Ludwig, S. and Luenser, G. (2008) Knowing the gap - intermediate information in tournaments. (ELSE Working Papers 312). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
Intermediate information is often available to competitors in dynamic tournaments. We develop two simple tournament models with two stages: one with intermediate information on subjects’ relative positions after the first stage, one without. In our models, equilibrium behavior in both stages is not changed by intermediate information. We test our formal analysis using data from laboratory experiments. We find no difference between average first and second stage efforts. With intermediate information, however, subjects adjust their effort to a higher extent. Subjects who lead tend to lower their second stage effort, subjects who lag still try to win the tournament. Overall, intermediate information does not endanger the effectiveness of rank-order tournaments: incentives do neither break down nor does a rat race arise. We also briefly investigate costly intermediate information.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Knowing the gap - intermediate information in tournaments |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2008 |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | C92, D01, D80, J30, M12 |
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