TURNING RIGHT
A Case Study on Contemporary Political Socialization of the Hungarian Youth

Erin Marie Saltman

School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University College London (UCL)

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

2014
I, Erin Marie Saltman, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

X___________________________________
ABSTRACT

Young Central and Eastern Europeans are growing up in newly solidifying democratic political systems with a parent generation raised under an entirely different regime. In order to comprehend future sociopolitical dynamics within these countries it is crucial to question how the youth are developing their political knowledge and how they are engaging in political activism. As such, political socialization theory provides a lens for analyzing what forms youth activism is taking as well as tracking the roots of current political trends.

Political socialization, as a theory, is relatively straightforward. Experiences and influences of various agents that affect an individual in their earlier years have a significant impact on political outlooks, activism and values in later years. However, implied within this theory, ‘political socialization’ is also a process and a field of research with a variety of methods and research structures. Through primarily qualitative analysis, the research in this case study investigates the influences behind post-communist political trends among the youth, targeting the primary agents of socialization: the family unit, educational institutions and the media. These agents are analyzed in the context of developing partisanship and activism within political parties and grassroots social movements.

Although socialization theory targets these agents as key actors affecting political development, there is limited previous research into multi-agent analysis, with the majority of research focusing on single agent analysis. This report also analyzes social movements as an increasingly salient agent of socialization, not traditionally targeted by previous political socialization theory. Thus, this report hopes to add to wider political socialization research as well as present a unique case study into youth political developments in a post-communist setting.

Hungary is an important and timely case study, used in this report to analyze the country’s growing political shift away from liberal European values, giving preference to localized, nationalist and increasingly exclusionary politics. Larger trends of right wing and radical right voter support are also heightened among the youth population. Tracking how these shifts are developing and mainstreaming in a nation-specific context serves to better define what is a national anomaly in Hungary and what might be a predictor of larger regional or European trends.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first and foremost give thanks to my doctoral supervisor, Dr. Seán Hanley, for his consistent and thorough guidance throughout the PhD process. His attention to detail as well as his ability to put my thesis into context within a wider framework has been of great assistance in keeping me on track with each step of my thesis, from my initial proposal through my fieldwork and throughout my writing up process.

I would also like to thank my colleagues and contacts that gave their assistance during my fieldwork and data collection, particularly Dr. István Benczes for helping arrange my affiliation at Corvinus University during my fieldwork, along with Erzsébet Trautmann, Mariann Pitroff, Georgia Efremova, László Galántai, Júlia Lakatos and the Pycrofts. I am eternally grateful to all the Hungarian activists, professors and specialists who gave their time for in-depth interviews and focus groups.

Special thanks as well to Eszter Tarsoly and Dóra Reichenberger for teaching me Hungarian. Eszter, without your patience, linguistic innovation and passion for the language, learning Hungarian would have been a far more difficult task. Your three years of teaching were invaluable to me not only in learning Hungarian but also in gaining a cultural understanding of the country I immersed myself in. Dóra, thank you for your lessons during my field research, tailoring each session to my research needs.

Thank you also to my fellow doctoral students Soraia Tabatabai, Kristen Perrin, Lise Herman, Camille Muris-Prime, Phillip Köker and Julia Halej for creating an outlet to discuss our research in its trials and tribulations, and to Dr. Peter Duncan and Professor Martyn Rady for always having an open door.

Lastly, I want to thank my family for supporting me through the PhD process. Thank you to my parents David Saltman and Kay Greenwood and to my grandparents Barbara and Paul Saltman and Marie Violet Walters for never doubting my academic path, despite it taking me so far from home. You gave me the tools to make my goals and the opportunities to enjoy the journeys that lead me towards them. Thank you Alex Dunnett for being there for me and always having a cup of tea ready.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## PART ONE: Introduction to Hungary and Thesis Research

1. Introduction: ............................................................................................................. 10
   1.1. The Political System in Hungary ................................................................. 12
       1.1.1. Hungary in Transition: A Tri-Polar Beginning
       1.1.2. Solidifying a Bipolar Spectrum in Hungary
       1.1.3. Defining Right, Left and Other
   1.2. Radicalism in Hungary: A Relevant Case Study ................................. 33
       1.2.1. Radical Right Politics in Hungary
       1.2.2. Youth Support for Fidesz and Jobbik
       1.2.4. Defining a Cohort: The Politically Active Hungarian Youth
   1.3. Chapter Outline ................................................................................................. 48

## PART TWO: Research Design, Methods & Theories ............................................ 51

2. Research Design, Methods & Theories ................................................................... 51
   2.1. Research and Methods .................................................................................. 51
       2.1.1. Interviews, Focus Groups and Participant Observation
   2.2. Political Socialization Theory and Research ............................................. 62
       2.2.1. Early to Modern Political Socialization Theory and Research
       2.2.2. Political Socialization Research in Hungary and CEE
   2.3. Grassroots Social Movement Theory and Research ............................... 82
       2.3.1. Mobilization as Part of Socialization
       2.3.2. Civil Participation and Social Movements in CEE

## PART TWO: Youth Engagement in Sociopolitical Organizations and Activism

3. Political Parties and Youth Participation ......................................................... 95
   3.1. Fidesz: Founder of Youth Parties in Hungary ........................................ 98
       3.1.1. The Early Years of Transition
       3.1.2. Mass Mobilization and Civic Circles
       3.1.3. Fidesz’s Open Door Policy: Radical Rhetoric
   3.2. A New Wave of Youth-Based Parties ..................................................... 113
       3.2.1. Movement Strategies: Horizontal and Vertical Processes
       3.2.2. A Polarized Youth: Politically and Regionally
   3.3. Political Youth Camps in Hungary .............................................................. 126

4. Grassroots Social Movements & Subcultures ................................................ 137
   4.1. Civic Participation and Political Activism in Hungary ....................... 139
       4.1.1. The Youth Appeal of Grassroots Social Movements
       4.1.2. Radical Right Grassroots Social Movements
       4.1.3. Liberal-Left and Green Grassroots Social Movements
   4.2. The Malleability of Social Movements ...................................................... 159
       4.2.1. Blurring Movements with Political Parties
       4.2.2. The Radical Right Subculture
PART THREE: Socialization Influences

5. Hungarian Families as Agents of Political Socialization ......................... 177
   5.1. Familial Legacies: Parental Socialization ......................................... 179
      5.1.1. Parental Political Socialization
      5.1.2. Passing on the Partisanship
   5.2. Historical Narratives ................................................................. 187
      5.2.1 Contentious Hungarian History
      5.2.2 Relating Familial Experiences to Youth Political Opinions
   5.3. Direct Familial Political Socialization ........................................... 198
      5.3.1. Family Influences on Partisanship, Voting and Membership
      5.3.2. Familial Predispositions to the Right

6. Education and Political Socialization ............................................... 209
   6.1. Education Decentralized and Recentralized ..................................... 210
      6.1.1. Post-Communist Educational Restructuring
      6.1.2. Difficulties and Complexities
   6.2. Political Efficacy and Activism in Universities ............................ 224
      6.2.1. Prohibiting Political Socialization in Universities
      6.2.2. Subjective and Selective Teaching
   6.3. Special Colleges: Elite Socialization ............................................ 232
      6.3.1. Origins of the Szakkollégium in Hungary
      6.3.2. Membership Process and Structure of Special Colleges
      6.3.3. Developing Political Parties and Socializing Activism

7. Media as an Agent of Political Socialization ....................................... 243
   7.1. Post-Communist Media Transformation .......................................... 245
      7.1.1. Privatization of Traditional Media
      7.1.2. Shifting the Media as a Tool for Right Wing Politics
      7.1.3. Outlets for Marginalized Political Views in the Media
   7.2. Youth Media Usage ..................................................................... 255
      7.2.1. Youth Internet Usage
      7.2.2. Politicizing the Internet: Online News as a Political Tool
      7.2.3. The Media’s Role as a Socializer

8. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 277
Appendix 1. Hungarian Election Results 1990-2010 ..................................... 293
Appendix 2. Participant Observation: Demonstrations, Events & Youth Camps .. 294
Appendix 3. Interviewee Breakdown ....................................................... 296
Appendix 4. Semi-Structured Interview Format & Example Questions .......... 298
Appendix 5. Family Political Discussion and Party Alliance ....................... 299
Appendix 6. Mapping Political Media Outlets Used by Young Hungarians .... 300
Appendix 7. Information Retrieval for Sociopolitical Information ............... 306
Appendix 9. Political Discourse and Socializing Influences in Schools ....... 308

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 310
FIGURES AND TABLES

Reference Table of Political Parties in Hungary 1990 – 2010 8

Chapter 1
Figure 1.1: Comparing Youth & Older Cohorts Voting Trends: 2006 & 2010 14
Table 1.1: Political Parties in Hungary 1990 – 2010 19
Figure 1.2: The Three Primary Political Cleavages in 1990 25
Table 1.2: Hungarian National Election Results 1990 26
Figure 1.3: Party Map of Ideological and Economic Right and Left in Hungary 28
Table 1.3: Hungarian National Election Results 1994 30
Figure 1.4: Stacked Column Chart of Party Representation in Parliament 41

Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: Political Map of Hungary 53
Figure 2.2: Citizen Involvement in Volunteering 79
Figure 2.3: Levels of Youth Participation in Hungary 90

Chapter 3
Figure 3.1: Hungarian Party Membership 2011 106
Table 3.1 List of Fidesz Government Measures Inspired by Jobbik 2010-2012 111
Figure 3.2 Comparing 2012 Polls of Youth and Nationwide Party Preferences 117
Figure 3.3 Mapping The Top 20 Constituencies of Jobbik and LMP 124
Table 3.2 Political Youth Organizations 129
Table 3.3 Political Youth Camps at a Glance 130
Table 3.4 Camper Profile 133

Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Significant Grassroots Social Movements in Hungary 147
Figure 4.1: Facebook Support of Grassroots Social Movements 148
Figure 4.2: Political Parties, Leaders and Youth Organizations on Facebook 162

Chapter 5
Table 5.1: Youth Information Retrieval Preference 183
Figure 5.1: Frequency of Political Discussions With Associates 185
Table 5.2: Linking Familial Historical Narratives to Political Alignment 196

Chapter 6
Figure 6.1: Structure of Administrative Decentralization in Education 1990 212
Figure 6.2: Students enrolled in Secondary School and Higher Education 215
Figure 6.3: Total GDP Spent on Education: A Comparative Glance 219
Table 6.1: MSZP Decentralization Versus Fidesz Recentralization 222

Chapter 7
Figure 7.1: Media Usage in Europe Comparing Age Cohorts 256
Figure 7.2: Daily Internet Usage in Hungary 2004 to 2012 260
Table 7.1: Daily Page Views to Main Hungarian News Sites 263
Table 7.2: Media Used by Young Activists 271
Table 7.3 Major Changes Imposed by the 2010 Media Law 273
## Reference Table of Political Parties in Hungary 1990 – 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fidesz</strong></td>
<td>Fidesz - Civic Union</td>
<td>Liberal 1990-1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist/Conservative 1993-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Originally the Alliance of Young Democrats)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSZP</strong></td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party</td>
<td>Left 1990-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal-Left 1994-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDF</strong></td>
<td>Hungarian Democratic Forum</td>
<td>Christian Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SZDSZ</strong></td>
<td>Alliance of Free Democrats</td>
<td>Liberal 1990-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal-Left 1994-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KDNP</strong></td>
<td>Christian Democratic People’s Party</td>
<td>Christian Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FKgP</strong></td>
<td>Independent Smallholders</td>
<td>Conservative Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIÉP</strong></td>
<td>Hungarian Justice and Life Party</td>
<td>Populist Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jobbik</strong></td>
<td>Movement for a Better Hungary</td>
<td>Populist Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LMP</strong></td>
<td>Politics Can Be Different</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE

Introduction to Hungary and Thesis Research
1. INTRODUCTION

Central and Eastern European nations have spent the last twenty-five years developing democratic systems, solidifying political partisanship and trying to come to terms with the communist past. Within this environment, the younger generation is growing up in a political system entirely different from that of their parents. Not only are familial backgrounds different for young post-communist youths compared with older western democracies, but many other sociopolitical influences also differ considerably. In order to comprehend future sociopolitical dynamics within the post-communist region it is crucial to question how the youth are developing political knowledge and how they are engaging in political activism. Analyzing the political engagement of the youth is key in understanding both present and future political trends.

Political socialization theory provides a lens and framework for understanding how and why the youth engages within the political environments they are raised in. As a theory, political socialization states that experiences and the influences of certain agents earlier in life have a significant and solidifying effect on political efficacy and practices later in life. Political socialization, as a field of research, varies widely with regards to method, structure and purpose. Through primarily qualitative analysis, the research in this case study investigates the influences behind post-communist political trends among the youth, targeting the primary agents of socialization: the family unit, educational institutions and the media. These agents are analyzed in the context of developing partisanship and activism within political parties and grassroots social movements.
This thesis adds to the growing body of research on youth politics, as well as the limited practical application of political socialization theory, by building a multifaceted approach to analyzing political value building processes.\(^1\) The post-communist youth is of increasing interest as they become the primary electorate as the first voters socialized under a democratic system. This study analyzes how the main agents of socialization (political parties, family, education, media and grassroots social movements) are affecting political alignment and activism. It is through these agents the research in this thesis tracks political divisions and sociopolitical trends among the youth.

The core focus of this thesis is a case study of the political socialization process of the youth in Hungary, analyzing the primary agents of socialization and their roles in developing political orientation. Hungary serves as a valuable and timely example of a post-communist country, struggling to define itself geopolitically, socially and culturally within its solidifying democratic system. In recent years Hungary has witnessed a political shift away from liberal European values, giving preference to localized, nationalist and increasingly exclusionary politics. Political socialization provides an important lens for tracing where young Hungarians are developing strong socio-political partisanship and how these agents are increasingly influencing tendencies towards supporting alternative, right and radical right wing parties and organizations.

This introduction serves as a scene-setting chapter, placing Hungary in context as a case study for political socialization research. The first part of this chapter discusses the political structures and socializing structures that the parent generation

\(^1\) An extensive review of political socialization theory and overview of literature is given in Chapter 3.
would have experienced, focusing primarily on the post-1956 Kádár era up through Hungary’s democratic transition. The second section of this chapter gives background on the more modern political developments which have given a majority of political support to both right wing and radical right political entities, disproportionately supported by young voters. This chapter concludes by putting Hungary in context, comparing some of its more recent sociopolitical trends with other Central and Eastern European countries and Europe at large. I argue that the post-communist arena has, in some respects, developed an a-typical network of socializing agents, which has amplified youth appeal towards the mobilizing and structure of populist and alternative forms of political participation. I also argue that current alternative and populist tactics being used by youth-based parties and social movements were founded by Fidesz and are now being used as a prototype for successful mass mobilization.

1.1 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN HUNGARY

Hungary has made headlines in recent years with an array of concerns from international watchdogs and media. The country’s democratic legitimacy, economic stability and membership within the European Union have all been questioned. The majority of international concern began after the 2010 national elections, which gave a two-third parliamentary majority to right wing party, Fidesz (Fidesz Magyar Polgári Szövetség – Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union), and made radical right party, Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom – Movement for a Better Hungary), the third largest party in government. Researchers have been questioning the fragility of liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe (Fowler et. al. 2007, Krastev 2007, Mudde 2007) and Hungary in particular since 2010 (Müller 2011, Vásárhelyi 2011, Jenne and
Mudde 2012, Korkut 2012, Lendvai 2012). However, the roots of this rightward shift are traceable in Hungary prior to 2010 looking at certain sociopolitical trends. One of these significant visible shifts has been the development of youth partisanship and activism, harbingers of the visible electoral shift towards right and radical right political parties. Hungary’s youth are taking a more dominant position in the current political landscape, not only participating in increased activism but also developing new political parties.

In 2009, youth-based green party LMP (Lehet Más A Politika – Politics Can Be Different) declared itself an official party and radical right party Jobbik broke into the political landscape by obtaining 14.77% in the European Parliamentary Elections.\(^2\) The strong support for Fidesz’s nationalist rhetoric and radical right political alternatives is widespread among the youth in Hungary. This trend was magnified by strong youth support for Jobbik and Fidesz in the 2010 National Elections, albeit visible even in the 2006 National Elections with 58% of young voters preferring the right wing politics of Fidesz to the liberal-left politics of MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt – Hungarian Socialist Party), with a mere 22.6% youth support despite MSZP’s victory that year (see Figure 1.1). While in 2010 longstanding political parties fell to the wayside in the shadow of right wing party, Fidesz, the two newer youth-based parties, Jobbik and LMP, entered parliament for the first time. LMP managed to pass the parliamentary threshold with 7.48%, making it the first successful green party in Hungary’s democratic history. Meanwhile Jobbik became the third largest party in Hungary winning 16.67%, drawing out a new subculture of youth activists with one in four first time voters casting a radical right vote in support of Jobbik (Jordon 2010).

Figure 1.1 displays voting alignment of the youth (aged eighteen to thirty) in comparison with older cohorts looking at the 2006 and 2010 elections. This figure clearly shows the higher tendencies for the youth to vote for right and radical right political parties as exemplified for the high levels of support for Fidesz in the 2006 and 2010 elections and the inflated increase in support for Jobbik in the 2010 elections.

Figure 1.1:
Comparing Youth & Older Cohorts Voting Trends: 2006 & 2010 Elections

2006 election results come from raw data self-stratified from exit polls from Szonda Ipsos.³ 2010 election raw data comes from the European Social Survey.⁴ Although ESS data was collected just after the 2010 elections it is the most accurate nationwide exit-poll raw data available to the public.

Looking at Figure 1.1, there is an obvious high level of support given to Fidesz. In 2010 youth support for Fidesz did not only increase nearly 8% but also radical right support was exponentially increased from 1.7% to 18.75%. While the reasons behind

---

³ 2006 Election Results, Szonda Ipsos (Hungarian economic and political statistical information website), <www.szondaipsos.hu/> [Accessed November 2008].
the sudden popularity of Jobbik are discussed in Chapter 3 the sustained Fidesz support along with Jobbik’s success meant that 83.93% of youth votes supported right and radical right parties in 2010.

Literature around the subject of voting trends and political shifts since transition ignores the role of the youth almost entirely, focusing instead on broader trends and concerns. A large portion of literature dealing with modern Hungarian politics originally focused on Hungary’s structural transformation from Soviet to democratic rule (Bozóki et. al. 1992, Csepeli and Örkény 1992, Kis 1989, Kovács 1996, Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, Szabó 2003) seen mainly as a successful transition to a westernized free market economy. While the potential for populist and nationalist tendencies was hinted at from early transition (Hockenos 1993, Arato 1994, Bozóki and Sükösd 1994) ultra-nationalist and radical right trends were largely marginalized.

The 2010 national elections transformed the political spectrum with the success of two new political parties gaining parliamentary seats in Hungary and witnessed the failure of older, seemingly stable, parties like liberal SZDSZ and conservative MDF (see Table 1.1 listing parties and dates in parliament). 2010 was only the second time in Hungary’s democratic history that a radical right party passed the electoral 5% threshold, not to mention achieved a significant portion of parliamentary representation. More recent literature has begun to recognize the strengthening of right and radical right wing forces in Hungary, looking mainly at the maneuvering of political elites and Fidesz’s concentration of power (Szabó 2003,

---

5 In 1998 the radical right party MIÉP barely passed the 5% electoral threshold into parliament but continued to be considered a largely marginalized periphery party. MIÉP no longer exists as a political party in Hungary.

Youth-specific political literature, particularly concerning political socialization processes in contemporary Hungary, is severely lacking. Youth research in Hungary during transition mainly tracked trends of Europeanization and post-materialist tendencies (Szabó 1988). Current youth research in Hungary, and the CEE region, focuses mainly on trends towards authoritarianism and low levels of democratic efficacy and participation (Iacovou and Berthoud 2001, Macháček 2001, Brannen 2002, Kuhar 2005, Kovacheva 2000 and 2005, Savicka 2008, Keil 2011) but rarely links these trends to larger political shifts. Youth specific literature in Hungary analyzing the rise of the radical right is limited to research profiling who Jobbik supporters are (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011, Bartlett et. al. 2012) rather than why these young supporters have chosen Jobbik. Although limited, some Hungarian researchers have begun showing concern for the popularization of the radical right subculture (Kürti 2012) and the increasing levels of radical and alternative political support among university students (Vásárhelyi 2011, Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011, Róna and Szabó 20136). This thesis fills a gap in current research by tracking how young Hungarians are developing their political partisanship by targeting which socializing agents are influencing youth political alignments.

6 Research conducted on profiling university students values and political alignments: Róna, Dániel and Andrea Szabó, Racionálisan Lázadó Hallgatók 2012, (February 2013), <http://aktivfiatalok.hu>
Hungary is an important case study in analyzing its growing trend away from liberal European values, giving preference to localized, nationalist and increasingly exclusionary political remedies. Tracking how these trends develop and become mainstream in nation-specific contexts can better define what is a national anomaly and what is a predictor of larger regional or European trends. In a 2009 report on youth culture in Hungary, the Council of Europe noted the enlargement of ‘post-traditional’ youth action outside of political parties, formal organizations and trade unions. Distrust and dissatisfaction with the government has led to party dealignment and political apathy alongside a desire to see a new forms of political participation and activism. While a large number of young Hungarians remain politically apathetic my research hones in on the active youth in the full spectrum of activism in Hungary.

Across Europe youth cohorts are favoring non-traditional forms of political participation replacing, or coinciding with traditional involvement (Topf 1995, Fuchs and Klingemann 1995, Goerres 2009). Unusually, in Hungary this trend has manifested strongly in favor of the right and radical right politics, alongside a parallel trend of grassroots opposition movements. Radical right support is most often linked to the undereducated, the blue-collar worker and the impoverished (Kürti 2002, Lánczi 2009, Mareš 2010, Harrison and Bruter 2011) yet in Hungary the strongest Jobbik supporters are often young, employed and generally well educated (Bíro Nagy and Róna 2011, Bartlett et. al. 2012).

This is one of the main reasons why there is much needed research analyzing how political alignments are developing among young Hungarian activists and

---

7 Youth Policy in Hungary: Conclusions of the Council of Europe International Review Team, Jaaberg (Chair of Committee), Council of Europe, (Strasbourg: Printed at the Council of Europe, 2008).
exploring the puzzle of why the Hungarian youth have moved increasingly to the right and radical right. In relation to this trend my research also questions how liberal counter mobilization is developing. While this was not an original focus, the rapidly changing political landscape since 2010 is developing new grassroots social movements affecting youth participation and partisanship. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the growing body of literature around post-communist democratization and the concerns of ‘liberal backsliding’ by analyzing the socialization and mobilization processes occurring in this shift to the right and radical right. This thesis also adds to modern youth research. Analyzing youth activism through political socialization allows for a multi-causal analysis, tracking how socializing agents influence partisanship development. Although Hungary is currently viewed as an exceptional case of contemporary radicalism, the Hungarian model can exploit whether the Hungarian scenario is truly unique or if similar developments can be, or are already starting to be, repeated elsewhere in Europe.

Analysis and trends of newer alternative youth-based parties are intrinsically linked to the party developments of their predecessors. Contemporary politics in Hungary is strongly marked by the legacies of the its past, the process of a peaceful negotiated transition and the distinct party politics that has molded the contemporary political system. It is difficult to comprehend the shifts of today without fully understanding the patterns of the past in Hungary. Although my research focuses primarily on events and changes between 2002 to present, this provides context for the political transition between 1989 through 2010, outlining necessary actors, parties and events. For the purposes of this thesis Hungarian political parties are defined along a criteria of a party’s self-definition. While these definitions might vary slightly
from more general Western European standards they are dependent on national and historic contexts:

Table 1.1: Political Parties in Hungary 1990 – 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Alignment</th>
<th>In Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic People’s Party</td>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>Christian Conservative</td>
<td>1990, 1994, thereafter with Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Justice and Life Party</td>
<td>MIÉP</td>
<td>Populist Radical Right</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for a Better Hungary</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>Populist Radical Right</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics Can Be Different</td>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table is a reference guide of party names and alignments. It also tracks when political parties were elected into parliament. Parties will be referred to primarily by their abbreviations.

**MSZP** is an established left-wing party, as defined during transformation with the primary definition linking back to its relation to the Soviet style Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZP). The *left* in Hungary is defined by its neo-liberal economic policies with a pro market economy based on privatization and decentralization as well as a liberal value of human rights (Pittaway 2003, Palonen...
SZDSZ is a self-defined liberal party, supporting similar neo-liberal policies in its previous coalition with MSZP, discussed within this chapter. The term liberal-left is often used to discuss the left side of the bipolar political spectrum. This is in reference to SZDSZ’ ‘liberal’ platforms that were originally a separate political camp from the left. Other political entities discussed and analyzed in later chapters are newer movements such as the MSZP fraction party, DK (Democratic Coalition-Demokratikus Koalició) and the Together 2014 movement (Együtt 2014).

While Fidesz originally defined itself through the liberal camp, the party is unquestionably a right wing party. For its more conservative, nationalist and economic policies as well as its self-definition the party remains the commanding concentrator of the right in Hungary. There is a continuing debate over whether Fidesz can be defined as a radical right party from its tactics to its rhetoric (Bozóki and Körösényi 1992, Bohlen 2002, Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). While Fidesz has left an open door to more radical elements with strong anti-communist, anti-globalization and nationalist appeals (Jenne and Mudde 2012, Bartlett et. al. 2012), for the purposes of this thesis Fidesz is considered right wing rather than radical right. However, Fidesz is referred to within this thesis as populist, as defined by their mobilization tactics and political rhetoric (Bozóki 2008, Palonen 2009), as well as a national conservative party (Enyedi 2005, Mudde 2007). The Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union consists of Fidesz and its coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) who make up the current ‘right’ as electorally significant in Hungary.

---

8 DK and Together 2014 are brought up in Chapters 3 and 4. Both are more recent political party movements, founded respectively in 2011 and 2012 in response to the controversial actions of the Fidesz majority government.
Jobbik and LMP are two new parties that entered parliament in 2010. Jobbik is the only radical right party in Hungary currently in parliament. Jobbik openly defines itself as a radical party, apparent in their manifesto and rhetoric (Waterbury 2010, Mareš 2010, Jobbik.hu). Jobbik is defined in its radicalism by its narrative of protectionist, anti-globalization messages with a commitment to ethnic Hungarian issues (Magyari 2009, Halasz 2009, Jobbik European Parliamentary Program 2009).

This line of thinking often dictates themes of anti-elitism, Zionist conspiracies and anti-Roma rhetoric and action. The radical right predecessor party MIÉP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party – Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja) will be discussed briefly in analyzing the rise of the radical right in Hungary. LMP is the only ‘green party’ to enter parliament in Hungary’s history. LMP is discussed throughout this thesis less for its widespread support, but for its integration of alternative political methods, attracting youth support, and its tactics for structure and mobilization. The party has refused from its beginnings to give allegiance to right or left political parties, taking a non-partisan stance on most issues. This has also been the party’s downfall in its inability to join opposition movements against Fidesz, ultimately fractioning the party in January 2012.

Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 explain transition politics in Hungary, mainly the political shift to a bipolar party system and the developments leading to Hungary’s current political spectrum, largely influenced by Fidesz’s transformation from a radical liberal youth party into a conservative nationalist party.

---

10 Ibid.
11 The party came to a stand still over internal debates on whether or not to join the current popular opposition group Together 2014 in January 2013.
1.1.1 **Hungary in Transition: A Tri Polar Beginning**\(^\text{12}\)

In the late 1980s Hungary’s political elites were already on a set path towards democratization with a majority of transition planning done far before the first democratic elections in 1990. Like the Velvet Revolutions of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany, Hungary transitioned peacefully, by way of bureaucratic structural reform over the course of numerous negotiations. After the 1956 revolution, under the leadership of János Kádár, Hungary shifted its socio-political and economic policies leading to partial economic liberalization. This allowed for the installation of certain free market mechanisms, improved living standards and easing on free speech and travel (Schöpflin 1991, Szalai 1994, Pittaway 2003, Korkut 2012, Solheim and Ekelove-Slydal 2013). Political stability was kept by building decentralized elements into Hungarian political culture so that the people were distanced from the political sphere. Administration aimed at a ‘collective amnesia’ of altercations with the political bodies such as forgetting the 1956 uprising in exchange for being left alone and receiving benefits from the government (Kis 1989). Under Kádár the *goulash communism* idea of ‘those who are not against us are with us’ was able to develop (Palonen 2009) allowing pockets of intellectual opposition to form, some taking shape as political parties during the lead up to the transition.

Hundreds of elite negotiations between the ruling Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt* - MSZMP) and political opposition groups were conducted in the lead up to transition tackling the complex process of decentralization and voting structures (Arato 1994, Ash 1994, Szabó 2003, Pittaway 2003). Rather than the violence and uncertainty of a people’s revolution, Hungary’s

\(^{12}\) For clarifications of party names, parliamentary representation and acronyms for political parties please refer to Table 1.1 listed previously.
transition became known as a ‘negotiated revolution’ of the elites, with a lesser focus on communist prosecution and lustration, resulting in the morphing of the Soviet style Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party into the democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt – MSZP) (Tőkés 1996, Szabó 2003, Wolek 2008). The last congress of the ruling party was dissolved October 7th, 1989, six months prior to the first democratic elections with a diminished support network returning to MSZP (Enyedi and Tóka 2007). By the time electoral competitions commenced citizens already had politicized partisanship developing and were mobilizing for elections (Enyedi and Tóka 2007). In the lead up to the first elections, 24 March 1990, the divides between political camps and ideologies solidified. With an elite driven transformation looking towards the west all parties shared similar economic goals of liberalization, privatization and deregulation, differing only in the speed at which they thought liberalization changes should be implemented. New democratic parties campaigned on the desire to discard the communist past and embrace a free market democracy (Schöpflin 1992, Körösény 1999). Early divides differentiated less on socioeconomic policies, resulting in campaigns based on symbolic and ideological platforms (Baytchinska 2008).

As seen in Figure 1.2, in the forming of party identities three distinct political camps emerged in Hungary’s first democratic elections. The ‘left’ had been intrinsically linked with the previous regime. Regardless of the party’s platforms this

---

13 Exact membership numbers are not given however, MSZP was seen as a party of the past, at least in the first elections, and few previous MSZMP members wanted to be associated with the failed Socialist Party. In the first 1990 elections MSZP only gained 10.9% of the vote (See Appendix 1).
14 The liberal camp made up of SZDSZ and Fidesz were radical in their call for rapid economic transformation while the conservative camp campaigned for a more gradual approach to economic transition.
15 Concrete economic divisions between parties began only after 1995 with the installation of the ‘Bokros’ package, named after the Minister of Finance, cutting back on social redistribution. The liberal camp went against the package, campaigning for increased mechanisms of social redistribution (Körösény 1999).
rhetorical association meant the reformed Hungarian Socialist Party became defined as a left-wing party to stand as its own political camp (Körösény 1999). The other two camps solidified defined by their levels of communist opposition and desired speed of transition. In this way the Christian-conservative parties were labeled as the ‘right’, defined by their desire for a more gradual approach to economic restructuring and less aggressive anti-communist campaign. Christian and traditional nationalist values were at the root of the right’s ideological stance from the beginning, using historical symbolic references to gain voter sympathy (Schöpflin 1991, Arato 1994, Szalai 1994, E. Kovacs 1998, Bozóki 1999, Wittenberg 2006, Palonen 2009 and 2011). This camp consisted of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum – MDF), the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt – KDNP) and the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt – FKgP). The followers of this camp could be roughly considered a network of the Christian middle class and moderate anti-communists.

The third group of parties made up the ‘liberal’ camp, defined by their campaign for rapid economic reforms to a market economy and vocal anti-communist rhetoric. The main party defining this camp was the Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – SZDSZ). At their side was the radical liberal youth group Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Fidesz), who maintained an age limit of thirty-five and under on membership until party

---

16 There were also some differences in attitudes towards the west. The Christian-conservative parties, like MDF, used slightly more nationalistic references in their platforms. However, the main differentiation for voters was how economic liberalization would be instated.

17 Both KDNP and FKgP were parties that had been formed previously during the interwar period that reformed in 1989. The Christian Democrats (KDNP) were originally formed in 1943. The Independent Smallholders (FKgP) were technically formed in 1908 but ran in the 1945 Hungarian election, winning an overwhelming majority after World War II. They reformed the party in 1988 in the lead up to the communist fall.
Restructuring in 1993 (Bozóki et. al. 1992, Fowler 2004, Hanley et. al. 2008). Liberal followers were mainly intelligentsia and more adamant anti-communists attracting larger following from the youth and Budapest-based voters.

**Figure 1.2: The Three Primary Political Cleavages in 1990**

![Diagram of tri-polar divide](image)

Right wing parties in the first election utilized nostalgia for the pre-communist past, incorporating symbols and historic events of pre-war Hungary into speeches and campaigning. All parties maintained a desire to democratize along a western standard or free market economy and privatization. The first elections showed a generational clash between old and new parties. New parties excelled in attracting activism and hype while historic parties reminded Hungarians of short lived democratic legacies. Much of this hype came from the radical youth party Fidesz, known for creating political rallies in ex-Soviet bunkers and vocally condemning socialism and Hungary’s oppressive past. Meanwhile, along with the reformed Socialist Party, KDNP and FKGp both had distinctive ties linking with Hungary’s previous regimes. Both parties had been active in the brief period of democracy between the end of

---

18 Diagram of tri-polar divide originally from Körösény (1999).
19 Other historical parties took part in the first democratic elections but failed to pass the 5% threshold to achieve parliamentary representation. Both parties were apart of Hungary’s short-lived democracy during the interwar period.
German occupation and the start of Soviet control (Laar 2009). With a clear victory to MDF and its leader József Antall the 1990 elections displayed the majority’s rejection of their socialist past and a desire for a moderate conservative pace to lead Hungary into its new democracy (Vachudova 2011). The conservative camp formed a coalition with MDF, KDNP and FKgP and the reformed Socialist Party (MSZP) faced a crushing defeat. Like many other newly democratizing countries, Hungary’s first elections were followed by internal party fractioning, electoral volatility and political realignment creating a vastly different political system by the second elections in 1994.

Table 1.2: Hungarian National Election Results 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>SMC Seat</th>
<th>SMC %</th>
<th>MMC Seat</th>
<th>MMC %</th>
<th>Ntnl Seats</th>
<th>Ttl Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SMC represents Single Member Constituencies, which equate to 176 seats in the national assembly. MMC represents Multi-Member Constituencies adding to 120 seats in parliament. An additional 90 seats are given from compensatory national seats adding to a total of 386 seats in the Hungarian National Assembly (data from Nohlen & Stöver 2010, p. 935).

The 1990 elections resulted in a large victory for conservative party MDF. As seen in Table 1.2, the results were magnified by the complicated mixed voting system, which combines first past the post and proportional representation.21

20 MDF won the national elections forming a government coalition in 1990 with KDNP and FKgP. MSZP managed only 10.9%. Tables of election results from 1990-2010 are given in Appendix 1.

21 As of the 2014 national elections the electoral voting system in Hungary simplifies to one round of voting, decreasing the number of MPs to 199 according to the Act CVIII of 2011.
1.1.2 Solidifying a Bipolar Spectrum in Hungary

The events between 1990 and 1994 broke previous party alignments, opening the door for MSZP and Fidesz to reposition their platforms and stabilize a bipolar political system in Hungary. Similar to neighboring transition countries, the first few elections saw high levels of party volatility and shifting voting alignments (Rose et al. 1998, Kostelecký 2002, Enyedi 2005 and 2006). Despite a more gradual approach to economic reforms the reality of free market transition still had a large impact on Hungary, bringing a wave of unemployment and decentralized social reforms that made MDF increasingly unpopular between 1990 and 1994. Weak internal party structures within MDF and electoral volatility led to the breaking and remaking of party coalitions and alignments. By 1992 the Smallholder’s Party (FKgP) had left the right wing, Christian conservative coalition and division over policy issues and strategy hurt relations between MDF and the Christian Democrats (KDNP).

At the same time, the Socialist Party (MSZP) offered coalition status to liberal SZDSZ as part of their effort to consolidate a liberal-left camp. This move gave MSZP an opportunity to distance the party from its negative communist typecast while giving SZDSZ the opportunity to have greater parliamentary influence. This coalition also gave MSZP and SZDSZ the opportunity to create a strong opposition to the conservative camp (Enyedi and Tóka 2007). SZDSZ had been regarded as a party of political and professional minded liberals with extreme anti-communist sentiments (Szalai 1994). The decision to align with the Socialist Party came as a blow to liberal support networks, including SZDSZ’s alliance with the young radical Fidesz. The liberal camp had built itself on strong anti-communist platforms only to lose its leading party to a coalition with the Hungarian Socialist Party. Fidesz was thus left alone in the liberal camp, seeing very little chance of electoral success without a
coalition of its own. Fidesz used this opportunity to shed itself of its radical youthful roots and take advantage of a weak and fragmented conservative camp. Losing a large portion of its original liberal supporters, Fidesz maintained an anti-communist stance but began transformed into a Christian conservative right-wing party (Fowler 2004). As seen in Figure 1.3, Fidesz transformed its ideological platform while mostly maintaining its economic stance.

**Figure 1.3: Party Map of Ideological and Economic Right and Left in Hungary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological-cultural right</th>
<th>Authoritarian-traditionalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MiEP/Jobbik</td>
<td>Conservative/Christian-democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christian-socialists</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP, FKGP</td>
<td>MDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fidesz (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian;income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>redistribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-democrat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>Fidesz (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian-progressive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological-cultural left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.3 shows where Hungarian political parties place defined on economic and ideological terms. The left to right placement of parties in the diagram define parties’ economic values. The vertical placement of parties defines parties’ ideological values. The original concept of this diagram comes from Bozóki et. al. (1992).

Electoral volatility in Hungary compares with the first few democratic elections neighboring countries, with large shifts in party alignments and voter support. However, the massive structural and ideological transformation of Fidesz and

---

22 An in-depth analysis of Fidesz’ transition to a right-wing conservatism is continued in Chapter 2.
its ability to concentrate the right in Hungary is unparalleled in Central and Eastern Europe (Fowler 2004). As defined by Fowler, electoral concentration is the ‘process in which one continuously existing party gains a larger share of the vote over time, while the vote shares of other parties shrink, sometimes to effective non-existence’, (2004, p. 80). Fidesz’s original liberal platforms with SZDSZ had focused on strong anti-communist messages and a goal of rapid economic liberalization and Europeanization. To make the shift away from its liberal roots Fidesz began adopting a more interventionist economic platform, campaigning for smaller enterprises, taking a more nationalist stance by going against capitol relations with foreign investors and building a campaign on national pride and domestic priorities (Körösény 1999). Although Fidesz’s platforms changed its populist-activist mobilization tactics did not. The party maintained its anti-communist stance, building clear distinctions between the old socialists and the new Hungary (Palonen 2011). Like SZDSZ, the initial shift away from the liberal camp hurt a large portion of Fidesz’ original electoral network. Fidesz’s stronghold of young radical liberal supporters had originally criticized the Christian conservatives camp that Fidesz was now joining (Korkut 2009). However, despite large ideological changes the party maintained most of its core internal members in the process of realignment (Fowler 2004).

The dismemberment of the liberal camp, splitting in opposite directions, meant that by the 1994 National Elections a very different divide had taken shape with a liberal-left coalition between MSZP and SZDSZ and a right-wing bloc of parties including Fidesz. By 1994 people were disappointed with the economic challenges felt on a local level by unemployment, regional disparities and the lack of socialist support structures. The death of Prime Minister József Antall, in 1993 also left the right wing camp in disrepair. Like Poland, Hungarian voters placed electoral
faith in a party with experience from the previous regime, voting in Socialist Party, MSZP (Grzymala-Busse 2002).

**Table 1.3: Hungarian National Election Results 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>SMC Seat</th>
<th>SMC %</th>
<th>MMC Seats</th>
<th>MMC %</th>
<th>Ntnl Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKGp</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3 shows the outcome of the 1994 elections resulting in a large wing towards left wing (MSZP) and liberal (SZDSZ) parties, away from right wing parties such as MDF, FKGp and KDNP.

Between 1994 and 1998 Fidesz concentrated the right in two phases, making coalitions with other right wing parties. The Christian Democrats (KDNP) and Smallholders (FKgP) had a strong socioeconomic voting base among elderly, rural-based churchgoers and less educated agriculture bases while the Democratic Forum (MDF) and Fidesz had catchall potential. Fidesz campaigned as a ‘new’ force within the right while at the same time appealing to the older, rural voter base (Fowler 2004). In January 1995 Fidesz announced the MDF-Fidesz Civic Alliance (*Polgári Szövetség*). Although FKgP attempted to counter Fidesz with its own alliances by autumn 1997 KDNP joined the Fidesz alliance creating the largest parliamentary opposition. By the 1998 national elections the survival of former leading right wing party, MDF, depended on cooperation with Fidesz. As Fidesz’s concentration grew other right wing parties could no longer maintain as the Democratic People’s Party disintegrated in 1997 and the Smallholders followed between 2001 and 2002. The

---

Hungarian youth have been socialized primarily under the bipolar hegemony developed between the right wing camp (Fidesz-MPP) and the left wing coalition between MSZP and SZDSZ (discussed in Chapter 3).

1.1.3 Defining Right, Left and Other

By 1994 a bipolar shift was apparent for the electorate, spurred by the split of the liberal camp into the conservative-right and liberal-left wing camps. The process of solidifying the two camps developed a strong ideological division between the national populist facets supporting the right and the liberal-left, supporting pluralism and a free market model (Kitschelt 1995 and 2002, Kitschelt et. al. 1999, Hanley et. al. 2008). By 1998 the victory of a fully transformed and concentrated right, led by Fidesz, began solidifying the bipolar nature of politics (Pittaway 2003, Solheim and Ekelove-Slydal 2013). The clear right-left divide pinned MSZP and Fidesz diabolically opposed to each other, reinforced by populist mobilization tactics and symbolic divisions (Szabó 2003). Both parties, but particularly Fidesz, used demonstrations and rallies against specific issues to draw out followings and polarize public opinion.

Hungary has always maintained a strong correlation between politics and ideology, basing the political spectrum on platforms along cultural cleavages (Fowler et. al. 2007, Baytchinska 2008). Many times even economic policy is used for ideological and symbolic means, such as Fidesz’s nationalist policies to support local, rather than foreign, investors, creating favor among the more rural, agriculturally

---

24 In 1998 Fidesz took office with a coalition between MDF, FKgP and KDNP to create a united right wing bloc with platforms based on Christian nationalist values (Solheim and Ekelove-Slydal 2013).
25 Political parties in Hungary have incited public demonstrations from the beginning of the 1990s. The most notable of these earlier demonstrations was the 1990 taxi drivers blockade against the government’s increase of petrol prices. Opposition backed the public blockade, which lasted three days and was supported by two-thirds of the public (Schöpflin 1991, Szalai 1994).
based communities and small business owners. As mentioned above the initial right-left divide solidified around the idea that the reformed Socialist Party (MSZP) was considered ‘left’, thus any party in opposition to MSZP was liberal or left. The disintegration of the liberal camp solidified the bipolar divide between left and right. Many of the post-communist transition states lacked the class-based or ethno-religious bases for party cleavages that the Soviet system tried to eradicate, meaning that political divisions are highly varying from Western definitions and spectrums (Körösényi 1991, Kitschelt 1995, Enyedi 2005). Simplifying the party spectrum, Fidesz found a basis for concentration of the right through deep-rooted anti-communist sentiments (Körösényi 1999, Krastev 2007, Palonen 2011).

Economic divisions began to solidify in Hungary around the controversial installation of the 1995 ‘Bokros Package’, bringing in a series of austerity measures under the Socialist Prime Minister Gyula Horn.26 Aimed at avoiding national bankruptcy the economic package gradually devalued the forint to counterbalance the deficit while limiting social benefits, introducing tuition fees with an inevitable reduction of real wages. In other words, short-term stabilization measures were combined with economic and social restructuring, bringing on strong criticism from right wing and labor union forces arguing for more gradual stabilizing policies (Köves 1995, Boros-Kazai 2005). Fidesz was at the forefront of opposition, deeming the package catastrophic. While the package proved to develop stabilizing economic growth by 1997 a visible economic divide now defined the right and left.27

26 The Bokros Package was named after he Minister of Finance, Lajos Bokros.
The left has since been defined economically by its more pro-market, conservative austerity measures, often taking advice from international institutions like the European Union for structural assistance. The right has subsequently embraced more paternalistic socialist policies, focusing on internal growth of small-scale private ownership, social mechanisms of redistribution and welfare (Fowler 2004). The populist side of such initiatives has developed more recently with Fidesz’s vocal critique of the IMF and EU policies as encroaching on the freedoms of the Hungarian people.28

1.2 RADICALISM IN HUNGARY: A RELEVANT CASE STUDY

Analyzing modern youth political socialization and the impact of political structures on the youth in Hungary will have a large focus on the right and particularly the radical right. Hungary is not alone in having an electorally successful radical right. Greece’s Golden Dawn is the most recently successful radical right party, winning 6.9% at national elections as recent as June 2012. France’s National Front and the Netherlands’ Freedom Party have been successful in exploiting resentment towards immigrant populations. The Dutch PVV party, founded in 2005, has also been successful becoming the third largest Dutch party on an anti-Islam platform in 2010. But the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe varies from Western radicalism. While the Western radical right tends to focus on immigration and Islamophobia the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) maintains older roots of irredentist disputes, animosity towards globalization and internal ethnic minorities: mainly the Roma and Jewish populations.

In general, the momentum behind the radical right in Europe and CEE seems to be declining compared with the recent surge of support in Hungary. In Poland the League of Polish Families failed to maintain parliamentary status in 2007. The Greater Romania Party, who was the second largest party in the 2000 national elections, lost all its parliamentary representation by 2008. In the Baltics, Czech Republic and Slovenia larger radical right parties no longer exist. Even in Slovakia and Bulgaria, where stronger radical traditions maintain, there seems to be a decreasing or stasis in electoral support. The Slovak National Party has maintained parliamentary representation in most elections since 1990 when they won 13.95% but have since lost support, no longer represented in parliament since 2012 elections. The Bulgarian Ataka is perhaps the closest example paralleling Jobbik’s recent rise in parliament. Founded in 2005 Ataka took 8.1% in their first elections and 9.4% in 2009, maintaining as the fourth largest party in Bulgaria and bringing a new type of populist party to the country (Ganev 2006). But even compared with Ataka Jobbik is in its own league, receiving 16.67% in the 2010 national elections. Not only does Jobbik possess a keen ability to formulate economic policies around state-control and protectionist regulations benefitting local farmers and small business but also yields a strong multifaceted subculture, socializing a new wave of young radicals.

1.2.1 Radical Right Politics in Hungary

Hungary has developed a very strong organizational network and value set behind the traditional conservatism and the more radical right, often sharing similar

29 Latvia is perhaps an exception to this list, developing its own radical right trends.
symbols and historical outlooks, creating a distinctive nationalist political culture in Hungary. Traditional conservatism in Central and Eastern Europe, as defined by Chan (1999) draws from heritage and culture looking at the past and pre-communist era to draw meaning and symbolism.\textsuperscript{32} From the stance of original anti-communist parties in Hungary, 1989 was a national liberation from an alien ideology and a time to bring back the nation’s authentic heritage and traditions. The years following the 1956 revolution had become known as the Kádár era, run by János Kádár and his goulash communism. Kádárism alienated the people from the politics, suppressing nationalist sentiments towards previous national historic events like the 1956 revolution and the 1920 Treaty of Trianon that had stripped Hungary of a large portion of land and populace (Schöpflin 1991). In the fall of Soviet rule Christian Conservative parties embraced the return of family, national, cultural and religious values.\textsuperscript{33} Parties like MDF brought back national historical topics such as the Treaty of Trianon and the significance of previous revolutions, embracing Hungary’s tormented past while looking to rebuild the country’s nationalist traditions.\textsuperscript{34}

While the conservative party MDF touched upon populist nationalist themes gaining support in the wake of transition, the first sizable party to establish an openly radical right agenda was the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), led by István Csurka, as a splinter party from within MDF.\textsuperscript{35} Csurka had originally been an MP for

\textsuperscript{32} From this ideology there are also strong strands of Euroscepticism seeing the European Union and other international forces like NATO akin to Soviet alien powers taking away Hungarian sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{33} The political family of conservatism in Hungary includes Christian nationalists, national peasant parties and religious-fundamentalists. MDF, KDNP and FKgP were the first parties in this camp. Later Fidesz joined this camp. MIÉP, and now Jobbik, lead the more radical-right of nationalist politics.

\textsuperscript{34} As Fidesz assimilated itself into the conservative camp it also began incorporating allusions to Hungary’s controversial past, utilizing nationalist symbols like the tri-colour (kókarda) for elections.

\textsuperscript{35} Beginning his career as a literary figure and well-known Hungarian playwright, István Csurka turned to politics during post-Communist transition. Csurka had originally been a MP for Christian conservative party MDF but was expelled for his anti-Semitic rhetoric and extremism. He went on to form the radical-right party MIÉP, father figure to the later created youth party Jobbik.
MDF but was expelled from the party in 1993 for his radical nationalist views, creating MIÉP later that year (Oltay 1993, van Biezen 2003, Pittaway 2003, Szabó 2003). MIÉP’s platforms supported ethnically based politics that politically divided the ‘globalists’ and Hungarians,\(^\text{36}\) where Hungarians were depicted as the victims of foreign oppression, be that by Nazi, communist or European forces (Bozóki and Kriza 2008). MIÉP platforms propagated anti-EU policies and openly brought the Treaty of Trianon and Hungary’s lost borders back into discourse (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006). Much of MIÉP’s rhetoric was based on nationalist literary movements from the past, mainly the interwar Népi movement (népi translated most often as ‘folk’ but also meaning ‘populist’).\(^\text{37}\) The Népi movement was an a-political movement started in the 1930’s, supported by intellectuals, writers, and poets supporting traditional living, the beauty of the untainted countryside and the ‘true Hungarian consciousness’. The movement also called for strong leadership to rid Hungary of its ailments, often linked with racist and anti-Semitic dialogues, finding scapegoats as a cause of Hungary’s weak state and international position (Hockenos 1993).\(^\text{38}\)

In a stark contrast from the core of today’s radical right, earlier radical movements, during the 1990s and early 2000s, were primarily fragmented. Those supporting MIÉP tended to be an older base of radical nationalists formed mainly around the fears brought on by prospects of globalization in a more anti-modern

\(^{36}\) Globalists refer to those favouring the influence or assistance of Western powers in Hungarian matters. This includes membership in the European Union and other international organization like NATO. It also includes those who want the influence of foreign capital such as foreign corporations buying and utilizing Hungarian lands and resources.

\(^{37}\) It should be noted that populism in Hungary differs slightly to more general ideas of populism in that its main discontent is with internal ‘others’ such as Jewish and Roma populations. Hungary is less concerned with external ‘others’ such as immigrants. In fact Jobbik and other radical right organizations have taken a pro-Palestine stance in international politics, unlike most populist entities in Europe, due to their anti-Semitic views.

\(^{38}\) The Népi movement was neither left nor right politically but called for a ‘third way’ in between socialism and capitalism. This movement expounded on the idea that Hungary’s true soul was founded out of traditional peasantry and small farming communities (Hockenos 1993).
fashion (Kober 2009, E. Kovács 1998). Meanwhile, a younger marginalized skinhead movement developed in the early to mid 1990s around the resurfacing of previously suppressed ideologies, youth revolt and questions of identity, though they remained largely separate from any formal political movements (Mareš 2010, Bozóki and Kriza 2008, E. Kovács 1998, A. Kovács 2000). Although MIÉP was unsuccessful in uniting a strong radical right political front in Hungary the party developed a prototype for future radical right political movements in two crucial ways. Firstly, MIÉP was spawned out of the conservative right, having splintered off from MDF, a trend that is arguably similar to Jobbik’s foundations in relation to Fidesz, and secondly, MIÉP assisted in developing platforms for symbolic politics that remain salient today, mainly in its usage of Trianon and Hungary’s tormented past. The origins of radical rhetoric begin with Hungary’s transition, which was a negotiated or ‘self-limiting’ revolution (Arato 1994, Bozóki 1999). The radical right and MIÉP personified the transition as an elite-run operation, denying the people a true political revolution while keeping the old elite in power.

The fine line between populist, nationalist, right and radical right has always been an issue in Hungary. Early threads of nationalist political rhetoric hinted at radical undercurrents, showing the potential salience of nationalist and xenophobic platforms, visible in allusions made by MDF (Szalai 1994, E.Kovács 1998, Gerő 2006, Bozóki 1999, Mudde 2007, Bozóki and Kriza 2008). Like many post-communist transition states, anti-communist intellectuals and politicians realized the potential of nationalist culture as a means to amass support, bringing controversial history back into the political arena, including the ‘Jewish question’ and other

39 MIÉP remained largely marginalized as a political party, peaking electorally in 1998 when they broke the 5% threshold into parliament. They have since failed to maintain parliamentary representation, even running with Jobbik in 2006, and received a disappointing 0.03% by 2010.
mechanisms of self-other rhetoric. This technique worked to create scapegoats out of those seen as ‘modernizers’ or ‘bearers of alien values’ (Schöpflin 1992).

Right and radical right political forces in Hungary have subsequently monopolized patriotic and nationalist symbols and sentiment in Hungary over the last two decades. Hungarian political scientists stereotype the late 1980s through the early 1990s as Hungary’s epoch of symbolic politics, using pre-communist images to evoke political meaning (Arato 1994, Bozóki 1999, Kovács 1998, Ost 2005). The main goals of the radical camp formed around the restitution of land, the purging of communist elites in politics, political justice and increasing an authoritative state. These radicalized goals were articulated through images of the Turul bird (alluding to Hungary’s ethnogenesis), the red and white Árpád flag (representing Hungary’s first kingships) and pre-Trianon Hungarian borders. These narratives and relating symbols are utilized to echo the perceived modern struggle (E. Kovács 1998, Dieckhoff 2003, Palonen 2011). Personifying these narratives are icons such as images of Hungary’s original borders (Nagy Magyarország térkép – Greater Hungary map), figures from the 1848 and 1956 revolutions and symbols alluding to ancient Hungary (E.Kovács 1998, Lendvai 2003).

This first wave of radical right politics, embodied by MIÉP remained largely a movement of an older nationalist generation, though potential for youth mobilization

---

40 The perpetuation and relevance of specific symbols and historic narratives is discussed in Chapter 5. 
41 Icons of the Greater Hungary map are widespread in Hungary, easily visible on bumper stickers, t-shirts and other forms throughout Hungary. The two great revolutions of Hungary are used not only for their symbolic weight of Hungary’s constant struggle against oppressive forces but also these remembrance days have become politically charged days for speeches, demonstrations and marches (to be discussed in depth in the chapters on political parties and grassroots and social movements). The Árpád red and white striped flag as well as St. István and Turul iconography will also be discussed further in the following chapters but are primarily used to indicate one’s more nationalist and traditionalist political alignment. The Árpád flag is particularly visible as a radical right symbols since it was not only an ancient Hungarian flag but also used as part of the Nazi Arrow Cross Party flag.
existed. On 23 October 1992, Hungary’s Memorial Day for the 1956 Revolution, MIÉP’s leader, István Csurka, amassed a popular protest against the ‘communist’ mass media with the aim of nationalizing Hungarian television and radio (Szalai 1994). This was the first radical civil movement uniting MIÉP with younger radical subcultures of the ‘National-Democratic Youth’. Old and young united using the controversial Árpád flag as their symbol (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Szabó 2003). Although radical right parties and social movements were mainly marginalized until 2006, MIÉP created an archetype for ethnically based symbolic politics in Hungary (Bozóki and Kriza 2008) used by today’s radical right youth.

1.2.2 Youth Support for Fidesz and Jobbik

Hungary as a case study on the youth is not only relevant for its current heightened activism but also useful in the wider discourse on democratization, political socialization and the future of civil participation. The literature around the topic of current youth activism has touched upon issues of Central and Eastern European ‘backsliding’ (Ost 2005, Schmitter 2006, Krastev 2007, Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), and Jobbik’s rising appeal (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006, Bartlett et. al. 2012, Halasz 2009, Jordon 2010, Keil 2011). However, this study treats the current trends as organic developments that can be tracked through political party tactics combined with influences from various agents of socialization starting at a young age.

Fidesz has been the most successful party in cultivating a strong official youth-base within its party. Fidesz has always maintained a significant youth following, apparent in its electoral youth turnout as well as its official membership in the party’s two youth organizations, Fidesz IT and Fidelitas. This aspect of Fidesz is unique in that no other political party has more than one official youth organization in Hungary. There are around 20,000 official youth members combining both
organizations’ figures. Other ‘larger’ political youth organizations in Hungary boast membership of around 2,000 (discussed further in Chapter 3, see Table 3.1).

The previous generation of radical right support came from fragmented periphery groups. Today’s radical right has taken successful elements from their predecessors and rejuvenated them with a modern, more tangible scapegoat as well as an immersive subculture (discussed in Chapter 4), highly attractive and interactive with Hungary’s youth. It is significant that while Jobbik has an official youth organization of only 2,000 members, Jobbik IT was only established in 2011. Their membership is also comparable with other longstanding youth organizations like IKSZ. Hungary as a whole voted Jobbik into parliament with 16.67% in 2010. This percentage was as high as 25% among young first-time voters (Jordon 2010, Medián and Tárki polls). The right and radical right have proven highly successful in attracting youth support. Although the 2010 electoral results sparked wider debates about a rightward and radical right turn among the youth certain youth trends were evident in the previous elections despite Socialist victories. Referring back to Figure 1.1, looking at the first round of the 2006 National Elections, 58% of youth voters (aged eighteen to thirty) supported Fidesz compared to 46.5% of older cohorts. Meanwhile combined support for the liberal-left coalition by youth voters was only 26.4% in 2006 down to 9.03% by 2010.

1.2.3 Breaking Bipolarity: The Shock of 2009/2010

Looking purely at electoral trends, the 2010 national elections completely changed the political landscape in Hungary. The stable bipolar divide cultivated
between the left wing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the right wing Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) seemed to be a fixed hegemonic bipolarity from 1994 until 2010. MSZP had a stable coalition with the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). Meanwhile, between 1994 and 1998 Fidesz had concentrated the right and developed a strong coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).

Figure 1.4: Stacked Column Chart of Party Representation in Parliament: 1990 – 2010

The polarization between right and liberal-left was heightened in 2002 when Fidesz launched an offensive attack after the first round of elections, bringing mass mobilization of the right wing supporters onto the streets, insinuating electoral foul play for the Socialist victory (discussed further in Chapter 3). What could not have been predicted was that large governmental scandals against MSZP, publicized by Fidesz and right wing media outlets, changed the dynamics of the political landscape.

The stacked column shows the shifts in parliamentary representation from a mixed conservative government in 1990 into a bipolar political system between Fidesz and MSZP in 1998, 2002 and 2006. By 2010 this model shifts drastically favoring the right and radical right.

** In the 1998 elections Fidesz ran with MDF and KDNP shown as one block in the diagram.

*** By 2002 the Fidesz bloc won 48.7%. KDNP and FKgP aligned with Fidesz creating Fidesz-MPP.

Parliamentary representation data from the Hungarian National Election Office (www.valasztas.hu).
Figure 1.4 shows the progression of Hungary’s election from a volatile first two elections in 1990 and 1994, into a solidified, and seemingly stable, bipolar system between 1998 and 2006. The stacked column helps visually display how drastic the shift to the right was in 2010 with significant gains for the right and radical right as well as significant losses for the liberal-left. Events after the 2006 national elections changed the political opportunity structure in Hungary allowing two new youth-based parties to enter parliament in 2010: radical right party, Jobbik, and green party, LMP (discussed further in Chapter 3). Significantly for this study, both parties were founded originally as youth-based organizations, campaigning through alternative media and grassroots organizations.

One of the reasons recent political shifts have been so shocking to the international community is due to Hungary’s longstanding image as one of the leading liberal and westernizing post-communist countries. In the early 1990’s Hungary began its process of democratization with fellow post-Communist countries. Eager to make changes based on a Western model, Hungary entered NATO in 1999 and became one of the first post-communist member states of the European Union by 2004 (Jordon 2010). Even in 2006 the now popular radical-right party Jobbik barely managed 2% in elections and the Socialist party (MSZP) enjoyed re-election to head parliament for a second term. Much has changed since 2006.45 Between 2006 and 2010 the right and radical right strengthened considerably. By the 2010 national elections Fidesz won 52.73% electorally giving the party a two-thirds majority in parliament and leaving its previous rival, MSZP, far behind with only 19.3%. Meanwhile Jobbik trailed only narrowly behind with 16.67%.

45 Some speculate that 2006 was a catalyst for right wing and radical-right support when protests broke out after tapes of the Socialist Prime Minister Gyurcsány saying his government had lied to get into the European Union leaked to the public (Jordon 2010). Discussed further in Chapter 3.
While the electoral success of the radical right was drastically higher than had been previously achieved in Hungary it is questionable whether or not the undercurrent of radical right ideological preferences is a new trend or just one that has been allowed to surface politically. Predictions about the potential influence and mainstreaming of the radical right began in the mid 1990’s:

The prospects for the stabilization of democratic institutions and the formation of a market economy in Hungary are menaced for the foreseeable future by dangers coming from the extreme right- the ideologies of a radical right are formulated within the governing party [MDF] itself. (Szalai 1994, p.137).

Hungarian researchers were quick to pick up on the salient, radical nationalist undercurrent in Hungary (Szalai 1994, A. Kovács 1996, E. Kovács 1998). There was already concern over the easy politicization of nationalism and hints of xenophobia used by parties to gain support, avoiding platforms concerned with complicated economic redistribution and unemployment problems left over from transition (Szalai 1994, Gerő 2006, Bozóki 1999, Bozóki and Kriza 2008).

Earlier research feared the potential political backlash from the disillusioned ‘losers of transition’ bearing the brunt of shock from the transition. The strong presence of the radical right today comes less from the older nationalist MIÉP supporters, pointing to Zionist conspiracies coming from Budapest. It is rather the Hungarian youth that has taken the radical right to new heights, and while the youth can be seen as a disadvantaged cohort from the economic recession, the radical right is often supported by well-educated university students, and the previously disillusioned non-voter (Varró 2009, Bartlett et al 2012, Nagy and Róna 2012). It is peculiarities such as this, and other new political youth trends, that are the focus of my research. Trends within the youth-based right and radical right are possible indicators of future nationalist and Eurosceptic levels within the region (Mareš 2010).
If current youth trends continue Hungary is at risk of an increasing population supporting extremist ideologies. Political transition has left young cohorts caught between values of a socialist past and a democratic present. Earlier predictions of potential radicalization are coming to pass:

The greatest threat to democracy today is no longer communism, either as a political movement or as an ideology. The threat grows instead from a combination of chauvinism, xenophobia, populism, and authoritarianism, all of them connected with the sense of frustration typical of great social upheavals. (Michnik 1991)

Mannheim (1960) postulated that quick and rapid social changes, such as the one surrounding the fall of the USSR, were more likely to produce a youth that has a clearly common culture, distinct from older generations. The rapidity of change requires the youth of the era to adapt to new systems and institutions while models of older generations become dissolved and obsolete (Mannheim 1960). This thesis analyzes the distinctness of this transitional youth and questions what mechanisms are behind the current upsurge of support for alternative and radical politics in Hungary. I also argue against the idea of a common youth culture as theorized by Mannheim, analyzing to what extent Hungary’s youth can be considered a united generation.

1.2.4 Defining a Cohort: The Politically Active Hungarian Youth

‘Youth’ is a contested concept, often context and culture specific (Philips 1999, Skelton and Valentine 1998, Kürti 2002). While social and psychological studies define ‘youth’ by life stages (Bynner and Roberts 1991, Wallace and Kovacheva 1998, Kovacheva 2005), there is debate on whether to separate individuals in generational terms or define them as a specific cohort (Goerres 2009, Szalai 2011, Vásárhelyi 2011). Defining a ‘cohort’ refers to a group of people born

---

46 In this context the youth is considered a transitory social group, moving through phases until independent living is achieved.
around the same time while a political ‘generation’ is defined by the shared experience of a group born during a specific period (Goerres 2009). I choose to refer to the group I am observing as a cohort since I am looking at a specific age group and certain requirements to qualify a ‘generation’, such as a shared and unifying experience, are arguably lacking from this group (Vásárhelyi 2011).47

Within Hungary the definition of youth varies on the context and sector defining it (Walther et. al. 2007). Age definitions and life stages were made clearer under the socialist system by distinct youth groups and political divisions48 however, the decentralization process and democratic transition has left institutions to define their own terms and conditions on what constitutes the ‘youth’, often with very different criteria.49 Membership into a political party’s youth organization also has different age conditions for joining. A good example of this is Fidesz. The party uniquely has two separate youth organizations with different age cut-offs: for youth party Fidelitas, the age cut-off for membership is 35 whereas the youth organization, Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat, (Fidesz IT) restricts age to under 30.

For the purposes of my research I examine politically active youths between the ages of eighteen and thirty.50 I begin at eighteen since that is the legal age to vote

---
47 There are specific requirements of a ‘generation’ that will be discussed more in depth later within this thesis, however it is contestable to say that the current youth cohort in Hungary represents a definable generation at this point (Szalai 2011). Discussed further in Chapter 3.
48 Youth leagues were set up clearly dividing children, youth, and adults. Those under the age of fourteen were instated in the Young Pioneers (Uttoros), while those aged fourteen to twenty-eight became members of the Communist Youth League (Kisz). These youth programs were created to ‘educate young people in the Communist spirit’ but also in order to divide up developmental stages (Volgyes 1975, p.110).
49 National reports place ‘young adults’ within the fifteen to twenty-nine ranges while labor market directs policies at eighteen to twenty-five year olds. At other times ‘youth’ refers only to students enrolled in academic institutions. Within the Hungarian court system criminal responsibility starts at the age of fourteen. For specific health, child protection, and poverty policies youth ends at eighteen, and for some Hungarian NGO’s standards range from six through thirty-four (Walther et. al. 2007).
50 My field research was conducted in 2011 meaning these were youths that were between eighteen and thirty at this time. More specifically my cohort was born between 1981 and 1993.
in Hungary. It is around this age that individuals begin voting, determine jobs, finalize academics and create professional goals with longer-term trajectories (Cannon 1995, Gokalp 1981, Bruter and Harrison 2009). While political exposure can begin in earlier stages of life this age period tends to be when political identifications solidify more concretely and individuals define partisan alignments and memberships (Bruter and Harrison 2009). This cohort has reached the voting age while Hungary has been a democracy and has been primarily socialized after Fidesz’s political shift to the right between 1993 and 1994. The cohort includes those that were first-time voters in the 2010 National Elections. This is also the standard age categorization for ‘youth’ in most Hungarian electoral statistic-based studies ensuring a more seamless comparison between my primarily qualitative data and the quantitative resources available.

Narrowing my research I focus only on the ‘politically active’ youth providing a clearer analysis on youth involved in current political changes and subcultures. *Political activity* is defined here as ‘legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take’ (Verba et. al. 1978, p.46).\(^51\) Included within this categorization I add actions that include diverse actors in the public, non-profit and private sectors aimed at supporting or changing aspects local or national policies and practices (Norris 2007).\(^52\) The youth have been at the forefront of political changes in the post-communist arena (Bunce and Wolchik 2006, Furlong and Cartmel 2007, Ó Beacháin et. al. 2012, Tereshchenko 2012). Mass protests and demonstrations are now arranged at least biannually since 2006, both opposing and supporting the government.


The current activist culture in Hungary has changed form in light of a shifting political climate bringing forth a new range of subcultures and political engagement not seen before in Hungary. Hungary’s activist youth culture is not a unique contemporary phenomenon. Young protesters are involving themselves in political changes across the Arab Spring territories while the Occupy movement went global throughout much of America and Europe. However, while most of today’s strongest youth movements hint at a spreading global consciousness and liberal value orientation the increasing support of radicalized networks by the youth in Hungary has caused concern by local and international onlookers (Halasz 2009, Palonen 2009, Jordon 2010, Mareš 2010, Szalai 2011, Vásárhelyi 2011, Kürti 2012, Bartlett et. al 2012). While originally this thesis focused solely on larger right and radical right activist trends newer grassroots social movements across the political spectrum are on the rise with numbers, unseen since earlier historic revolutions (discussed in Chapter 5). Focusing on young activists aged eighteen to thirty, this thesis is one of the few studies analyzing the causes behind new youth mobilization and shifts towards radical and alternative political options.


---


outlining of influences still apparent from the Socialist and pre-Soviet era, as well as new mechanisms of political socialization restructured after 1989. The youth of today are rapidly becoming the primary citizen and voter of tomorrow. Analyzing salient influences and political trends within this cohort develops an understanding of political preferences and directions Hungary may develop in the future.

1.3 CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is broken down into three main parts. The first part, consisting of this chapter and Chapter 2, serves to introduce the socio-political situation in Hungary and outline my research. This chapter gives a broad overview of political development in Hungary since transition and makes a case for analyzing youth political activism and strong trends towards the right and radical right. Going more specifically into my approach Chapter 2 serves as a research, methods and theory chapter giving an overview of political socialization theory and the practical side of its usage for a theoretical framework within a Central and Eastern European context. This chapter goes into the foundations of political socialization theory as well as a review of more current research incorporating political socialization as a method. Within the context of Central and Eastern Europe this chapter also reviews the heavy monitoring and implementation of political socialization under Socialism compared with the much sparser socialization research continuing today within the region.

Part II covers political organizations and grassroots social movements in how they organize and engage with young people in Hungary. Chapter 3 dives deeper into an analysis of how political parties are directing themselves at the youth through party structures, campaigns, youth organizations and events. This chapter emphasizes the stronger formal relations Fidesz has within its party structure compared with the more
informal, alternative networks attracting the youth to parties like Jobbik and LMP. An understanding of these relations gives a foundation for analyzing political socialization at large within Hungary. **Chapter 4** analyzes politically focused grassroots social movements seeing how the youth has become activated within these networks and mapping the primary movements influencing alternative political participation in Hungary. The malleability and political counterparts of certain movements is also discussed with reference to the current blurring between subcultures and movements as well as political parties and movements creating new movement parties in Hungary. Both chapters also serve to set the scene for how other agents of political socialization relate and interact with political parties and activist movements in Part III.

Part III deals more directly with my own research and findings corresponding with agents of socialization focused on in this research, the order of which correlates with the spheres of influence an individual first comes into contact with. **Chapter 5**, therefore, focuses on the role and influence of the family on the political socialization process. Once considered the primary mechanism of political socialization, this lens looks at how young Hungarians interact with their family on the topic of politics and historically relevant events in shaping their own political ideologies. Very little literature deals with familial political socialization in a post-communist setting. This chapter explores the relationship between family members’ political ideologies and the ideologies of young respondents, how politics is discusses, suppressed or active in the home. References to the past and passing on historic memories are of key interest in analyzing the remnants or discarding of politically significant events and symbols.

**Chapter 6** progresses into the current political socialization process taking place within the education system, mainly focusing on secondary and higher education
correlating with the main age of respondents and the timing of solidifying political partisanship. The transition from a highly centralized socialist education system to a fully decentralized structure has effected how politics addressed at schools. This chapter also looks at the influence of teachers as well as the school setting as a socializing space. With regards to teachers and professors I rely mainly on interviews with professors themselves as well as youth accounts of politically engaging or passive academic experiences. Somewhat unique to the Hungarian higher education system, this chapter also addresses Special Colleges existing as a quasi-dorm external learning space apart of certain universities, and their active role in political socialization and platform creation.

Chapter 7 looks directly at post-communist media transformations and the role media plays in politics. This chapter views media as an agent of political socialization as well as a structural political tool. Chapter 7 analyzes how the media has politically polarized in the wake of mass privatization efforts as a top-down process. Media in Hungary has also developed new trends in counter culture in the form of online media. This chapter addresses both mainstream media (print, television and radio) as well as alternative youth media, mapping the most used networks of information retrieval, discussing youth views on media ‘legitimacy’ and ‘objectivity’.

Chapter 8 serves as a conclusion chapter, bringing together these themes, analyzing the overall view of structural changes that have affected youth partisanship and activism and how various agents of political socialization have developed in a post-communist setting.
2. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS & THEORIES

This chapter serves as a framework to explain how research was structured around political socialization in Hungary while justifying the methods I utilized and the theoretical framework underpinning the basis for my approach. As mentioned in my introduction, my aim is to analyze how political parties, grassroots social movements, family, education and the media have an effect on and/or cultivate youth political alignment and participation practices in a post-communist setting. Section 2.1 of this chapter gives an overview of my research design and methodology in conducting field research in Hungary. This section explains the scope and reasons behind my mixed-methods approach as well as the technical aspects of how participants were recruited and how interviews and focus groups were conducted.

Section 2.2 looks more closely at political socialization theories, how this approach was founded and how it has developed since, as a theory, it has been put into research practice in a number of ways. Section 2.3 looks at the literature and research around grassroots social movements. Social movements have their own body of literature but also work as a potential agent for socialization through their ability to manipulate and change societal norms and political culture. Social movements are analyzed not only as a socializing agent but also call for a structural and stylistic analysis similar to political parties in their tactics and ability to activate youth participation.

2.1 RESEARCH AND METHODS

The complexity of current political trends in Hungary alongside an under-researched youth activist cohort led me to choose a qualitative approach for my
research. National electoral data and voter preference polls can show who is voting for what party but is unable to explain why an individual has chosen to vote for a particular party and more importantly how that partisanship was cultivated. Quantitative data is unable to explain if current youth voting trends are indicative of a temporary protest vote for new alternative and radical party options or if deeper political subcultures are forming, particularly concerning the drastic electoral increases in radical right support. While available quantitative electoral data and larger youth-based reports were used to compare and solidify findings, my research is based on a mixed-methods qualitative approach. In this way I was not only able to analyze trends beyond the statistical data but it also allowed for topics, narratives and trends previously unidentified to develop.

Among various qualitative methods I found political socialization most fit for a multi-variable approach despite the fact that it is rarely used for analysing more than one or two agents. Political socialization is also most often used to analyze youth development relating to civil participation and various influencing agents behind partisanship development. Political socialization is, by nature, very interdisciplinary, combining a wide arena for methodological approaches including psychological, sociological, anthropological and political theories. My own research approach is based in political science and sociology, analyzing the nature of political culture and activism among the youth in Hungary. This qualitative approach combines the structural analysis of political parties and social movements with political socialization theory analyzing the potential political influences of family, education and media. Analyses and conclusions are based on findings from my research in combination with existing data, relevant media sources, political polls and statistics.
Field research consisted of a six-month period in Hungary between March and September 2011, as well as various trips to Hungary before and after my fieldwork for major political events and protests. Research in Hungary was divided between three locations: Budapest, Debrecen and Miskolc (seen in Figure 2.1). These cities were chosen due to their size, significance and differing political cores. Larger Hungarian cities were of greater value for my research for more prevalent political activism and larger youth populations residing in these areas.

**Figure 2.1: Political Map of Hungary**

In this political map of Hungary the three cities I conducted research in are shown. Budapest is in the centre of the orange region. Miskolc is in the Northeastern region colored purple and Debrecen is located in the Eastern region colored pink.

The majority of the research time was spent in Budapest due to its central position as the capitol as well as the political epicenter of Hungary. Budapest is the

---

55 A list of relevant events attended are given in Appendix 3.
largest city in Hungary with a population around 1.7 million. It has the highest number of universities and colleges of higher education creating a broad population of young, educated individuals within my cohort range. While Budapest is considered, and electorally defined, as more liberal than the rest of the country I chose my other two locations to contrast the possible liberal biases found in Budapest. Debrecen is the second largest city in Hungary with a population of around 200 thousand located in Eastern Hungary. Debrecen contrasts Budapest in that it has been a longstanding Fidesz bastion. The mayor of Debrecen, Lajos Kósa, has been a strong Fidesz figure and has remained undefeated as mayor since 1998. The annual Fidelitas Congress 2011 was held in Debrecen, symbolic of the strong Fidesz youth-base in the region, which I was also able to attend. Debrecen also has a large central university, providing a flourishing youth population. For these reasons Debrecen was chosen as the second base for research.

In order to target the radical right subculture more directly my third research location was Miskolc, conducting interviews and attending Jobbik’s youth summer camp. Networking with Jobbik youth followers in Budapest proved relatively difficult compared with the openness of Miskolc and Debrecen-based Jobbik followers who felt less marginalized in these cities. This was particularly true of Miskolc. Miskolc is the fourth largest city in Hungary with a population of around 170 thousand located in

---


the northeastern region of Hungary.\textsuperscript{61} Previously an industrial city, Miskolc has suffered from economic depression and is now a stronghold for the radical right with some of the highest Jobbik-supporting exit polls. Fieldwork within these three locations consisted of in-depth, semi-structured interviews as well as focus groups and participant observation of relevant events and meetings.

2.1.1 Interviews, Focus Groups and Participant Observation

Interviews are important in acquiring deeper information and nuances that the format of surveys and focus groups are less able to achieve (Gubrium and Hosteign 2001). They are also useful in grasping points of view and personal accounts that can be expanded on through dialogue (Burgess 1982, Legard et. al. 2003). Previous youth political socialization research has used in-depth interviews to gauge levels of trust in civil and political institutions (Csepeli and Örkény 1997), interpret why young people join political parties (Bruter and Harrison 2009), and understand the process of how people reason when making political decisions (Herbert 1985). Within the context of my research, seventy in-depth, semi-structured interviews were held with politically active young Hungarians as well as relevant experts and researchers within Hungary.

The ‘politically active’ criteria for interviewees was that they were active in some form of political participation either by traditional means, such as voting and/or party membership, or by alternative forms of political participation, such as attending social movements or taking part in politically relevant demonstrations, protests or events. Interviews and focus groups were conducted primarily in public settings, such as cafés or within university grounds. In certain situations interviews were held at an individual’s home, based on their preference and my own comfort levels. Interviews

and focus groups were produced in a manner to best allow participants the opportunity to express personal opinions and feelings on relevant topics developing their political knowledge and reflections throughout the conversation while avoiding leading questions on a given topic.62 Interviews and focus groups were often tape-recorded, unless objected to by the interviewee, and notes were taken to supplement each interview. A list of research participants is given in Appendix 4, showing the age, political alignment and region of interviewees. Specialist interviewees with political analysts, professors, journalists and political representatives are also listed.

Focus groups were used to get a broad sense of political thought processes among various political alignments. While they were less useful in retrieving detailed information, they did map general trends and sentiments of particular subcultures. Focus groups between two to six people were arranged with politically like-minded individuals who knew each other either socially or through political outlets such as protest groups or political youth organizations. Focus groups held during my field research included members of the Socialist Youth Academy, liberal journalists, members of the Jobbik Youth organization (Jobbik IT), alternative lifestyle activists and Fidelitas members. Participants in focus groups were subsequently asked if they would be willing to also participate in an in-depth interview at a later date. A majority of focus group participants agreed to further research contribution and were subsequently interviewed.

Despite ensuring focus-group participants held similar political partisanship it became quickly apparent that participants did not feel fully comfortable expressing their own political thought processes or experiences in front of their peers. This is

62 The loose semi-structured format of interviews and example questions are given in Appendix 4.
potentially a cultural layover from the parent generation, raised under communism, where political opinions were kept private, only discussed within the family or among very close friends. Often focus groups would result in one person would dominate the conversation if particularly strong opinions were held and subsequently other participants would revert to nodding in agreement. For this reason I found interviews more useful for getting responses on specific questions, however, focus groups remained important not only for assessing general trends in the initial stages of my research as well as sources for networking for later interviews.

Interviewees and focus group participants were recruited primarily through three pathways: 1) by using contacts I had previously made in Hungary and using these contacts to spider-web (or snowball) connections within their social circles, 2) by targeting politically inclined youth groups and social movement coordinators through their websites and Facebook profiles and 3) by recruiting activists met at political and protest events. Participants in interviews and focus groups were found initially through certain contacts that had been maintained from my first stay in Hungary during my Masters in 2009-2010. For my Masters thesis I had already begun interviews on ‘youth culture’ in Hungary and, as such, had networked with young university-based Hungarians at Corvinus University in Budapest. These initial contacts varied in political support, although support for Green party LMP was somewhat over represented in the initial cohorts. This is partly due to the liberal bias in Budapest as well as the fact that LMP had, in part, been formed within a Special

---

63 The limited trust in non-family based networks is discussed further in Chapter 5.
College at Corvinus. However, some previous contacts had also been Fidesz and Jobbik supporters.

The majority of these previous contacts were willing to help me recruit participants from within their friends groups and in some cases offered to introduce me to the more politically active individuals they knew from either party membership or political events they had attended. This ‘spider-webbing’ was used with each individual that participated in interviews and/or focus groups. After interviews and focus groups were conducted I verbally asked if anyone could email me individuals that they knew of that would be willing to participate. I followed this up with personal emails one or two days after interviews to again request any further contacts. In many cases individuals would provide a name and contact details of a friend, relative or colleague.

Recruiting participants also took place by using the internet to contact political youth groups and social movements via official websites and Facebook groups. In this capacity I was able to directly message specific activist youth groups which included:

- local factions of political parties’ youth organizations, pro and anti-government protest movement organizers and student protest groups.
- Local factions of Fidelitas and Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat (both Fidesz youth organizations), LMP, MSZP and Jobbik youth groups were contacted.

Online networking was particularly useful in Debrecen and Miskolc, where I had little or no previous contacts. Lastly, some interviewees were recruited while attending political demonstrations and events. On a few occasions I approached organizers or active participants and was able to exchange details, asking to meet on a later date for interviewing.

---

64 Special Colleges are discussed in-depth in Chapter 6.
Due to the ‘politically active’ cohort my research focuses on there is a slightly in-built bias towards a sample that is much more active compared with, perhaps, the general youth population in Hungary. However, my aim was target youth that were engaging with the political system in different ways. Although previous estimates of youth participation in elections are estimated at around 67%, this percentage is likely higher when including young Hungarians participating in other forms of activism. Grasroots social movements have become more common place in Hungary in recent years, highly attended by the youth, and with the recent increase in youth votes supporting radical right party Jobbik some estimate up to 80% of young Hungarians engage in some form political activism. My definition of political activism, as explained previously, is also quite broad. Many interviewees had very little advanced activist experience but had perhaps voted or attended an event at some points.

Interviews were conducted in English or Hungarian, depending on whose second language skills proved better. On two occasions a politically neutral acquaintance was used as a translator who had been briefed on the nature of my research and the necessary conduct during an interview. This was to ensure an in-depth understanding of certain key specialist interviews. Notes were taken during all focus groups and in-depth interviews. In most cases interactions were also recorded to ensure translating and quotation accuracy, except on the few circumstances when interviewees were uncomfortable with electronic recording devices.

Within the in-depth interview process politically active young people were asked a progression of questions concerning their views and thoughts on personal

---

66 Discussed in a panel session at the ‘Summer University’ put on by LMP (August 2011).
experiences, memories and relations to the various agents of political socialization targeted in this thesis. The process of questioning was semi-structured in order to allow interviewees to bring in related topics, give personal anecdotes and develop their ideas. Most often youth interviews began with questioning their relations with the least controversial agent of socialization, mainly their upbringing and familial memories of political events and dialogues. Interviewees were asked to what extent they felt they knew family members’ political orientations, the nature of political dialogue in the home and their first memories of politics. On the topic of education interviewees were asked to discuss their secondary and university experience in terms of political efficacy, awareness of teachers’ political alignment and the openness of political dialogue and opinions within a campus setting. Media questions were more directly about media usage and opinions about various media outlets within Hungary, tracking perceived biases within the media. Grassroots social movements were discussed in terms of personal experience, willingness to participate in various movements and thoughts on current events. Political party preferences and opinions were generally asked last after the interviewee felt more comfortable with conversing. Direct topics on political parties are often a controversial subject matter in Hungary. Voting, participation and party preferences were usually divulged in the final stage of questioning.

Fifteen interviews were conducted with Hungarian specialists, mainly sociopolitical experts and university professors in the field of politics, civics and history, four of which were also youth cohorts. In specialist interviews I was able to

---

67 Appendix 5 gives the semi-structured interview format used in my research.
68 The interview sample spans across the political spectrum with slightly more respondents supporting Fidesz, LMP and Jobbik and fewer in support of other political parties. This was expected since these three parties have the largest bodies of youth support.
get a sense of larger political changes affecting the youth sector as well as how professors handle sensitive topics of history and politics within the classroom. There are increasingly high levels of radical right sentiments and anti-Semitism among university students, particularly taking courses in political science and history (Kovács 1996, Vásárhelyi 2002, Nagy and Róna 2011). My hypothesis was that either these trends are disseminated through the education system by professors in particular fields or that there are certain contentious topics that are avoided, causing a gap in knowledge of political history to be filled by other agents of socialization.69

Participant observation was used for researching the activities of grassroots social movements as well as the inner workings of political youth parties.70 This was most relevant for my structural analysis of movements and parties. I attended youth-based political events across the political spectrum. As seen in Chapter 2, with regards to observing political youth camps, participant observation was beneficial in mapping the structure and style of parties and movements and how they mobilized. It was also useful in profiling attendees to get a sense of age, gender and socioeconomic trends. Participant observation was also used to track symbols, slogans and subculture traits within movements and parties. This was especially useful looking at the distinct development of a radical right subculture in Hungary in recent years. On certain occasions an insider accompanied me to an event or camp, usually in order to gain initial access. Insiders tended to be an individual that had previously been interviewed and had offered admission of attendance. Appendix 3 gives a list of relevant events, speeches and youth camps attended for participant observation research.

69 Discussed in-depth in the chapter on Education as an agent of political socialization.
70 See Appendix 3 for a list and description of demonstrations, events and youth camps attended for participant observation in Hungary.
Data collected during my field research was analyzed extensively, tracking trends on different socializing agents and stratifying results, often along partisan lines. These trends and results are discussed in the following chapters. The next section discusses political socialization as well as social movement theories and research in relation to my framework.

2.2 POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH

Political socialization is an interdisciplinary field researching how values, beliefs, attitudes, behaviors and opinions are transmitted to the mass public. Seminally developed by Herbert Hyman (1959), political socialization draws from a variety of disciplines and subjects to analyze the process by which political values are developed in the youth by institutions. Specifically defined, it is the ‘process by which individuals acquire knowledge, skills and dispositions that enable them to participate as more or less effective members of groups and the society’ (Brim 1966; p 2). This includes how citizens learn their social role within their given environment from a young age onwards (Gross, Mason and McEachern 1958). Political socialization theory assumes that socialization experienced earlier in life will have a more lasting effect on attitudes and choices latter in life (Jennings and Niemi 1981, Fendrich and Turner 1989, Hooghe and Stolle 2003, Sears and Levy 2003, Galston 2001, Jennings and Stoker 2002). This process is two-fold. On the one hand it is assumed that experiences earlier in life will affect beliefs and attitudes more strongly than experiences later in life, and on the other hand it is assumed that networks established earlier in life are made more easily and will be stronger and more accessible than

71 Socialization is a complex and multifaceted field of research incorporating macro-system values, socialization or the resistance to it, political identity, community environment, discourse analysis and political identity (Torney-Purta 2002).
networks created later in life (Hooghe and Stolle 2003). This is not to say that attitudinal changes do not occur later in life due to employment (Kohn and Schooler 1982) or family transitions (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2001), but the primary networks of political attitude are developed during early phases of the life cycle (Sigel 1989, Hooghe and Stolle 2003).

Political socialization is relatively straightforward as a theory; however, as the basis for a research structure there is a large amount of variation. Often researchers have used qualitative methods to analyze the impact and inner-workings of one socializing agent in country or region-specific analyses: looking at family patterns (Chaffee et. al. 1973), the socializing effects of media (Chaffee 1997), the socialization of youth civic participation and civic education (Dudley and Gitelson 2002, Gimpel et. al. 2003, Hooghe and Stolle 2003, Letki 2004) and the developmental process of youth political participation (Hooghe et. al. 2004, Pacheco 2008). A limited scope of research has compared the impact of multiple agents (Jennings and Stoker 2002). Some research has previously analyzed the familial and media influences on political socialization as the television and internet become increasingly prevalent in daily lives (Grossbart et. al. 2002, Horowitz 2005). In fact, the only full multi-agent analysis of political socialization which has encompassed all the agents I am currently researching took place during the communist era under the strict centralized and totalitarian monitoring systems put in place primarily between 1950 through the 1970s (Clawson 1973, Macintyre 1993).

The above-mentioned research has all used a combination of qualitative methods, from large-scale surveys to in-depth interviews and focus groups. Without the scope to be able to fund a nation-wide survey, I felt that focus groups, interviews and participant observation provided the most robust framework for analyzing
political socialization trends in Hungary. In fact, after having completed my field work I realized that the answers I was seeking, about personal experiences and the influences of various institutions, were better answered through in-depth interviews and participant observation. While my research focused on youth activists as my primary cohort there an implied secondary focus on the generational divide between the current youth cohort and the parent generation. Section 2.2.2 discusses the political socialization experience of the parent generation in Hungary as a background comparison to contemporary processes.

Thus, this research adds a valuable multi-agent analysis to the larger body of political socialization research, looking at the five primary agents of socialization and their effects on youth partisanship and political ideology development. This is of particular use in the Hungarian post-communist context with a rapidly changing political landscape, largely shaped by youth voters and activists supporting alternative political parties and movements. Political socialization offers a useful lens for studying trends in youth politics particularly the rise in radical right sentiments among the youth population in Hungary.

2.2.1 Early to Modern Political Socialization Theory and Research

Early theories of political socialization in the 1950’s and 1960’s stated that youth participation on a civil and political level was the result of internalizing dominant social norms, which led to societal integration (Eisenstadt 1956, Coleman 1961, Goslin 1969, Parsons 1952). Along these lines, learning and internalizing social roles created comprehension of the role expected of an individual and the status they expected to be recognized from others (Goslin 1969, Gross et al 1958) creating the

72 The format for how questions were developed in a semi-structured and in-depth manner for interviews, and a list of events attended for participant observation are given in Appendices 2 and 3.
political and cultural structure of a society. Politically speaking, socialization on these terms is the transmission of political beliefs and attitudes from generation to generation. These are maintained or changed by shifts in the political, social and economic environment at community, national, and international levels (Almond and Verba 1963, Gimpel et al 2003, Owen 2008). A large body of early research focused on youth interactions with authoritarian and democratic personality structures (Laswell 1930 and 1948, Lane 1959 and 1962, Greenstein 1975) as well as children’s perceptions of authority figures (Easton and Dennis 1965, Jaros 1967). Although early theories have remained strong in political socialization research, these foundational concepts have a tendency to emphasize political influence from the political system, placing the youth as a passive subject, accepting values dictated by the status quo (Hartman and Trnka 1985).

More recent theories have developed active models with new dimensions of socialization taken into account such as media, technology, peer groups and education, giving a greater scope to the study of political culture. In modern political socialization research more interactive agents of socialization are given credence, such as family relations (Greenstein 1965, Niemi and Jennings 1991, Horowitz 2005, Bruter and Harrison 2009), educational institutions (Torney-Purta 2002, Kovács 1999), peer networks (Bruter and Harrison 2009), political organizations (Hockenos 1993, Hooghe and Stolle 2005, Johnson and Reynolds 2007), and the media (Chaffee 1997, Horowitz 2005). These agents of socialization often have varying levels of

---

73 It should be noted that early political socialization theories were based almost entirely in Western Democratic case studies, primarily in America and the United Kingdom.
74 To define political culture I use the definition laid out by Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (1965) considering it as a ‘system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions’ and not ‘what is happening in the world of politics, but what people believe about those happenings’ (Pye and Verba 1965, p.516). These beliefs can be empirically or emotionally based.
influence depending on national and cultural contexts.

Early political socialization research done in the 1950s and 1960s portrays the family as the primary source of socialization. In this model children base their values and political ideas on parental interaction and discussions at home (Greenstein 1965, Hyman 1959, Jennings and Niemi 1968). This remains a large part of youth socialization tracking the relation between parent-child interaction and potential political participation (Brady et. al. 1995, Gimpel et. al. 2003, Plutzer 2002, Verba et. al. 2005). Some still hold that the home environment is the most important factor in youth socialization as the first political resource an individual is exposed to. These resources include parental discussions, media materials and information technologies present in the home (Brady et. al. 1995, Verba et. al. 2005). Research has also shown that family-based socialization is intrinsically tied to party membership (Cross and Young 2008, Bruter and Harrison 2009).

Although parental influence might be strong in earlier years, some predict that parental influence is eroded as the individual matures (Niemi and Jennings 1991, Sapiro 2004). As a young person comes in contact with other, sometimes more alluring, agents of socialization like peer groups or academic environments, previous political ideologies may be undermined and replaced (Niemi and Jennings 1991). Generally it is accepted that parents who create a more open environment, either by valuing independent thinking or providing media resources, have a greater influence on their child’s political attitude and knowledge (Chaffee McLeod and Wackman

---

75 Studies by Cross and Young (2008) showed that in research on Europe youth members were twice as likely to join a political party if a parent was already a member and with party members age 25 and younger 50% said that they were recruited into the party by a family member. Looking at six European countries and fifteen political parties (including Hungary and political party Fidesz) Bruter and Harrison (2009) found that on average 53.4% of members said a family had inspired them to join. Only 9% said that the organization alone had influenced them.
1973, McLeod and Chaffee 1972). Research into the link between family environment and political socialization has been done primarily by qualitative interviews and opinion-based surveys (Bruter and Harrison 2009, Cross and Young 2008, Torney-Purta 2002, Niemi and Jennings 1991). Broad research shows that intergenerational value transmission is weakening with increased self-direction and individualism among the youth, leaving room for influences from other socializing agents (Slomczynski and Shabad 1997).

**Education** is a key tool in political socialization, analyzed in Chapter 6. Its utility as a mechanism to train the population according to national standards, including political and civic values, makes it a potentially powerful socializing tool (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Sears 1975). Civic education is highly correlated with political knowledge and has the ability to develop increased civic participation (Hyman et. al. 1975, Delli et. al. 1996, Nie et. al. 1996, Dudley and Gitelson 2002). The ability to teach democratic norms and values is of particular interest in the post-communist region where Western institutions are influencing national curriculums and structures within new democracies, eager to produce core democratic values (Barany and Vogyes 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996, Slomczynski and Shabad 1998, Sapiro 2004).

Adolescence and early adulthood, focused on in this thesis, is considered an especially important developmental period for learning civic orientation and developing norms for political participation (Galston 2001). In research done in twenty-eight countries, the Civic Education Study (CES) showed that the classroom environment has a large impact on personal expression and political perspectives (Torney-Purta 2004). Civic courses introduced into classrooms make up between a 4% and 11% impact on raising political efficacy (Niemi and Junn 1998). The
classroom environment is also effective in giving students information and awareness about social and political organizations available to them, preparing them with skills needed to interpret politics (Torney-Purta 2002, Niemi and Junn 1998).

Of the politically socializing agents discussed in this thesis the media is the most fluctuating and ambiguous of the agents for its dual nature as an agent within its own accord as well as a political tool, used by party politics. ‘Media’ here includes print media, news television, information radio programs and online news portals, analyzed further in Chapter 7. Earlier studies on the connection between media and political socialization remain focused on political efficacy rather than partisanship. Research shows that young people who pay closer attention to news media are more likely to discuss it at home, developing a higher political consciousness and active network (Pingree et al 1975). Television and Internet-based media are becoming the principal source of media socialization for many young people in developed democracies causing a new line of political socialization research (Chaffee and Yang 1990, Chaffee et al 1997). Computers, televisions and cell phones have revolutionized access to information on local and international levels creating a ‘total disclosure medium’ (Postman 1983 – p. 81, Buckingham 2000).

Newer online interactive media outlets also blur the distinction between media and social network. Increased media outlets and the Internet have allowed for newer, less conventional political participation; utilizing lobbying, forums, recruitment sites, networking and fundraising online (Norris 2002, Horowitz 2005). Linked to technological advances, social media has also changed how quickly young members

---

76 Television news and papers are considered by some to be the largest distributor of political knowledge and education (Chaffee 1997). Television, and arguably now the Internet, is a bridge to politics depicting real life politics and conveying concepts learned in school (Chaffee and Yang 1990).
can align and interact to create political identities through devices such as YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, and blogging (Owen 2008, Bennet 2008), relevant to Hungary’s blossoming mass mobilization culture. Since the abolition of media censorship laws in post-communist countries new television channels, newspapers, online news and forum outlets have become increasingly prevalent for youth information retrieval (Richardson 1998, Horowitz 2005).

While my thesis targets five primary agents of socialization there are a myriad of other socializing forces, which have been targets in other research. Other agents of political socialization not dealt with directly in this thesis include religious belief systems (Searing et. al. 1973, Jelen and Wilcox 1998, Davidson-Schmich et. al. 2002), the military (Beck 1977, Marshall 1998, Sapiro 2004, Gheciu 2005), non-governmental organizations (Risse and Sikkink 1999, Warleigh 2002, Sapiro 2004, Gheciu 2005, Forbig 2005), local communities (Gimpel et al 2003, Campbell 2006) and labor unions (Volgyes 1975, Klandermans 2011). These agents are, however, of less relevance for the Hungarian youth case study. With regards to religiosity in Hungary only 45% of Hungarians report to believe in god (Eurobarometer 72, 2010) with around 12% of the population reporting that they attend church (Manchin 2004). Among the youth religious participation and attendance is even lower. Up to two-thirds of young adults declare themselves as atheists or non-believers (Keil 2011). Labor unions are also perhaps less relevant to the youth cohort with very low youth subscription (Serrano and Waddington 2000, Pleyers 2005). With no large military presence, mandatory enrolment or international threat to Hungary the military also

77 Television access has changed media culture in post-Communist areas. When censorship laws were taken down in Poland in the early 1990’s, 24 new commercial television stations were created. Poland is now Europe’s 5th largest television market (Horowitz 2005) with Poles watching an average of 67 more hours of television a year compared to other European countries (Richardson 1998).
plays a less insignificant role for youth socialization, although paramilitary organizations belonging to the radical right are discussed further in Chapter Seven with regards to grassroots social movements. NGOs are also present in Hungary but have little direct effect on the cohort in question. There is very little institutional trust in NGOs with a typically low turn out for membership and involvement in Hungary (Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011).

In the original planning of my thesis peer networks, or social circles, were meant to be a primary agent of socialization I was analyzing. As my research progressed I quickly realized that dedicating a chapter to peer networks was highly problematic for a number of reasons. During interviews an overwhelming majority of young Hungarians said that they did not ever discuss politics with friends at school or casually. The only time young politically active Hungarians felt that they could talk about politics, if they wanted to, was during activist events, either for a political party or within a social movement.

The lack of social circle socialization was best exemplified during initial focus groups during my field research, discussed further in the second part of this chapter. Despite focus groups being constructed around like-minded partisanship, often created from within a friend groups, participants were hesitant and often unwilling to discuss personal political sentiments and opinions, other than general complaints or broad opinions, in front of their peers. For this reason, instead of developing peer networks as its own agent of socialization, social political interactions are discussed in relation to political youth organizations (discussed in Chapter 3), grassroots social movement (Chapter 4) and educational environments (Chapter 6).
2.2.2 Political Socialization Research in Hungary and CEE: Socialism to Present

This section serves as a review of pre and post-communist research analyzing various agents of socialization as well as trends in civil society since this is the main focus of much youth-based literature incorporating CEE countries. Political socialization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) before 1989 was highly monitored compared to Western democracies. Similar to other communist satellite states, political socialization of the youth was centrally organized and studied by the state. With an intricate centralized system, the government monitored and institutionalized political socialization within the education system and social sectors to enforce and maintain Soviet ideologies and culture (Csepeli and Örkény 1992). Among the Soviet satellite states governments controlled the media, educational institutions and public spaces leading to a population that developed a strong distrust for those outside immediate family and close social circles and a general withdrawal from the public sphere (Koralewicz and Wnuk-Lipinski 1989, Tarkowska and Tarkowski 1991, Slomczynski and Shabad 1999).

The goal was to ensure that the primary socializing agent was the Communist State, working through the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP). Although informal agents of socialization played a role in child development such as peer groups and family, the Soviet powers did what they could to inculcate the Communist agenda into all formal forms agents of socialization including media, literature, youth groups and culture (Clawson 1973, Volgyes 1975). Despite large-scale efforts, Communist socialization was unsuccessful in that the youth failed full political and

---

78 The Communist Party in Hungary created mandatory youth groups called the Young Pioneers’ and the ‘Communist Youth League’ to insert political ideology from social networks from childhood to adulthood. Political command of TV, radio and newspaper publications ensured media control. Publications of books, what films and theatre pieces were shown, and art was also censored to ensure control of formal agents of socialization (Volgyes 1975).
ideological indoctrination by the Soviet ideology (White 1977) counteracted by the impenetrable private sphere of family and primary support groups (Macintyre 1993, Siemienska 2002). This is not to say that communist rule did not leave its mark. Lasting imprints have been left on many facets of life in Hungary, however ideological indoctrination was far from successful. The changing grassroots landscape during Soviet rule also altered how the state viewed and treated the youth. In post-WWII through the 1960’s, young people were seen as active participants in the plan to rebuild the state (Kuhar 2005). The youth were well integrated into societal programs and agendas. In the 1960’s through mid 1970’s this changed as political suspicion of youth intellectuals increased with student movements leading to an increase in independence in the 1980’s. The youth became a symbol of societal rejuvenators as active integrators of change (Mitev 1982, Mahler 1983).

The Kádár administration (ruled by János Kádár from 1956 until 1989) was reliant on continued economic expansion in Hungary, which sustained through the 1970’s but began to stagnate through the 1980s (Tőkés 1996, Kornai 1996). Political stability was maintained by the Kádár administration through developing an apolitical culture, separating people from the political sphere. In terms of socialization this meant that the Hungarian Socialist Party explicitly socialized citizens away from political engagement. This was managed through state-controlled media and education (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). While the education system still taught communist ideologies, the censored media and public discourse aimed to keep the public disengaged. Politics were for politicians and maintaining a passive stance towards politics was paralleled by a lenient second economy and increased national-

---

79 There is also significant evidence that the lack of information about non-communist topics had a greater influence in causing counter-questioning against the state compared with political socialization directly from the state (Macintyre 1993).
cultural freedoms, developing Hungary’s unique ‘goulash communism’ (Kornai 1996, Nyyssönen 2006). Young Hungarians in the period of political transition were the first cohorts to develop their own, albeit limited, political culture and profile, engaging in public and political life in formal and personal ways without the same level of political interference experienced by previous generations (Kuhar 2005).

From the 1960s till the end of socialism in 1990 the demobilization strategy of the Kádár government socialized citizens towards a general disinterest of politics through low civic competence combined with centralized media outlets. The family unit was the only counter agent to bureaucratic institutions (Szabó 1991). Supporting individual autonomy even internal family communications around political topics diminished during the Kádár Era (Kéri 1987, Szabó 1987). Alienating citizens from political processes and information outlets decreased general political dialogue in the private sphere. However, the family was still the most important agent for alternative political discourse.

The Soviet system even attempted to control youth social networks by developing mandatory after school programs. Civil activities were mandatory for the youth under the communist system (Zasavsky and Brym 1978). Society building was communicated most heavily in mandatory ‘scouting’ youth organizations developed outside of school to promote the political system. Scouts under the age of fourteen were enrolled in the Young Pioneers (Uttoros) and those aged fourteen to twenty-eight were enlisted in the Communist Youth League (KISZ) with the task to ‘educate young people in the communist spirit’ (Volgyes 1975, p.10). Good participation was rewarded with incentives such as trips around Hungary. Youth programs such as these blurred the line between politics, education and social life for the youth living under communism, something that Hungary’s radical right is reinventing today. Memories
of communist youth programs are still vivid for young adults that were in primary school through the transition.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{Educating} a generation of Socialist youths was a top priority in the political agenda (Kürti 2002, Volgyes 1975). The education system was transformed through class-based de-stratification to bring education to the masses in a process of positive discrimination against the previously elite academic system (Szelényi 1998). To create a classless working population with homogenized support of the communist ideology the government installed free schooling and made education available to children from peasant and working-class families (Benda 1983, Ferge 1979, Bencédy 1982, Simkus and Andorka 1982, Szelényi 1998).\textsuperscript{81} A strong socialist political ideology was added to most facets of the curriculum in an attempt to decrease the intergenerational transference values and limit the socializing influence of the family (Aschaffenburg 1998, Simkus and Andorka 1982, Volgyes 1975). Universities had tight curricula with very few extracurricular options, making higher education more like an advanced extension of secondary school. Each university was introduced with a new center of communist control monitoring the social origin and any political activism of every student (Murray 1960).\textsuperscript{82} Administration aimed at a ‘collective amnesia’ editing history books and public discourse to omit controversial political pasts such as the 1956 Hungarian uprising against the Soviets. Remaining politically passive was exchanged for being left alone and receiving benefits from the

\textsuperscript{80} Although post-1956 education focused less on Sovietization in favour of a stronger Hungarian orientation there were still Soviet influences in academic and scouting exercises. Communist scouting programs were still active in Hungary up until transition, teaching communist songs and taking the youth on politically driven camping trips (see: Hungary Country Studies).

\textsuperscript{81} In 1949 school fees were abolished, dorms and cafeterias were created and admissions processes started favoring peasant and working-class children. By the 1950’s it was required that half of the students in schools had to be of peasant or working class families (Szelényi and Aschaffenburg 1993).

\textsuperscript{82} In 1956 university students took up arms against the Soviets in what is now known as the 1956 Revolution, changing the government’s tactic and view of the youth and the role of education.

The **media** was used to promoting cynicism, cultivate support for social individualism and atomize people as separate form politics (Hankiss 1989, Bruszt and Simon 1994, Körösény 1999). As part of liberal reforms within the Kádár Era, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, more autonomy was given to media editors and there was partial decentralizing of the press. Hungary had less rigid media regulation compared to elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, allowing for a slightly broader, albeit limited, scope for sociopolitical content and debate (Lánczi and O’Neil 1996). Changes during this time period also increased the circulation of certain national newspapers, almost doubling news availability within more provincial areas (Arpad 2004). Although outwardly the government showed willingness to decentralize, nationwide the press was still a state-run apparatus with restricted access to alternative or oppositional views. The monopoly of free press by the Hungarian state suppressed information about oppositional movements and smaller uprisings of the time, helping the government distance the people from national politics creating political apathy (Szabó 1996). The media was used as a political tool for culture control, however, only a small percentage of those exposed became committed Marxist-Leninists (Volgyes 1975, Wittenberg 2006).

The highly centralized and monitored system of control over socializing agents was stringent until 1980s when the government’s stimulus plans proved to be

---

83 It remains difficult to have a full understanding of the level of outward contention states under Communism due to the filtered media. Countries like Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have very few records from press at the time showing any controversial events or movements that might have been against the greater powers at the time (Szabó 1996).

84 Hungary was considered one of the least affected by Soviet political socialization through media. While some countries like East Germany, Romania and Czechoslovakia had highly restrictive media outlets; these regulations were comparably more lax in places like Hungary and Poland. Media messages through television and papers supported passive more than active support of the political system (Volgyes 1975).
economically unsustainable. Consistent figures of economic gain could no longer be maintained. The government-citizen relation of economic well being exchanged for civil passivity was no longer stable and it was at this point the government began negotiating the country’s transition towards democracy. Since transition policy-making has shifted the youth into a passive if not forgotten position with few directives aimed at youth development or political engagement (Chuprov et. al. 2001, Kovacheva 2005). This is partially explained by the large-scale decentralization projects of democratic transition between 1990 and 1998, directing very little centralized funding towards ‘youth projects’ relying on increasingly monetary distribution which has led to significant urban-rural divides (Roker and Eden 2002, Kovacheva 2000a). The focus away from youth-directed initiatives has also affected the youth socialization research more generally across Central and Eastern Europe, moving away from state-monitored research.

Contemporary youth-based political socialization studies in Central and Eastern Europe are primarily incorporated within larger research projects comparing the post-communist democracies with Western Europe. These studies most often track levels of democratic efficacy (Schwartz, Bardi and Bienchi 1996, Torney-Purta 2004, Baytchinska 2008, Bruter and Harrison 2009). Trying to measure levels of democratic consolidations and success in socializing democratic practices has been a priority for research on the youth population in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the largest concerns behind such studies is that traditional agents of socialization, such as family, school and mass media, may not be adequate resources to instill the post-communist youth population with democratic values (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, Chaffee 1997, 85

85 The newer youth-based parties and grassroots social movements discussed in this thesis are changing political space for the youth, providing tangible political outlets for young people as well as forcing political attention back onto the youth cohort.

The new youth generation is growing up without having lived through the Communist era while at the same time growing up without a stable tradition of democracy to set an example (Horowitz 2005). Many young people across Europe, but particularly in CEE countries, feel they have little or no power in influencing their economic and political situations and have become disillusioned by the political process (Touraine 1999, Pleyers 2005, Kovecheva 2005). Concern remains that the older generation, socialized under a socialist system, is not equipped to teach about democratic institutions or value sets (Chaffee and Jackson-Beeck 1977, Niemi and Hepburn 1995, Horowitz 2005). This is an increasing concern as right wing and radical right political outlets in Hungary offer historical revisionism and non-traditional forms of political participation that are often more appealing to young citizens (Mareš 2010).86

Modern socialization and citizenship theory depicts citizenship as an active, rather than passive socializing process. Political socialization has the ability to encompass a broad spectrum of influencing agents. How citizenship is defined is no longer limited to interaction with political institutions (Delanty 2000, Kovacheva 2005), encompassing participation within a variety of public and private networks. Volunteering, community involvement and a wide range of activities aimed at influencing policies, practices and environment are all relevant forms of citizen participation (Roker and Eden 2002).87 Political participation studies have shown that

86 Jobbik, as the strongest radical right wing political party, currently draws in significant youth supporter electorally. Taking into consideration the Bulgarian Ataka, the Serbian Radical Party, the Greater Romanian Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party in Russia, Jobbik is unique in its youth appeal and organizational management as a radical-right party (Mareš 2010).

87 Chisolm and Kovacheva (2002) outline three forms of political participation by contemporary youths; 1) activity in institutional politics such as elections, campaigns, and party membership, 2) new
involvement and knowledge of civic and political practices earlier in life leads to a greater likelihood of participation and involvement within these practices later in life. In modern political socialization research the primary agents of socialization are depicted as family relations (Greenstein 1965, Niemi and Jennings 1991, Horowitz 2005, Bruter and Harrison 2009), the education system (Torney-Purta 2002, Kovács 1999), social groups and grassroots networks (Bruter and Harrison 2009), political organizations (Hockenos 1993, Hooghe and Stolle 2005, Johnson and Reynolds 2007), and the media (Chaffee 1997, Horowitz 2005) all targeted in this study. Political parties have been addressed mainly with reference to their structure and style in socializing strong youth support networks. Grassroots social movements are similarly dissected with regards to their organizational and horizontal structuring, taking on a unique format compared with more traditional agents of socialization like family, education and media.

While political socialization remains an under-researched process within CEE most post-communist political research analyzes successful democratic transition through levels of civic engagement. Measuring civil society by way of voting, volunteering and membership in civic organizations is considered a critical factor in ensuring that new democratic institutions remain intact (Dahl 1989, Barnes and Simon 1998, Putnam 2000, Krishna 2002, Paxton 2002, Juknevicius and Savicka 2003, Letki 2004, Savicka 2008). Socializing effects of community and civic organizations remain much lower in Central and Eastern Europe compared with  

social movements and participation like protests and demonstrations and lastly and 3) civic engagement expressed by community participation, volunteering and association memberships. The third form of participation, defined by Siurala (2000) as post-modern participation, is any participation that encompasses expression, emotions, aestheticism, or virtual participation. 

88 Numerous studies have concluded that participation in voting at the earliest eligible age (usually 18) leads to a much greater likelihood of participation throughout one’s life (Plutzer 2002, Hooghe and Stolle 2003).
Western democracies (see Figure 2.2). In the early 2000s Hungary had estimates of above average levels of citizen volunteering compared with Western Europe but these levels have decreased drastically between 2004 and 2010. Currently Hungary maintains the lowest levels of volunteering within Central and Eastern Europe, as seen in Figure 2.2.

**Figure 2.2: Citizen Involvement in Volunteering**

![Graph showing citizen involvement in volunteering]

Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of citizens who claimed to be involved in some form of volunteering either on a local, national or international level. This figure shows the Western European Average compared with various Central and Eastern European Union members.

Without developing democratic socializing agents to encourage civic participation young people are less willing to give up time to participate in their community or politics (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003, Kuhar 2005). In Hungary there have been politically-driven increases in civic participation during election times, particularly driven by right wing party, Fidesz, and the creation of localized

---

89 Hungary had an estimated 40% citizen volunteering in 2004 yet more recent studies show Hungary's volunteering efforts have dropped to 5.5%. See Figure 2.2 (Information from same report).

‘civic circles’ (discussed in Chapter 3). Hungary has witnessed increased political activism in the election years of 2002, 2006 and 2010 as seen by civic protests, demonstrations and event riots.\textsuperscript{91} Despite general optimism towards civil participation in new democracies, alternative forms of political participation, popular among the youth, are not always a ‘democratic phoenix’ (Sloam 2013), as seen by the mainstreaming of radical right values through grassroots social movements in Hungary (discussed in Chapter 4). Research to date remains too narrowly focused on civic participation, defined by volunteering and/or statistics on membership in local or national organizations (eg. sports teams, environmental groups or local volunteer groups). Political socialization offers a more intricate analysis of what is driving political activism and partisanship.

Education is also a key institutional agent in teaching democratic values and civic participation, under scrutiny by researchers looking at post-communist countries (Slomczynski and Shabad 1998, Torney-Purta 2002 and 2004). Research in Central and Eastern Europe shows mixed results concerning the effects of schooling and socialization towards democratic practices (Csepeli et. al. 1994, Fratczak-Rudnicka 1991). How knowledge imparted within the education system solidifies or contradicts knowledge imparted from other socializing agents often determines success levels, as seen by the failures of Soviet ideological socialization. Family and education-based socialization processes are most often seen as primary foundation-builders (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Sears 1975, Slomczynski and Shabad 1998).

In new democracies one of the main questions is how new democratic systems are able to preserve the past while institutionalizing new norms and political practices

\textsuperscript{91} As discussed, the political scandal of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2006 led to violent riots, not typically common in Hungary.
(Sapiro 2004). While some research shows positive correlations between civic education and political efficacy (Slomeczynski and Shabad 1998) others argue that young citizens are not responsive to political programs or ideological messages distributed through civic education programs and political parties (Heyns and Jasinska-Kania 1992, Jowitt 1992). However, there is currently no literature comparing multi-agent socializing effects within Central and Eastern European countries making it difficult to know broader correlations between socializing agents.

The theoretical model of political socialization underlying my research allowed for a flexible research structure so that my focus could shift slightly after initial focus groups, conducted to get a sense of general trends at the start of my research. In part my research design was pragmatic, allowing for a mixed methods approach that evolved slightly as my research continued. I used available quantitative data sets concerning elections and sociopolitical trends from Eurobarometers for data triangulations in combination with methodological triangulations between my focus groups, interviews and participant observations. Interviews proved the most useful, however, focus groups were essential in initial research and participant observation was key in analyzing the results espoused in interviews.

Having targeted five primary agents of socialization from background research into contemporary Hungarian political trends and youth activism I expected certain tendencies from each agent. My expectations for each agent are elaborated on in the chapters focusing on individual agents, however, generally I expected a continued strong familial influence, politically divided media outlets and polarizing political influences. I was initially less certain about the role played by secondary and higher education and the socializing impact of social groups. As mentioned, my initial
focus on social groups as a primary agent shifted into an analysis of grassroots social movements, which are having an increasing impact on political activism and partisan development in Hungary. As such, grassroots social movements took on its own body of research with distinct background theory and research.

2.3 GRASSROOTS SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY RESEARCH

This report adds social movements into political socialization research. Although social movements are not traditionally analyzed as agents of political socialization this report recognizes the increasing importance of movements as an influential factor in youth activism and partisanship building. Social movements in a Hungarian context are particularly relevant since post-communist Hungary has witnessed three movements turn into legitimate political parties. Fidesz, Jobbik, LMP and Together 2014 all began as grassroots social movements and transformed into political parties. Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP are especially relevant since they were founded as youth organizations and became youth-based parties. As such this section analyzes social movement theory and research and places it within the context of socialization theory as well as contextualizing social movements within Central and Eastern Europe.

Social movements have their own body of research across the United States and Western Europe as well as within Central and Eastern Europe. Before a Hungarian specific analysis of grassroots social movements this section serves as an introductory review of foundational and region-specific social movement research. As defined by David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, social movements are ‘collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and
authorities’ (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, p. 4). The foundation for engagement of social movements most often entails a political or cultural conflict (Wright 2004). Social movements typically lack formal membership or chairpersons and have the capability to overlap with other movements, cross borders and utilize decentralized forms of democracy, unlike the confines of formal political institutions (Gundelack 1984, van de Donk et. al. 2004). The grassroots element maintains that the movement is organized and run by common or ordinary individuals, in contrast to the leaders or elites of political parties or government bodies. In the context of researching social movements this thesis focuses less on early theories of collective behavior as random occurrences (Kornhauser 1959, Smelser 1962), relative deprivation causes (Gurr 1970) or rational choice theory weighing costs and benefits of participation (Olsen 1965, Chong 1991, Lichbach 1995).

Grassroots social movements are essential in researching modern political socialization in Hungary due to their increased usage in recent years. Social movements, similar to political parties, have become a center for emotive responses to politicized topics and are creating activists out of previously passive citizens. Analyzing social movements in Hungary, my research mainly looks at structural and resource mobilization (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) paralleled with the political context creating an environment for social movements to arise (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, Meyers 2004). Grassroots social movements taken into consideration in the Hungarian context include civil protest movements and grassroots organizations affiliating themselves with specific political parties. Social relations developed early on often effect political socialization carried into adulthood (Settle et. al. 2010) regardless of social status or economic background (Campbell et. al. 1954, Mutz and Mondak 1998, Beck et. al. 2002). Often times social network affiliations find
common values between familiar parallel socializing trends such as family or friend networks (Bruter and Harrison 2009).92

In the Hungarian case, politicized social networks are often created and solidified within grassroots social movements while avoided, or even prohibited, in many other traditionally socializing outlets.93 While grassroots social movements are not a typical agent in political socialization research current social movements are playing an active socializing role in Hungary. My research originally focused on social/friend networks (mentioned in Chapter 1) but as my research continued my findings showed strong activist networks, partisan development and politically-based friendship socialization within Hungarian social movements. Grassroots social movements are an interesting and necessary agent in that they can create political space and content while also developing activist social networks beyond the original issue-specific causes (discussed in Chapter 4).

2.3.1 Mobilization as Part of Socialization

*The boundaries between politics, cultural values, identity processes and collective self-reliance become fluid; politics becomes not only an instrumental activity for achieving concrete goals, but even at times an expressive and performance activity, entwined with the development of the self.* (Dahlgren 2004, p. xii)

What mobilizes people and how people mobilize as citizens are key questions with relation to socializing political participation and solidifying partisanships. Participation in social movements is an increasingly important aspect of citizenship as

---

92 The influence of social networks and related movements often influences party membership and many times parallels with family influences. In Surveys and interview across Europe 16.4% of party members mentioned friends as the reason for membership, 9.1% mentioned friends in addition to a family member and 7.3% as the sole reason for joining (Bruter and Harrison 2009).

93 Discussed with relevance to Chapter 6 and the limiting education environment with regards to political social discourse.
participation in ‘official politics’ declines (Dahlgren 2004). Voluntary grassroots activism for political parties is in decline, paralleling trends of party de-alignment (Katz et. al. 1992, Mair 1994 Mair and van Biezen 2001, Dalton 2005). Civil society is defined as the process by which individuals interact and negotiate with each other, political actors and economic authorities by formally using parties and unions, or informally using voluntary associations and movements (Kaldor 2003). Social participation encompasses any means for an individual or group to participate within their community to influence policies, practices and the world around them (Roker and Eden 2002).

As more formal practices of voluntary political activism decline new forms of civil participation through social movements are becoming increasingly appealing (Whiteley 2011). Social movements are a specific type of ‘alternative politics’, that are more *ad hoc*, mainly independent of traditional institutions and elites, incorporating interest groups, activists, single-issue coalitions and civic networks (Dahlgren 2004). A large portion of modern social movement research came about after the Second World War, particularly in the 1960s, when many people were trying to discover new forms of collective action in the creation of what is now known as our information society (Touraine 2002). Social movements in this period in the United States and Western Europe, and to a certain extent through Central and Eastern Europe, experienced cultural movements such as women’s movements, environmental movements and global citizen movements that combined institutional

---

94 As mentioned previously ‘official politics’ refers mainly to institutionalized forms of political participation such as voting, party membership and volunteering for a political party.
95 Alternative politics is also sometimes referred to as ‘new politics’, ‘life politics’ and ‘sub-politics’. The term embodies non-traditional forms of political participation. Traditional participation is defined by party membership, voting, and membership in official issue oriented institutions like unions and youth parties.

An increasing body of social movement research analyses how the diversity within social movements affects cultural norms. Many researchers believe that networks between people of different backgrounds, cultures, and opinions are important for democratic politics (Putnam 2000, Marshall and Stolle 2004, Cigler and Joslyn 2002) but it remains unclear whether multicultural social networks have normative effects on political values and mobilization (Sears et al 1999). Some research finds a positive effect of multicultural peer networks fostering tolerance (Mutz 2002, Ciglar and Joslyn 2002) and stimulating community involvement (Harell et. al. 2007). Others have found that heterogeneous networks create weak political values, inhibiting rather than mobilizing democratic political participation (Sears et al 1999, Alesina and Ferrara 2000, Mutz 2006, Costa and Kahn 2003). The increasing frequency of political grassroots social movements in Hungary serves as an ideal platform for analyzing how movements are changing cultural norms and thus socialization trends.

Numerous studies have concluded that today’s young citizens in America and across Europe are more individualistic and less collectively minded than previous generations regarding organizational and political participation (Eisner 2004, Dalton 2008, Sander and Putnam 2010). However, exploring the evolving relationship between electoral politics and social movements allows for individualism and collective action to coexist (Burstein and Linton 2002, Meyer 2007, Heaney and Rojas 2007, Fisher 2012). Most young people in Hungary, and across Europe, feel

96 Most research up-to-date has been conducted in the United States and Western Europe making it difficult to say that the same results and mechanisms would be true within a post-communist context.
that parties fail to interact or make efforts towards the inclusion of their age cohort (Bang 2005, Bruter and Harrison 2009). Generally, flexible, non-committal social movements have been most successful in attracting young people across Europe (Tarrow 1998, Sloam 2013) including Hungary (Szabó 1996).

Grassroots social movements are of special interest with regards to political youth-based studies. Young people remain more likely to participate in social movements and protest activities compared with older cohorts (Dalton 1996), largely due to their increasing marginalization from electoral politics (Sloam 2013). Most research underestimates the scope of youth political activity by a narrow definition of political engagement (Owen 2008, Farthing 2010). While traditional political activism, such as party membership and volunteering, is rapidly decreasing (Mair and Van Biezen 2001, Pedersen et. al. 2004, Scarrow 2000, Webb et. al. 2002) the youth sector is developing new and preferred ways of expressing their disenchantment with politics and politicians within alternative political groups and organizations (Bruter and Harrison 2009, Whiteley 2007, Kürti 2002). Modern alternative political organizations tend to build on larger volunteer bases and rarely require formal membership or subscription (Whiteley 2007) compared with older movements requiring a small core of permanent organizers with a wider sporadic activist base (Gerhards and Rucht 1992).

To a large extent the growing use of social protest movements are diffused through electronic and internet communication, redefining the structure and capacity of movement organizations and allowing for a more rapid and widespread network (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, Gibson and Ward 2000, Dahlgren 2004). New media such as blogs, organization sites, e-zines and online groups allow inexpensive dispersal of information and communication between activists and interested individuals (Klein
Social movements remain largely based on direct interaction between people but have become increasingly complimented by internet networking as well as alternative media outlets such as leaflets, zines and newsletters (van de Donk et. al. 2004). The ability of social movements to penetrate accessible media formats to disperse their message remains one of the largest obstacles for most founding movements (Zaller 1992, Rucht 2004). Modern social movements can create temporary political mobilization directed at authorities as well as mature into parties and interest groups, creating long-lasting civil services (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, Kriesi 1995).

Social movements can shape public discourse and debate as well as create an infrastructure for collective action and facilitate mediating collective identities linking marginalized groups in society (Minkoff 1997). Grassroots social movements work to engage in communal civic networks and local communities, helping build civil society (Foley and Edwards 2006) similar to the strategies being employed by current alternative youth-based parties in Hungary like Jobbik.

2.3.2. Civil Participation and Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe

Social movements and political activism define the ‘political citizen’, establishing norms, creating socializing experiences and developing skills that define future political participation (Schier 2000, Owen 2008). Grassroots social movements are a participatory option available to the youth in Central and Eastern Europe that was previously denied. In Soviet-run society highly restricted public political discourse made open civil society and alternative political movements practically

---

97 Particularly in Hungary the youth uses the Internet with significantly higher frequency than older cohort, discussed in Chapter 7. See also Figure 7.1 comparing media usage by age cohort.
impossible (Csepeli and Örkény 1992, Siemienska 2002). Participatory democracy and an active civil society have been difficult to fully develop after years of social and political distrust in Central and Eastern Europe (Putnam 1993, Letki 2004, Kovács 1996, Mareš 2010). Till the early 2000s in CEE there was only a limited social movement culture and few identifiable new activist actors (Touraine 2002).

Low levels of interpersonal trust leftover from the Soviet era are thought to be a main cause of low participatory involvement. While social movements were prevalent during transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (Giugni 1998), activism declined as the initial goal of regime change normalized and citizens became more passive (Pickvance 1999). This effect can be seen as particularly high in Hungary where, as seen in Figure 2.1, only 5.5% of Hungarians participate in volunteering compared with a Western European average of 35%. Hungary also ranks low in activism in single-issue movements where only 2% of the population participates in political forms of activism.\(^9^8\) While Western democracies have a thriving culture of think tanks and NGOs, post-communist Europe has been less successful in developing NGOs, lacking resources, treated with apathy and seen skeptically by most of the public (Kurkchiyan 2003, Smilov and Tisné 2004, Grødeland 2006, Grødeland and Aasland 2011).

Analyzing the impact of social movements is useful in questioning whether the trend of youth un-involvement in traditional political participation, such as voting and party membership, is really a sign of youth disengagement or if new forms of activism are replacing traditional forms of participation (Kovacheva 2005). A

\(^9^8\) Poland has the fewest political activists and members while Hungary ranked close behind along with Latvia and Russia. This is thought to be caused by the Soviet legacy of weak civil society and discredited political affiliations (Whitely 2011).
majority of the youth in Hungary and across Europe feels that parties fail to make efforts to include their age cohort (Bruter and Harrison 2009). The youth are less politically active, especially in traditional political activities, than older cohorts (Siemienska 2002). Also, the ‘voluntary’ civil service that was mandatory for the youth under the Soviet system (Zasavsky and Brym 1978) no longer exists to enforce and socialize civil participation. Politically led civil youth programs attached to schools like the Hungarian Pioneers (Úttörő) and Communist Youth Organization (Magyar Kommunista Ifjúsági Szövetség – KISZ) promoted local volunteering and community activities with a strong focus on political socialization (Volgyes 1975, Szabó 1991). Forced political messages embodied in these mandatory youth programs have created a legacy of distrust in political parties and cynicism towards political as well as civil institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997).

**Figure 2.3: Levels of Youth Participation in Hungary Compared with EU27**

![Figure 2.3](image-url)

Figure 2.3 shows levels of youth participation in Hungary (in Blue) compared with the European Union average (in Red). The definition of ‘Youth’ for the purposes of the EU looks at responses from those between the ages of fifteen and thirty. Data for Figure 2.3 comes from: ‘Youth of the Move’, Flash Eurobarometer, (319a), (European Commission, May 2011).
This distrust and lack of interest in civil institution is apparent by the low participatory levels of young people in Hungary, shown in Figure 2.3. Hungary is about average compared with other CEE countries however they rank particularly low in youth participation in outward volunteering efforts. Sports Clubs, Youth Organizations and Cultural Organization usually have very little to do with civil participation aiding the community at large. Local activities rank higher with regards to civil participation however participation in political activities, environmentally focused work and international/human rights focused participation is particularly low in Hungary among young Hungarians. There are, however, some youth-directed NGOs at work in contemporary Hungary such as Mobility (Mobilitás - mobilitas.hu), the Foundation for Democratic Youth (Demokratikus Ifjúságért Alapítvány), and the Association of Community Developers (Közösségfjlesztők Egyesülete - www.kka.hu). These groups aim at increasing youth volunteering and civic education with varying levels of membership and participation.99

Popular demands for democratic institutions and freedoms by grassroots organizations in Central and Eastern Europe show an alternative view of democratic participation and political interest (Rose et. al. 1998). The use of grassroots social movements to convey political ideas is proliferating across Europe, becoming less of a subculture and more part of normalized participatory practices (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010, Sloam 2013). Thus legitimizing grassroots social movements as an increasingly influential socializing force, paralleling political parties. Grassroots social movements are being developed and utilized with more frequency in Hungary starting in 2002 with the politically charged creation of civic circles developed by Fidesz. Movements have increased further with the controversial political events sparked in 2006 as well

99 Only one interviewee mentioned participation within any of these NGO youth-directives.
as more recently in 2010 (discussed in Chapter 3). For the purposes of my research the final body chapter of this thesis targets grassroots social movements as an agent of socialization by mapping the most influential and prevalent movements, most drawing in substantial youth activism. Research on social movements is complex in that it stands alone as its own agent of political socialization as well as utilizing and attaching to other socializing agents such as media, educational institutions and political parties.

***

Political socialization remains a relatively new approach for research in post-communist countries. The highly state-centralized enforcement and monitoring of socialization processes within education, media and political messages during socialism has left distaste for the continuation of state-run socialization research. This is a large reason for the discontinuation of much socialization research within Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. While political socialization theory targets multiple agents, in practice, even within Western Europe and the United States, most research limits its focus to one socializing agent. However, in tracking the current processes behind political party alignments and value shifts towards right and radical right preferences among the Hungarian youth, a broader spectrum is necessary. While early socialization theory focused primarily on family upbringing and authority relations, modern theories have developed a framework for a more active and complex account of political socialization. Youth specific socialization research tends to focus mainly on family and education. CEE country research is usually only included in wider comparative, single-agent studies. This thesis goes beyond single-agent approaches in order to analyze, not only how initial civic and political practice is taught, but also compare various influences developing partisanship and activism.
In the last decade Hungary has also seen an increasing use of grassroots social movements in the form of large-scale protests and demonstrations as well as the institutionalization of politically aligned civil organizations. Hungary’s current political climate is far from stable, with large sociopolitical changes in flux. Although grassroots social movements are not often used as an agent in analyzing political socialization they are arguably a very influential and key force in these current shifts, particularly with regards to youth activism. The following chapters use Hungary as a case study for utilizing political socialization theory to track the influences behind Hungary’s shift to the right and radical right, largely represented by the youth.
PART TWO

Youth Engagement in Sociopolitical Organizations and Activism
3. POLITICAL PARTIES & YOUTH PARTICIPATION

Taking a youth-oriented perspective on political developments this chapter analyzes major shifts in party politics, covering the rise of the right and radical right as well as the decline of liberal-left parties between 2002 and 2010. The solidified bipolar nature of Hungarian politics, embodied by right wing party, Fidesz, and left wing party, MSZP, dominated the political landscape from 1998 until the 2010 national elections, which produced an entirely new political paradigm. The right (Fidesz) and radical right (Jobbik) have been highly successful in turning popular grassroots nationalism into official policy-driven nationalism.100 This chapter investigates the successes and weaknesses of Hungarian political parties in their ability to cultivate youth support within both traditional and alternative forms of political activism.101 Hungary’s significant electoral shift towards the right and radical right was greater among youth voters compared with other cohorts (see Figure 3.2), exemplifying a youth tendency towards conservative authoritarian political preferences, suggested by certain Hungarian researchers previous to the 2010 elections (Kitschelt 1992, Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, Nagy et. al. 2012).102

For the purposes of my research Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP are the primary parties focused on due to their high levels of youth electoral support compared with other parties as well as their youth foundations. All three parties were originally

---

100 The idea of party politics turning ‘popular nationalism’ into ‘official nationalism’ was first introduced by Anderson (1991) however this concept has been discussed with regards to post-communist networks by Hockenos (1993) looking at radical right movements in the early 1990s.  
101 Traditional activism is demonstrated by official youth party membership and voting trends. Alternative activism is demonstrated by civil protests and demonstrations.  
102 This thesis does not go into much depth over the materialist/post-materialist debate, which has an extensive literature. While some researchers within this field have pointed towards a youth in Hungary that is following Inglehart’s lines of post-material development (Mónika 2005), others have provided evidence tending towards more authoritarian values (Todosijević and Enyedi 2000). This thesis looks at the mechanisms behind political alignment and identity more than of post-materialism.
founded as youth organizations and gained high levels of youth support in the 2010 national elections. Fidesz has played a dynamic role not only in developing youth political activism in Hungary but also as the harbinger of other youth-based parties, Fidesz has developed a party structure and format for gaining grassroots support that both Jobbik and LMP have taken from in building their own parties. Throughout this thesis I refer to youth parties and youth-based parties with reference to Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP. Youth parties refer to parties that were founded by a group of young people, usually evolving out of a youth organization. Youth parties have an age limit to membership. In the case of Fidesz this cut off was originally thirty-five. I also refer to youth-based parties defined as parties aiming a large focus of their political efforts at younger voters and whose primary or most significant voter base is among those under the age of thirty. Most literature refers to youth organizations attached to political parties (Hooghe et. al. 2004, Hooghe and Stolle 2005, Bruter and Harrison 2009) but there is little written on political parties formed by youth organizations or made up of primarily youth supporters.

Fidesz was established as a youth party with an age limit of thirty five until 1993 when the party began to shift its alliances towards the right and rid of its age restriction.\(^{103}\) Jobbik originated and remains largely a youth-based party as defined by their foundations as a youth organization within one of Fidesz’s civic circle initiatives. Jobbik’s chairman, Gábor Vona, is also a hallmark of Jobbik’s youthful radicalism, still in his early thirties. LMP is considered a youth-based party as well by their core founders, formed largely within the Special College, TEK, attached to Corvinus University in Budapest (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). Their support network is primarily younger Hungarians and activists, drawing in large

\(^{103}\) Fidesz originally had an age limit of thirty-five labeled as a liberal youth party.
support from the Budapest-based youth. Fidesz was the only party that maintained an age limit as a political party, however Jobbik, previous to becoming an official party, also unsurprisingly had an age limit for membership in its youth organization. LMP’s foundations were mainly grassroots based, maintaining a relatively low profile until announcing their political status in 2009.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part focuses more on the founding structures and initiatives of Fidesz that have given a format to newer youth-based parties. The first part of this chapter dissects Fidesz as a party with reference to youth activism and support, starting with its foundations as a youth party through its tactics in gaining wider support across Hungary with its more grassroots techniques. Fidesz’s development of civic circles (polgári körök) to concentrate the right and create a network for mass mobilization has developed a model for sociopolitical maneuvering in Hungary. This section also addresses Fidesz’ relationship with the radical right in more recent years. The second section of this chapter looks more directly at the two newer parliamentary parties, Jobbik and LMP. Despite the current questionable stability of LMP as a political party in the long run the party is a useful case study. LMP not only shares similar strategies to LMP and Fidesz but also maintains high levels of youth support, mainly in Budapest, regardless of internal splits within the party.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{104} Media around the 2010 elections speculated that LMP’s ability to achieve parliamentary status and pass the electoral threshold had more to do with the lack of viable liberal-left political options more than LMP’s credentials. The party has also faced recent internal splits over the issue of whether or not to join other viable political opposition movements against Fidesz or to remain free of larger coalitions. The party’s ability to form from a youth-based grassroots format and their tactics to gain public awareness and political support is what will be of interest for this thesis.
3.1 FIDESZ: FOUNDER OF YOUTH PARTIES IN HUNGARY

Fidesz has maintained an influential role in youth politics in Hungary, from its foundation in March 1988 as the liberal Alliance of Young Democrats (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége* – FIDESZ) through its transformation into the conservative nationalist Hungarian Civic Union (*Fidesz Magyar Polgári Szövetség* - Fidesz-MPP). The party is, not least, important in this case study in its maintenance of the largest political youth organization in Hungary, and one of the largest in Europe, with around 12,000 members.105 Fidesz is a distinct case among CEE centre-right parties not only in its shift from a radical liberal party to a conservative nationalist party, but also in its ability to concentrate other right wing parties under its umbrella ideology and to organize mass mobilization in the form of *civic circles* (Fowler 2004, Enyedi and Linek 2008, Korkut 2012). Fidesz has also provided a crucial model for ‘youth parties’ and social movements that have aspirations of transforming into mainstream political parties. The early years of democratic transition molded Fidesz, in part, into the party it is today.

3.1.1 The Early Years of Transition

Fidesz was founded in 1988 as an autonomous student movement, organizing outlawed protests against the communist system, often in symbolic locations such as ex-Soviet bunkers (Szabó 2011). This dissident and avant-garde youth movement was a radical liberal alternative supporting the end of Soviet control as well as a strong separation of church and state (Enyedi 2005). Early Fidesz had the ability to collect tens of thousands of signatures asking communist MPs to resign in the last two years

---

105 12,000 is the membership number given through Fidelitas’ official website. Fidelitas representatives confirmed this number to be ranging between 10-12,000.
of socialism, taking a hard line against Soviet power (Körösény 1990). Most of Fidesz’s leading representatives in the 1990s had a record of anti-establishment activism in the Kádár period before 1989 (Szabó 2011). The Hungarian protest tradition in the late socialist period consisted of urban youths, young professionals and white-collar workers. Dissident opposition groups brought together artists, students, scientists and educators, conducting protests, mainly in the city center of Budapest and other larger university towns (Schöpflin 1979).

The 1989 Fidesz-led youth mobilizations modeled demonstrations on the Hungarian Revolutions of 1848 and 1956 (Tőkés 1998), a tradition that continues today. Hungary had some of the most highly attended youth protests in Central and Eastern European during the late Kádár era, rejecting models for planned economy and communist structures (Knabe 1989, Ramet 1991, Szabó 1991). It was from this atmosphere that Fidesz, as a political party, came into being. Tracking the frequency of political activism in the early transition years, between 1990 and 1994, Fidesz organized more protests and political demonstrations than any other political party in Hungary, mainly condensed between 1989 and 1992 (Ekiert-Kubik 1998). This was largely due to the strong youth network Fidesz had developed as an organization, supported by activist students and intellectuals.

While the party’s platforms have shifted over the years, Fidesz’ legacy as an ‘outlawed and clandestine’ political youth movement has been preserved in the party’s continued strong anti-communist stance and popular mobilization strategies (Szabó 2011, p.47, see also Bozóki 1992). Transitioning from a political youth

---

106 Other Central and Eastern European countries also began anti-Soviet political organizations in the lead up to transition. A large alternative example of this is the Polish Solidarity Movement. However, Fidesz was somewhat unique for being a well-organized youth movement with political intentions.
organization into a liberal youth party Fidesz maintained an age limit of thirty-five in its first three years as an official party. Even as an official party, Fidesz was known for its radicalism in demanding a constitutional state and liberal economy, as well as its readiness for action.\textsuperscript{107} The young Fidesz politician Viktor Orbán first came into national awareness on 16 June 1989 at the reburial of the former Prime Minister Imre Nagy, where Orbán demanded in his speech that all Soviet troops immediately withdraw from Hungary and that free elections commence (Palonen 2011, Lendvai 2012).\textsuperscript{108} In the first democratic national elections in 1990 Fidesz ran in a joint candidacy with fellow liberal party Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ).

SZDSZ was the original leading liberal party with strong anti-communist platforms and a core membership of liberal, Budapest and more urban-based intelligentsia (Körösény 1999). In the first national elections SZDSZ gained the majority of its support from their campaign for rapid, rather than gradual, changes to the transition economy as well as their distinct and clear stance against MSZP, seen as the continuation of socialism (Pittaway 2003). Although the two parties joined a coalition, SZDSZ was clearly a stronger party option in the first elections. SZDSZ gained 21.4\% of the votes, becoming the second largest political party in Hungary, while Fidesz only gained 9\% on its own (see Table 1.1 for Hungarian national election results 1990). By the second national elections in 1994 Fidesz had already begun to shift its image abandoning its original age limit and redefining its voter base.

Fidesz maintained membership in the political federation ‘Liberal International’ until 1992, with Viktor Orbán on the group’s bureau (Pridham 2008).

\textsuperscript{108} This seminal speech is also listed in Viktor Orbán’s official CV: ‘CV of Viktor Orbán’, \textit{Magyarorszag Jobban Teljesít}, Miniszterelnök Hatósági Weboldal (Prime Minister Official Website), <http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_cv_of_viktor_orban/>.
Between 1993 and 1998 Fidesz transformed itself from a radical liberal youth party into a conservative nationalist party while maintaining most of its core representatives keeping Viktor Orbán as the party’s unquestioned leader (Fowler 2004, Enyedi and Linek 2008, Szabó 2011, Korkut 2012). Fidesz began to modify its identity in 1993 when Viktor Orbán announced that the party was a national-liberal party at the Party Congress, keying on the nationalist aspects of Fidesz’s earlier stances (Enyedi 2005). However, it was only after a poor electoral result for the party in 1994 combined with the surprising shift of Fidesz’s liberal partner Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) that Fidesz openly began its conservative transformation.109

Similar to the political swing in Poland, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) won the second democratic elections in 1994 and SZDSZ shocked many of its liberal supporters, who campaigned strongly on anti-communist platforms, when the party agreed to a coalition with MSZP coalition. The alliance allowed MSZP to gain credibility away from its communist past while giving SZDSZ greater influence in parliament. Fidesz was thus left alone in the liberal camp and found political opportunity in the conservative right camp, which was at this point in disarray. The leading conservative right wing party, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), which had won elections in 1990, found transitional political decisions pressured resulting in socioeconomic strains, unwelcome by Hungarian citizens. MDF was further weakened by the death of the party’s leader and Prime Minister, József Antall, in 1993.

Fidesz recognized that a shift to the right would benefit the party and thus began their party reform to concentrate right wing political entities that had been

109 In 1994 the liberal camp dissolved in part from its inability to win the 1994 elections. SZDSZ received 19.74% while Fidesz received only 7.02%.
weakening from internal fractioning and external pressures of transformation (Fowler 2004, Korkut 2009). Between 1994 and 1998 the political rhetoric of Fidesz branded the party as a guardian of Hungarian values and an embodiment of the national consciousness (Korkut 2009). 1994 data shows that Fidesz was considered the least authoritarian party within the Hungarian political spectrum. By 2002 the party was on the other end of the spectrum as one of the most authoritarian parties in Hungary (Enyedi 2005). By 1998 Fidesz had developed a new right wing political format in Hungary by adopting mixed ideological elements and utilizing the lowest common denominator of anti-communist sentiments to consolidate a diverse range of right wing forces. In Hungary ideology and strategy are often blurred combining national myths with state aspirations to mobilize political support from citizens (Kovacs 1998, Bayer 2005). The first Fidesz government (1998 to 2002) combined conservative consolidation with populist mass mobilization branding itself the ‘second revolution’ by defeating MSZP, personified in propaganda as a continuation of the previous Communist regime (Bozóki 2008). In shedding the party’s ‘youth brand’, Fidesz strayed away from its grassroots organizational style after 1994, centralizing the party and strengthening its structure (van Biezen 2003), however the party soon re-recognized the salience of grassroots mobilization combined with centralized party structures. While the first Fidesz government focused on changing the media landscape (discussed in Chapter 7) and national re-branding of the party, it was not until the next elections in 2002 that Fidesz truly branded itself as a mass mobilization party.

3.1.2 Mass Mobilization and Civic Circles

Fidesz’s transformation into the most successful and powerful right wing party in Hungary was three-fold. Fidesz firstly asserted the party as a competent right wing
political option while keeping its core leaders and party structure between starting in 1994. Secondly, Fidesz developed links with traditional right wing parties and institutions, forming a coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) in 1998. The final step solidifying Fidesz as a right wing stronghold in Hungarian politics was the creation of right wing social movements and extra-parliamentary structures (Enyedi 2005). Fidesz came into power in 1998 as the leader of a large right wing coalition stressing increased national and popular issues (Glenn 2001, Mény-Surel 2002). However, it was not until 2002 during the national elections that Fidesz transformed the format and content of Hungarian politics.

After a close first round of voting between Fidesz and MSZP in the 2002 national elections Fidesz became wary that despite a high popular electoral victory the party might not win in Hungary’s system of proportional representation and first-pass-the-post. Fidesz began a more aggressive campaign tactic, mobilizing up to 100,000 citizens in demonstrations and rallies against MSZP (Enyedi and Linek 2008). Fidesz rhetoric questioned the legitimacy of electoral results before the second round of elections, preemptively calling for a re-vote in the case that MSZP might win. Fidesz lost the 2002 elections to MSZP by a narrow margin, however, the tactics and grassroots support networks developed by Fidesz during the course of the elections are the lynch pin behind Fidesz’s continued political strength. Prior to the start of the 2002 elections campaigns Fidesz maintained four hundred local branches

---

110 Hungary has a mixed electoral voting system taking place every four years in two rounds of voting. There are 386 members in the National Assembly: 176 representatives are elected via single-seat local constituencies while 152 of the parliamentary representatives are elected via proportional representation in multi-seat, or regional seat, constituencies. There are also 58 compensation seats from national list votes. As of the 2014 national elections voting will change slightly so that there are 199 Members of Parliament: 106 representatives elected via single-seat local constituencies and 93 via national party list votes (Official website of the Hungarian Government, <http://www.kormany.hu/en/hungary/the-electoral-system-parliamentary-changes>).
across Hungary. By 2005 after large-scale mass mobilization efforts and the development of civic circles Fidesz had 1,050 local branches, during a time when left-wing local organizations and branches were decreasing (Enyedi and Linek 2008).

2002-2006 was a peak point for protest from the Right which leveled the accusation that parliamentarism and constitutionalism were being manipulated by the Left and winning the elections was being accomplished through a clandestine conspiracy of Communism and Capitalism. (Szabó 2011, p.56)

The events of 2002 marked a distinct change in Fidesz’s campaign style by using openly antagonistic propaganda against MSZP combined with popular mobilization through citizen’s initiatives known as civic circles (polgári körök) (Szabó 2011). The salience and usage of the communist versus anti-communist propaganda, targeting MSZP as the reformed Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP), solidified through the creation of civic circles, as a means of spreading Fidesz support networks within localized civic groups. While many post-communist parties struggle with the lack of stable party membership and voter support (Kopecký 1995, van Biezen 2003 and 2005), Fidesz was the first party to introduce alternatives to official membership with the use of civic circles.

Civic circles are mainly compartmentalized subgroups based on interest in Fidesz created around location and/or interest-based such as Christian democratic associations, women’s groups, Roma forums, ethnic Hungarian groups (from neighboring countries), cultural movements and youth factions (Szabó 2003, Enyedi 2005, Enyedi and Linek 2008). Civic circles allow citizens to identify with a party through overlapping localized networks without binding affiliation to the party through official membership (Enyedi and Linek 2008). Due to Fidesz’s foundations as a memberless liberal social movement in 1988, these alternative, less formal forms of party support structure came as second nature to Fidesz (van Biezen 2003). Within
months of the creation of Fidesz’s localized initiative in 2002 there were over 10,000 civic circles with over 100,000 participants at a time when official party membership of Fidesz was only around 10,000 (Enyedi 2005). By the second round of the 2002 national elections right wing civic circles were questioning the Socialist Government’s legitimacy, mobilizing civic circle participants while at the same time unifying new right wing and radical right citizen groups (Szilágyi 2009).

Civic circles have also been linked as a catalyst for opening new political doors to populist tactics by legitimizing alternative grassroots political alliances (discussed in Chapter 4), as seen by the usage of similar mobilizing tactics by Jobbik (Szilágy 2009, Müller 2011). Civic circles based on more radical nationalist focuses have been allowed to flourish. Although participation in civic circles is informal the gray area between participation and partisanship allows for a myriad of voter support for Fidesz as a catchall party, ranging from moderate conservatives to more radical nationalists. Such is the case with the foundations of Jobbik through one of Fidesz’s youth initiatives, discussed in the following sections. Fidesz was the forerunner of blending formal and informal political participation within their party structure, as seen by the rapid growth of civic circles and the informal partisanship outlet they created. Civic circles attracted a variety of previously inactive citizens into political activism. Having a legitimate political party using dissident tactics of mass protest and grassroots organizing within a relatively stable democracy has drawn in significant youth interest through grassroots participation as well as official membership.

Seen in Figure 3.1, Fidesz’s informal participation options through civic circles have also turned into increased official party membership over the years. From only ten thousand official members in 2000, Fidesz now has the highest number of
official party members in Hungary (around 40,000 members) followed by MSZP (around 33,000). The data collected by the Hungarian national news media, MTI, shows that just over one percent of eligible voters in Hungary are members of a political party. Of those that are party members, membership numbers show the bipolar Fidesz-MSZP divide still remaining strong with a significant rise in membership for the newer radical right political party Jobbik.

**Figure 3.1: Hungarian Party Membership 2011**

Note: Continued support for KDNP can be attributed partly due to the fact that Fidesz allows dual party membership to multiple parties within its alliance.

Fidesz’s tactics still reflect protest party strategies, employing mass mobilizing events in opposition as well as in power. Fidesz successfully formed a mainstream nationalist divide between itself and MSZP with its anti-communist propaganda to concentrate the right through the party’s ability to ‘identify the common ideological denominator and establish an organizational structure that allows for the aggregation of interests’ (Enyedi 2005, p. 701). The anti-communist propaganda against the

---

112 Ibid.
Hungarian Socialist Party continues to personify MSZP as a continuation of communism.\textsuperscript{113}

Fidesz has also been highly successful in attracting official youth members through the party’s two youth organizations, mentioned briefly in Chapter 1. These youth organizations have attracted significant membership compared with other Hungarian youth organizations attached to political parties (see Table 1.4). Fidelitas, the primary youth party attached to Fidesz, is the largest youth party in Hungary and among the largest youth factions in Europe with between 10,000 and 12,000 official members. Fidelitas is the oldest official democratic youth organization attached to a political party in Hungary, founded in 1996. Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat (Fidesz Youth Division – Fidesz IT), a separate parallel youth faction, boasts another 8,000 members.\textsuperscript{114} Both youth organizations help the party during election time with campaigning and recruiting new members. Youth organizations also develop fun events and programs to create incentives for participation.\textsuperscript{115}

3.1.2 Fidesz’s Open Door Policy: Radical Rhetoric

Fidesz has successfully moved across the political spectrum from a radical liberal youth organization to the nationalist conservative party we see today (Kiss 2002, Korkut 2012). The array of Fidesz facades leaves researchers with an equal amount of difficulty defining Fidesz on the political spectrum. Although originally a pro-European liberal party in the European Parliament, Fidesz’s shift since the mid

\textsuperscript{113} This was apparent even in Fidesz’s 2010 electoral campaign, which depicted a number of MSZP candidates as liable for large monetary based political scandals, harking back on a corrupt communist elite. Fidesz’s rhetoric calling itself a ‘fourth republic’ also alludes to a continuation of the previous regime through MSZP that needs eradication for a true political transition.

\textsuperscript{114} Information from www.fidelitas.hu and www.ifjusagitagozat.hu. Data also comes from interviews with Fidelitas and Fidesz IT coordinators and elected officials. Jobbik’s IT is harder to measure although estimations will be given later. Jobbik’s youth division was founded only in 2011.

\textsuperscript{115} See Section 3.3 for a detailed analysis of political summer camps in Hungary.
1990s the party has taken a more Eurosceptic party stance (Taggart and Szerbiak 2001, Chytilek and Kaniok 2006, Biro Nagy et. al. 2012). Fidesz self defines, and is most notable, for its stance as a national conservative party (Enyedi 2005, Mudde 2007).

Although some have categorized Fidesz as a populist radical right party (Bohlen 2002), Fidesz remains a national conservative party. Fidesz utilizes populist tactics and nationalist rhetoric but as of yet remains a democratic party that is neither fully definable as anti-democratic nor anti-system (Učeň 2007). As defined by Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), Fidesz is a ‘moderately conservative party with at times radical right wing grid/group rhetoric’ (p. 470). The populist aspect of Fidesz’s structure developed early on in the original youth organization’s grassroots orientation, non-hierarchical membership and anti-elite campaigns. The development of civic circles from 2002 onwards brought widespread electoral success to the party by focusing on local networks, establishing a presence across Hungary. Within the diverse range of civic circles and nationalist rhetoric Fidesz has always left a door open to extremism in party officials’ rhetoric as well as certain policy actions (see Table 3.1). Yet Fidesz remains tactically careful not to be labeled as extreme (Korkut 2009, Jordon 2010, Müller 2011, Lendvai 2012).

Fidesz success in the 2010 elections can be attributed to internal as well as external political party factors. Autumn 2006 was a crucial breaking point for Fidesz’s strong stance against MSZP. Fidesz had again narrowly lost the national elections to the Hungarian Socialist Party in the Spring yet on September 18th a leaked broadcast onto the national radio exposed MSZP Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, saying that
he and his party had ‘lied morning, noon and night’ to win elections. A spontaneous mass gathering of ten thousand people congregated outside of parliament beginning a month of protests and riots demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. Fidesz supporters were a permanent installation at demonstrations, sending official speakers to the site almost daily (Szabó 2011).

The events of 2006 crippled Fidesz’s main adversary, MSZP and the liberal-left coalition, with a legacy of corruption while exposing a radical and united subculture that gave momentum to the radical right party Jobbik (Jordan 2010, Bartlett et. al. 2012, Korkut 2012). The large media attention focusing on the corruption of MSZP and the citizen mobilization against the government delegitimized the governing party to a point that they lost a large portion of their voter base. This is seen most clearly by the 2010 national election results where MSZP managed only 19.3% compared with 43.2% in 2006. Meanwhile liberal party SZDSZ did not manage to pass the 5% electoral threshold, having previously isolated a large portion of their original anti-communist voter base by forming an alliance in 1994 with MSZP in the first place (Pittaway 2003). These events also exemplified the continuation of Fidesz’s mobilization capabilities.

Fidesz and supporting right wing media networks were keen to point out corruption and financial scandals apparent among certain left wing politicians increasingly since the party’s 1998 media revival (Lendvai 2012 – discussed further in Chapter 7). Continued accusations climaxed with the 2006 leaked tape of the Prime Minister, Gyurcsány. MSZP and subsequently SZDSZ could not fully return to their

116 Listened in full the Prime Minister expressed his criticism of politics in general in Hungary yet the sound bite was enough to spark public outrage. A Hungarian transcription of the most significant first half of the leak tape can be found here: ‘Az őszödi beszéd első fele’, Index, (27 September 2006), <http://index.hu/belfold/part17339/>.
former strength, still only managing polling support of between 25% and 30%.\textsuperscript{117} The void in political competition against Fidesz was evident in the 2010 elections. Also evident was the opportunity for new political parties to put themselves forth as electoral alternatives.

In Hungary the aftermath of 2006 witnessed a shift not only in electoral trends but also in Fidesz rhetoric and, since 2010, political overhauls making many rethink Fidesz’s positions. Until recently Fidesz was not considered particularly Eurosceptic or radical. While Fidesz continues to articulate its commitment to suppressing the radical right and commitment to the EU, the party’s nationalist policies since the 2010 national elections also legitimize many of Jobbik’s political stances (Müller 2011). Many of Jobbik’s voters come from previous Fidesz voting bases (Bartlett et. al. 2012). Both parties share radicalized rhetoric and policy strategies around ‘gypsy criminality’ (\textit{cigánybűnözés}) and symbolic platforms such as the Treaty of Trianon\textsuperscript{118} and increased Euroscepticism (Kántor 2008, Lendvai 2012).\textsuperscript{119} While Jobbik openly calls for the exiting of the European Union,\textsuperscript{120} Fidesz words its Euroscepticism more carefully while still expressing outward critiques of the EU.

Popular policies and decrees by Fidesz since 2010 have included a number of Jobbik’s primary nationalist targets such as creating a national holiday on June 4\textsuperscript{th} as a memorial day for Trianon as well as the dual citizenship law concerning ethnic Hungarians (see Table 3.2).

\textsuperscript{117} Polls tracked between 2007 and 2012 (TÁRKI and Szonda Ipsos).
\textsuperscript{118} The Treaty of Trianon is a point of nationalist contention in Hungary. In 1920 after WWI the Allied Powers redistributed two-thirds of Hungary’s territory to neighboring countries (see Chapter 5).
\textsuperscript{119} See also: ‘A cigány kérdés kriminalizálása’, \textit{Heti Világgazdaság}, (21 February 2009). The title of the article translates as ‘The question of gypsy criminality’.
\textsuperscript{120} Jobbik has openly said that the only way to protect Hungarian land and keep it in the possession of Hungarians is to exit the European Union. Party Chairman, Gábor Vona has said openly that this is the only way to protect Hungary from ultraliberal international forces. (‘Protect Hungarian Land by Exiting EU, Jobbik Head Says’, \textit{Politics.hu}, (20 July 2013).
Table 3.1 List of Fidesz Government Measures Inspired by Jobbik 2010-2012\textsuperscript{121}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segments from Program</th>
<th>Jobbik’s Election 2010</th>
<th>Measures Instated by Fidesz Government Since 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>»The multinationals’ contribution to tax revenues is negligible, they use accounting tricks to make profits disappear and take them out of the country.«</td>
<td>Fidesz imposed a special tax on the telecommunications branch, energy providers and retail chains, sectors are mainly in the hands of foreign/multinational companies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»We will abolish compulsory private pensions and lead the pension’ system back towards a state arrangement, in which individual account-holding would nevertheless remain.«</td>
<td>Fidesz has nationalized savings paid into private pension funds. Unlike Jobbik’s proposal, however, moving to the state system is not optional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»The principle should be made clear that the Holy Crown and the Hungarian State as well as the Holy Crown and the Nation (consisting of members of various nationalities and religions) are identical.«</td>
<td>The reference to the Holy Crown is part of the new Constitution: »We honour the achievements of our historical constitution and the Holy Crown, which embody the constitutional state continuity of Hungary and the unity of the Nation.«</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»Jobbik will pass a media law creating new value-oriented media with public status. The criteria for such media will be [the contribution they make] to building a national identity and to communicating knowledge and balanced information of all kinds…we will facilitate the rapid imposition of penalties on individual media organizations.«</td>
<td>Fidesz has passed a new media law even changing the constitution to ensure approval. All Hungarian media organs are thus under the surveillance of government-appointed monitors. The preamble to this bill contains the same »value-oriented« arguments as those advanced by Jobbik. The draft law grants the media watchdog options for imposing sanctions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»We would make it obligatory in at least one of the upper years of primary schools for the children to go on a school trip to the Hungarian territories seized from us.«</td>
<td>A government initiative has been launched that allows all pupils in public education to receive state funding for a trip to a neighboring country inhabited by Hungarians. Approved October 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»We will remove the Károlyi-Statue from Kossuth square immediately... Roosevelt Square will be given the only name worthy of it, that of Count István Széchenyi!«</td>
<td>In March 2012 the Károlyi statue was removed from Kossuth Square. The Fidesz majority in Budapest changed the name of Roosevelt Square to Széchenyi Square. The application for the change submitted by Fidesz and the KDNP to the city administration states: »No public square, no public institution may bear the name of a person involved in the foundation, setting up or maintenance of a political system of arbitrary rule in the 20th century, nor a name that is an expression of or the name of an organization that directly refers to or recalls a political system of arbitrary rule in the 20th century.« One square has been named after Albert Wass.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>»In memory of Miklós Horthy, Albert Wass, Pál Teleki, Ottokár Prohászka, Cecile Tormay, Béla Hamvas and our other great figures who have been unworthily forgotten. Together with civil society we will launch a nationwide program to erect statues in public places.«</td>
<td>On the day of the constituent meeting of parliament Jobbik proposed a motion that would declare the anniversary of the Trianon Treaty a day of national remembrance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the day of the constituent meeting of parliament Jobbik proposed a motion that would declare the anniversary of the Trianon Treaty a day of national remembrance.</td>
<td>At the end of May 2010 the parliament declared the day of the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty a day of national unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{121} Table and translation come from Nagy et. al. (2012). See bibliography for Jobbik’s Election Programme.
Fidesz also shares an increasing Euroskeptic stance with Jobbik, often challenging EU authority. Early antagonism of ‘us versus them’ rhetoric targeted the remaining ‘communists’ embodied by MSZP in 2002 (Szabó 2003, Palonen 2009), however, the new ‘them’ has shifted since 2010 towards a new ‘other’, embodied by the EU. Prime Minister Orbán’s speeches have always titillated the masses, from his infamous first speech telling the Soviets to leave Hungary in 1989 at the age of twenty-six to his recent speeches challenging the EU. Euroskepticism has paralleled EU critiques of major Fidesz reforms since 2010. Viktor Orbán has likened the EU to Soviet and Habsburg oppressive forces personifying Brussels as a tyrannical center point:

*Freedom means that we decide about the laws governing our own life, we decide what is important and what isn’t. From the Hungarian perspective, with a Hungarian mindset, following the rhythm of our Hungarian hearts. We will not be a colony.*

Fidesz’s political rhetoric has brought radicalized discourse to the mainstream. This sociopolitical process of radicalization is particularly prevalent in younger voters as seen by voting trends (see Figure 1.1) as well as activist trends (discussed in Chapter 4). Fidesz has shifted to the right, increasingly towards radical politics while maintaining a strong youth network, taking young Hungarians with it from a liberal to nationalist conservative political ideology (Enyedi 2005). Table 3.2 shows the direct link between radical right objectives put forth by Jobbik compared with the Fidesz’s

---

122 Fidesz government overhauls include a New Media Law, a new Hungarian Constitution and changes to the constitutional court. The Fidesz government maintains that all these changes are in line with the fundamental principles of democracy and the outlines of the Treaty of Europe to the European Union, however, many international bodies and European institutions have questioned the democratic principles of these changes. Due to concerns and possible sanctions from the European Union institutions directed at Hungary the Fidesz government has already put forth five amendments to the new Constitution, the fifth being instated October 2013.

measures appealing to the same platforms (Nagy et. al. 2012). It also shows the increasing political potential of new youth-based parties in Hungary, like Jobbik.

3.2 A NEW WAVE OF YOUTH-BASED PARTIES

As discussed at the start of this chapter, youth-based parties are political parties that maintain a significant part, if not majority, of their electoral support from youth voters (aged 18 to 30) and who focus considerable political efforts directly at the youth. The flourishing networks being developed by new youth-based parties, from informal media outlets to grassroots collaboration, would have been impossible before democratic transition. In the process of decentralization and democratizing all state-run mechanisms involving the youth within politics, culture and community disappeared with very few youth-based institutions replacing them. The state shied away from centralized mandatory youth programs, such as the Communist Youth Leagues (discussed in Chapter 7), putting very little emphasis on youth-based structures and policies. As a result many young people feel little control over their personal economic and political situation and view the bureaucracy as complex, corrupt and ignorant of youth needs (Touraine 1999, Pleyers 2005, Kovacheva 2005). In Hungary, youth-future studies show a young population with en masse pessimism towards the democratic transition and a larger focus on individualism over community and national participation (Hideg and Nováky 2002). Fidesz has maintained a strong youth following, however, as newer youth-based parties appear in Hungary Fidesz’s image and voting base are beginning to shift.124

124 Despite large official membership numbers in Fidesz’s youth organizations, Fidelitas and Fidesz IT members mentioned in interviewees that it is increasingly hard to intrigue younger 18 to 23 year old voters who seem to prefer LMP or Jobbik.
Among today’s pensioners, who were socialized during the era of the Kádár regime, the MSZP is traditionally popular, whereas Fidesz always found the most favor with the age group that grew up with the opposition movement in the early 1980s. By contrast, the generation socialized after 1989 has no memory of socialism and they are too young to remember Viktor Orbán as the politician who on 16 June 1989 publically demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. (Nagy et. al. 2012)

For new movements or political parties to be given legitimate space within civil society sociopolitical opportunity structures have to shift, changing the access to decision making (Kitschelt 1986, Dalton 1994, Kriesi et. al. 1995, Donk et. al. 2004, Harrison and Bruter 2011). The downfall of the liberal-left political bloc and the anti-government demonstrations that ensued (discussed above) provided an outlet for Fidesz to create an electoral revolution, winning a two-third majority in the 2010 national elections (Palonen 2011). But the other critical shift from these events was that the bipolar hegemonic political spectrum was broken, changing the opportunity structure for new parties to enter the political arena. Thus, LMP and Jobbik were able to campaign in the 2010 national elections gaining newfound support in their platforms against elitism and corruption within politics.

Green parties and, more significantly, the populist radical right are the only two new party families to develop in Western democracies since WWII (Mudde 2007). Hungary has followed this trend with the recent inclusion of LMP and Jobbik into the Hungarian parliament. In 2010 radical right party Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom – Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary) and green party LMP (Lehet Más a Politika – Politics Can be Different) entered the Hungarian Parliament for the first time. This was the first time that a green party in Hungary entered parliament and only the second time a radical right party entered
parliament. LMP won 7.47% while Jobbik became the third largest party in Hungary with 16.67%. Both are youth-based parties, originating from groups of university students wanting to change not only who is running politics but also how politics is run in Hungary. Both LMP and Jobbik gained momentum and electoral significance around similar times, breaking into European Parliament in 2009 and passing the 5% threshold, entering the national parliament in 2010. The following sections focus on these newer youth-based parties in Hungary, analyzing Jobbik’s success in developing and maintaining a youth-based party into wider networks in contrast to LMPs failure to maintain itself beyond limited youth support since its 2010 electoral breakthrough.

Jobbik began in 2002 as the Right-Wing Youth Association (Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség - JOBBIK). Catholic and Protestant university students at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest founded the youth group. Jobbik was originally developed within one of Fidesz’s younger civic circles, offering services to right wing parties such as Fidesz, MDF and MIÉP with the original aim of assisting Fidesz in re-election (Czene 2009, Varró 2009, Nagy and Róna 2011, Nagy et. al. 2012, Korkut 2012). The 2002 national elections proved to be disappointing for right wing parties. The Jobbik youth group felt that Fidesz catered too much to European and international agendas and was therefore not the nationalist party of strength that Hungary needed to take the country forward (Nagy and Róna 2011). Jobbik registered as an official political party in October 2003, now known as Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik, Movement for a Better Hungary). Jobbik ran as a coalition partner to its radical right predecessor MIÉP for the 2006 national elections with a poor

---

125 The Hungarian Life and Justice Party (MIÉP) managed to pass the 5% electoral threshold in 1998 but feel short of electoral support afterwards.
electoral turnout\textsuperscript{126} leading Jobbik to run alone in the 2010 elections.\textsuperscript{127} One of the original founders and chairman of Jobbik is Gábor Vona. Still only in his early thirties, Vona embodies the youthful side of the radical right, often giving speeches in blue jeans and polo shirts, also fitting of Jobbik’s anti-elitist platforms.

LMP (\textit{Lehet Más a Politika} – Politics Can Be Different) emerged as a social initiative from a youth-based network of Hungarian environmental NGOs and university student networks in September 2008 (Lapos 2010). LMP officially registered as a political party in February 2009. The party was developed mainly at the Corvinus University in the specialist college TEK, which is known for its more liberal and eco-conscious stance (discussed in Chapter 6). Although LMP originally rejected ideological party labels of any kind, the core members, led by András Schiffer (also in his early thirties), eventually defined LMP as a ‘green party’, reflected in their 2010 Party Manifesto.\textsuperscript{128} The foundations of LMP are similar to Jobbik and Fidesz in that the party was originally an informal youth group, without official membership or internal hierarchy. LMP maintained its non-hierarchical core until the 2010 national elections when András Schiffer was put forth as party chairman. Like Jobbik, LMP targeted political corruption and the need for transparency among the elite, rallying for voter involvement in overturning the trends of blatant corruption seen in leading parties (Keil 2011).

\textsuperscript{126} The MIÉP – Jobbik coalition received only 1.7% and 2.2% in the two rounds of elections.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Miért alakult meg a Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom-párt (Why was the Movement for a Better Hungary founded?)}, zuglo.jobbik.hu (Hungarian), <Accessed 6 January 2008>.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Lehet Más a politika 2010 országgyűlési választás, LMP 2010 Manifesto,} (Budapest: 2010). Note: Although the future of LMP is currently uncertain they represent a political party format and structure relevant for gaining youth support and increasing participation through alternative activism. There is currently fractioning within LMP over the issue of whether or not to join larger opposition movements against Fidesz. The main issue concerns the electoral ‘Alliance for Change’ between the Gyurcsány-led Democratic Coalition, the Bajnai-led ‘Together 2014’ movement and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. LMP’s future state is therefore currently uncertain.
Both parties are significant for their ability to cultivate youth support and activism in the form of mass mobilization and voting allegiances. In a nationwide survey of Hungarian party preference, conducted in the fall 2012, results showed high levels of continued support for LMP and Jobbik among university students and young working people. As shown in Figure 3.2, 33% of the youth first and foremost supported Jobbik while 29% supported LMP. Contrary to Fidesz’s strong electoral success the conservative party ranked with substantial support but placing third with 24% support from this cohort while the Socialist Party (MSZP) received only 7%. 62% of young voters support the two new parties compared with only 22% of the average electorate Meanwhile the average electorate gave 72% to the established parties, MSZP and Fidesz.

---

129 It should be noted that there is a substantial increase in undecided voters since 2010. Currently disaffected voters make up as much as 55% of the voting population. Youth data comes from: ‘Racionálisan lázadó hallgatók 2012’, Aktív Fiatalok Magyarország (AFM), <http://aktivfiatalok.hu/> Nationwide party preference data comes from Szonda Ipsos polling (published 18 February 2013). 130 Data comes from: ‘Racionálisan lázadó hallgatók 2012’, Aktív Fiatalok Magyarország (AFM), <http://aktivfiatalok.hu/>.
131 Latest Ipsos poll shows Fidesz retaining solid lead against Socialists’, Politics.hu, (18 February 2013), <http://www.politics.hu>.
Jobbik serves most essentially as an example of a highly successful youth-based party that has managed to develop and maintain support in a seemingly short amount of time while LMP is a less successful example of a new youth-based party. Analyzing why this is, section 3.2.1 looks at the movement mentality of the two parties and their ability to blend grassroots structures and subcultures within their parties’ foundations and networks. Section 3.2.2 goes forward in analyzing the successes and limitations of these two parties are analyzed with reference to their ability in creating a stable following of activist youth supporters.

3.2.1 Movement Strategies: Horizontal and Vertical Processes

Although Jobbik and LMP represent opposite sides of the political spectrum they share strong foundational, tactical and even ideological approaches with regards to eco-conscious policies and varying degrees of Euroskepticism, drawing in large support from young Hungarians. The significant difference in success between the two parties lies in their structural development and grassroots alliances cultivating distinct subcultures. Similar to the non-hierarchical and movement-like strategy of early Fidesz both LMP and Jobbik have reproduced tactics blending grassroots efforts with political alignment (Korkut 2012). Jobbik and LMP became successful participatory and electoral alternatives to traditional parties for young people in 2010 by combining informal grassroots participation with formal political options.

This section examines Jobbik and LMP analyzing 1) how they organize through non-traditional media, 2) their abilities to create coalitions with grassroots movements and 3) their distinct party aims that appeal to activist youth culture and previously disillusioned young Hungarians. Similar to Fidesz’s foundations at ELTE

---

132 Subcultures referenced here as behavioral patterns and cultural values that are distinct to a particular group in society with distinguishable traits.
University, both Jobbik and LMP parties were formed informally within Budapest universities. Young radical intelligentsia founded Jobbik’s core as early as 1999 within ELTE University as one of Fidesz’s youth-based civic circles (Havas 2009, Korkut 2012). Meanwhile a more mixed-liberal network of intelligentsia and environmental activists began formulating LMP as early as 2007, networking within the Corvinus University special college, TEK, before their 2009 transformation into a political party. Both parties made their electoral debuts, gaining nationwide attention at the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. Although LMP only managed 2.61%, unable to enter the European Parliament, Jobbik made headlines by winning 14.77%. By the 2010 national elections both parties increased their support. Jobbik won 16.67% of the vote while LMP passed the electoral threshold with 7.47%.

Jobbik and LMP have used similar techniques in cultivating national recognition and electoral support, first and foremost in their creation of alternative methods of gaining media coverage. Both parties have been highly innovative in their usage of alternative news media creating their own interactive online portals, incorporating news, blogs and social networking aspects, most used by younger Hungarians (Solheim et. al. 2013). While older cohorts increasingly use online media across Europe, in Hungary daily usage remains much higher among younger cohorts (discussed in Chapter 7). Jobbik is supported by a variety of radical right online portals, most notoriously Kuruc.info (said to be maintained by the party) and Baríkad.hu, which also distributes a weekly magazine (Havas 2009, Bartlett et. al. 2012, Nagy et. al. 2012). Kuruc.info, run from an American website domain to avoid

---

133 As explained by LMP core member and party translator Balint Pinczes. Interviewees of LMP within TEK also recall LMP founders coming and holding discussions within the special college.
government interference, has been attacked openly by the government for its overt racist and xenophobic content (see Chapter 7). While less innovative than Jobbik, LMP was also highly active online distributing news emails to followers and posting articles and updates on their webpage during elections.

Ignoring the difficult access to mainstream media coverage, both parties used YouTube to create farcical as well as more serious political campaign ads attracting young voters. Outside of their own online networks both parties have also used activist shock methods to spark more mainstream media attention. During campaign time LMP created flash mobs and human chains to visually force people to pay attention to their issues, such as Fidesz’s media laws, environmental concerns and political corruption. Meanwhile Jobbik’s party chairman Gábor Vona and MEP Krisztina Morvai have made mainstream headlines in their visible displays of radical right support. Vona fulfilled one of his party promises by wearing the controversial uniform of the illegal paramilitary Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) at the opening session of parliament while Morvai has led groups of irredentist Hungarians to Versailles mourning the 1920 Treaty of Trianon.

The second organizational strategy that both parties have attracted youth networks from is in their blending and coordination with grassroots organizations. These organizations and informal networks (discussed in Chapter 4) do not necessitate official party membership but do assume party support and potential electoral partisanship, similar to civic circles. While Fidesz cultivated civic circles to develop its own grassroots network, newer youth-based parties have spread their

---

support through horizontal grassroots movements. LMP has mainly networked through various green NGOs such as Védegylet Egyesület (Protect the Future).\textsuperscript{137} Funding for the party has come in part from green organizations and parties across Europe. LMP has worked closely with the German Greens, taking from their structure and planning, as well as developing their youth camp mainly as an eco-learning space they call a Summer University (Nyári Egyetem) rather than a camp. Their ‘universities’ are run by mainly by the green Hungarian organization Ökopolitikai Műhely Alapítvány (Ecopolitics Workshop Foundation) that set up projects, events and political lectures by green parties across Europe.\textsuperscript{138} LMP also originally attached itself to the opposition movement Milla that spoke out against the Fidesz government’s controversial Media Law in 2010 (discussed in Chapter 4). Internal conflict over the direction LMP should take regarding its potential cooperation with other political parties and movements has led to a split within the party.\textsuperscript{139}

While LMP’s inability to maintain its internal and external networks led to the party’s split, Jobbik has developed a strong and loyal network system within the radical right. Often these organizations are unofficially attached or created by Jobbik but maintain a separate leadership and constitution. Despite being an official political party Jobbik describes itself as a movement, as implied by its full party title ‘Jobbik, Movement for a Better Hungary’. Jobbik works closely with other radical right civil

\textsuperscript{137} Védegylet is a green NGO that was founded in 2000 to encourage people in participating in local and national public affairs concerning environmental protection and sustainable energy issues: Official Védegylet Website, \texttt{<http://www.vedegylet.hu/>}.

\textsuperscript{138} Information from: Official Website of Ökopolitikai Műhely Alapítvány (Ecopolitics Workshop Foundation), \texttt{<http://okopolmuhely.hu/>}.

\textsuperscript{139} In October 2012 the arrival of a new political alliance Együtt 2014 (Together 2014) put LMP in a difficult position. Together 2014 is made up of a ex-Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai and two of the strongest grassroots opposition movements, Milla and unionist group Szolidaritás (discussed in Chapter 4). LMP has fractioned as a party, dividing over whether to join a political union that might include Together 2014 and MSZP or not. LMP has previously held anti-communist sentiments which hold back some of their core representatives from joining a coalition that would include MSZP.
organizations (Solheim et. al. 2013). Radical-right civil organizations are numerous and growing in Hungary. The two most active and powerful groups working with Jobbik are the well-known paramilitary group, the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) and the active Sixty-Four County Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegeye Ifjúsági Mozgalom- HVIM) (grassroots social movements analyzed in Chapter 4).

Lastly, both parties have supported similar populist platforms targeting elite and political corruption, political transparency including lustration of the previous regime and the need for sustainable environmental policies. These newer Hungarian parties are bringing ‘subterranean politics’ to the mainstream (Káldor and Selchow 2013).\textsuperscript{140} Beyond their online presence and accessibility through grassroots methods, Jobbik and LMP are attractive to the youth largely because they are addressing sociopolitical concerns that had previously been avoided in mainstream political discourses. Both parties vocalized the need to rise up against political corruption and flagged transparency issues during campaigns while rallying around the voter as a key component in changing Hungary (Keil 2011). Jobbik often differentiates itself from typical politicians and elites within its Manifesto as well is within speeches of representatives. As declared by Jobbik presidential nominee, Krisztina Morvai (now a Jobbik MEP) at the General Assembly introducing the 2010 Jobbik Manifesto:

\textit{Hungary, our communal home, is in crisis. And though it may be possible to list the symptoms of this crisis, it is now also necessary to finally endeavor to apply those remedies, which politicians would like to have us believe simply do not exist... This lie can now be maintained no longer.}

(Krisztina Morvai at the Jobbik General Assembly, 16 January 2010)\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{140} ‘Subterranean Politics’, as coined by Kaldor and Selchow (2013), are previously marginalized heterogeneous social movements and collective action that utilize political opportunity and breach mainstream public opinion.

\textsuperscript{141} English translation of the speeches from the General Assembly announcing the 2010 Jobbik Manifesto provided by the Jobbik official website: <http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>.
The anti-elite and anti-establishment topics brought up by both LMP and Jobbik are some of the main draws for youth support (Nagy and Róna 2011). Other common platforms include progressive leftist economic policies tied with ecologically aware economic and social policies. While the majority of attention paid to Jobbik focuses on the party’s more radical nationalist social policies their economic policies are similar to LMP in their national focus on a strong interventionist state to counteract the damaging effects of globalization (Nagy et. al. 2012).

3.2.2 ‘Two Hungaries’: A Polarized Youth

Behind the concept of ‘two Hungaries’ lies a history of sociopolitical and ideological division in Hungary, going back to longstanding polarities starting in the 16th century during the peasant revolts which, drew a line between the urban city-dwellers (emberek meaning men or people) and the ‘civilians’ or populists (polgári). Current streams of populist political rhetoric used by Fidesz and Jobbik also denote a distinct division in Hungary between the people and the real Hungarian citizens. Fidesz used this differentiation explicitly in the changing of the party’s full title to Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség) differentiating Fidesz from the more urban-based MSZP. This differentiation is also apparent among LMP and Jobbik voters showing a distinct regionalism of a more cosmopolitan liberal LMP based in Budapest and the more polgári countryside support of Jobbik in the Northeast. Budapest is often stereotyped as a liberal center of corruption by the radical right while the countryside is exemplified as being pious and untainted, not dissimilar to the rhetoric produced by many populist parties across Europe.

-----------

142 Data from comparing Jobbik’s 2010 Manifesto and LMP’s 2010 Manifesto. Jobbik even has a specific section of the manifest dedicated to ‘Agricultural and Rurul Renewal’ as well as environmental and energy sections that are very similar to LMP’s ‘Sustainable Rural Areas Programme’. See also Nagy and Róna (2011) and Nagy et. al. (2012).
Figure 3.3: Mapping The Top 20 Constituencies of Jobbik and LMP

The two maps show the urban-rural divide between LMP and Jobbik. Jobbik support is dominant in the northeastern region of Hungary, mainly ex-industrial areas hit hard by transition with higher Roma populations. LMP support is based almost entirely in Budapest, with a small pocket of support throughout Pécs, considered a liberal culture center of Hungary.

---

Jobbik’s Top Scores: 33.1% in Tiszavasvári, 32.1% in Ózd, 30.6% in Tiszaújváros, 30.1% in Mátészalka, 29.8% in Sajószentpéter, 29.7% in Kunhegyes, 29.5% in Heves, 28.9% in Mezőkövesd, 28.8% in Kazincbarcika, 28.7% in Füzesabony, 27.9% in Hatvan, 27.7% in Miskolc 1, 27.6% in Kiskárdi, 27.6% in Szerencs, 26.7% in Szarvas, 26.5% in Miskolc 4, 26.1% in Gyöngyös, 25.5% in Mezőtúr, 25.4% in Hódmezővásárhely, 24.7% in Miskolc 3. Note: A majority of these provinces are within the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg province.

LMP Top Scores: 17.5% in Budapest 9, 16.7% in Budapest 8, 16.4% in Budapest 1, 16.0% in Budapest 21, 15.6% in Budapest 10, 15.5% in Budapest 22, 14.8% in Budapest 12, 14.3% in Budapest 31, 13.8% in Budapest 15, 13.7% in Pilisvörösvár/Pest province, 13.6% in Budapest 17, 13.3% in Budapest 19, 13.2% in Budapest 6, 13.1% in Budapest 4, 12.9% in Pécs 3/Baranya province, 12.9% in Budapest 3, 12.8% in Budaörs/Pest, 12.8% in Pécs 4/Baranya, 12.7% in Szentendre/Pest, 12.6% in Budapest 18. Statistics calculated from ‘Election Resources’ from the Hungarian Government: http://www.electionresources.org/hu/maps.php?election=2010. Images developed by http://www.flickr.com/photos/almodozo/4516511580/.
This stereotype was played out in the 2010 elections looking at the political support for Jobbik compared with LMP seen in Figure 3.3. The concept of a right-left divide along regional lines has marginalized among youth supporters into an LMP-Jobbik divide. The urban population of Budapest gave the large majority of support to LMP while Jobbik managed up to 32% electoral success in more rural northeastern parts of the country (see Figure 3.3). Despite the disintegration of the bipolar MSZP-Fidesz divide, polarization remains a political tool to create unity and support networks (Palonen 2009). The more radical this polarization becomes the more Hungary is developing a youth population embodying the division of ‘two Hungaries’.

Jobbik and LMP represent a youth-based polarization in Hungarian political culture. This polarization was first solidified by the ‘bipolar hegemony’ between right and left, embodied by Fidesz and MSZP between 1994 and 2010 (Palonen 2009 – previously discussed in Chapter 1). Hungarian researchers looking at the apparent political and value-based division among the youth, between radical right and liberal support, have coined the term ‘two Hungaries’ (két Magyarország) (Gombár et. al. 2005, Gombár et. al. 2005, Osiris 2005, Palonen 2009, Szalai 2011, Rupnik 2012, Bruck 2012). In Hungary the youth generation is split due to the lack of generational continuity in the post-communist era and the socializing influence of the strong bipolar divide in Hungarian politics. Erzsébet Szalai (2011) explains that the youth cohort does not fit the criteria of having a coherent ‘generation’. Szalai outlines the three criteria for defining a generation as 1) a common developmental youth/teen experience, 2) rebellion against the parent generation turning into a common ideology or philosophy and 3) a common enemy perception (Szalai 2011).
The current parent generation in Hungary united over the transitional experience going from a socialist system to a democracy and the grandparent generation was defined by the post-1956 experience of communism. However, there has not been any significant uniting event or historical parameter to fuse the current youth cohort under a common experience. The youth was socialized at the height of political polarization between MSZP and Fidesz, normalizing a divided, rather than united, political youth culture. High levels of popular support for right wing and radical right politics in Hungary are undeniable. However, the less obvious but significant parallel trend of continued bipolar political divisions is continued among the youth. This division is politically exemplified in the form of Jobbik and LMP and the grassroots organizations attached to these opposing sociopolitical sides. While this division is most visible in the demonstrations of grassroots and social movements (discussed in Chapter 4) it is also visible in the polarized youth support divided between Jobbik and LMP, as seen in Figure 2.1 youth support of Jobbik (33%) and LMP (29%) are above all other political parties (Nagy et. al. 2012). These two distinct political camps have emerged in Hungary creating a split political culture among the youth. The existence of a strong political divide between right and left has re-emerged since the mid 1990s in Hungary (Kitschelt et. al. 1999, Kitschelt 1995 and 2002). This sociopolitical split is currently exacerbated into extremes within the youth context, with regionally divided urban-rural implications (as seen in Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Socioeconomic divisions related to partisanship, as well as differences in developing youth subcultures are exemplified in an analysis of political youth camps in Hungary.

3.3. POLITICAL YOUTH CAMPS IN HUNGARY

The following section gives a detailed overview of political youth camps in Hungary. Participant observation during my fieldwork included attending three out of
four of the parliamentary parties’ youth camps taking place in Summer 2011. I was unfortunately not able to attend the youth camp of MSZP for organizational reasons, however, as discussed previously in this chapter, MSZP has a much smaller and marginal youth base. Most liberal and left wing youths in Hungary tend to prefer LMP and other newer movement-parties such as Together 2014.

Fidesz was the first democratic party in Hungary to establish an official youth organization associated with its party, allowing the party to continue its youth legacy through a highly structured and organized youth faction. Fidelitas was created in 1996. It has subsequently grown larger than any other political youth organization in Hungary. Members of Fidelitas are between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five while official party membership of Fidesz is not required. To create a more strictly politically aligned youth group Fidesz created Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat (Fidesz Youth Organization – Fidesz IT). Fidesz IT focuses largely on international relations, networking with other conservative youth organizations abroad and assisting Fidesz in media management and youth recruitment. Differing from Fidelitas, Fidesz IT members have an age limit of thirty and must be official party members of Fidesz. All Fidesz members under the age of thirty are automatically enlisted in Fidesz IT.

Jobbik created its own official youth section in January 2011. Jobbik IT (Jobbik Ifjúsagi Tagozat). Jobbik IT has a national organizing committee of eight members that manage the various county youth divisions. Jobbik claims over one hundred Jobbik IT organizations across the country with nearly two thousand official

\[\text{Data official from the Deputy International Secretary of Fidesz IT in 2011 as well as Fidelitas’ official website: www.fidelitas.hu [accessed April 2010]}
\[\text{Fidesz IT, Bemutatkozás, <http://www.ifjusagitagozat.hu/Bemutatkozas.aspx?menuid=3>. Information was also given from interviewing Fidesz IT international representative.}
\[\text{Fidesz ‘Youth Department’, Ifjúsági Tagozat (IT), www.ifjusagitagozat.hu [accessed November 2009]}\]
members. On their official website Jobbik IT sets out its aims to attract young Hungarians away from apathy and pessimism, participation in local and national youth initiatives and have fun meeting like-minded people participating in a number of events. LMP created a youth division attached to the party informally between late 2011 and early 2012. While the group is not currently recognized by parliament as an official youth organization members congregate and organize within the LMP party. A few hundred active members are estimated to network, primarily throughout Budapest. Although the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) once had a significant youth organization youth support of MSZP was damaged directly when the young Socialist MP János Zuschlag, head of the MSZP youth organization ‘Young Leftists’ (Fiatal Baloldal- FIB), was arrested in 2007 for embezzling up to 75 million forints (about 300,000 Euros). While MSZP still maintains a youth division it has never fully recovered from what is now known as the ‘Zuschlag scandal’.

Youth members have varying levels of participation. A large majority of members are involved only around election times or for social gatherings; however, dedicated members meet weekly and play integrative roles in administering Fidesz directives, building political connections. While membership expectations tend to vary, depending on region and local headquarters, assisting in campaign efforts by distributing posters, rallying and retrieving list votes during election times are considered a minimum requirement of membership.

148 Finances were reportedly attached to the ‘Third Millennium Foundation’ and other FIB youth organization planning. The liberal-left has since been linked to numerous financial scandals, some speculative and some convicted, and the right and radical-right have been quick to utilize them in their political oppositions. Reports from fn.hu and politics.hu 2007
149 Information from interviews with Youth Organization representatives from Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP.
150 In the Hungarian electoral process, previous to 2011 Fidesz changes made to the voting system, parties running for office have to collect a certain number of ‘list signatures’ to show that they have
Table 3.2: Political Youth Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Group</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Date Created</th>
<th>~Membership</th>
<th>Age Limits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidelitas</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>35 and Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz IT</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>30 and Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKSZ151</td>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>35 and Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societas</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>1999 &amp; 2008*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>35 and Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik IT</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>~2,000</td>
<td>14-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP IT</td>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>2011/2012**</td>
<td>A few hundred</td>
<td>30 and Under</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table data comes from Youth Organizations official websites. Fidelitas, Fidesz IT, Jobbik IT and LMP IT representatives have confirmed figures and data.

* MSZP’s original Youth Organizations was Fiatal Baloldal (Young Left), created in 1999 but dissolved in 2008 due to financial scandals. Reformed as Societas–Új Mozgalom (New Movement).

** LMP IT has been informally created between 2011 and 2012 but it is uncertain whether or not the Hungarian Parliament officially recognizes the group as of yet.

An overview of political youth camps shows the difference in the types of support Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP are attracting. Camp access, agenda and camper profile displays the type of youth activism cultivated within these political parties. Research on young party members in Europe distinguish between three types of youth party members based on their incentives for participation: 1) the moral minded members pursuing ideological and policy preferences, 2) the professional minded member using membership to benefit a material and/or career path and 3) social minded members with altruistic group oriented goals (Bruter and Harrison 2009, see also Clark and Wilson 1961, Pedersen et. al. 2004). Based on the young party members criteria laid out by Bruter and Harrison (2009) each of the three parties in question fits a different genre of membership. Fidesz members fit a professional-

---

valid support to run for office. A certain number of list papers are needed depending on the district and region for a party to appear on the ballots.

151 IKSZ (Ifjúsági Kereszténydemokrata Szövetségis – Christian Youth Association) is the official Youth Organization for the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt- KDNP).
minded profile, Jobbik contains more socially minded members and LMP draws in moral-minded memberships.\textsuperscript{152} This is apparent in analyzing the youth organization summer camps (\textit{ifjúsági tagozat nyári tabor}) looking at the camp outline, event activities and participant profile.

\textbf{Table 3.3: Political Party Youth Camps at a Glance}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Campers</th>
<th>Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>21,700 Ft (Miskolc)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lake Balaton in Hotel</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>Fidelitas Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,000 Ft (Balaton)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>6,000 Ft per day</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Árnyas Sziget Camp Budapest</td>
<td>180-200</td>
<td>Anyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,000 Ft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>2,500 Ft (Miskolc)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>In a field in Sostofalva.</td>
<td>80-100</td>
<td>Jobbik supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,000 Ft (Balaton)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lake Balaton Tengerpart</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Access to political party youth camps varied between the three parties in openness, location, number of participants and cost. Concerning camp access Fidesz is the most closed of the camps. Attendants had to be youth party members. Many attending had also been to the camp previously. The cost of the ‘camp’ was also higher than the other camps costing 21,700 Forint (about 77 Euro). The four-day event was more like a conference than a camp taking place within a three star hotel (Hotel Ezüspart) on the water’s edge at Lake Balaton.\textsuperscript{153} Of the camps, Fidelitas had the most participants (370 campers).

LMP conducted a very different set up. LMP was not the organizer of the camp, nor was LMP written on any of the signs or posters officially at the camp. The camp is organized by the Ecopolitical Workshop Foundation (\textit{Ökopolitikai Műhely}

---

\textsuperscript{152} In this criteria professional-minded youth members join in order to better their position for gaining job opportunities or financial incentives. Social members join parties to meet like-minded people and create friend networks while interacting with their locality. Moral-minded members join parties to participate in pushing what they feel to be important issues forward in the political world (Bruter and Harrison 2009).

\textsuperscript{153} Lake Balaton is a well off middle and upper class area where many Hungarians have second homes. Due to the higher price of a location with hotel rooms one participant mentioned that financial aid from the party was available to some participants.
Alapítvány), referred to as a ‘Summer University’ (Nyári Egyetem) and includes a number of other green foundations and organizations supporting the camp. Access was open to anyone who wanted to come for either the entire four-day camp or a day ticket could be purchased. The price for just one day was 6,000 forints (slightly over 20 euros) or 15,000 forints (around 53 Euros) for the full five-day course of the camp. The camp was held at Árnyas Sziget Youth Camp, located within greater Budapest. Participants could come with a tent or for slightly more money there were a dozen log cabin type set ups that groups or families could stay in. 225 participants signed up for the camp with about 180-200 participants around on any given day.

Jobbik’s camp was also open to non-official members. Uniquely, Jobbik held two separate youth camps, each for four days in order to target youths from both the countryside and the city. One camp took place at Balaton Tengerpart costing 5,000 forints (about 18 euros for four days), considered the Nemzeti Tabor (National Camp). The second Jobbik youth camp took place in the Northeastern region of Hungary where the highest levels of Jobbik support can be found in Miskolc, in the field of a small town called Sóstofalva, called the Bórsod County camp and was half the price of the other camp (2,500 forints for the four days - less than 10 euros). The national camp had 200 participants while the Borsod County camp had around 80 to 100 participants.

Activities in the three camps varied, perhaps not in outline but in execution. While all three camps had political and national figures speaking content and presentation differed greatly. Fidesz had a well-planned schedule laying out various options throughout each day that individuals could partake in. These ranged from

---

154 http://okopolmuhely.hu/
155 At both the LMP and Jobbik camps there was an increase of participants on the weekends that came out for either the day or the weekend.
formal speeches and presentations from politically relevant individuals to lakeside sporting events. Those attending speeches tended to be the more politically devoted Fidelitas members, many seeing participation and immersion as helping them in their future political careers. Party events were held at night with dancing and socializing. LMP camp also had a well-planned structure with lectures and workshops taking place throughout the day. Speeches did not always touch upon specifically Hungarian issues and many times topics were about sustainable living questioning routes towards political change. LMP had the most diverse range of speakers including party representatives from the German Greens. Lectures also had translators available to assist in translating English lectures into Hungarian and Hungarian lectures into English. Headsets were available in the back of each lecture cabin. Some had been to this camp in previous years while others had come alone or with a friend for the first time.

Jobbik camp was organized on the outset. The original program included many events, but in reality it was a much looser schedule with many things on the hardcopy plan being ignored or falling into disarray. The camp was visited by party chairman, Gábor Vona for an hour to give a speech and sit with campers answering questions. Other than two political figures speaking the rest of the camp was created around leisure fun and traditional Hungarian sports and craft. Horseback riding, archery, shooting (with political figures from other parties as the targets), bullwhip and learning **rovás irás**, were all available. At night music was played and people gathered to sing, drink and bond. This was the first year Jobbik camp has existed so most participants were very new, few being official members.
Table 3.4: Camper Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Core Age</th>
<th>Economic Status</th>
<th>Clothing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidelitas</td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>Middle to Upper</td>
<td>Generally more formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>All ages mixed</td>
<td>Middle to Upper</td>
<td>Business casual-Hippy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>17-22</td>
<td>Lower to Middle</td>
<td>Casual-Nationalist-Traditional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The profile of campers varied greatly between the camps. At the Fidesz camp there was a much more professional feel to the organization as well as profile of camp participants. At lectures held by various political and national figures there was a mixture of formal suits, white button up shirts as well as more casual lakeside wear but nothing as informal as swimwear. Speakers, political figures or relevant individuals, all wore suits. Campers ranged mainly between the ages of 21 and 30 though the core group of attendance was in the latter 25 to 30 year old age category. Lehet Más A Politika campers had the greatest range in diversity. It was not specifically a youth camp and organizers as well as participants ranged across the spectrum from younger voters in their early to mid-20s to families with children to older liberals from academic circles. Even dogs were welcome to participate. The dress code was very casual though speakers tended on a more business casual line of dress. There was a significant amount of participants in more ‘hippy-wear’ attire with hemp clothing and loose fitting attire. Jobbik campers were the youngest core group of participants of the three camps. Ages ranged from 12, being the youngest camper, up through early 30s but by far the main age cohort was in the 17 to 22 range. This was the age range of the majority of campers. Jobbik also had the most homogenous ‘look’ of the three camps. There was an obvious abundance of Harcos t-shirts and outerwear as well as a very visible wearing of significant radical right symbols such as maps of greater Hungary, the Turul bird, *rovás írás* writing (usually saying...
Hungary), Petofi figures and tribal Atilla the Hun icons. There was a visible skinhead group though they were not the majority. There was also a visible group with ‘traditional wear’ (hagyományos) as well as more Turulistic wear, referencing Atilla the Hun and ancient warriors. Even speakers that came to the camp such as Gabor Vona and the now controversial Csanad Szegedi wore casual attire or hints of tribal wear. Most participants came from the Northeastern region of Hungary, but groups also came from Budapest with a spattering of participants from other regions.

As seen by the camps described above, as an example of youth party membership and relationship to the political party Fidesz maintains a youth organization with a more professionally aligned membership base. Jobbik draws in a wider range of stereotypically social-minded members, cultivating friends, defining themselves by group orientation and interacting with like-minded people. LMP, from its nature as a green party as well as its more university-formatted camp draws members that are mainly morally minded, pursuing policy change and ideological goals.

***

Young people feel increasingly alienated from mainstream politics, feeling a lack of choice between professional politicians who seem corrupted or separated from the issues of common society (Robertson 2009). Youth-based parties offer an alternative to mainstream politics by blending alternative grassroots participation with

---

156 These symbols and icons are discussed at length in the chapter on Social Networks as well as throughout this paper.
157 It is also important to remember that this was the Borsod County Jobbik camp in the Northeast. There was also a national camp held separately nearer to Lake Balaton.
traditional electoral participation. In Hungary the youth-party tradition began in 1989 with Fidesz and has recently been rejuvenated by newer youth-based parties, Jobbik and LMP. The creation of informal political participation in the form of civic circles not only became the precondition for Fidesz’s success (Enyedi 2005) but also laid the foundations of political strategies for both newer youth-based parties, who have used similar mobilization tactics and horizontal means of gaining support. These parties have been innovative in creating media-grabbing political stunts to reach wider audiences with their issues while also sustaining localized youth networks online and through events. Jobbik has maintained and increased its strong youth network by linking with other radical right networks, however, LMP has lost support by distancing itself from other liberal political and grassroots networks in its attempt to remain neutral.

The youth cohort has been socialized under a divided political culture. Fidesz’s transformation and concentration of the Hungarian right along with the liberal-left coalition between MSZP and SZDSZ developed a strong bipolar political hegemony between right and left between. This divisive political landscape peaked between 1998 and 2006 before liberal-left political scandals in 2006 eroded the bipolar divide to electorally favor the right by the 2010 national elections. This erosion created a significantly different political opportunity structure, giving Jobbik and LMP the opening to penetrate the political spectrum. Both parties used new media, cooperation with grassroots organizations and anti-elite platforms to garnish high levels of youth support. However, the strong polarized political culture remains among the youth, creating a split cohort, or ‘two Hungaries’, personified by the divided youth support for the radical right and alternative left. Political youth camps assist in exemplifying the socioeconomic and regional division apparent among the
youth based on partisanship. They also served show the different activism, values and motivations behind contemporary party membership for young Hungarians.

Political youth camps observed served to clarify the differences between how leading youth-based political parties coordinate their youth followers. There were vast differences between the profile, socioeconomic background and intent of campers. This also showed the strong unity of a developing subculture among the radical right. Other camps showed less visible unity.

Political parties are creating the primary context for political socialization to evolve within. The youth, raised under strong political bipolarities, show well-defined partisiances, even if this is sometimes defined most by what someone is not more than what they think they are. The next chapter gives maps the current development of grassroots social movements and movement parties, forming as an alternative to traditional political participation.
4. GRASSROOTS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & SUBCULTURES

Grassroots social movements, like political parties, are influential in political socialization in that they become the center of emotive responses to politicized topics and agendas, often activating previously passive or disillusioned citizens. They also have the ability to develop and disseminate new politically relevant topics and reframe the context or debate on preexisting topics, influencing sociopolitical culture and norms (Crossley 2002). Social movements represent a collective response challenging the existing power structures, uniting people with a common purpose, creating an interaction with elites, authorities and opposition (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). In this way grassroots social movements provide a space for political activism that is not confined to the formal structure or regulations of political organizations (van de Donk et. al. 2004). They are ‘organized conflicts’ or ‘conflicts between organized actors over the social use of common cultural values’ (Touraine 2002, p. 90). Social movements provide an answer to a threat or desire linked to a social group’s ability to make decisions and attempt to control changes, much like political parties.

Both grassroots social movements and political parties also have the potential to utilize other socializing agents, such as media outlets, to further their agendas.\textsuperscript{158} The purpose of this chapter is to map the most influential and visible grassroots social movements drawing out youth activism in Hungary in the last ten years and analyze how these movements are bridging the gap between the youth and politics. The movements targeted in this thesis are relevant in that they have been at the core of recent largest demonstrations and protests in Hungary. Most of them are also youth-

\textsuperscript{158} Grassroots social movements tend to have a single-issue target but can also diversify into a series of contentious campaigns or performances where ordinary citizens make a collective claim (Tilly 2004).
based movements, founded and run by younger Hungarian activists, although they have brought out a diverse age-range of support.

Like Chapter 3 on political parties, this chapter gives an analysis of current politically motivated grassroots social movements and how they are engaging and activating young Hungarians. There are two main parts to this chapter. The first looks at why the youth in particular are attracted to grassroots and social movements in general and in Hungary. The second part analyzes the blurring distinction between political parties and grassroots movements in Hungary as well as the blurring between social movements and popular culture. This blurring process is analyzed with reference to grassroots social movements’ role in attracting young people into politically participatory roles while inadvertently linking them to political partisanship and new subcultures.

Although Hungarian civil society is measured as declining in its strength by institutions such as Freedom House, there is a current resurgence of grassroots social movements in Hungary, which could improve civic participation in Hungary.159 Social movements are operating at the level of civil society or in a space between civil society and the state, developing distinctive cultural attributes, often affecting symbolic changes, collective identity and cultural politics (Melucci 1985, Martin 2002). Discussed later in this chapter, while civic participation is generally measured as a positive indicator of a healthy democracy (Dudley and Gitelson 2002, Wallace 2002) the most active grassroots movements in Hungary are not always cultivators of liberal democratic values.

159 Hungary was listed as the only Post-Communist nation where civil society was decreasing. ‘Democracy Deficit Grows in Former Soviet Union’, Freedom House, (Press Release: 27 June 2011), <www.freedomhouse.org>, (viewed 1 July 2011).
4.1 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT & POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN HUNGARY

There are a very few Hungarian specific studies looking at the social activism of the youth and youth perceptions of their role within society (Hideg and Nováky 2002, Hideg and Nováky 2009, Vásárhelyi 2006 and 2011). To date there have been no larger studies on youth participation in grassroots social movements in Hungary. Most research underestimates the scope of youth political activity by a narrow definition of youth political engagement (Owen 2008, Farthing 2010). As discussed in Chapter 3, civil society under state socialism was practically non-existent, monitored and oppressed by highly centralized state-controlled forces (Csepeli and Örkény 1992). Much of social and personal life was restricted to the family and close kin networks. While some believe that this socialist past has mainly indirect effects on the contemporary social and political experience in post-communist Europe (Mishler and Rose 1997) others believe that the cultural remnants from the previous era have impeded a healthy civil society from developing (Kovács 1996, Letki 2004, Mareš 2010).

During the 1980’s and into transition plurality increased and political civic engagement became more open and less prohibited. Political parties and social movements began to rapidly gain power by the rejection of state socialism (Csepeli and Örkény 1992). However, since the 1990s there was a decrease civic engagement on the local and national level. The main goal of achieving transition and establishing a democracy had been accomplished. Social movements and the ability to mobilize support for civic and non-governmental organizations decreased in the 1990s from a
scarcity of financial and citizen support combined with a still weak civil society (Szabó 1996, Rose-Ackerman 2007).  

Concern over the lagging development of a strong civic culture in Central and Eastern Europe includes a youth population that is uncompelled to give up free time for participation in NGOs, volunteering or community building (refer back to Figure 2.3). Civil activities were mandatory for the youth under the communist system (Zasavsky and Brym 1978). This is one source of the current alienation and cynicism towards political as well as civic institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997). In Central and Eastern Europe there remains low social capital and low levels of interpersonal trust leading to a weak political society lacking civil involvement (Letki 2004). While Western democracies have a stable culture of think tanks and NGOs, often supported by larger business or private investment, post-communist Europe has been less successful in developing similar organizations, often lacking resources, treated with apathy and seen skeptically by most of the public (Kurkchiyan 2003, Smilov and Tisné 2004, Grødeland 2006, Grødeland and Aasland 2011).

Youth participation in civic organizations is particularly low in Hungary discussed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.3). While Hungary remains below the EU27 average for youth participation in all organizations, from sports clubs to political parties, these figures are, for the most part, comparable with other post-communist countries. Levels of participation in human rights, international networking and

160 Only around 15% of Hungarians participate in some form of volunteering compared to an average of 35% in Western Europe. Hungary has also had the lowest increase in civil participation compared with other Central and Eastern European countries (Savicka 2008).
161 The Hungarian Pioneers (ages six to fourteen) and the Communist Youth Organization (ages fourteen to thirty) are prime examples of politically led youth civil programs made mandatory in Hungary (Volgyes 1975, Szabó 1991).
162 One of the reasons NGOs have not succeeded as widely in post-communist Europe is to a large extent due to the previous bureaucracy and red-tape of the Soviet era that developed informal networks to achieve goals rather than institutionalized processes (Grødeland and Aasland 2011).
political organizations are particularly low in Hungary. There are some organizations directed at youth involvement in democratic civil society but their membership remains largely marginalized.163

4.1.1 The Youth Appeal of Grassroots Social Movements

Grassroots social movements are the perfect vehicles for politically engaging the previously politically inactive youth. The youth across Europe and America are less interested in official politics, defined by elite political parties and nationally defined rules, and more interested in alternative forms of political participation (Donk et. al. 2004). Grassroots social movements are more appealing to the youth for three primary reasons dealing with form, focus and scope. Firstly, grassroots social movements allow for flexible forms of political involvement (Dahlgren 2004).164 For young citizens who have more flexible time schedules and the drive to be involved in sociopolitical change, the lack of formal restraints from membership or predesigned participatory rules is highly alluring. Secondly, unlike political parties, social movements have an undefined and changing scope, often joining with other organizations or movements, shifting goals or limiting aims to one-off events (Donk et. al. 2004). Lastly, building from the alternative social movements began in the 1960s and 1970s in America and Western Europe, new social movements tend to embrace diversity, decentralized informality and have the ability to span across national borders (Gundelack 1984).

163 There are some youth-directed NGOs at work in contemporary Hungary such as Mobilitas (mobilitas.hu), Amnesty International, The Foundation for Democratic Youth, and the Association of Community Developers (Közösségfillesztők Egyesülete- www.kka.hu). These groups aim at increasing youth volunteering and civic education, however their membership numbers remain relatively small.

164 Social movements are collective with a common purpose and create a social solidarity around a cause with sustained interaction aimed at elites or opposing authorities (Tarrow 1998). New forms of political participation are more ad hoc and less dependent on elites or hierarchical structures.
Online media, grassroots groups and decentralized local actors have made
democratic politics more complex and have allowed social movements to develop
protestors to question the legitimacy of power and refuse commitment to traditional
social norms and parties while at the same time refusing apathy and isolation (Pleyers
2005, Muxel 2001). While elements of western-style social movements are embodied
within the Hungarian case there remain some distinct differences. In Hungary
politically directed social movements provide an uncensored social space to address
topics that mainstream politics avoid, mainly corruption and politically sensitive
historical topics.

*The rebellion of the youth is aimed always first at topics that are taboo for societies. In the 50s and 60s it was a sexual revolution and nowadays we rebel against grounds of policy and history. Especially the Treaty of Versailles and things that have not been taught. We are still in a transition era. It is still considered an insult to speak about it. So people seek out these topics that they are not supposed to talk about and start talking about it. Because grown up politicians still find it difficult to address.* (Lászlo, Age 24: Budapest)

Observed in the United States and Western Europe, many social movements
are based on conflicts organized against people or power structures at a global level
and often targeting effects of globalization (Touraine 2002). However, in Hungary
the largest grassroots social movements are influenced by, and aimed towards,
discontent with national political elites and policies being made. Right wing, radical
right and alternative liberal-left social movements in Hungary have all been formed
on the basis of perceived political corruption. Hungary has a distinct branding of its
grassroots social movements using similar strategies to right wing and radical right
political parties.

---

165 This can be seen most recently with the Occupy movement as well as environmental movements that span across national borders.
In Hungary the largest grassroots social movements combine disillusionment and discontent towards the political elite with nationally relevant symbols and historic narratives, similar to Fidesz and Jobbik’s effective political tactics discussed in Chapter 3. The largest and most successful social movements in Hungary since 2002 have utilized distinct historical symbols and concepts, mainly: 1) that 1989 was not a legitimate ‘people’s revolution’ (Arato 1994), 2) that Hungary has a longstanding revolutionary tradition from 1848 and 1956 that is reflected today and 3) that Hungary is continuously suppressed as a nation by outside forces, tying in with points one and two. The last point is primarily reiterated by right wing and radical right movements while the first two points are used more generally across the political spectrum of grassroots social movements.\textsuperscript{166} It is important to note that political culture is ‘not what is happening in the world of politics, but what people believe about those happenings’ which can be empirical, value oriented or emotive (Pye and Verba 1965, p. 516).

The first point about feeling the need for a new ‘people’s revolution’ in Hungary is perpetuated within activist youth circles. The concept of 1989 as a ‘self-limiting revolution’ is rejected by more nationalist and radical right activists and was discussed openly in focus groups as well as individual interviews by activists. Most social movements drawing out youth activists revolve around the symbolic idea of developing a Fourth Republic to confront Hungary’s controversial aspects of history, holding politicians accountable for their scandalous and potentially undemocratic

\textsuperscript{166} Liberal activist/party group 4K! (Fourth Republic) and the radical right 64-County Youth Group both openly call for a people’s revolution that they feel did not happen in 1989. The concept of needing a further people’s revolution is apparent in nationalist and radical right movements like the Hungarian Guard and HVIM but also within liberal movements like 4K!, similar to LMP. See Table 4.1 for references on contemporary Hungarian Movements.
This symbolic revolution is also voiced openly through Fidesz, who referred poignantly to the 2010 national elections as a voter’s revolution, and through Jobbik’s call for complete political restructuring. These sentiments carry over into Hungarian activist traditions of demonstration and protest culture. Not only does the liberal movement-party 4K! literally stand for ‘fourth republic’ (negyedik köztársaság), implying the revolutionary need for a new republic, but the concept of a fourth republic has also been repeated by other larger movement-parties like Together 2014 (discussed in Section 4.2.1).

Regarding the second historically significant point current grassroots social movements are utilizing, past revolutions and historic national tragedies live on through constant use of their symbols, slogans and remembrance days (discussed further in Chapter 5 analyzing familial historical narratives). Nationally salient narratives are widely used by grassroots social movements in Hungary. Symbol formation within grassroots social movements is key in mediating sociopolitical understanding of a movement’s aims and discontents to the wider public (Laitin 1988).

Hungary’s revolutionary tradition has taken on national memorial dates of historically significant revolutions. Since 2006 the memorial days around the 1848 Revolution against the Hapsburgs and the 1956 Revolt against Soviet powers have become days of political activism, protests and demonstrations for political parties as well as oppositional activist groups (Palonen 2009). These national holidays have become institutionalized as days when political parties as well as grassroots social

---

167 The misrepresentation of Hungary’s recent and distant past is discussed more in Chapter 6 on Education.
168 Symbols used by movements enter people’s consciousness to unite and mobilize citizens (Tarrow 1998). Groups feel embedded within the world when they can trace their origins into history, tradition and ancient moments through relevant symbols. Mythical and historical symbols are thus transformed into modern relevant devices (Csepeli 1997).
169 March 15th is the national holiday in remembrance of the 1848 Revolution and October 23rd is the national holiday in remembrance of the 1956 Revolution.
movements, for and against the government, organize events and demonstrations. More recently the newly created national holiday day for remembrance of the Treaty of Trianon on June 4th has also drawn out more nationalist and radical right crowds.

Social movements and political parties are competing for public space on key symbolic days.

The last point, targeting Hungary as an oppressed nation by outside forces, ties in with the narrative of Hungary’s lacking revolution in 1989 as well as both revolutions in that international elites are the scapegoat for these happenings. Taking this perspective, 1989 was an elite-driven transition that kept key communist players in power. Both the 1848 against the Hapsburg’s rule and 1956 against Soviet rule both targeted international oppressive forces. While Hungary’s contentious past has been used by political parties and social movements to gain emotive leverage, the success or failure of marginalized political movements is highly dependent on shifts in the political opportunity structure.

The form and scope of grassroots social movements within a country are dependent on the sociopolitical opportunities available within a regime (Kitschelt 1986, Tarrow 1998). As discussed in Chapter 3, a shift in the political opportunity structure allows new players to enter the political sphere, also creating a space for alternative agents such as social movements (Kriesi et. al. 1995, Donk et. al. 2004). The same time periods allowing for strong political shifts in Hungary in 2002, 2006 and 2010, also cultivated new forms of politically motivated grassroots social

---

170 See Appendix 3 for a list of relevant events and speeches that I attended for research purposes.
171 In 2010 the Fidesz government instated June 4th as the Remembrance Day, known as the ‘national day of unity’ for the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. In parliament the new law about Trianon Day was supported by radical right party Jobbik as well as green party LMP. The Socialist Party MSZP was the only party not supporting the Fidesz initiative for the new national holiday. (‘Trianon Day in all but name’, The Budapest Times, (9 June 2010), <http://www.budapesttimes.hu/2010/06/09/trianon-day-in-all-but-name/>}.
movements. The first of these opportunities came in 2002 when Fidesz developed grassroots civic circles with non-membership oriented affiliations to the party, however, these circles were developed by Fidesz and mobilized by the party.

Two significant events in recent years in Hungary have sparked the creation and development of newer grassroots social movements across the political spectrum, bringing citizens out onto the streets to convey their discontent and speak out against the political elites. The first were the large-scale protests in reaction to the Prime Minister’s leaked tape in the Fall of 2006, giving way to a rise in civil youth activism supporting nationalism and the radical right. Later, as a counter-reaction to the 2010 Fidesz government, a new wave of visible liberal-left and green grassroots social movements appeared in Hungary. Parallel to the creation of alternative parties, Jobbik and LMP, youth-based networks have formed their own grassroots social movements that have developed outside of mainstream politics. Table 4.1 shows the larger, more significant grassroots social movements that have appeared since 2000 in Hungary. These movements are qualified by their common ideology bringing groups of people together in the attempt to achieve specific sociopolitical goals challenging existing power structures (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). The following sections focus on the primary grassroots activist groups in social politics, drawing youth supporters out onto the streets in alter-political movements.

Table 4.1 shows the more significant grassroots social movements developing since 2000. These movements are all aimed at sociopolitical topics, either in support of, or in opposition to, a political movement or party. Most of these movements are primarily youth-based apart from the Hungarian Guard, which has a largely middle-aged core, and Szolidaritás, which was created for the same purposes as Milla but
formatted itself on the Polish Solidarity unionist movement. Most Szolidaritás members are therefore also slightly older.

**Table 4.1 Significant Grassroots Social Movements in Hungary (2000 to Present)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Name</th>
<th>Created</th>
<th>Alignment</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64-County Youth Movement (HVIM)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>Supports regaining Hungary’s original borders. Supports other radical right parties and organizations. Arranges annual radical right culture festival ‘Magyar Sziget’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Guard</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>Grassroots paramilitary unit protecting the countryside. Protect Hungarian culture and tradition. Support radical right political movement Jobbik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milla</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Anti-Fidesz</td>
<td>Demonstrate and unite against undemocratic Fidesz legislation such as the New Media Law, new Constitution and other perceived restrictions on human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szolidaritás</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Anti-Fidesz</td>
<td>Similar to Milla but made mainly of trade unionists and a slightly older traditional crowd uniting for increased social security and equality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4K!*</td>
<td>2007/2011</td>
<td>‘Patriotic Left’</td>
<td>Originally to create public space for young Hungarians to ‘take back the streets’. To create community building. Supporting participatory democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Together 2014*</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Anti-Fidesz</td>
<td>Calling for an activist movement to unite all opposition parties and movements against Fidesz to overthrow the two-third majority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Békemenet **</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Pro-Fidesz</td>
<td>Created to counter Milla and Szolidaritás movements, rallying pro-government support for Fidesz.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 4K! and Together 2014 are significant in that they began as movements but became legitimately recognized political parties and will both be running in the 2014 elections. These ‘movement-parties’ are discussed in section 4.2.1.

** Békemenet (Peace March for Hungary) formed January 2012 by pro-Fidesz government supporters, marching to counteract anti-Fidesz movements. Participation ranges from 10,000 – 1,000,000.

While Facebook support is not a representative or accurate measurement of real participation it is a visual indicator of online support by mainly younger Hungarians. Figure 4.1 is given as an indicator of online support levels through Facebook usage supporting primary grassroots social movements and movement
parties. As seen in Figure 4.1, Milla has one of the highest online support networks compared with other grassroots social movements in Hungary.\footnote{Szolidaritás’ lower online support is most probably due to the group’s older cohort base, however, still has a relatively large online following compared with most social movement Facebook pages.} The online support around Milla and the Together 2014 movements are particularly impressive due to their more recent formations in 2010 and 2011.

**Figure 4.1: Facebook Support of Grassroots Social Movements**

The support levels given in Figure 4.1 correspond with ‘likes’ viewed 19 June 2013.

The seemingly low support online for radical right movements, HVIM and the Hungarian Guard, is surprising at first glance compared with the high levels of online support for Jobbik (see Figure 4.2) and the strong radical right alternative media online (discussed in Chapter 7). Searching on Facebook there are at least fifty-seven variations of HVIM pages and sixty-six variations of Hungarian Guard pages, mainly defined by supporters within local villages or towns across Hungary. This diffuses the support for one main Facebook page, which is often difficult to decipher from other pages with the same label. This is also indicative of grassroots social movements with strong localized networks that can feed into larger national grassroots activism,
catering to youth individualism allowing multiple levels of involvement and affiliation.

### 4.1.2 Radical Right Grassroots Social Movements

The 2006 MSZP political scandal, of the Prime Minister’s leaked tape, discussed in section 3.1.2, was utilized not only by right wing opposition, Fidesz, but by radical right movements, alongside Jobbik, to gain national attention (Waterbury 2010, Jordon 2010, Korkut 2012). The political scandal occurred just weeks before the Memorial Day for the 1956 Revolution against the Soviets and this day was utilized to unite the radical right counterculture against the government. Violence broke out between protestors and state police, climaxing with protestors taking over Hungary’s national media center, MTV (Magyar Televízió – Hungarian Television), harking back on the bloody 1956 revolution when revolutionaries stormed the media headquarters in Budapest. Rioting and protests continued for days on end outside of parliament. Meanwhile Jobbik became a visible group among protestors. Large red and white striped flags of the ancient King Árpád emerged among Jobbik supporters, controversially linked to the red and white stripes appearing on the flag used by the Hungarian Nazi Arrow Cross faction (Halasz 2009, Jordon 2010, Korkut 2012). This was also shocking since many Hungarians had not witnessed social movements that occupied public buildings, created blockades or incited police violence since 1956 (Szabó 1996). 

---

174 Among post-communist countries Hungary was previously considered to have the lowest levels of violent disruption or public disorder (Szabó 1996). Hungary did have taxi blockades occurring in the early 1990s around petrol inflation but nothing that would incite violence.
Jobbik and its radical counterparts appeared in the media as a strong and united young force addressing sociopolitical topics that had been previously ignored such as police crime (*rendőrség bűnözés*) and the much-evaded topic of gypsy crime (*cigánybűnözés*) (Halasz 2009, Magyari 2009). The 2006 protests were a crucial step for that radical right in gaining nationwide media coverage, giving Jobbik a platform to unite radical right subcultures and vocalize their discontent with current politics and corrupt politicians. While most grassroots social movements are defined by their inclusiveness and diversity, radical right movements tend to network in a more segregated fashion, often focusing on dense personal networks in smaller circles (van de Donk et. al. 2004).

Groups linked with the radical-right mentioned here are also of significance since, they have visibly supported the party at their events and rallies as well as signed informal agreements with Jobbik in 2009, creating what is referred to as the ‘Genuine National Side’ (*Valódi Nemzeti Oldal*). Both Fidesz’s civic circles and Jobbik’s affiliated movements support their respective political parties at events and demonstrations, also taking on civil roles during elections by handing out flyers and campaigning. However, Fidesz’s circles were developed as local informal support networks while radical right organizations have developed their own events and agendas outside of official Jobbik itineraries (discussed below). The two most well-known and large-scale radical right grassroots organizations are the 64-County Youth Movement (*Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom* abbreviated hereafter as HVIM) and the Hungarian Guard (*Magyar Gárda*).

175 In June 2009 leading representatives László Toroczkai (from HVIM), Róbert Kiss (from the Hungarian Guard), Zsolt Tyrityán (from the Army of Outlaws - *Betyársereg*) and Jobbik president Gábor Vona formed the ‘Genuine National Side’. ['Összefognak a nemzeti radikálisok', Index, (14 June 2009), <http://index.hu/belfold/2009/06/14/osszefognak_a_nemzeti_radikalosok/>].
The true participant numbers of these radical right groups and grassroots social movements are difficult to calculate. HVIM’s official Facebook page has just over 3,000 supporters while the main Hungarian Guard page has around 3,500 online supporters (see Figure 4.1).\(^{176}\) This is seemingly a low support number, however, both movements have numerous different Facebook pages and links corresponding to various regions and localities in Hungary, ranging in support from a few hundred to a few thousand. Regional support for HVIM and the Hungarian Guard tends to mirror Jobbik strongholds, showing larger networks in Northeastern Hungary (refer back to Figure 3.3).

**The Sixty-Four County Youth Movement (HVIM):**

As suggested by the movement’s name, HVIM is an irredentist nationalist group with an overarching goal of reinstating Hungary with its 64-county, pre-Trianon borders.\(^{177}\) The movement works closely alongside Jobbik and Jobbik’s youth faction (Jobbik IT), though they do not have official political ties to the party. HVIM is openly anti-EU and anti-globalization. Supporters of HVIM work alongside Jobbik’s youth organization, sometimes arranging events together, though not officially linked. HVIM is considered more extreme than Jobbik, as one Jobbik youth member explained:

‘*The 64 County Youth Movement is sort of partnered with Jobbik IT. They are separate but work with us. We do not share common members but they are invited to our demonstrations... We are good friends with them and have the same goals but sometimes different ways of getting those goals. It is good this way because they are more radical*’ (Péter, Age 24: Debrecen).

---

\(^{176}\) Most recently checked on 19 June 2013.

\(^{177}\) The post-WWI Treaty of Trianon distributed large portions of Hungary’s borders neighboring countries. The movement is named after the sixty-four Hungarian counties before the treaty.
Although HVIM was originally established in 2001, leadership has since changed and the movement’s following has grown significantly since the 2006 riots, when Jobbik and the radical right gained nationwide recognition.\textsuperscript{178} HVIM was an active force in the 2006 riots, leading the siege of the national radio headquarters, MTV, having drafted a petition against the government for the radio to read out, thought to incite the police violence that followed.\textsuperscript{179} While it is hard to calculate support levels this is most obviously marked by the increasing attendance at HVIM’s summer festival, \textit{Magyar Sziget} (Hungarian Island), which had over 10 thousand participants in 2009 (discussed further in section 4.2.2 analyzing the radical right as a subculture).\textsuperscript{180}

Besides the actual number of HVIM members the group is significant for its ability to develop a distinct radical right youth culture. With the ability to draw thousands of people out to attend anti-Trianon marches and music festivals, the youth group has become a strong youth-based grassroots social movement.\textsuperscript{181} The movement has been very successful in socializing young people around political partisanship directly for Jobbik, with their attendance and participation in riots, demonstrations and protests, as well as indirectly, with their immersion in popular culture creating concerts, festivals, charity events and establishing their own bars and

\textsuperscript{178} The original leader of HVIM is László Toroczkai who founded the group in 2001. In 2006 Toroczkai handed presidency over to Gyula György Zagyva possibly due to lawsuits brought forth against Toroczkai accusing him as instigating large-scale damage that was done to Hungary’s national media center, MTV, in Budapest during the 2006 riots. ['Court finds head of radical group responsible for damage in 2006 riots', \textit{Politics.hu}, (12 January 2012), <http://www.politics.hu/20120112/court-finds-head-of-radical-group-responsible-for-damage-in-2006-riots/>].


clubs (discussed in section 4.2.2). HVIM members are often seen beside Hungarian Guardsmen at local and national Jobbik rallies and political events.

**The Hungarian Guard:**

Jobbik’s party chairman, Gábor Vona, created the Hungarian Guard soon after the 2006 protests. The civil group was developed as a cultural organization with a paramilitary gendarmerie subdivision (csendőrség) to ‘prepare youth spiritually and physically for extraordinary situations when it might be necessary to mobilize the people’. The Hungarian Guard is a blend between a formal organization with official membership and a grassroots civil movement. The Hungarian Guard is also unique in that the movement draws from a broad age range with a majority of members between the ages of thirty-five and fifty, acting akin to an older counterpart of HVIM. The mission of the Hungarian Guard is to protect Hungarian culture and tradition, vowing to defend rural Hungarians that are victims of ‘gypsy crime’ (cigánybűnözés) (Jordon 2008). Like HVIM, the movement has undeniable links with Jobbik providing the party with a grassroots affiliation and well organized volunteer based militia created to work for the ‘Hungarian cause’ (Halasz 2009).

The Hungarian Guard’s uniform and presence is distinct and unmistakable. Members wear black military boots, white shirts and black caps, and a vest with the red and white striped Árpád Flag emblem while marching through provincial villages, attending official meetings and participating in Jobbik’s political rallies (Jordon 2008). Although it is difficult to estimate exact membership or support it is generally

---

183 An example of Jobbik’s links with the Hungarian Guard is the use of the Hungarian Guard uniform by head Jobbik MEPs. Controversially, just after the legal banning of the Hungarian Guards MEP Csanád Szegedi wore the Guard uniform attending the European Parliament July 2009: ‘Jobbik MEP wears banned Hungarian uniform in first EP session’, Politics.hu, (14 July 2009) first reported by MTI.
accepted that the Hungarian Guard is the largest and most well known radical right paramilitary organization in Hungary. Demonstrations in Budapest have brought out guardsmen by the hundreds. However, demonstrations in smaller localities have witnessed larger demonstrations upwards of a thousand.\textsuperscript{184} There is also a growing younger membership, as reported by Tibor, a youth member of the Debrecen Hungarian Guardsmen. As explained by Tibor the Hungarian Guard has been typecast as ignorant villagers but in fact are intelligent civil servicemen:

\textit{Everyone is thinking that the Hungarian Guard is chauvinist, uneducated and this is bull. If you look at the Hungarian guard, Jobbik and its youth [organization] the members are educated ...The only fault is that the Hungarian guard are really willing to do something for the nation and the government. We helped so many times and were called bad.} (Tibor, Age 24: Debrecen)

In May 2009 the Hungarian Courts ruled that the Hungarian Guard was illegal on grounds of engaging in racist and unconstitutional activities.\textsuperscript{185} The Hungarian Guard has since reformed ranks under various altered titles such as the New Hungarian Guard (Új Magyar Gárda) and the Better Future Civil Group (Szebb Jövőért Polgárőrség). While the Hungarian Guard continues under various titles they divide opinions among right wing and radical right youth activists. Some see the Hungarian Guard as violent radical fear mongers. Others see them as a symbol of national strength and civil unity that provide a service of protection that the government is not strong enough to take: \textsuperscript{186}


\textsuperscript{185} Although never proved, the group is linked to violence in Roma villages and over a dozen murders since 2006 (Salzmann 2009). In reaction to court rulings to ban the Hungarian Guard a group of up to 800 members demonstrated in Budapest July 2009, resulting in 127 arrests, including Gábor Vona.

\textsuperscript{186} It should also be noted that although many Hungarian Guard members are older than the youth cohort I look at, this is not true as a whole. Younger members of the Szebb Jövőért Polgárőrség interviewed reported substantially increasing numbers of younger members.
Violence is not good so I don't really agree fully with the Magyar Gárda, but if I was a villager and they came to help me (with a gypsy problem) when nobody else would then, yes, I would be ok with them too. (István, Age 25: Budapest)

Within interviews right wing supporting activists, like István, do not agree with the potentially violent outcomes of Hungarian Guard but they sympathize with the need for action in the countryside with what has been coined ‘gypsy crime’, something that many people do not believe mainstream political entities are dealing with, as discussed in Chapter 3. Radical right grassroots social movements are indicative of the divided ‘two Hungaries’, discussed previously, polarizing opinion by strengthening radical right political support for some while strongly dissuading others. Meanwhile, Budapest has become a bastion of liberal alternative grassroots social movements more recently since 2010.

4.1.3 Liberal-Left and Green Grassroots Social Movements

The next wave of social activism in Hungary after 2006 was brought forth in 2010 and 2011. These new movements formed in reaction to the controversial Media Law and constitutional changes put forth by the Fidesz government, as noted in Chapter 3. Electoral support for liberal-left political parties has decreased since 2006 and alternative green party support for LMP remains electorally marginal. However, where liberal-left and green parties are lacking in electoral support and mass mobilizations (see Section 3.1.2), grassroots social movements based on Fidesz opposition are drawing out crowds of up to 100,000. There are two main grassroots social movements that I focus on that have drawn out large crowds since 2010 and have been working together in their anti-Fidesz legislation efforts. These two groups

---

Appendix 1 shows tables of election results between 1990 and 2010. A significant decrease can be seen in support for MSZP-SZDSZ in the 2010 elections and LMP only barely managed to pass the 5% electoral threshold.
are **Milla** (*Egymillióan a Magyar sajtószabadságért* – One million for the freedom of press in Hungary, nicknamed Milla) and **Szolidaritás Mozgalom** (The Hungarian Solidarity Movement). Both movements declare that they are unaligned with political parties though their anti-Fidesz stance tends to place them more on the liberal-left side of the political spectrum. Milla was founded as a youth-based movement against Fidesz’s 2010 Media Law while unionist groups against Fidesz laws affecting pensions founded Szolidaritás. Szolidaritás has subsequently become a slightly older demonstration partner to Milla, often coordinating rallies and protests together.

**One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary (Milla):**

*Milla* was founded in December 2010 in reaction to the new laws being instated by the Fidesz government, particularly in reaction to the first draft of the New Media Laws, seen as infringing on the freedom of speech and press in Hungary. Milla is the largest national grassroots opposition movement speaking out against Fidesz and are active in creating demonstrations and protests to bring awareness to the potential threat to democracy and anti-human rights from Fidesz’ new political overhauls. On their Facebook website Milla says that their two main goals are to: 1) show politicians that citizens and civil society hold an important and active role in politics with the ability to change faulty politics or politicians and 2) to create a platform for alternative civil, grassroots and political groups to be heard.\(^{188}\)

Milla’s core followers are similar to the core support network of LMP voters in that they are primarily young activists and Budapest-based intelligentsia, as seen by the main organizers and the audience of their first demonstrations. During my fieldwork in Budapest I attended two Milla demonstrations, the largest of which took

\(^{188}\) Information from Milla’s Official Facebook Site: <www.facebook.com/sajtoszabadsagert?sk=wall>.
place March 15, 2011 and was the first large-scale demonstration they organized, drawing notice from national and international audiences and media. They have since put on numerous demonstrations mainly focusing on the potential threat to human rights from the Fidesz government’s initiatives. There is also a large presence and incorporation of Hungarian poets and writers presenting anti-Media Law texts to their audiences. In the last two years Milla has expanded, drawing in a broader age range out into the street to demonstrate against the Fidesz government.\textsuperscript{189} The movement has also been a highly incorporating movement, bringing in other organization and grassroots social movements that are against the current path the Fidesz government is taking.

\textit{Actually I used to be very Fidesz... I demonstrated with Milla when the new government made the Media Law and this was all arranged on Facebook. Student organization movements helped arrange movements about the new Fidesz laws (with Milla and LMP) (Beata, Age 24: Budapest).}

Milla is a significant new development in Hungarian civil society in that it has brought out estimates of 50,000 to 100,000 demonstrators in their last four large-scale events (taking place March 15\textsuperscript{th} and October 23\textsuperscript{rd} of 2011 and 2012).\textsuperscript{190} Milla is providing a political outlet for discontented liberal-left supporters and right wing supporters upset with Fidesz’s current path, as seen by Beata’s quotation. Milla also has the strongest Facebook support of any other civil movement on either side of the political spectrum with numbers close to that of the most well-known political figures in Hungary (comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2). They currently are the most successful grassroots social movement in Hungary providing information and creating activism among young people.

\textsuperscript{189} The increasing number and age range of Milla demonstration participants was apparent from observing Milla and Szolidaritás events between 2010 and 2012. See Appendix 3 for a list of relevant events, speeches and youth camps attended using participant observation.

\textsuperscript{190} See Appendix 3 for a list of relevant events attended for this research including Milla events.
The Hungarian Solidarity Movement (Szolidaritás):

The Hungarian Solidarity Movement (Szolidaritás) was founded in October 2011 as a ‘community organization’ in opposition to the recent Fidesz policies and constitutional changes, taking from Milla’s grassroots social movement format and developing an older counterpart to Milla. The main founders of the Szolidaritás movement are union activist groups, started primarily by members of one Hungary’s largest unions, the Armed Forces and Police Workers Advocacy Alliance (Fegyveres és Rendvédelmi Dolgozók Érdekvédelmi Szövetsége – FRDÉSZ). While quickly drawing in supporters on Facebook and in rallies Szolidaritás differs from Milla in that they are typically less of a youth-based movement. Their demonstration dynamic is a mixture of ages with a stronger middle-aged crowd, largely due to their stronger ties networking with worker’s union organizations. The main goal of Szolidaritás is to publicize the creation of liberal-left-green roundtable discussion forums to develop plans for how opposition forces can better strengthen against Fidesz.

Szolidaritás is relevant as an example of how youth-based grassroots social movements, like Milla, can change sociopolitical norms making alternative political participation open to a wider civic base. Szolidaritás is a prime example of the reverse socialization process where youth movements, like Milla, have set a political example for older generations, changing political culture at large (reverse socialization discussed further in Chapter 5). Younger activist networks are inspiring other civic

---

192 Naming the movement ‘Solidarity’ is in partial relation and reference to the Polish Solidarity Movement in Poland before transition.
193 The symbolic significance of a ‘roundtable’ discussion links to the roundtable discussions that political elites held during transition. Hundreds of such roundtables were held to create Hungary’s peaceful ‘velvet revolution’.
groups to modernize their approach to politics and develop non-traditional means of political participation through social movements.

4.2 THE MALLEABILITY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Grassroots and social movements have the ability to blur the distinction between political parties as well as popular culture through the cultivation of subcultures. While in some cases distinct subcultures create political parties (Johnston and Snow 1998, Art 2009) or develop movements based on a subculture’s preferences (Simonelli 2002), in Hungary grassroots social movements have become the initial source of new movement parties and subcultures. This section looks at how the main movements discussed in Section 4.1 are operating and why their tactics are directly and indirectly increasing youth activism and potential partisanship. Section 4.2.1 analyzes how grassroots social movements in Hungary have created the opportunity to counter as well as become alternative political parties. Section 4.2.2 looks at the ability of grassroots social movements to develop distinct new youth-based subcultures, indoctrinating political identities within the popular culture of certain movements. Like political parties, these movements are defining their own sociopolitical symbols and meaning as well as developing their own media networks and defining citizenship in their own terms.

4.2.1 Blurring Movements with Political Parties

Electoral politics and social movements have an important and necessary relationship. Grassroots social movements create a political outlet for those, usually young citizens, that would normally be passive or disillusioned by mainstream participatory practices (Putnam 2000, Dalton 2008, Fisher 2012). Social movements and political parties are both primary ways in which political interests are
communicated and intermediated (Kitschelt 2006). Social movements relate directly to the state by framing protest issues (Gamson and Meyer 1996), addressing repression (Rasler 1996), vocalizing outcomes (Dalton 1995) and changing the political opportunity structure (Kriesi 1995, Tarrow 1996). For these reasons, sometimes the boundaries between social movements and political parties become blurred (Burstein 1998, Goldstone 2003). There are two cases when this blurring occurs: 1) when political parties utilize movements or movement tactics within their political strategies to gain popular support and 2) when certain movements take on political debates at the party level, subsequently becoming movement parties (Kitschelt 2006).

The first movement-party relation is developing from political parties using social movement tactics of online activism and demonstrative mobilization to increase their activist and youth support networks as well as gain broader populist support. Fidesz’s civic circles, discussed in Section 3.1.2, are the most successful Hungarian example of a political party developing and employing movement tactics by creating localized networks of partisanship that can be brought together for larger political purposes. Fidesz’s civic circles developed a political format for cultivating successful populist tactics of mass mobilization more recently incorporated by radical right party, Jobbik, and green party, LMP. Fidesz has used grassroots organizations to spread and maintain support networks across Hungary, a tactic used effectively by Jobbik with relation to the Hungarian Guard and HVIM in reaching smaller towns and villages. Fidesz’s continued usage of mass mobilization through social movements is most recently embodied by the Békemenet (Peace March for Hungary).194 The ‘Peace Marches’, started January 2012, have corresponded mainly with large national

holidays where Fidesz, and more recently anti-Fidesz, rallies take place. The Békemenet movement was created specifically to counter anti-Fidesz demonstrators and give draw national media around the large pro-government followers.\footnote{To increase Peace March attendance Fidesz has also offered financial assistance to ethnic Hungarians in bordering countries to come to these rallies (‘A Fidesz is besegített a békemenetre utaztatásban’, Origo, (24 January 2012), <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20120123-civilek-mellett-a-fidesz-is-szervezett-buszokat-a-bekemenetre.html>.)
}

Jobbik has also been successful in using social movements, like the Hungarian Guard and HVIM to maintain the grassroots element of the party. Localized Jobbik networks work with regional radical right movements to support Jobbik’s strong core leadership, allowing for local and national mobilization and perceived intimacy to the party. As explained by one interviewee:

*The Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary is really strong. I can phone Gabor Vona and he will talk to me. We are like a big family... We are first a movement and second a party.* (Péter, Age 24: Debrecen)

At Jobbik events, such as Political Youth camps or Jobbik May Day Festival other radical right wing movements are present with official booths or roles.\footnote{At the Jobbik Youth Summer Camp the Hungarian Guard were the official security of the camp, checking bags at entry and staying for the entirety of the camp in uniform (see Section 3.3 and Appendix 3).} LMP has been less successful in maintaining its movement momentum. While LMP had original ties with the Milla movement it has split as a party over internal discrepancies specifically about how much to involve itself with other movements and parties.

Successful utilization of movements and movement tactics by Fidesz and Jobbik also correlates with stronger youth support, displayed by online activism and support through online networks such as Facebook (see Figure 4.2). Fidesz and Jobbik have been highly successful in developing an online presence, utilizing Facebook groups, blogs and online newsletters more than other political parties to
stream consistent information and recruit support (see Pleyers 2005).\textsuperscript{197} For previously marginalized parties this ‘mélange of virtual and real-world political activity is the way millions of people – especially young people – relate to politics in the twenty-first century. The nascent, messy and more ephemeral form of politics is becoming the norm for a younger, digital generation’ (Bartlett et. al. 2012, p. 14).

\textbf{Figure 4.2: Political Parties, Leaders and Youth Organizations on Facebook}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.2}
\caption{Figure 4.2 compares Facebook support for the current political parties, party chairmen (Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Ferenc Gyurcsány, Gábor Vona and András Schiffer) and political youth organizations (Fidelitas, Societas and Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat). Note: LMP has not officially established a formal youth party.\textsuperscript{198}}
\end{figure}

In Hungary daily Internet usage and especially online social networking sites remains largely youth-oriented.\textsuperscript{199} As seen by Figure 4.2, Jobbik and Jobbik’s leader, Gabor Vóná, have the most Facebook support, only surpassed by right wing Prime

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{197} LMP was also significant in its original usage of the Internet to campaign through YouTube and Facebook, however, as mentioned, the party has since lost many grassroots support networks.
\textsuperscript{198} Despite the fact that Ference Gyurcsány left MSZP in 2011 to form the new party, Democratic Coalition, he is still the primary political figure associated with MSZP.
\textsuperscript{199} In Hungary 79\% of young people aged 15 to 24 use the Internet almost daily whereas 64\% of 25 to 39 year olds, 50\% of 40 to 54 year olds and 23\% of those aged 50 and up use the Internet daily (Eurobarometer 76: Autumn 2011). See Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7.
\end{footnotesize}
Minister Viktor Orbán. While right and radical right support online and electorally remain strong new movement parties have formed in opposition to Fidesz for the 2014 national elections.

The second form of movement-party blurring has developed in the form of new movement parties in opposition to Fidesz. As defined by Herbert Kitschelt, movement parties are ‘coalitions of political activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition’ (2006, p. 280). The emergence of movement parties occurs when 1) grassroots social movements realize their goals demand a larger reorganizing of society rather than a singular policy reform, 2) when a movement feels they can amass a large electoral base from the popularity of their cause and 3) when the legislative and structural threshold to become a party is low enough for a movement to transition (Kitschelt 2006).

Following the first criteria of movement party development, both groups have recognized the need to become parties to counteract Fidesz’s current political hegemony. After having won a two-third majority in parliament in 2010, the Fidesz government has made large political overhauls affecting Hungary’s media laws, judiciary system and constitution. Anti-Fidesz movements are faced with a wider scope than a single-policy change solution. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 2, this scenario is paired with political weakness and fracturing on the liberal-left, creating an opportunity for opposition social movements to amass a large electoral base from previous MSZP-SZDSZ voters. In Hungary the 5% electoral threshold means that if current new movement parties are able to legitimize themselves and create alliances with other liberal-left facets there is a high likelihood that in 2014 there will be a new political party in parliament. Two distinct movement parties have emerged to provide
alternative political options in the 2014 national elections; **4K!** movement and **Together 2014** have formed in Hungary in an attempt to assemble the youth and disillusioned voters using social movement tactics to mobilize citizens against Fidesz.

**The Fourth Republic!:**

The **Fourth Republic!** movement (*Negyedik Köztársaságot!* – known as **4K!**) was founded as a youth movement in 2007, promoting young people taking public areas and creating public space for young Hungarians to feel comfortable in their cities. 4K! as a grassroots social movement set up flash mobs of city-wide pillow fights, impromptu Simon Says games and other activist programs to allow young people to identify themselves within their cities, often incorporating political messages in their actions. Founding chairman András Istvánffy explained in an interview the need for creating youth-based movements:

> When 4K! started there was a big desire from the youth to do something by the youth, for the youth. One reason people joined was to come for fun and the other was ‘Now at least the youth do something and show themselves’. It is an autonomous youth action. It is important that this generation can join something with creativity and courage – not just Societas and Fidelitas.

(András Istvánffy Interviewed 19 July 2011).

Istvánffy’s reference to MSZP and Fidesz’s youth organizations framed what he discussed as the lack of youth options for sociopolitical participation and activism that is not directly attached to a political party.

Since the 2010 national elections, however, 4K! began working closely with Milla in anti-Fidesz efforts. András Istvánffy, the 4K! chairman, and one of the party’s founders, was a headlining speaker at the March 15, 2011 Milla demonstrations. 4K! has subsequently made the transition to party politics and it is currently uncertain of how this might change the function and core participation of the
movement. In 2011 4K! registered as a political party with the slogan ‘There is no more right and left, just above and below’, signifying that elite politics were all the same in neglecting the average citizen. The movement party defines itself as the ‘patriotic left’ combining nationalism with left-wing platforms, something 4K! leaders say is missing in Hungary.200

**Together 2014:**

While 4K! caters mainly to the disillusioned Budapest-based youth, the line between social movement and political party has gone more mainstream with Together 2014 (*Együtt 2014*). Together 2014 is a true blending of Hungarian grassroots social movements and political mainstream created by three entities: Milla, Szolidaritás and the Patriotism and Progress Association (*Haza és Haladás Közpolitikai Alapítvány –HHKA*). HHKA was founded by the former interim Prime Minister, Gordon Bajnai.201 The ‘alliance’ was announced 23 October 2012 at the large Milla opposition rally against the Fidesz government with the ultimate goal of allying opposition forces to beat Fidesz in the 2014 elections.

Together 2014 has refrained from defining itself on the political party spectrum, preferring to unite all those in opposition to the current Fidesz monopoly in government. That being said, Bajnai’s role as the MSZP interim Prime Minister and Milla’s more liberal-left following tend to classify the movement party, however, as the patriotic left combining nationalism with left-wing platforms, something 4K! leaders say is missing in Hungary.

---

200 Information about 4K! comes from their official Facebook site: <https://www.facebook.com/NegyedikKoztarsasag?fref=ts>, and their official website <http://negyedikkoztarsasag.hu/>, as well as interviews with 4K! members and movement party founder, András Istvánffy.


Together 2014 also attracts disappointed Fidesz voters. Bajnai remains one of the most popular politicians in Hungary, and the Together 2014 movement, uniting activist movements and political elite, has one of the largest online support networks compared with all other large political parties and movements in Hungary (see Figure 4.1). The main question remains how successful these movement parties will be in the national elections in 2014, turning support on the streets and online into votes.202

4.2.2 The Radical Right Subculture

Subcultures are defined by an actively sought minority style, usually against what is considered normalcy or commercially provided styles and meanings (Riesman et. al. 1961, Hebdige 1979). Although subculture and social movement theorists originally held distinctly different fields of study, theorists since the 1970s have begun to recognize the complex interplay between subcultures and social movements (Willis 1978, Cohen 1987, Thornton 1995, Martin 2002). In Hungary, there has always been a strong link between subcultures and social movements, developing new identities, symbols and values for young Hungarians challenging the existing status quo (Kéri 1987, I. Szabó 1986, Szabó 1988).203 Nationalist revivalism in the years leading up to transition, for example, brought forth an array of youth movements with built in subcultures. These ranged from subcultures indirectly challenging communism, such as the Tánchaz204 – folk dance movement (Szabó 1991), to more

202 Together 2014 is now facing the difficulties of running as official political parties in the next national election. They are facing legal challenges by the national courts over party names. It is still uncertain how they will be able to transition into party politics and how support networks will change. For now this blending of political party and social movement is creating a hybrid outlet for participation.

203 Most noteworthy are perhaps the student and young intelligentsia uprisings that created the 1848 and 1956 revolutions in Hungary. During transition the ecological, feminist and skinhead subcultures also emerged (Szabó 1988 and 2002).

204 The Tánchaz movement, which still exists today, revitalized nationalism through creating space for distinctly Hungarian folk dancing. To this day Tánchaz dancers can meet informally at certain
aggressively political youth subcultures like the one founding the radical liberal Fidesz youth organization (discussed in Chapter 3). In Hungary subcultures serve as a basis for wider mobilization.

Current youth political activism in Hungary has developed a new radical right subculture, blending political activism with a popular culture incorporating music, nightclubs and festivals to go along with ideologies being conveyed (Bartlett et. al. 2012). Despite large Facebook support for opposition movements like Milla and Together 2014, it is in the smaller and localized support networks for radical right movements that the strongest new youth-based subculture is emerging. Young people are actively developing a popular subculture to rekindle nationalist awareness, by utilizing Hungarian symbols and traditions to counteract perceived Europeanization and Western influences.

Like many other anti-globalist movements, ultra-nationalist and radical right Hungarians are against globalization and capitalism, embodied by the influx of multinational corporations, banks and chain eateries (Lánczi 2002). Often the social narratives within nationalist and radical right political parties and movements give Europe, ‘Westerness’ and modernity distinct properties as something different to Hungary. This ‘otherness’ is also often associated with liberal-left ideologies and practices. In Hungary, claims of Western modernity can often conflict with counterclaims of Eastern authenticity (Gal 1991, Hofer 1991, Brubaker and

205 There is an increasing social dialogue articulated among informal friend groups, online networks and grassroots social movements questioning Western influences and attempting to revitalize a more Hungarian popular culture. I define popular culture as anything denoting ‘enculturation that people participate in or approve of. It may be differentiated into folk culture or enculturation by family and kin that teaches such day-to-day living skills as one’s native language, foodways, and modes of clothing, and that inculcates the group’s values, attitudes, and beliefs’ (Arpad 2004).
Examples of this can be seen in interviewee responses such as when a young Jobbik supporter asked me whether the stereotype in the movies was true in America, if we had parties at our parents’ houses while they were away. When I responded that this was in part true his response was:

Oh this is bad you know. Not for the drinking so much but the doing of drugs you see. That is a big part of us [being a ‘real’ Hungarian]. The radical right is very against drugs and these Western parties. (Lászlo, Age 21: Miskolc)

The radical right has subsequently developed its own subculture, linked to grassroots social movements like the Hungarian Guard and HVIM, and ultimately linking to radical right party Jobbik, depicted as the only authentically Hungarian party. The radical right subculture has transformed Hungary into an idealized form, or ‘nation-religion’ where the nation is not only a community but also an ordained territory with historic, ethnic, aesthetic and morally justified existence (Hockenos 1993, Gerő 2008, Szilágyi 2009). The radical right is developing what Thornton (1995) describes as the ‘aestheticization of politics’. An idealized vision of Hungary as a humble, traditional peasantry is displayed in fashion trends and narratives having roots in the literary interwar Népi movement (Hockenos 1993).

Symbols depicting the ‘real Hungarian’, or idealized Hungary, most often target pre-Trianon Hungary, symbols royal Hapsburg Hungary and ancient Hungary. The most common nationalist narrative and iconographies revolve around the Treaty of Trianon (Müller 2011) evoked through the pre-Trianon map of Greater Hungary.

---

206 The narrative of five hundred years of Hungarians fighting for independence includes the oppression of Turkish, Habsburg, Nazi and Soviet occupation. The European Union and all its facsimiles, are potentially added to this list: ‘They do not see accession as an opportunity to draw neighbouring countries together in terms of culture and politics, but rather, they consider European Enlargement a modern form of colonisation’ (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006, p.97).

207 The term Népi means the people or folk. The Népi movement was a romantic artistic movement in the interwar period when poets, artists and writers glorified the Hungarian countryside and traditional and cultural aspects of Hungarians. This current radical right subculture of romanticized Hungarian peasant culture is similar to UK working class youth subcultures in the 1970s (Cohen 1987).
Hungary. Greater Hungary represents a time when Hungary had geopolitical power, linked with the Hapsburg Empire. More ancient Hungarian symbols utilized by the radical right target the national Turul bird and Árpad flag. In the Hungarian ethnogenesis myth a large Turul appears and gives a vision to a young women that she will birth the founding father of Hungary. She is linked with the birth of King Árpad. The Árpad flag is represented by horizontal red and white stripes on a flag. The Árpad tribal kings are also linked in folklore to Attila the Hun as a strong pioneer of ancient Hungarian tribes. Nationalist and radical right historians also propagate the myth of rovás írás, a type of runic writing that some Hungarian historians say predates Latin and therefore links the founding of Hungary with ancient times. These symbols and icons are used to show nationalist and radical right partisanship and affiliations. Revisionist marches and songs like the Transylvanian March accompany tales of Hungary’s divine right to territory (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006).

Often times, images on T-shirts display menacing hands tearing pieces of Hungary off into its neighboring regions. Even in ‘liberal Budapest’ the Map of Greater Hungary is a common image displayed on bumper stickers, T-shirts, necklaces, flags, belt buckles, bags and any number of goods. These popular culture trends were widely visible at Jobbik events and Jobbik summer camp, attended for participant observation. A majority of radical right supporting youths are visible based solely on these trends. Verified in focus groups and interviews, non-radical right youths would not wear images of the Greater map of Hungary, the Árpád flag or rovás írás writing. Emerging from of the 2006 riots in Budapest was the brand Harcos, meaning fighter or warrior. Described and explained by numerous Jobbik

---

208 Rovás Irás writing is written from right to left and is now used phonetically since the original language paralleling the language is not fully understood.
youth supporters, Harcos clothing appeared in 2006 on the scene of the riots by the production of hooded sweatshirts that could be zipped up entirely so that the hood became a mask, showing only one’s eyes. The brand has since diversified making clothing displaying combinations of radicalized symbols, slogans and icons. Radical right subculture fashions are available at ‘Traditional Shops’ (Hagyományos Bolt) as well as through online outlets like MagyarHarcos.hu and TurulBolt.hu. Symbols are combined and manipulated to convey a distinctly radical right subculture.

The most notable event embodying this subculture is an annual nationalist festival called Magyar Sziget (Hungarian Island) put on by 64-County Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom – HVIM). Founded in 2001, the festival is a weeklong festival incorporating conferences, historical presentations, folk dance, handcrafts, cavalry, archery and national rock music (nemzeti rock). Magyar Sziget was formed in opposition to the ‘liberal’, Sziget Fest (Island Festival). The summer Sziget Fest on Óbudai-sziget (Old-Buda Island) boasts of being ‘the island of friendship, the island of love, the island of self-abandon, the island of freedom, the island of cultural diversity’, also controversially having a Roma tent and gay-lesbian venue on site. Magyar Sziget provides a counter attack to this ‘non-Hungarian’ entity.

Decreed on its website as the most important patriotic event in Hungary, chief organizer György Zagyva explains that one of the festivals main roles is to ‘serve mental ammunition for those who require this, and supporting those who are still at

---

209 National Rock is a genre of music in Hungary, considered its own category of hard rock and metal music. Bands of this genre typically have lyrics containing nationalist themes. The outfitting of a band in either Harcos attire or adding traditional Hungarian elements to their dress is common.

210 Sziget Fest began in 1993 and now attracts nearly 400,000 attendees from more than seventy countries into Budapest for the music festival. Sziget fest is mainly a music festival but also has cultural programs of theatre, circus and exhibitions (‘About’, Sziget Island of Freedom, Official Website, <www.sziget.hu>).
the stage of finding their own life path’. One interviewee spoke about the need for events like Magyar Sziget counteracting foreign forces in Hungary:

*Magyar Sziget is a quality cultural event. I don’t agree with the multiculturalism of Sziget Fest. We need something that is purely Hungarian. I don’t want a liberalism, which consents with drug use. Liberalism consents to abusing alcohol and trashing Hungary. All this culminates with Sziget Fest. At Magyar Sziget there are no drugs. We are on a silk prairie... Our little prairie is a peaceful and joyful event and its really green.* (Szabolcs, Age 20: Budapest).

In Szabolcs’s quotation the reference to the festival as ‘our little prairie' exemplifies the subculture around the romanticized peasant Hungarian. The nationalist festival invites like-minded patriots, journalists, businesses and nationalist rock bands to participate (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006). The festival’s website also shows the literal web of radical right wing subcultures coming together as the site links to other radical-based sites for media (linking to radical right news outlets like Kuruc.info, Magyar Jelen and Barikád.hu) as well as channels to national Hungarian rock music (NemzetiRoch.hu, Szent Korona Rádio and the band Karpatia). The union between movements and subcultures establishes a hegemony beyond politics (Szabó 2011).

The *nemzeti rock* (national rock), bands playing at such events, such as Kárpátia, Romantikus Erőszak (Romantic Violence) and Hungarica, have had a large influx of commercial success in recent years, topping record sales lists in 2009 and 2010 (Bartlett et. al. 2012). The success of HVIM and Magyar Sziget has also led to other outlets for radical right subcultures. Klub 64 is a bar and club based in central Budapest opened by HVIM in 2006 as a ‘national nightclub’ (*nemzeti szórakozóhelye*). Former leader of HVIM and founder of Klub 64 explains:

*The crowds of young people are not going to voluntarily go and sit in on a dry lecture, but concerts and pleasurable music can seduce them anywhere. And once*

---

they are here you can begin to nurture the minds of the nation’s consciousness.⁵¹² (László Toroczkai in an interview with Kuruc.info, 1 June 2010)

Whether online or in person at festivals and rallies, the media, music, clothing, community areas, social clubs and political organizations of the radical right have a stronger youth social cohesion than any other politically oriented youth network.⁵¹³

Considering the strong emerging radical right youth subculture there is very little political counter-culture from the liberal-left. Although there has been an influx of liberal-left and opposition protest culture, seen from the opposition efforts of Milla and Szolidaritás against controversial Fidesz legislation since 2010, there are still no cohesive symbols, slogans, fashion trends or music defining or uniting this subculture. Discussing developing subcultures interviewees were aware of the large void within the liberal-left:

Left symbols? There are none... well... maybe the EU flag. The political left is in a bad state right now. (Adam, Age 23: Budapest)

Many times you can tell a party preference by the style someone dresses in and the music they listen to. Jobbik is obvious with skinheads and traditionalists. Actually there are also one or two left wing bands but there is not really a distinct left wing music scene as much as a right one. Between Fidesz and LMP I can’t tell the style difference. (Zselykó, Age 17: Budapest)

The sarcastic reference of Adam to the left’s European allegiance and lack of national identity from one of the party’s own youth league members is particularly poignant. Zselykó’s quotation also shows the unidentifiable liberal-left and even right wing

---

⁵¹² Quotation found from: ‘Klub 64: egy magyar sziget egész évben Budapest szívében’, Kuruc.info, (1 June 2010), <http://kuruc.info/r/6/60545/).

⁵¹³ Note: The multi-faceted nature of radical right popular culture, blending politics with civil society and culture is not unusual to nationalist political networks (Wimmer 2002, Mudde 2007).
subculture. As explained by Bori Kriza, Hungarian sociologist and maker of the documentary film *Dübörög a Nemzeti Rock* (Drumming the National Rock):  

*There are no myths or symbols on the left or liberal side. You need music, myths, history, heroes, fashion. On March 15th [2011] there was a big rally for Milla. There was a large group but no ideology, slogan or symbol. Nothing to give people a ‘togetherness’.*

Bori Kriza: Social Scientist, Teacher, Documentary Film Maker about the National Rock movement (Interviewed 8 September 2011).

***

Grassroots social movements in Hungary have the potential to create new, previously separate networks between people as well as develop new sociopolitical goals, potentially implemented or institutionalized by the political elite (see Zolberg 1972, Tarrow 1998). Fidesz’s civic circles in 2002, the MSZP government scandals in 2006 and the breaking of electoral hegemonic bipolarity in 2010 created significant opportunity structures for mass mobilization through social movements to occur. The effect of these social movements was politically significant in cultivating a strong grassroots network for right wing mobilization in 2002. In 2006 the large-scale anti-government protests gave a face and name to the radical right, led by Jobbik. Now, after the 2010 national elections breaking previous party bipolarity, current grassroots social movements are changing political discourse and political culture norms. Large amounts of support are being given to social movements on the street and online and new anti-Fidesz movement parties have been formed that will be competing in the 2014 national elections. Youth-based social movements like Milla and 4K! are also changing sociopolitical culture norms as seen by older cohorts developing similar social movements (like Szolidaritás and Békemenet) and movement parties (like

---

214 The word *dübörög* in Hungarian refers to a lumbering or a continuous beating. I have translated it to drumming here to fit the meaning of the word in the context of the title: reference to rock music.
Together 2014), institutionalizing previously marginalized forms of political participation (this process of reverse socialization is discussed further in Chapter 5).

While civil society is measured as decreasing in Hungary current increases in participation in social movements is improving local and national civic participation. However, the strongest social movements and youth-based political cultures are not necessarily nurturing liberal democratic values. Radical right grassroots social movements are attracting youth activists and developing partisanship that are linking strongly to an all-encompassing radical right subculture. The inclusive package provided by Jobbik, combining politics with grassroots organizations and popular culture, presents an outlet for community, individual expression and non-traditional political participation, targeting the youth directly. This is the only politically linked subculture in Hungary providing music, nightclubs, historical revisionism, festivals and fashion trends to go along with the party’s ideology (Kürti 2012, Bartlett et. al. 2012).

Meanwhile, liberal-left political parties, like MSZP-SZDSZ, have very little youth support and green party, LMP, remains a primarily Budapest-based party. These parties are also not organically connecting themselves to the opposition grassroots social movements available to them, such as Milla and Szolidaritás. Although movement parties, like Together 2014, are trying to unite the liberal-left and disillusioned right the separate movements and parties are unwilling to give full allegiance to one another, feeling that it takes away from their original limited aims. This is the primary difference between the liberal-left compared with the flourishing networks backing the right and radical right. Right wing civic circles and radical right grassroots social movements work on localized as well as national levels creating
depth and breadth for the political parties they support which is lacking within liberal-left opposition movements and parties.

Social movements are becoming increasingly influential in youth and broader political activism. In the Hungarian context Social movements are not only increasing youth activism but mainstreaming into the political party spectrum. Part Three looks at familial networks, education and the media as agents of socialization, analyzing how they are affecting partisanship development among young activists.
PART THREE

Socialization Influences
5. HUNGARIAN FAMILIES AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the role of the family in relation to political partisan formation and the socialization of youth activism. The family is a leading factor in the political socialization process as the first formative agent in an individual’s political development. Due to the primacy of family-based political experiences the family is generally considered one of the strongest, if not the strongest, agent of political socialization influencing political alignment, party membership and voting trends (Greenstein 1956, Hyman 1959, Jennings and Niemi 1968, Volgyes 1975, Brady et. al. 1995, Verba et. al. 2005, Bruter and Harrison 2009). Most theories about family political socialization have been based in American and Western European research making it difficult to compare overarching family theories within a post-communist context (Szabó 1991, Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, Tarrósy 2004). However, this chapter looks at familial socializing trends and narratives from interviewees about the role and influence of family relations in developing political identities. I find that the family is the strongest socializing agent, influencing political activism and partisanship in the Hungarian case study, particularly important for the conservative-national right and radical right supporting youth activists.

My expectations around familial influences on the political socialization of youth activists in Hungary were three-fold. Firstly, I expected that the family continued to be a largely influential agent of socialization as a continuation from

---

215 Western family political socialization theories assume certain things about the family unit and political environment, which are not applicable in the post-communist case, such as parents being raised with a longstanding tradition of democracy and democratic history. Western theories also assume political cultures which are open to political discourse and which agree with general liberal democratic principles – which is not always the familial basis within post-communist family units.
communism, where the family was the only secure private sphere for information uninfluenced by government agendas. My second assumption was that there would be stronger family political influences based on nationalist and conservative discourse compared with liberal and left wing influences as a possible link to the increasing youth support for right wing party, Fidesz, and radical right party, Jobbik. Lastly, I predicted that familial socialization would be less influential in Budapest compared to the other two locations I conducted field research, Miskolc and Debrecen. Although Miskolc and Debrecen are considered large cities by Hungarian standards, with populations of 170 thousand and 200 thousand, they have significantly smaller city centers compared with Budapest.

My assumption was also based on the fact that within Budapest, as the capitol of Hungary, there are more active alternative political stimuli, such as demonstrations, protests, and a larger international population to counteract familial political socialization.\textsuperscript{216} As outlined in Chapter 1, interviews were with young political activists between the ages of eighteen and thirty. Activism is based on their traditional political participation in elections, campaigning or membership. Activism is also based on non-traditional participation in political demonstrations, social movements or protests.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the political socialization experience of the parent generation with reference to the infiltration of political agendas in every day life and the historical experiences parents and grandparents underwent which have contributed to historical narratives, passed on to young Hungarians. Historical narratives are the related stories of complicated and

\textsuperscript{216} An outline of semi-structured interview questions is given in Appendix 5 to exemplify how interviewees were questioned about familial political socialization.
controversial experiences, retold through a subjective narrative (Mink 1978). Parent and grandparent experiences and historical narratives play an indirect, but often influential role in partisanship, cultivating ideas and sentiments around politically relevant events and time periods (Feldman 1990, Ochs and Taylor 1992). The second part of this chapter looks at how families discuss political topics at home and the parent–youth relation towards partisanship, voting and party membership. This more direct political socialization is discussed with reference to how contemporary politics is discussed at home and how family-based socialization might have stronger predispositions towards right and radical right political options.  

5.1 FAMILIAL LEGACIES: PARENTAL SOCIALIZATION

During the socialist era, the family was often the only private sphere where unofficial socialization could take place, making the family unit one of the few agents countering official political propaganda (Volgyes 1975, Tarrósy 2004, Wittenberg 2006). It is important to understand a little about how the parent cohort of current youth activists was socialized under a socialist system. The parent cohort referred to in this thesis was primarily socialized under the last two decades of the Kádár Era roughly born between 1949 and 1969. How the parents of current politically active young Hungarians developed their relationship to politics in a non-democratic system has an effect on how political culture and national narratives are learned.

217 Discussed throughout this chapter, indirect socialization deals with topics and histories having political implications even if they might not be directly discussing modern political actors/parties. Direct socialization concerns the practices/discussions around the contemporary political environment.

218 Stock knowledge is embedded information about a nation showing distinct differences with other nations to identify one’s community and nation (Csepeli 1997). ‘Stock knowledge’ of past historical/political events develops a knowledge about national culture and identity (Bourdieu 1971).
There is a body of research questioning whether the post-communist parent cohort is capable of passing down democratic values when they themselves were not politically socialized within a democratic system (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, Horowitz 2005). There is concern over whether authoritarianism or post-materialist values are emerging among the post-communist youth (Todosijević and Enyedi 2000) as well as whether political passivity and distrust are being inherited from a politically apathetic parent cohort (Szabó 1991, Szlomczynski and Shabad 1998). There is also general apprehension, specifically in Hungary, about whether political and cultural pessimism is being taught to the youth by a politically skeptical and disillusioned parent cohort (Hideg and Nováky 2009). It is necessary to look at the sociopolitical dynamic the parent generation was socialized under in order to comprehend familial social environments today.

5.1.1 Parental Political Socialization

This section analyzes the overarching political socialization experience of the parent cohort assessing the cultural stigmas from the socialist period that might have been passed down to the youth. This section gives an account of the experienced socialization process during the Kádár Era, mainly looking at the 1960s and 1970s. Ivan Volgyes depicted the parent cohort raised under Kádárism in the 1970s as the ‘consolidated generation’. He generalized them as a group of young adults that did not understand the hardships of WWII nor Stalinist terror, describing them as giving support to the regime only in return for material benefit (Volgyes 1975).

219 The nature of the Kádár Regime is previously outlined in sections 1.1.1 and 2.2.2 for reference. See pages 68 – 70 specifically.
The parent generation of today’s youth cohort took place primarily in the aftermath of the 1956 Revolution in Hungary.\textsuperscript{220} Before the 1956 uprising the state had used more stringent totalitarian tactics of government, actively enforcing the communist ideology and trying to socialize the masses through psychological coercion (Csepeli and Órkény 1992, Niklasson 2006). The political era in Hungary after the violent and controversial 1956 uprising, led by János Kádár and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP), began the subsequent reign of ‘goulash communism’ in Hungary.

*People renounced their rights to power and participation and, in exchange, they got (by Eastern European standards) a relatively tolerant administration ... a kind of cultural pluralism, and the opportunity to build up for themselves a more and more comfortable, Western-European-style material life.* (Urban 1989)

Kádár, produced liberal economic reforms, through the New Economic Mechanism (NEM),\textsuperscript{221} turning a blind eye towards developing a private second economy in exchange citizens leaving the politics to the politicians (Volgyes 1975, Urban 1989). The events of 1956 were immediately censored by the media, historians and textbooks, creating an en masse ‘collective amnesia’ (Cox 1997, Lendvai 2012). While politically controversial events were avoided the population was demobilized through relative liberalism and allowance of certain freedoms in the private sphere. Previously suppressed Hungarian nationalism and patriotism was encouraged throughout the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{222} Folk culture revivalist movements were allowed in order to decrease opposition forces. This also served to gain passive support from

\textsuperscript{220} After the violently suppressed ‘people’s revolution’ of 1956 against Soviet powers in Hungary, János Kádár was instated as the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, beginning what is now known as the Kádár era from 1956 till transformation in 1989.
\textsuperscript{221} The New Economic Mechanism (Üj Gazdasági Mechanizmus) was launched in 1968, decentralizing economic structures in Hungary so that privatized economies could begin to form (Balassa 1970).
\textsuperscript{222} The re-nationalization of certain state elements was common among communist states during this time in an attempt to continue citizen support by creating a nationalist-communist alliance.
rightwing populists and youth factions (now the parent cohort). Instead of a totalitarian state run by fear by the 1970s, the motto of the Kádár government became ‘who is not against us, is with us’ (aki nincs ellenünk az velünk) (Szelényi 1998, p. 16). The post-1956 communist government worked to co-opt opposition movements, allowing for limited and constructed facades of nationalist opposition, institutionalizing mass cynicism and distancing people from the political sphere (Hankiss 1990, Lampland 1991, Arpad 2004).

Regardless of political cynicism of the time, János Kádár has become a largely positive symbolic figure in Hungary in the process of remembering the past (Rásky 2007). Polling in Hungary in 1999, a decade after János Kádár’s death, indicated that 58% of Hungarians had a positive view of the Communist era, yet only a minority would want to return to the previous regime showing a ‘nostalgic but realistic’ stance (Gough 2006, p. 254). By 2008 another poll showed that 62% of Hungarians felt that the period between World War II and 1989 was the happiest time in Hungarian history.

5.1.2 Passing on the Partisanship

As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the family was often the only agent that could remain politically critical and unmanaged by the Socialist government, often trusting other outlets for political discussion (Marody 1988,

---

223 It is during this time, mainly in the 1970s, that cultural reforming takes place and traditions like the Táncház (Dance-House) movement are revitalized. Táncház is now seen widely across Hungary as apart of the traditionalist revival and is popular among many young Hungarians (Information on Hungarian Táncház found at this site <http://www.tanchaz.hu/hun/>, and discussed within many interviews).
224 Hungarians were significantly more positive about the communist era compared with results from the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (Gough 2006).

Slomczynski and Shabad 1997, Kolarska-Bobinska 1998). Statistical data sets as well as interviews show a continuing trend of strong familial trust and influence on political value formation in Hungary. Looking at attitudes towards change and family transformation, Stankuniene and Maslauskaite note that, in Hungary, the very strong familial culture continues to impact attitudes towards family-centric values and ideologies, as seen in Table 5.2 below (2008, p. 135). Hungary is distinct in its continued strength of the family unit as a source of political and cultural information. Eurobarometer results (2003) show that out of thirteen examined countries in and around Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary is the only country where the youth trust and prefer information originating from the family concerning public and political information (Keil 2011). These results are comparative to other primary information-giving agents such as schools, informal social networks and media.

**Table 5.1: Youth Information Retrieval Preference**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Socialization Agent (Ranked as First)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education System</td>
<td>Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Turkey</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Organizations/Networks</td>
<td>Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media/TV</td>
<td>Romania, Bulgaria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eurobarometer surveys questioned young adults, age 15-30, about their preference of primary information retrieval concerning public and political ideologies and participation. Hungary is the only country where the youth considers family to be the preferred network of civil and political information (Eurobarometer 2003, pp. 62 – 64).226

One explanation for the high levels of family trust in Hungary is that young people are becoming independent at a younger age while remaining economically dependent (and often living at home) for longer periods into adulthood, making family a larger definer in social citizenship (Wallace 2002, Kürti 2002, Kuhar 2005,

226 Data comes from analysis of the results from the Eurobarometer 2003 compared with Eurobarometer 2011 in Keil (2011). Unfortunately there is currently no updated Eurobaromter research on political socialization agents conducted since 2003.
Walther et. al. 2008). Longer periods of familial dependency are due to increasing numbers of young people in higher education in the last twenty years as well as increasing difficulties for young people to find jobs, making leaving the home financially difficult, if not impossible for many young Hungarians.\(^{227}\) The trend of extended youth habitation with the family is not a phenomenon exclusive to Hungary, however, and does not fully explain Hungary’s unique Eurobarometer results.

Another explanation for Hungary’s high level of youth-family information retrieval points to the Kádárist legacy of goulash communism. In developing a strong second economy with a gray area of legality, interpersonal trust was necessary and often the family was the most trusted business partnership for developing semi-legal commerce (Hankiss 1988, Sik 1994). Hungary had a high level of open communication within the family while other social outlets were known to be less transparent (Keitner et. al. 1990). Political and economic topics remain generally avoided among social networks.\(^{228}\) This was most exemplified in focus groups conducted with young activists. Despite having arranged focus groups based around like-minded partisanship, often arranged within a group of friends, most young participants avoided talking about personal political opinions or sentiments. Despite sharing political ideologies young Hungarians felt wary expressing personal details of how they became politically involved or why they chose the party they support in front of their social network. The family remains a central source of trusted information.

\(^{227}\) Unemployment in Hungary is currently 11.6%, however this is more than doubled for youth unemployment, which currently stands at 29.7% in Hungary. Youth is cut off at thirty for this study. Data from: ‘Hungary Unemployment Rate’, Trading Economics, (March 2013), <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/hungary/unemployment-rate>.

\(^{228}\) Among interviewees very few respondents said that they discussed politics with friends unless it was specifically with friends from political or social movement networks.
Despite theories of a post-communist Kádárist layover continuing political apathy, a majority of young activists spoke of political discussions at home. Political discussions and civil practices shared between parent and child can develop increased political knowledge and interest leading to voting practices and incentives for party membership later in life (Brady et. al. 1995, Plutzer 2002, Gimpel et. al. 2003, Verba et. al. 2005, Pacheco 2008). Political discussions reported by young Hungarians occurred indirectly, around family historical narratives and stories (discussed in Section 2.2) but also directly, talking about current political parties and voting intentions. Most interviewees said that they discussed politics with their parents.\textsuperscript{229} Interviewee results parallel high levels of parental-political discussions found in nationwide Hungarian surveys throughout the 1990s (see Figure 5.1).

\textbf{Figure 5.1: Frequency of Political Discussions With Associates}

These studies were conducted in Budapest between 1991 and 1998. Results are given in percentages tracking how often students recalled who they discussed political matters with. (Csákó et. al. 1999).\textsuperscript{230}

\textsuperscript{229} See Appendix 6 showing interviewee responses about familial political discussions.

\textsuperscript{230} Although the age category for ‘youth’ in these studies was slightly younger than the age category dealt with in this thesis (13 to 18), it is relevant in comparing the high level of parental conversational socialization compared with other social agents. Currently there is no updated data for this research.
Figure 4.1, above, shows parents as the most frequent source of political discussion compared with other socializing agents such as classmates, friends and teachers. Even among other family members, such as siblings, parental political conversation was nearly five times more likely (Csákó et. al. 1999). These results suggest that during transition the family maintained its strong socializing role despite large sociopolitical changes.

An interesting finding from my own research was that among interviewees, if there was a dominant political figure in the family it was most often the father. These results parallel other research about post-communist familial units conserving traditional and paternalistic family structures (Pichler and Wallace 2007, Stankuniene and Maslauskaite 2008). Seen in Appendix 6, some interviewees, both male and female, made a point of mentioning the strong political influence of the father. These results are also congruent with 1990s Hungarian studies where among family members 66.6% of teenagers mention political conversations with their father compared to 53.1% mentioning conversations with their mother. This frequency drops significantly mentioning conversations with siblings (7.9%) and other relatives (Csákó et. al. 1999). Even when the interviewee chose a different political partisan stance to their family the father was still mentioned as the most active familial agent for political discourse. Exemplifying this point, Interviewee, Flóra, a continued a stronger political dialogue with her father despite developing conflicting political values with him:

My dad is culturally conservative, believing in family values. My mother would vote LMP due to civil stuff. She is much more left than my dad. With my mom I never speak about politics because she is too emotional and does not like to fight. With my dad I can speak politics. (Flóra, Age 21: Budapest)

Note: Flóra is an LMP voter who converted her mother to vote LMP
The high levels of political discourse between family members and young politically active Hungarians, corresponding with Eurobarometer results (shown in Table 5.1) and other research, showing that in Hungary the family remains highly influential as a trusted network for political information.\textsuperscript{231} How the family is influencing the youth, however, is another matter.

5.2 HISTORICAL NARRATIVES

Cultural reproduction through the family is very important in Hungary. The family remains a strong resource for educational attainment and stock knowledge (Csepeli and Örkény 1992, van Eijck and de Graaf 1995, Csepeli 1997). In the post-communist environment, historical narratives addressed by family members passed down to young activists are part of political socialization. Many youth interviewees expressed their own national and political identities in terms of familial historical narratives. As noted by one interviewee:

\textit{The scars of our parents and grandparents are passed down to us from generation to generation.} (Julia, Age 25: Budapest)

This section lays out some of the primary historical narratives discussed within Hungarian families that link to the development of political values and partisanship. These family-based narratives focus mainly on divisive historical events that have been reinterpreted into politically salient national symbols. These

\textsuperscript{231} Note: Grandparents were often mentioned with reference to familial historical narratives as an explanation for their party preferences while parents were discussed in terms of more contemporary political topics and discourse. There was generally less political discussion at home mentioned among LMP supporters with less likelihood of family members also voting for LMP. This is partly explained by LMP’s newness on the political scene in Hungary and its youth-focused strategy and media.
narratives are specific to a political culture and nation (Mink 1978, Norman 1991).

This section gives an analysis of the most frequently addressed family narratives, key in understanding some of the stronger political socialization trends in contemporary Hungary.

### 5.2.1 Contentious Hungarian History

There are specific politically significant memories, stories and histories being passed down to the Hungarian youth by parents and grandparents. Research conducted between 2001 and 2005 testing public opinion about Hungarian history targeted three of the strongest historical political events/time periods dividing society: 1) the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, 2) the Horthy Regime (1920 till 1944) and 3) the Kádár Era beginning after the 1956 Revolution (Vásárhelyi 2006). These three historically significant events and periods are representative of the largest geopolitical and sociopolitical changes to Hungary as a nation and remain used in political symbols and rhetoric today (mentioned previously in Chapter 1 and 3). These national historic periods are explained below with reference to their political divisiveness within familial narratives that plays out into broader political partisanship.

The 1920 **Treaty of Trianon** was a peace agreement signed at the end of World War I between the Allied forces and the Kingdom of Hungary, putting sanctions on Hungary and ultimately ending the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The treaty redistributed two-thirds of Hungarian land to neighboring countries and over

---

232 There is a strong link between populist and nationalist developments with salient historical narratives (Kramer 1997) particularly in a post-communist setting where democracy is intrinsically tied to national myths and symbols (Tismaneanu 1998).

233 The Allies were a political triple entente comprising of the French Republic, the British Empire and the Russian Empire.
one-third of the population. The treaty also put restraints on Hungarian military efforts. The Treaty of Trianon represents a tragic loss of power for most Hungarians across the political spectrum (E. Kovács 1998, Vásárhelyi 2011). Meanwhile populations of ethnic Hungarians remain significant in certain borderlands of neighboring countries, most notably in Transylvania. In Transylvania numerous policies and cultural efforts to preserve Hungarian roots have been instated with the help of the Hungarian government (Waterbury 2010).

For most Hungarians Trianon is ‘the most indigestible trauma’ (mindmáig feldolgozatlan tramája) (Vásárhelyi 2011). The symbol of Trianon and the implications attached to Hungary’s lost territory are highly politicized and the treatment of ethnic Hungarians living abroad has become an increasingly salient topic in Hungarian politics (Zeidler 2002, Ligeti and Nyeste 2006, Kántor 2008, Lendvai 2012). Trianon along with other national historic symbols are representative of Hungary’s cultural pessimism, constantly reminding Hungarians the misfortunes Hungary must constantly endure. While the Treaty of Trianon is recognized as a national tragedy across the political spectrum interviewees supporting right wing and radical right political parties and movements most frequently mentioned Trianon as part of their learned family narratives.

234 During this time the majority of inhabitants within redistributed Hungarian territories were not in fact ethnically Hungarian. This was part of the reason for geopolitical redistribution; however, most Hungarians believe the vast majority of people lost in the Treaty of Trianon were Magyars (Vásárhelyi 2006).

235 This topic is mentioned here since beyond the normal scope of political discourse over half of the interviewees in my research brought up the topic of Trianon and/or ethnic Hungarians without prompting, most often linking their opinions with specific policies or political parties.

236 Hungary is known for its cultural pessimism, which is present in much if the country’s national culture in historical narratives as well as stories, folk songs and daily communications. A Corvinus University Professor pointed out a poignant Hungarian sang relating to this pessimistic view towards Hungary and its fate: There is a saying in Hungary ‘We celebrate crying’, (Sirva Vigad a Magyar). Maybe this is also why people vote for the least bad party.
On the left there is a weak sense of identity. The left is still Kádár. My parents (as nationalists under communism) couldn’t talk about nationalism, politics or Trianon. (Sándor, Age 28: Debrecen)

My grandfather on my mother’s side was a heart surgeon. He was very strong. Originally he was from Transylvania but traveled and had prestige in the former regime so he turned to Fidesz. His main reason is Trianon. (Béata, Age 23: Budapest)

Sándor’s quotation shows the connection between nationalism and open discourse about Trianon that was previously suppressed by the Kádár regime; intrinsically tied to current left wing politics for the interviewee. Béata’s quotation expresses the great ethnic and economic changes that Hungarians felt from having the boundaries of the large territory of Transylvania redrawn and placed within Romania. The previous wealth and status of many Hungarians changed after 1920 as a result of the Treaty. The Treaty also divided many families along contentious newly drawn geographical boundaries.

The image and symbol of the pre-Trianon border has become linked with nationalist efforts by right and radical right parties, Fidesz and Jobbik. Fidesz created a new national remembrance day in 2010 to take place on June 4th as a day of national unity (a nemzeti összetartozás napja) commemorating the anniversary of the signing of the treaty. Jobbik has been active in creating large events for June 4th across Hungary. The radical right 64-County Youth Movement (HVIM) is also active in calling for the reunification of pre-Trianon borders, named specifically after the sixty-four counties in the pre-Trianon Hungarian borders (see Section 4.1.2).238

237 Hungary’s largest political incentive to make alliances with the Nazis was the promise of regaining Transylvanian land (Waterbury 2010).

238 With respect to goals of gaining back lost territories, HVIM is similar in form and objectives to Ireland’s 32 County Sovereignty Committee.
Miklós Horthy was the Regent of Hungary between 1920 and 1944 during the interwar period following the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War. Horthy was declared the Head of State after the Hungarian Communist Party was banned in 1920. Horthy is most divisive as a historic figure in Hungary for his role leading Hungary into World War II and entering an alliance with Nazi Germany. Horthy’s original decision to join forces with Germany was an attempt to restore the land Hungary lost in the Treaty of Trianon, however, his questionable allegiance led to the Nazi occupation and control of Hungary in October 1944 (Lendvai 2012). Right and left polarization around the legacy of Miklós Horthy and the Horthy Era in Hungary was resurrected with the symbolic reburial of the interwar Regent on 9 September 1991 (Taras 2003). Opinions on the regime of Miklós Horthy are strongly divided between viewing Horthy as a heroic nationalist or an oppressive fascist (Arpad 2004, Vásárhelyi 2006, Lendvai 2012).

Positive historic narratives about the Horthy Regime use Horthy narratives as a symbol of a strong Hungarian government making large-scale changes under difficult international circumstances (Tarrósy 2004), popular among contemporary right wing and radical right partisanships in Hungary. Horthy has symbolic relevance for religious conservatives and irredentist radical right supporters in particularly. During the interwar period the role and influence of the church was strengthened from Horthy’s goals to restore traditional family values through promoting religion and privatizing property for the church (Ignatius 1972, Wittenburg 2006). Many of the Hungarian elite during the Horthy Era also lost vast amounts of wealth, property and

239 The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire also ended monarchism in the region, leading to the installment of a Regent.
social status in the transition after Horthy Era into communism. Many descendents of the Horthy Era elite and others dispossessed by communism have found a base within right wing and radical right political parties today. As explained by one right wing interviewee:

*My parents’ family was nobility during Horthy. The Russian Communists came and took their property with force in 1956. This is a big difference in the East and West. Here, the family experience is much heavier. Family has blood in its past and it really affects peoples’ lives.* (András, Age 29: Budapest)

Right wing and radical right youth cohorts that mentioned Horthy or the Horthy Era in interviews often discussed the importance of values within Hungarian culture and the socioeconomic differences between previous family grandeur from the pre-communist regime compared with today.

Family-based historic narratives define historical villains and protagonists with modern political significance. While right and radical right political parties and media outlets depict positive images of either Horthy or the Horthy Era, liberal depictions of in media and political commentary show a much different depiction of Horthy:

*The Horthy regime’s romantic-nationalistic, populist, racist, anti-liberal, anti-intellectual and anti-cultural disposition, coupled with the purges and denunciations of professors and teachers (by no means only Jewish ones), led in the 1920s to an unprecedented brain-drain from the scientific-cultural milieu.* (Lendvai 2012, p. 385)

Familial historical narratives are dependent on a family’s past experiences and circumstance within these crucial time periods. Elites from the Horthy Era might have seen communism take away their status and wealth while to other Hungarians the ‘oppressive’ Horthy Era was ended by the egalitarian introduction of communism, molding perspectives on current political. Villains and heroes of Hungary’s history
are dictated by the experiences and narratives passed down from grandparents and parents.

Like their parents, many interviewees gave a positive image of the **Kádár Era** (1956 to 1989), reflecting on a time when Hungary was run by ‘goulash communism’.\(^{240}\) If and when interviewees mentioned the Kádár Era it was generally expressed as a time when Hungary had job stability and life was simpler, as reiterated by their parents.\(^{241}\) This general positive reflection crosses political ideology and party alignment. Very few interviewees referred to the era in negative terms and when mentioned with negative connotations it was mainly to verify that the ‘golden era’ was doomed due to economic instability.\(^{242}\) There is a politically paternalistic depiction by interviewees of the era as a time when life was simplified and basic needs were taken care of by government social schemes.

*The Kádár mentality remained after 1989. People think they can keep support with social benefits but its not sustainable.* (Szemere, Age 29: Budapest)

*Maybe social issues shift in Hungary but most of us still want the Kádár era. You just shut your mouth, keep your work, and die at seventy. It is safe. Hungarians don’t want confrontation or debate.* (Adam, Age 23: Budapest)

Interestingly, interviewee Adam uses the term *us* making it clear that although the youth cohort in question did not experience this era, the image and altered

\(^{240}\) Goulash communism refers to the Kádár government’s style of communism starting in the 1960s, which improved living standards and introduced new economic free market elements. The term goulash refers to a popular Hungarian stew mixing an assortment of ingredients creating a metaphor for the mixed political system instated by Hungary. The term ‘goulash communism’ is referenced in lots of the literature about Hungary between 1956 and 1989 (see Kovrig 1986, Kornai 1996, Lánczi and O’Neil 1996, Solheim and Ekelove-Slydal 2013). Also noted by interviews with Hungarian constitutional judge István Stumpf and political scientist András Bozóki (2011 Field Research Interviews).

\(^{241}\) Hungarian views towards the Kádár era are generally quite positive with around 62% of Hungarians reporting that this era was the most positive time in Hungarian history (see Wirth article).

\(^{242}\) Those referring to the Kádár era as unsustainable tend to be mostly LMP or Fidesz supporters. Also they were more highly politically aligned as either party members or active participants within their respective parties.
historical experience of the Kádár era is retold and passed down by the parent generation. It is important to note the duality behind Kádár era historical narratives. Positive attributes given to the Kádár era seemingly go beyond the strong communist versus anti-communist divide still apparent in Hungary, used in different ways to express various discontents with the contemporary political system. Nostalgia goes beyond right wing and radical right political discourse antagonizing ‘communists’ and instead gives positive attributes to an idealized time now lost. Meanwhile large portions of pro-communist support translated into support for the liberal-left in the aftermath of transition. Reflecting on an era unknown to them, youth cohorts are taking their parents stories and contrasting them with their own reality. Kádár nostalgia has cultivates cynicism towards modern dissatisfactions with the difficulties of transition. Democracy, in this youth perspective, has brought with it a lack of security, uncertain state loyalties and joblessness (Koklyagina 1995, Horowitz 2005).

The Kádár Era is also tied into the narrative around the 1956 uprising against Soviet powers. The 1956 uprising, sometimes referenced as a revolution, was a spontaneous revolt against the Hungarian government and Soviet rule in Hungary. What started as a student demonstration, 23 October 1956, turned into a people’s uprising, lasting until 10 November 1956 and ending violently with Soviet forces entering Hungary. The legacy of 1956 remains tied into many familial nationalist narratives. The parent generation were socialized as young people in the aftermath of the 1956 Revolution, starting the early divide of those rebelling against the communists versus those that sided with the communists. The onset of the Kádár

---

243 Discussed in Chapter 3.
244 During the course of the 1956 Revolution over 2,500 Hungarians and 700 Soviets were killed. It also led to a large number of Hungarians fleeing the country with estimates of about 200,000 refugees, not to mention tens of thousands of arrests (Molnár and Körösi 1996, Lendvai 2008).
system suppressed open discussions of 1956 through media and literature censorship, referring to it solely as a National Tragedy caused by nationalists (Schöpflin 1991). In 1989 open discussions of previously suppressed historical topics, such as the 1956 Revolution, surfaced again (Korkut 2012). The current national consensus is that 1956 represents the Hungarian will to independence, the fight against oppression and a legacy of civil society, demonstrating through street protests and uprisings (Kubik 1998).

5.2.2 Relating Familial Experiences to Youth Political Opinions

Some have postulated that the socializing affects of a parent generation socialized under the Kádár Era are breeding current strands of apathy among the youth (Szalai 2011). However, youth activists interviewed were aware of their parents' and grandparents' social positions during large sociopolitical transitions and events like the ones mentioned above. While discussions directly concerning politics are not always frequent in the home, familial historical narratives develop distinct identities for young Hungarians, defining historical events along personally relevant political lines. The 1956 revolution and subsequent Kádár Era of goulash communism have distinct family meanings for young political activists.

*My uncle was in the 1956 revolution and fled to the USA. My dad had Catholic School and went to groups illegally under communism. He almost went to jail for this.* (Palko, Age 23: Budapest)

*My grandfather was in WWII. He got home and tried to start a business with trucks. The communist party came and just took the trucks.* (Benigna, Age 27: Budapest)

*My father’s parents were really MSZMP (in the Kádár Era). My Grandfather hated the church and everything saying religion being (politically) important is a bad thing so after transition MSZP is the only choice.* (Flóra, Age 21: Budapest).
In all three of the above quotations interviewees connected their familial narratives to their own perception of events and their political outlooks. Palko and Benigna’s aversion towards harsh communist measures was later related to their inability to vote for the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP later in their interviews. Alternatively, Flóra’s relation to her grandparent’s narrative has led her to see MSZP as one of the only political options since Fidesz and other right and radical parties use religious rhetoric. She is now interested in LMP as a younger and more innovative liberal-left option.

Table 5.2: Linking Familial Historical Narratives to Political Alignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Events/Figures</th>
<th>Division in Views</th>
<th>Political Tendencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harsh dictator. Leads Hungary into WWII joining the Nazis. Causes Hungarian Holocaust.</td>
<td>MSZP, SZDSZ, LMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuation of Soviet control. Government takes control of private enterprises.</td>
<td>Fidesz, Jobbik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Trianon</td>
<td>Trianon is a sad element of Hungary’s past. There were reasons why Trianon happened.</td>
<td>MSZP, SZDSZ, LMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Hungarians are still a major concern. Pre-Trianon territory is Hungarian.</td>
<td>Fidesz, Jobbik, LMP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that all Hungarians see the Treaty of Trianon as a devastating blow to Hungary as a nation with the large loss of land and people to neighboring countries, however, there are political divides over how much Trianon should remain a political issues, causing potential conflicts with the countries in question, or if it remains a tragedy of the past.
Table 5.2 maps out the three largest narratives discussed from youth interviewees, the divisions within historic views and how they relate to their own political opinions and party support. Often time communist injustice is translated into right and radical right support while those experiencing less injustice had more positive ties with liberal-left political options. Likewise the Horthy Regime was beneficial to older Hungarian elites while others experienced harsh reforms causing a similar right-left divide. LMP, as undefined on the political spectrum, was the only party that showed cross over between certain historical narratives. LMP supporting youths come from both Fidesz and MSZP supporting families.

Without prompting, many times interviewees mentioned the experiences of their parents or grandparents as an explanation as to why they feel a certain way towards a political party. Historical narratives develop relations between sociopolitical events in the past and present political divisions. This interplays strongly with the bipolar political division between right wing Fidesz and left wing MSZP. Antagonistic political sentiments developed from familial narratives were most frequently vocalized in interviews with right and radical right interviewees against MSZP, often directly referred to as a continuation of the communist MSZMP.

*When I really started getting into politics it was in 2002. I was 18 so it was my first vote. Viktor Orbán versus the post-communist guys proving that they don’t understand Hungary. They had 40 years and couldn’t carry out building up Hungary…I joined Fidesz in 2002 and a few weeks later I joined Fidelitas.* (Dave, Age 27: Debrecen)

*We shouldn’t be proud of allowing MSZMP to become MSZP. We should admire the nations that held communists accountable. Now we face the problem that other countries don’t have to face. We passed our possibility and now after 20 years it is difficult.* (Sándor, Age 28: Debrecen)

*Fidesz uses the term ‘revolution’ because we still need to rid communism. In Hungary we still need to purge the system of its communism. Young people are aware of the*
If MSZP comes back my vote will definitely be Fidesz. (Jakab, Age 30: Budapest)

I can’t vote MSZP out of principle, seeing the shift from old communists that stayed in power. (Gábor, Age 24: Budapest)

Liberal-left and green supporting interviewees vocalized their dislike of parties like Fidesz and/or Jobbik, however, this was rarely related back to familial historic narratives. Fidesz was a product of the transition era and the party has used MSZP’s historical ties to the previous regime to play off of pre-existing narratives against the communist era.

5.3 DIRECT FAMILIAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The family is one of the main distributors of human capital and inter-generational values (Walther et. al. 2008). Direct family political influences deal with the relation between family and youth political activism. Section 5.2.1 analyzes familial socialization of traditional democratic practices. The main practices analyzed in this section are partisanship, voting routines and party memberships in correlation with familial practices. Section 5.2.2 analyzes why familial socialization is showing stronger positive relations towards youth activist taking on right wing and nationalist partisanship. This section also analyzes why liberal-left partisanship are not showing strong parent-youth correlation as well as the newer trend of reverse socialization.

5.3.1 Family Influences on Partisanship, Voting and Membership

The large majority of young Hungarians are avid voters. Hungary is above the EU average with 82% of eligible youths (between age eighteen to thirty) participating
in local, regional, national or EU elections.\textsuperscript{246} Despite concerns about a politically apathetic, post-communist youth developing from parents socialized under the Kádár regime the current youth population in Hungary is highly engaged in voting practices. This engagements relates strongly to parental partisanship and voting trends. Similar to results found by Keil (2011) and Cross and Young (2008), most interviewees mentioned that politics was discussed at home and many intended on voting for the same party as their parents.\textsuperscript{247} Many interviewees discussed how a parent got them involved in political discussions around election times from a young age onwards and either encouraged them or took them to vote when they came of age. The process of learning political efficacy, partisanship and traditional democratic participation is apparent in the familial socialization process despite a parent cohort socialized in a non-democratic political setting:

\textit{In 1998 I was too young to vote but in 2002 I could and I had big debates with my parents... When my dad was on his way to elections with me and my siblings, when we were eligible to vote, he would tell us in the care where to put our X.} (Dóra, Age 28: Budapest)

\textit{My first vote was in 2002 and I voted for Fidesz, before I was my own thinker. I voted with my family… They were very adamant that elections were important, especially this one.} (András, Age 29: Budapest).

Note: András is now an LMP supporter.

Both Dóra and András’s quotations show the initial socializing influence of parents inculcating them into voting practices and influencing their initial political views. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 2002 was a divisive polarizing election year between Fidesz and MSZP with Fidesz narrowly losing the elections. These elections were seminal in developing antagonistic political tactics and strong civic circles by Fidesz, discussed


\textsuperscript{247} Party preference influenced by family members, seen in Appendix 6, charts whether or not the interviewee votes for the same political party as their parents.
in Chapter 3. While other socializing agents such as political parties and the media (discussed in Chapter 7) played a role in heightening the atmosphere around the 2002 national elections the reaction and emotional involvement within the home was also significant. Interviewee responses like these are indicative of a politically polarizing atmosphere being socialized through family activism. Many interviewees said that they felt voting was a large family discussion point during election times in particular.

As noted in the quotations above, some youth activists began their political involvement following their family’s party preferences and later changed partisanship, showing the potential for other influencing agents of socialization, such as politicized friends, media or educators.

Hungary has quite low levels of party membership (seen in Figure 3.1), unsurprising for Central and Eastern Europe and consistent with party non-alignment trends (Mair and van Biezen 2001, Scarrow and Gezgor 2010, Whitely 2011). It is significant, however, that those who are becoming or maintaining membership show a trend towards right and radical right ideologies (Enyedi and Linek 2008). Data collected by the Hungarian National News Agency (Magyar Tábirati Iroda – MTI) shows that while party membership numbers are dropping for left wing party MSZP and remains relatively small for Green Party LMP, membership for right and radical right parties Fidesz, KDNP and Jobbik are maintaining and increasing.²⁴⁸ It is also noteworthy that the average age of membership for traditional parties like MSZP and Fidesz are forty-nine and fifty-six, respectively, while it is estimated that LMP party

²⁴⁸ See Figure 3.1. It is also worth keeping in mind that the mention of KDNP (Hungarian Christian Democrat Party) membership relates directly with its coalition with Fidesz. Fidesz is the only political party that allows dual membership with Fidesz and other right wing parties, mainly KDNP.
members are mainly around thirty-five years old and Jobbik members are estimated to
be mostly between the ages of twenty and thirty-five.

The family is often the strongest influence for youth membership in political
parties, whether driven by fighting for the same cause as a family member or being
inspired to join in a non-ideological way (Bruter and Harrison 2009). Common across
Europe, youths are twice as likely to become a party member if a parent or close
relative are a member of a political party (Cross and Young 2008). Over 50% of
young party members across Europe report that a member of their family was a fellow
party member or had been associated with the same party that they decided to take
membership in.249 In Hungary interviewees that were also members of political
organizations mostly had politically active parents that held open political discussions
at home and encourage activism:

*My political interests started in 2009. My dad introduced me to SZDSZ and did
campaign work for the European Parliamentary elections. I also helped by collecting
slips. SZDSZ dissolved after this so I was looking for something new. In 2011 the
MSZP Socialist academic program250 appeared in an advert and my mom found it and
said ‘Hey this is for you’ and I was accepted! My parents introduced me to politics.
They inspired me into politics.* (Adám, Age 23, Budapest).

Parent-youth partisan correlations with membership showed strong differences
depending on political alignment. Young Jobbik party members interviewed were
divided. Some parents were not party members, however, of the Jobbik activists
interviewed none of their parents were non-Jobbik supporters, though some had been

249 In a study on young party members family was mentioned as a reason for joining 53.4% of the
time. Compared with other reasons such as friends (16.4%) or membership in other organizations
(18.1%) the family remains the strongest incentives for youth political membership (Cross and Young
2008).

250 The MSZP Youth Academy was started in 2010 to train young Hungarians in various political
realms. Developing young politicos academy members were admitted to the program through a
written and verbal exam process before being given training about local, national and international
political jobs.
previously Fidesz voters. The liberal-left suffers in attracting official membership, especially among the youth with very few young MSZP or SZDSZ members, regardless of parental partisanship. MSZP badly discredited its youth division with the ‘Zuschlad scandal’ in 2007 so although some parents and youths were MSZP supporters no interviewees mentioned official party membership.\textsuperscript{251} LMP remains a relatively new party, just developing its membership base. Among LMP members some parents were interested in the party but very few parents were official members.

The strong parent-youth activist and membership correlation was found among Fidesz supporters. Fidesz youth party members \textit{all} had a parent or family member that was or had been a party member or actively involved within Fidesz. One reason for the higher likelihood of parent-youth membership correlation is due to the fact that Fidesz has a higher membership base in general compared with other political parties in Hungary (refer to Figure 3.1) paired with the fact that Fidesz has two official youth organizations, both with the largest youth memberships in Hungary (refer to Table 3.1). However there are also other reasons for strong youth predispositions to the right relating to familial socialization.

5.3.2 Familial Predispositions to the Right

Nearly all Fidesz and Jobbik interviewees had the same political preferences as their parents, while the majority of liberal, left and green supporting youths voted for different parties than their parents.\textsuperscript{252} While familial divergences can be partially explained by the influences of other agents of political socialization, there are two

\textsuperscript{251} Mentioned in chapter 2, finances attached to a foundation of MSZP’s youth organization, Societas, were found to be embezzled by János Zuschlag, the president of Societas at the time.

\textsuperscript{252} The table in Appendix 6, tracking interviewee relations to familial political discourse and activism, shows a large parallel between interviewee and parental party preference among rightwing and radical right supporters. While my own data is not statically relevant it does track possible trends emerging in the political socialization process relating to partisanship and political values.
primary reasons for stronger family-based predispositions towards the right, embodied by Fidesz and Jobbik partisanship: 1) Hungary has developed a parent-youth generational divide within liberal-left and green partisanship options and 2) historic narratives, first learned within the family unit, correlate more strongly with right wing and radical right partisanship. Jobbik, and to some degree LMP, are also developing new trends of ‘reverse socialization’, branching out from their youth-base to incorporate a more diversified age range in support.

Reasons for parental influences playing into the current shift in support of right wing and radical right political parties among the youth in Hungary are two-fold. One explanation is the deterioration of strong liberal-left political options (discussed in Chapter 3). Liberal and left wing political parties, embodied by the MSZP-SZDSZ alliance, have been discredited, as discussed in Chapter 3, by changing alliances and political scandals. For liberal-left supporters the parent cohort often expresses the dilemma of having few strong political party options. This is reflected in how the youth explains family dynamics in relation to their own political options.

I would have voted for Fidesz. I exclude MSZP-SZDSZ as an option because they have disgraced themselves...I’m more right wing, national, traditionalist. All of my family comes from Transylvania. My uncle was in the 1956 revolution and fled to the USA, my dad had Catholic School and went to groups illegally under communism. He almost went to jail. So my family is on the side closer to Fidesz. My dad voted SZDSZ in the first elections – he was liberal. But when MSZP and SZDSZ joined he could not vote for them. (Palko, Age 24: Budapest)

MSZP has also become stereotyped as a party for the older left wing generation. As described by Flóra’s quotation below, there is not necessarily outright lack of support

---

253 The largest events to discredit liberal-left options were the decision of liberal party, SZDSZ to form an alliance with MSZP in 1994 as well as the 2006 Őszödi Beszéd Scandal, leading to months of protests outside of parliament. SZDSZ is often discussed as a traitor to its original anti-communist platform and MSZP is vilified as a party of financial and political scandal.
for MSZP by liberal-left youths but the party seems to be supported more by the grandparent cohort and holds little appeal for young activists.

*Yes, we have an old party, MSZP, that works. My grandparents vote MSZP. Nowadays though to say to a twenty to thirty year old, ‘Yes I vote left’ then he or she thinks this is something just old and it does not live. I think for LMP it would be important to go left because there is nothing there.* (Flóra, Age 21: Budapest)

Flóra’s quotation addresses the lack of MSZP allure for young voters as well as utilizing LMP as a substitute for liberal-left youth voters. LMP is a political option for younger cohorts but the newness of the party and the lack of clarity in the party’s positions remains problematic for older cohorts who have been MSZP or SZDSZ voters for nearly twenty-five years. Very few LMP members had a parent that was also an LMP party member or supporter. The newness as well as the youth-based makeup of LMP plays into the lack of trust in the party for older cohorts.

*My parents do not support LMP. To them LMP is not strong enough to be a leader of a country. [LMP] needs time to develop for older people to trust it.* (Angela, Age 29: Debrecen).

More than other political parties, LMP supporting youth activists often expressed that they had common political ideologies as their parents but voted for a different party.\(^{254}\) Parents were often MSZP or SZDSZ supporters who sympathized with the choice of LMP but were not willing to vote for the party. The generational partisanship divide is not present within right and radical right parent-youth socialization making familial socialization weaker among liberal-left parent and youth supporters compared with the right and radical right.

The second explanation for strong familial socialization towards the right and radical right is the fusion of symbolic historical narratives, developed firstly within

\(^{254}\) This is shown in Table 5.2 under the column titled ‘Family Influences’.
the family, combined with the use of similar symbolic references in right and radical right wing political party rhetoric and legislation. Fidesz and Jobbik have used national narratives and symbols, common in familial historical narratives, to cultivate support, touched upon in Chapters 3 and 4. Fidesz’s use of the national tri-colour during political events and Jobbik’s use of the ancient Árpád flag and Greater Map of Hungary are prime examples of this (see section 4.1.2). The dual exposure to certain national symbols and historical narratives by family members and political parties helps solidify partisan ties that many young activists have been exposed to. The dominance and mainstreming of these nationalist narratives have helped solidify right wing and radical right support among the youth. More overtly radical right familial discourse around historical narratives has also been increasing in recent years as Jobbik becomes a more nationally accepted (Kovács 1996 and 2000).

I think ideas are much more dependent on family. If your family says Trianon is wrong then for you it is wrong. On the street the other day I saw an old lady saying to her grandchildren ‘we live in this small nation because Jews made Trianon which was not peaceful!’ You know that kid will be Jobbik. (Ármin, Age 20: Budapest)

Ármin’s quotation shows how familial narratives about Hungary’s past relate directly to radical right partisanship. Historical narratives in Hungary are first introduced through family stories and discussions and then utilized by right wing and radical right political parties as politically salient symbols. As it stands, liberal and left wing political outlets have been less successful in using national symbols and narratives to form accessible identifying markers, particularly with younger cohorts.

---

255 The two most notable current examples of this are the wearing of the national cockade (kokárda) on national holidays by Fidesz supporters and the utilization of the Greater Map of Hungary by Jobbik. The kokárda, made of the Hungarian tricolor, was politicized first during the 1998 national elections causing a stark bipolarity between MSZP and Fidesz. The kokárda is generally worn in Hungary during national holidays, mainly commiserating the 1848 and 1956 revolutions on March 15th and October 23rd.
One trend recently affecting partisanship and voting trends in Hungary is the appearance of youth activists attached to alternative political parties, Jobbik and LMP, changing the political partisanship of their parents. While this was only mentioned a few times it was limited to Jobbik and LMP support and both mentioned that they had explained their partisanship and loyalties to their respective parties with their parents, eventually causing their parents to change their vote in the 2010 national election. This ‘reverse socialization’ from youth to parent is interesting in that newer youth-based parties are spreading their networks through youth activists to a broader cohort range.\textsuperscript{256} In some cases parents even became party activists due to their child.

\textit{My mom raised me alone. She worked at City Hall around 1980 and joined the communists. She became very political for years and later she also became pro-Fidesz. Then she joined LMP. She was my campaign manager. I ran in the local elections. (Balint, Age 29: Budapest)}

Newer political parties, and potential new movement parties, have the ability to bring new political discourse to the forefront of discussion within their families.

***

Hungary is the only country within Central and Eastern Europe where the youth continues to utilize the family unit as their primary source for sociopolitical knowledge and information (seen in Table 5.1). The post-communist youth also discuss politics with their family more than other social outlets like classmates, friends or teachers. One of the reasons for the continued strength of family as an agent for socialization is the strongly polarized political environment in Hungary, making political discussions with friends or teachers potentially contentious and undesired. As

\textsuperscript{256} Reverse socialization has limited studies looking at how youth cohorts can re-socialize parental tendencies and preferences. While some studies have tracked reverse socialization of technological usage (Grossbart et. al. 2002, Aslan and Aslan 2009) or parental purchasing decisions (Gelperowic and Beharrell 1994), very little research has looked at cases of young people politically socializing their parents.
mentioned in Chapter 1, friendship networks, originally intended as chapter topic, proved primarily a-political with very few interviewees saying that they ever discussed political subjects with friends outside of friendships made from within political or youth organizations or social movements. Political debates and clubs are also often banned from secondary and higher education institutions, discussed in the next chapter.

Within the family socialization process many young Hungarians are using historic narratives, told by family members, to define themselves within the modern political spectrum. Highly politicized versions of contentious historical political figures, time periods and events relating to family members are linked directly to partisanship (see Table 5.2). Stories around the Treaty of Trianon, the Horthy Era and the post-1956 Kádár Era are the most influential and contentious historic narratives deciphered through familial political partisanship and being used by political parties.

Familial political socialization is taking place most strongly forming right wing and radical right partisanship. More right Fidesz and Jobbik supporting youths have the same voting preferences as their parents compared with MSZP-SZDSZ and LMP partisanship. This is largely due to the generational divide between liberal-left options with older cohorts preferring the traditional option of MSZP-SZDSZ while younger cohorts are more attracted to new alternative youth-based parties without previous political scandals attached to them, like LMP. Regardless, the youth are tending to prefer similar sides of the political spectrum compared with parental preferences and families are socializing active political participation in elections and activism, negating claims of political passivism past down from the Kádár Era.
The Hungarian case produces results that are in line with more broad political socialization theory, which originates socialization from within the family context. However, with such strong familial influences on sociopolitical knowledge development other socializing agents have developed a-typical socializing functions. The next chapter looks at the role of secondary and higher education in the political socialization process.
6. EDUCATION AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

This chapter aims to analyze the effects of secondary and higher education on both youth political efficacy as well as political partisan formation in Hungary. In the United States and across Europe educational institutions are thought to play a large role in developing civic skills and normalizing democratic participatory practices (Torney-Purta 2002, Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003). Although socialization in schools begins in early childhood (Easton and Hess 1961) this chapter focuses on secondary and higher education institutions. This is the time period when distinct political identities tend to form among individuals and when actual political activism begins for many young people and participation in elections becomes possible. Schools tend to play the most important role in secondary socialization, transferring uniform information about political practices and norms outside family influences (Szabó 1987, Tünde 2004). However, this is fully dependent on how curriculums are developed and implemented with potential disparities on local, regional or national levels. While there have been larger cross-European research projects analyzing civic education there is very little research looking at political socialization taking place within schools and its effect on potential political activism and partisanship (Szabó and Falus 2000, Csákó 2005).

Of all post-communist transitioning countries Hungary opted for the most decentralized and localized system of educational reforms with varying results (Radó 2010). This choice for large-scale decentralization was a political decision to move away from the previously state-centralized communist system, yet the results have become controversial and re-politicized within party politics. This has ultimately affected the structure, content and nature of education in Hungary with sociopolitical
ramifications. This chapter analyzes not only how civic education is implemented and conducted but also how contentious political history and modern political topics are being addressed in the classroom within secondary institutions, where civic education would be mandatory, and high education institutions, where young Hungarians are potentially by politically active students and/or professors.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section gives an overview on how secondary and higher education institutions transitioned from a socialist education model to a decentralized academic system. This section analyzes the political difficulties of education overhauls and the politicized nature of decentralization and centralization efforts by the MSZP and Fidesz governments, ultimately affecting curriculums, standards and funding. The second section of this chapter looks more directly at the socialization process young people are experiencing. This part looks more at how interviewees recall personal experiences at school dealing with politically relevant subjects, the transparency of political biases within the classroom and how sensitive political histories are dealt with. The last part of this chapter looks specifically at Special Colleges in Hungary as an elite socializer. These dorm-like institutions create a small unit of highly active, politically focused young members, many of which have historically become politically significant actors.

6.1 EDUCATION DECENTRALIZED & RECENTRALIZED

Hungary’s Communist Era between 1946 and 1989 changed the goals and framework of education from primary through higher education. The shift to a socialist political system in Hungary brought on a complete restructuring of the main aims and availability of education. In 1946 free education was established as a right
providing eight years of free education, irrespective of background and status. The new academic system stressed vocational and technical training coupled with a high emphasis on political education of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.\textsuperscript{257} Even in satellite states like Hungary the schools were tied closely to the requirements of planned economic developments, allowing increased educational opportunities for women, rural youths and the poor (Grant 1969). However, educational institutions were also used as political tools of indoctrination embodied with a calculated process of political socialization (Szabó and Falus 2000).

With a strict system of centrally imposed schooling, official ideology and civil standards were applied, prohibiting flexibility, pedagogical experimentation or innovative teaching in the classroom (Hiller 2008). Political ideologies and propaganda were embedded in academic literature and civic themes. By the 1980s it was apparent that the effectiveness of heavy communist indoctrination embedded in course curriculum and scouting programs as well as the quality of overall education was less than expected. Restructuring of the education system in Hungary was apparent in the years leading up to transition.

6.1.1. Post-Communist Educational Restructuring

The fear of political influence entering education after transition led to a quick and drastic shift away from centralized education in the early 1990s. The strong political influences in the communist structure of academics in Hungary created an equally strong aversion towards politically centralized education leading to large-scale decentralization efforts. Decentralization in education was considered a safeguard against strong political agendas and partisan biases being taught within

academic frameworks. There was general agreement among the democratizing political parties in the early 1990s that integrating regional and local levels of public administration into educational decision making would create politically autonomous bodies where the government could not issue direct orders to manipulate local governments (Baráth 2004). The initial decentralization structure of administration in 1990 is shown in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1: Structure of Administrative Decentralization in Education 1990

Information and image from Halász (1995), showing the early decentralization efforts in the education system in Hungary.

As seen in the figure above, by 1990 there were already mechanisms in place for a decentralized education system in Hungary. While definite hierarchies still existed between the government, county authorities and local instillations of educational programs the county educational departments had only indirect guidelines given to local education department and county institutions provided only loose
counseling for primary and secondary school programs (Halász 1995). Educational decentralization is often a natural choice for countries making the transition from authoritarian to democratic governments, seen in various levels among democratizing countries in Latin America and across the post-communist region (Hanson 1996, Hanson 1998).\textsuperscript{258} Decentralization is the transference of decision-making and responsibility from the national, governmental level to lower levels of organizational authorities, such as local administrations and institutions.\textsuperscript{259}

In Hungary educational transition was not as drastic as in other post-communist transition countries. Hungary was already in a state of educational transformation before the official end of Soviet control. During the Kádár era throughout the 1970s and 1980s local and regional councils were given an increased role in the administration of schools (Halász 1995, Kaufman 1997). The Hungarian 

\textbf{Education Act of 1985} put in place councils to monitor and supervise local implementation of education systems allowing County Pedagogic Institutes to create partnerships with schools, setting the foundations for decentralization (Howell 1988, Kaufman 1997). By 1990 the decentralization process had already began instating localized flexibility, creating counseling services from the county to the local level to foster independence in primary and secondary schools (seen in Figure 6.1).

By the late 2000s Hungary was considered the most successful case of nationwide decentralized education systems in Europe (Radó 2010). The first main laws changing the structural outline of the education in Hungary came by way of the

\textsuperscript{258} Centralized education systems have the benefit of reducing regional economic disparities in schools, creating uniformed academic programs and creating state control over the nationwide curriculum (Winkler 1993, Weiler 1993).

\textsuperscript{259} Decentralization tries to change the installation and administering of academic facilities from a top-down decision-making process to a more horizontal process, incorporating the decisions and ideas of local authorities and institution heads (Radó 2010).
1993 Act on Public Education expelling certain communist-based laws and making it possible for churches and private entities to found and run schools. It also gave parents free choice in where their children attended school and gave more power to local authorities and governments in managerial roles of developing and running schools. In order to ensure that the decentralized system had a united basis for developing educational content the MSZP government created a National Core Curriculum in 1995, setting general academic standards. However, in a decentralized academic system the application and structure of implementing curriculums and subjects is left up to localities (Radó 2010). In 1998 the new Fidesz government began to supplant previous decentralizing trends. Fidesz introduced further frameworks for a national curricula, making certain portions of the state-based curriculum requirements with regards to the volume and content of subjects being taught (Szabó and Falus 2000).

More education reforms took place with the entrance of Hungary into the European Union, adjusting certain aspects of Hungary’s education system. These changes were aimed particularly at Hungary’s higher education system. The Higher Education Act in 2005 created more flexible legal and policy conditions for higher education finances introducing a credit system and financial autonomy for university institutions (Hiller 2008). Hungary and other post-communist EU members signed the Bologna Declaration, taking measures to standardize higher education institutions by European standards. The Bologna Act was established to enhance academic mobility, increase university autonomy and administrative capacities and incorporate students into administrative processes (Bologna Declaration 1999, Prague Communiqué 2001, 260

260 Generally speaking in the political back and forth in the previous bipolar system in Hungary the MSZP government has always made policy efforts to de-centralize education as much as possible while the Fidesz government has tended to re-centralize policies.
Berlin Communiqué 2003). These changes were instated to allow for greater European academic exchanges as well as increase higher education participation in Hungary, which has been highly successful.

**Figure 6.2: Students enrolled in Secondary School and Higher Education**

![Graph showing enrolment rates of secondary and higher education in Hungary as a percentage of the total age group (OECD 2012).](image)

The above figure shows enrolment rates of secondary and higher education in Hungary as a percentage of the total age group (OECD 2012).

Government changes aimed at increasing Hungary’s enrolment in foundational and higher education has been highly successful. Seen in Figure 6.2, enrollment in education for ages fifteen through nineteen has increased from 64% of the relevant age group in 1995 to 92% by 2010. Higher education attendance has also increased from 10% to 25% in the same time frame. Increased participation in secondary and higher education is seen as a positive indicator of a well-transitioned academic system. However, beneath the surface Hungary is dealing with large structural and political dilemmas affecting political socialization within the education system.
6.1.2. Difficulties and Complexities

The complexity and increased thrust of local innovation involved in producing a fully decentralized education system has caused certain difficulties in Hungary. On the national level, government decisions and party politics in Hungary have affected educational political socialization directly and indirectly from constant policy changes. These decisions have affected how educational institutions are used as sociopolitical and civic socializers in two primary capacities. The first concerns regional economic disparities where smaller localities lack central monitoring mechanisms to ensure education equalities and standards. Decentralized education systems without strong local and regional resources are at a disadvantage to develop strong academic programs. Secondly, constantly changing government positions towards how academic institutions should be organized make it difficult for local authorities and schools to understand and implement academic systems. The polarized political system in Hungary has created a divergence in educational outlooks between parties, constantly changing the role of the state in educational attainment.

One of the largest problems in the post-communist decentralized education system is that a large amount of authority for developing budgets, curriculum and pedagogy is almost entirely given to local and regional actors (Kaufman 1997). Regional disparities not only effect the potential quality of education provided, but without centralized regulatory agents, it can also create large variations in the content of curricula, affecting sociopolitical and civic content. Decentralization requires innovation and increased participation from localized actors yet in Hungary very little
A side effect of these disparities is that teachers often lack the resources to acquire training in democratic civic education teaching competencies. The national core curricula from 2007 onwards states that civic skills are necessary learned requirements for Hungarian students but gives no pressure or authority for ensuring that action is taken to develop such courses. There is currently no political administrative institution responsible for the implementation of civic courses. While many countries in Europe create mandatory teacher training for civic education varies regionally.

__________

261 Teachers in Hungary did not see increased wages despite an increased role. In 1997 many teachers had to supplement earnings with private tutoring. Over 75% of teachers multiple (Kaufman 1997).
262 There are also significantly fewer established higher education facilities in these counties making training more difficult to acquire without relocating cities as a student, a financial pressure, which many young Hungarians can not afford (Rechnitzer 2000). This also means that classroom content for civic education varies regionally.
democracy courses this training is optional in Hungary and subjective upon institution-based regulations. There is also currently only one training facility providing teacher training in civic education at Szeged University’s Teacher Training College created in 2008 (ECPSA Questionnaire 2010). Szeged is in the southeast of Hungary, making it inconvenient for many secondary teachers to take time to undergo training without proper subsidies provided by their institution. In disadvantaged regions of Hungary this is an added expense that is often unaffordable.

The large regional economic disparities in Hungary have put pressure on local governments and teachers trying to allocate funding for primary, secondary and higher education institutions when government funding proves insufficient (Radó 2010). Local governments currently finance more than 80% of primary and secondary school institutions (Csiszárik-Kocsir and Medve 2009). Funding for higher education institutions has also dropped significantly in Hungary from the early 1990s to 2003 (Kärkkäinen 2006). Hungary has one of the lowest annual expenditures per student among OECD countries (see figure 6.3 below). Hungary’s expenditure on education is not only lower than other OECD and EU averages but was one of the only countries to decrease government funding between 2005 and 2009.

265 ECPSA Questionnaire 2010.
266 It should also be noted that this civic course given as teacher training contains minimal political science topics within the Hungarian ‘civic agenda’ for students.
267 Hungary shows the highest decrease in higher education government spending among all OECD countries in this time period. Figures are given in USD due to OECD standards, also creating continuity with the figures in Figure 6.3.
268 Hungary was one of only four countries that has seen a decrease in government funding towards education. Between 2005 and 2009 Hungary decreased spending by 0.3 percent. The only other countries seeing a slight decrease in such funding were Poland, Israel and Canada (OECD 2012).
Figure 6.3: Total GDP Spent on Education: A Comparative Glance

The above figure shows the annual percentage of total GDP spent on education. This figure shows Hungary’s spending on education between 2005 and 2009 compared with other Central European OECD members as well as giving the OECD and European Union 21 average expenditure (raw data sourced from OECD 2012).

There are four centers of power facilitating educational decentralization: political parties, government institutions (both national and regional), teachers and local citizens (see Appendix 9, Hanson 1998). University funding in Hungary comes from a combination of state subsidies, tuition fees and funded research projects (Radó 2010). Since government expenditures per student have decreased along with decreasing public funding, institutions have had to become innovative in making sure government resources are received with negative effects on academic quality (Kärkkäinen 2006). Universities are given government subsidies according to the number of registered students, creating incentives for elongated periods of study.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ Among bachelor degree students 10% to 20% finish their courses in six to seven years instead of the instated four-year bachelors course framework. That is between 38,000 and 76,000 students that are taking extended educational government funding from the tuition-free system Hungary currently has (Radó 2010). In 1998 Fidesz abolished tuition fees that had originally been put in place by the MSZP government’s economic package. (‘Hungarian Higher Education’, Hungarian Spectrum, 21 May
Recognized by university students, the creation of ‘useless’ or ‘time wasting’ degree programs was mentioned by a number of interviewees, discussing the vast disparities between universities and the increasing number of degrees with diminishing applicable value.

*It’s harder for the youth. A diploma is just a piece of paper and our background [from university] is not strong enough. The fault is in part due to teaching. There is also a demographic problem. We need more centralization.* (Sándor, Age 28: Debrecen)

*I’m the only person in my class of fifty or sixty that pursued and got a job related to my studies. Most have no job or work in a clothing shop or something. Hungarian universities do not teach you anything useful for the real world... There is a centralized core curriculum but we set the level low and then we try to crawl under it. That is the student mentality in university.* (Júlia, Age 25: Budapest)

While part of the difficulties facing university graduates are the high unemployment rates in Hungary, the devalued benefit of having a university degree has also impacted young Hungarians. Universities in Hungary are not always providing a strong structural basis for socializing young Hungarians into the adult world. This is less concerned with partisan socialization and more focused on civic socialization, failing to educate the youth in a manner preparing them to interact at a higher level with the world around them. Recent Fidesz changes to the role of the state in ensuring quality higher education will, perhaps, change how universities socialize towards a more nationalist centralized agenda. In 2010 government documents laid out an agenda for the new higher education act stating:

---


270 Youth unemployment is currently at 29.7% as of February 2013. This is much higher than the general population, which shows nationwide unemployment at 11.6%. Data from: ‘Hungary Unemployment Rate’, Trading Economics, (March 2013), <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/hungary/unemployment-rate>.

---
Hungarian higher education has to serve the public by increasing the qualification level of citizens and thereby serve their interests as well as national development in accordance with universal values and national cultural goals with traditions.\textsuperscript{271}

How ‘national cultural goals’ are translated into policy has become a contentious and politicized issue mainly concerning the content of the national core curriculum.

Since the mid 1990s there has been a constant back and forth in education policy between the leading parties. The two most powerful parties have had very different ideas about educational content and state influence. The Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP, has been the forerunner in strong decentralization initiatives while Fidesz has reinstated centralized factors to Hungarian education policies (see Table 6.1). The national core curriculum in particular has changed drastically since 1995 centralizing and decentralizing state influences on course content and structure. The content of the core curriculum has been a particularly contentious topic recently with the influx of right wing and radical right authors included in the mandatory literature requirements.

With the reinstatement of the Fidesz government in 2010 large-scale educational recentralization efforts have again been instated. The national core curriculum and government funding agendas have all been rewritten. The new national core curriculum was implemented September 2013, dictating around 90% of what secondary school teachers can teach, containing a number of nationalist authors, some of which have caused debate around the nationalist implementation of controversial authors and themes. Some of the authors implemented in the core curriculum include Transylvanian writers that were apart of the national conservative

\textsuperscript{271} ‘Strategic Directions in the Development of Higher Education’, The System of Education in Hungary, Prepared by the experts of the Ministry of National Resources of Hungary in cooperation with the Hungarian Eurydice Unit, (Budapest: Ministry of National Resources, 2010).
school.\textsuperscript{272} One particularly controversial example is the author József Nyiro, a former Catholic priest supporting the fascist Hungarian Arrow Cross Party (Murphy 2012).

Table 6.1 MSZP Decentralization Versus Fidesz Recentralization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Act on Public Education</td>
<td>MDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free to found schools by private or religious church entities –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schools run mainly by localities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>National Core Curriculum</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting content-based standards for classes and a system of national</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Rules of the Textbook Market</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provides free textbook supplies to institutions and give structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>national framework for textbook approval</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Cancel Mandatory Core Curriculum</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The MSZP government edits and changes the core curriculum so that</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>it is a suggested framework rather than mandatory.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Higher Education Act</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decentralize to local bodies the supervision, hiring, programming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and regulations of higher education facilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Restructuring Core Curriculum and Government Oversight</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A reinstallation of national standards for curriculum, grading and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>oversight.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As outlined in Table 6.1 decentralization began concretely with the 1993 Act on Public Education giving authority for running schools almost entirely by local governments and authorities (Csákó 2005). Fidesz’s recentralizing educational standards began with the National Core Curriculum in 1998 (Vágó and Vass 2005). The Act on the Rules of the Textbook Market was also passed in 2001. Compulsory usage of the core was cancelled with the reinstatement of an MSZP government 2002 (Baráth 2004). The MSZP government’s Higher Education Act in 2005, further undermined Fidesz recentralizing attempts.\textsuperscript{273} Since Fidesz’s return to power in 2010

\textsuperscript{272} The most notable and controversial authors included in the new mandatory core curriculum are Albert Wass, Deszo Szabó and József Nyiro, all interwar patriots that at some point produced anti-Semitic articles and writings.

\textsuperscript{273} This act increased decentralization efforts by giving more regulatory responsibilities to local governments and institutions, this running 95% of institutional decision-making in colleges and universities (Hiller 2008. See also: Act CXXXIX of 2005: On Higher Education).

222
the national core and its content have been largely altered and deemed mandatory by the Fidesz government.

The core curriculum has not only dictated what texts should be taught but in some cases the Fidesz government has given directions on how certain topics should be taught. In 2010 the government decreed June 4th a Day of National Unity commemorating the signing the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. Not only is this new national holiday a compulsory day of remembrance, but all educational institutions in Hungary received a 131 page document instructing teacher how to teach about the Treaty of Trianon. In order to enforce centralized standards and monitor implementations the Fidesz government has reintroduced a national school inspector system.274 The end result of Fidesz’s educational policy changes is not yet settled however, the constant fluctuation in Hungarian education policies remains highly political and indicative of differences in parties’ views towards the role of the government within the education process. Taking these policy changes to a classroom level, existing legislation about how to cover most politically and historically sensitive topics in Hungary remains vague and often teachers are not certain of their role in interpreting topics (Csákó 2005). As for students undergoing education through these transitions, there seems to be disparities in class structure and content making education within secondary and higher education institutions an illusive agent of socialization on the structural level.

275 This was announced mid March by education state secretary Rózsa Hoffmann. Test runs with the new school inspection system will began between April and May 2013 (‘Government to revive communist-era school inspector’, Politics.hu, (27 March 2013), <http://www.politics.hu/20130327/government-to-revive-communist-era-school-inspector-system/>.
6.2. POLITICAL EFFICACY AND ACTIVISM IN SCHOOL

Going beyond the national level of government policy the second part of this chapter analyzes the youth experience of socialization within secondary and primarily higher education institutions on an institutional and classroom level. This section analyzes the varying political socialization processes within educational institutions dealing with topics of political efficacy and civic participation. In Hungary political teaching concerning values, ideologies and relaying policies is primarily perceived by families as a familial responsibility, as a response from the previously politicized role of education during communism (Szabó and Falus 2000). The role of the school is perceived as an instrument to teach civic education with relation to understanding society and political practices. Hungarians often consider sensitive sociopolitical topics inappropriate for classroom content by Hungarians (Szabó 2013).

As expressed in Chapter 5, the family is arguably the strongest agent for political socialization. However, schools and universities are still responsible for teaching civic education and democratic practices, as stated by the Ministry of National Resources and the Hungarian National Core Curriculum. Interviews with young political activists and professors showed high levels of variation in the willingness and availability to discuss contemporary political topics at secondary and higher education institutions. The two largest factors effecting politicization within schools in Hungary on an institutional and classroom level are: 1) school regulations specifically prohibiting certain sociopolitical discourse and activities in universities

\[\text{276}\] In research done among OECD countries Hungary has a noticeably higher perception of the school’s role in developing civic and social skills among the youth. Only 16% of Hungarians consider it to be the school’s role to assist personal and civic development while 56% of Hungarians think the school and family have equal roles. The OECD average shows 33% considering the school has a primary civic role with 63% thinking the school and family share responsibility (Szabó and Falus 2000).

\[\text{277}\] Refer to ‘The System of Education in Hungary’ and the ‘Hungarian National Core Curriculum’. 
and 2) subjective political opinions and narratives introduced into classroom discussions by certain teachers and professors.

### 6.2.1 Prohibiting Political Socialization in Universities

Hungary’s decentralized education system has led to institution-based regulations of contemporary political topics in many universities. Political science, as a field of study, in the post-communist era is structured around university-specific parameters. How sociopolitical content is viewed in Hungary, particularly concerning contentious events in the twentieth century, is highly influenced by debates between leading intellectuals and politicians about the nature of political science itself (Ágh 1993, Csizmadia 1993, Tökés 1993, Szabó 2006). Due to the continued controversial nature of modern political topics and aversion towards politicized government influence in schools combined many universities create regulations to safeguard against contemporary political debates and activism on campus. Although some teachers do bring up political topics and party preferences general university policies (official or unofficial) try to prohibit classroom politicization through debates and partisan discussions. Expressed by professors and teachers in Hungarian institutions:

*I had an open session of political discussion in class. I was told specifically not to bring up politics in my class by the heads of the university. But students want the opportunity. They are very willing to talk when they are told they can... To not speak of politics or sensitive issues is a hangover from politics of old. Some youth are fearful to talk. They have inherited weariness.*

(Professor at Debrecen University – preferring to remain anonymous)

*Political opinions can’t develop in school. It is not allowed to, so you are not allowed to present your political opinions as a teacher or student. There is no debate or forums of opinions... I could get kicked out of my school for this.*

(Teacher from Miskolc preferring to remain anonymous)
Political parties, and their youth organizations, are often banned from working or congregating through many universities (Csepeli 1994, Csákó 2004). Because of the decentralized nature of instating university regulations these are not national regulations, rather, they are instated on an institutional basis by universities. Student political societies, found in most of Western Europe and the United States, are prohibited by most university regulations in Hungary. Youth activists in university said that attempts to put up flyers for politically related events, and even politically themed surveys, were all condemned and rejected by university officials, saying that it was against school policy. Youth organizations attached to political parties are often prohibited from using campus space to campaign, recruit or debate.

*There is no politics in university. It is not allowed to have rallies or recruit members. You can’t flyer or even really discuss politics at university. (Szabócs, Age 20: Budapest – Jobbik Youth Member)*

Directly political organizations and groups are generally prohibited from school campuses. However, grassroots youth organizations linked with political parties, such as early LMP rallies and the radical right 64-County Youth Movement (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) seem to fall in between the gaps of what is political and what is not. These quasi-political movements are finding ways of permeating into educational institutions as youth organizations since they represent a political gray area with regards to their goals and content.

---

278 Higher education institutions in Hungary can be either public (state-owned) or private (either denominational or other). Of the 69 higher education institutions in Hungary (as of 2010) there are 29 public and 40 private institutions (see ‘The System of Education in Hungary’, 2010).

279 Because regulations are by individual university regulations it is hard to say that all political groups are prohibited in all universities in Hungary. One interviewee mentioned that at ELTE there were groups of Fidesz students making semi-formal groups on campus.

280 Discussed further in Section 5.3: LMP began as a youth movement before it became an official political party, holding meetings within Special College, TEK, attached to Corvinus University.
The 64 County Youth Movement is active within schools. Even in Budapest. Even in 2002 they were helping organize camps in school. They are just semi-political. At universities the young people are very active not just for the right wing but also for LMP and Jobbik. (Áron, Age 23: Budapest)

University-based researchers have also come across difficulties in Hungary due to formal and informal rules opposed to political topics. Professors and students interviewed confirmed that most universities have created official institution-based regulations against party influences and politically contentious topics. It is understandable that universities would have an aversion towards politicization on campus as a reaction to the previous regime’s enforced political socialization. However, regulations are sometimes prohibiting universities from being a space for cultivating rational debate and discussion. Even Hungarian researchers questioning political interests and opinions in universities have found it difficult to receive permission from administration to conduct surveys and interviews. Administration often dismisses potential research projects dealing with political topics and preferences, labeling them as issues that are not of interest within the school (Csákó 2005).281 Students conducting undergraduate and masters research for classes have also come across similar difficulties.

For university I made surveys and asked the principal if I could distribute my survey. It was about socio-linguistics. He said it was not allowed if it had anything to do with politics, religion or drugs. I was outraged at the idea that you couldn’t ask about ‘anything’ political. (Adam, Age 23: Budapest)

Most interviewees mentioned that they felt there was a lack of contemporary political debate in schools. This was not only on the level of avoiding controversial

---

281 Hungarian sociologist Mihály Csákó was administering research on political socialization within secondary schools. Surveys included questions such as ‘How interested in politics are you?’, ‘Who do you talk politics with?’, and ‘How do you define a parliamentary democracy?’. The headmaster, upon examining the questionnaire deemed that it concerned issues that were not of interest to the school environment and that he should leave them alone (Csákó 2005).
topics during history or governance classes but also in the prohibiting of student-run discussions, forums or political promotion on campus. Most young people interviewed agreed that they would like to be able to debate and have in-class discussions about political topics in class. At the same time both students and teachers are uncertain on how to ensure political partisanship and ideologies are not brought into the classroom.

6.2.2 Subjective and Selective Teaching

In early transition efforts in the new academic environment most teachers had been trained under the socialist regime and found implementing innovative educational changes difficult, not knowing where decision-making was meant to occur (Mitter 1987, Horváth 1990). With constantly changing educational policies and core curriculum criteria it remains difficult for teachers to know how to cover certain sociopolitical and civic topics when the country itself has not fully come to terms with controversial national historical events (discussed in Section 5.2). Interviewees were asked about political topics discussed in high school and university (if applicable). Interviewees were asked how political topics were discussed in the classroom as well as whether or not they felt they knew the political orientation of their teachers, due to the strong divisive political biases in Hungarian party alignment, making neutral political discourse difficult. Interviewee responses showed lots of variation concerning in-class politicization experiences, indicative of the local and institutional differences in a decentralized system. However, some current trends in contemporary socialization are emerging concerning 1) avoidance of contentious

---

282 Appendix 10 outlines interviewee responses on political socialization in school.
historical and political topics, 2) student awareness of teacher partisanships and 3) overarching partisanships of certain universities and/or university departments.

One of the more notable trends that came through during interviews is that there seems to be a high level of teachers currently avoiding contemporary political topics, either cutting all modern, potentially polarizing, political topics or tailoring political discussions to avoid certain areas of discourse. While the other two trends discussed deal with university trends this point was relayed within interviews discussing both secondary and university courses that dealt with politics, government, history or civics. Interviewees most often discussed censorship of political discussions in potentially controversial topics, such as contested historical events, elections, policy changes and post-communist transition.283

Education aimed at civic society and touching on political identity is a problem and it’s a real problem because the 20th century is very controversial and very politicized even up to today. So if the central government wants students to learn factual history, they have to water it down basically because it will depend on the teacher what he or she will say about it. So after the regime change it was a very strict government policy to kick politics out of school altogether. [In my experience] there is absolutely no chance for high school students to learn about politics or even the 20th century. Most of my teachers, to avoid controversy, they skip the 20th century...sometimes not even the 1956 revolution, so most of the time maybe they go up to 1956 maybe not, maybe just 1945 so they say ok here is the book read it at home. Very few schools teach the communist years or regime change. (László, Age 24: Budapest)

The same historical narratives discussed in Chapter 5 are mentioned in the above quotation, showing the controversial and politicized nature of recent history for Hungarians. Even looking at modern political history on high school core curriculums multiple interviewees said that some teachers are apprehensive about these topics and

---

283 These trends pertain to classes that relate to politics and civic education such as government classes, political sciences, history (with regards to sensitive recent historical events) and civic education. Obviously certain classes are not applicable to these questions like maths or sciences.
leave them till the last one or two weeks of class, rushing through the topic on a simplified level, or left to read at home.

While not all teachers avoid political discussion, the classroom settings that did tackle contemporary political and civic education tended to identify the awareness of teachers’ political biases in the way content was shared and discussed. Interviewees primarily discussed this with reference to university experiences. Interestingly, even students who reported that there was no discussion of contemporary political subjects in the classroom also reported that they were aware of many of their teachers’ political alignments (highlighted in yellow in Appendix 10).

History in Hungary is a fairytale. Right wing teachers are usually more aggressive. It is hard to look at history without emotions in Hungary. Trianon, WWII, 1848, 1956...Post transition there are no big children or youth movements. No teaching groups or democratic cohesion. (Gábor, Age 30: Budapest).

I took a class on the Hungarian History of Law and the teacher never spoke about his political alignment but he came to class wearing a Bocskai outfit so you knew [he was radical right]... When I was finishing university and the state exams had a committee come to judge you one member was wearing an Árpád flag tie. It was embarrassing for me because this was inappropriate... It is always the right and radical right which show themselves. (Daniel, Age 28: Budapest)

As noted by Daniel’s quotation above, often times political partisanship is visible within universities, as well as in public, through easily identifiable political symbols such as the red and white striped Árpád flag or Bocskai dress style, signifying support

284 Sometimes interviewees were not certain of the exact party a teacher might vote for but knew whether they were nationalist conservative or liberal-left supporting. Only one interviewee mentioned that political topics were discussed in class while the teacher’s political alignment was unknown (highlighted in green on Appendix 10).
of the traditional nationalist sentiments and often support of the right or radical right.\

Typecasting of political partisanship was also mentioned with reference to university departments, seen in the above quotations, and institutions. Many interviewees mentioned history courses as being a bastion of right wing and particularly radical right ideologies and partisanship. Institutional stereotyping occurred in a number of interviews where students felt there were overwhelming political biases within certain universities.

Studying communication and talking media there is an obvious political side. Catholic university is so right wing. Mostly KDNP and Fidesz. (Dóra, Age 28: Budapest)

Many in the University of Debrecen are Jobbik. Liberals are in hiding... Some far right supporters are putting posters up at school. Only Jobbik was visible at my university. Everyone is either right or passive. (Adam, Age 23: Budapest)

I go to ELTE university and study history. At ELTE it is about 1/3 of the students that are Jobbik. In the history department maybe it is 50%. (Tibor, Age 20: Miskolc)

Dóra’s quotation is unsurprising since there are strong correlations between the right and the church. This is mainly due to Fidesz’s longstanding alliance with the Christian Democrats (KDNP). Recent findings by Hungarian researchers and investigative reporters have also verified certain university and departmental partisan tendencies. History and religious studies seem to be particularly attractive for

---

285 As mentioned, the Bocskai is a Hungarian traditional style of suit jacket, most often worn by a man, however, Jobbik MEP Kristzina Morvai has re-popularized the outfit along with other Jobbik MPs and older radical right MIÉP supporters.

286 Dóra attended Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem (known as Pázmány University). The Catholic University is located in Budapest. It is one of the oldest and most prestigious universities in Hungary.

287 ELTE is the abbreviation used for Eötvös Loránd University (Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem).

288 Jobbik was founded within ELTE University by a group of nationalist history students in 1999 (Havas 2009, Korkut 2012). At ELTE it was discovered recently that the student union, (HÖK) was making lists of students’ religious affiliations and party preferences, slandering Roma and Jewish
radical right supporting students and teachers.\textsuperscript{289} This is partially linked with the highly politicized historical narratives mentioned previously. Historical revisionism is highly attractive for nationalist and radical right supporters since how history is depicted creates distinct narratives about Hungarians as a people and Hungary’s position in international relations.\textsuperscript{290} As mentioned by interviewees and confirmed by Hungarian studies right wing and radical right support for Fidesz and Jobbik is most prevalent in universities when partisanship is identifiable (Vásárhelyi 2003).

6.3 SPECIAL COLLEGES: ELITE SOCIALIZATION

In contrast to the restricted political content and subjective channeling of political information within universities the development of Special Colleges (Szakkolégiumok) provides an elite opportunity for political information sharing that classrooms and main campuses prohibit. Although Special Colleges only admit a small amount of university students they are relevant here for their role as a seedbed for developing political elites as well as new parties and movements. Special Colleges are small semi-autonomous institutions attached to a university, providing their own extracurricular structure and classes, financing and system of admittance around a specified field of study. These colleges are self-run by student members, generally ranging between sixty and one hundred members in each. While not all Universities have a szakkolégium program the more well known universities in Budapest tend to

\begin{itemize}
  \item The vice president of the union and several other former presidents and members were Jobbik members, using these lists for Jobbik recruitment (‘Listázták ELTE gölyait’, Index, (19 February 2013), < http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/19/listaztak_az_elte_golyait/>).
  \item Studies by Maria Vásárhelyi concluded that there were high levels of radical right xenophobia among ELTE’s history and religious students. At ELTE it was found that among history and religious students 21\% openly felt that Jewish citizens weakened the Hungarian nation while 49\% felt that Jewish interests were different to Hungarian interests (Vásárhelyi 2003).
  \item The historical ties to Attila the Hun and the seven warrior tribes that lived in Pannonia (pre-Hungary) play into narratives of Hungary’s strength and will to conquer. Later histories of Hungary’s oppression by outside forces, such as the Hapsburbs and Soviets, play into radicalized conspiracy narratives of Hungary struggling against the world.
\end{itemize}
have one or two Special Colleges attached to the larger institution. Most Specialist Colleges include a designated area or hall of residence developed to create a special environment focused on extracurricular education and research for top students, above and beyond what the general university curriculum provides. As described by a member of the law-based Special College, Bibó:

*It’s like a hostel with classes.* (Mónika, Age 21: Budapest)

While some College programs have non-political foundations for specialization, for the purposes of my research I focus on an analysis of the foundational three Special Colleges, important for being the first Colleges of their kind as well as the most politically influential: **Rajk László College for Advanced Studies** (*Rajk László Szakkollégium* – known as **Rajk**), the **College for Advanced Studies in Social Theory** (*Társadalomelméleti Kollégium* – known as **TEK**) and the **Bibó István College for Advanced Studies** (*Bibó István Szakkollégium* – known as **Bibó**). These three Colleges are attached to two of the main Universities in Budapest, **Corvinus University** (*Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem*), previously the Karl Marx School of Economics and **Eötvös Loránd University** (*Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem* – known as **ELTE**).

These Special College institutions, the three listed in particular, are of important mention since within their confines they have founded and developed Fidesz and LMP as well as some links with Jobbik members. While Special Colleges are openly politically unbiased they have distinct links with political entities such as Bibó and Rajk’s link with the founding members of Fidesz and TEK’s participation in LMP’s beginning. This section discusses these three oldest and most influential

---

291 By western reference points these colleges are somewhat comparable to Oxbridge colleges or co-ed fraternity-like structures in the United States.
Special Colleges in Budapest as an elite outlet for political socialization that has direct party politic consequences.

6.3.1 Origins of the Szakkollégium in Hungary

The first Special Colleges were developed in Budapest in the 1970s. Small groups of between twenty and forty students would congregate regularly to train themselves further on subjects pertaining to their degrees. The Rajk Lászlo College for Advanced Studies (hereafter referred to as Rajk) was the first Specialist College of Hungary founded in 1970 as an autonomous, self-governed student association formally attached to the Karl Marx School of Economics (now Corvinus University). The College was established with Marxist principles and goals of providing members with a larger range of possibilities for professional, social and political self-education and activism with members coming from the economics, business and social sciences faculties. Hungary’s more open and liberal stance towards non-political associations at this time allowed for the beginning of Special Colleges.

Rajk College’s mission is to provide students with opportunities to increase their professional standard and educate members as socially sensitive intellectuals. Members operate the college as a democratic community, teaching active citizenship. Rajk College, named after a socially dividing political figure, showed the post-1956 Kádárist easement of the time, allowing for certain levels of social commentary and critique as long as it did not go against the main lines of the Socialist Party. During the transition period in Hungary between 1989 and 1990 Rajk

294 The naming of the College after Lászlo Rajk in 1970 displayed a critical stance towards the political structure and discourse of the time. Rajk had been a former Communist Minister of Foreign Affairs.
members continued the College as a decentralized, anti-communist institution, taking a more neoliberal stance, supporting the liberal camp of political parties SZDSZ and Fidesz.\textsuperscript{295}

The second oldest Szakkollégium in Hungary is the College for Advanced Studies in Social Theory (TEK) founded in 1981. TEK was founded by a group Rajk students, splitting from Rajk to develop a more left-wing theory base. While Rajk was looking to move away from Marxist centered sociopolitical theories, TEK looked to reinterpret political structures within Marxism. During democratic transition the College began to move away from Marxism and explore values of self-expression and global subject matters, though reinterpretations of Marxist ideology remains part of their discussion core. Today the College is known for its central debates on Hungary’s environmental projects, internal ethnic issues and the effects of globalization.\textsuperscript{296}

Bibó István College for Advanced Studies (Bibó) also lays claim as Hungary’s second advanced studies student community. A group of between twenty to forty ELTE University law students began convening between 1977 and 1978 to debate contemporary law issues and relating sociopolitical topics. Bibó College, named after another politically relevant figure\textsuperscript{297}, was formally established from this group in

\textsuperscript{295} As explained in Chapter 2, the original liberal camp, in the tripartite political system in 1990, was the more hard-line anti-communist camp. This was before SZDSZ shifted left to align itself with MSZP and before Fidesz re-aligned itself as a national conservative party. Information on the transition position of Rajk comes from interviewees who were Rajk members.

\textsuperscript{296} From interviewees that were members of TEK some of the extracurricular lecture themes offered in their Fall 2011 program included ‘Revolutionary Situation: A Critical Relationship Between Nature and Society Today’, ‘Psychedelic World View’, ‘Roma Murders’ and ‘Border Cases’.

\textsuperscript{297} Considered to be one of the greatest political thinkers of Hungary, István Bibó (1911-1979) had been a law student in Szeged continuing his career into the Royal Court of Justice and the Ministry of Justice by 1938. He had helped word the 12-point manifesto of the left-wing intellectual group the March Front, supporting communist-social democratic cooperation. In 1944, Bibó helped draft the ‘peace proposal’ for the communist party and issued safe conducts to restrict the deportation of Jews. In 1956 he backed Imre Nagy’s coalition government, and was consequently sentenced by the
1983, when the student group moved into a semi-professional college building on Ménési Road in Budapest, where members continue to reside today. Members come from the law and social sciences departments of ELTE. Like Rajk, the main aim of Bibó College is to prepare members for professional training and the labor market as well as build knowledge and networks that will benefit members in future careers. Bibó claims, similarly to the other colleges, to adhere to ‘political neutrality, tolerance and diversity, quality research and practice-oriented training, support, embracing talent and a well-functioning community life providing all that can be achieved’.

6.3.2. Membership Process and Structure of Special Colleges

Membership into one of Hungary’s prestigious Specialist Colleges is not a simple task and aims to select the best and the brightest individuals to enhance the College’s community and activities. Active student membership of each college maintains numbers of around one hundred or less per College. Student members run admission processes into each College democratically. Rajk, TEK and Bibó all have Admissions Committees, usually made up of members that hold active leadership roles within the college. Applicants must be full-time students at the university the College is attached to. Although there is some variation in the format and questioning of College applicants, generally a written questionnaire is filled out containing topical questions relating to the central focus of the College. Short essay questions ask about personal perspectives, world-views and expectations. For Colleges like Bibó, Rajk

299 He was later released and lived on but is most well known for his connection to the Imre Nagy government and his political writings during the interwar period. http://bibo.elte.hu/’politikai semlegesség, a tolerancia és sokszínűség talaján állva, az igényes kutatómunka és a gyakorlatorientált képzés támogatásával, a tehetségek felkarolásával, jól működő közösségi lét biztosításával lehet elérni’.
and TEK questions often include current national political debates and broader questions about globalization and economic policies that show the focal interest and topical orientation of each College. All Colleges ask applicants to question the sociopolitical world around them to get a sense of their views to see if they will fit within the close knit College environment. Successful written applications are followed by an interview with the Admissions Committee. Members create a close community, living and working together to educate one another and network with like-minded students and professionals.

Once admitted, members play an active role in the creation and participation of events. The Colleges are self-sustaining, funded by alumni and as well as revenue from programs, seminars, tutorials and conferences they host. Special Colleges allow the open sociopolitical discourse that the wider universities prohibit. These events as a platform for members to network with established professionals, intellectuals and politicians. Although Colleges are student-run an adult director is proposed by the Board of the General Assembly as well as the Student Affairs Committee and approved by the greater university body that the College is attached to.

6.3.3. Developing Political Parties and Socializing Activism

Special Colleges provide an elite arena for political socialization within universities. Professors, policy-makers and experts from Hungary and abroad are

---

300 For example, in the TEK 2012 written application short questions ask: What constitutes social responsibility? What does an oligarch do? How do we differentiate between a freedom fighter and a terrorist? What does an ethical bank do? Applicants are also asked to pick two quotations to write essays on commenting on contemporary philosophers, urban planners, economists and sociologists. <TEK Felvételi 2012, A Társadalomelméleti Kollégium Felvételi Kérdései (2012)>.

301 The intensity of the interview process varies as well. While some interviewees have noted a very formal interview process within Bibó, TEK is more relaxed with an informal interview structure.

302 This rector-like figure is appointed for a fixed period, usually between three and five years. Semi-annual meetings have College members manage funding, proposal writing, programming and the management of publications. Colleges become intricate mini-localities with Student Boards, Committees for Academic Activities and members of Assembly.
invited to give lectures, participate in conferences and debates, or conduct roundtables with College members. While general university policies and courses avoid controversial historical and political topics, Special Colleges have the freedom to question contemporary issues and discuss them in an academic setting. Those attending Special Colleges usually commented on the contrast between general university education courses and the more open political discourse permitted in College programs and discourse.

*At University we were not allowed to have political debates, but within colleges there is intellectual behavior more and it is more open. In those circles if is more common.* (Beata, Age 24: Budapest - TEK Member).

*It’s very different in high school. There is no fear about speaking about politics [in Bibó College] but you can always tell someone’s opinions* (Monika, Age 21: Budapest).

Special Colleges create a space for stronger political socialization that does not happen as strongly in general high school and university atmospheres. Interviewees that mentioned their membership in Special Colleges almost always noted a large influence of their respective college in developing their political ideologies and partisan alignment, as seen in Appendix 10 highlighted in blue. This strong college influence had the potential to counteract previous familial socialization while most other interviewees said that schooling had little or no effect on their political views.

*My influence was not so much in the family, just general discussion at home. I am a member of Bibó College. I was a-political before but now these Colleges are politicized. My fellow classmates were a big influence in how to practice politics, to give a voice.* (Dániel, Age 25: Budapest).

Besides creating a unique space for youth political socialization via conferences, lectures and open discussion, these Special Colleges have also played an
active role in political activism and creating party elites. Rajk College states proudly that their ‘college and its members have played an important role in preparing and assisting the transformation of Hungary to a democratic country with a market economy’. Rajk, Bibó and TEK have been particularly influential in political party formation from the first youth party, Fidesz, to more recent youth-based parties like LMP. The foundations of Bibó were directly linked with creating a space for open anti-establishment discourse. From the atmosphere created by Bibó and Rajk came the foundations of the Association of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – FIDESZ) in its original form. Fidesz was established at the Bibó College dorm in Budapest on 30 March 1988. Ten of the thirty-seven original founders of Fidesz were Bibó College members while a number of other founders were Rajk. Fidesz continues to recognize Bibó as the birthplace of the party and the older generation of Fidesz’s political activists remains in contact with the newer Bibó members. Social events are arranged, used sometimes to recruit Fidesz members from within the Bibó alumni network. Well-known Bibó-Fidesz members include Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, President János Áder and Foreign Affairs State Secretary Zsolt Németh. A list of well-known Bibó members are given on the colleges website, many with government and civil service positions.

304 One interviewee also mentioned the cultivation of certain Jobbik members within Bibó more recently but this remains unconfirmed and without external data.
305 Some of the other founding students could not be Bibó members since they were not students of law while another group of founding members were economists within Rajk College. (Information from an interview with Bibó Founding Director, István Stumpf – Current constitutional judge in Hungary).
306 Fidesz founders even held the party’s twentieth anniversary party at their former College, Bibó with cake and speeches from prominent founding members such as László Kövér, current Speaker of the National Assembly of Hungary and temporary incumbent President after the resignation of Pál Schmitt. ‘Fidesz Birthday Bash: Twenty Years’, Hungarian Spectrum, (30 March 2008), <http://esbalogh.typepad.com/hungarianspectrum/2008/03/fidesz-birthday.html>.
More recently, TEK has also played a role in party formation providing a space for the founders and members of youth-based green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP). As mentioned previously, themes within TEK are based on a more alternative political stance, focusing on urban renewal, sustainable living and tackling controversial socioeconomic concerns about homelessness and Roma integration in Hungary. These topics parallel much of the policy focus of LMP, allowing for an intellectual space for political thought development and socialization.

I am a member of TEK College. Founders of LMP were also TEK, communicating heavily, holding lectures and discussions. Then they became a party. My friends were apart of it. There were online newsletters and mail lists [from LMP]. We debated if it should be allowed in our Colleges mail stream. In TEK it’s really usual to talk politics without getting a negative stamp. It created an open space for me to shape my opinion and give my point of view (Beata, Age 24: Budapest).

While there are instances across Europe of students and universities giving rise to social and political movements this type of political socialization is limited to the elite sphere of Special Colleges in Hungary, operating on more active political premises. While universities prohibited open debates the Special Colleges set up debates, demonstrations and roundtables questioning the new political developments in Hungary. While the number of members in any given College generally remains limited to less than one hundred their impact on political activism and socialization goes beyond the scope of membership through their activities and publications. Their socializing also goes beyond their youth-based premises bringing alumni, scholars and policy-makers into their realm of debate. These Colleges provide a space for political socialization and discourse that universities are currently lacking.

Rajk, TEK and Bibó have all been active in government protests over the new changes to education policies by the Fidesz government, drawing out thousands of students in various protests (reported by Hungarian MTI, Magyar Narancs, Index.hu and Politics.hu). The Special Colleges also work with various NGOs and develop their own publications for public. TEK works closely with Habitat for Humanity while Bibó produces a monthly publication through Hungarian think tank Szazadveg (information from interview with founding director István Stumpf).
While education in most western democracies is used to socialize democratic practices and teach civic participation, in Hungary the education system remains dysfunctional as a political and civic socializing agent. Aspects of the education system impeding democratic civic socialization are caused at the national, institutional and classroom level. With regards to government effects on secondary schools and universities, large-scale decentralization efforts have created regional disparities since over 80% of institutional funding is meant to come from local and regional municipalities. Economic disparities in certain regions of Hungary, such as the northeast and far south, mean that institutions and teachers are often unable to access the same resources, such as teacher training courses, to ensure that young Hungarians are being taught newly introduced civics courses at an equal standard.

Decentralization requires a power shift, which comes with a necessary attitudinal shift to embrace new roles and local levels of responsibility. There is a lack of continuity or mutual agreement between political parties in Hungary about the role national and local actors should be playing. The nature of governmental regulations has affected educational political socialization with shifts between decentralization efforts, put forth by the MSZP government, and recentralizing legislation, instated by the Fidesz government. This has not only created confusion for institutions and teachers trying to implement legislation but the content of the core curriculum has become highly politicized. Particularly since changes made by the Fidesz government since 2010, the new national core curriculum has a distinct

---

309 Appendix 9 shows a model of the collaborative efforts necessary in a well-working decentralized education system, involving national and regional actors dealing with political, economic, organizational and educational goals. As seen in this model the process demands high levels of innovation and communication between local, regional and national actors.
national focus, incorporating new and controversial literature by interwar authors that are known to have supported the fascist Arrow Cross Party in Hungary. The Fidesz government has also begun distributing material on how contentious sociopolitical topics should be taught, as seen by the documents provided for teaching about the Treaty of Trianon. These changes are consciously realigning education-based socialization, mainly in secondary schools, re-nationalizing content and aims.

On an institutional level, regulations often suppress campus environments from developing healthy political debates and discussions in universities by prohibiting partisan content or organizations. Debates, political youth organizations, and surveys about sociopolitical perspectives are all often prohibited by institutional rules. Students are often faced with the contradictory nature of institutional restrictions compared with certain openly politicized teachers and professors, most often reported supporting the right and radical right. Students also reported certain overarching partisanship in certain universities or specific departments, most often correlating with right wing and radical right alignments. The only arena for strong and direct socializing processes in education is within the small elite Special Colleges. The environment provided for the students participating in these colleges is cultivating active young political elites as well as developing new political movements.

The next chapter looks at the role of the Hungarian media as an agent of political socialization.
7. MEDIA AS AN AGENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Across Europe mass media today is considered to have an increasing influence on socialization. TV news, newspapers and online media portals are reaching wider audiences and providing easy access to local, national and international news (Chaffee and Yang 1990, Chaffee 1997, Horowitz 2005). Journalists and media outlets in the post-communist environment in the last twenty-five years have experienced new democratic liberties of freedom of speech and press (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, Horowitz 2005). The early years of transition grappled with the process of privatization and decentralization with varied results. In the Hungarian case, certain distinct trends have emerged with regards to media-based partisanship and the transformation of online media accessibility. In theory, the state’s direct control over the media is drastically reduced in a post-communist democracy, however, the influence and power of the ruling party remains substantial. Political parties have retained influence over public radio, television stations and press agencies. This is not uncommon for most of Central and Eastern Europe. Many post-communist nations are struggling with defining and institutionalizing the role of the media offering fair and fact-based journalism (Gross 2004).

This chapter analyzes the current role media is playing in the process of political socialization in Hungary. Media considered in this chapter includes television, radio, newspapers, weekly magazines, and online news portals. Throughout the chapter ‘traditional media’ pertains to television, radio and various newsprint while alternative media refers broadly to alternative online news portals that are not attached to larger traditional broadcasts or publications. It should be noted that questions about media usage pertained to gaining information about political
news and not usage for entertainment.\textsuperscript{310} Online news portals considered in this study are included in cases where traditional news outlets have online outlets for their content, as well as newly developed news portals and politically relevant political news blogs.\textsuperscript{311}

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the top down process of post-communist media decentralization, looking at how political actors managed media privatization with distinctly political ends. This section follows a rough chronological development of national media from the end of the Kádár Era of highly centralized media, to post-transition media liberation. This section also analyzes the accessibility for marginalized political organizations and parties, such as Jobbik or newer grassroots social movements, to penetrate mainstream media outlets. The second section of this chapter looks at the bottom up process of how young people are interacting with various media outlets as a source for cultivating political efficacy and solidifying partisanship. This section tracks the types of media outlets being used with regards to attaining sociopolitical news as well as tracking how young Hungarians view political media as a whole, particularly with regards to newer online news outlets.\textsuperscript{312} How online media content compares with traditional news outlets and what affect this might have on media as an agent of socialization is also analyzed.

\textsuperscript{310} This is important mainly because in Hungary and across Central and Eastern Europe there are high levels households watching television but that does not necessarily correlate with watching television relevant to political socialization and acquiring news media (Eurobarometer 75 Autumn 2011).

\textsuperscript{311} While blogs may sometimes be categorized as more a social rather than media form of socialization, in the case of Hungary a majority of youth respondents referred to certain sites as primary media portals for political information, rather than social online interaction. It is for this reason that sites such as Mandiner, Konzervatórium and Jobbklikk as well as Index and Origo are included in this section.

\textsuperscript{312} Increasing online media usage by youths is a trend across Europe (Eurobarometer 76, Autumn 2011).
7.1 POST-COMMUNIST MEDIA TRANSFORMATION

During democratic transition the media was one of the largest focal points of change in attempts to decentralize the media away from government control. National and international private industries took over media outlets and developed new news outlets to renew the media sector. Although the new democratic government aimed to counter the previous regime’s politically centralized system, the politicized role of the media has subsequently recentralized around strong partisanship.

7.1.1 Privatization of Traditional Media

Diversifying and decentralizing the media away from state-controlled content was a symbol of democratization, allowing for autonomy and giving a platform to a diverse array of opinions and perspectives (Linz and Stepan 1996). However, the reality of transitional media changes was an elite power struggle for media control during the privatization process, recognizing media ownership as a potentially powerful tool for profit as well as political capital. Despite the major reforms in media during the transition from a socialist system to democracy, certain media outlets maintained their form, though most have changed drastically in content.313 Certain papers were forced to take sides politically during transition in a struggle to maintain themselves through the process of privatization (Arpad 2004).314 Many of those that

---

313 Papers like Népszava (The People’s Voice) and Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation) have been around long before 1989 however they have changed in their content and readership. While Népszava used to be the working class daily it is now more of a liberal-left news outlet. Meanwhile Magyar Nemzet originally had a large Budapest intelligentsia following while now it is more of the national working class right-wing paper (Arpad 2004).
314 Some stronger media outlets maintained through the transition despite their mostly Socialist Era roots. Népszabadság was, and continues to be, the most widely read newspaper in Hungary. It is still considered a left-wing news source along with Népszava from similar origins. While some media stayed aligned to the left other news outlets have changed allegiances such as the well-known paper Magyar Nemzet and radio stations like Kossuth and Petőfi. Kossuth and Petőfi radio stations used to
had the financial capital to acquire news industries had maintained wealth during the socialist period due to their allegiances, at least passively, to the socialist government. Media was a large topic of the decentralization process in the early 1990s with much of mainstream media simply exchanging hands and returning to Socialist Party supporting strongholds (Tóth 2012).

The early 1990s saw the development of a media struggle in defining the new terms what freedom of press meant in practice (Lendvai 2012). Privatization sold state-owned media to investors and entrepreneurs. The majority of Hungarians with the finances available to run large media outlets were those that had amassed funds during the previous regime, supporting or at least catering to the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP). Democratic transformation also led to spontaneous ‘early privatization’ where government run papers were transferred to new private ownerships at low costs before the first free elections even took place.315 This privatization process saw much of the major media corporations end up under management supporting the newly democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) (Körösény 1999, Tóth 2012). Tracking ownership and chief editor positions, some estimates show that during the early and mid 1990s the left controlled, explicitly or by association, up to 80% of the major television and newsprint media outlets (Lendvai 2012). An equal percentage of capital invested into mass media development in Hungary was foreign investment (Giorgi 1995, Coman 2000). In Hungary there are widespread examples of foreign financial ownership of local and national press. For

---

315 There were numerous cases of regional and county papers transferring ownership to foreign press entities (such as German-run Axel Springer) for low cost. These now privately owned media enterprises were staffed with journalists from the socialist era. Now privatized very little lustration or overhaul could be conducted even with right wing party MDF winning the first elections (Lánčzi and O’Neil 1996).
example: popular national dailies *Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hirlap, Mai Nap* and *Népszabadság* were all run on foreign investment in the early to mid 1990s (Coman 2000). Although the conservative right wing party Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) ran the first democratic government, the media shift became more obviously left wing when in 1994 MSZP won control of the government, regaining several large nationwide publications (Lánczi and O’Neil 1996).

The largely left wing media was confronted directly by populist radical, ‘new right’ articles in the conservative right wing media outlets available.\(^{316}\) Sparking an attack on the biased media spectrum was the publication of an article in August 1992 in the magazine *Magyar Forum* written by then MDF representative, István Csurka (later to be founder of the radical right party MIÉP) (Arpad 2004). In the first openly radical right article written by a political representative in a major news publication, Csurka discussed the deceit and treason imposed on the nation by liberals, Jews and ‘non-Hungarians’ living in Hungary. The article called for ethnic purism and intertwined with elements of mythical folk tales about Hungary’s origins.\(^{317}\) Within a month of the article’s publication, and republication in various other papers, there was a rally in Budapest against the article and the sentiments it supported, however, it also laid groundwork for gaining momentum behind radical right politics and rhetoric that could be represented within mainstream media without official reprimand (Pittaway 2003, Arpad 2004). Even though openly radical right media was primarily marginalized, with only a few thousand subscriptions, it was made apart of the media

---

\(^{316}\) While there was an apparent left wing bias in mainstream media outlets there were, of course, still significant conservative and right wing publications at the time.

\(^{317}\) The article was published in *Magyar Forum*, a leading conservative magazine, on 20 August 1992 titled ‘A few thoughts in conjunction with the two years since the system change and with the new Magyar Democratic Forum Program’ (*Néhány gondolat a rendszerváltás két esztendeje és az MDF új programja kapcsán* című írását).
made available to government deputies and made available in parliament. This is one of the first examples of radicalized rhetoric mainstreaming in traditional media.

The early and mid 1990s was characterized by a largely left wing media transformation. Although right wing and radical right media were in existence it was not as widely available, particularly with regards to openly radical right publications. However, the largest campaigns against the left wing media bias in the 1990s came from the radical right. The radical right party, MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja – Hungarian Justice and Life Party), founded in 1993 and led by ex-MDF MP István Csurka (see Section 1.2.1), campaigned strongly against the left wing media takeover in Hungary. While MIÉP never gained strong electoral support, only passing the 5% electoral threshold in 1998, it did build up a significant protest culture against the left. By Autumn 2002 right and radical right supporters mobilized against what Csurka labeled the ‘still communist’ mass media (Bayer 2002, Mude-Kopecky 2003, Szabó 2003). Bringing together a mixture of old nationalists and younger skinheads, calling themselves the ‘national-democratic youth’, a series of right-wing demonstrations were held against the left wing media monopoly (Szabó 2003).

7.1.2 Shifting the Media as a Tool for Right Wing Politics

While the radical right protested and published against the left wing media in Hungary there were few changes in media ownership or content until the end of the

---

318 Paramilitary right-wing journal Hunnia, referring to the Hungarian ‘chosen people’, openly questioning Trianon, international Zionism and Israel added to the available literature available in parliament, lobbied by MDF. The journal was added to the news media counter for deputies (Hockenos 1993).
319 It is common among populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe to accuse the media of being run by foreign traitors or left wing forces and the Hungarian radical right was quick to pick up such rhetoric (Mudde 2007). What is relevant in Hungary is the rapidity that populist nationalist rhetoric has dispersed in various media outlets in recent years, leading to civil demonstrations and protests. Content distributed and normalized through the media has had an active role in disseminating political messages in Hungary and solidifying party alignment.
1990s. As Fidesz began concentrating the right in Hungary (see Section 3.1) the party realized that a drastic shift in the nationwide media available was needed to solidify citizen support towards the right. After winning elections in 1998, one of the major political aims of the first Fidesz government was to re-shift the perceived imbalance in the media. Fidesz rallied right wing parties and organizations together against the MSZP government largely through an attack on the media. Fidesz used nationalist and right wing media outlets available as a tool to regain social legitimacy in the party’s political shift to the right. Fidesz devoted time campaigning to traditionalists, right wing elites and religious figures as well as 1956 veterans, ensuring face time in their media outlets, building the party’s umbrella network (Enyedi 2005).

While in power (1998 to 2002) the Fidesz government made rapid power shifts in media control. Exploiting media communications and transforming mainstream media into a government apparatus was one of the main goals of the first Fidesz government (Lendvai 2012). The Fidesz government, led by Viktor Orbán, reiterated parts of István Csurka’s original media discourse, campaigning against an unfair liberal monopoly of media in Hungary, calling for a policy of ‘media balance’ (médiaegyensúly). Relevant political themes of the Fidesz government expounded in the news brought back religiosity, urban-rural divides and anti-communist discourses (Enyedi 2005).

The Fidesz government’s plans to rebalance Hungarian media institutions in television, newsprint and radio were solidified through ‘non-governmental’ institutions. Under Fidesz administration between 1998 to 2002 only party members and adherents were appointed as representatives within the Board of Trustees for

Public Media. This resulted in the over-representation of Fidesz agendas in public television and radio, particularly during election times. In September 2000 the Fidesz government created the Natural and Social Development Foundation (Természet és Társadalombarát Fejlődésért Közalapítványt - TTFK). The TTFK was registered as a non-profit organization and founded with state funding. By 2001 the foundation received 1.5 billion forints in grants (around 5 million Euros) and 500 million forints (around 1.7 million Euros) from the government. This new organization made it possible to transform Magyar Nemzet, one of the most circulated daily newspapers in Hungary, into a nationalist conservative supporting circulation as well as developing strong government sympathies in nationwide television (Hír TV), and radio (Info Rádió and Lánchíd Rádió) (Pittaway 2003, Lendvai 2012).

The media has subsequently become one of the main campaigning tools of Fidesz. Fidesz’s complex party organization relies on its affiliate organizations, civil circles and media outlets in order to appeal to a broad range of right wing conservatives, nationalists, populists and more radicalized supporters (Enyedi and Linek 2008). By the end of Fidesz’s first parliamentary term (1998-2002) the party had changed the balance of media, shifting the monopoly away from left-wing media moguls and taking over certain critical news sources such as Magyar Nemzet. They also changed the role of media as an right wing tool for political socialization, shifting the content of media produced to embrace more openly nationalistic rhetoric and


323 This type of right-wing concentration, utilizing various organizations and media bodies to build support is what Enyedi and Linek (2008) refer to as ‘collectivist corporatist conservatives’, aggregating multiple outlets for party support.
reintroducing the idea of Hungary’s displaced Magyar population back into public discourse (Pittaway 2003). Mainstream media outlets have been turned into a useful secondary tool of political socialization for larger parties like Fidesz and MSZP. As explained by András Lánczi and Patrick O’Neil:

The media became the focus of political battles, involving parliament, government, the constitutional court and the president, and purges of journalists and officials in the media led to assertions that little had changed since the communist regime. The Question is whether control of the media will remain a spoil of election victory, or new legislation will establish a non-partisan framework for the future. (Lánczi and O’Neil 1996, p. 82)

While mainstream national news outlets have developed strong partisanship reflecting the polarized political views of the right (Fidesz) and the left (largely MSZP-SZDSZ) the space for alternative political opinions outside the bipolar spectrum has become restricted.

7.1.3 Outlets for Marginalized Political Views in the Media

Radio, television and nationwide news press have become a politically valuable and malleable tool for the larger parties in power, mainly for MSZP and Fidesz, that have brought in large-scale media overhauls each time their respective parties have come into power. Throughout the 1990s there was very little space for alternative media, however, there were some smaller outlets and publications for marginalized sociopolitical views. This mainly took shape in the form of zines and self-published pamphlets such as Hunnia, mentioned previously, one of the better-known publications discussing Trianon and Zionist conspiracies. Small publications like this developed a hyper nationalist narrative around defining what it is to be a true

324 This is most exemplified by the large-scale privatization plans instates by MSZMP (later MSZP) before the first democratic elections and Fidesz’s media overhaul to rebalance the media, and subsequently shift the scale more towards right wing media support through the TTFK.
Hungarian. However, subscriptions to these marginalized publications remained relatively low and unsustainable.\textsuperscript{325} Parties like MIÉP used small to medium-sized protests and demonstrations as a forum for gaining media attention in the 1990s though electoral support remained primarily insignificant. Discussed in Chapter 3, Jobbik rejuvenated the radical right and brought it to the mainstream by targeting more contemporary nationalist issues such as ‘gypsy criminality’ and ‘police brutality’, modernizing old scapegoats previously targeting Jews and Zionist conspiracies.\textsuperscript{326}

Today the radical right, led by Jobbik, as well as alternative liberal-left political options like LMP, have developed two ways to infiltrate Hungarian news media: 1) by creating or participating in shocking or performance-based political events to gain national media attention and 2) by developing new online media culture around specific marginalized partisanship. With regards to the first point, marginalized parties can use social movement tactics to compete with the mainstream media’s message. Gaining access into the mainstream media, however, has a double effect. While it at the very least gives national awareness to the party/movement it also is portrayed with a media-driven slant that can potentially be skewed in a way the party did not originally intent (Tarrow 1998, Rucht 2004). Arguably the first time Jobbik became nationally known was during the protests and riots sparked by the 2006 political scandal surrounding Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s leaked tape (see Section 3.1.2), showing a new level of right and radical right power within the

\textsuperscript{325} Subscription number to Hunnia, for example, never reached more than a few thousand even at its most popular in the early-mid 1990s (Hockenos 1993).

\textsuperscript{326} That is not to say that anti-Semitism and Zionist conspiracy building does not still exist in Hungary today. However, what Jobbik did was blend old radical nationalist ideas with new contemporarily significant discontents. Anti-Semitism in Hungary today tends to be latent, or hidden within carefully placed rhetoric (Kovács 2000).
media. The leaked tape of the speech over a national radio station led to as many as 50 thousand demonstrators protesting in front of parliament for the Prime Minister’s resignation (Palonen 2009).

Jobbik’s visibility during the 2006 events gave a face and form to the new radical right, launching Jobbik into national awareness as they were portrayed with unique red and white striped flags and Jobbik banners, creating visually identifiable markers and brands to the party. The media network in Hungary has been polarizing and strengthening its political allegiances, first through left wing privatization efforts and then by way of Fidesz’s media restructuring. The events of 2006 made headlines for months across Hungary through national television, radio and newsprint, bringing forth a platform for the radical right. The mainstream and traditional news outlets still have limited time/space for marginal political parties. The rise of Jobbik as a competitive political party has gained support despite a national media that shunned and slandered it (Jordon 2010).

Jobbik, and to a certain extent LMP, have had to find creative and shock-intriguing ways of breaking into the mainstream media, either by using excitable speech or performative political tactics to draw attention from the mainstream media. Jobbik has developed demonstrations around contentious historical days, taking groups of Hungarians to march through Versailles against the Treaty of Trianon. Jobbik MPs and MEPs have also disrupted political sessions by

---

327 Performative politics is often used by marginalized parties to gain broader attention to an issue or partisanship. Often excitable speech is used by more radical right partisanship as a means of drawing mainstream attention (Butler 1997, Butler and Athanasiou 2013).
controversially wearing the uniform of the Hungarian Guard, an illegal radical right paramilitary group discussed in Chapter 4.\footnote{329 } LMP has also used performative political tactics to penetrate mainstream media by creating flashmobs to address certain political issues or causing symbolic performances such as projecting the LMP logo onto parliament to create awareness of the party’s existence when they first launched in 2009.\footnote{330 } LMP has also placed a golden wheelbarrow next to parliament symbolizing corrupt public funding policies.\footnote{331 }

Jobbik has been highly successful in creating its own alternative media to counteract and substitute the negative views developed in mainstream media towards. In a large-scale survey of Jobbik’s Facebook members results showed that supporters had very low levels of trust in all major social and political institutions including the media (Bartlett et. al. 2012). The study concluded that one of the main reasons for Jobbik’s rapid success was not only the en masse disillusionment with mainstream political parties among Hungarians but also the attentive and interactive online media developed by Jobbik, easily accessible to younger audiences. Catering to Hungary’s disillusioned and radical nationalist citizens, including a large number of young Hungarians looking for an alternative political outlet, Jobbik and its supporters have developed their own media outlets both online and offline.

Jobbik’s main media hubs have been very successful in developing an acute rhetoric playing off tangible fears such as ‘police brutality’ and ‘gypsy crime’, used

\footnote{330 } I was witness to this launching event while living in Budapest in 2009. LMP members interviewed also discussed this event as a semi-legal performance for gaining national awareness about the LMP party.
\footnote{331 } Aranytalicskát állított az LMP a parlament elé’, Népszabadság Online, (9 December 2012), <http://nol.hu/belfold/aranytalicskat_allitott_az_lmp_a_parlamen_ele?ref=sso>.
repeatedly as a mantra-like theme within articles.\textsuperscript{332} A number of successful online news portals supporting the radical right have emerged since 2006 along with successfully developing a weekly news magazine, \textit{Barikád!} (Barricade), created in 2009 and costing 390 Forints (roughly 1.3 Euros) per issue (see Appendix 7 for a description of radical right media outlets). Analyzing how young Hungarians are using alternative online media portals is analyzed in the next section.

\section*{7.2 YOUTH MEDIA USAGE}

Media, as an agent of political socialization, is highly dependent on frequency of use as well as trust in given media outlets in analyzing its role in developing or solidifying political partisianceships and instigating potential activism. Previous research has shown that across Central and Eastern Europe television is the most influential media outlet on public opinion (Eurobarmoter 75 Autumn 2011, Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). Results also show that countries in the Central and Eastern European region still maintain high levels of state control over television and that independent TV and radio are mostly owned privately by domestic or foreign owners (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). Generally speaking these results are mainly also true in Hungary where 85% of Hungarians use television for political information retrieval. Other forms of media are used considerably less frequently.\textsuperscript{333}

Media usage looks very different when stratifying results by age cohorts. Looking at media usage across Europe television is still the most commonly used media, however, watching television everyday or almost every day is less common

\textsuperscript{332} Medias referred to here as ‘Jobbik media’ include Barikád! magazine, Kuruc.info, N1 TV and Jobbik’s own news feeds from its main political website.

\textsuperscript{333} When asked where an individual goes to get political news 85% of Eurobarometer respondents said Television, 50% said news press, 39% used radio and 29% used the Internet (Eurobarometer 75 Autumn 2011).
among younger cohorts compared with older cohorts (see Figure 7.1). Compared with older cohorts, the youth uses traditional forms of media retrieval far less than older cohorts. Figure 7.1 shows that younger cohorts (aged fifteen to twenty-four) use the television 16% less, the radio 14% less and printed news 26% less than older cohorts (fifty-five and older). The Internet is the one media medium in which younger cohorts supersede older cohorts in usage. Figure 7.1 shows the large disparity between cohorts with the youngest cohorts listed using the Internet 56% more than older cohorts. While Internet ranked last for the general public as a source for political news, the Internet is the most frequently used source for younger cohorts.

Figure 7.1: Media Usage in Europe Comparing Age Cohorts

The above figure looks at the percentage of daily consumption of various media outlets across the European Union with reference to age (Eurobarometer 76: Autumn 2011).

334 Data for these results come from Eurobarometer 76 (Autumn 2011) raw data files, which were then stratified. The cohort ranges listed were pre-given by Eurobarometer categories and could not be altered to directly parallel the eighteen to thirty age range. For this reason I have left the four tiered age range.
335 In the Eurobarometer the ‘youth’ category is aged fifteen to twenty-four.
Looking specifically at Hungary, while trust in all other forms of media has decreased in the last year, the Internet was the only form of media that did not decrease with 41% of Hungarians having trust in news found through the Internet (Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011). Trust levels in various media outlets also show a European youth cohort that is more trusting of information found on the Internet. While trust in radio, television and printed press is relatively similar across age cohorts, trust in the Internet is much higher among the youth. 52% of those aged fifteen to twenty-four trust the information they find on the Internet compared with trust levels of only 40% for those aged between forty and fifty-four and only 21% of those aged fifty-five and above.\textsuperscript{337}

It is generally agreed by both youth interviewees and political scientists within Hungary that there is an overwhelming political bias within almost all media that deals with national politics and culture (Szilágy-Gál 2010, Bozóki 2011\textsuperscript{338}, Lendvai 2012) partially explaining the decreasing levels of trust in traditional forms of media. While political media in recent years has helped mobilize the population by creating enemies of the opposition’s political elite (Palonen 2009) it has also created a media that is no longer trustworthy of providing critical analysis national politics. Awareness of strong biases in Hungarian news has even mobilized demonstrations in recent years, protesting for more objective and transparent news.\textsuperscript{339} Most young

\textsuperscript{337} Trust levels for radio, television and print news vary relatively little comparing ages: Trust in radio 55% - 58%. Trust in TV 51% - 55%. Trust in printed news 40% - 45%. The highest age discrepancy is trust in the Internet ranging between 21% for older 55+ cohorts to much higher trust levels (52%) for cohorts aged 15 to 24 (Eurobarometer 76: Autumn 2011).

\textsuperscript{338} Hungarian Political Scientist, András Bozóki was an interviewee for my studies, discussing the apparent bias in Hungarian media at length.

\textsuperscript{339} In May 2012 the Independent Union of Television and Film Makers (TFSZ) demonstrated with the NGO Clean Hands for a Democratic Hungary Movement marking the World Press Freedom Day. Their demands were based on the need for unbiased and fair broadcasting and newsprint in Hungary. These demonstrations tie in with large-scale discontent with the Fidesz government’s 2010 Media Laws, discussed later in this chapter (‘Union, NGO join in World Press Freedom Day demo for
people are highly aware of these biases across the political spectrum with most interviewees across the political spectrum mentioning the state of polarized media as sad and lacking objectivity.

*Media is divided in Hungary. You can try to find ‘objective’ media but you won’t find one. (Szemere, Age 29: Budapest).*

*Of course there is a media bias. Buy what is aimed at you. There is no objective view. We don’t get a chance to broaden horizons and see all the sides. (László, Age 24: Budapest)*

László’s quotation also points out that with such obvious political biases in mainstream media outlets individuals mainly buy and subscribe to media that is already supportive of their pre-existing political opinions. The new privatized media in Hungary also controls what official music, discourse and topics are allowed to be played on national radio stations and television (Kürti 2012). For a younger population developing popular culture around music and alternative political activism, traditional media does not provide the type of information the youth is looking for. While it is not necessarily uncommon for individual’s to consume media that appeals to preexisting partisanship it does insinuate that media as an agent of political socialization has become a passive, more non-interactive socializing agent, solidifying preexisting opinions.

There is a sense of a void of certain topics on the TV, played on mainstream radio channels and in the newspapers. Research on youth perceptions about the future shows that the Hungarian youth’s pessimism towards the democratic transformation process most often blames the education system and traditional media for inhibiting a

---

more positive future for Hungary (Hideg and Novaky 2002). A majority of interviewees echoed this sentiment, often critiquing traditional media for lacking debate or diversity of opinions. Television in particular was mentioned numerous times as a biased media outlet, lacking assorted political dialogue and avoiding real political discourse:

*I quit TV. I couldn’t stand it. This is not democratic journalism. I don’t want to pretend with my journalism, playing a game, politicians lying bullshit… I don’t watch TV or read papers much. My news is now mostly from Facebook and Internet* (Flóra, Age 30: Budapest). Note: Flóra is a freelance journalist

*Even reading papers I go online. No TV watching. TV news is all about chickens and old ladies* (Monika, Age 21: Budapest).

Even Monika, a Fidesz supporter, was critical of state-TV content, finding it devoid of real sociopolitical content. Although television is often the most used media in Hungary, young Hungarians are increasingly turning to the Internet for political information retrieval, discussed in the next section. Political parties attracting the most youth support have been equally keen on using the Internet as a medium for presenting platforms, ideas and their own news media.

### 7.2.1 Youth Internet Usage

Hungarians are increasingly using the Internet for information retrieval and helping manage their lives. Currently 65.3% of Hungarians are Internet users and up to 72% of Hungarians have used the Internet at some point in the last year. The usage of household Internet is increasing drastically. Internet subscriptions increased

---

340 Results were based on interviews with young students in secondary school and higher education showing that a majority of young Hungarians see the media as lacking inspiration or value beyond depicting depressive socioeconomic situations in Hungary.

from 3.3 million to 4.3 million between 2010 and 2011 alone.\(^{342}\) Stratifying usage by age, younger Hungarians are the most prominent users of the Internet. Internet usage has more than tripled in the last ten years. Figure 7.2 shows the increasing usage of the Internet in Hungary between 2004 and 2012. Daily usage of the Internet for Hungarians between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four is 24% higher than the general populace. Internet usage is significantly higher among younger Hungarians, as seen, with the largest usage by sixteen to twenty-four year olds. 82% of this age category uses the Internet daily.

**Figure 7.2: Daily Internet Usage in Hungary 2004 to 2012**

The above chart shows the increasing daily usage of the Internet in Hungary as a percentage of the total population (given in blue) as well as daily Internet usage for those aged sixteen to twenty-four (given in Red) and twenty-five to thirty-four (given in Green). Information comes from stratified raw data from Eurostat: Seybert, Heidi, ‘Internet use in household and by individuals in 2012’, *Eurostat: Statistics in Focus*, (May 2012).

The Internet is largely being utilized as a replacement for traditional media outlets for accessing news. As measured by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office,

\[^{342}\) 'Number of the Internet Subscriptions by Access Service', Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, March 2012), <http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_oni001.html>.}
61% of Internet usage in Hungary is for reading or downloading online newspapers/news. 16% of Hungarian Internet users have subscribed to online news services or products to receive news regularly. 30% of Internet users listen to the radio and/or watch television online. Even political activism is increasingly online. 14% of Internet use in Hungary is for reading, posting or voting on one’s opinions towards civic or political issues through various websites.343

While much of the older generation across Europe still prefers traditional news outlets, seeing digital media as a less legitimate and distracting outlet (Shea and Green 2007), younger cohorts are increasingly relying on the Internet as their primary news source (Eurobarometer 75 Autumn 2011). Among youth activists in Hungary there is an overwhelming usage of the Internet as a means of getting information about political and national news. This becomes very apparent looking at Appendix 8, tracking interviewee responses about media usage. Interviewee numbers highlighted in red represent those that explicitly stated that they either primarily or solely sought political related news through the Internet as a form of media. The table also tracks the various media outlets respondents described using to retrieve politically related news, showing similar results to Eurobarometer findings. There was an initial expectation that most Budapest-based university students would have higher access to the Internet. However, interviewees even in rural, more impoverished areas, most often sought political news through the Internet before other media outlets were used. Many younger interviewees mentioned that newspapers and magazines in hard copy form were only really browsed when at their parent’s home.

As mentioned above, trust in the Internet is much higher among youth cohorts in Hungary (Bodoky 2007, Tóth 2012). The Internet is seen as not only more easily accessible and free but also as a source of less politically corrupted news. This was apparent within youth interviews but also seems to be a more general sentiment in Hungary. While Hungarians remain below the EU average in their trust of news provided through television, radio and news press, they rank higher than the EU average in their trust of Internet news: 344 As explained by interviewees:

*The smallest media sources are probably the most objective. Larger corporate ones are very biased. The Internet is good. It is good when I see our generation reading news on the Internet.* (Ani, Age 30: Budapest)

*The most interesting news of good quality is available on blogs. It is more interesting information... Most of my information I get online: news, Facebook and blogs.* (Daniel, Age 28: Budapest).

Internet sites provide a contradictory nature of seeming to provide neutrality yet often still having identifiable partisan biases (see Table 6.3). The Internet has become, to a large extent, a replacement for hard copy subscriptions to daily and weekly newspapers and magazines. Circulations of even the largest leading political newspapers have seen significant drops in recent years. Leading liberal daily *Népszabadság* currently circulates just over 80,000 papers, down from nearly 250,000 ten years ago. Leading conservative paper, *Magyar Nemzet*, subscriptions have also dropped down to under 50,000. The other two leading political dailies, *Magyar Hírlap* and *Népszava* have both dropped to under 20,000 subscriptions. 345

344 Eurobarometer results from Autumn 2011 show that trust in Internet media is higher in Hungary than the EU average (EU37% - HU 41%).
345 ‘Melyik lap bukott nagyobbat az első negyedben?’, *Kreatív Online*, (5 March 2010), <http://www.kreativ.hu/cikk/melyik_lap_bukott_nagyobbat_az_elso_negyedben/>. Note: Appendix 7 lists the most used left, right and radical right media sources being used by young Hungarians with brief descriptions of content, usage and partisanship.
Table 7.1: Daily Page Views to Main Hungarian News Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEBSITE</th>
<th>Political Alignment</th>
<th>Daily Page Views</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index.hu</td>
<td>Left/Center</td>
<td>639,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origo.hu</td>
<td>Right/Center</td>
<td>599,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hir24.hu</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>164,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuruc.info</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>75,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVG.hu / Heti Világgazdaság online</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
<td>51,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOL.hu / Népszabadság online</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
<td>49,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heti Válasz online</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>38,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNO.hu / Magyar Nemzet Online</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>32,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Népszava.hu</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
<td>18,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barikád.hu (now Alfahir.hu)</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>17,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandiner.hu</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>10,692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2 shows the top Hungarian news portals and the daily page views each site receives. This table is limited to news portals that include a focus on political and national news sites. Top news sites in Hungary found using Alexa.com. Data filtering came from the free website valuation and site safety rating website: http://www.freewebsitereport.org/. Filtered 12 July 2013.

Meanwhile, falling in line with global media trends, most Hungarian newspapers and weeklies have developed online subscriptions and news portals, which are often being visited more frequently and by a much wider viewership than printed press. Table 7.2 lists the top online news portals in Hungary with their political alignment and monthly visitor rating. The most frequented online news portals, Index and Origo, were never established as printed publications but were developed solely online, incorporating multi-media and social networking functions into news media formatting. These two portals far surpass all other online news outlets in Hungary with regards to daily viewership.

---

346 Origo was developed in 1997 as a basic news site but rebranded in 2000 incorporating a more modern and accessible look. By 2006 the site re-developed again incorporating social networking capacities and a blogging section. A description of other leading media outlets is given in Appendix 7.

347 See Appendix 7 and 8 for a more detailed overview Hungarian news outlets and youth usage.
Looking at the most frequently visited news sites there are two points worth noting. The first is that the leading liberal left newspaper, Népszabadság, and leading right wing newspaper, Magyar Nemzet, are not the online news outlets gaining the most viewership. This supports the idea that the large Internet viewership is less interested in sourcing information through tradition media that has been reformatted online, preferring newer, less politically attached news portals. Secondly, the two leading online news portals, Index and Origo, are developing a forum for a range of political stances, often incorporating articles that are critical of government and opposition powers. Unlike mainstream media outlets considered these news sources to provide more politically neutral news options, attracting readership from across the political spectrum, a rarity compared to other forms of media: 348

*Usually I read Index but I think they are shifting from left to LMP. It is good because they are more critical of the left. They are critical of Fidesz but not enough.* (Adam, Age 23: Budapest) Note: Adam is a Liberal-Left supporter.

*The online sphere is better than traditional news. We have Index, which is technically independent and Origo. It was never cheaper to have your own media than now!* (Gergely, Age 26: Budapest) Note: Gergely is a Fidesz supporter.

*Mostly for information I look online. Index. Index is good, seldom too in depth – partly trash news... Index is liberal but not upfront about it but they have a general audience and not too biased.* (István, Age 25: Budapest) Note: István is a Fidesz supporter.

István brings up an important point about why these online news portals are so accessible and widely read. Articles on Index and Origo tend to be written in shorter, concise formats, often using more informal and explanatory language compared with traditional media that. Interviewees often sited online formatting as reasons for

---

348 Looking at interviewee responses about media usage in Appendix 8 the areas on the table highlighted in Yellow show which interviewees mentioned reading/watching news outlets from different political families.
preferring online news. While there are concerns about the quality of Hungarian media consumption declining as people increasing read online news, there is currently no longitudinal data showing decreasing news quality (Tóth 2012). The increasing trust and usage of the Internet as the primary news outlet for young Hungarians means that news sites have increasing potential, compared with other media outlets, to influence or reinforce sociopolitical preferences and partisanship.

7.2.2. Politicizing the Internet: Online News as a Political Tool

The newly diversified range of online media outlets used by young Hungarians has been a factor in creating a space for dissemination of information about alternative and radical political movements and parties. Before the widespread use of the Internet, party activism was key in communicating alternative political ideas to the public and mobilizing citizens awareness (Green and Gerber 2004, Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). Online media has fundamentally changed how quickly people can align and interact with each other to create political communities of information sharing through YouTube, Facebook and blogs (Owen 2008, Bennett 2008). This model of information distribution, used for campaigning and event organizing, has proven highly successful in Hungary for marginalized parties like LMP but particularly Jobbik, as seen by results of the 2009 European parliamentary elections and 2010 national elections. Both parties conducted large-scale online campaigns, developing their own platforms through news outlets on their party websites as well as linking with other newly created supportive online news portals (Jordon 2010).

While these marginalized parties were forced to use alternative media to disperse their messages, largely ignored by mainstream media, they also tapped into
the natural trend of young Hungarians that were already using the Internet as a source of information retrieval. Due to the youth base of both Jobbik and LMP, the Internet was a natural tool for distributing political information and creating online support networks. Young activists interviewed supporting Jobbik and LMP all mentioned online newsletters, party websites and campaign adds distributed through YouTube as ways they accessed party information. They were also able to easily share this information through emails and Facebook, using online news sources to network and recruit.

Jobbik especially has developed a strong network of supportive radical right online news portals, presenting news from a radical right perspective. Kuruc.info, was one of the first Jobbik supporting news portals gaining national attention, developed shortly after the 2006 protests. Barikád! (barikad.hu) was founded in 2009 in the lead up to the European Parliamentary elections, where Jobbik first made its strong electoral debut on its own, winning 14.77%. Barikád! developed its online news site along with a weekly magazine. The most recent online news outlet supporting the radical right was developed in 2011 in the form of an online television channel called Nemzetil (National 1) run through YouTube videos. These websites are easily accessible with user friendly content, often incorporating or linking with other radical right news and subculture outlets including radio stations, online clothing stores, Facebook, nationalist events and often Jobbik’s official webpage. Jobbik’s strengthening youth support has benefited greatly from their online media presence. Jobbik-supporting interviewees expressed gratitude for having Internet

349 Jobbik had run in the 2006 national elections in a coalition with older radical right party MIÉP. The partnership, termed the ‘third way alliance’, did not manage to pass the 5% electoral threshold.

350 A more detailed description of radical right media outlets and other widely used media outlets used by young Hungarians is given in Appendix 8.
news portals they can relate with, feeling that there is little or no merit in mainstream news. For radical right supporters the awareness of Jobbik’s negative portrayal in non-radical right media was a main reason for rejecting other forms of media. As explained by Jobbik youth activists:

*I don’t understand why the media wants a black and white image of Jobbik as an evil party while the Prime Minister [Orbán] sits in power but does nothing about the Roma problem. These politicians always say ‘next year’. Always a program saying something happens next year but no political party really does anything. You can’t trust these words.* (János, Age 16: Miskolc).

*Jobbik owes most of its success to Internet. That’s where there’s an alternative media channel not as biased and you find things that are credential. Facebook and official websites form groups of websites to find non-biased sources of information. Putting and sharing on the Internet is good because people put things like blogs and it’s shared automatically without top-down control... Conventional media treats us in a biased way so we share the truth on the sites.* (Szabolcs, Age 18: Budapest).351

Both quotations acknowledge strong biases against the radical right in mainstream media outlets but also depict online news as a purer and less politically corrupted space for horizontal information retrieval without hierarchical content controls. The unrestricted nature of online news, unbound to traditional media laws concerning publishable and inappropriate content, also causes concern over anti-Semitic and xenophobic themes spreading freely through the Internet (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006). Jobbik’s diverse online media networks have helped the party succeed where MIÉP failed in drawing enlarged electoral support, specifically from younger voters (Szilágy-Gál 2010). MIÉP was not only founded by an older cohort of radical nationalists, rarely drawing in younger support, but also MIÉP was limited to the information outlets available to the party at the time in the early 1990s, blocked from most mainstream media and beholden to smaller zine publications. While today’s

351 Here the interviewee also gives an anecdote saying how it is always shocking when on TV the news mentions a Jobbik event happening without any violence. It is funny but also sad for him, in his opinion, because the mainstream media assumes that a Jobbik event will always incite violence.
Jobbik supporters are pleased to have strengthening alternative news feeds, non-Jobbik supporters, particularly more Liberal-Left and LMP supporters, show anxiety over the growing online presence of radical right sites.

*Jobbik has very strong web tools. If there were no Internet Jobbik would not be in Parliament. Most of Jobbik voters are young guys. That is why they use the Internet. Have you read Kuruc? Lots of young guys think this is the truth. This is a big problem.* (Balázs, Age 29: Budapest)

Note: Interviewee is a journalist for multiple radio stations

I saw an interview and program on Nemzeti 1 and it was so radical. The program was about how Hungary has an aura around it protecting Hungary, a ‘magical aura’. (Sára, Age 21: Budapest).

Radical media subscribers and bloggers are thought to give a false sense of a mass support network in the structure and content of articles compared to tangible participants and voters (Szilágy-Gál 2010). While Jobbik has strengthened its political backing from younger cohorts from their online prowess (Jordon 2010, Bartlett et. al. 2012) it is very difficult to quantitatively measure support for the parties based on online media presence.

Mainstream parties have increased their online presence since 2009/2010 in an effort to compete with increasingly popular alternative political news outlets. Fidesz and its support networks have more recently embraced ‘new media’, establishing an online economic journal (Napi Gazdaság – Daily Economy) and news portals (Portfolio.hu and Index.hu)\(^\text{352}\) (Lendvai 2012). Young members of Fidesz’s youth organization, Fidelitas, have also established a popular conservative online news outlet, Mandiner, that allows for supportive and critical analysis of government

---

\(^{352}\) While Lendvai (2012) discusses Index as a Fidesz supporting online news portal it is up for debate its true alignment. Interviewees discussed the site in different ways with individuals from various political alignments using the site as a source of political news.
positions from a conservative perspective.\textsuperscript{353} Online media outlets allow for a blurring between official and informal information retrieval. While this may be problematic for mainstream media outlets that find it hard to compete with the Internet's accessibility and flexibility, as time passes alternative media and Internet news is becoming a less marginalized and more legitimate source of information retrieval (Rucht 2004, van de Donk et. al. 2004, Eurobaromter 75 Autumn 2011).

Internet media usage is developing parallel to trends across Europe of individualistic participation patterns, allowing for passive or active interaction with online media and blogs, creating what Lance Bennett (2004) terms ‘media democracy’. New media is having an affect how information is being dispersed within mass media (Klein 2000, Bennett 2003, Bennett 2004). Not only do all major newspapers, radio stations and weeklies now have online content sites but they are also legitimizing online news by referencing information from these portals in their own news reports. Internet news outlets such as Index, Origo and Mandiner are increasingly major reference points in Hungary.

\textbf{7.2.3 The Media’s Role as a Socializer}

While media was never mentioned by interviewees as the initial reason for developing an interest in politics, and only rarely mentioned as a reason for supporting a party, media remains a large tool for solidifying preconceived political ideologies. In this respect media serves as a secondary socializer caused mainly by two overriding trends in Hungary. Firstly, this is due to the strong awareness of political sympathies within primary mainstream media outlets. Most interviewees mentioned the oppositional and bipolar nature of mainstream media, often pointing

\textsuperscript{353} As explained by Fidelitas members, Mandiner began as a Fidelitas blog. The site changed its outline and broadened its focus in 2009, taking on a format, modeled loosely on the Huffington Post.
out the obvious political alignments of national television, radio and printed news. Many interviewees were also aware of the shift in media partisan, from a primarily liberal-left supporting ownership base that was shifted towards the right during Fidesz’s first government (1998 to 2002). One previously Fidesz, now LMP interviewee recalled the large-scale media transformations of the Fidesz government (1998 – 2002):

*I watched some TV and news while my ideas were forming. It was the Fidesz government then so there was an obvious bias. There still is an obvious bias. They are not even trying to be objective anymore... The early to mid 90s was probably more liberal-left media available than right. Fidesz counter balanced the gap in the right wing media between 1998 and 2002. It was a smart step.* (Daniel, Age 28: Budapest)

Secondly, media is justified as a secondary socializer looking at partisanship in comparison to readerships. Appendix 8 shows interviewees responses about media preferences, highlighting the rare occasions that young activists looked at media outlets that were not aligned with their political preferences. Almost no interviewees said that they read media sources outside of pre-developed partisanship. In two of the cases where there was partisan diversity in media readership interviewees were journalists, making note that they had to read across the political spectrum for their jobs. Trends from youth respondents show that media is primarily used as filtered information retrieval, solidifying pre-existing partisanship and preferences.

Table 7.3 shows the media outlets used by youth activists in Hungary, mentioned in interviews. Almost all of respondents’ media usage took place online. Even for those mentioning the usage of mainstream media sources, such as Népszabadság, usage was mainly through online versions of the news rather than newspapers or radio.
### Table 7.2: Media Used by Young Activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIA OUTLET</th>
<th>TYPE OF MEDIA</th>
<th>ALIGNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index (17)</td>
<td>Online</td>
<td>Left/Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Népszabadság (12)</td>
<td>Daily/Online</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuruc.info (12)</td>
<td>Online</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVG (12)</td>
<td>Weekly/Online</td>
<td>Right/Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barikád! (11)</td>
<td>Weekly/Online</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origo (9)</td>
<td>Online</td>
<td>Right/Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nemzeti 1 (8)</td>
<td>Online TV</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hírszerző (5)</td>
<td>Online</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Népszava (5)</td>
<td>Daily/Online</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar Narancs (5)</td>
<td>Weekly/Online</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figyelő (4)</td>
<td>Weekly/Online</td>
<td>Liberal-Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandiner (4)</td>
<td>Online</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbklikk (4)</td>
<td>Online</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konszervatórium (2)</td>
<td>Online</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hír TV (2)</td>
<td>TV/Online info</td>
<td>Right/Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heti Válasz (2)</td>
<td>Weekly/Online</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar Hírlap (2)</td>
<td>Daily/Online</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows media outlets mentioned by interviewees as sources for where they find their civil and political news feeds. The list only contains media that was mentioned by two or more interviewees to exclude smaller or obscure local publications. The number next to the media outlets listed in the first row shows how many interviewees mentioned each outlet.

Besides the Internet providing a seemingly less biased news outlet, online media also avoids the censorship and editing process that modern privatized media in Hungary is beholden to. As a socializing agent, online media sites have the ability to

---

354 While most interviewees reported that online news was preferable because it was less bias, when asked to identify partisanship of news sources most interviewees were able to label even online news sites with a general overarching partisanship. This is shown in Table 7.3.
normalize and cultivate awareness of previously marginalized subcultures, particularly the increasing radical right support in Hungary (Szilágy-Gál 2010). Subcultures such as the Nemzeti Rock movement have found strongholds in radical right radio stations and online portals, often linking supporting each other (Kürti 2012). As mentioned in section 6.1.3, the web of radicalized subcultures existing online facilitates the development of fringe subcultures and provides an information portal within the media spectrum.\(^{355}\) Content control of online media in Hungary might change in coming years with the installation of the Fidesz’s New Media Laws.

**A Note on the 2010 New Media Laws**

When the Fidesz government won its two-thirds majority in parliament in 2010 there were rapid overhauls of foundational national structures. One of the largest changes occurred in the form of the 2010 Media Law, bringing in a new, far-reaching package of laws and regulations to media outlets in Hungary. The Fidesz government’s Media Law, instated 1 January 2011, has a number of contentious issues that have potential limiting effects on the freedom of speech and press in Hungary. Critiqued by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Amnesty International, Freedom House and many other large international watchdogs, the new media regulations call into question Hungary’s democratic values. The 2010 Media Law has, in effect, altered media market conditions in Hungary (see Table 7.3).

One of the major points of contestation with the new law is its creation of the National Media and Information Communications Authority (*Nemzeti Média És Hírközlési Hatóság - NMHH*). The NMHH has the power to fine media for content

\(^{355}\) The online info web, particularly built by radical right supporters, is discussed in Chapter 4.
that is considered against the ‘public interest’, ‘morality’ and ‘national order’ or on the basis of unbalanced reporting.\(^{356}\) Specific fines for unbalanced coverage or breaching rules concerning violence, sex and alcohol are up to 722,000 Euros for television and radio stations and about half that for newspapers and websites.\(^{357}\) While Fidesz has argued that other countries have similar laws concerning content, incitement and public interest, the main problems seem to be found in the vague rhetoric about what deems a particular article or broadcast in breach of the new laws. The media authority of the NMHH has vast regulatory powers with members appointed by the ruling Fidesz government.

### Table 7.3 Major Changes Imposed by the 2010 Media Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modification of Act I of 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This modification created the new media authority (NMHH) and the Media Council (Médiatanács)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act CIV of 2010 ‘Media Constitution’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules on Media Content’ is known as the media constitution. Adopting this Act gives the basic obligations and content requirements of media outlets for television, radio, newspapers and online outlets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This Act regulates competition issues, penalties and fines that can be imposed on media outlets. This Act replaced Act II of 1986 and the majority of provisions given in Act I of 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modification of the National Constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Fidesz government used its parliamentary majority to modify two constitutional articles concerning the media. These amendments declared that ‘everyone has the right to proper information on public issues’(^{358}) and the NMHH president was given the right to issue decrees that can thereafter be enforced.(^{359})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are the major media reforms in the new 2010 Media Laws that have caused the largest concerns for the freedom of speech and press in Hungary. Information from Tóth (2012)

---


\(^{357}\) ‘Hungary to create new media watchdog’, *BBC News Europe*, (21 December 2010).


\(^{359}\) Act XX of 1949 was amended by the new constitution in 2011, coming into effect 1 January 2012.
There have already been a number of contentious regulatory impositions by the new media authority, justifying international concerns.\textsuperscript{360} Freedom House declared in June 2011 that Hungary had declined in its independent media status along with Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{361} As one of the first countries to join the EU from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as pioneering efforts to Westernize on the basis of EU, UN and NATO standards, this decline was seen as a shock to most international bodies. The instatement of the Media Law has already caused limitations by causing concern and fear among journalists about the content they produce, specifically if it gives critique to Fidesz related topics.\textsuperscript{362} If media content changes in accordance with Fidesz’s Media Law the diversity of topics in traditional media outlets could be limited. This would not only affect political socialization with limited news content but also increase online media, with fewer restrictions on content and easier access.

***

The media landscape in post-communist Hungary has developed highly bipolar partisanship within mainstream media. This development was caused, in the first case, by large-scale decentralization and privatization away from previous state-owned media in the early 1990s. However, due to the nature of privatization most large media industries went back into the hands of socialist supporting individuals, who had capital after transition, supporting the democratized left wing party, MSZP.

\textsuperscript{360} The laws starting their effect January 2011 had immediate ramifications with news outlets like Tilos Radio having investigations by the National Media and Communications Authority 2 January 2011 for playing certain American rap music. There have also been issues with online news outlets like Népszava. ‘Under fire Hungary media watchdog raises concerns’, \textit{BBC News Europe}, (2 January 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12104203, <accessed 3 May 2011>.


\textsuperscript{362} Four different Budapest-based journalists interviewed all shared concern over their job positions and writing content feeling like their opposition stance could get them in trouble.
Re-balancing of the media occurred as political polarization between MSZP and Fidesz heightened. The first Fidesz government (1998 – 2002) made legislative and administrative changes to stabilize strong conservative right wing media outlets. This growing politicization of traditional print, television and radio media has caused a decline in balanced coverage and has also facilitated a shift towards partisan-based media. Media has subsequently become a secondary socializer, functioning as a tool to solidify preconceived partisanship by expressing certain value sets and perspectives.

Among youth cohorts in Hungary there has been an increased use of online media, used more than any other media source for sociopolitical information retrieval. Although biases are still prevalent within Internet-based media it is considered more trustworthy and objective to young users compared to the restrained content found in traditional media. The shift towards online media by the youth has increased the potential for Internet-based political socialization. It is also facilitating marginalized political socialization, particularly benefiting radical right parties and organizations that have difficulty entering mainstream partisan media sources. Radical right online media has developed a wide and intricate network of radical right content with its own online news, blogs and television station. Radical right online media links directly to Jobbik party partisanship as well as the growing radical right subculture. Content-controls for online media are difficult to regulate, however, recent changes in Hungarian media laws may see monitoring of all Hungarian media.

With the large-scale changes the Fidesz government has made to media regulations through the 2010 Media Laws and the installation of the National Media and Information Communications Authority (NMHH) it is uncertain at this time how media might change in Hungary and what effect this might have on media as a
socializing agent. With the difficulty in regulating online media content these new changes might further popularize online news portals for young Hungarians who trust these alternative news outlets more than traditional media.

Similar to other agents, such as education systems, Hungary is developing an atypical process of socialization with regards to the media, highly influenced by bipolarity. Although research on contemporary media socialization is less developed, it is likely that the youth is increasingly turning to online news outlets for information. Similar to social movements, online media is blurring the distinctions. ‘Real’ and ‘unofficial’ news online is increasingly difficult to distinguish between, affecting how our media consumption affects our worldviews and sociopolitical perceptions.
8. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has taken political socialization and applied it to a multi-agent analysis of post-communist Hungary. Not only has this research brought together the primary agents recognized by political socialization theory to better understand a broad process of development, but this research has also added to the scope of socialization research by adding social movements to the analysis. Grassroots social movements, as seen by the Hungarian case study given, are proving to be an increasingly influential agent, instigating youth participation and helping define partisanship and efficacy development. Thus, this research also adds to the growing body of literature around youth politics, redefining what it is to be ‘politically active’ outside of traditional forms of participation.

Research analyzed trends in youth political activism, focusing primarily on events happening between 2002 through 2012, through the lens of political socialization. Political parties, joined more recently by grassroots social movements, dominate the Hungarian sociopolitical landscape, developing political culture, defining the parameters of political partisanship and giving organizational structure to politics at large. This thesis questions how key agents of socialization are affecting activism and partisanship development specifically with regards to recent electoral shifts towards the right and radical right. The family, educational institutions and the media are influential agents in Hungary, developing a basis for political meaning and influencing the political socialization process for young Hungarians. This thesis provides a multi-agent analysis case study, adding to broader political socialization research but also giving context to post-communist socialization processes. Numerous trends in Hungary’s modern political socialization have emerged with larger
implications for the future of Hungary, as today’s youth activists become tomorrow’s adult population.

8.1 Parties and Movements

Family, political parties and social movements are the primary socializers of Hungarian political culture. They are the organizations and agents having the largest impact on youth activism and political involvement. Parties and movements are defining political actors and participatory options while family socialization identifies how the individual youth fits within this political landscape. The socializing process in Hungary has amplified youth appeal for populist, nationalist and alternative forms of political participation. This played an important role in the high electoral support from the youth for right wing party, Fidesz, and radical right party, Jobbik, in the 2010 national elections. There are multiple reasons for right wing and radical right youth support connected directly to the post-communist political socialization experience. As shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, to a large extent, the youth appeal of Fidesz and Jobbik is due to the grassroots and informal political approaches these parties have used, incorporating mass mobilization protest politics. The same is true of the liberal-green LMP, using similar strategies to amass a Budapest-based following in the 2010 national elections, although with less success due to its inability to effectively maintain internal and external formal and informal networks.

The organizational prototype of combining party politics with grassroots mobilization tactics was created by Fidesz in 2002 by solidifying localized support networks across the country and providing an organizational structure which youth-based parties, like Jobbik and LMP, are now using. This grassroots approach to political party strategy was developed first within Fidesz, founded through the
creation of informal localized *civic circles* in 2002 during a close election with the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP. Civic circles have allowed for non-membership based political affiliation as well as the dissemination of emotionally charged political agendas. Despite an electoral defeat to MSZP, the tactics and populist support developed by civic circles solidified a strong Fidesz following, with many young interviewees reporting their first political awareness and activism around this time. Fidesz was a game changer for the right, and subsequently for alternative youth-based parties, by utilizing mass mobilization tactics and cultivating strong youth support through formal youth organizations working parallel with informal activist networks.

This formal and informal blending within a political party structure has subsequently been used as a prototype for current Hungarian youth-based parties, Jobbik and LMP. Jobbik has become the most successful youth-based party in Hungary, sparked by the anti-government demonstrations and riots in 2006. Political scandals in 2006 delegitimizing the liberal-left provided an opportunity structure for Jobbik to gain nationwide attention, breaking into mainstream media through visible participation in anti-government riots. Jobbik has also developed and maintained a strong youth following and popular radical right image largely from its informal ties to grassroots social movements like the Hungarian Guard and the 64-County Youth Movement (HVIM), developing a distinctive radical right subculture.

In this respect Jobbik is the strongest party in Hungary providing its own all-encompassing socializing process. Jobbik took from Fidesz’s model, combining grassroots movement tactics with formal partisanship, working alongside informal activist options. Jobbik, like Fidesz, has also developed its own media, with a large radical right network of information dissemination, mainly online. However, the radical right has furthered socialization efforts by developing the radical right as the
strongest politically based subculture in Hungary. This has been accomplished by
combining official party politics with social movements, unique fashion trends, a
music movement (nemzeti rock), as well as distinct radical right interpretations of
history. This immersive subculture is brought together within social events, such as
Jobbik’s summer youth camps or broader festivals like Magyar Sziget, uniting an
array of radical right youth supporters by providing a space for this multi-faceted
subculture to be experienced.

Fidesz still has the largest youth electorate compared with other political
parties with 58% of youth voters supporting Fidesz in the 2006 national elections
increasing to 65.19% in the 2010 national elections. Fidesz has been successful in
socializing support through membership within Fidesz’s youth organizations,
Fidelitas and Fidesz IT. These youth organizations are the largest in Hungary
compared with much smaller youth organizations within other parties. However,
youth support is equalizing between Fidesz and alternative political options like
Jobbik, seen in post-election research and polling showing a higher youth preference
towards Jobbik. Within party politics this shift has occurred in part due to the
opportunity structures provided by the diminished liberal-left options to counter
Fidesz.

Liberal-left political parties have done very little in employing alternative
political tactics or incorporating grassroots elements into their political structure.
MSZP in particular, failed to overcome political scandals seen at the administrative as
well as youth organization level. Compared with Fidesz and Jobbik, liberal-left and
green parties have been unsuccessful in cultivating significant national symbols,

---

363 See Figure 1.1 comparing youth and older cohort voting trends in the 2006 and 2010 national elections.
slogans and narratives for their parties, providing very little allure or connection for young voters to identify with. For the left, headed by MSZP, this has to do with the party’s attempts to distance themselves from their past as the reformed Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, MSZMP. The liberal-left has been associated with the communist past, perpetuated by right and radical right parties’ propaganda. Failing to counteract the right and radical right narratives against MSZP-SZDSZ or develop grassroots tactics has diminished the liberal-left’s potential for youth appeal and socialization potential. The bipolar right-left cultivated by MSZP and Fidesz between 1998 and 2006 socialized the youth within a highly polarizing political environment. This division has created ‘two Hungaries’ which has reappeared in the strong divide between youth-based movements and parties in the form of Jobbik on the one side and LMP along with opposition social movements on the other.

In Hungary youth political socialization and grassroots mobilization are intrinsically linked. Fidesz developed its popular grassroots support in 2002 with civic circles and Jobbik mainstreamed the radical right in 2006 through protest culture, however, youth involvement in activist liberal-left political activities has only developed more recently since 2010. Youth support for liberal-left leaning entities has grown not in the form of political party support but in the support online and on the streets for grassroots social movements and movement parties developed in opposition to Fidesz. Within movements like Milla and Szolidaritás and within movement parties like 4K! and Together 2014 the previously disillusioned liberal-left has found a voice. These grassroots social movements and movement parties are changing cultural political participation norms, subsequently changing the nature of political socialization by providing alternative options to mainstream political parties.
The future of movements like Milla, Szolidaritás and Together 2014 is highly uncertain depending on their ability to unite opposition forces, including political parties, against Fidesz for the 2014 national elections. Cultivating long-lasting support and partisanship will depend on how these grassroots social movements are able to relate to, and interplay with, other socializing agents such as the family, education and media.

8.2 Family

Foundational political socialization literature places a higher emphasis on family relations and education as the strongest agents normalizing democratic values and civic practices. The family still plays the most influential foundational socializing role in Hungary, priming partisanship and potential youth activism. The family is the strongest influencing socializer for young Hungarians, particularly relating to right wing party preferences. Parents remain the most trusted and frequented source of political discussions compared with classmates, friends and teachers and this channel for political information is highly influential. Most parents and grandparents discuss contemporary political topics within the family unit. Interviewees also often recalled familial historic narratives relating to specific political time periods in Hungary, translating previous historic accounts with modern partisan justifications. Familial views on national revolutions, transitions and political figures are still relevant for young Hungarians defining the modern political landscape.

---

364 Note: Together 2014 is currently trying to unite opposition into a united alliance against Fidesz for the 2014 national elections but there are already internal and external obstacles present. Internally Together 2014’s alliance with Milla is faltering. Milla as a grassroots social movement does not necessarily want to lose its core following of activists by ‘selling out’ to a political party. Meanwhile, the national court is potentially making Together 2014 change its name since there is controversy over its full name ‘Together 2014 Alliance’ and other bodies with similar names. This is thought to be Fidesz-led obstacle making to hinder the potential opposition alliance.
The strong allure for the youth towards right and radical right party support also comes from politicized historic narratives told first within the family and politicized by right wing and radical right parties. While politicization of Hungary’s history has been present since 1989 this has been most strongly and successfully incorporated by Fidesz’s monopolization of national symbols and Jobbik’s historic revisionism. Familial interpretations of politics and history play a foundational role in youth interpretations and partisan development. As seen by interviewee responses, there tends to be strong family-youth parallels in partisanship most often correlating with the right and radical right. Meanwhile parents with liberal-left supporting sentiments varied with relation to their child’s partisan sentiments with many liberal-left youths opting to vote for the party they felt was the ‘least bad’ (MSZP-SZDSZ) or voting for newer green party LMP as a liberal alternative.

Jobbik support was periodically founded within youth partisanship developed by other agents, mainly via social events within radical right grassroots social movements, and subsequently brought to the family by the youth activist. This was also the case with some LMP respondents. In these instances parental partisanship are undergoing reverse socialization towards the radical right, or alternative left, by politically active young Hungarians who are enthusiastically teaching family members about their political views. The implications of reverse socialization could lead to increased support for the radical right but could also more generally lead to older cohorts becoming more comfortable with less mainstream political party options. This changing political culture is already translating into increased political options in the 2014 elections, as seen by the addition of new movement parties, some of which have incorporated older cohort bases.
Right wing and radical right socialization tactics draw from and build upon familial socialization. Familial historical narratives used and politicized by right and radical parties have also intensified the nationalist discourse, creating divisive political party competitions between right and left and opening the door for anti-European, xenophobic and anti-Roma discussions in the mainstream. With a weak liberal-left opposition this trend implies the continuation of nationalist and radical right value sets socialized through politicized historic narratives such as the Treaty of Trianon, interwar politics and the personification of MSZP as a continuation of the communist regime. Utilizing familial historic also implies the continuation of emotionally charged, content-based socialization that is highly polarizing in Hungary.

8.3 Education

Agents such as education act as a counter agent in traditional political socialization theory, diffusing radicalism through civic education and in-class political discussions. However, education is an a-typical agent in Hungary. Hungary’s highly polarized political party system combined with contentious and unresolved historical interpretations of the past make it difficult for teachers and students to incorporate modern politics and civic discourse into the classroom and on campus. In Western Europe and the United States education is seen as a means of socializing normative democratic trends and civic participation, however, in Hungary there is a highly varied and often times weak or non-existent classroom engagement with modern or contentious history and politics. The avoidance of potentially controversial political topics is frequently institutionalized at a university level, in the prohibiting of

365 This is best exemplified by the increasingly open discussion of ‘gypsy crime’ in Hungarian media and within social networks. The term ‘gypsy crime’ (cigánybűnözés) was popularized by Jobbik and the activities of the Hungarian Guard in recent years, marching and protecting against gypsy criminality. The term and radical right activities subsequently became popularized within online and mainstream media.
political youth organizations, debates or research on students. The highly bipolar and oppositional nature of political party competition in Hungary means that it is very difficult to develop a politically neutral discussion. These trends imply that in Hungary, general and higher education are not countering radicalized or politically distorted versions of history or modern sociopolitical culture. In fact, recent changes to the national core curriculum are possibly inculcating politicized narratives, recentralizing the education system around government agendas.

There are varied levels of teacher politicization and institutional avoidance of political discussion across the Hungarian education system. Special Colleges are the exception to this trend. These self-run, dorm-like organizations, affiliated to larger university institutions, provide their own elite socialization process. Special Colleges like Rájk, Bibó and TEK are also connected with the foundations of parties like Fidesz and LMP, creating a space to develop Hungary’s political intelligentsia. Apart from the elite grouping of young people involved in Special Colleges education in secondary and higher education tends to play a very minor role in the overall political socialization process.

8.4 Media

The media plays a role as a secondary socializer in Hungary, reinforcing previously developed partisanship. Hungarian news media primarily serves the interests of larger political entities, creating an information structure that solidifies political predispositions. Mainstream media sources are often managed by strong partisanship for larger political parties, like MSZP and Fidesz. Television, newsprint and radio have created strong political biases within Hungarian media but also have made it difficult for marginalized and alternative youth-based political parties to
penetrate the news. Young Hungarians, aware of heavy news biases have turned to online news sources, often perceived as more objective and better formatted for youth consumption.

Radical right and alternative parties and movements have utilized online news media as a means of cultivating a space for information distribution and socialization. Particularly for Jobbik and radical right supporters, the Internet provides an interlinking web of radical right subculture, connecting radical right online social groups to fashion sites, national rock music pages and grassroots organizations like HVIM. Online news portals are, moreover, not held to the same regulations and fact-checking standards as mainstream news meaning the radical right now has greater freedom to disseminate its partisan message.

8.5 The Relation and Interplay Between Socializing Agents

All agents have the potential to influence and be influenced by one another, creating a complex overall process of political socialization. In Hungary historical narratives expressed first within the family and later politicized by parties and grassroots social movements best exemplify symbolic reference points and meaning developed by one agent and used by another, reinterpreted and reused for different socializing agendas. The ability for grassroots social movements to develop movement parties, subsequently changing party dynamics and political activism, is another example of the interplay between agents changing political culture. In Hungary political parties use media as a political tool to reinforce socialization. The education system also falls under political influences with regards to regulating topical subjects in the classroom as well as centralizing or decentralizing government
What this implies is that no agent is socializing in isolation of other agents and in the Hungarian case certain agents, like the family, political parties and social movements, are building the foundational environment for socialization to occur. Meanwhile other agents, like media and perhaps education, act as secondary socializers, solidifying values and political culture developed by primary socializers.

The relationship between these agents is most often socializing and solidifying right wing and radical right partisanship. This is begun at home with the strongest familial socializing processes taking place within right wing and nationalist supporting households. Meanwhile liberal-left families have a generational divide within partisan support. Parent cohorts are more comfortable with voting for older mainstream political parties while youth cohorts are disillusioned with liberal-left political options, tainted by scandal. The decline of viable liberal-left party options has opened the door for parties like LMP and newer movement parties to amass certain, albeit limited, levels of youth support. From familial to educational socialization, education institutions try to avoid playing a role in political socialization, not wanting to resemble previous communist education systems. However, the teachers and professors that do openly discuss political topics and themes tend to support right wing and radical right parties. The media then solidifies youth partisanship. Even alternative media, found online, tends to have strong partisan affiliations, most obviously on the right and radical right. This translates into a youth that is exposed to much stronger socializing agents towards right wing and radical right partisanship.

---

366 Discussed in Chapter 6, the liberal-left political forces tend to instate decentralizing policies while the right wing government recentralizes policies. Fidesz has also changed mandatory secondary school course content, most notably by creating a mandatory class section on the Treaty of Trianon along with a booklet of how to teach the subject of Trianon.
8.6 Research Limitations

While my research gives a broad case study analysis of the political socialization process in Hungary there are a few shortcomings limited by time and scope. Research was limited to a constrained cohort defined not only by age (defining youth as those between the ages of eighteen and thirty) but also by participation. I interviewed and analyzed politically active youth cohorts. This meant that I was able to engage with young Hungarians guaranteed to have stronger political influences and socializing experiences. However, it also meant that much of my qualitative data did not include people who might not be at all engaged with political participation but still might have socializing experiences worth researching, such as Roma youths. There is also a slight bias in my interview sampling of university students. While there were interviewees that were not in university (either still in secondary school or those who went straight into the work force) university students tended to be easier to contact and arrange interviews with and made up a large part of the activist network I was involved with. This was also due to the high rate of youths attending university in Hungary, particularly in the three locations I was based in.367

8.7 What Remains to be Learned?

In the future this research would benefit from continuation and expansion in order to combine qualitative work, such as the information found from my own field research, with research-directed quantitative data. Often national exit polls were not openly available and data from polling agencies had to be stratified for purpose. Polling in general within Hungary is often uncertain, with many polling agencies run

367 25% of young Hungarians attend higher education (OECD). This rate will have been higher in the areas that I based my research on since Budapest, Debrecen and Miskolc all have some of Hungary’s largest universities.
by partisan organizations. Given more time and funding my research would benefit from a statistically relevant national survey questioning general political socialization tendencies and partisan activism.

Political socialization research rarely considers more than one agent of socialization at a time. This limits the possibility of analyzing an overview of influences and agents. The research community would benefit from the continuation of multi-agent case studies to compare overarching socialization trends between countries and regions. Comparing political socialization case studies within Central and Eastern Europe can better determine what can be considered a socializing anomaly within a national context, and what is perhaps a common transitional trend within the region. Youth political socialization is particularly relevant in tracking future political predispositions. The research on Hungary as a case study analyzing youth activism through political socialization would also benefit from continuation to see how agents of socialization will change as the political spectrum shifts away from previous bipolarities and newer movement parties enter the political spectrum.

8.7 Looking to the Future

Some of the a-typical political socialization processes in Hungary, mentioned above, will take time to develop and stabilize. In time, as the youth population matures, the adult population will consist of a cohort with little or no lived experience within the communist era, changing certain historical and political narratives and outlooks. Hungary is currently undergoing large political overhauls by the Fidesz government, re-writing and amending the Hungarian constitution and changing fundamental legislation on media, education and the rule of law. While the benefit or potential harm of these changes is being debated on the national and international
level, how these changes will affect media content and the centralization of the education system towards a more national value-based curriculum is yet to be seen. Hungary, as a country, is still coming to terms with its communist, Nazi and Hapsburg past, questioning how to define contentious national history. Political platforms and policy-making are not just a matter of managing contemporary issues at hand. They are often also a statement about historical interpretations and views on how Hungary perceives itself within Europe. Looking at the changing state of political agents and influences Hungary is still undergoing democratic transition.

In terms of political socialization the youth are being exposed to agents that are also in flux. Educational decentralization and recentralization based on distinctly different party views on how education should relate to the state means that varied educational experiences and general avoidance of politically sensitive topics will most likely continue. It is also unlikely that mainstream media will de-politicize in the near future due to strong partisan ownerships, meaning that media will continue to be primarily a secondary socializing agent, solidifying preconceived partisanship introduced by other agents. The current grassroots social movements rallying in opposition to Fidesz are also a highly volatile agent and socializing influence since their existence is dependent on the state of their opposition. Newer and smaller parties like LMP and 4K! have an uncertain future if they are unable to pass the 5% electoral threshold. If Fidesz wins again in 2014 it will be difficult for anti-Fidesz movement parties to maintain a strong resistance force in opposition to a party that continues to show mass electoral appeal. If Fidesz happens to lose in 2014 to an alliance like the one proposed by Together 2014, then the nature and structure of the movement-party will have to change drastically. A movement party within parliament will generally have to change, strengthening its political structure and developing its positions on a
broader spectrum of national and international topics (Kitschelt 2006). While a change of government is possible in 2014 through a wide alliance of opposition forces it is also largely dependent on undecided voters.  

With regards to youth support, the strongest political forces remain Fidesz and Jobbik, combining grassroots tactics with strong political party structures. In the near future it is hard to see an opposition force that can electorally counter Fidesz. Jobbik will also remain a stable political party, backed by a faithful subculture. The political socialization process in Hungary within the family, educational institutions and the mainstream and alternative media is developing most strongly to favor right wing and radical right partisanship. The strength of these partisanship is also due to the weakness in counter socialization by liberal-left narratives, educational exposure and media alternatives. The current process of socialization in favor of the right and radical right will therefore continue until counter socialization strengthens or certain agents, such as education and media, de-politicize the nature of socialization by providing a space for broader civic education and more objective news sources.

Hungary is a key case study in the greater context of the direction European Union member states are taking. This report tracks the growing political shift away from liberal European values, giving preference to localized, nationalist and increasingly exclusionary politics. These larger trends of right wing and radical right voter support are heightened among the youth population. Tracking how these shifts are developing and mainstreaming in a nation-specific context better defines what might be a national anomaly in Hungary and what might be a predictor of larger trends.

---

368 Szonda Ipsos research center has speculated that an opposition alliance could win based on current figures. Fidesz has two million decided voters (July 2013) while opposition party MSZP combined with Together 2014 has an estimated 1.5 million supporters. There is currently a high level of undecided voters. Tapping into this group would be key for victory over Fidesz ('Change of Gov't Possible, Pollster says', Politics.hu, (19 July 2013)).
regional or European trends. Continuing to track the political socialization processes across Europe will serve to predict the direction European member states will take in the future.
APPENDIX 1: Hungarian Election Results 1990 – 2010\textsuperscript{369}

National Election Results 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ALIGNMENT</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Election Results 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ALIGNMENT</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Election Results 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ALIGNMENT</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz-MPP(MDF)</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIÉP</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Election Results 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ALIGNMENT</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz-MPP(MDF)</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Election Results 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ALIGNMENT</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz-MPP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Election Results 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ALIGNMENT</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz-MPP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX 2:
Participant Observation: Demonstrations, Events & Youth Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>RELEVANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 March 2011</td>
<td>Government Rally for National Holiday: Commemoration of 1848 Revolution</td>
<td>Speeches were given by Viktor Orbán as well as the Mayor of Budapest. Orbán likens Brussels to the oppressive forces from Hungary’s history such as the Hapsburgs, Nazis and Communists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 2011</td>
<td>Anti-Government Rallies</td>
<td>The online activist group Milla rallies around 100 thousand people against Fidesz’ Media Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April 2011</td>
<td>Pac-Man Anti-Government Rally</td>
<td>Tracking various anti-government movements. This was an event making a human pac-man out of ~100 of people dressed in Orange (representing Fidesz) illustrating the government’s abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 2011</td>
<td>Jobbik May Day Festival</td>
<td>Profiling the radical right culture seeing who is in attendance, the types of music being played and the types of goods being sold: Mixing traditional ‘ancient Hungary’ symbols with modern radical right ‘national rock music’. Jobbik Youth Division, HVIM and Hungarian Guardsmen were also in attendance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 2011</td>
<td>University Student Flashmob at Corvinus University</td>
<td>Hundreds of students making a human chain around the university against decreasing government education funds and the firing of certain professors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May 2011</td>
<td>Budapest Gay Pride Festival</td>
<td>Budapest’s gay pride has become quite controversial in its new founding’s and recent years. There was a large police presence this year to keep radical right anti-gay pride rallies from clashing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-17 July 2011</td>
<td>Jobbik Youth Division Summer Camp</td>
<td>Five-day camp in rural Sóstofalva (Borsod County). Profiling the types of young campers attending and the organization/planning of the camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 2011</td>
<td>Fidelitas Annual Congress &amp; Elections</td>
<td>In Debrecen, I went to profile the dedicated Fidelitas members and figures running for positions within Fidelitas. The Event was highly organized, professional and included entertainment and meal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July 2011</td>
<td>International Slut Walk</td>
<td>Budapest participated in the international ‘slut walk’ against male molestation and rape of women. A few hundred came out to support chanting ‘no means no’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7 August 2011</td>
<td>Fidelitas Summer Camp</td>
<td>Seven days in a hotel on Lake Balaton. Profiling the types of young campers attending and the organization/planning of the camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14 August 2011</td>
<td>LMP Summer University</td>
<td>Five days campgin on Old Buda Island. Profiling the types of young campers attending and the organization/planning of the camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October 2012</td>
<td>Government Rally and Pro-Government ‘Peace March’ on the National Holiday Commemorating the 1956 Revolution.</td>
<td>Fidesz representatives came out to give speeches along joined by an organized ‘Peace March’ by pro-Fidesz supporters that ended by congregating with the Fidesz rally. Estimated of between 50 – 70 thousand participated in the Peace March. Note: this is organized by a largely older right wing supporting crowd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October 2012</td>
<td>Anti-Government rallies by Milla, Szolidaritás and the announcement of Together 2014.</td>
<td>Anti-government activist organizations Milla (mainly online activists) and Szolidaritás (unionist activists), joined forces with a new political grouping led by ex-Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai. The movements (now party) is called Together 2014. Estimated of around 100 thousand came out in support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3: Interviewee Breakdown

The following table gives a list of interviewees. Names have been changed for anonymity but respondents’ age, political alignment and region is given. It is also noted if the interviewee is classified as a specialist of some kind in a category other than ‘youth activist’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Alignment</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Specialists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Julia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Political Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Szabolcs</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sándor Gallai</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>L/R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Political Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jakab</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Áron</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gábor</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>R/G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Melinda</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>LSR</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dóra</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>LSG</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ani</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Balázs</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>László</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Krisztán</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>István</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>LS</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Benigna</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Palko</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>RLG</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Esther</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Szabolcs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Ármin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Adam</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Dóra</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Laszlo</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Tamas</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>GROUP Anonymous</td>
<td>20-22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Kincse Szabolcs</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Zsolt</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Flóra</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Gábor</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Beata</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Dániel</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Balint</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Monika</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Beata</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Szemere</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Péter Radó</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ex-Education Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Philip Barker</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Dorci</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Gergely</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>András Istvanffy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>4K! Party Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Sára</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Dávid</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>László</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>András Bozóki</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>CEU Professor, Ex Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Flóra</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Zselykó</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4K</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>István Stumpf</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Constitutional Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Bori Kriza</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Sociologist on Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>János</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Lászlo (Louis Baci)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Gábor</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>Attila</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>László</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6</td>
<td>Szabolcs</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>Gábor</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Milán Szoboszlai</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>Tibor</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>Péter</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5</td>
<td>István</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6</td>
<td>Máté</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D7</td>
<td>Sándor Nagy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8</td>
<td>Gergely</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9</td>
<td>Angela</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D10</td>
<td>Joszéf</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D11</td>
<td>Zsanett</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>László Sebián-Petrovski</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>MSZP Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Hajnalka</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Erizsebet Novaky</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Names highlighted in Blue represent individuals who were also specialists, usually researchers, professors or experts with relation to my topic.

**Names highlighted in Yellow represent individuals who participated in focus groups. Most focus group participants also participated in in-depth interviews.

*** With regards to Alignment (In the one case that 4K is written it stands for a new political party ‘4th Republic!’):

R – Right
L – Liberal Left
S – Socialist (MSZP)
E – Radical Right
G – Green
APPENDIX 4: Semi-Structured Interview Format & Example Questions

Interviews conducted were in-depth and semi-structured, allowing for interviewees to develop their own narratives and bring up new, unasked topics if and when they desired. My role was primarily to make them comfortable enough to discuss personal political topics and various agents of socialization and keep the discussion going, ensuring that I covered my main topics of question. I would tend to begin discussing an interviewee's first political memories as a lead into discussing family-based political discussions, then ask about media and education, as less controversial political topics. I would then begin discussing their political orientation, activism and sentiments. Because an interviewee might take a topic in a different direction I kept a simple template, usually written on a piece of paper beside me, to make sure I had covered all topics:

FAMILY
- What are your first political memories?
- Do you recall your parents discussing politics at home?
- Did your parents/siblings/grandparents discuss politics with you?
- Did your parents ever take you with them when they went to vote?
- Do you have the same political values/ideologies/partisanship as your parents/siblings/grandparents?
- Do you feel parents/siblings/grandparents have influenced your political preferences?
- What sort of newspapers, television, radio is watched/listened to at home?

MEDIA
- How do you get political information?
- What is your most preferred medium for media (TV, Internet, Radio, Newspapers, Weeklies)?
- How often do you look up political information and how?
- Do you feel that there are political biases depending on what media you look at?
- Is there any media you can say gives unbiased political information?
- How did you first start using your media outlets: at home? From friends? Party information?

EDUCATION (Secondary and Higher Education)
- What sort of political/civic information do you learn in secondary school?
- Do you have political debates in school?
- Do you talk about politics at school?
- How is modern political history taught in school?
- Are there certain political topics you wish were discussed in school?
- Do you feel that you know the political alignment of teachers/professors?
- Has school influenced your political outlook? How?

POLITICAL PARTIES
- Did you vote last year in the 2010 national elections? Was it your first time?
- Do you feel that you have a strong/weak party preference? Membership?
- Has your political preference changed in the last few years? If so how and why?
- When did you first identify yourself with a political party? Explain?
- Would you ever change your party preference? Is there another party you would vote for?
- Have you ever postered? Debated? Attended political events? Attended political camp?

GRASSROOTS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
- Have you ever protested? Demonstrated? Gone on strike? Why?
- Are you involved in any political social movements (list a few).
- How did you hear about these movements? How did you get involved
- What do you think these movements can impact?
- Do you have family members that also participate in these movements?

In your opinion what is the greatest impact on your own political partisanship/viewpoint?
This table reviews interviewee responses about political discussions and voting alliance with relation to the family. The chart is arranged in party preference order of the interviewee so that a visual comparison can be seen. Boxes with (+) express an affirmative answer that the interviewee experienced political discussions at home or supports the same political party as their parents. Similarly (-) expresses a negative answer. Areas highlighted in yellow show when an interviewee responded negatively and areas highlighted in green show a parental discrepancy when, for example, the interviewee is able to discuss or share party alignment with one parent but not the other. The right hand column notes family influences that were mentioned strongly or interesting facts that changed the typical or expected family-youth dynamic.
APPENDIX 6: 
Mapping Political Media Outlets Used by Young Hungarians

This section gives a breakdown and analysis of some of the leading media outlets in Hungary, their alignment and data about media usage. The following is a concise breakdown of the most frequently mentioned news outlets discussed by interviewees. Television stations, newspapers, radio stations and Internet news sites are included. Media outlets are grouped in categories of political ideologies looking at conservative-nationalist, radical right, liberal-left media and media outlets that are questionable independent. Media is categorized by how interviewees mentioning the following news outlets described each, as well as looking up the media’s history and self-description. Independent media is listed as such because they not only describe themselves as independent but interviewees had mixed answers when categorizing the outlet themselves. Found at the end of the chapter are charts looking at what media outlets interviewees mentioned as their own sources of political information as well as a chart showing how often online media sites are used by individuals, to show the frequent use of online news portals by Hungarians. This section only includes media that was mentioned in interviews two or more times, giving an idea if the most used media outlets by young Hungarians. Some interviewees mentioned small local papers or obscure media blogs that were not included due to their marginal status.

Conservative-Nationalist Media

Heti Válasz (meaning Weekly Choice)- Heti Válasz defines itself as a moderate conservative weekly magazine. Topics covered deal with politics, economy and culture related issues. The magazine was created in 2001 founded around the first governmental term of Fidesz in 1998 when Orbán called for a policy of balance in the media, shedding light on the liberal media monopoly in Hungary at the time. Funding for creating Heti Válasz came indirectly from the government-created foundation, the Natural and Social Development Foundation (Természet- és Társadalombarát Fejlődésért Közalapítványt (TTFK)).

Hír TV – Hír TV was registered in 2002 and is a Hungarian television news channel. The station gives investigative reports and political discussions. Although the news channel declares itself as delivering unbiased and independent news, the nationally broadcasted channel is politically right leaning, having partnerships with the well-known right-wing newspaper Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian nation) as well as Lánchíd Rádió (Chain Bridge Radio). It was the only TV channel to broadcast the 2006 protests in Hungary live. Some say they were the only station given access. In their online information the station states a viewership of 2.9 million households.

Jobbklikk.hu (meaning the Right Click)– Jobbklikk, founded in 2009, is a conservative virtual community combined with blog-like articles. Jobbklikk considers itself ‘a community of young bloggers, writers and professionals who seek to Promote

371 http://hirtvklub.hu/
Conservative ideas in the Hungarian public discourse’. The site provides a forum for debate as well as published articles. The site has three columns allowing access to an Op-Ed section, a blogging section or Jobbklikk journalists and links to other related articles of interest from other sites. The site also has a twitter and Facebook page. Jobbklikk mentions on its homepage that it has common thinking with conservative online news portals like Mandiner and Konzervatórium. While it has a mainly conservative right-wing framework it also brings in a more moderate-radical right audience. (jobbklikk.hu)

Konzervatórium – Is currently the most well recognized conservative news-blogs in Hungary. Although the political alignment of the site is not hidden, articles maintain a healthy critique and open dialogue about current political issues and event concerning Hungary. With a format more like a news portal than a blog compared with its website rivals Mandiner and Jobbklikk, Konzervatórium has sections about the economy, politics, culture, interviews and impressions. All three websites link to each other showing a mutual respect of providing news portals for young conservatives interested in finding information and building conservative networks online.

Magyar Hírlap (meaning Hungarian Press) – Magyar Hírlap is a daily newspaper created in 1968 as a paper of the Hungarian Government. The paper became independent in 1990 later bought by media mogul Gábor Széles in 2006. The paper has since become a supporter of more conservative, traditional politics and parties. The paper has been strongly criticized for its publications of certain articles with anti-Semitic undertones, mainly written by well-known conservative writer Zsolt Bayer, who is a strong Fidesz supporter on the more radical side of their support network. In one article Bayer openly referred to Jews as ‘Israeli Jewish occupiers’ in Hungary and even as ‘stinking excrement’. Magyar Hírlap online was created in 2008, following the trend of many newspapers, radio stations and TV channels to develop online counterparts.

Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation)- Magyar Nemzet was established in 1937 as a moderate conservative paper, originally read mainly by Budapest based intellectuals (Arpad 2004). This newspaper was one of the top Socialist Government newspapers, behind Népszabadság (Volgyes 1975) and remains one of the most circulated dailies. Magyar Nemzet changed alignment in 2000, becoming a largely conservative, Fidesz supporting paper and maintaining its status as Hungary’s second largest daily. Despite it being one of the most highly circulated newspapers in Hungary only one youth respondent mentioned Magyar Nemzet as a news source that they read to find political information, reflecting the shift in media attainment for younger cohorts.

---

372 As written by Jobbklikk published on Mandiner: ‘Levél a toryknak’, Mandiner.hu, (1 February 2012), (http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20120201_jobbklikk_szerkesztoseg_level_a_toryknak), <accessed 3 June 2012>.


375 I have added information about Magyar Nemzet despite the fact that it was not mentioned more than once by interviewees as a source for political information used. The reason for this is because it
**Mandiner** (meaning cushion)—Mandiner is an interactive online blog and news site. Similar to Jobbklikk the site was developed by young conservative Hungarians to provide news, debate and opinions about Hungarian politics, culture and society. Maniner was created in 2009 as a sort of online Huffington Post and blog formatted site. The site has gained attention with its young-based intellectual responses to contemporary politics, justifying certain questionable political actions and giving a debate about the nature of current political trends and conflicts concerning Hungary.\(^{376}\) Alongside political dialogues, the site caters to a more youthful audience with specific sections on ‘wine’, ‘bicycling’, and ‘festivals’.

**Századvég**—is a polling agent now although it started as a periodical in 1985 founded by Bibó students with the first editor in chief István Stumpf. The periodical contained articles from politically active young people and turned into a relevant political reference at the time. Names on the list of some of the first to submit pieces to Századvég include István Bóka, Lászlo Köver, János Máté and Viktor Orbán. All politically relevant people linked with Fidesz. It also developed a political/civil academy started in 2003 assisting with polling agency, think tank and publishing house (Interview 49).\(^{377}\)

**Radical Right Media**

**Barikád.hu**—Similar to Kuruc, Barikád is an online as well as weekly news source. Barikád comes out as a weekly magazine as well as a linking online portal. Barikád more recently also linked Barikád TV to its online portal, using the format of radical right online news TV Nemzeti 1 where news is created and streamed through YouTube. Barikád openly supports the Hungarian Guard and its various factions as well as Jobbik. Barikád is the most well-known and lucrative radical right weeklies in Hungary. The weekly magazine was founded in 2009 and costs 390 forint-per-issue (roughly 1.3 Euros). Legally there are no link between Barikád magazine and Barakad.hu but they share similar emblems, topics and are virtually considered the same source. The magazine is more directly linked with Jobbik than Kuruc and possibly less openly extreme. Jobbik’s website has a link to the magazine.\(^{378}\)

**Kuruc.info**—Kuruc is a name for the anti-Habsburg rebels within Hungary during the late 1600s to early 1700s. The name itself hints at the alignment of an online news portal Kuruc.info, which is currently the leading news site for supporters of the radical right and extreme nationalists. The site has a more openly hostile tone towards Roma, Jewsish-Israeli and other foreign forces seen as invading Hungary.\(^{379}\) Created in February 2006 the site has caused numerous controversies with the content of its articles, once even exposing personal details of anti-Hungarian targets, that the Socialist government attempted banning the site in the summer of 2008, succeeding

\(^{376}\) Szmöre, ‘ Bántó’, Mandiner.blog.hu, (19 January 2012), (http://mandiner.blog.hu/2012/01/19/banto#more3575223), <accessed 5 July 2012>.

\(^{377}\) http://www.szazadveg.hu/

\(^{378}\) http://jobbik.hu/node/6303


is the second most circulated daily newspaper in Hungary so I feel that information on it should be added, particularly due to its significant change from a left wing to right wing supporting paper.
only in stopping the site for a month.\textsuperscript{380} The site has an openly irredentist opinion, feeling that the pre-Trianon Treaty borders should be restored. They were one of the first portals to call the anti-government protestors during the 2006 Ozsod riots ‘revolutionaries’, catapulting Kuruc.info into the centre of radical right news outlets.

**Nemzetil.hu** (National One aka N1) – N1 TV is a radical right online TV ‘station’ running through YouTube. The main website links the user to a list of video clippings ranging between eight and sixteen minutes in length of news reporting’s, political speeches and interviews. N1 was launched in January 2011 as ‘an attempt to correct biased reporting by the liberal media and disseminate information that the corporate media won’t cover at all or give a distorted version of it’.\textsuperscript{381} With little funding, the TV program runs a fifteen-minute newscast at 8pm on weekdays. Jobbik’s leader, Gabor Vona, announced the stations launch, showing an undeniable link between the station and the party. N1 subject matter targets Hungarian mysticism, history, politics and traditionalism. Controversial topics broadcasted include a report on Hitler’s birthday praising his qualities as a politician, showing images of Nazi parades.\textsuperscript{382}

**Liberal-Left Media**

**Figyelő** (meaning Observer)- Created in 1957, Figyelő is a weekly business and news publication looking at business, politics, economy, society and technology. The content of articles shows a slight liberal bias although the publication considers itself impartial, showing leanings towards centre-right and centre-left.\textsuperscript{383}

**Hírszerzőz** (meaning Intelligence)– Hírszerzőz is an online journal started in 2005 in self-run, though in relation to the think tank Political Capital and Capital Group Inc. The site was acquired by HVG Online Inc. in May 2010 strengthening the more journalistic and investigative side of the journal.\textsuperscript{384} The site defines itself as an ‘independent, liberal site’ maintaining that they remain ‘fair, moderate, but highly critical’ (tiszteségessé, mértéktartó, de nagyon kritikus).\textsuperscript{385} The site is written in colloquial dialogue in almost blog-format, using satirical headlines and remains openly critical of the government.

**Magyar Narancs** (meaning Hungarian Orange)- Magyar Narancs was founded in 1989 as a more radical, liberal-minded magazine relating to younger early Fidesz supporters (when Fidesz was still liberal). Currently the magazine is considered a liberal-liberal, intellectual weekly magazine. The content of the magazine tends to be colloquially written laced with irony and satirical articles tackling social, cultural and

\textsuperscript{380} The site runs its operations from a US based web-network so that it can continue its media output without worrying about Hungarian censorship: Magyari, Gábor, ‘Törvényértő a Kuruc.info? Hol van a szervere? Kik szerkeszik? - Amit hírportálunkról tudni kell’, Kuruc.info, (23 February 2010), <accessed 1 July 2012>.

\textsuperscript{381} ‘N1 on-line TV Station has been launched’, Hungarian Ambiance, (31 January 2011), http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2011/01/n1-on-line-tv-station-has-been-launched.html, <accessed 10 July 2012>.


\textsuperscript{383} http://www.figyelo.hu/hetilap/

\textsuperscript{384} ‘A HVG vette meg a Hírszerzőz’, Index.hu, 19 May 2010, http://index.hu/kultur/media/2010/05/19/a_hvg_vette_meg_a_hirszerzot/, <accessed 18 July 2012>

\textsuperscript{385} ‘Nem ülünk senkinek a zsebében!’, eMasa.hu, 15 July 2005
political issues. The name ‘Hungarian Orange’ refers to a film, mocking communism in the endeavor to try to cultivate oranges in Hungary, which of fails and a sour lemon is presented to the leader instead.\textsuperscript{386}

**Népszabadság** (meaning People’s Freedom)\textsuperscript{386}/ NOL.hu – Népszabadság was founded in 1956. Its name is in reference to its communist roots in the dissolved daily paper Szabad Nép (Free People). Népszabadság was previously and continues to be the most widely read newspaper in Hungary. In 1989 the paper became ‘independent’ but is considered a liberal-left leaning paper. The paper has an official website: NOL.hu. The paper is mainly owned by a Swiss publishing house Ringier but the Free Press foundation (Szabad Sajtó), which was founded by MSZP and owns 26.7% of the paper’s shares.\textsuperscript{387} It is generally a pro-EU/US paper and pro liberal left parties.

**Népszava** (meaning ‘People’s Voice’) – Népszava is the oldest Hungarian Daily. The newspaper was originally established in 1877 as the official paper of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, until 1948. Mainly the working class originally subscribed it to while papers like Magyar Nemzet were read more by Budapest intellectuals at the time (Arpad 2004). Up till 2002 is was the newspaper of the trade unions in Hungary in various forms before becoming privatized, now owned by its staff, relying on donations for funding.\textsuperscript{388} The paper and its online version, started around 2000, remain close to the Socialist party in its content.\textsuperscript{389} The format of Népszava in print and online provides short, easy to understand articles laced with images

**Independent**

**HVG = Heti Világgazdaság (World Economy Weekly)** – HVG is a weekly political economic magazine. Founded in 1979 modelled on the Economist. One of the few Hungarian journals considered to be truly independent as far as 2002 records show. Considered the leading news magazine of the country. HVG considers itself to be a liberal-minded news source providing public economic news weekly. Readership of HVG among interviewees seems to go beyond traditional right-left divides with individuals supporting Fidesz, LMP and MSZP-SZDSZ mentioning readership of HVG either in newspaper or online form.\textsuperscript{390}

**Index** – Is a one of the most popular Hungarian language news portals with an estimate of 1.3 million readers monthly. They are also particularly popular among younger people with an estimated 64% of their users between the ages of 18 and

39. Index was founded in 1995 under the internet portal name Internetto.hu and then changed to Index.hu. The site states itself as independent. Interestingly interviewees often class it both liberal and conservative. Usually liberal-left supporters will depict it is secretly conservative and conservative supporters state the opposite. From the content of the site there is possibly a liberal slant. Index mixes sociopolitical critiques with more tabloid-style news drawing in large youth readership. Articles are short with easy-to-read language.

**Origo** – Origo is by far the most trafficked portal, none the less news portal, in Hungary with 4.46 million visitors monthly (almost half of Hungary’s population). Origo Zrt. Includes its news portal (Origo.hu) as well as an email service (free mail) and a social networking site IWIW that was the leading social networking site among young people in Hungary before the Facebook boom three to five years ago. Origo was founded in 1997. Origo attempts a more objective and neutral journalistic brief-article style compared with its main news portal rival Index, who publishes more opinion-based articles. (Origo.hu)

---

APPENDIX 7: Information Retrieval for Sociopolitical Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEB</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>RADIO</th>
<th>PAPER</th>
<th>MAG</th>
<th>MEDIA</th>
<th>KEY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ONLINE MEDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I = Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>J = Jobbklikk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, K</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M = Mandiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HVG, N = Konzervatórium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Journalist = reads all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>MN, T, RC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B = Barikád!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>J, K, I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N1 = Nemzeti1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>I, O, HT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HI = Hírszerző</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>NSZ, O, M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O = Origo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>ME = Median</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HVG, IR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TA = Tarki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KU, B, J</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>KU, B, J</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RADIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T = Tilos Rádio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>I, NSZ, N, HVG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RC = Rádio Café</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HVG, F, N, MH, I, HVG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IR = InfoRádio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RTL = RTL Klub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HVG, F, NSZ, N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DAILIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>HVG, ES, I, O, ME, TA, MN, N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MH = Magyar Hírlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, HVG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N = Népszabadság</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>NSZ = Népszava</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>I, O, HI, NSZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MN = Magyar Nemzet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>HV, MN, RTL, HT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WEEKLIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>N = HV = Heti Válasz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>HVG, HI, O, I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MN = Magyar Narancs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>N, HI, I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>F = Figyelő</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HV, MN, NSZ, F, HVG, N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HVG = Heti Világgazdaság</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HI, N, MN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ES = Életes Írodalom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>FN.hu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>M, K</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>N, I, O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HT = Hir TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>HVG, I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MTI = National TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, HI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D = Duna TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>I, O, MH, MNe, B, N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>J</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>K, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>K, B, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>K, B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>K, B, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>K, B, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>K, B, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>K, B, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>K, B, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>K, B, N1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interviewees highlighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>MTI, HVG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in red reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>I, O, D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HVG, N, F, LMP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D11</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

306
This model maps the goals of decentralized education reforms, with relation to political, economic, organizational and educational considerations. This figure demonstrates the complexity and constant monitoring necessary in maintaining a well-balanced decentralized system. It also displays the heightened responsibility of regional and local actors, including teachers that are involved in the regional planning and technicalities involved in implementation of decided guidelines and standards (Figure and data from Hanson 1998).
## APPENDIX 9: Political Discourse and Socializing Influences in Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politics Discussed?</th>
<th>Teachers Alignment?</th>
<th>Teachers/School Influence Political Ideas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-/+ (skip some)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>-/+ (skip some)</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>-/+ (skip some)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>-/+ (skip some)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 - 21</td>
<td>-/+ in special schools</td>
<td>+ rebel against teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 - 24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 28</td>
<td>-/+ (skip some)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 - 30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 33</td>
<td>-/+ in special schools</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 36</td>
<td>-/+ in special schools</td>
<td>+/- in special college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 - 40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/- history teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 42</td>
<td>-/+ in special schools</td>
<td>+/- in special college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 - 47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>-/+ certain professors</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1 - D2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3 - D4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5 - D6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8 - D9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D11 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 P2 P3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/- in special schools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES FOR APPENDIX 10

The first column looks at responses given about whether or not current political topics were discussed by teachers in the classroom. The (-/+ or +/-) means that some topics were skipped in contemporary political discussions. The second column records responses of interviewees over whether or not they felt they knew their teachers' political alignment. The (+/- or +/-) signifies that they knew some teachers but not all their teachers' political views. The last column tracks respondents feelings about whether or not they felt teachers or their university environment has affected their political orientation and/or identity. The (+/- or +/-) signifies that a particular class or teacher has had some affect on their orientation.


Baráth, Tibor, ‘School improvement in public education: Case of Hungary’, Közoktatási Vezetőképző Intézet, (power point presentation at the University of Szeged: 4 November 2004).


Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik, ‘Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions’, *Journal of Democracy*, 17(4), (October 2006), pp. 5 – 18.


Chaffee, Steven H., ‘The newspaper as an agent of political socialisation in schools: effects of “El Diario en la Escuela” in Argentina’, paper presented at the annual convention of the *Association for Education in Journalism*, (Chicago, IL, 1997)


Csepeli, Gyorgy, ‘Children of a Paradise Lost’, in Csepeli et. al. (eds) From Subject to Citizen, (Hungarian Center for Political Education: Budapest, 1994)


‘Az egyetemisták közü a Jobbik a legnépszerűbb’, Index, (16 February 2013), <http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/16/az_egyetemistak_kozt_a_jobbik_a_legnepszerubb/>.


Furlong, Andrew, and Fred Cartmel, Young People and Social Change: Individualisation and Risk in Late Modernity, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997).


Gombár, Csaba, Zsolt Enyedi and Hédi Volosin, Két Magyarország, (Osiris: Budapest, 2005).


György, Péter, Néma Hagyomány: Kollektív felejtés és a kései múltértelmezés, (Budapest: Magvető, 2000).


Havas, Gábor, ‘Ne próbáljuk a bűnt etnicizálni’, Élet és Irodalom, (3 April 2009).


Hooghe, Marc, Dietland Stolle and Patrick Stouthuysen, ‘Head Start in Politics: The Recruitment Function of Youth Organizations of Political Parties in Belgium (Flanders)’, Party Politics, 10(2), (March 2004).


Kovacheva, Siyka, Keys to Youth Participation in Eastern Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000)


Kürti, László, Youth And the State in Hungary: Capitalism, communism and class, (London: Pluto Press, 2002).


Mény, Yves and Yves Surel (eds.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002).


Norman, Andrew P., ‘Telling it Like it Was: Historical Narratives on Their Own Terms’, History and Theory, 30(2), (May 1991), pp. 119-135.


Pedersen, Karina, Lars Bille, Roger Buch, Jorgen Elklit and Bernhard Hansen, ‘Sleeping or active partners? Danish party members at the turn of the millennium’, *Party Politics*, (10), (2004), pp.367-383.


Sloan, James, ‘The ‘Outraged Young’: How Young Europeans are Reshaping the Political Landscape’, Political Insight, 4(1), (March 2013), pp. 4-7.


Smilov, Daniel and Tisné, Martin, From the Ground Up: Assessing the Record of Anti-Corruption Assistance in Southeastern Europe, (Budapest: Central European University, 2004).


Szlai, Erzsébet, Koordinátákon kívül, (Budapest: Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 2011).


Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003


Touraine, Alain, Comment sortir du néolibéralisme?, (Paris: Fayard, 1999).


Whitely, Paul F., ‘Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world’, *Party Politics*, 17(1), (2011), pp. 21 – 44.


DOCUMENTS & ARTICLES


‘Az egyetemisták közt a Jobbik a legnépszerűbb’, Index, (16 February 2013), <http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/16/az_egyetemistak_kozt_a_jobbik_a_legnepszerubb/>.


1 List of Bibó College Alumni: <http://bibo.elte.hu/voltt>.


‘Neo-Nazi groups in Hungary: Guards of the Carpathian Homeland, National Front and Others’,


Ökopolitikai Műhely Alapítvány (Ecopolitics Workshop Foundation), Official Website: <http://okopolmuhely.hu/>.


‘Questionnaire on the State of Civic Education in Hungary’, Civic Education in Europe, (European Confederation of Political Science Associations, 2010).


*Youth Policy in Hungary: Conclusions of the Council of Europe International Review Team*, Jaaberg (Chair of Committee), Council of Europe, (Strasbourg: Printed at the Council of Europe, 2008).