Queues and Strategic Experimentation.
Presented at: World Congress of the Game Theory Society, IStambul.
We present a model of strategic experimentation in which each player's actions generate both payoff and information externalities for other players. A sequence of players arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. Players who decide to wait for service form a queue in the order of which they will be served. At each service opportunity, the number of players served follows a known geometric distribution in the good state, while no service ever occurs in the bad state. The queue lengthens with each new arrival and shortens if players are served or if queuing players become too pessimistic to wait and quit the queue.
|Type:||Conference item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Title:||Queues and Strategic Experimentation|
|Event:||World Congress of the Game Theory Society|
|Dates:||2012-07 - 2012-07|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics|
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