Dokumaci, E. and Lahkar, R. and Sandholm, W.H. (2007) The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games. (ELSE Working Papers 271). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
Every population game defines a vector field on the set of strategy distributions X. The projection dynamic maps each population game to a new vector field: namely, the one closest to the payoff vector field among those that never point outward from X. We investigate the geometric underpinnings of the projection dynamic, describe its basic game-theoretic properties, and establish a number of close connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007 |
| Language: | English |
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