts in which action and processes are produced. Relatively unstructured qualitative techniques are compatible with the aims of this study because they preserve the complexities of social life, focusing on social interaction and processes by grounding observations in a natural setting. This was important because this study aims (in part) to understand implementation from the point of view of the practitioners and groups of practitioners. Relatively unstructured qualitative techniques facilitated understanding this because through detailed questioning and probing it is possible to generate greater understanding of how practitioners experienced implementation than would be possible with quantitative techniques.

Using qualitative research methods is not without problems. Historically, qualitative research has been seen to suffer from problems about reliability. Reliability is usually taken to mean the ability to replicate the study with the same methods and get the same results. All research requires some interpretation of data but in quantitative research, efforts are made to minimise the extent to which the researcher interprets data through maximising the use of standardised data collection techniques and
statistical analysis. In contrast, most qualitative research requires researchers to interpret data and to make judgements. In qualitative research the roles of interpretation and judgement make results less likely to be replicated than would be the case in a quantitative study. The implication being that if the data collected were analysed by another researcher, it is more likely that they would interpret them differently.

In this study the aim was not to maximise the reliability of findings but to better understand patterns of project implementation. Qualitative research designs are more likely than quantitative ones to produce valid results but this in turn is dependent on how qualitative research studies are operationalised and implemented. Attempts to maximise the validity of the results were made through the development of appropriate and meaningful research tools. For example, interview schedules were based in part on the literature review that set out the top-down and bottom-up concerns. They were also based in part on observations of the implementation of projects in practice which had been conducted to attempt to ground the interview schedules in terms of how the practitioners experienced implementation of the projects. The unstructured interview approach also allowed the interviewer to probe answers to questions fully, allow the interviewee to clarify the meaning of questions should they not understand and also to comment more freely if issues that they think were important were not raised within the interview schedule. All of these facilitated the development of valid data for the study. There are also practical ways of guarding against the dangers related to researcher ‘biases’ that can help to maximise the reliability of qualitative data. One can make use of more than one researcher as more than one interpretation of the same data might help to confirm interpretation of the data. One can also assemble a range of data about the same happenings from a range of sources. This triangulation of data sources enables some cross-checking of data to validate the claims of qualitative findings (Denzin, 1970). The use of a triangulation of methods is discussed in the following sections.
Triangulation of Methods

Denzin (1970) proposed four main types of triangulation.

- Data triangulation: the collection of data at different times, at different locations and from a range of people.
- Investigator triangulation: the use of more than one researcher.
- Theory triangulation: the use of more than one kind of approach to generate categories of analysis.
- Methodological triangulation: the use of either two types a) within methods (e.g. using an interview schedule with open and close questions) and b) between methods (employing more than one type of method).

A triangulation of methodological techniques was used in this study in order to develop a meaningful approach to understanding patterns of project implementation. Triangulation has a long history in the social sciences and can be used for a variety of purposes. Between method triangulation was employed in this study partly because research questions can be approached from a number of angles and can be conceptualised in different ways. Different methods capture different aspects of social life and triangulation offered the opportunity to explore research questions from different angles, facilitating greater depth of analysis. This was considered to be important for building up a picture of the implementation of the projects from the varying perspectives of those people involved in their delivery. Different types of data capture different forms of phenomena. For example, examination of documentary evidence, particularly in the form of minutes of meetings and strategy documents, was useful for revealing the official version of project plans, events and decision making. In contrast observational data revealed the sometimes informal nature of decision making in the projects. Interview data had the advantage of being able to tease out the differences in how practitioners experienced the projects. These differences would have been harder to capture using one method alone. There are also practical reasons for triangulating data sources. Stake (1995) argued that we should constantly be asking ourselves if ‘we have this right?’ That is, we should be concerned about whether we are interpreting data in the right way. The use of a number of methods enables one effectively to check interpretation of data and improve reliability.
In this study, a range of methods were used and the reasons for including them are discussed in the following sections under the following three headings interviews, observations and documents.

**Interviews**

Depth interviewing is an important source of data in qualitative research. Interviews are useful for probing beneath the surface of answers to questions, maximising the level of detail obtained and to facilitate holistic understanding of behaviour (Patton, 1987). Interviews help to facilitate understanding and can provide greater meaning for other forms of observations.

There are a range of good reasons for including interviews in a case study. Researchers cannot observe everything in person but other people have experienced much of what we cannot observe for ourselves (Stake, 1995). Researchers cannot directly observe opinions and feelings about project implementation and interviewing those practitioners involved in implementing projects offers a way of accessing that kind of information. In addition to this, not everyone involved in a project will see its delivery in the same way. Conducting a number of interviews with a range of people can help to illuminate the different experiences of and opinions about a case (Stake, 1995).

Interviews are widely used in social research and come in a variety of forms. Put simply, the characteristics of interviews can be understood in terms of the degree of structure and standardisation employed (Fielding, 1995). Interviews can be highly structured: everyone is asked the same pre-determined questions in the same way. These are associated with quantitative tradition in social research and will typically produce results with greater reliability. At the other extreme of the spectrum are unstructured interviews, for which there is no pre-determined script and respondents are prompted to speak freely. These are associated with qualitative research and tend to produce more valid results. The choice of interview employed is important in the research design as it influences the nature of the data collected. The advantages and disadvantages associated with the degree of standardisation of interviews are shown in Box 4.4 below:
### Box 4.4: Interview types, features, advantages and disadvantages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Advantages and disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Informal conversational interview | • This relies on spontaneous generation of questions and nothing is prepared in advance  
• The data gathered from each interview will be different | • Time-consuming  
• Interviewer needs to be very skilled  
• Individualised, contextualised and in-depth |
| General interview guide     | • Guide is produced to ensure that essentially the same topics are covered for each interview – a kind of checklist  
• Interviewer still free to probe and questions can be asked in any order etc. | • Makes good use of available time |
| Standardised open-ended interview | • Carefully worded, standardised questions  
• All asked in the same way  
• Little room for manoeuvre | • Minimises interviewer effects and variation between interviews  
• No room for flexibility or probing interesting responses |

In practice, interviews usually fall somewhere between the two extremes described above. In this study, interviews were conducted using a general interview guide. This was to avoid the limitations associated with fully standardised scripts. There were also practical concerns about using a fully non-standardised script. Utilising an interview guide is useful to be sure that the topics of interest were covered in all the interviews and to maximise the use of available time, as often interviewees can only stay for a limited period of time.
Interviews can be administered in a number of ways, for example, face-to-face, on the telephone or via group discussions and there are advantages and disadvantages associated with these different approaches. In these cases the interviews were administered face-to-face. The benefits of this over using the telephone are that it is better for building up rapport, probing answers and observing the manner in which people answer questions. It is also possible to build up rapport and probe less confident people who may be more willing to engage. Interviews were preferred to focus groups because it was felt that the practitioners would be more forthcoming about their experiences and opinions away from their colleagues (although in a small number of cases practitioners requested to be interviewed in pairs and these requests were facilitated, see Annex one for details).

Observation

This study makes use of covert and overt observational data in the Manchester case study. Observations were not conducted in the Cambridge project because (as will be set out in detail in chapter five) it was considerably smaller in size and scope than the Manchester project and time consuming observations could not be justified.

The point of observational research is to observe phenomena in their natural state neither manipulating nor stimulating those people being studied (Punch, 1998). Observation data are highly unstructured as they are made in a natural setting and behaviour recorded as it happens. The researcher relies less on prior conceptualisations of action (as would be the case in interview guides or questionnaires) and interprets action more inductively.

Observation methods were used in this study for a number of reasons. First, observational data are very useful to help to describe a programme or project (Patton, 1987). Clearly understanding how projects are implemented is a key concern of this study and being able to observe some aspects of project implementation first hand aids understanding of what is happening in practice and enables one to make more sense of it. Similarly, observing behaviour directly also allows the researcher to see what an interviewee may be unwilling or unable to disclose in an interview which enables the study to move beyond the opinions and perceptions of other people to a more comprehensive understanding of what is actually going on in practice. Second,
this study is interested in understanding project implementation from the point of view of those people who were responsible for delivering it on a day-to-day basis, and observing project implementation in the natural setting in which it occurred allows one to examine practitioner patterns of behaviour in practice. Third, there were practical reasons for conducting some observations. As has been noted already, observations of implementation in practice facilitates the development of meaningful interview guides and other data collection tools because they can be based more closely on what was seen to be going on in practice rather on a researcher's preconceptions of what is important.

The problems with observation as a technique in social research are that it can be time consuming, difficult to set up and there are many situations that a researcher cannot realistically attend. The greatest problem, however, is probably the risk that the presence of the researcher can influence the behaviour of the group that are being studied. The extent to which it was a problem in this study will be covered later in this chapter which discusses the practical arrangements for data collection.

The role of documents
Documents are objects that can be read (though they increasingly include television and other visual documents) and which relate in some way to the area of study (Macdonald and Tipton, 1995). Documents can be a rich source of data in social science (Punch, 1998). A great range of documents are available to social scientists including government records and reports, letters, diaries and institutional records. They can be used in a variety of ways, examined on their own or, as in this study, as one of a number of methods.

Three main forms of documents were used in this study.

1. **Project and programme strategic and planning documents**: those documents created by the project staff a) to describe what that project aimed to do and b) to lay out how the project planned to meet its aims. These documents were used to examine what was planned, and how the project was developed over time and were particularly useful for showing the official view of what the project aimed to achieve and its main outputs.
2. Minutes of meetings: minutes of meeting were examined to help develop a record of official project decision-making and project outputs over the course of the implementation of the projects.

3. Activity logs: in the Manchester project, an attempt was made to encourage the practitioners to keep weekly records of their activities. In the long term this proved impossible as the practitioners resisted this form of record keeping as time-consuming and intrusive.

The inclusion of documents in the research design had a number of advantages. Many of them provided information about what the projects aimed to achieve and others served as a record of project decision-making and outputs. Care does, however, have to be taken with the use of documentary evidence. Macdonald and Tipton (1995) argued that the following are of particular importance. First, it is important to assess whether the document is authentic as it is possible that the document has been falsified for its author’s self-interest. Second, an assessment needs to be made about the document’s credibility and the extent to which it is likely to be free from distortion or error. Third, a decision has to be made about whether the document is representative and whether the documents being analysed constitute a representative sample of all those documents of its type. Fourth, efforts need to be made to examine what the document actually means, for example, does the document reveal surface or literal meaning? These issues and how they relate to this study are returned to in later sections of this chapter.

Limitations of research design and the nature of generalisations

There has been a long debate about the status of case studies in social research with many authors arguing that because studies are only based on one (or a few) cases, one cannot generalise to wider social life. This is a serious criticism of case study research designs and one that needs addressing here.

Case study research is not undertaken with the primary aim of making generalisations about social life but to understand in detail that case or those cases being studied. Case study research is undertaken with the aim of understanding the case in its entirety and within its context (Punch, 1998). This is especially true of a case when it
is considered to be important and worthy of study in its own right or where is a negative or deviant case (something marked from general patterns that are worthy of explanation). In this study, it certainly cannot be assumed that the patterns of implementation observed here will be repeated in other contexts – far from it. However, replicating the results was not the main aim of the study. Instead, this study is primarily interested in understanding the complexity of implementation in these cases to develop greater understanding of patterns of implementation of problem-oriented projects. In addition it has been argued that it can be possible to make generalised statements from case studies. Punch (1998), for example, describes a number of ways in which a case can produce results from which one can generalise. A case study can then go beyond description of results to develop wider concepts which can be used to help to explain observed phenomena more widely. This moves analysis above descriptions and enables case studies to develop potentially generalisable statements. Similarly, case studies can be used to develop propositions or hypotheses, which could subsequently be applied to other studies and tested. Indeed, as will be seen, these case studies ultimately have been used to help develop new ways of looking at implementation which might help shed light on the nature of the implementation of problem-oriented projects more widely.

**Implementation of the research design**

The following sections examine practical issues associated with the implementation of the research design including access, ethics and researcher roles and the practical arrangements for the collection and analysing of the interviews, observations and documents.

**Access, ethics and researcher roles**

Gaining access to the two case studies was not a problem in this study. As mentioned in earlier sections, the cases were selected because I was already evaluating them as part of my job as a government researcher. The projects were funded by a central government programme and required agreement to facilitate evaluation. This was fortunate as gaining access to cases can be time consuming and tricky. That said, a number of issues remained. Perhaps most importantly, there was the issue of gaining informed consent of those being studied. Stake (1995) pointed out that gaining
permission from senior staff to study a case is not enough. Those involved need to understand what research is trying to achieve and to give their informed consent to participate in it. Similarly, the British Society of Criminology states that researchers should:

Base research, so far as possible, on the freely given, informed consent of those studied. This implies a responsibility on the part of the researchers to explain as fully as possible, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the research is about, who is undertaking and financing it, why it is being undertaken, and how any research findings are to be disseminated. Researchers should also make clear that participants have the right to refuse permission whenever and for whatever reason they wish. Research participants should be informed about how far they will be afforded anonymity and confidentiality.

www.britsoccrim.org/ethics.htm

Therefore whilst the senior members of staff who applied for the grant funding were required to facilitate the research it was important that the practitioners working on the projects knew about the study, its aims and what it might entail for them in a practical sense. Early on in the research, efforts were made to explain to project staff the nature of the research and what might be expected of them. Care was also taken to ensure that at meetings attended, everyone knew that there was a researcher present and what the role of that researcher was. This issue was probably most important for interviews. At the beginning of interviews the research was explained and assurance given about confidentiality both in terms of the record of that interview and in any written report.

Related to this is the somewhat tricky area of researcher roles. Studies have pointed to the range of roles (and the associated pitfalls) that researchers have played when evaluating projects (Matassa and Newburn, 2003). These include distinguishing between whether the researcher should observe patterns of implementation independently or play a greater, action research role, in shaping decisions about project interventions. In this study, after the projects were set up, efforts were made independently to observe the implementation of these cases as much as possible and not to influence project events. I (with a colleague) was responsible for the early
problem analysis and definition in Manchester. We were then responsible for the process and outcome measurement of the project. In the Cambridge project we were responsible only for a process and outcome assessment. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is quite clear that I played a number of roles other than researcher whilst conducting the research. Probably the most obvious role was that of my status as representative of the financial sponsor of the projects. The research department of the Home Office has historically been somewhat separate from the policy and funding departments but that would not necessarily have been clear to the project staff. There is no doubt that my status as potential 'project spy' caused some concern in the early days. This is important because one would imagine that individuals might be less candid as a result. In the long run, as people got used to me, I do not think my Home Office status made any difference at all.

A further problematic issue for researchers is how to feed back and disseminate the results to those working on the project. Findings are clearly not always going to be positive and this can be difficult for those running and managing projects to accept (Weisburg, 1994). This was important for both the Manchester and Cambridge projects, though was much more of an issue in the Manchester case where interviews were conducted with staff throughout the duration of the project and senior staff requested feedback on themes and issues that arose from them. There is something of a conflict between observing patterns of implementation independently and providing interim feedback about project processes, outputs and outcomes and this might influence the future direction of a project. In practice it is very difficult not to provide feedback or advice when a project team asks for it; they are, after all, facilitating the research and (in this case) spending large amounts of public money. In the event, the research in Cambridge was conducted largely independently of the project but formal feedback was given to the Manchester project twice: 29 January 2002 (presentation to board) and 18 July 2002 (memo to project chair).

Interviews

Non-standardised interviews were the main data collected for this study and the justification for doing so has been described above. In all, 59 were conducted. The
following sections examine technical considerations in detail in respect to the interviews conducted.

**Interview design**

As described earlier, general guides for focusing interviews were prepared (all of these are provided in Annex two). This was basically to ensure that the same topics were covered in all the interviews and also to best use available time. It is important to have an advance plan for interviewing as it is easy to ask questions that do not illicit the information that is required to address stated aims (Stake, 1995). Therefore much consideration was given to what questions to ask. Again the bounded system of the cases and the research aims largely set the framework for questions to ask. This study aimed to account for patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing drawing on both top-down and bottom-up frameworks. Therefore, especially important to this study was to understand how practitioners interpreted the project aims and procedures and to understand what the range of practitioners did day-to-day in relation to the project and their perceptions of that. A key aim was also to identify practitioner views on the implementation of the programme and the problems encountered. Therefore, questioning took two main forms: firstly, factual questioning related to the practitioners' roles and their day-to-day experiences working in the project, and secondly, attitudinal questions to elicit their views and opinions about the project.

In the Cambridge case, eight interviews were conducted with nine individuals in spring 2002 as follows:

- one with the project manager;
- three with Cambridgeshire Constabulary civilian staff;
- two with police officers who had managerial responsibility for the project;
- one with a planner working for Cambridgeshire County Council; and,
- one with a member of the advisory group.

In Manchester, 51 interviews with 57 individuals were conducted at intervals between 2001 and 2003. Interviews were conducted with practitioners and their managers and with the steering group members. Many respondents were interviewed a number of
times. This is fairly typical in case study research where respondents are interviewed before, during and after an experience, to get an understanding of how implementation proceeded over time.

Box 4.5 shows the basic breakdown of the interviews in Manchester (more detail is provided in Annex one).

**Box 4.5: Manchester Interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approximate date</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 2001</td>
<td>10 interviews with 12 individuals</td>
<td>Board members and implementation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter 2001</td>
<td>12 interviews with 14 individuals</td>
<td>Practitioners, managers and implementation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 2002</td>
<td>10 interviews with 12 individuals</td>
<td>Practitioners, managers and implementation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter/spring 2003</td>
<td>19 interviews with 19 individuals</td>
<td>Practitioners, managers, board members and implementation team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly many more interviews were conducted in the more complex Manchester project than in Cambridge because the Manchester project was very much larger and hence necessitated a larger research study. As will be set out in the following chapter, about seven full-time members of staff were employed to work on the Manchester project at any one time compared to one in the Cambridge project. The projects also consisted of rather different interventions which were implemented in rather different circumstances (also elaborated in chapter five). The Cambridge project predominately consisted of situational measures (such as target hardening) whereas the Manchester project consisted of a range of social and preventative interventions. Quantifying the situational measures such as numbers of secure bicycle stands delivered was easier than quantifying the nature of social interventions such as hours of mentoring or outreach work. This meant that much more effort was required to understand the
implementation of the Manchester project. For both the Cambridge and Manchester cases, a detailed breakdown of the interviews, including those interviewed and when, their role in the project and how the interview was recorded can be seen in Annex one.

**Interview sampling**

Researchers cannot be everywhere, studying everything, even when only a limited number of cases are being studied and, as such, important decisions have to be made about whom to interview (Punch, 1998). Again, the boundaries of the cases being studied set useful parameters. Clearly of particular interest were those practitioners and managers who were involved in decision making in relation to the projects and those who actively delivered it on a day-to-day basis. As such, a ‘purposeful’ sample of respondents who had information about the implementation of the projects were sought and interviewed. The aim was not to identify a random sample of interviewees to maximise the statistical power of results but purposefully to select respondents who had information about the cases. These respondents included:

- those responsible for designing and setting up the projects;
- those responsible for management of the projects; and,
- those responsible for day-to-day implementation and their managers.

Some ‘snowball’ sampling was also employed. The logic of snowball sampling is to locate information-rich respondents by asking people involved in the project who has useful information; other respondents basically recommend respondents. This was especially the case for the Cambridge project, where the project manager was asked to nominate information-rich individuals for interview.

**Non-response**

All those known who met the criteria described above were invited to interview. There are many reasons why people may or may not decide to be interviewed. Box 4.6 (below) gives some examples and how they might have applied to this study.
### Box 4.6: Examining non-response to interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of non response</th>
<th>Risk to this study</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in subject matter</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>All interviewees were working on the projects or associated with it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived importance of study</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Research contributing to the knowledge base about what reduces crime is perceived to be important but not as important as doing the job itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of research (who is conducting it and how)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The research was conducted by government researchers who were well known to the respondents and had done nothing to make them distrust the research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill and persistence of researcher</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Efforts were made to facilitate interviews including meeting for interview where it suited the respondent, following up initial letters inviting people to interview and so on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area and cultural differences in willingness to be interviewed</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>This should not have been an issue – as all possible respondents were similar in that they were professionals working on the project. But there was a possibility of this</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Arber, 1995

The box indicates that response rates to interview requests should have been high. All the interviewees were working in the field, with a clear vested interest in the projects and the research. Legitimacy was high as researchers were from central government (response rates are normally high for government research). In terms of persistence, every effort was made to facilitate an interview, in terms of following up requests for interviewees, meeting when and where it was convenient for the interviewee, and explaining the purpose of the interview. Where interviews were not attended it was normally because of urgent or unexpected work commitments and normally could be rearranged. Whilst some interviews were rearranged, no one refused to be interviewed.
Minimising bias

The interviewer's performance can influence the interview data because it can introduce biases (Oppenheim, 1992). This can occur in a variety of ways and attempts were made to minimise it. The main forms of possible interview bias highlighted by Oppenheim (1992) and the risk that they posed to the study attempts to deal with it are summarised in box 4.7 below:

**Box 4.7: Minimising interview bias**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of bias</th>
<th>Risk to this study</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building too much or too little rapport</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• The interviewers were known to the interviewees which facilitated rapport with the respondents and, probably, facilitated truthful answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interviewers were not so well known to the interviewees that there was a risk of being seen as a friend or colleague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective recording of answers to probes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>• Care to record what interviewee said when noting the answers to probes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• In other cases interviews were recorded which facilitated accurate recording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digressing from question order</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• Care taken to ensure that all interviewees have had the chance to answer all questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language misunderstanding</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• Care to ensure that the interview schedules reflected practitioners experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unstructured techniques allowed misunderstandings to be clarified if required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Problem' respondents</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>• There was potential for 'incriminating' answers to questions, e.g. lack of knowledge about the project or limited outputs or activities in relation to the project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Interviewers had to be careful not to show surprise at answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational problems</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Interviews were conducted individually except where they requested to be interviewed in pairs to minimise the impact of the presence of others who may influence how they responded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Box 4.7 indicates there was potential for some forms to bias to enter into the interviews. It is not possible to entirely guard against some of these forms of bias but efforts were made to identify and minimise them if it was thought that they posed a risk. The main forms of biases identified as problematic here were the recording of probes and 'problematic' interviewees. As Oppenheim (1992) pointed out, interviewers sometimes have ideas about how they would like or expect certain respondents to respond to questions. Probing questions are a particularly common source of this bias and interviewers may be inclined to record what they want or expect to hear rather than what was actually said. The best way to avoid this is to tape record the interviews; where this was not possible, care was taken to ensure that answers were recorded accurately so that answers could be checked. The other potential source of bias highlighted in Box 4.7 is so called 'problem' respondents. In this study there was potential for this as respondents might have felt that they were giving 'wrong' answers to questions. The main way of guarding against this was to build rapport to try and facilitate truthful answers but also to avoid reacting (expressing surprise etc.) to respondents' answers.

**Recording the data**

Devising a way of recording interviews is important. Making notes or tape recording are the most common ways. Tape-recording clearly has the advantage of offering a full record of everything that a respondent says. However, an accurate record of the words of each person is less important than capturing the meaning, so recording is not always necessary and since tapes are time-consuming to transcribe, taking notes can be useful (Stake, 1995). Some of the interviews were taped and some were recorded in this study. Annex one sets out the details. The reasons for choosing the method of recording were largely pragmatic. When interviews were conducted alone, a tape
recorder was used and the tapes transcribed later. When two people were interviewing, notes were made.

**Analysing the interview data**

The form of analysis of qualitative interviews depends on the purpose of the research and there are no right or wrong ways (Patton, 1998). In this study the means of analysing interview data were essentially inductive but bounded by the aims of the study. Focus in the analysis of the interview data came from the literature review and corresponding aims of the study and the questions that were asked. Care was, however, taken to ensure that themes and issues were also developed from the data themselves. The aim of this study was to examine the hypothesis that either top-down or bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are sufficient to explain patterns of implementation in problem-oriented projects. The data analysis was thus framed by the concerns of the top-down and bottom-up perspectives that were identified in the literature review such as the role of leadership, resources, project theory, objectives and guidance, management and accountability. It was also concerned with identifying themes and issues related to practitioner negotiation of aims, routines and values and conflict in explaining patterns of implementation.

The analysis of the interview data was conducted using the following framework developed by Miles and Huberman (1994). The approach has three main constituents. First, it involves data reduction; that is editing, segmenting and summarising the data. This involves coding, finding themes and patterns recurrent in the data. In later stages it also involves developing abstract concepts from the data. Second, it involves organising, assembling and displaying data. Third, it involves using the preceding stages to develop propositions which seek to explain the data. This involves three over-lapping cyclical processes, which are described in the sections below.

Analysis of the interview data started with coding. Codes are labels and coding of interview data involved labelling pieces of data. The point of putting the labels on data is to describe them and also record them to make it easier to work with and retrieve them. After basic labelling of the data, the second stage of data analysis involved labelling and categorising interview data at a higher level of abstraction. The
aim of this was to describe patterns seen in the data and to make inferences from them. This level of analysis focused on developing patterns from the codes: making inferences from those initial codes in order to make sense of it. It also involved comparing different indicators which helped to develop more abstract concepts from the indicators in the data. The second stage of data analysis was to make memos: this involved recording ideas that emerge whilst data are being sorted and coded. The idea is that the memos provide deeper concepts than those already developed from the coding. They move the analysis of interview data on by developing concepts and how they might relate to one another. Memos also record theoretical and more substantive ideas that are not merely describing data but seeking to explain and make sense of it. The memos are used to bring the data together in a meaningful and coherent picture and to develop conclusions from the data.

Observation

This section examines the practical arrangements for the observational element of the study. Observations were only conducted in the Manchester case study. Observation research can be either overt or covert. The primary advantage of the covert approach is that it is less likely that the presence of the researcher would have an impact on the behaviour of the group being studied. It is, however, not straightforward as a means of collecting data as it is time-consuming and access can be hard to negotiate.

In overt observations, the group knows that they are part of a research study and this raises the possibility that they will alter their behaviour because they know that they are being studied. Whilst it is generally a more practical form of conducting observational research, the presence of the researcher might affect the behaviour of the group being studied.

Covert observations of the project set up stages were possible in the Manchester project. As already mentioned a colleague and I were responsible for the early problem definition for this project (see Bullock and Tilley, 2002). The problem definition was developed drawing on:

• calls for service data;
• recordable crime data;
• data held in the force intelligence bureau about crime events and individuals;
• the Armed Crime Unit database; and.
• data from GMPICs (the Greater Manchester Police intelligence system) on individuals who were associated with gangs, believed responsible for shootings, or who were victims of shootings.

This was supplemented with information from post-conviction interviews with gang members and attempts were made to gather data and other information from non-police agencies including the probation service, various local authority departments, schools, and hospitals. It was therefore possible to observe first-hand and keep records on the data collection and analysis stage of this project.

In this study it was not possible, for practical reasons, to undertake covert observation of the project as it was being actually being implemented. Because of my role in the analysis stage of this project I was well known to the project team and so observing covertly was not possible. There was clearly a risk that behaviour was affected by my presence. It is of course hard to know what the impact of this was. My sense was that it was minimal as those observed got used to me being there. In any case triangulation of data sources meant that data could be collected via other means should my presence have been having an impact on their behaviour and activities.

It has been noted that the aim of observation methods is neither to manipulate nor stimulate the behaviour of those people who are being studied (Punch, 1998). Despite the unstructured nature of observation research, there are practical considerations that need to be addressed. The first is how to gain access and the second is how to keep records and analyse data. In this study gaining access to the meetings and other project activities was not a problem, mostly because of the grant specification requiring co-operation with evaluators which was described more fully earlier. Decisions did have to be made about what to observe and how often. It was simply not possible to observe everything, not least because I was based in London and the case was based some 200 miles away in Manchester. Overall, eight practitioner meetings and ten steering group board meetings were attended and observed. The
board meetings were held fairly irregularly, every two to three months, and so it was possible to attend most of those. Observing these meetings was useful especially for examining how the senior managers came to make decisions. It would not be possible to access similar information from a different method. The line-level practitioner group for this project met regularly (usually weekly) and so it was not possible to attend all the meetings. Those held at what were thought to be likely key times (for example, when the project was set up and when staff changed) were attended. A two-day training event held from 24 to 26 October 2001 was also observed.

Decisions also had to be made about how to record the observations. There are two extremes in terms of recording observations. Structured approaches to observation involve the use of detailed pre-developed pro-formas for recording data. Unstructured analysis is the opposite, observing without a predetermined structure for recording actions. The logic of the latter is that themes and categories would emerge later during the analysis (Punch 1998). In unstructured observations, the data could be categorised in order to develop aggregates of coded data or they could be used to facilitate greater description of the case (Stake, 1995). In this study an unstructured approach was used. The data were not categorised but used, as State (1995) described, to illustrate points. Observation reports do need to be sufficiently detailed in order to enable examination of what has happened and how (Patton, 1987). Therefore quite detailed notes were kept, although selective recording of observation was inevitable. Notes were taken on:

- the setting in which activity was taking place;
- participants activities;
- the behaviour of individuals;
- interaction between individuals;
- unplanned events; and,
- non-verbal communication (e.g. what body language appeared to be saying).

Observation data were analysed in a similar manner to the interview data described above. Themes were drawn out of the data but these themes were framed in terms of the project aims and so focused on those issues identified by the concerns of both top-down and bottom-up analysts. However, because observations, by nature, capture behaviour and interaction in a naturalistic setting, they were especially useful for
facilitating understanding of bottom-up concerns regarding patterns of action and interaction in the project setting. As mentioned earlier, the data were also used to illustrate points, to facilitate a more holistic understanding of the project and to develop interview guides.

**Documents and records**

A range of project records were examined to look at the development of the projects, decision making and actions undertaken. These are summarised in Box 4.8, below:

**Box 4.8: Documents included for analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minutes of meetings</td>
<td>• Minutes of 44 practitioner group meetings held between October 2001 and March 2003 in Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minutes of the 14 board meetings held between March 2001 and March 2003 in Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minutes of 14 steering group meetings held between September 2000 and September 2002 in Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic documents and project records</td>
<td>• Strategic and day-to-day project documents and records</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The documents were used in a range of overlapping ways to help examine the patterns of implementation of the two projects. The strategic documents, planning documents and minutes of meetings all contributed to an overall documentation of and understanding of the history of the implementation of the projects. Timelines of the implementation of the two projects drawing on the minutes and other project documents are provided in Annexes five and six.

The same documents were also used to help develop classifications of the extent to which planned interventions were actually implemented. A scheme, which was
developed and described by Crawley and Hope (2003), was used to classify how planned interventions had been implemented (Box 4.9).

**Box 4.9: Classification scheme for implementation of planned interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Planned but not implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Stalled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Partially implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Completed and ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Not planned but implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Awaiting implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crawley and Hope (2003) point out that classifying project interventions and outputs can be difficult. For example, it is hard to know how to deal with changes in the status of an intervention. Also, the distinctions between the classifications can be rather vague especially between 'partially implemented' and 'implemented and ongoing'. The classification of the status of the projects' interventions (which can be seen in the following chapter) is not an exact process and judgements have had to be made. However, drawing on a range of data sources (including the interviews and the observations) helped inform judgements regarding the status of the implementation of an intervention.

**Assessing the credibility of documents**

Documents can be analysed in a number of ways. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, there are a number of issues that have to be considered when assessing the credibility of documents (set out in Box 4.10 below).
Box 4.10: Assessing the credibility of documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Extent to which it is a problem in this study</th>
<th>Reason why</th>
<th>How to account for problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Known that the documents were used by all implementing the project</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Medium/high</td>
<td>Documents likely to be distorted as the ‘official’ version of events</td>
<td>Use more than one source of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>All documents of their type were analysed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning</td>
<td>Medium/high</td>
<td>Documents likely to be distorted as the ‘official’ version of events</td>
<td>Use more than one source of data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drawing on the assessment in Box 4.10, of particular importance for this study were issues related to the credibility and meaning of the documents. In this study it is considered that the documents were authentic because project staff made use of them and they were circulated widely to all those working on the project as well to researchers. Representativeness was not considered to be an issue here because all the project documents were available and examined. In respect to credibility and meaning of the documents, in this study the particular risk of the documents was related to the extent to which they represented an official version of project aims and project outputs rather than a record of what was going on in practice. Some of the project documents examined were those likely to be shared with the project steering groups, the general public, elected members and those at the Home Office who funded the project. This especially related to those documents regarding applications for funding,
strategy documents, and project timetables and so on. As such these were considered much more likely to show an official account of the project’s aims, objectives and what was being achieved in practice than what the practitioners working on the project thought it was aiming to achieve and what was actually happening on the ground. Project-planning records then, were potentially limited to an official version of what the practitioners were supposed to do and what the project was supposed to be achieving rather than what practitioners actually did do.

It was also important to be careful about interpreting minutes of meetings. Meeting minutes probably only capture broad areas of discussion, the range of agreed decisions and actions and as such do not represent a full report of how a group came to a decision and the behaviour of staff during meetings. There was also evidence that the minutes were carefully sanitised before they were circulated in the Manchester project (see particularly chapter seven for discussion of this). It was therefore important to be careful when using these documents as a record of decision making.

Linking research questions to methods

To round off this chapter, box 4.11 is a summary of the link between this aims of the study and the data sources and methods chosen to address them.

Box 4.11: Linking research questions to methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with the implementation of problem-oriented approaches</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>• To set out project outputs, as described by practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>• To examine how respondents understood the factors that shaped implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To examine the official version of project strategy and record of decision making (minutes of meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with the implementation of problem-oriented approaches</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>• To examine project outputs, as recorded in administrative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>• To examine how respondents saw the factors that shaped implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To examine day-to-day behaviour and routines of the practitioners implementing the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To examine interaction and interaction between practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To examine the behaviour practitioners were unwilling or unable to express</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To capture the informal nature of decision making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Mason (1996)

The following chapter charts the implementation of the two projects. It examines what they planned to do, the structures and processes that were put in place to implement them, the outputs and outcomes of the two projects and the difference between what was planned and what was implemented.

In chapter six patterns of implementation of the two projects are examined in terms of their top-down features. These focus on the role played by project leadership and communication, resources, project theory and objectives, guidance and accountability and management. In chapter seven the role of bottom-up concerns in explaining patterns of implementation are discussed. These included how practitioners come to
understand and negotiate project aims, the role of agency routines and values and conflict.
Chapter five

Implementation in Cambridge and Manchester: processes, structures, outputs and outcomes

Introduction

The aim of this first results chapter is to describe planned the interventions in the Cambridge and Manchester projects, the processes through which these were delivered and the outputs and outcomes that the projects finally managed to deliver. It examines the difference between what the two projects planned to achieve and what was ultimately implemented. In doing so this chapter will provide the basis for the subsequent chapters which use top-down and bottom-up principles to examine patterns of implementation in the two projects. To this end, the chapter begins by describing the features of the programme from which the two projects were funded. It then sets out the profile of the problems that the two projects were trying to tackle through examining the crime and other data which were used to analyse and understand problems. The staffing and management arrangements that were set in place in order to implement them are discussed. The development of the responses in the two projects over time is then charted.

The Crime Reduction Programme and the Targeted Policing Initiative

The Cambridge and Manchester projects were funded from the government’s Crime Reduction Programme which was launched in 1999 and ran initially for three years. The Programme was an ambitious effort to reduce crime and improve the evidence base about what works in crime reduction (Laycock and Webb, 2003; Homel et al., 2005). The programme was established following the New Labour Government’s 1997 comprehensive spending review and was based on a review of the literature on what works in reducing crime (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998). The Programme had three main aims (Homel et al., 2005):
- the sustained reduction of crime through implementing interventions that are known to work and through promoting innovative practice in mainstream crime reduction activity;
- the generation of improvements in the knowledge base about what works in reducing crime; and,
- the delivery of cost savings through the reduction of crime and improved efficiency.

Some £400 million was granted to fund initiatives and a programme of research and development. Police services and their partners could apply for money to support locally based crime reduction initiatives via a centrally managed competitive grant system. The Crime Reduction Programme was set up as a series of initiatives, some of which focused on a specific crime type for example: burglary, violence against women and prostitution, and others had a broader crime reduction agenda such as; designing out crime, early interventions with young people, CCTV, and the Targeted Policing Initiative (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Ten per cent of the overall Crime Reduction Programme was set aside for evaluation of projects, reflecting the focus on improving the knowledge base on what works in reducing crime. The evaluation was managed centrally by the Research Development and Statistics Directorate at the Home Office, though a large proportion of the evaluation was contracted out to external academics and private consultants.

The Cambridge and Manchester projects were part of the Targeted Policing Initiative. The Initiative was one of the larger funding streams in the Crime Reduction Programme with a budget of about £30 million to fund projects, development and research. The stated aims of the Targeted Policing Initiative were actually fairly loose and the money was aimed very generally at providing an incentive to implement problem-oriented processes in police services. The release of funds for the Crime Reduction Programme coincided with increasing interest in problem-oriented policing nationally and this facilitated the release of this substantial amount of money to support its implementation. Reflecting the difficulties that had been seen in implementing problem-oriented policing in the past, the Targeted Policing Initiative aimed to provide the necessary financial support to facilitate the implementation of
the problem-oriented projects (Laycock and Webb, 2003). Those who designed the Initiative assumed that the availability of additional funding would provide the incentive for police services and their partner organisations to implement problem-oriented solutions to specific issues (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Thus, the intention was that the release of this money would provide the conditions to test the impact of problem-oriented policing as the police service would be equipped with the funds and wherewithal to implement projects locally (Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Laycock and Webb, 2003).

Over three years, the Targeted Policing Initiative spent around £30 million on fifty-nine projects and evaluation. Police services (and their partners) could apply for money in a number of ways. As mentioned above many locally based initiatives were selected by competitive bidding. In the Targeted Policing Initiative, the majority (two-thirds) of the projects were selected through two rounds of competitive bidding. The first round was held in early 1999 and funded eleven projects. A second round was held in 2000 and funded twenty-seven projects. The two competitive rounds were managed slightly differently but in both police officers and their partner agencies had to complete an application form that set out on the size and nature of the problem that was to be addressed and the details of the proposed responses to tackle it. The information that was required for the applications was based around the main processes of problem-oriented policing. Additional information was required for the management of the programme as a whole (for example, information about the resources required and timetables).

Box 5.1 (below) outlines the requirements for the two rounds.

**Box 5.1: Application requirements of round one and round two proposals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round one application requirements</th>
<th>Round two application requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• To provide a description of the problem that they sought money to tackle</td>
<td>• An outline of the size and the nature of the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To indicate how the problem related to the findings from local crime and</td>
<td>• A description of why the problem was worth tackling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• An explanation of why the problem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
disorder audits and strategies

• To show how the problem related to the local policing plan
• To spell out how the problem would be tackled, specifying in particular whether the project would make use of:
  - structured crime/incident data
  - new structures/arrangements
  - innovative tactics
  - to show what crime reduction targets could be achieved
• To note related initiatives
• To list other factors affecting the area
• To indicate what resources would be required

was amendable to a problem-oriented approach

• Objectives/targets for dealing with the problem
• Possible interventions to tackle the problem
• An outline of funding required
• Details of planned or ongoing initiatives
• A timetable

In both competitive rounds the police services had about a month to complete the applications. A team of Home Office researchers, policy officials and an external assessor reviewed and marked all the proposals and made recommendations for funding. Bullock et al. (2002) described the decision making process in relation to funding projects. A scoring system was devised and the scores used to make decisions about which projects to fund to introduce consistency and fairness in decision making and the proposals were selected on the extent to which they met a range of criteria. These criteria were related to quality of data collection and analysis, the identification and formulation of targeted policing responses, feasibility, expected outcome, and the plans for project sustainability. The total score accrued by a bid according to the various criteria was considered alongside a written qualitative assessment of a bid’s overall potential contribution to crime reduction and likelihood of success (Bullock et al., 2002). In both of the competitive rounds short development visits from academics and Home Office staff were undertaken to short-listed projects in order to help them improve their proposals.
The Cambridge project was funded from round two of the competitive grant funding scheme. In this case, Read and Tilley (both then from the Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate) visited Cambridge Constabulary on 7 June 2000 to discuss the bid that had been made to the Targeted Policing Initiative. Following this, the Cambridge project officially received £167,000 from the Home Office in September 2000. In addition, Cambridge Constabulary committed to allocate two constables from existing police resources for the duration of the project (estimated cost £120,000).

The Manchester project was funded somewhat differently. The then head of the community safety department at Greater Manchester Police and the then borough commander for South Manchester approached the then head of policing research at the Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate informally for funding for a project to tackle gang violence in South Manchester. As well as the competitive grant funding, the Targeted Policing Initiative funded some projects selected on a less systematic case-by-case basis. These tended to reflect very topical issues or problems that were of national interest (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). There was no particular application format for these projects and they were considered on an individual basis. They were not expected to fill in the same project profiles as those projects bidding for funding from the competitive rounds but they were supposed to be problem-oriented projects in nature. Examples included, among others, research on the police use of stop and search, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Crimestoppers scheme and an evaluation of the pilot of the National Intelligence Model.

Following a period of analysis of the problem of gang-related violence in Manchester by central Home Office researchers (see sections below) Targeted Policing Initiative funding for a £500,000 project to tackle gang related violence in South Manchester was formally agreed on 25 May 2001. In keeping with the evidence based nature of the Crime Reduction Programme, many of the projects were evaluated. Both the Cambridge and Manchester cases were evaluated by central Home Office research staff (Bullock and Tilley).
The following sections examine problem analysis and understanding in the two projects, their management and staffing arrangements, development of responses and the main project outputs and outcomes.

**Problem analysis and understanding**

**Cambridge**

The Cambridge project aimed to apply problem-oriented principles to cycle theft: a high volume, relatively low impact crime problem. The problem analysis was produced by the then head of the community safety department for the city of Cambridge along with an analyst from Cambridgeshire County Council.

An examination of the original project proposal showed that the problem definition predominately used recorded police data. Data were available for the overall numbers of cycle thefts for two years (1998/1999, 1999/2000) and broken down by place (the postcodes and streets where the thefts occurred); time (months of the year in which the thefts occurred); and, victim attributes (the age and gender of the victims).

Non-crime data were however also utilised for the analysis of the problem of bicycle theft. These included:

- Cambridge Cycling Campaign (a pressure group seeking better provision for cyclists in the city): counts of cycle parking usage for three months of one year, 1999 (the numbers of spaces by area, style of stand and whether the bicycles were securely fixed and by what locking mechanism);
- Cambridgeshire County Council traffic monitoring information which provided counts of the number of cycle trips in a 12-hour period in March 1999; and,
- the estimated cost of a bicycle theft and rates of bicycle recovery.

These data (along with some observations that were not evidence based) were used to analyse and explain cycle theft in Cambridge in terms of the location in which they occurred and attributes of the victims of cycle thefts and the detected offenders. The results are described in the following sections.
Overall the project’s problem analysis demonstrated that cycle theft was a large and persistent crime problem in Cambridge. In the year 1999-2000 cycle theft accounted for 20 per cent of all recorded crime in Cambridge, 50 per cent of which occurred in the city centre. There were 2,932 recorded cycle thefts in the year 1999/2000, which represented a five per cent increase on the year 1998/1999.

The proposal authors estimated that recorded cycle crime cost £832,000 in the calendar year 1999 (3,200 cycles). This was based on a conservative estimate of £160 per cycle and an additional £100 of police officer time. However, the proposal also noted that cycle theft tends to be under-recorded, possibly by as much as 80 per cent and as such the problem could have been costing as much as £4,100,000 per year.

Using the 1999/2000 recorded cycle theft data, the proposal identified seven geographic hotspot areas for cycle crime within the city of Cambridge, which are shown in box 5.1 (below):

**Box 5.2: Cycle crime hotspots in Cambridge as demonstrated by the project proposal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Post code</th>
<th>Number of offences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grafton shopping centre</td>
<td>CB1 1PS</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge train station</td>
<td>CB1 2JW</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummer Street bus station</td>
<td>CB1 1NQ</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addenbrookes hospital</td>
<td>CB2 2QQ</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mill Road</td>
<td>CB1 2BD</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Square</td>
<td>CB1 3QJ</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The YMCA</td>
<td>CB1 1ND</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Taken from the proposal document)

The proposal contained detailed information about each of the seven hotspot areas. This included the total number of offences, the number of offences by month and the ages and genders of the victims of cycle theft in these areas. An indicative example of this is shown in Box 5.3 below:
Box 5.3: Example of hotspot analysis in Cambridge

Hotspot location for cycle theft: Grafton shopping centre

There were a total of 126 cycle offences in and around the Grafton shopping centre, postcode CB1 1PS, in 1999/2000; this represented an increase from 71 recorded thefts in the same place in the financial year 1998/1999.

Of the 126 offences in 1999/2000, 86 were recorded as having taken place between the hours of 9am and 5pm, only seven offences were reported as having occurred after 9pm.

Data were also recorded about the month of the year in which the thefts from the Grafton Centre occurred:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999/2000</th>
<th>Number of offences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information was recorded about the age and gender of 95 of the victims of cycle theft in 1999/2000. Of these, 43 were male and 52 were female. This was broken down as follows.
### Age group vs Number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from the bid document)

The proposal then provided fairly detailed temporal information about when the thefts occurred including the time of year and time of day. Generally, the levels of cycle theft were higher in the summer than the rest of the year, peaking in October and they were most often reported as stolen during the daytime. The proposal also provided some details about the victims of cycle theft. Victims were predominately young (aged from 15 to 24). The analysis showed that 41 per cent of victims were in this age group in 1999/2000. There were slightly more male victims, for example, 1,362 male victims compared with 1,073 female victims in the year 1999/2000.

As well as providing quantitative data about the size of the cycle theft problem, its location and some victim attributes the proposal made efforts to understand why cycle theft was such a sizeable problem in Cambridge. The proposal noted that cycling is a major form of transport in Cambridge and the volume of cycles partly accounts for the high numbers of cycle thefts. Indeed the Cambridgeshire County Council traffic monitoring report counted 18,460 cycle trips across bridges over the River Cam in a 12-hour period in March 1999. The proposal pointed out that the high volume of cycles in Cambridge city centre increased demand on the available secure cycle parking places. Cambridge Cycling Campaign counts of cycle parking usage for three months of one year (1999) showed the level of secure parking was inadequate. Their research noted that only 35 per cent of bicycles were secured properly to cycle stands. In addition to that, the project proposal highlighted that some stands were inadequately designed and some were not properly installed. For example, older style ‘butterfly’ stands (in which only the front bicycle wheel can be secured with a lock)
were too small to fit the wheels of modern bicycles and some of the stands had been placed too closely together for modern cycles which tend to have wider handlebars than older models.

In commenting on the age of victims of cycle theft, the proposal pointed to the large numbers of university students who use bicycles as their main form of transport in the city. The proposal considered that young people generally are more likely to be victims of theft because they had a relaxed attitude towards securing their possessions. Additionally, the proposal described a tolerance of cycle theft in the city of Cambridge where it is considered to be a part of life. No data were provided in support of these observations.

The proposal suggested that there were three types of offenders who were responsible for thefts in Cambridge but again no evidence for these observations was provided. The first category of offender was thought to be 'joy riders'. These were people who take a bicycle without the owner's consent for a short journey within Cambridge and subsequently leave it in Cambridge. The second were offenders who were stealing bicycles opportunistically to then sell to fund problematic drug habits. The third were thought to be offenders who stole large volumes of bicycles, possibly to order, and who were possibly transporting them out of Cambridge to sell elsewhere.

Manchester
In contrast to Cambridge, the Manchester project aimed to apply problem-oriented policing principles to a very serious low volume crime problem: that of gang related shootings. The project was originally conceived along the lines of the seemingly very successful initiative in Boston, Massachusetts (the Boston Gun Project) which was associated with a rapid decline in numbers of fatalities caused by the use of guns and knives (Kennedy et al., 1996; Braga, et al., 1999). The reports of the project by the Harvard research team (who participated in that project's development and evaluated its impact) give an account of the work of the Boston project and provide compelling evidence of its effectiveness. Projects can never be fully described or fully replicated (Tilley, 1996) but the basic idea was to follow the principles of the Boston project in Manchester. This was to gather data about the nature of the problem and to formulate responses on the basis of this. The Boston project aimed to produce a quick decline in
firearms related injuries. It was not primarily focused on the underlying causes or the wider social conditions that caused shootings but on the more immediate circumstances in which shootings occurred to produce results in the short term. Following this, in Manchester the original aim was to look to affect reductions in the levels of shootings through attention to the proximate causes of shootings.

As in Cambridge, it was not incumbent on the police service to conduct the problem analysis of the crime problem themselves. Following the Boston model (which used Harvard researchers to conduct the problem analysis) Tilley and Bullock undertook an analysis of gang-related violence in Manchester. They were assisted in data collection by two civilian staff that were employed by Greater Manchester Police (in August and September 2000) and paid for from project funds. This research stage was known locally within the police service as Operation Chrome and was overseen by the then Chief Superintendent for South Manchester and a small group of Greater Manchester Police senior police officers, mainly Assistant Chief Constables.

For the analysis stage of the Manchester project attempts were made to extract and to gather information from the following.

- Calls for service data: these are records that are made every time someone calls the police.
- Recorded crime data: Home Office statistical returns representing the official picture of crime.
- Data held in the Force Intelligence Bureau about crime events and individuals: these are the records that CID keep.
- The Armed Crime Unit database: similar to the above and recorded if that crime involved a firearm.
- Data from GMPICs on individuals, who were associated with gangs, were believed responsible for shootings, or who were victims of shootings: GMPICs was Greater Manchester Police’s crime management system and the day-to-day means of recording intelligence on individuals and crimes.

These data were supplemented with information from interviews with incarcerated gang members and through canvassing the informed opinion from practitioners within
the police service and other agencies. Efforts were also made to elicit systematic data from non-police agencies that may have had additional information relevant to serious youth violence. These included the probation service, social services, the Youth Offending Team (YOT), schools and hospitals. Ultimately two special databases were constructed, one containing details of all verifiable shootings in Manchester from January 1997 to 2000 and another containing information on all individuals aged under 25 with known gang involvement.

The main findings of the analysis were as follows (Bullock and Tilley, 2002).

- Violence in general, gun violence in particular and fatal shootings most specifically were concentrated in some specific small areas of South Manchester.
- Victims of gun violence in Manchester were mainly young, Black or mixed race males, who have criminal records.
- Suspected perpetrators of serious gun violence in Manchester tended to have similar attributes to victims.
- Those who were victims of shootings were at increased risk of repeat incidents.
- The total annual cost of firearms-related violence in South Manchester was estimated as £5 million.
- Young Black (and mixed race) male victims of shootings in South Manchester were generally known to have been involved in gangs.
- There were differences in the make-up, origins, activities, and organisation of the four main South Manchester gangs, though members of all were involved in a wide range of criminal behaviour.
- Gang-membership comprised a mix of similar-age local friendship groups, blood relatives and recruits.
- Gang-related criminal behaviour included drug-related offences, but only as one element of a patchwork of violent and non-violent crime.
- Rates of arrest for gang-members tended to fall as they age.
- Gangs in South Manchester were loosely area-based.
- Alliances were sometimes formed between some South Manchester gangs, but conflict was endemic and easily triggered.
Intelligence records suggested that carrying firearms by gang members was at least partly protective, partly symbolic and partly instrumental for the commission of violent crime.

There were strong norms of non-co-operation to police enquiries into gang-related shootings, in particular in giving evidence and this had undermined successful prosecution of offenders.

These findings were presented to the Operation Chrome steering group along with a broad strategy for tackling gang-related violence based on the Boston Gun Project (set out in later sections of this chapter) held on 13 March 2001.

Management, structure and staffing of the projects

The Targeted Policing Initiative did not set out specific instructions about how the projects should be managed locally and arrangements for day-to-day oversight and management were left to the discretion of local managers. Arrangements for monitoring the grant were devolved from the central Home Office to the appropriate regionally based government office (East of England and the North West). In practice, other than monitoring whether the grant was being spent, the regional offices had little involvement in the delivery of either of the projects. The following sections discuss the local management and staffing arrangements for the two projects.

Cambridge

The Cambridge project commenced in September 2000 and was officially due to be completed in March 2002. The project was awarded £167,000 for this period from the Home Office Targeted Policing Initiative. In the event, a small amount of additional money was made available beyond March 2002 and the project manager was funded full-time until September 2002.

A full-time project manager was employed to implement the Cambridge project. The project manager was recruited by the police service on a short-term contract following an advertisement placed in the Cambridge Evening News on 26 July 2000. His job description can be seen in Annex eight. The council community safety manager for
Cambridge Southern Division and the police Chief Superintendent for Cambridge city centre had day-to-day management responsibility for the project manager. The project manager was based in the community safety department at the city police station and supported by the central research team at the County Council. A steering group was set up to monitor and oversee the implementation of the project. This consisted of representatives from the police service (two individuals), the University of Cambridge, Cambridge City Council (two individuals) and Cambridge Cycling Campaign (two individuals) and a representative from Anglia Polytechnic University.

Manchester

The structures for project implementation were much more complicated in Manchester than they were in Cambridge and so they will be described here in more detail. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the research and development phase of the project (Operation Chrome) was originally overseen by a small group of senior police officers. By the end of the research phase there had been some key personnel changes in south Manchester and the Chief Superintendent for South Manchester was replaced. On 29 March 2001 the newly appointed Chief Superintendent for South Manchester (also the new Chair of the Manchester project steering group) decided to reduce the police involvement in the subsequent stages of the project and increase the involvement of other agencies. From the end of March 2001 the project was overseen by a steering group of senior representatives of the agencies, set out in box 5.4, plus a headmaster from a local school, who was invited to attend permanently on 24 April 2001.

A full-time project manager, a police inspector, was appointed in May 2001 to coordinate the implementation of the Manchester project. The project manager was recruited following an internal Greater Manchester Police recruitment exercise. The roles of the two civilian staff formally employed on the research stage of Operation Chrome were amended, so that they became the ‘implementation manager’ and ‘information manager’ on 22 May 2001. The project office was based at Longsight police station in the South Manchester division. Practitioners were seconded from agencies or employed on short-term contracts as shown in Box 5.4.
Box 5.4: Staff appointed to the project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Number of posts</th>
<th>TPI funded</th>
<th>Seconded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth Offending Team</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Youth service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Education and welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed job descriptions for all the staff can be seen in Annex seven.

This group normally met weekly on Wednesday mornings to discuss and co-ordinate project interventions. On a day-to-day level this was directly overseen and facilitated by the police officer project manager and the two civilian posts (implementation and information managers). Home agency managers retained residual responsibility for their seconded staff. Initially, there were further meetings of a group for the line managers of seconded staff, though this group was disbanded early on.

Box 5.5 (below) shows the structure of the project whilst the manager’s group met. The same structure subsequently operated in the absence of the manager’s group. As in Cambridge, the evaluation of the project was ongoing largely independently of the project but formal feedback was given to the board twice (other than the initial presentation of 13 March 2001): 29 January 2002 (presentation to board) and 18 July 2002 (memo to project chair).
Box 5.5: Manchester project structure

**Steering group**
- Chair: police chief
- Superintendent
- Housing
- Probation
- City Council
- Education
- Social services
- Youth Offending Team

**Implementation team**
- Police inspector project manager
- Implementation manager
- Information manager

**Practitioners group**
- Housing
- Probation service
- Education
- Youth Offending Team
- Social services

**Managers group**
- Housing
- Education
- Youth Offending Team
- Social services
- Probation service
Response development

Cambridge

The Cambridge project manager came into his post with the aims of the project clearly articulated and the timetable for implementation of key initiatives documented in the project documents. The proposal stated that the aims of the Cambridge cycle theft reduction project were:

- to reduce the number of cycle thefts in Cambridge city centre by five to ten per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line);
- to reduce the number of cycle thefts from students in Cambridge city centre by 20 per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line); and,
- to increase the number of detections in Cambridge city centre by ten per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line).

The response was based on providing additional security for cycles, targeting offenders and reducing the risk-taking activities of cyclists. The specific stated objectives of this project were:

- to trial different types of secure cycle parking racks to determine which were the most user-friendly and secure, and appropriate for different locations in Cambridge;
- to provide a secure cycle park in the basement of Park Street car park;
- to determine additional locations throughout the city for installing secure cycle racking;
- to install extra racks and replace inadequate existing racking;
- to set up a comprehensive and consistent university wide cycle registration scheme and include publicity about racks;
- to use a black and fluorescent ‘police warning’ campaign to warn cyclists of theft problems;
- to set up a cycle squad of two police constables to proactively to target prolific offenders;
- to measure the change in the number of securely parked cycles in a pre-defined city centre location;
• to determine current figures of under reporting of cycle theft in Cambridge city;
  and,
• To work out what measures effectively reduce cycle crime.

The full project timetable is provided in Annex three. The key project milestones are set out in box 5.6 below:

**Box 5.6: Key milestones of the Cambridge project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Submission of revised project plan to the Home Office</td>
<td>End August 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Employ a project manager to carry out the research on the project</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Two police constables to start work on the cycle theft reduction project</td>
<td>November 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Research rack types and locations for pilot</td>
<td>December 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Work with university to determine registration scheme for use in colleges</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Develop registration scheme for implementation in October 2001</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Equip colleges to start registration scheme</td>
<td>September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Start the registration scheme</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Trial the racks and identify type of rack and location</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Design alteration of Park Street secure cycle park</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Install cycle racking at Park Street and locations in Cambridge city</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Start registration scheme at Anglia Polytechnic University, 6th form colleges and schools</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Manchester**

The response development stage was longer and more complicated in Manchester than it was in Cambridge. The Home Office agreed funding for the project in May 2001 from the Targeted Policing Initiative. Formally the funding (£500,000) was to run from July 2001 to September 2002. As with the Boston project the main focus
was to reduce shootings and serious violence. A broad strategy was laid out by Bullock and Tilley. The first three elements were based on the Boston project whilst the second three were suggested in light of the more distinctive conditions in Manchester.

1. To apply co-ordinated leverage to gangs through highly publicised multi-agency targeted crackdowns, aimed at gangs using firearms, possessing firearms or taking part in serious assaults.
2. To enhance community relations, to ensure that the community supported the strategy and to avoid the crackdown backfiring.
3. To engage with gang members to elicit information, to transmit consistent messages about targeted crackdowns, and to provide diversionary services.
4. To develop inter-gang mediation services, to head off and defuse tensions that risk leading to serious incidents of violence, including shootings.
5. To increase protection for victims and repeat victims.
6. To sensitise agencies to the implications of their actions for gangs and the risks to their members, especially in the light of the provisions of Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998).

These six broad elements of the project were agreed by the steering group on 13 March 2001. Box 5.7 shows the overall strategy as envisaged at the meeting of 13 March.
Box 5.7: The logic of the original Manchester project

Create context for successful crackdowns, with community support and gang engagement

Effect highly publicised, rapid multi-agency crackdowns in response to shootings with victim protection, and mediation if opportunity arose

Create fire-break
A halt in the shootings to allow other interventions to be implemented

Inhibit recruitment to gangs via early identification of children and youths at risk, mobilise family and community control, and agency intervention

Facilitate exiting from gang lifestyle with alternative educational services, employment services, business start ups, relocation, etc.
In the original strategy, suggestions were set out for developing a referral scheme for young people at risk of becoming involved in firearms and for developing a model of improving community relations, as shown in Box 5.8 below.

### Box 5.8: Referral and community relations schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referral scheme</td>
<td>A scheme in which:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• where a young person came to the attention of the police for crime or anti-social behaviour and there was evidence of gang involvement, the young person would be referred to the project, and a letter would be sent to parents;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• if the behaviour continued, a further letter would be sent to parents and to school; and,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• if it still persisted, a multi-agency case conference would be called and enforcement action might then be taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing community relations</td>
<td>A cyclical scheme whereby:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the project liaises with beat and housing officers who report signs of gang-related crime and disorder to the project;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the project collates data on gangs and guns in the target area;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The project liaises with relevant agencies to resolve problems and feeds back to the community what is done; and,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the community is consulted to identify areas of concern.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to Cambridge where the project manager had no input in the response development, detailed tactical planning in Manchester was left to the implementation team. The implementation team subsequently produced a number of sizeable
documents, which presented large numbers of recommendations about how to proceed with the implementation of the project. The first detailed draft strategy document dated 6 April 2001 ran to some 41 pages and contained well over one hundred recommendations. Recommendations were divided under two headings: ‘enforcement’ and ‘prevention.’ These were further divided into a range of proposed activities.

Boxes 5.9 and 5.10 (below) give some examples.

**Box 5.9: Indicative examples of law enforcement recommendations**

- Brief the head of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and key prosecutors based on the findings of the research

- Conduct regular sessions with Clerks to the keep the Courts updated on developments within the gang landscape, the wider context of gangs and impact on the community

- Ensure a detailed multi-agency assessment is carried out on all gang-involved youth and adults before the courts

- Develop a procedure whereby marginally involved youths can be released under licence or bailed to intensive supervision by the Youth Offending Team (YOT) and probation also involving individuals from other agencies

- In order to make deterrence work, adopt the pulling levers strategy in police crackdowns

- Initiate practices in probation that allow for increased frequency of home visits during non-traditional hours

- Address the needs of YOT relating to concerns about staff security/safety

- Rigorously enforce tenancy compliance, injunctions, evictions and [re]possession

- Partner agencies considering pursuing an Anti-social Behaviour Order inform other partners regarding who the target is for discussion

- Establish a combined law enforcement/criminal justice agency gang unit with the aim of setting a precedent for a multi-agency task force on gangs and gang violence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Box 5.10: Indicative examples of prevention recommendations</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Interventions must address the multiple factors which condition youth towards serious youth offending behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish a multi-agency database containing basic information on gang involved youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chronically affected areas be subject to the full range of interventions. Those with emerging gang problems be subject to a more limited set of interventions, e.g. a primary emphasis on work in the schools, outreach on the streets and increased police patrols at potential hotspots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greater Manchester Police exchange information about known gang members with neighbouring police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor the impact of gangs on non-gang offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor problems or obstacles that youth and family members may encounter as each tailored intervention plan unfolds; agencies must be flexible in this respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Encourage partners and community-based grass roots groups to collaborate in supervising youth whilst in school and immediately after the school day ends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish information routes so that data on gang-involved children and children vulnerable to gang influences get to appropriate school staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide a mix of day/evening/weekend classes, crash courses and tutoring in the home and at youth centres, colleges and other centres: an ‘alternative high school’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide simultaneous education/skills development and training to youth and youth’s parent[s] and other family members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify signs of impending disputes and carry out timely mediation in schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure that Sure Start is aware of any history of gang involvement of young parents they work with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify non-statutory community-based groups to act as first point of contact/intervention in support of families with gang-involved youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prior to release of an incarcerated gang-involved youth, identify and work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with other community members who may have latent antagonisms or disputes with the youth

- Directly approach youth in the streets, parks and other public 24 hours a day
- Intervene at early stages of a dispute
- Develop closer links with non-statutory groups
- Develop models for risk assessment related to different categories of youth
- Help to build relations between gang-involved youth and the wider civil society
- Develop a jobs bank to provide work as an alternative to gang involvement
- Practitioners conduct regular briefings for senior managers of partner agencies to ensure they are familiar with the changing dynamics of the gang landscape.
- Develop regular workshop for practitioners from different agencies who deal with, or have dealt with, gang involved youth and/or their families
- Police officers to get out of cars and onto the streets more often to become visible ‘same cop same neighbourhood’ officers
- Gang Involved Youth Service Providers Network to act as outreach organisation and as an interface between gang-involved youth and existing statutory agencies
- Raise health professionals’ awareness of gangs and impact of gang culture on youth
- Visits of partner practitioners to project units/offices to elicit feedback from project staff and those in receipt of services from the project

At a meeting held on 24 April 2001, the steering group decided it was not realistic to try to implement all the measures proposed by the implementation team. Each agency represented on the project was asked to select a smaller number of interventions, using an abridged template of options based on the document described in box 5.10, which were appropriate to their agency and which they agreed to implement. Interventions were considered by the individual agencies on the basis of desirability, viability, priority, and means of implementation. Agencies were also asked to consider naming individuals who would be responsible for implementing the interventions, and also to provide estimates of how much it would cost.
At the steering group meeting of 22 May 2001, thirty-one interventions were agreed by the group as detailed in Box 5.11 below.

**Box 5.11: The thirty-one elements of the Manchester project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project intervention</th>
<th>Lead and other main agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct regular home visits and identify the changing needs of youth and family</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop a jobs bank</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct conflict mediation in all environments affected by gangs</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Directly intervene with youth gang members if there is a likelihood of tit for tat reprisal</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Encourage local businesses to support specific projects</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure employment for youth and family members in regeneration projects</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish outreach worker pilot project to conduct street level outreach</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide mediation between youth, residents and local businesses</td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents</td>
<td>• Education department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liaise directly with schools to develop 'early warning mechanisms'</td>
<td>• Education department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assist schools in tackling gang problems</td>
<td>• Education department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate meetings between parents of gang members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish a ‘virtual transition school’ for gang-involved youth who have been excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish regular information exchange between all agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiate a ‘same cop same neighbourhood’ process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish ‘Community Prosecution’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engage grass roots groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raise awareness of gangs and gang dynamics among all agencies and schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance responsiveness to community concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop a risk assessment model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Utilise Anti-social Behaviour Orders and tenancy compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop links with agencies in other cities to ensure continued support for relocated youth and families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Provide intensive ‘wrap around’ support for youth and family
  - Social services

- Help youth and families access services
  - Social services
  - Manchester City Council Chief Executive’s Department

- Assist gang-involved youth to leave disorganised and/or destructive family situations
  - Social services
  - Housing

- Ensure security of young women victimised by gang members
  - Social services
  - Housing

- Provide independent and/or supported living accommodation in areas not affected by gangs
  - Social services
  - Housing

- Police/probation/YOT partnership for ‘Operation Nightlight’ with youth offenders
  - Youth Offending Team
  - Greater Manchester Police
  - Probation

- Monitor the impact of gangs on non-gang offenders
  - Youth Offending Team
  - Greater Manchester Police
  - Probation

- Work with incarcerated gang members and their families
  - Youth Offending Team
  - Probation
  - Outreach workers

At the steering group meeting held on 20 June 2001 a new name for the project, *The Manchester Multi-Agency Gang Strategy (MMAGS)* and a general mission statement were agreed. The stated mission was:

- to enforce the law through multi agency targeted crackdowns;
- to deter young people from entering into a gang / gun culture and divert them towards alternatives;
- to provide support to young people and families who are most vulnerable;
- to secure the conviction and/or rehabilitation of gang involved offenders;
• to reduce the incidence of death and injury to young people and the wider impact of gangs on the community; and,
• to create an environment for commercial investment.

Main project outputs: Cambridge

The outputs of the Cambridge cycle theft project fell into three main categories: provision of secure parking; bicycle registration schemes and publicity; and, targeting of prolific offenders. These are discussed in turn in the following sections:

Provision of secure parking
A secure cycle parking experiment was undertaken between September 2000 and August 2001 largely in accordance with the original project proposals. Eight varieties of racks were ultimately selected from over 120 designs considered by local cycling groups, planning officers, engineers and a disability consultative panel. Stands were selected on the basis of a range of factors. First, that it was possible to secure the frame of cycle to the stand. Second, that they should be easy to use. Third, that they should look attractive given the historic nature of Cambridge city centre. Fourth, that they met the needs of a variety of different shapes and sizes of bicycle. And lastly, that the finish was durable. Ninety-two were originally installed as part of the experiment. Pictures of the type of rack can be seen below in Box 5.12.
Box 5.12: Styles of rack used in the experiment

Following the pilot, secure parking was rolled out around the city centre. Overall, by the end of the project 277 additional racks had been installed providing 560 secure parking spaces. Box 5.13 shows a breakdown of the implementation of the secure parking.

Box 5.13: bicycle stand implementation information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Racks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Removed</td>
<td>Installed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-00</td>
<td>Milton Road School</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-01</td>
<td>Market Hill</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-01</td>
<td>Guildhall - Peas Hill Side</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-01</td>
<td>Market Hill end of Peas Hill</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-01</td>
<td>Guildhall - Petty Cury Side</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-01</td>
<td>Peas Hill</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-01</td>
<td>St. George's House</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An indoor secure cycle park (Park Street cycle park) was the biggest single financial investment of the Cambridge project. Park Street car park is close to the centre of the city of Cambridge and following the introduction of measures to control motor vehicle access to the city it was rarely full. This created the opportunity to site a large capacity cycle park. The building was provided at no cost by Cambridge city council who agreed to maintain it over the long term. The basement of the car park was converted to a secured cycle park, at a cost of £75,000. The facility provides secure cycle parking for 285 bicycles. It is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week and is covered by CCTV. It features:
• 218 free cycle parking spaces;
• 53 cycle lockers that can be hired for £10 per month;
• easy to use cycle racks suitable for securing a wide range of cycle types; and,
• special racks for tandems, bicycles with trailers and recumbent cycles.

The cycle park was completed in March 2002 and opened in July 2002. This was coming up for six months later than was originally planned.

Property marking, registration and publicity
Cycle marking involves fixing a unique identifier to a bicycle frame. A record of the code, a description of the bicycle and the owner’s details can be kept in a register and in the event that a cycle is lost an accurate description of the missing bicycle is available from the register and it can be recorded as lost or stolen. Any recovered bicycles can then be cross-checked with the register to return them to their owners. Marks on cycles can be overt or covert or a mixture of both. Box 5.14 shows the attributes of overt and covert marking.

Box 5.14: Covert and overt cycle marking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covert</th>
<th>Overt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Bright mark</td>
<td>• Hard to find</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May also include the code number and who to contact to check the register.</td>
<td>• In some cases may only be read with special equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Usually easy to remove</td>
<td>• Normally very hard to remove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Usually cheap</td>
<td>• Can be high tech and quite expensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In registration schemes, information about the bicycles is recorded centrally (usually by a registration company rather than by the police or other public body) and this company would normally assume responsibility for keeping the information on cycles up to date. The project proposal stated that before the start of the project there had been no systematic attempt by the police service to encourage Cambridge cyclists to register their bicycles with one of the registration schemes available. The university
college porters operated their own rather crude registration system which involved numbering bicycles with paint and keeping a paper record of those numbers and the contact details of the bicycle owners. The Cambridge project sought to encourage cyclists to register their bicycles more systematically.

The cycle theft reduction project used four different commercial registration companies for the property-making elements of the project (shown in Box 5.15).

**Box 5.15: Cycle marking systems used in the Cambridge project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kit</th>
<th>Marking Technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retainagroup</td>
<td>• Bright holographic sticker with code number punched through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Two covert stickers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Dot</td>
<td>• Microdots painted onto the bicycle frame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Presence of dot picked up by ultraviolet light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Code has to be read by a magnifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bikeregister.</td>
<td>• Coded stickers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>com</td>
<td>• Electronic transponder (trackers) inside the seat tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datalog</td>
<td>• Coded stickers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Electronic transponders (trackers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The university college porters preferred to keep the registration of cycles within the colleges and so the project manager also produced a special pack for the colleges to register their students’ cycles themselves. This contained:

- pens to mark bicycles with;
- a booklet in which to record information about the bicycle, its owner and its code to be retained by whoever was maintaining the scheme; and,
- a booklet giving bicycle security information for the cycle owner.

The project manager distributed many thousands of packs to the colleges but it was not clear from project records exactly how many additional cycles were registered as a direct result. However, the project manager sent a questionnaire to the colleges in an attempt to quantify the numbers of cycles that were registered. This showed that of
the 16 colleges (out of 31) that replied, the overall number of coded cycles increased from 682 cycles in the academic year 2000/01 to 1,290 in 2001/02.

In addition, about 25 other cycle registration events were held where several hundred bicycles were marked with the kits described in Box 5.15. Box 5.16 (below) shows the details (where available) of the larger events.

**Box 5.16: Cycle registration events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of registration and marking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St Johns College</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>Digital phone records made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge Festival of Cycling: Dr Bike event</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>60+ Retainagroup kits applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge Festival of Cycling: Cycle try out show</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>40+ Bikeregister.com kits applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perse School</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>60 bicycles marked with a school code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherry Hinton</td>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>Small number of Retainagroup kits applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addenbrooks hospital</td>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>36 special Addenbrooks marks applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkside police station</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>125 bicycles marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkside police station</td>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>11 staff bicycles marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge railway station</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>30 bicycles marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge railway station</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>20 bicycles marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morley Memorial School</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>49 bicycles marked with Bikeregister.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shire Hall</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>20 Bikeregister.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shire Hall</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>• 4 marked with Bikeregister.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 20 marked with Alpha Dot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 Datalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Bike (bicycle fixing)</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>• 8 Bikeregister.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Marking Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park Street cycle park</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barton School</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Day Out – Parkers Piece</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>Small number of bicycles marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge railway station – start of regular monthly marking</td>
<td>August 2002</td>
<td>7 Retainagroup kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDA supermarket</td>
<td>August 2002</td>
<td>20 Alpha Dot kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway station monthly marking</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>20 Retainagroup kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guildhall Cambridge</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>23 Datalog 9 Alpha Dot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway station monthly marking</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>11 Datalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park Street cycle park</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>64 Bikeregister.com kits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As set out in the objectives, the project aimed to implement a high visibility ‘police warning’ campaign to alert cyclists to high risk areas. In the event, the project team decided that highlighting specific high risk areas might be counterproductive and so they decided not to conduct this kind of publicity.

**Targeting of prolific offenders**

It has been seen that a key objective of the Cambridge project was to provide a dedicated squad of two police officers. The police officers were to:

- disrupt the activities of prolific offenders using suitable methods, including the cycle trap;
- identify offenders through intelligence gathering;
- link offenders to hot spot areas; and,
- monitor displacement or cessation of offences.
In the event, Cambridgeshire Constabulary were unable to provide two officers for this aspect of the project.

Box 5.17 (below) lists planned measures for the Cambridge project and summarises the extent of their implementation.

**Box 5.17: Summary of implementation of planned measures of the Cambridge project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned measure</th>
<th>Implementation status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• To trial different types of secure cycle parking racks to determine which were the most user-friendly and secure and appropriate for different locations in Cambridge</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To provide a secure car park in the basement of Park Street car park</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To measure the change in securely parked cycles in a pre-defined city centre location</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To use black and fluorescent 'police warning' campaign to warn cyclists of theft problems</td>
<td>Not implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To set up a cycle squad of two police constables to proactively target prolific offenders</td>
<td>Not implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To set up a comprehensive and consistent university-wide cycle registration scheme and include publicity about racks</td>
<td>Implemented and ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To determine additional locations throughout the city for installing secure cycle racking. Install extra racks and replace inadequate existing racking</td>
<td>Implemented and ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To determine current figures of under reporting of cycle theft in Cambridge city and to work out what measures effectively reduce cycle crime</td>
<td>Implemented and ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To summarise, the Cambridge bicycle theft project successfully implemented the secure bicycle parking aspects of the project albeit its biggest financial investment, the establishment of the indoor cycle park, was implemented about six months later than originally planned. It had partial success in setting up a comprehensive university-wide cycle registration scheme which, at the end of the evaluation period, was ongoing. It did not manage to implement the cycle squad to proactively target offenders.

**Main project outputs: Manchester**

As was discussed in the previous chapter, the outputs of this project were harder to quantify than the Cambridge project due to its scope and size and the varied and broad nature of the interventions that they ultimately sought to implement. These tended to be focused either on addressing a perceived root cause of problems (for example addressing poor attendance at school or addressing a family’s housing needs) or through attempting to divert young people away from crime by providing other activities to occupy their time. This (along with the reluctance to fill in activity logs) makes quantification of the outputs harder than it was in the Cambridge project. Nevertheless, the following is a description of the main observed outputs of the Manchester project broken down into the following sections:

- the target list;
- Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT scheme);
- community Relations;
- awareness raising; and,
- crackdown.

**The target list**

The practitioners employed on the Manchester case study spent most of their time engaged in the development of actions for individuals on a list who were selected for targeted interventions co-ordinated by the multi-agency team. The aim was to provide ‘wrap around’ interventions to support an individual who was assessed as being at
risk of joining a gang or who was known to be a gang member. In this project 'wrap around' meant that a range of services would be offered to support the various elements of a young person’s life that were thought to make him or her vulnerable to gang membership and crime. This could have included a wide range of interventions as felt appropriate by the project team and included: supporting a young person’s educational or training needs; helping a person find employment; attending to a young person’s and their family’s housing needs; linking into mental health or drug or alcohol misuse services; or, providing diversionary schemes. It could also be extended to members of the young person’s immediate family, if elements of a person’s family life were thought to be contributing to their vulnerability. The project steering group had stated that the project should seek to work with 85 gang-involved individuals at least to begin with.

At the end of March 2003, 172 individuals were on the list and some aggregate information about those individuals was available. Of the 172 individuals 150 were male. The average age was 19; the youngest being 12 and the oldest was in the mid-40s. Sixty-five per cent lived in south Manchester. The individuals on the target list had varied criminal histories. The police had obtained the criminal records of 55 of the 172 individuals (the others had no criminal record). Between them, this 55 had records of 852 offences, which is a mean of 15 offences per individual. However, this average masked a large range in offending history. One individual had 66 offences to his name. Others had only come to the attention of the police once.

As has been seen, the practitioners were unwilling to complete logs outlining the work that they were doing with the young people. This made it difficult to quantify the nature of agreed actions in respect to their interventions with the target list. Nevertheless, information about the nature of the project outputs were gleaned from other data sources. The minutes of meetings were examined for information relating to actions for the individuals on the target list. Two hundred and thirty-three actions, based on about 100 of the individuals that the group had worked with, were examined. There were problems using the minutes to quantify the project outputs: they probably underestimate activity in relation to the targeted individuals; they do not indicate whether interventions were merely planned or actually implemented; they give no
indication about the actual amount of time spent on activities; and, they do not indicate whether they were successful in the longer term. Thus they only give an indicative flavour of the sorts of intervention measures that were planned. The nature of the interventions were in fact very varied but have been classified for clarity. Box 5.18 shows some examples and the whole table can be seen in Annex four.

Box 5.18: Types of planned interventions for target individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Percentage of overall activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning activity</td>
<td>• Development of action plans for the young people</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assessments of needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Risk assessments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Locating and contacting individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>• Arranging meetings</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Home visits to individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Visits to individuals in prison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Introductions to the project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link to existing provision</td>
<td>• Link with key workers in various agencies</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Link with other agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific interventions</td>
<td>• Childcare</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Providing diversionary activities (often Go-Karting)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enforcement options</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>• Securing appropriate education provision</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supporting existing education provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>• Monitoring individuals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Updating meeting about individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Housing options

- Re-housing
- Secure accommodation
- Supported housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing options</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=233

**Gang Resistance Education and Training scheme**

The Gang Resistance Education and Training scheme programme was actually not one of the 31 original interventions (it was officially added as an intervention on 28 January 2003). Nevertheless it was developed by the education officers working on the project along with the project implementation manager and consumed most of the education officers’ time. The GREAT scheme was basically an attempt to teach young people and their parents the skills to avoid gang pressure and youth violence. The Manchester scheme included sessions on awareness of gangs, the consequences of gang life, conflict resolution activities and problem solving. By the end of Home Office funding the GREAT scheme was still in the stages of development and piloting.

**Community relations**

The community relations element of the strategy in practice basically involved meetings and discussions with community groups and representatives. It proved hard to quantify the exact number of such meetings because of unwillingness to fill in activity logs, but a good estimate was around 80 formal presentations and numerous informal discussions.

**Awareness raising**

A number of meetings (formal and informal) were held by the practitioners with members of their home agencies to try and raise awareness of gang-related problems and raise the profile of the project. Upwards of 50 formal meetings were held between October 2001 and March 2003 as well as numerous informal discussions.
Co-ordinated crackdown on gang-related shootings

The co-ordinated, gang-focused multi-agency crackdown, which was to follow explicitly stated and well-specified targeted behaviours, was not implemented as envisaged in any of the strategy documents.

In all around one-third of the 31 agreed lines of work agreed were not implemented in any form. Practitioner time was primarily spent on developing support and diversion for individuals on the target list; developing the GREAT programme; and, making presentations about gangs to community groups and agency staff.

Box 5.19 below shows which initiatives were not implemented along the lines envisaged in the implementation plans.

**Box 5.19: Elements of the Manchester project not implemented in any form**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Initiate a ‘same cop same neighbourhood’ process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish a ‘virtual transition school’ for gang involved youths who have been excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liaise directly with schools to develop early warning mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Directly intervene with youth-gang members if there is a likelihood of tit for tat reprisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide mediation between youth and residents and local businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct conflict mediation in all environments affected by gangs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure employment for youth and family members in regeneration projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop a jobs bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Encourage local businesses to support specific projects

Box 5.20 shows those elements that had been implemented and were ongoing at the conclusion of Home Office support through the Targeted Policing Initiative.

**Box 5.20: Elements of the Manchester gun project being implemented at the end of Home Office funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to schools in tackling gang problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising awareness of gangs and gang dynamics among all agencies and schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation of Anti-social Behaviour Orders and tenancy compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of independent and/or supported living accommodation in areas not affected by gangs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of intensive wrap around support for youth and family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to youth and families in access to services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to gang-involved youth in leaving disorganised and/or destructive family situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements to the security of young women victimised by gang members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of links with agencies in other cities to ensure continued support for relocated youth and families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of pilot project to conduct street-level outreach work with gang-involved youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with incarcerated gang members and family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with grass roots groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitation of meetings between parents of gang members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancement of responsiveness to community concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular home visits to identify the changing needs of youth and family</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Box 5.21 shows those elements of the project that were still being developed following the conclusion of Home Office funding.

**Box 5.21: Elements of the Manchester project still being developed at the end of Home Office funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy element with ongoing development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Establishment of regular information exchange between all agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development of a risk assessment model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Police/Probation/Youth Offending Team partnership for Operation Nightlight with youth offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement with Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court to establish ‘community prosecution’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring of the impact of gangs on non-gang offenders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project outcomes**

The project outcomes were evaluated and published by Bullock and Tilley (2003). The crime outcomes of the projects were not of primary importance to this study but are reproduced below:

**Cambridge**

Bicycle theft fell in Cambridge. Box 5.22 shows numbers of bicycle thefts between April 1998 and April 2002 in the Cambridge city (reproduced from Bullock and Tilley, 2003).
Box 5.22: Outcome data Cambridge

Note: The first drop line shows the arrest of a known, highly prolific bicycle thief in possession of bolt croppers for ‘going equipped’. The second drop line shows the conviction of the same prolific offender for theft of eight cycles with many other offences taken into consideration. The third drop line shows the start of the Cambridge project.

As Box 5.22 shows, the fall in mid to late 1999 preceded the start of the project and followed the apprehension, conviction and incarceration of a very prolific bicycle thief. The thief was sent to jail for four years in July 2000. He was known to be associated with around 16 per cent (164 offences) of all bicycle thefts in Cambridge in 1998/1999. In the 20 months prior to his charge for bicycle thefts in late November 1999 there were an average of 101 thefts of cycles per month in the city centre. This went down to 67 for the 29 months after his charge. In the ten months between the charge of the prolific offender and the start of the Cambridge project there were an average of 66 thefts of cycles per month, and in the following 19 months the average was 67 per month.
Thus, whilst bicycle theft fell in Cambridge, it is not possible convincingly to associate this with the project. There are a number of related issues that probably explain why the project was not associated with reductions in cycle theft in Cambridge at the end of the evaluation period. The first is to do with the timing and ‘dosage’ of the implementation of the security aspects of the project. The new stands were installed over a period of time and the largest investment in secure parking (the cycle park) was not open until very late on in the project. It may be the case that not enough time had elapsed for cyclists to change their behaviour and reduce their risk of cycle theft and perhaps the additional secure parking could be expected to have more of an impact over time. In addition, whilst evidently there were greater numbers of secure bicycle racks as a result of the project they may not have been enough given the sheer volume of cycles in the city. The second issue that might help explain the outcome is the failure to implement the offender interventions. Despite the fairly detailed analysis of the problem of cycle crime the original project proposal did not provide much information about motivation to steal cycles. Given the impact that the incarceration of one prolific offender (described above) had on the overall levels of cycle crime in the city, perhaps more effort to tackle prolific offenders would have been appropriate. Whilst it cannot be stated with certainty, failure to implement the offender element of this project might have been important in explaining the eventual project outcomes.

Manchester

Box 5.23 shows the overall number of verifiable shootings in the two targeted South Manchester divisions (reproduced from Bullock and Tilley, 2003).
Box 5.23: Outcome data Manchester: all verifiable shootings in Manchester

There was no decline in the number of shootings. The Manchester project was tackling entrenched social and economic conditions associated with parts of South Manchester that were considered to cause the gang-related problems. As such, in the short term it was unlikely that this project would have an observable impact on the overall numbers of shootings. Coupled with this, although South Manchester had high levels of shootings compared to other areas in the country, the overall numbers were nevertheless low. These small numbers make it difficult (if not impossible) to make inferences about any changes in the short term. It certainly was never likely that this project would be associated with the sort of reductions in the numbers seen in the Boston project because the problem in Boston was on a much greater scale than that in Manchester. In addition, the preceding sections of this chapter show that key elements of the strategy were not implemented at all. In these circumstances it was unlikely that the project could have been expected to have had an impact. Indeed,
overall the numbers of gang-related shootings in South Manchester did not reduce following the introduction of the project (Bullock and Tilley 2003).

Summary of chapter five

The aim of this chapter was to chart the implementation processes of the two projects and to describe the difference between what was planned and what was ultimately implemented. In both projects, some of the planned interventions were implemented, some were partially implemented and some were not implemented at all. In Cambridge, the project was largely implemented along the lines of the originally agreed project plans although some elements were late. The main exception to this was the implementation of the targeted proactive cycle squad of two officers which was not implemented. It has been seen that in Manchester the situation was somewhat different. The initiatives implemented in Manchester bore little resemblance to the original strategy described by Bullock and Tilley. In Manchester the size and scope of the project grew as the strategy was developed by the implementation team in the early stages. The Manchester project was occupied primarily with developing interventions for individuals on the list of gang members, associates and those at risk of becoming involved in gangs. At least a third of 31 planned interventions were not implemented in any form and the targeted multi-agency crackdown, the major focus of the original strategy, was not implemented in any form.

Returning now back to the aims of the study, the following chapters examine how top-down and bottom-up factors help to account for the patterns observed in the implementation of the two case studies.
Chapter Six

Top-down explanations of the implementation of the Cambridge and Manchester projects

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with those top-down factors that were observed to have influenced the patterns of implementation of the Manchester and the Cambridge projects. The literature review identified the focus of top-down approaches to analysing and understanding project implementation. For top-downers, patterns of implementation are conceived in terms of the extent to which management can set clear objectives based on clear cause and effect mechanisms, release appropriate resources, motivate practitioners to follow guidance, set up accounting mechanisms and hold those practitioners to account for implementing the project plans. The factors that helped shape implementation in Manchester and Cambridge that follow in this chapter were identified in the primary data but framed in terms of those factors that top-down analysts argue are important for implementing projects. These were identified in the literature review and include: the role of leadership and communication; resources; project theory and objectives; project guidance; and, accountability and management.

Project leadership and communication

In the Cambridge project a range of senior level individuals were represented on the steering group, including representatives of the universities, pressure groups, the city and county council and the police service. The steering group members were of sufficient seniority to provide the leverage to access resources for the project. The senior city council representatives on the steering group were considered to be especially important in facilitating the implementation of the secure parking elements of the project because of their access to the engineers and planners whose expertise was not available inside the police service. One steering group member stated in
Spring 2002 ‘... it is important to ensure that the right personnel are working on the project. It is also important to involve representatives from parties such as the cycling groups we have in Cambridge. It is vital to have a representative from the senior levels of the local authority.’

High level senior commitment from the city council was evident and this facilitated the implementation of the situational measures. Senior level police officers, in contrast, withdrew their original commitment to the Cambridge project and this meant that enforcement aspects of the project were not implemented. As has been seen, cycle theft constituted a significant volume crime problem in Cambridge but senior police officers did not consider it to be of sufficient priority to attend project meetings and ultimately to release resources for the project enforcement interventions. As one member of the cycle theft task force remarked in April 2002 ‘... the enforcement side has not happened. The police said that they would provide two dedicated officers but have not done so’. Another member of the cycle task force remarked ‘... obstacles to progress included the strain felt by the police force. There was more police involvement in the project in the beginning. As bike theft fell so did the amount of time that the police spent on the project.’ As this quote indicates, over the duration of the project, the senior police representatives stopped attending the project’s steering group meetings and the enforcement interventions were not implemented as a result.

The police service management explained this in terms of general shortages of police officers at the time coupled with competing demand for police resources. The borough commander for Cambridge city police stated in Spring 2002, for example, ‘... we are unable to provide the officers because of chronic shortage of officers caused by increased public order duties and general recruitment problems’. The police management certainly stated that they would have liked to have been able to dedicate the police officer resource to the project. However, in the circumstances where there were competing demands for a finite number of police officers, the senior management chose to focus those resources on the crimes types that they were being measured as central performance indicators and targets.

This did not go unnoticed by others working on the project. The cycle crime project’s steering group minutes stated on 23 January 2001 that ‘...concerns were raised that
the police are not pulling their weight on the policing commitment to the project'.
Later in the year, the minutes of the meeting held on 7 November 2001 noted that the police service was going to be formally reminded by the steering group that it was not meeting the commitments that it made to this project. Similar concerns were also raised by practitioners in interviews. For example, the head of planning services for Cambridge City Council stated that ‘...there could have been better communication of the intentions of the police regarding their involvement in the project and resources.’

In Manchester, strong support, enthusiasm and a general high level of commitment to the project aims facilitated the implementation of the project, at least to begin with. High level commitment was especially evident from the police chief superintendent and from the council’s deputy chief executive. This was important for setting the project up, dealing with problems as they arose and maintaining momentum for the project in the early days. The headmaster on the steering group, for example, stated in March 2003 that ‘...if [the deputy chief executive and the chief superintendent] hadn’t been behind it, the whole thing would have died a death. Whenever there was a crisis those two would make sure it got back on board.’ The chief superintendent project chair in particular was associated with ensuring commitment to the project from the senior staff of other agencies. The project information manager stated in February 2003 for example that ‘...in the early days probation and housing were looking to withdraw from MMAGS completely and would have done so had it not been for [the Chair’s] persistence’.

However, after initially facilitating the set-up of the project, the role that senior management played in shaping the implementation of the project changed. The attendance of senior representatives at the steering group meetings became more variable. The deputy chief executive, for example, commented in March 2003 ‘...I think it is fair to say that attendance hasn’t been as strong as it should be and I include myself in that’. The original senior level commitment to the project aims and inter-agency working appeared to sway as the realities of implementing the project became apparent. For example, the education manager remarked in September 2001 that ‘... the move to implementation has tested the willingness of the agencies to engage and highlighted problems of governance of the scheme’.
The practitioners working on the project certainly thought that the steering group was important for facilitating implementation of the project over-time and they felt that communication between the steering group members and the practitioner team was poor. They were concerned that implementation problems were not being resolved and the steering group was not setting the project agenda as a result. This is indicated by the following quotes:

The manager’s group hasn’t happened at all. The problem has been that there is three competing groups of opinion. There’s policy making decisions at the top, the steering group, there’s the day to day management decisions that are being made by the manager’s group, there’s the practice issues with the practitioner’s group. All three conflict. While you can get a certain amount of balance between the steering group and the practitioners group, as soon as you bring in the managers group you create a three way argument.
Information manager, February 2003

There always has been the issue where they [the steering group] are over there and we are over here. And I think the information is fed down instead of being fed up.
Education practitioner, October 2002

They [the board] are just there in terms of structural sense. They attend one or two meetings. Maybe that’s unfair but it’s what I think.
Probation service practitioner, February 2003

What’s important is that there is a strong connection between the practitioners group and the steering group... I think that it would have benefited if my group [the steering group] and that group met from time to time on a formal basis.
Deputy chief executive, Manchester City Council, March 2003

Resources

It has been seen that for top-down analysts, resources available to fund a new programme or project are important in analysing and understanding the implementation of new programmes and projects (Mountjoy and O’Toole, 1979; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Project resources are actually conceived in a fairly wide
sense. Top-down analysis of implementation is concerned with resources in a wider sense than the availability of money. They are referring to capacity to implement new programmes and projects. As well as funds, especially important are the availability and ability of staff and appropriate equipment. In the context of problem-oriented policing the analytic capacity to understand problems is also important. The role that these issues played in shaping the implementation of the Cambridge and Manchester projects are discussed in the next sections.

**Financial capacity to implement the projects**

In general terms, the grant funds from the Crime Reduction Programme facilitated the implementation of both of the projects. As Scott (2006) pointed out it is common for problem-oriented projects to be reliant on grant funding as mainstream resources are often already allocated. If it had not been for the grant funding it is unlikely that these two projects would have been implemented at all. The main issue concerning the role that financial resources played in the implementation of the two projects was the match between the project scope, the timescales and proposed resources which is a particular concern of top-down analysts (e.g. Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).

In the Cambridge project there was a match between the project scope and the resources available. The Cambridge project received £167,000 in September 2000. This was sufficient to cover the costs of the proposed situation measures, the registration schemes and the project manager’s salary for the period. The costs of the enforcement interventions were being covered by the police service.

In Manchester there was not a match between the plans, timescales and resources available, limiting what could realistically be achieved. The Manchester project received £500,000 in May 2001 which had to be spent by September 2002. The money was spent wholly on the wages of the seconded staff. Chapter five demonstrates that the Manchester project had transformed into a highly ambitious programme, with 31 broad interventions planned, many of which aimed to tackle difficult social and economic issues. Many of the practitioners working on the project discussed the project in terms of a ten-to fifteen-year strategy. However, funding had been secured for 18 months only and long-term mainstreaming plans had not been agreed. As this quote from an interview with the project manager in March 2003
indicates, '...everyone is happy to say that it's a ten to fifteen year strategy but the reality is that there is still no long-term financial plan for it'. Later in the same interview the project manager noted that the project was over-ambitious for its timescale and available resources:

[Named individual] is responsible for Communities Against Drugs and Neighbourhood Renewal Fund money and he said that there are two classic errors that people make in projects. Firstly, people always underestimate the length of time it will take to achieve their objectives, they always overestimate how much they will achieve in a given time. He was right in relation to MMAGS on both counts. My expectations in future would be different.

Indeed, by the end of the study, there was general feeling that the plans were too ambitious for the money available. One of the education board members, for example, stated in March 2003 ‘... I think the work plan was over ambitious in the first place. There was an awful lot of things that people were committed to doing’.

Capacity of staff

The availability, ability and suitability of staff influenced the implementation of both of the projects. The previous chapter detailed the staffing arrangements for the Cambridge project. The Cambridge project recruited one full-time member staff who took up the post in September 2000. Interviews showed that the project manager in Cambridge was widely considered to have some of the skills and experience to facilitate the implementation of this project but not all. His general enthusiasm and contacts within the cycling community in Cambridge were considered to be very useful for implementing the project ‘...the project manager’s knowledge and contacts were extremely useful’ (police officer, spring 2002).

However, as was set out in chapter five, although the building elements of the project were implemented in the Cambridge project, they were implemented late. The delivery of the indoor high security cycle park was especially late. The main reason for this was the project manager’s lack of experience of contracting work and overseeing building work in the context of a local authority. A member of the council for example, noted that:
It would have been better to have had someone who was experienced in working in a local authority setting to speed things up. [The project manager] did not know the procedures or who to speak to.

Head of planning services for Cambridge City Council, spring 2002

The project manager had no experience of the processes and procedures that needed to be followed to get permission for contract building works in Cambridge. In particular, he did not understand the need for and had no experience of implementing the processes of competitive tendering for building works. As a result this was not attended to until quite late in the project’s timetable and led to the delays that that have been described. The procurement manager from Cambridge Council for example, noted in spring 2002 that ‘... early involvement [of procurement] is vital to avoid delays to the project, especially if they involve large sums of money’.

As with the Cambridge project, the capacity of the staff was considered to have an impact on the delivery of the Manchester project. Two project managers were employed over the duration of the Manchester project. Concerns were raised that the first Manchester project manager did not have the appropriate management skills to orient the staff to deliver the project interventions. As was set out in chapter five, Greater Manchester Police recruited the original project manager in May 2001. He was of chief inspector rank and was recruited from open competition within the police service. Generally, his approach was to attempt to facilitate the implementation of the project through allowing the practitioners time to find their feet in the new environment that they were working in, to try to develop a common culture and understanding of project aims and to generally bond as a team. The original project manager stated in December 2001 ‘...perhaps we could have imposed more of a structure on the group but at the same time I wanted to give them ownership to develop their own ideas’. This approach to the management of the group was certainly welcomed by some of the members of the practitioner team. For example, one of the education practitioners stated in February 2003, ‘...[the original project manager] recognised that each agency worked in a particular way, which we’ve all had to do. He tried to make sure everything was done in a multi-agency way and to take on board different perspectives’.
However, as the project unfolded the original project manager was considered not to have some of the management skills necessary to keep the disparate team together, to hold practitioners to account and to implement the project interventions. The following quote from the deputy chief executive of Manchester City Council in March 2003 demonstrates:

We've had difficulties ... there were difficulties moving from the research phase to the delivery phase. There were difficulties between GMP and [the project implementation manager]. [The original project manager] didn't tackle the issues. We now have someone in [the second project manager] who has more about him in terms of management experience.

In contrast to the Cambridge project, the Manchester project involved a fairly large number of staff from different agencies (set out in chapter five). Following the recruitment of the project manager, these agencies seconded members of staff to the project and their salaries were paid for from project funds. This inter-agency arrangement was clearly considered by those working on the project to have facilitated the implementation of the project in some respects. The project was able to access resources more quickly than would otherwise have been the case and could provide a range of specialisms that would not have been immediately available to one agency alone. The probation officer remarked in June 2002, for example, '[an advantage of the project was] access to multi-agency resources – that would otherwise have taken a long time.'

However, the seconded staff arrangement created a number of significant problems related to the capacity of staff to work in an inter-agency setting, their motivation to do so and their ability to effectively implement interventions and these all shaped patterns of implementation. One early issue was the identification of capable staff by the home agencies. There was some feeling amongst the project implementation team that some agencies had used the secondments as an opportunity to move problematic staff members and that these staff did not have the appropriate skills to work effectively on this project. The project information manager in February 2003 for example, stated that '... other agencies appear to have palmed off onto us people they
'...some appointments were less than ideal. [The youth worker] was appointed by [the youth offending team] but not really part of it, [the probation worker] was off loaded by probation.'

The implementation of the Manchester project also appeared to be influenced by the motivation of some of the staff. Concerns were raised that the project might have attracted people motivated by their own agendas rather than by commitment to the project aims. Some individuals saw the Manchester project as a means to further their careers, probably because it was addressing such an exciting, high profile and important problem. One of the education managers, for example, stated in February 2003 that '...by definition you are going to get interesting characters in a project like this. You are not going to attract run of the mill types. You are going to attract people who are into rocking boats'. This resonated with comments from some of the practitioners as well:

They want to be associated with it because of what it is, rather than being committed to putting in the work to make it work for young people. MMAGS is quite high profile, sounds good, is a bit glamorous in some ways. But the bottom line is that there is a lot of work to be done in the community with the youngsters. But whether you would find this out at interview I don’t know. You don’t know until someone is working.

Youth Offending Team practitioner, February 2003

I think [the project implementation manager] sees the project as a spring board for his next job. I think he is going to try and use it to get to co-ordinate all this kind of work in Manchester permanently.

Youth services practitioner, January 2002

The implementation of the project was influenced by the ability and suitability of a number of members of staff recruited onto the project. In particular, the project implementation manager was widely perceived to have been the cause of time-consuming problems. Through his behaviour and his approach to working with others, the project implementation manager upset key individuals within agencies whose
support was required to implement elements of the project. This had an impact on their willingness to engage with the project and on their views of it. For example, the probation manager discussed some of the problems that his behaviour caused the probation service:

My relationship with [the police chief superintendent and the deputy chief executive] is the only reason why we remained involved in the project following the behaviour of [the project implementation manager]. It tainted how I thought about how the project would go. I have to convince myself that it was worth staying involved despite the involvement of [the project implementation manager] I have to fight against losing enthusiasm for the project.

Probation manager, August 2001

Those working on the project suggested in interview that, at times, the project implementation manager’s inappropriate behaviour was the result of not understanding how agencies worked and in particular not understanding the nature of working in an inter-agency environment and because he did not have the skills required for his role. A probation service manager remarking in January 2002 for example, ‘…[the project implementation manager] is a bad influence for the dynamics between the practitioners. He doesn’t understand the niceties of how professionals work. I don’t think that he accepts that [the probation officer] is the best person to judge how the probation angle of the project is approached and implemented. I think that if we have a project implementation manager it should come with a job spec and a person spec.’

Managers in the youth offending team in September 2001 noted that:

[The project implementation manager] has a habit of snapping at people’s heels which is not the way to behave in a multi-agency setting. He does not understand the concerns and considerations of the agencies and practitioners involved in the project.

Perhaps because of his lack of experience of working within this kind of multi-agency setting, the project implementation manager created difficult time-consuming distractions from the implementation of the project interventions. The project
manager remarked in June 2002, for example, ‘... [the project implementation manager] was difficult to handle. We inherited him and he wasn’t ideal. A lot of time was spent checking up on him and making sure he didn’t do anything stupid.’ More generally, concerns were raised about whether he had the skills and experience to do his job effectively. The Youth Offending Team managers stated in September 2001:

[The project implementation manager] has set the tone but there are serious concerns about his ability as implementation manager. This is a serious concern. I would like to see a person who is cool and objective when dealing with serious offenders but he seems to think it is all a bit of a game and gets over excited.

Staff turnover also had an impact on the nature of the implementation of the Manchester project. This was not evident in the Cambridge project. In December 2001 one of the secondees was sacked in relation to an earlier criminal conviction that, whilst disclosed at the time of application, ultimately meant that he could not work for one of the multi-agency teams. There was a strong feeling amongst the practitioner group that this sacking was unfair and this influenced the delivery of the project as they felt that it went against the supportive and rehabilitative nature of the project:

A slap in the face for the idea of rehabilitation. The project is about re-engaging and rehabilitation, how does this fit? It is hypocritical and undermines the legitimacy of the project. How does it look to the young men with criminal records that we are trying to engage? It sends out the message that there is no point re-engaging with mainstream activity because once you have a record it is hard to get employment. That needs to be addressed urgently before it undermines the project.
Youth services practitioner, January 2002

There is a problem of reconciling sacking of [the seconded worker] with the aims of the project as it could have an impact on how the project is seen in the community. It has certainly has had an impact on the staff.
Probation manager, January 2002

As such, a lot of time was spent discussing this issue and it ultimately served to reinforce the move from the original enforcement focus of the project to the ultimate
rehabilitative and supportive focus of the project. This issue is discussed in more
detail in chapter seven.

The decision not to renew the contract of the implementation manager was made at
the steering group meeting held on 9 May 2002. Although this individual was the
cause of ongoing concern there were some mixed feelings when he left. Concerns
were raised that some of the work would not get done and that momentum for the
project would be affected:

He was the engine of the car and when he went the car stopped and its chugging
along very slowly now.
Education worker, March 2003

A key individual is [the project implementation manager] well, in as much as he was
the one who had all the information. There was a lot of baggage with [the project
implementation manager] that meant he couldn’t really feature in the next phase that
went through though.
Head teacher, March 2003

The two original outreach workers left in June 2002 after the decision was made at the
9 May 2002 board meeting to re-advertise their jobs. This impacted on the
implementation of the project because it reduced the capacity of the practitioner team
as stated by an education practitioner in February 2003 ‘... the problem was the
outreach workers would have come and done that with me’.

The original project manager left in August 2002 and was replaced in September
2002. This replacement was associated with a change in the project management style
‘... [the original project manager] is completely different to [the replacement]. [The
original] was laid back and [the replacement] is structure’ (Youth Offending Team
practitioner, February 2003). There were mixed views about the change in the project
manager and the impact that it had on the style of project management and the
implementation of the project. This issue is discussed in more detail in the sections on
project management.
Capacity to understand problems

Capacity to understand problems is important for the development of problem-oriented responses. Capacity to understand problems is related to both the presence of staff with the ability and skills to analyse data and the availability of high quality data on which to base those analyses. As has been seen, in both the Manchester and Cambridge projects, problem analysis was conducted by professional researchers so the former was less of an issue. However, the latter issue remained, especially in Manchester, and, as has been set out in chapters two and three, the availability of high quality data is essential for the development of problem-oriented projects.

Analysis of the Cambridge project proposals showed that the data required to quantify the problem of cycle were available. As set out in chapter five, project documents show that police recorded crime data for a number of years were used to describe the size of the problem and to make estimates of its cost in Cambridge. These recorded crime data were used to provide detailed hotspot analysis (outlined in the previous chapter). Recorded crime data were also used to provide information about the victims of cycle crime although these were limited to information on age and gender. No quantifiable data were provided on the number of, or the characteristics of, offenders. In terms of development of understanding of the problem, the proposal drew on less evidence and inferred more. Quantifiable data were available on bicycle stand usage and security, though limited to one count in 1999. Data were also available on the numbers of bicycles being used in Cambridge over a specific period of time. It was also suggested that the high levels of cycle theft were related to the high numbers of students who used cycles as a primary form of transport although no evidence to corroborate this was provided. The proposal explained the vulnerability of particular victims in terms of the careless attitudes of young people towards their possessions and generally that cycle theft was part of life in Cambridge. Similarly suggestions were made about the types of bicycle thieves operating in Cambridge but again no evidence was provided to back up these observations. Box 6.1 below summarises the sources of data used and problem understanding in the Cambridge project.
Box 6.1: Summary of data sources used and problem understanding in the Cambridge project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem analysis</th>
<th>Quantifiable evidence provided</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Size of the problem | Yes | • Proportion of cycle crime compared to all recorded crime in Cambridge  
| | | • Figures to show increase in cycle crime  
| | | • Estimates of costs |
| Location of the problem | Yes | • Recorded crime data at basic command unit, postcode and street level for two years |
| Victim | Yes | • Age of victim over two years  
| | | • Gender of victims over two years |
| Offender | No |  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem understanding</th>
<th></th>
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</table>
| Location of problem | Yes | • Data on levels of bicycle usage from the city council  
| | | • Numbers of and use of secure cycle stands from the Cambridge cycling campaign |
| Victim characteristics | No |  |
| Offender characteristics | No |  |

Box 6.1 then, shows that quantifiable data were available to describe the size of the problem of bicycle theft in Cambridge, the locations of the problem and details about the victims. Data were not available to quantifiably describe the offenders. In terms of developing understanding of the nature of the problem of cycle theft however, quantifiable data were only available in respect to the locations where the problems
occurred (rather than in respect to the victims and offenders) although judgements were provided.

In contrast, in Manchester a lack of available data presented considerable difficulties for the problem analysis stage of the project although aspects of the problem were ultimately described. Many problems were observed in accessing data to conduct the problem analysis for the Manchester project.

First, delays were experienced gaining access to data for the problem analysis. Greater Manchester Police’s intelligence bureau for example, provided little information and provided it too late to make use of it. The IT department just did not appear to be able to make data sets available for problem analysis.

Second, data protection legislation, as it was interpreted by practitioners at the time, inhibited data sharing for the purpose of analysing problems. Data were only provided to the research team after extensive negotiations and with express agreement from the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police. The only individual level data available from external agencies were those provided by the social services and from the Youth Offending Teams in Manchester. The local education authority promised to provide data but in the long run did not deliver and the probation service refused access to individual data stating that data protection legislation did not allow it, though they did offer to provide aggregate level data compiled by their own staff, if it was paid for. Data were neither promised nor received from the health authorities or trusts.

Third, Greater Manchester Police did not have the systems that allow information to be readily extracted and used for the purpose of crime analysis. It was not possible for varying data sources to be amalgamated readily and data could not be easily exported into flexible analytic packages such as Microsoft Excel or SPSS. Data could not therefore be readily extracted and analysed for the research stage of this project. GMPICs (Greater Manchester Police’s day-to-day system for recording detailed information on crimes and incidents) held large volumes of potentially useful information relating to individuals and events, but did not lend itself to aggregate extraction for systematic analysis. For example, GMPICs could not be used for
aggregate analysis from user terminals. The prevalence of variable length fields stored in a non-tabular programme further diminished the possibility for data integration. Aggregate extraction could only be done by central IT staff who had access to the mainframe. Transfers of data could only be done manually because a cut-and-paste function was not available. The difficulties of manipulating GMPICs data for the purposes of the problem analysis stage of this project were considerable. In the event, the civilian research assistants in Manchester manually compiled two data sets from GMPICs. One contained information on 400 individuals and the other on 200 shooting events. This was extremely time-consuming.

Fourth, looking for long term problems and patterns also requires data sets that are available over several years. Calls for service can be important in providing a measure of the volume and distribution of public demand on the police service. In Manchester it proved very difficult to produce such a data set. It was necessary to look to the training school for the data, which seemed to be the only place within Greater Manchester Police that kept historical data sets. In any case it proved possible only to go back to May 1998, and even here there were problems with the data including missing whole months and much coded to 1900: a problem that did not seem to be explicable by reference to millennium bugs. It became clear that problem analysis was not going to be possible using long-term incident data as this information was not readily available and where it was, errors had crept in.

Fifth, even when data were received there were problems with the quality of data entry. In the police-recorded crime data set, some data fields were completed patchily. For example, incident data for premises was completed in only 40 per cent of cases so it was not possible to know what kind of locations were generating problems. For crime in relation to the victim, no age estimate was given in a third of cases, no gender in a quarter and no ethnicity in over two-fifths. Of course, many of these would have been crimes for which no person would be identified as a victim (e.g. in many cases of shop theft). Nevertheless, in about one in eight of the cases where one attribute of a victim was stated (age, gender, ethnicity) one or more of the others was not. Additionally, in relation to age, the use of age bands made some types of analysis difficult. More generally, aggregate analysis requires that fields are entered consistently. There were many examples where this had not happened. Most
conspicuously, time course analysis was inhibited through alterations in the categories used to classify events. Changes in Home Office counting rules appeared to have been one source of discontinuity but they might not have been the only one.

Lastly, it was not actually clear that data were used in practice to inform the responses in Manchester. As has been described, the original strategy was based on the Boston Gun Project model which was proposed by Bullock and Tilley but subsequently developed and altered by the project implementation team and the practitioners. It was much less clear that the original research (or indeed any other evidence) guided the changing shape of the project and in any case there were varying opinions amongst the practitioner team and the managers about the usefulness of the research in the subsequent development and implementation of the project:

I was a little disappointed with the research paper. I already knew the results and a lot of people who worked in the area did.
Chief Superintendent, July 2001

The research didn't provide anything more than could have been guessed.
Probation manager, August 2001

The research report gave the partners an idea of the project and what they could contribute.
Project information manager, August 2001

Nick's research gave the theoretical foundation.
Education board members, August 2001

The research phase was very interesting and important.
Youth Offending Team managers, September 2001
# Box 6.2: Summary of data difficulties in Manchester

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data collection</strong></td>
<td>• Data fields patchily completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Missing data on key attributes of victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Premises type completed in 40% of cases, makes it difficult to know what kinds of places are generating problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Age bands rather than actual ages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data transmission</strong></td>
<td>• Data provided too late to be useful for the analysis within the time frame available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Results in delays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data recording</strong></td>
<td>• Inconsistency of data entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In this case especially changes in the recording system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data storage</strong></td>
<td>• Availability of data sets over a number of years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Very difficult to reconstruct data bases</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Many inaccuracies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Date of incidents wrong in many cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data extraction</strong></td>
<td>• Incompatibility of police databases with those used for standard analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Could not extract from one system to another except manually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Extremely time consuming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data analysis</strong></td>
<td>• Focus on geographical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis by victim type, location type, patterns of repeats, MO, goods stolen, distribution networks of stolen goods, routes to crime, locations of victims at times of crime etc., and combinations of attribute types appears to be rare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data sharing

- Data protection problems
- Unwillingness to share data
- Willingness to share – but did not actually provide the data
- General failure to engage others to give data

Organisational issues

- Staff unavailable to provide data
- Much time and effort required to get data

Use of research

- Mixed views about how useful the research was
- Not clear that it was used by the project to develop strategy

Project theory and objectives

It has been seen that for top-down analysts, a project or programme must be based on a valid theory of cause and effect to have a chance of being successful (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Key to understanding implementation is an assessment of whether the mechanisms through which the project was supposed to work were valid. Crime reduction projects and programmes typically contain latent assumptions about how they are supposed to exert change in practice and result in reductions in crime (Tilley, 2005). Indeed, neither the Cambridge nor Manchester projects set out explicitly how the project was going to impact on crime. However, both contained implicit assumptions about how the project was going to exert change and reduce the targeted problems. The role played by the project theory and objectives in shaping the implementation of the projects are examined in the following sections.

In Cambridge, an examination of the project documents suggested that the proposed responses were grounded in the analysis of and explanations for the high levels of bicycle crime in the city. The analysis of the problem itself was set out around key elements of situational crime prevention theories. In particular, it focused around aspects of routine activity theory based on features of the victim, offender and location (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 1987). First, as set out in chapter five, analysis of patterns of bicycle theft showed that particular locations in Cambridge city centre were associated with high levels of thefts. These locations had high levels of
bicycle usage, low levels of secure parking and high levels of cycle theft was the result. The proposed response was to attend to features of those locations that were considered to make them vulnerable: specifically the provision of more secure bicycle racks of appropriate quality. Second, the project proposals suggest that some people were at higher risk of victimisation than others, in particular students who were considered to be lax in their attitudes to security. Publicity, warnings and property marking schemes aimed to attend to this. Third, the proposal discussed three different types of offenders motivated by different factors. As such the project aimed to deter these differently motivated offenders. For example, it was planned that opportunistic offenders would be deterred through better security for cycles and prolific thieves would be tackled though the activity of a proactive policing squad. In Cambridge then, the proposed responses appeared to be relevant, based on analysis and linked to well-established situational crime reduction theory, which in turn is based on a strong empirical evidence base (Tilley and Laycock, 2002).

Whilst not explicitly set out, the crime prevention mechanisms of the project were to exert change as follows. First, enforcement-based interventions were to be established in the form of a small dedicated squad of officers who would target prolific offenders. This would work through either increasing the offender's perceived risk of stealing cycles and deter him/her from doing so or would incapacitate bicycle thieves through arrest and detention. Second, victim focused interventions were conceived in terms of introducing a registration scheme and providing publicity about the risks of bicycle theft in order to reduce risky behaviour by a vulnerable group. Third, elements of the physical location that were contributing to cycle thefts would be attended to through the implementation of more and better quality bicycle stands, the replacement of older unsuitable ones and through the provision of a high security indoor cycle park. This would increase the risk of detection and the outcome would be reductions in crime.

The situation was somewhat different in the Manchester project. It has already been seen that the original strategy drawn up by Bullock and Tilley was based on the successful initiative implemented in Boston, Massachusetts. Whilst projects cannot be fully replicated, the idea in the Manchester project was to experiment with those ideas that had been shown to be successful in reducing shooting in Boston. In doing so the aim was to focus on reducing shootings through attending to the immediate situational
context in which they occurred. However, in this project detailed tactical planning had been left for the project implementation team. The implementation team developed plans for responses which were focused much more generally on tackling gang membership as a means of reducing the shootings. Through doing so the project was removed from its roots in the successful Boston initiative. As set out in chapter five the Manchester project was conceived in terms of a wide range of social interventions aimed at tackling the ‘root causes’ of gang membership, as this quote from the project manager in September 2001 indicated:

[the aim of the project is] to look at the socio-economic conditions disposing people to become involved and change the conditions so that they behave differently. Get them to see other choices and make them.

Ultimately, at the heart of the Manchester project was a series of wrap around services targeted at specific individuals perceived to be at risk of joining gangs or who were already in gangs. The project aimed to offer these individuals the support and services that the practitioners felt would divert them from joining gangs in the first place or facilitate their exit. In doing so, the numbers of shootings would be reduced.

The project theory shifted and this shift is important in explaining the nature of the patterns of implementation of this project. The Boston project had shown, counter-intuitively, that it is not necessary to tackle the underlying causes of shootings (which are often deep-rooted social, economic and psychological problems) to effectively impact on the problem of shootings. It is not being suggested that the focus on social interventions as a means of addressing gang-related problems in Manchester was wrong or somehow misguided. However, it was much less clear how the cause and effect mechanisms were going to work in the amended project, especially in the short term. In addition, there was limited empirical evidence about effective means of dealing with gang-related problems which the project could draw on. Therefore, it was much less clear that the project theory was likely to be effective.

Related is the issue of project objectives. It has been seen that setting clear objectives is important for top-down approaches to implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Setting clear objectives is important because if they are not uniquely described
then neither is the means through which they are to be achieved in practice. Chapter five set out the Cambridge project aims, which were:

- to reduce the number of cycle thefts in Cambridge city centre by five to ten per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line);
- to reduce the number of cycle thefts from students by 20 per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line); and,
- to increase the number of detections by 10 per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line).

In addition this project contained specific objectives:

- to trial different types of secure cycle parking racks to determine which were the most user-friendly and secure and appropriate for different locations in Cambridge;
- to provide a secure cycle park in the basement of Park Street car park;
- to determine additional locations throughout the city for installing secure cycle racking;
- to install extra racks and replace inadequate existing racking;
- to set up a comprehensive and consistent university wide cycle registration scheme and include publicity about racks;
- to use a black, fluorescent ‘police warning’ campaign to warn cyclists of theft problems;
- to set up a cycle squad of two police constables to proactively target prolific offenders;
- to measure the change in securely parked cycles in a pre-defined city centre location;
- to determine current figures of under reporting of cycle theft in Cambridge city; and,
- to work out what measures effectively reduce cycle crime.

These objectives are well stated and it is clear what the project was trying to achieve.
In contrast the Manchester project ‘mission’ was broader and vaguer: to enforce the law through multi-agency targeted crackdowns; to deter young people from entering into a gang/gun culture and divert them towards alternatives; to provide support to young people and families who are most vulnerable; to secure the conviction and/or rehabilitation of gang-involved offenders; to reduce the incidence of death and injury to young people and the wider impact of gangs on the community; and, to create an environment for commercial investment. In addition, the thirty-one planned interventions set out in chapter five were extremely ambitious and wide-ranging. It has been seen that top-down analysts argue that it is common for project objectives to be vague and ambitious. This influences implementation because where objectives are not clearly defined it is less likely that guidance about how to meet those objectives will be well set out (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). The role played by guidance in shaping the two projects is set out in the following sections.

Project guidance

Project guidance is different from project theory. Project theory is about the underlying mechanisms through which a project is supposed to work. The project guidance is about how to implement the various interventions that a project plans to deliver. It has been shown that for top-downers, the provision of adequate guidance is a key factor that explains the implementation (or otherwise) of projects (Mountjoy and O’Toole, 1981).

The provision of guidance played a role in shaping the nature of implementation of both of the projects. In the Cambridge project, detailed written guidance had already been developed by the community safety manager for the project manager to follow (see Annex three and the key milestones were set out in the previous chapter). These were fairly straightforward and detailed and the project manager just completed the tasks that he was set to do. The project manager himself stated that ‘...I just followed the guidance...’.

In Manchester the issue of guidance shaped patterns of implementation in rather different ways. It has been seen that the main thrust of the Manchester project was the
multi-agency group tasked to implement wrap around services for targeted individuals to offer the support to deter them from gang activity. However, how this was to be achieved in practice was not set out in detail in any strategy document. The project steering group had stated that the project should seek to work with 85 gang-involved individuals in the first instance but there was no guidance about how to identify those 85 individuals. What compromised a 'gang' and 'gang membership' proved to be far from clear on the ground (as has been seen generally in much of the literature on this issue, see Bullock and Tilley, 2002). Determining those individuals who were in gangs or who were at risk of joining gangs, and hence suitable for preventative interventions, proved problematic in a practical sense in a number of ways and influenced how the project was delivered. These are discussed in the following sections.

First, the lack of specific guidance about how to target individuals for project resources meant that very many young people were considered to be at risk of joining a gang and therefore potentially in scope for project interventions. By the summer of 2001, the implementation team had identified some 850 individuals deemed to be gang members, associates of gang members or at risk of becoming gang members in South Manchester. It was not going to be possible to work with all of those people who conceivably could have been in need of support from the project. As one of the board members stated in March 2003 '... my concern is that is you have a thousand kids, under the age of 25, involved in gangs. To have a team, of less than a dozen people working with them is just scratching the surface'.

Second, there was a lack of guidance for taking referrals onto the project. Indeed, despite the steering group’s instruction that the project should work with 85 individuals (at least to begin with) referrals to the project were taken fairly early on as awareness of the project increased amongst practitioners in Manchester more widely. A manager from the social services remarked in June 2002 that ‘...cases have not all been driven from the Wednesday meeting because people at work are realising MMAGS is around, they are getting in touch and asking for help’.

In some cases, young people were also effectively referring themselves to the scheme. For example, at a meeting observed on the 16 January 2002, a discussion was had
about a young man called Andy. Andy clearly had strong associations with the Manchester gangs but had become scared of the violence and wanted to leave the gangs and apparently had asked a police officer whether there was help available. The group decided that in these circumstances it was not possible to refuse to help support this young man in his attempt to leave the gangs.

As has been seen, by the end of March 2003, 172 individuals had been assessed for inclusion on the Manchester scheme. The problem was that it was far from clear how these increased numbers were going to be managed and the potential workload was spiralling:

There is no system of referral yet the project is taking referrals. If it continues in the same way the workers are going to be swamped with requests. As awareness is raised there will be more demand. We need to be clear about the aims and get the structure right
Probation service practitioner, June 2002

The project started off with a target list of 85. Now it is taking referrals. This has not been worked through. How are they going to cope with the numbers? It’s just ad hoc and woolly.
Social services manager, June 2002

Third, and perhaps most importantly, in the absence of specific guidance, the project implementation team selected individuals for interventions on variable levels of evidence of alleged involvement in firearm and gang-related activity. The implementation team themselves felt that the criteria were rather vague and that the process of identifying young people was not systematic. One of the project implementation team stated that the general guiding principles were that no one was to be over 26 years old, all had to be associated with South Manchester gangs and there was to be a mixture of young men and women.

The lack of guidance for how to target individuals caused disagreement in practice between practitioners about who should be included on the project. For example, practitioners’ meeting observed on 31 October 2001 a discussion was held about one
young man, Martin, who was on the target list. Martin’s older brother, a well known gang member, was in prison at the time but was due for release. There was concern that on his release his influence might turn Martin towards the gangs. The education representative had evidence that Martin was disruptive at school but he had no criminal record and was not known to the police service. The outreach workers were adamant that Martin should not have been on the list because, they felt, he was very marginal to the gangs and his level of risk was no greater or less than anyone else who lived in the area. However, the implementation manager and the information manager argued that he should be included and eventually Martin was included for interventions on the basis of the potential disruptive influence of his brother despite little evidence of his increased risk levels.

The practitioners also expressed their concerns in interview regarding whether the right people were on the target list. A probation manager noted in January 2002 ‘...I am not confident that the right people are on the list’. Similarly, a practitioner from the housing department also in January 2002 ‘...there is some question about the names on the target list and whether they should be there or not, especially the girls’. Again from the housing practitioner in January 2002 ‘... I think that they should have had categories of people based on what they had been up to rather than the target list.’ The outreach workers (who had once been gang members themselves) were particularly concerned about whether the right people were being selected for interventions from the project. This related especially to whether or not they were sufficiently involved in gangs to merit intervention:

The focus has been far too much on those on the periphery of the gangs but anyone who lives in [South Manchester] could be considered to be on the periphery of the gangs … at the moment there are far too many people on the periphery of the gangs for this to be a sensible way of prioritising.

Outreach worker, November 2001

And later in the same interview:
The focus has been on those on the periphery of the gangs ... we would prefer more
time to be spent on those who are more involved. Targeting and strategising of the list
is not well done.
Outreach worker, November 2001

As well as impacting on the capacity of the project and creating disagreements
amongst the practitioners, the lack of guidance about how to target individuals for
interventions was considered by some of the practitioners potentially to have
implications for the young people themselves. Some project practitioners felt that it
was important to target only those individuals who were known to be gang members
or were at very serious risk of being involved. Their experience highlighted the stigma
that could be associated with gang membership and possible resistance from parents
who rejected that label being attached to their children:

Parents take a step backwards when you mention gangs. Parents deny and resist ... because of stigma. There is greater stigma attached to gang membership than crime.
Youth Offending Team practitioner, June 2002

There were also suggestions that the negative connotations associated with being
labelled as a gang member could cause difficulties for young people when trying to
access services for them from other agencies:

That’s where the project is detrimental. If you start mentioning anything to do with
gangs then they [the schools] definitely won’t want them back. Unless they ask me
specifics, I just say that they are at risk of being involved [in gangs] and just working
around those issues and providing support.
Youth Offending Team practitioner, February 2003

Altogether then, the lack of specific guidance about how to implement the project
interventions meant that determining who should fall within the compass of project
intervention was contested and fraught with practical difficulties in the
implementation of the Manchester project. This was not evident in the Cambridge project.
Compliance and project management

For top-down analysts the degree to which practitioners are marshalled to comply with project objectives is important in shaping the nature of implementation. It has been seen that top-down analysts do not deny that deviation from project aims occurs and that conflict plays a role in the implementation of projects but point to the need to control the stages of implementation to minimise deviation and conflict (Parsons, 1999). Especially important in minimising deviation and preventing implementation problems is project management and setting up systems which monitor performance and hold practitioners to account. The following sections examine the role played by compliance and project management in shaping the delivery of the two projects.

Home Office management and compliance

As was seen in chapter five, the Targeted Policing Initiative did not set out specific instructions about how the projects should be managed locally. The central Home Office delegated the day-to-day management of the grants to the relevant Government Office for the Regions. In the event, the Regional Office played an active role in the delivery of neither project. The practitioners working on the project stated that the role of the Regional Office was limited to handling the accounting arrangements for the grant and receiving quarterly written updates from the project manager:

[Government office for the North West] have been helpful with the money. We just send a written report. They were helpful with the roll over of the money.
Project manager, Manchester, August 2001

We've not had much to do with [Government Office North West]. They came and visited me once. But mostly they deal with the money.
Police Chief Superintendent, Manchester, July 2001

[Government Office North West] has had nothing to do with the project and have no value for [the project] as far as I can see.
Deputy Chief Executive, Manchester City Council, August 2001

The government office was mostly interested in whether the money had been spent; they have not questioned what the money is spent on.
Drawing on top-down conceptions of project implementation it is reasonable to infer that the limited checks that were placed on the projects played a role in shaping what was delivered. As has been seen, the Manchester project was awarded a grant to implement a Boston-style project aimed at reducing the situational determinants of shootings. The lack of external supervision and moderation enabled the practitioners to orient the project into something quite different from that which was originally agreed with the grant donor. Similarly, the Cambridge project was awarded a grant on the basis that the enforcement interventions would be funded locally. The lack of direct Home Office monitoring of the Cambridge project made it easier for the police management to renege on their agreement to provide resources in kind because they were not held to account. The lack of Home Office supervision, then, allowed the local managers and practitioners to alter the project interventions and priorities. This played a role in shaping what the projects delivered in two main ways. First, the interventions that the projects delivered looked different from the projects originally agreed; and second, not all the elements were delivered in the originally agreed time frame.

Arrangements for day-to-day oversight and management were left to the discretion of local managers. The following sections describe the role played by the local project management in shaping what the projects delivered.

Co-ordination, administration and accountability in the Cambridge project
As was set out in chapter five, the Cambridge project recruited one practitioner who was based at Cambridge city police station and managed by a police inspector within the community safety team. It has already been shown that as the project unfolded, the senior police management withdrew their support for the enforcement elements of this project and the remaining interventions were mainly situational in nature. With the benefit of hindsight it was generally felt by those working on the project that this management arrangement was not the most appropriate and this had an impact on the nature of the implementation of the project. In particular, it was felt that the delays that befell this project might have been avoided if the project manager had been
housed within and managed by the council where expertise in building projects was to be found. The head of planning services for Cambridge City Council remarked ‘...if you want to build things it would be better to have someone with experience of that ... it was a mistake to leave things in the hands of the police who are not experts in building.' Apart from this, however, as has been seen, the project manager followed the project guidance to implement the project in Cambridge in a largely unproblematic manner.

In the Manchester project the structure and management for the project was very much more complicated than in the Cambridge. Because of their complexity, these will be discussed in some detail in the sections below.

**Co-ordination, administration and accountability in the Manchester project**

Early co-ordination and administration of the Manchester project was considered to be poor and this caused frustration amongst the practitioner team:

> Communication, administration and organisation have been poor and this has not been well received.
> Project manager, June 2002

> Information and particularly data are not being distributed by the implementation team and there is no explanation why not. I am chasing things up a lot.
> Youth services practitioner, January 2002

The poor administration and co-ordination created time consuming delays and resulted in concerns about the accountability of the project. These problems were created by a number of interrelated problems.

First, there was no single standardised management system for documenting information about those individuals targeted for project interventions or co-ordinating and monitoring the delivery of interventions and the activities of practitioners in order to hold the practitioners and ultimately the project to account:
When I started I found a project that was quite poorly run and it didn’t have systems in place to manage the workload of anybody. It didn’t have any systematic method of capturing the data needed to make an informed judgement on each individual....there was no system at all in place to ensure that the work was being carried out, was the right work, at the right time and with the right people and was having the right sort of evaluation about its effectiveness.

Project manager, March 2003

This made it difficult for the project manager to monitor what had been implemented and its subsequent impact, if any. Second, there were no case files on those individuals that the project was working with which resulted in concerns about whether interventions with individuals and families were being properly implemented, followed through and reviewed. A housing practitioner commented in June 2002 that ‘...the lack of case files is a problem. There is no feedback. For practitioners, it is really important that there are case files’. A similar concern was noted by a representative of the Youth Offending Team in June 2002 that ‘... it sometimes seems that things are done in an ad hoc way with no follow through. Cases get lost without tracking and then new cases crop up’. This issue was also highlighted by the manager of the Youth Offending Team who thought that some of the problems regarding the case files might have resulted because the police service did not work with families in this way:

The actions aren’t based on ‘this is best practice.’ It’s based on ‘this is a problem, how do we fix it’. When it comes to assessment, review, planning, evaluation that’s what agencies like probation, social services and the [the youth offending team] do as our daily work. I don’t think that’s what the police do on a case-by-case basis. They do it in management and in terms of project management but they don’t do it with individuals and with families. When I see the minutes that’s what I see that’s missing. It’s that assessment, planning and reviewing and how you change the plans after a review, how you modify things and how you make your decisions around that.

Youth Offending Team manager, March 2003

This concern about lack of follow up and monitoring of the interventions was also evident in the meeting minutes. For example, on 6 February 2002 the minutes stated
that ‘...concerns were raised about the lack of continuity with cases and in particular, with [name of family]’.

Third, there was no standardised project risk assessment criteria and so the practitioners all used the different ones that were provided by their home agencies. This caused practical concerns about the safety of the staff as quite clearly they were working with a difficult and potentially dangerous client group. In spring 2002 a practitioner noted the gaps in provision in this area ‘...there are gaps relating to confidentiality and health and safety risks. [We] still haven’t got an assessment tool to do the job’. This was also illustrated by a comment made by the probation manager in January 2002:

I am not happy with MMAGS risk assessment. That’s not to say that they should use the probation one. But at the moment, the priority of the information is skewed. I’d hoped it would evolve over time but this has not happened. I am also concerned about how it is used practically. Why is the information not given out in advance? It should be compiled jointly and should be a living model. I am not sure that this is the case.

Fourth, monitoring and co-ordinating the disparate team was difficult and they were not physically located together. Whilst responsible for the day-to-day activities of the practitioner team, the activities of the practitioners were not directly visible to the project manager. This was compounded by a series of communication and IT problems. The practitioners had differential access to computers and email systems and, even where they had access, the systems were not always compatible.

Observations of the meetings illustrated some of the problems that this was causing in practice. For example, at a board meeting observed on 1 March 2002 problems caused by differing IT systems were discussed. The steering group discussed the problems that were being caused when the communications sent out by the implementation team based at the police station by email could not be read by staff working in Manchester City Council because they used different and incompatible systems. This impacted on the implementation of the project because it made day-to-day administration much harder. For example, distributing the agendas for meetings and associated minutes, project documents and instructions and so on became time-
consuming and led to practitioners becoming frustrated where they did not receive information about issues related to the project in a timely manner.

It was felt by some of those working on the project that these problems were aggravated because members of the practitioner group were not housed in the same place, especially in terms of identifying and addressing issues more quickly. The housing practitioner for example, stated in June 2002 that ‘... it would have been a good idea to have the practitioners together under one roof at least for some of the time.’ Similarly the project manager in December 2001 stated that:

Some of the issues have arisen because all the agencies are all in different places. It would be easier to manage if they were all together...Some issues would have been addressed more quickly if they were all housed in the same place. But there is a trade off because line management is being provided by the home agencies.

Fifth, there were a series of practical information sharing problems. As has been mentioned, the project had no joint system for sharing information that could be accessed by all those working on the project. This meant that information had to be extracted from different agency records and reproduced at the weekly meetings and discussed there. The process was time-consuming and considered by some working on the project to be wasteful. In interview in March 2003 the project manager highlighted the problems that it caused in the following quote:

The main problems have been in terms of information exchange, through the lack of a joined up system. We are totally reliant on people to come together for a three hour period each week, share a massive amount of information, having briefed themselves on what they are likely to be asked and then go away and do their bit ... What we need is a joined up system whereby each individual can have access to one common data base which imports information from all those others held within those agencies. That’s the single biggest failure within this project. It’s frustrating for everybody involved.

The actual process of information sharing also had an impact on the nature of the implementation of the project. In particular, the different agencies had different approaches to sharing information about those individuals that the project was
working with. Some of the agencies represented on the project were thought to be historically reluctant to share information with the police service ‘...the social services, education and probation do not typically share information with the police and are not happy to do so and would prefer not to know...’ (Youth Offending Team managers, September 2001). On the other hand, the police service, which was widely considered to have access to important information on target individuals, was judged to be slow and unsystematic in their approach to sharing those data by some working on the project, as demonstrated in the following two quotes:

Information about individuals hasn’t been forthcoming. [We] can’t easily get much out of GMP. They don’t always record the relevant information. There have also been problems with information sharing. Where information is passed from the police, it is passed too slowly. There are also general problems with gleaning information. The neighbours don’t always know what is going on for example. [The information manager] knows a lot about people on the target list but doesn’t always write it down.

Housing practitioner, January 2002

GMP are not about sharing information. They are about gathering information. But when it comes to feeding back he [the project information manager] thinks just tell them on a need to know basis. It can be a bit disjointed.

Education practitioner, February 2003

Because of the lack of standardised information systems and poor administration of the meetings, the practitioners ultimately became concerned about sharing information in what some of them considered to be an unaccountable environment. This had an impact on the delivery of the project because, in practice, the practitioners became unwilling to share information about the targeted individuals, limiting what could be achieved. For example, at the meeting held on 23 October 2002, the minutes stated that ‘... [the implementation manager] raised concerns about confidentiality and the issue of information transmitted to home computers.’ Such were the concerns about transmission of information to personal computers that by 6 November 2002 the social service representative refused to share information in that environment. The minutes of the meeting from that date stated that ‘... [the social worker] raised concerns that minutes were being sent to one member of the teams email at a home
address. [The social worker] made it clear that given such a position, he is not willing to continue to share information in the meetings, given the sensitive nature of the information shared by the group, until this matter is resolved.

Many of these co-ordination and administration problems could have been considered to have been teething problems and efforts were made to attend to them. Indeed, some practitioners noted that managers missed early opportunities to implement good project management routines:

An opportunity was missed for setting ground rules, for example, no mobiles, a record of minutes, confidentiality statements, no side meetings...ground rules would have avoided mis-communication.
Housing practitioner, November 2001

The problem was that it took a long time to address the observed co-ordination and administration problems and created a distraction from implementing the project’s planned interventions. The minutes of the practitioner meeting held on 13 November 2002, for example, showed that the issue of risk assessment still had not been dealt with. The biggest practical problem was perhaps the joint access to information systems, which was still unresolved in March 2003. Perhaps more importantly, however, the co-ordination and administration problems led to real concerns amongst the practitioners about the accountability of the project. Generally, the lack of a monitoring system, poor recording of meetings and distribution of minutes and tasking made it difficult to monitor and review cases and subsequently to know what practitioners were supposed to be doing and to hold them to account.

Management in the Manchester project
The management arrangements for the individual practitioners working on the project also helped to frame the implementation of the Manchester project. It has already been seen that in the structure of the Manchester project (with the exception of the implementation team) line management responsibility continued to lie with their home agency. Many of the practitioners working on the project felt that this arrangement was appropriate in order to maintain the proper supervision and professional development of the seconded staff. The probation practitioner stating in
June 2002 for example, ‘... supervision with probation is crucial so as to not lose the link about what is going on in probation’.

Nevertheless, this line management arrangement impacted on the implementation of the project in a practical sense very early on. The police officer project manager was responsible for ensuring that elements of the strategy were executed but in this arrangement he had no direct control over performance management or discipline of the staff, which the home agency retained. Day-to-day management of the seconded staff soon became problematic for the project manager. As early as December 2001 the original project manager stated that ‘...the relationship between the MMAGS management and line management in mother agencies caused some problems’.

This was also noted later in the project. In March 2003 the second project manager also noted problems related to line management ‘... the structure was alright but it fell down in terms of line management.’ An education steering group member stated in March 2003 that ‘...key weaknesses were: not enough sharp management, particularly performance management at the individual level.’

The practitioners too stated that there were problems with the arrangements. For example, the housing practitioner reported in November 2001 that ‘....the structure is a problem. Practitioners are reporting to line managers who have less understanding of the project which allows poor communication to have an effect’.

Both of the project managers struggled to co-ordinate the range of practitioners with very different professional specialisms and responsibilities that were outside of their sphere of expertise and who had different ways of monitoring and assessing performance. A fundamental problem was that the project manager did not have the authority to discipline members of staff working in his team. The information manager, for example, stated in February 2003 that:

There’s also the problem of not enough authority has been given to the project manager. I think [the project managers] should have been able, from the beginning, to be responsible for discipline issues and job development. They should have been responsible to [the project manager], and then to the steering group.
The project managers struggled to co-ordinate the implementation of the interventions in this disparate environment:

It’s a bit difficult for [the project manager] being the strategy manager. We have our own line managers. We are all working to our own timings or whatever. Yet he’s the manager and some people don’t respect that.

Youth Offending Team practitioner, February 2003

Some posts had specific impacts on the nature of the implementation of the project. Replicating part of the Boston arrangements, the project recruited two former South Manchester gang members as outreach workers for the project. These appointments proved to be a management problem early on largely because the outreach workers had no experience of working within organisations. A Youth Offending Team manager stated in August 2001 that ‘... [the outreach workers] have no idea about how to work in organisations. For example, they’ll ring up directors and start ordering them around’. And the implementation manager remarked in February 2002 ‘... the problem with the outreach workers is that they weren’t trained in council etiquette and policy’.

Probably because these posts were new, initially there were difficulties in determining appropriate management and support for them and as a result, at the start of the project, it was not clear what they were supposed to be doing in practice. For example, the project manager stated in August 2001 ‘... The street workers were always going to be a problem. Bold promises were made by [the deputy chief executive]. But then the reality of supporting them was much harder’. Similarly, the social services manager in February 2003 that ‘... there were a few things at the start that were quite difficult. The outreach workers were very charming but doing their own things. They needed to be much more a part of the project and doing what was expected of them.’

As mentioned in chapter five, the outreach workers were initially managed by the Youth Offending Team. It was noted by Youth Offending Team managers early on that there were risks to using the outreach workers and that they would need to be carefully managed to make sure that they were used properly:
We have to be careful about how they [the outreach workers] are used. [The outreach workers] are the gateways into the gangs – once the doors are open the other agencies have to provide the services. [The outreach workers] will not be able to do this. Also [the implementation manager] thinks that they are his resource. The role of [the outreach workers] needs to be narrowed and clearly specified.

Youth Offending Team manager, September 2001

Respondents felt that the arrangements for the employment of the outreach workers were not handled well by the implementation manager. The project implementation manager made bold informal promises to the outreach workers that raised their expectations in respect to their salaries and working conditions. In the event, it was not possible for the project management to keep these promises:

The first arrangements were very hard because [the implementation manager] had raised expectations. He promised them staff, £30,000 a year, cars and their own premises etc. They [the outreach workers] told me that [the implementation manager] said that if pushed, she would give them what they wanted. But [the outreach workers] need properly marked cars – to give credibility in the community and for safety. For example, someone pointed a gun at their heads because they did not know who they were.

Youth Offending Team manager, September 2001

The informal relations with [the outreach workers] and [the implementation manager] have been a real problem. And he makes waves by not understanding the complexity of things. Need to be reigned in. There are positives to [the implementation manager] but there are problems when he gets involved in the practicalities of delivering solutions.

Project information manager, February 2003

The difficulties in the management and accountability arrangements were aggravated by a lack of clarity at middle management level. The role that individual line managers were expected to play in the management of the project was not clear. As set out in chapter five, the authority, direction and resources for the project lay with the high level project steering group. The project interventions themselves were
implemented by the line level practitioner group. In between these two groups there were also line managers and other middle management, the role of whom did not appear to be clear. A housing officer in June 2002 stated that ‘... communication between the groups of managers, practitioners and the board is poor. This is related to accountability and managers are being left out of the loop’.

Some of the host agencies seemed to be unclear about the level of management that they were supposed to be offering their seconded staff, presumably assuming that the MMAGS project manager would be responsible for day-to-day management of their staff. As a result, practitioners on the project received varying degrees of management support. Some practitioners considered that they received enough management support throughout the project. One housing practitioner remarked in June 2003 ‘...yeah, I’ve had loads [of support]. I’ve had really good support from my managers.’ Other members of the practitioner team were more or less cut adrift from their home agencies. One of the education practitioners stated in February 2003 ‘... I don’t have a manager. If I needed to discuss anything I would speak now and again with [the implementation team].’ In effect no one was managing the outputs of these practitioners:

Where it didn’t work was where you had some staff more or less cast loose from their agency. There was an unwritten expectation that they would be fully managed by the project manager. My view is that it is not feasible to do it this way. Because if you want to manage people you have to understand their sickness and welfare systems, their discipline systems and their professional development needs. All of which requires the host agencies to have a hand.

Project manager, March 2003

The group has no direction. They choose their own direction and they could do what they wanted. Most of them didn’t seem to have much of an input either from there or here. It is quite clear some of the practitioners do not have managers allocated to them. There has been confusion and lack of understanding and direction and the work that they have got to do to achieve that.

Housing manager, March 2003
Reflecting the continued link to the home agencies and the problems that the project manager faced managing the project, initially, there was a separate group for the line managers and project manager. However, for reasons that were unclear (interviewees were either unwilling or unable to explain) this group was disbanded very early on. Managers expressed differing views about whether this group performed a useful function. The probation manager stated in March 2003 ' ...I could do without more meetings but I am very aware of issues that have come up that would have been useful to have been discussed at manager level'. Similarly one manager from the education service stated in March in 2003 '... The managers group would have been useful in relation to some of the issues that have come up about staffing and the expectations about enforcement and the balance between enforcement and support.' A social services manager stated in February 2003 '...there are some things I would have liked to have brought up at the managers meetings about things from the practitioners group that aren't necessarily the business of the steering group. The sorts of things about agencies not recognising each others purpose and function and how that impacts on the practitioners group and how the decisions are made when everyone involved isn't fully aware of that.' Other managers did not think it was necessary. The Youth Offending Team manager stating in March 2003, for example '...it's useful that the managers' group doesn't meet any more because I haven't missed it. I don't have a view one way or the other but I haven't missed it. I don't liaise with the other managers a lot'.

Problems of authority were played out in practice in the management of the weekly practitioner team meetings. There were disagreements amongst the practitioners about what the focus of the project should have been (the causes of which are discussed more fully in the next chapter) and what they should be doing day-to-day. The meetings soon became very difficult to manage. Management of the group was considered by those working on the project to be a very serious problem in terms of controlling the behaviour of staff and the amount of work that was actually being achieved in that environment. The social services manager in February 2003, for example, stated that '...initially I did feel as if there was some drift around. Because at the meetings all sorts of practitioners had hobby horses they held forth and it was difficult to get the meeting back and moving on'. It was noted by the practitioners themselves too. The Youth Offending Team practitioner, for example, stated in
February 2003 that ‘... I don’t go to the meetings. I don’t go because they are dysfunctional. It was a bit rowdy and he [the project manager] just allowed that when he shouldn’t have done. It should have been more structured and then that culture carried on a bit.’

The rowdy nature of the group was created at least in part by the lack of guidance and the co-ordination problems described in the preceding sections, which gave the practitioners a high degree of scope to manoeuvre. It was felt by some that opportunities to set out ground rules had been lost in the early days of the implementation of the project. The housing practitioner remarked in January 2002 for example, ‘...to begin with, roles were not worked out smoothly. It was unclear about what people were supposed to be doing.’ Similarly one of the Youth Offending Team managers stated in November 2001 ‘...I am concerned about the amount of time that it is taking to get through the cases. People are confused about their roles but there is no need to be because the situation is the same as it would be in their own agencies – the difference is the specialist client group’.

Generally, however, the unruly nature of the project team was blamed on the original police project manager who, it was considered by many, should have been more authoritative and taken a more proactive role in preparing the organisation of the project:

There is a need for strong leadership and organisation. I am concerned that the group becomes unruly and someone needs to sort that out. People need to be more disciplined. If leadership was improved, these problems would be reduced.

Housing practitioner, June 2002

The role of the implementation team needs to be clearer and needs to be stuck to. There is a role for a very experienced individual to pull all the people together and set better team understanding. The idea was that [the project manager] did that but so far he is not showing evidence of the skill required to bring together such a varied skill set.

Probation manager, August 2002
Reflecting the widely held view that the poor functioning of the practitioner’s group was caused by the project manager’s lack of management and leadership skills, he was replaced. The new police inspector was selected purposefully by the chair of the steering group because it was felt that he had the right leadership skills to ensure that the practitioners implemented their elements of the strategy. The change in project manager was indeed associated with a change in the style of the management of the project. The social services manager, for example, remarked in February 2003 ‘... I know that he [the new project manager] manages the project in a very different way and he’s very much more direct and directed in his approach.’ The education manager stated in March 2003:

I think the agencies have worked better together since [the new manager] took on the leadership. I think that there is greater clarity. There’s certainly increased clarity in the paper work and I think that there’s a better level of trust and understanding than there was at the beginning.

There were actually very mixed views about the change in project manager amongst the practitioner team. As has been seen, some of the group in particular welcomed the flexibility that the original project manager had shown as the project was being set up and his sensitivity to the multiple concerns of the inter-agency group. Additionally, it was felt that the second project manager conceived the project to be predominately police led and was unsympathetic to the welfare perspective that much of the group were coming from:

I wouldn’t have had it led by an inspector from the police force but I thought [the original project manager] was alright. [The original project manager] would often say that from a bobby’s point of view we’d look at something like this but understanding the nature of this project, we’ve got to look at it like this. [The second project manager] doesn’t have the benefit of those ways of looking at things. He sees them from his own point of view. He struggles to understand the welfare issues and yet you have to think about things before you make decisions.

Education practitioner February 2003

More importantly, however, the change in project management and the shift to a more authoritative and directive style of management did not appear to solve the problems
observed in the management of the group. One of the Youth Offending Team practitioners stated in February 2003 that:

It has got more formal. There is an agenda now which is good. It’s more structured now but it is still rowdy. I’m not saying it’s not productive but it could be more productive.

Towards the end of the project funding, there was a sense that changing the style of project management was not going to solve the problems that the project was experiencing. One of the education managers remarked in March 2003 ‘... the board took a long time to get to grips with it. Everyone wants to think these problems are solvable. Maybe they weren’t anyway’. Similarly, the project information officer felt that both of the management styles caused problems and that the change in style didn’t seem to make a difference to how the practitioners behaved:

The two are at different extremes. [The original project manager] was very flexible and very free, perhaps too free. [The second project manager] is very strict, orthodox and both led to problems. In my opinion that group is in the exact same state as it was in March of last year. In the same way that [The original project managers’] flexibility allowed people to not address the issues they’ve had, [the second project manager], has brought these to a head in very damaging ways.

Project information officer, February 2003

By the end of the period of the study, it was widely agreed that the management and structural arrangements had not worked:

Well it [the structure] didn’t work. It’s clear that the manager’s group didn’t work. It’s quite clear that the idea of having residual line management with the host organisation allowed difficulties within the team to be avoided, or rather not be tackled successfully. It didn’t work. There is no question that the management arrangements didn’t work which means that to some extent, the practitioners group didn’t work.

Education manager, March 2003
We had a structure that wasn’t sufficiently thought through and as a board member I have to share responsibility for that. We made assumptions about the strength of the project team and just assumed that was where it was all going to get sorted out. In fact, actual direct project management was unable to sort it out.

Deputy chief executive Manchester City Council, March 2003

Summary

This chapter has examined those top-down factors that help to shape the nature of the implementation of the Manchester and Cambridge projects in terms of project leadership, resources, theory, guidance, and management and accountability. Leadership influenced the implementation of both of the projects albeit in different ways. In Cambridge non-attendance by senior police officers at project meetings indicated that they did not see the project as a high priority. Related to this, senior police management faced external pressures to meet centrally determined performance indicators coupled with a shortage of police officers. The police management did not see the bicycle theft project as sufficiently high priority and as such did not allocate police officer resources to the project. This meant that none of the enforcement interventions were implemented whereas senior City Council officers facilitated implementation of the situational measures. In contrast there was evidence of high level senior management support in the Manchester project which facilitated the establishment of the multi-agency practitioner team. However, over time the senior support wavered as implementation problems surfaced and poor communication between the practitioners and the steering group was evident.

The availability of resources played a role in shaping implementation in terms of finance, staffing and the availability of capable analysts to analyse problems. The grant funding facilitated implementation of both of the projects in general terms. The Manchester project was, however, ambitious for the available resources and the timetable. In contrast, the Cambridge project was feasible given its resources and timetable.

In terms of staff resources, in Cambridge, the project manager’s general enthusiasm and contacts facilitated the implementation of the project but lack of project
management experience contributed to delays to building elements of the project. In Manchester, the complex secondment structure had a particular impact on the nature of the implementation of the project: identifying capable and suitable staff to work on the project was problematic and some agencies appeared to be sending unsuitable staff; there were concerns about the commitment of staff to the project, with some feeling that motivation was more to do with developing careers than commitment to project aims; and, some individuals created very difficult management problems.

Both projects had access to staff capable of analysing problems to develop the problem definition but the implementation of the projects was shaped by access to suitable data. In the Cambridge project, data were largely available to develop the problem definition. In Manchester, there was a range of problems that included difficulties accessing data sets and transmission of data, data sharing difficulties and poor quality data. In the longer term it was also not clear that the research that had been conducted or any other evidence was used in the subsequent development of the project strategy.

Project theory was not articulated explicitly in either of the projects but influenced the nature of the implementation of both of them. In Cambridge, the latent theory based on situational crime prevention techniques addressing aspects of the victim, location and offender appeared to facilitate the development of suitable interventions. In Manchester, the project theory was transformed from its basis in the seemingly successful Boston Gun Project and was ultimately conceived in terms of a range of social and preventative interventions for which the evidence base is weaker and the cause and effect mechanisms much wider and longer term.

Related availability of clear project guidance also had an impact on the nature of the implementation of the projects. In the Cambridge project clear and detailed guidance outlining the planned interventions and when they should be implemented were provided and followed by the project manager. In Manchester, guidance about how to implement the interventions was not specifically stated. In these circumstances the project staff struggled to assess who was at risk and suitable for project interventions as too many individuals were meeting the vague criteria given the resources available. There was no system set up for taking referrals which led to an increasing
workload and individuals were selected for inclusion on the scheme on different levels of evidence.

The Home Office played a limited role in supervising the outputs of both projects, confining their role to monitoring the project accounts at the Regional Office level. This gave the projects scope to deviate from the agreements that they had made unchecked by the grant owner. The degree to which practitioners complied with project guidance had an impact on the implementation of both projects. In Cambridge the project manager followed the project guidance largely in a straightforward manner though some of the delays might have been avoided if the building interventions had been managed by the Council. The complex structure of the Manchester project created difficulties in managing the practitioners and led to concerns about project accountability. There was no standard way of documenting interventions and activities, which led to difficulties measuring outputs and holding practitioners to account. There were practical information sharing difficulties, which resulted in time-consuming delays and concerns about client confidentiality and there were differing risk assessment systems, which resulted in concerns about staff safety. The activities of the practitioners were not visible to the project manager day-to-day which caused a range of communication problems, which were aggravated by differential access to information technology. The seconded inter-agency structure created difficulties for the management of staff at the individual level. The project manager did not have control over the day-to-day activities of staff, which continued to lie with the home agencies. This was aggravated by a lack of clarity at line management, as some managers were not clear who was responsible for what. The result was that some practitioners received very little day-to-day management. There were concerns that the original project manager was not directive enough in his approach to manage the disparate team. That said, the change in project manager, which was associated with a change in management style, did not appear to have an impact on the behaviour of the practitioners.

The following chapter turns to those bottom-up factors which help explain patterns of implementation in the two projects.
Chapter seven

Bottom-up explanations of project implementation

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with those bottom-up factors that help to explain the implementation of the Manchester and Cambridge projects. As has been seen, bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation focus on how practitioners experience and understand implementation and the interaction between individuals and organisations. Again, framed by the literature review but grounded in evidence from the case studies this chapter focuses on those issues of particular concern to bottom-up analysts: how the practitioners negotiated project aims and came to understand, conceptualise and interpret the projects; the nature of inter-agency working; the role of routines and values; and, conflict.

Negotiation of project aims

In Manchester the aims and objectives of the project were renegotiated over time by the practitioners working on the project. This kind of project transformation was not evident in the Cambridge project.

The renegotiation of aims took two forms in the Manchester project. First, the preceding chapter showed how the Manchester project became detached from its roots in the Boston Gun Project and the situational determinants of shootings. It has been seen that over time the practitioners came to conceptualise the project in terms of the wider issue of gang membership and focused on addressing gang membership as a means of tackling the shootings. This transformation occurred because members of the project implementation team expanded the project scope during the early stages of its development to better suit their views about the nature of the problem. The project implementation team conceived the problem of shootings in terms of gang membership and renegotiated the project aims to better
reflect this. The project implementation manager stated in August 2001, for example, ‘... we have to tackle gang culture to reduce firearms crime because the two are linked’. And later in the same interview he said that ‘...initially the project was very focused on firearms but we realised that the problem was the gangs. If the gangs are still there the problem will come back’.

Second, as well as broadening its scope, the Manchester project also took on a meaning that was not present in the original strategy. In chapter five it was shown that the original project strategy was based on the Boston model and involved well publicised, multi-agency crackdowns as a means to apply leverage to gang members and to prevent shootings. It was hoped that during the ‘fire break’ other interventions offering support to young people could be implemented to deter young people from joining gangs or to divert them if they had done so. In practice the project staff came to understand the crackdown element of the project somewhat differently: enforcement activities (crackdown) would be targeted only on individuals who had been offered help and support to remain clear from offending and gangs and had either refused it or continued to offend or engage in gang activity. As this quote from the housing practitioner in February 2003 demonstrates ‘... the carrot and stick. You work with us we work with you. You don’t work with us, these things will happen to you. That message needs to be made crystal clear’. One of the Youth Offending Team practitioners stated in June 2002 ‘...I think we have to chat to people but if they don’t play ball with us, enforcement will follow.’ And one of the education workers stated:

[My main tasks] are to reach out to the most vulnerable young people who are on the periphery of getting involved in gun crime and also explain to them the no tolerance rule. The crackdown procedure and stuff like that. Explain to them that, if you work with me you’ve got a better chance of moving forward, getting out of gun crime and getting involved in education or a job and things like that. If you don’t work with me you’ve got more chance of being locked up.

Education worker, March 2003

The crackdown was therefore seen as a threat for individuals who would not cooperate with agencies who offered support, rather than a threat for groups of
individuals if they behaved in particular pre-determined ways. As has been seen there was very little enforcement activity in this project either as it was originally envisaged or reinterpreted:

"The thing that hasn’t worked well is crackdown. I haven’t really seen it and I’m not fully convinced that it wasn’t needed. I think that there are still people who think that enforcement is someone else’s business."
Deputy Chief Executive, March 2003

"The crackdown has not happened and I am not clear why"
Housing officer, June 2002

The primary consequence of this renegotiation of aims was that the project was taken in ways that had not been originally intended. It also shaped patterns of implementation in two other main ways. First, as has been seen, it had the effect of detaching the project from its Boston project roots based on the situational determinants of shootings and instead moved the project towards tackling the social determinants of gang membership. As set out in the previous chapter this impacted on the implementation of the project because the concept of gang membership proved to be very difficult to operationalise for preventative purposes. Second, renegotiation of the aims of the project resulted in observed differences between the practitioners in terms of how they conceived the project, its objectives and what it was supposed to be achieving. There was limited consensus amongst the practitioners in respect of what the project was trying to achieve and how to go about delivering project interventions. Some of the practitioners working on the project conceptualised the project in terms of the focus on shootings, as set out in the original strategy. Others saw it in terms of the much wider issue of gang culture. The housing practitioners were especially clear that the focus of the project was on reducing shootings and injuries. For example, a housing officer stated in November 2001 that the aim of the project was ‘...to reduce violent crime, especially that which is gun related’. Similarly, another housing officer stated in January 2002 that ‘...the aim of the project is to reduce shootings’. Other practitioners on the project, however, conceived the aims of the project to be more general than this. As well as focusing on reducing shootings some of the
practitioners focused on the wider issues of gang membership and the development of social interventions to support young people and deter them from joining gangs. The probation service practitioner, for example remarked in November 2001 that ‘... I think the aim is ok - to remove people from the periphery of gangs. To remove the future generations of gangs’. An education services practitioner stated in November 2001 ‘...[the aims of the project are] to support people with needs and to set up sustainable support structures to reduce the number of people joining gangs’.

These observed differences in the conceptualisation of the project were also evident within the steering group and at the level of line management. Some of the steering group members conceived the project in terms of preventing or diverting young people away from gang activities. For example, the project manager remarked in September 2001, ‘... [The aim of the project was] to create a situation where individuals involved in gang-related criminal behaviour do more productive things’. Similarly, the headmaster on the steering group stated in January 2001 ‘... [The aim of the project was] to develop strategies to enable gang members to leave – to present choices and to have an impact on life styles.’ Others on the steering group continued to conceptualise the project primarily in terms of its firearms roots. For example, somewhat in contrast to the quote from the headmaster, the Manchester City Council’s deputy chief executive stated in August 2001 that ‘... [the aim of the project was] to reduce the numbers of deaths and injuries in the city’.

The differences between agencies in terms of how the project and its aims were conceived were actually noted by practitioners early on and they raised concerns about it. The education steering group member remarked in August 2001 ‘... I am concerned that there are disparate views about the project and how it looks.’

The nature of inter-agency working

The partnership arrangements for the two projects were described in chapter five and it has been seen that they were rather different in the two projects. The nature of the partnership arrangements for the two projects is discussed in more detail in
the following sections followed by the implications for how the project delivered interventions.

In the Cambridge project the project manager was working largely independently, drawing in resources (mostly in terms of expertise) from other agencies as required to implement the project interventions. In contrast, the Manchester project involved the development of a new, seconded inter-agency structure that existed independently of established organisational boundaries.

The contrasting partnership arrangements of the two projects have resonance with Crawford’s 1997 dichotomy of inter-agency structures. Crawford distinguished between multi-agency and inter-agency working arrangements. Multi-agency working largely leaves the individual practitioners unaffected as they come together only for briefing and tasking with specific actions. They then go back to their own agencies and implement these actions independently. Crawford argued that the implementation of this kind of partnership working tends to be straightforward because it does not involve blurring of practitioner roles to any great degree. Indeed, this reflects the situation observed in the Cambridge project, where the project manager drew on expertise and advice from the relevant agencies as required or liaised with them to implement specific interventions within existing organisational frameworks and structures. This partnership arrangement was largely implemented in a non-problematic manner. As has been seen (and will be elaborated in the following sections) delays were created in this project because the procedures and practices of the City Council had not been accounted for in the project plans. These eventually had to be negotiated and led to delays and some frustration for the project manager but fundamentally the arrangement did not muddle existing organisational boundaries and was implemented in a straightforward manner.

In contrast, Crawford (1997) described inter-agency relationships which entail a higher degree of fusion and welding of relations between agencies: inter-agency working involves new structures that operate outside of boundaries of the participating agencies. As set out in chapter five, the arrangements in Manchester were of this sort. The practitioners represented a range of existing agencies and
worked outside of existing organisational boundaries to implement interventions in new ways. These, Crawford contended, are harder to implement because the boundaries between participating organisations become blurred and the opportunity for conflict is opened up. Chapter six has already discussed the role played by aspects of the Manchester project’s inter-agency structure on project coordination, management and accountability. However, the inter-agency structure also shaped the implementation of this project in different ways. Reflecting the greater tangle of organisational boundaries, differing day-to-day routines, organisational values and conflict between practitioners also shaped the nature of the Manchester project in ways that were not evident in Cambridge.

The following sections discuss the roles played by the organisational values of practitioners, their day-to-day routines and conflict in shaping the implementation of the two projects.

**Values**

In Manchester, the existing organisational values of the practitioners had an impact on the sorts of interventions that they perceived to be appropriate in tackling the problem of gangs and shootings. The practitioners (representing different organisations) held differing values about the sorts of interventions that they deemed to be appropriate. These different organisational values clashed and created arguments within the practitioner team. The marked differences in the practitioners’ understanding of what constituted appropriate interventions for tackling problems were observed predominately in relation to the failure of the crackdown element of the project. It has been seen that (however conceived) there was little enforcement activity in this project and this was predominately the result of the differences between the practitioners regarding the types of interventions that they considered to be appropriate for dealing with the behaviour of these young people, in particular, in respect to the extent to which they felt it was appropriate to work together to implement enforcement-based interventions. There were differences between the agencies regarding the balance of ‘enforcement’ type interventions and ‘preventive’ or ‘supportive’ type interventions and when they should be applied. In this context, enforcement activities related primarily to the
enforcement powers of the police service (arrest, charge and prosecution) and those of the housing service (Anti-social Behaviour Orders, Acceptable Behaviour Contracts, warnings and evictions). In theory, it could have also related to the enforcement powers of the probation service and Youth Offending Team in respect to breach of bail and other sentencing conditions but in practice these were not used. The preventative and supportive interventions refer to the very wide ranging activities that practitioners thought would provide the conditions which would prevent or deter the young people from joining the gangs or which might have facilitated their exit. These interventions might have included: education support to minimise the chances of a young person playing truant or being expelled from school; attempts to find a young person suitable employment, or the development of training and skills; youth and diversion schemes at the weekends, evenings and holidays to attempt to occupy their time and prevent them from being drawn towards the gangs or crime; general and wider support for their families (probably from social services) to try and stabilise the family environment; attention to a family's housing needs; and, help and support for young people with mental health problems and substance misuse.

The different agencies were strongly associated with different values regarding the sorts of interventions they felt the project should be implementing. In discussing the issue in an interview in December 2001, the project information officer ranked the agencies working on the project on a scale in terms of the extent to which they favoured enforcement interventions. He drew this on a piece of paper which is represented in box 7.1 below:

**Box 7.1: Scale of practitioners’ values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most enforcement</th>
<th>Least enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing, police service, YOT, education, social services, probation, youth service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the picture drawn by the project information officer demonstrates, the housing service in Manchester was especially associated with a preference to use their enforcement powers to tackle problems. Indeed, the practitioners working on the
project widely perceived the housing service to be primarily preoccupied by the enforcement element of this project. The project information manager, for example, remarked in June 2002 that:

Housing is very supportive of enforcement action. More even so than the police. [The chief superintendent] thought about 70–30 per cent for enforcement for this project but [the housing manager] thought it would be about 90 per cent enforcement.

The housing practitioners themselves also stated that they had anticipated that enforcement activity would constitute a substantial element of the project and that enforcement was their main role on the project:

[Our role] is to do with using levers to control behaviour. Where people were involved in shootings it was assumed that levers would be pulled. We thought that this would have been a bigger aspect of the project than it has been. It might be the result of the people on the project: they are more keen on why people are doing things than what they are doing. This is a balance. But the balance is too far in the why side.
Housing officer, June 2002

My focus in the project is on crackdown. I realise that others do not agree but that is my focus.
Housing officer, January 2002

A similar situation applied in respect to the police service which is clearly primarily associated with an enforcement agenda. As was set out in chapter five, there were no police officers seconded other than the police inspector project manager. However, the practitioners raised concerns that the police officer project managers (especially the second project manager) did not understand the concerns of the agencies that did not come with an enforcement agenda. For example, one of the education workers remarked in February 2003 that ‘... quite a few people round the table are coming from a welfare perspective and the welfare workers would find it difficult to understand the way GMP work and vice versa.’ The Manchester housing service and the police service were then, for this project,
primarily concerned with using the criminal and civil law in respect to firearms and gang related activity.

In contrast, the representatives from the other agencies working on the project, which included the education service, the youth service, the social services, the probation service and the Youth Offending Team were not typically in favour of implementing enforcement interventions against the young people targeted for the project. These practitioners tended to see their roles (generally and in this project specifically) in terms of providing support to individuals and families in order to facilitate an environment in which young people would be deterred or diverted from the gangs and crime, as demonstrated by the following quotes:

I am less concerned about the number of shootings and more concerned about the choices that people make. I am looking for MMAGS to stop the spiralling problems.
Head teacher, September 2001

My role is to work with kids aged between ten and seventeen who are connected with gang culture – it’s a mentoring role.
Youth Offending Team, December 2001

It’s [the project’s] intention to bring humanity back to the kids. This means being about to support parents in parenting their children.
Education officer, December 2001

I am specifically involved in looking at holistic need and in linking in with other agencies to take on aspects of care when necessary.
Social worker, June 2002

Some practitioners then came to the project with a view to enforcing the law as a means of tackling problems and others came to the project with a view of providing help and support to address problems much more broadly. These two approaches to tackling problems are quite evidently different. As one member of the youth offending team in June 2002 stated ‘... people have got different agendas. Housing is about enforcement. We are about improvement and help. The
two come against each other'. The enforcement focused practitioners clashed with the welfare focused practitioners as the team struggled to negotiate a common understanding of the project, agree interventions and implement them. The issue of conflict between the practitioners will be returned to later in this chapter.

The difference in organisational values had an impact on the ability of the representatives to engage in this partnership and to implement enforcement-focused interventions. For example, the project manager stated in August 2001 '...social services and probation have had problems with multi-agency work. They are 'touchy feely' but they need to recognise their enforcement role'. The project manager similarly stated in December 2001 that '...some practitioners are not happy with it [crackdown]. [The youth worker] especially does not want to be associated with it. He is concerned that if a crackdown is associated with MMAGS he will lose respect and it could put practitioners like [the outreach workers] in difficult and dangerous positions.'

The anti-enforcement agenda of some of the practitioners was certainly noted by those working on the project. For example, the probation service manager stated in January 2002 that '...there was suspicion about crackdown amongst probation officers'. Later in the same interview she went on to say that '...this was not a popular post. There was concern about the carrot and stick approach. Well, the concern was about the stick bit'. Similarly, speaking in relation to the crackdown elements of the project strategy the social worker in June 2002 stated '...I've not had much involvement in this ... I think that we need to think about what would be achieved anyway by a crackdown and think about solving problems more holistically.' As the quote from the project manager of December 2001 (above) suggests, some of the concerns raised by the practitioners about implementing the crackdown related to worries about staff safety and the impact that it would have on the image of the project, but generally the concerns were more related to the strong anti-enforcement agenda that permeated their work.

The difficulties caused in practice by the differences in values were observed at the practitioner meetings. At a meeting held on 2 November 2001 arguments were observed between practitioners regarding the nature of any crackdown and the
consequences that it might have. The probation officer was adamant that a crackdown could not work at all and generally the group wanted clarity on how the crackdown would work and on whom it would be focused. More specifically, the group argued with the housing officer about the role of Anti-social Behaviour Orders in the project. They were especially concerned that Anti-social Behaviour Orders could cover the area in which a person worked or where their families lived and the impact that this could have on a person’s quality of life. They were not content with reassurances from the housing officer. These issues were still evident a year later. At a practitioners meeting observed on 6 November 2002 a similarly long discussion was observed about the role of Anti-social Behaviour Orders in tackling the behaviour of the young people on the target list and the general agreement was that the group would not co-operate with the housing officers in respect to them. In addition concerns were still being expressed about whether enforcement activity could impact on the safety of staff.

Despite the strong anti-enforcement sentiment of some of the practitioners many of them stated in interview that enforcement interventions were appropriate in some circumstances. In particular, they said that they could see that enforcement activity might be appropriate if the individual had failed to engage with the preventative interventions:

The problem with crackdown is an issue of balance. At one point we thought that there was too much emphasis on enforcement rather than support. For example housing has stressed enforcement rather than help. But if they are not co-operative then enforcement does make sense.
Youth Offending Team June 2002

Enforcement is not contentious as such, but it shouldn't be put first. If you have tried to engage with someone then so be it. Housing seems to be gathering information to enforce but they should be gathering information to prevent.
Probation practitioner, June 2002

However, despite some common understanding of the potential use of enforcement powers within this project the strong anti-enforcement agenda (fuelled by the
welfare philosophy underpinning their work) strongly influenced the nature of implementation of the project. The welfare-focused practitioners undermined attempts at enforcement and this resulted in little enforcement action against the young people despite their behaviour. In practice, this took a number of forms which are described in the following sections.

Some of the practitioners who saw their roles as to support the young people refused to support and implement enforcement-based interventions even in the circumstances when they were supposed to. For example, this was demonstrated from the minutes of the meeting held on 17 November 2002, which stated that '... at the invitation of [the project manager] a discussion took place on the roles and responsibilities of the practitioners within the crackdown system. Issues that arose were: [the social worker] and [the youth worker] saw their roles as entirely supportive.'

Subsequently the steering group issued strongly worded guidance that all practitioners on the project would support all the elements of the strategy as this extract from the minutes of the practitioners meeting held on 5 February 2003 demonstrates:

[The project manager] took the opportunity to reiterate that in the event of enforcement action being taken all practitioners were expected to evidence failure to engage by target individuals. This followed from the unequivocal direction from the board that all practitioners should subscribe to all aspects of the strategy.

As an extract from the meeting held on 5 February 2003 minutes (above) implies, the anti-enforcement feeling of some practitioners was so strong that they would not engage with enforcement agencies even where their clients had broken the terms of their agreements and were persisting in conducting gang activities and offending. This is despite the claims made by the probation officer and the Youth Offending Team officer in interview (quoted above) that enforcement activity against the young people where they failed to engage with the project was appropriate. They frustrated attempts to implement enforcement interventions mostly by refusing to share information on the nature of their clients’ violations of
bail and other conditions with the police and housing officers. Examples of the many attempts to frustrate enforcement-based interventions by the social services and probation officers are demonstrated in the quotes below:

They [the probation service] are desperate to provide every single opportunity to rehabilitate even when the individual is engaging in gang activity. One particular example was where an offender was released and the information from the prison was that he was going to get involved in a gang as soon as he came out. Within a day of his release he’s brought together a load of gang members that hadn’t been seen together for six months. They were all driving around in a car when none of them had a driving license. Two of them were in breach of licence conditions. We wanted to put a very stern warning to him that if he didn’t stop this behaviour we were going to do everything in our power to get him into prison. Probation is determined not to allow any enforcement activity to take place until he’s been spoken to face-to-face. And he’s not engaging. He is in breach of his conditions.
Project information, manager February 2003

The situation was this person was being released and was on probation and we thought of the possibility of him forming a new gang. One thing we thought we might do was check on what the bail conditions were. And if the guy was out of line I would get people as quickly as possible to report it to probation and they would take action. But I was refused the bail conditions.
Housing practitioner, February 2003

[The project manager] fed back from one of his practitioner meetings where the youth service and probation service were causing some difficulties. Partly philosophical. The probation service person wouldn’t release information about the terms of a particular license. This didn’t appear to be a data protection issue.
Deputy chief executive, Manchester City Council March 2003

Opportunities for action have been lost. For example, I felt that an [Anti-social Behaviour Order] could usefully have been taken out on a young lad who was visiting his girlfriend at a children’s home and causing trouble there. But the social services wouldn’t allow it because they felt that it would make the problem worse.
Housing officer, January 2002
The anti-enforcement agenda of some of the practitioners then meant that they would not implement enforcement-based interventions and frustrated the efforts of others to do so.

The difficulties observed engaging partners in criminal justice initiatives, because of differing organisational cultures, have been documented in previous research. Pearson and colleagues (1992), for example, noted the very different tasks and responsibilities that social workers and police officers have which clearly has an impact on the job that they actually do. They went on to argue that, inevitably, the same problem would impact differently on the different agencies and so practitioners often have different perceptions of the nature of problems and how to deal with them. Similarly, Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994), drawing on Wilson (1992), argued that there are unacknowledged problems of deep-rooted ideological differences between the police service and social services which makes working together difficult. Crawford (1997) also argued that the police service and probation service are traditionally associated with rather different understandings and conceptual definitions of criminal justice. This, he argued, is born of different occupational cultures, training and working practices. The probation service has traditionally been associated with a social work basis and is client focused (Crawford, 1997). That said, over the last thirty years, the probation service has struggled to defend these historical ideals which have been discredited and displaced (Garland, 2000). Garland (2000) noted that under pressure to reform the probation service tightened its procedures and controls and represents itself as a community punishment organisation, moving from its original mission to one that better reflects modern concerns with crime and criminal justice: changing behaviour and reducing crime. Crawford (1997) also noted the attempts to engage the probation service in joint co-ordinated approaches to crime reduction. He argued that although broadly this might have been accepted at senior management level, it was far less clear that it has been accepted at practitioner level.

Indeed some of the quotes provided in this chapter have demonstrated that there was stated commitment to this new agenda (with a greater focus on enforcement) at the managerial level within the probation service. The probation manager herself
stated in January 2002 ‘...for me though, this [enforcement] was what the probation service should have been doing anyway. They need to do it and should use their enforcement powers when necessary’. However, as noted by Crawford, it appeared that the day-to-day values of the probation service practitioners were still strongly framed in terms of their historical welfare focus. For example, the project information manager stated in February 2003 ‘...generally probation and the [Youth Offending Team] claim to use their powers but they don’t really’. And again, in the same interview ‘...they believe strongly that the probation officer is the good guy. They do not see themselves as a law enforcement agency. They see themselves as a glorified re-hab agency. They are desperate to provide every single opportunity to provide rehabilitation’. The project information manager went on to note the difference between what the management state is agency policy and what the practitioners actually do in practice ‘...there are differences between what the managers say and what the practitioners do. Education officers are very reluctant to include truancy type orders in court. Youth workers don’t have powers and are very anti it. They see their role to support the youth.’ In respect to youth service the deputy chief executive at Manchester City Council made a similar point about the differences in views between the management and line level officers in respect to enforcement:

Youth service at managerial level are fully signed up for it [enforcement]. There have been some practical difficulties on the ground because there is a residual force in parts of the youth service that doesn’t think that their role is about enforcement and therefore are protecting the young people. Which makes it more difficult to work with particular enforcement agencies.

Deputy chief executive, Manchester City Council, March 2003

Indeed, more generally there were differences in commitment to the multi-agency project at the different levels within the agencies. It has been seen that there was commitment to the Manchester project at the strategic level. One of the education managers remarked in February 2003 that ‘... at the board level, people work well together; people seem to work together very well. There was a good level of engagement on the whole in those meetings’. However, this board level commitment to the project agenda and to inter-agency working to reduce shootings
was not replicated at the manager and practitioner level in all of the agencies represented on the project. The project implementation manager remarked in August 2001 for example, ‘...there is uncertainty about the extent of commitment through the agencies. [The deputy chief executive] gives orders but they are not always practical to do on the ground'. Similarly, the project manager in June 2002 stated that ‘... some people haven't embraced multi-agency work, especially middle management. Practitioners are under pressure with mutual project loyalty and agency loyalty'. He concluded that ‘... managers advocated multi-agency but didn’t deliver'. This too is resonant with previous research that has suggested that senior level commitment to a project may not be reflected amongst their line level colleagues. As has been seen, this issue was important for Lipsky (1980) who argued that managers and practitioners may have distinctly different interests, preferences and perceptions and it cannot be assumed that they are working towards shared goals. Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994) also argued that co-operation observed at a senior level within organisations may coexist with rather acrimonious relations at line level. They argued that this might be to do with differences in conceptualisations of roles or policies (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994).

**Routines**

Differences in organisational routines helped to shape the nature of the implementation of both projects although, again, this was much more evident in the inter-agency Manchester project. Key issues related to the organisational routines of practitioners in this study related to: differences in responsibilities and powers between agencies; differences in rigidity of organisational procedures and management; and, differences in performance indicators.

**Differences in responsibilities and powers between agencies**

The different statutory agencies working on the projects had different responsibilities, legal powers and procedures that needed to be followed which shaped how they worked on a day-to-day level. This influenced the implementation of both of the projects.
In Cambridge, delays resulted from differences in organisational procedures and powers between the City Council and the police service. The original project proposal, prepared by the police based community safety manager, had not accounted for the procedures of the City Council when preparing the timetable for the implementation of the situational aspects of the project. The police-based project manager himself did not understand the policies and procedures of the City Council building regulations which led to delays in implementing the situational elements of the project as these were attended to. It has been seen that especially late was the indoor high security cycle park. The main reason for this was that the project manager did not understand the rules and procedures that govern contracting and overseeing building works in the context of a local authority. The project manager and the police project management had no experience of the processes and procedures that needed to be followed to get permission to contract building works. In particular, he did not understand the need for and had no experience in implementing the processes of competitive tendering for building works. These differing organisational procedures did not, of course, prevent these interventions from being implemented: they just delayed them.

The implementation of the Manchester project was also influenced by differences in the roles and responsibilities of the agencies participating in the project. These different procedures, responsibilities and powers were not always understood by the practitioners and it resulted in time-consuming debates and arguments between the practitioners as they struggled to come to understand one another’s roles and responsibilities when implementing interventions. The differences made it harder for the practitioners to negotiate a common understanding of the project and to work together to get things done. These powers and responsibilities were not always understood by the different agencies who struggled to understand the decisions made by other agencies in respect of the young people on the project target list. As well as debate and conflict, the lack of understanding of each other’s roles, powers and responsibilities resulted, in some instances, with decisions to implement inappropriate interventions, in the absence of the specialist workers.

An example of this in practice is demonstrated by the quote from the social services manager in June 2002 (see below). The social services department had
been under a lot of pressure from the group to explain why a Section 25 (an order that the social services can use to retain a young person in their care in secure housing for their own protection) was taken out on a very young woman in the ‘looked after system’ who was being physically abused by her boyfriend. The majority of the group felt that this was unfair and was punishing the young woman for something she was not responsible for. In the end, the social services felt that they had to act because this young woman, for whom they were legally responsible, was at risk of continued violence from her boyfriend. The social worker manager explained the situation as follows:

Everyone said that the Section 25 for the girl who was experiencing domestic violence was a punishment. I felt uncomfortable about going down this route but the rest of the group felt that it was outrageous! They felt we should punish the young man. But the trouble was we [the social services] had been working with her for a long time and looking at ways of making her relationship safer and she wasn’t taking them up. I was seen as the villain, trying to punish her and not him. But I wouldn’t have wanted a collective decision on this. The rest of the group did not understand our duties towards that girl.

Social services manager, June 2002

Similar examples were described by one of the housing representatives who found that other practitioners questioned the housing officer’s decision making because they did not understand the regulations and procedures that shaped how their department worked in relation to re-housing:

Practitioners are asking frustrating questions about why the housing department works one way and not another. The housing department cannot stop people living where they want to. They can live where there are vacancies. There are still understanding problems.
Housing officer, June 2002

There seems to have been some kind of expectation that MMAGS cases would be prioritised, no matter who they were. This, however, is all on the condition of risk assessment.
Housing officer, June 2002
The practitioners struggled to understand each others roles and procedures. They also occasionally made inappropriate decisions on behalf of specialist workers in their absence. The social services manager gave another lengthy example of the problems caused when inappropriate decisions were made by the inter-agency group in an interview in February 2003:

It's about a lack of recognition of expertise. I can give you an example. In cases where young people have come to us and we haven’t known them before we complete something called a core assessment. It’s quite a weighty document looking at each area of the child’s family life. And that’s about assessing needs and our intervention. When a case comes through, [the social worker] picks it up. If it’s a case that’s known to another worker already they will be responsible for the core assessment. And the advantage of the core assessment is giving you a much more rounded picture of the family’s needs and involving the family in that as well. So you are very clear what the understanding is. That may throw up things that you didn’t know about, entirely different needs that aren’t apparent. It may throw up strengths in the family. So when you start a piece of work you are much better informed about that and on the whole you would expect to have the family with you and have some agreement about the areas you are going to work on. If something comes up through MMAGS there maybe other pressing, more important things that need dealing with then and there but they don’t take away the need for a core assessment to be completed. At the last MMAGS meeting when [the social worker] was absent on a case where just such a thing was going on, a worker in the main office is doing a core assessment and [the social worker] is involved in it. The core assessment isn’t completed. The group decided that it would be a good thing if the family went to parenting classes. So another member of the group entirely was told to investigate parenting classes, through an agency who I’m fairly sure don’t do them. That seems ludicrous to me because the worker in question has no contact with the family and knows nothing about them, but unless the family agrees they need parenting classes everyone’s wasting their time running around like headless chickens trying to find programmes for them to go on. You work through that, you go through your core assessment with them, look at areas where there might be difficulty. And then your time is to say, it strikes me you have difficulty in there areas, maybe a parenting class would be a good thing for you? You can’t decide on that when you don’t have the information. And the
decision was for [the social worker] to follow up on that. It isn’t appropriate for him to do it. And it wastes time going back to the group each time this happens and saying this is not appropriate.

**Differences in rigidity of organisational procedures and management**

As well as having different roles and responsibilities, the practitioners represented on the Manchester project worked within different levels of rigidity of organisational procedures and management. This was not evident in the Cambridge project.

In Manchester, the practitioners from the housing department worked in a very rigid manner, following pre-determined set rules and procedures that were applied consistently in prescribed circumstances. Other agencies, and especially the youth service, were much less rigid in their organisational procedures when addressing issues:

> There is also a very different relationship between the managers and the practitioners of the agencies – some are very relaxed – some are much more formal. Housing is very formal. So basically there are very different approaches to management and structure.
> 
> Information manager, December 2001

The rigidity of procedural routines was also reflected in rigidity of management styles and performance management. In terms of monitoring outputs and performance the practitioners from the housing service were used to more rigid performance management regimes than others were. These practitioners were expected to produce measurable outputs whereas others were not, as this quote from the project information manager in December 2001 demonstrates

> ‘...interesting dynamics between the agencies. Big differences in tone. Probation is very laid back whilst housing seem to be very frightening. Housing is much more likely to enforce than probation. There is a lot of pressure on the housing staff to get measurable results. Like evictions’.
The practitioners on the project routinely followed differing levels of rigidity in their day-to-procedures. This had an impact on the implementation of the project because the practitioners attempted to recreate those organisational routines in the new project setting. That resulted in tensions between the practitioners as they struggled to negotiate new routines for the project:

Differences between agencies are partly to do with differences in structure and process. Housing is very structured – so they want structure. But others are less bothered about how things are achieved so long as they are achieved.

Project manager, December 2001

In addition, some practitioners became frustrated at what they saw as failure to achieve measurable outputs:

I don’t think we have achieved as much as we should have should have done [...] I don’t think that there has been enough to do and some opportunities for action have been missed [...] my colleagues would be surprised if they knew how little legal action there has been.

Housing practitioner, January 2002

The issue of differing organisational routines was exacerbated because some of the practitioners on the project were not used to working within organisational routines at all. This was the case for the former gang members who were employed to work as outreach workers on the project. Early on in the project the practitioners and managers were very positive about the role that the outreach workers might play in the project in terms of providing a gateway into the gangs and in providing support to aspects of the overall strategy because of their contacts within the South Manchester community. The project implementation manager noted in August 2001 for example, that ‘...[the outreach workers] are very useful for providing introductions for some of the lads’.

Similarly, the information manager, also in August 2001, stated that ‘...One problem is community mistrust of agencies and this is unlikely to get better. [The outreach workers] will help in this and help with introductions and so on.’ However, it soon became apparent that their lack of experience working within organisations caused specific difficulties for those
managing the two outreach workers. Their lack of organisational experience meant that they struggled to understand the organisational constraints in which they were working:

The street worker perspective is very different. They do not have knowledge of the constraints of agencies. They can also get the wrong end of the stick. Perhaps the street workers should have been more specifically targeted in their use.
Social services manager, June 2002

[The outreach workers] also have no idea how to work in organisations. They’ll will ring the directors and order them about.
Youth Offending Team manager, September 2001

The problem with the outreach workers is that they weren’t trained in council etiquette and policy.
Information manager, February 2003

[The outreach worker] though employment issues not yet resolved – matters to do with health and safety, cultural issues to do with working with organisations. [The outreach workers] want respect. It’s not a payment issue. [The outreach workers] don’t understand how organisations work.
Project manager, August 2001

Ultimately, as has been seen, it became very difficult to manage the outreach workers and as a result those responsible for them became unhappy about doing so. The Youth Offending Team tried to pass responsibility to other agencies, as demonstrated by this quote:

[The Youth Offending Team] are now a bit unhappy about the management of [the outreach workers]. [The City Council chief executive] had said that the Youth Offending Team would do it and gave it to [The Youth Offending Team manager]. [The police] didn’t want to manage them and [the Youth Offending Team manager] doesn’t want to do it. [The Youth Offending Team manager] thinks [the implementation manager] is responsible for it. [The project manager] is going to try and sort it out.
Implementation manager September 2001
As has already been discussed, the outreach workers resigned in June 2002.

Differences in performance indicators
The implementation of the Manchester project was shaped by the pressure that agencies were under to achieve different things. This was not evident in Cambridge. The different agencies in Manchester had different targets and different pressures to meet these targets and these were not always compatible. The problem was that this aggravated the differences between the agencies as they struggled to find common ground for implementing the project:

It isn’t just about personalities because you see it at line manager and board level as well. It’s not even about working styles, it’s about pressures on agencies to do different things. It’s nothing to do with personality. It’s to do with performance indicators and targets that are placed on these agencies and the pressures that people are placed under to achieve. I’ll illustrate this crudely. GMP exists, in part, to lock people up and to get people convicted and imprisoned and if you speak to a lot of police officers they would argue that the best way to reduce crime is to take people out of circulation. And to have them imprisoned, especially say with prolific burglars, for periods of time. Because they are denied the opportunity to burgle. That’s without any high level debate about prison as a rehabilitative measure. Whereas the probation service would argue that they don’t want to get people locked up at all costs, they want to keep them out of prison. You’ve got friction between the two. That’s nothing to do with personality, its to do with performance indicators and the targets that are placed on these agencies and the pressure that people are under to achieve them.

Project manager, March 2003

Conflict

It should be clear that in Manchester the differences in organisational values and routines along with pressures to achieve different outputs and targets described in the preceding sections resulted in conflict between the participating agencies as they tried to negotiate the direction that the project should take. Conflict was not evident in the Cambridge project.
The conflict in the Manchester project was observed and remarked upon by both practitioners and managers in interview quite early on in the implementation of the project. The project manager, for example, remarked in August 2001 that '...there are interagency conflicts about what to do.' And one of the housing representatives in November 2001 '... there has been a lot of debate and disagreement'. This was related in part to the vague project aims and objectives, described in chapter five, which gave the project a potentially very wide remit and was compounded by practitioners’ preferences for different types of intervention and different day-to-day routines. This resulted in ongoing debate about the project focus and remit instead of implementation of the project interventions. This is demonstrated by a comment by the Youth Offending Team manager in March 2003 '... the practitioners group floundered at the beginning. Practitioners get mixed up as to what their role is; get mixed up in debating processes when they need to do actions. It's difficult for the police to manage that, and to set them action.' In Manchester the very differing value systems and day-to-day routines of practitioners led to conflict between agencies as they struggled to negotiate common ground for implementing the project interventions. As one member of the Youth Offending Team in June 2002 stated ‘... people have got different agendas. Housing is about enforcement. We are about improvement and help. The two come against each other'.

The implementation of the Manchester project became characterised by the conflict that arose as the practitioners attempted to ensure that their conception of appropriate interventions and appropriate means of achieving them became dominant in the project. However, it was far from the case that the implementation of the project was wholly constrained by the conflict about project interventions and the means of delivering them. Indeed agreements were reached between the participating agencies about the scope of the project and interventions were implemented, as outlined in chapter five.

Crawford’s 1997 discussion of the creative management of potential areas of conflict is useful in helping to understand how it was possible to make decisions and to implement interventions in the conflictual situation in Manchester.
Crawford (1997) demonstrated how managers could sometimes 'define away' potential conflict in order to facilitate the implementation of project interventions. By this he was referring to the ability of practitioners to manage conflictual situations to get things done in practice. Crawford described a number of ways that conflict was managed in multi-agency settings. The aims and scope of a project might, for example, be redefined to make it more acceptable to the participating agencies to maximise the chances of implementing interventions. Project managers might set vague and multiple aims and be flexible about what counts as successful in order to avoid conflict between agencies. Conflict might be managed through creative construction of the minutes and agendas to minimise the outward appearance of conflict. It also might occur through addressing issues and problems informally, outside of formally recorded meetings.

In the Manchester project, a range of strategies for ensuring that decisions were made and interventions implemented in the conflictual project were indeed observed. The presence of the broad and multiple aims in this project has already been noted. Crawford (1997) saw vague and multiple aims as a characteristic of inter-agency crime prevention work. Crawford, however, considered that the creation of vague and multiple aims could be a tactic for managing potential sources of conflict between agencies working in a partnership setting. He argued that where a range of project aims and objectives were claimed, it is more likely that an agency will identify with one of them. Crawford argued that there is some sense in this approach as a pragmatic means of getting support for projects. There is no evidence that the Manchester project was transformed purposefully for this reason. However, given the anti-enforcement agenda it may well be the case that had the project not been transformed in this manner – to focus generally on gang membership rather than firearms and to encompass a very wide range of interventions – it would have not been able to attract and maintain the support of the range of agencies that it did. However, the development of broad and multiple aims is not without risks. Crawford (1997) argued that in the longer term this can create difficulties as projects may become pulled in different and competing directions as they attempt to satisfy diverse interests (Crawford, 1997). This was indeed evident in Manchester.
Creative construction of project minutes which minimised the outward appearance of conflict in this project was also observed. The minutes tended to note that generally an issue had been discussed or that concerns had been voiced but did not record what these issues were or what the nature of the discussion was. For example, on at the meeting held on 6 February 2002 the minutes state that ‘... [the outreach worker] has requested time to discuss several issues related to MMAGS’. The minutes do not provide a record of what these issues were. In the minutes of the following meetings there is no evidence of this discussion taking place. Whether this means that the requested discussion did not occur, was dealt with informally or that the issues raised were simply not formally recorded in the minutes is of course unclear. The point is whatever the outreach workers wanted to discuss was not recorded in a formal manner. Similarly, the minutes from the meeting held on 13 February 2002 stated that ‘...a general conversation took place concerning the level of information provision prior to meetings at the present time’. No information was recorded about what the nature of that information was. A few months later on 8 May 2002 the following was recorded in the minutes ‘...following last week’s meeting, there were concerns raised over the manner in which events unfolded’. Again, no information was recorded about what those ‘unfolding events’ were and what the ‘concerns raised’ were. The following extract was taken from the minutes of the meeting held on the 5th February 2003 ‘...in relation to some of the questions raised by the case [the project manager] made it clear that practitioners should communicate with each other as often as possible’. What these ‘questions raised’ were of course is unclear from a read of the minutes. Likewise, on 26 March 2003 the following statement was recorded ‘...a discussion took place over the extent of data sharing that was being requested by MMAGS. [The probation officer] felt that some of the issues would constitute a breach of confidentiality’. Again, there was no indication of what the ‘issues that would constitute a breach’ were. This issue was also highlighted by the practitioners working on the project, as this interview quote from the housing practitioner in November 2001 demonstrates, ‘... sometimes issues just drop off the agenda, but for no apparent reason. It’s frustrating’.
As well as being extremely vague, omissions, errors and reconstruction of the minutes were also evident. The minutes of the meeting held on 11 December 2002, for example, state that ‘...[the probation officer] commented on some omissions from the AOB section from last week’s meeting. These were noted’. The construction of the minutes had in fact become a matter of discussion and debate amongst the practitioners themselves. For example, the minutes of 5 February 2003 stated that ‘...should there be amendments that practitioners would like to be made to minutes they should notify [the project information manager] by close of play of business on Fridays. The arbiter of any conflicting views will be [the project manager]’. Moreover perhaps, some forms of debate and discussion played out in the practitioner meetings was not recorded at all. At an observed meeting held on 22 May 2002, the practitioners decided that ‘personal type’ comments would not be recorded in the minutes at all. This decision was not recorded formally in any of the minutes of the meetings. The conflictual nature of the meetings would not be evident from a reading of the minutes alone. This would have implications for how the accountability of the meetings and also for any management efforts to try and manage conflict between the practitioners.

As was also observed by Crawford (1997), addressing issues informally outside of the group was evident as a means of making sure that decisions were made. For example, the minutes from 13 February 2002 stated that ‘...a separate meeting will be held to discuss other matters’. There was no indication of what those ‘other’ matters were but clearly also there was no formal record of that meeting and any decisions that might have been made there. Similarly, on 11 December 2002 the minutes stated that ‘...[the education practitioner] raised some concerns about the minutes that would be addressed outside the meeting.’

The issue of informal decision making outside of the formal project meetings was also noted by the practitioners themselves. In particular, some respondents felt that decisions were indeed being made by the police service and the implementation team and imposed without discussion. The education manager, for example, stated at an interview in August 2001:
I am concerned that there are things going on that the steering group does not get to hear about. I feel a bit like I do not know what is going on. An inner circle of people are organising things and the rest of us are not aware of what is going on.

Key then is who had access to informal meetings at which decisions were made (Crawford, 1997). Indeed (and related to the issue of informal decision making) some of the practitioners stated that they felt that some agencies had unequal influence within the project, through differential access to the project manager, as this statement from the probation manager suggests in February 2003:

"Part of the problem is on the board. Some of the board members are also line managers. The question is that some of the board members and line managers have more of an influence on [the project manager]?"

Crawford and Jones (1995) argued that these sorts of problems are caused by lack of trust and that the establishment of trust is important in establishing effective multi-agency working relationships. This, they suggested, is related to the ability of front-line workers to go beyond their professional roles and develop interpersonal trust relations with practitioners from other agencies. Difficulties getting along at a practitioner level and building trusting relationships were certainly present in this project for some of the practitioners. The Youth Offending Team member stated in February 2003: "...personalities are an ongoing problem as well. People are not willing to work with each other and get on with it". And similarly, from the project manager in March 2003:

"Some have done it better than others [have]. And the extent to which they have collaborated has been directly in proportion to the quality of interpersonal relationships between individual practitioners. And you see it with things like social services and youth services [who] work pretty much together because the practitioners get on."

Practitioners on the project indicated that there was mistrust of the sort described by Crawford and Jones (1995). The youth worker stated in January 2002: "...the police and youth services have a poor record of working together and youth..."
services are very mistrustful. Similarly, the project manager stated in August 2001 that, ‘... they need to get used to talking freely. There is still some wariness between the agencies.’

In Manchester then overt conflict was evident but decisions were nevertheless made and interventions were implemented. This was facilitated by, for example, making informal decisions to resolve difficulties and to minimise the appearance of conflict in the minutes. In this sense, informal decision making offered a means through which the project interventions could be implemented. On the other hand, by doing so, conflicts were left unacknowledged and unaddressed and the project became less accountable to those who were responsible for overseeing it. Crawford and Jones (1995) also argued that informal decision-making systems seem to offer a more workable basis for communication and negotiation in inter-agency working. However, they also noted that these can be risky and can endanger confidentiality and civil liberties and that the practice of informal conflict management results in pragmatic compromise, rather than negotiation of competing interests. Pearson et al. (1992) noted in their study that practitioners tended to feel that inter-agency working was most effective in an informal setting. However, the authors argued that a degree of formality is required to prevent blurring of roles and identities and to prevent breaches of confidentiality. Crawford (1997) also argued informal decision making is not necessarily a good thing, even if it does facilitate action in some circumstances. Informal decision making leaves differential power relations unchecked and it hides decision making from formal review. Like Pearson et al. (1992) he argued that more formal systems of representation would be appropriate in inter-agency working to improve clarity and prevent blurring of practitioner roles and identities (Crawford, 1997). The trade-off, as this study also suggests, might be that it is harder to reach consensus in the first place and hence to subsequently implement projects.

This chapter ends with a brief discussion of the role played by race and gender in the implementation of the Manchester project. It has been argued that gender issues could be a significant obstacle to inter-agency working, in particular that female line-level practitioners in the social services, probation services and health care may be reluctant to work with the male-dominated police service. It is
conceivable that similar issues may be present in respect to race. As such, efforts were made in this study to assess the role played by race and gender in explaining the nature of implementation. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the conflict in the Manchester project was caused by gender or race relations: the observed conflict between the agencies was caused primarily by differences in values and routines between the practitioners.

Summary of chapter seven

This chapter has examined the bottom-up factors that help to explain the implementation of the Manchester and Cambridge projects. These included negotiation of project aims, the role of practitioner values, routines and conflict. Renegotiation of the original project plans was evident in the Manchester project but not in the Cambridge project. In Manchester the project implementation team shifted the project theory to focus much more widely on the problem of gang membership rather than shootings early on in the project. In doing so, the scope of the project widened considerably leading to differences at all levels about how the project was conceptualised by those working on it and difficulties operationalising the project for practical purposes. Additionally, the project in Manchester took on a new meaning, which was not the same as that developed in the original project plans. The enforcement element of the project came to be seen as individual level enforcement action against individuals who would not co-operate with offers of support rather than in terms of the multi-agency crackdowns that were the main thrust of the Boston Gun Project that the project was attempting to replicate.

The implementation of the Manchester project was influenced by differences in organisational values between the practitioners. This related especially to differences about what were perceived by practitioners to be appropriate interventions. This was borne of differing conceptions of how best to tackle problems. In particular, there were differences between the agencies that came from a client-based welfare perspective and those who saw their role primarily as being to enforce regulations and the law. This was played out in terms of the extent to which enforcement initiatives should be implemented in relation to welfare and supportive interventions. The consequence of the differences in values was that
little enforcement activity (however conceived) was implemented as the welfare-focused practitioners undermined attempts at enforcement. The influence of organisational values in shaping the nature of implementation was not evident in the Cambridge project.

Organisational routines were also evident in shaping the two projects, again most notably in the Manchester project. There, the practitioners struggled to understand one another’s roles, procedures and processes. This resulted in problems understanding each other’s decision making and resulted in conflict between them as they struggled to agree on project scope. The different agencies were marked by differences in working styles. Some agencies operated rigid working procedures and operated within much more rigid organisational structures. This caused problems as some practitioners wanted a flexible working environment and others wanted to work within a more rigid organisational structure. Similarly, concern with attending to differing and sometimes conflicting performance indicators also caused difficulties. The role of routine was also evident in the Cambridge project albeit not to the same degree. That the project had not anticipated the City Council’s routines for building works led to delays, but did not fundamentally prevent the project from implementing its situational interventions in the long term.

The Manchester project was also shaped by conflict between the agencies as the practitioners struggled to co-operate and to come to a common understanding of what constituted suitable interventions. Within the conflictual nature of inter-agency working in the Manchester project, a number of strategies were employed to ensure that interventions were implemented. Creative management of agendas and minutes to avoid areas of conflict were observed. Details of minutes of meetings were vague; omissions and errors were evident. Issues were left off meetings’ agendas and dealt with outside of the official meetings. Conflict and its negotiation were not evident in Cambridge.
Chapter eight

Integrating top-down and bottom-up approaches

Introduction

Drawing on evidence from the case studies, the aim of this thesis was to examine the legitimacy of the top-down and bottom-up approach to analysing and understanding the implementation of problem-oriented projects within the police service and wider crime reduction arena. This chapter is concerned with examining the extent to which this was achieved and the interaction between the top-down and bottom-up approaches.

The chapter will start by reviewing those factors that shaped the implementation of the two case studies in light of the top-down and bottom-up literature. It will discuss what was planned and what the projects achieved in relation to top-down and bottom-up features of project implementation. It will be argued that whilst both top-down and bottom-up approaches play a role in explaining and understanding patterns of implementation, they are limited and these limitations are discussed with reference to evidence from this study. In light of these limitations this chapter finishes by outlining an alternative way of conceptualising project implementation, drawing on the ontological framework provided by Giddens (1984).

The role of top-down and bottom-up factors in the Cambridge project

In the Cambridge project there was limited deviation from the original plans although the enforcement interventions were not implemented at all and some interventions were implemented late. Top-down features of project implementation were strongly evident in shaping the nature of the Cambridge project. These included project leadership, the availability of resources, project theory, objectives and management and compliance. The role they played is discussed in the following sections.
Leadership played an important role in the delivery of the Cambridge project. The support of senior managers facilitated access to the grant funding required to get the project up and running. Senior support from the City Council facilitated implementation of the situational interventions in particular. However, external pressures on senior police managers to prioritise other forms of crime to meet centrally determined performance targets meant that they would not release officers to work on the enforcement interventions and these were not implemented in any form as a result. Top-down analysts acknowledge that circumstances beyond the control of those directly managing projects can play a role in shaping implementation of projects (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Generally, however, they have argued that these are inevitable, that there is little that can be done about them and they do not tend to examine their role in detail.

Whilst external pressures on available resources and the preferences of senior police management thwarted the delivery of the enforcement interventions, the nature of the resources available for this project shaped its implementation in other ways. As has been stressed, the availability of adequate resources is very important for top-down explanations of project implementation. In particular, the availability of adequate time and money at the right stages of implementation play an important role in shaping the nature of implementation of projects (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). It has been seen that, for the most part, the resources required to implement the Cambridge project were available and this helped explain the nature of the implementation of this project. As set out in detail in chapter six it has been contended that the Cambridge project was feasible in terms of its plans, the levels of staffing (and other) resources it had access to and the time available to implement the interventions. This match is an important condition for facilitating the delivery of interventions for top-down analysts (Hood, 1976; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).

Top-down analysts do, however, conceive resources more widely than just the availability of money and refer also to the staffing required to implement projects and other tools that might be required (in the context of problem-oriented projects the availability of data and analysts is especially important). Indeed, the implementation of the Cambridge project was shaped in part by the project manager who, it was
agreed by those working on the project, had some of the necessary skills to co-
ordinate the project interventions. The Cambridge project manager, however, did not
have all of the right skills and his lack of project management and particularly lack of
procurement experience led to delays delivering the situational aspects of the project.
The data and skills required to analyse the problem of bicycle theft and develop
responses were also available in the Cambridge project as was discussed in detail in
chapter six.

As well as being essential in explaining the implementation of projects in terms of
capacity and feasibility, resources are also important because they influence the nature
of other top-down features of project implementation. In the Cambridge project, the
availability of resources played a role in shaping the development of the project
theory. Top-down analysts have argued that a successful project depends on a detailed
understanding of the problem that it is seeking to tackle and on a clear theory
specifying cause and effect mechanisms because an initiative might just be a bad idea.
In the Cambridge project, the resources (in terms of availability of data and skills to
analyse the problem of bicycle theft) facilitated this and so played a role in shaping
project theory. It has been argued that the theory of the Cambridge project (drawing
on a range of data and observations) was based on a fairly detailed understanding of
the problem of bicycle theft in Cambridge and on situational crime prevention
methods for which there is a well-established evidence base indicating that they can
be successful in tackling problems. Looking at the project from a top-down point of
view, the project theory based on understanding of the nature of the problem and clear
cause and effect mechanisms was more likely to lead to success in addressing cycle
theft.

For top-downers, in developing project theory and objectives dependency links
between agencies should be kept to a minimum because where implementation
requires agreement from a wide number of agencies it is harder to make decisions to
implement interventions (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). As has been seen, Pressman
and Wildavsky (1973) stressed that programmes and projects reliant on a range of
agencies to make decisions and get measures put in place can break down because of
the complexity of decision making and the time that it takes to reach agreements. The
Cambridge project relied on a small number of key agencies to implement its
interventions and as such had limited dependency on other agencies. As top-downers suggest, this would seem to be important in explaining the nature of the implementation of this project. The Cambridge project implemented all its situational interventions and the delivery of these was facilitated because the project manager was not dependent on negotiating with large numbers of agencies and individuals within them to make decisions to get interventions implemented. There were, of course, dependency links to other agencies in this project, the most important being the reliance on the city council in respect to the building works. This led to delay (which will be discussed again in more detail shortly) but the dependency links were minimal here which fundamentally facilitated making decisions in this project and implementing the planned interventions in the long term.

That the project had a theory based on clear, short cause and effect relations had a subsequent impact on the development of the role played by the project objectives in explaining implementation. For top-down analysts well-stated objectives are very important in explaining project implementation. Related to the issue of dependency links between agencies there needs to be understanding and agreement of objectives which are clearly communicated and understood by those responsible for delivering them (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). There needs to be agreement at all stages because initial agreements can break down. In Cambridge, this point would seem to be useful in helping to explain the nature of implementation of the project. Generally, there was agreement between the main agencies (police, City Council and universities) about this project’s aims and the means through which these were to be achieved. There were, of course, delays as different agencies’ procedural routines were negotiated but generally the agreement about the aims and the means of the project facilitated implementation of this project.

More importantly, perhaps, top-down analysts argue that where theory and objectives are broad and unspecific, so will the guidance stating what practitioners should actually do (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Guidance needs to be fully specified in terms of what needs to be done and when and who is responsible for it (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). There is thus a relationship between the provision of well-stated objectives and the subsequent development of guidance for implementing a project. This top-down feature was present in the Cambridge project (summarised in chapter 5.
and set out in full in Annex three) and was followed by the project manager in a largely unproblematic manner.

The nature of the guidance in turn has an impact on the role played by other top-down features of project implementation. In particular, it played a role in shaping the management of the project. For top-down analysts it is a managerial task to ensure that elements of a programme are implemented. Perfect compliance with guidance is considered to be unlikely but it is argued that there does need to be good communication and management to ensure that tasks are completed and to minimise deviation (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). It has been seen that the minimal project monitoring by regionally based Home Office officials made it easier for Cambridge Constabulary to renege on their original promise to provide the resources to implement the enforcement-based initiatives. However, locally, for the most part the project manager in Cambridge did comply with the guidance for the elements of the project that he was responsible for. Management of the project was further shaped by the single line of management authority in the project. Top-downers argue that projects with single lines of authority are less complex to manage than those with multiple lines (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hood, 1976). Here the project manager was responsible directly to the community safety manager within the police service organisational structure. So there was a very clear, single line of management of the project manager which top-downers argue facilitates project implementation.

Top-down conceptions of project implementation then help to explain the nature of implementation of the Cambridge project. Deviation from the original plans was minimal in this project and this project indeed satisfies many of the conditions that the top-down analysts state need to be present to minimise deviation: adequate resources for the plans and timetable were available; the theory was based on short cause and effect relationships; there were well-stated objectives and guidance; there were few lines of dependency between agencies; and, there was a single line of management for the project manager. However, even here, where many of the top-down conditions were satisfied, it is not the case that these top-down features can wholly explain the delivery of the project. Importantly, whilst top-downers acknowledge the possibility of external events or pressures playing a role in implementation they do little to explain or understand their impact. Yet it has been seen that external pressures (in this
case the role of central performance indicators) were important in shaping what was done in this project. To neglect to account for this would limit understanding of the implementation of this project. Bottom-up features also played a role in the implementation of this project. As was set out in detail in chapters six and seven, delays resulted from differences in organisational routines between the city council and the police service. The police-based project manager struggled to understand the policies and procedures of the City Council building regulations which led to delays in putting in place some of the situational elements of the project.

The role of top-down and bottom-up factors in the Manchester project

It has been seen that the Manchester project deviated widely from its original plans and many intended interventions were not applied at all. As in Cambridge, top-down features help to explain the nature of the implementation of the Manchester project and again these include the nature of leadership, the availability of resources, project theory, objectives and management and compliance. These factors, however, shaped implementation in rather different ways than they did in the Cambridge project and are discussed in the following sections.

In Manchester, strong leadership was evident and played a role in shaping implementation through facilitating access to some of the resources required for the project. In contrast to Cambridge, senior management did release the staff required to work on the inter-agency project and this fundamentally facilitated the delivery of the project. However, more generally, the role played by resources in shaping implementation was more problematic here than in the Cambridge project. First, and perhaps most importantly, quite simply, this project was too ambitious for its allocated timescales and finances and this restricted what could realistically be achieved. Second, concerns were raised about the motivation and ability of some of the staff who worked on the project who were not considered by some managers and others working on the project to have all the right skills to deliver this project. Third, adequate data to understand the problem of gang violence were not readily available and this made it much harder to develop an understanding of the nature of gang-related violence in the first place and it was less clear that data and evidence were being used to guide the development of the new renegotiated theory over time.
In Manchester, the project theory shifted in the early days of the project to focus broadly on the wider social determinants of gang membership rather than on the situational determinants of shootings. This shift in project theory was not framed in terms of the analysis that had informed the original strategy or indeed any other evidence about how gang-related problems should be tackled. This shift in project theory was not questioned by the Regional Office who oversaw the accounts for the grant but did little to monitor what the project was delivering in practice.

The importance of basing project theory on clear cause and effect mechanisms for top-down accounts of project implementation has been discussed. In moving the project theory to focus on social determinants of gang membership, the cause and effect mechanisms underpinning the project theory were much longer and less clear than they were in the original strategy based on situational determinants of shootings and replicating the successful Boston arrangements. Long sequences of cause and effect relationships are problematic as they are far more likely to break down over time and so interventions are less likely to be implemented ‘...the fewer the steps, the fewer the opportunities for disasters to over take it’ (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: 147). Looking at the Manchester project theory from a top-down perspective then, conceiving the project in terms of the long-term social determinants of gang membership was likely to be problematic not least because these were not well understood but also because there was an increased risk that the sequences of cause and effect would break down over time.

It has been seen that top-down analysts make much of the role played by dependency links between agencies in shaping what projects deliver. Projects which rely on multiple agencies contain many different decision paths that have to be negotiated to make decisions and to get interventions implemented (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). This complicates the delivery of projects and programmes. As was set out in chapter five, the broad and ambitious project theory drew on the resources of a large number of individuals and agencies, including youth workers, education workers, outreach workers, housing officers, teachers, probation officers, social workers and police officers who all had to make decisions to act and/or negotiate decisions with their home agencies before interventions could be delivered. Thus the implementation
of this project was heavily reliant on multiple dependency links. Top-downers argue that this will make implementation much more problematic, as indeed was observed in Manchester.

The diverse project theory shaped patterns of implementation in two other ways. First, for top-downers there needs to be understanding and agreement of project objectives amongst those responsible for implementing them to minimise difficulties delivering interventions (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). In the Manchester project this was not straightforward. It has been seen in chapter seven that there was some general agreement about the importance of the project but there were differences between the practitioners in respect to the extent to which the project aims focused on reducing shootings or on addressing gang membership. This was evident at all levels of the project. Moreover, it is quite clear that there was no agreement about how to meet those aims, and the differences between practitioners in terms of whether the project should focus on enforcement or preventative and supportive interventions has been discussed at length. In short, there was some general agreement about the project ends but not about the means of getting there. Top-downers argue that this is problematic for project implementation and indeed in Manchester the fundamental disagreement about project objectives resulted in conflict between the practitioners (discussed in more detail later in this chapter). Second, project objectives need to be well-specified, mostly in order to facilitate the development of adequate guidance ‘...if objectives are not uniquely determined, neither are the modes of implementation for them’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). In Manchester, it did indeed prove difficult to operationalise the broad objectives for practical purposes and this led to difficulties. These were set out in chapter six and included the identification of those young people with whom the project should be working; when and how to take referrals; and, more widely, knowing what the practitioners should have been doing and when.

As top-downers would have foreseen, the fact that the guidance was not well stated had wider implications for this project. In the absence of clear guidance setting out what practitioners should have been doing it was much harder to manage on a day-to-day basis. As discussed in chapter six, it was difficult for the project managers to know what the practitioners should be achieving day-to-day and hence how and when to hold them to account.
The management of the project was complicated by the multiple lines of authority present in the multi-agency project. As has been seen, the practitioners had line management responsibility to the project manager but also to their differing home agencies. Top-down analysts have argued that these multiple lines complicate implementation because project authority becomes blurred (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) and that implementation of projects is more likely to be successful where there is a single line of authority (Hood, 1976). The problems caused by multiple lines of management in this project were discussed in chapter six and included the differences in the levels of line management support that the practitioners received; the difficulties faced by the project managers who struggled to manage and co-ordinate the different specialisms on a day-to-day basis; and, the difficulties of holding practitioners to account because the project manager did not have responsibility for discipline and performance management of the seconded practitioners. Ultimately the project managers struggled to control the behaviour of the practitioners and attempts to be more authoritative were unsuccessful.

Top-down features of project implementation were evident then in shaping the nature of the implementation of the Manchester project. However, the role these played in shaping the project were very different than they were in the Cambridge project. There was a high degree of deviation from the original plans in this project and around a third of the specific project interventions were not implemented in any form. In contrast to the Cambridge project, many of the conditions that top-down analysts have argued need to be present to minimise deviation and implementation problems were not satisfied in this project: namely, there was a mismatch between the available resources, the plans and the timetable; the theory was based on long sequences of cause and effect; the objectives were broad and ambitious and there was little agreement on them; the guidance was not formally stated; delivery of the project was dependent on multiple agencies; and, there were multiple lines of authority in staff management.

Whilst the nature of these top-down features played a role shaping implementation, bottom-up features were also very clearly evident in explaining the implementation of the Manchester project. It has been seen that a wide range of practitioners from a wide
range of backgrounds were brought together to implement it. In particular, the different practitioners came to the project with very different organisational values and routines which shaped the implementation of the project in various ways. The different practitioners were associated with different preferences about how to tackle problems associated with young people. The most obvious were the very marked differences between those practitioners who favoured supportive and rehabilitative interventions and those who favoured more punitive enforcement-based interventions. The different practitioners also had different day-to-day routines and procedures in respect to how they addressed problems with young people and their associated arrangements for management of staff. The practitioners thus came to the project with different values and routines and this shaped the implementation of the project in two main ways: first, practitioners started to attempt to renegotiate the project theory and objectives to better reflect their values and routines; and second, it ultimately led to conflict between the agencies.

Over time the practitioners’ values and routines then shaped the very nature of the project aims and objectives in Manchester, removing them from those that had been planned to better reflect their values and established organisational routines. This started with the implementation team who renegotiated project aims to better reflect their view that the problem of shootings should be tackled through addressing gang membership. It continued as the practitioners undermined the delivery of enforcement elements of the project. This resonates strongly with the bottom-up literature which points to how policy is not fixed but negotiated over time by those responsible for implementing it (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjern and Porter, 1981). Top-down analysts do not (as has been stressed) reject the potential for practitioners’ behaviour to influence the nature of implementation in this way, they just minimise its role and assume that the impact can be reduced through project management and accountability. However, the Manchester project shows that practitioners were able to resist the attempts of the project management to influence their behaviour. As indicated above, the nature of compliance had an impact on the implementation of this project as the practitioners were able, to an extent, to resist the directives of senior management to implement particular interventions that they did not agree with, most notably the enforcement elements of the project. Moreover, the change to a more directive project management style, associated with the second project manager, to try
to influence the behaviour of some of the practitioner team members did not result in any change in their behaviour (and if anything made matters worse). This suggests that the practitioners still had the capacity to resist attempts to marshal their activities in certain ways. This too strongly resonates with bottom-up analysts who have argued that it cannot be assumed that managers and practitioners have the same interests; that practitioners might not consider orders from above to be legitimate; and, that the means managers have to make practitioners comply might not be sufficient to ensure that they do so (Lipsky, 1980).

Lastly, it has been see that this project was characterised by conflict between the practitioners as they struggled to agree a project scope and the means of delivering it. The problem of conflict in inter-agency environments has been identified by both top-down and bottom-up analysts. As has been seen, for top-down analysts this has tended to be conceived in terms of project complexity: the involvement of multiple agencies makes implementation more complicated because many more perspectives have to be accounted for and more decision paths have to be cleared before decisions can be made and interventions delivered (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). The involvement of many actors in implementation creates a number of problems. It introduces a multiplicity of perspectives as practitioners become involved in projects for different reasons, for example, because they have jurisdiction over elements of the programme, because they feel that their interests were being impinged on or to build up local support (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). This potentially can result in conflict because practitioners try to impose their priorities and their preferred sequence of events (which may differ) onto others. For top-downers this conflict is an issue that should be resolved through project management.

Bottom-up analysts have also noted the issue of conflict in inter-agency environments but conceive it somewhat differently: as well as differing priorities and means of achieving them, they also highlight the role played by differing values and ideological perspectives in shaping implementation and creating conflict between practitioners. As discussed in chapter three, Barrett and Fudge (1981) conceived implementation in terms of achieving consensus: a consensus that needs to be negotiated between those participating in the implementation of a project over time. The negotiation of this consensus is partly dependent on the degree to which different actors and agencies
share value systems and objectives to support and execute particular policies or programmes. Compliance and co-operation with programmes and projects may only be achieved by negotiation and compromise. They argued that different values, attitudes and experiences combine to form ‘...the perception of the different actors which shape their whole approach to defining problems and issues and to determine whether or not action is needed or cannot be avoided’ (Barrett and Fudge, 1981:24). They argued that there is a need to understand the ways the practitioners arrive at goals and priorities to understand implementation properly at both the individual and the agency level. Hjern and Porter (1981) noted that many novel programmes are in fact implemented in new multi-agency settings which bring together a range of practitioners with different perspectives, priorities and means of implementing interventions. They argued that practitioners participating in new programmes attempt to adapt parts of the new programme to best fit wider organisational strategies and priorities. Lipsky (1980) also pointed to the difficulties caused where there are multiple actors involved in implementation. He argued that there are conflicts of interest between agencies which stem from their different ideological perspectives. This results in a need to negotiate an agreed course of action which satisfies all involved ‘...conflicting interests are deeply rooted and each side has marked out territory where it is influential. Each side must be content with the arrangement because neither can prevail’ (Lipsky, 1980:41).

In Manchester, the conflicts about the nature of the project proved hard to control through project management. Ultimately this conflict had an impact on the formal accountability and management of the project as decisions were made in informal settings to ensure that decisions were made and interventions implemented.

The relationship between top-down and bottom-up features

Top-down concerns of theory, objectives, guidance and management and accountability helped explain the patterns of delivery of both the Manchester and Cambridge projects, albeit in very different ways. This picture is, however, complicated by the role played by the practitioners themselves who influenced the projects through negotiating project aims, their different values and routines and
through the conflict between them. Top-down analysts fundamentally downplay the part these play in delivering projects. Practitioners have different values regarding which interventions constitute the most appropriate means of dealing with problems and different day-to-day procedural routines and processes and this shapes what projects achieve. This was evident in both of the case studies, though clearly very much more so in the complex inter-agency Manchester project.

In addition this study points to evidence of interaction between top-down and bottom-up factors. This furthers the view that projects cannot be understood through one or the other approach. This study suggests that the structural and behavioural features of projects are not independent of one another. The very nature of the top-down and bottom-up factors are influenced by their interaction with one another and this shapes how projects are delivered.

The following sections discuss the nature of the observed relationships between top-down and bottom-up features of project implementation with examples from the case studies.

Interaction between top-down and bottom-up features in the Manchester project

It has been seen that a feature of the Manchester project was renegotiation of the project theory by practitioners. Over time, the Manchester practitioners were able to renegotiate the scope and procedures of the project and this resulted in a project that looked very different from the one that had originally been planned. This negotiation was influenced by the practitioners' values and routines and the strategy was transformed to better reflect what they perceived to be appropriate interventions and procedures for dealing with the problem of gang-related violence. It is misleading then to conceive the top-down issue of project theory and objectives as independent of the bottom-up feature of renegotiation: practitioners very clearly influenced the evolution of the top-down features of theory and objectives over time. This, however, is not where the role played by the practitioners in determining the nature of top-down features of this project ended. It should be clear that top-down features of projects are not independent of one another and there are reciprocal relationships between them. The literature review and the discussion of top-down features of the Cambridge and Manchester projects in the preceding sections show that the nature of one top-down
feature of implementation has implications for the nature of others. For example, it has been seen that the provision of data has implications for the nature of the project theory, the theory has implications for how the project objectives are specified, and in turn the specification of the objectives influences how well the project guidance is set out and this ultimately influences how the project is managed.

In Manchester, the practitioners shifted and expanded the project theory and objectives which had an impact on the nature of the other top-down features of the project. It has been shown that notions of ‘gangs’ and ‘gang membership’ are difficult to operationalise for practical interventions and indeed the wide-ranging objectives negotiated by the Manchester practitioners proved difficult to translate into guidance for operational purposes. It was not clear how to identify and target young people for interventions and how and when to take referrals. This in turn led to increased workloads and difficulties in knowing whether the correct individuals had been selected for the project. The lack of specific guidance in turn shaped the nature of the management task in this project. As the guidance was not well specified it meant that it was not clear what the practitioners were supposed to be doing which complicated the management task. In the Manchester project, practitioner behaviour also shaped the very nature of the systems of accountability that were supposed to control their behaviour. In particular, the conflict between the practitioners on the group resulted in decision making outside of the formal project meetings and efforts were made to minimise the appearance of conflict through creative construction of project meeting minutes. Thus, the conflictual situation was not immediately apparent to those responsible for overseeing it. That the practitioners could shape the role played by formal systems of accountability clearly reduced the impact that those systems could have in controlling their behaviour.

In Manchester then, bottom-up features of practitioner renegotiation, values, routines and conflict helped to shape the very nature of those top-down features of theory, objectives, guidance, management and accountability that were supposed to orient their activities.
Interaction between top-down and bottom-up features in the Cambridge project

The same kind of interaction between top-down and bottom-up factors was not evident in the Cambridge project mostly because of the project structure and the nature of partnership interaction in this project. As has been seen, the Cambridge project was comprised only of a project manager who was situated in the community safety department of the police service and liaised with the relevant (mainly City Council) practitioners to implement very specific interventions. It is probably reasonable to infer that those different individuals involved with the project did have varying values and routines that informed and structured their day-to-day activities. The difference here is that the project did not attempt to bring these people together in a new structure where these could potentially interact and conflict. Instead, the project, in effect, provided a co-ordination function for the interventions and therefore did not blur the organisational boundaries of participating agencies to any great degree.

Nevertheless, there was some interaction between top-down and bottom-up features here too. It has been seen that bottom-up routines of the City Council interacted with the top-down features of guidance in this project, to a degree. The project manager had to change elements of the project guidance to reflect the procedural routines of the city council which had not been accounted for. This created delays but it did not fundamentally change either the nature of the project theory or objectives or mean that the interventions could not be implemented at all. This was because the City Council and the project manager agreed about the project objectives and worked together to achieve them. It may be the case that there were conflicting views about aspects of the project, but they did not come to the fore.

Limitations of top-down and bottom-up conceptions of implementation

This study demonstrates the complexity involved in analysing and understanding project implementation. On the basis of evidence from the case studies it has been argued that top-down and bottom-up conceptions of project implementation go some way to explaining aspects of project implementation but neither goes far enough. Like other studies, it has shown that the application of strict top-down models do not square with the reality that is found when projects are executed on the ground and to
approach implementation solely like this would lead to limited understanding of the complexity of implementation. Top-down features of theory, objectives and management all played a role in shaping what the two projects delivered, albeit in different ways. Whilst acknowledging that practitioners’ preferences can play a role in shaping implementation, the top-down approach does not do enough to understand this. Bottom-up features of renegotiation of aims, pre-existing organisational routines, values and conflict between agencies all shaped what was delivered in practice. In addition, whilst again taking for granted their existence, top-downers do little to examine the potential role of external factors on implementation.

It is contended then that neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches are sufficient for analysing and understanding the implementation of problem-oriented projects. This resonates with the concern of the various synthesisers (discussed in chapter three) who pointed to limitations of strict top-down or bottom-up approaches and so have argued that both need to be examined when approaching analysis of implementation. Whilst bringing aspects of top-down and bottom-up approaches together may lead to a better understanding of implementation it is contended that this too is limited. It has been argued that conceiving top-down and bottom-up features as independent of one another in a project setting may be misleading. Many factors shape the delivery of interventions and there are reciprocal relationships and dependencies between them. The bottom-up practitioner behaviour can shape the very nature of those top-down features that are supposed to control them. Top-down features of projects are themselves shaped by practitioners’ renegotiation of aims, routines and preferences and vice versa, at least in part. As such, the two do not exist independently from one another. It is contended that there is a further contradiction in the top-down/bottom-up categorisation of project implementation: the shape of and role played by top-down and bottom-up features in influencing patterns of implementation and in determining what projects manage to deliver in practice is determined by the nature of their interaction with each other.
Reconceiving project implementation

In seeking to conceptualise the nature of project implementation more widely, the discussion will now turn away from top-down and bottom-up approaches and existing attempts at synthesis towards the ontological framework provided by Giddens (1984). The principal concern of Giddens’ analysis is connecting structural features and human agency in social systems.

The framework is useful because it provides a means of conceptualising the relationship between human action and organisational constraint and moves analysis away from merely descriptive accounts of these interrelations (Fielding, 2002). The previous sections of this chapter describe the observed relationships between the top-down and bottom-up features in the projects. Giddens’ framework would appear to offer a means of moving away from descriptions of these relationships to wider conceptualisations of the relationships between organisational structures and human action in projects.

For clarity, this section starts by setting out briefly Giddens’ argument about the nature of structure and agency in social systems. Giddens’ framework is then used as a framework for examining relationships between project structures and practitioners’ actions and interactions in project settings. It discusses how Giddens’ conception of the relationship between structural and behavioural features of social systems may help explain the patterns of implementation observed in this study and to extrapolate them more widely to the nature of project implementation generally.

Social systems, structure and action

Social systems refer to the patterns of social action and interaction in social groups of all kinds, from small groupings of friends to large bureaucracies. Giddens (1984) argued that social systems consist of reproduced social relations between individual actors and structures. Structures are the organising properties of social systems that give them systematic form across time and space and comprise the rules and resources which regulate a given situation:
Structure refers to the structuring properties allowing the binding of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them systematic form.

Giddens, 1984: 17

By agency, Giddens is referring to the capacity of human beings to act intentionally in any given social situation and to potentially transform that situation in ways that had not been intended. Actors maintain an understanding of the grounds for their behaviour and can choose to act in different ways. Reflexive monitoring of activity is a feature of the everyday behaviour of human beings. Individuals monitor the flow of social action and expect others to do the same. People make choices about action and inaction and central to Giddens’ conception of agency is the human ability to influence events:

Actors not only monitor continuously the flow of their activities and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical of the contexts in which they move.

Giddens, 1984: 5

Human beings then act purposefully and they have reasons for their actions and can explain them. They are ‘learned’ in respect to the knowledge of social rules that they possess and they apply this in the production and reproduction of social life ‘...to be human is to be purposive and humans have reasons for their actions and can explain them’ (Giddens, 1984: 3). This enables humans to respond to and influence the situations that they encounter. For Giddens, individuals behave intentionally to meet specific goals and are capable of exercising choice and transforming action over time. However action is constrained by the structural conditions in which it takes place. The knowledgeability of agents is also bounded through unintended consequences of actions (which are hard to predict), unconscious motives for action that individuals are not aware of as well as by unacknowledged conditions of action which are structurally influenced.
Mutual dependency of structure and action in projects

Giddens (1984) casts structure and agency as mutually dependent on one another. Structures of social systems are not independent of human action as structures are products of human actions and vice versa. 'The constitution of agents and structure are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality...the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise' (Giddens 1984: 25). In this sense, structures (those rules and resources that govern any social system) do not exist independently of the knowledge that human beings have in going about their day-to-day lives. The structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of those practices that they organise: structures do not merely restrict activities but they create possibilities. Structural properties of social systems are related to human action because it is through that action that structures are produced and reproduced. The structural features of social systems both transform and are transformed by their interaction with and reproduction by individual actors.

In this context, the structural properties of a project refer to those rules and resources that govern them and include the project’s financial (and other) resources, systems of management, accountability and guidance. Agency refers to the capacity of practitioners to act with purpose to make choices about action and inaction in delivering project interventions. Through exercising these choices, practitioners influence the situations that they encounter and as such modify what projects achieve over time.

Drawing on Giddens’ conception of structure and agency in social systems as mutually dependent, it is suggested that the structures of projects are not necessarily independent of the actions of practitioners as they shape and reshape the nature of structural features of projects over time. Drawing on evidence from the case studies a relationship between project structures and practitioner actions in determining the nature of implementation has already been pointed to. The nature of rules and resources associated with a project do not exist independently of individual level practitioner action and the form that these structural features of a project take and the role that they play in shaping what projects deliver can be, at least in part, shaped by
the actions and interactions of the practitioners themselves.

This can be illustrated with examples from Manchester. The project theory was re-negotiated and expanded by practitioners in the early stages of its development to better suit their views about the nature of the problem of gang violence. As has been seen, this renegotiation played a significant role in explaining what this project delivered. In this sense, practitioners in Manchester acted purposefully to influence the structural form of this project. They drew on their wider values and routines about how they believed that problems should be tackled and applied them in coming to understand, renegotiate and deliver the project interventions. The practitioners acted purposefully to transform the original structures in the Manchester project; they had reasons for doing so and (as has been seen) they could explain those reasons. As well as shaping the nature of the project theory and objectives, the purposeful action of the practitioners shaped the nature of other structural features of the project. The actions of the practitioners shaped the nature of project guidance and the role that guidance ultimately played in delivering project interventions. It has been seen that through focusing on gang membership rather than shootings, identifying individuals who were suitable for preventative interventions proved problematic in a practical sense. Because notions of gang membership were difficult to operationalise in practice, the project practitioners struggled to assess who was at risk and suitable for project interventions and very many young people were meeting the vague criteria given the resources available. In addition, there was no system set up for taking referrals which led to an increasing work load and individuals were selected for inclusion on the scheme on different levels of evidence of gang activity. The practitioners’ re-negotiation of the project theory also helped to shape the nature of the management arrangements in Manchester because, as has been seen, it proved difficult for the project manager to know what the practitioners should be doing and when. As such, it became harder to hold them to account in delivering interventions.

This is of course not to say that structural properties of project settings do not play a role in determining what gets done. Giddens contended that the structural features of social systems both transform and are transformed by their interaction with and reproduction by individual actors. The key here is that there is a relationship between the two: structural features of a project setting can influence the behavioural ones and
vice versa. The structural features of the Manchester project were shaped by the practitioners’ actions and interactions but in turn those structures came to influence the activities and actions of the practitioners and how they understood and delivered the project. For example, it has been seen that the enforcement aspects of this project took on a meaning that was not present in the original strategy. The practitioners came to understand enforcement in terms of interventions against individuals who had been offered help and support to remain clear from offending and gangs and had either refused it or continued to offend or engage in gang activity rather than in terms of the well-publicised multi-agency crackdowns. This new conceptualisation of the nature of the enforcement interventions was shaped by the views and preferences of the practitioners in the early days of the project. Ultimately that reshaped conceptualisation of the enforcement interventions drove how the practitioners came to understand that element of the project and to deliver it.

The limits to constraint in project settings

Structural features of social systems, then, are not external to individuals and do not merely constrain their behaviour but are shaped and moulded by purposeful human action. Giddens (1984) argued that formal systems of social control have little authority unless they are sanctioned and mobilised by individuals. It has already been pointed out that individuals are conscious of flows of action and interaction and the context in which social interaction takes place. For Giddens, constraint, in the form of rules, will ‘...not push someone to do something if they have not all ready been pulled to do so’ (Giddens, 1984). Giddens went on to argue that even where compliance is achieved, it is of a fragile and contingent nature. That is, once compliance has been achieved, it cannot be guaranteed that this will last over time and it is conditional on people continuing to accept that authority.

These points both resonate strongly with evidence from the Manchester case study regarding the nature of control of the practitioners’ behaviour and offer a way of understanding authority in project settings. It has been seen that there were limits to the effectiveness of the use of authority in constraining the behaviour of practitioners in Manchester. Giddens (1984) argued that human action is purposeful even where constraints limiting action are very severe because people have an understanding of the grounds for their actions and can choose to act differently from what those with
authority intended. Evidence from this study suggests that individuals in project settings can and will actively contest formal means of constraining behaviour unless they have been previously sanctioned by them. For example, it has been seen that it proved very difficult to control the behaviour of the practitioners in the Manchester project through management. Born of their differing values and routines, the interaction between the practitioners in Manchester resulted in conflict. This conflict between practitioners helped to shape the nature of the systems of accountability and the role that they could play in delivering this project. The outward appearance of the conflict was minimised by the practitioners through manipulation of the project minutes, and decisions were made in informal situations to facilitate the delivery of certain interventions. This masked the problems that the project was facing from formal review and consequently limited the role that the formal project (steering group) management arrangements could play in shaping how the project was delivered.

The nature of compliance in this project was also fragile. As discussed in chapter six the flexible and negotiable management style of the original project manager was preferred by some of the practitioners and as a result of this they largely accepted the management of the police officer. However, this compliance dissolved with the recruitment of the second project manager who was associated with a much less flexible and a much more directive style of management. Some of the practitioners did not accept the authority of the second project manager and the result was conflict as these practitioners resisted this attempt to control and restrict their behaviour. Practitioners, then, may contest means of constraining their behaviour unless these very means of constraint have been sanctioned by them. They will not necessarily accept the authority of project management passively; it is fragile and contingent on continued legitimisation by practitioners over time.

**Project interaction with organisational routines**

For Giddens, the nature of a particular social structure depends on both its pre-existing form and its continual reproduction by human beings. Humans are reflexive and it is in and through their activities that the conditions that make action possible are reproduced. Social practices endure across time and across space because they become routinised and are reproduced by human beings:
The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. Human social activities, like some self-producing items in nature, are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible.

Giddens, 1984: 2

Human beings draw on rules and resources in a diverse set of contexts to produce and reproduce social systems through interaction. The routines (that which is done habitually) of day-to-day life are essential for the reproduction of social life ‘...routine is integral to the personality of the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily activities, and the institutions of society, which are such only through their continued reproduction’ (Giddens, 1984: 63). These routines provide people with a certain amount of security about the social world ‘...ordinary day-to-day social life ... involves an ontological security founded on autonomy of bodily control within routines and encounters’ (Giddens 1984: 64). Human beings then, draw on the routines of day-to-day life which are founded in wider experiences and in doing so they reproduce or change characteristics of their previous experience over time and over space.

In this sense, projects are not isolated from existing organisational routines: they interact with them and are transformed by them. Routinely understood processes and practices vary over time and over space and in this context between practitioners and groups of practitioners. New project processes and new interventions associated with them may be different from and so, potentially, interact with these routinely understood practices and processes. This would seem to be especially the case where projects are ‘inserted’ into pre-existing organisational contexts where practitioners already have sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices. This is likely to occur where projects are reliant on short-term grant funding. These short-term projects may set up processes and practices to tackle problems that differ from those that are routinely understood. Many problem-oriented projects are grant-funded.
and seeking to tackle problems in different ways. In these circumstances the form of
the new processes and practices may be influenced by the nature of those pre-existing
processes and practices over time. As such, new practices and processes are unlikely
to be put into operation by practitioners in a straightforward manner.

It has been argued that organisational routines were important in explaining patterns
of implementation in the Manchester project and were also evident in the Cambridge.
In delivering the Manchester project, the practitioners drew strongly on their previous
organisational routines. To complicate this, as has been seen, these different agencies
came to the new project with very different organisational routines. These different
routines interacted with the proposed project structures differently and as a result
transformed the project and created conflict between the practitioners. For example,
as was set out in detail in chapter seven, the housing practitioners drew on day-to-day
routines that were highly disciplined, hierarchical and output driven in terms of
behaviour and they sought to reproduce these as they set about implementing the new
project. At the other extreme, those working in social services drew on organisational
routines that were flexible and endlessly negotiable as they sought to understand the
project and influence the processes through which it sought to tackle the problems of
gang-related violence.

The issue of routines helps to make sense of why patterns of implementation were so
different in the Manchester and Cambridge projects. As has been seen, one of the
main differences between the Cambridge and Manchester projects was that the
Cambridge project did not blur existing organisational boundaries and so did not
interact with any pre-existing organisational routines and practices, at least not to any
great degree. In the Cambridge project, the project manager largely negotiated around
existing practices and processes to implement the interventions with, for example, the
planners in the City Council, procurement managers and contractors. In terms of their
day-to-day activities, those practitioners were largely unaffected by the existence of
the new project because it did not seek to introduce new processes or procedures and
so did not seek to influence or interact with their pre-existing organisational routines.
The situation in the Manchester project was clearly very different. The project
structures and processes interacted heavily with existing practices and processes
because the project brought together a wide range of practitioners from different
agencies in a new setting to attempt to tackle a difficult problem in new ways. Through drawing the practitioners together in this way, the new project interacted strongly with existing routinely understood practices and processes. The planned project was transformed by those routines as practitioners brought them to bear in the new setting and this subsequently helped explain patterns of implementation and particularly the conflict that resulted as the project staff renegotiated these different routines in the development of project processes.

The meandering nature of project implementation
Implementation of projects is clearly not static: it meanders and changes over time. Giddens’ argument that social structures are continually reproduced by those who constitute them would seem to offer a means of explaining this. For Giddens, structures do not exist independently of action in social systems and repeated patterns of action constitute structural reality. Social practices endure because they become routinised and they are reproduced. Although there are regularities in these patterns of action and there are constraints on individual behaviour, action, flexibility and creativity are, nevertheless, allowed for and it is through this that change over time can be explained, at least in part.

Practitioners construct projects over a period of time. Quite evidently, as well as being situated in a specific space, projects are also situated over a specific period of time and during that time the nature of implementation changes. Drawing on Giddens’ framework, it is inferred that the nature of project implementation changes over time because practitioners continue to construct and reconstruct projects over that period. It has already been argued in this chapter that when they come to interpret and implement projects over time practitioners draw on routinised organisational practices and values. As has been stressed by Giddens, key is the reproductive nature of social life and day-to-day routines are integral to this. Routines are important because they provide individuals with a sense of predictability and security about their lives. It is perhaps not surprising that people would seek to reproduce that which is familiar to them. The point is, however, that practitioners continually reproduce social activity. They continually recreate the conditions that make implementation possible, hence they continually reinterpret projects and the project setting; in doing so the project will change over time. Practitioners do not come to a project and interpret it and then
implement it in a straightforward manner based on that initial interpretation. Instead, they come to the project and continue to interpret it and recreate it over time and as such patterns of project implementation change.

In this sense change is an inevitable feature of project implementation but it can also result from specific events and disruptions. Giddens argued that disruption in external conditions or in the reflection or thoughts of individuals can create the possibility of change. Whilst such disruption might lead to uncertainty, individuals will nevertheless draw on their history, experiences and their ability (their 'knowledgeability') to interpret and react to these events. However this knowledgeability and capability is constrained by the unintended consequences of social action which conditions social reproduction. For Giddens the unintended consequences of actions and unacknowledged conditions play a key role in explaining change because it is through these that action is diverted from its intended, more 'ordered' course.

In project settings, 'disruptions' would appear to have an impact on the nature of implementation. A number of disruptions had an impact on the projects. These events evidently disrupted the flow of implementation and had an (unintended) impact on the delivery of the projects. Most of these were related in some way to the discipline or movement of staff. Two examples for the Manchester project will be mentioned here. First, the disruption associated with the change in project manager in the Manchester project has been discussed at length. The new project manager had little experience of working in a multi-agency setting and his management style was more authoritative and directive than the previous project manager. It has been seen that practitioners did not respond passively to this change. The practitioners reacted to this planned change in project scope and direction and through this reaction the project was shifted in directions that had not been intended. Most specifically, the practitioners rejected the legitimacy of the authority of the new police project manager. They undermined his attempts to implement forms of accountability and to hold them to account resulting in further arguments and delays in implementation of the project initiatives. This very clearly is not what the project steering group planned when they changed the project manager.

Second, as discussed in chapter six, one of the original practitioners from the Youth
Offending Team was sacked from the project because of a previous criminal conviction. Again, the practitioner team did not react passively to this event. Many of the practitioners argued that the sacking did not reflect what they saw as the rehabilitative nature of the project. As well as involving disagreements and conflict, the practitioners' discussions about this issue served to reinforce the views amongst some of the team that the project should primarily be supportive and rehabilitative in nature and fuelled the movement from the project's roots in the Boston Gun Project. This clearly is not what the management team had in mind or would have predicted would have been the outcome of the decision to remove this member of staff and this demonstrates the unanticipated impact that events can have on the flow of social action.

Particular events may be associated with disruption to and, potentially, changes in the flow of implementation of projects. It is, however, not so much the events themselves that generate disruption: such events are inevitable. Rather, reflecting their knowledgeable, it is the ways in which practitioners and managers construe and react to events that creates that disruption and alters the flow of implementation. In Manchester, the practitioners' interpretation of these events was influential in determining the flow of implementation over time. There was, perhaps, little reason why the sacking of a Youth Offending Team member should have been quite so disruptive and had quite such an impact on the subsequent course of the project but in this instance it was the practitioners' strong reaction to the event which helped to move the project in a specific direction rather than the decision itself. Similarly, the change of project manager in August 2002 need not have been as disruptive as it proved to be. Again, the point is that practitioners reacted against the change in the style of project management rather than accepting it more passively.

In a project setting then, what drives change in the nature of the implementation of projects over time? On the one hand, it follows that changes in the nature of implementation of projects over time is almost inevitable. Practitioners continue to draw on their knowledgability, framed by wider institutional and social settings, to implement projects but also to recreate and potentially change them as they do so. Practitioners continue to interpret and reinterpret the nature of projects and project settings. This would seem potentially to offer a useful way of conceptualising the
nature of project change over time. On the other hand, 'events' also have the potential to create disruption and thence to alter the course of implementation, quite possibly in ways taking the initiative from its originally intended direction. The nature of the disruption to implementation will depend on the way that practitioners and their managers react to those events. To borrow Giddens' language, it is quite possible that the practitioners observed in this study could have 'acted otherwise' when confronted with particular events. This too would seem to be important in explaining the nature of the implementation of projects and in particular would help to explain why similar events occur in different projects but do not have the same impact on the nature of implementation. The implication here is that disruptions to the external and structural conditions of projects are important in explaining the nature of implementation and need to be understood. These disruptions lead to uncertainty within the projects and to varying degrees, to changes in the nature of what is delivered.

Summary

It has been argued that there are limitations to top-down and bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding project implementation. Neither approach adequately captured the complexity of implementation of the two projects. There are also relationships between top-down and bottom-up features of projects which limit the applicability of approaches that seek to conceive implementation as either top-down or bottom-up and also limits the applicability of approaches which seek simply to draw elements of the two together.

This chapter has described an alternative way of conceptualising the relationships between structural and behavioural factors using the ontological framework described by Giddens (1984). It has been argued that the structural and agency features of project implementation are related: the structural features of projects are not independent from human action because structures are products of action. As such, project structures both transform and are transformed by their interaction and reproduction by the actions of practitioners. Additionally, it has been contended that there are limits to the nature of constraint in project settings: formal systems of social control have no authority unless they are sanctioned and mobilised by the very people they are trying to control. Human action remains purposeful even where constraints
limiting action are very severe. The routines of everyday life are essential for the reproduction of social life. Human beings draw on these routines and attempt to reproduce them and in doing so they influence the nature of the implementation of projects. Projects are inserted into organisational contexts where there are existing sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices. The new processes and practices introduced by projects are likely to be influenced by and have an influence on existing routines over time. Lastly, it has been argued that projects are not static and that the nature of implementation will of course vary over time. Practitioners continue to interpret and reinterpret the project over time and as such implementation will change. In addition, events will disrupt implementation and the practitioners' reaction to this will influence the nature of the implementation of the project.

The final chapter of the study will summarise the main findings in respect to the project's aims.
Chapter Nine

Conclusion

Introduction

This final chapter returns to the original aims of the study, reviews the evidence in relation to these aims and provides final conclusions.

The study

This study started from the premise that there are shortcomings in the existing accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing. As well as suffering from certain methodological weaknesses, existing studies are limited because they have largely sought to analyse and understand the implementation of projects within a top-down framework. They have largely neglected to take account of the bottom-up concerns of the action, interaction and day-to-day routines and values of practitioners in explaining patterns of implementation. This study aimed to examine the adequacy of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to understanding the implementation of problem-oriented policing through testing the following two hypotheses.

1. That top-down approaches are sufficient to explain the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK; and,

2. That bottom-up approaches are sufficient to explain implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.

In assessing these hypotheses this study drew on evidence from an examination of two very different problem-oriented projects: one addressing gang-related shootings in Manchester and the other addressing bicycle theft in Cambridge. The Cambridge project sought to reduce high levels of cycle theft in the city centre through the establishment of a small dedicated and proactive policing team, situational improvements to the locations where there were high levels of bicycle theft and
through setting up systematic cycle registration schemes. The Manchester project was based on the seemingly successful Boston Gun Project which had seen reductions in the number of shootings through targeted, highly publicised crackdowns.

It has been seen that in both projects some of the planned interventions were implemented, some were partially implemented and some were not implemented at all. In neither project were reductions in crime due to project activities evident. In the Cambridge project most of the project plans were put in place though some were implemented very late. The exception was the targeted cycle squad which did not happen at all. In Manchester the situation was very different. The interventions that were ultimately introduced bore little resemblance to the original plans. The size and the scope of the project grew as the nature and scope of the project was renegotiated by practitioners in its early stages and it took on a direction that was absent in the original strategy. This transformation resulted in an extremely wide-ranging project that encompassed a large number of broad interventions that had not been originally proposed. In the event, one-third of the planned measures were not implemented in any form and the multi-agency crackdown, the major initial thrust of the project, was not employed in any form whatsoever.

Findings

On the basis of evidence from the two case studies it is contended that neither of the two hypotheses set out above are substantiated. This study has shown that both top-down and bottom-up features of project implementation helped to explain patterns of implementation observed in the projects. Top-down features, including leadership and communication, project theory and objectives, guidance, management and accountability all played a role in shaping what was done in the two projects. Bottom-up features of renegotiation of aims, routines, values and conflict also played a role in shaping what was and what was not delivered in practice.

Whilst these factors influenced the nature of both of the projects, they did so in very different ways. In Cambridge, many of the conditions that top-down analysts suggest need to be in place to minimise deviation from project plans and implementation problems were indeed present. For example, as has been seen, the project plans were
feasible in terms of the resources and timetable available; there were sufficient data to analyse the problem of cycle theft; the project theory was based on plausible sequences and short chains of cause and effect; there were well-stated objectives and guidance; there were minimal lines of dependency between the agencies responsible for the project; and, there were single lines of management for project staff.

In contrast, in Manchester, many of these top-down preconditions for successful implementation conditions were not present. There was a mismatch between the resources available, the plans and the timetable; the theory was based on fragile and multiple, longer-term sequences of cause and effect; the objectives were broad and wide-ranging and there was little agreement on them between the partners; the guidance was not formally stated; the project was dependent on multiple agencies; and, there were multiple lines of authority in the project management. There were indeed high levels of deviation from the original project plans and substantial difficulties delivering the planned interventions were observed in this project.

Despite the role played by these top-down factors in shaping the projects, they are not sufficient for understanding what went on within them. In Cambridge, implementation was influenced by pressures to meet central performance indicators. Pressures to meet centrally determined crime targets meant that senior police management would not release police officers to work on the enforcement interventions and as such these were not implemented in any form. This is an external factor to which top-down approaches pay little attention. In bottom-up terms organisational routines also played a role in shaping the nature of this project: those of the City Council had not been accounted for in the project plans. Attending to these Council routines and incorporating them into the project plans led to delays in implementing the situational interventions. In Manchester, bottom-up features were strongly evident in shaping how the project was delivered. Over time the practitioners’ values and routines shaped the very nature of the project’s aims and objectives. In turn this influenced the shape of the project guidance and management. This led to conflict between the practitioners as they struggled to agree the project scope and to work together in the inter-agency environment.
This study suggests that top-down models do not make sense of the complexity faced by practitioners as projects are implemented on the ground. Even though organisational and technical features played a role in shaping both projects they are insufficient to explain what they delivered and why. They do not account for the complexity of what was actually done primarily because they neglect the role played by practitioners who are overlooked in top-down analyses of implementation. In addition, whilst taking for granted their existence, they do little to take account of the role of external factors in shaping patterns of implementation. In contrast, bottom-up approaches play down the role played by structural features in shaping the nature of implementation.

It has also been argued that conceiving top-down and bottom-up features of implementation as independent of one another is misleading. The top-down features of projects can be influenced by practitioner behaviour and vice versa. It has been shown that practitioners’ behaviour can shape the very nature of those top-down characteristics that are supposed to govern their behaviour and orient patterns of implementation. As has been seen, practitioners were able to shape project theory and objectives and consequently the content of project guidance and systems of accountability and management. Neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches account for this interdependency.

Because of weaknesses in conceiving implementation in terms of either bottom-up or top-down processes the study turned to Giddens’ ontological framework in seeking to understand the relationships between the structural features of projects and practitioner behaviour.

First, it is suggested that structural and behavioural features of projects are related. The nature of and role played by those structures in project implementation are, in part, products of the actions of the practitioners themselves. Practitioners are able to influence the nature of project theory, guidance, management and accountability. Over time these structures will, however, influence their behaviour as they come to shape how projects are conceived and understood.
Second, there are limits to the nature of constraint in project settings. Formal systems of project management have limited authority unless they are sanctioned and mobilised by the very people they are trying to monitor and control. Human action remains purposeful even where constraints limiting action are severe. Thus it is contended that there are limits to the role that management and accountability can play in shaping the nature of the implementation of a project unless those systems have been sanctioned by those who work on the project.

Third, projects are inserted into organisational contexts where there are existing taken-for-granted sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices. Projects interact with these processes and practices and are likely to be influenced by and to have an influence on those existing processes and routines. As such projects are not likely to be implemented in a straightforward manner.

Fourth, projects meander over time. It is suggested that practitioners continue to construct and reconstruct project structures and in doing so the patterns of implementation change over time. In addition, patterns of implementation are shaped by practitioners' reactions to events. Whilst change of this sort is inevitable it has been suggested that specific 'disruptions' in the project settings can also have an impact on patterns of implementation, often in ways that had not been intended or anticipated.
References


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Annex One

Breakdown of interviews

Interviews in Manchester

The following is a breakdown of the interviews conducted in Manchester. The first column gives the interview number, the second the cumulative number of people interviewed (e.g. some interviews had more than one person present), then the interviewee's role, their organisation and whether the interview was taped or if notes were taken.

Steering group autumn 2001

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<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Manager</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>03/03/2003</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>03/03/2003</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<td>06/03/2003</td>
<td>Deputy director</td>
<td>Education department</td>
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**Interviews in Cambridge**

The following is a breakdown of the interviews conducted in Cambridge. The first column gives the interview number, the second the cumulative number of people interviewed (e.g. some interviews had more than one person present), then the interviewee's role, their organisation and whether the interview was taped or if notes were taken. In Cambridge eight interviews were conducted in spring 2002 as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Interview number</th>
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<td>Cambridge Constabulary (civilian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bike shed manager</td>
<td>Cambridge Constabulary (retired officer)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bike shed manager</td>
<td>Cambridge Constabulary (retired officer)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Two with police officers who had managerial responsibility for the project</td>
<td>Community safety sergeant and manager of project manager</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Divisional commander</td>
<td>Cambridge constabulary</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Head of planning</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Head of security</td>
<td>Anglia Polytechnic University</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| city council |
Annex Two

Interview Guides

Manchester project interview guides

Manchester project steering group

Autumn 2001

- Background/main role
- On what basis did you get involved in CHROME?
- What are the objectives of CHROME?
- How is CHROME going to bring about change?
- Has understanding of the project changed?
- What have the key events so far been?
- Who have been the main actors – how might this change?
- What have the problems been?
- Funding/interagency/within agency/staff
- What do you see as the main tasks/interventions?
- How does CHROME differ from what you/your agency were doing in relation to gangs anyway?
- How has CHROME been seen internally? – at what level, in which roles.
- How does CHROME fit with wider aims of you/your agency?
- Relationship with Home Office/Regional office
- Data on gangs and shootings
- Who is missing from the partnership
- How does CHROME fit with wider crime and disorder strategy/other relevant strategies
- What future difficulties do you foresee?
• How can they best be overcome?
• What are the benefits?

Long term sustainability of CHROME
Manchester project steering group spring 2003

Role of interviewee

Background – *If don’t know*

Role in MMAGS – *if don’t know*

On what basis did you get involved in MMGAS – *if don’t know*

Main role you have played in MMAGS since March 2001

Understanding of MMAGS

What were the objectives of MMAGS?

What were the main tasks/interventions going to be?

How was it going to bring about change?

Has understanding of the project changed?

Setting up

What did they think about the way the project was set up?

- How smoothly did it all go? Who was involved? Was there anyone who should have been involved who was not? Was there anyone who should not have been involved who was?

What did they think of the processes by which staff were appointed?

- Especially the police co-ordinators? What impact did these processes have on the project? Are the right people on the staff – are people missing? Is there anyone who should not be involved who is?

What lessons can be drawn from the setting up process?

- What was done well? What was done not so well? Were there any external
factors that helped or hindered the process? If so, which?

If the project were to be repeated, with the benefit of hindsight, how would they go about it?

**Project structure**

What do they think of the structure of the project? [*show project structure.*]

- Has it worked well? Why, or why not? How does it compare with the structures of other projects they have worked on?

How well have the different agencies worked together?

- Prompt for strategic and practical levels?
- What differences have there been in agendas? What effect have any differences had on MMAGS?

What about co-ordination of the project?

- How well has this been done? What has worked well? What has worked less well? How has it worked having a police inspector as co-ordinator? How could it have been done better?

What advice would they give to future projects with similar objectives with regard to structure?

- Would they recommend that they copy the structure of the MMAGS? Why, or why not?

**Time line of the project**

Once the project got underway, who were the key people involved?

- What is their understanding of their roles?

What have been the key events / key interventions in the project?
• List them

What positive events have been encountered?

• What positive events have been due to the project itself, or people working on the project? Which have arisen externally? How successfully have problems been overcome?

What problems have there been?

• What positive events have been due to the project itself, or people working on the project? Which have arisen externally? How successfully have problems been overcome?

Other issues

How has MMAGS been seen within their agency?

• How well do the aims of the project fit with the aims of their agency? Does it fit with their internal targets and objectives? How much does it differ from what they were doing anyway?

Have they come across any media reaction to the project?

• If so, what, and where? What did they think of the reaction? Was it fair? Have the media been managed effectively?

Have there been any problems with funding?

• How well did it work with the police being the budget holder? Were there any problems with resources? If so, what?

Outcomes of the project

What has the project achieved so far?

• What impact has it made? Has it achieved more than they expected or less? Has it achieved as much as it could have? If not, how could it have achieved more?
Overall, has the project been a success?

- Why, or why not? How do they feel to have been involved?

What will the project have achieved by the time it finishes?

- Will it have reached a satisfactory conclusion? If not, what more should it have done?

What do they think will happen in the future?

- How will the project progress? How *should* it progress?

What advice would they give to future initiatives of this sort?

What advice would they give to people taking on their role in future initiatives of this sort?
Manchester project practitioners

Winter 2001

Role

Objectives of MMAGS

Key events

Difficulties

Training

Difference from before

How MMAGS is seen internally

Missing agency?

Benefits seen so far?

Future difficulties

Key individuals in implementation of the project so far? Has this changed? How might it change?

Sustainability
Manchester project practitioners

Spring 2002

Name – if don’t know

Role – if new or don’t know

Background and how did they get involved in MMAGS – if started after the last set of interviews

Describe your main tasks over the last few months

What do you typically do in a week?

How much non-MMAGS work do you do?

Describe what you did last week

Roughly how much was non-MMAGS work?

What have been your main achievements in the last few months?

What problems have you encountered?

What have the key achievements of MMAGS overall so far?

What problems have been encountered?
Practitioners

Spring 2003

Role of interviewee

Background – *If don’t know*

Role in MMAGS – *if don’t know*

On what basis did you get involved in MMGAS – *if don’t know*

Main role you have played in MMAGS since March 2001

Understanding of MMAGS

What were the objectives of MMAGS?

What were the main tasks/interventions going to be?

How was it going to bring about change?

Has understanding of the project changed?

Setting up

What did they think about the way the project was set up?

- How smoothly did it all go? Who was involved? Was there anyone who should have been involved who was not? Was there anyone who should not have been involved who was?

What did they think of the processes by which staff were appointed?
• Especially the police co-ordinators? What impact did these processes have on the project? Are the right people on the staff – are people missing? Is there anyone who should not be involved who is?

What lessons can be drawn from the setting up process?

• What was done well? What was done not so well? Were there any external factors that helped or hindered the process? If so, which?

If the project were to be repeated, with the benefit of hindsight, how would they go about it?

Project structure

What do they think of the structure of the project? [show project structure.]

• Has it worked well? Why, or why not? How does it compare with the structures of other projects they have worked on?

How well have the different agencies worked together?

• Prompt for strategic and practical levels?

• What differences have there been in agendas? What effect have any differences had on MMAGS?

What about co-ordination of the project?

• How well has this been done? What has worked well? What has worked less well? How has it worked having a police inspector as co-ordinator? How could it have been done better?

What advice would they give to future projects with similar objectives with regard to structure?

• Would they recommend that they copy the structure of the MMAGS? Why, or why not?
Time line of the project

Once the project got underway, who were the key people involved?

- What is their understanding of their roles?

What have been the key events / key interventions in the project?

- List them

What positive events have been encountered?

- What positive events have been due to the project itself, or people working on the project? Which have arisen externally? How successfully have problems been overcome?

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Other issues

How has MMAGS been seen within their agency?

- How well do the aims of the project fit with the aims of their agency? Does it fit with their internal targets and objectives? How much does it differ from what they were doing anyway?

Have they come across any media reaction to the project?

- If so, what, and where? What did they think of the reaction? Was it fair? Have the media been managed effectively?

Have there been any problems with funding?

- How well did it work with the police being the budget holder? Were there any problems with resources? If so, what?
Outcomes of the project

What has the project achieved so far?

- What impact has it made? Has it achieved more than they expected or less? Has it achieved as much as it could have? If not, how could it have achieved more?

Overall, has the project been a success?

- Why, or why not? How do they feel to have been involved?

What will the project have achieved by the time it finishes?

- Will it have reached a satisfactory conclusion? If not, what more should it have done?

What do they think will happen in the future?

- How will the project progress? How should it progress?

What advice would they give to future initiatives of this sort?

What advice would they give to people taking on their role in future initiatives of this sort?
Cambridge Cycle Project Interview guide

- Name of respondent if *don’t know*
- Length of involvement in project
- Level of involvement
- Understanding of aims of project
- Role in the project
- If relevant how the project fits in with aims and objectives of home agency? Across which levels and roles.
- Project set up – what worked well, what worked less well, who was involved, should anyone else have been involved.
- What about the processes through which people were appointed?
- If the project were to start again, in hindsight, how could the set up have been better?
- What about the project structure – what worked well, what worked less well
- Management and support – has there been sufficient management support, role of individual line managers, role of steering group?
- Time line – who was key in implementing the project, how have agencies worked together, who have you worked closets with and why? Who worked least with and why?
- Description of main tasks in relation to the project. Describe typical weak? What sort of tasks would be normal? Has work load been about right?
- Main personal achievements? Problems personally encountered with role played in the project.
- Overall aims achieved
- Over all elements of project that worked well
- Overall elements of project implemented
- Obstacles to implementation measures now in place
- Learning points
- Advice for other areas attempting to deal with cycle theft and cycle parking
• If there are continuing problems with cycle theft in Cambridge what could be done about them?
## Cambridge cycle theft reduction project plan

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<td>Preparation of bid to release Home Office funding</td>
<td>Community safety manager and five others</td>
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<td>21 June – 20 July</td>
<td>Preparation of project definition form, Person specification for police constables, Survey of current university registration schemes, Additional research from the county group, Additional research to cycle crime at the railway station, Preparation of programme of work, Identify further of areas of work form the Home Office</td>
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<td>Early August</td>
<td>Task group to meet and discuss the proposals and other information</td>
<td>Community safety manager</td>
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<td>By end August</td>
<td>Tidy up the bid with research documents and other information</td>
<td>Community safety manager and task group</td>
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<td>End September/early October</td>
<td>Feed information to Home Office and receive Home Office money</td>
<td>Community safety manager and others</td>
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<td>Person specification for the project manager</td>
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<td>Write person specification</td>
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<td>Research different racking for different locations</td>
<td>Project manager and task group</td>
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<td>Oct – Dec 2000</td>
<td>Identify types of racking for use in pilot schemes</td>
<td>Project manager and task group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct – Dec 2000</td>
<td>Identify locations for trialling the racks</td>
<td>Project manager and task group</td>
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<td>Oct 2000 – July 2001</td>
<td>Park street – design for conversion</td>
<td>Project manager and task group</td>
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<td>Trial the racks and determine the most appropriate locations</td>
<td>Project manager and Cambridge cycling campaign</td>
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<td>Jan – July 2001</td>
<td>Determine locations for installing new and replacing existing inadequate racks</td>
<td>Project manager and task group</td>
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<td>Survey the cycle parking the city centre (twice)</td>
<td>Project manager and Cambridge cycling campaign</td>
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<td>August 2001 – July 2002</td>
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<td>Aug 2001 – Dec 2001</td>
<td>Work on the installation of cycle raking at park street car park, including alterations to the car park</td>
<td>Project manager and city council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2001 – Dec 2001</td>
<td>Install new cycle racks in the identified locations throughout the city</td>
<td>Project manager and city council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2001 – July 2002</td>
<td>Survey the cycle parking in the city centre</td>
<td>Project manager and Cambridge Cycling Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2002 – July 2002</td>
<td>Work with the Home Office to evaluate the effectiveness of the scheme</td>
<td>Project manager, task force and Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2000 – July 2001</td>
<td>University registration scheme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2000 – Mar 2001</td>
<td>Work with the University of Cambridge porters, welfare officers, students &amp; academics to determine the best registration scheme.</td>
<td>Project manager and University of Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research registration schemes used in</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Action Description</td>
<td>Responsible Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April – July 2001</td>
<td>Develop a registration scheme for implementation from Autumn 2001</td>
<td>Project manager and task group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2001 – Sept 2002</td>
<td><strong>University registration scheme</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2001 – Sept 2001</td>
<td>Equip the university to receive and set in place a registration scheme to be running for freshers week</td>
<td>Project manager and the University of Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2001</td>
<td>Start to use the scheme</td>
<td>University of Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 01 – Dec 01</td>
<td>Monitor scheme and assess effectiveness over first term</td>
<td>Project manager, task group and Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 01 – Feb 02</td>
<td>Start negotiations with Anglia Polytechnic University, 6th form colleges and schools for rolling out the scheme in 2002</td>
<td>Project manager and heads of institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 02 – Jul 02</td>
<td>Further monitoring and evaluation of the university of Cambridge scheme, checking how it might be transferred</td>
<td>University of Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 02 – Jul 02</td>
<td>If appropriate start to transfer the scheme or amended scheme</td>
<td>Project manager and heads of institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 02 – Aug 02</td>
<td>Equip institutions to receive and set up scheme to be running for start of term</td>
<td>Heads of institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 02</td>
<td>Start to use scheme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

299
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2001 - Jul 2001</td>
<td>Poster campaign and other literature Design a poster warning the public that thieves operate in the area Identify other literature around responsible ownership of cycles that can be used as part of work with students and other members of the public</td>
<td>Project manager and task group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2001 – July 2002</td>
<td>Poster campaign and other literature Identify locations for the use of posters. Monitor on a weekly basis</td>
<td>Project manager and police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing through out the project</td>
<td>Police targeting offenders</td>
<td>Police targeting offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid July</td>
<td>Write the person specification Advertise the post</td>
<td>Police inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Aug - end Sept</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Police inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2002</td>
<td>In post</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2000 – Sept 2002</td>
<td>Identify offenders of cycle theft, through crime pattern analysis, identify locations for using the trap cycle, investigate offenders to determine locations for selling on cycles, other related crime.</td>
<td>Project manager and two police constables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On going through the project</td>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2000 – Sept 2002</td>
<td>Research of cycle crime to continue throughout the project development, to determine where to concentrate work, where new work needs to be developed etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Outputs of Manchester project

**Abbreviated action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning type activity</th>
<th>Count of abbreviated action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action plan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collate further information</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify means to contact</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locate individual</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact individual</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meetings</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrange meeting</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home visit</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison visit</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to MMAGS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Specific intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific intervention</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Childcare</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing diversionary activities</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement options</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Housing options**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing options</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-housing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure accommodation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported housing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing unclear</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure education</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link to existing provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link to key worker</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To link with other agencies</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>233</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Timeline of Manchester project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Main decisions / actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-implementation and research stages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>Greater Manchester Police approach to Home Office for funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>Research roles and responsibilities agreed by Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2000</td>
<td>Recruitment of first civilian researcher (later the project implementation manager)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2000</td>
<td>Trip to the Boston Gun Project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>Recruitment of second civilian research (later the information manager)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th March 2001</td>
<td>Manchester Executive Partnership Board meeting</td>
<td>• Broad strategy outlined by Nick Tilley (CRRS 13) accepted by Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th March 2001</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
<td>• Chief Superintendent expands board to include more partner agencies and fewer police representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Name of project change suggested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Implementation team tasked to develop a range of interventions to encompass the whole strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2001</td>
<td>Original chief superintendent replaced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6th 2001</td>
<td>Intervention document circulated</td>
<td>• The long document detailing potential interventions for the project board to consider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation stages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th April 2001</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
<td>• Issue of name of project discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed would not be feasible (time constraints) to ‘pass’ the whole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Strategy Developed by Implementation Team

- Agencies were to consider options from a template on the basis of ‘desirability, viability, priority and means of implementation’ and submit for consideration from implementation team.
- Consideration of sustainability discussed.

### May 2001

**Recruitment of the first project manager (police inspector)**

### 22nd May 2001

**Board meeting**

- Strategy of 31 interventions agreed to be started immediately.
- Implementation team to provide ‘aims and philosophy’ of project.
- Head teacher invited to be permanent member of the group.
- Issue of name for the project discussed.
- The two researchers provided with new job descriptions (implementation manager and information manager) and role requirements.

### 25th May 2001

**Funding formally agreed with Crime Reduction Unit at the Home Office**

### 20th June 2001

**Board meeting**

- Name and mission statement for project agreed.
- Decision to hold off formal launch of project until agencies are ready to implement crackdown.
- Decision that YOT would sort out the recruitment of the two outreach...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End June 2001</td>
<td>Two outreach workers recruited as planned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Recruitment of the remaining practitioners begins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th August 2001</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
<td>Decisions made to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop media strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop draft project objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop risk to practitioners assessment model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop training course for practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Confirm project appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Circulate target list by 12\textsuperscript{th} August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th October 2001</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th – 26th October 2001</td>
<td>Three day training for practitioners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st October 2001</td>
<td>First weekly multi-agency problem solving group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>Practitioner with Youth Offending Team sacked for conviction for violence in the past</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th December 2001</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
<td>- Decision made for no major launch because of trials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Decision made to revised strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Need for some for communication with the community identifies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Concerned that outreach worker and the implementation team in money runs out in May and the rest in September raised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Most funding bodies will not fund salaries and so mainstreaming the posts is the only option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 29th January 2002 | Board meeting | • Project manager suggests the focus crackdown should be changed  
• Practitioner issues – project manager raised some of the early practitioner issues  
• The matter of the sacking of Youth Offending Team member was considered closed |
| 1st March 2002  | Board meeting | • Evaluation update presented by Nick Tilley and Karen Bullock  
• Agreement to develop performance indicators  
• Agreement that the strategy should remain as it is until September 2002  
• Important questions of mainstreaming staff or maintaining the pilot to be addressed at the next meeting |
|              |                      | • Agreed further work on performance indicators necessary  
• Agreed performance indicators should be ‘viewed with the full and shifting circumstances of the problem. The principle aim of reducing firearms injury and death should not be forgotten’.  
• Deputy chief executive of Manchester City Council and the project manager agree to contact Training Manager of City Magistrates to raise awareness of the project and implications for sentencing |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting Type</th>
<th>Points Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 26<sup>th</sup> April 2002 | Board meeting | - Decision made for media release of the project and to release the report. This was to be coordinated with the end of the ‘Nile’ trial (a long prosecution against some gang members which had resulted in delays to the media launch of the project lest it interfered with the trial)  
- MMAGS leaflet generally agreed with some caveats  
- Need for representation from mental health discussed  
- Greater Manchester Police agree to pay for project manager until Sept 2002 and to dissolve the post of implementation manager  
- Decision to clarify issues associated with the extension of the outreach workers |
| 9<sup>th</sup> May 2002 | Board meeting | - Agreement to keep the structure but that the project required *a greater degree of authority in its management*  
- Decision consequently made to seek new project manager  
- Strong commitment to the crack down elements of the strategy expressed by steering group members  
- Stated that the project manager needs more support from the home |
agencies, project manager should be more directive of the secondees

- Concern about the running of the practitioners meeting expressed
- Decision made to follow the MAPPS model
- Decision to move the management of the street workers from the Youth Offending Team to the project manager
- The positions of the outreach workers to be re-advertised and existing outreach workers encouraged to apply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Project implementation manager leaves the project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st June 2002</td>
<td>Gang stop march</td>
<td>- March organized by members of the public well attended and decent feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>Outreach workers go off work on long term sick leave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>Decision made for project manager to manage street workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 10th June 2002 | Board meeting                           | - New job descriptions for outreach prepared
- Decision made to maintain a police officer as the project manager
- Board considered to fully understand and agree to crackdown – housing department to produce a survey of law enforcement options
- Agreed that consensus on the issue of crackdown was important and that if there were problems reaching agreement board members should be approached to resolve issues |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th July 2002</td>
<td>Board meeting • Agreed to extend contracts for existing street workers to end of August because of problems with advert • Idea of mentors introduced • Agreement to trial the GREAT scheme at a local high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2002</td>
<td>Original project manager leaves the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>New project manager starts as project manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th September 2002</td>
<td>Arrest of project implementation manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th September 2002</td>
<td>Board meeting • Intervention document circulated by housing department • New outreach workers selected • Issue of appropriate line management of secondees especially in relation to discipline, sickness management and internal agencies affairs discussed • Board agrees that agency line managers are responsible for everything but the day-to-day activities of the practitioners continue to be overseen by the project manager • Steering group member would have the final decision if issues couldn’t be resolved between practitioner and project manager • Agreed that the management of the street workers would revert to the Youth Offending Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Concerns raised by practitioners
- Concerns raised by practitioners regarding the consultation process for the GREAT programme discussed – agreed no further consultation was necessary
- New ‘traffic light’ system for performance indicators greed
- Concerns regarding original project implementation managers media exploits shared (the project manager continued to contact the press in respect to aspects of gang related problems in Manchester and the project and this resulted in his arrest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14(^{th}) October 2002</td>
<td>Official project launch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4(^{th}) December 2002</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4(^{th}) December 2002</td>
<td>New performance indicator framework agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finally decided that ‘crackdown as originally intended was impractical for implementation’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation team and Greater Manchester Police were to develop proposals for enforcement activity and were to provide details for the next board meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision there was no need for the virtual transition school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early warning mechanism for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Ongoing pilot of the GREAT programme at local High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th January 2003</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The problem of MMAGS practitioners not sharing a common approach to the project aims and objectives was discussed.
- Board stated commitment to practitioners participation in the whole strategy and that action should be taken if team members are not 'on message'.
- Decision made that there was still significant amounts of work to be done before MMAGS could be fully integrated into core work.
- Risk assessment still unfinished.
- Generic statement of ensuring economic support for employment rather than the jobs bank and other specific aims.
- Suggested that targets for gang involved adults and parents should be split into distinct groups.
- Agreed had not managed to implement GREAT in the financial year but that it was better late than...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>Chief superintendent and project chairman leaves and is replaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April 2003</td>
<td>Board meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Agreed to add GREAT to the aims
- Independent advisory group agreed
- Draft data protection protocol circulated
### Annex Six

**Timeline and summary of minutes of Cambridge project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Main issues and detail of discussion at steering group meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Meeting 7th September 2000 | • Decision to merge existing groups on bike theft in Cambridge into one  
                              • Steering group under the umbrella of the Cambridge Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership arrangements (set out by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act) |
|                    | Internal meetings about the bid to the Home Office on going  
                              Discussions about the how to assist the project manager when appointed |
| Meeting 5th October 2000 | Project manager introduced as the cycle theft reduction project manager |
| Registration schemes | • Students at Cambridge University are required to identify bikes with unique ID registered with porters  
                              • Anglia Polytechnic University does not require this of their students and don't have the capacity to sort this |
| Cycle racks         | • Locations for stands discussed  
                              • Discussion of how many stands will be required and how many different sorts of stands will be required |
<p>| Decision to conduct counts of numbers of bikes in Cambridge and parking available for them |
| Discussion of which locks should be recommended to students | • Police remind project they cannot recommend commercial products |
| Discussion of cycle flows in and out of Cambridge | • Counters not working properly |
| A survey of existing registration schemes in the colleges was discussed – it |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th November 2000</td>
<td>Discussion of locations for cycle racks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Maps have been produced of the proposed locations for new stands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussions about how to best link into the Grafton Centre re-development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cycle racking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Discussion of which stands to buy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cycle counters have now arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion of cycle park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Loss of 24 parking spaces would result in loss of revenue to the city of council of £180 a day when car park is full (which is in any case only at the weekends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Need to think about how much to charge cyclists (if at all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Have to decide which racks to have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Research on different types parking systems considered to be necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Discussion of how to create safe areas for cyclists and pedestrians within the new facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th December 2000</td>
<td>Further discussion of locations for cycle racks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further discussions about how to best link into the Grafton Centre re-development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further discussion of which stands to buy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 cycle counters have now arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion of cycle park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommended locks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <a href="http://www.soldsecure.com">www.soldsecure.com</a> recommends locks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- This site was set up by Essex and Cumbria police and is managed by a locksmith association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The website rates the locks making it easier to make decisions about which ones to buy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd January 2001</td>
<td>Targeting offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Concern raised that police not pulling their weight on the policing commitment to the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park street car park</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Orders placed for the new racks</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle registration events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Three events held since last meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• TV publicity encouraged people along</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental parking</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Paper about the experiment to be written up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle parking locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Work scheduled to begin at Trumpington Street, St Mary's Passage, St Edwards Passage and Lion Yard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle theft figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Annual summer rise not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Numbers lowest for a long time</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7-Feb-01 Video of bike police in Seattle</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Video sold the idea of community policing on bikes</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle parking trails</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Project manager showed 7 types of cycle stands and explained why they were selected Expected to be launched in April</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University &amp; APU cycle racks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 50 new Sheffield's at Downing site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Similar area in front of APU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assurance that new stands would be properly spaced was achieved</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Park street secure car park</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Pilot survey had been conducted and results were encouraging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The project manager presented a map showing the routes in and out of the park and the pros and cons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Discussion of cycle security leaflet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Project manager presented booklet <em>how to keep your bicycle safe</em> and asked for comments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University &amp; wider registration schemes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Oxford university have a similar bike store but do not auction bikes off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Looking into the viability of nation wide schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-May-01</td>
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<td>Park street secure car park</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cycle parking</td>
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<tr>
<td>25th July 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Park street secure car park</td>
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<td>Cycle parking locations</td>
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<td>22nd May 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th June 2002</td>
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<td>18th September 2002</td>
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Annex seven

Job descriptions for the Manchester project staff

The following sets out in more detail the roles of the Manchester practitioners in respect to the project interventions. These are reproduced almost precisely as they were in the project documentation.

The implementation team

- Project manager
- Implementation manager
- Information manager

The implementation team were the primarily responsible for:

- Engage CPS & Clerks of Court and establish 'Community Prosecution'
  - Led by the implementation team with all agencies

- Drip feed awareness of gangs and gang dynamics among all agencies and schools
  - Led by implementation team with all agencies

- Establish regular information exchange between all agencies and schools
  - To be initiated by the implementation team

- Participate in CIGS and LAPs
  - Led by the implementation team

- Employ two outreach workers as pilot project for future programme
  - Led by Chief Executive department with the implementation team directing programme of work and Youth Offending Team line managing
• Develop regular 'lessons learned' workshops
  – Led by the implementation team with Chief Execs

Secondary responsibly included:

• Anti-social Behaviour Order and Tenancy compliance
  – Led by housing but with all agencies

• Regular training for all involved workers
  – Led by Chief Executive Department with the implementation team

• Engage grass roots groups
  – Led by Local Education Authority with the implementation team and outreach workers

• Facilitate meetings between parents of gang members
  – Led by Local Education Authority with the implementation team and outreach workers

• Encourage local businesses to support specific projects
  – Led by Chief Executive with the implementation team

• Provide mediation between youth and residents & local businesses
  – Led by the outreach workers with the implementation team

• Establish outreach pilot project to conduct street level outreach
  – Led by Chief Executive Department and Youth Offending Team and the implementation team

• Establish a 'virtual transition school' for gang involved youth who have been excluded
- Led by Chief Executive Department and Youth Offending Team and the implementation team

- Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
  - Led by Chief Executive Department and Youth Offending Team and the implementation team

- Liaise directly with schools to develop 'early warning mechanisms'
  - Led by Local Education Authority and the implementation team

- Develop a risk assessment model
  - Led by Youth Offending Team with implementation team and Local Education Authority

- Monitor the impact of gangs on non gang offenders
  - Led by Youth Offending Team and implementation team

- Directly intervene with youth gang members if there is a likelihood of tit for tat reprisal
  - Led by outreach workers with implementation team

- Explore the full extent of roles under Crime & Disorder
  - Jointly led by Greater Manchester Police and Chief Executive Department with the implementation team

- Train key workers (Teachers, Police Officers, Youth Offending Team, social workers etc) in mediation
  - Led by Chief Executive Department with implementation team and Manchester Mediation Services

- Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth and community members and carry out mediation
- Led by Youth Offending Team and Probation with outreach and implementation

- Help youth broaden their experiences by linking with charities such as Fairbridge
  - Led by outreach workers with implementation team

- Develop an array of diversionary activities for youth to keep them off the streets
  - Led by outreach workers with Council Youth Services

Greater Manchester Police

Lead agency for:

- Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
  - Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, Nuisance Response Team, Probation, Youth Offending Team

- Enhanced responsiveness to community concerns
  - Led by Greater Manchester Police with Neighbourhood Response Team

- Explore the full extent of roles under Crime & Disorder
  - Jointly led by Greater Manchester Police and Chief Executive with implementation team

Involved with:

- Operation Nightlight with youth offenders
  - Led by Youth Offending Team with Greater Manchester Police

- Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish “Community Prosecution”
  - Led by implementation team with all agencies
• Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
  - Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies

**City Council Chief Executives Department**

**Lead Agency:**

• Regular training for all involved workers
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with implementation team

• Employ two Streetworkers as pilot project for future programme
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with implementation team directing programme of work and Youth Offending Team line managing

• Encourage local businesses to support specific projects
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with implementation team

• Establish Streetworker pilot project to conduct street level outreach
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department and Youth Offending Team and implementation team

• Develop a jobs bank
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department

• Employment for youth and family members in regeneration projects
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department

• Engage gang involved youth in community and city projects
- Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with outreach workers

- Explore the full extent of roles under Crime & Disorder
  - Jointly led by Greater Manchester Police and City Council Chief Executives Department

- Train key workers (Teachers, police officers, Youth Offending Team, social workers etc) in mediation
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with implementation team and Manchester Mediation Services

**Involved in:**

- Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish “Community Prosecution”
  - Led by implementation team with all agencies

- Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
  - Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies

- Develop regular ‘lessons learned’ workshops
  - Led by implementation team with City Council Chief Executives Department

**Housing**

**Lead Agency:**

- Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
  - Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
• Provide independent and/or supported living accommodation in areas not affected by gangs
  - Led by housing with social services

**Involved in:**

• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
  - Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, Nuisance Response Team, probation, Youth Offending Team

• Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish “Community Prosecution”
  - Led by implementation team with all agencies

• Assist gang involved youth to leave disorganised and/or destructive family situations
  - Led by social services with housing and outreach

• Ensure security of young women victimised by gang members
  - Led by social services with housing and outreach

• Enhanced responsiveness to community concerns
  - Led by Greater Manchester Police with Neighbourhood Response Team

**Probation**

**Lead Agency:**

• Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth and community members and carry out mediation
- Led by Youth Offending Team, probation with outreach workers and implementation team

Involved in:

- Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
  - Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, Nuisance Response Team, probation and Youth Offending Team

- Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish “Community Prosecution”
  - Led by implementation team with all agencies

- Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
  - Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies

Youth Offending Team

Lead Agency:

- Employ two outreach workers as pilot project for future programme
  - Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with implementation team directing programme of work and Youth Offending Team line managing

- Work with incarcerated gang members and family
  - Led by Youth Offending Team with outreach workers

- Operation Nightlight with youth offenders
  - Led by Youth Offending Team with Greater Manchester Police

- Develop a risk assessment model
• Monitor the impact of gangs on non gang offenders
  - Led by Youth Offending Team and implementation team

• Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth and community members and carry out mediation
  - Led by Youth Offending Team and probation with outreach workers and implementation team

Involved in:

• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
  - Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, Nuisance Response Team, probation and Youth Offending Team

• Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish ‘Community Prosecution’
  - Led by implementation team with all agencies

• Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
  - Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies

• Establish a ‘virtual transition school’ for gang involved youth who have been excluded
  - Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and implementation team

• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
  - Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and implementation team
Local Education Authority

Lead Agency

- Engage grass roots groups
  - Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team and outreach

- Facilitate meetings between parents of gang members
  - Led by Local Education Authority with outreach and implementation team

- Establish a 'virtual transition school' for gang involved youth who have been excluded
  - Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and implementation team

- Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
  - Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and implementation team

- Liaise directly with schools to develop 'early warning mechanisms'
  - Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team

Involved in:

- Engage Crown Prosecution Service & Clerks of Court and establish "Community Prosecution"
  - Led by implementation team with all agencies

- Anti-social Behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
  - Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
• Develop a risk assessment model.
  - Led by Youth Offending Team with implementation team and Local Education Authority

Social Services

Lead Agency:

• Provide intensive wrap around support for youth and family
  - Led by social services with outreach workers

• Ensure security of young women victimised by gang members
  - Led by social services with housing and outreach workers

• Develop links with agencies in other cities to ensure continued support for relocated youth and families
  - Led by social services with outreach

• Assist gang involved youth to leave disorganised and/or destructive family situations
  Led by social services with housing and outreach workers

Involved in:

• Conduct regular home visits and identify the changing needs of youth and family
  - Led by outreach with social services

• Provide independent and/or supported living accommodation in areas not affected by gangs
  - Led by housing with social services

Outreach workers
Lead Agency:

- Conduct outreach to gang involved youth
  - Led by outreach workers

- Provide mediation between youth and residents & local businesses
  - Led by outreach workers with implementation team

- Conduct regular home visits and identify the changing needs of youth and family
  - Led by outreach workers with social services

- Directly intervene with youth gang members if there is a likelihood of tit for tat reprisal
  - Led by outreach workers with implementation team

- Develop an array of diversionary activities for youth to keep them off the streets
  - Led by outreach workers with council youth services

- Conduct emergency room intervention and mediation
  - Led by outreach workers

- Help youth broaden their experiences by linking with charities such as Fairbridge
  - Led by outreach workers with implementation team

- Engage gang involved youth in community and city projects
  - Led by outreach workers with council youth services

Involved in:

- Work with incarcerated gang members and family
  - Led by Youth Offending Team with outreach workers

- Provide intensive wrap around support for youth and family
- Led by social services

- Assist gang involved youth to leave disorganised and/or destructive family situations
  - Led by social services with housing and outreach workers

- Ensure security of young women victimised by gang members
  - Led by social services with housing and outreach workers

- Develop links with agencies in other cities to ensure continued support for relocated youth and families
  - Led by social services with outreach workers

- Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth and community members and carry out mediation
  - Led by Youth Offending Team and probation with outreach workers and implementation team

Other partnership working

Council youth services

- Develop an array of diversionary activities for youth to keep them off the streets
  - Led by outreach workers with council youth services

Manchester Mediation Services

- Train key workers (teachers, police officers, Youth Offending Team, social workers etc) in mediation
  - Led by Chief Execs with implementation team and Manchester Mediation Services

Mothers against Violence
• Conduct regular home visits and identify the changing needs of youth and family
  - Led by outreach workers with social services

• Provide intensive wrap around support for youth and family
  - Led by social services with outreach workers

• Engage grass roots groups
  - Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team and outreach

• Facilitate meetings between parents of gang members
  - Led by Local Education Authority with outreach and implementation team

• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
  - Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and implementation team

• Liaise directly with schools to develop 'early warning mechanisms'
  - Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team
Annex eight

Job description project manager Cambridge

The following is the Cambridge project manager’s job description, reproduced from project records

Cambridge Constabulary

Job description

Job title: Project Manager – Cycle Theft Reduction Project

Department /location/telephone number:

Reports to: Community Safety Manager, Southern Division

1. Purpose of your job
Cycle theft reduction is a priority for the Cambridge Community Safety Partnership in their April 1999 – March 2002 Community Safety Strategy. The Home Office have provided funding through their crime reduction programme under the Targeted Policing Initiative, to help the Partnership reduce this crime types.

To assist with the implementation of the police response to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, with the aim of reducing crime and the fear of crime, whilst taking into account local areas of public concern,

2. Dimensions

Below are figures which give a picture of your job as follows:
(a) **Budgetary amount with which your job is either directly or indirectly involved**

Home Office Targeted Policing Fund £167,000  
Cambridge Community Safety Partnership £12,000  
Sponsorship

(b) **Number and grading of subordinate staff**

Directly none. However this post impacts of both internal and external personnel by providing the management of a substantial project set up by the multi-agency Cambridge Community Safety Partnership. They will be involved in setting the pro-active work of the two police constables who also form part of the project team, through research of cycle crime hotspots, crime trends and subsequent handling of the information, to focus on offenders.

(c) **Any other statistics relating to your work**

Representatives for the partnership on the Cycle Crime Task Group and other project groups whose function is to reduce cycle crime.

3. **Accountabilities**

**Accountability 1**

**Project management**

Manage the cycle theft reduction project on behalf of the Cambridge Community Safety Partnership, using project management techniques to provide the most effective solutions to the cycle theft problem in Cambridge City. This involved being the primary point of contact for the Partnership in all matters relating to the project, belonging to the Cycle Crime multi-agency Task Group, monitoring the Home Office Targeted Policing fund, maintaining regular contact with the Home Office Targeted Policing Department, holding regular meetings with the government appointed
evaluators for the project and reporting regularly on the performance of the project within the police and city council.

Accountability 2

The University of Cambridge Registration Scheme

To carry out reviews of the current systems of cycle registration used within the University of Cambridge colleges and negotiate with students and bursars as well as security officers, in order to develop a comprehensive news scheme to be operated throughout the university colleges; which can also be extended to cover Anglia Polytechnic University, sixth form colleges, schools and businesses in the future.

Accountability 3

Secure Cycle Parking in Cambridge City

Using historical and current crime data, plan and execute pilot secure cycle parking schemes in Cambridge City in order that different types of secure cycle racks can be tested for their effectiveness, both as a measure to reduce crime and also for their ease of use with the general public.

Determine locations for the installation of new cycle parking in Cambridge City and manage their installation, both within the historic city centre as well as identifying additional appropriate locations for secure parking, in co-operation with the city council and any affected owners of premises.

Accountability 4

Research and crime pattern analysis

Analyse crime information from existing systems, external sources and self initiated information systems to create relevant statistical information on cycle theft. Monitor the effectiveness of the Cycle Theft Reduction Project against its key indicators as
well as against the Community Safety Strategy and the Force Best Value Performance Indicators. Use historical and current data to identify long and short term trends and areas of concern so that interventions put into place will be most effective. Present these findings to the Project Team, Cycle Task Group and the Cambridge Community Safety Partnership, together with recommendations that will improve performance and meet the targets. Influence police and other agency resources to ensure that the project had optimum outcomes.

Accountability 5

*Cycle Theft Offenders*

Work with two police constables to pro-actively identify offenders of cycle theft (through analysis of crime patterns and hotspots) with the main purpose of their apprehension to increase the reduction and detection of this offence type.

Accountability 6

Undertake any other relevant tasks, so that the efficiency of the Crime Reduction Unit can be maximised.

4. Hardest part of your job

*Below is outlined the most complex or challenging part of your job and why*

Working in partnership with voluntary and statutory organisations whose working practices and priorities may differ from those of the Community Safety Partnership, particularly in regard to cycling provision in Cambridge City.

Marketing the role of crime reduction within the police force to convince police officers of the value of preventative action to reduce crime and their role in such action.

5. Organisation
How you are supervised

Supervision by immediate line management through informal meetings, departmental meetings and appraisals. The post holder will work independently with the general public and key personnel from other agencies, who may direct the work as a result of the Cycle Theft Reduction Project.

6. Job content

(a) Main functions of the section

To co-ordinate the district level crime and disorder strategies developed through the district partnership in southern division including assessment of the divisional resources and staff to meet the requirement of projects developed through the strategies.

Research, planning, implementation and evaluation of sustainable interventions to reduce crime and anti-social problems across the division.

(b) Work comes from/goes to

i) The majority of non-partnership work is initiated by the post-holder or sector staff in response to local problems identified via intelligence sources and data analysis.

ii) Initiated via a variety of partnership groups across the division, in particular district community safety partnerships via the crime and disorder strategies.

iii) Initiated and integrated into divisional tasking process.

iv) At county level via force headquarters e.g. the local policing plan

v) A national level in response to national campaigns, policies and ministerial priorities.
(c) How your job relates to the work of other officers, groups, committees, general public, both within and outside of the Constabulary

The majority of the work of the department involves statutory and voluntary agencies and commerce and many departments within the Constabulary. This requires considerable negotiation skills and the ability to see the strategic picture clearly in order that work is co-ordinated and purposeful, and that work carried out does not conflict with the policing plan but ensures that the ethos of community safety is integrated into the working practices of others.

(d) The most important legislation, policies, procedures, specifications and working practices which affect the job

- Crime and Disorder Act (1998)
- Force crime strategy and crime reduction policy
- Divisional performance plan
- Local performance plans
- Home Office crime prevention manual
- Towards 2000
- Date Protection Act 1998
- Audit Commission and HMIC recommendations and papers

7. Knowledge and experience

- At least 12 months experience of project management, including action planning, implementation, assessment and evaluation using a problem-solving approach
- Numerate and able to undertake statistical analysis
- At least 12 months experience in the identification, collection, analysis and interpretation of information from a wide variety of sources
- Competent and experienced in a wide range of IT systems, for example statistical analysis packages, relational databases, modelling sources
• Experience of writing specialist reports for a variety of recipients
• Experience of writing and delivering presentations to large and small groups
• The ability to negotiate with and influence other people's point of view in a one-to-one or group setting, whether multi-agency partners, senior managers or divisional officers
• Ability to manage time and resources effectively, including directing the efforts of others
• Confidence and ability to use own initiative and theoretical knowledge to produce short, medium and long term solutions to unique problems
• Ability to work as part of a team under strict time and resource limitations, negotiating with other players, motivating team members and sharing responsibility

8. Additional information

Below is briefly explained any aspects of your job which have not been adequately covered in previous sections and which are important in understanding your various duties, including any temporary features

Community Safety has been places at the core of effective policing strategies by a number of developments, including 'Towards 2000'. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 now elevates its position to one of central strategic management.

Due to the nature of this post and the potential for development of the project within two years, there is a possibility that the requirements of the role may change. Therefore the stakeholders needs to be willing to develop the project and flexible to undertake such changes.

Person specification

Post: Project manager cycle theft reduction project
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualifications</th>
<th>Essential</th>
<th>Desirable</th>
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<tr>
<td>Essential Desirable Qualifications</td>
<td>Willing to undertake any relevant training including the force computer systems</td>
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<td>Ability to travel within Cambridge city to fulfil the requirements of the role</td>
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<tr>
<th>Skills and experience</th>
<th>Essential</th>
<th>Desirable</th>
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<tr>
<td>Experience of project management, including action planning, implementation, assessment and evaluation</td>
<td>Knowledge and experience of working in the community or with the public</td>
<td>Experience of dealing with the media</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimum of 1 years experience in the identification, collection, analysis and interpretation of information from a wide variety of sources</td>
<td>Experience of computer data analysis</td>
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<td>High levels of innumeracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competent and experienced in a range of IT systems</td>
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<td>Minimum of 1 years experience of writing reports and making presentations to small and large groups of people using appropriate tools</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good communication skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal characteristics</td>
<td>Good organisational skills, with ability to work under own initiative</td>
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<td>Ability to manage time and resources effectively</td>
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<td>Must have persistence and thoroughness of approach to ensure that information gathered is complete and accurate, especially when dealing with busy people and or complex situations</td>
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<td>Have a flexible approach to hours and methods of working</td>
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<td>Assertiveness and confidence to work alone</td>
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<td>Good negotiation skills with the ability to motivate and influence others</td>
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<td>Be of smart appearance</td>
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