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The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand

Zhou, J; Lam, WHK; Heydecker, BG; (2005) The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand. TRANSPORT RES B-METH , 39 (6) 519 - 544. 10.1016/j.trb.2004.07.003.

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Abstract

This paper presents a bilevel transit fare equilibrium model for a deregulated transit system. In the upper-level problem, the transit competition is portrayed as an n-player, non-cooperative game by changing the fare structure of each of a set of transit lines separately so as to maximize the profit of each transit operator within the oligopolistic market. We show that there exists a generalized Nash game between transit operators, which can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem. In the lower-level problem, the passengers' response to the equilibrium fare structure of the transit operators is represented by the stochastic user equilibrium transit assignment model with elastic OD demand. As a result, the bilevel transit fare equilibrium problem is presented in the Stackelberg form and solved by a heuristic solution algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach. A numerical example is given to illustrate the competition mechanism on the transit network and some useful findings are presented on competitive operations. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Type:Article
Title:The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand
DOI:10.1016/j.trb.2004.07.003
Keywords:VARIATIONAL INEQUALITY, BUS SERVICES, COMPETITION, ASSIGNMENT, ALGORITHMS, TRANSPORT, NETWORKS
UCL classification:UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Civil, Environmental and Geomatic Engineering

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