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Group reputations: an experimental foray

Huck, S.; Luenser, G.; (2008) Group reputations: an experimental foray. (ELSE Working Papers 290). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access


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Often information structures are such that while individual reputation building is impossible groups of agents would have the opportunity of building up a reputation. We experimentally examine whether groups of sellers in markets that suffer from moral hazard are able to build up reputations and, thus, avoid market breakdown. We contrast our findings with situations where sellers alternatively can build up an individual reputation or where there are no possibilities for reputation building at all. Our results offer a rather optimistic outlook on group reputations. Even though sellers only receive some of the reputation benefits of withstanding short-run incentives to exploit trust, they are able to overcome the dilemma and successfully exploit the information structure.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Group reputations: an experimental foray
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2008
Language: English
Keywords: C72, C92, D40, L14
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14365
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