Armstrong, M. and Vickers, J. (2008) A model of delegated project choice. (ELSE Working Papers 268). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects are available to the agent. Two frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, and (ii) a dynamic setting in which the agent searches for projects.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | A model of delegated project choice |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2008 |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Delegation, principal-agent, rules, search, merger policy |
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