Jehiel, P. and Meyer-ter-Vehn, M. and Moldovanu, B. (2008) Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials. (ELSE Working Papers 297). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We introduce several notions of potentials for mechanism design problems with interdependent values, and relate them to implementation in ex-post equilibrium. Whereas ex-post implementation is closely linked to the ordinal concept of best-alternative potentials, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism corresponds to the stronger notion of a cardinal potential: agents agree not only on the best al- ternative, but also on the quantitative differences between all alternatives. We characterize all valuations that allow for cardinal potentials, and use this characterization for: 1) Identifying valuations for which ex-post implementation is possible; 2) Identifying classes of valuations for which all ex-post implementable choice rules correspond to cardinal potentials. The latter allows us to extend to interdependent valuations a result for dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, due to Roberts (1979).
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2008 |
| Language: | English |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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