Youth political disaffection and Chile's post-authoritarian political system

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DECLARATION

I, Juan Ignacio Venegas Muggli, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Juan Ignacio Venegas Muggli
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When I got to London in 2008 I did not really know what I was getting into. I only had a bunch of dreams and hopes waiting to become true very far from home. (Un) fortunately, after a couple of weeks I started to feel really homesick. This feeling was intensified after having failed to order the beer I wanted because of the bad quality of my spoken English (I had to drink a really ugly warm bitter beer). There were hard days at the beginning. I still think it was yesterday when, only two months after having arrived to London I thought "I am definitively not going to live here 4 years to do a PhD". However, things do not always happen as we planned them and that is why I am now writing these words instead of remembering the 4th anniversary of my return to Chile.

It was definitively a complex and hard process. However, it was also a very nice and constructive one. One clear thing is that it would have not been the same if I had not had the great support from several friends. First of all, I want to especially thank Mónica Gerber and Tito Elgueta for having been there during the 4 years. I also want to thank Pooja Guha, Lore Hayek, Paola Leal, Julia Foley and Victoria Galán, with whom I spent really nice moments during my first year. Moreover, I would like to express gratitude to the wonderful "Chilean Gang" (Arturo Arriagada, Cecilia Bravo, Carolina Velasco, Mauricio Sauma, Franco Fernández, Amaya Fraile, Carla Castillo, Ana María Troncoso and Juan Cristóbal González) for having made me feel that I was in Chile whenever I needed during my first year.

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Juan Ignacio Venegas Muggli
ABSTRACT

This research aims to explain current high levels of political disaffection among Chilean youth, to understand why youths in Chile are particularly more disaffected than other groups, and to comprehend the apparent new way of doing politics that would be emerging among this group. Since the return to democracy in 1990 Chile has experienced good levels of economic development and political stability. However, with the pass of years, Chilean citizens, and particularly young people, have increased their levels of political disaffection. Moreover, lately these feelings have begun to be expressed through strong social movements. This thesis argues that this phenomenon can be principally explained by a large disconnection between the political class and common citizens in Chile, which would be founded on both several institutional and socio-economic legacies of the dictatorship and the way the political transition was made. The relationship between youths and the political system in Chile is analyzed through both quantitative and qualitative analyses. This is done first through the direct analysis of the association between indicators of political disaffection and perceptions about the way of functioning of the Chilean Political system. Moreover, several case studies that express these feelings of disaffection are also analyzed in order to deepen the argument. First, an analysis of the lack of a youth public policy is done in order to describe a specific case that shows that the political system is particularly more disconnected regarding young people. Additionally, the success among youths of the independent presidential candidature of Marco Enriquez-Ominami in 2009 and the educational movements of 2006 and 2011-2012 are also analyzed. This is done also to more deeply comprehend the engenderment of feelings of disaffection but also in order to examine an apparent new way of doing politics that may be emerging among young people.
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ACRONYMS

- **ACES**: Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (Coordinator Assembly of Secondary Students).
- **CAE**: Crédito con Aval del Estado (Loan with state’s guarantee)
- **CEP**: Centro de Estudios Públicos (Centre of Public Studies).
- **CERC**: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (Centre of Studies of the Contemporary Reality).
- **CONES**: Coordinadora Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios (National Coordinator of Secondary Students).
- **CONFECH**: Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (Confederation of Chilean Students).
- **CFT**: Centro de Formación Técnica (Technical Training Centre)
- **CPS**: Chilean Political System.
- **INE**: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (National Institute of Statistics).
- **INJUV**: Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (National Institute of the Youth).
- **IP**: Instituto Profesional (Professional Institute).
- **LGE**: Ley General de Educación (General Law of Education).
- **LOCE**: Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Educación (Constitutional Organic Law of Education).
- **ME-O**: Marco Enriquez-Ominami.
- **PC**: Partido Comunista (Communist Party).
- **PDC**: Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party).
- **POE**: Political Opportunity Structure.
- **PPD**: Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy).
- **PRO**: Partido Progresista (Progressive Party).
- **PRSD**: Partido Radical Social Demócrata (Social Democratic Radical Party).
- **PUC**: Pontificia Universidad Católica.
- **RN**: Renovación Nacional (National Renovation).
- **SERVEL**: Servicio Electoral de Chile (Chilean Electoral Service).
- **SES**: Socio Economic Status.
- **SEG**: Socio Economic Group.
- **SERNAM**: Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (National Service of the Women).
- **UDI**: Unión Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic Union).
- **UDP**: Universidad Diego Portales.
- **UDEC**: Universidad de Concepción.
- **UP**: Unidad Popular (Popular Unit).
- **YPP**: Youth Public Policy.
Chapter 1: Introduction, literature review and methodology

1.1 The dilemma of youth political disaffection in a democratic context of improved wellbeing and political stability

Among the countries that were part of the third wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1990), and particularly within the Latin American context, Chile has been highlighted by many scholars as one of the most successful in achieving both economic success and political stability after its transition to a democratic regime (Angell, 2007, Oxhorn, 1999).

Chile recovered its democracy after the realisation of a plebiscite in 1988, when the majority of citizens opted to carry out elections to choose the next president and parliament instead of the continuation of Pinochet until 1997. It is remarkable that, since the first democratic government headed by Patricio Aylwin in 1990, high levels of economic development, and a stable democracy based on a proper functioning of its political institutions, have been permanent features of Chilean democracy. For instance, Alan Angell argues that "on most measures, party government in Chile since 1990 has been a success – a long period of sustained economic growth, political stability and increasing average earnings" (Angell, 2007: 167).

Concerning Chilean economy, political authorities assented during the agreed transition to avoid the modification of the neoliberal socio-economic model installed during the military government (E. Silva, 1993). This meant continuing with conservative fiscal and monetary policies and an open economy, which seems to have allowed Chile to make considerable progress. From 1990 until 2008, Chile had an average rate of economic growth (percentage of GDP growth) of 5.4% (World Bank, 2008). Moreover, there have been very low rates of inflation and moderate levels of unemployment. The greatest impact of this performance has been on the reduction of the percentage of people living below the poverty line. In 1990 38.6% of the Chilean population lived below the poverty line, while in 2006 this percentage decreased to 13.7% (CASEN, 1990, 2006).

The only major outstanding economic issue has been income inequality. The new democracy inherited huge levels of inequality that have not been significantly reduced
to date (Friedman, 2008, Larrañaga, 2009). Chile has been qualified as one of the most unequal countries in Latin America, which is in turn the most unequal region in the world. According to the Gini coefficient, Chile was ranked in 2010 as the fourteenth most unequal country in the world (CIA World Factbook, 2010).

Alongside this apparent economic success, high levels of political stability have been the other main Chilean achievement of the last twenty years. In relation to that, Chilean democracy has been positively highlighted for its high levels of democratic governance in a difficult context as it is the re-inauguration of a democratic regime (Angell, 2005). Since the return to democracy, all elections have been fair and free, with an active role of political parties within a stable political environment. This good performance can be observed in Chile’s scores of the Freedom House Political Rights and the Freedom House Civil Liberties indexes. Since 2004, Chile has boasted the highest score in both indexes. This means the country enjoys a wide range of “political rights, including free and fair elections” and “civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion” (Freedom House, 2010).

It is possible, then, to observe that apart from economic success there has been a positive evolution of Chilean democratic institutions since the transition. Currently, Chile presents an impressive democratic stability based on the good performance of its political institutions.¹ This situation is also shown in the World Bank Governance Index, where Chile performs much better than the Latin American average and is not far from the United States and the United Kingdom.

In summary, from a quick glance at Chile’s economic and political achievements of the last twenty years, it is possible to note that, despite some difficulties, there have been relevant improvements with respect to economic and political development. The problematic issue is that, regardless of these positive accomplishments, Chilean citizens, and particularly the youth, are showing high and increasing levels of political

¹ It is important to highlight that this good performance is just based on formal aspects of democracy and not on substantial matters.
disengagement and distrust regarding central political institutions, which have led to describe them as being politically disaffected.²

Similar phenomena have taken place in several parts of the world, including both developed and developing countries. In fact, the study of political support is currently one of the most relevant topics of study in the fields of political science and political sociology (Inglehart, 1990, Norris, 1999, Nye et.al, 1997, Mainwaring, 2004). Nevertheless, it seems the Chilean case presents unique characteristics that merit a deeper study. This is because disaffection has not only been expressed through feelings of distrust and political disengagement, but also through much more active forms, which have challenged previous analyses that described these groups as apathetic people. These new forms highlight strong popular mobilisations during 2006 and 2011-2012 and the support of an outsider candidate with a critical political discourse, as in the case of the presidential candidacy of Marco Enriquez-Ominami (ME-O) in 2009.

Concerning these apparent levels of political disaffection, it is possible to observe that they have been expressed both through decreasing turnout rates and political attitudes declared in public opinion surveys. Voter turnout has fallen significantly since the return to democracy. For example, the percentage of valid votes from the voting-age population for the first presidential election in 1990 was 84% and in the last election it was just 57%. This drop is even more significant for young people. The percentage of people between 18 and 29 years old registered to vote for the plebiscite in 1988 was 90% and those youths registered in 2008 totalled just 20% (INE, 2009, SERVEL, 2010).

In specific relation to young people, public opinion polls also show high levels of political discontent. For example, according to a survey conducted by the CEP in 1990, almost 80% of polled youths identified with a political party. However, in 2009, those identified were less than 50% (CEP, 2010). Moreover, some indicators also show less political support in Chile when comparing Chilean youth with other Latin American

² This thesis understands political disaffection as a rejection of formal politics. This concept will be further developed in the next section. The fact that youths are politically disaffected rather than just disengaged regarding formal politics will be also tested in a subsequent chapter. However, before those analyses are done it will be supposed that what Chilean youths are expressing is principally disaffection rather than disengagement.
countries. The most worrying indicator is confidence in political parties. In 1996 29% of Chilean youths declared they have confidence in political parties, while in 2008 this percentage was only 13% (Latinobarómetro 1996-2008). More worrisome is the fact that when comparing Chile with the region it is possible to observe that between 1996 and 2008 Chile dropped from fifth to bottom position (out of seventeen countries) regarding levels of confidence in political parties among youth.

It is clear, then, that there is a discrepancy between the country’s good economic and political performance and youth’s discontent with the political system. The citizenry, and particularly the youth, have become more disaffected despite some relevant political and economic achievements. This situation has become even more alarming as it was stated that in recent times strong popular mobilisations have expressed these feelings of discontent. For example, it has been argued that the educational movement of 2011-2012 has challenged the current Chilean political and socio-economic system as it represents the politicisation of previously passive feelings of unrest (Mayol and Azócar, 2011). In this sense, what seems to be happening is that, as people perceive that formal mechanisms of participation are not useful, they have sought other unconventional mechanisms of participation to express their discontent (Jácome, 2010). Moreover, the high level of youth support obtained by ME-O has also been described as an expression of disaffection. In this sense, it is possible to observe that Chile is currently witnessing different expressions of political discontent, covering formal and informal political spaces.

It is based on those facts that several scholars and even politicians have argued that Chile is presently experiencing a crisis of political representation, which would be much deeper among youth generations (Mira, 2011, Garretón 2012). Moreover, other authors have been even more drastic as they have claimed present mobilisations could imply the collapse of the current Chilean socio-economic and political model (Mayol, 2012a). In this regard, it is also possible to suggest that Chile would be following a regional tendency of political crisis, as several Latin American countries have been experiencing similar processes (Mainwaring, 2004, Levitsky and Roberts, 2011, Tanaka and Jácome, 2010).
There is, therefore, a dilemma in Chilean society that is worth trying to understand. To describe it as a dilemma is justified by the fact that several studies have shown an association between good economic and political performance and levels of political support. Norris (1999) found there is a relationship between the extension of political and civil liberties and citizens’ evaluations of the political system. Moreover, Miller et al., based on an empirical analysis, argue that “failed governmental performances directly contribute to declining public support for governmental institutions and for politicians even after controlling for economic conditions” (1999: 211). The relationship between good economic and political performance has also been highlighted for the Latin American context. Mainwaring (2004) concluded that the primary cause of the crisis of representation in the region is that states have failed to resolve problems such as income inequality and poverty, and have not generated more jobs and a sustained economic growth.

Based upon the foregoing, the fact that despite Chile’s good political and economic performance, Chilean citizens, and particularly the youth, are showing high levels of political disaffection, allows us to describe Chile as an anomaly or as a paradoxical case. This paradox would be particularly strong among young people, which justifies focusing this research specifically on this social group.

In this sense, the central research question that guides this study is the following:

**Why does the Chilean youth exhibit such high levels of political disaffection, in spite of Chile’s good political and economic performance, since its return to democracy?**

This research is focused, then, particularly on young people, as it is one of the most politically disaffected social groups in Chilean society. In this sense, given that the problem is raised as a paradoxical case to be studied in a specific group, this dissertation’s central hypothesis is essentially focused on finding an explanation based on particular historical and institutional aspects of recent Chilean political history. To this effect, this research intends to bring an institutional explanation to this phenomenon, as it is principally focused on observing how significant changes in the political process may have widened the gap between citizens and the state (Norris, 1999).
Apart from understanding current sources of youth political disaffection, this research also intends to understand why levels of political disaffection are higher among young people. Moreover, it also attempts to comprehend new active political expressions that have recently emerged among youths. In relation to this last point, it attempts to understand whether an apparent new way of doing politics is emerging among Chilean youths, the central elements of these new political forms and the main implications of these facts regarding the future of Chilean democracy. All these objectives should be accomplished by directly analysing the relationship between youth perceptions and feelings of political disaffection, and by examining several case studies that can also shed light on the relationship between youth and politics.

1.2 Youth political disaffection: definitions, implications and possible explanations

1.2.1 The concept of political disaffection

The phenomenon of political disaffection has historically been understood in several different ways, and as having diverse implications. Despite some divergences there is, however, a certain consensus about understanding it as a negative relationship between citizens and the political system which is expressed through attitudes and behaviours of the citizenry.

Apart from the use of the concept of political disaffection (Di Palma, 1970, Torcal, 2003), negative relationships between citizens and the political system have been discussed and named under other concepts such as political disenchantment (Hay, 2007, Stoker, 2006), political disengagement (Howe, 2006), political discontent (Craig and Maggioto, 1981), Political Alienation (Citrin, et al. 1975), Political dissatisfaction (Posner, 1999) and Political support (Norris, 1999, Dalton, 1998). These concepts can be more or less differentiated since, for example, political disengagement makes more reference to distancing from formal ways of participation, and political discontent refers more to reactions to specific public policies. However, this is not always the case, since sometimes similar situations, such as declining levels of electoral participation, are sometimes understood as constitutive elements of different concepts.
The use of similar indicators to conceptualise different phenomena makes it necessary to precisely define what will and what won’t be understood as political disaffection in this thesis. In this sense, this research understands Political Disaffection as a relatively enduring feeling of hostility toward the prevailing institutions, processes and values of the political system, which is expressed through negative attitudes and/or non-participative (conventional) behaviours.

As is stated in this definition, this feeling is expressed through both attitudes and behaviours. This distinction defines the two dimensions of the concept. The first dimension refers only to citizens’ attitudes towards the political system and will be called ‘attitudinal disaffection’. This dimension is defined as a feeling of general distrust in central political institutions and lack of adherence to the substantive values of the political system. The second dimension refers to relevant political behaviours that express this feeling of hostility. This dimension will be called ‘behavioural disaffection’ and is defined as the action of withdrawing from participating in conventional political channels given by the political system.

This concept is based on the classic conception of diffuse support provided by David Easton (1975). Easton distinguishes between specific and diffuse support. Regarding the first type of support: “Its uniqueness lies in its relationship to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities” (Easton, 1975: 437). On the other hand, diffuse support consists of a “reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants”(Easton, 1975: 444).

Once this distinction is clear it can be argued that the concept of political disaffection to be used in this research refers only to diffuse support, given that it only consigns enduring feelings of hostility and it does not make any reference to the evaluation of any specific policy. Evaluations of authorities’ performances are relevant for this conception but only when a perceived negative performance erodes feelings of attachment to the political regime.
This definition is complemented by a second distinction regarding the nature of support. Klingemann (1999), taking into account Easton’s definition, argues that as well as from types of support we can distinguish between objects of support. Easton differentiates three objects of support: the political community, the regime and the incumbent authorities. In this thesis definition, only the regime, which is constituted according to Klingemann (1999) of “those principles, processes, and formal institutions that persist and transcend particular incumbents” (Ibid. 33), is taken into account. Support for the political community is not considered since it is understood as feeling proud of having a particular nationality, which is not related to political disaffection. Incumbent authorities are also not considered, since they are objects of specific rather than diffuse support.

Political disaffection is, then, related to diffuse support and it is directed to three aspects of the political regime: its principles, processes and institutions. Since Chile is a democratic country, disaffection with the principles of the regime will make reference to disaffection with democracy as a form of government. Disaffection with the processes and institutions will be understood as a distrust of central political institutions. For this purpose, trust is understood in Gamson’s term, that is, as “the probability that the political system will produce outcomes even if left untended” (Gamson, 1968).

Apart from attitudes towards the principles, processes and institutions of a democratic political regime, this concept also refers to behaviours expressing these feelings of hostility. When Easton (1975) defines political support he argues that the way a person orients himself to some objects can be either through attitudes or behaviours. Mainwaring (2004) also states that political support has to be understood in its subjective and behavioural levels. Thus, the inclusion of this second dimension seems to be justified since politically relevant behaviours such as declining levels of formal participation can be understood as part of the same syndrome of disaffection with the political system that is expressed in negative attitudes.3

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3 The inclusion of political behaviours as part of a definition of political disaffection assumes that the fact of rejecting formal channels of participation is part of syndrome of discontentment with the political system. This
In summary, political disaffection implies feelings of hostility towards the political system. It is important to highlight that these feelings are expressed through a variety of forms that include both attitudes and behaviours. This means that it is not a one-dimensional phenomenon but it can be expressed through a variety of forms that do not necessarily have to come together.

After defining the concept of political disaffection it is also necessary to indicate what this concept is not about. It was already stated that political disaffection is not dissatisfaction with particular policies or with people who momentarily hold office, since that is linked to specific support. Other distinctions, however, are necessary.

First, it has to be clear that the way political disaffection is being understood in this thesis has nothing to do with a lack of interest in politics or feelings of political apathy. This distinction differentiates the concept used here from others that state one of the symptoms of political disaffection is a lack of interest in politics (Montero et al., 1998). Interest in politics could be linked to disaffection, but it is not a constitutive element of it since this concept only refers to a rejection of the current political system. To reject formal political institutions and formal channels of participation is different to rejecting anything related to politics. Youths could have high feelings of hostility towards the prevailing political system but still be politically involved. In fact, this last situation is what Chile has witnessed, since recent popular mobilisations have strongly criticised the country’s political system.

To be clearer about the difference between political disaffection and lack of interests in politics, the distinction made by Mouffe (1993) between ‘politics’ and the ‘political’ can be very helpful. She argues that ‘politics’ is the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions that seek to establish a sense of social order and organisation, while ‘the political’ is the antagonistic dimension of human societies that can be observed in the struggles of several groups for power and resources. In this sense, this concept of political disaffection only implies a rejection of ‘politics’ or

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assumption, however, has to be tested since low turnouts could also be explained by conformity or disinterest with the system. The assumption will be tested later in the thesis.
‘formal politics’ and not the rejection of the political, understood as an interest to improve the fate of society.

Secondly, this concept of political disaffection neither means feelings of political inefficacy or powerlessness. Di Palma defines political disaffection as the “subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic constitutions, but not questioning of the political regime” (1970: 6). Feelings of powerlessness are possible explanatory factors rather than constitutive elements of political disaffection, in the sense that you can develop feelings of hostility because you are unable to produce relevant changes in the political system.

Finally, it is necessary to argue that this concept is not also the same as the concept of political alienation understood as the sense of estrangement of the prevailing political system (Citrin et al., 1975). This concept also shows a negative relationship between citizens and the political system, but it is different to feel estranged than to feel hostility.

1.2.2 The implications of having high levels of political disaffection within a democratic regime

After having conceptually defined the phenomenon to be studied, it is necessary to discuss the main implications of having high levels of political disaffection. The interest in political disaffection is, above all, a concern about the type of democracy where politically disaffected people live and about how this situation can undermine the basis of a democratic regime’s legitimacy. Since the early studies of political culture the interest in political attitudes and behaviours has been based on a preoccupation about the quality and stability of a democratic regime (Almond and Verba, 1963).

Within this debate, the main discrepancy is about whether or not a highly disaffected citizenry can create the conditions for undermining the legitimacy of a democratic regime. The so-called ‘Miller-Citrin debate’ was one of the first relevant discussions about this situation. Miller (1974) argued that low levels of trust are indicators of diffuse support that can have a great impact on the political system. On
the other hand, Citrin (1974) believes that low levels of trust only express authorities’ evaluations as the relationship between political cynicism and support for disruptive actions disappears when you control for policy dissatisfaction.

Other optimistic views about the implications of high levels of political disaffection can be found in the ideas of Dalton (2006), Inglehart (1990a) and Norris (1999). They argue that higher levels of disaffection in post-industrial societies are associated with the increase in critical citizens who have greater expectations and promote a new style of citizen politics. This situation would not be bad for democracy since this new style of politics, rather than challenging the legitimacy of a democratic regime, “is a sign of vitality and opportunity for these societies to make further progress toward their democratic goals” (Dalton, 2006: 10).

Going beyond these unresolved discussions, this research assumes high levels of political disaffection are by no means healthy for democracy. Without necessarily believing that they could destroy a democratic regime, it is considered that political disaffection is always a problematic issue. This is because positive attitudes towards the political regime and the use of conventional participative channels are fundamental for holding political authorities accountable and for demanding more representativeness. As Philip (2003: 38) argues “for a democracy to be consolidated and healthy, its political institutions have to be seen as legitimate both by participants in the political process and by the general public”.

The consolidation of democracy must not only be constitutional, then, but should also imply the public’s behaviours and attitudes are supportive of the regime (Ibid.). Regarding this issue, Putnam argues that “the political process undoubtedly faces strains when an increasing number of people distrust those individuals who are running the institutions of democratic governance” (Putnam et al., 2000). Moreover, these tensions are higher when people stop using formal channels given by the political system, since that situation considerably decreases the chances of being heard.

It could be the case that disaffected citizens are more critical democrats and that they could increase the quality of the regime. However, while this is happening these
issues cannot be left unattended in anticipation of more democratic outcomes in the future. In fact, highly disaffected people can easily become attracted by other political forms that might not necessarily be democratic. In this sense, it is possible to argue that high levels of political disaffection are always a negative situation because they can lead to a crisis of political representation, possibly resulting in a variety of outcomes that are not always desirable.⁴

Regarding youth political disaffection, the argument is essentially the same. If young people do not participate, and if they have enduring feelings of hostility towards the values, processes and institutions of the political regime, the whole democratic process becomes weakened. Their demands will be taken into account less and they will have fewer chances to hold authorities accountable. Moreover, high levels of disaffection among youths have a more relevant upcoming challenge: the existence of a future political system based on the exclusion of its citizens.

In relation to the case of electoral withdrawal among Chilean youth, a report of the UNDP argues that “among the principal consequences of the exclusion of groups like this one from the political system we can find the impact that this absence can have over electoral results and, therefore, in the composition and representativeness of the government organs; and the fact that, by not forming part of the electoral process, the interests of the group become outside of that process. That is how a vicious circle can be generated where this segment is ignored in the moment where decisions are taken, which marginalises it even more from the political system” (UNDP, 2010: 8).

It is observed, then, that particularly for the case of Chilean youths, to study current high levels of political disaffection is of extreme importance since their rejection of formal institutions seems to have resulted in even higher levels of exclusion for this social group.

In summary, it can be argued that reduced levels of political disaffection are extremely relevant for the functioning of democracy, since that allows a more vibrant

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⁴According to this thesis, a crisis of political representation occurs when “patterns of representation are unstable and citizens believe that they are not well represented” (Mainwaring, 2004: 15).
citizen participation that finally enriches the democratic process through increasing levels of accountability and the capacity to have citizens’ demands represented. It is this situation, therefore, that justifies the study of this phenomenon for the case of Chilean youths.

1.2.3 Explaining youth political disaffection in a democratic context of improved wellbeing and political stability

In this section, three possible explanations for the existence of high levels of youth political disaffection are discussed. The first two are global explanations that intend to understand political disaffection in contexts of improved political and economic conditions, while the third is based on particular historical-institutional aspects of recent Chilean political history. As stated above, this research’s main hypothesis is focused on finding an explanation based on particular aspects of the Chilean political system. In this sense, these two global explanations are initially discussed to present the third explanation as the main hypothetical argument of this research later on.

1.2.3.1 The growth of post-materialist critical citizens

The first explanation to be developed, of which the main representatives are Inglehart (1990a) and Dalton (2006, 2007), has been almost exclusively associated with the emergence of feelings of political disaffection among developed countries, since it is based on the fact that people living in those countries have achieved high levels of education and physical security.

The central premise of this approach is that a better standard of living, a higher level of education and the expansion of mass communications have brought a “growth of more critical citizens, who value democracy as an ideal yet who remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political systems and particularly the core institutions of representative governments” (Norris, 1999: 26). These citizens are better-informed, less deferential and more realistic in their expectations of government and politics and therefore more ready to display their dissatisfaction, either through electoral non-participation or alternative channels of political protest (Hay, 2007).
Political disaffection is explained, then, by understanding how broad socio-economic transformations have changed the nature of politics in advanced industrial societies (Dalton, 2006). The first thing to understand is that system-level changes have had consequences at the individual level, which have eventually affected levels of political disaffection. The main system-level changes have been an increased economic and technological development and raising levels of education in conjunction with the expansion of mass communications (Inglehart, 1990a, Dalton, 2006).

To understand this explanation each of these connections has to be developed more profoundly. The first link to understand is how high levels of economic development have changed citizens’ value orientations and how this has affected levels of political disaffection. In relation to this issue, Inglehart (1990a) argues that value priorities of western public have been changing from a materialist emphasis toward a post-materialist one as people “have for a number of years experienced exceptionally high levels of economic and physical security” (Inglehart, 1990b: 248). Economic development then changes the value priorities of the public, since whole generations are raised in unprecedented conditions of prosperity and economic security (Inglehart, 1990a).

The main source of disaffection linked to the rise of post-materialist citizens is based on the fact that party systems are not adapting themselves to a new political environment where the post-materialist political cleavage begins to have more relevance (Inglehart 1977, 1990a). Dalton (2006) agrees with Inglehart about this point as he argues that the process of value change has produced an alteration in the issues of political debate. “Concerns about environmental protection, individual freedom, social equality, participation, and the quality of life have been added to the traditional political agenda of economic and security issues” (Ibid: 96). If the political system, then, does not take these new concerns into account, “the post-materialist minority is apt to find itself being overruled on matters that are important to them. As a general rule, we would expect those with post-materialist values to be relatively dissatisfied with their political system” (Inglehart, 1977: 458).
There is another way through which levels of political disaffection are expected to increase with the rise of post-material values. This second argument is based on the fact that post-materialists are sceptical of authority and formal hierarchical procedures of organisations such as elections and political parties. Post-materialists give a great emphasis to quality of life and subjective wellbeing. Therefore, they believe hierarchical organisations with strong authorities are not adequate for their purposes and they favour more participatory forms of political organisations, which make them withdraw from participation in conventional political channels (Dalton, 2006). This scepticism of hierarchical organisations is also reflected in the attitudes of post-materialists. Inglehart (1999) argues that the rise of post-materialist values brings a move away from acceptance of both traditional authority and state authority, which leads to declining confidence in hierarchical institutions such as political parties and the parliament.

The second system-level transformation that helps us to understand increasing levels of political disaffection is the process by which rising levels of education and the expansion of mass communication increases the political skills of the public. The core idea of this second transformation is that the process of cognitive mobilisation, which is defined by Inglehart as the "process where the dissemination of skills needed to cope with an extensive political community grow" (Inglehart, 1990a: 337), is transforming citizens’ expectations of the democratic process. Dalton (2006) argues that increase in education, accompanied by parallel increases in information resources such as electronic media, television, books and magazines, have produced a growth of skills and resources, which creates the most sophisticated public in the history of democracy.

The two core elements of the cognitive mobilisation process are the declining cost of acquiring information about politics and an increase of the ability to process information due to higher levels of education (Ibid.). The result of these two developments is the existence of citizens with more resources and skills to deal with the complexities of politics. This process of political sophistication is linked to increasing levels of political disaffection, since if citizens are more politically involved
and have more political skills they will evaluate the functioning of their political system with higher standards.

Apart from generating feelings of hostility towards the political system as part of a more critical attitude, the cognitive mobilisation process also affects levels of political disaffection by sophisticating the political means citizens use. Inglehart (1990a) argues that people with higher skills have the potential to participate in politics in more active and issue-specific ways than in the past. Critical citizens are more sophisticated and they prefer forms of democratic participation where they can have more influence on the political process. This situation affects levels of behavioural disaffection, since formal channels of participation are seen as a means where input is limited.

Is this explanation appropriate in the case of Chilean youths?\(^5\)

Despite the fact that this explanation appears to be highly suitable for contexts of improved economic and political conditions, it is argued it does not fit properly in the context of Chilean youths. This is basically because Chilean levels of development are quite distant from those in post-industrialised countries and because the type of disaffection of Chilean youths seems to be different.

Although Chile has achieved greater economic development, it is quite far from the living standards of post-industrial countries. Moreover, current high levels of inequality also imply the effects of economic development have not been fairly distributed, which means a great proportion of Chilean youths are not being raised in conditions of prosperity and economic security. The Chilean youths of today live in better conditions than their parents. However, this does not mean feelings of economic security are widespread within the whole youth population.

Moreover, when the specific conditions of Chilean youths are analysed it is possible to observe that the development of youth public polices has been one of the most unattended issues by the Chilean political system after the return to democracy (Asún, 2006, Krauskopf, 2011). One example of that is the instauration of a high-quality

\(^5\)The appropriateness of this explanation and the social capital one will be also empirically tested in further chapters.
educational system. Rates of education have risen considerably during twenty years of democracy. Nevertheless, the quality of public education is lower than in several other Latin American countries and much lower than in developed countries (OCDE, 2010). In this sense, Chilean youths are far from living in the conditions that would let them develop post-materialist orientations and the high political skills that would finally increase their levels of political disaffection.

The inappropriateness of this explanation can also be justified by analysing how the kind of disaffection of Chilean youths differs from the one this explanation describes. Chilean youths are today more critical and active than in past generations. However, post-materialist issues do not seem to dominate their value orientations and they do not seem to be rejecting hierarchical institutions. This can be observed, for example, by the fact that the biggest youth mobilisation was about improving education, which is clearly a materialist issue. Moreover, it is observed that despite distrusting parties and using informal mechanisms of participation, they are not rejecting political parties and electoral participation as valid political means but they simply dislike the way these institutions are currently functioning. This can be seen, for example, by the support obtained by an independent candidate such as ME-O in the last presidential elections and by the fact that youths are now forming political organisations.

1.2.3.2 Political dissatisfaction as a matter of lack of social cohesion

The second explanation for political disaffection to be described is also based on cultural changes, but it is more related to faults in civil society that motivate political engagement rather than the emergence of a specific type of citizen. The main representative of this perspective is Robert Putnam. He argues that one of the most relevant social phenomena to have occurred in recent decades is a decline of social capital (Putnam, 2000, 1994a). This situation has several economic, political and social consequences. One of them seems to be strictly related to increasing levels of political disaffection.

Putnam understands social capital as “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared
objectives" (Putnam, 1995: 665). The two central elements of the concept are the networks where individuals interact and the norms of reciprocity people develop within their networks. The problem is that a series of sources strongly suggests America’s stock of social capital has been shrinking for more than a quarter of a century. One of its effects has been on the increase of levels of political disaffection, which can be observed through three different mechanisms.

The first is related specifically to the main indicator of behavioural disaffection: electoral participation. Putnam argues that “declining electoral participation is merely the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from community life” (Ibid. 35). According to Putnam, low turnout rates are not themselves a consequence of declining levels of social capital, rather just one of several symptoms of a much broader societal malaise.

The second way low levels of social capital are associated with political disaffection is linked to features of governmental performance. The argument is that participation and involvement in voluntary activities creates social trust, cooperation, civic-mindedness and reciprocity, which are all relevant to creating strong governmental institutions. Without a strong civil society, there is more likelihood of a decreased institutional performance, which finally affects people’s confidence in relevant political institutions (Mansbridge, 1997).

The last way to connect these two phenomena is based on the idea that a democratic regime needs high levels of social capital since voluntary associations are the main way of expressing demands to governments and protecting ordinary citizens from political power. The argument is that low levels of social capital would be associated with increasing levels of political disaffection since by participating less in civic communities and by trusting less in our fellow citizens, we lose our capacity and willingness to work cooperatively to solve any kind of problem (Stoker, 2006).

Putnam (1994b) also argues that successful collaboration in one endeavour generates connections and trust that facilitate future collaboration in other unrelated tasks. In this sense, if people are not connecting themselves for simple tasks and do not trust their fellows, it is quite likely they will not engage politically since they will fail
to develop a sense that their objectives are more reachable if they act together. If citizens are not socialised in this way, they will not realize the importance of political activities. Therefore, a general feeling of rejection to the political system is expected.

**Is this second explanation appropriate for the case of Chilean youths?**

This second explanation clearly gives some relevant insights if sources of political disaffection are to be understood. However, it is believed that this cannot be the main argument to explain this phenomenon in the case of Chilean youths. The main reason to rule out this explanation is that it is too general and it does not offer much insight to particular mechanisms that explain the case. Moreover, current popular mobilisations have also shown Chilean youths do seem to have the capacity and willingness to work cooperatively to achieve certain goals.

The main objective of this research is to understand political disaffection in a specific group. In this sense, it is not possible to understand the situation if only broad societal changes that have some particular political consequences are taken into account. This explanation is too general and it is unclear about the particular situation that explains high levels of disaffection. Putnam argues that declining levels of electoral participation are just one syndrome of a broader social malaise. In this sense, to explain the changes in political participation in terms of variations in levels of social capital is to re-describe the phenomenon to be explained and not to deeply understand its sources (Hay, 2007).

This explanation, then, only gives us an insight about what can co-exist with political disaffection rather than a proper explanation of the problem. Moreover, the evidence indicates that this lack of social capital and political disaffection are not coming together. Strong youth mobilisations and even the high support of young people obtained by ME-O shows youths are not socially apathetic, but that they are part of social networks and are aware of the importance of political activities.
1.2.3.3 Political disaffection as a side effect of the development of Chile's post-authoritarian political system

The third and last explanation highlights the importance of national-historical contexts regarding the development of certain political phenomena. This explanation understands high levels of youth political disaffection as a consequence of the particular development of Chile's post-authoritarian political system as it is argued that the existing large disconnection between youth and politics would be founded on central features of contemporary Chilean politics. The solely discussion of these features for the Chilean case, however, does not mean that the association between certain political features and the emergence of political disaffection is something unique to Chile. In fact, there are several aspects of Chile's post-authoritarian politics, such having a two-party/coalition political system or the demobilisation of civil society, that have been also central features of other Latin-American democracies with similar political consequences (Coppedege, 1994, Tanaka and Vera, 2011 and Philip and Panizza, 2011,). In this sense, the fact that this section develops some arguments about Chilean politics does not necessarily mean that they might not also be applicable in other countries.

The central argument is that, based on several institutional and socio-economic legacies from the military government and the way the political transition was made, the Chilean Political System (CPS) developed in such a way that the gap between the citizenry and the political system increased a great deal. This situation has produced, particularly among young people, increasing feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy, which have finally generated high levels of political disaffection.

To develop this explanation the main legacies of the military government and the political transition are first discussed. After that, the way the nature of the CPS has

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6 This explanation is founded on several essayistic and empirical studies about the Chilean reality. Thus, the purpose of this section is to develop an explanation for Chilean Political Disaffection that define broad hypothesis to be later tested and deepened. In this sense, the intention of the empirical analysis will be to deepen the understanding of several mechanisms that explain disaffection as well as to find new elements that might not be yet fully described in the literature.

7 In order to discuss more accurately the uniqueness of this thesis’s arguments, the examination of the empirical evidence will try to incorporate some comparative analyses whenever it is possible.
affected the relationship between the citizenry and the political is described. Finally, the form through which this last process has increased levels of political disaffection and the facts that explain that youths are more disaffected than other groups is analysed.

What are the main legacies of the military government and the democratic transition that have shaped the nature of the CPS?

The way the military government shaped the nature of the new Chilean democracy has been a highly-discussed topic (Garretón, 2004, Huneeus, 2003). It is undeniable that several political and economic reforms made in this regime, as well as the agreements made during the political transition, heavily shaped the new Chilean democratic regime. Within these legacies it is possible to broadly distinguish between institutional legacies and socio-economic legacies.

Regarding institutional legacies, the most relevant is undoubtedly the political constitution of 1980. Despite some relevant reforms that have eliminated several authoritarian enclaves, it is possible to argue that the current Chilean political constitution is still the one that was established during the military government. In relation to the importance of that constitution, Loveman argues that: “Unlike the transitions in the rest of Latin America, however, the outgoing authoritarian government of General Augusto Pinochet left a new constitution in Chile. (...) Thus, the incoming civilian government in Chile was forced to operate within the limits of a new political system intended to institutionalise what its creators called ‘protected democracy’” (1991: 36).

This constitution was created to institutionalise a particular type of democracy. Its main objective was to create a political system based on the convergence of moderate positions (Baño, 1993). This meant political institutions were designed in such a way that, for every relevant change to be made, large majorities were necessary. Thus, every political decision had to be agreed between major political forces.

The most relevant political institution that reproduces this form of doing politics is the electoral system designed to choose members of the parliament. This system,
named as the binominal system, was designed during the dictatorship and continues today without any relevant change. According to this system, the country is divided into districts and for each district two candidates are elected. Parties or coalitions have to present lists with a candidate for each of the two seats to be filled. The first seat is awarded to the party or coalition with a plurality of votes. However, the list of the coalition that obtains the first seat must receive twice the votes of the second-placed list in order to take the second seat. This means that those lists that receive the two highest shares of votes obtain the two seats available in each district, and if a coalition wants to obtain the two seats it has to have more than the double of votes than the second coalition.

The most important effect of this electoral system is that it reproduces a party system based on two big, moderate, very similar, and strongly institutionalised coalitions, which blur ideological profiles of political parties (Ibid.). This does not mean, however, that both coalitions do not differ regarding some topics since there are relevant divergences about some post-material issues such as gay marriage and abortion, where the Concertación has a more liberal vision than the Alianza. However, despite of these differences, the literature has described these coalitions as being ideologically similar since both have supported a socio-economic model founded on market mechanisms (Posner, 2008, Angell, 2007).

This two-coalition system is also reproduced by the fact that this electoral system excludes actors because it reduces them to a few parties organised into these two stable coalitions, which discriminates against third parties outside these two main conglomerates.

The consequences of having a parliament based on a political draw goes beyond the type of party system and its representational characteristics. This is because this tie is reproduced in several institutions whose members are proposed or decided by the parliament (Judges of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional tribunal, the Central Bank, Public Television, etc.) (Garretón, 2010).

This moderate way of doing politics finds its complement in a consensual-elitist mode of government originated during the democratic transition. In this way of doing
politics, all sensitive policy issues are resolved through negotiation and agreement between the leaders of both political coalitions and powerful economic actors, where the need for a rapid consensus is always the main principle of action (Rindefjall, 2009).

The origins of what has been called the ‘democracia de los acuerdos’ (Democracy by Agreement) can be traced to the transition negotiations. Roberts (1998) sustains that the transition in Chile was only possible after reducing mobilisations to the elite’s pacts so the current government did not feel threatened. In this sense, political parties of the opposition coalition “sought to keep popular pressures in check and channels grass root participation unto less threatening forms of electoral mobilisations” (Ibid: 139). In this sense, it can be observed that the fact Chile had a ‘agreed transition’ heavily influenced the new regime’s way of doing politics as these pacts implicated the demobilisation of people and the concentration of power (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). As Ruiz (1991) argues, the conception of democracy during the transition was based on an elitist idea where decisions had to be concentrated in several formal institutions. This conception implied a monopolisation of politics that isolates political activities from daily life, as it is only manifested in the search for agreement and consensus among certain privileged political actors.

This type of democracy, based on elite agreements and the demobilisation of common citizens, has continued almost intact until today, since every political decision to be made is negotiated only between the elites of these two moderated coalitions. Camargo (2007) argues that one of the central principles to have followed Chilean political elites since 1990 is “consensualism”, which is “the almost dogmatic adscription to privileged political consensus (and when it is possible, socials) in the exercise of government” (Ibid. 16). In fact, the way the 2006 secondary movement was channelled by the Chilean political system, an event that will be analysed later, is one of the most recent expressions of this kind of politics.

One of the main attributes of current Chilean democracy is, then, a kind of aversion for political conflict. This is also expressed in the avoidance of certain topics, such as the type of socio-economic model (Angell, 2007) due to political elites always seeking accommodation and compromise over conflict in key areas of policy (Scully,
1995). This means that apart from processes of demobilisation, Chilean democracy has also reproduced processes of depoliticisation, which can be understood as the process by which certain issues previously subject to formal public deliberation and accountability are displaced to other arenas (Hay, 2007). This is problematic since when elites limit the scope of the political process to certain issues that are innocuous to them, they are also excessively exercising power in order to safeguard their interests (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). In fact, this feature of Chilean politics has been discussed as a negative thing as an absence of mobilised conflicts promoted by political parties contributes to the decreasing importance of programmatic links with the political system and to depoliticising common citizens (Luna, 2008, P. Silva, 2004).

The second main inheritance the CPS received from the military government is the socio–economic legacy. This legacy is related to the type of socio-economic model inherited from the dictatorship and the particular style of policy-making associated with it. As it is well known, during the military government Chile experienced radical economic reforms that imposed a neoliberal socio-economic model that, among other things, privatised several public services, opened Chilean economy and established conservative fiscal and monetary policies. This model continued after the transition, since during its negotiations the opposition coalition committed itself to it for acquiescence to political change (E. Silva, 1993). Moreover, all the following democratic regimes since have continued with its central premises.

The main effects of this situation on the current Chilean political system are given by the technocratic style of policy-making associated with this model and the relevant changes it has introduced to the balance of power regarding the main actors involved in policy-making processes.

In relation to these issues, P. Silva (2006) argues that since the beginning of the 1990s the technocratic ideology has been mixed with the democratic idea in Chile. The effect of this has been the development of a technocratic democracy where social problems are traduced in technical terms and where depolitisation has become a central element of Chilean society. Moreover, he argues that the continuation of this style of doing politics was what guaranteed the continuation of sectorial policies.
associated with the neoliberal model (P. Silva, 1991). Public policies are considered, then, as technical, which means they are unique responses to complex problems without considering political factors or judgments of value in their evaluation (Huneeus, 2003). Likewise, this way of policy-making has also meant the almost total exclusion of the citizenry from decision-making processes.

Even though the primordial role of technocrats was inherited from the military government, new democratic governments have further developed this principle (P. Silva, 1991). P.Silva (2007) highlights, for example, that Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) had a relevant technocratic orientation in her government under the support of the think tank Expansiva. Camargo (2007) also highlights this technocratic approach to policy-making but adds that there is something specific about the technocratic approach of the last twenty years of centre-left governments, since what we see more than an autonomous dominance of technocrats is a technocratisation of politicians themselves.

A second relevant element of the style of policy-making inherited from the dictatorship is related to the balance of power regarding policy discussions. A main characteristic of the current Chilean democracy is the great political power of big entrepreneurs and a weak labour movement that has almost no real political power (Posner, 2008, Sandbrook, et al., 2007, Taylor, 2004). Whenever a significant policy has to be discussed, entrepreneurs voice their interests very effectively through sectorial business associations, as any relevant policy has to be first consulted and coordinated with them.

This particular relationship between the business community and the government started during the dictatorship, when the entrepreneurial class played a relevant role in the 1980s economic global crisis (Posner, 2008). Since that episode a highly unified business community has been able to defend its particular interests, which are mainly the perpetuation of neoliberal economic and social policies (Ibid.). In this sense, it can be argued that this attribute implies a democratic deficit as Huber and Stephens (1997) argue that a democratic regime needs a delicate class balance between pressures from below and threat perception at the top. This is apparently not happening in Chile as
there seems to be an imbalance of power that favours upper classes, at least regarding political influences, which would imply a problematic situation.

The institutional and transitional legacies and the socio-economic inheritances are, then, central elements that have shaped the current CPS. It is relevant to emphasise that both legacies are associated. This is because it has been argued that the stability of Chilean democracy is not only based on certain rules but that there is also a consensus about the ends this democracy should follow. This is the agreement about the continuation of the neoliberal socio-economic model (Ruiz, 1991, Durán 2006).

This idea that Chilean democracy is based on an agreement about both means and ends coincides with Bachrach’s vision of an elitist-pluralist model of democracy, as he argues that in those types of regimes “it is not a question of elites transcending their vested interests to reach a consensus on procedural norms, but rather to reach a consensus on the substantive issues underlying the procedural norms” (1969: 53). Post-authoritarian Chilean democracy can arguably be based on a consensus that includes both the instauration of an elitist democracy regarding its means and the continuation of the neoliberal model regarding its ends. That is why both processes do not have to be understood separately. In fact, Garretón argues that the neoliberal model is set in the proper constitution and that this model generated a social rearrangement that implied the emergence of the entrepreneurial actor and the dissolution of popular social actors (Garretón, 2004).

In summary, the legacies of the military government and the political transition have highly shaped the nature of the CPS. The main features of this system can be summarised as following: a moderated party system based on two big coalitions with no clear ideological differences and incentives for competition (especially concerning economic policies), a style of politics where the need for a rapid consensus among political elites based on processes of demobilisation and depoliticisation is always the main principle, and a technocratic style of policy-making based on the reproduction of the neoliberal economic model where the entrepreneurial class has a privileged participation.
This type of political system is quite specific. Even though it can be assimilated to some ideal types elitist systems found in the literature such as the Elitist–Pluralist model of Bacharach (1967), the Equilibrium Democracy of Macpherson (1978) or the Consociational Democracy of Lijphart (1968), it is believed that the confluence of current attributes is something particular of the Chilean case. Chilean democracy is not just an elitist democracy. It is based on the principles of elitism but it is a kind that is deeply institutionalised and so has particular characteristics, such as the moderation of the elites and the fact that the business community is politically powerful. These features reproduce other processes, like the demobilisation of common citizens and the depolitisation of certain discussion topics, which without doubt are to have further political consequences.

**How has the nature of the CPS affected the relationship between the citizenry and the political system?**

After having discussed the main features of the CPS and how they were shaped by the legacies of the dictatorship, it is necessary to analyse them regarding their influence over the relationship between citizens and the political system.

The features already described, and particularly the moderate way of doing politics, have been highlighted by several authors as positive attributes. It is argued that it is because of them that Chile has attained quite impressive levels of political stability and democratic governance (Angell, 2007, Scully, 1995, Boenigner, 1998). However, without underestimating these achievements, this research argues that these same features have also had a negative consequence: the increase of the gap between the Chilean citizenry and the political system.

This gap increase is based on two parallel and inter-related processes that are explained by the current features of the CPS. On the one hand, since the system brings a moderate and homogenous political offer, the representational links between the political system and the citizenry become blurred. On the other hand, the proper citizenry, based on the processes of demobilisation and depolitisation already discussed, takes distance from the political system as politics loses its sense, which generates the feeling that relevant changes are impossible.
Regarding the first process, Garretón (2007) argues that the homogenous political offer of the CPS does not allow the presence of diversity nor the adequate expression of majorities. The problem is that a political system structure based on moderate and similar parties hampers the social representation of interests. This means the central features of the CPS undermine the role of political parties as agents of representation, since their main principle of action is the achievement of consensus among elites in order to generate a stable political regime and not to canalise social conflicts. Regarding this same topic, Baño (1993) argues that in the Chilean case it is true that greater political homogeneity is associated with calm and stability. However, at the same time, it also means a progressive separation between politics and society due to society not being homogenous, which make normal people feel they are not represented.

Within the CPS there is a limitation of public decision due to its elitist character, and because political elites are not incentivised to be more connected to the citizenry regarding its demands. The binominal electoral system is, in this sense, one of the most responsible for this blurring of representational links. Posner argues that: “The practice of coalition formation induced by the binominal system has promoted political consensus and stability; it has also shifted the expression of natural conflicts and acute programmatic differences among coalition partners. It thereby undercuts the role of political parties as agents of representation” (2008: 83).

Under this electoral system the significance of the vote is reduced; citizens practically only ratify candidates proposed by coalitions because as soon as they are selected by their parties they are virtually guaranteed to win (Arriagada, 1997). This situation clearly creates a disincentive for political authorities regarding the representation of interests, which increase the gap between the citizenry and the political authorities.

Problems of representativeness, however, are not only explained by electoral mechanisms. All other features already describing the CPS also contribute to the weakening of representational links. The demobilisation of the citizenry contributes by making the political class more autonomous from citizens’ pressures. Furthermore, the
depolitisation of certain topics, which is explained by the technocratic approach to policy-making and the privileged power positions of the business community, also limits the kind of political supply offered to the citizenry.

In summary, within the current Chilean political landscape the gap between the citizenry and the political system is wide since central political actors have weakened their representational role by presenting a quite homogeneous political offer. This does not mean however, that political authorities are completely disconnected from the needs of the citizenry since in the last twenty years there have been relevant social achievements. In fact, Navia (2009) and Roberts (2009) argue that the base of Chilean political stability is found in the attempts of the Concertación’s governments to address social problems through several public programs. The problem is that this connection has decreased because the political class is acting within narrow limits imposed by the proper functioning of the political system, and people feel they could be much better represented.

The second process by which the gap between the citizenry and the political system has become wider is more specifically related to citizens’ attitudes with respect to the importance they give to political issues. What is being argued is that the processes of citizen demobilisation and the depolitisation of relevant issues made the citizenry take distance from the political system as politics itself loses its meaning. Therefore, citizens do not feel they can produce any relevant change within the system.

The fact is that as you develop yourself as a citizen in a political system where there is deep demobilisation of citizens and a depolitisation of certain issues, as well as great influences of extra political-powers such as entrepreneurial unions, you are likely to be distanced from the political system. This is due to politics is not "representing the main vehicle to struggle for improvements in the living conditions of the population" (P.Silva, 2004). In this sense, as you become socialised in a politically-deactivated society, your interest in formal politics is quite likely to be low since the political system feels alien to you. In relation to this issue, Moulian (2002) argues the politics of consensus in Chile among political elites (and its homogenising character) have created
an environment where “politics does not exist any longer as the struggle for alternatives, as historicity, it only exists as a history of small variations, adjustments, and changes in aspects that do not compromise the global dynamic” (Ibid: 44).

Garretón (2007) also argues that the way of doing politics in Chile is alien to common citizens and that this situation is linked to the lack of interest in formal politics that can be observed in Chile. In addition, he links the current situation to the impossibility of the political class to change a political order inherited from the dictatorship. In relation to this same issue, Walter (2008) argues that the fact that the public agenda in Chile is restricted to issues that can be settled through elite agreements has led the public to perceive it has little opportunity for concerns to be heard. Indeed, educational mobilisations of 2006 and 2011-2012 demonstrate this point as one of the main criticisms made by students was precisely the fact that education is not being improved, since political elites restricted the debate by imposing their own positions.

Citizens are, then, aware that politics is not about producing relevant changes, since many issues are not discussed or their resolutions are predetermined by non-democratic forces. Moreover, they also have less interest in formal politics because they are not mobilised by the system to produce relevant changes. This situation makes them develop symptoms of political inefficacy, which can be defined as the feeling that individual political action cannot have an impact upon the political process (Campbell et.al, 1954).

In summary, it is possible to argue that, based on several attributes that Chile’s post-authoritarian democracy inherited from both the dictatorship and the agreed transition, the gap between the citizenry and the political system has widened. This process takes particularly more relevance in the Chilean case since Chile has historically developed a party democracy where the party system has been the main constituent dimension of collective action (Garretón, 2008). In other countries in the region there have been other forms of political representation. However, in Chile the predominant and hegemonic form of political representation has been always based on political parties (Panizza, 2009).
**How has the increase of the gap between the citizenry and the political system produced higher levels of political disaffection?**

The main connection between a wider gap between citizens and the political system and high levels of political disaffection is given by the fact that an increased gap engenders feelings of lack of representation or responsiveness and political inefficacy, which are highly associated with feelings of hostility towards the political system. These links can be observed with the help of several theoretical approaches.

If responsiveness is understood as “the collective property of a democratic ruling class which guarantees that citizen needs will be met and, hence that the exercise of public power will be legitimated” (Schmitter, 1983), it is clear citizens will have high levels of perception of lack of responsiveness if central political institutions do not act as agents of representation. If a political system is not really competitive, which is reflected in a homogeneous political offer, it should be expected that high levels of perception of lack of responsiveness. This condition is expected to be associated with high levels of political disaffection.

Stoker (2006) states that when there is no real political competition, the full range of society is not going to be well-represented, and this creates disaffection. Moreover, he argues that having more socially representative politicians helps to build trust between the elected representatives and citizens. Avendaño (2008) claims citizens have to feel politicians represent them since representation is the basis and foundation of modern democratic systems and it defines the methods of insertion and connection with the political community. Mouffe (1993) also refers to problems of representation as she states that the homogenisation of politics fosters dissatisfaction, as politics should express social conflicts rather than deny them. Finally, Luna and Zechmeister (2005), making reference to the Latin American context, claim a lack of representation affects citizens’ support for a system, as the shallower the connection between elites and the mass public, the less committed the mass public will be to the democratic regime.

Perceptions of lack of representation generate attitudinal as well as behavioural disaffection. Stoker (2006) argues that when people perceive they are not being
represented, their confidence in political authorities is reduced (Stoker, 2006). Moreover, Macpherson (1976) states that feeling unrepresented also prompts people to recede their electoral participation, because they feel there is no real choice between the candidates given that they have blurred some issues and diminished their responsibility to electorates.

The second way a broad gap between the citizens and the political system produces political disaffection is linked to levels of political inefficacy originating at a feeling that politics has lost its meaning. The argument is basically that, if citizens do not feel they can influence the political process, political participation is not seen as worthy as it would not produce any difference in participation with respect to the achievement of their demands. Moreover, this condition is also expected to generate distrust and even a lack of adherence to the main values of democracy.

This line of argument can be seen with authors like Pateman (1970). To be able to feel you have an impact upon the political process is important for understanding political disaffection, since “people who have a sense of political efficacy are more likely to participate in politics than those in whom this feeling is lacking” (Pateman, 1970: 46). In this sense, the rejection of mechanisms of participation can be based on the belief that whatever we do will not have a relevant political impact. That is why Pateman also highlights that authentic mechanisms of participation are necessary, since experiencing a participatory structure can both generate feelings of political efficacy and diminish tendencies towards non-democratic attitudes. David Easton (1975) also makes reference to this topic as he argues that “We would expect that, as people come to feel politically powerless or inefficacious, perceive politics as normalness or feel isolated and estranged, they will also become prime subjects for acquiring negative sentiments about political objects” (1975: 456).

This association between political disaffection and political efficacy has also been linked to a general current trend of depoliticising areas of public policy. This link is established because the fact that people are unable to produce any relevant change is also explained by a political system that avoids the political discussion of certain significant topics. In this context, Hay (2007) argues that the depolitisation of whole
areas of public policy, which is done by presenting contentious issues as purely technical matters, diminishes the realm of formal public political deliberation. This is what would finally explain high levels of political dissatisfaction and disengagement, at least from formal politics.

There are theoretical reasons, then, to believe that the consequences of a wider gap between citizens and the political system described for the Chilean case produce high levels of political disaffection. Nye and Zelikow (1997) argue that a decline of the role of political parties as mediators between the government and citizens is what explains disaffection. In this sense, as it was observed that this disconnection in Chile generates perceptions of lack of representation and feelings of political inefficacy, is that these kinds of perceptions are hypothetically defined in the thesis as the main sources of this phenomenon.

**Why have these particular effects been stronger for Chilean youths than for the rest of the Chilean population?**

Given that this research is based on Chilean youths it is necessary to clarify why the explanation already described is particularly useful to understand political disaffection in this specific social group. The main argument is that both processes through which the gap between the citizenry and the political system has extended have had a greater effect on youths than on the rest of the population. In this sense,

The first process that has widened the gap between the citizenry and the political system is related to the weakening of representational links between both components. It is believed here that young people are to be particularly more affected by the fact that the political system has undercut its role as agents of representation. If the system is not representative of the main interests of society, it would be even more difficult that it is representative of particular interests. This means that, in a system with a homogeneous political offer and with no clear representational links, youths are to be more disadvantaged since they have more specific interests that are less likely to be canalised and represented.
Garretón (1991) argues that processes of political elitisation within the CPS are to especially affect young people. He states that after the transition to democracy in Chile, the political forms of social representation that the social conflict acquires are not quite clear. This situation “affects all social sectors, but especially the youth sector that, apart from belonging to a social group, is part of a cultural and age category that is very sensitive in our society” (Ibid: 19).

Chilean youths, then, should be more politically disaffected than adults because the lack of representation they experience is greater. This situation is expressed, for example, by the fact that the instauration of a coherent youth public policy is currently one of the mayor deficits of the Chilean political system (Asún, 2006, Krauskopf, 2011). In relation to this issue, a report from the National Institute of the Youth (INJUV) argues that “Chilean society has strategic difficulties to get a series of social rights guaranteed and met for significant groups of young people. Linked to this, the Chilean state has not been able to clearly capitalise a policy on youth matters and to ensure minimum rights for this segment" (INJUV, 2010:17).

Higher perceptions of lack of representation among youths would then be the expression of the Chilean institutional set-up that seems to be somehow exclusionary of their interests. The particular interests of Chilean youths are not being adequately institutionally represented and this situation would be generating higher levels of political disaffection among them. 8

The second process through which the gap between citizens and the political system has increased is when distance from the system occurs since politics loses its meaning. This process should also more particularly affect youths as they are expected to distance themselves from the political system more than adults because they have socialised themselves completely in this demobilised and depoliticised society.

All people under thirty in Chile were at most ten years old at the beginning of the democratic regime in 1990. This means they were completely politically socialised in an environment where politics was not representing a vehicle to struggle for social

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8 A whole chapter will be dedicated to analysing the relationship between feelings of political disaffection and the lack of a coherent youth public policy.
improvements. Therefore, they should feel more alien to the political system and it should be expected that they will develop higher levels of political inefficacy that will finally be expressed in higher levels of political disaffection.

Garretón (1999) argues there is a structural distance between youths and the political system in Chile, and that the reasons for that phenomenon can be found in the characteristics of this new democratic era that is tangled in a fake consensus politics that masks cupular negotiations and an entrapment in the institutions of the dictatorship. These characteristics are different to those of previous democracies as those regimes had a political culture where voting was believed to be a mechanism of real change and where the party system played a relevant role, not only as a channel of social and political integration but also as a producer of socio-cultural identities (Ibid.).

This change should affect levels of political disaffection of the whole citizenry but particularly youths’ levels, since older people were politically socialised in conditions where a different vision of politics prevailed. Young people developed themselves living entirely in a political environment where practices of demobilisation and depoliticisation prevailed. It is in this sense that Eyssautier and Palma state that “Chilean youths have opted to remain outside conventional politics because this has in practice neglected the execution of a plan that promotes the deep, communitarian, collective and common welfare, that does not focus on specific situations” (2006: 13).

Young people would then be more attracted to a more meaningful style of politics that intend to truly incorporate them. This can be, for example, reflected in the fact that the only outsider candidate of the last Chilean presidential election (Marco Enriquez-Ominami), whose speech centred on a new way of doing politics, was exceptionally appealing to young people. Moreover, an attraction to more meaningful styles of doing politics was also observed in students’ mobilisations of 2006 and 2011-2012, since they internally developed democratic mechanisms of decision-making but also criticised the way the political system functions. What is being argued is that Chilean youths have been largely political and socially excluded and that their current

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9 This candidate obtained 20% of the votes but according to the CEP survey (2010) voting intention was 37% from people between 18 and 24 years old and 30% for those between 25 and 34 years old.
activation seems to be an expression of the discontent that this exclusion generates. In this sense, it is possible to hypothesize that recent student mobilizations would not be just the manifestation of idealistic attitudes typical of the youth condition (Lipset, 1966) but would be expressing discontent with a situation of exclusion.

In summary, the main hypothesis of this thesis to explain current high levels of political disaffection among young people is that central features of the CPS have particularly widened the gap between youths and the political system. In Siavellis’s terms, elites and the governed are out of face, since elites continue to operate under the transitional model of democracy while citizens demand new political forms (2009). These attributes have already been connected with the engenderment of feelings of distrust and disengagement (Garretón, 2008, Ruiz, 1991). However, it becomes necessary to observe the way the empirical evidence can test these hypotheses and to observe how the evidence can elucidate new sources explaining this phenomenon that can complement what was established in this section. This is to be done by directly analysing the link between feelings of political disaffection and perceptions about the CPS, and by examining several case studies such as the candidacy of ME-O and the educational movements of 2006 and 2011-2012 as they clearly expressed the kind of feelings that are supposedly generating feelings of political disaffection.

1.2.4 Other useful concepts for this research

This last section of the theoretical framework develops two concepts that are very useful in order to analyse further evidence. These are the concepts of political representation and a theoretical approach to explaining the emergence of social movements.

1.2.4.1 The concept of political representation

Since problems of political representation are being hypothesised in this thesis as one of the major issues associated with current high levels of political disaffection among Chilean youths, it becomes necessary to properly define this concept. This will be mainly done using the theoretical approach of Hanna Pitkin. Moreover, this
discussion will be complemented with contributions from other authors that stress the role of participation regarding substantive representation.

**The four dimensions of representation of Hanna Pitkin**

Hanna Pitkin (1967) argues that four main views of the concept of representation have been developed and used by several theorists: formal, descriptive, symbolic and substantive representation. Moreover, she states that none of these views can tell the whole story about representation, as they are just partial views of the phenomenon.

The first dimension is **formal representation** where it is possible to distinguish between the authorisation and the accountability views. Regarding the **authorisation view**, Pitkin argues that a representative is someone that has been authorised to act. Representation is defined in terms of the giving and having of authority since the represented “has been given a right to act which he did not have before, while the represented has become responsible for the consequences of that action as if he had done it himself” (Ibid: 39).

According the **accountability view**, the process of representation mostly has to do with holding representatives to account for their actions. Pitkin argues that this vision of representation is opposed to the previous one, but that is equally formal. A representative is “someone who is to be held to account, who will have to answer to another for what he does. The man or men to whom he most eventually accounts are those whom he represents” (Ibid. 55).

The second dimension of political representation is **descriptive representation**. In this case representation is associated with a process where the representative does not act for others but stands for them by correspondence. Representation means the making present of something by resemble or reflection. The central idea is that a representative body is truly representative when it is an accurate reflection of the variety of interests of society. True representation depends on “the representative's characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing something” (Ibid: 61). Classic examples of descriptive representation are black people and women being represented by black and woman rulers.
This dimension has been highly developed by other authors. Dovi (2002) argues that to have a fully democratic society, groups that have been denied full political membership have to be included in the political life. Mansbridge (1999) also justifies the existence of descriptive representation but without dismissing the central importance of substantive representation. He states that there are four benefits, based on four different contexts, that the representation of disadvantaged groups by descriptive representatives brings. These benefits and their respective contexts are: 1) to generate an adequate communication in contexts of mistrust, 2) to innovate thinking in contexts of uncrystallised interests, 3) to create a social meaning of ability to rule in contexts where this was not the case, and 4) to increase the polity’s de facto legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination.

The third dimension defined by Pitkin is **symbolic representation**. A political representative is understood here as a flag that represents the nation, or as a monarch that stands for the unity of the nation, representing the statehood. To say that something symbolises something else means that it evokes feelings or attitudes, such as the identified meaning of the symbol it is representing. In relation to the political field, a political leader can be considered to represent symbolically when he is believed in, and that belief can be fostered or created.

The fourth and last dimension Pitkin develops is **substantive representation**. In this case, representation is defined by what the representative does and how he/she does it. The representative’s duty is to accurately reflect the wishes and opinions of those he represents, since when he is representing he is acting in the interests of the represented. This dimension, therefore, highlights the nature of the activity of representing. To represent, then, means to promote the interests of the represented. In this sense, only this view provides standards for deciding whether some political authorities are representing well or badly.

**The mandate/independence controversy**

Once the concept of representation is clear, it is necessary to develop the issue of how the process of accurately reflecting the opinions of the represented is developed, regarding how independent or dependent the representative is with respect to the
represented. Regarding this topic, it is possible to identify two main poles. According to the first pole, representatives should be trustees that are completely independent and free to act to pursue constituents’ welfare. The second pole, by its parts, understands representatives as delegates that are bound by mandates and that have to do everything the represented want (Pitkin, 1967).

Pitkin states that neither complete independence nor full dependence are what really constitute an activity of representation. Her solution to this controversy is to argue that: “The substance of the activity of representing seems to consist in promoting the interest of the represented, in a context where the latter is conceived as capable of action and judgment, but in such a way that he does not object to what is done in his name” (Ibid: 155).

The mandate/independence controversy has been also discussed by several authors who have criticised Pitkin’s vision. Runciman (2007) argues that Pitkin cannot explain how it is possible to represent people since there are situations of tyranny when absence of objections cannot be taken as a form of assent, since they are the result of coercion. Urbanity and Warren (2008) and Plotke (1997) also criticise Pitkin, specifically the role she assigns to mechanisms of participation regarding the process of representation. While the former argues that Pitkin “did not enquire more broadly into the kind of political participation that representation brings about in a democratic society” (Urbanity and Warren, 2008: 393), the latter criticizes the fact that presence and representation are mainly opposites according to Pitkin.

**The necessity of mechanisms of participation**

In relation to these criticisms, the most relevant to the main objective of this thesis is about the role of participation. About this issue, the position of this thesis is closer to Urbanity and Warren’s point of view. This is because even though Pitkin opens a space for the existence of citizen participation in the process of representation she does not develop it sufficiently. She believes it is necessary to have some machinery through which people can express their concerns. Nevertheless, it is not possible to clearly observe from her approach how representation and participation are to be connected.
The association between representative democracy and mechanisms of participation has been developed by several authors that can enrich Pitkin’s approach. The main idea is that the opposite of representation is not participation, but exclusion. Plotke (1997) argues that to have an effective, open and fair process of political representation, it is necessary to improve representative practices where the inclusion of citizens through mechanisms of participation are essential. People gain political representation when the authorised representative tries to achieve their political aims, and those aims have to be subject to dialogue between both parts.

Urbanati (2000) has a similar view as he states that representation and participation are not two alternative forms of democracy, but related forms that are part of the continuum of political action in modern democracy. Political representation, then, cannot be understood without the existence of representatives who are connected through spaces of participation, since it is only in this way that bodies such as parliament can be expected to accurately reflect the interests and opinions of common citizens. In this sense, other spaces of participation, like formal electoral participation, would come to complement these other instances as they build on-going processes of action and reactions between institutions and society (Urbanity and Warren, 2008).

The relevance of authentic mechanisms of participation within representative institutions is also justified by the fact that if these institutions are not sufficiently connected with common citizens, negative situations, such as the emergence of a partyarchy, can take place. A partyarchy is a political system where political parties completely dominate political activities in a tyrannical way, concentrating all political power. Coppedge (1994) argues that in a partyarchy political parties monopolise electoral processes, dominate the legislative process and penetrate politically relevant organisations. Moreover, party domination also blocks informal channels of representation such as interest groups, the media and independent opinion leaders. Partyarchies don’t then have effective channels for the representation of citizens’ interests, which generates feelings of disenchantment.
In summary, Pitkin’s approach is very relevant for the aim of this thesis as it fully describes several forms of political representation. Nevertheless, she does not fully shed light on the role of participation in this activity and that is why her view has to be complemented with other authors’. The only way to make common people able to object representatives’ decisions and make them express their opinions is through authentic participation. That is why no definition of substantive representation has to avoid this crucial element, since the lack of authentic mechanisms of participation can generate harmful political systems such as a partyarchies. Representation does not occur only when people do not object to some decisions, but when they have been part of the process through which those decisions were taken.

1.2.4.2 The emergence and development of social movements

Since this thesis includes the analyses of two social movements, it becomes necessary to incorporate some theoretical approaches regarding the emergence and development of these phenomena. Social movements have, historically, been studied from different perspectives and today it does not seem to be a consensus regarding the form to analyse them. Among these several approaches there is, however, a very useful perspective for the aim of this thesis, as it tries to synthesise in a complementary way some of the most relevant approaches that have emerged in the last decades (McAdam et al., 1996 and McAdam et al., 1997). This perspective argues that social movements have to be analysed taking into account three main elements: the structure of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes.

The Political Opportunities Structure (POS)

The first element makes reference to the relevance of the structure of political opportunities and constraints with respect to the emergence, development and impact of social movements. The central idea of this approach is that movements arise, change, succeed or fail as a function of changes in the political opportunities they face (McAdam et al., 1996).

One of the main exponents of this perspective is Sidney Tarrow (1994, 1997). He defines a political opportunity structure as “Consistent but not necessarily formal,
permanent or national dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action" (Tarrow, 1994: 85). Social movements form when common citizens respond to several changes in opportunities that lower the cost of collective action, reveal potential allies, and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable (Tarrow, 1994). In this sense, changes in the POS become relevant for collective action since they reduce the power of disparity of a given challenging group and the state (McAdam, 1996).

With respect to which elements of the political structure are relevant for the prosperity of social movements Tarrow (1994) highlights four main dimensions: a) opening up access of participation, b) shifts in ruling alignments c) availability of influential allies, and d) cleavages within and among elites. Rutch (1996) also defines four variables of the POS that are relevant for collective mobilisation. These variables are: a) access to the party system and policy decision, b) the power of authorities to implement policies regardless of resistance, c) the configuration of allies and d) the configuration of opponents able to undermine social mobilisation.

Apart from these dimensions, several authors have highlighted other elements that are relevant for the emergence and development of social movements. Della Porta (1996) argues that protest policing can be an important barometer of the political opportunities available for social movements. Gamson and Meyer (1996) underline the opening of media system as a relevant element of the POS since it is a site where symbolic contests are carried out among competing sponsors of meaning. Finally, Tarrow (1994) argues that the proper structure of the state is relevant, as it can predict whether and where movements will find opportunities to engage in collective action.

One last element to be developed regarding this perspective is the fact that movements can also make and diffuse opportunities. Tarrow (1994) argues that movements can open opportunities as contentious collective action demonstrates the possibilities of action to others and because it exposes opponents’ points of weakness that might not be evident until they are challenged. Moreover, they are able to create opportunities too by revealing previously passive elites, either within or outside the
system, and by enquiring about the openness of institutional barriers through which the demands of others will pour. McAdam (1996) also highlights this element as he states that the actions of some groups are likely to affect the legislature or other forms of change that serve to restructure the legal and institutional basis of the political system.

**Mobilising structures**

The second perspective to be developed has to do with the organisational resources of movements. The main idea of this perspective is that the fate of mobilisations is mainly determined by the various kinds of mobilising structures through which groups seek to organise (McAdam et al., 1996). McCarthy defines mobilising structures as: “those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular tactical repertoires, particular social movement organisational form and modular social movement” (McCarthy, 1996: 141).

One of the most important approaches to come from this theoretical perspective is the resource mobilisation theory of McCarthy and Zald (1977). They argue that analyses of social movements have wrongly assumed a close link between grievances and the growth and decline of movement activity. Against this vision, they argue that the emphasis has to be on “the variety and sources of resources, the relationship of social movements to the media, authorities and other parties and the interaction among movement organisations” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1212). The main focus, then, is on the dynamics and tactics taken by social movements where societal support and constraint toward movements is very relevant.

Jenkins (1983) argues that, according to this vision, the formation of movements is linked to improvements in the status of aggrieved groups. However, this is not because of grievances created by the revolution of rising expectations but since these changes come to reduce the costs of mobilisation and improve the likelihood of success. The main issues to be focused on are the resources controlled by the group prior to mobilisation; those processes by which the group pools resources and directs them towards social change and the extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources (Ibid.).
Another relevant issue highlighted by Jenkins is the relevance of the type of organisations regarding the success of movements. The resource mobilisation theory had argued that centralised and formally structured movements were more effective regarding the mobilisation of resources. However, this assumption has been questioned with the emergence of decentralised movements such as several student movements (Jenkins, 1983). This is explained by the fact that “often decentralised structures are a product of deliberative choices by redemptive or personal change movements attempting to embody ideals in the hope these will serve as models for emulation” (Ibid: 541).

The last element to be highlighted regarding these resources is the tactical repertoires or forms of collective action used by movements. McCarthy (1996) states that in any concrete social setting there is a range of mobilising structural elements more or less available to activists when they attempt to create and nurture movements. Social movements use concrete patterns of mobilisation that are available to activists, but they can also invent new ones to achieve their collective purposes. Tarrow (1994) argues it is possible to distinguish between conventional and disruptive forms of collective action. Conventional collective forms are those that are well-known by the authorities, such as strikes or demonstrations. Disruptive forms, on the other hand, are new forms that obstruct the routine activities of opponents, bystanders or authorities. They broaden the circle of conflict and they can be seen as the concrete expression of a movement determination.

Framing processes

The third and last perspective to be described regarding the development of social movements puts emphasis on the role of cultural elements and on the construction of collective identities through collective action. It is argued that grievances and identities are not natural and that social movements “have to shape reality for their potential supporters, identifying injustices and attributing them to the system or to antagonistic others and providing positive symbols around which ordinary, and often timid people, could come together” (McAdam, et al., 1997: 149). The concept that is used to describe this phenomenon is framing processes, which is defined as “collective
processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action" (McAdam, et al., 1996: 3). In this sense, one of the major tasks of movements would be to find symbols that will be familiar enough to mobilise people around them (Tarrow, 1994).

The main proponent of this perspective is David Snow. He claims it is necessary to elaborate a perspective that links together social psychological and structural/organisational factors. It is argued that common interpretive problems are particularly relevant to comprehend the functioning of social movement organisations and the generation of support and participation in their activities. In order to understand the participation processes it is central to pay attention to the interpretation of grievances and other ideational elements such as values and supportive beliefs (Snow et al., 1986).

Movements require the existence of what Snow calls collective action frames, which are “action-oriented sets of belief and meaning that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation" (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614). It is based on these frames that movements are capable of generating support and participation. They operate based on core frame tasks. Among these tasks, it is possible to identify the diagnostic framing where some attributions regarding the responsibility of a situation that need to be changed are made. Another relevant core task is the prognostic framing, where an alternative set of arrangements to solve the problem is articulated and the motivational framing that urges others to act to affect change (Ibid.).

Another element highlighted by this perspective is the existence of different types of framing alignment processes. These are: “strategic efforts made by social movements to link their interests and interpretation frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers" (Benford and Snow, 2000: 624). There are four types of framing alignment processes: a) frame bridging: linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally congruent frames regarding a particular issue, b) frame amplification: clarification and invigoration of an interpretative frame that bears in a particular issue, c) frame extension: extension of
the boundaries of its primary framework to encompass the interests of potential adherents, and d) frame transformation: change values when they are not accepted for being considered unconventional (Snow et al., 1986).

The last thing to be highlighted with respect to this perspective is the role the media plays in framing processes. As it was stated, movements make efforts to promote their collective frames in order to gain adherents. Concerning this process, the role the mass media play is particularly relevant. Zald (1996) argues that framing contests occur in face-to-face interactions and also through several media, as when movements have to mobilise bystanders, many of the public only know about the movement through the media. Media channels, however, are not neutral to this process, and in capitalist democracies, apart from reporting the news, have to respond to their owners’ wishes and to market demands. In this sense, each change in technology modifies the framing potential of movements’ demands.

1.3 Research design

1.3.1 Research questions

The essential problem to be studied in this research is the apparent contradiction between Chile’s high levels of economic and political development and the high levels of political disaffection among young people. In this sense, the core research question that directs this investigation is the following:

Why does the Chilean youth exhibit such high levels of political disaffection, in spite of Chile’s good political and economic performance, since its return to democracy?

The main focus of the thesis is, then, on finding an explanation for this paradoxical case. This means to try to understand why a country that has had good levels of economic and political development in the last decades presents these high levels of youth political disaffection that have recently started to be expressed through much more active ways.
The fact that youths are more disaffected than other groups, and that they seem to be much more active regarding the expression of their feelings of political disaffection, define the other two main research questions being approached in this thesis.

**Why have Chilean youths developed particularly high levels of political disaffection comparing with other groups of Chilean society?**

**Is a new way of doing politics emerging among Chilean youths? If so, which are its main elements and implications for the future of Chilean democracy?**

The second research question refers to the fact that it is necessary to understand why Chilean youths are more politically disaffected. Currently this group has the lowest levels of electoral participation and confidence in political parties in Chile. This situation merits an explanation. Therefore, this research specifically attempts to understand the relationship between youths and politics, taking into consideration that youths are more disaffected than other groups.

The third research question makes reference to the activation of Chilean youths that Chile has witnessed in recent times through the support for an independent candidate, as in the presidential candidacy of ME-O, and the educational movements of 2006 and 2011-2012. These experiences seem to indicate that youths are not apathetic but they are only rejecting formal politics and not ‘the political’, understood as an interest in the fate of society. Moreover, they have also demonstrated that youths are attracted to new political forms. For example, in both movements youths have promoted the existence of democratic mechanisms of participation, to be executed both within the movement itself and when they have to negotiate with political authorities. In this sense, this thesis also attempts to understand the apparent new way of doing politics that could be emerging among Chilean youths.

These three questions are mostly analysed based on particular historical-institutional aspects of contemporary Chilean politics. That is why it was argued that this research proposes to give an institutional explanation to the questions raised, as it is based on analysing the relevance of changes to the political process affecting the
relationship between common citizens and politics (Norris, 1999). Therefore, most of the analyses are derived from the central hypothesis previously described that understands feelings of political disaffection as a consequence or side-effect of the development of Chile's post-authoritarian political system.

The main approach to be followed to bring an institutional explanation comes from the political sociology field. This is because the main focus of this research is to understand those political processes that generate political disaffection mostly focusing on the society level by analysing how common citizens perceive their relations with formal politics.

Sartori (1969) argues that political sociology is an interdisciplinary attempt to combine both political and non-political reasons to understand why people act the way they do in political life. For example, a political sociologist who intends to study parties should simultaneously explore how parties are conditioned by the society and how the society is conditioned by parties. That is exactly what is intended through this research, since the main objective is to understand a political phenomenon not only focusing on how several political institutions generated it, but also observing how the public perceive these political processes and how they react against them. For example, it will not only be analysed how the political system conditions political behaviours and attitudes but also how society responds by conditioning the development of the political system. This last thing, for example, is to be principally examined through the analyses of social movements.

The way to implement this political sociology approach will be by analysing the links between political disaffection and several perceptions about the functioning of the Chilean political system that are relevant according to the suggested hypotheses. This approach also allows the finding of new elements that could also be associated with the engenderment of political disaffection helping us to more profoundly comprehend this phenomenon. All these links are initially directly analysed through quantitative and qualitative material. Afterwards, the comprehension of these associations is deepened through the analysis of several case studies, mostly based on
qualitative and archive material that also shows how youth perceptions are to be associated with feelings of political disaffection.¹⁰

1.3.2 Research methods

This research combines quantitative and qualitative methods with archive examination to answer the proposed questions. All quantitative analyses are based on secondary data taken from several public opinion polls that include youths’ political and social attitudes. The qualitative part is taken from 68 in-depth interviews personally executed with relevant actors, such as politically involved youths, politicians, youth experts, members of social movements and people who participated in the negotiation processes with social movements. Archive examination mainly consisted in the analysis of relevant documents that allowed a better understanding of each of the case studies, such as the proposals of both movements and the political program of ME-O.

The combination of these three central methods is crucial to understanding political disaffection, focusing on particular historical-institutional aspects of the recent Chilean political history, based on a political sociology approach. This is because the only way to understand how the public feel and react regarding their relations with the political processes, and to comprehend how people’s perceptions can engender feelings of disaffection, is by directly asking them.

The epistemological basis of this claim is that people’s behaviour is primarily determined by the way they perceive reality, irrespective of whether these perceptions are real or not and that the most efficient and effective way to understand how people perceive things is by asking them directly. This research assumes, therefore, that even if some people have erroneous conceptions of reality, their own conceptions do have real consequences. To this effect, it can be argued that this thesis adopts “Thomas’s theorem” that “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas, 1928, quoted in Merton, 1995). This is because it is assumed

¹⁰ It is necessary to highlight that by perceptions this thesis refers to a way of understanding or interpreting something no matter if those understandings are accurate or not.
that it is essential to comprehend what people believe through their own words as the interpretation of some situations is what predominantly determinates people’s behaviours.

In this sense, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is essential. While quantitative methods allows the generalisation of some propositions regarding the types of perception generating disaffection, qualitative methods permit a deep understanding of these propositions through the proper words of the studied group. Additionally, archive examination permits a better contextualisation of those analysed associations, which is what finally allows us to link them to general attributes of Chilean democracy. Moreover, the use of these methods is also central to examining several case studies that deepen the understanding of the links between people’s perceptions and feelings of political disaffection. For example, the use of qualitative and archive material to analyse the emergence and development of two social movements are the best way to understand both how participants of those movements felt when they were negotiating with political authorities and how they finally conditioned the development of the political system.

*Ethics, Reflexivity, Sampling and Analysis of the Qualitative Material*

As in-depth interviews were the only applied method where the researcher had direct contact with those being researched, it is also necessary to discuss how this research attempted to be rigorous along with meeting the standards set by ethical principles, reflexivity, data selection and the analysis and interpretation of the material.

Regarding the first issue, in order to respect ethical principles while researching human subjects, the purposes and methods of the research were carefully explained before every interview. Moreover, this thesis also dealt with the issue of confidentiality. All interviews with politically involved youth, politicians and ME-O’s supporters were strictly confidential and it was made clear to the interviewee that their real names would not be disclosed in the thesis. However, the names of youth and education experts, and those of student leaders were included with their permission. In this case, all interviewees but one accepted stating their real names.
With regard to reflexivity, it was intended to reduce to the minimum the effect that the researcher’s positions, values and intellectual biases could have on participant’s views. Interview questions were therefore designed with the objective that every interviewee’s positions were treated as valid and that the interviewer did not impose or indicated his point of view.

Finally, concerning data selection and analysis, several strategies were adopted to deal with these issues. With respect to the interviewee’s selection, after identifying all categories to be interviewed in each stage, the main strategy was to find individuals following the snow-ball method. Moreover, after every interview, interviewees were asked if they could help in contacting some people. This process was further supplemented by directly contacting some people through emails, and social networks such as Facebook or Twitter.

With respect to ensuring rigour in the analysis of the qualitative material, all the interviews were personally transcribed and analysed with the help of the software Nvivo. This analysis basically consisted of looking for different categories that could help organize the data and writing synthesis paragraphs considering all the quotations of each created category. Then, within every chapter, when a specific topic was discussed, the most representative quotations were selected highlighting the material of the whole discussed category. To this effect, the views expressed through the citations displayed in every chapter cannot be generalized to the entire interviewee category theses citations are making reference. They are just good illustrative examples of the views of some specific actor regarding some particular topic.

In sum, care was taken in the collection and analysis of the qualitative material, with various strategies adopted to ensure rigour. A description of each of the research phases that applied these strategies regarding the qualitative material and other strategies for the other used methods follow.

11 All the identified categories are later explained in this chapter.
First phase

This phase of the research consisted on the collection of secondary quantitative data about political attitudes and behaviours of Chilean youths. The data are obtained from several databases, available from different representative opinion poll surveys conducted in Chile since 1988. The surveys used for this process are the following:

- Chilean National Institute of Youth (INJUV) Survey from 1994 to 2009.
- Latinobarómetro Survey from 1995 to 2009.
- Auditoría a la Democracia Survey from 2010 to 2012.
- Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) Survey from 1990 to 2009.
- Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) youth Survey of 2009.

The collected material from these surveys is complemented with other official sources in order to size up historical levels of electoral participation. For this purpose, information about Chilean population is collected from the Chilean national institute of statistics (INE) and information about the numbers of registered youths is collected from the Chilean national electoral service (SERVEL).

All these data are used to initially map current patterns of youth political disaffection analysing historical trends, comparisons among Latin American countries and relationships between feelings of political disaffection and socio-demographic variables. Moreover, these data are also used to perform a descriptive quantitative analysis to find several factors associated with feelings of political disaffection. Finally, the data are used to do binary logistic regressions, where several indicators of political disaffection are used as dependent variables and some perceptions about the functioning of the Chilean political system, along with some socio-demographic variables, are used as independent variables.

Second phase

The second stage of the fieldwork consists of in-depth semi-structured interviews with politically involved Chilean youths and politicians. The main focuses of the
interviews are interviewees’ perceptions about the existence of current high levels of youth political disaffection and its main sources\textsuperscript{12}.

With the initial quantitative analysis it is possible to test the link between particular perceptions about the functioning of the political system and indicators of political disaffection. However, this analysis only brings a broad picture of the problem. Therefore, by doing a qualitative analysis based on youths’ representations, it is possible to complement quantitative analyses and have a much clearer account of the phenomenon. To this effect, it has to be clear that the qualitative material presented in this chapter is only used to deepen the understanding of associations found with quantitative material that is representative of the whole youth population and do not pretend to generalize propositions. In order to deal with the issue of the representativeness of the qualitative data, the presented material intends to show the variety of positions regarding every topic paying special attention when there are conflicting visions.

This use of qualitative methods is then essential for this research, since it is indispensable to understand the main mechanisms behind quantitatively tested links. This means it is necessary to delve more deeply into youths’ perceptions about the political system that are associated with the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection; such feelings of lack of political representation and political inefficacy. For example, if an association between indicators of political disaffection and feelings of lack of representation are found, it is also necessary to comprehend what the meaning of feeling unrepresented is according to youths’ beliefs. If it is possible to comprehend young peoples’ own beliefs, representations and interpretations of the political process, the understanding of the link between the way the political system works and the emergence of feelings of political disaffection becomes much greater.

\textsuperscript{12} The reason why only politically involved youths are interviewed is that it is necessary to understand perceptions that are based on particular experiences. In this sense, apart from general perceptions about the functioning of the political system, the interviews also enquired on topics such as the difficulties, needs and challenges that youths experience when they are politically involved. The fact of interviewing only politically involved youth is clearly a limitation of this thesis. However, this decision is justified by the fact that the qualitative material is only used to complement previously found links with quantitative data that comes from national representative samples. In this sense, the qualitative data are not used in order to generalise propositions, but only to deepen the understanding of previously-quantitatively tested links that can be generalised for the whole youth population.
Since qualitative research involves the maximisation of the variety of representations based on the extension of social strata, functions or categories (Bauer and Gaskell, 2007), it is necessary to define the categories that segment the population of politically involved youths. The first category is the kind of political organisation they participate in. The main distinction here is between those who participate in youth divisions of traditional political parties and those who participate in informal political organisations, such as political collectives. Among youths who participate in political parties, it is possible to distinguish between three sectors defined by the three main political coalitions of the country: Concertación, Alianza por Chile and Juntos Podemos. Those youths involved in informal political organisations are distinguished between those who belong to organisations with materialist interests and those who belong to organisations with post-materialist interests. Moreover, it was also intended to have gender parity among interviewed youths. In total, 21 interviews were executed with politically-involved youths. Table 1.1 summarises these interviews according to each category.

Table 1.1 - Distribution of Interviewed Politically Involved Youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of the Youth Division of the UDI</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political Parties – Alianza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of the Youth Division of RN</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political Parties – Alianza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the youth division of RN</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Political Parties – Alianza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the youth division of the PDC</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Political Parties – Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the youth division of the PPD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political Parties – Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of the Youth Division of the PPD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political Parties – Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Secretary of the Youth Division of the PS</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Political Parties – Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Secretary of the Youth Division of the PC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political Parties – Juntos Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the youth division of the PC</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Political Parties – Juntos Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a youth organisation whose main principle is the defence of public health</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Materialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an educational political collective</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Materialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an university political collective</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Materialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Left Wing youth Political Organization</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Materialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a youth organisation linked to the gremialist movement</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Materialist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Political collectives are small and informal political organisations that intend to modify certain public situations.

14 Even though the post-materialist explanation for political disaffection was not defined as the main hypothesis of this thesis, the fact that many Chilean youths belong to organisations, such as environmental groups, justifies the inclusion of this variable for the aim of maximising the variety of representations among Chilean politically-involved youths.

15 As it was previously stated, all interviews conducted for this section were anonymous. The material of each of them is presented in further chapters with fakes names.
With respect to the politicians interviewed, the same selective criterion used for politically-involved youth members of traditional political parties was used. People from the three main political coalitions were interviewed, trying to achieve gender parity as well. Moreover, it was also prioritised the fact that these politicians have previously participated in commissions dedicated to youth or educational issues. Table 1.2 summarizes interviewed politicians according to each category.

**Table 1.2 - Distribution of Interviewed Politicians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy of RN</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Alianza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Deputy of RN</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Alianza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Deputy of UDI and member of the education commission of the congress</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alianza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ex-deputy of PPD and ex member of the youth commission of the congress.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Deputy of the PS</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Deputy of the PPD and ex-member of the youth commission of the congress.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Deputy of the DC and ex-president of the youth commission of the congress.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Deputy of the PC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Juntos Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ex-Minister of Education and ex presidential candidate (2009) for the Juntos Podemos.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Juntos Podemos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Third phase**

The third phase of the research consists of a deep exploration of the Chilean institutional set-up for young people in terms of analysing the relationship between the deficiencies of the youth public offer and the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection. Based on the examination of archives and the execution of in-depth interviews with key actors regarding this field, the idea was to understand a particular situation that seems to indicate the CPS is especially more reticent regarding the representation of youths’ interest.
The first part of this phase consisted in the examination of archives that allowed observations of the main channels through which youths’ interests are intended to be represented. This implied, among other things, an analysis of the functioning of government institutions particularly focused on youths’ interests and to analyse specific polices on youth matters. These analyses were complemented with seven in-depth and semi-structured interviews with key actors of the field. These actors were policy-makers specialising on youth matters, such as former directors of the INJUV from the current and previous governments. Moreover, the material of these interviews was complemented with material from the second phase, since both politically-involved youths and politicians were also asked about these issues. Finally, some secondary quantitative material was also used in order to analyse youths’ perceptions about the current youth public offer.

In all these interviews, apart from getting information about particular polices or governmental programmes offered to the youth, the idea was also to inquire about the perceptions of central actors of the relationship between the way the political system includes young people and their current high levels of political disaffection. Table 1.3 summarises all interviews executed regarding this section.

Table 1.3 - Distribution of Interviewed Youth Experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewed person</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Juan Faúndez – Former director of the INJUV</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Eugenio Ravinet - Former director of the INJUV</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ignacio Naudón - Former director of the INJUV</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Oscar Dávila - Director of a Youth research centre</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Raúl Zarzuri - Director of an youth university research centre of the Youth</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mario Sandoval - Director of a youth university research centre</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Dina Krauskopf - Ex-director of a Youth Latin-American Program of the FLACSO</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourth phase

The fourth stage of the fieldwork consists in the analysis of the emergence of the independent presidential candidacy of Marco Enríquez-Ominami (ME-O) in 2009 and the subsequent development of a new political party (The PRO), and how these events could appeal to several politically disaffected youths. Based on several archives and in-

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16 These interviews were not anonymous since all interviewed people agreed to be identified with their official names.
depth interviews with youths who voted for this candidate and important participants of both the campaign and the new party, the plan was to comprehend the attractiveness to young people of a project that was very critical of the current Chilean political system.

The initial part of this phase was about examining several archives that allowed an understanding of the emergence of this candidate and the subsequent formation of a new party. Some of the observed documents were the political programme of the presidential candidacy, political analyses of the internal disputes within the Concertación that ended in the resignation of ME-O from the PS in order to present an independent candidacy and the new party statute. After that, twelve in-depth interviews were conducted with youths who voted for this candidate and with important members of the campaign and the PRO. With respect to the selection of the interviewees, the main criterions were to cover several areas of the campaign and gender parity. Regarding youth voters, another specific criterion was used, as four interviews were conducted with youths who are currently part of the PRO and four with voters who are not part of the PRO. 17

The interviews inquired about the reasons behind the apparent success of these projects as well as the limitations people perceived to have emerged during the campaign and at the time the party was being established. Moreover, a special emphasis was put on particular reasons that explain the special appeal this candidacy had among young people. The analysis of the limitations was also complemented with the qualitative material of the second phase, as politically-involved youths were also asked about their opinions of these projects. Moreover, some quantitative secondary data were also employed to observe if this candidacy was more attractive to disaffected people and to observe which issues appealed more to ME-O’s voters. Table 1.4 summarises the interviews conducted for this section.

17 In order to analyse the attractiveness of this candidate, it would have been better to have a representative sample of those youth that voted for him. However, this was not possible to be obtained. In this sense, the qualitative material of this chapter should be only understood as showing the variety of opinions of MEO’s voters and not as data from where it can be generalized about the distribution of these opinions.
Fifth Phase

The last phase of the research was about analysing two social movements to have taken place in recent times in Chile: the 2006 secondary student movement and the still-active 2011-2012 educational movement. The main purpose of reviewing these case studies was to observe two situations where several demands emerged from Chilean civil society and were then channelled by the Chilean political system.

Within these analyses, the main focuses are on the factors that determined the emergence of both movements, and the understanding of how the way the political system functions regarding the channelisation of several demands is connected to the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection among youths. All these events were mainly analysed through the examination of archives, newspaper articles and the execution of 19 interviews with members of the movements and relevant political actors involved in the negotiation processes.

Regarding the 2006 movement, the initial methods used were archive and newspaper articles examinations such as the old and new laws of education, students’ proposals and reports from the presidential committee. This information was

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Table 1.4 - Distribution of interviewed MEO’s voters and members of his campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewed person</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marco Enríquez-Ominami - president of the PRO</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristian Warner - General Secretary of the PRO that also participated in the campaign</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandra Botinelli - Vice president of the PRO that also participated in the campaign</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javier Sajuria - Person in charge of the digital strategy of the campaign</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Campaigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Voter and current member of the party</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Party Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Voter and current member of the party</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Party Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Voter and current member of the party</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Party Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Voter</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Voter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Voter</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Voter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Voter</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Voter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Voter</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Voter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Regarding these interviews, members of the campaign agreed to be referred with their official names while with youth voters the agreement was to have anonymous interviews.
complemented with the realisation of twelve interviews. Six of them were with movement leaders, and six with adults who participated in the negotiation processes.

In order to select students to be interviewed, two main criterions were used: their political affiliation and gender. Regarding political affiliation, it was also distinguished between those who belonged to traditional parties and those who were part of other political organisations. Moreover, their political positions were also considered. Regarding those adults interviewed, it was distinguished between representatives of three sectors: the Alianza, the Concertación and the *Bloque Social* (a group of organisations supporting the movement).

Within the interviews, the main focus was on conversing about the movement emergence, the negotiation processes and evaluations of the final policy outcomes. Moreover, it was also asked how youth perceptions regarding the channelisation of their demands can be connected with broader processes regarding the relationship between youths and the political system. Table 1.5 summarises the interviews executed concerning the 2006 movement.

**Table 1.5 - Distribution of 2006 movement interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewed Person</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanessa Bolla - Youth that participated in the movement</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac Stevens - Youth that participated in the education committee.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Right-Wing Friendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julio Isamit - Youth that was spokesman of the movement</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Right-Wing Friendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Carlos Herrera - Youth that participated in the education committee.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Left-Wing Friendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesar Valenzuela - Youth that was spokesman of the movement</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Member of the PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pablo Orellana - Youth that participated in the education committee.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Member of the PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge Pavéz - Ex director of the teacher’s organisation that participated in the</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Bloque Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education committee.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismael Calderón - Ex director of the parent’s organisation that participated in the</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Bloque Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education committee.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex member of a right-wing think tank that participated in the education committee.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolina Velasco – ex member of a right-wing think tank that participated in the</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education committee.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristian Cox - Academic associated with the Concertación that participated in the</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education committee.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Eduardo García-Huidobro - Academic associated with the Concertación that</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was the president of the council of education created after the movement.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 All interviewees of this section but one right-wing representative of the 2006 committee agreed to be referred with their official names.
With respect to the 2011-2012 movement, a different kind of analysis was applied. This is because, unlike the 2006 movement, in this case there is not already a complete policy-making process where demands were absorbed and then expressed in policy outcomes. Thus, the analysis of this last case was only limited to the conditions that favoured its emergence and its future political implications. This last element was of extreme importance since the movement is not only demanding educational reforms but also broader social and political changes. That is why, for example, it has been described as the politicisation of discontent (Mayol and Azócar, 2011).

The methods used were archive examinations, qualitative interviews and secondary quantitative analysis. Regarding archives, extensive documents were observed that allowed a much better understanding of the movement. Among them are students’ proposals, documents that reveal students’ demands for broader changes and some reactions from the political world. This information was complemented by seven interviews with leaders of the movement. These members were distinguished by gender, type of education and political organisation. Finally, some quantitative secondary material was used to analyse if movements’ demands were also supported by larger sectors of the population. The main focus on the data collection was about understanding the conditions that determined the emergence of the movement and the apparent process of activation of previously passive feelings of disaffection among youths. Regarding this last point, it is also analysed if a new way of doing politics might be emerging among youths. Table 1.6 summarises students from the 2011-2012 movement interviewed.

**Table 1.6 - Distribution of 2011-2012 movement interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewed Person</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Nataly Espinoza – Student from the Universidad de Valparaíso</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>CONFECH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Laura Palma - Student from the Universidad de La Serena</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>CONFECH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Recaredo Gálvez – Student from the Universidad de Concepción.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>CONFECH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Alfredo Vielma – Secondary Student</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>ACES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Laura Ortiz - Secondary Student</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>ACES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Daniela Isla – Secondary Student</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>CONES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Rodrigo Rivera – Secondary Student</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>CONES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3.3 Organization of the chapters

Based on the previously-defined phases of the research the following division of the chapters is presented.

- **Chapter 2**: Evolution of the patterns and forms of political disaffection among Chilean youths.
- **Chapter 3**: Analysing the link between youths' perceptions of their relationship with the CPS and feelings of political disaffection with the use of quantitative and qualitative data.
- **Chapter 4**: Analysing the relationship between the lack of a Youth Public Policy and the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection.
- **Chapter 5**: The emergence of the presidential candidacy of ME-O and the PRO and their attractiveness for politically-disaffected youth.
- **Chapter 6**: The 2006 Secondary Student Movement: analysing the application of a way of doing politics.
- **Chapter 7**: The 2011-2012 Student Movement: the activation of politically-disaffected youths.
- **Chapter 8**: Conclusions.
Chapter 2: How can Chilean youth political disaffection be described?

2.1 Introduction

To have a clear understanding of the sources of current high levels of youth political disaffection, it is first necessary to comprehend the proper phenomenon under study. This means, that before analysing the possible explanatory factors of political disaffection it is first required to map its patterns and forms. In this sense, the main goal of this chapter is to size up existing levels of political disaffection and their historical changes among Chilean youths. This chapter involves, then, a deep examination of this dissertation dependent variable based on an extensive body of comparative survey research, which brings evidence to test the main assumption of this research: that Chilean youths have rather high levels of political disaffection and they are not just disengaged from formal politics.

The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first one analyses patterns and forms of political disaffection based on secondary quantitative data. Several indicators are used to analyse their current levels and historical trends, some comparisons with Latin American countries and their associations with some socio-demographic variables. The second section discusses whether Chilean youths can also be described as being politically apathetic using secondary quantitative data and primary qualitative material.

2.2 Mapping the patterns and forms of political disaffection

In this section, the evolution and comparisons of the indicators of behavioural disaffection is first shown. Later on, to see if these indicators can be seen as part of a more general syndrome of political disaffection, the link between the rejection of formal channels of participation and negative attitudes towards the political system is tested. Finally, the evolution and comparisons of indicators of attitudinal disaffection are displayed.

2.2.1 Behavioural disaffection indicators

The first dimension to be analysed is behavioural disaffection. This is constituted of
three indicators: electoral participation, partisan membership and party identification. Whenever the data allows it, these indicators are analysed regarding their historical trends, their comparison with Latin American countries and their associations with some socio-demographic variables.

**Electoral participation**

Regarding electoral participation, the first issue that can be analysed is the evolution of registration rates. From 1988 until 2012, you had to be at least 18 years old in Chile to vote and voting was compulsory after you voluntarily register yourself in the electoral registers. Therefore, the best way to comprehend this trend is to observe the evolution of the percentage of registered people over the total population.

In figure 2.1, the evolution of Chilean population registration rates can be examined. It is first observed that the percentage of people between 18 and 29 years registered in 1988 was 90% and that for the last presidential election it was just 23%. It can also be observed from this figure that this declining trend has taken place in each of the three age groups of youth analysed. Moreover, it is possible to observe too that this declining trend has not taken place among Chileans older than 30 years since rates of participation have remained high with the pass of years in this group (at least 85% in every election). These data would be indicating, then, that Chilean youth are more behaviourally disaffected than other Chilean age groups.

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20 This system was recently changed for one with automatic registration and voluntary voting. This change is not going to be highly analysed, either in this chapter or in following ones, since all the data for the analysis were collected before even the new system was approved. It is only relevant to argue that the new system did not change the trends to be analysed in this chapter.
These trends can be also examined in absolute terms regarding youth. As table 2.1 indicates, in 1988 2,676,878 youths were registered to vote, and in the last presidential election in 2009 those registered numbered only 762,349. This means the percentage of registered youths in 2009 represented only a 28% of those registered in 1988. It can be also observed that this declining trend is higher for younger people. The absolute number of registered youths has only increased in the last two presidential elections. This increase, however, seems to be explained by the fact that presidential elections have a more appealing character because after the presidential election in 2004, the number of registered youths declined again.

Table 2.1 - Evolution of the Electoral Roll in Youth by Age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections/Age group</th>
<th>18-29</th>
<th>18-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>24-29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plebiscite - 1988</td>
<td>2,676,878</td>
<td>409,109</td>
<td>1,164,656</td>
<td>1,103,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President - 1989</td>
<td>2,526,872</td>
<td>223,516</td>
<td>1,156,767</td>
<td>1,146,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor - 1992</td>
<td>2,348,099</td>
<td>211,185</td>
<td>955,920</td>
<td>1,180,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President - 1993</td>
<td>2,310,660</td>
<td>243,979</td>
<td>888,343</td>
<td>1,178,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor - 1996</td>
<td>1,798,274</td>
<td>99,001</td>
<td>638,906</td>
<td>1,060,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies - 1997</td>
<td>1,605,232</td>
<td>85,586</td>
<td>545,080</td>
<td>974,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President - 1999</td>
<td>1,297,821</td>
<td>77,652</td>
<td>391,672</td>
<td>828,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor - 2000</td>
<td>1,177,961</td>
<td>71,692</td>
<td>338,143</td>
<td>768,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies - 2001</td>
<td>1,051,368</td>
<td>55,479</td>
<td>317,263</td>
<td>678,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor - 2004</td>
<td>714,956</td>
<td>38,758</td>
<td>224,402</td>
<td>451,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President - 2005</td>
<td>797,991</td>
<td>87,861</td>
<td>281,153</td>
<td>428,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor - 2008</td>
<td>654,639</td>
<td>46,045</td>
<td>237,161</td>
<td>371,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President - 2009</td>
<td>762,349</td>
<td>87,289</td>
<td>286,505</td>
<td>388,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Last Election/Plebiscite 1988</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.servel.cl
Another interesting trend to be analysed is the percentage of registered youths with respect to the voting age population registered. As shown in Figure 2.2, the percentage of people from 18 to 29 years registered in 1988 represented 36% of the voting age population registered. This situation has also dramatically changed during the last twenty years since in 2009 youths represented just 9% of the voting age population registered. Therefore, it can be observed that there is an aging of the electoral roll, which is also an indication that Chilean youth are comparatively more behaviourally disaffected than other age groups.

**Figure 2.2 - Electoral Participation among Chilean Youth (18-29) by Age groups (% of Registered Youth /Voting Age Population Registered)**

![Electoral Participation among Chilean Youth (18-29) by Age groups](source: www.servel.cl www.ine.cl)

The fact that it is known that youths only represent a small portion of the electoral roll has been precisely argued as one relevant factor associated with the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection. A report from the UNDP states that the fact that youths are not voting generates a vicious circle since, as they do not vote, politicians ignore them, which further marginalises this group (UNDP, 2010). The fact that as youth do not vote they become more excluded would be reproducing, then, higher levels of disaffection that would be later reproduced in even lower rates of electoral participation.\(^{21}\)

Rates of electoral participation can be also compared with Latin American countries. In the 2008 Latinobarómetro survey it was asked whether one had voted or not in the last presidential election. Therefore, it is possible to compare how many

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\(^{21}\) One of the effects of this vicious circle is the lack of youth public policies. This issue will be further developed in a chapter of this thesis.
people declared to have voted among the whole continent. As shown in figure 2.3, Chile is by far the country where the least youths declared to have voted. Just 24% of Chilean youths said they voted. On the other hand, in all the other countries more than the half of the youth population affirmed that they participated in the elections. If Chile is compared with the average of Latin America, there is a difference of more than 40% with respect to the percentage of youths who declared to have voted.

Figure 2.3 - Percentage of Latin-American people (+18) who declared to have voted in the last presidential election by age groups (2008)

Another relevant thing that is possible to be examined from this chart is the difference between the percentage of adults (+29) and youths (18-29) that declared to have voted. Regarding this issue, it is observed that, although in every country adults have higher participation rates than youths, the difference between these two groups is far bigger in Chile than in the rest of the continent. Chile is the Latin-American country with the biggest difference between the percentage of adults and youths that declare to have voted in the last presidential election, which indicates that Chile is the country of the region where youth are comparatively more behaviourally disaffected in comparison with older people.

It has to be clear, however, that these percentages are difficult to compare, since each country has specific electoral laws that affect the number of people who vote. In fact, the electoral law that Chile had until 2012 has been precisely criticised because it exacerbated the disinterestedness of citizens, and particularly those of young people,
as it was based on voluntary registration and compulsory voting (Faundez, 2008). Thus, lower turnout levels in Chile could also be explained by this situation. Nevertheless, despite this fact, it is quite clear these figures show a trend that indicates that comparatively, Chilean youths have higher levels of behavioural disaffection than the rest of the continent. This statement can be also confirmed by the fact that in the last municipal election in 2012, where a new system based on automatic registration and voluntary voting was used, levels of participation declined even more. A study of La Tercera (2012a) indicates that among the new voting tables, which are those that mostly include previously unregistered young people, only 15% of voters voted.

One last thing that can be analysed regarding electoral participation is the association between having declared to be registered to vote and some socio-demographic variables. In figure 2.4 the data of the UDP’s youth survey can be observed. First, it is clear that there are great differences concerning vote registration with respect to Socio-Economic Status (SES).22 According to these data, the percentage of people from the high SES who declared to be registered is more than double the percentage of people from the low SES. It can be also observed that the older you are, the more likely you are to register to vote.23 Finally, it is also possible to notice that there is no difference in gender regarding voting.24

![Figure 2.4 - Registered Youths (18-29) by SES, Age group and Gender](image)

Source: UDP, 2009a. n: 1000.

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22 After applying a proportional difference test it is observed that the differences among the percentages of all the SES are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.

23 Proportional difference tests were also applied to compare age groups. It was found that all differences between them are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance except the one between youths from 18 to 19 and those between 20 and 24 years old.

24 The proportional difference test found that the difference between men and women regarding being registered to vote was not a significant one.
In summary, after analysing the trends and patterns of the first indicator of behavioural disaffection it can be stated that Chilean youths have quite low levels of electoral participation. This trend indicates, then, that they are expressing their disaffection with the political system by not exercising their democratic rights. This situation has worsened with the passing of years, and it is also comparatively worse when Chile is contrasted with other Latin American countries. Regarding the association between this indicator and socio-demographic variables, the most relevant association is the one between SES and registering to vote, which indicates that there is in Chile a process of gentrification of the vote (INJUV, 2008).

Partisan membership

The second indicator of behavioural disaffection to be analysed is partisan membership. The first thing that can be observed by looking at table 2.2 is that since the return to democracy, partisan membership has been extremely low among young people with declining tendencies. Nowadays, less than 1% of Chilean youths participate in political parties, which shows great levels of disaffection regarding this political institution.

Table 2.2 - Partisan membership among Chilean Youths (15-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: INJUV 2nd - 4th National Survey of Youth*

Partisan membership among Chilean youths can also be examined through data showing the evolution of the percentage of youths among party members within Chilean traditional political parties. As shown in Figure 2.5, the percentage of youths among party militants has dramatically declined from 1990 until today. For example, the PPD had 36% of youth militants in 1990 and only 2% in 2010. Moreover, it is also observed that currently no party has more than 5% of youth militants. These data
imply that Chilean parties have clearly not been renovated themselves with the passing of years, as they are not appealing to new youth militants and because party activity is mostly dominated by adult groups.

**Figure 2.5 - percentage of Chilean Youths (18-29) among party member**

![Graph showing percentage of Chilean youths among party members over time](image)

*Source: SERVEL (2009).*

The lack of renovation among party elites has been precisely highlighted by some scholars as a factor that is associated with the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection among youths (Dominguez, 2012). Moreover, the fact that ME-O was young was also argued as a relevant factor to have attracted disaffected youths as he embodied a message of renovation (Bunker and Navia, 2010). Therefore, it is possible to argue that a lack of youth descriptive representation, that is to say, lack of youth politicians within representative political institutions, could be a relevant source of current high levels of youth political disaffection.

Finally, levels of partisan membership can be also compared among Latin American countries. In table 2.3 percentages of youths that declared that they participate in political parties can be examined. It is observed that Chile is one of the Latin American countries with the lowest levels of partisan membership. Only Argentina has a lower percentage. The average Latin American youth partisan membership is 18% with some countries’ rates of participation over 40%. In contrast, in Chile less than 4% of youths use these conventional political channels.
In summary, it is clear there are high levels of political disaffection in Chile if this situation is observed through indicators of partisan membership. Participation rates are very low, and have declined with the passing of years. Moreover, when comparing with the rest of Latin America the Chilean situation can be qualified as being more worrisome, as it is one of the countries with lowest rates of partisan membership.  

**Party Identification**

The third and last indicator of behavioural disaffection to be analysed are levels of party identification. In relation to that, Figure 2.6 shows the historical trend of this indicator. As it is possible to observe, since 1990 until today this indicator trend has clearly been a declining one. The percentage of youths who declared to be identified with a political party was around 80% at the start of the 1990s and it is around 50% 

---

25 The fact than no more than 3% of Chilean youth participate in political parties generated the decision to exclude this indicator from the quantitative analysis of subsequent chapters, since a more equitable distribution within the answers of this question is needed to do multivariate quantitative analysis.
nowadays. Moreover, it is also possible to notice that levels of identification are not altogether different among age groups, and between youths and the whole population over 18, which means that according to this indicator youths will not be more behaviourally disaffected than adults. Another interesting trend observed is that party identification is higher in times of presidential elections, as was the case in 2005 and 2009.

Figure 2.6 - Historical evolution of party identification by age groups in Chile

Source: CEP (1990-2009)

Levels of party identification can also be analysed by examining differences in the categories of socio-demographic variables with respect to this indicator. In table 2.4 it is possible to notice that concerning this indicator, youths from lower SES are those most politically disaffected. Medium and low SES have similar levels of identification but the high SES is the one with highest rates. Regarding age groups, the main difference is between those from 25 to 29 years, being the oldest ones those most identified. Finally, with respect to gender it seems there are no differences.

Table 2.4 - Party identification by SES, age group and gender in Chilean youth (2003)²⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SES</th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INJUV 4th National Survey of Youth. n:7189.

²⁶ For these associations it was not possible to do proportional differences tests since the weight variable of this data base is based on an expansion factor. This situation does not allow to know the sample size of each of the groups which are necessary to do the tests.
2.2.2 Linking behavioural and attitudinal Disaffection

Even though patterns and forms of indicators of attitudinal disaffection have not yet been analysed, it is necessary to now test if the already described variables that measure behavioural disaffection are associated with indicators of attitudinal disaffection. It was already observed that Chilean youths are quite disengaged. Therefore, it is now necessary to test if disengagement is an expression of feelings of discontent, as rejecting formal channels of participation could be also an expression of feelings of conformity or disinterest. This assumption is tested especially because some scholars have claimed that in some societies, low turnout levels might be explained because when countries become more democratically stable and generate sustained growth, there are less important things at stake in politics and it loses relevance (Lehman, 1998).

Since the return to democracy, Chile has had high rates of economic growth and a remarkable democratic stability. Therefore, it could be the case that low political participation is explained more by citizens’ conformity rather than by feelings of disaffection. Moreover, low levels of behavioural disaffection could also be explained by feelings of disinterest that do not carry critical opinions of the political system.

The way to test this assumption is by observing whether there is any association between being registered to vote and indicators of attitudinal disaffection. If associations are found between these variables, it could be then surmised that people are principally not voting because there is discontent rather than because they are complacent or uninterested. This is tested by conducting a binary logistic regression with the answer to the question about being registered to vote as the dependent variable, and indicators of attitudinal disaffection and some control variables as the independent variables.

The data are taken from youths between 18 and 29 years old who responded the fifth national survey of the INJUV. As shown in table 2.5, controlling for gender, SES and age, the three indicators of attitudinal disaffection are significantly associated at the 99% confidence level with the probability of being registered to vote. The three associations are also in the expected direction; that is to say, the more attitudinal
disaffection you have, the less likely you are to register yourself to vote. It can be argued, then, that the more confidence you have in political parties and congress, the more likely it is that you will register yourself to vote. Moreover, people who support democracy have more chances to participate in elections than those who do not support it.

Table 2.5 - Binary logistic regression model for electoral registration in Chilean youths (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal Disaffection</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence - Pol. Parties</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>1.547</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence - Congress</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>1.160</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Support</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>0.938</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>1.216</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.638</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: INJUV, 2006. n: 4846.*

Since both measures of confidence in political institutions are ordinal variables, the probabilities of registering to vote can be also examined through some fitted probabilities that fix the values of the other variables. In figure 2.7 it can be graphically observed that, controlling for the other independent variables, when youths increase their confidence in either political parties or congress, the probability of registering to vote increases. Moreover, it can be also seen that the effect of confidence in political parties is higher than the one of confidence in the congress.

---

27 The dependent variable is based on the question of registration to vote where 1 is being registered and 0 not being registered. Among variables measuring confidence the higher the score the more confidence you have. In the case of the variable measuring satisfaction with democracy the higher the score the more satisfied you are. Finally, the variable support for democracy was recoded into a dummy variable where 1 means that the respondent supports democracy and 0 that he/she does not support it.

28 The symbol * means that the association is significant at the 99% level of confidence.
The evidence suggests, then, that in the case of Chilean youths the rejection of formal channels of participation shows feelings of disaffection rather than feelings of conformity or disinterest. People who do not vote also orient themselves negatively to the political system. Therefore, it is not the case that they are principally not voting because things are going well or because they are not interested in the fate of society. In this sense, these indicators of behavioural disaffection can be observed as part of a general pattern of political disaffection that includes both behaviours and attitudes.

### 2.2.3 Attitudinal disaffection indicators

The next section analyses trends and forms of three indicators of attitudinal disaffection: confidence in political parties, confidence in the congress and democracy support. Each of them is examined through its historical evolution, comparisons with other Latin American countries and associations with socio-demographic variables.

The first issue to be analysed is the historical evolution of these three indicators. In figure 2.8 it is possible to first observe that levels of democracy support declined sharply since 1999 and increased since 2001. By 2008, this measure of disaffection seems to exhibit similar levels to the ones at the beginning of the new democratic regime. Therefore, despite some fluctuations, it cannot be stated that with the passing

---
29 For this figure and for all the analysis based on the Latinobarómetro survey the indicators are summarised in the following form: The percentage of democracy support refers to those ones who believe that “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”. For both variables measuring confidence the percentage is based on those youth who have some or a lot confidence in a four-point scale of confidence.

---
of years, Chilean youths have increased their levels of disaffection with democratic values.

**Figure 2.8 - Evolution of the indicators of attitudinal disaffection in Chilean youths (18-29) between 1995 and 2008**

![Graph showing the evolution of indicators of attitudinal disaffection in Chilean youths from 1995 to 2008.](source: Latinobarómetro (1995-2008))

The same conclusion cannot be made, however, about the two measures of confidence in political institutions. Confidence in both political parties and the congress declined strongly from 1997 until 2003, after which the two indicators increased their levels but only until the mid 2000s. After that, while confidence in the congress stabilised since 2005 at significantly lower levels than those of the mid-1990s, confidence in political parties declined again. It is observed then that, in general terms, there have been declining trends in these two indicators since 1995. The most negative tendency, however, has been the one of confidence in political parties. In 1995, for example, 31% of youths declared they have confidence in political parties, whereas in 2008 this percentage was only 13.

These three measures of attitudinal disaffection can be also analysed by comparing Chilean youths with other Latin American countries. Table 2.6 shows measures of these four indicators. The first thing to highlight is that in none of the measures are Chilean youths well-ranked.

---

30 For this figure and for all the analysis based on the Latinobarómetro survey the indicators are summarised in the following form: The percentage of democracy support refers to those ones who believe that “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”. For both variables measuring confidence the percentage is based on those youth who have some or a lot confidence in a four point scale of confidence.
The indicator that shows the most negative results is again confidence in political parties as Chile in 2008 was the lowest ranked country of the continent regarding confidence in this political institution. With respect to disaffection with the values of a democratic regime, Chile ranks a little better since it is the eleventh placed country for democratic support. However, this percentage is not close to the continent’s average of 60%. Finally, regarding confidence in the congress, Chile has a similar score to the whole continent and is ranked eighth out of 17 countries.

Indicators of confidence in political institutions can be also compared with countries across the whole world with the data of the World Values Survey (WVS). According the last wave of this survey in 2005, Chile is ranked 39 among 54 countries regarding confidence in the congress among people from 18 to 29. For the case of political parties, Chile occupies the 42nd position out of 55 countries.

---

Table 2.6 - Indicators of attitudinal disaffection in Latin American youths (18-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td><strong>12.9%</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

Note: This survey does not have questions related to democracy support, so Chile cannot be compared worldwide regarding this indicator.
Since Chile comparatively has the lowest levels of confidence in political parties on the continent, it is necessary to conduct a deeper analysis of this situation. This is done through the comparison between Chile and other Latin American countries regarding their historical levels of this indicator and their differences between youths and adults concerning this disaffection's measure.

In relation to the first issue, it can be observed in table 2.7 that in 1996 Chile was well-placed among Latin American countries, being the 5th country with most confidence. However, this is far from the present situation as Chile declined to the 10th position in 2002 and to 17th position in 2008. The evidence suggests, then, that Chile has not historically had the worst levels of confidence in political parties of the region and the situation of 2008 is the product of a declining tendency that started in the mid-1990s.

Table 2.7 - Evolution of political party confidence in Latin American youths (18-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ranking (Chile)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5th</strong></td>
<td><strong>10th</strong></td>
<td><strong>17th</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another interesting issue that can be observed from this table is that those countries with the lowest levels of confidence in 1996 and in 2002 were undergoing
relevant crises of political representation during those time periods (Venezuela and Argentina). For example, it is shown that only 10.6% of Venezuelan youths had confidence in political parties in 1996, which is congruent with several analyses of Venezuelan democracy that argue that there was an important political and social crisis during the 1990s. Coppedege (1994) argues that in this period people began to criticize Venezuela’s two-party political system as they felt that politicians only cared about power and that they were not promoting a fair distribution of the country’s wealth, which led to questioning one of the most stable democracies of the region at that time. The Chilean case is clearly different. However, the fact that Chile’s confidence levels are similar and that the causes of those crises also appear to mirror what has been argued to be happening in Chile today should give cause for concern.

Table 2.8 - Confidence in Political Parties in Latin-American countries by age group\textsuperscript{32}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Youth (18-29)</th>
<th>Adults (+29)</th>
<th>(Adults - Youth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Republic</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-8%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin-America</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latinobarómetro (2008) n:6736

Concerning the comparison between youths and adult’s levels of confidence in political parties, it is observed in table 2.8 that Chile is the Latin-American country with

\textsuperscript{32} After applying a proportional difference test for each country it is observed that only in Chile, Perú and Colombia the difference between adults and youths are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.
the biggest difference between these two groups in favour of adults. Moreover, it is also observed that among those countries where youths have less confidence than adults Chile is the only one where this difference is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. To this effect, these data would come to support too the statement that Chilean youths are particularly more disaffected than other age groups of Chilean society.

Table 2.9 - Indicators of attitudinal disaffection in Chilean youths (15-29) by SEG, age group and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>ABC1</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>C3</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>15-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Support</td>
<td>64,0%</td>
<td>72,5%</td>
<td>74,8%</td>
<td>63,8%</td>
<td>57,8%</td>
<td>53,7%</td>
<td>62,5%</td>
<td>66,1%</td>
<td>63,5%</td>
<td>64,8%</td>
<td>63,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf. Congress</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf. Pol. Parties</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The last analysis to be made about the indicators of this second dimension is about possible associations between them and some socio-demographic variables. In table 2.9, levels of democracy support at different socio-economic groups (SEG) can be firstly observed. There is a clear association between these two variables since the two highest SEG have much higher levels of democracy support. Those youths in the C2 group have 11% more democracy support than the youth average and those in the lowest group have 10% less than the average. Therefore, social deprivation seems to play an important role in determining youth support for the values of democracy. It is also possible to notice there is not clear tendency regarding age groups and that

33 For the analysis based on the surveys of the INJUV, the indicators are summarised in the following form: the percentage of democracy support refers to those ones who believe that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”. The percentage of democracy satisfaction is based on the sum of those who are satisfied and very satisfied in a three-point scale of satisfaction. Finally, for both variables measuring confidence, the percentage is based on those youths who have total confidence in a five-point scale of confidence. These scales are different to the ones of the Latinobarómetro survey, so both surveys cannot be directly compared regarding these indicators.

34 After applying a proportional difference test it was observed that differences among the percentages of the groups ABC1 and C2 and all the others SEGs are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.
gender does not make a difference with respect to this indicator.\footnote{After applying proportional difference tests the only statistically significant difference at the 5\% level of significance is the one between youths who are between 15 and 19 years old and those one who are between 20 and 24 years old.}

In relation to the association between SEG and confidence in the congress, a strange situation occurs since the highest percentages of confidence are in the highest and in the lowest SEG. There are differences, then, between SEGs regarding this measure of disaffection but the tendency is not the same one found for the other indicators. Youths from the E SEG have quite high levels of confidence in the congress and those ones with the lowest confidence are in the C3 and D group.\footnote{After applying a proportional difference test it was found that the only statistically significant differences at the 5\% level of significance were the ones between the percentages of the groups ABC1 and C3 and D and between youth from the SES E and C3 and D groups.} Age groups again do not seem to show differences among them with respect to this indicator of disaffection. It is also observed that men seem to have more confidence in the congress than women.\footnote{There are no statistically significant differences between age groups and a statistically significant difference 5\% level of significance was found between men and women.}

Finally, the indicator of confidence of political parties also shows some associations with socio-demographic variables. With the exception of youths from the E group, it can be seen that the lower your SEG, the lower your confidence in political parties. Moreover, the older you are the less confidence you have in this institution. Finally, women seem to have less confidence than men.\footnote{Despite of these tendencies, no statistically significant differences were found regarding to SES and gender. The only statistically significant difference at the 5\% level of significance found was the one between youth who are between 15 and 19 years and youths who are between 24 and 29 years old.}

The evidence suggests even more strongly, therefore, that Chilean youths are principally expressing political disaffection rather than just disengagement or conformity since they also show high levels of attitudinal disaffection. What is also important to highlight is the fact these attitudes are not expressed in the same magnitude regarding each of the elements of the political regime. Levels of attitudinal disaffection are much higher with respect to the institutions than to the principles of the regime. Moreover, among institutions it was examined that political parties are the most rejected one.
2.3 Testing the apathy hypothesis

Throughout all the examined evidence, it was concluded that Chilean youths are highly politically disaffected and not only disengaged. One last issue that merits more analysis is to observe if Chilean youths can be also described as politically apathetic in order to understand what kind of political disaffection is currently being developed in Chile. This is necessary to be analysed, since youths might be expressing a lot of hostility towards the political system but without expressing interest in the fate of society. Moreover, as the main hypothesis of this thesis is that political disaffection is associated with a particular way of functioning of the current political system, it necessary to observe, using Mouffe’s terms, if they are rejecting just a particular way of doing politics or also ‘the political’. That is to say, to understand if youths are interested in the collective will of society or not. The apathy hypothesis is tested in this section by analysing indicators of non-conventional political participation, social participation, willingness of participation and critical visions of current elements of the political system. Moreover, some perceptions of politically-involved youths and politicians regarding this same issue are also presented based on qualitative data.

The first issue to be analysed is the indicators of non-conventional political participation. The inclusion of these indicators is justified based on Collin Hay’s statement that alternative modes of political participation "are an indication that we cannot simply read disaffection or disengagement from formal politics as an index either of political apathy or of the demise of politics itself" (2006: 27).

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39 Political apathy is relevant to be tested in the case of Chilean youths since the beginning of the 90s in Chile there has been a relevant academic trend that has been expended to the rest of society claiming that Chilean youths are totally apathetic by using the phrase “ellos no están ni ahi”, which literally means “they are not even there” and that indicates an attitude of indifference and disinterest.

40 Apart from this section, the fact that Chilean youths are interested in the wellbeing of society and that they advocate for a different way of doing politics will be also examined through three case studies to be developed in subsequent chapters: a) the presidential candidature of Marco Enriquez-Ominami in 2009, b) the secondary movement of 2006 and c) the education movement of 2011-2012.
In table 2.10 it is possible to check current rates of non-conventional participation and the participatory potential of them with two indicators. It can be observed that Chile is poorly ranked (15th) regarding percentage of youths who have signed a petition. However, it is relevant to highlight that 50% of Chilean youths have signed a petition or would do this action, which is near the continent’s average and brings positive evidence to indicate that Chilean youths are not totally apathetic. Regarding the second indicator, Chile is the sixth-placed country in the region in terms of rate of participation in authorised demonstrations. Moreover, Chileans’ current participation in protests, as well as the sum of the rate of participation and its potential are over the media of Latin America, which also somehow supports the statement that Chilean youths are not apathetic.

Table 2.11 also brings valuable data about non-conventional participation among Chilean youths that supports the statement that they are not apathetic. These data are
particularly relevant since they include both information about new ways of participation that are relevant to youths linked to online participation and updated information, since it was collected after the beginning of massive education protests that have taken place in Chile since 2011.

Table 2.11 - Percentage of Chilean youths (18-29) who have been involved in non-conventional political activities in the last year by SES, age group and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>SES</th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has expressed an opinion about an issue or public interest event through social networks</td>
<td>Total: 44.0%</td>
<td>18-19: 49.4%</td>
<td>Men: 46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABC1: 48.3%</td>
<td>20-24: 43.4%</td>
<td>Women: 41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C2: 53.5%</td>
<td>25-29: 42.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C3: 39.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-E: 43.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has participated in public manifestations</td>
<td>Total: 31.6%</td>
<td>18-19: 43.0%</td>
<td>Men: 34.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABC1: 37.9%</td>
<td>20-24: 32.7%</td>
<td>Women: 29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C2: 42.1%</td>
<td>25-29: 25.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C3: 26.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-E: 28.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has joined political, public or citizen’s causes in social networks</td>
<td>Total: 29.3%</td>
<td>18-19: 36.7%</td>
<td>Men: 29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABC1: 40.0%</td>
<td>20-24: 27.9%</td>
<td>Women: 28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C2: 40.9%</td>
<td>25-29: 27.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C3: 23.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-E: 26.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has expressed an opinion about an issue or public interest event through a blog</td>
<td>Total: 27.0%</td>
<td>18-19: 25.6%</td>
<td>Men: 32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABC1: 37.9%</td>
<td>20-24: 25.7%</td>
<td>Women: 21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C2: 33.9%</td>
<td>25-29: 28.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C3: 25.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-E: 20.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first thing observed is that almost half of Chilean youths have expressed an opinion about public issues through social networks. Moreover, approximately a third of them have participated in public manifestations, joined political causes in social networks and expressed their opinions regarding public issues in blogs. It is also possible to observe that for the last three issues, youths from higher SES are more participative. This evidence generates the conclusion that a not insignificant number of Chilean youths might not have used these means of participation, not because they are not interested in social issues but because they don’t have the resources to do so. A similar conclusion can be made when it is observed that older youths have participated much less in public manifestations over the last year, as this fact might also be explained by a matter of time rather than indifference.

Social participation can also be a way of observing if Chilean youths are apathetic or not in the sense that, if they would be participating in several organisations, this would indicate that they are not individualistic and that they are not uninterested about what is happening in their social environment.
By looking at the percentages of table 2.12 it is possible to state that rates of social participation are not low for Chilean youths. The fact that 56% participate at least in one organisation suggests that they are involved in social networks and that they are not mostly individualistic. This percentage takes more relevance if it is compared with rates of formal participation. The percentage of youths who are socially involved is more than double the percentage of Chilean youths that are registered to vote (23%). This indicates that the rejection of some formal means of participation is clearly not merely the expression of apathetic youths. Likewise, it also brings evidence against the social cohesion explanation for political disaffection. The fact that youths prefer more social than political organisations can be further ratified by the fact that political parties have the lowest rate of participation among the organisations included in this survey.

Another relevant thing to state is that, as it was observed in the case of non-conventional participation, the potential for larger social participation seems to be also important. Youths from older age groups and from lower SES participate significantly

Table 2.12- Social Participation in Chilean Youth (15-29) by SES, Age group and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>ABC1</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>C3</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>15-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports club</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual Community</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural or artistic organisation</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group that helps other people</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football supporters</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobbie or playgroup</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student centre</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group or urban tribe</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group that is organised to fight for a specific current cause</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation that advocates a cause or ideal</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood organisation</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union or profession organisation</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in at least one organisation</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

less than other groups, which indicates that with more resources social participation should also increase.

The last types of quantitative indicators that can contribute to generating evidence to test the apathy hypothesis are questions that ask about the willingness of political participation and opinions about current elements of the political system. This part especially brings evidence to observe whether Chilean youths would be interested in formal politics if it were developed differently.

In table 2.13 some indicators about the willingness of Chilean youths to participate in political organisations can be observed. The interest in being part of a political party is very low (9.2%) and has to be interpreted as an indicator of political disaffection, rather than apathy. The percentage of youths who would participate in organisations that advocate a social cause, on the other hand, is quite high. 57% of respondents would participate in a political organisation if a broad definition of ‘the political’ is used. It is also observed from this table that there are differences among SES, age groups and gender regarding this indicator. However, the fact that in every group more than the half of youths has the willingness to participate in organisations that advocate a social cause is very remarkable. The analysis of this indicator strongly suggests, then, that Chilean youths are not apathetic.

Table 2.13 - Percentage of Chilean youths (15-29) who would do some political actions and have critical political opinions by SES, age group, and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SES</th>
<th>Interested of being part of a Political Party</th>
<th>Would participate in organisations that advocate a social cause (Volunteer Work, Environment, Human Rights, Women’s rights, etc.)</th>
<th>It is necessary to make changes to the Political Electoral System</th>
<th>Would like Civic Education to be improved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>ABC1</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would participate in organisations that advocate a social cause (Volunteer Work, Environment, Human Rights, Women’s rights, etc.)</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is necessary to make changes to the Political Electoral System</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would like Civic Education to be improved</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One last thing to highlight about these two indicators is the fact that just 9% of respondents would participate in a political party and 57% would participate in an organisation interested in advocating social causes. This fact clearly evidences that Chilean youths do not perceive that political parties are organisations where social causes can be advocated and they prefer to organise themselves through different mechanisms. Indeed, these facts became evident in the case studies that will be later analysed to deepen the idea that youths are not apathetic. This is because in the 2011-2012 movement people heavily rejected political parties, demanding more autonomous organisations, and since one of the main proposals of ME-O was to break with a duopolic political system that prevents the generation of substantive changes.

From table 2.13 percentages of youths who manifest critical opinions of a couple of elements of the political system can be also checked. It is observed that almost 70% of them would make changes to the political electoral system, which is quite relevant because this system has been one of the most criticised elements of the current Chilean democracy. In this sense, the fact that a very high proportion of Chilean youths criticise this system shows they are not apathetic but that they are just rejecting a particular way of doing politics. Moreover, the fact that the higher the SES, the more critical the attitude regarding the electoral system, might also suggest there would be more criticisms if all youths had the capacity to acquire similar political information.

The second element criticised by youths has to do with the improvement of civic education. Civic education in Chile was removed from the compulsory curriculums of secondary education in the mid 90s during the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle and its quality is currently very poor. Therefore, the fact that 86% of Chilean youths would like to improve civic education, and that this percentage is over 80% in every social group, evidently suggests they are interested in what is happening in their society. Chilean youths perceive that civic education is quite bad today, and that its improvement is of vital importance, which indicates that they are not apathetic.

The analyses of these two last indicators suggest Chilean youths are advocating for a different kind of politics. Moreover, they also indicate that the sources of political disaffection have to be found in the proper functioning of the CPS. A youth survey
from the Diego Portales University also provides evidence in favour of this statement. The results of the study show, for example, that 87% of youths think the fact that authorities convoke to plebiscites to solve important matters is fundamental for the functioning of democracy. Furthermore, 79% of the youth population also think that it is fundamental for democracy that any person can present law projects to be discussed in the Congress (UDP, 2010a). These two things are quite far from being elements of the current Chilean democracy and the fact that Chilean youths believe they are very important indicates some relevant elements of a way of doing politics that would be more appealing to them. In fact, several of these new elements have been part of political forms that have already appealed to disaffected youths as both the 2011-2012 movement and MEO’s candidacy promoted more direct mechanisms of participation such as the existence of plebiscites to decide important social matters.

By observing all this quantitative data it can be argued that Chilean youths are not quite apathetic. When qualitative data are also analysed the same conclusion can be obtained, since both politically-involved youths and politicians believe Chilean youths are just rejecting formal politics, and particularly political parties, and that it is not the case that they are not worried about the fate of society.

"I would say that young people are "not even there" with parties rather than with politics. So, I would not say that young people disagree with participating in politics. An expression of this is that in student movements when important things are achieved, many youth are added. Many students with none political militancy link themselves to the movement as a product of general interest." Mariano, member of a left-wing youth organisation.

"I do not think that young people are "not even there" with politics. They are not even there with parties but they are there with politics. I think that if you talk to young people they are able to problematise about the challenges that Chile is facing. They are involved in pastoral work. They participate in sports issues. They participate a lot in issues of volunteering." Hugo, member of the youth division of the PPD.

Politically-involved youths perceive a rejection towards ‘politics’ and not towards ‘the political’, using Chantal Mouffe’s distinction. They perceive that many youths participate in several organisations such as student movements or sportive associations. Moreover, it is also believed that common youths do have opinions of relevant public issues. In this sense, Chilean youths would be interested in the
wellbeing of society but opt to channel these concerns through more informal organisations rather than through traditional political parties.

The political class itself has also the impression that Chilean youths are not apathetic, as it is believed they are aware of what is happening currently in Chile and they participate in other types of organisations. There is also the perception that a portion of young people have apathetic feelings. However, these feelings would not be the majority.

"I have the feeling that young people are very interested in politics. They are ‘not even there’ about being in a political party or with politicians. They give opinions of what happens, of what politicians do and the decisions taken by the government. I think they do politics every day." Woman, deputy of RN.

"Many young people have activities that we would have to categorise as political because they are young people involved in social movements, youths participating in protests, young people involved in human rights institutions, gender, sexual diversity. I think it is more a rejection of formal politics. There is a segment of young people and society that expresses nihilism and indifference. But I do not think that is the most representative phenomenon." Jorge Arrate, ex presidential candidate of the non-parliamentary left wing.

In summary, the evidence observed suggests political apathy is not something that affects the great majority of Chilean youths. Without doubt there is an important proportion of apathetic youth. However, apathy levels are by no means higher than political disaffection levels. Therefore, it is not possible to argue that political disaffection is explained by a disinterest of the youth in the fate of society. Chilean youths are showing their interest in ‘the political’ by using other methods of participation, through the participation in social organisations and by having the willingness to be more socially active. Moreover, they are also very critical of certain elements of the current political system. These situations indicate that Chilean youths would be more interested in formal politics if it functioned differently, which demonstrates that political disaffection is associated with the proper way the CPS is working. This statement is also demonstrated by the fact that diverse movements in the last time have been able to attract youths and that is why they will be analysed in subsequent chapters in order to develop this argument.

2.4 Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to map the patterns and forms of political
disaffection among Chilean youths since the return to democracy in 1990, and to observe if Chilean youths are also apathetic. This chapter fits the main goal of this research, since one necessary step to understand the factors associated with political disaffection is to comprehend descriptively the phenomenon being studied.

The first main observation from the analyses is that Chilean youths present quite high levels of behavioural disaffection and that their levels are comparatively higher than the one of other age groups. It was observed that youths are the group that are using less the channels of participation given by the formal structures of the political system as they have very low rates of voting registration, partisan membership and party identification. Furthermore, it was observed that these levels are low, even when compared with some other Latin American countries, and that they are the product of a declining tendency that started in the mid-1990s.

Low levels of political participation have been a highly-discussed topic in Chile. There are several positions that analyse these same trends and that also try to determine how worrisome this situation is. There are some authors who argue that this phenomenon is not as negative as it could be thought, because it might reflect feelings of contentment with a system that has provided political and economic development (Lehmann, 1999). Other positions believe the electoral law explains much of this situation (INJUV, 2008). Finally, other scholars state that low participation is undoubtedly reflecting feelings of hostility (Carlin, 2006, 2004).

These findings contribute to this discussion given that the analysed evidence also suggests associations between indicators of attitudinal disaffection and the fact of being registered to vote. In this sense, the results obtained could confirm the assumption that rejecting formal channels of participation can be understood as expressions of feelings of hostility towards the political system. Current low levels of participation could be also explained by the effects of electoral law and by the fact that rates were previously higher due to the historical moment Chile experienced in 1988 with the transition. However, based on the results of the regression analyses, the observation that Chilean levels are much lower than those of other Latin American countries, and the fact that a new electoral system produced even less participation, it
cannot be denied that low rates of participation are expressing political disaffection and not conformity or disinterest with the political system.

With respect to attitudinal disaffection, it was observed that current levels are also quite low. In relation to this issue, it is interesting to highlight that there are great differences regarding the patterns of their diverse forms. Although levels of democracy support are not high, they have not decreased since the return to democracy. On the other hand, levels of confidence in the congress, and especially in political parties, are currently very low and have declined sharply with the passing of years.

Chilean youths are also expressing then through their attitudes high feelings of hostility towards the political system, with political parties the element at which these feelings are principally directed. Chile has the lowest rate of youth confidence in political parties in Latin America and the highest difference between youths and adult’s levels of confidence in favour of adults. Moreover, it was also observed that this indicator is the one with the strongest association with levels of electoral participation. This situation is particularly interesting since political parties are comparatively more relevant to the Chilean case than for other Latin American countries. Political parties are the most important form of political representation in Chile as other forms of representation are absent in the Chilean context (Panizza, 2009). They have historically been the central institution of the political system in Chile, and their role in achieving today’s high levels of political and economic stability has been crucial.

Other relevant findings obtained from these analyses were associations found between socio-demographic variables and indicators of both dimensions of political disaffection. SES was associated with almost all indicators in the direction that people from lower SES were found to be more disaffected. Regarding some indicators of attitudinal disaffection, something unexpected arose since youths from the lowest SES were less disaffected than youths from other status. This fact might be explained by the focalised social policies that have been followed by Chilean governments which have reached only the poorest sectors of society.

Age was also associated with several measures of political disaffection. Something
peculiar also occurred, as younger youths tended to be more behaviourally disaffected but less attitudinally disaffected than older youths. Concerning associations between gender and political disaffection, it was only found that for some indicators of attitudinal disaffection, women were more disaffected than men.

Finally, this chapter also discussed evidence to observe if, apart from being described as disaffected, Chilean youths can be also characterised as being apathetic. In this sense, the evidence suggested that Chilean youths are not apathetic on the whole, since they are participating in other types of organisations and because they use non-conventional means of participation. Moreover, it was also found that they have critical opinions, which shows they are interested in the fate of society. Therefore, it can be argued that youth political disaffection cannot be explained by feelings of lack of interest. To this effect, this finding can be argued to be the first step in testing the main hypothesis of this thesis to be developed in further chapters as the fact that youths are not apathetic means they are politically disaffected due to a particular way of functioning that the Chilean political system has developed.

All in all, by doing this chapter it was possible to have a deep understanding of the main assumption of this research: that Chilean youths are currently highly disaffected with formal political structures. The evidence strongly suggested that despite Chile’s economic and political achievements of last twenty years, Chilean youths are expressing feelings of hostility towards the political system through behaviours and attitudes. In this sense, based on the obtained findings it can be reaffirmed that, at least concerning young people, Chile is currently experiencing a crisis of political representation. In Mainwaring’s terms, it can be stated that Chile is living a situation where patterns of representation are unstable and citizens believe they are not well-represented (2004). This situation is quite worrisome as it was stated that the consolidation of a democracy should not be only constitutional, but also behavioural and attitudinal, as formal rules have to be internalised, accepted and valued by the public (Philip, 2001). Chilean democracy seems to be working formally and constitutionally well. However, Chilean citizens are not sufficiently supporting their institutions, which is what finally justifies a deep analysis regarding the main sources that explain this phenomenon.
Chapter 3: Youth political disaffection and perceptions about the way the Chilean political system works: a quantitative – qualitative analysis

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter the evidence strongly suggested that Chilean youths are highly politically disaffected. Moreover, it was also observed that they are showing an interest in the fate of society, which allowed the statement that they are not predominantly apathetic but that they are mostly rejecting the way Chilean politics is currently being executed. It is now necessary to take a step forward and start analysing the main features of Chilean politics associated with these feelings of hostility towards the political system. In this sense, the main objective of this chapter is to start developing an explanation of the phenomenon under study through several quantitative and qualitative analyses of the relationship between political disaffection and youths’ perceptions of the way the Chilean political system (CPS) works.

This chapter, then, is the first approximation to the testing of the main hypothesis of this thesis: that Chilean youths’ political disaffection can be mainly explained by the particular way the CPS has worked after the transition, which has increased the gap between young people and the political system generating feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy. 41

In order to accomplish this objective, this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first analyses some alternative explanations that were found to not be theoretically relevant in the case of Chilean youths. The second examines descriptive quantitative data that brings a first approximation of some perceptions that are generating political disaffection. Finally, the third analyses links between perceptions about the political system and political disaffection combining multivariate quantitative analyses with the analysis of primary qualitative data.

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41 It is a first approximation since these links and a deeper understanding of them are complemented with the analysis of cases studies that will also show how the Chilean political system works and how Chilean youths perceive its functioning.
3.2 Analysing alternative explanations

The first thing to do in order to develop an account for Chilean youths’ political disaffection is to empirically analyse some alternative explanation of this phenomenon that does not seem to be adequately interpreting the Chilean case. These explanations were deeply developed and discussed in the theoretical framework, and it is now necessary to empirically test them.42

The first explanation to be analysed is the one associated with the rise of critical citizens with post-material values. The main argument of this explanation is that a better standard of living, higher levels of education and the expansion of mass communication have brought more critical citizens with post-materialist orientations. This is to be linked to political disaffection, since party systems would not be adapting themselves to these new orientations and because these citizens tend to be more sceptical of authority and hierarchical procedures (Inglehart 1990, Dalton, 2006, 2007).

The first thing to do in order to analyse this explanation is to observe those issues that Chilean youths declare are the most relevant to be solved in Chile. As shown in table 3.1, when Chilean youths are asked about this issue, almost 80% refer to materialist issues. The most relevant issues are improvements on health, unemployment and poverty conditions. In this sense, these data clearly indicates that Chilean youths have not developed post-materialist orientations, on the whole.

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42 The analysis is mostly based on quantitative data since, as these explanations were not appropriate in the case of Chilean youths, the qualitative material does not bring almost any reference regarding them.
Table 3.1 - Most relevant issues to be solved in Chile according to Chilean youths (15-29) 43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To improve health conditions of people</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reduce unemployment</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reduce poverty</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve the distribution of wealth</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To eliminate child exploitation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To increase literacy rates</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MATERIALIST ISSUES</strong></td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assert human rights</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve the environment</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To work for the peace</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSTMATERIALIST ISSUES</strong></td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second way this explanation can be tested is by observing fitted probabilities based on regression analysis, where indicators of political disaffection are tested against an indicator of value orientations. With respect to that, it can be observed in figure 3.1 that, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables, there are not significant associations between these variables. The only significant difference is the one between materialist youths and those with mixed orientations regarding the probability of having confidence in political parties. However, the direction of this association is in the opposite direction of what should be expected to confirm this explanation, since youths with materialist orientations have less confidence than post-materialist youths. In this sense, beyond the reasons previously stated to rule out this explanation, it can be argued now, based on empirical data, that Chilean youths’ political disaffection is not being entirely explained by the rise of more critical citizens with post-material values.

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43 This question is based on respondents’ three mentions that were rounded to percentages.

4 All fitted probabilities to be shown in this section are based on logistic regression models where indicators of these alternative explanations were added to those variables associated with explanations for political disaffection that were observed to be significantly associated with the dependent variables. The rest of the variables of the models were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a woman, aged 23, who is fairly interested in politics, that believes that the congress represent well people’s interests and who does not agree neither disagree with the statements “Political Parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies”, “I don’t think that the government cares much what people like me think” and “Political Parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies”. To see which variables were included in each model check the appendix 1 where the coefficients of all the models are presented.
Figure 3.1 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean Youth (18-29) with different value orientations


The second explanation to be analysed has to do with the association between problems of social cohesion and the emergence of feelings of political disaffection where it is argued that political disaffection is one of many consequences of a decline of social capital to have occurred in recent decades (Putnam, 2000). This account is also tested through regression analyses where it can be tested if those youths with less social capital are more politically disaffected.

In figure 3.2 it is possible to observe that, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables, there are a couple of significant associations between indicators of political disaffection and levels of social capital. However, their interpretations are quite confusing since the directions of these associations are not the same. Those youths with more social capital are supporting more democracy as a form of government, but at the same time they have less confidence in the congress. Regarding electoral participation and confidence in the congress, it can be observed that they are not associated with levels of social capital.
If this explanation is to be accurate it should be expected that those youths with less social capital were those most politically disaffected. This is clearly not the case, since it was only found that those more disaffected regarding the values of democracy have less social capital and an opposite association was even found. Moreover, the effect of social capital on electoral participation, where this approach has mostly focused, is null. These data reconfirms, then, analyses of the previous chapter, where it was observed that levels of social participation are much higher than levels of formal political participation. In this sense, based on empirical data, it can also be argued that problems of social cohesion are not the main determinants of Chilean youths’ political disaffection.

Finally, a couple of explanations related to political perceptions can be tested. The first is the association between feelings of hostility and perceiving high levels of corruption among political parties. This association is also tested using fitted probabilities based on regression analyses, where several indicators of political disaffection were tested against an indicator of this explanation.
Figure 3.3 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean youths (18-29) with different opinions regarding corruption spreading in political parties

From the four associations tested using these indicators, only the ones regarding electoral registration and democracy support were found to be statistically significant. However, as it can be observed from figure 3.3, the directions of these associations are in the opposite direction of what should be expected. Those youths perceiving more corruption have higher probabilities of electoral participation and higher probabilities of supporting democracy. Therefore, youth political disaffection cannot be also attributed to the perception of high levels of corruption. This situation is also expectable since Chile has been highlighted as the country in the continent with the lowest level of corruption perception (Transparency International, 2010).

Finally, it can be tested whether political disaffection is associated with what has been called ‘internal political efficacy’, which is the belief that one can understand politics and therefore participate in politics. If this explanation was appropriated, it should find that those youths who feel they have a low understanding of politics are more politically disaffected.

This explanation was also tested through regression analyses and it can be observed from figure 3.4 that, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables, there are no significant associations between the way in which the way an understanding of politics is perceived and indicators of political disaffection. Those youths who feel they do not have a good understanding of relevant political issues are not expressing more hostility towards the political system.
This association is also relevant to some findings of the qualitative data, since from interviews with both politically-involved youths and politicians a deep perception was found that current high levels of disaffection regarding the values of democracy are associated with a lack of civic education. The evidence analysed suggested that levels of democracy support are not higher among youths who perceive to a bad understanding of political issues. However, it is quite clear that this finding does not completely discard the association between a lack of civic education and low support for democratic values. This is an issue that should be more extensively tested through, for example, the analysis of associations between indicators of democracy support and questions that measure political knowledge. Unfortunately, those indicators were not available in the surveys analysed, which limits the analysis of the determinants of political disaffection somewhat.

In summary, it could be observed that these alternative explanations cannot properly account for high levels of Chilean youths’ political disaffection. They did not also have a counterpart in the qualitative data. The only issues that appeared were links between individualism and political disaffection, where it was argued young people do not involve themselves politically as they do not care about each other’s problems, and links between lack of civic education and feelings of political disaffection. This associations, however, do not seem to be accurate when quantitative
empirical data is was analysed since it was already observed that Chilean youths’ are not mainly apathetic and that feelings of internal efficacy are not associated with feelings of political disaffection.

### 3.3 Linking political disaffection with the way the Chilean political system works

**Descriptive quantitative analysis**

In this section descriptive quantitative data taken from surveys measuring political attitudes among Chilean youths are analysed in order to gain an initial idea about central perceptions of the CPS that generate feelings of hostility towards the political system.

The first useful data for this purpose is the distribution of reasons for not being registered to vote. On table 3.2, it is first possible to observe that the great majority of respondents (69%) give reasons associated with negative evaluations of the CPS when they are asked why they are not registered. The evidence indicates, then, that this indicator of behavioural disaffection cannot be explained by current electoral rules. Moreover, it also suggests that Chilean youths are mostly disaffected rather than disengaged from politics. Indeed, the fact that with a new registration system based on automatic registration and voluntary voting it was estimated that only 15% of new voters voted in the last municipal election in 2012 reaffirm this statement (La Tercera, 2012a).
Regarding perceptions about the CPS that are associated with feelings of political disaffection, it is possible to observe that youths who perceive that politics is not meaningful and who have perceptions of lack of representation clearly have less chance of registering to vote. Believing that politics does not solve people’s problems is particularly more relevant for youths from lower SES and women, while feelings of lack of representation seem to be more relevant for youths from higher SES and men.\(^{45}\)

The second way some perceptions about the CPS that are associated with political disaffection can be identified is by analysing youth perceptions of defects of political parties. As shown in table 3.3, the most stated defect is that political parties favour their interests over the interests of the country. This defect, alongside the perception that political parties do not represent people’s interests (the third-highest frequency),

\(^{45}\) Two of the reasons for not voting, lack of interest in politics and distrust, cannot be analysed since they are indicators of political disaffection rather than possible determinants of it.
are clearly associated with one of the features observed in the previous table about problems of representation. Chilean youths are therefore of the opinion that their interests are not being represented by political parties, which makes them reject them as well as withdraw from formal instances of political participation. They seem to feel that their interests are not being represented because politicians prefer to favour their own interests instead of the interests of the population.

Table 3.3 - Defects of political parties according to Chilean youths (18-29) by, SES, age group and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SES</th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They favour their interests over the interests of the country</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are sharply divided in groups, there is in-fighting</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They do not represent people's interests</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They select bad candidates for elections</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They hamper decision-making in the government</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They monopolise public discussion</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They facilitate corruption in the state</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't see any defect</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010 n: 331.

Other important defects that can be observed are that political parties have a lot of internal fighting and often select bad candidates. These two issues are related to how youths perceive the internal functioning of political parties. In this sense, it can be observed that, apart from feelings of lack of representation and the ineffectiveness of politics, the manner in which political parties work internally is also engendering political disaffection. Another issue to highlight is that corruption is the defect with the lowest percentage, which reaffirms previous evidence that this problem would not be associated with feelings of political disaffection.

46 The numbers of the following table are based on three mentions of the respondents that were rounded to percentages.
With respect to socio-demographic variables, the only variable that creates a difference is SES. Among youths from the high SES, lack of representation and corruption come up for mentions as the main defects while in-fighting seems to be more relevant for youths from the medium and low SES.

The third and last descriptive way hostile perceptions about the CPS can be analysed is through the observation of those situations that would make apathetic youths be more interested in politics. These data are useful since politics is clearly understood here as formal politics. Therefore, these situations can be analysed as conditions that would make youths less politically disaffected.

The first interesting thing to observe from table 3.4 is that more than three quarters of apathetic youths would be more interested in politics if something changed. This evidence contributes to the prior assumption that Chilean youths are not totally apathetic, as even those youths qualified as being the most apathetic would be interested in politics if it were developed differently.

Table 3.4 - Situations that would make apathetic Chilean youths (15-29) more interested in politics by SES, age group and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>SES</th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If political activity were more transparent</td>
<td></td>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>20-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I had any personal benefit</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I felt that politics could do something to build a better society</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I didn’t feel that power is the only objective that drives the political class</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I understood how laws that are discussed in the congress affect me</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


47 Apathetic youths are young people who don’t show any political interest in participating in any kind of organisation, who don’t talk about politics and who don’t have critical opinions of certain elements of the Chilean political system. This question is only analysed in this group because it was only asked to it in the analysed survey.

48 The numbers of the following table are based on two mentions and the sum of the percentages is not equal to 100% since several respondents mentioned only one situation.
Looking at the percentages of table 3.4, it is possible to affirm that transparency in political activity is the most important situation that what would make apathetic youths more interested in politics. This table reaffirms, then, that the internal functioning of political parties is being perceived as problematic by Chilean youths and that it is a feature of current Chilean politics that is associated with disaffection. The second and third situations with the highest percentages are related, since both are associated with considering politics as meaningless. More than half of youths then would be less politically disaffected if politics had a real sense of change for them. About the fourth situation, the fact that young people would be more interested in politics if they didn’t feel politicians are only driven by power can be connected with feelings of lack of representation observed in previous tables. It can be seen from the evidence that it seems Chilean youths feel the political class favours its interests over the country’s interests and that those favoured interests are strongly associated with the attainment of power at the expense of citizens’ interests.

Regarding associations between socio-demographic variables and these situations, it can be observed that more transparency, and not feeling that power is the only aim that drives politicians, will specially make youths from higher SES, older age groups and males be more interested in politics. Increasing feelings of political meaningfulness regarding the whole society are more relevant for middle class youths, while political meaningfulness for personal benefits is more important to youths from the lowest SES.

Overall, from all the evidence analysed from descriptive quantitative data, it is possible to broadly identify three main types of perceptions about the CPS that are associated with feelings of political disaffection: feelings of lack of representation, political inefficacy and perceptions about the internal functioning of political parties. It is important to note that the first two features coincide with central assumptions of this thesis, as it was previously hypothesised that youths’ political disaffection can be mostly explained by a disconnection between common citizens and formal politics expressed through feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy. In this sense, perceptions about the internal functioning of political parties emerge as a new attribute to be considered in further analyses that complement previous hypothesis regarding the disconnection between citizens and politics.
Multivariate quantitative and qualitative analyses

In this section a much deeper analysis of linkages between perceptions about the way the political system works and feelings of political disaffection triangulating quantitative with qualitative data is carried out. The structure of the analysis is based on findings of the previous part where links between each of the three types of perceptions and feelings of political disaffection are separately analysed. For each one quantitative data is first analysed using logistic regression models. Afterwards, qualitative data collected from interviews conducted with politically-involved youths and politicians is used to deepen those findings in order to understand those mechanisms behind the observed associations.

3.3.1 Feelings of lack of representation

The first type of perception about the CPS to be analysed regarding its associations with political disaffection is the feeling of lack of representation. These feelings are understood as feelings of lack of substantive representation, as this is the only dimension of representation that provides standards for deciding if politicians are representing well or badly (Pitkin, 1967). This was hypothesised as one of the main determinants of this phenomenon, as central features of the CPS, such as the homogenisation and moderation of politics, are supposedly generating representativeness problems (Garretón, 2007, Baño, 1993). Moreover, in the descriptive part it was observed that problems of representation were relevant issues regarding the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection. It is necessary now to complement these analyses in order to observe whether other evidence can support more strongly the statement that Chilean youths’ disaffection is associated with feelings of lack of representation.

49 The separation of these three aspects is merely an analytical distinction since they are clearly associated as they are all elements that express a disconnection between the political world and young people. These three aspects are presented separately but in the last part of the chapter there is a discussion where they are integrated in order to generate a coherent argument.

50 All quantitative analyses are based on binary logistic regression models where indicators of political disaffection (electoral participation, confidence in political parties and the congress and democracy support) were analysed against possible explanatory variables controlling for some socio-demographic variables (age, gender and SES). This section only shows fitted probabilities of those models where only significant associations were plotted. To see the results of regressions models more detailed go to appendix two.
In figure 3.5 it is possible to notice that, controlling for some relevant socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables\textsuperscript{51}, the way youths perceive how the congress represents people’s interests is significantly associated with confidence in both political parties and the congress. The better one thinks the congress represents people’s interests, the higher the probability of having confidence in both institutions. Moreover, it can be observed that this association is stronger in the case of confidence in political parties. Therefore, using Pitkin’s concept of substantive representation (1967), it can be argued that when youths do not feel people’s wishes and opinions are being accurately reflected by representatives they tend to develop feelings of political disaffection. This evidence confirms, then, in the case of Chilean youths, that the level of representation affects citizens’ support for the system in the sense that when people perceive that they are not well-represented they tend to reduce their political support (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, Stoker, 2006).

**Figure 3.5 - Fitted probabilities of having confidence in political institutions for Chilean youths (18-29) with different opinions regarding the way the congress represents people’s interests**\textsuperscript{52}

![Graph showing fitted probabilities of having confidence in political institutions for different perceptions of congress representation]

*Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331.*

\textsuperscript{51} What this statement and other similar statements of this chapter means by “controlling for other explanatory variables” can be observed in the appendix 2 where the regression coefficients of every variable included in each model are presented.

\textsuperscript{52} The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a man, aged 23, who is fairly interested in politics and who does not agree neither disagree with the statements “Political parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies”, “Political parties encourage people to be active in politics” and “I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think”. This last variable was only used for the calculation of the fitted probabilities regarding confidence in the congress since it was not significantly associated with the variable measuring confidence in political parties.
Youth public policy

The association between not feeling substantively represented and a rejection of formal politics can be more deeply understood with the help of qualitative data. One of the main issues arising from the interviews was the perception that the political system is not implementing public policies for the youth population since they are not a priority because young people are not voting. It is also observed that Chilean youths express hostility towards the political system, not only because they don’t obtain material returns but also because they realise that what explains this situation is the existence of a pragmatic political class that does not benefit itself by implementing youth public policies.

"I have friends who are leaders of the UDI and RN and we have the same criticism. Political parties have focused on making policies for themselves and not for young people. You perceive that as a young citizen. You perceive how politics is done. The decision-making. How you see if a politician is lying. Those are political forms that do much damage." Eugenia, militant of the youth division of the PS.

"In general, the youth is not linked to political parties because they do not represent them. They don’t see themselves as represented since they do not legislate around youth, and since most young people do not vote, they do not worry about them." Mariano, member of a left-wing political organisation.

This perception is linked to the whole political class and can be found among youths who participate in political parties and in other types of organisations. Young people feel that politicians are particularly disinterested with respect to youth issues. Moreover, they perceive that this disinterest is expressed not only by a lack of policies but also in the way politicians try to generate ties with them. They don’t feel captivated by politicians in any sense, either by policies or by the spaces that formal politics offer them to be politically integrated. As shown in the following quotes, these perceptions are also shared by politicians from different sectors that have been involved in youth legislation issues.

"The fact of not feeling represented has to do with the inability of the political world to create an attractive youth offer. From how you communicate, which spaces are used by the political activity or how you ascribe as a politician to involve young people. From there until getting to the theme of public policy and legislation." Woman, deputy of the PDC, member of the last youth commission of the congress.

"Politicians think that the young do not vote, and I do not care. In all political sectors I feel that you speak about youth and it’s like "ok, goodbye". So, obviously if you have
that disposition they see it.” Woman, deputy of RN, and member of the last youth commission of the congress.

The data imply that there are no incentives for young people to participate in formal politics since the political class is particularly disconnected from them, mostly by the fact that they are not registered to vote. This disconnection is expressed in a lack of policies as well in the way politicians approach young people. This situation is perceived by youths themselves and it seems to create a vicious circle. The less connected the political class is with respect to youth issues, the less formal political participation by this group, which finally increases the gap between both parts even more.

The absence of youth public policies described has previously been highlighted by several authors in Chile (Asún, 2006, Dávila, 2008). The main argument is that the Chilean state lacks both a youth public policy that guides state institutions and youth institutions able to influence the actions of the state. Moreover, it is argued that youth policies are also difficult establish, since there are not consultative and deliberative instances where youths can be represented. In this sense, it can be observed that deficiencies regarding policy response for young people contribute to understanding the meaning of feelings of lack of representation among youths. Moreover, it is necessary to highlight that this is a particularly interesting finding, as this issue also explains why youths are particularly more disaffected than other groups.

**Representation of powerful interests**

A second issue that can be analysed regarding problems of representation is the perception that the political system has represented powerful interests more strongly than the interests of the whole citizenry. This topic is relevant to be analysed as it was previously hypothesised that one of the main features of the current Chilean democracy generating problems of representation is a lack of power balance that favours business interests (Garretón, 2007, Taylor, 2004). In table 3.5 it is possible to observe fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection regarding their

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53 The relation between a lack of youth public policy and feelings of political disaffection is developed later in a whole chapter of the thesis.
opinion of the biggest beneficiaries of the form Chile is governed by, specified by SES for those indicators where interaction terms were found to be statistically significant.

Table 3.5 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean youths (18-29) with different opinions of the form Chile is governed with respect to its biggest beneficiaries and with different SES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion / SES</th>
<th>Probability of voting in the elections</th>
<th>Probability of having confidence in the congress</th>
<th>Probability of having confidence in Political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Whole Youth Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile is governed for the good of all</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile is governed for the benefit of a few powerful interests</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in table 3.5, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables, opinions regarding the way Chile is governed are clearly significantly associated with electoral participation among youths from the low and high status. The directions of these associations, however, are not the same. While youths from lower classes increase their probability of voting when they believe that Chile is governed for the good of all, youths from the high status decrease it. Regarding confidence in the congress, a similar situation is observed with the differences that the association between these two variables is weaker among youths from the high status, and that there is also an association among youths from the medium status, which is in the same direction than that of low class youths.

With respect to confidence in political parties, the effect of this opinion on it does not vary across socio-economic statuses, and it is only possible to observe that taking the whole youth population, there is a significant association between these two variables in the sense that those who believe Chile is governed for the good of all have more confidence in political parties.

54 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a man, aged 23 and that believe that the best way to contribute to change things is to participate in protest movements. For the case of confidence in political parties the interaction between the opinion regarding how Chile is governed and SES was not significantly associated with the dependent variable. Therefore it was not analysed taking into account SES. The SES of those fitted probabilities was fixed at a person from the medium SES.
The evidence indicates, then, that there is an association between believing that the political system benefits powerful interests and behavioural and attitudinal disaffection in most of the cases. It is also interesting to observe that class seems to play an important role, since richer youths are less disaffected when they believe powerful interests are being favoured. This could hypothetically mean that when rich youths see their interests being favoured they tend to reduce their hostility towards the political system. Poorer youths, on the other hand, are those who most increase their hostility when they feel powerful interests are benefited by the way the country is governed.

When the qualitative data is analysed in order to understand what youths understand as powerful interests, the first figures identified are big entrepreneurs, which somehow reaffirms previous hypotheses about this issue. It is observed that, especially among youths who are not part of political parties, there is the perception that some politicians from both central coalitions often opt to represent the interests of big entrepreneurs rather than those of the whole citizenry. The role that political lobbyism plays in this situation is also perceived when they observe that members of the political class are directly involved in the defence of these powerful interests, which provokes dissolution and a loss of confidence in the political system.

"I got into an organisation against Pascualama and I realised that Frei had sold the country in relation to mining issues. I saw that the daughters of Belisario Velasco were carrying the image cleaning of Barrick. So, with that level of nastiness, how can you trust someone? And Bachelet promised that she would not sign Pascualama and Lagos signed in the transition. From then until now I do not vote and I regret being registered. I lost my confidence of any person who is in politics." Francisca, member of an ecologist organisation.

Feelings of distrust, which also seem to increase levels of behavioural disaffection, arise, then, when youths observe that politicians use their influences to favour powerful interests. A rejection to this political practice has been particularly relevant recently, since many youths went to the streets early in 2011 to protest against the installation of thermoelectric plants in the Patagonia for the megaproject Hidroaysén. The main argument to reject this project was based on ecological issues but they were

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55 To contextualize the quote is important to state that Belisario Velasco is an important member of the PDC and that Barrick is a Canadian company that is in charge of a mining project in the north of Chile called Pascualama.
also claiming that the project would increase the power of big companies. Moreover, they argued that both political coalitions have not had the will to oppose the project, but have favoured it despite much opposition of citizens’ groups. Additionally, the present-day educational social movement has claimed that the current educational system benefits big entrepreneurs, as one of its main pillars is the existence of unregulated private universities whose owners illegally use to profit.

The evidence suggests, then, that the hypothesised association between an imbalance of power and feelings of lack of representation that finally engender political disaffection seems to be accurate. A central attribute of the post-authoritarian CPS has been a technocratic style of policy-making, where the privileged participation of powerful entrepreneurial associations have prevented several debates such as discussing alternatives to the current neoliberal socio-economic model (Rindfjall, 2009, P. Silva, 2006, Camargo, 2007). In this sense, the data suggest Chilean youths are expressing a rejection to that way of doing politics since they feel excluded in a context where relevant societal input is limited to business associations. The rejection of the Hidroaysén project alongside current educational mobilisations would be the main recent examples of these situations, as both movements have criticised the fact that decisions are only made by few people, which finally only reproduces the interests of powerful groups.

**Representation of the interests of the political class**

Another issue that can contribute to understanding current youth feelings of lack of representation is also related to those interests that are favoured by the way Chile is governed. From the qualitative data it is possible to observe that Chilean youths strongly perceive that the political class is more interested in representing their own interests than those of common citizens. In the first section of this chapter it was observed that Chilean youths argue this was the major defect of political parties and with the help of the interview material, this affirmation can now be more deeply understood. What is observed is that youths perceive that the main principle driving the actions of the political class is to reproduce their power positions, which finally limits the representation of common citizen interests.
"A feeling of disenchantment arises when you see that politicians are people who are only watching out for their things or their group and not for the good of the country. That is the impression I have of why we have that level of disenchantment with more traditional political parties." Marcelo, member of an ecologist organisation.

"Definitely some practices of political parties do not identify with the youth. I think that is the basis of disaffection. They are political practices where party interests take precedence over the common good. In political parties, before the common good to take care, the good of the party and their own egos have priority." Woman, deputy of RN.

The political class is therefore perceived as reproducing a style of politics where the common good of society is not the first priority, but the defence of corporative interests. This is clearly problematic since the impression is that politics is currently only about a struggle for power rather than for the wellbeing of citizens, which reduces its usefulness. Moreover, it is believed that since politicians are more dedicated to struggling for their own interests, it is relevant issues such as high levels of inequality are not approached, which would generate feelings of hostility towards the political system.

This finding can be also connected with some hypothesised features of Chilean democracy that increase the gap between common citizens and the political system. It was previously argued that since 1990 the spectrum of political discussion has been strongly reduced in order to avoid political conflict (Garretón, 2007, Moulian, 2002). The evidence now suggests that this style of politics is somehow being perceived by Chilean youths as they feel politics is not an arena of relevant discussion and that relevant debates, such as social inequality, are excluded. This last fact indicates that youths seem to be aware of the process described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) where elites limit the scope of the political process to topics that are innocuous to them. To this effect, current high levels of income inequality of Chilean society would be an expression of a political class that, as it is disconnected from common people, avoids the discussion of relevant issues.

What can be added to these monographic descriptions is that Chilean youths perceive that the avoidance of these topics is also based on the fact that politicians are more worried about their own power interests, rather than those of common citizens. The fact that youths perceive that one of the main elements of current politics is the reproduction of power positions at the expense of citizens’ interests can be described
as a new element that can be added to those features of Chilean politics that generate political disaffection. In this sense, using Coppedge’s term (1994), it can be argued that youths perceive that Chilean democracy has elements of a *partyarchy* since it is believed that citizens’ interests are not being adequately represented because there is a style of politics where politicians tend to concentrate all political power in order to reproduce their positions.

*Participation Spaces*

Another relevant issue to be discussed with respect to the relationship between feelings of lack of representation and political disaffection has to do with how young people perceive the way the political system generates channels of participation. This is a relevant issue because Chile has been described as having an elitist democracy based on a technocratic style of policy-making where political parties tend to demobilise citizens rather than generating authentic spaces of participation (Huneeus, 2003, P. Silva, 2004).

In figure 3.6 it is possible to observe the association between indicators of political disaffection and perceptions about how the government worries about what the people believe. The first thing to observe is that, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other relevant independent variables, there is a significant association between believing the government does not care what people think and confidence in the congress and democracy support. The more you agree with the statement "I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think", the less confidence you have in the congress and the less you support democracy. It can be also observed that the effect of this perception on democracy support is stronger for youths from higher SES.
The perception that the political system is not connected with the citizenry to enable them to be politically represented can be also deepened with the aid of the interview material. The main idea observed is that representation is weak since there are no spaces to exercise it. This would be explained by the fact that political parties are closed to societal inputs, as they only care about reproducing their power positions. Within this context, young people would be again the most affected since it is perceived that youth organisations are those ones less appealed by the political class.

"I think we have not been able to create a mechanism that gives expression to what is happening with adults as well as with young people. The main problem has to do with the fact that we worried more about being a government than a political party. We moved away from the citizenry. We moved away from the neighbourhood councils and social organisations and we dedicated to govern."

Hugo, member of the youth division of the PPD.

"Politics is something done behind people's backs that they later have to support. Therefore, how young people will rely on political parties when they see that they exist for the vote but they do not exist for decisions. They do not exist for participation. It is something that is simply from top to bottom but never from bottom to top." Héctor, member of a left wing organisation.

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56 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a man, aged 23, who thinks that corruption is somehow widespread among political parties for the fitted probabilities of democracy support. For the fitted probabilities of having confidence in the congress the values where a man, aged 23, from the medium SES, who is fairly interested in politics, that believes that the congress represent people’s interests well and who does not agree or disagree with the statements “Political parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies” and “Political parties encourage people to be active in politics”.
The responsibility of this closeness is believed to be more in the Concertación because since the transition it was more worried about governing than being connected with the citizenry. This feature of Chilean politics has been previously highlighted by Angell (2005) as he stated that political parties in Chile since 1990 have mostly been agents of government rather than agents of representation and that that has been crucial for attaining high levels of political stability. The evidence suggests that this fact is also perceived by youths. However, it is believed that this is a source of political disaffection, rather than a positive thing. Political parties, then, would be engendering feelings of hostility since, as they are not connected with people through authentic mechanisms of participation, common citizens feel parties are not an option to defend or represent ideas.

This feature of Chilean politics was also hypothesised as being a source of political disaffection and the empirical date seems to also suggest its accurateness. As it was previously argued, since 1990 Chilean democracy has demobilised civil society by severely limiting links between formal politics and common citizens (Roberts, 1999). This process of demobilisation would explain, then, the lack of spaces for exercising political representation that are generating political disaffection among Chilean youths. In this sense, it can be observed that Chilean youth’s beliefs coincide with previous theoretical ideas developed about the relationship between representation and participation, where it was argued that the only way to effectively represent people’s wishes is through authentic mechanisms of participation (Urbanati, 2000). Chilean youths seem to be aware that people gain political representation when representatives’ aims are subject to dialogue with common citizens (Plotke, 1997). Therefore, it is possible to state that political disaffection could be reduced if there were concrete spaces to participate and to exercise political representation.

**Political Offer**

The last aspect that is relevant to analyse regarding the association between problems of representation and political disaffection has to be with the heterogeneity of political offers. This issue is relevant to examine, as it has been argued that the current Chilean political system is based on the moderation of two similar coalitions
and that that situation generates problems of representativeness since with blurred ideological profiles sectorial social representation loses strength (Baño, 1993, Garretón, 2007). Moreover, some authors have also argued that homogeneous offers reduce political support as they generate problems of representation by limiting the expression of latent social conflicts (Mouffe, 1993).

As shown in figure 3.7, controlling for socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables, youth perceptions regarding the political offer given by political parties are significantly associated with confidence in both political parties and the congress. Those who agree more that political parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies have less confidence in political parties and in the congress. Moreover, it is also observed that this effect is stronger in the case of political parties.

**Figure 3.7 - Fitted probabilities of having confidence in political institutions for Chilean Youths (18-29) with different levels of agreements regarding whether there is a real choice of alternative public policies**

![Graph showing fitted probabilities of confidence in political institutions](image)

*Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331.*

The evidence indicates that young people are aware that Chilean politics brings a homogeneous political offer regarding relevant issues and that this perception

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57 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a man, aged 23, who is fairly interested in politics, that believes that the congress represent well people’s interests and who does not agree neither disagree with the statements “Political parties encourage people to be active in politics” and “I don’t think that the government cares much what people like me think”. This last variable was only used for the calculation of the fitted probabilities regarding confidence in the congress since it was not significantly associated with the variable measuring confidence in political parties.
generates political disaffection. The qualitative data can deepen the understanding of this link, as it is necessary to comprehend why this feature of Chilean democracy is being negatively evaluated. By analysing the interviews it can be observed that political homogeneity is seen as a harmful thing for many youths as it restricts political representation. Youths feel that political options are similar, more because the political system forces them to be similar than because there is an agreement based on the common good of society.

"I believe that the fact that they do not feel represented is because, if you see traditional political parties, they have administrated a political system for many years that if you see it from the economic and social point of view is very similar. Therefore, there is a system in which almost all political clusters agree and you see that inequality is worse than in African countries. You clearly see that something is failing." Marcelo, member of an ecologist organization.

"The young man who sits at home because both coalitions are alike feels that there is no difference between going to vote for one or for the other. I believe that we really do not get to pass on to a person young, which is the difference between voting for a deputy of RN or a deputy of the PRSD. Both sides point to the centre holding certain points." Raquel, member of the youth division of RN.

The basis of this situation is attributed to the binominal electoral system. The problem is that it reduces political discussion and transforms political activity in a matter of marketing rather than in a debate of ideas. Moreover, there is a feeling of distrust since it is difficult to believe that everybody agrees on a system that has many unsolved problems, such as huge levels of inequality. In this sense, it can be observed that high levels of inequality are again perceived as a problem that can be mainly explained by the acting of the political class, which reproduces feelings of hostility towards the political system.

The evidence indicates, then, that the homogeneity of the Chilean political system, which is principally given by the promotion of a pro-market model by both central coalitions, is associated with the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection. This therefore confirms the hypothesis that the existence of two moderate coalitions with reduced programmatic differences in terms of economic policies is an attribute of Chilean politics that generates problems of representation that finally engenders feelings of hostility towards the political system.
Another relevant issue to highlight is that the homogeneity of proposals is also generating political disengagement among some sectors of high-income youths who are not very hostile towards the political system. They feel that many things are not being played in politics because of the similarity of proposals, and they opt to avoid political participation. However, they do not do this because they feel that many things need to be changed, but because they are comfortable with the current situation and know that nothing will change that much.

In summary, with the combination of both quantitative and qualitative data it was possible to deeply understand the link between feelings of lack of representation and political disaffection in the case of Chilean youths. They are politically disaffected as they do not feel represented by the political system. This evidence reconfirms the statement that perceptions of lack of representation affects citizens’ support for a system, as the shallower the connections between elites and the common citizens, the less committed the citizens will be to the democratic regime (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Chilean youths do not feel they are being substantively well-represented, being problems of policy response, the fact that other interests than those of the citizenry are being better-represented, the lack of mechanisms of participation and political homogeneity the main issues that would be explaining these representativeness problems.

3.3.2 Feelings of political inefficacy

The second type of perceptions to be analysed with respect to their associations with feelings of political disaffection are feelings of political inefficacy. It was previously argued that feeling you cannot influence political processes can determine feelings of hostility towards the political system, since by feeling politically powerless you are expected to acquire negative sentiments about political objects (Pateman, 1970, Easton, 1975). Moreover, it was also observed that the way of functioning of the Chilean political system is supposedly engendering these kinds of feelings (Epstein, 2000, Garretón, 2007). In this sense, using both quantitative and qualitative data it is necessary to observe how the perception that people are not effective when involving themselves in politics is associated with feelings of political disaffection.
The first things to be observed are fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection regarding different opinions about the most effective way you can contribute to change things. As shown in Figure 3.8, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables, there are significant associations between youths’ opinions of the most effective way to change things and these four indicators of political disaffection. Those who believe that it is not possible to contribute to changing things in Chile are visibly more disaffected than those who believe you can contribute by voting or by participating in protest movements. Moreover, it can be also observed that regarding the probabilities of voting and of supporting democracy, there are also significant differences between those who believe electoral participation is the most effective way to contribute to changing things and those who believe you can contribute by participating in protest movements, the latter being the most disaffected.

58 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a woman, aged 23, from the medium SES and that believes the country is governed for the good of all. For the calculation of the fitted probabilities of supporting democracy, the variable that measures the perception regarding the biggest beneficiaries of the way Chile is governed was not included since it was not significantly associated with the dependent variable.

59 The distribution of the answers to this question also included a spontaneous answer coded as other means but since this category had low frequencies and an unclear interpretation it was not put in the figure although it was included in the model.
The evidence indicates, then, that the perception that no matter what you do you will not be able to produce relevant changes is generating political disaffection, which thus supports the hypothesis that Chilean youths are disaffected as the way of functioning of Chilean politics has generated feelings of political inefficacy. It is relevant to highlight that based on that perception, youth citizens are expressing hostility towards the whole spectrum of the political system, including its values, processes and institutions.

Table 3.6 - Distribution of the responses of Latin American youths (16-29) to the question: What is the most effective way in which you can contribute to change things?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Vote to choose those who defend my position</th>
<th>Participate in protest movements to demand changes</th>
<th>It is not possible to contribute to change things</th>
<th>Other Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Republic</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking Chile</td>
<td>18º</td>
<td>17º</td>
<td>1º</td>
<td>2º</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latinobarometro, 2008, n: 6891

Another relevant aspect to be discussed is the value young people give to electoral processes to change things in Chile. If the distribution of the responses of the previously analysed question is compared with the rest of Latin America, it is possible to reinforce the idea that Chilean youths don’t feel they can contribute to changing things through electoral participation. As shown in table 3.6, Chile is the country where least youths declared that voting is the most effective way to contribute to change
things. The counterpart of this is that Chile is the country where most youths stated it is not possible to contribute to changing things.

Perceptions about the ineffectiveness of electoral processes can be also observed in Figure 3.9, where fitted probabilities of registering to vote are plotted against opinions of the efficacy of formal participation. Controlling for socio-demographic variables and other explanatory variables, it is observed that those who believe the way you vote can influence what happens in the country have a higher probability of registering to vote than those who believe that the way you vote does not have an influence. In this sense, it seems even clearer that political disaffection and the belief that one is not effective when participating in politics go together in the case of Chilean youths.

**Figure 3.9 - Fitted probabilities of registering to vote voting for Chilean Youth (18-29) with different opinions regarding how the way you vote influence what happens in the country**

![Graph showing fitted probabilities of registering to vote](image)

*Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331.*

As it was the case with previous analyses, an understanding of the relationship between disaffection and inefficacy can be also deepened through the qualitative material. Regarding this issue, the main thing observed from the evidence is a strong belief about the pointlessness of politics in Chile. Politics is not perceived to be a vehicle of transformation, either for personal or societal interests, which makes Chilean youths feel that whatever they do things will not be changed. These perceptions make young people increase levels of behavioural disaffection. Moreover, they are even a source of feelings of hostility towards democratic values.

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60 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a woman, aged 23, from the medium SES and that is fairly interested in politics.
"We need to have the capacity to motivate and make people feel integrated with the political activity and feel that politics is effectively a way to solve problems. Many people think that we have deputies, senators but none are able to solve my issues or conflicts." **Pedro, member of the youth division of RN.**

"If you are involved in a phenomenon of hopelessness, if you feel that either doing something or not doing it will have the same results, obviously it will not matter much if we are in a democracy or in an authoritarian regime. If I feel that by organising myself I will not achieve that, I just feel like there is no democracy because in a democracy these notions must be balanced." **Susana, member of a lesbian organisation.**

Young people reject political parties and formal instances of participation, as they perceive that the fact that politics is not a space for transformation is explained by the existence of a political class that doesn't have political will, and that many times avoids discussing relevant issues. It is felt that although there are several things to be changed, these issues are not being approached since politicians do not have the will to do it. The main example of this situation is once more social inequality.

These perceptions are quite related to those analysed in the last section, where it was discussed that Chilean youths are disaffected since they perceive that the political class prefers to defend its interests rather than those of the citizenry. In this sense, it seems a political system that has been described as a space to administrate given conditions, rather than as a space to generate struggle for social improvements (Garretón, 2007, Moulian, 2002), is also engendering disaffection among the youth population by generating the belief that it is not possible to produce changes through formal politics. In fact, this link is also perceived by some members of the political class from left-wing parties.

"There is no incentive to vote. Why should a young person register to vote? If you finally do not make a substantive change in politics where politics believes again in utopias and believes in the need for change, it will be very difficult to motivate young people. Because there are also brutal and needed changes." **Deputy, ex member of the PS.**

"Low confidence in political parties in young people is because in the end, politics is not being the vehicle of transformation, nor something that makes sense to them with respect to the future." **Ex-deputy, member of the PPD.**

Chilean youths and some left-wing politicians perceive that the way Chilean politics is functioning is not allowing necessary transformations, and that is why it is believed youths generate perceptions of inefficacy that result in feelings of political disaffection. The evidence seems to suggest, then, the accurateness of the hypothesis
that disaffection is partly generated by a process where formal politics losses its meaning based on processes of demobilisation and depolitisation of relevant issues. It can be argued, therefore, that Chilean youths' levels of disaffection have been affected by the development of the post-authoritarian CPS, where the gentrification and moderation of politics has increased the gap between the citizenry and the political system by generating feelings of political inefficacy (P. Silva, 2004, Walter, 2008).

**Electoral system**

Feelings of political inefficacy were also found to be generated by a homogeneous political offer produced by the binominal electoral system. In the previous section it was discussed that this system is associated with feelings of disaffection, as it limits political representation by reproducing similar political offers. It can now be observed by the evidence from youths' perceptions that this system also generates disaffection, because the basis of a political system where changes are made with great difficulty seems to be this electoral system. This is because it practically delivers all the political power in a very predictable form to two very similar coalitions that do not need to advocate for significant transformations in order to reproduce their power positions.

"I feel young people are not charmed by politics because they feel that things will stay the same, that it does not matter if this or the other one is governing, why should I vote if that one is going to be elected anyway? And this is because of the binominal system since you have these so marked blocs and it is very complex to change something." **Amparo, member of the youth division of the PC.**

"I think that every year Chilean youths are registering less in electoral registers because they feel that their voice and their vote will not influence anything. This is actually a problem of the binominal system that prevents the emergence of new young candidates." **Diego, member of the youth division of the PPD.**

There is, then, a perception that the fact that the CPS does not produce relevant changes is somehow explained by the binominal electoral system. Electoral results, especially those of parliamentarian elections, are very predictable with this system since people practically just ratify candidates proposed by the two main coalitions (Arriagada, 1997). This is to generate few incentives for politicians to advocate deeper changes and it also excludes other relevant actors or the emergence of new actors, which makes the chances to produce relevant transformations even more limited. In this sense, it can be observed that one of the main perceptions to engender feelings of
disaffection is being generated by the main institution in charge to generate a political system based on the convergence of moderate positions (Baño, 1993).

**Internal Influence**

One last thing to analyse regarding the link between feelings of political disaffection and perceptions of political ineffectivity has to do with how young people who participate in political parties perceive their levels of influence within them. What is observed in the data is that youths who participate in political parties are, in general, advocating more spaces of influence. Although, some of them, especially from right-wing parties, are pleased with the current situation.

"You always have to be begging for space. What we obtained in the last time has to do with the participation in the decision-making of the Concertación. We took an important step in having some impact on macro politics of the Concertación but in previous times we have not had that." **Eugenia, member of the youth division of the PS.**

"If you analyse, you will notice that in the UDI the phenomenon that the directive does not take into account the youth division does not happen. The rule is at least one youth from the youth division competes in elections for councillors and for the political committee as any other person." **Ignacio, member of the youth division of the UDI.**

There is a feeling, then, that there should be more spaces to make youth divisions more influential within political parties and the fact that there are few spaces is a factor that explains low levels of youth participation among political parties. Youths from political parties also recognise, however, that many times youth militants are responsible for that since they don’t look for those spaces61. This situation was not previously hypothesised as generating disaffection. Therefore, it can be argued as a new-found element that seems to be relevant regarding the association between feeling that you are not effective when involved in politics and feeling hostility towards the political system.

The link between feelings of political ineffectivity and political disaffection was understood, then, by combining quantitative and qualitative data. Chilean youths are visibly feeling that when you get involved in politics you are not effective in producing relevant changes. This is generating feelings of hostility towards the political system,

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61 For a deep analysis of feelings of political efficacy among youth divisions of Chilean parties, see Espinoza and Madrid (2010).
which confirms to Chilean youths that, as people come to feel politically inefficacious, they perceive politics as normalness and tend to become primary subjects to acquire negative feelings about political objects (Easton, 1975).

3.3.3 Perceptions of the internal functioning of political parties

The third and last type of perceptions to be analysed with respect to its link to feelings of political disaffection are perceptions about the internal functioning of political parties. In the descriptive analysis of this chapter it was observed that Chilean youths perceive that political activity itself has some negative features that generate disaffection, such as a lot of in-fighting, bad selections of candidates and a lack of transparency. This was described as a new element found that was also determining feelings of political disaffection, and it is now necessary to analyse this issue more deeply. This would be done mostly with the use of qualitative data.62

Democratic functioning

The main issue that arose from the qualitative data is the perception that the internal functioning of political parties is not very democratic and transparent. Political parties are perceived to be instances where some bad practices take precedence over the generation of democratic spaces to participate. With respect to these bad practices, it is possible to distinguish a lack of transparency in the processes of admission of new militants and in the selection of candidates, an elitist form of decision-making and the primacy of party agreements over the wellbeing of society, among others.

"The disaffection that young people have has to do with bad practices. It has to do with seeing that parties are not pleasant instances to participate. There is little transparency in the admission. The instances of participation are also scarce. For example, when in the current political system there is not an institutional possibility to compete in primaries." Alfonso, member of the youth division of the PDC.

"Among political parties there is not even feedback. So, how do you want to have more participation of young people in those parties if parties themselves do not open elements to enable young people to be interested? Young people will see that they are

62 This is because those surveys analysed did not have good indicators to measure this type of perceptions.
not going to be taken into account. They are the gomas of parties."63 Héctor, member
of a left-wing organisation.

Political parties are not being perceived as transparent institutions where people
have spaces to participate and be part of decision-making processes. This is
particularly affecting young people, since with this form of functioning young people
are often used to only doing the hard work in campaigns. These bad practices are also
perceived to be associated with feelings of political disaffection by some members of
the political class, as they believe that parties are not open spaces for participating,
which moves young people away from them.

"Political parties today have not been able to create new spaces because their
structures are completely elitist. They are made of groups that are enclosed among
them, which administer electoral quotas and jobs in the government. The militancy of
parties is largely inactive and those who are involved participate in groups, sects or
internal clubs." Jorge Arrate, ex-presidential candidate for the non-parliamentary left
coalition.

"What I see in the case of young people is that they often enter to a party very excited.
But often they face the party machineries and that scares them immediately. Within
parties there are practices that deviate from the sense of broader politics. To fight for
the position. To use the party as a springboard. To search the space for personal power
rather than for collective power." Woman, deputy of the PDC.

Chilean political parties do not appear to be democratic, as the internal functioning
seems to favour small groups’ interests that do not advocate more democratic
mechanisms, as that could put their privileged positions at risk. The relevance of this
situation seems to be something that has not been highly analysed in the Chilean case
regarding the emergence of disaffection. Several authors have stated that Chilean
political activity is not as transparent as could be expected since, for example,
mechanisms for selecting candidates are not very democratic (Ruiz, 2009, Navia, 2004,
Siavelis, 2002). However, these analyses have not been sufficiently connected with the
emergence of disaffection and with broader features of Chilean politics. That is why
this thesis claims that the association between negative perceptions about the internal
functioning of political parties and feelings of hostility towards the political system can
be qualified as a new finding that contributes to the debate about the sources of
political disaffection.

63 To be a ‘goma’ is a Chilean slang term used to describe people who are subjugated to more powerful people
regarding the realisation of several duties that these powerful people are not willing to do.
**Adultcentrism**

Another important effect of the perceived undemocratic and elitist way of functioning of political parties, which is particularly affecting the youth population, is the reproduction of a political activity marked by a deep adult-centrism. Political parties are somehow monopolised by some small groups, where there are no transparent mechanisms to participate and to select candidates. Moreover, politicians know that youths are not voting. Therefore, a context within parties where youths have very few chances to be promoted to become candidates is generated. This is linked to feelings of political disaffection, since youth citizens do not see young candidates that advocate for interests more similar to theirs.

"I believe that young people do not feel represented because there are few young politicians. Regarding that, the right wing has done it better. They do not see people who are similar to them. You are going to have confidence in someone that you see as closer to you." Ruben, member of citizen movement.

"Political parties have been unable to open the doors to young people. We have deputies who have been in power for twenty years. These deputies go to re-elections indefinitely. Therefore, that might also discourage young people." Ignacio, member of the youth division of the UDI.

Popular elections often lack young candidates, since with current decision-making mechanisms of political parties it is very difficult for a young militant to obtain support to become a candidate. This clearly generates hostility among youths towards the political system, since they feel less represented with old candidates but also because they realise the source of this situation is the proper functioning of political parties that do not generate spaces for young people.

The lack of generational change in the political leadership has been also highlighted as a source of youth political disaffection in Chile (Dominguez, 2012). Using Pitkin’s concept of descriptive representation (1967), it can be argued that a lack of youth descriptive representatives, that is to say, the absence of youth representing youth, is to generate political disaffection. This is an important phenomenon since it has been argued that descriptive representation is especially beneficial in contexts of mistrust and where some interests are uncrystallised, which is clearly the current situation of Chilean youths (Mansbridge, 1999).
**Political Activation**

The last aspect to be analysed with respect to the link between political disaffection and perceptions about the internal functioning of political parties is also related to how political parties promote the participation of young people. In this sense, it can be observed from the data that not only the fact that political machineries limit the promotion of youth candidates within the parties is generating disaffection, but it is also generated by the fact that the political class is not worried about motivating youth political participation. In table 3.7 it is possible to observe some fitted probabilities of having confidence in both political parties and the congress regarding youths’ opinions of how political parties encourage people to be active in politics specified by SES.

**Table 3.7 - Fitted probabilities of having confidence in political institutions for Chilean Youth (18-29) with different levels of agreement with the statement “Political Parties encourage people to be active in politics” and with different SES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion / SES</th>
<th>Probability of having Confidence in Political Parties</th>
<th>Probability of having Confidence in the Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally disagree</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally Agree</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331*

As shown in table 3.7, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and others explanatory variables, opinions regarding how political parties encourage people to be active in politics are significantly associated with having confidence in these political institutions. Those who disagree more with the statement that political parties encourage people to be active in politics are those most politically disaffected. It can also be observed that this association is stronger for youth from higher SES.

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64 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a man, aged 23, who is fairly interested in politics, that believes that the congress represent well people’s interests and who does not agree neither disagree with the statements ‘political parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies’ and ‘I don’t think that the government cares much what people like me think’. This last variable was only used for the calculation of the fitted probabilities regarding confidence in the congress, since it was not significantly associated with the variable measuring confidence in political parties.
Those youths who perceive that political parties are not encouraging the activeness of common citizens are engendering more feelings of hostility towards the political system. With the aid of qualitative data it is also possible to deepen the understanding of this link. The main observation from that evidence is that youths believe that the political class is not particularly interested in motivating young people to participate in politics and that the reasons for that have to do with power interests.

"I think traditional political parties do not try to encourage greater youth participation because they are parties that have voters and not followers. Therefore, they prefer that the great mass of young people is not enrolled since they are more or less certain to have this electoral roll of twenty years that they know more or less how it behaves." Marcelo, member of an ecologist organisation.

"I do not think politicians try to encourage more youth participation. I think they try to discourage that because the logic of power interest has to do with having fewer people in politics and moving away those who shine a bit." Cristina, member of an organisation that advocates liberal values.

The main perception is that political parties are not encouraging youth political participation, since that will not deliver any power benefit to the political class. On the contrary, it is believed that they actually discourage participation since by motivating more young people to be politically involved their proper places of power are put in danger. Once more, then, the fact that youths are not registered to vote plays against them. The political class is used to the existing electoral roll that does not include many youths and to encourage youth participation would mean to alter a situation that is currently beneficial to them. This lack of interest of encouraging young people to be active in politics is also expressed by the fact that politicians do not go to places where young people are, in that they do not open spaces for youth participation and also by a lack of promotion of youth leadership. These findings then reaffirm what was previously established; that Chilean youths are demanding more participation as they are aware of the developed theoretical statement that effective representation can only be acquired through authentic mechanisms of participation where people can express their opinions and pressure their representatives (Plotke, 1997, Urbanati, 2000).

This phenomenon is also perceived by some members of the political class from left-wing parties. They link that with something that was previously discussed about the fact that political parties in Chile have been more focused on governing than on
being connected with the citizenry. This situation would affect the encouragement of young people to be active in politics since by behaving like that, the space for promoting youth leaders becomes weakened as possible leaders are situated in governmental positions rather than in positions where they are more connected with the civil society.

"I think parties are not encouraging young people to participate. First I think that what happened is that there was less priority for enhancing youth leaders because these movements were losing relevance. But a second thing that is very harmful is that parties began to encourage more young people for public positions with a professional profile rather than social or cultural leaders." Ex deputy of the PPD.

The fact that political parties do not encourage people to participate can be also understood as an effect of a process of social demobilisation, realised by political parties since the return to democracy. As it was previously stated, Chilean democracy has been described as having an elitist character as the political class intentionally demobilised civil society to acquire political stability (Roberts, 1999, Oxhorn, 1994). From this evidence it can be observed that these demobilisation processes not only provoke disaffection by not generating spaces to exercise political representation but also because youths negatively perceive that political parties are entities that do not promote participation in order to safeguard power positions.

It is also relevant to highlight that political elites of several other Latin American countries have also undergone processes where they have discouraged the promotion of civil participation after democratic transitions and other difficult political contexts. For example, Philip and Panizza (2011) argue that one relevant element of the political systems of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the 1990s was the promotion of passive civil societies through the reduction of the ties between formal politics and common citizens. Moreover, they also sustain that this situation contributed to generating high levels of political discontent that were later capitalised on by left-wing candidates. For instance, it has been argued that Chavez emerged in Venezuela because he was able to convince people that he was aiming to include them politically and socially in contrast to earlier administrations (McCoy, 1999, E. Silva, 2009). In this sense, it can be argued that the relation between disaffection and demobilisation adequately exemplifies the
fact that some elements that explain political disaffection are not unique to the Chilean case\textsuperscript{65}.

In summary, there is clearly an association between youth perceptions of the internal functioning of political parties and feelings of political disaffection. This issue was not initially hypothesised as a relevant source of this phenomenon, whence it can be described as a new finding provided by this thesis. This does not mean, however, that it cannot be connected with established hypotheses as the undemocratic functioning political parties are evidently also an expression of a political system with a large gap between politics and common citizens. These findings also seem to reconfirm the fact that Chile seems to have several elements of a \textit{partyarchy} that would be generating political disaffection. Coppedge (1994) argues that some of the main elements of a \textit{partyarchy} are parties that control all nominations of for public office, limiting the eligibility to citizens and electoral laws that limit citizens’ choices. Chilean youths noticeably perceive that Chilean parties have these same elements, which would lead to describe Chilean democracy as having some \textit{partyarchic} features.

\textbf{3.3.4 Merging the three perceptions into a coherent explanation}

After having analysed separately the links between these types of perceptions and feelings of political disaffection, it is necessary to develop a coherent explanation that merges them and that can also explain why these feelings are being expressed more strongly among young people.

The first thing to argue is that Chilean youths are expressing feelings of hostility towards the institutions, processes and values of the political system, basically because of the way the political system is connected with the citizenry, and particularly with young people. This then reaffirms for the Chilean case Nyew and Zelikow’s statement that declines in political support are to be linked to the declining role of political institutions as the mediating force between governments and citizens (1997). With respect to this issue, one of the main perceptions is that the Chilean political class is

\textsuperscript{65} As it was previously stated, the discussion of the uniqueness of the Chilean case regarding the association between several political features and the emergence of disaffection will not be something highly developed in this thesis due to it has a more limited scope.
not showing a real interest in being connected with society, since it is more focused on pursuing its own power interests. This disposition of the political class accounts for the absence of spaces of connection that limit the representation of certain sectors. Moreover, this disconnection is also generating feelings about the usefulness of politics, since there is a strong belief that politics is not a vehicle of transformation. Based on this limited connection youths do not feel involved and they do not perceive that politics is able to produce changes that would benefit the citizenry. These findings confirm and deepen the central hypothesis of this thesis, as it was established that Chilean youths are politically disaffected due to the way the post-authoritarian CPS has generated a large gap between common citizens and politics that is expressed through feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy.

The findings of this chapter, however, were not only limited to what was initially hypothesised. This is because it was also found that these feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy find their counterpart in the internal functioning of political parties. It seems that by not being connected with the citizenry, political parties have become institutions that are not transparent since the citizenry is not exercising any control over them. Moreover, as they are not transparent the capacity to generate changes through them is more difficult. Political parties do not generate participation spaces or motivate more participation, since they seem to be principally focused on obtaining power rather than on improving social conditions of the whole population. These situations would generate, then, even more problems of representation as their logic of functioning separates them even more from common citizens.

The question that arises now is why the youth population is the most affected group by the particular way politics is working in Chile regarding the generation of feelings of political disaffection. The answer is not very complex and it has to do with the fact that the political class is particularly more disconnected with respect to young people. By following the observed logic that politicians try to mainly satisfy their power interests, it is possible to argue that since youths are not currently voting, they are less appealing to the political class and therefore the political system is even less incentivised to generate ties with them. This fact is manifested in fewer spaces for
youth participation, lack of relevant youth public polices and a general lack of interest in encouraging their activation. All these situations make youths feel even more excluded from the political system, since it does not offer them spaces to participate or polices related to their interests. Therefore, it is them who most develop feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy. The internal functioning of political parties is also to be more negative towards young people since these institutions are dominated by powerful groups where youths are by far those with most difficulties to develop themselves within these parties. This situation is expressed by fewer young candidates and a lack of youth leaders connected with the citizenry.

The following quotes reflect what has been just stated. It could be argued, then, that within a political context of limited political discussion and few ties between citizens and the political system, young people are particularly more disaffected since they represent one of the most politically and socially excluded sectors of Chilean society.

"These feelings about not being able to influence are obviously stronger among young people because they are not taken into account at a societal level. The direction that is made for young people by society, the government, whatever, towards youth policy is null." Amparo, member of the youth division of the PC.

"This distance between people and politics is stronger in young people because they do not vote that much. That is a very practical thing. If young people in this country were forced to vote I guarantee you that the political world would be responsible for building bridges. And to speak in their languages. To be attractive." Woman, deputy of the PDC.

The explanation of this particular situation in youth citizens is given by the fact that power interests of the political class are not benefited by a connection with the youth world. In this sense, it is possible to argue that there is in Chile a very pragmatic political class that is quite disconnected from the citizenry, and that it is precisely this pragmatism that explains the greater distance between it and young people.

3.4 Conclusions

The main purpose of this chapter was to start developing an explanation for current high levels of political disaffection among Chilean youths. To accomplish this purpose, abundant quantitative and qualitative data were deeply analysed regarding links between feelings of political disaffection and youth perceptions about the
functioning of the CPS. In this sense, the main finding was that Chilean youths are highly disaffected because of the way in which the political class is connected with them. Moreover, it could be observed that the Chilean political class is perceived to be particularly disconnected from young people as they are not useful to it with respect to the reproduction of its power positions. This disconnection is to generate political disaffection as it engenders feelings of lack of representation and perceptions of political inefficacy, and because the internal functioning of political parties is very alien to young people. Moreover, it was also found that feelings of hostility towards the political system are greater since youths also perceive that these problematic situations are the product of a pragmatic political class whose main concern is to ensure its own power interests.

In this sense, it can be argued that the evidence suggests that the central hypothesis previously established relating to feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy generated by the particular way of working of the CPS are appropriate. It can be also argued that the importance of power issues and the internal functioning of political parties are new elements that were found to also be associated with the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection.

The explanation for such high levels of youth political disaffection is clearly, then, a political one. Since its return to democracy Chile has shown good levels of economic development and an admirable political stability. However, at the same time there has been also a disconnection between the political world and common citizens based on several institutional and socio-economic legacies inherited from the dictatorship and the form the transition took that defined central features of the CPS. It is precisely this disconnection that would be explaining these feelings of hostility towards the political system. As it was also observed during the chapter, this account for political disaffection largely agrees with several descriptions of central elements of Chilean politics that generate disaffection (Garretón, 2007, Angell, 2007 and Moulian, 1998). These authors have argued that the main attributes of the post-authoritarian Chilean democracy are the existence of a party system based on the convergence of moderated positions, the prevalence of a dogmatic adscription to privilege political consensus and to not mobilise people and a technocratic style of policy-making based
on the pacts of the elites where powerful entrepreneurs have a privileged participation. In this sense, the existence of highly politically disaffected youths would come to be a consequence of the development of a style of politics based on these features, since they are the main source of the disconnection between the political class and the citizenry.

The major contribution of this thesis to the debate about political disaffection in Chile is not principally related, then, to new elements that would explain this phenomenon, since what was observed mainly reconfirmed and deepened other monographic accounts through empirical data. What this thesis is in fact making a more relevant contribution to is the explanation of particularly high levels of disaffection among young people. The main argument is, then, that the source of these high feelings of hostility towards the political system is a large disconnection of the Chilean political class regarding the citizenry. This disconnection is affecting the whole Chilean population, but it is generating higher feelings of disaffection among young people since the political class is even more disconnected with youth citizens. This situation is mainly explained by the fact that being connected with youths does not bring any power benefit as they are not voting. In this sense, young people are one of the most politically and socially excluded groups in Chilean society, which is expressed through even fewer political spaces for them, a lack of policies that approach their interests and political parties whose internal functioning is rather unfriendly with respect to them.

The second main contribution of this thesis concerning something that has not been vastly discussed has to do with the link between political disaffection and two new elements. The first is how youths perceive the importance of acquiring power among politicians. The evidence suggested youths believe that the Chilean political class, on many occasions, opt for favouring their own power interests instead of the wellbeing of common citizens. In this sense, it is important to state that political disaffection is not merely the product of feelings of lack of representation or political inefficacy based on a disconnection between the political world and common citizens. These feelings of hostility are also explained by the fact that Chilean youths perceive they are not represented or able to produce changes because there is a political class
that consciously limits that in order to favour its own interests. The other new element found was the importance of the internal functioning of political parties. Chilean youths perceive that parties are undemocratic instances dominated by small groups whose main interest is to gain power. This would be, then, another relevant expression of a large disconnection between formal politics and youths that is also more relevant for this group, as undemocratic parties are particularly generating fewer ties with young people.

These two findings describe Chilean democracy as having some elements of a partyarchy, which is something that has not been fully described by the literature but that can be easily connected to other findings. It seems, then, that as Chilean democracy developed institutions that reproduced a style of politics based on a disconnection between formal politics and common citizens, the political class started to develop very pragmatic attitudes that led to it excessively prioritising the attainment of power at any cost. This attitude generates even more disconnection with the citizenry as it was observed that youths develop feelings of political disaffection when they perceive this situation. Moreover, this same pragmatic attitude would be also the base of the explanation of current higher levels of disaffection among Chilean youths.

Another interesting finding is that almost every time youth has to give examples about their feelings of disaffection they make reference to Chile’s high levels of income inequality. They are of the opinion that inequality is principally a political problem since it expresses the lack of will of a homogeneous political class that prioritizes the representation of their own interests, generating a sense that is very difficult to change things. In general terms, it seems therefore that Chilean youth believe that Chilean democracy has not been able to spread the results of a process of successful economic development across the population.

Finally, another interesting issue that could be observed is that there are some differences regarding the determinants of political disaffection if they are analysed taking into account youth socio-economic levels. It was found that, in general terms, feelings of lack of representation and perceptions about the internal functioning of
political parties seem to be more relevant for youths from higher SES while feelings of political inefficacy more determine the levels of disaffection in the case of youths from lower SES. These results, however, could not be fully understood and developed since the qualitative data collected did not give clues about them.\footnote{This situation clearly represents a limitation of this thesis and at the same time suggests additional analyses to be made in future researches.}

The main argument of the thesis has been then stated and subsequent analyses are to develop it. In this sense, the following chapters aim to deepen this argument through the revision of several case studies that emphasise some of its elements. With respect to that, a deep analysis of the way in which the CPS has addressed the issue of youth public polices will bring a much deeper understanding of the way youths’ interests are being represented. Moreover, a case where youths seem to have felt appealing with respect to formal politics, as in the presidential candidacy of Marco Enríquez-Ominami, can also deepen this argument as it gives clues about what kind of formal politics decreases levels of hostility. Finally, an analysis of educational social movements that face formal political institutions will show in detail how the CPS works regarding the representation of demands and the efficacy of politics.
Chapter 4: Linking Chilean youth political disaffection with the lack of a consistent youth public policy

4.1 Introduction

The evidence in the previous chapter suggested current high levels of Chilean youth political disaffection are explained by a particularly large disconnection between the Chilean political class and young people. At this point, it is necessary to deepen this argument more strongly by examining other types of evidences. This is to be done in this chapter by profoundly analysing a specific aspect of this disconnection between youths and politics to do with the development of a youth public policy (YPP). It has already been observed that feelings of political disaffection are associated with a perceived lack of representation being a deficiency of the youth public offer one of the most relevant issues that explains problems of representativeness. This chapter proposes, then, to deepen the understanding of this particular element taking into account that this is just one of several aspects of the relationship between youths and the CPS to generate disaffection.67

This chapter intends to analyse, then, how the CPS has addressed the issue of offering a youth public policy and its links with feelings of political disaffection under the assumption that, by examining one specific aspect of the relationship between youths and politics, it is possible to more deeply understand how broader aspects of Chilean politics are to generate disaffection. The main argument to be developed is that, despite some relevant efforts, since the return to democracy until now there has not been a consistent YPP and authentic mechanism through which young people can influence the youth public offer. This situation is linked to feelings of political disaffection since that strongly affects the representation of youths’ interests. A second idea to be elaborated is that this current scenario seems to be explained by the fact that youth issues are particularly less relevant to the Chilean political class. This is because its pragmatic fashion has limited the representation of youth interests because that does not contribute to reproducing politicians’ power positions. This

67 The lack of public policy is just one element of this negative relationship, with other aspects being, for example, the lack of youth leadership and the low influence capacity of youth divisions within traditional political parties. This topic was chosen since apart from showing problems of representativeness, it exemplifies well the fact that the political class is particularly more disconnected regarding youths as it is very pragmatic.
situation seems to also be perceived by young people. Thus, it is also analysed regarding the emergence of political disaffection.

In order to develop these arguments, this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first analyses the evolution of youth institutions and several attempts to generate a YPP at the beginning of the post-authoritarian democracy. The second section asks more specifically if there is currently a consistent YPP and how this can be connected with feelings of political disaffection. The third examines how Chilean youths are currently being incorporated into the development of public policies. Finally, the fourth part is focused on the reasons for this apparent lack of a YPP and participatory mechanisms and how these proper reasons can be linked to feelings of hostility towards the political system.

4.2 The first attempts to generate a Youth Public Policy

To be able to understand the current link between deficiencies of the youth public offer and the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection, it is first necessary to comprehend how this issue was addressed at the beginning of Chile’s post-authoritarian democracy. This is because the development of a YPP was a relevant topic of the political agenda at that time, but several events finally truncated its implementation, which finally generated the current scenario.

Before analysing these first attempts it has to be clear what is going to be understood as a youth public policy. In this sense, following Eugenio Ravinet’s definition, it can be argued that a public policy is "a system that organically integrates a speech or social representation to which is preferentially directed, a system of information that optimises the quality and transparency of actions and procedures, a flow of resources that allows its funding, a regulatory framework that regulates and empowers, a system of public communication and information, a group of programmatic offers, and institutions or organisational support through which the actions are executed" (Ravinet, 2008: 7).

68 This definition seems accurate for this thesis as Ravinet was a former director of the Chilean National Institute of the youth (INJUV) and former general secretary of the Youth Ibero-American organisation (OIJ).
In simpler terms, to have a youth public policy means the state assumes an accurate youth perspective regarding the functioning of the whole public sector through its agencies, resources and offers under a coherent design that guides public interventions. This situation implies having an intersectorial co-ordination of all public institutions that affect young peoples’ lives under the same policy design, based on a clear definition of a youth and with strong institutions advocated to that coordination (INJUV, 2006). For example, if there was a YPP in a specific country, that would mean that if the Ministry of Labor implemented a workers’ training programme it would be forced to develop, within that programme, a specific plan to train youths. Similarly, if the Ministry of Health developed a programme to prevent diseases among the poor, a specific part of that programme had to be focused on the prevention of diseases that affects poor youths.

To have a youth public policy does not mean, therefore, to have some specific programmes for the youth but to have a state that has a defined framework that gives sense and substance to the programmatic offer and that acts coordinately to deliver a consistent public offer. The relevance of that, regarding feelings of political disaffection, is that only an articulated state that recognises young people from a defined perspective regarding their interests can be truly sensitive to youths’ concerns and can create relations of confidence between youths and the political system (Asún, 2006). In this sense, it is only when the state approaches youth issues in this manner that young people are able to perceive a real preoccupation from the political world concerning their interests.

Having made clear what a YPP means, it is now necessary to analyse the first attempts to implement that kind of policy after Chile recovered its democracy. In relation to that, the creation of the National Institute of the Youth (INJUV) was without doubt the first relevant event. This institution was created in the early 1990s to generate the bases of a public institution regarding youth issues. One of the main arguments of its creation was the payment of the supposed social debt the state had to this population, as youths were one of the most affected social groups by several policies executed during the dictatorship (INJUV, 2006).
With the INJUV already functioning in 1991, the programme of opportunities for the youth (PROJOVEN) was launched. This has been highlighted as the best attempt to develop an articulated youth public policy, as it included intersectorial boards with 7 areas and 45 programmes (Dávila, 2001). Moreover, it also intended to be an articulated body of sectorial initiatives (INJUV, 2006). These efforts, however, did not have continuity. This was particularly the case after 1997, when there was an institutional crisis in the INJUV as there were serious accusations of embezzlement of funds that resulted in the resignation of its chief authorities. This crisis finally resulted in a drastic reduction of its budget that in 1998 was only 44% of the previous year, which forced the closure of a number of intervention programmes. Additionally, it also made the INJUV reduce its capacity to articulate a public offer, since it lost legitimacy within the Chilean state (INJUV, 2006).

This crisis was so severe that it has been argued it is based on these facts that Chile currently has several limitations regarding its youth public offer, as youth institutions were never able to fully recover. The last part of the 1990s represented a stagnation regarding the development of a YPP when compared to the first part of the decade, as institutional initiatives to develop the youth issue were weakened (Dávila, 2001, Krauskopf, 2011). The problem is that since this crisis there have never again been relevant and concrete efforts to articulate a YPP. From the INJUV itself, it is recognised that "since 1997 onwards preliminary efforts and attempts to articulate a consistent state policy have been postponed. Thus, the state still lacks a defined youth public policy and a clear generational perspective" (INJUV, 2006: 280).

The crisis of 1997 was clearly, then, a turning point concerning the strengthening of the youth public offer. The INJUV reduced its budget and lost power to other public institutions. Thus, a clear distancing of public policies regarding young people was generated, as there was a drastic retreat of the visible face of youth social policies in the public action (INJUV, 2006). The fact that after this crisis the youth public offer was never able to fully recover has also been cited as the possible starting point of a vicious circle between youths and politics. This is because, as the INJUV lost power, youths were less interested in becoming involved in formal politics, which finally generated even fewer incentives for politicians to generate an attractive youth public offer.
When youth experts are asked about this crisis it is argued that it took several years for the INJUV to recuperate some previous attributes such as increased budget and especially levels of legitimacy among the public sector. Moreover, they state that the main problem was that when the INJUV was in a better position to initiate deeper discussions, the political context was a different one, as young people were numbered very few among the electoral roll.

"The initial phase of the INJUV was very rich, where very concrete bases, ideas and proposals were established. Then the problem of 1997 with the institutional crisis comes. But when you manage to overcome these difficulties you are in front of a scenario in which young people were not representing more than 11% in every election. Therefore, for the proper political class it was not profitable to have an in-depth discussion concerning youth public policies." **Juan Eduardo Faúndez, former director of the INJUV between 2006 and 2010.**

"This started very powerful. It reached its peak in 1996 or 1997. After 1997, when the institution had some problems with corruption, they took away the budget, functions and programmes from the whole institute. And from there it took a lot to recover levels of investment and leadership that the INJUV can have." **Eugenio Ravinet, former director of the INJUV between 2001 and 2004.**

Those years of a practical obscurantism of the youth institutional framework after the 1997 crisis seem to have affected the number of young people who were incentivised to be registered to vote. At the same time, these lower rates of formal participation affected the perspectives of a more consistent youth public offer when the institute was in part recovered, as the political class had fewer incentives to be concerned about youth issues.

When this crisis was overcome there were other attempts to strengthen the youth public offer, such as the ‘Action Plan on Youth’ in 2004 that proposed several coordinated actions regarding youth (INJUV, 2004) and the Law project that created the Ministry of Sport and Youth in order to add political weight to youth issues within the Chilean state. There were also some projects to increase the participation of young people through the elaboration of public policies such as INJUV’s participative dialogues and the youth parliament. However, none of these experiences could be successfully implemented.

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69 In 2001 people from 18 to 29 represented only a 13% of the electoral roll.
4.3 Is there currently a consistent Youth Public Policy in Chile?

The vision of the experts

After having discussed the historical development of youth institutions since 1990, it is necessary to focus now on the current state of affairs of the Chilean youth public offer. With respect to that, when several official documents and specific literature are analysed it can be observed that there is a complete agreement that nowadays Chile is quite far from the development of a consistent YPP (Dávila, 2001, INJUV, 2006, Asún, 2006, Krauskopf, 2011). The main argument is that Chile lacks a YPP because there is no clear definition that guides the efforts of a group of institutions in the promotion of pertinent and integrated interventions of the youth population (INJUV, 2006). It is also argued that one of the main problems is that the INJUV is only a weak institutional support group that has not been able to adequately articulate several youth initiatives. The result would be the existence of a programmatic offer that operates in a sectorial way and as a function of institutional priorities with low coordination (Reinoso, 2006).

The current youth public offer has only a sectorial perspective, with no clear vision about the youth condition. Youth issues are present somehow in the public agenda. However, they are desegregated, disarticulated and without a perspective that starts with a political framework (Dávila, 2001). Therefore, public programmes have not constituted an integrated and coherent YPP that takes advantage of the synergies generated in each intervention (INJUV, 2006). Moreover, there is no law in Chile that defines the rights to be safeguarded by the state regarding youths as a specific population, which finally generates a situation where the specification of what a youth means is subject to the functional spheres that have a sectorial character (Santibañez and Zilveti, 2008).

When several experts on the Chilean youth are interviewed, their evaluations are accorded to what has been already argued. Both academic experts and former directors of the INJUV from both political sectors highlight the fact that Chile lacks a

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70 Regarding this point, it is important to state that Chile has not signed the Ibero-American convention of youth rights. There have been some signatures of conventions that include a section on youths, such as the convention of the rights of the child that include children up to 18 years old. However, these attempts have clearly not lead to a clear definition of the youth condition.
proper YPP. Moreover, they also recognise that the Chilean state does not have a specific vision of the youth, and that the public offer just consists of unconnected and fragmented programmes that are clearly insufficient for an adequate canalisation of youths’ concerns.

"If one checks social policy programmes, all groups of society are captured but young people. Today we have many programmes for youths. What happens is that they are not coordinated and there are not well-defined sectorial goals. And our goal is to orient ourselves to this great public policy." Ignacio Naudón, former director of the INJUV between 2010 and 2011.71

"The path that the INJUV has had has been rather erratic to say the least. Therefore, I would say the institution is poor, weak and fragmented. In Chile there is no national youth policy. There are things that have been tried in a targeted manner. But there is not something articulated. It is precarious." Mario Sandoval, coordinator of the Centro de Estudios en Juventud of the Universidad Católica Raúl Silva Henríquez.

Experts also agree on the need to develop a proper YPP, since in the current state of affairs youths’ interests are not being adequately attended. It is argued that one of the major deficiencies is that the INJUV has been very weak regarding the generation of coordinated policies.

This last point also coincides with some issues highlighted in the literature as Thezá (2005) argues that in order to have a YPP, it is first necessary to have strong youth institutions able to have a real capacity of coordination in national, regional and local dimensions. Moreover, he also states that these institutions need to be developed in a context where youths are legally subjects of rights differentiated by their socio-demographic characteristics as well. Only when there are strong institutions where the youth category is legally recognised as a specific subject of rights can the state have a coordinated YPP. This is clearly not currently the case in Chile as Asún (2006) states the normative frameworks in Chile do not define the youth as a legal category that really exists, which is linked to the fact that Chile lacks a YPP, since there is no clear definition of the youth that guides institutional interventions.

Another issue that can be analysed is that youth experts believe that this topic has been taken into account less by the Chilean political system. It is argued that when you compare youths with several other specific groups of Chilean society such as

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71 When the interview with Ignacio Naudón was conducted he has still the director of the INJUV.
women, children and the elderly, they are the group that has been the most ignored regarding the public offer. At the inaugural session of a youth governmental advisory in 2010, it was argued that "Chile has an historic debt with its youth. Unlike what happens with children, women and the elderly, our country has not advanced into a youth public policy. There are programmes, but not a policy that coordinates the various fields affecting the youth or that decisively promote their participation" (Consejo Asesor de Juventud, 2010). Moreover, it is argued the main consequence would be that youths are one of the social groups where several problematic and inequalities are stronger.

A comparison commonly made is that between the representation of youths’ interests and womens’ interests, based on the historical development of the INJUV and the SERNAM (National Service of the Woman) since the return to democracy. With respect to that, Krauskopf argues that "even though the youth thematic emerges with power after the dictatorship, it has not received the institutional support that other population instances obtained, such as the SERMAM, with ministerial rank. Thus, the SERNAM is strengthened in the years of the Concertación while the official youth institution has not even been able to implement what the SERNAM achieved since the beginning of the post-dictatorship" (2011: 30).

Currently in Chile there is a public policy for women, but not for youths, which seems to indicate that youth issues have been particularly less attended to in Chile. This difference means, for example, that if the Ministry of Culture wanted to implement a programme to subsidise artistic workshops in shanty towns, it would be forced to design a specific part of that programme for women, but not for young people.

One way the evidence can analyse the fact that youths are one of the social groups being taken into account less by the Chilean political class is by examining the budget assigned to several institutions by the Chilean state in 2011. As shown in table 4.1, when the INJUV’s budget is contrasted with comparable institutions such as children, women and senior citizen national services, it is observed that the allocated budget of the INJUV is significantly lower than the one of the other institutions.
Table 4.1 - Budget allocation of several Chilean institutions (2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Budget (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SENAME (Child National Service)</td>
<td>122.716£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND (National Institute of the Sport)</td>
<td>110.308£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADI (National Corporation of Indigenous Development)</td>
<td>92.533£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of the culture and arts</td>
<td>57.573£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERNAM (Women National Service)</td>
<td>27.223£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENAMA (Senior Citizen National Service)</td>
<td>15.649£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENADIS (Disability National Service)</td>
<td>15.085£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INJUV (National Institute of the Youth)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.056£</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DIPRES (2011).*

The INJUV’s budget for 2011 was approximately seventeen times less than that of the SENAME, four times less than that of the SERNAM and less than the half of the SENAMA. Moreover, it is also observed that institutions in charge of indigenous and disabled people have also significantly higher budgets than the INJUV. In fact, the comparatively low budget of the institution has been highlighted by the literature as one of the main elements that explains current deficiencies of the youth public offer and indicates the lack of priority youth issues have had within the Chilean state (Krauskopf, 2011).

This argument can be also deepened by discussing some evidence about objective conditions of the youth population. For example, when historic levels of unemployment are compared between youths and the rest of the Chilean population, it is observed that youths are, indeed, in a less favorable position. As shown in figure 4.1, in 2009 20% of Chilean youths were unemployed while only 7% of Chilean adults had this condition. In 2009 youth unemployment in Chile was almost three times that of adult unemployment, and it has consistently been more than double since 1990.
Figure 4.1 - Unemployment rates among Chilean youths (15-29) and Chilean adults (30+)

Source: CASEN (1990 – 2009)

Moreover, it can also be observed that Chilean youths had in 2009 the highest level of unemployment since the return to democracy. Since 1990, youths and adults have followed a similar pattern regarding levels of unemployment. However, it can be seen that in the last year measured, the growth of youth unemployment was larger.

The evolution unemployment rates among youths can also be examined regarding income quintiles. It can be observed in table 4.2 that youth unemployment is much bigger in quintiles with the lowest income as, for example, the level of unemployment in the poorest quintile is more than four times the level of the richest quintile. Therefore, it is observed that Chile’s problems of inequality seem to be also expressed regarding the way youths are incorporated into the labour market.

Table 4.2 - Rate of unemployment among Chilean youth (15-29) by income quintile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quintile 1</th>
<th>Quintile 2</th>
<th>Quintile 3</th>
<th>Quintile 4</th>
<th>Quintile 5</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Q1/Q5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30,4%</td>
<td>16,5%</td>
<td>9,5%</td>
<td>6,5%</td>
<td>6,0%</td>
<td>13,3%</td>
<td>5,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>23,4%</td>
<td>11,8%</td>
<td>7,6%</td>
<td>5,4%</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
<td>10,0%</td>
<td>5,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>28,1%</td>
<td>13,5%</td>
<td>9,4%</td>
<td>6,8%</td>
<td>5,3%</td>
<td>12,0%</td>
<td>5,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>23,0%</td>
<td>10,8%</td>
<td>8,6%</td>
<td>5,5%</td>
<td>3,5%</td>
<td>9,9%</td>
<td>6,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>39,6%</td>
<td>17,8%</td>
<td>12,6%</td>
<td>9,5%</td>
<td>7,3%</td>
<td>16,8%</td>
<td>5,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36,2%</td>
<td>19,5%</td>
<td>13,3%</td>
<td>10,3%</td>
<td>6,6%</td>
<td>17,5%</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>38,8%</td>
<td>20,2%</td>
<td>12,3%</td>
<td>8,9%</td>
<td>7,7%</td>
<td>17,0%</td>
<td>5,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>33,5%</td>
<td>16,0%</td>
<td>11,0%</td>
<td>8,4%</td>
<td>6,7%</td>
<td>13,9%</td>
<td>5,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>46,6%</td>
<td>22,6%</td>
<td>15,9%</td>
<td>12,1%</td>
<td>10,5%</td>
<td>19,7%</td>
<td>4,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CASEN(1990-2009)

Another relevant way to analyse levels of unemployment is by examining them comparing youths with the whole population in Latin American countries. In figure 4.2 twenty countries in the region are ordered by countries with the biggest difference
between youth unemployment and population unemployment to those with the lowest differences. It is observed that Chile is the second-highest country in Latin America with the biggest difference between youths and the whole population regarding unemployment rates.

**Figure 4.2 - Unemployment rates among Latin American people by age group**

![Unemployment rates among Latin American people by age group](source: The World Factbook (2012)).

This comparative evidence suggests then that, at least regarding unemployment, Chile is one of the Latin American countries where youths have comparatively more social problems when contrasted with the whole population. Indeed, out of the countries analysed Chile is the 11th with most population unemployment and the fourth with most youth unemployment. This situation can be also compared worldwide since with the same data it is observed that Chile is ranked 72th among 170 countries regarding population unemployment and 36th among 123 countries regarding youth employment. Moreover, these data also indicates that Chile is ranked 15th out of 115 countries regarding the difference between population and youth unemployment favorable to adults. These data seem to reconfirm, then, the fact that there is a particular situation in Chile where youths are less socially benefited than other groups.

The last way to analyse this issue is by comparing historical poverty rates between adults and youths from 1990 until now. When these data are analysed it is observed that since the beginning of Chile’s post-authoritarian democracy there has been a relevant gap between both populations favorable to adults. In the last twenty years Chilean youths have had higher rates of poverty than adults, which seems to bring
more evidence to support the statement that youths are one of Chile’s social groups living in comparatively worse social conditions.

**Figure 4.3 - Evolution of poverty rates among Chilean youths (15-29) and adults (30+)**

![Graph showing evolution of poverty rates among Chilean youths (15-29) and adults (30+).](source: CASEN (1990-2009).

The data show that youth poverty rates have significantly decreased since 1990 until today, which seems to indicate that Chile’s good economic conditions, alongside the implementation of several social programmes, have been able to reach youths. However, it is also possible to deduce that Chile has not been successful with respect to specifically improving youths’ social conditions in relation to other groups despite the argument that after the dictatorship, one of the most important social debts was, in fact, with young people (INJUV, 2006).

This evidence suggests therefore that young people are a social group within Chilean society that is more socially troubled than others. The low budget of the INJUV, comparatively higher levels of youth unemployment when contrasted with adults and comparatively higher rates of youth poverty seems to be clearly associated with the previously discussed fact that youth issues are not being fully approached by the Chilean political class.

In summary, it is observed that there are several deficiencies about the current youth public offer in Chile. It is possible to state that these situations are, without doubt, affecting the representation of their interests. Regarding this issue, it is also interesting to observe that experts themselves have connected these deficits with the emergence of feelings of political disaffection. Aravena (2008) argues that the fact that Chilean youths are not yet a specific subject of right and they lack consultative and
deliberative spaces where they can feel truly represented explains in part their low electoral participation and relative skepticism regarding the efficacy of the political system. Fernandez and Sepúlveda (2008) also support this idea as they state that current low levels of confidence in political institutions among Chilean youths could be explained by a lack of strength of youth public institutions, added to a sectorial and fragmentary design of certain policies, as that determines an insufficiency to respond to current demands of this population. Finally, a proper report of the INJUV also refers to this association, arguing that "a significant contribution to the restoration of confidence and the realisation of the new democratic promise is given by placing an articulated state sensitive to their concerns in front of the youths, equipped with a public policy and agents of this policy able to listen to them systematically" (INJUV, 2006: 285).

Those authors’ observations and the evidence examined in this section come, then, to ratify and deepen previously suggested findings, as it was argued that one of the main determinants of political disaffection was a perception of lack of representation and that a relevant aspect of these representativeness problems are difficulties regarding the current youth public offer. Likewise, these findings seem to reaffirm the idea that among young people would be occurring that problems of substantive representation negatively affect citizens’ support for the political system (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, Stoker, 2006).72

**The perceptions of the political class**

Having developed the vision of several experts regarding the development of a consistent YPP, it is necessary to analyse the beliefs of the Chilean political class concerning this issue.

With respect to that, it can be observed that they largely share the vision of some experts. The main vision of the political class, which is shared by members of both central political coalitions, is that youth issues are not being currently adequately

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72 It has to be clear, however, that this is just one element of several that would be engendering feelings of hostility towards the CPS, and that the lack of youth public policy is an expression of broader elements that determine the way of functioning of Chilean politics.
approached by the political system. It is also stated that Chile lacks a YPP and that institutions dedicated to that have not worked well. This issue is acknowledged by deputies of several political orientations, even though they differ with respect to the responsibility of the current situation. While deputies of the Alianza argue that the ones to be blamed are the Concertación governments, deputies of the Concertación inculpate the whole political spectrum.

"I think there has not been an action on youth. The INJUV was misplaced regarding its function. During these years of government by the Concertación there has not been an action where public polices can be expressed. There has not been a public policy for young people." Woman, Deputy of RN.

"What do we have for youths today? An institutional framework that is extremely precarious, with no capacity to respond. This is reflected even if you look at the sectorial level in health, educational or labour issues. Youth unemployment in this country is very large. The health issue. For example, the issue of teenage pregnancy in this country continues rising." Woman, Deputy of the PDC, member of the last youth commission of the congress.

"I think that to some extent the issue of youth public polices has been neglected. I think that there was an oversight of the Concertación. For example, a public policy that actually targeted young people was to broaden the coverage of higher education. However, this policy opened the possibility for many young people to enter to higher education but it did not address funding needs of these youth." Man, Deputy of the UDI.

Within deputys’ perceptions the impression that the youth public offer has had only a sectorial character is also found. Moreover, apart from criticising that way of functioning, they are also very critical regarding how specific sectorial policies have worked. Examples of that situation include policies related to youth employment, health issues and measures related to accessing higher education.73 It is believed that efforts made in these areas have failed, which would make the social situation of this group even more vulnerable as a specific social category.

Overall, the evidence suggests that the political class is aware of several social problems young people are facing today and that politicians themselves have paid less attention to youths’ concerns. There is therefore an agreement between what is stated by some experts on the topic and those persons in charge to change this current negative situation. Thus, it can be argued that there is self-criticism by the political

73 This last issue is very important to be highlighted, since solutions to debt problems of university students was one of the main demands raised by the 2011-2012 student movement to be later analysed.
class, although some politicians prefer to blame their political opponents rather than assume their own responsibilities.

**The perceptions of the youth**

Having clarified that both experts and politicians agree that there has not been a relevant preoccupation for the issue of youth public policy in Chile, it is necessary to deepen the knowledge of this topic by examining youths’ perceptions. Even though it was already stated in the last chapter that current high levels of youth political disaffection are to some extent explained by this situation, it is relevant to examine in greater detail specific perceptions of this issue.

In figure 4.4 Chilean youths’ perceptions regarding the actions of the government with respect to their concerns can be analysed. The first thing to be highlighted is that only 13% of youths believe that the Chilean government supports and promotes programmes directed to them. As it was earlier stated, there have been several programmes for this population in Chile. However, the evidence suggests that it seems these interventions have not had a real impact in generating the impression that the government is sufficiently worried about youth needs. In fact, according to this same survey, only 15% of youths are aware of any governmental project directed at them. Therefore, the data indicate that the absence of a state whose actions in relation to youths are intersectorially coordinated and based on a defined perspective generates the perception that there is not a preoccupation from the political world regarding youths’ interests in Chile (Asún, 2006).

**Figure 4.4 - Perceptions of the actions for the youth by the government among Chilean youths (18-29)**

![Bar chart showing perceptions of the actions for the youth by the government among Chilean youths (18-29).]  

Source: Juventudes Sudamericanas, 2009, n: 552
Another interesting observation that can be made from Figure 4.4 is that Chilean youths also largely perceive that the political class is aware of their unsolved needs. This is inferred by the fact that more than 60% of them declare that the government knows youths’ needs but does not do anything. It was previously shown that the political class is aware of these problems. It can be observed now that youths perceive that, despite politicians knowing their needs, they do not act in order to improve youths’ social conditions. In this sense, the evidence indicates that an important proportion of Chilean youths perceive that present deficiencies regarding the youth public offer are a matter of political will.

The qualitative material from interviews with politically-involved youths also contributes to deepening these analyses. In general terms, it can be observed that Chilean youths are of the opinion that from the return to democracy until today there has been little progress with respect to having a consistent public offer for this social category. The main criticism is directed towards the way the INJUV has worked as this is the most visible face of the supposed state preoccupation regarding youths. Rather than being perceived as an institution that advocates youths’ interests, the INJUV is conceived as a negative entity that has been used to favour some power interests and that is worried about irrelevant issues. The main things that youths perceive the INJUV has done are some cultural events and the distribution of condoms, which are disapproved actions that don’t address real problems in this population.

“We have had very few public policies concerning young people. The INJUV was the great public policy of the Concertación and it is not more than a condoms dealer in the summer and a concert organiser in the winter. We do not even have a youth agenda. For example, in the government, is there an agenda today?” Raquel, member of the youth division of RN.

"With the governments of the Concertación, there were few advances regarding issues of public policy in youths. The INJUV, for example, was an organ to fill positions rather than to generate real proposals. Therefore, governments since the return to democracy have become almost deaf to youths’ demands." Diego, member of the youth division of the PPD.

"I don’t know of any major advances that have been made in relation to youths. In childhood I could identify more, such as the issue of the nurseries. But if you ask if they regulated youth work or not, I don’t know. I think that is the most important thing and I have not seen anything concrete." Susana, member of a lesbian youth organisation.
There is the perception that in Chile there are relevant issues to be solved regarding the youth population, such as unemployment or sexual reproduction concerns. Additionally, it is perceived that these themes have not been approached as the main institution that should be in charge of that has been allocated to other things that are not of real importance. This would make the INJUV an institution that is not relevant for the life of youth in a context where this should clearly be the case. Moreover, there is also the perception that other specific social groups have been benefited more than youths regarding the existing public offer. These situations make them feel unrepresented as they are aware there is not a real preoccupation from the political world with respect to their interests.

Current problems regarding the youth public offer are also perceived by some youths as being connected with feelings of political disaffection. It is believed that, as there is a lack of policies directed to them, young people do not have incentives to incorporate themselves into the political process. The CPS would not be visualising youths’ demands and that would explain, to some extent, the present low levels of youth political involvement in formal instances.

"I think the explanations for low voter turnout rates of young people have to do with the incentive to participate. I think that today that has mainly to do with the fact that policies towards young people hardly exist. There is not a visualisation of youth demands that will make young people more involved." Hugo, member of the youth division of the PC.

"This rejection of parties is expressed because traditional parties have not exactly made a policy to the youths. For example, the INJUV is virtually nonexistent in young people’s lives. You can find people who got some tickets through the INJUV or who went to get condoms to the INJUV. People who are organised because of what the INJUV delivers regarding public policy are marginal." Mariano, member of a left-wing youth organisation.

Apart from incentives regarding the participation in electoral processes, the evidence indicates that the lack of youth public policies is also connected to feelings of hostility towards the political system by the fact that youths perceive that those responsible for the current situation are the existing political parties. These political institutions are rejected as youths believe they should have a more active role in order to have a youth public institutional framework that is present in young people’s lives, through the development of relevant public policies.
The fact that it seems that the current public offer is not sufficiently significant to positively alter youths’ lives can be also reaffirmed with the help of some quantitative data. In the 2009 national youth survey executed by the proper INJUV, it was asked if youths knew of or had heard about the INJUV. Moreover, those youths who were aware of the INJUV were further asked what it was. As shown in figure 4.5, more than half of Chilean youths have not even heard about this public institution and 14% of them only know its name. It can therefore be stated that almost 70% of young Chileans are not even aware of the existence or the role of the institution that is supposedly in charge of the development and coordination of the youth public offer, which indicates that it is not being relevant regarding youths’ lives.

![Figure 4.5 - Knowledge of the INJUV and its functions among Chilean youths (15-29)](image)


Another way to observe the fact that youth issues have not been adequately approached by the CPS is through an analysis of youth perceptions about the significance of public actions regarding the improvement of their social conditions. In this context, it can be observed in figure 4.6 that when Chilean youths are asked about the most important options to improve their lives only 4.2% referred to government policies.
Almost 85% of respondents stated that personal or familiar efforts are the most important thing to improve their lives and even a change in the economic system was more mentioned than government policies. This evidence indicates then that among Chilean youths there is clearly the perception that within the current environment public policies are not relevant to enhancing their life conditions. This perception is undoubtedly given by a context where the political world has done very little to generate a consistent youth public offer, which finally engenders feelings of hostility towards the political class.

The last type of analysis to be made regarding youths’ perceptions about the current Chilean public offer is related to what youths would expect to have if the Chilean state was truly worried about their needs. When politically-involved youths are asked about these issues, it is observed that they largely agree with idealistic views about a YPP previously discussed. When youths’ perceptions are analysed the evidence suggests they would like each state institution that affects youths’ lives to have specific policies regarding this population, which would put them in similar positions of other more socially-benefited groups, such as women. Moreover, they highlight that the INJUV should be the institution in charge of coordinating these actions by working together with all these state institutions and that important members of these institutions should be young.

"I imagine the INJUV visiting the labor minister to say that youth employment needs to be addressed in a specific way. The INJUV should be the link between state institutions and youth issues. But in any of the activities they organise, they do not do that."

Pedro, member of the youth division of RN.
"The INJUV should have a compulsory work in student unions and organisations. To have a connection coordinated with these agencies where the INJUV can have an effect in terms of youth policies. The INJUV should be constantly reviewing educational reforms. The incentive to do sports. The issue of the food given in schools. The labor ministry too." Mariano, member of a left-wing youth organisation.

With respect to the kind of policies they expect, youth highlight that labour, educational, sporting and health policies specifically targeted toward youths are the most important issues. In this sense, they also criticise that current policies developed by the INJUV, such as the organisation of free concerts, do not tackle relevant issues and that there should be a change of approach. Finally, youths also underline that these coordinated policies should always promote the direct participation of young people being one example of that the implementation of youth participative budgets.

In summary, when the evidence provided by youths’ perceptions is analysed, it becomes evident that they are conscious of current deficiencies of the youth public offer, and that their awareness is associated with the generation of political disaffection. They believe that the Chilean state is not offering enough programmes and actions directed to youths, which generates a context where what is done is not relevant to young people’s lives. This setting is what finally generates feelings of hostility towards the political system, as youths feel they are not being substantively represented. These feelings seem to be increased as young people believe that the main responsible of this scenario is the proper political class. In this sense, it can be argued that this new evidence also supports the statement that problems of representativeness originated by current deficiencies of the youth public offer is a factor that could engender feelings of disaffection among Chilean youths, and that would also explain particularly higher levels of disaffection in this social group.

4.4 Has the Chilean state incorporated young people into the development of public policies?

Another issue that merits discussion regarding the relationship between feelings of political disaffection and a lack of a consistent YPP has to do with the participatory mechanisms being offered to youths regarding the development of several public programmes. This analysis is quite relevant, as it has been argued that the incorporation of youths in the generation of public policies itself strengthens the
democratic system (Krauss, 2008) and that in order to build citizenry, it is necessary to have a youth participation with a binding character (Krauskopf, 2008).

When the literature about this topic is analysed with respect to the Chilean case, the main impression is that the incorporation of young people has been also very problematic. Aravena (2008) argues that Chilean youths lack consultative and deliberative instances where they can feel represented. Moreover, Espinoza (1999), after analysing several youth programmes in detail, sustains that the main problem of youth public policies in Chile has been the lack of the incorporation of the citizenry in their formulation and implementation. This situation would be very negative in the Chilean context, since it would not help to reduce the distance between youths and the public sphere.

The analysis of the interviews with experts on Chilean youth reconfirms these accounts. The main argument is that youth participation in the development of public policies in the national, regional and local levels has been very limited and unsystematic. Young people have not had a real capacity of influence, as the few programmes that have been executed have been done with a top-down approach. Experts also recognise the necessity of modifying this way of acting for an approach where policies are developed with the proper youth since, only when they are part of the construction of public policies, are these policies truly accurate to youth reality.

"The participation of young people has not been consistent and there have not been also appropriate legal or political tools to make this link between social youth organisations and the public policy." Juan Eduardo Faúndez, former director of the INJUV between 2006 and 2010.

"Young people have not had any impact on policy development. Politics continues to be a politics of experts in Chile. For example, the youth associativity law was never intended to be passed. Politics is always made from above. It is not made from below." Raúl Zarzuri, director of the Centro de Estudios Socio-Culturales.

"The paradigm that we want to break is that it is no longer enough to make policies for young people. You have to make politics with young people. And that requires a challenge to the government, which is to really listen to young people but with a slightly more binding attitude than the one that has traditionally been adopted." Ignacio Naudón, former director of the INJUV between 2010 and 2011.

It is also argued that the local level is where there has been more capacity of incidence but that some relevant efforts have not prospered. Moreover, the
The responsibility of the current scenario is perceived to be given in part by a lack of relevant laws that can incentivise youth participation. With respect to this issue, it is highlighted that at the beginning of the 1990s there was a youth associativity law that was not finally approved by the congress.  

Many of the interviewed experts make reference to this law having diverse opinions. The former director of the INJUV, Juan Eduardo Faúndez, for instance, argues that by not approving this law the youth institutional framework started with a basic error. This is because without this law the INJUV did not have power to involve itself in the youth social fabric. This denied youth organisations that had an important role in returning to democracy an institution that was functional to their interests. Other experts, such as Mario Sandoval, state that even though this law had been approved it would not have fomented the organisation of the youths since they tend to be more informally organised.

When politically-involved youths are asked about their participation in the development of the youth public offer, their perception is also a negative one as they believe they have not been incorporated into the development of policies. It is perceived that there are not currently relevant spaces to systematically participate in the elaboration of public policies that would come to solve youths’ social needs. This situation is perceived as being very harmful, since polices designed by experts who do not take them into account are finally impositions that do not accurately represent youths’ realities. They advocate for real mechanisms of participation to be applied systematically and with a deliberative capacity that allows them to be part of decision-making processes.

"Youth inclusion in these public policies is limited as well. One can observe that there is not real participation in society. Systematic participation of representative groups regarding youths. The few groups that exist, in addition to issues regarding university and secondary students, are developed after the emergence of specific situations."

Alfonso, member of the youth division of the PDC.

"I don’t want a post-doctoral expert to come and talk about drugs to young people. I want a person who has that training but that makes young people themselves diagnose their problems and solutions themselves. To be a tool for young people and

The youth associativity law was a project presented to the congress in conjunction with the law that created the INJUV at the beginning of the 1990s that intended to promote youth participation by establishing stronger relationships between formal youth organisations and youth institutions.
not someone who comes to impose a solution or his own vision." Darío, member of an educational organisation.

It is observed, then, that youths demand more participative mechanisms that would challenge a technocratic style of policy-making where experts decide public issues without discussing their decisions with members of civil society. This was in fact one of the hypothesised attributes of present Chilean democracy that would be generating a disconnection between common citizens and politics (Huneeus, 2003). Moreover, it was also observed in the previous chapter that this element of Chilean politics is being criticised by youths and that it generates political disaffection. It is now possible to observe, with this new evidence, that a relevant example of the association between the predominance of a technocratic policy-making style and the engenderment of feelings of disaffection is expressed in youth criticisms towards the way they are incorporated in the generation of public policies specifically directed to them.

Last to be analysed in this section are experts’ and youth’s evaluations of several instances that attempted to incorporate Chilean youths into the development of public policies, as there have been some failed efforts to do that. Some of the most relevant attempts that can be highlighted are the 2004 regional and local youth plans, the youth parliament and youth participative dialogues. Some of these initiatives even continue now. Nevertheless, they have been heavily criticised as they have not permitted a real incorporation of young people because they have suffered from a lack of continuity and have not had a binding character (Krauss, 2008).

Youth experts state that the participatory mechanisms that have attempted to be implemented have not been successful as they have been merely symbolic, with no real capacity of influence. Furthermore, it is argued that these experiences, in fact, worsen youths’ perceptions of politics as they feel frustrated when issues they have been asked about fail to exert any impact or influence.

"There were in Chile youth dialogues and such things. I believe that the kind of participatory things that have been made here are a boomerang. It goes against the long run because they ask young people to voice their views and then they do nothing with them." Dina Krauskopf, ex director of a youth programme of the FLACSO.
“There was a youth parliament in Chile, and other local initiatives. But these things did not have any interference as they have had in other countries, particularly among Latin America. These experiences have not been significant.” Raul Zarzuri, director of the Centro de Estudios Socio Culturales.

Among politically-involved youths interviewed, there were some who had participated in some of these attempts. Their perceptions were also very negative, the main critical point being the fact that these instances were merely symbolic and young people who participated there had a null capacity of influence. Both the youth parliament and participative dialogues are perceived as instances where nothing is achieved in terms of influencing public policies.

“I was a member of the youth parliament, but the decision-making power was zero. The parliament had no real attribution. Only on paper. It would have been better to have more participation in the real chamber in commissions of the youth field.” Ignacio, member of the youth division of the UDI.

“These participatory dialogues are a permanent déjà vu. Rather than making policies from youth discussions we are in eternal diagnoses. After the dialogues everything is archived. In fact, I asked, in the last dialogue, the person of the municipal youth department and to the regional director of the INJUV about things that were not so old from last year and they had no idea.” Marcelo, member of a youth ecologist organisation.

It is observed, then, that those youths who had some participative experience do not positively evaluate them, as they do not feel it was possible to achieve anything. This clearly engenders feelings of political inefficacy among them, as they empirically experience a situation where they decide to be politically involved in formal mechanisms of participation, but they finally perceive that their participation is useless as nothing concrete is achieved because their opinions are not truly taken into account to generate youth policies.

In summary, the evidence suggests that the Chilean state, apart from having a poor youth public offer, has not actively incorporated young people into the few programmes that have been executed. This situation is perceived by youths since they claim for more participation, as this is the only form that would finally bring more appropriate public policies. Likewise, the lack of authentic mechanisms of participation can be clearly linked to feelings of political disaffection as youths criticise this state of affairs and ask for more participation spaces. These findings also agree with previous observations in the sense that lack of mechanisms of participation regarding the
development of youth public policies can be described as a relevant expression of a
demobilised society whose style of politics is mostly based on a technocratic style of
policy-making (P. Silva, 2004). These features were previously observed to be
generating disaffection, as youths argue that it is partly because of them that their
interests are not being substantively represented. One relevant expression of this
association would be, then, a lack of real spaces to influence the youth public offer,
which also indicates that youths’ perceptions about this issue also demonstrate they
are aware of the relevance of having authentic mechanisms of participation to make
their wishes effectively represented (Urbanati, 2000).

4.5 Why Chile has lacked a consistent Youth Public Policy and real
mechanisms of participation?

Having observed from the evidence that Chile currently lacks a consistent YPP and
participative mechanisms, and that youth issues are particularly less attended within
the Chilean context, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind this situation.
Furthermore, it is also relevant to observe how these reasons can be associated with
the emergence of feelings of political disaffection too. The issue to be analysed in this
section is that it seems current deficiencies regarding the youth public offer are mainly
explained by the fact that the Chilean political class does not have an interest in them
since they are not enrolled on the electoral registers. In this sense, the main factor
explaining the current scenario would be a political one. Youth issues are not politically
relevant for present politicians regarding the reproduction of their power positions,
which prevents them from developing an attractive youth public offer. This situation is
perceived by youths themselves, which would be contributing to the enlargement of
feelings of hostility towards the political system.

One way to observe evidence about this issue is through youth experts’
perceptions regarding the main obstacles that have existed in Chile concerning the
developing of a YPP. What is principally stated in the interviews is that current
deficiencies are undoubtedly explained by a problem of political weight that youth
issues have had within the Chilean political system. At the same time, this lack of

75 It was already shown in chapter two that that only 23% of Chilean youths from 18 to 29 years are currently
registered to vote.
political weight is explained by the fact that young people in Chile are not registered to vote, which makes them almost irrelevant to the political class.

"In Chile the political class does not care about young people because youths do not vote. The greatest numbers of voters are in other age ranges and naturally these are the priorities that legislators and the government have when they do their job. By not being political subjects they are not an asset in generating policy proposals, political speeches and political stories. Eugenio Ravinet, former director of the INJUV between 2001-2004.

"The political class never cared about the youth issue as youth do not vote and they are not politically profitable. It is much more profitable one hour dedicated to elderly projects than an hour dedicated to youth projects. And so there is not an interest to put an eye on the youth institutional framework." Ignacio Naudón, former director of the INJUV between 2010 and 2011.

The political irrelevance of youth for the political class generates a scenario where those in charge of youth institutions have a low capacity to improve the current situation. Relevant changes need the political will of both the government and the congress. However, in the present context this will does not exist, as young people are not a priority because improving their social conditions does not bring the power benefits that the preoccupation for other groups, such as the elderly, can bring. This is a phenomenon that seems to happen in other countries too. However, the fact that Chile is one of the countries worldwide where young people formally participate less, and where there is a very pragmatic political class that is aware of that situation, leads to the generation of an scenario where youths’ interests seems to be comparatively less taken into account.

That youth issues are not politically prioritised, as they do not vote, can be also reflected by the fact that there have been several accurate diagnoses and plans regarding the precarious youth public offer, but there has not been enough political weight to implement them. It is owing to this situation that in recent years several administrations of the INJUV have prioritised the generation of political conditions to have more weight within the public state apparatus instead of the design of youth plans.

"In 2004 I had to analyse and study the proposal of a national youth plan and intersectorial boards. And if you ask me what was in the paper it was very consistent, perfect, reasonably, applicable. But they lacked political power to implement that. Therefore, my political objective as INJUV director was precisely to create the conditions to make the youth issue have a specific value for the different sectors. And
from here comes the idea of the creation of the youth undersecretary within the ministry of youth and sport.” Juan Eduardo Faúndez, former director of the INJUV between 2006 and 2010.

An important example of failed plans where there was an accurate diagnosis was the ‘Action Plan on Youth’ in 2004. This plan proposed several actions to be executed regarding the youth public offer, based on coordinated actions of several public institutions concerning the youth to advance towards the consolidation of a network of opportunities for young people (INJUV, 2004). However, these proposals were never fully applied and lacked continuity, mainly because of a matter of political weight as public institutions involved in the plan did not give due importance to it.

It is based on experiences like this one that those in charge of youth institutions have decided to focus mainly on the creation of political conditions to be able to implement several plans. The most important illustration of that has been the law project of the ministry of sport and the youth. This project was the main matter discussed during the special youth and sport commission of the deputy chamber of 2008. It was presented during Bachelet’s administration (2006-2010) and its main objective was to substitute the INJUV for a youth undersecretary in order to give more political power to the youth institutional framework. This project, however, was not finally approved, and according to some of the interviewed experts, the proper lack of interest on youth issues by the political class would explain its rejection.

Several deputies from both central political coalitions that participated in this last youth commission were also interviewed and their visions can contribute to understanding the interest the political class has regarding young people. In relation to this issue, the evidence suggests that several deputies recognise that, in general terms, Chilean politicians do not give importance to youth issues as they are not registered to vote. Moreover, it is argued that the proper functioning of the last youth commission in 2008 clearly expresses these negative attitudes.

"When we formed the youth commission I had a rejection in the room. They said that it was not necessary. And the result was that while we were heading the commission, it was very hard to get required quorums. The commission did not work. And this year the elderly commission was formed. They had an extraordinary report. They listened to all groups of grandparents. Therefore, you have in the political class a very high level of pragmatism. If you vote and you are relevant for my election I am going to be
worried about you and you will be subject of rights." *Woman, Deputy of RN, member of the last youth commission of the congress.*

"We formed the elderly commission this year. And it was straight ahead established as permanent commission. No one objected. In contrast, regarding the youth commission, it was very hard to form it. There were a lot of objections. We even had to insist that the commission's deputies come so they can give us quorum to function. That shows the importance given to the youth subject." *Woman, Deputy of the PDC, member of the last youth commission of the congress.*

Based on the statements of some deputies who have tried to generate proposals for young people, it can be observed more clearly that this social category has not been benefited with a relevant public offer since they are not relevant to the political class because they are not voting. This situation becomes quite clear when the development of special commissions for the youth and the elderly are compared. This is because this last instance seems to have worked much better, and generated better proposals, mainly because there is a pragmatic political class that knows almost all elderly people are registered to vote and the generation of proposals for old people contributes more to the reproduction of their power positions.

This pragmatism of the Chilean political class is also perceived by some young people, as it can be observed that among politically-involved youths there is the perception that youth public policies are not being developed, mainly because the political system itself is not interested on them.

"Apathy among young people is provoked because nothing is offered because they are not pressured by anyone. So it is like a vicious cycle that never ends. There is nobody to pressures you, and as you do not see yourself pressured, you are not going to generate public policies either." *Martin, member of the youth division of the PC.*

"The percentage of young people enrolled is extremely low. Politicians move themselves with votes and if there are not votes there is no festivity. As there is no festivity, how I am going to be willing, as a government, to invest a large budget in the youth issue if my market does not vote. They are not part of future elections. And for a politician that is important, as this issue is gained with votes." *Hugo, member of the youth division of the PPD.*

An interesting thing that is observed from the interviews is that there is a perception that a vicious circle emerges regarding the development of youth public policies. This circle would work in the following way: as there are not youth public policies, young people do not register themselves to vote, and because they do not
vote they become even less relevant for the political class, which finally makes young people have even fewer incentives to electorally participate.

Youths also perceive that this situation has an opportunity to be reverted with the approbation of a new form of registration where all citizens are automatically registered and voting is voluntary in the next municipal elections in 2012. However, it is considered that the pragmatism of the political class will not necessarily end with this situation as it is believed that only if new calculations estimate policies for young people are politically relevant will politicians be interested in that issue.76

Another way it can be observed that Chilean youths perceive this pragmatic acting of politicians is by linking what was developed in this section with some arguments previously discussed. In the previous chapter it was clearly shown that young people do not feel represented as they believe politicians normally favour their interests over the interests of the country. Moreover, in this chapter it was previously observed that most Chilean youths believe politicians know their needs but that they do not do anything about them. Therefore, it can be inferred from the evidence that Chilean youths perceive that their concerns have not been approached, since there are problems of political will and the explanation of that has to do with the low benefits the development of youth policies bring to the political class.

The awareness of this situation can also be connected to the emergence of feelings of political disaffection. This is the case as it was also previously observed that feelings of political disaffection are partly explained by the fact that young people believe their interests are not being represented, since politicians prefer to favour their own interests. The lack of a consistent youth public policy is without doubt a clear example of that situation, since the data indicate the political class has left aside youths’ concerns in order to favour their own power interests. Thus, the lack of a consistent YPP and mechanisms of participation can be argued to be associated with feelings of hostility towards the political system, both because youths’ interests are not being substantively represented and since young people perceive these problems are the

76 In fact, as it was indicated in chapter two, the municipal election seems to have not changed this scenario, as new rules did not imply higher levels of youth electoral participation.
result of the erratic actions of the political class. In this sense, it is possible to state that the observed problems of the current youth public offer can be understood as relevant expressions of more general attributes of Chilean democracy that generate disaffection. This is because they express both highly-discussed representativeness problems of Chilean politics (Garretón, 2007) and problems linked to a pragmatic and partyarchic acting of the Chilean political class that has, as one of its main driving principles, the reproduction of its power positions under any circumstances.

One last thing to be stated regarding the reasons that explain current deficiencies of the youth public offer, has to do with the origins of the described vicious circle. It was stated that because young people are not electorally participating, the political class has not been worried about them. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 90s almost 90% of Chilean youths were registered to vote. In this sense, an inquiry about what happened in that period, and how, afterwards, this vicious circle took place, emerges. Without intending to give an absolute answer, it is argued here that it seems the previously discussed corruption crisis that the INJUV experience in 1997 was a determining factor in the beginning of the vicious circle. This is because it has been argued that before the crisis there were the most serious attempts to develop a YPP in Chile, and that after it, it has been very difficult to recuperate youths institutions’ previous budgets and high levels of legitimacy within the Chilean state.

4.6 Conclusions

The revision of the way the Chilean political system has approached the issue of a youth public policy fits in the objective of this thesis, as it develops a specific aspect of the currently problematic relation between young people and politics that is generating feelings of political disaffection. A lack of substantive representation is one of the main factors that explain these feelings of hostility and within these problems of representativeness the absence of a consistent youth public offer constitutes a central element. With respect to that situation, this chapter revealed that the Chilean state currently lacks a consistent youth public policy, the main problems being a weak institutional youth framework and an unclear definition of the youth condition to make this social category a preferential subject of action. Moreover, it could be
observed that there are also not relevant mechanisms of participation through which the youth can be actively incorporated into the development of the youth public offer. Additionally, it was concluded that one of the main reasons that would explain these current deficiencies is a pragmatic acting of the Chilean political class that does not itself electorally benefit from generating youth proposals, as young people are not currently formally participating.

Young people perceive these problems since it was observed that they consider the youth public offer to be insufficient, and that there are not authentic mechanisms of participation. This is associated with the generation of feelings of political disaffection as it creates problems of representation and political inclusion because when there is not an attractive public offer they can feel part of, incentives to be politically-involved decrease. Moreover, sentiments of hostility towards the political system are also engendered since youths also perceive these deficiencies are mainly explained by a lack of political will of the political class. They consider that politicians are aware of their needs and that they are in a worse condition when compared with other social groups, but that they do not approach their concerns since that does not bring them power benefits. In this sense, it could be observed that the current scenario does not only generate political disaffection because of the existence of material lacks but also because these lacks are perceived to be the result of a reprehensible acting of politicians.

The central relevance of this chapter is, then, that it examines an issue that expresses several attributes of Chilean democracy connected to the engenderment of political disaffection, which finally deepens previous findings about the sources of these phenomena. Even more relevant is the fact that it illustrates two of the main new contributions that this thesis is providing to the debate regarding political disaffection in Chile, that were described in the previous chapter.

The first contribution is that Chilean youths are particularly more disaffected among the Chilean society since the political class is especially disconnected from young people because it cannot electorally profit from them. With respect to that, having a precarious youth public offer that is noticeably inferior to other specific social
categories, such as the elderly or women, demonstrated more deeply that young people are one of the most politically and socially excluded groups in Chilean society. In this sense, even though this exclusion can be observed in more aspects, such as the internal functioning of political parties that is particularly reticent to young people and the lack of youth leadership, this chapter was able to profoundly develop which is perhaps the greatest expression of the higher disconnection young people are currently facing.

The second previously-discussed contribution that was illustrated and deepened through this chapter has to do with the link between feelings of political disaffection and the way young people perceive the relevance of attaining power among politicians. It was previously stated that Chilean youths believed that, on several occasions, the political class opts to favouring its own power interests rather than those of the citizenry, which was described as a partyarchic attitude. Regarding that issue, this chapter described a clear example of this situation. It suggested that current deficiencies of the youth public offer are mainly explained by the fact that Chilean politicians have consciously given less relevance to that issue because they cannot favour their power interests by doing that since it is known that the proportion of young people presently registered to vote is very low.

One last aspect to be highlighted is that this chapter also brought some evidence about a new kind of politics that could be emerging among Chilean youths. This is the case since the evidence suggested that, apart from demanding a relevant youth public offer, young people are also calling for more participative mechanisms. It was observed that youths believe the only way to make their interests truly substantively represented is by directly participating in the elaboration of several public policies. These observations, then, reinforce previous findings sustaining that a more participative political system would decrease youths’ political disaffection levels. Moreover, they can also be understood as a youth critique towards Chile’s current technocratic way of policy-making.

In summary, it can be argued that the evidence obtained regarding current deficiencies of the youth public offer solidly fits with the general argument being
developed in the thesis. This means current deficiencies of the youth public offer have to be understood as an expression of a political class that is disconnected from the citizenry, and whose acting is marked by high levels of pragmatism that go beyond the youth field. What was analysed in this chapter is therefore only one of several manifestations of representative difficulties currently affecting the whole of Chilean society based on several features that have dominated Chile’s post-authoritarian politics. This disconnection is without doubt greater regarding young people. Nevertheless, it cannot be lost from sight that this is a phenomenon that involves the whole Chilean population and that what was described in this chapter is only one of several expressions that specifically contribute to the explanation of higher levels of disaffection among young people.
Chapter 5: The presidential candidacy of Marco Enriquez-Ominami and the emergence of the Partido Progresista; understanding an attractive phenomenon to politically disaffected Chilean youths

5.1 Introduction

The Chilean presidential election of 2009/2010 generated a relevant political break, since the triumph of Sebastián Piñera brought to power the first democratically-elected president from a centre-right wing coalition after almost fifty years. Moreover, it also represented the end of twenty years of apparently successful governments of a centre-left wing coalition. This event, however, was by no means the only relevant political phenomenon of those elections. The emergence of the young presidential candidate Marco Enriquez-Ominami (ME-O) also deeply shocked the Chilean political scene. By appealing to a very critical discourse about the Chilean political class, ME-O obtained 20.1% of votes, which made him one of the most successful independent presidential candidates of Chilean political history. Additionally, after the elections ME-O and his main collaborators were able to found a new political party that is currently progressing well with its legalisation.

The success of this candidate has been highlighted by many authors as a critical response to the functioning of the Chilean political system. One of ME-O’s central claims was to develop a “new way of doing politics”, and soon after his decision to be a presidential candidate he was labeled as the ‘discolo’ candidate. To this effect, it is argued that the adherence he obtained was an indication of support for political renewal in a context of high levels of political disaffection. Moreover, it has also been underlined that he was particularly appealing to young generations, not only because of his youthful appearance but also since he has been one of the biggest demanders of political changes (Bunker and Navia, 2010, Osorio and Schuester, 2010).

ME-O’s discourse was mainly based on critical postures concerning the performance of Chilean politics, which allowed him to engage people who were

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77 Even though M-EO did not get even a quarter of votes it merit calling his candidacy successful due to its independent character in a heavily-institutionalised political system.

78 To be a ‘discolo’ means to be a disobedient person who does not behave meekly. In political terms, to be a ‘discolo’ candidate means to be a candidate who behaves rebelliously by criticising traditional political structures.
dissatisfied with politics. In this sense, to examine the reasons for the success of the
candidacy and the formation of this new political party is quite relevant for the
purposes of this thesis, as it deepens analyses of the sources of political disaffection. It
was previously observed that current levels of disaffection are mainly explained by a
particularly large disconnection between the Chilean political class and young people,
produced by a particular style of doing politics. In this context, this chapter comes to
complement this argument by analysing a particular case where a political project that
criticised that specific style of politics seemed to have gained relevant support among
young people.

This chapter’s main assumption is, then, that through the understanding of the
achievements and limits of ME-O’s candidacy and the emergence of the Partido
Progresista (PRO) it is possible to comprehend more profoundly the current damaged
relationship between young people and formal politics. By studying that, it is possible
to obtain evidence about three specific aspects of this negative relationship. First of all,
using Mouffe’s distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, it contributes to the
discussion about whether Chilean youths are rejecting the current political system or
broader issues. Secondly, it allows the identification of reasons for such high feelings of
hostility towards the political system. Finally, it permits the understanding of the type
of formal politics that can be appealing to young people.

In order to develop these arguments, this chapter is divided into five sections. The
first describes ME-O’s antecedents and the emergence of his candidacy. The second is
about the reasons that made him an attractive candidate to young people. The third
examines the importance of social networks to the development of the candidacy. The
fourth analyses the emergence of the PRO. Finally, the last part discusses the limits of
these phenomena.

5.2 ME-O’s antecedents and the emergence of the ‘díscolo’ candidacy

Antecedents

Marco Enriquez-Ominami is a filmmaker who was only 36 years old at the time of
the 2009 elections. He has always been linked to the Chilean political world. His
grandfather was the first president of the PDC in Chile. His father, Miguel Enriquez, was killed by the Chilean dictatorship in 1974 as he was the main leader of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). After the coup d’état he was exiled to France, where his mother married Carlos Ominami. In exile ME-O was adopted by Ominami, who strongly influenced him politically as he was an important leader of the Concertación.

ME-O returned to Chile by the end of the dictatorship, joining the youth division of the Socialist Party (PS). After having studied at the University of Chile, where he participated in university politics, he returned to France to complete other studies. Following his second return to Chile, he started working in several projects related to his profession as a filmmaker that helped him to gain some media visibility. He directed well-known television series and founded ‘The Clinic’, a famous weekly left-wing newspaper. Moreover, he also worked in several political campaigns of the Concertación and made films and documentaries. In 2004, he married Karen Doggenweiler, one of the most famous Chilean television presenters, which also helped him to increase his popularity.

In 2005 ME-O presented himself as a deputy candidate for the PS, obtaining the first majority. As a deputy he participated in several commissions and 193 projects. Among them, it is possible to highlight projects about political reforms that have not been successfully approved until today, such as the establishment of participative local budgets and the instauration of recall referendums (Rendición de Cuenta parlamentaria diputado Marco Enriquez-Ominami Gumucio, 2010). Another aspect to be highlighted is that during his period as a deputy, he already showed some dissatisfaction with the actions of the Concertación that made him vote against some law projects proposed by this coalition. This saw ME-O and other Concertación deputies labeled as the ‘díscolos deputies’. In relation to that, one of their most significant demands was always to have more transparent processes of candidate selection (El Mercurio, 2009a, Osorio and Schuester, 2010).

79 The main example of that was his disapproval of the LGE, the new educational law approved after the student movement of 2006.
The emergence of the candidacy

The race to select the presidential candidate of the Concertación started in early 2009. By that time ME-O was part of the PS, and had shown some signs of his willing to be a potential candidate. The Concertación, however, had decided to hold a primary election just between the ex-president Eduardo Frei (PDC) and José Antonio Gomez (PRSD). These primary elections were executed on April 2009, based on a very peculiar system. Elections were initially going to be held in two regions and if one candidate won by a difference of 20% or more in one, he would be claimed as the winner. This mechanism was heavily criticised, since chosen regions were those where Frei had more prospect of winning (Castiglioni, 2010). As expected, the election was won by Frei with a difference that was greater than 20% in a process with a very low rate of participation. These primaries were then labeled as the ‘primarias truchas’ as they were seen as a procedure where the Concertación only wanted to be viewed as democratic, but where the candidate was selected by party leaders (Bunker and Navia, 2010).

Although this was the Concertación’s official selection procedure, while these events were taking place there was a parallel presidential race. ME-O and Jorge Arrate, two members of the PS at that time, were expressing their intention to be candidates of the Concertación more powerfully. These desires were expressed, for example, in a letter signed by 279 PS militants asking the party leadership to hold a primary election between ME-O and Frei (La Nación, 2009). Nevertheless, the PS central committee decided to support Frei without more consultations. This situation provoked the resignation of both alternative candidates to the PS, which had to find new alternatives. While Arrate was later proclaimed as the candidate of the Juntos Podemos Más coalition, ME-O initiated his independent candidacy (Bunker and Navia, 2010).

ME-O resigned from the PS in June 2009. Later on, he proclaimed his independent candidacy with a very critical discourse of the Concertación’s political leaders. He uploaded a video to YouTube where he stated: "this is a painful but necessary act in

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80 In Chilean slang ‘truco’ means something fake and tricky.
response to the decision of the party leadership of the Concertación and the PS to stifle competition and debate of ideas within the coalition.” As ME-O was now an independent candidate, he had to collect 36,000 signatures before a notary. After a couple of months’ campaigning he was able to gather more than 63,000 signatures, which allowed him to register his candidacy on 10 September of 2010 (Bunker and Navia, 2010). He was due to compete against Frei, Arrate and Piñera.

The candidacy’s support started to grow even before his determination to be an independent candidate. However, this decision was clearly appreciated by the public. As shown in figure 5.1, ME-O’s vote intention was increasing during 2009. While in May and June he had a vote intention close to 15%, this percentage was increasing after he started his campaign as an independent candidate. He attained around 20% of the votes a month after his candidacy was already officially inscribed.

![Figure 5.1 - Evolution of ME-O vote intention among those who are registered to vote](image)

During his campaign, ME-O continued with a very critical vision of the whole political system with a special emphasis on the vices of the Concertación. Therefore, he began to obtain support from diverse minor political parties such as the humanist and the ecologist parties and several movements such as ‘Movimiento Unificado de Minorías Sexuales’, ‘La Surda’ and ‘Red progresista’. Based on the support of these organisations, a new political coalition called ‘Nueva Mayoría Para Chile’ was formed. This coalition supported ME-O’s candidacy and presented several candidates for the parliamentary elections. None of them was elected though (Osorio and Schuester, 2010).

81 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=khkNkbD4qpc.
**ME-O's proposals and his bases of support**

The campaign’s proposals were fairly heterogeneous with respect to the type of public ME-O wanted to appeal to. The main cores were proposals linked to centre-left views, but he also proposed measures associated with a right-wing vision. It cannot be argued that he was proposing extremely radical changes. His government programme had three main subjects. The first was about democracy as the central theme for development. Concerning this subject, he proposed a new political constitution, the reformulation of the binominal system and a law for youth quotas. Moreover, reforms regarding gender issues and sexual minorities were also part of this first subject. The second subject was about the state and a new social pact. The main proposals were the improvement of public education and a tributary reform. Finally, the third subject was about sustainable development where the protection of water resources, and the development of an energetic policy with a special emphasis on non-conventional renewable energies, were the main proposals. This last point was represented by the rejection of the Hidroaysén project (Programa de Gobierno Marco Enríquez Ominami, 2009).

In any case, the campaign’s main pillar was the need to change the functioning of Chilean politics. For example, the opening paragraph of his programme states: "We are going to refresh politics, we will establish a new way of doing politics (...). We will risk for an active and true participation of people, getting the government and its authorities closer to the citizenry" (Ibid.). By criticising the performance of the political system, he then attempted to appeal to politically-disaffected people. Based on the same premise, he also tried to be diverse in his proposals and to avoid classic political categorisations. For instance, he never argued he was a left-wing candidate, but that he was a progressive candidate. Yet, he incorporated people linked to right-wing ideas in the campaign. The biggest example of this situation was his main economic adviser Paul Fontaine, who even joined Piñera’s campaign after the first round. This situation led him to propose some measures linked to a right-wing economic vision, such as privatising the 5% of CODELCO in order to get more efficiency and transparency.82 Due

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82 CODELCO is the biggest state-owned Chilean copper company and no other candidate had ever proposed to privatise a part of it.
to this heterogeneity, it has been argued that his bases of support were very diffused, with no clear support niches, which lead him to attract people annoyed with politics from several sectors (Bunker and Navia, 2010).

In summary, ME-O was a candidate with a very strong political background whose popularity can also be attributed to his proximity to the media. He emerged as a candidate whose main critical views were about the functioning of Chilean politics after having been the victim of this apparently undemocratic acting. In this sense, he intended to appeal to politically-disaffected people based on a diverse discourse that seems to have generated a diffuse base of support.

**5.3 Why did ME-O appealing to young people?**

After describing the emergence of this candidacy and its main proposals, it is necessary to observe what the evidence suggests about the specific reasons that made him an appealing candidate for this group. This is done by presenting evidence from more general arguments to more specific ones.

**5.3.1 The need for youth descriptive representation**

The first issue that contributes to comprehending ME-O’s attractiveness is the fact that he was a young candidate. At the time of the elections he was 36 years old. Moreover, his youthful appearance was also more relevant as other candidates were much older than him.\(^8^3\) ME-O’s age is highlighted both by young voters and young militants of the PRO as an important reason for supporting him. The attractiveness of being a young candidate is explained by the fact that this gave him an innovative and vital image that was closer to the youth generation. He was young and as such acted as having some youth habits, using a specific language and expression forms that called the attention of young people. Moreover, it is also highlighted that he has a biographic history that is closer to the youths’.

> Marco uses many young idioms in his language. So, I feel that is why he quickly synchronised with young people. And he did not look forced. Frei was once in a public event dancing the dance of the nose. It was ridiculous, pathetic, sad. While Marco was

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\(^8^3\) By the time of the elections Piñera was sixty years old, Frei was 67 and Arrate was 68.
able to sit in any university forum and fill the classroom. You had a guy who spoke their language. They felt part of his generation." **Eduardo, PRO militant.**

"I think my biography was far more interesting for young people than Frei’s. My own actions and my inheritance play a role. Many factors play a role. That is to say, Miguel, Karen, my movies, my language, my errors. I think that with young people there was a dialogue in that sense."**ME-O.**

**ME-O** recognises the role that his antecedents played in generating youth support, highlighting how his habits, the closeness to the media and even his mistakes generated a closer relationship. Moreover, it is also underlined that the fact other candidates were much older than him helped to emphasise his youth status.

The second factor that explains the importance of being a young person has to do with the significance that young people attribute to political renovation. Chilean political activity is currently marked by a profound adultcentrism where several people have been in power for many years. In this context, **ME-O** would come to break that logic as he is a young face, but also since it is believed that he would work with younger people in his potential government.

"**ME-O** was attractive because many times politicians have repeated their places in Chile. There are people who have been deputies for four periods. There are ministers who have participated even since Allende’s or Frei Montalva’s governments. Then, to renew politics is essential today. Because politicians who have been in power for forty or fifty years are often out of context and they use strategies and practices that Chile has to leave behind. Political personalism. To share out certain positions. To generate proposals within four walls." **Vicente, PRO militant.**

"It was appealing that he was so young and that he was there representing the youth. Above all he is a politician. However, I think he would have had a cabinet a little bit younger and closer to original ideas". **Carolina, voter.**

**ME-O** represented, to some young people, the introduction of new young faces in formal politics. He is seen as a renovator of Chilean politics. This situation is valued, since it introduces ideas that are beneficial to youths’ interests but also because it challenges bad practices of political parties such as political personalism and exclusionary ways of decision-making. In this sense, as he is young, it is believed that he has not been stained yet by some rejected features, which would make him able to contest current power structures.

The fact that **ME-O** was attractive because he was young reaffirms and deepens previous findings as it was previously observed that one of the reasons that explains
current high levels of youth political disaffection is a lack of political renewal. This is also one relevant reason that allows us to understand particularly higher levels of hostility among youths. Therefore, it can be argued that this new evidence demonstrates with a particular case how the reproduction of an adult-centred style of politics based on some partyarchic practices is rejected by youths as they value MEO’s youthfulness precisely because that challenges current undemocratic parties’ practices.

This evidence also allows us to infer that Chilean political system requires higher levels of youth descriptive representation (youths representing youths) in order to reduce political disaffection. Descriptive representation has been highlighted by many authors as a relevant attribute to be developed in a democratic regime (Dovi, 2002). This argument can be used in the case of Chilean youths, especially if the current context is taken into account. Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representation is particularly relevant in contexts of mistrust and where some interests are uncryystalised. This is clearly the case of Chilean youths as it was already shown that they do not trust politicians and that their interests have been particularly left aside. Hence, it is possible to claim that if better connections are to be made between youths and politics the introduction of younger representatives is clearly an important step to be taken.

5.3.2 The break with the way of doing politics

ME-O’s main criticism was about a way of doing politics that he believed to be very negative for Chilean democracy. This critical posture was also very relevant to appeal to young people, and particularly to captivate politically-disaffected youths. In this sense, this section illustrates how these criticisms were relevant to gaining youth support.

The first step to developing this issue is to examine evidence to observe if ME-O actually was more attractive to disaffected people to test the assumption that those who reject the way of functioning of Chilean politics were more captivated by this candidate. In table 5.1 it is possible to observe ME-O’s vote intention according to both age group and two indicators of political disaffection. It is observed first that that ME-O was more attractive to young people than for adults both in disaffected and not
disaffected people. This would indicate therefore that he was also attractive to non-disaffected youths, which might be explained by image and age, as developed in the previous section.

Table 5.1 - ME-O vote intention according to age group and indicators of political disaffection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Registered</th>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>Do not Have Confidence</th>
<th>Have Confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth (18-29)</td>
<td>35,8%</td>
<td>27,9%</td>
<td>35,1%</td>
<td>24,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (+30)</td>
<td>31,3%</td>
<td>17,4%</td>
<td>19,0%</td>
<td>11,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,3%</td>
<td>18,7%</td>
<td>23,4%</td>
<td>15,3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CEP, October 2009 n: 1505.*

It is also possible to observe that for the whole of the Chilean population, ME-O was without doubt more appealing to politically-disaffected people. His vote intention was much higher among people who are not registered to vote and those who do not have confidence in political parties. Therefore, it can be argued that he appealed more both behaviourally and attitudinally disaffected people. Moreover, it is also observed that among the disaffected he has more support from youths since the highest vote intention is among youths who do not electorally participate and distrust political parties.84

"I have always had a very anti-politics discourse. But with ME-O, I said I am voting because it is a proposal that sounds good. I think young people truly saw something in these discourses that they had to rely on. If you did not have confidence in politicians you have to have confidence in someone who was saying coherent things." **Rosario, voter.**

As evident in the interview quote, ME-O seemed to be a good alternative for some people who had high feelings of hostility towards the political system. For example, youth confidence in political parties in Chile is currently extremely low and among those distrustful youths, this candidacy obtained more than a third of vote intention. It seems then that a relevant portion of disaffected youths were willing to trust politicians after hearing a critical discourse concerning the political class.

84 Another relevant data that is not shown in the table is that, according to this same survey, ME-O obtained among politically disaffected youths almost the double the votes of Frei and a similar percentage to Piñera (CEP, 2009).
The criticism to the "duopoly partyarchy"

ME-O criticised several elements of the functioning of Chilean politics. Among them, his claim that politicians are dominated by power interests that restrict the achievement of substantive changes was without doubt one of the most attractive. He heavily condemned the existence of a ‘political duopoly’ composed by the Concertación and the Alianza that had monopolised political power, avoiding the emergence of political forces both inside and outside these coalitions. Additionally, he argued that this situation is especially represented by strong party leaderships that have constantly opted for power arrangements in detriment of substantive proposals in order to maintain certain privileges.

"The big problem in Chile is that it is governed by a duopoly. They make laws against ‘díscolo’ people so other forces do not emerge. They negotiate things. And the education law floats. Health floats. And tax reform is momentary. To change the binomial does not suit the one or the other. No one does relevant things. We were going to break that duopoly and steal from both sides." Cristian Warner, general secretary of the PRO.

When interviews are analysed it can be observed that youths’ strongest critiques are associated with these power-issues, and that ME-O represented a relevant change regarding this political scenario for them. He was perceived as a new political force who showed politicians power does not necessarily only have to be shared among these two coalitions and that electoral results could be less predictable. Indeed, the candidacy was seen as a break with respect to a monopolisation of politics that is perceived highly negatively by Chilean youths.

"I was interested in ME-O because he is a young person who came to break the scheme in the chessboard of politics. I liked him because deep inside he was a way to demonstrate to politicians they had gained nothing. To tell them that power is not among you, and that nothing was fixed before the elections. Deep inside it was a protest vote." Rodrigo, voter.

"If you look at older politicians, they are very scared about new proposals. And that is also why they get stuck. They are scared of these changes because they don’t know what will happen. And I think ME-O would have dared. Just because he was someone who was just getting into politics, or who was not so soaked with this issue of power." Carolina, voter.

The evidence indicates that Chilean youths reject a way of doing politics controlled by power interests that, among other things, limits the emergence of new leaderships and that has postponed the execution of several significant initiatives. It is considered
that politicians, in order to reproduce their power positions, normally opt to maintain a status quo that needs to be modified. In this context, ME-O represents a relevant change for several youths as they feel he would encourage substantial changes. Youths perceive that any person who decides to carve out a political career would inevitably become dominated by a logic where power attainment is always prioritised. In this sense, the fact that ME-O is young helps to make him more credible as he has not had the chance yet to get involved in this logic.

**The specific rejection of the Concertación**

A second issue to be developed has to do with MEO’s specific criticisms towards the Concertación. He criticised the whole Chilean political spectrum. However, as his candidacy was mostly based on centre-left wing proposals he represented a positive change, especially to some people who were initially attracted to the Concertación but who were now dissatisfied with this coalition. In fact, according to a survey executed a couple of months before the elections, ME-O obtained 50% of vote intention among youths who declared a left-wing leaning while Frei obtained just 24% (CEP, October, 2009).

When the interview material is examined it can be observed that power-related criticisms that appealed ME-O’s young voters are particularly more focused on the role of the Concertación. In this regard, it is noticed that ME-O absorbed high levels of disenchantment with respect to this coalition. This is explained by the fact that his main proposals came from a similar political view, but also as the Concertación has been the greatest contributor regarding the engenderment of feelings of hostility towards the political system among ME-O’s adherents. In this sense, it is believed that he will not reproduce the same negative practices of this coalition.

"ME-O gave a new face to the left because he is from the centre-left, recycling the vices of the Concertación after twenty years in office. Vices such as not allowing young people to advance. Like the proper ME-O. To continue for twenty years with the same people that it was already proven that they had their time. It is deep inside to embrace power and not leave it." **Alejandro, voter.**

"I believed it when Bachelet spoke about the citizenry government. And that is why Marco embodied again for me the feeling that was calling my attention. The Concertación absolutely disappointed me. The education agreement that Bachelet made was a disgrace. Education ends up being the icing on the cake of the
Concertación process, that having parliamentary majority at times did not push for major reforms. Bachelet should have embodied that leap. But that didn’t happen.”

Eduardo, PRO militant.

Among these negative practices the following can be highlighted: to have party leadership that makes all decisions without taking into account the opinion of ordinary party members or common citizens; to reproduce an adult-centric style of politics; and to be concerned mainly about the attainment of power to the detriment of people’s wellbeing. This last point is the most criticised, as it is believed that during the Concertación’s governments many more substantial reforms should have been accomplished. Young people argue that this coalition failed regarding the fulfillment of relevant promises, and that it is not credible anymore. One of the main examples is education reforms, where all governments of the Concertación, and especially that of Michelle Bachelet, are heavily criticised by some youths. Based on those criticisms, to vote for ME-O seemed to have represented in itself a criticism to the acting of the Concertación for some youths. He is more credible, and it is expected the he will substantively represent them in a much better way.

One last relevant aspect to be highlighted is the fact that ME-O attracted people who were dissatisfied with Bachelet’s performance. Bachelet also built her leadership by counteracting traditional parties. She was seen as a fresh and alternative leader against the continuity of the prevailing order, as she took distance from the establishment of the Concertación by presenting herself as someone who was closer to common citizens than to the political class (Tanaka, 2008). In fact, one of her main promises was to develop a ‘citizenry government’ that would encourage more citizen participation. These promises, however, seem to have not been accomplished according to some of ME-O’s young voters, since they were clearly disappointed about these issues. Therefore, ME-O represented somehow an alternative for political change for some people who witnessed how someone who they believed to be a significant alternative to the negative state of affairs of Chilean politics did not fulfill her promises.

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85 Let’s remember that during Bachelet’s administration (2006-2010) an educational social movement emerged and that it was seen as an opportunity to make important reforms. This episode will be analysed in the next chapter.
The significance of political guts

The last point to be developed regarding how ME-O’s criticisms of the way of doing politics appealed to young people has to do with his resignation from the Concertación. As it was previously described, ME-O resigned from the PS after the party imposed Frei’s candidacy. The evidence suggests that this was extremely valued by young people. This was due to this empirically embodying MEO’s main criticisms of the political class (especially towards the Concertación) about the monopolisation of politics based on the prioritisation of power interests. He was therefore seen as a consistent candidate who showed political guts to have revolted against the coalition where he initiated his political career.

"Another thing that attracted me was ME-O’s political history. He wanted to be in the Concertación’s primaries and he was left aside due to a circle of power that said that the PDC has to have a candidate. That shows that the Concertación also has a closed circle of power, that there is political quoting and that it is not possible to come out from there. Then ME-O came to break the board." **Alejandro, voter.**

"The political act of divorcing from the Concertación was the most powerful political act that motivated many of us to participate. To not go for a candidacy that would probably have secured his re-election as a deputy or maybe even as a senator." **Vicente, PRO militant.**

Some of ME-O’s voters were highly disaffected with respect to the Concertación, which made him an appealing candidate as he heavily criticised this coalition. However, what seems to have made several youths truly believe him seems to have been the fact that he was consistent with his positions. His resignation proved to young people that he was not in politics only for political power since to have continued in the Concertación would have at least guaranteed him a position as a deputy. Thus, they perceived that he was different from other members of the political class whose main interest is to acquire power. Moreover, as young people had also experienced the non-fulfillment of promises for political change from a traditional-party candidate like Bachelet, an outsider alternative became even more valued.

In summary, the evidence indicates that ME-O’s political criticisms were very relevant in appealing to young people. His critique’s central element, which was especially directed at the Concertación, was condemning a way of doing politics where two similar coalitions are principally worried about acquiring power. In this context,
ME-O was perceived as a valued alternative for several youths who were rejecting these political practices. Likewise, this section also demonstrated that Chilean youths would be more attracted to formal politics if politicians did not generate the perception that they are just there to gain power. Moreover, it also indicates that being young and not coming from classic political parties are helpful elements in making politicians more credible to disaffected youths.

These results can be also connected with previous findings. To this effect, it can be argued that ME-O’s appealing features regarding his political criticisms are in accordance with some youths’ perceptions that were previously observed to be generating political disaffection. This is because it was formerly remarked that youths who perceive that there is a homogeneous political offer and that the political class’s main interest is to reproduce its power positions develop feelings of hostility toward the political system. In relation to the first issue, the fact that ME-O was able to attract youths as he was perceived to be a break from a political duopoly indicates more strongly that Chilean youths reject the fact that Chilean democracy has a homogenous offer that excludes some discussion topics such as the promotion of a different socio-economic model (Posner, 2008, Angell, 2007). On the other hand, the observed relationship between ME-O’s support and his condemnation of the indiscriminate search of power brought solid evidence to reassert one of this thesis’s new contributions, that is to sustain that there is an association between political disaffection and partyarchic attributes of Chilean democracy. This is because this new evidence showed, with concrete examples, youths’ rejection of certain political practices that limit their substantive representation.

5.3.3 The attractiveness of the proposals

Going beyond the fact that ME-O was primarily appealing as he was representing a break with a form of doing politics, it is also important to highlight some specific proposals that were relevant to get youths support. Among them, this section specially put emphasis on proposals about a tributary reform, some measures related to post-material values and several initiatives regarding political reforms as those were the most highlighted by the interviewed people.
**Tributary reform**

One of the most relevant of MEO’s proposals was the realisation of a tributary reform. He was the only candidate to propose this in the first round, and the evidence indicates the initiative attracted several voters. ME-O argued that a tributary reform was needed, proposing to increase taxes to companies in 30%, to increase mining royalty and to reform the heritage law. It intended to rise public spending in 8% in 2010.

Among youths’ supporters this reform was highly valued, principally because nobody else pushed for it. Therefore, it seems that he was marking a break regarding substantive propositions too. It is believed that ME-O did not only have a groundbreaking discourse, but that he was also materialising his criticisms through innovative and significant initiatives.

"I thought the programme was different, that there were real groundbreaking proposals, for example, the tributary reform. This seemed quite interesting and revolutionary because the rest of the candidates were the same. It was to perpetuate the current system." **Cristina, PRO militant.**

"The tributary reform was attractive to me because for years no one proposed it. And that is to directly point to the solution of the inequality in Chile. An educational discourse of the Concertación or the right is not credible, because for twenty years they remained the same. The two protect the business issue. Both are dedicated to a free market without discussing and criticising the system. And the system is bad because Chile is still unequal." **Alejandro, voter.**

By proposing this reform, young people perceived that ME-O was challenging a status quo that the other two coalitions were protecting. This is a status quo that promotes, without any critiques, a neoliberal socio-economic model that principally benefits businessmen. It is believed that it is necessary to challenge this model, as that can contribute to reducing inequality levels. Moreover, it is considered that both the Concertación and the Alianza are very similar regarding proposals that perpetuate this pro-business system, and that they are not credible when they promote its transformation since they do not have tangible proposals to do that. In this context, ME-O becomes credible as he proposes concrete measures to change central pillars of a system that generates inequality by inhibiting a more even distribution of Chile’s economic development results.
The fact that ME-O was attractive through proposing this reform also extended the understanding of specific elements of Chilean politics that seemed to be engendering feelings of political disaffection analysed in chapter 3. It was shown there that youths who perceive that the interests of powerful people are preferably represented and that the political offer is very homogeneous are rejecting more formal politics. In this sense, these findings deepen previous observations as the tributary reform was believed to both breaking with a homogeneous political offer and limiting powerful interests. These measures seemed then to have been appealing since they confronted a technocratic style of politics based on the reproduction of a neoliberal socio-economic model that characterises Chilean society that is being rejected by Chilean youths (Rindfjall, 2009). To this effect, this experience suggests also that disaffected youths can be attracted by formal politics when they see concrete measures that contest a scenario that benefits powerful interests and that at the same time makes a difference concerning the current political offer.

**Post-materialist proposals**

Among ME-O’s proposals highlight too some that are linked to the emergence of post-materialist values. These are proposals that are associated with an emphasis on quality of life and self-expression that emerge when societies reach a better standard of living (Inglehart, 1990, Dalton 2006). The candidacy had several proposals of this type related to gender, sexual minority issues and environmental protection, and they seem to have attracted a great number of voters. In fact, they were supposedly key to attracting some liberal right-wing youths who were dissatisfied with the Alianza as it has always had a very conservative vision regarding value issues.86

The interview material indicates that post-materialist proposals such as gay marriage, abortion, greater protection of the environment and even initiatives against drug prohibition were very relevant for some youths to support ME-O. They were significant as these topics had not been part of the Chilean political agenda. Thus, they are perceived as somehow breaking the existing homogeneous political offer.

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86 This fact that right-wing youths supported ME-O can be shown by the fact that approximately a third of his supporters voted for Piñera in the second round.
Moreover, these proposals are also valued because they are linked more specifically to youths’ interests.

"ME-O spoke about many things that other candidates also spoke but they were ‘pantallas’. For example, what happened with Piñera in the case of civil unions and gays. In contrast, I think he would have made great changes in the field of opposite-sex couples concerning gender issue, in terms of women’s development, and sexual and reproductive rights." Carolina, voter.

"It was attractive that deep inside not only the typical topics are tackled since existing politics were addressed, like health, education, inequality, and so on. But he took into account issues such as sexual minorities, anti-prohibition concerning drugs and abortion." Luisa, PRO militant.

It is believed that when other candidates make references to these issues they just do so to obtain more votes and will not truly encourage these types of measures. Within this context ME-O appears convincing, since youths believe he is more actualised and that his actions are much more legitimate. This is the case, for example, as he was one of the few politicians who opposed the Hydroaysén project since it started.

When these findings are compared with results of previous chapters, it cannot be argued this time that they are in accordance. In fact, it was previously shown that there is not a significant association between value orientation and indicators of disaffection. This might be suggesting that post-material proposals were not relevant by themselves in attracting disaffected youths, but they could have attracted them since they also represented a break from a homogeneous political offer. It could also suggest that there is in fact a section of youths that will be less politically disaffected if these issues are a relevant part of the agenda, as Inglehart and Dalton have argued. This maybe the case, for example, of liberal right-wing youths who are not identified with current right-wing parties. These suggestions, however, would require further testing.

**Political reforms**

The last proposals to be highlighted are political reforms. They were also key regarding ME-O’s support, as they were the main expression of the already-described

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87 To be a “pantalla” means that you try to be seen in a way but you are not really like that.
criticisms of a way of doing politics. ME-O proposed several political reforms, from changing the constitution and the binominal system to having mandatory primaries among political parties. These reforms were supposed to be the bases for breaking a ‘duopoly partyarchy’ as they would challenge the current monopolisation of politics and would have allowed the emergence of new forces, both within and outside traditional parties.

Data from the interviews accounts for the relevance of these proposals, since it is observed that among some youth voters political reforms were very attractive. The most highlighted one is the reform of the binominal system, as it is perceived to be crucial in order to challenge a political duopoly that limits the generation of proposals. Other underlined proposals are the execution of primaries among parties. Moreover, it is argued that proposing these reforms was necessary if ME-O wanted to be consistent with his criticisms of the political class.

"There were several packages of proposals that were attractive to me. Mainly those reforms to the political system. The binominal system. To face the whole situation to break with political leaderships. For example, with the primaries that had to be made for the presidential elections or primaries within parties themselves." Vicente, PRO militant.

"Political reforms were attractive to me because deep down, governments have been a duopoly for over thirty years. What ME-O proposes with respect to the binominal system is necessary to beat the legitimacy crisis of political parties. Much of the public debate that it is being developed is because decisions are being taken without consulting people. These reforms attract people who want to get involved and have something to say." Rosario, voter.

These measures are also valued since they are central to further advancements on social matters. Additionally, it is believed that these political reforms are necessary to overcome current political parties’ crises of legitimacy that is explained by the fact that they make decisions without incorporating the citizenry. Youths believe that current social conflicts express a necessity to include common people in the decision-making processes. Thus, ME-O was attractive to them as he was proposing concrete measures to generate more participation.

The attractiveness of political reforms also agrees with previous findings. In fact, its requirement is very consistent with the perception that the political system is deficiently connected with the citizenry. ME-O proposed these measures and obtained
support from disaffected people. Therefore, that indicates that these types of initiatives can be relevant if levels of youth political disaffection are to be decreased. Moreover, these proposals’ appeal also reaffirms that one relevant element of a supposedly new way of doing politics that could be emerging among Chilean youths is the existence of authentic mechanisms of participation, and that youths are aware of the need of participative instruments to improve their capacity to be better substantively represented (Plotke, 1997).

To sum up, this candidacy had several proposals that appealed to young people. These measures were diverse, and all of them somehow contributed to deepening previously-developed arguments about the main sources of political disaffection. Figure 5.2 summarises the main issues that explain ME-O’s youth support and how he can be differentiated from other candidates. This figure is based on a multiple correspondence analysis that uses several categorical variables to generate a two-dimensional representation of their relationships. The variables included in this figure were vote intention, a couple of indicators of political disaffection, opinions of the day-after pill and type of government and a statism index.

**Figure 5.2 - Multiple correspondence analysis of candidates’ vote intention and several other indicators among Chilean youths (18-29)**

![Multiple correspondence analysis diagram](image)

*Source: UDP (2009a) n: 355*

Looking at the figure, it is observed that its first dimension is clearly defined by political position in terms of left and right wing, and that the second dimension mainly
measures feelings of political disaffection. Within this representation, it is observed that ME-O is located at the centre regarding the first dimension and that is the closest candidate to the disaffected people pole in the second dimension. He is the closest category to people who are not registered and do not have confidence in political parties. Moreover, he is also near to those who approve of the day-after pill and who prefer governments who ask people. Regarding levels of statism, he is close to high and medium levels. With respect to the other candidates, it is observed that Piñera has a clear cluster of support based on right-wing people who advocate governments that act fast without asking people, that are against the day-after pill and that prefer low levels of statism. On the other hand, Frei and Arrate are linked to left-wing youths who are not politically disaffected.

This figure reaffirms, therefore, that ME-O was especially attractive to disaffected youths as a candidate and that his bases of support are given by a variety of issues. Moreover, it also indicates that he was not only a candidate who appealed to left-wing youths as his proposals attracted people identified with the whole political spectrum.

5.4 The role of Social Networks

Having analysed the main substantial reasons that explain this candidacy success, it is necessary to examine another element that helps to understand ME-O’s support. This is the case in the relevance that social networks such as Facebook and Twitter had for the development of the campaign, and how their use was also significant in order to attract youths.

The influence of digital media for promoting political participation has been highlighted by several authors. Kobayashi et al. (2006) argue that through experiences of social exchange and support among online communities, people nourish social trust that finally can enhance both online and offline political participation. Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzula (2010) argue that online conversations provide useful tools for the proliferation of civic engagement, since they generate informational utility and as they also have mobilising effects among discussants. Dalton (2008) sustains that internet activism is a very relevant manifestation of an engaged-type of citizenship that stimulates political action through more expressive and participatory norms. Finally,
particularly regarding the use of social networks for political campaigns, Hanson et al. (2010) argue that newer forms of social media offer an opportunity for political communication that can affect political cynicism.

The qualitative material brings relevant information regarding the relevance that digital media had for ME-O’s campaign. First, it is observed that people that participated in the campaign strongly highlight that social networks were very relevant in gaining youth support. This is because these tools are very close to them so they facilitated communication. Young people normally use digital media. Therefore, ME-O became attractive as he was closer to the youth world because he spoke their language and used their platforms. Through these means he was able to be closer to young people through innovative means. For example, it is highlighted that ME-O himself managed his Twitter account. Moreover, it is argued that the digital strategy was also successful because people in charge of it were young.

"It was a little bit unavoidable to use digital media because there was no money at the beginning. I think that clearly helped. I mean, because we spoke youths’ language. We used their platforms. The campaign was led by young people. I mean, everybody who was working was younger than thirty years old." Javier Sajuria, responsible of the digital strategy of the campaign.

"What we did very well was to take advantage of the youth attribute. The proximity to digital media. With Facebook and Twitter. They were the most popular tools in that minute and served us very well in communicating. There was a mix of innovation and good knowledge of these tools, because they were comfortable for our generation. The media was not covering us. So, we used digital media." Cristian Warner, general secretary of the PRO.

It is also argued that these means were relevant since the campaign had few resources and because traditional mass media did not sufficiently cover this candidacy in order to protect other interests. In this sense, the use of social networks was also a necessity given the independent character of the campaign and the fact that it was criticising a status quo that is normally defended by traditional media.

Youth voters also stress the relevance of social networks. It is emphasised that these forms of communication are closer to young people and that situation made ME-O more attractive. Moreover, it is stated that the use of Facebook, Twitter and websites also showed the groundbreaking character of the candidacy that was
expressed in its critical discourse. This is because he was one of the first politicians who used these mediums, which projected him as being innovative.

"I work in the social field and I see the power that social networks have. ME-O moved in that way and it was very useful. And that also reflects that he had another vision, because the others would not have thought about it or would have thought about it later. Instead, he used it in the moment and it was useful." Carolina, voter.

"The use of social networks was very important to attracting youths. In fact, if you compare the resources of the candidacies, Marco’s campaign was made with one-third of the others, or maybe less. Digital media were extremely important. I mean, Facebook campaigns: everyone was there. Twitter, the websites. This was also another step in the emergence of the candidacy that made it different. That was one of the greatest reasons young people also got hooked." Cristina, PRO militant.

The use of social networks was also appealing to young people, as it showed a more open and transparent form of campaigning. Through digital media people had more access to information about proposals and campaign activities. Likewise, these social mediums increased opportunities for expressing opinions and having greater participation. Finally, youths also highlight that the use of these media was particularity relevant for a campaign that did not have plentiful economic resources.

All in all, the fact that ME-O was particularly appealing to young people is also attributed to the use of social networks in his campaign. The fact that campaign ideas were discussed online had the expected mobilising effect, as it clearly offered new opportunities for political communication in a context dominated by high levels of disaffection (Gil de Zuñiga and Valenzula, 2010, Hanson et al., 2010). Moreover, the use of these means was in accordance with other elements of ME-O’s discourse, such as promoting a more active citizenry, as both situations are part of an engaged type of citizenship (Dalton, 2008). The evidence suggests, then, that if formal politics is to be more attractive to younger generations, apart from having engaging proposals it is also necessary to use innovative means to inform these ideas.

5.5 The emergence of the ‘Partido Progresista’

Given the success of the candidacy, at the end of the presidential campaign in December 2009 it was decided that the best option to develop the political project was to found a new party that embodied the main criticisms and proposals made during the campaign. In May 2010 the party was finally named Partido Progresista (PRO).
After that, the party initiated a signature collection to officially register in the electoral system (La Tercera, 2010). To April 2012, the party is officially registered in six of Chile’s 15 regions. For example, it was already registered in the Metropolitan Region with more than 15,000 militants.

When important members of the PRO party leadership are asked about the success concerning the incorporation of youths, it is recognised that it has been a long and difficult process. Nevertheless, they argue that they have been successful and that there are good future perspectives. One of the main difficulties has been that young people are highly skeptical about the concept of political parties because current parties are perceived very negatively. In this context, the PRO attempts to be perceived as an institution that promotes democratic and inclusive logics as a response to the negative actions of traditional parties.

"We have been very successful in attracting young people to participate. I think there is an effort concerning proposals. I think there is a tremendous opportunity to do things differently. And we have shown perseverance that will reap rewards. The functioning of parties is a promise that we must fulfill, though. Internal elections are an example of democracy." ME-O.

"We have a tremendous challenge because we have to break the barrier with respect to parties. And young people are the most unbelieving. But we are extremely confident about that. So it's like making them part of a new project. I mean, building forms that are democratic, participatory. For example, we made the decision not to have a youth division in the party because young people are a perspective that must be inserted into the different areas of the party’s decision-making." Alejandra Botinelli, vice-president of education and culture of the PRO.

The PRO, for example, has promoted the idea that all elections within the party have to be democratic. Moreover, it was established that the party would not have a youth division in order to better incorporate youths in all decision-making spheres. These attributes are believed to have been crucial in engaging young people since they highly value instances where decisions are taken in a more horizontal way through authentic mechanisms of participation. In this sense, it is argued that several youths have become re-enchanted with the idea of parties.

When youth militants of the PRO are asked about their main motivations for participating in this new party, it can be observed that they are in accordance with what was argued by members of the party leadership. In fact, it is stated that its main
attraction is that it is a very democratic situation where they feel part of decision-making processes as it has authentic mechanisms of participation. These aspects are particularly valued when they compare the PRO with the functioning of other parties. They consider that other parties are not democratic since they are dominated by restricted groups and because they have very limited spaces of participation. Thus, the PRO becomes more appealing to them since it does not reproduce these negative logics.

“You really live here something that does not happen in other parties. I mean, the democratic story. Everything is democratic here in the assemblies. This clearly distinguishes it from other parties. I think that's the difference to speeches and programmes. In practice that differentiates us a lot.” Cristina.

“I had not militated in other parties because I knew they were completely dominated spaces and that I had to hang on some leadership to be within a circle of decision-making. Marco understands that there should not be a youth division because youths are removed from the decision-making area. And that is the guarantee that young people are not the labor of a future campaign but political actors of a transformation process.” Eduardo.

Young people value that decisions are not made between few people but that everybody in the party is able to participate and elaborate proposals. This is also the reason for appreciating that the PRO is self-managed, since that permits that everybody has to work equally and that there are not external economic pressures regarding some specific decisions. Specifically regarding youth participation, it is also highlighted that there is not a youth division but that there are quotas to include youths in decision-making spaces. Young militants of the PRO believe that this is a good measure, since it avoids what happens in other parties where youth divisions are mainly the party labour. In this sense, it is perceived that within the PRO there are much more horizontal relationships where everybody is capable of listening to each other. Finally, they underline that the fact that it is a new party helps to make it more credible, since as everything has to be built discussion is enriched and the participation of all is needed.

The evidence indicates, therefore, that the PRO has been successful in gaining youth militants by criticising the functioning of traditional parties through the implementation of more democratic functioning forms. These are features that have been highlighted among the literature, as Navia (2004) and Siavellis (2005) have
argued that processes of candidate selection among traditional Chilean parties had been very undemocratic since the return to democracy. Moreover, it can be observed that these findings also fully agree with one of the main new contributions of this thesis, that is, the observation of the association between political disaffection and an undemocratic internal functioning of parties. It was previously shown that traditional parties engender disaffection as they are controlled by logics of power that make them undemocratic, adult-centered and discouraging regarding the activation of people. In this sense, reasons given by PRO’s youth militants to participate in this party deepen this argument since they criticise traditional parties based on similar motives as this party is perceived as a transparent and democratic instance where they will not be excluded. This indicates, therefore, that some youths will be less politically disaffected if political parties worked differently in the sense of being more democratic with authentic mechanisms through which young people could participate and express their opinions.

This evidence also indicates that in a supposedly new way of doing politics that is emerging among youths the figure of political parties is not to be automatically rejected. Although parties are currently highly criticised and new parties find several difficulties in attracting new militants, it is observed that these institutions could play a relevant role in the future if they worked differently. As it has been argued in this thesis, Chile is a party democracy (Garretón, 2007) and that seems to have been the base of MEO’s decision to canalise his support through this political form rather than by the establishment of a social movement or other type of organisation. In this sense, the fact that PRO’s youth militants appreciated democratic forms of functioning seems to indicate that a reformulation of current party logics could both reduce levels of political disaffection’s and make parties a relevant element of an emerging new way of doing politics that generates much more public support.

5.6 The limits of the candidacy

Until now it has been shown that ME-O was an appealing candidate that particularly attracted disaffected youths. However, his critical discourse could clearly have been much more successful as he obtained only 20.1% of votes. Moreover, this
presidential election could not provoke a massive registration of young people. For example, the percentage of registered youths with respect to the whole youth population only passed from 20 to 23%. What is more, the experience of other Latin American countries indicates that in contexts of high levels of political disaffection, anti-establishment candidates have been able to obtain power (Levitsky, 1999, Tanaka, 2008, and Philip and Panizza, 2011). For instance, Philip and Panizza (2011) argue that a key element that explains the electoral success of current presidents of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador is that they were able to capitalise political discontent by challenging partycracies founded on the moderation of political antagonisms, the retrenchment of the state given by the implementation of market reforms and the deactivation of civil society. In this sense, it is necessary to reflect also in relation to the main situations that limited the success of a candidacy that emerged in a comparable context88.

**Institutional limits**

Some of MEO’s greatest limitations are related to institutional rules that define Chilean electoral processes. Among them, the most relevant one seems to have been the enrollment system. At the time of the 2009 elections, voting was compulsory where once one voluntarily registered to vote. This limited success since, those most affected by a system that reduces incentives to participate are clearly those disaffected with formal politics. This could be due to, for example, people felt attracted by a candidate for one election but they do not know what will happen in subsequent elections, so they do not want to be forced to vote eternally89. Based on that argument, the proper party leadership of the PRO argues that if there had been automatic enrollment and voluntary voting ME-O would have obtained more votes90.

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88 Evidently the Chilean context also differs in several elements comparing with other Latin American countries. The similarities and differences between Chile and other Latin American countries in relation to contexts that produces crisis of representation will be developed more deeply in subsequent chapters.

89 This is actually one of the arguments given by ME-O’s voters when they are asked why he did not obtain more support among disaffected people.

90 This system was in fact recently changed for one that establishes automatic enrolment and voluntary voting.
This speculation can be tested somehow with data from surveys regarding vote intention including both registered and non-registered people. Table 5.2 shows that if the whole population had voted ME-O would indeed have obtained more support.

**Table 5.2 - Vote intention for the 2009/2010 Chilean presidential election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Round</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Other (null, do not vote, etc.)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piñera</td>
<td>36,3%</td>
<td>25,7%</td>
<td>18,7%</td>
<td>4,5%</td>
<td>14,9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frei</td>
<td>23,9%</td>
<td>22,1%</td>
<td>4,2%</td>
<td>14,2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME-O</td>
<td>22,1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrate</td>
<td>4,2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  | Registered  |          |          |                                |          |          |
| Piñera           | 36,3%       | 25,7%    | 18,7%    | 4,5%                           | 14,9%    |          |
| Frei             | 23,9%       | 22,1%    | 4,2%     | 14,2%                          |          |          |
| ME-O             | 22,1%       |          |          |                                 |          |          |
| Arrate           | 4,2%        |          |          |                                 |          |          |
| Other (null, do not vote, etc.) | 14,9% | 14,2% |          |                                |          |          |

|                  | All population |          |          |                                |          |          |
| Piñera           | 35,6%         | 23,9%    | 22,1%    | 4,2%                           | 14,9%    |          |
| Frei             | 23,9%         | 22,1%    | 4,2%     | 14,2%                          |          |          |
| ME-O             | 22,1%         |          |          |                                 |          |          |
| Arrate           | 4,2%          |          |          |                                 |          |          |
| Other (null, do not vote, etc.) | 14,9% | 14,2% |          |                                |          |          |

*Source: CEP, October 2009 n: 1505*

In fact, taking into account the sampling error of these surveys and the fact that among those who stated that they do not vote or that they could vote null ME-O would have probably obtained more votes, it could be possible that under a different enrollment system ME-O would have been elected as Chile’s president. Even though it is difficult to believe that with this different system everybody would have voted, at least these data indicate that different institutional rules would have produced more favorable results for this candidacy.

Another institutional limitation that ME-O had was the long space of time that existed between elections and registration deadline. Presidential elections were held on the 13 December 2009 while people were only able to register to vote until 13 September. The fact that people were only able to register three months before the elections particularly affected ME-O, since he was the candidate who tried hardest to appeal to disaffected people. The most vibrant stage of the debate occurred in these three months but many people who felt attracted to ME-O in the closing stage of the campaign did not have the chance to officially support him. Moreover, let’s remember that ME-O officially registered his candidacy on 10 September. Therefore, there were only three days between him being an official candidate and the deadline for registering, which clearly affected his chances of gaining more support.
The limits of his political discourse

Beyond institutional limits, it is also possible to observe that ME-O’s discourse somehow limited his success as he was not able to appeal to a relevant group of youths who are very critical regarding the functioning of Chilean politics. This situation is identified when politically-involved youths that did not support this candidacy are asked about him. Although some of them highlight the emergence of the candidacy as a positive thing since it challenges a reprehensible political class through a valiant and consistent performance, it is observed that it generated large repulsion as well. This situation occurs mainly among youths associated with left-wing political positions who claim that ME-O’s candidacy was not attractive as his proposals were not found to be weighty and consistent. In this sense, it is argued that he was attractive to young people principally because he had an appealing youthful image that was well communicated, but that there were no substantive contents beyond that image. They argue that this situation is expressed in the fact that his coalition did not obtain any place in the parliament and that few people registered to vote for him.

"I think ME-O is not serious and that his appeal was more superficial. He had no weight. He had different advisers from several sides. How can you manage to have a political project if there is a Russian salad? At some point he also seemed attractive to me. Fresh air, generating debate. To be challenging. And deep inside, instead of saying what it is expected to say he says the opposite. I think he had a good communicational management but he lacked substance.” **Patricia, member of an organisation that promotes public health.**

"ME-O can be seen as something closer. But it is an image. It is no more than that. Some people saw an option in ME-O. But I don’t see that the penguins (secondary students), university students, popular youth, are interested in ME-O. It can be seen like that but if you look deeper and see the real possibilities that this person had there are not fundamental changes either." **Dario, member of an educational collective.**

More specifically, the consistency of his proposals is criticised by the fact that there were people from different political positions in his campaign, which ultimately resulted in a diffuse and heterogeneous offer that did not approach well several relevant social matters. An example of that is the critical position among some youths regarding the proposal to privatise a portion of CODELCO. It is also stated that within the current Chilean political context dominated by high levels of political mobilisation, ME-O would not be a relevant alternative to a great majority of the participants of these demonstrations. It is believed that he is appealing to several youths but mostly
to those who are not sufficiently politically-involved or not that disaffected regarding the functioning of the Chilean political system. Other criticisms he received are that his project is too personalistic, that he was not consistent with his criticisms after supporting Frei’s candidacy in the second round, and that he was not truly approaching youth issues\(^9^1\).

MEO’s discourse limited his success. He was not able to capitalise political discontent among several disaffected young people with more radical left-wing political positions. In this sense, it could be argued that in order to obtain the support of those people it would have also been necessary to deepen more left-wing proposals such as openly rejecting Chile’s neoliberal socio-economic model. Despite proposing some redistributive measures, ME-O was not an anti-neoliberalism candidate as in other electorally successful political projects of Latin America. This helped him to get the support of several people. However, at the same time it seems it also generated the rejection of several other disaffected people.

5.7 Conclusions

This chapter main’s objective was to analyse the sources of success of both the presidential candidacy of ME-O and the development of the PRO in order to understand more deeply current negative relations between youths and the Chilean political system. The main findings were that central reasons youths give for supporting ME-O are considerably accordant to what was previously found to be generating political disaffection among youths. Those who supported this new political project were very critical about the functioning of Chilean politics and these criticisms were very similar to perceptions previously observed to be associated with feelings of hostility towards the political system. In this sense, ME-O’s success can be described as another expression of Chile’s current crisis of political representation. He represented a significant alternative for several youths and the understanding of that situation contributed significantly to deepening the argument about why Chilean youths are

\(^9^1\) Regarding this last issue it can be highlighted that within ME-O’s programme there is no reference to the development of an intersectorially-coordinated youth public policy, although it was previously shown that this measure would help reduce political disaffection. When members of the PRO are asked about that situation they recognise there is a deficit.
politically disaffected. Moreover, it is also important to highlight that this chapter also deepened this thesis’s new contributions about Chile’s sources of political disaffection since it brought new evidence about youths’ perceptions that politicians are mostly worried about their power interests and that there is an undemocratic internal functioning of political parties.

The comprehension of ME-O’s success also reaffirmed the fact that Chilean youths seem to mostly be rejecting a form of doing politics and not ‘the political’. The fact that a critical discourse about Chilean politics could attract several youths demonstrates that they are not less politically involved because they are not interested in the wellbeing of society but because they are just rejecting how formal politics is currently being executed. What is more, results also indicate in which way a different style of doing politics would be more appealing to youths. It is observed that young people would be much more attracted to formal politics if: a) they perceived that politicians are not only interested in attaining power but in substantively representing people, b) there were more youth politicians, c) there were proposals that generated more participation and that limited powerful interests and d) there were more transparent and democratic parties.

Another relevant contribution of this chapter is that it also deepens the argument about the reasons that make Chilean youths especially more politically disaffected than the rest of Chilean population. With respect to the issue, it was previously stated that as youths are not relevant to reproducing politicians’ power positions, they are one of the most politically and socially excluded groups of the Chilean political system and consequently one of the most disaffected ones too. In this sense, ME-O’s candidacy corroborated this statement as it showed empirically how a project led by youth leaderships, that had as one of its main concerns the specific incorporation of young people and that even used means that were closed to this group was able to engage disaffected youths. One of the campaign’s proposals was to generate quotas to have more youth representatives. Moreover, within the new party one important rule is the avoidance of having a youth division. In this sense, it can be argued that this political project tried to somehow break a system that is particularly reticent about the
inclusion of young people, which seemed to have heavily contributed to obtaining youth support.

The analyses of this candidacy’s support could reaffirm and deepen, therefore, several propositions previously developed about the relationship between youths and politics. There are several elements that explain MEO’s support, such as his political criticisms, his youth condition and his policy preferences. Regarding this issue, the data analysed in this chapter do not allow us to distinguish the most relevant reason that explains this candidacy support among youths. However, it is important to highlight that all elements discussed have something in common. This all points to the fact that there is a disconnection between Chilean politics and common citizens, which is, according to this thesis’s main hypothesis, the main source of current high levels of youth political disaffection. In this sense, it can be claimed that the evidence discussed about this case study could verify previously-established hypotheses that explain the phenomenon being studied.

One final thing that is worthy of reflection has to do with the limits of this candidacy. It was shown in this chapter that ME-O could have been more successful, but that he was limited by both institutional rules and his own discourse. Concerning this issue, if more favourable conditions to generate support among disaffected youths are to be considered it is not possible to find straightforward directions. A different enrolment system would have clearly benefited ME-O. However, regarding his political discourse, it is not quite clear what would have produced more attraction. This is because the main criticism regarding his discourse is that he had a diffuse and heterogeneous offer based on diverse advisors. Hence, a project more linked to left-wing proposals and more critical of Chile’s neoliberal model could have brought him more support. This situation, however, would have probably reduced ME-O’s support from other people. Thus, it could be stated that ME-O was somehow entrapped in a similar situation of what Przeworski (1985) called "the dilemma of electoral socialism", 

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92 This would require the execution of a representative survey with MEO’s voters, which was not doable in the context of this thesis.
since both the maintenance and the modification of his discourse would have produced similar results\textsuperscript{93}.

What is intended to be argued through this last reflection is that ME-O’s political project by itself is quite far from being the answer to current problems of youth political disaffection in Chile. Just a portion of disaffected youths trusted politicians again with the emergence of this candidacy and this new party. In this sense, this phenomenon showed part of the path to reduce high levels of disaffection by demonstrating that new forms of doing politics would definitively engage more young people. Nevertheless, this new alternative is clearly not the only one that is going to unravel this problem. This situation requires further analysis and that is why the following chapters that analyse the emergence of two social movements put a special emphasis on which other political forms can attract disaffected youths.

\textsuperscript{93} This dilemma makes reference to a situation where social democratic parties participate in electoral processes. In that situation they seek allies in other classes by diluting their class appearance. However, as that action dilutes the party’s programmatic positions manual workers become alienate. Therefore, parties are finally condemned to minority status.
Chapter 6: The emergence and fall of the 2006 ‘pingüino movement’: illustrating a way of doing politics that generates political disaffection

6.1 Introduction

For most people it would have been very difficult to imagine that, only a few weeks after the beginning of Michelle Bachelet’s government (2006-2010), a massive social movement would have paralysed the country. Since the return to democracy in 1990, Chile has not witnessed substantive social mobilisations but there have been quite high levels of political stability based on a highly-institutionalised party system. Nevertheless, in May 2006 a strong movement composed of secondary school students shocked the stable Chilean political system. By demanding high quality education, the so-called ‘pingüino movement’ was able to challenge Chile’s status quo by forcing the formulation of a new educational constitutional law.94

The study of the emergence and fall of this movement can significantly deepen the understanding of the existing negative relationship between youths and formal politics in Chile. The evidence of previous chapters indicated that Chilean youths are disaffected as the current Chilean way of doing politics generates a disconnection between the political class and common citizens. Therefore, the examination of a particular case study where young people’s demands were channelled and materialised in policy outcomes brings a good opportunity to exhaustively analyse this way of doing politics. This is particularly the case since the way demands were absorbed by the political system has been highly criticised by students and some political actors. They argue that the final agreement was just reached among the system’s supporters, which would imply the way the movement was ultimately treated was just an expression of ‘politics as usual’ (Burton, 2012).

The analysis of this case study generates, then, relevant evidence of a situation where young people developed perceptions that are connected to the engenderment of political disaffection. To be more precise, the way the movement was channelled can demonstrate through a relevant example how perceptions of lack of

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94 The movement was named as the ‘pingüino movement’ because of the black and white uniforms of secondary students.
representation, political inefficacy and about an undemocratic functioning of political parties emerge and produce feelings of hostility towards formal politics. Moreover, the examination of this case study can also contribute to the discussion about whether Chilean youths are just rejecting a way of doing politics or if they are mostly apathetic. Finally, it also brings evidence about new political forms that can attract Chilean youths.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first describes the functioning of the Chilean schooling system and its main problems. The second analyses the emergence of the movement regarding the conditions that favoured its emergence in relation to the movement’s political opportunity structure, framing processes and mobilising structures. The third examines the negotiation process and the obtained final outcomes. Finally, the last part analyses the main limitations of the movement and how they can be associated with the emergence of feelings of political disaffection.

6.2 The Chilean Schooling System

The pillars of the Chilean schooling system

The first thing to understand about Chile’s schooling system is that it was generated under the military dictatorship in accordance with a neoliberal model of society that the regime tried to implement. The whole educational system was reformed during the military government and its changes can be understood as one of many market reforms implemented under this administration (Garretón, 2007). At the beginning of the 1980s Pinochet reformed the schooling system based on two main pillars: a new model of financing founded on a voucher system and a new model of administration based on a decentralisation process (Cornejo, 2006).

Regarding the first pillar, in the new system the state, rather than continuing funding schools directly, was going to indirectly financially support schools by assigning resources to students. Inspired by Milton Friedman’s concept of the voucher system, the idea was that schools would receive financial support based on their number of students (Taylor, 2006, Cox, 2005). The system was founded, then, with the objective of introducing market competition mechanisms among schools, as now they had to
compete for students in order to receive state subsidies (Cornejo, 2006). These changes were supposed to improve education quality since an informed demand about the quality of schools would make parents select the best schools and avoid the worst ones, which would generate pressures on teachers, directives and school administrators (Cox, 2005).

The second pillar of these reforms had to do with significant changes regarding school administration. In a process known as the ‘municipalización’, the main change was that schools passed from being administrated by the Ministry of Education to being administrated by municipalities. The Ministry of Education just maintained its functions regarding the determination of curriculums and textbooks, the delivery of technical supervision and the evaluation of the system (Ibid.).

These decentralisation processes were also accompanied by the entry of private providers. This situation generated a new category of state-subsidized private schools that also receive public funding through the voucher system (Matear, 2007). These new providers were able to select students and could be profit-oriented institutions to establish primary and secondary schools (Taylor, 2006, Burton, 2012). This system generated three types of primary and secondary schools: municipal schools financed by state vouchers and administrated by municipalities, state-subsidized private schools that are also financed by state vouchers but that are privately administrated, and paid private schools that do not receive state subsidies (Donoso, 2010).

All these reforms were finally consolidated through a new educational framework law (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de educación, LOCE) that was passed on Pinochet’s last day in office in 1990. Moreover, when this law was passed it was established that any future amendments to these reforms were to be subject to a very high quorum in the parliament (Matear, 2007)\textsuperscript{95}.

After the return to democracy, governments of the centre-left coalition Concertación have reformed education. However, these transformations have maintained central pillars of the 1980s reforms, and they have in some cases even

\textsuperscript{95} Any constitutional law needs 4/7 of approval in both chambers of the parliament in order to be changed.
deepened them (Cox, 2005, Cornejo, 2006). These reforms have had five big elements: an increment of public education spending, a curricular reform, an improvement in the teaching profession, the establishment of the full-school day (Jornada escolar completa, JEC), and the articulation of few focalised programs to improve education equity and quality. These reforms have not challenged the market principles by which this system is founded (Ibid.). In fact, the most substantive reform to the current system was the establishment of the shared funding in 1993, which reinforced the relevance of market mechanisms of coordination. This reform allowed parents to contribute a complementary sum of money to state-subsidised private schools in order to provide schools with extra resources to invest in improving the quality of education (Matear, 2007).

The main results of the system

These educational reforms have brought about several changes. The most important is that education has passed from being mostly administrated by public institutions to being administrated by private institutions. For example, according to the MINEDUC (2008), from 1980 to 2008 municipal school’s enrolment passed from 78% to 44%, while subsidised private schools passed from 15% to 48%. These changes have generated both positive and negative results. On the one hand, they have increased coverage. However, problems regarding the quality and equity of education have not been solved.

With respect to coverage, it has been significantly increased regarding primary and secondary education (Cox, 2007, Cornejo, 2006). Cox (2007) argues there has been a substantial movement of the opportunity structures and that the most important changes affect the lower 40% of Chilean income distribution. For example, secondary education coverage on the first quintile passed from 73% to 88% between 1990 and 2003. These improvements have been also accompanied with advances concerning schools’ infrastructure and equipment (Cornejo, 2006).

These improvements, however, have not come with enhancements to education quality and equity. With respect to quality, it has been argued that it has not improved,
as there is a stagnation of standardised tests results in maths and languages (Cornejo, 2006, Colegio de Profesores de Chile, 2006, OPECH, 2006).

In relation to equity, it has been stated that this is one of the main troubles of the system. The main indicator of this is that significant differences between the three types of schools, with respect to performance in standardised tests, have remained and they have even increased a little bit (OPECH, 2006). For example, as shown in figure 6.1, school achievement is highly associated with students’ socio-economic levels when results of the national standardized test in maths are analysed among fourth grade primary students. Moreover, it is observed that socio-economic differences have continued with the passing of years. In this sense, one of the main criticisms towards Chile’s current schooling system is that it reproduces existing high levels of social inequality. To this effect, the schooling would be then an important field where one of the most relevant problems of Chilean society is reproduced.

![Figure 6.1 - Math SIMCE results by SES and year among fourth grade Chilean primary students](image)

*Source: SIMCE (2006).*

Hand in hand with these high levels of inequality arises another relevant problem: current high levels of social segmentation of the education system. This phenomenon has been named as the ‘educative apartheid’, which means that Chile has set an educational offer that is differentiated for each segment of society since families of similar income levels have been grouping in the same types of schools (Cornejo, 2006). This process is partly given by the fact that subsided private schools are able to select students. Moreover, it has been increased by Aylwin’s reform that allowed subsidised private schools to charge fees to students (Redondo, 2009, Matear, 2007). That is why
the OECD has argued that Chile’s educational system is consciously structured for social classes, which fosters original inequalities among students (OECD, 2004).

In summary, in recent decades the Chilean education system has suffered several reforms, with mixed results. With respect to the solutions to these situations, there is not an agreement but there are quite diverse proposals. On the one hand, there are people who defend the current system, arguing that the main solutions have to do with modifying teachers’ status and giving more autonomy to schools. In a middle term position, there are people who, despite agreeing with current pillars of this pro-market system, plead for more state control. Finally, there are those who argue that the current system must be strongly modified as they oppose the existence of for-profit state-founded institutions stating that public education should be much more prioritised.

6.3 The emergence of the ‘pingüino movement’

6.3.1 A brief description of the events

Bachelet had just taken power in March 2006, and a few weeks later mobilisations started in a public school of Lota, a small city to the south of Santiago. Several students were protesting against serious infrastructure failures that provoked water filtrations in what was later named as the ‘aquatic school’. Since then, the political climate was different, and that initial event was the fuse that lit the fire (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008).

On 26 April the first massive demonstration took place in Santiago. Within a few weeks, these actions started to become more regular, bigger and with a high number of arrested students (Ibid.). The initial demands were about having free school transport and a free university selection test. However, as the movement became stronger more substantive demands such as the modification of the JEC and the derogation of the LOCE emerged. At the same time, protesters were already fully organised in the coordinator assembly of secondary students (ACES) (Henríquez, 2007). On 10 May one of the largest demonstrations occurred in several cities and ended in the arrest of 1042 students (La Tercera, 2006). This situation meant a turn in students’
Occupations started on 19 May in a context where more substantive demands started to take more relevance. In these circumstances, the fact that Bachelet’s reference to the conflict in her first public account on 21 May only criticised some acts of vandalism and did not bring any solutions to students’ demands engendered students’ grievances (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008). Afterwards, the conflict started to grow as there were also some failed discussions between students and representatives of the ministry of education. Moreover, massive demonstrations continued. On 30 May, 250 schools participated in a national strike that counted on the support of between 600,000 and one million people (El Clarín, 2006). That is when the government reacted, announcing measures to channel students’ demands in a televised public speech on 1 June. These measures included the solution of almost all specific demands and the creation of an Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education to analyse problems of educational regulatory frameworks. After these announcements, actions to be taken were highly discussed in the ACES. Mobilisations finally stopped on 9 June, with students expecting to have their demands represented in this new commission (Henriquez, 2007).

6.3.2 The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of the movement

The first thing to consider to understand the emergence of ‘pingüino movement’ is the POS the movement faced when it emerged. In Tarrow’s terms (1994), this means to analyse how changes in several dimensions of the Chilean political environment encouraged thousands of secondary students to use collective action. This section discusses two relevant situations that seemed to have lowered mobilisation costs: Bachelet’s ‘citizen government’ discourse and the inexperience of government’s new faces.

Bachelet won the presidency due to, among other things, her promise to build a new and more participatory style of politics. She proclaimed to build a citizens’ government (Valenzuela and Dammert, 2006). In this sense, she distanced herself from the classic establishment of the Concertación as she wanted to be perceived as
someone who was closer to common people rather than to the political class (Tanaka, 2008). For instance, she promised to create participatory advisory councils that would include broad sectors of civil society (Aguilera, 2007). This discourse was a change regarding previous presidents, and it is associated with the emergence of the movement since it lowered collective action costs. This is because students perceived the political system was opening up some spaces for participation. Therefore, they appreciated this new proposed style of doing politics. However, at the same time they wanted to take advantage of it in order to pursue their demands.

"The citizen government was also useful as a credit. This message that Bachelet was expecting a citizen government without knowing what that was. Precisely because she never imagined what a citizen government was when she was faced to what it really was is that they were so disturbed. And later they obviously forgot about the citizen government." Julio Isamit, spokesperson of the movement in 2006.

The fact that Bachelet’s citizen government discourse intensified the strength of the movement indicates that these measures attracted Chilean students. Moreover, it shows that the POS does not have to be necessarily more open to increase social mobilisations. Chilean students did not have to wait until the system truly increased its access to lower their mobilisation costs since mere pledges for greater spaces activated them as they felt in a position to demand more participation. Protesters did not necessarily believe that Bachelet was going to develop a more participative government. However, their high expectations about having a more participative form of governing seem to have strengthened mobilisations as they wanted to see an immediate implementation of this discourse.

The second political change that influenced the emergence of the movement has to also do with having a new president in power. Although social movement specialists argue that shifts in ruling alignments increase mobilisations (Tarrow, 1994), in this case having a new president of the same coalition did have an impact on the emergence of the ‘pingüino movement’.

In April 2005 there were secondary student mobilisations demanding similar things to those in 2006. These mobilisations, however, were rapidly absorbed through negotiation tables between student representatives and people from the ministry of education that ended up on a document that had the support of some authorities of
the ministry (Carrasco, 2007). The problem is that when students wanted to continue discussing these proposals with the new authorities in 2006, they realised that previous agreements were not recognised, which engendered their grievances.

"There is no transfer of accumulated intelligence from the ministry teams that previously worked with youth leaderships. This infuriates the student leadership. They had been about to sign, or have signed, some agreements in December 2005 and in April 2006 they found out that the ministry with which they had dealt before had no idea. There were no documents. Everything had to start all over again. That was a great reason to confront and protest." Cristian Cox, educational adviser to the Concertación, member of the educational committee of 2006

The encouragement of collective action, given by fact that new educational authorities were not aware of previous agreements, was even greater since new people who were dealing with students were politically inexperienced. The new minister of education was Martin Zilic, a doctor member of the PDC with not much previous political experience. This situation made him unequipped to manage the conflict. Students took advantage of that situation, which contributed to overwhelm the conflict (Interview, Cox, 2011, Interview, Stevens, 2011).

6.3.3 The Framing Processes of the movement

A second issue to be analysed regarding the emergence of the movement involves the collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction of the movement (McAdam, et al., 1996). This is examined through the understanding of the demands of the movement, how these demands were spread to obtain greater support and the way the movement identified those responsible for the current situation.

With respect to the demands, the main belief that shaped the movement in order to mobilise people was that the quality of Chilean education was really low, which was expressed both through problems of infrastructure and the quality of teaching. This dichotomy defined the two main core elements of students’ demands: short-term and long-term agendas. The short-term agenda consisted of several specific demands such as having free transportation, free university enrolment tests (PSU) and the improvement of schools’ infrastructure. The long-term agenda, on the other hand, included the derogation of the LOCE and the revision of the JEC and the
municipalisation process (Henríquez, 2007). Moreover, all these problems were also interpreted as part of an unequal and unfair system since it was believed that these deficiencies were the expression of a very uneven opportunity system (Interview, Orellana, 2011).

The integration of both agendas was perhaps the most challenging situation that the leaders of the movement had to face concerning framing processes. This is because for most students it was easier to visualise short-term agenda problems rather than long-term ones. Student leaders were aware of that situation, and that is why they opted to strategically promote short-term demands in the first stage to later encourage the long-term agenda issues.

"The short-term agenda topics are issues that turn people on. So, those issues allowed us to generate a lot of people on the streets. And then when that was done we started the second stage that was to begin to put deeper issues." Cesar Valenzuela, spokesperson of the movement in 2006, member of the PS.

"The short-agenda was created to add people. What motivated to make the secondary movement? It was not the school transportation pass. It was the poor quality of education. How did the movement start? By complaining for the school transportation pass and PSU's scholarships." Julio Isamit, Spokesperson of the movement in 2006.

Student leaders knew that the most effective way to mobilise people was by framing problems related to specific situations in the first place. However, that was just a first stage to increase the strength of the movement to be able to have a higher capacity to achieve the long-term agenda. Once students were already mobilised, the ACES intended to make students aware that current problems of the educational system were given by several regulatory frameworks that needed to be modified. For example, during schools’ occupations there were students in charge to explain the deficiencies of the LOCE.

By understanding the long-term agenda it is also possible to observe the movement’s diagnostic framing. With respect to that, students were always very clear that the responsibility of the bad quality of education lay with the existing educational frameworks. That is why they claimed for the derogation of the LOCE, the revision of the JEC and an alteration of the fact that public schools are administrated by municipalities. They sustained that education was very unequal and of a low quality because of reforms made during the dictatorship that implemented a new
administrative and financing system. For example, the municipalisation process was criticised since there are not efficient mechanisms to ensure that resources are effectively delivered to municipal schools (Propuesta de trabajo de estudiantes secundarios de la RM, 2005).

Despite having a clear diagnostic framing, the student movement did not have a homogeneous position regarding the modifications the educational system needed. In Benford and Snow’s terms (2000), the movement was not able to generate a coherent prognostic framing where alternative sets of arrangements were proposed to solve the problem. Students were unable to deliver a coherent proposal regarding specific modifications that the LOCE and other laws needed in order to improve the quality of education. The ACES had students from several political positions. Therefore, a specific agreement regarding these issues was very difficult to be achieved⁹⁶.

"Proposals were never specific. We said ‘end the LOCE’. And the right-wing says ‘end the LOCE’. And the socialist were saying ‘end the LOCE’, more state and the continuation of state-subsided private schools with more control. Then the more left-wing said ‘everything to the state’. However, the vision of the movement was a more statist one because we were an absolute majority." Cesar Valenzuela, spokesperson of the movement in 2006, member of the PS.

"The movement was more left-wing, but it never fully defined itself. It was defined only after mobilisations, when they sat on the advisory board. We were not able to agree on a document with the educational proposal secondary students wanted." Juan Herrera, spokesperson of the movement in 2006, member of a colectivo social.

Although there was never a full proposal, the main direction of the movement was clearly in favour of more state control within an educational context dominated by market principles. That is why it has been argued that it was an expression of anti-neoliberal mobilisations (Cornejo et al., 2007). For example, one of the most relevant frames that inspired and legitimated the actions of the movement was the opposition to the existence of for-profit state-subsided schools since the current system should not generate business opportunities (Interview, Orellana, 2011). A proper proposal of secondary students from the Metropolitan Region argues that "The only requirement to open a school is to be of legal age, which means that many providers are in the educational field only to obtain economic benefits" (Propuesta de trabajo de

⁹⁶ This situation was going to change once the movement joined the educational commission after the end of mobilisations when they formed a coalition with other social sectors and presented concrete proposals.
estudiantes secundarios de la RM, 2005). Moreover, it is argued that the cause of the current problem is the LOCE as it introduces education within the free market logic (Ibid.). 97

6.3.4 The Mobilizing Structures of the movement

The last issue to be analysed concerning the understanding of the emergence of the ‘pingüino movement’ is the mobilising structures that they had. This intends to understand how their ways of engaging in collective action determined the fate of mobilisations (Mc Adam et al., 1996). More specifically, this section mainly analyses the organisational form of the movement and particular tactical repertories they used.

In relation to the first aspect, the first thing to state is that students were organised through the coordinator assembly of secondary students (ACES). This national organisation was composed by people from schools’ student councils and members of ‘colectivos sociales’ 98 (Cornejo et al., 2007). Moreover, several participants, and especially some of its main spokespeople, were members of traditional Chilean political parties from the whole political spectrum (Henríquez, 2007). 99

The most relevant organisational aspect of the ACES was its democratic character. Having an assembly as a permanent instance of discussion, where everybody was able to express an opinion, allowed the installation of a horizontal dynamic within the movement. Agreements and decisions were always taken in the assembly, and were constantly checked. In this sense, assembly representatives were just bearers of a collective mandate (Cornejo et al., 2007).

This evidence indicates then that students’ perceptions of what a representative should do regarding the mandate/independence controversy are closer to the delegate

97 It is also important to highlight that the support for statist measures introduced by the movement seemed to be also backed by the whole Chilean population. According to a survey executed while the movement was taking place 73% of respondents agree that Chilean schools should be administrated by the Ministry of Education (CEP, 2006).
98 A ‘colectivo social’ is a small social organisation that works independently from parties.
99 The fact that many leaders came from youth divisions of traditional political parties seems to be incoherent with the argument of this chapter. However, it is necessary to highlight that the existence of these kinds of leaders seems to represent the existence of partyarchic practices that intend to co-opt social groups (Coppeedge 1994) rather than the support for traditional parties. Moreover, it is also important to indicate that disaffection was not as high as it is now when this movement emerged, and that experiences like this one heavily contributed to generate more disaffection.
view than the trustee one (Pitkin, 1967). Moreover, it shows too that students were also aware of the relevance common people’s participation has regarding achieving substantive representation (Plotke, 1997).

When the interview material is analysed it can be observed that the democratic nature of the movement was very relevant to getting the support of secondary students. By having horizontal and democratic mechanisms of decision-making where the opinion of majorities was always respected the movement was able to attract more people to participate. Common students were able to feel that they were truly part of the resolutions of the movement as they perceived that their opinions were taken into account.

"We tried to make students feel part of the movement, and part of the resolutions and discussions. And that led us also to replicate democratic systems in most of the schools and assemblies. That was very important, because it made each ‘penguin’ feel they were part of this movement and that they had a voice." Pablo Orellana, participant of the commission in 2006, member of the PC.

"There was a process. The decision of the majority was always taken. Organising like that was attractive because everyone participated somehow. There were always representatives. But they were only representatives." Vanessa, student leader in 2006.

Beyond students’ demands, the evidence suggests the proper forms of organization that the movement developed were crucial to obtaining support. This situation can evidently be connected to the sources of current high levels of political disaffection among Chilean youths as it brings evidence regarding which political forms attract youths. As it has been observed during the whole thesis, Chilean youths are disaffected since they reject an elitist style of doing politics based on a disconnection between the political class and common citizens. In this sense, the fact that youths were attracted by a movement because it had a democratic way of functioning with horizontal and participative logics indicates that if formal politics in Chile boasted these same characteristics, it would be able to attract many more young people.

In Pitkin’s terms (1967), students were attracted by a style of politics where substantive representation was performed based on the inclusion and participation of people. According to students, representatives were merely people who had to communicate what was decided in the assemblies without having autonomy to decide
what they believed was best for the movement. Jenkins (1983) argues that decentralised movements are effective regarding the mobilisation of resources since these structures also attempt to embody ideals to be replicated as models for emulation. Chilean students do not argue that the reasons behind these logics were to attempt to replicate this model. However, it is possible to infer from the evidence that they would like to have these logics replicated in Chilean politics and that if that was the case, Chilean youths would be clearly less politically disaffected.

One last issue to be analysed regarding the organisation of the movement is its impact on the public opinion regarding the image of young people. In relation to that, students argue that the fact they were able to democratically organise and discuss with authorities in order to demand several changes showed public opinion that Chilean youths were not apathetic. Students believe that the rise of the movement shocked adults who had believed that since the return of democracy Chilean youths "no estaban ni ahí" (they were not even there). 100

"The student movement was the basis to establish that young people were actually there. That they had interests and ideals. And that they were willing to sit at a table to discuss and to dialogue with authorities. It was a major change of direction when youth sat at a table and could begin to discuss." Isaac Stevens, student member of the commission in 2006.

Students perceive that the movement was able to demonstrate that Chilean youths were indeed interested in the fate of society as they had interests and ideals they wanted to materialise. Thus, it is argued that this generation somehow broke with an old discourse as it showed Chilean youths do want to participate and contribute to improving social conditions of the Chilean population. In this sense, it is observed that the proper existence of this movement contributes to reaffirming the statement that Chilean youths, using Mouffe’s concepts (1993), seem to be rejecting formal politics rather than ‘the political’.

A second aspect to be developed regarding the relation between mobilising structures and the emergence of the movement are the specific tactical repertories the movement used to pursue their demands. Secondary students mainly used

100 ‘No estar ni ahí’ is a Chilean expression that means that you are not interested in anything. This expression has been used to indicate that Chilean youths are apathetic in the sense that they don’t care about public issues.
conventional forms of collective action since their main forms of protest were marches and occupations. Marches were used mostly at the beginning of the movement when thousands of students gathered in several cities across the country (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008). However, they generated a significant problem, since the spread of the movement also increased repressive mechanisms of policemen authorities that ended, for example, with more than 1,000 arrested students on a march on 10 May (La Nación, 2006).

The high number of arrested students made the movement lose control over the circumstances as well as some support, especially from students’ parents. In this context, it was decided to change collective action forms from marching on the streets to occupying schools, as that would put more pressure on authorities and generate more control and support.

"When we saw that a thousand people were arrested in each demonstration I asked the assembly to occupy schools. That was fundamental since there was no control in the streets. That was the strongest strategy and that caused the greatest impact among society in terms of credibility." Cesar Valenzuela, spokesperson of the movement in 2006, member of the PS, quoted in Gerter and Ramos (2008).

Students were aware, then, that the fate of mobilisations was determined by the mobilisation structures through which they were organising, and that is why they changed their tactical repertories to focus on school occupations rather than on marches. They realised that, in order to legitimise their demands, they needed more support from both students and common citizens, and that is why they opted to modify their action repertories.

Once students were occupying schools they developed several strategies to expand their demands such as the ‘days of reflection’. In these days students gathered to reflect on educational matters so everybody was able to understand what they were demanding (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008). Additionally, they held national strikes that had a lot of support. For example, the most significant one on 30 March paralysed 250 schools (El Clarín, 2006). Occupations also put more pressure on governmental authorities since they prevented school administrators from obtaining state vouchers, which finally provoked the installation of negotiation tables between the government and students (Interview, Calderón, 2011).
One last element to be analysed concerning mobilising structures is the utilisation of virtual platforms to mobilise students. In 2006 social networks were not popular, as both Facebook and Twitter had not yet emerged. However, during the development of the movement students were able to disseminate information through the internet, mostly by e-mail and the use of Fotolog, a website where individuals upload pictures and people can comment on them. These platforms were used among students to spread information regarding future mobilisations and what was happening among occupied schools. For example, the Fotolog website of the Instituto Nacional, one of the most relevant schools of the movement, received nearly 200,000 visits during the first week of June 2006 (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008).

6.4 The negotiation processes and the subsequent policy outcomes

The emergence of the Presidential Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education

After more than one month of massive mobilisations, Bachelet decided to take action. It was on 1 June 2006 when she announced several measures concerning both the short-term and long-term demands. On the first issue, she promised to deliver more than half a million new lunches to the schooling system, improvements regarding the use of the school transportation pass and PSU scholarships for every student who needed them. In relation to the long-term agenda, she established a Presidential Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education to generate a consensual vision concerning several educational issues with the participation of students, experts and several other social actors (Henriquez, 2007).

These measures generated a lot of discussion within the movement since there was not an agreement regarding the actions to be taken after these announcements. For example, they provoked the resignation of Cesar Valenzuela, one of the main leaders of the movement member of the PS (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008). Students were not totally certain of the capacity this commission will have in relation to the fulfilment of their demands. That is why they asked that students should be the 50% - plus one - of the commission and that it should be a binding mechanism. However, both proposals were rejected by the government (Donoso, 2010). Finally, after a second national strike on 5 June, which was rejected by moderate sectors of
the assembly, students decided on 9 June to participate in the commission since if they had not joined it the movement would have lost too much legitimacy.

The fact that the political system responded to the emergence of this movement by fulfilling several short-term demands and by creating a new commission indicates, then, that the movement was able to modify the political agenda. Moreover, the formation of this commission can also be understood as the creation of new political opportunities by the movement (Tarrow, 1994). Although Bachelet had previously developed similar commissions, this was the first one that included civil-society members who were directly demanding substantive changes (Aguilera, 2007). Therefore, it can be argued that students were able to force the establishment of new political mechanisms to solve social conflicts, which means that, at least in its first stage, the way this situation was to be channelled would not be an expression of ‘politics as usual’.

The composition and functioning of the commission

The commission had 81 members. It worked from June 2006 to December 2006 with the idea to discuss several postures to be stated in reports due to highlight both agreements and disagreements. Their members included participants of social organisations such as university and secondary students and representatives from teacher unions, experts and policy-makers associated with think tanks linked to all political sectors, educational providers and civil servants (Burton, 2012).

Although there were members from several organisations, the great majority were experts and policy-makers linked to both central coalitions. According to Aguilera (2007), from the 81 members 31 of them were university academics, from which 16 had a PhD degree. Moreover, from all members 52 were party militants, with only four of them members of parties that did not belong to the Concertación or the Alianza. Finally, civil society organisations were mainly represented by 14 students, six education workers’ representatives and two representatives from parent organisations.
Despite the fact that members of the commission were very diverse, soon after discussions begun it was possible to identify three main postures: the ‘Bloque Social’ (Social Block), the Concertación block and the Alianza block (Burton 2012). The Bloque Social was composed of secondary and university students and members of social organisations such as teachers’ unions and parents’ representatives. The other two blocks were formed principally by policy-makers and experts linked to each of these coalitions.

The Bloque Social was against state-subsidies for profit-schools, student selection and shared funding. Moreover, they advocated a stronger state role. They proposed, for example, to significantly increase requirements for schools providers and to modify the municipalised system (Burton, 2012, Carrasco, 2007). The Concertación block had differing positions on for-profit schools and it advocated the regulation of selection processes. Additionally, a stronger state role was supported even though the municipalised system was not intended to be changed (Burton, 2012). Finally, the Alianza block defended for-profit schools and selection, advocating a weaker state role in order to have greater school autonomy (Burton, 2012, Velasco, 2006).

All these proposals were discussed during the commission’s sessions, where there was an initial agreement on the need to replace the LOCE. However, the features of the new educational framework were not instantly agreed. In this context, the main tension regarding the reaching of agreements that emerged was between a more technocratic pro-market discourse of policy-makers and experts linked to the Concertación and the Alianza and the discourse of the Bloque Social that embodied the vision of the movement and other social groups (Donoso, 2010).

In this scenario, although the commission also included representatives of civil society, the debate was mostly based on technical discussions. This situation limited the capacity of the Bloque Social to pursue its propositions as it did not have the necessary tools to counter-argue experts’ ideas. Likewise, the fact that the pro-market experts that dominated discussions were also the builders and principal supporters of the current educational model constrained even more the success of the Bloque Social’s proposals.
"In much more technical issues it was pretty hard for us. After that we saw further the possibility of trying to transcend our raised demands. When we were talking about quality we made contributions. But the cheese was cut somehow between these other people that were there. The experts. They were the builders of an old educational system." Pablo Orellana, secondary student participant of the commission in 2006, member of the PC.

"In the commission we were not going to get anything because the policy of the Concertación’s governments is merely of co-optioning social demands. They are possibilities to co-opt the demands. To convert its meaning. To take problems and give them a solution in market terms." Juan Herrera, secondary student member of the commission in 2006.

The way of functioning of the commission opposed then these two groups (experts and members of the Bloque Social) with the positions of technicians linked to the Concertación and the Alianza prevailing among discussions. This made students realise education was not going to be changed in the way they wanted.

It can be argued, based on this evidence, that the fact the main opposition observed in the commission was between these two groups indicates the manner this conflict was channelled. It also illustrates several attributes of Chilean politics that were previously discussed as being associated with the engenderment of political disaffection. Chile has been described as having a homogeneous political offer based on two similar coalitions that favour a pro-market socio-economic model, which have finally weakened parties’ ideological profiles (Posner, 2008, Baño, 1993). Moreover, it has also been argued that it has developed a technocratic style of policy-making that mostly excludes civil-society members as parties tend to demobilise citizens (Huneeus, 2003, P. Silva, 2004). To this effect, when the functioning of the commission is analysed, these two attributes can be clearly observed because what seems to have finally prevailed was the experts’ visions, which were supported by members of both central coalitions and rejected by participants of social organisations.

When experts are asked why the vision of the Bloque Social did not prevail and if they think students felt frustrated with the way of functioning of the commission, they argue that the situation was predictable because experts are those who have to make decisions; they are the specialists who have researched these issues and who have greater knowledge.

"Students are not mature enough. They have not made studies. It was good to put the issue on the table. But it is different to discuss public policies with children and youths."
Therefore, it is not that their opinion is not listened to. Their opinions are probably going to be a minority because they are not people who have much to say about the institutional vision of public policy because they are clearly users and that is their vision. Carolina Velasco, member of the commission in 2006, representative of a think tank of the Alianza.

"The commission is a change where students became offside. Their voices remain an extremely important element of the whole council but throughout the process they lived it with discipline but with frustration because they have little voice. Because they are not experts. They changed the agenda but when you start policies adults and the institutions they represent stay" Cristian Cox, member of the commission in 2006, former educational adviser of the Concertación.

For experts of the Alianza, the fact that students were able to decide on educational matters was imaginable since those who are direct beneficiaries of social services don’t have much to argue regarding public policies. On the other hand, experts from the Concertación sustain that although students’ feedback can be relevant, their efficacy to pursue changes is low since public policies are eventually generated by experts.

It is observed, then, that the vision of some experts of both coalitions regarding the way public policies are to be decided are fairly similar as they seem to support a technocratic style of policy-making. The commission, therefore, seems to ultimately become a space of technical discussion where visions from system supporters prevailed in detriment of more radical criticisms of several social sectors. To this effect, it can be stated that although this commission incorporated social sectors, its way of working finally replicated the technocratic and homogenising way of doing politics that Chile adopted since the return to democracy where common citizens are not able to generate relevant inputs and where market visions seems to prevail (Rindfjall, 2009).

As it is observed, this technocratic style of policy-making was negatively evaluated by members of the Bloque Social as they were aware that it limited the achievement of their proposals. This situation generated a lot of frustration, and that is why only a few days before the submission of the final report the Bloque Social decided not to subscribe to it. The reasons given were that their visions were not sufficiently represented in this document as it imposed the postures of those who were supporting the current educational system mostly based on market principles.

"The committee was a democratic body. But those who always win imposed their positions. We decided not to sign the document. We also made public the proposal of
the Bloque Social that was given to the public opinion with the idea that it was to be hopefully discussed in a social congress that could define policies." Jorge Pavéz, former president of the teacher’s union, member of the commission in 2006.

"The Bloque Social resigned since our social positions were not registered in the core document. That was logical because somehow we were not the majority. But we knew deep inside that within society were the great majority that had generated mobilisations that had challenged the educational system. Then, of course, it was violent for us. It was brutal." Pablo Orellana, secondary student member of the commission in 2006, member of the PC.

The Bloque Social expected to have this kind of document since they were only a minority within the commission. However, in spite of this, it was necessary to express their discontent as they believed that within Chilean society as a whole, their visions represented a majority. Based on that fact, they decided to socialise their own specific proposal in order to discuss it with broader sections of society.

Lastly, the final report only suggested consensus on several issues that did not challenge the main pillars of the educational system. Among other things, it proposed the continuation of public and private education, the need for greater participation of students and their families in school management, measures to encourage teachers to remain in their positions, more state funds, the end of arbitrary forms of discrimination, and modifications to the state’s institution to supervise the educational processes (Burton, 2012).

The resulting policy outcomes

With the submission of the final report, Bachelet asked a group of experts of the Concertación and several ministers to generate an educational law proposal. This new proposal was presented in April 2007 and it suggested the replacement of the LOCE. This new law presented several changes, such as the creation of the Education Superintendent to regulate the functioning of state-subsidised private schools and the limitation of selection processes. Additionally, it pushed for-profit schools receiving state funding to become not-for-profit institutions (Gerter and Ramos, 2008). This proposal was highly contested by members of the Alianza and even by several politicians from the Concertación. Among these criticisms, the prohibition of for-profit

101 This was the case because the commission intended to express consensus visions, but when that was not possible it distinguished the most representative opinions regarding their participants.
state-subsidised schools was the most disapproved issue (Interview, Velasco, 2011, Interview, Valenzuela, 2011). In this sense, since the emergence of this proposal it was known that its approval was not going to be possible as it needed 4/7 of quorum in a context where the parliament was completely dominated by members of both big coalitions and with no representative of the Bloque Social (Donoso, 2010).

The rejection of this law made the Alianza generate an alternative proposal. This proposal finally forced both coalitions to create a small committee only formed by politicians and experts of both coalitions in order to discuss a final law. This committee finally reached an agreement on November 2007, called the ‘Agreement for the Quality of Education’ (Libertad y Desarrollo, 2007). The agreement was presented in a press conference where several politicians of both sectors, and some students, raised their hands and proclaimed that a new educational law (LGE) was to be promulgated. Moreover, a document signed by presidents of the main Chilean political parties was presented, explaining the main changes of the law. That document stated that the agreement reached between the Chilean government, the Alianza and the Concertación will allow Chile to advance in a clear and determined way to a high quality education for everyone (Gobierno de Chile, Alianza, and Concertación, 2007).

The LGE included several modifications to the LOCE without questioning the main pillars of the pro-market educational model though. It established a new supervisory agency in charge of regulating educational quality and a new curricular structure to elevate education quality. Moreover, it defined new mechanisms to guarantee the efficiency and transparency of the whole educational system, such as increasing requirements for school administrators and new norms to regulate discriminatory and arbitrary selection processes. Additionally, it was also stated that school funding was to be increased by 15% and that it was necessary to keep and develop a mixed system of education (Ibid.). This law was finally passed in the congress on 18 March 2009 in a session that had numerous protest manifestations from several social sectors (El Mercurio, 2009b).

The LGE was well-assessed by the Alianza and by the majority of members of the Concertación, who highlighted that it was an important step towards improving the
quality of education (Libertad y Desarrollo, 2007, Interview, Cox, 2011). However, it was rejected by the secondary movement and the whole *Bloque Social* due to its lack of substantive changes and the way it was finally generated.

In relation to substantive aspects, it was criticised that it would not prevent schools from being profit-oriented and that it failed to provide a greater state role regarding the supply of public education (Burton, 2012). Even though some members of the *Bloque Social* recognise there are some improvements, the general position is a very critical one. It is stated that the law does not change an educational system where the main pillar is the existence of private educational providers, which made them argue that in several aspects the LGE is the same as the LOCE.

"It is the same thing. There were no changes. It is exactly the same. I do not think there is a change. I think no one was satisfied with the results obtained in 2006." *Vanessa, student leader in 2006.*

"The new law goes against the desire of the mobilisation. The feeling of the movement was to appeal for more state. The new law says the state cannot solve the problem, and that it is unconstitutional. Therefore, the only solution in terms of Chilean policies is market to everyone. There are no social rights in Chilean policies. There are subsidies to the demand." *Juan Herrera, secondary student member of the commission in 2006.*

Students were very critical as they would have liked for the new law to establish an educational system that prioritised above all the existence of high-quality public education without the presence of private providers that are able to profit with public funds. In this sense, some of them also establish a critique to Chile’s neoliberal socio-economic model, as it is believed education is just one expression of a model where the supply of public services is dominated by market principles. In this sense, it is observed that students and other important members of civil society did not feel represented by final policy outcomes. In Pitkin’s terms (1967), it can be stated that the LGE did not substantively represent students since in a context where they were clearly capable of action and judgment they objected to what was done in their names.

Beyond substantial criticisms, the evidence also suggests that the way the law was finally discussed was highly rejected by students and several social sectors. It is argued that it was very negative to observe that the emergence of a huge movement where
several youths showed they were not apathetic finished in an agreement between classic political players that excluded other relevant social actors.

"The way the law was passed was perhaps the most relevant thing regarding the rejection of the LGE. When you see that a great movement comes down with a negotiated agreement between the Concertación and the Right within four walls shaking hands. It was tremendous. That generated a very powerful rejection towards the political class. They see that their idea of democracy does not work. Civil society could say something but everything was cooked elsewhere." Pablo Orellana, participant of the commission in 2006, member of the PC.

The main frustration was to realise that the conflict was finally solved through a traditional way of doing politics where homogeneous political elites discuss between them without taking into account the positions of broader social sectors. This situation is associated with the generation of feelings of political disaffection as students empirically experienced how democratic ideals of substantive representation and inclusive participation are not applied to Chilean politics. It is perceived that despite civil-society members are capable of generating proposals everything is ultimately decided by the same dominant actors.

To this effect, the evidence about the way decisions were finally taken also indicates that the manner this conflict was approached illustrates Chile’s classic way of doing politics based on agreements between homogeneous elites (Ruiz, 1991). It could be argued, therefore, that the LGE represented one of the most recent expressions of Chile’s ‘Democracy by agreement’. Moreover, the fact that students rejected this way of acting by claiming more inclusive and participative ways of decision-making indicates also which political forms can attract disaffected youths.

6.5 The limitations of the movement and the engenderment of political disaffection

As it was already observed, the final outcomes from negotiation processes generated feelings of political disaffection among students for the resulting policy changes, as well as for the mechanisms used to solve the conflict. This link, however, can be much more deeply analysed through the proper perceptions of students regarding several situations that limited their success.
The lack of elite-mass congruence

Without doubt the main limitation the movement had regarding the consecution of deeper changes was that the vision of the Chilean political class concerning education was very different to that of the movement. Students opposed an educational system based on market principles, while the majority of Chilean politicians supported the current system. In this context, what students perceived to be the most negative issue is that a relevant portion of a centre-left coalition supported a system based on right-wing principles. They believe that behind their defeat there is a problem of political representation, in the sense that what authorities think does not agree with the beliefs of relevant sectors of Chilean population.

"Students can continue to be unhappy because their proposals were never accepted by authorities as they had no place in the political spectrum. The movement could not get representation in the discussion with parliamentarians. This lack of representativeness causes political apathy. Even though they have ideas they cannot lead them to the public table. The movement demonstrates significant problems of political representation. It shows serious deficiencies that democracy has that have not been corrected." Isaac Stevens, student member of the commission in 2006.

Problems of representativeness are connected to the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection since students reject the notion that, despite having relevant ideas, they could not be accurately expressed because they do not coincide with politicians’ positions. It is believed that their positions should be represented in the political spectrum, as the role of politicians is to truly express what society thinks. In this sense, it is observed that students conceive representatives as delegates bound by common people mandates, but finally observe that Chilean representatives are principally trustees who act freely regarding people’s representation (Pitkin, 1967). It is this discrepancy what generates their rejection. Thus, it can be argued that the secondary movement showed, through a specific case, Chile’s problems of political representation that were previously found to be associated with feelings of political disaffection.

The representation of other interests

A second issue that limited the success of the movement, according to student’s perceptions, was that members of the political class did not represent the movement’s
interests in order to represent other personal interests. What students and members of the *Bloque Social* state is that this lack of elite-mass congruence is given by the fact that politicians defended their own interests many times. Among these privileged interests it is possible to distinguish between the representation of economic and power-related interests. 102

On the first issue, it is observed that students feel that several politicians did not have the will to change the current system since they had economic interests that they would lose to substantive changes. It is argued that as several politicians were owners of private state-subsidised schools, they did not have the will to change a system that was economically benefiting them.

"The Concertación is supposed to be against market education systems. There are always personal interests when they make a decision like that one. We knew that many people who were voting for the law had schools. Both the Concertación and the right. It was a personal interest of theirs. I think that is the most influential thing." *Vanessa, student leader in 2006.*

"The economic interests of both the right and the Concertación are very close. Personal Interests. Interest in the universities. Interests in the schooling system with subsidised private schools. Interest in the Catholic Church. Therefore, the chance of generating a situation that means to effectively start in a different way with a different development model once again was frustrated." *Jorge Pavéz, former president of the teachers’ union, member of the commission in 2006.*

Students argue that they knew members of both coalitions owned private state-subsidised schools. Therefore, they perceive that relevant criterions to decide how to change the education system were politicians’ proper interests, which made them reject the actions of the political class. For example, it was perceived that right-wing politicians and members of the PDC would not accept that schools linked to the Catholic Church were not able to select students and to profit, as that would have significantly affected their personal interests.

A second type of interest students perceived to be prioritised to the detriment of their demands, which is specifically linked to the Concertación, is about power issues.

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102 It is not possible to really know the reasons behind politicians’ decisions. However, just the fact that students believe that makes these opinions relevant. As it was previously stated, this thesis works under the assumption that it does not matter whether some perceptions are correct or not since incorrect perceptions do have concrete consequences. In this case, it does not matter if students are right or not about arguing that politicians decided based on their personal interests since whether that was true or not these perceptions generates disaffection in any case.
It is believed that the governing coalition of that time could have tried to push for more changes in favour of students’ demands, but that they did not do so to defend their own political interests. What students argue is that the Concertación should have taken advantage of the movement as that could have allowed the promotion of educational changes of the kind the coalition was supposed to be interested in. Students feel the Concertación did not support the movement as it was perceived as a threat to their capacity to govern and to the stability of the political system itself.

"The Concertación got scared at the beginning. And they began to lower the level of support for the movement. The government was starting and Bachelet’s capacity to govern was still being doubted. Therefore, they had to somehow try to protect at all costs what the government was doing. Although there were areas of the Concertación that agreed with some students’ views, they could not adhere expressly to them because they first needed to improve the image of the government." Julio Isamit, spokesperson of the movement in 2006.

"The government should not have waited for that commission. President Bachelet should have taken advantage of the social mobilisation and not created the council that diluted everything. That was absurd. And that is a mistake of the government that is being paid for until today." Cesar Valenzuela, spokesperson of the movement in 2006, member of the PS.

Students believe that it was because the Concertación tried to rapidly solve the conflict in order to preserve political order that they avoided the generation of the level of conflict that support for the movement would have created. Moreover, it is argued that this moderate and conflict-avoiding performance was even more necessary, as there was a new government that needed to demonstrate its capacity to generate governance. In this sense, it is perceived that this kind of performance severely limited the success of students’ demands, which made students reject the actions of the political class.

Students rejected, therefore, that both economic and power interests of the political class were prioritised since that limited the consecution of more substantial changes. This situation also empirically exemplifies previous findings about elements that would be generating disaffection, as it was formerly observed that one relevant perception of young people associated with feelings of political disaffection is the idea that politicians often opt to represent their own interests instead of those of the citizenry. In this sense, it can be observed that the resolution of the ‘pingüino
movement’ shows the existence of this particular attribute of Chilean politics and how students reject it.

**The demobilisation of the movement**

The last issue to be described regarding the limitations of the movement that generated political disaffection is the fact that students perceived that the movement was demobilised by the Chilean political class. This process is related to the fact that politicians tried to solve the conflict rapidly to preserve political stability. What the supposed demobilisation process shows is that the lack of support for the movement was not only reflected in politicians’ moderate positions but also in their actions. In this sense, the political class was perceived to have demobilised the movement through their students’ militants.

The relation between the movement and traditional parties was always a complex one. Problems started when the movement became stronger and members of traditional political parties realised that several leaders were militants of their parties. Some students perceive that in that moment some politicians, especially from the Concertación, tried to control the movement by influencing their militants through the realisation of private meetings where they were pressured to moderate their positions in the pursuit of a more stable political environment. Moreover, it is argued that these influences successfully weaken the movement as they generated several divisions among students.

"The influence that parties began to make was seen when they realized they had leaders in the assembly. They started to influence in a super important and perhaps grotesque way. They began to invite them to have dinners. To invite them to senators’ flats to negotiate. To see if it was possible to put down the movement with the aim to weaken it because it was hurting the image of Bachelet’s government." **Isaac Stevens, student member of the commission in 2006.**

"It is almost certain that Valenzuela’s decision to resign was a political decision from the PS, and particularly from Escalona. Escalona was the leader of the PS and therefore he was within a traditional structure where finding solutions of this nature are unfortunately quite common. And they are generally rejected by common people who see parties with great suspicion because they stopped supporting what militant students have rightfully assumed as a generalised demand to enter to moderate. They were in office and it was not possible to create an image of chaos in the first year of Bachelet’s government. **Jorge Pavéz, former president of the teachers’ union, member of the commission in 2006.**
The greatest example of the way the political class intended to demobilise the movement perceived by students was the resignation of Cesar Valenzuela, who was one of the main spokespersons of the movement. He was member of the PS and he resigned after Bachelet announced the creation of the educational commission. He argued that he was never pressured by the PS and that he took that decision because of health problems of his mother (Interview, Valenzuela, 2011). However, several students and other members of the Bloque Social distrust his version as they perceive that his decision was strongly influenced by the leadership of the PS that forced him to resign in order to demobilise the movement to strength Bachelet’s capacity to govern. Moreover, it is also argued that the fact that currently Valenzuela is the president of the youth division of the PS, and is very close to Escalona, generates more doubts regarding his version of events.

The evidence suggests therefore that students perceived that the movement was limited as the political class tried to weaken it in order to pursue their own political interests. This situation was highly rejected by students and it is a good example also of partyarchic practices of the internal functioning of Chilean parties that intend to reproduce politicians’ power positions that were previously found to be sources of political disaffection. These events clearly evidence one central element of a partyarchy according to Coppedge (1994) that is the co-option of social organisations. Moreover, this situation also brings evidence about the continuity of some classic practices of post-authoritarian Chilean politics that also generate disaffection. Since the return to democracy, Chile has been highlighted as having a demobilised civil society that is the basis of a stable political environment (P. Silva, 2004, Roberts, 1998). In this sense, the way the movement was faced by the political class demonstrates that this manner of acting is still a relevant element of Chilean politics precisely because parties tried to demobilise the movement in pursuit of political stability.

6.6 Conclusions

This chapter’s main objective was to analyse the emergence and fall of the 2006 ‘pingüino movement’ in order to illustrate through a specific case study how the way of functioning of Chilean politics affects the relationship between youth and formal
politics. This movement generated an important political impact, as it resulted in several policy outcomes such as the generation of a new constitutional educational law, the establishment of a new educational supervisory structure and the increment of the requirements for schools administrators. Therefore, the analysis of these mobilisations brought a good opportunity to see how Chilean politics works. In this context, this chapter’s main finding was that, despite some initial variations, the manner in which students’ demands were absorbed finally accurately reflected the style of politics that Chilean democracy has developed since the transition in 1990. It is based on these evidences that the ‘Agreement for the Quality of Education’ was described as one of the latest expressions of Chile’s ‘Democracy by agreement’.

The way the Chilean political system faced this social conflict illustrated several elements of a way of doing politics that were previously observed to be relevant sources of youth political disaffection, which came to reconfirm several hypotheses initially developed about this phenomenon. Starting from more general issues, it exemplified the perception that there is currently an important disconnection between the political class and the citizenry. This was expressed by the fact that during negotiations the main opposition was the one between civil society representatives and the political class. While social figures demanded the substantive representation of their demands through the participation of broad sectors of society, the majority of the political class advocated a technocratic style of doing politics, despite having initially incorporated civil society. As it is expressed in the following quote, this way of solving conflicts has been an historical element of Chilean politics, and it was applied once more in the case of the ‘pingüino movement’.

"These commissions are very typical of Chilean democracy. That has to do with the way the transition was made that generates a group of political elites or experts that somehow supplant the citizenry. That is me one element that has generated the crisis of parties and youth disaffection. With the 2006 movement it is again an issue of lords. There are parties that all they do is to negotiate these representatives that do not represent much. This would be expressing a limitation of democracy." Juan García-Huidobro, president of the commission in 2006, former educational adviser of the Concertación.

As has been thoroughly discussed, one of the main aspects of Chile’s post-authoritarian democracy to have decreased common people’s political support is that politics is mostly based on elite’s agreements that follow a technocratic style of policy-
making with very limited citizen input (Rindfjall, 2007, Camargo, 2007). This is a style of politics that has been used, for example, to make decisions about highly criticised projects as Santiago’s new transportation system (Transantiago) and the development of hydro-electric power plants in the south of Chile (Hydroaysén) (Navia, 2009, Mira, 2011). To this effect, the evidence suggests that this type of politics was also reproduced by the way students’ demands were channelled, which therefore increased even more levels of hostility towards the political system.

The handling of this conflict also reflected several other specific elements of Chilean politics related to problems of representation, efficacy and the functioning of political parties that were previously found to be associated with the engenderment of political disaffection. Students vociferously claimed their demands were not taken into account since parliamentarian parties have homogeneous and moderate positions that did not represent them. Moreover, according to students’ perceptions it also negatively evaluated the fact that their demands were not represented, as the economic and political interests of the political class were given priority. Finally, they also disapproved that the political class tried to demobilise the movement in the pursuit of a more stable political environment. In this sense, it can be argued that the analysis of this case study could effectively reaffirm and deepen previous findings about sources of political disaffection.

Another important issue to be highlighted is that the canalisation of students’ demands followed Chile’s classic style of doing politics although there were some differences compared with the resolution of other problems. Because Bachelet’s citizens’ government speech and the fact that the educational commission incorporated members of civil society, several people thought a different way of doing politics was emerging. Nevertheless, the evidence suggested that this was not the case. Despite an initial opening of the political opportunity structure, the way the conflict was solved and its final outcomes can be argued to be a new expression of ‘politics as usual’ within the Chilean context. These facts then reproduced, and probably even increased, current high levels of disaffection as youths could observe that despite some promises of changes nothing truly happened.
Another important thing to be argued is that the analysis of this movement also brought important evidence to indicate that Chilean youth are not apathetic and that other political forms would attract them. The movement deeply showed Chilean public opinion that youths are very interested in the fate of society as they wanted to improve the education of the whole Chilean population. Moreover, it also demonstrated that they are just rejecting the current way Chilean politics is being executed. Students were captivated by Bachelet’s citizen government speech and they developed a very democratic and participative internal organisation whose main attribute was to understand representatives mostly as delegates. These situations, in conjunction with several students’ criticisms of the way the conflict was solved, strongly suggest that if Chilean politics developed more inclusive mechanisms of participation that finally lead the political class to substantively represent citizens, current high levels of political disaffection would be significantly reduced.

One last issue to be developed, which is related to the fact that this movement demonstrated that Chilean youths are not apathetic, is the fact that this movement also showed that the Chilean population seems to be currently looking for new forms of political representation. Chile has been historically highlighted as a party democracy with political parties being Chile’s only form of political representation (Panizza, 2009). In this sense, although party members initially played an important role regarding the movement development, the evidence deeply suggested that Chilean citizens are starting to look for new mechanisms of representation as they perceive that traditional parties are not currently effectively representing them. To this effect, the ‘pingüino movement’ can be cited to express Jácome’s (2011) statement that social protests emerge when closed political agendas with little flexibility make institutions lose their capacity to respond to different social sectors’ demands.
Chapter 7: The 2011-2012 student movement; the mobilisation of politically disaffected youths?

7.1 Introduction

Sebastian Piñera’s second year in office had not started as calmly as he would have expected. Several protests against the increase of gas prices in Magallanes, and massive marches against the installation of thermoelectric plants in Patagonia, marked the first months of 2011. However, these demonstrations were to be the beginning of a more politically active year. This is because the most massive social movement of recent Chilean political history emerged in early May 2011. Composed of both secondary and university students, this movement was able to shock Chile’s political scenario by demanding an educational system that prioritises the role of the state rather than that of private providers. Likewise, it also politically positioned itself more widely than previous movements as it demanded political and economic reforms as well. Moreover, students were extremely critical of the Chilean political class as they blamed it for the current state of affairs. In this sense, it has been argued that these mobilisations represented the politicisation of former passive feelings of unrest (Mayol and Azocar, 2011). As Mayol argues, "the student movement and all movements that have arisen afterwards gave back Chile the opportunity to do politics" (2012b: 15).

The empirical evidence of previous chapters suggested Chilean youths are highly disaffected because of a notable sense of disconnection with the political system. What is intended to be shown in this final chapter is that Chilean youths have become more expressive of their feelings of political disaffection. This chapter aims, therefore, to analyse the emergence and development of this movement and its political and social implications. Moreover, the main characteristics of a supposed new way of doing politics that would be emerging among young people are also discussed.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first describes Chile’s higher education system and the situation of current students. The second analyses the emergence of the movement with regard to its political opportunity structure, framing processes and mobilising structures. The third examines how disaffected youths are becoming more active and the main implications of that situation. Finally, the last
The Chilean higher education system (1980-2012)

This section describes the origins and development of Chile's current higher education system. Even though this movement was also composed by secondary students, this section only discusses the university system because the main pillars of the schooling system were already described in the previous chapter.

The foundations of the system

The origins of the present Chilean university system lie in the reforms introduced in the 1980s by Pinochet's government. Until 1980 there were only eight universities. Two of them were state-owned with 65% of total enrolment, and the rest were nominally private but with almost all their funding provided by the public sector (OECD, 2009). In 1981 significant reforms were applied to this system. The educational offer was liberalised to incorporate new private providers and regional campuses at public universities were transformed into local universities. Moreover, universities established prior to the reforms (named as traditional universities) continued to receive direct support from the state. This was, however, proportionally lower than in previous decades, which made public education no longer free (Beyer, 2000).

According to Brunner (1997), these reforms generated a predominantly market-oriented system. They permitted the creation of new self-financed private universities, professional institutes (IP) and technical training centres (CFT) with minimal requirements for their establishment. Moreover, they also forced the traditional system to adopt a more entrepreneurial attitude. Thus, the adoption of a market model was in accordance with the overall free market pro-privatisation ideology of the military government (Ibid.).

One of the most important changes introduced by this system is that it almost transferred the entire cost of studying from the state to students (OECD, 2009). The government only introduced a set of competition-enhancing mechanisms to allocate fiscal resources, with a limited amount of public funding to be regularly transferred to
traditional universities. Moreover, for low-income students of state supported universities a loan programme was established. In relation to new private providers, they were not initially allowed to obtain state support (Brunner, 1997).

After the return to democracy, the system did not significantly change. Private provision continued to grow, albeit at a lower rate, as there were more regulations for the establishment of private providers (OECD, 2009). Moreover, in 2006 a system to evaluate universities to accredit them was created. The same year another important reform was the implementation of a new university loan system called ‘the loan with state’s guarantee’ (CAE). This system allowed students from both traditional and new private accredited universities to receive loans from banks with the state as their guarantee (Ibid.).

The situation of current Chilean students

Based on the reforms just described, Chilean youths are currently experiencing three main phenomena: a) the existence of greater opportunities to become university students, b) high levels of debts, and c) the delivery of a low-quality education for some students.

Concerning the first issue, the most noteworthy result of these reforms has been the significant increase in the number of Chilean students in higher education. In 1990 there were 245,000 undergraduate students, while by 2007 there were more than 678,000. This has meant the percentage of coverage for the 18-24 age group increased from 16% in 1992 to 34% in 2006 (OECD, 2009). This increment occurred principally among private universities, as their students multiplied by more than ten. To this effect, it is claimed that Chilean higher education changed from being an elite system to becoming a mass one (Ibid.).

The flip side of the coin has been the transferring of educational costs from the state to families. Currently, families have to pay 83.7% of higher educational costs, which makes Chile the Latin American country with the highest percentage of private spending in higher education as a percentage of the GDP (Ibid.). This situation is also applicable to public universities. Chile is the only country in Latin America with high
public university fees and one of the few nations in the world where students pay more than USD 1000 a year in these institutions. Additionally, the few grants given depend on students’ scores on the university selection test and they only cover 63% to 70% of fee costs, which forces students to obtain loans either from the state or private institutions (Ibid.).

Due to the above, with this system Chilean families have experienced very high levels of debts as their incomes are not normally enough to pay for education costs. According to Mayol (2012b), 22% of family income is on average spent on education by Chilean families, which is the highest percentage among OECD countries. On average, each Chilean student obtains a degree with a debt of US$ 40,000. Moreover, 40% of students do not finally obtain the degree (CIPER, 2012a). One of the main problems is that university loans such as the CAE have had high interest rates. This problem has also affected middle class families that are unable to obtain neither public loans nor funding from the CAE. They have to resort to alternative loans such as the CORFO (Corporation of production promotion) loan system that charges up to 9% of annual interest rates and that, for example, can transform an original debt of US$ 22,200 into a debt of US$ 55,500 (Ibid.).

Debts problems have become more dramatic in recent years, as many students who received the CAE implemented in 2006 are starting to finish their studies. According to Rojas (2012), about 300,000 university students (a third of total students) are currently in debt to private banks because of the CAE. Many of them are not able to pay, either because of their low income, unemployment or desertion. One of the main student criticisms has been precisely directed towards this system as it generates huge levels of debts that have only benefited the financial banking system. The CAE is based on a system where people receive loans from banks with higher interest rates than public loans (6% against 2%) and the state is the endorsement. Moreover, banks are able to sell the treasury a percentage of the credits with an extra charge based on their estimations of students’ payment capacities (CIPER, 2012b). This system has generated high costs for the state, as in the last five years it had to pay 2091 US$ million dollars because of desertion and interest differences from CAE loans (Rojas, 2012). Additionally, it has brought benefits to private banks, as in the same period they
obtained profits of 313 US$ millions dollars after selling low capacity students’ loans to the state (CIPER, 2012b).

Alongside these debt problems, another negative phenomenon Chilean youths experience is that, as there are few regulations to establish universities, there are several low-quality private institutions that do not contribute to the country’s development. The liberalisation of Chile’s higher education system heavily increased the number of universities and students. However, it is believed that this growth has been inorganic, as education has not been conceived on the basis of the needs of national development because new universities mainly offer degrees following market criteria and not Chile's priority areas (Sanhueza, 2011). As Mayol states: "Chile does not have today an educational project but there is something very different: it has been built an education industry. As such, that industry has looked for the expansion of the educational market and it has proceed in accordance with anyone that plays with prices in a market goods" (2012b: 55).

One of the main criticisms regarding the expansion of the education market is that low quality is partly explained by the fact that higher education institution owners have been able to obtain economic benefits from educational services. In Chile CFTs and IPs can be profit-oriented, while universities are not legally authorised to profit. This has not meant, however, that universities have not obtained profits. In fact, a recent report from a special commission of the Chilean deputy chamber concluded that seven universities do not accomplish the legal requirement of being not-for-profit educational corporations (La Tercera, 2012b). In relation to this topic, Mayol argues that it is difficult to believe some institutions do not profit as in recent years an American company bought two Chilean universities for 26 and 37 US$ million respectively (2012b).

Rojas (2012) argues that it is because this system delivers good-quality education for some and low-quality education for many others that high inequality levels are finally reproduced. This is because students from poor families go to municipal schools and their only chance to study is to go to one of the private universities of doubtful quality that make businesses and profit with their debts. One of the main recent
examples of a low-quality university is the Universidad del Mar, which has more than 15,000 students and campuses in 15 cities. This institution was heavily questioned after its dean resigned in May 2012, arguing it was a priority for the university to pay the rent over workers’ salaries and pension contributions (Mayol, 2012b). After a couple of months of investigation, the National Educational Council decided to cancel the university’s legal status as it abandoned its university project, and because of problems with the management of certain degrees and irregularities regarding the election of the executive board (EMOL, 2012).

In summary, in recent years Chilean youths have experienced better opportunities to access higher education. Nevertheless, they have also felt that these opportunities are not as good as expected since many have high debts and degrees from low-quality universities, which has generated several grievances among them. To this effect, what the evidence suggests seems to be in accordance with the statement that Latin America’s crisis of representation are partly explained by the limitations of conservative modernisation projects that generate greater expectations that are unable to be accomplished (Filgueira et al., 2011). One of the main examples of this situation is education. Although these projects have brought improved education access, that has not meant improved occupational opportunities or a more evenly distributed education quality (Ibid.). This is precisely what seems to be happening in Chile, as it is argued that students have realised Chile’s central social integration promise is not truly being an effective means for upward mobility (Mayol, 2012a).

7.3 The emergence of the student movement

7.3.1 The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of the Movement

The right-wing coalition in power

To understand the emergence of the student movement, it is first necessary to understand the POS in which it developed itself. In respect to that, the main change of the Chilean political environment that could have encouraged youths to use collective action was having a new coalition in power. Since 1990 Chile was governed by a centre-left coalition. This situation changed in 2010 as a right-wing coalition lead by
Sebastian Piñera took office. Tarrow (1994) argues that one dimension that can encourage collective action is a shift in ruling alignments because that creates uncertainty and encourages challengers to exercise power that induce elites to compete for support outside the polity. In this sense, it is necessary to analyse this link.

When the evidence is analysed it can be observed that having a right-wing government did have an impact on the emergence of the movement. However, it was not in the sense of Tarrow’s statement. This is because students rejected the whole Chilean political class, arguing that both coalitions were very similar in terms of their political offer. Therefore, it was not the case that students were encouraged to use collective action as a result of having elites competing for support.

"We do not make the difference between the Concertación and the Alianza. We were governed by the Concertación for twenty years. Piñera now has four years at most. And he will not solve everything. I mean, we make criticisms of the whole political class, 100%" Daniela Isla, secondary leader of the CONES during 2011.

"The right-wing in power activated many more people who had not previously raised their voices in order to support certain sectors of the left. This year they raised their voices more loudly. Therefore, the catalyst that was that the right-wing government had won provoked a lot of support for the student movement." Rodrigo Rivera, secondary leader of the CONES during 2011.

Some youths believe having a right-wing government had an impact. However, it was not because the movement found more support among political elites, but because people who previously prevented themselves from participating in public demonstrations because of feelings of political loyalty were now free to openly express their discontent. It is stated that some students became more politically active when Piñera took office, as they had previously avoided participating in social movements when the Concertación was in power, since they had sympathy for this coalition.

Another aspect of the POS to be analysed has to do with the availability of new influential allies who can act as acceptable negotiators (Tarrow, 1994). The fact that the Alianza was governing and the Concertación was the opposition seemed to have determined the fate of the movement as the Concertación tried to act as an ally of the movement. Nevertheless, students believe the main effect of this coalition’s support was not about directly facilitating negotiations. They argue that the new role of the
Concertación contributed to the development of the movement since by not being in power they had neither the will nor the capacity to demobilise the movement.

"Concertación governments always sought the co-optation of social movements. Now, there was a whole political sector from the Concertación that was useful for the conflict. The state administration’s political spheres did not have the ability to generate consensus or to co-opt leaders of the mobilisation. The majority of leaders did not belong to political groups determined by parties too." **Reacaredo Galvez, university leader of the UDEC during 2011.**

"The action of the Concertación was opportunism. There were twenty years in which they privatised a lot the education system. The Concertación had more of a leading role at the end of mobilisations. But that happened in an opportunistic way. **Nataly Espinoza, university leader of the PUC of Valparaiso during 2011.**

As it was also observed in the previous chapter, students perceived that one of the reasons for the failure of previous movements was that the Concertación had the capacity to demobilise them in order to obtain political stability. In this case the Concertación did not do that and the Alianza did not have the capacity do to it, which facilitated having an opener and stronger movement. This situation did not mean, however, that students felt close to the Concertación. The evidence indicates that they believe they could take advantage of this situation but that the Concertación was still to be rejected as they did not have the will to make more substantial reforms in previous governments. In this sense, they interpreted their actions only as a sign of opportunism.

**Police repression**

Another relevant element of Chile's POS that had an impact on the level of use of collective action among youths is the high levels of policy repression that the movement experienced. Della Porta (1996) states that protest-policing is an important barometer of the political opportunities available for episodes of collective action. She argues the level of repression can either favour or obstruct the development of social movements depending on the popular support for both elites and challengers (Ibid.).

Regarding the Chilean case, the evidence suggests that based on the high popularity of students’ demands, high repression levels contributed to the development of the movement by fuelling youths’ grievances.
Repression was mainly executed during this movement through mechanisms to disperse protesters through the evacuation of occupied schools and universities. This fact has been highlighted by several reports that argue that during social manifestations the attitude of the police has been very repressive. The 2011 UDP Human Rights Report argues that when facing social movements the state has "justified and supported the disproportionate use of force by policemen as well as the indiscriminate use of dissuasion techniques" (UDP, 2011b: 80). Moreover, this report also questions several control practices such as people's illegal detention and the introduction of infiltrated polices within protest activities (Ibid.). Reports also criticise the fact that the government presented a new law to toughen penalties and give more power to the police since it is considered that this measure limits people's rights to express their opinions (UDP, 2012b).

Students themselves have criticised these actions as a public declaration of the main organisation of university students states that: "We express too our deep worry about a government that has turned a deaf ear to our demands, responding every time with more repression, both physic and through the media" (CONFEC, 2011). The most relevant expression of students’ rejection occurred on 4 August of 2011. That day students organised two demonstrations in Santiago, which the government did not authorise. The result was that people who showed up were brutally repressed and many people were detained. After these events Camila Vallejos (one of the main leaders of the movement) called for a ‘cacerolazo’ via Twitter, to be held at 9pm that day to express people's rejection to these repressive measures (Mayol, 2012b). The response was massive, as thousands of people from several cities used their pots and pans that day to complain about these repressive actions and demand better education (Pulgar, 2011). These events demonstrate, then, that repressive actions encouraged the use of collective action among Chilean people. Using Della Porta's argument (1996), this situation can be explained by the fact that when repression occurred elites were very unpopular, while challengers had a lot of support.

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103 A ‘cacerolazo’ is a disruptive repertoire where people bang pots, pans and other utensils to call for attention.
The effects of the 2006 experience

One last aspect of the POS to be analysed is the influence of the 2006 experience. When leaders of the current movement are interviewed it is observed that the 2006 ‘pingüino movement’ had an important impact on the development of this new movement. In this sense, this experience can be analysed as a dimension of the Chilean political environment that encouraged the use of collective action, as most students experienced those mobilisations either by having directly participated in, or by studying those events.

When the qualitative material is analysed, it is observed that 2011 students perceive the results of the 2006 movement as an expression of a rejected way of doing politics, and that the dissolution provoked by the results of that movement was an important factor that explains the strength of the 2011 movement. Students believe that on that occasion they were deceived by the political class as politicians made them believe their demands were supposed to be represented. However, eventually that did not happen, which generated feelings of disillusionment and powerlessness.

"There was not an achievement in 2006, but rather they put the finger in the mouth making up a law for another. From that event came the need to require real changes. Therefore, it became necessary for each student to realise that we are able to change a country." Laura Ortiz, secondary student leader member of the ACES during 2011.

"This movement is so explosive and permanent because previous events gave us a hint of disappointment and helplessness. We felt overlooked. The need for more direct participation is the product of 2006 because we felt decisions were made behind closed doors. We summed experience about how to stand against institutions. We learned not to trust in politicians who promise you everything." Laura Palma, university student leader of the Universidad de la Serena during 2011.

The 2006 experience was also relevant as it demonstrated to youths that they were able to paralyse a country in order to demand substantive changes. Students believe that in 2006 students were too naïve as they believed that through the mechanisms offered by the political system they would be able to achieve their demands. Students argue that from these previous experiences they learned several lessons about how to deal with political authorities, and that the application of those lessons contributed to the strength of the movement.
As Camila Vallejos argues, if the political class had intended to find a similar way to solve the conflict like the one in 2006: "it will only help to intensify social mobilisations. Because they will no longer face a numb society. Today Chile has changed and this time it will not allow the future of our country to be agreed between four walls" (Vallejos, 2011). Students have therefore learned from past experiences, which made reject Chile's classic way of doing politics. Among these lessons, the primary one was not to blindly trust the political class any further, but to demand direct participation. Moreover, it was also learned how to deal with attempts to demobilise the movement. Students argue that the capacity of avoiding co-option based on the 2006 experience is responsible for such high levels of support, which is expressed by the fact that new leaders were not principally members of traditional political parties, as in during 2006.104

7.3.2 The framing processes of the movement

The second issue to be examined in relation to the emergence of the movement is its framing processes, that is to say, the "collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action" (McAdam, et al., 1996: 3). These processes are analysed by understanding the movement's demands in terms of how students interpreted their needs and those attributed as being responsible for the current situation.

In terms of the demands, the movement argued that the current Chilean educational system was in crisis and that it needed to be changed in order to improve high levels of inequality. Students had a much clearer prognostic framing than previous movements since from the beginning of mobilisations an alternative set of solutions to the problem were proposed. They argued that there: "was an urgent need to restore education as a social and universal human right that must be guaranteed by the Chilean constitution, and that is structured according to a new national system of public, free, democratic and quality education organised and financed by the state at

104 As noted in the last chapter, the main leaders of the Pinguino movement belonged to political parties from the whole Chilean spectrum. In 2011 only few leaders were part of the PC, but the majority of them were independent or part of non-traditional left-wing organisations. The evidence shows that this change can be attributed to some lessons learned from the 2006 movement.
all levels" (Mesa Social, 2011). Students interpreted, therefore, that current problems of Chilean education are explained by the lack of a good public educational system. Thus, they were against the market-oriented educational model instituted during the dictatorship. In fact, one of the main demonstration's slogans was "It will fall down. It will fall down. Pinochet’s education”.

Concerning primary and secondary education, students wanted to finish the process of municipalisation and create a new national system of public education under the Ministry of Education. In this new system, funding was not to be defined by vouchers but all schools would receive a fixed contribution, which would finish with the shared-funding system where state-subsidised schools charge students. Moreover, they claimed that any type of profit-oriented activity had to be eliminated from schools that receive state funding (Ibid.).

In relation to higher education, it was criticised for growing in an explosive and unregulated way. They disapprove its expansion was not the product of a national plan of development but the result of an inorganic growth that has delivered a heterogeneous quality that responds to market logics (Ibid.). To strengthen public education, it was proposed to substantively increase state support for traditional universities. Moreover, students called for new systems of scholarships and funding in order to finish unsustainable families’ debt levels. It was proposed that, in order to advance towards free education, a system of scholarships for students from the 70% of lower income families must be promoted. Additionally, it was suggested that there must be a loan-system for students from the 30% of richer families from non-for-profit universities, which would eliminate the CAE and the role of banks within the funding system. Students also stated that private universities aiming to receive state funding must be accredited, guarantee the principle of free association and expression, ensure and promote the existence of student unions, be transparent regarding the use of funding resources and have a total absence of profit (Ibid.).

Students therefore advocated the strengthening of public education and a more rigorous control over private providers as they believed the educational system could not be principally market-oriented. Thus, it can be argued this was an anti-neoliberal
movement. These kinds of mobilisations have taken part in several parts of Latin America, which has been described as a regional wave of anti-neoliberal mass mobilisation (E. Silva, 2009). In this sense, the 2011-2012 Chilean student movement can be somehow understood as part of the same wave.

Students argue they could obtain greater support from families by framing the problem through the argument that people have high levels of debts because there is a market-oriented system where education is traded like any other commodity, and where some people are illegally profiting from it. They state that, since students framed education problems in a simple way, families could feel identified with these problems since they are daily experiencing the incapacity of responding to market logics.

"When we speak about free education, it is primarily something that reaches all families. We are seeking to establish that education should not be considered a commodity. We also achieved a lot of support among students' families since these are cross-cutting demands. Because we criticise how debts happen and how mechanisms for financing education are generated." Reacaredo Galvez, university student leader of the UDEC during 2011.

It is observed therefore, using Benford and Snow’s (2000) terms, that one relevant diagnostic framing of the movement was to blame the excessive and sometimes abusive role of private education providers, and that this strategy could expand the movement’s support. In fact, it has been argued that one of the most interesting thing of these mobilization was to have broken with the corporative character of students struggles in order to claim for more universal demands with a transverse sense (Azócar, 2013).

Blaming a market model was not, however, the main diagnostic framing of the movement. Through the analysis of the evidence it is observed, too, that students also argue that the responsible of current educational deficits is the presence of a non-representative political system that has not had the will to change the current system in order to represent the citizenry. That is why they also argue that protests express both important criticisms towards a political and economic system and youths’ needs to participate in a different kind of system.
"The reason people have been mobilised is not that much to do with the issue of education. It has to do with the collapse of a political system in which education is included. With the collapse of a political system that is not representative. Mobilisations are a way of expressing the need to participate that young people have in a kind of politics that it is not this one." Alfredo Vielma, secondary student leader of the ACES during 2011.

It is based on these beliefs that students were able to broaden their demands. To this effect, once the main educational demands described above were well-known by the Chilean population, students started to argue that education problems were just one expression of the current political and economic Chilean model. Based on that idea is that students’ prognostic framing also included the realisation of significant economic and political reforms. Concerning economic reforms, they advocated for a more universalistic role of the state, rather than a subsidiary one, to not only have better education but also improve public services concerning health, transportation, pensions and housing. To facilitate that, students proposed the realisation of a tax reform and the re-nationalisation of natural resources, principally copper deposits 70% currently controlled by private companies. These proposals are based on the belief that the increment of the state’s role is the only effective way to reduce current high levels of social inequality (CONFECH, 2011).

These economic criticisms were commonly framed in terms of the faults of a neoliberal socio-economic system. This system is understood as a model where the distribution of public services is based on market logics controlled by private providers, where everything is traded and can be bought by paying a price, which finally benefits only a small number of people. Students believe that this neoliberal system is responsible for the current negative situation as it is based on a system where education and other public services are understood only as commodities and not as social rights what finally reproduces current high levels of inequality. As a university student leader argues: "It is not just the problem of education. This movement questioned how wealth is distributed in Chile. The existence of a subsidiary state where companies are those that command the country. We proposed plenty alternatives to financing things through the re-nationalisation of natural resources and a tax reform. All that has to go with a reform of the political system, since today the majority cannot influence decision-making processes" (Interview, Espinoza, 2012).
The evidence reaffirms, therefore, the previous statement that this movement can be understood as part of a regional wave of anti-neoliberal mobilisations. Several other authors have also highlighted this issue. Pulgar (2012) states that the 2011 student movement is anti-neoliberal since it again discusses the role of the public sector regarding social rights and criticises the excessive role given to the market. Mayol (2012b) has a similar vision as he argues that students challenged the fact that the most important thing of several fields, such as education, pensions and transport, is the creation of markets that ultimately only benefit powerful people who gain economic profits from them.

With respect to political reforms, students criticised that political decisions are currently only a mandate of a minority in Chile, which led them to demand several reforms such as the requirement of a more representative electoral system, effective mechanisms of citizen participation and the establishment of a new constitution. Students argue that they became conscious about the importance of these types of reforms principally as a lesson of the 2006 movement as they feel students were strongly limited by the way political institutions worked at that time. In this sense, the evidence suggests that students realised the lack of substantive representation is also explained by a particular political model.

### 7.3.3 The mobilising structures of the movement

The last issue to be discussed concerning the emergence of the movement is the mobilising structures it used. This intends to understand how the mechanisms students used to engage in collective action contributed to the fate of the movement (McAdam et al., 1996). This is done by analysing student organisations and the tactics used to obtain support to achieve their demands.

As it was already stated, this movement was formed by both secondary and university students. In order to represent the interests of these students, there were several organisations. Concerning secondary students, there were two main organisations: the CONES and the ACES. The main ideological difference was that to be part of the ACES you were not allowed to be part of traditional political parties, which was established to avoid instances like the one in 2006 where parties demobilised the
movement (Interview, Ortiz, 2012). Beyond these differences, however, the demands of both organisations were very similar, which made them soon after mobilisations began to join forces (Interview, Rivera, 2012).

University students, on the other hand, were organised through the CONFECH. This organisation is formed by representatives of student’s unions from the 25 traditional universities across the country. Even though students of non-traditional private universities also supported some students’ demands, the CONFECH led all negotiations and activities. The CONFECH worked in conjunction with both ACES and CONES when they presented proposals and organised activities. The association of these three organisations and other groups of workers, teachers and parent organisations was called the "Mesa Social por la Educacion" (Colegio de Profesores, 2011). Each organisation was independent and had democratic mechanisms of decision-making where every student had the capacity to give their opinion. In this context, student representatives had to respect every decision made during the assemblies (Interview, Espinoza, 2012).

Students’ democratic organisation indicates that through this movement students also demonstrated that they understand representatives mainly as delegates rather than as trustees (Pitkin, 1967). Moreover, it also shows that they were aware of Plotke's (1997) statement that only when political aims are subject to dialogue between representatives and the represented do people truly gain political representation, which shows that students’ forms of organisation had a relevant role. In fact, several authors have highlighted the importance of the way the movement organised itself. Pulgar (2011) argues that one of the most relevant elements of this movement was the learning of participative democracy. This is because through the democratic practices executed within schools and universities thousands of students were able to receive a very democratic political formation that could lead to a long-term cultural change where citizens are much more committed regarding social wellbeing. Segovia and Gamboa (2012) also highlight the movement's organisation as they state that during 2011 students showed a better capacity of collective action and good leadership, which heavily contributed to increasing the support for the movement.
In terms of the movement’s tactical repertories, the most emphatic actions were conventional forms, such as the occupation of schools and universities and public demonstrations (Tarrow, 1994). According to the organisers, the most massive demonstration was on 30 June 2011 where more than 200,000 people in Santiago and 400,000 in the country participated (Cooperativa, 2011). However, the most relevant repertoires introduced by students were what was called ‘the new ways of mobilisation’. These were specific and innovative activities organised by the ‘Mesa Social’ to spread students’ demands, which can be understood as disruptive forms of mobilisation created by the movement to achieve their collective purposes (Tarrow, 1994). For example, on 24 June 2011 more than 4,000 students dressed as zombies danced to Michael Jackson’s song ‘Thriller’ in front of Chile’s government palace in order to symbolise the death of public education (El Mostrador, 2011). Other relevant activities were the 1,800 hours for the education, where hundreds of students ran without stopping around the government palace demanding free and public education, and the ‘besatón’, where thousands of students kissed their partners for 1,800 seconds in eleven cities in the country (La Nación, 2011a, La Nación, 2011b).

When students are asked about the role of these new forms of mobilisations, they unanimously state they were very relevant in order to position their demands and to obtain more support, especially from older people. They argue that the movement was forced to develop these new tactical repertories since they were not able to obtain support through conventional ways of engaging. This is because massive demonstrations were always informed in the news, increasingly highlighting the disturbances made by a few people, rather than the massiveness of these actions. As Azócar (2013) argues, the relevance of these new ways of doing politics is given by the fact that they were very creative and imaginative, which permitted the captivation of normally distant mass media that were finally forced to show positive aspects of mobilizations.

By conducting these activities students were able to show the rest of society that they were not vandals but conscious students whose main desire was to improve

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105In these activities the symbolic number was 1,800, as according to students the cost of financing education is 1,800 US$ million.
education, which significantly increased societal support for their claims. Moreover, students also state that these new ways of mobilising were relevant to obtaining more support from students themselves, as some of them were afraid of participating through conventional forms as they were more dangerous because of police repression.

"New forms of mobilisation were one of the greatest icons of these mobilisations. It was a very creative movement. These different forms, such as the ‘Thriller’ for education and the ‘besotón’ were entertaining forms with which families could feel more empathy than with a hoodie throwing stones. People said these guys are dancing for education. They are more committed." Rodrigo Rivera, secondary leader of the CONES during 2011.

The evidence indicates therefore that these innovative activities were crucial for expanding the range of support for the movement, which was relevant to pressurising the political class as it showed that the whole of Chilean society was demanding better education. Thus, it can be argued that these new disruptive forms fulfilled their role of broadening the circle of conflict by expressing the movements’ determination, as Tarrow (1994) argues. With respect to family support, students also argue that it was stronger during 2011 as families were more powerfully experiencing debt problems since their sons were starting to pay credits obtained through the CAE (Interview, Espinoza, 2012).

One last element of the mobilising structures to be examined is the use of social networks to spread information about the movement. Students argue that the use of social networks such as Facebook and Twitter were extremely relevant to the success of the movement as they helped spread information and keep students informed. All public activities were principally announced through these social networks, which allowed students to increase the number of participants.

"Many of our demonstrations were also promoted through alternative media like social networks. And they allowed us some massiveness. Mass media are highly co-opted by the political class. So, sometimes it was only displayed what they wanted and not necessarily what the student movement wanted. That is when a lot of alternative media such as TV channels from different student unions emerged." Nataly Espinoza, university leader of the PUC of Valparaiso during 2011.

Another important issue highlighted by students is that the use of social networks was even more relevant in the Chilean context. This is because they believe that in
Chile, all formal media such as television, newspapers and the radio are controlled by groups that are against students’ demands. In this context, social networks were a way to counteract the information students found to be inappropriate. That is why, for example, several student unions launched television channels to inform society about the activities of the movement to show they were not criminals and to generate debate in the community, which seems to have contributed to increasing the movement’s support. In this sense, it can be observed that in accordance with McCarthy and Zald's vision (1972), the 2011 student movement demonstrated the importance of the proper dynamics and tactics taken by participants to obtain more societal support and deal with several constraints they faced.

7.4 The expression of a crisis of representation through the political activation of disaffected youths

After having analysed the evidence about factors explaining the emergence of the 2011 movement, it is necessary to deepen the argument that this movement expressed the existence of a crisis of political representation within Chilean society. This section intends to do that by developing the idea that this movement represented the political activation of numerous previously passive disaffected youths and by analysing the implications of this situation

The activation of the youths

One way it can be tested whether the movement represented the activation of politically-disaffected youths is by observing if students’ political criticisms, and also their behaviours, match previous findings about current sources of political disaffection. Concerning this issue, it is observed that when students are asked about what they believe the movement showed regarding the relation between youths and politics, they state that it demonstrates that youths are highly politically disaffected. Moreover, the evidence also indicates that students’ main political criticisms coincide with the evidence of previous chapters.

Students argue that the movement demonstrates a discontentment with the political system, and that current parties are rejected since youths do not feel
substantively represented by them as they have distanced from them. Additionally, they believe the movement also expressed a critique of the current elitist ways of decision-making, the fact that politicians prioritise the representation of their own interests and that there are not generational changes among politicians.

"This movement has shown youth discontentment with the current institutional framework. Many youths have argued they no longer feel represented by these institutions. There is also a progressive distancing concerning representation through political parties. In fact, students have preferred to organise in other forms, such as independent organisations or groups."  

Reacredo Galvez, university student leader of the UDEC during 2011.

"The movement has shown that young people are tired of politics made between four walls that claim to represent citizens but that ultimately represent their own interests. It has also shown it is necessary to make a generational change to make politicians realise that the vast majority of young people are not interested in politics today because they are interested in real changes."  

Rodrigo Rivera, secondary student leader of the CONES during 2011.

The evidence also indicates that students’ behaviours expressed their feelings of hostility towards the political system. For example, they rejected the presence of traditional party leaders during several marches and asked to be part of every commission or meeting relating to their demands. In fact, one of the most relevant slogans of demonstrations was: "the people united, advance without parties". Students also argue that the youths’ discontentment could be also observed in the type of organisations students joined to protest for their demands. This is because, even though there were several members of the PC among leaders, the majority of students preferred to organise themselves through independent organisations.

Based on the fact that students’ criticisms exceeded negative evaluations of specific educational policies as they criticised the acting of the whole political system, it can be argued that they were expressing low levels of diffuse support rather than specific support (Easton, 1975). That is to say, students’ judgements express not only feelings of dissatisfaction with specific policies but enduring negative evaluations of what the Chilean political system represents, which would indicate that the mobilisation of several youths was indeed a more active expression of previously passive feelings of political disaffection.
Quantitative data also support the argument that the student movement represented the political activation of formerly passive disaffected youths. It is observed in the figure below that protests started in a period where both central political coalitions, as well as the Government and Piñera’s political approval, were very low.

Figure 7.1 - Evolution of indicators of political approval among Chilean people (18+)

![Figure 7.1 - Evolution of indicators of political approval among Chilean people (18+)](image)

Source: Adimark (2010-2011).

As shown in Figure 7.1, since October 2010 there was a clear downtrend among these four indicators that intensified after the emergence of the movement in May 2011. These levels of approval are very low, which implies that during the student conflict people were highly politically disaffected. Additionally, they also demonstrate that the conflict increased levels of hostility towards the political system.

The relevance of these low-support values become even more critical when compared with the population support for the movement. It is observed in Figure 7.2 that in every age group students’ demands were supported by more than 85%, which indicates a relevant difference regarding what was observed concerning political institutions’ support.

Figure 7.2 - Students’ demands support among Chilean people (18+) by age group

![Figure 7.2 - Students’ demands support among Chilean people (18+) by age group](image)

The qualitative material also brings relevant data to comprehend this apparent process of political activation since it is observed that students themselves are aware of this process. They believe the movement obtained a lot of support since youths became more conscious of both several injustices they were experiencing and the power organisation. Students argue that when they realised the importance of organising themselves to directly demand changes they were able to spread this feeling to the rest of society. They also state that this consciousness-raising is also explained by the fact that individuals feel more need to participate in a political system that excludes people. As a movement leader (Cristóbal Lagos) states: "Student mobilisation was the point where Chilean society woke up. There was a reinvigoration of discontent. It generated a new space to protest. Many people started to see it was necessary to organise to protest for what they believed to be fair" (The Argentinean Independent, 2011). In this sense, students highlight that one of the movement’s main achievements was to have increased the population’s levels of consciousness and promote a different educational and political-economic model.

The process of consciousness’s awareness that Chilean society seems to be currently experiencing has been also analysed by Chilean literature. Mayol (2012b) argues that in 2011 politics resuscitated in Chile as the student movement reclaimed the public space as its sphere of debate. According to Mayol (2012a), 2011 represented the political processing of feelings of unrest that had previously been left aside and that could now be discussed. Rojas (2012) has a similar argument as he states that the movement generated consciousness of the neoliberal model’s weaknesses and deficits of Chile’s political transition. He adds that this process "is the product of an accumulation of unrest and social dissatisfaction, of the frustration provoked by a speech that promised personal success but that actually ended in deception, indebtedness and fraud (Ibid, 14).

Mayol (2012a) argues that one way to evidence this activation in Chilean society is given by the fact that during 2011 complaints against market abuses increased in almost every aspect. For example, complaints against privately-administrated highways increased by 10% during 2011 and injunctions due to the rise of health plans from private insurers (ISAPRES) increased by 284% . This author claims that because
youths were on the streets criticising an educational model common people assumed those actions carried sense and that any citizen was able to change certain things. In this sense, it is argued that after the student movement Chilean citizenry woke up in order to advance towards having more participation as it had the capacity to rebuild Chilean politics (Mayol, 2012b).

It is observed, therefore, that the 2011-2012 student movement can be understood as an event where sentiments of unrest could be politically expressed. To this effect, the evidence indicates that the Chilean Student movement cannot be only attributed to the fact that revolutionary movements bring youths an idealistic rationale to break with several traditional structures and to the inherent character of this age group of being more transgressor (Lipset, 1966, 1968). These conditions could perfectly have played a role in the case of this student movement. However, the evidence is quite clear about showing that their activation was an expression of deep discontent rather than just a manifestation of rebellion attitudes typical of youth.

Another relevant finding derived from the evidence is that these political expressions were also able to spread to other sections of Chilean society. To this effect, what seems to currently be happening in Chilean society matches with Macpherson's statement (1976) about how to reach a more participatory democracy. He argues that in elitist democracies there is a vicious circle where low participation and social inequality come together. One way of breaking that circle to achieve a participatory democracy is to look for loopholes. A loophole takes place when some groups become more aware of the cost of political apathy, which encourages other groups to become more active. In this sense, it can be argued that the 2011-2012 student movement is currently a loophole in Chilean democracy since it has encouraged people to demand more participation and substantive changes within a context of high levels of social inequality, which, according to Macpherson, would indicate the existence of favourable conditions to advance towards a more participatory democracy that could finally also reduce inequality.
The implications of youth activation

After developing the idea that the emergence of the student movement implied the activation of important sectors of Chilean society, it is necessary to analyse the main implications of that. This is done by discussing what students believe about the movement's impact on the development of Chilean democracy, and by examining Chilean politicians' and scholars' interpretations of the consequences of current facts.

Regarding students' perceptions, the evidence indicates that they believe the movement expressed the crisis of a political model. Students state that by questioning several features of Chilean politics and proposing political reforms they evidenced that there is currently a crisis between formal politics and common citizens, which would be demonstrating that Chile's political model is collapsing. As a secondary student organisation document claimed: "After the last few months Chile will not be the country where a powerful few define the destiny of the majority. The model the Concertación and the Alianza defined of what they believed was best for the country has been broken" (ACES, 2011). Due to the expression of this crisis, students also believe that after the movement the political scenario will significantly change as it will force the incorporation of social actors.

"The movement has shown the crisis of the relationship between young people and Chilean politics. We believe this political model has expired. It expired in the same way traditional parties did. This year the crisis of the political class was demonstrated, which was reflected in our political demands, such as having a popular constituent assembly." Alfredo Vielma, secondary student leader of the ACES during 2011.

Students also indicate they are aware that this political model is an inheritance of the dictatorship as they argue the movement demonstrated current political deficiencies originated with the social contract established during the transition. Moreover, they also highlight that not only the student movement expose the collapse of this model since this was also shown in other mobilisations during 2011, such as the anti-Hydoraysén movement and several other regional movements. This is because all these mobilisations also demanded more political inclusiveness through the

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106 What students understand as the current political model is mainly the existence of two coalitions that make all decisions by elite consensus without incorporating and representing the citizenry. This matches significantly with classic accounts of Chilean democracy (See Moulian, 1998, Angell, 2007 and Rindfjall, 2009).
empowerment of civil society. Finally, students also state that it is important to reveal the crisis of this political model as it is one of the main limitations regarding the implementation of substantive social and economic reforms.

When Chilean political debate is examined, it is also possible to observe that an important part of the Chilean political class also recognises that the movement revealed the existence of a crisis of representation. In fact, the emergence of the movement itself generated an important discussion regarding the need for political reforms to strengthen Chilean representative democracy. Politicians admit that the quality of politics is being questioned, as people do not perceive that traditional political institutions have the capacity to substantively represent their demands, which would explain that many of them prefer to demand things directly on the streets.

"The majority of Chileans believe that traditional democratic institutions are not able to absorb, channel and process citizens’ demands efficiently in the economic and social issues. Deep down, we face a crisis of representation of our democratic institutions. The best way to solve this political and social crisis in order to avoid the emergence of a populist or delegative democracy, Chavez-style, is by strengthening representative democracy." Patricio Walker, member of the PDC, quoted in La Segunda (2011).

"It is urgent to revitalise our democracy. To make it more participative and closer to people’s needs, that is looking on the streets for what they don't find in their representatives today. It is essential to draw a road map that allows us to restore the credibility of our political institutions in the short term." Cristián Larroulet, Minister Secretary General of the Presidency during Piñera’s government, quoted in La Tercera (2011).

Politicians argue that this crisis has to be solved as it could lead to threatening situations such as an irreversible rupture between politics and the citizenry or the instauration of populist regimes. That is why the Chilean political class proposed, after the movement, several political reforms such as the change of the electoral system, the existence of more democratic candidate-selection processes and the instauration of plebiscites and popular law initiatives. Politicians believe this crisis can be internally solved by these reforms as they will be able to demonstrate to common citizens that politics can be more inclusive and participatory. These kinds of reforms have been furthered by almost all political parties, and only members of the UDI have been more reticent regarding these measures. For example, one relevant (and joint) proposal was presented by the PDC and RN, which was an important novelty as these parties belong to different political coalitions.
Finally, when Chilean academics debate the main implications of the emergence of this movement and the subsequent activation of other sectors of Chilean society, it is possible to identify three main positions: a) those who argue there is not a political crisis, only increased probabilities of suffering deceptions, b) those who argue Chile is, above all, experiencing a crisis of political representation, and c) those who argue that alongside this political crisis, Chile is also experiencing a crisis of its neoliberal socio-economic model. These three positions will be described first in order to discuss what the evidence of this thesis can contribute to this discussion.

Concerning the first position, its main representatives are Oppliger and Guzmán (2012). They argue the 2011 events do not represent a generalised feeling of unrest within Chilean society, as the majority’s wish is not to make substantive changes to Chile’s political and economic model because there is no indicator to support the supposed Chilean crisis. They state that Chile has a very stable and democratic political system with solid institutions. In this sense, current protests, rather than challenging the social order, would only be expressing the correct functioning of a democracy where people express demands and representatives try to accomplish them. Moreover, these authors also claim there is no crisis, and that the Chilean economic situation is better than ever, as Chile has recently experienced great achievements regarding GDP increase and poverty reduction.

What would explain the protests, according to this position, would be the higher expectations of Chileans, generated by the satisfaction of certain basic needs that have seen more aspirations and therefore more probability of deceit. This would imply then that, rather than being against a market-oriented model, Chilean people would only be demanding its improvement to avoid certain wrongful behaviours. Finally, these authors also argue that Chile is not suffering a crisis since the supposed high levels of discontent are similar to those in previous years, when nobody was talking about a crisis. In this sense, it is argued that if there is some unrest this might be explained by the lack of public order and bad political management experienced during the conflict, or because people believe Chile will not continue advancing if some proposed left-wing measures are implemented (Ibid.).
The second position contradicts the first one, arguing that Chile is indeed currently facing a political crisis whose solution would imply the implementation of several political reforms. These authors’ main reasons for the statement are the indicators of high levels of political disaffection, such as low electoral participation and low confidence in political parties. In this sense, it is argued that 2011 protests would be a manifestation of this political crisis as they express a generalised rejection of the Chilean political class. Some representatives of this vision are Huneeus (2011), Garretón (2011) and Salazar (2011).

All these authors believe the movement has demonstrated that the political model inherited from the dictatorship is collapsing, and that it has to be modified to strengthen Chilean democracy. Huneeus (2011) states there is a crisis of representation since this movement’s impact is precisely explained by some limitations of the Chilean political system. Moreover, he claims that this model could be internally improved if political reforms to generate confidence to empower both people and institutions are promoted. Garretón (2012), for his part, argues too that there is a political crisis in Chile. He states that this crisis is based on a political model created by the dictatorship that generates a political draw to ensure an economic and social model that is rejected by the citizenry. Coinciding with Huneeus, he also states that, to overcome this crisis, both traditional political actors and the citizenry are needed since the central issue regarding the transformation of the political model is the reconstruction of the relationship between politics and the citizenry.

Finally, Salazar (2011) also agrees that there is a crisis of representation. However, he is not that optimistic regarding the role that classic political figures can play in the reformation of Chilean democracy. This is because he argues that people have started to self-represent themselves without taking into account political parties, which would imply that these institutions will not be that relevant in a: "new citizen and civic culture that is slowly emerging in front of a model that is in crisis" (Ibid.).

The third and last position agrees with the second one about a possible crisis of representation. However, it is also stated that Chile’s current socio-economic model would be in crisis. The most relevant author concerning this perspective is Mayol
(2012a, 2012b). He states that the 2011 student movement and its subsequent consequences expressed the end of Chile's market society's legitimacy (Mayol, 2012a). This is because with the movement the role of the market could be again politicised as students demonstrated and questioned its abuses after several years in which the market was a zone of pain. As Mayol argues, this politicisation process challenged "the neoliberal articulation between economy and society (...). So, the internal logic of the Chilean economic model fell apart; it is cracking" (Ibid, 160).

The main expression of the legitimacy crisis of Chile's market model would be that numerous sectors of Chilean society have expressed their opposition to profit-oriented activities within several fields such as education, health and pensions (Mayol, 2012b). This position is also supported and deepened by Rojas (2012) as he argues that Chile "is attending today to a terminal disease of the neoliberal model that left almost everything in the hands of the market and private providers. (...) The current crisis, brewed in the past, is the product of the exhaustion of this model, since the market has not been able, by itself, to take out the country from underdevelopment." (109).

Having explained these three positions it is necessary to discuss what the evidence suggests. First, regarding the existence of a crisis of political representation, the evidence analysed throughout thesis has strongly suggested that Chile is indeed facing a political crisis, which is especially strong within young people. This crisis is not only given by having thousands of people on the streets but because Chilean people have quite high levels of political disaffection, as observed in chapter two. Moreover, the evidence of other chapters also indicated that Chilean people are very hostile to the current way of doing politics and they would be interested in formal politics if it worked differently. Finally, the data of recent surveys have also supported the idea that there is a political crisis that goes beyond the student movement. For example, a survey conducted by the CERC in 2011 indicated that 75% of Chileans want to reform the current constitution. Moreover, another survey indicated that 56% of Chileans believe that plebiscites are a good way to decide on important political issues (Auditoria a la Democracia, 2012). In this sense, it is not possible to agree with

107 The support to this mechanism was also demonstrated by the high audience that the symbolic educational plebiscite organized by the "Mesa Social" in 2011 had as 1.422.442 persons voted (LaNación, 2011).
Oppliger’s and Guzmán's (2011) perspective since there is clearly a general level of political discontent in Chile, which is an indicator that supports the statement that Chile is facing a political crisis.

The evidence also allows us to refute some specific Oppliger and Guzmán propositions. They argue there is not a crisis since current levels of discontentment are similar to levels from previous years and that it might be explained by other phenomena. Concerning the first issue, it is necessary to argue that the fact that Chileans had similar levels of unrest in previous years does not indicate the lack of a crisis, but that at that time discontentment had not yet found political expression. This chapter has developed the argument that 2011 events represent the activation of previously passive feelings of political disaffection, which would invalidate these authors’ arguments. With respect to other possible explanatory sources, those statements cannot be reaffirmed since the examined evidence has not indicated that there is disaffection because Chile lacks public order or because of the possible execution of left-wing proposals that can hinder Chile's development path.

In relation to the accurateness of the proposition about the crisis of Chile's socio-economic model, it is not possible to give a straightforward answer. Even though it was observed that the 2011 student movement did challenge Chile's neoliberal model, it is not possible to argue from that evidence that the vast majority of the Chilean population are of the same opinion. Thus, it is also necessary to analyse perceptions about market economy to see if the anti-neoliberal backlash observed in the movement can be also extended to the whole population. This issue is also very important to analyse as it has been argued that Chile's neoliberal model is the substantive principle of Chile's political model (Ruiz, 1991, Durán 2006).

In table 7.1 it can be observed some Chileans’ opinions that can shed light on their vision about market-oriented socio-economic models. Regarding educational issues, the evidence suggests that Chileans do not have pro-market orientations. More than two thirds disagree with having profit-oriented universities, although they deliver good-quality education and about half of them believe that private universities and state-subsidised schools should be taken into public ownership. These data also
coincide with what was observed in another recent survey that indicated that 80% of Chileans are against profit-oriented universities and schools (CEP, 2011).

**Table 7.1 - Perceptions about market economy among Chilean adults (+18)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It does not matter that universities profit as long they deliver good-quality education.</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All private universities should be taken into public ownership.</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-subsidised private schools should be taken into public ownership.</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transportation should be in the hands of a state company.</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODELCO should be privatised</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UDP (2012).*

Table 7.1 also indicates that Chileans are more statist-oriented regarding other social fields, which would support the statement that there is discontent regarding Chile's neoliberal socio-economic model. 61% of them would prefer public transportation to be administrated by a state-owned company rather than current private companies while only 21% of them privatised Chile's biggest state-owned company, the mining company CODELCO. These data are also coherent with what was found in other surveys, since 79% of Chileans support the increase of taxes for those who earn more in a CERC survey executed in 2011.

The fact that Chileans are mostly unsatisfied with a market-oriented economy can also be examined by comparing Chile with other Latin American countries using a survey executed two years before the emergence of the movement.

The evidence from table 7.2 indicates that Chile and Argentina are the Latin American countries whose populations show most discontent concerning market-oriented socio-economic models. Chile is the country where most people (64%) declared that private companies should be more regulated. Moreover, 66% of Chileans are dissatisfied with the privatisation of public utility companies (the second-highest percentage) and 52% of them disagree that the privatisation of state companies has been beneficial to Chile (third-highest percentage), which ratifies previous data that suggested Chilean people are not principally market-oriented but that they are demanding more state control.
Table 7.2 - Perceptions of market economy among Latin American people (+16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Believe that private companies should be more regulated</th>
<th>It is dissatisfied with the privatization of public utility companies</th>
<th>Disagree that the privatization of state companies has been beneficial to the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Republic</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin-America</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile Ranking</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latinobarometro (2009).

Chileans seem therefore dissatisfied with the socio-economic model developed in the country in recent decades. This criticism was also observed in previous chapters that indicated several youths believe Chile's high inequality is generated by a market-oriented model. All these examined data, however, cannot get to the conclusion that one of the movement’s repercussions is to take Chile’s neoliberal model to a terminal disease as Rojas (2012) argues, as that would imply much more relevant transformations that are not currently happening. To this effect, the evidence agrees more with Mayol's (2012a) statement that there is a legitimacy crisis of Chile's market-oriented model. Nevertheless, some repercussions highlighted by Mayol are also difficult to confirm, which would be only testable if more empirical research on this specific issue is done.
7.5 An emerging way of doing politics?

This chapter's last section delves into the apparent emergence of a new way of doing politics among Chilean youths since that has also been argued as being one of the main consequences of the emergence of the movement.

On analysing the qualitative material it is observed that students argue that, despite there being no specific proposal, the movement demonstrated an emerging way of doing politics. Its central idea is that everybody's opinion has to be taken into account through a much more horizontal decision-making system. Students also state that the political organisation of society has to start from small communal spaces to exercise a truly popular sovereignty where they highlight the need to create territorial organisations and strengthen classic organisations such as workers’ and students’ unions, neighbourhood associations and centres for parents.

"We want politics once again to be a means rather than an end. That you really can do politics with the citizenry and not behind its backs and that everyone has at least the power to participate and give opinions. The background of this social movement is that people are clamouring for more spaces for democratic participation where their opinions are really taken into account." Rodrigo Rivera, secondary leader of the CONES during 2011.

"One central thing around participation is to strengthen community spaces such as neighbourhood associations, student unions and centres for parents and grandparents. To make proposals that emerges within a space of dialogue. To promote the horizontality of decision-making processes. To decentralise decision-making processes too." Laura Palma, university student leader of the Universidad de la Serena during 2011.

The fact that students believe participation has to be executed through specific organisations generates the question of what the role of political parties should be within this supposed new way of doing politics. The evidence suggests that students do not automatically discard the role of parties as relevant institutions and that they only disapprove the way current parties are functioning. They recognise that if parties had more horizontal and participative ways of decision-making, they could be attracted to them.\footnote{This finding coincides with previous findings of M-EO’s candidature chapter, as it was shown there that several youths have felt attracted by a new party that intended to apply more democratic and inclusive logics.}
“There is no questioning of the political party as an organizational form. The movement questions current political parties precisely because of their vertical forms of making politics. When the central committee makes all decisions and then they go down to its militants throughout Chile and there is not a space of collective construction.” Nataly Espinoza, university leader of the PUC of Valparaiso during 2011.

“Political parties are stigmatised. So, I think that the political model that we need to have during this time has to do more with a movement. It is about a movement of popular participation. Like the broad social movement in Bolivia. I mean, where all have opinions. Where there is not a group of nominees that chooses for others.” Alfredo Vielma, secondary student leader of the ACES during 2011.

It is also observed that although students do not reject political parties as valid organisational forms, they believe that if new parties emerge or if existing ones are reformed they will find several barriers to becoming legitimised. Students state that in the current context of high levels of disaffection, a better option could be to develop social movements that can incorporate people in much more democratic ways. It is further argued that in today’s scenario, political parties are also not useful, as they do not have the capacity to support current processes of organisation based on territorial organisations with horizontal and flexible logics.

It can be seen therefore that students are not demanding a radical way of doing politics, and that their positions can still be defined as part of a representative democracy. Coinciding with Plotke’s position (1997), they promote representative democracy but including common citizens through effective mechanisms of participation. Urbanity and Warren (2008) also argues that representation is not possible without representatives who are connected with representing through spaces of participation, as this is the only way to reflect common people's interests. This is exactly what students seems to be demanding as they believe that within the current Chilean political model there are no spaces to participate as decisions are made just by few people through a technocratic style of policy-making.

The evidence suggests then that there is a similar political vision among students based on the promotion of more participative mechanisms and the organisation of common citizens. However, this does not mean there have not been differences between them. One relevant expression of that occurred during the 2012 municipal elections as students (specially secondary ones) differed in their opinions of this
process. On the one hand, the ACES promoted abstention with the campaign "I do not lend my vote". It was argued that: "the indifference of politicians and businessman against the people's demands has shown that elections are a mechanism that worsens the quality of life" (yonoprestoelvoto.cl). On the other hand, the CONES reacted with a counter-campaign called "I fight, participate and decide" that promoted people's electoral participation as they believed that youths must be central political figures, which implies to get involved in every necessary space (CONES, 2012).

This divergence evidences that the capitalisation of political discontent is something that does not have a unique recipe since some youths are clearly more willing to support traditional actors than others. This is also shown by the fact that while some student leaders such as Camilo Ballesteros (runner-up in the last mayor election in Estación Central and potential deputy candidate) have developed political careers within traditional parties, other ones, such as Giorgio Jackson, have developed their own political organisations. Jackson, for example, created ‘Revolución Democrática’, an organisation that currently has more than 5000 members and which recently proclaimed him as their deputy candidate.

In summary, it is observed that the 2011 movement also expressed the emergence of a new way of doing politics. The evidence suggests students have clear ideas about how they want politics to be executed as they promote more participation and the empowerment of civil society. In this context, political parties would be only considered as valid representative mechanisms if they worked very differently, which generates a lot of uncertainty about how political discontent could be capitalised since the citizenry is expecting significant changes and not just cosmetic measures. These findings also confirm that Chilean people are looking for new forms of political representation that go beyond parties, which is an important novelty as political representation has been historically monopolised by parties in Chile (Panizza, 2009).

7.6 Conclusions

This chapter's central aim was to go beyond the central objective of this thesis and examine an event where it seemed that previously passive youths started to express their discontent in a much more active way. To this effect, the evidence strongly
suggested that the 2011 movement can be understood as the maturation of feelings of political disaffection. This is because these mobilisations had a much more political character as they questioned Chile's political-economic model and proposed some guidelines for the establishment of a new model. It is also important to highlight, however, that this situation could not have happened if contextual conditions had been different. In fact, the process through which youths became more active was clearly accelerated by the context where the movement emerged. Several conditions such as having a right-wing government, high police repression, previous experiences and the ability to generate innovative forms of mobilisations that expressed broader demands were fundamental to politicising Chilean youths.

The main relevance of this activation is without doubt that it intensified a crisis of political representation among Chilean society, as the political model established during the dictatorship is now being more concretely and powerfully challenged. This fact is recognised by students themselves and some scholars who argue the old model is finishing its cycle and that a new way of doing politics should emerge. Politicians were also found to be aware of the need for political change, although they do not recognise there is a crisis of the Chilean political model. In any case, beyond the diversity of opinions, this chapter's evidence strongly suggested that the model of democracy that Chile inherited from the transition, and that has continued almost intact after more than twenty years, is being severely put into question.

The chief features of this model have been described as a moderate party system, an adscription to privileged political consensus and a technocratic style of policy-making based on the elite’s pacts and a market economy (Moulian, 1998, Garretón, 2007, P.Silva, 2004 and Rindefjall, 2009). These are precisely the attributes that are currently being challenged. Youths are demanding more spaces of participation and an increase of the state role, which goes against the spirit of the current consensual and technocratic model. To this effect, it can be argued that this political model could be living on borrowed time. Its future, however, is very difficult to predict at this time.

Another relevant finding related to the crisis of Chile's political model was that it was possible to observe that this movement also challenged the neoliberal socio-
economic model that Chile has developed since the 1970 and that there are high levels of dissatisfaction concerning central features of this socio-economic model within the whole population. This would imply that Chilean people are not only rejecting the main rules of the current political model but also one of its central substantive principles. Despite these findings, however, the evidence examined was not considered sufficient to conclude that this model is in crisis, as that would require more research.

This does not mean, however, that important sectors of Chilean society are not disappointed with this model since it was observed that many of them are against it as it reproduces high levels of social inequality and since it has not been successful in truly generating opportunities. In fact, it can be argued that education led social protests precisely because it expressed more strongly the failures of a system that promotes social integration through market mechanisms. As Mayol argues (2012b), education was the centre of the social mobility promise, which was demystified when it was evident that it was also the epicentre of an injustice. To this effect, current discontent evidences that Filgueira et al.'s (2011) argument that incorporation crises occur when conservative modernisation projects cannot provide legitimate representation as they fail to deliver policies able to synchronise collective expectations and individual needs would also be suitable for the Chilean case.

In summary, the movement and its subsequent repercussions had important impacts within Chilean society. The direction of future changes is quite difficult to be forecast at the moment, however. One evident thing is that they will be determined by the success of several actors that will try to impose their positions. On one hand, the traditional Chilean political class will certainly try to internally reform the political model in a moderate way in order to safeguard their power positions. On the other hand, mobilised people will try to make more substantive reforms. The success of this last group will only be possible, however, if they are able to capitalise on existing discontent through political organisations willing to compete for formal power positions.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

The present research profoundly analysed youth political disaffection in Chile. Based on plentiful quantitative, qualitative and archive material collected about the relationship between youths’ perceptions of the way of functioning of the Chilean political system and feelings of political disaffection, it was possible to identify the main sources of this phenomenon. Moreover, derived from this same evidence this thesis could also describe some elements of a new way of conceiving politics emerging among Chilean youths. At this point, it is necessary to close this thesis by developing some reflections regarding these findings and their main implications.

In order to accomplish the above, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first consists of a synopsis of the main findings of this study and some suggestions for further research. The second discusses the relation between having high levels of political disaffection and the main features of post-authoritarian Chilean politics. Finally, the third section closes this thesis by relocating Chile within the Latin American region.

A synopsis of the main findings

The central question examined through this dissertation was the contradiction between the high levels of economic and political development of Chile's post-authoritarian democracy and its elevated levels of youth political disaffection. Furthermore, this study was also focused on two specific issues: the understanding of youths’ higher disaffection levels and the examination of a new way of doing politics emerging among young people in Chile. In order to complete these objectives, this thesis utilised a political sociology approach as it examined how certain political phenomena generate disaffection focusing on society-level processes through the analysis of people’s perceptions of their relationships with formal politics.

Based on the examined evidence, the first thing to argue is that the main account for current high levels of youth political disaffection in Chile is a political one. The data suggested that, despite Chile's political and economic achievements of recent decades, Chilean people perceive that the political class has gradually distanced itself from
common citizens. Moreover, the evidence also indicated that this process has been especially strong regarding young people. This distancing was identified by observing that feelings of political disaffection are founded on youths’ negative perceptions of the functioning of the Chilean political system. In relation to that, it was found that there are three type of perceptions from which these feelings emerge: perceptions of lack of representation, feelings of political inefficacy and negative evaluations concerning the internal functioning of political parties. Additionally, these three issues were also found to be intersected by the perception that Chilean politicians are very pragmatic as they regularly prioritise the obtainment of power benefits rather than the representation of common citizens’ interests.

These findings suggest, therefore, that youths are not electorally participating or that they have low confidence in central political institutions since there is a great gap between them and the political system. This was initially observed in chapter three, where the association between youths’ perceptions and the engenderment of political disaffection was directly analysed through quantitative and qualitative material. Afterwards, these findings were deepened through the analysis of several case studies that illustrate some of the situations that generate disaffection.

For example, chapter four showed that the lack of a youth public policy expresses Chilean democracy's representativeness problems and the existence of a political class that excessively prioritise the reproduction of power positions. The analysis of MEO's candidacy in chapter five also deepened previous findings as it showed that reasons for supporting this independent candidacy significantly matched previously observed sources of political disaffection. For instance, it reconfirmed the importance of increasing levels of youths’ descriptive representation within more democratic and participative parties in order to reduce disaffection. Finally, the examination of the 2006 ‘pingüino movement’ in chapter six illustrated how the application of Chile's classic way of doing politics generates disaffection as the way this movement's demands were absorbed accurately expressed problems of political inefficacy and lack of representation within Chilean politics.
With respect to the first specific objective, the examined evidence could also bring relevant contributions. The main finding was that youths are more politically disaffected since the gap between politics and youths is larger than the one between politics and other groups. Moreover, it was also observed that this larger gap is explained by the existence of pragmatic politicians that generate few ties with youths as they cannot electorally profit from them because most youths do not vote. This larger gap was expressed through several aspects, such as problems of the youth public offer, the lack of youth leaderships and having parties whose internal functioning is particularly hostile to the incorporation of young people.

This association was also observed through several chapters. The direct analysis of the relationship between political disaffection and youths’ perceptions of chapter three suggested that young people feel they are one of the most politically and socially excluded groups within Chilean society. Chapter four also contributed to this discussion as it demonstrated that the lack of a youth public policy is one of most relevant examples of this larger gap between youths and politics explained by the existence of a pragmatic political class. Finally, chapter five also showed this situation as it illustrated how a political project guided by young politicians, that used several means closer to this group and that had specific proposals to increase youths’ political inclusiveness, was particularly successful in attracting disaffected youths.

Finally, regarding the second specific objective, the evidence could also bring relevant insights about a supposed emerging way of doing politics among youths. In relation to this issue, chapter two suggested that Chilean youths are not principally apathetic but are just rejecting the current way of functioning of Chilean politics. This finding was confirmed through the analysis of several case studies where some elements of an emerging way of conceiving politics were also observed. The main finding was that youths are demanding the active participation of citizens regarding the implementation of public policies. This finding is particularly relevant since it opposes one of the core elements of Chilean post-authoritarian politics: the technocratisation of decision-making processes (Rind fjall, 2009). To this effect, the evidence suggests that youths believe that it is only through active participation that they can be substantively represented, which indicates that their perceptions coincide
with some theoretical reflections about the existence of a virtuous circle between participation and representation (Plotke, 1997).

The vital role assigned to participation was also observed in chapter four as it showed that youths are demanding authentic mechanisms of participation for the development of youth public policies. Moreover, this was illustrated too in chapters six and seven as the analyses of the two social movements highlighted the importance students give to participation, both regarding the way internal decisions are taken and how they expect to negotiate with authorities.

Other elements of this way of conceiving politics were observed in chapter five as the analysis of the perceptions of ME-O’s supporters indicated that youths would have more political support if politicians were more worried about the representation of people’s interests and if there were younger politicians within more transparent and democratic parties. Finally, some elements of an emerging way of doing politics were also observed in a specific section of chapter seven, which analysed the 2011 movement as the activation of previously passive feelings of political disaffection. This evidence was in accordance with previous findings as it suggested youths are demanding more participation through the strengthening of several social organisations. Another relevant finding was that the rejection of formal politics has led several youths to start looking for new ways of political representation beyond political parties, which can be highlighted as an important novelty of current mobilizations. To this effect, it seems that if parties are to have a future significant role they should drastically change their current logics of functioning.

The uniqueness of present-day social protests concerning their relation with formal politics can be illustrated by comparing these events with other moments of Chilean history marked by high levels of political discontent. For example, the triumph of Salvador Allende in 1970 undoubtedly represented the culmination of feelings of social discontent of important sectors of Chilean society. However, those expressions were quite different from present-day manifestations. While the “Unidad Popular” (UP) project (1970-1973) was guided by two left-wing traditional parties (PS and PC), contemporary mobilizations emerged mostly independently of these institutions and
critical of the whole political class. Moreover, it can be also argued that what is happening nowadays is more ground-breaking than previous events. The UP project came to radicalize a model of development that Chile had been already implementing in the last decades (Salazar and Pinto, 1999), while present mobilizations’ demands are not easily accommodated within existing Chilean political programmes. Whereas Allende followed a member of the Christian Democratic Party who also promoted the strengthening of the state’s role and popular participation (Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970)), current protests call for the reinforcement of the public sector during a right-wing government that succeeded four centre-left governments that largely reproduced a pro-market development model.

It is observed, therefore, that the evidence brought important findings regarding all the questions initially raised by this research. To this effect, it is necessary to highlight the main contributions of these findings to the Chilean debate about the sources of political disaffection. In relation to that, it is possible to argue that the first important contribution was to have empirically tested several monographic descriptions about Chilean democracy. As it was observed during the whole thesis, many of the obtained findings coincided with classic descriptions of post-authoritarian Chilean politics. For example, problems of representativeness and efficacy have been highlighted by several authors, who argue that it is because of Chile's technocratic way of policy-making and its elitist and homogenising manner of doing politics that common citizens do not feel able to produce political impacts or to be substantively represented (Moulian, 1998, Garretón, 2007). In this sense, findings about the association between perceptions of lack of representation and political inefficacy and feelings of political disaffection verified this thesis's central hypothesis.

Other interesting contribution was to have found new elements associated with the engenderment of feelings of hostility towards the political system. The importance of the internal functioning of political parties and perceptions about the prioritisation of power attainment of the Chilean political class have not been highly discussed issues in Chilean literature. Thus, the association of what were named as partyarchic practices of Chilean democracy and the generation of political disaffection can be argued to be one of the main new contributions of this thesis.
Another relevant contribution is related to the reasons that make Chilean youths more disaffected than other groups in Chilean society. This issue had not been highly discussed within Chilean literature and this thesis could also brought relevant findings regarding that by having found, for example, that youths are more disaffected because several *partyarchic* practices had led Chilean politicians to generate even fewer ties with them.

Finally, the last main contribution has to do with having developed a very up-to-date debate about Chilean politics. This study could successfully connect the phenomena under study with the most recent political events since it brought an account of the 2011 mobilisations coherent with the main argument of the thesis. To this effect, to have shown through empirical data that this movement represents the activation of feelings of disaffection and that there is an emerging way of conceiving politics are, without doubt, relevant contributions to the Chilean political debate. Moreover, it can be also considered a relevant contribution to have evidenced in the last chapter that the Chilean population seems to be also calling for a new socio-economic model that can reduce current high levels of inequality, which evidenced that Chileans’ discontentment seems to be not only directed towards the main rules of the political model, but also towards one of its main substantive principles.

One last point to explore in this section is that of recommendations for further research. The first suggestion has to do with the last described contribution. In several chapters of this thesis it was observed that there is a discontent with Chile’s socio-economic model. This was shown, for example, by the fact that there is a criticism towards the technocratic way of policy-making associated with this model, that ME-O was attractive because he proposed a tributary reform that focused on reducing social inequality, that the analysed social movements advocated increasing the role of the state and because it was also observed that there is an objection to a market-oriented model within the whole Chilean population. However, due to the scope of this thesis, the analysed evidence was too general and not sufficient to develop more consistent statements. That is why one recommendation for further research would be to more deeply analyse why Chilean people are discontented with this model and the main implications of that situation.
Other suggestions are to deepen the study of other situations that illustrates that youths are being more politically and socially excluded than other groups. One example could be to research how the internal functioning of political parties includes youths comparing with other groups. Other interesting suggestion could be to more profoundly study the relations between sources of disaffection and SES. The quantitative material of chapter three suggested that some perceptions affect people's political disaffection levels differently, according to their SES. This evidence, however, could not be developed in this thesis with the collected qualitative material. Thus, one relevant suggestion would be to qualitatively study those perceptions distinguishing by the social origin of the subjects of study. Finally, one last recommendation is to keep analysing new youths’ political expressions using the same theoretical frameworks of this thesis in order to have a better comprehension of how youths’ discontentment is to be politically capitalised upon.

**Political disaffection as a consequence of Chile’s post-authoritarian political system**

Having clarified that youth political disaffection is explained by a disconnection between youths and the Chilean political system, it is suitable to discuss why Chilean democracy generated such large gaps. In relation to that question, what the evidence, alongside several scholars’ reflections suggested, is that this situation is principally produced by the particular development of Chile's post-authoritarian political system. That is to say, the evidence indicated that it is mainly based on the central attributes of Chilean politics, such as having a moderate and homogeneous party system, a technocratic style of policy-making and a general political style based on processes of demobilisation and depoliticisation (Rindefjall, 2009, P. Silva, 2004, Camargo, 2007) that there is a large disconnection between Chile’s civil society and its political class. This is the case as almost all types of perceptions associated with political disaffection were found to be the product of specific attributes of Chilean democracy, which would imply therefore that the modification of the Chilean political system could significantly contribute to reducing current high levels of youth political disaffection.

What is intended to be argued through this reflection is that the Chilean case successfully illustrates how certain political designs can generate more legitimacy
problems than others. During the military government and the democratic transition, the Chilean political system suffered drastic reforms that heavily restructured the relationship between politics and society (Garretón, 2004, Huneeus, 2003). This political model has persisted almost intact until nowadays as, for example, Chile presently has the same constitution and electoral system that was established in 1980. This thesis argues therefore that the current disconnection between politics and society is precisely the product of this political model since it was deliberately constructed to generate a political system whose central element is not people's political inclusion, but their dissipation in order to increase the political system’s governance capacity.

Another observation that can be established is that the Chilean political system has not generated a close relationship between common citizens and politics since its main institutions have reduced incentives to do so. For instance, a predictable electoral system clearly reduces politicians’ motivations to be connected with the citizenry and a party law that does not advocate more transparency evidently discourages parties to promote people's participation. It seems therefore that one relevant mechanism through which current political institutions have reduced connections between people and politics is by increasing politicians’ pragmatism levels. One relevant example of that was examined in this thesis by showing that the lack of a youth public policy is principally explained by the existence of politicians that are not worried about that issue. To this effect, it seems accurate to argue that since the return to democracy Chilean politicians have become more pragmatic, which has finally enlarged their detachment from common citizens.

As it was discussed in the introductory chapter, having high levels of political disaffection has several negative implications. Philip (2003) argues that in a consolidated democracy its political institutions have to be seen as legitimate by the public, which implies that people's behaviours and attitudes are supportive of the regime. Moreover, Putnam et al. (2000) state that political processes are damaged when people distrust political authorities and stop using formal channels of participation as that reduces their capacity to be heard. This means therefore that what is currently happening in Chile is clearly not positive and that some measures are
urgent in order to modify this situation. In relation to that, due to the importance that this thesis has given to the role of political institutions regarding the generation of political disaffection, the main recommendations to increase people's political support are evidently given by the reform of the Chilean political system.

Regarding some relevant reforms to be made, the examination of the evidence about an emerging way of conceiving politics bring several suggestions. First, it is clear that having authentic methods of participation through which common citizens can express their needs would reduce disaffection, as youths are aware of the importance of participation to achieving higher levels of representativeness. These would have to be mechanisms that worked together with existing social organisations in conjunction with other democratic methods of consulting, such as local and national plebiscites that make people feel they have a relevant political impact. In the same way, a new party law that established clear mechanisms to define candidates through binding internal elections and that defined specific quotas for youth candidates would clearly contribute to modify youths’ negative visions regarding the functioning of these institutions. All these specific reforms, however, would have to be also delimited within a more democratic context given possibly by the instauration of a new political constitution and a new electoral system. This means, for example, that it is not worth reforming parties or having plebiscites if there is still an electoral system that limits political representation by homogenising ideological differences.

The realisation of some political reforms, however, cannot be seen as a panacea to reducing disaffection. In fact, the cases of Venezuela in the late 1980s (Coppedge, 1994) and Bolivia in the early 1990s (Tanaka and Vera, 2011) indicate that the execution of moderate political reforms in contexts of crisis of representation does not necessarily solve the problem, but that it can even worsen it by empowering disaffected people. For example, by the mid-1980s, Venezuelan politicians realized that political discontent was increasing and decided to reform the political system in order to increase people’s participation. However, it has been argued that these reforms were not effective since traditional politicians did not intend to truly empower people but only to moderately reform the political system in order to create the impression of change with the aim of safeguarding their power (Coppedge, 1994).
What is intended to be argued is that if disaffection is to be reduced in Chile, political reforms have to be significant and promote a genuine inclusion of the citizenry, and that a bunch of rather tepid reforms promoted only within the system would clearly not be enough. For instance, the evidence suggested that the figure of the political party itself is something that Chilean people are not sure to continue supporting even though they are reformed. In fact, it was observed that people have started to look for new forms of representation. This reinforces, therefore, the statement that the Chilean public, and especially its youths, will be very demanding in their evaluations of measures adopted to deal with the current crisis of political representation.

In summary, it is observed that important problems of Chilean politics are generated by the political model elaborated during the military government that has continued practically intact until nowadays. Despite these problems, this model has been vastly acclaimed by some authors as it has produced high levels of political stability and economic development (Angell, 2007, Scully, 1995). Indeed, the discrepancy between these problems and achievements was what originated this research. Thus, after having analysed all the evidence it is necessary to reflect about this issue too.

To this effect, what can be hypothetically suggested is that it seems that, rather than being a contradictory expression of Chile's achievements, the existence of high levels of disaffection might be just the flip-side of the coin of these accomplishments. This political model was intentionally designed to reproduce a political system isolated from common citizens. Hence, it can be argued that Chile's high levels of political stability are precisely given by its capacity to reproduce a political model disconnected from the citizenry as that reduces social pressures and allows the uncritical application of certain policies that principally benefit economic and political elites.

This hypothesis finds its support on Huber and Stephen's (1997) analyses. They argue that democracies are surviving: "because they are deficient, particularly in the dimensions of equal protection of civil and political rights and in the capacity for participation of lower classes" as that reduces elite's threat perceptions by maintaining
the unchallenged position of their projects (1997: 11). These authors highlight the Chilean case, a in Chile: "the capacity of subordinate classes to participate effectively in the political process and make demands for material benefits was weakened, which in turn has kept any potential threat to bourgeois interests extremely low" (Ibid, 12). Roberts (2011) also supports this point as he argues that Chile's social-liberalism approach has helped to maintain political and economic stability, but at the price of abandoning commitments for far-reaching changes. In this sense, it is appreciated that certain social and political deficits that engender disaffection in Chile, rather than being qualified as contradictory outcomes, could be better defined as coherent elements of the same process that has produced some political and economic achievements.

This last reflection allows also the suggestion of a hypothetical consideration of the relationship between stability, growth and inequality. Chilean democracy seems to indicate that both high economic growth rates and elevated levels of social inequality are necessary conditions to develop stable political systems. Following the Chilean case, it appears that elites feel their interests are safeguarded when they secure high growth levels, much of it concentrated at the top of the income scale. Thus, it seems the stability of Chilean democracy is based on the fact that its political and economic elites have prevented a more equitable income distribution, which has been facilitated by the elitist character of the Chilean political system.

This reflection finds support on Przeworski’s statement that social equality is not an inherent element of democracies since in these regimes “Morally based arguments for redistribution or abolishment of property were marginal and ephemeral” (2009: 21). To this effect, the existence of stable democracies with high levels of inequality observed in Chile and in other Latin-American countries seems to be in line with what is expected of democratic regimes. To Przeworski’s argument, however, it could be added that unequal stable democracies seem to coexist also with elitist political systems that prevent people’s empowering that could demand a more equal income distribution.
Relocating Chilean democracy within the Latin-American region

One last thing to be discussed is Chile's relocation regarding the Latin American context. As it has been argued during the thesis, significant political crises have taken place in almost every country in the region. In fact, before the 2011 movement some scholars were discussing why Chile has not had strong protests similar to those one of other countries in the region. In relation to that, Oxhorn (2009) argued that it is difficult for the left to mobilise opposition to neoliberalism in Chile since the country has developed successful policies that have resulted in significant socio-economic gains for the majority. Navia (2009) also supports this argument as he states that Chile shows that when neoliberalism is complemented with some policies that promote social and economic inclusion, the emergence of strong popular challenges is inhibited. Based on all the evidence examined in this thesis, it can be argued that these analyses were proven to be wrong. Without doubts Chile's social improvements have contributed to a more peaceful social environment. However, current high levels of political disaffection and the significant challenge to the neoliberal model led by the 2011 student movement clearly indicate that it cannot be argued that Chile had previously lacked strong protests since people were satisfied.

Based on recent events, therefore, the query changes from asking why Chile has not had protests to debating why Chile took so long to have protests. In relation to that debate, the evidence of this thesis alongside the analyses of other Latin American cases can make a relevant contribution. Chapter seven indicated that current protests are the product of the maturation of feelings of unrest that were capable of being much more actively expressed given some new conditions such as having the right-wing in power or students' better organisational capacities. Going beyond these specific conditions, what can be also hypothetically argued is that this same disconnection between politics and society that generates disaffection is also responsible for the prevention of earlier protests.

This is because Chilean society has been historically used to channel their demands through political parties, as parties are the only valid mechanism of political representation (Paniizza, 2009). In this sense, given the disconnection between the
political system and common citizens, it was clearly a very hard process for Chilean society to organise itself to demand changes almost totally independently from traditional political parties. As Chilean society was used to count with the support of parties to organize and demand substantive changes, it seems reasonable then that it took a long until we could see Chilean society again on the streets since it had to do it without the help of one of its central historical ally.

The Chilean case demonstrates, therefore, how several political factors are decisive in shaping outcomes generated by certain social conditions. This is also shown through other Latin American cases, which can contribute to generating some suppositions about the future of Chilean democracy. For example, Philip and Panizza (2011) argue that the success of radical projects in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are the product of the crisis of a model based on the moderation of political tensions, the retrenchment of the state and the demobilisation of civil society, which would imply that Chile could follow a similar path. To this effect, Venezuela during the 1990s is perhaps the country that has more in common with present-day Chile. Prior to Chavez’ government (before 1998) Venezuela had a stable democracy within a favourable economic situation and the political system was dominated by two similar coalitions that were negatively perceived by many less advantaged groups as they had excluded them from the country’s social development (Coppedge, 1994).

These similarities, however, do not necessarily indicate that there are high odds of having a “Chilean Chavez” soon in Chile. Despite some correspondences, there are also relevant differences. Living conditions are significantly better in Chile now than in Venezuela in the 1990s. Moreover, the current Chilean political system is much more institutionalized as a result of the 1980 constitution, which clearly reduces the chances of having an anti-system candidate able to capitalize on political discontent.

The evidence of other countries also supports the statement that it is difficult to believe that Chile will follow the Venezuelan path. Political crisis in the region has also led to the emergence of other quite different projects, such as when Fujimori in Peru took advantage of a weakened and unrepresentative political class in order to implement an authoritarian right-wing regime (Levitsky, 1999). Moreover, the
Uruguayan case, a country that has also been compared to Chile, shows that discontent can be controlled through institutional channels when the elite is renovated, as occurred with the emergence of Frente Amplio (Chasquetti and Buquet, 2004).

It can be observed therefore that other Latin American countries also demonstrate the relevance of certain political factors regarding the resolution of political crisis as similar social situations have produced very different outcomes. Chile has similarities with the cases where more radical projects emerged since important parts of society are rejecting a similar political and economic model. However, Chile also shares with Uruguay the fact of having one of the most stable democracies of the region, which suggests that Chile could have the capacity to solve this crisis internally. To this effect, it is clear that the fate of Chilean politics is somewhat very difficult to predict at this time, as it will depend on numerous political factors and the behaviour of several actors in a process that is currently taking place. The only clear thing is that, whatever these changes are, if they are to reduce disaffection they should clearly prioritise the inclusion of youths as they are the ones leading expressions of discontent, since they are one of the most politically and socially excluded sectors of Chilean society.
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Appendix 1: Regression Models including significant associations and alternative explanations

a) Models done with data from the Latinobarómetro Survey:

**Electoral Participation:**

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Participation in Chilean Youth (18-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit of a few Powerful Interests</td>
<td>5.951</td>
<td>384.171</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most effective way to change things</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protest_Movements</td>
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<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.404</td>
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<td>Impossible to Change</td>
<td>-1.915</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>&lt;0.000*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Means</td>
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<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.015**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Orientations</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.139</td>
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<td>Mixed</td>
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<td>1.684</td>
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<td>1.005</td>
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<td>-3.200</td>
<td>0.041</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.050**</td>
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<td>1.373</td>
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**Confidence in Political Parties**

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in Political Parties in Chilean Youth (18-29)

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</table>

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109 The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you voted or not in the last presidential election where 1 means that you voted and 0 that you didn’t vote.

110 For all the presented p values * means that the association is significant at the 99% level of confidence, ** means that the association is significant at the 95% level of confidence and *** means that the association is significant at the 90% level of confidence.

111 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in political parties and 0 that you don’t have confidence.
**Confidence in the Congress**

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in the Congress in Chilean Youth (18-29)

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**Democracy Support**

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Democracy Support in Chilean Youth (18-29)

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<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible to Change</td>
<td>-1.219</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>&lt;0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Means</td>
<td>-1.036</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.038**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Orientations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>1.502</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>1.597</td>
<td>0.092***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>0.027**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.021</td>
<td>20.515</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

112 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.

113 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime’s preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.
b) Models done with data from the Auditoria a la Democracia Survey:

Electoral Registration

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Registration in Chilean Youth (18-29)\textsuperscript{114}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-0.934</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>&lt;0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy of Voting</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>2.349</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (PP)</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>1.674</td>
<td>0.048**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>1.088</td>
<td>0.566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-1.587</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>&lt;0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>1.165</td>
<td>&lt;0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>0.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidence in Political Parties

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in Political Parties in Chilean Youth (18-29)\textsuperscript{115}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-1.071</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>&lt;0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a real public policy choice (PP)</td>
<td>-0.521</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>2.395</td>
<td>10.973</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of interests (Congress)</td>
<td>-0.812</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>-0.700</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (PP)</td>
<td>-0.392</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>1.124</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>2.548</td>
<td>12.779</td>
<td>0.040**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.183</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.155</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{114} The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you are registered or not to vote where 1 means that you are registered and 0 that you are not registered.

\textsuperscript{115} The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.
Confidence in the Congress

**Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in the Congress in Chilean Youth (18-29)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-0.459</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of interests (Congress)</td>
<td>-0.558</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a real public policy choice (PP)</td>
<td>-0.323</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.050**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>1.875</td>
<td>6.523</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Indifference</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>-0.581</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.040**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (PP)</td>
<td>-0.331</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>0.856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

| SES                               | 1.833 | 6.255 | 0.050***|
| Age                               | -0.042 | 0.958 | 0.274   |
| Gender                            | 0.394 | 1.484 | 0.151   |
| Constant                          | -1.065 | 0.345 | 0.709   |

Democracy Support

**Binary Logistic Regression Model for Democracy Support in Chilean Youth (18-29)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (PP)</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>1.466</td>
<td>0.052***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Indifference</td>
<td>-1.079</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.037**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Government Indifference</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>1.379</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

| SES                               | -1.537 | 0.215 | 0.025** |
| Age                               | -0.054 | 0.948 | 0.099***|
| Gender                            | -0.299 | 0.741 | 0.185   |
| Constant                          | 6.200  | 492.927 | 0.003  |

---

116 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.

117 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime’s preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.
Appendix 2: Regression Models with only significant associations

b) Models with data from the Latinobarómetro Survey:

**Electoral Participation**

**Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Participation in Chilean Youth (18-29)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit of a few Powerful Interests</td>
<td>6.252</td>
<td>519.155</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most effective way to change things</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest_Movements</td>
<td>-0.603</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible to Change</td>
<td>-2.287</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Means</td>
<td>-2.379</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Benefit of a few Powerful Interests</td>
<td>-3.206</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>1.875</td>
<td>6.522</td>
<td>0.021*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>1.290</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>1.575</td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.554</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Confidence in Political Parties**

**Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in Political Parties in Chilean Youth (18-29)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit of a few Powerful Interests</td>
<td>-0.763</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most effective way to change things</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest_Movements</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.952</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible to Change</td>
<td>-1.157</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.028**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Means</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>0.888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-1.175</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>1.095</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>1.234</td>
<td>0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.982</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

118 The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you voted or not in the last presidential election where 1 means that you voted and 0 that you didn’t vote.

119 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in political parties and 0 that you don’t have confidence.
Confidence in the Congress

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in the Congress in Chilean Youth (18-29)\textsuperscript{120}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit of a few Powerful Interests</td>
<td>3.976</td>
<td>53.291</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most effective way to change things</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest_Movements</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>1.106</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible to Change</td>
<td>-1.117</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Means</td>
<td>-0.897</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.071**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Benefit of a few Powerful Interests</td>
<td>-2.445</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>1.157</td>
<td>3.180</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td>0.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.100</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Democracy Support

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Democracy Support in Chilean Youth (18-29)\textsuperscript{121}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most effective way to change things</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest_Movements</td>
<td>-0.758</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible to Change</td>
<td>-1.361</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>&lt; 0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Means</td>
<td>-1.153</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.952</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.292</td>
<td>0.747</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.740</td>
<td>42.081</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Models with data from the Auditoria a la Democracia Survey:

Electoral Registration

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Registration in Chilean Youth (18-29)\textsuperscript{122}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy of Voting</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>2.298</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-0.807</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-1.457</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>&lt; 0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>1.168</td>
<td>&lt; 0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>1.088</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>1.729</td>
<td>0.692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{120} The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.

\textsuperscript{121} The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime’s preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.

\textsuperscript{122} The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you are registered or not to vote where 1 means that you are registered and 0 that you are not registered.
**Confidence in Political Parties**

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in Political Parties in Chilean Youth (18-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-1.024</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>&lt;0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of interests (Congress)</td>
<td>-0.931</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>&lt;0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a real public policy choice (PP)</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>2.863</td>
<td>17.511</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>-0.932</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Confidence in the Congress**

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in the Congress in Chilean Youth (18-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-0.503</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of interests (Congress)</td>
<td>-0.514</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a real public policy choice (PP)</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>1.771</td>
<td>5.880</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Indifference</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
<td>0.779</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Activism Encouragement (PP)</td>
<td>-0.521</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Democracy Support**

Binary Logistic Regression Model for Democracy Support in Chilean Youth (18-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (PP)</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>0.036**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Indifference</td>
<td>-1.183</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES x Government Indifference</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>1.434</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

| SES | 3.225  | 25.147 | 0.005*  |
| Age | 0.066  | 1.068  | 0.163   |
| Gender | -0.254 | 0.776  | 0.463   |
| Constant | -5.703 | 0.003  | 0.094   |

| SES | 1.615  | 5.028  | 0.079*** |
| Age | -0.021 | 0.980  | 0.583   |
| Gender | 0.350  | 1.419  | 0.188   |
| Constant | -1.844 | 0.158  | 0.502   |

| SES | -1.661 | 0.190  | 0.015** |
| Age | -0.050 | 0.951  | 0.122   |
| Gender | -0.282 | 0.755  | 0.211   |
| Constant | 6.038  | 419.092| 0.003   |

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123 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.

124 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.

125 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime’s preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.