Monstrous predatory vampires and beneficent fairy-godmothers:

British post-war colonial development in Africa

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of PhD.
I, Charlotte Lydia Riley, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

This thesis explores the concept of colonial development, as enacted by the Attlee government during the immediate post-war period. It focuses on Africa, reflecting the ‘second colonial occupation’ of the continent during this period, and examines both economic and social welfare development initiatives. Post-war colonial development in the British African territories had two main aims: firstly, to increase the production of raw materials, to aid the reconstruction of the metropole and earn dollars on the international markets; and secondly, to improve the standard of living among colonial populations. This thesis explores the contradictions inherent in these two types of development. It can be seen that, although Britain was largely unsuccessful in this period with economic development programmes in Africa, it had some modest success with colonial social-welfare initiatives.

The thesis also examines the extent to which Arthur Creech Jones, Colonial Secretary 1946-1950, shaped colonial policy in Africa based on his Fabian beliefs. It examines how far British colonial policy in this period can be characterised as ‘socialist’, and how far metropolitan and colonial populations were separated by narratives of progress and development in this period.

This thesis also argues that colonial development in Africa in this period was shaped, rhetorically, ideologically and pragmatically, by the context of British reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. Colonial development was an arena in which Britain’s relationships with western Europe and the United States (the ‘special relationship’) could be explored, strengthened and sometimes challenged. The incipient Cold War imbued British policy in Africa with specific tensions, particularly relating to American ‘anti-imperialism’ and the threat of Soviet communist expansion across the continent. Colonial development, and the negotiation of such against the pressures exerted by Britain’s international political role, can thus be used as a lens, through which to view British foreign policy under the Attlee government.
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So this is why the colonies came
to stabilize the land.
Because The Dark Continent had copper and gold
and the discoverers had themselves a plan.
...
But still we are victims of word games,
semantics is always a bitch:
places once called under-developed and 'backwards'
are now called 'mineral rich.'
- Gil Scott-Heron, 'Black History'.

The immediate aftermath of the Second World War saw physical devastation and economic dislocation across Europe. Despite its position among the victorious Allied powers, Great Britain did not escape this legacy, and the process of recovery from the war brought with it new challenges. Britain would have to come to terms with itself as a world power dwarfed by two superpowers, an economic powerhouse crippled by debts and supported by foreign governments, and an empire losing its territories. However, this decline of British power and prestige must not be exaggerated. The 1950s and 1960s saw economic growth and an increase in living standards for much of the population. Britain maintained an international diplomatic role, holding crucial positions in the UN and NATO and, although the later twentieth century would see widespread decolonization, the seeds of that independence struggle were only just being sown in many territories in the British empire.

This thesis examines some of the new methods that Britain used to govern its colonial subjects, and the new futures that the British imagined for themselves and their colonies. It suggests that the post-war focus on colonial development set the tone for the relationship between Britain and its empire in the second half of the twentieth century. It prioritises economic policies, including both the development of raw materials and trade relationships, and the economics of social welfare provision, as a factor within the metropole-periphery relationship. The history of empires is essentially the history of the economic exploitation of colonial territories; the modern legacy of colonialism is the chasm between the ‘western’ industrialized world and the ‘global south’, developing nations that almost all share a history of colonial domination. Yet, as Stephen Howe has pointed out, the ‘new imperial history’ movement, which has revived the study of historic empires,

has generally been marked by the ‘neglect of economic history’. This thesis thus combines the history of the economic realities of colonial rule in the post-war period with a broader examination of the competing ideological and political pressures on colonial policy-makers.

**Thesis method**

This thesis examines the problem of colonial development from a number of different perspectives. It is first and foremost a piece of imperial history, with a strong focus on the British Colonial Office and central government policy. By focusing on the ideological motivations behind colonial development, and attempting to examine its reception in the colonies and the international community, I hope to bring an understanding of British political culture and foreign relations to the history of British imperial rule. This thesis, by contextualising colonial policy against domestic politics and foreign policy in the same period, is challenging the ‘FO371 school’ of British international history, whilst still acknowledging the importance of Britain’s international role in this period. This thesis is based on the Marshall Plan era, rather than the Attlee government as a whole; positioning colonial policy within international reconstruction efforts is important in explaining the dual narrative of progress and development enacted in the metropole and periphery. Focusing on the Marshall Plan period also contextualises British policy within the collaborative approach to development pursued by the European colonial powers, watched over by officials in Washington. Through its study of international and intra-national organisations, this thesis is also a study of transnational politics enacted in the years immediately following a global war. By analysing British imperial policy alongside questions of domestic and diplomatic politics, I hope to understand the ideas, values, arguments and criticisms of policy-makers at the time.

**Sources**

My work is based to a large extent on British governmental papers (particularly those produced by the Colonial Office [CO], Foreign Office [FO], Treasury [T], Prime Minister’s Office [PREM] and the Cabinet Office [CAB]), held at the National Archives, Kew. This includes the archived papers concerning British participation in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the subcommittee on colonial development, the Overseas Territories Committee (OTC). In addition, I used Hansard to examine parliamentary debates on colonial policy; this is available online through the UK Parliamentary Service. I also explored Arthur Creech Jones’s personal papers, held at the Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies, Rhodes House, Oxford; this collection also includes papers related to the Fabian Colonial Bureau. For the American perspective, I used the collections held in the Truman Library, at Independence, Missouri; I was able to access not only papers pertaining to the Marshall Plan, but also those concerning the establishment of the Point Four aid programme, as well as the extensive oral history collection, which is transcribed on

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the library’s website. In addition, I used the published Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) series, much of which is now available online through the University of Wisconsin’s Digital Collections. I also looked at a large volume of published primary sources from the period, including newspaper and magazine articles, scholarly journal articles and books, and films available through the Colonial Film Unit website.

This chapter serves as an introduction to this thesis, with a brief discussion of the relevant historiography. This thesis fits between several historical fields; as well as colonial history, and the burgeoning field of colonial development scholarship, it also speaks to British post-war foreign policy, the Attlee Labour government, Anglo-American relations, and the Marshall Plan. This section also serves as a brief introduction to relevant concepts and subjects; this discussion is extended in Chapter One.

**Britain’s Post-war Empire**

As well as the economic and physical devastation caused by the Second World War, Britain was facing a potential crisis in its Empire, which at the end of the war encompassed 800 million people, in territories spread across the globe from Aden to Zanzibar.4 This included the white Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand; the Asian territories, which would undergo decolonization starting with India in 1947 and followed by Burma and the state-of-emergency Malaysia; and the African territories, which ranged from South Africa and the white-settler territories of Kenya and Northern and Southern Rhodesia to the colonies of Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

This thesis addresses the ideology and policy of colonial development in the British African empire in the immediate post-war period. The British empire in Africa was built on a layered system of control, with colonies governed directly from the Colonial Office in London or by representatives of the colonial service on the ground. Some of the colonies, such as Gold Coast and Nyasaland, were governed along the principles of indirect rule with a small number of British administrators, whilst others, such as Kenya and the Rhodesias, had a stronger local government based on a substantial white settler population. The Union of South Africa, which had been created in 1910 through the union of several cape colonies and, as a Dominion, had been granted legislative equality with the British government under the 1931 Statute of Westminster, would leave the Commonwealth in 1961 after a whites-only referendum declared the territory a republic.5

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The Attlee government was, of course, faced with imperial challenges beyond those on the African continent. After a sustained independence campaign, the partition and independence of the Indian subcontinent was announced by Louis, the Viscount Mountbatten on 3 June 1947. Ceylonese independence followed on 4 February 1948. In the Far East, Burma received its independence on 12 February 1947 with the signing of the Panglong Agreement. Britain attempted to govern the Malay states from 1946 as crown colonies under the Malayan Union, and then as protectorates under the Federation of Malaya from 1948 to 1960, whilst fighting heavy resistance to British rule in the Malayan Emergency guerrilla war. Meanwhile, the West Indian territories gradually gained local political control during the 1940s, although most did not gain formal independence until the 1960s, after a failed attempt at federation between 1958-62.

The history of British imperial rule in the post-war period has often focused on the struggles for independence and the gradual dismantling of the British empire in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The mobilization of the Empire in the Second World War, arguably the point at which the Empire was at its most cohesive, has itself been identified as responsible for the wave of decolonization seen in the post-war period. However, there was in fact a concerted reassertion of metropolitan control over the empire in the immediate post-war period, often described, in Low and Lonsdale’s words, as a ‘second colonial occupation’; it was perhaps instead this new ‘intrusive and often haphazard imperialism of the era of reconstruction’ that provided the ‘fundamental watershed’ for European decolonization. Development of colonial resources was central to Britain’s relationship with its empire after the Second World War. It was believed that the resources within colonial territories might prove essential for British regeneration, whilst the ability to assert international influence was key to the successful maintenance of positive British foreign relations with Europe and America.


Development was enacted across most of the British empire in the post-war period; however, this thesis focuses on projects in the African continent, for a number of reasons. Firstly, this region became central to Britain’s empire after the war; faced with independence challenges elsewhere, and failing to predict the speed with which nationalist agitation would become a credible force on the continent, colonial officials turned to Africa as the future of the British empire. Secondly, Africa was an area where British interests intersected with those of other western European nations and the United States; the examination of cooperation – or the lack thereof – on this issue provides a microcosm of British foreign relations, whilst centring empire as vital to the British national experience. Finally, Africa was itself identified by Attlee’s government as having especial potential worth for the British economy, whilst the standard of living of colonial populations on the continent was comparatively low; both factors encouraged the development of African resources. This thesis therefore reflects the concerns of the British government at the time.

**Defining Colonial Development**

Development is a pernicious word, which fits comfortably into the narrative of a white man’s burden, selflessly borne, still embraced by many in the post-war period. When applied clumsily, the concept of ‘development’ implies a fundamental hierarchy of nations and communities, with some at a more advanced stage than others, and so the narrative of ‘development’ superimposes a Whiggish view of progress onto the history of economics, international relations and social change.

This reading can create serious problems, not only in scholarship, but also in practical policy. Björn Hettne argues that a ‘critical approach’ to the concept of development is important precisely because the meaning of the term can be contested, and so ‘much harm has been done to people in the name of development’. Hettne attributes the negative characteristics of development policy to the fact that all development practice is ‘ultimately rooted in colonialism’ and therefore contains ‘a good measure of paternalism, not to speak of arrogance and racism’. This argument has been used even against countries without formal imperial possessions. Gilbert Rist has argued that, in their attempts at international development after the Second World War, American officials were engaging in ‘a new anti-colonial imperialism’, in which they asserted the United States’ position at the top of ‘a hierarchical ladder’.

It might seem, therefore, that the concept of ‘colonial development’, tainted by its overt connection to imperial rule, should be dismissed as paternalistic, racist and exploitative. Yet it would be overly simplistic to claim that the post-war British Colonial Office was motivated only by avarice, arrogance or a lack of concern for its colonial peoples, or that all attempts by the European metropoles to develop their colonial empires were ultimately harmful to the populations living

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therein. This thesis argues that many of the British officials involved in colonial development plans were motivated, at least in part, by a genuine desire to improve conditions within the empire, not out of a patronising assumption of metropolitan superiority, but because of a detailed understanding of the prior failings of the British colonial state.

To reflect contemporary usage, this thesis uses the term ‘colonial development’ to mean the more efficient exploitation of economic assets and/or a better provision of social welfare resources within a colony by the colonial government and the metropole. To acknowledge that the African colonies required development is to acknowledge either that they had been deliberately underdeveloped by colonial rulers, or that the resources had not previously been available to develop them further, or that there had been advances in the metropole that had not yet been conferred on the periphery. The use of the term is not meant to imply any inherent judgement about comparative levels of ‘progress’. Indeed, through the Department for International Development (DFID) and the UN Millennium Development Goals, ‘development’ as a concept remains at the heart of Britain’s relationship with its Commonwealth and ex-colonies.

Michael Jennings, in his work on colonial development, has identified a rhetorical and ideological shift in the first half of the twentieth century. The informal imperialism that focused on development as ‘economic growth’ with little state intervention was gradually eclipsed in the 1920s, when the British government became more ‘pro-active’ in its approach to colonial development. By the post-war period, the concept encompassed not only ‘economic advancement’ but also the ‘intrinsic elements’ of improvements in education, healthcare provision, and standard of living.11 Economic colonial development focused on the creation of industry through the development of mines, farms or production plants, with the provision of plant and industrial materials, such as steel and coal; the exporting and developing of colonial technical knowledge, often through the export of metropolitan technicians from Europe or America; the development of effective transport and communication systems to improve trade; and the networking of effective trade links with Europe, the Commonwealth and the Americas. Social-welfare development focused on education, health services, legal and social frameworks such as courts and community organisations, and, in some cases, political structures which could be developed towards independence. It is not always possible or productive to isolate the instances of ‘economic’ development from those of ‘social’ development when attempting to research in this area; both aspects of development will be examined within this thesis.

The ‘monstrous predatory vampires’ and ‘beneficent fairy godmothers’ of the title are taken from a memorandum by John Strachey, Minister of Food, to Prime Minister Clement Attlee, concerning the ongoing debate about the establishment of the Overseas Food Corporation and Colonial Development Corporation. In the face of concerns that colonial development might be perceived as extractive and exploitative, Strachey argued that African people would not draw a distinction between development schemes aimed at the more efficient exploitation of colonial resources for the benefit of the metropole, and those intended to create wealth or raise living standards for the colonial people themselves. This was proved to be naïve; there was a great deal of colonial resentment about development schemes that were a thinly-veiled attempt to produce raw materials, foodstuffs and profits for the British public. This distinction, between development for the good of the colonial populations and development for the benefit of the metropole, is central to this thesis; one of the key questions addressed is how far colonial development can be seen as an altruistic act and how far it was fundamentally exploitative.

There has been some official attempt to guide the historic narrative of colonial development. The Official History of Colonial Development series, written by David Morgan, is spread across five volumes. The two relevant volumes to this thesis are Vol. II: Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-51, and Vol. V: Guidance Towards Self-Government in British Colonies, 1941-71. These books provide an informative chronological account of colonial development, with particular focus on specific case studies. For example, in Volume II, the infamous East African Groundnuts Scheme is used as an example of colonial development failure, despite some success in its second phase. This volume also includes a short section on the Marshall Plan, which details how British funding was used for development, for example to fund the investigations of American technicians who were searching for strategic resources within colonial territories. It also highlights that, although counterpart funds were not used in colonial development, the Marshall Plan freed up other sources of finance to be invested in the Empire. Volume V addresses the history of self-government, dividing colonial independence along territorial lines and giving a short description and analysis of the process which led to independence in each individual colony. Stephen Howe has described this official history as ‘five ill-organised volumes which never venture forth from the dusty files of Colonial Office plans… to ask what effect, if any, these have on the ground’, asserting therefore that ‘as a summary of the colonial record it is fatuous’. The texts act, as do all official histories, to explain and justify the establishment view, and are predominantly descriptive rather than analytical.

12 For more details about the usage of this phrase, and the debate over the development corporations, see Chapter Two.
13 Memorandum by the Minister of Food (John Strachey to PM), 6th October 1947, PREM 8/456.
16 Ibid., pp. 108-112.
Scholarship on imperial history in the post-war period has often dealt, in whole or in part, with the issue of colonial development, including work on economic and industrial development as well as social welfare provision. Several texts also examine the economic implications of post-war colonial policy, with a focus on the development of industrial and financial structures within Africa. For example, Gerold Krozewski argues that colonial development was motivated mainly by the realization that ‘a developing Africa with state-led enterprise’ could provide consumer imports for the metropole, protecting dollar and sterling balances; the desire for dollar-saving could lead to ‘sudden and sometimes bizarre’ projects, such as the Gambian egg project and the aforementioned groundnut scheme.

Also of importance to this thesis is the recent work on the role of experts in colonial development. Britain had a long tradition of scientific and anthropological research within its empire, and so was well-placed to lead the international community in a coherent approach to colonial and post-colonial development in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Joseph Morgan Hodge’s book Triumph of the

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Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism focuses on ‘the links between late British colonialism and the emergence of the post-war development paradigm’ by emphasising the role of colonial technical experts. Hodge begins his study in the late nineteenth century and concludes in the 1960s, examining the gradual movement towards state-managed colonial development and the role played in this endeavour by colonial scientific and technical experts. The book is particularly interesting in its assertion of the continuities between late colonial policies and post-colonial development strategies. With the movement towards colonial independence, there was a ‘growing institutionalization and globalization of colonial scientific knowledge and authority’, as the men and women who had acted as colonial technical experts found employment in the new organisations for international development. The role of technical and scientific experts in British colonial policy thus demonstrates the international community within which development was enacted (through such events as the international scientific conferences on imperial development issues, detailed in Chapter Two), and provides some continuity between colonial and post-colonial development in the African continent.

Hodge focuses on agrarian development, and there is room therefore for examination of the issue of expertise in other fields of colonial development policy. Joanna Lewis, for example, in her work on colonial welfare in Kenya, examines technical development from an entirely different perspective, that of ‘welfare-state colonialism’. Lewis explores the development of welfare services and the clashes over this issue between Whitehall, the white settlers and colonial officials, and the black African population in Kenya. The technical aspects of development can be seen to be linked to policies in the metropole, with an increasing focus in Britain on the provision of welfare services.

British Post-war Foreign Policy and the Labour Government

Whilst examining the history of British post-war imperial policy, this thesis also seeks to contextualise that policy within the broader history of the Attlee government, exploring the extent to which post-war colonial development was pursued from a specifically Labourite perspective. In July 1945, the British public had gone to the polls to decide on the fate of the government that had led them to Victory in Europe. In a truly khaki election, with five million men and women still serving in British armed and auxiliary forces, the results were delayed for three weeks whilst the ballots cast by those still serving overseas were transported to Britain to be counted. In a result that even many within the party felt was ‘unbelievable’, especially given Winston Churchill’s personal popularity during the war years, Labour polled 48 per cent of the vote, winning 393 seats.
in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{25}

It is debatable how much the Attlee government’s foreign and imperial policy differed from the course that would have been taken by the Conservative Party had they won the election. John Callaghan points to the focus on Britain remaining a ‘world power based upon its Empire-Commonwealth’ as ‘one element in continuity’ between the Labour government and its predecessors.\textsuperscript{26} Peter Weiler records that both Attlee and Bevin made public statements that they would not differ from Churchill and Eden on the key areas of foreign policy, understandably perhaps, given their active record in the War Cabinet. However, there was a great deal of expectation among the electorate and within the Party that Labour would pursue an actively socialist role in world affairs.\textsuperscript{27}

There have been several texts that have dealt with this issue in detail, often as part of a broader analysis of Labour’s role in British foreign policy or the party’s approach to key issues of British politics in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{28} Rhiannon Vickers, in her book \textit{The Labour Party and the World: Vol. 1, The Evolution of Labour’s Foreign Policy 1900-51}, concludes that the Labour Party did have a quintessential typology of foreign policy, characterized by certain ‘meta-principles’, including ‘a belief in progress and an optimistic view of human nature’, which she classifies as ‘internationalist’. The party was never really able to pursue a foreign policy based on socialist values, as many of their allies were ‘capitalist nation states’.\textsuperscript{29} The stark boundaries of the Cold War somewhat lessened Britain’s ability to make alliances based on shared left-wing ideologies.

Stephen Howe, in his book \textit{Anti-Colonialism in British Politics: the Left and the End of Empire 1918-1964}, focuses on the ideological and practical implications of the anti-imperial tradition within the Labour Party. He deliberately avoids most discussion of British colonial development policy, including that enacted under the Labour Party, to focus on areas of Labour ideology and practice that fitted into a broader narrative of left-wing anti-imperial thinking.\textsuperscript{30} However, not everybody within the Attlee government was firmly anti-empire. Vickers identifies a tension at the heart of Labour’s imperial policies: although the party, especially the grassroots members, erred towards ‘support for nationalist movements and for national self-determination’, this contradicted the

\textsuperscript{30} Howe, \textit{Anti-Colonialism in British Politics}, pp. vii-ix.
leadership’s ‘belief in continuing Britain’s continuing world and imperial role’. As a result, the party’s colonial policies could be ‘confused and inconsistent’.31 This tension between the ideologies of anti-colonialism and the realities of colonial rule is at the heart of this thesis.

**Anglo-American Relations**

Labour was not only forced to come to terms with itself as a party overseeing a vast imperial empire after the Second World War; the party also had face up to the realities of international relations to ultimately embrace a close relationship with the USA. The period of history encompassing the Second World War and its immediate aftermath was critical to the formation of the ‘special relationship’ and, although Churchill was the initial instigator of the close connection between the two countries, Attlee and Ernest Bevin did much to encourage its continuation.

Winston Churchill, himself a product of cordial Anglo-American relations, had utilised the concept of a transatlantic partnership to cajole the United States into supporting Britain both financially and militarily during the war. Churchill believed that the ‘special relationship’, a phrase that he appears to have coined, represented a natural connection across the Atlantic ocean.32 David Reynolds has pointed out that Churchill’s use of this phrase was ‘prescriptive as much as descriptive’; describing the transatlantic bond as ‘special’ was an attempt to bind Washington to London in both sentiment and policy.33 Churchill was unable to use the bonds of Anglo-American solidarity to force the United States into military invention, although he was able to negotiate the ‘most unsordid act in history’, the Lend-Lease agreements, which enabled Britain to borrow dollars to purchase vital war supplies from American producers.34 When the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor finally propelled the United States into military action, Churchill recorded that he ‘slept the sleep of the saved and thankful’.35

Churchill’s close personal relationship with, and great admiration of, President Roosevelt was critical to the cementing of transatlantic ties; the British Prime Minister once compared his relationship with the American leader to that of a lover who was constantly at the mercy of the ‘whim’ of his beloved.36 Churchill realised, however, that his own sentimental attitude to the special relationship was not necessarily shared by others, on either side of the Atlantic. He worked hard to forge diplomatic connections at the various conferences during and immediately after the war, attempting to strengthen the British relationship with the United States whilst simultaneously driving a rift between Washington and Moscow. It was seen as vital that the power balance within

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32 See, for example, Telegram No 6398, Winston Churchill to Clement Attlee and Secretary of State (Washington), ‘Post-war world organization to be discussed with Stalin’, 24 September 1943, FO 954/22A, National Archives.
the ‘Big Three’ alliance was never allowed to make the Anglo-American relationship less special in comparison. With American power increasing, the British needed to work hard to ensure that the relationship between the two nations would not be taken for granted or, even worse, become a case of unrequited love.

After the Second World War, the relationship between Britain and America waxed and waned in the context of the ascendancy of the United States, the relative decline of Great Britain, the gradual disentangling of the British Empire and the formation and dissolution of other alliances. The special relationship was consistently positive in two areas: military intelligence and nuclear defence. This resulted directly from the links built between Britain and America in these areas during the Second World War. However, in other areas, especially relating to diplomacy and foreign policy, the relationship was more vulnerable.

The ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States has been dissected by academics on both sides of the Atlantic, although the subject seems infinitely more fascinating to the British than the Americans. Alex Danchev separates theorists of the ‘special relationship’ into three types. ‘Evangelists’ attribute the maintenance of this relationship to the natural affinity between the two cultures, whilst ‘functionalists’ maintain that the partnership continues because of the practical benefits of continued association between the two nations; alternatively, there are those who prefer to take a ‘terminal’ approach, and consider the ‘specialness’ of the relationship to be wildly overestimated. Danchev also comments on the permanently quoted status of the ‘special relationship’, with the wry acknowledgement that:

> the inverted commas... are evidently meant to convey something important: a certain coolness – scepticism, perhaps, or irony – a postmodern awareness that words are playthings, ideas are constructs and nothing is what it seems.

41 Ibid., p. 1.
In the context of this thesis, one of the most interesting elements of the ‘special relationship’ is the ongoing tension over empire; several books have been written that focus specifically on Anglo-American relations and British colonial rule. The fundamental anti-imperialism of the United States has become something of a historical truism, but the realities of American policies towards imperial powers, including Great Britain, are more complex.

The classic article by WR Louis and R Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonisation’, specifically examines the role of the United States in the dissolution of the British Empire after the Second World War. The authors assert that the Empire survived after the war as ‘part of the Anglo-American coalition’ and was supported by the American loan. Marshall aid, and later the Mutual Security Programme, essentially ‘subsidized’ the British imperial system in return for British support in Cold War defence. However, as long as tropical Africa remained unblemished by Cold War tensions, the United States had ‘few interests… and little influence’ in the region. John Kent, in his article ‘United States reactions to empire, colonialism, and cold war in Black Africa, 1949-57’, further develops this analysis of the American role in African decolonization. Kent argues that the United States was caught between trying to encourage self-government in European colonial territories, and trying to court the support of the European nations themselves, whilst also attempting to foster profitable and mutually beneficial economic relationships between colony and metropole, and avoiding opening up territories to Soviet intervention. In his book Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War, Thomas Borstelmann examines American-African relations through the prism of the white settler colonies. He concludes that any concern the Truman government had for the ‘fifty million black people’ in Africa was ‘overshadowed’ by the desire to reconstruct Western Europe using colonial resources;

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44 Ibid., pp. 460-462.


indeed, State Department men like Dean Acheson and George Kennan ‘continued to support white minority rule in southern Africa long after the rest of the continent had been decolonized’.47

James P Hubbard attempts further analysis of the American role in the decolonization of the British empire, in his book *The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968*. Hubbard emphasises that, under Truman, there was no clear policy on the British empire; many senior diplomats, such as Loy Henderson, were ‘uncomfortable with anti-colonialism’, whilst others were ‘openly hostile’ to the British empire. He argues that, although officials in Washington were ‘quietly supportive’ when newly-created states were granted their independence, they ‘paid little attention to colonial issues’, and made only ‘brief and infrequent’ statements regarding empire, which largely ‘stuck to well-worn paths’.48 In fact, American officials were sometimes supportive of increased British intervention in the African colonies, although the Colonial Office was often resistant to what they perceived as American interference; this is explored in more depth in Chapter Four.

The historical issue of American (anti)imperialism has been stoked, since the Second World War, with accusations that the increasing power of the United States overseas has created a *de facto* American empire.49 For example, Julian Go, in his recent book *Patterns of Empire*, compares American ‘imperialism’ in 1945-73 with the British empire in 1815-73, periods which he identifies as the countries’ respective ‘phases of hegemonic maturity’. Go accuses America of operating the same type of ‘informal imperialism’ seen in the British empire, pointing to Washington’s covert influence with African dictators, American policies in the Middle East, and the territories held by the United States in the Caribbean and Pacific, although he also states that America has had ‘a lack of overseas colonies’, which seems incompatible with his overall argument.50 Whether the United States can properly be described as an empire can be disputed depending on the definition; imperialism can encompass the exercising of economic hegemony, a centralised power structure with peripheral violence, an acknowledged hierarchical political and cultural connection between metropole and territories, and many more types of relationship between periphery and centre. However, Go and other scholars emphasise the rising power of the United States relative to the declining or stagnating power of other hitherto imperial powers, an analytical framework that is central to this thesis.

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Post-war Reconstruction and The Marshall Plan

America’s role in the regeneration of Europe, including Britain, has itself been typified as imperial, albeit an ‘empire by invitation’.51 The Marshall Plan was central to the continuation of American international power and responsibilities after the Second World War and its role in the post-war period is fundamental to any understanding of the ‘special relationship’. The myth of the Marshall Plan as the ‘most unselfish and unsordid act’ in history – a myth which misappropriates Churchill’s grateful words on the wartime Lend-Lease Act – has gradually developed in popular memory, especially in the United States.52 Nonetheless, it is clear that the Marshall Plan, more properly called the European Recovery Programme (ERP), played an important part in Britain and Europe’s post-war economic and political landscapes.

The creation myth of the Marshall Plan is well known. On 5th June 1947, General George C. Marshall, the recently appointed American Secretary of State, delivered a speech at Harvard that reverberated throughout Europe. In it, he drew attention to the ‘very serious’ world situation, in which the substantial destruction caused by the ‘physical loss of life [and] the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads’ was surpassed only by the chaos caused by the ‘dislocation of the entire fabric of [the] European economy’. Marshall argued that the Second World War had destroyed the internal economies of the European countries and caused the breakdown of the economic structure of Europe as a whole. This was concerning to the United States not only because of the basic humanitarian need to consider the ‘plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples’ of Europe, but also because European recovery was essential to the United States’ economic future. European nations had previously relied on ‘foreign food and other essential products – principally from America’, and without this export market the American economy would be in dire straits.53

In his speech, the Secretary of State was careful to state that the United States was intervening ‘not against any country or doctrine’ but instead ‘against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos’. Initially, at least, the programme was not aimed against any threat, be that a resurgent Germany or the Communist USSR, but instead aimed to build a better future for all, including the United States, through economic and political cooperation. Marshall made it clear that the plan for action must come from the European nations themselves, with America acting to aid the drafting process and later providing practical financial ‘support’.54 This speech led to the development of the Marshall

52 See, for example, James Lachlan McLeod, ‘The Most Unsordid Act in History?’, George Mason University’s History News Network (6 October 2003), http://www.hnn.us/articles/1712.html, which carries a number of examples of this misappropriation, as well as a thorough debunking of the myth.
54 Ibid.
Plan, and resulted, eventually, in the granting of $13 billion over five years to the sixteen European nations involved; Britain received the largest share of this money, in total some $2.7 billion. The programme eventually evolved into the Mutual Security Act which distributed another $7 billion in foreign aid and created the Mutual Security Agency for a unified defence policy.

Most studies of the Marshall Plan begin with Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-52*. This covers the entire period of European recovery from the American perspective, from the ideological origins of the Marshall Plan in New Deal policy, to the transformation of the programme into military support which was heralded by the Korean War. The book has a detailed political focus and portrays the Marshall Plan as an American diplomatic project, which was intended to encourage political unification among the European nations as a way to ‘play an active role in the global containment of Soviet expansion’. Consequently, there is little focus on the economics of European recovery and only a small amount of research based in British archives. This means that there is essentially no coverage of the British Imperial or Commonwealth dimension; the overseas territories are briefly mentioned as a possible counterpart to British participation in Europe, but this factor is never elaborated or explored. This thesis seeks to address this deficiency.

In many ways the parallel text to Hogan’s book is Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*. This book focuses heavily on the economic impetus behind the Marshall Plan. Milward argues that the economic crisis was primarily caused not by post-war devastation and disruption, but by the rapid reconstruction in most European countries, which led to a widening balance of payments deficit and import-export imbalance, and a dollar shortage caused by the high level of investment in trade with the United States. Milward therefore asserts that, for every European country except France and the Netherlands, the programme was largely unnecessary. The United States used the ERP to reconstruct the political and economic anatomy of Europe, whilst simultaneously containing the German economy and guaranteeing American exports to Marshall Plan nations. As such, much of the book is concerned with the process leading to European economic cooperation, such as the Customs Union, the Schumann Plan, and the Common Market, with only two chapters specifically focused on the Marshall Plan. Throughout the book, Milward

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57 Ibid., p. 48.


uses a variety of European archives rather than taking the narrow American focus favoured by Hogan. British reluctance to incorporate fully within a European system is documented, alongside some consideration of the Dominions and their role in the Sterling Area, but with little exploration of how wider imperial issues affected British policy or American intentions.

There are several texts that focus specifically on the Marshall Plan and Great Britain, reflecting the British influence over the development and implementation of the programme. One of the most recent studies is Rhiannon Vickers’ book *Manipulating Hegemony: State Power, Labour and the Marshall Plan in Britain*. Vickers argues that the Marshall Plan did not herald American hegemony over British international relations and economics. Instead, the British government was ‘able to manage relations with the US, in terms of limiting unwanted US influence’, whilst manipulating domestic politics to entrench its power at home. Vickers does not speculate as to whether this extended to British autonomy in relations with the Empire/Commonwealth; the book focuses on domestic issues and makes no reference to the relationship between metropole and colonies as a possible forum for American hegemony.

Another recent scholarly approach to the Marshall Plan, in so far as it concerned British politics, is *Past and Present* journal’s February 2011 supplement, ‘Reconstruction in Post-war Europe’. The supplement is a comparative study of issues relating to the reconstruction of Europe at the end of the Second World War, in which the ‘historiography of the immediate post-war years… strikes out in new directions’ that ‘cannot be contained by the dichotomies of the Cold War’. As such, there are several articles that showcase new approaches to the history of the Marshall Plan. David Edgerton’s article, ‘War, Reconstruction, and the Nationalisation of Britain, 1939-1951’, questions the idea that Britain after the Second World War was first and foremost a welfare state. He points out that the ‘deep structural impact of the Cold War on post-war Britain’ meant that defence actually dominated public expenditure in the post-war period, and so the economy of the Attlee government was more outward-looking than is often assumed. Edgerton also believes that the role of empire in the reconstruction era has been ‘in some significant respects understated’, as the colonial empire became particularly important given its potential for trade and production. However, Edgerton highlights that the post-war period also saw the prioritisation of the concept of


64 Ibid., p. 34.
‘nation’ and ‘national’ identity, in which ‘the British nation [was] separated from Empire and Commonwealth’; the winning Labour manifesto had only negligible references to foreign and imperial relations, and the memory of the war became one of a national conflict, downplaying both overseas alliances and the imperial contribution. It can be seen that Marshall Plan and colonial development did not operate within a context of particular domestic interest in overseas or imperial affairs; this may have freed policy-makers from the constraints of popular opinion and perhaps meant that the Labour government was able to pursue a more consistent approach to foreign policy than would otherwise have been the case.

There are two articles in the Past and Present supplement that deal specifically with the role of empires in post-war reconstruction. Nicholas White’s article ‘Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire: the British, French, and Dutch Experiences Compared’ examines the relationship between the dollar shortage experienced in Britain, France and the Netherlands and the ‘development drive’ in these countries’ empires. For Britain, this meant emphasising the production of key exports that could be sold on the dollar market (the most important being rubber, tin, cocoa and bauxite), as well as colonial goods that could act as dollar savers by replacing imports to the United Kingdom (including copper and oil). White argues that, although the emphasis on increased production in the empires was initially a successful strategy for overcoming economic problems in the metropole, and this policy was therefore ‘tolerated by the United States’ despite American anti-imperialism, the ‘second colonial occupation’ also ‘exacerbated problems of colonial management’, leading to political problems. Misguided colonial development projects ‘alienated peasant communities’, creating receptive audiences across colonies for the nationalist politics of men like Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. White’s focus on the metropolitan conditions of colonial development, and his comparative approach to different European colonial policies, is mirrored in this thesis, particularly chapters two and three.

Frederick Cooper’s Past and Present article, ‘Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa’, approaches colonial development and post-war reconstruction from within the colonies, arguing that ‘it was… empire that European leaders at the end of World War II needed to reconstruct’. Britain and France needed to rebuild the moral legitimacy of imperial rule (after Hitler had given ‘racism a bad name’), whilst boosting production in their colonial territories to support the metropolitan economies. Both countries ‘reacted to threats and losses in Asia by looking more to

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65 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
66 White, ‘Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire’, p. 211.
67 Ibid., pp. 212, 214-5.
69 Ibid., p. 232.
71 Ibid., pp. 196, 199.
Africa’, prioritising the development of colonies on the continent to ensure their economic and military security. The fact that both nations were forced to sell their colonial products on international markets to secure revenue meant that other nations did not fear this expansion of imperial power. For Britain, tension arose when it became obvious that ‘the very terms by which the imperial state was trying to re legitimise itself’, namely colonial development and the expansion of political participation, were themselves leading to calls for more ‘social and economic resources’, and were thus fuelling demands for greater colonial independence; policies that focused on economic development were subject to criticism that they simply enabled more effective exploitation of colonial resources and people. Despite official rhetoric that focused on the potential for transition to self-government, the Colonial Office was caught in a ‘split vision of modernizing and dangerous Africans’ that made them reluctant to confer independence too quickly. Cooper concludes that, whilst Britain and France were trying to reconstruct their empires (and their metropoles) to their own plans, African populations were aware that empire ‘could not be constructed as it had been before’; the ‘differing but overlapping agendas’ of the colonial rulers and the ruled shaped the history of post-war colonialism and decolonization. Cooper’s article is therefore a useful example of the way in which the history of European politics and reconstruction can be written from a colonial perspective, and demonstrates the interconnectedness of metropolitan and imperial politics in the post-war world.

The Marshall Plan has also been the subject of recent popular histories, such as Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe and Nicolaus Mills, Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America’s Coming of Age as a Superpower. These books focus on the Marshall Plan as an example of positive American intervention in the world, acting as ‘feel-good’ histories of American foreign policy. Against the context of international and domestic disquiet about American ‘neo-imperialism’, stimulated recently by intervention in the Middle East, the Marshall Plan is a safe area for self-congratulation. An alternative interpretation for a ‘popular’ audience is provided by Corelli Barnett in a short article on the BBC History website entitled ‘The Wasting of Britain’s Marshall Aid’. Rehashing many ideas from his book The Lost Victory, Barnett excoriates the Attlee government for its ‘deluded’ approach to politics during the Marshall Plan era that led to ‘a monumental waste of a great and unrepeatable opportunity’. In spite of the BBC’s focus on impartial coverage, this article is

72 Ibid., pp. 199-200.
73 Ibid., pp. 202, 204.
74 Ibid., pp. 202-3.
presented without commentary, with no explanation of Barnett’s ideological perspective or any balancing interpretation; Barnett is simply described as ‘an award winning author and historian’. 78

Rik Schreurs’s article ‘A Marshall Plan for Africa? The Overseas Territories Committee and The Origins of European Co-operation in Africa’ is the only text published to date that directly interrogates the relationship between the Marshall Plan and African colonial development. 79 Schreurs highlights both the role of the overseas territories of all European countries in reconstructing the post-war economies, and the American vested interest in opening colonial markets to import and export while preventing the spread of communism through the region. 80 The European nations required that their colonial territories become dollar earners through exporting to the United States, whilst at the same time providing export markets for European products, and this role necessitated development in Africa. 81 Schreurs draws a specific link between this development and the Marshall Plan:

insufficient European budgets would have delayed the economic development of the overseas territories and their contribution to the reconstruction of Europe beyond the critical point of recovery, if the United States had not assisted through the ERP. 82

Schreurs is sceptical of the development undertaken by the Marshall Plan funds, criticizing the tendency for money to be spent on projects which fulfilled ‘American political and economic needs’ rather than those of the local political systems or economies; the funds and expertise of the ECA were insufficient to effectively complete the ‘huge task’ of African economic and social development. 83 However, Schreurs believes that the beginnings of African development under the Marshall Plan saw ‘a change in attitude towards the development of underdeveloped (overseas) colonies’. 84 There is still a great deal more research to be completed on the connections between reconstruction and colonial development, particularly the transnational connections between the administration of the Marshall Plan and European imperial policy, which this thesis will explicitly address.

Thesis Structure
Although this thesis is primarily a work of imperial history, it also seeks to shed light on questions of foreign policy and domestic political history. Colonial development can be examined as a case-study of British colonial policy in the post-war period, but it can also provide context and detail for work

80 Ibid., p. 88.
81 Ibid., p. 87.
82 Ibid., p. 88.
83 Ibid., p. 91.
84 Ibid., p. 93.
on African and British politics, and Britain’s foreign relations with the United States and western Europe. My first chapter considers the context in which development was enacted, in British Africa, in Europe, and in the transatlantic world; it explains the necessity for development in Africa and the variety of problems inherent in colonial policy in the post-war period. My second chapter examines the domestic political context for post-war colonial development. I argue that British imperial policy under the stewardship of Arthur Creech Jones’s Colonial Office was less fundamentally exploitative than it potentially could have been, because the influence of Fabian humanitarian thinking about empire tempered the extractive tendency of British imperial policy. My third chapter examines the way in which British colonial development intersected with British relations with Europe and the beginning of continental integration, within the context of the Marshall Plan. I argue that there was great potential for British cooperation with Western Europe in colonial development projects, and that European collaboration on this issue was indeed successful in some areas; however, this was undermined when cooperation in colonial policy was too unsubtly combined with European or American pressures for British involvement in European political integration. My fourth chapter examines the Anglo-American relationship and the effect that this had on British colonial policy. Having already established in my first chapter that the popular American reputation for anti-imperialism is not empirically supported, I argue that the United States was generally supportive of British attempts in colonial development, even drawing on British experiences and rhetoric for their own work in Liberia and under the Point Four scheme; however, American interference in British colonial policy in this period sometimes caused frustration in Whitehall. My final chapter explores some of the projects that Britain implemented in Africa under a colonial development umbrella during the Attlee government. Although there were some high-profile failures, such as the East African Groundnuts Scheme and the Gambia Poultry scheme, I argue that in a number of key areas, particularly health, education and social welfare, British colonial development in this period was quietly successful.
Chapter One: Juggling the Three Spheres: Britain and its Post-War World.

Colonial policy under the Attlee government cannot be assessed in a vacuum, or compared only with the colonial policies of other governments in other times. This chapter explores the extent to which Britain, at the end of the Second World War, was operating within a number of different spheres of influence, and the ways in which these spheres were interconnected. The political context of colonial policy, the personnel in Westminster, the domestic economy, and the social and cultural context within which these political decisions were enacted is vital to understanding colonial policy in this period. As has been argued by many practitioners of ‘new imperial history’, Britishness and Britain were fundamentally and intricately connected with the imperial and the empire, and knowledge and information flowed both ways between periphery and metropole. Antoinette Burton, for example, has argued that imperial history is ‘an integral part of ‘British’ social, political, and cultural history because empire itself was the product of British national institutions’. Yet there has been comparatively little study within the new imperial history movement of the economic links between Britain and its empire, despite the fact that the ties of trade and finance were some of the strongest and most visible links between metropole and periphery. Colonial development was, at least in part, motivated by the economic and industrial requirements of metropolitan reconstruction, and so the post-war British political and economic context is helpful in explaining the interest in colonial development within and beyond the Colonial Office.

Equally, the colonial policy of the Attlee government cannot be assessed properly without some understanding of contemporary foreign policy. In some issues, such as the independence of India, the communist insurgency in Malaya, and the withdrawal from Palestine, colonial and foreign policy merged and both the Foreign and Colonial Offices worked to protect British overseas interests. It is unsurprising, therefore, that surveys of British post-war foreign policy generally include at least some detail about British colonial strategy; it is important to make sure that explorations of colonial history return the favour, in order to understand the context in which colonial development was being enacted. Clearly, ideas about British status and power in the post-war world were influential on Colonial Office thinking, but these cannot fully be explored without a clear understanding of the challenges facing Britain in its international relationships.

This chapter therefore sets out to contextualise the thesis and its exploration of colonial development in the post-war world. The chapter examines the British domestic political situation, Labour’s attitude to colonial policy as a whole and the economic circumstances within which policy

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85 Antoinette Burton, ‘Rules of Thumb: British History and ‘Imperial Culture’ in Nineteenth- and Twentieth Century Britain’, in Howe (ed.), The New Imperial Histories Reader, p. 44.
was enacted. It then explores British cooperation with, and resistance to, a united western Europe in the context of the receipt of Marshall Aid. The Anglo-American relationship is also central, especially tensions surrounding British imperialism, and the notion of a ‘special relationship’ across the Atlantic. This chapter thus serves to establish important aspects of foreign and domestic background to colonial development, to support the following four chapters.

**Britain At Home**

The 1945 election was called less than three weeks after Victory in Europe day; the war in the Pacific would continue for another three months. The Conservative Party clearly hoped that they would be able to build on Winston Churchill’s extraordinary 87 per cent approval rating and his reputation as a war leader. However, despite this personalised support for Churchill, the Second World War, particularly after the retreat from Dunkirk in 1940 and the publication of the Beveridge Report in 1942, saw a gradual increase in support for the Labour Party. It has been debated whether this ‘steady strengthening of left-wing feeling’ among the voting population represented support for Attlee’s party, or a more generalised feeling of popular radicalism, fostered both by the wartime spirit of egalitarianism and scepticism towards the war leadership, that was fortuitously directed toward Labour at the ballot box.

The Labour Party manifesto, ‘Let Us Face the Future’, drafted largely by Michael Young, spoke of the need to ‘win the Peace for the People’. This meant ‘good food in plenty, useful work for all, and comfortable, labour-saving homes’, as well as ‘a high and rising standard of living, security for all against a rainy day and education to give ‘every boy and girl a chance to develop the best that is in them’. The manifesto described a broad programme of nationalisation of industry, as well as state powers to acquire land for public projects where necessary. Centralised planning and material purchasing would also be employed to make sure that the essential programme of house building could be efficiently carried out. Universal free secondary education, the new National Health Service, and the Social Insurance programme would make sure that everybody in Britain would be healthy, educated and protected against ‘mean and shabby treatment’. Finally, the manifesto turned to foreign policy. It was vital for Britain ‘to consolidate in peace the great war-time association of the British Commonwealth with the USA and the USSR’; the British must ‘play the part of brave and constructive leaders in international affairs’. In a final paragraph before a conclusion appealing ‘to all Progressives’, the Labour Party vowed ‘to promote mutual understanding and cordial cooperation’ between the Dominions, to advance India to ‘responsible self-government’, and to

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embrace ‘the planned progress’ of Britain’s colonies.\textsuperscript{88}

Notwithstanding this fleeting mention of international politics, and the images of Denis Healey and Roy Jenkins giving speeches at the 1945 Party Conference dressed in their military uniforms, Labour’s election campaign was very clearly based on domestic issues. This is particularly striking when compared to the Conservative manifesto, which, professing to be Churchill’s own ‘declaration of policy to the electors’, included three long sections on ‘Britain and the World’, ‘The British Empire and Commonwealth’ and ‘Defence’, before any reference to homes, jobs, healthcare or education.\textsuperscript{89} Unfortunately for Churchill, the election was fought and won, not on Britain’s place in the world, but on promises of a better life for the people who had endured wartime hardships at home or abroad. The servicemen and women who had fought for Britain wanted to come home to the future laid out in the Beveridge report, which the Conservative Party were perceived to be unwilling to implement in full.\textsuperscript{90} However, once the Labour Party had won the election, the new government could not focus solely on the implementation of the welfare state; the legacy of the Attlee government in foreign and imperial policy is just as important as in the domestic sphere.

Attlee’s Cabinet had gained considerable government experience in the wartime coalition. Attlee himself had served as Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council, and Secretary of State for the Dominions. He had remained in London in charge of the British government on the frequent occasions when Churchill was overseas during the war, and had himself visited France, Canada, Italy, Algeria and the Western Front in his official capacity. He had also led the British delegation to the 1941 International Labour Conference in New York, had been a member of the British delegation at the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, and had attended Potsdam as Churchill’s ‘friend and counsellor’ before becoming Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{91} Despite this experience in foreign affairs, many of the major decisions on foreign and imperial policy were taken by the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones; Attlee was ‘relaxed about delegating’, appointing strong ministers to run departments without too much intervention from the Prime Minister’s office.\textsuperscript{92}

Ernest Bevin, whom Attlee appointed Foreign Secretary, had expected to be made Chancellor of


\textsuperscript{90} Fielding, ‘What did ‘The People’ Want’, p. 639. There had also been significant demographic changes in Britain since the last election, which meant that the Labour Party enjoyed a natural majority among the electorate: see Mark Franklin and Matthew Ladner, ‘The Undoing of Winston Churchill: Mobilisation and Conversion in the 1945 Realignment of British Voters’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 451-2.


\textsuperscript{92} Pugh, Speak For Britain, p. 289.
the Exchequer. Bevin was not experienced in foreign policy; born into poverty in the West Country, he had risen through the trade union network, and in 1940 had been appointed Minister for Labour, where he had fought hard for the rights of British workers. Peter Weiler believes that Bevin carried something of the same attitude to the Foreign Office in 1945; formerly the champion of the working classes, he was now defending the interests of the entire British nation. Bevin was not an obvious match in temperament or beliefs with the establishment diplomats and mandarins; he had in fact been instrumental, with Anthony Eden, in reforming the Foreign Office in an attempt to make it more inclusive. However, his tenure as Foreign Secretary was remarkably popular with the civil servants who worked alongside him, and he was respected for his ‘robust and practical common sense’, which he claimed to have acquired ‘in the hedgerows of experience’. Attlee trusted Bevin, and was publicly supportive of his policies and theories, although they disagreed in private, for example over the continued importance of the Middle East to the British global position. Bevin is one of the most frequently celebrated Foreign Ministers of the twentieth century, credited with steering Britain’s path through the Cold War, tying the United States to Europe through the Marshall Plan and NATO, and maintaining Britain’s great power status in a hostile world. However, Bevin has also been criticised, mainly by those historians, such as Corelli Barnett, who see his policies as central to Britain’s post-war ‘decline’; Peter Weiler has claimed that Bevin’s pursuit of a continued world role actually limited Britain’s freedom of action and tied successive British governments into international commitments in the twentieth century that they were increasingly unable to fulfil.

Whilst Ernest Bevin is one of the most thoroughly-researched Foreign Secretaries of the twentieth century, Arthur Creech Jones, who served as Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1946-1950, has been almost ignored in scholarly literature. This is partly because he had nothing like the striking, gregarious personality of his Foreign Office colleague; Creech Jones is normally depicted – if he is depicted at all – as ‘uncharismatic, if earnest’. Creech Jones was not Attlee’s first appointment as colonial secretary. George Hall served from August 1945 to October 1946, being mostly preoccupied in this period by the Palestine crisis. However, when Hall resigned to take up a seat in the House of Lords and become the First Lord of the Admiralty, his under-secretary Creech Jones was an obvious choice for his replacement. Like his friend Bevin, he had risen through the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU); in 1926 he had written a handbook, Trade

94 As Bevin was not an MP at the time, a safe seat was found for him; he became the MP for Wandsworth Central in an unopposed by-election in June 1940.
99 See, for example, Roberts, ‘Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary’, pp. 21-42; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp. 839-848.
100 Barnett, The Lost Victory, p. 54; Weiler, ‘British Labour and the Cold War’, p. 76.
Unionism To-Day, which had been popular in the African colonies. In 1940, he had worked with Dr Rita Hinden to form the Fabian Colonial Bureau, a sub-committee of the Fabian Society, which was extremely influential on the Labour Party’s post-war colonial thinking.

Despite this expertise, Attlee had little faith in Creech Jones, believing that he was ‘bad in the House’ and that he contributed ‘nothing’ to Cabinet meetings; in fact, Attlee considered his appointment to Cabinet to have been one of his ‘mistakes’. This is unfair. It is true that many colonial issues were dominated by the Foreign Office in this period, notably Palestine and other areas of key strategic interest; this was partly because Creech Jones had served under Bevin at the TGWU (and was his Parliamentary Private Secretary from 1940-44), and in Whitehall he again assumed a subservient role. D. K. Fieldhouse has reiterated the idea that ‘great matters’ in colonial affairs were dealt with by the ‘great men’ in Attlee’s Cabinet – Attlee himself, Bevin, Morrison and Cripps. However, he concedes that the day-to-day rule of the colonies – including the very details of how they were to be ruled – and all matters pertaining to ‘the details of social and economic development in tropical Africa and elsewhere’ were handled ‘entirely within the Colonial Office’. This is supported by Howe, who critiques Attlee’s judgement that Creech Jones did not have ‘a real grip of administration in the Colonial Office’. In fact, Creech Jones’ role in shaping Labour’s colonial policy, first as a member of the FCB and then as Colonial Secretary, continued to influence colonial rule and decolonisation over the next three decades; John Flint, in a rare accolade, described him as the ‘architect of West African decolonization’. It is therefore important to foreground Creech Jones in any study of post-war colonial development.

Attlee’s government was fundamentally curtailed in all policies by straitened economic circumstances. In June 1946, food shortages forced the Government to increase rationing above wartime levels, including bread for the first time, which caused consternation among the British people. This position was exacerbated by the harsh winter of 1946-1947; in February 1947, the United Kingdom suffered a fuel and power crisis, when the unusually cold weather coincided with a ‘critically low stock position’ of coal. This had not only caused great immediate discomfort to the domestic population, but had substantially reduced the British capacity to produce coal and steel for the rest of the year, reducing potential exports and further depleting the hard currency


104 Howe, *Anti-Colonialism in British Politics*, p.146.


106 Howe, *Anti-Colonialism in British Politics* p.146


supply. In an effort to address this problem, the Government had to enforce the ‘diversion of supplies’ from domestic usage to export, resulting in a ‘postponement of increases in civil consumption’ that further reduced morale. The crisis reduced confidence in the Labour Government’s ability to effect post-war recovery, even within the Cabinet; Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1945-7, wrote that, after the fuel crisis, it was ‘never glad, confident morning again’.

The Labour Government had much to lack confidence about. Despite being the beneficiary of a $3.75 billion American loan in December 1945, Britain was running out of dollar reserves. This was exacerbated by the fact that Britain was forced under the terms of the loan to make sterling convertible by 15th July 1947, a disastrous experiment that led to a run on the pound costing the Treasury $237 million a week by the time convertibility was suspended in August. By this point the United Kingdom, along with much of Europe, was suffering from severe inflation, a loss of capital and a dollar shortage which severely limited purchasing power in the international markets. Britain also had specific economic issues resulting from its role as a colonial metropolitan financer: these included a sterling area gold and dollar deficit of £1,024 million, as well as sterling balances (effectively debts owed to other sterling countries within and outside the Commonwealth) of £3,680 million by June 1947. The Labour government would struggle to enact the promises in its manifesto without significant efforts to improve Britain’s import-export deficit, strengthen sterling internationally and stimulate industrial, agricultural and commercial production; the Marshall Plan would thus prove vital to Britain’s economic recovery. On top of these economic issues, Britain also faced diplomatic challenges. The British had fought the war alongside colonial and commonwealth comrades-in-arms, European allies, and – eventually – American saviours, and these relationships needed to be maintained in the post-war world.

**Britain in Europe**

After the war, there were two major issues in Britain’s relationship with Europe. The first was the gradual Cold War polarisation of the continent. This divide was exacerbated by the Marshall Plan, by Russian intransigence over issues of territory and sovereignty, and by the increasing tension between the two global superpowers. The second, a direct corollary of this division, was the increasing pressure from within the continent, from the United States, and even from some factions within British politics, for increased cooperation, even integration, between the Western

110 Ibid.
112 Lord Packenham, Finance Bill (Second Reading), HL Debate, 18th December 1947, vol. 153, c. 408.
113 The United Kingdom and Marshall Aid (Notes for the guidance of Sir Oliver Franks prepared by the London Committee on European Economic Cooperation), 4th October 1947 [PREM 8/495].
114 ‘Second Report to ECA on Operations under the Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the USA Covering the First Calendar Quarter of 1948’, n.d. (c. 8th February 1949), [CO 537/5160], National Archives; Hugh Dalton, *HC Debate*, 11th November 1947, vol. 444, c. 42W.
European states. Both of these issues are vital to understanding British foreign policy in the immediate post-war period.

Continental Europe in 1945 was fractious and volatile. France, Belgium and the Netherlands were victors, but economically and militarily crippled; Germany, Austria and Italy were vanquished, truculent and still eyed warily by their former opponents; Russia was suspicious, resentful of the high price it had paid on the Eastern Front and eager to gain recompense. Britain was theoretically on the winning side but the price of victory was shortages of food, housing, manpower and money. The settlement at the end of the First World War had been intended to prevent such slaughter and mayhem ever occurring again on the continent; the settlement at the end of the Second World War had even more difficult conditions with which to contend. Immediately after the election results had been announced, Attlee and Bevin flew to Potsdam to continue negotiations; apart from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, the British delegation comprised the same 35 men as under Churchill.115

During the Second World War, Churchill’s Britain had played the lead role in Western Europe. After the conflict, the ex-Prime Minister continued to provide a compelling figurehead for pro-European sentiment. On 14th May 1947, the United European Movement was officially formed in a meeting that filled the Royal Albert Hall and was broadcast on the BBC; Churchill was its Chairman. The former leader called for the people of Europe to ‘come together and work together for mutual advantage… to sweep away the horrors and miseries which surround them… and allow the streams of freedom, happiness and abundance to begin again their healing flow’. The movement, which could ‘express [its] purpose in a single word – “Europe”’, was supported by ‘almost all the political parties in… British national life and nearly all the creeds and churches of the Western World’.116 This support for British participation in and leadership of an integrated European community was rarely to be repeated with the same enthusiasm within mainstream British politics. The central role played by Britain in the Second World War is often, in fact, now an emotive crutch for arguments urging the United Kingdom to remain separate from Europe; Churchill himself has erroneously become something of a figurehead for the British ‘Eurosceptic’ movement.117

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115 Harris, Attlee, p. 266.
117 See, for example, Stuart MacDonald, ‘Churchill’s family angry at UKIP hijack’, May 24th 2009, The Sunday Times.
The evolution of British reluctance to embrace European integration since 1945 has been documented elsewhere. The history of Euro-scepticism in Britain does not have a clear ideological connection to either the Left or the Right, having instead been embraced by figures across the political spectrum, with party allegiances shifting over the years. In 1939, Clement Attlee was broadly supportive of European unity, even going so far as to declare in a document entitled *Labour’s Peace Aims* that Europe ‘must federate or perish’. However, the Second World War fostered doubt in Britain about Europe’s ability to work within a framework of united government. Significantly, there were few Labour politicians included in Churchill’s supposedly non-partisan United Europe movement. The Labour Executive perceived it as an attempt to form an anti-Soviet bloc (before such things were accepted Cold War policy), possibly even an attempt to weaken the Attlee Government, and official policy had dictated that Labour members did not get involved. British politicians espoused cautiously the virtues of codification of some aspects of European cooperation, particularly defence, whilst broadly resisting any abrogation of national sovereignty to supranational governing organisations. This ambivalence towards Europe as a political entity had important consequences for Britain’s role in post-war regeneration.

**The Marshall Plan and Europe**

In his speech at Harvard in June 1947, General George Marshall stated that it would be ‘neither fitting nor efficacious’ for the American government to unilaterally develop a programme to alleviate the economic and social devastation caused by the Second World War. Instead, ‘the initiative… must come from Europe’; Washington was hoping for an integrated continental approach to the problems of reconstruction. The United States was keen for the European nations to recover after the devastation of war, from both humanitarian and self-interested motives; these motives were either economic, based on the need to create and strengthen European markets to ensure a healthy import-export relationship with the United States, or political, growing from the increasingly urgent desire to harness Western European states to the American side of the incipient Cold War.

Although European reconstruction was based on a collective approach, the programme would need a leader to continue the momentum that had been generated by Marshall’s speech. To this end,

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120 Tippens and Loth, ed. *Documents on the History of European Integration* Vol. 3 p. 669.
122 These two accepted interpretations (the Hoganesque and the Milwardian) were for years the two poles of scholarship of the Marshall Plan, between which every student and historian had to locate their work.
Dean Acheson had primed three British journalists, Leonard Miall, Malcolm Muggeridge and Stewart McCall, telling them that Marshall would be delivering a speech of great potential importance to the United Kingdom. The three men played their roles admirably, ensuring that the story was broadcast by the BBC, and published by the *Daily Express* and the *News Chronicle*, and delivering the text of the speech to Bevin at his home.123 The Foreign Secretary responded with appropriate urgency. Rallying Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, he immediately began organising the European response to this ‘lifeline to sinking men’.124

Bevin initially met with Bidault and Vyacheslav Molotov, the foreign minister of the USSR, to attempt to create an outline for a programme that could include Eastern European and Soviet countries alongside Western Europe. These talks quickly broke down, due to Russian intransigence on the issue of national sovereignty, and the programme was eventually formed including only the sixteen Western European nations. Representatives from these countries came together in the summer of 1947 at the Paris Conference, or the Conference for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), where they tried to organise European needs and desires for aid from the United States. The British delegation supported the idea of European cooperation in this arena, with Bevin expressing his enthusiasm, in a letter to the British Ambassador to the United States, at the chance to ‘treat Europe as a whole’.125 For their part, American statesmen were keen that Britain should act as the leader of a transcontinental European movement, from which it could perform the role of representative in Europe of American desires and demands.

However, in reality Britain was never sufficiently committed to the idea of European cooperation to fulfil this position. In fact, all of the delegates in Paris were focused on narrow, nationally-defined goals, which inevitably led them to view the opportunity for aid in terms of their own national requirements. Indeed, Britain had initially been keen to receive aid separately from the rest of Europe, although they had been disabused of this notion by mid-June, when Will Clayton had told a meeting in the Foreign Office that the only way to get a reconstruction bill through Congress would be to present a unified European plan; this meant that ‘a scheme could not now be envisaged dealing with Great Britain, apart from the rest of Europe’.126 Even after this had been made clear, the British delegation was still unwilling to work closely enough with the other European states to create a realistic budget for recovery. In a memorandum prepared by the London Committee to the CEEC, the British demands alone were estimated at anything between $2 and $6 billion a year, just to cover the UK deficit with the United States.127 This national

124 Ernest Bevin, quoted in Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction*, p. 75.
126 ‘Note of a Meeting on Tuesday, 24th June, 1947, in the Chancellors Room’, PREM 8/495.
approach meant that the first European proposal took the form of sixteen separate lists of demands, totalling $26-28 billion.\footnote{128} This was unacceptable to the American government. The approach taken by the European nations rendered reconstruction far too expensive and did not demonstrate sufficient willingness to cooperate within the continent. Washington found the figure 'disturbing', not least because even at this great cost, the delegation had been unable to promise a viable European economy before 1951.\footnote{129} Moreover, it contravened American guidelines, which had specifically warned that 'an itemised bill summing up prospective deficits against a background of present policies and arrangements will definitely not be sufficient'; instead, the United States wanted proof of economic cooperation.\footnote{130}

By the beginning of September, the American government had accepted that they were unable to rely on the European nations to propose an aid package that would be palatable to the United States. It was recognised in Washington that the European governments were 'operating under formidable strains, internal and external'.\footnote{131} The Paris conference was not, therefore, a perfect opportunity for the flowering of a new united Europe; it instead reflected 'all the weakness, the escapism, the paralysis of a region caught by war in the midst of serious problems of long-term adjustment, and sadly torn by hardship, confusion and outside pressure'.\footnote{132} Britain, which might have been expected to lead the organisation towards a bright new future of cooperation, was instead suffering a domestic economic situation that was 'tragic to a point that challenges description'.\footnote{133}

From September 1947, the CEEC was brought under American administration. Once the final report was completed, the future of European reconstruction, and the matter of interim aid to try to slow Europe's seemingly inexorable economic decline, was placed in the hands of the United States Congress. The European Recovery Programme (ERP) was written into law on 3 April 1948; Congress voted $5 billion to fund the first year, and created the European Cooperation Administration (ECA) to administer the ERP alongside the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which had replaced the CEEC as a permanent organisation to continue work on recovery and supervise the distribution of aid.\footnote{134}

\begin{flushright}
129 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid, p. 399.
134 For a more detailed account of this laborious process, see Hogan, \textit{The Marshall Plan}, pp. 54-87.
\end{flushright}
Britain, America, and the Balance of Power

The Marshall Plan was enacted within the context of a newly-close relationship between Britain and the United States. At the end of the First World War, America had retreated into isolationism. After the Second World War, British politicians were more confident that they could count on an American presence in international politics, but they were still unsure as to the role that America would play. British policy towards the United States in the immediate post-war period was therefore aimed, fundamentally, at securing a positive relationship between the two nations, whilst also demonstrating British power and influence on an international stage. The Foreign Office could use a strong international role either to assert independence from the United States, or to prove to the Americans that the British were worthy allies, not subordinates.

The Anglo-American relationship of the war had been ‘special’ to a large part because of the strong interpersonal connection between Churchill and Roosevelt; this meant that when later Prime Ministers and Presidents lacked rapport, the diplomatic relationship between the two countries was also strained. It was understood in Washington that there was a ‘latent fear’ of any intimate Anglo-American relationship in a ‘number of circles’ in the British political elite. Labour had a lingering mistrust of American ‘capitalism’; the Conservative party was worried about the threats that America posed to imperial preference and British economic competition. It was believed that, across ‘all shades of political opinion’, there was concern that American policy might be ‘erratic’, and that Washington might ‘drag [Britain] into other adventures’ on a whim.\textsuperscript{135}

Britain’s relationship with the United States immediately after the Second World War seemed engineered to demonstrate the imbalance of power between the two nations. In 1945, with the abrupt end to the Lend-Lease programme, the Treasury had no choice but to send a delegation to Washington to ask for a loan, in dollars, in order to import food and raw materials and to begin the reconstruction of British industry, housing and infrastructure. The delegation, led by Lord Halifax and John Maynard Keynes, had hoped for $6,000 million dollars, as a grant or interest-free loan; instead, after much negotiation, they received $3,750 million at a rate of 2 per cent interest.\textsuperscript{136}

Many British people perceived this as an overt demonstration of ascendant American power over a newly-weakened British state, and believed that Halifax and Keynes had not fought hard enough for British interests. Robert Boothby (Con, Aberdeenshire and Kincardineshire Eastern), described Keynes as ‘a siren, beckoning us to our doom from the murkier depths of Bretton Woods’, and the loan agreement as ‘selling the Empire for a packet of cigarettes’; he felt that Britain was poised at its

\textsuperscript{135} The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1948, \textit{FRUS}, 1948, vol. III, pp. 1074-6.

‘economic Munich’.\textsuperscript{137} This opinion was not confined to the Conservative Party. Norman Smith (Lab, Nottingham South), felt that Britain was being ‘treated like a defeated nation’ and would ‘inevitably’ be forced to default on the repayment of the American loan because of the harsh conditions imposed.\textsuperscript{138} In contrast, many American observers felt that the loan was flawed only in its magnanimity, being ‘an outright gift’; one Congressman proclaimed that the generous agreement would ‘promote too damned much Socialism at home and too damned much imperialism abroad’.\textsuperscript{139}

Ultimately Britain had no alternative but to accept the loan; the House of Commons voted in favour of the motion 348 to 98, with 169 abstentions.\textsuperscript{140} The sum was repaid in fifty instalments, with the final sum of $100 million being settled by Britain in December 2006.\textsuperscript{141} The loan had several conditions; Britain was expected to make sterling convertible, which it attempted in July 1947, only to abandon the project in August because the drain on its currency was costing the Treasury £247 million a week.\textsuperscript{142} Britain was also supposed to terminate all quantitative restrictions on imports by 31 December 1946, vastly reducing the economic power of the Sterling Area. However, after the convertibility crisis, the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers worked together to follow an economic policy that was as inherently protectionist as the old system of imperial preference; policies were implemented that controlled the flow of capital by rationing dollars to exclude dollar imports, increasing dollar-saving trade within the sterling area, and restricting capital transfers. Kathleen Burk has argued that Washington accepted this strategy because the sterling crisis demonstrated the frailty of the British fiscal situation; the United Kingdom could never be a useful ally to the United States if it was constrained by economic weakness.\textsuperscript{143}

Three months after the agreement of the American loan, Winston Churchill made his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri. The occasion has been remembered mainly for his evocative description of an ‘Iron Curtain’ descending from Stettin to Trieste. However, the main theme of the speech was the importance of the Anglo-American relationship. Churchill expounded on the need to move away from wartime alliances to a ‘fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples’ in Britain, the Empire-Commonwealth and the United States, proclaiming that this would bring about an ‘overwhelming assurance of security’ for the world.\textsuperscript{144} Clark M Clifford, who was Special Counsel to Harry S Truman 1945-1950, recalled in an oral history interview that Churchill’s proposal was not ‘appealing’ to the American President, saying:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Norman Smith, \textit{HC Debate}, 12 December 1945 vol. 417 cc. 470, 476.
  \item \textit{HC Debate}, 13 December 1945 vol. 417 cc. 738-9.
  \item Burk, \textit{Old World, New World}, p. 560.
  \item Burk, \textit{Old World, New World}, p. 574.
  \item Winston Churchill, speech at Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946, in John Baylis, \textit{Anglo-American Relations since 1939}, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 43-5.
\end{itemize}
There was no reason why there should be an Anglo-American commitment of some kind; the alliance had to be broader than that. England didn't have very much to bring to such a commitment; they had taken a terrible clobbering during the war. They still had some Navy, but they had serious problems. They had problems economically, politically and militarily, so that I would think that a proposal of that sort wouldn't have any particular appeal.145

Churchill had overestimated the importance of the British in the eyes of Washington officials. In the post-war period, British politicians had increasingly to come to terms with the concept of Britain as a junior partner to the United States. A report prepared in November 1947 by the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid outlined Britain’s financial problems, including the coal crisis in January, which had ‘brought British industry to a standstill’; global inflation, which had reduced the American loan value by twenty per cent; and the drain on sterling occasioned by the convertibility crisis. Britain accounted for more than a quarter of the total dollar deficit accrued by the Marshall Plan countries, with around $2.6 billion evenly divided between trade with the United States and the rest of the Americas. These financial difficulties made Britain stand out from the rest of Europe as a ‘special case’.146

**Truman and Attlee: A ‘Special Relationship’?**

In Britain, the debate around pursuing a close relationship with the United States was linked to concerns about declining British international power. In this context, the special relationship can be read in a number of different ways. It could indicate that Britain was one of the post-war Great Powers, at the centre of international policy-making, and thus a vital ally for the United States; Britain and America, bound together by language, culture and heritage, were working together to carve out a new world order, in a mutually beneficial relationship based on strength and prestige. Or it could indicate that the United Kingdom, devastated and financially ruined by the Second World War, was unable to shape international policy and forced to seek alliances among the new elite; Britain, a once-great power, found itself sadly impotent, clinging to America to maintain some semblance of past glories. In both interpretations, Britain had something to offer the United States to justify its equal or subordinate presence in the relationship. Of course, there is a third argument, which challenges the notion of the ‘special relationship’ in itself, and posits that any transatlantic connection existed solely in the deluded minds of British policy-makers, who grossly overestimated the existence of any such concerns in Washington.147

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146 European Recovery and American Aid: A Report by the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid (Parts One and Two), President’s Committee on Foreign Aid, Box 23, File: European Recovery and American Aid, Truman Library.

147 These interpretations loosely correlate to Alex Danchev’s categories of ‘evangelical’, ‘functional’ and ‘terminal’; Danchev, ‘On Friendship: Anglo-America at fin de siecle’, *passim.*
In fact, despite the imbalance in power between the two nations, the United States continued to see Britain as an important and valued partner in international affairs. The President's Committee on Foreign Aid acknowledged the importance of the British international role; Britain was ‘not just an island, but the nexus of a Commonwealth and Empire’. It was asserted that ‘a solvent Britain is a United States necessity’, but the American interest in the plight of the British was not due solely to economic factors. The two nations were also culturally close; the ‘mixing up’ of British and American ‘affairs’ had ‘proceeded at an unprecedented rate during the war and immediate post war years’, and the conduct of the British people was praised as ‘the best augury for the future’. It was therefore important to encourage a ‘joint effort’ between Britain and America, who could learn from past mistakes to ‘fulfil the promise of a military victory’.148

This positive attitude to the Anglo-American relationship was echoed in other areas of the American policy machine. In 1948, Waldemar J. Gallman, in his role as American Chargé d’Affaires in Great Britain at the beginning of his diplomatic career, described the Anglo-American relationship as ‘virtually unbreakable’, and said that the State Department had ‘every reason to be satisfied with Anglo-American solidarity’ in the context of the Marshall Plan negotiations.149 However, Gallman warned against taking this relationship ‘for granted’; he was concerned that if Marshall Aid to Britain were delayed, or delivered with ‘conditions offensive to British pride’, the gratitude felt for the United States in Britain might be endangered. There was even the risk that, if Britain did not feel secure in the ‘special relationship’, the government might seek ‘rapprochement’ with the USSR rather than continue to rely on American generosity and protection.150

Gordon Gray, in his position as Truman’s special advisor on the Agency for International Development, was called to write about the American relationship with the sterling area. Although Gray began his report with a lukewarm reference to ‘a working relationship of sorts between the US and the UK’, he admitted that this had been the case ‘for a great many years and in spite of periods of strain and stress’. The realities of fighting in alliance for two world wars had ‘converted this relationship into a partnership’ that was ‘one of the foundations of [US] foreign relations’. It was known that the British attached ‘great importance to the continuance of an especially close relationship with the US’ and sometimes tried ‘to make this relationship more overt’ than was desirable in Washington; however, the American government had ‘assured’ Britain that they recognised the importance of the ‘special relationship’.151

148 European Recovery and American Aid: A Report by the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid (Parts One and Two), President’s Committee on Foreign Aid, Box 23, File: European Recovery and American Aid, Truman Library.
150 Ibid.
However, not everybody in the American administration agreed with this assessment. When Theodore A. Wilson interviewed W. John Kenney, the ECA Chief of Mission in England 1949-50, for the Truman Library oral history collection, he asked whether he agreed with the apparently common perception on the continent that the British were reluctant Europeans because they could ‘always fall back on this ‘special relationship’ with the United States’. According to Wilson, officials interviewed in Europe had claimed that ‘the British Government was persuaded that the United States would not push too much, because of linguistic ties, and the war effort, and a bundle of reasons’. Kenney regretfully disputed this idea, despite his claim to be an ‘advocate’ of the special relationship; indeed, he had felt that Britain and America would have been ‘a lot better off’ if the two nations had mutually agreed policies which they could have dictated to ‘the rest of the world’. However, there had been ‘a very, very strong feeling in the State Department’ that Great Britain ‘was only one of the many nations in the world’, which ‘had no different position in the United States than any other’.

The Truman Library oral history project also travelled across the Atlantic to interview British officials for their memories of the Truman Presidency. Roger Makins, who served in the British Foreign Office during the Marshall Plan period and was Ambassador to the United States between 1953-56, was asked by Wilson about the perceived ‘special relationship’ and its effect on international diplomacy. Makins stated that there was ‘no doubt’ that there had ‘always been a special relationship between the United States and Great Britain’, based on ‘common language… literature… goals… origins, and… social contacts at every kind of level’. However, the United States also had a ‘special relationship’ with France, ‘dating back from Lafayette’; with Germany, ‘especially since the war’; and with Japan, ‘since the occupation’. The United States relationship with Canada was singled out as ‘very special’. In fact, the Americans had special relationships ‘with a whole lot of other countries’, just as Britain had a special relationship with its allies, ‘particularly with the countries of the Commonwealth’. Makins did concede that Anglo-American relations were very close in a ‘number of fields’ in which the two governments were collaborating, notably nuclear power and the administration of the Bizon area of Germany, and that this created a relationship ‘on which both governments could rely’. He also singled out a number of American officials, including Dean Acheson, Paul Nitze, Will Clayton, W. Averell Harriman, Thomas Finletter, Charles ‘Chip’ Bohlen and Paul Hoffman, praising them as ‘an exceptionally able and intelligent group of men’ and a ‘remarkable group of people’.

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153 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
Frank Figgures, the British Director of Trade and Finance for the OEEC from 1948 to 1951, was also interviewed about Anglo-American relations under the Truman presidency. Figgures was clear that there was not a ‘special relationship’ between the two nations, notwithstanding any British beliefs to the contrary:

There is a consciousness in this country that there was a special relationship with the United States. One may move around in Washington and hear people say, ‘What is it? I’ve never heard of it’.156

However, he accepted that this varied by government department, and that in the fields of military and intelligence relations, the two countries worked extremely closely. In contrast to many of the other observers at the time, Figgures also dismissed the idea, popular among other commentators, that there existed close personal connections between the two countries, saying that the relationship between British and American officials was not ‘very much more tight than between other people’; in fact, he claimed that ‘the closest emotional relationships were between the Americans and the French, who had got very, very close relationships’.157

In August 1948, Lewis Douglas, the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, wrote to the State Department that he had ‘begun to sense an undercurrent of feeling… against the US both in and out of government’, which had initially manifested itself in ‘irritation and testiness’, but had recently ‘taken on a much more serious form’, bordering on ‘pathological’. Douglas believed that the British people accepted the need for American leadership on a global stage, but were suffering from ‘anxiety neurosis’ because they had never previously experienced their ‘national security and economic fate’ being so ‘completely dependent on and at the mercy of another country’s decisions’. British ‘weakness’ was ‘a bitter pill’ for a nation that was used to enjoying ‘full control of [its] national destiny’. This attitude was especially prevalent because the British were confident that they would ‘again become a power to be reckoned with’, and that the United States needed Britain almost as much as Britain needed the United States; ‘in all the world’ there was ‘no more stable, predictable or reliable ally than [the] British Commonwealth and Empire led by [the] UK’. People in the United Kingdom therefore regarded any policy that insisted on ‘treating [the] UK on [the] same basis as other Western European powers’ as ‘short-sighted and ill-considered’. In fact, as Douglas identified, although there was some anti-Americanism in British society at this point, it was predicated on the belief that the ‘special relationship’ was not being recognised as special enough, rather than any desire to break ties with the United States. Despite their occasional ‘neurotic and

157 Ibid.
super-sensitive feeling’, Douglas believed that the British appreciated ‘the imperative need for the closest US-UK relationship’ and ‘on the whole’ were ‘anxious to accommodate their views’ to those of the Americans.\(^\text{158}\)

The concept of the ‘special relationship’, then, is perhaps of only limited use when analysing the relations between Truman’s America and Attlee’s Britain. It is at least clear that the balance of power within the relationship was not rigid; there can be no meaningful dichotomy drawn between the eager British and the aloof Americans, in contrast to the widespread popular belief towards the end of the twentieth century that the power in the relationship lay overwhelmingly with the United States.\(^\text{159}\)

Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador to Washington during the Marshall Plan period, spoke at the end of his career about the ‘three circles of… destiny’ that represented British foreign policy, as drawn out for him by Churchill: they represented the ‘American dimension, the Commonwealth dimension and the European dimension’, which together formed ‘the foundation of Britain’s power and influence in the world’. Franks described this attitude, which persisted throughout the Attlee government and into Churchill’s second premiership, as fundamental to British foreign policy in the period. Although the ‘nineteenth century had gone’, Britain needed to maintain all three circles in order to ‘recover and continue as a Great power and go on being entitled to a seat at the top table’; the difference in the post-war period was that Britain would have to operate in the context of the ‘age of superpowers’. Franks conceded that the British government could ‘no longer decide its foreign policy alone’ but ‘only in association with… the United States’, and so although Europe and the Commonwealth were crucial to British foreign relations, the American circle was ‘most important of all’.\(^\text{160}\)

United States officials were aware that Britain was operating in a number of spheres, and that there was the danger of ‘apparent or real conflict’ between the British identities as ‘a leading European power’, the ‘principal member of the Commonwealth’ and as ‘an intimate partner of the US’. As Gordon Gray made clear, America required Britain to play a ‘variety of roles in the world scene’, including

(a) a leader (with France) in the movement toward closer European unity, (b) the cement which holds the Commonwealth together, (c) our principal partner in strategic planning, (d) a major force in ensuring political and economic stability in the Near and Middle East, (e) a collaborator in the resistance to Communist expansion in the Far East, (f) a willing


\(^{159}\) See, for example, ‘Britain: The Ties that Bind: Britain and America’, \textit{The Economist}, 26 July 2008.

\(^{160}\) Oliver Franks, \textit{Anglo-American Relations and the ‘Special Relationship’, 1947-1952}, Faculty Seminar on British Studies, (Harry Ransom Humanities Research Centre: University of Texas at Austin, 1990), p. 12.
collaborator in promoting the developing of an expanding multilateral world trade, (g) a leader in furthering the development and emergence of dependent areas and (h) a principal supporter of the UN.\textsuperscript{161}

Gray emphasised that this was no easy task. There were a number of ‘internal inconsistencies’ between the different roles that Britain was expected to play, and whilst they might have corresponded to ‘the capabilities of the British Empire… when [it] was a major world power’, in the current climate they would ‘tax the capacities of any country’. Gray understood that Britain was unable to fulfil all of these roles ‘without the closest support and collaboration of the US’; in fact, ‘the UK could not survive if it played a role of total independence from and antagonism to the US’. Gray believed that not everybody in Britain recognised this reality; in fact, ‘certain extremists in the UK’ appeared to believe that ‘one or another of these roles should be put into first place with the others subordinated or even abandoned’.\textsuperscript{162} Gray may have been referring here to the unwillingness among parts of the British elite to embrace European unity, or the desire among many to sustain Britain as a major colonial power, but he must also have been aware that the ‘special relationship’ was a potential casualty of British domestic politics.

**The Left and the Right – Socialism and Anglo-American Relations**

Far from celebrating the ‘specialness’ of transatlantic relations, the post-war Labour Party was divided over the desirability of maintaining a connection with Washington at all. Anti-Americanism was not confined to the British Left; many Conservative MPs were suspicious of the Americans, both because of their ‘New Deal’ economics in the 1930s and because of their historic anti-imperialism.\textsuperscript{163} However, for many within the Labour Party, general mistrust of the United States was combined with a deep ambivalence towards the Cold War divisions that were at the heart of international relations in the period. Many Labour MPs had been reluctant to abandon the notion of a close relationship between Great Britain and the USSR based on a shared understanding of political economy. At the Labour Party conference at Blackpool in 1945, Bevin had used the phrase ‘Left understands Left’ to emphasise his sympathies with the socialist trend in French politics; in the following months this was frequently misquoted to refer to a possible agreement with the Soviet Union, built on supposedly-shared socialist values.\textsuperscript{164}

A small group of hard-line left-wing MPs, including Konni Zilliacus (Lab, Gateshead), John Platts-Mills (Lab, Finsbury) and William Warbey (Lab, Luton), maintained that Britain should pursue relationship with the USSR based on common socialist policies. A second group, including Richard


\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.


Crossman (Lab, Coventry East), Tom Driberg (Lab, Malden), Ian Mikardo (Lab, Reading) and Michael Foot (Lab, Plymouth Davenport), wanted Britain to take a more neutral position between the two superpowers. This latter group was instrumental in the production of the ‘Keep Left’ pamphlet in 1947, which advocated the formation of a European bloc, headed by Britain, which would be a ‘third force’ of democratic socialism against the backdrop of ideological cold warfare, a ‘genuine middle way between the extreme alternatives of American “free enterprise” economics and Russian socio-political life’.

Within the context of early Cold War tensions, many MPs were anxious about the breakdown of relations between the once-Allied powers and the possible consequences of pursuing a partnership with the United States to the detriment of other relationships. In a speech to the House of Commons in early 1946, Seymour Cocks (Lab, Broxtowe) argued that ‘friendship’ between Russia, America and Britain was a prerequisite for a ‘peaceful constructive settlement in Europe and Asia’, but that Britain’s affiliation with the United States was leading to ‘rumours of an inevitable war’ with the Soviet Union. Many Labour MPs also believed that American policy, with its focus on capitalist growth, was fundamentally incompatible with the Labour Party ethos. Later in 1946, Richard Crossman produced an amendment to the King’s Speech which criticised Bevin’s foreign policy for its ‘pro-American’ bias; 154 Labour MPs defied a three-line whip to vote in favour of the amendment.

Given these conditions, it is not surprising that policy-makers in the United States were concerned that the Labour government in Westminster might be politically closer to Moscow than to Washington. Many Americans suspected that Labour would fall before it could implement its most treasured principles; it was not clear that the Attlee government would make the necessary ideological compromises, if left to its own devices, to make a vital contribution to European post-war recovery. The huge spending involved in the creation of the British welfare state at a time of economic crisis and uncertainty perplexed and infuriated American politicians and businessmen alike. Lewis Douglas wrote to Averell Harriman (the US representative in Europe under the ECA) in May 1948 to express concern that high cost of social services in Britain might have an impact upon economic recovery. Douglas wrote that the British were ‘extraordinarily sensitive’ about any suggestion, however euphemistic, that the ‘burden’ of the welfare state be ‘reduced’, and expressed

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165 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 63.
exasperation at the way in which the population had come to accept all provisions in their ‘full extravagant measure as a matter of right’.170

In the summer of 1948, Douglas again wrote to the State Department about the political situation in Britain. He believed the Attlee government ‘could have done a great deal more to improve their economic position’, and had ‘contributed to their economic difficulties’ by pursuing socialist policies; this also meant that the Cabinet had ‘contributed to their own exhaustion by the heavy legislative programme’. Douglas argued, however, that considering the position that the Labour Party was in at the end of the war, in the context of ‘promises… made over the span of a third of a century’ and compared to other European countries, the United Kingdom had ‘done a reasonably respectable job’. Douglas also stressed that in many areas of political thinking, including foreign policy, the Labour Party and Conservative Party beliefs were ‘remarkably alike’; the Attlee government was not pursuing a fanatical socialist strategy in its international diplomacy.171

Other American observers had somewhat different perceptions of British politics. In the late 1940s, John A. Bierwirth, President of the National Distillers and Chemical Corporation, undertook a series of foreign trips, surveying the nations that he visited and reporting his findings to President Truman. In one such document, he singled Britain out from continental Europe, not because of the ‘specialness’ of their relationship, but because the British balance of payments problem was much larger than that of any other European country. He believed that this was due to the ‘militantly socialist’ tendencies of the British government, which had ‘undoubtedly accentuated her problems’, although he was willing to concede that Britain would still have struggled, although to a lesser extent, under less left-wing leadership. However, Bierwirth was keen to praise the British people and their characteristic ‘fine spirit of sacrifice’ that had enabled much of the economic recovery to date.172

In his account of his travels, Bierwirth also passed judgement on a number of other European states. France had displayed unfortunate ‘socialistic tendencies’, although these appeared to Bierwirth to be waning by 1949. Spain gave ‘a distinct impression of being outside of the main current of western European thought and development’, unsurprisingly for a nation ostracised on the continent for its fascist government. Austria was performing ‘rather well’, especially ‘considering the handicap of being occupied by four armies’; in contrast, the German population had ‘not changed essentially’ since Nazism and still posed a security risk. The nation most honoured in Bierwirth’s account was not Britain, but the Netherlands, which was populated by ‘a fine type of people… [who were] extremely industrious’. Overall, Bierwirth felt that the United

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170 Lewis Douglas to Averell Harriman, 11 May 1948, Dean G Acheson Papers, Box 64, File: Douglas, Ambassador Lewis W, Truman Library.


States was met with ‘high regard’ across Europe; he believed that American leadership, characterised by ‘a sincere belief in free enterprise and reward for individual effort’, was a necessary panacea for ‘slowing or even reversing the socialistic trends’ that he had identified across the continent.173

Perceptions and realities of American anti-socialism in this period are critical to understanding the ‘special relationship’. Anti-Soviet feeling in the United States, which had reached a high point with the arrest of 3,000 suspected communists in the ‘Red Scare’ of 1919-20, had temporarily abated during the wartime alliance, despite tensions between the USA and the USSR over issues like Lend Lease and the Eastern Front.174 However, anti-communist feeling remained prevalent in American society; from 1940 it was illegal even to advocate communism as a political system. The national hysteria provoked by the uncovering of two possible spy rings in 1945 and 1946 had led to the memorable Republican campaign in the 1946 congressional elections: ‘Got enough inflation?... Got enough strikes?... Got enough communism?’.175 As the Cold War began to escalate, amid an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, Americans became obsessed with the spectre of reds under their beds.

Anti-communism in this period was heightened by the anti-Soviet policies followed by the Truman administration, a partisan campaign by opportunist Republicans, and a grassroots movement fuelled by wide-ranging anxieties and resentments.176 Popular opinion in the United States in this period was fundamentally distrustful of any political movement that could be linked to communism and this often extended to the American perception of Great Britain. Polls conducted by the State Department found that, of the eight out of ten college-educated Americans who knew which political party governed Britain, a majority disapproved. Later surveys discovered widespread popular criticism of the British Labour government’s ‘unwise socialist policies’.177

This negative perception of Britain highlights the inability or disinclination of some Americans to draw distinctions between British socialism and Russian communism.178 In fact, the Labour Party had voted against affiliation with the Communist Party in 1945, but British officials in America frequently encountered suspicion that the two organisations were connected.179 William P. N. Edwards was the Director of Information at the British Information Services in Washington,

173 Ibid.
175 Ibid., p. 98.
179 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 276.
charged with creating positive feeling about Britain in the United States. He believed that the relationship between the governments of the two countries was ‘intimate’, despite problems over specific issues such as the Palestine mandate. However, his work often led him to meetings with American businessmen, ‘Republicans, almost… without exception’, who were unwilling ‘to distinguish between socialism and communism’ and so ‘didn’t like the Labour Government’. Frank Figgures felt that for the Americans, socialism ‘implied being soft on communism’, although it was understood that they were separate concepts. In fact, in his interactions with American officials, he felt that socialism was seen as an ‘odd manifestation’ of political economy that was ‘permissible’ within the context of the Cold War. American ideology was ‘basically anti-Communist’ but there needed to be a ‘black and white method of talking about what was a power struggle’ because those were the terms in which the American people liked to think.

A related issue was the American concern that the Labour government might use Marshall Aid in a ‘socialist’ manner. Attlee might spend American funds on projects such as nationalising key industries, or might even use the money to promote the cause of international socialism. In parallel to this, much of the discussion in Britain about whether to accept Marshall aid arose from the concern that the United States could interfere in the British economy to prevent the full realisation of the Labour Party’s plan for the nation. Frank Fairhurst (Lab, Oldham) wanted reassurance that the American government would not be able to ‘retard, restrain or prevent’ the Attlee government from pursuing policies such as the nationalisation of the steel industry. Conversely, Sir Waldron Smithers (Con, Orpington), who was anti-socialist to the point of regularly lobbying for a British version of the House Un-American Activities Committee, claimed in Parliament that the continuation of the ‘suicidal policy of nationalised industries’ would lead to a ‘considerable reduction in, or stoppage of, Marshall Aid’. These fears were proven to be unfounded. John Kenney recalled that some Marshall officials ‘weren’t happy about the nationalization of, say, the steel industry, or the nationalisation of the coal’, and American officials sometimes visited to ‘make fervent speeches about the British health program’, but overall they accepted the various measures because they ‘all recognized that England was in one hell of a mess and something had to be done’.

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Although the officials directly involved were fairly relaxed about the issue, there was more general American concern about the possibility of Marshall aid being used for socialist programmes. The Office of Public Affairs conducted research into American public opinion and produced a digest for the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid. In 1947, there was an ‘increasing – but still small’ number of people who were concerned that the American attempts to aid European reconstruction might amount to the ‘financing of ‘socialism’ (although this was countered by an equally small number of ‘liberal' commentators who felt that in trying to ‘stop socialism’ the US was wrongly ‘interfering in the internal policies of other nations’). Overall, there was ‘considerable dissatisfaction with Britain’s inability to get ahead with production under its Socialist Government’, and businessmen were concerned that nationalising industries would lead to reduced production. However, there was ‘little discussion’ of the issue of ‘financing socialism’ and ‘only a slight concern’ that in aiding Europe, the USA would be encouraging socialism to flourish.

Although the United States was unable to, or uninterested in trying to, manipulate British socialist policies, it was also quick to identify when these policies were inadequate and promote alternative action. In 1949, Washington forced Britain to accept the devaluation of sterling; if socialist policies meant that the British economy was not flexible enough to be competitive in an international market, the United States would not underwrite them. This reasoning was also common among the American public, who were generally found to be ‘reluctant to subsidize socialism’ where they felt it had ‘retarded recovery’.

The potentially disruptive influence of British unions was also an American concern. In the United States there had been a great deal of concern about communist infiltration of labour unions in the 1930s and 1940s, resulting in a purge of communist and socialist activists from the Congress of Industrial Organisations in 1949-50. However, British trade unions had actually been overwhelmingly anti-communist since Bevin’s tenure as General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). William P. N. Edwards, at the British Information Services at Washington, was often frustrated by the American refusal to grasp that ‘the most ardent anti-Communists in Britain were the trade unionists, whatever the issue’; trade union leaders were...

‘much more afraid of communism than the average industrialist’ because they had first hand experience of dealing with agitators in their midst. Unfortunately, he ‘couldn’t get this across very well’ to his American contacts.192

However, there was some American acknowledgement of the positive contribution of the British trade unions to the post-war settlement. Paul Hoffman (the Administrator of the ECA) issued a statement in 1949, in which he said that nothing had given the Americans ‘more gratification’ than the support they had received from ‘democratic unions’ across Europe, which were ‘at the forefront of those fighting for European recovery’.193 As Rhiannon Vickers has shown, the international trade union movement was actually deeply divided over Marshall aid, with many refusing to support the programme. However, because of its deep-rooted anti-communism, the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) was instrumental in establishing the European Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory Committee (ERPTUAC), which supported a ‘massive pro-Marshall Plan propaganda programme’.194

The Attlee government was clearly aware of American concerns about British socialism, despite claims by some writers that ‘socialism did not arise as an issue in intergovernmental relations’.195 Diane Kirby highlights how the British government, particularly the Foreign Office, attempted to reassure the United States by emphasising the distinction between Soviet communism and British socialism; she demonstrates how religious rhetoric, and the avowal of Christian belief, was used as a marker to distinguish Attlee’s government from the godless Soviet Union and to promote the acceptance of a common transatlantic ideological identity.196 Caroline Anstey’s insightful article demonstrates that the Foreign Office was aware of the American perception of British socialism, and sought to diminish the issue as much as possible in their dealings with Washington. Ultimately, however, the American government had too great an interest in Britain’s position as a solvent global ally to discriminate against Attlee’s government on political grounds; although officials were often ‘highly critical’ of Labour’s economic programmes, Washington worked hard in public to support Britain’s position.197

It is also important to recognise that any anti-socialist criticism of the Labour government was generally directed at its political ideology, rather than the individuals in power. Edwards remembered that his businessman contacts admired individuals such as ‘Ernie’ Bevin, who was ‘a

194 Vickers, Manipulating Hegemony, pp.51, 92-104.
great man judged by any standards’, whilst Figgures made it clear that, whilst Bevin was a socialist, he was also ‘a totally acceptable chap’ to the Americans.\footnote{Figgures, Oral History conducted by Theodore A. Wilson, London, England, 14 August 1970, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/figgures.htm.} The incongruity of the close relationships built across political divisions in this period was the subject of reflection at the time. At a dinner for the Pilgrim Society in the summer of 1949, Stafford Cripps spoke warmly of his American contacts in the Marshall Plan organisation. About his relationship with Paul Hoffman, he acknowledged that it is indeed remarkable that a great motor-car magnate of America should be able to get on with and tolerate a Socialist Chancellor of the Exchequer and it is a peculiar tribute to his tolerance and understanding.\footnote{Stafford Cripps, Speech at Pilgrims Dinner, 16 June 1949, Thomas K Finletter Papers Box 15, January-August 1958, File: Personal Memoranda File 8/44-11/49, Truman Library.}

He described Averell Harriman as a ‘valued friend’ to Britain, whilst Tom Finletter (Chief of the ECA Mission to the UK) had ‘won his way right deep into the hearts of everyone’, as had his ‘charming wife’; Cripps joked that he had become ‘almost anxious’ about the ‘Tom Finletter cult in the Treasury’.\footnote{Cripps to Tom Finletter, 10 March 1949, Thomas K Finletter Papers Box 15, January-August 1958, File: Personal Memoranda File 8/44-11/49, Truman Library.} This was not just a public front; in a private letter to Finletter, Cripps described him as a ‘real and understanding friend’.\footnote{Ibid.} Finletter himself acknowledged that ideological differences had meant that the Anglo-American relationship, particularly in relation to the Marshall Plan, had sometimes been ‘especially difficult’. However, he praised the ‘increasing solidarity’ between officials of the two countries, paying particular tribute to Stafford Cripps, for whom he and the other Marshall Plan bureaucrats had ‘the highest regard’; when reporting to Congress on the use of Marshall aid in Britain, Finletter felt he was ‘in the agreeable position of being able to boast of… friends’.\footnote{States Information Service, ‘Text of Finletter Address At Pilgrim Society Dinner’, June 15, 1949, Thomas K Finletter Papers Box 15, January-August 1958, File: Personal Memoranda File 8/44-11/49, Truman Library.}

Eventually, too, the rank and file of the Labour Party began to warm to the Truman administration. The announcement of the Marshall Plan was perceived as a positive act of American foreign policy, with only the very far left decrying it as an anti-communist weapon.\footnote{Leon D Epstein, ‘The British Labour Left and US Foreign Policy’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec. 1951), p. 986.} In America, officials in the State Department were hopeful that their ‘recognition’ that British socialism was based in the ‘same human and democratic principles’ as those underpinning American ideology had reassured the Labour Party that their intentions were benevolent. It was believed that ‘large sections of [the
British labour movement’ had changed their attitude ‘from one of suspicion of [the] US to one of open friendliness’.204

In 1949, Paul Zimmer, who worked in the British Commonwealth Bureau in the State Department Office of Research and Intelligence, wrote to a colleague to report a speech by a young Dennis Healey, then Secretary of the International Department of the Labour Party. Healey described the Third Force as the idea that ‘Socialism being between Communism and Capitalism… could mediate between them’, an idea that had been supported by Britain’s geographic location between the United States and the Soviet Union, which, it was believed, ‘made it a natural bridge for mediation’. Healey had dismissed this argument as ‘based on a fallacious logic that things ‘in between’ were called on to mediate’, rather than being a bridge which would be ‘walked over in peace time and blown up in war’. This realisation, in the context of European politics, meant that Britain had ‘turned away from any ideas of leading Europe’ and was rather ‘seeking a partnership with the US to put the world in order and combat communism’. Zimmer found this expression of Britain’s shift from Europe to the United States to be a ‘jolting surprise’ that ‘gave [him] the jitters’ and brought home exactly how ‘ruthless’ power politics could be.205

Labour’s shift towards the United States was not only based on realist assessments of international relations, but also on a changing understanding of political ideology. The re-election of President Truman in 1948 had convinced many in the British left that the United States was becoming more progressive – even, perhaps, more socialistic. Margaret Cole, the prominent Fabian, wrote in 1949 that America, far from being a ‘stronghold of unrestricted laissez-faire capitalism’ had ‘swung definitely and unmistakeably leftwards’.206 In 1950, many of the MPs involved in the publication of the original pamphlet produced a sequel, optimistically entitled ‘Keeping Left’, which largely abandoned the anti-American ideals of the Keep Left movement.207 Even in foreign policy, the Labour left was sometimes willing to throw its weight behind the United States; in a speech in a House of Commons defence debate in 1950, Richard Crossman praised ‘President Truman and Mr. Acheson and the Fair Dealers’ and credited ‘collaboration’ between the ‘loyal Labour Government’ and ‘an American Administration which shares the same ideals’ with ‘saving peace’ in the Far East.208 The Korean War, the Republican gains in the 1950 Congressional elections, and the rising profile of Senator Joseph McCarthy (Rep, WI), would eventually lead to a resurgence in anti-Americanism in the British left. However, the Attlee government was willing to work in close

204 The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1948, FRUS 1948 vol. III, p. 1074.
205 Paul Zimmer to Joe Sweeney, 30 September 1949, Joseph D Sweeney Papers, Box 1, File: Britain and Western Europe, Articles and Press Clippings, 1940-78, Truman Library.
cooperation with the Truman administration, and this policy was supported by much of the Labour Party.

**Britain’s African Empire**

To understand the foreign and colonial policy of the Attlee government, it is also important to examine the political context of the African territories. Although the post-war period is truncated in popular memory as a period of rapid retreat from empire, in 1945, across the whole continent of Africa, only four countries were even nominally independent from European rule: Egypt, Liberia, South Africa, and Ethiopia.\(^{209}\) However, it is true that, during and after the Second World War, there was a growing movement across the continent to question the legitimacy of imperial rule.\(^{210}\)

This increase in nationalist sentiment was influenced by a variety of factors, not least the successful campaign in the Indian subcontinent which led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent and the creation of India and Pakistan in 1947; Burma and Ceylon (renamed Sri Lanka in 1971) followed in 1948. A Colonial Office committee in 1947 warned of the ‘almost irresistible force’ which had been unleashed by Indian independence, and predicted that ‘within a generation’, many countries in the Empire would be ‘within sight of… full responsibility for local affairs’.\(^{211}\) What was no doubt considered somewhat overdramatic at the time of Indian independence looks rather understated with historical hindsight. As Louis and Robinson highlighted, the Colonial Office in the 1930s believed that the African territories would remain within the empire until the twenty-first century; by the 1950s, they were predicting independence in the 1970s.\(^{212}\) In reality, Sudan, Ghana and Nigeria were independent states by 1960, when Harold Macmillan proclaimed a ‘wind of change’ across the continent, to the distaste of the white inhabitants of Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

Given the chronological proximity of colonial development and decolonisation in Africa, it is tempting to consider these processes as related. Either the British government was attempting to placate indigenous nationalist movements by improving standards of living, or it was resigned to the inevitability of mass decolonisation and was therefore attempting to produce political, economic and social structures within the African societies that could be co-opted by newly-independent states. The development of African nationalist movements provided a recurring

\(^{209}\) Ethiopia had gained independence from Italy in 1941. Of the remaining three, Egypt was under *de facto* British rule, and South Africa was a dominion of the British Empire until 1961 and was in any case administrated by a brutal regime of white minority rule. Liberia was a unique example of an African colony, which was established by African-American settlers who wished to return to their ancestral continent after the experience of slavery; the territory was ruled by Americo-Liberians until the 1980 coup d’état; for more information about Liberia’s relationship with the United States, see Chapter Four.


undercurrent to British colonial development plans. Frederick Cooper has written about the transition by French and British metropolitan governments towards a ‘development-minded colonialism’, which was used to increase the efficiency of colonial economic extraction whilst simultaneously legitimating European rule.\(^{213}\) However, the ‘second colonial occupation’ cannot be explained through a simple narrative of increased European control over the colonial economies. The heightened levels of metropole-peripheral interaction after the Second World War and the more complete British intrusion into colonial life also increased the potential for antagonism of African populations.\(^{214}\)

As in the Indian subcontinent, the experience of global conflict was a key factor in intensifying African criticism of and resistance to colonialism. In Africa, the Second World War ‘started earlier and lasted longer’ than the European experience of conflict.\(^{215}\) The Colonial Office recorded that 374,000 Africa soldiers were mobilised for the Allies, with around 7,000 fatalities; David Killingray has estimated that over half a million African soldiers served in frontline and non-combatant roles.\(^{216}\) Warfare spilled across the continent, encroaching directly on British territories, with fighting in East Africa against Italian forces and in West Africa against Vichy France, and involving British empire and commonwealth armies in bloody battles against the German Afrika Corps and the Italian armies in North Africa. Against a backdrop of military campaigns, there was also an ongoing tension between African workers and their British employers and rulers. General strikes had begun in 1935 and continued once the war was over; between 1939 and 1945 there was some rioting, for example in the Gold Coast in Konongo in 1942 and Kumawu in 1943, mainly as a response to conscription and military conditions, although generally, as in the metropole, military requirements subsumed labour agitation.\(^{217}\)

### 1948: African Nationalism

1948 was a watershed year for African nationalism. The riots and strikes that had been subdued during the war were newly invigorated in the post-war era; returning soldiers were greeted with food and consumer goods shortages, high rates of inflation and a lack of available jobs, reigniting pre-war issues.\(^{218}\) The protests, strikes and riots, across Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, were stimulated to a large extent by the international economic crisis, in the context of a colonial system that shackled African producers to depressed markets and low prices for raw materials. This causation was dismissed by many within the British Government, who preferred to believe that rather than a ‘spontaneous outburst of public opinion’ against post-war economic

\(^{213}\) Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, p.39.
\(^{215}\) Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, p. 35.
\(^{218}\) Killingray, ‘Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast During the Second World War’, p. 95.
problems, the riots had been ‘actively fomented by persons with ulterior motives’. In fact, the protests, in addressing issues like labour rights and racial discrimination, were fundamentally political; in the Gold Coast, for example, the post-war agitation was central to the formalisation of the nationalist movement and the rise of Kwame Nkrumah, leader of the Convention People’s Party and the first Prime Minister of independent Ghana.

In the post-war period, after the contribution which had been made by African territories to the British war effort, there had been an attempt to placate West Africa by drawing up new constitutions that incorporated a limited amount of black African political participation. For example, in Nigeria, the Richards Constitution created an appointed legislature, which widened the governance of the colony beyond the Governor and his council; the colony was split into three regions, East, West and North, which were each granted an administrative service and a House of Assembly that would discuss regional budgets and legislation. Bernard Bourdillon, who had been Governor of Nigeria from 1935 until ill-health forced him to retire in May 1943, wrote of his relief that the constitution had not been marred by the ‘bickering and haggling’ that usually accompanied any process of political restructuring in the colonies. He credited this to the fact that the government of Nigeria had acted on the ‘intelligent anticipation of agitation’, and had promoted constitutional reform whilst the demand for change was ‘neither widespread nor intelligent’, being limited (as he saw it) to calls for ‘More jobs for Africans’. Bourdillon was concerned that the Nigerian public had not ‘been given every chance to say what they thought’ about the constitution, as there had been no public consultation; nevertheless, he saw the reform as a ‘very promising solution’ to the political situation in Nigeria, against a background of ‘social, economic and racial troubles’.

The Richards Constitution paved the way for more extensive reforms in 1951, which allowed the election of representatives by each Intermediate Area Council to the Advisory Council and created elected District Courts. There was some concern among black Nigerians that these reforms would lead to domination by the Igbo in the Eastern legislature, leading to the creation of Western and Northern political parties around Hausa and Yoruba ethnic identities; once independence was granted, Nigerian politics were marred by corruption and ethnic clientelism, leading to a series of coups and the Nigerian-Biafran War of 1967-70. However, the Nigerian administration’s commitment to ‘gradual, controlled change’ contributed much to a peaceful, if conservatively slow-paced, transition towards indigenous rule.

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219 See, for example, Lord Rennell, HL Debate, 24 July 1952, vol. 178, c. 248.
223 Iliffe, Africans, pp. 235, 258.
It might have been expected that Gold Coast would follow a similarly slow and steady process of gradual power transfer. In 1946 a new constitution had drawn the Ashanti into the government of the territory for the first time, giving the African population ‘a new and unofficial majority’, and temporarily quelling nationalist discontent. However, less than a year later, influential chiefs and businessmen had organised a successful boycott against expensive imported products as a protest against high inflation. By 1948 there had evolved a serious nationalist movement, pushing for self-government as a new Ghanaian state, to be named after a powerful Sudanese kingdom with ethnic ties to the area. There followed a series of political riots, not just in Accra and other urban centres, but also across rural areas; the farmers in Gold Coast had long suffered from colonial policies, particularly the forced removal of cocoa trees infected with cacao swollen shoot virus (CSSV), which had caused severe economic hardship and motivated rural communities to support nationalist demands.

The rising tensions in the colony led many British politicians to question how long it would be feasible to maintain control over the Gold Coast. Arthur Creech Jones spoke in the House of Commons in September 1948, emphasising the ‘surprise’ felt by the Colonial Office at recent developments; colonial officials had hoped the new constitution would allow a ‘period of continuing progress and development’, in which the people of Africa could begin to ‘play a more direct part’ in their own government. In the face of hostile questioning, Creech Jones emphatically stated that Government policy was ‘not designed in any way to suppress nationalist movements or trade unionism’, although clearly not all quarters of British government were firmly committed to immediate West African independence. The Watson Report into the Gold Coast riots exhorted that ‘the Constitution and Government… must be so reshaped as to give every African of ability an opportunity to govern the country’; in response to these recommendations, the Coussey Committee on Constitutional Reform created a new constitution, and in the February 1951 elections Kwame Nkrumah’s CPP won an overwhelming majority of 34 out of 38 possible seats.

However, the narrative of Ghanaian independence is not a simple tale of riots leading to reform and independence. The CPP were unhappy with the pace of change after the Watson Report, and

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229 Ibid.
made a series of demands, including universal franchise and self-government under the Statute of Westminster. Upon the rejection of these proposals, the CPP began a non-violent campaign for immediate self-government, which was harshly repressed by the British administration, leading to the imprisonment of CPP leaders, including Nkrumah, who was still serving his jail sentence when his party achieved its landslide victory. Charles Arden Clarke, who was appointed Governor of Gold Coast two months before the publication of the Coussey Report, dismissed the ‘positive action’ campaign as ‘illegal strikes for political ends, the subversion of lawful authority and the creation of chaos’ and praised the actions of the police in quelling the riots with ‘plenty of ‘bloody cox-combs’, but no bodies’. Although Arden Clarke eventually worked closely with Nkrumah to create a new Ghana, it was almost a decade from the riots until formal independence.

The British post-war approach to West Africa had been based around constitutional reform which slowly drew black Africans into the political process; this was not possible in East and Southern Africa because of the presence of large, vocal white populations. Just as urbanisation was a catalyst for increased black consciousness, white nationalism was often built on fears about rising black populations in cities and the decline of the rural African colonial state. This antipathy towards black urbanisation was problematic for the British, who were hoping to spearhead colonial development through the increased industrialisation of African economies.

This tension over economic development and urbanisation frequently manifested itself in the attempts of white nationalist movements to control and maintain their privileged status. In the 1948 South African elections, D. F. Malan’s National Party defeated Jan Smut’s United Party with a majority of only five seats. This narrow victory marked the beginning of the formal codification of apartheid policies, which segregated the South African population along strictly delineated racial boundaries and promoted the interests of the white population.

The intensification of white nationalism in post-war South Africa was troubling to many figures within the British Government. Tom Driberg (Lab, Maldon), the maverick MP and journalist, made an impassioned speech in the House of Commons in which he decried apartheid as ‘contrary, not only to Christianity but to everything that anybody can possibly mean by that much over-used word “democracy”’. He was supported in this sentiment by Reginald Sorenson (Lab, Leyton West), a

233 For a more detailed explanation of South African politics, with particular focus on the relationship with Britain, see R. Hyam and P Henshaw, *The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa Since the Boer War*. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
234 Tom Driberg, Baron Bradwell, joined the Labour Party in 1945 after his election to Parliament as an Independent after many years as a member of the British Communist Party. He was an openly gay man at a time when this was punishable by imprisonment (his Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry describes him as having ‘a consuming passion for felling handsome, lean, intelligent working-class toughs’); he was also possibly acting as an agent for MI5, or the KGB,
Unitarian minister, who called for Britain to ‘stand quite firm’ at the United Nations ‘as believers in the equal rights of coloured men with the white peoples’ and to push upon the Commonwealth the recognition of ‘common rights’ for all. The anti-apartheid movement in Britain did not become organised and active until the 1950s, although British activists such as Michael Scott were committed to ending racial segregation and persecution in South Africa from the 1940s; Scott was lauded in the British liberal press, with the Observer likening him to David Livingstone, for his actions at the UN which led to South Africa being internationally vilified.

Despite domestic and international criticism of apartheid, British officials were anxious to maintain positive relations with the Malan government wherever possible. They attempted to avoid pressure to pronounce against apartheid by stressing the relative autonomy of South Africa as a Dominion within the empire; in 1951, on a visit to Cape Town, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker said that it would be as inappropriate for a British government official to pronounce on the ‘internal political controversies of the Union’, as it would be for a South African politician to comment on Labour’s plans to nationalise the iron and steel industries. This attitude was criticised at the time; Hugh Champion de Crespigny, a senior RAF officer who later stood as a Labour Party candidate, accused Gordon Walker of deliberately ‘clos[ing] his eyes…[and] neglect[ing] the welfare of 10 million Africans under the British Crown’ in a policy which represented ‘the betrayal of all the ideas our Labour movement has stood for ever since its inception’. The elections in South Africa which heralded the beginning of apartheid were less than two months before the arrival of the Empire Windrush at Essex’s Tilbury Docks; the minority, but increasing, black British population applied mounting pressure on Whitehall to cut ties with Malan’s racist regime, although their ‘small-scale publications’ and ‘occasional protest meetings’ made little political headway.

One major reason that the Labour government was unwilling to act decisively against the apartheid system was the strong economic connection between South Africa and Great Britain. In 1947, the Boer government had helped to alleviate the British economic crisis by making a gold loan of £80 million, and the territory was one of the few economies with which Britain had a positive balance.

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235 Reginald Sorenson, Commonwealth (Racial Relations), HC Debate 06 May 1949 vol. 464, cc. 1414-5.
of trade in the Marshall Plan period. Britain had to be especially careful in its relationship with South Africa because white nationalism was often a response to perceived threats to Afrikaner identity; it was not just the black African population which was viewed with suspicion, but also the British government, a tendency which ultimately led to South Africa leaving the British Commonwealth in 1961 under Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. Gordon Walker decided after his trip to the continent that apartheid itself could not be overtly supported, but that cooperation with South Africa was nonetheless to remain an objective of British policy.

White nationalism was not confined to South Africa in this period; every British territory on the continent with a sizeable white population was a possible area of racial tension, and this was located in both black and white communities. Britain could not pursue new constitutions and increased black African political participation in Eastern and Southern Africa, as they had done in the West African territories. Instead, there remained in these areas an uneasy balance between white minority rule and burgeoning black nationalism.

In Kenya, 1948 was the year in which colonial officials first became aware of a movement known among the black African population as ‘Mau Mau’; even the name itself was impermeable to the British, arising as it did from a ‘linguistic void’ with no traceable etymology. The movement had its roots in the two Kikuyu-dominated political parties, the Kikuyu Central Association and Kenyan African Union, which were proscribed by the colonial government in the late 1940s as politically subversive. The prohibited organisations were soon dominated by radicals, who embraced the ideology of violent confrontation to achieve political independence. Despite this, from 1948 until 1952, the colonial government ignored warnings from local administrators, dismissing the rising Mau Mau as a dini, a religious group which posed little threat to colonial rule. This exacerbated the feeling among white settlers that the administration was remote from the realities of life in Kenya and increased communal hysteria and the likelihood of mob justice within settler communities.

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242 The British government would later try to control this dangerous mixture of nationalisms and uneven economic development through the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also known as the Central African Federation (CAF). Created in 1953, the CAF comprised Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; it had collapsed by 1963 under pressure from black nationalist movements for a larger share in governing power than the white minority rulers were willing to concede.
Mau Mau violence began with the prevalence of ‘oathing’, whereby new recruits to the movement were expected to participate in bastardised tribal ceremonies. Violence was then extended to the widespread maiming and killing of cattle, and several high-profile murders such as the performative killing of Gray Leakey.\textsuperscript{246} This development led the white settler population to demand government protection, and eventually British colonial authorities responded by declaring a State of Emergency on 22 October 1951 and increasing the police and military presence within the colony.\textsuperscript{247} Mau Mau was initially a protest at the treatment of the Kikuyu labour tenants, who were forced to work as ‘squatters’ on white settler farms; it eventually encompassed all areas of British encroachment into traditional Kikuyu society and culture, including the Ngaitana controversy, when chiefs attempted to ban female circumcision.\textsuperscript{248} Violence continued, with Mau Mau fighters increasingly utilising guerrilla warfare, although ultimately the Emergency never developed into the race war anticipated by British government officials. By 1956, the number of active Mau Mau rebels had been reduced to c. 450.\textsuperscript{249} The historiography of Mau Mau remains controversial, not least because, in an apparently straightforward anti-colonial uprising, only 32 white settlers and around 200 white police and armed forces personnel lost their lives, compared to a death toll of least 1,800 African civilians and upwards of 12,000 Mau Mau rebels, who were brutalised and dehumanised by torturous acts such as the Hola Camp Massacre in March 1959.\textsuperscript{250} After suppressing the uprising, the British implemented reforms which brought black Africans into the Kenyan Legislative Council, although there was continued agitation for universal suffrage. The colony was eventually granted independence in 1962, and most of the white settlers were bought out by the British government, returning ‘home’ to a country that many of them had never previously visited.\textsuperscript{251}

It can be seen from the events of 1948 that the post-war period was shaped by the on-going development of nationalisms across the African continent. White and black Africans attempted to negotiate the post-war world in the light of recent global conflict, the changing nature of British colonial rule, and the fragile and shifting international context of the Cold War. Nationalist ideology and colonial development were therefore interlinked from the very beginning of the period; it would be the unhappy lot of the Labour government to negotiate a path between the contesting

\textsuperscript{247} Nicholls, \textit{Red Strangers}, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{248} Lynn Thomas, “Ngaitana (I will circumcise myself): Lessons from Colonial Campaigns to Ban Excision in Meru, Kenya”, in Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund, \textit{Female ‘Circumcision’ in Africa}, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), passim.
\textsuperscript{250} The historiography is complicated by the differing calculations of the black African death toll, with the greatest disparity between the work of Caroline Elkins and David Anderson. In April 2011, David Anderson began acting as an expert witness on behalf of four elderly Kenyans who were assaulted during the Mau Mau uprising by British detention camp officials and who wish to claim compensation from the British Government in the High Court – given his undoubted expertise in this area, it is his estimation of death tolls that are cited here; David Anderson, \textit{Histories of the Hanged}, (London: 2005), p. 4.
\textsuperscript{251} For more information about the Kenyan independence process, see Keith Kyle, \textit{The Politics of the Independence of Kenya}, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
groups, to create a programme for the future that placated white and black Africans, the British public, and the international community at large.

**Imperial Pressures in the Special Relationship**

In considering British imperial policy in the post-war period, it is important to consider not only the navigation of African nationalist agitation, but also the tension that imperial issues introduced into the Anglo-American relationship. America’s history as a former colony of Great Britain had historically created a preference for self-determination and a distaste for imperial rule, which was hardly congruent with supporting a protectionist, centrally-administered British Empire. Wm Roger Louis has described the ideology behind American anti-colonialism as ‘a force in itself which helped to shape the substance of defence, economic and foreign policy’. The belief that all people had the right to independence and self-rule was critical to the American worldview, and would remain so throughout the twentieth century, despite the frequent flagrant breaches of this right in American domestic and foreign policy. This empire was thus, simultaneously, a resource that enabled British politicians to claim power and influence across the world, and a potential impediment to the cultivation of an Anglo-American relationship that could enable Britain to maintain an international role. Imperialism was therefore a key element within the ‘special relationship’.

In the early days of American intervention in the Second World War, there famously appeared in Life magazine an open letter to the British public. The editors of the magazine upheld the concept of the special relationship, proclaiming that ‘no two peoples on… Earth’ were as close as the British and the Americans were in ‘their institutions, or their language, or their ties of blood’. The United States had been ‘dreadfully slow’ in entering the war, but was now ready ‘to support England[’s]… heroic struggle’. But if politicians in London were ‘planning a war to hold the British Empire together’ they would ‘sooner or later find themselves strategizing alone’. The magazine article conceded that, once victorious, the British people could ‘decide what to do about the Empire’, but only within the context of the supposedly quintessential American homily that ‘if one wants to be free one cannot be free alone – one must be free with other people’. It was assumed that the Second World War would be won by the Allied forces on account of their ‘principles’, which would require the British to make important imperial concessions, particularly in the cited case of India.

This popular expression of anti-imperial sentiment was echoed in the ‘Atlantic Charter’, a joint statement made by Roosevelt and Churchill after the 1941 Atlantic Conference; the third article of this document guaranteed ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which

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253 An interesting refutation of American exceptionalist thinking.
they will live’. Churchill, however, refuted any idea that this should apply to the British Empire, arguing that the Charter referred to ‘the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke’, which was ‘quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown’. British politicians were unwilling to bow down to demands from the United States to reduce their imperial holdings. In a debate in the House of Lords in 1945, Lord Teynham, who was later ADC to the governors of the Leeward Isles, Bermuda and Jamaica, said that without its imperial possessions, Britain would be ‘of very small account’. It was important to remember that ‘mighty empires of the past [were] swept away by weaknesses [that] developed after great wars’; Britain must resist any tendency to diminish the importance of the British Empire by the United States or other powers. It was, in part, the imbalance of power between Britain and the United States that made the British unwilling to concede to any American demands to relinquish colonial possessions; the imperial sphere was the last area in which American ambitions could never hope to rival British prestige. For Washington, the empire may have been representative of a retrogressive, obsolete form of global power that had once subjugated their own nation, but for London, the empire was a potent reminder that Britain had once been the strongest, most influential nation on the planet.

In the period after the Second World War, international pressures from the United States, the USSR and the United Nations meant that the prestige to be gained from imperial possessions was often debatable. One Colonial Office document spluttered frustration at the way that Britain increasingly found itself denounced as an imperialist ‘not only by the Soviet bloc and Asiatic countries but also by some of the Latin Americans and even on occasion by the Americans’. The Colonial Office even considered changing its name in this period, partly for the sake of accuracy (since the department administered several territories that were ‘not, technically speaking, colonies’), but mainly because the traditional title was ‘liable to give rise to misunderstanding, particularly [at the] United Nations’, where Britain was ‘subject to frequent charges [of] exploitation’. However, the name-change was rejected as it was thought to be ‘doubtful whether a change of title would lead to any respite of abuse at the United Nations or elsewhere’; neither France nor Holland had the work ‘colonial’ in the names of their departments for overseas territories and they were ‘no less subject to charges of exploitation’ than Britain. Indeed, it was believed within the Colonial Office that

258 The portion of this quotation that was crossed through in the first draft was judiciously omitted from the final document; ‘Colonial Development and the Continuing Organisation (Note by the Colonial Office), enclosed in Robinson to RW Clarke, 17th March 1948, Folder UR 344/344/98 Colonial Development, FO 371/71822.
the very making of a change might be made the subject of a specially virulent attack such as, for example, that we were showing typical British hypocrisy in attempting to disguise our colonial exploitation by a change of name.\textsuperscript{259}

The Colonial Office thus retained its name and function until 1966, when it merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office to become the Commonwealth Office, which was in turn subsumed within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1968.

When Truman first came to power, Edward R. Stettinius, then Secretary of State, prepared for him a foreign policy manual that outlined American interests, which included the social and economic growth of dependent peoples and their eventual independent sovereignty.\textsuperscript{260} As Wm. Roger Louis has demonstrated, the United States promoted independence and supported nationalist movements in India, Libya and Egypt, although the American influence on the dissolution of the British Empire as a whole ‘must have been small’.\textsuperscript{261} Given the American history of colonial occupation and independence, it is understandable that they were often sympathetic to the plight of colonial freedom fighters and supportive of nascent imperial nationalism; Roger Makins recalled that ‘some Americans always saw a budding George Washington in every dissident or revolutionary movement’ and that this ‘coloured a good deal of American policy and thinking throughout that period’.\textsuperscript{262} Overall, however, American anti-colonialism was always tempered by economic and political security concerns. Within the context of the Cold War, there was a fundamental shift in American attitudes to the British Empire, with the growing realisation of the benefits of territorial control in the fight against communist expansion, and the necessity of overseas development to bolster the power of America’s allies.

Even during the Second World War, the American public was not as anti-imperialist as has often been assumed. During the Pacific campaign, American forces captured several groups of islands in the Micronesia region, which had been ruled since the Second World War by the Japanese government under the South Pacific League of Nations Mandate. The United States already had a foothold in the region, with their control of Guam, and Britain, Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Portugal also had territories there, many of which were used as bases for US forces. A 1944 Gallup poll revealed that not only did 69 per cent of the American public want to take possession of Japanese Micronesia after the war, but they also wanted to retain control of the

\textsuperscript{259} ‘Draft Report by the Committee on the Administration of Overseas Territories’, March 1949, CO 537/4260.


\textsuperscript{261} Louis, ‘American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire’, \textit{passim}.

British and Australian islands that were temporarily occupied by American troops. The American government, too, had distinctly imperial attitudes to the peoples of the region, which were maintained even after the Second World War. A National Security Council resolution in 1949 described the South Pacific islander populations, in language reminiscent of British explorers of nineteenth-century Africa, as ‘unsophisticated and acquiescent’ without even ‘a degree of worldly wisdom and personal ambition’, creating ideal conditions for ‘successful’ colonialism without ‘discontent, resistance, and political psychoses’.

Apart from a history as a society born of a fight for independence from colonial rule, there was nothing in American politics that should lead historians to presuppose hostility to European empires in the developing world. The (mainly white) American population, like the (mainly white) European metropoles, operated within a fundamentally racialised narrative of the world, so that their appraisal of European colonial rule would never be uncomplicatedly on the side of the colonial peoples. American society, politics and economies privileged those of white European descent whilst ‘ghettoizing’ those who were descended from black Africa. This is reflected in American government documents concerning European empires in Africa. For example, the American consul general in Dakar wrote to the State Department in 1950 to inform them that

Peoples in Black Africa are basically primitive… due to racial characteristics and environmental influence... [W]ithout the discipline and control of Western nations... numerous races or tribes would attack traditional enemies in primitive savagery... [T]hey have not yet as a people achieved sufficient evolutionary stature to understand the existence of motivation other than the compulsion of self-interest of a very low order or fear.

In fact, American government officials were often conciliatory, even supportive, on the issue of British colonial territories. Lewis Douglas, in his report on imperial defence, described British colonial policy as ‘enlightened’, praising the ‘very flexible’ system of imperial government that had enabled Britain to ‘guide… national consciousness into channels of ordered progress’ and ‘raise the status of some of her colonies’ so that they would ‘in the near future… be in a position to take their place among the sovereign nations of the world’. This rhetoric recalls Oliver Stanley’s mid-war proclamations of a British pledge to ‘guide Colonial people along the road to self-government… to

267 Lewis Douglas to Dean Acheson, 11 June 1947, , Truman Papers PSF, Box 160, File L, Truman Library.
build up their social and economic institutions, and... to develop their natural resources', as well as British Labour and Fabian colonial thinking in the post-war period.268

The increasing international importance of the imperial world led to the establishment of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs in 1949. The Bureau produced a paper in April 1950 on the ‘Future of Africa’, which described the continent as ‘the largest remaining backward area in the world’ and claimed that African people had ‘not yet achieved full understanding of modern political, social and economic institutions’ necessary for independence. In this context, the paper identified British colonial policy in Africa as working towards ‘political freedom and self-government... advanced as rapidly as circumstances existing in given areas permit’. The report outlined the main reasons that the United States was interested in the future of the continent; as well as a self-proclaimed ‘humanitarian interest in assisting under-privileged peoples’, and the belief that Africa had ‘considerable undeveloped resources’ that would be ‘important in the future of any world struggle’, there was also mention of the ‘sympathy of the American Negroes for the aspirations of the African peoples, particularly those living in the area south of the Sahara’. It was felt that ‘differing views’ on the issue of empire had ‘become a source of irritation’ between the United States and the western European colonial powers, and it was important that this ‘should be removed... so far as is possible’. Overall, it was in American interests to see ‘harmonious relations’ between the African people and ‘the peoples and governments with whom they [were] associated’.269

Globally, not everybody was as supportive of British imperialism. At a series of meetings at the United Nations on the ‘colonial question’, Britain had endured ‘a great deal of prejudice, ignorance and hostile criticism’ from a ‘hard core’ of anti-imperial ‘inconvertible opponents’. 270 However, Arthur Creech Jones was able to reassure the Cabinet that the United States had ‘largely come round to [the British] point of view in recent years’ regarding colonialism; the Americans were ‘too preoccupied with communism to devote much time to “British imperialism”’, so it was vital that Britain used ‘positive measures and publicity’ to ‘win as much support’ as possible for British colonial policies.271

270 This included ‘the Slav bloc, India, and... the ‘coloured’ nations (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Siam)... Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico and sometimes Panama’, as well as the Arab nations, which were ‘apt to be capricious’. The USSR was not identified specifically as anti-imperial, although the Colonial Secretary was despairing of ‘Soviet obstructiveness in almost every aspect of United Nations work’. Arthur Creech Jones, ‘United Nations General Assembly, 1947 – the Colonial Question: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies’, 30th January 1948, CAB 129/24, The National Archives.
271 Ibid.
Ultimately, it was not the ‘special relationship’ but ‘exceptional international circumstances’ which led to a mellowing of American anti-imperial policy and rhetoric.\textsuperscript{272} The empires controlled by Western European nations were regional powers that could be relied upon as bulwarks against global communist expansion. Since the Second World War, the US Department of State had been monitoring political movements in Africa for signs of communist infiltration; they had had some concerns about the nationalist movements in French north Africa, but were reassured by their belief that communism was ‘naturally repugnant to practicing Moslems’.\textsuperscript{273} In early 1948, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) described Africa, as a continent, as an area that was ‘relatively little exposed to communist pressures’ and ‘not… a subject of great power conflicts’.\textsuperscript{274}

However, this attitude soon changed. American observers became less hopeful about the chances of resistance to communist influence if countries were released from the protective boundaries of colonial rule. In his assessment of the indigenous population of the Sudan, the American consul general in Dakar contended that granting independence ‘prematurely’ would ‘only result in creating political entities which would almost immediately become pawns of the Kremlin’.\textsuperscript{275} The Bureau for Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs contended that, although communism had made very little headway in most of Africa, both the European metropoles and the United States had ‘become alert to the danger of militant Communism penetrating the area’, a fear heightened by the USSR’s self-appointed role within the international community as ‘the champion of the colonial peoples of the world’.\textsuperscript{276} The American government was therefore content to support European colonial rule in African territories, as long as it acted as a barrier to communist infiltration. As Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson have argued, by 1947 the Americans were ‘doing a great deal to prop up the empire’, as competition with the USSR forced the United States to strengthen its allies and their imperial holdings.\textsuperscript{277} Decolonization brought with it new challenges; in the second half of the twentieth century, African states and people increasingly became ‘pawns in Cold War conflicts’.\textsuperscript{278}

In 1947, John Foster Dulles, in his role as the United States delegate to the United Nations, was asked about ‘the principle of independence for the colonial peoples’. Dulles explained that although the United States had endorsed this principle, the American government was ‘torn’ between the ‘desire to help the colonial peoples toward independence’ and their ‘strategic inter-dependence with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{273} Telegram, Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State, Tangier, 30 January 1947, \textit{FRUS} 1947, vol. V, p. 673.
\item \textsuperscript{275} Consul General Dakar to State Department, 23 February 1950, cited in Kent, ‘The United States and the Decolonization of Black Africa, 1945-63’, pp. 170-1.
\item \textsuperscript{277} Louis and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’, pp. 456-7.
\item \textsuperscript{278} Cooper, \textit{Africa Since 1940}, p. 134.
\end{itemize}
the colonial powers which derived their economic strength from their colonies’. In the post-war period, the American government was increasingly aware of the necessity of encouraging, not only the maintenance of European colonial empires, but also their more efficient economic exploitation. A review by the Policy Planning Staff in early 1948 outlined how the regeneration of the western European nations could be effected if they undertook ‘jointly the economic development and exploitation of the colonial and dependent areas of the African Continent’, although the PPS believed that the process would be demanding to a point that was ‘probably well above the vision and strengths and leadership capacity’ of the Western European governments. Gabriel Kolko has argued that this understanding of the economic importance of the colonies led the United States government to oppose the acceleration of decolonization, fearing that this would ‘cut the economic ties’ between Africa and the European metropoles. American anti-imperialism was fundamentally governed by realist foreign policy aims; the dual context of the pressures of post-war reconstruction, and the tensions of the Cold War led to a significant measure of support in Washington for British policies in Africa. This would be important in the context of British colonial policy under the Marshall Plan.

Conclusions
Throughout the Marshall Plan era, Britain continued to operate within Churchill’s ‘three circles of destiny’. Although Churchill claimed that the Anglo-American sphere was the most critical to British policy, this belief was not uniformly held across the Attlee government. The Colonial Office registered American anti-imperialism but did not treat it as a key element in policy, prioritising the populations of the metropole and periphery. The Foreign Office prioritised Anglo-American relations over Anglo-European relations, but these spheres often overlapped in terms of policy, with pressure from Washington for Britain to cooperate more closely with the western European nations; ultimately, the Foreign Office would not support any overseas policy that threatened British interests. What can clearly be seen is that British foreign and imperial policy in the immediate post-war era was fundamentally a juggling act, balancing domestic welfare initiatives, socialist ideology, and Cold War Realpolitik. This is the context in which colonial development must be viewed – the Colonial Office, the administrators on-the-spot, the delegates in European and Anglo-American meetings, were all aware of Britain’s world role and the challenges and opportunities that this would bring to colonial policy. As can be seen in the next chapter, there was also a significant amount of tension in the Attlee government over the relative importance of the needs of the metropole and the needs of the periphery. Not only foreign policy, but also domestic policy, is intrinsic to a proper understanding of colonial development.

Chapter Two: Bureaucracy, Negotiation and Administration: the Politics of Colonial Development

When the Labour Party won the 1945 election, both the nation and the empire had been irrevocably altered by the experience of war. Attlee’s government had campaigned mainly on domestic issues: the National Health Service; full employment and nationalised industries; the rebuilding of homes, towns and cities; and the provision of social insurance for the entire population. The vast empire in the African continent was inherited by the Labour Party and its supporters with distinctly mixed feelings; the party had historically been critical of imperial expansion in Africa and would now have to govern an empire that they had had no hand in acquiring. Stephen Howe, in his work on anti-colonialism on the British left, describes ‘a general lack of concern for colonial issues as compared with the urgent tasks of post-war reconstruction, nationalisation, and extending welfare provision’.282 Indeed, in a survey of the British public conducted for the Colonial Office in 1948, only half of the respondents could correctly name at least one colony, and only 37 per cent could name any foodstuff or raw material that came to Britain from the empire.283

However, for some members of the new Labour government, colonial issues were at the forefront of their minds during the immediate post-war years. The hopes for regeneration of the British economy based on colonial bounty, buoyed by the mobilisation of the empire during the Second World War, came to a head in 1948 with the establishment of the Colonial Development Corporation. Not only Arthur Creech Jones, but also Ernest Bevin, Stafford Cripps, John Strachey and Clement Attlee all engaged with the issue of colonial development, both as a way to contribute to the British domestic economy, and as the basis for a re-imagined relationship between periphery and metropole. Although this thesis is concerned with development in the sub-Saharan African territories, power shifts within the empire as a whole clearly informed this approach. The juxtaposition between the colonial Empire and the Commonwealth nations, recently supplemented with the newly independent nations of the Indian subcontinent, forced a re-evaluation of colonial imperialism with a greater focus on mutual development and shared responsibilities. The development of the British Colonial Empire in Africa thus had the potential to provide a solution for many of Britain’s domestic problems, whilst also addressing many existing issues within the colonial territories.

This chapter therefore examines the domestic and institutional context within which British colonial development was enacted in the sub-Saharan African territories, and addresses the

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282 Howe, Anti-Colonialism and the British Left, p. 147.
question of the ‘official mind’ of British colonial policy. ‘Official mind’, a concept from Robinson and Gallagher by way of Frank Heinlein, is defined as ‘the sum of the ideas, perceptions and intentions of those policy-makers who had a bearing on imperial policies’.

Whilst Frank Heinlein defines these ‘policy-makers’ to be any ‘politicians and civil servants who were responsible for or had a bearing on the development and execution of imperial policy’, in colonial development, there needs to be drawn a distinction between those working within the Colonial Office, and those working in other areas of government who nonetheless exercised – or attempted to exercise – influence over colonial policy. Arthur Creech Jones and his colonial officials had a fundamentally different ideological approach to the colonies than the men in the Foreign Office, Treasury or Ministry for Food and Agriculture. In fact, Creech Jones’s strongly moral attitude to colonial policy and development shaped British policy in Africa for the rest of the twentieth century.

The issue of colonial development in Africa was clearly not as partisan as the other policies pursued by the Attlee cabinet. In many aspects of colonial policy, particularly economic development, the Labour government received cross-party support; indeed, the Colonial Development and Welfare (CDW) Acts had entered the statute books during the wartime coalition. However, the ideological basis for colonial development as enacted by Arthur Creech Jones’ Colonial Office was fundamentally different from that which underpinned Conservative Party thinking on imperial issues. For Creech Jones, colonial development was both a duty imposed on the metropole by a history of exploitation and neglect, and a necessary step for colonies on their way to independence. However, the context of post-war devastation and reconstruction meant that the Colonial Office could not operate in a political vacuum; the process of determining the shape of development in Africa involved negotiation in parliament, in Cabinet, and in public.

**The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts**

The first Colonial Development Act was passed in 1929 and was intended to ease domestic unemployment in the Great Depression whilst aiding colonial economic development. The act established a fund for colonial development of between £750,000 and £1 million per annum, and focused on schemes where labour requirements could be met through exporting British workers. The funds were applied in an ad hoc, short term manner, and were not an effective panacea for either colonial underdevelopment or British unemployment; in 1931 the scheme provided jobs for around 13,000 British workers, out of a total of 2,671,000 who were without work.

The first Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed in 1940 largely through the efforts of

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286 For more information about interwar colonial development, see Meredith and Havinden, *Colonialism and Development*, pp. 140-206.

287 Ibid., pp. 147-8.
Malcolm Macdonald, the pioneering ‘National Labour’ Secretary of State for the Colonies appointed in 1938. The CDW Act moved away from the simple imperialist mercantilism of the 1929 Colonial Development Act to also provide for the development of welfare resources; Macdonald believed that if Britain did not provide ‘proper social services’ for the colonies then they would inevitably and deservedly lose them.²⁸⁸ The CDW Act was therefore ‘authorised to make schemes for any purpose likely to promote the development of the resources of any Colony or the welfare of its people’.²⁸⁹ The British government could spend up to £500,000 a year on schemes either ‘promoting research or inquiry’; another £5 million was budgeted every year until 1951 for all other projects.²⁹⁰ The CDW Act was administered directly by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, rather than the Treasury, who had overseen the 1929 Colonial Development Act. The CDW Act of 1940 was hampered by the fact that ‘the purposes of war’ had to have ‘the first call on the resources of the country, whether in men, material or money’.²⁹¹ However, by the end of March 1946, 595 Development and Welfare Schemes and 105 Research Schemes had been initiated, at a total cost of £28,841,000.²⁹²

Oliver Stanley, who became Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1944, also enthusiastically embraced the CDW Act. Even before the end of the war, Parliament had voted to ‘increase the provision for colonial development and welfare in order that colonies should be enabled to pursue an active policy of development when peace returned’. The 1945 CDW Act, which came into effect on 1 April 1946, made available £120 million over ten years, with an annual limit of £17.5 million, of which £1 million could be spent on research. These figures enabled the planning of long-term development with the realisation that projects would initially require a smaller share of the funds because expenditure would increase as the schemes progressed; therefore more than one-tenth of the overall funds could be granted in any one year.²⁹³ In total, just over £13.25 million was spent in a combination of grants and loans under CDW Act provision between 1940 and 1947. The funds were split between residual Colonial Development Fund schemes, research projects, development and welfare schemes, and salaries and expenses accrued in the administration of the programmes, with the bulk of the amount, more than £12 million, being spent on development and welfare schemes.²⁹⁴

The CDW Acts also resulted in the creation of several research bodies and advisory boards. This included the Colonial Economic and Development Council, which had been created by Creech

²⁸⁸ Malcolm Macdonald, cited in Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, p. 86.
²⁹⁰ Ibid.
²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 2-3.
²⁹² Ibid., p. 3.
²⁹³ Ibid.
²⁹⁴ Ibid., ‘Table A : Estimates and Expenditure from 1940-41’, p. 6.
Jones in September 1946 to advise on ‘the framing and subsequent review of plans for economic and social development in the Colonial Empire’ and on ‘questions of general economic and financial policy’. These organisations increased the culture of bureaucracy surrounding British post-war colonial development, and reflected the Labour Government’s great enthusiasm for government through committees of experts.

The CDW Acts paved the way for post-war colonial development. They established the legal principles of grant- and loan-aided development, whilst enshrining the moral and economic importance of welfare and research programmes. In doing so, they established a tradition of colonial development which could be utilised within the context of post-war Labour ideology. Attlee’s government had ambitious plans for the African territories, which would simultaneously support British post-war recovery and advance British Africa’s economic development, within the context of European post-war reconstruction.

**Colonial Development: the African Economic Context**

It is important to consider not only the British metropolitan context for colonial development, but also the circumstances in the African empire. Colonial planners and policy-makers were not dealing with a homogenous region; British territories on the continent spanned a huge and diverse area south of the Sahara. The African colonies differed in the size and density of their populations, in their ecological conditions, ranging from impenetrable jungle to lush savannah to arid desert, and in their transport links which stimulated and enabled trade. In 1947, the Colonial Office wrote to the Treasury about the colonial development plans, warning them against a homogenous view of the empire in Africa; general conditions were apt to ‘vary so much from Colony to Colony’ that the Colonial Office had ‘found it very difficult to formulate any general principles which would not create more anomalies than they removed’. As Robert W. Steel, working as a geographer lecturer at Oxford University, wrote in the 1950s, generalisations about the continent were ‘difficult and sometimes dangerous’. Africa would be developed on a case-by-case basis.

Some of the British African colonies had highly-developed international trade links with continental Western Europe and the United States alongside the trade relationship with the metropole. This was particularly true of British West Africa; Nigeria and the Gold Coast were estimated by the Foreign Office to have projected earnings of about $75 million per annum in 1948, through exports such as palm oil and cocoa. These earnings meant that the British African territories would be a net dollar earner, as the remaining territories were expected to spend only $5 million during the same

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295 Ibid., p. 3.
296 JB Williams (Colonial Office) to LN Helsby (Treasury), 24 March 1947, T 220/200.
period. This, of course, had particular implications for the progress towards independence being made in both Nigeria and the Gold Coast.

However, West Africa was largely an exception to the general economic trend in British African territories. The basis of British imperial rule was economic extraction; territories were ‘skewed’ towards producing commodities required in the metropole or which could be sold on the international dollar markets. Economic development had been carried out only so far as was necessary for the British economy and imperial trade relationship. Arthur Creech Jones, writing in 1944, acknowledged that complaints about colonial exploitation were ‘well-founded’ and that a critique of economic imperialism was fully justified; Africans had a right to ‘bitterly complain’ about the wealth ‘drained’ from the continent and the small amount returned from the ‘huge profits’ made from colonial goods. The limited industrialisation of the African territories was a function of their economic relationship with Britain; their markets were open to world imports that could undersell most indigenous finished goods, which did not encourage metropolitan investment, and most African cash incomes were too low to promote a widespread consumer economy. Most economies were dominated by a small number of British import-export firms, and limited industrial development.

However, this changed with the great economic stimulus provided by the Second World War, which had ‘profoundly modified’ African ‘political and social relationships’ and ‘economic development’. African production shifted to reflect the needs of the metropole at war, with labourers working to produce vital materials such as sisal, rubber, pyrethrum and tin, the supply of which had been interrupted by the loss of territories such as Malaya and the disruption to transport and communications. Bulk-purchasing schemes were established for major exports, including copper from North Rhodesia, cotton and sisal from East Africa and tin from Nigeria. In some cases, these products were not even exported; the purchase in bulk of much of the cocoa and vegetable oils produced in West Africa was a way for the British government to stimulate the local economy and protect the local community from socio-economic hardship. The wartime expansion of the African economies led to an enlarged class of urban and wage-earning workers,

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298 William Gorell Barnes to R. W. ‘Otto’ Clarke, 8th March 1948, Folder UR 344/344/98 Colonial Development, FO 371/71822
301 Fieldhouse, Black Africa, pp. 46-7.
and the high prices commanded by agricultural exports after the war continued to support their desire to purchase foreign consumer goods.\textsuperscript{305}

The economic context of British colonial development in Africa was thus a history of profound neglect, with a short-lived frantic mobilization of resources during the Second World War. This was coupled with an exploitative trade relationship, which prevented African colonies from profiting from their raw materials or industrial development at the expense of the metropole, and which in any case siphoned off profits and prevented reinvestment in industry or the provision of sufficient social welfare services. Some within the post-war Labour government approached the economic and social development of Africa intending to continue this framework as far as possible; some, including Arthur Creech Jones, intended to replace it with a new model.

\textbf{Why did Britain prioritise colonial development after the Second World War?}

Firstly, Britain needed raw materials for consumption at home. This included many foodstuffs such as oils, fats, meats and grains, to provide for the essentials of British domestic human and livestock consumption, as well as luxuries, such as cocoa and tobacco, to boost morale among the war-ravaged population. As well as foodstuffs, Britain needed raw materials to rebuild the country’s industry after the damage sustained under enemy bombing and a prolonged war economy which had focused on arms production. The African colonies were primary producers of many industrial materials, such as tin, copper, bauxite and asbestos, which were essential to post-war redevelopment in Britain, and it was believed that there was scope to increase the production of these materials with a sustained programme of development.\textsuperscript{306} However, industrial development of the colonies would itself require a great many resources not available within Africa, such as structural iron and steel, cement, locomotives, tractors and even nails.\textsuperscript{307} The Colonial Office would therefore be forced to compete with domestic industrial demand for resources, money and manpower; this was only possible if the long-term benefits of colonial development for British industry were emphasised.

There were also more esoteric issues arising from Britain’s specific experience in the Second World War. There was, for instance, a great shortage of jute, because the Japanese had sunk cargo boats carrying British imperial supplies from Calcutta; this meant that the Colonial Empire overall was experiencing great difficulty in transporting any foodstuffs ‘owing to lack of bags’.\textsuperscript{308} Without a supply of jute, Britain would be unable to import

\textsuperscript{305} Fieldhouse, \textit{Black Africa}, p. 47.


\textsuperscript{307} Arthur Creech Jones to Ernest Bevin, 12th August 1947, FO 371/62557.

\textsuperscript{308} V Thomson (Commonwealth Relations Office) to L. Barnett (Economic Rels Dept, Foreign Office), n.d. (received 13th September 1947), Folder – UE8631/5666/53 Colonial Primary Products Committee: Jute, FO 371/62558 (Economic: 1947), National Archives.
oilseeds, ground nuts and palm kernels from West Africa, Argentina and other countries,
sugar from the Caribbean, Australia, South Africa, Mauritius, Fiji and Java, rice from
Burma, Siam, Malaya, Java and the Caribbean, cocoa from West Africa and the Caribbean
and coffee and many other products from various parts of the world.309

Additionally, the Sterling Area as a whole, including the essential meat producers in Australia and
New Zealand, would be unable to export their goods to outside clients.310 This illustrates the very
practical problems faced by the Attlee government in the immediate post-war period.

In addition, the need to improve the balance of payments and the British dollar shortage could be
addressed through trade with the African colonies. If African industry focused on the production
of items which both Britain and the United States desired, Britain could save dollars by purchasing
essential products in sterling, whilst America simultaneously purchased goods in dollars and thus
increased the Sterling Area’s dollar reserves. Ernest Bevin had a keen interest in colonial
development as a solution to British economic issues, and was engaged at the time of his Marshall
Plan negotiations in considering ‘all the essential raw materials which the United States is short of’,
such as ‘copper, lead, sisal… palm nuts… [and] even… diamonds’.311 By July 1947, a Foreign
Office Memorandum had been prepared which detailed all the possible raw materials ‘in which the
United States [was] not self-sufficient’, grouped into minerals, comprising ‘tin, copper, nickel, lead,
bauxite, mercury, antimony, manganese, tungsten, chromite, platinum, industrial diamonds, quartz
diamonds, graphite, asbestos and mica’; vegetable products, including ‘rubber, coffee, sugar, oils
and fats, rice, cordage fibres, paper and wood pulp, cinchona bark and quinine’; and animal
products, such as ‘silk, wool, furs, hides and skins’. The report catalogues the American ‘virtual
exhaustion’ of many of these materials, before listing the British African colonies that were
fortuitously capable of producing large quantities of the minerals needed by the United States. It
was also expected that many African colonies would be capable of producing ‘greatly increased
quantities’ of vegetable products, also required by America.312

Creech Jones responded to this memorandum with a letter in which he enunciated three key points
for colonial development. Firstly, he wrote, it would be important not only to focus on the
production of ‘things which are in short supply in the United Kingdom’, but instead to ‘pay equal
attention to products which can find a market in hard currency areas’; he therefore highlighted the
role of potential ‘dollar earners’, such as Tanganyikan diamonds. Secondly, he emphasised that in

309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
311 Minute from Ernest Bevin to Clement Attlee (draft), 7th July 1947, FO 371/62557.
312 Memorandum prepared by Mr Fitzgerald, ‘Raw Materials of which the United States is short’, Economic Intelligence
Department, 16th July 1947, Folder: UE 6221/5666/53 ‘Colonial Development: Raw Materials of which the United
States is short’, FO 371/62557.

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some cases the United Kingdom might be forced to ‘restrict… imports from the Colonies in order to make more supplies available for export elsewhere’, saying that just as the home consumer is asked to go short of textiles in order to make more available for export, it may be necessary for the time being that he should go short of Colonial cocoa, or tea, or sisal, so that we can sell more of these products somewhere else.313

Thirdly, Creech Jones focused on the importance of ensuring that colonial goods that could be sold in a hard currency market should be sold at as high a price as possible, in order to maximise their dollar earning potential; this would be beneficial to Great Britain, even if they were forced to pay a higher sterling price for the goods which they bought from the colonies themselves.314

There was also some possibility of opening the African colonies to foreign, particularly American, investment, which would increase the number of dollars spent in the Sterling Area that were therefore available to the British Government. Although the Americans abandoned fairly quickly their attempt to use Marshall Aid to force Britain to break up the Empire, the prospect of easier trading with the African territories ‘excited the American investors’.315 Businessmen in the United States had previously believed that the British government was ‘not favourably disposed’ to American investment in the empire, but the Treasury was quick to reassure them that, although individual investors would have to be assessed on their merits, there was ‘no general prejudice against – rather the contrary’.316

This type of development, focusing on agricultural and industrial production, combined with the transportation and communication advances required to ensure success, was primarily aimed at British economic and financial requirements, and can be seen as a natural successor to the kind of extractive imperialism historically enacted by all European powers in Africa. This is not to say that it was without benefit to the African people themselves, but the primary intended benefactor was the British government and public. In a period of domestic hardship, Creech Jones often emphasised the necessity of colonial development in the ‘battle for stability and prosperity in Britain’, especially in speeches referencing industrial and agricultural initiatives.317 Ernest Bevin described himself as a ‘strong advocate’ of this kind of development, which he regarded, in the context of the Marshall

314 Ibid.
315 Extracts from letter from the Minister of State to the Secretary of State dated 26th July 1947 sent to Sydney Caine, Rowe-Dutton and Fearvyear by Makins on 15th August 1947, T276/29/3 (International Bank – Loans to UK for Colonial Development), National Archives.
Plan, as ‘more vital than ever’; it was also wholeheartedly supported by figures within the Treasury, including Sir Stafford Cripps, who wanted to ‘force the pace’ of colonial development in Africa to aid British economic reconstruction.318

Colonial development in the post-war period was based on a realistic assessment of the need to develop colonial resources alongside European reconstruction. It was important to open up Africa with new methods of mechanization and sustainable economic development, in order to justify the continued maintenance of colonial rule. There was also the practical realisation that Britain was perhaps no longer capable of supporting and ruling an empire from the centre given its own economic situation. In a House of Lords debate on Overseas Development, one speaker baldly stated that there could be ‘no services for the Africans, no education, nothing whatever, without economic development’ because British taxpayers no longer had any means of financing this colonial adventure.319

As well as mobilising colonial resources for the demands of the metropole, then, colonial development could also be directed at fulfilling the needs of the colonies themselves. Kathryn Tidrick, in her book on the relationship between empire and the English national character, highlights the transition from traditional British extractive imperialism to a different attitude, created through the ‘erosion of the once sacrosanct idea that the colonies must be, if nothing else, self-supporting’.320 As Rita Hinden, the South African-born Fabian economist pointed out, this focus on development funded only through locally-raised revenue meant that colonies became ‘caught in a vicious cycle of low productivity, low revenues, and low expenditure’, unable to afford public investment even when it might lead to higher profits.321 Tidrick draws a clear distinction between the ‘old imperial system’, where colonies had ‘puttered along as virtually independent satrapies’, and the new imperial attitude, which ‘involved the Colonial Office intimately in economic planning for the empire’ and ‘forced the British government to take a more visible interest in colonial welfare’.322

This newfound concern for the living conditions of the colonial populations led to social welfare development that mirrored the contemporaneous implementation of the British welfare state. This development of health and education services was also supported by the provision of transport and communication services. This type of development is not unproblematic, based as it was on a conception of African society that was fundamentally less developed – maybe even less civilised –

318 Minute from Ernest Bevin to Clement Attlee (draft), 7th July 1947, FO 371/62557; Stafford Cripps, speech on 12 November 1947, cited in Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, p. 131.
322 Tidrick, Empire and English Character, p. 256.
than Western Europe. However, the development projects carried out within this category were aimed more clearly at improving African quality of life than those with an economic slant.

The rhetoric of the civilising mission of the nineteenth century colonialists had changed in the post-war period to encompass economic and industrial progression over religious and social enlightenment, although the residue of the old imperialist world view persisted in some quarters. For example, in the House of Lords debate, Lord Altringham had been keen to reiterate the British duty of ‘bringing… Western knowledge and… Christian principles to the service of the African peoples’.323 There was a persistent belief in much of the British political establishment that the African labourers remained uneducated and uncivilised, with their ability to develop their own territories through agriculture or industry limited by their continued use of ‘primitive tools’.324 Development was therefore the next step in the British colonial experience; without some form of economic progression, the empire would not pay. These arguments were often used to support the provision of social welfare measures, as well as economic development programmes. An article in _Foreign Affairs_ in 1948 noted that a common criticism in Britain of colonial development was the prioritising of social welfare, but emphasised that clean water, medical supplies and technical education were themselves vital factors in economic progression.325

However, there were also exponents of this type of colonial development in Africa who can be classified as broadly altruistic, although their altruism was refracted through contemporary racial rhetoric and understanding. In the Overseas Development debate, the Lords emphasised that previous international economic slumps had affected the producers of primary goods in the Empire more severely than those employed in the mixed industries of the Dominions; it was therefore important to help the African colonial territories to expand and diversify their economies.326 Many speakers in the Lords commented on the British ‘obligation to these native populations, to lift them out of their low standard of existence and so to develop labour conditions and welfare schemes’, not only ‘to make them more efficient as producers’ but also to provide ‘a higher standard of life’.327 There was gratitude expressed for the way that the Commonwealth had ‘really saved the world in the first eighteen months of the war’ and a feeling that the Colonies should justly be included in the European development schemes.328 The new colonial relationship in Britain, which would give imperialism ‘an entirely new meaning’, was to be built around a partnership between the colonised and the colonisers.329

324 Lord Dukeston, ibid., c. 792.
327 Ibid., c. 792.
328 Ibid., c. 794.
329 Lord Faringdon, ibid., c. 805.
Many British politicians also hoped that, if they could ‘make the populations of the Colonies feel that they [were] progressing and [could] play a vital part themselves’, they would be less keen to demand political independence; if colonial populations could be made to feel that their societies were modernising, economically and eventually politically, through the judicious implementation of development policies, they might at least be prepared to wait until the (happily long-term) development schemes had matured.\textsuperscript{330} Joseph Morgan Hodge has argued that the new focus on development in imperial policy was borne as much from ‘fear and uncertainty about the future as arrogance and confidence in Western progress’. By focusing on ‘substandard living standards and inadequate government services’ as reasons for African discontent, the British could avoid dealing with these issues as ‘structural or political questions’, treating them instead as ‘technical problems that were remediable by large-scale government planning and state-directed welfare schemes’.\textsuperscript{331} Colonial administrators could therefore argue that the needs of the African colonies needed could be addressed within the framework of the British empire, without the need for political independence. For some people, whilst development was a response to nationalist movements within the Empire, it was not a recognition of legitimate demands; rather, it was an attempt to quash those demands with pseudo-concessions.

Although there was broad support government and the public for the development of the overseas territories, it is clear that motives for supporting developed varied between different departments. In his work on the ‘planned decolonization’ of British Africa, Robert Pearce identified a focus in the Ministry of Food and the Treasury on the ‘swift utilisation’ of colonial resources, in contrast to the ‘idealistic element’ in post-war Colonial Office policy.\textsuperscript{332} This is illustrated in a series of communications between the Treasury and the Colonial Office in early 1947. In March, J. B. Williams from the Colonial Office wrote a letter to the Treasury, in which he described British colonial development as attempting ‘to raise the general standard in Colonial territories’.\textsuperscript{333} Discussing this communication within the Treasury, Sir David Serpell suggested that it would serve his department best to remain as detached as possible from the development programmes as a whole; in his view, the Treasury was ‘not really in a position to judge anything except the balance between welfare and development (the latter being the more important to the Treasury)’.\textsuperscript{334} Serpell wrote to the Colonial Office that the ‘raising of standards brought about by CDW activities…should not be simply a raising of standards of welfare’, and reiterated that the Treasury would ‘attach particular importance to… economic development’, particularly that which would yield short-term results for the metropole.\textsuperscript{335} The Colonial Office response was dismissive, arguing

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., c. 806.
\textsuperscript{331} Hodge, \textit{Triumph of the Experts}, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{333} Williams to Helsby, 24 March 1947, T 220/200.
\textsuperscript{334} D R Serpell (Treasury) to Colonel Russell Edmonds (Treasury), n.d. (c. April 1947), T 220/200.
\textsuperscript{335} Serpell to Williams, 3 May 1947, T 220/200.
that ‘educational and health services’ were in fact ‘an essential pre-requisite of any attempt to raise the productive levels of a Colonial people’, and that the ‘combined results of both forms of development’ should be ‘judged over the long term rather than the immediate future’.336 Within the Treasury, this response was grudgingly accepted. It was asserted that the department had ‘always recognised’ that ‘to a large extent welfare interlocks with development’, and that ‘a worker’s productive power is enhanced in direct ratio to an improvement in his social conditions’, although the value of social welfare development in itself was not discussed.337

As Paul Kelemen notes, then, the Attlee government did not have a ‘distinct position on British policy in Africa’.338 Different government departments had very different priorities for Africa. However, to a large extent, colonial development policy was created by the Colonial Office, under Arthur Creech Jones, within the specific ideological framework that had been developed by the Colonial Secretary prior to his appointment. The intellectual background of Creech Jones is therefore pertinent to any explanation of British colonial development policy in this period.

**British Colonial Development: The Fabian Influence**

In 1940, in response to the debates surrounding the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, the Fabian Society established the Fabian Colonial Bureau in order to define clearly British left-wing thinking on imperialism. For twenty years it represented the most consistent left-wing intellectual response to the British Empire, developing into an important policy group. It commissioned research, which was disseminated across more than sixty territories in a journal, *Empire* (from 1949, *Venture*); briefed Labour Party MPs, many of whom were asked to sit on parliamentary committees; and campaigned on issues including independence and constitutional progression, economic development, the exploitation of natural resources in the empire, and rural and urban land use.

Many of the people involved in the creation of the FCB were to become influential in colonial government policy and academic study; as well as Arthur Creech Jones, who was its first Chairman, there was Rita Hinden, who edited and wrote much of the FCB’s journal; Margery Perham, the influential historian and anthropologist; and W. Arthur Lewis, the development economist; as well as Leonard Woolf, Frank Horrabin, and Margaret Cole. To raise publicity for the organisation, Creech Jones enlisted a panel of MPs to ask ‘Questions in Parliament’ on colonial issues, and the *Manchester Guardian* and the Reuter’s overseas correspondent were courted as sympathetic media contacts.339

336 H A Harding (Colonial Office) to Serpell, 18th June 1947, T 220/200.
The FCB was the ‘sole political research group devoting its efforts to colonial affairs’ during the period and, as such, had some public authority. The organisation has been characterised as the ‘only traceable Fabian influence upon the thinking of Members of Parliament’ during Attlee’s government (not least because of Creech Jones’s dual role), and as the ‘main inspiration’ for Labour’s imperial policies.\(^{340}\) The influence of the FCB was no doubt magnified by the previous lack of concentrated research within the Labour Party on imperial issues, which had been addressed only in the most ‘cursory manner’. Within this policy void, the Fabians ‘studied, debated, elaborated, criticised and honed down to desirable goals’ the most vital colonial issues.\(^{341}\)

Initially, the relationship between the FCB and the Colonial Office was somewhat tense, to the extent that Rita Hinden was unsure about continuing the project; however, Creech Jones persuaded her that it was important to persevere, in the belief that the Colonial Office would eventually appreciate the FCB’s analytical and constructive reports. The department did eventually realise that the Bureau was a useful resource in colonial research, and there developed a ‘friendly, as well as businesslike’ relationship between the Colonial Office and the FCB; Creech Jones himself built a number of personal relationships, as he used his position as an MP to regularly consult experts in the Colonial Office on various colonial issues.\(^{342}\) The Bureau also attracted representatives from the colonies, who visited the offices to share information and suggest areas for research. Hastings Banda, Jomo Kenyatta, Norman Manley and Nnamdi Azikiwe were all regular correspondents with the group.\(^{343}\)

The FCB did engage in some blanket criticisms of imperialism. The prominent anti-colonialist author Norman Leys wrote expressing anger at the social conditions of Africans in British territories, whom he believed enjoyed a ‘place in society…nearer to that of chattel slaves than to that of freemen’. However, the movement also aimed to change, rather than immediately bring to an end, British colonial rule in Africa. Leys himself promoted the idea of equal franchise conditions between the white and black communities as a way to address inequality.\(^{344}\) As a whole, members of the FCB were keen to stress that it was possible to be anti-imperialist without calling for immediate decolonisation, or supporting a laissez-faire approach from the metropole. Rita Hinden, writing in 1959 about the FCB and its role in post-war imperial policy, outlined Labour’s options when they came to power in 1945 and inherited a vast colonial empire:


\(^{341}\) Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organise, p. 198.

\(^{342}\) Ibid. p. 189.

\(^{343}\) Ibid. p. 194.

\(^{344}\) Memorandum No 205 by Norman Leys on ‘Labour’s Colonial Policy’ Labour Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions, with an appendix – February 1939, Box 16 file 2 ff. 23-30, Bodl. RH, Creech Jones MSS, MS Brit. Emp. s. 332.
To this massive legacy, the socialists were heirs; they had the duty to decide on its use. Enjoy it? No, that would have been a violation of socialist principle. Reject it outright, and so remain true to the anti-imperialism which socialists had always preached? Or, better still perhaps, accept the heritage, but with the determination to nurse and develop it for the advantage of its rightful owners till they themselves should have come of age?  

This writing is in itself problematic, with its reference to colonial peoples being too immature to rule their own territories. Hinden acknowledged that ‘poverty and backwardness’ in the colonies had been accentuated by imperialism, which had ‘extort[ed] the country’s wealth and alienat[ed] the land from the people’ through ‘taxation and forced labour… [and] the despoliation of the soil’. However, she and other Fabians also claimed that ‘even before the entry of imperialist powers, the colonial territories were poor and economically backward’ and that poverty might ‘be sooner cured by prolonging imperial rule’ than by hastening toward independence. Arthur Creech Jones himself believed that many problems in colonial societies were due to ‘the poverty of nature and the backwardness of people [who were] tied by tradition and tribalism and oppressed by ignorance and superstition’. It was the duty of socialist governments to act as ‘trustees’ to ‘develop and enrich’ the colonial territories for their own populations. In this way, most Fabians argued against immediate independence for the colonies, instead promoting development as a way to ready colonial populations for self-government. It was believed that ‘the gradualist approach, punctuated by the occasional leap in the dark’ was the correct way to proceed to widespread colonial independence.

Hinden argued that, although many colonies had been and could be granted independence ‘without any noticeable decline in their standards of living’, there were problems specific to the British empire that made immediate independence difficult: the ‘plural societies’ of colonies with high proportions of white settlers; the small size of some colonies, which were ‘non-viable little patches of earth’ that could might never achieve self-sufficiency; and the importance of the strategic colonies for British defence. Because of these issues, Hinden and other FCB members believed strongly that Britain could not simply abandon the empire to independence, as ‘evil is not undone simply by withdrawing from the scene of the crime’; Britain and the other colonial powers faced ‘a debt to history’ and their colonial territories.

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346 Ibid., p. 13.
349 Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organise, p. 199.
351 Ibid.
was not predicated on independence regardless of context: ‘Anti-imperialism? Yes. But non-interventionism? No’.352

Within the British Left, economic independence was seen as integral to political independence. One socialist speaker at Chatham House declared that it was ‘only on a secure economic foundation that schemes of social advance can be planned and carried out continuously’.353 However, in his government role, Creech Jones also focused heavily on the moral and political motivations for granting independence to the African colonies. He declared that ‘consultation and cooperation’ with native Africans was ‘required in the planning of all future development in Africa’, because African communities were knowledgeable about their own economies, infrastructures and societies. African people were naturally keen to be involved in these processes, because it was ‘their country’ and they wanted to see ‘their ideas in the schemes of change that are being worked out’. They no longer wanted so-called ‘“paternal” government’, and Creech Jones avowed his commitment to ‘speedy social and political changes in Africa’; he denounced the ‘shortsighted folly’ that led other politicians to ‘tinker and ameliorate and not to go all out for bold and imaginative development’.354

The Fabians argued stridently against the imperialists who wanted ‘to suggest that the British Empire is a blessing to the world, and, in particular, to the Natives’.355 Instead, the FCB promoted a new attitude to empire, based on collaboration and cooperation between colonized and colonizers. Arthur Creech Jones depicted an ‘honourable tradition’ of a progressive attitude towards colonial peoples which sprang from the British Labour movement, within which he grouped activists, such as William Wilberforce, with philanthropists, missionaries, administrators and colonial officials; Rita Hinden wrote that British socialists were ‘among the greatest Empire-reformers the world has seen’.356 This self-consciously reformist and progressive attitude towards Africa was a key element of Fabian colonial identity.

The FCB raised traditionally socialist concerns and applied them to the colonial territories. Creech Jones decried the fact that African wages were ‘determined only by what is necessary to keep a body and soul together on a level as low as human existence can just manage’, arguing that African agricultural workers could only achieve acceptable living standards when they received a fair price

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for the fruits of their labours. This rhetoric clearly echoed the earlier demands of socialists in the metropole. There was a focus within the FCB from the 1930s on the ‘riots and strikes’ within the non-self-governing empire, which did not ‘suggest contentment’ with the status quo and mirrored the political action taken by marginalised groups in Britain. Paul Kelemen, in his work on Kenya, has emphasised the development of ‘trade unions, co-operatives and local government’ as central to the ‘specific contribution’ of the Attlee government to ‘post-war metropolitan thinking on Africa and on the colonial question’. Venture, the FCB journal, heralded in 1950 the ‘existence of a thousand colonial trade unions with a membership of over 600,000’ and celebrated the work of British ‘trade union advisers who have brought the “know-how” of British unionism to the Colonies’.

Writing in 1959, Rita Hinden summarised the interests of the FCB to include such typical Fabian and socialist priorities as

the establishment of trade unions and cooperative societies, schools and welfare services
and the money to pay for them, grand projects of colonial development (and again the money to pay for them), irrigation, sanitation, the conservation of the soil, better prices for colonial products, the establishment of new industries.

These concerns, which included ‘anything and everything that would relieve the pressing burden of colonial poverty’ are clearly analogous to the welfare and labour issues that were demanded by Labour for British people in the metropole. They illustrate an identifiable left-wing ideology, which was co-opted into development policy by an amenable Colonial Office.

Several historians have examined the connection between the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the Labour government’s colonial policy in this period. Among others, Cowen and Shenton agree that post-war Labour Government’s efforts at colonial development can be located in Fabian thinking, which they link to Joseph Chamberlain and the development of ‘great estates’ in the empire. Their article focuses on economic development, and investigates the role of Fabian ideology in formulating ‘a doctrine of development which would meet the claims of liberalism within the

358 Buxton, ‘Note on Colonial Office Vote’, June 7th 1939, Box 16, File 2, ff. 61-63, Bodl. RH, Creech Jones MSS, MS Brit. Emp. s. 332.
362 Ibid.
363 See, for example, Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, pp. 90-127, 144-5; Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, pp. 113-164.
contours of a socialist version of trusteeship'. Arguably, however, the Fabian influence is most discernable in social welfare projects. Decision-making about colonial development was governed by an ideological conviction that it was necessary to improve the standards of living for colonial populations in the short- and long-term, primarily as a method of creating self-sufficient colonies that could progress toward self-government and, eventually, independence. Creech Jones and the FCB fundamentally believed that territories were only being held ‘in trust for the native inhabitants’, with the main aim of all colonial administration being ‘to train the native inhabitants in every possible way, so that they may be able in the shortest possible time to govern themselves’. For the Fabians, colonial development was intended to benefit local populations, and was thus central to the creation of new nations.

**British Development in Africa: Ideological Conflict.**

Not everybody in the British government acquiesced in the Fabian ideals of social welfare development and progression toward self-government. In January 1948, the British Cabinet held a meeting to consider a report by Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, which he had prepared after a tour across Africa. In this report, Montgomery advocated that Britain ‘advance, courageously, as did Cecil Rhodes’ to develop African land ‘in order that the British may survive’. He described the typical African as ‘a complete savage’, who needed controlling and manipulating in Britain’s interests, although he was also critical of many of the white settlers that he met on the continent, believing them to be indolent and lazy. His greatest concern for the continent was an ‘increasing social and political consciousness developing in the African peoples’ which must be managed as ‘a very great potential danger’.

When the Cabinet discussed this report, they emphasised that ‘in recent years much progress had been made in the economic development of the Colonies’. However, the context of international economic crisis and the continuing needs of British post-war reconstruction made it imperative to review colonial policy and its implementation. The colonies were of ‘vital importance’ to Britain because their economic promise and their strategic potential. It could not be guaranteed that the ERP would be ‘sufficient to restore the economic independence’ of Britain, and the government should therefore ‘look to the economic development of the Colonial territories in Africa’ and

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365 Memorandum by Creech Jones of Colonial Policy of Labour Administration, c. 1947, Box 4 file 4 f2-5, Bodl. RH, Creech Jones MSS, MS Brit. Emp. s. 332.
366 Montgomery’s tour included French Morocco and Belgian Congo as well as Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and South Africa.
368 The Ministers present were Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Ernest Bevin, Stafford Cripps, Lord Addison (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs) and Arthur Creech Jones; ‘Cabinet : Report by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on His Visit to Africa: Minutes of a Meeting of Ministers Held at No. 10 Downing Street, SW1, on Friday, 9th January, 1948 at 12 noon’, PREM 8/923, National Archives, Kew.
‘devote as much attention and energy to Colonial development’ as to European reconstruction.\textsuperscript{369} In the years prior to 1948, there had been ‘insufficient attention’ paid to the ‘integration’ of colonial policy with domestic economic policy, and it had therefore been ‘impossible’ to assess how far development in the colonies could contribute to the balance of payments issue.\textsuperscript{370} It was decided that a plan of development would be prepared that allowed for ‘full co-ordination… between the United Kingdom and the Colonies as a whole’, as well as between the plans for individual territories.\textsuperscript{371} For much of the Cabinet, then, the impetus for developing the territories was fear of the fate which might befall Britain without economic and strategic support from the imperial territories, although their language was not as crudely racist or imperialist as Montgomery’s.

At the Cabinet meeting, Creech Jones claimed to be ‘in agreement with the Chief of the Imperial Staff as to the importance of a quick and vigorous development of Africa’.\textsuperscript{372} However, the Colonial Secretary was deeply unhappy with the report. On receipt of Montgomery’s missive, he had prepared for the Cabinet a detailed reply, setting out the problems that he saw in the Field Marshal’s approach to Africa.\textsuperscript{373} This memorandum argued that a centralised ‘grand design or master plan’ for colonial development would ‘not be practical politics’ and would ‘conflict with [Britain’s] declared policy of devolution in the process of building up self-government’. The direct management of colonial economies from the metropole was fundamentally incompatible with the concept of greater African control over state and government, and the imposition of development plans would ‘not secure the cooperation of local people’, without which success would be impossible.\textsuperscript{374}

Creech Jones explained that, in his promotion of the economic exploitation of the empire, Montgomery had overestimated Africa’s material resources, and underestimated the amount of money which would be required from the metropole to implement any sort of grand development scheme. Africa was not an ‘undiscovered Eldorado’ but ‘a poor continent’ which could ‘only be developed at great expense of money and effort’. As well as capital shortages, the main factors retarding African economic growth were shortages of ‘capital goods, consumer goods and technical staff’, which were exacerbated by the requirements of the metropole for its own post-war reconstruction. Progress had been slow previously, not because of a lack of impetus from the colonial service – which far from being indolent and weak was in fact ‘a first-rate body of men’ – but because of a ‘lack of appreciation by past Governments’ of African needs, and a lack of money

\textsuperscript{369} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{373} Montgomery’s report was ready on 19 December 1947, and Creech Jones’ reply was prepared for the Cabinet meeting on 6 January 1948. As Ronald Hyam has pointed out, it ‘must have ruined his Christmas and New Year’. Hyam, ‘Africa and the Labour Government, 1945-51’, pp. 161-2.
\textsuperscript{374} Arthur Creech Jones, ‘Memorandum By the Secretary of State for the Colonies’, 6 January 1948, PREM 8/923.
‘through the old policy of making Colonies pay their way’. This would be rectified to a great extent by the CDW funds. Montgomery had claimed that there were ‘no plans for development’ in any of the British African territories, but this was ‘quite incorrect’. The Colonial Office had a ‘clear and well-understood’ policy that African colonial development would revolve around ten-year development plans drawn up by colonial administrations, in conjunction with regional plans which addressed inter-territorial issues.375

Creech Jones also addressed the political issues raised by the Field Marshal’s report. The Colonial Secretary argued that the only way to counter black African nationalism was to develop the ‘existing friendly relations with the African peoples through the existing policy of building up responsible native institutions’. The only way to counter the incipient nationalist movements in East Africa, which Creech Jones conceded might ‘well be a danger to the development of the territories concerned’, was to give the African people in these regions ‘a real part in the constructive work of government’; this policy had already proved successful in Gold Coast. He was also critical of Montgomery’s clear sympathies with the Union of South Africa and rejected any cooperation with the territory on issues of African nationalism. South Africa’s aim was ‘maintaining white supremacy’, whilst the British government wished to work towards ‘self-government for the Africans’; their ideologies were fundamentally incompatible.376

Creech Jones recorded in his private papers a more candid critique of Montgomery’s report on African development. The Field Marshal had produced the document, which was ‘exceptional’ only in its ‘astonishing superficiality’, after ‘a rapid and perfunctory flight over that vast continent’. He had demonstrated ‘amazing ignorance’ of the problems faced by the colonial territories and had offered nothing but ‘specious generalisations’, which were ‘too fatuous and ignorant’ for proper consideration by the Colonial Office. Creech Jones believed that ultimately, Montgomery was incapable of understanding the new direction of British imperial policy:

He wanted to fasten onto Africa a ‘master plan’ for imperial aims. He was blindly incapable of comprehending the work initiated for political freedom, the people’s development, and all the fundamental work on which the Africans could build their future. The Field Marshal might have the ability to conceive military campaigns, but his thoughts about human rights and development belong to an age which fortunately the world is rapidly leaving behind.377

375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
Some of the Cabinet clearly sympathised with Montgomery's views, but in the face of Creech Jones’ resolute opposition, and the report’s inflammatory language, it was felt that it would be impossible to use it as the basis for colonial policy. Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, warned Attlee that, although there was ‘general support’ for rapid colonial development in Africa to ‘support the political and economic position of the United Kingdom’, it was important to consider the likely public reception of such a provocative report:

I wonder whether Ministers have considered sufficiently the difficulties of defending this policy against the criticisms, and misrepresentation, which it may provoke? It could, I suppose, be said to fall within the ordinary definition of ‘Imperialism’. And, at the level of a political broadcast, it might be represented as policy of exploiting native peoples in order to support the standards of living of the workers in this country. This policy is doubtless inevitable – there are compelling reasons, both economic and international, for adopting it. But if it is disclosed incautiously or incidentally, without proper justification and explanation, may it not be something of a shock to Government supporters – and indeed, to enlightened public opinion generally? 378

Although development in Africa would bring ‘social and economic advantages to the native peoples in addition to buttressing the political and economic influence of the United Kingdom’, Brook stressed that this argument would be difficult to articulate to the British public, the African colonial population, and the international community. 379 Despite Hyam’s claim that ‘senior ministers took this report seriously’, Montgomery’s plan was not made public. 380 The document was suppressed until 1999, when it was released under the 50-year rule by the National Archives, and was received with great interest by the British press, who characterised it as a ‘racist masterplan’. 381

The controversy over Montgomery’s report demonstrates the inherent conflict within the British government over colonial development aims. The majority of the Cabinet was happy to support development that was aimed primarily at the economic progression of the metropole, although they were less willing to publicly admit that this was their main priority. Creech Jones and the Colonial Office, on the other hand, supported development policies that prioritised the needs of colonial governments and their populations (notwithstanding the thorny issues of minority government in the white settler colonies) over the desires and demands of the metropole. Colonial development plans would be funded by local revenue and through applications to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which was intended for ‘the creation of social capital’, and would thus yield no direct

378 Note from Norman Brook to Clement Attlee, 14 January 1948, PREM 8/923.
379 Ibid.
income for the metropole.\textsuperscript{382} Frank Heinlein has highlighted the resistance by Colonial Office officials 'on moral grounds' to any development plans that might engender exploitation, or even the perception of exploitation, of colonial populations for British financial gain.\textsuperscript{383} However, the colonial governments were not to be allowed to entirely determine the future of British policy in the continent; their schemes would be 'supplemented' by the programmes implemented through the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) and the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC).\textsuperscript{384}

**British Colonial Development: the Corporations.**

Regardless of Fabian high ideals about altruism and social welfare, it was imperative that colonial development in the context of the European Recovery Programme was 'sufficiently remunerative' to justify British investment at a time of great economic difficulty.\textsuperscript{385} In order to enable this, a system of development through corporations was established that allowed an explicit focus on potentially profitable development schemes and research projects. The Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation, both established after debates within the British Government between 1947 and 1948, were central actors in post-war British colonial development.

The Overseas Food Corporation was initially discussed and established in connection with the East African Groundnuts Scheme in Tanganyika, perhaps the most infamous and ill-fated example of a post-war British colonial development project. John Strachey, the British Minister for Food and a staunch proponent of overseas development to aid domestic food shortages, first introduced the project to the Government in January 1947, recommending that 'a short and not very controversial Bill should be introduced as soon as possible to establish a public Corporation'.\textsuperscript{386}

Once the idea of the Overseas Food Corporation had been raised, Creech Jones was keen to establish another corporation that could be more generally applied to 'the development for new sources of supply of foodstuffs and raw materials from the Colonies'.\textsuperscript{387} The concept of a general Colonial Development Corporation had already been explored by Viscount Wyndham Portal, the Chairman of the Colonial Economic and Development Council (CEDC). In a note presented to the Council, Portal had outlined the humanitarian basis for development in the British colonies; the CDW Acts were essentially 'catching up with arrears of past obligations' by 'bringing up to tolerable standards the basic public services' in the African territories.\textsuperscript{388} Development could not be


\textsuperscript{383} Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation*, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{384} Creech Jones, ‘Memorandum By the Secretary of State for the Colonies’, 6 January 1948, PREM 8/923.

\textsuperscript{385} Arthur Creech Jones, ‘Circular Despatch to The Officer Administering the Government of (All Colonies, Protectorates and Mandates)’, 10th July 1947, CO 537/2002.

\textsuperscript{386} John Strachey, East African Groundnuts Scheme: Memorandum by the Minister of Food, 4th January 1947, CAB 129/16, National Archives.

\textsuperscript{387} Minute, SC to CG Eastwood, 21st March 1947, CO 537/2002.

\textsuperscript{388} CEDC: Note by the Chairman on the formation of a Colonial Development Corporation’, n.d., CO 999/4 (Colonial Economic and Development Council: Papers), National Archives.
‘efficiently discharged by the scattered efforts of small organisations Colony by Colony’ but would require a centralised ‘new instrument of development’. The CDC would work ‘in the interests of [Britain] itself quite as much as in those of the Colonies’, as its imperial projects would provide ‘increased quantities of the food and raw materials’ for the metropole. This would enable the colonies ‘to support higher standards of living from their own resources’, whilst simultaneously helping to relieve the dire British balance of payments position. The Corporation would be required ‘to work in the closest harmony and co-operation with Colonial Governments concerned in any particular enterprise’, and the ‘full consent’ of colonial authorities would be sought before a project commenced.389

Creech Jones brought these plans to Attlee’s attention, suggesting that a corporation should be created with functions ‘analogous to those of the two Finance Corporations’ set up after the Second World War.390 This would ‘make it possible to initiate big or small projects of enterprise and production’ and would help Great Britain by ‘stimulating increased production in the Colonies of raw materials of short supply’, whilst also promoting ‘considerable benefit to the Colonies themselves’. The Colonial Secretary was optimistic that the proposed Corporation would thus ‘meet a big gap – perhaps the principal gap’ in British colonial development.391

On 17th June 1947, after an extensive research process, the Treasury met with representatives from the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Food to organise the monetary provision for the CDC and the OFC. From this point onwards, the two Corporations were almost always envisaged acting in tandem to best serve the interests of Great Britain and the colonial territories.392 Accordingly, the Overseas Food Corporation and the Colonial Development Corporation were combined in one Bill, and the Colonial Office generally approached colonial development through a unified mandate, which attempted to integrate the production of food, the increase of foreign exports, the earning of dollars and the general improvement of colonial welfare.

Creech Jones publicly addressed the concept of colonial development through corporate activity in the Colonial Affairs Committee debate on 29th July 1947. In his speech, he emphasised that the colonial territories were ‘anxious that their affairs should receive the closest attention of the British Government’, because of the unique challenges that they were facing.393 Since the end of the war, it had been necessary

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389 Ibid.
390 Arthur Creech Jones to Clement Attlee, 26th March 1947, CO 537/2002. The Finance Corporations to which Creech Jones refers were the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation and the UK Finance Corporation for Industry, both established in 1945 – they were established to provide long-term capital funding to small and large businesses in the national interest. See Sir John Anderson, HC Debate, 23rd January 1945, vol. 407, c. 644.
391 Creech Jones to Attlee, 26th March 1947.
to transform the territories back to normal peace-time conditions, to adjust their individual economies, to absorb their military forces, to restore the ravages of war, to review the colonial services, to cope with neglect and disturbance and grievances, to satisfy the claims of nationalism and expanding freedom, to discuss the highly controversial problems of international policy, to deal with planning in conditions of fluctuating economies and to make practical demonstrations, in spite of the shortages of manpower, materials and skills, of our desire to serve the colonial peoples in peace as in war.394

The immensity of the task meant that it was impossible to rely on ‘directives from the Colonial Office or the Government of the day’; development would require the British government not only to implement ‘principles and policies’ in the territories, but also to recognise that the Empire was ‘advancing to some degree of responsible self-government’.395 Development schemes needed to be created with provisions for the eventual handover of control to newly-independent governments, and so projects would have to eventually generate a profit to enable their continued operation. In this way, the development corporations were part of a long-term plan for African self-determination. Creech Jones expressed his certainty that the Colonial Development Corporation would ‘give additional encouragement and practical aid to both private and public enterprise’ in the colonies, whilst also financing schemes which would contribute to the ‘permanent economies of the territories concerned’; the ‘Overseas Foodstuffs [sic] Corporation’ would be initially preoccupied with the fledgling groundnuts scheme.396

The drafting of the Bill took place over the summer of 1947, within the context of Marshall Plan debates and European conventions on colonial development. The first draft was produced in September 1947, after extensive discussions between the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Food. Although it had been established that the Bill would include both the OFC and the CDC, there was some opposition to this from within the Colonial Office. Much of this came from Ivor Thomas (Lab, Keighley), who had been Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies until 7th October; he had lost his place in a Cabinet reshuffle amid a general belief that he was becoming dissatisfied with Attlee’s attempt at creating a socialist state.397

One of Thomas’s last actions as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies had been to send a memorandum to the Prime Minister, in which he expressed a variety of reasons why he felt that colonial development should be operated purely through the Colonial Office, without influence

394 Ibid., c. 264.
395 Ibid.
396 Ibid., c. 279-80.
397 He left the Labour Party the next year and stood unsuccessfully as the Conservative candidate for Newport in the 1950 General Election.
from the Ministry of Food. These included the fact that the Bill did not delineate clearly enough the
remits of the two Corporations, either by action or by geographical focus; the ‘big repercussions’
that a ‘rich and powerful Government corporation’ would have on the economies, society and
politics of the colonies involved; the possible reactions of the colonial territories who might ‘fear
that the emphasis in development would be on the benefit of the United Kingdom and not on the
benefit of the Colonies’ if the Ministry of Food were involved; and possible opposition to the Bill in
its current state from the Conservative Party. Oliver Stanley had indeed made his feelings clear some
time before the first reading of the Bill; in a message to the Prime Minister included in the appendix
of Thomas’s report, he had said that the Conservatives intended to ‘oppose the responsibility of the
Ministry of Food’ for any part of colonial development, because of the ‘tremendous difficulties’
which might emerge if the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not maintain overall control.398

The Ministry of Food objected strongly to the Thomas memorandum. They felt that there was
undue focus on limiting the powers of the OFC in the colonies, when ‘Unilever’s or any other
private firm’ would be able to undertake food production development schemes in the colonial
empire. This would mean that the Government was effectively ‘imposing limitations on its own
chosen instrument of Socialist development which it would not impose on any Capitalist
organisation’.399 Preventing the OFC from operating in colonial territories might ‘lead to a waste of
its specialist knowledge and experience’; food production on the scale required in the colonies was ‘a
highly complex and technical problem’ and required a specialist organisation.400 Strachey also
contested the idea that the use of the OFC and the Ministry of Food would lead to feelings of
exploitation in the colonial empire, saying

I confess that this argument seems to me far-fetched. It is based on a distinction which it
is imagined that the native peoples of the Colonies will themselves draw between the
characters of the two Corporations… I personally find it almost discriminating as to look
on the Colonial Development Corporation as a beneficent fairy godmother and on the
Overseas Food Corporation as a sort of monstrous predatory vampire.401

Ultimately, although Thomas claimed that his objections were shared by Creech Jones and Lord
Trefgarne, the matter was effectively resolved with the Cabinet reshuffle. By mid-October, David
Rees-Williams, Thomas’s replacement as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, was reporting
that the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Food had ‘arrived at a compromise’ which was
agreeable to both parties, who were happy to see the two corporations created and governed
through the same piece of legislation. In order to avoid the ‘political difficulties’ which might arise

398 Stanley, Appendix (Statement by Mr Stanley), 1st October 1947, PREM 8/456.
399 Memorandum by the Minister of Food (Strachey to PM), 6th October 1947, PREM 8/456.
400 Ibid.
401 Ibid.
from unbridled OFC activity in the empire, there was an agreement between the two departments that the organisation would ‘not engage in any activities in a Colonial territory except at the express invitation’ of the Colonial Office.\textsuperscript{402} A representative from the Ministry of Food cautiously anticipated that the finished draft represented ‘a reasonable hope of smooth working for the future’.\textsuperscript{403} All that remained was for Parliament to be persuaded likewise.

In a letter to all Colonial Governors just before Christmas 1947, Arthur Creech Jones outlined the process of British parliamentary procedure and correctly predicted that the development corporations bill would be passed ‘early in the New Year’. He expressed his ‘earnest desire’ that colonial governments would give their ‘fullest and most sympathetic collaboration’ to the nascent corporations. Their ‘primary task’ was to assist the development of colonial resources in order to ‘strengthen the resources of the sterling group as a whole’, and thus provide ‘considerable benefit to all the members of that group and not only to the Colonies themselves’.\textsuperscript{404} There was little fanfare in the letter, which outlined the process by which the colonial governors could approach the corporations for development assistance, and emphasising the collaborative nature of the proposed schemes. However, the Overseas Resources Development Bill would fundamentally shape post-war British colonial policy.

**The Overseas Resources Development Bill**

The Overseas Resources Development Bill was first read in the House of Commons on 23\textsuperscript{rd} October 1947. It was presented by John Strachey and supported by Creech Jones, Stafford Cripps, Ernest Bevin and Philip Noel-Baker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Creech Jones and Cripps were possibly not best pleased to be described by Ivor Thomas as ‘imperialists of long standing’.\textsuperscript{405} However, their support of the Bill represented approval from that section of the Party historically interested in colonial matters, compared to MPs who were rather more recent converts to the cause.

As had been agreed, the Bill provided for the establishment of a Colonial Development Corporation ‘for securing development in the colonial territories’ and an Overseas Food Corporation ‘for securing the production or processing of foodstuffs or other products in places outside the United Kingdom, and the marketing thereof’.\textsuperscript{406} During the Parliamentary debates, it became clear that the CDC and the OFC would mainly focus on development within the African continent. In an early question session, David Rees-Williams made it clear that it would be ‘primarily for the Board to determine’ what projects it would undertake, given the ‘wide powers proposed under the Bill’, but

\begin{footnotes}
\item Rees-Williams to Attlee, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1947, PREM 8/456.
\item LM to Attlee, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1947, PREM 8/456.
\item Arthur Creech Jones to The Officer Administering the Government Of : All Colonies, Protectorates and Mandates (except Ceylon and Malta), 17\textsuperscript{th} December 1947, CO 537/2002.
\item Ivor Thomas, HC Debate, 6\textsuperscript{th} November 1947, vol. 244, c. 2047.
\item Overseas Resources Development Bill, HC Debates, 23\textsuperscript{rd} October 1947, vol. 443, c. 236.
\end{footnotes}
added that he had ‘no doubt’ that ‘enterprises in Africa will be very much in their minds’.407

John Strachey began the debate at the Second Reading of the Bill with a detailed exposition of the functions and budgets of the two proposed corporations. The Colonial Development Corporation was to be financed through loans or advances from the Exchequer of up to £100 million ‘at risk at any one moment’; additionally, it could borrow short term loans of up to £10 million.408 The CDC was intended to ‘undertake every kind of development within Colonial territory’, and would also become the managing agency for the Government in territories where development was being undertaken. Overall, the CDC would be expected to ‘undertake in Colonial territories all those schemes which involve the improvement and developing of existing methods of production’, focusing on both ‘natives’ and white producers.409 It would be confined to operating within British colonies but would have almost no limits imposed on the type of project it could promote; whilst there might sometimes be a concerted focus on the production of ‘great primary products’ such as coal or minerals, the Corporation would also be empowered to produce agricultural produce and foodstuffs.410

The Overseas Food Corporation, by contrast, would be a smaller body with a budget of up to £50 million, plus another £5 million available in short term loans.411 It would be responsible to the Ministry of Food, in contrast to the CDC which would be managed by the Colonial Office, and would be concerned with the ‘production or the promotion of production of food and agricultural products’. It would therefore operate in colonies where the production of foodstuffs required the development of ‘very large schemes on virgin lands’, such as the East Africa Groundnuts Scheme.412 The OFC would not be confined to the British Colonies and could, if desired, work with Dominion or foreign governments as a managing agency; however, it could only undertake projects which were directly concerned with agriculture and food production.413

The Overseas Resources Development Bill was felt by its authors to be uncontroversial. Oliver Stanley remarked that, in the midst of ‘furios Debates’ on many subjects in the autumn of 1947, the Bill provided a pleasant ‘lull’ for MPs; the legislation appeared to be ‘a Measure on which it is possible for all sections of the House to unite’, because the issue of colonial development was ‘not of a party character’.414 However, despite the broad consensus which appeared to surround colonial

410 Ibid., c. 2021.
413 Ibid., c. 2023.
414 Oliver Stanley, HC Debate, ibid., c. 2035.
development, there was still considerable debate on the details of its implementation.\footnote{The Bill underwent 42,096 words of debate on its second reading, compared to the 45,812 words devoted to the second reading three weeks later of the highly contested National Assistance Bill formally proposing the creation of the welfare state; ‘Overseas Resources Development Bill’, \textit{HC Debate}, 6th November 1947, vol. 443 cc. 2016-2121, and ‘National Assistance Bill’, \textit{HC Debate}, 24th November 1947, vol. 444 cc. 1603-1716.}

Many of the areas of debate concerning the Overseas Resources Development Bill were minor, being focused on the clarification of small details or the exposition of subjects in which the enquirer was a specialist. As the representative of the Scottish Universities, for example, Sir John Graham Kerr was keen to speak about the ‘importance of investigation and research’ into public health and agricultural products in the colonies.\footnote{Sir John Graham Kerr, \textit{HC Debate}, 6th November 1947, vol. 244, cc. 2064-7.} Similarly, Jean Mann (Scottish Lab, Coatbridge) welcomed the proposed legislation ‘as a housewife’ who wanted to see an increase in the fat allowances, and spoke for some time about the difficulties faced by women trying to cook on existing rations.\footnote{Jean Mann, \textit{HC Debate}, 6th November 1947, vol. 244, cc. 2080-81.}

However, there were some MPs who criticised aspects of the Attlee Government’s approach to overseas development.

Firstly, there was some consternation on the Opposition benches about the general tone surrounding the new measures; much of these criticisms and queries were voiced by Stanley, in his position as the Conservative former Secretary of State for the Colonies. Despite welcoming the positive nature of the debates, Stanley objected to the idea that the CDC represented an innovation in overseas development, as under his direction the CDW Act had encouraged ‘the setting up of different corporations in the major Colonies’, although these had been initiated and operated from within the Colonies themselves.\footnote{Oliver Stanley, \textit{HC Debate}, 6th November 1947, vol. 244, c. 2036.} He also strongly disapproved of the ‘ungenerous and untrue party propaganda’ surrounding the Bill; as the previous architect of colonial policy, it is not surprising that he objected to the tendency by many of the ‘less knowledgeable or perhaps… less scrupulous’ supporters of the Labour Party to contrast the ‘great spirit of enterprise of [Attlee’s] Government with the neglect of the Colonial territories in the past’. The tendency to frame the debate on colonial development in these terms had been picked up by the press, with Labour policies even having ‘incurred the approval of Lord Beaverbrook’ and the Daily Express, although Stanley correctly predicted this support to be ‘transitory’.\footnote{Ibid, c. 2037.} Frustration with the negative press coverage of the Conservative record on imperialism may have been the impetus behind some of the personal attacks directed at the architects of the Bill. Edgar Granville (Lib, Eye) claimed both that he could not visualise the Minister of Food as a ‘great Empire Builder’, and that he was terrified by the prospect of him having any sort of power in the colonial territories, whilst dismissing Lord Trefgarne, the proposed leader of the CDC, as neither ‘a great pioneer or a man with a mission’.\footnote{Edgar Granville, ibid., c. 2057.}
The supporters of the Bill were keen to defend their position as modernising and benevolent colonial innovators. At one point in the debate, Rees-Williams, frustrated by continual interruptions from Conservative MPs, declared that the Labour Government was ‘up against the years which the locusts have eaten’, in which the Conservatives had perpetuated a ‘19th century policy’ of only ‘slow and haphazard economic development’, provoking a furious response from the Opposition benches.421 However, generally Labour attempted to be conciliatory, mindful of the need to utilise Conservative support, both in passing the Bill and in implementing policies. Attlee’s government had won a landslide, but even with a majority of 145 seats they needed to cooperate with the Opposition whenever possible, given their status as a young political party who were fundamentally opposed to or by many of the traditional sources of power within Great Britain. Strachey therefore dismissed claims that the Conservative Party had been guilty of neglect of the colonial territories as ‘not universally valid’, and commended the ‘great deal of development’ that had been concentrated in areas like tin and rubber in Malaya and copper in Rhodesia.422

As well as objecting to the tone of debate, Stanley also criticised the way in which the legislation had been ‘entrusted’ to the Minister of Food to send through Parliament, when the publicity surrounding the Bill had proclaimed it to be ‘a great act of Colonial statesmanship’. He argued that if the primary benefit of the corporations was to be aimed at colonial peoples, the Bill should have instead been chaperoned by the Colonial Office.423 Stanley contrasted the terms of the CDW Act, which he saw as a selfless ‘£120 million free gift of the taxpayers of this country to be used exclusively for the benefit and development of the Colonies themselves’, with the Overseas Resources Development Act, which was ‘to be used on a commercial basis primarily for the benefit of the consumers in this country’.424 Strachey responded by pointing out that developing commodities required in Britain and Europe would bring positive results for colonial populations:

> the Colonial territory in question will be most benefited by producing the commodity of which there is the greatest world shortage, for which there is the greatest world demand, and for which, other things being equal, they will get the best price. Therefore, the development will benefit both us, the world, and the primary producer of the commodity.425

Other Conservative critics of the Bill focused on the finances of development. Alan Lennox-Boyd (Con, Mid Bed) questioned the idea that the proposals would aid the British dollar situation.426

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421 Rees-Williams, ibid., cc. 2217-8; Stanley retorted, ‘do not expect any help from us if that is the attitude’, Stanley, ibid., c. 2218.
422 Strachey, ibid., c. 2016.
423 Ibid., cc. 2035-6.
424 Ibid., cc. 2037-8.
425 John Strachey, ibid., c. 2038.
426 Lennox-Boyd would later become Secretary of State for the Colonies, and would oversee the independence of Cyprus, Ghana, Iraq, Malaya and Sudan, as well as the Mau-Mau uprising and the Hola atrocity.
Lennox-Boyd criticised Jean Mann and others who ‘seemed to think that there was some chance in these new proposals of saving dollars’, claiming that, because the majority of the goods produced by the colonial territories were products which the United States needed to import, rather than export, no dollars would be saved.427 This criticism was flawed. Even if Lennox-Boyd had been correct in stating that the colonies could only produce goods of which the United States was an importer, rather than replacing items which Britain currently imported from the United States with substitutes from the Sterling Area, this would still have earned dollars for the Empire. In fact, as Colonel Charles Ponsonby (Con, Sevenoaks) made clear, in Northern and Southern Rhodesia alone there was the possibility of producing commodities which could be either ‘dollar earning [or] dollar saving’, such as tobacco, chrome, copper and coal.428

Stanley also emphasised the long term nature of development under the corporations, bluntly stating that people had ‘no right to expect, from any schemes under this Bill, any relief from the immediate crisis over the next two years’ and that ‘not only must people not expect anything immediately, but they ought not to be led to expect too much’ from programmes such as the groundnuts scheme.429 In fact, it had always been intended that the corporations would focus on long term projects, because any attempt at African colonial development would ‘involve something like a social revolution’ in labour and mechanisation.430

Stanley’s final objection to the Overseas Resources Development Bill surrounded the proposed structure of the corporations. He objected strongly to the ‘illogical and incomprehensive’ allocation of duties between the OFC and the CDC, dismissing the organisation of the two corporations as the most ‘cock-eyed set-up’ that he had ever seen.431 Although Stanley acknowledged that it could be necessary for two corporations to be created, he felt that this should result in a logical separation of activity; one organisation for agriculture and another for industry, or one for colonial territories and another for all other regions. He could not fathom the need for ‘a division of function and region’ which left ‘some areas and some functions common to both’ with ‘other functions and other areas which… neither of the two [could] undertake’.432 This objection was rooted in Stanley’s distrust of the Ministry of Food. He felt that whilst ‘all developments of any kind’ should be placed under the remit of the Colonial Office, unfortunately the Minister of Food was ‘the cuckoo in the nest [who] got into the groundnuts nest pretty early… and all the flustered flutterings of the hen birds from the Colonial Office have never managed to get him out’.433 Stanley was concerned that the role of the Ministry of Food would create suspicion in Africa, since as a department it was concerned primarily

428 Colonel Charles Ponsonby, ibid., e. 2091.
429 Stanley, ibid., c. 2039.
432 Ibid.
433 Ibid.
with the welfare of the domestic British public; he predicted that the Bill would lead to a situation in which ‘the Minister of Food creates the difficulties and the Secretary of the Colonies has to solve them’.  

Some of Stanley’s criticisms of the Bill were echoed in debate by Ivor Thomas. Thomas had remained a supporter of colonial development after his removal from Cabinet, and in the House of Commons Debate he noted that ‘a Bill must be very good in these days of rising party feeling when the Opposition can commend it so warmly’. Thomas himself was particularly impressed with the clause that allowed the CDC to maintain projects in any territory that had been under colonial control at the time of the CDW Act in 1940, as this would allow for the continuation of development schemes when a territory had ‘marche[d] along to its constitutional destiny’ and gained independence. He also took the opportunity to promote the improvement of transportation in Africa, which had been identified as a problem integral to the idea of colonial development and would prove vital to the successful implementation of development schemes.

However, Thomas had been relieved of his duties in the Colonial Office before it and the Ministry of Food had agreed ‘the division of functions’ between the two corporations. Thomas criticised this division of control over the OFC and CDC, agreeing with Stanley’s assertion that the Ministry of Food would carry an unnecessary stigma of exploitation in the African territories, compared to the Colonial Office which had a ‘reputation as the trustee for the interests of people in the Colonies’. Nevertheless, Thomas was ultimately unwilling to oppose more firmly what he saw as an ‘act of departmental baby-snatching’ by the Ministry of Food, because of the practicalities of the existing groundnuts scheme. Embracing the kidnapping metaphor, he declared that the ‘custody of the child’ had been given to the Minister of Food and ‘it would be very disturbing to his upbringing if he were now transferred to other hands’. In addition, he conceded that the scheme was taking place on hitherto undeveloped land, which meant that there would be fewer ‘complicated questions of land tenure and local custom’ than might arise in more developed regions. In concluding, Thomas was generous in his praise for a Bill with which he was no longer directly involved, describing the proposed legislation as a ‘landmark’ in British, as well as African, economic development. He also hailed ‘the most hopeful signs’ of cooperation in Western Europe, which might lead not only to European political unity but also to coordination of African policy, which would enable a ‘United Western Europe’ to utilise ‘Africa as its hinterland, developing a great

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434 Ibid.
436 Ibid., c. 2053.
437 Ibid., c. 2054.
438 LM to Attlee, 16th October 1947, PREM 8/456.
440 Ibid., cc. 2049-50.
agriculture and a great flow of materials for the industries in Europe’.

This idealistic support for the grand mission narrative of development envisaged in the Bill was echoed by other MPs, including Thomas ‘Fred’ Peart (Lab, Workington), who made a speech hailing ‘the use of public corporations in the field of Colonial development as an opportunity to fulfil some of those obligations’ that Britain owed to the colonial populations. Peart expressed his hope that ‘the two new corporations w[ould] not be white bureaucracies superimposed upon backward peoples’, and called for Parliament to eschew ‘a one-way traffic of goods, products, raw materials and valuable minerals’ and instead support the ‘stimulation of native productivity’ in order to ‘improve the standard of living of the native worker and the native primary producer’.

Ultimately it was this positive attitude to the possibilities presented by the Overseas Resources Development Bill that carried it through Parliament. There was some discussion in the Third Reading of passing an amendment proposed by Stanley, which would allow for schemes ‘formulated or…carried out by the Overseas Food Corporation’ to be forcibly transferred to the CDC by the direct order of His Majesty in Council, if he so wished; after lengthy objections by the supporters of the original draft, this motion was defeated by 252 to 133. A second amendment, which would have stopped the OFC from undertaking any projects within colonial territories beyond the East African Groundnuts Scheme, which was already in progress, was also heavily defeated. However, an amendment introduced by John Strachey, which compelled the OFC to include ‘persons having knowledge of the circumstances and requirements of the inhabitants of the territory obtained by their being or having been themselves inhabitants thereof or residents therein’ on any committees connected to development schemes in the colonies, was passed; this was a clear concession to the objection raised in the Second Reading, that the Ministry of Food might lack either experience or credentials in colonial development. Stanley was therefore happy to proffer the support of the Conservative Party for the Bill as a whole. He emphasised that the points on which the two Parties differed were ‘only a very small part of the Bill itself’, the general principles of which all were in agreement. He also, on behalf of the Opposition, wished the ‘greatest success’ to the two Corporations, believing as he did that their success would represent ‘great advantage’ both to Great Britain and the Colonial Empire. Strachey welcomed this support, stressing that the British position was ‘really too grave to warrant any indulgence in… particular opinions on the methods of overseas development’. Development in the colonies was ‘a life and death matter for the economy’

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441 Ibid., c. 2055.
442 Thomas Fred Peart, Ibid., c. 2062.
of Great Britain and Europe as a whole, and the country must ‘set an example to other countries with resources which might join in one form or another… in the development to the greatest possible extent of primary production throughout the world’.447

At the end of the Third Reading of the Bill, Arthur Creech Jones asserted that the proposed legislation was ‘as much designed for the purpose of meeting the needs of the world’ as for ‘meeting the special needs of the Colonial peoples’, and reiterated the importance of economic progression in helping colonial populations to reach ‘a higher stage of social development’.448 The Colonial Secretary declared that he had ‘no apprehension’ about the role of the OFC in colonial development and emphasised that the Colonial Office would ‘still carry a general responsibility in regard to the whole of the economic development of the territories’, regardless of whether the CDC or OFC was operating within individual colonies.449 Creech Jones also outlined the progress which had been made with the practical creation of the CDC. Lord Trefgarne had been officially invited to be Chairman of the Corporation, with Sir Frank Stockdale as his deputy; both of these positions were full-time with salaries of £5,000 and £3,000 p.a. respectively.450 Stockdale would also be a member of the OFC, and as such would be the ‘interlocking point of the interlocking directorates’.451 The Board was to be part-time, with remuneration of £500 per member p.a.; those selected included specialists in development, finance and scientific research.452 The progress made to date was supported by Stanley, who applauded both the general framework of the CDC, and the specific selection of a ‘number of highly respected people of exactly the type of experience which would seem desirable for a Corporation of this kind’.453

At the end of this Third Reading, the Bill was passed by the House of Commons. It proceeded to the House of Lords, where it proved as non-divisive as predicted; there was more than ‘a little self-congratulation’ about the quality of debate and the lack of serious objections to the draft.454 The Overseas Resources Development Bill was duly passed on its Third Reading on 10th February 1948.455

The Development Corporations in Action

Despite the initial optimism surrounding the Overseas Resources Development Bill, the programmes undertaken by both the OFC and the CDC were beset by problems caused by poor planning, lack of specialist knowledge, lack of attention to local conditions and unrealistic

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447 Strachey, ibid., c. 141.
448 Creech Jones, ibid., c. 133.
449 Ibid., cc. 133-4.
450 Ibid., cc. 135-6.
451 Strachey, ibid., c. 140.
452 Arthur Creech Jones, c. 136.
453 Stanley, c. 136-7.
expectations for change. These problems were compounded by the very vague mandate for development enjoyed by both Corporations. There was little public – or even elite – understanding of the aims of the CDC and OFC, and very little conception of realistic aims for development programmes. Some of the practical issues surrounding development in the colonies are explored in Chapter Five; however, there were also key problems in the organisation and administration of the CDC and OFC themselves.

In a pamphlet published in 1949, the CDC attempted to describe clearly its role within the colonies. According to this publication, the CDC was to focus mainly on the development of agricultural production, as this sector was ‘basic to the economy of the majority of the Colonies’, although there would be ‘many other and varied projects’ aimed to meet ‘primarily local requirements as well as producing for export’. The CDC claimed somewhat dubiously that the policy of overseas development would ‘benefit primarily the Colonies themselves’; the corporation acknowledged that there would also be ‘important secondary advantages to the British Commonwealth as a whole’, as well as to ‘the rest of the world’. Despite a focus on improving ‘social conditions’ in the colonies, the CDC justified its focus on economic programmes with the assertion that ‘improved Government and social services’ had ‘already been covered’ by the CDW acts in 1940 and 1945. The report declared that making profits was not ‘a main purpose of the Corporation’, whilst simultaneously acknowledging that the CDC had to ‘pay its way’, the same as any other commercial concern.

The programmes that were to be undertaken by the CDC could not be ‘hastily prepared and put into operation’, but instead required detailed planning, examination and investigation of conditions, to avoid burdening colonial economies with ‘unsound enterprises’, or wasting CDC resources on projects undertaken with ‘undue optimism’. However, there would be ‘some preference’ given to short-term projects and those based on expanding existing areas of production, in light of the ‘general economic situation’ within which the corporation was operating. Despite the claims about acting primarily in colonial interests, the ‘dollar-earning and dollar-saving prospects of a scheme’ would be part of the ‘principle criteria governing the acceptability of any project’. Perhaps understandably, given the vague goals set for development, the CDC wished ‘to discourage expectations of early production on a large scale’ (although it hoped to ‘apply to its task the utmost sense of urgency’), and warned the general public not to ‘expect detailed reports during the early

457 Ibid., p. 1.
458 Ibid., pp 1-2.
459 Ibid., pp. 3-5.
stages of the Corporation’s activities’. The CDC promised instead to provide ‘the fullest
information about its activities’ at the ‘appropriate time’.460

If British colonial development suffered to a large extent from a vagueness of mandate, the
presence of independence movements and nationalist agitation in the British African colonies
further complicated the ideology of ‘development’. If development was intended to help the
colonial peoples, it was not entirely clear that it would be gratefully received; if, on the other hand,
development was merely a way to make colonial rule more productive and extractive, its efficiency
would be dulled by uncooperative indigenous populations. In the Annual Report of the Colonial
Development Corporation for 1948, a paragraph devoted to ‘Political Conditions’ in the colonies
outlined the difficulties of working in territories with a ‘changing political outlook’, particularly in
the context of ‘stimulated agitation against British political influence, and… European participation
in commercial development’, although it was conceded that territories where this was a concern
were ‘in number negligible’.461 The Colonial Office received this section of the report with
irritation; any reference to a number of ‘politically undesirable’ territories might lead to public
pressure for the Colonial Secretary to outline which colonies were considered to fall into this
category, and ‘unfortunate results’ would probably ensue from revealing specific names.462 It was
supposed that Lord Trefgarne, the Chairman of the CDC, was behind this reference, which was
assumed to be directed towards the Gold Coast; Colonial Office civil servants noted that Trefgarne
was ‘hardly rational’ in his approach to the territory, which seemed to have ‘got under [his] skin’.463

The possibility of antagonising African populations through the pursuit of colonial development
plans was acknowledged by many of the figures involved, and there was some attempt to manage
the political impact of increased metropolitan interference in the territories. This was not altogether
successful. By March 1948, Gorell Barnes at the Colonial Office was reporting that the subject of
colonial development had become ‘pretty explosive’ in African territories, where there were vocal
protests that Britain and other European colonial powers were ‘turning to Colonial “exploitation”
as a solution’ to the economic crisis.464 The Cabinet Office acknowledged in a note on the ERP that
this was a subject of ‘considerable’ discussion within the Empire, blaming Russian propaganda
about European colonial oppression. They cautioned therefore that the ‘greatest care’ must be
taken to ensure that colonial populations recognised that development of production in the
territories was not in fact ‘solely designed to enable the United Kingdom to meet its obligations
under ERP’.465 This echoed Sir Norman Brook’s earlier statement that all official communication

460 Ibid., pp. 3, 7.
461 Paragraph 41, ‘Colonial Development Corporation: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended
31st December 1948’, 24 May 1949, CO 852/841/5, National Archives.
462 Mayle, ‘Comments on CDC’s Annual Report’, 31st May 1949, CO 852/841/5.
463 Eastwood, Minute, 30 May 1949, CO 852/841/5.
464 William Gorell Barnes to RWB (Otto) Clarke, 8th March 1948, FO 371/71822.
on colonial policy should emphasise that the rapid development of African resources would ‘bring social and economic advantages to the native peoples’, whilst also ‘buttress[ing]… the political and economic influence of the United Kingdom’.466

There was also some consideration of the possibility of involving African people more directly in colonial development policy-making in an attempt to reduce accusations of exploitation. Black African people were already involved in the implementation of colonial development programmes, in both the economic and the social-welfare spheres. Hospitals, schools and universities all had black African employees (and patients and students), and industrial and agricultural development required the cooperation of indigenous labour forces, although, as Michael Havinden and David Meredith have pointed out, this was overwhelmingly in ‘low-paid unskilled or semi-skilled’ roles.467 However, there was an ongoing debate about the participation of African representatives on the bodies devising and implementing colonial development at policy level.

The CDC worked through Regional Corporations, which were established in five areas to coordinate the development programmes of twenty-five colonial territories. Lord Trefgarne intended that these would involve local advisors on agricultural or industrial issues who could be either ‘European or coloured’ and would be appointed ‘entirely on the efficiency of individuals concerned’468. In addition to the Regional Corporations, as early as November 1947 Arthur Creech Jones was attempting to find a person who could be considered ‘definitely representative of Colonial peoples’, who could serve as a delegate on the main governing board of the CDC.469 He was unable to produce a suitable name, but in late 1948 the issue was revived and the Colonial Office began investigating possible candidates.

However, there was some dispute in the Colonial Office as to the efficacy of appointing one person to represent the colonial territories as a whole. This was not just because of the scale of representation necessary, or the range of differing experiences in an Empire that ranged from Accra and Kingston to the Falkland Islands and Zanzibar. In the case of Africa, racial and ethnic issues also surfaced. It was felt that, if someone were selected from West Africa, someone would also have to be appointed to represent East Africa, and this would ‘have to be a European’ because of the tenuous state of race relations in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia.470 Creech Jones dismissed this argument, saying that it was important to have a ‘colonial’ on the CDC board and that ‘colonial

466 Note from Sir Norman Brook to Clement Attlee, 14th January 1948, PREM 8/923.
467 Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, p.282.
469 Newton to Eastwood, Minute, 22 October 1948, CO 537/4498 (Representation of Colonial Peoples on CDC), National Archives.
470 IRC, Minute, 5 November 1948, CO 537/4498.
jealousies’ or concerns about ‘neglect of other colonial interests’ were not likely to be a formidable obstacle to the programme; any representative from Africa would ‘be no passenger on the Board’, although he admitted that ‘psychologically his presence would be of value’.471 The Colonial Secretary vetoed suggestions for a white British representative, even one with colonial experience, to fill the position, since the CDC was already vice-chaired by Sir Frank Stockdale, who had extensive experience in Ceylon, Mauritius and the West Indies.472 Creech Jones had long maintained that colonial development must be carried out through ‘consultation and cooperation’ with African people, not only to placate resistance to British colonial policy, but also because it was pragmatic to acknowledge that Africans were ‘intimately’ acquainted with the ‘problems’ of their colonies and could make valuable contributions to development schemes.473

It proved difficult, however, for the Colonial Office to think of a suitable colonial candidate. Various names were suggested from Malaysia, the West Indies and Africa, among them businessmen, university professors and ex-politicians. Professor W. Arthur Lewis, the esteemed economist from St Lucia, was asked to take part but was unable to commit himself to the position alongside his new appointment to a chair in economics at the University of Manchester; it was presumably his outspoken commitment to development economics in the empire that led one official at the Colonial Office to comment that they should be ‘thankful’ that he was unable to take the position.474 One Mr Alema, an African businessman ‘of standing and repute’ was suggested by virtue of being ‘an Oxford man [with]… a good degree in agriculture’, but he had recently been appointed as General Manager of a Consumer Cooperation Society and would in any case be busy overseeing wholesale and retail business relating to the CDC.475 By mid-January 1949, the civil servants in the Colonial Office had decided that it was simply impossible to find an African candidate for delegation to the CDC. The search was deemed to be ‘fruitless’ and the issue was shelved.476 In 1950, the issue was again reviewed, but again there was ‘no colonial… who could usefully be added to the Board’ and it was judged that Lord Trefgarne’s ‘probable attitude’ to any black colonial appointment would be negative.477 Colonial development was instead to be enacted through the traditional racial confines of the British Empire, with only limited concessions to political and social developments in Africa.

This lack of collaboration between colonisers and colonised led to some resentment. A 1948 article asserted that colonial populations regarded development schemes with ‘a measure of cynicism and

471 Arthur Creech Jones, annotations on Mayle, Minute, 11 January 1949, CO 537/4498.
472 Poynton, Minute, 3 December 1948, CO 537/4498.
474 Eastwood to Poynton, Minute, 28 October 1948, CO 537/4498.
475 H Cummings to Mr Keith, Minute, 24 November 1948, CO 537/4498; JK Thompson, Minute, 3 December 1948, CO 537/4498.
476 Poynton, Minute, 15 January 1949, CO 537/4498.
477 A Emmanuel, Minute, 15 April 1950, CO 537/4498.
suspicion’, because they believed that the programmes were ‘motivated not so much by British altruism as by British economic hardship’. This feeling was presumed to be exacerbated by the fact that development schemes were ‘entirely British - born of British imagination and planning, designed to meet purely British needs, financed by Britons, and staffed by British managers’.478 Some attempts at development and modernisation were met with hostility. For example, in Gold Coast, the policy of cutting out diseased cocoa trees to eradicate an epidemic of swollen shoot disease had to be abandoned because of local resistance, despite British offers of compensation for lost earnings.479 Frederick Cooper has addressed this issue of colonial alienation from development plans, drawing direct links between the Mau Mau uprising and British colonial development programmes in Kenya. He describes how the Kikuyu felt exploited by their enforced participation in development schemes, such as anti-erosion work, which offered little immediate economic benefit. He also highlights Labour’s focus on development and ‘progression’ in Africa, which attacked traditionalism as a rejection of modernity and an affront to British values; this possibly explains their reluctance to engage with Mau Mau as a political movement.480 Colonial development, especially economic development, was often perceived by much of the native colonial population as extractive, exploitative, and fundamentally motivated by British need or arrogance; this was not the image that Creech Jones had hoped to project in the African territories.

Conclusions

Colonial development was fundamentally shaped by the personalities in the Labour Cabinet in the post-war period. Ernest Bevin and John Strachey prioritised the needs of the metropole in determining development priorities, whilst Arthur Creech Jones and the Colonial Office, under the influence of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, emphasized the requirements of the colonial populations. Whilst the Foreign Office had a large measure of control over some colonial issues, particularly in Palestine, the Indian subcontinent, and Malaya, the Colonial Office was largely able to enact colonial development policy without a great deal of outside interference, although the Ministry of Food and the Treasury attempted to prioritise development that could be turned to the advantage of the metropole. Across the political landscape, there was a clear divide between those who saw colonial development as a way to placate nationalist movements, bring colonies under closer central control, and thus reduce calls for independence, and those who saw development, both economic and social, as a tool for bringing colonial territories closer to a point at which self-government and independence were feasible goals; there was some correlation between the former position and the Conservatives, and the latter position and the Labour Party, although colonial development could never be polarised tidily along party lines. As well as being a vital part of domestic ideological and imperial policy, colonial development was also a key issue in British international relations in this

480 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, pp. 71-2.
period; the next chapter explores the ways in which colonial development became a site for European cooperation, and the extent to which British reluctance to coordinate with the other Western European powers had an impact on imperial policy in the post-war world.

Post-war reconstruction provided a backdrop for the re-examination of the concepts of colonial development and ‘progress’ in all of the European metropoles. This chapter examines how British colonial development policy was enacted within the context of European politics, and explores the extent to which British reluctance to participate in the formalised integration of Europe was reflected in its relationship with the other colonial powers.

Whilst the Marshall Plan conferences in Paris were underway, there was a second set of discussions taking place in Brussels. These meetings, involving representatives of all the major European colonial powers, represented a concerted effort to confront the future of the colonial territories and the possibilities that existed for their development in a pan-European context. The Marshall Plan and the context of American-sponsored European integration had a significant effect on the European approach to colonial development in this period. However, even without the supportive framework of the Marshall Plan, there would almost certainly have been an attempt at a unified approach to European development of the African colonies, although it may have looked very different.

British colonial policy was a fundamental part of foreign policy in this period, and the question of European cooperation was a central concern for successive post-war British governments. Ostensibly, colonial development was an area that held real potential for British cooperation with western Europe, as the shared experience of imperial rule could paper over the cracks in fractious continental relationships. However, the British government resisted attempts by the western European nations and the United States to scrutinise or influence policy in the British Empire just as wholeheartedly as they resisted this pressure in their foreign or domestic policies. Ultimately, the British government, including the Colonial Office, was too wary of foreign encroachment in the empire to ever really embrace intra-governmental cooperation on colonial issues. This chapter explores some of these issues.

The Attlee Government and Europe

In the early post-war period, the Labour Party position on Europe and European imperial issues was complex. Ernest Bevin was wholeheartedly in favour of a closer association between the

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481 The major colonial powers were defined in this period as Britain, France, Belgian, the Netherlands and Portugal. Spain was excluded because of her domestic political situation, Italy, once an imperial power, had lost her colonies to UN mandates in the post-war settlement, as had Germany, who was in any case excluded from most inter-European ventures and was not a sovereign nation at the beginning of ERP aid. Of the remaining four imperial powers, France, Belgium and the Netherlands were all heavily involved in different ways in the Marshall Plan and the associated schemes for European integration. Portugal was technically a member of the OEEC, but did not receive economic aid until the financial year 1950-1.
nations of Western Europe, as long as this was enacted within an inter-governmental, rather than federalist, framework. In the summer of 1945, Bevin had proclaimed to the Foreign Office his desire to build a close relationship between Britain and the governments in the western and southern Europe and Scandinavia. However, he held off from establishing anything like a ‘Western Group’ until the possible reaction of the USSR became clear; in 1945, Bevin was still anxious to avoid any action which might hasten the division of Europe and the world between East and West.482 In 1947, Bevin negotiated the Treaty of Dunkirk with the French government; this document promised to ‘facilitate the settlement in a spirit of mutual understanding of all questions arising between the two countries’, not only by providing for mutual defence (especially ‘in the event of any renewal of German aggression), but also through the strengthening of ‘the economic relations between the two countries to their mutual advantage and in the interests of general prosperity’.483 Although the Treaty of Dunkirk has sometimes been heralded as the first step in Bevin’s efforts to effect a more activist British foreign policy on the continent, Sean Greenwood has dismissed the alliance as ‘based on rather more immediate objectives than laying the foundations for European cooperation’. Greenwood believes that the treaty was predominately a measure taken by Bevin, who was deeply suspicious of communism, to prevent the French Communist Party, under influence from the Soviet Union, from swinging French domestic politics and foreign policy towards the hard left.484

Bevin’s initial enthusiasm for intra-European cooperation was gradually undermined throughout 1948 and 1949 by the domination of the movement for European cooperation by federalist activists; this included Winston Churchill and other Conservative Party figures, whose ideals appeared to pose a risk to British sovereignty within domestic and imperial politics. The Treasury and the Board of Trade were equally resistant to Bevin’s own policies for Europe. From 1949 to 1951, Geoffrey Warner has depicted British policy as ‘increased… isolation from and even hostility towards the movement in favour of western European union’, with initiatives like the Council of Europe and the Schumann Plan causing ‘serious friction’ between Britain and the continent.485 This resistance was enacted in the face of considerable American pressure for European federation.486 Roger Makins believed that there had been an ‘element in American thought for as long as [he could] remember’ that could not understand why Europe was not governed along more

486 For a fuller account of Britain’s relationship with Europe and the United States during the Marshall Plan period, see Burk, ‘Britain and the Marshall Plan’.
cooperative lines. As Makins remembered, in the post-war period many Americans wanted answers to questions including

"Why are there all these countries in Europe?", "Why do we have to show our passports in going from one to another?", "Why do they have these customs barriers?", "Why can't they be like us?".487

Eric Roll, one of the British delegates to the OEEC in the late 1940s, felt that the Americans were 'pushing very hard' for the Europeans to 'put more and more into the OEEC', with 'constant harping on the theme of European integration' coming from Washington. Roll acknowledged that 'historically there's no denying that the main resistance to this came from the British'. The Dutch and the Belgians were 'very integration minded', the Italians were in no position to do anything other than 'coast along', and the French were 'pretending to be ready to go along with it', although Roll was not sure, 'if the bluff had been called', that they would have followed through.488 John Kenney remembered British officials 'dragging their feet' on European integration throughout the period; however, in some ways this was preferable to the American experience with the governments on the Continent, who would 'promise you everything' but 'wouldn’t live up to 20 per cent’ of what they pledged.489

It is often claimed that British reluctance to fully integrate with Europe was due to a desire to prioritise its relationship with the Empire-Commonwealth. Scott Newton, among others, has argued that Britain preferred to 'cling to its world economic role' in the imperial territories and the Sterling Area rather than 'accede to the American desire that it should become part of an integrated Europe'.490 This attitude can be seen in British government documents of the period. Sir Edward Hall-Patch, Deputy Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, warned that 'many Americans will seek, in good faith, to put pressure on [Britain] to 'integrate' with Europe' because they believed that 'without the UK, there will never be the necessary leadership to bring about the 'integration' of Europe' that was necessary to 'remedy... the economic and political ills’ on the continent.491

Despite this flattering portrayal of British importance, it was in Britain's best interests to resist this pressure, because integration could only come 'at the cost of [Britain's] economic links with the Commonwealth' and, if taken to its logical conclusion, would result in 'the disintegration of the Sterling Area'; this, in turn, might 'well spell the beginning of the end of the United Kingdom as a

490 Newton, 'Britain, the Sterling Area and European Integration, 1945-1950', p. 170.
491 E Hall-Patch, Memorandum, 9 March 1948, FO 371/71851.
World Power’. It was believed in the Foreign Office that, ‘in a purely European context’, British interests would ‘not receive a fair deal’; Europe alone was not worth the sacrifice of imperial connections.

British officials justified their reluctance to embrace economic unity with Europe with a pragmatic argument. Britain conducted less than twenty-five per cent of its trade with Europe and so European recovery alone was not enough to alleviate British economic woes; a healthy British economy depended most of all on the ‘rest of the world’, most obviously the empire and Sterling Area. If this were not acknowledged in the plans for reconstruction, Britain’s trading economy would suffer, and its position in the world would be weakened. As well as undermining Britain’s international role, this would disrupt international trade, a situation in which, after all, ‘America would be among the first sufferers’.

The United States viewed these arguments with some scepticism. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to President Truman, reported that there was a ‘tendency’ for Britain to claim that ‘Commonwealth responsibilities’ made it ‘impossible for them to associate themselves too closely with the Continent’, but that this was ‘probably often an excuse rather than a position taken as a result of objective analysis’. It was certainly the case that ‘Empire and Commonwealth defence relationships’ were important to both ‘British defence thinking’ and ‘US planning’. Gray also casually acknowledged that ‘a real political merger with the Continent would undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Commonwealth relationship’. However, British politicians needed to accept that ‘the welfare of the Commonwealth…in the long run’ was ‘dependent’ on both a strong Western Europe and a healthy Anglo-American relationship. Britain therefore had to demonstrate commitment to both of these alliances, and this might sometimes mean prioritising relationships with the other western powers over the empire and commonwealth. Gray also acknowledged that Britain resented being treated as ‘just another European power’; the State Department had ‘assured the British’ that they recognised both the Anglo-American and the British-imperial ‘special relationship’, but believed that these partnerships were ‘not incompatible with close association in a European framework’.

In 1950, in the wake of a British election that had seen the Labour Party majority reduced to only five seats, Averell Harriman wrote to the President with ‘the most lucid and best analysis’ of the

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492 Ibid.
495 Hall-Patch, Memorandum, 9 March 1948, FO 371/71851.
British political situation that Truman had read. Harriman felt that the tenuous position of the Labour Party meant that they would ‘not wish to give the appearance of breaking with’ the United States. The ‘Attlee-Morrison-Bevin group’ within the Labour Party had been strengthened in the election, with Aneurin Bevan and his ‘leftist followers’ temporarily disempowered, and the party would have to ‘play a more conservative role to have any hope in the next election’. Churchill himself had told Harriman that the election had acted as a ‘check on British socialism’ and predicted that this would ‘in the long run make Britain a more effective associate of the United States in world affairs’; Harriman hoped that Dean Acheson might find Bevin ‘more cooperative on some of the political matters’ that had been ‘troubling’ the United States. However, the Labour Party had campaigned on a promise to ‘keep people in their jobs at all costs’, which meant that the British government would be ‘less cooperative in further liberalization of trade and payments with the Continent’ in an attempt to avoid any ‘temporary dislocations’ in the economy. This meant that it would be ‘even more difficult to get the British government to move on European economic cooperation’.

However, at least at the beginning of the post-war period, Britain had been willing to engage with ideas of European cooperation, as long as this engagement did not reduce Britain’s ability to act in foreign, domestic or imperial policy. Even if the Treaty of Dunkirk was mainly motivated by short-term factors, Bevin did continue to hope for a wider integration of Western Europe, in the face of increasing hostility from the Soviet Union. On 8 January 1948, the Foreign Secretary presented to the Cabinet a paper entitled ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, in which he promoted the creation of a ‘Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal’, to include Germany and Spain at a later date. This would not necessarily ‘take the shape of a formal alliance’, although Britain might in time extend its treaty with France to the other countries. The Cabinet Secretary’s notebooks from 8 January record Bevin’s belief that the incipient Marshall Plan had ‘violently’ precipitated Russian aggression and his conviction that, in this context, Britain could not ‘afford not to have w[estern] Europe organised’ for much longer. Among Cabinet members as diverse as Aneurin Bevan and Herbert Morrison, there was some trepidation that, by following these policies, Britain was drawing an immutable line across Europe, allying itself in the process with the United States and making an enemy of the USSR. As far as Bevin was concerned, the policy would allow the Foreign Office to ‘develop B[ritish] influence in the heart of the world’ – from the Mediterranean and Middle East to India, from Africa to South East Asia – which would leave the ‘US and R[ussia] to clash on the fringe’.

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On 22 and 23 January, the House of Commons debated the Foreign Secretary’s proposals. Bevin declared that ‘the idea of European unity’ was not disputed, and that the issue was ‘whether European unity cannot be achieved without the domination and control of one great Power’. Britain had avoided ‘pressing’ the issue of western union because of the hope that the German and Austrian peace settlements would ‘close the breach between East and West’ and would ‘thus avoid the necessity of crystallising Europe into separate blocs’, but this had not transpired. It had thus become necessary for ‘the free nations of Western Europe… [to] draw closely together’, in order to ‘preserve peace and [British]… safety’.\textsuperscript{503} Antony Eden (Con, Warwick and Leamington) welcomed the ‘broad lines’ of Bevin’s statement, and called for the conception of western union to be ‘further developed’, to create connections ‘not only in the political sphere, but in the economic sphere, and in the cultural sphere also’.\textsuperscript{502} Although cross-party support for government policies might be perceived as advantageous, this bipartisan embrace of pro-European policies caused some consternation among the Labour Cabinet; Aneurin Bevan was disheartened that Bevin’s policies would just as well ‘commend themselves to Tory newspapers’, whilst Stafford Cripps, and even Herbert Morrison, professed a generalised ‘dislike of Tory support’ for Labour strategy.\textsuperscript{503}

The western union concept had important implications for the British empire. At the Cabinet meeting on 8 January, Bevin rejected the idea that Britain was steering a course too close to the United States, saying that as soon as Britain could ‘afford to develop Africa’ the government could ‘cut loose’ from the Americans; however, it was important to ‘be quiet’ about the technical development of Africa to avoid arousing interest in Washington. In fact, Stafford Cripps saw western union as a ‘prime necessity’ for Britain’s ‘economic survival’, as long as it also involved Africa. This also influenced the composition of the proposed alliance; Cripps had wanted to build a union on a ‘Socialist basis’, excluding Spain and Portugal, but both Bevin and Creech Jones pointed out that it was impossible to ‘ignore’ Portugal if Africa was to be part of the western European ‘sphere’. Imperial manpower would also increase the defence forces available to the union; Russia was thought to have capabilities of 300 million men compared to 150 million in western Europe, but if Africa were included then the western union might control a greater number of forces than either the USSR or the USA.\textsuperscript{504}

Bevin emphasised the role of the British empire in his speech to the Commons, stressing that he was ‘not concerned only with Europe as a geographical conception’ but instead meant to include ‘the closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and with overseas territories, not only

\textsuperscript{502} Anthony Eden, Ibid., c. 420.
\textsuperscript{503} Aneurin Bevan, Stafford Cripps and Herbert Morrison, ‘Foreign Policy’, 8 January 1948, CM 20 (48), pp. 13-14, CAB 195/6.
British but French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese’. He highlighted the importance of the overseas territories as providers of ‘raw materials, food and resources’, which could be ‘turned to very great common advantage, both to the people of the territories themselves, to Europe, and to the world as a whole’. The British government intended to ‘develop the economic cooperation between Western European countries step by step, to develop the resources of the territories’ and to ‘bring together resources, manpower, organisation and opportunity for millions of people’. This imperial angle clearly caught the public imagination, with The Times reporting the speech the next day with the headline ‘Mr Bevin’s Outline For A Western Union: Hope of Treaties with the Benelux Countries: Role of Overseas Territories’; the article declared that the organisation would involve ‘the closest cooperation with the Commonwealth and with the overseas territories of the French and others’.

The American government was impressed by Bevin’s proposals. George Marshall wrote to Lord Inverchapel to say that he had been ‘deeply interested and moved’ by Bevin’s proposal to bring about a ‘closer material and spiritual link between the western European nations’. Marshall believed the project was of ‘fundamental importance to the future of western civilisation’ and would be ‘warmly applauded in the United States’; he hoped that the American government could be of help in bringing the project to fruition. The Times reported that the United States government had ‘enthusiastically greeted’ the proposals for a united western Europe, but urged caution. Washington had for some time been ‘swept by the urge to transfer to western Europe the benefits of the American federal system’, but even the ‘men who worked in Philadelphia all through the summer of 1787’ had only managed to win the case for federalism ‘after a long educational campaign and by a narrow majority’, despite working with only thirteen states with ‘one language and an uncomplicated political and economic structure’.

By March 1948, the Treaty of Brussels had been signed between the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries. The Treaty would last for fifty years and promised to strengthen the ‘economic, social and cultural ties’, which ‘already united’ the five nations. The countries would ‘organise and coordinate their economic activities’; ‘promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples’; ‘promote cultural exchanges’; and if any of the five countries were ‘the object of an armed attack in Europe’, the other countries would ‘afford the Party so attacked all the

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506 ‘Mr Bevin’s Outline For A Western Union: Hope of Treaties with the Benelux Countries: Role of Overseas Territories’, The Times, 23 January 1948; or more information about this desire for a collaboration between European empires and their colonies, see John Kent, ‘Bevin’s imperialism and the idea of Euro-Africa, 1945-49’, in Michael Dockrill and John Young (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 47-76.
military and other aid and assistance in their power’. Despite the centrality of the overseas territories to Bevin’s conception of a western union, the European empires were not mentioned at all in the final treaty. In the context of the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia, it was Article IV, which guaranteed mutual defence arrangements, which became the most important.

Because of increasing Soviet hostility, and despite his focus in Cabinet on the role of western union in reducing Britain’s closeness with the United States, Bevin was by this point convinced of the need for American backing for any alliance between the western European powers. Collective defence against one superpower was meaningless without the support of another. This attitude can be contextualised against the rising power of the federalist movement in Europe, beginning with their congress at the Hague in May 1948; Bevin could not embrace with any enthusiasm political, social and cultural integration in Europe when it appeared to threaten British sovereign power. Instead, the Foreign Secretary focused with renewed vigour on the collective defence of Western Europe, supported by forces from across the Atlantic. Truman had reacted to the Brussels Treaty with enthusiasm, telling a special meeting of Congress that the United States would match European attempts at mutual defence with ‘an equal determination… to help them do so’; in a direct parallel to the Marshall aid negotiations, Washington was more willing to work to help Europe once it had begun to help itself. In September 1948, the Western Union Defence Organisation formally codified the collective defence agreement in the Treaty of Brussels; after some prevarication, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was signed on 4 April 1949, and included the Brussels Treaty nations alongside Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and the United States. This was not European cooperation, but western alliance.

Throughout the Marshall Plan, Britain tested American patience by refusing to integrate with Europe in a federated system, and created tension with the Europeans by trying to switch too often between roles as a dispassionate outsider and leader of the pack. The potential for Britain’s participation in many aspects of European integration was fundamentally undermined by the desire in London to maintain the United Kingdom as an independent world power. The British overseas territories were a central part of this vision. It is therefore an historical irony that the one area of European cooperation in which Britain was able to maintain some form of dominance throughout the Marshall Plan period was colonial development.

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European Colonial Development: Britain and Europe

The historian Nicholas Mansergh, writing at the end of 1948, questioned the extent to which cooperation between the European powers could have positive consequences for the African colonies, since integration alone would ‘not increase either resources or productivity’. There was a ‘crying need’ in colonial Africa for ‘capital goods and more efficient means of transport’, but, since there were shortages of these commodities in all Western European countries, it was difficult to see how pooling resources would improve the situation, at least ‘in the short run’. The validity of this criticism can be seen in the fact that the most productive areas of cooperation between the European powers were in technical knowledge and medical research, with some joint action on transportation and communication. The Colonial Office generally stressed a rather nebulous benefit to the African colonies from European cooperation; in the summer of 1948, a Colonial Office note stated that

Happily the interests of the Colonial territories and of the metropolitan countries are complementary to each other... If it is true that the development of Africa will strengthen the world position of the Western European countries, it is equally true that it is in the interest of the Colonial territories themselves that the Western European countries regain their strength and be able to maintain a form of independent existence.

It was maintained therefore that ‘the part which Colonial territories and peoples’ were called upon to play in this context would be ‘to their lasting benefit’. In this vein, and in contrast to British reluctance to fully engage with Europe on matters of economic cooperation or political federation, the Colonial Office had been supportive of efforts to encourage European coordination on the issue of colonial development since the end of the Second World War.

The first motive for cooperation in African colonial development was one of pragmatism; the continent was large and often inhospitable, and any efforts to share the initial burden of development were welcomed, certainly in ‘technical and scientific subjects’ and ‘also to some extent in the political field’. There were existing contacts between Britain and the other colonial nations through international trade bodies, for example those concerned with the tin and rubber trades, and so it made sense to continue any economic development on an at least partially multi-lateral basis. This was also true of infrastructure development, which was desperately needed to promote international trade. As Mansergh made clear, Africa as a continent was handicapped by

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515 Ibid.
516 Robinson to Gore Booth, 24th August 1948, FO 371/71822.
517 Ibid.
chronic lack of planning and development in transportation and communications during the colonial period. For example, one British visitor to Southern Rhodesia, a relatively wealthy colony, in 1947, bemoaned the ‘quite inadequate’ railway connections that led to resources becoming ‘bottle-necked’, which had impeded the trade of chrome, steel and coal – all commodities that could have found eager buyers on an international market. As individual territories began to attempt to increase their trade with external consumers, the practicalities of transportation around Africa became paramount. It was important, for example, that the European colonial powers were all using the same railway gauge to allow efficient transportation between empires across the continent, yet, as Ronald Hyam points out, in the post-war period there were seven different railway gauges being used in Africa, the integration of which was prohibitively expensive and complicated.

This interest in a European approach to colonial development from a practical perspective is underlined by the fact that liaisons between Britain and other European colonial powers predated the Marshall Plan discussions by several years. Britain had been conducting bilateral meetings with France on colonial issues since the end of the war, and had enjoyed a similar arrangement with Belgium from 1946. By 1947, a series of tripartite conferences involving all three colonial powers had been secured, with the intention of eventually including Portuguese and Dutch colonial government representatives. In the summer of 1947, an Anglo-French-Belgian conference on African colonial development policy took place. This focused mainly on common approaches to social welfare issues such as ‘public health, labour, soil conservation [and] control of major diseases such as rinderpest and trypanosomiasis’. By December 1947, four of the colonial nations (excluding the Dutch) were meeting in a series of bilateral groupings, normally spearheaded by the British or the French. Cooperation had been organised through a series of conferences, either in the metropoles or the colonies themselves, which addressed a diverse range of colonial issues. In 1946, a medical conference was held in Accra to initiate the sharing of anatopathological laboratories. Delegates discussed the creation of medical schools to train African doctors and nurses, and extended the 1943 Lagos Agreement on the control of infectious diseases; the attendees also worked out a plan for joint action by medical teams operating along international borders, and arranged the joint

521 ‘Colonial Development and the Continuing Organisation (Note by the Colonial Office), enclosed in Robinson to RW Clarke, 17th March 1948, FO 371/71822.
522 Ibid.
preparation and distribution of vaccines. The same year, the Lorenzo Marques Conference studied trypanosomiasis and sleeping sickness; this work was developed by the Brazzaville Conference in February 1948, which recommended the establishment of a permanent ‘clearing house’ for information on the subject and the coordination of entomological and protozoological research through an International Scientists Committee. A conference in Goma in 1948 tackled the prevention of soil erosion, the coordination of phyto-sanitary legislation and the issue of forestry nomenclature. At the same time, representatives from trade unions in the British and French African territories attended a labour conference in Jos, where they examined labour organisations, government administration of workforces, and issues around social security, training and wage fixing in the African territories. That summer, there was a meeting held in London to address various phyto-sanitary problems that resulted in a convention which, it was hoped, would reduce the ‘outbreak and spread’ of parasite and plant diseases. In addition, there were two Anglo-French meetings held in London and Paris in 1947 and 1948, which aimed to maintain the close economic relationship built between the two empires during the war, particularly through developing those policies which would ‘lessen the risk of future over-production in particular commodities”. Overall, this conference system was judged by the Colonial Office to have been ‘both active and effective’ since the end of the war; conference attendance had not been limited to colonial powers but had also involved delegates from Abyssinia, the Sudan, Egypt, Liberia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and had involved the discussion of ‘common problems in the widest possible forum’.

Colonial Development and the Marshall Plan

European colonial development thus predated the Marshall Plan, but there is no doubt that the machinery of the ERP created an organisational framework and legal structure within which transnational development programmes could operate. In the British Bilateral Economic Co-Operation Agreement, one of 16 bilateral treaties between each ERP nation and the USA, the United Kingdom was explicitly defined as ‘including the Colonies (‘self-governing and non-self-governing’) overseas territories, protectorates and trusteeships’. This meant that aid received by Great Britain could legitimately be spent in the colonial territories. When signing the Bilateral agreement, British officials had been uncertain about whether to fund colonial development through dollar sources, mainly because of the high costs involved. However, they were clear that


527 Report by the London Committee, Serial No. 48 : Draft Economic Co-Operation Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the United States (Note by the Secretary) , 2nd June, 1948, CAB 134/218.

528 Ibid.
it would be foolish to formally exclude the British Empire from the scope of ERP aid; it would ‘seriously reduce’ Britain’s ability to use the Marshall Plan funds to meet their dollar requirements, and would probably lead to ‘strong opposition’ from the United States, as the colonies were a key source for the raw materials that the Americans were ‘most anxious to receive for stockpiling purposes’. Britain was therefore happy to accept the formal definition of the Marshall Plan as aid to be shared around the colonial empire. In March 1948, when the Cabinet discussed the ERP and the establishment of a continuing organisation to administer European recovery, Ernest Bevin noted that there was ‘much’ for the Colonial Office to study in the proposals. Arthur Creech Jones agreed, stressing that colonial development depended ‘on [a] healthy Europe’.  

By early 1948, British officials had already decided that some elements of the ERP would be ‘distasteful’; however, they were at least confident that they would be able to ‘play the lead’ among the European countries in the various bodies and organisations involved in reconstructing the continent. Although this leading role never really transpired, international colonial development was a way for European powers to demonstrate to the United States their willingness and ability to cooperate effectively in reconstruction. This was especially important for the British, given their increasing unwillingness to embrace European cooperation. Portraying colonial development as a multilateral European action might also deflect any accusations that Britain was alone in exploiting its empire.

The British were certain that the only metropolitan states involved in colonial development should themselves be colonial powers. This was partly due to simple considerations of practicality; observers from non-colonial states would have little to offer to detailed discussions of imperial policy. However, working within the framework of the Marshall Plan meant working within a context of European reconstruction. This was problematic because, if all Western nations were allowed to influence colonial development, the narrative that depicted experienced imperial powers fulfilling their colonial responsibilities and selflessly aiding their own territories’ development would be exposed as a sham. To this end, Britain resisted repeated attempts by the Italian government to be involved in the European discussions on colonial development, to avoid any accusations that there existed ‘a European club for exploitation of Colonies’; it was particularly important to maintain this resistance to avoid possible criticism from the new Commonwealth nations.

529 Ibid.
532 E Melville (UK Delegation to the OEEC) to Mrs Chilvers (Colonial Office), 8th October 1948, Folder: UR 6362/5042/98 Overseas Territories Working Party, FO 371/71989.
In order to maintain this position, the British government had to also exclude Dominion governments from the development discussions, as they were administered separately from the colonies and held no territories of their own.\textsuperscript{534} However, Britain was careful both to brief the Dominions Relations Office about development policy and to ‘avoid giving the impression that the UK can afford to ignore the help towards recovery she receives and has received from the Dominions’.\textsuperscript{535} South Africa, in particular, took a ‘very lively interest’ in colonial development in the African territories; this was recognised by British politicians to be ‘entirely reasonable’ given their strong diplomatic, economic and political links throughout the continent, and so the South African government was kept well informed of European progress, as well as being used as a location for a major African development conference in 1950.\textsuperscript{536} The British Government were apprehensive that the Dominions might become ‘concerned at the United Kingdom’s growing contact with Europe’; there was a chance that it would be perceived as potentially weakening Britain’s links with the Commonwealth, involving ‘onerous commitments out of harmony with the Dominions’ own interests’, and leading to a loss of capital goods from, or markets in, the United Kingdom. The Dominions Relations Office was therefore always careful to ‘rub home’ the idea that strengthening Great Britain would ultimately (‘even if not directly’) strengthen the Dominions themselves; they also emphasised that European cooperation was an addendum, not an alternative, to the Commonwealth relationship.\textsuperscript{537}

Within the context of European collaboration, the relationship with the colonies was no less fraught with potential tension. It was essential, ‘for political and constitutional reasons’, if colonial governments were to be recipients of, or contributors to, the Marshall Plan, that they should be ‘consulted fully’.\textsuperscript{538} British officials were wary of provoking the ire of colonial administrations by involving them in any sort of grand continental plan without their informed consent. The Colonial Office was also anxious to avoid demanding too much information from the colonies, to avoid ‘overloading the machine’ or irritating Governors and Colonial Secretaries with frequent demands for extra work; as the bureaucratic machine in most overseas territories was fairly basic, any demands for statistics on trade, national income or cost of living were not popular among colonial administrations.\textsuperscript{539} The British government was therefore not only trying to balance the demands of its American and European allies with its own domestic and foreign policies, but it was also trying...
to reconcile the needs and desires of the colonial governments with the policies and aims of the Foreign and Colonial Offices.

**European Colonial Development and the OEEC**

Initially, Britain was not enthusiastic about the formation of a formal body to coordinate European colonial development. This reluctance was borne of several factors, which reflect the concerns above; any official body for development would be open to misinterpretation by outsiders and by the colonial territories themselves. Additionally, the Colonial Office was suspicious that other European nations had urged the establishment of formal machinery not ‘on grounds of efficiency’, but instead ‘on political grounds arising from their own internal political situations’. They were instead keen to promote the ‘primary importance of local collaboration’; any formal machinery for joint colonial policy would have to ‘assist rather than hinder the development of closer local collaboration’.

Britain had been initially keen to undertake cooperation on colonial development through the framework of the Havana Charter and the International Trade Organisation (ITO). As the Charter established the necessity of ‘facilitating and promoting industrial and general economic development and consequently higher standards of living’ and linked the idea of aiding ‘relatively undeveloped’ countries with the ‘reconstruction of those countries whose economies have been devastated by war’, it seemed the perfect forum for cooperative colonial development. Unfortunately, the ITO was never approved by the US Congress and was gradually abandoned in favour of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). After this setback, and given the explicit link between the European metropoles and their colonies enshrined in the Convention for European Economic Co-operation, it was difficult for Britain to prevent the creation of a formal organisation. The Marshall Plan agreements formally voiced an obligation for the countries involved in the ERP, ‘both individually and collectively’, to vigorously promote ‘the development of production, through efficient use of the resources at their command, whether in their Metropolitan or Overseas Territories’. In this way, the development of the colonial territories became intrinsically linked to the practical organisation of the Marshall Plan.

In this context, Britain was keen to be a leader of any continental approach to colonial development. The Cabinet self-designated Britain ‘as the chief Colonial power’ and recognised that it would therefore ‘bear a heavy responsibility’ for the development of overseas empires, both ‘in

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540 ‘Colonial Development and the Continuing Organisation (Note by the Colonial Office)’, enclosed in Robinson to RW Clarke, 17th March 1948, FO 371/71822.
the interests of the territories themselves and their inhabitants, as well as in the interests of the peoples of Europe’. As well as formalising this role, an official medium for joint action on colonial development would provide a mutually acceptable ‘instrument for cooperation’ with a selection of other OEEC nations; a failure to accept this would have contributed to the ‘strong feeling in Western Europe’ that Britain was ‘not serious in support of [the] OEEC’.

An organisation was therefore set up to formalise the role of colonial development in the ERP: the Overseas Territories Working Group (OTWG), later the Overseas Territories Committee (OTC), comprising representatives from the five western European colonial powers. Britain’s conception of this organisation was strictly delineated. Before the OTWG had been established, the Colonial Office had expressed its desire that a formal organisation would limit its activities to acting as ‘a centre for discussion of any common problems of the Colonial territories of the European powers’, particularly those that arose from participation in the ERP, and providing ‘the means of exchanging information about development plans’, as well as ‘considering any problems arising’ from possible competition between the plans of the different Colonial powers. The organisation should focus on research and the ‘exchange of information’ rather than on direct control; it was crucial that ‘there should not be any obligation to obtain international approval’ before development projects were enacted in individual territories. Where common action was necessary, for example ‘against disease and pests’, the organisation could act as a mediator to identify existing machinery that could be used to work in the field; it could establish where new machinery could be created, but it should not attempt to set up any new organisations itself. Finally, the organisation should not be the only means of cooperation between the imperial metropoles; direct contact between one or more colonial powers ‘would not be precluded and would, in fact, certainly need to continue and be extended’. Despite these clear limits, the Colonial Office hoped that formal machinery to coordinate European colonial development plans would ensure that the ‘major aim’ of the ERP would be kept ‘fully in mind’ in plans for developing the overseas territories, whilst avoiding any charges of ‘exploiting Colonial peoples’.

The Colonial Office, busy with the plans for the new Colonial Development Corporation, prepared a brief on colonial development plans for the UK Delegation to the Working Party on the Continuing Organisation in the spring of 1948. The report stated that UK policy was to ‘ensure that the main activity of the Continuing Organisation should be to correct the participating countries’
deficit with the Western Hemisphere’ and that this could be done through ‘building up production both in Europe and in the Colonies of the European powers’ to replace imports from and build up exports to the United States. It was felt, therefore, that colonial development questions had ‘an immediate bearing’ on the work of the OEEC, although the Colonial Office was unclear about whether colonial requirements would be considered in the allocations of funds to colonial powers, and whether these allocations, if given, would be provided in funds or commodities. The Colonial Office wished for the British territories either to be omitted from the ERP altogether and paid for with dollars already earned by the metropole and territories, or to be considered alongside UK requirements and not compared to or considered with the requirements of other European colonial territories. It was therefore best, in their opinion, that the colonial aspect of the ERP be limited to the development of specific dollar-saving or dollar-earning commodities. In the report, the Colonial Office officials were careful to assert that British colonies had ‘very much greater powers of self-government’ than other European empires; many policies were ‘in practice, left, under the UK system, to be exercised by the ‘men on the spot’, as was ‘consistent with the declared policy of HMG of promoting self government as rapidly as possible’. It was therefore vital that any plans to bring colonial development under the aegis of the Marshall Plan made sure to reconcile ‘general UK policy and local interests’, which was generally ‘a task of the utmost difficulty, more especially in the economic field’. 550

C. T. Crowe of the Foreign Office noted, on receipt of this memorandum, that the Colonial Office had attached so many caveats to the possibility of colonial development under the ERP and OEEC that ‘one wonders whether the Colonial Office have… got cold feet about the idea of bringing Colonial development into the framework of the Continuing Organisation’. 551 The Foreign Office, as the basis for remarks made by Bevin at the opening session of the CEEC, made a general statement, referring to western European nations being ‘responsible for the admin. of overseas territories [which] have a special contrib[ution] to make’ for the reconstruction of Europe, which could in turn contribute ‘to econ[omic] success in [the] overseas territories for the progress and benefit of the peoples concerned’. As they acknowledged, this sentiment was so non-specific and non-committal that it ‘could offend no-one’. 552

The British achieved essentially what they had hoped for in terms of the OTWG; the group was given ‘a mandate to report on existing economic cooperation between the metropolitan countries with regard to their dependent overseas territories’, in order to ‘determine the part that territories can play in the achievement of viability’. 553 There was some delay initially in getting the working

550 Robinson to RW Clarke, ‘Colonial Development and the Continuing Organisation (Note by the Colonial Office)’, 17 March 1948, Folder OR 774/344/98, FO 371/71822.
551 CT Crowe, Minute, 18 March 1948, Folder OR 774/344/98, FO 371/71822.
552 Minutes, 18 March 1948, Folder UR 344/344/98 Colonial Development, FO 371/71822.
553 ‘Second Report to ECA on Operations under the Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Governments of
group to meet, as it was necessary first to see how far each colonial power had included their overseas territories in their ‘long-term programme’, completed for the OEEC in September 1948.\footnote{554} The OTWG was formally established at the 49th meeting of the OEEC on the 4th October 1948, and the first session was held on 12 October, with Eugene Melville from the Economic Relations Department of the Foreign Office acting as Britain’s representative; Sir Gerard Clauson, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 1940-51, was also a key figure in the British delegation.\footnote{555}

By the end of October 1948, the OTWG had completed the first draft of an interim report on the state of colonial development in the European empires; with only minor editing, it would be finished by the beginning of December. The work was intended to provide the OEEC with information about the five colonial empires, principally ‘to indicate to the Organisation the part that these Overseas territories can and should play in a long-term programme for European recovery’.\footnote{556} The report was in five parts; after a short introduction, it had chapters on inter-colonial cooperation; production programmes and export targets; potential methods of development; and general conclusions.

The report began by acknowledging that, by signing up to the Charter of the United Nations, the governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had all agreed to ‘certain principles for the administration of those non-self-governing territories for which they [had] responsibility’.\footnote{557} They were bound by ‘the general principle of good neighbourliness’ to take account of the ‘interests and well-being of the rest of the world in social, economic and commercial matters’, whilst recognising that the interests of the colonials subjects themselves were ‘paramount’.\footnote{558} This meant that the metropoles were firmly attached to the ‘basic principles of development of their Overseas Territories in the interests of the peoples themselves'; there was 'no conflict' between the policy of economic development in the colonial countries and the programme of European reconstruction.\footnote{559} To avoid charges of exploitation being levelled at the OEEC, it was important to stress that the

\footnote{554} K E Robinson to X Torre (French Colonial Office), 2nd September 1948, Folder: UR 5042/5042/98 Colonial Int. Committee of OEEC, FO 371/71989.

\footnote{555} Sir Gerard Leslie Makins Clauson was a remarkable man, one of the last great Orientalists in the Colonial Office, who was enamoured with the languages and literature of the British empire. At the age of fifteen, whilst still at Eton, he published a critical edition of a short text in Pali, a Middle Indo-Aryan language; he was fluent and entirely self taught in Russian, Hungarian and Chinese, and wrote 40 articles after his retirement on Turkish and Mongolian languages. Clifford Edmund Bosworth ‘Gerard Leslie Makins Clauson’, in Clifford Edmund Bosworth (ed.), A Century of British Orientalists 1902-2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2001), pp. 88-100.

\footnote{556} E Melville to various at CO, Minute, 5th January 1949, CO 852/1054/4.

\footnote{557} Portugal, by virtue of its domestic political situation, was not a member of the United Nations, but had agreed to adopt similar principles and aims for international relations; ‘Interim Report of the Overseas Territories Working Group’, OEEC Executive Committee Paris, 8th December 1948, CO 852/1054/4.

\footnote{558} Ibid.

\footnote{559} Ibid.
development of the colonies was in the interests of both metropoles and peripheries. The report emphasised this symbiotic relationship between European reconstruction and colonial development, stating that

The Overseas Territories… must depend upon the rest of the world, and in particular upon Europe, for the provision of most of the finance, skill and capital equipment required for their social and economic development as well as markets for a large part of their exports of foodstuffs and primary raw materials… it is, therefore, as much in the interests of the peoples of the overseas territories as in those of the peoples of Europe that the economy of the participating European countries should, within the shortest possible space of time, be reconstructed and set once again upon secure foundations.560

The OTWG report stated that the continuing objective of European colonial policy must be to develop the overseas territories ‘as rapidly as possible’ both in the ‘interests of the local peoples’ and their ‘social and constitutional progress’, as well as for European reconstruction. It was crucial to restore and improve capital equipment, to aid future development; to promote the types of primary and industrial production ‘having regard to the balance of their economies and the advantages of external trade’ which would be most beneficial to colonial nations; to raise the standard of living as quickly as colonial productivity permitted; and to promote the ‘fullest possible exchange of finance, equipment and skill’ from the European metropoles in return for ‘increased production’ from the colonial territories. Overall, overseas territories were expected to make the maximum possible contribution to development, particularly by giving priority to short term projects which would aid European recovery. Ever anxious to avoid accusations of exploitation, however, the OTWG acknowledged that many of the programmes for researching common problems and providing ‘basic social and economic services’ would necessarily be long term; these projects were to take place ‘at the same time as, and independently of’, short-term schemes.561

The report also detailed existing international organisations through which colonial development was already being tackled: the Food and Agriculture Organisation, which worked on research and information exchange on all aspects of rural development; the Caribbean and South Pacific Commissions, which promoted and developed international cooperation and economic and social welfare in these areas; the Commodity Study Groups, set up in accordance with the Havana Charter, which provided opportunities for European colonial countries to cooperate on issues pertaining to the production, consumption and trade of various commodities; and the ITO, as mentioned above.562 All of these bodies involved British delegates and are an example of the on-

561 Ibid.
562 Ibid.
going need for collaboration outside the OTWG, as highlighted by the Colonial Office. The report also listed the many conferences which had already been held on African development and the ones planned for the future, and acknowledged the importance of this method of collaboration.

The OTWG identified areas of production where the overseas territories could expand to produce exportable surpluses to earn dollars; it was noted that these were mainly agricultural, with exports generally comprising ‘basic raw materials and foodstuffs’. The most important were identified as groundnuts, palm oil and palm kernel oil, copra and coconut oil, edible and non-edible vegetable oils, raw cane sugar, cocoa beans, rice, maize, cotton, sisal, lime phosphates, rubber, hides and skins, hard wood, coal, iron ore, copper, zinc, lead, bauxite, tin, and other non-ferrous metals. The report then went on to identify development trends which were likely to create exportable surpluses of these products. Many of these were taking place in British territories. The Tanganyika groundnut scheme, for example, was cited as an attempt to increase worldwide supplies of oil; in West Africa, there was a programme of research being undertaken to attempt to prevent swollen shoot disease from continuing to devastate the annual cocoa crop; Uganda and Nigeria were utilising pesticides and adopting an organised marketing system to stimulate cotton production.

The report explained that there were many reasons why production was not at its optimum level in many overseas territories. The lack of capital equipment during the war and the ‘continued scarcity’ of capital and consumer goods were significant factors; there were also many natural obstacles, such as disease, pests, and bad weather leading to poor harvests, combined with labour shortages. It was also true in many cases that the export market offered comparatively low prices, which had to compete with local demand for foodstuffs and raw materials; the ‘successive slumps’ in international markets had made everyone, from small-scale producers to colonial governments, wary of focusing even on areas of production where there was an international shortage, without some guarantee of market prices. This was clearly an area with potential for international cooperation. The OTWG had identified key areas in which the European governments could offer aid to the overseas territories: the increase in supply of capital equipment, and the provision of spare parts and repair facilities, which had been strained during the war and was now suffering because of the need to replenish equipment in Europe; the improvement of transport, the poor state of which frequently resulted in ‘considerable losses or… destruction of stocks’ in areas such as Nigeria and Ivory Coast; the extension of basic economic and economic research services to enable overseas territories to develop and expand existing resources; and the increase in supply of consumer goods, to fulfil the needs of the workforces in the overseas territories, who would gain greater earning potential, often through the acquisition of technical skills, under the development

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564 Ibid.
565 Ibid.
schemes. These objectives could be achieved through a combination of public and private investment. European governments also needed to develop the transfer of skills, through the judicious use of European and American technicians and experts, and explore how to use these skills to increase labour productivity.\textsuperscript{566}

The OTWG report was an attempt to demonstrate ‘the need for a balanced development’ of the European colonies, which would ensure economic progress but also ‘a corresponding evolution in social institutions’ with ‘a steady rise in living standards’. All five national delegations were committed, by national and international declarations, to development policies in their territories to increase wealth and welfare facilities. Regardless of this fact, it is clear on reading the report that, despite the frequent protestations of concern for the colonial populations, development was being pursued on a European scale because it was ‘essential for the restoration of world economic equilibrium in general and that of Europe in particular’; it reflects the tension in the Marshall Plan itself between altruism and hard-headed economic reality. However, the recognition that much investment would only have made returns in the long term – palm and coconut trees can take six to ten years to bear crops, while cocoa plants require between four and seven years before harvest – does show some concern for the overseas territories over and above the immediate needs of the European powers.\textsuperscript{567}

The OTWG felt able to ‘forecast with reasonable confidence’ that there would be an increase in the volume of both foodstuffs and raw materials exported from the overseas territories during the Marshall Plan period, due at least partly to proposed new development schemes; this would be of ‘major assistance’ to European recovery and to the overseas territories themselves. However, it was not able to provide any effective demonstration of how this could be achieved through European cooperation. As the Colonial Office in London had desired, the OTWG was an advisory group, nothing more; it could not establish or implement development itself, but could only survey and collate development plans, suggesting, when appropriate, areas where new bodies might be necessary. As such, the group had stated that there was potential for ‘joint discussion and joint action’ on transport and communications, suggesting that it might be possible to set up a ‘joint survey organisation’ to undertake a review of these areas. There was also ‘further scope’ for coordinated research work in African development, on general issues such as pests and disease, as well as specific projects such as breeding new crop strains, which could potentially be carried out through a central research organisation. It might also be possible to ‘suggest’ to overseas territories any adjustments which might be needed to ‘avoid excess production of particular commodities and under production of others’.\textsuperscript{568}

\textsuperscript{566} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{567} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{568} Ibid.
Essentially, the OTWG was severely limited in its scope for action, admitting in the report itself that many aspects of development would continue to be organised outside the OEEC. The report even outlined why it was so difficult to coordinate European action on the territories: each country had a different approach to development, metropolitan governments had wildly differing levels of direct control over their colonies, and even where there was a high level of centralised control, no European government could devote the time and resources needed to plan ‘the whole field of development policy’. Perhaps most crucially, the overseas territories depended so heavily on their colonial administrations that their position was at all times precariously conditional on the fluctuations in European economies and governments. It was simply not possible to compile and maintain the amount of information that would be needed to run a pan-European scheme.569

Soon after compiling this report for the OEEC, an OTWG Working Group, chaired by Sir Gerard Clauson and comprising representatives from the western European colonial powers, was asked to produce a second survey report that would demonstrate the technical assistance available at the time to each country’s overseas territories, and indicate future requirements. This was partly provoked by President Truman’s ‘fourth point’ speech, delivered as his inaugural address on 20 January 1949, and the Economic and Social Council’s subsequent request that the UN prepare a programme of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. It was necessary for the OEEC to demonstrate to the UN that the European powers were already taking very seriously the concept of development in their overseas territories.570 This report was even less encouraging of the concept of European cooperation in colonial development. As many members of the Working Party were convinced that the survey was being commissioned primarily to promote the ‘infiltration’ of Italian and other non-colonial powers into the OTWG and the development of the overseas territories, the delegates were

firmly resolved to show that the Overseas Territories were doing very nicely so far as technical assistance was concerned by relying on their metropolitan countries for the help that they needed, and that if anything more was required, the metropolitan countries could help one another more than anyone else could, with the exception of a certain amount of help from America.571

The report was thus heavily criticised by the Executive Committee of the OEEC and received only in interim.572

569 Ibid.
570 G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
571 Ibid.
572 Perhaps as a result of this behaviour, the United States intervened with a six-point letter demanding information about development plans for the colonial territories. This is discussed in Chapter Four.
By the end of 1949, the OTC (as the OTWG was now known, having been upgraded from a working group to a permanent committee) was considering its future programme of work. The French delegation were keen that the Committee should try to set its own agenda, and suggested a regional ‘comparison and coordination’ of the overseas development plans of the five member states. The British delegation, led by this point by Clauson, were unsure what this would amount to but were nonetheless against it. However, Frank Figgures, at this point Director of Trade and Finance at the OEEC, was enthused by the proposal, saying that he thought it would be ‘a good thing if the OTC….could… make something of coordinating investment in the Overseas Territories’.

This intervention, which seemed to embrace the possibility of collaborative action in the colonies and invite scrutiny from foreign governments into British imperial economics, horrified Clauson, as indeed it did the entire London Committee to the OEEC, who ‘primed’ him with various ‘more innocuous’ suggestions to occupy the OTC, to no avail. Will Mathieson reported to Andrew Cohen and Sir Hilton Poynton that the British delegation found itself ‘completely isolated’ in the position that an attempt to compare and coordinate development plans was meaningless and useless’. Clauson and the rest of the British delegation had attempted to focus the OTC on ‘a further examination of the technical assistance needs of the territories’ rather than the proposed ‘wide survey of the development of the Overseas Territories’, not because the British delegates had ‘any particular conviction of its value’, but because the former was a ‘more manageable undertaking’ than the latter, involving less onerous commitments from the Colonial Office and the colonial governors. However, in the negotiations between the various members of the Executive Committee it had become clear that Britain would be ‘unable to evade the wider task’; ‘owing to the delicate state of his relations in the OEEC, Clauson was unable to assert himself, and in order to dodge Figgures’ suggestion, he was eventually forced to agree to compile yet another report on technical assistance, followed by a study of investment in the territories.

As Mathieson made clear, Britain could no longer ‘avoid work of this general nature’, and it was now key to ‘find some method of approach’ that would ‘involve the Colonial Office and Colonial Governments in a minimal amount of useless work’. The British delegation, by calling for repeated surveys of the requirements of the African territories, could re-use much of the information produced for the economic surveys of the British overseas territories, thus avoiding ‘making further

573 Clauson described Figgures thus: ‘an Englishman (I am not quite certain what his origin is, but he was a temporary civil servant at one time during the war) and is something fairly highly placed in the Secretariat’. Figgures in fact held a senior role within the OEEC and would later become Under Secretary of State for the Treasury, when he would oversee the British approach to European integration; he went on to hold the position of developer and first director general of EFTA. G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161; Eric Roll, ‘Figgures, Sir Frank Edward (1910–1990)’, rev. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2006.
574 G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
575 Mathieson to Andrew Cohen and Hilton Poynton, Minute, 22 November 1949, CO 537/5162; G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
calls on Colonial Governments’ whilst simultaneously giving the other European metropoles ‘work to do which could keep them occupied for a period’. Andrew Cohen agreed with this assessment, and stated that unless the Colonial Office had ‘specific authority’ from the Secretary of State it should avoid making any ‘further calls on Colonial Governments’. The Colonial Office was ‘just not staffed to undertake this extra burden’; metropolitan demands were already ‘hopelessly overloading the machine’ and were thus ‘in danger of causing administrative breakdowns’ in the colonial service.

By early 1950, the OTC had agreed to prepare a transport survey of the African continent, but this was again riven by differences between the European delegations. The French proposed a conference, the establishment of several working parties, and a report for a reconvened conference, whilst the British had assumed there would be nothing more onerous than a three-day conference, at which a general review of transport problems in African south of the Sahara would be completed. Unsurprisingly, the American advisers strongly supported a more detailed survey, which would examine social and economic elements to the problem, and the British were forced to agree to the more detailed scheme of work, although they did manage to get South African and Southern Rhodesian representatives admitted to the programme. As Britain’s position hardened against federalist calls for European cooperation, the Colonial Office continued to be out of step with the rest of the European metropoles on plans for the overseas territories. Its representatives in Europe continued to resist outside scrutiny of British imperial policy and impede, wherever possible, attempts to effect meaningful collaborative action in the empires.

European Colonial Development: the British Perspective

At the end of 1949, Gerard Clauson wrote a candid letter to all British colonial governors. This had initially been intended as ‘a little light after dinner reading’, but eventually developed, in his words, into a ‘most portentous essay’. He used the missive to outline the recent work of the OTC and to apologise in advance for the requests for information which were bound to be required for future reports. Clauson also wrote in detail about the other European delegations, providing an important insight into the Colonial Office’s view of continental politics.

European cooperation to date was described as ‘a slow and difficult business’, not least because all the delegates to the OEEC essentially saw cooperation as ‘a device to get the other fellow to do things the way you want him to do and to like doing it’. The fact that the OEEC was simultaneously intended for the division of aid and the promotion of cooperation seemed to

576 Mathieson to Andrew Cohen and Hilton Poynton, 22 November 1949, CO 537/5162; G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
577 Andrew Cohen, Minute, 22 November 1949, CO 537/5162.
579 G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
Clauson to be inherently contradictory; in practice, it led to ‘everyone trying to scramble for as much aid as he can get without due regard to the interests of others’. Nevertheless, through ‘a great deal of strain and acrimony’, the Organisation had managed by 1949 to surmount these difficulties and there had been some useful work completed, such as the Intra-European Payments Agreements, which had facilitated trade between participating economies.\textsuperscript{580}

However, it seemed more difficult to achieve full cooperation in imperial affairs. This was partly because of the different levels of control exercised by European governments over their colonial territories. The British system of government utilised men-on-the-spot, with differing levels of policy guidance and financial support provided by the Colonial Office. In contrast, Clauson stated, ‘the Belgian Colonial Office really does govern the Congo and the French Ministry of Overseas France really does govern the French colonial territories’. Similarly, he believed, the Dutch colonies were ‘so small that they probably can be ordered about’, with the exception of Indonesia, which was in any case engulfed in civil disorder and could not be judged an effective example of imperial rule; it was ‘very difficult to speak confidently about the Portuguese’, but it was assumed that their system was rather closer to that of the French than the British. It was perhaps a little wistfully that Clauson wrote that ‘if the French and Belgian Colonial officials think that some change in policy is necessary, they can effect it’, in stark contrast to the ‘powers of persuasion’ (but little else) enjoyed by the British Colonial Office. It was therefore difficult for the British delegation to draw up policy in collaboration with European powers and implement it in the colonies; this point was often lost on the Americans, as well as on other European delegates, who often accused the British officials of ‘dragging the [sic] feet’.\textsuperscript{581} Although this accusation clearly had a ring of truth, Clauson was right to highlight that the British Colonial Office had less direct control over the colonies than their European counterparts. In addition, the Colonial Secretary had to deal with the influence of the Foreign Office and the Treasury over imperial policy, not to mention the often ponderously-slow nature of British bureaucratic politics.

The communiqué was also candid about the British Colonial Office’s attitude to other European nations. Clauson was fond of the head of the French delegation, M. Peter, who he was happy to report was not ‘a typical Latin’ but was instead ‘entirely trustworthy and friendly’.\textsuperscript{582} His deputy, M. Poumaillou, was also described as ‘an extremely competent and agreeable fellow’. The Belgian delegation had initially been led by Van den Abeele, but since he had become head of the Belgian Colonial Office he had been replaced first by Monsieur Masure and then by Lefebvre; Clauson found Lefebvre to be ‘extremely intelligent and logical’, albeit unfortunately a ‘strong theoretical supporter’ of European cooperation, although he could usually be ‘persuaded by an appeal to his

\textsuperscript{580} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{582} Unlike, apparently, ‘some of the other French officials connected with OEEC’.

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sense of logic to abandon ideas of an embarrassing nature’. The Portuguese delegation, ‘quite the most ineffective members of the Committee’, were led by Senor Bebiano, who was according to Clauson ‘a nice fellow’, who spoke ‘English in preference to French, although neither well’. Clauson grudgingly admitted in his letter that the Portuguese, although rather slow, could produce ‘quite effective work’, and had already created a 10-year development plan for the Lusophone colonies. Their work in the OTC was minimal at best, and they made few contributions to reports, but their interjections were ‘always taken by the Committee as good clean fun’, largely because the delegation had ‘never dug their toes in when it came to a pinch’.

The Dutch delegation was another matter. Mr Harthoorn, their leader, had ‘done more to slow down and bedevil the operations of the Committee’ than everyone else combined. Clauson loathed Harthoorn, writing to the colonial governors that

> he is by origin a civil engineer of some kind who has spent most of his life in Indonesia and was a prisoner of the Japanese. This, no doubt, gives him claim to our sympathy, but he does his best to alienate it by being extremely obstructive and full of ideas nearly all of which are wrong, on subjects which do not concern him… Apart from anything else, he is extremely vain and an Empire-builder of the first calibre.

Clauson’s hostility to Harthoorn had been ignited by a disagreement over the Vice-Chairmanship of the OTC. When the OTC had been transformed from the OTWG into a permanent committee, M. Peter had been made Chairman and the British had arranged with him that, as they were ‘the most important colonial power’, they should hold the Vice-Chairmanship. Harthoorn had objected to this arrangement and had ‘raised the banner of Benelux’ to summon Belgian support for his own nomination, despite the fact that he was ‘very imperfectly acquainted with both the English and the French languages’ and would be a poor candidate for the position. The British were suspicious, believing the Dutch delegate to be a ‘Quisling’ figure who was anxious to appease the United States at all costs. The French and British delegations resisted Benelux pressure, until it was finally agreed that there should be two Vice-Chairman positions, occupied by Clauson and Harthoorn. These constant struggles over relatively petty issues perhaps go some way to indicating why the British delegation was unable to take the OTC seriously as an international body.

In his letter, Clauson confessed that he had ‘not the shadowiest idea of what exactly would happen next for the OTC. He apologised in advance that there would be ‘further embarrassing enquiries in

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583 G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
584 Ibid.
585 Clauson, on the other hand, spoke perfect French, and frequently corrected the British translations of the minutes of the OTC, which were compiled by a French secretariat.
586 G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
the near future’ for information on trade, economics and development, explaining that ‘in the last resort’ Britain could not afford to appear unwilling to cooperate with the Committee. He warned the colonial governors that it was important not to underrate the serious nature of the global economic crisis, or to ‘jeopardise the continuance of American help’; it was important for Britain to participate fully in the Committee, which might mean invoking the help of the governors and colonial secretaries throughout the empire. Clauson left for business in Washington immediately after drafting this note; Will Mathieson in the Colonial Office added a few passages of explanatory notes and then sent the letter to the Foreign Office for approval. The Colonial Office staff were amused by the ‘frankness and colloquiality’ of the letter but felt that the Foreign Office might perhaps ‘get sticky’ about its contents; the civil servants who dealt with the colonies every day were quite happy to occasionally ‘take the lid off and let Governors see the wheels go round’. The Foreign Office, indeed, had a ‘much rosier view’ of the OEEC than the Colonial Office, and were ‘reluctant to see any suggestion to Colonial Governors that the Organisation was essentially a failure’. Philip Broad of the Foreign Office wrote to Will Mathieson complaining that, although the letter was ‘a most interesting and lively account’ of contemporary events,

…to some extent the letter in its present form might convey to its recipients the impression that we regard close collaboration with our partners in OEEC as an unmitigated nuisance, the necessity for which is only imposed on us by a desire to get all the ERP dollars we can and which we shall drop as soon as the need to maintain a façade has passed.

Broad instead wanted to make quite clear to the Colonial governors – and presumably also the Colonial Office – that, regardless of British views about the ‘efficacy of OEEC as a vehicle for cooperation’, it was nonetheless part of Britain’s ‘general foreign policy, in the economic and in the military and political spheres, to foster the growth of cooperation in Europe’.

The Colonial Office duly noted this objection and made some significant changes to the draft, particularly in their inclusion of some background information on the establishment and work of the OEEC; the general character of the note, however, remained the same as Clauson’s original draft. The colonial governors around the globe appreciated the letter, and its frank tone, and

\[587\] Ibid.
\[588\] Poynton to Mathieson, 26th October 1949, CO 537/5161.
\[589\] Mathieson to Clauson, 4th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
\[590\] Philip Broad (FO) to Will Mathieson, 3 November 1949, CO 537/5161.
\[591\] Ibid.
\[592\] Mathieson to Clauson, 4th November 1949, CO 537/5161.
Clauson received many notes of thanks for the ‘extraordinarily interesting, if depressing, picture’ which he had painted.593

The OEEC and the Colonial Territories

In 1951, the OEEC produced a slim book entitled Investments in Overseas Territories in Africa, South of the Sahara, which attempted to summarise the development problems, projects and aims of the European empires in the continent. The report claimed that the metropolitan countries had ‘already made a great contribution’ towards the development of their overseas empires, an effort which was to ‘the mutual benefit of both the peoples of the African continent and those of other continents as well’. The OEEC claimed that the metropolitan countries had ‘felt it necessary to deal jointly’ with the problems of colonial development, in order to ‘pool their experience and draw up an overall picture of the prospects of development in the area’; it was ‘natural’ that this should be undertaken by the OEEC. The report made reference to other, non-colonial, European powers and the United States and Canada helping ‘in one way or another’ with colonial development, for instance in making financial contributions towards development in African countries, although this was of course a deeply contentious issue with the Colonial Office.594 The book then discussed the problems inherent in attempting to develop the African territories, before summarising the sources and methods of financing development, the different national approaches to colonial projects, and possible additional sources of financing schemes in the empires.

The book concluded by saying that, although colonial development was ‘both necessary and possible’, the task was ‘a heavy one’ and the cost was ‘high’. However, ‘considerable’ improvements had been made since the end of the Second World War, which had led to ‘improvements in the living conditions of the inhabitants and to the participation of the territories in international trade’, justifying the ‘hopes for the success of the plans’ for the next decade.595 It was crucial that the territories were given the ‘future ability… to maintain a more developed, and consequently more expensive, social and economic machine’; the OEEC clearly envisaged development as a precursor to eventual independence. It also stated that African development was ‘a matter of interest’ to many non-colonial states, including the United States, as well as organisations such as the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Overall, the development of the colonies was ‘a long term task’, the completion of which was in the interest of the whole world.596 What is striking about the book is the lack of references to European collaboration on colonial development; after the introduction, there is little reference to the OEEC itself, only five paragraphs (out of 234) on the ECA or Marshall aid, and not one single reference to the OTC. The ‘thin mandate’ of the committee meant that even the OEEC could not pretend the organisation

593 See for example Jock Macpherson (Lagos, Nigeria) to Clauson, 15th December 1949 CO 537/5162.
595 Ibid., p. 77.
596 Ibid., pp. 77-9.
could make much practical contribution to the development of the colonial territories.\footnote{Schreurs, ‘A Marshall Plan for Africa?’, p. 87} This was a state of affairs with which the British delegation was quite satisfied.

**Conclusions**

Dr John Orchard had been plucked from his position as a professor of economic geography at Columbia University to act as the American observer on the OTC. At the end of the Marshall Plan period he wrote a scholarly article that detailed the ways in which the ERP had helped the overseas territories. The colonies had been able to receive money directly from the Marshall Plan funds programmed to their European metropoles; they had been able to draw on a special reserve fund created to provide technical assistance to participating nations; they were entitled to funds from the un-programmed reserve intended to develop materials needed for stock-piling by the United States; and they were able to draw from the special reserve fund established by the ECA specifically for development in the overseas territories.\footnote{John Orchard, ‘ECA and the Dependent Territories’, *Geographical Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan, 1951), p. 74.} The British African colonies did in fact benefit from all of these types of funding, to some extent. However, it is important to note that none of these methods required European cooperation to a great degree.

The OTC and the framework established by the OEEC and the ECA did not encourage Britain to work more closely with their European imperial counterparts; if anything, the creation of an official body to encourage colonial development through European cooperation made Britain less likely to work with the continent on these issues. There was a great resistance in the Colonial Office to any attempt at the ‘Europeanisation’ of development in the African territories. Mathieson believed that this term demonstrated an attempt to approach development of the overseas territories ‘with a view to making use of their resources for the benefit of Europe’, and that this was the result of pressure from Swiss and Italian representatives on the OEEC. Poumaillou, the French delegate to the OTC, tried to reassure Mathieson that this term meant merely that the OTC ‘could not be regarded simply as a club of metropolitan powers who had no regard for the interests of other European countries in shaping their politics for the Overseas Territories’.\footnote{Mathieson to Clauson, 15th December 1949, CO 537/5162.} However, the term was deployed again at an OTC meeting at the end of December, and Clauson clashed with Dr Orchard over its usage, saying that ‘there must be no suggestion of the exploitation of the territories in the interests of Europe’ and that therefore ‘the term “Europeanisation” was a bad one’.\footnote{Gerard Clauson, ‘Overseas Territories Committee: Minutes of the 16th and 17th Meetings held at the Chateau de la Muette Monday and Tuesday, the 19th and 20th December, 194, OEEC, Paris’, 28th December, CO 537/5162.} Mathieson reported the next day that the OTC as a whole had a ‘grave objection’ to the term, as it was ‘liable to serious misinterpretation as representing a desire… to use the Overseas Territories merely as instruments for promoting the strength of the European economy’. The OTC was in fact attempting to ‘help metropolitan Governments to carry out their obligations to promote the well-being and...
development of the non-self-governing territories for which they have responsibility in the interests of the peoples of those territories'; the committee thus agreed that the term should be avoided.\footnote{Mathieson to St. Edwards (Secretariat, OEEC, Paris), 30th December 1949, CO 537/5161.}

Overall, the Colonial Office was deeply sceptical of the role of the OTC in colonial development. Even as head of the British delegation to the OTC, Clauson did not think that the Committee had ‘produced any very useful results’ and he did not hold out much hope that its work would contribute very heavily to solving the problem of overseas development.\footnote{G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.} This attitude is echoed by Mathieson’s rather hopeless judgement that, although the OTC would ‘be put to work’, the work it completed would be ‘largely fruitless’. The French delegates believed that it was ‘of vital importance that the European powers should coordinate the development of their territories in Africa’, but British officials held rather more prosaic aims, wishing mainly to limit the amount of energy expended on OTC projects, and attempt to guide the committee to areas of research in which it could ‘hope to produce results’.\footnote{Mathieson to Clauson, 30 September 1949, CO 537/5161.}

However, whilst the OTC as a tool for development was indeed largely fruitless during this period, it had some utility as a forum in which Britain could enact (some, limited) European cooperation. Clauson himself acknowledged that the OTC was ‘an instrument for cooperation’ with Britain’s partners in the OEEC, and a useful tool to demonstrate the ‘wholeheartedness’ of Britain’s efforts ‘to help Europe recover’.\footnote{G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.} The Foreign Office certainly saw the OTC as one facet of British cooperation with Europe. In February 1950, a Foreign Office memorandum celebrated the fact that on the issue of overseas territories, ‘relations with the Belgians and the French h[a]d improved considerably’, although those with the Dutch were still ‘very indifferent’. Indeed, the author was optimistic that Britain’s ‘more timid European colleagues’ might soon ‘grow sufficiently intrepid’ to oppose ‘objectionable American proposals’.\footnote{Memorandum on Recent Developments in the Overseas Territories Committee, n.d., UR 5410/4 Overseas Territories Committee : Reply to Request for Information from British Embassy at Brussels, 21st February 1950, FO 371/87311.} Despite British reluctance to embrace European integration, there was thus no clear prioritising of the Anglo-American relationship over Anglo-Continental relations in colonial issues.

Clauson himself wrote about the importance of maintaining British relations with both Europe and the United States within the context of colonial policy. Although it had ‘often been maintained’ that a close relationship with Europe was ‘incompatible’ with Britain’s imperial role, Clauson argued that this was ‘not the case’. In fact, it was Britain’s ‘close relations’ with Europe, the Commonwealth and the USA that made it ‘better able to contribute properly to the strength of each of them’. Britain’s position, however, at the centre of this triumvirate of relationships did place ‘peculiar...
responsibilities’ on its relationship with Europe. Post-war European recovery would have been ‘impossible’ without ‘active assistance’ from Britain, but at the same time, the government had to be cautious not to enter into any agreements with the continent that they could not ‘reconcile with obligations towards the Commonwealth’. There was no possibility of ‘any exclusive relationship with Europe’ and so sometimes Britain was ‘accused of hindering the process of Europe towards unification’. However, Clauson believed this to be unfair. The objective of British policy, especially within the OTC and the other frameworks within the OEEC, was to ensure that the development of economic, political and military relations with Europe, the United States and the Commonwealth were ‘in harmony with one another’ so that Britain could ‘contribute to the strength of each of these great communities’.606

It is clear that, within the Colonial Office, Europe was one of three areas of interest, between which Britain needed to navigate carefully. Whilst Britain was generally not interested in encouraging too much collusion with western Europe, it was mindful of the practicalities of a post-war recovery administered across sixteen nations, and realised the need to pay at least lip-service to the notion of cooperation across national borders. This applied just as much to colonial issues as to other foreign policy concerns. In addition, there were some areas in colonial policy, such as technical, medical and agricultural research, where the Colonial Office conceded the desirability of cooperation between metropolitan powers. What the British objected to was any suggestion that the colonial administrators might lose sovereignty in their own empire, or be forced to permit foreign nations or international organisations to involve themselves in British colonial affairs. In this context, in order to understand British colonial policy in this period, it is important not only to situate it against the backdrop of British political and economic relations with Europe, but also, clearly, within the framework of Anglo-American relations. The ‘special relationship’, with American power in the ascendency in the post-war world, was critical to British policy in Europe and the empire, and Washington’s growing interest in both European cooperation and their imperial possessions was viewed with trepidation on the other side of the Atlantic.

606 G Clauson, Report to all Governors and OAGS, 11th November 1949, CO 537/5161.

For much of the period after the Second World War, the ‘special relationship’ was a central tenet of British foreign relations. Until the late twentieth century, transatlantic relations were performed against a backdrop of a Cold War that occasionally became heated. British officials strove to ensure that the United Kingdom retained a special place in America’s affections, whilst the United States was extending alliances far beyond the transatlantic world. British foreign policy, including imperial strategy and colonial development, was inextricably linked to the United States; in turn, within the context of the Cold War, American officials were increasingly interested in the European empires and the role of the developing world in global politics.

This chapter examines British colonial policy within the context of the ‘special relationship’. As established in Chapter One, the United States had a historic claim to anti-imperialism; despite the fact that this attitude was often undermined by American behaviour, this traditional prejudice against empires and imperialism continued to colour American policy towards the British empire in this period. However, the post-war Cold War context shaped American strategic concerns, and often required covert, or even overt, support of imperial regimes against the greater threat of Soviet communism. This chapter explores the ways in which the Marshall Plan and British colonial policy intersected. It examines British concerns about losing imperial sovereignty to American influence, and their desire to use the empire to emphasise their own importance within international politics, thus extending the themes raised in Chapter Three; much of Britain’s reluctant participation in pan-European approaches to colonial development within the ERP was an attempt to placate the United States. This chapter also explores American attitudes toward British colonial development in Africa in this period, and concludes that the United States was generally supportive of British policy. Although the British government welcomed this support, the Colonial Office in particular was sometimes suspicious of American interference in the empire and was occasionally concerned that the United States was trying to infiltrate the empire for its own benefit. The United States itself began to pursue a policy of overseas development in this period, created within the same intellectual tradition as, and shaped by the American perception of, British post-war colonial development. The Point Four programme, which extended technical and economic support to developing countries, became an important element in shaping America’s relationship with newly-independent nations in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The programme represented American accession to the position of colonial metropole, filling the space created by the diminishing power of the European colonial nations.
Defend and Attack

The American-British-Soviet alliance did not descend into the antagonism of the Cold War immediately after the Potsdam conference. Indeed, the American State Department under James Byrnes remained hopeful for some time that the wartime alliance could be continued, if only in the form of cordial distance; they were unwilling to court hostility from the Soviets when there was little popular support for the possibility of further military action.607 This changed in early 1946, when the deputy chief of the US mission in Moscow, George Kennan, sent his ‘Long Telegram’ to the State Department, warning them of Stalin’s expansionist aims. Frank Roberts, Kennan’s British counterpart, passed a similar missive to the Foreign Office, which helped London to keep abreast of American attitudes, and ensured that British officials realised the inevitability of conflict between Britain and the USSR, in case any hopes of an international socialist alliance still lingered.608 By 1950, the Americans had embraced the fundamental ideologies and conflicts of the Cold War; as Congressman Eaton (Rep, NJ) memorably argued, it was time ‘to strip off [their] peace clothes and show [their] muscles to the world’.609

The United States government had been concerned about British foreign policy and the possibility of collaboration between Britain and the USSR at the expense of American interests. However, they believed that the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers conference in December 1947 was a ‘watershed’ in British foreign policy, which marked a dissipation of ‘any lingering illusions about Soviet intentions’. The abandonment by ‘virtually [the] whole British labour movement’ of any ‘sentimental attitude’ towards the USSR was praised as a symbol of ‘political maturity’ and an ‘unshakable attachment… to democratic, humanist and liberal conceptions’.610 Historians such as Peter Weiler and Terry Anderson have credited Bevin and the Foreign Office as effective catalysts of American Cold War attitude and strategy.611 It is certainly true that the international role assumed by the United States in this period was often a reaction to British weakness. The Truman Doctrine, announced in March 1947, was provoked by British financial and military limitations that had forced the withdrawal of British troops from Greece in the face of communist insurrection and civil war. Clifford recalled this announcement as creating a ‘very real

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609 Congressman Eaton, cited in George M Elsey, minutes on ‘Meeting of the President with Congressional Leaders in the Cabinet Room, 10:00AM, Wednesday, December 13, 1950’, 14 December 1950, , December 1950, Truman Papers: PSE, Box 149, File: Attlee Meeting, Truman Library.

610 The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. III, p. 1073.

crisis' for the American government.\textsuperscript{612} The British Embassy in Washington had warned Westminster that British troop withdrawal from strategic areas was likely to be perceived as a ‘desperate eleventh-hour abandonment of… international responsibilities’. Truman’s government ‘counted upon [Britain] to share with the United States the responsibility of defending the democratic position in the world’; any attempt to shun these duties was likely to jeopardise the Anglo-American relationship.\textsuperscript{613} The Foreign Office resented this attitude; Bevin maintained that, as Britain had been in Greece for three years with ‘no support from the US and certainly no kind words from them’, it was time that the Americans took on a greater role.\textsuperscript{614} The Americans eventually agreed.

The Truman Doctrine promised ‘to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity’ in the face of ‘aggressive movements’ and ‘totalitarian regimes’. The speech did not directly mention the USSR and included only one reference to Communists (in the Greek civil war), but the document is nevertheless an important early example of American Cold War rhetoric, which divided the world into ‘totalitarian regimes… nurtured by misery and want’ and controlled by the USSR, and the ‘free peoples of the world’ supported by the United States.\textsuperscript{615} This Cold War attitude evolved as the United States Government began to widen its own definition of appropriate international intervention. A report produced by the State-War-Navy Ad Hoc Committee in April 1947 enunciated American foreign policy as

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supporting economic stability and orderly political processes, opposing the spread of chaos and extremism, preventing advancement of Communist influence and use of armed minorities, and orienting other foreign nations towards the US and UN.
\end{center}
\end{quote}

The United States would not retreat into isolationism, or abandon the world to communism, ‘starvation and suffering’\textsuperscript{616}

An article in \textit{The Times} a fortnight after Truman’s speech argued that the decision to intervene in Greece and Turkey was demonstrative of a ‘fundamental alteration in American foreign policy’, rather than an ‘isolated and temporary response’. The paper predicted that Truman would be able to negotiate funding through Congress and that this would ‘mark a turning point in the American role in the world’; if Truman were unsuccessful, on the other hand, this would prove that the

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\item \textsuperscript{612} Clark M Clifford, Oral History interview conducted by Jerry N Hess, Washington, D.C., 13 April 1971, \url{http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cliford2.htm}.
\item \textsuperscript{613} Telegram, British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, 31 July 1947, FO 371/61003, in Baylis, Anglo-American Relations since 1939, pp. 45-7.
\item \textsuperscript{614} Memorandum, ‘Tactics with the United States Administration’, 19 August 1947, FO 371/61003 in Baylis, Anglo-American Relations since 1939, pp. 47-9.
\item \textsuperscript{615} President Harry S. Truman's Address Before A Joint Session Of Congress, 12 March 1947 \url{http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp}.
\end{itemize}
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United States was ‘not yet prepared to exercise its great material strength to the full in support of its convictions’. The Times described American intervention in the world as potentially a ‘stabilising and tranquilising factor’, but warned against any temptation to embark on ‘a barren and restrictive anti-Communist crusade’. The Truman doctrine had ‘historic possibilities’, if it were to be enacted as a ‘positive support of peace and genuine democracy’.617 Not everybody in Britain perceived the Truman Doctrine as such a benevolent force. Konni Zilliacus (Lab, Gateshead), in a blistering House of Commons speech, condemned American policy as ‘virtually a declaration of economic, diplomatic and secondhand military intervention against Socialism and the Left in Europe’, and criticised the United States administration for arming the Greek government in a state of civil war.618

Within the context of the Cold War, American foreign policy was often contingent on Britain’s ability to act as an international defensive force, especially in areas of traditional British influence; Britain, in turn, was often sustained internationally by American support. In June 1947, Lewis Douglas telegrammed the State Department outlining the situation in Britain regarding ‘Empire Defence’. Douglas maintained that British policy was predicated on the assumption that ‘except for unpredictable developments another World War is improbable for 10 to 15 years’; if Britain could survive this period, it was hoped that the nation would have ‘so recovered a position of authority’ that it would be able to work with the USA to preserve world peace.619 It was believed that Britain perceived the USSR as its ‘only important potential enemy’, whilst the United States was ‘at worst a benevolent neutral, or at best an active ally’ in any imperial war. Douglas characterised Britain as ‘seeking desperately to cut her cloth to fit her present stature’, and so predicted the ‘voluntary curtailment, if not abandonment’ of some overseas commitments, predominately through the transfer of these responsibilities to members of the Commonwealth, the United States and its dominions, and the UN. Presumably Douglas had the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey in mind as an example of this strategy.620

Regarding imperial policy, it was predicted that if ‘pressure in Colonial fields [became]... irresistible’ or the defence ‘burden’ became too heavy, Britain would ‘continue to withdraw or to seek, at most, a maintenance of the status quo’; Britain could no longer afford to impose colonial rule on territories that were ambivalent or antagonistic to the concept.621 Douglas believed that Westminster would attempt to spread the weight of imperial defence throughout the empire, by expanding the policy, first seen in the dominions, of sharing defence costs between metropole and periphery. This strategy had been controversial, with opposition from the Canadian and South

619 Lewis Douglas to Dean Acheson, 11 June 1947, Truman Papers PSE, Box 160, File: L, Truman Library.
620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
African governments. In fact, since the Second World War, the defence of the dominions had increasingly fallen to the United States. In 1941, Canada had signed the Ogdensburg Treaty with the United States, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and guaranteed American defence of Canadian sovereignty in the event of invasion. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, felt that these agreements cemented the dominion’s role as a mediator between Britain and the United States, increasing Canada’s (and King’s) international prestige. By September 1951, Australia and New Zealand had signed the ANZUS agreement, in which the United States guaranteed their territorial integrity. This was a formal acknowledgement that Britain, which was not invited to join the pact, was unable to commit forces to the defence of its dominion allies. British policymakers were not happy about this shift in imperial alliances, although it had been anticipated by the Foreign Office the previous year; by 1951, ‘the pound sterling and the Royal Navy’ could not hope to compete with the attraction exerted by ‘the dollar and the atom bomb’, despite any sentimental connection the dominions might feel with the former.

In this context of waning British military power, it was vital for Britain to create a defensive arrangement with its allies on the continent and further afield. Initially Bevin had focused on European solutions to defence issues, signing the Dunkirk Treaty with France in 1947. However, the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers impressed on Bevin the importance of uniting Western Europe in defence against the Soviet bloc, a decision only intensified by the Berlin blockade. Bevin included in his plans not merely a ‘geographical conception of Europe alone’ but also ‘the closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and the overseas territories of the European power’, as well as ‘the United States and the countries of Latin America’, which were as much part of ‘common Western civilisation’ as ‘the nations of the British Commonwealth’. In view of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, it was vital that American ‘powers and resources’ should be tied into a North Atlantic Pact to protect the western world.

The bill to approve membership of the Atlantic Pact was passed by the House of Commons on 12 May 1949. Bevin commended the treaty to the House as ‘one of the greatest steps for peace’, which would enable Britain and the other western powers to combine their ‘great resources and great scientific and organisational ability, and use them to raise the standard of life for the masses of people all over the world’.

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622 Ibid.
a ‘cordial welcome’ to the treaty and ‘thanks to the United States for the splendid part’ they were playing in the world.\(^{629}\) Churchill also used the opportunity to berate those who had criticised his speech at Fulton, Missouri, for being ‘calculated to do injury to good relations between Great Britain, the USA and the USSR’, proclaiming that the Labour government must have experienced a ‘change of heart’ to sign a treaty which formally divided West from East.\(^{630}\) One Labour MP objected to this assessment, pointing out that

because a number of people are prepared to support the calling in of the fire brigade, that
does not mean that they withdraw one word of censure from those who contributed to
the setting of the house on fire.\(^{631}\)

By 1949, the Labour Party broadly accepted the need for a western alliance against the Soviet Union, but many of its members refused to accept that this state of affairs had been inevitable and unavoidable since the end of the war. In fact, a small minority of the Labour left refused to accept the validity of the Atlantic Pact as a defensive instrument. William Warbey (Lab, Luton), one of the MPs who had promoted an alliance between the UK and the USSR at the end of the war, criticised the government for allowing itself ‘to be driven down a fatal course by Soviet and American policy’ and ‘destroying the possibility of building up a really constructive Socialist European union’. Warbey argued that a vote for NATO was a vote for ‘Fultonism’ and refused to ‘go into the Lobby… with the right. Hon. Member for Woodford in order to help in celebrate his Roman triumph’.\(^{632}\) Konni Zilliacus criticised the Atlantic Pact and associated defence spending as ‘sacrificing the standard of living in order to arm to the teeth’ and attacked the American government for treating the British people as ‘cannon-fodder for American Century power politics and a counterrevolutionary war of intervention masquerading as the defence of democracy’.\(^{633}\) However, most Labour MPs were content to silence whatever reservations they had about the Atlantic Pact in the interests of the security of the United Kingdom; the Treaty was approved 333 to 6, with several members, including Warbey, abstaining.\(^{634}\)

In line with Warbey’s argument above, it has been contended by historians such as Peter Weiler that the decision to align Britain so closely with the United States, through actions such as the Atlantic Pact, diminished Britain’s ‘freedom of action’ in the post-war period.\(^{635}\) Paul Addison has claimed that, rather than trying to accommodate the USSR, since 1940 Britain had been ‘selling out

\(^{630}\) Ibid., c. 2024.
\(^{631}\) Samuel Silverman, Ibid., cc. 2024-5.
\(^{632}\) William Warbey, Ibid., cc. 2042-3;
\(^{633}\) Konni Zilliacus, Ibid., cc. 2074, 2083;
\(^{635}\) Weiler, ‘British Labour and the Cold War’, p. 76.
to the United States’.\textsuperscript{636} Weiler argues that, in order to maintain a close relationship with the United States, Britain was forced to ‘agree to fulfil a world role that they were, in fact, increasingly unable to maintain’.\textsuperscript{637} It may be true that Britain continued to perpetuate international commitments that were, in reality, beyond their economic and military capabilities, but this was clearly not due to American pressure alone. In fact, the Labour government was unable to be ‘realistic’ about international commitments, because it would have attracted too much criticism from the Conservative party and middle England.

Overall, to many British MPs, it seemed that a close relationship with the United States was the safest guarantee of British national security. In a 1950 Cabinet meeting, Attlee celebrated the fact that he had ‘persuaded’ the Americans to ‘accept the Anglo-American partnership as the mainspring of Atlantic defence’, warning against allowing Britain to be ‘treated as merely one of the European countries’ and thus losing any advantage it had been able to cultivate since the Second World War.\textsuperscript{638} However, this was not merely an attempt to prioritise the Anglo-American relationship over other potential alliances; it was also an attempt to avoid the risk, ‘however remote it might seem’, that the United States could ‘lose interest in the defence of Europe’ if left unsupported by its allies.\textsuperscript{639} Britain needed to be seen to be taking its international responsibilities seriously, to convince the Americans that it was valuable enough to defend.

\textbf{A Hand Stretched Across the Water}

As well as defence assistance, Britain and the other Western Europe nations were reliant on the United States for economic assistance. In May 1947, in the wake of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the American Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, spoke at a meeting of the Delta Council in Mississippi. His speech described how the ‘devastation of war’ had reduced international politics to ‘elementals’, not ‘ideologies or power or armies’, but ‘food and fuel and their relation to industrial production’. The chaos in Europe after the Second World War had brought home to American politicians ‘how short is the distance between food and fuel either to peace or to anarchy’, and how easily ‘hopeless and hungry people’ could be driven to ‘desperate measures’. It was imperative, therefore, that the American government carry out a programme of ‘relief and reconstruction’, not only because of basic humanitarian concerns, but ‘chiefly as a matter of self-interest’. Intervention overseas was necessary to protect the United States, and the rest of the world, from political and economic catastrophe.\textsuperscript{640} Clark Clifford described this speech as containing the ‘genesis of the Marshall Plan’; Acheson himself credited Will Clayton with the

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{637} Weiler, ‘British Labour and the Cold War’, p. 76.
  \item \textsuperscript{638} ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, SW1, on Monday, 18th December, 1950, at 11am’, CAB 128/18.
  \item \textsuperscript{639} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{640} Speech draft, “The Requirements of Reconstruction”, May 5, 1947, \textit{Joseph M Jones Papers}, Box 6, Truman Library.
\end{itemize}
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development of these ideas.\(^{641}\) What is clear is that the Marshall Plan was produced by cooperation between the Office of the President and the State Department, and was directed by long-term policy aims.

Marshall’s speech, delivered at Harvard University in June 1947, was more suggestion than policy, an attempt to demonstrate to the world what the Americans could be willing to do, if only they had support from allies abroad. The Secretary of State described the need for a ‘revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist’.\(^{642}\) According to Oliver Franks, in Marshall’s speech Bevin ‘saw a hand stretched across the water’ from Washington, ‘like a light shining out of nowhere in a dark night’, and he ‘grabbed it with both hands’.\(^ {643}\)

It took more than six months of negotiation for the European powers to work out a joint economic plan that was satisfactory to themselves and to the United States. During this period, the British delegation frequently attempted to act as an intermediary between European and American politicians; Franks described Britain as ‘the leader in Europe and the only possible leader’ at this time.\(^ {644}\) Franks himself played an important part in the process, chairing the negotiations between European powers to transform the plans from sixteen individual ‘shopping lists’ to a coherent, unified programme.\(^ {645}\) As with the discussions over NATO, Britain was keen to preserve a separate identity from the rest of the continent; the ‘special relationship’ was to be preserved, even in the face of American pressure for Britain to integrate more smoothly with other European nations.

It seemed clear that the Marshall Plan would cement the United States as a dominant figure in Europe, and many British observers were concerned about the effect this would have on Britain’s relationships with Europe and America. Each country involved had to sign a bilateral treaty with the United States, and many people within Britain, including much of the Cabinet, felt that the terms of their treaty were unacceptable. Debates about the possible repercussions of accepting American aid, particularly in relation to Britain’s standing in the transatlantic partnership, dominated newspaper and parliamentary discussions.\(^ {646}\) For the Cabinet, there were several ‘breaking points’ contained in the treaty; most important was the requirement that Britain extend Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to the Germany, Korea and Japan, which would have given


\(^{644}\) Oliver Franks, Anglo-American Relations and the ‘Special Relationship’, 1947-1952’, Faculty Seminar on British Studies, (Harry Ransom Humanities Research Centre: University of Texas at Austin, 1990), p. 11.

\(^{645}\) Burk, Old World, New World, p. 583.

\(^{646}\) Ibid., p. 584.
these countries the same trade conditions as other Commonwealth countries without reciprocity. The treaty also appeared to include an ‘infraction of British sovereignty’ by stating that the British government would take ‘all possible steps’ in reference to the financial and monetary measures that would be enacted to rehabilitate the economy.\textsuperscript{647} Overall, it was felt that ‘the tone of the draft agreement’ was ‘in many places not that normally used between sovereign states negotiating on an equal footing’, and so the document made the ERP ‘appear a screen for American economic penetration’.\textsuperscript{648}

Lewis Douglas, who was reasonably sympathetic to British concerns over the bilateral agreement, wrote to the State Department urging caution in Anglo-American relations, and questioning ‘the extraordinary demands’ which the United States was making ‘for data or demands to carry out policies’ that would be ‘impossible except under totalitarian conditions’. Douglas assured the State Department that Britain was ‘not reluctant to supply pertinent information or pursue any reasonable policy’, but they wanted to be reassured of American ‘confidence in their integrity, their intelligence, their efficiency and their good faith’.\textsuperscript{649}

In June 1948, it seemed so likely that Cabinet would reject the Marshall Plan proposals that Stafford Cripps sent to the Cabinet a report, written in March 1948, that predicted dire economic and social conditions if Britain did not receive aid from the Americans; although the report had been produced three months earlier, the Chancellor believed it to be ‘still broadly correct in its conclusion’.\textsuperscript{650} Cripps and the Treasury had predicted that, without Marshall aid, the British gold reserves would be reduced to only £270 million, well below the supposed minimum safe level of £300 million. This would put Britain in a position of the ‘utmost gravity’.\textsuperscript{651} Additionally, Britain would need to radically increase exports to and cut expenditure in dollar areas to try to close the dollar gap, which would stand at about £370 million.\textsuperscript{652} If this policy were successful, the Treasury would still be left with only £215 million to finance dollar imports, and this would mean that there would be severe economic restrictions, including the reduction of imports of food, tobacco and raw materials; a reduction of the petrol and food rations for the British public, with food rations ten per cent below the pre-war average; and restrictions on consumer goods including cotton, paper for books and newspapers, and non-ferrous metals. This would lead to ‘extreme industrial dislocation’, with up to 1½ million unemployed, and the possibility of ‘unrest and inefficiency’

\textsuperscript{648} ‘Report by the London Committee’, 2nd June 1948, \textit{CAB} 134/128.
\textsuperscript{650} Stafford Cripps, ‘Economic Consequences of Receiving No European Recovery Programme Aid’, 23 June 1948, \textit{PREM} 8/768.
\textsuperscript{651} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{652} ‘Economic Consequences of Receiving No ERP Aid’, March 1948, \textit{PREM} 8/768.
among a workforce disheartened by the ‘dreariness of the consumption standards’ and the ‘inadequacy of the national diet’.653

Given this prognosis, the Cabinet accepted the need for Marshall aid to Britain, but remained unhappy about the terms of the bilateral treaty. In the face of British unease, the United States accepted that it was really necessary for Britain to be granted funds on equitable terms. Kathleen Burk argues that, in contrast with the negotiations over the loan in 1945, the United States was willing to compromise with Britain over the bilateral treaty because American officials fully understood British economic weakness; the United Kingdom was a useless ally if it did not have at least a chance of financial stability. Both sides compromised over the bilateral treaty, but Britain was able to have removed the most unacceptable elements, including Article X, which would have allowed the United States to dictate the sterling exchange rate.654

Initially, American attempts to improve European economic prospects had buoyed the special relationship. In June 1947, the American Embassy in London had reported that the press had ‘not disguised the fact that it feels much happier about the Truman Doctrine since Acheson’s speech in Mississippi and Marshall’s at Harvard’. 655 The State Department was aware that Britain would ideally prefer independence from the United States in foreign affairs, but felt that the Attlee government was increasingly, albeit with ‘some reluctance’, abandoning the idea that Britain was ‘able to go it alone’ or to maintain its position as [an] aloof spectator’.656 In Britain, there was public praise of the ‘generous and far-sighted provision’ of the programme, and the ‘generosity shown by the American people’.657 Even so, by the end of the programme, the British public was beginning to tire of their ‘dependence’ on American goodwill; the Cabinet reported in 1950 that ‘public opinion… had greeted with relief the termination of Marshall Aid’.658 The economic necessity of Marshall Plan aid has been challenged, notably by Alan Milward and Peter Burnham.659 However, the scheme enabled the Labour Party to implement large-scale state spending, whereas

656 The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. III, Western Europe, 1948, p. 1077.
658 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, SW1, on Monday, 18th December, 1950, at 11am, CAB 128/10; by this point, the United States may also have become bored with the Marshall Plan – at the Senate meeting discussing the 1950-51 budget allocation for the ERP, Franks reported that discussion had at one point ‘tailed off, perhaps inhibited by the fact that Senator Green, who was sitting between Hoffman and Fulbright, had obviously fallen asleep’. Franks felt that even Hoffman, by 1950, found Marshall aid ‘faintly tiresome’. Telegram, Oliver Franks to Foreign Office, 6 March 1950, CO 537/6636.
659 See, for example, Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, p. 469 and Peter Burnham, The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1990), p. 111.
without Marshall aid Britain would probably have fallen to an even worse level of austerity than during the war.\footnote{Burk, ‘The Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks’, p. 270.}

The American Office of Public Affairs found that people generally felt positive about attempts to enable European reconstruction, although a small minority felt that ‘to pour dollars into Europe’ was like pouring ‘water down a rathole’.\footnote{Department of State: Office of Public Affairs: Division of Public Studies, ‘US Opinion on European Reconstruction: Developments: July 1-18, 1947’, 21 July 1947, \textit{President’s Committee on Foreign Aid}, File: Public Opinion, Box 11, Truman Library.} An editorial in \textit{The New York Times} framed both the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine against declining British power, arguing that the two initiatives were ‘little more than measures to fill power vacuums caused by British withdrawals’. For the newspaper, these two programmes demonstrated that ‘the exercise of power politics always must, in the last analysis, depend upon economic and military force’.\footnote{Herbert L. Matthews, ‘Britain at the End of an Era: Dominions Now in Key Role’, \textit{The New York Times}, 24 November 1947.} This description makes clear the perception that, had Britain been in a stronger position, the post-war economic reconstruction and defence of Europe would have been orchestrated from London, rather than Washington. As it was, Britain was as dependent – sometimes more dependent – on American aid as the rest of Europe.

Britain used most of its Marshall Aid for food, raw materials, petrol and coal, with the overwhelming majority of its counterpart funds being used to retire public debt (the remaining three per cent was spent on arms), despite American pressure to use this money for investment.\footnote{Killick, \textit{The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960}, pp. 101-2.} Alongside this domestic expenditure, Britain used $98 million of the money received through the ERP for colonial development, chiefly through the CDW Act.\footnote{Schreurs, ‘A Marshall Plan for Africa?’, p. 88.} As well as this direct expenditure of ECA funds in the British empire, it can be assumed, as was claimed by the OEEC, that the economic boost provided by Marshall aid ‘improved the financial position of the metropolitan countries and no doubt made it easier for the Governments to offer grants or loans to the territories’.\footnote{OEEC, \textit{Investments in Overseas Territories in Africa, South of the Sahara}, p. 51.}

However, although the Marshall Plan clearly made a positive contribution to British colonial development in the post-war period, and the British empire in return contributed to metropolitan recovery, there was not a natural affinity between Marshall planners and imperial policymakers. The tension inherent in Anglo-American relations concerning colonial issues, alongside British unwillingness to surrender imperial sovereignty for a new future working within a united Europe, meant that the issue of empire within the concept of Marshall aid was at times extremely fraught.
The Marshall Plan and Empire

The Marshall Plan may have been primarily concerned with European economics, but among British politicians there was some anxiety about the potential ramifications of the ERP on the British empire and Commonwealth. This was expressed in the House of Commons debate on accepting Marshall aid. This concern was not partisan, as MPs on both sides of the house were anxious about increased American intervention in the colonies.

Beverley Baxter (Con, Wood Green), who was one of only a handful of Conservative MPs to oppose Marshall aid, was afraid that the agreement would allow the United States administration to advise the British colonies ‘what they should produce to meet the requirements of [the] American economy’; Britain would be reduced to a point where they would ‘not be masters in the Colonies’ because they were ‘opening [their] gates and those of the Dominions to the American dollar’. 666

Major Geoffrey Bing (Lab, Hornchurch) felt that if colonial production were an important part of Marshall Plan economics, ‘the standard of living in the Colonies must be raised’, because it was impossible to trade with ‘impoverished areas’ without ‘merely exploiting its raw materials’; not only would this be ‘morally wrong’, but it would also be ‘economically unsound’.667 Denis Pritt (Ind. Lab, Hammersmith North) agreed that the exploitation of the colonies was fundamentally immoral, and objected further to the idea that the United States might gain materially from this arrangement:

I do not want myself to see the Colonies administered in our interests; I want to see them administered by themselves in their own interests; but I certainly do not want to see a Socialist Government agreeing that they are to be administered in accordance with the interests of the American ruling classes, and that is plainly what comes about under this Agreement. 668

Not all MPs objected to the development of the colonies within the framework of the Marshall Plan. Philip Noel-Baker (Lab, Derby) supported the ‘development of the Colonial resources of Western Europe’ and ‘increased trade inside the British Empire and inside the Sterling Area’ as methods of rejuvenating the British economy. 669 Oliver Stanley objected to any argument that the agreement would impose ‘restrictions’ on British relations with the dominions or colonies, or that it provided the Americans with ‘the opportunity to dictate colonial development in their own interests’; in fact, the document was ‘so hedged around with safeguards’ that the British government could ‘refuse any proposal put up to them by the Americans’ if it were not in ‘the interest of [Britain] and the Colonies’. 670 It was true that the agreement stated that American

667 Major Geoffrey Bing, Ibid., c. 310.
668 Denis Pritt, Ibid., c. 244.
669 Philip Noel-Baker, Ibid., c. 316.
670 Oliver Stanley, Ibid., c. 322-3.
investors were ‘entitled, allowed and indeed encouraged in the Colonies’, and that there would be dollars made available to enable them to withdraw any profits that they might accrue. However, this hardly meant that ‘the Colonies [would] belong to the American ruling class’.671

The Marshall Plan officials had to incorporate the British overseas territories, alongside other European empires, into their plans for economic redevelopment; the bilateral treaties signed between each nation and the United States had expressly included imperial possessions alongside the metropole.672 This meant that the British empire would, under the Marshall Plan, become even more central to Anglo-American relations. As *Time* magazine put it, early in 1947:

> On a quiet afternoon last week, 171 years after the American Colonies broke away from the Crown, the terrible responsibilities (and the equally awesome opportunities) of the British Empire were delivered to Washington, addressed to the American people, c/o George C. Marshall.673

The British empire was a vital arena for British trade. Between 1931 and 1950, British imports from the empire-commonwealth had increased from 24.5 per cent to 41.1 per cent of total imports, whilst exports to the region had risen from 32.6 per cent to 47.7 per cent of total British exports.674 With the British economy faltering, it seemed inevitable that the government would turn to the empire to provide solutions to domestic problems. As Alastair Hinds has emphasised, the 1947 sterling crisis and the ensuing economic panic in Britain was an important factor in the Labour Party’s decision to focus on ‘resource mobilization’ in the British empire, as it seemed that this would enable both domestic reconstruction and the defence of sterling on the international markets.675

The British government also hoped that the empire would provide the ‘material resources’ to ‘show clearly’ that Britain was ‘not subservient to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union’.676 The British Empire was a treasure trove, as it had been for more than a century, which might enable the British economy to compete once again on a global stage. Ernest Bevin wrote to the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Colonial Secretary, among others, to tell them that he was ‘anxious’ to use the exploitation of colonial raw materials to

671 Oliver Stanley, Ibid., c. 323.
develop an independent position with the United States instead of being supplicants, [by adopting] a position which, in addition to feeding our own industries adequately here, will give a priority to developments which will produce the raw materials in short supply in the United States and enable us to ship them there.\footnote{Ernest Bevin to Clement Attlee, Minute, (copies also sent to Chancellor of the Exchequer, Colonial Secretary, President of Board of Trade and Minister of Supply) (draft), 7th July 1947, Folder: UE 5666/5666/53 ‘Foreign Exchange Position: Colonial Raw Materials’, FO 371/62557, National Archives.}

Indeed, Hugh Dalton recorded in his diary that Bevin predicted somewhat over-enthusiastically in 1948 that British imperial resources were so profitable as to eventually render the United States ‘completely dependent’ on the United Kingdom, to the extent that America would be ‘eating out of [Britain’s] hand, in four or five years’.\footnote{Hugh Dalton diary entry, 15 October 1948, cited in Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation*, p. 29; this attitude is corroborated by the Cabinet Notebooks, which record Bevin saying, in January 1948, ‘as soon as we can afford to develop Africa, we can cut loose from US’. Cabinet Minutes, CM (48) 1st Meeting – CM (48), CAB 195/6, 8 January 1948, p. 15.} Bevin’s conception of western union, and the Labour Left’s Third Force, both of which saw Britain at the centre of an alliance of Western Europe and its imperial territories, relied heavily on the role of the British Empire as a bottomless source of raw materials, labour and military power. However, the ultimate acceptance of the Anglo-American relationship as a major framework of British foreign policy meant that colonial development was no longer framed as a way to gain independence from American domination; instead, it could prove Britain’s worth in international markets, and within the ‘special relationship’.

The United States had engaged with the issue of colonial development in a limited way before the Marshall Plan. However, they were often dismissive of what they saw as exploitation dressed up with developmentalist rhetoric, and many in Washington believed that the British were essentially neglectful of their colonial charges. When Franklin D. Roosevelt travelled to the Casablanca conference in January 1943, he stopped in Bathurst (Banjul), the capital city of The Gambia. The city was apparently ‘the most horrible thing’ he had ever seen in his life; in an example of ‘plain exploitation’, the colonial people had to live with ‘Dirt… Disease… [a] Very high mortality rate’, ‘no education whatsoever’, and ‘pitiful’ agricultural conditions. After his visit, he was left with the belief that ‘for every dollar that the British… for two hundred years, have put into Gambia, they have taken out ten’.\footnote{Franklin D. Roosevelt, cited in Nwaubani and Nwaubani, ‘The United States and the Liquidation of European Colonial Rule in Tropical Africa’, p. 512.} At the end of the Second World War, *The New York Times* affirmed, there was a prevalent belief in America ‘that Britain was another Spain that had long neglected an ancient empire, that her colonies were autocratically ruled and exploited by the Government and big business and that colonial preference monopolized colonial trade’.\footnote{John MacCormac, ‘Stanley Opposes Rending of Empire’, *The New York Times*, 20 March 1945.}
Colonial Development and the ECA

As the Cold War context diminished generalised American anti-colonial feeling, so too the context of the economic redevelopment of Europe changed the way that American observers perceived colonial development schemes. Officials in Washington began to appreciate the development of overseas territories as a way to pull Europe out of economic decline, bring more raw materials into international markets, and solve the dollar deficit between Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The British government was somewhat reluctant to involve the United States in colonial development in Africa, especially in light of the debates about American intentions for trading with sterling zone territories. There was therefore some ambiguity in Britain about the extent to which the colonial territories should be included within the machinery of internationalised post-war reconstruction, and this created tension within the Anglo-American relationship, as well as in Britain’s relations with western Europe.

Despite their reservations, the officials working under Arthur Creech Jones were satisfied that some development of the colonies must be carried out within the framework of the Marshall Plan. Their main concern was maintaining British control over their own territories. By the end of 1948, the OEEC Executive Committee had agreed provisionally that colonial development was to be ‘one of its major long-term projects’, which would be delivered through the Overseas Territories Working Group (OTWG), later the Overseas Territories Committee (OTC), on which the Colonial Office had a number of representatives.681 As noted above, this group also enjoyed fairly close scrutiny from a group of American observers from the ECA Office of Special Representatives in Europe (OSR): chief among these was Dr John Orchard, an economic geographer from Columbia University. In addition, Paul Hoffman appointed an all-American Advisory Committee on the Development of Overseas Territories (ACDOT), which met occasionally in Washington to discuss ‘questions of major policy in the ECA programme for the development of the overseas territories’.682 The British were fairly resigned to the prospect of American representatives from the ECA and the World Bank being admitted to the OTC; it was not ‘politic’ to refuse and might even be desirable, ‘so long as the observers behave[d] themselves reasonably’.683 As demonstrated in Chapter Three, Britain worked within the Overseas Territories Organisation at the OEEC to manipulate international coordination on imperial policy to suit British intentions, and to ensure that European cooperation never infringed on the sovereignty of the metropole within the imperial territories.

681 As discussed in Chapter Three. Joan Burbidge, Minute, 27 August 1948, Folder: UR 4472/344/98 Record of a Meeting held in the Foreign Office on 29 July, concerning African and Middle East Development Projects, FO 371/11822.
683 Melville to Chilvers, 8th October 1948, FO 371/71989.
Gerard Clauson reported to the colonial governors that the Americans attached ‘great particular importance to the contribution which the overseas territories [could] make to European recovery, and therefore to the role of the Overseas Territory Committee’. However, the American officials had ‘a good deal less experience’ in the issue of colonial development than in the other arenas of OEEC activity, and so they were apt to ‘present the Committee with impossible demands’ and ‘expect sudden and spectacular results’ that were ‘impossible to achieve’. Despite these concerns, the American government’s ‘new-found enthusiasm’ for colonial affairs was to be encouraged, as it was a ‘great advance on the previous American attitude of extreme distaste for Colonial possessions in general’. The United States needed to be directed ‘in the right channels’, and British officials had spent some time in Washington arguing that investment in the overseas territories was an area for fruitful cooperation. Above all, Britain must be careful not to give the impression that it was ‘not interested in American assistance’.

Dr John Orchard, in his role as ECA observer, addressed the OTC in the spring of 1949. He highlighted the importance of ‘the possibility of economic development in the overseas territories’. Orchard described the American position as promoting an ‘expanding economy’ that would have ‘more to offer to world prosperity and to the living standards of all nations’ than any policy followed before. He reiterated that colonial development was viewed by the United States as ‘one possible means of correcting the dollar shortage’, which might exist even at the conclusion of Marshall aid, in order to establish a ‘viable’ European economy. Orchard expressed American hopes of establishing a ‘triangular trade’ that would ‘provide needed commodities for the United States and other dollar areas and greater purchasing power both for Europe and for the overseas territories’. Clauson believed that Orchard was ‘genuinely anxious to stimulate the Overseas Territories to play their part in promoting European recovery’, but also felt that there was a ‘strong element of Empire-building in his character’:

as a Professor of many years’ standing he is much more used to telling students what they ought to work at than assuming the proper role of an Observer with a Committee which is to offer, when called upon to do so, such advice as he may think necessary.

Clauson’s attitude was influenced not only by Orchard’s attempts to ‘run the committee’, but also by general suspicion within the Colonial Office about American attempts to infiltrate British colonial policy, and a perceived lack of nuanced understanding in Washington about the proper role of colonial development. In turn, the Americans grew frustrated by what they perceived as

684 G. Clauson to all Governors and OAGs, 11 November 1949, CO 537/5161.
685 Dr Orchard, Annex Deux - Organisation Européene De Coopération Économique - Groupe de Travail No2 Du Comite des territoires d’outre-mer, CO 537/5161.
686 G. Clauson to all Governors and OAGs, 11 November 1949, CO 537/5161.
European, mainly British, ‘defensiveness’ when it came to analysing colonial development policy. Indeed, British colonial officials were often critical or dismissive about American attempts to involve themselves in colonial affairs. Prior to Orchard’s appointment, Melville in the Colonial Office had predicted that ‘however well-disposed the American observer’ might feel toward the British Empire, Britain would ‘have to do a lot of educating in the facts of Colonial life’. This attitude persisted throughout the Marshall Plan period, with the Colonial Office stressing the necessity of ‘massed battalions’ of European colonial powers subjecting the American observers to a ‘process of education’. When dealing with American ignorance on imperial policy, officials often suggested (if only to one another) an ‘educative tour’ of the territories in order to bring home the realities of British colonial rule. Throughout the Marshall Plan period, the Colonial Office thus pursued the ‘missionary aim’ of ‘educating the Americans in the true approach to Colonial development’. However, excessive American curiosity was discouraged. When Enos Curtin, Deputy Director of the ECA, expressed the wish to travel to Zanzibar, Will Mathieson complained within the Colonial Office that there was ‘no reason at all’ why this trip was necessary unless Curtin was ‘interested in stockpiling sultanas’.

Eventually, the United States administration became dissatisfied with the generally obfuscatory behaviour of the national delegates at the OTC. William C. Foster, the deputy director of the ECA, sent a six-point letter to the Committee, requesting detailed information on development plans in all European colonial territories. Foster wanted reports to be produced on ‘major development projects’ in the colonies, ‘foreign investment policy and legislation’, ‘land tenure and settlement legislation’, and ‘lists of dollar saving and dollar earning commodities’. The British were deeply unhappy with this request and concerned about the potential burden on the colonial administrations. The amount of fieldwork and in-depth analysis incurred through such a report did not fit into the traditional process of information-gathering in the Colonial Office. The officials in London were privy to ‘an enormous amount of detail’ about colonial development schemes, but did not collate the material into reports on individual subjects, which would be ‘out of date as soon as they [were] written’. Instead, a ‘comprehensive report’ was produced once a year for the Annual Report to Parliament, which was supplemented by each colonial administration’s

687 Overseas Territories Committee: Minutes of the 16th and 17th Meetings held at the Chateau de la Muette Monday and Tuesday, the 19th and 20th December, 1949, OEEC, Paris, 28th December 1949, CO 537/5162.
688 Melville (UK Delegation to the OEEC) to Chilvers (Colonial Office), 8th October 1948, FO 371/71989.
689 Gerard Clauson to AH Poynton, 3rd June 1949, CO 537/5161.
690 AH Poynton, 3rd June 1949, CO 537/5161.
691 AH Poynton to Rogers, 14 November 1950, CO 537/5160.
692 Mathieson to Rogers, 14 November 1950, CO 852/1289/1 European Recovery Programme: Economic Cooperation Act: Visit of Mr Enos Curtin (ECA, Washington) to Africa, National Archives.
693 WS Carter to Emanuel, Clauson and Poynton, 24th May 1949, CO 537/5160.
694 It was this request which was the catalyst for Clauson’s letter to all OAGs in November 1949, as described in Chapter Two and above.
Annual Report on development progress.\textsuperscript{695} There was in fact some understanding within the ECA that the collection and analysis of imperial data was not straightforward. The Deputy ECA Special Representative on the OTC was clear that it was ‘impossible’ to prepare reports for the colonies as elaborate as those prepared for economic planning in metropolitan countries, both because the administrative services in the colonies were ‘not yet sufficiently developed’ and because the colonial administrations were ‘fairly independent of the home country in framing their economic policies’.\textsuperscript{696}

In line with their focus on the production of detailed reports, the Americans were wedded to what became known in the Colonial Office as the ‘major project approach’, which assessed colonial development primarily through the perspective of large-scale, expensive programmes.\textsuperscript{697} It was believed among many in Britain that this was the influence of Dr Orchard, who saw his ‘mission’ on the ECA as ‘the acceleration of development of the Overseas Territories on Tennessee Valley lines’.\textsuperscript{698} British colonial development was not flattered by this approach, as it instead focused on ‘the prime importance of “basic” development and the wide spread of investment resources over the whole field of economic and social development’, including health and social welfare initiatives as well as commodity production.\textsuperscript{699} Indeed, the specific projects being undertaken in the African colonies by the British could be ‘counted on the fingers of one hand’: the Groundnut Scheme; the East African hydro-electric and Nile Valley projects; the Central and East African railway link; and a pilot scheme for mechanised food production running in a number of locations.\textsuperscript{700} It was felt that the Americans did not understand the importance of ‘unspectacular’ social welfare development schemes in Africa, whilst for the Colonial Office, ‘without improved education and health’, long term colonial development was simply not ‘practicable’.\textsuperscript{701}

The Colonial Office was not supported in this resistance by the Foreign Office, who were eager to ‘dress up’ colonial development commitments as ‘projects’ to fulfil Britain’s duties under Article 2 of the April 1948 OEEC Convention, which required that all member states should ‘promote with vigour the development of production… whether in their metropolitan or overseas territories’.\textsuperscript{702}

K. Robinson from the Colonial Office, at a meeting with Foreign Office representatives before the OTC had received Foster’s letter, had stressed that new projects were not as essential to colonial development as ‘the maintenance of existing production’, and that ‘undue concentration on

\textsuperscript{695} Emanuel, Minute, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1949, CO 537/5160.
\textsuperscript{696} ‘Letter from the United States Deputy Special Representative on the re-adjustment of the 1949-50 Programmes (CE(49)142) : Comments of the Overseas Territories Committee Secretariat, drawn up in consultation with Members of the Committee’, 16\textsuperscript{th} November 1949, CO 537/5173.
\textsuperscript{697} WS Carter to Emanuel, Clauson and Poynton, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1949, CO 537/5160.
\textsuperscript{698} Memorandum on Recent Developments in the Overseas Territories Committee, n.d. (Feb, 1950), FO 371/87311.
\textsuperscript{699} WS Carter to Emanuel, Clauson and Poynton, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1949, CO 537/5160.
\textsuperscript{700} Emanuel to Mathieson, 17 May 1949, CO 537/5160.
\textsuperscript{701} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{702} EJW Barnes, 14\textsuperscript{th} August 1948, Folder: UR 4051/344/98 ECA loan aid for the Colonies, FO 371/71822; Paul Gore-Booth, Record of Meeting 29 July 1948 – African and Middle East Development Projects, Folder: UR 4472/344/98, FO 371/71822.
“development projects” might well lead to neglect of existing production resources and their maintenance. However, the Foreign Office remained keen to promote colonial development projects as the recipients of ECA money; as Joan Burbidge noted, the failure to do so might ‘confirm many Americans in their belief’ that Britain offered to the colonies ‘no comparable advantage’ to that which they got out of them.

The Colonial Office continued to resist the major project approach, concerned that the Americans were intending to create a list of schemes, from which they could ‘pick and choose’ where to intervene directly in the colonies. This was a ‘pretty horrifying’ prospect, which could cause ‘a great deal of trouble’. The Colonial office was committed to the principle that only British and colonial governments could be ‘the judges of what projects [were] required’ in the British empire. Officials such as Hilton Poynton, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, were committed to avoiding any policy that implied a ‘supervisory right either by ECOSOC or OEEC over British Colonial development’; Britain was, after all, ‘still sovereign’ in its territories.

As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the Americans were ‘wasting their effort in thinking of direct aid’ to the empire. Firstly, given the choice, Britain would never allow it. Secondly, even if direct American intervention were forced upon the British colonial authorities, the resultant cut in aid to Britain (felt to be inevitable, given the likelihood that Congress would refuse to increase, or might even cut, the overall allocation to the United Kingdom and empire-commonwealth) would ‘severely’ affect the ability of the British government to carry out its planned colonial development programmes. The Foreign Office was concerned that, if an ‘American Corporation for Colonial Development’ were created under the aegis of the ECA, this would allow the organisation to ‘press upon’ Britain a number of ‘pet schemes’ in which the British were not interested. Similarly, the Colonial Office was convinced that direct aid from the Americans would necessarily entail ‘strings and administrative difficulties’.

Crucially, Britain could never admit that another nation would be better able to develop its empire than itself. While Arthur Creech Jones accepted in principle the idea that ‘dollar assistance would help to accelerate work on some projects’ in the empire, he also outlined the risks of giving the impression that ‘His Majesty’s Government cannot do all that is required for the Colonies’ and the

703 K Robinson, Record of Meeting 29 July 1948 – African and Middle East Development Projects, FO 371/71822.
704 Joan Burbidge, 12th August 1948, Folder: UR 4051/344/98 ECA Loan Aid for the Colonies, FO 371/71822.
danger that this would only strengthen the politicisation of colonial nationalism in the post-war period.\textsuperscript{711} The Foreign Office had already admitted that open American intervention might be 'open to misinterpretation in the Colonies', as it subsumed the concept of a colonial burden of development within a free-for-all of international exploitation.\textsuperscript{712} Ultimately, however, Britain was unable to 'withhold information' from the ECA about colonial development, because the Colonies were participating territories under the terms of the bilateral agreements. It was decided that the Colonial Office would 'aim to give as much information' as possible, in a way that would 'contribute to ECA's proper understanding' of British colonial development.\textsuperscript{713} The Colonial Office duly contributed information for the preparation of the OTC reports. However, it remained convinced that the British government was 'far better equipped by knowledge and experience to guide the Colonies' development than anyone else (including the US)' and that the best way for the United States to help the colonial populations was to 'spend their dollars on making a healthy UK'.\textsuperscript{714}

Britain was entitled to spend Marshall Plan aid on the empire in order to develop the production of raw materials and industrial plant to further the reconstruction of its domestic economy. In addition, there was also $68.8 million available in the Overseas Development Fund (ODF), which was managed by the ECA, and an additional $47 million in the fund for the development of strategic materials.\textsuperscript{715} The Overseas Development Fund was intended to meet the essential dollar component costs of individual projects which, it was determined, would either contribute directly to increased production in the territories or pave the way for such increase in the relatively near future by laying foundations – in the form of urgently needed public facilities, particularly in the field of transport.\textsuperscript{716}

The ECA made a number of contributions to British imperial development in the post-war period. Dennis A. Fitzgerald, the Director of the Food and Agricultural Division of the ECA, remembered the organisation having 'quite a little activity' in the British territories, with 'not too much in agriculture' but 'quite a few projects… in ports and railroads, and lots of other things'. Fitzgerald was quick to stress that all ECA activity in the British empire was done 'through the British

\textsuperscript{711} Creech Jones, 'Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) Assistance for Colonial Development.' INTEL No 325, 15 August 1949, Box 44 File 1; ff 105, Bodl. RH, Creech Jones MSS, MS Brit. Emp.s.352.

\textsuperscript{712} Telegram, Foreign Office to Washington, 7 January 1949, FO 371/71822.

\textsuperscript{713} WS Carter to Emanuel, Clauson and Poynton, 30th May 1949, CO 537/5160.

\textsuperscript{714} Emanuel, postscript to notes on report on meetings of OTC in Paris compiled by WS Carter, 25 May 1949, CO537/5160.


\textsuperscript{716} ‘Economic Cooperation Administration: Aid to the Dependencies of ERP Countries From the ECA Overseas Development Fund Up to June 30, 1951’, 13 July 1951, John D Sumner Papers, Box 8, File: General - ERP & Marshall Plan Materials Re. 1948-51 (2), Truman Library.
Colonial Office, of course’, and that if the colonial officials were uncomfortable about a project, the ECA ‘just didn’t try it’.717

Britain did make a series of requests for aid from the ECA for development projects in the African territories. Towards the end of the Marshall Plan period, Britain applied to the reserve pool for colonial projects, established by the ECA in 1949, for the financing of 29 projects, requiring assistance totalling $7.6 million; the money acquired through this pool was subject to fewer constraints and less outside interference than other sources of ECA funding for colonial projects.718

A total of $12,313,000 was made available in 1950-51 ‘in support of British territorial programs and projects, principally in Africa’, and the Special Overseas Development and Technical Assistance Funds remained available to the British empire even after ECA assistance to the United Kingdom was suspended in January 1952.719 This money was around an eighth of the overall cost of the projects involved, and represented less than six per cent of the total amount of British investments in overseas development programmes in the period.720 Britain used this money for a variety of projects, including road development programmes in Nyasaland, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Kenya; reservoir construction in Somaliland; the development the Enugu colliery in Nigeria; the building of a railway in Gold Coast; and a project to attempt the control of red locusts across East Africa.721 In addition, Britain requested aid from the ECA to develop timber production in Sierra Leone, and improve Nigerian inland waterways.722

There was also some attempt to use the ECA framework to increase the amount of American investment in the British overseas territories, with limited success. For example, the Export-Import Bank was considered to have an ‘almost pathetic interest’ in investing funds in East Africa. However, the only vital project in the region was the provision of American heavy tractors to power sawmills for the timber industry and, as the market for timber was domestic to East Africa, the project was judged to be neither dollar-saving nor dollar-earning and was therefore ineligible for Export-Import Bank funding.723

Perhaps most importantly, the United States contributed technical know-how in a similar way to the training provided for European managers and business leaders within the Marshall Plan.

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718 Memorandum on Recent Developments in the Overseas Territories Committee, c. 21st February 1950, FO 371/87311.
720 Ibid.
721 Ibid.
722 ‘Appendix A – List of Projects Presented and Approved As Justification for Aid from the Overseas Development Fund’ 13 July 1951, Ibid.
724 EW Bovill, ‘East Africa and the President's Point IV’, 9 November 1949, CO 852/1259/1.
ECA had been keen to finance the employment of American technicians in colonial territories through the money appropriated for technical assistance, but the British government was against this idea, as the project expenditure would have attracted mandatory counterpart funds. However, the Marshall Plan did enable American technicians, teachers, engineers and medics to be employed within imperial territories to aid colonial development programmes. American geologists were employed to survey possible rail routes between Rhodesia and East Africa, while epidemiologists from the United States were used to help in the ongoing fight against malarial mosquitoes and trypanosomiasis-carrying tsetse flies.

The Colonial Governors were surveyed as to their desire for American technical assistance under the Marshall Plan. Sir Jock Macpherson agreed to the temporary employment of US geologists in Nigeria, so long as Marshall aid was available to pay for housing, office and laboratory equipment provision. Sir J. Hathorn Hall found the proposal for one field geologist and one chemist assayer to be assigned to Uganda ‘acceptable’, although it was important that the people selected should ‘clearly understand’ that conditions in Uganda ‘both as regards housing and technical equipment’ were ‘still considerably below most modern standards’; similarly, Sir Gordon Creasy was happy to welcome two geologists and one petrologist, so long as their salaries were limited ‘to equivalent or appropriate rates for Gold Coast officers’. Sir G. B. Stokes, the Governor of Sierra Leone, agreed to the employment of one American field geologist in his territory on the condition that he was ‘not at liberty to roam at will all over the territory’ and that he would ‘not be a charge on local revenue’. Stokes confessed to ‘some misgivings’ about accepting the offer of American technical aid, because he was concerned that the Sierra Leone Development Company and the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, the principle mining countries in the territory, might ‘object strongly’ to an American geologist surveying areas in which they had an interest. He was also concerned that any survey of the territory would be aimed at the ‘exploitation by American interests’ of any strategic minerals discovered. These mixed reactions to American technical aid demonstrate the real suspicions in the territories around outside involvement in colonial programmes, as well as the competing power interests in each territory that had to be reconciled within any plans for economic or social development.

Overall, compared to the other colonial powers, Britain utilised a fairly meagre amount of assistance from the ECA in its overseas territories. By 1950, France and the Netherlands had committed around $350,000,000 of Marshall Plan funding for purchasing goods and services for

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726 Jock McPherson to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 November 1948, FO 371/71822.
727 J. Hathorn Hall (Uganda) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23rd October 1948, FO 371/71822; G Creasy (Gold Coast) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25th October 1948, FO 371/71822.
728 GB Stokes (Sierra Leone) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 October 1948, FO 371/71822.
their overseas territories; Portugal was planning to apply around $1,500,000 of its commodity funds in the territories before the end of the year. Britain, alongside Belgium, chose to do the majority of its spending in the empire using non-ECA resources.\textsuperscript{729}

British reluctance to fully embrace an international approach to colonial development in this period can be ascribed to several factors. Firstly, there was a general desire among the British government not to open up British sovereign power to infringement by other nations or inter- or supra-national bodies. As discussed in Chapter Three, British resistance to European integration led to a lack of proper cooperation with the ECA, and this feeling was just as strong in the Colonial Office as in other government departments. Additionally, the British government was often hesitant to spend money in the colonies when it could be spent in the metropole. As payments made by the ECA had to be matched and paid into a general fund by national governments, the ‘straightened circumstances’ of Britain in the post-war period meant that the British Treasury was sometimes ‘a little more discriminating in sponsoring projects for submission to ECA than ECA altogether like[d]’.\textsuperscript{730} Similarly, the Treasury was reluctant to sanction loans from the ECA to British colonies, unless it was clear that a lack of capital was ‘seriously hampering internal development’; with a variety funds for promoting development projects available from Britain and within the colonies, a loan from an external provider was always only a final resort.\textsuperscript{731}

For the United States, the funding of colonial projects represented the beginning of a new enthusiasm for overseas development schemes. America realised that it had fundamental economic interests in advancing the ‘direct United States trade, investment, and transportation interests’ in Africa, as well as the strategic interests engendered by the Cold War context that necessitated access to raw materials and military bases; there were also general benefits to be reaped from an ‘increased total African production and trade and participation in world trade’.\textsuperscript{732} As the European economies began to recover, and eager to win more hearts and minds in the global Cold War, the Truman administration began to look elsewhere for possible recipients of American aid. The economic stimulation of the Marshall Plan, combined with the developmentalist policies in the overseas territories, was combined in the fourth point of President Truman’s 1949 inaugural address. However, Point Four was not the first time that the United States had devoted funding and ideological promotion in the developing world; it had first cut its teeth in Africa in its very own colony.

\textsuperscript{730} EW Bovill, ‘East Africa and the President’s Point IV’, 9 November 1949, CO 852/1259/1.
\textsuperscript{731} Ibid.
Liberia: Home of Glorious Liberty?

As this thesis has already explored, the American reputation for anti-colonial ideology does not always stand up to scrutiny of American global policies. Despite fervent American anti-colonial rhetoric, the United States has in fact enjoyed the dubious pleasures of colonial rule all over the world. American possessions in the Pacific and the Caribbean were important strategic and military assets; many of these possessions became unincorporated territories after the Second World War. In 1946, the United States nominally granted independence to the Philippines, but with the imposition of a number of conditions relating to trade and military relations. In 1947, Puerto Ricans won the right to elect their own governor, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was established between 1948-52, but the United States currently retains the right to legislate over many aspects of domestic and foreign policy. However, of all the American overseas territories, Liberia is perhaps most fittingly described as a colonial possession, and provides the most useful counterpoint to British colonial policy in Africa, although it has often been overlooked by scholars of twentieth-century American ‘empire’; there is not a single reference to ‘Liberia’, or indeed ‘Africa’, in Julian Go’s recent book comparing British and American imperialism.

The American Colonization Society (ACS) was established in 1816 by fifty white, mainly Southern, American men, who were searching for a solution to the ‘problem’ posed by freedmen and emancipated slaves. A colonial territory in Africa would protect the whiteness of the American South and so, in coalition with the American government, the ACS worked to create a settlement on the coast of west Africa, finally establishing the town of Monrovia in 1821. Between 1820 and the end of the nineteenth century, 15,386 black settlers were sent to the Liberian territory from the United States; this movement was usually ‘a coercive condition of emancipation’, and there was considerable resistance to the colonization process from abolitionist leaders, notably Frederick Douglass. In addition, around 5,000 Africans were deposited in the territory after being seized as illegal slave cargo by the American navy.

A constitution was drawn up in 1825 to give the American Colonization Society full governing powers in Liberia; this created a territory in a position analogous to that of India under the East India Company before 1858, ‘neither an American protectorate nor a sovereign state’ but ‘a colony of a private corporation’. Notwithstanding distinctions in international law, the United States

735 Go, Patterns of Empire, passim.
739 Mower, The Republic of Liberia, p. 266.
740 Nnamdi Azikiwe, Liberia in World Politics (London: 1934), p. 44.
clearly had a direct colonial relationship with Liberia until the 1840s; a series of white American governors, appointed by the ACS, ruled over the territory until 1841, with all laws being ratified, modified or annulled by the ACS Board of Managers in Washington DC. However, the increasing urgency of the slavery issue at home and the ‘high death rate’ of the white governors led the ACS to withdraw from the territory in the 1840s, and Liberian independence was declared in July 1847.741

Despite nominal independence from the United States, and the formal withdrawal of white American influence from the colony, the settler class in Liberia that arrogated to itself the rule of the territory after independence was fundamentally American, rather than African, regardless of skin colour. The prominent Americo-Liberian families that ran the country from the 1840s to the twentieth century lived in houses based on those built by plantation owners across the southern states. They wore ‘Western’ style clothing and imported American foodstuffs including pickled beef, bacon, cornmeal and butter, while their African compatriots wore traditional African dress and consumed cassava, plantains and yams. The Americo-Liberians built an English-speaking, Christian state, which practised an expansionist form of colonial government based on the same ‘civilising’ mission as that of the British, French, Belgian and Portuguese governments on the continent.742 In fact, the Americo-Liberians were essentially a ‘comprador class’, compelling this non-colony to perform its domestic and foreign politics in a fundamentally colonial manner.743

Liberia occupied an interesting position in the American political imagination. In 1946, in an article headed ‘Our Aid to Liberia Not “Imperialism”’, the New York Times was careful to point out that ongoing American aid to the territory was intended to ‘encourage the development of that country… along peaceful lines’ and was ‘certainly not the work of an imperialist power dealing with a colony or other dependency’.744 However, the next year, an article on the same subject in the Washington Post described Liberia as ‘America’s only experiment at overseas colonization’.745 In 1947, Truman wrote a letter to Moss H. Kendrix, the famous African-American public relations pioneer, who was then the Executive Secretary of the National Committee for the American Celebration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of Liberia. Truman described the first settlers in Liberia as having ‘all but completely conquered the jungle wilderness’ in order to ‘establish their new nation’; this rhetoric of settlers triumphing over hostile environments to build a new settlement (with no mention of the indigenous peoples already living in the area) not only echoes

742 Ibid., p. 219-222.
743 For more explanation of the concept of a ‘comprador class’, see Flint, ‘Planned decolonization and its failure in British Africa’, p. 391.

The United States had started economic and technical development in the country in 1944, and it was one of the first theatres of Point Four assistance, which was largely directed by former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. The American attitude to development in Liberia was overwhelmingly positive, based on a conception of the programme as broadly humanitarian; there were frequent references in official documents to the United States being Liberia’s ‘best friend’, and the population was believed to be ‘grateful for [American] friendship and help’ in matters of public health, social welfare and economic infrastructure development.\footnote{Carl Murphy (President Afro-American Newspapers) and Mary MeLeod Bethune to Truman, 22 January 1952, \textit{Truman Papers: WHCF: Official File}, Box 1505, OF: 476 Liberia, Truman Library.} American development in the territory was directed through the Liberia Company, formed by Stettinius in 1948 as a subsidiary of Stettinius Associates. The company was established with $1,000,000 in capital, of which 65 per cent of profits would go directly to the parent company, 25 per cent directly to the Liberian government and 10 per cent to the Liberian Foundation, a charity dedicated to improving education, health and social welfare in the territory.\footnote{Rodney Carlisle, ‘The ‘American Century’ Implemented: Stettinius and the Liberian Flag of Convenience’, \textit{The Business History Review}, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Summer, 1980), p. 177.}

British officials viewed US overseas programmes in Liberia with equal measures of suspicion and derision. In 1949, the Colonial Office sent a letter to the British Embassy in Washington, which mocked the Americans ‘do-gooders’ who were engaged in ‘much bustle and very little real work’.\footnote{Melville to E Salben-Clare (British Embassy Washinston), 24 January 1949, \textit{FO 371/73927}, African: Liberia.} The United States had little experience of working in Africa and British officials, who had direct experience of conditions on the continent, were ‘a little sceptical’ that the Liberia Company would ‘stay the whole course’.\footnote{Bowering (British Legation, Monrovia) to Wright (Foreign Office), 5 February 1949, \textit{FO 371/73927}.} They felt that the Americans were ‘a little optimistic about the possibilities of any serious development in Liberia’, especially in secondary industrial production.\footnote{WB Monson (West African Council, Accra) to K. E. Robinson (CO), 10 August 1948, \textit{CO 537/3160}.}

The British attitude to United States prospects in Liberia may have been snobbery about the lack of American experience of colonial rule, but it was also possibly based in negative racial attitudes towards the Liberians themselves. An article in the \textit{Crown Colonist} described a Liberian population of ‘nearly one and half millions, all of African race’ of which ‘only some 60,000 [could] be considered civilised’; the article claimed that ‘a hundred years of independence’ had ‘not fostered very much progress’ in the territory.\footnote{‘New Era for Liberia?’, \textit{The Crown Colonist}, December 1947, \textit{CO 537/3160}.} This feeling was, in fact, shared by many Americans; the
United States Consul in Dakar believed that the population in Liberia under ‘direct native supervision’ was marked by ‘sloth, dishonesty, incompetence and uncooperativeness’.753

The United Africa Company (UAC), a British subsidiary of Unilever that had been active in the continent since 1929, was considered to be far more accomplished in the region than the American effort, mainly because of its ‘superior efficiency’.754 There was initially some antagonism between the UAC and the Liberia Company, based on agreements between Unilever and the Liberian government that would enable the UAC to establish cocoa and palm-oil plantations in the territory; a subsidiary of the UAC, the Cavalla River Company, was also active in the region.755 This caused ‘considerable misapprehension’ in ‘certain circles in the United States’, who were concerned about British encroachment into American areas of influence.756 However, the governments in Washington and London attempted to play down this dispute as much as possible; the State Department reassured the British that they ‘fully appreciated’ the position of the UAC and that the Liberia Company was engaged in ‘very little activity’ related to cocoa farming in the region.757 The British government was convinced that the Liberia Company’s agreement with the Liberian government did not endow them with ‘monopolistic rights’ in fields such as cocoa development (although it did contain ‘a whole chorus of pious hopes in agricultural and other endeavours’). However, the Colonial Office felt that the UAC would not wish to ‘antagonise’ the Liberia Company by enforcing too crudely its rights in the region, and would instead ‘ride in on their back towards such goodwill as may exist with the Liberian Government for the New Look in Colonial exploitation’.758

The wry manner in which the Colonial Office officials wrote about the Liberia Company’s relationship with the Liberian Government indicates their general impression of American intentions in the region. Another Colonial Office document claimed that the American idea of colonial development was ‘largely exploitationist’, with ‘Stettinius-in-Liberia’, and his focus on the mining industry, an especially egregious example.759 This attitude was perceived internationally as evincing tensions within the Anglo-American relationship. The Soviet News Agency TASS reported the British to be ‘deeply disturbed’ by American attempts at ‘seizing the raw materials of the African colonies’, and claimed that American activity in the region was potentially a ‘serious threat’ to British dominion in Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Togo and Gold Coast.760 This was dismissed by the Foreign Office as ‘an effort to drive a wedge into Anglo-American

754 Melville to E Sabben-Clare, 24 January 1949, FO 371/73927.
755 WB Monson to WS Carter, 11 January 1949, FO 371/73927.
756 ARI Mellor (UAC) to the Foreign Office, 27 January 1949, FO 371/73927.
757 EE Roache for Colonial attaché (Brit Embassy Washington) to Melville, 2 May 1949, FO 371/73927.
758 Melville to Sabben-Clare, 24 January 1949, FO 371/73927.
759 Clauson, Minute, 24th May 1949, CO 537/5160.
cooperation in the economic field”; apparently neither British nor French officials viewed American expeditions into West Africa ‘with any great alarm’.761

The Liberia Company enacted a number of different schemes in the region, including studies into the possibilities for diamond mines, cocoa and coffee plantations, fisheries, and timber plants, as well as plans for a road and rail system, the electrification of Monrovia, and the provision of water and sewage systems. Despite Stettinius’s best efforts, many of these plans attracted little capital funding.762 However, American development in the region led to the creation of the Port of Monrovia; the founding of a ship registry; the establishment of Liberian International airways with a redeveloped airport; the large-scale mining of iron ore in the region; and the creation of an international bank.763

In the late 1940s the Liberia Company experienced some economic problems, and contacted the American government to try to solicit financial aid. Joseph Grew, by then head of the Liberia Company, wrote to President Truman to ask for economic assistance; he warned that in the context of ECA activities on the African continent,

an American economic policy which favours Liberia’s colonial neighbours and discriminates against the only independent Negro republic in Africa may be resented by Negroes everywhere and by colonial peoples aspiring to self-government.764

Grew was struck by the unfairness of a situation where Liberia, ‘solely because it [was] independent’, was not eligible for financial aid under the ECA, in contrast to British and French colonies. He argued that Liberia was an ‘integral part of European supply from Africa’, yet it had been omitted from ECA funding under a ‘mistaken assumption’ that it was not vital for European recovery.765 Channing H Tobias, the Director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund for educational development, made a similar point, when he argued that the ‘little Republic’, which had been ‘patterned after’ the American government, should ‘receive encouragement and support’ since the ECA and related organisations were ‘doing so much for Europe and the colonial possessions of European governments in Africa’.766 These arguments reveal a deep frustration at a situation where European empires, long derided as unjust and exploitative, were benefiting from American investment, whilst Liberia, which had never been formally colonised but had historic ties to the United States, was being overlooked.

761 Minutes, February 1949, Folder: J 1334/11345/24, FO 371/73927.
765 Ibid.
Although Truman believed that Grew’s argument had ‘some merit’, ultimately the State Department was not convinced. The ECA had been omitted from ECA funding ‘for the same reason as other non-European countries’. The ERP was intended to stimulate ‘relief and recovery of certain European countries’, rather than provide for general ‘development and expansion’ of territories. Funding Liberia would ‘set an unfortunate and embarrassing precedent’ and would lead to renewed demands for Marshall Plans for other areas of the world. The ECA would not provide capital support for the Liberia Company or fund development in the region. However, the United States government would in fact enact a series of development schemes in Liberia, including technical assistance, the development of public health programmes, and annual aid contributions in collaboration funds set aside by the Liberian government. These measures, along with similar development programmes in countries all over the world, would be enacted under the aegis of the Point Four initiative.

**Point Four: The Dawn of American Aid**

Harry S Truman won the 1948 election in a fight that was so close, the *Chicago Tribune* famously proclaimed that he had been beaten by Thomas E. Dewey. His inaugural speech in 1949 capitalised on his image as an international statesman. In the fourth point of a speech which stressed the importance of the UN, anticipated world economic recovery and promoted the role of ‘freedom-loving nations’ in the fight against communist aggressors, Truman stated that America was to ‘embark on a bold new program’ which would make the benefits of American ‘scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’. Truman focused on the humanitarian motivations for development, decrying the fact that ‘more than half the people in the world’ were ‘living in conditions approaching misery’ and invoking the role of the United States as ‘pre-eminent among the nations’ and thus duty-bound to enable widespread development. Within this rousing promotion of overseas humanitarian intervention, the President denounced ‘old imperialism’ as purely ‘exploitation for foreign profit’, instead characterising American development plans as the extension of ‘democratic fair-dealing’ to those in need.

The Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (ACTA), later the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), was established under Willard L. Thorp and Samuel Hayes to devise and implement Point Four aid.

By January 1950, the Department of State had produced a slim book detailing the ideology and scope of the Point Four programme. This text emphasised the ‘common concern’ of the United States and other ‘free nations’ in the ‘material progress’ of underdeveloped regions, both ‘as a

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humanitarian end in itself’ and to promote ‘the advance of human freedom, the secure growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, and the development of international understanding and goodwill’. However, the State Department maintained that the programme was ‘not an attempt to force American ways or American capital upon the people of other nations’ but a ‘program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing’.

The two main methods for development were technical assistance and the promotion of international investment in underdeveloped areas. The programme would work in the four basic fields of agriculture, education, health and housing, as well as in the development of resources and industries such as water supply, minerals, fisheries, transportation and communications. The similarity in focus and aims between the Point Four programme and the British colonial development schemes is clear.

The immediate American reaction to Point Four was cautiously positive. The New York Times proclaimed the programme to be vital ‘in terms of propaganda, in terms of world politics, in terms of world economics, and in terms of the United States’ anti-colonial tradition’. Within the context of the Cold War, the programme was ‘a long-range proposition in economic terms’, but was even more important in the short-term as ‘an instrument of propaganda and politics’; raising ‘the standard of living, the standard of health, and the standard of education’ in underdeveloped areas was ‘not only a question of altruism but of self-interest to the United States’. However, many Americans held the ‘same kind of suspicions that were evident at the birth of the European Recovery Programme’, and were concerned that the American taxpayer was being forced into further foreign hand-outs. Critics mocked the programme as aiming to provide ‘a can of milk for every Hottentot’, and drew parallels between Point Four and British colonial development, depicting the programme as ‘another socialised “peanut scheme” which will fail’. Right-wing criticism of the programme became particularly intense after Senator Joseph McCarthy focused his charges of ‘communist sympathisers in the State Department’ into a direct personal attack on Haldore Hanson, who was Chief of the Technical Cooperation Projects Staff directly under Willard Thorp.

Of course, in 1949 the United States was already involved in one large-scale humanitarian relief effort overseas, as well as being an active participant in other international organisations, including the UN and NATO. The Point Four programme and Truman’s focus on underdeveloped nations

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773 Oliver Franks to Ernest Bevin, 17 April 1950, CO 852/1259/1.
contributed to the revitalisation of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the creation of a comprehensive plan for UN-led technical assistance delivered through a variety of specialised agencies.774 One of the major challenges of the Point Four programme would be navigating a pathway between the various international agencies for development already in existence, in order to work out the most efficient framework for American relationships with the developing world. The ECA was represented on the ACTA, and it had been agreed that any projects undertaken under the Point Four programme in an ECA territory would be ‘first cleared with ECA’.775 In this context, the heads of the ECA missions in the European imperial metropoles met in autumn 1949 to discuss future development plans for the European overseas territories. There were no representatives present from the metropolitan nations involved, or indeed the colonial territories themselves.

For the American experts, it was clear that colonial development was vital, ‘not only from the short-term point of view of meeting the dollar gap’, but also ‘as a factor in the health and prosperity’ of the American economy. If the American economy was allowed to ‘stagnate’, as in the interwar period, the populations of the overseas territories might ‘lose confidence’ in the economic system and ‘look elsewhere for leadership’, presumably foremost to the USSR.776 The various schemes of development being enacted under the ECA were ‘no longer “colonial” in the sense of exploitation’ and should therefore ‘stress health, welfare, and the orderly development’ of the regions involved. It was important to emphasise the ‘ethical principle’ of development, or ‘risk losing these territories for the free economic world’.777

Abbot Low Moffat, the ECA Deputy Chief of Mission for the United Kingdom, emphasised that there was comparatively little need in the British overseas territories for assistance in economic commodity development, which was being completed through the CDC and the colonies’ own development corporations. Instead, the British territories needed help with ‘more fundamental improvements’ such as transportation, geological surveys, and social services. Moffat used as an example the Gold Coast, which he believed had only 35,000 ‘natives educated and healthy enough for even semi-skilled work’ out of a population of several million.778 Where the British territories did require dollar assistance, it was mainly for the purchase of agricultural equipment, mainly earth-moving machinery.779

775 Summary of Discussions Conference on Overseas Territories September 12-13 1949, John D Sumner Papers, Box 10 File: Conference on Overseas Territories 1949-50, Truman Library.
776 Ibid.
777 Ibid.
778 Ibid.
779 Ibid.
The focus on this type of development in the colonies meant that American technical assistance could be especially effective in bringing about progress, certainly compared to direct dollar aid, which the British government would have never allowed. In this way, ECA work in the colonies was a direct precursor to the Point Four programme because, whilst capital for development projects was already available through the American Export-Import Bank and the International Bank, there was no international organisation to supply technical assistance to those who needed it.

It had initially appeared that there would be no clash between the Point Four and ECA programmes, as ECA focused primarily on ‘the achievement of viability’ of the European metropoles. There was, in fact, considerable overlap in scope between the two schemes, although ECA retained economic profitability as its primary objective, whilst Point Four could focus on ‘health, welfare and educational projects without consideration of their immediate effect on economic development’. Technical assistance under the ECA constituted ‘an exception to the requirement’ that all projects ‘must result in immediate and measurable economic improvement’, as that was judged to be ‘unduly limiting’ in territories where the level of underdevelopment necessitated a focus on ‘basic services’ that would never turn a profit. Given this overlap, it was important that the ‘cooperation and support of OEEC should be obtained for Point IV Program activities to be carried out in the OEEC countries and in dependent overseas territories under their administration’. Indeed, although the Marshall Plan representatives were ‘reasonably certain’ that the ECA would ‘always be larger in the overseas territories of the Marshall Plan countries than the Point IV program in the same areas’, the two programmes were fundamentally connected. It was therefore vital that

The ECA program in the overseas territories of the Marshall Plan countries should not be considered a short-term program with an early ending but rather as the foundation and start of a long-term, continuing program of development which [would] be carried forward after 1952 under Point IV or similar legislation.

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780 Ibid.
781 Ibid.
783 Ibid.
The British reaction to the proposals for Point Four aid was mainly positive. Herbert Morrison wrote to Attlee in June 1949 to emphasise the programme as a ‘new and acceptable outlet to enable the Americans to go on financing the world with dollars as Marshall aid tapers off’, about which Truman had ‘thrown out a number of feelers… similar to the early feelers about the Marshall Plan’. Morrison believed that the United States had ‘a big economic and political interest in fuller development of backward territories’, many of which were within the sterling area. By January 1950, the Colonial Office felt that it was ‘gradually emerging in the American mind’ that ECA assistance to the overseas territories was ‘fourth-point-like in character but… not part of the Fourth Point’, and although the programmes were ‘quite distinct’ they would have to be coordinated closely. Under the Marshall Plan, the United States had already established its willingness to provide funds to be spent in the colonial empire to ‘help promote European recovery’, and it was hoped in Britain that Point Four meant that the Americans would be prepared to interpret the principle of colonial development funding ‘very liberally’, beyond those schemes required for economic progression. The Colonial Office welcomed the idea that there would be funds available, not only for schemes to increase production of dollar-earning and dollar-saving commodities, but also for ‘basic development such as communications’, ‘health services and technical education’.

Given their colonial responsibilities, British officials believed that they had a ‘special responsibility’ within the Point Four programme:

As the leading Colonial Power in the world it is incumbent upon us to discuss ways and means by which the scheme can be utilised to assist in the speeding up on plans for improving conditions in undeveloped areas within our own Empire.

Although this approach might appear rather self-serving, the British empire was ‘itself a part of the world, not something outside it whose development may also benefit “the world”’. If Britain focused on developing its own colonial territories, that would be a ‘direct contribution to the world problem of the development of the under-developed territories’; after all, ‘the inhabitants of Nigeria [were] as much human beings as the inhabitants of Brazil’, with the only difference being that the former happened to be under British ‘care’. Britain could also contribute more generally to Point Four, because of its ‘long and deep experience’ in the management of underdeveloped areas. There was particular British expertise in the sphere of scientific research, and British technicians could

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787 Clauson, Minute, 27 January 1950, CO 852/1259/1.
788 Mathieson to Clauson and Poynton, 6 June 1949, CO 537/5160.
789 Ibid.
791 Cabinet: Committee on Colonial Development: ‘President Truman’s “Fourth Point” (Memorandum by the Colonial Office)’, 14 March 1949, T 232/227.
contribute to schemes for geological surveys, tsetse eradication, irrigation schemes, crop surveys and the studies of disease vectors. The need for international support was acknowledged by American officials, who had always known that they ‘did not have unlimited funds to carry out the policy’, but after a year of thinking also discovered that they ‘did not have as much “know how” as would be needed’ either; the Americans made ‘handsome admissions that the US could learn a lot from other people’s experience’, including Britain’s.

The reaction to Point Four in Britain was not entirely positive, however. There were some general concerns based on British perceptions of American empire-building in the developing world. Predictably, the Daily Worker criticised the Point Four programmes as ‘vast plans of colonial aggrandisement’, maintaining that the ‘development of backward areas’ was merely a ‘synonym for US financial penetration into the colonies’. Somewhat less predictably, in a letter to all Commonwealth governments, the Commonwealth Relations Office criticised the Point Four pamphlet produced by the American government as being ‘coloured by two characteristic American beliefs’: firstly, that ‘the American way of life is the best and should be a goal which other countries should strive to attain’, and secondly, ‘the belief in mechanisation as a means to progress’. There was also uproar in the British press when they believed that they had uncovered an ulterior motive for American intervention in colonial territories; the Daily Express reported in May 1950 that Benjamin Gerig, one of Truman’s men in the State Department, had described the purpose of the Point Four programme as being ‘to develop colonial backward areas to a point where they can revolt against their countries’. Gerig was anxious to assure the British that he had ‘no intention of giving the impression that Americans would encourage rebellion’, although they were ‘always sympathetic to peoples’ desire for independence’. The Colonial Office was reassured by Sir Alan Burns, the UK Permanent Representative on the UN Trusteeship Council, that although Gerig had some ‘wild ideas’, he would not ‘be in favour of encouraging revolt’.

As well as some generalised anxiety about American intentions in the developing world, there was also some concern in Britain that the proposed American programmes might actually hinder British development plans. In the summer of 1949, Gerard Clauson wrote a long, cautionary memorandum on the issue of Point Four as it applied to the British colonies. He stated that the Colonial Office was ‘wholly opposed to the progressive “internationalisation” of technical assistance to backward countries’, as it was not ‘more efficient’ but merely motivated by ‘Empire building’. Clauson felt

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793 Emanuel to Poynton, 31 March 1950, CO 852/1259/1.
794 ‘Editorial – Billions for New War’, Daily Worker, 10 January 1950.
795 Commonwealth Relations Office to Commonwealth Governments, 7 April 1950, CO 852/1259/1.
796 ‘REVOLT PLOT ‘in colonies’’, Daily Express, 1 May 1950.
797 Alan Burns, United Kingdom Permanent Delegation (Geneva) to AN Galsworthy, Colonial Office, 1 March 1950, CO 852/1259/1.
strongly that industrialisation was ‘not a panacea for backwardness’; countries needed to ‘specialise in what they can do best’, such as ‘a particular kind of agriculture or mining’, and development programmes should focus on ‘evolution not revolution’ of underdeveloped economies. It was also important to work out exactly what was necessary for a region’s progression. Air travel, for example, was a ‘rich country’s toy not a backward country’s necessity’, and funds should not be diverted from other projects to develop airports and runways. Clauson believed fundamentally that the United States, coming to development late in the project, was ignorant of what was ‘already going on in the Colonial field’. Colonial research in all areas of technical development had ‘found out all the easy answers long ago’ and the American projects would not make the rapid progress that some predicted. However, Clauson acknowledged the need to show willing in the international development of ‘backward’ areas, as well as channelling aid directly to the empire, and recommended that the British governments ensured that, after preparing colonial development projects, there was a ‘net remainder in men, resources and money’ to contribute to international plans for development.798

Fundamentally, the British Government recognised that any official move toward American support for overseas development, whether technical, social or economic, would be a positive force in British colonial development. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office was concerned that this sudden interest in questions of overseas development would lead to increasing American interference in the British colonial territories. There was exasperation about the ‘endless fruitless 4th Point discussions’ that Washington was suddenly instigating.799 In the same way that the British government had approached their dealings with the OTC, the Colonial Office was desperate to avoid a situation where they became, ‘in effect, accountable to the US government’ for their overseas development policy, and resented American requests for information on programmes within the Empire.800 However, it was vital that Britain did not appear to be dragging its feet. Rather than refusing to supply information to the Americans, the Colonial Office instead resolved to send over, not only the requested data, but also ‘large quantities of documents’, with the judicious inclusion of at least ‘one unpublished report… marked confidential!’. This policy of ‘choking the cat with cream’ would ensure that the Americans had ‘so much to read that they [had] less time to talk’, and the British would ‘establish the conviction’ that they were ‘out to cooperate’.801 This policy appears to have been pursued with the Americans none the wiser as to British intentions.

Not everybody within the Colonial Office was resistant to Washington’s newfound interest in colonial development plans. Sir William Gorell Barnes was concerned that, if the Colonial Office continued to follow an ‘entirely negative policy’ within the OTC, they were not only in for ‘a row

798 Clauson to Roger Jackling (FO), 20 June 1949, CO 537/5174.
799 Poynton to Emanuel, 21 April 1949; Clauson, Minutes, 19 April 1949 CO 852/1323/2.
800 Ibid.
801 Clauson, Minutes, 19 April 1949; Chilvers to Carter and Mathieson, 4 May 1949 CO 852/1323/2.
with the Americans’ but also risked kindling an ‘anti-Colonial Office atmosphere in Whitehall and among Ministers’, the likes of which had harmed the department in the past. By many within the Colonial Office, American enthusiasm for colonial development was very much the lesser of two possible evils. In the context of increasing United Nations interest in the colonial territories and the developing world, it was considered ‘unfortunate’ that the Americans, who ‘had no experience of the administrative problems’ which British officials faced daily in Africa, did not ‘realise the evil consequences of the advocacy by the United Nations of premature self-government for backward peoples’. It was believed that ‘with a greater stake in [British] colonies, the United States would have a ‘better understanding of… colonial problems’; it was important therefore that ‘no effort should be spared to encourage American participation in the development of… African colonies’.

The Point Four concept was rather slow to be developed into a coherent programme, not least because Truman had outlined the idea in his inaugural speech without any practical concept of how the scheme would work; as with the Marshall Plan, the idea was ‘just a gleam in the eye’ when it was first presented in public. By the early 1950s, the programme had sent four thousand technicians out to ‘various countries’, working in agriculture, public health, education and industrial arts. For the Point Four administration, Liberia formed something of a ‘pilot plant’, and the organisation supported the development of a new port facility in Monrovia, as well as a health and sanitation programme that focused on malaria, venereal disease and sleeping sickness, and an aviation project to map the territory and enable more efficient pesticide spraying against desert locusts. The programme was ambitious in scope but showed fairly minor short-term results. Instead, it was intended to work over ‘decades, scores of years’ and was viewed as a ‘long run effort’ by all the people involved, who were overwhelmingly technical experts unconcerned with Cold War pressures for immediate, public results. Under President Eisenhower, Point Four and the TCA were reorganised into the Foreign Operations Administration, which in turn evolved into the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); in 2012, USAID accounted for 1% of the American federal budget, $51.6 billion, which was spent on defending American security and investing in human and economic security, including initiatives in global health, food security, poverty reduction, climate change, and empowering women and girls through humanitarian

802 Gorell Barnes to Clauson and Poynton, 6th June 1949, CO 537/5161.
803 Bovill, ‘East Africa and the President’s Point IV’, 9 November 1949, CO 852/1259/1.
programmes.808

Conclusions

British officials were fundamentally sceptical about the level of proposed American assistance in the overseas territories. Towards the end of the Marshall Plan period, the political elite had begun to suspect that there was not ‘much more than mere words in... American asseverations’ supporting the aims of British colonial policy.809 However, this was not the view across the Atlantic; the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs judged the United States to have been ‘generally sympathetic toward the efforts of the [British] government’ to develop its African colonies.810 The period certainly represents a rapprochement within the Anglo-American relationship on the subject of empire, as supporting colonial rule in Africa became a important part of American Cold War policy. However, this period was also the beginning of the end of the British empire on the African continent. Dean Acheson, when interviewed for the Truman Library oral history project, recalled that, in the immediate post-war period, Washington ‘didn’t realise the Empire had gone’ and that Britain was ‘hardly more important than Brazil in the world’; the United States government had to adjust its expectations of its allies within the context of post-war devastation and the incipient Cold War.811

Acheson’s judgement of post-war British imperial power might have been overly dramatic, but a combination of African nationalism, international anti-imperialism and domestic economic constraints did eventually lead to the dissolution of the British empire in Africa. The pace gradually quickened, with the incipient nationalist movements of the late 1940s gaining credence and power in the 1950s, culminating in Harold Macmillan’s 1960 ‘Winds of Change’ warning to white nationalists that African independence and black majority rule was not a force that could be resisted. Within this context of waning British influence in Africa, so American activity grew.

The outbreak of the Korean War shifted the focus of American policy in Africa, and development began to focus specifically on ‘the production of strategic and other primary materials’. 812 In the context of the Cold War, the United States intervened in a number of domestic conflicts in Africa, sponsoring the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961 and supporting the anti-government guerrilla forces of UNITA in Angola in 1986, whilst simultaneously disregarding corruption or poor

government in those countries, such as Kenya, Somalia and Liberia, that were seen as reliably anti-communist and anti-USSR.\textsuperscript{813}

The British Left, which had largely accepted Anglo-American relations and had even heralded Truman’s domestic policies as a type of New World socialism, was never prepared to accept the new military direction taken by the USA after 1950. By mid-1951, it seemed that American foreign policy was ‘the embodiment of all those elements to which the Labour left objected’.\textsuperscript{814} By October 1951, however, the United States was dealing with a Conservative Britain. The Labour Party would not come to power again until 1964; their time in opposition incubated a rich vein of anti-American ideology.

\textsuperscript{814} Epstein, ‘The British Labour Left and US Foreign Policy’, p. 993.

In the period after the Second World War, there was a fundamental tension at the heart of British colonial development policy. The programmes implemented in the Attlee period can be read as a protracted struggle between altruism and exploitation. Fundamentally, all colonial rule was extractive. The acquisition of British territories in Africa had been driven by businessmen like Cecil Rhodes and the continent had been eagerly anticipated as a repository of raw industrial materials and precious metals, leading to tensions between occupying colonial powers. Colonial development in Africa after the Second World War was partly driven by this urge to exploit raw materials and labour on the continent, tempered by genuinely humanitarian concerns about the quality of life and potential for advancement of African populations. It was a product of political conditions and ideological context at every level, from the Cabinet and the Colonial Office, to the colonial administrations in the territories and African people themselves. Each actor in the process had a different motivation for participation – and a varying level of autonomy in deciding whether to participate at all.

This chapter explores Britain’s level of success in colonial development under the Attlee government. Britain’s often tentative juggling of the ‘special relationship’, Anglo-European relations, the British imperial role and the domestic economic and political situation all combined to create a fragile context for British colonial policy. Creech Jones and the Colonial Office had specific aims for the African colonies – namely, the building of domestic economies and social welfare provision to enable progression to independence – that were not always consistent with the aims and priorities of the Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office for Britain’s imperial territories. Nevertheless, Creech Jones had some considerable success in moulding colonial development to his vision, and laid the foundations for a British colonial and post-colonial policy that aimed to create new, independent nations and support those nations through on-going development aid.

This chapter examines some of the projects implemented in the African colonies through the CDC, the OFC and the Colonial Development and Welfare funds. First, it addresses those projects aimed at economic development, and finds that this type of scheme was often badly managed, lacked support from colonial populations, and had little success in achieving its aims. The chapter then goes on to examine development of infrastructure and communication technology, and social welfare development such as healthcare and education. It is clear that, although there were some problems in implementing these schemes, this type of development was more successful; the

815 For example, the Witwatersrand Gold Rush had been a major contributing factor to the Jameson Raid of 1896 and the Second Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902.
desired outcomes for these schemes were clearer and easier to assess, they were executed with a clearer and more coherent message to justify their importance, and local populations were more supportive of their aims and more willing to cooperate with their implementation. This type of development reflected the social welfare measures being implemented in the metropole in this period, and fitted into a broader humanitarian conception of a new social, political and cultural relationship with the colonies that drew much of its inspiration from Fabian ideology. Creech Jones and his Colonial Office may be largely remembered for the British withdrawal from India and Palestine, but in focusing on a humanitarian, welfare-centred vision of development, they changed the relationship between metropole and periphery and set the tone for colonial policy for the remainder of the twentieth century.

**Why did Africa need Economic Development?**

In his seminal text *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Walter Rodney, the political activist and historian, addressed the state of African economies as a result of European colonial rule. He criticised as ‘completely false’ the idea that European colonial governments had ever contributed to the economic development of the African continent, instead condemning economic practices that had focused on cash crops and the provision of cheap labour, without adequate provision for social services, transport and communication infrastructure, or inter-African trade. Rodney dismissed the idea that European capital was invested in the continent; financial institutions were ‘scandalously neglectful of indigenous African interests’ and the territories were largely exploited through capital ‘produced out of African labour’. Instead, Rodney pointed to the underdevelopment of capitalism in the African states, attributing this to the ‘competition, elimination and monopoly’ inherent in the capitalist system. European nations were unwilling to establish an effective system of African capitalism or an African working class, and resisted the spread of industrial skills throughout Africa, preferring instead to maintain a system where the majority of the population were confined to forced agricultural labour or the production of raw materials such as diamonds, bauxite, rubber and gold. Agricultural production was vital to the colonial economies, although because the workforce was so plentiful there was little impetus to make production more efficient or less demanding by bringing in scientific techniques; this was accompanied by a pervasive racist tendency to attribute this ‘technological backwardness’ to an innate racial inferiority in the African people. Overall, despite persistent imperialist rhetoric focusing on the role of ‘foreign’ capital in modernising Africa, in reality the ‘profits from African ventures continually outran the capital invested in the colonies’.

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816 Walter Rodney was a black left-wing intellectual and historian, who was born in British Guiana in 1942. He studied under CLR James before moving to Tanzania in 1966 to lecture in African and Caribbean History at Dar-es-Salaam University; he was assassinated in independent Guyana in 1980, having returned to the country to fight for democratic change. Jason Tomes, 'Rodney, Walter Anthony (1942–1980)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford: 2004).
818 Ibid., pp 210-11, 212-3, 216-7, 219.
It is difficult to repudiate the vast majority of Rodney’s claims or to deny the righteous passion and anger with which he wrote them. However, there had been an increased willingness after the Second World War for the British to support the development of secondary industries, which had been discouraged by earlier governments; the metropolitan realisation that African economies could not be based purely on agricultural revenue was welcomed by colonial administrators. Colonial advisers extolled the virtues of a ‘varied economy’, which would protect African territories from ‘those great fluctuations of fortune that bedevil the economy of countries or regions that depend on their prosperity on producing one or only a few commodities’, such as the dip in the clove market that had had a disastrous effect on the Zanzibar economy. This concern was deeply hypocritical, given the manner in which the metropole had consistently imposed a system of monocropping and share-cropping on its colonial territories and labourers. Additionally, black Africans were forbidden from growing the most lucrative crops; legislation preserving the sole right of white settlers to grow coffee in Kenya, for example, was not repealed until the 1950s.

There was, however, a continuing tendency among many in the British government to believe that African economic development had been retarded by some innately African failing, rather than because of British agricultural policy. David Rees-Williams, the Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Colonies, proclaimed in a Cabinet meeting that ‘the African must be converted into an efficient farmer’ and ‘taught animal husbandry’; Britain should retain ‘close control’ over African agricultural practice and ‘teach and supervise’ African agricultural labourers. It was also proposed that vast tracts of land be ‘reclaimed’ from the tsetse fly, in place of which heavy and light industry could be developed to ‘drain’ labour from the ‘overcrowded reserves’. This policy was based on ambition and ignorance, since in the absence of an effective vaccination or prophylactic, trypanosomiasis outbreaks could only be prevented by avoiding the areas near water where the tsetse fly was prevalent; African labourers lived and farmed in ‘overcrowded’ areas to avoid infection. As Walter Rodney understood, this racialised arrogance was fundamental to the British attitude towards agricultural development in Africa and is central to understanding why British economic development in the region failed so overwhelmingly. It is also important to acknowledge that years of British underdevelopment had created an unlikely setting for widespread large-scale economic advancement.

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821 Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, p. 23.

822 ‘Cabinet Economic Policy Committee: MINUTES of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, SW1, on Thursday, 6th May, 1948, at Noon’; *PREM 8/923*. 180
A Case Study in Failed Economic Development

One programme of agricultural development has achieved infamy as an example of a failed colonial project. The East African Groundnut Scheme was an ambitious attempt to instigate the extensive farming of groundnuts (peanuts) on more than three million acres of land, which had previously been entirely unexploited because of the prevalence of tsetse fly and the dense bush that engulfed the region.823 Henry Morton Stanley, on his mission to find David Livingstone, had described the area as 'an interminable jungle of thorn-bushes'.824 The programme was instigated by Frank Samuel, the managing director of United Africa Company Ltd (UAC), who was heavily influenced by the writing of John, Lord Boyd-Orr, a biologist who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1949 for his research into nutrition and food shortages.825 Samuel had submitted his proposal to grow groundnuts in Tanganyika to the British government, who sent a technical mission to East Africa; the ensuing Wakefield report recommended that the scheme should entail the mechanised production of groundnuts across Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, in 107 ‘farms’, each 30,000 acres.826

In a talk explaining the scheme to the Royal Empire Society, Samuel explained that he was not a socialist, but was ‘nevertheless…in whole hearted agreement’ with the government that

the management of an undertaking of this nature, which calls for the alienation of 5,000 square miles of land in a Colonial territory, and which may profoundly affect the whole economic and social policies in Colonial development, should be vested in a Government owned and financed Corporation… answerable to the Government but with the fullest scope for initiative.827

The scheme had been enthusiastically embraced by the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Food as a response to the worldwide oil and fats shortage at the end of the Second World War. This had been caused by many factors, including war-damage to plantations and whaling fleets around the world, the increase in the world population, which was estimated to have grown by 125 million people since 1938 taking into account war deaths, and the increase of oil consumption in oil-producing countries such as India.828 This caused particular difficulties for the British government, as prior to the war around two million tons of oilseeds had been imported from the Indian subcontinent; the independence movement, and the war in the Dutch East Indies, meant that this

827 Ibid., p. 136.
828 Ibid., p. 136.
was no longer feasible.\(^{829}\)

The East Africa Groundnuts Scheme was seen as the solution to these immediate problems, and a blueprint for future colonial food production. In a Cabinet Memorandum, John Strachey, the Minister for Food, detailed the estimated budget and structure of the scheme; the programme was initially to be controlled by the UAC but would need to come under government control before August 1948, beyond which point the private company was ‘unwilling to continue’ its management role. As detailed in Chapter Two, the scheme was therefore the initial impetus behind the creation of the OFC. Strachey was hopeful that the Corporation would soon grow food products other than groundnuts in areas outside the Colonies, which would in turn stimulate markets for British manufacturing and agricultural machinery.\(^{830}\)

The East Africa Groundnut scheme was heralded at its inception as a ‘great African project’ with ‘immense significance’ for the agricultural development of the colonial territories.\(^{831}\) In a Central Office of Information release, the scheme was described as ‘the most important single act of Government in the history of British Tropical Africa’, which would provide a ‘practical demonstration’ of ‘the improved productivity, health, social welfare and prosperity which scientific agriculture can bring to Africa’.\(^{832}\) British experts were particularly keen to support the Groundnut Scheme because it was an agricultural project. Industrial development could be a great spur for economic prosperity and a higher African standard of living, but the mass industrialisation of Africa and depopulation of rural areas would be ‘fatal’ given the tropical colonies’ role as food producers. The Groundnut Scheme was considered the ideal project, as it allowed ‘the development of food production – plantations, crops and stock farming – on an industrial scale’, which would in turn increase the number of waged workers in the African territories, leading to a higher standard of living.\(^{833}\)

However, within a few months, the attitude toward the Groundnut Scheme and the OFC had changed dramatically. The project was seen as an expensive mistake, which demonstrated the incompetence or, at least, the naiveté of the British government in colonial affairs. The historiography of the programme is also largely negative; a typical scholarly article dismisses the


\(^{830}\) John Strachey, ‘East African Groundnuts Scheme: Memorandum by the Minister of Food’, 8 June 1947, CAB 129/19, National Archives.


\(^{833}\) Professor HJ Seddon, ‘Addendum’ (n.d.) February 1948 CO 994/4
scheme, the ‘largest of all the projects’ to develop African agriculture, as ‘ill-conceived, ill-managed and unlucky’, a ‘large-scale… failure’.834

Alan Wood, a British-Australian journalist who had worked on the project, published an evaluation of the OFC’s management of the Groundnut Scheme in 1950. It was rumoured that the Ministry of Food had tried to ban its publication, and the issue was raised in Parliament, although Maurice Webb, the Minister of Food from 1950-51, could ‘neither deny or confirm’ this accusation.835 Wood described the Groundnut Scheme as ‘a tragedy, with many of the elements of a tragi-comedy’, in ‘a story of failure, frustration, heartbreak, bad luck and bad blunders’.836 He described the difficulty of enacting such an ambitious scheme in the context of the post-war world; the project seemed to ‘attract to itself, as if by magic, all the old and decrepit equipment from all over the world’, as well as ‘all the new experimental models which nobody had tried out before’.837

The Wakefield Report had accepted that it would be difficult to source personnel and equipment, but had predicted that the project would be successful if it were ‘undertaken with the sense of determination and urgency which the gravity of the situation demands’.838 However, in the context of worldwide shortages, it was almost impossible to procure the correct heavy machinery needed to clear the area for planting, especially given the high demands for such equipment in the metropole; when machinery was obtained, it was found unsuitable for the conditions in East Africa.839 Bulldozers designed for moving earth rather than clearing vegetation threw huge clouds of dust into the labourers’ faces and disturbed the precious topsoil, whilst tractors overheated, their radiators choked with debris from the bush.840 Eventually, tanks were adapted for land-clearance, with some success; however, this did not solve the problem of how to clear the soil of the tough roots which were left behind after clearing above ground, a problem which was exacerbated in the dry season, when tree and bush trunks would simply snap, leaving a stump and root cluster in earth that was dried as hard as concrete. The soil itself was so abrasive that it wore down the blades of tractor ploughs, further depleting machinery stocks and making it difficult to harvest the groundnuts, a process which often had to be done by hand.841

It had initially been intended that the scheme would mostly be staffed by African labourers, acting as clerks, artisans and lorry-drivers, and at the beginning of the scheme many were recruited

837 Ibid., p. 68.
841 Ibid., p. 178-9.
through local tribal chiefs, although the colonial administration in Tanganyika was itself unwilling to promote the scheme or recruit labour. African workers were accommodated in tents, provided with 3,500 calories of rations a day (including 6 oz of meat, 2 oz groundnuts and 1 oz red chillies) and paid upwards of fifteen shillings a month; many of them had fought in the King’s African Rifles in the Second World War and already had some experience of working with the British. However, early in the scheme it was discovered that the African workforce did not have the requisite skills needed for the mass bush clearance, and so European tractor drivers had to be sent to Africa, and a tractor-driving school established. The labour force was challenged by the monotonous and physically demanding work; the only excitement was the ‘serious menace’ of the native bee population, and occasional encounters with lions and rhinoceroses.

In the first two years of the scheme, only 46,000 acres of land had been cleared, at a cost of over £21 million, in comparison to initial estimates in the development White Paper of 600,000 acres to be cleared in two years at a cost of £6 million. The OFC and the Minister for Food attributed this problem to the fact that the process of land-clearance had been ‘much more difficult than had been anticipated’; at the beginning of the project, it had taken up to eight hours to clear a single acre. However, as Wood indicated in his book, it is implausible to attribute this failure solely to the lack of appropriate machinery, although this was a major factor. With hindsight, the Groundnut Scheme was impossible to implement without adequate workshops and training for the African workforce, and it was inevitable that such an ambitious project would struggle without an established industrial proletariat. Additionally, the OFC had inherited the Groundnut Scheme a year into its schedule, by which time many of the above issues had become entrenched in the organisation. The scheme had indeed been ‘a splendid vision for Africa’, but ‘a vision beyond attainment by a new organisation in the difficult post-war years’.

Both contemporaries and historians have criticised the Groundnut Scheme because of its early failures to meet its development targets; Joseph Morgan Hodge has described the programme as a ‘white elephant’ that was ‘ill-conceived, hastily put into practice, and badly managed’. However,
its negative image was also a direct result of the initial marketing of the scheme, which was heavily
called as an example of pioneering colonial development and thus attracted much press
opprobrium when it faltered.\textsuperscript{851} Professor Hugh Bunting, a South African agricultural scientist who
was involved in the Groundnut Scheme from the first visit of the Wakefield delegation and who
was the Chief Scientific Office of the OFC until his dismissal in 1951, wrote an article defending
the scheme as ‘the unavoidably expensive foundation for benefits to be derived in the future’.\textsuperscript{852}
His assertion that the project demonstrated ‘an efficient survey, clearing and development
organisation’ was somewhat bullish in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, but he
was correct in stating that prototypes are always vastly more expensive than subsequent models,
and his warning against assessing the scheme purely in terms of agricultural yield, rather than the
social, financial and welfare developments it heralded, should not be dismissed.\textsuperscript{853} Matteo Rizzo has
demonstrated how the Groundnut Scheme stimulated the economies of the districts involved, with
an increase in the volume of trade and a more free-flowing money supply for both workers and the
colonial state; this had positive consequences such as improved roads, health services and
educational facilities, albeit alongside negative effects such as inflation and social unrest.\textsuperscript{854} In
addition, the scheme left a permanent legacy in the form of a thriving agricultural research service
for Tanganyika, which largely comprised staff formerly employed by the OFC.\textsuperscript{855} Wood may have
criticised the organisation of the scheme, but he still described it as ‘one of the most inspiring
ventures since the Second World War’ and ‘one of the most worthwhile experiments’ being carried
out ‘in a mad world already talking of more wars to come’.\textsuperscript{856}

Agriculturally, the scheme clearly failed. The overall cost was around £36 million to produce 9,162
tons of shelled nuts, actually less than was imported in seed, alongside smaller amounts of other
crops such as maize and sunflowers; the greatest agricultural legacy was the lesson that schemes
should be tested in pilot form before any large-scale undertaking.\textsuperscript{857} The scheme was criticised at
the time for the extractive and paternalistic attitude which it demonstrated towards the concept of
colonial development. An article in \textit{Venture}, the official journal of the Fabian Colonial Bureau,
asserted that ‘even if the groundnuts scheme had been a technical success’, it would have ‘stirred no
enthusiasm among colonial peoples’, because it was perceived by the black Tanganyikan population

\textsuperscript{851} Vincent, ‘East African Development’, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{852} Amir Kassam and Jeremy Elston, ‘Professor Hugh Bunting (Obituary)’, \textit{The Independent}, Monday 19 August 2002;
\textsuperscript{853} Bunting, ‘Land Development and Large Scale Food Production in East Africa by the Overseas Food Corporation’, p.
67.
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\textsuperscript{856} Wood, \textit{The Groundnut Affair}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{857} Hogendorn and Scott, ‘The East African Groundnut Scheme’, p. 108; Rizzo, ‘What Was Left of the Groundnut
Scheme?’, p. 208.
as ‘a white man’s plan… directed in the white man’s interest’.\textsuperscript{858} Alan Wood echoed this argument when he wrote that the men involved in the initial planning ‘were not Africa-minded, but margarine-minded’; if the Groundnut Scheme had been successful, African economic progress would have been a happy by-product of the fulfilment of British trade and economic needs.\textsuperscript{859}

**Economic Development: Beyond Groundnuts**

The East African Groundnut Scheme could not have been so vehemently labelled a failure if it had delivered a lesson to the British colonial authorities about large-scale development. However, the Colonial Development Corporation did not learn from the problems of the OFC; the details of the Gambia Egg and Poultry Scheme, for example, echo key elements of the Groundnut Scheme. This was an ambitious project, started in 1949, which was intended to produce twenty million eggs and one million pounds of dressed poultry every year. This was to be done on an area of ten thousand acres, the clearance of which was to be funded through the sale of timber from the land, and on which enough poultry feed needed to be grown to nourish the enormous brood.\textsuperscript{860} In 1947, the Ministry of Food had been ‘somewhat sceptical’ about the possibility for any rapid contribution of eggs from Africa, but felt that there were no ‘inherent reasons’ against such an endeavour; Britain had required c. 80,000 tonnes of frozen egg a year in the pre-war period merely to satisfy the demands of the bakery trade, and this would only increase.\textsuperscript{861} Similarly, it was felt that the short-term prospects for poultry farming in Africa for the British market were good, although in the long term there would have to be a focus on producing only ‘the best quality poultry’, packaged in ‘the most modern and attractive manner’, and the market would only be sustainable if the ‘increased consumption’ of poultry in Britain were encouraged.\textsuperscript{862} Despite these reservations, the CDC pushed on with the scheme, with the focus on creating a dollar-saving enterprise which would also benefit the Gambian economy.\textsuperscript{863}

The project got off to a bad start when the British press discovered that the Rhode Island Red eggs were to be purchased in the United States, at a cost of $14,000, alongside American grain for feed. The ever-patriotic *Daily Express* was outraged and attempted to fly 1,000 baby chicks or hatching eggs over to Gambia instead, whilst British farmers protested as they were themselves prevented by government import restrictions from purchasing foreign grain.\textsuperscript{864} By 1951, the Colonial Office, then under James Griffiths, was forced abandon the scheme as a failure, after producing only 34,500lbs


\textsuperscript{862} John Strachey, ‘Colonial Primary Products Committee: Production of Poultry in Africa’, November 1947 (CPP (47) 34), UE11558/5666/53 Colonial Primary Products Committee: Production of Poultry in Africa, FO 371/62559.


of meat and 28,440 eggs; among other problems, there had not been sufficient investigation into whether it was possible to grow chicken feed in Gambia, and so it had had to be imported throughout the programme. The scheme also highlighted problems in communication between the CDC and the Colonial Office. The CDC felt that they did not receive enough guidance from the British government, whereas the Colonial Office felt that they had been intentionally kept in the dark about the scheme, about which they had been informed merely that the ‘CDC was thinking of producing many eggs in the Gambia, not far from the Equator, and might have to spend a lot of dollars to do it’. This lack of communication led to a missed opportunity with market conditions; the Colonial Office was well aware that, in order to receive the optimum price, eggs would have to get to the British market in December or January, but the CDC were planning to first export around February.

This failure was seized by critics of colonial development, at home and overseas. The American magazine *Time* ran an article in which it proclaimed that ‘another ambitious Socialist scheme flapped sadly home to roost’, and reported that Tory MPs had suggested the remaining chickens be fed ‘on promises and groundnuts’. The failure of the Gambia Eggs and Poultry Scheme was a major contributing factor to Lord Trefgarne’s resignation of his position at the head of the CDC, although the organisation continued to conduct development schemes under its new leader, Lord Reith, the former Governor of the BBC. James Griffiths was keen to stress that, unlike the OFC with the Groundnut Scheme, the CDC was able to meet its financial commitments with the Gambia Poultry Scheme and thus would be able to ‘carry out the obligations imposed upon it by statute to break even’, without having to ask Parliament to write off any financial losses.

Other agricultural development schemes pursued in British Africa included the Lake Nyasa Fishery; the Gambia Rice Farm; the Niger Agricultural Project; the West African Fisheries; the Atlantic Fisheries; the Lobatsi Abattoir; the Bechuanaland Cattle Ranch; the Kasungu Tobacco Farms; the Limpassa Dambo Farm; the Swaziland Irrigation Scheme; the British Somaliland Abattoir, the Molopo Holding Ranch; the Kenya Fish Farms; and the Umbombo Ranches. Of these, the Lobatsi Abattoir in Bechuanaland was profitable from 1955, and the Molopo Holding Ranch, which provided cattle for the abattoir, from 1953; the Swaziland Irrigation Scheme, which produced rice and sugar, was profitable from 1958; and the Umbombo Ranches were commercially viable and repaid their CDC loan in full. The remaining schemes either made losses and were eventually sold to private enterprise, or were so unprofitable that they were abandoned. However, despite these conspicuous failures, the CDC was able to continue to operate as a development agent, unlike the

866 Overseas Production Division to Peter Gregoire (MAF), 27 October 1948, MAF 83/193, National Archives.
868 James Griffiths to Herbert Morrison, 18 April 1951, FO 800/632, National Archives.
869 Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, p.290.
OFIC, which had collapsed under the strain of the Groundnut failure. This was mainly because the CDC, under Lord Reith, began to pursue a smaller number of schemes, which revolved around loaning money to colonial governments for development projects. This failure of most economic development in Africa also led to a prioritising of social development and welfare, infrastructure, transport and communications projects, complementing the CDW Act.

**Colonial Development: Infrastructure**

From the immediate post-war period, development in transport and communications was a major priority in colonial policy in Africa. As the Cold War became embedded in diplomatic relations, colonial officials carried out their work against the backdrop of international conflict, and there was therefore a concern running through discussions on imperial policy that British Africa might need to be mobilised or protected in the event of another world war. The Chiefs of Staff Committee Joint Administrative Planning Staff, in discussing the possibility of establishing a west-east and south-north route across the continent, decided that, ‘in the event of another major war’, East Africa would become a ‘base… sustaining large forces’ and would thus require a transport system across the continent; this might be problematic, given that the African railway system was of ‘substandard gauge’ which would make it difficult to transport ‘tanks, large vehicles, and earth-moving or other machinery’. The possible routes included a ‘northern route’ which was 3,900 miles in length, including 2,100 miles of deserts tracks and roads, and 890 miles of river transport; as a report on African development made clear, the possible routes were all ‘very long’, giving in comparison the distance by air between London and Cairo at 2,500 miles. The capacity at the end of any route was only around 200 tonnes a day, and all of these passages involved ‘long stretches of river and/or road transport’, further slowing the progress of vital cargo.

It was proposed that, because of this difficulty, shipping might in fact be more economical and more efficient than land-based transportation, but this carried with it the ‘risk of loss or damage to ships, personnel, and supplies, as a result of attack by submarines or surface craft’. It was suggested instead that continental railways might be established; the Benguela Route, which ran 3,150 miles from west to east, and the Cape Route, 3,550 miles from south to north, would provide ‘a single line rail route across Africa’. However, these railways were not without problems: ‘stringent medical precautions would be required on the West-East route in view of the unhealthy climate of Central Africa’, and the routes also ran through foreign territory, potentially creating problems in times of war. Ultimately it was decided that the ‘strategic advantages’ accrued from developing

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870 EW Longley Cook, JC D’A Dalton, N Carter, ‘African Development: Report to the Ad Hoc Committee’, 1 November 1946, Chiefs of Staff Committee: Joint Administrative Planning Staff CAB 84/95.
872 JPW Samuelson, ‘African Development: Note by the Secretary’, Offices of the Cabinet and Minister of Defence, 30 September 1946, CAB 84/95; DH Hall Thompson, JC D’A Dalton, VHB Roth, ‘African Development: Report by the Joint Administrative Planning Staff’, 11 February 1947, CAB 84/95.
either rail route could not justify the heavy costs likely to be accrued by construction and operation, although they might one day be commercially viable.\(^7\)

As well as preparation for war, the focus on transport and communications development was a logical response to the needs of mass agricultural development. Transport in Africa was woefully inadequate for large-scale agricultural production and trade. The Directorate of Colonial Surveys, charged with mapping the continent (another aspect of infrastructure neglected before the post-war development period), received a letter from the Department of Lands, Mines and Surveys in Kenya apologetically explaining that ‘a main road in the Nairobi district would probably be classed as a cart-road in New Zealand’, and suggesting that roads be split into categories, ranging from ‘tarmac surface’ to ‘indifferent’ and, ominously, ‘dry weather only’.\(^4\)

As early as 1947, Arthur Creech Jones had already identified various logistical problems which accompanied large-scale economic programmes, such as the need to prioritise the supply of capital goods for development projects in colonial territories; the requirement for the supply of consumer goods ‘needed as incentives to increased production’ in Africa; and ‘as a more distant, not immediate problem’ the need to secure financial and other assistance from outside sources, including the United States.\(^5\) In 1948, the Colonial Office experts drew attention to the problems in development schemes already caused by the inadequate African transport and communication systems. Colonial administrators were faced with problems such as ‘groundnuts heaped up in Kano [and] the difficulties in extracting Gold Coast timber’, caused by ‘congestion on the Beira railway [and] the communications jam in Tanganyika’. As the Colonial Office pointed out, this situation would only be exacerbated by the continued operation of the CDC and the OFC as they pursued economic and welfare development projects, and so it was important that infrastructure, especially railways, should always be ‘one step ahead of other forms of development’.\(^6\) This was already established in British colonial policy; under the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, £4,200,000 had been allocated to communications and transport.\(^7\)

The need for transport and infrastructure development alongside the projects enacted by the CDC and the OFC could be a source of tension between the corporations, the Colonial Office and the colonial administrations. The CDC report from 1948 complained that

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\(^{7}3\) DH Hall Thompson, JC D’A Dalton, VHB Roth, ‘African Development: Report by the Joint Administrative Planning Staff’, 11 February 1947, CAB 84/95.


\(^{5}5\) Creech Jones to Cripps, 22nd November 1947, MAF 83/2363 C3, National Archives.

\(^{6}6\) Newton to Eastwood, 17 April 1948, Colonial Development Corporation: Supply of Information CO 537/3032.

In many cases the Corporation has not only to send heavy equipment to a Colony, but it must construct the wharf to land it, the road to take it to its destination, the workshops to maintain it, and the houses and services for those who will work it.\textsuperscript{878}

The CDC thus threatened that the ‘commercially self-supporting aspects’ of its work might have to be separated from the provision of transport and communications services in order to achieve economic success.\textsuperscript{879} The Colonial Office received this complaint with slight bemusement. Although it was agreed that the CDC might have ‘very great difficulty in paying its way’ if forced to continue ‘large-scale capital works’, officials pointed out the ‘bald fact’ that many of the Colonies were simply ‘too poor to provide adequate public services all over their territory’. If the CDC wanted to work in new districts it was inevitable that it would have to create new infrastructure. In fact, as the Colonial Office pointed out, most colonial governments did ‘do their best to be helpful within the limits of their resources’; even Nyasaland, one of the poorer African territories, had contributed £200,000 for the building of a road from the centre of the territory to a CDC project at the Vipya plateau.\textsuperscript{880}

There was also a focus on transport and communication as a development arena to fulfil the needs of colonial administrations across Africa. In the ten year development plans drawn up by the colonial governments, transport and infrastructure loomed large. For example, the Ugandan Ten Year Plan included £7,509,000 reserved for ‘common services’, comprising infrastructure, legal and administrative services and transport and communications, of which £1,009,000 was reserved for roads and £240,000 for air transport; in addition, shipping and rail services would be developed through the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours Administration.\textsuperscript{881} Similarly, the plan for Nyasaland had a significant transports and infrastructure contingent. The territory was landlocked, and the colonial administration had endeavoured therefore to create a rail connection which would bridge the Zambezi river and allow goods and people to travel 243 miles to the coast through Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). This had created a ‘heavy public debt’, which was being supported by a grant-in-aid by the British government which totalled c. £125,000 a year. Much of Nyasaland’s development was therefore aimed at reducing the burden of this financial obligation to the metropole; there was a strong focus ‘on the side of real economic development’. The protectorate proposed a development expenditure of £5,646,086, of which £618,000 would be spent on roads. However, this was adjusted by the Colonial Office, who suggested that a total of £4,889,000 should be spent with £1,560,000 going towards ‘roads, air communications, posts and


\textsuperscript{879} Paragraph 36, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{880} Newton to Mayle, Eastwood, Poynton, 27 May 1949, CO 852/841/5; Eastwood, Minute, 31 May 1949, CO 852/841/5.

telegraphs, water supplies etc’; it was felt that ‘in view of the fundamental importance of improved communications’ to all other forms of development, the territory should initially focus on transport and infrastructure expenses.882

The Colonial Office was also keen to coordinate transport policy between the British African territories.883 This was seen as a way of providing community transport ‘as cheaply as possible’ with ‘the least use of current resources’. One possible solution was to create a ‘complete state monopoly of all transport’, which could provide the cheapest option of either road or rail to create a functioning transport network across the empire in Africa. However, a full monopoly was not considered practical ‘in Colonial conditions’.884 British African transport policy could instead be coordinated through the Colonial Office. Ten year plans, CDW fund applications and proposals by the CDC were all approved by Colonial Office civil servants, who framed infrastructure development in individual territories within a wider context. Transport development could also be coordinated through research organisations, such as the East African Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, which was created in 1949 under the research funding section of the CDW Act and was granted £18,333 before 1951.885 It was proposed that this organisation would examine the state of roads in the region and issues such as problems with bitumen surfacing, with the intention of achieving ‘considerable economies in building and road construction’.886 The West African Road Research Laboratory was established at the same time, and was granted £5,575 between 1948-1951; this was a specialised agency devoted to transport research.887

Colonial Development: Communicating to the Colonies

Communication and broadcasting technology was also an important part of colonial development in this period. Within communications development, there was a particular focus on the need to develop broadcast services within the colonies. This was partly because the Cold War heightened British concerns about controlling the information received by colonial populations. In 1948, against a backdrop of increasing international tension, the Cabinet Office voiced concerns about ‘the present ineffectiveness of the broadcasting machine in the Colonial territories’, given the necessity of ‘broadcasting as a medium for countering communist propaganda’. This was considered to be of particular importance in Malaya and the African territories.888 In 1939, the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) had been established to produce war propaganda films directly at

883 There was also some discussion of the coordination of transport policy and infrastructure between the various European African empires, as discussed in Chapter Three.
885 Clarke, ‘A Technocratic Imperial State?’, p. 473.
887 Clarke, ‘A Technocratic Imperial State?’, p. 473.
888 Address to Sir Charles Jeffries, ‘Minute account of Cabinet Discussion 22/7/48’ CO 537/4230 National Archives.
illiterate audiences, primarily in Africa, but at the end of the war, the unit had been reconfigured to focus on instructional and educational films.\textsuperscript{889} British Cabinet members were angry that Russia enjoyed such success in ‘painting a picture of Britain as the reactionary exploiter and Russia as the progressive liberator’. In fact, the USSR had been so effective in their endeavours that this was a popular interpretation, not only in the international community, but also among ‘some quarters in Britain’.\textsuperscript{890} It was considered vital that Britain find an effective method of countering this attack.

This desire for pro-western propaganda should be understood within the context of a tendency towards censorship in British colonial territories. This was particularly prevalent in colonies with a large white population, who were anxious about African insurrection and keen to restrict information and cultural imagery likely to provoke unrest. White officials were also cautious around issues of morality; they were often convinced, for example, that African minds would be easily corrupted by films or plays showing scenes of a sexual nature.\textsuperscript{891} Northern Rhodesia established a Native Film Censorship Board in 1937, which became increasingly politically motivated after the Second World War. The Board inspected all films to be shown to a black African audience and erased any scenes containing references to political insurrection or rioting, as well as storylines depicting ‘women of easy virtue’ or the ‘manhandling of women’; any ‘scenes where masks are worn’; stories demonstrating the ‘capture and tying up of Europeans by natives, including North American Indians’; and ‘all scenes of obvious crimes readily understood by Africans’.\textsuperscript{892} In this context of highly controlled information, Cold War and pro-imperial propaganda was easily espoused by British colonial officials.

The British Government endorsed a ‘two-fold’ effort to counter the effects of Russian propaganda in the empire:

\begin{quote}
On the constructive side we must convince the world that our conduct has been and is progressive and the best in the world. On the destructive side we must give the world a true picture of Russia’s conduct in Eastern Europe and in its own territories.\textsuperscript{893}
\end{quote}

Although there was ‘no lack of plans’ for developing colonial broadcasting to this aim, there was a distinct lack of funds. Neither the CDC or the CDW were willing to underwrite the entire

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\textsuperscript{890} The role of the CFU in information dissemination and education is discussed later in this chapter; Rosaleen Smyth, ‘The Post-War Career of the Colonial Film Unit in Africa: 1946-1955’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1992), p. 163.

\textsuperscript{891} Christopher Mayhew (PUSS for Foreign Affairs) ‘Anti-Soviet and Pro-British Propaganda (Note Prepared for the Cabinet)’ 16 June 1948, CO 537/4230.


development of colonial broadcasting facilities, as media provision did not have a direct and quantifiable economic or social welfare benefit. It was decided that the planned expansion of African broadcasting services focusing specifically on propaganda would have to be abandoned until further funds were made available.894

Colonial Development: Broadcasting and the BBC
Radio services were not only under development because of the need for propaganda. An extensive communications network would also enable more efficient trade and more comprehensive welfare initiatives, and a closer and more effective connection with the metropole. This could be used to propagandise achievements in colonial development, as well as promoting Africa’s place within the British Empire, and transmitting educational information on subjects such as maternal and infant hygiene. It was also suggested at the time that broadcasting facilities were vital in order to maximise the cultural benefits accrued by African populations through agricultural and social welfare development; exposure to British media would ‘accelerate the process of acculturation’ across territories that were considered to be ‘truly “backward” areas’.895

The practicalities of communications development had to be carried out as cheaply as possible, partly because of general concerns about post-war austerity and also because communications services would create no immediate measurable profit. It was this concern which led the Cabinet Secretary to propose that both transportation and communications facilities should first ‘make good the productivity of existing facilities’, in order to create ‘the quickest returns at the lowest cost’.896 In fact, because of the limited funds available centrally, the vast bulk of colonial media transmission was not orchestrated by the Colonial Office, but was instead provided through the BBC.

The BBC Empire Service had been founded in 1932, and was aimed at English-speaking peoples around the world; it developed into the General Overseas Service in 1947.897 The Overseas Service was funded by the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office.898 The annual grant-in-aid was about £4,500,000, of which the vast bulk was borne by the Foreign Office, since only around ninety minutes of daily programming on this service was aimed directly at the colonies; as a Colonial Office memo pointed out, this was ‘rather less’ than was devoted to one

894 Minutes addressed to Sir Charles Jeffries, 3 August 1948, CO 537/4230.
896 Norman Brook to Attlee, 5 May 1948, PREM 8/923.
898 This financial arrangement continued well into the twenty-first century; it was announced in the October 2010 Spending Review that the Foreign Office would relinquish responsibility for funding the World Service to the BBC in 2014.
of the smaller European nations, such as Yugoslavia. Although the BBC was as independent in its overseas broadcasting as it was at home, the Corporation was expected to liaise with government departments to obtain information about relevant ‘policies of His Majesty’s Government’ towards specific countries, in order that it could ‘plan its programmes in the national interest’.

The Colonial Office had employed a Colonial Liaison Officer for the BBC since 1943, who was supposed to ensure that BBC programmes reflected government policy; the first holder of this post was the indomitable Elspeth Huxley. In addition, the BBC sent Oliver J. Whitley on a two-year secondment to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office occasionally considered whether to attempt to impose itself more heavily on the BBC, for example by demanding to examine scripts of programmes to ensure that they were ‘putting across’ British government policies, but generally decided against this idea. It was seen as important to preserve the BBC’s independence so that it could ‘exercise greater influence on public opinion in the Colonies’; the Corporation was worth more to the Colonial Office if it was perceived ‘as an independent commentator and not merely as the voice of His Majesty’s Government’.

In addition to its general Overseas Service broadcasts, the BBC Transcriptions Service produced copies of ‘non-topical’ programmes, mainly derived from BBC Domestic Service productions, for colonial consumption. These were vital to the African broadcast stations, forming ‘one of the mainstays of their programmes’. The transcriptions were produced by the BBC without charge, and were sent to the territories through the Colonial Office system; the programme copies ‘cost a great deal of money to produce’ and the colonies would certainly have not been able to afford to obtain them otherwise.

The Transcription Service continued to play an important role in colonial and Commonwealth broadcasting for many years, before becoming part of the umbrella group BBC Radio International; in the late 1950s the Corporation provided around 700 programmes a year through this service, producing 50-60,000 tapes that were distributed to more than 100 different countries.

The impetus for further developing African broadcasting came from both the government and from within the BBC. In 1948, the Colonial Office produced a report on the state of colonial broadcasting and possible ways to develop for the future. At the time the report was written, local

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899 Blackburne and Millar, ‘Relationship between the Colonial Office and the BBC’, 12 December 1949, Broadcasting Liaison with the BBC, CO 875/70/8, National Archives.
904 OJ Whitley (BBC Liaison Officer at Information Department at CO), 13 February 1948, Broadcasting: BBC Transcription Service, CO 875/70/4.
broadcasting services were available to around 10 million people, out of a colonial population of around 60 million; only around 500,000, or 1 per cent of colonial inhabitants, had facilities to enable regular listening. This was particularly unfortunate in those colonies where there was ‘widespread illiteracy’, as it was the only effective way to disseminate information. This was particularly important in emergency situations in areas where there was ‘no speedier means of communication…than bicycles and runners’.\[906\]

As well as concerns in the Colonial Office about the small audience for broadcast material in the colonies in Africa, there was also some dissatisfaction about the content transmitted. David Rees-Williams visited West Africa in 1948 and was critical of the BBC’s broadcasting in the region; he felt that the news bulletins had been nothing more than ‘a catalogue of disagreements and disturbances, whether social, industrial, political or international’, and that this had ‘an ill effect on African minds’ that were ‘already somewhat unsettled and lacking the general background of knowledge’ that ‘maturer’ [sic] people used to evaluate information. He felt that this was due to an ‘emphasis on the sensational’ rather than ‘the good things in British life and achievement’, which could be ‘corrected’ without harming ‘the good name for truth and completeness’ earned by the BBC. In addition, he felt that the general programmes broadcast in Africa were often inappropriate, comprising ‘long and detailed League football results’ or ‘talks on farming in Kent’ rather than issues directly pertaining to African experience. He was perturbed to note that there had been no reference to his visit to the region, which he felt ‘presumably had some news value to Africans’.\[907\]

This criticism was borne with good grace by Sir Ian Jacob, Director of the Overseas Service and later BBC Director General. Jacob gently warned against any idea of censorship of BBC material, which would reduce the ‘balance, reputation and value’ of news reporting, although he reassured the Colonial Office that the Overseas Service was mindful of the need to use ‘materials and methods of treatment appropriate to the audiences served’, in which ‘the projection of Britain’ would always be ‘a dominant and recurring feature’. Jacob also accepted that the programming in Africa ‘included much that was of no particular interest to African listeners’. However, he pointed out that the primary object of the Overseas Service was in fact to produce a simulacrum ‘Home Service’ for British communities overseas, and was broadcast worldwide; the BBC could not provide a comprehensive service for specific imperial communities.\[908\]

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908 Ian Jacob, cited in ‘Committee on Colonial Information Policy: BBC’s Overseas Broadcasts to African Nations: Note by Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies’, 30 November 1948, CO 537/4229. Generally the role of the BBC in colonial communications was gratefully appreciated. In 1951, Charles Jeffries wrote that ‘without the whole-hearted support of the BBC it would have been quite impossible to achieve the present general, if limited, development in colonial broadcasting’; CJ Jeffries to Lord Reith, 7 June 1951, CO 875/70/7.
In the Colonial Office report on broadcasting, there was a strong emphasis on broadcasting as a priority for future development in the colonies. It had previously been official policy to encourage colonial administrations to develop resources themselves, and so any progress in media communications had been reliant on the ‘degree of enlightenment and interest’ in the colonies and, more importantly, on ‘the willingness or the ability of the Colonies to provide funds’.\(^909\) This had not been successful. Colonial governments had always been unwilling to commit themselves to a high level of expenditure to fund communications projects at the expense of providing ‘basic economic and social services’. It was therefore decided that colonial broadcasting could not develop without a substantial financial commitment by the metropole. The main requirements were equipment, especially transmitters, and skilled staff to implement the development programme; both resources were in short supply. West Africa, East Africa and Central Africa were all named as areas in which ‘initial effort’ should be concentrated.\(^910\)

There was some discussion as to whether private companies should be approached in order to hasten the provision of communications services in the colonies. However, Arthur Creech Jones was committed to public service broadcasting and had contacted colonial governments in May 1948 to urge caution in their relationship with commercial broadcasters.\(^911\) Instead, it was decided that CDW funds should be granted to enable the initial development of broadcasting facilities; the BBC would be invited to cooperate with the first stages of development, either to assist the Colonial government with staff or technical information, or to provide services across regions with the help of a local advisory committee.\(^912\) This programme would initially cost £1 million, which would be provided through the CDW funds, although Creech Jones was unable to commit the Department to future expenditure beyond this amount.

In a finance report on the proposals, Stafford Cripps expressed his concern at the overall growth of public expenditure, and was cautious about the limited funding available for development against the background of increasing spending on Information Services; however, he was sufficiently convinced by the importance of colonial broadcasting, particularly in light of the threat of Communist propaganda, to sanction expenditure.\(^913\) In March 1949, £1 million was made available from the CDW General Reserve, to develop new broadcasting services where none existed, for example in Tanganyika and Uganda, and to develop existing services in other territories, such as Nigeria and Northern Rhodesia. The Nigerian broadcasting scheme was the largest in the empire;

\(^909\) ‘Committee on Colonial Information Policy: Development of Broadcasting Services in the Colonies: Interim Report’ 15 November 1948, CO 537/4229.
\(^910\) Ibid.
\(^911\) Ibid.
\(^912\) ‘Committee on Colonial Information Policy: Development of Broadcasting Services in the Colonies: Interim Report’ 15 November 1948, CO 537/4229.
\(^913\) Cripps to Attlee, 2nd December 1949, with attached comments on ‘Cabinet Committee on Colonial Information Policy: Development of Broadcasting Services in the Colonies: Interim Report’ 15 November 1948, CO 857/4229.
based on the conclusions of a BBC technical survey, six broadcasting stations were to be constructed across the territory, at a cost of £300,000, with a £190,000 contribution from the CDW funds. The BBC also trained technical ‘field’ staff in radio production and radio engineering, in internal training courses culminating in attachments to output departments, which allowed African radio staff to observe the production process and liaise with experienced BBC producers. This training was funded by the British government as part of the BBC grant-in-aid.

The BBC generally focused on kick-starting projects in the colonies; the precise details could then be worked out by colonial administrators to fit their exact specifications. This can be seen in the development of a regional radio station in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia. The BBC were asked to help to develop local broadcasting in East and Central Africa and sent W. E. C. Varley, an engineer, to survey the area and make recommendations for how best to enable African broadcasting. In a report on the region, Varley suggested that Lusaka would be an ideal location for a broadcasting station to serve Central Africa. He also drew attention to the fact that very few communities in the region had access to receivers and focused on the problems inherent in the provision of radio in such rural areas.

Although much of Eastern and Central Africa was not inspired by the Varley report, Harry Franklin, the Director of Information in Northern Rhodesia, was galvanised in his pursuit of local African broadcasting, despite the many obstacles in his way. In order to broadcast to a sufficiently wide area, the radio station would have to utilise nine languages from Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and even this excluded several large minorities. Even if the population could understand the programming, it was unlikely that they would be able to hear it. There were fewer than three hundred community radio receivers in the whole region and almost no Africans owned radios themselves; few African houses had electricity to run radios from the mains, and most could not afford luxury consumer goods.

It took three years for Franklin to find a company that would make a battery-operated, short-wave, cheaply produced radio receiver for African homes. Eventually, a company produced a prototype with an unusual shape and sturdy design that led to it being known as the ‘Saucepan Special’, which proved extremely popular among the African population. There had been some discussion that the radios might be ‘preset’ so that they could only receive selected radio stations, but this had been rejected by officials. Instead, Africans could listen to programmes from ‘both sides of the Iron

914 CJ Jeffries to Lord Reith, 15 January 1951, CO 875/70/7.
916 Ibid., pp. 366-7.
918 Ibid.
Curtain’, although the Lusaka radio station staff were confident that they could counter any ‘undesirable foreign broadcasts’ and maintain African loyalty to their own programming. Lusaka Radio broadcast African news; music programming; talks or lectures under a ‘five-year propaganda campaign’; BBC news direct from London; plays and book reviews. These were all shared between native languages and British English; the station’s efforts to record in different dialects helped to preserve on tape folk songs and myths from around the region. Franklin funded the project through the CDW funds, which granted £78,100 for capital expenditure; the remaining running expenses, less than £20,000 a year, were shared between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.919

The relationship between colonial development and the BBC strengthened with time, not least because of Lord Reith’s appointment to the CDC. Lord Reith was keen to promote the CDC as a provider of broadcasting development, in tandem with the technical abilities and experience of the BBC; it was recorded by the Colonial Office that this was a ‘refreshing contrast’ to the attitude of his predecessor.920 By 1950, colonial governments operated a broadcasting service in fourteen territories, and in another ten there was a service that was operated in collaboration with a commercial company. However, in nine territories there was still no broadcasting service whatsoever; in addition, only around 1.9 million out of the 65 million inhabitants of colonial territories had any access to radio receivers.921 Lord Reith was keen to rectify this situation, either through the CDC or through his own experience at the BBC. He suggested a ‘colonial broadcasting development corporation’, incorporating the BBC, the Colonial Office and perhaps the CDC, which could be used to coordinate efforts in this field. It is typical of his boundlessly ambitious and exacting personality that Reith casually assumed that more money on top of the £1 million could be found to support such a scheme.922

The Colonial Office were happy to see Reith’s enthusiasm for colonial broadcasting, but were dubious about his suggestions for the most effective method of development. As well as the problem of finances, it was considered unlikely that colonial governments would accept a system where they were expected to ‘acquiesce in entrusting the development of broadcasting to a London-based organisation over whose doings they had little or no evident control’. The CDC was ‘unpopular and suspect’ in several territories, and thus any development of this kind would have to be carried out independently to avoid ‘adverse and damaging criticism which would violate its usefulness’.923 It was difficult to force colonial governments to work along a set pattern of development in the field of broadcasting; colonies were happy to take ‘advice and technical

920 CJ Jeffries to Mr Carstairs, 5 January 1951, CO 875/70/7.
921 CJ Jeffries to Lord Reith, 15 January 1951, CO 875/70/7.
922 CJ Jeffries was more experienced in dealing with CDW funds, and annotated this suggestion as ‘a non-sequitur, sadly!’. Lord Reith to CJ Jeffries, 1 February 1951, CO 875/70/7.
923 CY Carstairs to CJ Jeffries, 17 February 1951, CO 875/70/7.
assistance and financial help’ from Britain, but local broadcasting services only really had a chance of success if colonial governments were prepared to ‘work hard and enthusiastically’, and for this there had to be a strong impetus for development within the colonies themselves.\textsuperscript{924} It was decided instead that the most useful way that the British government could intervene in colonial broadcasting was to set up a central purchasing agency for equipment, which would enable transmitting and receiving equipment to be made available to the colonies quickly and cheaply. This would meet projected demands for 10,000 cheap medium wave radio sets, as well as various short and medium wave transmitters at different wattages for use in African colonies.\textsuperscript{925}

Lord Reith reacted to the news that a central colonial broadcasting corporation was unworkable with ‘highly characteristic’ dramatics.\textsuperscript{926} His letter condemned the previous colonial secretaries who could have implemented centrally orchestrated regional broadcasting in the context of more pacific imperial relations; he depicted his position at the BBC as a ‘voice crying in the wilderness’, to whom the British government should have ‘paid heed’ when they had the chance. He also dismissed the idea that colonial governments would object to the British implementation of broadcasting, conjuring instead the image of ‘sovereign rights melting before money’. He ended with a warning that even if the Colonial Office thought it was too late to pursue colonial broadcasting, the Russians presumably did not.\textsuperscript{927} The Colonial Office remained unmoved, operating as they were in the face of ‘present day political realities’.\textsuperscript{928} Colonial broadcasting continued to develop along ad hoc lines.

Transport and communications development in the colonies was, for the post-war British government, essentially a catch-up operation. Before this concerted effort, the provision of railways, roads and even mapping services had been patchy at best, and very few African communities had benefited from resources to enable communication with or from the rest of the world. Progression in these areas was crucial for economic, social and welfare development, but transport and broadcast projects also had their own impetus. Although many colonial governments resented spending money on communications development, it was an area that was enthusiastically embraced by the black African population. One listener of Lusaka Radio heralded the development by comparing ‘broadcasting…to Africans’ to ‘the great invention of printing…to European countries in the Renaissance era’, and proclaimed that the continent was ‘no longer isolated’.\textsuperscript{929}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{924} CJ Jeffries to Lord Reith, 7 June 1951, CO 875/70/7.
  \item \textsuperscript{925} JB Millar to CY Carstairs, 3 February 1951, CO 875/70/7.
  \item \textsuperscript{926} CY Carstairs, (minute), 16 June 1951, CO 875/70/7.
  \item \textsuperscript{927} Lord Reith to CJ Jeffries, 11 June 1951, CO 875/70/7.
  \item \textsuperscript{928} CY Carstairs, (minute), 16 June 1951, CO 875/70/7.
\end{itemize}
Colonial Development: Social Welfare

Prior to the Second World War, the provision of social welfare services across the British African empire had been patchy at best. Decades of indirect rule that had led Walter Rodney to proclaim angrily that ‘hardly anything was done that could be termed a service to the African people’, The lack of basic amenities in many black African communities was a major motivation for the post-war economic and industrial development of the colonies. Uganda’s ten year development plan, for example, stressed the importance of ‘the conservation, development and exploitation’ of the territory’s natural resources in order to provide ‘increased subsistence in its broadest sense’ and ‘social and other public services’. A Cabinet document highlighted how ‘failings of native labour’ were chiefly caused by ‘inadequate or unsuitable food’; nutritional education and more effective healthcare provision were vital in producing a workforce capable of carrying out the large-scale development of Africa envisaged by the British government.

Many within the Colonial Office also believed that social welfare was a positive force in its own right. Creech Jones’s approach to development in Africa, built around the concept of ‘mass education’, was quintessentially concerned with social welfare. The official definition of mass education, as agreed by the Colonial Economic Development Council (CEDC), encompassed the whole range of development activities in the districts, whether these are undertaken by Government or unofficial bodies; in the field of agriculture by securing the adoption of better methods of soil conservation, better methods of farming and better care of livestock; in the field of health by promoting better sanitation and water supplies, proper measures of hygiene and infant and maternity welfare; and in the field of education by spreading literacy and adult education as well as by the extension and improvement of schools for children.

Mass education was not to be the responsibility of one or two Government departments, but was instead supposed to run through all aspects of development policy in the colonies, although some departments, such as education, would clearly have special responsibilities. The programme was intended to prepare colonial populations for political participation and, eventually, democratic national government. There was also to be a ‘decentralization and devolution of financial and executive authority’, allowing policies to originate and be organised at the provincial level. This programme was launched with a memorandum to all colonial governors six months after Arthur Creech Jones was first appointed colonial secretary. By July 1947, mass education officers had been

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932 ‘Cabinet Economic Policy Committee: MINUTES of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, SW1, on Thursday, 6th May, 1948, at Noon’, PREM 8/923.
933 Creech Jones to African Governors, 10 November 1948, CO 994/4.
934 Ibid.
appointed in Gold Coast and Tanganyika, and there were ‘team units’ working across many different territories in fields including ‘health, welfare, labour and agriculture’.935

However, the programme appears to have stalled in the next few months, as other colonial development plans took precedence. In 1948, Creech Jones contacted all African governors to reiterate that ‘mass education along with development of local government’ should be at the ‘forefront’ of development policy on the continent, and admonishing them for the ‘disappointing progress’ in this area so far. The lack of progress was attributed by the Colonial Secretary to the fact that many colonial governments did not understand what was meant by the phrase ‘mass education’. The programme was not intended to be ‘an inferior substitute for education in the formal sense’, as was believed by many Africans; nor was it ‘an attempt to import into Africa’ a completely new system of administration, as was suspected by many colonial governors. Instead, the phrase was meant to invoke ‘a movement to secure the active cooperation of the people of each community in programmes designed to raise standards of living and to promote development in all its forms’. It was ‘designed to promote better living for the whole community’ and was to be based on ‘active participation’ by African people, perhaps stimulated from above but met with an ‘active and enthusiastic response’.936 This type of development was intended to provide, in the words of Rita Hinden, ‘a certain framework of economic life’, by supplying ‘communications, water supplies, a certain extension of education and improvement and health and resources’, rather than focusing on the ‘actual enterprise itself’.937 In short, it was to fill the gaps left by the work of the CDC.

Mass education development initiatives were generally more successful than those aimed at economic growth or the production of raw materials for the colonies. However, there has been some criticism of the way in which social welfare development was conceived and implemented in the British colonies in this period. Joanna Lewis has interrogated the problematic nature of British welfare reform in Africa. She highlights the real achievement of the Colonial Office in making the Treasury agree to the inclusion of welfare projects in colonial development funding. However, she emphasizes the lack of state structure in the African colonies which impeded any attempt at enacting welfare development along the same lines as that in the metropole after the Second World War.938 Creech Jones himself acknowledged the discrepancy between the powers of the British state and the role of the colonial administrations, criticising the ineffective and inefficient ‘machinery of government’ in British African colonies, which had retarded the planning and execution of the mass education programme.939 Lewis points out the discrepancy between the British metropole and

935 Ivor Thomas, ‘Colonial Affairs’, *HC Debates*, 29 July 1947, vol. 441, c. 377
936 Creech Jones to African Governors, 10 November 1948, *CO 994/4*.
937 Hinden, ‘Economic Plans and Problems in the British Colonies’, p. 78
939 Creech Jones to African Governors, 10 November 1948, *CO 994/4*. 201
colonial Africa; William Beveridge’s attack on the ‘five giants on the road of reconstruction’ was carried out with ‘a self-perpetuating source of finance’ and ‘an established civil society’, whereas African poverty was ‘pandemic, framed by resource scarcity and the absence of a single moral community’. Colonial welfare reform thus ‘bequeathed a huge burden and further incoherence’ to the African colonial administrations in the last years before independence.

However, it is difficult to see a different course of action for the Colonial Office in this period. As a ‘steadily rising population’ in most African colonies strained the continent’s resources, it was vital that their welfare needs be recognised. Under the Attlee government, there was an effort to provide rudimentary mass social welfare services in the colonies, particularly in the fields of medicine, public health and education. It is not surprising that the budget for colonial social welfare development never approached that of the welfare state in the metropole, and it is possible to recognise the achievements in colonial welfare after the Second World War, without disregarding the legacy of British neglect and the shortcomings inherent in colonial development policy.

Colonial Development: In Sickness and in Health

African colonial territories suffered from basic failings in medicine and public health provision, which led to endemic illness and high rates of morbidity and mortality. In his account of the East African Ground Nut Scheme, Alan Wood depicts a landscape shaped by ‘death and disease’. This had long been a concern for the Colonial Office, and there had been committees on tropical medicine and sanitation since the early the twentieth century. The Colonial Advisory Medical Committee (CAMC), along with the Colonial Medical Research Committee, harnessed the expertise of British medical researchers, to analyse the major problems in African healthcare. In 1948, this body called for a unified campaign across the tropics, to be directed against all preventative illness... by attacking communicable diseases and malnutrition, by improving sanitation, water supplies, house and village planning and by education and propaganda.

These would be the tenets of colonial health policy under the Attlee government.

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In the introduction to his book on the Groundnut Scheme, Alan Wood wrote that ‘the real power which holds Tanganyika in trust is not the British Authority, but the tsetse fly’. This maxim can be repeated for much of East and Central Africa in this period. Across the tropical African colonies, vast areas were infested with the flies, which transmitted trypanosome parasites to their hosts, causing African trypanosomiasis in humans and nagana in animals such as cattle and horses.

The disease, commonly known as ‘sleeping sickness’, is a wasting illness that affects the central nervous system; the initial symptoms are non-specific (nausea, fever and lethargy) and are thus easily misdiagnosed as influenza or malaria. As the disease progresses, the parasite trypanosomes cross the blood-brain barrier and cause the more severe symptoms associated with the later stages of the disease, including pathologically disrupted sleeping patterns and loss of concentration and coordination; unless the disease is treated, it eventually leads to death, although this can take anywhere between six months and twenty years. Until the early 1950s, trypanosomiasis was a ‘killing disease’, with a cure rate of only 48 per cent during a large scale epidemic.

The two most dangerous subspecies of tsetse fly are the riverine tsetse (glossina palpalis) and savannah tsetse (glossina morsitans), of which the latter is prevalent in Eastern and Central Africa. Trypanosomiasis had probably been present in East Africa for centuries, but it was formally identified by British colonial administrators in the late nineteenth century. Between 1895-9, David and Mary Bruce’s pioneering research linked ‘tsetse-fly disease’ (human trypanosomiasis) to nagana, and isolated the single-celled parasite trypanosome which caused both diseases. The first recorded major epidemic among humans was the Great Epidemic of 1900, which devastated areas of Uganda and Kenya and infected around 500,000 people.

By the 1930s, tsetse had engulfed large areas across Africa, with so-called ‘fly belts’ reaching their greatest extent after the Second World War. It has been hypothesised, most notably by John Ford, that the act of colonialism itself increased the spread of trypanosomiasis in humans and animals, by increasing the size of the area infested with tsetse whilst simultaneously reducing the natural partial immunity which had been developing within African communities. British colonial territories employed a diverse range of strategies to attempt to limit infection rates. In Tanganyika, colonial officials resettled whole communities in an attempt to avoid infection; this policy of ‘villagization’ continued until the 1950s and was closely linked to other attempts to implement more centralized strategies.

949 Beinart and Hughes, Environment and Empire, p. 186.
control over agriculture and land use in this period.\textsuperscript{953} In Southern Rhodesia, it was decided instead to focus on the role that livestock played in transmitting trypanosomiasis; between 1948-51, the government culled over 100,000 game animals, predominately from white-owned farmland, to try to limit the spread of the disease.\textsuperscript{954} The attempts to avoid tsetse-infested areas could have a great impact on colonial administration: despite the large number of lakes and rivers in the territory, Uganda suffered from ‘an acute water problem’, and could not provide clean drinking water or effective sanitation for its population.\textsuperscript{955}

The Attlee government addressed trypanosomiasis in a number of ways. Several research institutions were established in Africa to work on a strategy for dealing with the spread of tsetse flies. The West African Institute for Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Research was established in 1946-7, with a total grant until 1951 of £372,833; the East African Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Research and Reclamation Organization was established a year later, receiving a total of £254,444, and was supplemented by the East African Central Trypanosomiasis Research Institute in 1950 with a budget of £280,000. There was also a smaller Tsetse Fly Research Unit in Northern Rhodesia which received a grant of £16,616.\textsuperscript{956} In addition, the Medical Research Council in Great Britain monitored the work going on in the colonies, most notably the research being undertaken by Dr Harold Fairbairn at Tinde in Uganda, who had built up a network of several hundred African volunteers on which to test his theories about trypanosome infection.\textsuperscript{957} Fairbairn was a pioneering researcher; before recruiting the African volunteers, he had infected himself with trypanosomiasis in order to prove the efficacy of Bayer 205 (suramin), a prophylactic treatment.\textsuperscript{958} Individual colonies also included responses to tsetse and other contagious diseases in their Ten Year Development Plans; Nigeria, for example, put aside £469,070 over ten years for its sleeping sickness service, as well as £114,000 for anti-malarial measures and £983,400 for leprosy control.\textsuperscript{959} Overall, around eight per cent of all colonial research funding was spent on trypanosomiasis and tsetse fly.\textsuperscript{960}

\textbf{Colonial Development: Mothers and Babies}

Alongside major epidemic diseases, there were also endemic health issues in the African colonies. One significant factor in African society was maternal and infant morbidity and mortality. Alan

\textsuperscript{953} William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, \emph{Environment and Empire}, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{954} Ibid., p. 196.
\textsuperscript{955} ‘Colonial Economic and Development Council: Outline Development Plan for Uganda: Note by the Colonial Office’, 22\textsuperscript{nd} July 1947, CO 999/4.
\textsuperscript{956} Clarke, ‘A Technocratic Imperial State?’, p. 473.
\textsuperscript{957} PA Buxton, ‘Proposal to ask help from Rockefeller Foundation, for work on trypanosomiasis in East Africa’, attached to Professor PA Buxton (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) to Sir E Mellanby (MRC), 30 September 1947, \emph{Trypanosomiasis Chemotherapy of Africa} FD 1/1881.
\textsuperscript{960} Clarke, ‘A Technocratic Imperial State?’, p. 471.
Wood estimated that 70 to 80 per cent of children in east Africa died before their first birthday, from malnutrition, malaria (which was endemic to the region), or as victims of infanticide, a practice which was believed to be rife and which was directed at any children who did not follow ‘normal’ patterns of birth or development, including premature babies, twins, or even babies which cut their upper teeth before their lower. Infant mortality across all African colonies varied, but ranged from 60 to 330 per 1,000 live births, with 29 of the 39 assessed colonies having a rate of 100 or higher; it was noted by a Colonial Office medical adviser that this was ‘appallingly high’, compared to the United Kingdom infant mortality rate of 45 per 1,000 live births.

It was believed that one of the major contributors to infant mortality in Africa was the adherence to traditional childrearing techniques, which often went against contemporary norms in the metropole. A report into infant-feeding practices in the colonies provides an insight into how child-rearing practices across the empire changed during the twentieth century, and the cultural and racial signifiers behind the history of childcare. The author noted with surprise that it was usual in most areas ‘for the baby to be put to the breast whenever it cries, and allowed to feed until it falls asleep’, describing this behaviour as a ‘primitive practice’. However, the report goes on to say that this method was ‘almost exclusively used by the civilised Chinese’, and notes that American paediatricians had recently been won over to the concept of ‘self demand’ feeding as ‘physiological and beneficial to child and mother’. By the end of the twentieth century, this approach was embraced by the NHS and nursing mothers in Britain.

However, many aspects of childcare in the colonies were contributing to infant morbidity and mortality. The author of the Milk Pamphlet highlighted the use of techniques that were ‘condemned by current Western teaching’. Children in Swaziland were fed ‘sour porridge’ alongside breast milk, whilst babies in Nyasaland were sustained on a ‘thin maize gruel’. Additionally, many babies were fed cow milk alongside or instead of breast milk, which led to digestive problems. Any feeding practice other than breast-feeding had the potential to be harmful, as sanitation and water provision in colonial communities was often insufficient and there were many opportunities for ‘bacterial contamination’ of the baby’s food. However, the report stressed that some approaches that been dismissed as harmful were actually neutral or beneficial to infant health; for example, the supplementing of milk with starchy food could have positive effects even from a young age. Ultimately, the report was forced to concede that, despite being ‘simpler and easier’, ‘successful breast feeding is, generally speaking, only possible if the mother is properly nourished’. In fact, it was acknowledged that in many colonies, babies were born already undernourished, because the food intake of pregnant women was poor ‘both in total quantity and in respect of individual

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963 Ibid.
nutrients’. It was therefore vital to devote resources to maternal health in order to have an impact on infant mortality and morbidity.

Dr Cicely Williams, a Jamaican paediatrician who built her career in colonial child health, becoming the first head of the maternal and child health section of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1948, contributed a report to the Colonial Office on the issue of maternal and infant mortality. She argued that a ‘great deal’ needed to be done to help women and children in the tropics, with a clear need for public health education initiatives. Maternal and infant morbidity and mortality in the colonies was ‘mainly due to ignorance, superstition and dirt’, which resulted in ‘malnutrition, helminthic [parasitic worm] and other intestinal and respiratory infections, malaria, anaemia and yaws etc’. Williams conceded that ‘hospitals, building and equipment’ had been funded by the colonial administrators, but criticised this focus on large and visible schemes; maternal and infant illness and death had been ‘neglected’ because healthcare development had not been directed into people’s homes, which were ‘the source of most ill health’. Women and children rarely attended the hospitals built in large population centres, and the doctors who trained in these new hospitals often returned ‘to an environment where every tenet of rational health law is broken’.

Williams suggested that African doctors should be given a more thorough schooling in paediatric medicine, as current medical training involved ‘a great deal about the natural history of the louse and liver flukes’ but ‘little of the natural history of the peoples’. Doctors needed to know more about issues such as infant malaria, a common cause of illness and death in Africa. It was agreed by the CAMC that the curriculum of colonial medical schools must be examined; there was too much focus on ‘curative’ medicine, and doctors were ‘unenthusiastic’ about preventative medicine because they were following a curriculum largely determined by the needs of the metropole. This focus on curative treatment was ill-suited to the needs of tropical Africa; it was also more expensive than focusing on prevention, and was therefore unsustainable if the cost were to ‘ultimately be borne by the colonies themselves’.

Given the need to utilise the cheapest possible means of medical provision, it was important that colonial medical authorities should work with traditional practitioners. Another document considered by the CAMC recommended that doctors should be encouraged to consider the ‘health significance’ of ‘tribal taboos, customs and prejudices’. It was vital that colonial health providers make efforts to ‘obtain the support rather than inspire the antagonism of the native handywoman’; the colonial administrations must work with the traditional sources of medical advice in Africa by

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964 Ibid.
966 Ibid.
967 Prof. Davey, Mr Farrer Brown, Prof. Mackintosh, Prof. Monerieff and Prof. Seddon, Memorandum: ‘Advancement of Preventative Medicine in the Colonies’, CO 994/4.
increasing their knowledge, seeking their participation and… equipping them’ to deal with health problems more effectively.\textsuperscript{968} It was also vital to utilise community nurses, who could minister to patients unable to travel to central healthcare facilities. However, the provision of community nurses could be problematic, since the low standard of education in rural areas meant that women from these regions could not be trained to a sufficiently high standard; women from urban areas were better educated, but they would not ‘contentedly settle down in remote districts’, often because of a language barrier. In addition, urban-trained nurses felt themselves ‘intellectually superior’ to rural populations, and found it difficult to command the respect of their patients. It was decided that there should be specific training programmes, with a high degree of practical education, to be ‘closely adapted to local needs’, in order to enable the provision of community nurses throughout territories.\textsuperscript{969}

Healthcare provision was made more urgent by the social and demographic developments in most territories during this period. In Uganda, a large section of the population was living in slum areas, which would need to be cleared in order to improve public health; this was a public health issue for most African colonies with growing urban industrial areas.\textsuperscript{970} The rapid rate of population growth in tropical areas was perceived as one of the ‘most pressing problems’ for the management of social welfare issues in the continent. A report produced by Professor T. H. Davey for the CAMC highlighted the population increase occurring in various ethnic groups, including the Kikuyu, who made up a quarter of the population of Kenya, and who were growing at a rate of around two per cent a year. The report explained that it was not colonial medical advances that had worked to increase the African population. Instead, the ‘three biological checks on population increase’, identified as war, pestilence and famine, had been reduced to two because colonial rule had prevented, to a large extent, local tribal warfare. It was true that ‘widespread famine and pestilence’ remained the ‘main agents in reducing population increase in primitive societies’. However, British colonial work on the control of community diseases, such as malaria and trypanosomiasis, would lead to lower death rates and increased fertility; it was believed that birth control was ‘unlikely to be acceptable to primitive peoples’ and could not be applied as a solution until the ‘economic and educational status’ of the colonies was higher.\textsuperscript{971}

Professor Davey, concerned about expanding African populations, pessimistically envisaged two possible scenarios. Firstly, the colonies might be rendered unable to feed themselves, and this

\textsuperscript{968} Dr Robert Sutherland, ‘Health Education in the Colonies’, CAMC 1/49 CO 994/4.
\textsuperscript{969} Davey, Farrer Brown, Mackintosh, Moncrieff and Seddon, Memorandum: ‘Advancement of Preventative Medicine in the Colonies’, CO 994/4.
responsibility would fall instead to the United Kingdom; this might be sustainable for a short while, but

it would not be long before the average citizen of the United Kingdom would ask how far his standard of living and nourishment were to be lowered in order to maintain in our dependencies an increasing tropical population which could not support itself and did not limit its growth.972

Secondly, Davey warned of ‘the political unrest which follows gross overcrowding’. In something of a non sequitur, he wrote that it would be ‘tragic indeed’ if the British, after ‘introducing the benefits of peace and civilisation to the peoples of the tropics’, were forced into a ‘war for survival’, in which they might have to use ‘the most terrible of weapons which science has produced’ against their African subjects. After threatening a future where nuclear weapons were deployed against colonial peoples, Davey ruled out ‘any procedure or deliberate negligence which would augment the death rate’ as ‘contrary to common humanity’, although ‘the population would be stabilised if the former causes of mortality were allowed to operate unchecked’.973

An addendum to this report was produced by Professor H. J. Seddon, who was quick to point out that ‘reduction in birth-rate should be brought about by agencies less crude and cruel than famine, pestilence and war’. He acknowledged that it was vital that the tropics remain ‘great food-producing territories’, and promoted the development of food production over the increased industrialisation of the region. Seddon believed, however, that the best way to limit population expansion was to promote ‘a desire for some measure of sophistication, an appetite for things less primitive than the biological urges to eat, sleep and reproduce one’s kind’ in the colonial populations. He suggested that implementing a universal wage labour policy would encourage working men to think of their families as more than ‘chattels’, and motivate them to limit their family size in order to maintain a higher standard of living.974 This recommendation was echoed by Dr Williams, who criticised the notion that ‘to permit more children to survive is to increase the problem of world food’; people who had ‘learnt to regard their children with care and pride’ did not ‘breed recklessly’, and the only way to reduce unchecked population increase was to turn the care of children into ‘a highly developed art’.975 These arguments are clearly reminiscent of the Fabian espousal of the role of public health in regulating reproduction and raising quality of life for the British working classes. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Fabian Women’s Group had publicised the concerns of working class women about sex and reproduction, and it was understood within the Fabian Society

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972 Ibid.
973 Ibid.
as a whole that access to contraception not only helped to protect women’s health but also reduced the economic burden on working-class households.\textsuperscript{976}

Public health and hygiene campaigns were also an important part of the British colonial healthcare policy in this period. Public demonstrations of the principles of general hygiene could be used to prove to African populations that ‘much disease is simply and cheaply preventable’.\textsuperscript{977} The Colonial Film Unit, freed from its wartime obligations to produce pro-British propaganda, played an important part in colonial public health education. The CFU was directed by the Central Office of Information (COI), from 1946 until 1950, when the unit was taken under the control of the Colonial Office. The films produced by the CFU were expected to be instructive and educational, pitched at the correct level for African colonial audiences. Many of these films had a strong public health message. The first film produced in West Africa was ‘Fight TB in the Home’ (1946), requested by the colonial medical department of Lagos; the feature explained the conditions which enabled the virus to spread and demonstrated simple ways to try to avoid the disease.\textsuperscript{978} In East Africa, ‘Dysentery’ (1950) depicted a man eating bread that had been contaminated by flies and cleaning a bare-bottomed baby without washing his hands, who was then taken ‘very ill’ and was treated for dysentery in hospital. ‘Childbirth Today’ (1949) was aimed at young mothers and encouraged them to use antenatal services, providing information about blood-pressure, blood and urine tests; the film was popularly received, although it was criticised for its depiction of an ambulance arriving at a remote village, a highly implausible scenario.\textsuperscript{979}

There was also an attempt to disseminate health information through other media. The African Information Services in Kenya regularly produced pamphlets, filled with photographs and diagrams, on health issues like tuberculosis. In Uganda, information officers often organised a Chuntauqua, a type of mass educational entertainment event first seen in the United States, around an exhibition, a series of lectures, and information disseminated by trained African and European experts, to circulate information about public health issues.\textsuperscript{980}

When the African territories approached decolonisation, health services were one of the first areas devolved to local governments; the people of Africa and the nationalist independence movements understandably attached ‘immense importance’ to the health of the bodies of the body politic. As the Chief Medical Officer for the Colonial Office acknowledged in 1951, this was a positive force in health development, as the Ministry of Health became an important department in colonial


\textsuperscript{977} Davey, Farrer Brown, Mackintosh, Moncrieff and Seddon, Memorandum: ‘Advancement of Preventative Medicine in the Colonies’, CO 994/4.


\textsuperscript{979} Ibid., pp. 170-1.

\textsuperscript{980} Doob, ‘Information Services in Central Africa’, pp. 10, 14.
governments and was awarded ‘a very high priority as regards funds and development’. Some colonies were able to develop their medical services to an extremely high standard; by 1962, the year of Ugandan independence, Kampala’s main hospital was superior to many in Britain, and was conducting world-leading research on viral cancer and heart disease.

Colonial Development: Education

Arthur Creech Jones saw education as vital to the development of African colonies towards independence. His own career had been built on evening classes and the literary education he had given himself whilst in prison as a conscientious objector in the First World War, and he was a governor of Ruskin College and Queen Elizabeth House, both in Oxford, which provided education for trade unionists and British and imperial mature students respectively. Prior to his tenure as Colonial Secretary, he served on the Colonial Office advisory committee on education in the colonies and was vice-Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa.

Andrew Porter may have characterised the British Empire as ‘the world’s greatest ever educational enterprise’, but at the end of the Second World War the facilities for educating the African population were far below what would be required for mass education or even universal literacy. Indeed, as A. J. Stockwell has made clear, the British government had been cautious about the possible effects of educating the colonial population, and the task had fallen instead to an amalgam of official and unofficial groups such as settlers, missionaries and imperial philanthropists. After the war, however, African populations became more vocal in their desire for education and the British colonial government had to address this need more directly. In 1944, Creech Jones visited West Africa in his role on the Commission on Higher Education, and wrote that the demand for schooling for children and mass education for adults was ‘wide, insistent and passionate’; there was a desire among African people ‘for literacy, for greater knowledge of the ordinary things necessary for good everyday living’. In 1945, Rita Hinden wrote in Tribune that education ‘must advance along a broad front’ in the colonies, advocating not only the promotion of elementary education but also the development of universities in the colonies. Not only were university-educated teachers required to deliver primary and secondary schooling to African children, but the colonies would require ‘skilled administrators, professional men, and citizens of good intellectual capacity’ if they were to advance to self-government. New independent nations would not succeed if they had ‘no

981 EDP Chief Medical Officer ‘The Colonial Advisory Committee: Note by the Chief Medical Officer, Colonial Office’, 7 November 1951, CAMC 2/51, CO 994/4.
982 Shane Doyle, ‘STDs and Welfare in East Africa’, IHR, http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/welfare/articles/doyles.html#t11
983 Pugh, ‘Jones, Arthur Creech (1891-1964)’.
cultural centres, no research facilities, no outflow of men and women of high intellectual status and academic training’.

In Africa, many schools had originally been provided by Christian missionaries, who had set up infant and primary schools as part of their evangelising mission. African churches had gradually taken over these schools, which were overwhelmingly fee-paying, to provide education to the children of the congregation; in Northern Nigeria, Muslim communities had set up centres for instruction in the Koran for young boys and occasionally girls. Colonial governments had begun setting up their own fee-paying schools from the mid-1930s, but the numbers of children attending primary school varied dramatically, from 43 per cent in the colony of Sierra Leone to only 1.7 per cent in Northern Nigeria. In East and Southern Africa, the situation was complicated by the white settlers, who built educational facilities for their children that were almost entirely racially segregated; black children receive a poorer standard of education and their curriculum focused on technical and vocational subjects. To counter this, primary schools were set up by black African communities; the Kikuyu founded between three and four hundred schools in Kenya between 1929 and 1952, mainly as an attempt to limit the influence of Christian missionaries over traditional culture.

There was an even more limited attempt to provide secondary and higher education. In 1942, there were 43 secondary schools in West Africa educating around 11,500 pupils, of which 10,000 were boys; these schools were not dispersed evenly across the colonies and there were some areas where there was very little provision for either primary or secondary education. As a whole, secondary school education in the British tropical colonies reached only one or two per cent of the eligible population; British colonial administrations had focused on developing practical skills required for village life, an approach which was increasingly challenged by African populations. Only a tiny minority of African students graduated from a higher education institution, such as Makerere University, a technical school established in Uganda in 1922. In fact, prior to the Second World War, outside India and the Dominions there existed only four universities in the British Empire, in Malta, Jerusalem, Ceylon and Hong Kong.

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987 Rita Hinden, ‘Education for the Colonies’, Tribune, 19 October 1945.
990 Iliffe, Africans, pp. 222-3
991 Iliffe, Africans, pp. 222-3
992 Iliffe, Africans, pp. 222-3
Of course, large numbers of the white population in Africa had been educated in the metropole, the British colonial administration being composed of ‘the right public-school and Oxbridge men’. A small minority of black Africans were also educated within Britain. African students were supported by the West African Students Union (WASU), established by two black African students in 1925; Arthur Creech Jones was a close ally of the organisation, forming the West African Parliamentary Committee to liaise with its members. In the 1930s, there had been four to five hundred students from the colonial empire studying in Britain; by 1947 this figure had risen to 3,000, and by 1949 there were 3,500, compared to 3,450 from the Indian subcontinent. This dramatic increase in numbers was due to an increase in financial support forthcoming from the CDW funds, at a time when African and Caribbean demands for university places outstripped provision in the colonies. Colonial students formed 11.5 per cent of the London student body by the late 1950s, mainly studying medicine, engineering and law. They often suffered from racial prejudice and became disillusioned by British society, although some had more happy experiences; Joseph Appiah, a Ghanaian law student, met and married Peggy Cripps, daughter of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whilst studying in London.

Education as an area of African welfare development was central to colonial development policy in this period; it was believed to be ‘essential’ that ‘territories should regard educational development as a foundation of economic development rather than one of its fruits’. The Colonial Office attitude to African education was frequently underpinned by a racialised, hierarchical view of social and cultural progression. It was considered ‘doubtful’ whether any ‘real progress’ could be made by populations who were on the whole ‘illiterate and incapable of appreciating or even of desiring any very great economic or social advance’, but education was a way of bridging this perceived cultural gap. In some colonies, such as Zanzibar, this message was taken to heart, with the Director of Education in that territory securing a large proportion of the CDW funds for educational development; however, in most colonies there was a reluctance to spend on education as opposed to ‘schemes which would bring rapid returns from which social services could be developed later’.

The ‘ultimate aim’ of colonial policy was ‘universal, free and compulsory education for all children of all races’; this aim would not be achieved until the ‘distant future’ but it was necessary for all

996 Stockwell, Leaders, Dissidents and the Disappointed, p. 490.
997 Ibid., p. 491.
998 Ibid., p. 492.
policy to be informed by these ideals.\textsuperscript{1002} The most difficult aspect would be the provision of education without charge; it was believed that schooling could only be free after it had become universal and so it must remain ‘a privilege rather than a right’ until it was available to all, which meant that those people who were ‘fortunate enough’ to live near a school would have to pay to attend. It was only with ‘voluntary help, taxation or fees’ that an education system could be established across a continent; without a large tax base, even if the contributions for local governments could be doubled, schools would have to be funded by those who used them. However, primary education was considered a necessity, and so the responsibility for its provision would increasingly fall to local authorities, with grants from central government and CDW funds where possible.\textsuperscript{1003}

The highest cost in the expansion of education was the training and salaries of teachers. The annual intake to teacher training colleges in the African colonies was thus determined largely by the capacity of the government to meet the salaries of the teachers when trained; in some territories, this meant that only 10 to 15 per cent of the number of qualified teachers required were available. Until more teachers could be fully trained, it was suggested that a graded system of teachers could be introduced; unqualified or part-qualified teachers could work in association with experienced teachers, to gain experience on a lower wage. This solution was adopted in Tanganyika as part of their Ten Year Development Plan; the alternative was demonstrated in Uganda, which followed a system whereby all trained teachers worked in government-aided schools, leaving all other schools functioning with ‘wholly unqualified’ staff and creating a massive gulf in experience across different regions.\textsuperscript{1004}

Another major issue in teacher training in the British African colonies was the very small number of qualified women teachers, which created profound problems in the extension of education to African girls. Phillip Morris, Vice-Chancellor of Bristol University and a government advisor on colonial education, emphasised the need to educate ‘lasses’ as well as ‘lads’, which required a ‘substantial majority’ of women teachers to educate African girls.\textsuperscript{1005} It was necessary to emphasise the importance of female education in the colonies, as there was often a ‘false conception’ of education as ‘simply a means to a better job bringing higher pay’ in communities that still largely disapproved of careers for women. Education therefore had to be promoted as ‘the gateway to a fuller and more satisfying life’ which had innate benefits for women and girls.\textsuperscript{1006}

\textsuperscript{1002} Draft of ‘Education Policy’, 22 February 1950, CO 859/168/3.
\textsuperscript{1003} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1004} ‘Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies – Territorial Sub-Committee ‘A’ – Draft Minutes of the 15th Meeting held on the 16th November 1949’, 7 December 1949, CO 859/168/3.
\textsuperscript{1005} Phillip Morris to RJ Harvey, 6th January 1950, CO 859/168/3.
\textsuperscript{1006} Draft of ‘Education Policy’, 22 February 1950, CO 859/168/3.
It was also important to educate women because of their community role. One Colonial Office report quoted Dr James E. K. Aggrey, an African intellectual and teacher, in saying that ‘to educate a boy is to educate an individual; to educate a girl is to educate a family’. However, Colonial Office conceptions of education were limited by conventional gender roles; it was expected that girls would be educated in ‘current and improved methods of housecraft’ with the dominant theme in female primary education being ‘the improvement of the life of the home’.1007 Joanna Lewis has identified how female education was used to disseminate official advice in an effort to reduce infant mortality and illness; female education about ‘personal and domestic hygiene’ was, from the interwar period onwards, seen as vital by British men who would have found it ‘an awkward and possibly mysterious subject’.1008 However, the focus on female education was not sustained enough to ensure anything like equal provision of educational facilities across genders. The Second World War and nationalist agitation led colonial administrators to re-privilege male demands over female needs, and the focus shifted to providing higher education for those African men who would become leaders of newly independent states.1009 This gendered colonial legacy of limited access to land, resources, rights and education for women was perpetuated in many independent nations, especially in autocratic regimes where women still remain largely excluded from positions of political or economic power.1010

University education in Africa was invigorated under the Attlee administration, as a way to provide technical and higher education for the potential new leaders of independent states. The 1943 Asquith Commission had supported the expansion of technical education and engineering, and had led to the creation of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies, which promoted the creation of imperial universities. In 1948, Yaba College in Lagos was transferred to Ibadan, becoming the first university in Nigeria, and the University College of the Gold Coast was founded near Accra; in 1949, Makerere College in Uganda became the University College of East Africa; and in 1950, Gordon Memorial College was formally renamed University of Khartoum. Most African universities were affiliated with British universities, which advised on degree structures and curricula and accredited degrees; the University of London had a ‘special relationship’ to this effect with British African universities from 1948.1011 University recruitment varied; in its first year, University College at Ibadan attracted 224 students, compared to 90 at the University College of the Gold Coast, but by the end of the 1950s all African universities were enrolling at least five hundred students a year.1012 These universities were at least partly funded by

1007 Ibid.
1009 Ibid., p. 72.
the CDW Act, which increased the central funds available for higher education from £4.5 million to £6.5 million in 1947; the colonies also provided capital funds for construction. The construction of universities in the African colonies is important not only because of the practical implications of the provision of higher education, but also because it indicates a shift in the perception of what African people and societies were capable of achieving. In 1939, Norman Leys, a member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, had criticised the ‘false idea’ that the indigenous populations of African colonies led ‘lives of their own in which such things as franchise and higher education are incongruous’; the creation of universities represented a new acceptance of the importance of education for black African populations.

The Attlee government also utilised other resources to improve access to education in the African territories. In 1950, the Colonial Office and BBC discussed how the Transcriptions Service could be used to deliver educational content; it was agreed that the service could be particularly useful in providing ‘school broadcasts’ and ‘English by Radio’ programmes. This type of resource was considered a legitimate project for CDW funding, which had £1 million available for broadcasting development. It was important to utilise the BBC in the provision of schools programmes, not only in order to deliver content but as an incentive for individual colonies to further develop their own school broadcasting systems; it was also crucial for colonial governments to equip schools with suitable radio sets and to address problems like ‘echoey’ classrooms. Ian Jacobs was keen for the BBC to expand their education provision and in so doing to bestow upon African schoolchildren ‘a better appreciation of the history, character and value of the British Commonwealth of Nations’. Programmes would have to be versatile enough to be relevant to a ‘wide variety of different local conditions’, and could not presuppose that any ‘sound teaching of basic facts’ had already been imparted; however, ‘properly planned educational broadcasting’ could be relied upon to greatly benefit colonial school-children. Jacobs was keen that radio broadcasting should be utilised in teacher-training, and in suggesting ‘new ideas and methods’ for the classroom; this was already established in the Bahamas and could be extended across Africa if institutions were provided with radio sets. He also suggested the extension of the ‘English by radio’ services, which would draw upon the linguistic resources of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) within the University of London to create two hundred recorded lessons and associated material, at a cost of £5,000.

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1013 Walter Adams (Secretary Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies) to Colonial University Grants Advisory Committee, 27 September 1947, BW 90/46.
1016 JB Millar, Minute, 5 December 1950, CO 875/70/4.
There was some resistance to this approach from within the Colonial Office. William E. F. Ward, a member of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, criticised the BBC’s attitude that it could ‘sit in London and prepare lessons which will be as useful as in Fiji or Kampala’, and questioned whether colonial governments would accept the provision of educational broadcasting from within the metropole. Ward wanted to see ‘as much localisation as educational requirements necessitate’ but realised that this was an ‘unattainable’ ideal, given the economic motivation for producing transcripts with the ‘widest possible circulation’. However, the Colonial Office was keen on providing schools programming as a ‘matter of general interest’ to all the colonies as soon as possible; from 1952, a dedicated Colonial Schools Transcription Unit was created within the BBC, which was funded through £30,000 from the CDW and which aimed to kick-start the provision of school broadcasting and teacher training via radio. By 1960, when the CDW Act stopped funding the scheme, more than five hundred educational programmes had been made to support primary and secondary education; almost every colonial territory, and even newly independent states such as Ghana and Malaya, used this service in their schools.

Educational projects were a key focus of Arthur Creech Jones’s vision for colonial development in this period. Much progress was made in the analysis of current educational provision and of the extension of key areas, such as the creation of British-affiliated universities across the continent. However, some groups, particularly women, were left out of the advances made in colonial education during this period; African territories still progressed to independence with a large proportion of their populations having received only a basic education. In the late 1950s, with the continent in an inexorable move towards independence, there were only about 8,000 black African secondary school graduates out of a total population of nearly 200 million; however, almost half of these came from Ghana and Nigeria. Britain did not come anywhere close to providing the universal education espoused by Creech Jones, Hinden and others, but it did perhaps come closer than many other colonial empires.

Conclusions

In assessing the veracity of the colonial development claims of the European powers, Walter Rodney concluded simply that ‘the vast majority of Africans went into colonialism with a hoe and came out with a hoe’. Whilst John Illiffe agrees with this conclusion, he points out that ‘it was

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1019 WEF Ward, Minute, 17 January 1951, CO 875/70/4.
often a better hoe'.

This chapter has stressed the importance of assessing colonial development firstly on the merits of individual projects, encompassing different types of development ranging from economic to social welfare, and secondly through the layers of intention and ideology that are revealed by British colonial actions in this period. Despite the official concentration on economic and financial development, the Attlee government was distinguished by a marked lack of success in this arena. This was almost certainly, as was suggested at the time, because the ‘vagueness of the mandate’ for the development corporations attempted to compromise between funding projects with sure economic returns and responding to African community needs, leading to financial underperformance. Development schemes that focused on improving African living standards and promoting social welfare programmes were more successful, often laying foundations for the provision of these resources post-independence. In many cases it was actually a lack of attention to hoes, and other basic realities of African colonial life, that led to the downfall of British colonial development ambitions; on the occasions when ideology, intention and pragmatism were synchronised, British colonial development could be quietly and modestly successful.

1024 John Iliffe, Africans, p. 214.
Conclusions: Association Football and the Expression 'Fuck Off'? The Ambiguous Legacies of the British colonial period.

R. G. Turnbull, when Governor of Tanganyika, was asked by Denis Healey, “Tell me, Sir Richard, what are the enduring legacies which Britain will leave to Africa?” “Association football”, replied His Excellency, “and the expression ‘fuck off’!”.

- Charles Chevenix Trench, Men Who Ruled Kenya.1026

Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. With neo-colonialism neither is the case.

- Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism.1027

This thesis has assessed British colonial development in the Marshall Plan period, to provide a fuller explanation of the Attlee government’s colonial policy in its African territories. Post-war colonial development in British Africa had two main aims: firstly, to increase the production of raw materials, to aid the reconstruction of the metropole and earn dollars on the international markets; and secondly, to improve the standard of living among colonial populations, either through improved economic conditions based on improved raw material production and trade, or through providing more comprehensive social welfare mechanisms. It is clear that these two aims were often contradictory. While Arthur Creech Jones and others within the Colonial Office proclaimed that the improvement of living conditions and a move toward greater economic self-sufficiency was a precursor to self-governments and independence, many others within the British government and the colonial service overseas believed that colonial development was only useful if it could be used to diminish the power of nationalist agitators. This tension informed priorities for development at home and in the metropole.

Chapter One assessed the three spheres of British influence in the post-war period, concluding that British foreign and imperial policy was carefully balanced against Labour’s socialist ideology, domestic economic pressures, and Cold War realities. The Colonial Office operated within this context, prioritising the empire as a sphere of action; the Foreign Office and Treasury were more concerned with maintaining British economic and diplomatic power, which could sometimes cause tension; and Britain’s allies in Europe and the United States exerted their own pressures on British policy in the empire.

Chapter Two examined more thoroughly the domestic political context surrounding colonial development. The Colonial Office under Arthur Creech Jones operated within a wider Fabian approach to international relations, which saw economic and social development as a way to move colonial territories towards self-government and independence. Of course, economic development was appealing to the Labour Party as a way to address the financial problems of the metropole; however, there was also a clear rhetorical focus on the importance of social welfare development in improving the lives of African people.

Chapter Three explored further the idea raised in Chapter One, that British reluctance to cooperate with continental Europe undermined international and transnational collaboration on colonial development. The Colonial Office was not immune from the British tendency to ‘drag the feet’ over continental cooperation, although there were key elements, chiefly technical and medical research, in which British experts were able to work effectively with their European counterparts. The limited cooperation that did occur enabled Britain to counter accusations from France and America that the government was unwilling to work with the continent.

Chapter Four extended this theme of American pressure on British policy abroad, to explore how far Britain worked with the United States in the empire, how far Washington was willing to support imperial policies in this period, and how American action in the global south fitted into a broader context of imperialism. The post-war period was a time of reconciliation on the issue of empire within the Anglo-American relationship, as the United States realised the value of British influence in imperial territories in the context of the Cold War. As British power waned, and American influence overseas increased, the United States used its own development programmes to take the place of Britain and other European metropoles in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

Finally, Chapter Five examined the different programmes implemented by Britain in its African colonies, in the fields of agriculture and industry, transport and communications, education and health. Although there were some high-profile failures, especially in economic development, there were also some important successes, especially in the field of social welfare policy, which improved the lives of British imperial citizens and helped to prepare communities for the experience of self-government.

Overall, this thesis has stressed the importance of contextualising colonial history against foreign and domestic policy, and has emphasised the interaction between actors’ ideological perspectives and the practical constraints on their actions. Colonial development was a fundamental part of the Attlee government’s colonial policy, which had long term consequences for the colonies and the
metropole; this conclusion will highlight some of the legacies of colonial development, at home and abroad.

**Evaluating Development**

Arthur Creech Jones lost his seat in Shipley in the 1950 Labour election, and so for the remainder of the Attlee government, James Griffiths took the helm at the Colonial Office.\(^{1028}\) Creech Jones thus lost control of his empire, although he remained active in imperial politics with the Fabian Colonial Bureau, which continued its role as an external expert advisory service until the 1960s. In a letter to all colonial governors following his defeat at the polls, Creech Jones described his ‘privilege to enjoy nearly four intensive years’ as Colonial Secretary ‘during one of the most difficult periods of British history’, in which ‘an important chapter in Colonial Development’ had been written. He thanked colonial officials across the globe for their ‘splendid loyalty and great devotion… fine cooperation… and goodwill’.\(^{1029}\)

Creech Jones’s departure from the Colonial Office was met with a great number of personal messages of gratitude for his service to the empire. Corona, the official journal of the Corona Club, an organisation for members of the British colonial service, published a response to his farewell letter.\(^{1030}\) Although ‘neither the Colonial Service, nor, of course, Corona ha[d] any politics’, the journal nevertheless expressed ‘personal sympathy’ for Creech Jones on the loss of his seat, and paid ‘tribute to him as a friend and a man’. The outgoing Colonial Secretary was described as ‘approachable, human, unpretentious and ready to listen’; ‘no Minister ever came to the Colonial Office with so much knowledge of his subject’, and he had ‘devoted himself to the development of the colonies and the welfare of their people of whatever race’, so that the colonial service was ‘glad to have worked under him’.\(^{1031}\) Officials from within the Colonial Office echoed this view; T. I. K. Lloyd wrote to Creech Jones to report ‘the quite general and genuine sorrow’ in the department that the Colonial Secretary had lost his seat and therefore his ministerial position.\(^{1032}\) James Griffiths, the incoming Colonial Secretary, recorded in his memoirs that he was following in the footsteps of ‘one of the outstanding Colonial Secretaries of the twentieth century’; this judgement was echoed by Ernest Bevin, who wrote to Creech Jones to say that, although he often hid his ‘light under a bushel’, there was nobody with ‘a greater record’ in ‘the history of Colonial Development’.\(^{1033}\)

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1028 Creech Jones returned to the House of Commons in 1954 representing Wakefield, a seat he held until ill health forced his retirement in the summer of 1964. He died a week after Labour’s victory in the 1964 election.
1030 The journal was established by Creech Jones in 1948, who was at least partly motivated by the need to keep the colonial service in touch with the officials in the Colonial Office. Anthony Kirk-Greene, *Aspects of Empire: A New Corona Anthology*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. viii.
The Attlee government survived only one year longer than Creech Jones, losing to the Conservatives by twenty six seats, despite polling a majority of the popular vote with the most votes ever won by any political party until 1992. The Colonial Office greeted their new minister, Oliver Lyttelton, with equanimity. A document prepared for Churchill to outline the policy followed under Creech Jones, before the Prime Minister’s trip to the United States, said that the Colonial Office was ‘pushing ahead with Colonial Development as rapidly as resources permit’, but stressed that it was ‘inevitably a long-term business’ based in ‘technical education and general community development’.1034 The continuing legacy of Arthur Creech Jones and the continuing influence of the Fabian Colonial Bureau is discernable.

Creech Jones frequently returned to his time at the Colonial Office in his writing and speeches throughout the rest of his career. In 1959, he edited a volume of New Fabian Colonial Essays, which brought together writing by several former Cabinet ministers, members of the Colonial Service and other leading figures from within the FCB. It included Rita Hinden on empire and socialism, Kenneth Younger on colonial issues in international politics, Harold Ingrams on the administration of the overseas service and Marjorie Nicholson on political development in the empire. Creech Jones himself contributed a piece on the Attlee government’s colonial policy, in which he assessed the legacy of his programmes in the empire.

According to Creech Jones, Labour had inherited the empire at a time when it would have been ‘hypocritical and embarrassing’ to ‘show indifference to colonial progress’; the post-war period, despite the ‘severe economic conditions facing Britain’ and the turbulent international context, had to see development and change within the empire. Creech Jones believed that Labour had showed ‘a readier disposition to extend responsibility and devolve imperial authority to the colonial people’ than the Conservatives, as well as more enlightened views on ‘race relations, political development and economic policy’. Labour had been ‘widely acclaimed’ in advance of its election victory for the ‘political advance, economic improvement and social welfare’ that it could bring to the colonies, and it was important to live up to this expectation, although the Colonial Secretary’s ‘powers to export “socialism” to a colony’ were heavily restricted because of the power held by the governors and legislative councils on the spot.1035

Nevertheless, the Labour government brought about significant change in the colonies by harnessing the CDW Act (which had previously ‘hardly been operated’) and creating the two development corporations, as well as through commissioning of economic, scientific and medical

1034 Emanuel to Poynton, ‘Brief for Mr Churchill on Colonial Development’, 18 December 1951, CO 537/7597, National Archives.
research in the colonies. In his essay, Creech Jones described in some detail the schemes that had been enacted under his direction. These included the ‘ill-fated groundnuts scheme’, which ‘encountered immense difficulties’ but nonetheless ‘added public works and services to East Africa and acquired important scientific knowledge’; the establishment of university colleges in Nigeria, Gold Coast and East Africa and important ‘work against illiteracy and for community education’ across the empire; the construction of roads, railways and harbours, which enabled an ‘increase in employment, the extension of transport, and… improvements in labour conditions’; advances in workers’ rights, including the expansion of trade unions, the improvements of wage standards and the abolition of forced labour, although some issues such as ‘colour bars [and] indifferent wage regulations’ remained; and attempts to tackle ‘the problems of malnutrition and water supplies… maternity and child welfare’ and to eradicate diseases such as leprosy, malaria and sleeping sickness. Overall, he stressed the importance of ‘the human approach to all colonial issues’, which entailed liaising with colonial officials and colonial populations, making visits to study problems ‘on the spot’, and involving colonial representatives in conferences, training and planning wherever possible. Labour in 1945 had been ‘ready with a policy’ for its empire; the work had not been ‘a series of ad hoc decisions’ but had instead demonstrated ‘great vision and practical confidence’ to move colonial peoples towards ‘nationhood, independence and better living’. Robert Pearce agrees with Creech Jones’ assessment of Labour’s impact on the empire, writing that ‘the years following Labour’s victory in 1945 proved to be of crucial value for the colonial empire in Africa’ because of the focus on ‘progressive welfare’ and the ‘definite commitment to self-government… underpinned by economic and social change’. Development and the Imperial Legacy

Historians have sometimes struggled to ascribe a post-colonial legacy for the British empire. Of course, this might be because the world is not yet truly post-colonial; the power structures of empire remain in place in contemporary international relations, and not only former colonies but also the old metropoles of once-great empires are still fundamentally shaped by their historic experience. Bernard Porter has claimed that most historians of empire either ‘blame it for most of the problems of the modern world’ or ‘credit… it with spreading modernity’, but there is clearly

1036 Ibid., pp. 29-37.
1037 Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, pp. 112-3.
room for a more nuanced assessment of the legacies of imperialism in the twenty-first century. Matthew Lange, for example, has rejected ideas that British colonial policy was either ‘universally developmental or universally despotic’, instead insisting that its legacy depended on the extent to which government in each territory was based on direct or indirect rule. Although the post-war period is framed more commonly in terms of the decolonisation process, an honest evaluation of the last days of empire is important for a full understanding of the ways in which imperial rule cast a shadow over the new independent African nations, and the newly-bereft British state. Britain had a lasting effect in its colonies, beyond sporting competition and unsporting language, and colonial development was an important part of this legacy.

In 1951, Penguin published a slim volume that proclaimed itself to be ‘a survey of the main problems of British Africa, suggesting the lines of policy that any British government should follow in the years ahead’. The authors of this book proclaimed that, after the seismic power shifts caused by colonial withdrawal from Asia, Britain was ‘no longer the mother-country of the British Empire’ but, instead, ‘an equal member of a multi-racial Commonwealth’; this change had occurred ‘almost without being realised’, but would have ‘a profound bearing on the future of Africa’. Yet the granting of independence to the Indian subcontinent did not lead to the immediate British withdrawal from Africa; the first countries to become independent, Sudan and Ghana, did not do so until 1956 and 1957 respectively. In the decade between Indian and African independence, the British continued to exert colonial power across the African continent; at times, they asserted their right to rule emphatically and violently.

However, as this thesis has argued, British colonial development saw a sea-change in the official attitude to the empire. Previously, the colonial territories had been expected to fund their own imperial rule, and any development – even that which might lead to increased profits for the metropolitan treasury – had to be funded by colonial governments and populations. By the post-war period, this was no longer the case. The ‘white man’s burden’ had been transformed into something beyond the sharing of the spiritual benefits of civilisation: the metropole would now confer upon its imperial territories its knowledge of advances in industry, agriculture, healthcare and education. Technical research, particularly in agriculture and health, which had historically used Africa as a field for study, flourished under the new development regime. International cooperation on scientific research in Africa after decolonisation was one of the major legacies of post-war European colonial development.

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1042 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
1043 See Hodge, Triumph of the Expert; Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory.
A short documentary produced in 1950 by the Crown Film Unit focused on the various advances made in British colonies through colonial development initiatives, which had helped colonial states to ‘raise their standards and increase their wealth’, within the framework of colonial ten-year development plans. The first half of Spotlight on the Colonies highlighted initiatives such as the training of doctors at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; the work of African research stations in eradicating locusts; and the provision of health centres, schools and colleges, which would give the colonies ‘their own professional men and leaders’. The film emphasised that ‘in an age of shortage’ there was ‘another side to this plan for the colonies’; international shortages were portrayed as ‘an opportunity’ for the colonies, which were ‘preparing to become suppliers of food and raw materials, both for themselves and for a needy world’. The profits from agricultural and industrial projects would lead to ‘a higher income, and a higher standard of living’ for colonial people; development was thus an exercise in ‘mutual prosperity’ for metropole and periphery. It was therefore

on this basis of development, social and economic, [that] the British colonies [were] expanding their horizons, raising their own standards of living, increasing their own food supplies and supplying much-needed raw materials to the world.

Development was portrayed as a mutual effort; if Britain wished to benefit from the foods and raw materials from its empire, it must invest, providing funding, technical equipment and know-how. In this way, Britain and its empire were ‘staunch partners on [their] common road to progress and prosperity’. It is no surprise that the research and story outline for this film was carried out by Dr Rita Hinden, as the central message, that development was of mutual benefit to metropole and periphery, was a fundamental tenet of the Fabian Colonial Bureau. However, the British government removed the more radical aspects of Hinden’s research, with no hint in the film that developing the empire might also be working towards its dissolution.

British colonial development was itself central to the ideology of the decolonisation process. Decolonisation can be cast as an abandonment of colonial territories, motivated by economic pressure and international disapproval, but it can also be read as the realisation of contemporary rhetoric about trusteeship; colonies were to become independent when they had the structures in place to enable self-government. Ultimately, Britain was propelled into decolonisation by swelling black nationalism, combined with an increasingly apathetic metropolitan population, struggling domestic economy and rising international pressure. However, post-war colonial development, with

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1045 Ibid.
its focus on the transference of skills from metropole to periphery, demonstrates that many officials within Britain were preparing for gradual self-rule and independence within a framework of development policy. When Oliver Stanley made his statement, during the Second World War, affirming Britain’s aim in the territories to ‘guide colonial peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire’, he did so after two years of demands by Arthur Creech Jones that this intention be publicly declared.\footnote{Flint, ‘Planned decolonization and its failure in British Africa’, p. 409.}

Creech Jones did not want independence for the colonies during his tenure as Colonial Secretary; indeed, he feared that this would have created ‘more pain and difficulties than would have been removed’.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 36–7.} But his policies, even if they were ‘only the beginning’, were carried out with the understanding that colonial populations were being ‘set on the road’ to ‘nationhood, independence and better living’.\footnote{Pearce, The Turning Point In Africa, p. 109.} These ideals were shared by his colleagues in the FCB; Hinden described the role of the Bureau as ‘to hasten the day when self-government, or – if desired – independence, could be achieved’ in the empire.\footnote{Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, pp. 257–8.} Development in the colonies was absolutely fundamental to this process. However, by 1950, the British government was less convinced of the necessity of colonial development as a prerequisite for successful independence, mainly because of the perceived cost of large projects, although the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts continued to be renewed until March 1970.\footnote{Flint, ‘Planned decolonization and its failure in British Africa’, p. 392.} As the African colonies gradually gained their independence, their relationship with their former colonial ruler changed; however, development and aid continued to contribute to the bond between the former metropole and its ex-empire.

**Development After Colonialism**

In the twenty-first century, development is a central element within Britain’s relationship with its former colonial empire. However, this was historically not always the case. Kwame Nkrumah decried the ‘power without responsibility’ and ‘exploitation without redress’ that typified neo-colonialism in a supposedly post-colonial world; in contrast, imperialism had been tempered by the checks and balances provided by domestic sensibilities and a perceived duty to protect colonial populations.\footnote{Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, p. xi.} Theorists in the neo-colonial or *dependista* school believe that British involved the widespread transfer of power from colonial authorities to a comprador class, dependent on an exploitative form of ‘international capitalism’ that was ultimately linked to American multinational corporations.\footnote{Flint, ‘Planned decolonization and its failure in British Africa’, p. 392.} This interpretation has been criticised by historians such as John Flint, who argues that the British were ‘not, in fact, gifted with Machiavellian skills and prophetic insights’ and had...
‘no aspirations whatsoever for the role of puppet masters’. The attempted creation of an educated elite of ‘natural rulers’ was motivated by a desire for the ‘legitimacy of political authority’ for states that would one day achieve self-government and independence, rather than a desire to create a comprador class.\textsuperscript{1054} However, as the British retreat from empire in the 1950s and 1960s was motivated by the need to replace expensive direct colonial control with ‘informal empire’ in order to ‘secure British economic and strategic assets’, it is certainly true that decolonisation saw both the attempted continuation of imperial control through diplomatic means, and a reduction in the economic development and military protection that had once been part of the imperial \textit{quid pro quo}.\textsuperscript{1055}

For a long time, independence from British rule meant an end to British state-sponsored social and welfare development schemes in African countries. For many British people, this was accompanied by a general apathy about African poverty and social problems. John Lonsdale has linked this apathy explicitly to the end of empire in Africa, arguing that while ‘fifty years ago European electorates felt they had responsibilities towards Africa [as] Africans were their colonial subjects’, after independence the continent was perceived as ‘lawless, tribal, starving Africa’\textsuperscript{1056} The British popular press constructed the continent as hopeless, helpless and history-less, focusing on ‘images of helplessness, dependency and suffering’ in its depiction of famine, civil war and genocide.\textsuperscript{1057} In this climate, social welfare action was difficult for governments to justify because it seemed like Africa was not trying hard enough to help itself; as Lonsdale says, Africa was seen as a ‘feckless victim’ who expected the West to be a ‘rescue service’.\textsuperscript{1058}

Instead of government action, the space for social welfare development in Africa was filled by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The establishment of the UN in 1945, with provisions in Article 71 of Chapter 10 of the United Nations Charter for cooperation and consultation with NGOs, enshrined the role of the non-governmental organisation in international and transnational relations.\textsuperscript{1059} The NGO was therefore evolving as an instrument of international policy alongside the Attlee Government’s colonial development programmes. One such British organisation is Oxfam, which has worked extensively within British ex-colonies providing development aid and humanitarian relief. The charity, founded in 1942 as a response to the humanitarian crisis in Greece during the Second World War, did not carry out campaigns in British African territories until post-independence. Oxfam effectively filled the gap that had been created by the withdrawal of British

\textsuperscript{1054} Ibid., p. 404.
\textsuperscript{1055} Louis and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonisation’, p. 487.
\textsuperscript{1059} Article 71 of Chapter 10 of the United Nations Charter, 1945
administrators and years of colonial neglect, beginning work in Sierra Leone in 1961, Kenya and Uganda in 1963 and Nigeria in 1965, eventually working in Ghana and Ethiopia in the 1980s. The charity provided emergency humanitarian relief, for example in Nigeria in the 1967-70 civil war, and enabled long-term development programmes, working to promote peace and manage conflicts, and supporting governments to end chronic poverty and suffering.\textsuperscript{1060}

It has been argued that NGOs were able to survive the process of colonial independence because the history of development discourse, and the rise of the ‘development NGO’ as a specific entity, enabled them to distinguish themselves from colonial regimes. Proponents of this argument maintain that it was an ‘emerging discourse’ of development which enabled voluntary organisations to build a role within the post-colonial nations; Oxfam, as well as Save the Children and Plan International, are identified as ‘war charities’ which had no ‘direct involvement in the colonies’, as opposed to missionary charities like Christian Aid. These organisations were driven to look beyond Europe partly because of the alleviating effects of the Marshall Plan, but also because of an ‘idealist tradition of liberal internationalism’, which motivated their work in post-colonial nations.\textsuperscript{1061} In fact, it can be argued that it was not in opposition to colonial regimes, but instead in the very model of colonial development programmes, that Oxfam \textit{et al} began their work in Africa; they may have worked outside official British state action but their fundamental motivations were not so different from those of Creech Jones and the FCB. As Michael Jennings and others have argued, there were strong continuities, not only in ideology and approach but also in personnel, between the colonial regimes and the international and intra-national development organisations of the 1960s and beyond.\textsuperscript{1062}

It must be stressed that this continuity does not mean that all international development programmes in former colonial nations were merely an attempt to perpetuate the power structure of the old imperial world. Manji and O’Coill’s adherence to a theory of development in which humanitarian action works only to recreate the periphery-metropole relationship post-independence obscures the motivations of the individual actors in colonial and post-colonial development. As David Simon has argued, this construction is ‘simplistic and deterministic’ in its efforts to apportion blame for the negative social impact of development policies like structural adjustment.\textsuperscript{1063} Recently, several books have been produced on the subject of international development, humanitarianism and the legacy of imperial rule, which emphasise the complex


relationship between colonial history and contemporary welfare and development initiatives. This work explores ‘the numerous, often striking parallels between contemporary issues of international security, humanitarian aid and international development assistance and the logic and form of empire’. There remains scope to develop this work further, to examine the ways in which the contemporary transnational development industry draws rhetorical and practical inspiration from imperial practice, or encounters popular hostility and practical obstacles because of its colonial legacy.

In comparison to humanitarian and social welfare development processes, which were largely enacted by NGOs, economic development was continued in various forms in the ex-colonies by the British government. Economic aid was depicted as a productive way to mould African nations into the international community and global markets. Since the 1960 White Paper stressed the importance of economic development for lifting poorer nations out of poverty, various government departments have been established and tasked with administrating British development efforts, from the Ministry of Overseas Development headed by Barbara Castle in 1964, to its most recent incarnation, DFID, created in 1997. As was intended at its creation, the CDC remained a force for state-sponsored development in former colonial nations; it was renamed Commonwealth Development Corporation in 1963, and was eventually rebranded as the CDC Group PLC.

In the post-war period, the Attlee government was unwilling to work with other European colonial powers to implement meaningful collaborative development programmes, because of concerns over sovereignty, power and control. Britain remained resistant to integration with Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, only turning towards Europe as an alternative to the Commonwealth when it became clear that the economic and political power of the former was significantly greater than that of the latter. At the same time, European cooperation on imperial issues waned, as colonial development became subsumed by the movement towards independence. However, the link between the overseas territories and the European Community was maintained with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which included a reference at the time to a ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’.

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1066 In 2010 it was announced that the International Development Committee was to conduct an inquiry into the CDC to examine its effectiveness, and to consider possible reforms, including the option of abolition. It was decided that the CDC should remain an active force in British investment and development overseas, but that the company needed to be more transparent and accountable, with a closer relationship between the CDC and DFID. There is a (heavily edited) history of the CDC on its website, http://www.cdcgroup.com/company-history.


The OTC survived as an organisation for twelve years, before merging with the Development Assistance Group, membership of which was not limited to colonial powers, in December 1961; this created the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as part of the newly formed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).\textsuperscript{1069} As international and transnational organisations became more central to global diplomacy, the British government became more willing to work on overseas development within an international framework. When Britain joined the EC in 1973, the relationship between former colonies and colonisers was renegotiated. The first Lomé Convention was signed in February 1975 in Togo, and provided a framework of cooperation between the EC and developing African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, based on trade quotas and a commitment for aid and investment in ACP territories.\textsuperscript{1070} In addition, the Millennium Development Goals, with policies promoting universal education and healthcare and a global partnership for development based on fair trade relationships, re-emphasised social and welfare concerns in Britain’s and Europe’s relationship with the developing world.\textsuperscript{1071} In this way, the goals of the international development movement mirror the dual aims of the Attlee government; Britain’s relationship with its ex-colonies in the twenty-first century is not so different from that optimistically envisaged by Arthur Creech Jones.

In 1950, the FCB journal \textit{Venture} published a summary of Labour’s progress in colonial issues. The journal believed that the Labour Party could ‘point with pride’ at ‘the most intensive period of progress’ ever experienced in the British empire. The ‘days when one could justifiably complain that the Colonies were neglected, their people exploited, deprived of civil liberties, and political rights’ were over. The Labour legacy was one ‘of money being spent, of research undertaken, of new educational facilities, of diseases conquered by science, and of political advancement’. Yet there were still enormous problems facing the colonies. In East and Central Africa, ‘the question of race’ was still a huge issue, enhanced by Britain’s tacit support for South Africa at the UN and the ‘bad handling of the Seretse Khama case’. Across Africa, colonial populations were convinced that development plans were ‘all designed to provide cheap raw materials and dollars for Britain’, a belief enhanced by high profile failures such as the groundnuts scheme. Even the African trade unions, of which the Labour Party had been so proud, were in 1950 ‘the spearhead of anti-British nationalism’. However, the article ended on an upbeat note; the ‘spirit of true socialism’, combined with ‘hard, unselfish work and the imagination to avoid past mistakes’ might still enable the Labour Party to gain the respect and trust of their ‘friends in the Colonies’.\textsuperscript{1072}

\textsuperscript{1069} Ibid.
In his 1959 essay on the Labour Party and colonial policy, Arthur Creech Jones admitted that Labour’s actions had been both ‘inadequate’ and ‘mistaken’ at times. Some of the policies enacted in the period did ‘no more than confirm inevitable trends’. However, as a whole, he believed that the post-war era was ‘one of the most constructive and satisfying chapters in… British colonial history’; Labour’s policy in the empire had been ‘sound, coherent, and remarkably consistent with its philosophy’.1073 In the context of Cold War politics, against a backdrop of Marshall Plan alliances, and from an understanding of domestic requirements and constraints, the Labour government had to work hard to carve out a coherent colonial policy; in a period that saw the independence of India and the withdrawal from Palestine, Labour’s record in Africa is sometimes overlooked. However, the actions of the Labour government on the continent shaped Britain’s attitude and approach to empire for many years, and the ideas that they explored continue to dominate debates around Britain’s relationship with its former colonies. The history of colonial development in this period therefore contributes to a greater understanding of British colonial policy, and the legacy of this policy in the modern world.

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