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Unconditionally Secure Approximate Message Authentication

Tonien, D; Safavi-Naini, R; Nickolas, P; Desmedt, Y; (2009) Unconditionally Secure Approximate Message Authentication. In: Chee, YM and Ling, CLS and Wang, HX and Xing, CP, (eds.) CODING AND CRYPTOLOGY, PROCEEDINGS. (pp. 233 - 247). SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN

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Abstract

Approximate message authentication codes (AMAC) arise naturally in biometric and multimedia applications where, plaintexts are fuzzy and a tagged message (x', t) where t. is the calculated tag for a message x that is 'close' to x' should pass the verification test. Fuzziness of plaintexts can be due to a variety of factors including applying acceptable transforms such as compression and decompression to data, or inaccuracy of sensors in reading biometric data.This paper develops a framework for approximate message authentication systems in unconditionally security setting. We give Formal definition of AMAC and analyze two attacks, impersonation attack and substitution attack. We derive lower bounds on an opponents deception probability in these attacks under the assumption that all keys arc equiprobable. Our bounds generalize known combinatorial bounds in classical authentication theory.

Type:Proceedings paper
Title:Unconditionally Secure Approximate Message Authentication
Event:2nd International Workshop on Coding and Cryptology
Location:Zhangjiajie, PEOPLES R CHINA
Dates:2009-06-01 - 2009-06-05
ISBN-13:978-3-642-01813-8
Keywords:approximate authentication, biometric authentication, unconditional security, CODES
UCL classification:UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Computer Science

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