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PICTURE

Our contributors, following picture:


In Barbara Nauny, Elective AffinitiesFig. 1. Louis G. Luciano Barzoned; Wolfang Goethegart: Reclam, 2002.
Museum, St Petersburg;
Meisterwerke: Ger
OLYMPIAN OR PATHOLOGIST?
CASSIRER, GUNDOLF, AND THE HERO MYTH

By Dina Gusejnova

Perhaps the most important and most alarming feature in this development of modern political thought is the appearance of a new power: the power of mythical thought’, Cassirer wrote in The Myth of the State. Today man is ‘admonished to go back to the first rudimentary stages of human culture. Here rational and scientific thought openly confess their breakdown; they surrender to their most dangerous enemy’. The assumption that the twentieth century produced a disintegration of cultural harmony to the detriment of rational thought left two possible positions for an intellectual: either one of a detached Olympian, as Cassirer’s friends used to call him in his early years as a student at Marburg, when he could still contemplate the ideal notion of culture as a harmony of opposites; or, under the influence of Jacob Burckhardt, the philosopher could take the role of a pathologist of civilization. As the Nazi regime progressed, the latter role became almost unavoidable.

In the 1930s, Cassirer not only identified himself with the role of a cultural pathologist, establishing the line of cultural development towards the twentieth century (from the high point of German idealism) as declining. He also increasingly began to search for an active position of philosophy in the struggle for ideal culture. In this process, mythic thought played a crucial role as a continuously present paradigm in human thought. Cassirer diagnosed Nazism as an ideology which profited from a ‘technique of mythical thought’. Because intellectual, not social or material forces were at the core of Cassirer’s causality for the success of Nazi ideology, any aetiology of the problem consequently had to focus on the symptoms of the problem in the thought process itself. Cassirer’s attention to elements of mythic thought in the writing of his own contemporaries was part of this critique.

It was common for critics of Nazism from the 1940s onwards to create direct connections between nineteenth and early twentieth-century hero myths and the cult of the Führer in National Socialist ideology. For example, the art historian Ernst Gombrich (1909–2001), speaking on the subject of ‘Myth and Reality in German War-Time Broadcasts’ (1969), addressed his audience with a critique of the contribution to hero-worship made by the literary scholar Friedrich Gundolf (1880–1931), citing Gundolf’s phrase: ‘The historian cannot be a good politician [...] but he can help stir the air in which visionary deeds may thrive and he can recruit the minds of men for coming heroes. In this way he can fan the flames of a new pow

1: The Form

Cassirer’s premises were a clear acceptance of the mythic, as a critique of the problems of the present, he was not creating a new world in which it has become a ‘condition of necessity to.’ Voraussetzung der Frage sich zu stellen, um etwas zu wenden, deuten evidentely from something. Kant never

The second human interests have their
heroes. In this sense he summons the forces of history and their embodiments, the peoples and leaders. Replacing Gundolf’s own phrase of ‘stirring of the air’ with the more familiar Old Testament notion of ‘sowing the wind’, Gombrich remarked sarcastically that the German-Jewish scholar who ‘helped to “stir the air” would himself have reaped the whirlwind, had he not died in 1931’. The seeds of Gundolf’s mythic thought, he argued, subsequently flourished as part of Nazi ideology and its regime.

Compared to such critiques, Cassirer’s problematization of mythic thought in the modern age was more subtle. In this context, his positive evaluation of Gundolf’s work (of which we know from Cassirer’s published references to Gundolf and their correspondence) seems particularly surprising. To understand Cassirer’s ambiguous relationship to hero-worship, we need first to analyse what basis can be found in his understanding of mythic thought for isolating and quarantining mythic elements from modern intellectual writing, as implicitly intended by Gombrich. After a discussion of the cognitive role Cassirer attributed to history, and particularly history seen through the lens of individual characters, it will be possible to return in greater detail to Cassirer’s attitudes to Friedrich Gundolf’s work and reassess their mutual sympathies.

I: THE BOUNDARIES OF CASSIRER’S CRITIQUE OF MYTHIC THOUGHT

1. The Foundations for a Critique of Mythic Thought

Cassirer’s phenomenology of mythic thought began with two initial premises which discussed why he as a philosopher could not, at first sight, accept mythic thought as an object of study. Following Kant, ‘the notion of a critique presupposes that the philosophical question addresses a fact which was not created by philosophy in its unique significance and features, but which it has come across as already existent, so as to analyse it according to its “conditions of possibility”’ [‘der Ausdruck der Kritik schließt seit Kant die Voraussetzung in sich, dass ein Faktum vorliegt, an das die philosophische Frage sich wendet — ein Faktum, das in seiner eigentümlichen Bedeutung und Geltung von der Philosophie nicht erschaffen, sondern vorgefunden wird, um sodann auf die “Bedingungen seiner Möglichkeit” untersucht zu werden’]. Mythic thought, by contrast to ethical life or art, did not evidently fulfill this condition. Not only was mythic thought not an obvious subject of investigation; from a strictly idealist perspective, it seemed to be something ‘non-existent’ [‘eine Nichtseitendes’]. This was the reason why Kant never considered it an object of inquiry.

The second problem had to do with the history of the development of the human intellect. Cassirer argued that the original forms of all ‘spiritual’ culture have their roots in mythic thought, and all our notions of space and time,
numeric systems, legal thought, notions of community, economy, art, technology, are 'genetically related' to mythic thought.\(^8\) If this proposition was to be accepted, however, then it was questionable why a philosopher should study mythic thought as a symbolic form in pari bis with others, if in fact it had chronologically preceded (and even to an extent comprised the embryonic forms of) the others. Perhaps this should be left to anthropologists or historians.

Following this sceptical introduction, Cassirer proceeded to rule out both problems by designating boundaries within which these problems could be solved. Mythic thought was, in fact, an object of study, he argued, with particular reference to Schelling's work on this subject, because it was a system of thought and perception, which possessed a coherence of its own, and a certain way of shaping the world. \(^9\) 'Philosophy', Cassirer wrote, 'that is the thinking contemplation of being, can never aim at or long for life as such, before and beyond its formation; from its point of view, life and form constitute a unity' ['Für die Philosophie, für die denkende Betrachtung des Seins, kann daher niemals das Leben selbst, vor und außerhalb aller Geformtheit, das Ziel und die Sehnsucht der Betrachtung bilden; sondern für sie bilden Leben und Form eine unternembare Einheit']. \(^10\) Myth, in short, was not a primitive life form, but a system of thought and a symbolic form, and could therefore be subject to a critique in the Kantian sense. Because of the impossibility for philosophy to attain knowledge without self-reflection, 'the critique of reason turns into a critique of culture' as the system in which philosophy itself is rooted. \(^11\) Symbolic forms as *geistige Bildwelten* ('spiritual image-worlds'), of which mythic thought forms one group, are the only modes in which culture is accessible to the philosopher. \(^12\) In Cassirer's reading, therefore, Kant's critique of reason widened into a critique of culture, and Hegel's phenomenology of spirit was narrowed down to a phenomenology of symbolic forms.

The second problem, whether it was legitimate to study myth in an a-historical manner despite the fact that it chronologically preceded later symbolic forms such as religion or science, seemed more difficult to circumvent. But Cassirer turned the apparent problem into its solution: the genetic theory of human culture and philosophy, which roots it in mythic thought, did not imply, for Cassirer, that the first stages of development, once they have been overcome, actually belonged exclusively to the past. Rather, that genetic connection tied myth forever with each of the symbolic forms. Kant's chief contribution here was 'not his negative warning that we cannot find the "thing in itself" but his positive implication that cognition has found firm foundations in the study of itself [dass sie nunmehr ihren festen Grund in sich selber gefunden hat']. \(^13\)
The study of myth was therefore a reflection of the human intellectual apparatus itself. The structure of Cassirer’s work on mythic consciousness, then, can be seen as a replica, an Urmodel, of his entire philosophy of symbolic forms. Mythic thought had its own conceptual and categoric apparatus, its own notion of identity, and even its own dialectical system. It was both the most fundamental layer in all other thought, and it still coexisted simultaneously with the growth of scientific rationalism. Conversely, elements of mythic thought could always be discerned within each of the other symbolic forms. To give evidence of this, Cassirer drew both on historical, and on contemporary anthropological examples from indigenous societies, not always in order to give a teleological account of the growth of science and to promote a myth of the Enlightenment (an accusation levelled against him by the Russian philosopher Alexei Losev), but rather in order to position these elements of mythic thought within its own system of giving shape to the world. 14 For example, he argued that even linguistic analysis made it necessary to go back to totemic imagery from the period when mythic thought was the dominant symbolic form. 15 Goethe’s works and letters served Cassirer to exemplify instances now of scientific, now of mythic thought. Cassirer found evidence of mythic thought in Goethe’s letter to Riemer of 23 June 1809, in Goethe’s tendency to identify in the different phases of his life a ‘shedding of an old skin’, a Vita Nuova in Dante’s sense (ECW 12, pp. 193–94).

For Cassirer, a philosophical analysis of mythic thought was inextricably tied to the double relationship between philosophy and history. Due to this relationship, two things could be ontological opposites even if they were historically related. Mythic thought was genetically related to philosophy. Nevertheless, as a way of conceiving the world, it was also opposed to philosophy. As John Michael Krois puts it, for Cassirer ‘the antithesis between mythic and non-mythic ways of conceiving the world’ was the most fundamental of the conflicts underlying culture as a whole. 16

The purpose of historical study (which comprised the study of hero-worship, which so often is indistinguishable from hero-worship itself) was not just cognitive, but also therapeutic. As Cassirer put it, historical facts could not be just reconstructed but actually ‘remembered’. 17 Writing history was a psychological process. This reflected the historical understanding of his former colleagues attached with Warburg, who had written in an introduction to the first bibliography published by the Warburg Institute (in a kind of mission statement):

History [...] proceeds in crises, and the decisive events in history are those ‘pauses for recollection’, which are followed by phases of action. In these crises the creative power of memory has to prove its worth, by grasping and reviving old symbols it can give a call to reflection or action and cause a turnover of events. In the crisis of decision the remembered symbol has the effect of an idol
or a warning, in the pauses of doubt it motivates or reins in. Hence for the historian of the symbol, 'memory' is the central problem of a philosophy of history: not only because memory itself is an organ of historical knowledge, but because — in its symbols — it creates the reservoir of powers which are being discharged historically in a given situation.\(^{18}\)

In the 1930s, humanity certainly found itself at a point of crisis which required a new cognitive attitude and new uses of the historical past, which included the persistence of mythic thought. The philosopher and historian were, therefore, not just scholars of symbolic forms; they were also holders of symbols which could be discharged in historical situations — a double responsibility, which no doubt still resounded in Gombrich's words when he spoke in 1969 as director of the Warburg Institute.

2. The Methods of Cassirer's Critique

In his critique of mythic thought, Cassirer used at least three methods: a genealogical analysis of the relation of mythic thought to other symbolic thought, a functional and structural analysis of mythic thought, and an etymological analysis. The genealogy of the human intellect is one of the core elements of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. He used this method not for the purpose of a teleological justification of philosophy as a victory of scientific thought, but in the strictly Nietzschean understanding of genealogy as the only honest way to trace the emergence of a phenomenon in all its contingencies.\(^{19}\) In Cassirer's work, genealogy most often took the shape of a historiographical overview, one could even say, a bibliography, of a problem (as in *Das Erkenntnisproblem* or *The Problem of Knowledge* [1922–1923]). Nietzsche's notorious dictum that 'only something which has no history can be defined' allows us to understand Cassirer's definition of philosophy historically as a way of conceiving the world which was opposed to mythic thought.\(^{20}\) But at the same time, in his historical analysis, he reflected on its genetic debt to the analytical opposite of itself. An outright and clean 'exorcism' of mythic thought was therefore impossible, even if in an ideal definition the two conceptual worlds ought to have been entirely separate. In this sense, paradoxically, Gombrich, who wanted the intellectual sphere to be kept clear of myth, remained a true Kantian, whilst Cassirer, though sailing under Kantian flags, had secretly approached the shores of Nietzsche's methodological realm.

This ambiguous relationship between philosophy and history risked the problem of tautology, or an isomorphic structure between the subject of an investigation and the intellectual method of addressing it. As Cassirer's colleague Erwin Panofsky underlined in a comment on Cassirer's lecture, this was a fundamental problem of any intellectual discipline which wanted to present its subject matter as a 'given', and thus creating it presumably in the same sense of the art historical bargain between neonate and form, outcome and practice.

Cassirer's intellect told him what he had to say. For this reason, Kantian and Nietzschean, Cassirer could only sustain his methods, as he agreed with Nietzsche's first sentence: 'What he has become' (a 'given'). Cassirer suggested that Kantian, etc. could not be told more about how to do history — Paraphrasing Nietzsche, he replied: 'It is not by man, but by the intellect that history is re-examined.'

History was not an objective, rational, a priori context. It was a product of the human intellect, which, as Cassirer, had to be re-examined, re-defined, and maybe re-constructed, as a process. History was, in a sense, Mannheim's 'immanent technique' — reflecting on the intellectual conditions of those who are working on the problem, and the intellectual conditions of those who are working on it.

In this context, Arendt's reflections on the relationship between philosophy and history might not be just a throwaway comment. Arendt, in discussing the relationship between philosophy and history, from its determinism,
present its subject of investigation (such as style, as in Panofsky's example, or indeed mythic thought) as a given thing to be analysed, but was actually creating it prior to this seemingly external analysis. Panofsky remarked in that instance that, just like the notion of space for the philosopher, for example, the art historian's concept of style could not be wholly freed from an accusation of tautology. A concept of style such as 'Gothic' was the result of a bargain between a priori perceptions and selective interpretation. In the same sense, the idea of a national character, or an individual hero, was also an outcome of such a bargain.

Cassirer avoided this problem by affirming the capability of the human intellect to emancipate itself from its own origins. But this emancipation could only occur through a reflection of its own history. When Cassirer agreed with a statement by José Ortega y Gasset that 'man has [...] no nature, what he has is [...] history', he seemed to find in history the empirical reality of the intellect which Kant had denied him in physical reality. Aware of the narrow boundary within which any subject could be said to have been a 'given' by nature, or artificially created by a self-deceiving philosopher, Cassirer suggested that history conceived of as meta-history was the best cure for this problem. Seeing the different Platos: mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian, Kantian, etc., and the different Caesars, which people created for themselves, told more about the respective 'presents' than about the historical figure. Paraphrasing Comte, Cassirer argued that 'humanity is not to be explained by man, but man by humanity. The problem must be reformulated and re-examined; it must be put on a broader and sounder basis. Such a basis we have discovered in sociological and historical thought. "To know yourself", says Comte, "know history". The historian — in Friedrich Schlegel's phrase, a 'backward-looking prophet' (rückwärts gewandter Prophet) — always interpreted from his position in the present, and therefore the 'process of interpretation never comes to a complete standstill', and 'as soon as we have reached a new center and a new line of vision in our own thoughts we must revise our judgments'. The study of mythic thought was, then, not just a technically possible step for any philosopher, but his first duty.

History was for Cassirer what sociology was for his contemporary Karl Mannheim. Both felt that no ontology could be successful that did not reflect on the conditions of its own development, prior to a reflection on the conditions of its subjects of analysis. If Mannheim had argued that philosophers needed to be questioned about the social conditions of their thought, Cassirer thought that they ought to reflect the historical roots of their discipline in mythic thought. Both, incidentally, were views which Hannah Arendt, in defence of Heidegger's position, presented as a fundamental threat to philosophy as such, since, in her view, philosophy derived its authority from its detachment from any conditional circumstances. By contrast,
Cassirer say what one could describe as a ‘meta-ontology’ undertaken by a philosopher as the only possible path towards further growth and emancipation of the intellect.

Mythic thought could further be analysed in greater detail by looking at each of its categories of understanding the world, from the magic of numbers to the belief in animism. Cassirer did not look at hero-worship as a narrative about great men, but analysed it at a deeper and functional level. Thus in the second volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, the historic heroes as they are known from Plutarch’s lives, for example, were hardly present. There are no references to Alexander or Hercules, Caesar is present with just one reference, and not as an ‘actor’, but as the ‘author’ of the account how the Romans followed the lunar calendar. Conversely, Plutarch as the narrator of heroic lives only interested Cassirer as a comparative source in a juxtaposition of Plutarch’s concepts of a good character (εὐπορία) and the notions of Vohu Manah (‘good disposition’, gute Gesinnung) and Asha Vashinta (‘best honesty’, beste Redlichkeit) in Iranian mythology.

Instead, what attracted Cassirer was the mythic function underlying any identification of heroes amongst other human beings: the Greek notion of a demon, and the Italian notion of genius. The first appearance of the notion of a demonic force in archaic Greece, Cassirer tells us, was the idea of a demon, whose function Hermann Usener aptly described as that of a ‘special god of the moment’ (Augenblicks- oder Sondereg). Cassirer traced how these demons evolved from accidental gods into fateful ones:

At the same time, another process takes place, which internalises the previously external demons, turns the special gods of the moment into fateful creatures and shapes. The demon expresses not what accidentally happens to a human being, but what he is originally. He is given to him from his birth, so as to accompany him in his life and to guide his wishes and his deeds.

Cassirer pursued this second stage of animist thought further, writing about Kant’s understanding of genius. As he wrote in the Essay on Man, “Genius,” says Kant in his Critique of Judgment, “is the innate mental disposition (inension) through which Nature gives the rule to Art.” It is “a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given; it is not a mere aptitude for what can be learnt by rule. Hence originality must be its first property”. But Cassirer adds: “This form of originality is the prerogative and distinction of art; it cannot be extended to other fields of human activity.”

In what became The Myth of the State, Cassirer pursued this development into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in the third part of the book entitled ‘The Myth of the Twentieth Century’. In this discussion he compared and contrasted Carlyle’s hero-worship with the idea of the leader of a totalitarian state which emerged in the twentieth century. Defending Carlyle against the most powerful

Cassirer showed through poetic sources to Carlyle’s correspondence.

Cassirer developed sharper formations of the human being as an expression of his personal, not only to the individual people and every form of making it self-evident to the verb of the demon or genius, or to

In addition to the work Cassirer began to develop his method in its own right, emphasizing by the questions of the logic of the science to avoid the trap of looking for an answer and orient him towards the ‘Questions of origins are not significant. They have a form’, he wrote. Historical methods were to be applied to both individuals and to the world.

3. Individuals in Cassirer’s Thought

Individuals made their presence felt, which can be briefly considered. Paracelsus, Renaissance Cusa, post-1933 reception of abstraction (which will be

(a) Some individuals system, for example, Pico della Mirandola, Pico is p
against the most virulent critics who linked him straight away with Hitler, Cassirer showed to what extent Carlyle's idea of the hero was derived more from poetic sources with an ultimate ancestry in Greek animism, and referred to Carlyle's correspondence with Goethe who was equally interested in pantheism. His conclusion was that Carlyle provided some of the ideas for the dangerous twentieth-century cult of the leader, but by no means its foundations.

Cassirer developed a benign understanding of hero-worship. "In the sharper formation of this basic understanding of the italic concept of "genius", the genius, as his name tells us, turns out to be the actual "creator" of the human being, not his physical but his spiritual creator, the source and expression of his personal uniqueness", he wrote, "he is now being attributed not only to the individual, but to the family and the house, the state, the people and every form of human community." This etymological approach made it self-evident to Cassirer that genius as a spirit, ingenium, was also related to the verb 'to generate' or 'to beget' — generare — and hence the demon or genius, or the idea, generated the human being.  

In addition to these three approaches, towards the end of the 1930s Cassirer began to develop Goethe's notion of morphology into an intellectual method in its own right, which was to lay out the final separation (always emphasized by the neo-Kantians) between the logic of the humanities and the logic of the sciences. Only the study of forms could help the historian to avoid the trap of looking for empirical or causal problems in the humanities, and orient him towards the search for problems of meaning and structure. "Questions of origines have ceased to be empirically possible and empirically significant. They have to be replaced by the question of meaning (structure/form)", he wrote. Therefore both individual-orientated and idea-driven historical methods were, from his point of view, equally legitimate if both individuals and ideas were conceived of as forms, not as instances of a reality.

3. Individuals in Cassirer's History of Philosophy

Individuals made their appearances in Cassirer's work in different functions, which can be briefly outlined using six examples: Pico della Mirandola, Paracelsus, Renaissance allegories of Hercules and Prometheus, Nicholas of Cusa, post-1933 receptions of Goethe, and the idea of a character as an abstraction (which will provide the largest part of this section).

(a) Some individuals were exemplary figures in Cassirer's own value system, for example, Pico della Mirandola. Cassirer did not shy away from certain literary techniques of characterization, well known from all descriptions of heroes from Arrian to Carlyle. In Cassirer's characterization of Pico della Mirandola, Pico is presented as a path breaker for some of Cassirer's own
beliefs and a founder figure of rationalism and individualism. Cassirer praised Pico’s character: for example, his ability not to dismiss his intellectual opponents as ‘heretics of the intellect’, despite his aggressive argumentation (features that also marked Cassirer’s own character). According to Cassirer, Pico had broken with scholastic logic in the sphere of historical thought, arguing that the different classes of human existence (his past, present, and future) had to be considered both synthetically and independently. ‘The goods of history’, Cassirer paraphrased Pico, ‘are passed down in uninterrupted succession […] But each historical moment has at once the right and the duty to appropriate them in independence.’

This idea, positively emphasized by Cassirer, is arguably related to the selective appropriation of heroes advocated by Gundolf. In a very similar vein, Benjamin had described the task of an historian as the awakening of a dead element of the past in a moment of ‘danger’.

(b) Other individuals were chosen by Cassirer as important nodal points in the development of a symbolic form; for example, Paracelsus, in the case of science. Paracelsus played a crucial role in the academic debates of the 1920s and 1930s as a landmark between different national or international intellectual histories. In Gundolf’s view of the history of philosophy, Paracelsus was, in the first place, a German thinker who marked the beginning of a genealogy of German intellectual iconoclasts leading via Luther to Nietzsche.

As Carl Gustav Jung’s 1929 lecture on Paracelsus confirms, the medico-alchemical was commonly invoked in nationalist academic discourses in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, and in this context Gundolf adopted the ‘national’ appropriation of Paracelsus.

Cassirer, by contrast, placed Paracelsus in the context of the Italian humanists and neo-Platonists, above all, Marsilio Ficino. He showed that Paracelsus was strongly indebted to Ficino. Curiously, in contrast to Jung’s first lecture on Paracelsus in Germany in 1929, his two lectures delivered in Switzerland in 1941 come rather close to Cassirer’s view of Paracelsus. But it is only in his later lectures that Jung acknowledged the Italian origins of some of Paracelsus’ thoughts, especially Paracelsus’ indebtedness to the Florentine neo-Platonists in discarding scholasticism. By 1941, he presented Paracelsus in a modernized fashion, as a universal proto-psychoanalyst. These ‘emphases’ placed on the interpretation of historical figures were tropes borrowed from the characterization of heroes: not just every age, but each interpreter, appropriated his historical heroes in the way that suited his needs. In this sense Cassirer certainly focused on such individuals for the purposes of positioning himself in an academic debate.

(c) According to Cassirer, in history heroes could also play the role of allegories expressing something beyond their own ‘biographies’. He imported Warburg’s notion of ‘pathos formulae’ to intellectual history, reinterpreting
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Cassirer, by contrast, placed Paracelsus in the context of the Italian humanists and neo-Platonists, above all, Marsilio Ficino. He showed that Paracelsus was strongly indebted to Ficino. Curiously, in contrast to Jung’s first lecture on Paracelsus in Germany in 1929, his two lectures delivered in Switzerland in 1941 come rather close to Cassirer’s view of Paracelsus. But it is only in his later lectures that Jung acknowledged the Italian origins of some of Paracelsus’ thoughts, especially Paracelsus’ indebtedness to the Florentine neo-Platonists in discarding scholasticism. By 1941, he presented Paracelsus in a modernized fashion, as a universal proto-psychoanalyst. These ‘emphases’ placed on the interpretation of historical figures were all tropes borrowed from the characterization of heroes: not just every age, but each interpreter, appropriated his historical heroes in the way that suited his needs. In this sense Cassirer certainly focused on such individuals for the purposes of positioning himself in an academic debate.

(c) According to Cassirer, in history heroes could also play the role of allegories expressing something beyond their own ‘biographies’. He imported Warburg’s notion of ‘pathos formulae’ to intellectual history, reinterpret
the term as a 'heroic affect which seeks to find its own language and legitimation in thought'. As Cassirer showed in his work on Renaissance philosophy, the hero often impersonated a cause for social transformation and political change in an allegorical sense. The idea of Hercules, whose appearance in ancient Greek thought Cassirer did not discuss, had a positive effect on the philosophy of the Renaissance, transformed allegorically into a Warburgian 'pathos formula', serving as a vehicle for a new understanding of man. Cassirer discerned a similar function in the Prometheus motif. For Cassirer, Prometheus was an Urnothi, already used by Plato in his Protagoras, by Plotinus, and by other neo-Platonists, and now, confounded with the Christian image of Adam, it entered different representations in the Renaissance. It represented man in a new constitution, as an artist who forms mankind and himself. Prometheus was a meta-heroic theme in Cassirer's work.

(d) There were some individuals who could have been turned into intellectual heroes of Pico's kind, but who had been prevented from such a path by individual pragmatic choices. One such was Nicholas of Cusa. To make this point in his description of the contribution made by Nicholas of Cusa to scientific thought, Cassirer surprisingly even drew a distinction between philosophy and life:

In the great conflict between the religious and the philosophical concept of truth, between belief and knowledge, religion and secular education, Nicholas of Cusa's system provided an equilibrium. [...] But with his religious optimism [...] Nicholas had underestimated the power of his opponents. It is not so much Nicholas of Cusa's philosophy where this tragic mistake becomes evident, but in his life, in his activities in politics and in the Church.

Pressed by circumstances, Cassirer explained, Nicholas of Cusa had entered the services of the papal party and devoted his life to its support. 'In his own life we can recognize how the opposing forces which he sought to intertwine and combine to a systematic unity and harmony in his thought continued to strive apart in his life, in the immediate reality in which he was standing', Cassirer wrote. Cassirer, as an historian of philosophy, acknowledged a distinction between an immediate reality and the reality of a written work, and emphasized the consequences of certain choices made by individuals in this real life onto the development of philosophy.

(e) Then again, there were individuals whose own life and work seem 'impeccable' for a ticket to the pantheon of heroes, but whose later reception in history did not allow scholars to continue treating them as heroes. Tragically for Cassirer and other Germans, by the end of the 1930s this list also included Goethe. Cassirer at first rejected the deconstruction of Goethe that Thomas Mann attempted in the early 1940s with Lotte in Weimar. In this work, Mann showed a 'petit bourgeois, provincial' Goethe, as Cassirer put it,
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and also emphasized his old age. This book, which at first remained 'alien to Cassirer', was most probably triggered by the shock of the abrupt demise of German culture in his time. It is all the more striking to see how Cassirer later implicitly stated the need to distance himself from hero-worship of any sort, even if it was worship of Goethe, by admitting that perhaps Thomas Mann's attempt at a deconstruction of his hero was 'right'. "Thomas Mann did not show us Goethe the "Olympian". His Goethe is not just human, he is all-too-human." If during the Weimar Republic, holding up the image of Goethe could be of benefit for reforming German society, after the abuse of Goethe in Nazi ideology, the careful distancing from any kind of hero-worship seemed more pertinent.

(f) On the most abstract level of the six discussed here, the characterization of individuals lent Cassirer a method of characterizing movements and epochs, such as 'humanism'. Cassirer described the crisis of modernity as a condition caused by an imbalance of symbolic forms: the symbolic form of technology, together with politics, overpowered man's cultural activities to the detriment of the whole character of human existence. If the Renaissance was the origin of modernity, and modernity at its origin had proved to be Janus-faced, then the study of the Renaissance would exemplify to human culture the fundamental dialectic of its own foundations (between mythic and non-mythic thought). By understanding the character of the Renaissance, modern man could understand himself. Therefore the first volume of the Problem of Knowledge begins with the chapter on 'the Renaissance of the problem of knowledge': the problem of knowledge could not be addressed by the philosopher without studying what could be called its own 'medical history'.

To explain how deeply this idea of a historical period as a character was embedded in interwar German debates, it is worth drawing at some greater length on the work undertaken by Cassirer's own colleagues working at the Warburg Library, and other contemporaries. Cassirer agreed with Ludwig Klages — whom he usually criticized — that the application of psychic attributes to other realms was the result of the inability to 'to characterize forms of motion and spatial forms' otherwise. It was a limitation of language and experience that forms and movements have been experienced as psychic phenomena before they are judged by the understanding from the standpoint of objectivity, and because language can express objective concepts only through the mediation of the experience of impressions. Art historian Erwin Panofsky similarly argued that it was legitimate to characterize certain periods by way of a 'physiognomy', that is, by treating this period like an individual organism: its facial (i.e., stylistic) features, its actions and behaviour, as well as determine its birth and death. Cassirer argued that this method should be understood neither as an attempt to reduce emotions to things.

rather, to "an external relationship to things". Both Cassirer and anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss have written on this respect, and both note that "humanity is related to whole metaphysics". Panofsky's work is a reference in medical history in medical history.

Panofsky was a prominent figure from Expressionism. In this framework, he found its 'expressionism' as a "mappo" the terms of anxiety and introspection in the Renaissance, which caused the central role of the Melancholy and individual in the art, as a Warburg...

Its findings are most closely followed by scholars such as Mauzan and Bruckner, Warburg students who spent the most time at Warburg. Cassirer's collective method, "impressionism", is a process, the
attempt to find an analogy in the external world to the world of human emotions or experience, nor as a way to understand them emphatically. Rather, the process of cognition of the world ought to be understood as 'an externalization by which the original expressive characters gradually become objective characteristics and determinations and attributes of things'.

Both Cassirer and the other Warburg scholars shared an interest in clinical psychology which included the sphere of culture. Cassirer's anthropology (the foundations of which were laid in the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms) relied on research of human pathology and psychology. In this respect, he followed the methodology of the philologist and anthropologist Hermann Usener, who applied findings in the sciences to the humanities. Just as Cassirer gave characteristics applied to individuals to whole periods of culture, or culture as a whole, his colleagues Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl began their study of Dürer's Melancolia with a reference to the modern medical condition of melancholy and depression in medical journals.

Panofsky and Saxl focused merely on one problem of modern man: the question of melancholy. Melancholy, frenzy and depression featured prominently in early twentieth-century critiques of modernity, ranging from Expressionist poetry to Adorno and the sociologist Arnold Gehlen. In this framework, the approach of Saturn and Melancholy seems to have found its way into Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Saxl and Panofsky mapped their concept of melancholy on the various meanings that the terms experienced: between a modern notion of a depressed state of anxiety and the idea of the 'four humours' as developed in antiquity and in the Renaissance. In their work, melancholy as a 'type of character trait' which constituted the 'system of the "four humours"', was turned into the central subject (or character) of a historical study. In the case of Saturn and Melancholy, the characterization was derived from a concrete historical individual. Dedicated to and written under the 'patronage' of Aby Warburg, it paid tribute to his own melancholy character.

Its findings were flattering: they established melancholy as the concept most closely associated with genius, which the Renaissance thinkers such as Marsilio Ficino had rediscovered in Plato, just as interwar German scholars were now rediscovering it in their study of the Renaissance. Warburg showed the first clear signs of a psychological illness in 1918 and spent the rest of his life until his death (in 1929) in therapies and clinics. As Warburg himself argued, memory (and by this he meant 'both that of a collective personality and the individual') could 'protect individuals from irrational fears by offering mythological or rational explanations'. In this process, 'the monstra of the imagination' could turn into 'the decisive
leaders into the future’ [‘zu zukunftbestimmenden Lebensführern werden’]. Warburg described the process of uncovering the continuing importance of the traditions of antiquity and paganism in modern life as ‘the process of undemonizing the phobically imprinted stores of impressions’ [‘der Entdämonisierungsprozess der phobisch geprägten Eindruckserbmasse’].

‘Sometimes it appears to me’, Aby Warburg wrote in his diary on 3 April 1929, ‘as if I, the psycho-historian, were trying to deduct the schizophrenia of the West from the imagery of autobiographical references’.

This tendency to extrapolate elements of individualist history to larger questions was set, among others, by the German historian Karl Lamprecht, whose lectures both Warburg and Cassirer had attended in Bonn in the 1890s. Cassirer made explicit in his Essay on Man that he did not accept Lamprecht’s pretensions to be able to predict the course of history. As far as the past was concerned, however, Cassirer agreed both with Lamprecht’s method, ‘which convinces us that the world of history is a symbolic universe, not a physical universe’, and with his philosophical understanding. History, Cassirer paraphrased Lamprecht, ‘must cease being a study of individuals; it must free itself from all sorts of hero-worship’, for ‘its main problem has to do with social-psyche, as compared and contrasted with individual-psyche factors’.

What Cassirer took on board from Lamprecht’s theory was the ‘relative ness of the single perceptive phenomenon, given here and now, to a characteristic total meaning’. As we have seen, however, in his work, Cassirer sought to combine many different approaches to giving shape to the past, and one of these was focusing on individuals.

Even if Cassirer drew an analytical distinction between mythic and non-mythic thought, he found it implausible to isolate mythic elements from an intellectual context. In order to study mythic thought, it was crucial for the philosopher not to erase, but to become aware of, elements of mythic thought which persisted in modern rationalism. This was on the level on cognition. In addition, on the level of the composition of a text, seeing history in the shape of individuals was also a narrative prerequisite, which permitted turning the seemingly chaotic ‘rubbish’ into a ‘living plant’. On this level, it is understandable why Cassirer was hesitant in accusing fellow academics of falling prey to mythic thought, such as hero-worship.

4. Cassirer as an ‘Exorcist’ of Mythic Thought

But Cassirer was not cautious about all contemporary intellectuals. In speaking of the dangers of mythic thought in his contemporary intellectual world, Cassirer was most critical of all ideas which expressed a desire to place human beings in a cosmic order in which individual fate was taken out of man’s hands. For Cassirer, who had a great respect for the book, individual man and Spengler and his encompassing attractiveness were the individual.

The organization of knowledge, and to the extent that a deeper darkening in understanding of great circles of historical and mythic thought is legitimate in this world, it is necessary to attempt an exorcism, a true exorcism is coming, and Cassirer’s method is widely used in the II of the book. As the most important to exorcism, the
tit
hands. For example, he singled out the vitalist philosopher Ludwig Klages, who had been close to the George Circle in its early days, for his desire to place the individual in a large cosmic context beyond his control (in Klages’ book, *Von kosmogonischen Eros*). These ideas were limitations to the individual range of human thought and action. Similarly, the fatalism in Oswald Spengler’s concept of culture attracted Cassirer’s criticism. The inadequate assessment of technology, as a mystical force beyond human control, also attracted Cassirer’s critique, as did, in his later works, Hegel’s subjection of the individual to the ‘re lentless progress of the World Spirit’.

The hero myth seemed to have a far less important role in his problematization of modern myth, probably for the reason that Cassirer related it more to the progressive intellectual history of individualist principles than to the darker forces of totalitarian states. Nevertheless, Cassirer expressed some criticism of the programmatic attempts to write a new history as a ‘mythology’ of great men, as they were presented in the historical school of the George circle. One of its most famous examples was the book written by the historian Ernst Bertram which had an appropriate title — * Nietzsche: Versuch einer My thologie*. ‘The past wants to be turned into a representation [Bild], life into legend, all reality into myth’, Bertram wrote, but Cassirer radically opposed this view. Cassirer wrote dismissively that ‘some attempts have been made recently’ which were ready to give up the ‘concept of historical truth — attempts that want to hand history over to myth (Bertram, Nietzsche). But a true historian will always reject these abstruse aberrations — what he wants is cognition, academic standards [*Wissenschaft*]. In the *Myth of the State*, Cassirer’s own attempt to explain the phenomenon of Nazi ideology, Cassirer’s critique focused on another book of the George school, Ernst Kantorowicz’s soon-to-be-famous biography of the thirteenth-century king, Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Here Cassirer remarked that, whilst this book extolled the image of Frederick II as a modern leader, Frederick was ‘by no means modern in his thoughts’, but rather spoke ‘as a mystic’, and then proceeded to cite the words of his biographer, who in his own turn, and in the spirit of the George circle, used mystical language to describe his protagonist.

At the same time, finding what he called ‘heretics of the intellect’ by the criterion of their attachment to mythic thought was a delicate matter for Cassirer. Thus in the second part of his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, when discussing popular psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*) as developed by psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, whose lectures he had heard as a student at Leipzig, Cassirer never conceded that, in looking for a psychology of peoples, Wundt himself had given in to the mythic belief in a popular identity. Instead, he used Wundt exclusively as a secondary, never as a primary source, discussing the history of the belief in ‘demons’ and other mythic forces attributed to social collectives.
Towards the late 1930s, Cassirer’s careful position began to change as he concerned himself specifically with the individual responsibility of intellectuals in keeping and saving human civilization. He spoke of individual responsibility as ‘a rubber ball which has lost its elasticity’ in modern times. Cassirer praised outstanding individuals, most notably Albert Schweitzer, for having faced the crisis more appropriately than detached Olympians like himself. In his essay on Albert Schweitzer, Cassirer underlined the importance of Schweitzer’s personality in realizing and then overcoming the lack of moral conviction in contemporary philosophy, one, he seemed to imply, that we all ought to emulate.

Cassirer’s interest in psychopathology made him follow cultural pessimists like Burchhardt, or, in his own day, Schweitzer, in attributing to his own age a kind of sickness that had to be cured: an imbalance of symbolic forms. He longed for an ethics of intellectual life which was to restore this imbalance, and redress the progression of chauvinism in German thought. If the historical dimension was originally not dominant in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in the Essay on Man he emphasized and reinterpreted his own synchronic analysis of symbolic forms as a diachronic philosophy of history in decline. In fact, these strands had always been present in Cassirer’s thought, however, only now they were being emphasized more strongly. In 1918, Cassirer admired his intellectual idol Goethe for finding the appropriate balance between action and contemplation in his incomplete Festspiel, entitled Pandora. Faced with the choice between the man of action, Prometheus, and the man of melancholy and passive contemplation, Epimetheus, Cassirer opted for the figure of Pandora — reinterpreted not as a bringer of care, but a bringer of reflective action. These are all the more reason, it seems, to question why Cassirer did not criticize Gundolf together with other thinkers of the George Circle.

Even if mythic thought was related to philosophy, its reflection of itself ought to permit philosophy to emancipate itself from mythic thought.

II: CASSIRER AND GUNDOLF

1. Cassirer and Gundolf: The ‘Encounter in the Middle of the Path’

Reading your work, I often had the impression that although our points of departure are different and we are perhaps aiming at entirely different ends, we encounter each other in the middle of the path’, Cassirer wrote to Gundolf, having read his soon-to-be-classic biography of Goethe of 1916. For somebody not acquainted with Cassirer’s style and with accounts of his friendly personality, this sentence might seem somewhat sarcastic. In the midst of the First World War, Cassirer had published his Freiheit und Form (Freedom and Form), which linked the history of German idealism inextricably

with the history of human thought. Gundolf, on the other hand, had been opposed to the cult of the classic and the nationalistic philosophy of the period.
with French and English thought, and other works arguing that Friedrich Schiller had received the torch of the progressive ideas in Renaissance humanism from Shaftesbury. At that time, Gundolf, together with the rest of the George Circle, engaged in expositions of the primacy of German culture in the world, tracing German spirit even in Shakespeare. It is hard to think how much further apart both their points of departure and estimated points of arrival could have been.

And yet, Cassirer also praised not just Gundolf's Goethe, but even his book on Shakespeare and the German Spirit [Shakespeare und der deutsche Geist].

Perhaps more surprisingly, Gundolf responded equally positively to Cassirer's treatment of Goethe in the fourth chapter of Freedom and Form, not just because of the 'feeling of redemption by its high level of accomplishment' ['abgesehen von dem erlösend hohen Niveau'], but also because he saw therein a confirmation of some of his own findings. His own work, Gundolf admitted straight away, aimed at showing 'the eternal ideas as temporal, and German phenomena' ['die ewigen Ideen als zeitliche, zumal deutsche, Erscheinungen zu fassen']. Indeed, he accepted that perhaps he was driven in his work 'by other motives and other means' than Cassirer, 'but perhaps inspired by the same imperative and maturity of our historic moment'. 'I meet you in the middle of the path', Gundolf echoed Cassirer, surprised how a philosopher could agree with a poet and literary critic in questions of method and interpretation.

In the ensuing correspondence, which continued until Gundolf's death in 1931, both found most points of agreement in their assessment of Goethe. At first Gundolf had argued that Goethe's Pandora was intended to be an incomplete and not altogether coherent work, because it was a work of art, not a philosophical tract. Cassirer saw in it one of Goethe's philosophically most coherent works, and distanced himself from Gundolf's view. Responding to Cassirer's essay in a letter, Gundolf agreed that Goethe could be considered both as a philosopher and as poet, with different aesthetic criteria arising from both persons. 'As a structure the Pandora is a layering of different moods of the soul, as a thought it is a coherent edifice' ['Als Gebicht ist die Pandora eine Schichtung verschiedener Seelenlagen, als Gedanke ein einheitlicher Bau']. Gundolf concluded in agreement with Cassirer.

Gundolf wrote to Cassirer that he appreciated the way he avoided a fixed causality of the primacy of ideas or persons. 'Whilst the Hegelians extract the dialectic of the spirit out of the "characters" and turn art into a masked philosophy [...] you are concerned with how ideas were embedded in the irreplaceable historical moment' ['Während die Hegelianer aus den "Gestalten" sich die Dialektik des Geistes herausschälen und aus der Kunst eine maskierte Philosophie machten [...], gehen Sie der Einbettung der Ideen in den unersetzlichen geschichtlichen Augenblick nach']. The 'encounter in
the middle of the path' was a constant negotiation about the primacy of poetry over philosophy or ideas over persons. Cassirer and Gundolf saw their mutual appreciation not just as a personal sympathy, but discovered in it a possibility for philosophy and literary study to approach each other.75

The agreements were strongest when Goethe was the subject of conversation, for, unlike other thinkers, Cassirer and Gundolf both saw in Goethe not only a poet and genius, but also a kind of source of infinite wisdom for all ages. Like Cassirer, Gundolf was fascinated by animism in its different manifestations, including polytheism in archaic Greece, and both owed that to Goethe's alleged polytheism. In his book on Hölderlin, Gundolf wrote that heroes and great poets were marked by 'the presence of a demon', so such poets as Hölderlin and Goethe could distinguish, and write about, gods and other great men so truthfully because they themselves shared the quality which made them great.76

Cassirer was attracted by the way in which Goethe captured traits of 'himself' and 'his own attitude to the world' in Caesar, Socrates, and Mohammed, 'in the character and the destiny of these great men'.

What attracts Goethe again and again is the relationship between the hero and genius with the world; the effect he has on it and what he receives from it in return. Again and again he is pushed back in these considerations to the same tragic fundamental problem. The heroic power of the will is stilled, the purest ideal intention is crossed and thwarted, as soon as they try to interfere with the events in the world. It is futile for the individual to attempt drawing these events up to himself; if he is to rule their course, he has to descend to their level. And this first step already constitutes a descent from his original mission.

[Was Goethe immer wieder anzieht, das ist das Verhältnis des Heroen und des Genius zur Welt: die Art, wie er auf sie wirkt, und die Rückwirkung, die er von ihr empfängt. Immer wieder sieht er sich in dieser Betrachtung auf das gleiche tragische Grundproblem zurückgewiesen. Die heroische Kraft des Willens wird gehemmt, die reinste ideelle Absicht wird durchkreuzt und vereitelt, sobald sie in das Weltgeschehen einzugreifen versuchen. Vergeblich sucht der einzelne dieses Geschehen zu sich selbst emporzuheben; er muß, wenn er es beherrschen will, zu ihm hinabsteigen. Und dieser erste Schritt bedeutet schon den Abfall von seiner eigentlichen Mission.]77

If hero-worship was the point of encounter in the middle of the path, it also marked a parting of the ways.

Cassirer was willing to grant Gundolf the Carlylean category of heroes as intellectual leaders and poets, which Goethe was.78 But when Gundolf called for 'heroes' or 'geniuses' on every level, and particularly on the political one, Cassirer could not follow. For Cassirer, following Kant's Third Critique, the concept of genius was reserved exclusively to art, and he thought that any attempt of the

Moreover, he argued in Vom Geist und der Lehre (Kant's philosophia naturalis), his problems of philosophy were the problems of his personal development, which, separate from the individual's own object, has a scarcity of which he can find a liberation for.

For Cassirer, to be drawn on an individual could lead to a mystic constituted in Book 1, philosophical conceptions: "The demon will choose the blameless."79

In some non-mythic sense, the idea: idea, he really can. For this private anything beyond the analytical powers of persons whose peculiar science we agree about, in the case of Cassirer, is attracted to limitation I.80

Gundolf considered to be a problematic. The Geistgeschichte showed that 'ideas and thoughts' are only human and, in Marxian terms, contains the richness of the consequences of the conception of the Romanticist.
attempt of the genius to mesh with political affairs would degrade him or her. Moreover, he did not want to create a cult of genius. In Kant’s Leben und Lehre (Kant’s Life and Thought), for example, Cassirer argued that the problems of Kant’s philosophy cannot be discussed merely in the framework of his personality. In them we encounter [...] an independent ideal content which, separated from all temporal and subjective-personal constraints, has its own objective value. Even as a biographer, Cassirer considered the scarcity of what is known about Kant’s private life not as an inhibition, but as a liberation for a better understanding of his work.

For Cassirer, the boundary between mythic thought and philosophy could be drawn on the basis of the question whether a thinker believed that the individual chose his demon to become a hero or genius, or whether, in a mystic constellation, the demon chose the individual. If, in mythic thought (Cassirer argued in his chapter on the self in the second volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms), each man is chosen by his demon, so Plato, in Book 10 of his Republic, used this paradigm “in order to create a new consequence which is opposed to the mythical way of thinking and feeling. “The demon will not choose you”, Lachesis is telling the souls, “but you will choose the demons [...]”. The one who chooses is to blame, God is blameless.’

In some passages, it seems that Gundolf would agree with Cassirer’s non-mythic position. He argued that ‘the real human being is always before the idea: ideas are the means and consequences, not the causes’. However, he really came from a different starting-point and headed for a different end. For this primacy of the personality meant that he was not interested in anything beyond personality and that he was not interested in those individuals whose personality did not appeal to him. ‘This might be the reasons why we agree about Goethe but differ as far a Kant is concerned’, Gundolf wrote to Cassirer. ‘For ideas do not capture me if I am not in human terms attracted to their holder, be this holder an individual or a people. This is a limitation I have to bear with.’

Gundolf saw universal significance in those individuals whom he considered to be geniuses or heroes, and believed in their demonic calling. In his Geistesgeschichte, a manuscript on the philosophy of history, Gundolf wrote that ‘ideas as such do not exist, at least not for our human perception, there are only human ideas [...] socialism for example is merely the shadow of Karl Marx: however, only those persons are creative [schöpferisch] whose thought contains the condensed richness of a popular spirit, just as the seed contains the richness of the tree and the forest’. Heroes and leaders were ‘neither the consequences nor the users of general circumstances, as the mileu-theoreticians would have it, nor do they make history as the Carlylean Romantic hero-worship presents it’. Rather, as Hegel put it, the private ends
of great men both sum up and express the will of the World Spirit. Burckhardt called them the ‘coincidence of the special and the universal’, which not only resume, but also ‘pre-assume’ whole peoples, cultures, ages. ‘In short, they are the bodies of history [Leib der Geschichte].’

At this point Cassirer’s path would have drawn far away. In *The Myth of the State*, Cassirer evaluated Hegel’s contribution to totalitarian thought, focusing on precisely the aspect which Gundolf accepted, that great men were imbued with a special authority because of their unique representative character of the World Spirit. In Hegel’s original phrase, ‘all states had been founded by the noble force of great men, not physical power, for many are stronger than one. […] This is the advantage of great men, to know and to speak the absolute Will. Everyone gathers around them, he is their God’.

Unlike the emergence of the legal sphere, which requires *Anerkennung* (i.e., an intersubjective conflict), the state is founded by charismatic leader figures alone. Only in their singular activity can the ‘absolute will’ of spirit find its expression.

Cassirer, by contrast, ‘used’ heroes as a way of conveying meaning. This is why Cassirer did not seek to criticize monumental history as a genre, because it could clarify aspects of the historical past which other methods would not. ‘The political historians usually assumed that they ought to reject “typological” and cultural history due to their conventional “hero-worship”’, Cassirer wrote, whilst cultural and social historians, by contrast, ‘sought to limit the rights of “individualist” historiography’. In his view, both failed to recognize that such phenomena as, for example, Puritanism, could be explained with equal value as an intellectual idea, as a mass phenomenon, and an individual trait. It is not the ‘object’ of investigation that determines whether a historian is an individualist or a collectivist. Once Cassirer’s proposition was acknowledged — that the prime aim of history was to find the meaning, not the cause of the past — the conflict of methods would cease to be political.

2. Gundolf as a Hero-Worshipper

Nevertheless, Gombrich did not take out of thin air his accusation that Gundolf’s hero-worship was proto-ideological. Cassirer never reflected on the fact that, as the closest member of the circle around the poet Stefan George, Gundolf had also shaped what can be called the ‘George school’ of history, including his critic George Steiner.}

...and his follower, Caesar, ‘a human being, an agonizing, suffering being’.

The historian, Weber, noted that the hero of the panegyrist’s rhapsody was not the real hero, but an idiom, a type, an expression, a motif, an allegory.

The hero who fascinated Gundolf was not a real person, it was a myth. He was a hero of the past, the hero of the community, the hero who had led the people to victory.

...and the hero of the past, the hero of the community, the hero who had led the people to victory.
of historical writing, which consciously focused on great men of history, including George himself, with a political agenda in mind. Even after George had broken off contact with Gundolf due to Gundolf's marriage in 1926, Gundolf continued praising the poet in publications. "It is", he wrote

the duty of every living movement, to hold their heroes alive in the present, to transform them into their own being and to turn the radiance which they receive from them into a new figure [Vorüber. [...] In so doing it should not preserve what their idols [Vorüber] were and did, nor take them in the way they understood themselves: no, our task is not the cult of relics, nor do we want to resurrect the past or serve authorities. The great ones are great by virtue of their never-ebbing newness, not their antiquity, by virtue of the fact that they still persist after a thousand years, not that they existed a thousand years ago."

And his books treated of some of the 'great men' of history — Shakespeare, Caesar, Paracelsus, Goethe. Although he was against a 'cult of the unique human being for the sake of his uniqueness', for Gundolf, history was an agonistic process of 'interaction between creative and receptive human beings'. Those creative outstanding historical figures ought to be remembered, as their image would benefit any present society.

The George Circle was an exemplary case of such a movement. Marianne Weber judged its promiscuity to mystification and myth as follows: 'The George circle judged ethical autonomy as an educational ideal and refused to recognize the value of the individual soul. Subordination to the authority of the hero, and for woman to be subordinate to man: that is their "faith"." When, in 1928, George's sixtieth birthday was celebrated in the German press, some panegyrics spoke of the 'proud phalanx of intellectual historians which he sent out into the world', and listed 'Gundolf, who gave us Goethe, Bertram, who gave us Nietzsche, Vallentin, who taught us how to see Napoleon afresh, Friedemann, Hildebrandt, Singer, Karl Reinhardt, Salin, who founded a new way of seeing Plato, then Kantorowicz ("Frederick the Second"), and Wolfram von den Steinen (Helden und Heilige).'. Gundolf bemoaned the fact that the present age lacked a clear idea of a hero, who would be able to grasp the modern chaos of 'factories, presses, banks, and traditions' and to form it into attractive cultural material — 'regardless of whether he will be a centralizing figure like Caesar or a universal emancipator like Goethe [...] as soon as such a hero came, the people would want nothing but to become his instruments.'

Needless to say, even in Gundolf's choice of vocabulary Gombrich could recognize a parallel with the National Socialist movement, which kept alive its heroes (and even some of Gundolf's) in such works as Alfred Rosenberg's The Myth of the Twentieth Century (Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts).
(Incidentally, in his student days no other than Joseph Goebbels had approached Gundolf, with no success, asking him to supervise his doctoral dissertation, an incident which Gombrich recollected inaccurately — assuming that Goebbels was one of Gundolf’s PhD students — which at least gives evidence of the fact that his thought seemed attractive to future Nazis. At the same time, given the cult which had developed around Gundolf at the time, his attraction was probably almost universal.)

Gundolf’s anti-democratic and elitist values permeated his historical method. Yet his political vision did not point in the direction of National Socialism. He was George’s prophet, yet he was critical in the 1920s of those prophets (such as Friedrich Wolters) whose worship of George would later lead them to Nazism. He also wrote that ‘merely nationally minded men cannot create culture’. Gundolf connected his call for a hero with a vision of cultural and political progress. Similar to Carlyle’s, Gundolf’s heroes were divided in three rubrics: poets, warriors or politicians, and philosophers. Even the advent of the hero was not a goal in itself, but served, rather in a Nietzschean way, the creation of new outstanding culture. Drawing a distinction between ‘real’ myths and hollow ideology and self-worship that he described as ‘the egotistic romping of private dreams’ [‘das selbstige Tumulten privater Träume’], warned his readers of false heroes, megalomaniacs who would deceive humanity by presenting themselves as the true saviours. To that extent, Gundolf cannot be positioned as a predecessor of Nazism.

Cassirer’s outright rejection of the two main historians of George’s circle makes it at first rather difficult to assess his positive reception of Gundolf. After all, Gundolf himself had not only praised Bertram’s work but even provided its title, Versuch einer Mythologie. He even compared Bertram’s book with his own ‘classic’ Goethe biography. Both books were intended to represent George’s historical school. Its aim was not just the description of a myth, but the rekindling of historical heroes prepared for modern times, and the fashioning and design of heroes for a new age (such as George himself).

Apart from the special case of Goethe and the quest for genius, Cassirer’s sympathies for Gundolf are best explained if his highly selective appreciation of his work is considered. Sensitive to the thin boundary between a meta-mythology and an intellectual’s endorsement of mythic thought, in his latest reference to Gundolf’s work Cassirer praised only one book by Gundolf, his Caesar: A History of His Fame (Caesar: Geschichte seines Ruhmes). As Cassirer remarked, this was a book ‘not about Caesar but about the history of Caesar’s fame and the varying interpretations of his character and political mission from antiquity down to our own time’. Rather than contributing to the myth of Caesar, this book was a document of the ‘continuous process of interpretation and reinterpretation’. Cassirer agreed with Kant’s conviction,
who, speaking of Plato, said that posterity could understand a past thinker and his intentions ‘better than he has understood himself’. To this, Cassirer added, that ‘what holds for the interpretation of a great thinker and his philosophical works holds also for judgments concerning a great political character’, such as Caesar.104

Indeed, as we can see from Gundolf’s archive of newspaper cuttings relating to his book on Caesar, it does not give evidence of Gundolf’s hero-worship.105 Gundolf collected ‘instances’ of Caesar’s survival in the modern world (to use Warburgian terms), his name used as a brand for a Swiss company, comparisons of Caesar’s nose with the noses of other figures, together with announcements of Mussolini’s play ‘Caesar’ to be performed in London, and caricatures from the German press comparing Mussolini to Caesar.106 The collection itself has the air of detached irony concerning Caesar, or the references to Caesar in contemporary press. In fact, in many ways this approach assimilated those parts of Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas where he listed modern photographs together with stamps and newspaper clippings. In this sense, Gundolf’s book Caesar: Geschichte seines Ruhms and its archive stand out amongst his other books on heroes. This book is the only one of his series of panegyrics of great men, in which a myth is not perpetuated, but rather analysed critically. It is a meta-mythology, not a mythology like his other books. If the other books belong to the genre of monumental history, then the Caesar book is definitely an instance of critical history, a history of historiography.

Cassirer could speak to Gundolf where a conversation with other George followers would have already been impossible. Despite the caveat of the interconnection between mythic thought and philosophy, Cassirer distinguished between those scholars, such as Ludwig Klages, Ernst Bertram, or Oswald Spengler, whose kind of mythic thought threatened rationality, and few others, such as Gundolf, some, though not all, of whose publications smoothly moved between the mythic and the mytho-critical realms. Their paths crossed not in an actual indulgence in hero-worship, but rather in a discussion of hero-worship in Goethe’s thought, and the role of individuals in history. Above all, Cassirer probably valued Gundolf’s work for his ability to give shape to the past. As one of Cassirer’s citations from Shakespeare reads,

The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Both glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.107
III: Conclusion

Looking back at the interwar period in the late 1930s and 1940s, Cassirer remarked in his notes on history that hero-worship indeed usually attracted more thinkers of the political right. The nationally minded, conservative political historians of his time (such as Georg von Below, Eduard Meyer), were attracted to individualistic history, whilst the democratic and socialist historians (such as Karl Lamprecht) adhered to a typological, social psychological or economic viewpoint on history. In this sense Cassirer conceded that a political polarization of methods existed. At the same time, as Ulrich Raulff had put it, the 'German intellectual landscape around 1930 was not so disparate as to prevent critical historians like Warburg from communicating with anticritical hero-worshippers like Gundolf'. Cassirer distinguished the role of the philosopher from that of the politician by saying that, in Plato's phrase, the state was not 'the true home of the philosopher'. In an ideal world, this permitted the intellectual debate between holders of fundamentally opposing views, such as, for example, Cassirer's own notorious encounter with Heidegger at Davos in 1929. However, Cassirer added, in a situation of crisis such as the world was facing after 1933, philosophers 'must be summoned back to earth — and, if necessary, they must be compelled to participate in the life of the State'. The state had to be widely conceived as 'politics' in this instance, one should add, for, in Cassirer's case, he had taken this decision somewhat too late. The 'state' he should have participated in was beyond his reach; 'it' would have killed him if he had stayed, and 'it' would not listen to him after he had emigrated.

On his return from Olympus, Cassirer's belief in the primacy of individualism as a value which, within limits, seemed to justify hero-worship, appeared to enter a conflict with his critique of myth in modern politics. Cassirer saw those mythic forces as most problematic which overruled any individual impact on social and cultural life, such as the myths of race, the state, and fate. By contrast, every hero-myth bore a Janus face between radical individualism and radical authoritarianism. It was an expression of radical individualism if the hero was understood as a genius in the sphere of art and the intellect. Thus Cassirer defended the Romantic notion of genius because it was something like a one-man-show, where the prince is nothing but an artistic genius, as Friedrich Schlegel had put it, 'the artist of artists [...]' the prince performs in an infinitely manifold spectacle where the scene and the public, the actors and spectators are one and the same, and where he himself is the author, the director, and the hero of the play'. Yet as soon as the hero was conceived of as a political agent, the hero myth required a passive and obedient audience, and the hero turned into an autocratic leader. The importance of individualism as a value in Cassirer's thought made it far more difficult for him to accept that hero worship had become morally acceptable and desirable.

Notes
1 Ernst Cassirer, "In" P. 2
2 Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 3
5 Gus van Does the wind reap fields?
7 Cassirer, Myth and Science, p. 2
8 Ernst Cassirer, "Philosophie der Kunst. In" Hamburger Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, 2003, pp. 3-75 [henceforth "Casirer, Der Begriff"]
more difficult for him to develop a coherent critique of hero myths, than it was to develop a critique of the belief in fate. In a post-Cassirean world, the hero survives as a pathos formula, and hero-worship as a method of giving meaning to culture.

Notes
2 Cassirer, The Myth of the State, pp. 3-4.
3 Cassirer lists the following books as an example: Peter Viereck, Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941); Benjamin Harrison Lehman, Carlyle's Theory of the Hero: Its Sources, Development, History, and Influence on Carlyle's Work; A Study of a Nineteenth Century Idea (Durham, NC: Duke University Press); Herbert John Clifford Grierson, Carlyle and Hitler, the Adamson lecture in the University of Manchester, December 1930, with some additions and modifications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933); Ernest Scellère, Un précurseur du National-Socialisme: L'activité de Carlyle (Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1939). The following book was not listed by Cassirer but belongs in this list: Eric Bentley, A Century of Hero-Worship: A Study of the Idea of Heroism in Carlyle and Nietzsche, with Notes on Wagner, Spengler, Stefan George, and D.H. Lawrence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). One could also a parallel in the implication in Carl Schmitt's attack on Hobbes' decision to use the comparison with the mythical creature Leviathan in his presentation of an otherwise rational and systematic political philosophy; see Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Feldleitung eines politischen Symbols (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938).
5 Gombrich, Myth and Reality, p. 26, n. 7; the biblical reference is to Hosea, 8:7, 'he who soweth the wind reaps the whirlwind'.
7 The very question of the conceptual form of the myth thus seems to imply an entirely inadmissible rationalization of it. 'Schon die bloße Frage nach der Begriffsform des Mythos schenkt daher eine völlig unzulässige Rationalisierung desselben in sich zu schießen!' (ECW 12, p. 10).
8 Cassirer uses the words 'genetischer Zusammenhang' (ECW 12, p. xi).
10 Cassirer, 'Der Begriff der symbolischen Form' (1923); ECW 16, pp. 75–105 [p. 104].
12 ECW 11, p. 49.
13 Cassirer, 'Der Begriff der symbolischen Form'; ECW 16, p. 88 (my translation).
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38 Cassirer, 'Der Begriff der symbolischen Form'; ECW 16, p. 104.
39 I owe this specific distinction between Nietzsche's method of genealogy and its more traditional meaning as the history of aristocratic descent to Raymond Geuss. He distinguishes between a 'pedigree', which legitimates a present order, and a 'genealogy', which gives account of the present order as contingently evolving from a variety of sources (Raymond Geuss, Nietzsche and Genealogy, in John Richardson and Brian Leiter (eds) Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 322–41.
43 Cassirer, Essay on Man, p. 64.
45 Karl Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1929).
46 Arendt summed up Mannheim's premises as follows: 'Philosophy from a sociological point of view is no longer an answer to the question of the "being of existence", but is itself now taken to be an enmeshed and entangled in the world of the existent, and its motivational possibilities, to be an existent among existents. Philosophy itself is doubted here in its absolute reality, in that it is derived from an original reality that it has forgotten; indeed, its transcendence is assessed as a simple instance of having forgotten: its claim to non-determination rests on a forgetting of its historical rootedness', concluding: 'The sociologist does not inquire into "being in the world" as a formal structure of existence as such, but into the particular historically determinate world in which the person lives. This determination of sociology is apparently harmless, as if it were simply delineating the boundaries of its competence. It begins to threaten philosophy only when it maintains that the world cannot in principle be disclosed as a formal structure of human being, but only as the determinant content of the particular world of a particular life. This claim disputes the possibility of an ontological understanding of being as such' (Hannah Arendt, 'Philosophie und Soziologie: Zu Karl Mannheims Ideologie und Utopie', Die Gesellschaft, vol. 7 (1930), pp. 161–76; reprinted in part and translated in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg (eds), The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 101–2).
47 ECW 12, pp. 127 and 138.
49 ECW 12, pp. 198–99 (my translation)
51 ECW 12, pp. 198–99.
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24 Cassirer, 'Giovanni Pico della Mirandola', p. 324.


29 C. G. Jung, Paracelsus: Vortrag, gehalten im Rahmen des Literarischen Clubs Zürich beim Geburtshaus von Paracelsus an der Teufelsbrücke bei Einsiedeln (June 1929); Paracelsus als Arzt: Vortrag, gehalten anlässlich der Feier zum 400. Todestag des Paracelsus im Rahmen der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft zur Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaft an der Jahresversammlung der Naturforschenden Gesellschaft (7 September 1941); and Paracelsus als geistige Erscheinung (5 October 1941); all three reprinted in Jung, Paracelsus.

30 For further discussion, see Paul Bishop, The Dionysian Self: C. G. Jung's Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter), especially the section in chapter 8 on 'The Alchimical Nietzsche' (pp. 222-30).

31 Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos; ECW 14, p. 87.


33 Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos; ECW 14, p. 71 (my translation).

34 Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos; ECW 14, p. 71 (my translation).

35 Cassirer asked at first: 'Was soll uns dieser klebringerliche, provinzielle Goethe? [...] menschlich bleib mir das Werk fremd' (Ernst Cassirer, 'Thomas-Mann-Aufsatz', 1940, draft fragment for the Germanic Review (1945), Beinecke Library, Yale University, New Haven, GEN MSS 98, 913, Envelope 173, p. 4).

36 Beinecke Library, Yale University, New Haven, GEN MSS 98, folders 913 and 914.


39 ECW 13, p. 84 (my translation).


41 Fritz Saxl, Erwin Panofsky, and Raymond Klibansky, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art (London: Nelson, 1964). The book had originally been written by Saxl and Panofsky, but when the typeset was destroyed in the war, Klibansky joined the group of authors and contributed to its actual first edition. It has been argued that even Jung's collective psychoanalysis with reference to collective archetypes was a continuation of Cassirer's idea of symbolic forms. For further discussion,
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52 See Wolf Lepenies, Melancholie und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969); also Saxl, Pöppelken, and Klubansky, Saturn und Melancholy, p. 12.


54 Manchmal kommt es mir vor, als ob ich als Psychobistoriker die Schizophrenie des Abendlandes aus dem Bildhaftigkeit in selbstbiographischen [...] abzuleiten versuche: die ekstatische Nymphe (manischer) einerseits und der trauernde Flussgott (depressiv) andererseits (Gombrich, Warburg, p. 302).

55 Cassirer papers, Beinecke Library, GEN MSS 98, Section III personal papers, box 6, 156, Lecture notes Universität Leipzig, 1893-1933.

56 Cassirer, Essay on Man, pp. 200-01.

57 ECW 13, p. 202 (my translation).

58 Cassirer, Essay on Man, p. 177.

59 In Klages’ own words: 'Whereas every non-human living being pulses in the rhythm of cosmic life, human beings have been separated from this life by the law of Spirit. Whatever appears to him as the bearer of ego-consciousness, about the world in the light of the superiority of pre-calculation thought, appears to the metaphysician, if he penetrates deeply enough, in the light of enslavement of life under the yoke of concepts!' ' Während jedes außermenschliche Lebewesen im Rhythmus des kosmischen Lebens pulst, hat den Menschen aus diesem abgetrennt den Geist, das Gesetz des Geistes. Was ihm als dem Träger des Ichbewußtseins im Lichte der Überlebensvorausschauenden Denkens über die Welt erscheint, das erscheint dem Metaphysiker, wenn er tief genug eindringt, das Lichte einer Knechtung des Lebens unter das Loch der Begriffe!' (Ludwig Klages, Vom kosmogenen Ethos (Munich: Müller, 1922), p. 43); and: 'Human kind has fallen out with the planet that gives birth to and nourishes it; indeed, fallen out with the eternal motion of all the stars, because it is possessed by this vampiric, soul-destroying power!' '[Der Mensch] hat sich zerschlagen mit dem Planeten, der ihn geboren und nährt, ja mit dem Werdenkreislauf aller Gestirne, weil er besessen ist von dieser vampirischen, dieser seelenzerstörenden Macht!' (Ludwig Klages, Mensch und Ethos: Fünf Abhandlungen (Munich: Müller, 1920), pp. 40-41).


61 Es gibt freilich in neuerer Zeit auch Bestrebungen, die diesen historischen Wahrheitsgegriff opfern — die die Geschichte dem Mythos auslösen und preisgeben wollen (Bertram, Nietzsche) — aber das sind nur Verräumlichungen und Verwischungen, die der echte Historiker immer abweisen wird — was er will, ist Erkenntnis, Wissenschaft — und er sucht nach einem philosophischen Ideal der Erkenntnis, dem er seine Arbeit, sein objektives “Wahrheitsstreben”, einordnen kann’ (Cassirer, Geschichte des Mythos; ECN 3, p. 420).

62 The reference is to Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz, Frederick the Second, trans. by Emily Overend Lorimer (London: Constable, 1931), p. 253. For further discussion of the political implications of Kantorowicz’s thought, see Martin Ruelh, 'In This Time Without Emperors: The Politics of Ernst Kantorowicz’s “Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite” Reconsidered', Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, vol. 63 (2000), pp. 187-242. I have benefited from discussions of material in this paper with Martin Ruelh.

63 Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 137.
65 See Krois, Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History, p. 203.
67 Krois, Cassirer, p. 170.
69 Gundolf, letter to Gundolf, 24 November 1928.
70 Gundolf, letter to Cassirer of 13 October 1916. Beinecke Library, Yale University, Ernst Cassirer Papers, GEN MSS 98, IV, Letters from Gundolf.
71 “[.] aus anderen Gründen und mit andern Mitteln wie Sie, aber vielleicht Kraft desselben Befehls und desselben Reife unsres weltgeschichtlichen Augenblicks’ (Gundolf, letter to Cassirer of 13 October 1916).
73 Gundolf to Cassirer of 10 August 1919, Beinecke Library, Yale University, Ernst Cassirer Papers, GEN MSS 98, IV, Letters from Gundolf.
74 Gundolf, letter to Cassirer of 10 August 1919.
76 ‘Freihlich ist nur ein heroisches Leben das Ziehen der demonischen Berufung’ (Friedrich Gundolf, Höllderlin’s Archipelago (Heidelberg: Weiß, 1911), p. 20).
78 Carlyle’s categories were as follows: 1. The Hero As Divinity (Oedipus, Paganism; Scandinavian Mythology); 2. The Hero As Prophet (Mahomet; Islam); 3. The Hero As Poet (Dante, Shakespeare); 4. The Hero As Priest (Luther; Reformation; Knox; Puritanism); 5. The Hero As King (Cromwell, Napoleon; Modern Revolutionism).
82 ‘Hieraus mag sich ebenso sehr die Übereinstimmung betreffs Goethe, als unser Differenz betreffs Kant, erklären, da mich Ideen nicht ergreifen, wenn mich ihre Träger nicht
menschlich ergriffen, seien sie Mensch oder Volk. Das ist eine Begrenzung mit der ich mich abfinden muss' (Gundolf to Cassirer, 13 October 1916, Beinecke Library, Yale University, Ernst Cassirer Papers, GEN MSS 98, IV, Letters from Gundolf).


89 Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), p. 100.

86 Gundolf, Dichter und Heldent, p. 7, footnote.


89 Friedrich Gundolf, Stefan George in unserer Zeit (Berlin: Bondi, 1913).

90 Gundolf, Dichter und Heldent, p. 24 (my translation).

91 Friedrich Gundolf, Shakespeare und der deutsche Geist (Berlin: Bondi, 1911); Goethe (Berlin: Bondi, 1916); Prometheus (Berlin: Bondi, 1927); Caesar: Geschichte seines Rahmens (Berlin: Bondi, 1924).

92 Gundolf, Dichter und Heldent, pp. 30, 26–27.


95 See Gundolf's letter to Eduard Fraenkel of 8 March 1966: 'In der Möglichkeit Ihrer Rede liegt eine schöne Widerlegung des Vorwurfs als ob unsere Zeit so antithetisch sei. [...] Und gewiss sind heute erst die Wagner, Böcklin, Nietzsche, Jakob Burckhards tiefen Gedanken, eine einzige Suche nach dem Heldenhaften, Tragischen, Feierlichen, nach der Art gehobenen Daseins. [...] Aber geformt ist das neue Heldentum freilich noch nicht, nur die Stimmung davon geht um und harrt des Stosses der sie kristallisierer [...]'. (Gundolf-Briefe: Neue Folge, ed. by Lothar Helling and Claus Victor Bock (Amsterdam: Castrum Peregrini, 1966), p. 126.)


97 On Gundolf's rejection of Goebbels, see Raymond Khilansky, Erinnerung an ein Jahrhundert: Gespräche mit Georges Lefaux (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 2001), pp. 61–62.

98 See Khilansky, 139.

99 Gundolf, Dichter und Heldent, p. 100.

100 See Carlyle's Collected Works (1857).


102 Cassirer, Essays on the Philosophy of History (trans. of Pierre Rosan), trn.


104 'Genie und Naive', Gundolf Archive, II.


109 Cassirer, Meinung, 1915.

110 I would like to thank the Carse Fellowship at The University of Glasgow for its financial support, and also grateful to Carse for research at the Ailsa research highlights at the Ailsa research highlights at the Ailsa research highlights.
98 See Klibansky, Erinnerung an ein Jahrhundert, p. 79. See also Kurt Hildebrandt, Erinnerungen an Stefan George (Bonn: Boervier, 1963), pp. 89–90.
99 Gundolf, Dichter und Helden, pp. 22, 23.
103 Caesar: Geschichte seines Ruhms (1924) was followed by Gundolf’s meta-biography of Caesar im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Berlin: Bondi, 1926).
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