Armstrong, M.; Vickers, J.; Zhou, J.; (2008) Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed. (Department Working Papers 08/02). Department of Economics, University College London: London, UK.

Preview

PDF 14336.pdf Download (155kB)

Abstract

We discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumers’ incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market. In a market with costly information acquisition, we find that imposing a cap on suppliers’ prices reduces the incentive to become informed of market conditions, with the result that prices paid by consumers (both informed and uninformed) may rise. In a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing, we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off.

Download activity - last month

Export as XMLCSVJSON

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as JSONCSVXML

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Archive Staff Only

View Item