BODILY IDENTITY IN
SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY

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Submitted for the degree of PhD in History

2013
I, Antonia Fitzpatrick, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
BODILY IDENTITY IN SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY

ABSTRACT

At the core of this thesis is an examination of how Aquinas's materialistic understanding of resurrection shaped his thinking on human nature, individuality and bodily identity.

Resurrection implied two things with respect to the individual body. First: the union between soul and matter was intimate and essential. Aquinas held that the soul is the only substantial, or nature-determining, form in a human being. Second: the material part in a human was relatively independent from the soul. Aquinas grounded the relative independence of body from soul on the accidental form 'dimensive quantity', which gave to the body its organic structure, individualised its matter, and supported its material continuity.

Chapters 1 and 2 discuss Aquinas's Aristotelian and Averroan sources. For Aristotle, although individuality had its basis in matter, all matter was exchangeable without prejudice to identity. Problematically for the theologian working on resurrection, Aristotle offered no account of postmortem bodily continuity. Averroes, crucially, imported Aristotle's geometrical notion of 'body' as a three-dimensional kind of quantity into his discussions of bodily identity. Averroes thought that matter had a bodily structure of its own, supporting its continuing identity across radical change.

Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Aquinas's thinking on the individual body and bodily identity. Reflection on resurrection, it seems, pushed Aquinas towards adopting a position on the nature of matter similar to Averroes'.

In the 1270s, critics (mostly Franciscan) of Aquinas's theory of human nature turned it on its head, argued that it threatened the body (with heretical consequences for the identity of Christ's corpse), and set off the late-thirteenth century's defining debate on human nature.

Chapter 5 discusses the divergent ways in which the Dominicans Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford, and Richard Knapwell defended Aquinas's theory of human nature and its consequences for postmortem bodily continuity at Oxford during 1277-86. It culminates in an examination of Knapwell's advanced work on the nature of matter, which built upon Averroes' and Aquinas's. The thesis contends, furthermore, that these three Dominicans can still be grouped under the banner of the 'early Thomistic school' if the ground they share is understood to be primarily political, rather than primarily doctrinal.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of the following institutions:

The Arts and Humanities Research Council

University College London

St. John's College, Oxford.

I am particularly grateful for the support, encouragement and advice of my supervisor
David d’Avray.

I am also grateful to others who have read parts of this thesis or have discussed its arguments with me, and have offered helpful criticism: Sophie Page, Alain Boureau, Sylvain Piron, and John Sabapathy.
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In the thirteenth century, scholastic theologians' interpretation of the doctrine of the general resurrection was literal and materialistic. It did not make sense to use the word *resurrectio*, Thomas Aquinas pointed out, unless the very same body that died would be that which rose again.\(^1\) Longstanding theological reasoning supported this interpretation of the general resurrection, as did the decrees of the great reforming Church councils of the thirteenth century: each individual would be justly judged or rewarded only in their sinning flesh; the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the Second Council of Lyons (1274), in the face of the threat of dualist heretics who taught that matter was evil, reaffirmed that every woman and man would rise again with their own body, a body that was identical to their mortal body.\(^2\) But in virtue of what would any person's risen body be the same as their mortal body? Which flesh formerly belonging to them would need to rise, and how much of it? And how, in any case, did an individual body's remains persist and remain the same after its death and decomposition? Answering questions like these led theologians to develop complex analyses of bodily identity. They discussed the development of the individual body *in utero*, the material transmission of characteristics across generations, and the physiology of growth and nutrition. Questioning how the material particular to an individual body might survive across the body's decay,

\(^1\) Non enim resurrectio dici potest, nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat: quia resurrectio est iterata resurrectio; ejusdem autem est surgere et cadere'. Thomas Aquinas, *In quattuor libris sententiarum* (hereafter *In Sent.*) IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, q.c.1, response, *Opera omnia* (ed.) R. Busa, 7 vols. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), vol. 1, p. 635.

decomposition, and even being eaten by other humans, they analysed the nature of matter itself.

The question of personal identity remains provocative and fertile in modern philosophical debate, of course. In order to try to isolate the criteria for personal survival, modern analytical philosophers have devised thought experiments that invite us to imagine the possibility and consequences of two 'persons' coming to occupy one another's bodies, or the reaction that an individual might have to being told that they would on some future morning wake up with no memory, but in excruciating pain. What would be the outcome for personal survival of transplanting brains between bodies, of dividing a brain and housing each half in a new body, or of transferring a 'brain state' from one individual to another, much like copying the hard-drive of a computer? What if 'teletransportation', which figures in science fiction as a mode of travel, were actually possible, and a person could be destroyed on Earth and recreated in new matter on Mars, with the blueprint of each of their cells beamed across space at the speed of light in the intervening minutes? Would this really be survival?3

Behind thirteenth-century discussions of bodily identity, of course, was the fundamental assumption that, in addition to their immortal rational soul, an individual human's particular material part, their body, would be crucial to their identity at the resurrection, or to what made them the same as their mortal self: each individual would rise again the same person only if the body reconstructed for them was materially the same as their mortal body.

Scholastic theologians devised bizarre thought experiments of their own, in order to demonstrate that several individuals might lay claim to the same material: what if a male cannibal were to eat another's flesh and then beget a child, or, even, live entirely off human fetuses and (assuming that his semen is constituted from superfluous nutriment) father a child? At the resurrection, would the shared matter go to the

father, to the child, or to the fetuses themselves (whose bodies would rise again augmented by divine power)\(^4\)

In his very earliest work on the resurrection, his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (c.1252-56),\(^5\) the controversial Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas made an uncompromising intervention into scholastic debate on resurrection and bodily identity. It is with this intervention and its consequences for scholastic thought on bodily identity that this thesis is concerned.

Just as it implied that material identity was crucial to personal identity, the doctrine of the general resurrection implied, universally, that human nature was composite, comprising a body as well as an immortal soul.\(^6\) Thomas Aquinas claimed that a new theory of the composition of human nature that he himself had developed was the only (or at least by far the best available) theory that could *preserve* the body, in addition to the soul, as an essential component of human nature. By extension, only this theory could preserve a true understanding of the general resurrection as the reunification of each individual human soul to its own body and no other body: only his own theory of human nature, Aquinas argued, implied that an individual's material identity was in fact crucial to their personal identity.

This new theory, to put it into technical scholastic language, was of course Aquinas's famous idea that the immortal rational soul is the only substantial, or nature-determining, form in any human. This study will refer to that theory as the 'theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans'. Any other form in the body, Aquinas argued, was an 'accidental' form that did not define its nature. In Aquinas's conception of human nature, the rational soul and matter therefore combine in a distinctively intimate union.


Although he insisted to his colleagues in the Theology faculty at Paris that only the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was concordant with the literal understanding of the general resurrection in the respect just outlined, the departure that Aquinas made in developing the theory seems to have represented a genuine intellectual impulse rather than an intentionally highly provocative move. Nonetheless, in the years following Aquinas's death in 1274, the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans became the subject of the most impassioned debate about the composition of human nature in the high medieval period.

Critics of Aquinas's philosophy, mostly members of the Franciscan Order, found it possible to interpret the theory in a very different way. They claimed that the theory that the soul was the only nature-determining form in the human being in fact radically diminished the importance of the body as a component of human nature, and of the individual human. Therefore, they argued, it had dangerous theological consequences. If the soul was the body's only defining form, there could be no real bodily continuity across the soul's separation at death: Christ's dead body was not really His dead body, and the relic was not really the saint.

Aquinas's critics advocated a different theory of the composition of human nature: that there was at least one other substantial form in each human body, namely a corporeal substantial form. This thesis will refer to any such theory as a 'pluralist' theory, or 'theory of the plurality of substantial forms in humans'. Pluralists argued that the persistence of such a corporeal form in the corpse was necessary to guarantee any concrete identity between the body living and dead.

Several scholars, mostly Dominicans, responded in defence of Aquinas's theory of the composition of human nature, explaining why it had no false theological consequences.

Given that the educational system at the universities of the medieval west actively encouraged daily adversarial debate on almost all philosophical and theological issues, and given too that Aquinas had been a highly respected theologian whose faith could not really be doubted, the way in which the debate over the implications of Aquinas's new theory about the composition of human nature escalated was extraordinary. The theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was implicitly targeted by the Dominican Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Kilwardby in a public
prohibition on the teaching of certain theses at Oxford on 18 March 1277; there were accusations of heresy from both sides; and the theory was condemned as heretical by Kilwardby's successor as Archbishop of Canterbury, the Franciscan John Peckham, on 30 April 1286.

The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it aims to understand Aquinas's innovative thought on the individual body, bodily identity, postmortem bodily continuity, and bodily resurrection, in its own right. Then, using this understanding as a basis from which to work, it aims to provide a close analysis of the reception of Aquinas's thought on these topics in this late thirteenth-century debate on the composition of human nature up to 1286, focusing on the work of three Dominicans, all at Oxford, who made significant contributions to the debate: Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford, and Richard Knapwell. Pursuing these twin aims, the thesis in effect consists in two case studies, each in a different phenomenon that characterised medieval scholasticism.

In the first instance, focusing just on Thomas Aquinas's thought, the thesis provides a case study in a phenomenon that in western intellectual history is peculiar to scholasticism: in the universities of the high-to-late medieval West, where Theology was the highest prestige subject and master discipline, all of the most cutting-edge scientific thinking was done in response to theological problems. The relevance of this point to scholastic thought about the resurrection was hinted at at the very outset. The thesis will discuss how reflection on the doctrine of bodily resurrection would shape Aquinas's innovative theory of the composition of human nature, and the analysis of the individual body and bodily identity that went with it, along with his thinking on postmortem bodily continuity and the nature of matter.

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8 Cf. also P. L. Reynolds, *Food and the Body. Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), which was an important source of inspiration for this thesis, details how reflection on the resurrection and original sin provoked advanced speculation about sexual reproduction, digestion, nutrition and growth in scholastic theology up to Aquinas. Whereas Reynolds' focus is primarily biological, the present study concerns the metaphysical issues associated with resurrection.
Insofar as it takes a close interest in the ways in which Dominicans interpreted and defended Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological consequences for bodily identity, the thesis will also provide a short case study in the emergence of intellectual schools at the end of the thirteenth century, and more precisely in emergence of the so-called 'early Thomistic school'. The works that Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell produced in defence of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans display no homogenous understanding of its implications for the body and for bodily identity. The thesis will ask whether and in what sense, therefore, these three Dominicans can meaningfully be considered as representatives of an early Thomistic school.

The close textual analysis provided in the chapters that follow will necessarily get quite technical: the short summary of Aquinas's theory of human nature that was given above is just where it starts. Getting to grips with detail is worth the effort, though, because it enables a much fuller understanding of what was at stake in this outstanding scholastic debate on the composition of human nature, whose repercussions, there are strong indications, would continue to colour scholars' thought on theological questions touching upon the nature of the body for the remainder of the medieval period.

The rest of this introduction, including the chapter layout below, will summarise the key ideas that will dominate the discussion of bodily identity in scholastic theology that builds over the five chapters of this study.

Theology Driving Scientific Innovation

It was John Marenbon in his *Later Medieval Philosophy* who made the point that the late medieval period is distinctive in western intellectual history because theologians were responsible for the most sophisticated and innovative scientific and philosophical thinking that emerged from universities:

'Independence in speculation was usually the preserve of the theologians, both because they were more mature and highly trained, and because a good deal of the ancient and Arab texts was incompatible with their doctrinal aims and presuppositions... Most important thinkers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were theologians; most of their important works were treatises on theology. Not only did thinkers like Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and
Ockham presuppose the articles of faith, their main aim was to understand them better and elaborate their consequences. Thomas Aquinas's work on the general resurrection neatly bears out this characterisation of the aims and achievements of scholastic theologians. Aquinas had in hand the account of the general resurrection found in Peter Lombard's theological textbook the *Sentences* (1154-57), an account with only rudimentary scientific content and limited explanatory power. As a bachelor in Theology, completing the commentary on the *Sentences* that was compulsory for any scholar at that stage in his career, Aquinas questioned and analysed the implications of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, aiming to improve upon the Lombard's account in order to understand as precisely as possible what it might involve, thereby elucidating fully its consequences for the workings of nature full-stop.

As a basis from which to work, Aquinas used his advanced knowledge of Aristotle's encyclopaedic works on natural philosophy, prescribed reading on the Arts syllabus in Paris in 1255, and newly available in a more reliable translation, directly from the Greek, courtesy of William of Moerbeke, in the 1260s and 1270s. Training in the Arts was the necessary preparation for tackling the most advanced scientific problems, like providing an analysis of what bodily resurrection would involve, that were reserved for the most outstanding minds at the universities' Theology faculties. And by common consensus, Aristotle's works contained the most comprehensive and accurate analysis of nature that humankind had yet produced. Although Aristotle was simply 'the Philosopher' to Aquinas and his contemporaries, however, he was still a pagan without access to revealed truth, and scholastic theologians did not expect him to have all of the answers that they sought, all of the time. Aristotle had made mistakes: claims that contradicted what the articles of faith implied about the created world. In correcting these mistakes, a theologian's job was

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to speculate and to improve upon the most sophisticated scientific knowledge available in order to demonstrate the harmony that he believed to obtain between truths about nature discoverable by reason and the truth contained in the articles of faith.\(^\text{12}\)

Aquinas's new ideas about the composition of human nature, the individual body and bodily identity, postmortem bodily continuity, and the nature of matter, then, were the outcome of his attempt to improve upon Peter Lombard's account of the body and its resurrection using Aristotle's cutting-edge scientific concepts, to thereby reconcile the Lombard's account with the most up-to-date science, and furthermore to suggest new scientific solutions where Aristotle either had been wrong or simply could not help.\(^\text{13}\)

*Resurrection in the Sentences: The "Truth of Human Nature"

Peter Lombard had discussed the general resurrection in two places in the *Sentences*, even if the doctrine was dealt with directly only in his treatment of the 'last things' at the very end of book IV. There, verbatim quotations from St. Augustine's works dominated the Lombard's treatment of postmortem bodily continuity and resurrection. Augustine had, in chapter 23 of his *Enchiridion*, provided a straightforward account of the reconstruction of individual bodies by an omnipotent God, informed by an atomist physics. God would simply find the material particles belonging to each individual body, wherever they might have been scattered, and whatever other animal bodies they might have been incorporated into, and return them to their proper body. In cases of cannibalism, implying that two people could lay claim to the same material, the shared flesh would be returned to the body in

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which it was first animated. Each body would rise whole, with all of its parts, and, as Augustine explained in *De civitate Dei* book XXII, each would rise at the perfect age, the age at which Christ Himself had died and was resurrected. God would supply any deficiencies and remove deformities and superfluities.

Surely not all of the matter that had ever subsisted in an individual body would rise in it, so which of the particles formerly belonging to each body would have priority? In a discussion of original sin in book II of the *Sentences*, the Lombard suggested that there was a distinct set of particles in each individual body that served as the material basis for its continuing identity during mortal life and at the resurrection. The Lombard called this flesh the 'truth of human nature' (*veritas humanae naturae*) particular to each body. This special kind of flesh had been passed down through the generations of humans since Adam, and was augmented and multiplied 'in itself' (*in se*) when fomented by food. It never mixed with the other kind of flesh in the individual human body, namely the flesh that was built up from food, and each resurrected body, the Lombard supposed, would comprise only its

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17 The Lombard's proximate source for this particular concept of the 'truth of human nature' was the anonymous *Summa sententiarum*, another theological textbook. The latter's source for the phrase was Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur Deus homo* in which 'the truth of human nature' meant something quite different: it was just what was included in the definition of human beings; since humans were destined to become immortal, mortality could not belong to the 'truth of human nature'. In the hands of the author or the *Summa sententiarum* the concept of the immortal 'truth of human nature' was conflated with an idea from a Laon treatise, the *Deus summe atque ineffabiliter bonus*, which spoke of original material from Adam, which did not mix with food, and which would rise again. See Reynolds, *Food and the Body*, pp. 54-6.

own 'truth of human nature'. The concept of the 'truth of human nature' on the one hand, and the topic of the general resurrection, on the other, became very closely linked thereafter in Sentences commentaries: some theologians would discuss the 'truth of human nature' only in their commentaries on book IV.

**After Aristotle: Bodily Resurrection "idem numero"**

New concepts and axioms from Aristotelian science would challenge this relatively uncomplicated account of the body and its resurrection. The way in which Aristotle's science all at once shaped theologians' handling of the topic of resurrection and challenged their understanding of it, providing them with sophisticated concepts with which to think whilst creating the need for philosophical clarification in order to resolve apparent tensions between reason and faith, can be grasped swiftly through reflection on the impact of one particular Aristotelian axiom on scholarly discussion of resurrection. This axiom would become a standard objection to the very possibility of resurrection in theological quaestiones.

At the end of the last chapter of *De generatione et corruptione*, Aristotle had contrasted the circular motion of heavenly bodies (the planets and stars) with the cycles of generation and corruption we find in the sublunar world. Heavenly bodies, Aristotle noted, were incorruptible and moved in orbits, always returning, identical, to exactly the same place. Corruptible substances such as water also moved through cycles of a sort: water evaporated to become air; this air condensed in the atmosphere; water fell again as rain. But the second lot of water was not identical to the first lot or, in technical language, whereas any corruptible substance, having been corrupted, could 'repeat' or return (*reiterare*) the same in species or kind (*idem specie*), it could not return the same 'in number' (*idem numero*) or as exactly the same individual.  

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19 'Non infitiatur tamen quin cibi et humores in carnem et sanguinem transeant, sed non in veritatem humanae naturae quae a primis descendit parentibus; quae sola in resurrectione erit. Reliqua vero caro, in quam cibi transeunt, tanquam superflua in resurrectione deponetur'. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II, d. 30, chapter 15.2 (ed.) Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 1, p. 505.

20 Reynolds, *Food and the Body*, p. 50.

This passage, in scholastic theologians’ eyes, was of obvious relevance to an analysis of bodily resurrection. Aristotle might well deny that the very same individual human body, as a corruptible substance, could return naturally, but scholastic theologians knew that the resurrection would be brought about by divine power. And they now had a new, technical way of expressing the result of bodily resurrection: each resurrected body would be the ‘same in number’ (idem numero) it was in mortal life.

Unpacking the technical notion that a resurrected human body would be idem numero as it was before death, we get to the two topics within Aquinas’s thought on human nature that will provide the focus for the first four chapters of the present study: individuality and bodily identity.

First, the body resurrected idem numero would be an individual, or one thing, or a numerical unit. A thing’s individuality is that intrinsic feature or set of features in virtue of which it is unique and set apart from all other things, including members of the same species or kind. Medieval theologians found several different ways of conceptualising individuality, but Aquinas would think of any one thing’s individuality primarily in terms of its distinction from others of the same species or kind, or in terms of intra-specific differences.

Second, the body resurrected idem numero would be the same (idem) as it had been in life. An individual thing’s identity in a metaphysical context is understood to be

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22 The word individualitas is a later medieval Latin word; theologians used the word individuum in some contexts to refer to this feature of a thing, and the word individuatio in others. The use of the latter term is this sense is a little confusing for the modern interpreter, because individuatio in medieval Latin usually just meant the process by which something acquired its individuality: ‘individuation’, which is also the most natural English translation of the word. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation, pp. 19-20.

that feature of a thing by which it continues to be itself over time and in spite of change; it presupposes that the thing in question is an individual distinct from others.24

And so, in accordance with his literal, materialistic understanding of 
resurrectio drawn from the Sentences and Augustine's texts, Aquinas would develop an analysis of the human body that assumed that the matter particular to it was crucial both to its individuality and to its identity (and therefore to the individuality and identity of the human to which that body belonged). Moreover, he would radically revise Peter Lombard's concept of the 'truth of human nature' by refining his thinking on the individual body and bodily identity using further relevant concepts and ideas from Aristotle's scientific texts.

Aristotle's suggestion in De generatione et corruptione that a thing's identity implied its continuity or uninterruptedness squared well with Augustine's assumption that the matter particular to individual bodies would be continuous across their death and resurrection. Aquinas, too, assumed that, even if the body as a whole might corrupt, its constituent parts would survive to be reunited by God. He took up the challenge of providing a revised scientific explanation for how the remains of an individual body could lie in wait to be reintegrated by divine power.

Chapters 1 and 2 will set out the Aristotelian scientific background necessary to appreciate Aquinas's own work on the individual body and bodily identity, to be discussed in chapters 3 and 4. The first four chapters between them furnish the background for chapter 5's discussion of the way in which Aquinas's thought on the body and bodily continuity was received and interpreted by Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, themselves also, of course, working from Aristotle's texts.

The Aristotelian texts referred to in chapters 1 and 2, as in the passage quoted above from De generatione et corruptione, will be the medieval translations into Latin, since these were the versions that Thomas Aquinas, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell were using.

**Aristotle on the Individual Body**

Chapter 1 will cover two fundamental Aristotelian principles upon which Aquinas would base his account of the individual human body. First, there is the principle that, in any composite, matter and form necessarily bore a *proportionate* relationship to one another. Each kind of form, for Aristotle, had its appropriate matter, or ‘proper matter’ (*materia propria*). Second, there is Aristotle's concept of the material cause in natural generation. For Aristotle, certain material conditions needed to be in place in order that a certain kind of substantial, or species-determining, form could manifest itself in matter: in this sense, matter represented necessity in causation. Furthermore, Aristotle held that the *particular* material conditions obtaining in a *certain* case of generation constrained the precise way in which the particular substantial form could manifest itself in that case. Material conditions, in other words, accounted for the natural differences (both formal and material) that we observe in things, on the level *below* the species. On the basis of Aristotle's texts, then, Aquinas could straightforwardly develop an account of the material part in a human being according to which it was not only crucial to, but indeed the very root of, their individuality.

**Aristotle and Averroes on Bodily Identity**

Chapter 2 will examine Aristotle's texts on bodily identity, which proved rather more difficult to square with what the doctrine of bodily resurrection entailed. A passage on growth in *De generatione et corruptione* directly contradicted Peter Lombard by suggesting that an organic body might remain the same thing over the course of its lifetime *despite* the exchange of *all* of its matter. If this position were correct, why would any resurrected body need to be recovered from any matter in particular? In other words, was Aristotle saying that the continuing identity of the body, and therefore of the whole human individual, depended on the soul alone?

Moreover, Aristotle's scientific texts were almost silent when it came to the topic of *postmortem* bodily identity and material continuity. In his work on substantial generation and corruption, Aristotle had focussed on formal change rather than the material substratum for that change. And Aristotle's physics was continuist, not atomist or corpuscular. It could not provide for the idea that a body had particles, let
alone that the particles belonging to a particular body might persist across its death and resurrection despite being scattered, eaten and incorporated into other bodies.

Insights provided by Aristotle's twelfth-century Arabic commentator Averroes (1126-98) would prove to be particularly helpful to Aquinas, as he developed an account of bodily identity and postmortem bodily continuity in line with the implications of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. Averroes was simply 'the Commentator' to scholastic theologians: his expositions of the Stagirite's work were the standard gloss for thirteenth-century scholars.25

Crucially, there was a second concept of the body in Aristotle's works (in addition to the idea that the body is the soul's proportionate material subject), which was central to Averroes' analysis of bodily identity. Aristotle had, in several places, defined 'body' in a mathematical way, as a three-dimensional solid structure, comprising parts arranged in a particular way, divisible in three dimensions, and divided by its boundaries or limits from its surroundings.

Such geometrical structures, for Aristotle, were immanent in natural bodies. Averroes thought that each natural body's three-dimensional structure was an 'accidental' form, or a property of that body, rather than a 'substantial' form defining its species. In technical terms, this three-dimensional bodily structure was an accidental form in the category of 'quantity' (quantitas). It directly underpinned that body's three-dimensional shape (figura); another accidental form belonging to the body. And Averroes had noted that the body's physical shape or figura (and therefore

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its quantitative structure), and not just its soul, remained the same in it across bodily growth and material flux, supporting its continuing identity.

Then there was the question of postmortem bodily continuity. Averroes argued that the Aristotle's scientific framework for generation and corruption in fact required that matter, if not a collection of atoms, be invested with a physical structure of its own, giving it extension, location, and partibility or divisibility: the material substratum for natural change, in itself, needed to take on some of the features that Aristotle had ascribed to a mathematical body. Averroes, then, came up with a theory that matter had its own accidental structuring form (really distinct from the accidental structuring forms belonging to individual bodies). He would explicitly use this structuring form and the features it gave to matter as a means of explaining how any particular part of matter could remain the same thing in itself, even as it took on a succession of forms in different bodies across various changes.

**Aquinas on the Individual Body**

Chapter 3 will focus on Aquinas's thought on individuality and the individual body. This discussion is separated from chapter 4's discussion of Aquinas's work on bodily identity in order to make transparent exactly how Aquinas used and developed upon Aristotle's ideas. Of course, the kind of reasoning all scholastic theologians did was distinctively holistic or 'simultaneous', rather than linear, involving 'a system held before a mind as a whole rather than a successive sequence of parts'. The analyses of the individual body and of bodily identity evident in Aquinas's writings on the general resurrection and anywhere else in his work were already complete in his mind, and had already been informed by his understanding of that article of the faith, before he started composing his commentary on book IV of the *Sentences*.

For Aquinas, the doctrine of bodily resurrection implied two things with respect to the individual human body: first, that the union between individual soul and individual body should be intimate and essential; second, that, nonetheless, the body should be relatively independent from the soul, as a component of the human being.

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Aquinas objected to the notion that there should be a corporeal substantial form in the human being in addition to the soul, intervening between the soul and matter, because this additional substantial form would render the union between an individual soul and particular matter merely incidental: as a result, a human soul could in theory be reincarnated in any animal body. Whereas the vast majority of Aquinas's predecessors had advocated (somewhat metaphysically vague) pluralist theories of human nature, Aquinas argued that only a theory according to which the soul is the body's only form, having a proper material subject proportionate to it (after Aristotle), could preserve the true doctrine of bodily resurrection. According to Aquinas, the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was one of Aristotle's 'true principles of philosophy' (vera philosophi principia): Aristotle had held, Aquinas wrote, that in virtue of a single form a human was human, animal, living and a body, both in substance, and in being. He traced the philosophical origins of the pluralist theories of the composition of human nature held by his contemporaries back to a Platonist position advocated, in particular, by the Jewish Neoplatonist philosopher Avicebron.

A distinction should be drawn at this stage between the problem of whether a human being has one soul or several (rational, sensitive, and vegetative), and the problem of the unicity or plurality of substantial forms in a human. On the one

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28 See Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis* (hereafter DSC), a. 3, response, passage beginning, 'Set tunc dubium restat quid sit proprium subjectum anime, quod comparetur ad ipsam sicut materia ad formam. Circa hoc enim est duplex opinio: quidam enim dicunt quod sunt multe forme substantialia in codem individuo... Alia opinio est quod in uno individuo non est nisi una forma substantialis: et secundum hoc oportet dicere quod per formam substantialiæ, quæ est anima humana, habet hoc individuum non solum quod sit homo, sed quod sit animal, et quod sit vivum, et quod sit corpus, et substantia et ens... et hoc [the pluralist position] fuit proprium Platonicerum... et hoc [the position that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being] fuit proprium philosophi Aristotelis... et hec [the pluralist position] est positio Avicebron in libro Fontis vitae... Set hec posito secundum vera philosophiae principia quæ consideravit Aristotelis est impossibilis... *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2* (Rome and Paris: Commissio Leonina and Les éditions du Cerf, 2000), pp. 39-42. Aquinas adhered to this position throughout his career. See J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D. C.: CUA Press, 2000), pp. 327-51 for an extended discussion of this and other passages in which Aquinas sets out his position on the unicity of form, and see esp. pp. 346-51, including works of Zavalloni and Roland-Gosselin cited at p. 347 n. 197, regarding the modern debate on the clarity of Aquinas's position in his early work.
hand, committing oneself to a plurality of souls will certainly mean committing oneself to a pluralist theory of the composition of human nature; on the other hand, it is quite possible to hold that there is only one soul that is at once rational, sensitive and vegetative, and still maintain a pluralist position according to which there are further substantial forms in a human being, including one or more corporeal substantial forms distinct from the soul.

Earlier thirteenth-century debate on the question of the unicity or plurality of forms in humans, indeed, had focussed on the problem of the unicity or plurality of the soul. Aquinas transformed this debate in psychology into an all-encompassing metaphysical debate by integrating the theory of the unity of the soul into a more general theory of the substantial unity of the human being, and indeed the unity of any substance composed of matter and form. Whereas previous theories advocating the unity of the soul had still viewed the soul, somewhat ambiguously, as the body's perfection, Sander de Boer explains, 'Aquinas is the first who truly considers the soul to be a substantial form, rather than a perfection'.

There has been much discussion among modern interpreters of scholastic thought on the problem of the unicity or plurality of forms in humans, over which authorities in the Aristotelian commentary tradition were the precursors to thirteenth-century pluralist theories of human nature, either pre- or post-Aquinas (the notion of a forma corporeitatis does not originate with St. Augustine, whatever Aquinas's late thirteenth-century pluralist critics might claim). Whereas historians agree over the position of Avicebron, they disagree regarding Avicenna's position. The latter did in fact posit a bodily form distinct from the soul in a human being, and view the soul as the body's 'perfection'. In any case, Aquinas's pluralist critics


30 Daniel Callus held that the textual origins of the late thirteenth century debate lay in Dominicus Gundissalinus' translations in the latter half of the twelfth century of Avicenna's Liber sex naturalium [for the unicity of form] and Avicebron's Fons vitae [for the pluralist position]. D. A. Callus, 'The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form', The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 24 (1961), pp. 270-1. Roberto Zavalloni disagreed, arguing that Avicenna was a true precursor to pluralist theory, despite Aquinas's frequent citation of him as an advocate of the theory of the unicity of form, see his Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes. Textes inédits et étude critique (Louvain: Editions de L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1951), pp. 420-9. John Marenbon cites Avicenna's De anima to demonstrate that Avicenna 'assumes that the ensouled body has as its form, not the soul itself, but a forma complexionatis which is suitable for the soul', Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 103. Cf. also the more
refined their own theories of the composition of human nature primarily in response to technical issues that he himself had clarified in re-defining the debate over the number of substantial forms in a human being in the mid-thirteenth century. And both Aquinas's defenders and his detractors would claim that the full range of philosophical and theological authorities, including the Philosopher himself, were advocates for their own position.

With the unity of the human being taken care of, then, Aquinas maintained the relative independence of the body from the soul within the human individual not only by maintaining that its matter admitted of a certain complexity, or proportion, to the soul which was its only substantial form, but also by grounding the relative independence of the material part of the human being upon an accidental form which, taking on the attributes that Aristotle had ascribed to a geometrical body, gave to the human body its three-dimensional physical structure.

Aquinas habitually referred to this form as 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva), and he described it as being 'close to substance'. Etienne Gilson, in his summary of the late thirteenth-century debate over the unicity or plurality of substantial forms in humans, supposed that it was the Augustinian Friar Giles of Rome who had first put forward the idea that this accidental quantitative form could serve as a substitute for a pluralist's corporeal form;31 Marylin McCord Adams in her recent book on transubstantiation in scholastic thought identified the importance of the body's quantitative structuring form in Aquinas's thought on that particular theological topic;32 the present study will address the full significance of quantitas dimensiva in Aquinas's thought on resurrection, individuality, and bodily identity.

For Aquinas, the body's quantitas dimensiva was the only form in it that was capable of individualising its matter, dividing its matter from other matter and making it this matter. The consequence of this was that, in Aquinas's view, all of the matter

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32 McCord Adams, Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist, see esp. comments at pp. 14, 18, and discussion in chapter 4.
subsisting under the body's quantitative form intimately belonged to its material 'truth of human nature'.

Aquinas on Bodily Identity

Accordingly, as will become clear in chapter 4, Aquinas grounded the material continuity of the mortal body over growth and the gradual replacement of its matter upon its accidental quantitative structure, \textit{quantitas dimensiva}. Up to Aquinas, theologians had assumed (after Peter Lombard) that there must be some fixed or non-exchangeable ingredient in the flesh of each human in order to account for its material identity over time.\textsuperscript{33}

Aquinas's thought on the topic of the \textit{postmortem} continuity of the matter particular to an individual body was rather more obscure, although he was sure that his explanation of bodily continuity across death and resurrection at least had the advantage, over any pluralist theory, of being able to clearly account for the continuity of the body's \textit{substantial form} (since this was the same thing as the immortal soul). Aquinas's basic account of the corpse merely said that it was the same as the living body with respect to its matter (\textit{secundum materiam}). Looking beyond the point of bodily decay, Aquinas sought to construct an account of material continuity in the spirit of and with reference to St. Augustine's \textit{Enchiridion}.

In every one of his systematic treatments of resurrection, Aquinas tried to argue that \textit{traces} of the individual body's \textit{quantitas dimensiva}, which had individualised its matter over the course of its lifetime, would continue to particularise and identify that matter as belonging to that body across death and resurrection. But there was a tension within this account of material continuity that cannot have escaped Aquinas. His work on the resurrection might well provide the best available system for fitting a particular set of theological and philosophical puzzle-pieces together (at least in his own eyes), but gaps remained even so. And although he appeared, in his work on the resurrection, to be moving towards the position that matter was invested with a

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. Reynolds, \textit{Food and the Body}, p. 431, see also pp. 297-303 for Albertus Magnus's thought on this point and pp. 325-31 for Bonaventure's.
corporeal structure of its own, Aquinas was never quite able to openly and fully adopt a position similar to the Commentator's on matter.

Averroes' position on matter had contravened a basic axiom in Aristotle's metaphysical apparatus, which Aquinas himself had upheld consistently and unequivocally in his writings on topics other than the resurrection: that a substance is ontologically prior to its accidents. Aquinas never provided an explanation for how he could simultaneously uphold this axiom, on the one hand, and claim that traces of the body's accidental quantitative structure could remain in the matter particular to it across the substantial corruption of the body at death, on the other.

At this juncture, a historiographical point needs briefly to be addressed. There is a certain confusion in modern scholarship regarding Aquinas's account of postmortem material continuity, arising from the fact that he refers directly to Averroes' theory of matter as invested with its own quantitative structure in his early Sentences commentary, but drops all reference to the Commentator's work in his mature accounts of resurrection in his Summa contra Gentiles (completed 1264-65) and Compendium theologiae (1265-67).

Scholars have assumed that Aquinas subscribed to Averroes' theory of matter to begin with, and later changed his mind, either because he had finally identified the philosophical tension between Averroes' theory and the principle of the priority of substance to accident,34 or because Averroes had become completely discredited in Aquinas's eyes during the 'Averroist' controversy at the University of Paris during 1265-70. This controversy had been triggered by the Arts master Siger of Brabant's adoption of a particular reading of Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's De anima, namely that there was a single intellect for all humans, and Siger's claim that this was the correct reading of the Stagirite's text.35 The notion of the unique intellect was condemned in 1270, and, writing his De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas in the same year, Aquinas pointed out not only that Siger's was an inaccurate reading of Aristotle,


35 For a summary account of these events see Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 68-9. On the writings produced during the Averroist or 'monopsychism' controversy see Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century, chapters 6 and 7.
but also that Averroes was (at least in respect of his work on the intellect) a 'corruptor' (depravator) of Peripatetic philosophy.\textsuperscript{36}

There is no concrete textual evidence, however, to support the view that Aquinas ever fully subscribed to Averroes' theory of matter, and none, either, suggest that Aquinas was ever blind to the basic Aristotelian axiom that a substance is ontologically prior to its accidents. Furthermore, even if Aquinas did not directly cite the Commentator in his more mature accounts of resurrection, he continued to argue that there were persistent structural principles in the matter belonging an individual human body, which could account for the individuality and sameness of that matter across death and resurrection. The tension between the account of material continuity that Aquinas wanted to give, on the one hand, and the Aristotelian principle of the ontological priority of substance to accident, on the other hand, is present in \textit{all} of his systematic treatments of the resurrection.

And Aquinas did not seek to rid his work of the influence of Averroes' thought, simply because of the controversial way in which certain Arts masters at Paris had interpreted the Commentator's writings on the intellect. Aquinas had written against the idea of the unique intellect for all humans from very early on in his career, all the time continuing to call upon Averroes' authority with respect in other contexts: the Commentator could surely be right about anything else. In 1270, Aquinas was writing primarily against the so-called \textit{Averroists}, not Averroes himself. Averroes' commentaries remained the standard gloss on Aristotle's works during 1265-70 and afterwards, and Aquinas continued to explicitly rely on proofs from Averroes in his mature writings.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} Francis E. Kelley makes this argument in the introduction to his edition of Thomas of Sutton's continuation of Aquinas's commentary on \textit{De generatione et corruptione}, with specific reference to Aquinas's use of Averroes work on material continuity: 'In the judgement of Aquinas, Averroes was no longer a guide in interpreting Aristotle; rather the Commentator was now taken to be a "Peripatetice Philosophiae depravator"... Any reference to him henceforth could only muddy the waters of proper understanding'. \textit{Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis In libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione. Continuatio per Thomam de Sutona} (ed.) F. E. Kelley [Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1976], editor's introduction, p. 27, n. 2. For the original comment from Aquinas, see Aquinas, \textit{De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas}, c. 2, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 43 (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), p. 302.

\textsuperscript{37} Edward Booth has put this point forcibly: 'It is all too easy to take the strong language used by Thomas about Ibn Rushd in the controversy over his position that there was a single potential intellect for all men, as referring to the whole of his philosophy... The frequent respectful references which
It is certainly possible that Aquinas simply did not want to sound like Averroes when the Averroist controversy was still in full swing. It was one thing for Aquinas to have taken on his colleagues in the name of Aristotle, to suggest a radical overhaul of their understanding of the metaphysical composition of human nature. It would have been quite another to have championed Averroes' authority in connection to any major theological topic at a time when others who did so were under extreme suspicion of unorthodoxy.

There was probably a deeper reason why Aquinas's account of material continuity across death and resurrection remained imperfectly transparent, or why, in other words, he failed to be explicit about the degree to which he agreed with the Commentator. Creative thinking is ultimately limited by the concepts that serve as its basis. The pure process of logic was clearly not the only factor involved in Aquinas's work on resurrection and the nature of matter: the tension between what he wanted to say and the traditional Aristotelian conceptual apparatus created a drag effect on his thought. To an extent, perhaps, Aquinas was in denial about the need to make the break from an idea that seemed so ingrained in Aristotle's science, in order to make it perfectly clear how he intended his argument for material continuity across death and resurrection to work philosophically. His particular irenicist tendencies would have made it more difficult still for Aquinas to make this break, and therefore to advance his thinking on the nature of matter much further down the path it had already been pushed by reflection on problems associated with the doctrine of the general resurrection.

**Bodily Identity in Dominican Thought at Oxford up to 1286**

Chapter 5 will detail how, in debate at Oxford during 1277-86, the Dominicans Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell defended Aquinas's [Aquinas] made to the opinions of the 'Commentator' and the absorption on a number of his theses into the metaphysical figure he arrived at as a means of receiving the Greek and Arab peripatetic tradition, must discount such a facile assumption, which can only be substantiated by the (impossible) demonstration that the Averroan involvement in his ideas was, with these words, expunged'. E. Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers* (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), pp. 252-3 (my insertion).

theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological repercussions in the area of postmortem bodily continuity. They did so in deeply divergent ways.

Thomas of Sutton's work was heavily critical of pluralist theory, on both philosophical and theological grounds. It focussed on demonstrating that the pluralists had also to admit discontinuity in the body across its death, and furthermore that their philosophy was incompatible with the doctrine of the general resurrection. Robert of Orford took a conciliatory approach to the debate, aiming to give a strong account of postmortem bodily continuity that could match the pluralists'. Of the three, Knapwell alone would identify the significance of Aquinas's advanced speculation on the nature of matter, and indeed go much further than Aquinas, developing a full philosophical account of the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies. Beneath these very different treatments of the topic of postmortem bodily identity lay three very different interpretations of the implications of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans for the individual body.

The present study is certainly not the first discussion of these Dominican works and the debate to which they contributed, and not even the only recent one, but it is distinctive in that uses a very close engagement with Aquinas's texts in their own right as a basis from which to clarify where the ideas of these three Dominican theologians diverged both from Aquinas's and from one another. Additionally, the reading that it provides of the work of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard

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A. Boureau, Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle: le cas de Jean Peckham (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1999) provides a more subtle reading of Aquinas's philosophy than most modern accounts of the debate (see p. 39 where the matter into which the soul is infused is referred to as 'structurée') but discusses the content of Dominican works produced in Aquinas's defence only briefly, at pp. 83, 209-13. The present study disagrees with Boureau's presentation at pp. 210-11 of Thomas of Sutton's work as more representative of Aquinas's thought than that of Richard Knapwell; Boureau relies here on Francis Kelley (cited above, n. 36), who thinks that Aquinas completely rejected Averroes' insights into the nature of matter in his mature work. Boureau's book replaces Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes as the major modern account of the philosophical arguments on either side of the debate. Zavalloni provided only a very broad outline of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans some of its implications (pp. 261-71), exploring none of the subtleties within Aquinas's thought on the body that would become important to his Dominican interpreters, and dismissing their work as unoriginal, without discussing its content, on the premise that the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was so clearly defined by Aquinas that it was impossible for Dominican thinking on the composition of human nature to evolve (pp. 278-87, see esp. p. 287).
Knapwell responds to Frederick Roensch and Francis Kelley, the two scholars who have worked most closely on the reception of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans in the thought of these three Dominicans. Both Roensch and Kelley group Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell under the banner of the 'early Thomistic school', on the precise grounds that they did understand the exact meaning and implications of Aquinas's innovative work.40

So, even despite the evident doctrinal heterogeneity in their work, which the present study will bring into view, can these three Dominicans still be considered to be members of an 'early Thomistic school'? Stephen Marrone, in a groundbreaking discussion of intellectual schools in the introduction to his extended study of medieval theories of knowledge, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and the Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century,41 points out that any attempt to detect in (or indeed to retrospectively impose upon), the work of any group of scholastic theologians a common and uniform subscription to a rigidly defined set of doctrines is bound to fail.

For more than a century, Marrone notes, historians of scholasticism have tried to write its history by identifying doctrinally defined intellectual schools. Franz Ehrle delineated Aquinas's 'Aristotelianism' from Franciscan 'Augustinianism' in the 1880s; Pierre Mandonnet added another school, 'Latin Averroism' a decade later; in the 1920s, Etienne Gilson distinguished between the 'Aristotelianism' advocated by

40 F. J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1964), chapter 5, and p. 19: '...early Dominicans not only defended St. Thomas, but understood his teaching in exactly the same way as he did himself'. The topic of postmortem bodily continuity is touched upon briefly at pp. 205, 225-6, 228-9. Roensch's work as completed before Francis Kelley's edited Knapwell's Quaestio disputata de unitate formae and does not discuss this important work. Francis Kelley refers to an 'early Oxford Thomist school' whose representatives understood the 'meaning and implications' of the 'Thomist innovations' at pp. 1, 4 of his study The Thomists and their opponents at Oxford in the last part of the thirteenth century (unpublished D. Phil thesis, Oxford Univ., 1977), MS. Bodleian D. Phil. d. 6258. Part I, chapter 4, of this Kelley's thesis, entitled 'Oxford Thomists on the Unity of Form' (pp. 79-162) is reproduced verbatim across his widely available published works: Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis In libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione. Continuatio per Thomam de Sutton (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction (full citation above, n. 36); Richard Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae (ed.) F. E. Kelley (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982); F. E. Kelley, 'The Egidian Influence in Robert of Orford's Doctrine on Form', The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 47 (1983), pp. 77-99. Kelley discusses postmortem bodily continuity in the thought of Thomas of Sutton and Richard Knapwell, and in particular their respective interpretations of Averroes' doctrine of a quantitative structure in matter. The present study disagrees with Kelley's analysis of Aquinas's attitude towards Averroes' work on material continuity: see above, n. 36.

Aquinas and those who followed him from an 'Aristotelianising Augustinianism' (which still influenced Aquinas) and an 'Avicennising Augustinianism' which was closer to Neoplatonism; Maurice De Wulf in the 1900s and again in the 1930s argued that almost all scholastic debate fell under the umbrella of 'Aristotelianism', within which there was 'Augustinianism', 'Thomism', 'Scotism' and 'Averroism', but that there was also a distinct brand of Neoplatonic thought; finally, Fernand Van Steenberghen in the 1940s argued that a philosophically unsystematic 'Neoplatonising Aristotelianism' of the pre-1250s was succeeded by three philosophically rigorous schools after 1250: there was Aquinas's moderate Aristotelianism, and the radical or heterodox Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant, and, then, in reaction to both of these schools there emerged a systematic 'Neo-Augustinianism', which was not a throwback to a more traditional theological school, but in fact the first Augustinian philosophical school of the high medieval period.42

Given, however, that we know the scholastic environment to have been one of 'progressive intellectual metamorphosis' in the continuing search for truth, where regent masters remained in their posts for very short periods, where intellectual innovation was rewarded and where the substantive topics of primary intellectual interest could shift, it is difficult to imagine how schools defined by a common subscription to determined sets of doctrine could have maintained themselves for long.43

And yet, Marrone argues, there is no need to abandon completely the notion of intellectual schools. That is to say, it is still possible for historians of scholasticism to meaningfully delineate medieval intellectual schools, but only if they employ criteria that are primarily non-doctrinal.

Medieval intellectual schools, according to Marrone, were primarily defined by 'ideological disposition and politics'.44 He points out that, insofar as the common

42 ibid., pp. 1-3, 6-7.


ground binding together members of an intellectual school is at least 'as much political as philosophical or formally intellectual', the identity of an intellectual school can 'subsist to that degree more in the intentions and sometimes unconscious motivations of scholastics engaged in their work, and the reactions of readers poring over their writings, than in the actual substance of the theories or doctrines propounded'. In any ideological debate, he argues, arguments advanced either for or against any idea 'conjure up in the mind of contemporary readers and listeners tacit sympathies with or antipathies to familiar groups of allies or opponents'. Moreover, these 'concomitants of political affinity' have a concrete effect on doctrine, pointing towards 'a limited range of doctrinal options', though the specifics might change from thinker to thinker.45

With Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell's work in defence of Aquinas's work on the body and bodily identity, admittedly, we have only a very limited case study in the new beginnings of a potential intellectual school, during a period in which scholars at Paris and Oxford were under a particular pressure to show their political allegiance.

Dominicans took Franciscan criticism of Aquinas's philosophy as an affront to the Dominican Order itself. The impassioned debate over the unicity or plurality of substantial forms in humans that ensued was seminal in a process, lasting from the late 1270s to the mid 1280s, by which the intellectual lines between the two major mendicant orders, who had always had distinct programmes of study at their respective studia generalia, solidified.46 In the 1280s, in response to the debate, the Dominican and Franciscan Orders' respective governing bodies sought to build up their respective corporate identities in opposition to one another, through the active promotion of distinct theological traditions. It was set down in statute that Franciscan scholars were, in effect, to treat Aquinas's philosophy with extreme caution, and Dominicans were to defend it.47

46 The major study of Dominican education in this period is M. M. Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study...", *Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1998).
47 For general comment on the role of late thirteenth-century intellectual developments in shaping Dominican corporate identity, see discussion in R. L. Friedman 'The Sentences Commentary, 1250-
Whatever the differences in their respective interpretations of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, it is sufficiently clear, at least, that Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, shared a common political allegiance to their Order and a basic motivation, therefore, to defend the theory. Their grouping under the banner of the 'early Thomistic school' will be discussed further at the end of chapter 5. Whether, and if so, how the politics of inter-order rivalry affected Dominican, and indeed Franciscan, thought on the composition of human nature and related theological questions in the longer term is a very interesting question.

**Caroline Walker Bynum on the 'Thomistic Solution to the Identity Problem'**

The final thing to point out by way of introduction is that the present study will dramatically revise Caroline Walker Bynum's influential interpretation of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, the criticism it attracted in the late thirteenth century, and its reception by Dominicans. Bynum's essay 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the Resurrection of the Body: A Scholastic Discussion in its Medieval and Modern Contexts' (which highlights the potential for comparison between medieval and modern philosophical thinking on personal identity that was noted at the outset of this chapter)\(^48\) and her book *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336*,\(^49\) are likely still to provide the starting point for any historian of medieval culture interested in this area, in the English-speaking world at least. Bynum's work was a significant source of inspiration for the research behind this thesis.

The great success of Bynum's treatment of resurrection and bodily continuity in medieval thought is to locate thirteenth-century scholastic debate on postmortem

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\(^{49}\) Full citation above, n. 2.
bodily continuity in the context of a broader assumption in medieval culture that material continuity is crucial to identity. To cite a few of her examples, this assumption was reflected not only in the relic cult and in concern for proper burial practice (both in the prohibition that Boniface VIII's bull _Detestande feritatis_ placed on the cutting up of dead bodies on the battlefield to ease their transportation, and in the continued practice of noble men and women of having their dead bodies partitioned for burial near to more than one saint); it was also expressed in hagiographical tales of saints healing and temporarily resurrecting corpses, or of simply collecting together their dismembered parts; in the folk wisdom according to which corpses would bleed to accuse their murderers; and in medical treatises on the growth of hair and fingernails in corpses after their death.\(^{50}\)

This thesis contends, however, that Bynum misinterprets the implications of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. Bynum advances two conclusions, in particular, that will be revised over the chapters that follow.

First, Bynum's narrative supposes that Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being _did_ necessarily, and even intentionally, diminish the body as a component of the human individual.\(^{51}\) It could not, therefore, _really_ provide any concrete account of postmortem bodily continuity and was condemned for its inherently scandalous implications: strictly following Aquinas's theory of human nature, according to Bynum, Christ's dead body was not really the same thing as His living body and the relic was not really the saint.\(^{52}\) Bynum relies for this interpretation of Aquinas's thought upon 'a few perceptive Catholic philosophers', who have argued that 'what Aquinas's teaching actually threatens is _body_, since, in denying the plurality of forms, Aquinas must assert that the soul (our only form) is the


\(^{51}\) Others have pointed out Bynum's misreading of Aquinas. Cf. d'Avray, _Death and the Prince_, p. 174, n. 61; Reynolds, _Food and the Body_, p. 399; and E. C. Sweeney, 'Individuation and the Body in Aquinas' in _Miscellanea Mediaevalia_, 24, _Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter_ (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 178-96, at pp. 178-181; see esp. p. 178 n. 4, where Sweeney notes Bynum's misreading the works of Luyten and Bazán upon which she relies for her interpretation of Aquinas's thought (for which see n. 53 below).

form of our bodiliness, too, reducing what is left over to mere primary matter or potency'.

For scholastic theologians, primary matter, or 'prime' matter (materia prima) was understood to be completely featureless: nature's ultimate and undifferentiated material substratum. If the body left behind at death were just featureless prime matter, then it was no body at all, let alone the body of anyone in particular. The conclusion that the body in itself might be mere prime matter was in fact the very conclusion drawn from Aquinas's philosophy by the Franciscan William de la Mare in his Correctorium fratris Thomae, which was the sweeping critique of Aquinas's writings that ignited the debate over the theological repercussions of his theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. It was intended to be a completely absurd conclusion, and was certainly not one, according to the argument of the present study, that Aquinas intended to be drawn from his philosophical principles.

Bynum supposes that Aquinas continued to speak as if Christ's dead body and the saint's relic were materially (secundum materiam) the same as their respective living bodies, then, out of a preference for 'philosophical inconsistency' over 'scandalising the faithful'. Her somewhat chronologically confused argument is that John Peckham condemned Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans in 1286 for its necessarily scandalous implications before these were fully understood, that is, before, according to Bynum, certain Dominican thinkers, this time, had finally spelled out what she calls the 'Thomistic solution to the identity problem' by drawing Aquinas's thought on human nature to what was, as she sees it, its logical conclusion.

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This brings us to the second conclusion in Bynum's work that this thesis revises, namely that there was a single, distinctive, 'Thomistic solution to the identity problem' (primarily, in Bynum's narrative, the problem of how numerically identical bodies can return at the resurrection), that emerged in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries as the logical conclusion of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans.

This 'purely formal' theory of identity, Bynum writes, 'packed' the body into the soul, meaning that the resurrected body need not be recovered from any particular matter.\textsuperscript{56} Aquinas himself had merely 'adumbrated' such a theory when he initially developed the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans,\textsuperscript{57} according to Bynum's account. He had continued to speak in such a way as to imply that concrete material continuity across death and resurrection was necessary, perhaps (improbable as this may seem) failing to understand the implications of his own ideas.\textsuperscript{58} Such a 'purely formal' theory of identity was indeed spelled out in the \textit{Sentences} commentaries of two Dominicans to whom Bynum refers:\textsuperscript{59} John of Paris, whose work on the \textit{Sentences} originates from 1292-95, and Durandus of St. Pourçain, who produced three reactions of his \textit{Sentences} commentary in the early fourteenth century (first redaction 1304-07; second redaction 1310-11; final redaction 1317-27).\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{60} In their respective \textit{Sentences} commentaries, these two Dominicans imagine the consequences if Peter's soul were to be united to Paul's matter or ashes (or to any other ashes) at the resurrection, and both conclude that Peter would be the same, body and soul, on account of the identity of his soul. John of Paris writes: 'Sed tamen dico, quod si anima Petri in resurrectione acciperet cineres Pauli, adhauc tamen idem esset Petrus in numero propter unitatem formae', \textit{In Sententias}, IV, d. 45, response, edited in Weber, \textit{Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten}, p. 377. Durandus of St Pourcain writes in his \textit{Sentences} commentary, Book IV, d. 44, q. 1, response (6): 'dicendum est quod cuicunque materiae uniatur anima Petri in resurrectione, ex quo est cadem forma secundum numerum, per consequens erit idem Petrus secundum numerum'. \textit{Durandi de Santo Porciano Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum, Buch IV, dd.}
Now, as we will see in chapter 5, John Peckham condemned the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans in 1286 from an isolated position: there was certainly no consensus in either Oxford or Paris as to its scandalous or heretical implications. Furthermore, leaving to one side the fact that the 'Thomistic solution to the identity problem' that Bynum describes was neither Aquinas's own, nor a necessary logical conclusion of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans as he had articulated it, it will become abundantly clear in the same chapter that, among the Dominicans who actively developed their own work on postmortem bodily continuity with reference to Aquinas's, there was no single solution to the problem of postmortem bodily continuity.

It is worth remaining with the writings of John of Paris and Durandus of St. Pourçain just for a moment, however, because the circumstances of the censures of their respective works suggest that the scholastic consensus, even on a major theological topic such as the resurrection, could shift. Bynum points out that, whereas John of Paris was criticised for having advocated a formal theory of identity in connection with the resurrection when his Sentences commentary was censured in 1295, Durandus of St. Pourçain's censors in the second decade of the fourteenth century overlooked his own formal theory of bodily identity.


61 On these events, see brief comments in J. Dunbabin, 'The Commentary of John of Paris (Quidort) on the Sentences', in Evans (ed.), Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 1, pp. 131-2; J. M. M. H. Thijsen, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 28-9, 173-4 (Thijsen incorrectly dates the censure to 1286/7). John of Paris's apologia explains that he had not actually argued that one person's soul might be resurrected in another person's body, but that whatever ashes might be united to a particular person's soul at the resurrection would constitute their body, on the account of the identity of the soul. He claimed that on this point he followed a certain 'frater Egidius', generally assumed to be Giles of Rome. The apologia is edited in P. Glorieux, 'Un mémoire justificatif de Bernard de Trilia', Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 17 (1928), pp. 407-15; see p. 411. (For the correct attribution of the work, see P. Glorieux, 'Bernard de Trilia ou Jean de Paris?', Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 19 (1930), pp. 469-74). John of Paris, it would appear, was misrepresenting Giles of Rome's thought. In his Quaestiones disputatae de resurrectione mortuorum, Giles of Rome made an elaborate argument for material continuity that said that a body's particular formal dispositiones (accidental forms) would corrupt into matter after its decomposition, but would be drawn out same as they were from certain formal principles (which Giles calls rationes obedientiales) in matter which responded only to divine power. If for some reason there was not enough matter available for a particular body, God could transform any other matter into matter suitable for that body. Giles of Rome's argument was not that the soul alone would guarantee the identity of the entire human being, body, or matter, and soul. See K. Nolan, The Immortality of the Soul and the Resurrection of the Body according to Giles of Rome (Rome: Studium Theologicum "Augustinianum", 1967), see esp. q. 1, response, arg. 2, ad 2, and ad 3, and q. 2, ad 6, pp. 70-4, 96. According to Bynum's narrative Giles of Rome, along with Aquinas, was one who 'adumbrated' a formal theory of
It is strange, of course, to see Durandus of St. Pourçain identified as Aquinas's direct intellectual descendent in any respect at all. He is infamous for having been criticised by the other leading Dominican intellectuals of his time for straying too far from Aquinas's teachings. His *Sentences* commentary was investigated and censured by his Dominican colleagues twice in the early fourteenth century, the first time on the grounds that his teachings deviated from doctrinal truth (in 1314, 93 articles were identified as 'false, erroneous or heretical'), and the second time on the grounds that his teachings deviated too far from Aquinas's (in 1317, 235 articles were highlighted by Durandus's censors for this reason). That Durandus's censors passed over his work on the general resurrection without comment both times, then, suggests a waning concern to preserve the literal understanding of bodily resurrection emphasised in scholarship from Augustine to Aquinas. Durandus' deviation from Aquinas on that particular theological point was not their priority.

This apparent shift of the scholarly consensus, in the early fourteenth century, away from the literal and materialistic understanding of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, along with the potential implications of this shift for scholastic thought on bodily identity, either within or without Dominican intellectual tradition, is, however, a story beyond the scope of this thesis.

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63 Edited, respectively, as 'Articuli nonaginta tres extracti ex Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. primo scripto super Sententia et examinati per magistros et baccalarios Ordinis' and 'Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratri Thome' in J. Koch, *Kleine Schriften* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1973), pp. 53-118. The definitive study of these events is now I. Iribarren, *Durandus of St Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas* (Oxford: OUP, 2005), see esp. pp. 183-5, 233-8 on the two censures of Durandus's work.
CHAPTER 1

ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND (I): INDIVIDUALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL BODY

Introduction

Thomas Aquinas would develop his innovative analysis of human nature, individuality, and the individual human body, working from his understanding of the implications of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. This chapter will uncover the Aristotelian foundations of Aquinas's thought on individuality and the individual body: Aristotle's scientific writings on these topics would confirm Aquinas's presupposition that the material part in any human individual had to be crucial to their individuality.

Aristotle's own account of the individual body can be approached, in outline, through his understanding of the individual substance. For Aristotle, an individual is numerically one, one thing, or a unity, inasmuch as it is physically continuous. An individual that is one thing naturally, such as an animal possessing a form that defines the species, or kind, into which it falls, is one in the fullest sense: it is continuous by virtue of its very nature, and not just put together artificially, like a table, for instance. Several individual substances can possess the same kind of nature-determining form and, therefore, belong to the same species or kind. But of course natural individuals, such as individual humans, exhibit differences on the level below the species, or *intra*-specific differences. So what accounts for these differences?

Each individual human is a unity with a material aspect (a body) and a formal aspect (a rational soul). And every human, Aristotle holds, is human in an absolute way: he makes it clear in the *Categories* that one human cannot be a member of the

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human species to a greater or lesser extent than another. Put another way, in virtue of possessing the same kind of form, all humans possess the same set of features essential to the species, and are equally human: form accounts for the similarities between humans; differences on the level below the species cannot originate with form. Crucially, the natural inequalities which distinguish one human from the next have material origins: the unique material aspect, the unique body, belonging to each human is ultimately responsible for the exact way in which the features essential to the species are realised in his or her particular case. In the Metaphysica, then, Aristotle states again that a substance does not admit of variation (or admit of 'more or less') with respect to its form or species (since forms, like numbers, cannot vary in themselves); he suggests that it is 'with matter' that intra-specific differences arise.

Aquinas, following Aristotle, would understand the individuality of any human primarily in terms of what differentiated him or her from other humans. Aquinas, then, would find Aristotle's idea that the individual body, with its unique material features, was the very basis of any human's individuality to be obvious concord with what the doctrine of the resurrection implied: if each would rise again the very individual that they were in mortal life by recovering the particular body that they had had then, then any human's material part must be crucial to their individuality, or to what made him or her unique.

In order to fully take in and understand the influence of Aristotle's work on the individual body on Aquinas's, two fundamental and closely interrelated Aristotelian scientific principles, which would become deeply ingrained in Aquinas's own scientific thinking, need to be grasped. The first principle is that the matter and form of any composite substance necessarily bear a proportion to one another: each kind of soul, for Aristotle, requires a particular kind of complex material subject (its 'proper' matter). Aristotle himself explicitly applies this principle only on the level of the species. The second principle is that matter represents necessity in causation: in

65 Aristotle, *Categories* (hereafter *Cat*.), 3b30-4a10.

order for a certain kind of form to manifest itself in animal generation, certain material conditions, namely that form's 'proper' matter, need to have developed and therefore to be in place. And Aristotle did describe the role of the material cause in generation on the level below the species: the particular material conditions obtaining in an individual case of animal generation, he thinks, are a limiting factor on the operations of the form that emerges in that individual case.

As will become clear in chapter 3, Aquinas would take Aristotle's thinking on individuality one step further: knowing that each human soul would be reunited only to its own matter at the resurrection, and that each individual human soul and its particular material body must bear a unique relationship to one another, Aquinas proposed that each soul had an intrinsic specification for or bore a unique proportional relationship to its own particular, complex material complement: its own body. Looking forward to chapter 5, certain late thirteenth-century defenders of Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only substantial, or nature-defining form in a human individual would develop upon the idea that the individual body is a particular soul's complex material subject in order to counter Franciscan pluralist arguments that Aquinas's theory of human nature reduced the body to mere, featureless, prime matter.

For now, it will be enough to set out in a little more detail the passages in Aristotle's natural scientific works that would most closely influence Aquinas's account of the individual human body. Aristotle's works on animals and animal generation, and book VII of his Metaphysica, in which he explores individuality by way of a discussion of the universalisable characteristics in things, would prove to be particularly important.

1. The Basics (I): Body and Soul as 'Proper Matter' and 'Proper Form'

We get to Aristotle's account of the individual body through his understanding of the human body as the rational soul's 'proper matter' or appropriate material subject, and we get to that, in turn, through Aristotle's ideas about matter itself. Aristotle's theory of matter replaces atoms with a material principle. The material principle can
only be understood in relation to the forms that manifest themselves in it.\(^{67}\) The material aspect of any substance is related to its formal aspect as potency is related to the actualisation of that potency. And so, in any composite substance, matter and form are thus necessarily in proportion to one another: any act, or form, naturally comes into being only in its proper matter (\textit{propria materia}), or potency.\(^{68}\)

Aristotle explicitly applies this thinking to the case of body and soul in his \textit{De anima}. In \textit{De anima} II.1, he describes living things as composite substances:\(^{69}\) each is composed of a body and a soul. Body and soul are related as matter and form, or potency and act, respectively. Aristotle defines the soul in three ways: first as the form (\textit{species}) of a natural body having life potentially within it, where the body is the 'subject or matter';\(^{70}\) second as an actuality, of the first kind, of a natural body having life potentially within it where such a body is a body with organs; and finally as an actuality, of the first kind, of a natural body with organs.\(^{71}\) It is clear that Aristotle understands these descriptions to be equivalent in meaning. When he says that the soul is the body's 'actuality of the first kind', Aristotle means that it is in virtue of the soul that the body possesses the capacity to perform the functions proper to its nature as a living thing. The soul, Aristotle holds, is neither separate from the body, nor the same thing as the body, but something belonging to the body.\(^{72}\)

A soul, then, does not belong to just \textit{any} sort of body: there is a necessary correspondence between the material make-up of a living body and its capacity for


\(^{70}\) 'corpus... sicut subiectum et materia est. Necesse est ergo animam substantiam esse, sicut speciem corporis phisici potentia uitam habentis., \textit{DA}, 412a18-20, in Aquinas, \textit{In DA}, \textit{Opus omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 45, 1, p. 67.

\(^{71}\) 'Unde anima est primus actus corporis phisici potenti\ae\ uitam habentis. Tale autem quodcunque organicum', 'anima... erit... actus primus corporis physici organici'. \textit{DA}, 412a27-28, 412b4-6, in Aquinas, \textit{In DA}, \textit{Opus omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 45, 1, p. 67. An adaptation of the first of these last two definitions became as a standard definition of the soul in the philosophical florilegium the \textit{Auctoritates Aristotelis}: 'Anima est actus corporis organic\ae\ physici vitam habentis in potentia, scilicet ad opera vitae'. \textit{Auctoritates Aristotelis} (ed.) Hamesse, p. 177 (41).

\(^{72}\) \textit{DA}, 414a19-21.
the functions of life. Only an appropriate, that is to say, an *organic*, body can be endowed with this capacity: even plants, the simplest living things, have organs.\(^{73}\) It seems ridiculous to Aristotle that Plato and the Pythagoreans attempted to examine the soul without specifying anything about the conditions required in the body of which it is the form, or explaining how or why body and soul are joined together.\(^{74}\) The concept of the body as the soul's proper, or appropriate matter thus goes hand in hand with Aristotle's emphatic account of the unity of substance: if the soul is the very form and act of the body, Aristotle states, then it is unnecessary to ask whether (and how) they constitute a single substance, just as it is unnecessary to ask whether wax and an impression made upon it are united to one another.\(^{75}\)

And so, body and soul are not related simply as matter and form respectively, but more precisely, as *proper* matter and *proper* form.\(^{76}\) Aristotle's definition of the appropriate material subject for a soul in *De anima* II.1 covers *any* soul: plant, animal or human. In a few places in the *Metaphysica*, Aristotle notes that the human 'species' is always made manifest with a certain kind of material composition: 'flesh, bone, and other such parts'.\(^{77}\) Thomas Aquinas would, therefore, sometimes use the label 'flesh and bone' to point to human proper matter.

### 1.1. Substance and Accident

This last reference from the *Metaphysica* in fact provides a good occasion to introduce the scholastic distinction between substantial and accidental forms. Scholastic theologians would take the word 'species' in Latin translations of Aristotle's works to refer to what they called a 'substantial form', that is, a nature- or species-

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\(^{73}\) *DA*, 412a28-b 1.


\(^{75}\) *DA*, 412b6-9.

\(^{76}\) See above, nn. 68 and 74.

defining form, in passages where it seemed obvious to them that Aristotle was referring to such a form.

The term *forma substantialis* does not occur in the Latin Aristotle, but the Stagirite himself does make clear the crucial point that it is the formal component in a composite substance, such as a soul in the case of a human being, which defines it as a substance of a certain species or kind, or, in Aristotle’s words, as a 'this something' (*hoc aliquid*). 'Form' (*forma et species*), he states, 'is that in virtue of which a thing is called a "this something"'.

Furthermore, Aristotle had distinguished between things that have a primary kind of existence (substances), human beings, for example, and the things that depend on, or 'happen to' these primary entities, and therefore exist in a secondary or derivative way (accidents), a human's hair colour, for example. A basic tenet in Aristotle's metaphysical apparatus is the primacy of substance and its ontological priority to its accidents. The classic statement of this axiom can be found at *Metaphysica* VII.1.

Though, again, the term *forma accidentalis* is not found in the Latin Aristotle, scholastic theologians would call 'accidental forms' other forms which did not define a substance's species or kind, but which governed the various 'accidental' features - its shape, size, colour, and so on - that belonged to it and depended on it for their being.

### 2. The Basics (II): Human Generation, the Material Principle, and Necessity in Causation

Pushing onwards in the direction of his account of the individual human body, the next piece to be added to the puzzle is Aristotle's understanding of the role of the material cause in human generation.

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78 'Dicimus itaque unum quoddam genus eorum que sunt substantiam. Huius autem aliud quidem sicut materiam, quod secundum se quidem non est hoc aliquid, aliud autem formam et speciem secundum secundum quod dicitur iam hoc aliquid'. *DA*, 412a6-9, in Aquinas, *In DA*, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 67.


80 *Met.*, 1028a21-1028b2.
As established, Aristotle holds that a form naturally comes into being *only* in its proper matter, or proper potency, even if, as he writes in the *Metaphysica*, there is one material principle from which all things come into being.\(^{81}\) Given this, it is not surprising that Aristotle's material principle, understood as a material *cause*, is crucial in his general framework of causation in natural change, and to his analysis of human generation in particular. Matter, along with the changes that occur in it, takes on the role of necessity in Aristotle's framework of causation and change:\(^{82}\) insofar as matter is the stuff out of which things are made, certain material conditions are a necessary prerequisite in order that a certain kind of thing can come into being.

A grasp of the role of matter in Aristotle's account of natural generation eventually leads to an understanding of his conception of the individual body: this latter is brought into view most clearly in passages in which Aristotle applies his analysis of material causation in human generation on the level below the species. Aristotle is interested in the way in which the precise material conditions involved in individual cases of animal generation, including human generation, restrict, or constrain the outcomes of those processes of development. He thinks that the particular material conditions obtaining in an individual body, resulting from the precise circumstances of its generation *in utero*, prove to be a limiting factor on the way in which its soul operates: matter accounts for natural differences on the level below the species.

Before exploring Aristotle's thought on human generation and the individual body more fully, it will be helpful to situate it within the broader context of the relationship between the material cause and the final cause in Aristotle's framework of causation and change. As anyone familiar with Aristotle's work on animals will know, his teleological\(^{83}\) approach to analysing the composition of natural things entails a particular emphasis on their final causes - the purposes for which animals


bodies are put together in a certain ways, or the goals towards which their particular generative processes tend - rather than on their material causes.

So whilst Aristotle does acknowledge that when we refer to a thing’s nature, we can refer either to its matter, or to its form, he criticises natural scientists who try to study nature by looking exclusively at matter, or at necessity in natural processes. Forms, as final causes, being the reasons for which composites of matter and form are as they are, are obviously far more important than matter to the natural scientist, who asks *why* things are as they are. A human body’s soul is to be understood not only as its *formal* cause, that which defines what species or kind of thing it is, but also as its *final* cause. If we want to understand why the human body is constructed in the way that it is, Aristotle thinks, we should direct our attention to the soul, for the sake of whose functions and operations it exists. This approach is reflected in Aristotle's analysis of how the human body differs from the bodies of other animals, and it is worth dwelling on that analysis for a moment because it would inform Thomas Aquinas's distinctive conception of the perfection of the human body, which will be discussed further in chapter 3.

Aristotle has much to say about how the human body is constructed in the best possible way for the sake of the functions of its rational soul. The human soul is at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of the kinds of soul found in living things. In *De generatione animalium*, Aristotle explains that all animated bodies are 'more divine' than non-animated bodies. But souls differ in nobility (*honorabilitas*). Not surprisingly, given that he thinks that matter and form necessarily bear a proportion to one another, Aristotle holds that the more noble the soul is, or the more elevated and

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84 *Phys.*, 194a12-13.
85 *Phys.*, 194a18ff, 198b10-16.
86 *Phys.*, 199a30-33.
88 *Phys.*, 194b26-29.
89 *Phys.*, 199a30-32.
varied its powers are, the more noble the nature of its required body, its required matter, will be.\textsuperscript{91}

He illustrates this point further in various passages in his \textit{De partibus animalium} (particularly in II.10 and IV.10), explaining that humans participate in a higher kind of life than other animals because they are rational, and that the human body is, therefore, structured in an appropriate way. Among the animal bodies, Aristotle notes, human bodies alone are upright, with their parts holding their natural position: the upper part of the human body is turned towards the upper part of the universe.\textsuperscript{92} This stance is made possible because the human body's upper part, reaching from the mouth to the seat, is duly proportioned to its lower, weight-bearing part. Other animals' bodies have disproportionately weighty upper sections, meaning that they walk on all fours. Such weighty bodies burden the senses, impeding their operations. In contrast, humans' senses, and their intellects, function freely: humans' erect stance is designed for the sake of the god-like operation of the rational soul (\textit{operatio membri divini}).\textsuperscript{93}

Further, Aristotle notes, humans, not requiring forefeet, are naturally endowed with hands instead. It is because humans are the most intelligent animals, and can acquire manifold skills, that nature has given them members capable of making any number of further instruments to put to a variety of different uses. Those natural scientists who say that the human design is inferior to the design of other animal bodies, insofar as it lacks natural armour and forms of defense, are mistaken: humans have the advantage of being undetermined to a particular form of defense, and can make for themselves whatever weapons they choose.\textsuperscript{94}

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\textsuperscript{92} \textit{DPA}, 656a6-13.


\textsuperscript{94} \textit{DPA}, 687a5-b24.
Particular parts of animals' bodies, with particular, complex material properties, exist for the purpose of carrying out particular functions.\textsuperscript{95} Among animal bodies, human bodies have the greatest diversity in their parts, to accommodate the most advanced animal operations. Since humans, uniquely, have the higher faculty of speech, which requires the articulation of complex sounds, human lips are soft and capable of a range of movements, and the human tongue is free in its movement in a way that other animals' tongues are not.\textsuperscript{96} Human teeth, in respect of their number and shape, are also designed according to the requirements of speech.\textsuperscript{97}

It is Aristotle's focus on final causation in his analysis of nature that lies behind these striking passages on the superiority of the human body to other animal bodies. Remarkable as these passages are, however, their formal perspective should not be allowed to occlude the extent to which Aristotle is interested in the material make up of animal bodies.

Aristotle, as is well known, favoured craft analogies, and in particular house-building analogies, when illustrating the relationship between types of causes. Setting out his framework for understanding causation in \textit{Physica} II.3-9, Aristotle explains that nature's designs are like those of a skilful craftsman, orientated purposefully toward what is best. Like a craftsman, nature works in a particular way, the best way relative to the job at hand, and does nothing superfluously.\textsuperscript{98} It is because the plan of a house has such and such a form that it is constructed in a particular manner.\textsuperscript{99} Such analogies, it is true, are particularly useful for highlighting the importance of final causation, or the teleological aspect of natural processes. But Aristotle explicitly holds that it is a builder's job to know about the bricks and planks from which a house is built, as well as its plan.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{DP}A, 646b10-25.
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{DP}A, 659b29-660a8, 17-30.
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{DP}A, 661b13-15.
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Phys.}, 198b7-9; cf. also 199a8-25, \textit{DG}A, 731a25ff., 738b1, 739b19-20, \textit{DP}A, 640a15-17.
\textsuperscript{99} \textit{DP}A, 640a17-20.
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Phys.}, 194a12ff; cf. \textit{D}A, 403b1-15, \textit{Met.}, 1037a10-20.
When he does take a more material (or 'bottom up') perspective on animal bodies, then, Aristotle distinguishes three degrees of complexity in the material make-up of the parts of animals. Body parts are ultimately constructed from the four elements, or the elementary qualities: hot, cold, wet, and dry. Other material qualities or properties, such as density or rarity, roughness or smoothness, are secondary to these. Then, homogenous, or uniform parts (such as flesh and bone) are constituted from the elements, along with these qualities. Finally, heterogeneous or non-uniform bodily parts, the hands, the face, and so on, are constituted from the homogenous parts.101 (This is of course an analytical, and not a temporal sequence).

But it is only in his work on the generation of humans and other animals that the significance of matter and of material causation in Aristotle's thought on natural bodies is really brought into sharp relief. In this context, Aristotle notes that the order of nature, or the order of logical existence, is always the inverse of the order of actual development. The purpose of a process, the form to be generated, is logically prior to the process through which it comes into being: we cannot define, or understand, a process unless we can appreciate the end towards which it aims. Nonetheless, in the temporal sequence of development, that which is prior is the thing most remote from the goal of the process or the thing to be generated.102

The human soul, then, requires its proper matter, or an appropriate material subject, but this material does not spring up all of a sudden. Its development has to take place in a certain sequence, with each prior stage of material development necessary in order to entail a potentiality for the next. If a house has been built, then its foundations must necessarily have come into being first; since its foundations have come into being, then the clay from which they are made must have come into being before them, and so on.103 Aristotle draws a distinction between human proper matter, which is the proximate material cause of a human, and the mother's menstrual


102 DPA, 646a25-b5.

103 'Si igitur quod prius necesse est generari, si quod posterius erit, verbi gratia si domus, fundamentum, si vero hoc, lutum'. DGEC, 337b14-15ff. Cf. also DPA, 639b34-640a5. A highly compressed comment in the Physica applies this model to human development: 'Manifestum est igitur quoniam necessarium in phisicis quod sicut materia dicitur et motus ipsius... quoniam domus talis est, hec oportet fieri ex necessitate et esse; sic et si homo hoc est, hec inquam; si autem hec, hec sane'. Phys., 200a31-b4 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 95.
fluid,\textsuperscript{104} which might be labelled the 'remote' material cause of a human. The course of the process of material development in human generation from remote to proximate matter will be sketched out next; as indicated, it is through an understanding of this course of development in individual cases that we get the clearest picture of Aristotle's understanding of the individual human body.

Completing the framework of causation in human generation, then, in which the formal and final cause (the rational soul), and a material cause (remote and proximate) are already in place, is the fourth kind of cause in Aristotle's schema: the efficient, or agent cause (or the craftsman himself in Aristotle's housebuilding analogy). Male semen is the agent cause of material developments \textit{in utero}.\textsuperscript{105} It is responsible for setting in motion the precise sequence of changes involved in the development of menstrual fluid into a material subject appropriate for a rational soul. In an individual case of human generation, as we will see, it is the way in which a particular seminal power from the male parent acts upon particular material provided by the female parent that results in the set of material conditions unique to the individual human body.

As Aristotle explains in \textit{De generatione animalium} II, then, the material provided by the female parent in animal generation has the differentiated potential to become the body parts specific to the kind of animal to be generated.\textsuperscript{106} Just as a craftsman cannot make a saw from wood or wool,\textsuperscript{107} Aristotle explains, in a passage on material causation from the \textit{Metaphysica}, the agent cause in human generation cannot make a human body from just any matter.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{flushright}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104}‘Ut hominis que causa ut materia? Equidem menstrua... Oportet autem proximas causas dicere. Que materia? Non ignem aut terram sed propriam’. \textit{Met.}, 1044a35-b3 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 175.
\item \textsuperscript{105}\textit{Phys.}, 194b30-32, \textit{Met.}, 1044a34.
\item \textsuperscript{106}‘Et enim illud superfluum [femelle] omnes partes habet potentia, actu autem nullam’. \textit{DGA}, 737a23-25 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{107}\textit{Met.}, 1044a25-1044b1.
\item \textsuperscript{108}‘Qualiter autem quidem unumquodque fit, hinc oportet sumere, principium facientes primo quidem igitur quia quecumque natura aut arte, ab actu existente fiunt, ex ente potentia tali’. \textit{DGA}, 734b20-23 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 49.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushright}
The precise formative properties possessed by human male semen are also confined to the species: humans generate and are generated by humans alone.\textsuperscript{109} Male semen, then, has within it a power, or movement, which initiates and governs the material development of the embryo, making its parts.\textsuperscript{110} This power is not a definite object (\textit{hoc aliquid}); Aristotle refers to it as a principle (\textit{principium}) and a motion (\textit{motum}) that semen has with respect to the formation of the body’s particular parts,\textsuperscript{111} or just as a power (\textit{virtus}) in semen.\textsuperscript{112} Like someone who initiates a movement in an automatic machine, the father’s generative power initiates this movement in his semen, and like the movement in the machine, the movement in semen continues in separation from its originator.\textsuperscript{113} Borrowing a powerful simile from a poem attributed to Orpheus, Aristotle notes that an animal comes into being like the knitting of a net: its organs are formed not all at once, or at random, but in an exact order of succession.\textsuperscript{114}

As soon as each of the body’s parts comes into being, having been configured by the active ingredient in semen at a precise stage in the sequence of the body’s development, it does so as a living, animated, part.\textsuperscript{115} In this way, the soul emerges from the body, or from prior material developments \textit{in utero}. Accordingly, Aristotle explains, if it is the female parent who provides the body in animal generation, then, in setting up the motion that configures the animal body, the male parent provides its soul.\textsuperscript{116}

The latter part of this statement requires unpicking. The father’s semen does not \textit{actually} contain a soul. But, since animals' parts are constructed in a living state by a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{109} \textit{DPA}, 640a20-26, 641b25-30.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{DGA}, 734b22-24.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{DGA}, 734b23-25 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 49.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{DPA}, 640a23 (ed.) van Oppenraaij, vol. 2, p. 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} \textit{DGA}, 734b10-17, 737a20-23.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{DGA}, 734a17-25.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} ‘Sperma quidem igitur tale, et habet motum et principium tale, ut cessante motu fiat unaqueque particularum et animatum’. \textit{DGA}, 734a22-24 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 49.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} ‘Est autem corpus quidem ex femella, anima autem ex mascolo’. \textit{DGA}, 738b25-27 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 58.
\end{itemize}
power in semen, the life imparted to the animal body must come from semen. Aristotle reasons that semen 'has or is soul, virtually' or potentially.\textsuperscript{117} Even so, he does not necessarily seem to think that paternal semen can provide the \textit{rational} soul in human generation.

In human generation, then, the embryo, in accordance with the necessary sequence in which its organs are configured, first possesses a vegetative, or plant-like soul, then a sensitive, or animal soul, and finally a rational, or human soul. All animals, Aristotle explains, acquire a non-specific animal soul before they acquire the exact kind of soul that defines their species.\textsuperscript{118} The acquisition of each prior kind of soul is necessary for the acquisition of the next in the sequence, and each kind of soul is possessed potentially before it is actually possessed.\textsuperscript{119} It is clear that the formative motion in human male semen can bring the embryo as far as the stage at which it is an appropriate material subject for a rational soul. Yet the question of how humans come to possess reason, Aristotle explains, raises acute problems.\textsuperscript{120} Whereas it is not difficult to appreciate that the nutritive and sensitive souls come into being in the embryo when the embryo develops the precise bodily parts that these kinds of souls require to function, intellectual operations, in themselves, have no necessary connection with bodily processes. In a deeply enigmatic passage, Aristotle claims that the intellect is 'divine' and arrives at the embryo from 'outside'.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{117} 'Utrum autem habet anima sperma aut non?... et habet et est virtute'. \textit{DGA}, 735a5 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 50.
\bibitem{119} 'Nutritivam quidem igitur animam spermata et fetus separabiles palam quia virtute quidem habentia ponendum, actu autem non habentia... Consequentem autem palam quia et de sensitiva dicendum anima, et de activa et de intellectiva: omnes enim necessarium potentia prius habere quam actu'. \textit{DGA}, 736b9-16 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 53.
\bibitem{120} 'Propter quod et de intellectu, quando et quomodo accipiunt et unde participantia hoc principio, habet dubitationem plurimam, et oportet intendere secundum virtutem accipere et secundum quantum contingit'. \textit{DGA}, 736b3-9 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 53.
\bibitem{121} 'Quorumcumque enim principiorum est operatio corporalis, palam quia hec sine corpore impossibile existere, ut ambulare sine pedibus; quare et deformis ingredi impossibile: neque enim ipsas secundum ipsas ingredi possibile inseparabiles existentes, neque in corpore ingredi... Rehiquitur autem intellectum solum deformis advenire et divinum esse solum: nichil enim ipsius operationi communicat corporalis operatio'. \textit{DGA}, 736b23-30 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, pp. 53-4.
\end{thebibliography}
Before moving on to explain how Aristotle understands this sequence of material development in utero to play out on the level below the species, it is worth pointing out a certain difficulty with interpreting the Stagirite's account of human generation. His commentators would disagree as to how any form's differentiated proper matter should be conceived.

Some argued that the role of proper matter in generation must be played by something that, in itself, already possesses a form. This interpretation was put forward, at the latest, by John Philoponus, a Greek philosopher educated in the Neoplatonist tradition, in his *Contra Proclum* (composed c. 529 AD). In the thirteenth century, advocates of the theory of the plurality of substantial forms in human beings, too, would maintain, on the basis of Aristotle's texts on substantial change and embryonic development, that the rational soul's proper matter must already be informed by a corporeal substantial form of its own. Roberto Zavalloni's work remains the best starting point for pluralist position on proper matter and human generation; the topic will not be discussed in any detail in chapter 5, which focuses on postmortem bodily continuity.

An alternative conception of proper matter, consistent in theory with Aquinas's position that the soul is the only substantial form in the body, is found in Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* XII.2, in which the Stagirite, analysing substance, again states that different things have different matter, and raises the question of what kind of non-being (non ente), it is from which things come into being. Aristotle's idea that generation proceeds from non-being to being will be discussed further in chapter 2. In this commentary on this passage, Averroes takes it that 'prime' matter, that is, an entirely featureless substratum common to all material things, and surviving across all cases of natural change, is a fundamental feature in


123 The key difference between John Philoponus's exact position and that of those late thirteenth century philosophers who argued for a distinct corporeal form in each human was that Philoponus argued that proper matter should not be conceived as a composite of matter and form (whereas pluralists held that it could), but should be understood as something one and simple in itself. ibid., p. 257.


125 'Omnia vero materiam habent quecumque transmutantur, sed aliam... Dubitabit autem utique aliquis ex quali non ente est generatio'. *Met.* 1069b24-28 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 248.
Aristotle's natural scientific schema. The concept of prime matter, along with the question of whether it was in fact present in Aristotle's thought, need not be explored further now; it will be covered in chapter 2, along with the more technical aspects of Aristotle's account of substantial generation.

The important point for now is that, for Averroes, although prime matter is a single substratum, it is also 'several' (multa) with respect to its potency, or its ability (habilitas) to serve as a substrate for several different kinds of forms: each form, or act, comes into being in its proper potency. According to Averroes, prime matter possesses several potencies, or habitates, which bear an order to one another such that, in natural generation, the potency proper to the form to be generated develops through certain necessary stages of increasing complexity. Averroes holds that the forms generated at earlier stages in the process mediate the development of this proper potency, but it is the development of this proper potency itself that remains the focus of his analysis.

So the Commentator provides a head-on discussion of proper matter, not viewed through the lens of substantial form but confronted in its own right, as characterised by being in a complex or highly differentiated state of potency. It will be argued in chapter 3 that Aquinas adopted a position similar to Averroes' in this area.

2.1. The Generation of the Individual Body

In book IV of De generatione animalium, Aristotle applies this framework for human generation on the level below the species. In every case of human generation, the paternal seminal power that is the agent of the generation of the individual body works up the matter provided by the mother in a unique way.

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126 'non enim quodlibet ens fit ex qualibet potentia, sec unum quodque entium fit ex eo quod est in potentia illud, quod fit, id est ex potentia propria... Et dicit hoc, quia opinatur, quod prima materia est unum secundum subjectum, & multa secundum habilitates. Primo enim habet habitates ad recipiendum primas contrarietates, scilicet formas omnium quatuor elementorum, secundo vero habet potentias consimilium partium mediantibus formas quatuor elementorum. & istae potentiae diversantur secundum diversitatem mixtiorum quatuor elementorum, ita quod ex hoc diversantur formae generabilia'. Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XLI et Averrois Cordubensis in eodem commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis vol. VIII (ed.) Venetiis apud Junctas 1562-74 (repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962), Book XII, comment 11, f. 297r, E-F.
Every part and organ of an individual human body is fashioned in a particular way and is characterised by features inherited over the course of its unique process of material development in utero. Since Aristotle holds that all of the soul's operations, apart from those of the intellect, take place in bodily organs, it is not surprising that he should state that a child resembles its parents with respect to the particular quality of its soul's operations, too, such as in the characteristic way in which it moves (secundum motum) or in the particular sound of its voice (secundum vocem). In each case of human generation, then, unique material conditions constrain the way in which the formal characteristics associated with a species are realised in the individual.

Seeking to explain in De generatione animalium IV how children can inherit characteristics from either one or both of their parents, and even from their grandparents and more remote ancestors, Aristotle rejects the theory of panspermia, which posits that semen is like a liquid mixed from many different kinds of juice. A portion taken at random from that liquid would not be an even mixture of all the constituent juices, but would have more of one than another, or some of one and none at all of another, and so on. In the same way, so the theory goes, depending on the precise make-up of the semen from which he or she is generated, a child resembles one parent more than the other, or one grandparent more than the other, and so on. It is the lack of precision in this theory to which Aristotle objects. In his own account of the fashioning of the individual body in utero, the Stagirite posits that the overall formative movement that shapes the foetus, though governed by the formative power, is in fact the intricately complex result of the precise interplay of several different movements.

There are several efficient movements, so Aristotle thinks, that originate in the formative power in male semen. Some communicate individual (singularē) characteristics, whilst others communicate specific and generic characteristics: the characteristics tied just to being human and an animal respectively. The movements that communicate individual characteristics have more force in the generative process than those that communicate common characteristics. This is because the

127 DGA, 769a5.


129 DGA, 769a25-769b1.
primary way in which Socrates exists is as the individual Socrates, not as a human or as an animal.\textsuperscript{130}

The material provided by the mother limits the way in which these different movements in the seminal agent act. Aristotle still holds that the only movements involved in an \textit{actual} way in the complex formative movement that fashions the individual body are those originating in the formative power in semen. But he thinks that 'movements' originating from the material provided by the mother are involved in a \textit{potential} way.\textsuperscript{131} The interplay between the paternal and maternal contributions to the generative process is analogous to the way in which a knife is blunted by what it cuts, or the way in a heating agent is cooled by what it heats, so Aristotle thinks. Every moving or efficient cause receives some motion from that which it moves, he explains, and any force that pushes is itself pushed back in return.\textsuperscript{132}

A movement originating on the paternal side, then, can be conquered (\textit{victum}) by its opposite on the maternal side, or vice versa. Movements able to communicate the individual characteristics of more remote ancestors, from either the maternal or the paternal line, are also potential contributors to the overall formative movement. Aristotle holds that the relevant movement on whichever side, maternal or paternal, which prevails with respect to the communication of a particular characteristic, can still be 'resolved' (\textit{solutum}) into another taking its origin from somewhere else in the ancestral line. Depending on the extent to which a movement is resolved, Aristotle posits, the movement into which it is resolved is more or less remote in the ancestral line.\textsuperscript{133} Taking the case of physical appearance, he explains that, if the movement that communicates the father’s individual likeness prevails but is resolved (\textit{solvitur}) to a lesser extent, it changes into a movement which communicates the likeness of the father’s father, the offspring's paternal grandfather. If it prevails and is resolved to a

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{DG\textsc{a}}, 767b27-768a1 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, pp. 128-9.

\textsuperscript{131} ‘Insunt autem hii quidem motuum actu, hii autem potentia: actu quidem generantis et universalium, puta hominis et animalis, potentia autem qui femelle et progenitorum’. \textit{DG\textsc{a}}, 768a12-15, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{DG\textsc{a}}, 768b15-20.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{DG\textsc{a}}, 768b5-11, (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 130.
greater extent, it changes into a movement communicating the likeness of the offspring's paternal grandfather's father, and so on.\footnote{DGA, 768a15ff.}

It is possible for the various intricate movements that shape the body's individual parts to be so confused together (\textit{confunduntur}) that the individual offspring bears no easily discernible resemblance to either of its parents or any of their parents or ancestors. In this extreme case of the complex interplay of movements the only definite characteristic that remains is that shared by all: the characteristic of being human.\footnote{DGA, 768b1-15 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 130.} This point demonstrates Aristotle’s claim that the movement communicating the characteristics that are tied simply to being human is distinct from those movements that confer various purely individual characteristics. In addition, there are cases in which human parents generate offspring that does not appear to be human at all and appears instead to be just some kind of animal (\emph{animal aliquod}). Such offspring are called monstrosities (\textit{monstra}),\footnote{DGA, 769b5-10 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 132.} and result from an extreme resolution of seminal movements: only the movement that communicates the most universal characteristic of all, that of being an animal, prevails over the embryo's matter.\footnote{DGA, 769b10-15 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 133.} Such cases, Aristotle supposes, can arise either due to some defect in the material the mother provides, or due to some defect in the seminal power.\footnote{DGA, 770a5-10. Cf. Phys., 199b5-6.}

In Aristotle’s \textit{De generatione animalium}, then, Thomas Aquinas had in hand a detailed analysis of the origins of the intra-specific differences amongst humans. The individuality of any human had its very basis in the precise material conditions obtaining in their individual body, inherited in a complex manner over the course of its development in the womb. This bore out Aquinas's basic presupposition that the particular body was crucial to, or made an independent contribution to, the individuality of the human being to whom it belonged.
3. The Individual Body and its Intellect in *De anima*

As will become clear in the discussion of individuality in Aristotle's *Metaphysica* that concludes this chapter, the Stagirite, for epistemological reasons, struggled with the idea that each human soul might be intrinsically unique. Aquinas, in contrast, would posit that individual souls were intrinsically characterised by intra-specific differences, resulting from their creation in individual bodies.

And Aquinas would use a particular passage in Aristotle's *De anima* as a proof text for his position that each human soul was intrinsically limited and shaped, even in respect of its intellectual nature, according to the body in which it was created. It was clearly Aristotle's view that intellectual acts did not take place in any bodily organ, but the Stagirite had also explained that the act of understanding was dependent on operations that did occur in bodily organs insofar as it involved the imagination, which, in turn, was dependent upon sense perception.

The key passage was in *De anima* II.9. There, Aristotle notes that even if many animals seem to outstrip humans in the sharpness of their sense powers, the exception to this rule is the human sense of touch, which is far more accurate than that of any other animal. (He explains further, in *De partibus animalium* II.1, that touch is the most complex of the sense organs because it is correlated with a wide range of sensory objects, and is finely tuned to recognise a variety of kinds of contrasts: hot and cold, solidity and fluidity, and so on.) The accuracy of the human sense of touch, Aristotle goes on, is the reason why humans are the most intelligent of all the animals. Crucially, his evidence for this correlation between the sense of touch and intelligence is drawn from an observation about differences on the

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139 *DGA*, 736b21-29.

140 *DA*, 403a7-10.

141 *DA*, 428b10ff.

142 *DPA*, 647a15-20.
level below the species: among humans those who have softer skin (and therefore a sharper sense of touch) have greater intellectual ability.\textsuperscript{143}

*De partibus animalium* IV.10, discussed above, is in tension with this passage. There, of course, Aristotle had stated that quadrupedal animals' weighty upper bodies in fact impeded their sensory operations. Aquinas's reconciliation of these two passages will be explained in chapter 3.

### 4. Essence and Individuality in the *Metaphysica*

Aquinas's final Aristotelian source on the topic of individuality would be the *Metaphysica*. Here, approaching the topic of individuality from an entirely different perspective, Aristotle again confirms that humans are differentiated from one another in virtue of their unique, individual bodies.

In the *Metaphysica*, Aristotle is preoccupied with explaining the real presence of *universality* in the particular things we encounter in the natural world. The approach to individuality that he takes is the very inverse of the approach that discussions of individuality in medieval metaphysics tended to take, as Edward Booth's close study of Aristotle's thought on the topic has demonstrated.\textsuperscript{144} Scholastic theologians would enquire about what they called the 'principle of individuation' (*principium individuationis*): what principle or metaphysical constituent of a thing was responsible for its individuality?\textsuperscript{145} Aristotle's own treatment of individuality was an extended critique of Plato's metaphysics on the grounds that it relegated individual material objects to a realm of unreal things, separated from a realm of the real, inhabited by universal, paradigmatic Forms. Conversely, *individuals*, for Aristotle, were the starting point.

\textsuperscript{143}'tactus... hunc autem habet homo sensum certissimum; in aliis enim deficiat ab animalibus multis, secundum autem tactum differenter certificat. Unde et prudentissimum animalium est; signum autem est in genere hominum secundum sensum hunc ingenirosos esse et non ingenirosos, secundum alium autem nullum. Duri enim carne, inepti mente, molles autem carne, bene apti'. *DA* 421a19-25, edited in Aquinas, *In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 45, 1, p. 147.

\textsuperscript{144}E. Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology*, full citation above, n. 37. The understanding of *Metaphysica* VII demonstrated here is heavily indebted to Booth's research.

But this metaphysical reorientation created its own urgent problem. Aristotle was convinced that certainty in natural scientific knowledge could only be guaranteed in the same way that certainty in mathematical knowledge is guaranteed, that is, by the systematisation of that knowledge in abstract and universal terms. The difficulty, as Aristotle saw it, was not that the intellect might not be accurate in its development of the abstract concepts to be used in scientific expression. His concern was rather that a science based on such abstractions might not really be a science of the concrete individual inhabitants of the natural world, individuals characterised by intra-specific differences, after all.

So unless Aristotle could formulate an ontological model in which the immanent principles of concrete individuals were themselves in fact universal, a gap threatened to open up between the reality of the natural world and the knowledge that humans develop about it. This was a desperately difficult problem, which Aristotle described at one point in his *Metaphysica* as the greatest he faced in metaphysics.

Book VII of the *Metaphysica* contains the results of Aristotle's sustained effort to formulate a model to solve it. Aristotle discusses individuals, such as humans, as composites, but not simply composites of matter and form. In this particular analysis, Aristotle is more concerned to discuss essence, or what it is to be a thing (*quod quid erat esse*), or that which would be captured in the definition of a thing, than form as such. After all, a thing's essence, precisely as that which would be captured in its definition, is also that which would be relevant to a scientific account of it.

In *Metaphysica* VII, then, Aristotle frequently substitutes essence in place of form (or 'substantial form'), and of course in place of soul when he is discussing living bodies. So, for Aristotle, it is important to note, essence is form, but form considered precisely as that single principle constitutive of a thing that comprehends

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146 See Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology*, pp. 1-5.

147 ibid., p. 6 which cites *Met.* 1087a10-13. It was precisely the rejection of Plato’s Forms which provoked Aristotle’s close reflection on individuality and universality in things, *pace* Gracia: ‘the ancients paid little attention to individuality... Aristotle was so concerned to attack his former teacher’s view that he seems often to have forgotten about this fundamental feature of the world’. Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individualisation*, p. 259.

the complex of universalisable characteristics to be found in the thing in question.\footnote{Booth, \textit{Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology}, p. 3 (which cites \textit{Metaphysica} 1038b17-18), and pp. 9-10.}

For example, 'animal' is one such universal nature, found in a human, which we use to define a human. As comprehended in their essences (or forms), for Aristotle, universals become intrinsic to things.

In \textit{Metaphysica} VII.6, Aristotle puts forward a model in which a particular thing is completely identified with its essence as a means of closing the gap between knowledge and reality.\footnote{\textit{Ex hiis itaque rationibus unum et idem non secundum accidens ipsum unumquodque et quod quid erat esse, et quod scire unumquodque horum est quod quid erat esse scire; quare secundum expositionem necessum unum aliquod esse ambo'}. \footnote{\textit{Met.}, 1031b19-20 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 141. Cf. Booth, \textit{Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology}, p. 13.} But where does this model leave the real individuality of the particular thing?

Aristotle developed two models that would resonate in Aquinas's own work on individuality and the individual body. The first is found in \textit{Metaphysica} VII.8, a discussion of the generation of substances.\footnote{For commentary on these two models, see Booth, \textit{Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology}, pp. 13-14.} Plato's Forms cannot explain natural generation, Aristotle explains here; a form manifests itself in matter at the end of a process of generation, which is driven by an \textit{efficient} cause. He models the union of universal with individual in the composite product of human generation as the union of form (or essence) with matter:

\begin{quote}
'Omnis uero iam talis species in hiis carnibus et ossibus, Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem propter materiam (namque diversa) idem uero specie; nam individua species'.\footnote{\textit{Met.}, 1034a5-10 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 147.}
\end{quote}

Socrates and Callias are alike with respect to their 'undivided' \textit{species}, a word that scholastic theologians would read to mean substantial form, in this context. So the same essence is present in Callias and Socrates. The difference between them (or the
individuality of each) is due to, and, in this model, is confined to, their respective material aspects. Each has his particular flesh and bones: these.\textsuperscript{153}

The second model, outlined in \textit{Metaphysica VII.10}, is more nuanced. Aristotle suggests that, in an individual composite, we can identify universalisable aspects of its composition as well as its individuality. When we apply a general or universal term such as 'man' or 'horse' to an individual, we are not talking about that individual substance as such but a kind of whole (\textit{totum quoddam}) composed of a particular account or definition (\textit{hac ratio}), and particular matter (\textit{hac materia}), regarded as universal. And yet, he continues, individuals such as Socrates are singular things due to 'ultimate matter'.\textsuperscript{154} There are a couple of obscurities in this passage. We may wonder what Aristotle means by particular matter regarded as universal, since in this enquiry he equates universals strictly with formal or defining elements in things. Conversely, how can the definition or account of something be particular? This model is consistent with the previous one at least in its suggestion that matter is the basis of individuality in things that belong to the same species.

This extended discussion in \textit{Metaphysica VII} was, for Aristotle, the close exploration of a difficulty, rather than the working through of a final solution to it.\textsuperscript{155} Any conclusion Aristotle might have reached is far less important for the purposes of the present study than the way in which Aquinas used the Stagirite's work to develop an account of the individual body, and the individual human, in light of his understanding of what resurrection would involve. The way in which Aquinas did so can be illustrated briefly with a swift glance forward at two passages from his \textit{Summa Theologiae}.


\textsuperscript{154} 'Homo uero et equus et que ita in singularibus, universaliter autem, non sunt substantia sed simul toto quoddam ex hac ratione et hac materia universaliter. Singulare uero ex ultima materia Socrates iam est, et in alis similiter'. \textit{Met.} 1035b27-32, (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Metaphysica VII} was an 'aporetic initiation' to the topic. Booth, \textit{Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology}, p. 20.
The first passage is *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 2, wherein Aquinas explores the difference between 'person' and 'essence'. Properly speaking, he writes, essence is what is captured in a definition. Unlike Aristotle, however, Aquinas holds that the essence of a material substance is *composite*. It captures not only the form that places the substance in its species, but also the distinctive material pattern shared by all members of that species. Here, Aquinas refers to that material pattern as 'common matter' (common, that is, to members of the species).

Aquinas calls the form and matter that compose the essence of a human being, the 'principles of the species': the formal principle is 'soul' (or rational soul), and the material principle is 'flesh and bone'. A person, or an individual substance, on the other hand, is composed of 'individual principles'. Their formal individual principle is *this* form, or *this* soul, and their material individual principle is *this* matter, or *this* flesh and *this* bone. In the concrete individual, these 'individual principles' capture characteristics additional to what is captured by the essence, or in other words what is universal in humans. The essence cannot, therefore, be identified with the individual.\(^{156}\) The gap thus threatening to open up between knowledge and reality did not trouble Aquinas, as it did Aristotle: the formula Aristotle offered in *Metaphysica* VII.6, as a means of closing that gap, is rejected outright by Aquinas.

Aquinas's model for relating universality and individuality in things is also different from that which Aristotle offers in *Metaphysica* VII.8. There, Aristotle's text implies that Socrates and Callias differ only materially. Aquinas, in contrast, would emphasise that each has an individual formal principle, *this* soul, as well as an individual material principle, *this* flesh and *this* bone. Aquinas's denial that an essence can be identified absolutely either with an individual, or just with the formal principle in an individual, does not, in his view, amount to a denial that essences are immanent in things, however.

Set alongside *Metaphysica* VII.10, Aquinas' essence looks fairly similar to Aristotle's 'kind of whole' composed of a particular account of something and its particular matter, insofar as they can be regarded as universal. For Aquinas, the features in an individual that are common to all members of its species are still real characteristics of that individual. They just do not exhaust the features in that individual: in order to grasp the individual, we have to note the precise ways in which these common characteristics are realised in his or her particular case.

The second passage is Aquinas's discussion of the 'truth of human nature', in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 119, a. 1. This article brings into clear view the way in which Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's work on the relationship between essence and the individual was shaped by his thinking on resurrection. To recap, as it appeared in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, the 'truth of human nature' in a human individual was a core of material particular to their body, upon which the material aspect of their individuality (and identity) in mortal life was founded, and from which their resurrected body would necessarily be reconstituted.\(^\text{157}\)

As Aquinas sees it, however, whatever enters into the constitution of something belongs to the 'truth' of its nature. We can consider nature in general, as it corresponds to the essence of the species, or alternatively as it is found in a particular individual.\(^\text{158}\) Understood in the first way, the truth of human nature comprises the human form and matter considered in a common way, as soul and body (or as 'principles of the species'). Understood in the second way, the 'truth of human nature' in the individual human Peter, that from which he will be reconstituted at the resurrection, has both a material component, *this* body and *this* soul, or 'individual, signate matter' (matter that can be pointed to as belonging to them) and a formal

\(^{157}\) See above, pp. 15-17.

component, the form that is 'individuated by that matter': Peter's 'individual principles', in the language of *Summa Theologica* I, q. 29, a. 2.\(^{159}\)

Setting these passages from the *Summa Theologica* alongside Aristotle's discussion of individuality in the *Metaphysica* not only highlights the way in which Aquinas used Aristotle's work to confirm his presupposition that the material part unique to each individual human was crucial to their individuality. It also begins to bring into view the theological reasoning that led Aquinas to emphatically accept an idea that Aristotle, for epistemological reasons, would not: that each human's soul is intrinsically unique.

Chapter 3's discussion of Aquinas's thought on individuality and the individual body will set Aquinas's concept of the composite human essence within the context of his writings on bodily resurrection. It will also explore in much more detail Aquinas's idea that there is a unique, proportionate relationship (a *commensuratio*) obtaining between each soul and its own matter, such that individual souls remain diverse following their separation from their bodies, and such that it is not *possible* for a particular soul to be reunited with any matter other than its own at the resurrection.

**Conclusions**

Thomas Aquinas would not see the need to change much about Aristotle's scientific analysis of individuality within the human species in light of the implications, for individuality and the individual body, of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. Aristotle's thinking, whether in biology or metaphysics, confirmed time and again the presupposition that an individual human's particular material part, their body, made a crucial contribution to his or her individuality: it was the very basis of his or her individuality.

Aquinas, then, would adopt Aristotle's account of the material origins of individuality in generation and of the development of the individual human body.

\(^{159}\) 'Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haecc anima et hoc corpus'. ibid.
He would adopt, too, Aristotle's suggestion that, just as matter and form, or body and soul, necessarily bore a proportion to one another considered on the level of the species, so the complex and unique material state belonging to each individual body necessarily posed limits or constraints on the actual operations of its soul. But he would draw the additional conclusion, for precise theological reasons, that the very inner nature of each human soul is unique.

As will become clear in the next chapter, Aristotle's writings on bodily identity did not sit nearly so easily with what the doctrine of the literal resurrection of the body implied with respect to the crucial significance of matter both to human nature and in the make-up of individual humans. His thought on the identity of the mortal body seemed to pull the rug from beneath the emphasis put on matter in his writings on individuality. Aristotle appeared to think that the material part in a human being made no crucial or independent contribution to its continuing identity: the conclusion to be drawn from Aristotle's writings seemed to be that a living body could remain the same individual thing over the course of its lifetime despite the exchange of all of its matter.
CHAPTER 2

ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND (II): BODILY IDENTITY

Introduction

A superficial glance at Aristotle's work on the concept of identity in the *Metaphysica* would suggest that, like his writings on individuality, his thought on bodily identity was in basic agreement with what a literal interpretation of the resurrection of the body implied, namely that in order to be the *same* individual at the resurrection, each individual human being would have to recover the material particular to them: material sameness was crucial to personal identity.

Aristotle outlines three ways in which sameness is talked about in a brief passage in *Metaphysica* X.3. First, he notes, there is sameness in number (*secundum numerum*) or numerical identity, to which we refer whenever we say simply that something is itself. Then there is sameness both in definition or account (*ratio*) and in number (*numero*), when something is one with itself both in species (or form) and in matter. Finally, sometimes we say that things that share a definition or account (*ratio*), such as two equal straight lines, are the same.\(^{160}\) This third kind of sameness is simply sameness in species, or kind.

This short discussion in fact implies that the numerical identity of any composite substance, such as a human being, the kind of identity in virtue of which it is the same only as itself (and not the same as anything else in its species), is grounded *only* in its material sameness. As explained in the previous chapter, Aristotle, in certain

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passages in the *Metaphysica*, looks upon form (or essence) as a nature which individuals hold in common with others of their kind: in *Metaphysica* VII.8, he wants to argue that Socrates and Callias are the same with respect to their forms; the way in which each is like himself and no other (the way in which each is numerically the same as himself) is restricted to his possession of his own flesh and bones: *this* matter, and no other matter.\[^{161}\]

Even so, other passages in Aristotle's works, pertinent more precisely to the question of bodily identity *over time* and *across change*, were, in two respects, in tension with the idea that the resurrection of the very same individual body as that which formerly lived would, or even could, necessarily involve the gathering together of the material particular to it.

First, Aristotle's discussion of growth at *De generatione et corruptione* I.5 implied that the identity of a human's body throughout his or her life was completely *independent* of the exchange of its matter, and was instead dependent on form. This contradicted the account of nutrition and growth in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which posited that each individual body had a collection of particles within it (its 'truth of human nature') which served as the material *core* of its continuing individuality and identity during mortal life, and from which it would be constituted at the resurrection.\[^{162}\] If Aristotle's account of growth were right, and an individual's material part made no *necessary* contribution to his or her continuing identity *over* a lifetime, why would his or her bodily identity at the resurrection depend on the recovery of any matter in particular?

Second, Aristotle's account of the dead body seemed to leave little room for any sense in which an individual human's matter could remain the same thing, *their* matter, after their death and after, subsequently, having been scattered and incorporated into the bodies of other living things. This second point of tension was created in part by the fact that Aristotle's physics was continuist rather than atomist or corpuscular. If matter is a collection of particles or atoms, each a thing in itself, then it is intuitively appreciable that a set of particles belonging to a particular

\[^{161}\] *Met.*, 1034a5-10.

\[^{162}\] See above, pp. 15-17.
person's body might each remain the same thing across the period of time separating their death from their resurrection. But if, as in Aristotle's science, the underlying structure of the physical world is a material continuum, or a material principle subject to various substantial forms, it is not obvious how a particular body's matter can, in itself, remain the same thing across a sequence of changes through which it serves as the subject of different substantial forms in succession.

This chapter will set out the passages in Aristotle's texts that created these two key points of tension with the literal understanding of the doctrine of bodily resurrection to which Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries subscribed. Aquinas would attempt to resolve them, building upon Aristotle's science in order to demonstrate that the correct application of reason would reach conclusions about the conditions for bodily identity and postmortem bodily continuity that were in harmony with the implications of the faith. Doing this would require Aquinas to innovate, and in doing so he would draw upon certain insights he found in the work of the Commentator Averroes on bodily identity.

The key to resolving each of these points of tension would be Aristotle's mathematical concept of 'body', which the Commentator had made central to his own work on bodily identity. Chapter 1 introduced Aristotle's idea that the human body is the 'proper matter' for, or the material subject with an organic constitution appropriate for, a rational soul, and that the individual human body is still such a material subject, but with its own unique material characteristics. In his natural philosophical works, Aristotle also gives a geometrical definition of 'body': it is a particular kind of 'quantity', namely a three-dimensional structure. Averroes, and Aquinas following him, would deduce that any natural body, including any human body, had a three-dimensional structure particular to it. This physical structure was not a substantial form, but an accidental form.

In his commentary on Aristotle's work on growth, Averroes simply indicated that the body's structuring form remains in it, and stays the same, as it grows and diminishes across material exchange. As we will see in chapter 4, Aquinas would argue, furthermore, that the continuing identity of the body's quantitative structure underpinned its material continuity during mortal life.
The bulk of the present chapter's discussion will be devoted to discussing the second point of tension between Aristotle's texts and the implications of the faith, in the area of *postmortem* bodily identity and material continuity. Averroes held, for reasons to do with the logic of Aristotle's account of substantial generation and corruption, that the material principle in an Aristotelian physics had to be invested with a bodily structure of its own. This structure could account for the identity of any particular section of matter, rendering it *this* matter, even as it served as the substratum for a series of radical substantial changes (of which bodily death was one example). Chapter 4 of this thesis will argue that, in his discussions of the general resurrection, Aquinas was advancing towards a position on the nature of matter similar to that of the Commentator.

### 1. Body as a Kind of Quantity

Aristotle's mathematical concept of 'body', then, provides the jumping-off point. Aristotle offers mathematical definitions of 'body' in several places. In the *Categoriae*, after completing his exposition on substance, he discusses, in turn, the various categories of what scholastic theologians would call 'accidents' or the features belonging to substances and ontologically dependent on them. First in line among the accidental categories is quantity. Quantity (*quantum*), Aristotle writes, can be either discrete, like number, or continuous, like lines, surfaces, and bodies, time and place.¹⁶³

Aristotle outlines features that differentiate body, and other the continua which comprise it, namely lines and surfaces, from other kinds of quantity. Bodies (and their lines and surfaces in turn) have parts which join at common boundaries: the parts of a line join at a point; the parts of a surface join at a line; the parts of a body join at a line or along a surface. Each part of a body (or line or surface) has a relative position to other parts within the whole: each part is situated somewhere, and it is

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¹⁶³ *Cat.*, 4b20-25.
possible to distinguish it, say where it is in relation to the whole, and explain to which other parts it is contiguous.\textsuperscript{164}

Aristotle's geometrical definition of body in \textit{De caelo} is put differently, but is consistent with that in the \textit{Categoricae}. The basic understanding, again, is that a body is a geometrical solid. In \textit{De caelo} I.1, a body is defined as a magnitude, which is continuous in (or spatially extended in) or in other words, can be divided in, three dimensions. A line is continuous in only one direction or dimension, and a surface only in two. Since it is three dimensional, and is thus spatially extended in every possible direction, Aristotle explains, body alone is a 'complete' \textit{(perfecta)} magnitude.\textsuperscript{165}

Defining quantity \textit{(quantum)} in his lexicon of philosophical terms in \textit{Metaphysica} V, Aristotle draws together aspects of the definitions of body in the \textit{Categoricae} and \textit{De caelo}. He explains that a quantity is anything that is divisible into intrinsic parts, each of which has its own kind of unity and can be pointed to as a 'this something' \textit{(hoc aliquid)}. There are two basic sorts of quantity. On the one hand there are 'multitudes', or countable quantities. A countable quantity is just a set or group of things, whose parts are not physically continuous with one another (like a pile of books). On the other hand there are 'magnitudes', whose potential parts, or the parts into which they might be divided, are continuous with one another. A magnitude that is continuous in one dimension is called a length, one that is continuous in two dimensions is called a breadth and one that is continuous in three dimensions is

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{165} 'Continuum quidem igitur est, quod divisibile in semper divisibilia: Corpus autem, quod omniaquaque divisibile. Magnitudinis autem quae quidem ad unum, linea; quae autem ad duo, planum; quae autem ad tria, corpus', 'corpus utique erit solum e magnitudinis perfecta. Solum enim determinatum est tribus; hoc autem est omne. Terquaque autem, existens divisible, omniaquaque est divisibile', 'Quaecumque quidem igitur divisibile magnitudines sunt, et continuae haec sunt '. Aristotle; \textit{De caelo} (hereafter \textit{DC}), 268a5-10, 22-27, edited in Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Commentaria in libros Aristotelis de caelo et mundo, de generatione et corruptione et meteologicorum, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 3 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1886), p. 5. For similar definitions of body, see also Aristotle, \textit{Topica}, 142b24, \textit{Phys.}, 204b20, \textit{Met.}, 1016b28, 1066b31.
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called a depth. A finite length is called a line, a finite breadth is called a surface, and a finite depth is called a body.\textsuperscript{166}

According to Aristotle, then, 'body' considered in a mathematical way, or body as defined in the category of quantity, is a finite structure, spatially extended and divisible in three dimensions, with parts that are distinguishable from and continuous with one another, each of which has a definite position relative to other parts within the whole.

Furthermore, in the \textit{Categoriae}, Aristotle draws a distinction between quantity, or mathematical structure, on the one hand, and shape (\textit{figura}), or what he calls the external form of a thing (\textit{circa unumquodque existens forma}), on the other. This external form, \textit{figura} or shape, Aristotle states, is a kind of quality, not a kind of quantity: he would draw a distinction, however fine, between the internal structure of a body and the external shape that follows upon that structure. A surface, for example, is a two-dimensional continuous quantity, or mathematical structure, and Aristotle would point out that we qualify it as being a certain shape: triangular, or quadrangular for example.\textsuperscript{167}

The same would go for a three-dimensional body: we could discuss its intrinsic structure and the arrangement of its parts and surfaces; to say that it has a particular overall shape as its external form would be to point directly to a different, if closely related, aspect of it. Thomas Aquinas would treat quantitative structure, on the one hand, and shape or \textit{figura}, on the other hand, as really distinct, but very closely related accidental forms. He would describe \textit{figura} as a quality, or form, literally 'surrounding quantity' (\textit{forma circa quantitatem}): for Aquinas, \textit{figura} consists in the

\textsuperscript{166}‘Quantum igitur quod est divisibile in ea que insunt, quorum utrumque aut singulum unum aliiquid et hoc aliiquid naturam esse. Multitudo ergo quantum aliiquid si numerabilis fuerit, magnitudo autem si mensurabilis fuerit. Dicitur autem multitudo quidem divisibile potestate in non continua, magnitudo autem quod in contina, magnitudinis vero que quidem ad unum continua longitudo, que autem ad duo latitudo, que autem ad tria profunditas. Horum autem... finita... longitudo linea et latitudo superficies et profundum corpus’. \textit{Met.}, 1020a5-15 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 110. Cf. \textit{Met.}, 1066b23 and \textit{Phys.}, 204b5.

\textsuperscript{167}‘Quartum autem genus qualitatis figure et circa unumquodque existens forma, adhuc autem cum hisi rectitudo et curvitas, et si quid aliud simile est hiis; unumquodque enim horum quale aliiquid dicitur; eo enim quod triangulare vel quadrangulare sit, quale aliiquid dicitur, et co quod rectum vel curvum. Et secundum formam autem unumquodque quale aliiquid dicitur’. \textit{Cat.}, 10a11-16 (ed.) L. Minio-Paluello, 3. \textit{Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka}, p. 104.
'bounding' or in the physical limits (*terminatio*) of the underlying quantitative structure.\(^{168}\)

Now, Aristotle explicitly holds that mathematical structures are intrinsic to natural bodies. He explains in the *Physica* that natural bodies contain surfaces, lines, and points, which are the subject matter of mathematics. Since Aristotle's physics is continuist, geometry, the very science that studies continuous magnitudes, can be applied to nature.\(^{169}\) Aristotle thinks that both natural philosopher and the geometer treat of these mathematical objects, but unlike the natural philosopher the geometer treats of them only in the abstract, not insofar as they occur in physical bodies.\(^{170}\) He does not, however, thoroughly and explicitly import a discussion of the role of quantitative structure into his various physical and metaphysical analyses of natural bodies and the changes they undergo in the same way that both Averroes or Aquinas later would.

### 2. The Identity of the Mortal Body: Growth and Material Exchange

The Commentator Averroes brought the natural body's quantitative structure into play in order to shed light on an area of obscurity that he identified in Aristotle's discussion of growth at *De generatione et corruptione* I.5. This was the passage in which Aristotle introduced the idea, problematic for any theologian subscribing to the traditional understanding of bodily resurrection as the gathering together of the matter *particular* to a body, that a living body could remain the same thing across growth despite the exchange of potentially all of its matter.

In *De generatione et corruptione* I.5, then, Aristotle defines growth (*augmentatio*) and its opposite diminution (*diminutio*) as changes with respect to the size (*circa magnitudinem*) of something. He makes it clear that the thing that grows must already possess some

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\(^{168}\) 'figura, quae consistit in terminacione quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem', *ST* I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 2, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 4, p. 72. Cf. also *ST* I, q. 78, a. 3, ad 2, and *ST* III, q. 63, a. 2 ad 1.


physical size. He elaborates upon this definition: for a case of growth to occur, three criteria must be met. First, each part of the growing thing must increase in size (every part of flesh if the thing which is growing is flesh), or, in other words, that which grows does so proportionately; second, something must be added to the thing that grows (that is, new matter); finally, the thing which grows must be preserved and remain the same throughout the change, even if its size does not remain the same. By noting that that which grows will be precisely that which remains the same throughout this change, Aristotle’s analysis promises an account of the basis for bodily identity across change.

So what, according to Aristotle, is the basis for the sameness of a body despite changes in its size and the accession of new material to it? Aristotle first sets out that the body’s heterogeneous parts such as its hands, feet, head and so on grow only because the homogenous parts grow, the flesh and bone from which these heterogeneous parts are composed, themselves grow.

The focus of the discussion having been shifted to focus squarely on the homogenous parts, flesh and bone, Aristotle goes on to explain that there is one aspect from which we can see that flesh and bone are in flux, and another aspect from which we can see that they remain the same across this change. Flesh and bone are composites of matter and form: the words 'flesh' and 'bone' can be applied both to the material (the *materia*) and to the formal aspect (the *species*) of these parts. The first and second phenomena involved in growth, that every part of the thing grows and that something accedes to the thing that grows, Aristotle continues, can be


172 'Oportet enim salvare ratione existentia eius quod augetur et diminutur. Hec autem tria sunt, quorum unum quidem est quamcumque partem maiorem esse eius quod augetur magnitudinis, verbi gratia si caro carnis; et adveniente aliquo, et tertium, ut salvetur quod augetur et maneat... cum autem [aliquid]... aut augetur aut diminutur manet idem quod augetur aut alteratur, sed... magnitudo eadem non manet'. *DGEC*, 321a18-26 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 28-9 (my insertion).


present in flesh and bone according to their formal aspect (secundum speciem) but not according to their material aspect (secundum materiam).\textsuperscript{175}

He illustrates this using a somewhat obscure image of a measuring vessel being used to measure out water: the water that comes to be in the measuring vessel is constantly changing. Aristotle intends the water to represent the material aspect of flesh. When flesh grows, it is not the case that the flesh's matter itself is added to with respect to each and every one of its parts, it is rather the case that, during growth, matter is in flux: some matter flows out of the bodily member and new matter flows in. What is added to in all of its parts when flesh grows and therefore, we may assume, what is also the very thing that remains the same when flesh grows, is its form (forma et species).\textsuperscript{176} Aristotle captures, using a different image, the way in which new matter is incorporated into flesh: when wood is consumed by fire, the formal aspects of fire are imparted to the wood’s matter. As new logs are placed on a burning fire, it is fed and it grows (this is not to be confused with a situation in which a fire is generated anew when wood suddenly catches light).\textsuperscript{177}

Now, Averroes notes in his 'middle' commentary on \textit{De generatione et corruptione} that Aristotle's claim that flesh remains the same and grows in all of its parts with respect to its form or species is far from straightforward. As mentioned in chapter 1, the term species, as found in the \textit{Aristoteles Latinus}, was usually read by Aristotle's interpreters as referring to a nature-defining, 'substantial' form.\textsuperscript{178} In that case the form with respect to which flesh would be understood to grow would be the soul, which, for Aristotle, is

\textsuperscript{175} 'Quamcumque igitur partem augmentari et adveniente aliquo, secundum quidem speciem est contingens, secundum autem materiam non est'. \textit{DGEC}, 321b23-25 (ed.) Judycka, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{176} 'Oportet autem intelligere, quemadmodum si quis mensurabit eadem mensura aquam: semper enim aliud et aliud quod generatur. Sic utique augmentatur materia carnis, sed non cuicumque parti omni adgenerator, sed hoc quidem defuit, hoc autem advenit, forme autem et speciei cuicumque particule', 'Quapropter est quidem si quodcunque carnis auctum est, est autem sic non: secundum speciem quidem enim cuicumque advenit, secundum materiam autem non'. \textit{DGEC}, 321b24-27, 33-35 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 30-1.

\textsuperscript{177} 'Maius quidem totum generatum est adveniente quidem aliquo, quod vocatur cibus et contrarium, transmutante autem in cadem speciem', 'Quemadmodum ignis tangens urenda ita in eo quod augetur et ente actu caro, inens augible adveniente potentia carne fecit actu carnem. Igitur simul ente; si enim seorsum, generatio. Est quidem enim ita ignem facere in existente adiungentem ligna. Sed sic quidem augmentatio est. Quando autem ipsa ligna incendutur, generatio'. \textit{DGEC}, 321b33-322a2, 322a11-17 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 31-2.

\textsuperscript{178} See above, chapter 1, section 1.1.
just the body's 'first actuality', its capacity to perform the functions of life.\textsuperscript{179} And yet it makes no sense to say that the soul increases in size, since only things with physical size can grow, as Aristotle himself establishes at the outset of this discussion on growth.\textsuperscript{180}

Given this, Averroes offers an alternative suggestion for what the form or species, with respect to which flesh and bone grow, might be. He interprets Aristotle's measuring vessel as a leather bottle, which expands and contracts depending on the volume of water poured into it. The water, as in Aristotle's text, represents matter in flux in the bodily member. The bottle represents the form of the bodily member, which remains the same as the member grows or diminishes. Crucially, Averroes clarifies that the form in question is an accidental form: the bottle's (or the member's) physical, three-dimensional shape (figura).\textsuperscript{181} We can imagine the relationship between form and matter in growth, Averroes' account suggests, as follows. The bodily member's (three-dimensional) shape or in other words, its proportions remain (that is, something accedes to every part of its shape); the body's size and the matter from which it is composed are those things that change.

Averroes' identification of the form that persists as a body part grows as its figura squares well with another passage in Aristotle's account of growth. Aristotle thinks that his theory that the phenomena of growth belong to the formal (and not to the material) aspects of bodily members is easier to grasp when attention is turned towards the body's heterogeneous parts. The difference between the formal (and permanent) and material (and fluid) aspects of a hand, for example, is easy to point out. We can see exactly what remains with respect to the hand across this change: it retains its proportions, growing according to a consistent pattern. The soul's operations with respect to growth are thus manifest in it. Of course, Aristotle maintains that

\textsuperscript{179} See above, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{180} Cf. further discussion on this point in Reynolds, \textit{Food and the Body}, pp. 93-6.

\textsuperscript{181} 'si imaginaris unum mensurans, quod aliquando crescit per illud, quod intrat in ipsum, & aliquando diminuitur, conservando figura eius, tunc imaginaberis dispositionem formae in suo cimento in respectu materiae. Et hoc recte imaginaberis, quando imaginaberis utrem corii, quod quando intrat in ipsum aqua pauca diminuitur, quando autem multa crescit, & in utroque conservat figuram suam'. \textit{Aristotelis De coelo, De Generatione & Corruptione, Meteorologicorum, De Plantis cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis}, Vol. V, Book I, comment 36, f. 358r, A-B (my emphasis).
exactly the same distinction obtains between permanent and fluid aspects of flesh itself as it grows in a proportionate way (holding, as he does, that the hand grows in a proportionate way precisely because the flesh and bone from which it is compose grow in a proportionate way), but he is ready to concede that this is not immediately appreciable, as it is in the case of the hand.182

Averroes explains that if it is said that the phenomena of growth are present in the body’s parts secundum formam (substituted, in his commentary, for speciem), and substantial form is meant, then such a statement cannot mean that the substantial form itself grows: it must be maintained that growth can only happen with respect to physical size (secundum magnitudinem), to something already possessing size. Such a statement, therefore, would have to mean that the body considered insofar as it possessed of size and structure (the quantum) grows insofar as it has a substantial form endowing it with the capacity for growth.183

And so, in Averroes' commentary on De generatione et corruptione I.5 Aquinas would find a convincing argument that the Stagirite's account did not actually mean to imply that bodily identity across growth and material exchange was dependent only on the identity of the soul, even if Aristotle held that all of a body's matter was in theory exchangeable. Crucially, the Commentator had noted that what was continuous in the body in addition to the soul, and what remained the same as the body grew was its shape or figura (and therefore the structure underlying that shape).

With the doctrine of general resurrection in mind, Aquinas would, in refining his own analysis of growth and bodily identity, follow the Commentator and go one step further. As indicated, not only would Aquinas argue that the individual body's quantitative structure remains the same in it across its growth, he would also argue

182 'In anomiomereis autem hoc magis manifestum, verbi gratia manu, quoniam proportionaliter auctum est; materia enim alia ens manifesta magis specie hic quam in carne et omiomereis'. DGEC, 321b27-34 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 30-1.

183 'Manifestum est, si aliquis dicat augmentum esse secundum formam, quod non vult dicere formam augmentari, secundum quod est forma; augmentum enim est secundum magnitudinem... sed illud, quod augetur in omnibus partibus, non augetur, in eo quod est quantum, sed in eo quod est quantum habens formam. Quod autem augmentum in omnibus partibus non est, nisi inquantum partes habent formam, manifestum est'. Aristotelis... De Generatione & Corruptione... cum Averrois Cordubensis varis in eodem commentaris, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentaris, Vol. V, Book I, comment 37, f. 358v, G.
that the individual body's persistent structural form would be responsible for guaranteeing its material identity across material exchange.

3. The Identity of the Corpse

So much for the identity of the mortal body. What did Aristotle have to say about postmortem bodily and material continuity? The answer is, very little. Aristotle's account of the dead body focuses on the formal change it has undergone. He evidently saw no reason to address in any detail a philosophical question that would be of direct interest to Aquinas in his work on the resurrection, namely the question of how the matter particular to an individual body might remain the same thing in itself, even as it served as the subject for a succession of different substantial forms.

And it is difficult to see how Aristotle's account of substantial change leaves room for this possibility, not least because Aristotle eschewed the idea that matter is a collection of atoms which could potentially be scattered and regathered (as in Augustine's account of bodily resurrection) in favour of the idea that matter is a principle in which various forms manifest themselves.

Starting with his account of the corpse, the Stagirite states, uncompromisingly, that a dead body is radically different from the living body that has corrupted into it. In De anima II.1, having set out his theory that soul is the body's defining (substantial) form and first actuality, Aristotle explains a corollary of the theory. Taking as his starting point a part of a living animal body with a particular capacity, an eye with its capacity for sight, Aristotle states that if the eye were an animal, then sight would be its soul. When sight leaves an eye, he continues, that eye is not really an eye at all; it is an eye only equivocally, in the same way that a stone or painted eye is an 'eye'. In very first sentences of his Categoriae, indeed, Aristotle had explained that a word is used equivocally when it is applied to two things that differ in their definition (and therefore in terms of their nature or real substance), like a man and a 'man' in a

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184 See above, pp. 15-16.
What goes for the heterogeneous parts of the body, of course, also goes for the homogenous parts from which they are constituted. The word 'flesh' can be applied only equivocally to the material of the dead body. Just as an eye, properly speaking, is the site of a soul's operation, so is flesh. In *De anima* II.1, Aristotle extends his analysis to the whole body. The relation between a part of perception (such as sight) and a part of the perceiving body (such as the eye) is the same as that between all of perception and the whole perceiving body: a dead body, lacking its soul, and therefore lacking the capacities and functions of a living thing, is just as different from a living body as a stone eye is different from a living eye.

Furthermore, when a body dies, Aristotle holds, not only formal change (the loss of a soul), but also material change, occurs. Something that has cast away its soul (a corpse) is not potentially alive, whereas something that has a soul (a living body) is potentially alive, or the appropriate material subject for a soul. In other words, to revive the terminology introduced in chapter 1, the matter comprising a corpse is no longer a soul's 'proper' matter.

And yet, looking closely at Aristotle's important discussion of the concept of proper matter at *Metaphysica* VIII.4-5, he does provide at least an outline of an account of postmortem bodily continuity. Aristotle explains that all things capable of undergoing transformation into one another share matter. When it comes to changes that we couch more readily in terms of corruption than of generation, such as animal death or the souring of wine into vinegar, we do not tend to say that the
animal is potentially dead or that the wine is potentially vinegar, even though the
dead body comes from the living and vinegar from wine. But in fact, matter of a
living animal’s body, as that body undergoes corruption, should be understood to be in
(proper) potency to, and as the (proper) matter of, a corpse: a dead body comes from
a living body, Aristotle notes, as naturally as night comes from day.189

So the living body and the dead share a material subject which is in some sense
the same thing, according to Aristotle, notwithstanding its deterioration from a state
in which it is the appropriate material subject for a soul into one in which it is the
proper matter for a corpse.

4. Substantial Change and Material Continuity

In order to fully explain the implications of the doctrine of the resurrection of the
body for the nature of matter, or in order to construct a convincing account of the
continuity of matter particular to individual bodies across death and resurrection, it
would not be enough simply to point to Aristotle's view that the material principle is
the continuant of any natural change in which one substantial form is lost and
another gained. Aquinas would want to give an account of how the matter particular
to an individual human body could remain the same thing across any possible case of
substantial change, for which it might serve as the substratum, after the death of that
body, and prior to its resurrection.

This was a deeply difficult task, particularly because Aquinas understood the
ultimate continuant of any case of substantial change to be prime matter (materia
prima). Here, he was following a long tradition of Neoplatonist interpreters of
Aristotle's texts, who had attached the name 'prime matter' to the matter understood
to be found at the most primitive level in Aristotle's physical universe, the matter that

189 'De materiali autem substantia oportet non latere quia... si ex... cadem materia ut principium hiis
que fiunt, est tamen aliqua propria cuiuslibet', 'Nec omnis materia est sed quorum generatio est et
transmutatio in invicem. Quecumque autem sine transmutari sunt aut non, non est horum materia...
Dubitatio autem quedam est et quare vinum non materia aceti nec potentia acetum (quamvis fiat ex
ipso acetum) et vivens potentia mortuus... Animalis uero materia hec secundum corruptionem mortui
potentia et materia...; fit enim ex hiis ut ex die nox'. Met., 1044a15-19, 1044b27-30, 1044b34-1045a4
(ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, pp. 174, 176.
served as the substratum for change between the elements, or the very simplest bodies.  

This traditional notion of prime matter was, it is likely, the product of an attempt to harmonise Aristotle's thought with Plato's: scholars were looking in Aristotle's writings for an equivalent of the material receptacle from Plato's Timaeus, which was conceived as being able to receive all forms, or as the common matter for all forms. This concept of prime matter, then, became a standard fixture in interpretations of Aristotle: scholars at western medieval universities absorbed the concept of prime matter through various influential commentaries on or summaries of Aristotle's and Plato's works, both Neoplatonist commentaries originating in late antiquity, and the eleventh- and twelfth-century writings of Avicenna and Averroes respectively.

Aristotle's own referent for prote hyle (which would translate into Latin as materia prima), in fact, was not the material substratum of transformation between the elements. The expression is ambiguous in his writings and can point either to a thing's proper matter (the bronze of a bronze sculpture), or directly to an element constitutive of a thing (water in the case of soluble things).

Modern scholarly debate about whether or not the traditional concept of 'prime matter' is detectable in Aristotle's account of natural change, therefore, turns on the question of whether any such primitive material level, serving as the ultimate continuant of all possible cases of substantial change, is in fact a present and

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190 What Aristotle calls 'simple bodies' are in fact different from the elements. Aristotle holds that the 'air' and 'fire' that we observe in nature are not in fact the same as the simple bodies themselves; each of the 'elements' that we are familiar with is in fact a mixed body, though of course a mixture dominated by the simple body to which it corresponds. DGEc, 330b22-25.

191 de Haas, John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter, pp. xi, 255.


193 See Aristotle's discussion of the term 'nature' in Metaphysica V. 'Nature' can mean 'first matter': 'Natura autem materia prima; et hec dupliciter, aut que ad ipsam prima aut omnino prima, ut operum erorum ad ipsa quidem primum em, totaliter vero forsan aqua, si omnia liquabilia aqua'. Met., 1015a 7-11 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 97. For commentary on this passage see King, 'Aristotle without Prima Materi', pp. 371-372. On Aristotle's few uses of the expression prote hyle, see Charlton (trans.), Aristotle's Physics, Appendix: Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter?, pp. 129-31.
conceptually necessary aspect of Aristotle's physics. Those modern commentators who deny that such an ultimate material substratum is present and conceptually necessary instead hold that, for Aristotle, the elements themselves occupy the lowest or least developed level on the material scale in the natural world.

The important point to grasp for now is why Aquinas's acceptance of prime matter, conceived in line with the Aristotelian commentary tradition as the only constituent of all possible cases of substantial change, made the problem of accounting for the continuity of matter particular to individual human bodies particularly demanding. Prime matter, precisely because it occupied this very lowest level in the physical universe, was understood to be completely featureless in itself.

Aristotle's ancient and medieval interpreters found a description for what they called prime matter in his *Metaphysica* VII.3. Here, Aristotle, discussing the nature of substance, approaches the material principle not through a physical analysis, as the substratum of change, but through a logical and metaphysical analysis: stripping all forms from it, he considers it as the ultimate subject of determination by forms. Matter considered in this way, to which, just in itself, none of the predicates that we use to describe actual entities apply, cannot be substance or a 'this'. The conclusion of the passage reads as follows:


195 Further aspects of the traditional interpretation of Aristotle are therefore also rejected as retrospective distortions (such as the notion that the elemental bodies are composites in the traditional sense, comprising matter and substantial form), see King, 'Aristotle without Prima Materia', pp. 377-87, or misleading assumptions (such as the notion that for Aristotle the substratum of change in every case remained across it, see Charlton (trans.), *Aristotle's Physics, Appendix: Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter?*, pp. 131-2. A reply to Charlton on the latter point is A. Code, 'The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter', *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, 29 (1976), pp. 357-67, see esp. pp. 363-5.
'Dico autem materiam que secundum se neque quid neque quantitas neque aliud aliquid dicitur quibus ens est determinatum'. \[196\]

This passage from *Metaphysica* VII.3 would become the standard definition of prime matter (*materia prima*) for scholastic theologians, as the following except from a widely circulated late thirteenth-century philosophical florilegium, the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, illustrates:

'Materia prima nec est quid, nec est quantum, nec quale, nec aliquid aliorum quibus ens est determinatum'. \[197\]

So the crux of the problem facing Aquinas can now be appreciated with some clarity. If the matter particular to an individual human body would remain the same stuff, across death and resurrection, *only* on the level of prime matter, then by definition this would preclude that it might at the same time retain any identifying features.

Aquinas would find a way out of this difficulty in Averroes' analysis of substantial change. The Commentator developed a theory that prime matter itself must be invested with some of the formal features that Aristotle had ascribed to a mathematical body. Aquinas would move towards adopting a similar position for theological reasons, but Averroes' reasons for positing that *more than* a featureless substratum needed to persist across any case of substantial change were purely philosophical. They were based on a close unpicking of the logic of Aristotle's own writings on substantial generation and corruption: matter needed to possess a structure of its own, in the Averroes' eyes, for Aristotle's account of substantial change to make sense. In order to follow Averroes' reasoning, it will be helpful to set out his theory of matter in the very way in which it was developed, that is to say, as a commentary on Aristotle's own account of substantial change.

\[196\] *Met.*, 1029a20-23 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 135.

\[197\] *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed.) Hamesse, p. 128 (161).
4.1. Aristotle on Substantial Change

Aristotle's biological account of substantial change was discussed in chapter 1: human generation is a complex case of substantial change; the manifestation of several intermediate substantial forms is required *en route* to the emergence of the final substantial form, the rational soul. Aristotle's interpreters read his work on the generation of animals in light of his two major presentations of the general framework for substantial change, *Physica* I.6-9, and *De generatione et corruptione* I.3-4, which are both rather more technical. These two accounts of substantial change are structurally similar to one another, and consistent with one another, but differ somewhat in respect of their emphasis and the terminology they employ.\(^\text{198}\)

In the *Physica*, Aristotle argues that all changes or instances of generation, be they natural or artificial, conform to the same model: there are three principles involved in every change. Two of these principles are the 'opposites' or contraries between which change takes place: form and its 'privation' (*privatio*, the lack of that very form).\(^\text{199}\) Form is acquired in generation, and the privation of that form is lost. In *De generatione et corruptione*, the contraries between which change takes place are understood, instead, as two forms that are 'similar in genus but dissimilar in species'.\(^\text{200}\) Averroes would square the *Physica* and *De generatione et corruptione* on this point by stating that the contraries as described in *De generatione et corruptione* are in fact reducible to the 'primary contrariety' of privation of the form to be acquired (non-being, or *non esse*) and that very form.\(^\text{201}\)

Reasoning, in the *Physica*, that nothing can itself change into or produce its opposite, Aristotle installs a third principle of change: in every change there is a

\(^{198}\) For a brief technical comparison of the two accounts, see Williams (trans.), *Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione*, commentary section at pp. 83-4.

\(^{199}\) "unum [principium] autem est ratio, amplius autem contrarium huic privatio est*. *Phys.*, 191a13-15 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 35. The word *ratio*, here meaning definition or account, is read to mean form, isasmuch as the latter it is that in virtue of which a thing is defined.

\(^{200}\) "genere quidem cadem et similia, specie autem dissimilia, talia autem contraria... sunt*. *DGEC*, 324a5-7 (ed.) Judycka, p. 37.

\(^{201}\) "Amplius invenitur necessario esse illud, ex quod est factio rei, & ad quod est, esse contraria, & habere idem genus. Et quod illa contrarietas reducitur ad primam contrarietatem, scilicet non esse, & forma*. *Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, vol. IX, ch. 1, f. 3v, K.
underlying thing or substratum which is first subject to the privation of the form to be acquired and then to that form. When change is merely accidental, substance itself serves as the underlying thing: we say that a substance comes to be 'so and so', as it undergoes, for example, changes with respect to quantity (or size, as happens in growth), quality, relation, time, or place.

Only substances come to be or are generated in an unqualified sense (simpliciter). The substratum for substantial change, of course, is matter. Matter is that from which a substance comes to be and which persists as a component of the generated composite; it is conserved across change insofar as it is in potency to form (secundum potentiam), and cannot, itself, be generated or corrupted.

Aristotle's account of the material substratum for substantial change in De generatione et corruptione is slightly different. This time, Aristotle emphasises not the sense in which the substratum remains constant, but the sense in which it changes. The idea that matter itself changes across substantial change has just been touched upon in the discussion of Aristotle's analysis of the corpse, and, as noted, the idea makes sense in light of Aristotle's concept of proper matter: matter will change from a state in which it is the proper matter of one substantial form to a state in which it is the proper matter of another. In accidental change (here called alteration), Aristotle explains, a perceptible substratum (or a substance) persists, whereas in substantial

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202 'Unde est quidem sicut duo dicenda esse principia, est autem sicut tria; et est quidem sicut contraria... est sicut autem non; ab alterutris enim pati contraria inpossible est. Solvitur autem et hoc proprietate quod alius est subjectum; hoc enim non est contrarium... Quaerumque quidem igitur principia circa generationem physicorum, et quomodo tot sint, dictum est; et ostensum est quoniam oportet subici aliquid contrariis et contraria duo esse'. Phys., 190b29-191a5 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, pp. 33-4.

203 'Multipliciter autem cum dicatur fieri, et horum quidem non fieri sed hoc aliquid fieri, simpliciter autem fieri substantiarum solum, secundum quidem alia manifestum est quoniam neccessa est subici aliquid quod fit; et enim quantum et quale et ad alterum et aliando et ubi fitum subjecto aliquid'. Phys., 190a31-35 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 31-2.

204 'dico enim materiam primum subjectum unicuique, ex quo sit aliquid cum insit non secundum accident'. Phys., 192a30-32 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 40.

205 '[materia] in quantum autem est secundum potentiam... incorruptibilem et ingenitam neccessa est ipsam esse'. Phys., 192a27-30 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 40 (my insertion).

206 'igitur est aliquid subjectum et aliud passio que de subjecto innata est dici, et est transmutatione utriusque horum'. DGEC, 319b8-10 (ed.) Judycka, p. 23.
change (here called generation *simpliciter*), 'the whole' changes: semen changes into blood; air condenses into water.²⁰⁷

One absolutely crucial point must be made clear: for Aristotle, there is never an instant in which the material substrate of change is without one (substantial) form or another. It should be remembered that, for Aristotle, the material principle can only be grasped in relation to the forms that manifest themselves in it.²⁰⁸ The matter subject to the privation of the form that emerges in generation is, at that time, also subject to another substantial form, which will be lost in that change. Substantial change is instantaneous; there is no distinct first instant of change; at the very instant in which something is changing, it has already changed.²⁰⁹ As Aristotle puts it in *De generatione et corruptione*, the generation of one substance is the corruption of another, and vice versa.²¹⁰

Aristotle takes it that his model for substantial change resolves difficulties raised by earlier thinkers who, denying that something could come to be from 'what is not' (that is to say, they held that there must always be some substratum for change), did away altogether with the idea that substances could come into being in an unqualified way.²¹¹ He preserves an account of substantial generation, of the fundamental changes we see in nature, then, without making the claim that such changes are completely discontinuous, or that something can come to be from nothing. In the *Physica* he explains that since privation is in its very nature 'non-

²⁰⁷ 'alteratio quidem est, quando manente subiecto sensato ente transmutat in eius passionibus aut contrariis aut mediis... Quando autem to tum transmutat non manente aliquo sensato ut subiecto codem, sed quasi ex semine sanguis toto aut ex aqua aer aut ex aere omni aqua, generato iam hoc tale'. *DGEC*, 319b10-18 (ed.) Judycka, p. 24.

²⁰⁸ *Phys.*, 191a9-11.

²⁰⁹ This is demonstrated in *Phys.* VI.5, see esp. 235b30ff.

²¹⁰ 'De... simpliciter generari... dictum est, et quoniam generationem esse continue causa ut materia subiectum, quoniam transmutativum in contraria; et est alterius generatio semper in substantiis alterius corruptio et alterius corruptio alterius generatio'. *DGEC*, 319a17-23 (ed.) Judycka, p. 22.

²¹¹ This is slightly over-simplified. In fact, these earlier thinkers had supposed that whatever comes to be must come to be *either* from what is (in which case it is in being already) *or* from what is not (which they took to be an unacceptable thesis): 'Quod autem singulariter sic solvitur et antiquorum defectus, dicimus post hec. Querentes enim secundum philosophiam primi veritatem et naturam rerum... dicunt neque fieri neque nullum neque corrupi, propter id quod necessarium est fieri quod aut ex eo quod est aut ex eo quod non est, ex his autem utriusque impossible est esse; neque enim quod est fieri (esse enim iam) et ex eo quod non est nichil utique fieri; subici enim aliquid oportet'. *Phys.* 191a23-32 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, pp. 35-6.
being and does not remain after generation, and since therefore a thing is understood to come to be, in a way, from its privation, there is a qualified sense (ut secundum accidens) in which a thing can be understood as coming to be from what is not.\textsuperscript{212} But given the persistence of matter, we are not left with the uncomfortable conclusion that something could come into being from nothing absolutely.

In \textit{De generatione et corruptione} I.3-4, which does not include the concept of privation in its analysis, Aristotle offers an alternative solution (consistent with the solution in the \textit{Physica}); in every case of substantial generation, that which comes to be necessarily pre-exists potentially (so what comes to be does not come from nothing) if not actually (so what comes to be does, in a way, come from non-being). This, of course, is the same idea we encounter in Aristotle's biological account of the generation of animals: a body which potentially possesses a certain kind of soul necessarily pre-exists both the acquisition of that soul, and therefore the body which actually possesses that kind soul (the substance which comes into being \textit{simpliciter}).

\textbf{4.2. Averroes on Substantial Change and Corporeal Structure}

Based on the framework for substantial change just outlined, Averroes is able to reach the conclusion that prime matter is invested with a quantitative structure that gives to it some of the attributes of a mathematical body. While the Commentator's fullest discussion of this key idea is found in his \textit{De substantia orbis}, his direct commentary on Aristotle's account of substantial change in the \textit{Physica} would provide Aquinas with a second authoritative text on the topic.\textsuperscript{213}

Averroes admits, in \textit{De substantia orbis}, that some of the details belonging to the model of substantial change he himself offers cannot be found in Aristotle's texts. Even so, he argues, his findings follow so closely from what Aristotle had proved that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{212} \textit{Nos autem et ipsi dicimus fieri quidem simpliciter nichil ex eo quod non est, sed tamen fieri ex eo quod non est ut secundum accidens; ex privatione enim, quod est per se quod non est, non ex eo quod est fit}. \textit{Phys.} 191b12-16 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 37.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Silvia Donati's work is the best starting point for studying the influence of Averroes' doctrine on medieval physics. See S. Donati, \textit{The Notion of Dimensiones Indeterminatae} in the Commentary Tradition of the \textit{Physics} in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century\textendash , in C. Leijenhorst, C. Lüthy, and J. M. M. H. Thijssen (eds.) \textit{The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century} (Brill: Leiden, 2002), pp. 189-223, which offers a summary of Averroes' position on the corporeal structure in matter at pp. 190-1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Stagirite himself must have documented those results in a work since lost.\textsuperscript{214} Averroes therefore tends to present his own deductions on this topic as if they are Aristotle's own.

There are three strands to the Commentator’s argument as to why, according to Aristotle’s account of substantial change, corporeal structure must persist across every imaginable case of it.

\textbf{4.2.1. Corporeal Structure as Incorruptible}

First, Averroes makes the basic argument that there must be an incorruptible corporeal structure in matter. As explained, Aristotle held that substantial generation and corruption take place between contraries or opposites: privation and form. Yet, as a long line of commentators on Aristotle’s texts had in fact noted, all material substances subject to generation and corruption are bodies. If change between contraries involved one kind of body being generated and another corrupted, then 'body' in itself remained across this change or, in order words, was incorruptible: no case of generation, as several eminent interpreters of Aristotle observed, proceeded from a privation of 'body' (or 'non-body') to 'body'.

What was this incorruptible 'body'? Commentators reasoned that it could not be prime matter. Prime matter was featureless and therefore incorporeal, whereas the body that persisted across any case of substantial change possessed the characteristic properties constant in all material bodies.

By the sixth century, borrowing vocabulary from Stoic philosophy, Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle’s work on substantial change commonly referred to an 'unqualified body' that persisted across substantial change. The basic defining feature of 'unqualified body' was understood to be extension in three dimensions.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{214} ‘non tamen omnia, quae diximus, invenimus ea declarata in libris, qui pervenerunt ad nos ex verbis Arist. sed aliquaque eorum invenimus in eis ab eo declarata, & aliquaque sequuntur ex dictis eius. Apparet tamen ex verbis Arist. quod iam declaravit omnia ista in libris, qui non pervenerunt ad nos’. \textit{Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentaris}, vol. IX, chapter 1, f. 5v, K.

\textsuperscript{215} On these developments, see de Haas, \textit{John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter}, esp. ch 2.
Long before Averroés composed his own scientific works, then, several commentators had already drawn upon Aristotle's mathematical definition of body, as three-dimensional continuous quantity, in order to theorise that prime matter was invested with a basic mathematical structure comprising extension in three dimensions (but without determined limits in any direction or dimension). This 'unqualified body' was distinct from prime matter, and was conceived as the metaphysical layer immediately above it, or, in other words, as the immediate substratum for the transformation of the simplest bodies, the elements, into one another.²¹⁶

Aristotle himself had denied, in De generatione et corruptione, that there was a 'body common to everything'.²¹⁷ Notwithstanding this, his commentators carefully used other passages in his works to carve out a position within an Aristotelian metaphysical schema for their 'unqualified body', situated above the level of prime matter, but below, or prior to, any other kind of formal determination.

In Metaphysica VII.3, the passage mentioned above in connection with the scholastic definition of prime matter, Aristotle analytically 'strips away' every formal determination of matter to leave a featureless substratum ('prime matter' to his interpreters). The Neoplatonist commentary tradition accorded significance to the fact that Aristotle, in this analytical exercise, treated the three dimensions, length, breadth and depth, as more fundamental than any other property: the Stagirite, according to their reading of his text, had stated that prime matter was what was left when three-dimensional structure, finally, was taken away.²¹⁸


²¹⁷ 'corpus commune enim nullum'. DGEC 320b23 (ed.) Judycka, p. 27.

²¹⁸ de Haas, John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter, pp. 60-3, cf. also pp. 69, 79-80 (for reference to a 'traditional abstraction series'), and 85.
With reference to *Metaphysica* VII.3, Neoplatonist commentaries on the *Categoriae* would commonly argue that Aristotle had treated the category of quantity immediately after his discussion of substance precisely because three-dimensional structure was more fundamental than, and prior to, any of the accidental qualities.\(^{219}\)

Aristotle's commentators, not surprisingly, found various original ways of conceiving and analysing the notion of 'unqualified body'. Only Averroes' work is of direct concern here.

In *De substantia orbis*, Averroes gives the label 'indeterminate dimensions' (*dimensiones non terminatae* or *dimensiones interminatae* interchangeably), or simply 'absolute body' (*corpus simpliciter*), to a mathematical structure, whose nature is simply three-dimensional extension, and which persists in prime matter across all cases of substantial change.

Crucially, for Averroes, this structure, with which *prime matter* is invested, is really distinct from, and defined in contrast to, the 'determinate dimensions' (*dimensiones terminatae*) which comprise the actual, spatially limited, structure, or the quantitative accidental form, possessed by the *complete* individual composite substance comprising *both* matter and substantial form.

In *De substantia orbis* Averroes writes that, 'since Aristotle found that all forms [or substances] share indeterminate dimensions, he knew that prime matter is never stripped of them' or, to translate this into more accessible language, Aristotle knew, according to Averroes, that prime matter is never denuded of the most basic kind of corporeal structure: extension in three dimensions. (Averroes also refers to this basic structure, in this passage, as 'corporeal form'). If matter were stripped of these dimensions, or this extension, Averroes continues, then body would come into being from 'non-body' and dimension from 'non-dimension', a notion that Averroes takes to be self-evidently absurd, since clearly all material substances between which generation and corruption occur are, in fact, three-dimensional bodies.\(^{220}\)

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\(^{219}\) *ibid.*, p. 99.

\(^{220}\) Words in square brackets are my insertion. *Et, quia invenit omnes formas communicari in dimensionibus non terminatis, scivit quod prima materia numquam denudatur a dimensionibus non terminatis. Quia, si denudaretur, tunc corpus esset ex non corpore, & dimensio ex non dimensione,* &
Aristotle also recognised, Averroes continues in *De substantia orbis*, that if all substantial forms (or substances) have this basic mathematical structure consisting of extension in three dimensions, or 'indeterminate dimensions', in common, then each form (or substance) has its 'proper determinate quantity'. What he means is that certain 'determinate dimensions' follow ontologically on, or a certain spatially limited physical structure in act (again, really distinct from the structure with which matter itself is invested), follows ontologically on, a certain substantial form in act. This spatially limited structure, 'determinate dimensions', takes an individual substance as its subject, just like all other individual accidental forms in act.221

To illustrate these interrelationships, Averroes cites a simple case of substantial change between the elements, to which any natural scientist might bear witness: the evaporation of water. What we see when a body of water is heated (assuming that no new matter enters the system222), he writes, is that the water undergoes an increase in the spatial limits of its (determinate) dimensions, such that these limits approach the (determinate) dimensions of air. When water reaches the maximum 'quantity of dimensions' (that is, determinate dimensions) proper to it, then the subject of the substantial change (prime matter) is divested of the substantial form of water, and the 'quantity of dimensions' (again, determinate dimensions) proper to it, and receives the substantial form of air and the 'quantity of dimensions' (determinate dimensions once more) proper to air.

tunc formae corporales essent contrariae, & succedentes sibi in hoc subiecto sicut est dispositio de forma substantialis'. *Averroes Cordobensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, vol. IX, ch. 1, f. 4r, B-C. NB. Later in ch. 1 of *De substantia orbis* this basic structure is referred to as *dimensiones interminatae* (ibid., f. 5r C). It is clear from the context that both forms of the expression have the same referent.

221 'Et, cum invenit in eis dimensionibus communicari formas omnes, quorum quaelibet habet quantitatem terminatam propriae, scitit dimensiones terminatas ultimo actu non posse esse, nisi postquam forma substantialis est in eo, sicut est dispositio de aliis accidentibus in actu. Invenit etiam quod subjecta omnium accidentium sunt individua substantiae, quae sunt in actu'. *Averroes Cordobensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, vol. IX, ch. 1, f. 4r, A.

222 Our intuitive understanding of rarefaction and condensation tells us that these changes occur without any new matter entering the system. Neither Aristotle nor Averroes, however, had a descriptive term to point to the *amount* of matter that is assumed to remain constant across change in the volume that it occupies. Cf. discussion in Reynolds, *Food and the Body*, pp. 84-5. In the 1270s, in his work on the Eucharist, Giles of Rome would introduce a notion of an amount of matter (*tanta materia*), equivalent to our modern concept of mass, distinct from volume. In fact, the structure in virtue of which matter admits of sheer amounts is precisely what *Giles of Rome* means by 'dimensiones indeterminatae'. See Donati, ‘The Notion of *Dimensiones Indeterminatae* in the Commentary Tradition of the *Physics* in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century’, p. 202.
If, in the Latin translation, the terminology with which Averroes' point is illustrated (in particular the phrase 'quantity of dimensions') is a little awkward, then the Commentator's basic point is absolutely clear. The actual accidental form that is the proper structure of a body of water might well corrupt, along with the substantial form of water, when the substantial form of air is generated, and the actual accidental form that is the proper structure of air arrives. But the 'absolute' dimensions, or the 'indeterminate dimensions', which consist just in three-dimensional extension, are not stripped from prime matter, the ultimate substrate for this change. They remain; 'absolute body' remains; matter itself continues to be structured in such a way that it is extended in three dimensions across this case of substantial change, as it does across all cases of substantial change. 223

With respect to this last passage, there is one other point to be highlighted for now, which would become relevant to Aquinas's work on growth and bodily identity. As Averroes sees it, the actual three-dimensional structure proper to a particular body (or 'determinate dimensions'), can admit, in itself, of a certain range or latitude: it can remain the same form across changes in its size. 224

4.2.2. Corporeal Structure as Divisible

The second major strand of Averroes' argument sets out that prime matter must be invested with its own corporeal structure, because only such a structure could render matter divisible. Averroes, then, understands Aristotle's account of substantial change to make the prior assumption that the substrate for any and all cases of substantial change is divisible. This point emerges in a relatively convoluted way in De substantia orbis chapter 1, and the clearest way in which to represent Averroes' thinking is as follows.

223 'Et hoc totum convenit sensui. Videtur enim forma caliditatis agente in aqua, aqua augeri, & crescere in dimensionibus, & vicinari in dimensionibus aeris; cum igitur pervenit ad maximam quantitatem aquae propria tunc subjectum eius denudatur a forma aqua, & quantitate dimensionum aquae propria, et recipit forma aeris, & quantitatem dimensionum propriarum formae aeris... Dimensiones igitur simpliciter, quae appellantur corpus simpliciter, non denudatur a prima materia'. ibid., ch. 1, f. 1r, C-D.

Generation and corruption occur between contraries: one substantial form is gained and another lost. The nature of the ultimate substrate for all cases of substantial change, prime matter, is undetermined and in potency to many different forms (Averroes' conception of prime matter as 'several' with respect to its potency was noted in chapter 1).225

If prime matter did not have this nature, it would not be capable of gaining and losing different contrary forms in generation and corruption: it could only ever be the subject of one form. And the fact that prime matter loses one form and gains another in substantial change implies, in addition, that it is the subject for more than one form at once. This is because there is, in every case of substantial change, an agent (or efficient cause) that brings about change. When water is heated and undergoes evaporation, for example, the form belonging to the substance that is the heating agent simultaneously exists along with the form of water. These two forms share prime matter as their common subject.226

If prime matter has to be capable of receiving more than one form at once, then the ultimate substratum for substantial change, in an Aristotelian framework, must be divisible. And Averroes takes it that quantitative structure, precisely, is the natural form responsible for divisibility. In De caelo, as explained above, Aristotle had defined mathematical body as a magnitude divisible in three dimensions. In addition, in a discussion of the infinite in the Physica, Aristotle had stated that what is divisible must be a kind of quantity, whether it be a continuous magnitude (such as a line, surface or body) or an aggregate (a countable, or discrete quantity).227 Averroes comments on this passage that only quantity is per se divisible; other items, whether substances or

225 See above, p. 55 and n.126.

226 'Declaratum est igitur quod causa corruptionis entium, & factionis eorum est contrarietas existens in suis formis, & commune subiectum, quod... est potentia recipienti... formas diversas in specie', 'immo impossibile est a subiecto denudarc formam, vel subiectum denudari a forma, nisi per formae destructionem, neque etiam est possibile ipsum fieri in subiecto, nisi per agens extrahens illa de potentia ad actum. Unde necesse est has formas esse contrarias, adeo quod altera corrupat suam contrarium'. Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentaris, vol. IX, ch. 1, f. 4r, D-F (my emphasis).

227 Phys., 204a8-12.
accidental forms, are divisible only *per accidens*, or in virtue of divisibility of their mathematical structure.²²⁸

Setting completed substances to one side, and returning to focus on prime matter, in his *De substantia orbis* Averroes’ argument is that it is in virtue of the incorruptible *indeterminate* dimensions with which prime matter is invested that prime matter has the characteristic of being divisible into different parts, in order to receive different forms in different places.²²⁹ Substantial form, according to Averroes at least, then actually divides the divisible substratum.²³⁰

So ‘indeterminate dimensions’ are, or ‘absolute body’ is, the first form existing in prime matter.²³¹ Averroes writes that prime matter’s reception of this structure is prior to its reception of substantial form, and prime matter receives substantial form *by means of* this structure.²³² *Indeterminate dimensions* are ontologically prior to substantial form. Since all of the events of substantial change occur in a single instant, there is no such thing as the temporal priority or posteriority in substantial

²²⁸ *Omnia ista sunt divisibilia, aut per se, ut est quantum, aut per accidens, ut sunt reliqua*. Aristotelis *de Physico Auditu*, libri octo, cum Averrois Cordubensis cariss in eosdem Commentariis, Aristotelis *Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, vol. IV, Book I, comment 18, f. 14r, C.

²²⁹ *impossibile sit hoc subiectum recipere duas earum [i.e. two substantial forms] in eadem parte*, *divisio autem non est huic subiecto nisi inquantum habet quantitatem, scivit [i.e. Aristotle knew] quod primum eorum, quae existunt in hoc, sunt tres dimensiones, quae sunt corpus*. Averroes summarises his position as follows: ‘Et causa huius totius est, quod hoc subiectum recipit primitus dimensiones interminatas, & quia est multum in potentia. Quoniam, si non haberet dimensionem, non recipieret simul formas diversas numero neque formas diversas specie, sed in eodem tempore non invenitur, nisi una forma. Et cum hoc quod eius materia est una numero, si non esset multa potentia, non denudaretur ab illa una forma, quam recipieret, & esset forma in substantia illius subjecti, & istud subjectum esset impossibile ut denudaretur a sua forma omnino, aut corrumpetur illa forma, & alia forma generaretur’. Averroes *Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis*, Aristotelis *Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, vol. IX, respectively: ch. 1, f. 4r, D (my insertion), ff. 3v, M- 4r, A (my insertion), ff. 4r, F- 4v, G.

²³⁰ Averroes’ position is that indeterminate dimensions render both matter divisible by substantial form, and, in turn, render substantial forms themselves divisible by virtue of the divisibility of the matter in which they inhere. Prime matter as a subject ‘divisible secundum formam’, he writes and substantial form is ‘divisibilis secundum eius [matter’s] dimensiones’. ibid., chapter 1, f. 4v, H (my insertion).

²³¹ ‘illa forma, scilicet dimensiones non terminatae existit in prima materia primitus’. ibid., ch. 1, f. 4r, D.

²³² In the context of a comparison between the forms of celestial and terrestrial bodies, Averroes writes, ‘formas eorum [i.e. the celestial bodies] non esse in subiecto mediantibus dimensionibus’, ‘neque possunt [i.e. the celestial bodies] recipere formas mediantibus dimensionibus interminatis, sicut est dispositio de formis generabilibus et corruptibilibus’, ibid., ch 1, f. 4v, M, f. 5r, C (my insertion and emphasis).
generation and corruption.\textsuperscript{233} Nor, accordingly, are the 'indeterminate dimensions' a structure which matter itself receives in time: as Averroës sees it, prime matter is never stripped of this structure, and has never been without it.

\textbf{4.2.3. Corporeal Structure and Material Identity}

Averroës' direct commentary on Aristotle's \textit{Physica} I.6-9 contains the third and final strand in his argument for the persistence of a corporeal structure in matter across any case of substantial change. There, the Commentator's point is that since, \textit{perceptibly}, the particular material subject of any case of substantial change remains one and the same thing, in the same place, across that change, it must be the case that absolute, or unqualified body persists in matter. The key idea behind this final strand of Averroës' argument, which is assumed rather than spelled out in the text of the \textit{Physica} commentary, is that three-dimensional mathematical structure (as defined in the \textit{Categoriae}) is responsible for distinguishing matter into parts, each of which occupies a certain \textit{position}.\textsuperscript{234}

Averroës starts by identifying a basic similarity between substantial change, on the one hand, and accidental change, on the other. Both kinds of change consist in the alteration of the \textit{same} thing from one quality or disposition to another.\textsuperscript{235} Averroës thus approaches the subject of substantial change from a completely different angle to Aristotle; rather than focusing on formal \textit{difference}, the Commentator promises a head-on discussion of the \textit{identity} of the material substratum across a case of substantial generation and corruption.

Now, the crucial distinction between accidental alteration and substantial change, Averroës notes, is that whereas, with the former, a thing's disposition changes in such

\textsuperscript{233} Referring to the arrival of substantial form in matter after indeterminate dimensions, Averroës writes, 'Et intelligo post, secundum esse, non post, secundum tempus'. ibid., ch. 1, f. 4v, I.


\textsuperscript{235} 'Et apparet per inductionem quod generatio indiget necessario subiecto... Et hae duas transmutationes, scilicet quae est in accidentibus rei & quae est in substantia, conveniunt in hoc, quoniam sunt alteratio eiusmodi rei de una qualitate in aliam & de una dispositio in aliam'. \textit{Aristotelis de Physico Auditu, libri octo, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eisdem Commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentaris}, vol. IV, Book I, comment 63, f. 37v L-M.
a way that neither its name nor its definition changes, in contrast, with the latter, a thing changes with respect to its dispositions in such a way that its name and definition do change: it changes with respect to its 'substantial dispositions'. Yet, Averroes continues, the subject which 'bears' or 'carries' (defert) the transmutation in each of the two types of change remains the same in number across the change as a corpus demonstratum: a body that one can point to.

In cases of substantial change, what we observe is the same body in the same place undergoing change in its name or definition, even in cases where the substantial dispositions of the material subject change so radically that it undergoes transmutation from a fleshy nature, to an earthy nature, to a plant-like nature, and so on.

So how does Averroes analyse the identity of the material subject that persists across substantial change? The bodily subject which undergoes accidental alteration, for example from being white to being black, is the same thing in number in virtue of its persistent substantial disposition, Averroes notes, according to which it has an unchanging name and definition. That much seems clear. It cannot of course be claimed that the subject that undergoes substantial transmutation is one and the same in virtue of some substantial disposition. If this subject had a persistent substantial

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236 'Sed quia viderunt quod, quando res transmutatur in quibusdam istis dispositionibus, statim nomen, & definitio eius transmutabuntur, & in quibusdam non, vocaverunt primum modum transmutationem in substantiam... & vocaverunt istas dispositiones substantiales. Secundum vero transmutationem, in qua neque nomen rei neque eius definitionem transmutatur, vocaverunt alterationem accidentalem', ibid., Book I, comment 63, ff. 37v, M-38r, A.

237 'Et, cum consideraverunt illud, quod defert utraque transmutationem, inveniunt ipsum idem numero, & est corpus demonstratum'. ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, A (my emphasis).

238 'Videmus enim idem corpus in idem loco transferri de carneitate in terrestreitatem, & de terrestreitate in vegetabilitatem, & mutabitur nomen eius & definitio'. ibid (my emphasis).

239 'Videmus etiam ipsum [corpus] transferri de albedine in nigredinem, sed non amittit nomen et definitionem, et ex hoc scitur, quod corpus, quod est subjectum isti transmutationem, permanet in nomine et definitione, et quod est eius dispositio substantialis, qua fit unum numero'. ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, A-B (my insertion).

240 'Corpus autem, cuius nomen, & definitio mutantur per transmutationem dispositionum, non est unum per dispositio existentem in ipso, dantem ei nomen & definitionem propriam'. ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, B.
form, then there would be no such thing as substantial change at all: all change would be accidental.\textsuperscript{241}

The subject in question, the ultimate subject of any case of substantial change is, of course, prime matter. Prime matter has no form or definition just in itself, but clearly something \textit{must} account for the fact that it remains 'one', in Averroes' words, or the same individual subject, across substantial change. Something must explain the observed fact upon which Averroes is building his entire analysis: that in substantial change what we \textit{see} is the \textit{same} body of material, in the \textit{same place}, undergoing a change in its substantial nature.\textsuperscript{242}

It is therefore necessary, Averroes argues, that the three dimensions (\textit{tres dimensiones}), which seem (\textit{videntur}) to be inseparable from prime matter, the dimensions that are called 'body', should themselves be \textit{one}, or the same in number across substantial change. This three-dimensional structure, extending across prime matter and extending prime matter, as it exists in a particular part of prime matter, makes \textit{that} part of the ultimate material substratum 'one in number' across any case of substantial change, or gives \textit{that} part of prime matter its continuing identity. Though Averroes' use of vocabulary is different, it is sufficiently clear from the context that this 'body' consisting of 'three dimensions', which is said in the \textit{Physica} commentary to be inseparable from prime matter, is the same thing as the basic incorruptible corporeal structure, the 'absolute body' consisting of 'indeterminate dimensions' discussed in \textit{De substantia orbis}.\textsuperscript{243}

\textsuperscript{241} 'Non enim est subiectum habens formam substantialem, quoniam, si essent de dispositionibus substantiae, non mutaretur nomen istius subiecti, neque eius eius definitio per mutationem alicuius dispositionis eius, & esset tota transmutatio in accidentibus'. ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, C.

\textsuperscript{242} 'Unde necesse est ut istud subiectum sit unum, quia non habet formam dantem nomen & definitionem unam'. ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r B (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{243} 'Et est necesse etiam ut tres dimensiones, quae videntur inseparabiles ab ipso, & cadae numero, quae dicuntur corpus, sint... unum, quia subiectum eorum non habet nomen neque definitionem unam numero'. 'Et, cum ita sit, est igitur unum subiectum numero, non habens dispositionem substantialem, sed habens natura recipiendi istas dispositiones substantiales. Est igitur in potentia ens omnes dispositiones substantiales, & accidentales, & haec dicitur prima materia, & prima hyle. Et manifestum est quod ista materia non denudatur a corporeitate'. ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, B-D (my emphasis).
4.2.4. 'Indeterminate Dimensions': an Accidental Form sui generis

Averroes confirms explicitly, in his commentary on the Physica, that this basic corporeal structure is an accident, or that these three dimensions are accidental properties\(^{244}\) (and not some kind of substantial form), having described 'absolute body', 'indeterminate dimensions' or the three-dimensional extension with which prime matter is invested simply as 'corporeal form' in De substantia orbis.

This is hardly surprising: Aristotle himself placed body as a geometrical solid into the accidental category of quantity. But as Silvia Donati has pointed out in her work on Averroes' concept of 'indeterminate dimensions', this incorruptible mathematical structure is an accident sui generis, insofar as it is conceived by Averroes in partial violation of one of the basic tenets in the conceptual apparatus of Aristotle's metaphysics. This is, of course, the axiom, spelled out in Metaphysica VII.1, and set out above (chapter 1, section 1.1), that any substance is prior to its accidents: accidents depend on substances for their existence.

The violation is only partial, Donati notes, because 'indeterminate dimensions' are ontologically prior only to one of the two principles of substance, namely substantial form.\(^{245}\) Additionally, it may be maintained that the violation of Aristotle's principles is only a partial one because, as we have seen, Averroes still holds explicitly that all accidents in act are posterior to and ontologically dependent on individual substances composed of matter and form. In his De substantia orbis, he points out that 'indeterminate dimensions', in contrast to other accidents, exist only in potency.\(^{246}\)

\(^{244}\) 'Et est necesse etiam ut tres dimensiones, quae videntur inseparrabiles ab ipso, & eadem numero, quae dicuntur corpus, sint accidentia'. ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, B-C.

\(^{245}\) S. Donati, 'Materia e dimensioni tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle dimensiones indeterminatae', Quaestio, 7 (2007), p. 393: 'Elemento caratteristico della dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate, sia nella formulazione originale elaborata da Averroè, sia in interpretazioni successive, come per esempio quella egidiana, è l'idea delle dimensioni come un accidente sui generis, con una posizione privilegiata nella struttura metafisica della sostanza: le dimensioni costituiscono una parziale violazione del principio aristotelico del primato della sostanza sull'accidente, in quanto, precedendo la forma sostanziale, precedono uno dei due principi costitutivi della sostanza'.

\(^{246}\) Comparing the matter of celestial bodies to that of corruptible bodies, Averroes writes, 'materia eorum [i.e. of the celestial bodies] non recipit formas mediantibus dimensionibus existentibus in eis in potentia, scilicet non terminatis, sicut est dispositio in dimensionibus quae sunt in prima materia'.


Stepping back from the detail of Averroes' account of substantial change, the Commentator's innovations seem rather more wide-ranging. It has already been noted that Averroes' account of substantial change employs a concept of prime matter that was not clearly evident in Aristotle's own work on natural change. Averroes' own analysis of prime matter is slightly more technically nuanced than has hitherto been suggested. For the sake of completing this account of the Commentator's work on substantial change, these nuances should be briefly noted.

Averroes holds that it is the very nature of prime matter to admit of a potentiality to substantial forms, but does not think that prime matter can be adequately described just in terms of its potentiality. This is because prime matter's potentiality is always predicated of it with regard to a particular form, and therefore falls into the category of relation. Averroes, then, supposes that prime matter, as something in itself of which this relation to forms is predicated, can be described as a kind of substance (albeit not a substance in act). This is another reason why, for the Commentator, prime matter must possess a form of its own.247

Conclusions

Crudely put, this chapter's argument has been that Thomas Aquinas's work on bodily identity would draw even more on Averroes' than it would on Aristotle's. The Commentator had identified and explored certain obscure areas within the Stagirite's respective accounts of identity of the mortal body, and bodily continuity across substantial change. And in the event, Aquinas would find the Commentator's findings to be highly relevant to his theological analysis of bodily identity.

Aquinas would pin the individual body's material continuity across growth upon the persistence of the body's accidental structuring form (which he would call 'dimensive quantity'). And he would intend to use the Commentator's work on the structure belonging to prime matter to explain the continuity of the matter belonging to particular bodies across their death and resurrection.

Even so, as will become clear in chapter 4, notwithstanding his evident reliance upon and respect for the Commentator's insights, Aquinas would struggle to accept that, in order to make full and explicit use of Averroes' theory of material identity across substantial change in his work on the general resurrection, he too would need to partially break away from, or at least modify his understanding of, the basic Aristotelian principle that a substance is ontologically prior to its accidents.
CHAPTER 3

THOMAS AQUINAS (I): INDIVIDUALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL BODY

Introduction

Chapter 1 concluded by setting out how Thomas Aquinas, based on his reading of Aristotle's writings on individuality and the individual body, completely reworked Peter Lombard's concept of the 'truth of human nature'. For the Lombard, again, the 'truth of human nature' in an individual was a fixed and non-exchangeable set of particles in their body, which accounted for the body's individuality and identity during mortal life, and from which it would be reconstituted at the resurrection. Aquinas explains at Summa Theologiae I (c.1266-68), q. 119, a. 1, in contrast, that the totality of an individual human's material part, all of their 'individual, signate matter' (matter that can be pointed to as being theirs) entered into his or her material truth of human nature. In addition, as Aquinas sees it, there is a formal aspect to the truth of human nature in each individual: the form individuated by their particular matter, or, in other words, his or her particular immortal soul. So the resurrection of an individual human, for Aquinas, involves the reunification of these formal and material aspects of their 'truth of human nature': their soul, and their individual matter.

The present chapter's discussion will unpick the thinking behind Summa Theologiae I, q. 119, a. 1. It will illustrate the ways in which Aquinas's literal and materialistic understanding of the doctrine of bodily resurrection shaped his thought on the composition of human nature, and of the human individual. It will demonstrate how

248 See above, pp. 15-17.
249 'ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata'. ST I, q. 119, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 571.
Aquinas thoroughly integrated certain Aristotelian ideas about the composition of the individual body, explored in chapters 1 and 2, into his own thinking on this topic.

The analysis will be split into four sections. The first section concerns Aquinas's innovative theory that the soul is the only substantial, or nature-determining form in a human being, or, in other words, his theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. For Aquinas, the doctrine of bodily resurrection implies that the union between individual soul and individual matter in human being is essential and intimate, such that the soul is incomplete without its particular material complement. Aquinas thinks that only this theory of human nature, and not a pluralist theory, or a theory that would posit any additional, corporeal form in a human body prior to the soul, can guarantee this intimate union between the soul and matter in human nature.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body, literally understood, entails, at the same time, that the body should maintain a relative independence from the soul as a component of the human individual. If the resurrection of an individual necessarily involves the gathering together of a person's 'individual matter', then the particular material component in an individual makes a crucial and independent contribution to their individuality.

Later in the thirteenth century, critics of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans would effectively maintain that he could not have it both ways: if there was to be the closest possible union between matter and the soul in a human being, then body could not retain any independence from soul. The individual body must, pluralists argued, be reduced to mere prime matter. This pluralist critique has informed certain modern philosophical and historical accounts of Aquinas's thought on the body and its resurrection, including Caroline Walker Bynum's, which claims that Aquinas 'packed' the body into the soul.250

As will become clear, however, for Aquinas, following Aristotle, the material part of a human being is not mere prime matter, but the differentiated, proper and proportionate material subject for a rational soul. And notwithstanding that he makes the soul the body's only substantial, or nature-determining form, Aquinas still thinks

250 See above, pp. 35-7.
there is a corporeal form in each human body other than its soul. It is just not a substantial form. Adopting Aristotle's mathematical conception of 'body' as a kind of quantitative structure, Aquinas grounds the body's relative independence from the soul on the accidental form 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva), a form which, Aquinas says, is close to substance.

This chapter's second section, then, will set out Aquinas's account of the metaphysical composition of the body, bringing the role of the accidental corporeal form, quantitas dimensiva, to centre stage. It is this form that immediately underpins the human body's organic structure; indeed, according to Aquinas, it is this very form upon which the particular structural beauty that characterises the human body, among the animal bodies, is grounded.

With his basic account of the composition of the human body and its relative independence from the soul in hand, the third section of the chapter's analysis will approach Aquinas's thought on the individual body through his work on human generation. Closely basing his thinking in this area on Aristotle's, Aquinas holds that the matter in which each individual soul is created has a unique 'capacity', depending on the precise make up of the body in which it is created, which in turn depends on prior, natural, material developments in utero. God then creates each individual soul intrinsically unique, Aquinas thinks, in proportion to its own body.

The fourth and final section addresses Aquinas's technical concept of 'individual matter', or 'signate matter', by way of a discussion of his thought on the principle of individuation. Again, Aquinas's strong account of the relative independence of the individual body from the individual soul will be thrown into sharp relief. As noted in chapter 2, it was the Commentator Averroes' view that substantial forms are actually responsible for dividing one part of matter from another (matter having already been rendered divisible by its own corporeal structure). Aquinas, in contrast, thinks that the only form in an individual body that is equipped to actually divide its matter from any other matter is its dimensive quantity. It is dimensive quantity, and not the soul, for Aquinas, which makes the matter belonging to an individual body this matter.

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251 See above, chapter 2, section 1.

252 See above, chapter 1, section 4.2.2.
1. The Basics (I): Substantial Form and Matter in Human Nature

In Aquinas's view, only his theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being is concordant with the idea that, at the resurrection, an individual soul will reunited to a human body, let alone its own body. This section will illustrate why, by drawing upon a selection of passages from Aquinas's work on the basic metaphysical composition of human nature. Some of these are taken directly from his work on the resurrection in book IV of his *Sentences* commentary (c.1252-56), book IV of his *Summa contra Gentiles* (completed 1264-65) and part I, chapters 153-4 of his *Compendium theologiae* (1265-67). The specifics of Aquinas's account of bodily and personal identity at the resurrection will be addressed head-on in chapter 4.

1.1. Essence and Esse

Aquinas thinks that if there were an additional corporeal substantial form intervening between the soul and matter, this would necessarily mean that soul and body were united only accidentally, or incidentally, and not as essential parts of a unified human nature. This in turn would allow for alternative, heretical interpretations of the afterlife, including the reincarnation of human souls into different human bodies, or even animal bodies. Leading Aquinas to this conclusion is his understanding, basic in his metaphysics, of the relationship between essence, on the one hand, and esse (existence, or act of being) in any composite substance, including any human being, on the other hand.

We saw at the end of chapter 1 that, for Aquinas, the human essence itself is *composite*: human nature comprises not only the soul, but also the body. Aquinas's concept of the composite human essence will be unpicked shortly. For now, the first point to grasp is that Aquinas thinks that there is a second level of composition in any human, in addition to that between matter and form. The entire composite essence enters into composition with its esse, or act of existence. Like matter and

253 See above, pp. 64-5.

254 On the real composition and distinction of essence and esse in Aquinas's thought, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 132-7 (for the modern debate concerning whether Aquinas does in fact defends a real distinction, as well as real composition, between essence and esse, see esp. p. 136, n. 11).
substantial form, essence and esse are related as potency and act respectively. And substantial form is the principle in any composite that gives or communicates esse, or the composite's act of existence, to matter (as Aquinas puts it, form 'perfects matter by giving it existence'255), and therefore to the whole composite.

More precisely, Aquinas understands the relationship between matter and form, on the one hand, and essence and existence, on the other hand, in terms of potency and act obtaining on two levels. First, matter is in potency to form, and form is its actuality, just as a soul is the act of a body. Then, the nature or essence composed of matter and substantial form, or body and soul, for example, can be understood as being in potency to its act of being (esse) insofar as it receives that act of being.256 It is not, then, that there are two distinct acts: substantial form is matter's act precisely because it is through substantial form that matter participates in esse, the composite's single act of being. Taken as a component of a material thing's essence, however, substantial form is in potency to the esse which is distinct from that essence, and which it communicates to the composite. Substantial form is not identical to esse.

The second point to grasp is Aquinas's position that unity is a transcendental property or characteristic of being.257 Unity is distinct from being only conceptually: unity in this sense is not something really added to being (inasmuch as unity here means just a negation or privation of division); rather it is interchangeable with being.258

255 'Forma enim, inquantum perficit materiam dando ei esse...'. ST I, q. 14, a. 2, ad. 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 4, p. 168.

256 'In natura igitur rerum corporearum materia non per se participat ipsum esse, sed per formam; forma enim adveniens materiae facit ipsum esse actu, sicut anima corpori. Unde in rebus compositis est considerare duplicem actum, et duplicem potentiam. Nam primo quidem materia est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus eius; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva eiusmod'. DSC, a.1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, p. 14.


258 'unum convertitur cum ente' or phrases of equivalent meaning can be found in several places in Aquinas' corpus. See, for example, 'Unum enim quod cum ente convertitur, ipsum ens designat, superaddens indensionis rationem, quae, cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti additam. Et sic in nullo differt ab ente secundum rem, sed solum ratione'. Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, [hereafter In Met.] IV, lect. 2, n. 560 (ed.) M. -R. Cathala (Taurini: Marietti, 1935), p. 187.
And so, because a composite's existence as a unit, one substance, follows upon its being, then there can only be one substantial form, if there is to be a single, essentially unified, composite substance. Two substantial forms, each communicating a substantial act of being (esse), would give two composite unities, or two substances. As Aquinas puts it, if it were permitted that there should be two substantial forms in a substance, no such substance would be one absolutely, or unconditionally (simpliciter): it is not from two acts that something is one simpliciter, Aquinas writes; a single thing results from potency being brought into act. Such a substance, then, would be one only accidentally, incidentally, or in a relative way (secundum quid). Hence, according to Aquinas's principles at least, an additional substantial form in the human body would ensure that the union between body and soul was a purely incidental one.

So a substantial form, for Aquinas, gives absolute substantial being (esse simpliciter) to a composite. In this respect, a substantial form differs from an accidental form, which only gives being 'of such a kind' (tale), for example, the accidental form 'heat' makes its substantial subject hot.

It is in accordance with the fact that it communicates an absolute act of substantial being (esse) to the composite to which it belongs, then, that a substantial form, for Aquinas, is the absolute determining principle of that composite's nature. It is the single source of all of the composite's natural perfections and operations: it is from a single form, the soul, that a human being is human, animal, living, a body, a substance and a being (ens). For Aquinas, following a dictum from Aristotle's Metaphysica, substantial forms do not admit of grades or degrees or any kind of growth

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259 'Quidam enim dicunt, quod sunt multae formae substantiales in eodem individuo... Sed haec positio... est impossibilis. Primo quidem, quia nullum individuum substantiae esset simpliciter unum. Non enim fit simpliciter unum ex duobus actibus, sed ex potentia et actu, in quantum id quod est potentia fit actu... Manifestum est ergo, quod si multiplicarentur multae formae substantiales in uno individuo substantiae, individuum substantiae non esset unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut homo albus'. DSC, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, pp. 39, 42-3.

260 'considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentalii differt quia forma accidentalii non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum'. ST I, q. 76, a. 4, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 224.

261 See above, n. 28.
or intensification in themselves: each substantial form has an absolute nature, like a discrete number. 262

1.2. The Composite Human Essence

As for any thirteenth-century scholastic theologian, so for Aquinas, human nature had to be composite, comprising both a rational soul and a human body, because that was what the doctrine of bodily resurrection implied. Whereas Aristotle had identified human nature, or essence, or what it is to be human, with form alone, 263 Aquinas understands the universal human nature or essence to comprise 'common soul' (or rational soul) and 'common matter', each of which, as we saw in chapter 1, he calls a 'principle of the species' at Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2. 264

In Aquinas's view, just as only the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans preserves the unity of the human being, so, accordingly, it is the only available theory of the composition of human nature that really preserves the idea that the human essence is composite. This is because the theory that the soul is the body's substantial form (and its only substantial form) entails that the soul is the form of the body (or of the material part of the human) according to its very nature. 265 Given that it is in the soul's very nature to be united (or to be capable of being united) to the body, or to matter, the soul cannot be a complete nature in itself: human nature must, therefore, be composite. 266 The soul's union with the body is a natural good, Aquinas thinks, and was from the beginning God's perfect design for the

262 'species comparantur numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaph.: quorum species per additionem et subtractionem unitatis variantur'. DSC, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, p. 44. Cf. Met. 1044a9-10.

263 See above, pp. 61-2.

264 Text quoted above at n. 156. Cf. also, 'materia communis per se pertinent ad speciem'. In Met. VII, lect. 9, n. 1473 (ed.) Cathala, p. 433, and similar statement at In Met. VII, lect 10, n. 1497 and n. 1500 and ST I, q. 75, a. 4, response.

265 'anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis forma'. ST I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 4, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 210 (NB. essentia here is used loosely, just to point to the soul's nature).

266 'anima ex natura suae essentiae habet quod sit corpori unibilis. Unde nec proprie anima est in specie; sed compositum'. ST I, q. 75, a. 7, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 207 (species here is synonymous with human essence or nature).
human species: the soul is created in the body, and does not possess the fulness of its natural perfection unless it is presently united to the body.\textsuperscript{267}

To be separated from the body, conversely, is contrary to the very nature of the soul. Human death, or the separation of body and soul, is natural, but only considering the corruptible nature of the mortal human body.\textsuperscript{268} Aquinas explains that when the soul is separated from the body, it retains its natural inclination to be reunited to the body, in the same way that a light body retains its light nature when removed from its proper atmospheric resting place, and thus retains its inclination to return to that proper place (to use a modern example: a weighted-down helium balloon will float back upwards if released).\textsuperscript{269} Since what is contrary to nature cannot be perpetual, and since the immortal soul itself does not naturally pass away, it follows therefore that the soul must be destined for reunion with matter at some point in the future (even if the reunion itself cannot happen naturally).\textsuperscript{270} The resurrection of the body, then, will restore to the soul its complete nature, just as it will restore the totality of human nature.

According to the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, of course, it is not in the nature of a rational soul as the substantial form of a human body to be united, or reunited, to just any matter, but only to appropriate matter or to a proportionate material subject. This matter is the matter that is the other part of human essence, or the material principle of the human species, to which Aquinas in fact refers either as (human) 'common matter' (a principle of the common or universal

\textsuperscript{267} 'Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisse conveniens animam sine corpore creari', 'Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore'. \textit{ST} I, q. 90, a. 4, response, and ad 1, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 5, pp. 388-9.

\textsuperscript{268} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Compendium Theologiae} (hereafter \textit{CT}) I, c. 152.

\textsuperscript{269} 'dicendum quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri, sicut secundum se convenit corpori levi esse sursum. Et sicut corpus levum manet quidem levum cum a loco proprio fuerit separatum, cum aptitudine tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem'. \textit{ST} I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 6, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 5, p. 210

\textsuperscript{270} \textit{CT} I, c. 151, \textit{Summa contra Gentiles} (hereafter \textit{SCG}), IV, 79.
human nature) or, employing Aristotle's terminology,271 as (human) 'proper matter' (appropriate for a human soul).

Asking whether the soul will resume the very same body at the resurrection in Book IV, distinction 44 of his Sentences commentary, indeed, Aquinas introduces the theory is the soul is the body's substantial form (and its only substantial form), and its consequence that human nature is composed of rational soul and human body, as the orthodox antidote to alternative conceptions of the afterlife advocated by ancient philosophers and, more recently, by certain heretics. According to these erroneous positions, souls would be reunited to bodies that were not human. His initial (unnamed) target is Plato,272 who had thought that the souls of the unrighteous would reincarnated into different bodies, either into different human bodies, or into whatever animal bodies were fitting in light of the particular nature of their vicious lifestyles (a violent person, Aquinas notes, would find themselves reincarnated into a lion's body).273

Aquinas goes on to explain that this view of the afterlife follows from an account of human nature that says that the soul is not joined to the body essentially, as form to matter, but only accidentally, or incidentally, as a person to their clothing, or as a mover to what it moves.274 He elsewhere explicitly criticises Plato's theory of human nature for positing that human nature consisted of the soul alone, and that the soul

271 See above, chapter 1, section 1.


273 'Circa hanc quaestionem et philosophi erraverunt, et quidam moderni haeretici errant. quidam enim philosophi posuerunt animas a corpore separatas iterato corporibus conjungi... sed... primo... ponebant animam separatam corpori iterum conjungi naturaliter per viam generationis""... secundo... ponebant... quod secunda conjunctio non erat ad idem corpus quod per mortem depositum fuit, sed ad alium; quandoque quidem enim specie, quandoque autem diversum; ad diversum quidem quando anima in corpore existens praeter rationis ordinem vitam duxerat bestiale, unde transibat post mortem de corpore hominis in corpus alterius animalis cuius moribus vivendo se conformavi, sicut... in corpus leonis propter rapinam et violentiam, et sic de alis'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, response, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.

274 'Sed haec opinio ex... falsis radicibus venit: quorum prima est, quia anima non conjungitur corpori essentialiter sicut forma materiae, sed solum accidentaliter, sicut motor mobili, aut homo vestimento; et ideo ponere poterant quod anima praexistebat antequam corpori generato infunderetur in generatione naturali; et iterum quod diversis corporibus uniretur'. ibid.
merely uses the body like a sailor a ship, or a man his clothes.\textsuperscript{275} That soul and body are united only incidentally or accidentally, and not essentially, of course, is also, in Aquinas's view, the \textit{necessary} consequence of any pluralist account of the composition of human nature that posits a substantial form in the human being prior to the soul. It was not usual practice, during the period spanning Aquinas's career at least, for theologians to directly criticise the work of their contemporaries in theological commentaries. In any case, we have already seen that Aquinas does explicitly associate the pluralist theory of human nature against which he explicitly sets up his own theory with followers of Plato.\textsuperscript{276}

Falling under the sway of the Plato's account of human nature, Aquinas goes on to explain in Book IV, distinction 44 of his \textit{Sentences} commentary, certain heretics have suggested that human souls would be rejoined to bodies that were celestial (quite literally, that is, to heavenly \textit{spheres}), or ethereal.

Again, Aquinas does not directly name his targets, but their identity is sufficiently clear from other passages in which he writes about Plato's legacy for thought on the union of body and soul. In his \textit{Summa contra Gentiles} II, 83, discussing whether the soul begins to exist when the body does, Aquinas identifies Plato's intellectual successors as, on the one hand, Origen (c.185-254), who thought that the souls of all humans were created apart from their bodies at the same time as the angels, before the material world, and thereafter bound to bodies as a punishment for sin, and, on the other hand, the Manichaean heretics who teach reincarnation 'today'.\textsuperscript{277}


\textsuperscript{276}See above, n. 28.

\textsuperscript{277}'qui posuerunt animas humana in sui multitudine esse immortales, silicet Platonici, posuerunt easdem ab aeternouisse, et nunc quidem corporibus uniri, nunc autem a corporibus absolvsi, hac vicissitudine secundum determinata corporibus absolvsi, hac vicissitudine secundum determinata annorum curricula observata... Quidam vero Catholicam fidei profitebantur, Platonicorum doctrinis imbutili, viam mediam tenuerunt. Quia enim, secundum fidei Catholicam, nihil est aeternum prater Deum, humana quidem animas aeternas non posuerunt, sed eas cum mundo, sive potius antu mundum visibilem, creatasuisse, et tamen eas de novo corporibus alligari. Quam quidem positionem primus inter Christianae fidei professores Origenes posuisse inventur, et post plures ipsum sequentes. Quae quidem opinio usque hodie apud haereticos manet: quorum Manichaei eas etiam aeternas...
Origen had certainly held that resurrected bodies would be ethereal, angelic bodies, and in 543, prior to the Second Council of Constantinople, a council of bishops in Constantinople had indeed condemned Origen's work for apparently teaching that resurrected bodies would be spherical like celestial bodies. The 'Cathars', the Manichean heretics contemporary to Aquinas, taught that souls were utterly incompatible with the evil material world: human souls had been trapped in matter by Satan, or the evil God. According to Cathar teachings, souls would remain trapped, reincarnated into animal or human bodies over and over again, until they were purified by the rite known as the *consolamentum*. Then, they could return to the heaven created by the good God, from which they had been snatched at the 'Fall'. The Cathars, of course, had been the principal target of the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), and the Second Council of Lyons (1274), that had confirmed the literal interpretation of resurrection as individuals' recovery of the very same bodies they had in mortal life.

The theory that the soul is united to the body essentially and as its form, Aquinas concludes in Book IV, distinction 44 of his *Sentences* commentary, 'destroys' and firmly locks out all of these alternative heretical interpretations of the afterlife (with which, he clearly thinks, a pluralist theory of human nature is basically compatible). At *Compendium Theologiae* I, c. 153, he writes, accordingly, that since the soul is united to the body as its form, and since each form corresponds to its proper matter, the soul will be reunited, not to a celestial or ethereal body, or some other animal body, but to


278 Cf. Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body*, p. 67. This was probably a later interpolation by the group of Egyptian monks who came to be known as Origenists. See Chadwick, 'Origen, Celsus and the Resurrection of the Body', pp. 94-102.


280 See above, n. 2.

281 'Sed praedictae... radices destruuntur a philosopho, in Lib. de anima; quibus destructis, patet falsitas praedictae positionis. Et simili modo destruuntur errores quorumdam haereticorum: quorum quidam in praedictas positiones inciderunt; quidam autem posuerunt animam iterato conjungi corporibus caelestibus, vel etiam corporibus in modum venti subtilibus... non enim resurrectio dici potest nisi anima ad idem corpori redate'. *In Sent. IV*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, response, *Opera omnia* (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.
a body of the same species as that which it laid down at death: a human body composed of flesh, bones and organs.\textsuperscript{282}

At this point, an obscurity within Aquinas's work on the human body should be highlighted: Aquinas never provides a penetrating metaphysical analysis of what the human soul's proper matter really is. A concrete resurrected body, like a concrete mortal body, will certainly comprise flesh, bone, and other human organs. At \textit{Summa Theologiae} I, q. 29, a. 2 and elsewhere, Aquinas describes the 'common matter' that is the material principle of the human species as 'flesh and bone'.\textsuperscript{283} In other places, he can be found to refer to the human soul's proper matter either as 'flesh and bone', or, in terms lifted from Aristotle's \textit{De anima} II.1, as an organic body.\textsuperscript{284} At \textit{Summa Theologiae} I, q. 119, a. 1, he even points to the material part of the human essence simply as 'body'.\textsuperscript{285}

These labels are problematic because they appear to point to matter \textit{already} informed, whereas Aquinas clearly means to treat the matter and the form that enter into human essence as two \textit{distinct} components of human nature.\textsuperscript{286} And it is impossible, according to Aquinas's metaphysical schema, that any \textit{accidental} form

\textsuperscript{282} 'Cum autem anima corpori uniatur ut forma, unicuique autem formae propria materia respondeat, necesse est quod corpus cui iterato anima unietur sit eiusdem rationis et speciei cum corpore quod deponit per mortem. Non enim resumet anima in resurrectione corpus caeleste vel aereum, vel corpus aliquius alterius animalis, ut quidam fabulantur, sed corpus humanum ex carnibus et ossibus compositum, organicum eisdem organis ex quibus nunc consistit'. \textit{CT} I, c. 153, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 42 (Rome: Editori de San Tommaso, 1979), p. 139. Cf. also \textit{SCG} IV, 84.

\textsuperscript{283} See abive, n. 156, and cf. 'materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus... materia communis... ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus'. \textit{ST} I, q. 75, a. 4, response, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis}, 5, p. 200.


\textsuperscript{285} 'Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei... Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus'. \textit{ST} I, q. 119, a.1, response, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 5 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1889), p. 571.

\textsuperscript{286} 'in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, essentia significat non solum formam, nec solum materiam, sed compositum ex materia et forma communi'. \textit{ST} I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 4, p. 330.
should enter into essence to give definition to its material part, since essence and its parts or principles are categorically distinct from any accident.\textsuperscript{287}

Actually, it is not particularly surprising that Aquinas's presentation of human essence should contain this obscurity. Robert Pasnau, in particular, has done much to bring to light scholastic theologians' general pessimism regarding humans' ability to grasp essences, which are the \textit{inner} natures of things.\textsuperscript{288}

Human beings reach their understanding of essences by starting with sensory impressions that directly capture only the \textit{accidental} features of things, and Aquinas thinks that the human intellect, at best, grasps even the simplest essences in an incomplete way. 'Our cognition is so weak', he writes, 'that no philosopher can ever perfectly investigate the nature of a single fly'.\textsuperscript{289} Aquinas explains that this weakness is directly reflected in the way in which philosophers formulate the definitions that they use to capture the essences of things. Since they have to rely on sense-perceptible, accidental features of things in order to learn about their essences, philosophers frequently use words that capture the accidental attributes that follow from that nature in order to point to the hidden substantial differentiae that in fact comprise the essences of species.\textsuperscript{290}

In the definition of 'human' as 'rational animal', or of the human soul as the 'rational soul', for example, the difference 'rational', insofar as it refers to a power of the soul, actually names an \textit{accidental} attribute. The description of the formal component of human essence as 'soul'\textsuperscript{291} or 'common form', of course, tells us little more about the inner nature of human soul than the description of the material

\textsuperscript{287} Cf. Wippel, \textit{The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas}, p. 268.


\textsuperscript{289} 'cognitio nostra est adeo debilis quod nullus philosophus potuit unquam perfecte investigare naturam unius muscae'. Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum}, proemium, \textit{Opera omnia} (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 6, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{290} 'in genere substantiae frequenter accipiuntur differentiae accidentales loco substantialium, inquantum per eas designantur principia essentialia'. \textit{ST} I-IIae, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 6, p. 312. Cf. also \textit{ST} I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 3.

\textsuperscript{291} e.g. at \textit{ST} I, q. 75, a. 4, response, and \textit{ST} I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3.
component of human essence as 'flesh and bone' tells us about the inner nature and pattern of the material arrangement appropriate for such a soul. Following Aristotle, indeed, Aquinas thinks that the nature of matter in itself is unknowable: it has to be grasped by analogy, in virtue of the proportional relationship it bears to the form whose subject it is.292

The crucial idea that the rational soul's proper matter is a highly differentiated material arrangement does, however, come across clearly in Aquinas's texts. In his commentary on Aristotle's important discussion of proper matter at *Metaphysica* VIII.4-5 (composed c. 1270-71), Aquinas discusses the 'proper matters' which are 'different for different things' in explicit contradistinction to featureless prime matter, which is 'common to all things'.293

The discussion so far has operated purely on the level of the species. As explained at the end of chapter 1, although he thinks that the human essence cannot be identified with the individual, Aquinas still thinks that the universal essence is really present in the individual. In his work on the resurrection, as we will see in chapter 4, Aquinas refers to the composite human essence 'humanity', as the 'form of the whole'

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293 'Quia vero, licet materia prima sit communis omnibus, tamen materiae propriae sunt diversae diversorum'. *In Met.* VIII, lect. 4, n. 1735 (ed.) Cathala, p. 503. Some commentators nonetheless assume that it is mere prime matter that enters into essence. See A. Maurer, 'Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St Thomas', *Mediaeval Studies*, 13 (1951), p. 175 and Wippel *Metaphysical Thought* p. 331. Others appear to take at face value Aquinas's ambiguous suggestion that the material principle of the species is matter already informed. See P. King, 'the Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages', *Theoria*, 66 (2000), p. 11, 'What kind of matter is "included"? Here Aquinas treads carefully: if we speak of an animal, not just any matter will do; animals are not composed of, say, granite blocks. Rather, they are composed of flesh and blood and bones. The particular arrangement of flesh and bones defines the kind of animal... The pattern of material composition is thus part of the form of the whole'.

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(forma totius), and treats it as a 'form' that is reintegrated when a human being is resurrected.\textsuperscript{294}

The formula 'forma totius' for designating the human essence arises again in Aquinas's commentary on \textit{Metaphysica} VII.10, wherein he again outlines the relationship between the human essence and the human individual.\textsuperscript{295} An individual can be taken as both universal and singular, Aquinas explains: when we consider Socrates just insofar as he is a man, we are referring to the fact that he possesses body and soul; when we consider him as a singular object we refer to him as a composite of \textit{this} body, or 'individual matter' (Aquinas's interpretation of what Aristotle calls 'ultimate matter' in that passage\textsuperscript{296}), and \textit{this} soul,\textsuperscript{297} or, in other words, as a composite of the individualised components which enter into Socrates' 'truth of human nature'.

Therefore, the individual human \textit{possesses} (rather than \textit{is}) the essence 'humanity', because he or she has individual differentiating characteristics in addition to those which he or she shares with other humans: 'humanity' itself (or the forma totius) therefore captures or signifies only a \textit{part} of the individual human.\textsuperscript{298}

\textsuperscript{294} See below, chapter 4, section 2.4.

\textsuperscript{295} In this passage, Aquinas discusses the positions of Aristotle, Averroes, and Avicenna on essence. According to Aquinas, Averroes identified human essence (or \textit{forma totius}) with soul alone. On this point Averroes is of course in agreement with Aristotle. Aquinas massages Aristotle's text, however, and he reads the Stagirite as being in agreement with both Avicenna, and himself, regarding the fact that essence is composite. See \textit{In Met. VII}, lect. 9, nn. 1467-9, and for further commentary, see Maurer, 'Form and Essence' pp. 165-8, 171. Avicenna's position is in fact more nuanced Avicenna's composite essence, or 'quiddity in itself', is entirely neutral with respect to individuality and universality. Universality, for Avicenna, attaches to essence as an accident. On essence or quiddity in Avicenna's philosophy see A. Bäck, 'The Islamic Background: Avicenna (b. 980; d. 1037) and Averroes (b. 1126; d. 1198)', in Gracia (ed.), \textit{Individuation in Scholasticism}, pp. 42-5, and Booth, \textit{Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology}, pp. 115-22.

\textsuperscript{296} See above, n. 154.

\textsuperscript{297} 'Sciendum tamen, quod hoc compositum, quod est animal vel homo, potest dupliciter sumi: vel sicut universale, vel sicut singulare. Sicut universale quidem, sicut homo et animal. Sicut singulare, ut Socrates et Callias... Homo enim dicit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, non autem ex hac anima et hoc corpore. Sed singulare dicit aliquid compositum ex ultima materia, idest materia individuali. Est enim Socrates aliquid compositum ex hac anima et hoc corpore... Compositum autem est tam universale quam singularis'. In \textit{Met. VII}, lect. 10, nn. 1490-1 (ed.) Cathala, p. 438.

\textsuperscript{298} 'homo dicatur qui humanitatem habet, per hoc vero quod humanitatem habet, non excluditur quin alia habeat... unde homo significat per modum totius, humanitas vero per modum partis, nec de homine praedicatur'. \textit{CT} I, c. 154, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 42, pp. 140-1. For further comment on this point see Wippel, \textit{The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas}, pp. 205-6.
1.3. Commensuratio between Individual Soul and Individual Body

Aquinas's more detailed thinking on the individuality of body and soul will be set out in sections 3 and 4 below. To round off this basic introduction to Aquinas's thought on the metaphysical composition of human nature, it is at least possible to briefly illustrate the way in which Aquinas applies, on the level below the species, and within the context of discussing life after death, his distinctive vision of a human being as a unity in which matter completes the soul just as much as the soul completes the body.

At *Summa contra Gentiles* II, 80-81, Aquinas refutes the idea that souls cannot out-survive the corruption of their bodies. If they were to survive, one objection contends, they would have to do so as diverse substances. But how do souls retain their diversity once they have departed from their bodies? Aquinas answers that, if it is in the nature of the rational soul to be the form of a human body, then each individual human soul is, according to its *particular* nature or substance, the form of a *particular* body. In other words, each soul is, intrinsically, 'commensurate' (*commensurata*) with its *own* body, and this, not surprisingly, is because each soul is united to its particular body, or to its particular matter, not merely accidentally, but as its *substantial* form.\(^\text{299}\)

Aquinas makes it explicit that each soul, beyond the fixtures of its nature that it shares with other members of the species, has its *own*, individual substantial nature. And so, 'this soul is commensurate to *this* body and not *that*', Aquinas reasons; 'that soul is commensurate to another body, and so on for all souls'.\(^\text{300}\)

Human souls, then, remain a diverse group after their separation from their bodies, because each retains its unique *commensuratio* to its particular body, or to

\(^{299}\) *Sunt enim animae secundum substantias suas formae corporum: alias accidentaliter corpori unirentur, et sic ex anima et corpore non fieret unum per se, sed unum per accidens. Inquantum autem formae sunt, oportet eas esse corporibus commensuratas*. *SCG* II, 80-81, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 13, p. 505.

\(^{300}\) *Multitudo igitur animarum a corporibus separatarum consequitur quidem diversitatem formarum secundum substantiam, quia alia est substantia huic animae et illius: non tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium ipsius animae, nec est secundum diversam rationem animae; sed est secundum diversam commensurationem animarum ad corpora; haec enim anima est commensurata huic corpori et non illi, illa autem aliæ, et sic de omnibus*. Ibid.
particular matter. Resurrection, precisely, will restore the complete nature of each individual soul as the substantial form of a particular body, reuniting it with its own matter. This is the thinking behind Aquinas's argument at Compendium Theologiae c. 153, that, according to the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, it is not possible for any soul to be reunited with any body, or matter, other than the very same matter that was particular to its individual body, or the same matter 'in number' (eadem materia secundum numerum).

2. The Basics (II): Dimensive Quantity as the Body's Accidental Corporeal Form

The material and immaterial parts of the human being might well interpenetrate and complete one another's very natures, but in the concrete, for Aquinas, the relative independence of body from soul within the human being is grounded upon the accidental form giving to the body its physical structure, which he calls 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva). Dimensive quantity, in Aquinas's thought, takes on the attributes that Aristotle had ascribed to 'body' considered as a geometrical solid, or as it fell into the accidental category of 'quantity'. As was explained in chapter 2, Aristotle himself had indicated that such geometrical structures were immanent in natural bodies.

When Aquinas says that the rational soul is the human body's only substantial form, then, he means that the soul determines the body's specific nature, imparts absolute substantial being (esse) to it, and is the source of the body's actions and operations. He does not mean that the soul is a physical shape. It is the quantitative structure in each human body that accounts for the physical organisation of its organic parts, and its overall shape as a result of that organisation. The substance of a body

301 'Huiusmodi autem commensurationes remanent in animabus etiam percutitis corporibus'. ibid.

302 In order to illustrate this point regarding the individuality of human souls, Aquinas uses the somewhat confusing example, arguing that one cow's soul cannot become the soul of another cow. 'sicut eidem formae secundum speciem debetur cadem materia secundum speciem, ita cedem formae secundum numerum debetur cadem materia secundum numerum: sicut enim anima bovis non potest esse anima corporis equi, ita anima huius non potest esse anima alterius bovis. Oportet igitur quod cum cedem numero anima rationalis remaneat, quod corpori cedem numero in resurrectione rursus uniatur'. CT I, c. 153, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, pp. 139-40 (my emphasis).

303 See above, chapter 2, section 1.
and its quantitative structure, then, are not the same thing: bodily substance, matter
and substantial form (insofar as it informs matter), has an accidental form giving it
physical structure; physical structure is found in bodily substance.

At *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 18, a. 2, Aquinas defines bodily substances as 'things in
which three dimensions are found', or in which a three-dimensional structure is
found, a definition which he introduces as if it is commonplace, and for which he
could in fact find support from Augustine, as well as Aristotle. Yet, sometimes, he
notes, the word 'body' is applied directly to those three dimensions themselves (or to
that three-dimensional structure itself), in reference to the fact that three-dimensional
bodily structures fall into the accidental category of quantity.

The remainder of the present section will expose the crucial role that the body's
accidental corporeal form, its dimensive quantity, has to play in Aquinas's metaphysical
account of bodily composition. To highlight the role of dimensive quantity, it will
illustrate the involvement of the body's structural form in the vivid picture that
Aquinas paints of the human body's remarkable beauty and nobility in his work on
the Creation and on the union between body and soul.

Although the explication of Aquinas's thought will again remain at the level of the
species for now, what Aquinas has to say about the role of the human body's
accidental corporeal form is of course meant to apply to the basic design found in any
individual body. Moreover, the discussion will serve as the immediate springboard
for the analysis contained in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter, on the construction of
individual human bodies in generation, and Aquinas's concept of 'individual matter'
respectively.

### 2.1. Dimensive Quantity and Organic Structure

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305 'Sicut patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres dimensiones, et ideo Aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur species Quantitatis'. *ST* I, q.18, a. 2, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 4, p. 226.
In *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 8, which concludes his discussion of the union of body and soul in humans in that particular work, Aquinas delineates the way in which the soul, on the one hand, and the accidental form giving to the body its physical and organic structure, on the other hand, are present in the human body.

Since the soul is united to the body as its substantial form, Aquinas writes, it is *whole in each part* of the body, according to the totality of its perfection and 'essence' (or nature); it defines each part as human, and it is the act of the whole body and each part of the body. This is the case even if certain powers of the soul manifest themselves only in certain parts of the body (as hearing occurs only in the ear, for example).³⁰⁶

The other *forma totius* present in the human body (that is, the other form of the *whole body*, not to be confused with the *forma totius* which Aquinas elsewhere identifies with essence) is a 'quantitative whole' (*totalitas quantitativa*) divisible into 'quantitative parts' (*partes quantitativas*). It is an accidental form, consisting in the composition and order (*compositio et ordo*) of the body’s parts. Demonstrating his characteristic weakness in providing good illustrative examples, Aquinas compares this accidental form to the form of a house.³⁰⁷ This accidental corporeal form, in contrast to the soul as *substantial* form, is whole in the whole body and *part* in each of its parts.³⁰⁸

Aquinas thinks, then, that it is in the nature of the human body's quantitative form to be spatially extended, and therefore to extend matter in three dimensions, and to have distinct and determinate parts, and therefore to serve as the basis for structural distinctions in the body's matter. Parts in any quantitative structure attach

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³⁰⁶ 'Respondeo dicendum quod... quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in qualibet parte corporis... enim est forma... substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis... oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum totius, sed cuiuslibet partis... sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis et essentiae; non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis. Quia non secundum quamlibet suam potentiam est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, secundum auditum in aure, et sic de aliis'. *ST* I, q. 76 a. 8, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 5, pp. 232-3.

³⁰⁷ 'Cum enim totum consistat ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus corporis, est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus: et talis forma est accidentalis', 'quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut... totum corpus... [est] totalitas quantitativa'. *ST* I, q. 76, a. 8, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 5, p. 232 (my insertion).

³⁰⁸ Aquinas makes this explicit elsewhere: 'si accipiatur totum per comparationem ad partes quantitativas... non est tota in qualibet parte, sed tota in toto, et pars in parte'. *QDA*, q. 10, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 24, 1, p. 91.
to one another in a certain order. As the comparison with the form of a house would also suggest, the relative proportions of the body's organic parts are also founded on its quantitative structure. Aquinas makes it explicit, in a discussion of how Christ's body is present in the sacrament, that the structural detail in an organic body, the 'determinate distances' of the body's organs from one another, the distance of eye from eye and eye from ear, are based upon that body's accidental corporeal form, its *quantitas dimensiva*.\textsuperscript{309}

Insofar as it accounts for its proportions, the body's *quantitas dimensiva* directly underlies its three-dimensional shape, or *figura*. As was noted in chapter 2, it is Aquinas's view that *quantitas dimensiva* and *figura* are distinct, but closely related forms.\textsuperscript{310} The body's *figura* is the overall effect of the various parts of the underlying structure being arranged and proportioned relative to one another in a precise way, and Aquinas confirms that 'figura... est qualitas circa quantitatem': the very concept (ratio) of shape or *figura* consists in the limitation or bounding of the bulk of the body's three-dimensional structure (*in terminacione magnitudinis*), he explains,\textsuperscript{311} and bodily shape 'follows directly' on quantitative structure (*figura... consequitur quantitatem*).\textsuperscript{312}

Aquinas uses the technical term 'disposition' (*dispositio*) to refer to the order or relative positioning of parts essential to the body's quantitative structure. *Dispositio* is discussed in Aristotle's lexicon of philosophical terms in the *Metaphysica*, precisely at *Metaphysica* V.19. There, the Stagirite explains that the term *dispositio* refers to the *order* of that which has parts 'either as to place, potentiality, or species'.\textsuperscript{313} Aquinas's

\textsuperscript{309} 'Corpus Christi, cum sit organicum, habet partes determinate distantes, est enim de ratione organicorum corporis determinata distantia singularum partium ad invicem, sicut oculi ab oculo, et oculi ab aure', 'determinata distantia partium in corpore organicum fundatur super quantitatem dimensivam ipsius'. *ST* III, q. 76, a. 3, arg. 2 and ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1906), pp. 182-3.

\textsuperscript{310} See above, pp. 73-4.

\textsuperscript{311} 'Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio figurae in terminacione magnitudinis'. *ST* I, q. 78, a. 3, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 254. Cf. 'figuratio est quaedam terminatio quantitatis'. *ST* III, q. 65, a. 2 ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 32; 'figura, quae consistit in terminacione quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem'. *ST* I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 4, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{312} *ST* I-IIae, q. 52, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 6, p. 331. The context for this discussion of accidental forms is the question of whether habits can admit of increase (*augmentum*).

\textsuperscript{313} 'Dispositio dicitur habentis partes ordo aut secundum locum aut secundum potentiam aut secundum speciem'. *Met.*, 1022b1-3 (ed.) Vuillemin-DiM, p. 116.
commentary on this passage illustrates that the word *species* in the Latin Aristotle was not always understood by him to mean *substantial* form. He takes *species* here to be synonymous with *figura*: so *dispositio* can be used to refer to the ordering of parts as considered within the shape or overall structure of the whole.314

There is potential for confusion over Aquinas's use of the term *dispositio* when analysing the fabric of the human body because he also refers to dimensive quantity itself as being the 'first disposition' of the body's matter (*prima dispositio materiae*). Aquinas frequently characterises quantitative structure in this way in his discussions of transubstantiation, the miracle in which the substance of the sacramental bread and wine is transformed whilst their visible physical features or accidents remain. Dimensive quantity, in Aquinas's view, is naturally or ontologically prior (though not prior in time) to any other accidental form inhering in matter, or in bodily substance. Other accidents inhere in substance, or in matter, with this structure acting as a medium or proximate subject (*proximum subiectum*) for them.315

So, as this characterisation of quantitative structure as the *first* disposition of matter suggests, Aquinas also uses the term *dispositio* in a broader way to refer to other properties of the body. The *dispositio* that is found in other accidental features consists in their particular ordering or mutual adjustment (*commensuratio*) relative to one another, which can vary from one individual body to the next. Health and


315 *Sciendum autem, quod substantia corporalis habet quod sit subjectum accidentium ex materia sua, cui primo inest subjici alteri. Prima autem dispositio materiae est quantitas... Unde omnia alia accidentia mediante quantitate in substantia fundantur, et quantitas est prior eis naturaliter*. In *Sent.* IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 3, response, *Opera Omnia* (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 484; *Inter accidentia vero quidam ordo considerandus est. Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhaeret substantiae quantitas dimensiva. Deinde qualitates in substantia recipiuntur quantitate mediate*. *SCG* IV, 63, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 15, p. 201; *quia prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva... Et quia primum subiectum est materia, consequens est quod omnia alia accidentia referantur ad subjunctum mediante quantitate dimensiva...* *ST* III, q. 77, a. 2, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 12, p. 196; *Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativa*. *ST* I, q. 78, a. 3 ad 2, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 5, p. 254 (the context in this final case is a discussion of sense perception). For more on dimensive quantity in Aquinas's work on transubstantiation, see McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist*, ch. 4.
beauty, for example, are dispositions each of which consists in a certain ordering of different accidental features.\textsuperscript{316}

Aquinas underlines the fundamental role that the body's quantitative structure and \textit{figura} have to play in its metaphysical make-up in a discussion on the topic of accidental alteration in his \textit{Physica} commentary (1268-69). He explains that, among a material thing's accidents, its \textit{figura} will most clearly indicate the species, or kind, into which it falls. The reason for this is that while quantity, among the accidents, is most closely related to substance (presumably in virtue of the fact that it acts as a proximate subject for all other accidents in matter), \textit{figura}, the external shape following directly upon quantitative structure, is the accident most closely related to substantial form. It is for this reason that some philosophers have confused quantitative structure with substance, on the one hand, and the \textit{figura} that follows upon it with substantial form, on the other hand. These are both, in fact, \textit{accidental forms}.\textsuperscript{317}

\textbf{2.2. The Human Body as 'optime dispositus'}

The extraordinary passages on the Creation and on the union of body and soul in which Aquinas explains how the human body exceeds all other animal bodies in respect of the beauty and nobility of its design refer to the human body as being, precisely, 'optimally disposed'. A key text in this regard is \textit{Summa Theologiae} I, q. 91, a. 3,\textsuperscript{318} where Aquinas asks whether the human body was created with a 'fitting disposition' (\textit{conveniens dispositio}). Even if it has become subject to death and prone to

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\textsuperscript{316} 'dicitus autem dispositiones... sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia huicmodi, quae important quandam commensurationem plurium quae diversis modis commensurari possunt'. \textit{ST} I-IIae, q. 49, a. 4, response, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 6 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1891), p. 315.

\textsuperscript{317} 'considerandum est, quod inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime consequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum. Quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo certiori judicio diversitas specierum diuidicari potest, quam diversitate figurarum. \textit{Et hoc ideo}, quia sicut quantitas propinquissime se habet ad substantiam inter alia accidentia, ita figura, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, propinquissime se habet ad formam substantiae. Unde sicut posuerunt aliqui dimensiones esse substantiam rerum, ita posuerunt aliqui figuram esse substantiales formas'. \textit{In Phys.}, VII, lect. 5, n. 917 (5), \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 2, p. 339 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{318} Cf. also \textit{ST} I, q. 76, a. 5 (\textit{Utrum anima intellectiva conveniunt tali corpori unitat}); \textit{SCG} II, 90 (\textit{Quod nulli ali corpori nisi humano unitur substantia intellectualis ut forma}); \textit{QDA}, q. 8 (\textit{Utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debuerit uniri quale est corpus humanum}); \textit{In Sent.} II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5 (\textit{Utrum anima humana tali corpori debuerit uniri}).
defects as a result of the Fall, Aquinas holds, the human body retains all of the perfections belonging to its natural physical constitution. Summa Theologiae I, q. 91, a. 3, then, provides ample illustration of the significance of dimensive quantity in Aquinas's thought on the human body. As will become obvious, Aquinas's understanding of the perfection of the human body is here dependent upon Aristotle's *De partibus animalium* in particular.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that the soul is the body's final cause, the purpose for which it exists. God, nature's craftsman, has designed the human body with the best possible disposition (*in optima dispositione*) so that it is the fitting subject for the rational soul and its operations. Put another way, the human body has been designed so as to be in proportion to such a soul and its operations. Of course, disposition of the human body is absolutely the best disposition in comparison to the respective dispositions of other kinds of living bodies. The human body is designed as the proportionate subject of the most perfect kind of soul immersed in matter, the rational soul: the more noble the form, the more noble the body whose form it is.

Aquinas analyses the various perfections belonging to the organic structure of the human body. He notes that the human being's distinctive upright stature means that, unlike plants and other animals, it is disposed in the best possible way (*optime dispositus*) with respect to the surrounding universe. Like Aristotle, Aquinas highlights that

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319 *ST* I-IIae, q. 85, a. 5.

320 *ST* I-IIae, q. 85, articles 1 and 4.

321 See above, pp. 48-9.

322 ‘Respondeo dicendum quod omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina, unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimum inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad finem... Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimum dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem... Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius, materia enim est propter formam... Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad tale formam et ad tales operationes. Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea quae requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes’. *ST* I, q. 91, a. 3, response; *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 5, p. 393 (my emphasis).

323 ‘nobilioris corporis sit nobilior forma... nobilissima forma... est anima intellectiva’. *SCG* II, 90, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 13, p. 549.

324 ‘Nam homo habet superius sui, id est caput, versus superius mundi, et inferius sui versus inferius mundi: et ideo est optime dispositus secundum dispositionem totius. Plantae vero habent superius sui
humans, as upright, have hands. So they might not have a fixed form of defence against predators like other animals, but instead they have the practical creative freedom that befits an intellect capable of conceiving an infinite number of ideas. In virtue of their erect stance, humans do not have to take food straight into their mouths from the ground, as other animals do. So the human tongue and human lips are softer than those of other animals, permitting the speech proper to a rational animal. The fact that the human stands with his or her face erect is also fitting: the sense organs are principally located in the face, and, in contrast to other animals (whose faces are turned to the ground), humans enjoy the beauty of their natural surroundings for its own sake, and were given senses for the purpose of uncovering intelligible truths about earth and the heavens.

At De partibus animalium IV.10, Aristotle had claimed that humans' upright stature permitted their senses to operate more freely than those of other animals. Aquinas himself restricts the application of this idea to what he takes to be the four interior sense powers (the common sense, imagination, memory, and estimative power) which, drawing upon Avicenna's advances on Aristotle's work, he takes to be the powers that process the raw data gained from the five external senses. Aquinas thinks that these interior senses are located in the brain, and, in humans, the

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325 'cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum... homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis... Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi', 'si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret'. ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 2 and ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 394.

326 'si homo haberet pronam staturam... ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis'. ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 394.

327 'sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad cognoscendum... solus homo delectetur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigint in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram... homo vero haberet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et praecipue per visum, qui est subtilior et plures differentias rerum ostendit, libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat veritatem'. ibid.
elevation of the brain above the rest of the body, and the relatively large size of the brain, enable these powers to operate more freely, as befits a rational animal.328

Aquinas sees the fulness of the human body's nobility and perfection in the sheer diversity of its parts and the diversity of dispositions found in these parts. Due to its perfection, Aquinas writes, the rational soul is manifold in its power, performing more varied operations than any other kind of animal soul, and therefore it requires an organic body with a greater variety of parts than any other kind of animal body, with each part disposed in a different way to perform the operation proper to it.329 The more perfect the living body, Aquinas explains in his Quaestiones disputatae de anima (1265-66), a. 10, the greater the diversity of parts it has.330 Hence, in a manner of speaking, humans are perfected by the parts proper and intrinsic to them.331

At Summa Theologiae I q. 91 a. 3, and in every one of his other major discussions of human bodily perfection, Aquinas highlights the distinctive composition of human flesh. Amongst the animal bodies, human bodies have the most temperate complexion (temperatissima complexio) or a perfectly equable one (perfecta complexionis aequalitas)332 in proportion, of course, to the rational soul as the most noble (nobilissima)

328 'Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum... ut liberius in eo perferrentur operationes interiorum virium sensivatarum, quae sunt necessariae ad intellectus operationem', 'ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes habeant, dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perfi ciuntur, non est depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis elevatum'. ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 1 and ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, pp. 393-4. The major modern study on the interior senses in scholastic theology is now J. Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses. Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013). This was accessed during research for the present chapter as an unpublished PhD thesis, under the title Animal Consciousness. Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2009), wherein there is an exposition on Avicenna's contribution to the theory of the interior sense powers pp. 178-81.

329 'Et hoc competit animae intellectivae, quae quamvis sit una secundum essentiam, tamen propter sui perfectionem est multiplex in virtute; et ideo, ad diversas operationes, indiget diversus dispositionibus in partibus corporis cui unitur. Et propter hoc videmus quod maior est diversitas partium in animalibus perfectis quam in imperfectis, et in his quam in plantis'. ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 228.

330 'Et quanto corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter maiorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri maiore diversitatim in partibus'. QDAI, q. 9, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, p. 82.

331 'homo perfectitur per proprias partes'. ST I, q. 70, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 117.

332 In Sent. II, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 167; ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 393.
kind of animal form. There is a most perfect or harmonious combination of elements (perfectissimum commixtionis modum), in human skin, the organ of touch. This means that the complexion of the organ is a perfect medium between the contraries that it perceives. Although certain of the other external senses are much weaker in humans than on other animals, such as the sense of smell, still, of the five external sense powers, it is the sensitivity of touch alone that correlates with intelligence in animals. Aquinas's basic authority for this idea is, of course, Aristotle's De anima II.9. So Aquinas tacitly dissolves the tension (noted in chapter 1) between De anima II.9 and De partibus animalium IV.10, by taking the former text to be a discussion of the external sense powers, and the latter to the interior sense powers. Being remote from unstable contrary qualities, Aquinas concludes, the human body resembles a celestial body and therefore has a particular dignity.

3. Human Generation and the Shaping of Individuals

As for Aristotle, so for Aquinas, the best way to approach his account of the individual body is through his account of its generation. Unlike Aristotle's, however, Aquinas's direct discussions of human generation are almost entirely confined to the level of the species. In any case, Aquinas's understanding of the construction of the human body in utero follows Aristotle's closely, and, as with the Stagirite's work, an appreciation of the general framework is a prerequisite for understanding how generation plays out in individual cases. As we will see, the human body, for Aquinas, is constructed independently in utero by the agent power in paternal semen.
which (following his teacher Albertus Magnus\textsuperscript{338}), Aquinas refers to as the 'formative power' (\textit{virtus formativa}). The \textit{virtus formativa} acts upon the matter provided by the mother\textsuperscript{339} and, once the body has reached a state of soul-readiness, God creates the soul in it.

By way of an understanding of the precise work that the \textit{virtus formativa} does, as we will see, it is possible to fully grasp what Aquinas means when he says that the numerical diversity, or individuality among human souls follows the varying dispositions of the bodies in which they are created. And it is necessary to try to uncover what is going on on a purely \textit{material} level in Aquinas's general account of human generation, in order to understand what he means when he says that each soul is created in its individual body according to the 'capacity' of its particular matter.

Reading closely Aquinas's work on human generation, we learn much more about the unique and permanent \textit{commensuratio}, or proportioning, that each soul receives in relation to its \textit{particular} matter at the moment of its creation. It is in virtue of this unique \textit{commensuratio} that it bears towards its own, \textit{particular} material complement, of course, that each soul can be reunited \textit{only} with the matter particular to its own body at the general resurrection.

3.1. Material Developments in Human Generation

For Aquinas, given that he holds that there can by definition only ever be one substantial form in any composite, there can be no \textit{formal} continuity across the entire process of a human foetus's development. Even so, like Aristotle's, Aquinas's work on human generation and the union of body and soul focuses on the various \textit{forms} gained


\textsuperscript{339} 'dicendum quod in generatione hominis mater ministrat materiam corporis informem, formatur autem per virtutem formativam quae est in semine patris'. \textit{ST} II-IIae, q. 26, a. 10, ad 1, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 8 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1895), p. 220 (the context is a discussion of whether a child should love their mother more than their father); 'in naturali generatione animalium, principium actum est virtus formativa quae est in semine, in iis quae ex semine generantur'. \textit{ST} I, q. 71, a. 1, ad 1, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 5, p. 182.
and lost, rather than on the material principle as the continuant of change. Since substantial change is instantaneous, of course, there is never a moment at which matter is without a substantial form. So it takes some careful excavatory work in order to attempt to reveal what is going on, just as far as matter is concerned, in Aquinas's account of human generation.

Aquinas thinks that, on its path to a state of soul-readiness, the embryo acquires and loses a series of intermediate substantial forms, each more perfect than the last. None of these intermediate substantial forms places the embryo in a 'complete' species; they are generated purely because they are the means by which the goal of the process, the acquisition of the rational soul, is reached. Prior to the acquisition of the rational soul, then, the embryo is human only potentially; it becomes human the moment the soul is created in it by God. Since no substantial form endures across this process, neither does any accidental form. Aquinas subscribes to the Aristotelian principle of the priority of substance to its accidents in his work on the union between body and soul: at each stage of the process of the development of the embryo, the human body's accidental forms depend for their existence on the substance, matter and substantial form, in which they inhere.

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340 'materia nunquam denudatur ab omni forma, propter hoc quandocumque recipit unam formam, perdit aliam, et e converso'. DSC, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, pp. 43-4.

341 'dicendum est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus alius, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris: ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius. Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus'. ST I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 567. Cf. DSC, a. 3, ad 13.

342 'Nec est inconveniens si aliquid intermedium generatur et statim postmodum interrumpitur: quia intermedia non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut in via ad speciem; et ideo non generantur ut permaneant, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum perveniatur'. SCG II, 89, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 542.

343 'Corpus igitur humanum, secundum quod est in potentia ad animam, utpote cum nondum habet animam, est prius tempore quam anima: tunc autem non est humanum actum, sed potentia tantum. Cum vero est humanum actum, quasi per animam humanam perfectum, non est prius neque posterius anima, sed simul cum ea'. SCG II, 89, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 543.

344 'Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter... Unde impossibile est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praexistant in materia ante formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam'. ST I, q. 76, a. 6, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 229.
Yet, while substantial change is instantaneous, accidental alteration is a gradual 'movement'. During the periods of time that separate the moments of acquisition (and loss) of intermediate substantial forms, the virtus formativa 'disposes' the developing body for the acquisition of the next substantial form in the sequence, by setting in motion various accidental alterations. In the very instant in which the body is suitably disposed for the next substantial form in the sequence, it acquires, or better, has already acquired, that next substantial form. The virtus formativa has induced in the body the dispositions that befit that substantial form, and the previous accidental dispositions have corrupted, along with the previous substantial form.

So the newly generated human being is composed of a divinely created immortal soul, and a material part disposed for the soul by the accidental forms introduced by the virtus formativa. As Aquinas puts it, in the generation of a human, the natural agent, or virtus formativa, 'terminates at matter', or extends itself only to configuring and disposing the body, while and the divine agent 'terminates at form', or makes the rational soul.

So what, if anything, does Aquinas have to say about the development of the material principle in its own right? The first thing to establish is that Aquinas does explicitly confirm that matter is the continuant of these substantial and accidental formal changes. But it is not the case that a certain thing can come from just any

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345 'Cum enim forma substantialis non continue vel successive in actum producatur, sed in instanti (alias oportet esse motum in genere substantiae, sicut est in genere qualitatis). QDP, q. 3, a. 9, ad 9, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 205. Cf. ST I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2.

346 'in generatione aliorum hominum... successive corpus formatur et disponitur ad animam, unde primo, tanquam imperfecte dispositum, recipit animam imperfectam; et postmodum, quando perfecte est dispositum, recipit animam perfectam'. ST III, q. 33, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 11, p. 342. (Aquinas is explaining how the in utero development of other human embryos differs from Christ’s incarnation). On the work of the virtus formativa as 'dispositive': 'Sic enim homo sibi simile in specie generat, inquantum virtus seminis eius dispositive operatur ad ultimam formam, ex qua homo speciem sortitur'. SCG II, 89, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 542.

347 ' duo agentia omnino disparata non possunt hoc modo se habere quod actio unius terminetur ad materiam, et alterius ad forma; hoc tamen contingit in duobus agentibus ordinatis, quorum unum est instrumentum alterius... Natura autem est sicut instrumentum quoddam divinae virtutis ut supra, ostensum est. Unde non est inconveniens, si virtus divina sola faciat animam rationalem, actione naturae se extendente solum ad disponentium corpus'. QDP, q. 3, a. 9, ad 21, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 205. Cf. SCG II, 89, ST I, q. 118, a. 1, ad 3.

348 Aquinas explains that this was Aristotle's solution to the ancient problem of defining generation simpliciter without maintaining that something can come from nothing: 'cum enim generatio sit transmutatio de non esse in esse, id simpliciter generatur quod fit ens simpliciter loquendo, de non ente simpliciter... propter hoc omnes antiqui, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquid actu, ut
matter: following Aristotle, Aquinas thinks that certain matter is necessary in order that a certain substantial form can be acquired in generation. The material substratum of human generation develops from a state in which it is what in one discussion of the incarnation Aquinas calls 'fitting', 'determinate' matter, provided by the mother, into, of course, human proper matter, or the appropriate material subject for a rational soul.

Nowhere, indeed, does Aquinas suggest that a featureless prime matter, alone, is the continuant of a complex case of substantial change such as human generation. He explicitly rejects this idea in his commentary on Aristotle's discussion of proper matter at *Metaphysica* VIII.4-5. If prime matter, which is common to all things, were enough to serve as the material cause in any case of generation, then the diversity that we see in things would be entirely due to their efficient, or agent causes, and in no way due to the matter out of which they are made. But, as Aristotle himself said, nobody could make a saw from wood: of necessity, Aquinas maintains, different things have diverse, 'proper matters'.

There are certain passages in Aquinas's work on substantial change in which he does shift his focus towards the development of material principle itself, even if he maintains that matter can only be grasped in relation to the forms that it takes on. Passages in which this shift of focus occurs help to cut through the ambiguity Aquinas introduces into his metaphysical account of the body by habitually using certain shorthand labels for proper matter, such as 'flesh and bone', which point to matter insofar as it is invested with accidental forms.

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350 'Quia vero, licet materia prima sit communis omnibus, tamen materiae proprie sunt diversae diversorum: ideo ne aliquis totam diversiatem rerum attribueret moventi, et nullo modo materiali principio, subiungit quod in quibusdam diversorum ex necessitate est diversa materia, propria scilicet. Non enim quodlibet natum est fieri ex qualibet materia; sicut serra non fit ex ligno'. *In Met. VIII*, lect. 4, n. 1735; (ed.) Cathala, p. 503.
In his commentary on *Metaphysica* VIII.5, continuing the same discussion of proper matter, Aquinas analyses head-on the role of material principle in limiting the changes that can take place in nature. 'Whenever matter', he writes, 'is related to different forms in a certain order, it cannot be brought back from a subsequent state to the state which preceded it in that order'. To reach that preceding state again, matter first has to be resolved back to the very least complex level, or to the level of prime matter. Hence, Aquinas continues, in preparation for animal generation semen is generated in the body from blood, and blood from food, but this order of successive generations could not be reversed: everything has a 'determinate mode of generation', limited and constrained by the sequence in which the material principle can undergo development.351

In chapter 1, Averroes' general account of complex cases of generation was set out. Aquinas would of course have read it. According to the Commentator, matter has several potencies or *habilitates* which are ordered to one another such that, in natural generation, the *proper potency* appropriate for the ultimate form to be acquired develops in a determinate sequence, with the development of this complex potency mediated by the intermediary forms acquired and lost.352

Writing on the union between body and soul, and the proportionate relationship between the two, Aquinas himself treats interchangeably the ideas that 'a proper act comes into being in its proper matter', on the one hand, and 'a proper act comes to be in its proper potency', on the other.353 So does he think, along lines similar to the 351 'quandocumque materia se habet ad diversa secundum ordinem, non potest ex posteriori rediri in id quod praecedet secundum ordinem. Sicut in generatione animalis ex cibo fit sanguis, et ex sanguine semen et menstruum, et quibus generatur animal. Non potest autem mutari ordo, scilicet ut ex semine fiat sanguis, aut ex sanguine cibus, nisi per resolutionem ad primam materiam, ex eo quod cuiuslibet rei est determinatus modus generationis'. *In Met.* VIII, lect. 4, n. 1753 (ed.) Cathala, p. 506.

352 See above, p. 55 and n. 125.

Commentator, that the material principle has a scale of potency within it, according
to which the sequence of forms that can be acquired in it is determined and limited?
It is true that Aquinas never directly refers to this passage in Averroes' commentary
on the *Metaphysica* in his work on human generation. But then, Aquinas *does* explicitly
hold that matter is in potency to a range of forms of varying complexity; that, when
in composition with those forms, it bears a proportionate relationship to them; and
finally that, when matter is the proportionate subject of one form it is not is a further
state of potency to any other form indiscriminately, but only to a certain other kind
of form.

And there are several places in Aquinas's work on generation and on the union of
body and soul in humans that indicate that these are indeed the lines along which
Aquinas would describe purely material developments in human generation. In his
*Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 9, in an echo of his *Metaphysica* commentary, Aquinas
writes that matter is in potency to forms only in a certain order: whatever is proper to
a superior form can only be received in matter through the mediation of that which is
proper to an inferior form.\(^{354}\)

Additionally, Aquinas discusses 'grades' or 'modes' according to which form
perfects matter. At *Summa Theologiae* I q. 76 a. 6, he writes that the same rational soul
perfects matter according to 'diverse grades of perfection'.\(^{355}\) In his *De spiritualibus
creatoris* (1267-68), a. 4, analysing the concept of proper matter in a response to an
objection that suggests that, in order to sustain a concrete notion of proper matter,
there must be some corporeal substantial form intervening between the soul and
matter, Aquinas maintains that insofar as matter (itself) is already perfected in the
'mode of perfection' according to which an inferior form was perfected it, it is *propria
materia* for those perfections that a superior form adds to it.\(^{356}\)

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\(^{354}\) *materia secundum ordinem est in potentia ad formas; non quod recipiat diversas formas
substantiales ordinatim, sed quia id quod est proprium superioris formae non recipitur nisi mediante
eo quod est proprium inferioris formae*. *QDA*, q. 9, ad 9, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 24, 1, pp. 84-5.

\(^{355}\) *forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem
existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus... materia praeintelligitur perfecta
secundum esse ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis*. *ST* I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 1, *Opera omnia iussu
Leonis XIII*, 5, p. 229.

\(^{356}\) *cum forma perfectissima det omnia quae dant formae imperfectiores, et adhuc amplius; materia,
prout ab ea perficitur eo modo perfectionis quo perficitur a formis imperfectioribus, consideratur ut
Further, in his Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 9, Aquinas discusses the role of accidental dispositions induced in matter by the virtus formativa in the development of these grades of perfection. He explains that the accidental dispositions which dispose matter for a substantial form, or which make matter the propria materia for that form, are not media intervening between matter and that very form in an absolute way. Analytically speaking, however, they are media between matter itself, considered insofar as it had already been perfected by a perfection of an inferior grade, that is, before it became the subject of the new form, and the (already) acquired form insofar as it brings matter into act at a higher grade of perfection. So accidental dispositions themselves are, in a qualified sense, media between substantial form and matter, because a substantial form cannot be acquired unless in matter that is already suitably disposed. Again, it is worth repeating, a new substantial form is acquired in the very same instant that the dispositions which make matter the proper matter for that form are induced in matter by the virtus formativa. The induced dispositions are neither temporally nor ontologically prior, in matter, to the new substantial form.

In further passages from De spiritualibus creaturis that discuss the union between body and soul, Aquinas presents matter, or 'the body', as having a certain 'capacity' or internal 'proportion' (or scale) to it. This capacity or proportion is, so to speak, filled up or exhausted by a rational soul, whose existence is certainly grounded in the body, but which, in virtue of the fact that its intellectual operations do not occur in any bodily organ, is not confined to matter but surpasses or exceeds it (supergreditur, excedit, superexcedit). The image of the soul grounded in matter, but overreaching

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357 The stage of development with which Aquinas is concerned here is the infusion of the rational soul, hence the more perfect form in question brings matter into act not just according to a higher grade of perfection but according to the 'ultimate perfection': 'dispositiones accidentales quae faciunt materiam proprium ad aliquam formam, non sunt medie totaliter inter formam et materiam; sed inter formam secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem, et materiam secundum quod iam est perfecta perfectione inferioris gradus'. QDA, q. 9 ad 5, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, p. 83.

358 'Perfectissima autem formarum, id est anima humana, quae est finis omnium formarum naturalium, habet operationem omnino excedentem materiam, quae non fit per organum corporale, scilicet intelligere... oportet quod esse animae humanae superexcedat materiam corporalem, et non sit totaliter comprehensum ab ipsa, sed tamen aliquo modo attingatur ab ea, in quantum igitur supergreditur esse materiae corporalis, potens per se subsistere et operari, anima humana est substantia spiritualis...', 'dicendum quod intelligere est operatio animae humanae secundum quod superexcedit proportionem materiae corporalis', 'anima... superexcedit corporis proportionem', 'virtus animae capacitatem corporis excedit'. DSC, a. 2, response, ad 2 and ad 4, and a. 4, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, pp. 29-30, 53.
matter in its perfection and power, appears again at *Summa Theologiae* I q. 76 a. 1, also on the union between body and soul. There, Aquinas writes that the more noble a form is, the more it dominates corporeal matter, the less it is 'immersed' (*immergitur*) in matter, and the more its power or operation 'exceeds' matter. The human form, he again explains, is the highest and noblest kind of form designed to be immersed in matter, and a power that overreaches matter *entirely*: the intellect.\(^{359}\)

It should be assumed *prima facie* that there is no contradiction between the idea that the human soul comes into being in its *proper* potency, on the one hand, and another pillar of Aquinas's thought on the union of matter and form, namely that 'a substantial form does not arrive at a subject already existing in act, but one which exists in potency alone, that is, *prime* matter'.\(^{360}\) The soul is united immediately and intimately to its entire material subject, right down to the level of prime matter (analytically speaking, not in a temporal sequence), which, featureless in itself, is logically presupposed by any further degree of perfection. The soul perfects its matter according to various degrees of perfection (again analytically speaking, and not in a temporal sequence): being, living, sensing and understanding\(^{361}\) (in this last respect in fact overreaching matter entirely).

### 3.2. The Individual Body

With this general framework for understanding the body's development, independent from the soul, in place, we reach Aquinas's account of the generation of the individual body. Discussing, at *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia* (1265-66), q. 3, a. 9, whether the rational soul is transmitted to the body in paternal semen or whether it is

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created in the body by God, Aquinas briefly and suggestively notes that the 'disposition of the soul follows the disposition of the body' in human generation. In each individual case, the parents are directly responsible only for the disposition of the body, but God creates the soul in proportion to the individual body, which explains why children resemble their parents in features that pertain to their souls, as well as in their physical characteristics.362

Aquinas thinks that inequality amongst humans is natural. It would have obtained even in the state of innocence due to environmental factors, if not with respect to any deficiency in body or soul.363 He closely follows Aristotle's De generatione animalium IV in explaining post-lapsarian intra-specific differences among humans, and the origins of those differences in the material conditions of their generation, but, in order to get full confirmation of this picture, we have to look beyond Aquinas's writings directly in the area of human generation and the union between body and soul.

At Summa Theologiae III, q. 74, a. 3 (1271-73), Aquinas asks whether the sacramental bread must be made of wheat, or whether it can instead be made of another grain that simply looks like wheat. It is here that Aquinas makes it explicit that, in generation, the work of the virtus formativa accounts for the fact that a father generates offspring like himself in species, but that, beyond this, both the matter upon which it works and the strength of the virtus formativa itself are limiting factors with respect to the inheritance of characteristics in particular cases.364

Illustrating contingency in nature in the context of various discussions of divine will and predestination, Aquinas notes that a strong virtus formativa will result in the

362 'quod ipsam dispositionem corporis sequitur dispositio animae rationalis... Et ex hoc est quod filii similantur parentibus etiam in quae pertinent ad animam'. QDP, q. 3, a. 9, ad 7, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 205.

363 ST I, q. 96, a. 3, response. For further comment see Sweeney, 'Individuation and the Body in Aquinas', p. 186.

364 'generans generat sibi simile in specie, fit tamen aliquando aliqua dissimilitudo generantis ad genitum quantum ad accidentia, vel propter materiam, vel propter debilitatem virtutis generativae'. ST III, q. 74, a. 3 ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 147. (The virtus generativa is the power of the father's soul which is responsible for producing the virtus formativa). On the mother's contribution, 'bona dispositio matricis operatur ad bonam dispositionem prolis'. In Sent. III, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 271.
generation of a son who is physically very similar to his father. The weaker the *virtus formativa*, the weaker the resemblance will be.\(^{365}\) The goal of the *virtus formativa* is of course the perfect fitting-together (*consummatio*) of the body's members;\(^{366}\) characteristics such as corporeal agility can be inherited if the *formativa* is strong, we learn in a discussion of original sin,\(^{367}\) but if there are defects either in the material provided by the mother or in the *virtus formativa*, then epilepsy can result, and leprosy and gout can be inherited\(^{368}\) and in extreme cases 'monstrous offspring' can be generated.\(^{369}\)

At *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85 a. 7, discussing whether one human can understand the same thing better than another soul can, Aquinas discusses the individuality of both body and soul. He explains that any form, in this case any human soul, is received in matter according to the unique *capacity* of the available matter in a particular situation (*secundum materiae capacitatem*).\(^{370}\) In the same article, and more frequently elsewhere, Aquinas explains the origins of intra-specific diversity, or *numerical* diversity, among human souls simply in terms of differing accidental

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\(^{365}\) 'Oportet enim patiens assimilari agenti: et si agens sit fortissimum, erit similitudo effectus ad causam agentem perfecta; si autem agens sit debile, erit similitudo imperfecta; sicut propter fortitudinem viri virtutis formativae in semine, filius assimilatur patri non solum in natura speciei, sed in multis aliiis accidentibus; e contrario vero, propter debilitatem praedictae virtutis, annihilatur praedicta assimilatio, ut dicitur in Lib. de animalibus'. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (hereafter *QDV*), q. 23, a. 5, response, *Opera omnia* (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 3, p. 139.

\(^{366}\) *videmus in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quorum virtutes quandoque deficiunt a propriis effectibus, ad quos sunt ordinatae sicut ad propios fines, sicut virtus formativa quandoque deficit a perfecta consummatione membrorum...*. *QDV*, q. 6, a. 3, response, *Opera Omnia* (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 38.

\(^{367}\) 'si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia individualia propagantur in filios, pertinientia ad dispositionem naturae, sicut velocitas corporis'. *ST I-IIae, q. 81, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 7, p. 89.

\(^{368}\) 'corporis defectus traducuntur a parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis'. *ST I-IIae, q. 81, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 7, pp. 87-8. See *ST III*, q. 14, a. 4, response, on the inheritance of epilepsy.

\(^{369}\) 'sciendum est, quod in qualibet actione est aliquid considerandum ex parte agentis, et aliquid ex parte recipiens... in operatione naturae... ex parte virtutis formativae, quae est in semine, est quod animal perfectum producatur, sed ex parte materiae recipiens... quandoque est indisposita, contingit quandoque quod non producitur perfectum animal, sicut contingit in partubus monstruosis'. *QDV*, q. 23, a. 2, response, *Opera Omnia* (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 136.

\(^{370}\) See n. 372 below.
dispositions extant in the matter available in particular cases of generation, rather than referring directly to the capacity of the underlying matter itself.\textsuperscript{371}

And so one human’s intellect can have a greater power of understanding than that of another, Aquinas thinks, just as one human's power of sight can be more acute than that of another: the better the disposition of the body, the more intelligent the soul created in it will be. Taking his lead from Aristotle’s \textit{De anima} II.9, on the correlation of the acuity of touch and intelligence, Aquinas notes that a particular intellect's ability to understand is limited according to the complexion of the body of which it is the form.\textsuperscript{373}

Treating the individuality of body and soul together in a discussion of original sin, Aquinas reveals that defects of soul can be inherited in virtue of the inheritance of what he calls bodily 'indisposition': he observes that 'the stupid are sometimes generated by the stupid'.\textsuperscript{374} He also supposes that some humans are more prone to sinful acts than others, and that this disposition has a hereditary aspect to it. The privation of original justice at the Fall does not admit of degrees and so affects all humans equally. Nonetheless, Aquinas thinks that, due to inherited bodily dispositions, the powers of the soul in virtue of which humans are inclined to sinful

\textsuperscript{371} 'differentia formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositione materiae, non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum secundum numerum; sunt enim diversorum individuorum diversae formae, secundum materiam diversificatae'. \textit{ST} I, q. 85, a. 7, ad 3, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 5, p. 344.

\textsuperscript{372} 'Et sic unus alio potest eandem rem melius intelligere, quia est melioris virtutis in intelligendo; sicut melius videt visione corporali rem aliquam qui est perfectioris virtutis, et in quo virtus visiva est perfectior'. \textit{ST} I, q. 85, a. 7, response, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 5, p. 344.

\textsuperscript{373} 'Manifestum est enim quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto meliorem sortitum animam, quod manifeste apparet in his quae sunt secundum speciem diversa. Cuius ratio est, quia actus et forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae capacitate. Unde cum etiam in hominibus quidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam maioris virtutis in intelligendo, unde dicitur in II de anima quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus'. ibid.

\textsuperscript{374} 'Cum autem corpus sit proportionatum animae... dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex consequenti, propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex fatis fatui generantur'. \textit{ST} I-IIae, q. 81, a. 1, response, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 7 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1892), p. 88.
acts (the irascible and concupiscible powers), are stronger in some individuals than in others.\footnote{375}

Aquinas discusses at least one other particular power of the soul that is limited according to the state of the matter available at the moment of human generation. A discussion of Christ’s incarnation at *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 33, a. 2 leads him to reveal that there must be an absolute minimum bulk of material comprising the human embryo for the creation of the rational soul in it to be possible, but beyond this there will be variation in the size of the embryo in individual cases. The maximum size to which a human body will eventually grow in adult life is proportionate to the size it was when its soul was created in it (or, as Aquinas has it here, 'infused' into it).\footnote{376} Hence from the outset of human life there is an intrinsic limit set on each soul’s augmentative power determined by the most basic material condition: the initial size of the individual body in which it is created.

We now have in hand a much fuller understanding of Aquinas's concept of the individual soul, or of the formal aspect of the 'truth of human nature' in an individual. Each human soul is intrinsically different because its individual nature is permanently limited according to the capacity and disposition of the matter to which it is joined, in the most intimate of unions, at the moment of its creation. The outward sign of this inner natural diversity among human souls is that the same kind of power of the soul in any two humans operates differently.

The individual body that is constructed by the natural agent of generation, on the other hand, consists of matter admitting of a unique capacity or complex potency, which has been developed sequentially by means of a series of formal changes taking

\footnote{375} 'sulito vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, unaquaeque vis animae tendit in suum proprium motum; et tanto vehementius, quanto fuerit fortior. Contingit autem vires aliquas animae esse fortiores in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis complexiones. Quod ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est ratione peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aequaliter solvatur vinculum originalis iustitiae, et aequaliter in omnibus partes inferiores animae sibi relinquuntur, sed accidit hoc ex diversa dispositione potentiarum, sicut dictum est'. *ST I*–*IIae*, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 7, p. 99 (my emphasis). Cf. also *In Sent. II*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, response and ad 2.

\footnote{376} 'anima requirit debitam quantitatem in materia cui infunditur, sed ista quantitas quandam latitudinem habet, quia et in maiori et minori quantitate salvatur. Quantitas autem corporis quam habet cum primo sibi infunditur anima, proportionatur quantitati perfectae ad quam per augmentum perveniet, ita scilicet quod maiorum hominum maiorem quantitatem corpora habent in prima animatione'. *ST III*, q. 33, a. 2, ad 2, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 11, p. 342.
place in the womb prior to the soul's creation. This matter is informed by a particular set of inherited accidental dispositions, which take the accidental form in the body that accounts for its basic physical structure, the dimensive quantity particular to that body, as their proximate subject.

There is slightly more to say, however, about the material aspect of the 'truth of human nature' in each human individual. Aquinas has a more technical explanation for how the matter particular to an individual body, the 'individual signate matter' to which he refers at *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 119, a. 1, and which he there says *individuates* the substantial form in each human, gets to be individual matter, or *this* matter, distinct from any other matter.

4. Individual Matter

It is in Aquinas's various discussions of the principle of individuation in material things that his concept of individual matter is most clearly brought into view. When scholastic theologians enquired about the principle of individuation the basic question they were asking was, what is the metaphysical constituent or principle of a thing that accounts for its individuality?377

There are two major discussions of the principle of individuation in Aquinas's writings. Early in his career, in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*, part 2, q. 4, a. 2 (1257-58), Aquinas asks whether the cause of the plurality of individual things ('numerical plurality', or *pluralitas secundum numerum*) is variation in their accidental forms. At the end of his career, at *Summa Theologiae* III q. 77 a. 2 (1271-73), Aquinas discusses individuation at length again, this time in the context of a discussion of transubstantiation, responding to the question of whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents in material things (and concluding that it is their proximate subject). In both places, Aquinas states that matter is the principle of individuation. More precisely, matter is the principle of individuation insofar as matter is subject to quantitative structure. As we will see, matter insofar as it is subject to quantitative structure, is precisely what Aquinas means by 'individual matter'.

So Aquinas's discussions of individuation provide one more occasion for him to explain how the body's quantitative structure guarantees its relative independence from the soul. It is not the individual soul that makes the matter belonging to its body this individual matter, demarcating it and distinguishing it from other matter; it is rather the accidental corporeal form particular to that body. Before proceeding to explain how the individual body's quantitative structure is responsible for making its matter individual, there are a few general points to clarify regarding Aquinas's account of individuation.

In both major discussions of individuation, Aquinas defines the individual (individuum) as what is undivided in itself, and divided from everything else. In Aquinas's view, however, the core difficulty in the task of determining the principle of individuation is in explaining the latter characteristic of the individual. As he puts it in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, 'the principle of individuation is the principle of numerical diversity'. Numerical diversity obtains on the level below the species; the numerical distinction is that drawn between two individuals of the same species, and therefore also between an individual of one species and an individual of any other species.

In passages beyond these two major direct analyses of the concept of the individual and the principle of individuation, Aquinas refers to the principle of individuation in terms that presuppose an understanding of individuality as intra-specific difference, and therefore an understanding of individuation as intra-specific diversification. This is the case notwithstanding either the fact that there is another crucial characteristic of the individual as Aquinas has defined it (that it is undivided in itself) or the fact that the principle of individuation, as the principle of numerical diversity, will explain the basis of an individual's differences not only from others of its species, but also from any other thing belonging to any other species. Given, in addition, Aquinas's view that material conditions are the root of the differences that

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378 'de ratione individui est quod sit in se indivisum et ab aliis ultima divisione divisum'. In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125, and cf. the passage from ST III, q. 77, a. 2, response, quoted below, n. 405.

379 (My emphasis). 'Sed illud, quod est principium individuationis, est principium diversitatis secundum numerum'. In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, sc. 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 122.

380 Gracia, 'Introduction: The Problem of Individuation', pp. 4-5.
distinguish one member of a species from the next, it is little surprise that in these passages he identifies matter as the principle of individuation. He has no standard terminology for doing so, however.\footnote{For a more extended discussion of Aquinas' \textit{principium individuationis} in material things as it appears across his works, see Wippel, \textit{The Metaphysical Thought of Thomae Aquinas}, pp. 351-75.}

In passages in which he discusses forms' reception in matter, for example, Aquinas can be found to refer to the principle of individuation simply as matter,\footnote{\textit{ST} I, q. 3, a. 2, arg. 3 and ad 3.} as the disposition of matter,\footnote{\textit{In Sent} II, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.} as 'from matter',\footnote{\textit{QDP}, q. 9, a. 3, ad 5.} or (in a discussion, precisely, of intra-specific diversity) as the 'diversity of matter'.\footnote{This Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle's \textit{Metaphysica} VII.8, 1033b29-1038a8 (discussed in Chapter 1) where it is stated that Socrates and Callias are alike in form, but differ according to their matter (this flesh and these bones): 'Omnis autem species, quae est in materia, scilicet in his carnis et in his ossibus, est aliquod singularum, ut Callias et Socrates. Et ista etiam species caussas similitudinem speciei in generando est diversa a specie generati secundum numerum propter diversam materiam. Cuius diversitas est principium diversitatis individuorum in eadem specie. Diversa namque est materia, in qua est forma hominis generantis et hominis generati. Sed utraque forma est idem secundum speciem'. In \textit{Met. VII}, lect. 7, n. 1435 (ed.) Cathala, p. 421.} Where the context is the question of how the universal human essence is present in individuals, Aquinas's terminology varies again. In \textit{De ente et essentia}, c. 2 (1252-6), the principle of individuation in Socrates is identified with 'signate' or 'designated' matter (\textit{signata}, \textit{designata}), which, Aquinas writes, is matter considered as it is subject to 'determinate dimensions', or a particular quantitative structure. 'Signate' matter is also equated, in this passage, with \textit{this} flesh and \textit{this} bone.\footnote{\textquoteleft Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur... hoc os et haec caro...'. Thomas Aquinas, \textit{De ente et essentia} (hereafter \textit{DEE}), c.2, \textit{Opera omnia} iussu Leonis XIII, 43 (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), p. 371.} Making a similar point about the relationship between universality and individuality in things at \textit{Summa Theologiae} I, q. 75, a. 4, Aquinas cites 'signate' matter, simply, as the principle of individuation.\footnote{\textit{ST} I, q. 75, a. 4, response.} And we already know that, in his discussion of the 'truth of human nature' at \textit{Summa Theologiae} I, q. 119, a.1, Aquinas identifies 'individual signate matter' as that which individuates...
In his commentary on Aristotle’s extended discussion on the presence of essences in things at *Metaphysica* VII, furthermore, Aquinas points to the principle of individuation in material things variously as 'individual matter', this individual matter... *this* flesh, and *these* bones and 'designated matter' (in this last case directly attributing this position on individuation to Aristotle himself). Finally, in passages where he discusses the mind's abstraction of universal essences from concrete individuals, Aquinas refers to the principle of individuation as 'matter', 'material and material conditions' (which he refers to as 'principles' of individuation), and 'material and individuating conditions'. Discussing the same topic, in his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (*Metaphysica* VII, lect. 11, n. 1535), in the very same article Aquinas characterises the principle of individuation both as 'matter and all material conditions' and as 'signate' matter 'considered with a determination of dimensions, *these* for example, or *those*'. Again discussing the way in which the mind abstracts universals from individuals in his commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima* (1267-68) Aquinas says that individuation in material things is 'from corporeal matter, contained under 'determinate dimensions'.
And yet, notwithstanding the differing terminology with which it is expressed, the basic thinking behind all of these statements is the same. It is matter, and matter either simply as 'signate', or subject to quantitative structure, or further, matter as it is subject to other accidental forms or dispositions in addition to quantitative (in the case where Aquinas equates 'signate matter', further, with this flesh, and these bones, for example), which is the principle of individuation, or rather, in all these passages, first and foremost the principle of *intra-specific diversity* in material things. In his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, Aquinas draws an important distinction between the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the problem of finding the basis for individuality in material things. While other accidents allow us to identify individuals, he notes, quantitative structure is the only accident really involved in individuation.\(^{398}\) The final thing to highlight, before moving on to explain exactly why this should be so, is that the terminology that Aquinas uses to refer to quantitative structure involved in individuation differs between his two major discussions of individuation.

In his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, Aquinas refers to the structure involved in individuation using the label 'indeterminate dimensions' (*dimensiones interminatae* or *indeterminatae* interchangeably\(^{399}\)). This vocabulary is drawn from Averroes' work but, crucially, Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions' in this discussion is very different from the Commentator's.

Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions' is *not*, as it was for Averroes, 'unqualified' or 'absolute' body: a three-dimensional, accidental structure with which all of prime matter is invested.\(^{400}\) For Aquinas, in contrast, it is, rather, an *individual* accidental form belonging to a particular bodily substance. More precisely, for Aquinas, the label 'indeterminate dimensions' refers to a body's particular quantitative structure considered from a certain *perspective*, namely, considered as

\(^{398}\) *Alia vero accidentia non sunt principium individuationis, sed sunt principium cognoscendi distinctionem individuum*. In *BDT*, q. 4, a. 2, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 50, p. 125. For more on the distinction between the ontological and the epistemic approach to the problem of individuation see Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation*, pp. 48-50.

\(^{399}\) Cf. the following statement *materia... est principium diversitatis secundum numerum, prout subest dimensionibus interminatis*. In *BDT*, q. 4, a. 2, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 50, p. 125, and the passage quoted below, n. 400, which refers to 'dimensionibus indeterminatis'.

\(^{400}\) See above, chapter 2, section 4.2 and subsections.
extended, and admitting of parts bearing a proportion to one another, or, in other words, with everything else that pertains to it, apart from the particular spatial limits of its extension, and its precise size, at any particular time. Now, the same accidental structure or the same dimensions Aquinas, writes, can be considered in another way, namely 'according to their termination' (secundum earum terminationem); in other words the same accidental structure can be considered with reference to its precise spatial limits, or precise size and shape (secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram), at any particular point in time.

It is evident from Aquinas's discussion of individuation in his commentary Boethius's De Trinitate, then, that he thinks that the principle of individuation is also the principle of identity over time. (His thought on bodily identity over time will be discussed further in chapter 4). Aquinas maintains that quantitative structure can be involved in individuation only insofar as it is considered as 'indeterminate', because, from this perspective, it is continuous over time: whilst the exact size and shape of bodily structure varies over time, everything else belonging to it remains constant. So it is 'from these indeterminate dimensions', Aquinas writes, 'that matter is made this signate matter'. It was noted above that in Aquinas's Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, written around the same time as the commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate, and his commentary on Aristotle's De anima, written afterwards, that Aquinas refers to the structure involved in individuation as 'determinate'. But the precise issue of identity over time was not at all relevant in these discussions of the mind's abstraction of universals from singulars.

In any case, from his Summa contra Gentiles (1264-65) onwards, Aquinas (with the exception of the passage quoted above from his commentary on Aristotle's De anima) drops the complicated vocabulary of 'determinate' versus 'indeterminate' dimensions, along with any associated consideration of distinct perspectives from which the actual individual quantitative structure belonging to a substance can be considered. Where

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401 ‘Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum earum terminationem; et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram... Et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio dimensionum varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret semper idem numero. Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint... Et ex his dimensionibus indeterminatis materia efficitur haec materia signata...’. In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125.
he refers to an accidental structure involved in individuation, he calls it simply 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva).

So why should quantitative structure be involved in individuation? Aquinas identifies, both in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, and at *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 77, a. 2, two features exclusive to quantitative structure which make it uniquely equipped, among all the forms immersed in matter, both substantial and accidental, for the work individuating a material substance. Both of these are features are drawn from Aristotle's discussion of 'body' insofar as it fell into the accidental category of quantity.\(^{402}\) In virtue of these two particular features essential to it, then, quantitative structure, and only quantitative structure, can make matter *this* matter, or make a person's individual matter *their* individual matter.

First, Aristotle had said that *divisibility* is a feature essential to quantitative structure. For Aquinas, anything in nature that is physically divisible or actually divided from other things is so in virtue of the accidental structure immanent in it.

At *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 77, a. 2, Aquinas discusses the individuation of both substantial and accidental forms and elaborates upon his analysis of the concept of the individual (*individuum*). An individual form is in one thing alone, he writes, not in many.\(^{403}\) Matter is the principle of individuation, therefore, because by virtue of being in one material subject, a form, substantial or accidental, cannot be in another.\(^{404}\) Dimensive quantity also enters into the principle of individuation, however, because for a form to be in one subject (a substantial form in a material subject, or an accidental form in its substantial subject: in Aquinas's example, *this* accidental form 'whiteness' is in *this* bodily subject), that subject has to be undivided in itself, and divided from all other subjects. Since only quantitative structure can divide one part of matter from another (so that substantial forms can be received in

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\(^{402}\) See above, chapter 1, section 1.

\(^{403}\) 'Est enim de ratione individui quod non possit in pluribus esse'. *ST* III, q. 77, a. 2, response; *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 12, p. 196.

\(^{404}\) Continuing directly from the text in the previous footnote, 'Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est natum in aliquo esse... Quantum igitur ad primum, materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus, quia, cum huiusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae in aliquo esse sicut in subjecto, ex quo aliquam earum recipitur in materia, quae non est in alio, iam nec ipsa forma sic existens potest in alio esse'. ibid.
distinct parts of it), and therefore one composite substance from another (so that
accidental forms can be received in different composite substances), it is necessarily
involved in individuation.405

Aquinas makes the same point in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate: since
division is proper to quantity alone, matter is divided into distinct parts only in virtue
of quantitative structure.406 And in the course of a discussion of the difference
between human and angelic natures at Summa Theologiae I, q. 75, a. 7, he puts the
basic idea even more directly: 'matter can only be called this matter, distinct from
that', he writes, 'according to quantitative division'.407 Only quantitative structure,
then, can demarcate and divide the 'individual matter' particular to one person from
any other matter.

405 Picking up the thread again from the text in the previous footnote, 'Alio modo, ex co quod forma
substantialis vel accidentalis est quidem nata in aliquo esse, non tamen in pluribus, sicut haec albedo,
quae est in hoc corpore... Quantum autem ad secundum, dicendum est quod individuationis
principium est quantitas dimensiva. Ex hoc enim aliquid est natum esse in uno solo, quod illud est in
se individum et divisum ab omnibus aliis. Divisio autem accidit substantiae ratione quantitatis, ut
dicitur in I Physic. Et ideo ipsa quantitas dimensiva est quoddam individuationis principium
huiusmodi formis, inquantum scilicet diversae formae numero sunt in diversis partibus materiae'. ST
III, q. 77, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 196 (my emphasis). Aquinas's Leonine
editors make several suggestions regarding his source for this quotation from the Physica: there is no
statement in the Aristoteles Latinus formulated in these exact terms, and yet Aquinas makes reference to
it in several places beyond the passages discussed here. Whereas the closest statement to that quoted
as authoritative is found at Phys., 204a9-11 (that is, in book III: see above p. 94 and n. 227), Aquinas's
teacher Albertus Magnus in his Sentences commentary also made reference to such a statement in
Physica I, possibly pointing to 185a31-b5, 185b16-17 and/or 186b12-13 (see Opera Omnia iussu Leonis
XIII, 25,1, p. 102). At this stage an objection from Robert Pasnau should be noted. Pasnau suggests
that matter individuates not the whole composite substance, but just, and only initially, its substantial
form. Substantial form then takes on the role of directly individuating the substance ('it is more
accurate to say that matter individuates the form, and that the form individuates the substance').
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 391-2, quotation from p. 392. But this interpretation
cannot account for the full implications of ST III, q. 77, a. 2: it is explicitly stated here that any subject
receptive of any form naturally found in matter is individuated by matter and the dimensive quantity
which divides matter it from other things. In Aquinas' own example, quoted in the following footnote,
the subject in question is a composite substance that receives an accident: this body (made this body by
its matter being subject to dimensive quantity) is subject to this whiteness. So, when a body undergoes
any accidental change, the new accidental form or forms will be individuated in virtue of the
substance's (structured) matter, which evidently, therefore, continues to play a crucial role in
individuating the substance.

406 'de ratione individui est quod sit in se individum et ab aliis ultima divisione divisum. Nullum autem
accidens habet ex se proprium rationem divisionis nisi quantitas'. In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; Opera omnia
iusu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125

407 'hec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa, nisi secundum divisionem quantitativam'. ST I, q. 75, a. 7,
response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 207.
Second, Aristotle had said that it was essential to quantitative bodily structure to have parts that occupy a particular position (to the exclusion of any other body). It is precisely because it is in the very nature of the body's accidental structural form that it occupies a particular position, Aquinas notes in both of his major discussions of individuation, that each accidental structure naturally has individuality in and of itself.\textsuperscript{408} Again, this leaves structure uniquely equipped to make this individual matter this individual matter, and therefore this composite substance this composite substance, distinct from others.

Aquinas does not explicitly unpick the other characteristic of the individual, namely that it is undivided in itself, in either of his extended discussions of individuation. For absolute clarity, it should be noted that the lack of division to which Aquinas is referring in both discussions, as is clear from the context, is not the unity or lack of division that is interchangeable with the composite's act of being, or esse.

It is quantitative structure, again, which accounts for the individual's indi
division from itself: in every material thing, Aquinas thinks, there is a second kind of unity, or indi
division, which is simply the result of the fact that it possesses a continuous quantitative structure. Aquinas calls this second kind of unity, or indi
division, the 'principle of number' because it adds the 'concept of measure' to substance: it renders substance countable as a discrete unit, divided from the rest of the material continuum.\textsuperscript{409} Esse, it is true, retains a primary role in the ontological structure of the composite substance (without the act of existence there would be no actual substance, no dimensive quantity and no individuation). But, for Aquinas, esse cannot be the principle of individuation in material things: it cannot perform the very precise work of

\textsuperscript{408} 'Unde ipsa quantitas dimensiva secundum se habet quandam individuationem, ita quod possumus imaginari plures lineas eiusdem speciei differentes positione, quae cadit in ratione quantitatis huius; convenit enim dimensioni quod sit quantitas positionem habens'. ST III, q. 77, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, pp. 196-7. 'dimensiones ex se ipsis habent quandam rationem individuationis secundum determinatum situm, prout situs est differentia quantitatis'. In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, pp. 125-6.

\textsuperscript{409} 'Unum igitur quod est principium numeri, aliud est ab eo quod cum ente convertitur... in nullo differt ab ente secundum rem, sed solum ratione... Unum vero quod est principium numeri addit supra substantiam, rationem mensurae, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo inventitur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuum. Nam numerus ex divisione continua causatur'. In Met. IV, lect. 2, n. 560 (ed.) Cathala, p. 187.
differentiating material substances from one another that the principle of individuation, in Aquinas's view, has to perform.\textsuperscript{410} Aquinas notes in his \textit{De ente et essentia} that each human's individual \textit{esse}, or act of being, is itself individuated in the body, just as the soul is individuated in the body (even if the individuality of the soul, and its \textit{esse}, outlast the death of the body).\textsuperscript{411}

\textit{Matter}, then, is Aquinas's principle of individuation in material things, precisely insofar as it subsists under the body's accidental structural form. The principle of individuation is therefore ultimately a principle of \textit{substance}: Aquinas's theory of individuation is not intended to imply the ontological priority of an accident to its substance.\textsuperscript{412} Dimensive quantity, as an accidental form, takes substance, and matter as a component of substance, as its subject: the structural form's existence is dependent on the substance in which it inheres. Nor, for Aquinas, could there be any question of \textit{temporal} priority or posteriority with respect to the individuation of the rational soul as it is received in matter. Again, his account of individuation assumes that several things happen \textit{simultaneously}: the acquisition of the soul in the moment of human generation and its differentiation from other souls, according to the capacity of the matter in which it is received, on the one hand, and the acquisition of all of the accidental forms belonging to the new human individual, including the induction of the new human body's accidental quantitative structure by the \textit{virtus formativa}, the structure which makes the matter of that body \textit{this} matter, on the other hand.

\textsuperscript{410}Joseph Owens argues that for Aquinas \textit{esse} is the 'cause' of individuation, if not the principle of individuation. J. Owens, 'Thomas Aquinas (B. CA. 1225; D. 1274)' in Gracia (ed.), \textit{Individuation in Scholasticism}, pp. 173-94; see esp. p. 188 where Owens explains, 'Even in the area that came to be covered in tradition by the "principle of individuation", namely, material things, the first requirement was that the thing be an actual existent. Only after that fundamental condition came matter and quantity'.

\textsuperscript{411}‘Et licet individuatio eius [animae humanae] ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore, cuius est actus, non tamen oportet ut subtrahat corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum, ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum’. \textit{DEE}, c. 5, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 43, p. 378.

\textsuperscript{412}Cf. McCord Adams, \textit{Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist}, p. 18. In the twelfth century, Abelard had criticised the notion that an accident or a 'bundle' of accidents alone could be the source of a substance's individuality since accident is ontologically posterior to substance. After Abelard, any major scholastic thinker who preserved a role for accidents in individuation would involve other principles (in Aquinas's case matter, a principle of substance). See Gracia, \textit{Introduction to the Problem of Individuation}, pp. 127-8 (on the origin of the theory of individuation by accidents in Boethius' \textit{De Trinitate}), and 208-10, 269, 276-7.
It is worth emphasising, again, that, unlike in Averroes' account of substantial generation, in Aquinas's account of generation there is simply no place given to an quantitative structure with which matter itself is invested, ontologically prior to any form, in virtue of which matter might be rendered divisible for the reception of different forms in different places. As will be discussed in chapter 4, it is not in his work on generation or individuation, but in his work the postmortem continuity of individual matter and resurrection, that we see Aquinas pushed in the direction of arguing that the material principle is invested with structural features of its own. Aquinas would ground the continuing material identity of an individual body upon the continuity of its particular accidental corporeal form, quantitative structure, or quantitas dimensiva, and he would want to try to argue that traces of this individual structure continue to particularise the matter belonging to that body beyond the grave.

Conclusions

Guided by his materialistic understanding of what bodily resurrection would involve, Aquinas developed his innovative theory that the soul is the only substantial form in the individual human body. This theory entailed that each person's soul and the matter particular to their body (which admitted of a unique and complex 'capacity'), were naturally joined in the most intimate of unions: the individual soul would be incomplete in separation from the matter particular to its own body; matter completes the very individual nature of each soul, in Aquinas's view, just as each individual soul penetrates and completes the nature of its body, in virtue of being its only substantial form.

Since the doctrine of bodily resurrection entailed both that individual soul and individual be so intimately united, and that each human's particular matter made a crucial contribution in its own right to their individuality, it was absolutely necessary that Aquinas should make room for a strong account of the relative autonomy of the body within the individual human being. Aquinas struck the balance by theorising that each individual body had a distinct accidental (if not a distinct substantial) form, which was directly responsible both for its basic corporeal features, including its organic structure, and for the individuality of its matter.
Chapter 5's discussion will explain how Aquinas's Dominican defenders in the late thirteenth century drew upon and developed their own interpretations of different aspects of Aquinas's conception of the individual body, in order to counter the Franciscan pluralist argument that the theory of the unicity of substantial form reduced the individual body, in its own right, to mere, featureless, *prime* matter, and therefore had false theological consequences for the identity of Christ's corpse, and saints' relics.

A fitting way to round off the present chapter, however, is with a reminder that the great historian of scholasticism Sir Richard Southern saw in Aquinas's work the very apogee of what he called 'scholastic humanism': Aquinas's exaltation of the perfection of human nature, soul *and* body was, according to Southern, unparalleled in the medieval period. Southern wrote that Aquinas 'reversed the ancient opinion that the body is the ruined habitation of the soul, and held... that it is the basis of the soul's being. Everywhere he points to the natural perfection of man... The dignity of human nature is not simply a poetic vision; it has become a central truth of philosophy'.

The more technical philosophical thinking behind the vivid picture of the dignity and nobility of humans in Aquinas's work to which Southern is referring has been clarified here. Aquinas designed the theory that the soul is the body's only substantial form in order to ensure that the dignity of human nature, as the product of a natural union between body and soul wherein the soul naturally perfects the matter in which it is grounded and then *exceeds* it in respect of its purely intellectual nature, was a 'central truth of philosophy'. Each human body, for Aquinas, is the *immediate* and therefore the *proportionate* subject of the noblest kind of soul, the only kind of soul that 'overreaches' matter. Though individual human bodies are a diverse group, each in its own way is an example of the most beautiful bodily design in all creation.

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CHAPTER 4

THOMAS AQUINAS (II): BODILY IDENTITY

Introduction

This chapter will explore Aquinas’s thought on the identity of the individual body during its mortal life, across the separation of its soul and its subsequent decomposition and decay, and at the resurrection.

Aquinas evidently supposes that the resurrection of an individual body will literally involve the reintegration of the material belonging to it by God. Not only does the notion of resurrectio makes sense only if the very same individual bodies that lived and died will rise again, to suggest otherwise, Aquinas writes, is heretical and goes against the truth of scripture. Job 19:25-26 provides the decisive proof: ‘For I know that my redeemer lives, and on the last day I will rise out of the earth, and I will be clothed again in my own skin, and in my flesh I will see God’. Conversely, Aquinas does not take I Corinthians 15. 42-44, according to which the body was 'sown in corruption' but would 'rise in incorruption', was 'sown a natural body' but would 'rise a spiritual body', and was 'sown in weakness' but would 'rise in power', to.

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414 'non enim resurrectio dici potest, nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat: quia resurrectio est iterata resurrectio; ejusdem autem est surgere et cadere... et ita, si non est idem corpus quod anima resumit, non dictetur resurrectio, sed magis novi corporis assumptio'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.

415 'ponere quod non sit idem numero qui resurget, est haereticum, derogans veritati Scripturae, quae resurrectionem praedicat'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.

416 'Expresse etiam corporum resurrectio praenuntiatur a Iob. Dicitur enim Iob XIX: Scio quod Redemptor meus vivit, et in novissimo die de terra resurrectus sum, et rursus circumdabor pelle mea, et in carne mea video Deum'. SCG IV, 79, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 248 (editor's italics). Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de quodlibet (hereafter Quod.) XI, q. 6, sc., In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 1, sc. 1, In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, sc. 1, and qc. 2, sc. 1.
be a statement on the resurrected body's identity. Rather, he understands it to refer to the gifts given to glorified resurrected bodies: brightness, agility, and impassibility.417

Aquinas, then, draws upon the traditional authority of Augustine's *Enchiridion* chapter 23 (which Peter Lombard had copied into his discussion of the resurrection in the *Sentences*418) to argue that God can keep track of the material, the 'ashes' or particles, belonging to each particular human body and return them to that body, despite the fact that each individual body decays after death and is resolved into elemental material, which is then scattered and converted into the flesh of other bodies.419

It is important to highlight at this stage that the interpretation of Aquinas's thought on bodily identity that will be offered in this chapter sets itself at odds with other prominent interpretations of Aquinas's thought in this area, precisely because it takes it that a literal understanding of bodily resurrection is presupposed in, and shapes, Aquinas's work on human nature. Caroline Walker Bynum's position (which follows that of Aquinas's late thirteenth-century pluralist critics) has already been discussed: Aquinas develops a 'purely formal' theory of bodily identity, which entails that the body is reduced to a featureless prime matter, and according to which, therefore, the continuing identity of the individual body depends on the identity of the individual soul, as its only substantial or nature-determining form.420 Furthermore, Robert Pasnau and Eleonore Stump have also concluded, each by way of their own philosophical analysis of his work on human nature, that, for Aquinas, the continuing identity of the human individual, body and soul, depends on the soul alone: material continuity does not matter. Pasnau, indeed, states that Aquinas does not prove that it

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418 See above, pp. 15-16.

419 'Corpus humanum potest resolvi ad ipsa elementa, vel etiam in carnes aliorum animalium converti... patet per auctoritatem augistini in enchirid.: corpus humanum in quamcumque aliorum corporum substantiam, vel in ipsa elementa vertatur', 'ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae statuit illos cineres iterum animae conjungi... conventit quod illae partes elementorum iterato conjungantur'. In *Sent.* IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, sc 1 and response, *Opera omnia* (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 633.

420 See above, pp. 35-7.
is necessary for each individual body to be recovered from the very same matter at the resurrection.\footnote{\textquote{Aquinas has not proved that the soul "must be reunited at the resurrection to numerically the same body". Pasnau, \textit{Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature}, pp. 392-3 (Pasnau is directly referring to \textit{CT}, c. 153); \textquote{What is necessary and sufficient for something to be identical to Socrates is that its substantial form be identical to the substantial form of Socrates}. E. Stump, \textquote{Resurrection, Reassembly and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul} in B. Niederbacher and E. Runggaldier (eds.) \textit{Die menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den Dualismus?} (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag, 2006), p. 161, repeated verbatim from E. Stump, \textit{Aquinas} (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 46.}

The objective here is not to offer direct, point-by-point responses to these modern philosophical analyses of Aquinas's thought bodily identity, although significant points of disagreement will be noted in the appropriate places. The purpose of the present discussion is simply to demonstrate, building upon what has been established in the previous three chapters of this study, how Aquinas's prior assumption that the resurrection of a body will involve the regathering of the material particular to it by divine power, which (according to the approach adopted here, at least) was not something that, in itself, he ever sought to prove, informed his innovative scientific account of bodily identity and postmortem material continuity.

At first glance, Aquinas's thought on bodily identity, and in particular on the material identity of the body, whether during its life or after its death, is less than perfectly transparent. Aquinas follows Aristotle's account of growth in \textit{De generatione et corruptione} 1.5, arguing that all of an individual body's matter can in theory be exchanged over the course of its lifetime without prejudice to its continuing identity. The question of how he can consistently hold that an individual resurrected body will \textit{necessarily} be recovered from the matter \textit{particular} to it, then, is a good one. Again, with Aristotle, Aquinas argues that a living and a freshly dead body are the same only equivocally, or in name, and not \textit{really} identical: how can he therefore argue that an individual body's particular material remains do in fact persist during the period separating its death from its resurrection?

The first section of this chapter will address Aquinas's answer to the first of these two questions. In order to grasp his account of the mortal body's material continuity, one needs to hold in front of the mind Aquinas's account of the relative autonomy of the individual body within the human being, set out in chapter 3. As will become clear, Aquinas \textit{does} thinks that the composite body's material continuity is crucial to its
continuing sameness. And it is not the soul, but the accidental form that gives to the body its physical structure, 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva) which, as we saw in chapter 3 section 4, is the only form in the body capable of rendering its matter physically distinct from any other matter, that is responsible for guaranteeing the body's material identity over the course of its mortal life.

Aquinas's adherence to the literal and materialistic interpretation of bodily resurrection looks puzzling only if his theory that the soul is the human body's only substantial form is interpreted as implying that each soul is somehow directly responsible for guaranteeing the individuality and identity of the whole human being, including the whole body. The second section of the chapter will illustrate more fully that this would be a misconception of the role of the soul in Aquinas's thought on bodily identity, by way of delineating clearly the precise role that the individual soul has to play in guaranteeing its body's identity at the resurrection. Aristotle had written in De generatione et corruptione that a substance, once corrupted, could not return numerically the same, or the very same individual that it was. Aquinas would apply this axiom to any corruptible substantial form posited in the body, in addition to the soul. With respect to bodily identity, what the immortal soul accounts for, as far as Aquinas is concerned, is precisely the identity of the body's substantial form, because it is the body's only substantial form.

Aquinas's answer to the second of the two key questions set out above, his thinking in the area of postmortem material continuity, that is to say, is more obscure. His basic position on the corpse is that it is formally different from the living body that corrupts into it, but that it is still materially (secundum materiam) the same thing as that body in some sense. Aristotle himself had not directly addressed the issue of the continuing identity of matter across substantial change, but, as was explained in chapter 2, the Commentator Averroes had addressed this issue head on and explored it thoroughly. Averroes would appear to be the obvious authority upon whose work to draw in connection with the problem of material continuity across death and resurrection, and Aquinas would try to take advantage of the Commentator's insights, arguing that elements of an individual body's particular quantitative

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422 See above, pp. 17-18 and n. 21.
structure will continue to render the matter belonging to it distinguishable beyond the grave.

Aquinas outlines his case for the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies in all of his four systematic treatments of the topic of bodily resurrection: book IV of his Sentences commentary (c.1252-56); his Quodlibet XI, q. 6 (Easter, 1259); book IV of his Summa contra Gentiles (1264-65); and the first part of his Compendium Theologiae (1265-67). Quodlibet XI, q. 6 does not add anything significant to any of the three other discussions and in fact, as Philip Lyndon Reynolds notes in his own discussion of Aquinas's work on resurrection, the text of this Quodlibet is confused in places, and possibly corrupt.423 Comparisons between the Quodlibet and the other three texts will therefore be made only in footnotes.

Finally, a presentation of Aquinas's writings on the continuing identity of Christ's corpse and saints' relics will provide a direct link forward to chapter 5's discussion of the reception and interpretation of Aquinas's work in this area by Dominicans. Aquinas's writings on those particular theological topics do not exhibit the same advanced thinking about postmortem bodily and material continuity that is evident in his work on the general resurrection. But it would be upon the issue of postmortem bodily identity in the cases of Christ and the saints that Aquinas's Franciscan critics would initially focus the seminal late thirteenth-century scholastic debate on the theological repercussions of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans.

1. Material Continuity and the Identity of the Mortal Body

The major recent study of the ways on which reflection on the resurrection informed scholastic thought on bodily identity up to Aquinas is Philip Lyndon Reynolds' Food and the Body: Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology (1999).424 The following analysis owes much to Reynolds' research.

423 Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 403.

424 Full citation above, n. 8.
Given his literal interpretation of resurrection, then, Aquinas does assume that material continuity of some sort will be necessary in order to safeguard the continuing identity of the individual mortal human body. But he does not think, with Peter Lombard, that there is a non-exchangeable core of material within each individual human body (the 'truth of human nature'), that serves as the material core of the continuing identity of that body throughout its mortal life, and at the resurrection. Nor does he agree with his predecessors and contemporaries at Paris (among them his own teacher Albertus Magnus, and Bonaventure, the greatest Franciscan thinker of Aquinas's generation), who thought that the 'truth of human nature', from which an individual body would be reconstructed at the resurrection comprised, primarily, a fixed, radical core of seminal material, and, secondarily, some of the flesh subsequently built up in the body from nutriment.425

As indicated in chapter 3, Aquinas's own view is that the material 'truth of human nature' belonging to an individual comprises all of their 'individual, "signate" matter', that is to say, all of the matter subsisting under the accidental form, dimensive quantity, that is responsible for giving to their body its organic structure.426

So all of the matter that subsists under this quantitative structure at any one time, for Aquinas, belongs to that individual's material 'truth of human nature'; there is no demarcated portion of flesh in an individual body which is in theory non-exchangeable427 (although, in fact, there will never be a point in a body's lifetime at which it has lost all of the material which it had at the beginning428); and, since the full amount of matter that has belonged to the 'truth of human nature' in an individual during their lifetime will, of course, usually exceed the amount that is

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426 See chapter 3, section 4.

427 Aquinas says of his position, 'non distinguit aliquid materiale signatum permanens in homine toto tempore vitae eius'. *In Sent. IV*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, q. 4, response Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 637 (ll.125-150). Cf. Reynolds, *Food and the Body*, p. 380, and see pp. 361-71 for extended comment on Aquinas's presentation of contemporary views with which he disagrees.

needed to reconstruct their body at the resurrection, not all of it need rise in their body. Aquinas thinks that only enough matter need rise in each part of the individual body, such that it can be reconstituted in its stature at the perfect age, the age at which Christ died.

In common with his contemporaries, Aquinas holds that, in order for the risen body to be the same as the mortal body, a particular part of matter will need to be returned to the same heterogeneous part of the body whose constitution it entered into in life (a piece of matter from the hand should return to the hand), though it need not return to the exact same part of the homogenous flesh, bone, nerve or so on which constituted that heterogeneous part (a piece of matter from the thumb’s flesh can return to the flesh of the middle finger). But since he refuses to delineate, as his contemporaries had, different ways in which the body's matter belongs to the 'truth of human nature', it is somewhat incongruous (and perhaps, Reynolds notes, with some hesitation), that Aquinas also holds that the matter which was first animated by the rational soul will rise in it because it 'partakes of the perfection of the species' more perfectly (perfectius virtutem speciei participat) than flesh built up from food.

So what exactly does Aquinas have to say about the material continuity of the body across growth and the assimilation of new flesh built up from nutriment? At *Summa Theologica* I, q. 119, a. 1, discussing whether food enters into the 'truth of human nature', Aquinas analyses head-on the concept of the 'identity of matter' (identitas materiae). The fifth objection contends that, if everything in a human materially speaking is exchangeable, then they will not be the same in number, or exactly the same individual, throughout their lifetime. In order for something to be

429 'non requiritur ad hoc quod resurgat homo numero idem, quod quicquid fuit materialiter in eo secundum totum tempus vitae suae resumatur'. *SCG* IV, 81, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 15, p. 254. Cf. *In Sent.* IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response, *CT* I, c. 159.


431 *In Sent.* IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 3, response. This was the common position of theologians at the time, including Bonaventure. It was thought fitting that God should return matter to the same places in the body. Reynolds, *Food and the Body*, p. 335.

numerically the same, so the objection goes, the identity of its matter \((identitas materiae)\) is necessary.\(^{433}\)

Aquinas tacitly accepts this last premise, and in a brief response explains that there is a necessary material aspect to the individual body's continuing self-identity. To illustrate this point, he refers to the distinction that Aristotle drew, in *De generatione et corruptione*, between the lighting of a new fire (analogous to substantial generation) and the 'feeding' of an existing fire (analogous to the events of growth).\(^{434}\) If an entire portion of material loses the form of fire all at once, and fire is generated elsewhere, then this will be an entirely new, and different fire. If a body were to exchange all of its matter at once, then it would not remain the same body. But if an existing fire is fed with new material, then it will remain the same fire, even once all of the material that was originally in it has been exchanged, because the new material will pass into (transit) material already comprising the fire. So even though Aquinas thinks that all of a body's matter is (in theory) exchangeable over the course of an entire lifetime, he holds, still, that the body will remain the very same body during that period on the condition that its matter is exchanged only gradually (\(paulatim\)) the new material added forms a continuum with its existing material.\(^{435}\)

Of course, the quantitative structure particular to an individual body, or its *quantitas dimensiva* (which the present study has also referred to as the body's accidental corporeal form), is not only the form in the individual body in virtue of which its material is divided and distinguished from other matter, and made to be this matter,

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\(^{433}\) 'cum ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae'. *ST* I, q. 119, a. 1, arg. 5, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 571.

\(^{434}\) See above, p. 76 and n. 177.

\(^{435}\) 'dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in I de Generat., quando aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari: quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem praexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, alius substitutatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumatur, semper remanet idem ignis numero: quia semper quod additur, transit in praexistentis. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus viventibus'. *ST* I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 5, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 573. Cf. Reynolds, *Food and the Body*, p. 381-2: 'Thomas points out that the individual as a whole - the body or the fire or whatever - remains through the exchange of matter because new matter is always united with matter that is already in place [...] Thus there is a material as well as a formal aspect of the body's continuing self-identity'; and S. Edwards, 'Saint Thomas Aquinas on 'The Same Man'', *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 10.1 (1979), p. 92: 'The constant entering and departing of material particles must occur in an overlapping fashion, so that at no time are all the particles of matter entirely new and different from ones of the most recent time'.
belonging to this body, at any one time;\textsuperscript{436} it is also the very form in virtue of which the individual body is an unbroken material continuum.\textsuperscript{437} And so, it is not just that the individual body's permanent quantitative structure accounts for the individuality of its matter at any one point in time. Insofar as it is directly responsible for the body's continuous organic structure, this form also provides the direct metaphysical support for the material aspect that Aquinas highlights as being crucial to that body's continuing self-identity.

Now, prior to Aquinas, scholastic theologians had found a particular way of reconciling Aristotle's account of growth and bodily identity in \textit{De generatione et corruptione} I.5 with the notion that there was some radical and fixed component of flesh in the human body. Aristotle himself, of course, had denied that there was a fixed material component in any individual body, and had simply distinguished two ways in which flesh, a homogenous part of a growing body, could be viewed: it could be considered with respect to what was permanent in it (\textit{secundum speciem}), or it could be considered insofar as it was in flux (\textit{secundum materiam}).\textsuperscript{438} Theologians had tended to read into Aristotle's text the idea that there were two different kinds of material in humans, identifying 'flesh according to form' (\textit{caro secundum speciem}) with an enduring, radical collection of particles, on the one hand, and 'flesh according to matter' (\textit{caro secundum materiam}) with flesh in flux, built up from food and subject to replacement, on the other.\textsuperscript{439}

Aquinas notes this as a misreading of Aristotle in his own commentary on \textit{De generatione et corruptione}, explaining that the misreading in fact takes its origin from Alexander of Aphrodisias' interpretation of the Stagirite, a reading which Averroes

\textsuperscript{436} See above, chapter 3, section 4.

\textsuperscript{437} At this stage, it is worth reproducing a passage quoted in the chapter 3's discussion of individuation: 'Unum vero quod est principium numeri addit supra substantiam, rationem mensurae, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo inventur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuat. Nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur'. \textit{In Met. IV}, lect. 2, n. 560 (ed.) Cathala, p. 187 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{438} See above, pp. 75-6 and nn. 175-6.

Aquinas's denial that there is any fixed material component in the body is therefore an attempt to correct an error in contemporary scientific writing and to bring scholars' understanding of bodily identity back into line with both the Philosopher and the Commentator.

Aquinas's usual referent for *caro secundum speciem*, or flesh in the aspect in which it endures in an individual body, not surprisingly, is matter insofar as it is subject to the form that gives it its organic structure, dimensive quantity, and the other accidental forms making up the visible fabric of the body, which take dimensive quantity as their proximate subject. On this technical point Aquinas is in basic agreement with Averroes, who, as explained in chapter 2 section 2, identified the physical *species* or form according to which the body grew and remained the same with its *figura* or three-dimensional shape: the *species* in question was not, and indeed in context could not be, so Averroes argued, the soul. Aquinas builds upon Averroes' thinking, as we have just seen, to argue the body's quantitative structure individualises its matter and guarantees the material aspect of its continuity throughout mortal life.

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440 Passage beginning 'Et haec fuit opinio Alexandri, ut dicit Averroes in expositione huius loci'. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentaria in De generatione et corruptione* (hereafter *In DGEC*), I, lect. 15, n. 2 (105), *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 3, p. 315.

441 Cf. Edwards, 'Saint Thomas Aquinas on 'The Same Man', p. 92, 'The "species"... can only mean the dimensive quantity of an individual... Individual cells come and go, but the quantity and configuration of any two stages of the same body are continuous and similar'. See also the distinction Chris Hughes draws in Aquinas's thought between 'thick matter', or 'flesh and bone', which is matter considered as 'permanent, essential, and individuating' and 'thin matter', which is matter considered as transient. C. Hughes, 'Matter and Individuation in Aquinas', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 13 (1996), pp. 8-10.

442 The correct translation of the word *species* in this context is therefore crucial. Robert Pasnau translates *secundum speciem* to give the idea that the body's parts have to remain the same 'only specifically' over the course of its lifetime. He argues, on this basis, that in order for the body to continue to be the same as itself over time 'there is therefore no need for the matter to remain the same, or even for its stages to be continuous', and therefore that Aquinas' argument for the resurrection of numerically the same body is unnecessary, or as he puts it in a footnote 'flat-out invalid': 'Since personal identity does not directly rest on the body's numerical identity, Aquinas need not explain how numerically the same body can be destroyed and then recreated. The question of whether the resurrected body is the same body or merely a replica does not arise, because sameness of body is accounted for in terms of sameness of form... what preserves identity over time, through death and separation, is the incorruptible essence of the human soul, whose numerical sameness over time is unproblematic'. This fits with Pasnau's view, noted in the last chapter (see above, n. 405) that, for Aquinas, *substantial form* directly individuates the body's *matter*, after having initially been individuated by that matter. For these arguments, see Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, pp. 392-3 and p. 462, n. 22. Stump also thinks that 'for Aquinas, the individuation and identity of anything at all is provided by its substantial form. And so the matter configuring Socrates' resurrected body is the same as the matter configuring Socrates' earthly body in virtue of the fact that it is configured by the same
At *Summa Theologica* I, q. 119, a. 1, then, Aquinas introduces, as the second objection, the notion that *only* a fixed and radical portion of 'flesh according to form' belongs to the material 'truth of human nature' in an individual body. Any flesh in flux, or 'flesh according to matter' that is built up from food, so the objection goes, does not. Responding, Aquinas explains that by *caro secundum speciem* Aristotle meant flesh considered according to 'that which is formal in it', namely, the 'nature of flesh and its natural disposition'. It is the soul as the body's substantial form, it is true, which gives it the 'nature of flesh'. But, for Aquinas, of course, the *dispositio* of flesh is first and foremost its dimensive quantity as the *prima dispositio materiae* giving it its physical structure, and then the other accidental dispositions that are proximately grounded upon that structure.

In other places, when he discusses to the aspect in which an individual body's flesh endures throughout its lifetime, Aquinas does not refer to the soul. Instead, he talks simply of matter as it is subject to quantitative structure and the other accidental forms, in particular the shape (*figura*) of the body, which follow immediately upon that structure.

In his commentary on *De generatione et corruptione* I.5, Aquinas again discusses the image of the fire that is 'fed' with new logs: Aristotle's metaphor for growth. He notes that the *species* and *figura* of the fire remain, despite the fact that the matter in which

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444 'dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, ideo secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius'. *ST* I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 2, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 5, p. 573.

445 See above, pp. 121-2.
the fire burns is in flux. The term *species* here, if not synonymous with *figura* itself, could mean simply the external appearance of the fire.

In Book IV of his *Sentences* commentary, Aquinas asks whether everything that pertains to an individual's 'truth of human nature' will be resurrected in their body. He confirms that any matter that takes on an individual's 'form of flesh and bones' pertains to the 'truth of human nature' in them. It becomes clear that Aquinas's referent for 'form of flesh and bones' is the body's particular quantitative structure, and that this structure is understood to remain the same across material flux, when he compares the material change that occurs in the parts of the mortal body to that which occurs in the professional population of a city (*civitas*). The inhabitants who die and are replaced by others represent matter in flux; the interrelated offices, occupations and positions (*officia et ordines*) that are vacated and re-filled represent the city's persistent form. Similarly, Aquinas's explanation continues, bodily parts sustain flux in respect of their matter, but remain with respect their shape and relative position (*in eadem figura et in eodem situ*). The relative positioning and proportioning of the body's parts, and also therefore its shape, of course, are grounded upon its quantitative structure.

Again, when discussing resurrection and bodily identity in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, Aquinas explains that not everything which has *ever* been in an individual, materially speaking, need rise in it. A fire remains one in number as it consumes logs, and others are put in their place, because its *species* persists; in the same way, a human body and a human being is one in number throughout mortal life because the species of its individual parts (*forma et species singularium partium*) remains throughout its

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446 ‘Simile est etiam in igne, cuíus species et figura semper manet, licet ligna in quibus materialiter ignis ardet, consuamantur, et iterum alia apponantur’. In DGEC. I, lect. 15, n. 4 (107), p. 316.

447 Aquinas took *species* to be synonymous with *figura* in his commentary on *Metaphysica* V. 19: see above, pp. 121-2.

448 ‘ut ita etiam intelligamus contingere in partibus hominis unius sicut contingit in tota multitudine civitatis, quia singuli subtrahuntur a multitudine per mortem, aliiis in locum eorum succedentibus; unde partes multitudinis fluunt et refluent materialiter; sed formaliter manent, quia ad eadem officia et ordines substituuntur aliis, a quibus priores subtrahuntur; unde república una numero manere dicitur. Et similiter etiam dum quibusdam partibus fluentibus aliae reparauntur in eadem figura et in eodem situ, omnès partes fluunt et refluent secundum materiam, sed manent secundum speciem; manet nihilominus unus homo numero’. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 638 (my emphasis).
lifetime, even though those parts undergo material exchange. At first glance, the form being referred to could be the body's substantial form, but given the context of the rest of Aquinas's work in this area, it is most probable that Aquinas is here referring to dimensive quantity, the accidental form giving to the body its organic structure, as the very form that remains the same in the body across gradual material flux.

1.1. The Identity of Dimensive Quantity across Growth

There is a potential objection to be dealt with at this stage. Aquinas's analysis of the mortal body's identity of course takes it that an individual body's accidental quantitative structure, as the form ultimately responsible for the individuality and continuity of its material part, can itself remain identical across the radical changes in its size and precise shape that it will undergo throughout life. Not all of Aquinas's modern commentators agree that he did in fact maintain that the body's accidental quantitative structure has this ability, especially in his mature work.

The confusion arises because, as we saw in chapter 3, in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate Aquinas refers to the structure that is involved in individuating the body's matter, and in guaranteeing its identity over time, as, precisely 'indeterminate dimensions'. Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions' there, it is worth repeating, is not the same as Averroes': it is not a corporeal structure with which all of prime matter is invested. Rather, the label 'indeterminate dimensions' refers to the accidental quantitative structure particular to a body, considered with everything proper to it other than its precise spatial limits at any one time. In the same discussion, the same structure is referred to as being 'terminated' according to its precise spatial limits (secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram) at any one point in time. Since

449 'In corpore autem hominis, quandiu vivit, non semper sunt caedem partes secundum materiam, sed solum secundum speciem; secundum vero materiam partes fluunt et refluunt: nec propter hoc impeditur quin homo sit unus numero a principio vitae usque in finem. Cuius exemplum accipitur ex igne, qui, dum continue ardet, unus numero dicitur, propter hoc quod specie eius manet, licet ligna consumantur et de novo apponantur. Sic etiam est in humano corpore. Nam forma et species singularium partium eius continue manet per totam vitam: sed materia partium et resolvitur per actionem caloris naturalis, et de novo adgeneratur per alimentum. Non est igitur alius numero homo secundum diversas aetates, quamvis non quicquid materialiter est in homine secundum unum statum sit in eo secundum alium'. SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 254 (my emphasis).

450 See above, chapter 2, section 4.2 and subsections.
structure considered as determinate in this way does not persist over time, so Aquinas’s argument in his commentary on Boethius’ *De Trinitate* goes, we have to fall back on our consideration of bodily structure as indeterminate in order to understand how the very same structure continues to individuate the body’s matter, making it ‘this signate matter’, across physical change.\footnote{For the sake of clarity, it is worth repeating this passage, which was also noted in the previous chapter: ‘Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum earum terminationem; et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram... Et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio dimensionum varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret semper idem numero. Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quamvis nuncquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint... Et ex his dimensionibus indeterminatis materia efficitur haec materia signata...’. In *BDT*, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, response 7, *Opera Omnia* (ed.) Busa, vol. 4, p. 530 (my emphasis).}

In his more mature works on individuation, and particularly from *Summa contra Gentiles* (1264-65) onwards, Aquinas drops all reference to the two ways in which the quantitative structure particular to an individual body can be considered. He usually simply to dimensive quantity, but can be found to refer to the structure involved in individuation as 'determinate' in at least one mature discussion of individuation (namely his commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima*, as discussed in the previous chapter, which dates from 1267-68).\footnote{See above, p. 143 and n. 397. For further discussion on this point, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 368-71.} Jorge Gracia has assumed that this change in vocabulary reflects a change in Aquinas's position: when he stopped referring to the quantitative structure involved in individuation as 'indeterminate', Aquinas no longer thought that quantitative structure had any role in guaranteeing the body's continuing identity.\footnote{J. J. E Gracia, ‘Numerical Continuity in Material Substances: The Principle of Identity in Thomistic Metaphysics’, *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (1979), p. 80: ‘[Aquinas] seems to abandon this view [i.e. that structure regarded as 'indeterminate' is involved in individuation], and regard matter under determinate dimensions as the principle of individuation. This second view is unacceptable as an answer to the problem of identity’ (my insertions).}

On a closer reading of Aquinas's texts, however, it becomes clear that his position regarding the role of quantity in guaranteeing bodily identity is unaltered in his mature work: dimensive quantity can indeed withstand changes in its size and yet remain the same form.
That the shift in Aquinas's writings on bodily identity is a mere shift in vocabulary, rather than a shift in position, can be illustrated by bringing together two further passages from Aquinas's works. In his *Quodlibet IX*, q. 6, a. 1 (Advent 1257), produced around the same time as his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, Aquinas writes that, in bodily growth, the 'essence of quantity' is not destroyed (non tollitur) because 'indeterminate dimension' (dimensio interminata) always remains, even if this structure takes on different actual limits as it grows. At *Summa Theologiae III*, q. 77, a. 8 (1271-73), Aquinas simply states that changes in its size 'diversify dimensive quantity, not with respect to its essence, but with respect to the determination of its measure'.

In any case, as discussed in chapter 3, Aquinas has no consistent vocabulary for referring to the principle of individuation across his works. More to the point, on the rare occasion that he does refer to the structure involved in individuation as 'determinate' after his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, it is never in a context in which the question of identity over time is directly relevant.

It is important to remember, in all of these discussions of bodily identity, that Aquinas's use of the vocabulary of 'indeterminate' versus 'determinate' structure was

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454 'in augmento corporali ipsa essencia quantitatis non tollitur, cum semper maneat dimensio interminata, set secundum diversas terminaciones quas recipit, fit mutatio de parvo in magnum, quae est augmentum'. *Quod. IX*, q. 6, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 25, 1, p. 114.

455 'magnum et parvum diversificant quantitatem dimensivam non quantum ad eius essentiam, sed quantum ad determinationem mensurae'. *ST III*, q. 77, a. 8, ad 4, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 12, p. 204.

456 See above, p. 142, and comments in J. Bobik, 'Dimensions in the Individuation of Bodily Substances', *Philosophical Studies*, 4 (1954), p. 72: 'the difficulty of determined dimensions vs. unterminated dimensions in the writings of St. Thomas is not a difficulty at all. To be sure, it appears a difficulty and even an inconsistency. But this deceiving appearance... has its origin in a failure to remember that the characteristics of the bodily individual are many, and that St. Thomas is not concerned with explaining or accounting for all of these characteristics each time his thought turns to the problem of individuation.' Indeed the notion that quantitative structure is 'determinate', in Aquinas's mature work, does not preclude that it has a certain 'elasticity' to it. In a discussion of perfection in his commentary on Aristotle's lexicon of philosophical terms at *Metaphysica V*, Aquinas notes that the 'determinate' structure of a horse has 'latitude' within fixed limits. 'quaelibet res naturalis, habet determinatam mensuram naturalis magnitudinis secundum quantitatem continuam, ut dicitur in secundo de anima... Equus enim habet quantitatem dimensivam determinatam secundum naturam cum aliqua latitudine. Est enim aliqua quantitas, ultra quam nullus equus protrahatur in magnitudine. Et similiter est aliqua quantitas, quam non transcendent in parvitate'. In *Met. V*, lect 18, n. 1037 (ed.) Cathala, p. 324 (my emphasis). Of course, Aquinas may well be referring to the structure of *any* horse, universally, here, rather than to an individual 'determinate dimensive quantity' belonging to an individual horse. It is not entirely clear. Even so, the passage still highlights the importance of contextualising his use of vocabulary when pointing to the body's quantitative structure.
not the same as the Commentator's. Of course, we saw in chapter 2 that, in his *De substantia orbis*, Averroes himself had used the label 'determinate dimensions' to refer to an individual structure that *could* remain the same thing, despite changes in its size.\(^{457}\)

It will be particularly crucial to recall again below, in connection with Aquinas's work on *postmortem* bodily identity, that Aquinas uses the Commentator's vocabulary in a different way to that in which Averroes himself used it.

### 2. Formal Continuity and Bodily Identity at the Resurrection

Aquinas's treatment of the body's *formal* continuity across death and resurrection can be read as an attempt to improve upon the theory put forward by his Franciscan contemporary Bonaventure, who advocated a pluralist theory of human nature. In light of the axiom from Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione* that a substance, once corrupted, could not return identical, Bonaventure, in his own *Sentences* commentary (1253-57), saw the need to explain how the body's corporeal form *could* return *idem numero*, after it had corrupted into matter.

To do so, the Franciscan had made use of Augustine's idea that matter is imbued with the seminal principles of corruptible forms, or *rationes seminales*. This picture of the material principle had figured in Augustine's literal commentary on Genesis as a way of reconciling the idea that the world was created in an instant, on the one hand, with the idea that the various species of creatures came into being in a certain order, on the other.\(^{458}\) Augustine had said that matter was 'pregnant with all things', Bonaventure argued. And bodily forms corrupted into the very *rationes seminales* from which they were produced: crucially, these forms did not corrupt entirely (*omnino*), but remained 'in some way' (*aliquo modo*) across death and resurrection. Although no natural power could draw out (*deducere*) the very same forms from matter, God could.\(^{459}\) There were obscurities in this account of postmortem bodily continuity,

\(^{457}\) See above, pp. 92-3.


\(^{459}\) *necesse est, aliquo modo formas naturales esse in materia, antequam producantur; et substantia materiae praegnantis est omnibus: ergo rationes seminales omnium formarum sunt in ipsa... Et sic dicit Augustinus; unde formas in materia ante productionem dicit esse quantum ad rationes seminales...*
however: for one, rationes seminales were usually conceptualised as the formal principles of species or kinds, not of individuals. It was unclear, therefore, how rationes seminales could account for the fact that each particular bodily form might retain its individuality.⁴⁶⁰

Aquinas himself rejected the idea that the material principle was invested with seminal forms.⁴⁶¹ Like Bonaventure, Aquinas assumes that the Aristotelian axiom on continuity and identity still applies to natural events. That is to say, although resurrection can happen only by divine power,⁴⁶² in order to be truly resurrected, the body's components need to survive somehow. And even if he does not cite Bonaventure's or any similar argument for bodily continuity across death and resurrection directly in his own work, Aquinas undoubtedly sets up his own treatment of the problem pointedly to demonstrate the advantage of the theory that the soul is the body's only substantial form for an account of bodily identity at the resurrection.

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⁴⁶⁰ As Reynolds puts it in his discussion of Bonaventure's work on bodily continuity and resurrection in *Food and the Body*, p. 354, 'even if God could educe the form without changing its identity, what is it supposed to be the same as? It cannot be numerically identical with the seminal principle, for that is potentially an unlimited number of individuated substantial forms: its numerical, substantial identity is indeterminate. When the actual form corrupted, so that the form reverted to its seminal state, it lost its substantial identity'. For more detail on thirteenth-century discussion of rationes seminales as the principles of generic forms, and the ways in which rationes seminales were understood to 'evolve' into generated forms, see S. Donati, ‘The Anonymous Commentary on the Physics in Erfurt, Cod. Amplon. Q. 312 and Richard Rufus of Cornwall’, *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales*, 72 (2005), pp. 290-9.

⁴⁶¹ *ST* I, q. 115, a. 2.

⁴⁶² ‘Ea vero quae secundum substantiam corrumpuntur, non reiterantur cadem numero secundum operationem naturae, sed solum secundum speciem... Cum igitur corpus humanum per mortem substantialiter corrumpatur, non potest operatione naturae idem numero reparationi... consequens est quod resurrectio hominum non fiet per actionem naturae... sed resurgentium reparationi sola virtute divina fiet’. *CT* I, c. 154, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 42, p. 140. Cf. *SCG* IV, 81 and *In Sent.* IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg. 1 (which directly cites *De generatione et corruptione*) and ad 1.
2.1. The Body's Uninterrupted Esse

Now, in his work on the general resurrection, Aquinas treats the question of the continuity of the body's individual act of existence, or esse, in a distinct set of philosophical objections and responses. It will be remembered from the previous chapter that, in Aquinas's metaphysical schema, each human has an individual act of existence (or esse), which enters into composition with their matter and their form.

It is the rational soul that is responsible for communicating esse to the whole composite, and the individuated act of being, or esse, that the rational soul communicates, is not dependent on the soul's union with matter: the soul subsists in its own right (per se subsistens). Unlike the souls of other animals, Aquinas explains, the human soul 'exceeds' or overreaches matter in its nature and its being. Hence each human body's individuated act of existence remains, without interruption, with the soul across bodily dissolution, to be returned to the body's matter once more at the resurrection.463

2.2. The Soul and the Body's Formal Identity

Aquinas illustrates the full advantage of his theory that the immortal soul is the only substantial form in the human body for an account of resurrection by responding to a series of objections that suppose that there are additional substantial forms in the body. Those additional substantial forms, so the various objections have it, are annihilated after bodily death and decomposition. None of them, therefore, can return as exactly the same individual substantial form at the resurrection. The resurrection of the body idem numero, therefore, is impossible.

463 'aliorum generabilium et corruptibilium forma non est per se subsistens, ut post compositi corruptionem manere valeat, sicut est de anima rationali, quae esse, quod sibi in corpore acquiritur, etiam post corpus retinet, et in participationem illius esse corpus per resurrectionem adducitur, cum non sit alius esse corporis et alius animae in corpore... et sic nulla interrupto facta est in esse substantiali hominis, ut non possit idem numero redire propter interruptionem essendi, sicut accidit in aliis rebus corruptis, quorum esse omnino interrumpitur'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 1 (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 655; 'Differt tamen quantum ad hoc anima rationalis ab aliis formis. Nam esse aliarum formarum non est nisi in concretione ad materiam... Anima vero rationalis... excedit materiam... Unde... esse suum non est solum in concretione ad materiam. Esse igitur eius, quod erat compositi, manet in ipsa corpore dissoluto: et reparato corpore in resurrectione, in idem esse reductur quod remansit in anima'. SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 253. Cf. also above, n. 357 (on the soul 'exceeding' matter), and n. 410 on the soul's individuated esse outlasting the body.
Across Aquinas's various systematic discussions of resurrection, such objections posit that there is a substantial form of corporeity (corporeitas); a distinct substantial form of the mixture of elements (forma mixtionis or forma mixti); and distinct substantial forms constituting the sensitive and nutritive souls respectively (which, according to the objections, cannot exist independently of bodily organs) in each human. His responses to such objections set out to clarify the distinction between certain accidental forms in the body, and the soul as its substantial form: the soul is an individual body's only substantial form and enters (with individual matter), into its substance or inner nature; then, there are various accidental forms in the body that follow on that substantial nature and are what indicate that nature to the senses.

Aquinas notes that, from one perspective, the bodily features referred to in these objections can be looked upon merely as accidental forms. From this perspective, corporeitas is the body's accidental quantitative structure; the forma mixtionis is a certain composite quality the body possesses; the vegetative and sense powers are accidental forms belonging to the composite human being. He explains that the body's accidental forms, ontologically dependent on the human substance in which they inhere, will indeed corrupt at death. None of them can therefore return the same in number in the resurrected body, in line with the Aristotelian axiom that that which corrupts cannot return the same in number. Yet the resurrected body can still be the same thing as the mortal body in each case, Aquinas holds, even if its accidental forms are different.

464 SCG IV, 80, CT I, c. 154.
465 In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, arg. 4, SCG IV, 80.
466 In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg. 3, SCG IV, 80, CT I, c. 154.
467 See passages noted below, nn. 470-71.
468 The intellect and will, which can operate independently of corporeal organs, actually remain in the separated soul. The nutritive and sensitive powers, which take the composite of body and soul as their subject, corrupt at the separation of body and soul and remain in the soul only in a virtual way (virtute) insofar as the soul is their principle or root (sicut in principio vel radice). ST I, q. 77, a. 8, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 249.
469 'eadem ratio est de omnibus accidentibus, quorum diversitas identitatem secundum numerum non tollit'. CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 141. This Aquinas makes this argument in every one of his systematic discussions of resurrection. Yet, as Philip Lyndon Reynolds has observed, at another point in CT I, c. 154 Aquinas seems to contradict this with another statement that tacitly concedes that a numerical difference of accidental forms in the risen body would impede its numerical
From another perspective, however, it is the rational soul, as the only substantial form in an individual human body, which is the formal principle determining its inner substantial nature as a body and as a mixed body. The rational soul survives across death and resurrection and therefore guarantees the formal identity of the individual bodily substance it informs, both as a body, and as a mixed body, when it rises. Furthermore, Aquinas explains, the sensitive and vegetative souls are not corruptible souls, like animal souls, but are the same in substance as the mortal rational soul, which is the only substantial form in the body. As substantial natures, then, all of these supposed distinct forms are in fact comprehended within the nature of the immortal rational soul itself. And so they survive across death and resurrection.

Discussing the corruption or survival of the sensitive soul across death and resurrection in his *Sentences* commentary, Aquinas explains that the objection that that soul might corrupt at death, and therefore could not return the same at the resurrection, is the best argument (optime concludit) against those who hold that the sensitive soul is a substantial form really distinct from the rational soul in each human: those who posit that the rational and sensitive souls are one and the same

identity: since a human's sense powers corrupt at death (and cannot return numerically the same by nature), only divine power can restore a dead human to life. See *CT* I, c. 154, passage beginning, 'manifestum est quod sensus privati restitui non possunt per operationem naturae', *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 42, p. 140, and Reynolds, *Food and the Body*, pp. 425-6. This particular ambiguity makes no great difference to the argument of the present chapter.

470 'Neque etiam praedicta identitas secundum numerum impeditur ex hoc quod corporeitas non reeducat eadem numero, cum corrupto corpore corrumpatur. Nam si per corporetatem intelligatur forma substantialis, per quam aliquid in genere substantiae corporeae ordinatur, cum non sit unius nisi una forma substantialis, talis corporeitas non est aliud quam anima... et sic corporeitas accepita eadem numero manet, rationali anima eadem existente. Si vero corporeitatis nomine forma quaeque intelligatur, a qua denominatur corpus, quod ponitur in genere quantitatis, sic est quaedam forma accidentalis... Unde licet non eadem numero reeducat, identitas subjecti non impeditur'. *CT* I, c. 154, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 42, p. 141 (my emphasis). See also passage beginning 'Corporeitas autem dupliciter accipi potest', and passage beginning 'Similiter etiam forma mixti dupliciter accipi potest' in *SCG* IV, 81, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 15, pp. 252-3; and passage beginning 'forma mixtionis, quae est forma resultans ex qualitatus simplicibus ad medium venientibus, non est substantialis forma corporis mixti, sed est accidentis proprium'. *In Sent*. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, *Opera Omnia* (ed.) Busa, p. 635.

471 'Sic etiam dicendum est et de parte nutritiva, et sensitiva. Si enim per partem sensitivam et nutritivam intelligentur ipsa potentia, quae sunt proprietates naturales animae, vel magis compositi, corrupto corpore corrumpuntur: nec tamen per hoc impeditur unitas resurgentis. Si vero per partes praedictas intelligatur ipsa substantia animae sensitivae et nutritivae, utraque eadem est. Nam enim sunt in homine tres animae, sed una tantum...'. *SCG* IV, 81, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 13, p. 255. Cf. *CT* I, c.154, passage beginning 'Similiter nec diversitas potentiarum...'; *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 42, p. 141. See also *In Sent*. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3, reproduced in next footnote.
substantial form simply do not have to face this difficulty in giving an account of the body's identity at the resurrection.\textsuperscript{472}

Plainly, however, Aquinas arranges his entire discussion of formal continuity and bodily identity at the resurrection in order to demonstrate that any version of the pluralist position on human nature, that is, any theory positing that the body has another, corruptible substantial form in addition to the soul, meets deep philosophical difficulties when it comes to giving a clear account of the body's formal identity at the resurrection.

\textbf{2.3. The Soul as the Body's Efficient Cause}

At one point in his account of the general resurrection in his Sentences commentary, Aquinas notes that the soul is not simply the body's formal cause (as its substantial form) or its final cause (as the purpose for which it exists) but also its efficient, or agent cause. And so, he continues, 'a human cannot be complete' at the resurrection 'unless everything implicitly contained in the soul is exhibited in an exterior way in the body'.\textsuperscript{473} But Aquinas is not implying, here, that there is some sort of blueprint unfolding from the soul will literally shape the body at the resurrection.\textsuperscript{474} In order to grasp what it is that he is driving at, it is necessary to understand what Aquinas actually means when he says that each soul is its body's efficient cause.

At Summa contra Gentiles II, 89, Aquinas directly addresses any potential misconception arising from Aristotle's use of the image of a seal stamped on wax in

\textsuperscript{472} 'ratio illa optime concludit contra illos qui ponebant animam sensibilem et rationalem divisas in homine esse: quia secundum hoc anima sensitiva in homine non esset incorruptibilis, sicut nec in aliis animalibus. Unde in resurrectione non erit eadem anima sensibilis, et per consequens nec idem animal, nec idem homo. Si autem ponamus quod cadae anima secundum substantiam in homine sit rationalis et sensibilis, nullas in hoc angustias patiemur'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, q.c. 2, ad 3, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 636 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{473} 'nec homo posset esse perfectus, nisi totum quod in anima implicite continetur, exterius in corpore explicetur'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2 q.c. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 637.

\textsuperscript{474} Pace Bynum, who writes, in reference to this passage, 'Aquinas even suggests that body is the product of soul, its expression or unfolding'. Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, p. 242. Robert Pasnau and Eleonore Stump also think that the soul is directly responsible for shaping the body: see Appendix I.
De anima to illustrate the intimacy of the union of body and soul.\textsuperscript{475} This image does not imply, Aquinas explains there, that an individual soul physically shapes the matter into which it is infused, making the body in that sense. Aristotle does elsewhere state, however, that the soul is the body's efficient cause, and Aquinas would apply this idea in two ways. First, a father's soul (insofar as it is responsible for generating the \textit{virtus formativa}) is the efficient cause of his progeny's body.\textsuperscript{476} Second, each soul is the efficient cause of its own body insofar as it is the root of all that body's movements and vital functions.\textsuperscript{477}

The first way in which soul is body's efficient cause is irrelevant to the resurrection. It is Aquinas's understanding of the soul's role as the body's efficient cause in the \textit{second sense} that lies behind the comment from his \textit{Sentences} commentary quoted above.

The comment, in fact, comes from a passage in which Aquinas is discussing the integrity of the resurrected body, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the body's material identity. And God, of course, will be the \textit{agent} of the reconstruction of individual bodies at the resurrection.

As is clear from the context, then, what Aquinas is saying at that particular juncture in his \textit{Sentences} commentary is that an individual body, as reconstructed by God, will be reintegrated in proportion to the soul with which it is reunited, precisely insofar as that soul is the root of all that body's movements and vital functions. All \textit{this} means is that the body will rise with all of its parts. All of those bodily parts in which the soul's powers were made manifest in mortal life should rise. Even if not all

\textsuperscript{475} Cf. above, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{476} The objection reads, 'Quod configuratur alicui, constitutur ex actione eius cui configuratur: sicut cera quae configuratur sigillo, accipit hanc configurationem ex impressione sigilli' and the response, 'Quod autem decimo obiicitur, corpus animae configurari, et ob hoc animam sibi corpus simile praeparare... Similiter enim et omnis materia suae formae configuratur: non tamen haec configuratio fit ex actione generati, sed ex actione formae generantis'. \textit{SCG II}, 88-89, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 13, pp. 540, 543. Cf. the Aquinas's account of human generation above, chapter 3, section 3.

\textsuperscript{477} 'Ad sextum dicendum, quod philosophus non dicit animam, efficientem esse causam corporis, sed causam unde est principium motus, in quantum est principium motus localis in corpore, et augmenti et aliorum huiusmodi, ut ipsemet exponit ibidem'. \textit{QDP}, q. 3, a. 10, ad 6, \textit{Opera Omnia} (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 206.
of those parts will remain in use (the intestines will be defunct, for example), still, their presence will exhibit the soul’s manifold powers as the body's efficient cause.\footnote{In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1, response, ad 1 and ad 2.}

2.4. The Soul as One of Two Essential Principles

There is one final facet to Aquinas's analysis of formal continuity across death and resurrection, which will in fact lead us directly to a consideration of postmortem material continuity. This is his account of the forma totius, the humanity or essence that each human possesses.\footnote{CT I, c. 154, SCG IV, 80, Quod. XI, q. 6, arg. 4, In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg. 2.} Objections in each of Aquinas's treatments of the resurrection state that this form would seem to be destroyed at death, with the separation of body and soul, and cannot therefore return the same in number.\footnote{CT I, c. 154, SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 253; and passage beginning, 'forma totius [or humanitas]... est totum resultans ex compositione formae et materiae , comprehendens in se utrumque'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 2 Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, p. 636 (my insertion).}

Aquinas's response reveals that the Aristotelian axiom on continuity and identity from De generatione et corruptione does not apply as usual in this particular case, since the humanity, essence, or the 'form of the whole' that each human has, is not some form distinct from the rational soul entering into their metaphysical make up. 'Humanity', Aquinas explains, signifies 'body' and 'soul' as, respectively, the formal and material essential principles of the human species, considered in isolation from the individual features characterising particular humans.\footnote{CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 140. Cf. passage beginning, 'De humanitate vero, non est intelligendum quod sit quaedam forma consurgens ex coniunctione formae ad materiam, quasi realiter sit alia ab utroque...', SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 253; and passage beginning, 'forma totius [or humanitas]... est totum resultans ex compositione formae et materiae , comprehendens in se utrumque'. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 2 Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, p. 636 (my insertion).}

His explanation goes as follows: what is restored in a case of resurrection is not 'humanity' as such, but an individual human that possesses humanity. Socrates, Aquinas account of the resurrection states, has two 'essential principles': this matter, and this form, or soul. They are his essential principles (remembering that Socrates's essence, strictly speaking, comprises those aspects of his nature which he shares with all other
humans), because in virtue of his possession of them Socrates contains the universal human components 'body' and 'soul'.

But Socrates's particular matter and form are also, of course, his 'individual principles' (Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2), or the constituents of his particular 'truth of human nature' (Summa Theologiae I, q. 119, a. 1). Aquinas writes, in his work on the resurrection in the Compendium Theologiae, that Socrates's particular matter and form constitute what it is to be Socrates. That is to say, if Socrates could be defined (and as an individual he cannot be), his particular matter and form, or his individual principles, would be that in terms of which he would be defined.482

This last point helps Aquinas to explain what will be required and what will suffice such that the Socrates that is resurrected by God is numerically the same as the mortal Socrates.483 Socrates's same 'humanity' is restored, or the universalisable aspects of his composite nature are restored, in virtue of the reunion of his body with his soul at the resurrection, then what it is to be Socrates in particular, the 'truth of human nature' in Socrates, is restored by the reunion of his form and his matter, precisely.484 (As noted already, a diversity of accidental forms in the mortal and risen Socrates will not make a difference to his identity). If, on the other hand, one of Socrates's essential principles (or components of the 'truth of human nature' in Socrates), either his matter or his form, should be different at the resurrection, then Socrates will not be the vary same individual (idem numero).485

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482 'In Sorte vero aut Platone includitur haec materia et haec forma, ut sicut est ratio hominis ex hoc quod componitur ex anima et corpore, ita si Sortes definiretur, ratio eius esset quod esset compositus ex iis carnibus et iis ossibus et haec anima.' CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 141 (my emphasis).

483 Philip Lyndon Reynolds notes that in Aquinas's commentary on First Corinthians (1 Cor. 15:53), which dates from 1265-68, Aquinas tacitly concedes that if a human's particular matter and form could be reunited naturally (which they cannot), the result would be a numerically different human being. The resurrected body needs to be repaired by divine power. Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 424-5.

484 Pasnau and Stump disagree over whether the disembodied soul alone can, according to Aquinas, accurately be considered an individual human being; see Appendix II.

485 'Cum igitur humanitas non sit aliqua alia forma praeter animam et corpus, sed sit aliquid compositum ex utroque, manifestum est quod eodem corpore reparato, et cadem anima remanente, cadem numero humanitas erit' and with respect to the body's accidental corporeal form, Aquinas writes: 'Unde licet non eadem numero redate, identitas subjecti non impeditur, ad quam sufficit unitas essentialium principiorum'. CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42 p. 141 (my emphasis). Cf. also 'Unde patet quod et homo redit idem numero in resurrectione, et humanitas cadem numero, propter animae rationalis permanentiam et materiae unitatem'. SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis
3. Postmortem Bodily and Material Continuity

It is time now to turn to Aquinas's account of the postmortem continuity of the individual body's remains, which would become so highly controversial in the decade following his own death in 1274. The discussion will start with Aquinas's philosophical account of the corpse and postmortem bodily decay, and then go on to set out both his innovative and speculative and innovative work on the continuity of the material particular to individual bodies across death and resurrection, and his treatment of postmortem bodily continuity in the cases of Christ and the saints.

In only a few places across his works does Aquinas discuss the composition of the corpse in any detail. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, human death is a moment of radical substantial change. At the moment of human death, the body's accidental dispositions which, so to speak, 'hold' the soul in matter,\textsuperscript{486} corrupt, and the individual body undergoes dissolution.\textsuperscript{487} Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that the word 'body' (in the sense of living body) is applied only equivocally to the material which remains: it has lost its substantial form, and therefore no longer belongs to the same species as the living body.\textsuperscript{488}

Yet, again along with Aristotle, Aquinas certainly thinks that there is material continuity of some sort between living body and corpse. The material remains of an individual human body, since they are no longer the appropriate material subject for

\textsuperscript{486} 'dispositiones... quoddamodo tenent formam in materia...'. \textit{QDP}, q. 3, a. 9, arg. 17, \textit{Opera Omnia} (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 204.

\textsuperscript{487} 'discedente anima, corpus dissolvitur'. \textit{SCG} II, 58, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 13, p. 410

\textsuperscript{488} 'ita anima est forma substantialis viventis corporis, et ea remota non remanet corpus vivum nisi aequivoce'. \textit{In Da I}, lect. 2, \textit{Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII}, 45, 1, p. 75.
a rational soul, can no longer be properly or strictly referred to as an organic body (that is, as comprising heterogeneous human body parts), or as 'flesh and bone' (as comprising homogenous body parts), it is true. But these remains continue to comprise a mixture of the elements. Aquinas writes, in his commentary on Aristotle's discussion of proper matter at *Metaphysica* VIII.5, that 'the elements' are the matter of the dead body.\(^489\) And even this is not to say that the material principle loses all of its complexity at the instant of bodily death. Aquinas, of course, holds that the material principle is in potency to forms only in a certain order, and this is true in all cases of substantial change, whether they are more readily characterised as generation, or as corruption.\(^490\) The process of dissolution and decomposition that bodily remains undergo is gradual, requiring several intermediary forms to be acquired and lost.\(^491\)

Aquinas dwells on the dissolution of complex composite substances again in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* VII.16, and in doing so suggests one other way of framing material continuity between living body and corpse. At *Metaphysica* VII.16, on the composition of substances, Aristotle had explained that even if the material parts of animals might seem to be substances in their own right, they in fact exist only in potency for as long as the composite is a naturally continuous whole.\(^492\) In his commentary on this passage, Aquinas supposes that when a whole substance is dissolved, its material constituents, which were previously only in a state of potency in their own right, take on an actuality of their own. He gives an example. When the elements earth, air, fire and water are in a compound, they exist in it only potentially. Yet, after the compound dissolves, each element becomes an actually existing thing in its own right, and is no longer a mere part of something else.

\(^{489}\) *vivum non est materia mortui, sed sunt elementa*. *In Met.* VIII, lect. 4, n. 1751 (ed.) Cathala, p. 506.

\(^{490}\) See above, p. 130-1 and n. 350.

\(^{491}\) *Similiter etiam ex parte corruptionis sunt multae formae mediae, quae sunt formae incompletae: non enim, separata anima, corpus animalis statim resolvitur in elementa; sed hoc fit per multas corruptiones medias, succedentibus sibi in materia multis formis imperfectis, sicut est forma corporis mortui, et postmodum putrefacti, et sic inde*. *In DGEC*, I, lect. 8, n. 3 (60), *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 3, p. 292.

\(^{492}\) *Met.*, 1040b5ff (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 163-4, passage beginning, 'Manifestum est autem quod substantiarum esse existimarum plurime potestate sunt, et ipse partes animalium; nichil enim separatum ipsorum est. Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia materia omnia, terra, ignis, et aer*. 
In a much more complex composite substance such as an organic body, Aquinas continues, parts of matter are 'formally distinct'. Presumably, he is here referring to the fact that an organic body's quantitative structure renders its parts distinct from one another. Such highly developed and differentiated material parts are 'close to being actual', or might be described as being in a state of 'potentiality close to actuality'. But they remain in potency before the natural dissolution of the composite. As we will see in chapter 5, the Dominican Robert of Orford, trying to make sense of Aquinas's thought on postmortem bodily at Oxford in the early 1280s, would follow this particular framework.

Aquinas refers to the least complex material level, beyond which dissolution cannot continue, as *praeiacens materia*. As Reynolds has explained, the word *praeiacens* is not easy to translate (*praeiacere* is 'to lie in front of'), but 'pre-existing' works in this context: *praeiacens materia* is the matter that is 'primitively formed in relation to a higher form or substance'. Aquinas himself describes *praeiacens materia* as prime matter informed by the elemental forms, the very simplest forms in nature. Since the material principle is always informed, and therefore always found in proportion to particular forms, however simple, resolution can never in fact continue in such a way that all that remains is a completely featureless prime matter.

### 3.1. The Continuity of the Matter Particular to Individual Bodies

Aquinas thinks that each individual body will be reconstructed from the *praeiacens materia* that formerly belonged to it at the resurrection. This matter will have been

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493 'Quando autem ea, quae ponuntur partes, fuerint separata ab invicem dissoluto toto, tunc quidem sunt entia in actu... Sicut patet de terra et igne et aere, quae quando sunt partes corporis mixti, non sunt actu existentia, sed potentia in mixto; cum vero separantur, tunc sunt in actu existentia, et non partes... Quamvis enim omnes partes sint in potentia, tamen maxime poterit aliquis opinari partes animatorum et partes animae esse propinquas, ut flant actu et potentia, idest ut sint in potentia propinquaque actu. Et hoc ideo, quia corpora animata sunt corpora organica habentia partes distinctas secundum formam; unde maxime sunt propinquae ad hoc quod sint actu... Sed tamen quamvis istae partes animae et animatorum sint propinquae actu, nihilominus sunt omnia in potentia, quando totum fuerit unum et continuum per naturam'. In Met. VII, lect. 16, nn. 1633-1634, 1636 (ed.) M. -R. Cathala, pp. 472-3.


495 'praeiacens autem materia in quam corpora mixta resolvi possunt, sunt quatuor elementa, non enim potest fieri resoluto in materiam primam, ita quod sine forma existat, quia materia sine forma esse non potest'. *ST* III, q. 75, a. 3, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 12, p. 165.
dispersed, consumed by other animals, and even other humans, and incorporated into their bodies. In the case of those humans who will die only in the final conflagration, their matter will be resolved instantly into praeiacens materia. Aquinas therefore identifies the 'ashes' (cineres) from which it was commonly held that human bodies would be reconstituted at the resurrection, with praeiacens materia. There is no natural inclination in the ashes that were formerly united to a particular soul, to be reunited to that soul once more. Bonaventure had thought this, but Aquinas regards the notion as frivolous (frivolum). Nonetheless, he maintains that matter is ordained to be rejoined to its own soul by Providence: God will reconstruct each individual body from the same matter that subsisted in it in life. Following Augustine, Aquinas thinks that in cases of cannibalism, the person in whom the 'shared' matter was first animated has the prior claim to it.

If not enough matter is available in an individual case, God will make up the deficit. With respect to last this point it is absolutely crucial to note that Aquinas does not mean to imply that any matter will do for a particular body at the resurrection. To make up the difference, God will have to effect a transmutation in some other matter such that that matter becomes the particular matter belonging to that particular body. Whereas natural agents are limited to effecting change in things by means of introducing some form or other, Aquinas holds, God can alter matter itself.

496 In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, sc. 1.
497 See In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 3, and In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 2.
499 'dicendum est, quod in cineribus illis nulla est naturalis inclinatio ad resurrectionem, sed solum ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae statuit illos cineres iterum animae conjungi; et ex hoc convenit quod illae partes elementorum iterato conjungantur, et non aliae'. In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 633.
500 CT I, c. 161, SCG IV, 81, In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, ad 3- ad 5. Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 391-5 for further discussion of Aquinas's treatment of the cannibalism problem.
501 'ita etiam si quid materialiter defuit, Deus supplebit'. CT I, c. 160, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 143. Cf. SCG IV, 81, and In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, qc.1, response.
502 This point is heavily alluded to in Aquinas' work on the resurrection, in which he writes that resurrection can only happen by divine power because natural agents are limited to effecting formal change. See SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 252: 'operatione naturae hic fieri non possit, ut corpus reparetur ad vitam, tamen virtute divina id fieri potest. Nam quod natura hoc facere
And so we reach the crux of the problem of postmortem bodily continuity: what is it that accounts for the continuing identity of the praeiacens materia particular to each individual body across that body's death and resurrection? Since Aquinas thinks that quantitative structure is the only natural form capable of introducing distinctions into matter, it is not surprising that he should look to quantitative structure in order to explain the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies.

In his account of resurrection at Summa contra Gentiles IV, 81, Aquinas writes that the matter belonging to an individual body remains, across death and resurrection, 'under the same dimensions, from which it had the characteristic of being individual matter'.\textsuperscript{503} At Compendium Theologiae I, c. 154, he writes that it is easy (de facili) to see how a body can be restored numerically the same by God. Even the very least of things, Aquinas reminds his reader, fall under the purview of divine Providence. It is clear (manifestum est) that the matter of this human body, whatever form it might receive after human death, does not escape divine power and knowledge. And this matter remains the same in number, insofar as it is understood as existing 'under dimensions, according to which it can be called this matter, and is the principle of individuation'. Since this matter remains the same, since God will repair the same individual body from it, and since it will be united to the same soul, the individual human, body and soul, will rise again the same in number (idem numero).\textsuperscript{504}
But things are very far from clear: there is an obvious gap in this account of postmortem material continuity. As has already been noted, Aquinas maintains, in these same analyses of the general resurrection, that the particular quantitative structure belonging to an individual human body *corrupts*, along with all of the other accidental forms belonging to that body, when the individual human being corrupts at death, with the separation of body and soul. The general Aristotelian principle in operation here is, of course, that a substance is ontologically prior to its accidents, and Aquinas explicitly subscribes to this principle throughout his career. So how can any quantitative structure remain in matter across the corruption of the bodily substance whose property it is?

Before an attempt is made to speculate on the thinking behind these later explanations for the continuity of matter particular to individual bodies, Aquinas's earlier treatment of the same problem in Book IV, d. 44 of his *Sentences* commentary should be addressed, too. It employs different terminology from the later two accounts, and has obscurities of its own.

The relevant, carefully phrased objection states that bodily death (and subsequent decay) is a resolution of the body into the elements (or, in other words, *praeciacens materia*). Aquinas points out that these portions of elemental material retain none of the complexity proper to matter in a living body and therefore have nothing in common with the matter in the formerly living body, except inasmuch as both presuppose prime matter. But all other portions of the elements have the level of prime matter in common with that formerly living body, too. And nobody would claim that an individual body reformed from just *any* portion of the elements would be the same in number as it was in mortal life. So it would seem that an individual body cannot return numerically the same at the resurrection, even if it *is* reformed.

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505 See above, text cited at n. 470.

506 'esse accidentale non praecedat substantiale'. *In Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, response, Opera Omnia* (ed.) Busa, vol 1, p. 26; 'Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter... Unde impossibile est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praexistant in materia ante formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam'. *ST I, q. 76, a. 6, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 5, p. 229.
from that very portion of elements into which it was resolved.\textsuperscript{507} To overcome this difficulty, as he is well aware, Aquinas needs to build an account of the continuity of matter as the matter particular to an individual body.

Aquinas’s response to this objection, however, is far less transparent than his careful presentation of the problem at hand. He argues that what is understood to be in matter before a substantial form arrives can really remain after that form’s separation, according to the principle that if you remove what is posterior, what is prior can remain. Then he introduces the authority of Averroes’ \textit{De substantia orbis} and commentary on \textit{Physica} I. Averroes says, Aquinas writes, that before the reception of a substantial form in matter we should understand (intelligere) matter to be divided by 'indeterminate dimensions' (dimensiones non terminatae) in order that it can receive different forms in different places. So, he continues, after the separation of that form (the soul in this case), these indeterminate dimensions really remain the same. He then claims that matter existing under these indeterminate dimensions, whatever substantial form it might receive, retains a greater identity the particular human body that was generated from it than any other matter existing under any other substantial form. The matter belonging to a particular body can therefore be identified at the resurrection and returned to it.\textsuperscript{508}

There is much here that requires further explanation. As noted above, Aquinas’s own referent for ‘indeterminate dimensions’ is not the absolute, or unqualified, body that Averroes describes in the works that Aquinas cites here in his \textit{Sentences} commentary. That is to say, it is not an accidental structure, with a potential kind of

\textsuperscript{507} ‘corpus humanum usque ad elementa post mortem resolvitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed illae partes elementorum in quas corpus humanum resolutum est, non conveniunt cum corpore humano quod in ea resolutum est, nisi in materia prima, quomodo quaelibet aliae elementorum partes cum praedicto corpore conveniunt. Si autem ex aliis partibus elementorum corpus formaretur, non dicetur idem numero. Ergo nec si ex illis partibus reparetur, corpus erit numero idem’. \textit{In Sent.} IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, arg. 3, \textit{Opera Omnia} (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.

\textsuperscript{508} ‘Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod intelligitur in materia ante formam, remanet in materia post corruptionem: quia remoto posteriori, remanere adhuc potest prius. Oportet autem, ut Commentator dicit in 1 Physic., et in Lib. de substantia orbis, in materia generabilium et corruptibilium ante formam substantiali sem intelligere dimensiones non terminatas, secundum quas attendatur divisio materiae, ut diversas formas in diversis partibus recipere possit; unde et post separationem formae substantialis a materia adhuc dimensiones illae manent eadem; et sic materia sub illis dimensionibus existens, quamcumque formam accipiat, habet majorem identitatem ad illud quod ex ea generatum fuerat, quam aliqua pars alia materiae sub quacumque forma existens; et sic eadem materia ad corpus humanum reparatorum reducetur quae prius ejus materia fuit’. \textit{In Sent.} IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 3, \textit{Opera Omnia} (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.

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existence, informing all of prime matter, ontologically prior to any substantial form and therefore constituting a real formal medium between any substantial form and prime matter.

Again, Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions', in places other than this discussion of the resurrection, at least, is simply a particular accidental form belonging to a particular bodily substance, considered with everything belonging to it apart from its precise spatial limits at any particular time. Granted that in a few discussions touching upon the reception of form in matter early on in his career (including in his major discussion of the topic in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate), Aquinas does refer to the need to 'understand' or 'presuppose' (consider, praemunire, intelligere) that matter is divided by 'indeterminate dimensions' in order to receive a substantial form in a particular place, he never suggests that this accidental structure is really or ontologically prior to its substance, or is a formal medium between substantial form and matter, or, in other words, is anything other than an individual accidental form already belonging to a substance. In these passages, Aquinas is simply picking apart the order of our understanding of how individuation works. Of course, the individual soul's creation in the individual human body happens at the very same moment at which the virtus formativa introduces into matter the accidental forms that are dependent on the completed human substance for their existence, including the body's quantitative structure that divides its matter from other matter.

In later discussions touching upon individuation and the reception of substantial form in matter, Aquinas abandons this complicated explanatory move, along with its associated vocabulary, presumably because both were superfluous to his requirements. Nor does Aquinas, in any of his general accounts of the generation

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510 'Sed impossibile est in materia intelligere diversas partes, nisi praeinteligitur in materia quantitas dimensiva ad minus interminata, per quam dividatur, ut dicit Commentator in libro de substantia orbis, et in 1 Physic., quaia separata quantitate a substantia, remanet indivisibilis, ut in 1 Phys. philosophus dicit'. In Sent. II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 133; (my emphasis) 'Divisio autem non accidit materiae, nisi secundum quod consideratur sub dimensionibus saltum interminatis; quia remota quantitate, ut in 1 Physicor. dicitur, substantia erit indivisibile'. In Sent. II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 214 (my emphasis). In Aquinas's commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, 'indeterminate dimensions' are said to be 'praemuniret in materia'. In BDT, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 126. For further explication of this point, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomae Aquinas, pp. 364-5.
and corruption of substances, articulate any concept of an absolute or unqualified body in matter, ontologically prior to any substantial form, which could map onto what Averroes meant by 'indeterminate dimensions'.

So Aquinas's argument for the continuity of particular matter across death and resurrection in his Sentences commentary does not work, and this is because he is trying to draw upon Averroes' authority without committing himself to the Commentator's full position. That is, Aquinas is trying to use Averroes' idea that there is a corporeal structure which remains after substantial corruption as authoritative support for what he wants to say about the postmortem continuity of the matter belonging to individual bodies, but without explicitly and in principle accepting the Commentator's innovative notion that it is possible for there to be an accidental structure in matter ontologically prior to substantial form.

Averroes', 'indeterminate dimensions', again, are not merely understood to be in matter before it receives a new form. That corporeal structure is really there as a medium between matter and substantial form, and is really distinct from any individual body's particular accidental structure. The intellectual tension in Aquinas's early account of the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies is clear. By the time he came to write his Summa contra Gentiles, the formulation, and terminology, of his explanation for continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies had changed.

511 In this connection, modern scholars disagree over the implications of an early discussion at In Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, in which Aquinas claims that corporeity is the first form received in matter. See Appendix III.

Aquinas employs the same problematic form of argument, namely that the structure that is merely understood to be in matter before substantial form can really remain after its departure, in a discussion of transubstantiation in his Sentences commentary, asking whether anything can be generated from the sacramental species. See In Sent. IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 483, passage beginning, 'quicquid autem intelligitur in materia ante adventum forma substantialis, hoc manet idem numero in generato et in eo ex quo generat; quia remoto posteriori oportet remanere prae: dimensiones autem illae interminatae...'. This argument was simplified and improved in the Summa Theologica, by which point in his career Aquinas had eschewed the confusing terminological distinction between 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' dimensions. There, he refers instead simply to 'dimensive quantity' as that which miraculously takes on the property of matter, from which something might naturally be generated: 'melius videtur dicendum quod in ipso consecratione miraculose datur quantitati dimensivae panis et vini quod sit primum subiectum subsequentium formarum. Hoc autem est proprium materiae. Et ideo ex consequenti datur praedicatae quantitati dimensivae omne id quod ad materiam pertinet'. ST III, q. 77, a. 5, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 200.
Neither in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, then, nor in the *Compendium Theologiae*, does Aquinas make reference to any kind of priority in 'understanding' or otherwise, of any quantitative structure in connection with the soul's initial *reception* in matter. His argument is simply that the structure that individuates the matter of a particular human body can in some sense persist across the corruption of the bodily substance that is supposed to be its ontological support. And he now refers to the structure that is supposed to persist across substantial corruption simply as 'dimensions'. In his mature writings, then, Aquinas's solution to the problem of the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies is still very far from transparent. But the very basic point that he is getting at, at least, is fairly easy to appreciate: again, quantitative structure is the only thing that can introduce distinctions into matter, so if there is a natural explanation for the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies, then quantitative structure must be the key to it.

If the problem of accounting for the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies pushed Aquinas to the very limits of his thinking on the nature of matter, then it is possible at least to speculate on the direction in which his thinking was *still* moving his mature accounts of the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies.

When Socrates dies, the particular quantitative structure belonging to his body corrupts as a whole: this structure was dependent, for its continued existence, on the continued existence of the composite substance Socrates. Nonetheless, the mathematical entities that comprised this structure, its parts, or 'dimensions', remain in a potential or virtual, if not in an *actual* way, in the matter that formerly belonged to his body, or Socrates' 'individual matter'. They thus serve as traces, in matter, of Socrates' whole, actual, three-dimensional, bodily structure. Elements of any quantitative structure always occupy a particular position and so are radically individual. The parts of what was Socrates' bodily structure remain positioned in his matter, allowing it to be tracked by God across any sequence of substantial changes. The structure of Socrates' body, as a whole, survives only in the mind of God, who alone can therefore perceive the traces of this structure in matter, identify

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513 See above, p. 147 and n. 408.
the matter particular to Socrates' body, and then reform that body the same as it was, by returning particular matter to particular places within it.

However obscure, this was Aquinas's best shot at an alternative to Augustine's atomist account of material continuity and bodily resurrection, within the framework of an Aristotelian physics that had dispensed with atoms.\textsuperscript{514} Admittedly, there are theoretical difficulties even with this very speculative summary of Aquinas's position. Aquinas does not think that the chain of material continuity in the individual will, at the resurrection, simply pick up where it left off at death: as indicated, he thinks that the material from which an individual body is generated will rise in it, but does not, in theory at least, hold that all or indeed any of this matter must still subsist in the body at the end of its life.\textsuperscript{515}

Even if Aquinas does not mention Averroes' work in either of his mature accounts of resurrection, his attempt to work out the consequences of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body for the nature of matter does seem to have consistently pushed him in the direction of violating, or at least partially violating, as Averroes himself had, the principle of the ontological priority of substance to accident. That is to say, it does seem that in his work on the general resurrection Aquinas was moving tentatively towards the idea that matter \textit{in itself} was or could become invested with structural principles, at least in the case of the matter that had belonged to human bodies.

It was suggested in the general introduction that Aquinas failed to be upfront about the extent to which he was moving towards a position in any way similar to Averroes' on matter in his later work on resurrection, not only because of the contemporary association of the Commentator's name with the unorthodox position that there was a single intellect for all humans, but also because the Aristotelian conceptual apparatus with which Aquinas generally worked, in which a completed substance is prior to any accident, created a drag effect on his ability to develop and

\textsuperscript{514} Cf. Reynolds, \textit{Food and the Body}, pp. 413-4: 'No less than an atomist, Thomas believes that matter follows uninterrupted tracks through corruption and generation. This part goes here, and that part goes there. Some of the matter in this Parisian raindrop may once have been fire in Africa. But all things, Thomas says, even the least of them, are in the purview of divine providence'.

\textsuperscript{515} ibid., pp. 390-1.
express new ideas that were in conflict with it. Aquinas was never quite able to openly and clearly to make the intellectual break that was necessary in order to explicitly develop a theory of substantial change that would allow him to give the full and clear account that wanted to give for the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies across their death and resurrection.

When Aquinas stopped referring to Averroes in the context of discussing resurrection, then, he was not necessarily rejecting thereby the value of the Commentator's ideas and insight. Quite to the contrary, it would be more accurate to say that Aquinas's developing ideas on matter and quantitative structure were inspired by and close to Averroes', but that his articulation of them had not yet reached a level of clarity, or conviction, comparable to that found in the Commentator's work.

3.2. Christ's Dead Body and Saints' Relics

Aquinas does not integrate his speculative thinking on the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual human bodies into his work on the topic of postmortem bodily continuity as it arose in other theological contexts: specifically, he does not introduce it in the cases of Christ's dead body and of saints' relics.

Aquinas's position on the identity of saints' relics is expressed in simple terms. Asking himself whether saints' relics are worthy of worship at *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 6, he responds to an objection which points out that saints' relics belong to a different *species* to their living bodies, and suggests that, therefore, they are unworthy of worship. In his reply, Aquinas agrees that a saint's dead body is indeed *formally* different from his or her living body. Yet it is the same thing in another way, he continues, due to the identity of its matter (*identitas materiae*), which is destined to be reunited with its soul.516 Saints' dead bodies should be venerated, not on their own

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516 'corpus mortuum alicuius sancti non est idem numero quod primo fuerit dum viveret, propter diversitatem formae, quae est anima, est tamen idem identitate materiae, quae est iterum suae formae unienda'. *ST* III, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 11, p. 284.
account as dead objects, but for the sake of the souls to which they were united, and for the sake of God whose ministers the saints were.\textsuperscript{517}

The question of the identity of Christ's dead body, however, was exceptionally complicated. Aquinas addressed it at several points during his career. Notably, he was pushed to explain his position further in three separate quodlibetal disputes during his second Parisian regency (1268-72), demonstrating the uncertainty with which his novel theory of the composition of human nature, together with the new account of postmortem bodily continuity that it entailed, was initially met.

By emphatically ruling out that there could be any distinct corporeal substantial form continuous in the body across the separation of its soul at death, and by claiming that there was concrete \textit{material} continuity between the body living and dead, but without offering a truly penetrating analysis of the composition of the dead body, Aquinas had opened up a new area of intense theological debate regarding the precise nature of Christ's dead body.

At Advent 1269 (\textit{Quodlibet II}, q. 1, a. 1), then, Aquinas was asked whether Christ was the same man in the three days of his death (\textit{in triduo}). At Lent 1270 (\textit{Quodlibet III}, q. 2, a. 2), he was asked whether Christ's eye after His death was an 'eye' only equivocally speaking (in clear reference to Aristotle's \textit{De anima} II.1.\textsuperscript{518})\textsuperscript{518}. Finally, at Lent 1271 (\textit{Quodlibet IV}, q. 5), Aquinas was asked whether the body of Christ as it was affixed to the cross, and as it lay in the tomb, was the same in number. Jean-Luc Solère's recent close study of these various discussions has debunked the old view that there was a shift in Aquinas's position on the continuity of Christ's body living and dead between the first two of these quodlibetal disputes on the one hand, and the last of them and his final exposition on the same question at \textit{Summa Theologiae III}, q. 50, a. 5, on the other.\textsuperscript{519}\textsuperscript{519}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{517} ‘corpus insensibile non adoramus propter seipsum, sed propter animam, quae ei fuit unita, quae nunc fruitur Deo; et propter Deum, cuius fuerunt ministri’. \textit{ST III}, q. 25, a. 6, ad 2, ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{518} See above, p. 80 and n. 187.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Aquinas, then, emphasises that Christ's death was a true human death, just as He was truly human. At the moment of His death Christ's body underwent the substantial corruption necessarily attendant on its separation from His soul. In contrast to other human bodies, however, it was preserved from any dissolution beyond this. This, Aquinas explains, was the meaning of Psalm 15:10: 'nor will you give your holy one to see corruption'. So Aquinas insists on the same formal discontinuity between Christ's living and dead body as one would find across any case of human death. Considering just the components of Christ's human nature, only insofar as they are components of that nature, His immortal soul is absolutely the same across death and resurrection but His body is the same only with respect to its matter (secundum materiam).

And so, the material remains of Christ are only equivocally human, and the eye in the tomb was only equivocally an eye. Neutralising his colleagues' objections, Aquinas argues that this must be the case regardless of whether there is one substantial form in Christ's body nature, the soul (a position which, Aquinas notes, seems to be more in harmony with the truth), or more than one, namely a distinct corporeal substantial form. In both cases, the soul is in some sense the form of the body, and therefore, when the body undergoes a true human death, it loses an essential principle, specifically the form placing it in the human species. This means...

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520 'dicendum, quod etsi Christus non sit purus homo, est tamen verus homo, et mors eius fuit vera mors; unde quidquid est verum de homine in quantum est homo, et de morte hominis, totum est verum de Christo et de morte eius'. Quod. III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 247. Aquinas and his contemporaries agreed that it is not correct to say that Christ was human or a man in the three days of his death: a human is body and soul united. This premise was a rare point on which Aquinas and his contemporaries completely disagreed with Peter Lombard, who had held that the union of Christ's body and soul was not necessary for the survival of His humanity across death and resurrection. J. -L. Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb?', p. 530.

521 See, on this last point in particular, Quod. III, q. 2, a. 2, response and ST III, q. 50, a. 5, response.

522 Cited by Aquinas at Quod. IV, q. 5, response.

523 'de Christo in triduo mortis... loqui possimus... quantum ad naturam humanam; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad totam naturam, quae humanitas dicitur: et sic Christus non fuit homo in triduo mortis, unde nec idem homo... aut quantum ad partem humanae naturae: et sic anima quidem fuit omnino eadem numero, eo quod non est transmutata secundum substratum; corpus vero fuit idem numero secundum materiam, sed non secundum formam substantialem, quae est anima. Unde non potest dici quod simpliciter fuerit idem numero, quia quaelibet differentia substantialis excludit idem simpliciter; animatum autem est differentia substantialis; et ideo mori est corrumpi, non alterari tantum. Dicendum est ergo, quod fuit secundum quid idem, secundum quid non idem: secundum materiam enim idem, secundum formam vero non idem'. Quod. II, q. 1, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, pp. 211-2 (my emphasis).
precisely, that Christ's dead body was only equivocally a human body, and His eye was only equivocally an eye, according to either position on the composition of human nature. Indeed, Aquinas notes, to deny that Christ's body underwent true corruption, and lost an essential principle, would be heretical. Here, Aquinas has in mind the heresy of Gaian, which was a version of Monophysitism that taught that a single nature resulted from the union of God and man in Christ, such that that nature including Christ's bodily nature was incorruptible. Whatever one's position regarding the number of substantial forms entering into the nature of the body, it would in fact be heretical to say that Christ's body did not also lose an essential principle: it would be heretical, in other words, to say that Christ's dead body remained unequivocally human, that his dead eye remained unequivocally an eye, or that his corpse was formally exactly the same as His living body. 524

What made Christ's death a particularly complicated case was that doctrine dictated that, notwithstanding any necessary difference obtaining between Christ's living body and its material remains on account of its death, Christ's body as it lay in the tomb, was still absolutely (simpliciter) identical to, or the same in number as, His living body. Theologians commonly held that the hypostatic union of Christ’s divinity to His humanity, once effected, could not be undone: if Christ's divinity did not remain united to His humanity after His death, then at least it remained united to the components of that nature, His body and His soul. 525 This idea in itself implied absolute identity between Christ's body living and dead. Furthermore, the absolute identity of Christ's body in the tomb with His living body was attested both

524 'Dicendum quod aequivocum et univocum dicitur secundum definitivam rationem eandem, vel non eamdem. Ratio autem definitiva cuiuslibet speciei sumitur a forma specifica ipsius. Forma autem specifica hominis est anima rationalis; unde remota anima rationali, non potest remanere homo univoce, sed aequivoco tantum... ita nec dicitur oculus nisi aequivoco; et hoc indifferenter, sive praesupponatur alia forma substantialis in corpore ante animam rationalem, ut quidam volunt; sive non, ut magis videtur consonum veritati. Quodcumque enim essentialium principiorum subtrahatur, iam non remanebit eadem ratio speciei, unde nec nomen univoce dicetur. Solo autem hoc modo anima recedente remaneret corpus humanum et partes eius secundum eamdem rationem speciei, si anima non uniretur corpori ut forma; set tunc sequeretur quod nec per unionem animae esset substantialis generatio, nec per separationem corruptio. Quod quidem ponere in corpore Christi est haereticum. Dicit enim Damascenus in III libro quod... Incorruptibile autem secundum insipientem Iulianum et Galanum corpus domini dicere secundum primum corruptionis significatum ante resurrectionem, impium'. Quod, III, q. 2, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 246. (editor's italics; my emphasis). Aquinas also criticises Gaianism at Quod. IV, q. 5, response, and ST III, q. 50, a. 5, response. For further commentary on passage, including Aquinas's critique of Gaianism, see Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb?', pp. 544-8.

525 J. -L. Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb?', p. 530.
in the Creed, and in scripture. In fact, Aquinas would use the unbroken union of Christ's unchanging divinity to His material remains in order to provide the necessary metaphysical support for the continuing, unconditional numerical identity of His body living and dead.

There is a crucial technical piece of vocabulary to be introduced at this stage. Scholastic theologians used the word supposit (suppositum) to refer to any independently existing, or better, *non-assumed*, individual nature. In every instance of human nature other than Christ's, the *suppositum* is simply the individual human substance, body and soul. In the case of Christ, however, the *suppositum* is the divine person of Christ, which assumed an individual human nature.

Aquinas argues, at *Summa Theologica* III, q. 50, a. 5, that Christ's dead body, although it lacked a soul, therefore lacked life, and thus was not essentially or 'totally' (*totaliter* or *simpliciter*) the same in the tomb, still it was absolutely (*absolute*) identical to His living body, due to its unbroken union to the person of Christ: it was sustained by the same individual subject, or *suppositum*. 'We say that something is absolutely the same', Aquinas writes, 'because it is the same in respect of its supposit'. The dead body of any other human does not remain united to any permanent supposit, and so does not remain the same absolutely, but only relatively (*secundum quid*), that is to say, with respect to its matter (*secundum materiam*), but not its form (*secundum formam*).

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526 'divinitas non fuit separata nec ab anima nec a corpore: quod patet ex symbolo fidei, in quo de filio Dei dicitur, quod *sepultus* est et *descendit ad inferos*. Quod. II, q. 1, a.1, response, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 25, 2, p. 211 (editor's italics).

527 Aquinas cites Matthew XII.40: 'Dicitur enim Matth. XII, 40: *sicut fuit Ionas in ventre ceti tribus diebus et tribus noctibus, ita et Filius hominis in corde terrae*, set non fuit alius Filius hominis in corde terrae nisi Filius hominis qui loquebatur super terram'. Quod. II, q. 1, a.1, arg 1, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 25, 2, p. 211 (editor's italics).


529 *Dicendum quod hoc quod dico simpliciter, potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, quod simpliciter idem est quod absolute... Et hoc modo corpus Christi mortuum et vivum simpliciter fuit idem numero. Dicitur enim alicui esse idem numero simpliciter, quia est supposito idem. Corpus autem Christi vivum et mortuum fuit supposito idem, quia non habuit aliam hypostasim vivum et mortuum, praeter hypostasim Dei verbi... Alio modo, simpliciter idem est quod omnino vel totaliter. Et sic corpus Christi motuum et vivum non fuit simpliciter idem numero. Quia non fuit totaliter idem, cum vita sit alicui de essentia corporis viventi, est enim predicatum essentiale... unde consequens est quod corpus quod desinit esse vivum non totaliter idem remanet*, 'dicendum quod corpus mortuum cuiuscumque alterius hominis non remanet unitum alicui hypostasi permanenti, sicut corpus mortuum Christi. Et ideo corpus mortuum cuiuscumque alterius hominis non est idem simpliciter, sed
Aquinas thus decouples the question of Christ's dead body's substantial nature, on the one hand, from the question of its numerical identity, on the other. The former question does not consider the suppositum or person of Christ at all, and has to do with the components of His human nature just insofar as they are components of that human nature, a nature that undergoes a true human death. And the absolute identity of Christ's dead body with His living body, founded upon its unbreakable union to the very same suppositum, trumps completely the natural substantial difference in that body resulting from its true death: the body of Christ as it hung living on the cross and lay dead in the tomb, Aquinas therefore writes, was unconditionally the same in number.

Not totally, and yet absolutely the same: that, in sum, was Aquinas's necessarily complicated solution to a particularly involved theological balancing act that demanded that he maintain both that Christ's dead body was transformed in death, and yet that remained unconditionally His body.

Conclusions

Aquinas thought that the resurrection of an individual human body would involve, quite literally, the location and reintegration of the material particular to it by God, so he worked hard to produce a theory of bodily identity which both faithfully followed Aristotle's, on the one hand, and preserved the idea that the individual body's material continuity was crucial to its continuing self-identity, on the other. He reached the conclusion that, during body's mortal lifetime, an unbroken material continuum, albeit one that underwent gradual augmentation, diminution, wastage and replacement, was necessary in order to guarantee that that body

secundum quid, quia est idem secum materiam, non autem idem secundum formam'. ST III, q. 50, a. 5, response and ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 11, p. 484.

530 Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb?', p. 547.

531 'Sic igitur corpus Christi post mortem est simpliciter idem secundum substanciam que est ypostasis, non autem secundum substanciam quae est essencia vel natura. Univocatio autem et aequipvocatio non respicit suppositum, sed essenciam vel naturam, quam significat diffinitio'. Quod. III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 247.

532 'oportet nos ponere ydemptitatem secundum suppositum in corpore Christi appenso cruci et posito in sepulcro... oportet nos ponere veram differentiam mortis et vitae. Sed quia prima unitas maior est quam secunda differentia, dicendum est, quod est idem numero corpus Christi appensum cruci et iacens in sepulcro'. Quod. IV, q. 5, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 327.
remained the same thing. The accidental form in the body responsible for its relative independence from the soul, that gave it its organic structure, and which individualised its matter, namely dimensive quantity, was the same form that supported the continuing identity of the body's matter.

Aquinas clearly thought that an individual body's matter remained the same thing in a real and concrete sense after its soul departed at death, and that that individual matter, the material aspect of the 'truth of human nature' in that individual, retained its identity whatever the sequences of substantial changes for which it might serve as the substratum over the period separating that body's death from its resurrection.

He is so consistently masterful in reconciling philosophical authorities, both with the requirements of the faith, and with one another, that it comes as a surprise when the philosophical conclusions that Aquinas presents appear to be anything less than perfectly internally coherent and thoroughly worked-out in advance. Yet this is precisely the state of affairs that the interpreter of his work on postmortem bodily continuity, and in particular in his work on the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies across death and resurrection, faces. Here Aquinas was required to innovate in an area in which the best available scientific theory by common consensus, Aristotle's, had almost nothing to offer. He was pushed to his intellectual limits: there are significant unresolved tensions in Aquinas's account of postmortem material continuity, as he struggles to put in clear terms what he evidently wants to say.

Aquinas had already wrought a complete overhaul in the contemporary understanding of the basic composition of human nature, in order to bring it into much closer alignment with the implications of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. The theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, he argued, was the only available theory of the composition of human nature that could guarantee that each soul would be reunited with the matter particular to it own body at the resurrection, and was the only theory that could guarantee the continuity of the body's substantial form across death and resurrection: that form just was the immortal soul.

On reflection, perhaps it is not such a great surprise that the details of the new theory of postmortem bodily continuity that was tied to Aquinas's innovative theory
of human nature were left less than exhaustively explored, and that not every potential future objection was already accounted for. In the event, Aquinas's late thirteenth-century Franciscan critics would find a way to argue that the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans could provide no concrete account whatsoever of postmortem bodily continuity. The next chapter will explore three Dominicans' very different responses to this challenge.
CHAPTER 5

POSTMORTEM BODILY CONTINUITY IN
DOMINICAN THOUGHT (1277-1286): THOMAS OF
SUTTON, ROBERT OF ORFORD, AND RICHARD
KNAPWELL

Introduction

'It should be considered that, in order that the identity of the human body be preserved at various points in time, each party of opinion imputes error to the other with respect to the faith. For just as those who posit many forms put it to the contrary party of opinion that their position cannot safeguard the fact that the body of Christ living and dead was the same in number, so, on the contrary, those who posit a single form in a human put it to their adversaries that their position cannot safeguard the fact that, after the general resurrection, the bodies of those who rise should be the same in number as they were before death'.

The above summary of the thirteenth century's defining debate on the composition of human nature is taken from the Dominican Thomas of Sutton's *De pluralitate formarum*, written in Oxford in 1278. On the one side were the (mostly Dominican) advocates of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in

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humans. On the other side were the (mostly Franciscan) advocates of an alternative kind of theory that posited a plurality of substantial forms in a human being, including, crucially, a corporeal substantial form distinct from the rational soul. The topic of bodily identity, and particularly of postmortem bodily continuity, was central to the debate, and the primary weapon wielded by each side was the accusation that the other side's position led to false theological consequences. Pluralists initiated the debate, arguing that Aquinas's theory of human nature could provide no account of the identity of Christ's dead body, or indeed the relics of saints, because it could not provide for the continuity of any bodily substantial form across the separation of the soul. Defenders of Aquinas's philosophy argued that pluralist theory ran into deep difficulties when it came to giving an account of the identity of individual bodies at the general resurrection. There were accusations of heresy from both sides, and, on 30 April 1286, in the presence of a special council of bishops convened at the church of St. Mary of the Bow in London, the Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury John Peckham condemned the theory that the rational soul is the only substantial form in a human being, along with several of its heretical consequences, as he saw them at least, in the area of postmortem bodily continuity. Peckham himself advocated a pluralist theory of human nature, and had opposed several of Aquinas's philosophical positions when Aquinas's opposite number as Franciscan regent master at Paris during (1269-71).

The above, not surprisingly, is a rather simplified summary of what would become a deeply complex dispute: the surviving record of theological writings from the period covered by this chapter, when read closely, tells us that the scholastic debate over whether there was one substantial form in a human being or more than one was far from being a simple clash of two already statically defined visions of the

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534 For the condemned articles see Registrum epistolarum fratris Johannis Peckham archiepiscopi cantuariensis (hereafter Registrum), 3 vols. (ed.) C. T. Martin (London: Longman, 1882-5), vol. 3, pp. 922-3; the final article reads, ‘Octavus est, quod in homine est tantum una forma, scilicet anima rationalis, et nulla alia forma substantialis; ex qua opinione sequi videtur omnes haereses supradictae’.

composition of human nature advocated by two opposed camps of theologians, focussing on a mere two theological topics.

However, the main goal of the present chapter's discussion is not to retread ground already carefully covered by the most recent study of this seminal scholastic debate, namely Alain Boureau's *Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle: le cas de Jean Peckham* (1999),536 even if the more detailed outline of the debate to be presented in the remainder of this introduction is indebted to Boureau's research. Boureau's magisterial book traces the major intellectual developments in the dispute over the consequences of Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being up to 1286, and analyses the form of and grounds for the condemnation, and the career and character of John Peckham. It should remain the first point of reference for any reader particularly interested in the contribution of the highly original secular master Henry of Ghent, the evolution of whose thought on the composition of human nature during 1276-86 culminated in the development of a 'dimorphic' theory that posited a single substantial form in every other kind of material being, but two substantial forms in a human.537 And any researcher interested in the way in which the involved issue of transubstantiation figured in the debate, into the orbit of which were drawn several theological topics which demanded an account of bodily continuity, including original sin and the incarnation, should also begin with Boureau.538

This final chapter necessarily has a rather more modest aim. It will supply a detailed discussion on a topic for which Boureau does not make much room at all: the early reception of Aquinas's work on the composition of human nature, the individual body, and bodily identity in *Dominican* thought, specifically, during 1277-86. More precisely, it will closely examine the different ways in which three


538 Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure*, pp. 127-34.
Dominicans at Oxford, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, defended and interpreted Aquinas's work in these areas in their respective responses to pluralist criticism. As far as the theological issues involved in the debate are concerned, there is space to cover only two in any depth, namely the two issues in the area of postmortem bodily continuity identified as crucial by Thomas of Sutton, which remained central to the debate: the identity of Christ's corpse, and bodily identity at the general resurrection.

Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, as will become clear, developed wildly divergent accounts of the individual human body and of postmortem bodily continuity, notwithstanding the fact that they worked at close quarters to defend Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans against the same pluralist criticisms. Significant differences between their respective accounts of the composition of human nature emerge as soon as one descends from the level of their mere acceptance of the theory that the soul is the only substantial form giving existence to the human being, to the level of their underlying justifications and reasoning.

After engaging with the detail, the chapter will conclude by taking a step back and reflecting on the nature of the so-called 'early Thomistic school'. As indicated, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell have been grouped together under this banner by Frederick Roensch and Francis Kelley,539 who have both worked closely on the reception of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans in these Dominicans' writings. The works of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell from 1277-86, it is true, can provide only a snapshot of the early writings produced by members of the Dominican Order in defence of Aquinas's new theory of the composition of human nature. Even so, it is certainly justifiable to ask how, exactly, historians can speak meaningfully of the beginnings of a Thomistic school with Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, given that their works display no formally common understanding of what one of Aquinas's central theses entailed.

539 See above, p. 31 and n. 40.
With the exception of Richard Knapwell's *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*, to be discussed at the end of the chapter, the texts of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell to be examined here do not fall into any ordinary genre of scholastic writing. They are polemical works rather than *Sentences* commentaries, philosophical commentaries, *Quaestiones disputatae* or *Quodlibeta*. In fact, very little else survives of the theological writings of any of these authors from the period covered by this chapter.\(^540\) So, of course, both the relevant ideas in Aquinas's own works, and the layer of pluralist criticism that had been added to those ideas, to which Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell were immediately responding, furnished the intellectual context from which their own arguments and interpretations emerged. That intellectual context will be sketched out in this extended introduction, but first, why were the chronological limits of the present chapter's discussion set at 1277-86?

If the condemnation of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans on 30 April 1286 provides a natural chronological *terminus ad quem*, then it was the condemnation and censure of certain positions in philosophy and theology in Paris and Oxford in March 1277 that gave to the deep controversy that would surround Aquinas's theory of human nature and its theological implications its critical impetus.

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\(^540\) For lists of the surviving works of these authors in manuscript or printed edition, along with documented works that are not known to survive, see R. Sharpe, *A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 487, 567-8, 682-4. There is one manuscript containing *Quaestiones* on the *Sentences* ascribed to 'Thomas Anglicus', which might have been Thomas of Sutton's work, and might have originated from 1277-86. Thomas of Sutton's major surviving theological writings, his *Quodlibeta* and *Quaestiones Ordinariae*, along with his critique of Books I-III of Robert Cowton's *Sentences* commentary and of Book IV of Scotus's, were written after 1286. Robert of Orford's *Sentences* commentary does not survive. His *Quodlibeta*, an extended attack on Henry of Ghent, and his critique of Giles of Rome date from 1289-93 and 1288-91 respectively; cf. A. P. Vella, *Robert of Oxford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford in the late Thirteenth Century* (unpublished B. Litt. dissertation, Oxford Univ., 1946), MS. Bodleian B./M. Litt. c. 30), pp. 18-20, and *Robert d'Orford, Reprobationes dictorum a fratre egidio in primum sententiarum* (ed.) A. P. Vella, *Les premières polémiques thomistes* (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1968). In addition to the works of Richard Knapwell to discussed in this chapter, we have his 'notes' (*Notabilia*) on the first book of the *Sentences* from 1273-7 which have been used to trace the early development of his thought on the unicity of substantial form (see M.-D., Chenu, *La première diffusion de Thomisme à Oxford*. Klapwell et ses "notes" sur les Sentences', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 3 (1928), pp. 185-200), another *Quaestio disputata*, and a single *Quodlibet* (dating from 1284-5) comprising 29 questions, including a short discussion of individuation. On this *Quodlibet*, see comments in Friedman, 'Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, CA. 1260-1330', pp. 418-9, and Pickavé, 'The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in *Quodlibeta* (1277-CA. 1320)', both in Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, pp. 59-60, 418-9.
The Franciscan William de la Mare wrote his famous \textit{Correctorium fratris Thomae},\footnote{The first redaction of the \textit{Correctorium fratris Thomae} (hereafter \textit{CFT}), to which all of the Dominican writings discussed in this chapter were responding, is edited along with Richard Knapwell's response, \textit{Quare}, in \textit{Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"}, (ed.) P. Glorieux, \textit{Les premières polémiques thomistes}, 1 (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927). The second redaction of the \textit{Correctorium} (1282-85) dropped 9 articles to do with Aquinas's \textit{Sentences} commentary, and added a further 25. A recent discussion of the second redaction is A. Olivia, 'La deuxième rédaction du Correctorium de Guillaume de la Mare: les questions concernant la I Pars', \textit{Archivum Franciscum Historicum} (2005), pp. 423-64. de la Mare probably followed Peckham as Franciscan regent master in Theology at Paris from 1271-2. His \textit{Sentences} commentary borrowed extensively from Peckham's, whilst showing a far more respectful attitude to Aquinas's work than the \textit{Correctorium fratris Thomae}. On his career and writings, see H. Kraml, 'William de la Mare' in P. W. Rosemann (ed.), \textit{Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard} vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 228-38.} containing the key pluralist critique of the theory and its consequences for postmortem bodily continuity, with reference to these condemnations. And it was only after March 1277, in response to these condemnations and to de la Mare's text, that Dominicans began to write extended tracts for the purpose of defending Aquinas's philosophy of human nature, reporting of theologians dividing themselves into two opposed groups, each openly accusing the other of heresy.

This is not to say that the \textit{Correctorium fratris Thomae} began the scholastic debate surrounding the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its consequences full-stop; it is simply to say that the evidence we have from before March 1277 suggests that the debate was previously largely confined to the schoolroom. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that Aquinas himself, although he had maintained his position on the identity of Christ's dead body openly and without censure until his death in 1274,\footnote{Cf. discussion of the old debate on this point in Boureau, \textit{Théologie, science et censure}, p. 71.} had been pushed to clarify it in quodlibetal disputes.\footnote{See chapter 4, section 3.2.}

Aquinas's own explanations, then, did not dispel the evident uncertainty among his contemporaries at the Parisian Theology faculty regarding the implications of his new theory of human nature. In the mid-1270s (Van Steenberghen defends the dating 1273-76),\footnote{F. Van Steenberghen, \textit{Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale} (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974), pp. 454-6.} the Dominican scholar Giles of Lessines wrote from Paris to Albertus Magnus, asking for his pronouncement on several positions that that were being put forward by certain masters of high repute and 'attacked in several
assemblies', including the position that Christ's body dead in the tomb was not absolutely the same as His body when it was suspended from the cross, but only in a certain sense (*secundum quid*). The wording of this position reflected the quodlibetal question that Aquinas had debated at Lent 1271. Albertus Magnus replied that it was temerarious for any philosopher to speak of the nature of Christ's dead body; no philosopher should say too much on this topic, because it did not fall under human reason.\textsuperscript{545}

The new generation of theologians at Paris, their interest in the topic ignited by Aquinas's innovatory work on the composition of human nature, displayed no such qualms. As Boureau points out, it was Henry of Ghent, in his *Quodlibet* I, q. 4 (1276), who made the first recorded link between Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being and the controversial idea that a new substantial form might have been introduced into Christ's dead body. This supposed consequence of Aquinas's theory of human nature would subsequently become crucial to de la Mare's critique of the theory. Henry of Ghent explained that the introduction of a new 'form of corruption' (*forma putredinis*) into Christ's corpse would have contradicted Psalm 15.10,\textsuperscript{546} and entailed that Christ's dead body underwent an extreme and therefore profoundly unfitting kind of dissolution.\textsuperscript{547}

Turning to the censures of March 1277, as is well established, it was in Oxford, and not in Paris, that the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was *publicly* condemned, or rather was widely *perceived* to have been publicly condemned. Robert Wielockx's careful unpicking of the events of that turbulent month in university life, however, has demonstrated that the theory came close to being condemned in Paris, too. The 219 erroneous positions apparently being taught at

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\textsuperscript{545} 'Articulos quod proponunt magistri in scolis Parisius, qui in philosophia maiores reputantur... eos tamen in multis congregationibus impugnatos...'; 'Quod autem XIV° ponitur, scilicet quod corpus Christi iacens in sepulcro et suspensum in cruce non sit idem numero simpliciter, sed secundum quid... Sed de corpore Christi loqui per philosophiam temerarium est, eo quod rationi humanae non subicitur... De hoc tamen non multum loqui est philosopho'. Albertus Magnus, *De quindecim problematis* (ed.) P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et L'Averroïsme Latin au XIIIe siècle*, vol. 2, *Les Philosophes Belges*, VII (Louvain: L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1908), pp. 29, 51.

\textsuperscript{546} See above, p. 189.

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the Parisian Arts faculty that were condemned by bishop of Paris Stephen Tempier with the cooperation of a commission of theologians on 7 March 1277 touched upon Aquinas's position that individuation is by matter but did not include the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. Nonetheless, in the Correctorium fratris Thomae, William de la Mare claims that masters at Paris condemned both positions. In the case of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, Wielockx argues, de la Mare is very probably referring to an incident for which two further witnesses survive: the first redaction of Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet X, q. 5 (1286) and John Peckham's Archiepiscopal register from Canterbury.

The same commission of theologians, then, was reconvened by Tempier twice more during March 1277: first to censure the Augustinian friar Giles of Rome's Sentences commentary (including the position that 'in any composite there is only one form'), and afterwards to consider a further set of theological propositions, among which was the position that the rational soul is the only substantial form in a human being. According to Henry of Ghent's memory of these events, the Franciscan papal legate in Paris Simon de Brion, present in these discussions, condemned this position 'although not publicly' (licet non publice) and all but two of the Theology masters (presumably the two Dominicans) voted to censure the theory. This time, however, Tempier delayed pronouncing a condemnation in order to seek approval from the


549 The censors had the nature of angels in view. 'Quod, quia intelligentie non habent materiam, deus non posset plures eiusdem speciei facere', a. 81 (43), 'Quod deus non potest multiplicare individua sub una specie sine materia', a. 96 (42), Piché with Laffleur, La Condamnation Parisienne, pp. 104, 108; cf. Hissette, Enquête, pp. 82-7.

550 The notion that the intellect was not in any way the act or essential perfection of the body was condemned, with the theory of the unique intellect for all humans in view. 'Quod intellectus non est actus corporis, nisi sicut nauta nautis, nec est perfectio essentialis hominis', Piché with Laffleur, La Condamnation Parisienne, a. 7 (123), p. 82; cf. Hissette, Enquête, pp. 199-201 and Bourreau, Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle, pp. 72-3.

551 'Haec positio de unitate formae substantialis reprobatur a magistris...', 'Supponendo autem quod in homine et in coeteris animatis non est alia forma prater animam sicut opinatur, tenet consequentia; sed suppositio falsa est, et a magistris Parisius condemnata', de la Mare, CFT, a. 31 and a. 32 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 129, 145 (and see a. 11, p. 60 for de la Mare's reference to the condemnation of individuation by matter in connection with the problem of the nature of angels).

Curia. The process was halted during the period of papal *interregnum* during May-November 1277, at which time Peckham was lector there.553

On 18 March 1277 in Oxford, however, the Dominican Archbishop Robert Kilwardby, with the cooperation of an assembly of regent and non-regent masters, went ahead with placing a prohibition on the teaching and assertion of certain positions in natural philosophy. Some of these were obviously related to the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and Aquinas's position on substantial change, including the notion that a body living and dead is the same thing only equivocally, or in a relative sense (*secundum quid*).554 Kilwardby's half of a subsequent correspondence with the Dominican Archbishop of Corinth Peter of Conflans (then resident at the Curia), justifying why he had targeted certain of the articles, leaves no doubt either as to the fact that the prohibition was being perceived as a direct attack on the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, or as to Kilwardby's view that the theory was dangerous to the faith. It is not clear from the text of the prohibition whether Kilwardby had the case of Christ's dead body, in particular, in his sights on 18 March. Nor did his *apologia* include any direct comment on the


554 'Item quod corpus vivum et mortuum est equivoce corpus, et corpus mortuum secundum quod corpus mortuum sit corpus secundum quid', a. 13 (*In Naturalibus*). Also condemned *In Naturalibus* were the ideas that [a. 2] a form corrupts into nothing absolutely, and the related idea [a. 3] that there are no 'active potencies' in matter; that [a. 7] that when the intellectual soul arrives at the human embryo the vegetative and sensitive souls corrupt; that [a. 12] the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual souls are a simple form; and that [a. 16] the intellectual soul is united to prime matter in such a way that that which precedes it corrupts to the level of prime matter (*usque ad materiam primam*). This last position is an inference incorrectly drawn from Aquinas's theory of substantial change: Aquinas did not hold that corruption to the level of prime matter ever naturally occurred. (See above, p. 177 and n. 494). For the full list of articles *In Grammaticalibus*, *In Logicalibus* and *In Naturalibus*, see Ch. Denifle and Chatelain vol. 1, n. 474, p. 558-9.
prohibited position on postmortem bodily continuity just mentioned, or on the composition of Christ's corpse.\(^{555}\)

Now, the ideas from Aquinas's own writings that would become most relevant to the debate were covered in some detail in chapters 3 and 4. Those chapters set out how Aquinas's thought on the individual body, bodily identity, and postmortem bodily continuity was shaped by certain presuppositions about the composition of human nature related, in particular, to the doctrine of the general resurrection.

We will begin to set out the intellectual backdrop for the Dominican writings to be discussed in this chapter by revisiting Aquinas's work on the general resurrection, and by isolating the origins, in particular, of the counter-attack that Thomas of Sutton reports to have been launched by defenders of Aquinas's theory of human nature, against its pluralist critics. For Aquinas, as was explained, the notion of resurrection implied an essential and most intimate union between the soul and matter in the human individual, so that it would make sense to say that a soul could be reunited only to the matter that had formerly belonged to its own body at the resurrection: in Aquinas's view, each soul bore a unique relationship, or commensuratio to its own matter. And so, he reasoned, the doctrine of resurrection demanded that the soul be the only substantial form in a human being, because any intervening corporeal substantial form would render the union between a particular soul and particular matter merely incidental. More to the immediate point, Aquinas asked how, if there were some additional, corruptible substantial form in an individual human body, that form, and therefore that body could return identical at the resurrection. Here, it will be remembered, he had in mind the Aristotelian axiom on continuity

\(^{555}\) Kilwardby's apologia is edited in two parts. The first justifies the prohibition of certain of the articles, beginning by explaining that they were not condemned as heresies, but their reading, teaching and dogmatic assertion was prohibited because some were clearly false, some deviated from philosophical truth, some were close to intolerable errors, and some were unacceptable according to the faith. F. Ehrle, 'Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts', Archiv für Literatur-und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, 5 (Freiburg: Herder, 1889), pp. 614-32. The second part deals directly with the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans ("positio de unitate formae"), which Kilwardby explains was not on the list of prohibited articles, but is still a foolish opinion ("fatuus positio") and against the faith ("contra fidem"), and if followed pertinaciously, should be reproved as erroneous ("temeritas illa... si comitaretur pertinacia, esset tamquam erronea reprobanda"). A. Birkenmajer, Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 20 (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1922), pp. 60-4.
and identity from *De generatione et corruptione*: a substance, once corrupted, could never return as exactly the same individual.\textsuperscript{556}

The topic of the general resurrection was not raised by de la Mare in his *Correctorium fratris Thomae*,\textsuperscript{557} even though the Parisian censure of 7 March 1277 had drawn attention to this Aristotelian axiom and its implications for an account of bodily resurrection: among the 219 condemned articles was the position that 'a corrupted body cannot return, or rise again, the same in number'.\textsuperscript{558}

The very earliest surviving Dominican contribution to the debate surrounding the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological implications post 1277, Giles of Lessines' *De unitate formae* (written in Paris, during July 1278),\textsuperscript{559} highlights, as the particularly unfitting consequence of pluralist theory, that it would appear to be incompatible with the doctrine of the general resurrection. *De unitate formae*, whilst it responds to arguments contained within de la Mare's *Correctorium*, is also in part a direct response to Robert Kilwardby's *apologia* in reply to Peter of Conflans. Kilwardby had briefly discussed the general resurrection when justifying why he had prohibited the teaching of the ideas that 'a form corrupts into nothing, absolutely', and that the 'vegetative, sensitive, and intellective souls are one substance'. He had explained that it is necessary to posit *rationes seminales* in matter, or certain principles from which corruptible substantial forms are drawn out of matter, and into which they corrupt, in order to support the continuity of corruptible bodily

\textsuperscript{556} See above, pp. 17-18, and n. 21; chapter 3, section 1 and subsections; and chapter 4, section 2.2.

\textsuperscript{557} de la Mare does briefly discuss the scriptural account of Christ's resurrection at John 2.19, but only to make an point about His body's immediate postmortem bodily continuity. See passage beginning 'Item, tertio, quia repugnat Sacrae Scripturae. Ioann.2: Solvite templum hoc'. de la Mare, *CFT*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 131.


\textsuperscript{559} *De unitate formae* (hereafter *DUF*) is edited: Giles of Lessines, *De unitate formae* (ed.) M. de Wulf, *Les Philosophes de Moyen Âge*, 1 (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1902). See editor's introduction, pp. 79-81 on the dating of *De unitate formae*, and pp. 57-89 on Giles of Lessines' career and other works. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, pp. 89-90 also gives a biographical summary for Giles of Lessines.
forms across death and resurrection. The Franciscan Bonaventure, of course, had also made use of *rationes seminales* in matter in this way in his own work on bodily continuity across death and resurrection.

If Giles of Lessines means to criticise Kilwardby's account of the general resurrection in *De unitate formae*, then he does so only implicitly. He argues simply that the additional substantial form that the pluralists posit human body would corrupt into nothing after bodily decay (*in nihilum*): the resurrected body would have to be 'reconstructed' with a different corporeal form would not, therefore, be the same in number as the mortal body. He points out that only the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, according to which the immortal soul is the individual body's only substantial form, can guarantee that body's *formal* identity at the resurrection. Thomas of Sutton puts forward a criticism of pluralist theory that is broadly similar in his *De pluralitate formarum*, as we will see.

The power of this elegant criticism of the pluralist position is attested by the fact that it riled pluralist opponents of Aquinas's philosophy. The Franciscan Roger Marston, a former pupil of Peckham when at Paris, debated his *Quodlibet* IV as regent master at Oxford in Lent 1284. He points out (q.9) that 'certain people' temerarily argue that corruptible bodily forms cannot be drawn out of, or 'educed from' the same matter at the resurrection even by divine power (specifically citing Christ's resurrection), and therefore fall into error: he himself advocates the position that there are *rationes seminales* in matter, to support the continuity of

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561 See above, p. 167-8 and n. 459.

562 Passage beginning 'Inde si corpus mortuum incineratur, constat quod non manet cadem forma corporis', and ending 'et identitas numero praecipue salvatur in resurrectione, tam ex parte formae corporis, quae in vivente est anima, quam ex parte animae, quae cadem numero manet non corrupta', Giles of Lessines, *DF*, pt. 3, ch. 3, III (ed.) de Wulf, p. 66.

individual corruptible bodily forms across death and resurrection. Furthermore, Marston argues (q.27) that God could reconstruct any individual body the same as it was in mortal life, even if none of the material particular to it remained. John Peckham himself, in a letter to the Chancellor and Masters of Oxford dated 7 December 1284, recalls his utter outrage at hearing that certain defenders of the 'erroneous' theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human had 'tumbled into a pit of such subversion' as to have made the particular argument, verbally and in writing, that 'if a human had any substantial form besides the rational soul, the corrupted human body could not be repaired the same in number, even miraculously.'

On what grounds, conversely, did pluralists initially attack Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its consequences? Returning again to Aquinas's work on the individual body, it will be recalled that, in addition to an intimate union of soul and body in human nature, Aquinas took it that the resurrection implied the relative independence of the body from the soul as a component of the human being: the body in its own right was an essential part of human nature, and each human individual would be incomplete without his or her own material part. As Thomas of Sutton suggests in his summary of the debate, and as will be evident, too, from what has already been set out regarding the debate surrounding Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans up to 1277, the pluralist critique of the theory would focus on Aquinas's account of the body's independence from the soul, and particularly on his account of the body's postmortem independence from the soul.

Aquinas himself, of course, had suggested that the material part in any human being was a complex and highly differentiated material subject, suitable for a rational soul: the soul's 'proper matter'. He thought that material part in a human individual

564 Marston, Quodlibet IV, q. 9 (Utrum vegetativa et sensitiva in Christo sint eductae de materia) (eds.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 385.

565 Marston, Quodlibet IV, q. 27 (Utrum per generativam vel nutritivam aliquid transeat de alimento in id quod resurget), ad 1 (eds.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 427.

566 'subiunximus nos quosdam istius erroris temerarios defensores in tantae subversionis foveam corruisse, ut dixerunt scilicet et scripserint, "quod si homo haberet alam formam ad anima rationali, non posset corpus hominis corruptum, idem numero etiam per miraculum reparari". Peckham, Registrum (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, p. 866.
admitted of a unique complexity, or 'capacity', proportionate, of course, to its own soul. He grounded the relative independence of the material part in each human individual from their soul, moreover, on a corporeal form that give to the body's matter its organic structure and individualised that matter. This was not a substantial form, but an accidental form, or property of the individual bodily substance; Aquinas called this accidental form 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva).\textsuperscript{567}

But Aquinas did not supply his account of the postmortem bodily independence from soul, or, in other words, the identity of the material remains of any human individual, with much technical detail at all. He had stated that any corpse, including the remains of any saint, was formally different from the individual human body that had corrupted into it, but was the same with respect to its matter (secundum materiam).\textsuperscript{568} But what did it mean, exactly, for the living body and corpse to be the same secundum materiam?

In the context of his discussions of the general resurrection, it is true, Aquinas had accounted for the identity and continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies across death, bodily decomposition and dispersion, and resurrection, by advancing a speculative argument inspired by the Commentator Averroes' work on matter. In the case of each body, Aquinas had suggested, traces of the individualised quantitative structure formerly belonging to it would remain in the matter particular to it. But he did not back up this account with any detailed explanation of the metaphysical status of these structural elements in matter, and neither did he tie this analysis together with his discussions of postmortem bodily continuity in other contexts.

In the case of Christ, Aquinas had held that His dead body was not totally (totaliter) the same as His living body considering just His human nature: it had undergone a true human death, and so was formally different, if materially the same across this change. He had also argued that Christ's dead body was absolutely (simpliciter) the same as His living body: with Christ, unlike with any other human being, the ultimate (or non-assumed) metaphysical subject, or supposit (suppositum)

\textsuperscript{567} See above, chapter 3, esp. sections 2, 3.2 and 4.

\textsuperscript{568} See above, chapter 4, section 3.
was not of course His individual human nature itself, but instead His very divine person, which had assumed that individual nature and remained inseparably united to it. Aquinas grounded the absolute numerical identity of Christ's material remains on their continued union to the same divine supposit or subject. But in any case, again, what exactly did it mean for Christ's dead body to be the same *secundum materiam* as His dead body?

Every Dominican tract produced in defence of Aquinas's philosophy and its consequences for Christ's corpse during 1277-86 was responding to arguments contained within William de la Mare's *Correctorium fratris Thomae* on this topic. Composed in Paris, as indicated, during or soon after March 1277, the *Correctorium* was a wide-ranging critique of some 117 positions drawn from across several of Aquinas's works, but it was dominated by an attack on the theory of the unicity of substantial from in humans and other theses directly related to it. The crucial article for the purposes of this chapter's discussion is article 31, devoted to attacking the precise position that 'in a human being there is only one substantial form', along with several of its theological consequences.

William de la Mare's interpretation of Aquinas's position that Christ's corpse was the same as His living body *secundum materiam*, but formally different, was simple: either Christ's corpse was a featureless *prime* matter alone, an absurd conclusion, because then it would not have been a body at all, or (following Henry of Ghent's

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570 On the dating of the *Correctorium fratris Thomae* see Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure*, p. 75.

571 'Quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis', de la Mare, *CFT*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 127-35 (the direct target of de la Mare's critique here is Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 76, a. 3). Including a. 31, at least 22 articles in the *Correctorium fratris Thomae* are directly related to Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. On Christ's corpse, see also a. 107 ('Quod corpus Christi in triduo quoad aliquid non fuit idem quod prius'). In addition, see esp. a. 32 ('Quod nulla dispositio accidentalis praeexistit in materia ante inductionem formae substantialis'); a. 90 ('Quod anima unitur materiae corporali sine medio'); article 98 ('Quod anima vegetativa, sensitiva et rationalis sunt una substantia in homine'); and a. 102 ('Quod impossibile est plures formas substantiales esse in eodem'). The position that the soul communicates to the composite its only act of existence (*esse*) is criticised in articles 52, 86, and 114. Individuation by matter and Aquinas's denial of matter/form composition in the human soul and in angels are targetted at articles 8, 10, 11, 12, 28, 29, 30, 88, 100, 113, 115. Aquinas's thought on the role of matter in generation, including his denial that matter is the seat of *rationes seminales*, is targetted at articles 27 and 85.
suggestion in his *Quodlibet* I, q. 4) it had a new corporeal form. Either way, it could not be the same thing as His living body.572

The related pluralist argument that it would follow from Aquinas's philosophy that the relic was not *really* the saint's body was not found in the *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, but entered the debate in its early stages nonetheless. Concern for the implications that certain philosophical positions being taught at the Arts faculty in Paris might have for the cult of the dead was evident in the condemnation of 7 March 1277: on the list of 219 censured articles was the position that 'it is not necessary to care for those who are to be buried'.573 The Augustinian friar Giles of Rome points out in his *De gradibus formarum*, which, written in Rome after Christmas 1277 and before Easter 1278,574 is the earliest surviving treatise from any scholar defending the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans,575 that the very greatest difficulty in the scholarly debate over the composition of human nature has arisen because of the Aristotelian notion that corpse is only *equivocally*, or in name, and not *really* flesh and bone. He adds that this position seems, to the ears of the faithful, to be a 'great error', because it implies *both* that Christ's dead flesh was not really flesh, *and* that the bones of saints are not really bones.576

572 *si autem illius corporis Christi non fuisset alia forma substantialis quam intellectiva, postquam fuit separata, remansit prima materia sola vel alia forma substantialis introducta. Ex quibus sequitur quod non fuit idem corpus numero... Si enim remansit sola materia, non erat corpus; ergo nec idem corpus numero, materia enim prima non est corpus... Si vero propter hoc dicatur quod alia forma substantialis... introducta, sequitur ex hoc quod Corpus Christi vivum et mortuum non fuit idem numero; ubi enim est alia forma substantialis, ibi et aliud corpus*. de la Mare, *CFT*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 129-30.


574 Giles of Rome's *De gradibus formarum* also circulated under the title *Contra gradus et pluralitates formarum*. On its dating, see Vella, *Robert of Orford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford*, p. 42 and Callus, 'The Problem of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell', p. 125.


576 *Difficultatem maximam facit in proposito equivocatio que videtur consurgere circa carnes et ossa vivorum et mortuorum, quia recedente anime secundum philosophum non remanet caro nisi equivoco, et os nisi equivoco.... secundum hoc via philosophi magnam errorem generat in auribus..."*
So what account of postmortem bodily continuity could Aquinas's defenders develop, based on his texts? In order to counterpoint and clarify the distinctiveness of the approach of Aquinas's Dominican defenders to their respective analyses of the relative independence of the individual body from the soul, and of its continuity across the soul's separation, it will be essential to explore in slightly more detail the position of his pluralist critics.

The *Correctorium fratris Thomae* itself was foremost an analytical critique, and did not offer a particularly detailed, positive, pluralist account of postmortem bodily continuity. Of course, all of the Franciscan pluralist theories of the late thirteenth-century were worked out in response to Aquinas's work, so the development of a range of alternatives that could match Aquinas's in the refinement of their metaphysical underpinning necessarily took time.\(^{577}\) For now, it is important to grasp only two very simple assumptions that lie behind William de la Mare's argument in article 31 of the *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, and are common to all of the pluralist accounts of postmortem bodily continuity that we do have from the period 1277-86.

First, as will probably be obvious from what has already been explained, these pluralist works assume that continuity of a bodily substantial form is *necessary* to support *any* concrete bodily continuity, be it across the soul's infusion, or its separation. Second, on a closely related and more technical note, in order that there can be at least one other substantial form entering into human nature in addition to the soul, such pluralist accounts assume that a substantial form can admit of an *incomplete* or partial nature in itself, and can itself communicate an *incomplete* act of substantial being, such that, in the case of bodily forms, one form can be in potency to another. In stark contrast, of course, Aquinas had thought that each substantial form communicated an *absolute* act of substantial being (*esse*), and was the absolute defining principle in any composite, such that there could only be *one* substantial form in any one individual determining its nature.\(^{578}\) In article 31 of the *Correctorium fidelium*, quia ex hoc sequitur, ut videtur, quod caro christi mortua non esset vera caro; relique etiam sanctorum, ut eorum ossa non erant vera ossa'. Giles of Rome, *De gradibus formarum*, pt. 2, ch. 4, printed in *Expositio domini Egidii Romani super libros de anima cm textu. De materia celvi contra Averroim. De intellectu possibiliti. De gradibus formarum* (Venice, 1500), f. 99vb (my punctuation). For Aristotle's position, see above, p. 80 and n. 187.

\(^{577}\) Cf. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure*, p. 70.

\(^{578}\) See above, pp. 107-8.
fratris Thomae, then, de la Mare explains that the soul does not give to the composite human all of its being (esse), but perfects the nature of the forms which precede its infusion. As the 'essential complement' (essentiale complementum) of those forms, the soul converges with them, completing their being (esse), to give a unified nature.\textsuperscript{579} A corporeal form, then, can continue in its own existence across the infusion and the separation of the soul. As de la Mare puts it, the difference 'animated' does not affect the substantial nature of the body: in death the body undergoes corruption only insofar as it is \textit{alive}, not insofar as it is a \textit{body}.\textsuperscript{580}

Only three major examples of Franciscan pluralist theories survive from the period before the appearance of Richard de Mediavilla's \textit{De gradu formarum} (c. 1286).\textsuperscript{581} There is Pierre de Jean Olivi's characteristically highly original theory, found in his '\textit{Summa of questions}' on Book II of the \textit{Sentences} (c. 1278, Narbonne). Olivi posited six different forms in a human being and two kinds of matter (physical matter and spiritual matter). His work had little influence on other thinkers beyond one of his own pupils, and would not have been known at Oxford.\textsuperscript{582} Then, there is Peckham's own account of human nature in his \textit{Quodlibet IV}, q. 11 (Rome, 1277 or 1278),\textsuperscript{583} a discussion of the identity of Christ's dead body, which \textit{was} known at

\textsuperscript{579} Passage beginning, 'verum est quod non dat illud esse totum quod datur per formas praecedentes'. de la Mare, \textit{CFT}, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{580} Passage beginning, 'animatum non est differentia substantialis corporis ut corpus est sed in quantum vivum'. de la Mare, \textit{CFT}, a. 107, (ed.) Glorieux, p. 407.

\textsuperscript{581} edited in Zavalloni, \textit{Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes}.

\textsuperscript{582} For further discussion see Boureau, \textit{Théologie, science et censure}, pp. 76-7. The relevant questions are edited: Pierre de Jean Olivi, \textit{Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum}, vol. II (ed.) B. Jansen, (Quaracchi: ex typographia collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924): see q. 50 (\textit{Urum in corpore humano sit aliqua forma substantialis praeter animam}) and q. 51 (\textit{An sensitiva hominis sit a generante}), pp. 23-198. For Olivi's account of bodily continuity across the arrival and separation of the soul, see q. 50, ad 3, p. 37, passage beginning, 'Corpus ergo humanum, cum advenit sibi anima, non debet dici quod fiat aliud ens...'. For his account of Christ's dead body, see q. 50, \textit{responsio}, pp. 32-3 esp. passage on p. 33 beginning 'Praeterea, materia prima, in quantum talis, non est corpus'. On Olivi's 'Summa of questions' on I-IV \textit{Sentences}, originating in a series of disputations between the late 1270s and 1290s, see Friedman, 'The \textit{Sentences} Commentary, 1250-1320', p. 60, and n. 49; S. Piron, 'Les œuvres perdues d'Olivé: essai de reconstitution' in \textit{Archivum Franciscanum Historicum}, 91 (1998), pp. 361, 368-70, 373-4. For summary biographical details, see A. Boureau and S. Piron (eds.) \textit{Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298): Pensée scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et société} (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1999), editors' introduction, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{583} John Peckham, \textit{Quodlibeta Quatuor} (ed.) F. Delorme (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1989), \textit{Quodlibet IV}, q. 11 (\textit{Urum oculus dictur de oculo Christi vivo et mortuo unioce vel aliquoce}), pp. 196-202, which criticises Aquinas's position as \textit{frivola et inanis} (p. 198). Peckham's view is that a corporeal substance remains the same in number and essence across the soul's separation at death, but that its mode of existence changes. For further discussion see Boureau, \textit{Théologie, science et censure}, pp. 176-8.
Oxford during this period. Finally, there is Roger Marston's account of the composition of human nature in his *Quodlibet* II, q. 22 (Lent, 1282), the only major Franciscan account of human nature to emerge from Oxford during the period covered by this chapter. It is more technically refined than Peckham's account, and will be briefly summarised here, both to further illustrate the two basic elements of the pluralist position noted above, and because it is likely that Richard Knapwell had Marston's version of the pluralist theory directly in view when he composed his *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*, to be discussed at the end of this chapter.

Roger Marston, in his *Quodlibet* II, q. 22, then, develops a theory of human nature positing that, in addition to the soul, there is a single bodily substantial form in each human that is educed from matter in their generation. This single form has different 'grades' within it, according to the different grades of substantial being (*esse*) it acquires over the process of the body's 'ennoblement' during generation. Each grade remains when the next grade is acquired; the form acquires a more noble being (*esse*) at each stage; and the arrival of the soul further perfects the bodily form that persists across its infusion. When the soul separates at death, since the bodily form remains, the body remains the same in number as before, even though it has lost some of its substantial being, namely that which it had from the soul. And so, Marston points out, this theory of human nature preserves the identity of Christ's dead body. If, however, Marston explains in an echo of the *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, the soul were the only substantial form in a human, then a human would comprise the intellectual soul and mere *prime* matter. And when Christ died a new

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584 Knapwell responds to Peckham's critique of Aquinas's position in his *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*. See passage beginning, 'si obiiciatur quod ex hoc quod consequens est'. Richard Knapwell, *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* (hereafter *QDFU*), respondiones ad argumenta, ad 29 (ed.) Kelley, p. 88.


586 'idem corporis Christi vivi et mortui vere salvatur secundum istum modum dicendi quem teneo. Non enim, separata intellectiva, corruptur... sed eadem numero manet quae prius, corrupto tamen aliquo eius esse substantiali.' Marston, *Quodlibet* II, q. 22, ad argumenta, (ed.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 274.
form would have been introduced into His dead body, such that it would not have been really be the same thing as His living body. Marston simply cannot see how Christ's body living and dead can be the same body without having the same form.

Giles of Lessines, in *De unitate formae*, explored a way in which the robust pluralist account of postmortem formal continuity in the body could be matched, even if the soul were posited to be the only substantial form in a human being. Doing so, he made of the use of the framework for bodily continuity across substantial change that Aquinas had set out in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* VII.16. Robert of Orford's own account of postmortem bodily continuity would bear some similarities to Giles of Lessines'.

In *De unitate formae*, Giles of Lessines argues that the body living and dead is indeed the same only *secundum materiam*, but that the form of the corpse emerges from the matter that is left behind at the soul's separation, and is not something introduced as if extraneous to the system. The material subject of a rational soul is not mere *prima* matter, he explains, but the soul's *proper* matter, in a state of *proximate* potency to a rational soul, in which several 'disposing potencies' can be found. Though the mind readily conceives some formal medium between the soul and matter, he goes on to explain, in reality it is this complex material subject *itself* that mediates its own union to the soul. On the separation of the soul in any case of human death, the

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587 'Et in hoc discrepat haec opinio a quibusdam ponentibus tantum unam formam, ita tamen quod semper, adveniente posteriori, corrumpitur prima... Ideo dicunt quod in homine est tantum intellectiva et materia prima. Et ipsis accidit difficultas de identitate corporis Christi vivi et mortui... Nam... mortuum alia forma sibi dante corporeitatem corpus fuisset et ideo sequitur necessario quod aequivoce praedicatur corpus de corpore Christi vivo et mortuo'. ibid., p. 273.

588 'non video quomodo posset esse idem corpus nisi haberet eandem formam'. Marston, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 11 (*Utrum si idem numero corpus Christi mortuum et vivum*), responsio (ed.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 389.

589 See above, pp. 177-8.

590 'Si ergo anima rationalis adveniat corpori organizato, iam eidem advenit ut forma materiae, et ut actus potentiae, non tollitur ratio subjecti quam habet a materia, in quantum in potentia proxima erat a huiusmodi formam'; '[Forma] Habet tamen relationem ad materiam suam proprium sicut ad subjectum in quo recipitur per modum inhaerentiae' (my insertion); 'in natura hoc aliquid constitutur ex materia una et forma una et quicquid est ante adventum formam est ad unitatem materiae pertinens, quamvis in ipsa aliquando plures potentiae disponentes reperiantur magis in uno quam in aliis' (the way in which matter is disposed will differ from species to species). Giles of Lessines, *DUF*, pt. 2, ch. 3, p. 30, and ch. 7, and pt. 3, ch. 4, ad I (ed.) de Wulf, pp. 52, 67-8.

591 'hoc est quod supposuimus in isto capitulo, formam scilicet per se uniri materiae sine medio efficiente unionem, tamen aliquo modo posse uniri per medium disponens et praeparans ad unionem.'
form of the corpse that emerges was 'formerly as matter to another form', namely the soul, which kept it in a state of potency; it was in a state of 'ultimate potency' to the 'corrupt form', or the form of the corpse. The corpse as a whole is different from the living body: it has a new substantial form (albeit one originating from the living body's matter) and a new individual act of being.

With Christ, however, there was a much greater identity between His corpse and His living body than in any other case of human death, on account of the identity and unity of the divine supposit that remained inseparably united to His corpse. His body was united to the divinity as a part of human nature, or, in other words, through its relationship to His soul, as the subject of His soul, Giles explains. His body remained that same material subject in number even when dead, albeit deprived of His soul.

This was just one possible mode of response to the pluralists, however, and, as indicated, each of our three Dominicans working at Oxford during 1277-86 would come up with his own account of the individual body and its postmortem continuity. Of the three, only Richard Knapwell would revive Aquinas's central idea that the body's relative independence within the human individual was grounded upon the accidental form dimensive quantity, which gave to the body its physical structure. Knapwell, moreover, would break new ground by recognising the significance of

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392 'Unde, cum per separationem animae corruptitur animatum esse ab hoc corpore... illud quod erat in potentia ultima respectu formae corruptae fit iam actu et rationem verae formae habens', 'introducta est forma dans esse hoc aliquid, quae prius erat ut materiam ad aliam formam'. Giles of Lessines, DUF, pt. 2, ch. 3 (ed.) de Wulf, p. 30.

393 'hoc corpus mortuum... constet ex materia et forma propria, quae dat sibi aliquid esse et individuum. Sed huissmodi forma non potest esse anima; quare iam numero differt in hoc respectu a corpore vivo'. Giles of Lessines, DUF, pt. 3, ch. 5, I and III (ed.) de Wulf, pp. 82, 86.

394 'identitas et unitas suppositi manet in corpore Christi mortuo et vivo talis, qualis non inventitur in alis hominibus... secundum fidem nostram inseparabiliter facta est unio Christi et toti animae et toti corpore... et ideo cum idem suppositum sit idem numero, relinquitur maior identitas quare corpus Christi mortuum et vivum, quam aliorum hominum'. ibid., pp. 83-6.

395 'Nam idem corpus numero dictimus, secundum quod rationem habet subiecti unius, in eo quod subicitur formae uno modo et in eo quod subicitur privationi alio modo; unde per relationem ad unam formam dicitur unum numero, et per relationem ad illam formam unita est divinitas ipsi. Non enim unita est divinitas corpori Christi quia corpus est, sed quia pars est et subiectum naturae humanae, cui subicitur per animam rationalem Christi, cuius adhuc manet subiectum, ipsa separata in morte'. ibid., p. 87.
Aquinas's speculative work on the postmortem continuity of a quantitative structure in the matter particular to individual bodies. He would develop a full natural philosophical account of such a structure, and he would do this by way of a theological discussion which drew together, in a way that no other Dominican contribution the debate hitherto had, the two major theological issues implicated in the dispute over the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its consequences: the immediate postmortem continuity of Christ's body, on the one hand, and the general resurrection, on the other.

Why were Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell selected as representatives of those who defended Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans during 1277-86?

Since it was in Oxford that the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was perceived to have been publicly censured, at least implicitly, it was at Oxford, in particular, that Dominican leaders felt the need to manage the reception of Aquinas's philosophy. Following Kilwardby's promotion to become Cardinal-Bishop Porto with residence at the Curia in March 1278, the Dominican General Chapter in June dispatched two visitators to the English province, to punish with privation from office and exile any Dominican found to be bringing scandal to the Order by detracting from Aquinas's writings. There is no record of any scholars having been punished, although the provision of the 1279 General Chapter that no improper or irreverent talk about Aquinas or his works would any longer be tolerated suggests that cooperation was not immediately universal. In any case, by 1279, the new generation of Dominican bachelors in Theology at Oxford had already jumped to the defence of Aquinas's intellectual legacy, and Oxford swiftly became the de facto intellectual centre of this project. John Peckham's aggressive stance, following his promotion to become Archbishop of Canterbury on 29 January 1279, ensured that the defence of Aquinas's intellectual legacy at Oxford remained an urgent task. Peckham believed that Kilwardby had explicitly prohibited the teaching of the theory of the unicity of substantial form humans, though he had never himself seen the list of


597 ibid., p. 204.
prohibited articles. Having renewed Kilwardby's prohibition on 29 October 1284, Peckham made it clear, in a subsequent letter to the University dating from 10 November, that Aquinas's theory of human nature was his particular target, citing its supposed theologically dangerous consequences for Christ's corpse and saints' relics.\textsuperscript{598}

It was against this background of sustained pressure from outside the schoolroom, then, that Richard Knapwell and Robert of Orford produced the two earliest and longest, not to mention the only two complete surviving point-by-point Dominican responses to William de la Mare's \textit{Correctorium} (dubbed the 'Corruptorium' by Dominicans), called \textit{Quare} (1278) and \textit{Sciendum} (1282-83), respectively, after their incipits. These tracts, along with Thomas of Sutton's \textit{De pluralitate formarum}, make up three of the six earliest surviving tracts of certain attribution written in whole or in large part with the objective of defending the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological consequences.\textsuperscript{599} These writings are therefore an obvious starting point for a discussion of the early interpretation of the theory by its defenders. Two of the remaining three early defences of the theory, Giles of Lessines' \textit{De unitate formae} and the Augustinian Giles of Rome's \textit{De gradibus formarum}, have already been cited. The latter will be discussed again in the next section, in relation to Thomas of Sutton's \textit{De pluralitate formarum}, which makes reference to it. The last of the six earliest works defending Aquinas's theory of human nature is a \textit{Tractatus de formis} written by John of Paris (in Paris, before 1283),\textsuperscript{600} which will not be discussed further here, since there is no room at present to take on another Dominican thinker, with another take on Aquinas's theory of human nature, in any depth.

\textsuperscript{598} 'Unum vero illorum expresse notavimus articulum, quorundam dicentium "in homine esse tantummodo formam unam". Notavimus, inquam, pro eo quod ex ipso sequitur, ut putamus, nec corpus Christi fuisse unum numero vivum et mortuum, nec aliqua sanctorum corpora tota vel secundum partes aliquas in orbe existere vel in urbe'. Peckham, \textit{Registrum} (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, p. 841.


\textsuperscript{600} Kaepelli, \textit{Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum}, vol. 2, p. 518, n. 2562.
With the three Dominican candidates selected, two further texts complete the set that will be examined here. There is Richard Knapwell's mature interpretation of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, his *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* (1285), which contains his theory of postmortem material continuity and provided the direct provocation for the condemnation of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans on 30 April 1286. An anonymous tract entitled *De natura materiae* will also be included on the grounds of its close connection to Robert of Orford's *Sciendum* and because it contains a discussion of the general resurrection. There is very good reason to attribute *De natura materiae* to Robert of Orford: the account of the composition of human nature in it is barely distinguishable from that in *Sciendum* and Robert of Orford incorporates passages from it verbatim into *Sciendum*.\(^{601}\)

Beyond the chapter's purview are the three other surviving Dominican responses to William de la Mare's *Correctorium*, which are all incomplete.\(^{602}\) William of Macclesfield is the likely author of the third English *Correctorium corruptorii*, known as *Quaestione* (probably composed during 1284),\(^{603}\) which in fact stops at article 30 and therefore does not tackle the critical article 31 or the topic of postmortem bodily continuity; then there is John of Paris's *Circa* (1283 or 1284);\(^{604}\) and finally, there is Ramberto de' Primadizzi of Bologna's *Apologeticum veritatis* (1286-88).\(^{605}\)

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\(^{602}\) For an overview of the five Dominican *Correctoria corruptorii* see M. D. Jordan, 'The Controversy of the Correctoria and the Limits of Metaphysics', *Speculum*, 57 (1982), esp. pp. 292-8, and n. 3, which cites a vast bibliography detailing the previous seventy years of research on these texts, including works by Hödl, Mandonnet, Ehrle, Grégoire, Creytens and Pelzer. The dating (though not the sequence) of the *Correctoria* given by Jordan is currently under review, cf. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure*, p. 79, n. 76: the dating of *Quare* and *Sciendum* adopted here follows Boureau's.


1. Thomas of Sutton: De pluralitate formarum (1278)

Thomas of Sutton's *De pluralitate formarum*, composed in 1278, is the earliest substantive and systematic contribution that we have from any Dominican at Oxford to the debate surrounding the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological consequences.\(^{606}\) Thomas of Sutton was still a bachelor in theology when he wrote it; he incepted as master in theology at Oxford c. 1291-93, and died sometime after 1315.\(^{607}\) In the *prooemium* to *De pluralitate formarum*, Thomas of Sutton states that he aims to strengthen common arguments against the 'sophistry' (*cavillationes*) of his opponents, and to dissolve false arguments that have taken hold of their thinking, rather than to introduce new arguments into the debate.\(^{608}\) The account of substantial change and the individual body that he uses to do this, nonetheless, is his own.

The metaphysical vision of human nature and the individual body that Thomas of Sutton gives in *De pluralitate formarum* deviates from Aquinas's in several crucial respects,\(^{609}\) but the simplest way in which to distil Thomas of Sutton's distinctive position is as follows: he puts such strong emphasis on the close union between matter and the soul in human nature that he radically undermines the relative independence of body from soul.

\(^{606}\) Knapwell's *Quaere* (1278) depends on *De pluralitate formarum*, hence the latter is also dated to 1278. Thomas of Sutton's authorship of this treatise, which has been printed more than once among genuine works of Aquinas, was confirmed by MS. Assisi 118. See *Expositio D. Thomae Aquinatis in Libros Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione. Continuatio per Thoma de Sutona* (ed.) Kelley, introduction, pp. 2-3, n. 3. It circulated in 9 MSS, also under the titles *Contra pluralitate formarum* and *De unitate formae*. Kelley, *The Thomists and their Opponents at Oxford*, p. 64.


\(^{609}\) Zavalloni notes a deterioration of Aquinas's teachings in *De pluralitate formarum* in his *Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes*, p. 286. The present study agrees with Gilson's more neutral assessment that Thomas of Sutton agrees with the conclusion that the soul is the only substantial form in humans but not on all counts with Aquinas's reasoning. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, p. 419.
De pluralitate formarum begins with and is dominated by an extended philosophical critique of the pluralist position. Crucially, it is in the context of this philosophical critique, rather than in the context of reflection on the theological problems at stake in the debate, that Thomas of Sutton sets out his own theory of the composition of human nature. Only the final, and shortest, section of the tract, from which summary of the debate quoted at the beginning of the chapter is taken, deals directly with the theological consequences of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. By the time his argument reaches this stage, as will become clear shortly, Thomas of Sutton has left himself with very little room in which to develop a convincing account of postmortem bodily continuity. The critique that he presents of the consequences of pluralist theory for the general resurrection, however, is rather more successful.

Thomas of Sutton, then, strongly endorses Aquinas's view that there can only be one substantial form in a single human being, and therefore in an individual human body, because substantial form is what gives any composite its act of existence (esse), and because unity is a transcendental characteristic of, or is interchangeable with, being: two substantial forms therefore necessarily result in two distinct things. As Thomas of Sutton puts it, any existing thing has the characteristic of existing absolutely, and being one or a unity absolutely, from the same component, namely its substantial form. He explains that essence and act of existence (esse) are related as potency and act respectively. This means that if there were some substantial form distinct from the soul entering into the nature or essence of the body, prior to the soul's arrival, then this form would give to the body an absolute act of substantial existence, and so no additional further form could enter into the same human essence such that it should comprise both body and soul. The soul, instead, would be an accidental form, arriving at a body already unconditionally in act.

610 See above, pp. 106-7.

611 'ab eodem res habet quod sit ens simpliciter, et quod sit unum simpliciter... sed a forma substantiali... habet quod sit ens simpliciter... ergo ab eadem habet unitatem simpliciter'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 3 in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 574, II.1-25.

612 'Praeterea, omne quod advenit rei subsistenti et consequitur esse substantiali, non potest esse de essentia rei; quia tota essentia rei intelligitur ut principium susceptivum ipsius esse. Comparatur enim essentia ad esse sicut potentia ad actum. Tota ergo essentia rei sive substantia praecognitigatur ipsius
In Aquinas's own account of the composition of human nature, it will be remembered, potency and act operated on two levels. Not only was essence in potency to its act of existence (esse); within the composite essence itself; additionally, matter was in potency to the substantial form that communicated to the composite its act of existence. For Aquinas, of course, the material part or principle made a crucial contribution to human nature or the human essence: in the human being unified by a single act of existence, the soul perfected and 'exceeded' matter, but matter completed the very nature of the soul in return. And each individual human's soul, along with the individual act of existence that it communicated to the composite, was individuated in his or her particular matter.

The metaphysical model of human nature that Thomas of Sutton presents in *De pluralitate formarum*, in contrast, effectively collapses the human essence into the soul, and the individual body into the individual soul. It is very difficult to see, according to Thomas of Sutton's own account of human nature, how the material part in a human being can make any distinct contribution to their individuality.

Endorsing a passage from Averroes' commentary on the *Metaphysica* in support of his anti-pluralist claim that the body simply cannot exist without the soul, Thomas of Sutton states, then, that body and soul are not two distinct things. He points out that the 'organic body' that Aristotle took to enter into the unified, composite human nature is a body already informed by a soul. The material part of human nature is not, for Thomas of Sutton, what Aquinas had called 'common' or 'proper' matter:

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613 See above, pp. 108-9, 134-5.
614 See above, chapter 3, section 4.
matter in a differentiated state appropriate for the human *species*.\textsuperscript{617} Neither, for Thomas of Sutton, does the material part of human nature admit of what Giles of Lessines would call a complex or *proximate* potency, in distinction from *prime* matter, which was understood to be in potency to all forms indiscriminately.\textsuperscript{618} Thomas of Sutton, in contrast to each of the two other Dominicans, would have it that the proximate subject of all forms immersed in matter is prime matter, and that prime matter is in a state of *immediate* potency to the soul.\textsuperscript{619}

Furthermore, Thomas of Sutton thinks that it is the *soul* that individuates *matter*, rather than vice versa. He reaches this conclusion by conflating the two kinds of unity that Aquinas thought to obtain within a human being: first, the transcendental unity which is interchangeable with being, or the unity in virtue of which soul and matter are one human being; second, the unity which is the principle of number, or in other words the unity which consists in the physical indivision of a material thing from itself and its physical division from other material things. For Aquinas, it was this second kind of unity that was relevant to the individuation of a material thing, or its distinction from other bodies, and matter insofar as it was subject to the structural form dimensive quantity was responsible for individuation.\textsuperscript{620}

Thomas of Sutton writes, in contrast, that it is in the nature of *substantial form* to 'divide and distinguish' the composite to which it belongs from any other composite;\textsuperscript{621} just as it is in virtue of its substantial form that the composite has its

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\textsuperscript{617} See above, pp. 113-5, 131-5.

\textsuperscript{618} See above, pp. 214, n. 590.


\textsuperscript{620} See above, p. 148 and n. 409.

existence as one thing comprising matter and form, so it is that matter is called 'this thing' in virtue of its substantial form.622

In De pluralitate formarum, Thomas of Sutton describes the continuant of substantial change as a matter which is 'nec quantum, nec quale' and so on, which was the standard scholastic description of featureless prime matter.623 With this account of the individual body and substantial change, then, he appears to have played directly into the hands of de la Mare and the pluralists: what positive explanation can Thomas of Sutton possibly give for postmortem bodily continuity?

Reflecting on why it is that a living body should corrupt into a dead body and nothing else, Thomas of Sutton glosses Aristotle's account of proper matter at Metaphysica VIII.5, which contained the statement that the dead body came from the living body as naturally as night from day.624 The significant idea that Aquinas had taken from this passage was that there was a certain order within matter, which meant that substantial forms could be acquired in it only in a certain sequence. Thomas of Sutton's own reading of Metaphysica VIII.5, in contrast, makes no reference to matter at all, and rejects both Aristotle and Aquinas's position that matter represents necessity in natural change (that is to say, certain material conditions need to be in place in order for a certain change to take place).625

Thomas of Sutton cites Aristotle's text, then, in support of a theory that he had developed: there is a 'natural order' between the substantial forms which follow one another in substantial change, Thomas of Sutton thinks, such that a certain substance is necessarily generated when a certain other substance corrupts in nature: when the soul leaves the body, the form of a corpse simply follows it naturally in matter. And even if all of the living body's accidental forms corrupt, similar accidental forms


623 'id ex quo est generatio, et id ex quo est corruptio, est substantia in potentia tantum; nec est actu quid, nec quantum, nec quale et sic de alis. Tale autem non est aliquid, nisi materia intellecta sine forma omni'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 2, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 573, ll. 275-300.

624 See above, pp. 80-1.

625 See above, pp. 46, 50-51, 131-2.
necessarily appear immediately in the corpse: this is because their counterparts in the living body were only corrupted per accidens, or due to the corruption of their subject, and not in virtue of meeting their contrary. Thomas of Sutton wants to argue, additionally, that matter is already 'sufficiently disposed' to receive the new set of accidental forms.626 This last statement, rather confusing in the context of what has already been explained, brings into view the gap created in an account of substantial change that drastically diminishes the role that the material continuant has to play: how can matter remain disposed, if all that persists across substantial change is a featureless prime matter, in potency to all forms indiscriminately?

Thomas of Sutton explicitly rejects Averroes' position that an accidental quantitative structure can persist in matter across any case of substantial change, on the grounds of the Aristotelian axiom that substance is ontologically prior to accident.627 In fact, this criticism of the Commentator, together with Thomas of Sutton's entire account of human nature and postmortem bodily continuity, represented a drastic about-turn from his position in his earlier commentary on Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione. In this earlier work, we find him advocating a pluralist position in the context of an extended comment on Aristotle's concept of symbola.628 When discussing the reciprocal transformation of the elements in De generatione et corruptione, Aristotle had referred to the features common to the two

626 'Ad sextum dicendum quod in morte animalis quaedam forma imperfecta inducitur in materia... Est enim ordo naturalis inter animam et talem formam, ita quod abjectionem animae a materia necesse est talem formam sequi in eadem. Unde philosophus dicit in 8 Metaph. quod ex vivo fit mortuum sicut ex vino fit acetum, et sicut ex die fit nox'. And on the necessary appearance of certain accidental forms in the dead body, 'advertendum est quod in omni corruptione necessarium est quod illis accidentibus secundum quae non est transmutatio nisi per accidentem, scilicet ad corruptionem subjecti, subito simili accidentia adveniant in eo quod generatur, ex hoc enim quod praecedixit in eo quod corruptionis, disposita est materiam sufficientier ad eorum receptionem'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 5, ad 5 and ad 6, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7 p. 575, ll. 150-225 (my emphasis).

627 'Sed quia magis tenendum est quod subjectum dimensionum et aliorum accidentium consequentia sit substantia in actu, eo quod substantia in actu praecedat naturaliter accidentes in actu; ideo dicendum quod illa accidentia non manent in corpore vivo et mortuo eadem numero'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 5, ad 5, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 575, ll. 125-150.

elements on either side of a transformation, according to the Latin translation, as *symbola* ('hot' was a *symbolum* in the case of the transformation from fire to air, for example). Scholastic theologians would apply the concept of *symbola* to all other cases of substantial change, and refer to *any* accidental features that were shared by the substances on either side of a case of substantial change as *symbola*.

Thomas of Sutton had argued in his direct commentary on this passage, then, that a living and freshly dead body look the same because they *really* share common accidental forms, which remain the same in number across the soul's separation. These common accidents, one of which is quantitative structure, or 'indeterminate quantity' (*quantitas indeterminata*), remain identical across substantial change because their subject, a generic bodily substantial form, also remains. He had cited Averroes' *De substantia orbis* in support of this analysis. Francis Kelley supposes, in the introduction to his edition of this commentary, that Thomas of Sutton changed his stance towards Averroes' theory of bodily continuity because the Dominican had 'finally understood the incompatibility of the Averroist doctrine and the unity of form thesis'. It would be more accurate to say simply that, in *De pluralitate formarum*, Thomas of Sutton rejected the pluralist thesis, whilst continuing to uphold the principle of the ontological priority of substance to accident, *without* making a particular exception for a quantitative structure in matter, an exception which the Commentator had made, and which Aquinas appeared to be trying to make in his work on the general resurrection.

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631 'Manifestum est autem quod dimensiones accidunt communiter omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Oportet igitur quod consequantur genus commune omnibus tanquam suum subiectum. Et hoc genus est corpus...'; 'Corpus autem prout est subiectum quantitas indeterminata, precedit naturaliter illam quantitatem, sicut subiectum naturaliter precedit suum accidens... Et ideo necesse est ut quantitas indeterminata semper manet eadem numero in omne generatione, quia semper manet suum subiectum'. ibid., pp. 141-2.

632 Passage beginning, 'Averroys enim ponit rationabiler quod huiusmodi accidentia communia remanent eadem numero. Dicit enim in libro de Substantia Orbis'. ibid., p. 140.

633 ibid., editor's introduction, p. 13.
Turning directly to Thomas of Sutton's discussion of the theological implications of his account of postmortem bodily continuity, the Dominican simply wants to maintain that the matter that persists in a dead body can meaningfully be called the same as the matter that subsisted in the living body, even if this idea is in tension with the idea that all that persists across any case of substantial change is prime matter. He argues that a saint's dead body is rightly held in the highest veneration both because of its material identity with the saint's living body (this material identity, Thomas of Sutton protests, is 'manifest'), and because its substantial and accidental forms are left as relics of the saint's living body, or, better of the saint's soul (because they succeed that soul in the order to nature, rather as children are 'relics' of their parents) which exists in a state of joy in the company of the Angels.634

Thomas of Sutton does not tackle head-on the awkward idea that a new substantial form might have been introduced into Christ's dead body, however. He merely argues (along lines established by Aquinas635) that, whatever one's position on the number of substantial forms in a human being, Christ's dead body cannot have been formally the same as His living body, because it underwent a true death.636 The identity of the matter in Christ's body, along with the continuing identity of the divine supposito to which that matter is inseparably joined, must therefore between them suffice to safeguard the numerical identity of Christ's dead body with His living body, even if it was formally different (because it was not alive), and therefore in that sense not totally the same, in the three days of His death. Although he has provided no particularly concrete account of postmortem bodily continuity in De pluralitate

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634 'Si igitur non manet eadem forma corporis post mortem... sequitur quod corpus Petri est naturae alius. Sed enim ad omnia quae apparent in corpore et sunt ex separatione animae Petri, ibi sunt reliquiae, silecit corporis vivi. Manifestum est enim quod materia est cadem numero quae prius. Forma etiam, licet alia sit, tamen, propter separationem animae, ibi relinquitur tamquam quaedam reliquia, ut ita dicam, animae separatae. Similiter et omnia accidentia relinquuntur similia... et ideo dignum est quod corpora sancorum in magna veneratione habeantur ab hominibus quia sunt reliquiae eorum quorum animae laetantur cum Angelis'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 7, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.75-100.

635 See above, p. 190 and n. 524.

636 'si autem post separationem animae mansisset corpus idem secundum formam quae prius, jam idem corpus non fuit solutum post mortem proprie loquendo'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 8, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 577, ll.150-75.
formarum, then, Thomas of Sutton clearly thinks this argument is a good enough reply to pluralist criticism regarding the identity of Christ's dead body.637

Evidently conscious, even so, that he has offered a rather thin account of postmortem material continuity in this discussion of Christ's corpse, Thomas of Sutton refers his reader onward to a more robust account of postmortem bodily continuity given by 'some masters' (aliqui magistri). Nobody contests the notion, he repeats, that the body's matter remains the same in number across its death. The further account to which he refers can explain how the body, just as the material part of the human individual, remains structured and organised after its death, not as composed of different things, but with a certain relation to its formal determinations (cum tali modo se habendi): in this sense, according to this account, the dead body really remains the same as the living body.638

The account in question is found in Giles of Rome's De gradibus formarum, which works better as a counterpoint than as an addendum to Thomas of Sutton's rather intellectually barren treatment of the topic of postmortem bodily continuity.639 Giles of Rome had developed the idea that the matter in an individual human body is composite in itself insofar as it admits of a certain mode or manner of bearing a relation to something else (modus se habendi), or in other words insofar as it is composed for something (huic), if not from different things (ex his).

637 'dicendum quod corpus Christi vivum et mortuum est idem numero propter identitatem hypostasis, licet eandem formam non habeat vivum et mortuum... Cum enim vita sit aliiquid corporis vivi, consequens est quod corpus quod desinit esse vivum non totaliter idem remaneat. Manet tamen idem numero secundum suppositum. Non enim habuit aliam hypostasim vivum et mortuum praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. Est etiam idem secundum materiam, licet non secundum formam. Et advertemus est quod ista identitas corporis secundum suppositum et secundum materiam sufficere debet adversariis ad identitatem formalen, quia hoc necessario debent illi dicere qui ponunt formam corporis esse aliam ab anima'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 7, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.25-50.

638 'Potest autem hoc idem salvari faciliter, ponendo, sicut aliqui magistri ponunt, quod hoc nomen corpus, prout significat partem materialem hominis, non includit in sua significazione formam, sed significat materiam prout conjuncta est quantitati tali et naturae tali, et organisata ita... et sic significata materia non est aliud quam materia. Non enim est aliud compositum ex diversis, sed est materia quae est simpliciter cum tali modo se habendi. Quia igitur nulli dubium est quin materia fuerit eadem numero ante mortem et post, planum est quod corpus fuit idem accepta significazione hujus nominis corpus, non solum per communem modum loquendi, sed per existentiam rei'. Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 8, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 577, ll.200-250.

This composition in matter, Giles of Rome explains in *De gradibus formarum*, is the result of matter's union with *accidental* forms. When matter is joined to the structural form *quantitas*, for example, the result is a certain *modus se habendi*, or determination in matter, such that matter is extended and has, in itself, organic parts. The extended parts of this composite matter are *really* distinct from the extended parts of the structural form. Composite matter, Giles of Rome emphasises, consists of nothing beyond the essence of matter itself. So if we use the word 'body' to refer to *just* the material part of the human composite, considered in distinction from any accidental or substantial form, including the quantitative structure for which (\*huic\*) it is composed, it is *composite matter* that is being referred to.\(^{640}\) Again, the terms 'flesh' and 'bone', when applied just to the material part of the human, refer to composite matter as it bears a relation to all of the physical qualities appropriate to flesh and bone: softness, hardness and the like.\(^{641}\) Composite matter is what Giles of Rome refers to as *proximate* or 'close' (*propinqua*) matter (equivalent to 'proper' matter) as opposed to *prime* matter.\(^{642}\)

At the crux of Giles of Rome's account of postmortem bodily continuity is the idea that the individual body's composite matter *retains* much of its complexity across

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\(^{640}\) *Verum est quod superius dicebatur, quod sola materia potest quid compositum dicere et, ut quid compositum nominat, potest corporis nominationem suscipere... Semper enim remanet dubium quomodo materia extensa et habens partes, que quodammodo quid compositum nominat, potest dicere solam materiam, cum sola materia, ut videtur, quod compositum nominare non possit. Ad hujus difficilatis intelligentiam, valet illa communis distinctio quod duplex est compositio: ex his et huic... Manifestum est quidem quod sola materia nullo modo potest dicere quid compositum ex his, quia, omne quod ex his realiter componitur, habet in se duo componentia que realiter differunt... materia extensa ergo, licet solam materiam nominet, dicit tamen quid compositum non ex his sed huic, quia dicit quod compositum quantitati, aliqaud resultat in materia ex eo quod coniungit quantitati et forme, quia materia de se est indeterminata et inextensa; coniuncta vero quantitati determinatur et extenditur. Et quia alius modus se habendi,... ut est extensa, competit materie ex eo quod coniungitur quantitati... materia extensa dicit quid compositum huic, ut quid compositum quantitati*. Giles of Rome, *De gradibus formarum*, pt. 2, ch. 2, f. 99ra (my emphasis and punctuation).

\(^{641}\) *Hiis viis de levi apparet quod significatur nomine carnis et ossis... cum altera pars compositi in animalibus non dicat materiam quoquem modo sumptam, sed materiam et extensam et organisatam et affectam per debitas qualitates physicas, huius materia prout erat affecta alia et alia qualitate physica, aliud et aliud sortitur vocabulum: ut affecta per duritiam et alia qualitates debitas nominabitur os, affecta vero per molliciem et per alia qualitates debitas vocabitur caro*. ibid., pt. 2, ch. 3, f. 99vb (my punctuation).

\(^{642}\) *Ex hoc autem patere potest quod materia sic accepta, ut dicitur corpus aut caro aut os, non est materia sumpta secundum se. Et sic differt materia prima et proxima: ita quod si consideretur materia secundum suam essentiam solum, prout non est organisata secundum aliqua dispositionem partium, nec est affecta per aliqua qualitatem, sic accipiatur ut est prima, et hoc modo est una in omnibus habentibus eam. Sed si sumatur materia ut est organisata et extensa, sic potest dici corpus... secundum quod est altera pars compositi*. ibid., pt. 2, ch. 4, f. 100rb (my punctuation).
bodily death, because the living body and the corpse really share identical accidental forms, or *symbola*, even if they share no substantial form in common. To make this argument, he draws upon an account of the corpse from Avicenna's scientific encyclopedia known in Latin by the title *Sufficientia* (but without citing Avicenna's authority). Giles of Rome explains, following Avicenna, that some accidents 'hold themselves' (*tenent se*) 'from', or are grounded in, the material part of the composite (*ex parte materie*), whilst others 'hold themselves from' the (substantial) formal part (*ex parte forme*). Avicenna had cited the blackness of an Ethiopian's skin, scar tissue, and bodily extension as accidents that are *ex parte materie*, and hope, joy and the ability to laugh as accidents that are *ex parte formae*, in humans.\footnote{Horum autem accidentia... sunt... quaedam que consequuntur materiam ut nigredo ethyiopis et cicatrices vulnerum et extensio stature. Sunt enim quaedam que consequuntur formam sicut spes et gaudium et potentia ridendi et cetera in hominibus... Que vero consequuntur ex parte materiae aliquando remanent post forma, sicut cicatrices vulnerum, et nigredo ethyopis post mortem'. Avicenna, *Sufficientia*, Bk I, ch. 6, in *Opera Philosophica*, Venise, 1508, repr. (Louvain: Edition de la bibliothèque S.J., 1961), f. 17r, B. Cf. Giles of Rome, *De gradibus formarum*, pt 2, ch. 5, f. 100va, passage beginning, 'Nam licet materia ut subiecta sic forme sit causa omnium accidentium que fiunt in ea, ut dicit primo physicorum, aliqua tamen accidentia magis tenent se ex parte materiae et alia vero magis ex parte formae'\footnote{Cum ergo dicitur qualitas simbola non manet idem numero in re corrupta et generata, ut quidam volunt, hoc intelligendum est de qualitate simbola se tenente ex parte formae, et non de qualitate simbola se tenente ex parte materiae... si simbola se teneat ex parte materiae, cum materia sit individuacionis principium et maneat idem numero, probabiliter, ut videtur, poterit sustineri quod, quantum ad individuationem et quantum ad identitatem materialem, huiusmodi proprietas poterit eadem numero remanere... manet.. realiter eadem quantitas simbolica se tenens ex parte materia. Et quia mollicies et alia accidentia physica quibusc aucta materia nominat caro tenent se ex parte materiae, poterunt eadem realiter remanere'. Giles of Rome, *De gradibus formarum*, pt. 2, ch. 5, f. 100vb (my punctuation).}

Giles of Rome concludes that it is probable that the *symbola* shared by the living and dead body that are *ex parte materie* can remain the same in number in the living and dead body, especially since matter is the principle of individuation (and therefore the very basis for the individuality of those accidental forms).\footnote{For Giles of Rome's thought on individuation, see L. Peterson, 'Cardinal Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) (b. 1468; d. 1534) and Giles of Rome (b. ca. 1243/47; d. 1316)’ in Gracia (ed.), *Individuation in Scholasticism*, esp. pp. 434-7.}

The physical accidents of flesh and bone all hold themselves *ex parte materie*, and with these *symbola* remaining the same in number across death, the dead body's matter really retains the very same composition, or *modus se habendi*, in relation to those accidents.\footnote{645}

This brief reference to Giles of Rome's work is the closest that Thomas of Sutton comes to offering a positive and constructive account of postmortem bodily
continuity in *De pluralitate formarum*. Of course, the two accounts are mutually incompatible: Thomas of Sutton himself would deny *both* that any accidents remain the same in *number* in the body across its death, *and* the notion that there can be any complexity on the part of the individual body's matter in itself.

Finally, there is Thomas of Sutton's analytical critique of the consequences of pluralist theory for bodily identity at the resurrection. He presents this critique as one commonly put forward by defenders of Aquinas's philosophy, rather than as one that he has developed independently. In short, he sets out an argument of the sort that irritated Roger Marston, that is to say, an argument designed to demonstrate that it would be absolutely impossible, even for divine power, to reconstruct, in each case, the very same bodily form that previously corrupted into matter, *even if* that form somehow remained in matter after its decomposition.

Such a form would have to return, Thomas of Sutton explains, by being drawn out of matter. However, he goes on, *if* a form were to be educed from and received by matter in this way, then matter would individuate it. (There is a clear tension between this last comment and Thomas of Sutton's suggestion that it is *form* that individuates *matter*, so it is important to bear in mind at this stage in the analysis that this argument on the resurrection probably did not originate with him). The bodily form, so the argument goes, would be individuated anew at the resurrection, despite the fact that *divine* power would be the agent of its reconstruction: it is not the *agent* that individuates the form; it is matter, as the principle of individuation. There would, therefore, be a contradiction, impossible to produce even for God, that the

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646 See above, pp. 206-7.


648 '[Talis forma] Redibit ergo per eductionem de materia... Licet igitur ejus eductio ponitur miraculosa per virtutem divinam immediate, educentem, tamen individuatio ejus est naturalis. Individuatio enim talis formae non attribuitur agenti, sed materiae, quae est principium individuationis. Cum igitur ponatur quod materia de novo recipiat formam illam, sequitur quod materia novam ipsius individuationem causet, et per consequens aliam unitatem numeralem ab illa quam prius habuit... Ergo forma quae ponitur redire cadem numero, non esset cadem numero'. Thomas of Sutton, *DPF*, pt. 8, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, *Opera omnia* (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.1-50.
supposed bodily form would be both the same in number, and different in number.\textsuperscript{649} Furthermore, Thomas of Sutton continues, if God were, instead, simply to repair an individual body from nothing, this would not be resurrection, but rather a divine production of bodies: resurrection is precisely of that which perished and which remains afterwards, at least in its parts.\textsuperscript{650}

In the face of this argument, Thomas of Sutton suggests, the pluralists can choose one of two options, admitting defeat either way. They can choose to maintain their pluralist position whilst abandoning the idea that the identity of a corporeal form is in fact necessary for bodily identity, in which case their objection regarding the formal identity of Christ's dead body collapses. Or they can accept along with Thomas of Sutton's group (or 'with us'), that the incorruptible soul is the body's only substantial form, in order that the formal identity of the resurrected body be preserved: they can argue, that is to say, that from the very same principles, both formal (the soul) and material, each human body will be reconstructed the same in number at the resurrection.\textsuperscript{651}

These last comments again bring to the surface the tension between Thomas of Sutton's account of the individual body, on the one hand, and commonly held theological presuppositions, on the other. Just as he wants to argue that Christ's body remains materially the same in some concrete sense across His death, Thomas of Sutton also wants to endorse the traditional view that each body will be resurrected...


\textsuperscript{650} 'Secus autem esset, si ponetur quod Deus adnihilaret aliquod totum compositum et illud postea repararet. Illud enim posset reparari idem numero, quia, non esset nova individuatio formae per novam receptionem ejus in materia... sed esset ipsius formae individuatae cum sua materia reparatio... Dato quod illa forma quae corrupta erat rediret miraculose eadem numero, adhuc secundum istam viam non esset proprie loquendo corporum resurrectio futura, sed esset corporum proprie productio. Resurrectio enim est ejus quod cecidit, quod manet postea, saltem secundum suas partes'. Thomas of Sutton, \textit{DPF}, pt. 8, in Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Opera omnia} (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.25-50.

\textsuperscript{651} 'Aut igitur concedant quod ad identitatem corporis secundum numerum non requiritur quod habeat eandem formam per quam sit corpus, et tunc cessat ista de corpore Christi objectio. Aut dican nobiscum quod corpus hominis est corpus per animam, et quod ipsa propter suam incorrupibilitatem manebit eadem numero et eadem materiæ corporali unietur respective; et sic ex eisdem principiis tam formali quam materiali resurget idem corpus numero'. Thomas of Sutton, \textit{DPF}, pt. 7, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Opera omnia} (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.50-100.
from its own matter, even though he elsewhere denies that a individual body's matter makes a distinct contribution to its individuality.

It is certainly possible that the gap between Thomas of Sutton's theological and philosophical thinking in *De pluralitate formarum*, manifest in the very layout of the treatise, was due to his only recently having progressed to study Theology. A swift glance towards those of his works he produced as master in Theology over a decade later reveals that his mature thought on the composition of human nature was much closer to Aquinas's. In his *Quodlibet I*, q. 21, debated very soon after his promotion, Thomas of Sutton points to dimensive quantity as the 'radical principle of individuation' in a material substance. And, in his *Quaestiones Ordinariae* q. 18, we find Thomas of Sutton arguing that each human soul is distinct due to a certain 'proportion' or intrinsic difference that it receives from the body in which it comes into being (*acceptit a corpore quandam proportionem*), and that each soul retains its proportion its own body after bodily death, in the same way that the impression of a seal remains on wax after the seal is removed.

2. Robert of Orford's *Sciendum* (1282-83) and the anonymous *De natura materiae*

Robert of Orford completed *Sciendum*, his response to William de la Mare's *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, when still a bachelor in Theology. He became regent

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652 On the dating of these works, see Thomas of Sutton, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (ed.) J. Schneider (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), editor's introduction, pp. 45-54.


654 Thomas of Sutton, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (ed.) J. Schneider, q. 18, ad 19, p. 519.

master in Theology at Oxford in the late 1280s or early 1290s, and died in 1293.\textsuperscript{656} During his regency, he composed an "anti-Quodlibet", a question-by-question refutation of Henry of Ghent's Quodlibeta I-XIV. Given Henry of Ghent's interest in the topic, this work surely contains Robert of Orford's mature reflections on postmortem bodily continuity; it must be set aside now nonetheless, and reserved for a further study.\textsuperscript{657}

In the context of his reply to article 31 of the Correctorium fratris Thomae, Robert of Orford develops an account of the composition of human being that could hardly be more different from the one that Thomas of Sutton gives in De pluralitate formarum. It is the product of a completely different, explicitly conciliatory, approach to the debate with the pluralists. Discussing the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans again elsewhere in Sciendum, Robert of Orford states his general intention to resolve the differences between the competing theories of human nature rather than to oppose the one to the other; he will, he says, respond in an original way (meo modo) to de la Mare.\textsuperscript{658} The result is a hybrid of Aquinas's and a pluralist theory of the composition of human nature, which radically emphasises the independence of body from soul, on the one hand, at the expense of the unity of the human being, on the other. The treatment of the general resurrection in De natura materiae, which was probably written by Robert of Orford, again represents an attempt to find a middle ground between Aquinas's and pluralist thinking: it certainly does not fit into the pattern of argument already established by Giles of Lessines and Thomas of Sutton.

Robert of Orford begins article 31 of Sciendum by setting out a crucial distinction that he will go on to use to explain the body's postmortem continuity. In any

\textsuperscript{656} Robert of Orford was also known as Robert of Colletorto or Robert of Torto Collo. For a summary account of his life and works, see Robert d'Orford, Reprobationes dictorum a fratre egidio (ed.) Vella, editor's introduction, pp. 9-24; Vella, Robert of Orford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford, pp. 1-27; Roenshch, Early Thomistic School, pp. 41-4.

\textsuperscript{657} This 'anti-Quodlibet' is preserved in two manuscripts. See brief comments in Friedman, 'Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, CA. 1260-1330', pp. 420-2; and Vella, Robert of Orford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford p. 89. See also F. E. Kelley, 'Two Early English Thomists: Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent', The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 45 (1981), pp. 345-87, for Robert of Orford's responses to Henry of Ghent on the distinction between essence and esse, the distinction between the soul and its faculties, and the creation of matter without form.

\textsuperscript{658} 'principalis intentio in hoc opusculo est magis solvere quam opponere [...] et meo modo respondissem'. Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 90bis (Utrum anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sint una substantia in homine) (ed.) P. Glorieux, p. 314.
composite of matter and form, Robert of Orford explains, using Boethian language, there are two things to consider: first, what it is (quod est), or its composition from matter and form, on the one hand, and second, that which makes it to be what it is (quo est). That which makes something to be what it is efficiently is its agent cause. That which makes something to be what it is formally is the substantial form giving it its act of existence (esse).

Aquinas's gloss on this Boethian distinction had underlined, further, the difference between, on the one hand, the substantial form that was quo est for any composite, and, on the other hand, esse, the act of existence communicated to the composite by its substantial form. Again, for Aquinas, substantial form (as a component of the human essence), and esse were related as potency and act respectively. Robert of Orford, in contrast, does not explore, at least not in Sciendum, the relationship between the substantial form giving to the composite its act of existence, and the act of existence itself.

Robert of Orford, then, applies this distinction between quod est and quo est directly to the body. The rational soul is quo est with respect to the body: the soul gives the body its act of existence, just as it gives to the whole human being a single act of existence. Robert of Orford refers to the soul as the 'form of the whole' (forma totius) in the human individual. Robert of Orford's referent for forma totius is therefore different from Aquinas's, which was the human being's composite essence. Robert of Orford argues, along lines that are by now broadly familiar, that there can only be one substantial form in any composite that gives it the totality of its substantial esse;

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660 'sciendum quod in omni re composita ex materia et forma est duo considerare, scilicet quod est et quo est. Quod est, est ipsum suppositum subsistens compositum ex utroque; quo est, est forma. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter: vel quo est effective vel quo est formaliter; quo est effective est ipsum efficiens sive potentia effectiva cui assimilatur effectus; quo est formaliter est forma ipsum effectus. Forma igitur est principium essendi eius cuius est forma, non effectivum sed formale... principium essendi simpliciter... est forma substantialis...'. Robert of Orford, *Sciendum*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 137-8.


that the composite substance is unified by its act of being; and that more than one act of 'total' substantial being would give more than one substance.\textsuperscript{663}

The extent of the deviation of his own account of the composition of human nature from Aquinas's, however, becomes clear when Robert of Orford explains that the soul does not enter into what the body is (\textit{quod est}): the individual human body, as Robert of Orford explains in article 31 of \textit{Sciendum}, consists of matter and several 'partial' corporeal substantial forms, or forms of parts. In the same article, and elsewhere in \textit{Sciendum}, Robert of Orford refers to just one corporeal form or \textit{corporeitas} in each human, which he calls a 'form of the part' (\textit{forma partis}), or 'partial' substantial form, to distinguish it from the soul as \textit{forma totius}.\textsuperscript{664} The body's partial substantial forms, or forms of parts, Robert of Orford writes, do not give \textit{esse} to the body in their own right; they \textit{participate} in the \textit{esse} that the soul, as the form of the whole human, gives.\textsuperscript{665}

Robert of Orford narrowly avoids the pluralist label by arguing that there can only be one form in any human, the soul, that gives \textit{esse} to it, and furthermore that this form endows the human with a single, \textit{complete} or 'total', act of substantial being: the other 'partial' substantial form or forms in the body do not communicate any act of being, or \textit{esse}, in their own right. According to Robert of Orford, furthermore, it is still in virtue of the form of the whole, the soul that gives existence to the human being, and not in virtue of any of the partial substantial forms, that all of the terms describing the human being's substantial nature are predicated of it. It is in virtue of

\textsuperscript{663} ‘Si loquamur de esse substantiale totali et de forma quae dat esse substantiale totale, sic impossibile est esse plures formas in una re... illa substantia esset non unum totum sed plura tota, quod est implicatio contradictonis, nam una re esset plures res’. Robert of Orford, \textit{Sciendum}, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 138.

\textsuperscript{664} Cf. Robert of Orford, \textit{Sciendum}, a. 31 and a. 114 (\textit{forma partis}); a. 52 (\textit{formae partium} and \textit{forma partis}); a. 86 (\textit{corporeitas, quae fuit forma partis}); and a. 107 (\textit{forma corporeitatis prout corpus est pars}) (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 139, 203, 311, 335, 341.

\textsuperscript{665} ‘Huiusmodi igitur formae substantiales partiales sunt plures in toto... Quae tamen non dant aliquod esse impediente forma totius, sed participant forma totius’. Robert of Orford, \textit{Sciendum}, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 138.
one form, he writes, and not from several forms, that we say that the human being is 'human', 'living', 'animal' and 'body'.

And so, whereas Thomas of Sutton, in *De pluralitate formarum*, had effectively collapsed the human nature into the soul, Robert of Orford radically separates the two parts of the human essence. The latter writes that *each* of the two essential parts of human nature, body and soul, has its own, discrete essence or nature, with its own form (or 'essence of form'). The two essential parts of human nature, one material the other immaterial, are united only insofar as they share a single act of being (*esse*), according to Robert of Orford: body and soul do not penetrate one another's very natures within the unified human essence, as they did in Aquinas's account of it.

Robert of Orford explains, then, that the rational soul does not perfect prime matter directly, as the pluralists claim in their own rendering of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, but only 'in' its proximate matter (analytically speaking, inasmuch as proximate matter presupposes prime matter), which is an organic body with an optimal complexion. The individual body is constructed *in utero* (its agent cause being the formative power taking its origin from the father's soul) through a necessary sequence of stages of development. Citing Averroes' idea that the material principle possesses several *habilitates*, or potencies, Robert of Orford explains that matter has an 'amplitude' (*amplitudo*) intrinsic to it, in virtue of

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666 *praedicamenta substantialia... non sumuntur a diversis formis sed ab una et eadem forma; cum enim pars non praedicatur de toto, oportet singula praedicamenta accipi a forma totius non a forma partis... a forma partis non potest sumi praedicamentum quod dicit totum quod est in re... Ab una forma... habet homo quod sit homo et animal et vivum et corpus, non a diversis*. Robert of Orford, *Sciendum*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 139.


668 *anima intellectiva non est perfectio materiae primae absolutae, ut ipsi obiciunt, sed corporis mixti optime complexionati, in quo est considerare materiam primam; materia enim proxima praesupponit materiam remotam et non e converso. Anima igitur perficit materiam primam in materia proxima, id est corpore organico...*. Robert of Orford, *Sciendum*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 143-4.

669 *illa forma partis non est ab anima generati in hominibus, sed ab anima generantis*. ibid., p. 139.

which it is in potency to different forms in a certain order. According to Robert of Orford, these *habilitates* are not the pluralists' *rationes seminales*, conceived as active potencies or principles of forms, but passive and receptive potencies, or 'inclinations' or appetites for the different material forms. He does adopt pluralist language, however, in claiming that these forms are 'educed from' the potency of matter by the agent of generation.

Christ's body, then, can be considered with respect to *quod est* or *quo est*. Christ's soul is *quo est* as far as His body is concerned, and this is separated at His death. It is the separation of the soul, and the body's *complete* loss of the substantial *esse* that the soul gave to it, that makes Christ's bodily death a true case of corruption in Robert of Orford's view. The pluralist Roger Marston's account of Christ's corpse, as we saw, supposes that the body loses just *some* of the substantial act of being it had when alive.

But, Robert of Orford continues, if we consider Christ's body with respect to what it is (*quantum ad id quod est*), it is a body composed of His matter and the bodily form (the substantial 'form of the part') corresponding to it. This *forma partis* survives the separation of the soul, and so, with respect to what it is, any individual body can survive *in its totality* and remain the same in number living and dead. Of course, it bears repeating, Aquinas's own position was emphatically not that the body could survive, in its *totality*, across the separation of the soul: the soul was the body's only substantial form and entered into its very nature. In any case of human death other


672 ‘Quod vero dicit Commentator materiam esse unam secundum substantiam, plures secundum habilitates, pro nobis est; habilitates enim vocat potentias naturales passivas sive receptivas, sive inclinationes seu appetitus naturales materiae ad diversas formas quae per virtutem agentis educuntur de potencia materia’. Robert of Orford, *Sciendum*, a. 85 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 303.

673 ‘dicendum quod corpus Christ potest accipi dupliciter: vel quod est vel quo est: quo est, in quantum anima facit hominem, est forma totius; et istam formam amittit corpus cum per mortem separatur anima. Unde dicit Thomas, in quaestionibus De Anima, quaestione I, in solutione 14 argumenti, corpus dictur corruptum in quantum deficit ab illo esse quod erat sibi et animae commune; cum enim mors sit corruptio, corruptio autem simpliciter sit amissio alicuius formae substantialis, oportet dicere si Christus fuerit vere mortuus quod veram substantialem formam amiserit per mortem’. Robert of Orford, *Sciendum*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 139.

674 ‘Si autem loquamur de corpore Christi quantum ad id quod est, sic est corpus compositum ex materia sua et forma sibi correspondente; et sic mansit idem numero vivum et mortuum’. ibid.
than Christ's, Robert of Orford thinks, this bodily form remains the same in number up until the point at which putrefaction sets in. In Christ's case, His body was preserved from decay by divine power, and the unbroken hypostatic union ensured that there was a greater unity and identity between His body living and dead, than in any other case of human death.

Like Giles of Lessines, then, Robert of Orford thinks that the form of the corpse should not be understood as a form somehow newly introduced into the system. He correctly notes, in article 31 of *Sciendum*, that Aquinas himself never made the claim that a new form was introduced into any dead body. Again like Giles of Lessines', Robert of Orford's analysis echoes the framework for bodily continuity that Aquinas had set out in his commentary on *Metaphysica* VII.16. When in the living body, Robert of Orford explains, the *forma partis* is in a state of 'potency, close to act' (*potentia propinqua actui*) with respect to its own *esse*. The bodily form's own prospective act of being should be understood as something impeded by the *esse* which the soul gives, according to Robert of Orford: when the soul departs, the form, or forms, of the body that were in a state of potency close to act 'advance' into act (*vadunt in actum*).
What was previously the *forma partis* in the human being, then, succeeds to become the dead body's *forma totius*.\(^682\)

Of course, one key difference between Giles of Lessines' account of the individual body and postmortem bodily continuity and Robert of Orford's is that the latter posits that the corpse's form already subsisted in the living body as a *substantial form*, albeit a 'partial' one: for Giles of Lessines, the corpse's form is still a new *form*; for Robert of Orford it is not. Robert of Orford still wants to maintain, following Aquinas, that the dead body remains the same as the living *only* materially. He points out that, when still alive, 'the part', matter and corporeal form, is material within the whole, or bears a material relationship to the soul or *forma totius*.\(^683\)

Now, the very brief treatment of the general resurrection that is included in *De natura materiae* is closely related to article 29 of *Sciendum*, a discussion of individuation in which Robert of Orford sets out the role that dimensive quantity plays in the individuation of material things. Aquinas himself, of course, had grounded the relative independence of the body within the human being upon the accidental structuring form dimensive quantity, rather than on any substantial form: dimensive quantity was the most closely related accident to substance in Aquinas's view.\(^684\) Robert of Orford gives quantitative structure a clear role in individuation, too, as the only form capable of physically dividing matter: he explains that *quantitas dimensiva* is the 'intrinsic, *sine qua non*' cause of individuation in a material thing, alongside matter as the 'intrinsic, *per se*' cause of individuation.\(^685\)

In the same article, Robert of Orford outlines the relationship between the body's quantitative structure and its corporeal 'form of the part'. Doing so, he reproduces a passage from chapter 4 of *De natura materiae*, which explains that dimensions, or

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\(^682\) 'non introductur nova forma quia hoc natura non intendit; sed remota forma totius, forma partis quae prius forma partis erat fit forma totius, quia corpus quod fuit pars animalis viventis, separata anima, est quoddam totum in se ab alia forma quam ab anima quae prius erat forma totius'. ibid.

\(^683\) 'Et quia pars est materia respectu totius, ideo respiciendo formam totius non manet nisi idem corpus materialiter, vivum et mortuum'. Robert of Orford, *Sciendum*, a. 86 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 310.

\(^684\) See above, p. 123.

\(^685\) Passage beginning, 'Causa individuationis est causa limitationis formae ad materiam determinatam'. Robert of Orford, *Sciendum*, a. 29 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 124 (cf. also a. 11, p. 67, passage beginning, 'Materia autem habere partem, non est intelligere nisi prout est sub dimensionibus').
quantitative structure, 'follow' matter 'in order to' this corporeal form, or 'draw their origin' (trahunt originem) from corporeal form (it is not temporal, but ontological posteriority that is being implied here). The discussion in Sciendum article 29 then diverges slightly from the text in De natura materiae and explains that, given this, when the soul is separated, the body's new forma totius gives this same accidental quantitative structure a new act of existence. The analysis in De natura materiae, however, continues beyond the point of bodily decomposition, and develops into a discussion of the general resurrection.

This discussion is highly compact, and rather out of place in De natura materiae, which otherwise confines its discussion to a purely philosophical plane. As indicated, the account of the general resurrection in De natura materiae bears some similarities to a pluralist account of resurrection: the author treats the accidental quantitative structure (referred to simply as dimensiones) belonging to an individual body like a pluralist's corporeal form.

So there are three principles, according to the author of De natura materiae, that need to return the same to an individual body at the resurrection, in order for its numerical identity to be safeguarded: the soul, the body's matter, and its structure (dimensiones). Aquinas, of course, had thought that only two principles needed return to each resurrected human: their individual matter (which traces of the individual body's accidental structure simply served to mark out for resurrection in their body) and their individual soul. The reason why an individual's structure needs to return numerically the same, the author of De natura materiae notes, is precisely because of its

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687 'Forma igitur corporis secundum quod corpus est pars humanae naturae, quia non dat esse non causat dimensiones, sed est in potentia ut causet... ita quod separata anima causabit dimensiones actu et dabit esse actu'. Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 29 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 133. This excerpt summarises Robert of Orford's basic argument, and will suffice for present purposes. The discussion from which it is taken concerns the correct application of the Averroan vocabulary of 'indeterminate' and 'determinate' dimensions to an analysis of natural bodies. After rejecting the way in which Averroes himself applied this vocabulary, Robert of Orford suggests that quantitative structure is 'indeterminate' whilst the bodily form upon which it follows is forma partis, and then becomes 'determinate' once this bodily form succeeds to become forma totius in the corpse.
role in individuation. The author's implicit argument would appear to be that the individual body's corporeal form can be reconstructed, identical, from its matter, only because of the continuity of an individualised and individuating quantitative structure in that matter.

After its bodily subject decomposes, then, an individual bodily structure is 'reduced' (redigi) into the body's matter and remains in it in potency, and crucially, only with respect to the divine agent. This avoids the false result (according to the axiom on continuity and identity from Aristotle's De generation et corruptione) that the same structure, and therefore the same body, could return naturally. So God can 'educere' a structure that is numerically the same for each body, the explanation continues, and when the same matter, the same structure (and presumably, therefore, the same corporeal form individuated by that structure) and the same soul are reunited, the same individual human being will rise again.

This short aside on the topic of the general resurrection is out of place in De natura materiae, not only because it is a treatment of a theological topic, but also because it contains certain ideas that are rather inconsistent with assertions that the author makes elsewhere in the tract. In chapter 1 of De natura materiae, the author had argued that matter is the principle of individuation, and that quantitative structure merely indicates the individual to the senses by locating it in space and time: if Robert of Orford did author De natura materiae, then he had clearly changed his mind on individuation by the time he came to write Sciendum. Moreover, the author had

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688 'Ex quibus patet quod idem homo numero resurget et non alius, cum omnia principia sua cadem numero relæcant ad invicem. Anima enim humana simpliciter cadem numero manet post mortem... Materia etiam cadem manet, cum materia sit incorruptibilis. Easdem etiam dimensiones necesse est manere in materia non nisi in potentia... quia aliter non foerit idem numero individuum, cum dimensiones agant ad individuationem'. De natura materiae, ch 4 (ed.) Wyss, p. 116.

689 'Manifestum est etiam subiecto eodem [i.e. the corporeal form] manente et durante, dimensiones easdem manere et, ipso corrupto, redigi in materiam eadem, de qua iterum eadem numero educi non possunt per naturam... si tamen per miraculum educuntur eadem numero, natae sunt ad eundem actum animae accipi... Easdem etiam dimensiones necesse est manere in materia non nisi in potentia, aliter agens physicum eadem numero produceret, quod falsum est. Manent ergo in potentia materiae eadem numero respectu agentis divini'. ibid. (my insertion).

690 'et ideo ex eadem materia et eisdem dimensionibus cum anima cadem erit idem homo qui resurget et non alius'. ibid.

691 Passage beginning, 'Ad hanc igitur divisionem formarum non requiritur in materia dimensio'. De natura materiae, ch. 1 (ed.) Wyss, pp. 92-3, and editor's commentary, p. 67.
devoted chapters 2 and 3 of *De natura materiae* to an examination of Averroes' work on the continuity of quantitative structure across substantial change only in order to *disprove* the notion that such a structure could remain in matter.\(^{692}\)

The philosophical account of the composition of human nature that Robert of Orford set out in article 31 of *Sciendum* was clearly shaped by a consideration of how an account of the identity of Christ's corpse might be given. The author of *De natura materiae*, however, who might well have been the same Dominican scholar at a slightly earlier stage in his career, did *not* let a consideration of the general resurrection drive his philosophical analysis of matter itself, even if he evidently realised the relevance of that particular theological topic to an account of the nature of matter. The pattern was similar with Thomas of Sutton's *De pluralitate formarum*: that treatise, too, was the work of a new bachelor in Theology still unaccustomed, it would seem, to allowing theological considerations to fundamentally inform his analysis of the natural world.

It is no coincidence that Richard Knapwell's *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*, to be discussed next, is, on the one hand, the only Dominican text discussed in this chapter to have been composed by a *master* in Theology, and, on the other hand, the only Dominican text *both* to offer a *unified* response to the problems of the identity of Christ's dead corpse and the general resurrection, *and*, in this very context, to set out a detailed natural philosophical analysis of postmortem bodily and material continuity.

### 3. Richard Knapwell: *Quare* (1278) and the *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* (1285)

Richard Knapwell's two major contributions to the debate surrounding Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological implications were written at either end of his career as a theologian.\(^{693}\) He wrote *Quare*, the earliest surviving point-by-point response to William de la Mare's *Correctorium fratris*...
Tho\mae, whilst still a bachelor of theology.\footnote{Quare is edited along with de la Mare's *Correctorium fratris Thomae in Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"* (hereafter *Quare*) (ed.) P. Glorieux, *Les premières polémiques thomistes 1* (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927). On Knapwell's authorship of *Quare*, see Knapwell, *QDUF* (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction, pp. 18-23.} His *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* was composed after he had incepted as master in Theology in 1284-85. It is the only Dominican work on the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological consequences that survives from Oxford from the period separating Peckham's first formal attempt to prevent the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans being taught at Oxford, on 29 October 1284, and the Archbishop's condemnation of the theory in London, on 30 April 1286. It would be Knapwell's last theological work. Not only was the *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* the proximate target of the condemnation, Peckham also excommunicated Knapwell on the same day, effectively ending the Dominican's career.

*Quare* and the *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* have different objectives. In article 31 of *Quare*, Knapwell aims to demonstrate that no heresy follows from Aquinas's position on the composition of human nature, and moreover that pluralist theory cannot evade Aquinas's criticism of it.\footnote{Nostrum autem in proposito erit ostendere quod nullum inconveniens vel haeresis sequitur ex illa positione [i.e. the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans], et quod isti, per suas respondiones, argumenta fratris Thomae non evadunt'. Knapwell, *Quare*, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 135 (my insertion).} As Francis Kelley has pointed out, Knapwell would rely, elsewhere in *Quare*, upon arguments from Thomas of Sutton's *De pluralitate formarum* and another tract written by Thomas of Sutton at around the same time, *De productione formae substantialis*,\footnote{*De productione formae substantialis* is edited: S. Włodek, 'Thomas Sutton, de producione formae substantialis', *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age*, 46 (1979), pp. 127-75.} in order to complete his philosophical criticism of certain aspects of the pluralist position, including the pluralist account of substantial change.\footnote{Expositio D. Thomae Aquinatis in Libros Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione Continuatio per Thoma de Sutona (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction, pp. 2-12.} Nonetheless, the account of postmortem bodily continuity in the case of Christ that Knapwell offers in *Quare* is his own. It is brief: Knapwell says just enough in article 31 of *Quare* to meet his stated objective, and certainly does not venture beyond it. Since his short treatment of the topic in *Quare* is compatible with the penetrating account of postmortem bodily continuity that Knapwell would later
refine and set out in his *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*, the two texts will be dealt with together here.

In the *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*, Knapwell's stated objective, at least, is more conciliatory. The precise question is whether, according to the faith, one ought to posit that several substantial forms belong to the essence of human nature united to the Word.\textsuperscript{698} Knapwell explains that great minds have disagreed over this question, with each party to the debate arguing that the other’s position is against the faith. He intends, he says, to take a 'middle way' (*media via*), to demonstrate that neither position on the composition of human nature contradicts the faith, and to do this without asserting anything that is doubted by either side, and without prejudice to any better argument or theory.\textsuperscript{699} The *Quaestio* gives a comprehensive account of the philosophical and theological arguments on either side of the debate, but is dominated by a discussion of postmortem bodily continuity. Knapwell sets out and refutes 39 arguments in favour of the pluralist position. Of these, 11 concern postmortem bodily continuity, of which 8 of directly concern Christ's corpse. He sets out explains a further 32 arguments in favour of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, without refuting them. The *responsio* section of the *Quaestio disputata* contains an extended discussion of the general resurrection.

On closer inspection, however, Knapwell's *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* contains ideas and arguments that were undoubtedly deeply provocative within the context of the debate as it had hitherto developed. In this *Quaestio disputata* Knapwell is not, as Robert of Orford was in *Sciemendum*, attempting to reconcile Aquinas's and pluralist philosophy, by finding a way to provide an account of postmortem bodily continuity on pluralist terms: that is to say, finding a way to give an account of *formal continuity* between living body and corpse. In the course of pursuing his own 'middle way', Knapwell in fact intentionally and carefully *dismantles* the framework that de la

\textsuperscript{698}'Quaestio est utrum secundum fidem de essentia humanae naturae verbo unitae oporteat ponere plures formas'. Knapwell, *QDUF* (ed.) Kelley, p. 49.

Mare had constructed for the debate on postmortem bodily continuity in his *Correctorium fratris Thomae*.

It is not just that, under the pretext of finding a 'middle way' between Aquinas's and pluralist philosophy, Knapwell pulls the rug from beneath the most basic pluralist argument in the debate: that the continuity of a *substantial form* in the corpse is *necessary* to support any continuing identity between living body and corpse. Neither is it simply that he points out, in addition, that *both* parties should focus simply on explaining *material* continuity, and that *both* should accept the account of the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies that he himself has developed through building upon Aquinas's most speculative thinking in this area.

More than this, the *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* contains an attempt to completely unravel the pluralists' philosophical account of postmortem bodily continuity, full-stop. Knapwell puts forward an argument to demonstrate that the pluralists *cannot* posit the identity of any substantial form in the body across its death, in any meaningful way, after all: according to Knapwell, the pluralist position, *like* the position of those who follow Aquinas, entails that the form of the corpse is *numerically different* from the form of the living body.

The way in which Knapwell is able to reach this surprising interpretation of the consequences of pluralist theory will be explained below. For now, it is enough to note that, when he reinterprets the consequences of pluralist theory for postmortem bodily continuity in this way, Knapwell is in fact staying true to his stated objective to show that *neither* theory of human nature contradicts the faith. (He is just not giving an interpretation of the pluralist theory that any pluralist would recognise as accurate). As we will see, Knapwell thinks that in order to preserve that Christ underwent a true death it is in fact *necessary* to posit that a *new* substantial form was introduced into Christ's dead body, but he also thinks that both sides can argue that Christ's dead body was absolutely the same thing as His living body *despite* the introduction of this new substantial form into it.

Now, given that the main focus of his intellectual energy in *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae* is upon developing an account of the postmortem continuity of individual bodies' *matter*, it is no surprise that Richard Knapwell, in contrast to
Thomas of Sutton, provides an account of the individual human body that emphasises its relative independence from the soul within the human being. He does this, moreover, without compromising the unity of the human being, as Robert of Orford had.

Like both Thomas of Sutton and Thomas Aquinas, Richard Knapwell would emphasise that the unity of the human being, body and soul, is guaranteed only if the soul is the body's only substantial form. If the soul were to arrive at a body already in act by another form, he notes, then the human being, body and soul, would be a mere 'aggregate' of two things. The act of existence of any thing is 'outside' (extra) its essence or quiddity (quidditas) and is the 'ultimate perfection' of that quiddity: a soul following a corporeal form that was already perfected by an act of existence would not be able to enter into the same essence or quiddity with that body.700

But unlike Thomas of Sutton, and like Thomas Aquinas, Knapwell would also emphasise that the material part of human nature is in a differentiated state of potency: according to one argument that Knapwell puts forward in favour of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, the human essence is a unity comprising both the soul and the matter that is in an appropriate state of potency for the soul. The 'essence' of the body, Knapwell writes, is a 'proper potency with respect to the soul'.701

In the concrete, just as Aquinas had, Knapwell grounds the relative independence of the individual body within the human being upon the accidental form giving to the body its physical structure: dimensive quantity. In the Quaestio

700 'Item, si corpus haberet formam ante unionem animae, illa forma ex qua est substantialis esset corpori principium existendi per se... et sic natura humana esset ex duobus in act existentibus. Et per consequens non esset una nisi per aggregationem... Actus quicumque existendi est ultima perfectio quidditas illius cuius est actus. Cum enim actus existendi quidditas substantiae sit extra ipsam quidditatem, necesse est quod illud quod naturaliter sequitur esse sit extra quidditatem eandem. Ergo ex hoc ipso quod corpus ponitur ante animam habere actum existendi, ex consequenti negatur habere potentiam ad animam tamquam ad aliud pertinens ad eius quidditatem vel essentiam'; 'Item, ab eodem habet aliquid esse et unitatem. Unum enim sequitur ens. Cum ergo a forma unaquaque res habeat esse, a forma etiam habet unitatem. Si ergo in homine ponatur plures formae substantiales, homo non erit unum ens sed plura'. Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 2, and arg. 17 (ed.) Kelley, pp. 56, 61.

701 'Item, ex anima et corpore Christi fiebat unum per essentiam. Ergo mutatio per quam facta est separatio animae a corpore attingebat ipsum essentiam corporis quae erat propria potentia respectu animae'. Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 24 (ed.) Kelley, p. 63.
disputata de unitate formae, he puts forward an argument, in favour of the pluralist position, which states that it is necessary to posit a distinct substantial form in the individual body as the metaphysical support for its basic corporeal features, including its extension. Knapwell confirms that dimensive quantity is the only form capable of giving extension to matter and dividing it into parts, and that the human body's dimensive quantity is not somehow produced by the body to which it belongs. It is, of course, constructed by the power of the agent of the body's generation, the virtus formativa in paternal semen. In Quare, in the context of a discussion of angelic individuation, Knapwell gives an account of the properties of dimensive quantity that equip it for the role of individuating material things that is very close to that which Aquinas's gives at Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, a. 2.

Finally, clarifying his position on the proper signification of 'body' elsewhere in Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, Knapwell outlines and rejects Giles of Rome's position that the body as the 'other part' of human nature (that is, the part that is not the soul) is simply matter itself, insofar as it possesses a certain internal organisation and complexity resulting from its relationship to the various accidental forms that are found within it. Knapwell argues that the acquisition of these characteristics would presuppose a composite of matter and substantial form in act; he does not understand how matter per se and alone can be understood as possessing the structural features and complexion proper to a human body. According to an

702 Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro pluralitatem formarum, arg. 11 (ed.) Kelley, p. 51.

703 'dicendum quod sicut nulla forma substantialis dici potest cuius est formam extendere neque effective neque formaliter, ita nec anima, quoniam quantitas dimensiva qua formaliter corpus extenditur quantumcumque non efficitur per virtutem corporis eiusdem, sed per virtutem generantis'. Knapwell, QDUF, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 11 (ed.) Kelley, p. 79. Cf. argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 28, p. 65: 'Distinctio materiae per partes fit per quantitatem dimensivam'; and for Knapwell's account of human generation, see responsiones ad argumenta ad 1-ad 6, pp. 74-7.

704 See esp. Knapwell, Qure, a. 10 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 56-7, passage beginning, 'Distinctio enim secundum numerum praesupponit divisionem secundum quantitatem'.

705 'corpus sumitur pro altera parte humanae naturae... secundum quosdam... est solummodo humanae naturae principium materiale... ipsa sscilicet materia eius... secundum esse quod habet in habitudine ad dimensionem qua extenditur et organizationem et complexionem qua affectur et terminatur. Ponunt enim quod... sic materiae corporis humani extensa vel affecta... nihil aliud est quam ipsa eius essentia'. Knapwell, QDUF, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 7 (ed.) Kelley, p. 77.

706 'quoniam dimensio et organizatio ac sequens complexio subjectum actu compositum requirit, non intelligo qualiter materia per se sola possit intelligi dimensificata... cum qualitates primae ex quarum adequatione resultat complexio...'. ibid.
alternative position that Knapwell endorses, when applied correctly to the 'other part' of the human being, the word 'body' in fact signifies the material part of human nature, entering (in the appropriate state of potency, we may assume) into composition with the soul or 'human form', but only insofar as human nature's various material properties follow ontologically upon that form.\footnote{Et ideo secundum hoc [nomen corporis] non significat nisi partem humanae naturae materialem, quia non significat compositum ex materia et humana forma, nisi inquantum ipsam consequuntur dispositiones ac proprietates humanae naturae materiales’. ibid., pp. 77-8 (my insertion).} In \textit{Quare}, responding to the pluralist notion that the body is mere prime matter according to Aquinas's philosophy, Knapwell singles out dimensive quantity as the particular accidental form in virtue of which this 'other part' of human nature is called the 'body'.\footnote{Haec ergo natura tota’, that is, the composite of matter and the soul, ‘prout ipsam consequitur illa quantitas dimensiva, dicitur corpus’. Knapwell, \textit{Quare} (ed.) Glorieux, a. 31, p. 138.}

Turning, now, to Knapwell's discussion of postmortem bodily continuity in the \textit{responsio} section of the \textit{Quaestio disputata de unitate formae}, the Dominican master introduces a theological premise upon which both parties to the debate have to agree, which in fact concerns not only the general resurrection, but also the identity of saints' relics. Reflecting on this premise, Knapwell argues, both parties should be able to see that what the faith ultimately demands, precisely, is a philosophical account of the continuity of the matter particular to each individual body: the question of the continuity or non-continuity of any \textit{substantial form} is irrelevant to the continuing identity of the corpse's remains beyond a certain point of decay.

All can agree, then, that according to the faith the souls of the saints have a 'natural appetite' or desire to be reunited with their \textit{own} matter, however changed (\textit{quantuncumque mutatam}) the state of that matter might be.\footnote{Cf. Aquinas's position, above, p. 109 and n. 269.} Evidently, Knapwell points out, this appetite, in each case, cannot be accounted for by the substantial form under which those remains currently subsist, since in every case that is simply the form of 'ashes' (\textit{forma cineris}). It must therefore be that saints' souls are naturally drawn to the matter particular to their individual bodies itself.\footnote{Animae sanctorum appetitum habent naturalem ad suam materiam quantuncumque mutatam. Ratio autem huius appetitus non est forma cineris in materia corporum sanctorum introducta, sed materia ipsa quae et prius erat in corporibus corum dum animabus uniebatur.’ Knapwell, \textit{QDUF}, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 67.} The selection of this

\footnote{Evidently, Knapwell points out, this appetite, in each case, cannot be accounted for by the substantial form under which those remains currently subsist, since in every case that is simply the form of 'ashes' (\textit{forma cineris}). It must therefore be that saints' souls are naturally drawn to the matter particular to their individual bodies itself. Knapwell, \textit{QDUF}, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 67.}
particular theological premise is shrewd, and not only because it allows Knapwell to deal with the two issues of the general resurrection and the identity of saints' relics at the same time. It also provides a clear riposte to Roger Marston's defensive argument in his Quodlibet IV, from the previous year, noted above: Marston, in effect, had argued that the faith did not in fact demand an account of the continuity of every human individual's material remains beyond bodily decay.  

Working from the premise that each saint's soul desires reunion to its own matter, Knapwell gives his own natural philosophical account of the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies, finding his own way, that is, to fill in the outline of the account of material continuity that Aquinas had handed down in his own work on the general resurrection.

Knapwell explains that the matter particular to each saint's body must, for its part, retain the same 'distinction and numbering' (distinctionem eamdem ac numerationem), or individuality, which it had in their living body, however many intervening substantial forms it has served as the subject for since that body's decomposition. So how does the particular matter formerly belonging to an individual saint's living body retain its individuality and identity? There are no distinctions within the essence of matter itself, so matter cannot account for its own 'distinction and numbering'. Dimensive quantity, Knapwell writes, is the principle of matter's divisibility and partibility. His conclusion, more precisely, is that the matter that was particular to a saint's living body retains its individuality even under the form of ashes because it retains the same 'nature of dimensive quantity' (natura quantitas dimensiva) that it had in the saint's living body. So what is the 'nature of dimensive quantity'?

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711 See above, p. 207.

712 'Materia sive pars materiae in qua succedunt sibi duas formae substantiales est una numero, divisa et distincta ab aliis materiae partibus quibuscumque oportet. Quod esse non potest solum ratione suae essentiae in qua convenit cum materia quacumque. Ergo oportet quod in illa essentia materiae quae successive informatur illis formis remaneat illud quod est principium divisionis et partibilitatis. Hae autem est quantitas dimensiva'. Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 67.

713 'Cum ergo singulares animae singulas materias appetant per naturam, manifestum est quod in membris illis sub forma cineris manet natura quantitatis dimensivae eadem quae prius erat in corporibus vivis. Alioquin distinctionem ac numerationem quam prius materiae illae non retinerent. Nec per consequens animae eadem partes materiae quas prius informabant et non alias appeterent per naturam, cuius oppositionem tenet fides'. ibid., pp. 67-8.
According to Knapwell, the 'nature of dimensive quantity', or the structural element responsible for particularising the material remains of any individual saint (or indeed any human), is not an accidental form in act. Nor is it a kind of medium, or metaphysical layer, intervening between matter and any substantial form, even though it ontologically precedes substantial form in matter.\(^{714}\) Knapwell conceives the 'nature of dimensive quantity' in any particular part of matter, rather, as the particular \textit{property} of that part of matter, and as subsisting, in itself, in a state of potency, just as the matter whose property it is, is in a state of potency just in itself.\(^{715}\) According to Knapwell, the 'nature of dimensive quantity' in any particular part of matter is equipped for the continuous work of distinguishing that part of matter from any other matter, across any sequence of substantial changes, because it is naturally, or of itself, individualised: in Knapwell's terms, it is naturally 'individuated and indivisibly numbered', or has 'material unity' in itself.\(^{716}\)

What is the relationship between the 'nature of dimensive quantity', or the structural principle in a particular part of matter, on the one hand, and the accidental corporeal form in act, to which Knapwell refers simply as 'dimensive quantity', belonging to the individual body in which that matter currently subsists, on the other? As the particular part of matter to which it belongs is brought into act, or 'perfected' by a particular substantial form, Knapwell thinks, so the particular nature of dimensive quantity, or structural principle, possessed by that particular part of matter is in turn 'perfected' by 'terminations'. These 'terminations' are the actual structural features belonging to the particular accidental quantitative structure that is appropriate for the particular natural entity defined by that very substantial form.\(^{717}\)

\(^{714}\) 'Sciendum tamen quod natura quantitatis dimensivae, licet... praecedat formam substantialem in materia, non tamen est illud mediante quo forma substantialis unitur eidem'. ibid., p. 68.

\(^{715}\) 'natura dimensionis sic accepta non est actus sed potentia. Unde dicitur quod non opoteat quod habeat subjectum sibi proprium ens in actu. Sed satis videtur suae naturae ut naturam materiae quae similitur est in potentia consequatur, utpote quaedam proprietas eiusmodem'. ibid., p. 69.

\(^{716}\) 'quantitas dimensiva... semper manet cadem cum materia cuius est proprietas, cadem remanente. Et hoc satis est probable, cum quantitas dimensiva habeat in sui natura unde individuetur ac indivisibiliter numeretur... Naturae vero aliarum materialium formarum non habent ex se unitatem materialem'. ibid., p. 70.

\(^{717}\) 'sicut cadem essentia materiae perficitur per diversos terminos substantiales, sic cadem natura quantitatis dimensivae perficitur per diversas terminaciones consequentes diversas formas substantiales'. ibid., p. 69.
this structure will be the physical structure of a human body, if the substantial form is a soul.

Knapwell explains, further, that these structural features in act or 'terminations' are extraneous to the very essence of dimensive quantity. So whilst the actual individual structures in which it is perfected vary across a sequence of substantial changes, the nature of dimensive quantity in any particular part of matter, or the principle of those structures, in itself remains the same thing: just as the essence of the matter that serves as the substrate for this sequence of substantial changes remains the same, even though it is in a state of proper potency to each substantial form in turn, so, too, the nature of dimensive quantity is the same across those changes, even though it is in a state of proper potency to different sets of actual corporeal structural features or 'terminations' in turn.718

From one angle at least, the nature of dimensive quantity appears to serve a similar purpose to the formal principles that pluralists posited in matter, or rationes seminales: in generation, corporeal forms of one sort or another 'unfold', so to speak, from each kind of formal principle in matter. We are left to wonder what account Knapwell might have given of the material identity of the mortal body across growth and material exchange given that, according to this account of substantial change, the structural principles from which a individual's particular bodily structure unfolds would appear be rooted in the very matter from which their body was originally generated.

In any case, for the purpose of constructing of an account of postmortem bodily continuity, Knapwell's 'nature of dimensive quantity' has a certain advantage over a pluralist's ratio seminalis: it is naturally individual, whereas the pluralist's ratio seminalis, supposedly the metaphysical support for the continuity of individual bodily substantial forms, was not. And the 'nature of dimensive quantity' serves quite a different

718 'terminus quantitatis dimensivae est extra essentia eiusdem. Et ideo variato termino, remanet totum quod ad essentiam quantitas dimensivae pertinet', 'Ita scilicet quod sicut essentia materiae manet cum formis diversis respectu quorum est in potentia propria, sic natura dimensionis quae est potentia propria respectu harum terminationum manet eadem in eisdem. ibid., pp. 69, 70. Francis Kelley, in his commentary on this passage (editor's introduction, p. 38), suggests that there is a 'fatal flaw' in Knapwell's argument because he is arguing that the nature of dimensive quantity is 'at one and the same time numerically one and numerically several'. All Knapwell seems to be trying to say here is that the nature of dimensive quantity in any part of matter, numerically one in itself, can be brought into act in different structures in a succession of substances.
purpose, of course, to a pluralist's *ratio seminalis* in the context of a discussion of resurrection: the former is posited simply to account for the continuity of the *matter* particular to individual bodies across death and resurrection. Knapwell does not address directly the theory of *rationes seminales* in his *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*. His explicit argument is simply that both sides in the dispute must be in agreement regarding the role that the 'nature of dimensive quantity' has to play in an account of postmortem bodily continuity.\(^{719}\)

This account of the continuity of quantitative structure across substantial change, particularising parts of matter and serving as the basis for their continuing identity, differs from Averroes', even though Knapwell cites Averroes' *De substantia orbis* for authoritative support,\(^ {720}\) and uses Averroes' vocabulary in his own analysis: at one point in this discussion of postmortem material continuity the 'nature of dimensive quantity' is described as 'indeterminate' (*interminata*) in itself.\(^ {721}\) For Averroes, of course, 'absolute body' or 'indeterminate dimensions' was or were a layer of quantitative structure extending across prime matter (and thus extending prime matter), and rendering it divisible, and did constitute a real medium intervening between matter and substantial form. For Averroes, this structure was also a really distinct thing from the various particular accidental forms belonging to individual bodies.\(^ {722}\) Knapwell, as just explained, envisages a direct relationship of potency and act linking, respectively, the principle of corporeal structure that is a property of a particular part of matter, and the concrete corporeal structure that is the particular accidental form belonging to the substantial body in which that very matter is currently subsisting. Sylvia Donati's research into *Physics* commentaries produced around this time by Arts masters at Oxford has revealed a similar tendency in their

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\(^{719}\) 'consideranda sunt quaedam in quibus necesse est habent tam hii quam illi convenire. Quorum primum pertinet ad naturam dimensivae quantitatis'. Knapwell, *QDUF*, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 67.

\(^{720}\) Ibid., p. 67.

\(^{721}\) 'natura quantitatis dimensivae eatenus qua terminata est, formam substantialem consequitur, quam tamen praecedet alio modo interminata'. Ibid., p. 69.

\(^{722}\) See above, chapter 2, section 4.2 and subsections, esp. 4.2.1. .
work to analyse dimensive quantity into a compound of act and potency in order to explain the partition of matter.\textsuperscript{223}

Knapwell's account of the continuity of matter as particular across any case of substantial change is very similar to that in Averroes' \textit{Physica} commentary, however, in that what both thinkers ultimately provide is a natural philosophical account of the continuity of particular parts of matter \textit{in themselves}. What \textit{Aquinas} had pointedly attempted to do in his mature work on the resurrection, in contrast, was to outline an explanation for the continuing identity of the matter particular to an individual body across death and resurrection, not simply \textit{as particular}, but precisely \textit{as} the matter belonging to that very individual body. \textit{Aquinas} had suggested that what remained in the matter particular to an individual body after its death were \textit{precisely} the traces of the accidental quantitative structure that had belonged to an individual body when it was alive: his own explanation in his work on the resurrection went no further than that.

\textit{Aquinas} and \textit{Knapwell} are both ultimately trying to give an account of postmortem material continuity that is equivalent to Augustine's atomist account.\textsuperscript{224} Analogously, then, whereas \textit{Aquinas} simply discusses where the atoms formerly belonging to an individual body go after bodily decay, and goes no further, \textit{Knapwell} offers a full natural philosophical account of those atoms themselves: the nature of them; their path before and after becoming incorporated into a particular human body; and the way in which they actually comprise different organic structures in different bodies in succession.

Now, \textit{Knapwell} wants to explain the appetite of each soul to be reunited with its own matter in terms of the continuing particularity of that matter itself, and yet he thinks that any part of matter is potentially particular to a number of different

\textsuperscript{223} The third main issue in the commentators' discussion of indeterminate dimensions does not originate from Averroes' treatment of this topic... but seems to be an original contribution of our authors... Most commentators imply appeal to a general metaphysical rule... Typical of our commentators is to extend this principle to dimensive quantity, by maintaining that that actual dimensions require as their counterpart a potentiality in the category of quantity. Such potentiality is identified by the commentators with indeterminate dimensions'. Donati, 'The Notion of \textit{Dimensiones Indeterminatae} in the Commentary Tradition of the \textit{Physics} in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century', pp. 211-2.

\textsuperscript{224} See above, pp. 15-16.
individual bodies in turn. Why should the link between any particular soul and any particular part of matter be especially strong? Knapwell's analysis, of course, does not preclude that two or more souls could desire reunion to the same matter. Theologians had long debated the outcome of situations resulting from cannibalism, where matter was 'shared' by two bodies in turn, discussing where the shared matter would ultimately go at the resurrection, and developing rules for assigning priority to one body over another.\textsuperscript{725}

Moving on in the direction of Knapwell's discussion of the identity of Christ's corpse in particular, it is worth pointing out that the commentaries of Daniel Callus, Francis Kelley, and Alain Boureau on this Quaestio disputata have all given credence to Knapwell's claim to be trying to find middle ground between Aquinas's and pluralist theory, based on this account of postmortem bodily continuity and further comments that Knapwell makes in the remainder of the responsio section of the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae.\textsuperscript{726}

In the responsio, it is true, Knapwell continues to adopt a conciliatory tone, and moves on to discuss bodily continuity across substantial generation in general. If both parties must agree that the 'nature of dimensive quantity' remains in matter across substantial change, then they also agree, Knapwell explains, that there are symbola or common accidental qualities on either side of any case of substantial change, and that the presence of these symbola can explain why a certain substance is so readily transformed into a certain other substance.

\textsuperscript{725} Reynolds, \textit{Food and the Body}, see pp. 304-5 (on Albertus Magnus), 313-4, 343-4 (on Bonaventure) and 391-5 (on Aquinas).

\textsuperscript{726} Callus writes of Knapwell, 'He does not attack the pluralist position... His purpose is to show that pluralist theory is not the only means of safeguarding the Catholic faith', 'Knapwell tries to reconcile the two conflicting theories, but his solution is almost purely verbal'. Callus also quotes a passage from the reportatio version of the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, wherein Knapwell recalls in his responsio that Kilwardby himself posited that matter was invested with a quantitative structure, albeit along with corporeal form as the subject for that structure. Callus, 'Richard Knapwell and the Problem of the Unity of Form', pp. 140, 147-9. Kelley writes, 'There can be little doubt at least that he saw his approach in this Quaestio as constructive, as a step forward towards bridge building, but without undue compromise'. Knapwell, \textit{QDUF} (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction, p. 34. Boureau's position moves between detecting 'la construction de zones intermédiaires de compromis', on the one hand, and 'quelque tromperie dans le compromis de Knapwell', on the other hand, in \textit{Théologie, science et censure}, pp. 213, 322 (see pp. 209-13 for Boureau's commentary on Knapwell's Quaestio disputata, which relies on Kelley's).
At this stage in his argument, Knapwell simply points out that the two parties disagree with respect to the precise way in which they understand the events of substantial change. Those who posit several forms in the same substance say that the very same corporeal form remains across substantial generation and corruption, along with the same structure or dimensive quantity, and the same symbola or accidental qualities in number although they undergo a change in the 'grade' of their nature. Those who posit a single form in any composite say that the nature of dimensive quantity remains, though 'terminated' in act in a new way (aliter terminata); that other accidental qualities, or symbola, are numerically different on either side of a case of substantial change, but are still very close in the 'grade' of their nature to their counterparts belonging to the substance on the other side of the substantial change; and that even if there is no bodily form that actually remains across substantial change, one can still say that a less perfect substantial form virtually persists when a more perfect form is acquired, because the qualities proper to the more perfect form are very close in the 'grade' of their nature to the qualities that follow the less perfect form.727 These differences notwithstanding, Knapwell invites his audience to 'see how closely these two ways run together'.728

Knapwell might well present pluralist theory in these uncontroversial terms in the responsio section of the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae. But the rest of the argument regarding postmortem bodily continuity in the Quaestio disputata, comprising not only the relevant arguments that Knapwell puts forward in favour of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, but also his subsequent responses to various pluralist arguments regarding the issue of the immediate identity of the corpse, amounts to the complete pulling-apart of the pluralist position on this topic. Knapwell's direct and extended exposition on the identity of Christ's corpse in the

727 See the extended discussion beginning, 'Primi volunt quod sicut quantitas dimensiva remanet eadem numero in generato et corrupto, sic cadem forma corporea'. Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, responsio, pp. 72-3; see also editor's introduction, pp. 39-40, and cf. commentary in Callus, 'The Problem of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell', pp. 146-8. Knapwell's text is somewhat ambiguous regarding whether symbola can remain across substantial change according to the theory of the unicity of substantial form. The present analysis agrees with Callus's judgement that Knapwell means to say that symbola cannot remain the same in number. Kelley disagrees, based on his opinion that Knapwell at one juncture means to endorse Giles of Rome's position on the continuity of symbola across substantial change.

728 'Ecce quam prope et vicino concurrunt viae supra dictae'. Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 73.
Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, in fact, is found only in the section in which he responds to specific pluralist arguments.

The first thing to point out with regard to Knapwell's position on Christ's corpse is that he evidently agrees with the arguments of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Sutton that both parties to the debate must say that there is a formal difference in Christ's body living and dead, in order to safeguard that He underwent a true death. But Knapwell, both in Quare and in the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, confidently goes further than either of these other two Dominicans. In article 31 of Quare, that is to say, Knapwell positively accepts that Christ's human nature would not have undergone the dissolution or mutation of a true death unless a new form were introduced into His body. In the Quaestio disputata, he repeats this argument. It does not follow, Knapwell goes on to explain in Quare, that Christ assumed a new nature in death: from the moment He was incarnated He assumed a nature that was mortal, to be transformed in death and repaired in resurrection. And, besides, the new form in His dead body is not per se assumable into the hypostatic union.

The next thing to say is that, as already indicated, Knapwell refuses to admit that there is any significant philosophical difference between the pluralist account of the identity of the corpse and that offered by the advocates of Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being. Knapwell sets out an argument in favour of the pluralist position, then, that says that if there is only one substantial form in a human being, living and dead flesh are not the same thing in number, and therefore it is not the same flesh, in the case of any human individual, which lives, is buried, and rises again. His response is designed to demonstrate that, whether one

729 'corpus Christi... tamen in morte non esset solutum nisi per animae separationem et alterius formae inductionem fuisse mutatum...’ Quare, article 31, p. 138; Et sic ad hoc quod salvetur vera mors Christi, necesse est ponere quod aliquam substantiallem formam induci novam per veram mutationem corporis Christi in morte’. Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 22 (ed.) Kelley, p. 63.

730 'Et licet corpus sit mutatum per mortem, non tamen sequitur quod in morte novam naturam assumperit, tum quia illa forma substantialis in morte inducta non est per se assumptible, tum quia natura sic fuit in principio suae incarnationis assumpta, videlicet mutabilis ac mortalis, tandem per mortem mutanda et per gloriam resurrectionis reparanda’. Knapwell, Quare, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 135.

731 Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro pluralitate formarum, arg. 20 (ed.) Kelley, p. 52.
posits one substantial form in a human being or more than one, the form of the body living and dead is not the same form in number.\textsuperscript{732}

According to Knapwell's rendering of their position, the pluralists posit that there is a corporeal form of the same nature in the body living and dead but that this nature changes according to its 'grade' across death. He probably has Roger Marston's version of the pluralist theory, recently articulated in Quodlibetal debate, in mind.\textsuperscript{733} But the pluralists also have to admit, Knapwell continues, that the individual subject of this form, or supposit (\textit{suppositum}), is different, too, because the living and the dead individual, the human and the non-human individual, are clearly different individual subjects or substances. If this simply looks like a more technical way of saying that bodily death is a case of substantial change, then the conclusion that Knapwell wants to draw, at least, is clear and uncompromising: if a form differs according to the grade of its nature, and has a different supposit or belongs to a different individual substance, then it it necessarily individuated anew, or counted as a different individual form (\textit{numerari}).\textsuperscript{734}

We now arrive at Knapwell's positive account of the identity of Christ's dead body, the content of which, given what has just been established, will come as no surprise. In \textit{Quare}, Knapwell's argument had simply been that Christ's dead body was not \textit{totally} the same, on account of being formally different (a requirement of the faith, as just explained), and yet was absolutely (\textit{simpliciter}) the same on account of its continued subsistence in the same supposit, the divine person of the Word.\textsuperscript{735} In the

\begin{commentary}
\textsuperscript{732} 'dicendum quod sive ponamus in homine plures formas sive unam. non potest dici ut videtur quod forma vivi et mortui sit simpliciter una tantum numero'. Knapwell, \textit{QDUF}, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 20 (ed.) Kelley, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{733} See above, pp. 213-4.

\textsuperscript{734} 'Videmus enim quod forma quae potest habere diversos naturae gradus, licet non numeretur propter solam suorum graduum diversitatem, necesse tamen habet numerari ubi habet diversum gradum et diversum suppositum... Sed qui ponunt eiusdem naturae formae corporalem in vivo et mortuo necesse habent ponere - quod et dicunt - quod natura differat secundum gradum in eisdem, et non tantum secundum gradum sed secundum suppositum, quoniam alid est suppositum vivum et mortuum; homo et non-homo'. Knapwell, \textit{QDUF}, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 20 (ed.) Kelley, pp. 82-3 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{735} 'corpus Christi mortuum et vivum est idem numero simpliciter, prout simpliciter dicitur quod nullo addito dicitur, id est absolute, et hoc propter unitatem suppositi divinae personae sive Verbi quo subsistebat. Non fuit tamen idem simpliciter prout simpliciter dicit idem quod totaliter; tune enim non
\end{commentary}
Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, in a lengthy response to the pluralist argument, again recently stated by Roger Marston in Quodlibetal debate, that, in order for Christ's dead body to be the same in number as His living body it must have had the same substantial form in number,\textsuperscript{736} Knapwell, this time around, is able to give a much fuller account of the continuing identity of Christ's corpse.

He notes that the crucial difference between Christ's dead body and any other human corpse is that the material remains of Christ remain in the same supposit: their ultimate individual metaphysical subject, to which they remain inseparably united, is the subsisting Word. Christ's dead body did have the same matter in number, the same nature of dimensive quantity, though brought into act in a slightly different bodily structure (\textit{aliter terminata}), and a similar complexion, even if it was formally different, on account of having either a new substantial form or what the pluralists call a new 'grade' of form. But it was rather (\textit{potius}) because it remained in the same supposit that it remained \textit{absolutely} the same body as His living body.\textsuperscript{737} Hammering Knapwell's point home is one particularly provocative argument that he advances in favour of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans: even if Christ's body \textit{had} undergone complete corruption and been reduced to ashes in the tomb, it would still have been His same body, on account of its continued union to the Word.\textsuperscript{738}

Knapwell concludes his response to this pluralist argument regarding the identity of Christ's dead body by pointing out that, since the corporeal form that the pluralists

\textsuperscript{736} Knapwell, \textit{Quaere}, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{737} 'De corporibus mortuis aliorum dicendum quod poni non potest. Quoniam nulla opinio ponere potest quod forma corporis vivi et mortui in aliis, eodem supposito remanere potest. Proprius potius in corpore Christi vivo et mortuo non solum remanebat eadem materia numero et eadem natura quantitatis dimensivae, aliter tamen terminata, et eadem natura complexionis in gradu alio... sed una cum hoc - omnia ista cum gradu formae vel forma in morte Christi inducta, in eodem supposito remanebant... non solum ratione materiae et quantitas dimensivae... nec ratione organizationis et complexionis... sed potius ratione Verbi subsistentis in omnimoda identitate cum corpore vivo et mortuo, simpliciter debet dici corpus unum'. Knapwell, \textit{QDUF}, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 29 (ed.) Kelley, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{738} 'Corpus autem Christi erat per naturam mutabile tam vivum quam mortuum. Et si corpus eius mortuum fuisse ulterior in cinerem mutatam, adhuc ut prius Verbo Dei fuisse unitum, et per consequens corpus Christi exitisset'. Knapwell, \textit{QDUF}, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 21 (ed.) Kelley, p. 62.
posit to remain in the corpse cannot in fact be absolutely the same in number as it was in the living body, and since neither party in the dispute therefore holds that the form in Christ's corpse was really the same (or had the same 'grade' of its nature) as the form of his living body, the difference between the two parties in fact comes down to a mere difference in the use of words. Those who subscribe to the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans are willing to call the form of the corpse (or 'grade' of form) a 'new form'; the pluralists deny that it is a new form.\footnote{\textit{in nullo videtur fidei derogare si gradus formae de novo inducatur in morte Christi in corpore eius - quod secundum ponentes unam formam in composito est novam formam corporis induci... Nec est plus dicere inter opiniones istas, nisi quod isti gradum formae substantialis novum vocant 'novam formam' propter rationem praedictam, quod ali negant. Unde videtur in re convenire quoad hoc, quod non fuit idem gradus naturae in forma corporis vivi et mortui. Sed hii, istam diversitatem gradus dicunt formalem, illi autem non'. Knapwell, \textit{QDCE}, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 89.}

Taking in the complete argument that Knapwell presents in his \textit{Quaestio disputata de unitate formae}, then, it is very difficult to sustain the view that his stated intention to find a 'middle way' between the two theories of human nature is genuine. Rather, the treatment of postmortem bodily continuity in this \textit{Quaestio} appears carefully calibrated to prove that pluralists have to abandon their longstanding position, as set out in de la Mare's \textit{Correctorium}, and repeated more recently by Roger Marston, the most significant Franciscan scholar of Knapwell's generation at Oxford.

In sum, it is worth repeating, the pluralist position was that the continuity of some substantial form is necessary across death in order to sustain the continuing identity of the living body with the corpse, and that the faith therefore demanded a pluralist theory of human nature in order to preserve the identity of Christ's dead body. Quite to the contrary, Knapwell argues in his \textit{Quaestio disputata de unitate formae}, doctrine demands both that a new substantial form be introduced into Christ's corpse, and that the pluralists have to subscribe to the particular account of postmortem material identity that he has developed, in place of their account of postmortem formal continuity. In addition to this, Knapwell argues, quite aside, in fact, from the particular demands of the faith, pluralist theory simply cannot provide the account of formal continuity that the pluralists claim it can.

Along with the theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being, four of the articles condemned by John Peckham on 30 April 1286, in particular,
reflected the account of Christ's dead body given in Knapwell's *Quaestio disputata de unitate formae*. The first condemned article was that Christ's dead body possessed no substantial form that was the same as any it had when alive;\(^740\) while the second was that a new substantial form, a new species or nature, was introduced into His dead body, meaning (according to the text of the condemnation at least), that Christ would have been some additional, 'unnamed species' after His death.\(^741\) The fifth condemned article was that Christ's dead body was numerically identical to His living body, but only on account of the identity of its matter and of 'indeterminate dimensions', the relationship of these to the immortal soul, and their continued existence in a hypostatic union to the Word.\(^742\) The sixth was that the dead body of any human or saint, before its decomposition into the elements and the scattering of its material into the wind, is the same in number as the living body that corrupted into it only in a certain sense (*secundum quid*), namely on account of their shared matter and because of an accident that they share in common, that is, *quantity*; absolutely (*simpliciter*) the living body and corpse are different in species and in number (that is, they differ *formally*).\(^743\) There is another record of the condemned articles, in the *Annals* of Dunstable, which attributes the condemned articles directly to Knapwell.\(^744\)

Before stepping back and bringing this chapter's long discussion to its conclusion, a historiographical point should be raised, specifically regarding Caroline Walker Bynum's interpretation of the condemnation of the theory of the unicity of substantial


\(^741\) 'Secundus est, quod in morte fuit introducta nova forma substantialis, et nova species, vel natura, quamvis non nova assumptione vel unione Verbo copulata; ex quo sequitur, quod filius Dei non fuerit tantum homo, sed alterius speciei innominatae'. ibid.

\(^742\) 'Quintus est, identitatem fuisse numeralem corporis Christi mortui cum eius corpore vivo, tantummodo propter identitatem materiae et dimensionum interminatarum, et habitudinis ipsarum ad animam intellectivam, quae immortalis est. Esse insuper identitatem numeralem corporis vivi et mortui ratione existentiae utriusque in eadem hypostasi Verbi'. ibid.

\(^743\) 'Sextus est, corpus cujuscunque sancti vel hominis mortuum, antequam sit per putrefactionem mutatum in auras vel elementa, non esse idem numero cum corpore eius vivo, nisi secundum quid; scilicet ratione materiae communis, sicut sunt unum, quae invicem transmutantur, ut caro et vermis, et ratione accidentis communis, scilicet quantitatis. Simpliciter autem esse diversum corpus mortuum a vivo, specie et numero'. ibid., pp. 922-3.

form in humans. As indicated, Bynum's influential narrative supposes that Aquinas's work on the composition of human nature was condemned because it had inherently scandalous consequences: de la Mare, in other words, was right.\textsuperscript{745} Bourreau's *Théologie, science et censure* has already done much to tacitly correct this narrative: the public condemnation of a major theory openly developed in the work of a highly respected theologian, Bourreau emphasises, should be viewed *prima facie* as highly unusual.\textsuperscript{746} More to the point, Bourreau highlights the implicit and explicit lack of support for the condemnation from Theology masters at both Oxford and Paris at the time.

Aquinas's uncompromising new theory of the composition of human nature, along with the dawning realisation that it had far-reaching consequences for the way in which any theological question touching upon the human body would henceforward be framed, had provoked a strongly conservative reaction amongst certain masters at Paris and Oxford in 1277, it is true. But before 1286, both Theology faculties had absorbed the shock, and had returned to their default setting of encouraging open debate on all theological issues. In the mid 1270s, as we saw, Albertus Magnus had been deeply hesitant over whether philosophers should even be enquiring about the composition of Christ's dead body. In 1276, Henry of Ghent had thought it deeply unfitting to suggest that a new substantial form might have been introduced into Christ's dead body. By 1285, Richard Knapwell was not only *insisting* that a new form should have been introduced into Christ's corpse, he was also openly speculating as to what would have been the consequences for the identity of Christ's dead body had it decomposed *completely*.\textsuperscript{747}

Masters at Oxford repeatedly ignored Peckham's attempts to obtain from them a copy of Kilwardby's prohibited articles,\textsuperscript{748} whilst an anonymous pamphlet circulated at the University, poking fun at the Archbishop by recommending that he observe

\textsuperscript{745} See above, pp. 35-7.


\textsuperscript{747} Bourreau points out that Knapwell's strongly naturalistic approach would have appeared deeply unfitting to Peckham, no longer at the cutting edge of theological debate. ibid., pp. 212-3.

the 'single form of silence'. By proceeding with the condemnation of 30 April 1286 in the presence of a council of bishops in London, without having consulted a council of university masters about the censure of one of their scholars, Peckham gravely contravened contemporary practice at the Universities.

Knapwell gained the sympathy of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines in Paris as he made his way to Rome to appeal his excommunication. The two secular masters not only heavily criticised the manner of the condemnation, they also explicitly rejected its terms in Quodlibetal debates in Advent 1286. Godfrey of Fontaines rejected it outright, whilst Henry of Ghent accepted that the condemned positions followed from the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, but denied that the theory was heretical and opposed the position behind the condemnation that there should be absolute, rather than (in some sense) relative, identity between living body and corpse. In these same Quodlibetal questions, both masters also mention a letter signed by 12 masters of Theology at Paris in response to the Oxford condemnation, denying that the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans had ever been censured as heretical or erroneous at Paris. This followed the re-examination of the theory during the process of the rehabilitation of Giles of Rome between April 1285 and April 1286, which would seem to have resolved any remaining uncertainty regarding the case surrounding Aquinas's philosophy of human nature overhanging from March 1277.

Peckham publicly condemned the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans as heretical in 1286, then, from an isolated and reactionary position: the pursuit of the theory's condemnation had become a personal obsession. Boureau

749 Peckham reports this pamphlet to the Bishop of Lincoln in a letter dated 1 June 1285: 'Demum unicam nos voluit tenere formam silentii loquax ipse'. ibid., p. 900. Cf. Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 224-5.

750 On the procedure adopted by Peckham, see Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 16, 19-20.

751 ibid., pp. 16-17, 301.

752 ibid., p. 302.

753 ibid., pp. 309-10.

754 ibid., p. 298. On this letter and the rehabilitation of Giles of Rome, see also Giles of Rome, Apologia, (ed.) Wielockx, editor's introduction, pp. 219-223.
suggests that the Archbishop was driven not only by partisan feeling and professional jealousy directed against Aquinas, but also, perhaps, by a particular obsession with postmortem bodily continuity, provoked by an incident in which he had witnessed the bleeding corpse of a former subordinate with whom he had had an altercation, the bishop Thomas of Cantilupe.  

Unluckily for Knapwell, by the time his appeal came to be heard in 1288, Honorius IV, who had overseen the rehabilitation of Giles of Rome, had been replaced by Nicholas IV, the former Franciscan Minister General Jerome of Ascoli. Unsympathetic to the Dominican's cause, the new pope imposed perpetual silence on Knapwell who, according to the *Annals of Dunstable* at least, ended his days in Bologna later that year having torn out his eyes in misery.  

**Conclusions**

The accounts of the individual body and postmortem bodily continuity that were developed by Giles of Lessines, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell in defence of Aquinas's theory of the composition of human nature, as we have seen, could diverge significantly from Aquinas's thought and from one another, in doing so could respond to basic Aristotelian and Averroan concepts in very different ways, and, furthermore, could be vastly different in respect of their temper and precise objective. The further correction that the present study offers to Bynum's narrative of the reception of Aquinas's philosophy, as indicated at the very outset, is that there was no single 'Thomist solution to the identity problem', which 'packed' the identity of the human individual into their soul.

Giles of Lessines and Robert of Orford both developed strong accounts of postmortem bodily continuity with the clear aim of matching the pluralists on that score. And whilst both Thomas of Sutton and Giles of Lessines attacked pluralist theory on the grounds of its false consequences for bodily resurrection, neither Dominican positively suggested that the individual's soul alone could account for his

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757 See above, p. 37.
or her identity at the resurrection. Richard Knapwell focussed his attention on the postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies, and developed a new scientific account in this area, which, in its own right, is a great example of the way in which reflection on a difficult theological problem could provoke philosophical innovation. As we saw in chapter 4, Aquinas himself had not quite been able to make the breakthrough that was required, in order to be able to openly and explicitly develop a natural philosophical account of the nature of matter that squared with his convictions regarding individual bodies' material continuity across death and resurrection.

What, finally, should be made of the idea that the works of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell studied here represent the output of an 'early Thomistic school'?

There is no need to jettison the notion that these three Dominicans belonged to the same intellectual school, despite the evident heterogeneity in the detail of their thought on human nature, as long as, following Stephen Marrone's lead, we suppose that in the Middle Ages genuine intellectual schools, real intellectual 'lines of consanguinity', were primarily defined, not in doctrinal terms, but instead in terms of 'ideological disposition and politics'.

There was, undeniably, a political colouring to the debate regarding the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological consequences during 1277-86, which was given its critical impetus, after all, by a Franciscan text written in part with the objective of highlighting the connection between certain positions condemned in Paris in March 1277 and the teachings of a famous Dominican theologian. Not all of Aquinas's defenders were Dominican, and not all of his critics Franciscan. What we have clearly seen over the course of this chapter's discussion, nonetheless, is the beginnings of a situation in which the public accusation that a philosophical position could lead to false theological consequences was becoming a weapon in the broader institutional rivalry between the Franciscan and Dominican Orders.

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758 Marrone, _The Light of Thy Countenance_, pp. 13-17, quotation from p. 17.

759 Iribarren, "'Responsio secundum Thomam' and the Search for an Early Thomistic School", p. 296.
The impact that Aquinas's intellectual contribution had made on Dominican corporate identity was such that, in the view of the General Chapter of 1278, to criticise Aquinas was to bring scandal to the Order. Peckham was accused by Dominicans at Oxford of criticising 'the opinions of the Order insofar as they are the opinions of the Order' and of deliberately seminating discord between the Franciscans and the Dominicans,\(^{760}\) whilst the Dominican provincial prior William Hothum (even if, according to Peckham, he may not have himself advocated the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans\(^{761}\)) pointed out to Peckham that it would cause serious harm to the Order if a member of another order were to attempt to correct Aquinas's teachings.\(^{762}\) Evidently, Dominicans at Oxford were beginning to see the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans as an emblem of their institutional identity.\(^{763}\)

As we saw above, Marrone suggests that where the ground shared in common by members of an intellectual school is as much political as intellectual, the identity of an intellectual school fundamentally consists rather less in the exact substance of the teachings propounded by the individuals within it than in the intentions and motivations, conscious or unconscious, of those scholars, and in the reactions of their audience. In the course of ordinary theological debate, when scholastic disputes over relatively abstruse metaphysical points were not accompanied by public acrimony, therefore, it would still be the case that any argument that a scholar might put forward for or against an idea or theory, even without naming a precise opponent, would allow his audience to identify his allegiance.\(^{764}\)

The debate over the composition of human nature discussed in this chapter was of course highly unusual in respect of its openly politically charged nature. The basic intention and motivation behind the polemical Dominican works under


\(^{761}\) ibid., p. 866.

\(^{762}\) We know this from a speech made by Hothum to the Congregation of the masters of Oxford on 24 November 1284, recorded in the *Registram Johannis de Pontissara Episcopi Wyntoniensis* vol. 1 (ed.) C. Deedes (London: Canterbury and York Society, 1915), pp. 307-8 (reprinted in Callus, 'The Problem of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell', pp. 30-1, n. 22).

\(^{763}\) As suggested in Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure*, p. 320.

consideration here was in full view and the allegiance of their authors was clear. They all adopted, though in differing ways, the theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being and sought to defend it, and, through defending it, to defend the reputation of their Order.

Furthermore, Marrone points out that an author's political affinity, though it would still leave him room in which to manoeuvre, would ultimately direct him towards a 'limited range of doctrinal options'. Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell not only subscribed to the idea that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being that gives to it its existence, they all clearly identify themselves as followers of Aquinas by emphasising, in words obviously reminiscent of Aquinas's, that the psychosomatic unity of the human being is preserved according to that very theory, and only that theory. An additional, explicit expression of political allegiance was their common adoption of Aquinas's knock-down argument in the most contentious area of the entire debate: Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell all agreed that the absolute continuing identity of Christ's material remains should be explained in terms of the continued union of His body to the divine supposit, an argument rejected by Franciscans.

Beyond these areas of doctrinal agreement in open allegiance to Aquinas and the Dominican Order, Aquinas's Dominican defenders shared a particular intellectual posture. John Peckham famously asserted in a letter of 1285 to the Bishop of Lincoln that the teachings of the Franciscans and Dominicans in all debatable things had become mutually opposed, since the Dominicans had filled the house of God with idols by relying exclusively upon philosophical doctrines, whilst his own side in the debate remained true to the teachings of Augustine and the other saints. In fact, pluralist arguments explicitly relied just as much on interpretations of various Aristotelian and Averroan concepts as did those of Aquinas's defenders, and, of course, neither pluralist nor Aquinas's philosophy posed any inherent danger to the faith. But even so, Peckham had put his finger on something significant.

765 ibid.
We find Roger Marston self-consciously adopting a reactionary posture whilst putting forward his theory that corporeal forms are educated from principles or *rationes seminales* in matter, stating 'I believe that the doctrine of antiquity, approved by my teachers, is completely true'.\(^{768}\) (He backs up his position, in the next breath, with additional proofs from Aristotle and Averroes). Conversely, we find Thomas of Sutton and Richard Knapwell self-consciously upholding the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and the account of substantial change that goes with it as intellectually superior, precisely, that is, as the improved theory that correctly represents the thought of Aristotle and Averroes.\(^{769}\) When developing his pluralist-mirroring idea that there are potencies in matter from which forms are drawn out, Robert of Orford chooses to describe these potencies in *Averroan* language, as *habilitates*, rather than as *rationes seminales*.

Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, then, had a common a political allegiance to their Order, an attendant shared motivation to advocate Aquinas's theory of the composition of human nature (however they expressed it), and a common intellectual posture, all in fact defined in opposition (however intense in each individual case) to their Franciscan pluralist adversaries. They can meaningfully be delineated as members of a distinct intellectual school, additionally, because they were part of the same community of discussion. That is to say, whatever their original interpretation of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans might be, each of these Dominicans was engaged in the same discussion of the ways in which Aquinas's theory of human nature could or could not, and should or should not, be interpreted, a precise point which, in itself, did

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\(^{768}\) 'Credo igitur doctrinam antiquitatis approbatam magistrorum meorum meorum penitus veram esse, videlicet quod forma diminuta sit in materia quam agens promovet successive ut tandem sit forma completa'. Marston, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 9, response (ed.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 384.

\(^{769}\) At the outset of *De pluralitate formarum* Thomas of Sutton pointedly states his intention as 'rationes... auctoritatiibus scilicet philosophi et sui commentatoris... confirmare'. Thomas of Sutton, *DPF*, prooemium in Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia* (ed.) Busa, p. 570. Cf. the prologue to Thomas of Sutton's *De productione formae substantialis*: 'De productione formae substantialis: De productione formae substantialis in esse sententiam solemnem priorum doctorum tamquam principium ab initio habitam, posteriores tamquam impossibilem respuunt, quam tamen priores propter consuetudinem, quae est altera natura quantum ad immutabilitatem, non reliquit et sic sibi invicem contradicunt'. Włodek, 'Thomas Sutton, *De productione formae substantialis*, p. 142. Knapwell inserts an article to *Quare* as an addendum to article 31 (also entitled 'Quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis'), in which, borrowing some of Thomas of Sutton's arguments, he states that pluralist theory has various philosophically unsound implications 'secundum doctrinam Aristotelis et Commentatoris'. Knapwell, *Quare*, a. 48 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 206.
not much bother Aquinas's pluralist critics (at least not during the period covered by this chapter). Aquinas's critics, with a caricature of his position on human nature in hand, simply went about developing alternatives.\textsuperscript{770} In all these ways, then, Thomas of Sutton, Richard Knapwell and Robert of Orford did comprise a genuine 'early Thomistic school' during 1277-86.

As is well-known, the Orders' governing bodies legislated in response to this controversy, seeking to create a situation in which the intellectual divide between their university scholars could be solidified and their respective institutional identities could be bolstered by the development of mutually opposed theological traditions.\textsuperscript{771} The 1282 Franciscan General Chapter already decreed that only the Order's most talented students should study Aquinas's \textit{Summa Theologiae}, and then only with de la Mare's corrections actually set into the text, so that they would not be led astray by Aquinas's errors.\textsuperscript{772} The Dominican General Chapter of 1286, convened five weeks after the condemnation, set down that every friar as far as he was able should devote himself to the study, promotion and defence of Aquinas's teachings on pain of removal from office.\textsuperscript{773}

The question of the unicity or plurality of substantial forms in humans not only had an obvious potential to divide scholars into two opposed camps, it also, of course, had repercussions for the whole gamut of major theological topics relating to the human body, its composition, and its continuity. But what real impact did this legislation, effectively compelling scholars to hold either position on human nature,

\textsuperscript{770} This is to borrow from Mikołaj Olszewski's discussion of the Thomistic school at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in his \textit{Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences by James of Metz andHEREAUS NATALIS} (Aschendorff: Verlag, 2010), p. 339: 'they formed a community of discussion... The interest in questions pertaining to the right or wrong interpretation of Aquinas's texts - interesting only to Dominicans, but not to others who focussed instead on solutions of issues outside Aquinas's conceptions - is able to serve as a criterion for distinguishing the Thomistic school from others'.


\textsuperscript{772} P. G. Fussenegger (ed.), 'Definitiones Capituli Generalis Argentinas, Celebrati anno 1282', \textit{Archivum Franciscanum Historicum}, 26 (1933), pp.127-40, at p. 139, n.2.

have on the Orders' respective intellectual traditions beyond, that is, the initial period of their mutual opposition in the late-thirteenth century?

Did the institutional politics of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders in fact leave a lasting imprint on their scholars' metaphysical conceptions of the body, operating as a significant limiting factor upon the ways in which they would approach and treated theological problems associated with bodily composition and identity? Did Franciscan and Dominican scholars themselves continue to adopt a self-consciously partisan approach to these problems?
EPILOGUE

On Christmas day, 1462, presiding at a packed papal Curia, Pope Pius II witnessed a curious scene. Franciscans and Dominicans were engaged in furious debate over whether or not, during the three days of His death, the blood that Christ had shed at the passion had remained united to His divine person. It was freezing, the Pope recalls, and yet the friars on both sides were sweating, so great was their eagerness to defeat their opponents.

A public scandal had been building since Easter that year, when, in Brescia, the Franciscan James of the March had been accused of heresy by the local Dominican inquisitor, James of Brescia, because he had preached that Christ's shed blood had become separated from His divinity. In the weeks and months that followed, Dominicans and Franciscans lined up in opposition to one another, preaching their opposed positions and exchanging accusations of heresy, trying to draw their listeners to their own side. When it became clear that the dispute could not be resolved locally, it was brought before the Pope.

Actually, the position of neither party contravened papally approved doctrine, and several at the Curia judged that the question was purely academic and of no great theological import. And, revealingly, Pius's memoirs tell us that the issue at the crux of the debate was whether or not Christ's blood could be properly understood to enter into the 'truth of human nature'.

Almost two centuries after the condemnation of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans in 1286, then, Franciscans and Dominicans were once again fiercely debating postmortem bodily continuity; once again, either side of the argument could be justified perfectly well without prejudice to the faith; and once again, at the root of the dispute, were conflicting accounts of the metaphysical composition of human nature. According to the Dominicans ( subscribing to the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans), Christ's body was matter to His soul, all of the matter in His body, or, better, all of His proper matter belonged intimately to His human nature: it remained united to His divine person. According to the Franciscans, informed by a pluralist theory of human nature, Christ's body was
a substance in its own right, with its own form, and Christ's blood was contained in His body in the same way that water is contained in a vase: it became separated from Him when shed.\footnote{On this debate, see A. Fitzpatrick, 'Mendicant Order Politics and the Status of Christ's Shed Blood', \textit{Historical Research}, 85 (2012), pp. 210-27, esp. 213-4, 221-3 on the technical arguments from either side; C. W. Bynum, \textit{Wonderful Blood. Theology and Practice in Late Medieval Northern Germany and Beyond} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 120-5.}

There are at least two other occasions between 1286 and 1462, involving the two mendicant Orders, in which we can detect the use, as a weapon in inter-order rivalry, of the accusation that the other Order's position on the composition of human nature had false theological repercussions. On both of these occasions, we see again Dominicans on the offensive against Franciscans.

First, there is the case of Franciscus Baiuli, the Franciscan who preached the same position as James of the March in Barcelona over a hundred years earlier, in 1351, only to be tried for heresy by two successive Dominican inquisitors. The first of these two inquisitors, named Pontius, preached against Baiuli's opinion and was in turn charged with erroneous views by certain Franciscans in front of the vicar of the bishop of Barcelona.\footnote{Bynum, \textit{Wonderful Blood}, pp. 113-4.}

The second case, more subtle, certainly, is the approval by the Council of Vienne in 1311-12 of the position that, within the human nature assumed by Christ, the rational soul is \textit{per se} and essentially the form of the body.\footnote{\textquoteleft aperte cum sancta matre ecclesiae confitemur, unigenitum Dei Filium... partes nostrae naturae simul unitas, ex quibus ipse in se verus Deus existens fieret verus homo, human videlicet corpus passibile et animam intellectivam seu rationalem, ipsum corpus vere per se et essentialiter informantem, assumpisses...\textquoteright. \textit{Decreta} of the Council of Vienna, 1: \textit{Fidei catholicae fundamenta}, in N. P. Tanner (ed.), \textit{Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils} vol. 1: \textit{Nicaea I to Lateran V}, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), p. 360.} This came after a careful examination of the writings of the Franciscan Pierre de Jean Olivi, at the request of the leadership of his own Order. Sylvain Piron has pointed out that the inclusion of a general statement on the union between body and soul in the Council's decrees was almost certainly the work of the two Dominicans on the commission of theologians appointed to assess Olivi's orthodoxy. This statement was less a reproval of Olivi (who had not denied that the soul was the form of the body), Piron argues, than a
Dominican attempt at point-scoring, harking back to the late thirteenth-century debate on the composition of human nature.\textsuperscript{777}

Be that as it may, the position approved at Vienne is perfectly compatible with a pluralist theory of human nature (it does not require that the soul should be the only form in the body). It is true that, in the event, the vast majority of subsequent medieval commentaries on Aristotle's \textit{De anima} interpreted the Vienna decree as an endorsement of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. But Franciscans wrote hardly any of the commentaries on \textit{De anima} from the period immediately following the Council of Vienna, and the Franciscan interpretation of the Vienna decree, detectable, instead, in \textit{Sentences} commentaries, was (not surprisingly) that the approved account of the union of body and soul was compatible with a range of philosophical positions.\textsuperscript{778}

The natural extension of the present study would be an investigation into how the dynamics of the longstanding inter-order rivalry between the Dominican and Franciscan Orders, and in particular the legislation through which the Orders sought to build up their respective institutional identities by way of the promotion of distinct intellectual traditions,\textsuperscript{779} actually affected the thought of their scholars on theological and philosophical questions relating to the composition of human nature, and, more specifically, individuality and bodily identity, between 1286 and 1462 (and even beyond).

Recent research on Dominican intellectual developments at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries suggests that the historian who would attempt


\textsuperscript{779} See above, p. 268.
this ambitious project should expect to become swiftly immersed in an ocean of circumstance and detail. Plainly, among the earliest defenders of Aquinas's philosophy, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, there was no continuous understanding of precisely what the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans entailed with respect to the composition of human nature, individuality, and bodily identity. And there is no reason to suppose that the intellectual developments become any tidier as further generations of Dominican theologians weigh in.

Looking beyond the work of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell from 1277-86, we have already seen how, in the creative thinking of the Dominicans John of Paris and Durandus of Pourçain (and, we may suppose, other Dominicans too), the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans is turned on its head: body is absorbed into soul, rather than, as in Richard Southern's characterisation of Aquinas's thought, serving as the very basis of the soul's being. In turning Aquinas's theory of human nature upside down in this way, these two Dominicans, in effect, find a way to turn the Franciscan interpretation of Aquinas's theory of the composition of human nature (namely that it reduced the material part of human nature to a featureless prime matter), to the Dominican advantage: if body is packed into soul, then there is no need to bother with any of the complex objections regarding bodily identity at the resurrection that turned on cases of cannibalism. We saw in the general introduction that John of Paris was censured for his innovative account of bodily identity at the resurrection. We also saw that, by the second decade of the fourteenth century at the latest, when Durandus was writing, theologians of his own Order no longer considered it a particular theological priority to uphold a literal interpretation of resurrection, according to which God would gather together the material particular to each body (an interpretation which had been traditional in treatments of the general resurrection from Augustine to Aquinas). Debate in this particular theological area, it would appear, had moved on. Even so, there is every reason to think that John of Paris and Durandus represent only one strand of Dominican thinking on resurrection and bodily identity.  

780 See above, pp. 150-1.
The general picture of Dominican intellectual developments into the fourteenth century becomes yet more complicated as, moving on from William de la Mare's *Correctorium fratrie Thomae*, Dominicans take on new interlocutors, actively seeking to correct errors in the works of other scholars, who are not in every case Franciscan.

Robert of Orford goes on to produce critiques of Book I of Giles of Rome's *Sentences* Commentary and Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta* (both composed during 1289-93); Thomas of Sutton, critiques of the Franciscans Robert Cowton and John Duns Scotus's *Sentences* commentaries (after 1312). Mikołaj Olszewski's recent comparative study of the prologues to the respective *Sentences* commentaries of the Dominicans James of Metz (c. 1300-03) and Hervaeus Natalis (c. 1309) demonstrates that these two Dominicans are primarily engaged with refuting the positions of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines on the scientific status of theology, and show almost no interest in the Franciscan position, or in John Duns Scotus's view that theology is a practical science, in particular.

Indeed, the major intellectual struggle of Hervaeus Natalis's career would be an *intra-*order conflict, during the campaign for doctrinal uniformity that he led (as Dominican Minister General from 1318) whilst also mounting a campaign for Aquinas's canonisation, which eventually succeeded in July 1323. Durandus of St. Pourçain, as indicated above, was targeted by Hervaeus and other leading Dominican intellectuals of his time, over certain departures that he had made from Aquinas's thinking. Capitular legislation enacted at Saragossa in 1309 had reinforced the requirement that scholars should determine according to Aquinas's teachings.

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781 Friedman, 'The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250-1320', pp. 118-24.

782 On the dating of these commentaries, see ibid., pp. 69-70.

783 Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads* (full citation above, n. 770), pp. vii-viii, 335. Olszewski considers his 'most important discovery' to be the 'direct and strong independence of Hervaeus' prologue to his *Commentary on the Sentences* to that of James', even though Hervaeus Natalis was one of James of Metz's severest critics. Olszewski notes that this discovery complicates the distinction that historians of Thomism at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are accustomed to drawing between disciples of Aquinas, represented by Hervaeus, on the one hand, and dissidents, represented by James of Metz and Durandus of St. Pourçain, on the other.

784 See above, p. 39.

785 *Volumus et districte iniungimus lectoribus et sublectoribus universis quod legant et determinent secundum doctrinam et opera venerabilis doctoris fratrie Thomae de Aquino et in cadem scoalaes suos...*
and it was in the context of increasing concern about Durandus's deviations that the Dominican General Chapter at Metz in 1313 decreed that Aquinas's teachings were the 'common opinion' of the Order, bringing in the provision that no friar should be sent to Paris unless he had first studied Aquinas's teachings for at least three years.786

Isabel Iribarren's close study of what was at stake ideologically in this long conflict (1308-25), which focussed upon Trinitarian theology, adds yet another layer of complexity to this broad-brush view of the dynamics of Dominican intellectual developments in the early fourteenth century. This conflict was far from being a simple clash between a pre-defined and monolithic 'Thomism' and Durandus's rebellious 'anti-Thomism'.787 Iribarren explains that the brand of 'Thomist' thought on the Trinity promoted by Hervaeus Natalis combined a standard interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, with, crucially, insights incorporated from John Duns Scotus's thought, intended to strengthen the Dominican intellectual tradition by bringing it up to date with the very latest metaphysical innovations. Durandus's thinking was similarly doctrinally eclectic, making conceptual borrowings from Bonaventure, in fact, but was considered a threat precisely because it jettisoned several standard Aristotelian metaphysical assumptions. And so the two competing theological trends in play in this long controversy, Iribarren argues, were Franciscan.788

Russell Friedman characterises Thomism in the first fifty years after Aquinas's death as 'dynamic, evolving and creative'; Thomism "retooled" itself in order to focus

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786 'Cum doctrina venerabilis doctris fratris Thomae de Aquino sanior et communior reputetur, et eam ordo noster specialiter prosequi teneatur, inhibemus districte quod nullus frater legendo, determinando, respondendo, audaciter tenere contrarium eius quod communiter creditur de opinione doctoris praedicti, nec recitare aut confirmare aliquam singularum opinionem contra communem doctorum sententiam in his quae ad fidem vel mores pertinere noscuntur, nisi repugnando et statim objectionibus respondendo... Nullus etiam ad studium Parisiense mittatur, nisi in doctrina fratri Thomae saltem tribus annis studuerit diligentiter'. ibid., pp. 64-5.

787 The dispute is portrayed in this way in E. Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas. The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St Poursain (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), see esp. ch. 4, directly criticised in Iribarren, Durandus of St Poursain, p. 284, n. 9.

788 Iribarren, Durandus of St Poursain, pp. 278-84.
on the newest and most challenging threats'. Evidently even the most ardent self-proclaimed promoters of Aquinas's philosophy were more than comfortable making use of the intellectual tools that the Franciscans had to offer.

Going back to the Orders' respective theories of the composition of human nature, and moving back in time to the late thirteenth century, we have already seen one example of the potential porosity of the lines between Dominican and Franciscan theories in this area, of course, with Robert of Orford's attempt to formulate a hybrid account of Aquinas's and pluralist metaphysics.

To conclude, we can add Richard de Mediavilla to the mix as a Franciscan who sympathised somewhat with Aquinas's position on the composition of human nature. Mediavilla was the most significant Franciscan thinker between Bonaventure and Scotus, or, as Piron had put it, 'the only true master of quodlibeta within the Franciscan Order' at Paris during 1280-1300. He is already known as a thinker who attempted to update Franciscan theology in line with certain of Aquinas's insights (Mediavilla rejected, for example, Bonaventure's theory that a special act of divine illumination is required to guarantee certainty in cognition). The suggestion that Mediavilla made any intellectual concessions to Aquinas's views in respect of the metaphysics of the body will come as a surprise, however, because, as briefly indicated in chapter 5, he was the author of *De gradu formarum* (c. 1286): the first major Franciscan tract devoted to setting out a positive pluralist theory of human nature and offering an exposition on the full range of theological points touched upon in the debate over the unicity or plurality of substantial form in humans.

Nonetheless, in his Quodlibet II, qq. 14-15 (1284-87), asking, respectively, whether quantity, in the concrete, is something real beyond the substance to which it belongs (*Utrum quantitas dicat rem aliquam ultra substantias cuius est quantitas, loquendo de re absoluta*), and whether the reason why two bodies cannot coincide in the same place is 'dimension' (*Utrum causa precisa quare duo corpora non possunt esse simul sit dimensio*),

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789 Friedman, 'Dominican Quodlibetal Literature', p. 465.

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Mediavilla defends the crucial distinction that Aquinas had drawn in his own metaphysical account of the body between the body's substantial nature, on the one hand, and the accidental quantitative form giving to the body its organic structure, on the other.

The Franciscan explains that it is indeed in virtue of a body's accidental quantitative structure, and not in virtue of its substantial form, that it is extended, continuous, divided into parts, and positioned in a certain place. Arguing from the theological example of the transubstantiation, Mediavilla points out, in terms reminiscent of Aquinas, that the quantitative structure of the bread remains whilst its substance is transformed.792

Although the substantial body has its numerical identity from its essence (and not from its continuous quantity, which gives it only an accidental kind of unity), Mediavilla argues, bodily substance (matter and substantial form), just in itself, it not something extended, but simply something capable of extension; in itself is not something with physical parts in its own right, but something with the potential to have physical parts;793 in itself, the substantial body does not admit of the soliditas in virtue of which it is in one place and excludes others from that place. It is in virtue of
the body's quantitative structure, or, as Medievilla puts it, 'the body which is quantity' that the substantial body has *soliditas*.\(^{794}\)

So even if Medievilla was an obvious candidate, in the late 1280s, to produce a tract on the plurality of forms for the purpose of matching Dominican defences of Aquinas's philosophy, in towing the basic party line on the composition of human nature, he evidently still found room to incorporate some of Aquinas's insights into his thinking. In his writings on the general resurrection in his *Sentences* commentary (revised by Medievilla in the 1290s), indeed, Medievilla again appears as one towing a party line with less than complete conviction. That is to say, even if he includes a Bonaventuran-type solution that would pin the continuity of individual bodily substantial forms across death and resurrection upon formal principles in matter, Medievilla seems rather unpersuaded of the efficacy of this kind of solution, and points to it only as an afterthought.\(^{795}\)

John Duns Scotus and William Ockham would disagree with Medievilla's metaphysical account of the body, at least. Both of these Franciscans would argue that matter and the substantial form inhering in it are divided into integral parts in themselves, rather than by way of quantity.\(^{796}\)

Whatever the innovations introduced by individual Dominican and Franciscan thinkers into their metaphysical conceptions of the body, and whatever the particular conceptual borrowings across party lines might have been, however, the situation we find in 1462 was one in which combatants on either side were utterly convinced of the truth of their own position, and yet completely unable to persuade their opponents of this. Cumulatively, it would appear, the divergence between Dominican and Franciscan thinking on the metaphysics of the body and range of

\(^{794}\) 'concludendum est... quod causa precisa quare duo corpora non possunt simul naturaliter esse, est dimensio secundum latum et longum et profundum, que vocantur soliditas, et alio nomine vocatur corpus quod est quantitas'. *Quodlibet* II, q. 15, response, f. 18va


doctrinal problems relating to bodily identity was significant. Whatever the complexity on the surface, undercurrents of partisanship remained strong, and intellectually formative.

The Middle Ages is a rich period in philosophical thinking on individuality and bodily identity, even from the standpoint of modern philosophy. The vast bulk of the work remains to be done, in order to discover how that thinking was shaped by the intellectual politics of two begging orders.

APPENDIX I

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOUL AND THE BODY'S ACCIDENTAL FORMS

According to the readings of Aquinas on human nature offered by both Robert Pasnau and Eleanor Stump, the soul shapes the body. Stump writes,

'on Aquinas's account, the soul is what makes unformed prime matter into this human being by configuring prime matter in such a way that matter is this living animal capable of intellectual cognition. In the resurrection of the body, by informing unformed matter, the soul makes unformed matter this human being again'.\textsuperscript{798}

As illustrated above in chapter 3, section 3, and confirmed in chapter 4, section 2.3, it is Aquinas's view that it is the \textit{virtus formativa} in paternal semen, as the efficient cause of the individual body, that gives to it its organic structure and accidental disposition.

Citing \textit{ST I}, q. 77, a. 6. (\textit{Utrum potentia animae fluant ab eius essentia}), Robert Pasnau writes, in a similar vein to Stump,

'The soul is responsible for all of what makes me be me, in the sense that my defining attributes, physical and mental, 'flow from' the soul'.\textsuperscript{799}

Aquinas does indeed state, at \textit{ST I}, q. 77, a. 6, response, and ad 2, that the soul's powers flow (\textit{fluunt}) from its 'essence', or nature, and even that the soul causes its own powers as an active principle (\textit{sicur principium activum}), probably pointing to the fact that the soul is the efficient cause of those powers' operations (chapter 4, section 2.3).

\textsuperscript{798} Stump, 'Resurrection, Reassembly and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul', p. 170.

Aquinas does not say that the individual body's physical features directly flow from the soul, however. What he says is that, by communicating existence to the composite human, the soul makes it possible that such accidents, which depends for their existence on the esse of their subject, can exist:

'Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto. Sed e contrario, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti'.

John F. Wippel has examined at length Aquinas's work on the relationship between composite substances and their accidents. Aquinas's usual argument is that accidents simply 'follow' on both of the principles of their subject, material and formal, either the principles of its species or its individual principles: when their subject is brought into being, those accidents are automatically and instantaneously given. Towards the end of his career in his Metaphysica commentary, Aquinas was content with the idea that an individual composite was merely a subject for (or a material cause of) its accidents.

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800 ST I, q. 77, a. 6, response, and ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 246.

801 See In Met. IV, lect. 1, n. 539, discussed in Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 266, and pp. 266-75 for the full survey of Aquinas's thinking in this area.
APPENDIX II

ON HUMAN NATURE AFTER DEATH

Robert Pasnau and Eleonore Stump disagree regarding whether the disembodied soul alone can, according to Aquinas, accurately be considered an individual human being. The reading of Aquinas's work on resurrection offered in this study agrees with Pasnau that it cannot: the immortal soul is only part of the human being. Pasnau therefore thinks that an individual human will have to recover a human body in order to be complete at the resurrection, even if, according to his own reading of Aquinas, it need not recover a body that is numerically identical to that which it had in mortal life.802

Stump contends that an individual human being can remain, composed of soul alone, after bodily death. She points out powerful theological arguments in Aquinas's work that are in tension with his own statement, discussed above in chapter 4, section 2.4, that what it is to be Socrates comprises his individual matter as well as his soul. Aquinas explains at Summa contra Gentiles IV, 91, indeed, that the soul of an individual will receive rewards or punishments immediately on its separation from the body in accordance with its actions in the body. The soul may see God in its disembodied state, descend to hell, or have its venial sins purged in purgatory.803

This tension must be admitted, and the recovery of the body does seem to take on a secondary kind of importance in the afterlife if beatitude can be achieved without it. The basic point made by the present study stands, however. Aquinas's belief that an individual human will in fact recover a body reconstructed from the matter particular to it did fundamentally inform his thinking on human nature and bodily identity: in his work on the individuality and identity of the mortal human being, 802 Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 387-8, 393.

Aquinas makes matter and material continuity crucial to continuing self-identity.

In this connection, indeed, there is a particular objection to be raised against Stump's analysis of Aquinas's philosophical thought on identity. Stump's position is that, in Aquinas's view, 'constitution is not identity', hence, though not identical to just the soul, the human being can continue to exist composed only of the soul.

Contrary to what Aquinas says about Socrates' identity in his work on resurrection, then, Stump supposes that, for Aquinas, an individual substance's identity does not consist in its constitution from its metaphysical parts, matter and form. Her source for the theory that 'constitution is not identity' is the following passage from Aquinas's Metaphysica commentary:

'in omnibus talibus oportet, quod ipsum compositum non sit ea ex quibus componitur... nec caro est idem quod ignis et terra... sic... caro non solum est ignis et terra... sed etiam est aliquid alterum per quod caro est caro'.

All this passage in Aquinas's Metaphysica commentary actually says is that a substance comprises not only its material constituents, but also a substantial form. Aquinas does not say or imply that he would extend the idea that 'constitution is not identity' to the metaphysical parts of substance, matter and form. Stump's argument that, for Aquinas, 'constitution is not identity' has persuaded Jason Eberl and Christopher Brown.

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APPENDIX III

ON CORPOREITY AS THE 'FIRST FORM IN MATTER'

In connection with the question of whether, following Averroes, Aquinas ever held that matter had its own corporeal form, scholars have debated the implications of a very early discussion of whether the soul is simple or composed of matter and form in Aquinas's *Sentences* commentary. Aquinas concludes that the soul is simple. Matter is found only in bodies, not in souls: all matter is contained under corporeal form. He writes:

'Ergo oportet quod prima forma substantialis perficiat totam materiam. Sed prima forma quae recipitur in materia, est corporeitas, a qua nunquam denudatur, ut dicit Comment. Ergo forma corporeitis est in tota materia, et ita materia non erit nisi in corporibus.'

Some readers, then, have taken this to suggest that there is a substantial 'first' form of corporeity intervening between matter and any other form. Notably, if Aquinas is suggesting this, his position here certainly does not match that of Averroes, for whom absolute body was an accidental, not a substantial form (see above, chapter 4, section 4.2.4). But it is not necessary to read this passage in that way. This early passage in Aquinas's *Sentences* commentary can be read simply as saying that the first form in any matter (or the matter in any body), the substantial form of corporeity, is also the one and only substantial form in each body: the same, single, form which determines its

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corporeal nature along with other aspects of its specific nature. In other words, since each form in matter is a corporeal form, matter is not found without corporeity.

The distinction between the nature of corporeity that is found in all matter, on the one hand, and other aspects of individual substances’ specific natures, on the other hand, is purely analytical. Aquinas makes this point in the following passage on the union of body and soul from his *Summa Theologica*, written at stage in his career at which no modern commentator would suppose that Aquinas subscribed to a pluralist theory of human nature, or think that Aquinas held that matter had a substantial form of its own. Here again, Aquinas notes that all matter is found under the form of corporeity:

‘dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde materia iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ulteriores perfectionis gradus. Quamvis enim eadem forma sit secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus materiae attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem rationis differt’.808

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808 *ST* I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 2, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, 5, p. 229.
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