GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE AND THE POLITICS OF COMPETITIVENESS

By

Amparo Adelaida Tarazona Vento

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University College London
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I, Amparo Adelaida Tarazona Vento confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
ABSTRACT

This research examines the new urban policy that, in the last decades, has put emphasis on urban regeneration based on urban renewal and city marketing, particularly through the use of events and mega projects by global star architects. Through the case study of Valencia (Spain), which, in the last years, has become a good example of an entrepreneurial city, the study sets out to, first, discover the implications of the new urban policy for the built environment, planning practices and democratic governance, second, analyse the economic, political, social and cultural factors that have led to the use of such urban policy and, third, understand the actual processes and actors involved in it.

Although emblematic projects are expected to generate economic activity and employment, this research has shown that – given their very limited effectiveness for economic and social regeneration and their inequality in the distribution of benefits – the main reasons for the implementation of these projects are related to the economic, political and professional interests of different groups and, to ideational reasons, such as the ‘politics of self-esteem’. The case of Valencia has particularly shown the significance of a hegemonic project such as the creation of a new regional state from a political, economic and identity viewpoints.

It has also highlighted the crucial role in the implementation of the urban policy played by a boosterist urban regime, brought together and kept in place by the local and regional governments. Also, the involvement of and, relationship between local and global actors, particularly in processes of mediation and translation of interests.

Finally, it has provided evidence of how mega projects and events have become a conduit of state restructuring and neoliberal globalisation by fostering a mode of governance characterized by the privatisation of decision making and the lack of transparency and democratic control.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and problem statement

In the last decades it has been possible to observe urban changes in big and small cities throughout the Western World, from suburbanisation processes that have expanded the peripheries of the cities - often creating monotonous residential landscapes - to the construction of mega projects with the aim of economically regenerating urban areas or, the gentrification of city centres and old blue-collar neighbourhoods, which for Smith (2002:443) have become ‘an increasingly unassailable capital accumulation strategy for competing urban economies’.

Urban regeneration through inter-urban competitive strategies has greatly contributed to one of the most publicised phenomena, the proliferation of iconic buildings (Jencks, 2006; Sklair, 2005, 2006a, 2006b). Architectural icons - which according to Sklair (2006b:25) are defined by a ‘unique combination of fame with symbolism and aesthetic quality’ - include corporate and commercial buildings. For instance, Foster’s Swiss Re (Gherkin) in London or, the Future Systems building for Selfridges in Birmingham easily spring to mind. However, lured by regeneration money, global architects have sharpened their weapons of seduction to convince politicians that their city needs an icon signed by them, while politicians have gladly succumbed to the promises of tourism and economic affluence for their cities made by the gurus of the architectural profession. Mitterrand’s grand projets in 1990s Paris are a notable example but the list of initiatives is long, including - to mention just a few – buildings such as Rem Koolhaas’ Casa da Musica in Porto, The National Museum of the XXI Century Arts (MAXXI) by Zaha Hadid in Rome, Herzog and De Meuron’s Tate Modern in London or The Jewish Museum in Berlin by Daniel Libeskind.

Indeed, the most visible change is the emergence of emblematic architectural projects that have transformed urban landscapes but, if we observe more attentively, it is also possible to perceive a change in the discourse of politicians and urban governors. For them these iconic projects connect cities to so-called “global flows” and are the key to economic regeneration in a globalised era that has intensified competitiveness.

Urban change - particularly in relationship to flagship projects - has been studied and explained from different, and interrelated, perspectives. Indeed, these processes of change are linked to wider societal changes. On the one hand, post-modern values that emphasise the moral superiority of individual choice in contrast to collective decision-making have transformed consumption in the differentiating element that configures social identity. In this way, consumption has lost the integrating and equalising role that it had during fordism and has caused the disintegration of citizenship in groups of consumers.

The new technologies have contributed to such fragmentation and polarisation processes (Graham and Marvin, 2001). The new technologies, together with the new forms of production and consumption, have changed the perceived and real ways in which time and space are experienced. Thus, as explained by
Harvey (1993), the uneven layout of networked infrastructures causes a time-space compression that breaks down temporal and spatial barriers in order to underpin the capital accumulation of the favoured classes whilst segregates less favoured urban areas and social groups.

In the same way, planning has adapted to the new global economic climate by focusing, first, on the elaboration of large scale urban projects – faced by the difficulty of producing comprehensive urban plans in the fragmented city – and, second, on the land market management needed to implement those projects. It could be argued that urban planning is facing a ‘paradigm crisis’ whilst the market has taken over (Ezquiaga, 1998; Roch, 2001; Benabent, 2001; Sánchez, 2003). According to Portas (2003), this fact has effected a mutation, probably irreversible, that has led from the city as traditionally known to a continuum of undefined urbanised land. This territorial model has been supported by various factors, such as, the convergent changes in social values and in the role of the state and the development of the informational technologies (Portas 2003).

Looking specifically into the emergence of the use of ‘global architecture’ as a regeneration strategy, academics have generally resorted to notions such as globalisation and urban restructuring (Jessop, 2000; Brenner, 1999), inter-city competition and the “rise of the entrepreneurial city” (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Leitner and Sheppard, 2002) and, city marketing (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Hall, 1998; Crilley, 1993; Miles, 2007), iconic architecture (Sklair, 2005, 2006), the Transnational Capitalist Class and the Global Intelligence Corps (Olds, 1996; Sklair, 2005; Ward, 2005). They have contended that, on the one hand cities are being restructured to become new centres of accumulation; on the other hand they are trying to become important as a place of governance of the global. In this way, the economic and political scalar restructuring associated to globalisation processes has been considered to put cities and cities’ economies in the centre of attention. It has been argued that, the changes in the role of the state due to globalisation and decentralisation have fostered a tendency towards political fragmentation (Lefèvre, 2003). States have lost power and cities and regions, which are more flexible in adapting to the changing conditions of markets, technology and culture, have become the main economical actors (Castells and Hall, 1994) and compete as such in the marketplace.

At the same time, such global competition has provoked physical, social and economic fragmentation within the cities. This is mainly due to the increasingly common practice of selecting certain areas of the metropolis to develop strategic projects directed to ‘brand’ the city whilst other areas are abandoned and social and geographical cross-subsidies withdrawn. In this way, the same logics of late capitalism are used, that is to say, picking out the most profitable consumers and causing the less lucrative ones to drop out.

In order to increase their competitive edge, cities have oriented their strategies beyond the national boundaries, trying to attract new forms of investment within the city (in competition with other cities). This competitive response in cities that has made some authors call them entrepreneurial cities. Not
CHAPTER 1

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surprisingly, place promotion has become one of the main activities of entrepreneurial cities and iconic architecture has proved a very powerful advertising tool.

For some (Sklair, 2005; Olds, 1996), the agents of change who are most responsible for the promotion of iconic architecture as a tool for urban revitalisation, are the transnational capitalist class – a group of elite professionals with globally linked economic interests which includes a very small number of architects that are designing iconic architecture around the world, which Olds (1996) has called the Global Intelligence Corps. However, it has been recognised that, the transnational capitalist class has both globalising and localising agendas and globalising processes are in part driven and amplified by bottom-up processes. This is reflected in the vigorously negotiated and contested economic politics of place and the politics of identity.

In Spain, urban planners agree that Spanish cities, or city-regions, are going through similar processes of fragmentation and polarisation to those commented for a more general case (Ferrer, 2005). Spanish cities are affected, on the one hand, by the new economic dynamics and social demands that force them to undergo internal restructuring and, on the other hand, by competitiveness, both of which have arisen the politicians’ interest in urban mega-projects designed by ‘star’ architects. In Moix’s (2010:9) words,

‘Between the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st Centuries, Spain believed in miracles. Specifically in the miracles that star architects could perform. It was enough that Bilbao built the Guggenheim and, that thanks to it the city jumped from postindustrial greyness to the brightness of a service economy, for other regions, cities and towns to place a part of their hopes for the future in the hands of the most famous architects’.

Thus, for example, Barcelona –with an already long tradition in hiring global architects – launched an event called the international Forum of Cultures 2004 which included the remodeling of a section of the city with buildings such as the Forum building, a landmark by Herzog and de Meuron. The Galician regional government initiated the City of Culture by Peter Eisenman, Córboba a convention centre by Rem Koolhas and, Zaragoza held the international exposition Expo 2008, which gathered buildings designed by different prestigious architects including the symbol of the event, a pavilion by Zaha Hadid.

In Valencia, politicians’ bedazzlement by global architecture and the glamour of international events has gone as far as to be one of the main causes of the bankruptcy of the regional government. In a newspaper article on the New York times entitled ‘First a Building Spree, Now the Ax Is Falling’ (Carvajal and Minder, 8 July 2012), commenting on the regional government’s financial difficulties due to the investment on mega-projects, the initiatives to blame were described;

Valencia’s other investments included a harbour for superyachts, an opera house styled like the one in Sydney, Australia, a futuristic science museum, the biggest aquarium in Europe and a sail-shaped bridge, not to mention an airport that never had a single arrival or departure. It also attracted extravagant events like the America’s Cup and Formula One racing.
But, the most paradigmatic case is global architect Santiago Calatrava’s seduction of Valencia’s local and regional governors to produce a ‘monoculture of Calatrava’ in the city (Moix, 2010:37). As member of parliament of the regional government Blanco states referring to the city of Arts and Sciences by Calatrava, the project represents ‘the symbol of an epoch, of the irresponsibility and delusions of grandeur of the governors who have ruined us as a people and left the regional government on the verge of bankruptcy’ (Arabí, 5 May 2012).

It is within this context that my research can be situated. Therefore, my topic is the use of global architecture as the key strategy for addressing urban economic and social decline. More specifically, the object of the research is the new urban policy that, in the last decades, has put emphasis on urban regeneration based on urban renewal, particularly through the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects. Emblematic projects are expected to generate economic activity and employment but, their main objective is to improve the tax basis by increasing the value of urban land. However, extensive empirical evidence (Barnekov, Boyle and Roch, 1988; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Holcomb, 1993; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998) has demonstrated that not only have they had very limited effectiveness for economic regeneration but can have negative effects such as the draining away of public funds.

In short, in spite of the existing evidence of their ineffectiveness and negative social and environmental impacts spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration are being widely used in different contexts. This suggests that the motives behind urban regeneration deserve closer inspection.

1.2 Purpose and objectives of the research

The object of this thesis is the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration. The main aims are to examine the different economic, political, social and cultural factors that have led to the use of such regeneration strategy, to understand the actual processes and actors involved in it and the implications for the built environment and for planning practices.

The specific objectives of the research are to

a) find out the implications for planning practices and for the shaping of the city’s physical form of the urban policy that uses spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration, (What)

b) conceptualise and identify the causes of the formulation of such urban policy and, (Why)

c) identify and analyse the economic and political actors and processes at different scales and their interplay involved in the formulation and enactment of such urban policy. (How)
The three main research questions entail the investigation of several issues linked to them.

To answer the question about the implications of the urban policy (the what type question), the physical, economic, social and political returns and impacts of the mega-projects need to be analysed, but also the governance changes that they bring about, particularly through the introduction of new delivery bodies.

To answer the question about the causes of the urban policy (the why type question) it is necessary to investigate several issues. First, the interests of various groups need to be analysed. The interests to consider are economic but also of other types, for instance professional interests – in the case of architects – or political and electoral interests – in the case of politicians. Also the accumulation strategies prioritised and the role of the state in strategy-making, financing, and bringing together the interests of different groups need to be studied. Finally, ideational factors such as how different ways of interpreting the world influence the formulation of the urban policy need to be taken into consideration.

To answer the question about the processes and actors involved in the enactment of the urban policy (the how type question) the influence of different global and local actors and the alliances they form need to be studied. Also, which issues generate agreement or dissent and, how and with the aid of which instruments consensus over the urban policy is generated need to be considered.

1.3 Valencia as a case study

My study is focused on the city of Valencia in Spain, a city which has become in the last years a good example of an entrepreneurial city that has been restructuring very rapidly. Valencia, with approximately 800,000 inhabitants, is the third biggest city in Spain and, its metropolitan area is home for 1,400,000 people. It is situated at approximately the same distance from Madrid and Barcelona and within the so-called European Mediterranean Arch that spans approximately from Cadiz to Naples. Economically is the natural port of Madrid and culturally has, through history, been second to Barcelona in the Catalan speaking sphere. Also, like Barcelona, it was an important industrial city that after deindustrialisation had to find its place in the Spanish and European system of cities and create a new identity. On the other hand, in 1982, some years after Franco’s death, a new State of the Autonomies was instated in Spain. Valencia, then, became the capital city of the Valencian Autonomous Community and took an administrative function as seat of the regional government.

Thus, being secondary to both Barcelona and Madrid, Valencia’s identity has had to be negotiated in between the need for being “independent” from central Spain but, at the same time, differentiating from Barcelona, the hegemonic centre of “Catalan” culture. Moreover, Valencia’s hierarchy in Spain has lead it to specialise and take other functions, in this case, the city’s only one function at European level is tourism, although it holds important commercial fairs (for instance one of the three most important
furniture fairs in Europe) and has a European stock market (Rozemblat, 2003). See a map situating the city and its region within Spain in figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1 Valencia city and region in Spain**

Source: Adapted from a map by Daniel Dalet

Indeed, political decentralisation and cultural regionalism are crucial to understand the context for urban and economic development in Valencia. The “Generalitat Valenciana” is the regional government of the Valencian Autonomous Community and its president is the head of the regional government. The President of the “Generalitat Valenciana” is elected by the Valencian parliament and has the power to elect the “consellers” who take charge of the different areas of the regional government that include education, cultural and language policy, health, tourism promotion, environmental regulation and land use planning. Therefore, the regional government has exclusive legislative authority over regional and urban planning and the local authorities are responsible for urban planning practice in the municipality, from design to the implementation phase (Trapero, 1999).

In the last two decades, pursuing a distinct political project the local and regional governments of Valencia have worked together with the objective of connecting the city to the global flows of capital and knowledge, and entering the global tourist circuit as clearly spelled out in the strategic plan (CeyD, 2006). They have tried to achieve their goal through large public investments in infrastructure, prestige projects and the organisation of international events, in order to re-image the city and make it attractive to investors.
and tourists, and which have lead the Valencian government to be one of the most indebted in Spain. The initiatives include, for instance, the City of Arts and Sciences, the International Convention Centre, the regeneration of the historic centre and the restructuring of the port and surrounding areas to host the America’s Cup and Formula One competitions. Also infrastructural development that includes the extension of the airport, the high-speed train connecting with Madrid and the improvement of the motorway network, are part of the territorial project.

Valencia’s peculiarity is that the same strategy of “using architecture to boost culture, leisure and business.” (Torres, 2005, p. 143) has been used over time across different political colours in both the regional and local governments. This fact points out to urban regime theory (Stone, 1989, 1993; Mossberger, 2001) since, for regimes to be considered as such, there must be long-term cooperation. Therefore, in Valencia’s case, where there is durability of the strategy over the electoral cycle, regime theory seems to offer a useful theoretical instrument of analysis. The different political periods run as follows. The first regional president to be elected in 1982 was Joan Lerma from the socialist party (PSPV-PSOE) and was in office until 1995 when the conservative party (PP) won the elections. Meanwhile, locally the socialist party governed from 1979 (the first democratic municipal elections after Franco) to 1991 when Rita Barberá from the conservative party, and who is still in office, was elected.

The boosterist strategy can be considered to have been started by the socialist regional government in the 1980’s with projects such as the IVAM (Valencian Institute of Modern Art), a museum created in 1986 which has entered the international circuits of modern art, and continued by the conservative party in 1995, when they took over the ongoing project of the City of Sciences, conceived by Lerma in 1989. In fact, there has been some controversy over whether the socialists or the conservatives are to take credit for the project. Thus, the architecture and urban design produced have been aimed to the activation of the global flows. To that effect, town planning, accused of being inflexible, slow and inefficient, has been substituted by ‘strategic planning’ although with little or ineffective citizen participation.

Also urban planning legislation has supported the developist strategies. In 1994, the LRAU, a new Act that regulated urban planning activity in the Valencian Autonomous Community, was approved. The LRAU, with the introduction of the “urbanising agent” has been considered to be the most innovative contribution to contemporary Spanish urbanism and the one which has had the most evident effects on the patterns of urbanisation (Olmos, 2005; Díaz, 2006). Indeed it has been very influential as shown by the fact that it has been used as a model by many other regional governments and their respective new urbanism laws, for instance, Castilla la Mancha and la Rioja in 1998, Castilla-León in 1999, and, Canarias, Murcia and Madrid in 2001 (Domínguez, 2002).

The new law favoured the involvement of the private initiative in the planning and development processes through the figure of the “urbanising agent” defined as a private agent that manages a public service that is the layout and preparation of the land for development, and is controlled by the local authority. The
landowners of the land being prepared for development must pay the urbanising agent either in land or in money. In this way, the urbanising agents have accumulated immense quantities of land in the last years.

The LRAU, together with the liberalising Spanish 1998 Act that regulates land ownership and classification, expedited the availability of urban land, causing an enormous increase in development activity. For instance, in the case of the city of Valencia Miguel Domínguez (2002), the responsible for urbanism in the local authority, boasted that, from 1994 to 2002, more than 4,450,000 square metres of urban land had been or were being laid out and prepared for city development and 29,722 new dwellings built or being built although, according to Simó (2004), there were more than 60,000 empty dwellings in the city. In 2005, the Valencian government urged by the European Commission, substituted the LRAU, which did not respect European Directives in public contracting, by the LUV (Ley Urbanística Valenciana).

On the other hand, the political project of construction of a new identity that involves the re-imaging of Valencia through the use of global architecture has been carried out unfailingly although being contested by grassroots movements. Furthermore, politicians have allied with finance and real estate interest groups to launch city marketing operations directed not only to investors but to citizens, too. In fact, they have tried to win votes by hiring global star architects to legitimate their projects and by calling on patriotic feelings of pride.

Therefore, it could be argued that, in most cases, iconic architecture and infrastructural development, supported by regulatory practices, have gone hand in hand with real estate speculation and financial interests, contributing to the configuration of Valencia as a diffuse, fragmented and polarised city-region and, consequently, to its perverse environmental and social effects.

To conclude, there are many reasons why the Valencian case is interesting from an academic viewpoint. First, Valencia is unique in terms of long standing and continuous emphasis on global architecture. There are several flagship projects not just a few which indicates the significance for the case. Second, the strategy of using emblematic architecture has been used by different political parties and has remained the same over time and across different levels of government. As Calatrava puts it when explaining one of Valencia’s key strategic projects

“The importance of the City of Arts and Sciences is that during the fifteen years during which work has progressed, the political parties in power have changed, but all have recognized the importance of this project. This is the reason for it to continue independent of politics. The City of Arts and Sciences is the achievement of a democracy and celebrates democracy.” (Calatrava in Torres, 2005:143)

Third, it offers an excellent example of Regionalism and construction of local identity in the context of globalisation and political re-scaling (Prytherch, 2005). In this sense it can be compared to Madrid where there is not such impelling need for building a regional identity and to Barcelona where the construction of
a regional identity has encountered more political stability. Commenting on the re-territorialisation of the European political economy Prytherch (2003), claims that

“No city demonstrates the culturally complex and politically contested dimensions of urban change more clearly than Valencia. For the kind of state-led urbanization typified by the City of Arts and Sciences must come at the expense of some of the richest farmlands in Europe, which surround the city of Valencia on nearly every side.” (Prytherch, 2003, p.426)

Finally, it has not only imported models but produced them too, as other Spanish regions have used the Valencian Urbanism Act (LRAU) as a model for their own laws. After full competencies on urbanism and town planning were transferred to the Autonomous Communities, the regional governments endeavoured to elaborate their own urbanism laws. The LRAU, approved by the Valencian regional government in 1994, was considered the first regional law to introduce important innovations with regard to the previous Spanish law and, therefore, other Autonomous Communities took it as a model for their own regulations.

1.4 The flagship projects

This study describes Valencia’s urban policy to then analyse three flagship developments in depth. The research has tried to unearth processes and to determine the relative importance of the actors to see how those processes can be challenged. Therefore, my data has needed to be comprehensive in the range of actors to investigate rather than in the number of projects. Given that the different projects are subject to the same general economic and political trends, they were expected to show similarities in processes under similar conditions. The selected projects are of different kinds but all of them have the same approach, the use of emblematic architecture and urban design to achieve urban revitalisation and economic growth. I am not trying to evaluate a particular strategy (culture-led, property-led, creative quarters...) but to analyse the common ‘way of doing’ they have. The studied flagship projects are The City of Arts and Sciences, the projects linked to the celebration of the America’s Cup sailing competition in 2007 and, a housing development called Sociopolis. Table 1.1 summarises the main background data of the three projects.

The City of Arts and Sciences is a prestige cultural project entirely paid for by the regional government. The 350,000 square metres complex includes a planetarium, a science museum, a museum of oceanography, an opera theatre and the Agora, a multifunctional space. It was presented in 1989 by the first president of the regional government some years after Valencia became capital city of the Valencian Autonomous Community. The project was considered part of the “modernisation” of the city, the institutions and even “the economy” after the dictatorship, which both local and regional governments saw as their mission. Also, it was seen as a strategy to market Valencia.

The complex has taken a long time to be completed. The first building to be finished was the planetarium in 1998, followed by the museum of science and car park in 2000. The museum of oceanography was
open in 2003, the opera theatre in 2005, and the last building - the Agora – in 2009. During that period there have been 4 different regional presidents, all of them committed to the project.

Table 1.1 Background table of the projects under study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City of Arts and Sciences</th>
<th>America’s Cup (Infrastructural work)</th>
<th>Sociopolis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start year</strong></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year of completion</strong></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functions</strong></td>
<td>Cultural complex including: planetarium, science museum, museum of oceanography, opera theatre and multifunctional building</td>
<td>Infrastructure for the sailing competition including: a new canal to communicate the inner harbour with the open sea, the docking of mega yachts, the team bases, urban design of the inner harbour and iconic building for guests of teams and sponsors</td>
<td>Residential development including approximately 3,000 dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>Urban position: Riverbed East of the city</td>
<td>Urban location: inner harbour of port of Valencia</td>
<td>Southern periphery of Valencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land area</strong></td>
<td>350,000 m²</td>
<td>330,000 m²</td>
<td>350,000 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated final cost</strong></td>
<td>1,300 million euro</td>
<td>450 million euro</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investors</strong></td>
<td>Valencian regional government</td>
<td>Consortium Valencia 2007, through a credit given by the Official Institute of Credit (ICO)</td>
<td>Valencian regional government through the Valencian Institute of housing (IVVSA) and private developers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

On the other hand, the celebration of the America’s Cup was the source of an extensive urban transformation, particularly in the harbour area. Valencia was designated in 2003 as a venue for the 2007 America’s Cup. The designation, based on just a few sketches of the port, was considered to be a demonstration of Valencia’s entrepreneurialism. As Fernández Galiano explains

“on the one hand, it [the designation] reflects the ambition, dynamism and determination of Spain’s third city, able to compete successfully in the demanding urban leagues for the organization of planetary events; on the other, it provides an alibi to boost its large projects of urban renewal and to show the world its accomplishments.” (Fernández-Galiano, 2005:3).

When Valencia was elected to hold the 32nd America’s Cup, the applicable General Plan of 1988 did not include any detailed project for the seafront (Olmos, 2005). Immediately afterwards many projects were proposed for the redesign of the seafront as well as “embellishing projects” for the city such as the renewal
of the Avenida del Puerto (Olmos, 2005). Also the transport network was to be improved. The airport and
the underground network were extended while the central government was urged to speed up the arrival of
the high speed train from Madrid (Fernández-Galiano, 2005).

However, the main focus of the America’s Cup was the inner harbour and, therefore, in 2004, the
“Consorcio Valencia 2007” approved an investment plan of 444 million Euros for the works to be
conducted in the area, including the construction of a new canal that would communicate the inner
harbour with the open sea, in preparation of the event (Boira, 2007). The decision of opening the canal
was highly controversial because it was thought to be the first step towards the extension of the freight
port (Olmos, 2005) which would have evil effects on the neighbouring beaches and natural spaces (Boira,
2007).

The other key project was the Foredeck, a representative building that was commissioned to David
Chipperfield and Fermín Vázquez as a result of an international competition. The Foredeck, renamed
“Veles e Vents”, has won the LEAF (Leading European Architects Forum for intelligent design) award
and has been short listed in the European Award of Contemporary Architecture (Boira, 2007).

But, the America’s Cup was to trigger more development. In 2004 Jean Nouvel presented “Valencia
Litoral” a project for the inner harbour and a residential development in the neighbouring areas which was
the first to consider the sailing event (Olmos, 2005). The project did not go forward but, in 2006, the
consortium organized an international ideas competition, presented in the Venetian Biennale, for the inner
harbour, new marina and a section - of nearly 340,000 square metres – of the Grao, an urban quarter
located by the inner harbour (PAI del Grao). The site comprised a total of 1.3 million square metres of
land and 565,000 square metres of water. The first prize ex-aequo was given to the German office GMP
International Architects and to the joint proposal of Jean Nouvel and José María Tomás (Boira, 2007).

In 2007, it was decided that, the following year, the Formula One competition would go to Valencia in an
urban circuit that runs around the inner harbour and into the Grao. The redevelopment of the Grao was
adapted to the needs of the competition.

Finally, Sociopolis is a new urban quarter of 350,000 square metres located by the river to the South of the
city. It is an initiative of the Regional government, through the “Instituto Valenciano de la Vivienda”
(Valencian institute of Housing) to build social housing for immigrants, handicapped people, young and
old people with difficulties to access the free market. The idea of such a quarter was presented in the

Sociopolis includes 18 buildings that contain 2,809 subsidized dwellings designed by internationally well-
known architects such as Vicente Guallart, Duncan Lewis+Block, Greg Lynn Form, Sogo Arquitectos,
Manuel Gausa, Willy Müller, Jou Min Lin, José María Torres Nadal, Ábalos y Herreros, MVRDV, Josep
Lluís Mateo, María Colomer, Eduardo Arroyo, Toyo Ito, François Roche and Young Joon Kim.
The development, master-planned by Vicente Guallart and Maria Díaz, has been marketed as a socially sustainable urban quarter where social interaction is encouraged by the well-designed urban environment and which is integrated in the Valencian farm lands as a way of preserving the city’s cultural identity (Guallart Architects, www.guallart.com), and has arisen enormous interest both in the general public and within the architectural profession.

Sociopolis was planned to be finished in 2007 but construction works are still ongoing.

1.5 Thesis structure

Having discussed the scope and research objectives of the thesis, given an outline of research methodology and, discussed the political-economic background of the case under study together with its academic relevance in Chapter One, Chapter Two provides a critical review of the literature which sets this thesis in the wider theoretical context.

Chapter Two covers different bodies of literature on theories of globalisation, globalisation and city building, inter-urban competition, and actors of both globalisation and localisation.

The first set of literature, starts off from the suggestion that globalisation is one of the why causes driving change in cities and therefore outlines interpretations regarding globalisation in general and different aspects of globalisation, considering cities as nodes within the global economy. Cities appear as key sites within the global economy. They condense many of the forces of globalisation and therefore are laboratories in which to explore these processes.

The second set of literature focus on city competitiveness and the ‘rise of the entrepreneurial city’. It also critically discusses place promotion and symbolic architecture as competitive strategies frequently used by cities.

The last set of literature addresses the issue of the actors who drive globalisation, both local and global. Concepts such as the transnational capitalist class and the global intelligence corps are discussed. However it is not just global actors but also local actors that drive globalisation. Therefore local coalitions of interests and the manner in which they come together are also discussed.

Chapter Three goes on to establish the theories and concepts that will be used to analyse and interpret the empirical findings. Three bodies of literature are reviewed to build a theoretical framework.

The first body of literature reviews regulation theory, the strategic-relational approach, cultural political economy and the politics of scale literature to point to the restructuring of the ‘national’ state and the emergence of the metropolitan and regional scale. This, as we will see, is highly relevant to Spain where particularly regions have been importantly empowered in the urban arena.
The second deals with the politics of urban regeneration. It includes the growth coalition and urban regime literature to address the question of how politics of regeneration is instituted differently in different places.

Finally, the literature on the implications of the new politics of regeneration explores the rise of new delivery organisations and forms and, their outcomes in terms of impacts on democratic decision-making, planning possibilities and, social and economic cohesion. This rise is clearly visible in Valencia where, new delivery organisations such as foundations and public corporations have flourished along with the urban policy based on mega-projects and events, strongly impacting democratic decision making and control.

Chapter Four is a methodology chapter where the rationale behind the research strategy, the research protocol and the research methods used in this thesis are explained. The design of the case study, the logic that links the collected data to the research questions and, the analytical strategy and theoretical approach to data analysis are also discussed in this chapter. Finally, the organisation system used to write the case study in the following chapters is explained.

Chapter Five presents the city of Valencia as a case under study. It also analyses and interprets the findings that provide the context for the three selected flagship projects.

The following three chapters - Chapter Six, Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight – are empirical chapters which examine the empirical findings related to each of the flagship projects and present their interpretation. They are not organised by project but by theme, or research question.

Chapter Six examines the impacts of the spatially targeted regeneration policy, placing special emphasis on new practices and modes of governance. First, it examines the physical changes and the changes in the perception of the city. Then, it analyses the political, economic and social returns of the policy, and finally, it discusses issues of governance such as privatisation, participation, democratic accountability, new bodies created, transfer of public money to private hands, etc.

Chapter Seven approaches the why type research question. It explores on the one hand political and economic issues, analysing the interests of different groups and at different scales. It focuses on the role of the state and the political projects at different scales - national, regional and local - with special emphasis on the construction of a new Valencian regional state.

On the other hand it discusses relevant ideational issues such as the semiotic construction of state or the complex of inferiority which has led Valencian politicians to institute a politics of self-esteem, but also the importance of local ideas of modernity, modernisation and globality.

Chapter Eight deals with the question of how spatially targeted regeneration policies based on urban mega-projects by global architects are instituted. It discusses the findings regarding the different actors and coalitions of interest at different scales and their relationship, in particular how local actors mediate to introduce global actors in the scene and, the role of global actors in the creation of local and regional coalitions of interest. It stresses the importance of individual actors in decision-making and the role of
personal relationship and very particularly the relevance of politics –and tactics - versus planning – and strategy. Finally it discusses the ways in which consensus is created and popular consent built.

Lastly, in Chapter Nine final conclusions are drawn. This final chapter reviews the findings and their interpretation and, discusses them in relationship to theory. To conclude, the chapter includes directions for further research on the topic.
2. CITY-BUILDING IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION

2.1 Introduction

The last decades have seen the ubiquitous emergence of eye-catching urban developments and flagship projects which have transformed the appearance of small and big cities through the Western world. The spectacular resultant urban landscapes – often referred to as ‘post-industrial landscapes’ of consumption - are seen to express post-modern values of consumerism and entertainment (Harvey, 1990; Zukin, 1995; Hubbard, 1996; Ward, 1998). Beyond the evident physical transformation it has been also possible to observe a change in the discourse of politicians and city governors. For them, the key to economic regeneration after de-industrialisation seems to lay in favourably situating the city in the global stage and connecting to the so-called ‘global flows’. Even the architecture of the new developments is expected to be suitable to the space of flows. Thus, words such as, the ‘informational city’, the ‘new economy’, the ‘knowledge society’ and so forth are tirelessly cited in the rhetoric of city leaders and the numerous new strategic plans that have been produced.

In short, the discourse, although generally too abstract, reflects that globalisation is considered to be a driving force of change. Typically, globalisation is presented as an unstoppable force. Flows seem to float in the air with no relationship to geographical space and no reference is made as to how and by whom those flows are mobilised (Olds, 1996). However, the transformation of the fabric of the cities is clearly visible and the claimed links to globalisation processes deserve closer inspection.

2.2 Cities as nodes within the global economy

Indeed, globalisation is used as a discourse by many city leaders to explain and justify the changes that have been transforming the landscapes of Western cities since the 1970s. It is nevertheless clear that cities are undergoing processes of economic, political and social restructuring and there is a strong suggestion that globalisation – be it considered a discourse or a factual reality - is a driving force of change. In fact, there are different interpretations of globalisation, whether the impacts of the new technologies, the time-space compression of economic activity, the stretching of social relations over time and across the globe or the political processes through which globalisation is constructed, are emphasised (Martin and Sunley, 1997). Whereas some commentators (Castells, 1989, 1996, 1998; Appadurai, 1996) have focused on the analysis of material – people, commodities, money - and non-material – information, identities, images - global flows others - criticizing the decontextualisation of the ‘space of flows’ - have focused on the re-scaling and reconfiguration of territorial organisation that allow such flows (Brenner, 1999, 2000, 2003; Swyngedouw, 1996, 1997; Jessop, 2000; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).

In any case, the concept is controversial and the debate very much polarised between what Held (2002) has called ‘globalists’ and ‘sceptics’ and Dicken, Peck and Tickell (1997) ‘boosters’ and ‘hypercritics’. For sceptics, such as Callinicos (1994), Hirst (1997) or Hoogvelt (1997), ‘rather than globalization, current trends reflect a process of ‘internationalization’ (Held, 2002:3). They argue that
globalisation proves to be a useful concept for the legitimisation of a neoliberal global project consisting of the creation of a global free market. Hirst (1997) goes as far as to claim that globalisation merely amounts to Westernisation or Americanisation. On the other hand, globalists, such as Castells (1996) or Dicken (1997) highlight the spatial attributes of globalisation and assert that it has rendered national territorial boundaries obsolete as social, economic and political activity transcend them and are independent from them (Held, 2002).

Their differing positions regarding globalisation become evident in their economic, political and cultural analysis. In economy their major points of disagreement are, first, that whereas for globalists national economies as autonomous systems have been substituted by a single global economy, sceptics assert that there is no single global market but a process of internationalisation of economic activity. Second, sceptics discard the idea that the liberation of capital from territorial constraints has caused the emergence of a global capitalism whereby corporate capital rather than states holds economic power. Finally, globalists contend that a new global division of labour, in which developed countries are moving towards a service economy and developing countries are taking up manufacturing activities, has been forging. On the contrary, sceptics argue that the shift to a service economy is due to neoliberalisation and technological change and that, however, developed countries still control trade in manufactured goods (Held, 2002).

Concerning politics, whereas for sceptics the national state remains the main political element through which international order is established, for globalists political power has been restructured as states, immerse in webs of global interconnectedness, have lost the capacity to act independently and exercise national power to achieve policy objectives, and therefore are unable to secure the delivery of fundamental goods and services (Held, 2002). The issue has important associations since in one case states are granted the capacity of pursuing welfarist strategies while in the other their only option is to compete in the marketplace to achieve a good position in the global division of labour.

When it comes to culture, sceptics contend that the new technologies and communication systems reinforce rather than diminish the importance of national and regional identities since they help intensify social interaction within one culture. For globalists global corporations - through their consumer goods, channels of distribution and the impact of the mass media - have become the main sources of cultural creation and, consequently, also of values and identity generation (Held, 2002).

According to Dicken, Peck and Tickell (1997) the debate between the supporters of the globalisation thesis and the sceptics is pointless since it has been reduced to a mere question of quantification when, what is required is to qualify through a conceptual distinction between globalisation and internationalisation. From their point of view, globalisation would imply a functional integration of economic activities, the constriction and conditioning of national political strategies by extra-national forms and the complex rearticulation of cultural relationships. The question remains unresolved, however, there is a broad consensus that the increasing economic interconnectedness and the stretching of social and cultural relations have generated new interregional inequalities - of wealth, power, privilege and knowledge - and, transborder problems and challenges that would need political coordination at a global level to be confronted effectively (Held, 2002).
From a conceptual point of view, one of the main issues that marks the different positions in the globalisation debate, and the one which has furthest reaching implications, is whether globalisation is treated as an inevitable process that advances relentlessly as it were a natural force, thrusting the nations and regions into global competition between each other, or, on the contrary, it is interpreted as a political-economic project that can be challenged. On this issue, I will draw on Jessop’s (2000) distinction between structural and strategic moments of globalisation. According to him, the structural moment involves the ‘processes whereby increasing global interdependence is created among actions, organizations and institutions within different functional subsystems’ and the strategic moment the various actors’ attempts to coordinate their activities in order to produce global effects (Jessop, 2000: 339). Thus considered globalisation, on the one hand, can be challenged since it is ‘strategically constructed’ but, on the other, brings about structural changes that can be observed, and must be acknowledged. To the different global projects that can be potentially pursued the global becomes a horizon of action rather than a present scenario. This is important because although actions remain in different scales the global must be strategically taken into account. Therefore, at the same time that globalisation is promoted at different geographical scales, it can be resisted at such less inclusive scales too (Jessop, 2000). Moreover, there is another implication to this standpoint, namely, that global and local actors become important from an empirical point of view, as components of the globalising trend, and, as agents of change. In Dicken, Peck and Tickell’s words ‘national states, transnational corporations, institutions of global and supranational governance, regional and local states an so on are both responding to and reproducing globalization tendencies’ (Dicken, Peck and Tickell, 1997:165).

On the other hand, I will follow the socio-economic paradigm which considers economic action as a form of social action that is socially situated and constructed. Consequently, although some points, in the heartlands of capitalism, have become global producers and distributors of cultural commodities (Scott, 2000), globalization does not imply cultural homogenisation since not only imported cultural products are indigenised but also, cultural global flows are filtered through the specific socio-cultural parameters and re-interpreted accordingly (Olds, 1996; Appadurai, 1996).

As a result, my conceptualisation of globalisation has various important dimensions. First, globalisation, rather than a singular causal mechanism is a contingent and non-unidirectional outcome of a complex of processes (Jessop, 2000). Second, it involves the accelerated and expanded flow of commodities, capital, money, people and information - which has been called time-space compression - and the stretching out of social relations over time and space - which has been called time-space distantiation (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). In this way it has increased the interconnections at many geographical scales. Third, globalisation processes are socially constructed ‘in specific institutionally, historically and geographically specific sites’ (Dicken, Peck and Tickell, 1997:165). Thus, time-space compression needs the existence of relatively fixed spatial infrastructures to allow the flows (Brenner, 1999). Fourth, globalisation neither is uniform or homogeneous nor causes homogenisation. Instead, it reinforces differences. Fifth, since it goes hand in hand with uneven development it is highly conflictual and contested (Jessop, 2000; Held, 2002). Finally, globalisation does not imply a scalar move from less inclusive scales to the global but it entails a reorganisation of the relationships
between scales. Moreover, it is produced at different scales (Dicken, Peck and Tickell, 1997; Jessop, 2000).

The scalar restructuring associated to globalisation processes has relevant implications for cities. As noted above, different globalisation projects are promoted from different scalar viewpoints. The competition among different scales to become important as a place of regulation and governance of the global has triggered off essential changes in the position of the urban. In the currently prevailing globalising project capitalist economic globalisation is dominant. As the national economy loses its primacy as the main object of state intervention and as the measure of economic performance, different political-economic spaces compete to become the new nodes of capital accumulation. This, it is claimed, has increased the importance given to regional and local economies whether directly caused by globalisation or as a reaction to it (Jessop, 2000; Brenner, 1999). On the other hand, capital flows are abstract and therefore need to be valorised in space. Cities do that through infrastructures that are spatially fixed and need to be accordingly built and adapted (Harvey, 1982; Harvey, 1985; Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). In this way, as Neil Brenner (1999: 432-433) has pointed ‘new geographies of global urbanization and capital accumulation’ and state regulation have emerged both at supranational and sub-national scales, most importantly represented by increased inter-urban competition.

In short, cities and states are being reconfigured and re-scaled to secure the valorisation of capital. Although both scales remain crucial forms of territorial organisation for the circulation of capital, globalisation has effected changes in the relative importance of cities within the global economy. On the one hand, leading cities have increased in size while new hierarchies of cities at a world level have crystallized. On the other, cities have orientated their strategies beyond the national boundaries in their entrepreneurial attempt to increase their economic competitive edge (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). Thereby, economic and political restructuring have put cities in the centre of attention. But there are other reasons why cities are important as units of analysis of globalisation processes. Firstly, they are important because they condense many forces of globalisation. In them not only trends at different scales interplay and can be observed but also globalisation’s physical outcomes – such as the transformation of the urban landscapes - become evident. As Sassen (2007: 163) puts it, ‘multiple processes of globalisation become concrete and localised’ in big cities. Finally, cities contain both the ‘losers of globalisation’, that is migrants and non-qualified workers, and the ‘winners’ such as global corporations and economic elites, and therefore it is in them where ‘the contradictions of economic globalisation materialise’ (Sassen, 2007:163).

2.3 Globalisation and inter-city competition for flagship projects

Since the 1970’s, an entrepreneurial approach to urban governance in order to achieve economic growth has spread out in developed capitalist countries both geographically – in big and middle size cities - and across political views (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Harvey, 1989). An approach that is not new to US cities but that has developed different characteristics in Europe (Gold and Ward, 1994; Haila, 1998) and which has been termed entrepreneurialism by Harvey (1989), and referred to as ‘the
politics of the global city’ (Haila, 1998) or the ‘new urban politics’ (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Cox and Mair, 1988).

The objectives of the new urban policy are inherently growth-oriented. They entail the political prioritisation of local economic development by seeking to expand the tax base, enhance property values and attract new forms of investment within the city territory. Definitively, the aim of such policies is to promote the comparative advantages of the city in relation to other cities which may be competing for similar forms of investment. For that purpose, local public resources previously used for the provision of welfare are utilised for the promotion of the private sector, especially to foster small firms’ economic growth (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). In fact, entrepreneurial policies are typically characterised by the cooperation of local governments and business elites through public-private partnerships in which, very often, the public sector takes the risks and the private sector the benefits. This fact is seen by several commentators to signify the deep transformations occurred in urban governance (Harvey, 1989; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Jessop, 1997), in Hubbard and Hall’s words it conforms an ‘organisational and institutional shift from urban government to urban governance’ (Hubbard and Hall, 1998:8).

As noted above, the focus of such policies is on speculative urban investment rather than job creation and social welfare and therefore, David Harvey has pointed out, the political economy of place with its associated speculative construction of place becomes more important than the ‘amelioration of conditions within a particular territory’ (Harvey, 1989: 8). Thus, the politics of the global city is defined as that which creates the image of the city in order to attract investments, especially real estate investment (Haila, 1998). The construction of an attractive built environment is seen to attract investment by two means. On the one hand, it appeals to professionals and tourists (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). On the other hand, an appropriate image reduces the perceived risk of real estate investment - which is typically based on estimates of future increases in rents and value - by signifying the city compromise with the real estate sector (Haila, 1998). Not in vain, the real estate sector has replaced the industrial sector in a time when consumption rather than production is highlighted as the key to prosperity.

Although the specific strategies used by cities to attract investment vary, their success is always, to some extent, dependent on market forces, and imply some sort of inter-urban competition in the city’s attempt to enhance its comparative advantages (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). The activities typically include the re-imagining of the city through place promotion, the construction of place-specific mega projects and the promotion of knowledge-based industries.

The reasons why this entrepreneurial politics are so wide-spread have to be sought at two levels, one is the success of a neo-liberal discourse, which stresses ideas of entrepreneurship, competitiveness, flexibility, innovation, and the effectiveness of the private sector, and is reflected in urban governors’ policy choices. The other is to be found in structural trends linked to globalisation processes. First, Financial markets have become more integrated geographically and institutionally and therefore, allegedly enhanced capital mobility, which can easily flow from one city to another (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998; Begg, 2002). Second, the new technologies and communications revolution have
meant that firms have a greater choice over location given that the importance of geographical accessibility has declined. This also implies that there is more scope for cities to increase their competitive edge through incentivisation strategies such as introducing small changes in legislation and taxation (Harvey, 1989). Third, deindustrialisation has changed the economic sectors that drive growth, generating a need for cities to physically transform their obsolete infrastructure and socially reorganise themselves (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). These trends have increased both the real and perceived economic insecurity of cities, introducing city leaders to the logic of competitiveness and entrepreneurship (Martin and Sunley, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). Thus, in order to justify their entrepreneurial attitude city governors often mention, on the one hand, the economic instability, fiscal austerity and unemployment triggered off by de-industrialisation and, on the other hand, the idea that the accelerated mobility of capital and the economic dominance of transnational firms have made cities economically more vulnerable (Gold and Ward, 1994; Hubbard and Hall, 1998).

Moreover, also national states have adhered to the neoliberalist logic of the virtues and benefits of competing in a free market, putting pressures on cities to act entrepreneurially, reducing expenditure in welfare, privatising public services, and withdrawing social and economic redistribution measures (Jessop, 1997; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). In this way, cities have been deprived of an important source of investment and found more reasons to lure global private capital. At the same time, state restructuring has offered cities new opportunities. On the one hand, the decentralisation processes that have transferred power from the national to the regional and local levels and, on the other, the increasing importance of supranational economic institutions have contributed to put cities in a better position than states to negotiate for investment (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998; Harvey, 1989).

All these factors have provoked a competitive response in cities that has induced some authors to give them the name of entrepreneurial cities (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Leitner and Sheppard, 2002). Thus, according to Parkinson and Harding (1995:66-67) the entrepreneurial city can be defined as ‘one where key interest groups in the public, private and voluntary sectors develop a commitment to realising a broadly consensual vision of urban development, devise appropriate structures for implementing this vision and mobilise both local and non-local resources to pursue it’.

However, some commentators, based on Schumpeter’s definition of entrepreneurship as ‘the creation of opportunities for surplus profit through ‘new combinations’ or innovation’ (Schumpeter, 1934 in Jessop, 1998: 79) have problematised the characterization of all so-called ‘entrepreneurial cities’ as entrepreneurial. Jessop (1998: 79), drawing on Cox’s distinction between strong competition – aimed to ‘improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through innovation’ - and weak competition – aimed to the ‘reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities’ - has argued that, most ‘entrepreneurial cities’ are engaged in weak forms of competition such as regulatory and city re-imaging measures to attract footloose capital and therefore cannot be properly called entrepreneurial. Leitner and Sheppard (1998: 305) have called such weak or soft competitive strategies ‘inward investment types of entrepreneurial strategies’.
David Harvey (1989) has identified four, non-exclusive, entrepreneurial options for cities. Cities can compete within the international division of labour, over acquisition of control and command functions, for central government redistribution capital or within the spatial division of consumption. The last one is the more extended as it focused on weak types of competition such as the attraction of tourism and quality of life by physical upgrading of the urban environment and the provision of consumer attractions and entertainment.

Although, according to Bob Jessop (1998) most cities would not enter the category of entrepreneurial, the narratives of the entrepreneurial city have been very successful to present cities as such, becoming regularly used by local governors in their rhetoric to justify and legitimate their policies (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Haila, 1998). Jessop has argued that the success of the discourse is due to its plausibility and to the fact that it resonates with personal stories. In his words, ‘the entrepreneurial city or region as subject, site, and stake in economic competitiveness’ ‘has been constructed in and through public narratives’ (Jessop, 1997:30). Thus, as the city has been re-imagined as an entrepreneurial entity that needs to enhance its competitiveness, its governance has been transformed to involve private sector actors which, allegedly, are more efficient and competitive. At the same time, the narratives of the entrepreneurial city have presented competitiveness as an unavoidable approach to resolving the cities’ economic problems in a globalised world, thus, avoiding debate (Jessop, 1997).

In addition, the conceptualisation of a city as entrepreneurial poses several further problems. First, treating a city as an economic actor, as a unity, is questionable. On the one hand, cities are representations (MacNeill, 1998). As Harvey (1989) has argued, they are constituted by complex sets of social relations and different interests and therefore cannot be equated with their political leaders or coalitions. On the other hand, there is the risk of considering cities as firms that compete among themselves in the marketplace. The analogy, Leitner (1998) has argued, rests on the assumption that cities are economic actors that compete on an even playing field where all cities have the same access to resources and are equally equipped for competition. These assumptions ignore that cities depart with differences, they are embedded in ‘a set of national and regional institutions, regulatory systems, traditions and norms that condition the nature and possible outcomes of local initiatives’ (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998:300). Moreover, cities are territorially defined and local governments’ democratic legitimation is subject to the achievement of goals other than economic profit, such as the welfare of their residents. Second, a focus on the entrepreneurial characteristics of a city may divert attention from other relevant narratives and interpretations, especially, locally and empirically centered (MacNeill, 1998). Third, as noted above, cities that present themselves as entrepreneurial are very often not engaged in innovation but just selling their image (Jessop, 1998), so more than real entrepreneurship we are in front of a zero-sum competition among cities.

And this takes us to the question of the effectiveness of such strategies. Indeed, there is wide consensus that policies based on investing money and subsidising firms with the aim of relocating economic activities and attracting footloose capital are ineffective and counter-productive from a regional point of view since they do no generate wealth but transfer investment from one place to another (Agnew, 2000; Leitner, 1998; Begg, 2002). Moreover, as entrepreneurial strategies are copied
by new competitors – and competitive weak strategies are easy to imitate - their effectiveness declines since the competitive advantage fades, creating in this way the necessity of continually introducing new ideas (Leitner, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Harvey, 1989). In this cyclic process of introduction of new strategies and imitation the inequalities between cities increase. Thus, Harvey (1989) has pointed out that, as more and more cities ‘feel compelled’ to enter the competition game there will be losers as well as winners. Dominant cities will exploit their advantaged position while cities of lower hierarchy or worse positioned to compete, will struggle to follow them. This trend is enhanced by the support given by national states to the most competitive cities and regions and the withdrawal of the nationally provided welfare funds (Martin and Sunley, 1997).

On the other hand, empirical studies have suggested that entrepreneurial strategies, while actually renovating the urban landscape and giving an impression of economic regeneration, have failed to redress their employment, social and fiscal situation (Barnekov, Boyle and Roch, 1988; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Holcomb, 1993; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998; García, 2005). They have also provoked in many cases the increasing indebtedness of local and regional governments.

Even when entrepreneurial strategies do succeed in attracting investment they have proved to exacerbate distributive inequalities of wealth and income. They increase the social and economic problems of the disadvantaged communities, while those with economic interests, such as property owners, in favoured areas or highly skilled workers of certain sectors benefit (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Agnew, 2000; Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1998). Some reasons have been pointed out to explain why entrepreneurial strategies are bound to producing inequity. First of all, concentration on image diverts attention – and investment in welfare provision for the disadvantaged social groups - from economic and social problems. Second, the kind of activities often favoured by city governors, generally small businesses and service sector activities based on consumption and entertainment, generate jobs in opposite poles of income (Harvey, 1989). Also, it has been argued that such strategies, through the resort to public-private partnership have amounted to a net transfer of public resources to the private sector, as cities subsidise the cost of relocation of firms in order to attract investment, provide the infrastructures and absorb the risk (Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1998). In addition, by subsidising capital in their competition with each other, cities have facilitated the relocation of economic activity thereby increasing their economic insecurity. On the other hand, according to David Harvey, inter-urban competition has facilitated the transition to flexible accumulation as ‘urban governments have been forced into innovation and investment to make their cities more attractive as consumer and cultural centres’ (Harvey, 1990: 256), and it has ‘opened up the urban spaces to new patterns of development’ (Harvey, 1989:11). Therefore, it is clear that ‘soft’ or ‘inward investment types of entrepreneurial strategies’ are not only ineffective but produce negative impacts, too.

In response to the drawbacks of entrepreneurialism different alternatives to it have been proposed. Those alternatives include the promotion of the enterprise society that would focus ‘on personal and community enabling and empowerment rather than private enterprise and private profit; and on the learning region rather than the entrepreneurial city’ (Jessop, 1998:98), the enhancement of the competitive rather than the comparative advantage of a city or region by engaging in innovation
(Begg, 2002; Agnew, 2000) or the defence of policy integration as a mechanism to compensate the negative effects of competition in terms of welfare and wealth and income distribution (Savitch and Kantor, 1995; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Begg, 2002; Portas, 2003). The more widely extended proposal has been the resource to cooperation in the form of city networks. This option has been embraced by both progressives, such as Portas (2003) - as an alternative to markets – and neoliberals - as a vehicle for promoting free markets. For progressives, by cooperating with the other cities of the network, they become better equipped to challenge the power of capital while for neoliberals the networks allow the markets to function adequately by providing the necessary trust (Leitner and Sheppard, 2002).

However, Leitner and Sheppard (1998 and 2002) have argued that networks are not an alternative to competitiveness since they just elevate competition to the scale of the network, excluding the less prosperous cities and citizens from the benefits of collaboration. Moreover, given that networks are embedded in pre-existing state structures, really existing networks show a tendency towards ‘hierarchy, inequality, imitation, and exclusion’, characteristics that have contributed to turn them into ‘channels of neoliberalisation’ (Leitner and Sheppard, 2002:514).

2.4 Cities and global architecture

Place promotion, particularly through key developments promoted as flagship projects, has become one of the main strategies deployed by city leaders of ‘entrepreneurial cities’ in order to achieve economic regeneration. It has a long tradition, especially in North America – represented, for instance, by the City Beautiful schemes of the early twentieth century – which, from the beginning, exported models to Europe and the rest of the world. However, only in the last decades it has become a global phenomenon. Increasingly, also Europe has started to provide models – particularly for cultural strategies - as shown by the diffusion of the cases of Glasgow, Newcastle, Bilbao and Barcelona (Ward, 1998; Gold and Ward, 1994, Bailey et al., 2004, Miles, 2005a; Miles, 2005b; Miles and Paddison, 2005). Physical rejuvenation and re-imaging are the most common devices used to signal change for tourists, and investors, and they are so widely used that cities have ended up having a uniform appearance.

The practice has been called place selling, place promotion, place marketing or place advertising, often used as synonymous. Philo and Kearns have defined place selling as a practice that ‘entails the various ways in which public and private agencies - local authorities and local entrepreneurs, often working collaboratively - strive to ’sell’ the image of a particular geographically-defined ‘place’, usually a town or city, so as to make it attractive to economic enterprises, to tourists and even to inhabitants of that place’ (Philo and Kearns, 1993:3).

For Tim Hall, however, there is a fundamental difference between selling and marketing that can be applied to cities too. Whereas selling consists on persuading the buyers that they ‘want or need what one has to sell’ and therefore it is determined by the product itself, marketing, through advertising, actually shapes the product one is trying to sell (Hall,1998:29). Consequently, drawing on Fretter’s
work (1993) Hall (1998) has argued that place marketing, more than just selling the city to lure firms to relocate in the area and tourists, is actually shaping the city in the sense that it is guiding its development in order to achieve a desired environment. Also Gold and Ward have incorporated a clear reference to marketing in their definition of place promotion which, in their words is ‘the conscious use of publicity and marketing to communicate selective images of specific geographical localities or areas to a target audience’ (Gold and Ward, 1994:2). In fact, two of the main activities that place promotion involves are the manipulation of culture and the use of history to enhance the appeal of places (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Ward, 1998; Crilley, 1993; Miles, 2007). Indeed, not only urban landscapes but the histories behind them need to be aesthetized and packaged in order to make a place attractive. An image of cultural diversity, sometimes even of exoticism - albeit conveniently depoliticised and sanitised - is directed to an audience of consumers of housing, culture and entertainment. Therefore, the most attractive images are selected and appropriated while ‘any problems are played down’ (Ward, 1998:1).

In this light, the objectives of place promotion can be considered twofold. Apart from the spelled out goal of achieving economic regeneration by attracting investment and tourist expenditure, place promotion is aimed, via the media, press and advertising to ‘galvanise local support and foster civic pride’ (Hubbard, 1996:1443). And, thereby, by attempting to convince citizens of the virtues of competitive strategies it becomes a form of social control (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Hubbard, 1996), what Harvey (1989) has referred to as ‘bread and circuses’. Therefore, as Phil Hubbard has pointed out, ‘city images, cultures and experiences have become every bit as important to the accumulation of social and political power by hegemonic groups as more traditional material concerns’ (Hubbard, 1996:1443). Nevertheless, the manipulation of image is likely to provoke tensions and conflicts over representation. According to Zukin (1995), different interest groups – corporations, community groups, professional groups - have their own vision and exercise political pressure to imprint it on the urban landscape. Moreover, as Hubbard (1996) has pointed out, while an attractive urban landscape can produce the effect of diverting attention from more essential issues it can also render evident the high level of expenditure and lead citizens to question who actually profits from entrepreneurial strategies. Although city marketers often use techniques to anticipate conflict such as, using references to the local history and culture in architecture, urban design and public art or accusing oppositional groups of being against progress these methods not always work and, very often, conflict does arise (Boyle and Hughes, 1991; Philo and Kearns, 1993; Hubbard, 1996). Some commentators have even argued that the typical oppositional group constituted by academics, professionals and businessmen rather than being representative of the local population serves as an alibi to entrepreneurial governors to claim that they have co-operated with the public (Robinson and Shaw, 1991; Hubbard, 1996).

Thereby, not surprisingly, place promotion has received much academic criticism. On the one hand, cities engaged in place promotion are accused of presenting an image of regeneration that differs from a reality of unemployment and social problems which have not been adequately addressed (Hall, 1998). This fact makes evident that importance is given to surface rather than to content. Therefore, the individuality of a place is just superficial for surface differences suffice to make an image attractive, draining any controversial content from it (Philo and Kearns, 1993). And, by wanting to differentiate
themselves in such a superficial way, marketed places end up giving a sense of homogeneity (Philo and Kearns, 1993), what Harvey (1989) has called serial reproduction. On the other hand, the appropriation of image by economic and political elites in order to constitute ‘an “official” urban image’ very often involved in place marketing tends to be exclusionary (Hall, 1998:28; Zukin, 1995). In Tim Hall’s words; ‘because the audiences for place promotion are predominantly white and wealthy, the people who populate the imagined cities of place promotion are similarly white and wealthy’ (Hall, 1998:28). In short, cities involved in place promotion are most commonly accused of dualism of image, superficiality, homogeneity and of fostering the appropriation of urban identity by politically and economically powerful groups. In addition, from a public policy viewpoint, analysts agree that, place promotion objectives are difficult to reconcile with more welfarist ones because in order to achieve the first public expenditure is diverted into speculative image construction (Ward, 1998; Hubbard, 1996).

Although there are many ways of promoting places such as advertising and, bidding for and organizing special events - sports, Olympics, capital of culture, expos - the most extended - and generally included in the others - is the use of architecture and urban design for, some physical reality in needed in order to support the image of regeneration that is being marketed (Ward, 1998). For that reason, architecture has become one of the most effective forms of advertising. Indeed, it constitutes a powerful device deployed to signify a city’s economic regeneration and urban vitality (Crilley, 1993). The mechanism in play is the mobilisation of symbolic capital, which, according to Pierre Bourdieu, is “the collection of luxury goods attesting the taste and distinction of the owner” (in Harvey, 1990).

Emblematic buildings are a source of symbolic capital, generated not only by mere aesthetics but through the association with architects with cultural credentials, who also advertise themselves in glossy architectural magazines (Crilley, 1993). Sklair has called such structures iconic architecture, defined as ‘buildings or spaces that are famous for architects or the public and have special symbolic/aesthetic significance attached to them’ (Sklair; 2005:485).

In their analysis of architecture as an advertising tool, many commentators have argued that the post-modernist architectural paradigm – with its emphasis on symbolism and narration – is the most adequate for the practice of place marketing (Crilley, 1993; Harvey, 1990; Philo and Kearns, 1993). Post-modern architecture is seen to coincide with the ethos of place promotion in different ways. On the one hand, linked to the idea of urbanity, post-modern architects seek in their architecture qualities such as difference and diversity. The result is an ornamental mode of expression that uses recognisable elements In fact, in opposition to the stylistic unity and purity of modernism, post-modern architecture is eclectic. It makes use of historical styles and vernacular traditions to familiarise the public with the urban landscape (Crilley, 1993). Thus, ‘the resources of culture and history readily get stirred into the post-modern melting-pot’ in order to appeal to the nostalgic feelings of the observer (Philo and Kearns, 1993:22). On the other hand, it is claimed that post-modern architects have learnt from market research and apply techniques such as the segmentation of markets in order to make their architecture attractive to different aesthetic tastes and cultures (Crilley, 1993).
By those means, post-modernism in architecture is considered to divert attention from content to surface, from the social relations of production to style (Crilley, 1993). In Ghirardo’s words: ‘builders and developers could not in their wildest dreams have designed a strategy of such academic and intellectual status that it would successfully direct analysis toward trivial matters of surface and away from much more vexing matters of substance’ (Ghirado, 1990:236 in Crilley, 1993). Other characteristics of post-modern architecture have received academic critique too. The collage approach to design - which mixes elements from different styles and materials - not only has the effect of familiarising the public with the urban landscape but, also contributes to the draining of meaning and socio-political content through excessive decontextualisation (Philo and Kearns, 1993). Therefore, postmodern architecture, in spite of the alleged fact that it seeks to be ‘more democratic’ by appealing to a wider audience in response to the univalence of modern architecture, is not other than a new stylistic form adopted by the architecture of power in order to mobilise meaning in support of the status quo (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Hubbard, 1996). Thus, according to David Harvey (1990), post-modernism in architecture has facilitated the transition to a regime of flexible accumulation. Although he acknowledges that post-modernism can be interpreted in more sympathetic ways, and as instances he mentions Aldo Rossi and Frampton’s critical regionalism, Harvey insists in the impact on the city of postmodern architecture connected to flexible accumulation.

For other commentators such as Olds (1996) modernist architecture – or, in its latest period also called neo-modernist architecture- with its preference for space and spectacular huge buildings and its abstract international style that can be applied in whatever spot of the world, is more consistent with the entrepreneurial approach and with creating buildings which are meant to connect with global flows.

Whatever style is preferred, it is true that lately the interest of architects – post-modernist or neo-modernist – has been directed towards the surface. Thus, increasingly neo-modernist architecture focuses attention on the use of new and eye-catching materials in the facades. Also, very often, achieving a building with a breathtaking sculptural form becomes more important than the perception of space typically prioritised by modernist architects. Thereby, architecture becomes a means to produce eye-catching images that can be reproduced in glossy architectural journals in order to advertise, at the same time, the architect, those who have commissioned the project and, as noted above, the place where the work of architecture is located. In this light, the criticisms to post-modern architecture, especially the interest in surface rather than content, could in many senses be applied to neo-modernist architecture as well.

Whereas post-modern architecture aims to achieve social control by means of its eclecticism, use of history and local traditions, decontextualisation and multiple narratives, neo-modernism resorts to a strategy of admiration and impact. Thus, when the idiosyncrasy of a place requires that a sense of looking forwardness and pride in local achievement is highlighted, the attributes preferred are monumentality and grandeur as for instance in the case of the City of Arts and Sciences in Valencia with its futuristic look. Therefore, I am more inclined to follow Hubbard (1996) in not equating a specific ‘style’ - post-modern architecture - with a form of governance - entrepreneurialism. Although
the argument that post-modernism has furbished effective ideological and empirical design tools for place marketing through architecture is convincing that does not mean that the same goals - place selling and social control - cannot be achieved by resorting to other mechanisms and architectural languages. As Philo and Kearns (1993) have pointed out, urban elites have been exercising social control through cultural practices since very early on in history. In this sense, according to Phil Hubbard ‘the direct mapping that is frequently made between post-modern architectural forms and urban entrepreneurialism fails to recognise the complex institutional and social processes involved in the production of the built environment, and the complex manner in which meaning is appropriated and redesignated through local processes of social and spatial differentiation’ (Hubbard, 1996:1459).

In any case, whatever the architectural approach to city building, there is wide consensus that architecture –especially iconic architecture- produces both space and symbols, in an intimately linked manner. Zukin (1995) has theorised it making use of the concept of the symbolic economy. For her, cities have always had symbolic economies, that is to say “a continual production of symbols and spaces that frames and gives meaning to ethnic competition, racial change, and environmental renewal and decay” but modern cities owe them to the devise of place entrepreneurs (Zukin, 1995:256).

But, in a globalising world, other issues about the production of symbols must be taken into account. On the one hand, the production of symbols has shifted from local to global images. The stretching of relationships of power associated to globalisation processes has implied that also the meanings and symbols attached to power have acquired global dimensions. Thus, global symbolism is also being used in iconic architecture. The audience to which the message is directed is wider than the local communities as it intends to reach ‘globally’ through mass media circulation of images and tourism. Therefore it has to be ‘legible’ as a symbol for a ‘global’ audience even when in some way it is intended to express a distinct ‘local identity’.

Thereby, culture has become, at the same time, both place-bound and global in scope. In order to analyse the global cultural economy Appadurai (1996) has proposed a framework that considers the ‘relationships among flows of persons, technologies, finance, information, and ideology’ (Appadurai, 1996:47). These interrelated flows or what he has called ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes impact on the construction of the built environment. Therefore, in the production of iconic architecture, not only flows of images and symbols are involved, also other flows –such as finance and real estate flows - and processes related to globalisation are important. As Leslie Sklair (2005:485) has pointed out ‘one of the consequences of capitalist globalization is a transformation in the production, marketing and reception of iconic architecture’.

On the one hand, the internationalisation of financial markets has increased the funds available for the construction of spectacular developments (Haila, 1998; Olds, 1996). On the other hand, the spread of similar methods of construction (Haila, 1998) and the globalisation of real estate markets (Olds, 1996) has facilitated the operation of transnational companies in the development industry.

However, property markets are not as globalised as it is often claimed. Wood (2004) in his study of the property development industry in Columbus (Ohio) concluded that the development industry has a parochial and fragmentated form that at the same time, places importance on local politics and
networking. Also, in his words, ‘the inherently speculative nature of the industry places a significant premium on local knowledge, which, in turn, encourages the development and reproduction of a locally embedded organizational form’ (Wood, 2004:137). Therefore, in contrast to the thesis that globalisation implies a scalar transformation of economic activity, Wood highlights the cultural embeddedness of economic practices and also the importance for analysts to focus on developers rather than finance.

Finally, the stretching of social relations has meant that global actors are working to construct the image of the cities around the world, especially global elite architects, who move from city to city to design the urban landscape and thereby contribute to the dissemination of urban development models.

2.5 Cities and global actors

In order to understand the changes that cities are currently undergoing it is necessary to consider general trends towards globalisation and liberalisation. Nevertheless, it is also essential that the actors driving those changes are situated and interpreted not only as subject to systemic forces but as agents of change too. If globalisation and global flows are social constructs that are culturally embedded then they are not abstract entities but formulated by actors with the ability to activate such flows and the power to shape globalising trends. Therefore, on the one hand individual actors respond to external pressures that are due to the general trends, as well as to internal motivations, while, on the other hand the aggregate of their actions contribute to form the general trends (Massey, 1985; Olds, 1996; Fainstein, 2001).

Increasingly, as a result of the stretching of social relations characteristic of globalisation, different social and ethnic groups, and economic and political formations operate at transnational levels (Appadurai, 1997). This is especially true of transnational cultural and professional elites which have been given much academic attention as ‘conduits’ of globalisation (Sklaïr, 2005; Olds, 1996; Sassen, 2007). Indeed, social contacts, networking and travelling are becoming more important for transnational elites, contributing to the emergence of transnational professional communities that share knowledge and expertise (Ward, 2005).

Sklaïr (2005) has called this group of transnational elite professionals the transnational capitalist class and defined them as ‘people from many countries who operate transnationally as a normal part of their working lives and who more often than not have more than one place that they can call home’ (Sklaïr, 2005:485). They are transnational in the sense that they have ‘globally linked economic interests and outward-oriented globalising perspectives, seek to exert economic control locally and internationally, share similar life-styles and project images of themselves as citizens of the world as well as of their places of birth’ (Sklaïr, 2005: 486).

Under processes of globalisation transnational elites of professionals have acquired increasing relevance, however, they are more connected to the geographical territory than is typically depicted. As Sklaïr (2005) has pointed out, the transnational capitalist class has both globalising and localising
agendas. According to Saskia Sassen (2007) they are embedded in dense local social contexts and, moreover, in order to be hypermobile they need an advanced infrastructure which, to a great extent, has to be provided by the states where they work. The production of this platform is related to the partial denationalisation of certain institutional domains. Therefore the transnational class of professionals is situated in an intermediate position between the global and the national scale (Sassen, 2007).

To the transnational elite, Sassen (2007) adds another two global classes. The first one is the class formed by transnational civil servants that must coordinate their activities around the world such as judges, migration agents or police officers specialised in finance flows of global terrorism. The other one is constituted by transnational social activists and migrant communities. In order to conceptualise the politics of big cities with global aspirations both global capital and the global migrant workforce must be considered. According to Saskia Sassen (2007) these classes are partially denationalised but still embedded in national spheres. This implies that their socio-political structures may be more affected by policies and governmental mechanisms than is usually believed and, thus, they could be a bridge between dense national spheres and the global dynamics (Sassen, 2007).

However, it is the transnational capitalist class, Leslie Sklair (2005) has argued, the one which is most responsible for the promotion of the use of iconic architecture as a means of economic development. Thus, regarding the production of urban space, the transnational capitalist class includes four fractions - the corporate fraction, the state fraction, the consumerist fraction and the technical fraction – and each fraction includes groups of people with different links to iconic buildings (Sklair, 2005). The corporate fraction is constituted by those who control the major transnational architectural and engineering corporations and their local affiliates. The state fraction includes politicians and bureaucrats who decide what gets built where and how. In ‘entrepreneurial cities’, they very often form coalitions of interest with global economic actors to promote iconic architecture projects. The consumerist fraction includes the merchants and media. The media contribute to raise the profile of iconic architecture and architects while, at the same time, academics who write for architectural journals have joined the ‘starchitecture system’ (Sklair, 2005). The technical fraction includes the globalising professionals. According to Olds (1996) globalisation processes are dependent on the knowledge of experts, which are considered agents of globalisation - in the case of mega-projects they depend on property developers, government officials and professional elites involved in their design, implementation and management around the world. Moreover, these epistemic communities work through the formation of globalised relationship networks among them (Olds, 1996).

Although the origins of international professional practice in architecture and urban planning, according to Stephen Ward (2005), must be traced back to the end of the 19th century and are related to the structural context as well as with the inherent characteristics of the profession, under globalisation processes, the tendency towards international practice has intensified. On the one hand, the spread of entrepreneurial policies has widened the scope for iconic architecture. On the other hand, iconic architecture tends to involve mega projects rather than piecemeal development and as projects
become of bigger scale the companies involved in their production need to be bigger too. This generally implies that their global links are more extended too.

Therefore, the need for specialised firms in big scale projects has given elite architects the opportunity to work in cities around the world that are willing to acquire global credentials. This has increased their expertise and symbolic capital at the same time. In this way, they have gained more advantage over potential competitors and, therefore, reduced the number of star-architects who can aspire to big commissions. This is where the interests of star architects regarding mega-projects come into play. In fact, it is just a small group of architects who are producing the majority of iconic buildings. The term Global Intelligence Corps (GIC) is used to designate this ‘very small number of élite architectural and planning firms that aspire for prestigious commissions in cities around the world’ (Olds, 1996:142). Typically, these few firms are not big corporations but what Sklair (2005) has called ‘strong ideas firms’, namely architectural studios lead by signature architects rich in symbolic capital. Kris Olds (1996) has argued that it is through professional discourses that elite architects are constituted. Thus prestigious architects take part in competitions and exhibitions, engage in the dissemination of their work through books, specialised journals and general press and, even lecture at university in order to increase the symbolic capital needed to obtain important commissions.

Yet, elite architects, apart from increasing their symbolic capital, need to devote much effort to networking with global actors such as members of professional bodies, of the press, financiers or transnational property developers, since they are dependent on the willingness of economic and political elites to hire them (Olds, 1996).

It is mainly the GIC who help other elite public and private actors to profit from the changes that mega-projects are conduit of, and from the economic benefits they entail (Olds, 1996). As Moulaert et al. (2005) have discussed, the interest groups participating in iconic mega-projects belong to business, political and professional elites while citizen and grassroots movements are excluded from not only decision-making but the benefits too. Certainly, although mega-projects can be studied in relationship to global flows, they also represent the territorialisation of capital, which benefits local and global elites (Olds, 1996; Moulaert et al., 2005). The viability and profitability of these projects - which become speculative real estate investments - often depend on the future materialisation of urban rents (Swyngedouw et al., 2005a, 2005b). In this territorialisation of capital, the state plays a mediating role (Swyngedouw et al., 2005b). Politicians, at the same time, depend on private capital investment and on real estate revenues for funding but also need democratic legitimisation and are subject to grassroots pressures from citizens. Iconic architecture designed by elite professionals have proved to be a useful tool for the popular good reception of mega-projects and electorally profitable for politicians.

### 2.6 Globalisation and localisation

On closer inspection, globalisation processes clearly appear to be linked to localisation processes in various ways. First of all, globalisation is not only shaped in global institutions but is also locally
produced through political activity conducted at local, regional and national scales. The majority of states, albeit via different paths, have qualitatively reorganised and implemented policies that facilitate economic globalisation (Sassen, 2007; McLeod, 2001; in MacLeod: Anderson, 1996; Le Gales, 1998b; Peck, 2000). Therefore, different scales, from the local to the global are involved in processes of globalisation, which, it has been argued, have changed the nature of the relationships between scales (Dicken, Peck and Tickell 1997; Jessop, 2000). The fact that globalisation is constructed at different scales implies that not just global actors but also local actors drive globalisation. Moreover, even global actors, as discussed in the previous section, are more connected to the geographical territory than is typically depicted given that economic activity is socially and culturally embedded. Particularly in property development, networking is a fundamental activity for engaging in business. Local networks, on the one hand, generate, circulate and valorise the local knowledge that a spatially fixed industry needs. On the other hand, they enable the involvement of those responsible for land regulation in the support of development practices (Wood, 2004). Thus, not only star architects but also property developers need to establish links with local politicians, a fact that contributes to embed property development practices within local contexts.

Second, globalisation has made place and identities connected to it, become economically and politically more important. According to Harvey (1993) this is due to the facts that on the one hand globalisation is perceived as a threat to local identities and on the other, through entrepreneurial activities and inter-urban competition, place distinctiveness has become an economic asset. This is reflected in the different strategies pursued by cities and firms in order to enhance and exploit local differences, such as glurbanisation and glocalisation (Swyngedouw in Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). At the same time, speculative place construction has fostered economic accumulation via real estate activity as shown by the appearance of local growth coalitions. Place identity is linked to property values and property values are determined economically but also socially because they are a means of social differentiation (Zukin, 1995). As a consequence they are used for the accumulation of both capital and power.

Yet, place identity is not only important because of its economic and social value for also its symbolism invokes feelings of belonging to imagined communities such as nation or ethnicity. Thus, in the politics of place, struggles over representation become intertwined with those related to economic interests and relationships of power (Harvey, 1993). It is through the increased importance given to place identity that globalisation has contributed to the emergence of different nationalisms which, political elites have come to use as a weapon to justify the need for the decentralisation of power and thereby pursue their political project. It is in this context that McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones (2003), drawing on Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’ have argued that architecture has become one of the main vehicles of national or regional identity. Iconic architecture becomes thus imbued with further meanings while the image of urban revitalisation appears connected to the resurgence of a national or regional identity.

Furthermore, in the struggle among different scales to become the relevant institutional arena in a globalising world, political-economic elites of cities, regions and even nations have resorted to
different kinds of localisms from an economic perspective too. According to Brenner and Theodore these elites are ‘aggressively attempting to promote economic rejuvenation from below’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002:342). In this sense, regions are being increasingly viewed by many as the territorial framework where economic development can be effectively pursued. As explained by Scott (1998), from his perspective, the world economy is constituted by a ‘global mosaic of regional economies’ in which regional economies are lead by the specialised economies of their major cities (Scott, 1998:70). Both academics and politicians have adhered to this view of the regional political economy. The body of work produced by the increasing number of scholars that have proclaimed the re-emergence of the regional economies and consequently emphasised ‘the significance of the region as an effective arena for situating the institutions of post-Fordist economic governance’ has been described as the New Regionalism (McLeod, 2001:807). The thesis of the New Regionalists has been used to guide policy choices and has permeated political discourses.

Certainly, when studying globalisation and localisation processes linked to iconic mega-projects, the regional scale - as the Valencia case study will show – has increasingly become a crucial object of analysis from an economic, political and identity viewpoints, particularly in the Spanish context where since the 1980s competencies accumulated by central governments during the development of the welfare state – such as education, health and urban planning – have been decentralized and handed to the regional tier of government. However, a focus on the regional without further considering inter-scalar relationships entails the risk of ignoring the social and political embeddedness of economy as well as the importance of power relations. In John Lovering’s words, New Regionalism shows ‘a reluctance to place regional change within a wider political economy that is increasingly characterized by fiscal restraint and welfare retrenchment’ (Lovering, 1999: 388).

In fact, despite the new regionalist interest in highlighting the importance of regional economies, many large cities and regions in the Western World have very little political autonomy and are embedded in national political structures (Agnew, 2000). Lovering has also suggested that such alleged regional resurgence ‘reflects the rise of a new regional service class’ of ‘economic development professionals’(Lovering, 1999:390) to which it could be added that it signifies the potential promise of a new source of political power and influence at a sub-national level.

Furthermore, a focus on micro-economic scale and disregard of the fact that economy is socially and politically constructed implies a bias towards neoliberalism. On the one hand, placing the responsibility for economic development at a regional level contributes to the justification of the dismantlement of welfarist redistributive structures at higher scale levels (Lovering, 1999). On the other hand, considering regions or cities as economic actors that compete as if they were firms tends to foster neoliberalism by focussing attention on the specific activities that cities undertake and diverting it from the wider political and ideological context. In this way, the perception of the increased importance of regional economies disguises the real relevance of the capitalist global economic interests in promoting the competitive game in which cities feel compelled to take part (McLeod, 2001). By this means, global elements of neoliberalism have been, particularly since the
1980’s, transferred internationally, but as such experiments have been translated to local contexts they have been in part driven and amplified by bottom up processes.

2.7 Conclusion

It is clear that both globalisation and localisation processes are closely linked. Jointly considered they will help make sense of the changes observed in cities as well as of the increasing interest of urban governors and economically powerful groups in iconic architecture and flagship projects. On the other hand, taking account of the fact that both local and global actors drive globalisation and are agents of change, closer attention must be directed to the political, economic, cultural and professional elites, who have more power to influence the shaping of such globalisation and localisation processes (Olds, 1996).

As discussed in the previous section, general trends towards globalisation and liberalisation are in part driven and amplified by bottom-up processes as reflected in the vigorously negotiated and contested economic politics of place and the politics of identity. Consequently local politics matter and this means that it is important to understand how local coalitions of interests work and the way in which they come together. But it is evident too that further issues related to the global scale have become intermingled with more localist views. In consequence, in an era of globalisation, the underlying interests involved in local politics are not only local in scope but strategically directed to the global scale too. This means that it is necessary to take into account on the one hand global actors, and on the other local actors with their global connections and motivations.

To conclude, not only growth coalitions, political elites and the like but also grassroots associations and migrant communities must be situated in the wider context with their multiple global associations in order to adequately conceptualise the politics of globalising metropolitan regions.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE POLITICS OF URBAN REGENERATION IN A GLOBAL ERA

3.1 Introduction

In the last decades, the new urban policy has put emphasis on economic regeneration. As discussed in the previous chapter, the promotion of growth and competitiveness - particularly through the use of ‘global architecture’ - has been the key strategy for addressing urban economic and social decline. Thus, urban regeneration - generally based on physical renewal - has become central to economic regeneration policies, which have been directed to restructuring urban economies after de-industrialisation in order to position them favourably in the global economic stage (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Brenner, 2003; Rodríguez et al., 2005; Coaffee, 2007a, 2007b).

Gradually, Keynesian distributional policies have been substituted by spatially targeted interventions (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Thus, regeneration is seen as a place based activity whereby places are regenerated rather than the necessities of the population met. Regeneration is understood as ‘the transformation of a place—residential, commercial or open space—that has displayed the symptoms of physical, social and/or economic decline’ (Evans, 2005:967). Such transformation combines social, economic and physical aspects and therefore urban regeneration can be defined as ‘a comprehensive integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about lasting change in the economic, social, physical and environmental condition of an area that has been the subject of change’ (Roberts and Sykes, 2000:17 in Coaffee, 2007:150).

Various models for economic regeneration have been put forward. The most important and widely spread are property-led and culture-led regeneration. In the first case, the development or improvement of buildings for ‘occupation and investment purposes’ (Turok, 1992:362) is considered to be the engine of change while in the second it is cultural activity, generally represented by a flagship cultural venue or event - expo, city of culture or even the organisation of the Olympic Games - which is used as the symbol of regeneration (Evans, 2005). Indeed, art or sport events are considered perfect catalysts for regenerating large urban areas because they combine local pride, the attraction of tourism and urban physical renewal (Garcia, 2004b; Kitchin, 2007).

Anyway, both models use spatially targeted emblematic projects as the preferred instrument of regeneration. In this way, the large-scale urban project or urban mega-project has become the alternative to comprehensive planning. This approach to planning has the alleged advantage of being flexible and - since urban mega-projects invariably contain high-profile prestige architecture - of having great symbolic capacity (Beazley, 1997; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a).

Large-scale urban projects, as Swyngedouw (2002, 2005a) has explained, are expected to generate economic activity and employment but, their main objective - given that local governments highly depend on land rent based tax returns for financing - is to improve the tax basis by revaluing urban land. However, extensive empirical evidence has demonstrated that prestige urban mega-projects have had very limited effectiveness for economic regeneration as shown, according to Evans (2005), by the
fact that in many cases cities such as for example Bradford, Barnsley, Salford, Liverpool, Valencia, Marseilles, Rotterdam, Toronto and Montreal are on their second or third round of investment in flagship projects.

From a property-led regeneration perspective, the use of prestige mega-projects is not a solution for economic regeneration for many reasons. First, it does not produce a rise of economic activity (Imrie and Thomas, 1999). Second, its alleged role in encouraging private sector development or investment has not proved to be true (Cochrane, 1999). Third, construction activity does not necessarily imply more local employment. In addition, the employment that is generated is insecure and low-wage unskilled work (Turok, 1992). Finally, the evidence of the invariably mentioned trickle-down effect on local communities happening is absent or very limited (Cochrane, 1999; Imrie and Thomas, 1999).

On the other hand, the evidence regarding the contribution of cultural flagships to the social and economic needs of the area shows that the benefits are limited and often displaced by the gentrification that they bring about (Zukin, 1995; Gómez, 1998; García, 2004a; Evans, 2005). Moreover, only major cities can sustain them and even then their long term sustainability is problematic (Evans, 2005).

In short, in spite of the existing evidence of their ineffectiveness and negative social and environmental impacts (Turok, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2002; Evans, 2005; Coaffee and Johnston, 2007) spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration are being widely used in different contexts. As Evans has pointed out, maybe flagship developments ‘are less about regeneration than the conventional wisdom portrays them’ (Evans, 2005:975).

For that reason, in order to analyse both the causes why and the processes through which urban change takes place the theoretical framework I have adopted will situate the problem in a context where economic forces are considered but that asserts that politics matter and where the formal and strategic dimensions of the state take centre stage. Thus, structural causes are crucial for the understanding of urban change but there is also space for human agency, which allows for a greater emphasis on empirical analysis.

Other important elements of my theoretical framework are the conceptualisation of scale as socially constructed and the emphasis on the spatial aspects for capital needs to be valorised in space and in our case this is done through spatially targeted urban mega projects. In this way, globalisation processes are considered at both a ‘structural’ level - to point out to state restructuring and the transfer of global elements of neoliberalism - and at an ‘agency’ level to take into account political and economic interests at different and superimposed scales. As discussed in Chapter two globalisation and localisation processes are closely linked and need to be considered jointly. Urban mega projects are expressions and mediators of contemporary restructuring processes and, therefore, through them the channels of integration of the local and the global, the restructuring of scales and the creation of new scales can be analysed (Swyngedouw et al., 2005b). They also offer a lens to study agency at different scales, as they are embedded in different economic and institutional frameworks.
With these objectives, I will draw, as explained in the following sections, on a combination of strategic-relational theory, Cultural Political Economy and the literature on the politics of scale - to consider globalisation and its scalar and spatial effects - with urban regime theory and notions of translation of interests between geographical scales.

Finally, for the study of the implications for planning practices of the politics of regeneration I will draw on the literature on neoliberalism as a mode of governance and a range of empirical analyses of the impacts of urban mega-projects and flagship developments.

3.2 Cities, globalisation and the politics of scale

With the objective of investigating the motives and driving forces of urban regeneration I will look at the different approaches that academics have adopted in order to explain urban change. On the one hand, neoliberal theorists have produced accounts that reify markets and consider globalisation almost as a natural force, neglecting agency in this way. Alternatively, within a Marxist tradition, there have been various theories and concepts introduced and refined in order to understand the transformations of urban governance. Following that tradition, regulation theory was developed in the 1970s and early 1980s by a group of Marxist economists including Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz as a critique of Althusserian structuralism and orthodox economics (Painter, 1996; Collinge, 1999). Although its initial aim was to explain ‘how capitalism could survive even though the capital relation itself inevitably produced antagonisms, contradiction, and crises’ (Jessop, 1990:170 in Collinge, 1999) several academics working in the fields of urban theory, political geography and political science started to resort to it in the 1980s to explain the broad shifts in urban politics that were taking place. They drew on it because regulation theory offers an account of the changing role of cities within the capitalist economy that integrates economic and non-economic – social, political and cultural - spheres and, contrary to other versions of orthodox Marxism, assigns an important role to political processes (Painter, 1996).

Regulation theory has most typically been deployed to explain the re-structuring of capitalism, mainly the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Jones, 1997) but influential proponents of regulationism such as Jessop and Boyer have stressed its methodological character, preferring to refer to it as an approach rather than as a theory (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996). Thus, instead of a unified school of regulation theory there are different strands. The most influential of them is the Parisian school - mainly represented by Aglietta, Boyer and Lipietz - but all of them share the same framework or method of analysis (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996; Collinge, 1999). Both its scientific realism approach and its concern with on the one hand the reproduction of capital as a social relation and on the other the political economy of capitalism derived from historical materialism have their roots in Marxism (Tickell and Peck, 1992). Thus, regulation theory studies the regulation of capital as a social relation (Jessop, 2000), that is to say the processes that mitigate the inherent contradictions and tendencies towards crisis and rupture in the capitalist accumulation process (Peck and Tickell, 1992; Hubbard and Hall, 1998) and displace them in space or time (Goodwin and Painter, 1996). Those processes include not only the economic conditions of
accumulation in a strict sense but also other social practices (Jessop, 2000) which, albeit may result in successful regulation have frequently been undertaken with different objectives (Painter, 1996; Goodwin and Painter, 1996). Therefore regulation is an unintentional process rather than ‘an inevitable, automatic or structurally necessary process’ (Goodwin and Painter, 1996:638). However, regulation is only a partial and temporary solution to the contradictions and crisis tendencies of the capitalist mode of production (Peck and Tickell, 1992).

There are two core concepts deployed by mainstream regulationists: the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation or mode of social regulation. The regime of accumulation is a set of arrangements or macroeconomic relations that allow the accumulation of capital and comprises the relationship between the systems of production and consumption and with investment (Collinge, 1999; Painter, 1996). The mode of regulation or mode of social regulation refers to the social framework constituted by the institutions, rules and social practices which ensures that the relationships between the systems of production and consumption are conducive to capital accumulation (Painter, 1996; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Collinge, 1999; Jessop, 2000). As discussed above, such institutions, rules and practices are not established with the intention of sustaining accumulation and are prone to losing effectiveness over time (Painter, 1996; Collinge, 1999).

In some regulationist accounts there are differences in the terminology. For instance, according to Peck and Tickell (1992) the relationship between investment, production and consumption is an accumulation system. Only when it is successfully realized through different procedures that constitute a mode of social regulation we have what is called a regime of accumulation. Thus, a regime of accumulation includes two elements; an accumulation system and a mode of regulation and it is defined as a ‘macroeconomically coherent phase of capitalist development’ (Tickell and Peck, 1992:192). However, the underlying approach is the same and social regulation is considered a ‘historically specific’ (Jessop, 2000:327) ‘temporary institutional fix’ (Peck and Tickell, 1992:348) that ‘can never permanently resolve the contradictions of capitalism, but only translate acute crises into crisis tendencies’ (Painter, 1996:95).

Crisis is therefore another important concept of regulation theory and is defined as a ‘rupture in the reproduction of a social system’ (Goodwin and Painter, 1996:638). It can be structural or conjunctural (Tickell and Peck, 1992). Also microcrises that affect fractions of capital have been identified but according to Tickell and Peck (1992) they have little theoretical importance. A structural crisis threatens the rupture of the whole system in which case it means that the mode of regulation can no longer secure accumulation. It can only be eventually resolved if an alternative mode of regulation develops (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Goodwin and Painter, 1996). In a conjunctural crisis it is only a part of the system which is under threat and therefore can be resolved within the system through minor adjustments (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Goodwin and Painter, 1996).

Therefore, regulation theory, and this is one of the reasons why I am interested to draw upon it, is a useful framework to analyse broad political and economic re-structuring processes that affect cities avoiding economic determinism by integrating in the approach the political, economic, social and cultural spheres and the relationships between them (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996).
However, the approach has also received many criticisms, vigorously responded and addressed by regulationists. First, the definition of mode of regulation has led some commentators to accuse regulation theory of presenting a tendency to functionalism because it implies that a mode of regulation appears in order to fulfil a necessity of the capitalist accumulation process. Effectively, according to regulation theory only modes of regulation that are compatible with the accumulation process will succeed and therefore they are economically determined in the last instance (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996; Jones, 1997; Collinge, 1999). Second, regulation theory is considered to be limited to explain urban politics and local transformation given that it places emphasis on the nation-state and the wider social and economic context but is unable to fully explain uneven spatial development and specific political shifts at the local scale (Peck and Tickell, 1992; Painter, 1996; Jones, 1997, Kratke, 1999). Peck and Tickell (1992, 1995) tried to talk of local modes of social regulation but all that came out of that was a little unsatisfactory and few have taken it further. Third, political intervention and social conflict, particularly within a coupling of regime of accumulation and mode of regulation, are underplayed. Similarly, empirical study of individual institutions and consideration of agency are neglected (Painter, 1996; Jones, 1997).

In order to overcome its shortcomings, regulation theory, considered as an incomplete project by its proponents, has been developed and refined through different generations. According to Jones’ (1997) periodisation first-generation regulationism is focused on the national scale and concerned mainly with labour processes and the wage relation. Second-generation accounts are concerned with the insertion of nation-states capital in the global economy. It is third-generation regulationists who start to address the role of space and its relationship with accumulation and regulation in order to account for local transformation. They also introduce important elements in their analysis such as the state and political action to counter charges of functionalism and economic reductionism. Brenner (2003) adds a fourth generation to the account which is concerned with analysing the different processes and strategies deployed at different scales to mediate crisis.

Thus, as noted above, in order to avoid functionalism it has been suggested that the state should again take centre stage within regulation theory, where, as several commentators have argued (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Collinge, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2005b) drawing on the writings of the Parisian school, it always was. Indeed, regulation theory maintains that ‘the role of the state within processes of social and economic regulation is to facilitate the transition of the economy in the interest of capital accumulation while absorbing the social costs of this transition’ (Hubbard and Hall, 1998:17). To the state, Collinge (1999) assigns the role of meta-regulation, defined as ‘the systemic process of restructuring the corrective regulatory mechanisms when these begin to fail, and when normal crises become ‘structural’’, and which underpins regulation: ‘the social process of control over the relations of accumulation, and involves norms and institutions that may contribute to viable accumulation by correcting ‘normal’ crises’ (Collinge, 1999:559).

In the 1980s, Jessop, within a regulationist theoretical context and drawing both on Gramscian theories of hegemony and the work of state theorists Offe and Poulantzas, introduced what he terms the strategic-relational approach. Jessop addresses the analysis of the state from a neo-Gramscian
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perspective, focusing on exploring how the institutions and informal networks related to its apparatus mediate leadership (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Moreover, his conceptualisation of the state as relatively autonomous of external social forces and as a site of strategy comes from a neo-Gramscian reading to Poulantzas, with whom he also shares the emphasis on the importance of politics to achieve hegemony (Jones, 1997). Hegemony is understood as the ‘interpellation and organisation of different ‘class relevant’ (but not necessarily class conscious) forces under the political, intellectual and moral leadership of a particular class (or class fraction) or, more precisely, its political, intellectual, and moral spokesmen’ (Jessop 1983b: 100 in Collinge and Hall, 1997).

From Offe, Jessop takes the concept of structural selectivity of the state which explains how a particular state form is more conducive to privileging some economic or political strategies than others and therefore to include the interests of certain social groups while excluding others (Jones, 1997; Collinge, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). However, determinism is not implied for the internal structure of the state is the result of past strategies (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Thus, as explained by Collinge (1999), there are two processes at play. On the one hand, changes in the institutional structure developed through conflicting strategies. On the other hand, the selection of the changes that better contribute to the reproduction of capital.

In short, the strategic-relational approach develops an account of the role of the state in the process of social regulation seeking to avoid structuralism by introducing a political dimension, and instrumentalism by ‘recognising the impossibility of monistic control and emphasising the participation of a plurality of interests within the political process, forming a ruling coalition or hegemonic bloc’ (Collinge and Hall, 1997:134). Thus, the state is considered to be a mediator between groups whose interests gravitate around different regimes of accumulation (Collinge and Hall, 1997). In such mediation the state favours the interests of some groups over others in a process – structural selectivity - whereby class interests are translated into effective political influence on the basis of both material power and discourse (Collinge and Hall, 1997). This privileging can also be direct and often takes the form of economic and symbolic rewards such as access to contracts, inclusion in public-private decision-making bodies, etc. In this way the state acquires a legitimating role and at the same time becomes not only a product of strategy but a generator of strategy. By analysing both the structural and the strategic dimensions of the state, Jessop emphasises political action and finds a way between structure and agency (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Jones, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2005).

This approach is given substance by the deployment of two core concepts: accumulation strategy and hegemonic project. The concept of accumulation strategy combines politics and economics and is defined as ‘a specific economic growth model complete with its various extra-economic preconditions and outlines the general strategy appropriate to its realisation’ (Jessop, 1983b: 91 in Jones, 1997). Different groups may have conflicting accumulation strategies but if one of them achieves general acceptance from powerful elements of society it becomes hegemonic. For that reason, Jessop’s concept of accumulation strategy has been considered a way of resolving the necessity to understand how regimes of accumulation form (Tickell and Peck, 1992). The concept of hegemonic project

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introduces ideology and political action to the accumulation strategies and involves the ‘mobilisation of support behind a concrete, national popular program of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) and which also privileges particular ‘economic-corporate’ interests compatible with this program’ (Jessop, 1983b:100 in Jones, 1997). Therefore, a hegemonic project includes concerns that are wider than mere economic interest, such as ‘military expansion, moral regeneration, social reform, or political stability’ (Jessop 1983a:155 in Collinge and Hall, 1997) and serves to give direction to the activities of the state (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).

In that respect, ideational factors can be taken into account in the strategic-relational approach by resorting to cultural political economy. Thus, semiosis - which entails the social production of meaning – is considered to be a foundational moment in the strategic relational approach (Jessop, 2007; Jessop and Sum, 2010) and - as cultural political economy contends - it plays an important role in the production of hegemony. Cultural political economy, in the version developed by scholars at Lancaster University (Jessop, 2007; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum, 2009; Jessop and Sum, 2010) ‘interweaves Foucauldian concerns with discourse, discipline, and governmentality and Gramscian concerns with language, domination, and hegemony’ (Sum, 2009:185) and integrates them into ‘a broader historical materialist framework influenced by Marx and Gramsci’ (Sum, 2009:186).

Drawing on the discursive and extra-discursive dimensions of both analyses, cultural political economy considers the complex relationships that meanings and practices have, for culture – from a historical materialism viewpoint - is conceptualised as comprising every aspect of social life, including behaviour and thought (Jessop, 2007; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum, 2009). Therefore, both materiality and the dialectic of discursivity are considered important to explain the production and reproduction of hegemony. The semiotic formation, selection, privileging and retention of certain imaginaries in interaction with extra-semiotic practices ‘gives relatively successful economic and political imaginaries their performative, constitutive force in the material world’ (Jessop, 2007:240).

The evolutionary process consists first in the continuous intentional or unintentional variation of the imaginaries and discourses through which actors explain, define and redefine their projects, strategies and ideas, and, second, in the selection and retention of some of those imaginaries and discourses (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008). Semiotic and extra-semiotic factors are involved in this process. The power of discourses depends on their relationship to other structural mechanisms and on whether they resonate with other social forces. Therefore, discourses will be more likely to be retained when - in Jessop and Oosterlynck’s (2008:1160) words - ‘they correspond to (or successfully shape) underlying material transformations, can mobilize different elites to form a new power bloc, can organize popular support, disorganize opposition, and marginalize resistance’.

On the other hand, it has been argued that the strategic-relational approach is limited in its ability to explain local transformation because it is not sensitive enough to space for it focuses on the national level and privileges macroeconomic interpretations (Jones, 1997; Collinge and Hall, 1997). However, as some commentators have pointed out the concepts of hegemonic project and accumulation strategy can be used at a different scale (Jessop, 1997c in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In fact, the approach
has been more and more widely applied to study changes at sub-national scales (e.g. Mayer, 1991; Painter, 1991; Goodwin, 1993; Peck, 1995 in Hubbard and Hall, 1998:17; Collinge and Hall, 1997).

In my opinion, the strategic-relational approach has the potential to provide useful insights into the restructuring of urban and regional governance by allowing us to look through the lens of specific political projects - which, as would be the case in Valencia, can be shared by different political parties - at how the structurally selective activities of successive governments have sought to achieve a certain configuration. Moreover, these state projects or strategies – which can be pursued by national or regional ‘states’- have privileged certain social groups, spatial fixes and policy paradigms - including urban policy paradigms (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). It also provides a framework to analyse local accumulation strategies in relationship with hegemonic national and regional state hegemonic projects in order to situate them in a wider social and political context. For these reasons I will also draw on the concepts provided by the strategic relational approach in order to explore the driving forces and motives of urban regeneration. However, both regulation theory and the strategic-relational approach remain inappropriately sensitive to space and therefore are unable to explain uneven development. Moreover, the use of the concepts drawn from regulation theory to the local scale remains problematic.

Various solutions have been proposed in order to overcome such shortcomings. Thus, Jessop has explained the restructuring of the state in a globalising era resorting to the notion of ‘hollowing out’ processes whereby the national state power is eroded and moved ‘upwards, downwards, and sideways’ through strategic selectivity (Jessop, 1997a: 18 in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Jones, 1997; Collinge, 1999). For Jones (1997) the strategic-relational approach needs to be complemented with the concept of spatial selectivity of the state in order to correct its insensitivity to space. By spatial selectivity it is meant that the state tends to privilege the places that are more supportive and compatible with its objectives within accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. Jones contends that this privileging is both material and ideological. Therefore, in Jones’ words: ‘the impetus for spatial selectivity is ultimately driven by political ideology, a need by the state to maintain hegemony, suppressing counter hegemonic interests and in the process attempting to gain, through pursuing a particular accumulation strategy, international competitiveness’ (Jones, 1997:849).

Others address the analysis of local transformation through the application of the concepts of regulation theory adapted to the sub-national scale. For instance, Peck and Tickell (1992) suggest that distinct modes of regulation can be found at different scales, therefore there can be different regional couplings of system of accumulation and social modes of regulation, which they call local modes of regulation. However, Goodwin (2001) cautions against the search for local modes of regulation on the grounds that it does not allow for appropriate comparative work as different scales of regulation cannot be compared.

From my point of view, a more promising strand of literature than the concept of local modes of regulation is that concerned with the politics of scale, which would also help take forward the notion of spatial selectivity of the state. The importance of problematising scale has been recognised in the work of many geographers, social and political scientists, and urban theorists particularly from the
beginning of the 1990s and acquired increasing relevance due to the re-structuring of scales and the changes in the relationships between them produced due to globalising processes. Thus, the notion of geographical scale as a given has been challenged and the notion of it as socially constructed emphasised. Scale - considered as socially constructed - is an outcome of social processes which are always conflictory and politically contested but, at the same time, it is implicated in the generation of such processes (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Collinge, 1999; Brenner, 2000; Swyngedouw et al., 2005b).

Swyngedouw’s concept of ‘glocalisation’ captures the notion that spatial scale is being re-organised as a result of globalisation. It refers to both ‘the contested restructuring of the institutional, regulatory level (the level of social reproduction) from the national scale both upwards to supranational and/or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body, the local urban or regional configurations’ and ‘the strategies of global localization of key forms of industrial, service and financial capital’ (Swyngedouw, 1997:170). The spatial dimension becomes a central element of the definition for the reorganisation of scales implies a territorial reconfiguration both at an accumulatory and regulatory level.

On the one hand, glocalisation can be a state strategy to fix capital within its boundaries. Indeed, even in an allegedly globalising economy, capital needs to be valorised in space - which, as in our case, is increasingly being done through spatially targeted urban projects. On the other hand, it can become a strategy whereby the state reconfigures its spatiality in order to promote competitiveness. Thus, I will draw on the concept of globalisation and the literature on the politics of scale in order to introduce a spatial dimension to state strategy and selectivity and, crucially, taking into consideration globalisation processes.

As a consequence of globalisation, the spatial configurations that support capital accumulation have been reorganised as sub- and supra-national scales have become more important and displaced the nation-state as the main site of accumulation and regulation (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). However, as none of those scales has become the dominant regulatory or accumulatory scale, the possibility of turning scale itself into the object of socio-political struggle has emerged. In Jessop’s words, there is ‘a continuing and still unresolved search process to find new forms of state and new modes of governance on different scales to secure new spatio-temporal fixes within which accumulation on a world scale can be maintained – or to find new forms of state and new modes of governance with which to brake the (i)logics of accumulation on a world scale and develop alternative ways of organizing global-local order’ (Jessop, 2000:357). This struggle among different fractions of capital and state and governance institutions in which scale is at the same time site and object has been described as ‘the politics of scale’ (Smith, 1993, 1995 in Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000).

It is in this context that Swyngedouw (1996, 2005b) and Brenner’s (1999) conceptualisation of the state as a ‘glocalised’ state must be understood. The glocalisation of the state refers to its re-organisation that takes form through, on the one hand, an externalisation of its functions through privatisation, de-regulation and decentralisation, and on the other hand a re-scaling of governance.
both upwards – to a supranational level- and downwards - to the level of the city or the region (Swyngedouw, 1997, 2005; Brenner, 1999).

This re-scaling of the state has manifold implications that must be considered as empirical trends rather than explanatory concepts. First, as already noted, city-regions have acquired increased importance as sites of governance, often by-passing the national state. Second, since this restructuring is embedded in the spread of a neoliberal ideology, the glocalisation of the state has been seen as a strategy to promote investment in the most competitive regions while enhancing their locational advantages through the involvement of private actors – particularly business elites - in a more ‘entrepreneurial’ and elitist approach to governance. Third, the state, in cooperation with the private sector, has become the sponsor of such entrepreneurial initiatives (Swyngedouw, 1996, 2005b; Brenner, 1999). In Brenner’s words: ‘a major goal of these ‘glocally’ oriented state institutions is to enhance the locational advantages and productive capacities of their territorial jurisdictions as maximally competitive nodes in the world economy’ (Brenner, 1999:440). Yet, the transformation of urban governance cannot be explained just by means of state re-structuring, but, the question of scale has become central to analysing urban/regional institutional and political changes. Crucially, urban regions must be viewed as ‘glocal’ spaces where social, economic and political processes take place at multiple and superimposed scales and where the struggle over the scale of governance has become central (Brenner, 1999, 2000, 2003). Therefore urban and regional governance must be analysed on different scales from the local to the global.

As already discussed, the strategic-relational approach combined with the insights provided by the analysis of the politics of scale offers a powerful structural framework to understand urban governance from a perspective that adequately situates the state in a globalising era. However, such a framework has empirical limitations. Collinge and Hall (1997) have argued referring to Neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony that, on the one hand, they tend to downplay the importance of political process, particularly how to build the capacity to govern effectively, and on the other hand, they neglect empirical investigation of how the relationship between hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies is articulated by hegemonic groups. In short, this framework can help us to address the why question of what the driving forces and motives of urban regeneration are but, in order to understand how the politics of regeneration are instituted – and they are instituted differently in different places - it is necessary to turn to other theories that raise issues of capacity building and prioritise empirical analysis. In this sense, many have pointed to the theories developed within American political science such as urban regime or growth machine (Collinge and Hall, 1997).

### 3.3 The politics of urban regeneration

Urban regime theory (Stone, 1989, 1993; Stoker and Mossberger, 1993; Lauria, 1997) and growth machine analysis (Logan and Molotch, 1987) have been, since the 1980s, the two most influential political economy approaches for the study of urban transformation (Harding, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).
Logan and Molotch developed the concept of growth machine as an alternative approach to the ‘reigning sociological paradigm of ‘urban ecology’’ (Logan, 2007: viii). For them urban development is influenced by the market, which cannot be considered free, but also by ‘conflicting interests, contested plans, and policy choices’ (Logan, 2007: viii). Thus, in their analysis, they consider the ‘underlying ‘structural’ relations’ (Logan, 2007:12) but place emphasis on human agency by giving ‘primary attention to the strategies, schemes, and needs of human agents and their institutions at the local level’ (Logan, 2007:12). Drawing on Henri Lefebvre they contend that space is socially produced and, through an empirical approach, set out to explore how it is produced (Logan, 2007). Their main focus and where their explanation of urban change lies is the conflict between use and exchange values of real estate (Logan, 2007).

The growth machine model is focused on the conflict between use and value interests which brings about the formation of coalitions of local property owners and other ‘place entrepreneurs’ with the objective of promoting growth (Wood, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). The consensus over economic growth - represented by the intensification of land uses - is what maintains the collaboration within the coalition (Molotch, 1976). Thus, according to Logan, uncovering who rules is as important as investigating ‘for what’ they govern (Logan, 2007). The elites pursue their growth objectives by trying to influence public policies to prioritise growth over residents’ necessities and create a good ‘business climate’ – for instance providing tax incentives, vocational training, protection of property and social control to avoid conflict (Molotch, 1976, 1979; Wood, 1996; Logan, 2007). They also compete with other groups and localities for public funds, subsidies and infrastructure (Molotch, 1976; Logan, 2007). Yet, not only those who make money from land or from generating rent are interested in participating in the growth coalition, also other actors, such as business people, corporate capitalists, local media, leaders of public or quasi-public agencies (e.g. universities, utilities), politicians, museums, theatres, professional sports, union leaders, self-employed professionals and small retailers, feel that have a stake in it since growth is considered to bring jobs, prestige and, a wider clientele, audience or even constituency (Molotch, 1976, 1979; Logan, 2007). In later work (Logan et al., 1997, Molotch et al., 2000) the growth machine model has been revised and updated by stressing the importance of amenities and cultural consumption to explain growth and urban economic vitality, to take into account more recent developments in the economic restructuring of post-industrial cities. The focus has turned to competition based on livability rather than on land use intensification. According to Clark et al. (2002:496), ‘in many locations, smart or managed growth strategies have replaced the growth machine as the driving civic ideology’.

Urban regime theory was also developed in the US within the pluralist tradition as a response to neo-classical economic accounts of urban redevelopment and local government, and can be situated in the middle ground between the structuralist and liberal positions (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). The focus of the analysis is on decision-making based on individual choice and rejecting economic determinism (Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). However, the approach recognises that access to urban politics is uneven and depends on the structural position of the actors (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). Governments need to build the capacity to govern and, given the separation between market and state, search for collaboration outside their boundaries.
In short, the model of power adopted is of social production in which the elites, through coalition building and their access to informal networks are able to mobilise the powers within the local government and achieve pursued policy outcomes (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Mossberger, 2001).

Stone defined an urban regime as ‘the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions’ (Stone, 1987:6 in Hubbard and Hall, 1998) or ‘the set of agreements (or perhaps substantive policy dispositions) by which the division of labour between political and economic institutions is managed’ (Stone 1993:2 in Collinge and Hall, 1997). It is constituted by a number of interest groups that cooperate to achieve their objectives in terms of policies (Ward, 1996; Mossberger, 2001).

But, as Mossberger (2001) has explained drawing on Stone’s writings from 1989 to 1993, in order to be able to conceptualise an urban regime as such, additional properties are needed. First, there must be government and business participation in the coalitions. Governments need the economic capacity of businesses and the popular support that their economic activity can generate, while businesses need the government’s democratic legitimacy. The respective position of business and urban governments varies in different regimes depending on how much governments need business-sourced taxes and to what extent businesses are economically successful (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993). Second, collaboration must be achieved through informal networks as well as through formal institutions. This cooperation is often problematic and not free from conflict since the interests and points of view of such a diversity of participants can be contradictory and therefore, consensus and a common line of action must be constructed (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993). Third, policy agendas depend on the composition of the coalition and therefore it must be possible to identify them in relation to the participants. The interests of different groups are brought together in a regime and reflected in the policies that are implemented. For instance, in places where a policy based on mega-projects and events is instituted – such as Valencia - the interests typically found can be electoral for politicians because mega-projects and events often have popular support, professional and economic for architects and construction companies because they benefit from appealing contracts and, economic for the owner’s of mega-events because they find support for their business. Fourth, there must be long-term cooperation although temporary coalitions may be considered as ‘failed regimes’. Finally, collaboration tends to produce consensus over policy although agreement over values and beliefs is not necessary. Popular agreement with the policy initiatives is not a necessary condition although, it is recognised by urban regime theorists that popular politics are important since citizen mobilisation and opposition can disrupt successful regimes (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993).

Therefore, as derived from above, the specific agendas of urban regimes are not a component of the conceptualisation since they vary depending on the participants of the coalition. However, based on policy objectives, different types of regime have been defined to facilitate analysis (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Mossberger, 2001). The main types according to Stone are: maintenance or caretaker regimes, development regimes that are concerned with changing land use to promote growth; middle-class progressive regimes, which include aims such as environmental protection, historic preservation,
affordable housing, and linkage funds; and lower-class opportunity expansion regimes (Mossberger, 2001).

To summarise, the urban regime approach rejects economism and places stress on politics and the need for electoral legitimacy (Ward, 1996; Collinge and Hall, 1997). It uses a social production model of power in contrast with a social control power. This means that attention is drawn not towards who has the power over but to how the power to is achieved. (Mossberger, 2001) Thus, the building of political alliances and construction of coalitions become essential activities in order to achieve the capacity to govern. On the other hand, participation in the governing coalitions is achieved through the distribution of economic or symbolic incentives (Collinge and Hall, 1997). Public collaboration with private actors is considered imperative in order to produce the capacity to govern given the division of labour between market and state and the necessity of both resources - electoral legitimacy and capital (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Mossberger, 2001). In this way, the participation of a plurality of interests is emphasised given that the impossibility of control in a liberal democracy is acknowledged (Mossberger, 2001). Finally, the structure of power and the policies adopted depend on the composition of the governing coalition and therefore the impact of economic interests is accounted for through the participation of the business elites in the governing coalitions (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Mossberger, 2001).

Both approaches have obvious similarities, mainly that they reject economic determination and emphasise the central role of the elites in urban governance (Wood 1996). Yet, while the growth machine approach focuses on specifying the interests involved in the governing coalitions, which it links to urban development and real estate (Harding, 1997), urban regime theory focuses on the analysis of the construction of electorally legitimised coalitions (Wood 1996). Thus, regime theory tries to explain how the capacity to govern is achieved (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).

The focus of the urban regime and growth machine models on the social processes involved in the production of space and urban governance suggests that they may be useful for the analysis of how the politics of regeneration are instituted. They have directed attention to the social and economic actors outside the formal institutions of government, who are involved in governance and decision-making. However, they share weaknesses too. In both cases, the stress on internal alliances, coalition building dynamics and local actors, it has been argued, has implied a voluntarist emphasis on agency, a neglect of structure and the wider social and economic context beyond the urban (for instance globalisation processes) and, therefore, a localist focus (Ward, 1996; Wood 1996; Harding, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Thus, although some (Mossberger, 2001) see the combination of structure and agency in its analysis as one of the strengths of urban regime theory others have accused it of being voluntarist, undertheorised, empiricist, localist and of disregarding structural forces (Wood 1996; Collinge and Hall, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). According to Fainstein (2001:14) ‘while regime theory recognizes the importance of economic structure, it does not incorporate the forces creating that structure into its argument.’
This localism and undertheorisation has meant that the urban regime and growth machine models do not travel well. Moreover, having emerged within the US context, both models are open to charges of ethnocentrism. In fact, they are an abstraction of the American urban politics where local governments are highly dependent on private capital (Wood 1996; Harding, 1997; Mossberger, 2001; Pierre, 2005). Moreover, as with other structural forces, the form of the state, its role and structural relationships are neglected for it is only taken into account as part of a regime or growth coalition (Collinge and Hall, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). This is problematic for various reasons. First, it is often the state that sets the rules and controls the formation of regimes and coalitions, for instance, appointing members of local quangos (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Second, not only they are subject to the policies and demands of national and increasingly supra-national levels of government but are very often highly dependent on state funding (Ward, 1996; Harding, 1997). In Ward’s words, regimes and coalitions ‘may appear ‘bottom-up’ because that is the way they have been studied’ (Ward, 1996:432).

On the other hand, both models over-simplify the problem of scale in relation to the conceptualisation of state and in the consideration of the spatial context of analysis (Ward, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Particularly, they do not take into consideration the scalar complexity of globalisation processes and the implications for the state and for economic interests, which they place mainly in the local and regional level and divide, in a simplistic way, in local and non-local (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Phelps and Wood, 2006).

In short, the weaknesses that the growth machine and urban regime theories need to overcome are similar: ethnocentrism, voluntarism, empiricism and undertheorisation, neglect of the role of the state, localism and an unproblematised consideration of scale. However, the applicability of the growth machine approach is more restricted because it places too much emphasis on real estate property and rent, failing to account for a range of interests in the local economy other than growth. In the same way social interests are reduced to those of residents neglecting, for instance, questions of production and therefore labour interests (Wood 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Therefore, the urban regime model, with the necessary modifications, will be of greater interest for my purpose.

Regarding the charges of ethnocentricity, the transfer of the urban regime concept to the European context is difficult since it was developed for the US context where the relationships of the governments at different levels and with the private sector are different. However, it has been argued that the spread of neoliberal policies has brought about a convergence between the US and Europe in economic regeneration strategies, competitiveness or entrepreneurialism, and in institutional structures with the emergence of public-private partnerships that has made the understanding of the dynamics of urban governance more relevant and widened the scope for the use of the American political economy approach, especially the urban regime model (Wood 1996; Mossberger, 2001; Logan, 2007).

Thus, some commentators have used the urban regime concept in Europe, at regional, local and even at the borough level in the case of London (Wood 1996; Mossberger, 2001). For instance, Stewart (1996 in Stewart, 2003) identified an ‘incipient regime’ in Bristol and, later, DiGaetano and Klemanski (2000 in Stewart, 2003) characterised it as a pro-growth regime. Also, in their study of the
regeneration process, Collinge and Hall (1997) identified an urban regime in Birmingham. Harding (1997) studied five European cities - Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Edinburgh, Hamburg and Manchester – and concluded that, although there are important differences with the American cases, it is possible to find development coalitions and informal networks of governance.

Although there are also variations between different countries in Europe some conclusions as to the general contrast between US and Europe emerge from the empirical studies. First, in Europe local governments tend to receive resources from central governments and own land for public development. Therefore they are less dependent on private sector capital, have more control over the development process than local governments in the US and are less autonomous from central governments (Harding, 1997; Mossberger, 2001). Second, the balance of power and of participation in partnerships between the public and the private sector differs. In Europe, the participation of the different levels of government and of public or quasi-public agencies tends to be higher (Harding, 1997; Mossberger, 2001). Moreover, in many cases the local authorities take up the role of coordinating urban regimes (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Quilley, 1999). Also central governments become important partners by sponsoring and encouraging the formation of coalitions (Harding, 1997; Mossberger, 2001). For those reasons, urban regimes in Europe also tend to be less stable.

In this way - through the comparison of case studies and the classification of empirical characteristics – the urban regime concept has been developed. Stoker and Mossberger (1993) developed a typology of regimes based on their general purpose and described their empirical characteristics with respect to the motivations of the participants, the congruence of their interests, their sense of common purpose and the strategies they use to deal with other levels of government and the wider environment. It included three types of regime: instrumental, organic and symbolic regimes. Instrumental regimes – which are dominant in the US – aim to maintain the status quo, organic regimes are focused on the realization of specific projects and, symbolic regimes have the purpose of redirecting the ideology or image of a city. Within the symbolic type Stoker and Mossberger (1993) described a subtype which they called urban revitalization regimes. This kind of regime intends to change the image of the city in order to attract investment. Through the use of symbols they aim to mobilize positive attitudes about the city which can help the city to attract new investment. Remarkably, the description of this type of regime corresponds with the description of entrepreneurial cities engaged in city marketing discussed in Chapter two, and brings to mind Valencia’s case study.

Although the procedure of comparing case studies and classifying them according to their empirical characteristics has been defended as appropriate for the study of a dynamic process (Mossberger, 2001), the construction of theory based on case studies is problematic (Ward 1996). In this sense, although the concept has been modified to expand its applicability to a wider number of cases and ideal typologies have been developed in order to construct a common framework for analysis (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993; Mossberger, 2001) there are fundamental aspects, such as the conditions and mechanisms underpinning regime formation and maintenance, that cannot be clarified by referring to prototypical regimes (Ward 1996).
In order to explain regime formation Cox (in Wood, 1996; Ward, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999) proposed the concept of local dependence defined as ‘a relation to locality that results from the relative spatial immobility of some social relations, perhaps related to fixed investments in the built environment or to the particularization of social relations’ (Cox and Mair, 1989:142 in Wood 1996). It means that the interests of particular actors, including local governments, are attached to a locality in diverse forms and are ‘effectively realised through the growth of the local economy’ (Wood 1996:1291). However, although the concept is useful for the analysis of the relation with space of the capitalist economy it does not have enough explanatory power to identify concrete interests – as in the case of utilities – or to account for the scalar complexities of governance and the territoriality of the state (Wood 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Mossberger, 2001).

Several other solutions have been proposed in order to overcome the undertheorisation of the urban regime model. Some commentators have suggested increasing the level of abstraction through the use of concepts such as policy network or governance. Policy network includes different types of cross-institutional collaboration from those integrated by a low number of participants and a stable relationship to those with a large number of participants and a limited interconnection, and therefore can include urban regimes (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Mossberger, 2001). This approach tries to go beyond the dualism between public and private interests by considering that different departments and institutions within the government have certain degrees of autonomy, and to incorporate the different levels of government into the analysis in order to avoid localism in decision-making (Jones, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). But, as with urban regime, the concept has been criticised for neglecting structure and the wider social and economic contexts (Jones, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In this way, it remains useful to inform us about the processes at play but gives little information as to why they occur.

On the other hand, Pierre (1999) has proposed the use of the concept of governance –within institutional theory - to ‘bring together regime theory, theories of the local state, and urban political economy into a broader analytical framework’ (Pierre, 1999:376). From this perspective, a ‘regime should be conceived of as a culturally and historically specific model of urban governance’ (Pierre, 2005:446) ‘in terms of the configuration of actors, the types of goals and objectives pursued, and so on’ (Pierre, 2005:453). Governance as a theory is concerned with processes of ‘regulation, coordination, and control’ (Pierre, 1999:376), whereby ‘local authorities, in concert with private interests, seek to enhance collective goals’ (Pierre, 1999:374). In this way the role of government becomes an empirical question for ‘urban governance makes no prejudgment about the cast of actors involved in shaping the urban political agenda, nor does it make any assumptions about the normative direction and objectives of the governing coalition’ (Pierre, 2005:452). Such a framework for urban politics, he contends, would allow for comparative research between different regional or national contexts and, by integrating urban regime within it, theorise its underpinnings. Moreover, according to Pierre (1999:376), ‘the governance approach to urban politics highlights the wide range of constraints on local authorities' abilities to bring about change in the local community’.
In general, moving to higher levels of abstraction entails the risk of explaining the processes in less depth instead of understanding the causes behind them. Therefore, in my opinion a more fruitful approach is to combine urban regime theory with theories at higher levels of abstraction. By doing that, undertheorisation can be avoided and the structure and the role of the state considered. In this sense, various have been the suggestions. For instance, on the one hand, Ward (1996) and Wood (1996) have pointed to regulation theory. On the other hand, Collinge and Hall (1997) have proposed the combination of regime theory with neo-gramscian theory. Also MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) have suggested this alternative since for them combining regime theory with regulation theory to overcome its undertheorisation causes methodological ambiguity. Having discussed both theories in the previous section, suffice it to say now that, in my opinion, a strategic-relational approach can serve as a framework that helps link urban regimes with structural processes and - with the aid of the politics of scale literature – situate the (re-structuring) state, which at present plays an important role in the formation and maintenance of regimes. Moreover, linking urban regime with theories at different scale can help avoid reading local change off from global change.

Although they come from different traditions urban regime theory and the strategic-relational approach are philosophically compatible. First of all, both of them take into consideration the role of structure and agency.

The strategic-relational approach addresses the analysis of the state from a neo-Gramscian perspective. Seeking to avoid structuralism, it recognizes that in order to achieve hegemony politics matter. Given that the state cannot exercise control on its own, a ruling coalition in which a plurality of interests participate needs to be formed (Collinge and Hall, 1997). The state is considered a mediator between groups whose interests gravitate around different regimes of accumulation (Collinge and Hall, 1997). Leadership is mediated by the institutions and informal networks related to the state apparatus.

Urban regime theory - which appeared within the pluralist tradition - can be situated in the middle ground between the structuralist and liberal positions. It adopts a social production model of power in which the elites, through coalition building and their access to informal networks are able to mobilise the powers within the local government and achieve pursued policy outcomes (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). However, it recognizes that access to urban politics is uneven and depends on the structural position of the actors (Hubbard and Hall, 1998).

In this way, the strategic-relational approach, finds a way between structure and agency by introducing a political dimension (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Jones, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2005) while urban regime theory, although more focused on agency, introduces structure by taking into account the structural position of the actors.

On the other hand, the strategic-relational approach emphasizes the importance of the state as site of strategy and mediator between different interests. The state acquires a legitimating role and becomes a generator of strategy, as well as a product of strategy (Collinge and Hall, 1997). As different studies have pointed out (Harding, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Quilley, 1999; Mossberger, 2001), in
Europe, not only the participation of government in urban regimes is higher but, in many cases the local authorities take up the role of coordinating them too. In this manner, the importance of state leadership for regime formation has been recognized. Therefore, leadership provides a link between strategic relational approach and urban regime theory. In Valencia’s case, it is clearly local and regional governors who provide leadership.

Regarding leadership, the role of the ideational - semiosis and discourse - is of great relevance. As previously discussed, both the strategic relational approach –through cultural political economy – and urban regime theory –particularly in the case of symbolic regimes (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993) – emphasise the significance of semiosis and discourse. The case of Valencia also shows how politicians, besides providing leadership, provide vision, along with star architects.

The ideational is, therefore, intimately related to the construction of hegemonic projects but also to urban regime formation. Discourse and the strategic use of symbols, language and symbolic rewards, can motivate participation in regimes and help to build ‘a common sense of purpose’ (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993) or contribute –alongside the material – to the achievement of consensus around a program of action, resulting in the generation of a hegemonic project. For instance, the construction – including the semiotic construction - of a regional state in Valencia can be considered a hegemonic project, which is intimately linked to the use of symbols, particularly architectural symbols. In this way, concepts such as hegemonic project can help overcome the problem of undertheorisation of urban regime theory.

There is another reason why concepts such as hegemonic projects and the processes through which they are formed are useful to avoid undertheorisation. Although regime theory emphasises the existence of negotiation to arrive to a common sense of purpose, it maps policy outcomes directly to the different interests of the participants in the regime. Cultural political economy, instead, by considering both the conditions of action which go unacknowledged by actors and the struggles to transform those conditions of actions, avoids pure social constructivism (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008).

Therefore, although methodologically the combination of the strategic-relational and urban regime theory presents us with the difficulty of deciding the most appropriate way to interpret different empirical findings, by combining both approaches it is possible to build on the empirical strengths of regime theory while providing a firmer theoretical grounding.

However, in order to further develop an approach which combines strategic relational and regime approaches we need to take into consideration globalisation processes. Just like they have been considered in relationship to the state and, in order to overcome localism, globalisation processes have to be taken into account when considering the interests at play in urban regimes. Thus, political and economic interests at different and superimposed scales must be considered, not privileging one scale over the others and avoiding a simplistic distinction between global and local interests. In this sense I will draw on the work of Phelps and Wood (2006) about what they have termed ‘inward investment regimes’. In it they propose the notion of translation, a process whereby the interests of transnational capital, instead of being represented in a top-down manner, are modified when transferred between
geographical scales. This approach puts stress on the complex relationships between actors involved in translation processes at different scales and considers the interests of such actors as ‘only relatively autonomous from one another’ (Phelps and Wood, 2006:494). ‘Inward investment regimes’ are organizationally coherent coalitions which are territorialized locally but at the same time engaged with interests at multiple scales, and whose components, being involved in multiscalar networks of power, ‘translate between the interests of transnational capital and more local interests’ (Phelps and Wood, 2006:508). Thus, in contrast with traditional coalitions, ‘inward investment regimes’ are multiscalar in nature and less bounded to a certain geographical scale (Phelps and Wood, 2006). In short, the notion of translation, applied to the context of urban regeneration, can help us emphasise the complex scalar organisation of political and economic interests and to acknowledge the possible role of transnational elites in local coalition building.

3.4 The implications of the new politics of regeneration

Considered at structural level, processes of globalisation entail the transfer of global elements of neoliberalism as economic regeneration policies based on entrepreneurial strategies spread. Urban mega projects, as discussed in Chapter two, are conduits of globalisation and therefore of neoliberal practices – such as, for instance, the privatisation of management - too. Consequently, the literature on neoliberalism is useful to look for the implications –particularly at a governance level – of the urban policy based on mega projects and events. However, as Cochrane (2007) warns, although ‘neoliberalism’ can provide a tool to identify broad characteristics of contemporary urban policy, there is the danger of taking everything that occurs in contemporary politics as an example of neoliberalism, and this brings us to the problem of conceptualisation.

As Leitner, Peck and Sheppard (2007:316-317) have pointed out, some authors approach neoliberalism as ‘a diffuse regime of political-economic power’ while for others it is ‘a very loose bundle of political practices and governmentalities’. In this respect, in this section, neoliberalism will be considered as an effect rather than to explain the motives behind the urban policy, although neoliberal ideology – looked at from a cultural political economy viewpoint - is also important in the semiotic selection of certain policies and the success of particular hegemonic projects. In short, neoliberalism will be considered as a mode of governance. As explained by Keil (2002:239), ‘the concrete implementation of new technologies of power has played a key role in these processes of neoliberalization’.

The literature identifies the key features of neoliberalism, understood as technologies of power, that is: privatisation of management and public services, the ‘use of market style approaches in the public sector’ (Jessop 2002: 454) - for instance an ‘emphasis on performance, efficiency, and marketability of knowledge’ (Keil, 2002:234), the redefinition of citizens as clients, an approach to governance based on public private partnership and authoritarianism, and the lack of democratic accountability (Keil, 2002; Jessop 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). The analysis of examples of urban regeneration from that perspective provides a more detailed overview of the implications of the new urban policy based on mega projects and events.
As a result of the new approach to urban regeneration new organisations for the delivery of spatially targeted emblematic projects have proliferated. For instance, the Urban Development Corporations in the UK constitute a well documented instance of the kind of delivery organisations that characterise this new approach and one which can teach us many lessons (Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Colenutt, 1999; Cochrane, 1999; Brownhill, 1999). In Spain two paradigmatic and well-known cases of spatially targeted urban regeneration based on architecture and urban design where it is possible to find new delivery organisations are Barcelona – with the creation of the Olympic Holding, later transformed into the Agencia Metropolitana Barcelona Regional, SA - and Bilbao – with the constitution of Bilbao Metropoli 30, an association which included universities, business associations and other private organisations (Monclús, 2003; Gómez, 1998; Gómez, 1998).

These organisations are often project related and are considered to provide a more effective entrepreneurial approach to solving urban problems (Cochrane et al., 1996; Rodríguez et al., 2005; Swyngedouw et al., 2005b). This has been described as a shift from government to a governance system in which private actors – informal institutions, agencies, and business associations - are involved in the design and delivery of regeneration strategies (Swyngedouw, 1996; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Rodríguez et al., 2005).

An approach to governance that entails the mobilisation of key private actors - through business elite leadership but more often through public-private partnerships – is defended, from a neoliberal perspective, on the grounds of allegedly being more technically efficient, flexible, collaborative and participative (Cochrane et al., 1996; Jessop, 1997; Ward, 1998; Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill, 2000; Rodríguez et al., 2005; Gold, 2007). Thus, the practice of partnership has become the preferred organisational model of spatially targeted urban regeneration intervention and granted the private sector a greater influence over planning decision-making (Ward, 1998; Colenutt, 1999; Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill, 2000; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). However, a growing number of empirical studies have brought to light the potentially new outcomes in terms of impacts on democratic decision-making, planning possibilities and social and economic cohesion of this approach to regeneration and of the flagship developments themselves.

One of the legacies of regeneration experiences such as the Urban Development corporations in the UK or the Barcelona Olympics is the belief that economic success is linked to symbolism, tourism and business prosperity while other aspects and needs –welfare benefits, public transport and affordable housing – are neglected (Cochrane, 1999; Monclús, 2003). This new discourse has spread and rooted in the minds of politicians and regulators. In this way, market objectives of growth and economic success have been prioritised over social needs while the communities have been promised a mere trickle down (Beazley, 1997; Cochrane, 1999; Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005). Indeed, prestige urban projects focus on economic feasibility, are designed to capture global economic flows and adapted to international events and the use by affluent groups rather than to meet the everyday needs of local communities (Beazley, 1997; Gómez, 1998; Brenner, 1999; García, 2004a; Evans, 2005).

In addition, because the viability of large-scale urban projects depends on the returns from land revalorisation they tend to displace population either for the development of key urban sites or due to
gentrification processes, as the increase in rent prices the less affluent population out of the area (Zukin, 1995; Evans, 2005). Thus, real estate markets contribute to the creation of fragmented urban landscapes and accentuate socio-spatial polarisation and exclusion processes (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Evans, 2005). On the other hand, the benefits of the revalorisation of the land and the built environment are almost exclusively reaped by the elite. However, given the speculative nature of the investment there is financial risk involved and this is carried by the public sector for prestige mega-projects are almost always state-led and state financed (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Rodríguez et al., 2005). Again, social and economic polarisation processes are enhanced by what has been described as a transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector through the built environment (Swyngedouw et al., 2002).

Another legacy of the use of flagship projects and events - such as the Urban Development Corporations, the Manchester Olympic bid, the Athens Olympics and so on - is the emphasis on an approach that entails elite networking and public-private partnership in order to achieve competitive and pro-growth objectives (Cochrane, 1999; Gold, 2007). Thus, stakeholder participation has become normative and new committees, managing bodies and partnerships that cut across different levels of government and private sector organisations have flourished and acquired greater strategic and decision-making power (Swyngedouw et al., 2005a).

This shift towards quasi-private management structures - based on the premise that the performance of the private sector in managing resources is better - and the consequent partial loss of public control over the decision-making and development processes has been described as a privatisation of governance and planning since the new delivery bodies have displaced governmental and planning institutions (Cochrane et al., 1996; Collinge and Hall, 1997; Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Rodríguez et al., 2005; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). This privatisation entails the redistribution of power and competencies away from elected local governments and towards the private sector through the subordination of the local authorities to such quasi-private bodies and the redefinition of their role to becoming mere strategic enablers of the regeneration process (Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005a).

The growth of partnerships can be considered an instance of the broader move towards a more flexible, less hierarchical and stake-holder based style of decision-making (Rodríguez et al., 2005). Although this new approach is often portrayed as more bottom-up and participatory, in practice only a limited group of professionals and members of the elite - architects, planners, engineers, developers, economists, financiers, business leaders - are allowed to take part in decision-making. The general public input is restricted and postponed to very advanced stages of the process when the important decisions have already be made given that the main responsibility lies on the ‘experts’ (Beazley, 1997; Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005; Rodríguez et al., 2005; Coaffee and Johnston, 2007). In this way, certain groups are excluded from the decision-making process while the interests of the city are identified with those of the members of the business elites and privileged social groups.

The focus of the local political apparatus on the creation of adjunct means of governance is one of the ways in which the state is being glocalised, in an exercise of strategic selectivity of the state which
takes place through the formation of new elite coalitions and strengthening of the existing. Offering a link between regime theory and strategic selectivity, the new governance bodies, can also be seen as one of the vehicles where the arrangements for the cooperation between the public sector and private institutions characteristic of urban regimes crystallize and can take place.

Elitist decision-making means that democratic debate about costs and benefits is generally avoided and information about the real financial costs of the projects is not made available to the public (Beazley, 1997; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). Thus, as Swyngedouw (2002, 2005a) has argued, the need for creating networks of collaboration between the elites and the public sector in order to achieve the necessary stability to compete for state and private investment has enhanced the secrecy of the regeneration activities by leading them to restrict the access to information and data in order to prevent externals actors from de-stabilising the cohesion of the networks.

Therefore, the consequences of the privatisation of planning and the stakeholder approach to regeneration are an erosion of democratic decision-making, a deficit of representativity, an inadequate citizen participation, the exclusion of disadvantaged groups from decision-making and, a lack of political accountability and transparency (Gómez, 1998; Swyngedouw et al., 2002,2005a; Moulaert et al., 2005a). In short, a more autocratic style of governance, with its associated mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, is adopted (Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). In this way, contestation is minimised for mega projects are marketed as promoting growth for all (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008) and, furthermore, the transfer of public funds to private hands already mentioned occurs in an obscure way ‘and since relatively few people are directly injured, it is difficult to mobilize opposition’ (Orueta and Fainstein, 2008:761).

Finally, this trend is enhanced by the spread of the practice of considering exceptionality measures for the design and implementation of the urban mega-projects which is justified on the grounds of a their scale, significance for the whole of the city, the need for greater technical efficiency and shorter times of delivery (Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005a). As a consequence of their ‘exceptionality’ urban mega-projects are poorly or not at all integrated into urban plans of higher level (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). A style of planning through projects is instituted while, at the same time, the integrated plan at city level is replaced by a more business-like model of planning - the strategic plan (Monclus, 2003). This is not surprising given the involvement of the business elites in the planning process.

**3.5 Conclusion**

In order to answer the research questions theoretical and empirical tools are necessary. This chapter has dealt with theory. The adopted theoretical framework situates the problem in a context where economic forces are considered but that asserts that politics matter and where the formal and strategic dimensions of the state take centre stage. It considers that structural forces are very important for understanding urban change but it leaves space for human agency to allow for a greater emphasis on empirical analysis. In addition, scale is conceptualised as socially constructed. Last but not least,
emphasis is put on the spatial aspects because capital needs to be valorised in space and in our case this is done through flagship projects.

Therefore, with these premises, a combination of different theories and concepts has been useful from a theoretical perspective. On the one hand, I have drawn on the strategic-relational approach, cultural political economy and the literature on the politics of scale with the aim to consider globalisation and its scalar and spatial effects. On the other hand, I have drawn on urban regime theory combined with notions of translation of interests between geographical scales in order to consider globalisation and overcome localism.

Finally, for the study of the implications for planning practices of the politics of regeneration I have drawn on the literature of neoliberalism as a mode of governance and, a range of empirical analyses of the impacts of flagship developments.

The next chapter will deal with the empirical approach taken to answer the research questions. It will discuss the combination different research methods used to obtain the necessary data – mainly semi-structured interviews, press coverage analysis and analysis of documents - and the methodology and conceptual framework used for the analysis of the data collected.
4. RESEARCHING URBAN POLITICS IN VALENCIA

4.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration and, it is focused on the city of Valencia. With the support of a theoretical framework and an empirical methodology which provide guidance on the collection and analysis of data, this thesis aims to examine the different economic, political, social and cultural factors that have led to the use of such regeneration strategy, to understand the actual processes and actors involved in it and, to identify the implications for the built environment and for planning practices. A mix of research methods are used to collect the necessary data to help answer the main research questions, which include a why, a how and a what type question.

Thus, the main objectives of this thesis are to:

a) find out the implications for planning practices and for the shaping of the city’s physical form of the urban policy that uses spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration,

b) conceptualise and identify the causes of the formulation of such urban policy and,

c) identify and analyse the economic and political actors and processes at different scales and their interplay involved in the formulation and enactment of such urban policy.

4.2 Case study research

This research is intended to analyse the current social, political and economic forces that are transforming cities, taking as a starting point the supposition that different cultural and political traditions, technical rules and social practices greatly influence city production processes in a specific context. My standpoint is that globalisation is a heterogeneous phenomenon, dependent ‘on the social and specifically cultural character of the economy’ (Wood, 2004:124).

In my opinion, case study research, which has been defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 1994:13) is optimum for the topic I am looking at. Furthermore, I follow Flyvberg (2006) in the belief that more detailed case studies are needed for the production of a contextualised and effective social science.

Therefore, my research adopts a case study strategy which uses detailed evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon in a specific geographic, political and cultural context. On the one hand, the phenomenon studied - global architecture and urban development - is difficult to separate from the context and, on the other hand it is spatially fixed due to the ‘secondary circuit of capital’ (Harvey, 1978). Development industries and, land and property markets are place-specific and therefore must
be studied within their context. In addition, my case fits in the typical situation where a case study strategy is preferred, that is, according to Yin (1994), when the questions being posed are of a ‘how’ and ‘why’ type and the researcher has little control over events.

The selected case study is the city of Valencia in Spain, where, in the last two decades, both the local and regional governments have tried to reimage the city to make it attractive to investors and tourists through large investments in infrastructure, prestige projects and the organisation of international events. Indeed, Valencia is a good example of city entrepreneurialism. Moreover, the urban and economic regeneration strategies represented by a myriad of emblematic projects have fuelled the development of a diffuse, fragmented and polarised city-region and, consequently, contributed to its perverse environmental and social effects.

Being an in-depth single case study, its significance is not statistical but it is related to ‘what it tells us about the world in which it is embedded’ (Burawoy et al., 1991:281). There are many reasons why the Valencian case is relevant from an academic perspective. First, Valencia is unique in terms of long standing and continuous emphasis on global architecture. There are several flagship projects not just a few, which indicates the significance for the case. Second, the strategy of using emblematic architecture has been used by different political parties and has remained the same over time and across different levels of government. Third, as argued by academics such as Prytherch (2003, 2005), it offers an excellent example of Regionalism and construction of local identity in the context of globalisation and political re-scaling. Finally, it has not only imported models but produced them too, as other Spanish regions have used the Valencian Urbanism Act as a model for their own laws.

On the other hand, regarding the design of the case study, it includes three flagship projects as units of analysis, which are the City of Arts and Sciences, the projects linked to the celebration of the America’s Cup sailing competition and Sociopolis. I study three projects because, since I am trying to unearth processes and the relative importance of the actors, my data needs to be comprehensive in the range of actors to investigate rather than in the number of projects. The processes analysed in each of the projects show several parallels since all of the flagships have been subject to very similar economic and political general trends.

Furthermore, the selected projects are of different kinds - a cultural mega-project, a sporting event and a housing development - but all of them have the same approach, the use of emblematic architecture to achieve urban revitalisation and economic growth. The purpose is not to analyse different approaches to regeneration – culture-led or property-led for instance - but to analyse the common ‘way of doing’ they have. What their commonalities in terms of processes, interests and actors can tell us about the causes, operation modes, and consequences of the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration.

Finally, the projects are in different phases of development and started at different times. The City of Sciences can be considered the first ‘competitive’ mega-project in the city and the one which has taken longer to be completed. This cultural mega-project was first conceived at the end of the 1980s
and was finished in 2009. Meanwhile, in 2003 Valencia was selected as a venue for the America’s Cup sailing competition in 2007. A second edition was held in the city in 2010. Sociopolis was presented for the first time in the Valencia Bienal of 2003 and is still being executed. Therefore the selected projects can provide a chronological perspective. In addition, the evolution of the regeneration strategies, the impact of different historical and economic moments in the processes and the influence of the perceived result of one project over the others can be studied through them.

From an empirical perspective, I set out to study prestige mega-projects for different reasons. On the one hand, they are the meeting point of global, national, regional and local political and economic interests, that is to say, the transnational class, local hegemonies and ‘national’ political projects. On the other hand, they reflect the power struggles among different elite groups to influence and try to shape built environments and forms of governance to their convenience (Zukin, 1995; Hubbard, 1996; Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005b). Also, in their conception and development, processes at different scales interact and are condensed. Thus, through this interaction of scales, global trends are captured and incorporated in a localised setting, or as Moluaert has put it, through them ‘globalisation becomes urbanised’ (Moulaert et al., 2005:3). In this way, prestige mega-projects become the expression of the socio-spatial and scalar political restructuring of the city and the changes in the relationships between scales. Yet, these spatialised interventions are embedded in their geographical contexts and institutional frameworks (Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005b). They are also highly ‘localised’ since it is through the built environment – and particularly through them – that capital from different scales is geographically fixed and valorised (Brenner, 1999; Moulaert et al., 2005a:47).

Finally, flagship projects are not only empirical manifestations of globalisation, but also motors of change. They can be considered conduits of globalisation and of changes in the form of governance. In this sense flagship developments and the decision-making and development processes related to them contribute to the spatial reorganisation and the shaping of a new way of doing. Therefore they constitute empirical instances where some processes are evidenced. Through them we can analyse processes of urban change such as urban restructuring, the interaction between the local and the global, socio-spatial transformation, regulatory framework reforms and changes in the ways of doing (Swyngedouw et al., 2005b; Moulaert et al., 2005).

4.3 Research methodology and research methods

The research methodology involves a mix of different qualitative methods. It comprises different phases, from the identification of the key issues to be studied to the drawing of final conclusions. Thus, I have followed different steps. First, I have identified the relevant issues and have situated the selected case study through an initial literature review. Second, I have conducted a secondary literature review with the purpose of establishing initial theoretical and empirical frameworks with which to analyse the case studies. This secondary review has included two sets of literature, one purely theoretical on the issues identified in the first phase of research – covering theories of urban politics, political-economic theories, city competitiveness, globalisation and actors of globalisation -
and the other one empirical, aimed to contextualise the case study – which has included literature on Spanish and Valencian urbanism, and urban regeneration case studies. Third, I have conducted empirical research, which has entailed the collection and analysis of data about the Valencian context and the three flagship projects. Four main research methods have been used to obtain both contextual and specific data on the flagship projects studied, that is, elaboration and analysis of secondary data, document analysis, press coverage analysis and analysis of original data from semi-structured interviews. Lastly, I have reviewed literature in reference to relevant aspects for the interpretation of the findings identified during the conduction of the empirical phase of the research. Then I have evaluated the findings and, have drawn final conclusions.

As previously stated I have used a variety of research methods during the empirical phase of the research. On the one hand, I have used secondary data - including contextual information and data about specific case studies - as background information for interviews and, later on, during the interviewing phase, I have used it to corroborate of interview and press records (Flyvbjerg, 1997). Data have been drawn from statistical material published by public and private sources, academic studies, governmental, public agencies and business reports, general and architectural press.

The different types of documents that have been collected to be analysed include, for instance, strategic plans (e.g.: Plan estratégico de Valencia’, 1996; ‘Plan Estratégico de Valencia 2015’), city-marketing documents (e.g.: ‘Valencia en Marcha’, ‘Valencia, ciudad de oportunidades para la inversión’ and ‘Valencia modelo de ciudad’, ‘Valencia motor del Mediterráneo’), urban and territorial development documents (e.g.: Plan de Desarrollo Urbanístico de la Comunidad Valenciana, 1993; Estrategias de Vertebración Territorial, 1995, Plan General de Ordenación Urbana de Valencia, 1988), marketing documents of the specific projects and masterplans.

As the main research method, and in order to analyse decision-making and development processes, I have conducted sixty-two face to face semi-structured (elite) interviews, of an average duration of 60 minutes each. Twenty-five of the interviews were mainly general about the use of prestige projects in Valencia or also covered more than one of the flagships, when the interviewees had first-hand information about them. The remainder of the interviews were specific of the projects – 14 for The City of Arts and Sciences, 12 for the America’s Cup and 11 for Sociopolis.

Semi-structured interviews, particularly elite interviews, are considered to provide a richness of detail and complexity about certain phenomena which other approaches – such as surveys or statistical data – fail to offer (Schoenberger, 1991). For other researchers (Smith, 2006), however, the distinction between elite and non-elite interviews is based on inadequate conceptions of power since defining an individual as belonging to an elite is problematic. Anyway, in the case of Valencia’s urban policy based on mega-projects and events, the interviewees have been considered to belong to the ‘elite’ in reference to their access to specific knowledge, whether because they have been involved in the implementation of the policy or affected by it (as it is the case of civic groups). The interviewees have included a varied range of actors such as municipal and regional politicians, planning officials, public agencies or institutes (e.g. the Valencian Institute of Housing or ‘Consorcio Valencia 2007’, which is
a partnership constituted by the central, regional and local governments and created for the organisation of the America’s Cup), academics, members of the city marketing organisation (i.e. CEyD), business groups (i.e. Chamber of Commerce), developers’ organisations, real estate agents, professional bodies, political parties, economic institutions, community representatives, journalists and editors, construction company representatives and developers, private professionals (architects, engineers, planners) and other interest groups.

Last but not least, I have conducted a press coverage analysis of a main general information newspaper. The newspaper chosen has been *El País* because it is ‘Spain’s largest circulation daily newspaper’ and it is considered ‘a source of reference for the most influential sectors of society’ (Nexis UK). *El País* was established in 1976. The Valencian edition - which since 1995 contains a special regional supplement - started to be published in 1987, just before the first of the three projects studied in this thesis started (www.elpais.com). One main newspaper has been considered to be sufficient for the purpose of complementing, corroborating information from the interviews and establishing the sequence of events.

I believe it is important to stress the importance for the validity and reliability of the research of having used multiple sources of evidence - interviews, press coverage and documents - and of having considered independent data sets about the same information in combination. In this way, data sources have been triangulated, allowing for the corroboration of information and augmentation of evidence (Yin, 2003).

The documents have been used to corroborate information, although they present the downside of being of uneven coverage. This problem has been overcome with the use of a systematic analysis of press coverage. In addition to avoiding the excluding of important events that might not come out in the interviews I have also used the press to establish a chronology of events, which at the same time has helped maintain the chain of evidence.

Finally, being a case study of a single city in a particular historical and geographic context this thesis’ aim is not to generalise results in a statistical manner but to contribute to the research already conducted for other cases. Thus, the case of Valencia covers generalisable theoretical issues in the study of urban politics - such as the role of the estate at different levels, the role of political projects and accumulation strategies and the importance of global and local actors, for instance – and therefore it allows for an analytical generalisation to broader theories. In Burawoy’s (1991:279) words, ‘it seeks generalisation through reconstructing existing generalisations, that is, the reconstruction of existing theory’.
4.4 Data collection

The process of data collection has been systematic and closely related to the research questions and the theoretical framework established beforehand. It has involved the collection of documents and press, and the conduction of research interviews.

The data to collect is intended to answer the research questions but, in order to make the process operational, intermediate steps are necessary. Thus, three types of questions can be distinguished in this research. First, at a more general level, there are the three research questions – which I have called the why, the how and the what question – then there are the questions of inquiry, that is to say questions to ask to the flagship projects as units of analysis – which are direct questions that as researcher I pose to myself – and finally the questions for the interviewees, which are indirect and are questions to use in the field (Foddy, 1993; Gillham, 2000; Yin, 2003).

The procedure I have used to decide which data to collect has been to produce a table which links the data to be collected to the questions to be answered. In the table, the different levels of questions, the source and type of data to collect and the theoretical concepts which help formulate the questions of enquiry are linked in a chain; theoretical concept, research question, questions of enquiry, source of data (interviews, press or documents), type of data (direct or indirect). Thus, the table contains information about; the concepts or theories from the literature review which help me formulate the questions of enquiry and will guide me in the later analysis as well, the data necessary to answer the questions and, the sources from where it can be collected (interviews, press or documents). Finally, it says whether the data answers the question directly or it needs further interpretation to relate to the question.

From there I have gone on to produce an interview schedule with the questions to ask in the field, which are not direct but are likely to produce the necessary information. The questions are divided by general or specific to projects and by topic (design, economic, delivery, communication and marketing, etc.). After the first interviews I refined the questionnaire. The resulting final research questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.

However, being open-ended interviews the topics and issues covered have been the same and generally all of them have been covered in each of the interviews but the actual questions, the order of them and the emphasis on the different topics has varied depending on the knowledge of the interviewee and the development of the interview.

Having produced a research questionnaire, the next issue is to decide who to interview, what Saunders (1979) has called the problem of identification in urban politics research since ‘before it can begin to analyse what the powerful do, it must first identify who the powerful are’ (Saunders, 1979:327). However, the aim of this research is not to identify who the powerful are but, within a pluralist tradition, it is more interested in how power is exercised and assumes that power lies in political
institutions but also outside of them. In trying to address the why question it looks for political projects and accumulation strategies considering that not only elected politicians have an influence on them. On the one hand politicians depend on votes, on the other there are other powerful groups with different interests also. Not least, beyond specific interests, politicians as well as other actors are part of a society and they share values, beliefs and perceptions, as it has been found in this research. For instance, ideas of modernity are a commonality found across different actors and form part of the Valencian imaginary.

Therefore, the research needs to take into account as many points of views as possible, especially of people or groups that are in positions of influence due to their access to economic and political resources and people who have first-hand information because they have been directly involved in the projects. Clearly, this includes members of the local and regional governments and, those ‘who control local material resources, who enjoy strong numerical support, who occupy strategic locations in social-political networks, who have expert knowledge or are in a position to control the distribution of information’ (Saunders, 1979:333-334).

The techniques used to select who the key actors to interview were have been to search in internet, business directories and published books about local themes, to ask informants and, last but not least, to ask other interviewees. Thus, apart from talking to academics which have acted as informants and provided me with important contacts, at the end of each one of the interviews I have checked the list of selected contacts and of the already conducted interviews with the interviewees, and have asked for suggestions. Generally, there has been a coincidence in who different people pointed to me as a relevant person to interview.

All this has been done in a systematic manner by creating a table which was organised by type of actor –academic, politician, architect, business group, press, developer, citizen organisation, etc. - and type of interview - general or about each one of the projects - and periodically updated to always ensure that all types of actors for each type of interview where covered and that the quantity of each of them was balanced. The sample is not ‘complete’ but it covers a wide range of actors and it is balanced in the number of each of the type of actors interviewed. The final list of interviews can be found in Appendix B.

Indeed, not only deciding who to interview but accessing ‘elite interviewees’ has been another problem to overcome. Interviewees have been contacted by email, by cold calling, in book presentations and other events or through other interviewees and contacts. Many times a lot of insistence and patience has been necessary but when an interview has not been possible I have substituted it by other with the help of the contacts table. Although some actors have been reluctant to grant an interview, being an architect and coming from a prestigious foreign University – despite having been born in Valencia - has helped me gain access to relevant actors and allowed me to present myself as an insider or an outsider at my own advantage. According to Sabot (1999) local elites are more willing to give information to foreign than to local researchers because they feel less ‘threatened’ by the use they can make of the knowledge acquired. On the other hand, it is often
assumed that ‘insiders’ are in a privileged position to understand the context of the research. This brings to mind reflections about the positionality of the researcher and the dichotomy insider-outsider. Given that the positionality of both interviewer and interviewee can change over time and in relationship to what identity attributes are stressed, Herod (1999) has proposed that the dualism insider-outsider should be substituted by the idea of ‘degrees of outsiderness’, which implies that the relationship between the researcher and the researched involves a ‘sliding scale of intimacy’ (Herod, 1999:326).

On the other hand, as Ward and Jones (1999) have argued, beyond the positionality of the researcher, the kind of knowledge acquired and responses obtained from semi-structured interviews depend on the political-temporal contingencies that affect research access. For them, the researcher not only needs to be reflexive regarding issues of his or her own personality, class, gender, nationality and so on in relationship to the object of research and the interviewees, but also theoretically reflexive. Therefore, Ward and Jones (1999) argue, politics must be placed inside the research design for research access to elites ‘is conditioned by the politics of time and the geographical complexities of place’ (1999:304) and ‘the researchers need to be aware that they are unable to completely remove themselves from their context’ (1999:309).

In that respect, it is important to mention that, the period of conducting the interviews has coincided with a moment when many democratically elected representatives and politicians were being prosecuted for corruption. Although I was afraid that this fact and the distrust atmosphere it might create would have a critical impact on empirical work, in reality, the response has been largely positive and it has been possible to interview enough – in range and number - key actors. Perhaps, being in an early stage of the judicial processes and a moment where momentum in popular discontent and opposition to the urban policy based on mega projects had not been reached, the sensitivity of the topic was not very high yet. Also, I believe, the ethos of an urban policy that aimed to market the city and make it known internationally has influenced the willingness of the actors involved in it to discuss the policy. Nevertheless, I have found that, generally, it has been easier to access politicians who are not currently in office although there have been exceptions. On the other hand, star architects, such as Santiago Calatrava, have not been possible to access. However they have been substituted by their trusted representatives.

Having got access to the key actors, it is important to obtain as much as possible of the evidence needed rather than just the information that the interviewee wants to disclose or which is in his or her agenda. To achieve that I have used different techniques for guiding the conversation but at the same time letting the interviewees express their point of view. First of all the style of questioning has been non-aggressive in order to make the interviewee feel at ease, but, I have pointed out inconsistencies. Secondly, I have left them talk with little interruption for, after a long conversation, interviewees dropped off their guard and were happy to discuss any topic in a relaxed way. Also, when it has been possible, I have waited for them to touch on controversial topics instead of introducing them myself. Otherwise, I have introduced them casually. Lastly, in the final part of the interview, when the
interviewee was comfortable I have gone back to important matters, to issues that had been identified during the interview as key or where the interviewee could have more to say.

Usually, the interviewees have spoken quite freely. Sometimes I have been requested to stop recording for a while or to not use some of the information but, most of the interviewees have not shown concern about the use of the information after learning that it was for academic purposes.

The interviews have been conducted in Spanish - mother tongue of both interviewer and interviewees – which has helped to avoid misunderstandings, to capture the subtleties of the spoken and non-spoken language and to understand the cultural context.

On the other hand, the collection of press articles has been done with the aid of the online electronic database Nexis UK, which allows downloading electronic versions of the articles selected with the use of filters. For the selected newspaper – the Spanish newspaper *El País* - there are electronic records from 18th April 1996 and therefore for the search of articles from previous dates – which total 70 - it was necessary to go to the newspaper and periodicals section of the Public Library of Valencia, go through the paper edition of the newspaper and photocopy them. I also did a final selection of articles in order to rule out those which were not relevant because only mentioned the project laterally.

The period covered for the search of articles of each project starts when each project was first made public and finishes on the date when I first started collecting the articles, which is 20 March 2010.

Thus, for The City of Arts and Sciences the period covered has been from 1st January 1989 until 20th March 2010. The filters applied have been a combination of the search terms ‘Ciudad de las artes y las ciencias’ or ‘Ciudad de las Ciencias’ or ‘Ciudad de la Ciencia’ or ‘CACSA’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’ anywhere in the article.

For the America’s Cup the period of time covered has been from 19th April 1996 until 20th March 2010. Four sets of search words anywhere in the article have been applied: first, ‘Copa del America’ and ‘32’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’, second, ‘ACM’ and ‘Consorcio Valencia 2007’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’, third, ‘Valencia litoral’ or ‘Marina Real Juan Carlos I’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’ and, fourth, ‘Veles e Vents’ or ‘foredeck’ and ‘copa’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’.

For Sociopolis the period of time covered has been from 1st January 2003 until 20th March 2010 and includes a combination of the articles found in two different searches, the first with the words ‘Sociopolis’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’, and the second with the words ‘Plan especial’ and ‘la Torre’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’ anywhere in the article.

After applying all the filters and checking manually, the total number of newspaper articles analysed is 1,298 (422 for the city of arts and Sciences, 793 for the America’s Cup and 74 for Sociopolis). A full list of the press articles analysed can be found in Appendix C.
Finally, the collection of documents has been less systematic. It has relied on internet searches for issues raised during the interviews and on documents provided or suggested by the interviewees. The documents include strategic plans, city-marketing documents, urban and territorial development documents, master plans, books and published papers in relation to Valencia and the specific projects, etc.

4.5 Data analysis

The analysis of data has involved several steps. The first preliminary analysis took place while data was being collected and interviews transcribed, in order to check what needed to be followed up, to understand which the main interpretative threads were and, to identify possible relevant issues that had not been considered during the design of the case study. Second, with all the data collected I looked for the most important issues that emerged from data and could develop into themes which related to theory, and started dividing them into the why, how and what questions.

Finally, I did a more thorough analysis with the aid of computer software NVivo 8. Data needed to be put in format so it could be uploaded to the program so I transcribed all 62 interviews and chronologically organised and divided into different files the newspaper articles. In the case of photocopied articles, I have coded them manually and then typed the relevant extracts to be introduced in NVivo 8. The files have been organised by project and type of data, interview or press article.

I established a structure of codes and divided them by question and by themes which derived from the preliminary analysis so a more detailed thematic analysis could be done. However, I improved the structure of codes as the coding process went along and some issues became obvious. All the data, except the documents, have been coded. The documents have been used to increase and contrast the evidence from press and interviews and have not been analysed with NVivo 8.

In order to complement and help establish causalities and the evolution of processes I conducted a chronological analysis, based mainly on press coverage and documents. It consisted in situating graphically the main events - such as changes of government, new urban plans, start of each of the projects and changes in them - and looking for temporal relationships.

From there I could start the interpretation of the data based on the developed themes. I used theoretical propositions which guided the analysis by helping to focus on certain data (Grbich, 2007). Indeed, those propositions had already guided the data collection but in this stage they helped me ignore the data which were not relevant to the research questions, especially so for the why and how type questions. For the what type question, the procedure was to see if the outcomes of mega-projects observed in other case studies and found in the literature review – privatisation, lack of transparency, focus on image, etc. - also appeared here as expected.
All of these methods were used to build an explanation of the phenomenon which also takes into account the three studied projects. Particular care was given to examine not only evidence for why things happened in a certain way but also why they did not happen in a different way.

From a more theoretical viewpoint, while collecting and interpreting the data, I realised that not only the ‘objective’ different political and economic interests were important for understanding the phenomenon under study but also how people think about them. In other words, not only the material but also the ideational plays a role in shaping strategic action. In addition, the motives expressed by the actors not always correspond with what can be interpreted from their actions. The relationship between the material and the ideational became one of the major concerns of the analysis.

Political and economic discourses are not only a way of justifying one’s actions but a way of understanding and interpreting the world, which indeed also influences behaviour. Therefore, in my opinion it is analytically important, albeit problematic, to distinguish between ‘objective’ interests, acknowledged and unacknowledged interests and perceived interests, and also, how they shape and are shaped by discourse.

Hay (2001) explains the relevance of discourse very clearly. According to him the strategies considered and deployed by actors are a reflection of how they understand the context in which they are. As he goes on to elaborate

    Nonetheless, for particular ideas, narratives and paradigms to continue to provide cognitive templates through which actors interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with those actors’ direct and mediated experiences. In this sense the discursive or ideational is only ever relatively autonomous of the material. . . . What the above discussion hopefully demonstrates, is the centrality of ideas to any adequate understanding of the relationship between agent and structure, conduct and context. It also suggests the power of those able to provide the cognitive filters, such as policy paradigms, through which actors interpret the strategic environment’ (Hay, 2001).

However, behaviour and thought are linked but it is not a causal relationship in either way. They are interwoven in more complex ways and therefore difficult to analyse. In order to take into account the interactions between thought and behaviour, discourse analysis is not adequate since it says nothing about the relations between talk and action, and therefore is not useful to interpret the why of the phenomenon, which is one of my main research questions. I am interested in interests, values and beliefs and their relationship to behaviour.

For those reasons I have drawn, on the one hand, on Cultural Political Economy (already discussed in Chapter three) for it highlights ‘the complex relations between meanings and practices’ and ‘is also interested in the variation, selection and retention of different discourses’ (Jessop, 2007:237). On the other hand, my understanding of behaviour and thought is based on Marvin Harris’ definition of culture as a socially learned mode of life which can be found in human societies and comprises every
aspect of social life, including behaviour and thought (Harris, 2001), which, at the same time, is consistent with Cultural Political Economy. Ideas are not simply a guide of behaviour and hence the why and how questions cannot be approached separately for behaviour and action are related in complex ways. Analytically, these perspectives and concepts have helped me to make sense of the different explanations at different levels that have emerged from the empirical data and to relate them to the theoretical framework.

4.6 Writing up the case study

The case study is divided in four empirical chapters, including a background chapter which has a chronological structure and three chapters which are organised by research question and have a thematic structure. The background chapter introduces chronologically the regeneration strategy used in Valencia explaining when it started and how it has evolved and, puts the story of the three flagship projects into this context. Also, it points out the key actors and their motivation, interpreting what the main interests and objectives behind each of the three flagship projects are. The other three chapters address each one of the research questions, drawing and bringing together evidence from the three flagship projects to discuss thematic issues linked to the theoretical framework.

When it has been possible I have told the story making use of quotes, not only in the background chapter but also, although they are more abstract, in the three thematic chapters. In order to deal with confidentiality issues some quotes are not attributed to a specific person but more generally to a type of actor. For obvious practical reasons, the interviews, their transcription and analysis have been done in the original language – Spanish – and I have only translated into English the quotes to be used in the text.

4.7 Conclusion

As the next chapters will show, although the case of Valencia is less well-known than other Spanish cases, it is a strong example of the vibrancy of Spanish urban politics. Bigger and smaller cities in Spain have undergone processes of urban regeneration in the last decades, especially after the onset of democracy. However, despite at a first glance the processes might look similar and, particularly Bilbao and Barcelona, are often cited as the models which other cities have followed, the regeneration policies show many differences. For instance, Bilbao’s one-off Guggenheim operation was just another piece of a wider regeneration policy. Barcelona’s model has been very focused on urban design and on bringing to the city a wide and diverse range of global star architects to leave their stamp on the urban fabric. Chapter five will discuss the evolution of Valencia’s urban policy through the three main projects under study, showing an unprecedented and almost exclusive emphasis on mega-projects and events, spanning a long period of time.
CHAPTER 5

5. VALENCIA: THE PROJECTS

5.1 Introduction

The first and most important urban transformation of twentieth century Valencia was indeed the Garden of the Turia, an eleven kilometre long lineal park built in the old bed of the Turia river. After the floods of 1957 the old river bed had been dissected to avoid future overflowing and the course of the river had been moved three kilometres south of the city. During the first years of democracy and after citizen contestation had overturned the Francoist administration’s plan to build a highway, the old river bed was converted into a park, that would provide the city with a green structuring spine to which the main urban cultural and leisure amenities would be connected (Olmos 2004; Interviews 19, 42 and 54).

The urban design of the Turia’s Gardens project was commissioned by the city council to Catalan architect Ricardo Bofill. The brief consisted in the ‘design of an urban park with plantations, fountains and ponds, a botanical garden, and sports and cultural facilities’ (Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura, www.ricardobofill.com). Bofill’s unitary project could not be implemented in its entirety due to budgetary restrictions and only two sections of the river out of twelve were developed by the architect, based on the original idea. Figure 5.1 shows a current view of the Turia’s Park, crossed by several bridges.

Figure 5.1 Turia’s Park.

Source: Vivir Valencia (www.vivirvalencia.com)

The General Urban Plan of 1989 captured and established the structuring function of the new park (Interview 42). According to Alejandro Escribano - director of the plan - the 1989 General plan, swaying away from the, at the time, current paradigm of the ‘urbanism of austerity’, defined a finished ‘balanced urban model’ which has been able to accommodate Valencia’s subsequent urban mega-projects. The architect explains it in his own words:

‘Valencia’s originality comes from the fact that the birth of these projects coincided with a General Urban Plan which gave them a support base and made them understandable at the city level. [...] Keep in mind that Valencia’s great works are recovering the old riverbed [...], reusing the port or reusing all of the industrial and railway areas in the South. By doing so, we follow with what we could call the most recent European tendency, the most logical at the moment. But this has been done within a grid, within a holistic urban plan that offered a clearer reading’.

(Interview 42)
Therefore, the General Urban Plan provided the legal framework which established the urban model to follow, which, according to the then Head of the Mayor’s Office (1983-89) (Interview 9) consisted roughly in a green old river bed and a regenerated maritime facade.

The new regional urbanism law (LRAU), introduced in 1994 provided the management tool for the rapid implementation of the plan – until then still hardly effective - (Gaja, 2006b; Interviews 17 and 54), which allowed that, ten years after its introduction, nearly all the land in the urban border earmarked for development had been planned or already developed (El País, 9 May 2004).

In the 1980s the urban planning policy had the objective of curbing the lack of amenities accumulated during decades of rural-urban migration and rapid growth, and urban development plans were initiated, directed and managed by the public sector. From the 1990s the economic recovery and the increased power of the real estate groups set the background for the wider introduction of the private sector in urban development. New public-private partnership formulas were experimented – particularly in the urban plan of the Avenida de Francia (Interview 54) – which culminated in the introduction of the figure of the ‘urbanising agent’ in the 1994 Urbanism Act (LRAU). That meant, in essence, ‘the handing over of public responsibility to a private agent’ (Interview 54). According to senior lecturer in urbanism Ángel Martínez the thinking behind it was:

‘let us give the prerogatives to develop the zone to a private investor with the ability to do so. This guarantees us the presence of funds that we do not possess, the capacity to manage which we do not have, and it allows us to do away with the difficulties that the property owners who are withholding the land are making’ (Interview 54).

The projects during the 1980s and 1990s were part of the ‘rationalising process’ (Interview 13) which was reflected in the Urban General Plan of 1989. Local scholars (Gaja, 2006b; Interviews 13 and 19) agree that the projects were generally aimed to meeting the local population’s needs and demands rather than positioning the city ‘in this sort of ranking of cities that provoke exclamation’ (Interview 19).

Valencia’s big projects of the 1980s and 1990s were the concert hall (Palau de la Música) – ‘the first hint of hope that the city can have other investments’ (Interview 42) and the ‘last large rationalising work’ (Interview 13) – the Valencian Institute of Modern Art (IVAM), the seafront promenade, the new underground system and, of course, the City of Sciences, which was the first project which was born with the clear intention of being a new icon for Valencia.

From the mid 1990s there arose an interest in capturing international cultural and sporting events. For instance, in 1997 Valencia lost to Bari the holding of the Games of the Mediterranean and in 2001 Valencia’s candidature to European Cultural Capital failed as it was awarded to Salamanca (Olmos, 2004). Finally, in 2003, the city was designated to hold the America’s Cup sailing competition. Consecutively,
the 2000s and 2010s saw an emphasis on the events, including two editions of the America’s Cup, the F1 competition, Valencia open 500 tennis competition or the pope’s visit among other less relevant ones. Some of those events – particularly the America’s Cup - required the implementation of considerable infrastructural works. The projects not longer stemmed from a social demand but, instead, aimed to generate a demand, not necessarily local (Interview 19).

At the same time that the city was immersed in the race to attract new events the City of Sciences was being extended and new buildings added to the complex, such as the Agora (the last one) which would host the Valencia Open 500 tennis competition.

On the other hand, side-by-side to the spectacular mega-projects - and supported by the Valencian Urbanism Laws of 1994 (LRAU) and 2006 (LUV) and the National Land Law of 1998 - the city and the region had suffered a rapid real estate expansion, which has been called an ‘urbanising tsunami’ (Gaja, 2008). It could be described as a real estate boom that was predatory upon Valencia’s rural environment, since the expansion of the city had to be at the expense of the fertile lands which surround it. Fernando Gaja, senior lecturer of urbanism at the UPV (Gaja, 2006b) has contended that Valencia’s Urban Planning model is characterised by two complementary phenomena; a disproportionate residential growth and the implementation of urban mega-projects by the public administrations. Sociopolis can be considered to embody both of them. On the one hand it is an example of residential urbanisation of croplands in the periphery of the city, and on the other, it is an emblematic project of the regional government, particularly the pet project of regional minister Rafael Blasco.
Figure 5.2 Timeline

1985
- Since 1979: Pérez Casado mayor (socialist)
- Since 1982: González president (socialist)
- Lerma regional president (socialist)
- Ródenas elected mayor (soc.)
- General urban plan of 1989
- City of Sciences and Technology project launched

1990
- Barberá elected mayor (conservative)
- Public presentation of project
- Creation of VACICO
- Start recession in Spain
- Regional Urbanism Law (LRAU)
- Call for bids for construction works
- Zapata elected regional president (conservative)
- Construction works start
- Project stopped
- Aznar elected president (cons.)
- Project City of Arts and Sciences presented
- End recession
- Start of real estate bubble
- Opening of Planetarium
- Opening of Science museum

1995
- Zaplana elected regional president (conservative)
- VACICO is substituted by CACSA
- Start of real estate bubble

2000
- Olivas regional president (conservative)
- Opening of Oceanography museum
- Camps elected regional president (conservative)
- First project of skyscrapers presented
- Zapatero elected president (socialist)
- Second project of skyscrapers presented
- Infrastructure works finished
- Competition for Grao & Marina
- Results competition G & Marina
- 32nd America’s Cup held
- Opening of Opera palace
- Competition for Grao & Marina
- Selection host of 32nd AC
- Infrastructure works start
- Novel presents Valencia litoral
- Financing infrastructures agreed
- Pal Giano competition launched
- Pal Giano competition stopped
- Infrastructure works finished
- Competition for Grao & Marina
- Results competition G & Marina
- 32nd America’s Cup held
- Opening of Opera palace
- First development plan (by IVYSA) approved
- Definitive plan (by IVYSA) approved
- Call for bids for construction of housing
- Implementation of Sociopolis still incomplete
- 33rd America’s Cup held
- Works on site start
- Opening of Apotheke
- Implementation of Sociopolis still incomplete

Source: Author
On the same expansionist line a modification of the General Urban Plan of 1989 –under the figure of ‘revision to the plan’- started to be elaborated in 2004. However, the burst of the real estate bubble in 2008 spoilt many residential expansion projects.

Thus, the old and new mega-projects overlap in time, as shown in figure 5.2. For instance, the City of Sciences continued to grow while the city embarked in other endeavours such as the America’s Cup or more modest ones such as Sociopolis. Considered altogether they constitute an urban policy based on mega-projects and events. The evolution of the urban policy is affected by (and affects) economic cycles, legislation changes and other economic, social and political processes (see figure 5.2). In the next subsections we will look at the three projects under study in more detail.

5.2 The City of Arts and Sciences

The City of Sciences was an initiative of the first regional government – particularly of president Joan Lerma - and launched in 1989 (Interviews 9, 17, 26, 31, 32, 42, 55 and 58), some years after a New State of the Autonomies was instated in Spain and, Valencia became capital city of the Valencian Autonomous Community. The initial project was called the City of Sciences and Technology and included a planetarium, a science museum and a telecommunications tower. The City of Sciences has been considered ‘the first urban mega-project’ (Interview 42) and, although the inception of the project had a governmental origin, ‘there was a general consensus in the business and political spheres that Valencia needed a mega project because the city was completely asleep’ (Interview 42).

It was in Lerma’s presentation speech of the City of Sciences in the Generalitat Palace with Calatrava in attendance when the idea of an emblematic project to represent Valencia was very clearly spelt out for the first time (Interview 38). Thus, ‘it was clearly an initiative from the regional government and endorsed by the interest of the president at the time, Lerma, to position the city’ (Interview 26). There was a need for a boost in self-esteem and showing the capacity to build a new icon for the city was an opportunity to do so.

In the words of the Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia:

[In] the 1980s, the sensation was one of general pessimism. That is, everything here was going badly, everything was awful. [...] There was a total distrust of anything that meant new urban development. So, it was necessary to beat this feeling a bit. (Interview 42)

Therefore, from the beginning, when the project was just an idea, there was the sense that it had to be ‘a striking project’ (Interview 42), ‘something important for Valencia’ (Interview 30) which would - in the words of the then president of the regional government - ‘make of the city an emblematic place’ (Beltrán, 13 September 1991).

As the Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia explains:
The program was generated as the project was being developed. In other words, the fundamental idea was to do something stunning and there was not even a museum layout plan or anything like it. [...] In the beginning, the project was really just an idea. Not even one page about what it was they wanted there had been written. It is [Calatrava] who defines the project as it goes along’ (Interview 42).

In addition, the project intended to give the city an image of modernity - linked to science and technology - in contrast to its, until then, rural one. ‘The idea was to create an emblem that could signify that Valencia was in the future too’, (Interview 26) according to the Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95). The City of Sciences would re-image and internationalise the city, market Valencia and the Valencian Community in the world (Interviews 5, 11, 24, 26, 38 and 42).

The Valencian governors had different images in mind as models for the future City of Sciences. For the communications tower the model was the CN tower in Toronto (Interview 7). From a content viewpoint the models for the City of Sciences were Futuroscope in Poitiers and the ‘Cité des Sciences et de l’Industrie’ in the Parc de la Villette in Paris, France. The president of the regional government had been seduced by the ‘City of Sciences and Industry’ during a visit to Paris and wanted to build a similar complex in Valencia (Interviews 5, 7, 26, 42 and 58).

**Figure 5.3 Location of the City of Sciences**

Source: Author
When looking for a location the regional government consulted the city council. In that period, the General Urban Plan was being elaborated and, after ruling out alternative locations in Campanar and La Coma, it was decided that the complex would be built in the old river bed, a more central setting although, at the time, it was still a heavily polluted and under-developed area (Interview 42) (see location map in figure 5.3). According to the director of the 1989 Urban Plan (Interview 42) choosing that location, which benefits the city over the metropolitan area as a whole, ‘clearly, it was a bet on the City of Valencia, its capital city status, and for the city’s image’ (Interview 42).

The architect selected to design the City of Sciences was Valencia-born architect Santiago Calatrava. In 1986, called by a former architecture school class-mate and then head of the local authority’s urban planning department, Calatrava had already built the ‘9 d’Octubre’ bridge in Valencia, which had made him known in the city outside the professional circles. Later on, the architect won an initial competition to build a communications tower, which would solve the problem of Valencia being a flat city and could also create an attraction pole (Interview 26).

Figure 5.4 Model of the City of Sciences and Communications

Source: Sharp, 1996

Calatrava’s contract was extended – with no further competition and no questioning from any sector - to include the then known as City of Sciences and Communications (Ferrandis, 27 April 1993; Martínez, 17 December 1995; Interviews 23 and 26). As seen in figure 5.4, the project included a planetarium and a science museum besides the communications tower. Being internationally prestigious and born in Valencia, Santiago Calatrava was seen as, not only an obvious choice (Interviews 1, 11, 12, 26, 27, 41, 42, 55 and 59) but almost the only option for, as José Antonio Pérez condenses very well, he is ‘the only Valencian global architect we have’ (Interview 26).

On the other hand, Calatrava’s spectacular architecture fitted with the objective of creating an icon ‘because it could bring about the spectacular image that was intended’ (Interview 42) and, rather than the architectural quality what was important ‘was that it would have the ability to attract which Calatrava’s architecture has demonstrated to have’ (Interview 26). His architecture – often referred to as hideously monumental, megalomaniac, striking and spectacular (Interviews 26, 41, 55 and 59a) – has an undeniable visual impact that makes it very attractive.

But, beyond the emblematic character and the visual impact, which were the specific objectives of the complex? Located in the old river bed in an old industrial dilapidated and heavily polluted area, one of the stated objectives of the project was the regeneration of the area, creating a new pole of urban growth towards the sea, where a new neighbourhood development, the Urban Plan of the Avenida de Francia, was going to be implemented (Interviews 5, 7, 14, 42 and 54).
In the 1980s the Administration had launched in Valencia two big areas of residential growth, and negotiated with the small group of real estate investors (such as the old Cros industries and Prima Inmobiliaria) who after the industrial crisis concentrated in their hands most of the land and wanted to obtain a profit from it. As Ángel Martínez explains

the intervention is the same, that is, two areas of prestige of the city will be developed. In those areas the private initiative will make the investment, but the city council, the regional government, that is the administration, say, will provide an extremely important symbolic element of public space, public dedication, in each one of them. In the case of the Avenida de Francia, it is the City of Arts and Sciences. In the case of the Avenida de las Cortes Valencianas, it is the Convention Centre, commissioned respectively to Calatrava and Foster. (Interview 54)

Thus, the Project of the City of Sciences went hand in hand with the development of the Urban Plan Avenida de Francia (Interviews 42 and 54). For Clementina Ródenas, mayor of the city (1989-91), the City of Sciences was not ‘an isolated thing but, rather, one of the pieces which conformed a vision for the whole city’ (Interview 7). Figure 5.5 shows a model of the initial plan Avenida de Francia including some undetermined buildings on the City of Sciences site since, at that stage, the content of the project had not been completely decided yet.

**Figure 5.5 Model of the urban plan Avenida de Francia**

In addition, the regional government’s investment to build the City of Sciences resolved one section of the Turia’s Garden for the city council lacked the necessary funds to completely urbanise the old river bed (El País, 16 December 1990; Interviews 23 and 30). Given the lack of funds to implement Bofill’s overall plan for the Turia’s Garden, the city council decided to divide the old river bed in sections and resolve their design and funding separately, the Regional Ministry of Agriculture intervened in one section, the Regional Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism created a children’s park in another, and so on. The City of Sciences would occupy another section, next to the future Avenida de Francia neighbourhood.

As a result of the urban transformation, the value of the land in the surroundings of the City of Sciences area increased up to threefold (Interviews 11 and 17), a ‘good deal’ according to Javier Quesadas, Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 17). However, as pointed out by most of the interviewees, the cost of the complex, even in its first version, was far too high to constitute a mere urban regeneration project.

The other main stated objective of the project was to achieve a regular income from tourism throughout the year. The tourist industry was focused on summer season sun and sand tourism and the City of Sciences intended to create an attraction linked to scientific culture and technology (Interviews 43 and 44).
As José Antonio Pérez, Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95), stated at the time, Calatrava’s Science Museum, thanks to its spectacular nature, aspired to ‘have the tourist guidebooks give them a star that means it is worth to check it out’ (Ferrandis, 27 April 1993).

However, there has been some scepticism as to the real objectives of the project, particularly in terms of the tourist strategy. First, it was not linked to the regional ministry of Tourism but to the regional ministry of Economy and Treasury to facilitate its funding (Interviews 30 and 55). Second, according to Andrés García Reche, Regional Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-93), (Interview 30) there was not a clear tourism strategy behind the inception of the City of Sciences, it was rather the emblematic aspect of the project what clearly predominated in the minds of the decision-makers. In García Reche’s words:

My opinion, which I gave at the time and which was in disagreement, was that if they did it and spent so much money, it should be not just to make good buildings and regenerate part of the city - which is always a good thing - but also to add some content that would attract tourists, and that could only be called a theme park. We are talking about three million tourists. We are not talking about just 800,000 that come to Valencia according to the data; that is ridiculous. We are talking about a real theme park, a normal one. […] That was not accepted. The model selected consisted of putting three things with three contents and because it is really pretty and is going to regenerate part of the city, hey, better to have this than nothing, and, effectively, it is better this than nothing, that’s it. There is nothing behind it. Don’t look for strategies or great minds behind this; there weren’t any. (Interview 30)

The objectives in terms of program were not very clear either. For instance, in the case of the science museum, Santiago Calatrava was commissioned to design a ‘container’ while the content would be added consequently by the government (Interview 12). A member of staff of the Centre for Strategy and Development of Valencia expresses it very clearly

In many of these other cases, the building has come up and then it was considered what content to give it. This is the case, for example of the Museum of Sciences which is very difficult to run and maintain. They made the icon. The spectacular building, you can like it or not. But, I remember that when it was necessary to give it a content it was very difficult and it was a never-ending effort because the dimensions are so big that the first year, when it was planned, the exhibitions that were there came from the V&A and the Museum of Sciences from the Caixa of Barcelona, they were exhibitions that you saw there and they made an impact, they were interesting but, all of a sudden, seeing them in the museum, they ended up like Pin and Pon toys. It was almost ridiculous and the people, obviously, were shocked. Obviously, because the content is the same but the setting is complicated. But I don’t know why politicians get into megalomania, an outside image, and sometimes don’t know how to stop at the right time. (Interview 6)
In fact, after the building was finished, with a different regional government already in office, a new director – Manuel Toharia (Interview 35) - was hired because ‘there was no concrete museum curation project.’

There was one at the beginning, very encyclopedia-like, very exhaustive, for a bigger museum, for a planetarium and nothing else. When everything then began to get bigger and that encyclopedia-like plan no longer looked too attractive, too interesting. Another model – which no one ever knew which model it was - was opted for. They started to hire things here and there, not much else, like someone going to a supermarket to buy a half-pound of this and a pound of that without any concrete order and that was when they called me to get things in order a little bit. (Interview 35)

According to Toharia, from a scientific policy point of view, dispersing different facilities within the Autonomous Community of Valencia would have been more effective than concentrating all the investment in the capital city. Moreover, the content of the museum should have been decided before designing the building but, as he says, ‘then, it would not have been Calatrava, but a much less relevant architect, I don’t know. The only museum, one of the few museums in such an impressive building is this one’ (Interview 35). In short, the evidence shows that the emphasis was on the emblematic aspect of the project rather than on other objectives. The spectacular scale of the planetarium and science museum can be seen in figure 5.6.

**Figure 5.6 Planetarium and science museum**

Source: Author

For the delivery of the project, a public corporation dependant on the regional ministry of Economy and Treasury, and directly funded by it, VACICO (Valencia Science and Communications) was created in
1991 with the mission of building and managing the complex once completed (Interview 26). On the other hand, when the City of Sciences was commissioned to Calatrava the architect had offices in Paris and Zurich and, as a condition of the contract, he was asked to open an office in Valencia to manage the project, which he did also in 1991 (Interview 41).

Regarding the economic feasibility of the project, it was to be entirely paid for by the Regional Government and the financial risk was taken by the public debt of the regional government. The total cost of the complex was estimated in 20,000 million pesetas (120 million Euro) in 1993, 25,000 million pesetas (150 million Euro) in 1994, and 28,000 (170 million Euro) million pesetas in 1995 just before opening the call for bids for its construction (Ferrandis, 10 May 1994; Ferrandis, 27 January 1995). The cost of each building was: telecommunications tower: 14,000 million pesetas (84 million Euros); museum: 10,000 million pesetas (60 million Euros); planetarium: 3,000 million pesetas (18 million Euros). The project, according to the Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95) (Interview 26), was a ‘budgetary priority’ (in his own words) and could be assumed directly by the regional government without the need of bank credits. The finance plan was that the management of the communications tower would be funded by the revenue coming from the commercial running of the telecommunications installations and the offices it included, in addition to a European Union structural funds subsidy of 2,700 million pesetas. The planetarium would be partially self-sufficient by its commercial exploitation as an IMAX cinema, managed through an exploitation concession to a private company (Martínez, 17 December 1995; Interview 26). The science museum was considered a public cultural amenity and was to be entirely financed through the regional government budget. However, it was expected that most of the museum permanent exhibits would be paid for by the Ministry of Culture and through sponsorships. On the other hand, apart from the compulsory purchase order of the land where a portion of the museum and the telecommunications tower would sit, there was a previous purchase of land by Vacico before the project was launched. Some of this land was to be used to partially amortise the investment in the complex through the surplus value generated by it (Interview 26).

In 1993, within a recessionist economic climate, the search for private investment had to be intensified while the regional administration budget had to be frozen, but the government persevered (Ferrandis, 13 September 1993).

From the beginning, although there were some minor critiques, the first project - the City of Sciences and Communications - found political support from all the parties in the opposition both in the council and the regional government (S.B., 20 May 1993; Martínez, 17 December 1995). For an economically drained city council an investment of that magnitude and symbolic impact in the city – paid for by the regional government - was certainly well received and the council’s urbanism department set out to ease the urban planning procedures.
There was also general social support to the project for, in the words of Clementina Ródenas Mayor of Valencia (1989-91), ‘the idea had been pretty well accepted by the public opinion’ (Interview 7). To that consensus contributed the fact that the site was at the time a heavily polluted area and a public amenity project could not other than be well received (Interview 2). Moreover, the land was obtained by compulsory purchase order and since the site was in the river bed and there were not any affected residents that was not a source of conflict.

In this atmosphere, after the presentation of the definitive project in May 1993, there was a call for bids for the constructions works and 40% of the construction contracts were awarded in the first trimester of 1995. The contractors – Cubiertas, MZOV, Dragados y Construcciones, FCC, Entrecanales, Pacsa and Hochtief - started working just before the regional government election of 1995.

In 1995, after the elections and with the tower and museum already in construction, the new conservative government stopped the project. This came in as a surprise because the conservative party went from supporting the project when in the opposition to stopping it when they arrived in office. As the Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95) explains:

‘to me, it, honestly, came as quite a surprise. I had worked years on this project, from 1989 to 1995, six years, and at several meetings that I had with representatives of the conservative party to explain the project to them and to inform them of its progress, I was met only with agreement. ‘This is something very important for Valencia, we support it’, and so on. And, when the conservative party government arrived at the regional government they tried to stop it’ (Interview 26).

There were two main alleged reasons as to why the government sought to interrupt the implementation of the project, based on a couple of reports, one by Price Waterhouse and another, which was commissioned to a group of professors of the UPV after a previous one by the Universitary School of telecommunications of the UPV was favourable to the telecommunications tower (Ferrandis, 27 October 1995). On the one hand, the tower and science museum were considered un-necessary and on the other hand too costly for the limited financial resources. José Luis Olivas, the new Regional Minister of Economy was always emphatic in his interventions in the Valencian parliament regarding the complex with statements such as ‘there is not technical or economic reason that justifies building the telecommunications tower’ or ‘we should ask those who are on the dole if they demand emblematic projects or, on the contrary, they demand work’ (Villena, 22 December 1995). However, none of the participants in the project – city council, architect, construction companies nor investors interested in the project - had been consulted before making the decision of stopping the project (Ferrandis, 1 October 1995).
As compensation, in October 1995 the regional government announced that the project would be modified but the investments maintained (Agencias, 31 October 1995). A couple of months later, on 5 December 1996, a first proposal for an alternative project was presented by Olivas, the regional minister of economy. The alternative project maintained the planetarium and added ‘a City of Justice, various thematic pavilions, a covered pool, hotels and restaurants, a farm school and even a geyser’ (García del Moral, 16 April 1998). But the alternative to the City of Sciences was not well received, and was accused, in the ex-mayor Clementina Ródenas’ words, of being ‘a rough sketch made by two architects from Vacico, compared to the project designed by a prestigious international figure such as Calatrava’ (Navarro, 23 March 1996). Olivas, on his part, recognised that the alternative project had been elaborated in haste by civil servant architects but defended it.

All the political parties in the opposition both in the council and in the regional parliament (PSOE, EU, UV) - not only the socialist party, responsible for its inception– opposed the interruption of the project and were not satisfied with the alternative projects proposed. Importantly, the regionalist party Unió Valenciana, which governed the region and the city in coalition with the conservative party, supported the project of the City of Sciences (especially the communications tower) and threatened with allying with the left parties to pressurise the conservatives.

On its part, the city council, of the same political party as the regional government and in coalition with the regionalist party UV, had included the City of Sciences in the strategic plan of the city, highlighting the communications tower as a key element of the plan. However, the mayor had to defend her party’s decision in the plenary council meeting. The position of the central government, in socialist hands, was established by the declarations of the State Secretary for Universities and research, Enric Banda:

‘The regional government, upon eliminating the Museum of Science, has made Valencia go back to the 19th century instead of moving towards the 21st century.’ […] ‘The regional government, with this decision, lives on with its back to the future. It is a worrying setback’. (Villena, 20 December 1995)

The architect defended his project using his public relation skills (Interviews 26, 28, 38 and 55). For the Director General for Budget of the Regional government (82-95), ‘one day, the city will have to recognise to Mr. Calatrava, [that] his determination and his capacity of influence in other spheres of the national and international economic structure was the reason why the project did not fall apart’ (Interview 26). Calatrava went as far as to declare in the local press that ‘it would be an affront to all Valencian people to not make the City of Sciences’ (Villena, 27 December 1995). His call seemed to have an effect for even a citizen organisation called Friends of the City of Sciences was created to support the project.

On the other hand, the affected construction companies – although they would be beneficiaries of a 20% of the total contract in compensation (around 39 million Euro) - formed a united front to coerce the
government to continue with the project for, in the words of the president of the Commerce Chamber of the Valencian Community ‘the companies are not for charging compensation (because of the cancellation of contracts) and take off but rather to work’ (Ferrandis, 27 October 1995).
After several months of continued pressure from construction companies, political opposition and government allies, finally, negotiations with Calatrava were resumed in March 1996. The government accepted to continue with Calatrava’s project but introducing some modifications. Thus, a modified project for the now called City of Arts and Sciences, which substituted the communications tower by an Opera palace was finally presented by Calatrava on 20th June 1996 at the Valencian Institute of Modern Art. Figure 5.7 shows a general view of the complex with the opera palace in the foreground and the science museum and planetarium in the background.

The new complex also included an oceanography museum, planned by a local practice – Civis Project Management - integrating in the design some thin-shell structures by renowned architect Félix Candela (see figure 5.8). The origin of the oceanography museum - awarded to Civis Project management with no public competition two months after the company was registered in London - is unclear but the selection of the design company has been justified by alleging that the brief required a functionalist design which a formalist architect such as Santiago Calatrava would have not been able to deliver (Interviews 59a and 59b).

Calatrava, on the other hand, had been able to persuade the new government that he was able to modify the previous City of Sciences project designed by him to their needs. The Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (95-98) recognises that ‘apart from being from here, he is a person who has a huge capacity of persuasion, seduction, many things, power, social power’. There are people who reject
him but he is a man of genius, very bright and anyone he explains his project to falls for him’ (Interview 11).

Figure 5.8 Museum of oceanography

Although having almost been ‘compelled’ to return to Calatrava, the new government ensured that what Olivas – regional minister of economy and treasury - had described as ‘a hideously monumental structure for the greater glory of the previous government of Joan Lerma’ (El País, 20 December 1995) would not be identified with the socialist government. The substitution of the tower – the most iconic element of the project - by the opera palace was interpreted as a way for Eduardo Zaplana - the new president - to leave his own political footprint and erase that of the old one, Lerma, and not as a decision made on more rationally justified grounds (Interviews 12, 13, 14, 26, 31, 41 and 55). The opera palace was even more impressive than the tower, as shown by figure 5.9. It included a main hall and auditorium with capacity to seat 1,500 people each, and two more halls with capacity to seat 400 people each.

Also Vacíco, the public corporation created to build and manage the complex, changed name to CACSA (Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias, S.A.) and was adapted to the new corporate purpose in July 1996 (Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias, S.A., www.cac.es/CACSA). Despite the changes, the Director General for Budget of the previous Regional government (1982-95) admits (Interview 26), the new project, ‘respond[ed] to the same philosophy as the previous one’. The intention of creating a monumental area
which would become an icon of the city was maintained, as can be clearly understood when observing the result (Interviews 5, 14 and 54). Also, the alleged general objectives of urban and economic regeneration were similar, according to Business director of CACSA (Interview 43) because the objectives were ‘very generic, such as, for example, the generation of wealth, welfare, urban revitalisation of the area. In addition, they are goals that any government that comes to power would commit to as they are generally positive.’ However no socio-economic impact study was elaborated until the project was well under way (Interview 18).

**Figure 5.9 Model showing a cross section of the opera palace**

Source: Lefaivre and Tzonis, 2009

Finally, the planetarium was opened to the public on 10th April 1998, the science museum on 13th November 2000, the museum of oceanography on 15th February 2003 and the opera palace in 2005, three years later than it was initially planned. By that time, both the opera palace and the oceanography museum accumulated cost overruns of 436% and 295% respectively. In addition, the fact that the opera palace is largely over-sized made the difficulties to pay for its construction and maintenance huge. The Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) clearly admits it:

[…] that was intended to function as a cultural area which would be connected to the river. The river was to be made into a walkway to go from the Music Auditorium to the Opera house, from the Opera house to the Museum of Sciences, like in Chicago, like in the world’s great cities. Just that in Chicago there are 10 million people nearby and there are extraordinary companies, they sponsor, there are people with a lot of money and it is full of millionaires and of the middle class […] In short, the project is out of scale. (Interview 11)

According to social scientist José Miguel Iribas (Interview 28), hired by the regional government to do a study of usage of the opera palace, the loss the opera palace generated yearly was calculated at around 54 million euro and ‘they assumed it as good and, to me, that fact was mind-boggling.’

In 2005, the same year that the opera palace was inaugurated the project for a new building by Calatrava for the City of Sciences – the Agora - was presented. Now, since 2003, the regional government, still in conservative hands, had a new president, Francisco Camps, who, back in 1996 from his seat at the Valencia city council had declared that ‘to renounce the City of Sciences project has been an expression of reasonableness which characterizes the Conservative party, its ability to adapt to reality’ (Olivares, 21 January 1996).
The Agora - a building with no specific brief or function - was considered to be Camps’ pet project (Interview 11). The building was 80 metres tall and could reach a maximum capacity of 6,000 people (see figure 5.10). The building, inaugurated in 2009, closed the complex of the City of Sciences, a project – according to Quesadas, Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 11) – of the regional government and not necessarily of the bourgeoisie.

The director of El Mundo in Valencia explains it very clearly:

From there it comes the City of Arts and Science which initially had been projected by the socialist party in their last years in office and that has come with many changes, that is, the socialist party started it, Zaplana changed it and pushed for it, Olivas retouched and Camps ended up adding the last building in his last mandate. In short, the City of Arts and Sciences is an entity of one, two, three and four presidents of the regional government, of all of the presidents the regional government has had. (Interview 44)

For the political opposition and other observers the Agora did not seem to have any other justification than doing something bigger and more impressive (Interviews 4 and 38) and was harshly criticized. Considering the huge cost overruns that the City of Sciences had already accumulated, the plan of adding
a new element to the complex was considered the last straw by the political opposition (EU and PSOE), who back in 1995 had passionately defended the project.

The gigantic cost overruns can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that – as pointed out by the public auditing body’s reports and the construction companies (Ferrandis and Olivares, 23 December 2008, Interview 62) – the budgets are not closed, Calatrava’s initial projects are little detailed and need subsequent modifications and additions which obviously result in increased costs. Moreover, the political opposition accuses the government of not being able to keep the architect’s ‘creative greed’ at bay (Interview 55). According to the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) controlling Santiago Calatrava from a budgetary point of view

‘is very difficult because often when he designs a project the companies, which are always eager to get work, make very low bids if they see a project that is not well defined because they know that detailing will come later, that many details are missing. This makes the politician say: “Wow, how cheap, of course we are going to do it”. This is a bit of a trap because the moment it is started, the company is waiting for the architect or someone to say: “How do we proceed?” and someone says: “Ah, well, it will have to be done…” And they start to add items that were not in the initial project. Then, the construction company tries to lower expenses, the architect fights because he says something, another says something different and the architect puts his foot down. However, it is the administration that has to pay. So, at best, the constructor says that it will be cheaper painting something grey but the architect says: “Hey, I thought you were going to paint it white for this price”. Then there is a three-sided struggle where everyone blames each other. The politician says: “I don’t want to funnel more of the budget to this”. The company owner says it was not in the project plan. The architect says: “it was but you don’t want to do it that way because you made a low bid to get the project and you promised me that we would do it this way and you’re not doing it”. It is really difficult to run it all, who really knows who is right’. (Interview 11)

The maintenance costs of the existing buildings - the managers of the complex complain (Interviews 43 and 59a) - are also very high due to their spectacular characteristics and formalism. Finally, the huge accumulation of costly architecture by Calatrava has been censored by many sections of the society such as politicians, architects, engineers, intellectuals, businessmen and even real estate agents (Interview 1), who consider that the City of Sciences complex has arrived to a saturation point in Calatrava artefacts which are not able to add any more economic value to the area.

By the end of the century, the huge cost overruns and maintenance costs of the City of Sciences had greatly impacted CACSA’s profitability. The losses of the public corporation were so substantial that a desperate and indebted regional government was already trying by different means to curb them, such as injecting public capital or legally increasing the useful life of the buildings. With the objective of reducing
CACSA’s debt, the mayor and the regional president presented a project to build four skyscrapers in 2004 - which in September 2005, when the final contract with the architect was signed, were reduced to three of 308m, 266m and 220m – designed by Calatrava. The design development drawings for the skyscrapers, which included up-market housing units, offices and hotels, were commissioned and paid to Calatrava but the project was never implemented for no private developer or investor believed in its economic viability (Velert, 28 October 2008; El País, 8 March 2008). Figure 5.11 shows the powerful impact the skyscrapers would have had on Valencia’s skyline.

**Figure 5.11 Photomontage of the skyscrapers designed by Calatrava**

Source: Calatravate la clava (www.calatravatelaclava.com)

Despite the costs, the general public has been satisfied with the City of Sciences and, for a long time there has not been strong citizen contestation (Interviews 5, 17, 19, 26, 40, 44 and 55). In the beginning, most of the critiques arrived from groups of intellectuals worried by the huge cost overruns and negative cost/benefit relationship. It was not until the second decade of the 21st century, and already in full-blown economic recession that the discontent with the City of Sciences grew and became relatively widespread.

**5.3 The America’s Cup**

The America’s Cup sailing competition was unknown in Valencia to the general public until the Swiss team Alinghi won the competition in 2003 and needed to find a maritime venue to celebrate the 2007 edition. The Valencia Sailing Club used to attend the different editions as spectator, and its president, Manuel Casanova, suggested the Swiss Valencia as a venue (Interviews 33 and 34). Ernesto Bertarelli, Alinghi team’s principal, created the private company America’s Cup Management (ACM) to organise the 33rd edition of the competition, which, as a first step, launched a competitive process to select a venue. Informed by the Valencia Sailing Club, the mayor and José Luis Olivas, the regional president at the time, officially expressed the city’s interest in participating in the process. The city council – through a small team directed by José Salinas and based in the city’s tourism office Valencia convention Bureau - took on the main weigh of the first phase of the candidature process (Interview 21).
After the ruling out of 52 cities, in April 2003, Valencia was shortlisted as a candidate together with Marseille, Naples and Lisbon. In October 2003 the local, regional and national administrations created a consortium called Valencia 2007 – with José Salinas as its president - with the objective of achieving the designation of the city (Huet, 2005; El País, 30 September 2003) and, finally, on 26 November 2003 Valencia was designated to hold the 33rd America’s Cup. The location of the area where the competition would take place, along with that of the area later on earmarked for the Development Plan el Grao can be seen in figure 5.12.

The plan of hosting the America’s Cup (and the infrastructural works it implied) had always institutional support from the three levels of government, national – under the conservatives first and the socialists afterwards – regional, and local, materialised from the last phase of the candidature process in the Consortium Valencia 2007 (Interview 21). From the elections of 2004, the socialist central government and president Zapatero were always at pains to emphasise that they supported Valencia in hosting the America’s Cup competition in response to the accusations of the conservative local and regional governments. There was a general consensus that the America’s Cup was a good opportunity for Valencia and, both the main business associations of the city – such as CEV, AVE and business chamber –and the political opposition in the local and regional governments unanimously expressed their support of the event (Velert, 9 May 2004; García del Moral, 29 September 2005).
From the point of view of the Valencian decision-makers the main objectives of the celebration of the America’s Cup in Valencia were twofold, the opportunity to internationally market the city and, to transform the maritime waterfront area (Interviews 21, 33, 34 and 45). In the words of José Mª Gil Suay, Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, the event provided ‘a platform to launch the city internationally and even nationally, to generate some citizen’s pride and also, to begin physical changes, in this case, located basically in the port’ (Interview 33).

The marketing of the city intended to be directed mainly to the promotion of tourism, particularly to the attraction high-end tourism and luxury cruises (Interviews 9, 28, 34 and 52). Not in vain the pre-candidature and candidature projects were born in Valencia Convention Bureau, the body responsible for establishing the city’s tourist strategy, and the first president of the consortium was José Salinas, also director of Valencia convention bureau. On the other hand, with the precedent of the transformations and investments from the central government in Barcelona and Seville for the 1992 Olympics and Expo, the America’s Cup was expected to be a lever to achieve the inner harbour –in hands of the port authority and used by the commercial port - for citizen use (Interview 42) and, substantial investments from the central government. Figure 5.13 shows a view of the inner harbour before the start of the construction works for the America’s Cup.

Although the official discourse emphasised the transformation of the territory as one of the key objectives of hosting the event in Valencia, the subsequent mismanagement of the inner harbour area and the destruction of the urban design works realized for the America’s Cup in order to accommodate the area for the celebration of the F1 competition has created doubts about the real initial objectives (Interview 51a).

**Figure 5.13 Inner harbour before being remodelled for the America’s Cup**

Source: Cruceros, 2013

With regards to the general Valencian public, the event was broadly well received too. According to a survey commissioned by the socialist group in the city council opposition, 78.78% of the citizens were of the opinion that hosting the America’s Cup would have a positive impact on the city (Vázquez, 33 November 2004).

The opposition to the America’s Cup was very minoritary, only a few citizen, ecologist and intellectual groups – such as Iniciativa COPA-sos, Coordinadora Pel Litoral Que Volem, the Federation of Residents Associations of Valencia and Universitat en Bici (Morenilla, 30 October 2004) - considered that the event was being used as an excuse for real estate speculation, the privatisation of the public realm and the destruction of the environment, and demanded citizen participation in the debate about the future of the city.
The enthusiastic reception of the majority of the population was due to the need for a boost in self-esteem and the optimistic economic expectations fueled by the different economic impact reports commissioned by the administrations and different business associations of the city – which fundamentally coincided in the previsions of growth - and disseminated by the local press. In short, the previsions were an economic direct impact of more than 1,500 million Euros, the creation of more than 10,000 jobs according to the Port Authority and Valencia convention Bureau (Zafra, 30 April 2004) and a 1.7% increase in the regional GDP according to AVE and KPMG (Olivares, 5 June 2004). The real estate and tourism sectors were considered to be the most likely to benefit from the event. Also, the local press insisted in the opportunity offered by the America’s Cup for the urban transformation of the city. An extract of the local edition of El País in April 2006 read like this:

‘[…] the America’s Cup and its reception in this land is understood by virtue of the opportunity that it represents to the improvement of the city of Valencia because its main reason for existence is that any event organization of this magnitude brings investments with it that improve communications and provide infrastructure that contributes to modernization and, frequently, elevates the standard of living of the citizens of the city in question. If not, just look at the changes experienced by capital cities such as Barcelona and Seville after the Olympic celebrations and the Expo, respectively’. (El País, 13 April 2006)

From September 2003 to the designation of the city in November 2003, the city council entrusted a small team directed by tourism and city marketing expert José Salinas - head of Valencia Convention Bureau - with the task of producing a candidature project. The time, less than three months, was very limited and, as expressed by Salinas (Interview 21), ‘logically, having limited time, you rely on your own team, on outside consultants for whatever you end up needing. For example, if it is something to do with engineering, an engineering consultant… but really fast, you know?’ Thus, ‘to speed up the processes’ (Interview 21) the urban planning project was commissioned to Áreas - the architectural and engineering practice of José María Tomás, who had already worked in the project Balcón al mar in the area.

Once Valencia was the only Spanish candidate in the selection process, the central government was incorporated to the project through the creation of the consortium Valencia 2007, formed by the three levels of government and chaired by Rita Barberá, mayor of Valencia. The involvement of the national scale was essential since the central government has competences related to the needs of the event - such as national security, air navigation, maritime navigation and radio space– and the space where the competition would take place belonged to the central state (a total of 330,000 square metres of land and 565,000 square metres of water) (Vázquez, 27 March 2007). The process of constitution of the consortium and initial negotiations with ACM was very speedy as José Salinas, first director of the Consortium explains;
‘And of course, [the Consortium] has to be constituted. Well...This whole process is completed in three weeks and at the beginning of October in an official act in Valencia with the vice-president of the economy at the time, Rodrigo Rato, in attendance. The document is signed; we have a consortium. But, well, we have to continue working because, at the same time, the four finalist cities are negotiating with ACM the contract of host city. Because what they intelligently do to maintain the tension and the competition, between the cities is to say: ‘no, no, no, what we are going to do is sign a contract with the four cities, with a suspension clause that says that this contract will be valid and in force if this city is designated as the host and, if not, it will not be valid.’ So, during this time it is necessary, say, to go on negotiating the contract with the organisers and, at the same time, keep on coordinating the legal processes with the public administration because there is a series of agreements that must be made. And, breaking bureaucratic records, in some twenty days, there is a document to be signed on the Council of Ministers desk. Twenty-odd days is a world record, which is the agreement of the Council of Ministers of 31st of October for which a series of things that were absolutely necessary for the contract were approved: fiscal issues, for example, that were demanded by the organisers to favour the teams and their participants, tax reductions, etc. etc’. (Interview 21)

**Figure 5.14 View of the new canal**

Source: Megaconstrucciones (www.megaconstrucciones.net)

After the designation of Valencia in November 2003 the main objectives of the consortium were to build the necessary infrastructures for the sailing competition and to be the visible head of the Spanish public administration for ACM (Interview 47). The contract with ACM included the payment of a canon of 90 million euros, of which 40% was contributed by the central government, 40% by the regional government and 20% by the city council. Also, the realization of a series of infrastructure works - including the construction of a new canal that would communicate the inner harbour with the open sea, in preparation of the event and initially budgeted in 500 million euro - formed part of the contract (see a view of the canal in figure 5.14).

The definitive infrastructure project of the inner harbour was soon approved but the consortium had not agreed on how to finance the works. In view of the lack of agreement about the financing of the infrastructures and to speed up the process the invite for tender was done by the port authority and construction works in the inner harbour started in 2003. The mayor had suggested that an urban development operation which would include a marina and about 4,000 dwellings in the Eastern and Western Quays, the landowner of which was the Port Authority, could be the formula to fund the necessary infrastructures for the competition (El País, 8 June 2005). But the change of central government in March 2004 - in which the socialists substituted the conservatives – ruined her plans.
Finally, after the local and regional governments recognised that they did not have the financial capacity to carry out the project and putting an end to several months of disagreements, in October 2004 - following Fernando Huet’s designation as new director of the Consortium - there was a definitive agreement regarding the financing of the infrastructure works. The central government would provide a bank guarantee for a credit of 500 million euro given by the Official Institute of Credit (ICO), 70% of which the government expected to recover through the exploitation of the inner harbour area after the sailing competition had taken place. This formula was chosen, according to the Director of the Valencia Port Foundation for two main reasons. The first is ‘to avoid making a budgetary allocation. A loan is a different type of financial asset and does not accrue as public debt while a budgetary allocation is active in the budget and is debt, it is accrued as debt. So, it is very common in this type of project to depend on this type of financial instrument’ (Interview 45). The second is what we call the finance project. This has to do with you expecting the business that is underway to generate a certain income in the future with which to pay back the loan. It is like a toll motorway […] But, in a project like this, the toll is not clear, that is, it is not clear when you do the risk analysis of the project because the political and institutional components of the project are large and depending on how things are implemented it will be more or less clear. So, to do this, if the Consortium had tried to issue a bond or go into debt with a banking institution, etc. the bank analysts would have denied it and required a guarantee from the State to give the credit. And if you need a bank guarantee from the state the existing formula is the governmental agency that we call ICO (Institute of Official Credit). So, the ICO provides the funds but, because they know that the payback can be complicated and they have to defend their profit and loss account balance, what they do is say to the Council of Ministers, that is, the Government: Very well, I will lend what the Ministry of Public Administrations tells me to lend, I have no problem with it, but I need a state guarantee. In such a way that if the Consortium cannot pay because they do not have the money, because the marinas are not generating income, well, the result is that the state would have to pay the ICO back. (Interview 45)

Therefore, in November 2004, the Consortium took over the construction works started by the Port Authority and the construction of the rest of the necessary infrastructures. In June 2006, after the completion of the works, Fernando Huet returned to his previous position in a construction company and, Jorge Gisbert took over the presidency of the consortium. As Huet explains:

In that year and a half, obviously, all of the works were completed. I believe that the management was doubly successful. First, for having complied with everything that was to be done in two and a half years because one year had been lost and, second, which I believe to be the most important achievement of the Consortium, because infrastructural works budgeted in 500 million were completed for 450 and not for 2,000 as is usually the case, right? This is, I think, the most
SUCCESSFUL PART; EVERYTHING WAS COMPLETED ON TIME AND FOR LESS MONEY THAN BUDGETED. (INTERVIEW 57)

Besides the financing of the infrastructure works, the other issue of contention was land ownership. The Port Authority, dependent of the central government, was the landowner of the inner harbour - except for the old Art Deco port warehouses which had been ceded to the city council in 2003. There was an agreement from 1997 between the Ministry of Public Works, the regional government, the local council and the Port Authority according to which in exchange of other privileges – mainly the construction of an access to the port through the North - the Port Authority would cede the inner harbour for citizen use but the transfer had not taken place. (INTERVIEW 34) On occasion of the America’s Cup the port Authority signed a concession for the exploitation of the area in favour of the consortium, who at the same time subcontracted it with ACM (INTERVIEWS 34 AND 47). However, there were tensions between the Port Authority and the Consortium because the port’s expansion plans were hindered by the America’s Cup, as expressed by the president of the port authority Rafael del Moral.

The port is making a tremendous effort because the America’s Cup is another piece of land taken from the extension through the north, which is just a project but is supposed to be done for sure, but which is worth for the Valencian Community only if the interests be compatible. (FERRANDES, 1 APRIL 2004)


competition, which was won by British renowned architect David Chipperfield and Fermín Vázquez (see figure 5.15).

**Figure 5.15 Building Veles e Vents**

![Building Veles e Vents](image)

Source: Author

With all the necessary works finished, pre-regattas of the America’s Cup were held in Valencia in June 2005 and on 2nd July 2007 the Swiss team Alinghi won the 32nd edition of the America’s Cup. Soon afterwards, on 25th July 2007, Alinghi announced that the 33rd America’s Cup competition would be held in Valencia in 2009. The Valencian decision-makers’ expectations for this second edition were more modest as José Mª Gil Suay, Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, explains:

‘Theoretically, we knew what was happening and we were totally sure that a second edition of the Cup was much less powerful than a first edition […] the Cup had generated this impact in the first edition; the additional impact of a second edition was much less and, in terms of cost and effect, at least arguable. But, well, according to how it was considered in 2007, another edition was to be celebrated in 2009. That was two years. Meanwhile, they could put all of the international competition rules together for the exploitation of the inner harbor […] In short, it meant to delay two years the completion of the transformation of the harbour into a multi-use space and not just for the Cup and, of course, two years in the history of the city wasn’t much’.

(Interview 33)

The three administrations expressed their support to holding a second edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia. In an interview with Bertarelli, the president Rodríguez Zapatero guaranteed the central government’s support to the agreement (Velert, 25 July 2007). Also the president of the Port Authority
expressed his support, ‘compromise’ and ‘eagerness to cooperate’ in the organisation of the America’s Cup (El País, 25 July 2007).

In October 2007 a contract for the 33rd America’s cup competition was signed. However, on 22 November 2007 ACM announced that the 33rd America’s Cup would be postponed due to a sporting dispute between the winning team Alinghi and its main rival Oracle, which had to be resolved by a New York legal court. In June 2008 ACM handed over the Inner harbour to the Consortium for its management due to the uncertainties about a possible new edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia.

After many months of uncertainties and changes of mind about the dates and location of the next edition of the America’s Cup, ACM decided that there would be a second edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia. In November 2009 the regional president and the mayor of Valencia announced that the 33rd edition of the America’s Cup would be held in Valencia in February 2010; and it did. By that time, the consortium had already great difficulties returning the credit for the inner harbour had been in ACM’s hands for a long time and, in addition, the economic crisis had heavily impacted the profitability of its exploitation when it returned to the Consortium.

Apart from the infrastructural works necessary for the hosting of the sailing competition, the America’s Cup generated further development and transformation of the maritime area. In 1995 there had been a competition to redesign the inner harbour and coastal area called Balcón al Mar, which was won by José María Tomás, but which had never been implemented (Interview 23). The selection of the city to host the America’s Cup in 2003 meant that the maritime area would be ‘in the limelight or centre of the media attention of the city’ (Interview 20) and, real estate consultant Ignacio Jiménez de Laiglesia – motivated by the council’s lack of overall planning for the area - presented a private initiative to develop the maritime area next to the inner harbour. Jiménez de Laiglesia explains his motivation:

‘The initiative comes up in an almost spontaneous way, without any premeditation or institutional support, nothing, that is, it comes up as a concern for me as a professional and as a Valencian. […] With the America’s cup, here there was going to be I don’t know what number of things, all the television channels, all of the wealthy elites, all the I don’t know what. And this is a bit as in the house of the farmer who is going to marry his son or his daughter and says to himself, well, the guests are going to come. And there is a sort of need to paint over the flaking paint that had been there forever, to repair this piece of furniture or, in the end, give an image of modernity to the city and so forth. And given that all this circus was to be precisely in the most conflictive and degraded urban environment of the city, the debate about what to do with that area arose’. (Interview 20)
Jiménez de Laiglesia had a personal relationship of friendship with French star architect Jean Nouvel, who visited Valencia and got enthusiastic about developing a strategic project for the maritime waterfront and coastal area of the city (for which Jiménez would pay him only the incurred expenses). The project – which achieved the blessing of the mayor and deputy mayor to get started (Velert, 12 November 2004) - had the intention of opening the debate about what to do in the area and was baptised with the name Valencia Litoral (Interview 20).

Valencia Litoral –which delivered a ‘holistic proposal about dealing with all this, with uses, with what type of amenities, how to approach the environment design, to which kind of people is it directed’ (Interview 20) for an area that spanned nearly the whole waterfront of the city (see figure 5.16) - was presented by Nouvel in November 2004 to the general public, and local and national authorities. The star architect had the express support of the crème de la crème of the architectural profession, including names such as Norman Foster, Alberto Campo Baeza, Richard Rogers, Salvador Perez Arroyo, Renzo Piano, Frank O. Gehry, Ben van Berkel and Peter Cook (Velert, 12 November 2004). The project sparked off huge media interest and was broadly received by the general public.

Mayor Barberá and deputy mayor Jorge Bellver liked the proposal and promised to study its viability, although Valencia Litoral promoter Jimenez de Laiglesia was sceptical about their understanding of the project. According to him;

‘The mayor still likes and loves the project, however her way of interpreting the project is frankly in need of revision. That is, because she believes to be following the spirit of the project but every time there is a proposal or something it is crazy; it has nothing to do with what we were proposing. Why? Well, because she only has the most superficial understanding of the project, the most visual part’. (Interview 20)

The city council picked up the relay and, in November 2004, through the municipal public corporation responsible for urban planning AUMSA organised an international competition for the master plan of the residential sector of El Grao. The area - of 370,372 square metres by the last section of the Turia’s Garden and the port - approximately coincided with Nouvel’s Valencia Litoral.

Prestigious international architects such as Ieoh Ming Pei (who designed the Louvre pyramids), Meinhard von Gerkan and VolkwinMarg (designers of the remodeling of Berlin’s Olympic Stadium), Zaera (author of Yokohama airport terminal), Koolhaas, (Pritzker Prize in 2000), or famous Spanish architects Emilio Tuñón and Luis Mansilla submitted their entries to the competition.
However, in September 2005, although four architectural practices had already been shortlisted and GMP International had taken the lead, the mayor Rita Barberá – using the sailing competition as a justification - decided to leave the resolution of the competition in stand-by with the intention of extending the area to be planned in order to include the inner harbour (Velert, 20 September 2005).

In September 2006, a new international competition was convened, this time by the Consortium, which, apart from the area of the Development Plan El Grao, included the design of a new marina in the inner harbour area. The final area delimited for the competition covered approximately 1.35 million square metres and included a water surface area of approximately 565,000 square metres (Consorcio Valencia 2007). The objectives of the marine were related to the America’s Cup for the intention was to create a marine for mega-yatches which could attract high-end tourism too (Interview 46). In the Urban Plan El Grao the council, differently to the usual procedure in other urban plans, divided the design from the implementation of the plan, thus introducing an intermediate phase – the design – for which a competition was convened (Interview 54).

In March 2007, the winners of the Competition Marina Juan Carlos I were announced. The first prize ex-aequo was awarded to Jean Nouvel and to Volkwin Marg (GPM), but local architect José María Tomás (author of the previous project Balcón al Mar) was commissioned to coordinate a final proposal which would combine the proposals of the two winners.

**Figure 5.17 View of the Marina Real Juan Carlos I**

Source: Author

The competition was considered a way to approve, from an administrative perspective, a proposal – Valencia Litoral – which the mayor thought was interesting (Interviews 20 and 54). However, according to de Laiglesia, in the end,
‘the competition is to justify doing then what [the mayor] likes because really, at the end of it, the competition and all of this boring talk, the City Council has commissioned an architect through a municipal company, or stuck him in, let’s say, almost using a shoehorn to ram him in, in the proposal with Jean’ (Interview 20).

The marine project – a view of which can be seen in figure 5.17 - was implemented but the economic crisis has left the Urban Plan El Grao awaiting for investment from private developers to be carried out.

5.4 Sociopolis

The project of Sociopolis was an initiative of a group of architects called Metapolis, appeared in 1998 and lead by Valencian architect based in Barcelona Vicent Guallart. This group of architects, which included among others Manel Gausa, Willy Mueller, Enric Ruiz-Geli and Ramon Prat, was also involved in the creation of the ‘Institute for Advanced Architecture of Catalonia’ (IAAC) in 2001, funded mainly by the Catalan Regional government (Serra, 13 June 2004; Interview 25). The IAAC - which describes itself as a ‘a cutting edge education and research centre dedicated to the development of an architecture capable of meeting the worldwide challenges in the construction of habitability in the early 21st century’ (Institute for Advanced Architectures of Catalonia, www.iaac.net/institute/vision-objectives) – was created, according to one of the members, with the intention of ‘getting commissions from the public administrations through the institute, to do things that we thought had to be done’(Interview 25).

In this context, Sociopolis was born as a theoretical project in which a group of architects proposed their idea of how a city should be organised (Interview 25). Here it was not the client – in this case the regional government - who contacted the architect but the other way round. In fact, the project was proposed by the architects –with Guallart at the head – to the public administration. Vicent Guallart had a personal friendship relationship with Consuelo Císcar (then responsible for the Valencia arts Bienal) and her husband Rafael Blasco (then regional minister of Social Welfare) and proposed a project – Sociopolis - which, according to him, would step away from the dominant paradigm of the architectural icon and would work on the construction of neighbourhoods and housing (Interview 60). Guallart explains how the project was initiated:

Well, in fact, the initiative came about in a conversation with Rafael Blasco, Consuelo Císcar and me. At that time, Consuelo Císcar was starting up or was leading the Biennial of Arts of Valencia and Rafael Blasco was, at the time, the Minister of Social Welfare. That was 2001, a time of great euphoria for architecture, mega events and so on and I thought that it was important to work again on the idea of constructing neighborhoods and designing good architecture for social housing programs [...] So, I said to them: Well, if Consuelo is going to do a Biennial of Arts and Rafael is responsible for Social Welfare, why don’t we look at that idea of doing an exhibition at
the Biennial of Arts, invite some architects and we draw up a project for designing a neighborhood and then it can be developed, right? And, actually, that is why it is called Sociopolis, because it was pushed forward by the Department of Social Welfare, initially. (Interview 60)

Therefore, as a result of the conversation a first theoretical project called Sociopolis was commissioned by the regional Ministry of Welfare. Guallart gathered a group of well-known architects - Guallart, Abalos & Herreros, Duncan Lewis, Zaera, Greg Lynn, Torres Nadal, Gausa, Vinymas, Eduardo Arroyo, François Roche, Lourdes García Sogo and Toyo Ito - who elaborated a project of an ideal neighbourhood that proposed new types of housing for young people that live alone or share flats, older people in homes, immigrants or single-parent families. Sociopolis was presented in the Valencia Arts Bienal –the topic of which was ‘the ideal city’ – hosted in 2003 at the old monastery of San Miguel de los Reyes. The model exhibited in the Bienal can be seen in figure 5.18.

**Figure 5.18 Model of the initial Sociopolis project**

Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com)

The opportunity for Sociopolis to become a real urban design project arrived when Rafael Blasco was appointed Regional Minister for Housing, Territory, Urbanism and Environment, in 2003 (Interviews 50 and 60).

Immediately after Blasco arrived in office the Valencian Institute of Housing (IVVSA) was made responsible for the development of Sociopolis, to ‘make it real’ (Interview 56), that is, find a site and the funding to formalise what until then had been a ‘mere theoretical speculation’ (Interview 50). The Institute’s remit is to develop publicly subsidised housing, on urban land provided by the local councils in the beginning and, since the onset of the Valencian urbanism law in 1994, also on land generated through the planning process by them acting as ‘urbanising agent’. This last option was the one used in this case.

Sociopolis was a regional government project managed through the IVVSA but the city council, since it was subsidised housing and an emblematic project, took interest in it and collaborated from the beginning. In Guallart’s words ‘the City Council, at its highest level, has supported us since the beginning and I believe that this is very important because otherwise, the project would have gone nowhere’ (Interview 60). There was an agreement between the regional and local authorities to build Sociopolis. Together they defined the site for the project and the council modified the urban plan - reclassifying 35 Ha - to allow the development of previously protected cropland. The local authority also ceded land which was earmarked for amenities to the IVVSA to build social housing (Interviews 50 and 56).
The location, in a dependant village within the Valencia city territory called La Torre, was selected in collaboration with the Valencia city council and, as shown in figure 5.19, was in the periphery of the city. The selected site was on historical croplands and therefore the planning figure selected was a ‘special plan’, which was called ‘La Torre special plan’ and included approximately 3,000 dwellings. The decision to build on protected croplands was very controversial but justified by the author of the environmental impact study in this way:

The problem in Valencia is that any urban development has to be made at the expense of the croplands or the Albufera nature park. [...] if urban growth was absolutely necessary and had to be located somewhere, well that is where it had the least impact (Interview 22).

Regarding the objectives of the project the architects speak about architectural experimentation and innovation. According to Guallart (Interview 60), the fact that the council offered rural land as a location, arguing that there was no land available within the urban core of the city, was perceived by him as an opportunity to look into the creation of a new rural-urban development typology and the integration of the croplands and urban life. Also the collaborators of the project describe Sociopolis as innovative, vanguardist and experimental (Interviews 8 and 22). It is considered so from several points of views. First, it explores an urban design typology which combines a rural environment with an urban one. Second, it
investigates about new ways of dwelling and creates a laboratory of social housing. Third, the architecture of the individual buildings is not only typologically but also formally singular.

**Figure 5.20 View of the Sociopolis construction site**

Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com)

When Sociopolis became a real project under the direction of the IVVSA, according to Mª Jesús Rodríguez, Director General of Housing of the Regional Ministry of Environment, Water, Urbanism and Housing (Interview 56), it kept the intention of being a pioneering project from an architectural and urban design perspective, where the buildings were commissioned to prestigious architects. The officially stated objectives were to propose a new type of neighbourhood which would integrate urban living with traditional croplands and provide new types of dwellings for the new types of families. The other important *raison d'être* of the project, according to Rodríguez (Interview 56) was to provide an important proportion of the amount of subsidised affordable housing needed. This objective was also interpreted as a way of satisfying regional president Camps’ electoral promise of building 100,000 subsidised affordable dwellings (Interview 9) in a very visible way since Sociopolis was the Valencian Institute of Housing flagship project.

Despite the official rhetoric of Sociopolis intending to be a sustainable neighbourhood with social aims, which provided the project with popular support, urbanists, ecologist and intellectual citizen groups – such as Per l’Horta and Terra Crítica (Diago et al., 2008) – and the local socialist party in the opposition opposed the project on the grounds that it would destroy Valencia’s valuable rural environment. As explained by Senior lecturer of Urbanism at Valencia’s Polytechnic University and member of the grassroots group Terra Crítica Fernando Gaja that destroying ‘one of [Valencia’s] best rural lands to make an ecological neighborhood’ is absurd and contradictory: ‘You cannot destroy the croplands saying that you are going to save the croplands’ (Interview 2). Figure 5.20 shows the rural land being prepared for the construction of Sociopolis, and the more fertile layer of soil removed in the process.

The residents of La Torre – the hamlet dependent on Valencia where Sociopolis is located – however, thought that the new development would be an improvement for them because, in Miguel Moreno’s – farmer and resident – own words ‘La Torre has always been a very small neighbourhood and this will provide more volume of housing. This will make it livelier’ (Interview 61). Representative of Per l’Horta, Josep Gavaldá, describes it in a less positive way: ‘they think that it is good for the village, they have an idea of progress that, for us, is from the 19th century’ (Interview 15). Also those farmers whose farming land had been object of compulsory purchase were happy to sell ‘because they are old people (the youngest being 60-65 years old) and they are happy to quit farming’ (Interview 22), as the author of the environmental impact study explains.
In any case, several facts pointed out by the critics contradicts the stated sustainability objectives and questions the urban design quality of the development. First, Sociopolis is a neighbourhood of affordable housing segregated from the urban area, whose deficient public transport links makes it car dependent. Moreover, its segregation means that it does not solve the metropolitan area’s structural problems (Interviews 2, 9, 15 and 54).

Second, building new dwellings in a peripheral location instead of refurbishing the estimated 40,000 empty dwellings existing within the urban core or developing available more central land, questions its social justification (Interviews 2 and 15). In addition, since they intend to be ‘remarkable architecture’ the construction of the new dwelling results too expensive for being affordable housing (Interview 2). The project by Dutch architects MVRDV – in figure 5.21 – is an example of how imagination has been given full rein and construction costs not taken into account.

**Figure 5.21 Infography of experimental housing project in Sociopolis**

Source: MVRDV

Third, the neighbourhood is badly integrated with the environment (it could have been anywhere), lacks conviviality spaces (Interview 54) and its buildings are ‘banal architecture’ (Interview 15). In short, ‘Sociopolis, as a concept, is a common and vulgar new town’ (Interview 9).

Urban planner and author of the Valencia Urban Plan of 1989, Alejandro Escribano summarizes the critiques very well.

Well, it is a contradiction, a *contradictio in terminis*, it makes no sense. If you are going to make a sustainable neighborhood, you are going to bet on vanguard architecture what you cannot do is start by trampling the territory, and locate a neighborhood like by a high-use motorway, with noise levels above the permitted, without public transport, with bad accessibility and all this just to get some press headlines. I see it plainly like this. Sociopolis doesn’t look like a model operation to me at all. And then, in addition, the vanguard architecture is not going to be implemented. So, if in the end you said, hey, here we’re going to have a mix of 10 or 12 architects, we are going to have such and such name but it ends up that they are private promoters that probably will have to use a type of architecture that generates at least a minimum level of income or else it won’t sell. And, on the other hand, the project has many issues; from how the public spaces are designed, the maintenance of the croplands that have been left there, within the urban fabric in an artificial way and with no guarantees that it can be maintained. (Interview 42)
On the other hand, including, as Sociopolis did, an 80% of subsidised affordable dwellings was also considered a way of justifying the occupation of protected croplands by appealing to its ‘strong social interest’ (Interview 8). Guallart is very clear about the ‘social value’ of the project:

The truth is that Sociopolis, when the General Urban Plan was created in 1989 it was decided that all of the land that was not urban would be considered specially protected rural land. Then, in our case, the Valencian law itself allowed that in this type of land if you were going to use 70% of the edification rate for subsidised housing, the state could do it, but, despite this, it was a transformation of specially protected croplands to build subsidised housing, which required, in Rafael Blasco’s words, its sale as something social, or creating links with people, with agents that would add value to the project. [...] In short, despite it being an urban development to make subsidised housing, I have wanted to surround it with people who could contribute a different kind of values and knowledge (Interview 60).

Moreover, concentrating subsidised affordable housing in peripheral and badly communicated areas of the city or metropolitan area left more central and appealing areas for more profitable uses, such as tertiary or free-market housing, and did not interfere in the housing market of the core city by lowering prices.

Yet, the project received the approval of the international architectural professional and cultural worlds when in 2004 - being still a theoretical project - it was exhibited in the Architekturzentrum of Viena – a prestigious centre for architecture. Dietmar Steiner – director of the centre – commented that Sociopolis was ‘very connected to the architecture with a social purpose and even experimental’ and ‘for the first time in the new millennium, the Sociopolis project is designing a really integrative and hybrid vision for the new European city of the future’ (El País, 1 November 2004). Later on, Sociopolis was one of the projects represented in the exhibition about contemporary Spanish architecture ‘Onsite: New Architecture in Spain’ held at MoMA, New York, in 2005 (El País, 5 February 2006).

According to Guallart (Interview 60), this external recognition helped to find support for the project at home.

I believe that there was a key moment in Sociopolis which is when it was also acknowledged abroad, because here there was a lot of criticism from the opposition. Recently, for example, I have understood that the opposition supported the project, to have it completed. Sometimes, I have felt that they help more than the government itself. And, basically I believe that foreign acknowledgement is always fundamental to ease the people, to make them understand that it is supported by someone, you know? (Interview 60)

The project although not without difficulties started to be implemented. Having been born as a neighbourhood of experimental architecture to finally become a ‘neighbourhood with social aims,’
compromised the feasibility of the project since the cost of experimental ‘emblematic architecture’ is incompatible with the necessary budgetary contention of publicly subsidised housing. To make the plan economically viable a higher floor area ratio than that established by the General Urban Plan was allowed. Also 20% of the dwellings would be sold at market prices instead of being affordable subsidised dwellings as it was initially planned. Moreover, due to the quality and singularity of the dwellings most of those which were subsidised belonged to the higher price end of the rank.

**Figure 5.22 Virtual model of Special Plan La Torre (Sociopolis)**

Source: IVVSA

When the project turned from being a theoretical into a ‘real’ project it also became less of an artistic and intellectual endeavour and was more linked to the urban development sphere (Interview 60). For the theoretical project all the participant architects had been selected by Guallart. In his words, they were ‘friends of mine, let’s say [...] We didn’t contact anyone we didn’t know but rather only people that we had worked with on past projects, in conferences, etc. in past years’ (Interview 60). When the Valencian institute of Housing commissioned the architect the master plan for the ‘La Torre special plan’, each one of the architects of the initial group were assigned a plot of land to develop a housing project and given a new brief and, in addition, other plots were assigned by public competition to teams formed by an architect and a developer (Interview 25). Moreover, the size of the site for the special plan grew seven-fold in comparison to the theoretical one (Interview 60). From a design point of view, the initial master plan elaborated by Guallart was modified in collaboration with the architects of the Valencian Housing Institute to arrive to a more feasible final design (Interviews 25 and 56). In figure 5.22 a virtual model of the modified Sociopolis project (‘La Torre Special plan’), including high-rise residential buildings in the middle of the croplands, can be seen. It can also be observed the difference of scale between the new buildings and the existing urban fabric of La Torre (behind).

The connection to urban utilities was difficult and therefore the investment in infrastructures was considerable (Interview 22). An agreement to retain the irrigation canal of Favara - one of the main historical water supplies for agriculture still in use – in good functional use was signed by the community of users and the Valencian Institute of Housing. However, although the original intention was to maintain the irrigation and paths infrastructure of the croplands as unchanged as possible, in the end as architect García Sogo (Interview 25) complains this feature of the project has been lost and the urbanisation of the land has become more standardised (see general view of Sociopolis in figure 5.23).

The implementation of the project, which is still going on, has encountered many difficulties. According to Guallart, building a neighbourhood is more difficult than building a building-icon for many more agents are involved – landscape architects, botanists, ecologists, architects, engineers and so on – and in the
process ‘many hands intervene and, this, well, provokes that easily 20-25% of the quality is lost on the way, for various and even justified reasons, we could say’ (Interview 60).

**Figure 5.23 General view of Sociopolis**

On the other hand, coordinating a group of star architects spread around the world and which have little knowledge or interest in the local building regulations and planning system has been complicated, especially given the fact that each of them is involved just in a small housing project with a limited budget rather than in the design of an iconic mega-project (Interviews 56 and 60).

Also, when the projects of the star architects were submitted to a call for bids for their construction, there was little response to some of them from the developers due to their technical and structural difficulty considering that it is social housing. On top of it all, from 2007, the economic recession and burst of the real estate bubble impacted the project due to a lack of buyers for the dwellings and of financing for the developers.

In the end Sociopolis is an emblematic project with a political justification. It was intended to be the flagship project of the IVVSA (Interview 48). It allowed the Regional government to make visible its special focus on subsidised housing and even counteract the negative publicity that Valencian Urbanism has in the EU due to the 1994 Urbanism Act (LRAU) (Interview 9, 42 and 54). The project has been mainly driven first by architect Guallart and -when it became more than a theoretical endeavour - by the IVVSA, but it was also regional minister Blasco’s pet project.
5.5 Conclusion

The analysed projects are different in size and scale of money involved. While the America’s Cup, in a relatively short period of time, had spectacular international media impact, Sociopolis – of a more modest scale - has had less media coverage and relevance. On the other hand, although the budget for the infrastructural work implemented in the harbour for the America’s Cup was considerable – 500 million euro - a project of the magnitude and economic cost of the City of Sciences – estimated in more than 1,200 million euro – exceeds it in an overwhelming way.

Despite the differences, the three projects show similarities in their objectives and approach. In all of them, the use of emblematic architecture to achieve urban revitalisation and economic growth occupies central stage and the construction and real estate sectors play an important role. On the other hand, the actors involved in the projects are of the same type. Particularly, the understanding between elected politicians and star architects providing them with sought-after symbols stands out.

Having understood better the context of Valencia’s mega-projects, how they came about and their objectives, the processes of design and implementation as well as the support and the obstacles to their delivery, in the next chapters the actors and coalitions of interests involved in the projects, the motives behind the urban policy and its economic, social and planning outcomes will be examined more in depth.
6. INDEBTEDNESS AND AUTHORITARIANISM: THE OUTCOMES OF VALENCIA’S URBAN POLICY

6.1 Introduction: Urban change and the image of the new Valencia

It is undeniable that Valencia has undergone a profound urban transformation in the last 15-20 years. As it is always the case with architecture, the physical transformation is the most tangible effect of Valencia’s urban policy. In the words of one of the interviewees:

[…] Valencia was pretty much a transit city even before the bypass was built. It was called the traffic light of Europe. In other words you could come from Germany to Alicante and only pass through Valencia as a traffic light. […] I’d say that as a city it was ugly. Nowadays the change for the better is obvious. Casting my memory way back I can even remember a roadsign at the entrance to Valencia, painted brown to make it even uglier still, if that were possible: Valencia historical centre 2 hours. This could be taken two ways. Firstly it might mean that as we know you’re only passing through here you can do the historical centre on only a two-hour visit; alternatively it might be interpreted as don’t bother spending more than two hours on the visit because by then you will have seen it all (Interview 1).

Figure 6.1 Aerial view of the Sociopolis site

Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com)

Indeed, both the City of Sciences and the transformation of the harbour and waterfront area are of spectacular scale and have completely changed the face of the city. Sociopolis, situated in the periphery of the city and still being built, is less visible but represents an example of the residential urban growth that has clearly extended the footprint of Valencia and its metropolitan area, as can be seen in figure 6.1. In fact there is consensus not only around the convenience of urban transformation but also, and more specifically, pro-growth. And these projects have indeed generated growth in the sense of new urbanisation, colonising new areas of the city. Sociopolis is a clear case of urban growth but, similarly, the City of Sciences started the expansion of the city by the river towards the sea and the America’s Cup was the driving force for the development of the waterfront area.

The general consensus is that the transformation has been positive, the city has acquired new heritage – Calatrava’s spectacular architecture or the Veles e Vents building by David Chipperfield for instance – which, on the other hand, provides new tourist attractions for the city, regardless of the ‘architectural quality’ of the buildings. Thus, everybody agrees that the City of Sciences is spectacular. For CACSA’s representatives the concentration of elements makes the complex ‘unique worldwide’ (Interview 43), for many, it is beautiful and an example of quality architecture (Interviews 17 and 25).

The critics, however, attack the City of Sciences’ lack of real content (Gaja, 2006a; Interviews 3, 6, 7, 17, 30 and 58) and its urban design, which has left it as an isolated element that could have been
anywhere and which has no impact in the urban structure of the city (Interviews 19 and 53). An aerial view of the complex – as seen in figure 6.2 – clearly shows both its spectacular nature and its isolation from the city’s urban fabric.

**Figure 6.2 Aerial view of the City of Sciences.**

Source: Patricia Gómez de la Casa

Besides growth, urban transformation regarded as modernisation is the other issue that has created consensus. The construction of new infrastructure such as the extension of the port and the airport on occasion of the America’s Cup are seen as conducive to growth and modernisation (Interview 21). Also, the City of Sciences is successful urban modernisation (Interviews 12 and 41). The physical transformation from a highly polluted industrial brownfield into a ‘visually attractive’ (Interview 26) ‘very modern and very beautiful’ (Interview 58) new urban area has been considered successful and positive by the decision-makers but also generally by the population. Business director of CACSA explains:

> I have a photograph of what the City of Arts and Sciences looked like 10 years ago and the difference between what it was then and what it is now is vast. […] Beforehand there was nothing and the change now leaps to the eye. So it’s what you see with your own eyes; you can tick off the list of buildings made, for example, over 5,000 houses, supermarkets, leisure centres, whopping green areas and 16 hotels in the area and you get some idea of what the City of Arts and Sciences has meant. That’s really the difference; it’s tremendous; you only have to look about you and you can see that, yes, it’s changed (Interview 43).

For some, however, the development has been excessive and ‘disproportionate to the long term needs of the city’ (Interview 24). The city has transformed itself in order to host the America’s Cup rather than the city using the event to transform itself according to its needs (Interview 54). On the one hand, according to expert in urban economy Sorribes (Interview 9) the transformation has been focused on concrete parts of the city – around the City of Sciences and in the port areas – and has not produced a positive impact on neighbouring impoverished areas of the city (such as la Malvarrosa, el Cabañal and Nazaret). But, more importantly, the environmental negative impacts have been significant. In the case of Sociopolis, historical croplands which cannot be recovered have been destroyed. The group Per L’horta has claimed that the irreversibility of the project is its main flaw (Interview 15), and alerts of the importance of being cautious when making decisions that will affect future generations. In fact, as engineer Javier Obartí (Interview 22) - author of the environmental impact study – explains, Sociopolis is from a time when conservation of landscape issues were not considered important. The new infrastructures built for the America’s Cup also have negative environmental effects. The transformation of the inner harbour has caused problems of erosion of the coast line but also opened the doors to real estate speculation, according to ecologist groups. The benefits that the America’s Cup would bring to Valencia were used to justify the negative environmental impacts that the
infrastructural works would have. Both the America’s Cup and Sociopolis affect environmentally fragile spaces of the city but the ‘economic regeneration’ relevance of the projects has seemed to weight more for decision makers than the irreversible environmental impacts they imply.

A less tangible but, indeed, very clear effect of Valencia’s urban policy has been the general impression that as a result of physical change the city has improved; it is more beautiful than before. It has changed for the better, an impression widely held in Valencia but also shared by other places in Spain (Interviews 1, 6, 30, 32, 39 and 46). The expressions ‘how much Valencia has changed’ or ‘how pretty Valencia is now’ are common among visitors from other regions (Interviews 5, 16, 32, 39 and 46). The citizens can be proud of their city and perceive their urban environment under a better light. Seeing the perception of others has made them revalue their urban space. For instance the America’s Cup definitely changed the vision of the port and the maritime area, making it become a new area of centrality and prestige of the city (Interviews 27 and 54).

This positive image has also been projected to the exterior. Valencia, in relationship with the megaprojects and events, is described as dynamic and vital by many of the interviewees (Interviews 5, 16, 24 and 34). All the interviewees agree that more people know Valencia thanks to the City of Sciences and events such as the America’s Cup and F1 (Interviews 1, 6, 18, 19, 31, 34, 44, 54, 55 and 58). Decision-makers insist that the objectives have been achieved: Thanks to mega-projects and events ‘Valencia is on the map now’, and this could be the most repeated phrase by decision-makers and population alike, the one that sums it all. Therefore, the City of Sciences has provided Valencia with an icon while the America’s Cup has provided it with publicity; many hours of television around the world that have made Valencia known internationally. In the words of the person responsible for tourism promotion in the city:

What’s obvious is Valencia’s huge media splash thanks to the America's Cup. We’ve made headlines in papers of the five continents; we’ve been reported on CNN, in the New York Times, we’ve had half-hour slots on the BBC or CNBC. But for this massive media event, it would be very hard to gain such an international projection for more than a couple of minutes. Why? Because in such a globalised world there’s so much news to fit in. (Interview 21)

**Figure 6.3 Tourists during the America’s Cup competition**

Source: La Marina Real Juan Carlos I

This positive perception of the city has had an effect on tourism too, for more people consider Valencia as a tourist destination. As an interviewee comments: ‘I had never seen tourists in the city before and now one sees them’ (Interview 1) (see the crowds generated by the America’s cup competition in figure 6.3). This has been remarked by both people who agree and people who disagree with the urban policy based on mega-projects and events, thanks to the City of Sciences and events.
such as the America’s Cup Valencia is in the tour circuits. The director of Commercial Strategy and
Corporative Development of the Port Authority of Valencia explains regarding the America’s Cup:

Valencia’s citizens saw that the city was suddenly filling up with a flood of tourists from all round the world. This effect of people from all parts each waving the flag of their country lasted for nearly two years and, this really livened up the city. And the truth is that the more these visitors saw of Valencia the more they were impressed by the city and I think this effect lingers on over the years. Valencia was the vogue not only in Spain but also in Europe and the whole word. Just as everyone visited Barcelona or Seville in the nineties, well in the noughties everyone wanted to come to Valencia and there is a knock-on trickle of visitors even today. (Interview 34)

On the other hand, the importance of global architecture and architects in attracting media attention
must be stressed. Architects of Santiago Calatrava’s reputation not only have high ‘social and media
impact’ (Interview 28) but their architecture, described as iconic, is expected to work particularly in
terms of image. Thus, with the City of Sciences Valencia has attained an emblem with which to be identified. The complex is described as a new urban landmark for the city (Interviews 29 and 30), ‘a scenography’ (Interviews 16 and 39), ‘a cinema set’ (Interview 38), ‘an urban image’ (Interviews 17 and 36), ‘an icon’ (Interview 14), ‘a tourist attraction’ (Interview 17), a ‘background landmark’ where you can take pictures (Interview 16). In a synthetic way and either as a compliment or a critique, it is considered ‘a postcard’ (Interviews 5 and 31), something that makes Valencia recognisable. As the ex-director of the Calatrava office in Valencia admits, mega-projects such as this:

They are projects that are very ambitious in general because there’s no easily recognisable payback (...) they can’t be set against ticket sales. They are projects with other sorts of payback. It’s like Bilbao’s Guggenheim museum; the construction cost is not met by ticket sales but in terms of Bilbao’s image, the snapshot […] How much does a city postcard cost? A recognisable city postcard. How much does it cost? How much do you have to pay? No one really knows. (Interview 5)

Likewise, the building Veles e Vents, designed by British architect David Chipperfield and built on
oxasion of the America’s Cup celebration also attracted the international press attention and, in 2006,
was awarded the Leading European Architects Forum (LEAF) prize to the best building. Even in the
case of Sociopolis, although its impact has been bigger in professional circles, there is the perception
that the fact that there are well known architects in the project has contributed to Valencia being better
known abroad. As expressed by the director general of housing of the regional government:

I reckon that the importance lies precisely in the participation of international architects,
bringing Valencia and its project to outside notice so that people can see the sort of architecture we’re capable of. But for me even more important is the fact that IVVSA’s working policy for some time now has been the search for building quality (Interview 56).
The emphasis on the benefits in terms of image has caused to emerge questions about the correspondence of this image of success with the reality, with the real benefits for the city in economic or social terms. The Regional Minister of Public Works and Transport (1990-95) summarises very well a common appraisal of the City of Sciences:

Most people see the buildings and say ‘How lovely!’ snap a few shots and move on. Few actually enter the museum and it has no cultural or scientific life, that’s for sure. It’s become a sort of upmarket funfair; how pretty is Valencia! Let’s pull in the tourists, make this new area so eye-catching and spectacular (Interview 17).

Similarly, the America’s Cup is described as ‘a minute of glory’ (Interview 51a) or ‘fireworks’ (Interviews 33 and 51a). Gil Suay, Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, complains:

What I mean is that the immediate results, more immediate anyway, were spectacular. What I’m much less satisfied and sure about is the long term input. Truth is that the falla afterwards was fabulous, a beautiful monument seen all over the world and the cremá was quite spectacular too, with impressive fireworks. People were stunned, but after the last flame flickered, darkness came down and here we are today. That’s what I miss; I mean the ground had been prepared for a really huge long-term boost for the city rather than just letting it all drop afterwards (Interview 33).

In any case, the new Valencia and its improved image have been very profitable electorally for the party in office. The people are generally happy of the visible results and that pays off in the ballot. Although initiated by the socialist party, the political and electoral benefits of Calatrava’s project – although with initial hesitation – were understood by the conservative party, which strived to appropriate it, deleting the former president’s stamp. Subsequently both socialist and conservative parties have tried to capitalise the merit of the City of Sciences but the project has become the ‘trade mark’ of the conservative party (Interview 9) and has often been used in its electoral publicity. The America’s Cup was one of the key points of the mayor’s electoral message and has been considered the key of her success. Finally, Sociopolis has been the flagship housing project of the regional government, the one that demonstrates that the promise of building a certain number of subsidised dwellings was being kept.

6.2 Profitability and economic impact

In terms of direct economic returns Valencia’s mega-projects – particularly the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup – have been non-profitable, even ruinous, for the public administration. In that sense, it is generally accepted that this kind of projects do not make any profit but - in the words of the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 11) - generate wealth for the ‘society as a whole’. A Member of staff of the Centre for Strategy and Development of Valencia expresses the notion very clearly:
The city has benefited in terms of its image and job creation from all the building and development and the new areas. All this has generated knock-on wealth but the projects themselves have not yet broken even (Interview 6).

From the beginning the project of the City of Sciences and CACSA, the public corporation which manages it, have been loss making. Already in 1999, the only building functioning at that time, the planetarium, despite the high number of visitors could not balance its accounts and CACSA got a set of loans from different banks for a total of 345 million euro for which all its shares had to be pledged as a guarantee. (That meant that if CACSA could not return the loan, to secure repayment, the possessory titles of the buildings would be conveyed to the creditor; the banks, in this case). Only during the year 2002 the losses amounted to 36 million euro, giving an accumulated debt of 713 million euro in 2005. Again, CACSA’s losses were 45 million Euros in 2006 and 62 million euros in 2007. As the complex grew also the expenses did and, for instance, in 2007 the expenses of more than 192 million euro could not be balanced by the 34.5 million euros of turnover, creating a continuous dynamic of accumulated economic loss.

To balance CACSA’s accounts and avoid its compulsory liquidation due to bankruptcy, the regional government injected public capital to the public corporation several times. According to an agreement signed by CACSA and the Regional government in 1999, the latter makes the commitment to defray operating costs that the company cannot cover with its own income and to carry out capital increases to keep the company’s financial structure balanced.

(Olivares, 28 August 2008)

Thus, between 1996 and 2009 there were no less than eleven injections of public capital, the last of 115 million euro in 2006, 113.3 million euro in 2008 and 72.7 million euro in 2009. According to a report of the Sindicatura de Comptes (public auditing body), of the public capital injected to CACSA 314 million euro have been used to offset the depreciation of the entity (El País, 23 December 2008).
### Table 6.1 Cost overruns of the city of Sciences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial budget (million euro)</th>
<th>Final cost (million euro)</th>
<th>Cost overrun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planetarium</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>178%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museum of sciences</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>242%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking building</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>236%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opera palace</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>382.5</td>
<td>351%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museum of oceanography</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>440%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agora</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>193%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elaborated from data obtained from the local press

In addition, CACSA’s economic losses have gone hand in hand with the cost overruns (see chapter 5). Thus, if the budget for the initial project of the City of Sciences was the equivalent to approximately 210.3 million euro in 1996, in 2006, the unfinished City of Sciences had already cost the regional government 1,065 million euro and in 2011 nearly 1,300. According to the reports of the *Sindicatura de Comptes* the total cost overruns of the City of Sciences were over 300% in 2003 and over 400% in 2011. The approximate cost overruns of each of the buildings as to 2012 are reflected on table 6.1.

But it was not only the City of Sciences which was accumulating losses but the rest of the nine regional public corporations linked to mega-projects were in similar economic situation too. Indeed, as the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) admits the regional estate runs with the financial risks of the City of Sciences and other megaprojects and that is why, according to him, it is the most indebted in Spain (Interview 11).

The case of the infrastructure created for the America’s Cup is another example of difficult economic returns. The inner harbour area - which was supposed to pay for the loan given to the Consortium by the ICO to do the infrastructure works - remained deserted after the sailing competition finished in 2007 and failed to generate any income. After the celebration of the America’s Cup in 2007 the pubs and restaurants gradually had to close due to the lack of clients. Also, the marina has 311 moorings for mega-yachts of which, in 2009, only 6% were occupied (Zafra, 13 September 2009).
The main problem was that ACM (America’s Cup Management) had exclusive rights to exploit the inner harbour during the period of time in which the sailing competition was being held, which, including the pre-regattas, was between 2004 and 2007. The uncertainties about the possibility of holding a second edition of the competition in Valencia extended the period of time during which the Consortium could not exploit the area to generate income and pay the loan for the infrastructure works. This fact put the Consortium in a very difficult financial situation.

The loan, guaranteed by the ICO, had to be reimbursed in 2010 but the Consortium had been accumulating losses since 2006 because the income from the exploitation of the inner harbour was lower than the ordinary expenses. In 2006, the balance sheet showed negative equity capital of 15 million, which would have forced the Consortium to dissolve had it had to abide by the regular trading corporations rules. In 2008, the total loss was 30.6 million euro. The three administrations represented in the consortium agreed to inject capital for a total of 40 million euro in 2006 but only the central government contributed its part, 16 million euros. In 2011 the losses were 18 million euro and the Consortium had not reimbursed any of the capital credited for the infrastructure works.

All these cost overruns, management loses of the public corporations and investments with no economic return have contributed to the high indebtedness of the local and particularly the regional government, leading the last one to be technically bankrupt. The huge cost of maintenance of the new infrastructures created – particularly the city of Sciences - left the regional government lacking in funds for it.

Also the local government was heavily indebted, according to them mainly due to the investment for the America’s Cup. In 2006, the local government, for the first time ever, had to ask for permission from the central government to contract new loans because the (admitted) indebtedness was over 110% (Velert, 24 February 2006).

However, the case of the regional government has been paradigmatic within Spain. Already in 2001, Moody’s report alerted about the high financial risks that CACSA represented for the regional government (El País, 12 October 2001). In fact, all the budgetary increments of the regional ministries in 2001 were absorbed by the payment of debt interests. In 2004 the Regional Government had a debt of 10,098 million Euros, 11% of its GDP, which placed it as the most indebted in Spain (before Galicia with 7.8%). To this we must add the debt supported by the public corporations, which are not included in the public debt but –as explained for the case of CACSA– depend on the regional budget too.

The report of the Sindicatura de Comptes of 2006 confirmed that, as to 2005, if the rules for private corporations had applied, the regional government would have had to be dissolved (García del Moral, 27 December 2006). In 2007 the Valencian Community, with 11,500 million euros of total debt, representing 11.4 of the GDP, was still the more indebted in Spain according to the Bank of Spain (El País, 27 March 2008). Moody’s report of 2008 stated that most of the debt increase was due to the
indebtedness of the public corporations and the bank guarantees given to them (Ferrandis, 20 March 2008).

With the economic crisis the problem of indebtedness and the difficulties to maintain the mega-projects built during the economic boom were made more evident. Finally, in 2012, the Valencian regional government – which had been put by president Rajoy as the example for the rest of Spain – was the first one to ask for a bail-out from the central government.

As the regional minister of economy affirmed in 2007 referring to the City of Sciences, ‘projects of this kind do not necessarily have to be financially profitable short term’ (García del Moral, 8 August 2007). According to the regional government, the objective of mega-projects and events is not their economic profitability but their positive impact on the regional economy (Interviews 11 and 18). The Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) expresses the governments view:

[…] the accounts of the City of Sciences have always been in the red, for various reasons. But the thing is that as a public initiative it cannot charge market prices, neither in the museum, the planetarium and not even in the opera palace, which is intrinsically loss making. But these are book losses; if you take into account all the knock-on benefits in terms of jobs, activity, hotel- and restaurant-trade, etc., the returns are very positive (Interview 11).

Therefore, despite their financial situation being problematic, the regional government has claimed that the benefits from the mega projects and events have been received by the society as a whole. This argument has been sustained based on several economic impact reports of both the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup commissioned to the Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE), a research centre founded by the regional government in 1990. According to the (on the other hand contested) economic impact study the proportion of wealth generated has been around 1 to 2, that is, for each euro of public investment approximately 2 euros have been generated for the benefit of the private sector.

In the case of the City of Sciences and according to the reports elaborated by the IVIE, the calculated internal rate of return, which includes the social returns, has consistently been over 5%, which is the value of reference according to the European Commission (Interview 18). With these positive results the regional government was able to obtain funding from the European Investment Bank (BEI) (Interviews 11 and 18). Joaquín Maudos, author of the IVIE economic impact reports, explains how the economic impact and social profitability were calculated:

What we did in that study was: firstly to estimate the museum’s economic impact on Valencia’s employment and income figures, taking into account two sources, namely the construction itself, a sizeable sum, and the ongoing operation. The operation itself can then be broken down into two impacts, one deriving from the operating account, i.e. people working there, procurements here, security services bought there, publicity etc. All this
generates economic impacts. Secondly, and very important from the social point of view of Valencia’s economy, is the impact associated with the tourism expenditure of museum visitors. We also took into account two additional social benefits of the museum, firstly the intellectual enrichment of the visit, which has a value in terms of human capital. We economists try to turn this human capital into monetary terms. In other words if you visit the museum and get some personal enrichment out of it this has an economic value, which we reflect in the report. Secondly the price per square metre of the housing in the hinterland has soared since the event was approved. We therefore tapped into the cadastres and other information sources and calculated from a plan just how much the housing price per square metre had risen by districts and how much it is likely to rise in the future. This factor brought it from last place in the rankings to first. Then there was a tremendous town-planning impact and this also represented an appreciation of value. It was as though the owners were shareholders and suddenly their capital is worth more, you’ve become richer. So what we do in the report is to calculate economic impacts in income and employment and then we factor in social costs and benefits and private costs and benefits. Then we calculate what is known as the internal rate of return (Interview 18).

Although the reports have not been made accessible to the public, the regional government presents a summary every year to justify the profitability of their urban policy. Thus, Maudos goes on explaining:

[…] what the regional ministry of economy does, and this is used greatly by the economics regional minister and first vice president, what we do is to begin adding together the whole impact in terms of income and employment, not social profitability note, income and employment impacts for the whole set of activities, and this can obviously be added up. Then the cumulative GDP percentage of the Valencian Community is set in a yearly scenario. They annualise the impact and say: Look, thanks to the whole set of activities throughout the year the major events generate such and such a percentage of Valencia’s regional GDP. But, I repeat, note that this does not take into account the social profitability, only the economic impact, which is by no means the same (Interview 18).

In the case of the America’s Cup, before the celebration of the first edition in Valencia there were five economic impact reports commissioned by different institutions. The Regional Ministry of Economy commissioned one to the IVIE and the national Ministry of Public Administrations commissioned another to the ‘Fundación Tomillo’. The Valencian Chambers of Commerce did their own study, the Valencian Association of Entrepreneurs (AVE) commissioned a study to the consultancy KPMG and the local newspaper Levante EMV commissioned another to the Instituto de Economía Internacional de la Universidad de Valencia.

The five studies used the same methodology, an input-output analysis, but differed slightly in their results because they disagreed on the public investments that were attributable to the America’s Cup
(Interview 18). As Maudos (Interview 18) advises, it is very difficult to consider the induced private investment because it is complicated to know what to attribute it to. Thus, for instance, according to the IVIE’s report, the America’s Cup would increase the regional GDP in 1% and the creation of jobs in 1.2%. The most benefited economic sectors would be the service sector - mainly commerce, hospitality industry, real estate agencies and business services – and the construction sector. According to ‘Fundación Tomillo’ 40,770 jobs would be created, and the economic impact on the Valencian economy would be 3,663 million euro – 1,300 million Euros of direct impact and 1,435 of indirect impact. The most benefited sectors would be the service sector, industry and construction. According to KPMG the economic impact would be 3,150 million euro and 111,000 jobs would be generated in Spain in four years. According to the Chamber of Commerce the construction sector would be the more benefited due to the construction of infrastructures (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010). Despite some differences, all of them agreed that the America’s Cup would have a huge positive economic impact on the Valencian economy, create thousands of jobs and bring about an increase in tourism.

In 2008, after the sailing competition had taken place, the regional government presented the definitive report of the America’s Cup’s economic impact (Maudos et al., 2007), which confirmed the positive forecast of the former report in terms of GDP and employment and quantified the total income in 7,724 million euro. The report analysed both the direct and indirect economic impacts generated by the current expenditure (26% of the total) and the investments in infrastructures (74% of the total) produced from 2004 to 2007 and linked to the America’s Cup. According to the report, 75% of the total expenditure corresponded to the Spanish administrations, 16 % to teams and organisers and the rest to visitors, media and others.

The 440 million euro invested by the Consortium in the remodeling of the inner harbor to adapt it to the needs of the competition, represented according to the report only 16% of the total expenditure while the higher expenditure 1,250 million euro, representing 45.05% of the total, corresponded to the Regional government’s ‘Action Plan for the America’s Cup 2004-2007’.

The expenditure of the regional government attributable to the America’s Cup has been a bone of contention and has generated many critiques to the IVIE report. In 2004 the regional government had presented an investment plan of 500 million euro but in 2005 decided to present a new plan of 2,102 million euro that included a list of 150 actions, of which several were old projects already initiated. The action plan included not only the improvement of the public transport network and road accessibility to the city but also projects such as the new La Fé hospital already under construction (the author of the IVIE report decided to exclude this expense from the report (Interview 18)).

As the author of the impact report admits the economic impact of mega-projects and events is proportional to the expense ‘if you spend more you always generate a bigger impact’ (Interview 18) and, given that the investment is substantial, the impact on the GDP is considerable too. However,
considering that most of the economic impact calculated corresponded to infrastructure and most of the expenditure was public expenditure, the study of alternative investments to holding the America’s Cup would have been highly advisable, even more if we take into account the profitability of the investments in infrastructure in the inner harbour and the difficult financial situation of the Consortium.

**6.3 Distribution of benefits and the effect on the Valencian Economy**

As suggested by the hefty costs of construction and indicated by the economic impact reports of both the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup, the main economic sectors which have reaped the benefits of an urban policy based on mega-projects and events are construction and real estate on the one hand and, tourism and the hospitality industry on the other. The huge investments have generated substantial capital gains which have been left entirely in private hands.

Indeed, the most important direct beneficiaries of the investments have been the big construction companies which have signed succulent contracts, but real estate capital gains induced by an urban policy that has incentivised urban development (of which Sociopolis is an example too) must not be overlooked as it has resulted in huge economic returns for some (Interviews 4, 7, 28, 32 and 51a).

The land around the harbour area, where the America’s cup and F1 competitions took place generated considerable capital gains but the case of the area surrounding the city of Sciences is very clear (Interview 18) as the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) explains:

> What we have seen in the surroundings, therefore, has been something of a bonanza. The initial town-planning gains have been appropriated by all the private sectors that have built, promoted or purchased housing in the area, who have seen prices triple in a few years as a result of the town-planning improvements (Interview 11).

Certainly, the financial risks of projects such as the City of Sciences have been taken by the state but the bulk of the benefits have been reaped by the private sector. According to the conservative regional government, and in the words of the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 11) by ‘the society as a whole’ although considering the equity of the distribution –mostly in hands of big construction and real estate companies – it would be better characterised as a transfer of public money to private hands.

The other benefited sectors have been tourism and the service sector. From the late 1990s Valencia started to present a more characteristic urban tourism profile type (Universidad Valencia, 2007), at the same time as the number of visitors grew substantially (see table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Number of visitors to the city of Valencia

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VISITORS</td>
<td>372,205</td>
<td>743,859</td>
<td>1,074,203</td>
<td>1,921,197</td>
<td>1,825,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Institute of Statistics and Valencia Tourism

This growth has been attributed partly to exogenous causes – such as the increase of low cost air travel for instance - but also significantly to the administration’s effort to equip the city with leisure and cultural attractions and the emphasis on the organisation of mega-events (Universidad de Valencia, 2007). While, in 2003, the main reason to travel of over 60% of the visitors was work related, in 2011, 60% of the visitors mentioned leisure as their primary motivation of travel (Departament Economia Aplicada. Universitat València, 2007; Turismo Valencia, 2011). The City of Sciences first and the America’s Cup later on have been crucial elements of a tourism policy focused on the attraction of urban tourists (Rausell, 2004; Rausell and Marco, 2005; Carrasco and Rausell, 2006).

There has been however some scepticism about the figures of number of visitors to the City of Sciences complex given by the regional government. While the director of the complex (Interview 35) boasts of an annual number of 5 million visitors, from other sectors (Interviews 13, 28 and 51) there are more pessimistic views, not least because the visitor counting system of the complex does not allow to differentiate visitors from members of staff and does not take into account that some visitors are counted more than once (Departament Economia Aplicada. Universitat València, 2007). On the other hand, a crowding out effect of the City of Sciences on other cultural attractions of the city has been observed, which indicates that many of the visitors of the City of Sciences do not count towards the total growth of visitors to the city (Departament Economia Aplicada. Universitat València, 2007).

An important boost to the Valencian tourist sector was the celebration of the America’s Cup. The Director of Valencian Convention Bureau (Interview 21), responsible of Valencia’s tourist promotion, explains the impact that the America’s Cup had in terms of tourism:

Valencia, which was already growing a lot in tourism terms, has in fact been Spain and Europe’s quickest growing tourism city in the last five years. But we have not only grown quantitatively but also qualitatively in two different directions. Firstly the geographic demand-side direction – i.e. we have internationalised Valencia’s tourism; beforehand we had a seventy-thirty international-national split and now a fifty-fifty split. Secondly, from a series of firms and sponsors, we have nurtured a much freer-spending client type than the normal weekend visitors (Interview 21).

But, again, this optimistic analysis is contested (Interviews 7, 9, 13, 28, 30 and 51). Although Valencia, between 1990 and 2004, was in effect the European city with a bigger increase in hotel stays (Nácher and Sancho, 2007) the success in tourism terms needs to be put in context. According to tourism expert Iribas (Interview 28), Valencia’s number of visitors was so low in relationship to the
city’s possibilities that it could only increase. In the words of Rausell, Senior lecturer of Economics at the University of Valencia:

Effectively, Valencia from the tourism point of view has been a success story since the late nineties. The moot point now, however, is: why was Valencia not a tourism city before the late nineties? Here the most important point is perhaps the failure of the tourism model when it boasted the entire wherewithal for becoming a tourism city. Valencia since 2000 has grown vastly in terms of number of visitors; it is one of the quickest growing European cities in fact. This growth rate started from a very low base, however, but of course I believe it is a success story. But if we cancel out the one-off effect of opening various events and equipping them, the negative growth rate is higher than in other European cities. We are wringing out the last drops of this inauguration effect in a city with no previous references to go on, and so the people are coming for the first time. Most visitors in the early noughties were first-time visitors and this effect is now dying out. But this is because, surprisingly, Valencia’s main competitive strengths, mostly involving in my opinion its lifestyle, were not previously conceptualised or exploited properly. The setting up and equipping of the major events therefore served as an excuse, an attraction drawing in trippers. Since there were so many people who had not visited Valencia before as sight-seeing or weekend tourism, this obviously acts as an attraction and draws in visitors. But there lies the rub. What we are doing now is living off the lack of tourists from ten years ago and this effect will inevitably die out. When this inauguration effect flags, the City of arts and Sciences… it will all become trickier. In other words, success is unquestionable in tourism terms but due account has to be given here to the one-off boost of setting up and equipping these major events. (Interview 13)

The data about the America’s Cup are in line with Rausell’s analysis. In 2007, the number of visitors increased in 8.1% and the number of night stays increased in 15.2%. In 2009, the number of visitors decreased in 7% and the number of night stays in 6% (Zafra, 8 February 2010). The experts explain the contrast attributing it to the so-called ‘champaign effect’, an increase in the demand due to a novelty in the supply which after a period of time goes back to normal levels of demand. For many commentators, this is a proof of the inefficacy of mega events to sustain and boost the tourist sector (Interview 28).

The benefits of the hospitality sector during the competition – with some reserves - were substantial but, in the aftermath the scenario changed completely. The America’s Cup’s generation of wealth has been defined as ‘immediate and punctual’ (Interview 52).

Although in 2007 the hotel occupancy in the Valencia province increased in nearly 1.8 points, in 2008 the figures went back to pre America’s Cup levels (Biot and Castillo, 27 January 2008). In addition, in 2008 the hospitality industry entrepreneurs complained that the huge increase in the supply - in part due to the optimistic expectations that the America’s Cup had generated - had left the sector in a flagrant situation of crisis. After all, between 1999 and 2005 the hotel supply in the city had increased
in 60% (Nácher and Sancho, 2007). Thus, the returns in tourism terms were not as expected in the long term. For the hoteliers, as expressed by the president of the Hotel union of Valencia Province ‘the America’s Cup impact has been excellent but so far it has not been able to compensate the increase in supply’ (Biot, 19 February 2005).

Emiliano García, representative for tourism in the Confederation of Businesses recalls:

There was an initial reaction of scepticism from many people, I included, but the truth is that even I more or less got caught up in the wave of euphoria. Being so close to the America’s Cup site and also being highly publicised in many good-food guides, the truth is that I had a considerable boost in sales, not in profit but yes in sales. But the America’s Cup had little overspill in hotel and tourism terms because the port facilities mopped up most of it. And then there were people, me included, who wondered: What’s going to happen tomorrow? Then tomorrow comes and we see that, in effect, it was not catered for; not only that but the stock of establishments has increased appreciably and though we are given a very high tourism score in surveys, I mistrust this because we had to find new personnel overnight. I had to resort to unskilled people by offering high pay and this is not good for the sector in the long term. Now this unskilled personnel is back on the dole. (Interview 52)

In contrast, ACM, the corporation responsible for the organisation of the America’s Cup, obtained direct economic benefits of 30 million euros according to the official version, apart from the canon of 90 million euros (Ros, 6 July 2007). The Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup explains very clearly what can only be considered a net transfer of public money to private hands, in this case to the Swiss company:

[…] ACM is so to speak the rights-holding body. All the dock, its whole transformation is placed by the consortium in ACM’s hands for holding the Cup and ACM then manages all this infrastructure, organises the races, and lays down the rules. In other words, it’s as though we built the house and then handed it over to the tenant, only instead of being paid a rent we pay him to come. We made the house, we hand it over to the tenant and pay him a rent and it is he the tenant who manages all the races and what we might call connected factors such as publicity. (Interview 33)

On the other hand, at a more structural level the urban policy has not resulted in important changes in the productive structure of the city, where the service sector continues to predominate (Banyuls and Sánchez, 2007; Interview 13 and 28). The main economic sectors of the Valencian Autonomous Community are commerce, hospitality sector and consumer goods industry. In the last decades the construction sector has increased its weight and there has been a progressive terciarisation of the economy. In 2009 the service sector represented 70% of the jobs in the region and 66% of the regional GDP (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010). Similarly, in 2008, in the Metropolitan area of Valencia commerce and the hospitality sector represented 26% of the total employment, construction 9% and, real estate and business services 15%. Only 12% of the working
population was employed in the industrial sector and 3% in agriculture and farming (Oficina d’Estadística Ajuntament de Valencia, 2008).

Albeit, according to the economic impact reports, the America’s Cup would generate a 1% increase in the regional GDP, in 2007, the total increase of the Valencian regional GDP was 5.9% while the total increase in Spain was 7%. In 2009 the variation of the GDP was -3.1% in Spain and -3.8% in the Valencian Autonomous Community, according to the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional Estadística, www.ine.es).

Moreover, a model based on tourism and construction has generated precarious jobs. In 2008, in the Valencian Autonomous Community the temporary employment rate was 32.3% whereas the Spanish average was 29.3% (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010). Also, the qualification rate of the Valencian labour force – 29.8% of the workforce has a university degree – was below the Spanish average (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010). This is due to having a productive structure based on labour intensive sectors - construction, commerce, tourism, transport, etc. – which do not require a highly qualified labour force – and therefore attract unqualified migrants - and where precarious contracts – short term contracts, part time contracts, etc. – predominate.

According to the National institute of Statistics, the average annual salary in construction, commerce, hospitality sector and businesses services was lower than the Spanish average in 2002, 2006 and 2010, the average salary in the hospitality sector being between 30% and 40% lower than the Spanish average. Therefore, the average salary in the Valencian Autonomous Community was 10%, 8% and 9% below the national average respectively in those years (Instituto Nacional Estadística, www.ine.es). Certainly, neither the City of Sciences nor the America’s Cup economic impact studies consider in their analysis the type of jobs generated (Interview 18).

Despite the official discourse about the ‘city of knowledge’ the structural impact on knowledge, innovation, etc. of the urban policy based on megaprojects and events has been inexistent (Interview 13). In fact, the global investment in R+D has been consistently below the national and European averages. For instance, in 2008, the global investment in R+D in the Valencian Autonomous Community was only 1% of the GDP, below the Spanish average of 1.35% and the 1.99% average of the 15 richest European countries (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010; Instituto Nacional Estadística, www.ine.es).

Therefore, investments such as the City of Sciences or the America’s Cup seemed good more as an effect of institutional publicity than the reality shown by the data. As expressed by an ex-candidate to the Presidency of the Regional Government of Valencia:

With all the advertising hype it seemed as though the America’s Cup was going to be the golden bullet that solved all our problems. Then the America’s Cup is gone and you wonder am I worse or better off? Well I didn’t notice much effect (Interview 4).
6.4 The social outcomes

Despite the economic results of the urban policy, the regional government insist that projects such as the City of Sciences must be measured in terms of social profitability. They have commissioned a report to the IVIE – which is updated every year and put forward in their public appearances - to defend the social profitability of the City of Sciences (El País, 10 November 2004, García del Moral, 8 August 2007). Social profitability, for the government, means that through the contracts and the functioning of the complex the investment has reverted in the Valencian society. In addition, the IVIE report monetarises what can be considered more intangible benefits. Thus, the author of the report explains:

> How do you value in monetary terms the increase in your intellectual capacity, in your human capital? So what we do is, well, a person values his or her visit at least in terms of what he or she is willing to pay; if you have paid for the entrance ticket it’s because you reckon the visit is at least worth the entrance fee. Then, since a considerable part of the entrance fee is subsidised, school groups, groups of elderly people, private groups, then there is a real difference between what they pay and what they would be prepared to pay. This is an important profit to be taken into account. So what we do in the report is work from the entrance price, which reflects what you are prepared to pay and hence the value you receive. Then we correct it in terms of the mean age of the visitor, because it is not the same thing to be visited by a thirteen-year old, with all the possible enrichment to be tapped into over the next sixty years, as a sixty year old with no likely return. So a correction is made for the mean age of the visitor. So in the end I take into account visitors, type of visitor, mean ages, ticket price and thus obtain an estimate of human capital. This is a mere bagatelle in the whole picture, adding up, I believe, to about eight million euros. (Interview 18)

Even from that viewpoint, the expenditure has been so substantial that the government’s argument about the social profitability of the projects does not hold when the cost/benefit ratio is considered. Analysing the social outcomes more generally, the Valencian Community economic model has resulted not only in precarious interim jobs but also in a high rate of abandonment of studies, a trend which has been exacerbated by the economic crisis. In fact, the data of abandonment of compulsory secondary education in the Valencian Autonomous Community has consistently been one of the worst in Spain. For instance in 2009 while the percentage in Spain was 25.9% in Valencia it was 36.9% (Colectivo Lorenzo Luzuriaga, 2010). This can be in part attributed to an economy based on tourism and the construction, which provides jobs which require low qualification levels.

**Figure 6.4 School in temporary sheds in Valencia**

Source: Santiago Carreguí in El País, 13 September 2009
On top of that, social services (health, education and culture) have suffered from a lack of investment since the funds have gone to ‘economic regeneration’ expenditure (i.e. mega-projects and events). Figure 6.4 shows the effects of this lack of investment. Mega-projects and events as a means to urban regeneration have become almost the only public policy. The critiques have started to be heard:

Now, this is the moment for taking stock, for saying, now listen, we’ve got kids living in slums and prefab schools and yet you’re hosting a Formula One race spending god knows how many billions. Look at the huge healthcare waiting lists and then we put on Formula One, the America’s Cup and what not. This is the flak it has come in for since. (Interview 44)

In the words of regional PM Camarasa ‘with 105 million Euros [the capital transferred to CACSA in 2005] it is possible to pay half of the new La Fé hospital or six old people’s homes for 1,400 people each’ (Olivares, 27 February 2005).

In fact, between the years 2000 and 2008, per capita public expenditure in education, health and social protection in the Valencian Autonomous Community gradually and substantially decreased in relationship with the Spanish average, as table 6.3 shows.

### Table 6.3 Per capita social public expenditure

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<tr>
<td>Valencian Community</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>884</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>1.107</td>
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<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Valencian Community</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>1.118</td>
<td>1.189</td>
<td>1.252</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td>1.267</td>
<td>1.344</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differential</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-65</td>
<td>-149</td>
<td>-154</td>
<td>-201</td>
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<td><strong>Social protection</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Valencian Community</td>
<td>1.866</td>
<td>1.943</td>
<td>2.020</td>
<td>2.081</td>
<td>2.207</td>
<td>2.325</td>
<td>2.407</td>
<td>2.565</td>
<td>2.740</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.058</td>
<td>2.161</td>
<td>2.294</td>
<td>2.420</td>
<td>2.567</td>
<td>2.711</td>
<td>2.883</td>
<td>3.069</td>
<td>3.345</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differential</td>
<td>-192</td>
<td>-218</td>
<td>-274</td>
<td>-340</td>
<td>-360</td>
<td>-386</td>
<td>-476</td>
<td>-503</td>
<td>-605</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Differential</td>
<td>-157</td>
<td>-196</td>
<td>-620</td>
<td>-853</td>
<td>-1.018</td>
<td>-1.143</td>
<td>-1.439</td>
<td>-1.591</td>
<td>-1.843</td>
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Even within the Valencian government there have been complaints that mega-projects and events have been prioritised at the expense of the budget of other regional ministries (Interview 3). For instance, according to the DOCV (Diari Oficial de la Comunitat Valenciana), the official budget of the Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and Food was modified in 1,051,739 euros to assign them to the America’s Cup and promotion of the region (El País, 4 May 2009).

Dissociation between the local and the global can be perceived. The effort to situate Valencia globally has contrasted with how day-to-day investment in the neighbourhoods has been neglected. According to the President of the Federation of Residents’ Associations of Valencia:

So from our point of view, until we have hard profit figures, then we have not benefited. We might have benefited by putting Valencia on the map; Valencia (Spain), Formula one, America’s Cup, but as I’ve already said – have we got a cutting-edge education, have we got a cutting-edge healthcare, better hospitals than anyone else, incredible services for the elderly? Well the answer is clearly no. (Interview 49)

The case of Nazaret – a deprived maritime neighbourhood next to the America’s Cup area – is paradigmatic. Just some hundreds of meters away from the sailing boats and mega-yachts lies Natzarèt – at the other side of a security bubble – a rundown neighbourhood plagued by drug-trafficking and poverty. According to the vice-president of Natzarèt’s residents’ association ‘the only benefit most residents have noticed from the holding of the Cup is that the prostitutes are swept off the streets before the high-ups arrive’ (Velert, 14 October 2004).

Although in the city of Valencia, the strategic plan placed great emphasis on livability and quality of life, contradictorily, the focus on an urban economy has not only resulted in an economy that produces precarious jobs and high rates of abandonment of studies but has increased the cost of life for many, in particular for those who have seen their salaries go down and prices –especially real estate and everything related to it; retail, leisure, restaurants, etc. - go up.

On the other hand, competitiveness driven by amenities has not been a source of social cohesion. For some local commentators, although the city might have improved its international image its social cohesion has deteriorated (Azagra and Romero, 2012). Between 1973 and 2005 most autonomous communities in Spain improved the equality of income distribution, and the poorer 5% improved their situation. The Valencian Autonomous Community was one of the exceptions. In addition, the richer 5% was richer in 2005 than in 1973 (Aldás, Goerlich and Mas, 2007). Between 1996 and 2007, a period of economic growth, the Gini coefficient of income distribution showed no improvement in equality while the percentage of relative poverty increased from 13.3% to 15.2% (Azagra and Romero, 2007). In 2010, the effects of the economic crisis were patent with a clear increase in the inequality of income distribution and an index of moderate poverty of 19.6% (higher than in 1981 which was 16.5%) (Azagra and Romero, 2007). Therefore, the years of economic expansion did not
mean an improvement in equality and, moreover, the economic crisis brought inequality and poverty to levels higher than in the beginning of the 1980s.
6.5 Governance: privatisation, transparency and democratic control

Beyond the image, physical, social and economic outcomes, Valencia’s urban policy can be considered a conduit of profound governance changes, as expressed by a local commentator mega-projects and events are ‘veritable ideological engine rooms based not so much on what is said as on ways of being and doing that are established’ (Sánchez, 16 May 2007).

First of all, although in the main the population has not shown discontent until very late, there has been a general complaint in the city about the lack of debate about the important decisions (Boira, 2003b). The regional economic model has not been widely debated and the urban policy based on mega-projects and events either. Whoever has disagreed with it has been called ‘anti-Valencian’. As the regional minister of public administration (85-87) complains,

There is no public debate because the conservative party has pulled off an important feat by stigmatising anyone who questions the model as anti Valencia. [...] They turned a deaf ear to anyone else. They closed ranks and stigmatised any critical voices. (Interview 14)

At local level there has been no involvement of the social agents in the debate about city strategy, or about mega-projects. In the words of the secretary of studies and programmes of the socialist party in the city of Valencia ‘mega projects are not previously agreed with the city or its residents’ (Interview 24).

Some citizen groups – such as Iniciativa COPA-sos, Pel Litoral Que Volem, the Federation of Neighbourhood Associations of Valencia and Universitat en Bici - have demanded more public participation and citizen debate on the city’s important projects (Morenilla, 30 October 2004; Interview 49). As the manifesto of the ecologist group Pel Litoral stated, their claim was

Rather than a city managed on a seat-of-the-pants basis in the interests of the favoured few and their vested interests, we are advocating a city run in the interests of all with across-the-board participation. (Zafra, 28 May 2004)

Considering the individual projects, none of them has involved and extensive consultation or participatory process. For instance, when the first democratic regional government came up with the project for the City of Sciences no alternatives for the ‘economic regeneration’ of the area or the city were discussed. From the beginning, the style of decision was top-down. When the first conservative regional government arrived in office and decided to change the communications tower for an opera house little explanation was given. This way of doing continued until the project was completed. Also the convenience of hosting the America’s Cup in Valencia was taken for granted. The infrastructure and urban transformation projects linked to the America’s Cup did not generate any citizen debate either.
Although the lack of citizen involvement in urban projects decision-making can be considered a general trend of Spanish society after the first years of participatory euphoria which came with the onset of democracy, megaprojects and events and the mechanisms used to implement them have played an important role in the process.

First, for the majority of mega projects and events exceptionality measures have been applied with the justification of efficiency, the speeding-up of procedures and the social interest of the projects. Thus, urban planning has been adjusted to allow for the projects. For instance Sociopolis did not abide with the general urban plan of Valencia, and, therefore, the general plan was modified by the public administration as allowed by the Valencian Urbanism Act. Protected land was reclassified so it was possible to build Sociopolis. The planning figure used was a ‘special plan’, which as explained by an architect involved in the planning of the project ‘it is called special because it has a very important social interest, which, in this case was the substantial quantity of subsidised housing to be built there’ (Interview 8). Guallart explains the importance of the social interest of a project such as Sociopolis to achieve the modification of the urban plan:

Sociopolis, when the General Urban Plan of Valencia was drawn up back in 1986, decided that all land which was not urban should be listed as specially protected croplands (limited development with only typical farming and market-garden constructions allowed). In our case this means that under Valencia law the government was entitled to construct on land of this type if 70% of the buildings were to be state-subsidised housing. Despite this, however, there was a clear transformation of specially protected croplands into land for the construction of subsidised housing. In the words of Rafael Blasco this called for its social sale, that is, the collaboration of agents that gave an added value to the project was needed. (Interview 60)

Once the General Plan was modified and the project approved there were more adjustments. The initial project established that all the dwellings would be publicly subsidised but the final project includes 2,614 subsidised dwellings and 462 free market dwellings. In addition, the allowed residential density was allowed to be increased on the grounds that Sociopolis was a singular project.

Also the City of Sciences was a direct intervention of the regional government to do a project which was not contemplated in the General Plan but which was considered of exceptional importance. As early on as 1994, for the first project which included a communications tower, the local authority was open to modify the urban plan if necessary so the tower could also house private activities (S.B, 18 January 1994). Later on, in 2004, the project of four skyscrapers commissioned to Calatrava within the complex of the City of Sciences needed modifications of uses and volumetry of the General Urban Plan of Valencia to adapt it to the star architect’s design.

Therefore, while in Sociopolis – a peripheral location - protected crop land was reclassified to build subsidised housing; in the City of Sciences –a prime location – land earmarked for subsidised housing
was reclassified to allow for more economically profitable uses. Urban planning was being changed to suit the government’s interests.

However, the project for the skyscrapers, which did not respect the use for which the land had been obtained, arouse suspicions about the legality of the compulsory land purchase order and made the previous land owners resort to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided that the ‘social interest’ which was the justification for the compulsory purchase order did not apply anymore and therefore it was revoked. The Regional Government was sentenced to revise the price of the land (which had hugely increased in price since the compulsory purchase order) or to return it (El País, 8 March 2008).

Also, time pressures and the government’s declaration of the ‘special interest’ of the America’s Cup was used to speed-up hiring processes or compulsory purchase orders and, to skip procedures. The case is paradigmatic of how decisions had to be made in a rush. Since the candidature project needed to be done in a short period of time there was no time for proper democratic controls. For instance the architect for the master plan was hired directly, without competition, as explained by Salinas, the first director of the Consortium.

This master plan is contracted by the Consortium, well firstly by us and then by the Consortium, from the architecture firm of José María Tomas to speed up the process, because it was they who had carried out the Balcón al Mar project. So of course they had everything in train and there was no time for any other option. There was no question of saying, ‘let’s see how the project pans out’, but rather ‘I need this in 15 days’. So the overriding aspect, as we’ve already pointed out, was the fact that it was a project already underway, you know, already under consideration. (Interview 21)

Once the city was designated and the candidature project became the definitive one, the infrastructure works were contracted by direct hiring because there was no time to call for bids. Also other decisions - such as the constitution of a consortium or tax reductions for the participants in the competition – had to be made in a rush (see chapter 5). Thus, a sponsorship decree - which gave special fiscal privileges to organisers, sponsors and participants in the America’s Cup - was passed by first the conservative and then the socialist central government. For instance, donations to the Consortium or the participants in the America’s Cup had a tax deduction of between 25% and 35%, the owners of the boats and owners of the sailing teams would be exempt from social security taxes and, both Consortium and teams would have special tax deductions. The regional government, in turn, also granted fiscal exemptions to people related to the sailing competition and their families. For instance, an exemption of 99.99% in the property tax was offered to those who bought property in the Valencian Community due to the sailing competition. All these privileges can be considered an actual transfer of public money to private hands, aggravated by the fact that, in 2009, the Consortium had accumulated losses of around 60 million euro.
The second main mechanism to take decision-making out of the citizens’ control has been the transfer of management to public-private organisms. The 1990s was the moment when, in Spain, many public administrations resorted to the creation of public corporations, which were considered to provide agile management. On the one hand the administrations were undergoing a process of modernisation and on the other hand substantial European funds needed to be managed rapidly. Therefore, the mix of public ownership and private management that public corporations offered was seen as the most convenient formula.

Since then, also in Valencia, many public corporations have been created to manage mega-projects and events, but also to deal with urban planning and urban design at different scales – AUMSA, CEyD, CIEGSA, IVVSA, etc. For instance, the Valencian institute of Housing (IVVSA) is the regional public corporation responsible for social and affordable housing, and therefore managed the Sociopolis project. Actually, public private partnerships with IVVSA as the public partner were introduced in 2003 with the stated aim of solving the lack of subsidised housing. Most of these corporations are loss-making and have been used to increase the level of indebtedness of the regional government. They have also provided positions for the clientele network of the local and regional governments. This can be seen as a process of structural and spatial selectivity of the state. On the one hand, public corporations are used as a way of privileging certain groups of interest – those which are part of the urban regime – through their inclusion in the increasingly large number of semi-public bodies created, many times seemingly with that only purpose. On the other hand, the state reorganises itself – becomes ‘glocalised’ (Swyngedouw, 1997, 2005b; Brenner, 1999) in order to promote competitiveness by externalising its functions through privatisation, de-regulation and decentralisation.

VACICO, which then changed name to CACSA, was created for the construction and management of the City of Sciences, to speed up processes and to skip bureaucratic procedures – for instance to have more freedom to hire staff, etc. CACSA is a corporation with public capital whose president is the regional minister of economy. It has an administration board of ten people. It is managed as a private company but its capital is public. Being a public corporation its obligations of transparency are less numerous and strict than the public administration’s. The information about CACSA’s accountability - expenses, profits and losses – is not in the public budget. The Sindicatura de Comptes – the regional public auditing body - is the organism which audits its accounts. The ex-director of the Calatrava office in Valencia explains the functioning very graphically:

What you do is, you receive public money, pay it into cash and work from then on as a private firm: you manage it and come up with a more professional approach or you try to ensure a more professional money-management approach from this firm. That is the aim. (Interview 5)

In this way, despite the continuous demands of the press and political opposition, the regional government has avoided giving information about CACSA’s contracts - for instance Calatrava’s fees - on the grounds that that information is ‘professional secret’ between the two parties and it is only for
‘internal use’ of CACSA (Ferrandis, 12 December 2009). According to Gerardo Camps, regional minister of economy, ‘CACSA passes on this information only to the Sindicatura de la Comunitat Valenciana (the Public Audit Office for Valencia) and working auditors inspecting this company’s annual accounts’ (Ferrandis, 12 December 2009).

The same has happened with academics, who have found very difficult to obtain information about mega-projects and events for research purposes. For instance, out of the IVIE economic impact report of the City of Sciences only a summary of the results has been made available to the public, or to researchers. According to an academic of the University of Valencia:

I’ve been trying for five years to get the study. Now, it is presented in a press conference by the regional minister in charge, who says: “The profitability rate of the City of Sciences is 9%”, and that’s it. This never appears anywhere and it’s impossible to pull it off. It’s done by colleagues of mine from upstairs, who keep it on their desktop. I’ve been trying to get it for eight or nine years but there’s a complete lack of transparency. (Interview 13)

In turn, the different yearly reports of the public auditing body - Sindicatura de Comptes - have questioned CACSA’s contract awarding system and have even advised about a possible misappropriation of public funds. For instance, in 2006 the report pointed out the ‘scandalous amount of shoo-in contracting without abiding by any principle of publicity or even-handedness’ (García del Moral, 27 December 2006).

Moreover, in 2001, with the excuse of a more efficient management and the fact that ‘legally and operationally it is easier to set up contractual relations’ (Olivares, 16 August 2001), CACSA was divided into four limited companies. The new formula is closer to having four unipersonal enterprises, where the directors do not have to respond before a governing body and a shareholders board, and their liability is only that invested or guaranteed to the company. Also, the quantity of information they must make public is further reduced.

On the other hand, a new foundation was created for the management of the opera house; the Foundation of the Arts, which depends on the regional ministry of culture. As Senior lecturer of Economics at University of Valencia complains, the creation of foundations adds another step in management opacity:

Then there’s another process, which is ‘foundationalisation’. Here there is another argument, i.e. the incorporation of private agents, but most of them are foundations, precisely those closest linked to culture. The inputs of private agents are minimal. This means that 90% of the budget goes to foundations, foundation of the City of Arts, CACSA, City of Arts and Sciences, 90% is publicly funded, likewise the foundation of the Luz de las Imágenes, the foundation of the Teatro de Sagunto… which are mainly the contributions of public boards, but these are part of a completely opaque circuit. Then there’s the transfer of money from the
government to the foundation, whereupon all trace is lost, you don’t know what they do with this money, why or when they spend it or who or what they spend it on ...(Interview 13)

Also, with the aim of promoting Valencia as a tourist place and a place to invest in occasion of the America’s Cup many obscure public companies such as VEPI, VCI and SGIEPCV were created, sometimes with an overlapping of functions. Therefore, although Valencia Turismo Convention Bureau was the municipal body for the tourism promotion of the city, a new foundation to promote Valencia’s tourism on occasion of the America’s Cup, VEPI (Valencia Estrategia, Promoción e Imagen) was created with 50% of its capital coming from the local government (through Valencia Turismo Convention Bureau) and the other 50% coming from the regional government (through SGIEPCVSA). In addition, a regional public corporation SGIEPCVSA (Sociedad Gestora para la Imagen Estratégica y Promocional de la Comunitat Valenciana) was created to promote the autonomous community in occasion of the America’s Cup. Finally, VCI (Valencian community Investment) was created in 2004 to attract investment on occasion of the America’s Cup. Such proliferation of bodies with the same functions – some of which with little activity - suggests that they were being used by both local and regional governments to provide rewards for the participants in the governing coalition, to create a clientele network which helped structure the existing urban regime and, to act as mediators between the government and private interests.

Referring to VEPI, socialist party city councilor Botella complains

Then, all the money that has been managed through this America’s Cup promotion firm is opaque. There’s no way of knowing and millions of euros have been set aside for management – we’re not talking two figures here but maybe three or four judging from the last accounts we’ve seen because the latest accounts have not yet been deposited. But the crucial factor here is that an instrumental company has been set up that is unaccountable to anyone from the opposition or the public at large who might like to know that is being done with public money. No account is rendered of the reports and it has been used for contracting companies or hiring personnel at will, even in the current crisis, for organising the event. So this is also how the event is managed, how public resources are handled through instrumental companies of a legal nature set up to shirk any accountability by the Sindicatura de Comptes or the opposition party. (E51a)

Not surprisingly, with this premises, Valencia’s events - F1, America’s Cup, visit of the Pope, etc. - have been linked to cases of corruption; particularly to the infamous Gürtel case, a political corruption scandal which consisted in the alleged illegal financing of the conservative party in exchange of the illicit awarding of contracts to several companies by different conservative regional governments. The company linked to the Gürtel corruption network in the Valencian Autonomous Community was Orange Market - an enterprise specialised in the organisation of events.

With only five employees in the payroll, SGIEPCV needed to source out and hire companies specialised in the management of events and marketing and, thus, Orange Market was the beneficiary
of several contracts. Orange Market was hired also by the Consortium to organise opening ceremonies and events for the America’s Cup. Many times the contracts were divided into smaller contracts to avoid a call for bids.

Therefore, mega-projects and events have been prone to corruption, not least because the opacity of public corporations and foundations allows for it. One of the interviewees (who wishes to remain anonymous) summarises it very well:

Mega events or the major operations of the CACSA type are a staggering nest of corruption. Why is that? Firstly because parallel, uncontrollable companies are set up to circumvent red tape and speed up the management process. Here’s where the strange contracts start, the contracting of people that are not really necessary but money is coughed up because they are said to be vital. The rectifications, the price revisions, the ... everything’s OK, you’ve deviated 300 percent, everything’s fine. You really believe in all this deviation and there have already been so many complaints without anyone being caught with their hands in the till, a very large till. And isn’t it likely that there are many dipping into this till? And isn’t it equally likely that there is no end of connivance to bring friends and cronies into the firms because they are outside the pale of state contracting procedures? In the interests of urgency, because there is always urgency in these cases, then all the bureaucratic controls are blown wide open.

Both exceptionality measures and privatisation of management - through the creation of semi-public foundations and public corporations - have resulted in a lack of transparency and a lack of democratic control which, many times have derived in corruption. In this way, urban mega projects and events have constituted patent conduits for the establishment and normalisation of new neoliberal technologies of power (Keil, 2002).

The other process which has led to privatisation - not only of management but of public assets and even public space - has been the need to balance the cost overruns and the budgetary problems that a loss-making complex such as City of Sciences creates. For instance, the museum of oceanography is managed by the corporation ‘Parques Reunidos’ – owner, among others, of the zoo and the amusement park of Madrid – of which Bancaixa is a partner at 12.5% (Vázquez, 19 December 2002). According to Iribas (Interview 28), the regional government decided to give it to private management to minimise loses. More importantly, in 2002 a new regional property law was passed to allow the transfer of the property rights of the buildings of the City of Sciences from the regional government to CACSA without paying the tax of property transfer. The aim, according to the regional government was to ‘make better use of resources’ and introduce ‘more flexible managerial procedures’ in publicly owned property (El País, 16 October 2002).

The struggle to maintain the expensive complex of the City of Sciences has pushed their managers to find new ways of funding, even at the expense of privatising part of what in the master plan was considered public open space. An example of this is the Umbracle, an open public space, half the
surface of which was rented to be exploited as an outdoors private club. In fact, according to CACSA’s business director (Interview 43), 25% of the City of Sciences’ revenue comes from renting its spaces for private events. The financial difficulties encountered in the management of public mega-projects have provoked not only a process of privatisation but also the ‘naturalisation’ of such a process. Once indebtedness shows its face politicians are able to justify anything, even privatisation of public space, in order to find new financing.

### 6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the outcomes of Valencia’s urban policy based on mega-projects and events. Although the benefits of the urban policy in terms of physical change, perceived image and the population’s self-esteem are obvious to the eye, they do not correspond with the social and economic reality. The substantial expenditure in urban regeneration projects, often subjected to huge cost overruns has left the local and regional administrations highly indebted. The allegedly intended creation of wealth for all has instead resulted in a precarious regional labour market, under-financed social services - health, education and social protection - and a more unequal society. However, some sectors of the society – particularly the big construction companies and real estate agents – have been economically benefited by the urban policy. On the other hand, the mechanisms used to implement megaprojects and events – such as the application of exceptionality measures and the transfer of management to semi-private delivery bodies - have played an important role in a process leading towards more authoritative and privatised decision-making.

Keeping in mind the social, economic and democratic implications and the real beneficiaries of an urban policy based on mega-projects and events in Valencia, the empirical findings regarding the reasons behind the formulation of such urban policy will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7

7. SELF-ESTEEM AND THE NEW REGIONAL ESTATE: THE MOTIVES OF URBAN REGENERATION IN VALENCIA

7.1 Introduction: Valencia’s entrepreneurialism

Valencia’s strategic commitment to architectural icons and international events in the attempt to increase the city’s competitive advantages represents a weak form of competition identified by Harvey (1989), the attraction of tourism. As many local commentators have agreed, Valencia has gone for ‘the easy option’ (Interview 9). According to the Secretary-General of FECOVAL,

We’re right at the rear of the R&D rankings. As yet the city has not been capable of attracting the intellectual elite, snobs, European bon vivant, even with a fantastic climate. We have not managed to become the European California or Florida neither with the elderly nor the young. We have not managed to pull this off even starting out with all the advantages, so we’ve lost too in this model. Which model do we have? In the end it will be a process of elimination, like shedding Russian dolls, not this, not this . . . and what will we end up with? What no one else wants, that’s for sure. (Interview 62)

Also in the physical upgrading of the environment to increase its competitive edge Valencia has opted, as several interviewees have agreed (Interviews 13, 14 and 50), for an easy –if not inexpensive – choice, that is to build new heritage instead of restoring the existing. Indeed, it is easier to build from scratch than to manage the existing.

Presented as urban regeneration projects to market the city and attract tourism - particularly cultural and upmarket tourism in opposition to the traditional sun and sand tourism – both the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup show enough contradictions to make us wonder about ulterior motives behind urban regeneration. To mention just a few of the contradictions, the City of Sciences is not designed thinking about the content or a scientific strategy. The opera palace is over-sized for the purpose of fomenting musical culture in the population and, such a big building as the Agora was designed and built with no specific use in mind. A common critique to the complex is that image has been given priority over content. The director of the science museum’s complaints seems to confirm it;

I’m as big as La Villette and instead of one thousand people I’ve got two hundred, and instead of a budget... well, to give you an idea, my operational budget is less than fifteen percent of theirs and yet I’ve got the same number of visitors. (Interview 35)

Perhaps those objectives were overlooked for the sake of a higher level objective, the attraction of tourism to the city and the economic impact it could have. However, no cost/benefit studies of the project have been elaborated and the economic impact study that exists was commissioned while City of Sciences was already being built (Interview 18). As the author of the study states,
Here is a project I’m asked to evaluate and I do so but they don’t tell me to assess it against another, no, this is different. I’ve had to do it a posteriori rather than a priori. In other words, there is no ranking of projects to choose from, funding the highest earning one, nothing of the sort. Here there is no ranking of projects, the City of arts and Sciences is paramount and I’m asked to weigh up its social profitability but not vis-à-vis other projects. (Interview 18)

On the other hand, the City of Sciences was not linked to any sectorial policy, it depended on the Regional Ministry of Economy and Treasure and not, for instance, on the Regional Ministry of Tourism.

The America’s Cup project – initiated by tourism expert and director of the local body for tourist promotion José Salinas – came out from the very centre of the city’s tourism policy. The focus of the strategy was very clearly on upmarket tourism while a key tourist asset of the city, such as the beaches, which were the reason of 78% of the foreign tourism flows (El País, 30 May 2004), was being overlooked. For many, the America’s Cup has been a lost opportunity for a well-thought-out urban transformation of the maritime area. It seems, as shown by the management of the post-event, that the event in itself was more important than using it to generate an urban transformation.

Sociopolis’ objectives were allegedly closer to objectives of social reproduction. However, as already discussed, neither the social nor sustainability justifications of Sociopolis hold up in that location. The project – although modest in comparison to the City of Sciences and America’s Cup – had also internationalisation aspirations linked to the use of global architecture and prestigious architects as a marketing tool. Tourism - beyond tourism of architects visiting the work of the stars of the profession publicised in architectural journals– was not an objective of Sociopolis but similarly to the City of Sciences and America’s Cup it is closely related to the construction and real estate sectors.

An urban policy based on mega-projects and events is a policy of times of growth when there is no strict order of expenditure priorities for it seems there is budget for everything (Interviews 13 and 14). Definitely, the very costly City of Sciences ‘is a project of an era of economic boom’ (Interview 5). However, as late as 2009 and despite the economic crisis, the regional government insisted on the virtues of a policy based on mega-projects and events. Francisco Camps, the regional president, affirmed referring the hosting of mega-events ‘this is one of our ways to employment and prosperity’ (Alberola and Biot, 5 March 2009).

In short, all these facts show that Valencia’s urban policy is due to more than a mere entrepreneurially devised economic strategy. Therefore, the conceptualisation of Valencia as an entrepreneurial city to explain the motives behind the urban policy adopted needs to be problematised, as McNeill (1998, 1999) pointed out for the case of Barcelona too.
7.2 Groups of interest

The interests of different groups meet in the development of flagship projects, and therefore, their analysis offers a first approach to the motives behind urban regeneration. Although different groups may have conflicting accumulation strategies, if one of those strategies achieves general acceptance from powerful elements of society it becomes hegemonic (Jones, 1997; Collinge, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). The analysis of the interests that have been privileged provides information about the ruling coalition or hegemonic bloc. The main groups of interest benefited by Valencia’s emphasis on mega-projects and events have been construction companies, developers, elected politicians and architects. They have been able to exercise political influence and, their interests have been privileged and reflected in the urban policy.

The group which, in economic terms, benefits more directly from the mega-projects is the construction companies. Only the cost of the City of Sciences represents more than 1,200 million euros, a big cut of which corresponds to construction works. At the time when the first project for the City of Sciences the communications tower was the most important construction project in the city, apart from infrastructural works in the underground system and the port (Interview 29). The socialist regional government awarded the construction contracts trying to distribute them equally among all the important companies (Interview 12) and, when the new government interrupted the works, all the companies pulled together to pressurise the government to go on with the project. Their preference of doing the works rather than receiving the 20% compensation, resulted wise in the long term for the over costs of the City of Sciences have been gigantic (see chapter 6).

On the other hand, outstanding architectural mega-projects, such as Calatrava’s, are considered to increase considerably the prestige of a construction company (Interviews 5, 29 and 41). In the words of architect Carmona, who worked in the city of Sciences project for both Calatrava and a construction company,

[Construction companies] diversify their business activity, they don’t only make roads and junctions, you know. And then they can also bid for other works of Santiago, which always end up running over budget but the construction company doesn’t foot the bill, right? We do, the general public, because the politicians succumb to blackmail and ‘cough up’ in the end with our money. So the construction company wins out, never loses any money with a work of Santiago, it might happen sometimes but this is certainly not the rule. [...] also it’s a fantastic shop window for the construction company, isn’t it? To be able to brag of this construction in all their books, their website and records gives them loads of kudos, doesn’t it? No end of clout among construction companies. (Interview 41)

However, although architects and construction companies benefit from mega-projects, the architect’s and the construction companies’ interests do not coincide completely. As Carmona explains,
Santiago wants the most perfect construction, doesn’t he? What the construction company wants is to make as much money as possible because that’s its raison d’être as a company. Indeed you might think that any construction company wants to do the work well and they do but they’re even keener to make money, they want to earn even more. So if at any given moment they can earn a bit more by skimping here and there they do so. [...] So this small clash of objectives is always on the cards. Santiago couldn’t care less and he’s quite right; he couldn’t give a damn about how much the construction company earns, it’s not his problem. His concern is to carry out the project as he wants, in the best way possible as an architect. (Interview 41)

Also the infrastructure works for the America’s Cup represented a big flow of public money which increased the big construction companies’ business volume. Again, almost all the construction companies at local and national levels were involved in the America’s Cup works (Interview 47). Actually, in 2005, Eloy Durá, president of the Valencian Federation of construction (Fevec) after complaining about the central government’s insufficient investment in the Valencian Community and lamenting the end of the European structural funds in 2006, affirmed that ‘the only thing that might bail us out a bit is the investments in the America’s Cup’ (Vázquez, 10 February 2005). Therefore, in the words of Eduardo Beut, Secretary-General of FECOVAL (Federation of Companies of the Valencian Community which are Building Contractors for the Public Administration),

[…] if your approach was one of public works, of construction […] I would have told you quite the opposite. We’re delighted because we’ve won a tremendous amount of public construction, flagship buildings. [...] Public works is delighted with everything done in the city and if we’re told to take out this bridge and communicate with the aquarium underground, we’ll do it without batting an eyelid. Anything to do with public works seems fantastic, that’s the official version of this federation. (Interview 62)

Linked to the construction of mega-projects, the other sectors in expansion have been the development and real estate sectors. The Integral Development plan of Grao – next to America’s Cup’s harbour-and the Integral Development plan of Avenida Francia –next to City of Sciences –are clear examples, and interviewees from both a censuring and a non-critical perspective agree (Interviews 1, 2, 4, 7 and 19). Not for nothing, as discussed in Chapter five, the regional government had come to the agreement with the developers that the development plan of avenida Francia would be backed by a singular element, i.e. the City of Sciences, in the same way that the council would provide a Convention Centre by Norman Foster in the Development Plan Ademuz (West of the city). Figure 7.1 shows some of the residential buildings developed right in front of the City of Sciences.

There has been some scepticism about the effect of the City of Sciences in the real estate value increase in the area, as Benjamín Muñoz, Secretary-General of the Federation of Property Developers and Urbanising Agents on the Valencian Community (FPIAUCV) explains:
Now, I’m convinced that the existence of the City of Arts and Sciences hasn’t impinged in any way whatsoever on prices and construction activity roundabout. Construction work would have been the same anyway, in an upmarket zone of Valencia, a zone well defined by the Avenida de Baleares, the Avenida al Mar, Avenida whatisitsname, Avenida de Francia, with sufficient heights, because the building work in a new Valencia site, the first Integral Development Plan to join up Valencia with the sea, with free space and the river running right through the middle, would have filled up anyway with a football pitch, a municipal swimming pool or a millennium wheel like the one in London. (Interview 58)

However, be it City of Sciences or a more modest project, without the support and investment of the public administrations in the urban regeneration of a heavily polluted industrial brownfield on the old river bed the Development Plan Avenida de Francia would have not been possible.

**Figure 7.1 Residential buildings next to the City of Sciences**

The Integral development Plan of Grao, directly linked to the America’s Cup (see chapter five), provided a lucrative speculative business for CLH (Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos), owner of land in the area. CLH moved their premises, where they had fuel tanks, and demolished the old ones at a total cost of 70 million euro, to later – in November 2006 - sell the land at auction to a real estate group formed by Bancaixa, Lubasa and Sacyr Vallehermoso for 320 million euro (El País, 9 November 2006; Interview 9). The expectations of the buyers were that, after the land was urbanised, the price of the land would increase from 3,200 euro per square metre to at least 7,000 euro per square metre (El País, 9 November 2006) but the burst of the real estate bubble in 2007 ruined their plans. The virtual model in figure 7.2 shows the substantial volume of new development foreseen by the plan.
Figure 7.2 Virtual model of the Integral development Plan of Grao

Source: Tomás Llavador arquitectos+ingenieros (www.tomasllavador.com)

On the other hand, the fact that the construction of hotels started before Valencia’s designation to host the America’s Cup (although it intensified after it) can only be fully explained considering the real estate interests behind it. Sociopolis, in turn, directly represented for developers the colonisation of further formerly protected agricultural land.

Therefore, mega projects and events, contend critical groups and architects (García del Moral, 7 September; Interviews 2, 9, 15 and 19), have been an excuse for more development and real estate accumulation, which have increased the already considerable number of existing empty dwellings, while development companies have increased in size and economic power.

State actors - beyond more general political and strategic objectives- also have their own specific distinct interests, which can be summarised in to main objectives, on the one hand the financial maintenance of the public administrations and on the other hand their own electoral self-reproduction. Due to the unresolved problem of the funding of the local authorities, urban development taxes have been used to alleviate the council’s economic situation. The figure of the urbanising agent introduced by the regional urbanism law of 1994 (LRAU) has also been used by several institutions of the regional government such as the Valencian Institute of Housing – responsible for the implementation of the Sociopolis master plan – to get hold of land for development and for their social and subsidised housing schemes.

But, more importantly, mega-projects designed by star architects and events provide politicians with a very effective tool for self-promotion and political legitimation. They can be at the same time a visible proof of the governors’ work – things are being done - and an element of glamour. For a political leader, being identified with a mega project is a way of improving his or her personal political image. Not surprisingly, all the Valencian regional presidents have strived to leave their stamp in the City of Sciences. In a populist politics of the photograph, inaugurating prestigious projects such as the City of Sciences and events such as the America’s Cup is valuable media publicity, even more prized when supported by the presence of star architects - many times more media celebrated than elected politicians. This explains too why Jean Nouvel was so well received by the local authorities.

Santiago Calatrava has used the Valencian governors’ interest in linking their names to his. Also, Vicente Guallart is fully aware of the added value that prestigious architects can provide. In his own words,

So for them [politicians] this is like a present really, right? To have... I’ve worked my socks off to bring architects here charging the same rates as a local architect. (Interview 60)
And in fact, as other of the architects involved in the project explains, elected politicians have made the most of this aspect of Sociopolis since celebrity architects provided an added value to the project (Interview 25). In figure 7.3 Guallart explains the project to local and regional politicians.

**Figure 7.3 Guallart explaining the Sociopolis project to Camps, Barberá and Blasco** (left to right)

Source: EFE

Megaprojects and events are so visible and have proved so popular in Valencia that even the politicians in the opposition have realised that it is electorally more profitable to support them than not (Interviews 2 and 44). As the Director of the editorial office of *El Mundo* in Valencia explains,

> At one point there was some political opposition from the socialist party, which I believe was mistaken and was in fact rectified later, an opposition to the mega events, with some of the media inevitably tagging along in their editorial line. Like the socialist party I reckon that most cottoned on in the end to the fact that this was not an electoral ploy because the conservative party is going from strength to strength while the socialist party is losing election after election and has hit rock bottom. The new leader of this socialist party, Jorge Alarte, has now changed tack and supports mega events. (Interview 44)

Architects, or more accurately a tight group of prestigious architects, are another powerful interest group in relationship to urban mega-projects. Their interests are not only economic – increase business volume and maintain their practices - but career-wise (even personal) as well. Indeed, iconic projects provide them with the opportunity to raise their professional profile. Both in the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup or Sociopolis we find architects – higher or lower in the global prestige ranking – trying to realize their creative ideas, further their careers and satisfy their egos.

Moreover, (star) architects generally prefer to work for the public sector because the control of the budget is less strict and they are granted with more freedom to experiment. As architect Rodriguez explains,

> For architects of this type there is very little private capital; it’s mostly public capital. Let’s just say that most of the star architects’ projects are publicly funded. (Interview 5)

For Santiago Calatrava, as he affirmed in 1993, the City of Sciences represented his project of ‘greater urban planning significance’ ever (Ferrandis, 1 June 1993). Whether he was trying to please the Valencian people or not, his closest collaborators in the project (Interviews 5 and 12) have agreed that the City of Sciences has been a good showroom to get more work, ‘a fine worldwide calling card for Santiago’ (Interview 5).

In Valencia, Calatrava in particular has built a considerable body of work. According to Javier Quesadas, Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 11), that is so because the architect ‘is very ambitious, has 50 projects on the go and would like to carry them
all out and has to defend himself a bit. [...] Any right-minded architect wants to build everything he or she has in his or her head and turn them into viable business plans’. (Interview 11) Thus, working for the public sector has indeed proved favourable and, Calatrava’s prestige has allowed him to be hired by the public sector. As the director of Calatrava’s office in Valencia has stated

Now let’s get this straight, private entrepreneurs look out for their own money and politicians for public money. Or that’s how I see it, so the private entrepreneur is keen above all to have clear targets, hone prices; they keep a closer control of the economic side and contract you with a specific idea in mind. It’s like a single-family dwelling; they have to have 3 bedrooms and 2 bathrooms because that’s what they want. The politician tells you I want a 20,000-metre square container to make a museum and then lets Santiago do whatever he wants. (Interview 12)

The America’s Cup also brought opportunities in the city for members of the select group of internationally renowned architects other than ubiquitous Calatrava. David Chipperfield designed the architectural icon of the sailing competition, the building *Veles e Vents*. The international architectural competitions to design the marina and the master plan of the inner harbour area attracted the interest of many star architects from over the world, such as, to mention a few, Norman Foster, Ieoh Ming Pei, Meinhard von Gerkan and Volkwin Marg, Alejandro Zaera, Rem Koolhaas or SOM.

But, as discussed in Chapter five, the most publicised intervention was that of French star architect Jean Nouvel, who, by arriving in 2004 by the hand of a local real estate agent Ignacio Jiménez de Laiglesia to present the project Valencia Litoral had made the mayor aware of the interest of la crème de la crème of the architectural profession in the area. Nouvel’s cicerone and friend Jiménez de Laiglesia explains the architect’s enthusiasm about the project;

Jean did it because it gave him a buzz, because he still has an artist’s heart, he is not moved by... OK, if with time this spawns further work for him, well not for him exactly but for a factory with over 100 architects on the payroll, all well and good, obviously. But we soon came to an agreement, I told him I’d pay for all travelling costs, god knows how many hotels and comings and goings and collaborators and I’ll make sure it’s all carried through successfully and you take on responsibility for your own study and Bob’s your uncle. Then he soon proved to be, well, a person who is not moved by selfish motives but still believes in his vocation and is keen to take on projects that make some sense for him. We got on like a house on fire... it was a time of permanent intellectual ecstasy because we never ceased to come up with new ideas, modifying and debating them, mooting things, revamping everything, and all this was great fun and very rewarding because the result was completely satisfying and the grassroots reception was tremendous. (Interview 20)

In fact, Nouvel was one of the winners - ex-aequo with GMP - of the competition which was subsequently organised by the Consortium Valencia 2007 to design part of the area covered by Valencia Litoral. However, when local architect Tomás was asked to combine the proposals of both
winners in a definitive master plan, Nouvel’s professional prestige (or personal pride maybe) proved more important for him so he resigned and refused to sign a project which was not his original (Interview 20).

Sociopolis is another example of how a group of architects, led by Vicent Guallart, managed to achieve the commission of a project they had been working on their own initiative. One of the participants in the project, Lourdes García Sogo, (Interview 25) claims the advantage of this procedure;

Here we worked backwards, i.e., we got together and then sounded each other out. This was crucial and very interesting, architects from all over the world continually meeting up here and there. They were also here in Valencia twice, two weekends, we talked it all over and there was an American, a Chinese and god knows what else. All this was fine and no one really planned any of it, we organised ourselves. From there we managed to get them to continue hiring us because without money you can’t do anything and it would never have had the impact it had, but it wasn’t the other way around, in other words it wasn’t a question of a politician deciding to reintegrate the market-garden land and holding a tender to find out how best to do so; that would have been a disaster because then each architect would have gone his or her own way with all sorts of overlapping and redundancy. I reckon that this is the most important lesson to be learnt from the Sociopolis, the way of organising the architects, letting them and the town planners organise themselves and then we go to the university, the politicians and say, ‘listen, if you’re interested in this project we’re prepared to carry it out’. Then they’re much likelier to take it on. (Interview 25)

But in this case, the interest of the architects is again not only economic. As García Sogo continues to explain, for her the project has not been profitable economically but it has been profitable intellectually (Interview 25). Here, the ‘investment’ consists on being able to realize one’s creative and experimental ideas as well as raising one’s profile as an architect from an intellectual viewpoint.

Also Vicent Guallart - main promoter of the project - emphasises the relevance of the project for him as an architect, which meant that he was granted the opportunity to develop one of his architectural ideas (Interview 60). Indeed, encouraged by the fact that they are working for the public sector the architects want to take the chance to stand out (Interview 56).

However and although the interests of several groups converge in Valencia’s urban policy, all the mega-projects and events have been paid for with public money (Interview 4, Interview 24, Interview 38, Interview 40) for, in the words of an ex-candidate to the Presidency of the Regional Government of Valencia, ‘private initiative jumps on the bandwagon only when the business is already up and running’ (Interview 4). In this way the risks have been supported by the public sector and, therefore, by the citizens. Local commentators (Interviews 7 and 38) have portrayed the Valencian business and entrepreneurial sector as weak and highly dependent on public investment.
Regarding iconic architecture, all the projects by internationally prestigious architects in Valencia have been public projects. As the Secretary-General of FPIAUCV complains;

But great architects here have been used – how can I put it? – only for government initiatives either at national, regional or local level. The great architects, well Calatrava has done this, Foster has made a palace, Chipperfield has built *Veles e Vents* but here Valencia’s middle class or private promotion has been very timid. No Valencian promoter, even during the recent boom years, has said, “well look, my building I’m going to put up in Plaza de América will be done by so and so”. No, they’ve just kept on working with their longstanding architects, taking no risks. (Interview 58)

Even when prompted by the government, for instance for the project of the Calatrava towers in the City of Sciences, the private sector have been cautious about getting involved in risky projects. Certainly, projects such as City of Sciences - with architects such as Calatrava - are only possible in times of economic boom and when they are paid for with public money – since, in that case, budgetary control is not as strict as when the investment is private.

Moreover, although many times the projects initially came from a private initiative - Sociopolis, Valencia Litoral or even the America’s Cup – there was the need for state support in order for the projects to come to term. Certainly, the state has the funding, institutional and the organisational capacity, but also the necessary legitimacy.

Financially, the fact that the main Valencian building societies (Bancaixa and CAM) are semi-public and dependant on the political power has meant that they have invested in projects which by strictly profitability and financial risk criteria they would not have invested in (Interviews 19, 30, 14 and 28). In fact, their bankruptcy in 2012 was mainly caused by having had to back up political investment decisions in mega-projects (for instance the City of Sciences but also Terra Mítica and others) made by the regional government (Interviews 14 and 28). In the words of city councilor Gonzalez,

Bancaixa, regretfully, jumps to the orders of the powers that be. It is not an autonomous bank acting on its own profit motive. These savings banks are organisations of a social character; rather than seeking economic or social profitability they act to political dictates. So if Bancaixa receives an instruction from Calle Caballeros, the street where the regional president is headquartered, telling it to buy such and such or support the Integral development plan of Grao, well of course it does so and all the others fall into line. (Interview 19)

In the case of the infrastructure for the America’s Cup the council and regional government needed the financial capacity of the central government. The works for America’s Cup were funded with an ICO’s bank guarantee.

Therefore, investment capacity is crucial, but also organizational capacity and legitimacy. For instance, although the idea of bringing the America’s Cup to Valencia was of the president of the
sailing club, a private entity, the candidature project was taken over by the city council, the legitimate representative of the city. Moreover, although the council was the initial driving force of the America’s Cup candidature, the infrastructure of the port belongs to the Ministry of Public Works and therefore central government needed to be involved too.

On the other hand, many competencies of the central government – such as security, radio-electric space, air navigation, maritime navigation, etc. – are involved in an event of this type.

Sociopolis, as discussed, was possible thanks to the complicity of regional minister Blasco and his support. The state – at its various scales – not only provided funding but also organisational capacity through a public corporation, the Valencian Institute of Housing (IVVSA). Unlike other residential development projects of the Valencian Housing Institute, Sociopolis, being their flagship project, is not managed by a public private partnership but is completely public, although the resulting plots of land were left to the private initiative which had to follow the design of the architects assigned by IVVSA (Velert, 3 May 2009; Interviews 48 and 50). This has been considered the reason why it is also the only project which, despite despite encountering many difficulties, was still going on after the start of the economic recession (Interview 50).

Valencia Litoral, although widely publicised and backed-up by the cream of the architectural profession needed the support of the public sector, as admitted by Jiménez de la Iglesia (Interview 20), father of the initiative;

Anyway, these types of major projects, which are those that motivate me personally, move me even to pie-in-the-sky proposals like this one. Because unfortunately in the end you need the public input, that is as debate, because each person can set things up his or her own way and they see you as quixotic, giving you many slaps on the back and congratulations but even so . . . If you don’t have the backing of the powers that be . . . and this is very difficult if you’re really an independent spirit in your judgments and proposals. (Interview 20)

Thus, it was the mayor who took over and converted the proposal into a competition for the development of the area, after adapting it to her political interests. The competition was duly won by Jean Nouvel’s team, although ex-aequo with German team GMP. A third party, José María Tomás - Barberá’s ‘house architect’ - was commissioned to combine both winning projects, infuriating star architect Nouvel.

**7.3 Strategy and the state: the construction of the Valencian regional state**

Mega-projects and particularly mega-events have ranked high in the Spanish political agenda, not only in Valencia but elsewhere. As vice-president de la Vega pointed out
‘If we already put on a good show in the Barcelona Olympic Games and the Seville Expo in 1992, we’re going to do even better in 2007’. ‘Spain is a country with all the specialist skills for organising events of this nature’. (Ferrandis, 12 December 2004)

The central government – both when in socialist or conservative hands - has supported the celebration of mega-events in different Spanish cities, from Barcelona Olympics and Seville Expo in 1992 to the more recent Expo 2008 in Zaragoza, for instance. As the central state has ‘glocalised’ (Swyngedouw, 1997), through – among other processes - restructuring downwards to the regional and urban scale, it has also privileged competitive strategies –such as inter-city competition for mega events – which are more compatible with those scales. This can be interpreted – resorting to the concept of spatial selectivity (Jones, 1997) – as a shift of political emphasis to individual cities’ capacity to successfully compete and promote themselves (Jones and Ward, 2002).

Thus, despite the difficulties of coordinating different levels of government and their policies, big events have always created consensus. Architect Escribano explains it very clearly referring to the America’s Cup,

Well I believe that precisely because they are events that bring together hefty investments and concerted effort by government authorities. At the end of the day the key to success in these large-scale projects is blending the wills of the central, regional and local government, because in a country like Spain, with a quasi federal government since 78, there is always a risk of overlapping and conflicting competencies at these three levels and even at the residual provincial level. So what does the America’s Cup achieve? What does an Olympic Games achieve? The joining of wills because they know that political loggerheads have to be set aside when the America’s Cup is at stake because we can’t afford to become a laughing stock and no one would glean any political kudos from a badly organised Olympics or America’s Cup. Everyone puts their shoulder to the wheel and buries the axe, therefore, with only minor skirmishes in the worst case. They know how crucial it is to do well and this concentrates minds and wills wonderfully and above all raises investments that would otherwise be unavailable. In other words Valencia is going to receive 300 million euros for reform of the inner dock and also in a very short period of time. (Interview 42)

Hence, the America’s Cup was presented, in the words of president Zapatero as, ‘a project of all the Spanish people’ (Vázquez, 6 February 2005), ‘a project of state’ for which the president offered ‘as many investment efforts as be necessary’ (Vázquez, 15 July 2005). A project for which the three tiers of government would work together, as representatives of the three administrations insisted in public declarations (Ferrandis, 27 May 2004, El País, 9 June 2004). Consensus was reached not only among the different tiers of government but also with the political opposition, which unanimously gave their support to the event.

However, for the Valencian regional government urban mega projects and the hosting of events has become the core of their policy. It was started by the first socialist regional government with the
project of the City of Sciences and, it achieved its hayday with the subsequent conservative governments, while also politically supported by Rita Barberá, mayor of Valencia since 1991. Certainly, when trying to understand the emphasis placed on global architectural icons in Spain, and particularly in Valencia, it must be stressed the importance of the regional states, each one with a distinct political project and economic strategy.

The so-called self government after the Valencian Autonomous Community was created in 1982 was the framework where a new cultural and identity context could be generated. The discourse of Joan Lerma, the first elected regional president (1982-1995), revolved around the ‘modernisation’ of Valencian society and the creation of a new administration, both intimately related to democratisation too. Therefore, the era of the first democratically elected regional president was that of the modernisation of the institutions and the start of the creation of the Valencian public sector. On the other hand, also Valencia needed to consolidate its role as capital city of the autonomous community. According to Escribano (Interview 42) with the City of Sciences Valencia wanted to become not just the economic and demographic capital city but the moral capital also. In the words of the Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia;

Bear in mind here that Valencia needed to shore up its status as capital city. It is unquestionably the historical capital, clearly outweighing Alicante in terms of economic clout and population. Against the 300,000 inhabitants of Alicante or the 200,000 poorly counted of Castellón, Valencia’s demographic weight is clear. But the moral weight needed underlining because Alicante harboured misgivings about the regional self government and Castellón also had its qualms with all the controversy about language and all the rest, seen as an artifice of the city of Valencia. (Interview 42)

The project of the City of Sciences has to be understood in that context of modernisation but also as the symbol of the ‘self-government’. It is the architecture of a new power, which is the regional government.

The second president – Eduardo Zaplana (1995-2002) – under the epithet ‘Valencian power’ took the mission of creating a – not only politically but economically - powerful regional space (taking Catalonia as a model) with its own Valencian building societies, utility companies and construction companies.

From 1995, when the local and regional governments were conservative, both tiers of governments shared ‘a vision for Valencia’ (Interview 27) and ‘joined their efforts in the same direction’ (Interview 19). This joining of efforts was especially patent after the regional government recovered the project of the City of Sciences initially put in doubt. The mayor and city council (also in conservative hands) had included the project in the strategic plan of the city and listed it as one of Valencia’s assets to bid for being European cultural Capital but, due to party politics, they had to support the regional government decision of stopping the project.
The two icons of the Zaplana government were the theme park Terra Mítica and the modified project for the City of Sciences, including the opera palace and the oceanography museum (Interviews 44 and 55). The City of Sciences, Lerma’s emblematic project, was therefore turned into an icon of Zaplana’s political project of structuring the Valencian Community and making it globally known.

Thus, in a first period, with Eduardo Zaplana (1995-2002) and Jose Luis Olivas (2002-2003) in the presidency of the regional government, regional politics were directed to turn Valencia into a ‘strong region’, influential in Spain but also in Europe. Moreover, with the conservatives in office the discourse acquired a more populist vein and turned to issues of self-esteem and identity. The Secretary-General of FECOVAL explains;

In this Autonomous Community there was a change that we should not forget to take into account: a change in self-esteem. Zaplana […] managed to rebuild the Valencians’ self esteem. Suddenly we were no longer the people who crept shame-facedly into Madrid on tiptoe; no longer did we feel unimportant, incompetent, the people who only did things disastrously and late. This was suddenly a thing of the past; we did things well, on time and to brilliant effect. (Interview 62)

After Olivas’ short term in office (2002-2003), the discourse of the fourth regional president, Francisco Camps (2003-2011), insisted on the importance of the Valencian Community territorial project and, for instance, claimed that the America’s Cup could be useful to structure the territory through the new infrastructures. The event was considered important for the image of the region as well as the city.

Between 2003 and 2011, not only the regional and local governments were of the same political party but Rita Barberá - the mayor - and Francisco Camps –the regional president – had a perfect political and personal understanding (Interviews 5 and 54). During this period, big events started to complement megaprojects. Thus, to regional mega-projects such as the Agora, Calatrava’s skyscrapers, the City of Languages, the city of Light, Mundo Ilusión and so on, there was the addition of events such as the America’s Cup, the Volvo Ocean Race, the Formula 1 competition, the European Athletics championship, etc.

In fact Camps’ presidency was characterised by the emphasis on megaprojects and events and Rita’s mayoral election campaign of 2007 was based on two lines; a city focused on the citizens’ quality of life and the commitment to attract mega-events, among which she highlighted the F1, America’s Cup and possibly the final of the Champion’s league (Velert, 13 February 2007). This was so much so that Bernie Ecclestone, owner of the F1 competition rights, conditioned the celebration of the race in Valencia to the electoral victory of Francisco Camps in the regional government and Rita Barberá in the city council (Ferrandis, 11 May 2007) (see figure 7.4).
The hosting of events became the core of the regional government’s political project (Interviews 4, 40 and 60), almost the only policy; ‘an obsession’ (Interview 36). A journalist of El País in Valencia’s editorial office expresses it very graphically,

The concept would be that of a totem. I really like the comparison because mega events and projects are a sort of totem on which we Valencians staked our all. Industry and our traditional sectors might go to the wall; there might be no end of problems with the education system and the environment but this totem becomes an overriding concern. (Interview 38)

In 2004, when the socialist party won the general elections, they found in Rodriguez Zapatero the perfect outside enemy of the Valencians and their ‘prosperity’ - represented by the urban policy based on mega-projects and events. The central government was at pains to ensure their support to the America’s Cup.

Therefore, both local and regional governments have focused their political project on the emphasis on mega-projects and events. As commented by American architectural critic Terence Riley (2005:17), the big investments in architecture in Spain have been by the regional governments. Since the onset of the autonomy in 1982, the regional government has been the state tier which has invested more substantially in Valencia’s urban mega-projects. The council has always played an important political role but it is the regional government who has paid for important projects not least because of its bigger economic capacity.

Indeed, an investment of the magnitude of the City of Sciences would have not been possible without the regional government for the council was financially too weak. As the Regional Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-93) recalls;

The city council is penniless, the river bed still has to be made; something needs to be done with the river. There is no money for doing anything significant with the river. So what do we do with the river? We chop it up for a piecemeal approach. Then Bofill makes a garden part, we make a music auditorium paid for by god knows who, we do a Gulliver, which was an invention of mine. [It’s small things] but all these piecemeal solutions taken together are solving the problem of the river bed. A Mediterranean woodland made by the Regional Culture Ministry, up there hard by the zoo, OK. This breaks it all down into sections and hey presto the problem of the river is solved. But there was one last section. The council wonders: What can I do here? Here’s where the regional government comes in and says: We’re going to invest in a City of Sciences and god knows what else. Fine. They build it and that’s that. (Interview 30)
The regional government, through the development of Sociopolis, also benefited the local authority by providing affordable housing within the city territory.

However, Rita Barberá’s – mayor of Valencia since 1991 – mayoral politics have played an important role in the implementation of the urban policy, if not from a financial, from a discursive point of view. According to Camps, when he was a city councilor before being regional president,

The city council has a limited budget but a lot of ideas and is more aware than anyone else of what the city lacks. It should be a party to all important decisions affecting the city and in fact it is. But it cannot single-handedly take on the large-scale city projects. (Olivares, 21 January 1996)

The city council is financially weak but, from the moment mayor Barberá was economically backed up by a regional government of the same political party, she was able to fully pursue her political project. Projects such as the City of Sciences and the location of Sociopolis in Valencia (Interview 60) had the blessing of the council but, the focus of Barberá’s mayoral politics and populist discourse was the America’s Cup. In order to capitalise on the America’s Cup the mayor’s manoeuvres have been manifold, from presenting projects for Valencia on occasion of the America’s Cup and repeatedly pressurising the central government to invest in them to arranging meetings – outside the framework of the Consortium – with the main central state actors about the America’s Cup project.

The construction of the Valencian regional state – in itself a hegemonic project which gave direction to the activities of the regional government - had also several political and institutional implications.

First, as already mentioned, the creation of a new government meant the creation of a capital city as well, and Valencia - its historical main city – acquired renovated strength. The City of Sciences was a project of the regional government which contributed to reinforce Valencia’s nature as capital city. In the words of the Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia;

The regional government footed the whole bill; it was the regional government’s baby and more in the interests of the capital than the city. It should not be forgotten here that Valencia needed to shore up its role as capital. It is unquestionably the historical capital, clearly outweighing Alicante in terms of economic clout and population. Against the 300,000 inhabitants of Alicante or the 200,000 poorly counted of Castellón, Valencia’s demographic weight is clear. But the moral weight needed underlining because Alicante harboured misgivings about the regional self government and Castellón also had its qualms with all the controversy about language and all the rest, seen as an artifice of the city of Valencia. So there was a need to create a city with a powerful image to strengthen its capital status. (Interview 42)

Indeed, the fact that Valencia is not only the most populated city in the Valencian Community but its capital city too, has conferred it added political, economic, institutional and representative relevance (Boira, 2003a). Other investments of the regional government concentrated in the capital city as well.
Thus, in 2005, the mayor commented that the regional government’s investment in Valencia confirmed their ‘firm bid for the capital of the Valencian Community as the main city, the site of large-scale projects’ (Velert, 25 November 2005). Not surprisingly, the regional government has invested where the political power is, in the capital city, which due to its higher demographic weigh is also seen as more profitable electorally (Interviews 3, 9 and 31). Guallart’s explanation of why Sociopolis was located in Valencia and not, for instance, in its metropolitan area exemplifies this preference for the city very well. For him, although Sociopolis could have been anywhere, regional minister Blasco wanted it to be in Valencia ‘because relevant projects occur in relevant places’ (Interview 60).

Second, the devolution of competencies to the Autonomous Communities generated a Valencian public sector which, starting from scratch, became the ‘first Valencian enterprise’ (Antuñano and Fuentes, 2007) with a GDP of around 12% of the regional. The process involved the creation of the necessary institutions to manage the newly acquired competencies and, therefore of a corps of bureaucrats of different levels dependant directly on the regional government. The creation of such an important state apparatus needed to be legitimised by the visible products of the so-called self-government. However, the construction of the Valencian regional state was political and institutional but also economic, in terms of identity and even semiotic, as will be discuss in subsequent sections.

7.4 The importance of the national scale

In Valencia’s case, the regional and local governments can be considered to have been the main generators of strategy but, the central government’s supporting and facilitating role has been crucial.

In Spain, the onset of the state of the autonomies partially decentralised economic state capacity and decision-making. However, investment which is crucial for the regions - for instance in infrastructure - remained in the central state hands and, furthermore, the regional governments need the central government’s permission to increase their level of indebtedness. The regional states have got involved in a competition to achieve the best central state funding possible. For instance, the decision to build an opera house (or the City of Sciences) was the regional government’s but in order to run it they needed– likewise the opera palace of Barcelona and Madrid - a subsidy from the central government. In this way, producing a coordinated policy on culture was left out of the reach of the central government. The Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) explains it:

Battle lines were drawn up there because it is the same government telling Madrid it needs money for the City of Sciences and it wants the same per capita as given to La Rioja. But now the figures have come out and Valencia is at the moment the worst financed per capita. The regional minister claims that no money is sent, I have no choice, I’m not going to deny [medical] treatment to a single person. Meanwhile they revise the regional financing model for the umpteenth time because the regional government is running up a bigger debt. The alternative is not to run up any debt, behave yourself, and then you’ll get no City of Sciences,
or America’s Cup or Formula One or anything else. But this wasn’t the style of the regional
government, which says it’s going to blow in your hands because I’m going to do the same as
Barcelona, as other places, right? Well I don’t intend to stop until the funds are forthcoming.
(Interview 11)

In this scenario mega projects have become a way of competing for central government funds
leverage, too. The America’s Cup is a textbook example of this. On the one hand, the America’s Cup
would have not been possible without the central government’s financial aid, but more importantly,
the sailing competition was considered a perfect pretext to receive investment in infrastructure from
the central government (Interviews 7, 21 and 38). In the words of Clementina Ródenas, Mayor of
Valencia 1989-91 and representative of the central government in the Consortium Valencia 2007:

What good is the America’s Cup to me, city of Valencia? Well a lot of good to me because
the central government is going to foot the bill for some phenomenal constructions worth a
mint and the port will be a gold mine. That’s stupendous. Projects of this type are fantastic;
with my meagre input and the regional government’s the net result is a bonanza project and
I’ll fill my boots; it’s going to be wonderful. (Interview 7)

Therefore, the requests to the central government were several; from infrastructures such as the high-
speed train and improvements of the three airports of the region - demanded by the regional president –
to embellishment works for the city – demanded by the mayor. Thus, in 2005, the mayor presented a
request of 1,600 million euro to the Minister of Public Administrations to pay for the necessary works
for the America’s Cup and to embellish the city (Velert, 10 June 2004). In the list of proposed works
presented to the central government later on, in January 2005, she included the remodeling of public
gardens, the construction of new old people’s homes, sport centres, upgrading of the city centre and
maritime quarters and the elimination of architectural barriers. Also the head of the opposition in the
council, of the socialist party, presented the socialist minister of Public Administrations a list of
demands and supported the request to allow an increase in the city’s level of indebtedness (El País, 12
November 2004).

In addition, the conservative local and regional governments’ discourse of the socialist central
government’s economic discrimination against them was used electorally but also as a way to
pressurise the central government for funds. As the Regional minister of public administration (1985-
87) explains

Everything changed when Rodríguez Zapatero came to power. Why? Because then that
Cinderella conscience could be channelled through political ire. This was perfect, manna
from heaven for local and regional governments of the conservative party. For it should be
remembered here that a sense of being hard done by is hard-wired into Valencia’s psyche.
And historical memory being so short, no one remembers that during the Aznar
administration only one high-speed train link was made. But from the very next day the high-
speed train, AVE, was asked for instantly as though it could be brought in overnight. (Interview 14)

The strategy was not completely unsuccessful. The central government allowed the council 50.8 million euros of further indebtedness to embellish the city in occasion of the America’s Cup, which was less than 240 million euro requested but still a substantial quantity. Also the project of extension of the local airport, Manises, was expedited thanks to the America’s Cup.

All in all, despite the rhetoric of global competitiveness, Spain is still an important framework of competition. One of the aims of Valencia’s urban policy was to increase the city and the region’s economic and geopolitical influence within Spain. A project such as the City of Sciences was expected to help consolidate Valencia’s position as the third most important city in Spain and counteract Barcelona and Madrid’s power (Interviews 3, 5, 7, 11 and 31). Politicians from the two main parties – socialists and conservatives – clearly recognise it. Therefore, socialist mayor (1989-1991) Ródenas admits

The first question is this: as a result of this policy of mega projects do we want Valencia to be a great city or a provincial city? Are we really the country’s third most important city and do we really want to keep up with Madrid and Barcelona or do we only want to remain there in a sort of limbo? (Interview 7)

Similarly, conservative Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) says

But of course Valencia was always looking on while Barcelona won the Olympics, Madrid as the state capital and with chances now of also getting the Olympics, well just imagine, without anything with similar clout the third-ranked Spanish capital lags well behind the two front-runners. (Interview 11)

Also the America’s Cup was interpreted in geopolitical key as an opportunity for Valencia to consolidate its position and political and economic weight in Spain. This understanding of the interests of the region in relationship with the rest of regions in Spain, as well as the shared interests in leveraging money from the central government can be seen as part of the political project of creating a strong region. It is also an element which, as we will see in chapter eight, has created cohesion within the urban regime and, general consensus. Both the party in the government and the main opposition party agree on that point.

A personal wish of historical relevance can be glimpsed in the mayor’s promotion of the America’s Cup, Blasco’s support of Sociopolis or the different regional presidents’ footprint in the City of Sciences. But, beyond that, Valencian governors sought to improve their own political relevance within their parties and in Spanish national politics while enhancing the weight of the Valencian Community within Spain. Both Lerma and Zaplana are considered to have used the regional government as a stepping-stone to Madrid (Interviews 31 and 44). For the director of the editorial office of El Mundo in Valencia it is very clear. In his own words:
Here we need to look for a different economic model so a great part of this tourist vision focuses on the mega events that have this double or even triple aspect, seeking a regional image, seeking an economic alternative and seeking political projection. Zaplana used it for this end without any doubt, [...] at national level, for he ended up as minister [...] and was even once on the point of running for president. (Interview 44)

Moreover, apart from competing for government funds and influence at national level, there is also a competition for prestige. Therefore, Spain remains an important arena of imitation and comparison in the Valencian imaginary. As architect Martínez puts it, Valencia does not want to 'remain at the rear of all Spanish cities’ (Interview 46).

After the Barcelona Olympics and Sevilla Expo’92 Valencia’s governors felt that the city needed to do something not to be left behind (Interviews 3, 14, 33 and 38), to overcome a ‘Cinderella complex’ (Interview 14) with respect to Barcelona, Madrid and even Seville. The City of Sciences was in a sense Valencia’s response to that frustration feeling for - unlike Madrid, Barcelona and Seville - not achieving anything for 1992 (Interviews 5, 26, 38 and 41). According to the Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95)

All this stemmed from the fact that the Expo was held in 92, right? Because, of course, I can perfectly understand the presidents and politicians of other Autonomous Communities than Andalusia thinking ‘we’ve got to something similar here as well’. And the Olympic Games in Barcelona likewise. Then came Valencia. The Basque Country, Bilbao made the Guggenheim museum... (Interview 26)

On the other hand post-Olympic Barcelona and Bilbao’s Guggenheim had been constructed as successful models to imitate (Interviews 1, 2 and 3). However, within the Valencian imaginary, although the ‘Guggenheim effect’ had certain influence in the decision-makers’ minds, Barcelona had always been the city to imitate (Interviews 3, 4, 9, 16, 28 and 31). As local academic Piqueras explains;

They try to stand out from the pack, not so much in terms of a model but trying to match Barcelona’s international projection, tourism development and development of urban services with the Olympics; so here they said, ‘this is the way to go’. Always at loggerheads with Barcelona, always squabbling, but at the end of the day they emulate it. And what they have done with the port, converting the old dock into a leisure site, is what Barcelona did with the Port Vell much earlier. (Interview 3)

7.5 Tourism, construction, and real estate

In the 1920-30s, Valencian fruit and vegetable exports were the main source of foreign currency in Spain, a trend which continued during the post-war (1940-50s) (Boira, 2012). During the 1960-70s a
process of de-agrarianisation and industrialisation started in the Valencian region, and continued until the 1990s.

In 1960 the number of agriculture jobs was higher (by 127,000) than industrial jobs in the province of Valencia. Nine years later, the agriculture sector had lost 64,500 jobs and between 1970 and 1971, 51,470 agriculture jobs were lost. At the same time, between 1962 and 1973, the industry sector grew in 11.5%. (Boira, 2012:115). In the mid-1970s agriculture jobs had gone down to 15% and industrial jobs were 44% of the total (Boira, 2012:115).

In the 1980s, with Spain’s entry in the EEC, the traditional industrial sectors started to decline. But it was not until the late 1990s when deindustrialisation gave pass to a service economy. As the Valencian economy - affected by globalisation and the flooding of the market with Chinese industrial products – deindustrialised, the weight of the tourism and construction sectors - both intimately linked - grew.

From 1982, the Valencian region was known as the Valencian Autonomous Community and had a democratic regional government. The first regional government, of the socialist party, was rather supportive of the industrial sector but already started to see that the existent economic model was becoming obsolete. In fact, one of the stated objectives of the first project for the City of Sciences was to promote city tourism in Valencia (see chapter 5).

With Zaplana (1995-2002) in office the decline of the traditional industry could be clearly seen. As Director of the editorial office of El Mundo in Valencia explains,

> When we stopped being competitive back in the eighties and especially in the nineties and fierce competition started up, here they had to look for a different economic model. Then a great part of this tourist vision focuses on mega events that have this double or even triple aspect, seeking a regional image, seeking an economic alternative and seeking political projection. Zaplana used it for this end without any doubt. (Interview 44)

The Valencian Community had a tradition of sun and sand tourism and tourism seemed to be a logical and easy option (Interviews 3, 32 and E51a), a solution to deindustrialisation, although maybe it showed a lack of imagination (Interview 2). Mega-projects, and later on events, seemed a good way to support the tourist sector. The Secretary of studies and programs of the socialist party in the city of Valencia describes Zaplana’s vision of tourism,

> Let’s just say that Eduardo Zaplana’s model consisted in making of the Valencian Community a large-scale Benidorm. He had been mayor of Benidorm, he was familiar with that model; the knew its strengths, which it undoubtedly had, and tried to export them to the region as a whole and then anything he saw, whether a future technology park, a water park or whatever, what he saw there was tourism potential, he saw coaches, cameras; he saw what he had learned there. (Interview 24)
However, there seemed to be wide consensus. The secretary-general of the Valencian socialist party (1997-99) at the time coincided in the analysis. In his own words,

A productive structure like Valencia’s, taking the case in point, has to specialise in something, diversify into something outside its two mainstays, a traditional, long-standing tourism sector. He had to revamp this to improve it and then look for an alternative to an industrial sector that was fine back in the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties but was now showing signs of fatigue. This I see as logical. Which was the most logical path to take? Reinforce some sector of the service economy. And what are the strong points of the Valencian Community? Its climate, geographical situation, good communications, an attractive site, strong demand from Europe. And this was a fairly logical line; I wouldn’t have done otherwise. (Interview 40)

The other economic sector to grow while deindustrialisation advanced was construction, as many industrialists decided to relocate their industries and use the land left vacant to enter the construction sector. In this way, whereas in 1994, the construction sector was 7.4% of the GDP and 8.1% of the total employment, in 2000, the construction sector was 10% of the GDP and 12% of the employment in the Valencian Community (Boira, 2012:117). In 2009, after the burst of the real estate bubble, the construction sector was 11% of the GDP and 14.8% of the total employment (Boira, 2012:117).

This was an option which was supported by the regional government and, which has a lot to do with Valencia’s mega-projects and events (Pedro and Sorribes, 2007). Thus, the conservative governments have insisted in tourism and construction being the economic motors of the region. As the Regional Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-93) explains, ‘to their minds tourism, events are now productive fabric and the events generate economic activity in their own right’ (Interview 30).

President Camps, in his public interventions has been very clear about it and has described projects such as the City of Sciences, Terra Mítica, the City of Light, the America’s Cup or the Formula 1 Competition as the ‘tourism factories of the 21st century’ (Pérez, 11 February 2007).

Also the construction sector was clearly favoured in the official discourse of the regional government. After the burst of the real estate bubble not only the construction sector but also the majority of the industry, which was linked to it - glass, ceramic for construction, furniture, etc. – was affected and many commentators said that a change of economic model was necessary. However, in 2009, president Camps still insisted that the construction sector had ‘to continue being the main driving force of the economy, job creation and welfare’ (Ferrandis, 24 March 2009). Also business associations, such as CEV, expressed the need to involve the construction sector businessmen in innovation to create a new Valencian economic model.

The regional capital city was to be the main focus of this accumulation strategy, which was however of regional level. Valencia was not a tourist city until the end of the 1990s. It was in fact considered an ‘anti-tourist city’ until very recently (Interview 9; see chapter 5). From the 1990s, with Rita Barberá in
the city council, urban tourism acquired relevance in the council policies (although, as seen in Chapter six, there are some discrepancies about the success of the urban tourist sector). In any case, urban tourism intended to be an alternative to sun and sand tourism, which would attract upmarket and year-round tourism, in opposition to seasonal tourism. The construction of mega-projects, such as the City of Sciences, and hosting of events, such as the America’s Cup or F1, would drive the transition (Interviews 1, 2 and 6). Therefore, the tourism strategy promoted by both local and regional governments, especially in the city of Valencia, was mainly based on mega-projects and events (Interview 51a).

**Figure 7.5 View of a regatta during the America’s Cup competition 2007**

Source: La Marina Real Juan Carlos I

Thus, one of the stated objectives of the City of Sciences – according to both socialist and conservative governments - was to promote urban tourism internationally, to diversify the sector. In the words of the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98),

> I want the same, I don’t say 10 planes from London every day because that would be over-ambitious but a daily flight from the main European cities and then the tourists visit the museum, the opera palace, going to a concert, going to the oceanography museum, going out to have a paella, in two days, seeing the Albufera, visiting the old part of the city, seeing the painting galleries, which are all fine. In short you arrange a two-day schedule for them for a reasonable hotel price, because now there is a wide range of hotels: the richest at Westin, the less well-off at the four-star establishments. And in this sense I’d say that internationally we’ve been successful. Because the fact they know about us in Castellón, Albacete or Madrid, that’s already done and dusted, but what we’re interested in now is the people in London, with about 200 coming every week; and all 200 of them saying this isn’t at all bad. (Interview 11)

It was the first project with this aim and Valencia is considered to have become a tourist city with the City of Sciences. However, the most direct economic effect of the City of Sciences has been absorbed by the construction and real estate sectors (see chapter 6).

For the Director of Valencian Convention Bureau, responsible for tourism in Valencia, the City of Sciences represented one of the main structural tourist assets of Valencia and the America’s Cup was the circumstantial opportunity to make the assets visible and therefore could be easily integrated in the tourism policy of the city (Interview 21). The America’s Cup was considered an important step towards a high-end urban tourism, focused in attracting cruise operators. Figure 7.5 shows a moment of the America’s Cup competition where the new tourist assets – new urban spaces, buildings and marina - generated in the maritime area can be seen.
But again, America’s Cup and tourism were also an excuse for more urban development and growth. First, the America’s Cup opened up business for the big construction companies because of the necessary infrastructures to be implemented not only in the harbour area but also in the airport, etc. Second, the sailing competition brought about urban development projects in the maritime area. It was also a good occasion for real estate speculation in the harbour area as Sorribes, specialist in urban economy explains,

Now, the Integral development Plan of Grao, this land that is a fantastic speculative operation, because the firm that was there left. The move to the industrial estate called *Polígono del Mediterráneo* and demolition cost the firm about 70 million Euros, I believe. A year later they sold the land to a consortium formed by Sacyr, Bancaixa and Vallehermoso for 320 million euros and the city didn’t see one peseta of this capital gain, adding up to 250 million euros. (Interview 9)

Therefore, besides tourism, the other prioritised sectors were construction and real estate. Although mega-projects are justified on the grounds of tourism, the really benefited sectors are construction and real estate, which have capitalised the benefits (Interviews 2, 7, 13 and 14). For instance, as the president of the FEHPV (Valencian Federation of Hotelier Businesses) complained in 2004, the lion’s share of the capital invested in new hotels came from real estate companies rather than the hotel sector (Olivares, 1 April 2004). Similarly, Rausell, local academic expert in tourism analysis explains,

For example, why are more hotels built here, which is one of the prerequisites? Well because of the real estate boom, but this was before the America’s Cup. There are studies by Exceltur showing that by 2002 it was impossible for Valencia to meet its hotel building plans. Even here, the hoteliers, the hoteliers themselves asked the city council not to grant more hotel licences because there madness lay. The hotels were built for the sheer logic of the real-estate sector, because it turned out to be profitable to build hotels. Not to meet the needs of the tourism sector. (Interview 13)

The evolution of the Valencian construction sector sheds light on the matter. At the end of the 1980s and 1990s, when many entrepreneurs got into real estate development and left other industrial sectors, Valencian real estate and urban development companies were small and could not compete with nation-wide powerful companies.

By adding new spectacular heritage instead of restoring the historical centre, the City of Sciences along with other megaprojects provided the opportunity to the Valencian construction companies to grow and acquire know-how. The Secretary-General of FECOVAL recalls,

For 12 years we have carried out so many public works here that there was no need for innovation... You know, that this business of innovation, effectiveness, exportation or winning business abroad is like a muscle: if you don’t exercise it goes flabby. Here there was so much construction that there was work for everyone and profit for all and there wasn’t that
The construction of the first buildings of the City of Sciences – the telecommunications tower, the museum of science and the planetarium - were awarded to the main nation-wide construction companies although, to facilitate the bid of Valencian companies for the preparation of land works the size requirements of the companies were lowered (Ferrandis, 17 August 1994; Interview 29).

Some years later and for the first time ever for a project of such size and relevance, the Agora was awarded to a partnership of Valencian construction companies, which had already the technical and economic capacity to opt for a work of such size. Figure 7.6 shows the scale of the work and the complexity involved in the construction of the Agora. As an Engineer of Necsa at the Museum of Sciences working site recalls, when the works for the first project of the City of Sciences started, some of the Valencian companies which have worked in the Agora were ‘not much more than the owner and three employees’ (Interview 29).

In the meantime, the Valencian construction companies had got organised, as the Secretary-General of FECOVAL explains,

> This federation is exclusively of public works, contractors of public work. […] Suddenly, 25 years ago, especially those of us that were always public work contractors, small subcontractors, thought that we’d had enough of carrying out the work ourselves and that the important people of Madrid, SEOPAN, Fomento, Acciona, the big boys took on the construction, subcontracted us and they earned a commission for doing absolutely nothing. A federation was therefore set up to defend vested interests; then it became crystal clear that we are not promoters, residential constructors, no; this federation is solely made up by public works contractors. (Interview 62)

Also, there was a will to support the Valencian companies, as CACSA architect explains ‘in this project the guiding idea is always to promote Valencia’s interests, whether Valencian architects, Valencian businessmen or even Valencian construction firms’ (Interview 59b).

**Figure 7.6 Construction works of Agora**

Source: PERI (www.peri.com.mx)

Looking at it from a different angle, some commentators (Interview 2) have seen in the discourse about entrepreneurialism an excuse to hide that the real objective of mega-projects is to feed the construction sector. Certainly, many construction companies live almost exclusively on public construction works. Academic and member of the grassroots group ‘Terra Crítica’ Gaja explains,

> This discourse is the official line: Valencia has to take its rightful place in the worldwide concert of cities; it has to promote its image; the city’s image sells and draws in tourists and
CHAPTER 7

ipso facto wealth and economic activity. This is the official line. I personally am very critical of this official line; it might have a kernel of truth but it cloaks many other things. What does it hide? It hides the fact that these major works are completely unnecessary; in many cases they are a shocking waste of money and are justified only by the desire to boost a private sector living off the public budget. Many major construction firms would close in six months if they didn’t receive government commissions and in fact they have admitted publicly that they live off the government. It is a sector that can be dubbed semi-public or semi-private. (Interview 2)

In any case, the regional government has taken into account whether the construction company was Valencian when awarding important contracts. In the words of the Secretary-General of FECOVAL,

If you bid for public work you must have economic and technical solvency. That said, the Regional Government has supported us. The president that kicked off the boom was Zaplana; with Lerma there was little construction. When the socialist president was in office, it wasn’t a lack of will, there was little construction around at the time, the boom took off with Zaplana, who apparently threw himself in the deep end; for much of the work there wasn’t even any funding but somehow the bloke got it all done anyway. Now there was a tremendous boom and this was the first era. In the first legislature of President Camps, there was also construction work, right? — So now of course Valencia’s interests became paramount; they were nurtured tacitly, never explicitly but tacitly; the so-called UTEs (joint ventures) were fomented, which are nothing else than consortia as they are called elsewhere. They are usually made up by a national firm and Valencia firm 50%, 60% 40% depending on the technical procedure, so, of course, in all the projects you mention there are firms from here. [You say this was done tacitly; how does this work?] Yes, the mechanism is obvious. You make bids as a national firm single handedly and you don’t win any tenders, and then you see a UTE with a national and Valencia firm and they win the tender. One case might be a coincidence but three… You know the trick is to bid jointly, at least try to … In other parts of Spain this process is even more extreme; in Catalonia, for example, the biggest Catalan firms bid single handedly, not in a UTE with the bigger Madrid firms or national firms, they go alone. In the latest era in Andalusia there are also important firms, Sandro and the rest, with a lot of clout and they bid solo and they tell me – I don’t know, I’m not really in touch with regional trends – that this is also happening in Galicia; since the minister Blanco came to office some of them are going it alone. (Interview 62)

The regional government’s support of the Valencian companies to create a strong Valencian construction sector can be seen as part of the creation of a new regional estate.

To conclude, mega-projects can be considered the expression of a new power, the regional government. The accumulation strategy favoured by the different Valencian regionals governments, when the economy was affected by globalisation and de-industrialisation, was based on tourism and construction. Those economic sectors were selected to the detriment of other sectors such as
traditional industry - which was formed by small and medium size enterprises – or agriculture. Particularly Zaplana, and later on Camps, focused the regional economic model on tourism ‘Benidorm style’, based on the construction of mega-projects and, later on, the celebration of mega-events. For them, this matched well with the construction of a strong regional space not only economically but also institutionally and symbolically.

7.6 Imaginaries and discourses

The ideational component has been a crucial aspect to understand the consistency of Valencia’s urban policy. On the one hand decision-makers have taken advantage of the population’s need for self-esteem, wish for modernisation and glamour. On the other hand, they – as part of the same society – have had the same aspirations themselves.

After the dictatorship and particularly with the onset of the first democratically elected local and regional governments there was a need in Valencia for recovering self-esteem (Interviews 31 and 38), to feel that the city was able to do ‘important things’. Other Spanish cities were organising international events; Barcelona the 1992 Olympics, Sevilla the 1992 Expo, Madrid had been elected European Cultural City and Bilbao had initiated the Guggenheim operation. Valencia’s initial response was the socialist regional government initiative to build the City of Sciences. In the words of the Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup;

The idea is to shove everything into the shop window and then anything that comes along is welcome, right? Valencia had been hugely frustrated in 92, when, as everybody remembers Barcelona hosted the Olympics and Seville the Expo. Valencia bid to be the European Capital of Culture, tried to clamber onto the bandwagon of some big event; I believe it was at this moment that Valencia and many other cities cottoned onto the importance of events. Both Barcelona and Seville won worldwide fame, especially Barcelona and then everyone wanted to climb on this bandwagon and Valencia got left by the wayside and felt enormously frustrated. [...] In 93, 94 the city was more or less saying: ‘all we get is the ugliest and worst stuff; we’re no good for anything, no one wants us and we’re condemned to eternal mediocrity’. (Interview 33)

He goes on to explain the change in attitude represented in first place by the project of the City of Sciences:

This defeatism changed normally into a sense of: ‘we can do things”; ‘yes we can’ was invented some time ago, it was said in Valencian but it comes to the same thing, and this was the start of a couple of important milestones. (Interview 33)

Later on, the subsequent conservative regional governments would capitalise on the Valencian people’s need for self-esteem and would construct their discourse around it, making of the City of Sciences one of their symbols of local pride. President Camps would describe it, for instance, as ‘the
most ambitious project in our history’ (Ferrandis, 7 April 2006). The ‘politics of self-esteem’ were instituted. This shows the way in which regional, and also local, politicians provided a strong vision of a new Valencia, which would be key to their leadership in the construction of the hegemonic project, or also the formation of an urban regime, as will be discussed in Chapter eight.

With the ‘politics of self-esteem’ already ongoing the America’s Cup reinforced the feeling of achievement. Finally, after several failures (see chapter 5) the city’s entrepreneurial efforts had been rewarded with the awarding of an event of international relevance. Mega-events such as the Formula 1 or the America’s Cup were also understood as a way of showing off to the world how much the city had already improved and the City of Sciences was a proof of it (Interviews 11, 31 and 42). As the Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup explains;

This is a city that has changed a lot, a huge amount in the last 20 years. It was in a situation of profound change and also hopeful of doing something important some day. The idea was to dress up smart and sooner or later we would find a fiancé and get married. (Interview 33)

Certainly, the urban policy and the discourse that has accompanied it have been extremely successful in terms of increasing the Valencian citizens’ self-esteem. The overcoming of a complex of inferiority which was initiated with the onset of the democracy and the so-called self-government was also linked to the project of modernisation of the city, the region and their institutions. The city, seat of the regional government, was to be converted into a worthy capital city and a European cosmopolitan city. The City of Sciences was seen as a key element of such modernisation and when the conservative party stopped the project there was a reaction against what it was seen as a hinder to modernisation. The idea of modernity was later on integrated also to the discourse of the conservative governments (and the architect) not only for the City of Sciences but also for the America’s Cup. Thus, Valencia’s maritime facade was to be modern, cosmopolitan and international as a result of the remodeling works implemented on occasion of the America’s Cup. Discourse and the strategic use of symbols were key to the achievement of consensus around a program of action. In that regard, the architects’ role in providing the symbols of the politician’s vision was crucial.

In this breeding ground, ideas of competitiveness and city marketing – a global trend started during the 1980s - easily permeated through the Valencian decision-makers’ minds. Policy discourses about city marketing seemed to justify the benefits of mega-projects and events. The understanding went like this; many other cities are doing it and therefore not only must it be effective but Valencia must not be left behind in the competition. Thus, Valencia followed the trend of having buildings by media relevant architects initiated in the 1980s and of competing for mega-events (Interview 36). The Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95) is very clear about it;

But it was not only Valencia that did this; Madrid did it, Barcelona did it, Rome did it; all cities on the map or that wanted to be on the map did likewise. But the thing is that some could draw on past goodwill; Paris, Barcelona, New York, Chicago. These are world-ranking cities, aren’t they? And Valencia isn’t. Will it be one day? I don’t know. We’ll probably have
to invest a lot to make it so. Obviously an Olympic games brings you into the world limelight. (Interview 26)

In this way, the search for self-esteem and local pride translated into an aspiration to be part of the first tier of cities when global ideas of competitiveness penetrated the Valencian imaginary of both decision-makers and population. It resulted in what can be described as a parochial globalism whereby ‘globalising’ or becoming global means to do bigger things, ‘be on the map’ and rub shoulders with the ‘global elite of the glamour’. In local editor Lagardera’s words,

The city desperately sought a mirror and has found it at last, whether we like it or not, the city has found it. Now we’re being seen. Beforehand we weren’t but now we are. […] Of course the city aims to break into the first division of cities or become a bustling second-division city, which is what I believe we have achieved. (Interview 31)

This connects well with the Valencian idiosyncrasy. The idea of ‘doing things’ to ‘put Valencia on the map’ – the most repeated phrase – seems ubiquitous. Mega-projects and events are an opportunity to show the world what the city is capable of doing, of putting it on the map. Thus, the City of Sciences is described as ‘unique in the world’ (Interviews 43 and 59a), something to be proud of and through which Valencia can be compared with cities such as New York, London, Paris or Berlin (Interviews 5, 11 and 35). Even those who are in charge of managing the Valencian economy boast about having spent and done things bigger than the size of the city would allow for. The words of the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) show it very clearly;

‘The fact of placing Valencia on the map, the perception is that things are being done here. I hear it on the radio and see it on the written press. And, I say: ‘but, if we are poor as church mice’. And everybody says: ‘what things they are doing!’ (…) I can affirm that we have a project, the city of Arts and Sciences, which corresponds to a city of ten million inhabitants and not one million’ […] That was designed to work as a cultural riverside area with the river acting as a walkway from the music auditorium to the opera palace, from the opera palace to the science museum, as in Chicago, as in the world’s biggest cities. But the thing is that Chicago has a population of 10 million in its hinterland and there are extraordinary sponsor-friendly firms, wealthy people; it is full of pocket-book millionaires and middle class and lower class and the like. Here there is a mismatch between the size of the city and its middle class, upper class and working class, in other words the city as compared with its project. The project is out of scale. (Interview 11)

For him, Valencia’s aim must be to ‘show up, be noticed; feature in the league of those who get things done’ (Interview 11).

In turn, the America’s Cup was seen as the perfect opportunity to make Valencia known around the world (see chapter 5). Apart from this craving for visibility, the other element of Valencia’s parochial globalism has been the search for ‘glamour’, represented on the one hand by global architects and on
the other hand by high-end tourism. Certainly, during the America’s Cup the crème de la crème of the world rich and famous passed through Valencia and provided the sought after glamour in excess.

In this respect, for some, the fact that Valencia now has more high-end shops, restaurants and hotels is a marker of the ‘success’ of the city’s urban policy (Interviews 5, 27 and 31). Local editor Lagardera explains it;

The results for the city are marvellous, and I’m saying this as a book and magazine publisher in the city, okey? I’ve seen how this has changed radically in recent years; the one hundred restaurants of yesteryear have now become three hundred. The fact is that a new restaurant opens up every week; each one prettier, cooler, more stupendous and more god knows what than the last. And shops and luxury boutiques, none of which existed before. Here there was no Vuitton or other fashion houses. None of that. Now there’s Vuitton and Bulgari and the like. In other words, this is a city-measuring scale; for example I wrote an article called: ‘The Prada Shop is missing’. And this was a sort of metaphor standing for all this. A university philosophy professor wrote to me saying: ‘what a load of trivia’. But this bloke is an idiot because the existence of luxury shops is in fact a gauge of the city’s success. (Interview 31)

Sociopolis - although its marketing has been mainly directed to the professional public - partook of the same ideology of the other projects. On the one hand it was presented as innovative, a modern way of urbanising but rooted in the past. On the other hand, the fact that it brought together a group of renowned architects in Valencia and that two of its residential buildings where exhibited at the MOMA in New York, provided glamour and sense of achievement.

This latent yearning of the Valencian people was translated to a discourse based on the visibility and spectularisation of mega-projects, iconic character of architecture and, events (Interviews 13, Interview 14 and 38). The discourse exploited the Valencian people’s inferiority complex by appealing to feelings of self-esteem at the same time that the visibility of the mega-projects and events actually nurtured the citizen’s self-esteem (Interviews 1, 38 and 54).

The populist discourse of both the regional president and the mayor makes reference to ‘dreams that come true’ (Interview 38) and to Valencia’s historical importance. According to Sorribes (2007), who has analysed the mayor’s discourse, the message is deeply populist. It makes reference to 15th century Valencia – the city’s golden age – and compares it to the new Valencia, which – according to the mayor’s discourse – is again in the European avant-garde.

Therefore, as it was to be expected, all the mentioned ideational components are present in the (populist) official discourse about Valencia’s urban policy; modernisation, self-esteem, local pride and glamour. Certainly, they are in the imaginary of the Valencian people – to which the political class and local commentators also belong. The ideational is, in part, how decision-makers and population understand the world, their own and other people’s actions and strategy, but they are also how they choose to justify them and therefore are contained in the discourse.
However, the content of the discourse rather than decided strategically in advance was formed through a process of semiotic selection (Jessop, 2007) and therefore constructed at the same time as the urban policy was being ‘improvised’. In this way, modernisation, europeisation and self-esteem were linked to globalisation and city marketing and competitiveness. According to local academic Rausell (Interview 13), the Valencian urban policy responds to ‘fancy’ decisions rather than to before-hand planning, a ‘casual’ model generated by improvisation. The discourse is generated a posteriori. In his own words;

It is action that shapes the discourse. A discourse finally cropped up I’d say in the mid nineties until the America’s Cup arrived. They are seat-of-the-pants decisions. And as from the America’s Cup attempts were made to bring the planning discourse into line as though everything had been thought out beforehand; this is a very Valencian model of after-the-event thinking. (Interview 13)

In fact, the construction of the discourse was a parallel process to the construction of the regional state, evidencing the importance of both materiality and the dialectic of discursivity in the production of hegemony (Jessop, 2007; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum, 2009). The self-government, as explained by journalist Beltrán, ‘represented the end of a period of subsidiarity, of parochialism’ and the chance to ‘create a new ideological context, identity-building and cultural’ (Interview 38). Whereas in a first era the main tasks were the modernisation and democratisation of society and, the creation of the new institutions, the first conservative government realized that a powerful discourse to accompany it was needed (Interviews 13 and 38). Gradually, using fragments of discourses and elements taken both from local and global sources, the discourse continued to be constructed.

7.7 Conclusion

As we have seen, the interests of various groups – mainly construction companies and developers, elected politicians and star architects - meet in the development of mega-projects and events. However, in the case of Valencia, it is the state in its different tiers the major investor, as well as the chief instigator and facilitator of the emphasis on the use of mega-projects and events as a regeneration strategy.

In the analysis of why an urban policy based on mega-projects and events has been instituted in Valencia, two particularities stand out. First, the relevance of the construction of a new regional state after the onset of the of the autonomy in post-francoist Spain and, second, what I have called the politics of self-esteem as an underlying factor to the various motives behind the formulation and lastingness of Valencia’s urban policy. Certainly, Valencia’s mega-projects can be considered the expression of a new power but also signify the city’s newly acquired status of regional capital city and the need of the Valencian people for reinforcing their identity and recovering their self-esteem, as well as their wish for modernisation. Therefore, for Valencian regional presidents, mega-projects and
events have matched well with the construction of a strong regional space not only economically but also institutionally and symbolically.

Having discussed the motives of urban regeneration in Valencia, the next chapter will focus on the processes at different scales and on how different local and global actors have been involved in the formulation and enactment of the urban policy based on mega-projects and events.
8. STAR ARCHITECTS, POLITICIANS, CONSTRUCTORS AND MAGNATES: THE POLITICS OF REGENERATION IN VALENCIA

8.1 Introduction

Although, as seen in the previous chapter, the role of government is important in the institution of an urban policy based on mega-projects and events, for all the projects are mainly publicly funded and led - collaboration of other relevant groups to implement them is needed. Governments need to build the capacity to govern seeking collaboration outside their boundaries (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Mossberger, 2001). In Valencia, as already discussed, there are several groups whose interests converge in the institution of the urban policy, and which are part of what in Valencia can be characterised as a ‘boosterist’ urban regime. Indeed, the long-standing emphasis on ‘using architecture to boost culture, leisure and business’ (Torres, 2005:143) seen in Valencia and which has been seen over time across different political colours in both the regional and local governments, points out to urban regime theory, as other elements which will be discussed in this also chapter do.

However, Valencia’s case study offers insights into the role of other actors who are not included in the regime, and how their interests have been transferred to the local scale, too. For instance, the role of owners of mega-events such as the America’s Cup or the Formula one competition and of global architects will be considered.

Finally, the creation of popular consent through different mechanisms has been crucial for the durability of the regime.

8.2 Local coalitions of interest and decision-making

In Valencia, coalitions of interest have formed and pursued specific policy outcomes. Thus, we can find business lobbies which have ‘circles of intimacy’ (Interview 24) with the political power. The business lobbies include, apart from the Business Chamber and the CEV (Confederación de Empresarios de Valencia), business associations, such as AVE (Asociación Valenciana de Empresarios), considered the non-official employers’ organisation (Interview 44). The industrial port is certainly another powerful actor. In the different organizations, the same entrepreneurial figures and surnames are found –Virosque, Mompó, Boluda, Soler, Noguera, Casanova, Serratosa (Navarro, 2005). In order to realize their political project local and regional governments needed the collaboration of business, while business needed the government’s legitimacy, but also, their leadership. As we will see, there are more factors which allow us to characterise this collaboration as an urban regime.

Regarding projects such as the America’s Cup the Valencian entrepreneurs got specifically organised to channel their initiatives. In December 2003, CEV set up the America’s Cup Entrepreneurial Council with the aim of coordinating the proposals and being the interlocutor of the Valencian entrepreneurs in front of the public administrations in order to achieve the participation of the higher
possible number of companies in the America’s Cup’s project (Velert, 19 June 2004). Both AVE and the council created by CEV held different meetings with the Minister of Public Administrations - representative of the central government for the America’s Cup – and the Valencian authorities to maintain ‘the collaboration spirit’ – in the words of Rafael Ferrando, president of CEV (Velert, 22 June 2004) – and give the entrepreneurs’ point of view. According to Taberner (Interview 4) the construction and real estate lobbies which pressurised the government were a tight group of powerful actors in front of the little and medium industries of the Valencian Community and were able to influence the government agenda. Although some fortunes were made during the rise of the Valencian bourgeoisie in the 19th century, most of them have interests in the construction and urban development sectors, some of them from as early as the 1950s during ‘developmentalism’ (Navarro, 2005; Sanchis Guarner, 2007).

But, the demand for collaboration has been both ways, and many times through informal networks as well as through formal institutions, as it is characteristic of urban regimes. For instance, in 2007, the Regional government accompanied by several entrepreneurs of the tourism, construction and housing development sectors travelled to Brussels to defend the Valencian urbanism Act (R. M. de R., 12 April 2007). When the president of regional government was being charged with corruption the support of the business sector was recruited too, during different institutional events. Looking at how the projects under study were started it is possible to find evidence of such informal ‘networking’. Sociopolis has its origin Blasco and Guallart’s personal friendship while Valencia Litoral, although coming from a private initiative, had extra-officially received the blessing of the mayor and deputy mayor before starting (see chapter 5). Also, as it will be discussed in this chapter, Calatrava’s relationship with regional president Camps went beyond the strictly professional relationship.

At a different level and using art and culture as an attraction factor, groups of architects tried to network their way into the influential group of people involved in the construction and development sectors, for instance organising informal dinners and art previews to which prominent members of the those sectors were invited (interview 25). The complicity between the public and private sectors - especially construction and development sectors but also the port authority – can be seen in many projects (Mundo Ilusión, Terra Mítica, Marina d’Or...) where we find a mix of the public and the private with no clear boundaries between them.

Some commentators have argued (Interviews 7, 14 and 40) that in the city the priorities have been established by the private sector – the participants in the regime - and thus, the public sector decisions have been in favour of private interests. A Member of the grassroots group ‘Per l’Horta’, referring to the elaboration of the strategic plan of Valencia, explains this prioritising of interests very clearly:

They say: We’re going to see what the people of Valencia think. But for them the people are the port of Valencia, the Chamber of Commerce, maybe the Professional Architects’ Association if they were playing ball that day, and few else. And you say, what about the social associations? And they say; what do they know about urban development? So of course, that’s how it’s done and the master lines are more port, more motorways, more
airport and more constructions because, of course, the constructors swing into line with the whole plan. But you say: This is a Christmas wish-list for your firms to continue making profits but it isn’t sustainable and doesn’t fit in at all with what we really need here. So we have little respect for this strategic plan because it’s a Christmas wish-list for corporations with vested interests in the project. They tell us: We need the high-speed train. But what for? These are things I don’t understand. If you have a 220 km/h line to Barcelona which has not yet been brought on line and a one-track section running from Castellón to Tarragona, well finish it. And when we are running chock-a-block at 220 let’s ask ourselves whether to make a high-speed train or an airline. (Interview 15)

However, the entrepreneurial groups have followed the initiative of the local and - especially – the regional government. As derived from the literature, in Europe it is often the state who takes up the role of coordinating urban regimes (Harding, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Mossberger, 2001), and the case of Valencia confirms it. The Regional Minister of Public Administration (1987-89) explains;

So there was overwhelming support from the public sector, of course, but this doesn’t mean that the private sector wasn’t involved, but on many occasions it was sucked in. Look, you’re either with me or against me and if I’ve got a project that also benefits you then it only stands to reason that I ask you for support. And so they ask for support in the privatisation of hospitals, for example, to build Terra Mitica. Huge fortunes are also present in board meetings. (Interview 32)

For instance, the government lead initiatives such as the towers by Calatrava to close the complex of the City of Sciences and tried to involve the developers, although this time with little success.

The consensus generated within an urban regime is on policy and not necessarily over values as it derives from the motivation of the participants (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993). However, although the interests of many groups converge in the development of mega-projects and events, such interests are not exactly the same and emphasis is put in different aspects and there is place for politics and negotiation in decision-making. Politicians need star architects who provide them with their needed icons and architects prefer to work for public clients because the control of the budget is less strict. In this way, for example, Calatrava’s creative interests and the regional government’s wish for emblematic architecture meet in the City of Sciences. Also construction companies benefit from emblematic mega-projects but their emphasis is more on making money than on the architectural quality of the work wished for by architects. Thus, as Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) very well summarizes, it is

’a three-way ploy with everyone at fault. […] The government would want it to be cheap and showy, the construction firm very dear and quick and the architect very showy and if possible slightly under budget’. (Interview 11)
In Sociopolis it is possible to see again the conflicts between producing architecture that stands out, making money and managing to deliver an urban plan.

Regarding an event such as the 32nd edition of the America’s Cup, ACM (America’s Cup management) – owner of the race rights – arrived in Valencia in search to pursue their interests, both sporting and economic. This raised the suspicions of the local entrepreneurs who, on the one hand saw the America’s Cup as an opportunity but on the other were wary of the Swiss monopolising the benefits of the competition. As the Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, Gil-Suay, complains ‘it was a veritable dictatorship of ACM, spectacular, a bonanza for them (Interview 33).

For the Valencian governors the America’s Cup meant publicity, not just for the city within the inter-city competition race, but also for themselves before their constituency. On the other hand, an international event creates the consensus necessary to undertake – and speed up - important urban transformations which involve many actors and need the coordination of different levels of government.

In the same way, accumulation strategies based on tourism and on construction can be considered complementary. Even the remaining industrial activity in the Valencian Community is linked to the construction sector. However, in Valencia there is a point of conflict which the America’s Cup brought to light. The fact that ValenciaPort is mainly an industrial port and not a passenger port although it is situated adjoining to the urban area, has caused territorial and land use compatibility conflicts. These conflicts were intensified by the America’s Cup because the port activity and the sailing competition overlapped geographically.

The Port Authority of Valencia (APV) is a public body dependent of the Ministry of Public Works. It is responsible for the management of ValenciaPort, name used to designate the state owned ports of Valencia, Sagunto and Gandia, all of them located on the Eastern Mediterranean coast of the Valencian Autonomous Community (Port Authority of Valencia, www.valenciaport.com). According to data provided by the ministry of Public Works (Port Authority of Valencia, www.valenciaport.com), ValenciaPort handled over 64 million tons during 2010 and is considered leader on the western Mediterranean coast in terms of container traffic. It also provides direct or indirect employment to approximately 15,000 people and generates a volume of business of over 1.1 billion Euros. Therefore, the Port Authority is a very important economic actor in Valencia. Figure 8.1 shows the colossal size of the port.

Valenciaport’s economic interests, as expressed in its Strategic Plan 2015 gravitate around the growth of the port space in order to increase its competitiveness by consolidating it as the ‘main deep sea gateway on the Iberian peninsula’ and converting it into the ‘leading intermodal logistics platform in the Mediterranean’ (Port Authority of Valencia, www.valenciaport.com).

The designation of Valencia as the venue for the 2007 America’s Cup moved the focus of the city to the maritime and harbour area, territory mostly in hands of the Port Authority. Apart from the land use...
disputes over the inner harbour, the sailing event put in danger ValenciaPort’s longest standing strategic project, the so-called Northern access, a road access through the North. The project had been proposed by the Chamber of Commerce in the beginning of the 1990s but had never received government funding for its planning and implementation (Velert, 4 July 2004; Interviews 3 and 37). The Northern access seemed incompatible with a new tertiary and leisure area linked to the America’s Cup harbour, an obstacle which was added to the already existing ones.

**Figure 8.1 Mega-port of Valencia**

Source: Prácticos de Valencia (www.valenciapilots.com)

The America’s Cup presented several inconveniences for the port’s interests. First, the old port project of opening an access through the North became more difficult, as a Professor of Geography at University of Valencia explains;

> The America’s Cup put paid in theory to one of their projects, i.e. the northern connection because there were now more port-access difficulties. […] They wanted to run it underground and enter the port but it was now even trickier because the northern part of the port had been picked as a leisure site so how could you run a motorway through it to reach the port, as they intended to do? It could reach the commercial port but now it would come to a leisure and show site and this is no zone for container lorries, which is what they wanted it for. And this raised objections and a certain opposition. (Interview 3)

Second, there was a conflict with the council’s intention of building housing on port territory to finance the America’s Cup. This conflict was, however, promptly resolved by the socialist central government, which did not allow it.

Finally, and more importantly, there was the question of whether a big industrial port within the urban fabric was compatible with a citizen leisure area linked to cruise tourism which the America’s Cup would promote. The geographical proximity of both the leisure and industrial port are evidenced in figure 8.2. As tourism representative in the CEV explains;

> If it was decided to make it a completely tertiary-sector port, solely tourism, we might forfeit our hegemony as a strategic merchandise port and this possibility needed to be factored in. I believe that the two might live together but only in a very well designed project and we certainly couldn’t stage events of this type, could we, because they run counter to the other aspect. (Interview 52)

In short, in Valencia’s inner harbour area two accumulation strategies which seemed compatible a priori – production and its logistics and a consumption-based urban economy - clashed as they were spatialised. The prioritisation of one over the other presented no little dilemma to the local and
regional tiers of government, not least because global interests represented by the owner of the America’s Cup rights, Ernesto Bertarelli, and the F1, Bernie Ecclestone, were involved in the dispute.

**Figure 8.2 Tertiary port and industrial port**

Source: Planenge LTDA (http://www.planenge-ltda.com)

Although Valencia port is central-state owned, the president of the port authority is appointed by the president of the regional government. The regional government has always supported the port, which, on the other hand, is very close to the city’s main business associations (Commerce Chamber, CEV and AVE). The local government, as would have been expected, favoured a strategy based on the urban development of the area with residential and leisure uses linked to services and tourism.

However, both local and regional governments, with the support of the central government, marked the America’s Cup as a priority of their political project and the port authority’s demands put the regional government in a difficult position. Already in 2004 (see chapter 5) Rafael del Moral had resigned and been substituted in the presidency the port authority, probably in part caused by the tensions regarding the disputes created by the America’s Cup.

In view of the situation, the port authority’s policy was to advocate for the compatibility of the hosting of the America’s Cup with their industrial activity and, particularly, their plans of creating a northern extension and access. The Director of Commercial Strategy and Corporative Development of the Port Authority of Valencia explains the port’s position;

> Well, the truth is that we are not really a tourism-oriented institution. That said, there is a central thrust within our strategy, which is integration between port and city because we are an urban port, due to city sprawl, and in the end we have to blend our commercial uses with public uses. […] But for the Port, for the Harbour Authority, the cruise sector is not very profitable because they take up very expensive infrastructure; port infrastructure is costly and passenger and cruise ships generate less income than container ships. Nonetheless, as part and parcel of this strategy of harmonising port and city we consider it very important to endow the port with the necessary infrastructure for a cruise stopover port. […] In other words it was also good for Valencia, for the Port of Valencia, to nurture the idea of Valencia as a cruise port, but as strategy geared more towards making port and city compatible than the port activity itself. (Interview 34)

The conflict tourism versus industrial port intensified after the celebration of the America’s Cup in 2007, when a new edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia was being negotiated. The enlargement of the port was seen by ACM (and Ernesto Bertarelli) as a problem for the celebration of a 2nd edition of the sailing competition and the consolidation of the America’s Cup harbour area as a leisure and tourist area.
Bertarelli pressurised the Valencian authorities saying that a second edition of the America’s Cup and the enlargement of the port were incompatible. The port authority – supported by the local and regional business associations (i.e. Cierval) - on the other hand, insisted on the compatibility of a mega-port and tourism and compromised to ‘phase in’ the construction work to ‘make it compatible’ with the regattas ‘as far as possible’ (Ros, 6 July 2007). In the words of the Director of Valencia Port Foundation,

We generate twenty-odd thousand jobs, taking in direct and indirect employment, and help to make importing and exporting more competitive on the strength of an inter-ocean port that is currently the leading port in the Mediterranean and the world’s only port clocking up over two and a half million TEUs, which has continued to grow until the last month despite the downturn. So mister Bertarelli has his own point of view, which is just as valid as anyone else’s, but obviously our action does not go in the same direction; it aims at making the activities compatible. And we have already shown that the city has hosted the America's Cup and Formula One races and this port has continued growing and providing a service for the productive economy, which is our overriding aim. (Interview 45)

The local and regional governments, although trying to avoid a conflict with the port and business associations, clearly prioritised the America’s Cup (which, on the other hand, had been so profitable in electoral terms). However, the Northern enlargement of the port was finally approved by the government. The uncertainties about a second edition of the America’s Cup created by the judicial case cooled down the expectations and plans to turn the harbour into a sporting and leisure area which could attract high-end tourism and cruises.

In the end, the America’s Cup helped the Port Authority find support for another long-ambitioned project, the northern extension. As the Director of Commercial Strategy and Corporative Development of the Port Authority of Valencia explains;

As I see it, the America’s Cup represents two important indirect advantages for the port of Valencia and maybe they were thought of at first but brought out later. Firstly there is the northern extension. […] The northern extension, here the construction work started, well this yearbook is a little out of date, but the northern extension is a port expansion in this zone that had aroused a certain public objection due to the environmental impact, because they claimed that the new sea wall might alter the sea-land sand flows. So no one objected to holding the America’s Cup, everyone was in favour, weren’t they, the whole society including the political parties. And since the holding of the America’s Cup meant building this new canal, the creation of this canal, and this sea wall set the limits of the extension, so the whole negative environmental impact basically boiled down to the build up of sand here and the loss of sand there. […] The America’s Cup is a project supported by one and all and since it had received overall support nothing negative could be said against the northern extension, which doesn’t grow at all and adds no other impact. So it is a great advantage because it saved us a lot of media debate. (Interview 34)
On the other hand, as port representatives have stated (Interviews 34 and 45); the America’s Cup has given ValenciaPort the opportunity to demonstrate that their activities are compatible with the citizen’s use of the inner harbour for leisure and to improve the image that the population had of the port.

This conflict regarding the uses and specialisation of the port highlights the role of the state – in its different tiers - as mediator between different groups of interest through a process of structural selectivity. Although the America’s Cup was prioritary for the government, in the end, the durability of the regime was not compromised, which, otherwise, would have also diminished the government’s capacity to govern. The government in its role of mediator was able to distribute rewards – such as in this case support to the northern extension of the port – and ensure the cohesion of the governing coalition.
8.3 Global actors and translation of interests

Local coalitions of interest, guided as we have seen by the local and regional governments are just a part of the story. In a globalised (glocalised) era, a new set of actors – global actors to simplify – have made their appearance and acquired paramount importance. On the one hand there are the global architects who find work opportunities all over the world and, on the other hand, the owners of events such as the F1 and the America’s Cup. However, global and local interests are not completely autonomous from each other and cannot be studied in a simplistic excluding way, for they are interrelated.

The America’s Cup was not only seen as an opportunity by the Valencian governors but, for the Swiss, Valencia offered extraordinary business opportunities. However, there was a clash of interest between the Swiss entrepreneurs - who arrived with ACM - and the local economic lobbies, who wanted to have their share of the business. In the end all the parties strived to benefit from the event. The groups of interest included public works construction companies who would get substantial contracts for the infrastructures, those who manage the publicity campaigns and the local urban development sector (because the America’s Cup and the new public sector investments would turn the maritime area into a profitable field for housing development and revitalise the real estate market). On the other hand, AVE and Port Authority lobbied for the extension of the port in Valencia while Bertarelli and Eclestone pressurised the Valencian authorities to prioritise tourism and leisure in the area.

The Valencia Litoral project can be seen as one of the urban development opportunities brought by the America’s Cup. Nouvel was perceived by the local lobbies as an intruding agent but, at the same time, he needed to be integrated in the process somehow, given the local council’s good acceptance of the publicity and prestige he brought to Valencia with the Valencia Litoral project. A restricted architectural competition was organised. But, when the competition was given to both Nouvel and GMP exaequo, local architect Tomas was commissioned to coordinate a joint project. For the promoter of Valencia Litoral, the purpose of the competition was to justify a direct commission to José María Tomás, who is considered Rita Barberá’s ‘official’ architect (Interviews 16, 19, 31 and 41), the one the mayor trusts to get things done. When there was a need for the design of a master plan for the candidature of the America’s Cup and very little time, Tomás was assigned the task. Thus, global architects – Jean Nouvel in this case - provide the prestige and publicity and local architects – Tomás - provide politicians with local knowledge and the confidence of the well-known. The case of Calatrava is particular because he is at the same time global and local (Tzonis, 2005), and therefore ideal to be made the ‘house architect’ by the regional government.

On the other hand, the involvement of global actors has generally come about through the mediation of local actors. Moreover, global actors’ interests have been transferred to the local scale through a process of translation. As one interviewee pointed out, the city has been transformed to suit the needs
of the events (Interview 54). According to the Secretary of studies and programs of the socialist party in the city of Valencia;

The model has been to trail what the will of the owners of the mega events was, completely submit to that will, develop point by point their requirements and little else, I believe. (Interview 24)

This transforming the city as a translation of foreign actors’ interests is very clear in the case of the America’s Cup. Indeed, once the city had been appointed, the mayor did not hesitate to affirm that the city would transform itself to offer the best America’s Cup (Velert, 8 December 2003). Valencia and its maritime area were put to the service of the Swiss company ACM. The Swiss did not have the necessary infrastructure to hold their sailing competition - the sea. Valencia not only provided it but also adapted it to their specific needs.

Thus, Valencia offered Bertarelli an excellent regatta field because of the wind regimes but also, as book editor Lagardera explains;

At that moment the national government was in the hands of the conservative party and also the regional and local government. So everything is hunky dory and the answer is always ‘whatever you want’ and so there is a great communion of interests between the Swiss and the vested interests of the local political class at the moment. (Interview 31)

Salinas (Interview 21), Director of Valencian Convention Bureau and responsible for the pre-candidature phase of the event explains that the three main factors that made the Swiss choose Valencia (as explained by the Swiss themselves) were threefold. First, the city, its ongoing transformation process and the expectations on its further transformation. Second, the existence of institutional support at the different tiers of government. Third, a good professional team ‘who understood what the challenge was and how to tackle it in the best way in a very tight time schedule’ (Interview 21).

For Valencia the America’s Cup was an opportunity, for ACM it was a business, and Valencia an opportunity to make money too. Thus, for ACM everything was benefits. Starting from the fact that Valencia had to pay a canon (90 million euro), to ‘buy’ the rights to hold the America’s Cup (Interviews 14 and 17). The owners of the event offered it to the best bidder and Valencia bid higher than the other cities (Interviews 51a, 51b and 52).

Second, Valencia’s inner harbour area was redesigned according to ACM’s requirements. The master plan of the inner harbour area was designed for the purpose of the America’s Cup, in Gil Suay’s words the project ‘was functionally conceived with the Cup in mind’ (Interview 33).

In the negotiation with ACM the infrastructural, technical, legal and security conditions that the city needed to fulfil were established, as Salinas, first director of the Consortium explains
So of course the ground rules are set. Who sets them? The organiser, who says, listen, if you really want to be candidate as host city you have to present a whole series of things, you have to submit a project, a candidature. […] In the end there is a contract between the organisation supporting the host city and the event organiser, laying down the rights and obligations of the parties. (Interview 21)

The master plan for the candidature project – elaborated by José María Tomás architectural practice at the request of the city council - followed the brief given by ACM and was strictly limited to the area required for the America’s Cup (Interview 23).

When the city was selected and the consortium was constituted to carry out the infrastructure works agreed with ACM, the candidature project was implemented directly with little further design or architectural competition. According to the Project and Conservation Manager of America’s Cup Consortium

The projects put out for tender were really fairly well defined because the organising body laid down guidelines in the contract plus some basic requisites for each item. Certain dimensions had to be met, there had to be a berth for mega yachts of so many metres with so many berthing points, the area of the guest zone had to be such and such. […] The building had to have so many square metres, there had to be parking places. So in the end the bid had to be made with all these factors in mind. (Interview 47)

In fact, the only original addition to the candidature project – and therefore to ACM’s brief - was the building *Veles e Vents*, which was meant to be a vestige to remind the city of the America’s Cup (Interview 57).

Third, although the infrastructures were built by the Consortium with public money, for the duration of the regattas (until December 2007), ACM had the exclusive rights to exploit the inner harbour area – under the name ‘Port America’s Cup’. The Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup complains;

ACM is so to speak the rights-holding body. The entire dock, its whole transformation is placed by the consortium in ACM’s hands for holding the Cup and ACM then manages all this infrastructure, organises the races, and lays down the rules. In other words, it’s as though we built the house and then handed it over to the tenant, only instead of being paid a rent we pay him to come. We made the house, handed it over to the tenant and paid him a rent and it is he the tenant who managed all the races and what we might call connected factors such as publicity, who managed all aspects such as the banning of publicity in the Avenida del Puerto unless authorised by ACM, in the whole inner dock, and a whole host of other things. For example Damm was the only beer on sale simply because Estrella Damm was one of the sponsors … Well, this was a true dictatorship by ACM, mind-blowing. Here it really filled its boots. (Interview 33)
Everything in the city seemed to be conditioned to the celebration of the America’s Cup. The most obvious thing was that the expansion plans of the port had to adapt to the America’s Cup, a fact which caused no little friction with the port’s authority. Also, the old regional airport terminal had to be modified to convert it into a terminal for the private aircrafts which arrived for the America’s Cup (Interview 21). But even other projects such as the approval of the Plan of Albufera (Plan Rector de Uso y Gestión (PRUG) de L’Albufera) were postponed until the needs for America’s Cup were known (El País, 29 February 2004).

The America’s Cup seemed to be such a priority that the aftermath planning was overlooked. The bases of the teams, which were designed especially for the America’s Cup, were to be knocked down after the competition instead of re-used (Interview 57). Figure 8.3 shows a view of the bases, which have not been demolished yet.

**Figure 8.3 Bases of the America’s Cup teams**

![Bases of the America’s Cup teams](image)

Source: Author

Even what to do after the America’s Cup depended on the investment already done with the purpose of the event. After holding the first edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia, the conditions for a second edition went further, not only a higher canon for the competition but also Bertarelli pressurised the administrations to plan the maritime area to his own interest. Finally, an agreement was reached. The central government assured that the organiser’s needs for a second America’s Cup would be met.

Regarding global architects there is a process of translation, too. There is the idea that architecture is a highly globalised profession and architects – particularly star architects - work anywhere in the world. However, there is always a need for translation for, as shown in Sociopolis, global architects often
need the collaboration of local architects who know the workings of the local construction industry and building legislation. Thus, global architects got in touch with local architects to collaborate with them in projects in Valencia. For instance, Greg Lynn contacted Tomás for a project in Sociopolis (Interview 23). But, the call for collaboration happens also in the opposite direction. Local architects call foreign star architects to achieve more credibility in front of the administrations. On their side, foreign star architects increase their volume of business and visibility. Sociopolis includes a group of well-known architects which provide this credibility. In order to participate in an architectural competition for the America’s Cup Juan Añón – director of a well-known local architectural practice - got in touch with global architect Alejandro Zaera.

In whichever direction the first contact happens, there seems to be a mediation of local agents to introduce global architects in the Valencian scene. The case of the Valencia Litoral project is paradigmatic. French star architect Jean Nouvel arrived in Valencia through a local real estate consultant who has a friendship relationship with him. Nouvel created a team with local people - for instance Iribas, Lozano - who provided the local knowledge.

In the case of Calatrava, being a global-local (glocal) architect this translation occurs within his own architectural practice. Thus, although Calatrava is specifically asked to open an office in Valencia when he is commissioned the City of Sciences as a condition in the contract and needs to hire local architects - who know the local regulations and speak the language - he is conscious of the importance of his brand as a global architect and requires them to adapt to Calatrava’s office ideology. For that reason ‘Santiago’s interest was to employ young architects who could be easily freed from prejudices, without a very solid basis which would prevent them from doing what he told them to do, who followed his orders without question and without saying a word’ (Interview 41) explains a former employee.

### 8.4 The importance of individual actors

Not only politics matter but there is also some place for the agency of individual actors. Certainly, in the Valencia case, the influence of different individual personalities and their preferences can be traced. Apart from considering the state as an actor, individual politicians have put their personal stamp in Valencia’s politics. The importance of the figures of regional presidents such as Lerma, Zaplana or Camps, and of Rita Barberá, mayor since 1991 must not be underestimated. Besides the importance of the main political figures there are other secondary but very powerful political actors who highly influence policies. Thus, even when the initiative comes from someone else, as in the case of the America’s Cup which was the initiative of the former president of the sailing club, the mayor wants to be the protagonist and stamp her mark.

According to Pau Rausell (Interview 13), a ‘casual model’ such as this of Valencia and the Valencian Community is dependent on which particular person is there at a particular time. Political projects heavily carry the stamp of particular persons. Blasco, married to Consuelo Císcar, is a politician who...
has been in all the regional governments with different parties. He has been very powerful within the regional governments of each of the parties. Sociopolis was possible through the personal relationship of Guallart with Blasco and Císcar, and a series of coincidences (Interviews 28 and 60). Consuelo was the director of the Valencia Bienal and Blasco Regional Minister of Welfare. Then Blasco was appointed Regional Minister of Housing just when the regional governments were starting to say that it was necessary to build affordable subsidised housing (Interview 60). Subsequent regional ministers have not supported the project as much as he did (Interview 60; see chapter 5).

Along with politicians and governors, as already discussed, architects are an influential group. Not only do they have special influence in the creation of the legal planning network for the development of the city (for in Spain architects are also spatial planners) but they also provide politicians with the emblem they need. Their role in the generation of vision in which much of the government’s leadership of the ruling coalition or urban regime rests cannot be overestimated. The relationship between architecture and power has been thoroughly studied (Glendinning, 2010; Sudjic, 2005). Architecture and power have always been intimately linked but in a world where the media are so important and public image a crucial asset of power, the balances of power between an elected politician and a star architect seem to be somehow nearly reversed. Thus, within the architectural world it is assumed that it is true that star architects choose their clients and not the other way round.

In Valencia, the figure of architect Santiago Calatrava has been particularly relevant, and his architecture can be found everywhere despite the fact that many people (Interviews 1, 4, 6, 16, 23, 28, 29, 36 and 55) complain about the saturation of his works that the city has. His work is ubiquitous and politicians seem to be dependent on him. In the words of a Member of the Valencian Regional Parliament,

They wanted to go ahead with this spectacular image of Valencia and this almost psychological dependence on Calatrava. Because the question no one posed here was whether a city should be practically an urban development complex and architectural theme park of Santiago Calatrava or whether a city should input a certain cosmopolitanism and in certain parts of the city there is room for commissions, so to speak, from Calatrava, Foster already has something, from the Iraqi, Zaha Hadid, from Nouvel, from Renzo Piano, from Rogers, in short, do something, right? But here there is a knee-jerk dependence on Santiago Calatrava. (Interview 55)

There is almost a direct identification of Valencia with Calatrava (Interview 55). Each regional president has had his Calatrava building in the City of Sciences. Calatrava is considered to have what is necessary to become an architect of icons. From the 1980s, the architectural world followed the same trends of privatisation and economic liberalism as other social and professional spheres, gradually embracing the values of individualism and creative freedom (Glendinning, 2010). Individual personality – which is also reflected in an architect’s work – became paramount to professional success, not least because some of that artistic personality aura could be shared with the clients
Calatrava is said to be an ambassador of the city (Interview 6) and president Camps’ architectural guru because he’s a ‘bag full of personality, of blarney; he has an international image…’ (Interview 62). He would be an excellent representative of how: ‘right from the beginning of the Modern Movement, sprang a new kind of individualistic ‘hero architect’, concerned both with exalted prophesying and with promotion of his own reputation, as well as being highly sensitive to the visual ‘image’ of his work’ (Glendinning, 2010:33). See the architect presenting a new project for the City of Sciences to politicians, developers and other members of the Valencian business sphere in figure 8.4.

**Figure 8.4 Calatrava with Barberá and Camps in the presentation of the skyscrapers project**

Source: Jordi Vicent, in Ferrandis, 8 November 2011

Calatrava’s skill to sell his work, particularly to sell Valencian regional presidents more pieces for the City of Sciences, is undisputed (Interviews 5, 11, 54, 55 and 62). As the Secretary-General of FECOVAL explains:

> Bear in mind that construction work is being given out to him against the opinion of all and sundry; there were raging rows with him in the economics department, raging rows with him in the infrastructure department, none of the companies want to work with him. The president said – bah! – I don’t mind. (Interview 62)

From the very beginning and particularly when the project of the City of Sciences was threatened due to the change in regional government, Calatrava’s role was essential. Also Vicent Guallart plays the role of the ‘hero architect’, coordinating a group of international architects, finding a client – through his relationship with Blasco – and promoting Sociopolis within the cultural sphere of architecture. Guallart justifies his projects recurring to eloquent theorisations. In Sociopolis he mixes ideas of the garden city with the fashionable leitmotiv of sustainability and talks about the creation of a rur-urban environment (Guallart, 2004). This proves to be an effective way of achieving commissions and raising his work’s profile. His personality, persistence (Interviews 25 and 31) and ‘a good capacity of social and political relation’ (Interview 54) ensured the project to go on despite the difficulties.

Valencia Litoral is the private initiative of a real estate consultant (although with the blessing of the local council) who hires French architect Jean Nouvel to propose an ambitious urban design project for Valencia. Jean Nouvel’s status of star architect also grants him the legitimacy to present a grand proposal for Valencia’s maritime front. Although the Valencian urbanism law allows the private sector to propose urban plans, a proposal by a corporate actor without an intellectual-artistic backing, would most probably have not been received as well (by representatives not only of the council but also of the central government such as minister Sevilla). Nouvel’s professional prestige and support by the existing handful of global star architects was played in favour of the proposal.
But star architects such as French architect Jean Nouvel are not the only foreign private actors who have been involved in Valencia’s fortune. Valencian governors’ reliance on sporting events as a marketing tool has brought to the arena the relevant figures of the owners of the events, Ecclestone in the case of the F1 and Bertarelli in the case of the America’s Cup. Both of them have wanted to shape Valencia in their interest. Once Valencia was selected to host the America’s Cup, the planning machine was put to service the needs of the competition, as discussed in the previous section. In the same way, Ecclestone decided that, although there was a circuit in Cheste, 27 km from Valencia, he would prefer an urban F1 circuit in the harbour area and Valencia’s governors granted his desire (Interviews 2, 4, 30, 51a, 58 and 62).

After the holding the sailing competition in Valencia 2007, Bertarelli, the patron of the America’s Cup, pressurised the Valencian public administrations to have the planning of the harbour area suit his needs. The eventual celebration of a second edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia was conditioned to the project of extending the commercial port. The two economic models, tourism and the industrial port competed for the same space and the Swiss tycoon put in crisis the alleged compatibility of both.

The interests of the Swiss went further than the celebration of a sailing competition for Bertarelli was interested in the long term economic vision for the area and several Swiss entrepreneurs were interested in investing in Valencia if the port changed course to focus on high-end nautical tourism. Also Ecclestone’s interests coincide with those of Bertarelli in having a harbour specialised in tourism and leisure, which would be more profitable both for the America’s Cup and F1 competitions. As commented in a local newspaper ‘one and the other seem to want to design the future of the city, when what they are really pledged to is the future of their businesses’ (El País, 26 June 2007).

Although some local businessmen representatives complained about the intromission in local politics – certainly defending their own economic interests - the local authorities yielded to the pressures of the owners of the events and tried to please them. On the one hand the sporting competitions seemed to them an important asset, on the other the economic feasibility of the maritime area depended on the patrons of the sporting competitions for without the crowds brought by them bars and restaurants in the America’s Cup’s harbour had already started to close.

To add further complication to the equation, internal sporting disputes between the teams which had to be resolved by the New York superior court conditioned the celebration of the 33rd edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia. In the meanwhile the America’s Cup’s harbour area had no activity. Finally, on 2nd April 2009, the court pronounced sentence resolving a lawsuit that had started on 20th July 2007 by invalidating the Club Náutico Español de Vela (CNEV) as ‘Challenger of Record’. As a result, the 33rd edition of the America’s Cup would be a one-on-one competition between BMW Oracle and Alinghi. On 20th November 2009 it was decided that the competition would be held in Valencia in February 2010. During all the period of uncertainty the America’s Cup’s area was in economic decline.
In sum, the whole process got out the hands of the Valencian authorities, who entrusted their economic model to a third party (ACM), making it highly vulnerable to contingency.

8.5 Politics versus planning and tactics versus strategy

Although the emphasis on mega-projects and events has been consistent in Valencia over time, it is perceived to respond more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy. For most of the interviewees Valencia’s particularity is actually the lack of a clear strategy, of a predetermined plan (Interviews 2, 4, 13, 26, 30, 31, 36, 45, 51, 52, 58 and 62). The projects are considered to respond to a permanent improvisation (Interviews 2, 31 and 51), to ‘fancy ideas’ (Interview 36) and instead of following a strategy are done ‘as opportunity arises’ (Interviews 2 and 58), and therefore are ‘propaganda- and election-driven seat-of-the-pants jobs’ (Interview 58).

The fact of specialising in mega-events was not a planned decision but an accumulation of events by chance which, in the end, formed what seems to be a strategy, the model was ‘constructed on the go’ (Rausell, 2006; Interview 36), what Rausell, senior lecturer of Economics at University of Valencia, has called ‘a fancy ideas model’ (Interview 13) which responds to decisions linked to the interests of different pressure groups (Rausell, 2006; Gaja, 2007). For Rausell, unrelated and fortuitous decisions have converged on an emphasis on mega-projects and events, which have been later on been presented as a thought-out strategy. In the words of the Secretary-General of FECOVAL:

it’s like catching anything that moves. For me, quite sincerely . . . I mean have you got a city strategy or not? […] What doesn’t seem on to me is to swallow anything just to feature in the photo, whatever it costs. It’s a cost-benefit issue and I believe this wasn’t done; instead it was dressed up afterwards. (Interview 62)

There is a sense of path dependency (Interviews 58 and 62). It is a chain of decisions in which one leads to the other. Therefore, Valencia is perceived as ‘an empty container to host events’ (Interview 30), a container which transforms itself in order to accommodate the different events (Interview 54). As the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) admits

But in my view one of the knock-on benefits of the City of Sciences might be the America’s Cup. None of us could have imagined that when designing and promoting a city project this would give birth to other projects but success breeds success. (Interview 11)

The city, however, had a strategic plan which was published in 1995 and was called Valencia 2015, but it reflects the characteristic improvisation as it has been repetitively changed to introduce and adapt to the new events (Interviews 13 and 19). Rausell (Interview 13) uses the term permanent re-programming to describe it. He explains

There is, for example, the city planning office, which is the Strategy and Development Centre (CEyD); here they draw up ostensibly strategic city plans that incorporate the mega events in
a very imprecise way. They invent a concept such as permanent reprogramming; conceptually it runs counter to the planning processes because what has to be brought into line with each new occurrence is the official discourse. And the occurrence might... I mean, why the America’s Cup? Previously they had bid for many other events and if it had been a world-ranking athletics meet or whatever it would have been held in another part of the city or the outcome would have been completely different. There was no sense of ‘let’s reorganise the city with the sea in mind and therefore bid for the America’s Cup’, no, lets’ just try out options and see what we get. (Interview 13)

On the other hand, the strategic plan is considered more of a ‘marketing device’ or ‘shop-window policy’ (Interview 9) than a real policy guiding document (Interview 17).

According to architect Llopis (Interview 53), in Valencia there is little consensus to achieve a kind of integrated holistic planning which could have integrated the mega-projects and events into a wider strategic project. First, urban planning is territorially fragmented. A territorial plan has never been elaborated and there has not been an overall planning coordination of the Valencia city council with other councils in the metropolitan area (with the exception of some services such as water and rubbish management) (Interviews 19, 36, 42 and 51a). This fragmentation has resulted in the existence of contradictions between different plans at different scales, for instance the General Urban Plan of Valencia and the PAT (Plan de Acción territorial). Moreover, the General Urban Plan, which should have guided the future development of the city, has been modified at convenience. The case of Sociopolis is a clear example (see chapter 5).

Without a coordinated planning framework which takes into account the whole metropolitan area it is much easier to do isolated mega-projects than to plan integratedly. It is also more rewarding from the public visibility point of view and therefore more beneficial electorally.

Furthermore, the cost opportunity of the investments has not been studied (Pedro and Sorribes, 2007; Interviews 14, 30 and 55). Commentators and economists’ analysis emphasise the huge cost opportunity of these projects (especially the City of Sciences) (Interviews 13, 14, 17, 28, 30 and 55) and the bad relationship cost benefit (Interviews 1, 13, 14, 17, 28, 30, 51 and 55). Pau Rausell (Interview 13), Senior lecturer of Economics at University of Valencia explains it very clearly:

Here everything is overkill. Here, to grow a sapling we flood three thousand hectares and so of course the sapling grows but the opportunity-cost of wasting so much water is vast. Indeed, everything here is overkill and naturally restructuring and repositioning the city has an impact and puts the city on the map. I believe that this is a very inefficient way of working but the impact in terms of citizen satisfaction is positive; the local people are happy and the city’s share of world tourism grows too. The results have been spectacular. No exaggeration but they have been notable. (Interview 13)
Looking at specific projects and events it is possible to trace Valencia’s ‘unplanned strategy’. The initial project for the City of Sciences, responded to the idea that Valencia needed an emblem, an icon but the objectives were not very specific (see chapter 5). The Director of the Science Museum explains it very clearly

I believe that it’s a strategy designed by no one. There was no one with a light-bulb idea of ‘within the next fifty years Valencia has got to change and to that end we’ve got to do such and such’. No, I believe that this was trumped up by the successive governments, but like all governments sometimes they are successful and sometimes not. (Interview 35)

There was a lack of specific planning for economic regeneration. There was just an intuition that it would happen. In fact, decisions were taken without considering neither any alternative options nor doing a cost-benefit analysis (Interview 18). There was not an established planning of the area either. As a Member of staff of CeyD explains;

But things were done slightly off the cuff. I can tell you that I lived through the City of Sciences project from scratch. We set out to sell it abroad when only the planetarium was up; the rest was only an information graphic. There was no more than an information graphic and lots of construction sites. The people who came here were disappointed and said ‘what’s all this?’ Because they’d seen the pictures and thought everything was finished already. There were no bus routes. All these questions were gradually cleared up on the go, whereas if it had been planned properly beforehand it would all have been perfectly thought out from the start. (Interview 6)

Then, the project was modified and the communications tower substituted by an opera palace, without much debate or feasibility study. And from there the project grew and grew. Even the buildings were built before there was a detailed brief for their use. In 2001, when the opening of the opera was planned for 2003, the director general of CACSA stated that it was not possible to estimate the maintenance cost of the building or the cost of running the opera house (El País, 6 June 2001). A study of the possible uses of the building was commissioned to sociologist Iribas when it was already in use (Interview 28).

On the other hand, the Agora was built with no clear purpose, as described in CACSA webpage it was ‘conceived as a very versatile multifunctional space for holding different types of events’ (Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias, S.A., www.cac.es/agora/) and, since its opening in 2009 has been underused.

As the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) has admitted ‘Valencia, ‘pensat i fet’. That’s a saying from around here, you know? ‘Pensat i fet’ means planning little and trusting on instinct...’ (Interview 11)

The story of the America’s Cup is also one of chances and accumulation of decisions. The sailing competition went to Valencia by chance, because the winners of the former edition, the Swiss team, needed a city by the sea. The America’s Cup was seen as a good opportunity by the Valencian
governors, mainly the mayor, and with no further economic analysis of cost-benefit and no alternative investment study (Interview 18) the city prepared to contend to bring it to Valencia.

The project seemed more of a tactic - to get money from central government - than strategic (Interview 38). In fact, before the appearance of the America’s Cup the clear priority was the industrial port, which was being planned as a trading mega-port which would be referential in the Mediterranean (Interview 4) and it needed to be extended. Afterwards, with the America’s Cup, the priorities changed and the development of the port could be sacrificed in benefit of the tourist and sporting uses (Interview 4). Therefore, the America’s Cup did not respond to a strategic plan of the city and was not integrated into any overall strategy afterwards. Regarding urban planning, the event was not incorporated into a spatial plan of the city either. Although in 2004 the America’s Cup was perceived as an opportunity for the holistic spatial planning of the maritime area by architects and urban planners (El País, 28 January 2004) the urban project of the infrastructures to carry out was hastily established during the candidature process. No further design work was done. What to do with the maritime area was not clear and an overall master plan was not elaborated. Therefore, the America’s Cup was not used to plan the maritime area of the city which remained without an overall spatial plan. It was within this scenario that the Valencia Litoral initiative appeared. An individual developer perceived that the maritime area lacked overall planning, it was fragmented and forgotten (Interview 20).

The economic opportunities linked to developing the area were grasped and realized but as a set of fragmented plans, as explained by architect Peñín (Zafra, 17 November 2007) Valencia’s waterfront area has had fourteen strategic plans, none of them implemented in its entirety, which has resulted in a seemingly unplanned design. The most profitable pieces within the waterfront area (due to the America’s Cup and F1) were designed and implemented first regardless of other considerations.

Moreover, after the America’s Cup, the inner harbour area was re-designed for the F1 competition. The poor results in terms of public realm of the improvised redesign can be seen in figure 8.5. The author of the interior urban design of the harbour for the America’s Cup explains;

Then they ran a tender for what they called the East Park, which closed off the port. We won the contract and it was carried out. It was a sort of linear park running along the new canal and closed off the port, you know? Then it had to be extended towards what was part of the new mooring berths that were being constructed. This park was built and as well as the tender specs it also had to meet some soundproofing conditions; a separation barrier had to be installed between the port activity area and the leisure-based area and since it was also a mooring area for yachts paying huge mooring fees blah, blah, these had to be protected from lorry noise. All this was designed and this park, as soon as the America’s Cup was over, well the Formula One circuit started and the circuit was plotted out above the park so the whole thing was dismantled. It was a hefty outlay, I think it cost about ten or twelve million Euros and then it was all dismantled almost as soon as it was built. Now that was built as a short-
lived project because if it had been they would have... you know how it is... one day they think of one thing and the next month something else occurs to them. (Interview 36)

**Figure 8.5 Public realm in harbour designed for Formula 1 competition**

On the other hand, not only was there a lack of holistic spatial planning there was also a lack of integrated long term tourism planning despite the fact that the boost of tourism was one of the alleged objectives of the America’s Cup. The optimistic expectations of the administrations, transmitted to the population to build up support for the sailing competition, and the lack of an adequate forecasting resulted in an oversupply of hotels and restaurants (Interview 52).

The lack of long term planning for the aftermath of the America’s Cup was generalised. Thus, once the sailing competition finished the inner harbour remained deserted, in the words of one of the interviewees it looked like ‘a ghost town’ (Interview 52).

The critiques to this lack of long-term planning came from very different sectors of society, the Federation of Residents Associations, retailers and hoteliers associations, the political opposition, intellectuals and even from within the responsible for the organisation of the America’s Cup (Maseres, 7 August 2009; Maseres, 7 September 2009; El País, 1 March 2010; Interview 33). It was not until the end of October 2010 that the local and regional governments presented a usage plan for the inner harbour, which was linked to the arrival of the high speed train to Valencia (Levante, 27 October 2010). Short term planning but not agreed long term planning and strategy restricted the choices a posteriori. A path dependency was created for, without a long term strategy, finding other events to bring to the area seemed to be the easiest solution.
The idea of a lack of a clear strategy is reinforced by the fact that the projects have been politically used in a tactic way. Many of the discussions around the mega projects have been approached from a partisan viewpoint. The City of Sciences was very clearly the project of one president and it needed to be appropriated by the next government (see chapter 5). Politicians of different parties have strived to be identified with the City of Sciences. As discussed in chapter 5, all the presidents of the regional government have wanted to leave their print in the megalomaniac complex. The City of Sciences is used as political propaganda; it gives an image of modernity. It appears in architectural journals too. It is an element of political prestige (Interviews 9 and 55).

Along the same line, the mayor of the city, Rita Barberá, strived to be identified with the America’s Cup and put the event in the centre of her populist politics. The America’s Cup and the alleged political and budgetary involvement of governments of different political parties has been a veritable bone of contention. This has been clearly staged in the Consortium. The disagreements started when, after the 2004 general elections, the conservative central government was substituted by a socialist party one. Fundamentally the discussion was an attack of the local and regional conservative governments, accusing the socialist central government of not pulling its weight and hindering strategic projects such as the celebration the America’s Cup. In Ricardo Costa’s words; ‘Zapatero’s government now doesn’t know what to invent to damage the Valencian Community’ (Ricardo Costa in Velert, 3 June 2004). Every public appearance was an excuse to accuse the central government of not supporting the America’s Cup enough and was reflected in the newspapers (García del Moral, 12 May 2004; Ferrandis, 14 May 2004; Vázquez and Velert, 4 June 2004). First, the central government had not appointed their representatives in the consortium (April to June 2004), then the delay of the environmental impact report, and so on.

Meanwhile the central government tried to counteract the accusations. Later on, when the Consortium was given a credit for the infrastructural works with the bank guarantee of the ICO both local and regional governments complained that the central government was not investing (although the only capital came from the credit guaranteed by the ICO). Again they repeated it endlessly on every possible occasion. Also the comparison with the central government support of Sevilla Expo ’92 and Barcelona Olympics was a constant. The central government, on its side, counteracted by demanding investment from local and regional governments (which never occurred), accusing them of not investing, and threatening with managing the event directly on its own if they did not contribute economically (Vázquez, 10 June 2004; Velert, 14 June 2004). Political representatives in different tiers of government of both the conservative and socialist parties participated in the discussions.

Finally, after ACM’s complaints, seven months of disagreements between the three administrations represented in the consortium came to a close and the works could be finished. However, even after the successful celebration of the America’s Cup the political row continued between the local and central governments over the property of the port’s land and the investments.

Despite its described unplanned character, the urban policy has been consistent over time because the components – and therefore the interests - of the regime have been stable, not because a coherent
‘strategy’ had been devised in advance. However, an emphasis – for instance - on the construction sector could have been achieved with a different type of megaprojects, not necessarily emblematic projects such as the City of Sciences, which, as already discussed, has the footprint of each regional president. In that sense, the idea of a political project which guides the activities of the state and includes concerns that are wider than mere economic interest - such as the construction of a strong regional state within Spain - is crucial. Prestige mega-projects and events benefit certain interest groups – as already discussed – but they have been prioritised because they are consistent with the state’s hegemonic project.

8.6 Issues of dissent

In the 1980s, during the first local and regional democratically elected governments, the conservative political opposition criticised the socialist party in power for what they considered an over expenditure in big structural projects such as the underground or the Turia’s Garden (Interview 7). The City of Sciences was one of those criticised hideously monumental structures. However, the conservatives soon changed their minds when in government and made of the City of Sciences one of their flagships (see chapter 5).

When the urban policy based on mega-projects and events was being pursued in full, there were some opposition groups to mega-projects and events on the grounds that there was a lack of social expenditure as a result. Some neighbourhood associations complained about the over-expenditure in mega-projects and events and got organised to demand more amenities for their neighbourhoods. However, the general public was satisfied with the urban policy, as shown by the electoral results. General opposition was not strong, nor had a real social effect (Interviews 2, 24, 38 and 44).

Later on (from around 2009 on), as the country entered economic recession the critical voices became louder and more numerous (see figure 8.6). In any case, until very recently, it has always been very specific groups - architects and planners, intellectuals, ecologists, etc – which have been critical with the urban policy. Political opposition has not been strong. Critical citizen groups have only had – on some occasions - the support of minority political parties, such as IU and the Green party (Interview 2).

Figure 8.6 Protests against the urban policy based on mega-projects and events

Source: EFE, 11 February 2012

The critiques have been on the one hand to the short-sightedness of an urban policy which has been called a policy of the spectacle. On the other hand, mega-projects and events have been, according to anti-growth ecologist groups, intimately linked to excessive urban development and, have provoked huge environmental impacts. Therefore, for opposition groups, mega projects, events and iconic architecture have been an excuse for urban growth and unsustainable urbanism. The collective Terra
Critica published critical articles in the local press and published a book compiling them (Diago et al., 2008; Interview 2). There was also an oppositional platform to the F1 competition called Fórmula Verda or one to the America’s Cup called Copa Sostenible (Interview 2). But, it was not a wide oppositional movement. In addition, citizen oppositional groups had little support, money and access to information. Thus, only some minority groups opposed the America’s Cup, while the critiques from the main opposition political party were not to the fact that Valencia would hold the America’s Cup but to the way the organisation of the event was being dealt with.

In the same way, the City of Sciences, having been incepted by the socialist party when in power, could not be directly dismissed by them when in the opposition. Moreover, there was an electoral risk in being completely opposed to such a popular project. Therefore, not surprisingly, the socialist party was never openly contrary to the use of iconic megaprojects since they had started this tendency with the inception of the City of Sciences. As the Regional Minister of Public Administration (1987-89) admits,

> It is effectively the idea of mega projects; that’s why I said earlier that it wasn’t simply another rejectable model; the socialist government itself also initiated it. The trouble is that it was only one more part of the whole at first, whereas after 94, still with the Zaplana administrations, it was conceived as a political ploy […] This is what usually happens in the last governments; the change consists in converting what was simply one facet of a tourism policy into the central thrust of the whole economic policy. (Interview 32)

Or, as very simply put by the Director of the CBRE Valencia and Palma Offices Marín,

> I reckon this strategy has been very similar. The river [referring to the City of Sciences project] was started by the socialist party many years ago and all the conservative party did was to up the stakes. (Interview 1)

Thus, the critiques from the socialist party – the main political opposition party – were directed, again, more than to the strategic relevance of the City of Sciences to the enormous cost overruns. They also focused in the figure of Calatrava.

Moreover, many interviewees, including architects, business groups, developers and real estate agents among others, agreed that the city needs buildings by star architects but disagreed with Calatrava doing everything (Interviews 1, 6, 33, 43 and 55). In the words of real estate agent Marín,

> Maybe the most criticisable aspect is the setting up of Calatrava on a pedestal … and the fact they turned to no one else and the concentration of elements. Now I hear many critical voices wondering whether it was really necessary to build the bridge of the Azud d’Or, a really expensive bridge to span a river that didn’t carry water anywhere and then the construction of the Agora. All these features were the brainchild of Calatrava, of the same architect, with a specific style and all concentrated together. OK, let’s put a series of elements in other parts of the city to bring out its value. In the end, within a 1 km stretch, they pack in so many things
you begin to wonder if they’re really adding anything. The marginal utility of putting in the bridge of Azud d’Or or the Agora is really doubtful and they probably add very little in the end. (Interview 1)

The emphasis on mega events was introduced with the conservative party in office both in the local and regional governments. However, both conservative and socialist parties roughly agreed that events were beneficial for the city. In the specific case of the America’s Cup, all the political parties included in the local assembly –PP, PSOE and EU – agreed in 2004 that the sailing competition was a great opportunity for the city (Velert, 9 may 2004; Interviews 51a and 51b). Therefore, they disagreed in the form rather than in the substance of the policy. That is, about how the strategy is carried out - for instance prioritising short term objectives instead of long term objectives - rather than on the strategy itself (Interviews 24, 32, 40, 51a and 51b). In the words of the Secretary of studies and programs of the socialist party in the city of Valencia,

I reckon that the mega projects have been one of the foremost strategies of the regional and local government because they are in some way elements organising the modern economy; they help to project cities further afield and are probably one of the smartest and most productive city and development options, aren’t they? The trouble arises when their only target is political kudos and there is no attempt to tap into the major assets that might derive from these major events when they are planned properly with participation and anticipation, with a medium- and long-term outlook and strategic approach. This is what was lacking in this case. (Interview 24)

But the consensus was much wider. In fact when it was announced that the sailing competition would be held in Valencia it was received as a great opportunity by different groups; an opportunity to shape the city in different ways, an opportunity to finish the maritime facade of the city, to recuperate the maritime area for citizen and leisure uses, to boost central government investment in infrastructures such as the high speed train, the extension of the airport (new terminal) or the extension of the port, to consolidate the tourist sector and focus on high-end tourists. The residents associations foresaw or hoped that it would also serve to complete Valencia’s neighbourhoods with much needed new schools and medical centres and regenerate the impoverished maritime neighbourhoods (Biot and Velert, 30 November 2003).

Thus, the general agreement about the goodness of the America’s Cup was qualified with references to the need for the competition to be ‘sustainable’ – particularly regarding real estate speculation and environmental impacts to the coast – and references for the need to plan for the redistribution of the benefits and for the aftermath of the competition. In that sense, the debate turned mainly around the infrastructure project for the inner harbour and how to minimise its inevitable environmental impact. As architect Añón puts it, ‘who is not going to agree about bringing in an event of this type? No, but the problem is how it is carried out’ (Interview 36).
After the first America’s Cup competition some divergences among the decision-makers started to appear, particularly between consultants and elected politicians. A policy based on mega events started to seem too weak to generate sustained economic growth. Too much emphasis had been put on the America’s Cup forgetting the wider strategy. Thus, Gil Suay, commissioner for the America’s Cup by the local authority explains,

I was quite clear about this from the start. Before the end of 2007, i.e., before the end of the races, at the end of the Cup, I began to draw up documents for the authorities saying: ‘if there is another Cup we’ll have to negotiate with these people anew so they don’t take the mickey again’, pointing out which things could be exploited, how to tackle the overseas launch to reinforce issues that are really worth reinforcing, which complementary plans we could start to implement. In other words let’s work seriously on some of these things, quite a few things and it was already obvious that the next Cup was not going to be a pushover. But anyway a contract was quickly signed and it seemed to be a case of ‘having been overly pessimistic’ but unfortunately it was not so. So we have lost some precious time and now we’ve hooked up with another big event, Formula One, but in my opinion we can’t afford to pin all our hopes on these big events. Events are fine as a springboard but if you concentrate solely on events, well firstly its very expensive, very people-intensive and each particular event calls for no end of knowledge and expertise, different every time, etc. And from my point of view it’s like a plot of land where they set up the Christmas circus. When the circus has gone off this plot is no longer such and such square, it’s now the place where they set up circuses and it’s forfeited its own personality, it’s lost its rightful individuality. (Interview 33)

In the same way, other economic sectors – the hospitality sector for instance – demanded further integrated planning to make the most of the city marketing benefits achieved due to the sailing competition (Aliaga, 31 January 2009; Interview 52).

In sum, there are two main issues of general consensus, the necessity of growth – in economic and physical terms – and the need to market Valencia, and events and iconic projects are considered an excellent way to do so. But, for some, as previously discussed, events such as the America’s Cup have proved to be too ephemeral to be a sustainable growth strategy and the regional government’s insistence on Calatrava’s architecture excessive. Therefore, the main issues of disagreement have been on how the urban policy has been implemented rather than the policy itself. In this way, durability – an essential characteristic of urban regimes – is pinpointed in Valencia by the fact different individuals and parties did not fundamentally question the programme of activities. Although government participation is considered in the literature (Harding, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Mossberger, 2001) to be one of the causes of less stability of regimes in Europe, it has not been the case in Valencia. Apart from the shared interests, it has been the strong leadership of the government which has provided the glue to keep the regime stable. Global architecture as a symbol of growth and competition has been successfully used by the government, not only within the ruling coalition but also, as discussed in the next section, to gain popular consensus.
8.7 The creation of popular consent

Valencia’s urban policy – despite some issues of divergence - achieved for many years wide popular consensus. Popular agreement is highly relevant for the durability of the urban regime for - in addition to being electorally beneficial to the government in place – a lack of it can lead to strong citizen mobilisation and the disruption of the regime. The reasons of such consensus were mainly of two kinds; economic and ideational. Perception of economic success and social imaginaries were both fabricated and mobilised to recruit consent for the urban policy. Apart from relying on a lack of transparency about the real expenditure and decision-making processes, the press and institutional marketing campaigns played a crucial role in creating consent.

On the one hand, notions of ‘growth for all’ generated consensus based on economic gain. Therefore, the idea that tourism would bring about the creation of wealth created consensus. In fact, the number of tourists visibly increased and that gave people the impression of success. In addition, the real estate model was widely accepted because it coincided with a moment of boom, of growth of the real estate bubble. It generated jobs and ‘easy’ money for ‘all’ (Interviews 7, 24, 28 and 32). Indeed, the expectations that any rural land could be urbanised and generate income for its land owner created social consensus about an economic model based in construction and real estate (see figure 8.7). From this perspective it is easy to understand why local farmers did not oppose to Sociopolis being built. For them urban development is more profitable than agriculture. As the Solicitor of the Irrigation Canal of Favara explains,

No, the farmers put up no opposition. I’ll tell you something, and no doubt you’ll already have heard it elsewhere, what the farmers want is to plant mainstays. You know what I mean by that, don’t you? Market gardening is down on its uppers, the game is up and there had been many buoyant years when the farmers had reaped the best harvests of their lives, right? So there was no opposition because the people . . . no youngsters are going into farming and the producers are in such a bad state that there is no profit in it anymore. (Interview 10)
On the other hand, there is a strong ideational component that contributed to the achievement of consensus for the new urban policy. The ideational not only plays a role in explaining why decision makers favoured a certain urban policy, as discussed in chapter 7, but it is also important to understand how the public was persuaded of the policy’s appropriateness. Valencia’s ‘boosterist’ urban regime strongly relied on populist symbolic politics. First, local pride and nationalist feelings have been cunningly used by politicians (particularly of the conservative government), for instance appealing to Valencian people’s imaginary of discrimination by the Madrid government (used to keep cohesion within the regime too).

For many local commentators, the Valencian idiosyncrasy plays an important role, and the political class has usefully grasped it. It has been argued that the character of the Valencians is little critical, little interested in public money accountability, there is not the awareness that public money comes from tax-payers’ purses (Cucó, 2007; Interviews 4, 17, 24, 28, 30 and 55). It also tends to an exaggerated local pride (Interviews 16 and 30) and to spend money in the ephemeral (Interviews 17, 30 and 40). However relevant the existence of a specific ‘Valencian character’, the social psychology of the self-esteem has certainly been played to the advantage of the urban policy. Mega-projects are certainly something to show off to visitors and to be proud of (Interviews 14, 38 and 55). Thus, a type of discourse that is directed to the emotional intelligence and not to the rational one has been predominant in Valencia (Interviews 2, 4 and 30). For Gaja (Interview 2) only in this way the following question can be answered:
Why does a society beset by so many dearths, such grave lacks of school and healthcare equipment of all type look on so happily as public money is squandered on useless, short-lived feasts and festivals? (Interview 2)

It has been described as bread and circuses. This emotional response of the people has been very well used by the political party in power with outstanding electoral success.

The other emotional component which was added to the discourse is the appeal to feelings of belonging and identity, of which spectacular architecture can be a representation (Vale, 1999). Those who criticised the model were called bad Valencians (Interviews 14 and 38). As Quilley (1999:191) has discussed for the case of Manchester, the assumption is that ‘to compete successfully requires the subordination of divisive class-based loyalties in the interests of the local ‘team effort’. For journalist Beltrán (Interview 38), in Valencia, this type of discourse has become central to local politics, the entirety of the political discourse is around the sublimation of mega-projects and events such as the City of Sciences, the America’s Cup or the F1.

Architecture, or more exactly architecture by prestigious architects, is also a way of legitimising certain operations (Gaja, 2007). Calatrava is the most paradigmatic instance of this. As already discussed, his prestige as a star architect is uncontested. In Valencia Litoral, not only was Jean Nouvel a central element of the legitimisation but the project was also backed-up by a long list of star architects of high media impact - Richard Rogers, Frank O. Gehry, Renzo Piano, Ben Van Berkel, Norman Foster and Peter Cook among others – who went to Valencia and who recorded videos praising the project (Interview 20). At a smaller scale, Sociopolis is, in great measure, valorised on the grounds of its architectural quality (Interviews 9, 15, 16 and 22). Gavaldá (Interview 15) goes as far as to say that star architects serve as an alibi. In Sociopolis, apart from the participation of prestigious architects there is the added value of it being presented as a project of social interest – because it is mainly protected housing. Alberto Sanchís, Head of the Professional Support Service of the Regional Ministry of Territory and Housing (Interview 50), explains it:

Because at that moment, back in 2003 the real estate bubble was swelling and state-subsidised housing was not being built. There was some awareness of a problem with affordable housing, of a lack of affordable housing. Then Sociopolis makes with practically 100% of state subsidised housing, okey?, affordable housing, since about 2,900 or so I believe are subsidised and it is put forward as an operation of state-subsidised and affordable housing at a moment when there was no subsidised housing in the city of Valencia or in surrounding municipalities. So that’s what it’s all about; it’s a showcase deal to generate a wide range of subsidised housing at a time when there wasn’t any, right? So it was a question of selling the story not only in terms of social housing because more or less international teams were also chosen, people from the world of architecture with some profile. So let’s say it was an attractive project; it was a question of selling a project with these components: social housing, quality projects, public intervention. (Interview 50)
Global architects not only provide ‘certified’ expertise but also glamour. In the same way, Calatrava’s opera palace was presented as a cultural amenity (which made it difficult to contest) but also provided the newspapers with a long list of high cult musical celebrities to present to the Valencian public. This sort of populism - which in Valencia is taken for granted - can be applied to the America’s Cup too (Interviews 34 and 62). It translates as: Who is going to be against a beautiful and glamorous competition such as the America’s Cup?

The main instruments to gain consensus for a policy based in mega projects and events have been the local television and the written press. Intellectuals and commentators complain that generally the press is not critical, and its role has been ‘to applaud and join the general consensus’ (Interview 2). El País journalist Adolf Beltran explains the role of the press very clearly:

In this city there is a certain tendency to present a project to the press and it’s sure to hit the headlines next day. Look through past newspapers and you’ll see a host of examples of front-page projects and mock-ups which then disappeared into oblivion, you know? You thrust a mock-up before them and . . . bwah!, the tallest skyscraper in Christ knows where, now one more building is to be put up... There is a more grotesque example involving some promoters who had presented twice a mid-ocean island, making quite a splash in the Valencia press; they were going to make a great big artificial island out there and, well, it was utter madness because this is not the United Arab Emirates or Dubai or Kuwait or any of those places. And the latest is a cable car from Bioparc to the port, presented by the same promoters, which also hit the headlines and then fell into oblivion. This is just playing with people. They’re playing on the populist gullibility of ‘great! We’re going to have the biggest...’ Words like ‘bigger,’ always play a very obfuscating role in these types of things, in my opinion. As I say a part of the press are fairly critical, we’ve often criticised this situation, maybe as a reaction to so much vacuous euphoria and grandiloquent words, and another part has been an enthusiastic propagandist of the matter, you know? It’s always difficult to strike the right balance, you know? And the grandiloquence tends to drown out any possible debate of the rational elements like what is good and bad about the project, above all because it’s fissureless; it leaves no space or gaps for any sensible discussion. ‘Either you’re with me or against me; either you’re in favour of Valencia becoming something important or you’re a traitor to this idea’. (Interview 38)

Anyway, the written press does not have as much widespread diffusion or impact as the public regional television (Canal 9), which has been the main formulator of the public opinion (Interviews 4, 32, and 55). It is controlled by the regional government and it has been instrumental in the conservative party’s consecutive re-elections as well as the consolidation of social support for their urban policies (Piqueras et al., 2011). Furthermore, it is important to remember that, on the other hand independent information and democratic control have been made very difficult by the lack of transparency that characterised the whole process (see chapter 6).
Figure 8.8 Photomontage of Sociopolis

Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com)

Figure 8.9 Photomontage of Sociopolis

Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com)

Thus, the local written press has presented the mega projects to the Valencian public in a positive and praising tone. Analysing the press coverage, Sociopolis is presented as innovative, sustainable, socially mixed, a project of exceptional importance, etc. See photomontages of Sociopolis published in the press in figures 8.8 and 8.9. As a Member of the grassroots group ‘Per l’Horta’ complains:

The problem is that the bottleneck is very wide for them and very narrow for us, and we don’t believe in the media. Out of every five press releases you send in, one might be published from time to time. It’s different for them; they send out photos taken by an architects’ studio and say: this is going to be Hollywood. (Interview 15)

The City of Sciences – despite the losses and cost overruns being published – has been described by the written press using words such as spectacular, ambitious, the leader, magnificent, or, the biggest cultural, educative and leisure complex in Spain and one of the biggest in the world. Everything is superlative: biggest, best, tallest... Figure 8.10, for example, shows a diagram of the first project for the City of Sciences where the telecommunications tower is described as the third biggest in the world. Also the figures of visitors have been periodically published, giving the public the impression of great success (despite the fact that the figures of the economic loss are also impressive).

In relation to the holding of the America’s Cup in Valencia, from the beginning, the local press stressed how beneficial for the economy it would be. Since the selection of the city in 2003 until the celebration of the competition in 2007, numerous press articles emphasised how important, economically beneficial, powerful in terms of marketing and boosting tourism the sailing competition would be or was being. In them it is possible to sense a feel of local pride. Different economic impact reports, importantly that commissioned to the IVIE by the regional government, were disseminated through the press.

Figure 8.10 Diagram of communications tower

Source: El País, 31 January 1995

Regarding the urban transformation, as ex-candidate to the Presidency of the Regional Government of Valencia Taberner (Interview 4) puts it, there was not any citizen debate about the America’s Cup
because the press immediately showed artist’s impressions of how beautiful the harbour area would be after the development and, the public was impressed. In his own words,

There’s been no opposition; there was some debate about this, focusing more I believe on the specialist sectors and the political sectors of the city council itself, but no social debate. Why? Because next day’s papers print pictures of the future development of that whole area and the reaction is: ‘how lovely! I like that!’ They show you the other project whatever and you go: ‘how lovely! I like that!’ (Interview 4)

On the other hand, the economic impact reports of both the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup elaborated by the IVIE have been used by the regional government to justify them, and to justify almost anything.

Apart from the use of the press, different kinds of marketing campaigns have also been important. For instance, in the case of Sociopolis, the first theoretical project was exhibited in the Valencia Bienal, Sao Paulo Bienal and Architektur Zentrum of Vienna. Guallart gave talks about it internationally. The Sociopolis exhibition in the Valencia bienal had 7,523 visitors (Bono, 15 October 2003) and cost - according to the regional minister of culture – 606,601 Euros (Bono, 4 March 2004). In addition, regional minister Blasco organised an international landscape conference where Sociopolis was presented and the IVAM held an exhibition about Guallart’s architectural work. However, marketing, information and reality rarely seem to coincide. Whether Sociopolis will be what it has been hailed to be – a super-modern, green and intellectual project (Interview 17) - is still to be seen.

In the case of Sociopolis the marketing strategy was more limited than that of the City of Sciences and America’s Cup. Not only were the City of Sciences project, and Calatrava’s body of work exhibited in local museums and presented to the public but there was a marketing campaign to promote the complex abroad. The City of Sciences was presented in National and international tourism fairs (World Travel Market, Fitur), and other events as a key tourist asset of the Valencian Community.

Even regional president Camps participated actively in the promotion of Valencia’s mega-projects and events. He travelled to the United States several times to present the America’s Cup, the City of Sciences and other mega-projects as part of the international promotion of the Valencian Community.

Also the America’s Cup had an institutional marketing campaign to mobilise social support for the competition. As the Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup explains;

The selling of the sports element was basically in the hands of ACM but we want not only America’s Cup to be sold but also Valencia. And anyway setting up our own complementary campaign and mobilising the city ran the risk of a counterproductive reaction, a very good turnout, and that’s what we had been working on for those two years. (Interview 33)

Thus, both the economic expectations and ideational components were mobilised by the press and marketing campaigns to achieve popular consensus.
8.8 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how different local and global actors have been involved in the formulation and enactment of Valencia’s urban policy. Certainly, the interests of many groups – politicians, global architects, construction companies, business lobbies, etc. - converge in the development of mega-projects and events. In Valencia, coalitions of interest have formed and pursued specific policy outcomes. To build the capacity to govern, local and regional governments have built alliances with the elite, which on their part needed the government’s legitimacy and economic and organisational capacity. As a result, a durable ‘boosterist’ urban regime has emerged. Thus, the public sector decisions have been in favour of private interests, as was to be expected given their participation in the governing coalition. However, it is the government which has put in place and guided the formation of coalitions, as it often is in the European case. Global actors – such as architects and the owners of mega-events - and their interests have also intervened and influenced Valencia’s urban policy. The involvement of global actors has generally come about through the mediation of local actors and their interests have been transferred to the local scale through a process of translation.

Although the emphasis on mega-projects and events has been pervasive in Valencia over time, it is perceived to respond more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy as shown by the lack of holistic spatial planning and the lack of integrated long term economic planning. The consistency of the urban policy is due to the stability in the composition of the regime and to the leadership of the local and regional governments, guided in their actions by a marked hegemonic project of constructing a strong regional space within Spain.

Valencia’s urban policy, despite some issues of disagreement, has enjoyed wide political consensus within the main political parties and influential local economic groups. Opposition to the urban policy has come from a limited number of very specific groups – local architects and planners, intellectuals, ecologists, etc – and has not generated a wide impact on the population. On the contrary, as shown by the electoral results, the general public has been in favour of the urban policy. The reasons for the wide popular consensus achieved by Valencia’s urban policy have been mainly of two kinds; economic and ideational. On the one hand, there was a perception of economic success brought about by the growth in tourism and the real estate bubble. On the other hand, the use of the emotional response of people mobilised by the official discourse and focused on local pride, identity issues and the need for self-esteem, have been crucial to understand popular support to the urban policy.
9. CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Introduction

This research has examined the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as the key strategy for addressing urban economic and social decline. More specifically, the object of the research has been the urban policy that, in the last decades, has put emphasis on urban regeneration based on urban renewal, particularly through the use of mega projects by global star architects and events.

The study was set out to examine the different economic, political, social and cultural factors that have led to the use of such regeneration strategy, to understand the actual processes and actors involved in it and the implications for the built environment and for planning practices.

The specific research questions of the study were three. First, the research has sought to find out the implications of the urban policy for planning practices and for the shaping of the city’s physical form. Second, it has sought to conceptualise and identify the causes of the formulation of an urban policy that uses flagship projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration. Third, it has aimed to identify and analyse economic and political actors and processes at different scales and, their interplay involved in the formulation and enactment of the urban policy.

9.2 The empirical findings

The empirical findings discussed in chapters five, six, seven and eight have helped find answers to the research questions. First, they have shed light on what the implications of an urban policy based on mega-projects and events have been. The outcomes of the urban policy are physical, in terms of image, social, economic and in terms of governance.

Certainly, as discussed in chapter 6, Valencia’s spectacular physical transformation has confirmed Hall’s (1989) statement that place marketing actually shapes cities in the sense that it guides their development in order to achieve a desired environment. In our case, this physical transformation has produced a new Valencia with an improved image which has attracted international media attention, improved the population’s self-esteem, attracted tourism, and been electorally valuable for the party in office.

However, the benefits in terms of image do not correspond with the social and economic reality, corroborating existing research (Barnekov, Boyle and Roch, 1988; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Holcomb, 1993; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). Not only have mega projects and events and their incurred cost overruns left the local and regional administrations highly indebted but the alleged generation of wealth for the ‘society as a whole’ has not been materialised either. A regional economy based on tourism and construction - promoted by the urban policy - has generated a regional labour market where precarious jobs and salaries below the national average dominate. Moreover, a focus on regeneration based on mega-projects and events has drained funds off social services - health,
education and social protection - in a turn from welfarism to entrepreneurialism. As a result, and despite the years of economic expansion before the onset of the crisis in 2008, an improvement in equality has not taken place, as previous research on the topic in other localities also suggested (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Agnew, 2000; Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1998). Meanwhile, the construction and real estate sectors have reaped the bulk of the economic benefits in a clear transfer of public money to private hands.

But, an urban policy based on mega-projects and events has proved to be a clear conduit of profound governance changes. Not only are projects such as the City of Sciences considered big and important enough to justify legislative changes (see chapter 6) but they are also used as models and laboratories of urban management and development. A paradigmatic case of the last is the use of the Integrated Development Plan of avenida Francia – linked to the City of Sciences – as a pilot for the development of the Valencian Urbanism Act (see chapter 5).

The mechanisms used to implement megaprojects and events have played an important role in a process leading towards more authoritative and privatised decision-making. Also, in the advancement of ‘hollowing out’ of the state processes as described by Jessop (1997a: 18 in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).

On the one hand, with the justification of efficiency, the speeding-up of procedures and the social interest of the projects, exceptionality measures were applied for the majority of mega projects and events. On the other hand, decision-making and democratic control was taken out of the citizens’ hands as management was transferred to public corporations and foundations, which, in addition, have been used to increase the level of indebtedness of the regional government over the legal limits and provided positions for the clientele network of the local and regional governments. Both exceptionality measures and privatisation of management - through the creation of semi-public foundations and public corporations - have resulted in a lack of transparency and a lack of democratic control which, many times have derived in corruption.

Last but not least, financial difficulties brought about by the typical cost overruns of mega-projects have contributed to the public acceptance of privatisation processes.

Second, the empirical findings further the understanding of the reasons why an urban policy based on mega-projects and events has been formulated.

The interests of different groups – mainly construction companies and developers, elected politicians and star architects - meet in the development of mega-projects and events. Thus, linked to the construction of mega-projects, the economic sectors in expansion have been the construction, development and real estate sectors. For star architects, iconic projects provide the opportunity to increase their business volume and raise their professional profile. Elected politicians, beyond more general political and strategic objectives, see mega-projects and events as a source of personal glory, political promotion and electoral success.
However and although the interests of several groups converge in Valencia’s urban policy, all the mega-projects and events have been paid for with public money. The private sector has been benefited but needed the state’s support too. The state has the funding, institutional and the organisational capacity, but also the necessary legitimacy.

The central government –both when in socialist or conservative hands - supported the celebration of mega-events in different Spanish cities but for the Valencian regional government the urban mega projects and the hosting of events became the core of their policy. In Valencia, both local and regional governments focused their political project on the emphasis on mega-projects and events.

Since the onset of the autonomy in 1982, the Valencian regional government has been the state tier which has invested more substantially in Valencia’s urban mega-projects. The council has always played an important political role but it is the regional government who has paid for important projects such as the City of Sciences, not least because of its bigger economic capacity. In Valencia’s case, the regional and local governments can be considered to have been the main generators of strategy.

Nevertheless, the central government’s supporting and facilitating role has been crucial since important investment for the regions, such as transport infrastructure, remain centralised and mega-projects and events are seen as a way of competing for central government funds leverage. Therefore, despite the rhetoric of global competitiveness, Spain is still an important framework of competition for government funds and economic and geopolitical influence at national level, but also for prestige.

From a strategic point of view, the construction of the Valencian regional state and its political and institutional implications are crucial to understand why an urban policy based on mega-projects and events, focused in the city of Valencia, came into being.

The creation of a new government meant converting Valencia from a provincial capital to the worthy capital of the new regional state. In addition, it involved the creation of the necessary institutions and of a corps of bureaucrats to manage the newly acquired competencies. The establishment of such an important state apparatus implied the need for legitimation through the visible products of the so-called self-government. Certainly, mega-projects can be considered the expression of a new power, the regional government.

From an economic point of view, the accumulation strategy favoured by the different Valencian regional governments to counteract de-industrialisation was based on tourism and construction. Those economic sectors were selected to the detriment of other sectors such as the existing traditional industry or agriculture. Particularly, the regional government’s support of the Valencian companies to create a strong regional construction sector was an important component of the creation of a new regional estate.
For the Valencian regional presidents, mega-projects and events matched well with the construction of a strong regional space not only economically but also institutionally and symbolically. The construction of the Valencian regional state was also in terms of identity and even semiotic.

The ideational component has been a crucial aspect to understand the consistency of Valencia’s urban policy. On the one hand decision-makers have taken advantage of the population’s need for self-esteem, wish for modernisation and glamour. On the other hand, they – as part of the same society – have had the same aspirations themselves. The search for self-esteem and local pride translated into an aspiration to be part of the first tier of cities when global ideas of competitiveness penetrated the Valencian imaginary of both decision-makers and population. Thus, at the same time, an official discourse about Valencia’s urban policy which included all the ideational components in the social imaginaries - modernisation, self-esteem, local pride, glamour, “Valencianess”, etc. - was being constructed.

Third, the empirical findings offer an analysis of the processes at different scales and how different local and global actors have been involved in the formulation and enactment of the urban policy based on mega-projects and events.

Valencia’s urban policy, despite some issues of disagreement has enjoyed wide political consensus within the main political parties and influential local economic groups. The main issues which generated general consensus were twofold; the necessity of growth – in economic and physical terms – and the need to market Valencia through the use of mega-events and iconic architecture. The disagreements have focused on how the urban policy has been carried out - for instance prioritising short term objectives instead of long term objectives - rather than on the policy itself. Thus, for some, events such as the America’s Cup have proved to be too ephemeral to be a sustainable growth strategy and the regional government’s insistence on Calatrava’s architecture excessive. However, the disagreements have generally been of form rather than of substance.

Opposition to the urban policy has come from a limited number of very specific groups - architects and planners, intellectuals, ecologists, etc – and has not generated a wide impact on the population. On the contrary, as shown by the electoral results, the general public has been in favour of the urban policy.

The reasons for the wide popular consensus achieved by Valencia’s urban policy have been mainly of two kinds; economic and ideational. On the one hand, there was a perception of economic success brought about by the growth in tourism and the real estate bubble. On the other hand, the use of the emotional response of the people mobilised by the official discourse and focused on local pride, identity issues and the need for self-esteem, have been crucial to understand popular support to the urban policy. It could be aptly summarised as ‘bread and circuses’. The instruments used to crystallise consensus have been the local media, different kinds of marketing campaigns and last but not least the prestige of star architects.
Although the emphasis on mega-projects and events has been consistent in Valencia over time, it is perceived to respond more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy as shown by the lack of holistic spatial planning and the lack of integrated long term economic planning. Furthermore, not any serious studies of cost opportunity of the investments in mega-projects and events have been elaborated to guide decision-making.

Certainly, despite the lack of a deliberate planned strategy, the interests of many groups – politicians, global architects, construction companies, business lobbies, etc. - converge in the development of mega-projects and events. Coalitions of interest have formed and pursued specific policy outcomes. To build the capacity to govern, local and regional governments have built alliances with the elite, which on their part needed the government’s legitimacy and economic and organisational capacity. Thus, clearly, the public sector’s decisions have been in favour of private interests, as was to be expected given their participation in the governing coalition. However, it is the government which has put in place and guided the formation of coalitions, as it often is in the European case (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).

Despite the convergence of interests, they do not coincide exactly, and emphasis is placed in different aspects, leaving space for negotiation and urban politics. For instance the America’s Cup brought to light a conflict between two different accumulation strategies – one based on production and the other on consumption – when the valorisation of capital was expected to take place in the same space, the harbour area. The prioritisation of one strategy over the other presented no little dilemma to the local and regional tiers of government.

In addition, the case of the America’s Cup shows very clearly how global actors – such as star architects and the owners of events like the F1 and the America’s Cup – and their interests, intervene and effect urban policies. However, the empirical research has demonstrated that the involvement of global actors has generally come about through the mediation of local actors. Moreover, global actors’ interests have been transferred to the local scale through a process of translation.

In the case of architects, global architects often need the collaboration of local architects who know the workings of the local construction industry and building legislation, while local architects call foreign star architects to achieve more credibility in front of the administrations.

The owners of mega-events are seen by decision-makers as representing an opportunity for the city while the former need their interests to be translated to the local scale. Thus, although local business groups complained about the intromission in local politics of the owners of mega-events – certainly defending their own economic interests - the local authorities yielded to the pressures of the owners of the events and tried to transform the city to adapt it to their specific needs.
9.3 Theoretical implications

This research has adopted a theoretical framework which combines different theories and concepts, such as, on the one hand the strategic-relational approach, cultural political economy and the literature on the politics of scale - with the aim to consider globalisation and its scalar and spatial effects - and, on the other hand, urban regime theory combined with notions of translation of interests between geographical scales in order to consider globalisation and overcome localism.

The use of such framework to the Valencia case study has had several implications regarding theory. First, it has entailed the application of the strategic relational approach to the regional level. In the analysis of why an urban policy based on mega-projects and events has been instituted in Valencia, the relevance of the construction of a new regional state after the onset of the autonomy in post-francoist Spain has come to the fore.

Certainly, Valencia’s mega-projects can be considered the expression of a new power but also signify the city’s newly acquired status of regional capital city and the need of the Valencian people for reinforcing their identity and recovering their self-esteem, as well as their wish for modernisation. For Valencian regional presidents, mega-projects and events have matched well with the construction of a strong regional space not only economically but also institutionally and symbolically. The construction of the Valencian regional state can be considered in itself a hegemonic project which gave direction to the activities of the regional government. The accumulation strategy favoured by the different Valencian regional governments, when the economy was affected by de-industrialisation, was based on tourism and construction. Mayoral politics have played an important role in the implementation of the urban policy, if not from a financial, from a discursive point of view, since the importance of Valencia as capital city was enhanced by the creation of a new regional state.

But, the analysis would not be complete without considering processes of globalisation (and localisation). The literature on the politics of scale has proved useful to overcome the relational strategic approach’s insensitivity to space. In Valencia, the regional and local governments can be considered to have been the main generators of strategy but, the central government’s supporting and facilitating role has been crucial. In this scenario mega projects have become also a way of competing for central government funds leverage, and - interpreted in geopolitical key - an opportunity for Valencia to consolidate its position and political and economic weight in Spain. This is also an element of the political project of creating a strong region. All in all, despite the rhetoric of global competitiveness, Spain is still an important framework of competition.

Thus, as the central state has 'glocalised’, through – among other processes - restructuring downwards to the regional and urban scale, it has also privileged competitive strategies – such as inter-city competition for mega events – which are more compatible with those scales. This can be interpreted – resorting to the concept of spatial selectivity – as a shift of political emphasis to individual cities’ capacity to successfully compete and promote themselves. Other observed processes of glocalisation
in the Valencia case have included the hollowing out of the state apparatus – particularly at local and regional levels - through the creation of public enterprises privatised management.

In short, by allowing us to look through the lens of specific political projects - pursued by national or regional governments - that privilege certain social groups, spatial fixes and policy paradigms, including urban policy paradigms, the strategic-relational approach combined with the insights provided by the analysis of the politics of scale has shown its ability to be a powerful structural framework to understand urban governance from a perspective that adequately situates the state in a globalising era. However, this approach has empirical limitations as it tends to downplay the importance of political process, particularly how to build the capacity to govern effectively. On the other hand, it can neglect empirical investigation on how the relationship between hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies is articulated by hegemonic groups. In order to overcome such limitations and to avoid reading local change off from global change, this research has shown how the strategic relational approach can be combined with urban regime theory.

Both theoretical approaches are philosophically and methodologically compatible. Although they place emphasis on different aspects, both of them recognise the importance of structure and agency, and take into consideration the role of the state. While the strategic-relational approach emphasises the importance of the state as site of strategy and mediator between different interests, urban regime theory – when it has been applied in Europe – has shown that in many cases the local authorities take up the role of coordinating the regimes. Thus, by combining both approaches it is possible to build on the empirical strengths of regime theory while providing a firmer theoretical grounding.

In Valencia, to build the capacity to govern, local and regional governments have built alliances with the elite, which on their part needed the government’s legitimacy and economic and organisational capacity. As a result, a durable “boosterist” urban regime has emerged. Thus, the public sector’s decisions have been in favour of private interests, as was to be expected given their participation in the governing coalition. However, it is the government which has put in place and guided the formation of coalitions, as it often is in the European case. In conflicts such as that regarding the uses and specialization of the port, the role of the state – in its different tiers - as mediator between different groups of interest through a process of structural selectivity has been highlighted. Although the regional government prioritised the America’s Cup over the port’s interests, in the end, the durability of the regime was not compromised. The regional government in its role of mediator was able to distribute rewards – such as in this case support to the northern extension of the port – and ensure the cohesion of the governing coalition. In this way the durability of the regime was preserved and with it the government’s capacity to govern.

Therefore, from a conceptual viewpoint, leadership provides a link between both approaches. In Valencia’s case, it is clearly local and regional governors who provide leadership. Empirically, the pervasive emphasis on mega-projects and events in Valencia over time, it is perceived to respond more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy, as shown by the lack of holistic spatial planning and the lack of integrated long term economic planning. Resorting to theory, the consistency of the urban policy can be explained by the stability in the composition of the
regime and to the leadership of the local and regional governments, guided in their actions by a marked hegemonic project of constructing a strong regional space, and capital city, within Spain.

Furthermore, the Valencia case study has also shown to what degree the ideational – semiosis and discourse - is intimately related to the construction of hegemonic projects but, also, to urban regime formation. Discourse and the strategic use of symbols, language and symbolic rewards, can motivate participation in regimes and help to build ‘a common sense of purpose’ or contribute – alongside the material – to the achievement of consensus around a program of action, resulting in the generation of a hegemonic project. In fact, in Valencia’s case the construction of the discourse was a parallel process to the construction of the regional state, evidencing the importance of both materiality and the dialectic of discursivity in the production of hegemony.

The ideational can be key to keeping the cohesion of an urban regime, and avoiding popular contestation, which could disrupt it. Therefore, it is another link between the strategic relational approach and urban regime theory. Both of them, the first – through cultural political economy – and the second – particularly in the case of symbolic regimes – emphasise the significance of semiosis and discourse. In Valencia, politicians, besides providing leadership, have provided vision. Therefore, apart from the shared interests, it has been the strong leadership of the government which has provided the glue to keep the regime stable. Global architecture as a symbol of growth and competition was successfully used by the local and regional governments, not only within the ruling coalition but also to gain popular consensus. Global architects’ role in providing the symbols of the politician’s vision was crucial.

Finally, the use of cultural political economy in the consideration of semiosis has helped avoid the risk of reading off policy outcomes directly to the different interests of the participants in the urban regime – apart from through the use of the concept of hegemonic project – by considering both the conditions of action which go unacknowledged by actors and the struggles to transform those conditions of action.

9.4 Future areas of research

This research is an in-depth study of urban politics in Valencia and, therefore it has provided detailed insights into the causes, processes and actors involved in the institution of an urban policy based on mega-projects and events. The case of Valencia covers generalisable theoretical issues in the study of urban politics - such as the role of the estate at different levels, the role of political projects and accumulation strategies and the importance of global and local actors. However, to further the understanding of such questions it would be useful to apply the used theoretical framework to other contexts, such as other cities in Spain where many of the processes are similar but where social, political and economic differences can be found, or in other countries, particularly in Europe.

As made evident in the case of Valencia – which is a paradigmatic case in Spain - but is also suggested in other Spanish regions - for instance by the emphasis in global architecture - the onset of the new regional governments – each of them with individual political projects and, competing for
central government investment – is crucial to understand Spanish urban politics. The trend towards regionalisation is wide-spread in Europe and therefore its influence in urban politics – not only in Spain - would deserve further attention. Analytically, the theoretical framework used in this research could offer a useful tool.

On the other hand, this research has highlighted the importance of the ideational - semiosis and discourse - in the creation of a hegemonic project, the cohesion of urban regimes and, the generation of popular consent. It would be interesting to compare in that regard Valencia with cities of other cultural contexts with different idiosyncrasies, or cities of different tiers, where the ‘politics of self-esteem’ could have a different character.

In Valencia the urban policy based on mega-projects and events became practically the only policy, but in a first tier city, for instance, the conditions would be different. As commented by one of the interviewees, many cities use global architecture to be ‘on the map’ but there are world cities such as ‘Paris, Barcelona, New York and Chicago’ which have a lot of accumulated heritage whereas Valencia, to become a world city, will need to invest very heavily (Interview 26). Also the balance of power between local governors and global actors such as global architects or owners of mega events are likely to be different in other kind of cities. For instance, Calatrava in Valencia is a local-global actor, but, what differences would we find if we studied Calatrava working abroad instead of at home?

Valencia’s empirical research is strong on the interests of different types of actors. However, more research on the motives of global actors such as the owners of mega-events or architects would be useful, not only to understand better their interests but also to study more in-depth processes of mediation and translation of interests, which have appeared as an important theme in the present research. Particularly, further research on mediation within the architectural world would offer a way into the relationship between processes of localisation and globalisation and their influence in urbanisation. This would also provide insights into how ideas travel.

Regarding the travelling of ideas, some questions arise. Are global architects travelling elsewhere - for instance newly developing countries - and the urban policy which puts emphasis on global architecture and events experimented there instead of in crisis-ridden Europe? Examples such as Olympic Rio or the race among Asian cities to build the highest skyscraper in the world come to mind. Therefore, is the urban policy based on mega-projects still in full force or are we seeing the decline of it?

Global architects seem to be taking on board the new economic situation and changing strategy. Their discourse is now more focused on austerity and ecology. In this sense, Sociopolis has provided an example of a different kind of architectural icon which claims to be sustainable. It remains to be seen whether this is only an adaptation to the new situation with the aim of maintaining the status quo.

The last developments in Valencia – with a bankrupt regional government and cuts in public services - have shown a change in the reaction of the population to the urban policy, which has been put in the
limelight by the press and social movements as the visible cause of the region’s economic problems. Indeed, it was an urban policy of times of growth but, what will the evolution be in a different economic climate? One of the first measures Fabra – the new regional president after Camps resigned in 2011 - took was to dismantle many of the regional public corporations.

Moreover, in the last months, the disastrous results of Valencia’s urban policy have drawn huge attention from the international press. Thus, a negative example in contrast to successful models such as “the Barcelona model” or the “Guggenheim effect” is being constructed, although it is still early to analyse the effect it will have in other places.

In short, the study of a similar phenomenon in different contexts - political, cultural or in terms of structural position of the city – and different economic times, would advance the understanding of the actors and processes involved in it – such as state restructuring, travelling of ideas, introduction of new technologies of power and so on - from an empirical viewpoint. It would also test the usefulness of the application of the conceptual framework and would contribute to its further development.

9.5 Conclusion

Although emblematic projects are expected to generate economic activity and employment, this research has shown that – given their very limited effectiveness for economic and social regeneration and their inequality in the distribution of benefits – the main reasons for the implementation of these projects are related to the economic, political and professional interests of different groups and, to ideational reasons, such as the ‘politics of self-esteem’. The case of Valencia has particularly shown the importance of the creation of a new regional state from an institutional, political, economic and identity viewpoints.

It has also highlighted the crucial role in the implementation of the urban policy played by a “boosterist” urban regime brought together and kept in place by the local and regional governments. Also, the involvement of local and global actors and the relationship between them, particularly in processes of mediation and translation of interests.

Finally, it has provided evidence of how mega projects and events have become a conduit of state restructuring and neoliberal globalisation by fostering privatisation of assets and decision making and a lack of transparency and democratic control.
APPENDIX A. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

General questions about Valencia’s urban policy:

Why has there been so much emphasis on prestige mega projects in Valencia? Is it part of a general strategy/urban policy? What are the objectives?

What has been the prevalence of the strategy/urban policy over time? Have there been any differences? Why? Depending on the political party in office?

Has the strategy/urban policy been inspired by other experiences? Has it been justified on the grounds of the success or failure of previous experiences here or elsewhere?

What kind of support (political and civic) has the strategy/urban policy had?

Has there been any opposition? From which groups?

Questions specific to a project:

1. Initiative and objectives (why)

Who initiates the project? Why?

a. Inspired from other experiences? Are they justified on the grounds of the success or failure of previous experiences? Have they learnt from previous experiences in Valencia or in other places?

Is the project part of a wider strategy? What strategy?

a. Is it part of a political project of construction of Valencian identity?

b. Is it part of an internasionalisation strategy? How?

c. Competition in tourism? Why?

d. Relationship of the project with the strategic plan

e. Other components of the strategy.

Prevalence of strategy over time? Have there been differences? In what sense? Why?

Differences depending on the political party in power

What are the specific objectives of the project?

a. Have the objectives been aided by other measures?

Have the objectives changed over time?

a. Have there been differences depending on the political party in power?

Who supports the project

a. State support to the projects? Why or why not? What kind of support?
b. Have there been differences depending on the political party in power? Why or why not?

c. Collaboration local/regional governments: how has it been over time?

d. What has been the response of civic/residents groups?

Opposition to the project.

a. groups in the city against and for development

b. Opposition groups? Who they represent, composition?

c. What was done to overcome opposition? How was it handled? What were the positions taken by the different levels of government?

d. Other proposed alternatives

e. Reasons for the opposition. Issues of disagreement

2. Economic feasibility (why-how)

Selection of the site.

a. How and why was that site selected?

b. Land ownership?

c. Was there anything there?

d. Was there opposition? Why?

Finance

a. Where does the capital come from? How much capital?

b. What is the proportion of the general public budget invested in the project? Has it changed over time?

Who carries financial risk?

a. Financial risks for the state?

Who benefits economically from the projects? Public sector? Private sector?

a. Increase in value of the adjacent land and buildings? Was it an objective (for instance to secure the viability of the project)? Who reaps the benefits?

b. Does it open up new land and opportunities for development? Relationship with real estate market.

3. Delivery (institutional and planning) (how)

What institutions and levels of government have participated in the project. Relationship and interdependence
Institutional arrangements.

a. Have new bodies and partnerships been created? When? By who?

b. With what objectives? Why have these bodies been created? More efficient delivery?


d. Have there been changes in them?

e. What are the competencies of these bodies? What power do these bodies have? consultory?

f. Who are those bodies accountable to?

g. How are decisions made?

Relationship of the project with the strategic plan and relationship with the general plan.

a. Have exceptionality measures for the design and implementation of the project been taken?

- Who are the planners? Public officials?
- Has there been public participation in the project? How?

4. Design (Architecture and urban design) (how)

Procedure to select architect.

a. Public competition? What kind of competition? What were the requirements to participate?

b. Who was the jury?

c. Why was this project selected? Style? Symbolic capital of the architect and/or the building?

d. Importance of networking?

Interests of the actors

a. Incentives to participate. Why was it interesting to participate in this project from the point of view of the architect?

Models used for the design

Design, symbolism and identity from the point of view of production

a. Were there requirements for the design?

b. Design mechanisms
c. Were identity issues taken into consideration for the design? How is the project different because it is in Valencia?

d. How is the project physically integrated with the urban fabric?

Has the experience here been useful for subsequent projects? How?

Relationship with the delivery bodies

a. Who is the client? Who are they accountable to?

b. Decision-making to solve the problems

5. Development (Implementation) (how-what)

Procedure for the selection of development companies

a. Public competition? Requirements

b. Importance of networking

Interests of actors

a. Incentives to participate. Why was it interesting to participate in this project from the point of view of the developer?

b. Economic returns?

c. Have these projects opened up opportunities for more work?

Relationship with the delivery bodies

a. Who is the client? Who are they accountable to?

b. Decision-making to solve the problems

6. Communication and marketing (how)

Public information during the different phases of design and development.

a. What information does the public get? Has the information about the real financial costs of the project been made available to the public?

b. Has there been a democratic debate about costs and benefits? What has the role of the press been?

How has the project been marketed?

a. Objectives of the marketing

b. Audience to which it is directed

What has been the reception of the project

a. By the local population in general
b. Internationally

c. By the specialised public

7. Evaluation (what)

Have the objectives been met?

What are the benefits of the project?

a. for Valencia in general

b. for the residents of the area

Is the general public satisfied with the project? Is there any kind of opposition?

Are there any negative sides to it? Impacts? Things that could have been done better?

Have new opportunities for Valencia been opened up as a result of the project?

Have new opportunities for development in the area been opened up as a result of the project?

Sum-up

Which is the significance of the project for Valencia?

Is there a Valencian way of doing regeneration different, for instance, from Madrid and Barcelona?
APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Interview 1: José Luis Marín Sendra, Director of the CBRE Richard Ellis Valencia and Palma Offices, May 11, 2009

Interview 2: Fernando Gaja, Senior lecturer of Urbanism at Valencia’s Polytechnic University and member of the grassroots group “Terra Crítica”, May 11, 2009

Interview 3: Juan Piqueras, Professor of Geography at University of Valencia, May 12, 2009

Interview 4: Albert Taberner, Ex-candidate to the Presidency of the Regional Government of Valencia, member of the Valencian Parliament for the left-wing party Esquerra Unida, May 12, 2009

Interview 5: Adolfo Rodríguez, Ex-director of the Calatrava office in Valencia, May 14, 2009

Interview 6: Mª Luisa Peydró, Member of staff of CeyD (Centre for Strategy and Development of Valencia), June 6, 2009

Interview 7: Clementina Ródenas, Mayor of Valencia 1989-91, June 23, 2009

Interview 8: Belén Hernández, Architect at Nebot Arquitectos, author of the plot distribution project of La Torre (Sociopolis), June 25, 2009

Interview 9: Josep Sorribes, Head of the Mayor’s Office (1983-89), Senior lecturer of Economy at University of Valencia, June 30, 2009

Interview 10: Alfonso Pastor, Solicitor of the Irrigation Canal of Favara, June 30, 2009

Interview 11: Javier Quesadas, Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98), July 1, 2009

Interview 12: Cristina Martínez, Director of Architecture of the Calatrava office in Valencia, July 1, 2009

Interview 13: Pau Rausell, Senior lecturer of Economics at University of Valencia, July 2, 2009

Interview 14: Vicent Soler, Regional minister of public administration (85-87), Councilor of the Valencia city council, July 2, 2009

Interview 15: Josep Gavaldá, Member of the grassroots group “Per l'Horta”, July 3, 2009

Interview 16: David Estal, Consultant of the Institute of the Territory of Valencia, July 3, 2009
Interview 17: Eugenio Burriel, Regional Minister of Public Works and Transport (1990-95), July 6, 2009

Interview 18: Joaquín Maudos, Economist of the IVIE (Valencian Institute of Economic Research) and author of the economic impact studies of the City of Arts and Sciences, July 7, 2009

Interview 19: Vicente González Móstoles, Director of Town-Planning services in Valencia City Council (1981-84), Head of the Service of Urban Architecture of the Valencia City Council (1984-87), July 7, 2009

Interview 20: Ignacio Jiménez de Laiglesia, real estate investor, July 8, 2009

Interview 21: José Salinas, Director of Valencian Convention Bureau, July 9, 2009

Interview 22: Javier Obartí, Author of the environmental impact study of Sociopolis, July 9, 2009

Interview 23: José Mª Tomás, Architect, author of the America’s Cup master plan, July 10, 2009

Interview 24: Carlos González Triviño, Secretary of studies and programs of the socialist party in the city of Valencia, July 10, 2009

Interview 25: Lourdes García Sogo, Director of Sogo Architects, September 17, 2009

Interview 26: José Antonio Pérez, Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95), September 18, 2009

Interview 27: Luis Sendra, President of the Architects’ Professional Association of Valencia, September 21, 2009

Interview 28: José Miguel Iribas, Social scientist specialized in territorial, town-planning and tourist diagnosis, September 22, 2009

Interview 29: Miguel Arenas, Engineer of Necso at the Museum of Sciences working site, September 23, 2009

Interview 30: Andrés García Reche, Regional Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-93), September 23, 2009

Interview 31: Juan Lagardera, Editor-in-chief of the Valencia City magazine, September 25, 2009

Interview 32: Joaquín Azagra, Regional Minister of Public Administration (1987-89), September 28, 2009

Interview 33: José Mª Gil Suay, Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, September 29, 2009
Interview 34: Juan Antonio Delgado, Director of Commercial Strategy and Corporative Development of the Port Authority of Valencia, September 30, 2009

Interview 35: Manuel Toharia, Scientific Director of CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences Corporation) and Director of the Science Museum, October 1, 2009

Interview 36: Juan Añón, Architect, author of the interior urban design of the harbour for the America’s Cup, October 1, 2009

Interview 37: Arturo Virosque, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Valencia and of the Council of Chambers of the Valencian Community, October 2, 2009

Interview 38: Adolf Beltrán, Journalist of El País in Valencia’s editorial office, October 2, 2009

Interview 39: Jordi Paniagua, Knowledge Management Director of Valencian Community Investment Corporation, October 5, 2009


Interview 41: Francisco Carmona, Architect working at the Museum of Science Project, first for Calatrava’s office and then for a Construction company, October 22, 2009


Interview 43: Marta del Olmo, Business director of CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences Corporation), October 27, 2009

Interview 44: Rafael Navarro, Director of the editorial office of El Mundo in Valencia, October 27, 2009

Interview 45: Leandro García, Director of Valencia Port Foundation, October 28, 2009

Interview 46: Enrique Martínez, Architect at AUMSA (public corporation responsible for Valencia’s urban planning), October 28, 2009

Interview 47: Manuela Gras, Project and Conservation Manager of America’s Cup Consortium, October 29, 2009

Interview 48: Javier Soriano, Former architect at IVVSA (Valencian Institute of Housing), October 30, 2009
Interview 49: Mª José Broseta, President of the Federation of Residents’ Associations of Valencia, November 2, 2009

Interview 50: Alberto Sanchís, Head of the Professional Support Service of the Regional Ministry of Territory and Housing, November 3, 2009

Interview 51a: Ana Botella, socialist party city councilor, November 3, 2009

Interview 51b: Miquel Villanueva, adviser to the socialist group at city hall, November 3, 2009

Interview 52: Emiliano García, Tourism representative in CEV, (Valencian Business Confederation) and CEPYMEV (Confederation of small and medium-size businesses), November 4, 2009


Interview 54: Ángel Martínez, Architect, co-author of the Integral Development Plan Avenida Francia, November 5, 2009

Interview 55: José Camarasa, Member of the Valencian Regional Parliament (Socialist party), November 6, 2009

Interview 56: Mª Jesús Rodríguez, Director General of Housing of the Regional Ministry of Environment, Water, Urbanism and Housing, November 9, 2009

Interview 57: Fernando Huet, ex-director of America’s Cup Consortium, November 10, 2009

Interview 58: Benjamín Muñoz, Secretary-General of FPIAUCV (Federation of Property Developers and Urbanizing Agents on the Valencian Community), November 10, 2009

Interview 59a: Mª Ángeles Mallent, Administration director of CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences Corporation), November 10, 2009

Interview 59b: Ascensión Gil, Architect at CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences Corporation), November 10, 2009

Interview 60: Vicente Guallart, architect, author and promoter of Sociopolis, December 14, 2009

Interview 61: Miguel Moreno, Farmer and resident of La Torre, adviser for Sociopolis master plan, December 15, 2009

Interview 62: Eduardo Beut, Secretary-General of FECOVAL: Federation of Companies of the Valencian Community which are Building Contractors for the Public Administration, December 18, 2009
APPENDIX C. LIST OF PRESS ARTICLES

C.1. The City of Arts and Sciences (from 1 January 1989 to 22 March 2010)


8. Calatrava "la Ciutat de les Ciències es mi proyecto de mayor trascendencia urbanística". *El País*. June 1, 1993

9. La crisis lleva al Consell a buscar más apoyo privado a la Ciutat de les Ciències. *El País*. September 13, 1993


14. La adjudicación de la Ciutat de les Ciències atrae a las principales constructoras españolas. *El País*. August 17, 1994


17. La Ciutat de les Ciències se pone en marcha con una exposición ciudadana. *El País*. January 21, 1995


23 El PSPV pide a Barberá que defienda la Ciutat de les Ciències. *El País*. September 19, 1995


26 La duda demoledora del PP. *El País*. October 1, 1995

27 Olivas dice que el Consell mantendrá la inversión en la Ciutat de les Ciències. *El País*. October 19, 1995

28 Economía asegura que decidirá antes de dos semanas si paraliza las obras de la Ciutat de les Ciències. *El País*. October 27, 1995

29 Zaplana garantiza a los empresarios que la Ciutat de les Ciències se construirá, aunque modificada. *El País*. October 31, 1995


33 Olivas sostiene que el proyecto de la Ciutat de les Ciències “no lo necesita ni lo demanda nadie”. *El País*. November 24, 1995

34 Olivas asume toda la responsabilidad por la nueva Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País*. December 8, 1995

35 El carpetazo a la Ciudad de las Ciencias muestra cómo el Consell sólo ha actuado por vía negativa. *El País*. December 10, 1995


38 El Consell ratifica la decisión de enterrar la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País*. December 13, 1995


41 Olivas dice ahora que su alternativa a la Ciudad de las Ciencias no está cerrada. *El País*. December 16, 1995


43 Fichas para jugar a la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País*. December 17, 1995
44 La Politécnica aconseja no repetir “la locura del 92” con la torre de Calatrava. *El País.* December 18, 1995

45 Socialistas y regionalistas pactan una estrategia de “pinza” para que el PP invierta más en Valencia. *El País.* December 20, 1995

46 El PP mantiene su plan de la Ciudad de las Ciencias pese a la amenaza de UV. *El País.* December 20, 1995

47 El choque del PP y UV por la Ciudad de las Ciencias abre la mayor crisis del Consell. *El País.* December 21, 1995


49 La disputa sobre la Ciudad de las Ciencias abre la mayor crisis de la coalición del PP y UV. *El País.* December 21, 1995


51 El PP no tiene una alternativa seria a la Ciudad de las Ciencias, según UV. *El País.* December 22, 1995

52 UV se ofrece para propiciar el consenso en la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País.* December 23, 1995


54 Los socialistas emplazan a Zaplana a que explique su plan para la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País.* December 27, 1995

55 Zaplana niega que existan estudios a favor de la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País.* December 28, 1995


57 Calatrava y Raimon reciben la medalla de oro de las Bellas Artes. *El País.* December 29, 1995


59 El PP carece de documentos que avalen su acusación de favoritismo contra el PSPV en la carpa de las ciencias. *El País.* December 29, 1995

60 Barberá logra que el ayuntamiento apoye la supresión de la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País.* December 30, 1995

61 Olivas: “con lo que vale la torre de Calatrava se pueden hacer dos hospitales”. *El País.* January 9, 1996


63 Los socialistas instan a Olivas que diga de una vez si construirá o no la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País.* January 25, 1996

64 Un centenar de personas se unen para defender la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País.* February 6, 1996

La inactividad de VACICO le permite obtener 30 millones de intereses. *El País*. March 26, 1996

El PP consigue apoyo parlamentario para crear una comisión de investigación sobre VACICO. *El País*. March 28, 1996


El PP fuerza la presencia socialista en la mesa de la comisión sobre VACICO. *El País*. April 27, 1996

Amigos de la Ciudad de las Ciencias afirman que “Olivas ahuyenta las inversiones”. *El País*. April 28, 1996


El fallo que anula el plan de la Ciudad de las Artes se recurrirá. *El País*. May 22, 1998

Una firma que controla obras de CACSA fue creada después de ser adjudicadas. *El País*. May 23, 1998

Calatrava reduce a la mitad el coste de su último puente para Valencia; el proyecto final se quedará en 1.500 millones. *El País*. July 15, 1998

El Consell se atribuye el mérito de la bajada de los tipos de interés y la mejora de infraestructuras. *El País*. August 4, 1998


El Consell se endeudará en 27.170 millones para impulsar sus grandes proyectos de ocio la Ciudad de las Artes, Terra Mítica y Castellón Cultural piden un 61% más de créditos. *El País*. November 1, 1998

Las obras del Parque Oceanográfico acabarán en verano, dice Olivas; la fecha de inauguración depende de la aclimatación de los animales. *El País*. December 31, 1998

239
89 Una funcionaria municipal será directora de la Ciutat de les Arts i les Ciències. *El País*. January 27, 1999

90 Desaceleración. *El País*. March 1, 1999

91 Valencia quiere estar en la élite de los museos de la ciencia. *El País*. March 7, 1999

92 Un año del Hemisfèric. *El País*. April 17, 1999


94 Asunción acusa a Zaplana de ocultar con ilusiónismo la ausencia de gestión; Moreno atribuye al PP los modos de la derecha reaccionaria. *El País*. April 23, 1999


96 Asunción exige al PP que explique en qué ha gastado los 750.000 millones que debe el Consell. El candidato socialista reivindica la labor de Joan Lerma como aval del PSPV. *El País*. May 9, 1999

97 *El País*. May 17, 1999


100 Edificios singulares. *El País*. May 27, 1999


102 Carles Francesc el Museo de las Ciencias, Grisolía y los siete "nobeles". *El País*. June 24, 1999

103 El Consell tiene vacantes en presidencia y seis consejerías. *El País*. September 17, 1999

104 La Ciudad de las Ciencias amplía en 5.000 millones su capital. *El País*. October 15, 1999


106 La Ciudad de las Ciencias suscribe un préstamo de 35.000 millones. *El País*. October 19, 1999

107 Olivas anuncia un plan de espacios turísticos para ordenar la oferta. *El País*. October 21, 1999


113 Fenómenos. *El País*. February 1, 2000
115 La Generalitat paga con suelo el 40% del capital social de CACSA. *El País*. May 31, 2000
116 El director del 'banco' de la Generalitat crea una sociedad para gestionar su patrimonio con ventaja; el responsable del Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas no puede tener ninguna actividad privada. *El País*. June 8, 2000
118 Cultura proyecta una sala permanente de arte contemporáneo en la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. June 29, 2000
119 Valencia deja de ser una ciudad de paso gracias a su nuevo auge turístico; el aumento de viajeros y de pernoctaciones supera la media española. *El País*. August 4, 2000
121 Edificios emblemáticos que encierran la cultura la Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias de Valencia encabeza las infraestructuras para el nuevo milenio. *El País*. October 9, 2000
122 El Consell 'hipoteca' la Ciudad de las Ciencias como garantía para hacer frente a los créditos todas las acciones de la empresa pública están pignoradas por los bancos acreedores. *El País*. November 12, 2000
124 El planeamiento urbanístico y la cesión de inmuebles son elementos claves de la ingeniería financiera de la Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias. *El País*. November 12, 2000
127 Zaplana afirma en la apertura del Museu de les Ciències que su intención es que sea rentable; los socialistas lamentan el sectoralismo del partido popular y critican la mala gestión económica. *El País*. November 14, 2000
129 El Consell adjudicó el proyecto con unas garantías irredimibles de plazo y presupuesto. *El País*. December 27, 2000
130 La Sindicatura cuestiona las contrataciones en CACSA. *El País*. December 27, 2000
132 El PSPV pide un plan de viabilidad para la Ciudad de las Artes; considera que la empresa está en situación de quiebra financiera. *El País*. January 24, 2001
133 Galiano subraya el predominio de la "arquitectura del espectáculo". *El País*. January 26, 2001
134 Zaplana se adjudica el crecimiento del turismo y Pla dice que el modelo del PP está agotado; el líder del PSPV dice en Fitur que los populares tutelan y dirigen demasiado el sector. *El País*. February 2, 2001
137 2.000 millones de la CAM para la Ciudad de las Artes. \textit{El País}. March 23, 2001
138 La CAM aprueba una operación financiera de 2.000 millones con la Ciudad de las Artes; la entidad alicantina da luz verde a un modesto plan de apertura de oficinas en Valencia. \textit{El País}. March 23, 2001
139 Urbe oferta a empresas y público 30 millones de metros cuadrados de promociones inmobiliarias; los constructores valencianos organizan una feria propia para captar nuevos inversores. \textit{El País}. April 25, 2001
140 Retraso del Oceanográfico. \textit{El País}. April 27, 2001
141 La desazón del inspector. \textit{El País}. April 29, 2001
142 Zaplana pide al Consell que controle el gasto pero exige nuevas iniciativas las "fórmulas imaginativas" de financiación generan nuevas deudas. \textit{El País}. April 29, 2001
143 El Consell niega las irregularidades en la Ciudad de las Artes que refleja el último informe de la sindicatura. \textit{El País}. May 8, 2001
144 Argüelles dice ignorar el coste de mantenimiento del Palau de les Arts. \textit{El País}. June 6, 2001
145 Hacienda concede avales a la Ciudad de las Artes por 17.470 millones. \textit{El País}. June 19, 2001
146 Los bancos extreman las cautelas. \textit{El País}. June 28, 2001
147 El Consell autoriza más avales por valor de 17.470 millones para financiar la Ciudad de las Ciencias; la Generalitat transmitirá la titularidad de los edificios para respaldar las acciones pignoradas. \textit{El País}. June 28, 2001
148 El Consell avala nuevos créditos a la Ciudad de las Ciencias por 17.470 millones. \textit{El País}. June 28, 2001
149 Los socialistas acusan al Consell de abrir unas grietas económicas insalvables en la Ciudad de las Ciencias. \textit{El País}. June 29, 2001
150 Parque temático de Alicante pagará 400 millones por el control de las obras de la Ciudad de la Luz. \textit{El País}. July 27, 2001
151 La Generalitat 'inventa' la sociedad pública de responsabilidad limitada; la fórmula restringe los órganos de gobierno y la información pública. \textit{El País}. August 16, 2001
152 Hacienda traslada 814 millones del servicio de la deuda para pagar las cargas de Ferrocarrils; el compromiso con FGV abre la vía para dotar las obligaciones de otras empresas públicas. \textit{El País}. August 21, 2001
153 Hacienda paga las cargas de FGV y abre la vía a otras empresas públicas. \textit{El País}. August 21, 2001
154 El operador del Oceanográfico definirá costes, inversiones y tarifas sin asumir riesgo alguno; la Generalitat sostiene que los auditores propusieron dividir CACSA en sociedades limitadas. \textit{El País}. August 24, 2001
155 PSPV y EU piden una moratoria para el litoral; propuestas. \textit{El País}. September 14, 2001
156 \textit{El País}. September 19, 2001
Císcar aboga por ubicar los institutos del cine y de la música en la Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias. *El País*. October 9, 2001

La Ciudad de las Artes y el Instituto de Finanzas agudizan el riesgo financiero de la Generalitat; una agencia alerta del incremento de la deuda. *El País*. October 12, 2001

PSPV y EU dicen que los cambios son para "colocar amigos". *El País*. October 31, 2001

Zaplana refuerza el área de política social y potencia la figura de Rafael Blasco en el Consell; el presidente rescata a Miguel Navarro, número dos de la Consejería de Innovación y Tecnología. *El País*. October 31, 2001

El presupuesto de las empresas públicas sube un 46%. *El País*. November 1, 2001

El Consell presenta un presupuesto expansivo para 2002 frente a la contención del gobierno; el capítulo de gasto corriente se incrementa un 23,7% y el de personal un 5,7%. *El País*. November 1, 2001

Las deudas de las empresas públicas superarán en 2002 el medio billón de pesetas; Hacienda les da margen para que aumenten su endeudamiento en casi 90.000 millones. *El País*. November 2, 2001


La discrepancia sobre el impacto de la crisis marca el debate de presupuestos en las Cortes; rechazadas las enmiendas a la totalidad de la oposición a las cuentas presentadas por el Consell. *El País*. November 20, 2001

Rambla dice que la oposición "sigue sin saber leer los presupuestos". *El País*. November 22, 2001

El PP rechaza 50 comparecencias que pide el PSPV para explicar el informe del Síndic; los socialistas consideran que el "crítico" documento desvela múltiples irregularidades. *El País*. January 11, 2002

El Museu de les Ciències concentra las visitas concertadas y reduce las de otros centros; el IVAM esquiva la tendencia a la baja con un aumento de público en 2001. *El País*. January 16, 2002


La vida sigue igual. *El País*. January 24, 2002


*El País*. January 26, 2002


VPO. *El País*. February 14, 2002

La Ciudad de las Artes arrastra ya una deuda de 679 millones de euros, según la oposición el PP dice que el proyecto es "económicamente viable" y rechaza un plan de saneamiento. *El País*. March 22, 2002
177 El País. April 3, 2002
178 En Valencia, las cosas no van tan bien. El País. April 8, 2002
179 Una progresión peligrosa. El País. May 2, 2002
180 "La inversión pública será de ‘Guinness’.". El País. June 2, 2002
182 Falta de voluntad política. El País. July 9, 2002
184 El turismo tropieza con la crisis, julio arranca con una caída de la ocupación entre el 4% y el 25% en las principales zonas del país. El País. July 21, 2002
185 Olivas toma posesión arropado por tres ministros y mantiene el Consell de Zaplana el nuevo presidente de la Generalitat solo introducirá cambios en el 'segundo escalón'. El País. July 24, 2002
186 Olivas lleva a presidencia el área de ciencia y tecnología y rescata la Consejería de Industria. El País. July 25, 2002
187 Un río de propuestas. El País. October 8, 2002
188 Interior eleva a 500 los efectivos de la policía autonómica. El País. October 16, 2002
189 Los hoteleros advierten de que en 2005 sobrarán 5.000 alojamientos en la ciudad de Valencia la capital contará dentro de cuatro años con 43 nuevos establecimientos. El País. October 16, 2002
190 Decisiones tardías. El País. October 25, 2002
192 El PP defiende sus previsiones con informes de "agencias de prestigio". El País. November 3, 2002
193 Camps viaja a Munich para proponer a Zubin Mehta que dirija la futura orquesta autonómica si gana el PP. El País. November 8, 2002
194 El País. November 10, 2002
195 La oposición cree que la situación de Terra Mítica y CACSA amenaza las finanzas de la Generalitat. El País. November 27, 2002
196 La oposición presenta más de 4.000 enmiendas a los presupuestos de la Generalitat. El País. November 30, 2002
197 A toda máquina en l’Oceanogràfic. El País. December 8, 2002
198 El baile de los presupuestos. El País. December 9, 2002
200 Los 45.000 animales de l’Oceanogràfic convierten Valencia en un nuevo polo de atracción turística. El País. December 13, 2002
203  Bancaixa entra con un 12,5% en la sociedad de l’Oceanogràfic por medio millón de euros. *El País*. December 19, 2002
205  Ferrando quiere cambiar el modelo turístico y pide revisar la incidencia del sector en el IPC. *El País*. January 29, 2003
210  Camps califica de ruinoso el modelo turístico del PSPV. *El País*. April 20, 2003
211  Valencia, entre Madrid y Barcelona *El País*. May 12, 2003
212  El Consell dobla el capital social de la firma que gestiona Terra Mítica *El País*. June 10, 2003
215  Camps afirma que el tren de alta velocidad será "una realidad en nuestra Comunidad en 2007". *El País*. June 23, 2003
221  La Generalitat adquiere otras 52.000 acciones de Terra Mítica por 16 millones de euros. *El País*. October 14, 2003
222  La deuda de las empresas públicas se ha multiplicado por dos en los últimos tres años. *El País*. October 30, 2003
223  La Ciudad de las Ciencias multiplica por cinco su inversión con el grueso de la obra ya realizada. *El País*. October 31, 2003
225  Pla asegura que las cuentas del Consell revelan que la caja está vacía y propone sanearla. *El País*. November 1, 2003
226  De la Copa América a CACSA. *El País*. November 13, 2003

245
228 La Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias registra más de 100.000 visitantes durante el puente. *El País*. December 9, 2003
235 "Las bienales ya no tienen sentido: son parques temáticos". *El País*. January 11, 2004
237 Camps, a diferencia de Zaplana, invita a Pla y a Alborch a los actos del día valenciano en Fitur *El País*. January 30, 2004
239 *El País*. February 16, 2004
240 L’Oceanogràfic ingresa 27 millones y recibe dos millones de visitas en un año. *El País*. February 18, 2004
242 El nuevo Gobierno repercutirá en varios proyectos estrella del , PERO. *El País*. March 16, 2004
243 La Ciudad de las Ciencias registra un record de visitas en la semana de Fallas. *El País*. March 22, 2004
244 La deuda del Consell ronda los 10.000 millones con las empresas públicas. *El País*. March 26, 2004
245 Camps reconoce que el coste del Palau de les Arts ya se ha duplicado. *El País*. May 18, 2004
246 Un experto cifra la deuda del Consell en 10.678 millones y califica la situación de encubierta suspensión de pagos. *El País*. June 3, 2004
247 La deuda valenciana sube otra vez y alcanza ya el 11% del PIB. *El País*. June 25, 2004
249 El Consell inyecta 67 millones a la Ciudad de las Artes y enjuaga perdidas por 145,8 millones. *El País*. July 1, 2004
250 De la autonomía a la independencia. *El País*. July 1, 2004

La factura de los grandes proyectos emblemáticos asciende ya a 230 millones. *El País*. July 1, 2004

La Ciudad de las Ciencias recibe 1.700.000 visitas entre junio y agosto. *El País*. September 6, 2004


Los 'pozos sin fondo' del Consell. *El País*. September 17, 2004

Cultura a punta pala. *El País*. October 21, 2004

Camps y Barberá intentan cerrar el complejo de la Ciudad de las Ciencias con otro proyecto de Calatrava. *El País*. November 7, 2004

El decano de los arquitectos considera que "sobra espectáculo" y falta rigor en el desarrollo de Valencia. *El País*. November 9, 2004


La ciudad prudente. *El País*. November 17, 2004


El PSPV propone a Camps que gaste los 147 millones previstos para parques temáticos en medidas sociales. *El País*. November 27, 2004

Cuentos de contar cultura. *El País*. December 1, 2004

Calatrava defiende sus torres como un hito que se verá en toda la ciudad. *El País*. December 2, 2004

El coste final del Palau de les Arts cuadruplicará el presupuesto inicial. *El País*. December 4, 2004

Rubio alerta de que en las torres de Calatrava se han de edificar 450 VPO. *El País*. December 24, 2004

Más pérdidas en Parques Temáticos y desvió del 219% en la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. December 31, 2004

La deuda atenaza las cuentas de la Generalitat. *El País*. December 31, 2004

La ciudad de los prodigios. *El País*. February 2, 2005

El Consell amplia otros 105 millones el capital para pagar la deuda de la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. February 26, 2005

El Consell destina otros 105 millones a la deuda de la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. February 26, 2005

Calatrava plantea tres torres sobre una estación de AVE para rematar la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País*. February 27, 2005
274 El apeadero del AVE que pide Camps obligaría a replantear el plan ferroviario de Valencia. *El País*. March 1, 2005
275 Rubio asegura que Camps y Barberá actúan "como agentes inmobiliarios" con las torres de Calatrava. *El País*. March 1, 2005
276 El gerente de riesgos del IVF asume la dirección de la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. March 12, 2005
277 El tiempo da la razón, y la seguirá dando. *El País*. March 19, 2005
278 Camps fijo la inauguración en octubre para no dilatar más la puesta en marcha del Palau. *El País*. March 31, 2005
279 Calatrava nombra a Villalonga director de su estudio en Valencia. *El País*. April 15, 2005
280 Placido Domingo abrirá la temporada regular del Palau de les Arts, que se llamará Reina Sofía. *El País*. April 30, 2005
281 Nueva York se rinde ante el arte de Santiago Calatrava. *El País*. May 1, 2005
283 Calatrava inventa el rascacielos corporal. *El País*. August 27, 2005
286 El Consell cesa al director de grandes proyectos. *El País*. September 17, 2005
287 Santiago Calatrava recibirá la Alta Distinción de la Generalitat el próximo 9 d'Octubre. *El País*. October 6, 2005
288 Helga Schmidt, Intendente del Palau de les Arts Reina Sofía: "En España no hay una gran orquesta internacional". *El País*. October 7, 2005
289 Reuters: "Valencia estrena su espectacular Palau de les Arts". *El País*. October 8, 2005
290 Calatrava. *El País*. October 8, 2005
291 Rubio denuncia que el Palau de les Arts no tiene licencia de actividad ni informe de bomberos. *El País*. October 11, 2005
292 El Palau de les Arts no cumple la norma de emergencias, según Rubio. *El País*. October 14, 2005
293 El glamour golpea a la oposición. *El País*. October 16, 2005
294 Santiago Calatrava ensena en el Metropolitan su 'escultura dentro de la arquitectura'. *El País*. October 19, 2005
296 El Consell reconoce que ha gastado más de 760 millones en la Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias. *El País*. October 28, 2005
297 Rita, dígalo. *El País*. November 1, 2005
La deuda de las empresas públicas se dispara en 2006 hasta superar los 6.000 millones de euros. *El País*. November 2, 2005

El Consell anuncia 26,5 millones para iniciar las obras del Ágora de la Ciudad de las Ciencias. *El País*. November 9, 2005


Maciá dice que el PSPV está abierto a la venta de terrenos para salvar Terra Mítica. *El País*. December 15, 2005

Font de Mora replica a la socialista Ana Noguera desde el escaño que ella provocó el fuego en Ciegsa. *El País*. December 21, 2005

Los socialistas piden una solución a largo plazo para levantar la suspensión de pagos de Terra Mítica. *El País*. December 30, 2005

Cuentas y cuentos. *El País*. December 30, 2005


El Ágora de la Ciudad de las Artes sale a información pública. *El País*. January 24, 2006


El Consell adjudica la obra del Ágora a una UTE liderada por Lubasa. *El País*. March 29, 2006

Camps identifica los rascacielos y el Ágora de Calatrava con modernidad. *El País*. April 7, 2006

Un parque controlado por personas de confianza del ex presidente. *El País*. May 16, 2006

Pla asegura que Terra Mítica es la "punta del iceberg". *El País*. May 16, 2006

¿Cuánto nos costará el Palau de les Arts? *El País*. May 16, 2006

"Alternativa real de gobierno". *El País*. May 25, 2006


Rubio denuncia que el Consell no ha pagado 121 millones que debe a Valencia por impuestos. *El País*. June 6, 2006
Las obras ejecutadas por el Ayuntamiento de Valencia sobrepasan en un 53,41% su coste inicial, según Rubio. *El País*. June 12, 2006


CACSA fuerza a coger vacaciones a un grupo de trabajadores por la visita del Papa. *El País*. June 14, 2006

Polémica por los gastos de la directora del Palau de les Arts, Helga Schmidt. Facturó 3.000 euros por dos noches de hotel. *El País*. June 24, 2006


El PSPV acusa al Consell de querer ocultar el gasto de la visita de Benedicto XVI. *El País*. August 4, 2006 Friday

Barberá pide un hito a Calatrava para conmemorar la visita del Papa. *El País*. September 2, 2006 Saturday

Turbulencias de moda. *El País*. September 12, 2006 Tuesday

El PSPV denuncia que el Palau de les Arts paga sueldos millonarios a 10 cargos. *El País*. September 24, 2006 Sunday

El PP ve ridícula la iniciativa y achaca la corrupción al PSPV. *El País*. October 5, 2006 Thursday

¿Síntoma o enfermedad? *El País*. October 9, 2006 Monday

Ros Casares anuncia carga de trabajo para Izar por 100 millones. *El País*. October 21, 2006 Saturday


En el camino. *El País*. December 5, 2006 Tuesday

La avería del escenario del Palau de les Arts deja en precario la programación. *El País*. December 6, 2006 Wednesday

La sociedad de grandes proyectos sigue la vía de RTVV y se sitúa en quiebra técnica. *El País*. December 23, 2006 Saturday

El coste del Palau de les Arts se triplica hasta alcanzar los 332 millones el pasado año. *El País*. December 23, 2006 Saturday

El informe del Síndic confirma el estado de “colapso” de la Generalitat, según el PSPV. *El País*. December 27, 2006 Wednesday

El PSPV exige al Síndic que detalle las empresas que contrató el Consell de forma irregular. *El País*. January 12, 2007 Friday


Hacienda dedica 211.000 euros a explicar sus deducciones fiscales. *El País*. January 17, 2007 Wednesday

El PSPV alerta sobre el caos de la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. January 24, 2008 Thursday

"Ocultaban facturas en un cajón bajo llave". *El País*. March 2, 2007 Friday

Canal 9 emitirá publicidad del Consell en horario de máxima audiencia durante la campaña electoral. *El País*. March 10, 2007 Saturday

Internet se llena de referencias elogiosas sobre el evento y la ciudad. *El País*. April 18, 2007 Wednesday

*El País*. April 23, 2007 Monday

La Generalitat alquila L'Umbracle para abrir una terraza de copas. *El País*. May 5, 2007 Saturday

Cuidado con las rebajas. *El País*. May 8, 2007 Tuesday


Barberá mantiene la mayoría sin signos de fatiga en sus votantes. *El País*. May 21, 2007 Monday

El PAI La Punta subasta unas 120 hanegadas de huerta en Valencia. *El País*. July 13, 2007 Friday

Un fallo informático genera protestas y largas colas en la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. August 8, 2007 Wednesday

La Ciudad de las Artes ingresa 32,4 millones de Euros pero sus gastos anuales son de 197cuatro. *El País*. August 16, 2007 Thursday


Signes considera "intolerables" las ayudas del Consell a fundaciones "afines al PP". *El País*. August 21, 2007 Tuesday

Millón y medio de visitas a CACSA en verano *El País*. September 4, 2007 Tuesday


Calatrava apunta hacia el jardín elevado como causa. *El País*. October 13, 2007 Saturday

El riesgo de inundaciones del Palau de les Arts se conoce desde hace 10 años. *El País*. October 16, 2007 Tuesday

Un pretil separará el Palau de les Arts del antiguo río para evitar inundaciones. *El País*. October 18, 2007 Thursday

Escuchar con los ojos cerrados. *El País*. October 23, 2007 Tuesday

La programación del Palau de les Arts naufraga por las inundaciones. *El País*. October 23, 2007 Tuesday

Bofill dice que el Palau de les Arts "no está bien ubicado" en el cauce. *El País*. November 13, 2007 Tuesday


La Generalitat lleva gastados 1.128 millones en la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. December 22, 2007 Saturday

El Consell deberá indemnizar por un terreno de la Ciutat de les Arts. *El País*. March 8, 2008 Saturday

La parcela desierta de las torres de Calatrava. *El País*. March 8, 2008 Saturday

Moody's alerta al Consell que debe frenar la deuda y el gasto sanitario. *El País*. March 20, 2008 Thursday

La deuda de la Generalitat crece en un año 619 millones y suma ya 11.500. *El País*. March 27, 2008 Thursday

Luna reclama al PP que colabore con Madrid. *El País*. March 28, 2008 Friday

La avería del escenario costó medio millón al Palau. *El País*. May 7, 2008 Wednesday

Los socialistas ven temerarios los proyectos faraónicos del Consell. *El País*. July 11, 2008 Friday

El Consell afirma que CACSA ingresó 40,5 millones y el PSPV, que perdió 62. *El País*. August 6, 2008 Wednesday

Nuevo cruce de cifras por la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. August 6, 2008 Wednesday

De superávit a déficit. *El País*. August 8, 2008 Friday

El pozo sin fondo de las empresas públicas. *El País*. August 8, 2008 Friday

El consejero insiste en negar el déficit. *El País*. August 9, 2008 Saturday

Los socialistas proponen "un gran pacto valenciano" para salir de la crisis. *El País*. August 16, 2008 Saturday

*El País*. August 20, 2008 Wednesday

*El País*. August 21, 2008 Thursday


El Consell espera el enésimo estudio de viabilidad sobre Mundo Ilusión. *El País*. September 2, 2008 Tuesday

Calatrava atribuye la inundación del Palau a las obras para el altar del Papa. *El País*. September 4, 2008 Thursday

El PP de Valencia rechaza exigir al Consell el fondo de financiación local. *El País*. September 26, 2008 Friday

Camarasa pide responsables de la grave inundación. *El País*. October 9, 2008 Thursday


Emblemás con recorte. *El País*. October 30, 2008 Thursday

*El País*. November 2, 2008 Sunday
El Ágora acelera por el tenis. *El País*. November 8, 2008 Saturday


Camps insinúa que el Palau se inundó por la desidia de Barberá. *El País*. December 4, 2008 Thursday

La obra sufrió roturas por un fallo de montaje. *El País*. December 11, 2008 Thursday

El Síndic reclama una nueva financiación. *El País*. December 23, 2008 Tuesday

Los modificados de Calatrava lastran la Ciudad de las Artes. *El País*. December 23, 2008 Tuesday

Las empresas públicas toman la deuda que la Generalitat no puede permitirse. *El País*. March 20, 2009 Friday

El Consell amplía de nuevo el capital de la Ciutat de les Arts. *El País*. April 4, 2009 Saturday


Hitos arquitectónicos lastrados por la crisis. *El País*. April 27, 2009 Monday

La recesión cuestiona la viabilidad de proyectos urbanísticos faraónicos. *El País*. April 27, 2009 Monday


El chocolate del loro. *El País*. July 28, 2009 Tuesday

El sobrecoste de la Ciudad de las Artes supera el 200%. *El País*. August 12, 2009 Wednesday

90 millones para un Ágora con urinarios provisionales. *El País*. August 27, 2009 Thursday

El Consell aumenta la vida útil del Palau de les Arts de 100 a 300 años para ahorrar. *El País*. September 15, 2009 Tuesday

Y ahora, los Juegos Olímpicos. *El País*. October 30, 2009 Friday

El PSPV culpa a Barberá de no cumplir con el 63% de sus promesas electorales. *El País*. November 17, 2009 Tuesday

El PSPV tilda de 'incapaz' a Barberá por los presupuestos. *El País*. November 21, 2009 Saturday

La reforma del modelo económico de la CEV incluye a las inmobiliarias. *El País*. November 27, 2009 Friday

El Consell niega al PSPV los contratos del Ágora y de la Fórmula 1. *El País*. December 12, 2009 Saturday

El Consell reordena parte del segundo escalón meses después de la remodelación. *El País*. December 19, 2009 Saturday
La Sindicatura de Comptes no audita las empresas vinculadas a Gürtel. *El País*. December 24, 2009 Thursday

La Ciudad de las Artes sólo se mira. *El País*. January 17, 2010 Sunday

La Sindicatura rechaza el patrocinio público de actividades privadas. *El País*. January 21, 2010 Thursday

El descontrol del PP se apodera de las Cortes. *El País*. February 18, 2010 Thursday

La fundación que gestiona el turismo en Valencia evita el control externo. *El País*. February 25, 2010 Thursday
C.2. The America’s Cup (from 1 April 2003 to 22 March 2010)

1 Valencia quiere la ‘Formula 1’ de vela. El País. April 9, 2003


3 La Copa de América obliga a rediseñar el acceso norte del puerto. El País. September 24, 2003


5 Rajoy asegura que si es presidente impulsará las grandes infraestructuras que reclama el Consell. El País. October 11, 2003

6 Rajoy asume ante Camps las grandes infraestructuras que reclama el Consell. El País. October 11, 2003

7 El presupuesto municipal de Valencia crece un 2,6% y no incluye previsiones para la Copa de América. El País. November 22, 2003


11 Jordi Vicent, Valencia se hace con la Copa de América, la F-1 de la vela. El País. November 27, 2003

12 La ACM explotará la zona del puerto que albergara a los barcos de la Copa de América. El País. November 28, 2003


"Maragall metió la pata con el agua del Ebro". *El País*. November 30, 2003


Camps anuncia un departamento dedicado a la Copa de América. *El País*. December 1, 2003


La oposición critica el anuncio de nuevos cargos por la copa de vela. *El País*. December 2, 2003


La CEV creará una comisión de trabajo encargada de elaborar propuestas ante la Copa de América. *El País*. December 5, 2003


"El puerto se ha integrado en la ciudad". *El País*. December 8, 2003


E la nave va... *El País*. December 9, 2003


*El País*. December 12, 2003

Cascos solo se compromete a tener la línea de alta velocidad tres años después de la Copa de América. *El País*. December 12, 2003


Rubio critica que la Copa de América no está en los presupuestos. *El País*. December 19, 2003


Socialistas y vecinos advierten de que la ampliación norte del puerto agrava la regresión de las playas. *El País*. December 31, 2003

Camps centra en el pleno empleo, el AVE y la Copa de América los retos inmediatos del Consell. *El País*. January 2, 2004

De Natzaret a Malvarrosa. *El País*. January 12, 2004


Dudas sobre el turismo con la Copa de América. *El País*. January 23, 2004


AENA invirtió cinco millones en los aeropuertos valencianos en 2002 frente a 807 en los catalanes. *El País*. February 1, 2004


Valencia construye unas sofisticadas piscinas de alta competición bajo una cubierta de teflón. *El País*. February 8, 2004


Socialistas y vecinos advierten de que la ampliación norte del puerto agrava la regresión de las playas. *El País*. December 31, 2003

Camps centra en el pleno empleo, el AVE y la Copa de América los retos inmediatos del Consell. *El País*. January 2, 2004

De Natzaret a Malvarrosa. *El País*. January 12, 2004


Dudas sobre el turismo con la Copa de América. *El País*. January 23, 2004


AENA invirtió cinco millones en los aeropuertos valencianos en 2002 frente a 807 en los catalanes. *El País*. February 1, 2004


Valencia construye unas sofisticadas piscinas de alta competición bajo una cubierta de teflón. *El País*. February 8, 2004
73 Camps y Barberá presentan la Copa de América en la Unión Europea. *El País*. February 9, 2004
74 Cultura presenta en Arco la Bienal del agua y la Copa de América. *El País*. February 11, 2004
75 Camps y Barberá presentan la Copa de América en Bruselas. *El País*. February 12, 2004
76 El Consell ve la vela como el recambio a los fondos de la UE. *El País*. February 13, 2004
77 El Puerto se anticipa al Consorcio de la Copa de América y licita obras por 124 millones. *El País*. February 14, 2004
78 El Puerto adelanta al consorcio de la Copa de América con obras que consumen la cuarta parte del presupuesto. *El País*. February 14, 2004
79 Rubio acusa a Blasco y Barberá de alentar la especulación en L'Albufera. *El País*. February 17, 2004
80 Más apoyo al puerto. *El País*. February 18, 2004
81 Valencia tiene suelo edificable para los próximos 18 años sin recalificar huerta, según el PSPV. *El País*. February 20, 2004
82 Camps no descarta la modificación del concurso de privatización de Canal 9 tras el revés judicial. *El País*. February 20, 2004
84 El Ayuntamiento estudia la obra del canal del puerto. *El País*. March 5, 2004
86 "El Palau de les Arts es un artefacto de pesadilla". *El País*. March 14, 2004
87 El decano de los arquitectos critica el urbanismo espectáculo. *El País*. March 14, 2004
88 El nuevo Gobierno repercutirá en varios proyectos estrella del PP. *El País*. March 16, 2004
89 Menos obstáculos en el camino del PSPV. *El País*. March 16, 2004
90 Alborch: "Zapatero hará lo que esté en su mano para entenderse con Camps". *El País*. March 16, 2004
91 El PSOE controlará la Agencia Tributaria y la fiscalía tras el relevo en el Ejecutivo central. *El País*. March 16, 2004
92 Los empresarios esperan un nuevo modelo de plan hidrológico. *El País*. March 16, 2004
93 "La Zona de Actividades Logísticas llega con 20 años de retraso y es pequeñísima". *El País*. March 21, 2004
95 Rubio sospecha que el puerto usará la Copa de América para su ampliación. *El País*. March 25, 2004
96 Rita en la meca del lujo. *El País*. March 27, 2004
García Antón reclama al PSOE la inversión de 3.000 millones. El País. March 31, 2004

El Puerto de Valencia cree que el PSOE no cuestiona su desarrollo. El País. April 1, 2004

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Esta playa es tu herencia. El País. April 5, 2004

Camps y Pla se reúnen con serias diferencias sobre el PHN y el AVE. El País. April 5, 2004

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La oposición pide a Camps la reforma del Estatuto. El País. April 17, 2004

Varios colectivos sociales plantean una modernidad sostenible para la Valencia de la Copa de América. El País. April 23, 2004

Media Planning ubica en Valencia su centro operativo del Mediterráneo. El País. April 30, 2004

El canal de la Copa de América repercutirá de forma “severa” sobre la playa de la Malvarrosa. El País. April 30, 2004

La oposición pide un menor impacto ambiental de la Copa de América. El País. May 1, 2004

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Reconquista de la ciudad. El País. May 9, 2004

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Camps y Sevilla acuerdan revisar en el consejo de Política Fiscal la financiación de la sanidad. El País. May 11, 2004

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El Santander patrocina la Copa de América y será su banco oficial. El País. May 13, 2004

Camps advierte a Zapatero de que marginara a los valencianos si no invierte lo pactado con Aznar. El País. May 14, 2004

Un experto propone tres alternativas de menor impacto al nuevo canal del Puerto de Valencia. El País. May 15, 2004

El Gobierno se compromete con la Copa de América y la sitúa al mismo nivel que unos Juegos Olímpicos. El País. May 15, 2004

Cuatro UTE compiten por el canal de la Copa de América. El País. May 19, 2004
La Cámara y CC OO alertan de la debilidad del sistema productivo. *El País*. May 19, 2004

Impacto ambiental de la nueva bocana del puerto. *El País*. May 24, 2004

Un nuevo canal y una ampliación controvertida. *El País*. May 24, 2004

Fomento reitera su apoyo a la Copa de América pero quiere evitar que se especule como en Terra Mítica. *El País*. May 27, 2004


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Mucho (o todo) por hacer. *El País*. May 30, 2004


Rubio se opone a que el canal de la Copa de América sirva de excusa para ampliar el puerto. *El País*. June 2, 2004

Camps reivindica la centralidad valenciana en el desarrollo español y reclama mayores inversiones. *El País*. June 2, 2004

Rubio rechaza que la Copa de pie a ampliar el puerto. *El País*. June 2, 2004


Malestar en el Ejecutivo por el uso que hace el PP de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 4, 2004

Solo el 14% de los grandes empresarios estudian las oportunidades que abre la Copa de América. *El País*. June 5, 2004


Copa. *El País*. June 7, 2004

La alcaldesa reclama al Gobierno socialista 1.000 millones más de los que solicitó al Ejecutivo de Aznar. *El País*. June 9, 2004

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Barberá pide 1.600 millones a Solbes para pagar el coste de todas las obras de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 9, 2004

El Gobierno estudia que una sociedad estatal gestione el proyecto de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 10, 2004

Barberá asegura que pidió inversiones a un director general de Hacienda del PP. *El País*. June 10, 2004

150 El puerto llevará este mes al Gobierno la ampliación y asume la posible pérdida de suelo por la Copa. *El País*. June 12, 2004

151 *El País*. June 13, 2004

152 Solbes estudia crear una sociedad estatal para la Copa de América. *El País*. June 14, 2004

153 La alcaldesa pide el mismo trato que recibieron en 1992 Barcelona y Sevilla. *El País*. June 14, 2004

154 El Gobierno espera que Barberá y Camps aporten financiación a la Copa. *El País*. June 16, 2004

155 El Gobierno pide más peso en el Consorcio de la Copa de América dada su aportación económica. *El País*. June 17, 2004

156 Sevilla toma contacto con la firma suiza de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 18, 2004


158 Los empresarios se reunirán con Sevilla para analizar la Copa de América. *El País*. June 19, 2004

159 La retransmisión de las regatas está pendiente de un acuerdo con TVE. *El País*. June 21, 2004

160 El Consejo de Ministros aprobará en breve la ventanilla única para atender a los regatistas. *El País*. June 21, 2004


163 El Ayuntamiento y el Consell aceptan el plan de Gobierno para las obras de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 22, 2004

164 Jordi Sevilla pide que se involucre toda la sociedad para que Valencia "de el salto adelante que necesita". *El País*. June 22, 2004

165 El puerto se desmarca del plan del Gobierno para el canal de la Copa. *El País*. June 22, 2004

166 Rubio invita a los empresarios a que inviertan en promocionar Valencia para la Copa de América. *El País*. June 23, 2004


168 Los socialistas invitan a los empresarios a invertir en la Copa de América. *El País*. June 23, 2004

169 Sevilla recuerda al PP que en la Copa de América solo pone dinero el Gobierno. *El País*. June 24, 2004

170 El Consejo de Ministros aprobará hoy la creación de una Oficina Estatal de apoyo a la Copa de América. *El País*. June 25, 2004


El presidente del puerto corrige a Barberá y asegura que votó contra el retraso del túnel. *El País*. June 29, 2004

La alcaldesa defiende la gestión del Consorcio y exige al Gobierno que se "vuelque" en la Copa de América. *El País*. June 29, 2004

Del Moral corrige a Barberá y dice que votó "no" en el Consorcio de la Copa. *El País*. June 29, 2004

Los 500 millones que el Consell asigna a la Copa de América incluyen proyectos antiguos. *El País*. June 30, 2004


Fomento replica a Del Moral que no tiene fondos porque no presentó proyecto. *El País*. June 30, 2004

Camps anuncia ahora una inversión de 500 millones para la Copa de América. *El País*. June 30, 2004

Sevilla anuncia que el Gobierno aportará al menos 1.000 millones a la Copa de América. *El País*. July 1, 2004

El Gobierno invertirá al menos 1.000 millones en la Copa de América. *El País*. July 1, 2004

Del Moral pidió que el acta del Consorcio indicara que votó en contra del nuevo canal. *El País*. July 2, 2004

El Consell hará juzgados, ampliará el Clínico y mejorará el paisaje de la huerta para la Copa de América *El País*. July 3, 2004

*El País*. July 4, 2004

"Al puerto no le sobra ni un metro cuadrado". *El País*. July 4, 2004

Cyes acomete un plan de expansión territorial y opta a obras ferroviarias y de carreteras. *El País*. July 8, 2004

El Consorcio estudia el relevo de Salinas y prepara una sociedad para ejecutar las obras. *El País*. July 8, 2004

Pacten o márchense. *El País*. July 8, 2004

Bertarelli se queja del Consorcio de la Copa de América ante el Rey. *El País*. July 8, 2004

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Vivir del turismo. *El País*. July 9, 2004


"Los hechos se impondrán a la propaganda". *El País*. July 11, 2004

Las primeras obras de la Copa de América estarán listas en septiembre. *El País*. July 17, 2004

*El País*. July 18, 2004

La ciudad pendiente. *El País*. July 18, 2004


El Consorcio de la Copa del América aborda el relevo del director general *El País*. July 27, 2004

El Consorcio aplaza a septiembre el cambio de director y la creación de una sociedad estatal. *El País*. July 28, 2004


Los vecinos plantean a Sevilla sus dudas sobre la Copa de América. *El País*. July 29, 2004

El Gobierno ha disipado dudas de la Copa de América, dice el PSPV. *El País*. August 1, 2004


Rafael Aznar presidirá el puerto de Valencia al dimitir Del Moral. *El País*. September 8, 2004

Del Moral pasa el testigo del puerto de Valencia a una persona de la confianza de Rita Barberá. *El País*. September 9, 2004

Camps: "Lo exigimos todo". *El País*. September 9, 2004


Rubio critica el dramatismo de Barberá con la Copa de América. *El País*. September 14, 2004

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Pla acusa al PP de cerrar Valencia "en la urna de la Copa de América". *El País*. September 19, 2004

Los clubes náuticos piden a Sevilla que agilice los amarres para la Copa. *El País*. September 24, 2004

Las prerregatas de la Copa de América arrancan esta semana con la medición e inspección de los barcos. *El País*. September 27, 2004


Gobierno y Consell aceleraran la V-30, el aeropuerto y el ‘by pass’. *El País*. September 29, 2004
Barberá se resiste a ceder el Balcón al Mar para que el Gobierno recupere la inversión en la Copa. *El País*. September 29, 2004

Una empresa estatal gestionará durante 20 años las infraestructuras de la Copa de América. *El País*. September 29, 2004


Barberá busca un acuerdo con el Gobierno tras perder peso en la organización de la competición. *El País*. September 30, 2004

Pagar y poner la cama. *El País*. September 30, 2004


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Barberá acepta la sociedad estatal para la Copa. *El País*. October 1, 2004

La ACM repartirá entre los equipos de la Copa de América 13,2 millones de euros. *El País*. October 3, 2004


El Gobierno crea tasas nuevas y modifica alrededor de 15. *El País*. October 8, 2004

El puerto de Valencia vive su primer día frenético de visitantes desde que comenzaron las regatas. *El País*. October 10, 2004

Sevilla dice que la Copa de América obtendrá un apoyo similar al que se dio a los Juegos de Barcelona. *El País*. October 10, 2004

Camps reclamará a Solbes que financie las obras de embellecimiento de Valencia que pide Barberá. *El País*. October 13, 2004

A pocos metros de la Copa de América. *El País*. October 14, 2004

Barberá se resiste a ceder el control de la Copa de América. *El País*. October 14, 2004

200 personas se manifiestan en Natzaret para exigir las indemnizaciones por la inundación. *El País*. October 15, 2004

Sevilla aboga por profesionalizar la Copa de América frente al protagonismo político. *El País*. October 15, 2004


Siete meses de tensión. *El País*. October 19, 2004

El Gobierno se hace con el control de la gestión de la Copa de América. *El País*. October 19, 2004

El Consell exime de impuestos a los participantes en la Copa de América. *El País*. October 21, 2004

Sifre y Recuenco piden a Barberá más inversión en políticas de empleo. *El País*. October 22, 2004

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Salinas dice que lo importante es que los problemas de la Copa se resuelvan. *El País*. October 22, 2004

1.000 metros entre el lujo y la droga. *El País*. October 24, 2004

Lecciones después de un ensayo. *El País*. October 25, 2004

Barcelona entra de lleno. *El País*. October 25, 2004

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El Puerto convoca hoy la mesa que adjudicará las obras previstas para la Copa de América. *El País*. November 5, 2004

Gerardo Camps destaca el esfuerzo en política de empleo y en prevención de riesgos laborales. *El País*. November 5, 2004


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El Gobierno subraya su apuesta de invertir mil millones de euros para la Copa de América. *El País*. November 6, 2004


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Nouvel propone una integración de Valencia con el mar desde el respeto a la historia y la huerta. *El País*. November 12, 2004


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Socialistas y EU presentan más de 100 enmiendas a la ley de acompañamiento. *El País*. November 13, 2004


Sevilla aboga por el consenso para que Valencia desarrolle un proyecto como el de Nouvel "o parecido". *El País*. November 18, 2004

Portela critica la tendencia de buscar espectáculo en la arquitectura. *El País*. November 19, 2004
266 Cyes apuesta por su especialidad y compra un barco para obra marina. *El País*. November 20, 2004

267 "Hemos planteado el desarrollo de Valencia en términos sensibles". *El País*. November 21, 2004

268 ACM insta a los empresarios valencianos a aprovechar la plataforma de las regatas por la Copa de América. *El País*. November 25, 2004


271 Un año de 'glamour' y veleros. *El País*. November 26, 2004


274 El 78% de los valencianos valora la Copa de América y cree que subirá los precios, según una encuesta del PSPV. *El País*. November 30, 2004

275 La Generalitat pretende implicar al Gobierno en la financiación del costoso Palau de les Arts. *El País*. December 3, 2004


277 Las pasiones y los intereses. *El País*. December 7, 2004


279 La vicepresidenta del Gobierno ofrece a Camps que proponga un cupo de traductores en la UE. *El País*. December 11, 2004

280 El Gobierno acepta que Barberá rebase el límite de deuda para invertir en la Copa de América. *El País*. December 12, 2004


282 Rubio dice que incluir el puerto en el plan de El Grau rompe el acuerdo para la Copa. *El País*. December 14, 2004


284 Iberdrola fuerza un acuerdo entre el Náutico de Valencia y 'El Reto' para la Copa de América. *El País*. December 16, 2004

285 Paradores retoma el plan de reforma de El Saler para la Copa de América. *El País*. December 17, 2004

286 'El Reto-Iberdrola' se inscribe hoy para la Copa de América. de 2007 *El País*. December 17, 2004
La obra principal de la Copa de América se abre paso en el puerto. *El País*. December 17, 2004

AENA inicia la ampliación de la terminal de pasajeros, la pista y el aparcamiento del aeropuerto de Manises. *El País*. December 21, 2004

El puerto de Valencia se unirá al ‘lobby’ por un eje ferroviario de mercancías entre España y Alemania. *El País*. December 23, 2004

La oposición tacha el discurso de puro artificio teatral. *El País*. January 2, 2005


Barberá pide al Gobierno que le facilite inversiones por 240 millones de cara a la Copa de América. *El País*. January 13, 2005

Felicidades por la parte que te toca... de caos. *El País*. January 15, 2005


Compás de espera. *El País*. January 22, 2005

Barberá afronta la Copa con unas arcas exhaustas por la elevada deuda. *El País*. January 22, 2005

Premios de Hostelería para modernizar el sector de cara a la Copa de América. *El País*. January 25, 2005

El día después de la Copa de América. *El País*. January 26, 2005

La alcaldesa, que pidió 240 millones, dice que el préstamo es insuficiente para Valencia. *El País*. January 26, 2005

El Gobierno autoriza a Barberá a endeudarse en solo 50,8 millones. *El País*. January 26, 2005


El Gobierno pagará 100 millones para sacar las torres del Parque Central y aumentar la VPO. *El País*. January 28, 2005


Repensar el frente marítimo. *El País*. February 3, 2005

TVE ofrece a Camps una amplia cobertura de la Copa de América. *El País*. February 4, 2005


Camps acusa a Valenzuela de “irresponsabilidad política” por asegurar que la Generalitat margina a Alicante. *El País*. February 5, 2005
Zapatero reitera su apoyo a la Copa de América e insiste en que es un proyecto de todos los españoles. *El País*. February 6, 2005

El presidente de los constructores pide al Consell que se endeude más si es preciso para invertir. *El País*. February 10, 2005

Barberá pierde protagonismo en la gestión de la Copa de América con los nuevos estatutos del Consorcio. *El País*. February 13, 2005

Los vecinos de Valencia piden inversiones de cara a la Copa de América. *El País*. February 16, 2005

Sevilla y Barberá abogan por que los nuevos estatutos aclaren la financiación local. *El País*. February 17, 2005

Valenzuela aboga por la creación de un grupo de presión para demandar las necesidades de Alicante. *El País*. February 18, 2005

Inversiones para la Copa de América. *El País*. February 18, 2005

Los hoteleros esperan que pare el ‘boom’ de aperturas tras dos años de malos datos. *El País*. February 19, 2005


El gobierno de Barberá dejo de invertir 55,9 millones en 2004 y ve "normal" estar al límite de la deuda. *El País*. February 24, 2005

Rubio acusa a Barberá de propiciar ‘pelotazos’ en Tabacalera y El Cabanyal. *El País*. February 26, 2005

Los hosteleros de Valencia prevén invertir 40 millones para renovar el sector de cara a la Copa de América. *El País*. March 1, 2005

Sevilla asegura que la sociedad valenciana ha sufrido demasiado por problemas de identidad. *El País*. March 2, 2005

Nuevas obras para la Copa de América. *El País*. March 9, 2005

El Consorcio iniciará este año los planes de uso de la dársena tras la Copa de América. *El País*. March 11, 2005

La coordinadora contra los abusos urbanísticos se extiende a Valencia. *El País*. March 11, 2005

Campos opina que Zapatero maltrata a la Generalitat porque tiene sentido de Estado. *El País*. March 14, 2005


Rubio asegura que la alcaldesa de Valencia practica el absolutismo y pretende eliminar a la oposición. *El País*. April 5, 2005

Del Río denuncia que el coste de limpiar Valencia se dispara un 83%. *El País*. April 9, 2005

"Nuestra ‘chance’ es entrar en Europa desde la periferia". *El País*. April 10, 2005

Sevilla autorizará a Barberá a endeudarse en 4 millones más para la Copa América. *El País*. April 10, 2005
Álvarez advierte al 'lobby' AVE que, a diferencia de Cascos, no asumirá compromisos que no pueda cumplir. *El País*. April 12, 2005

Camps: "Hoy no es día de más peticiones a la ministra". *El País*. April 12, 2005

Escribano opina que Valencia aun no tiene un plan "coordinado" para unir la ciudad y su frente litoral. *El País*. April 26, 2005


Camps dice en Nueva York que la Copa de América es la embajadora de Valencia. *El País*. April 29, 2005

La política se calienta y el presidente viaja. *El País*. May 1, 2005

Ocho arquitectos concursan a instalaciones de la Copa de América. *El País*. May 5, 2005

La arquitectura de lo 'normal'. *El País*. May 6, 2005


Solo 4 propuestas para diseñar El Grau en Valencia. *El País*. May 9, 2005

El Consell cede por otros 10 años las instalaciones que ocupa RTVE. *El País*. May 10, 2005

ACM busca acercar el evento al público en las regatas de junio. *El País*. May 10, 2005

Una comisión de expertos evaluará los 8 diseños de la zona de ocio de la Copa de América. *El País*. May 10, 2005

La Cámara ofrece 25.000 proveedores a los equipos de la Copa de América. *El País*. May 12, 2005

Rubio exige a Barberá que decida el concurso de El Grau. *El País*. May 12, 2005

El Ayuntamiento aprueba la urbanización de varias calles del centro histórico por 3.300.000 euros. *El País*. May 14, 2005

El informe del concurso del Grau se inclina por el arquitecto Von Ger-kan. *El País*. May 14, 2005

Valencia: el puerto, 'mar adentro'. *El País*. May 17, 2005

Camps pide a Zapatero 600 millones extra para cubrir el déficit sanitario. *El País*. May 18, 2005

El Consell exige al Estado que doble la inversión de la Copa de América. *El País*. May 18, 2005

Defensa de la ciudad continua. *El País*. May 21, 2005

El puerto aprovecha la Copa de América para crecer por el norte. *El País*. May 21, 2005

Una playa en peligro. *El País*. May 21, 2005

Bernabé critica a Barberá su postura en la Copa desleal con el Gobierno. *El País*. May 26, 2005
El pulso político de la Copa de América no preocupa a Bonnefous. *El País*. May 31, 2005
La Generalitat hace otro plan sin concretar para la Copa de América. *El País*. June 2, 2005
Los arquitectos exponen sus diseños del 'Foredeck' al jurado del concurso. *El País*. June 3, 2005
El proyecto de la dársena tendrá un coste de 35,1 millones de euros. *El País*. June 4, 2005
Chipperfield y Vázquez ganan el concurso para el edificio de invitados de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 4, 2005

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El paraíso del 'megayate'. *El País*. June 18, 2005
El Rey, tripulante 18 del 'Iberdrola'. *El País*. June 20, 2005
Rubio pide que la ampliación del puerto se retrasa hasta evaluar el impacto del canal en las playas de Valencia. *El País*. June 21, 2005
Rodríguez Zapatero visitará el domingo las instalaciones de la Copa de América en Valencia. *El País*. June 23, 2005
Zapatero aplaza a julio la visita a la Copa de América por su agenda. *El País*. June 24, 2005
Los visitantes de la Copa de América gastaron 538 Euros de media. *El País*. June 30, 2005
Los ecologistas alertan de la construcción de 768.000 viviendas en la costa española. *El País*. July 6, 2005
Los puertos se reunirán para buscar sinergias en logística. *El País*. July 6, 2005
Las obras de la Copa de América hacen desaparecer la lonja de pescadores. *El País*. July 7, 2005
Industria y regatas. *El País*. July 8, 2005
Barberá ve en la Copa de América su mayor logro en este mandato. *El País*. July 9, 2005
Rubio dice que la Copa de América se logró con dinero y apoyo de todos. *El País*. July 13, 2005
El PSPV dice que el Consell ofrece una “sobredosis de propaganda y mentiras” en vez de explicar su gestión. El País. July 17, 2005

"La Copa de América debe beneficiar a toda la ciudad de Valencia". El País. August 15, 2005

El Consell cifra en 20 millones el impacto turístico de las prerregatas Louis Vuitton. El País. August 22, 2005

La conquista Suiza. El País. August 22, 2005

Natzaret teme a la lluvia. El País. September 2, 2005

El Consell y el Gobierno consideran clave la población para revisar la financiación sanitaria. El País. September 3, 2005

El encuentro de Valencia se suma a los proyectos internacionales. El País. September 9, 2005

El Colegio de Arquitectos recurrirá a los juzgados para restablecer la racionalidad urbanística. El País. September 10, 2005

AVE se compromete con la Autoridad Portuaria a urgir los accesos y la integración entre Valencia y Sagunto. El País. September 17, 2005

Barberá pide 774 millones al Gobierno en 2006 para la Copa de América. El País. September 17, 2005

Sevilla ofrece a Pérez Casado ser alto comisionado de la Copa de América. El País. September 17, 2005

Pérez Casado acepta ser alto comisionado de la Copa de América. El País. September 20, 2005

Barberá deja en el aire el concurso internacional que convoco para la conexión urbana de Valencia con el mar. El País. September 20, 2005

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"Solo haremos enmiendas consensuadas con el PP". El País. September 25, 2005

Dos comisionados y una presidenta. El País. September 26, 2005

Las Cortes rechazan una moratoria urbanística y la agencia del agua. El País. September 29, 2005

El PP reanuda las críticas a Zapatero tras el debate de política general. El País. September 30, 2005

La urgente necesidad de un ataque de cordura. El País. October 13, 2005

Pérez Casado es nombrado comisionado de la Copa de América. El País. October 14, 2005

El ‘Alinghi’ echa el ancla en el puerto. El País. October 16, 2005


El País. October 21, 2005
Las tres administraciones aparcan diferencias y se comprometen a hacer de la Copa "un éxito". *El País*. October 21, 2005

Pla ve imposible nuevos pactos con el PP y pide la movilización de "todos" para ganar en 2007. *El País*. October 23, 2005

Mucho futuro y difícil seguimiento. *El País*. October 23, 2005

Barberá endeuda a Valencia en otros 30 millones para la Copa de América. *El País*. October 25, 2005

Ocho nuevas empresas públicas para la Copa de América y para proyectos de Blasco y de Fabra. *El País*. November 1, 2005


Vigilados por mil ojos. *El País*. November 6, 2005

El aeropuerto de Manises alcanza los 4,5 millones de pasajeros, un millón más que el año pasado. *El País*. November 12, 2005

Embarcaciones de recreo protestan en Gandía contra los yates de la Copa de América que ocuparan sus amarres. *El País*. November 13, 2005

El Gobierno invierte 2 millones en promoción de la Copa de América. *El País*. November 18, 2005

El PSPV destaca la inversión del Estado en Valencia y el PP critica que no hay obra nueva. *El País*. November 18, 2005

Aeropuertos en la pista de despegue. *El País*. November 18, 2005

Un puerto entre la ciudad y los grandes buques. *El País*. November 18, 2005

Unos presupuestos generales de Estado por debajo del 10%. *El País*. November 18, 2005

El interior, a la espera de un gran eje. *El País*. November 18, 2005

Valencia apuesta por las inversiones en el plan de El Cabanyal, Ciutat Vella y la Copa de América. *El País*. November 19, 2005


*El País*. November 21, 2005

Los vuelos de bajo coste suponen casi el 40% del volumen de pasajeros de Manises y L’Altet. *El País*. November 21, 2005

Rubio critica que Barberá pida ahora apoyo empresarial a la Copa de América. *El País*. November 24, 2005

Barberá ensalza la inversión del Consell en obras y en la Copa de América. *El País*. November 25, 2005

PP y PSPV se enfrentan por el tercer comisionado de la Copa de América. *El País*. November 26, 2005

Camps viaja a Nueva York para promocionar la Comunidad. *El País*. November 27, 2005

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Dragados, Drace y Sedesa harán por 37,6 millones la mayor obra del puerto vinculada a la Copa de América. *El País*. December 2, 2005


Los socialistas vuelven a reclamar un cambio de modelo urbanístico y la destitución del consejero Blasco. *El País*. December 18, 2005


Pérez Casado lamenta que Barberá avale un concurso de ideas sobre la dársena interior sin proyecto de ciudad *El País*. January 15, 2006

Marcos dice que el PP y el PSOE equivocan las prioridades para la Comunidad. *El País*. January 15, 2006


Hacienda exigirá a Barberá un plan para bajar la deuda. *El País*. February 24, 2006


La Copa de América y la escasa oferta elevan un 113% el precio de la vivienda en Valencia. *El País*. March 2, 2006


Bernabé asegura que la ampliación del aeropuerto estará para las prerregratas de la Copa de América. *El País*. March 25, 2006

Las obras para la Copa de América eliminan el muro que separa el paseo marítimo de Valencia del puerto. *El País*. March 29, 2006


Camps dice que las obras de la Copa de América están adelantadas. *El País*. April 6, 2006

Barberá recibe un premio que concede el Ayuntamiento. *El País*. April 10, 2006

Una treintena de entidades piden el 0,7% de la Copa de América para cooperación. *El País*. April 12, 2006

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El Rey presidirá un acto de presentación de la Copa de América organizado por el Gobierno en Madrid. *El País*. April 20, 2006

Las obras en la avenida y por la Copa de América colapsan el tráfico del puerto. *El País*. April 22, 2006

Un 33% de la franja costera valenciana está urbanizada, según un informe de Greenpeace. *El País*. May 1, 2006


La invitación del Rey evita el boicot del PP al acto del Gobierno por la Copa de América. *El País*. May 9, 2006

Malcriados. *El País*. May 9, 2006

Rubio promociona con una campaña la labor estatal en la Copa de América. *El País*. May 11, 2006

Colas para ver las regatas de la Copa de América. *El País*. May 12, 2006

Ejecutivos de 10 multinacionales constatan el auge del turismo y la construcción en detrimento de la industria. *El País*. May 18, 2006

El Consell critica el trato "residual" de RTVE a la Copa de América. *El País*. May 18, 2006

La Guardia Civil ocupa 17 patrulleras en la Copa de América en plena crisis inmigratoria. *El País*. May 19, 2006

"El PAI es un Ferrari sobre un camino sin señales de tráfico por el que pasa mucha gente". *El País*. May 21, 2006


"Los eventos no son rentables". *El País*. May 31, 2006


El puerto de Valencia crecerá más en superficie que el de Hong Kong. *El País*. June 11, 2006

Chipperfield abre un curso de arquitectos estrella de la UPC. *El País*. June 13, 2006

*El País*. June 14, 2006

La Generalitat limpia de basura el campo de regatas *El País*. June 19, 2006

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El autor del plan maestro de la Copa pide que el interés social prime sobre la ampliación del puerto. *El País*. June 23, 2006


Barberá acusa a Zapatero de no invertir y de eludir responsabilidades en vísperas de su visita. *El País*. June 30, 2006 Friday

La ministra de Fomento dice que se esforzará aunque el compromiso del AVE es para 2010. *El País*. July 1, 2006 Saturday

Un concurso de ideas determinará los usos de la dársena tras la Copa de América. *El País*. July 4, 2006 Tuesday

Valencia anda sobrada de marcas. *El País*. August 4, 2006 Friday

El Consell anuncia su oposición frontal a las prospecciones petrolíferas frente a El Saler. *El País*. August 24, 2006 Thursday


Rubio pide que se expongán al público los proyectos de la futura marina. *El País*. September 8, 2006 Friday

El Puerto de Valencia avisa de que se perderán mil millones si no crece. *El País*. September 21, 2006 Thursday

Los arquitectos europeos premian el edificio Veles e Vents. *El País*. September 23, 2006 Saturday

Valencia ya tiene su "milla de oro". *El País*. September 27, 2006 Wednesday

La Generalitat dejará de ingresar 175 millones por rebajar la presión fiscal. *El País*. September 30, 2006 Saturday

El PP afirma que los Presupuestos Generales son un fraude y aportan 396 millones menos que la media. *El País*. October 1, 2006 Sunday

El Consell ignora las críticas al impacto de la ampliación del puerto de Valencia. *El País*. October 2, 2006 Monday

60.000 Euros por un anuncio. *El País*. October 17, 2006 Tuesday

El PP ve escasa la inversión que prevé el presupuesto estatal. *El País*. October 20, 2006 Friday

Campos defiende la subida del 39% del gasto previsto en Presidencia. *El País*. November 4, 2006 Saturday

500 Bancaixa, Lubasa y Sacyr se adjudican el suelo de El Grau por 320 millones. *El País*. November 9, 2006 Thursday

501 Consell y PP arremeten contra el Gobierno por la "paralización". *El País*. November 17, 2006 Friday


504 Barberá destinará sólo 4 millones a promover Valencia el año de la Copa de América. *El País*. December 6, 2006 Wednesday

505 Camps reclamará la revisión del sistema de financiación. *El País*. December 29, 2006 Friday

506 Camps pide al Gobierno más dinero por el aumento de un millón de habitantes. *El País*. January 2, 2007 Tuesday


508 La Copa de América no tira del precio de la vivienda, pero sí el nuevo Mestalla en Campanar. *El País*. January 10, 2007 Wednesday

509 Clos subraya el impacto de la Copa de América. *El País*. January 20, 2007 Saturday

510 Sevilla destaca la división del PP y que su proyecto está "agotado y sin ideas". *El País*. January 28, 2007 Sunday

511 Barberá crea marcas y firmas con la excusa de la Copa de América. *El País*. January 30, 2007 Tuesday


513 Los planes urbanísticos sustituyen a los parques temáticos como reclamo en Fitur. *El País*. February 1, 2007 Thursday


515 Barberá centrará su campaña en los barrios y los grandes eventos. *El País*. February 13, 2007 Tuesday

516 Barberá anuncia más inversiones al bajar la deuda al 105,6% en 2006. *El País*. February 17, 2007 Saturday

517 Los técnicos destacan 11 proyectos de la marina del puerto de Valencia. *El País*. February 27, 2007 Tuesday


520 La Valencia del futuro se abre paso por el mar. *El País*. March 4, 2007 Sunday

521 2.000 agentes y 24 barcos velarán por la seguridad de la Copa de América. *El País*. March 8, 2007 Thursday
Manises despega. *El País*. March 9, 2007 Friday

Jordi Sevilla propondrá una sede eventual del Instituto Español de Oceanografía en Gandía. *El País*. March 13, 2007 Tuesday


ACM busca el calor del público con grandes conciertos. *El País*. March 16, 2007 Friday

Sevilla planta cara a Barberá en el puerto. *El País*. March 24, 2007 Saturday

Manises estrena la terminal que debe cubrir sus necesidades para cuatro años. *El País*. March 26, 2007 Monday

El Gobierno y la Generalitat pelean hasta por las infraestructuras. *El País*. March 26, 2007 Monday

La Copa tendrá un impacto económico de 3.600 millones de euros. *El País*. March 27, 2007 Tuesday

Como las Olímpiadas. *El País*. March 27, 2007 Tuesday

Sevilla controlará con una sociedad estatal el futuro del frente portuario tras la Copa. *El País*. March 27, 2007 Tuesday

El peor escenario del día después. *El País*. March 27, 2007 Tuesday

Barberá replica que la mitad del puerto es de la ciudad. *El País*. March 27, 2007 Tuesday

El Gobierno reta a Barberá a demostrar qué terrenos tiene la ciudad en el puerto. *El País*. March 29, 2007 Thursday

Virosque considera politizada la Copa de América. *El País*. March 30, 2007 Friday

Barberá discute que el Estado tenga derechos sobre la dársena. *El País*. March 30, 2007 Friday

Viaje de Zapatero para inaugurar el aeropuerto y ver la Copa de América. *El País*. April 3, 2007 Tuesday

Los concejales de Valencia incluyen al puerto entre sus logros económicos. *El País*. April 4, 2007 Wednesday


Vender grandes eventos, silenciar grandes políticas. *El País*. April 8, 2007 Sunday

Valencia y el mar. *El País*. April 9, 2007 Monday

La reforma de la dársena abre un nuevo espacio ciudadano de ocio en Valencia. *El País*. April 10, 2007 Tuesday


Zapatero asegura haber recuperado el tiempo perdido por el PP en Valencia. *El País*. April 11, 2007 Wednesday

*El País*. April 11, 2007 Wednesday
El 'lobby' valenciano hace piña contra el último informe. *El País*. April 12, 2007 Thursday

La Copa de América dejará en Valencia siete veces más dinero que en Auckland 03. *El País*. April 15, 2007 Sunday

Olas, fuegos y luces. *El País*. April 15, 2007 Sunday

Pasarela de ilustres de la mano de la Copa de América. *El País*. April 16, 2007 Monday

El Levante proyecta su nuevo estadio en la dársena del puerto de Valencia. *El País*. April 19, 2007 Thursday

El puerto acredita que es titular de la dársena de Valencia. *El País*. April 28, 2007 Saturday

"Exigiremos la moratoria urbanística". *El País*. May 5, 2007 Saturday

Lo que la sexta se llevó. *El País*. May 5, 2007 Saturday

Viento favorable a los 'cinco estrellas'. *El País*. May 7, 2007 Monday

Cuidado con las rebajas. *El País*. May 8, 2007 Tuesday


La Copa de América genera 2.500 contratos de servicios hasta abril. *El País*. May 11, 2007 Friday


¿Hay vida más allá del ladrillo? *El País*. May 12, 2007 Saturday

Zapatero afirma que los principios del PP "son de hojalata, como su patriotismo". *El País*. May 13, 2007 Sunday


Barberá elude el debate con Alborch. *El País*. May 15, 2007 Tuesday

La ampliación del puerto dificulta que Valencia vuelva a ser sede de la Copa Bonnefous: "Si gana el Alinghi, la próxima edición será en Europa en 2009 o 2011". *El País*. May 15, 2007 Tuesday


"El puerto de Valencia no debe ser una parcela de lujo". *El País*. May 16, 2007 Wednesday


Pla pide la colaboración de los empresarios para recuperar el tiempo perdido por el PP. *El País*. May 17, 2007 Thursday

El ministro Sevilla y Bonnefous hablan del futuro de la Copa. *El País*. May 18, 2007 Friday

Andreu: "Es una humillación". *El País*. May 19, 2007 Saturday

Compromís destapa el patrimonio acosado por el urbanismo salvaje. *El País*. May 20, 2007 Sunday

Barberá mantiene la mayoría sin signos de fatiga en sus votantes. *El País*. May 21, 2007 Monday

"Hemos puesto a la ciudad en el mapa". *El País*. May 22, 2007 Tuesday


La tecnología española supera el déficit comercial con EE UU. *El País*. June 5, 2007 Tuesday

Peralta critica al Gobierno por falta de seguridad ante el riesgo de un atentado. *El País*. June 7, 2007 Thursday

Los economistas celebran el impulso turístico de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 8, 2007 Friday

Los ganadores del concurso de la marina critican la apertura al tráfico de la dársena. *El País*. June 12, 2007 Tuesday


Bertarelli ve incompatible la ampliación del puerto con la Copa de América. *El País*. June 16, 2007 Saturday

Rita Barberá acentúa su apuesta por la Valencia de los grandes eventos. *El País*. June 17, 2007 Sunday

Rita y el puerto. *El País*. June 18, 2007 Monday

El Ejército se suma al dispositivo de seguridad de la Copa de América. *El País*. June 19, 2007 Tuesday

Los hoteleros piden que se doble el presupuesto del área de Turismo. *El País*. June 21, 2007 Thursday

"Valencia da mucha importancia a estar en el mundo y descuida el día a día". *El País*. June 23, 2007 Saturday

El Consell acusa al Gobierno de entorpecer su defensa en la UE. *El País*. June 23, 2007 Saturday


Cirugía en un paciente que corre. *El País*. June 23, 2007 Saturday

La Copa de América estrecha los lazos entre Valencia y Suiza. *El País*. June 24, 2007 Sunday

Zapatero ha aumentado un 60% la inversión del Estado por valenciano. *El País*. June 24, 2007 Sunday

Valencia acogerá de nuevo la Copa de América si amplía el puerto en Sagunto. *El País*. June 25, 2007 Monday


No se arrodillen ante Bertarelli. *El País*. June 26, 2007 Tuesday

Los vuelos chárter e internacionales de Manises se disparan. *El País*. June 30, 2007 Saturday 

La ampliación, a Sagunto. *El País*. July 2, 2007 Monday 

La Copa deja una lluvia de millones y un récord de público. *El País*. July 4, 2007 Wednesday 

Ferrando: "No hay excusa para dilatar la ampliación del Puerto de Valencia". *El País*. July 5, 2007 Thursday 

La Copa sólo seguirá en Valencia si se frena la ampliación del puerto industrial. *El País*. July 6, 2007 Friday 

Bertarelli ha creado un negocio millonario y tiene el apoyo de la Administración para repetirlo. *El País*. July 6, 2007 Friday 


La ampliación del puerto se retrasa a 2009 tras las exigencias de ACM. *El País*. July 7, 2007 Saturday 

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Los controles en el puerto desaparecen tras el final de la Copa de América. *El País*. July 11, 2007 Wednesday 


Bertarelli y Prodi analizan el traslado de la Copa de América a Cerdeña. *El País*. July 13, 2007 Friday 

El circuito de F-1 obliga a reformar la dársena del puerto de la Copa de América. *El País*. July 14, 2007 Saturday 

"Queremos utilizar Valencia como el 'hub' tecnológico del Mediterráneo". *El País*. July 16, 2007 Monday 


Los turistas utilizan las tarjetas de crédito un 68% más que en 2006. *El País*. July 20, 2007 Friday 

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Las obras del puerto sólo se pararán durante las regatas. *El País*. July 25, 2007 Wednesday

"Hemos elegido Valencia porque ha demostrado ser una sede fantástica". *El País*. July 26, 2007 Thursday


Barberá rechaza crear una comisión sobre el frente litoral. *El País*. July 28, 2007 Saturday

La ampliación del puerto de Valencia se condiciona a la preservación de las playas. *El País*. August 1, 2007 Wednesday

Carmen Alborch advierte de los riesgos de la ampliación del puerto para las playas y L’Albufera. *El País*. August 2, 2007 Thursday

El precio de los alquileres y de las VPO expulsa a los jóvenes de Valencia. *El País*. August 3, 2007 Friday

Una costa con puntos y banderas negras. *El País*. August 14, 2007 Tuesday

Lo que queda de la Copa de América. *El País*. August 19, 2007 Sunday

El Gobierno quiere una presidencia rotatoria para el consorcio de la Copa. *El País*. September 1, 2007 Saturday

El frenazo de la construcción en agosto provoca un alza del desempleo del 6,7%. *El País*. September 5, 2007 Wednesday

Barberá y Camps arremeten contra el Gobierno por el control de la Copa. *El País*. September 5, 2007 Wednesday


El Gobierno hace valer su poder en la Copa y provoca la cólera del PP. *El País*. September 8, 2007 Saturday

Barberá acusa al Ejecutivo de prepotencia y rechaza el "trágala". *El País*. September 8, 2007 Saturday

El turismo subió un 20% en Valencia durante julio y agosto. *El País*. September 8, 2007 Saturday

El PP califica el cambio de estatutos de la copa de "atraco a maño armada". *El País*. September 9, 2007 Sunday

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Las 70 mayores ONG acusan al Consell de “colapsar” la ayuda al Tercer Mundo. La Generalitat anunció que daría el 0,7% a combatir la pobreza y lo ha rebajado al 0,22%. El País. September 27, 2007 Thursday
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Los hoteles se vacían cuando pasan los grandes eventos. *El País*. January 27, 2008 Sunday


Camps asegura que el beneficio de los grandes eventos es indiscutible. *El País*. February 1, 2008 Friday

"El Gobierno cooperará con la Generalitat, lo quiera o no". *El País*. March 7, 2008 Friday

La 33ª edición de la Copa de América se aleja de Valencia. *El País*. March 19, 2008 Wednesday

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Oracle se compromete a traer de vuelta la Copa a Valencia si gana. El Alinghi y los estadounidenses no logran pactar las fechas de la 33ª edición. *El País*. March 27, 2008 Thursday

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Los visitantes de crucero en Valencia caen un 82%. *El País*. May 9, 2008 Friday

La Copa de América en 2009 obliga a retocar el contrato. *El País*. May 14, 2008 Wednesday

El Consell insta al Gobierno a ejecutar el trasvase a Barcelona. *El País*. May 31, 2008 Saturday


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La ampliación del puerto alejará el mar 100 metros en la Malvarrosa. *El País*. July 10, 2008 Thursday

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La polvareda y el ruido de las obras afectarán a la dársena deportiva. *El País*. July 31, 2008 Thursday

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Las reservas en los grandes hoteles de Valencia caen el 50%. *El País*. November 3, 2008 Monday

El Gobierno aprueba beneficios fiscales a la Copa de América. *El País*. November 15, 2008 Saturday

Las administraciones dan por hecha la Copa de América. *El País*. December 6, 2008 Saturday


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714 Una sociedad para gestionar los grandes eventos. *El País*. February 11, 2009 Wednesday

715 Los ojos en la Copa. *El País*. February 12, 2009 Thursday

716 Copa de América, Valencia acogerá regatas en julio y octubre. *El País*. February 14, 2009 Saturday

717 Luna visita hoy la sociedad para grandes eventos. *El País*. February 16, 2009 Monday

718 Cinco consejerías y tres entidades contrataron con Orange Market. *El País*. February 26, 2009 Thursday

719 Camps se enroca en los eventos mientras aprieta el paro y la crisis. *El País*. March 5, 2009 Thursday

720 El Gobierno rechaza pagar 20 millones a Bertarelli por dos regatas. *El País*. March 26, 2009 Thursday

721 Los políticos se apuntan a la batalla naval. *El País*. March 30, 2009 Monday


723 Camps y Barberá aceptan el coste de 9 millones por una regata. *El País*. April 2, 2009 Thursday

724 Auckland, más barato. *El País*. April 2, 2009 Thursday

725 Cronología del conflicto judicial entre el Alinghi y el Oracle. *El País*. April 3, 2009 Friday


727 "Si no hay prerregatas múltiples rescindiríamos el contrato”. *El País*. April 3, 2009 Friday

728 Nueva York falla a favor de BMW-Oracle en su pleito con el Alinghi, el fiasco de Barberá y Camps. *El País*. April 3, 2009 Friday


730 El Gobierno considera "irresponsable" el fiasco de Barberá y Camps en la Copa. *El País*. April 4, 2009 Saturday

731 El Consorcio de la Copa hace aguas. *El País*. April 6, 2009 Monday


733 Salgado rechazó el contrato por prematuro y abusivo. *El País*. April 10, 2009 Friday

734 Barberá rompe cinco días después el contrato de las regatas con ACM. *El País*. April 10, 2009 Friday

735 Barberá pierde credibilidad con el fiasco de las regatas, afirma Alborch. *El País*. April 12, 2009 Sunday

736 Virosque: "Mejor la ONU que la Copa". *El País*. April 17, 2009 Friday
Economía, Virosque matiza sus críticas a la Copa de América. *El País*. April 18, 2009 Saturday

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Barberá pide otra vez diálogo para no perder la Copa. *El País*. April 30, 2009 Thursday

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El Consell da a la Copa un millón que era de agricultura, según el PSPV. *El País*. May 4, 2009 Monday


Presidencia negó contratos de la trama para la Copa de América. *El País*. May 5, 2009 Tuesday

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Una competición de ida y vuelta. *El País*. August 6, 2009 Thursday

Del fiasco de las prerregatas al abandono definitivo. *El País*. August 6, 2009 Thursday

Adiós a la Copa de América. *El País*. August 6, 2009 Thursday

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Adiós a la Copa de América. Los vecinos reclaman el uso de la dársena "privatizada". *El País*. August 7, 2009 Friday

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8. La Generalitat anuncia que la próxima Bienal se dedicara al agua bajo el lema 'Sin ti, no soy'. *El País*. October 15, 2003
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23. *El País*. June 8, 2005
25. El PGOU ha sufrido un centenar de modificaciones, según el PSPV. *El País*. June 27, 2005
27. Territorio ratifica el plan especial de Sociopolis en La Torre *El País*. September 11, 2005

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