INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND MISUNDERSTANDING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC THEOLOGY ON THE TRINITY IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with the development of a distinct and coherent tradition of thought on the Trinity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The strength of this tradition was such that, in a significant number of cases, it actually prevented theologians from being able to see the real issues before them. When theologians in the thirteenth century come to put forward their interpretations of the statement on the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, they are severely hampered in their ability to do so because of their preoccupation with an argument about the divine essence which is, at the most, tangential in the Lateran decree itself. Their interpretations are so wide of the mark as to constitute nothing less than a case of collective misunderstanding.

This raises questions about rationality and hermeneutics which are not as easily answerable as they first appear. The difficulty arises because it is just possible to discern a conceptual link between the skewed interpretation offered by these theologians and the issues addressed in the Lateran decree as they appear to us today. It is almost as if theologians considered their version to be legitimate because they saw an intrinsic link between the issues of divine unity and divine generation, the main concerns of the decree and academic theologians respectively.

What gives credence to this possibility is that these issues were themselves often inseparable in the development of trinitarian theology in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Much of the coherence of the tradition of academic theology of the Trinity derived from a recurrent preoccupation with the question of whether the divine essence begets. In certain crucial instances, the answer to this question was determined with reference to the doctrine of divine unity. The idea was that the generation of the essence would impair irretrievably the absolute unity of essence which was beginning to emerge as the dominant view of divine unity.

The Lateran Council’s statement on the doctrine can only be understood within this wider theological context. It is no longer possible to attribute this statement to Pope Innocent III’s wish to bolster the authority of Peter Lombard. Innocent himself borrowed from Joachim’s trinitarian theology, making it almost inconceivable that he would have later wished to condemn the same theologian. Only by giving less attention to the personalities involved and more to the issues themselves can we realise the full significance of the theological controversies of this period.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the following individuals and institutions in their order of appearance on the road to the completion of this thesis. Firstly, I am indebted to Maxine Daniels for teaching me how to write intelligibly, and to Brenda Bolton and Conrad Russell for their crucial encouragement of my intention to undertake research. The research itself was made possible by a three-year award from the Scottish Education Department. During this period, I came into contact with a number of distinguished scholars, some of whom had a critical bearing on my work. In particular, I would like to give special mention to Marjorie Reeves, Kurt-Victor Selge and Robert Lerner, and to Axel Mehlmann for kindly making available his soon to be published research. As for the emotional and intellectual sustenance without which any doctoral student cannot sanely exist, I must thank everyone who knows me at the Institute of Historical Research, especially Anke Holdenried and Catherine Moye. Thanks also to Tim Wales for his comments on the later drafts, which have added greatly to the overall coherence of the argument.

Finally, I must attempt to express, or at least convey, some idea of the depth of my gratitude to my supervisor, David d'Avray. Everyone who knows him will agree that he is one of the most generous and creative scholars they are ever likely to meet.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AFH Archivum Franciscanum Historicum.
AHDLMA Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge.
ALKM Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters.
BGPTM Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters.
CCSL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina.
CCM Corpus Christianorum Series Mediaevalis.
CIMAGL Cahiers d'Institut du moyen âge grec et latin.
DHGE Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques.
DTC Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.
DZ Enchiridion conciliorum, ed. H. Denzinger (12th edition; Freiburg, 1913).
MS Medieval Studies.
RTAM Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale.
SSL Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense.
I INTRODUCTION

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity was at the cutting edge of medieval thought. It was both one of the moving forces as well as one of the principal ‘beneficiaries’ of the system of thought generally known as medieval scholasticism. The logical complexity of the doctrine was particularly suited to the kind of syllogistic argumentation which became one of the hallmarks of the scholastic approach, much to the chagrin of many an ecclesiastic. The theology of the Trinity thus enjoyed significant points of contact with the techniques and concerns of the disciplines of logic and grammar in its attempt to mediate between the often conflicting demands of language, meaning and metaphysical truth. For as well as being concerned with the very nature of God and his inner life, trinitarian theology also deals with what we can both know and say about his being; and because the doctrine lies at the heart of the Christian confession of faith, was the subject indeed of the first ecumenically recognised creed, it has traditionally been one of the most volatile, and consequently creative, areas of discussion among theologians. The Middle Ages, when theology had the kind of status accorded to the experimental sciences today, was no exception to this. In their discussions on the Trinity, medieval theologians repeatedly ventured into previously unexplored territories which were of crucial significance to other scholars; and this applies not only to common concerns, such as the debate on universals, but also to problems of methodology. One is therefore justified in making the audacious, though (I hope) not presumptuous claim, that to write a history of the doctrine of the Trinity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is to examine the very dynamic of scholastic thought itself.

This is not to reduce medieval trinitarian theology to a mere device by which we can observe the much more interesting and significant phenomenon of scholasticism, even if only to establish whether or not that term adequately describes the various institutions, problems and methods usually designated by it. It is not simply the exterior form of a set of ideas and problems which just happens to be theological in content. On the contrary, trinitarian theology informs as much as it is informed by scholastic thought. Many of the questions addressed by academics during...
this period, though they were not the direct result of speculation about the Trinity (many were as old as philosophy itself), assumed acute significance because of the way in which they impinged upon the doctrine.

Making the connection with the development of scholastic thought, therefore, is simply an attempt to place discussions on the Trinity within their social and intellectual contexts. In this sense, this study is primarily historical insofar as it seeks to describe the emergence of a distinct tradition of thought on the Trinity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries without imposing value judgements about correct doctrine. My aim (retrospectively) was to identify a set of interrelated problems in trinitarian theology and then to trace their treatment by a succession of theologians within a very definite social context. The criteria of selection were not the originality and lasting significance of the writings, which would have meant extensive discussion of works such as Saint Anselm of Canterbury's *Monologion* and Richard of Saint-Victor's *De trinitate*. This study is not, in other words, an overview of the major thinkers on the subject. Instead, I was interested in those authors who could be seen to be taking up previously discussed points, irrespective of the originality of their insights; in writings which are important not because they change the direction of trinitarian theology, but rather because they engage very specifically with well-established arguments and share a common body of material with other writings. Precisely in those texts, in other words, which are derivative (though not just derivative) and contingent upon what is being said and written elsewhere.

This may seem to be drawing unnecessary attention to the universally acknowledged fact that all writing is to some extent dependent on what has been written before, a phenomenon which may be described as genre, influence or intertextuality depending perhaps on where one wants to put the author. But this having been established, it is surely necessary to identify precisely what form such dependency may take. I am less concerned with questions of direct or indirect influence, a fairly well-studied type of dependency, than with subscription to a

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1 See J. Clayton and E. Rothstein, 'Figures in the Corpus: Theories of Influence and Intertextuality', in J. Clayton and E. Rothstein edd., *Influence and Intertextuality in Literary History* (Univ. of Wisconsin, 1991), 3-36. This is one of the few intelligent discussions in an otherwise impenetrable (at least to the non-specialist) debate about a term which promises much but delivers little. Also illuminating and stimulating is U. Eco, *The Role of the Reader. Explorations in the Semiotics of Text* (London, 1979), pp.21-2.
common body of ideas and methods which are not necessarily traceable to any one, unique source. By limiting myself to those works which share many of the same preoccupations and frame them using recognisably similar terms and arguments, I have hoped to trace the transmission of ideas about the Trinity and thereby say something not only about the development of the doctrine, but also about the actual mechanisms propelling that development. It is for this reason that I believe the results of my research constitute an original contribution not only to the history of medieval thought, but also to our understanding of the nature and formation of intellectual traditions in general and to the formation of Christian doctrine in particular. The emphasis is very much upon continuity, and only upon innovation insofar as any innovation is in turn appropriated by others to become part of a common approach.

This criterion of continuity has also determined the chronological limits of the thesis. I begin in the late eleventh century with the controversy between Anselm of Canterbury and Roscelin of Compiègne on the orthodoxy of Roscelin’s description of the three Persons as three res. For Anselm, Roscelin’s description seemed to jeopardise the fundamental principle of trinitarian theology established in the West since Augustine’s De trinitate: the crucial distinction between unity and trinity, essence and Person upon which coherent discussion of the doctrine was absolutely dependent if one God were to be three coequal and consubstantial Persons. From the beginning, then, language played a central role in arguments about the Trinity and was to be a recurrent preoccupation throughout twelfth- and thirteenth-century discussions. Hence the reason for the interdependent development of trinitarian thought with logic and grammar.

The arguments brought to bear by Roscelin, known to us chiefly through Anselm’s polemical writings against him, had at least one major consequence for subsequent developments. They exposed in acute terms the vulnerability of traditional explanations of the Trinity to questions from logically-minded theologians or, as some critics saw it, logicians with a smattering of theology. Just what does it mean to say that one God or essence is three Persons when each of those Persons is equally and individually God, and without there being three gods? The problem itself was not really new but the same one of identity of substance and distinction of Person which had plagued early defenders of the consubstantiality of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
And perhaps it would not have been an enduring one had it not been for the emergence of permanent institutions expressly devoted to posing and solving such problems. It is not enough that Roscelin was a brilliant and original thinker, if indeed he was. For his questions to have any lasting impact or resonance among contemporaries there had to be a corresponding ability, reason and opportunity to grapple with them. The rise of the cathedral schools, and eventually of a university in Paris, together with the emergence of professional theologians, satisfied these conditions. Students were trained to read and to think critically, to find gaps in authoritative texts. They considered it worthwhile to do so, firstly, because the problems they confronted were genuinely interesting and important to them, but also because the status of the theologian in Christian society was increasing in significance. A career in teaching remained the province of a very few. But for many more, a certain allure attached to a theological education, which they thought would serve them well in later life. Finally, the schools provided the opportunity for all this to take place. They allowed for teaching on a large scale and, like any institution, opened the way for a standardisation of intellectual practices. The emergence of a doctrinal consensus in the twelfth century is in this respect not dissimilar from the previous single greatest formation of doctrine, in the third and fourth centuries. In the earlier period the introduction of an official orthodoxy promulgated with imperial authority at the Council of Nicea was a means of imposing uniformity of faith upon the disparate teachings of the various schools and theological traditions throughout the Empire. The difference in the twelfth century was that this regulation was effectively self-imposed. The clarification of the doctrine issued by the Fourth Lateran Council was only feasible because theologians had themselves already reached a consensus on the major issues.

The challenge laid down by Roscelin, to bring some logical coherence to the doctrine, was taken up most successfully by his one-time pupil, Peter Abelard. Abelard’s approach was to develop a theory of signification which allowed him to explain why terms which seemed to be of the same type could not always be used in the same contexts. The main instance of this problematic was provoked by the terms ‘God’ and ‘essence’; and the main illustration was why it was permissible to say ‘God begot God’ but not ‘essence begot essence’, or rather, why ‘God begot God’ did not
necessarily imply 'essence begot essence'. This focus was not an arbitrary one. It is no accident that these propositions both concern one of the most important elements in twelfth-century trinitarian theology, the Father's generation of the Son. They were the semantic counterpart to the ontological problem of how Father and Son could be distinct by property but the same (and numerically the same) in essence. For it was precisely this identity of essence which suggested that if we can conceptualise the Father's generation of the Son as God begot God, there is no reason why we cannot say essence begot essence since 'God' and 'essence' indicate the same reality. The generation of the Son from the Father's very essence or substance thus seemed to provide the key to the problem of identity and difference in God: the Father had brought forth a being which was essentially the same as himself and yet which was in some manner distinct.

Discussion of this problem dominates Abelard's *Theologia*. The debate about the respective legitimacy of the propositions 'God begot God' and 'essence begot essence' was the semantic form which it assumed. If 'God begot God' did not imply even, on the grounds of identity of essence, that God had begotten himself or another God but that the Father who is God begot the Son who is God, why was it not permissible to say 'essence begot essence' for the same reason. What was the difference between 'God' and 'essence'?

Abelard did not provide a fully comprehensive solution or at least not a solution which proved acceptable to contemporaries. Much of his discussion centred on long and complex analogies which earned the condemnation of William of Saint-Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux. But Abelard's semantic approach in general and his particular emphasis upon the question of the Father's generation of the Son proved to be of more lasting significance. In his *Sentences* Peter Lombard placed this question at the very beginning of his discussion of God. The Lombard himself did not contribute any new insights to the semantic problem but brought a greater clarity to the discussion. He raised more succinctly than Abelard, though not in a fully formulated way, the problem of the relationship between the doctrine on divine generation and on divine unity. The guiding assumption of the Lombard's discussion of whether or not the divine essence begets is his definition of 'essence' as the reality or nature common to the three Persons, the *summa quaedam res*. The identification
of the essence with this ultimate reality precluded any possibility that the essence could be begetting. For if that were the case then it would follow that the essence begot itself. And as Abelard had already pointed out, according to the principle established by Augustine, no thing could beget itself, could be its own cause. The interdependency of the doctrines of divine generation and divine unity had been implied by Roscelin and was presupposed by Abelard, but receives its sharpest treatment from Peter Lombard. This conceptual linkage may perhaps have elicited no further comment had it not been for Joachim of Fiore's attack some years later. Joachim's objection to the Lombard's concept of divine unity as a *quaedam summa res* was the immediate occasion for the detailed clarification of the doctrine of the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council, but the roots of the decree lie much deeper in the twelfth century.

The *Sentences* represent a landmark in twelfth-century theology. This fact is so well established it is almost a platitude, a statement which seems to require little further investigation. But as with so many platitudes its full significance can only be grasped upon deeper reflection and inquiry. For this statement is so important and yet so impenetrable in its bare form that it actually demands extensive examination to be in any way meaningful. Since the pioneering studies of continental scholars between the wars this has been an all too rare undertaking. One of the supplementary aims of my research, therefore, has been to ascertain the precise nature of the work's importance for trinitarian theology and to chronicle in greater detail the mechanisms of its transmission throughout the second half of the twelfth century. The chapter on Peter Lombard is thus an essential lynchpin in the argument for continuity in trinitarian theology. By examining its points of contact with preceding authors and its incorporation into the very structure of the study of theology in the second half of the twelfth century, I hope to show how and to what extent the *Sentences* served as a mediator of earlier debates and a constant point of reference for theologians in the later period.

The presence of the *Sentences* as a common denominator in the study of theology was one factor in the development of a distinct method, which may broadly be defined as a consensus, in trinitarian theology in the later twelfth century. In addition we can identify a whole range of assumptions shared by these authors which
take up and expand upon the complex of questions surrounding the issue of divine generation. A problem of interpretation arises at this point. Theologians persisted in their discussion of why ‘God begot God’ was valid but not ‘essence begot essence’ even though there is little evidence of anyone actually maintaining that the essence begot. Much of this has simply to do with the repetitive nature of scholasticism, whereby blocks and sequences of argument are copied in their entirety. Once a given problem had entered the discussion it would probably never be solved definitively. Instead it would evolve and mutate into a series of additional problems. At this point the original issue would become fossilised without becoming detached from the entire corpus. This accounts for the in-built tendency of scholastic theology to pile up arguments for and against a particular proposition. No argument is definitive inasmuch as no argument can answer or anticipate all possible counter-arguments. The result is that no single argument is ever sufficient, nor should it be, since that would defeat the very rationale of finding new, more satisfactory ones. Each problem thus becomes an archeology of questions and arguments, layered one upon the other, and interconnecting like a complex rock formation. The result is that some of the problems, like some of the layers of rock, are remote and unyielding; but they cannot be discarded without destroying the unity of the entire structure.

To a considerable extent this seems to be the case with the propositions ‘God begot God’ and ‘essence begot essence’. Originally the task had been to explain why the first but not the second was true. The answer was that no thing begets itself. But this raised the further problem of why ‘God begot God’ did not imply that something begot itself whilst ‘essence begot essence’ did. This in turn focused attention on the signification of the terms ‘God’ and ‘essence’ and on signification theory in general. This proved to be a minefield which theologians could not easily traverse. The original question was thus turned on its head. Signification theory was no longer merely the tidy solution to the paradox of why two terms which referred to the same reality could not be used in the same way. Instead the propositions ‘God begot God’ and ‘essence begot essence’ became the main illustrations of why the meaning of ‘God’ and ‘essence’ was such a perennially fascinating and perplexing issue. That is why the debate about the signification of these terms could not be entirely divorced from the problem which had given rise to it even though that problem itself seemed utterly
exhausted.

Virtually all the theologians of the second half of the twelfth century who discuss these issues discuss them in a way which presupposes a set of shared assumptions about theological language and valid argumentation. Adopting a phrase from Giuseppe Angelini’s study of Prepositinus of Cremona, I have described this approach as grammatical theology. Although I shall in effect be talking about the same phenomenon as most scholars mean by scholasticism, ‘grammatical theology’ is intended as a more analytically precise description of the nature of scholastic thought. Scholastic theology strictly speaking implies nothing more than the academic atmosphere of the schools and the practice of the *quaestio*, and not only means different things to different people but has acquired a number of negative meanings. Grammatical theology is more precise and less prejudicial in its connotations. It suggests an emphasis upon the structure and nature of language as a fundamental principle of the theory and practice of theology, of talk about God. Nothing new about that in itself, except the extreme degree to which it was taken. The technical precision and sophistication of this methodology was enough to distinguish it qualitatively from previous efforts. The analysis of words in their context (supposition) and the categorisation of words according to type (signification) provided theologians with a complete system of question, answer and explanation. This was a system of thought which could be adopted effectively and with little modification by any thinker trained, as most theologians were, in the disciplines of logic and grammar.

It is the adoption of this approach by a significant enough number of theologians which in my view justifies talk of the emergence of a consensus in trinitarian theology during the later twelfth century. This consensus was one of the preconditions for the statement on the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council. It is this body of opinion, really quite uniform despite the presence of various ‘schools’ of thought, which probably lies behind Joachim’s condemnation, or which at least presupposes it. Traditionally scholars have attributed Joachim’s condemnation

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to the initiative of Pope Innocent III but this hypothesis is no longer tenable. It is certainly reasonable to assume that Innocent's studies at Paris in the 1180s would have left him with a natural bias towards Peter Lombard and that this would account for his condemnation of Joachim of Fiore's attack on the Paris theologian. However, I have established that Innocent himself borrows from Joachim's trinitarian theology in a way which makes it extremely difficult to conceive of him actively seeking out Joachim's condemnation. If Innocent did not initiate the proceedings against Joachim, an alternative might be to look towards theologians at Paris. The Pope's invitation for submissions to the Council may have been taken up theologians aware of Joachim's attack and anxious that it might bring further disrepute to the emerging university so soon after the condemnation of Almaric of Bène.

My argument for a Paris initiated and orchestrated condemnation is again only an hypothesis and one not without its own problems. Nevertheless, I think it provides a more satisfactory, if still inadequate, explanation than the one traditionally proposed by scholars which stresses the social and political loyalties of the main protagonists. More than just sweeping away an older view, however, I hope my argument opens up the decree to its intellectual context. The theological issues addressed in the decree were real ones, not simply trumped up for the sake of securing Joachim's condemnation. These issues have a history and a context which are relevant to our understanding of the decree. Modern theologians have recognised the theological significance of the decree; historians have considered its social and political context. But to my knowledge no one has examined the decree in its most expansive form, taking in its social, intellectual and historical contexts. This was the object of my detailed study of the decree. In particular, I wanted to emphasise its theological complexity which accounts for the difficulty of arriving at a single, definitive reading. The decree can only be approached through its relationship to a series of other texts, its meaning activated from within a system of texts. Perhaps this is what theorists mean by intertextuality.

The decree and its interpretation by academic theologians in the thirteenth century represents a case study in the phenomenon of intellectual tradition and

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*See my forthcoming article, 'Did Innocent III Personally Condemn Joachim of Fiore?', Florensis (1993).*
misunderstanding. The vast majority of theologians seem to miss the main point of Joachim’s condemnation entirely, concentrating instead on an issue apparently raised only incidentally in the decree. They do not discuss the doctrine of unity of collection, of reducing divine unity from a unity of essence to a unity of will, for which Joachim was condemned, so much as the question of whether or not the divine essence begets. They proceed as though Joachim had attacked Peter Lombard because he disagreed with the Lombard’s view that the essence did not beget. In fact, Joachim had attacked the Lombard’s view because he objected to his concept of the essence as a *quaedam summa res*. But thirteenth-century commentators virtually ignore this point, which is resoundingly clear in the decree, and instead attribute Joachim’s condemnation to his position that essence begot essence.

We would naturally think this a most obscure and inexplicable interpretation if we did not already know about the consistent role this question had played in trinitarian theology since at least the time of Peter Abelard. Knowing this as we do, we can see how scholastic theologians were in a sense hampered by the legacy which they inherited from their predecessors, by the fact that they belonged to a distinct and continuous theological tradition in which the centrality of this question was taken for granted. They are unable to engage with the decree outside the complex of arguments about why the essence did not beget, and read into it their own concerns and preoccupations. Thus the intellectual tradition to which they belong leads them fundamentally to misinterpret the Lateran decree.

To stop here, however, would be to deny any validity to thirteenth-century interpretations, to dismiss them as wrong, even if wrong for rational and understandable reasons to do with the intellectual preoccupations of their authors. In that case, we align ourselves with romantic hermeneutics by claiming greater authority for the interpretation of the detached scholar than for that of the involved contemporary, we claim ‘to understand the author better than he understood himself’. I would argue, however, that we have to allow for the possibility that these

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theologians, precisely because of their proximity to the decree, can tell us who are so far removed from it, something about its meaning, not to mention the immediate intellectual context to which it belonged. The reason for doing so is not simply out of a liberal sense that everyone must be given their due. That would be a rather pointless exercise. It is because there are grounds for thinking that a connection between the issues of unity of collection and the essence as begetting is implicit in the decree, whether actually implicit according to the intentions of those who drafted it or implicit according to what could reasonably be inferred by the theology of the time. For the Council not only condemned Joachim's doctrine of unity of collection, but also eliminated any position which entailed the generation of the essence either as a counterpart to Joachim's own position or as a further alternative to the Lombard's *quaedam summa res*.

But any attempt to apportion due value both to thirteenth-century interpretations and to modern accounts, which can see how those interpretations were historically conditioned, seems doomed to failure. Hermeneutic philosophy attempts precisely this. Instead of setting up text and interpreter as providing separate and competing solutions to the same textual problem, hermeneutics conceives of the act of interpretation as a dialogue in which the text and the interpreter are equally open to be questioned by one another. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, the leading exponent of this philosophy, it is only in the genuine encounter with the radical otherness of the text, through the foregrounding of our own prejudices, that we can recognise the truth of the text over and above our expectations of it. For example, the expectation that a text should be complete and internally consistent (what Gadamer calls the fore-conception of completeness) is one of the governing principles of any interpretation; it is only when this condition of completeness is not fulfilled, 'when the attempt to accept what is said as true fails', that we attempt to explain the text with reference to its historical context, as the temporary eclipse of the truth of the matter by the author's inability to see beyond his own immediate situation. The historian interrogates the text in much the same way as a lawyer cross-examines a

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witness, forcing it to yield information which is not immediately forthcoming. 8

But historians cannot detach themselves from the tradition through which the
text they wish to understand is mediated. Although it may seem that the true meaning
of a text can only be known when it is far enough removed from the interpreter's own
concerns not to engage his personal interest - it has, in other words, become of merely
historical interest - to approach a text with this attitude is already to prejudge its
potentiality for truth, to close it off and make it an object of academic curiosity. 9
Thus instead of attempting to exchange momentarily our horizon for the horizon of
the past, Gadamer talks of understanding as the result of the fusion of these two
horizons. 10 This is the dialogue of question and answer in which the interpreter,
rather than naively reproducing meaning, actually creates it. 11 Temporal distance
from our area of inquiry certainly endows us with a wider view but 'the discovery of
the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished'. 12

This process of the on-going recovery of meaning implies, however, that
although a definitive interpretation will always be beyond our reach, each generation
of interpreters and each new interpretation approximates ever more closely to the truth
of the text, as 'all kinds of things are filtered out that obscure the true meaning'. 13
Thus the idea of progressive clarification of the meaning of a text seems to conflict
with Gadamer's further assertion that each appropriation of meaning simply offers a
different point of view:

Every appropriation is historically different: which does not mean that each one represents only an
imperfect understanding of it. Rather, each is the experience of an 'aspect' of the thing itself. 14

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8Ibid., p.338.

9Ibid., pp.298, 302-4. This is one of the criticisms of Skinner's contextualist approach. See Tully ed., Meaning
and Context, esp. pp.156-75, 204-17.


11Ibid., pp.362-79.

12Ibid., p.298.

13Ibid., p.298.

14Ibid., p.473.
Gadamer thus seems to fudge the issue of whether one interpretation is better than another, whether we can legitimately describe a particular interpretation as a misinterpretation. True, he admits the possibility of misunderstanding defined as the failure to achieve the 'harmony of all the details with the whole' (the hermeneutic circle). But by claiming to detect when misunderstanding has occurred, we unavoidably claim greater authority for our own interpretation. This would seem to lead us back to our original difficulty of judging between conflicting interpretations of the same text.

A slightly different approach is taken by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur who stresses the indeterminacy of meaning, particularly in writing. But like Gadamer, Ricoeur tends to dodge the question of misunderstanding. On the one hand, he maintains that the distanciation produced by writing, whereby the writer and the reader do not share the same concrete reality characteristic of spoken discourse, disqualifies us from judging the meaning of a text according to the intention of the author. The text detaches itself from both the author and the original audience:

In short, the work decontextualises itself, from the sociological as well as from the psychological point of view, and is able to recontextualise itself differently in the act of reading. It follows that the mediation of the text cannot be treated as an extension of the dialogical situation. For in the dialogue, the vis-à-vis of discourse is given in advance by the setting itself; with writing the original addressee is transcended. The work itself creates an audience, which potentially includes anyone who can read.

On the other hand, although every reading includes an unavoidable rewriting and reconstruction of meaning, no text is entirely autonomous, entirely at the mercy of whatever meaning a particular interpreter may wish to impose upon it. According to Ricoeur's concept of appropriation, although a text has no definitive meaning, the act of interpretation may draw out the intended trajectory of meaning and thereby

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15Ibid., p.291.


17'Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology', in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p.91.

fulfil the potential of the text. This is possible precisely because no text is an enclosed, self-contained entity like a discarded pebble (Ricoeur’s analogy) with no connection or relationship to any other object. But what are we doing when we identify the intended trajectory of meaning if not claiming greater authority for our interpretation, as sanctioned by the text, than other conflicting interpretations? We are, in other words, saying that we have understood where someone else has misunderstood.

The problem is thus how to balance the interpretation of thirteenth-century theologians, which seems to be a fairly clear-cut case of misunderstanding, with the hermeneutic principle that every reading within a particular tradition brings new insights to its subject matter and is part of an on-going dialogue. Hermeneutic philosophy does not provide a satisfactory resolution of this dilemma. It betrays a tendency to slide between being totalitarian and libertarian; between the attribution of authority to the historically detached reading and the democratisation of readings. Consequently, it fails to recognise the centrality of the issue of misunderstanding for the whole hermeneutic undertaking.

My own solution to the immediate problem at hand betrays the same tendency of wanting to have my cake and eat it. I would argue that thirteenth-century interpretations of the decree are an instance both of misunderstanding, which we can see and explain historically, and of a truth which we cannot see except through agonising reflection on the deep but subtle connection between the issues of divine unity and divine generation. There is no doubt that these theologians tend not only to ignore the main issues involved in Joachim’s condemnation, but actually invent arguments which are nowhere present in the decree. At the same time, their proximity to the issues provides them with a deeper understanding of the interrelationship between the Lombard’s quaedam summa res, the doctrine of unity of collection for which Joachim was actually condemned and the view that essence begets essence. There is always a point in trinitarian theology where one aspect of the doctrine threatens to merge into another and where one’s position on a given issue has

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20. ‘Writing as a Problem for Literary Criticism’, p.325.
implications for a series of other issues. Firstly, Joachim's condemnation for conceiving of divine unity as nothing more cohesive than a unity of collection among the Persons would, according to the theology of the time, tend to affect his view of the essence relative to the Father's generation of the Son. If Joachim had no proper conception of the essence apart from the three Persons, no conception of unity of essence, it would be entirely consistent for him to have held (even though he did not) that essence begot essence, just as God begot God and the Father begot the Son. Secondly, the decree itself lays the foundation for thirteenth-century interpretations by eliminating the view that essence begets essence as a further potential alternative to the Lombard's *quaedam summa res*. Theologians in the thirteenth century saw that it was valid to discuss the decree in terms of essence begets essence because the connection between the issues of divine unity and divine generation was itself implied in the decree. And the issue was further complicated by Peter Olivi's insistence in the late thirteenth century that the decree does not rule out the doctrine that the essence begets. He at least saw no contradiction between the *quaedam summa res* and the essence as begetting.

This arcane world of thought was far removed from the beliefs and preoccupations of most people. But given a proliferation of both heretical and evangelical movements, it was important from the pastoral point of view that the central doctrine of Christian faith should be unimpeachable.

The detailed study of the development of trinitarian theology is also important as a case study in intellectual history. In a general way, I hope that my research will help to demonstrate the vibrancy and creativity of medieval theology. Part of the reason why the subject has not previously received the attention which it deserves is a consequence of the distinction scholars make between medieval philosophy and medieval theology. Of the numerous volumes written on 'medieval philosophy', whether by anti-Catholic rationalists or Christian apologists, very few deal with theological subjects.  

21 Many of the great pioneering works on medieval thought

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devote themselves first and foremost to the problem of universals as if theological problems did not exist or had nothing to do with discussions on universals. There is an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption that the debate on universals was the highpoint of intellectual endeavour in the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{22} This is compounded by a sense that any progress in medieval thought was in spite, not because, of Christianity.\textsuperscript{23}

Following in the tradition of Etienne Gilson, there have some been attempts to reverse this rather dismissive attitude to medieval theology. Gilson warned of the danger of introducing a false separation between philosophy and theology:

toute histoire de la philosophie au moyen âge présuppose la décision d'abstraire cette philosophie du milieu théologique où elle a pris naissance, et dont on ne peut la séparer sans faire violence à la réalité historique.\textsuperscript{21}

Gilson himself was not entirely immune from this tendency. His definition of Christian philosophy as ‘the use made of philosophical notions by the Christian writers of those times’ begs the questions of how meaningfully we can in any case speak of purely philosophical ideas distinct from their use by theologians in theological contexts.\textsuperscript{25}

An approach more consistent with the claims of the sources has recently been proposed by John Marenbon.\textsuperscript{26} Marenbon points out the artificiality and drawbacks inherent in the approach which divorces, for the sake of coherence, the ideas of medieval thinkers from the theological context and intention which govern them.\textsuperscript{27} He goes so far as to assert, rightly in my view, ‘that revealed religion, so far from being an obstacle to philosophical speculation, encouraged some of its most profitable

\textsuperscript{22}Especially B. Hauréau, De la philosophie médiévale 2 vols. (Paris, 1850), pp.30-46 identifies the distinctive feature of scholastic philosophy as the question of universals.


\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., pp.87-9.
developments'. But so convinced are we that medieval thought was shackled by its adherence to a system of dogmatic beliefs, that Marenbon's statement seems almost reckless. Yet it is actually no different in its presuppositions from the sober and uncontroversial view that we cannot understand, for example, Marx's theory of historical development without reference to his political beliefs; that his political beliefs, indeed, inform and expand his understanding of history.

What seems so different about medieval theology is that it simultaneously embraces two concepts which are problematic for twentieth-century rationalism: 'Middle Ages' and 'theology'. It is very difficult for even the most impartial scholar to overcome fully the connotations of sterility and dogmatism which these words generally evoke in our culture. One option for historians might be to take the contextual approach to its logical conclusion by, at least occasionally, taking medieval theology rather than philosophy as the starting point. There are of course difficulties here as well, though they are not the usual ones of having to explain why medieval philosophy is not the same as modern philosophy. Instead, we would have to stress that theology in the Middle Ages is not synonymous with the bland repetition of endless doctrinal formulations, and be extra alert to the temptation to describe developments as though they were somehow inevitable. But surely the resulting shift in emphasis from philosophy to theology is worth the risk of a certain teleology entering into the account. It may seem that what is at issue is no more than a name (philosophy or theology) but it is a name which often determines what we expect from the sources and from the studies written about them. All labels and expressions are limiting in one way or another. That is why I would suggest that we need a greater variety of them if our understanding of the intellectual history of the Middle Ages is to be more nuanced.

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28 Early Medieval Philosophy, pp.xiii-xiv.
Any consideration of the development of thought on the Trinity from its beginnings will necessarily be somewhat schematic given the enormity and complexity of the subject. Nevertheless, highlighting some of the major themes in the history of trinitarian theology will serve as an introduction and point of reference for the more detailed discussion that will follow.

The very notion of development in Christian doctrine is one which is widely accepted among scholars today, including theologians. The concept of development, which goes back to Newman's seminal essay on the subject, is one which embraces change as a necessary means of clarifying what the Church believes. But we also find the idea among the first Christian theologians, particularly with reference to a fully worked out concept of the Trinity, which, although perhaps immanent, is not explicit in the Bible. The technical language which eventually came to be so indispensable to rational thought on the Trinity is virtually non-existent in the Bible. Patristic and medieval theologians who used non-biblical terminology were thus open to the charge of innovation incompatible with what the Bible itself permitted.

At the heart of the Christian confession of faith was the incarnation and revelation of the Son of God through the person of Jesus Christ. It was precisely the question of Christ's status which sustained the brunt of attacks on Christians by other groups; a philosophically defensible doctrine was therefore a matter of some urgency. During the first four centuries the main issues proved to be: (1) Was the Son of God divine in the same way as the Father? (2) If so, how could this be reconciled with the

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monotheism of the Old Testament?

Scripture was not much help in resolving these questions. The Old Testament provided no direct reference to a Son or another beside God. On the contrary, the God of the Old Testament was unequivocally a single God: *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord* (Deut 6, 4). Cryptic allusions to plurality in God had to be elaborated in the light of the New Testament revelation. The most important Old Testament passages in early Christian exegesis and in the Middle Ages were *Gen 1, 26 (Let us make man to our image and likeness)*; *Gen 18* which describes Abraham’s encounter with three men whom he addresses as one; *Is 6, 3 (Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God of hosts)*; and *Prov 8, 22 (The Lord possessed me from the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning)*. All of these were taken as oblique references to plurality in God.⁵

Even the New Testament yielded little in the way of clarification, since it gave no account of Christ’s ontological relationship with his Father. It only hinted at some possible interpretations, most notably *Jn 10, 30 (I and the Father are one)* and *Jn 14, 28 (the Father is greater than I)*, both of which were exploited by opposing parties in later controversies.⁶ As for the occurrence of trinitarian formulas, in which Father, Son and Holy Spirit are referred to conjointly, these are few and far between.⁷ The most explicit was the baptismal formula of *Mt 28, 19 (Going therefore, teach ye all the nations: baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost)*. On the other hand, although no philosophical definition of the ontological relationship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit is provided, there is, depending upon one’s starting position, scope for a metaphysical interpretation of their salvific mission.

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relative to the world: no doctrine, but a problem. There is no explicit trinitarian formula but an implicit trinitarian ‘ground-plan’ or ‘pattern’ from the beginning. Early theologians did not attempt to force Scripture to say what it patently does not say, that there is one God who is three coequal and consubstantial Persons, that there is unity in Trinity, but undertook to evolve a doctrine within a continuing tradition of reflection upon Scripture.

Several important factors stand out in this process of elucidation. An integral part of the Christian understanding of God from the beginning was the devotional practice of baptism. The baptismal formula of Mt 28, 19 was adopted as an invocation to the Trinity in many early Christian texts. During the baptismal rite itself the trinitarian formula was underlined through the act of triple immersion and an interrogation of faith which usually contained a strong trinitarian element. Indeed, before the first ecumenical council at Nicea issued the first official statement of doctrine on God, this baptismal interrogation, although not a declaratory act, was the nearest thing to a Christian profession of faith. The very word *symbolum* itself originally referred to these triple baptismal interrogations and was thus particularly connected with the Trinity.

Scholars also recognise the important interaction of Greek philosophy and Christian thought in these centuries. Much debate has focused on whether Christian

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14Ibid., p.58.
theology is simply a version of Greek philosophy, a hellenisation of the Bible. Of course the picture is not as straightforward as this and several (usually avowedly Christian) scholars have vigorously challenged this view of Christianity as passively receiving Greek thought without transforming it in the process.

Others emphasise the eclectic nature of Christian sources. Thus it is perhaps not until the Cappadocian Fathers of the later fourth century that we can truly speak of Christian Platonism. Nevertheless, Christians could be justified in borrowing the insights of pagan philosophy given that they were only mediated by the Greeks, not actually conceived by them. Many, they argued, had in any case been derived directly from Moses and the Old Testament. Greek philosophy was merely a method and tool exploited by Christians for their own objectives; it did not have the final word on the Christian understanding of God. The parallel with the later period is clear, though it should not be pushed too far: in every period the cross-fertilisation between Christian doctrine and the 'secular' disciplines is not only unavoidable but absolutely necessary if new questions and answers are to be formulated in a way which is meaningful to contemporaries.

The influence of Platonic philosophy can already be discerned in the work of

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18 On the various reasons justifying the use of Greek philosophy adopted by Justin and Clement of Alexandria, see Daniélou, Histoire des doctrines chrétiennes II, pp.42-72.


Philo of Alexandria (25 BC-50 AD) whose 'remarkable synthesis' was the first attempt to bring the precision and clarity of Greek thought to bear on the Bible. His concept of the Logos as an emanation of divine reality issuing from God and thus in some sense distinct from him allowed for the possibility of a mediation between God and his creation which did not compromise divine transcendance. The crucial role attributed to the Word-Logos in the Gospel of Saint John may be of Philonic origin. This concept, channelled through Philo and the Middle Platonists, was adopted and elaborated upon by early Christian writers. It is central to the theology of Justin Martyr (d. 163/7), as well as Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) and his pupil Origen (c. 185-254).

But in the Platonic scheme of thought where the supreme being is utterly transcendant the role of the Logos as the mediator between God and creation almost inevitably entails a hierarchical scale of being, particularly when the Logos exists primarily for the sake of creation rather than as an integral part of the divine life.

There is a similar tendency towards subordination in Christian thought of the second and third centuries which was further compounded by the trend in exegesis to

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assimilate the Logos and the Spirit to angels. This hierarchy is further accentuated by the distinction between the immanent and the expressed Logos, the one referring to the eternal Logos and the other to the Logos brought forth for the purpose of creation. It is not clear, however, how far pagan philosophy was responsible for this subordinationist solution in Christian thought on God. The subordination of the Son to the Father is associated in particular with Origen but it would be truer to say that Origen actually goes further than his predecessors in establishing the Son’s claim to divinity through his eternal generation from the Father. Indeed subordination only becomes a heterodoxy in view of subsequent developments; before the Council of Nicea in 325 it was a feature of all theology.

The course adopted by Arius (d. 336) was one attempt among several to circumvent the threat posed to divine unity and transcendance by the Son’s divinity and, as recent studies have emphasised, was part of a more general process of working out a viable and satisfactory doctrine of God. Nicea was, after all, ‘an awkward reminder of the extent to which the Church had not fully decided what it was saying’.

Arius contended that the Son could not possibly be coeternal with the Father or begotten from his substance since this would mean that God himself had suffered through the Incarnation. It followed from this that the Father was superior to the Son

28Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp.123-4 but argues for a Stoic origin of Christian usage.
32Williams, Arius and especially Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God.
33Williams, Arius, p.236.
and had produced him through an act of will, not from his nature. He objected most acutely to the implication of a material, physical process which he regarded as an unavoidable consequence of his opponents’ insistence on the Son’s generation from the Father’s substance. It is interesting that many of the controversies of twelfth-century debates should also revolve around this same question of the Father’s generation of the Son.

But for various reasons, political as well as doctrinal, the Arian solution was repellent to many strands of opinion within the Church. In this respect, Nicea’s authorisation of the term *homoousios* (the same in substance; made of the same kind of stuff) to describe the Son’s relationship to the Father was recommended by its very ambiguity which allowed it to be used against Arius without dividing his opponents in the process. Recent attempts to pin down the meaning of the term as used at Nicea suggest that it was much looser than the numerical identity of Father and Son which characterised its later usage. The Council’s declaration that the Son was born from the Father’s substance and was *homoousios* (consubstantial) with him actually raised more questions than it solved.

Although for subsequent generations the Nicene faith came to represent the formal endorsement of the doctrine of consubstantiality of Father and Son, in the sense of the numerical identity of one substance, it is probably true to say that it was less concerned with the question of divine unity than with simply proclaiming that the Father and the Son were God in the same sense of God, that they were equal. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Nicene Creed did not settle the controversy over

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35Williams, *Arius*, pp.98, 143.


38Conciliorum, p.5: 'Iesum Christum filium dei, natum de patre, hoc est de substantia patris, deum de deo, lumen de lumine, deum verum de deo vero, natum non factum, unius substantiae cum patre, quod Graeci dicunt homoousion'.

Christ's divinity and had hardly even begun to deal with the Holy Spirit. The central figure in the post-Nicene phase of doctrinal development was Athanasius of Alexandria (295-373) who campaigned throughout his career for the establishment of a Nicene orthodoxy as he understood it.

The precise meaning of *homoousios* also looms large in the work of the three Cappadocian theologians, Basil of Caesaria (330-379), his younger brother Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394) and their friend Gregory of Nazianzus (329-90). Through their clarification of the meaning of the terms *homoousios*, *OUSIA* and *hypostasis*, the Cappadocian theologians 'were together decisively influential in bringing about the final form of the doctrine of the Trinity'. They stated that there is one *ousia* and three *hypostases*, thus distinguishing clearly for the first time what was proper to unity and what to trinity by breaking with the tendency of their predecessors to use these two terms as synonyms. Basil defined the *ousia* as that which is common to the three *hypostases* (individually subsistent things) but which does not exist apart from them. He thus veered towards a generic understanding of the Trinity, which placed the *ousia* as the general and the *hypostasis* as the particular. This is not, however, to be confused with the Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary substance, between the individual and the universal as two types of substance, since there is little evidence of knowledge of this distinction among Christian writers before the end of the fourth century.

The Cappadocian solution to divine simplicity was a viable alternative to Neoplatonic subordinationism. Instead of distinguishing between an absolute and a lower unity which earlier theologians had identified with God and the Logos, they emphasised the coequality of Father, Son and Holy Spirit and the pure being of the

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41 Ibid., p.676.

42 Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, p.318-22; Pelikan, Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, pp.219-25; Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, pp.181-90.

43 *DTC* 15.2, 1671-8; Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, pp.734-7.

44 Stead, Divine Substance, p.114.
divine ousia. The solution arrived at during the emergence of a consensus in the fourth century was the introduction of a radical opposition not between Father and Son, but between God and creation. This had the advantage of preserving divine transcendence and the doctrine of consubstantiality.

The Cappadocian contribution was also crucial in clarifying the neglected problem of the Holy Spirit’s relationship to God. There was nothing inevitable about this except that the Holy Spirit’s inclusion in the baptismal formula served as a constant reminder of its special status. Only Gregory of Nazianzus was prepared to state categorically that the Holy Spirit was God, rather than merely of equal honour with Father and Son. When the Council of Constantinople issued its creed in 381 it reflected these developments by proclaiming the Spirit’s procession from the Father.

Although this thesis is concerned purely with the Latin doctrine of the Trinity, it is necessary to trace its elaboration and definition by Greek theologians since this is indispensable to the development of the doctrine in the West. At this stage indeed it is well to remember that the Latin tradition is part of the Greek, and even with Augustine there is no definite break. In my discussion of Latin trinitarian theology, therefore, I shall be taking it for granted that the Latin theologians whom I shall be discussing share many things in common with their Greek predecessors and counterparts. What I shall primarily be concerned with, however, is the emergence of a tradition of Latin trinitarian theology, both as it differs and depends on the Greek, since it is this that will be the basis of medieval discussions.

Before considering the subject in any detail this would seem to be a good place to broach the question of the relationship between Greek and Latin theology. This

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Ibid., pp.163-4, 186-9.

Williams, Aries, p.242.

Pelikan, Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, pp.211-18; Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, pp.772-90.

Ibid., p.739.

Ibid., pp.780-1.

Conciliorum. p.24: ‘et in spiritum sanctum, dominum et vivificatorem, ex patre procedentem, cum patre et filio coadorandum et conglorificandum’.
issue is not only pertinent to the present discussion but often accounts for the assessment of modern scholars in classifying 'heretical' views on the Trinity in the twelfth century as Greek rather than Latin in orientation. In many cases they are drawing on, explicitly or not, de Régnon's ambitious schematisation of Greek and scholastic (Latin) approaches to the Trinity.⁵¹ According to de Régnon, in scholastic thought, the fundamental matter is the common nature upon which individuality is, as it were, superimposed; in the Greek scheme, conversely, the common nature cannot be conceived apart from its inherence in each individually subsistant Person.⁵² The circumincession or mutual immanence and penetration of the Persons is here the principle establishing their unity.⁵³

De Régnon's purpose was not to downgrade one approach in favour of another, but to show that each has its advantages and disadvantages. The Latins are in danger of collapsing the Persons into the nature (Sabellianism) and the Greeks of destroying divine unity by creating three separate individuals (tritheism).⁵⁴ It is this assessment of a Greek tendency towards tritheism which has clouded subsequent studies. Little allowance has been made for the fact that each tradition contained a number of approaches or that any tendency among Latin theologians to play down divine unity was not necessarily due to Greek influence. The simplistic application of the Greek/Latin dichotomy has been particularly lamentable for our understanding of twelfth-century theology. Alleged tritheists such as Gilbert of Poitiers and Joachim of Fiore are placed in the Greek tradition whilst 'orthodox' theologians such as Peter Lombard remain faithful to their Augustinian inheritance. Indeed the great weakness of de Régnon's thesis is that his assessment of the Latin tradition is based almost exclusively on later scholasticism, particularly Thomas Aquinas, even though, as Karl Rahner remarks, it was not until the time of Aquinas that the so-called Latin

⁵³De Régnon. Études de théologie positive I, pp.335-435.
⁵⁴Ibid., p.366.
conception had an exclusive monopoly. No one is denying that there are different emphases within the Greek and Latin traditions, just the existence of only one Latin approach which ran uninterruptedly from Augustine to Aquinas and that any divergence from this dominant strand can be accounted for with reference to Greek theology.

Let me now turn to the emergence of a Latin trinitarian theology. The starting point must be the output of the North African theologian Tertullian (d. after 220), generally recognised as the founder of Latin thought on the Trinity. Tertullian’s principal achievement in the area of theological language has been defined as ‘un effort de fixation et d’adjustement bien plutôt que de néologie’. Unmistakably his most important work in this respect was his *Adversus Praxeum* written against the so-called Monarchianist view of God which denied any real distinction between Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Perhaps Tertullian’s most widely acknowledged contribution to trinitarian language was his use of the term *trinitas*, thought to be the first of its kind, to signify not just three but the collection of three in some kind of unity. On the one hand, Tertullian avoided as far as possible any suggestion of division by frequently associating *trinitas* with *unitas*; on the other, he made *trinitas* the term for


designating *distinctio* in God.\(^{62}\)

More difficult to pin down is Tertullian’s understanding of *substantia* and *unitas substantiae*. He seems to follow contemporary philosophical usage by assimilating *substantia* to its Greek equivalent *ousia*.\(^{63}\) The meaning of *unitas substantiae* is more elusive; it is not possible to say whether this expression designates a numerical or a generic unity.\(^{64}\) The important point is that Tertullian consistently opposes *substantia* to another term critical for Latin theology, *persona*.\(^{65}\) *Persona* refers to what is proper and distinct in God and as such has a natural affinity with *proprietas* and *distinctio*.\(^{66}\) Tertullian says that the substance which became the Word is the *persona* of the Son and, commenting on *Gen 1, 26*, that ‘Scripture distinguishes among the Persons’.\(^{67}\) But, argues Moïgnt, he falls short of inaugurating *persona* as a truly theological concept because he omits a definition of its ontological status.\(^{68}\)

On the question of the Father’s generation of the Son, Tertullian states clearly that the Son (and Holy Spirit) proceed from the Father’s substance, a position which is important for his concept of *unitas substantiae*.\(^{69}\) Tertullian was innovatory, moreover, in his use of material analogies to convey the possibility of a process of generation which did not destroy unity - a shoot proceeding from the root of a tree, a spring from its source, a ray of light from the sun:

*Everything that proceeds from something must of necessity be another beside that from which it proceeds, but it is not for that reason separated [...] In this way the Trinity, proceeding by intermingled...*
Tertullian's sources were both Greek and Latin but it is in his work as an innovator rather than as a translator that his importance lies. The most important works in transmitting the Nicene orthodoxy to Latin Christendom were Hilary of Poitiers' *De trinitate* and the *De synodis*, both completed before his return to Poitiers from Phrygia. Hilary was an ardent defender of the Athanasian line on the eternal generation of the Son. In the *De trinitate*, his preferred term for what is one in God is *natura*; he rarely uses *essentia* except in translation of the Greek *ousia*. In the *De synodis*, Hilary states that Nicea in no way introduced any diversity of *essentia* or *natura* between Father and Son. He opposes *homooeusios* (*similis essentiae*) to *homoousios* (*unius essentiae*). He almost never uses *persona*. The absence of a consistent term for designating what is three results in a conceptual confusion which is compounded by his use of *substantia* to designate both oneness and threeness. This problem was addressed by subsequent writers, most notably Augustine.

Hilary's defense of the Nicene faith was taken up Ambrose (d. 397), Bishop of Milan and Jerome (d. 419/20), translator of the Hebrew Old Testament and the Greek New Testament. Neither were original in their thought on the Trinity but were nevertheless crucial in consolidating the acceptance of the Nicene-Athanasian position in the West. In his *De fide ad Gratianum*, Ambrose followed Hilary in rarely using *persona* though he does adopt it in a crucial statement at the beginning of the work where he says that 'Father and Son are one (*unum*), not by confusing the Persons, but.
by unity of nature. He also remarks that between Father and Son there is ‘an expressed distinction of generation’.

Before Augustine, Jerome probably did more than anyone else to secure the acceptance of the term *persona*. In the years leading up to the second ecumenical council at Constantinople in 381, there took place a series of heated exchanges concerning the relative merits of the expressions *tres personae* and *tres hypostases* and which centered on the schism in the church at Antioch between Bishop Paulinus who favoured the former and the exiled Bishop Meletius who insisted upon the latter. Jerome was to play a decisive role in the dispute since he happened to be in Antioch at the time. In 376 Jerome wrote to Pope Damasus (366-384), who had himself used the expression in 374, arguing strongly for the *tres personae* formula. He argued that the *tres hypostases* formula was dangerous and misleading since everyone understands *hypostasis* as a synonym for *ousia*. ‘It should be sufficient for us to say one substance and three subsisting, perfect, equal and coeternal Persons’.

The most important and enduring contribution to the development of Latin trinitarian theology in the Middle Ages is undoubtedly Augustine’s *De trinitate*, written during the first quarter of the fifth century. Although the terms had been used before, it was his exposition of the *essentia-persona* distinction which came to be adopted by subsequent writers and which was particularly important in the twelfth century. Moreover, it was Augustine’s use of the Aristotelian categories of substance

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77 I.9, *PL* 16.531A.

De fide ad Gratianum I.16, *PL* 16.532C.


81DZ n.144, p.63 in a letter to eastern bishops: ‘omnes uno ore unius virtutis, unius maiestatis, unius divinitatis, unius usiae dicimus Trinitatem, ita ut inseparabilem potestatem, tres tamen adseramus personas’.

82*PL* 22.355-8.

83*PL* 22.357: ‘Sufficiat nobis dicere unam substantiam. tres personas subsistentes perfectas, aequales, coaeternas’.

and relation which proved so effective in explaining in what sense Father and Son were distinct if not according to substance.

The work divides into three parts along lines that were to prove significant for the Middle Ages. The first section (Books I-IV) considers scriptural proofs, both Old and New Testament, for the Trinity; the second establishes the doctrine on purely rational grounds (Books V-VII); and the third constitutes a lengthy and complex exposition on the various images and vestiges of the Trinity in man. The second section is by far Augustine's most significant methodological contribution to Latin trinitarian theology. In addition, his distinction between scriptural and rational proofs came to be used as a convention for justifying the very act of writing about the Trinity at all. For although Scripture provides the basis for sound, orthodox doctrine, rational argument is also needed to defeat the logical objections of heretics, such as those of the Arians with which Augustine deals. This principle was provided with its exemplary treatment in the twelfth century by Abelard who undertook to disprove the facetious objections not of heretics, but of pseudo-dialecticians; but it is also used in a justificatory as well as structural sense by Peter Lombard in his Sentences. Indeed, it becomes the rationale for theology itself.

Augustine's entire conception of the Trinity, in particular his understanding of divine unity and simplicity, was profoundly influenced by his previous association with Manichean religion. He finally rejected the Manichean view of God as a material being in favour of the Neoplatonic concept of a non-composite divine being. He thus set up a radical opposition not only between God and creation but additionally between divine simplicity and immutability on the one hand, and compositeness and


86 De trin. I.4, CCSL 50, p.31.11-14, PL 42.822: 'Sed primum secundum auctoritatem scripturarum sanctarum utrum ita se fides habeat demonstrandum est. Deinde si voluerit et adivuerit deus, istis garrulis ratiocinatoribus'.

mutability on the other. Moreover, because God does not change there can be no accidents in him. The concepts of immutability and mutability come to designate two polarities of existence between which there is no true communication or likeness.

But it is Augustine's distinction between essence and Person, substance and relation, as categories of analysis which constitutes his greatest achievement. Unity of essence was to be judged according to substance and trinity of Persons according to relation. This means that with respect to himself each Person is spoken of according to substance, but with respect to one another they are spoken of according to relation, thus avoiding introducing a distinction of substance among the Persons. And because these relations are eternal, they are not accidents. This settles the further problem of why we can say 'the Father is God', 'the Son is God', 'the Holy Spirit is God', but not 'three gods', since whatever is stated with reference to substance is always stated in the singular.

Augustine elaborates this distinction during the important middle section in which he refutes the Arian argument that 'begotten' and 'unbegotten' must refer to substance since there are no accidents in God. From this it follows that there are two substances in God since 'begotten' and 'unbegotten' are opposite. Augustine's response is to formulate a theory of relation which succeeds in avoiding any positing of accidents in God which would be incompatible with his simplicity. The concept of relation was not a current one in Latin theology, though it had been anticipated by

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89 De* trin.* V. 5, *CCL* 50, p. 209.16, *PL* 42.913: 'Nihil itaque accidens in deo quia nihil mutabile aut amissibile'.

90 De* trin.* V. 7, *CCL* 50, p. 212.41-9, *PL* 42.915.

91 De* trin.* V. 6, *CCL* 50, p. 211.19-22, *PL* 42.914.

92 De* trin.* V. 9, *CCL* 50, p. 216.35-7, *PL* 42.917: 'Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur deus et de singulis personis ter dicitur patre et filio et spiritu sancto, et simul de ipsa trinitate non pluraliter sed singulariter dicitur'.

93 De* trin.* V. 7, *CCL* 50, p. 211.1-12, *PL* 42.914.

some of the Cappadocian theologians whom Augustine had probably read. But if the identity of essence is to be spoken of according to substance and the distinction of Persons according to relation, what of the Persons themselves? Augustine explains the use of the term as a pure linguistic necessity. In disputes with heretics it was essential to have a term which answered the question ‘three what?’ We can say ‘three Persons’ but not ‘three gods’ because whilst Scripture forbids the latter, it does not prohibit the former. But in that case why is it not permissible to say ‘three essences’ which is also not forbidden in Scripture. At this point Augustine is forced to fall back on the excuse that pure necessity requires that we say something. Augustine simultaneously denies that persona is a relative term and yet this is precisely how he uses it. Whilst there may still be some confusion as to the ontological status of persona, Augustine has nevertheless gone a long way to solving the difficulty by distinguishing between absolute and relative names.

More than any other author, Augustine also provides a wealth of material for later discussions on the Father’s generation of the Son. His maxim that no thing begets itself was one of the fundamental principles in trinitarian theology from Roscelin onwards. He also discussed at considerable length one of the cornerstones of the doctrine, the phrase from the Nicene Creed, ‘God from God’, which was itself the source of later discussions about the orthodoxy of ‘God begot God’ but not ‘essence begot essence’. Related to this was the problem posed by the special attribution of

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96 De trin. V.10, CCSL 50, p.217.8-11, PL 42.918: ‘Tamen cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud dicetur sed ne taceretur’. Also De trin. VII.7, CCSL 50, p.255, PL 42.939.

97 De trin. V.8, CCSL 50, p.258.94-7, PL 42.941.

98 De trin. VII.8, CCSL 50, p.258.97-9, PL 42.941.

99 De trin. VII.9, CCSL 50, p.259, PL 42.941-2; De trin. VII.11, CCSL 50, p.262.28-33, PL 42.943.

100 Chevalier, S. Augustin et la pensée grecque, pp.61-5.

101 De trin. I.1, CCSL 50, p.28.32-6, PL 42.820: ‘Qui autem putant eius esse potentiae deum ut seipsum ipse genuerit, eo plus errant quod non solum deus ita non est sed nec spiritualis nec corporalis creatura. Nulla enim omnino res est quae se ipsum gignat ut sit’.
wisdom to the Son (1 Cor 1, 24) which could be taken to mean that the Father was not wisdom in his own right but only by virtue of the Son. This would in turn lead to the utterly absurd conclusion that, since there is no distinction in God between being and being wise, the Father exists only by virtue of the Son whom he begot. 102

The sixth century brought further consolidation and development. In the De fide ad Petrum of Fulgentius of Ruspe (467-533), attributed to Augustine throughout the Middle Ages, the distinction between persona and substantia or essentia is commonplace: 'And so Trinity refers to the Persons of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, unity to the nature'. 103

This period also witnesses the composition, probably in Spain, of the so-called Athanasian Creed or Quicumque as it is known from its opening words. 104 This text enjoyed a particularly extensive influence throughout the Middle Ages as it was used to instruct the clergy and found its way into the liturgy. 105 Further evidence of the development of a Western trinitarian theology also comes from Spain in the form of the creeds of the various councils of Toledo held from the fifth to the seventh centuries. The Toledan creeds are notable for their extremely well-balanced and succinct formulations of unity and trinity in God. 106 Perhaps the most important of these is the eleventh Council of Toledo (675) which was widely disseminated throughout the Middle Ages and which may have served as a model for the decree on the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council. 107 The creed of this council draws upon a considerable range of authors, including Isidore of Seville (d. 636), Fulgentius of Ruspe, the sixth Council of Toledo and, above all, Augustine. Most importantly it

102 De trin. VII.1, CCSL 50, p.245, PL 42.933; De trin. VII.2, CCSL 50, p.249, PL 42.936.
103 PL 65.675B.
105 Ibid., p.42.
106 For example, Toledo 4 held in 633, DZ n.485, p.165: 'Secundum divinas Scripturas et doctrinam, quam a sanctis Patribus accepimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum unius deitatis atque substantiae confitemur; in personarum diversitate trinitatem credentes, in divinitate unitatem praedicantes, nec personas confundimus nec substantiam separamus'.
affirms Augustine’s doctrine of relation among the Persons. The semantic distinction between essence and Person is also firmly in place:

For when we say that the Father himself is not he who (quem) is the Son, reference is made to the distinction of Persons. But when we say that the Father himself is quod is the Son, the Son himself that which (quod) is the Father, the Holy Spirit that which (quod) is Father and Son, reference is made to the nature by which God is, or is shown to pertain to substance, because they are one in substance. For we distinguish the Persons but do not separate the deity. Therefore we acknowledge the Trinity in the distinction of Persons, and confess unity on account of the nature or substance.

All of these conciliar proclamations are essentially Augustinian in orientation, as is, not surprisingly, the section on the Trinity in Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae, which stands very much within Toledan tradition. The most original and influential thinker on the Trinity after Augustine was, however, Boethius (d. 524), also the translator of Aristotle’s logical works. Boethius considered at length the problem of identity and difference in a God where there was absolute identity of essence among the Persons and yet where the Persons were not identical in every respect. Like Augustine, Boethius framed the problem very much in terms of the Aristotelian categories of substance and accident and how these must be modified when applied to God. The statement ‘the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God’ did not mean that there were three gods; it was not an enumeration, but a reiteration of the same thing. Yet although Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the same, they are not identical. For Boethius the relations among the Persons are constitutive of their very being and for that reason cannot possibly be accidents. But the predication of relation does not alter the essence of the Persons because the relationship is already

108DZ n.528, pp.176-7. Madoz, Le symbole du Xle concile de Tolède, pp.56-9 established Isidore of Seville (PL 82.271C) as the direct source here.

109DZ n.530-1, p.177: ‘Cum dicimus non ipsum esse Patrem quem Filium, ad personarum distinctionem refertur. Cum autem dicimus ipsum esse Patrem quod Filium, ipsum Filium quod Patrem, ipsum Spiritum Sanctum quod Patrem et Filium, ad naturam, qua Deus est, vel substantiam pertinere monstratur, quia substantia unum sunt; personas enim distinguimus, non deitatem separamus. Trinitatem igitur in personarum distinctione agnoscimus; unitatem propter naturam vel substantiam profitemur’.

110VII.4. PL 82.271-2


112De trinit. III. p.16
presupposed by the pure fact of the existence of more than one Person.\textsuperscript{113}

Without wishing to belittle the achievement of other theologians before the eleventh century, I propose to draw my survey to a close at this juncture. It is not that trinitarian theology was static during this period, but simply that it has little bearing on discussions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Disputes did occur. In the eighth century a lively debate was sparked off by the view, mainly held by some Spanish bishops, that although the Son was God by nature, as man he was God by adoption.\textsuperscript{114} More pertinent to later developments was the ninth-century controversy between Hincmar of Reims and Gottschalk of Orbais concerning Gottschalk's description of God as trina deitas.\textsuperscript{115} These authors were rarely cited in the later period and for that reason are not immediately relevant to the scope of my thesis. In terms of continuity it is only from the late eleventh century that the sustained discussion of the same complex of issues can begin to be identified.

\textsuperscript{113}De trin. V, pp.24-8.


\textsuperscript{115}J. Jolivet, Godescalc d'Orbais et la Trinité. La méthode de la théologie à l'époque carolingienne (Paris, 1958); Pelikan, Growth of Medieval Theology, pp.59-61.
I have argued that it is valid to speak of a tradition of thought and argument on the Trinity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which is distinct within the wider Latin tradition just outlined. I would emphasise that in this chapter I am concerned with beginnings, i.e. first identifiable instances, rather than with causes. I have left to one side the question of causes, why people began to discuss these issues when they did, since it strikes me as inseparable from the more general problem of the twelfth century as an epoch of unprecedented change and growth in virtually every aspect of medieval culture. In speaking of beginnings, then, my aim is to define and characterise rather than explain in causal terms the first instances of discussions on the Trinity which can be seen to have a resonance in the subsequent development of academic trinitarian theology and which bear, therefore, on the issue of continuity.

A beginning is far from being a tradition. In the light of the subsequent direction taken in discussions on the Trinity, however, it is possible to identify those elements and conditions which proved to be the defining features of a distinct tradition of thought on the doctrine. It is worth restating these briefly. Firstly, there was the emergence of permanent and semi-permanent centres for theological study; this was the essential precondition not only for the development of a sustained debate but also in providing the social and institutional background common to all who participated in it. This institutional setting was crucial for the intellectual coherence of discussions because theologians with this training were thereby in a position to understand one another - they spoke the same language, read the same texts, were practised in the same methods and often shared the same teachers. They were, in other words, discussing the same issues, communicating.

This period also witnesses the emergence of by far and away the most outstanding defining characteristic of the academic approach, the logico-semantic

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method in textual interpretation and problem solving. The concentration on the varied significations of the same word in different contexts as the source both of problems and of solutions took the form of piecemeal application in this early period, but was the foundation of the more systematic linguistic theology of the later twelfth century. This sensitivity to the necessity for technical exactitude in theological language accounts for such crucial distinctions as that between signification and supposition, which was to have such a decisive impact on the resolution of some of the more intractable of trinitarian questions. This more rigorous attitude to the propriety of theological language is also detectable in a more critical approach to the use of analogies which surfaces in this period, and which is also an important aspect of the Fourth Lateran Council’s criticism of Joachim of Fiore.

1. Anselm’s dispute with Roscelin

The first evidence that some thinkers were approaching the doctrine from a new point of departure comes, rather predictably in a study on scholasticism, from the works of Saint Anselm (d. 1109), Abbot of Bec (1078-1093) and then Archbishop of Canterbury. I say ‘predictably’ because of Anselm’s established position as the ‘Father of scholasticism’ and his well-known method of ‘faith seeking understanding’. But actually it is not so much that Anselm’s writings are themselves indicative of a new approach, as that they provide evidence of a new questioning attitude elsewhere. His approach, which relied little on patristic sources or the logic of question and answer, was not easily adaptable to the interests of subsequent writers who favoured self-contained and clearly demarcated problems. He had little discernible impact on the immediate development of academic theology on the Trinity.

It is, rather, Anselm’s confrontation with Roscelin of Compiègne (d. 1129) which is relevant for the academic tradition of thought on the Trinity. For Anselm, the articles of the Christian faith were enigmas to be illuminated in a variety of ways,  

2Much of Anselm’s claim to this title rests on his importance in Grabmann’s Geschichte der scholastischen Methode. For a recent account, see R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm. A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge, 1990).

3J. Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Univ. of Minnesota, 1972), pp.100-8 has an excellent summary.
but were certainly not to be challenged for the sake of maintaining logical consistency. The kind of questioning which seems to have been habitual for Roscelin, on the other hand, was to become a central activity of professional theologians. The systematic identification and resolution of logical contradictions in the Trinity which was characteristic of the twelfth-century scholastic approach is anticipated by Roscelin, not Anselm. Thus in both recensions of his *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* (completed in 1094), which was written as a refutation of Roscelin's own position on the Trinity, Anselm on numerous occasions inveighs against the temerity of the *moderni dialectici* who would presume to challenge such a basic tenet of Christain faith. It is no one's place to question what the Church teaches. If the Christian proceeds from understanding to faith, rather than from faith to understanding as he ought, any understanding which he attains will be worthless, or even worse, will be contrary to the Catholic faith.

Our first indication of disagreement between Anselm and Roscelin dates from c. 1089, when the monk John wrote to Anselm, praising his prudence in matters of faith and citing an argument about the Trinity which Roscelin had put forward: If the three Persons are one thing only, and not three things in themselves (*per se*), in the same way as three angels or three souls for example, so that even in terms of power and will they are altogether the same thing, it follows that the Father and the Holy Spirit are incarnate with the Son.

Roscelin's argument that the absolute unity of the three Persons in one thing necessarily implied that all three must therefore be incarnate was simply a contemporary version of the age-old problem of how to distinguish between unity and

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6 *Ep. de incarn. verbi* II, p.6.10-11: 'Nullus quippe Christianus debet disputare, quomodo quod catholica ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur non sit'.


trinity in God. It was becoming increasingly difficult, however, to depend solely on
the old answers as a means of resolving such questions, at least as far as sceptics were
concerned. In the same letter, the monk John also accused Roscelin of rejecting the
traditional analogy of the light and heat of the sun being distinct in one sun as a
similitudo for unity and trinity in God. In his own writings Anselm was careful to
point out that any analogies for the Trinity which he used were far removed from any
true likeness to it. In his river analogy, he draws a parallel between the source,
stream and pool being one entity, the River Nile, and the three Persons being distinct
in one God, but at the same time warns that this comparison is magna
dissimilitudo. This kind of conventional self-deprecation was perhaps becoming less
convincing than it had once been. For Abelard, the analogy’s imprecision was so
outrageous that he mercilessly held it up for ridicule before his students, perhaps in
retaliation for Anselm’s justification of papal censorship which may have contributed
to Abelard’s later condemnation at Soissons. Patristic-style analogies no longer
seemed to answer the logical objections of school-trained, would-be theologians.
They were increasingly discredited as convincing methods of explanation.

In his response to Roscelin, Anselm is anxious to clear himself from any
suspicion of trying to improve or correct patristic writings. On the contrary, by making
explicit those things about which the Fathers were silent, he actually adheres to their
teachings. More pressingly, it was felt necessary to issue some further refutation
because Roscelin had allegedly gone back on his promise at the Synod of Soissons in

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11Ibid. II, p.33.2; the complete analogy appears at pp.31-3.


14Ep. de incarn. verbi II, p.20.22-4: ‘non quasi docendo quod doctores nostri nescierunt, aut corrigendo quod non bene dixerunt, sed dicendo forsitan quod tacuerunt, quod tamen ab illorum dictis non discordet sed illis cohaeret’.
1092 to renounce his views. Some of Anselm’s monks gathered together Roscelin’s statements so that Anselm could resolve the issue once and for all.\textsuperscript{15} Again, Anselm says this by way of explanation, ‘in case any one should think that I have presumed to imagine that the strength of the Christian faith needed the aid of my defence.’\textsuperscript{16}

Despite this collection of Roscelin’s views, it is clear that Anselm had almost no idea what his opponent’s arguments really were. The views attributed to Roscelin by the monk John in his original letter to Anselm are repeated in both recensions of the \textit{Epistola de incarnatione verbi}, but most of Anselm’s attack is pure conjecture. Throughout his arguments, Anselm regularly anticipates Roscelin’s possible counter-arguments, with phrases such as ‘perhaps he will say, I venture’ or ‘he will answer’.\textsuperscript{17} He dismisses the possibility that Roscelin’s views have been misrepresented, instead concluding that the evidence is weighted overwhelmingly against his opponent.\textsuperscript{18}

Roscelin’s ultimate aim was to bring some measure of logical coherence to the doctrine.\textsuperscript{19} His only extant work is a letter to Abelard defending himself from his former pupil’s attacks.\textsuperscript{20} It is often unclear where Roscelin is putting forward his own view, that of someone else, or anticipating a possible counter-position. His assertion, for example, that all names spoken of God signify substance, and that it is only a case of linguistic convention that the Latins say three Persons and the Greeks say three substances, was a fairly standard explanation for the discrepancy in usage and hardly

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, II, p.5.1-4.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, II, p.5.4-6: ‘Quod rogo, ne putet aliquis me praesumpsisse quasi fortitudinem fidei Christianae meae existimem indigere defensionis auxilio’.


amounts to saying that the three Persons are three *res*.\(^{21}\) He brings out the obligatory rhetoric about avoiding the errors of both Arius and Sabellius.\(^{22}\) He unequivocally rejects the separation of substance maintained by Arius as introducing a hierarchy among the Persons. At the same time he seems to suggest that some degree of separation is unavoidable, as long as the Persons remain coeternal and coequal.\(^{23}\) This would presumably be the only way of avoiding the conclusion that the incarnation of the Son, where there is absolute unity of substance, was contingent upon the incarnation of the other two Persons.

Anselm is, however, clearly ignorant of the contents of this letter. His aim is to show that neither of the consequences put forward by Roscelin as reported to him by his original informant is necessary.\(^{24}\) He nevertheless takes his opponent’s contention that the three Persons must be three *res* more seriously than his argument that all three Persons must be incarnate, and in general proceeds as though this were Roscelin’s real position.\(^{25}\) Much of Anselm’s refutation, therefore, hinges on Roscelin’s use of the word *res*. In his initial reply on the matter, to the same monk John, Anselm characterises Roscelin’s novel language as either irrelevant (*superflue*) or heretical.\(^{26}\) If Roscelin simply means by the expression *tres res* nothing other than the three relations pertaining among the Persons, his teaching is pointless since it adds no new understanding to what is already established by Christian doctrine; if, however, he means that the relations themselves are things, in the same sense as the one


\(^{22}\) *Ep. ad Abaelardum*, p.74.


\(^{24}\) *Ep. de incarn. verbi* II, p.20.11-13: ‘Ostendendum ergo est in quo iste fallitur, et quomodo incarnationem solius filii non sequitur tres personas esse tres res separatas; aut si una sunt res tres personae, omnes eas incarnatas esse’.

\(^{25}\) Anselm’s emphasis on Roscelin’s view of the Persons as *per se separatim* is particularly strong in the second recension of the *Ep. de incarn. verbi* II, pp.12-13. This emphasis is supported by Abelard’s letter against Roscelin, which refers to his heresy as *tres deos confiteri*. See Peter Abelard, *Letters IX-XIV*, ed. E.R. Smits (Groningen, 1983), pp.279.

\(^{26}\) *Ep.129, Opera* III, pp.271-2.
substance which is God, either he thinks that there are three gods or he is talking nonsense. These arguments are taken up by Abelard and other writers.

Related to the signification of the word res, is Anselm's view that Roscelin's training in logic and his controversial views on universals are responsible for his erroneous doctrine. He has been followed in this respect by modern scholarly opinion, which sees Roscelin's supposed tritheism, the doctrine that there are three gods, as the theological counterpart of his nominalism. The nominalist position, that there are no universal substances, only universal terms (\textit{flatus vocis}) predicated of individual substances, makes it difficult to conceive of the unity of essence among the Persons as a single res since there can be no one thing which is essentially in each of the Persons. Roscelin seems to have taken this view of divine unity on the basis that where there is plurality there must also be separation. According to Anselm, Roscelin's logical misconceptions underlie his doctrinal errors:

For how does someone, who does not yet understand how several oxes in a species are one ox, comprehend of the most secret and exalted nature how several Persons, each one of which is perfect God, are one God? And how does someone, whose intellect is blind to the distinction between an ass and its colour, distinguish between the one God and his three relations?

This is an extremely revealing passage for what it says about the common ground between debates on universals and debates on the Trinity. Roscelin's inability to conceive of a form of unity of the type 'ox' or 'God', in which all individuals possessing the nature 'ox' or 'God' respectively are united, is conditioned both by his

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27Ibid., p.272.21-2: 'Quod si dicit tres personas esse tres res, secundum quod unaquaeque persona deus est: aut tres deos vult constituere, aut non intelligit quod dicit'.

28M.L. Colish, The Mirror of Language. A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge (Rev. edition; London, 1983), p.84 is right to stress the grammatical premises of Anselm's opposition, but it does not follow from this, as Colish says it does, that they are not also logical.


30Ep. ad Abaelardum, p.74.17-20: 'Quomodo enim, si sic est una, ut etiam plures sint, sicut Graeca clamat ecclesia, non separatur? Omnia enim plura pluralitatis lege separantur, quia scriptum est, quod omnis differentia in discrepantium pluralitate consistit'.

31Ep. de incarn. verbi I, p.285.11-16: 'Qui enim nondum intelligit quomodo plures boves in specie sint unus bos: qualiter in illa secretissima et altissima natura comprehendet quomodo plures persona, quorum singula quaeque perfectus est deus, sint unus deus? Et cuius mens obscura est ad diiudicandum inter asinum suum et colorem eius: qualiter discernet inter unum deum et trinam relationem eius?'

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denial that universals are substances and the fact that his intellect cannot rise above visible realities to higher spiritual truths. His deficiency, therefore, is both logical and spiritual. Further, the concept of unity which Anselm has in mind is conditioned not only by the Aristotelian distinction between primary substances (individual subjects) and the secondary substances (genera and species) which depend upon them, but also by an uncompromising concept of divine unity derived ultimately from Augustine. It was through this interplay between theology and philosophy that new questions emerged.

According to Anselm, then, for Roscelin res can only ever mean individual, not universal substance. Hence, when Roscelin says that the three Persons are three ‘things’, he must mean not simply that they are distinct through relation, but separate in substance. In this way, he fails to maintain the fundamental Augustinian distinction between substance and relation, upon which the entire doctrine of the Trinity depended. He confuses what is common with what is proper to each Person.

Although he does not use the term, Roscelin’s conception of divine unity is not unlike the collection theory of universals, whereby any degree of unity is contingent upon individuals being members of the same class or unit so that unity is always a collection of parts. He says that the Trinity is one not through singularity but through a kind of communion.

The problem with collection theory, according to Abelard, is that a universal cannot thereby be truly predicated of an individual, just

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32 Ibid. I, p.285.7-11: ‘In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quae et princeps et iudex debet omnium esse quae sunt in homine, sic est in imaginationibus corporeis obvoluta, ut ex eis se non possit evolvere nec ab ipsis ea quae ipsa sola et pura contemplari debet, valeat discernere’.


34 M.M. Tweedale, Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam, 1976), p.130: ‘The Trinity is one of those theological topics which in scholasticism forced to the surface logical questions that might otherwise have been skirted.’

35 Ep. de incarn. verbi I, p.286.14-16: ‘Cum igitur dicit has duas personas esse duas res, quaero quid dicat ibi esse duas res: an id quod commune est illis, an ea quae sunt singula propria singulis’.


37 Ep. ad Ahaelardum ., p.77.1-5: ‘Audisti trinitatem unam esse propter maiestatis communionem, non propter maiestatis singularitatem: quod enim singulare est, nullum modo commune est, et quod commune est, singularare esse non potest. Maiestas igitur trinitatis quia communis est, quomodo singularis esse potest?’
as the whole cannot be predicated of one part. Similarly, the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, a work which fuses elements from Abelard and the Victorines, contrasts unity of essence with unity of collection. Anselm also seems to read Roscelin's doctrine in this way. He anticipates Roscelin's counter-argument to the accusation that, in calling the Persons *tres res*, he has created three gods; perhaps, speculates Anselm, Roscelin would argue that collectively these *tres res* are one God. But this would be just as unacceptable, for then 'each single Person is not God, but rather God is composed from three things', and thus no Person alone is God, but only the three together. The most perfectly simple divine nature would thereby be turned into a composite being.

Given the paucity of the documentation, 'unity of collection' is, in fact, the most accurate label that can reasonably be given to Roscelin's doctrine. In this respect, there are strong grounds for linking Roscelin's conception of divine unity (roughly defined as unity of collection) with his position on the Father's generation of the Son. The possibility of this conceptual linkage is provided by a passage from Roscelin's letter to Abelard. This passage is important for my argument that there is an essential continuity in twelfth- and thirteenth-century trinitarian theology because it prefigures the interdependency of these doctrines of divine unity and divine generation in the work of Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard. That interdependency also provides the grounds for thinking that thirteenth-century interpretations of the Lateran decree, though a misunderstanding, may very well have something of value to say about the presuppositions of the decree. If one's position on divine unity was determinative of where one placed the divine essence in relation to the Father's generation of the Son, it is not fantastic to suggest that Joachim's condemnation for unity of collection could reasonably also be read as a condemnation of his view that essence begot essence. That is, only someone with a weak concept of unity of essence could think that

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40 *Ep. de incarn. verbi* I, p. 289.4-6: 'Ergo singula quaeque res de illis tribus, id est singula quaeque persona, non est deus, sed ex tribus rebus conficitur deus'.
The following passage of Roscelin is the first indication of this interdependency:

For the substance of the Father is nothing other than the Father, and the substance of the Son is nothing other than the Son, just as the city of Rome is Rome, and the watery creature is water. Therefore, because the Father begot the Son, the substance of the Father begot the substance of the Son. Because, therefore, the substance of the begetter is different from the substance of the begotten, the one is from the other. For the begetter and the begotten are always several things, not one, according to the doctrine of blessed Augustine, since 'there is absolutely no thing which begets itself.' For the begetter is unbegotten, whereas the begotten is the only-begotten [...] Therefore, we cannot entirely avoid introducing separation into the substance of the Holy Trinity.  

It is really not possible to say whether this passage is significant in terms of the textual transmission of ideas, though it is well to remember that this letter was addressed to Abelard, who was to go on to consider at length the problem of the Father's generation of the Son. Roscelin states explicitly that the relationship of opposition between begetter and begotten cannot be accommodated by an absolute unity of substance. As proof he cites Augustine's maxim, the importance of which is difficult to exaggerate, that no thing begets itself.  

It follows that there must be some measure of separation if Father and Son are to be truly distinct. What is important here is that positions taken on divine unity and the Father's generation of the Son have an almost symbiotic relation to one another. The very fact that Roscelin does this suggests that this connection was not just a conceptual possibility which we can imagine, but was one actually made by contemporaries.

2. Abelard's approach to theology in the Theologia

The so-called Theologia is Abelard's main theological work. It survives in three distinct versions all of which in turn underwent several revisions: the Theologia
According to the most recent chronologies, their composition spans a period of about 22 years, between 1118 and 1140. The earliest version, the TSum, was written in 1118-20 and condemned shortly after at the Council of Soissons in 1121. The second, the TChr, was written between 1122 and 1125 in response to the accusations levelled at Soissons and was further revised in the 1130s. The third and final edition, the TSch, including its revisions, was composed between 1134 and 1140. It was attacked by Bernard of Clairvaux and his supporters, resulting in its condemnation at the Council of Sens in 1140.

Each version of the Theologia develops and modifies the themes of its predecessor but the basic structure remains the same. In all three works, Abelard first establishes the doctrine of the Trinity according to scriptural authority before proceeding to recount logical objections. He aims most of his efforts at resolving these objections and at establishing a secure logical basis for the doctrine, thereby defending the doctrine on his opponents' own terms. This three-fold structure has been identified as Abelard's concept of theologia, that is, the specific task, as he conceived it, of proceeding from the articles of faith to the refutation of objections to the Trinity, rather than simply talking about God in general.

The main difference between the TSum and the TChr is Abelard's more frequent appeal to patristic authority, which seems to have been in response to the
criticism levelled at Soissons that he had paid scant attention to these authors. This criticism also partly accounts for Abelard’s decision to produce a collection of authoritative texts, the *Sic et non*. The status of the *Sic et non* as a source book for subsequent authors makes Abelard’s achievement in the provision of patristic authorities at least as important for the subsequent development of theology as his rational approach to theology. The final version, the *TSch*, is considered to be Abelard’s most mature treatment of the doctrine of God as well as the one most familiar to contemporaries. It is concerned less with the logical problem posed by the Trinity, the resolution of which had dominated the previous works, than with an appraisal of divine attributes and omnipotence.

Abelard defines the aim of his works in terms of a defence of the faith against the objections of pseudo-dialecticians. Like Anselm in the *Epistola de incarnatione verbi*, Abelard casts himself in the role of a sincerely motivated defender of orthodoxy. He does not presume to teach the true faith, only to defend it from impious attacks. The daily proliferation of new questions demand new answers. These new questions can no longer be adequately answered with reference to scriptural and patristic authority alone. If Abelard’s arguments are to be meaningful and his aim

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49 Cottiaux, ‘La conception de la théologie’, pp.255-6. This criticism is hinted at in the confrontation between Abelard and Alberic of Reims recounted by Abelard in the *Hist. calam.*, p.84.


54 *TSum* II.4, pp.114-15; II.25-6, pp.122-3; *TChr* IV.71-5, pp.297-300; *TSch* II.14-18, pp.412-14.

55 *TSum* II.26, p.123; *TChr* IV.71, p.297.1031-4: ‘Non enim hoc opusculo veritatem docere sed defendere intendimus, maxime adversus pseudo-philosophos qui nos philosophicos maxime rationibus aggrediuntur’.

56 *TSum* II.4, pp.114-15; *TChr* IV.72, p.297.1042-5: ‘et pro diversitate hominum vel temporum novae quotidie quæstiones vel impugnaciones oriuntur, novis quotidie rationibus resistendum puto, et novis ex orientibus morbis nova quaerenda remedia’.

57 *TSum* II.25, p.122.217-18: ‘At quoniam neque sanctorum neque philosophorum auctoritate importunitas argumentorum refelli potest’.
is to be carried out effectively, therefore, he is obliged to speak in the same terms as those used by his opponents.\textsuperscript{58} It is essential to present the Trinity in a way which will be plausible and comprehensible to those who attack it.\textsuperscript{59} As one author has written of the \textit{TSum}:

The intention is not to 'prove' by logical means - that is, to verify - that any revealed doctrine of the faith is 'true'. It is merely to illustrate by the principles of a linguistic polemic (\textit{Sprachlogik}) and by descriptive analogies that the content of faith statements is reasonable.\textsuperscript{60}

This rational defence of the faith corresponds to one of the three functions Abelard assigns to the use of reason in theology, the other two being the clarification of the meaning of Scripture and the reinforcement of authoritative texts.\textsuperscript{61} In this respect, indeed, Abelard belongs firmly within the tradition of Christian apologetics.\textsuperscript{62} He is especially in tune with a similar justification given by Augustine at the beginning of his \textit{De trinitate}.

Several of these pseudo-philosophers are singled out as proposing either particularly insidious or particularly inane objections to the Trinity. The chief target of this reprobation would seem to be Abelard's former master, Roscelin of Compiègne. In his letter against Roscelin, Abelard refers to him in the same language as his opponents in the \textit{Theologia}, that is, as both a pseudo-logician and a pseudo-Christian.\textsuperscript{63} It may even be the case that the \textit{TSum} was partly written with the

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, p.122.218-22: 'nisi humanis rationibus eis obsistatur qui humanis rationibus invehuntur, decrevimus et stultis secundum stulticam suam respondere et eorum impugnationes ex ipsis artibus quibus nos impungnant conquassare'.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, II.26, p.123.232-6: 'De quo quidem nos docere veritatem non promittimus, quam neque nos neque aliquem mortalium scire constat, sed saltem aliquid verissimile atque humane rationi vicinum nec sacre scripture contrarium proponere libet adversus eos qui humanis rationibus fidem se impugnare gloriuntur'.


\textsuperscript{61}Cottiaux, 'La conception de la théologie', pp.799-821.

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{TChr} IV.72, p.298.1051-3: 'in antiquis temporibus sancti patres ea quae tunc adversum Catholicam fidem opponi audiret rectis diluerent rationibus'.

\textsuperscript{63}Smits ed., p.280.41.
specific aim of convincing students of the superiority of Abelard’s trinitarian doctrine over that of Roscelin.\(^{64}\)

Abelard’s theological writings aroused considerable controversy at the time. Not only particular teachings but Abelard’s entire approach to Christian doctrine as an *existimatio rerum non apparentium* seemed to threaten its solid foundations.\(^{65}\) Most famously, William of Saint-Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux took exception to this definition of faith as an ‘estimation’ on the grounds that it reduced doctrine from the certainty of knowledge to the level of personal opinion.\(^{66}\) Given greater leisure, a man of William’s education might well have admitted the necessity of conducting a rational defence of the faith against those who used rational arguments to attack it. Indeed, he seems to have come some way towards this concession through his concept of *ratio fidei*.\(^{67}\) Bernard, for his part, took most of his pointers concerning Abelard’s errors from William. His effectiveness was as a shrewd rhetorician and polemicist rather than as an original thinker.\(^{68}\)

The campaign initiated by William of Saint-Thierry and brought to fruition by Bernard of Clairvaux eventually resulted in the condemnation of the *TSch* at the Council of Sens in 1140.\(^{69}\) Many of their criticisms came to be included in the

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\(^{64}\)Mews, *CCM* 13, pp.42-3.

\(^{65}\)*TSch* 1.1, p.318. The same definition is also characteristic of those works which have been assigned to Abelard’s school. See, for example, the *Sententiae florianses*, ed. H. Oostdender, Florilegium Patristicum 19 (Bonn, 1929), p.1; *Sententiae Hermanni*, ed. S. Buzzeni, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università di Milano 31 (Florence, 1983), p.25.4, and PL 178.1695A. D.E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard. The Influence of Abelard’s Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge, 1969).


nineteen capitula circulating against Abelard around the time of the condemnation.\textsuperscript{70} These capitula do not seem to be an official record of the decision at Sens, but were drawn up by William, Bernard and Thomas of Morigny, and circulated with Bernard’s letter against Abelard before the Council itself.\textsuperscript{71} Of these nineteen, three concerned trinitarian errors. The first of the capitula alleged that Abelard had attributed \textit{plena potentia} to the Father, \textit{quaedam potentia} to the Son and \textit{nulla potentia} to the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{72} In his \textit{Apologia}, written before the Council of Sens, Abelard says that Bernard would not have misunderstood his meaning here if he had had sufficient training in the verbal arts.\textsuperscript{73} Again emphasising Bernard’s ignorance, Abelard retorted that to say wisdom is a certain power and to identify the same wisdom with the Son is not the same as saying that the Son is a certain power: some words which may have a single \textit{significatio} can nevertheless change their meaning in the context of a particular sentence.\textsuperscript{74} Abelard also repudiated the second charge, that he had denied that the Holy Spirit was from the Father’s substance.\textsuperscript{75} The fourteenth capitulum accused Abelard of having attributed omnipotence specially or properly to the Father, on the grounds that the Father was from no other Person. This had also been the

\textsuperscript{70}For the full list see Mews, ‘The List of Heresies’, pp.108-10, first established by J. Rivière, ‘Les capitula d’Abélard condamnés au concile de Sens’, \textit{RTAM} 5 (1933), 5-22. For a full discussion of their accuracy see Luscombe, \textit{The School of Peter Abelard}, pp.115-42.

\textsuperscript{71}Mews, ‘The List of Heresies’, pp.96-105.

\textsuperscript{72}A similar accusation had earlier been levelled by Walter of Mortagne, in his \textit{Epistola Gualteri de Mauritania Episcopi ad Petrum Abelardum}, ed. H. Ostlender, Florilégium Patristicum 19 (Bonn, 1929), p.35.7-9; also \textit{De trinitate}, \textit{PL} 209.588-9; Jolivet, ‘Sur quelques critiques’, pp.18-19.


\textsuperscript{74}\textit{Ibid.}, p.363.136-46: ‘Scito itaque quae nescisti et disce quae non didicisti, quod quamvis idem sit “sapientia Dei” quod “Filius Dei”, aut “caritas Dei” quod “Spiritus Sanctus”, non tamen idem est dicere vel intelligere “Filium Dei esse quandam Dei potentiam” et “sapientiam Dei esse quandam eius potentiam”, vel “Spirimum Sanctum esse nullam Dei potentiam” et “caritatem sive amorem eius esse nullam potentiam”. Saepe namque contingit, ut cum voces aliquae per se acceptae sint eiusdem penitius significatis, in constructione tamen positae et eisdem vocibus aggregatae constructionis ita sententiam variant, ut ille verus sit constructionis sensus, ille falsus’.

\textsuperscript{75}The \textit{Apologia}, which only survives in fragmentary form, ends at this point. The refutation may be found, however, in Abelard’s \textit{Confessio fidei univeris}. See C.S.F. Burnett, ‘Peter Abelard, \textit{Confessio Fidei “Universis”: A Critical Edition of Abelard’s Reply to Accusations of Heresy}, \textit{MS} 48 (1986), p.134. Burnett suggests that the \textit{Confessio} may be a profession of faith circulated by Abelard before Sens.
principal charge at Soissons in 1121 at which William of Saint-Thierry, who first initiated the proceedings against Abelard, had been present.\(^7^6\)

Abelard’s belief that the Christian faith could be rationally explained if it had to be, and his opponents’ belief that it could not, was almost bound to lead him to make assertions about God which gave the appearance of diminishing divine ineffability, our sense of awe at the mystery of God’s being. It was this confidence which so disturbed Bernard and William. The novelty of Abelard’s enterprise was sensed, moreover, not just by monastic critics but by critics from within the schools. Abelard’s main opponents at the Council of Soissons in 1121, where the \textit{TSum} was condemned and publicly burnt, were other masters. Master Walter of Mortagne, later Bishop of Laon (1154-74), also reproached Abelard in about 1135 for his audacity for presuming to obtain a perfect knowledge of God.\(^7^7\)

Concern about Abelard’s views on the Trinity was also to do with the success of Abelard’s teachings. It is well known that he commanded an enormous influence among students in the schools, who, because of their common approach to theology and their espousal of particular doctrines, together constituted something of a ‘school’.\(^7^8\) Abelard’s particular brand of trinitarian theology, most notably his attribution of power, wisdom and goodness to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit respectively, was also adopted by such authors as Peter Lombard, Robert of Melun and Richard of Saint-Victor.\(^7^9\) Potentially much more threatening, though, than this body of Abelardian writings and also more apparent than Abelard’s more indirect influence upon subsequent theology, was the penetration of Abelard’s method and ideas into the ecclesiastical hierarchy itself. In the letter which accompanied his \textit{Disputatio}, William of Saint-Thierry referred to the fact that Abelard’s doctrines even

\(^{76}\)Mews, \textit{CCM} 12, p.56.

\(^{77}\)Ep. \textit{Gualteri ad Abaelardum}, p.35.4-7: ‘Quis autem orthodoxus de fide catholica tractaturus non veritatem, sed sensum opinionis suae promittat exponere? Quis etiam audiens non veritatem, sed opinionem promittit, fidem audiat sequentibus adhibere?’

\(^{78}\)See Luscombe, \textit{The School of Peter Abelard}, esp. pp.145-68.

\(^{79}\)Ibid., pp.263, 287, 302. Also Mews, \textit{CCM} 13, pp.264-6 on Abelard’s influence on the Lombard.
found their adherents at Rome. Among Abelard's pupils could be ranked such prominent figures as Master Guy of Castello, cardinal-priest of St Mark and the future Celestine II, and Hyacinth Boboni, who was to become Celestine III. A further candidate, although there seems no way of establishing this with certainty, is Pope Alexander III.

3. Logical and grammatical problems about the Trinity

Abelard attributes the contemporary debate on the Trinity to impious questions posed by logicians:

They attack the trinity of Persons with reference to the unity of essence and, on the other hand, go to great lengths to attack, on the grounds of the diversity of Persons, the identity of essence.

They are not satisfied with what the Church teaches on the Trinity. Instead, they find only logical inconsistency in the concept of the triune God. For surely the distinction of names in the Persons merely indicates a difference in words not things. And if this is not the case, and it is a real distinction, does that not mean that in God there is a threefold substance. If there is complete identity in God between substance and Person, either there is one Person because one substance, or three substances because

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80PL 182.531BC: 'Petrus enim Abaelardus iterum nova docet, nova scribit; et libri eius transseunt maria, transiliunt Alpes; et novae eius sententiae de fide, et nova dogmata per provincias et regna deferuntur, celebriter praedicantur, et libere defenduntur: in tantum ut in curia Romana dicantur habere auctoritatem'.

81Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, pp.20-1.

82Ibid., pp.22-3.

83J.T. Noonan, 'Who was Rolandas', in K. Pennington and R. Somerville edd., Law, Church and Society. Essays in Honour of Stephan Kuttner (Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1977), 27-48 questions the traditional identification of Roland, the canon lawyer influenced by Abelard, with Alexander III.

84TSum II.43, p.128.390-4: 'Quo in loco gravissime et difficillime dialectorum questiones occurrunt. Hi quippe ex unitate essentiae trinitatem personarum impugnans et rursus ex diversitate personas idem probatur esse essentiae oppugnare laborant'; TChr III.89, p.230.1143-6. For Abelard's rendering of the objections, see TSum II.44-62, pp.129-34; TChr III.90-114, pp.230-6.

85TSum II.44, p.129; TChr III.90, p.230.

86TSum II.46, p.129; TChr III.92, pp.230-1.
three Persons. These objections are restatements of Roscelin's original paradox: if there is absolute unity of substance, all three Persons must be incarnate (Sabellianism); or, if the Persons are really distinct, unity of substance cannot be binding (Arianism). Such questions surface constantly in subsequent writings.

Logicians also find fault with the imprecision of traditional theological language, for example, the expression 'triune God'. According to the rules of normal language it should mean three gods or three substances since triune is simply an enumeration of three. It does not make sense to say that there are three distinct Persons each of whom is substance and God, and not also say that there are three gods or three substances. Surely the two are simply different ways of saying the same thing, particularly since the plural noun is nothing other than the addition of its singulars. The question is why do we say three Persons and not three gods or three substances when each of the three Persons is that very same God and divine substance.

Logical sense would also require that because 'the Father is God' and 'God is eternal', it follows 'the Father is eternal'. Similarly, it should follow 'the Father is God', 'the Son is God' and thus 'the Father is the Son'. This rule must apply more particularly to God than to anything else since God is so uniquely singular. Just because, for instance, an individual man Socrates has many qualities and diverse forms inhering in him, does not mean that he is many persons. Socrates is a single, concrete essence, not a universal and thus all statements predicated of him refer to the same substance. Yet in God, who is utterly simple and has nothing in common with composite forms, there is this awkward distinction of Persons. The objection Abelard is here reporting ultimately asks: surely divine simplicity, the absence of forms in God

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87TSum II.47, pp.129-30; TChr III.93, p.231. Cf. Augustine, De trin. VII.8, CCSL 50, pp.257, PL 42.940-1; VII.11, CCSL p.262.28-30, PL 42.943: 'Cur ergo non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus sicut unam essentiam et unum deum, sed dicimus tres personas, cum tres deos aut tres essentias non dicamus'.

88TSum II.52, p.131; TChr III.98, p.232.

89TSum II.53, p.131; TChr III.100, p.232.

90TSum II.54, p.131; TChr III.101, p.232.

91TSum II.59-61, pp.132-4; TChr III.106-8, p.234. The ultimate source of this rule is Aristotle, Categories 3, p.6 (1b 10-15), but it is firmly rooted in logical textbooks, esp. those connected with Boethius' De topicis differentiis. See Abelard's Dialectica, ed. L.M. de Rijk (Rev. edition: Assen, 1970), p.352.31-3; E. Stump, Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic (Cornell, 1988).
and the fact that even in created things all predicative statements refer to the same substance, require that the Father is identical with the Son. The problem is again inspired by Roscelin's paradox that where Father and Son are the same unique and individual substance, if the Son is incarnate, so too is the Father.92

Since all of these objections derive from the same inability to accept a distinction of Persons compatible with an undivided substantial unity, Abelard responds to them all in more or less the same way. All of his answers are predicated on a theory of identity and difference which allows him to distinguish between essence and Person.93 For much of this Abelard is indebted to Porphyry's Isagoge and Boethius' De trinitate.94 Accordingly, the Persons are distinct not by substance, but by definition and proprium, just as a sword and a blade or this animal and this man have the same substance.95 And since 'Person' and 'essence' do not have the same definition, it does not follow that there is one Person because one essence or three essences because three Persons.96 It would be absurd to say that the Father is the Son because then we say that the proprium of the Father is the proprium of the Son, 'that is, to be the Father and to be the Son is the same thing by definition'.97

Apart from which, traditional usage forbids us to say this.98 Furthermore, he says that argument from the predicate, which holds that when the predicate of a proposition is

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92TSum II.61, p.134; TChr III.108, p.234.
94Mews, 'The Development of the Theologia', p.184. On the question of Abelard's influences, it is interesting to note that his approach is not unlike that found in a question on the Trinity attributed to his teacher, William of Champeaux. See O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, V, Problèmes de l'histoire littéraire: L'école d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux (Louvain, 1959), pp.192-4.
95TSum II.103, p.150.963-70: 'sic eadem est substantia ensis et gladii vel huius hominis et huius animalis. Sunt tamen ab invicem diverse persone, id est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, ad similitudinem eorum que diversa sunt secundum diffinitiones, eo videlicet quod, cum eadem penius essentia sit pater que est filius vel spiritus sanctus, aliud tamen proprium est patris, in eo scilicet quod pater est, et aliud filii et aliud spiritus sancti'.
96TSum III.1.4- pp.157-8; TChr IV.1-8, pp.266-9.
97TSum III.29, p.170.384-6. Cf. TChr IV.34, p.280.514-15 where proprium has been replaced by persona.
98TSum III.33, pp.171-2; TChr IV.41, p.283.
in turn the subject of another, it follows that its predicate may be joined to the subject of the first proposition, only applies in cases of essential identity, not identity of propria. This concept of the propria of the Persons helps Abelard explain why the incarnation of the Son does not entail the incarnation of the other two Persons. There is a unity of operation of the Trinity in the world, in which some works (incarnation) are appropriated to particular Persons (the Son). The doctrine usually noted as characteristic of Abelard is his attribution of the different propria of power, wisdom and goodness to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit respectively. But it is no less true that for Abelard the traditional mode of distinction for the Persons through the properties of unbegotten, begotten and proceeding is integral to his understanding of the doctrine. It is in fact in these terms that Abelard discusses the question of divine generation, thus moving closer to a resolution of the problem of unity and trinity in God.

The problem with Abelard’s solution, as contemporaries noted, was that it tended to reduce the Persons to mere aspects of the same reality. This is particularly true of Abelard’s recurrent use of the analogy of the three grammatical persons which described the same individual according to different perspectives. Otto of Freising identifies a similarly inappropriate analogy in that of the three parts of a proposition (non bonis usus exemplis) as the grounds for Abelard’s condemnation at Soissons in 1121. He attributes this Sabellianism to Abelard’s nominalism. Otto’s reading

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99 TSum III.41-2, p.175; TChr IV.56-7, pp.289-90.


101 TSum II.103, p.151.972-3: ‘proprium est patris posse, filii discernere, spiritus sancti benignum esse’.


of the condemnation, however, bears little resemblance to Abelard's account. He is probably thinking less of the events at Soissons than of Bernard and William's more recent criticisms. In particular, his assertion that the Persons are not merely vacua nomina but res distinctas suggests this. In addition, Otto's application of the expression res distinctas to the Persons, so reminiscent of the erroneous doctrine attributed to Roscelin, reveals a fundamental lack of understanding of recent discussions, and the new sensitivity to the need for technical precision in language about God.

4. Abelard's dispute with Alberic of Reims on the Father's generation of the Son

For Abelard the question of how the Son is begotten from the Father is perhaps the most crucial question in twelfth-century trinitarian theology. It constitutes the most significant obstacle to a coherent doctrine of trinity and unity in God. For only a satisfactory doctrine on divine generation can in the end account for a real and meaningful distinction among the Persons, since it is the act of generation which alone establishes the grounds for distinction.

The importance of this undertaking is further underlined by the fact that the majority of trinitarian errors listed by Abelard derive from an inability to understand how the Persons can be distinct without this undermining divine unity and simplicity. The Son is consubstantial with the Father, a point which had been established since the fourth century. Also uncontroversial was that the Son was divine essence begotten from the Father, that is, the Son received his essence from the Father. The unsettling question in the twelfth century, however, was how to distinguish in this respect between essence and Person. The inviolability of divine simplicity and unity seemed to require that whatever can be said of the Father can also be said of the Son on the grounds that both Father and Son possess the same essence, a train of thought leading

\[\text{\textsuperscript{105}} \text{Ibid., p.69.19-20. The charge of Sabellianism is reasserted in the DTC 1, 45-6 and 15.2, 1713, though rejected by Cottiaux, 'La conception de la théologie', p.810 and Jolivet, 'Sur quelques critiques', pp.13-14.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{106}} \text{William, PL 180.253C, cites against Abelard's view that the names of the Persons are improperly applied to God, the assertion of Ambrose, Non sunt nuda haece nomina, sed operatricis virtutis indicia.}\]
to Sabellianism. On the other hand, maintaining a rigid distinction between essence and Person held the danger of destroying divine simplicity in one way or another.

It was Roscelin who had first formulated this paradox, with his proposition that if the three Persons were one thing the Father must be incarnate, or, if only the Son was incarnate, it followed that the three Persons were three distinct res. Another version of this failure to distinguish between different terms used to describe God arose at the Council of Soissons in 1121 and is mentioned in all versions of the Theologia: the view which Abelard attributes to Alberic of Reims (d. 1141) that 'God begot God' necessarily implies (1) 'God begot himself'; (2) 'substance begot substance'. Abelian's lengthy response to Alberic's position attempted to show that the Father's generation of the Son was not incompatible with a numerical unity of substance; that divine unity was not jeopardised by divine generation. In many ways, Abelard's semantic approach anticipates subsequent developments towards the theory of supposition.

In his own bitter recollection of his condemnation at the Council of Soissons in 1121, Abelard accused his main opponents, Alberic and Lotulph of Lombardy, of acting purely out of jealousy. He says that they struggled to find a genuine basis for a condemnation. As a last resort, they cited Abelard's allegedly exclusive attribution of omnipotence to the Father as sufficient grounds. The condemnation itself does not seem to have been definitive, probably because such an apparatus did not yet exist.

Abelard's rivalry with Alberic went back to their student days under Master Anselm of Laon (d. 1117). The public nature of disputation presented an ideal opportunity for an ambitious and confident student such as Abelard to make a name

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108Hist. calam., p.83.708-10: 'Unde emuli mei vehementer accensi concilium contra me congregaverunt, maxime duo illi antiqui insidiatores, Albericus scilicet et Lotulfus'.

109Hist. calam., p.88.871-4: 'Ut tamen non nichil dicere viderentur, quidam de adversariis meis id submurmuravit quod in libro scriptum deprenderat solum patrem Deum omnipotentem esse'. Jolivet, 'Sur quelques critiques', p.11 says there is no textual basis for the accusation.

110Mews. CCM 13, pp.56-7.

111Luscombe. The School of Peter Abelard, pp.179-81.
for himself by challenging the opinion of the master conducting the debate.\textsuperscript{112} The result was that he had few friends.

For his part, Alberic of Reims retained his master's emphasis on biblical exegesis.\textsuperscript{113} Although many sources testify to the fame and influence of his teacher, Anselm of Laon, the only writings which can be assigned with certainty to the latter are his scriptural commentaries. Nor can the collections of 'sentences' which have been attributed to various members of Anselm's school be necessarily relied upon as indicators of Alberic's own stance on particular issues.\textsuperscript{114} Indeed, the whole question of a 'School of Laon' is notoriously problematic, particularly the notion that a uniform and systematic approach to theology characterises the works of the school, if it may even be defined as such.\textsuperscript{115} But even allowing for some common elements among these various writings, this is still not a secure basis for extrapolating methods and doctrines from them to assign to Alberic. Our knowledge of the composition of these texts does not permit this. Nor would it be of much use in relation to determining whether Alberic's dispute with Abelard had any precedent in teaching at Laon, for the simple reason that very few 'sentences' pertain to the Trinity, and none whatsoever


\textsuperscript{113}J.R. Williams, 'The Cathedral School of Reims in the Time of Master Alberic, 1118-1136', Traditio 20 (1964), pp.97-100.

\textsuperscript{114}The texts tend to take one of two forms: either collections of excerpts, of which some are attributed to Anselm of Laon (\textit{Liber Pancræsis}), or more uniform compilations (\textit{Sententiae divinae paginæ} and \textit{Sententiae Anselmi}). For the latter two, see \textit{Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen}, ed. F. Bliemetzrieder, \textit{BOPTM} 18 (Münster, 1919). Others may be found in various publications by O. Lottin: 'Nouveaux fragments théologiques de l'école d'Anselme de Laon', \textit{RTAM} 11 (1939), 242-59, 305-23; 12 (1940), 49-77; 13 (1946), 202-21, 261-81; 14 (1947), 5-31, 157-85; \textit{Psychologie et morale V}.

\textsuperscript{115}On the one hand, see R. Silvain, 'La tradition des sentences d'Anselme de Laon', \textit{AHDLMA} 16 (1947-48), 1-52, who argues strongly in favour of there being a discernible structure to the writings in question, which he considers a function of their status as \textit{reparationes} of Anselm's original Sentences. This argument was rejected by Lottin, \textit{Psychologie et morale V}, pp.178-83, who suggested (pp.444-5) instead that the uniformity of these works was due to their derivation from Anselm's biblical commentaries. More recently, see V.I.J. Flint, 'The "School of Laon": A Reconsideration', \textit{RTAM} 43 (1976), 89-110, who rejects the idea that any common approach is due to a school of Laon as such, but is a more widespread intellectual phenomenon. For a modification of this view, see M.L. Colish, 'Another Look at the School of Laon', \textit{AHDLMA} 53 (1986), 7-22, who argues that the importance of the Laon texts lies not in their systematic approach, but in their application of techniques for the interpretation of conflicting authorities.
to the particular point of contention between Alberic and Abelard.\textsuperscript{116} The orientation of these texts is overwhelmingly towards spiritual and sacramental questions.\textsuperscript{117}

In a personal encounter which took place before the main session at Soissons, Alberic had confronted Abelard with his assertion in the \textit{TSum} that even though ‘God begot God’ and God is unique, it did not follow that ‘God begot himself’.\textsuperscript{118} Abelard implies that this was merely another desperate ploy to find some valid basis for condemning his work.\textsuperscript{119} In response to Alberic’s demand that he produce some authority for this statement, Abelard was able to point to his own citation of Augustine’s dictum that no thing begets itself. He then proceeded to show that Alberic’s position led to the doctrine that the Father was his own son. In the \textit{TChr}, Abelard explores further Alberic’s line of reasoning. If God begot himself, it follows that a Person begot himself, which again is Sabellianism.\textsuperscript{120}

Alberic also infers from the statement ‘God begot God’ that ‘substance begot substance’.\textsuperscript{121} The guiding assumption here is the necessity to preserve divine simplicity. ‘Substance begot substance’, since the divine substance is unique, would in turn imply, says Abelard, that the same thing begot itself. But both reason and authority reject this.\textsuperscript{122}

In effect, Alberic’s determination to preserve the identity of essence in God has led him into the age-old error of sacrificing the trinity of Persons to divine unity. In the twelfth century, though, as distinct from the third, the route to this error was through a failure to distinguish between the different significations of different words or the same words in different contexts on the assumption that to do so would undermine the identity of essence in God. Arguing from this principle, Alberic

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{116} The following is the closest printed by Lottin: ‘Deus pater Deum filium genuerit, non voluntate neque necessitate, sed natura’. See \textit{RTAM} 13 (1946), p.212.
\item\textsuperscript{117} O. Lottin, ‘Nouveaux fragments théologiques de l’école d’Anselme de Laon’, \textit{RTAM} 14 (1947), p.159.
\item\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Hist. calam.}, pp.84.5. Also \textit{TChr} III.110-11, pp.235-6; IV.78, pp.301-2; \textit{TSch} II.64, p.440.
\item\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Hist. calam.}, p.84.751-2; ‘Quadam autem die, Albericit ad me animo intemptantis cum quibusdam discipuli suis accedens’.
\item\textsuperscript{120} \textit{TChr} IV.110, p.235.
\item\textsuperscript{121} \textit{TSum} II.62, p.134; \textit{TChr} III.109, p.235.
\item\textsuperscript{122} \textit{TSum} II.62, p.134; \textit{TChr} III.109, p.235 citing Augustine, \textit{De trin.} I.1. CCSL 50, p.28.32-6, \textit{PL} 42.820.
\end{itemize}
therefore identifies the terms ‘God’, ‘substance’ and ‘Person’ with one another without qualification. The importance of distinguishing between the general meaning of words and their meaning in particular contexts is one of the governing principles of Abelard’s response. ‘God’, ‘substance’ and ‘Person’ all denote the same thing, but they do not signify it in the same way. They cannot be substituted for each other indiscriminately merely because identity of essence in God requires that everything in God is identified completely with the divine essence.

Abelard’s approach to these interrelated problems takes the form of a theory of verbal signification which will allow a differentiation between how terms signify and the actual things which they signify. He is able to do this because he has liberated himself from the traditional analysis of universals in terms of genera and species in favour of a theory of predication based on Aristotle’s principle that universals are those things which may be predicated of many subjects. He is interested in how a *sermo*, a significant word, can be predicated of many things rather than in how it is that a universal inheres in many singular things. In this way, he is able to avoid the problems which arise when conventionally nominalist or realist positions are taken with reference to the Trinity, for neither of these extreme positions could accommodate the unity-trinity balance.

In his refutation of Alberic’s position, Abelard adopts a number of analogies which convey the main point of this theory of signification. In the *TSum* and the *TChr* these analogies consist of comparisons of the Father’s generation of the Son to

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that of a species from its genus, form from matter and a waxen statue from wax. In
the TSch this general format is retained, but the image of the waxen statue from wax
is replaced by that of the bronze seal from bronze. These comparisons are
intended to demonstrate that the same terms can be predicated of each other both
absolutely and relatively, that is indicating identity of essence and distinction of
relation between two terms. Thus in terms of identity, or absolute, it can be said
that 'the waxen statue is wax' or 'the bronze seal is bronze', but in terms of relation,
or relative, only that 'the waxen statue is from wax' and 'the bronze seal is from
bronze'. This is the same as saying that the Son is that which is the Father and
is from the Father, but not that he is the Father; for just as the waxen statue is from
the wax, but not therefore from itself, so the Son is from the Father, but not therefore
from himself. For this reason, when we wish to convey the notion of a
relationship, rather than the identity of substance, the terms in question cannot be
predicated of one another absolutely, but only relatively. Otherwise the result is
that something is from itself.

The Father's generation of the Son is thus compared to examples from created
things. For Abelard these analogies are valid because they reveal that identity of
essence is compatible with some form of distinction through property even in created
things. How much more, therefore, is this true of God. Abelard proceeds to adduce
additional arguments which demonstrate that identity of essence does not unavoidably
result in an absolute equivalence between two terms in every respect. His aim here is

\[\text{127}\text{These analogies are adopted by works which belong to Abelard's school. See Sent. Floriansenses, pp.5, 7;}
\text{Sent. Hermanni, pp.68, 72-4, PL 178.1717, 1720; Sententie Pariensienses, ed. Landgraf, Ecrits theologiques de l'école}
\text{d'Abébard, p.9; Die Sentenzen Rolands, ed. A.M. Giet (Freiburg, 1891), pp.28-9; Robert of Melun, Questiones de}
\text{epistolis Pauli, p.27.}
\]

\[\text{128}\text{TSum III.54-61, pp.180-3; TChr IV.86-90, pp.306-9; TSch II.141-7, pp.478-80.}
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\[\text{129}\text{TSch II.147, pp.479-80: 'Sicut igitur in ere et erceo sigillo absoluta eorum nomina sibi per predicationem}
\text{coniunguntur, quando videlicet eorum eandem esse substantiam demonstramus, veluti cum dicimus "es est eorum}
\text{sigillum" vel econverso, et similia, nec tamen eorum relativa nomina [...] sed non ipse pater est filius, scilicet sui,}
\text{vel est spiritus sanctus, cum ipse videlicet pater non procedat ex patre, hoc est ex scipso vel filio sicut spiritus ex}
\text{patre procedit sive filio.'}
\]

\[\text{130}\text{TChr IV.90, p.309: 'eadem, inquam, proportionis ratione et in divinis personis neque Pater est Filius, hoc}
\text{est Deus Pater genitus a se ipso, neque Filius est Pater, hoc est Deus Filius genitor sui ipsius.'}
\]

\[\text{131}\text{Cf. Sent. divine pagine, pp.9-10: 'Cum autem dicatur vere: pater est idem quod filius, et e converso, non}
\text{tamen vere dicitur: pater est filius; quod per tale simile confirmant sancti: splendor, radius et sol, ideo non tamen}
\text{vere dicitur: radius est sol'}.}
\]
to show that identity of substance does not mean that, where there is a distinction of relation, this amounts to saying that something begot itself. For instance, matter is to form as Father is to Son. Thus, relatively speaking, matter is not its own form, just as the Father is not the Son. The relationship is in each case one of begetter to begotten.\textsuperscript{131} No other conclusion is permissible on the grounds that no thing causes or begets itself. Matter and form, begetter and begotten refer to one and the same thing in reality; but the Father is not the Son, not because Father and Son each denote a separate substance, but because the Father did not beget himself.$^{132}$ And thus the analogy of the wax and the waxen statue easily destroys the objection that the essential identity between Father and Son requires that if the Father begot the Son, the same thing begot itself.$^{133}$ For since the waxen statue which is said to be from the wax cannot be shown to be the same as it by definition, although it is numerically and essentially the same, we cannot say that the same thing is from itself.$^{134}$ Similarly with Father and Son which are distinct in terms of definition and property, though they are the same in essence, it does not follow from the fact that the Son is begotten from the Father that something is begotten from itself.$^{135}$

Again Alberic might counter with the authority of the Nicene Creed, ‘God from God’ (\textit{dicis mihi quia Deus de Deo}).$^{136}$ For since the word ‘God’ is a proper name indicating one undivided and singular substance, it must be conceded that

\textsuperscript{131}TSum III.60-1, pp.182-3; TChr IV.89-90, p.308; TSch II.145-6, p.479.

\textsuperscript{132} TChr IV.90, p.308.1368-77: 'Eadem itaque ratione qua non licet dici quod materia ex se ipsa sit materiata, vel materiatur sui ipsius sit materia, vel constitutum sit constitutum ex se vel posterius se vel generans se, quamvis in talibus idem sit essentialiter materia quod materiatur, velut hoc aes idem quod haec statua, et idem constitutum quod constitutum, et idem prius quod posterius, et generans quod generans, - eadem, inquam, proportionis ratione et in divinis personis neque Pater est Filius, hoc est Deus Pater generans a se ipso, neque Filius est Pater, hoc est Deus Filius personis sui ipsius'.

\textsuperscript{133} TChr IV.102, p.315.1600-4: 'Quod vero objectum est quod, quia idem si essentialet Filius quod Pater et Pater generet Filium, idem generet se ipsum, hoc est quia Filius, ut diximus, est ex Patre, idem sit ex se ipso, - facile est quasari ex simulitudine superius indacta, de cera videlicet atque cerea imagine'.

\textsuperscript{134} TChr IV.102, p.315.1619-21: 'non possit ostendi id quod dicitur esse ex illlo idem esse definitione cum illo, non est ideo verum idem esse ex se ipso, etsi hoc idem sit essentialiter ac numero cum illo'.

\textsuperscript{135} TChr IV.102, p.316.1622-5: 'cum Pater et Filius diversi ab invicem sint tam definitione quam proprietate, licet sint idem essentialiter, non est necesse ut, cum Filius sit ex Patre vel generetur ex Patre, idem sit ex se vel generetur ex se'.

\textsuperscript{136} TSum III.62, p.183; TChr IV.103, p.316.
something begot itself.\textsuperscript{137} Abelard responds that God is distinct from God by definition or property according to the distinction of Persons.\textsuperscript{138} In the same way that one man is distinct from another by definition or property, but it does not follow from this that the same thing, man, is distinct from itself. Abelard discusses here very explicitly the problem of the signification of the word ‘God’ in a way which has a direct bearing on subsequent treatments of the same issue. In the expression ‘God from God’, the word ‘God’ has different meanings. Moreover, the placing of the preposition ‘de’, which indicates a relation between begetter and begotten, between ‘God’ and ‘God’ shows that the Persons rather than the substance are being indicated.\textsuperscript{139} This is possible because of the context, and because words are often transferred from their normal signification to another.\textsuperscript{140} It is not so amazing, then, that in the Creed a common name such as ‘God’ should take on the properties of personal names.\textsuperscript{141} In the context of Alberic’s objection Abelard has to show that this transference has taken place. Alberic’s contention is that ‘God’ signifies the divine essence or substance and since this is unique and individual, ‘God begot God’ necessarily implies ‘substance begot substance’ and ‘something begot itself’. But if Abelard can show that in the expression ‘God from God’, the word ‘God’ does not signify substance but Person, he has destroyed the entire premise of Alberic’s argument. This is precisely how subsequent authors will proceed in their treatment of the same problem.

In this way Abelard is able to preserve the identity of essence between the three Persons, thus maintaining divine simplicity, and at the same time allow for the distinction of the Persons through their properties. As Jolivet, defending Abelard’s analogies from William of Saint-Thierry’s criticisms, writes:

\textsuperscript{137}TSum III.62, p.183.768-71; TChr IV.103, p.316.1626-32.

\textsuperscript{138}TChr IV.103, p.316.1638-9.

\textsuperscript{139}TSum III.62, p.183.

\textsuperscript{140}TSum III.62, p.184.782-3: ‘Sepe autem voces ex adiunctis a propria significatione evocantur ad aliam’.

\textsuperscript{141}TSum III.65, p.185.824-6: ‘Quid ergo mirum si in simbolo fidei commune nomen trium personarum, quod est deus vel lumen, ex appositis transeat in significationem personalium nominum’.
Abélard cherchait à opposer aux ‘pseudo-dialecticiens’ une structure logique qui fasse s’unir identité et différence dans un même sujet, tout en incluant un rapport d’origine entre les deux termes différents.\(^{142}\)

Abelard’s theory of absolute and relative predication and his insistence that two things may denote the same substance without this implying absolute equivalence in terms of either one’s special distinguishing property was an attempt to answer the questions of logicians. This semantic approach anticipates the later distinction between significatio and suppositio. Moreover, Abelard’s treatment of Alberic’s doctrine set the terms for the debate on one of the key questions in this area, whether divine essence (or substance) begot divine essence. His devastating refutation of Alberic’s view that ‘God begot God’ implies ‘substance begot substance’ was borrowed by subsequent authors and quickly became established as the prevailing orthodoxy in the schools. This argument was to have an exceptionally long life-span. It became so entrenched in academic thought on the Trinity that it proved to be the key talking point in thirteenth-century interpretations of the Fourth Lateran Council’s statement on the doctrine.

\(^{142}\) Sur quelques critiques’, p.31.
The heated debates and personal exchanges which characterised the first half of the twelfth century tailed off during the second. This change in tone and intensity was partly a consequence of the replacement of one generation of theologians by another, the early pioneers by their successors. Another factor in the shift to a more structured and impersonal approach was the institutionalisation of study itself, particularly the increasing authority of the master and pivotal role of the *quaestio* technique. In this chapter I wish to consider a further aspect, strongly interrelated to these two: the role of Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* as a common source in the academic study of theology and as a text which informs the structure of virtually all subsequent scholastic theological writings, irrespective of any notional allegiance of the authors to a particular master or ‘school’.

The *Sentences* both reflected this tendency towards greater convergence in method and doctrine among theologians and at the same time were an agent in this process. There is no denying the work’s central role, intellectually and chronologically, in opening the way to the doctrinal consensus of the later twelfth century. Its universal adoption as a theological reference work was a necessary precondition for the emergence of this consensus before 1215. In particular, the Lombard’s concept of the essence as a *quaedam summa res*, and his related position that the essence does not beget, were at the centre of the Fourth Lateran Council’s clarification of the doctrine. For the Lombard, as for Abelard, there is an implicit link between the doctrines of divine unity (of essence) and divine generation (not of essence) which is reflected in the Lateran decree itself. His position that unity of essence (*quaedam summa res*) precludes the generation of the essence is cited in the decree and is the immediate cause of thirteenth-century misinterpretations. But it is also, paradoxically, the reason why these very same authors may be justified in their interpretation. They almost exclusively discuss the question of the generation of the essence and ignore that of the *quaedam summa res*, but the strong connection between these two issues in the *Sentences* gave them reason to think this a legitimate way of approaching the decree.
Peter Lombard was born in Lombardy but made his name in France.¹ In about 1134, Bernard of Clairvaux wrote to Gilduin, Abbot of Saint-Victor in Paris, telling him that the Lombard was travelling to northern France to study at the schools of Reims and Paris (moraretur in Francia causa studi) and entrusting him to his care.² In the same letter, he explained that he had been asked by the Bishop of Lucca to act as the Lombard’s guardian during his stay in France. This detail is of considerable interest for the Sentences themselves, since one of the work’s most important sources is the anonymous Summa Sententiarum which may have been written by Otto, Bishop of Lucca (1138-1146).³ The Lombard’s recommendation by Otto’s predecessor, Hubert (1128-1137), is concrete evidence of his link with the town. Together with the Lombard’s extensive borrowings from the Summa Sententiarum this suggests that if Otto is its author, the Lombard probably studied under him at Lucca.⁴

Peter was probably drawn to Reims by its international reputation for theological study, particularly under the aegis of Alberic of Reims who taught there until 1136.⁵ During his period at Reims, the Lombard may also have heard Walter of Mortagne, from whom he was also to borrow, lecture at nearby Laon.⁶ From Reims, the Lombard went to Paris where he stayed until his death in 1160.⁷ Before his appointment as Bishop of Paris in 1159, he was first a canon, then a subdeacon and finally an archdeacon of Notre-Dame.⁸ In the period up to 1159, he taught at the school of Notre-Dame and wrote his three major works, the Glossa in Psalms (c.

⁴Ibid., pp.542-3.
⁵Williams, ‘The Cathedral School of Reims’, p.102. Alberic himself, however, does not seem to have exerted a major influence, at least not on the Lombard’s trinitarian theology.
⁷Ibid., p.42*.
1138), the *Glossa in epistolae Pauli* (after 1148)\(^9\) and the *Sentences* (1155-57).\(^10\)

1. The *Sentences*: sources, organisation and methods of interpretation

Peter Lombard's *Sentences* consist of a series of *quaestiones* divided into four books according to subject. The first book deals with the Trinity and God's foreknowledge and omnipotence, the second with creation and original sin, the third with the incarnation and the fourth with the sacraments. The *quaestio* technique used by the Lombard depended on the juxtaposition and critical reading of authoritative texts with a view to reconciling any contradiction in them, the so-called *sic-et-non* technique developed by Abelard. Because *quaestiones* are the basic units which collectively make up the work, the sources which they draw upon are absolutely fundamental to its entire organisation. Further, the Lombard’s arrangement of these *quaestiones* is by no means arbitrary; there is, at least in the first book, a discernible conceptual progression. Finally, the methods of interpretation which the Lombard adopts in his solutions again lead us back to his sources, since his solutions usually depend upon how he clarifies the sense of a particular passage.

The sources of the *Sentences* fall into two general categories: scriptural and patristic sources on the one hand, and contemporary authors on the other. But ancient texts were often drawn from contemporary writings which cited them rather than directly from the original work. It is often important to identify the immediate context from which a passage is taken as this may help in clarifying the Lombard’s own use of it. The Lombard certainly used original works as his pioneering use of the recently translated (c. 1154) *De fide orthodoxia* of John Damascene demonstrates.\(^11\) At the same time, his selection and interpretation of sources was also determined by their most recent usage.

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\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 82*-8*-8* disagrees with D. Van den Eynde's dating to 1142. Eynde had inferred this from his dating of one of Gerhoch of Reichersberg's works in which the Lombard's commentary is mentioned. See *L'oeuvre littéraire de Géoch de Reichersberg*, Spicilegium Pontificii Athenai Antoniani 11 (Rome, 1957), p. 76.

\(^10\)Brady, *prolog.*, p. 32*.

Of all patristic authors, Augustine is by far the most often cited. Some would even go so far as to call the *Sentences* a compilation of Augustinian citations. Accordingly, the Lombard’s Augustinianism guarantees his orthodoxy. A more accurate picture balances the importance of Augustine’s authority against Peter Lombard’s selective use of it. But apart from anything else, the structure of the *Sentences* bears little resemblance to the *De trinitate*; Augustine’s three-fold division of scriptural proofs, rational proofs and the image of the Trinity in man is not adopted by the Lombard. Indeed the entire second half of the *De trinitate*, where Augustine discusses and refines his argument about the image of the Trinity in man, has been condensed by the Lombard into a few chapters at the beginning of the work. In addition, the Lombard’s citations indicate a strong preference for the middle section of the *De trinitate*, where Augustine meets Arian objections to the consubstantiality of Father and Son with a series of rational arguments and justifications. Clearly, this was the approach which made the most sense to anyone involved, as was Peter Lombard, in the twelfth-century schools.

Most of the authoritative texts cited by Peter Lombard had already been cited in previous works, such as seventh-century Spanish collections or anonymous *florilegia*. But contemporary theological writings unquestionably account for the vast majority of the Lombard’s citations in Book I. These include the *Decretum* (c. 1093) and *Panormia* (c. 1094) of Ivo of Chartres, Gratian’s *Decretum* (1140),

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17 *PL* 187.
and the biblical gloss generally known as the *Glossa ordinaria*. By far and away the most important, however, are Abelard’s *Sic et non* and *Theologia* and the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum*.

The same works which provide the Lombard with many of his scriptural and patristic citations also have the strongest bearing on the structure and content of the *Sentences*. When the Lombard takes on an entire block of citations he is often also adopting the very concept governing the use of those same passages in his source. This is certainly the case with his wholesale borrowing from Abelard of a series of scriptural passages which, like his source, he employs as New Testament proofs for the Trinity. Much the same could be said of the Lombard’s extensive borrowings from the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum*, written in 1138-41, which is one of the most important sources for his trinitarian doctrine and was probably the most important reference work before the *Sentences*. The *Summa* was once thought to be the work of Hugh of Saint-Victor, but an emerging scholarly consensus points instead to Otto, Bishop of Lucca, probably one of Peter Lombard’s teachers. The author also shows an ambivalence to Abelard not unlike the Lombard’s own.

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18 *PL* 113-114. Generations of scholars attributed the *Glossa* to Walafrid Strabo (d. 849) under whose name it is printed by Migne, until B. Smalley argued that the *Glossa* is a collaborative work mainly put together by Anselm of Laon. She thus also rejected the argument of H.H. Glunz, *History of the Vulgate in England from Alcuin to Roger Bacon* (Cambridge, 1933), pp.213-15 that Peter Lombard had been responsible for arranging the *Glossa* in its final form. See ‘Gilbertus Universalis, Bishop of London (1128-34), and the Problem of the *Glossa Ordinaria*’, *RTAM* 7 (1935), 235-62 and 8 (1936), 24-60; ‘La *Glossa Ordinaria*. Quelques prédecesseurs d’Anselme de Laon’, *RTAM* 9 (1937), 365-400; *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (3rd edition; London, 1983), pp.46-66, which summarizes the earlier articles. See also G.R. Evans, *The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1984), pp.37-47. A recent challenge to this view was issued by E. Bertola, ‘La *Glossa Ordinaria* biblica ed i suoi problemi’. *RTAM* 45 (1978), 34-78, refuted by R. Wielockx, ‘Autour de la *Gloss Ordinaria*’, *RTAM* 49 (1982), 222-8.


21 Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, pp.207-13 who revises the old view of de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, p.197 and others that the *Summa* represents ‘le confluent des deux courants’ of Abelard and the school of Saint-Victor.
It is now well-established that the *Summa* was the pivotal contemporary source for the Lombard’s trinitarian doctrine. Again, as with Augustine, the way round the charge of plagiarism was to qualify the nature, if not the extent, of the Lombard’s borrowing, by emphasizing his shrewd principles of selection and the improvements he often makes upon his source.

Peter Lombard’s extensive borrowing from contemporary authors and, through them, of oft-cited patristic texts, allowed the transmission of many of the same questions and arguments from the first to the second half of the twelfth century. The assimilation of these early debates into the *Sentences* provided a link between the early and later parts of the century so that we can truly speak of continuity in twelfth-century trinitarian theology.

The Lombard himself conceived of the work as a useful collection of texts. Indeed, after the *Sentences* there was very little new research on the Church Fathers until the later thirteenth century. Again, the notion of the *Sentences* as a work of compilation raises the familiar spectre of plagiarism, the lazy regurgitation of other people’s work. But given centuries of accumulated and unsorted material on every conceivable theological issue intelligent plagiarism was understandably a highly valued commodity in the twelfth century. The *Sentences* were considered a prototype of thirteenth-century *compilationes*. The use of the third person passive and the

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23 Ibid., pp.179-85 for the Lombard’s use of patristic authorities found in the *Summa*.

24 See prologus, *Sent.*, p.4.23-6: ‘brevi volumine complicans Patrum sententias, appositis eorum testimoniis, ut non sit necesse quaerenti librorum numerositatem evolvere. cui brevitas collecta quod quaeritur offert sine labore.’


27 A. J. Minnis, ‘Late-medieval discussions of *compilatio* and the role of the *compilator*, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 101 (Tübingen, 1979), p.394. N. Hathaway, ‘*Compilatio*: From Plagiarism to Compiling’, *Viator* 20 (1989), 19-44 argues that *compilatio* is not simply a thirteenth-century phenomenon, but one dating back to late antiquity. In the thirteenth century it is not a new ‘genre’, so much as a more widespread
profuse citation of patristic authorities engenders an impersonality which tends to draw attention away from the author to the authorities which he cites. 2 But as well as amassing this vast quantity of material, the Lombard had to find some way of making it accessible to his readers, an organizing principle which corresponded to the need for a rational rather than an arbitrary ordering of theological questions. The Sentences were not the first attempt in the twelfth century at a systematic treatment of the entire gamut of theological issues. But the Lombard’s plan was not strictly modelled on any single predecessor, whether theologian or canon lawyer. 29

As a work of synthesis, the Sentences are often seen as bringing together and reconciling the different strands in twelfth-century theology, particularly the speculative and the symbolic. Espenberger inaugurated this thesis when he defined the Lombard’s theology as a middle way between fideism and rationalism. 30 This assessment of the Lombard’s cautious moderation has dominated subsequent scholarship. 31 According to de Ghellinck:

En même temps qu’elle tirait parti de cette soif de recherche et de spéculation, qui caractérisait le réveil intellectuel de son èpoque, elle gardait une attitude fort réservée vis-à-vis de toute curiosité indiscreète. Ces deux caractéristiques lui faisaient tenir une sorte de via media entre les divers courants qui se partageaient les esprits. En outre, comme nous l’avons déjà insinué, le manque d’originalité dans beaucoup de parties et l’indécision du Magister dans un certain nombre de questions, qu’il ne faut pourtant exagérer, faisaient de son livre un excellent thème à leçons, où pouvait se donner carrière l’interprétation des commentateurs. Comparé aux affirmations tranchées d’Abélard, ou aux énoncés très fermes de Gilbert de la Porée, aux pages toutes personnelles de Hugues de Saint-Victor, l’ouvrage de Pierre Lombard offrait de prime abord des ressources précieuses pour la facilité du commentaire. 32

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29De Ghellinck, Le mouvement théologique, pp.416-510 proposed the idea that the codification of canon law was an essential ingredient in the composition of the Sentences.


32Le mouvement théologique, pp.244-5.
This hits the nail on the head. De Ghellinck subscribes to the *via media* thesis, but goes much further when he argues that this very moderation, or rather anonymity, on the part of Peter Lombard, meant that contemporaries now possessed a source book of arguments from a number of points of view, rather than a collection of one man’s opinions. Theologians wanted a series of arguments with which to engage, not a litany of personal opinions.33

The Lombard’s method in relaying these arguments is essentially that of Abelard’s *sic-et-non* method, where great stress is placed on the role of diverse signification in the resolution of apparently contradictory texts.34 This explains the prominence of the verbs *videtur*35 and *intelligitur*36 in the Lombard’s explanations; the *seeming* contradiction between two authoritative texts arises when insufficient attention is paid to the meaning of a word in a particular context; but every problematic text can be *understood* in such a way that its true meaning is brought to the surface. This juxtaposition of seemingly discordant authorities lies at the root of the *quaestio* technique.37

The origins of the *quaestio* have been variously identified in the disputations of secular law students at Bologna;38 the practices of Islamic law, which could have


35*Sent. V.*. 1, p. 82.4-5: ‘Huic autem videtur contrarium quod Augustinus ait’; *ibid.*, p. 82.23-4: ‘Praedictis autem videtur esse contrarium quod dicit’; *ibid.*, p. 83.4: ‘Determinatio eorum quae videntur contraria’.

36For example, *Sent. V.*. 1, p. 82.12: ‘Ad quod respondemus, illa verba sic intelligenda esse dicentes’; *ibid.*, p. 83.10: ‘Quod autem ita intelligi debet’; *ibid.*, p. 84.15: ‘Quomodo sint intelligenda praemissa verba Hilarii’; *ibid.*, p. 86.28-9: ‘Vehementer moven nos haec verba; quae quomodo intelligenda sint’.

37De Rijk, *La philosophie*, pp. 96-8. On authors and councils accepted as authoritative in the middle ages, see Ivo of Chartes, *Panormia*, PL 161.1101-16.


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been transmitted to the West via Byzantium or Spain; and the increased availability of Aristotle’s logical works, known collectively as the *Organon*. Aristotle’s *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and Boethius’ commentaries and own logical works (*logica vetus*) were already becoming more widely available in the eleventh century. In addition, twelfth-century translations of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *De sophisticis elenchis* (*logica nova*) may have provided theologians with a more sophisticated apparatus for developing methods of argumentation. The problem of origins is compounded by the fact that the act of asking questions is of course not historically specific to twelfth- and thirteenth-century scholastic theology, but is inherent in human nature, and the medieval method has precedents in antiquity. But rather than being the result of some external stimulus, the *quaestio* technique was much more the product of the critical reading to which theologians began to subject their sources. Their reading of the works of Aristotle


41On the availability of the *logica vetus* in the ninth to eleventh centuries, see M. Haren, *Medieval Thought. The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century* (2nd edition; London, 1992), pp.88-9. The standard version of the *Categories* used from the tenth to the sixteenth century was not Boethius’s translation, but one made at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries. See L. Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam, 1972), pp.35-6. That the *logica vetus* was truly conceived as an integral whole, at least from the twelfth century, is suggested by the common occurrence of Aristotle’s *Categories* and *De interpretatione* along with Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in the same manuscript. See, J. Isaac, *Le Peri Hermeneutis en Occident de Boëce à Saint Thomas*, Bibliothèque Thomiste 29 (Paris, 1953), pp.38-9.


44There is no really dramatic increase in copies of the *Categories*, *De interpretatione* and *Isagoge* until the early thirteenth century, well after the establishment of a dialectical method of questioning. See Isaac, *Le Peri Hermeneutis*, p.36 for the *De interpretatione*. Isaac’s research has been expanded upon with similar conclusions for the *Categories* and the *Isagoge* by O. Lewry, ‘Boethian Logic in the Medieval West’, in M. Gibson ed., *Boethius. His Life. Thought and Influence* (Oxford, 1981), pp.103-4. Scholastic method was already well-defined before the
and Boethius, far from being a passive reception of already developed techniques, was a productive process by which they read their own assumptions into their sources. The most distinctive feature of theological questions is this link between quaestio and lectio. Hence the central importance of authoritative texts in the framing of questions since the practice of lectio, the use of dialectic to isolate and solve problems of meaning, was an extremely rich source of questions. As Landgraf wrote many years ago, 'Il n’y a aucun doute que les questions se rattachaient à cette lectio.' The widespread practice of the quaestio and its unifying role in academic theology will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Lombard’s semantic approach and his application of the quaestio technique is highlighted particularly well in his treatment of various questions on the Holy Spirit. One problem is why the Holy Spirit is called caritas and amor, when the Trinity as a whole is caritas and amor. The apparent contradiction is one raised by the juxtaposition of a series of passages from Augustine’s De trinitate. That the Holy Spirit is the love or charity of the Father and the Son is shown by Augustine’s statement that the Father and the Son love one another through the Holy Spirit. Augustine himself provides the key to advent of the logica nova. See J.A. Endres, ‘Über den Ursprung und die Entwicklung der scholastischen Lehrenmethode’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 2 (1889), 52-9; de Rijk, La philosophie, p.98.

An excellent example is Gilbert of Poitiers who, in his commentaries on Boethius’ Opuscula sacra, understands Boethius’ intention to solve the question of the Trinity to be an actual quaestio. See J. Marenbon, ‘Gilbert of Poitiers’, in Dronke ed., A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy’, pp.332-3.


Particularly good on this, esp. the role of glosses, is A. Lang, Die theologische Prinzipienlehre der mittelalterlichen Scholastik (Freiburg, 1964), pp.26-33.


Sent.X.1.2. p.110; citing Augustine, De trin.XV.27. CCSL 50A. p.501 PL 42.1080.
the solution when he says that the Holy Spirit is properly called charity, just as the Son is properly called wisdom. Peter Lombard synthesises these passages when he explains that in the Trinity caritas sometimes refers to the common substance and sometimes specially to the Person of the Holy Spirit. And, just as the Holy Spirit is common to Father and Son, so it takes a common name as its own special name (proprium).

The same methods are employed to resolve amicably the question, in controversy between the Greek and Latin Churches, of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Several scriptural passages demonstrate that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father: God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts (Gal 4, 6); and the Son says of the Holy Spirit, whom I will send you from the Father (Jn 15, 26). The Greeks, however, deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but only from the Father, and in support cite several scriptural passages as well as the councils of the early Church. To the charge levelled by the Greeks that the Latins are to be anathematised for having disobeyed the conciliar injunction that nothing else is to be taught than what is stated in the creeds, the Lombard responds that this means nothing contrary to Church doctrine; it was not said that nothing was to be added or made explicit. On top of all this, says Peter, the Greeks agree with us on the essentials of the doctrine but simply diverge over the words used to express it. For the Greeks confess that the Spirit is of the Son and of the Father, which is the same as saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Finally, the Lombard rests his case on a series of citations from the Greek Fathers which,
according to his interpretation, show that Greek authorities themselves maintain that
the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son.  

Peter Lombard’s methods of interpretation here are fairly convincing and his
reconciliation of seemingly mutually exclusive points of departure is a notable success,
though his solution owes much to the work of previous authors, especially Abelard
and the Summa Sententiarum. The examples given here are by no means exhaustive
but merely serve to give some indication of the methods which the Lombard had at
his disposal. The systematic regularity with which he employs these techniques will
become apparent in his approach to trinitarian theology.

2. Book I: The Trinity

In theology, the Trinity would seem an obvious place to start. More than any
other aspect of Christian doctrine, writing on the Trinity constituted a distinct and
well-defined tradition in Latin theology. The genre was dominated by the De trinitate
of three of the most accomplished Latin theologians, Hilary of Poitiers, Saint
Augustine and Boethius. Their writings on the Trinity, along with the conciliar
statements of the early Church, provided trinitarian theology with a really solid base
to draw on. Peter Lombard was, however, the first author, even as late as the twelfth
century, to begin a systematic treatise with the doctrine of the Trinity. He had an
outstanding precedent in Abelard’s Theologia, but that work was almost exclusively
devoted to the subject of the Trinity. By placing the Trinity at the beginning of a
theological summa, the Lombard achieved real insight. In a conceptual as opposed to
chronological arrangement, the doctrine of God, inseparable from the Trinity, naturally
held place of honour. Moreover, the doctrine was, because of its association with the
Greek philosophical tradition via Augustine and Boethius, particularly receptive to the
kind of speculation characteristic of twelfth-century scholarship in all fields.

The overall structure of the first book of the Sentences very broadly follows
the plan of the Theologia, but probably indicates an Abelardian inspiration rather than

\[\text{Sent.XI.2, pp.116-17.}\]

\[\text{Summa Sententiarum, PL 176.52D; Abelard. TSch II.148-60, pp.480-5.}\]

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a strict model. Like Abelard, the Lombard begins the work by giving a definition of faith which explains the order of subjects treated. Not the faith, charity and sacraments of Abelard, but Augustine’s division of the world into things (res) and signs (signa), meaning God and everything which gives a sign of God. True, by far the bulk of the first distinction is taken from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana (20 citations), but the basic structure resembles Abelard’s: from him comes the Lombard’s justification for writing on the Trinity, the citation of the scriptural testimony, the definition of the doctrine in its most essential form and finally the systematic examination of specific trinitarian problems. The difference lies in the Lombard’s conciseness and refusal to digress. Where Abelard divides problems from their solutions, the Lombard introduces and resolves each question in the same place.

The Lombard begins the discussion proper by justifying the very activity of writing on the Trinity with a citation from Augustine. Its purpose, according to Augustine, is to teach that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God of one substance, that there are not three gods, but rather the Father begot the Son and thus he is not the Son, the Son was begotten from the Father and thus he is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit is neither the Son nor the Father, but their spirit, coequal to both and pertaining to the unity of the Trinity. In other words, there is unity in the essence and plurality in the Persons (ut sit unitas in essentia et pluralitas in personis). This is the doctrine stated in its purest and simplest terms. It allows the Lombard to go straight to the heart of trinitarian theology, the problem of how to maintain the correct unity-trinity balance. Hugh of Saint-Victor cites the same Augustinian text but not until Book II of his De sacramentis. By placing this passage at the very beginning of

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62 J. Schneider, Die Lehre von dreieinigen Gott in der Schule des Petrus Lombardus, Münchener theologische Studien II: Systematische Abteilung 22 (München, 1961), p.12 also compares the general structure with the Theologia.

63 This is also the interpretation of G. Angelini, L'ortodossia e la grammatica. Analisi di struttura e deduzione storica della teologia trinitaria de Prepositino. Analecta Gregoriana 183 (Rome, 1972), p.66.

64 Sent. II.2.1. p.62.

65 Augustine, De trin.1.7. CCSL 50, pp.34-5. PL 42.824.


67 PL 176.376B.
both his discussion of the Trinity and of the work as a whole. the Lombard throws the whole debate on the Trinity into relief, immediately drawing attention to the central issue. Again this is Abelard’s approach, but the Lombard is even more to the point.

The Lombard proposes to proceed first by dealing with the scriptural authority on the Trinity and second by defending the faith from malicious attack. Most of the scriptural passages which follow are cited from Abelard’s Theologia ‘Scholarium’ and Abelard’s influence is also conspicuous in the Lombard’s semantic breakdown of certain texts. In his analysis of Gen. 1, 26, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, he is particularly concerned to give the precise meaning of each word; ‘faciamus’ and ‘nostram’ signify the plurality of the Persons, and ‘imaginem’ the unity of the essence. But the Lombard also cites authorities in support of his interpretation. This gives the impression of total objectivity or impersonal mode of address, which no doubt accounts for the moderation with which the Lombard is so often attributed. Peter Lombard is giving his opinion concerning the meaning of the words no less than Abelard, and the interpretation was in any case an uncontroversial one, but he adduces numerous authorities to reinforce his reading of the scriptural text. As a result he could not be accused, as Abelard had been, of reducing faith to an existimatio.

The Lombard also omits any material which is not of immediate relevance to the central problem of trinity and unity. For example, he begins his chapter on New Testament proofs for the Trinity with a sentence from the Theologia ‘Scholarium’. However, where Abelard has a long section on the knowledge of the Trinity in pagan

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69 ISent. II.4, p.64-11-12: ‘Dicens enim Faciamus et nostrain, pluralitatem ostendit; dicens vero imaginem, unitatem essentiae’. Although Abelard seems to be the Lombard’s immediate source, the discussion of this scriptural text was well-established in the twelfth century. See the Sententiae divine pagine, p.7; Summa Sententiarum, PL 176.51A.

70 De fide ad Petrunt, PL 65.674C; and in a garbled form, Hilary, De trin. III.23, CCSL 62, p.96, PL 10.92A-B; IV.17-18, CCSL 62, pp.120-1, PL 10.110C-11C.


72 ISent. II.5.1, p.67.10-11, citing TSch I.94, p.356.
philosophers.\textsuperscript{74} the Lombard proceeds directly to the relevant passages. Clearly Abelard’s intention was to depict the gradual revelation of the Trinity throughout history, first in the Old Testament, then by Greek and Roman philosophers and culminating with the full revelation in the New Testament.\textsuperscript{75} But the knowledge held by pagan philosophers is completely irrelevant for the Lombard, since they do not rank as authorities on the Christian faith. This facilitates a brevity and logical coherence which is not a notable feature of the \textit{Theologia ‘Scholarium’}, or, for that matter, of the \textit{Sentences} (c. 1152-60) of the Lombard’s contemporary, Robert of Melun.\textsuperscript{76} Nor indeed does Greek philosophy feature strongly in the work as a whole. This is perhaps the most fundamental difference between the \textit{Sentences} and the \textit{Theologia}. There are no long discussions in the \textit{Sentences} on Aristotle’s definition of substance or the different degrees of identity and difference delineated by Porphyry. This may also account for the Lombard’s virtual rejection of Boethius, whose work was so fundamentally informed by pagan philosophy.\textsuperscript{77} It is not that the Lombard avoids any ontological definition of terms such as essence, substance and Person, but he does not become embroiled in a lengthy and complex discussion. This absence of major digressions is characteristic of the economy of the Lombard’s approach. It must have been a crucial element in the accessibility of the work to others who had been similarly educated in the \textit{quaestio} technique. Similarly, Peter Lombard rejects Abelard’s controversial analogies between the Trinity and various forms of genus and species.\textsuperscript{78}

The rest of Book I consists of an ordered consideration of various aspects of trinitarian theology, through the framing and resolution of a series of questions. This

\textsuperscript{74}\textit{Sch} I.94-199, pp.356-405.

\textsuperscript{75}Simonis, \textit{Trinität und Vernunft}, pp.46-53.

\textsuperscript{76}For example, \textit{Sent.}5.XXXV, pp.229-32, \textit{Oeuvres de Robert de Melun} 4 vols., ed. R.M. Martin, SSL 13, 18, 21, 25 (Louvain, 1932-52), where Robert discusses at considerable length the question of whether there is a difference in signification between ‘God’ and ‘Person’, only to come to no firm conclusion, except to refer the reader to a previous discussion. All references to Robert’s works will be to SSL 25 (Louvain, 1952).

\textsuperscript{77}S. Otto, ‘Augustine and Boethius im 12. Jahrhundert. Anmerkungen zur Entstehung des Traktates \textit{De Deo Unio}’, \textit{Wissenschaft und Weisheit} 26 (1963), 15-26 detects different approaches between theologians, i.e. Peter Lombard and Gilbert of Poitiers according to their preferred authorities.

\textsuperscript{78}\textit{Sent.}XIX.7-9, pp.165-9.
is in accord with the Lombard’s stated intention to defend the faith from impious questions. The very first question with which he deals is the proposition that ‘God begot God’ implies ‘God begot himself or another God’. Immediately, therefore, we enter the semantic discussion about the term ‘God’. This is crucially important in subsequent writings, including thirteenth-century interpretations of the Lateran decree. In his account of the position of Alberic of Reims, the Lombard, like Abelard and the anonymous Summa Sententiarum, identifies the root of the problem in the expression from the Nicene Creed ‘God from God’. The Lombard’s version of Alberic’s argument is almost identical with Abelard’s. The basic apparatus, including the important Augustinian dictum that no thing begets itself, was to become a permanent feature of twelfth- and thirteenth-century discussions. The Lombard goes on to consider the proposition, also reported by Abelard, that if ‘God the Father begot God’, either he begot God who is God the Father or God who is not God the Father. The only possible response is that ‘God the Father begot God who is not the Father’, where the correct meaning (sensus verus) is clearly God the Son.

It is significant that the first question which the Lombard considers should relate to the problem of divine generation. This must surely be an indication of the central importance of this question in academic thought on the Trinity. It was a core concern because it was the point of convergence of several really key issues in trinitarian theology. The exact nature of the Son’s relation to the Father was after all the very problem which had given rise to some concept of divine Trinity in the first place. In fact many of the early chapters of the Sentences (Distinctions IV-VII, IX-

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79 Sent. IV.1.1, pp.77-8.

80 Sent. IV.1.1, p.78.5-6. Cf. Abelard, TSum III.62, p.183; TChr IV.103, p.316; Summa Sententiarum, PL 176C. The Summa’s influence on the discussion of this question can also be discerned in the Ysagoge in theologiam, pp.252-3 and the Sent. divinitatis, p.160*.

81 Augustine, De trin.I.1, CCSL 50, p.28.33-6, PL 42.820.

82 For subsequent treatments of the same question in unpublished manuscripts, citing the Augustinian passage: Glossa, BM Royal 7F XIII, fol.7va; Sententiae Udonis, Munich Clm. 7622, fol.4ra; Hubertus, Summa, Munich Clm. 28799, fol.3ra; Summa, BM Royal 9E XII, fol.151va. Not citing Augustine: Quaestiones, BM Harley 3855, fol.12ra and Paris Maz. 1708, fol.249ra; Peter of Capua, Summa, Munich Clm. 14508, fol.2ra; Quaestiones, BM Royal 9E XII, fol.233ra; Commentarium in Petri Lombardi Sententiarum prologum, BN lat. 3894A, fol.185va. Authors citing the Augustinian passage tend both to cite more authorities in general and to rely more on the Sentences, from where they take these authorities, than their counterparts.

83 Sent. IV.1.2, p.78. See Abelard, TChr III.111, pp.235-6. Also Robert of Melun, Sent.4.XXI, p.142.
XIII) concern themselves with various aspects of divine generation. The longest of these chapters, the first chapter of Distinction V, is also the longest in Book I. Here the Lombard considers the question ‘whether it ought to be conceded that the Father begot the divine essence, or that the divine essence begot the Son, or that essence begot essence, or that the divine essence in no sense begot or was begotten.’

This was one of the most hotly contended issues in discussions on the Trinity.

The genesis of this question would again seem to be in Abelard’s *Theologia* and in his dispute with Alberic of Reims at the Council of Soissons in 1121. Abelard had ridiculed the position allegedly taken by Alberic, namely that, if divine simplicity was to remain intact, ‘God begot God’ necessarily implied ‘substance begot substance’. By the 1150s, there is little indication that the issue was causing divisions in any conventional sense - no author actually proposed the view that the divine nature begets. This suggests that we would be wrong to associate specific individuals or groups with the alleged disputants. Rather, we are confronted here by one of the most distinctive features of scholastic thought, its tendency towards repetition and regurgitation. But such repetition was not necessarily pointless, since in this case the problem of ‘essence begot essence’ brought so clearly into focus the question of divine unity and trinity. It was fairly quickly established that the divine essence could not beget, but it remained to discover how best to explain this. Moreover, the certainty that the essence did not beget represented a constant in a shifting landscape of argument and counter-argument. Its internal logic was so secure that it could be used as a control for other arguments, and an argument was often valid only if it was compatible with the essence as non-begetting. Certainly, it was

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84 *Sent.* V.1.1, pp.80-1.


86 *TSum* II.62, p.134; *TChr* III.109, p.235; *Hist. calam.*, pp.84-5.

87 O. Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus. Ihre Quellen und ihre dogmengeschichtliche Bedeutung* (Leipzig, 1902), pp.17-18 was certainly wrong to identify Gilbert as the Lombard’s opponent here.
used by Gilbert of Poitiers and his supporters to justify the need for a distinction between essence and Person, as well as in support of their claim that the personal properties could not be predicated either of the essence or of the Persons themselves. They argued that if these distinctions were abandoned the unavoidable consequence would be the generation of the essence. This method of argumentation is already apparent in the *Sentences*, but achieves greater expression in subsequent works.\(^{88}\)

The Lombard's treatment of the question again relies principally on Abelard and especially the *Summa Sententiarum*. This is a prime example of how the Lombard assimilates earlier debates which are then taken up by subsequent authors, thus revealing the essential continuity in twelfth-century trinitarian theology. The Lombard's principal refutation of the proposition depends less on the Augustinian dictum popularised by Abelard, that no thing begets itself, than on a question found in the *Summa*. There the author asks:

> it may be noted that since the Son is wisdom begotten from the Father, and the Father is wise by his own wisdom, whether the Father is wise by the wisdom which he begot from himself.\(^{89}\)

The author cites a series of Augustinian texts against this interpretation. Now this question is dealt with twice in the *Sentences*, once as a separate question (XXXII.2), but firstly in the context of the problem presently under consideration. The Lombard's solution is very similar to the author of the *Summa*, even though his precise selection of Augustinian texts differs. His main argument builds on the idea that just as the Father cannot have begotten his own wisdom, nor can he have begotten his own cause, the divine essence:

> if the Father is the begettor of the divine essence, since it is by the divine essence that he both is and is God, therefore it is because he begets that he is and is God. Thus not that which is begotten from the Father is therefore God, but the Father by the fact that he begets, both is and is God; and if it is so, the one begotten is the cause of the begetter being and being God, rather than the begetter the cause of the one begotten both being and being God.\(^{90}\)

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\(^{88}\)See section 3 of this chapter, esp. pp.97-102.

\(^{89}\)PL 176.60A.

\(^{90}\)Sent.V.1.4. p.81.16-20: 'si Pater est genitor divinae essentiae, cum ipsa essentia divina et sit et Deus sit, eo ergo quod generat et est et Deus est. Ita ergo non illud quod generatur est a Patre Deus, sed Pater eo quod generat et est et Deus est; et si ita est, non genito gigneres, sed gignenti genitus causa est ut et sit et Deus sit'.
The Lombard’s formulation of the opposing argument as a *reductio ad absurdum* demonstrates that the doctrine that the essence begets is untenable, since in that case the Father would have begotten the very thing which makes him God. This makes a nonsense of the *self-evident* truth that the begetter, not the begotten, is the natural cause of something. The Augustinian citations which follow depend on an analogy between being and being wise which recalls the problem as it was posed in the *Summa*. Thus the Lombard cites Augustine’s view that it is totally insane to suggest that in God, in whom being is the same as being wise, the Father is wise by the wisdom which he begot. For in order to maintain divine simplicity, we would consequently be in the position of saying that the wisdom which the Father begot caused him to be for the very reason that it also caused him to be wise. ‘Therefore,’ says the Lombard, ‘if the Father begot the essence by which he is, the essence which he begot caused him to be; therefore, he did not beget that very essence by which he is.’ The reason that the divine essence cannot beget or be begotten is that it is *una et summa quaedam res*, an absolute and unique entity; if essence begot essence then the same thing would have begotten itself. The Lombard is clear that the essence cannot both be a *quaedam summa res* and begetting. For him the one excludes the other because where there is one supreme reality, if it begets, it begets itself which is impossible. Strictly speaking it is not absolutely necessary that this should be the case, and at least one theologian, Peter Olivi in the late thirteenth century, could envisage a doctrine whereby the essence was both a *quaedam summa res* and begetting. But Olivi is the exception, and his doctrine depends on a flexible definition of essence which was no longer widely accepted. In general, academic theologians took it as axiomatic that the *quaedam summa res* implied the essence as non-begetting and vice versa. The interdependence of these doctrines of divine unity and divine generation is important in its own terms, but also has a critical bearing on our understanding of the Fourth Lateran Council where the issue is raised precisely with reference to this section in the *Sentences*. The Council defended the Lombard’s *quaedam summa res* against the unity of collection attributed to Joachim. Later commentators, however,

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91 *Sent.* V.1.4. p.81.29-31.

92 *Sent.* V.1.6. p.82.20-1: ‘cum enim una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia, si divina essentia essentiam genuit, eadem res se ipsam genuit, quod omnino esse non potest’.
were much more interested in another, probably interrelated, alternative to the Lombard’s position, the view that the divine essence is begetting. Having condemned Joachim’s unity of collection, it was only natural that the Council should reject yet another contender to the Lombard’s *quaedam summa res*, the view that essence begets essence.

Thus for Peter Lombard the Persons as begetting, begotten and proceeding, and the essence as common are diametrically opposed theological absolutes: a Person can never be common and the essence can in no sense beget. Yet essence and Person are not for this reason ontologically distinct, as the Lombard effectively says when he cites Augustine’s statement that three Persons are of the same essence, but are not from *ex* the same essence.93 In other words, the relationship between essence and Person is not the same as that between cause and effect.94

The Lombard’s subsequent discussion on divine simplicity reinforces the logic of his denial that the divine essence begets.95 He takes the classic Augustinian line on divine simplicity, citing him to the effect that there is no distinction in God between substance and quality, and no accidents in God. Great stress is placed upon the great distance which separates God and creation in this respect. Creatures are in no way simple, but composed of parts and subject to accidents.96 Only God is truly simple (*solum Deum vere simplicem esse*).97 Thus the multitude of names used to describe God do not reflect a composite nature because they all signify one thing, the divine nature.98 This section thus underlines the absoluteness of the divine essence and the impossibility of its self-generation.

93 *ISent. V. 2.4, p.88.12-15; citing Augustine, *De trin.* VII.11. CCSL 50, pp.264-5, PL 42.945.

94 See *ISent. XIX. 8, p.166.29-30: ‘Non ergo secundum materialem causam tres personas unam dicimus essentiam, sicut tres statuae dicuntur unum aurum.’


97 *ISent. VIII. 5. p.99.30-1.

98 *ISent. VIII. 5, pp.99-100: ‘Sed hoc non propter diversitatem accidentium vel partium dicit, sed propter diversitatem ac multitudinem nominum quae de Deo dicuntur; quae, licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant, scilicet divinam Naturam.’
3. Opposition to Gilbert of Poitiers

Because Peter Lombard does not attribute any of the arguments which he cites to specific individuals, using instead the anonymous *quidam* or the impersonal *queritur*, identifying his opponents is not straightforward. The detached and impersonal tone of the Sentences tends to emphasize the consensus of opinion on any given issue rather than the view of any single individual. But besides his rejection of certain of Abelard’s doctrines, it is generally thought that the Lombard’s main objection in trinitarian theology was to the teachings and theological method of Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-54). This opposition is said to account for the rivalry between the ‘schools’ of the Lombard and Gilbert, which was to determine the course of theology in the second half of the twelfth century and culminate in the Fourth Lateran Council itself. One author has gone so far as to call the Fourth Lateran Council a reaffirmation of the prohibition issued at Reims against any distinction between essence and Person. There is no question that the Council of Reims, at which Gilbert’s views were implicitly condemned, generated more interest and controversy than any other single dispute on the Trinity. As late as the 1190s, Cardinal Albinus (d. 1196/97) was moved to write to Geoffrey of Auxerre, Bernard of Clairvaux’s secretary and one of the principal witnesses at Reims, to request his version of events. What is questionable, however, is that the outcome of Reims was the single most important determining factor in trinitarian theology before 1215.

Nor can it be taken for granted that Peter Lombard was unqualified in his
rejection of Gilbert’s views. What is so intriguing is that the Lombard’s ambivalent position on some of Gilbert’s teachings actually allows some of Gilbert’s key conceptual distinctions into the Sentences through the back door. Although the Lombard takes the line throughout that divine simplicity leaves no room for such distinctions as between the essence, the Persons and the personal properties, he actually concedes the necessity for some kind of mental distinction between essence and Person. Not only that, Peter Lombard and Gilbert agree on the fundamental question of the essence as non-begetting. Often when this issue is being debated, it is not in fact the real point in question but rather the author’s trump card in proving that an opposing position on an entirely different matter must be false. Thus when the Lombard wants to show that the Persons are identical with their properties, he has to face squarely the objection that, if this were the case, it would follow that the essence begot. The debate about the generation of the essence was a recurrent one partly, therefore, because it raised a number of important questions about the meaning of predicative statements and the inferences which could be drawn from them. It was, in other words, at the heart of the problem of theological language.

The Lombard’s opposition to Gilbert at the Council of Reims in 1148 is elliptically recorded by John of Salisbury. And despite John’s suggestion that he may have simply opposed Gilbert out of some sense of deference to Bernard of Clairvaux, it is also well grounded in the Sentences. The main Council had been convened by Pope Eugenius III to legislate on Church reform and ecclesiastical discipline, which explains both the impressive attendance by ecclesiastics from all over

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103 For one thing the Lombard borrowed from Gilbert for his Glossa super epistolas Pauli. See Brady, prolog., pp.76-82. M.L. Colish, ‘Gilbert, the Early Porretans and Peter Lombard. Semantics and Theology’, in J. Jolivet and A. de Libera edd., Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Actes du septième symposium européen d’histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales (Naples, 1987), 229-50 offers a reassessment of Peter Lombard’s opposition to Gilbert but seems to exaggerate the parallels which she identifies between their respective positions on the Trinity.

104 Historia Pontificalis, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall (London, 1956), p.16. The Lombard’s presence is also recorded by Geoffrey of Auxerre, Scriptura 28, p.35, though he is not mentioned by Otto of Freising. Colish, ‘Gilbert, the Early Porretans and Peter Lombard’, p.230 remarks that ‘Peter is usually held to have been cool toward Gilbert, although no record reports his opinion at Reims.’ I take this to mean that the nature rather than the fact of the Lombard’s opposition is unknown.

western Europe and the number of surviving eyewitness accounts. The accusations brought against Gilbert of Poitiers' trinitarian teachings were discussed at a separate consistory, held only after the main Council had drawn to a close. The charges against Gilbert, delivered by his main prosecutor, Bernard of Clairvaux, are reported in the three principal sources for the trial, that of Otto of Freising (who did not himself attend Reims), and the first-hand accounts of Geoffrey of Auxerre and John of Salisbury.

The case against Gilbert floundered at the public hearing before Pope Eugenius III, despite Bernard's efforts to rally the opposition against him. Gilbert was exonerated of the charges brought against him, but at the same time the Pope ordered him to alter his Commentary on Boethius' *De trinitate* in accordance with the doctrines as defined by Bernard. In this way, Eugenius gave implicit papal approval to Bernard's views.

Examinations of Gilbert's orthodoxy have tended to focus on the first accusation, his alleged distinction between God and his divinity which in the eyes of his opponents was incompatible with divine simplicity. But Häring has denied that

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106 On these points, see N.M. Häring, 'Notes on the Council and Consistory of Rheims (1148)', *MS* 28 (1966), pp.39-45.


108 *Gesta I.59*, p.85. Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, pp.82-3, follows Poole in suggesting that Otto obtained his information by stopping off at the papal curia on his way back from the Holy Land in 1149.


111 The implications of Gilbert's view receive extensive treatment by Geoffrey of Auxerre in his *Libellus* under the heading, 'Forma ponebatur in deo qua deus esset et que non esset deus ut humanitas hominis forma est non que sit sed qua sit homo.' (II.1, p.38). Against him, Geoffrey cited Augustine, *De trin.* V.11: 'Deus non ea magnitudine magnus est que non est quod ipse ut quasi particeps eius sit deus cum magnus est. Alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam deus.' (*Libellus* II.19, p.41, *Scriptura* 3, p.31); Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Cantica Cantorum* 80.6-8. *Opera II*, pp.281-3; *De consideratione* V.15-17. *Opera III*, pp.479-81. Other attacks
Gilbert's conceptual distinction between the substance and form of material objects, i.e. the thing which is white \textit{id quo} from the quality 'whiteness' \textit{id quod} which makes it so, meant that the \textit{id quo} and \textit{id quod} were separate in reality or that this distinction could be simplistically applied to God.\textsuperscript{112}

Peter Lombard does not address this issue in the \textit{Sentences}, which may explain why it does not feature prominently in subsequent scholastic debates. He does take issue, however, with Gilbert's view, without mentioning him by name, that although God and the divine essence can be predicated of the three Persons, the Persons cannot be predicated of God or the essence. Accordingly, we could say 'the three Persons are the divine essence', but not 'the divine essence is the three Persons'.\textsuperscript{113} The principle behind Gilbert's argument was that since only the \textit{id quo} (\textit{paternitas}) and not the \textit{id quod} (\textit{pater}) of a Person was truly predicable, it was not legitimate to say 'the divine essence is the Persons'.\textsuperscript{114} This would be like saying 'one Person is three Persons' since the subject-term 'God' or 'essence' would have to stand for a Person.\textsuperscript{115}
Gilbert’s concern was a logical one about the rectitude of predicating concrete individuals of a universal form. Peter Lombard, however, does not elaborate on any possible justification for Gilbert’s position, but simply adduces a number of authorities against him in which the overriding concern is the primacy of divine simplicity.116

Others confront Gilbert’s objections more directly, usually to explain why his argument that if the Persons were predicated of the essence, it follows the essence begets, was not valid. Robert of Melun deals squarely with the problem of why, if the essence is the Father, it does not beget, given that the Father is the Father and he begets. Master Hubertus, writing in the 1190s, also realises that Gilbert’s objection to the three Persons being predicated of the essence is an attempt to prevent the essence from begetting. This is the argument that since it is proper to the Father to beget, if the Father is predicated of the essence, i.e. if we can say ‘the divine essence is the Father’, it must follow that the essence is also begetting.117 This problem shows how the necessity of avoiding the conclusion that the essence was begetting or begotten was often one of the driving factors in someone’s argument.

The Lombard considers another interrelated issue raised at Reims, the question of whether the Persons are identical with their properties.119 Gilbert argued that the personal properties are not the Persons themselves but extrinsic to them. The


118Summa, Munich Clm. 28799, fol.8va: ‘Sed divina essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, ergo est generans, genita et procedens, ergo non est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus’. See Appendix A.2 for other arguments in this vein.


implicit papal approval given to Bernard’s view, that the properties are the Persons, may have influenced the course of subsequent treatments of the issue. But of much greater consequence was surely Peter Lombard’s opposition to Gilbert’s position, which is taken up by later authors. Peter takes as his point of departure the problem of how the properties could be in the Persons and yet not be them. He cites the standard authority on this question, a passage attributed to Jerome, where the properties are equated with the Persons and somewhat predictably concludes from this that they are the Persons. He is clearly referring to Gilbert when he mentions that some people deny that the properties are the Persons even though they are in the Persons. Their position is that the properties are in the Persons and the divine essence not internally (interius), in such a way that they are identical with the divine substance, but are externally joined (extrinsecus affixa). One of their supporting arguments is that if the properties are the Persons, the Persons cannot be characterised by them, presumably because that would be like saying something characterises itself, which is meaningless. Further, if the properties and the essence are identical, it would be difficult to see how the Persons could be distinct through their properties but not through their common essence; on the contrary, the fact that the Persons are identical in essence suggests that they would be identical in their properties also.

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121 See Schneider, Die Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott, pp.146-66 for the Glossa, Udo, Gandulph of Bologna, Peter of Poitiers, Prepositinus and Peter of Capua, who all follow Peter Lombard. An exception is Master Martinus who is Porretan in outlook. See also the anonymous Summa, BM Royal 9E XII, fol.150ra: ‘Simboloum fidei quo declarata proprietates esse personas. Ad corroboratem autem veritatis, subicimus hic simboloum fidei quod adversus errores magistri Gileberti porrete editum est’. In the same manuscript is a series of theological questions in which the question is similarly addressed at fol.236vb: ‘Non enim, videmus quod proprietates sint in deo et non sint deus, cum deus simplex sit. Quamvis porretanius magister G(ilibertus), sicut quidam asserunt in contrarium, docuerit quod tamen negavit, abiaravit et quaternum scarbello frustratum disserpsit in concilio remensi coram papa eugenio sub eius doctrina scriptum’.

122 [Sent. XXXIII.1.1-2, p.240.

123 [Sent. XXXIII.1.2, p.241. The passage in question is in fact Pelagius, PL 45.1717.

124 [Sent. XXXIII.1.6, p.242. Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta, p.68 says extrinsecus is used in the sense of non-substantial.

125 [Sent. XXXIII.1.7, p.242.13-14. Essential background here is the principle that the properties distinguish the Persons. JSent. XXVII.3.1, p.205.

126 [Sent. XXXIII.1.8, p.242.18-21. Cf. the anonymous quaestio, Munich Clm. 7622, fol.46rb: ‘Unde sciendum est quod secundum magistrum Achardum non sequitur si genita sit divina essentia, quod sit in divina essentia. Dicit enim: proprietatem esse in aliquo, non est alius nisi apropriare et distinguere ipsum ab ipso, quare cum divina essentia nulla proprietate distinguatur seu differat ab alio, nulla proprietate est in ea. Unde hoc dicentibus talis datur
Also, if these properties were in the divine essence that would mean that the same thing begets and is begotten which is nothing less than Sabellianism.\textsuperscript{127} The Gilbertine Sententiae divinitatis puts forward this same objection to the personal properties being in the essence.\textsuperscript{128} As in the problem of whether the Persons are predicated of the essence, the argument that the essence is non-begetting is apparently being used here by Gilbert and his followers to show that the properties cannot be in the essence. In both cases, i.e. ‘the essence is the three Persons’ and ‘the essence is begetting, begotten and proceeding’, the undesired consequence would seem to be that the essence begets. One of Gilbert’s intentions in denying these propositions is, according to Peter Lombard and others, to avoid the unwelcome conclusions to which they would lead, namely that the essence begets.

The Lombard’s refutation of these objections does not really address the genuine difficulties which they raise but rests on the principle that the properties must be both the Persons and the essence in order to preserve divine simplicity.\textsuperscript{129} He thus reveals an inability or perhaps a reluctance to recognise that some distinctions, as long as they remain conceptual tools, do not affect the issue of divine simplicity. He does make the distinction, however, that the properties are not in the essence in the same way that they are in the Persons. It does not follow, therefore, simply because they determine the Persons when they are in them, that they also determine the essence if they are in it. And so paternity and sonship are the essence without that meaning that

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Sent. XXXIII. I. 9, p. 243.10-13: ‘Si paternitas et filiatio in Deo sive in divina essentia sunt, eadem igitur res habet in se paternitatem et filiationem, ipsa et generat et generatur.’}

\textsuperscript{128}\textit{Sent. div., p.160*: ‘In divina substantia non sunt, quia divina substantia non gignit neque gignitur, sed in Deo esse concedi potest: quia hoc nomen "Deus" ad utrumque se habet scilicet ad personam et ad substantiam.’}

\textsuperscript{129}\textit{The inadequacy of his treatmet is suggested by the abbreviation on the Sentences, BM Royal 7F XIII, fol.134ra: ‘Alii vero proprietates in personis esse dicitur, sed easdem personas esse, vel essentiam differtentur, et his argumentis et forte aliis sententie Magistri Petri opponunt.’ See Landgraf, ‘Frühscholastische Abkürzungen der Sentenzen’, pp.178-9.}
the essence begets or is begotten.\textsuperscript{130}

Peter of Poitiers combines the Lombard’s section on the properties and the essence with his arguments from Distinctions IV and V that the essence does not beget.\textsuperscript{131} He reinforces the Lombard’s conclusions, and goes further in clarifying the issue with an analogy which shows just how the properties may be in the Persons and in the essence in different ways: a cellar contains a cask of wine, and thus the wine is ‘in’ both the cask and the cellar; yet the wine moistens the cask only, not the cellar.\textsuperscript{132} In other words, the wine has a physical effect on only one of those things in which it is said to be. The analogy works on the basis of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second substance. A distinguishing quality is in both the first (individual) and second (common) substance, in the sense of what is signified by them, but it only determines the first, not the second substance.\textsuperscript{133} Thus the properties of individuals are different from those of the common nature shared by them.

The final issue of Gilbertine theology addressed in the Sentences was Gilbert’s insistence on a conceptual distinction between essence and Person. Although Gilbert’s contention that in God there must be some distinction of this type was not one of the four charges listed in accounts of the hearing at Reims, it was debated there.\textsuperscript{134}
Gilbert argued that without this distinction we would be left in the absurd position of admitting that the same thing is begetting and begotten and that therefore the same thing begot itself. The necessity for this distinction also formed the subject of several treatises by Gilbert’s supporters, the Porretani, throughout the second half of the twelfth century.

Peter Lombard’s position on the question is ambiguous despite the assumption made by scholars that he opposed it unreservedly. He notes that the rationale of this proposed distinction between essence and Person is that otherwise there would be no way of distinguishing among the Persons. And if there is no distinction of Persons, it follows that the same thing begot and is begotten. Proponents of this position cite Hilary of Poitiers, who distinguishes between natura and res naturae. They take this to mean that nature (natura) and Person (res naturae) are not the same.

Peter clearly takes Gilbert’s position as a denial of the essential identity of the three Persons. He cites a number of authorities to the effect that although distinctions between the common nature and the individual substance may apply to creatures, they do not apply to God. But the Lombard actually seems to come some way towards Gilbert’s position on the matter, when he says that ‘there is some intellectual

135 Otto of Freising, Gesta I.58, p.83: ‘Ex qua absurditate facile sensus hereticus iuxta Sabellium emergeret, ut eadem res dicetur et generans et genita et eadem se ipsum genuisse’.


137 Sent. XXXIV.1.1, p.246.16-18: ‘dicentes eandem essentiam non posse esse Patrem et Filium sine personarum confusione. Si enim, iniquit, ea essentia quae Pater est. Filius est. idem sibi pater est et filius’.

138 Sent. XXXIV.1.1. pp.246-7: ‘Si hanc rem dicis esse Patrem, et aliam quaere quam dicas Filium. Si vero aliam non quaesieris, sed eandem dixeris, idem genuit et genitus est.’


140 Sent. XXXIV.1.3, p.247.26-8: ‘intelligentes in his praemissis verbis Hilarii per “rem naturae” personam, et nomine “naturae” divinam naturam.’

141 Sent. XXXIV.1.6-8, pp.249-50.
distinction in our mind when we say "hypostasis" and when we say "essence".\textsuperscript{142} His final position, then, would seem to be that essence and Person are in every way the same thing, but that they signify differently, which does not really seem very far from Gilbert at all.\textsuperscript{143}

4. The influence of the Sentences in the second half of the twelfth century

Peter Lombard’s Sentences had an enormous impact on teaching in the schools and were instrumental in paving the way for the doctrinal consensus of the later twelfth century. Although the Sentences were not formally lectured upon until their introduction by Alexander of Hales in the 1220s,\textsuperscript{144} it seems almost inconceivable that the volume of sources which bear their imprint is not an indication of their use as a teaching aid as well as a work of personal reference. They were used in this way almost as soon as they were written.

Their influence was, on the one hand, mediated through a network of direct and indirect pupils, the famous ‘school’ of Peter Lombard. In the second half of the twelfth century virtually all the chancellors of the cathedral school of Notre-Dame were the Lombard’s direct or indirect pupils: Odo of Soissons (c. 1153/60-c. 1167); Peter Comestor (1168-78); Hilduin (c. 1178-93); Peter of Poitiers (1193-1205); Prepositinus of Cremona (1206-9).\textsuperscript{145} The presence of this pro-Lombardian group might imply the existence of an anti-Lombardian group. No such group existed, except perhaps the most fervent of the Porretani. Rather, virtually every work of scholastic

\textsuperscript{142}\textsuperscript{Sent.XXIV.1.9, p.250.12-16: ‘Quod aliqua est in ratione intelligentiae distinctio cum dicitur "hypostasis" et cum dicitur "essentia". Nec tamen diffitemur distinctionem habendum fore secundum intelligentiae rationem, cum dicitur "hypostasis", et cum dicitur "essentia": quia ibi significatur quod est commune tribus, hic vero non. Est tamen hypostasis essentia, et e converso.’}

\textsuperscript{143}\textsuperscript{For thinkers who follow the Lombard’s conceptual distinction (Peter of Poitiers, Peter of Capua), see Schneider, Die Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott, pp.182-4. Cf. Häring, ‘Petrus Lombardus und die Sprachlogik’, pp.121-2.}

\textsuperscript{144}\textsuperscript{I. Brady, ‘The Distinctions of Lombard’s Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales’, Franciscan Studies 25 (1965), 90-116.}

\textsuperscript{145}\textsuperscript{S. Feniolo, The Origins of the University. The Schools of Paris and their Critics 1110-1215 (Stanford, 1985), pp.190-2. See also P. Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle 2 vols. (Paris, 1933) I, p.13 for Bernard Chabert (1205), Jean de la Chandeleur (1209-1213/15), Stephen of Reims (c. 1214-1218), whose educational backgrounds are not known.}
theology written after 1160 reveals the influence of the Sentences. This includes the works of Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai, thinkers usually assigned to the school of Gilbert of Poitiers. Their works clearly draw on the Sentences for patristic sources and for the framing of many questions. In the second half of the twelfth century, the Sentences transcend any notional or actual division by school. They become part of the very edifice of theological study itself.

A further, perhaps even more important ingredient in this process, was the literary genre or industry entirely devoted to summarizing, explaining and developing various aspects of the Sentences - the abbreviations, glosses and commentaries to which the work gave rise. Let us for the moment examine this specifically oriented Sentence-literature before going on to consider scholastic theology in general.

An abbreviation is, as its name implies, a condensed version of the Sentences which follows precisely the original organisation and preserves as far as possible the basic wording of its source. Clearly such derivative works offer little for those interested in intellectual originality and independence of thought, but they are invaluable indicators of the rapid and widespread use of the Sentences as an authoritative reference work. The main aim of a gloss is to clarify the literal meaning

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146 A point recognised by Schneider in his survey, Die Lehre vom dreizeinigen Gott, pp.3-4.


149 Examples of abbreviations include Master Bandinus, Sententiarum Libri Quatuor, PL 192.970-1112; Saint Martin of Leon (c. 1130-1203), Sermo XXXIV in festivitate sanctae Trinitatis, PL 208.1269-1350, on whom see, Dictionnaire de Spiritualité 10 (Paris, 1980), 685-6. See especially, Landgraf, ‘Frü scholastische Abkürzungen der Sentenzen’ for the same version of a Breviarum sententiarum in BM Royal 7F XIII; Paris Maz. lat. 984 (1049) (fols.1-132); Magdalen College Oxford, 40; Bodleian Laud. misc. 513; Dublin, Trinity College 275, fols.1-118, attributed to Simon of Tournai; Lambeth Palace 116 (fols.71-136); Luxemburg BN lat. 165 (fols.1-245); Landgraf, Introduction. pp.114-15 leaves the question of Simon’s authorship open.
of the original text. This is true both of marginal glosses and those which are written as separate works. Glosses which do survive in this separate form, of which the most important is the *Glossa super Sententias* once attributed to Peter of Poitiers, resemble the stage of transition between gloss and commentary. This *Glossa* is neither strictly speaking a literal gloss or paraphrase, nor a free-style commentary. It is true that in structure, the *Glossa* resembles a gloss more than a commentary, but the main difference is often in the length of the exposition rather than in the analysis offered. Its explication does not always adhere precisely to the order of the Lombard’s text, and the language and method of argumentation differ significantly from the Lombard’s. This is very clear, for example, from the gloss or commentary on Distinction IV of Book I, which is merged almost indistinguishably with that on Distinction V. This indicates that the *Glossa* belongs much more to the tradition which tries to see the unifying impulse behind the direction of the Lombard’s thought, rather than simply being a literal gloss. For although the contents of Distinctions IV-V are very much interrelated, the nature of this connection is assumed rather than made explicit in the *Sentences*. In both the anonymous *Glossa* and in the *Sentences* of Peter of Poitiers, on the other hand, the same questions which are dealt with separately by the Lombard, are treated as a single unit by their authors. There were good reasons, in this sense, for thinking that the *Glossa* was the work of Peter of Poitiers.

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154London BM Royal 7F XIII. fol.7va.
In contrast to the extreme dependence of abbreviations and glosses on not just the structure, but also the views expressed in the Sentences, commentaries are distinguished by the author’s independent stance on particular questions. The first commentary of this type, the Sententie Udonis, has been dated to c. 1160-65 and, like many other works of the second half of the twelfth century, draws on the Glossa on the Sentences. This author is writing very much in the spirit of Peter Lombard himself. Just as the Lombard had compiled the Sentences for the benefit of hard-pressed students, so our author has composed this Summa super sententias magistri petri as a kind of accessus to the entire work, thus rendering the subject matter, purpose and method of the Sentences themselves accessible to the lazy and sluggish reader. Judging by the number of manuscripts, the work must have been fairly well known, and it was almost certainly used by Peter of Poitiers. The author’s approach is to summarize the state of the question as presented by Peter Lombard, often using the same expressions and making selective use of patristic texts or referring to them in short hand rather than reproducing them in their entirety. He also proves the Lombard’s position by adducing a number of patently absurd counter-arguments. For example, the Lombard had argued that ‘God begot God’ did not imply either that he begot himself or another God because there are neither several gods nor anything capable of begetting itself. One can show that neither of the inferences are necessary by examples: the Word became man, therefore himself as man or another man.

The other main commentary of this period was written by Stephen Langton (d. 1550).
1228) in the early thirteenth century. The theological agenda of Langton’s *Summa* and *Quaestiones* (c. 1200-06) is also clearly defined in very fundamental ways by a reading of the *Sentences*. These works precede the Fourth Lateran Council by only a few years and are extremely important for our understanding of the nature of thought on the Trinity at that time, even though Langton does not seem to have played an important role at the Council itself. But, as I shall argue, it is the years immediately preceding the Council, rather than the short time in which it sat, which count. Langton’s views are particularly important in this respect since they influenced other thinkers.

Besides works explicitly directed towards the *Sentences* there is a whole host of works, whether by Lombardians or otherwise, which is informed by the Lombard’s work in some fundamental way. The most outstanding illustration of this influence is the perpetuation of the Lombard’s teachings through his own pupils. Perhaps the most important of these was Peter Comestor, chancellor of Notre-Dame (1168-78), who is thought to have been personally taught by the Lombard. His best known work is the *Historia scholastica* which, like the *Sentences*, became a scholastic textbook. However, several contemporary authors also cite Comestor’s opinion on particular questions of doctrine. His importance in the development of twelfth-century

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160 For the dating, L. Antl, ‘An Introduction to the *Quaestiones theologicae* of Stephen Langton’, *Franciscan Studies* 12 (1952), pp.168-72 and S. Ebbesen and L.B. Mortensen, ‘A Partial Edition of Stephen Langton’s *Summa* and *Quaestiones* with Parallels from Andrew Sunesen’s *Hexameron*’, *CIMAGL* 49 (1985), p.25. These scholars all agree that Langton’s theological works must predate his appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal in 1206. Ebbesen and Mortensen also note that MS. Cambridge, St John’s C7 (James 57) upon which their edition is based reflects editorial work, not by Langton himself, as late as the 1210s or 1220s. The *Summa* is in fact a condensed version of disputed questions rather than a full theological *summa*, (ibid., p.26).


162 For Langton’s influence on Geoffrey of Poitiers, see G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, ‘The *Quaestiones* of Cardinal Stephen Langton (III)’, *New Scholasticism* 4 (1930), 115-64.


164 R.M. Martin, ‘Notes sur l’oeuvre littéraire de Pierre le Mangeur’, *RTAM* 3 (1931), 54-66; A.M. Landgraf, ‘Recherches sur les écrits de Pierre le Mangeur’, *RTAM* 3 (1931), p.294 prints Comestor’s opinion on *ISent*.V.1 as reported by the *Glossa* on the *Sentences* (Bamberg Patr.128, fol.34rb; BM Royal 7F XIII, fol.7vb has M.P.). See also I. Brady, ‘Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings of Peter Lombard’, *Antoninianum* 41 (1966), pp.489-90 who argues that reports of Comestor’s opinions are included among the *Quaestiones* of Odo of Soissons, Paris BN lat. 18108, fols.83a-107b and Troyes lat. 964, fols.89-159v.
theology is further attested to by the existence of a prologue to a full-length gloss on the Sentences which has been attributed to him.165 Comestor may even have lectured on the Sentences and secured their use as a scholastic textbook.166 Either way, Comestor’s writings and teachings on doctrinal theology, which are little more than hinted at in the extant sources, must have been crucial to the subsequent fate of the Lombard’s Sentences.

The Sentences of Peter of Poitiers (1130-1205), written c. 1170,167 are heavily indebted to the Lombard’s Sentences and must have served to widen their influence.168 Peter himself was probably taught by Peter Comestor, and like him he went on to hold the position of chancellor of Notre-Dame (1193-1205).169 The wide use of Peter of Poitiers’ Sentences is shown both by the impressive number of extant manuscripts and by their relationship to a number of collections of quaestiones.170 Partly because they share the same title, Peter’s work is always remembered for its dependence on the Lombard’s Sentences, even though it is divided into five rather than four books; more than half of the questions which he discusses and most of the patristic texts are found in the Lombard’s work, and he never diverges from the

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167 Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers, pp. 39-41 dates the work to before May 1170, the date of Alexander III’s letter to William, Archbishop of Sens, against the teaching of Peter Lombard’s christological doctrine, arguing that it is highly improbable that Peter would dedicate a work in which he proposed the prohibited doctrine, to this same William.

168 Esp. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode II, pp. 406, though his assessment was partly determined by his belief that Peter was the author of the Glossa (pp. 504-8); Sententiae, eedd. Moore and Dulong, p. vii.

169 The magister meus to whom Peter refers on six occasions is Peter Comestor in at least two cases. See H. Weisweiler in a review of Moore and Dulong’s edition of Peter’s Sentences, Scholastik 27 (1952), p. 476, and Brady, ‘Petrus Manuducator’, p. 482. For Peter’s biography, see Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers, pp. 1-24.

170 For the manuscripts, see ibid., pp. 27-36. The quaestiones, all associated with the teachings of Odo of Soissons (Paris Maz. lat. 1708; Paris BN lat. 18108; London BM Harley 3855), are discussed by A. M. Landgraf, ‘Petrus von Poitiers und die Quaestionsliteratur des 12. Jahrhunderts’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 52 (1939), 202-22, 348-58 who says they may be by him. Also Landgraf, Introduction, pp. 143, 145-6 for abbreviations of Peter’s Sentences and quaestiones associated with them.
Lombard position. But with Peter of Poitiers, we are no longer purely in the realm of the sic-et-non method of resolving apparently contradictory authorities. Rather than giving an exhaustive list of authoritative texts which have a bearing on the interpretation of any given question, Peter selects a few for citation, almost always from the Lombard’s Sentences, in order to locate the problem within the parameters of an on-going debate. In contrast to the Lombard’s exhaustive approach, he refers to any other authorities in a few words. Peter’s language and use of argument also bear the imprint of contemporary teachings on logic and grammar. His more frequent use of dialectic and grammatical distinctions, therefore, reflects the changing intellectual context. His knowledge of the latest techniques of argument is indicated by his employment of fallacies and instantiae. In this respect Peter’s approach resembles very much that of Alan of Lille, upon whom he probably depends for his grammatical theory.

Continuing this line of the Lombard’s indirect pupillage is Peter of Capua (d. 1214), thought to be a direct pupil of Peter of Poitiers when he studied at Paris in the 1180s and early 1190s. Peter’s Summa (written before 1190) belongs firmly within the group of writings which adopts the Lombard’s fourfold division of subject

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173 The view of Angelini, L’ortodossia e la grammatica, p.100.


175 Ibid., pp.100-1.


177 Dated by Maleczek, Petrus Capuanus, p.233.
matter into God, creation and angelology. Christology, and the sacraments and shows strong relationships with several other works of the period. 179 Like the Lombard, Peter adopts a citation from Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana* as the *Summa’s* organizing principle. 180

Peter of Poitiers’ mixture of dependence and independence vis-à-vis the Lombard’s *Sentences* shows that we should be wary of oversimplifying the eclectic range of methods and sources which theologians used and developed. This is true not only of Peter of Poitiers, but of virtually every major author of the later twelfth century. Prepositinus of Cremona (d. 1209/10) is another example of a theologian whose work only makes sense in the context of a knowledge of the *Sentences*, but whose techniques for solving problems are also indicative of post-Lombardian developments. Prepositinus 181 first studied and taught at Paris, with a brief spell at Mainz, before becoming chancellor of Notre-Dame during the crucial years of 1206-1209/10. 182 His most important work of doctrinal theology is the *Summa ‘Qui producit ventos’* (c. 1188-94). 183 Throughout it he refers to the opinion of ‘Master Peter Lombard’, sometimes as only one opinion amongst several, without any special status of its own, 184 elsewhere as the authoritative position on a question, 185 or, on

179 *Ibid.*, p.235. The *Summa* is influenced by the *Glossa* and shows parallels with *quaestiones* in BM Royal 9E XII (fols.2r-8v) and Paris Maz. lat. 1708. It in turn influences the *Summa of Gerard of Sessio* Vat. lat. 10754 and the anonymous *Summa* Bamberg Patr. 136. See A. Landgraf, ‘A Study of the Academic Latitude of Peter of Capua’, *New Scholasticism* 14 (1940), 57-74 and *Introduction*, p.147.


184 *Summa* 1.8, p.203.4, on the various opinions concerning the signification of *equalis* and *similis*; *ibid.*12.2, p.277.4, on the number of personal properties.

185 *Summa* 5.2, p.220.61-2: ‘Ad hoc bene respondetur in Sententiiis, quod non ostenditur ibi quod filius potuit generare filium, sed removetur ad eo impotentia’, on the question of whether or not the Son has the power to beget. Prepositinus cites the standard Augustinian authority on the subject found in the *Sentences* (it is not that the Son could not beget, but it is not appropriate for him to do so; *I Sent.* VII.1.2, p.92).
occasion, he even rejects the Lombard’s solution in favour of his own. Much more important for the overall content of the work than these occasional references to the Lombard’s personal opinion, however, is the apparatus of questions provided by the Sentences. Sometimes this is made explicit, as when Prepositinus reproduces the arguments found in the Sentences about ‘God begot God; therefore himself or another God’ and ‘God the Father begot God who is God the Father or God who is not the Father.’ More often the origin of a question in the Sentences is clear from the way it is framed by Prepositinus and from the authorities he adduces for and against, as when he considers the question of whether the Father is wise by the wisdom which he begot.

The Speculum Speculationem, written no earlier than 1201, is the only work of dialectical theology by Alexander Nequam (1157-1217). The aim of the work has been defined as threefold: to refute Cathar doctrines; to use logic in the service of theology, especially the methods of terminist logic; and to bring the Lombard’s Sentences, whose structure it generally follows, up to date in the light of the logica nova. Alexander had studied and taught at Paris c. 1175-1182, so his approach is very much of a piece with other Paris theologians and reflects their concerns. He clearly takes many of his questions and authorities from the Sentences.

Particular opinions of the Lombard could also be disseminated in the form of quaestiones. For example, several collections of quaestiones associated with the

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186 Summa 10.6, p.264,7-12, on whether the personal properties are in the essence: ‘Magister tamen Petrus simpliciter concedit in sententias, dicess eas esse ita in essentia quod eam non determinant sed in personis ita quod eas determinant. Convenientius tamen puto quod distinguatur illa propositione, scilicet: proprietates sunt in essentia; i.e sunt ipsa essentia, vera est; sunt proprietates essentiae, falsa est.’ Prepositinus cites the Lombard’s view that the properties are in the essence in such a way that they do not determine it and in the Persons in such a way that they do determine them (Sent. XXXIII.1.10, p.243); he says a better explanation is that the properties are in the essence, but that they are not the properties of the essence.

187 Summa 4.4, p.217,1-3: ‘Ex predictis potest haberi solutio argumenti quod in sententias inventur, scilicet huius: pater genuit deum, ergo deum qui est pater vel deum qui non est pater.’


190 Ibid., pp.ix-x. Of Alexander’s ancient sources, Aristotle is the most frequently cited after Augustine (ibid., pp.xiii-xvii).

191 For example, Speculum II.xiii, p.132, on whether essence begets essence; also striking in this respect is Master Hubertus. Summa. Munich Clm. 28799, fol.2va-b, where the entire question is structured by the format in the Sentences.
teaching of Odo of Soissons, chancellor of Notre-Dame (c. 1153/60-c. 1167) and thought to be a direct pupil of the Lombard contain the Lombard formula, *Dicit Augustinus: deus pater genuit se alterum*.¹⁹² One author, perhaps Odo himself, even paraphrases entire sections from the *Sentences*.¹⁹³ As the *quaestio* informs the basic structure of the theological *summae* of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it is extremely significant that individual *quaestiones* should be so heavily indebted to the *Sentences*. The *Compilatio quaestionum theologiae* of Master Martin, written in the 1190s, borrows its subject matter from a wide range of sources, again with a significant contribution from Peter Lombard.¹⁹⁴

But the orbit of influence of the *Sentences* was not restricted to the ‘Lombard school’. The work penetrated the very process of study itself, so that no theologian remained untouched by it. This is true even of the so-called mild supporters of Gilbert, Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai. Alan, whose influence on theological methodology is difficult to exaggerate, taught at Paris and then Montpellier, before retiring to Citeaux, where he died in either 1202 or 1203.¹⁹⁵ He is best known for his methodological affinity to Gilbert of Poitiers, especially his use of negative theology and his predilection for Boethius and Pseudo-Dionysius.¹⁹⁶ According to


¹⁹³See esp. *Quaestiones Odonis* 259, p.87 for a whole series of authorities taken from Distinction IV-V of the *Sentences*. Cf. for example, ‘Quod autem Pater essentiam suam non genuerit, sic probatur indiscusse: Cum Pater sua sit essentia, si suam generat essentiam, eo quod generat, est. Igitur quod generat est...et quod est impossibile’ with ISent.V.1.4, p.81.


the latter, every created thing holds its place of importance relative to God in a
descending hierarchy of likeness to him.197 Thus the celestial hierarchy of angels is
closer to God than the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church.198 It is through this
divine likeness that the hierarchies are able in varying degrees to serve as sources of
knowledge of the divine nature.199 But because any dissimilarity is always greater
than any similarity, theological statements should always be negative rather than
affirmative, i.e. should say what God is not rather than what he is.200

Consistent with this preference for negative theology is Alan’s attention to
technical precision in theological language. He is perhaps the earliest theologian to
make extensive use of the distinction between signification and supposition, and this
in itself may partly account for the distinction’s universal adoption by contemporary
and subsequent scholastic theologians. It is somewhat ironic, given that Gilbert’s
argument for a distinction between ‘essence’ and ‘Person’ became something of a
cause célèbre, that so much of supposition theory should depend precisely on such a
semantic distinction between terms, including ‘essence’ and ‘Person’.

Alan may be a ‘Gilbertine’ by theoretical disposition, but this does not
preclude him from using the Sentences. Many of the quaestiones found in the Summa
‘Quoniam Homines’ (c. 1160) are drawn either directly or indirectly from the
Sentences, sometimes with little modification.201 The question of whether essence
begot essence is an excellent case in point. Alan cites a series of patristic authorities,
all found in Distinction V of the Sentences, relevant to a determination of the
problem.202 He even refers the reader directly to that work for additional

197 On the Dionysian hierarchy, see, R. Roques, L’univers dionysien. Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le
Pseudo-Denis (Paris, 1954); A. Louth, Denis the Areopagite (London, 1989); Pseudo-Dionysius. The Complete

198 Louth, Denis the Areopagite, pp.38-9.

199 Ibid., p.39.

200 Alan cites Dionysius explicitly on this issue of negative theology, Regulae caelestis iuris XVIII.3, ed. N.M.

201 For the dating, see P. Glorieux, AHDLM 20 (1953), p.116.

PL 42.936; and Hilary, De trin.IV.10. CCSL 62, p.111. PL 10.104. See Lombard, ISent.V.1.5. p.82.5-7; V.1.7.
p.82.25-7; and V.1.9, p.83.26-7 respectively.
The standard arguments are also reproduced: if the divinity begot the divinity then the same thing begot itself, which is contrary to all reason; if the divinity begot the divinity there would be no distinctions in the Trinity; if the Father begot the divinity, he would have begotten his own cause; if the divinity begot the divinity, something would be its own cause; if the divinity begot the Son it would be distinct from the Son through generation and thus the divinity would no longer be the Son. The influence of well-established scholastic formulations of certain questions is evident elsewhere in the *Summa* when Alan discusses in succession ‘whether the Father loves the Son through the Holy Spirit’ and ‘whether the Father is wise through the Son’.

Simon of Tournai (d. 1201) also depends heavily on the Lombard’s *Sentences*. A comparison of the trinitarian sections from Simon’s *Summa* or *Institutiones in sacram paginam* (1170-1175) with corresponding sections from the Lombard’s *Sentences* reveals not only that Simon’s source for the vast majority of his patristic citations is Peter Lombard, but also that the structure of Simon’s work follows the *Sentences* to such an extent as to resemble in places a commentary. So it is not surprising to learn, therefore, that an abbreviation of the *Sentences* has

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203 *Summa* 65, p.216: ‘Sed quia. hec auctoritates et multe alie in sententiis diffuse expositae sunt, ad praesens his supersedemus.’


205 *Summa* 118-19, pp.252-4.


207 Dated by Heinzmann, *Die Institutiones*, p.10. Heinzmann also argues, on the basis of Simon’s own reference in the *Disputationes*, that the authentic title of the work is *Institutiones* not *Summa*.

208 On Simon’s sources in general, see Warichez, *Les disputationes*, pp.xxiii-xxvii. For his use of Aristotle, see Heinzmann, *Die Institutiones*. Twelfth-century sources include the canonist Rufinus for which see D. Van den Eynde, ‘Deux sources de la Somme théologique de Simon de Tournai’, *Antonianum* 24 (1949), 19-42. For Alan of Lille, see O. Lottin, ‘Alain de Lille, une des sources des *Disputationes* de Simon de Tournai’, *RTAM* 17 (1950), 175-86 who publishes the incipits of the 19 anonymous *quaestiones*, which he attributes to Alan of Lille, from London BM Royal 9 E XII, fols.79rb-97va upon which the first 21 (except 7 and 17) of Simon’s *Disputationes* depend. See Häring, ‘Simon of Tournai’s Commentary on the so-called Athanasian Creed’, pp.143-4 for borrowings from the *Summa* ‘Quoniam Homines’. 
been attributed to Simon.\textsuperscript{209} The trinitarian sections of the \textit{Institutiones} in fact read like a compilation from Gilbert's commentary on Boethius's \textit{De trinitate} and Peter Lombard's \textit{Sentences}.\textsuperscript{210} Certain expressions which accompany Simon's scriptural citations are found in the \textit{Sentences}, confirming beyond reasonable doubt that work to be Simon's source.\textsuperscript{211} The same can be said of the sections in which Simon sets out his position on divine generation.\textsuperscript{212} On the question of whether the Father's power to beget means that he possesses a power which the Son lacks, Simon follows the \textit{Sentences} by drawing particular attention to Augustine's response that it is not that the Son is not able to beget, but rather that it is not appropriate for him to do so.\textsuperscript{213} Simon's treatment is much longer than Peter Lombard's, which suggests that he is consciously expanding upon his source. Finally, a long section consisting of thirty questions relating to various points about the Holy Spirit follows in detail the order and content of the Lombard's treatment of the same questions.\textsuperscript{214}

Concrete evidence of the penetration of the \textit{Sentences} into southern Europe is provided by the \textit{Sentences} of Gandulph of Bologna, written in the 1160s.\textsuperscript{215} Though by no means a commentary, Gandulph borrows heavily from the Lombard.\textsuperscript{216} De Ghellinck has stressed both authors' common use of dialectic in the harmonisation of

\textsuperscript{209}Troyes lat. 1371; London BM Royal 7 F XIII; Dublin, Trinity College 275, fols.1-118; Paris Maz. lat. 984; Oxford, Bodleian Laud. Misc. 513; Oxford, Magdalen College lat. 40. The work cannot be definitively attributed to Simon, according to Landgraf, \textit{Introduction}, pp.114-15.

\textsuperscript{210}The beginning of the work (4-10, pp.63-8) is taken from Gilbert. See N.M. Häring, 'Simon of Tourmai and Gilbert of Poitiers', \textit{MS 27} (1965), 325-30 for Gilbert's influence. The remaining sections on the Trinity correspond to questions found in the \textit{Sentences}: 13-14, pp.69-71 literally reproduce the scriptural and patristic texts relating to the testimony on the Trinity in the Old and New Testaments in the original order in which they are found in Lombard, \textit{ISent.} II.4-5, pp.63-8

\textsuperscript{211}For example \textit{Institutiones} 13, p.69: 'Ecce dicens faciamus et nostram pluralitatem ostendit personarum'. Cf. Lombard, \textit{ISent.} II.4.2, p.64: 'Dicens enim faciamus et nostram, pluralitatem personarum ostendit'.


\textsuperscript{215}Dated von Walter, \textit{Magistri Ganduphi Bononiensis}, p.lxviii.

\textsuperscript{216}De Ghellinck, \textit{Le mouvement théologique}, pp.334-5.
of subject. Of particular relevance for twelfth-century discussions of the Trinity is the fact that Gandulph follows virtually the same order of questions in his section on divine generation as the Lombard. There is also a strong literary tradition connecting the two works, for although it does not seem that Gandulph's work was widely disseminated, he is often cited in the marginal glosses of the Lombard's Sentences.

Finally, the Sentences inform the structure of thirteenth-century summae, for example, the Fragmenta quaestionum theologicorum of Master Hubertus, written between 1194 and 1200. Despite the work is not a collection of questions, but a summa, of special interest from the point of view of the structure of the theological summae of the early thirteenth century. The author's work of synthesis is truly remarkable. He cites an impressive range of contemporary theologians from Robert of Melun and Peter of Corbeil to Prepostinus of Cremona. However, Peter Lombard is not only the most frequently cited twelfth-century theologian, but his Sentences provide the model for the division of the work into four books.223

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218Sent. 66-92, pp.46-62, esp. pp.46-7. 'That God begot God, but not himself or another God', where Gandulph's approach is a condensed form of the corresponding section in Lombard, ISent.IV.1 and V.1.5.
220Dated by R. Heinzmann, Die Summe 'Colligite fragmenta' des Magister Hubertus (Clm 28799). Ein Beitrag zur theologischen Systembildung in der Scholastik (München, 1974), pp.20-4 on the evidence of a reference to the work in the Chronica of Otto of Saint Blaise under the year 1191. The work was first discovered by Martin Grabmann, 'Note sur la somme théologique de Magister Hubertus', RTAM 1 (1929), 229-39 and is now held by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Munich Clm 28799. M.-T. d'Alvery, 'Humbertus de Balesma', AHDLM 51 (1984), 127-91 identifies the author of the summa with another Master Hubertus who delivered a sermon to students at Paris in 1192/3.
221Heinzmann, Die Summe 'Colligite fragmenta' des Magister Hubertus, p.8.
222Prepositinus is cited only 5 times (see Heinzmann, Die Summe 'Colligite fragmenta' des Magister Hubertus, p.14), but entire passages have been taken from his Summa. See Appendix C.
223Munich Clm. 28799, fol.2ra: 'Primum enim genus quaestionum est de creatore; secundum de opere creationis; tertium de opere recreatiois gesto in persona Christi, id est de incarnatione, baptismo, passione, resurrectione etc.; quartum de opere recreatiois quod Christus gerit in persona ecclesie; quinta de bonorum et malorum retributione. Et secundum hunc ordinam Liber Sententiarum dividitur in quattuor partes'.
All this testifies to the diversity of channels through which the Sentences were accessible to an ever-growing number of students of theology. But this dominance does not mean that there was no room for anyone else, as if twelfth-century scholars could only cope with the idea of one authority or point of view. Even theologians such as Odo of Soissons, who are, by general consent, assigned to the Lombard’s ‘school’, could and did disagree with some of his views.224 Another prime example of eclecticism and independence of thought is Peter the Chanter.225 The range of twelfth-century theologians drawn upon by the Chanter and the diverse nature of his own compositions further belies the sometimes rigid division of twelfth-century theology into ‘schools’.226 By the second half of the twelfth century theologians were no longer thinking in terms of personal allegiances and differences but rather in terms of the common interests and preoccupations, professional and intellectual, fostered by their common vocation. The adoption of the Sentences as a theological reference work meant that theologians were working to the same agenda, a circumstance which was bound to facilitate the emergence of a common tradition of thought on the Trinity.

5. The ‘triumph’ of Peter Lombard

In his monumental work on twelfth-century theology, de Ghellinck distinguished three phases in the definitive triumph of Peter Lombard: the christological disputes of the 1160s and 1170s; the near-condemnation issued by the Third Lateran Council of 1179; and the probably unique formal approbation of the Lombard’s personal doctrine at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.227 Despite his sometimes tendentious tone, de Ghellinck’s account still holds good. Moreover, the very inclusion of a section on the Lombard’s triumph ranks as an implicit recognition


226 Ibid., pp.47-8.

227 Le mouvement théologique, pp.251-66.
that Peter Lombard's success was not a predetermined certainty, a mere formality of the historical process, but was very much subject to the political and theological vicissitudes of the time. For the Lombard was as much the object of suspicion and hostility as Peter Abelard or Gilbert of Poitiers had been. The attacks upon his teachings almost all came from outside the schools, from men whose conception of God was very much more rooted in personal experience. A Gerhoch of Reichersperg, a Walter of Saint-Victor, even a Richard of Saint-Victor, took great exception to the confident tone characteristic of scholastic theology. Perhaps they regarded the standard evocations about the impossibility of knowing God and the poverty of human understanding as nothing more than hollow tokenism. Thus when Peter Lombard succeeded in resisting the accumulative weight of these fairly considerable onslaughts, a new moment in the history of Christian thought was inaugurated. Not just Peter Lombard the individual, but Peter Lombard, or rather the Sentences, as indicative of theology as a scientific discipline, triumphed.

My survey of the theological literature of the second half of the twelfth century has stressed that no corner of scholastic theology remained untouched by the enormous impact of the Sentences on teaching and study. There is, of course, only an indirect causal relationship between the Lombard's increasing dominance in the schools and his eventual triumph, inasmuch as the schools themselves assumed a greater social importance independent of the particular fortunes of the Sentences. As soon as men who had spent some years studying theology at Paris began to gain official positions in the Church, the likelihood of a successful condemnation of any of the Lombard's teachings receded rapidly, because these were now often the received wisdom. In effect this meant the further entrenchment of the Sentences as a given rather than a variable in theological study.

The most protracted of these controversies, the attacks on the Lombard's Christology from the time of the Council of Tours in 1163 to the Third Lateran Council in 1179, best highlights the Lombard's changing fortunes and the change in

228J. Leclercq, 'The Renewal of Theology', in Constable and Benson edd., Renaissance and Renewal, p.77 regards this as one of the main differences between scholastic and monastic theology.
the papacy’s attitude to the very principle of theological debate. During this period the Lombard was accused of expounding the view that ‘Christ, insofar as he is man, is nothing’ (Christus, secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid), the doctrine which earned the name of ‘christological nihilism’. Pope Alexander III’s efforts to prohibit the teaching of the Lombard’s alleged error were reissued on several occasions but seem to have met with little success.

The dispute continued unabated with the publication about 1179 of John of Cornwall’s Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium, in which John urged Alexander III to condemn the disputed doctrine at the forthcoming council. The only source which indicates that the matter was raised at the Third Lateran Council is the account of the vehemently anti-scholastic writer, Walter of Saint-Victor, who gives a brief but vivid account of the proceedings. Scholars dispute whether Walter’s account actually refers to the Third Lateran Council or to some other consistory. Walter claims that the Pope wished to condemn the Lombard’s christological nihilism, and was only prevented from doing so by the opposition of several cardinals and the outspoken defence of Adam of Saint Asaph. The cardinals were of the view that the matter was not significant enough to warrant lengthy consideration, whilst Adam


230 The phrase was apparently coined by Walter of Saint-Victor. See Châtitlon, ‘Latran III’, p.80.


234 Glorieux, pp.194-5 dates the work to 1178 and considers that the events described by Walter refer to a consistory not the Lateran Council. Châtitlon, ‘Latran III’, pp.85-8 rejects both this and the doubts cast on the reliability of Walter’s account.

235 This Adam is not to be confused with Adam of Balsham. See L. Minio-Paluello, ‘The Ars Disserendi of Adam of Balsham “Parvipontanus”’, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 3 (1954), pp.165-6.
pledged to defend the Sentences, which he taught in the schools, on any count:

Recently at the Roman Council, Pope Alexander resolved to condemn by name that man’s teachings through which the diabolical error of Arius and Sabellius and modern heretics has once again erupted, namely that Christ, in so far as he is man, is nothing. Some of the cardinals, however, wanted to delay the cause of God and the faith of the Christian religion, according to which we stand and live, to another discussion, and, failing to answer correctly, they said to the Lord Pope: ‘Lord, we have undertaken to deal with other greater questions’. Then the Pope said: ‘the first and greatest task concerns the faith and heretics’. At which some of those present left the consistory. Then a bishop, Adam of Wales, rose with them saying: ‘Lord Pope, as both a cleric and formerly a director of his school, I would defend the teachings of the Master.’

If Walter’s testimony does indeed refer to the Third Lateran Council, it seems that the Lombard was saved from condemnation not by general belief in his orthodoxy on this specific issue, but only because the Pope was over-whelmed either by the indifference of the cardinals and/or by support for the Sentences as a theological system at the very core of teaching at Paris. The reluctance of the cardinals even to discuss the disputed question suggests that the steady growth of cardinals with a theological education had yet to have a significant impact on their interests.

This suggests that one of the reasons debates about the Lombard’s teachings came to a head in 1215 but not in 1179 may have been the changing nature of the cardinalate. In 1179 it was still just about conceivable for Rome to ignore developments in Paris; in 1215 it was impossible. On the other hand, it is perhaps not so remarkable that Peter Lombard escaped official condemnation at a time when such unequivocal judgement was extremely unusual. Even the judgements against Abelard, especially at Soissons, and against Gilbert at Reims, were by no means definitive. This represents not so much a reluctance to judge, though there may have been a feeling


that official condemnations created more problems than they solved, as a lack of a clear sense of how to make judgements about such complex issues. There was no established procedure for arriving at decisions about doctrine. The most obvious judge was of course the pope himself, but as the events of 1179 show, even the pope could not act without the support of his cardinals and other interested parties. A similar situation must have arisen during the preparation for the Fourth Lateran Council. As I shall show in chapter six, Innocent III's substantial borrowings from Joachim's trinitarian theology makes it almost inconceivable that he would have initiated the latter's condemnation. This means that some other, still unknown, group was responsible.
Before c. 1160 the instances of borrowing and influence in trinitarian theology cannot really be said to amount to a distinct tradition. The questions raised by Roscelin in his dispute with Anselm were addressed by Abelard in his *Theologia*. Peter Lombard in turn assimilated a significant proportion of the arguments and solutions set down by Abelard, and also adopted his general interpretive framework for resolving seemingly contradictory questions. In addition, several other works of theology, such as the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum* and the *De trinitate* of Walter of Mortagne covered many of the same issues. But this scattering of theological writings on the Trinity does not amount to a common tradition. Collectively these works do not yet evince a clearly identifiable tone, method and preoccupation. Moreover, to earn the name ‘tradition’ a phenomenon must be well-established and transmitted from one generation to the next. Thus *continuity* and *duration* are essential.

It is only from 1160 onwards, from the time, in other words, that the Lombard’s *Sentences* began to be widely studied, that we can truly speak of an academic tradition of thought on the Trinity. In this period substantial agreement emerged on a number of issues and a distinct methodology was adopted. Indeed, by the late twelfth century, consensus rather than controversy was the dominant feature of debate in the schools. This consensus was in large part purely intellectual; it reflected agreement on a range of doctrinal problems as well as the best approach for resolving those problems. But the social and institutional structures which generated these discussions and writings gave an added coherence to thought on the Trinity. Indeed, the institutional framework was the necessary precondition for the development of a distinct tradition of thought on the Trinity. Without the kind of regularised teaching which the schools fostered, writings on the Trinity would have been isolated and disconnected. They would have constituted not so much a tradition as a polemic, such as we find in the ninth century, and again in the twelfth, in the various confrontations between ‘monastic’ and ‘scholastic’ theologians. The
institutional foundations of this scholastic tradition, moreover, are clearly observable in the theological texts themselves. For all works which may be characterised as scholastic belong ultimately to the same genre whose defining feature was the quaestio. These quaestiones lie at the root of the theological summae of the twelfth century and the systematic theology of the thirteenth.

1. The structural unity of scholastic works: the quaestio

The quaestio technique may be regarded as one of the defining characteristics of scholasticism itself. Its presence transcends the division of knowledge into various disciplines, and its adoption as the organizing principle of a given written work immediately endows that work with a certain literary structure. Anyone writing such a work must arrange their material according to certain largely predetermined conventions. The posing of a question, the formulation of a problem, usually in the form of a contradiction, took various forms, but in its essentials could be reduced to a variation on the sequence quaeritur utrum...an, so that even the language of quaestio literature is identifiable. All quaestiones and all works whose structure is informed by the quaestio technique belong, therefore, to a given genre.

Thus the meaning and content of every work which we assign to the genre of scholastic theology are strongly predetermined by the simple fact of belonging to that genre. The conspicuous repetition of entire structures of expressions and arguments from one theological work, or rather from a corpus of works, to another is as much a function of writing and thinking within a particular genre, subscribing to an entire range of conventions about how knowledge can be most effectively attained and communicated, as it is of how far the author actually agrees with the standard argument, proposition or solution. The repetition of these structures may also have something to do with the use of easily remembered stock arguments as a teaching device.\(^1\) That is why theologians distinguish themselves when they express

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disagreement with the standard solution to a particular question or when they expand upon it significantly. But even in these cases the author still adopts or remains within the structure of the question as it is conventionally framed and developed. Thus the most striking thing about the universal application of the quaestio technique is the large extent to which it determines the structure, content and approach of works of scholastic theology.

Adoption of the activity of asking questions as a common practice could only take place in the context of the institutionalisation of study itself. The emergence of institutions whose sole function was to pose and resolve systematically problems about meaning and interpretation was bound to affect both written and oral ways of structuring these problems. The practice of the quaestio, therefore, owes as much to teaching methods and classroom discussions as it does to problems arising from purely textual study. Many quaestiones, after all, take the form of student notes of the master’s framing of a question (reportationes).²

In this respect, the use of authoritative texts as an integral part of the quaestio technique actually enabled the master to impose his own personal interpretation. For once detached from its original context, a passage assumed an independent status and was subject to the individual interpretation of the presiding master. As de Rijk has written, “the authoritative text, despite its initial importance, increasingly took on the character of an instrument.”³ There was a gradual shift in emphasis from the role of authoritative texts to the role of the master in interpreting those texts (determinatio), and the opinion of modern masters came to be cited alongside those of ancient authorities.⁴ This is not unlike Gadamerian hermeneutics, whereby to go behind what is said is to question beyond what is said; we may begin with someone else’s question, but travel far beyond that by the very act of questioning.⁵

³La philosophie, p.102.
⁴M.-D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle (2nd edition; Paris, 1966), pp.358-60. For a contemporary description of a determinatio, see Matthew Paris, Chronica majora 7 vols., Rolls Series 57 (London, 1872-83), pp.476-7 for his account of one of Simon of Tournai’s eventful lectures.
⁵Truth and Method, pp.370-5.
An analysis of the *quaestiones* of this period will give some idea of just how the use of the *quaestio* is often more constitutive of the fundamental character of a work than its actual authorship. The teaching of Odo of Soissons (d. 1171) is an excellent example of this. Odo was first (c. 1147) a master of theology at Notre-Dame and then its chancellor from 1160 to c. 1167 when he retired to the Cistercian monastery of Ourscamp. He was eventually persuaded by Pope Alexander III to accept the office of Cardinal-Bishop of Tusculum in 1170. It is assumed from the fact that his name does not appear in curial documents after 1171, that Odo died that same year.

A number of collections of *quaestiones* have been attributed to Odo or his school. This is significant from the point of view of the unity of scholastic works in general because the question of Odo’s authorship, or rather the precise relationship between these *quaestiones* and Odo’s teaching, is virtually impossible to determine. In other words, despite the uncertainty of a single authorship, these various collections evince a generic unity by virtue of their similar content and the presence of the *quaestio* technique.

The problem of authorship is further compounded by the fact that some manuscripts contain not only questions, but also *reportationes*, that is, reports by a student of classroom discussions. The likelihood of establishing a single authorship is made even more remote in view of the contradiction between Odo’s view, that of...

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7 The only printed edition of these is the *Quaestiones Magistri Odonis*, ed. J.B. Pitra, *Analecta Novissima Spicilegii Solesmensis Altera Continuatio* II (Rome, 1888), pp.1-188 from Paris BN lat. 3230. An evaluation of Pitra’s edition can be found in Brady, ‘Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings’, pp.461-5 who, on the basis of mss. not analysed by Pitra, argues that his text is not an exhaustive collection of all those *quaestiones* attributed to Odo and also contains some *quaestiones* which do not belong to Odo. For the list of mss. associated with Odo, see Landgraf’s important pioneering studies in *RTAM* 6-7 (1934-35), 368-93 and 113-28. For the most recent list, including those added by the research of Giusberti, see G.R. Evans, ‘The Place of Odo of Soisson’s *Quaestiones*. Problem-Solving in Mid-Twelfth Century Bible Study and Some Matters of Logic and Language’, *RTAM* 49 (1982), pp.123-5.

8 In Pitra’s edition of BN lat. 3230 the *reportationes* begin at no. 288, p.98. Warichez, *Les disputations*, p.xiii thinks that this student reporter may be Simon of Tournai.
another master" and the opinion of a third, referred to as magister noster.10 This range of opinion strongly suggests that these quaestiones emanate not just from Odo’s ‘school’, but more generally from the schools of Paris during this period.11

Despite the difficulty of identifying any single individual as the author or source of these questions, it is clear that these works are linked by a common method and approach and that in them we can see the emergence of a distinct tradition of thought on the Trinity. One common thread between these various questions is the reliance on the Lombard’s Sentences both for the framing of a particular question and for the patristic authorities cited. The Sentences are a constant point of reference throughout; the course taken in some questions either does not make sense without a knowledge of the Lombard’s work or is considerably enhanced by such knowledge.

That the Lombard’s Sentences are invariably the source for many of these questions is demonstrated by the treatment in these collections of the problem of whether or not the divine essence begets. Three quaestiones associated with Odo’s school launch into this problem with a citation from Augustine, Deus pater genuit se alterum, which corresponds more closely to the Lombard’s comments on the passage than to Augustine’s actual words.12 The approach to this question is formulaic, derivative and varies little from one quaestio to another. The most striking similarity is between London Harley 3855 and Paris Mazarine 1708, which are almost but not quite identical.13 Both of these quaestiones proceed along semantic lines. Augustine’s

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10 Quaestiones Odonis 293, 313, 314, 316, 318, 322, 326, 332 and 334. See Giusberti, Materials, p.118. Brady, ‘Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings’, pp.479-90 identifies this magister noster with Peter Comestor; Giusberti, Materials, p.118 finds Brady’s argument convincing on the whole; Evans, ‘The Place of Odo of Soissons’s Quaestiones’, pp.129-30 is more sceptical about the possibility of identifying with any certainty this magister noster.


12 Quaestiones Odonis 259, p.87; London BM Harley 3855, fol.12ra; Paris Maz. 1708, fol.249ra. Simon of Tournai cites the Augustinian passage in full, see Institutiones 30, p.194 and Disputationes LXXXVII.1, p.250. Cf. Lombard, Sent.IV.2.4, p.80.

expression seems to imply that the Father begot himself, but if we pay close attention
to the precise meaning of the crucial words, we must distinguish between ‘se’ and
‘alterum’; the one denotes identity of essence and the other distinction of Persons. 14
Moreover, the process of begetting does not produce another substance, just as when
a craftsman makes an image, or a king makes a knight, it is not a question either of
substance or non-substance. 15

These authors agree, then, with the Lombard that the essence does not beget,
but they also reject the statement, which he accepts, that ‘God begot God’. For used
in this way, that is, without any adjoining word, the word ‘God’ always designates
divine essence, which does not beget. 16 All that can be said is that ‘God the Father
begot God the Son’, since ‘in this case, this noun “God”, which signifies the divine
essence, is joined to the personal names and is thus confined to the Persons. 17 This
rejection of the expression ‘God begot God’ suggests that the problem of the
signification of the word ‘God’ was far from resolved when these works were written
in the 1160s. Theologians had yet to articulate the general principle which was to
dominate later discussions, that with notional verbs (verbs signifying begetting, etc.)

14 Lombard, ISent.IV.2.4, p.80.19-22: ‘Quod qua intelligi potest: id est de se alterum genuit, non utique alterum
Deum, sed alteram personam; vel genuit se alterum, id est genuit alterum qui est hoc quod ipse; nam etiam si sit
Pater quam Filius, non est tamen aliud, sed unum.’ Harley 3855, fol.12ra: ‘Augustinus dicit: deus pater genuit se
alterum. Unde videtur quod filius genus sit ipse pater et alter ab ipso. Sed exponendum est. Nam per hoc quod
dicit “se”, identitatem essentiae voluit notare; dicendo “alterum”, alteritatem in persona tantum, ut sit sensus: “se
alterum”; id est, filium, qui idem est cum patre in essentia, et alter in persona et ita alteram genuit personam.’ Maz.
1708, fol.349va: ‘Dicit Augustinus: deus pater genuit se alterum. Et hoc quibusdam improbis possit videri quod
filius genus esset ipse pater et alter ab ipso. Dicit verbum Augustinus exponendum, per hoc quod dicit “se”,
identitatem essentiae genuisse voluit demonstrare; dicendo “alterum”, alteritatem in persona tamen significavit, ut
sit sensus “genuit se alterum”; id est, filius qui idem est in essentia cum deo patre et alter in persona et ita alteram
genuit personam’.

15 Harley 3855, fol.12ra: ‘non tamen sequitur ipsum genuisse substantiam vel non substantiam. Sic iste facit
imaginem aut rex militem, non tamen substantiam vel non substantiam.’ Maz. 1708, fol.249ra: ‘non ideo sequitur
ipsum genuisse substantiam vel non substantiam. In multis enim similibus fallit; cum enim artifex facit imaginem
 nec substantiam nee ut substantiam facit, vel rex faciendo militem.’

16 Harley 3855, fol.12ra: ‘unde non est concedendum quod pater genuit divinam substantiam, nec divina
substantia filium, nec deus filium, nec pater deum, nec deus deum, quia “deus” ita per se et simpliciter positum
semper in designatione divinae essentiae ponitur, que nec genuit nec genita est, sed communis toti trinitati.’ Maz.
1708, fol.249ra: ‘unde non est concedendum quod pater genuit divinam substantiam, nec divina substantia filium,
nec deus filium, nec pater deum, nec deus deum, quia “deus” ita per se et simpliciter positum semper in
designatione divinae essentiae ponitur que nec genuit nec genita est, sed communis toti trinitati.’

17 Harley 3855, fol.12ra: ‘Potest autem dicit: deus pater genuit deum filium. Tunc enim hoc nomen “deus”
divinam significans essentiam auiducium nominibus personalibus restringitur circa personas.’ Maz. 1708,
fol.249rab: ‘Potest autem dicit quod deus pater genuit deum filium. Tunc enim hoc nomen “deus” divinam
significans essentiam auiducium nominibus personalibus restringitur circa personas.’
'God' never signifies essence, only Person.

More or less the same treatment is to be found in the quaestiones attributed to Odo of Soissons that have been published by Pitra, except that the question is dealt with under the larger heading of 'whether Person is identical with substance'. The author's approach presupposes that the question of whether or not the essence begets is just one of a series of questions which raise the paradox of identity of substance and distinction of Person in God. For example, how can Augustine on the one hand say that the Father loves the Son by that love which is the Holy Spirit alone, and on the other deny that the Father is wise not by that wisdom which is the Son alone, but which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Clearly, the resolution of the difficulty is that in the first case the attribute of love is personal, whilst in the second it is essential.

'Odo's' treatment of the statement 'God begot God', which reads like a commentary on Distinction IV of Book I of the Sentences, raises similar problems about the distinction between substance and Person. Without diverging from the Lombard's original explanation, 'Odo' nevertheless makes greater use of technical distinctions. In Augustine's statement, Pater genuit se alterum, 'se' is actually in the ablative, not the accusative. Read thus, Augustine's statement signifies not that God begot another self (se alterum), but another from himself (alterum de se) or another of the same essence. This usage of extremely precise grammatical distinctions is an increasingly dominant feature of theological works informed by the quaestio method, probably because these kinds of distinctions are particularly suited to solving the apparent contradictions of meaning with which quaestiones tend to be concerned. Simon of Tournai's treatment of the same question amounts to an extensive commentary on the Sentences with the addition of these precise grammatical distinctions. Thus, in the same Augustinian phrase, 'se' signifies essence and for that reason is of neutral gender, whilst 'alterum' signifies Person and is consequently of

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18Quaestiones Odonis 259, pp.85-8.

19Ibid., p.86: 'Pater diligit Filium, et Filius Patrem ea dilectione quae est solum Spiritus sanctus. Negat tamen esse sapientiam ea sapientia, quae est solum Filius, sed ea quae est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus.' These questions are also treated as a unit by Stephen Langton, Summa. pp.75-6.

20Quaestiones Odonis, p.87.
masculine gender.21

Other quaestiones of this period show a similar tendency to those associated with Odo of Soissons, to concentrate on language itself as both the root cause of, and the solution to, theological problems. The so-called Quaestiones Varsavienses are an excellent example of what might be called the classic quaeestio technique.22 As with other collections of this period, there is no discernible order to the arrangement of subjects. There is, however, a clearly definable procedure: the problem is posed (quaeritur), correctly resolved (Ad quod dicimus; scien dum est; solutio) and objections are reported and dealt with (Sed contra; Opponitur).

The central role of the quaeestio method in determining the formal structure of theological writings is strongly in evidence in other kinds of theological works besides actual collections of quaestiones themselves. The Summa of Peter of Capua is an excellent case in point, but the same could be said of virtually any author writing during the second half of the twelfth century:

We shall show in advance, however, the way in which the questions are to be dealt with. Firstly, the authoritative grounds shall be established. Secondly, the walls of the arguments and questions erected. Thirdly, the roof of solutions and explanations shall be placed on top, so that the argument or question may be discussed, the solution or reasoning illuminated.23

In addition to being a way of structuring written works, the act of asking questions was also a method of reading and teaching. The practice of questioning, therefore, embraces the method of critical reading, the institutional framework and the formal written structure of scholastic theology. In any hierarchy of necessary conditions for the scholastic method as it has come down to us, the quaeestio technique would be near

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21 Inslitutiones 30, p.194: ‘De se genuit alterum se, intelligit alterum esse masculini generis et personale, se vero neutri generis et essentia e contra proprietatem relationis. Est enim regula grammaticae relativum eiusdem generis esse cum eo, ad quod reffertur. Sed tamen Pater est masculini generis et se neutri. Haec autem improprietas ibi invenitur: Semini tuo, qui est Christus (Gal 3. 16). Est ergo sensus: Pater de se genuit alterum in persona et se, id est sibi idem in essentia.’

22 Quaestiones Varsavienses Trinitariae et Christologicae’, ed. F. Stegmüller, Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati II (Vatican, 1946), 282-310 from Lat. 0. vell. 1.16, fols.112r-142r held in the National Library at Warsaw. Stegmüller (p.283) suggests that these quaestiones may be one of the sources for the disputabilia inordinata mentioned in the prologue of the Sentences of Peter of Poitiers.

23 Munich Clm. 14508, fol.1ra: ‘Modum autem tractandi questiones presignemus. Primo iacentur fundamenta auctoritatum; secundo, erigentur paries argumentorum et questionum; tertio, superponentur tectum solutionum et rationum, ut, quod in domo dei auctoritas quasi certum proponit, argumentatio sive questio discutiatur, solutio sive ratio elucidet.’
2. Grammatical theology

In the twelfth century, developments within grammar and theology occurred more or less concurrently. The beginnings of academic theology coincide closely with those of philosophical grammar and modern linguistic science. Throughout the Middle Ages doctrinal controversies often revolved around questions of language, and there was always a close link between the study of God and the study of language. Unsurprisingly developments in the field of grammar invariably had their repercussions in theology, and vice versa.

It was not until this period that grammarians, under the influence of dialectic, embarked upon a new phase when they began to ask questions about the philosophical foundation of their discipline. Of particular importance were the implications for Priscian’s classic definition of the noun as signifying substance with quality. Whilst grammarians did not distinguish between the proper and the improper signification of a noun, logicians, working from Boethius’ translation of the Categories available from the early eleventh century, did. Whether a noun signified substance or accident

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properly would affect its meaning in a sentence.27

One of the earliest work associated with the philosophical grammar of the twelfth century was by a theologian, Anselm of Canterbury.28 This shows that although the influence of grammar upon theology was always bound to be more conspicuous, since all academic theologians had been trained in the arts, theologians were nevertheless often in a position to ask the most searching questions about language. Many scholars now recognise that eleventh- and twelfth-century developments in grammatical theory can only be understood as a response to discussions by theologians.29 The need for a precise and technical language for talking about God acted as a stimulus to grammarians to sharpen their own conceptual tools.

This brings us to the method of grammatical theology, in which ‘The theme of reflection is language about God and not divine reality in itself’.30 Although this assessment was made solely with reference to Prepositinus of Cremona, it accurately describes a major trend in theology from about 1160 onwards. Theologians within this strand include some of the most eminent thinkers of the time: Alan of Lille, Peter of Poitiers, Peter the Chanter and Stephen Langton, to name only a few. But what makes the significance of this approach quite outstanding is its presence in a number of lesser known and anonymous works. Even fairly limited research in the libraries of London, Paris and Munich bears out this claim. ‘Grammatical theology’ was a method practised at all levels of intellectual ability and achievement in the schools. It was not just the province of brilliant and original minds, but also, and just as importantly, of the less original. It is its widespread adoption that makes the method of grammatical theology the most important development in scholastic theology in the later twelfth century.

27 On these points, see Colish, The Mirror of Language, pp.69-70.
30 Angelini, L’ortodossia e la grammatica, p.29.
The approach has several distinguishing features which bind it to the discipline of grammar. Broadly speaking, the premise of grammatical theology was that it was possible, and indeed necessary, to identify a series of very specific and conceptually related rules governing theological discourse, just as in grammar there were such rules. As theologians became more aware of the difficulties and dangers involved in using a humanly instituted language to describe divine reality - the problem of projecting the human onto the divine - the need for guidance in the conditions governing the transference of words to theology became ever-more pressing. Alan of Lille maintained that theology, like every other science, possessed its own rules and principles. The essential feature of such rules was the application of semantic and grammatical principles as a procedure for distinguishing between correct and incorrect statements, or rather for explaining why some statements were permissible and others not. For example, the gender of a pronoun in a given proposition will have a crucial bearing on the meaning of the whole and may provide the key to a correct interpretation. Masculine and feminine pronouns indicate Person, whilst neuter pronouns indicate essence. Hence the Father is not he who (ille qui) the Son is, but that which (illud quod) the Son is. Any sloppiness here could leave us with a statement which effectively means that the Father is the same Person as the Son.

The idea that theology was a separate discipline with its own methodology went back to Boethius' threefold division of speculative philosophy into naturalis, mathematica and theologia, and was further developed by Gilbert of Poitiers in his Commentaries on the opuscula sacra. This new theology was something distinct from traditional biblical exegesis, though it never severed its links with the study of

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31Ibid., pp.29, 106, and esp. Lang, Die theologischen Principienlehre, pp.36-105.
33Regulae, prologus 1, pp.121-2.
34See Alan of Lille, Summa 71, p.219; Regulae XXVII, p.143. Peter of Poitiers, ISent. III, p.18.179-80.
the Bible. Gilbert, for his part, stressed that the valid application of rules to theological questions depended upon taking full account of theology’s unique subject-matter, so that rules would always have to be transferred from the other sciences in a special way. Master Hubertus put forward a similar position:

Translation creates an impropriety, because, as it was said, all words are properly and principally invented and introduced in order to signify the objects of the ten categories. When therefore some word is spoken of God, it is spoken in translation, because it is transferred, through some resemblance, to a divine signification, as though borrowed from its proper signification.

The emergence of theological rules reflects a move away from inductive methods towards deductive ones, at the same time as collections of individual ‘sentences’ became systematic textbooks of rules. In his Summa ‘Quoniam Homines’, for example, Alan of Lille deals with a sequence of interrelated problems of interpretation, solving each one individually before eventually arriving at a general principle according to which each question could be systematically resolved. In the Regulae, however, Alan reverses this approach, by proceeding from methodically arranged rules to particular examples of their application. Thus in the Summa, during the course of his inquiry into whether essential nouns are common (appellativa) or proper (propria), Alan notes an argument for their being proper, since an essential term such as ‘deitas’ does not accept partitive nouns such as ‘quedam’ and ‘alicuis’.

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36 Ibid., p.92.
37 Lang, Die theologischen Prinzipienlehre, pp.48-57; Evans, Old Arts, pp.49-56.
38 Summa, Munich Clm. 28799, fol.7vb: Translatio parit improprietatem, quia sicut dictum est omnia vocabula proprie et principaliter ad significandas res decem predicamentorum inventa et instituta sunt. Cum ergo vocabulum aliquod de deo dicitur, translative dicitur, quia quasi a propria significatione mutatum per quamdam similitudinem ad divinam significationem transfertur. Cf. Alan of Lille, Summa 56, p.200: ‘Et hoc nomen “Deus” est quasi appellatum; non enim proprie dicitur esse appellatum, quia, ut dicit Boethius, cum nomina transferuntur ad theologica cuncta mutantur; non enim transferruntur secundum plenitudinem similitudinis sed secundum partem plenitudinis.’
39 Summa, Munich Clm. 28799, fol.7vb: Translatio parit improprietatem, quia sicut dictum est omnia vocabula proprie et principaliter ad significandas res decem predicamentorum inventa et instituta sunt. Cum ergo vocabulum aliquod de deo dicitur, translative dicitur, quia quasi a propria significatione mutatum per quamdam similitudinem ad divinam significationem transfertur. Cf. Alan of Lille, Summa 56, p.200: ‘Et hoc nomen “Deus” est quasi appellatum; non enim proprie dicitur esse appellatum, quia, ut dicit Boethius, cum nomina transferuntur ad theologica cuncta mutantur; non enim transferruntur secundum plenitudinem similitudinis sed secundum partem plenitudinis.’
41 Summa 55, p.199.
Regulae, however, this principle is formulated at the outset as a general rule.\[42\]

This progression from the tedious and repetitive resolution of individual *quaestiones* to the formulation of general rules in theology was not peculiar to Alan, though he is perhaps the most outstanding exponent of the *Regularmethode.*\[43\] Prepositinus of Cremona and Peter of Poitiers are other clear examples.\[44\] By the late twelfth century, another theologian, Master Martinus, expressed the doctrine that the essence does not beget in the form of a theological rule.\[45\]

The most important general principle was that all essential nouns used of God are always predicated in the singular, irrespective of whether they are being used of one Person only or the three together.\[46\] Related to this was the classification of words according to general type as either essential, personal or notional. This classification is one of the fundamental principles by which general rules could be formulated in the first place, and probably goes back to Anselm of Laon via his two most famous and influential pupils. Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers.\[47\] In some cases, it is constitutive of the very structure of the work. For example, Peter of Capua’s *Summa:*

Of the names which are spoken of God, some are essential, such as ‘God’, ‘just’ and similar words; some are personal, such as ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and such like; some are notional, such as ‘paternity’ and ‘sonship’ and similar words.\[48\]

In other works, these distinctions are assumed rather than made explicit, as in the

\[42\]Regulae XXVIII. p. 144.

\[43\]Lang, *Die theologischen Prinzipienlehre.* pp.75-93.

\[44\]Angelini, *L’ortodossia e la grammatica.* pp.105-70 has an extensive comparison of these three authors.

\[45\]Quaestiones, Paris BN lat. 14556, fol.280ra: ‘Regula est theologica quod natura divina non gignit nec gignitur, nec procedit nec spirat.’


\[47\]For example, *Sent.* divine pages. pp.6-8. Also from Anselm’s ‘school’, a *quaestio,* printed by Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* V. pp.230-1; *Sententie Aretabentes,* in *ibid.*. p.404.

\[48\]Munich Clm. 14508, fol.1vb: ‘Sciendum igitur quod nominum que de deo dicitur, quedam sunt essentialia, ut “deus”, “justus” et huiusmodi; quedam sunt personalia, ut “pater”, “filius” et huiusmodi; quedam notionalia, ut “paternitas” et “filiatio” et huiusmodi.’
anonymous Glossa on the Sentences\(^{49}\) or the Summa of Master Hubertus.\(^{50}\) This classification of the divine names as essential, personal or notional was the highest category of technical generalisation about theological language and from it proceeded a number of subcategories. It has even been suggested that this categorisation is to theology what Aristotle's Categories is to the natural world: every theological word belongs to and exhibits the properties of at least one category.\(^{51}\) Peter of Poitiers begins his treatise with this ever decreasing hierarchy of application. Thus, of the words stated of God, some are temporal and some are eternal; of those which are eternal, some are used singly either according to essence (deus) or according to Person (pater); of those which are stated essentially, some are understood essentially (divinitas; essentia) and some personally (potentia; deus).\(^{52}\) Following this procedure, Peter arrives at a classification of nine types of word, including those which signify and always stand for essence and those which signify essence but sometimes stand for Person.\(^{53}\) It is this nine-fold classification which determines the structure of Peter's work.\(^{54}\)

The typology of nouns predicated of God is even more intricately delineated in the Summa of Alan of Lille, whose first book is divided according to personal and essential words. Of theological nouns, some are essential in that they signify the essence without having any other connotation (deus; essentia; deitas).\(^{55}\) Others are essential in that they signify relations which are added (addictas) to the divine nature (dominus; origo).\(^{56}\) Still others are partly personal and partly essential in that they

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\(^{49}\)BM Royal 7F XIII, fol.7va: 'Deus genuit deum, id est pater filium, ubi "deus" est nomen personale non essentiale.'

\(^{50}\)Munich Clm. 28799, fol.2vb: 'hoc nomen "deus", licet essentiale sit, personaliter tamen ibi tenetur.'

\(^{51}\)S. Ebbesen, 'The Semantics of the Trinity According to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen', in Gilbert de Poitiers, p.408.

\(^{52}\)ISent. II, p.10.1-15.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., p.11.25-9.

\(^{54}\)See Angelini, L'ortodossia e la grammatica, p.99.

\(^{55}\)Summa 55, p.198: 'Nominum autem theologorum alia sunt essentialia que ita essentiam predicant quod nullam distinctionem copredicant'.

\(^{56}\)Ibid: 'Alia coessentialia, que significant relationes addictas divine usie'.
signify the divine essence principally or directly and co-signify (signify secondarily or indirectly) the personal distinctions (*persona; *trinitas*). 57 Others are purely personal, either signifying (*pater; filius; spiritus sanctus*) or denoting (*paternitas; filiation; processio*) a personal property. 58 Finally, some are co-personal in that they signify relations added to the personal properties (*distinctus; alius*). 59

Furthermore, some essential nouns signify and stand for the same thing, the divine essence (*deitas; natura*), whilst others signify essence and stand for Person (*deus*). Another way of defining this difference between totally and partially essential nouns is the distinction between mathematical or abstract, and concrete nouns. 60 Essential nouns are mathematical when they signify and stand for the same thing, the divine essence. 61 Just as *whiteness* (*albedo*) signifies without calling to mind any particular white thing, so essential nouns which signify and stand for the divine essence do not convey the idea of any one of the divine Persons as part of their general meaning. Concrete nouns, on the other hand, signify Person as much as nature, just as in the natural world *white* (*albus*) signifies a thing which has the property of being white.

The range of semantic categories elucidated by Alan of Lille gains systematic coherence in the *Regulae*:

Every name which is spoken of God is either essential, co-essential, personal, co-personal, or partly

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59 *Ibid*: ‘Alia compersonalia, que significant relationes addictas personalibus proprietatibus’.


61 *Summa* 55, p.199: ‘Nomium autem essentialium, alia idem significat et appellant, ut illa que sunt quasi mathematica, verbi gratia ut hec deitas, natura, usia, essentia; idem enim significat et appellant scilicet essentiam divinam.’
A similar classification is provided by the anonymous author of a theological treatise, probably written in the late twelfth century, who argues that all nouns, whether essential, personal or notional, can each be further subdivided according to when they are used essentially, personally or notionally.

This overall tendency to sort and classify is one of the fundamentals of scholastic theology in the latter half of the twelfth century and developed concurrently with the equally important distinction between signification and supposition. Although this distinction is usually studied from the point of view of developments in language and logic, it was also at the heart of the semantic approach to the resolution of theological problems. In particular, the distinction between signification and supposition provided theologians with a more than adequate explanation of why ‘God begot God’ did not imply ‘essence begot essence’. Indeed, it seems more than likely that the concept of supposition was invented by theologians, since ‘No one could have a stronger motivation than a teacher of theology for asking what terms stand for in given contexts’. The centrality of the distinction in the academic theology of the Trinity is further borne out by the fact that it provides thirteenth-century theologians with their conceptual framework for interpreting Joachim’s condemnation at the Fourth Lateran Council.

Medieval discussions of signification took place within two main traditions: the logical, which was predominantly Aristotelian; and the grammatical, which evolved in commentaries on Priscian’s Institutiones grammaticae. On balance the latter seems to have had the more lasting impact. According to grammarians writing in the second half of the twelfth-century, the signification of any word could ultimately be

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62Regulæ XXXII, p.146.

63London BM Royal 9E XII (fols.100-157), fol.148vb: ‘Que nomina, sive essentialia sive personalia sive notionalia. ponunt essentia!iter et personaliter et notionaliter.’


traced back to its first usage, its *prima impositio*. Consequently, every word possessed a core, general meaning which derived from its first use, and which was prior to its meaning in any given context. This was a fairly vague concept, as the definition given by Peter of Spain in the 1230s, but common from c. 1030, shows:

> The signification of a term, as it is understood here, is the representation of a thing by means of an appropriate word.

The doctrine of signification meant therefore that every word had a fixed, essential meaning which had to be squared with that word’s usage in any given context. The concept of supposition provided precisely the means for determining a word’s meaning as used in an actual sentence.

Until the twelfth century, the term *suppositum* and associated terms referred to the grammatical subject of the sentence. There is no metaphysical dimension, no sense in which the subject has reference to an actual substance. It was during this period that *suppositum* acquired this second meaning - the property of the subject of a sentence to stand for some thing.

In his *De grammatico*, Saint Anselm distinguished between the significatio and the appellatio of a word. In effect, this anticipates the distinction between signification and supposition, even though Anselm does not use the technical language of the later

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69They are used in this sense by Boethius, Priscian and Peter Helias. See de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II.1, p.521, 527.

70Ibid., p.521.

71But C.H. Kneepkens, ‘*Suppositio* and *Supponere* in 12th-Century Grammar’, in *Gilbert de Poitiers*, 325-51 argues that it was not until Peter Helias in the mid-twelfth century that *suppositum* even meant the grammatical subject.
twelfth century. Anselm uses the example of grammaticus (literate, i.e. one who has the property of knowing grammar) to illustrate his point. He says that grammaticus does not signify man and literacy together (substance and quality), but literacy directly or properly and man indirectly or improperly. Grammaticus denotes man (appellativum hominis) in the sense of the one being literate, but does not convey or signify the proper meaning of man. Anselm’s theory resembles supposition, then, insofar as a term (grammaticus) may signify one thing (literacy), but stand for or denote another (man). The concept of appellation did not itself become redundant once the distinction between signification and supposition became established. Instead it came to designate, according to the definition of Peter of Spain, ‘the acceptance of a common term for an already existent thing.’ The example used by Peter is the term ‘Antichrist’, which signifies and stands for the Antichrist, but which appelles nothing whatsoever since the Antichrist was still to come.

A similar distinction between meaning and use, signification and supposition, is found in Abelard and William of Conches, where it takes the form of a distinction between significatio and nominatio. But most important from the point of view of trinitarian theology is the presence of an embryonic concept of suppositio in the work of Gilbert of Poitiers and his followers. The dominant usage is still ‘function as the subject of a sentence’ rather than ‘the function of the subject as standing for

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73 For this account of Anselm, see D.P. Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm (Oxford, 1967), pp.19-24; Evans, Language and Logic, pp.77-8; Pinborg, Logik und Semantik, pp.43-7.

74 De grammatico 4.232, p.37: ‘Grammaticus vero non significat hominem et grammaticum ut unum, sed grammaticum per se et hominem per aliud significat.’

75 Ibid. 4.233, p.37: ‘Et hoc nomen quamvis sit appellativum hominis, non tamen proprie dicitur eius significativum.’

76 Summulae logicales, p.197: ‘Appellatio est acceptio termini communis pro re existente.’

77 For Abelard, see Maierü, Terminologia Logica, p.70; for William of Conches see, de Rijk, Logica Modernorum II.1, pp.227-8.

something’. But it is through the works of Gilbert and the Porretani that this usage of supposition first made its entry into grammar and logic. Nielson has argued that Gilbert and his followers are interested in the concept of *suppositio* only in so far as it impinges on problems of theology and theological discourse. Further on the origins of supposition in theology, Ebbesen suggests that the notion of *suppositio personalis* was invented by theologians to indicate when the word ‘God’ in a proposition stood for one of the Persons as distinct from the divine essence.

By the late twelfth century the distinction between signification and supposition had come into its own, replacing that between signification and appellation. Peter of Spain, writing in the 1230s, defines the distinction thus:

> Signification and supposition differ, however, because signification occurs through the imposition of a word for the thing to be signified, whereas supposition is the acceptance of an already significant term for something.

The importance of supposition theory at the level of practical application ties in with the division of all theological words into categories and sub-categories. For once a noun had been classified as either personal or essential according to the various stipulations about whether it signified essence properly or improperly, directly or indirectly, it was possible to explain precisely how and why that word functioned as it did in different contexts.

As well as being used to solve individual theological problems, the signification-supposition distinction became an integral part of the theoretical framework adopted by theologians writing in the second half of the twelfth century.

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82 The Semantics of the Trinity’, p.402.


84 *Summule Logicales*, p.80-9-11: ‘Differunt autem suppositio et significatio, quia significatio est per impositionem vocis ad rem significandum, suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis rem pro aliquo.’
Master Hubertus devotes a lengthy chapter to the concept of supposition as applied in a range of theological contexts. He considers first the supposition of essential names, such as ‘God’ and ‘divine essence’ and whether, when they are the subject of a sentence, they always stand for a Person, answering, as if there were any real doubt, in the negative (i.e. since one Person is not the Trinity). Then there is the problem that the supposition of ‘God’ in the sentence ‘God begets and God is begotten’ seems to be indefinite since the word ‘God’ does not stand for the Father any more than for the Son. The distinction between signification and supposition was the most popular device for explaining away apparent absurdities, objections or contradictions, and its use was absolutely crucial to the emergence of a broad consensus in trinitarian theology. Alan of Lille may have been responsible for its widespread use by the late twelfth century: he certainly seems to have been the first theologian to use it extensively.

At the very core of the development and refinement of this approach was the still thorny question of exactly why ‘God begot God’ did not imply ‘essence begot essence’. The on-going vitality of this debate is quite remarkable, given the apparent absence of any dispute between genuine opponents. Apart from Alberic of Reims, and even his opposition must be considered questionable, there is no evidence that anyone seriously thought that the essence did beget. In other words, from the time that the question was first explicitly framed by Abelard, there was an unanimous agreement among school-trained theologians that the essence did not beget. Why then was the question pursued so vigorously throughout the twelfth century and after? The answer is twofold. Firstly, the issue was central to the entire clarification of the opposition between unity of essence and distinction of Person; the problem of why, when the

85 *Summa*. Munich Clm. 28799, fols.5rb-6vb, Fol.6va: ‘Dicimus quod non semper hoc nomen “deus” in subjecto aliquam personarum designat, sed aliquando supponit essentiam, aliquando personam. Cum ergo dicitar “deus est pater”, si hoc nomen “pater” substantivae teneatur et quasi cum subintelecto articuli intelligatur, tune hoc nomine “deus” potest supponi essentia; si autem adiectivae et quasi relative teneatur, tune necessario supponitur persona et non essentia.

86 Munich Clm. 28799, fol.7rb. But against this is the fact that the signification of ‘God’ is singular since it signifies the divinity. Hubertus’ solution is that the propositions in question are neither indefinite nor singular since ‘God’ itself is neither a proper nor a common noun, but has elements of both. Cf. Alan of Lille’s and Prepositinus of Cremona’s definition of appellative and proper nouns below, p.146, n.100.

87 Alan himself seems to have derived the distinction from Gilbert of Poitiers. See A. de Libera, ‘Logique et théologie dans la *Summa “Quoniam Hominis” d’Alain de Lille*, in Gilbert de Poitiers, 437-69.
Father who is essence begot the Son who is essence, it did not follow that essence begot essence. This does not mean that theologians seriously considered the possibility that the essence did beget. They knew from early on in trinitarian discussions that this was impossible, on the grounds provided by Augustine that no thing begets itself. Rather, as de Rijk has written of the quaestio technique in general, their inquiry was ‘purely theoretical, aimed at an exclusively intellectual clarification’. Such an inquiry would deepen and sharpen understanding.

Secondly, the dilemma of why ‘God begot God’, but not ‘essence begot essence’ raised searching questions about language and signification which echoed a range of preoccupations common not just to theologians, but to other scholars as well. Language, how to understand and manipulate it, was the burning philosophical question of the age. Discussion of the question of whether essence begot essence provided a forum in which to thrash out and refine semantic concepts such as the distinction between signification and supposition and their applicability to empirical problems. The evidence that this was indeed the case is irrefutable; in their discussion of the signification of particular words theologians repeatedly used the example of God begot God/essence begot essence as a kind of test case for their argument.

Again, this common methodology reinforces the case for consensus in trinitarian theology in the later twelfth century. The similarities among academic theologians outweigh their differences, which is why the concept of ‘schools of theology’ can be somewhat misleading for this period. Both Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai were undoubtedly influenced by Gilbert of Poitiers, but it does not necessarily follow from this that they belonged to his ‘school’ (even with the qualification that they are not to be confused with the Porretani, Gilbert’s self-proclaimed followers and defenders). These same authors, as I have emphasised, also relied heavily on the Sentences of Peter Lombard in a way which makes it difficult to assign them to Gilbert’s school without this being misleading. As Gillian Evans has written of Simon of Tournai:

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88La philosophic, p.97.

89 This distinction between Gilbert’s hard-core and less committed followers is a standard one. See Châtillon, ‘La méthode théologique’, pp.49-51.
The community of interest here, the exchange of views, is more important than the classification of a man’s opinions as predominantly those of the Lombard or those of Gilbert of Poitiers.90

The overwhelming feature of academic theology during this period is consensus rather than divergence on a range of doctrinal issues. Of course, issues over which theologians disagreed should not be dismissed for the sake of uniformity. But these disagreements invariably centred on specific issues and should not detract from the significant agreement which had emerged both in terms of methodology and of the corpus of problems under discussion.91 I shall attempt to substantiate these claims by examining the interdependency of the problem of the signification of the terms deus, essentia and persona with that of why ‘God begot God’ but not ‘essence begot essence’.

3. deus/essentia: ‘God begot God’ but not ‘essence begot essence’

The signification of the terms ‘God’ and ‘essence’ was inextricably linked to the problem of why ‘God begot God’ did not imply ‘essence begot essence’. The solution adopted by theologians to this problem hinged on their distinction between the signification of these two terms. In particular, they had to account for the fact that ‘God’, unlike other essential terms, did not always signify the divine essence. Rather, ‘God’, because it was partly essential and partly personal, sometimes stood for essence and sometimes for Person.92 The same point had already been made by Gilbert of

90 Alan of Lille, p.8. Evans seems immediately to qualify this, however, by suggesting that this ‘community of interest’ may have broken down by the end of the twelfth century under the pressure resulting from the competition for students. Cf. Châtillon, ‘La méthode théologique’ and Angelini, L’ortodossia e la grammatica, esp. p.80, both of whom consider the differences between the ‘schools’ as much more prominent than their similarities.


However they explained this peculiarity of the word 'God', all academic theologians agreed on one point: the signification of the term 'God' was equivocal and therefore its supposition (reference or meaning in context) in any given sentence was never a foregone conclusion but had to be determined in each individual case.

For Alan of Lille, 'God' was a special case of an essential noun whose signification was the divine essence but whose proper supposition was a Person, and only improperly the divine essence. Only this kind of flexibility in the supposition and signification of 'God' would be able to account for its varied uses in different propositions. For if 'God' stood only for essence, we would not be able to say 'God begot' without concluding that 'essence begot essence'. On the other hand, even though the proper supposition of 'God' was a Person, it had at least improperly to stand for the essence if statements such as 'God is Trinity' were to be true, i.e. since no one Person is the Trinity.

Thus, according to Alan, 'God' is properly used as a personal, but improperly as an essential noun. That is, it stands for Person directly, and for essence indirectly. Indeed, such is also the case, he explains, in the natural world. For 'man', since every man is an animal, is properly used to signify and stand for man, as in 'man is an animal', but improperly, since no man is a species, to signify and stand for

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Deo et huiusmodi, pro personis intelligitur. Cum vero dicitur per se, ut: Deus est, ad essentiam pertinet.

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95 Summa 56, p.200: ‘Nec essentia est tanturn, quia non esset verum Deus genuit Deum, quia essentia divina non genuit nec genita est.’

96 Ibid., pp.199-200: ‘Item si tantum personale ponitur, ergo non vere dicitur Deus est trinitas, quia pro ulla persona est ista vera.’

97 Ibid., p.200: ‘Ad hoc dicitus quod hoc nomen “Deus” propri est personale sed inproprie ponitur essentialiter’. Alan’s usage of ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ seems to contradict Evans’ judgement that Alan does not employ these terms as a measure of technical exactitude. See *Alan of Lille*, pp.33-4.
species, as in 'man is a species'.

For both 'God' and 'man' are appellative (common) rather than proper nouns, insofar as they denote a plurality of individuals possessing the same nature. Thus 'God' appellates the plurality of Persons. It is as if to get from the word 'man' to the species man we have to travel via the individual man. By analogy, in order to reach the idea of the divine essence from the word 'God' we have to go through one of the divine Persons.

The explanation given by Prepositinus of Cremona to account for why two essential terms, 'God' and 'essence', should differ in their signification and supposition, is effectively the same as Alan of Lille's, though he is less concerned about the propriety of 'God' standing for essence. He argues that 'God', unlike other essential nouns, notably essence, is used both essentially and personally. The general principle is:

the noun 'God' whenever it is used to say something about God, signifies the divine nature. But sometimes 'God' both signifies and stands for nature, as when we say 'God is three Persons'; sometimes it signifies nature and does not stand for it, but for a Person, as when we say 'God begets'.

\[\text{Summa 56, p.200: 'sicut et in naturalibus contingit: nam hoc nomen "homo" proprium ponitur ad significandum et supponendum hominem, ut cum dicitur homo est animal; inproprie tamen ponitur ad significandum et supponendum speciem, ut cum dicitur: homo est species.'}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p.200: 'Ad hoc enim ut aliquod nomen proprie sit appellativurn, oportet ut illud sit plurium suppositorum appellatum in una communis natura, una dico non unitate sed unione et conformitate; unde hoc nomen "homo" plura appellat et una communis natura, id est in natura conformi et unieni; nam humanitas Socratis dicitur una, id est uniformis et uniens humanitate Platonis'. On the distinction between nomen proprium and nomen appellativum, see Maieru, Terminologia Logica, pp.47-52.}\]

\[\text{Summa 67, p.217: 'Dicimus quod appellativum, quia significat naturam communem plurium; et est plurium appellativum, quia plurium personarum.' Cf. Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 4.2, p.216.28-31: 'hoc nomen "deus" nec proprium est nec appellativum, sed habet aliquid proprium et aliquid appellativum. Habet enim significationem proprii et suppositionem appellativum. This is the view reported by the anonymous BM Royal 9E XII (fols.231-246v), fol.239rb: 'Queritur an hoc nomen "deus" proprie an appellative accipiat. Et dicunt quidam quod nec proprii nec appellativum tantum, sed appellative ratione suppositionis, ut: pater est deus, filius est deus, spiritus sanctus est deus; proprio vero ratione significatis, ut cum dico divina essentia est deus.' Angelini, L'ortodossia e la grammatica, p.110 notes that Prepositinus, like Alan, introduces the discussion on proper and appellative names during questions on divine generation.}\]

\[\text{Summa 4, pp.214-18.}\]

\[\text{Ibid. 4.1, p.214.1-3: 'Sunt etiam nomina que tantum essentialiter dicuntur, ut "essentia", "natura"; quedam que essentialiter et personaliter dicuntur, ut "deus".'}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p.215.29-32: 'hoc nomen "deus" ubique significat divinam naturam cum deo dicitur. Sed quandoque significat eam et supponit pro ea. ut deus est tres personae; quandoque significat eam et non supponit pro ea. sed pro persona una, ut deus generat.'}\n
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The word 'essence', on the other hand, never stood for Person, but only for the divine essence. It is notable that the examples given by Prepositinus for the essential and personal supposition of 'God' are exactly the same as Alan of Lille's. For him, as for virtually all theologians, the main proof that 'God' does not always stand for the divine essence is the argument that, if it did, 'God begot God' would imply 'essence begot essence', which they had already rejected as impossible.

Peter of Capua uses many of the same examples, including the main one that even though the word 'God' is essential, it is sometimes used personally, as when we say 'God begot God'. A much more complex example reverses the order of the statement 'God begets and he is' to 'God is and he begets'. Now the supposition of 'God' is no longer the Father but the divine essence, and from this it would follow that the essence begot.

Peter's lengthiest discussion of the signification of the word 'God' occurs during his consideration of the proposition 'God begot God, therefore himself or another God'. He reports a number of the alternative solutions put forward to explain why neither inference (himself or another God) is valid. The first is that although the proper supposition of 'God' is the divine essence, when 'God' is taken (transumitur) to stand for Person, its supposition is narrowed (contrahit) by the verb to which it is joined, so that it stands for one specific Person (ut supponat determinate

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104Ibid. 3.8. p.213.8-9: 'Si dicas essentiam esse verum est de persona, probo quod non: quia hoc nomen "essentia" non supponit pro persona.' ibid. 9.1, p.256.13-15: 'Nomen "essentia" non supponit nisi pro essentia; et hec dictio "trinus" non habet poni nisi gratia personarum; non ergo essentia est trina.'

105Cf. Alan of Lille, Summa 56, pp.199-200; 67-70, pp.218-19; Regulae XXIX, pp.144-5.

106Summa, Munich Clm. 14508, fol.1vb: 'Quamvis autem hoc nomen "deus" essentiale sit, aliquando ponitur personaliter, ut deus genuit deum.'

107Munich Clm. 14508, fol.1vb: 'Deus generat et ipse est; ergo verum est deum generare et ipsum esse; ergo vera sunt deum generare et ipsos esse; ergo vera sunt deum esse et ipsum generare; ergo deus est et ipse generat. Sed hic non sit suppositio per hoc nomen "deus" nisi pro divina essentia; ergo divina essentia est et ipsa generat. Respondemus: cum hoc nomen "deus" immediate adingitur verbo substantivo, ita quod non sequitur aliquod adjectivum quod immittatur illi nominis, ut cum dictur deus est genus, non potest supponere nisi pro essentia; cum vero tinguitur verbo notionali tamen sumitur ab essentia ad personam; est ergo illatio falsa: vera sunt deum generare et ipsum esse, ergo vera sunt deum esse et ipsum generare.'

108Munich Clm. 14508, fol.2ra.
Accordingly, the statements 'the Father begets' and 'God begets' are exactly equivalent (equipollent). An alternative solution is that with notional verbs, 'God' is indeed taken to stand for Person, but indeterminately so that no particular Person is singled out. The problem here is that because una et alia persona is begetting and begotten this would seem to open the way for unus et alius deus being both begetting and begotten. A third group argue that in such statements as 'God begot God' the word 'God' is taken to stand for Person, and never stands for essence. Its supposition is quasi mixtum; it stands for Person along with essence so that the sense is: God begot God, i.e. a Person participating in the divinity begot a Person participating in the divinity. But this raises other difficulties when it is not appropriate to replace the term 'God' with the term 'a Person participating in the divinity'. Finally, a fourth opinion holds that 'God' in its widest sense (ampliatus) always stands for essence, but that sometimes its supposition depends on the nature of the verb to which it is joined so that it may stand for Person.

In all, Peter reports four different opinions. Explanations range from the proper supposition of 'God' being essence to the proper supposition being Person, and if Person, whether determinate or indeterminate. More impressive than these subtle variations, however, is the fact that all four of the proposed solutions presuppose an entire array of shared assumptions, including proper and improper supposition, determinate and indeterminate supposition and the restriction of terms. Peter himself does not express a preference for one solution over another. He simply relays the state of the question among contemporaries.

The same problem of why 'God begot God' does not imply 'essence begot...
essence’ provides the point of departure for Alexander Nequam’s assertion that although ‘God’ is properly essential, it is sometimes used personally. The verb ‘to beget’ in the expression ‘God begot God’ restricts the supposition of ‘God’ to Person only. The anonymous author of a *summa* uses the example of ‘God begot God’ as an illustration of the general principle that essential words can be used personally.

Master Martinus also considers the problem of the signification of ‘God’ in this context:

Some people ask, not in vain, whether the name ‘God’ signifies substance only or Person only or Person and nature. That it signifies nature only is an untenable position since the name ‘God’ can act for Person, as when it is said ‘God begets God’.

The first solution Martin reports is that ‘God’ signifies neither nature only nor Person only nor nature and Person, but signifies nature and Person differently. The solution favoured by Martin himself is that of Alan of Lille, that ‘God’ signifies nature but stands for Person.

Stephen Langton states that the word ‘God’ is restricted to standing for Person when it is joined to terms coupling or indicating notion as in the case of ‘God begets’

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115 *Fol.* 148vb: ‘Essentia ponuntur personaliter, ut ibi deum deo, et venit ad nos calciata divinitas, essentia genuit essentiam.’

116 BN lat. 14556, fol.279vb: ‘Querunt quidam non invacue, utrum hoc nomen “deus” significet substantiam tantum vel tantum personam vel personam et naturam. Quod significat tantum naturam improbatur sic < > cum hoc nomen “deus” possit agi de persona, ut cum dicitur “deus gignit deum.”’


118 BN lat. 14556, fol.279vb: ‘Alii dicunt quod hoc nomen “deus” significat tantum naturam, sicut hoc nomen “homo” significat tantum naturam, et appellat personam, sicut hoc nomen “homo” significat tantum homo et appellat Socrates, quod melius est.’
or ‘God from God’. By the same token, Langton explains, because ‘God’ in this context stands for Person, it does not follow from ‘God begets’ that ‘the divinity begets’. And similarly, ‘God begot God’ does not imply ‘essence begot essence’ because of the different significations of these two terms:

The noun ‘essence’ signifies God in existence (existential). The noun ‘God’, in a manner of speaking, is shared by the three Persons. For this reason, the noun ‘God’ can be restricted to standing for Person, but the noun ‘essence’ cannot. And thus it is false: divine essence begot divine essence.

As he does for so many other questions, Master Hubertus provides a concise summary of the main points of the contemporary debate. He himself favours the same solution as that proposed by Stephen Langton:

Many opinions present themselves concerning the supposition of the name ‘God’. But this solution seems more useful and correct, namely that with notional verbs ‘God’ is reduced to personal supposition only, and in that instance can make a true supposition for Person and not for essence. Thus the sense is: God begot God, that is, the Father begot the Son.

Hubertus reproduces many of the arguments and authorities found in the Lombard’s *Sentences*. But where the Lombard’s method of piling up authorities and arguments is sometimes at the expense of overall clarity, Hubertus’ approach gains a theoretical depth and clarity from his appeal to the general laws of causation, relation and identity. For if the divine essence is begotten, it is either begotten from a Person or from the essence, and the former is impossible by reason of causation, relation and

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119*Summa*, p.57: ‘Item haec dictio “deus” restringitur ad supponendum pro persona per terminum copulamentum notionem vel per terminum notantem notionem. Per terminum copulamentum ut deus generat; per terminum notantem ut deus de deo.’ See also anonymous, BM Royal 9E XII (fols.247r-250v), fol.248va: ‘Nota quod deus prope supponit pro divina essencia, sed cum verbis notionalibus nihil amittens extenditur ad personas. Qualia sunt “generat”, “gignitur”, “procedit”, “spirat”, “spiratur.”’


122*Summa*, Munich Clm. 28799, fol.9rb: ‘plurales occurrunt opiniones de suppositione huius nominis “deus”. Expeditor tamen et verior videtur hec, scilicet quod ex notionali verbo contrahat personalem tantum suppositionem, et quod meram ibi faciat suppositionem pro persona et non pro essentia. Est ergo sensus: deus genuit deum, id est pater filium.’

123*Summa*, Munich Clm. 28799, fol.2va. For example, Augustine, *De trin. VII.3*, CCSL 50, p.249, *PL* 42.936 (ISent.V.1.7, p.82.25-7); Hilary, *De trin. IV.10*, CCSL 62, p.111, *PL* 10.103 (ISent.V.1.9, p.83.26).
identity. The argument by causation is a paraphrase of the Lombard’s argument that the Father cannot beget his own cause (I Sent. V.1.4), the argument by relation repeats the principle also cited by the Lombard that the essence cannot be spoken of relatively with respect to the Father (I Sent. V.1.2), and the argument by identity takes up the point that since the Father and the divine essence are identical, if the Father begot the essence, then something begot itself, which is impossible (I Sent. V.1.3). For the same reason the divine essence cannot be begotten from the essence.

Hubertus proceeds to consider three opinions on the matter. Some hold the (rather peculiar) view that the essence does beget, since it is true that the divine nature which is in the Father is begotten in the Son. They allow that the essence begets itself, but not that it causes itself to exist. The second opinion is that of Robert of Melun who takes the line that we may say ‘God begot God’ and ‘essence begot essence’ as long as the terms ‘God’ and ‘essence’, though essential, are understood personally. This would seem to be a very liberal interpretation of Robert’s position, who was himself well aware of the dangers of the expression ‘essence begot essence’. The third opinion cited is that of Peter Lombard who rejects both the sense and the expression ‘essence begot essence’. If any such expression is found in authorities, the Lombard expounds its correct meaning. Again Hubertus essentially reproduces the Lombard’s explanation of these passages, but within a theoretical framework which is absent from his source. In Augustine’s statement ‘essence from essence’, for example, the word ‘essence’ is assumed from the context to have a personal signification and is understood personally.

Finally, Hubertus cites a series of instantiae against the arguments in favour

124 Munich Clm. 28799, fol.2vb.

125 The only other author to report this view is Peter of Capua, Summa, Munich Clm. 14508, fol.2vb: ‘Alii autem hoc concesserunt etiam essentialiter utentes hoc nomine, quod Augustinus dicit nulla res se ipsum gignit ut sit, dicunt non esse contra se, quia nec ipsi concedunt quod essentia divina gignat se ut sit, sed ut sit, scilicet nec ex generatione habet esse sed habet ex ea esse’.

126 Cf. Peter of Capua, Summa, Munich Clm. 14508, fol.2vb: ‘Quidam tamen, utentes hoc nomine “essentia” personaliter, concesserunt essentiam generare essentiam’.

127 Munich Clm. 28799, fol.2vb. Cf. I Sent. V.1.8, p.83 where the Lombard explains that the Son, who is substance is from the Father, who is the same substance.
of the view that the essence begets. Thus to the argument that the Son has the essence through generation from the Father and that therefore the essence is begotten corresponds the *instantia*: Peter possesses hair by virtue of generation from his mother; therefore his hair is begotten from his mother. In other words, the Son has the essence but this does not mean that the essence is begotten. Also, whatever is truly stated of the Father must beget since it is proper for the Father to beget; consequently the essence begets, since the Father is the essence. Hubertus counters: this statue is bronze and a property of bronze is that it is natural, therefore the statue is natural.

These examples from a wide range of theologians show how progress towards a satisfactory clarification of the different significations of the words ‘God’ and ‘essence’ was ultimately bound up with, perhaps even driven by, questions concerning the doctrine of divine generation. Every author who has something to say on the subject either raises the issue of the signification of these terms in the context of why ‘God begot God’, but not ‘essence begot essence’, or, conversely, employs these propositions as the main instances of why their signification is problematic in the first place.

4. persona

In the later twelfth century, it becomes a commonplace of academic theology to take a conceptual distinction between essence and Person for granted. Although this distinction had been championed by the Porretani, it was also accepted by Peter Lombard. The validity of an intellectual distinction between essence and Person, and its acceptance in non-Gilbertine circles is further testimony to the growing consensus in trinitarian theology. The essence-Person distinction became detached from the Porretani to become the general property of all school-trained theologians. Once theologians had accepted this distinction there was no need to sacrifice divine simplicity for the sake of explaining why essence was acceptable in one statement but

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128Munich Clm. 28799, fol.3ra.
Person in another.

Nevertheless, if it is possible to identify ‘schools’ of thought within academic theology on the Trinity in such a way that we can point to one group of individuals as likely to hold certain views distinct from another group, then it is probably discussion about the definition and signification of the word ‘Person’ which brings this division most sharply into focus. More than any other issue in trinitarian theology, the position adopted relative to the meaning of ‘Person’ was likely to mark an individual as either of the ‘Lombardian’ or ‘Gilbertine’ school. The first tended to take their point of departure from Augustine’s statement that ‘in God, it is not one thing to be, and another thing to be a Person’. This was cited as proof that ‘Person’ did indeed signify essence, but was a problematic term by virtue of its changing meaning in different contexts as well as over time. The characteristic doctrine of those more susceptible to Gilbert’s position on the issue was the definition of persona as per se una, implying both distinction and unity.

Acknowledging these differences, however, does not amount to saying that theologians were at loggerheads over the issue. Opinions differed but the essential approach was the same. It was a question of degree, rather than of absolute orientation how far an individual thinker was influenced by either Peter Lombard or Gilbert of Poitiers, as the examples of Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai show. If we look beyond the existence of a range of opinion on various issues, we find not only a basically similar approach, but a convergence on points of detail which often makes the concept of ‘schools’ redundant.

The main issue was to establish whether and how ‘Person’ signified essence. Peter Lombard took the unqualified view that ‘Person’ did signify

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130 De trin. VII.11, CCSL 50, p.261. PL 42.943: ‘non enim aliud est deo esse, aliud personam esse.’


133 Peter Lombard, ISent.XXV.1-3, pp.190-6; Gandulph of Bologna, ISent.17, pp.9-12; Alan of Lille, Summa 36b-42, pp.177-84; Peter of Poitiers, ISent.3, pp.12-23; Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 3.1-5, pp.207-11; Quaestiones, BM Royal 9E XII, fols.237vb-238ra; 248rh. See Angelini, L’ortodossia e la grammatica, pp.120-30, who contrasts the approach of Alan of Lille with that of Prepositinus of Cremona as Gilbertine versus Lombardian.
essence, and only cited Boethius’ definition of Person as ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’ with respect to human not divine persons.\textsuperscript{134} But this position was susceptible to a number of extremely powerful objections, the most common of which dated back to Roscelin and Abelard.\textsuperscript{135} For if ‘Person’ did signify essence, it would seem to follow that since there is one essence, there is only one Person; or that since there are three Persons, there are three essences.\textsuperscript{136}

Although most authors agreed with Peter Lombard that ‘Person’ did signify essence, they were more circumspect in their solutions. It is only at this point that any difference according to ‘school’ becomes apparent. Contemporaries themselves expressed the range of opinion in such terms. Master Hubertus provides a convenient summary:

For some, such as Master Peter Lombard and his followers, have said that the name ‘Person’ is essential. Others, such as Master Robert, that it is personal. Still others, however, namely the Porretani, that it is mixed - partly personal and partly essential.\textsuperscript{137}

According to Prepositinus, some held the view that the signification of ‘Person’ was threefold. When it stands by itself without any word joined to it, ‘Person’ signifies essence, as in \textit{pater est persona}. When, however, a word is joined to it, ‘Person’ signifies hypostasis, as in \textit{pater est aliqua persona}. Finally, when the Father is


\textsuperscript{135}Ab, elard, TSum 11.47, pp. 129-30; TChr 111.93, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{136} Alan of Lille, \textit{Summa} 36c, p.178: ‘ista duo nomina: persona, usia eiusdem sunt prorsus significationis et consignificationis. Ergo vel non una sola est usia vel una sola est persona.’; Peter of Poitiers, ISent.3, p.12.18-20: ‘idem significatur hoc nomine “persona” et hoc nomine “essentia”; ergo Pater et Filius sunt una persona, vel non sunt una essentia’; Prepositinus of Cremona, \textit{Summa} 3.1, p.208.18-19: ‘Idem est omnino patri esse essentiam et esse personam. Sed pater est essentia que est filius, ergo est persona que est filius’; \textit{Quaestiones}, BM Royal 9E XII, fol.237vb: ‘Hiis quia dicunt quod hoc nomen “persona” semper significat essentiam, ita obicitur: pater est persona; ergo Filius est alia vel non est alia; si non est alia, ergo est eadem, ergo pater et Filius sunt una persona; si est alia, ergo pater et Filius sunt personae, ergo essentia, cum semper retinet hoc nomen “persona” suam significationem’; Hubertus, \textit{Summa}, Munich Clm. 28799, fol.5va: ‘quod hoc nomen “persona” sit personale, et non essentiale, multis rationibus posse probari videtur, et posito indirecte sic: idem est patri esse personam quod esse essentiam; pater est una essentia cum filio, ergo est una persona cum filio; vel, pater est essentia que est filius, ergo est persona que est filius. Item: patri est idem esse essentiam quod esse personam; est alia persona quam filius, ergo est alia essentia quam filius’.

\textsuperscript{137}\textit{Summa}, Munich Clm. 28799, fols.5va-b: ‘Quidam enim, ut magister Petrus Longobardus et sequaces eius, dixerunt hoc nomen “personam” esse essentiale. Quidam, ut magister Robertus, personale. Quidam vero, ut porretani, mixtum. <partim> personale et partim essentiale’.

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distinguished from the Son in person. ‘Person’ signifies property. This is the view of Peter of Poitiers. However, a certain Master Gerardus Puella asserts that ‘Person’ and ‘essence’ signify the divine nature in different ways. What Gerardus means is that ‘essence’ stands for the divine nature and not for any of the Persons, because it signifies the divine nature in itself (gratia sui). ‘Person’, on the other hand, does not signify the divine nature in itself but by virtue of its referents (pater; filius; spiritus sanctus). And ‘Person’ signifies the divine nature in such a way that it does not stand for it, but for one of the Persons, just as ‘the species man’ designates the species man in itself and therefore stands for it, whilst ‘man’ only signifies the same species via individual men. Thus the signification of ‘Person’ restricts it from

138 Summa 3.2, p. 208.1-8: ‘Ad predicta respondent quidam dicentes quod hoc nomen “persona” triplicem habet significationem. Quandoque significat essentiam, quando secliset per se ponitur in predicato, sine aliquo adiecto; ut: pater est persona, filius est persona. Quandoque significat ypostasim, i.e. subsistentiam, ut quando ei aliquid additur, ut: pater est aliqua persona, filius est aliqua persona, et alia est persona patris et alia filii. Quandoque proprietatem, ut: pater in persona distinguat a filio i.e. in personali proprietate.’ The same opinions are reported by the author of some Quaestiones, BM Royal 9E XII, fol. 237vb: ‘Nota quod hoc nomen “persona”, ut M[agister] dicet in sententias, tres acceptiones habet: aliquando significat essentiam, unde idem esse deo esse deum et esse personam; aliquando ypostasim sive subsistentiam, unde pater proprietate est pater vel persona; aliquando personalem proprietatem, unde pater in persona id est in personali proprietate, differat a filio.’ Also Peter of Capua, Munich Clm. 14508, fol. 11va-b; also Alan of Lille, Summa 36d, p. 179: ‘Has objectiones quidam vitare conantes, attribuunt huic nomini “persona” diversa significaciones. ut nunc usia, ut cum dicitur Pater est persona; nunc ypostasim, ut cum dicitur Pater est aliqua persona quam Filius; nunc personalem proprietatem, ut cum dicitur Pater differat a filio in persona, significet. Dicunt ergo quod hoc nomen “persona” significat usiam quoties per se ponitur, ut cum dicitur Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt personae, vel Pater est persona. Ex adiunctio vero mutat significacionem, ut cum dicitur Pater est una persona, vel Pater est alia persona quam Filius.’

139 Sent. 3, pp. 13-14: ‘Predictorum non est facile sumere solutionem nisi determinata equivocatione huius nominis “persona”; nam hoc nomen “persona” interdum significat essentiam, ut cum dicitur: Pater est persona, Filius est persona. Spiritus sanctus est persona; interdum significat ypostasim apud grecos, ut: alia persona est Pater, alia est Filius; interdum in designacione personalis proprietatis ponitur, ut cum dicitur: alius est Filius in persona, alius Pater [...]. Cum vero hoc habeat significaciones hoc nomen, ex diversis adiunctis determinatur in qua illorum significacionum ponatur.’ Angelini, L’ortodossia e la grammatica, pp. 125-6 maintains that Peter’s view is compatible with Peter Lombard’s despite the superficial similarity to that of the Porretani.

140 Died 1184. Studied with John of Salisbury and from before 1165 he was teaching at Paris where he gained a considerable reputation. None of his written works survive. Bishop of Coventry in 1183. See DIGH 20.787-8.

141 Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 3.3, p. 209.1-3: ‘Propter has objectiones dixit magister G. Puella quod hoc nomen “persona” alter significat divinum naturum quam hoc nomen “essentia.” The second of the four opinions reported by Stephen Langton, Summa, p. 130: ‘Ita secundum istam opinionem tam iste terminus “deus” quam iste terminus “persona” significat divinam essentiam, sed aliter et aliter.’ Also the view of Alan of Lille, according to Angelini, L’ortodossia e la grammatica, p. 127.

142 Summa 3.3, p. 209.3-8: ‘Quia hoc nomen “essentia” significat divinum naturum gratia sui, i.e. ita quod supra ponit pro ea, et non pro aliqua personarum. Et hoc nomen “persona” eversiceo significat divinam naturam non gratia sui, sed gratia contentorum, i.e. patris et filii et spiritus sancti. Et ita significat eam quod non supponit pro ea, sed pro aliqua personarum. Ut in hoc simili video potest; hec oratio: hec species homo, designat hanc speciem homo gratia sui et supponti pro ea. Sed hoc nomen “homo” significat eandem speciem non gratia sui, sed gratia contentorum.’ Cf. Langton, Summa, p. 130: ‘iste terminus “persona” significat divinum essentiam ut inhaurerentem et non supponti cum, immo tantum personam; iste terminus “essentia” significat divinum essentiam ut subsistentem
standing for the divine nature.

An alternative solution is that ‘Person’ signifies essence principally and co-signifies distinction.\textsuperscript{143} This is the solution of Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai.\textsuperscript{144} Arguing against the proposition that ‘one Person alone begets’ implies that ‘one God alone begets’, Simon of Tournai takes the view that even though ‘God’ and ‘Person’ signify the same thing, the divine essence, ‘Person’ also co-signifies distinction.\textsuperscript{145} We can say ‘one Person alone begets’ because there are a plurality of Persons only one of whom begets; ‘one God alone begets’ is inadmissable, however, since there are not a plurality of gods of whom only one begets. In his commentary on the Athanasian Creed, however, Simon takes a slightly different stand when he says that ‘Person’ signifies substance in the sense of hypostasis not essence.\textsuperscript{146} This solves the problem of why three Persons does not mean three gods or three essences.\textsuperscript{147} Simon actually seems to be trying to steer a middle path between ‘Person’ signifying and not signifying essence. In both the singular and the plural ‘Person’ signifies essence, but exclusively so in the singular, whilst in the plural distinction is co-signified. It is by virtue of this co-signification of ‘Person’, rather than its primary signification, that we say there are three Persons.\textsuperscript{148}

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\textit{et eam supponit.} \textsuperscript{143}
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\textsuperscript{144} Also, the Porretan Sententie Magistri Gisleberti, ed. N.M.Häring, \textit{AHDLMA} 45 (1978) 9, p.112.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Disputationes} LXXIX.4, p.230.23-6: ‘Tamen licet nomen Dei et nomen persone idem significent, congrue dicitur, una sola persona gignit: nomen enim persone non solum significat essentiam, sed etiam personalem discretionem.’; \textit{ibid.}, p.230.34-5: ‘Licet ergo nomen Persone significet essentiam, quia tamen plures consignificat distinctiones’.

\textsuperscript{146} Ed. N.M. Häring, \textit{AHDLMA} 43 (1976) 14, p.162: ‘Nomen igitur persone significat substantiam, non usyiam sed ypostasim.’ Cf. Peter of Capua, \textit{Summa}, Munich Clm. 14508, fols.11vb-12ra: ‘Dicimus ergo quod hoc nomen “persona” non pariter transsumptione equivocum erat ad essentiam et ad ypostasim, sed iam modo decidit ad significationem essentie secundum theologum et significat tantum ypostasim.’

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Comm. on the Athanasian Creed} 15, p.162: ‘Dicitur ergo: pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt tres persone quia tres hypostases, non tres dii quia non tres usye’.

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}, 17, p.163: ‘nomen persone in utroque numero singulariter designat unitatem sive essentiam sed in singulari, singulariter unius. In plurali vero pluraliter plurium personarum consignificat distinctiones. Quare ratione consignificationis, non principalis significations, pluraliter dicitur de tribus personis.’
Similarly, Alan of Lille argues that because ‘Person’, in addition to signifying essence, co-signifies distinction, the recurrent objection that if ‘Person’ signifies essence it follows either that there is more than one essence or that there is only one Person, can be finally met. Both Alan and Simon also attempt an etymological definition of ‘Person’ as per se una. This was a way of conveying the word’s twofold semantic function as signifying unity (of essence) and distinction (of Person).

Prepositinus’ own solution is that at one time ‘Person’ did signify essence but that it no longer does so. This was Augustine’s solution to the problem: the early defenders of the faith needed a word to answer the question ‘three what?’ regarding their confession of a trinity in God; Person was adapted for this purpose.

The debate about the term ‘Person’ is further evidence of scholars’ need for flexibility in usage: actual usage is the determining factor in the term’s definition.

5. The use of technical arguments by theologians

An integral part of the entire edifice of grammatical theology was the increasing use of specific types of argument. The art of discovering valid arguments was a growing concern for scholars in all fields in the twelfth century, and was given an additional stimulus by the Latin translation of Aristotle’s De sophisticis elenchis.
by James of Venice c. 1125-50. According to Aristotle, sophistical refutations are really fallacies, and thus only have the appearance of truth. It is precisely by knowing all of the thirteen fallacies which Aristotle discusses that the honest seeker after truth is able to identify and expose the fallacious reasoning of his sophistical opponents. Even though the study of the rules of valid argument was primarily the task of logicians, the subject naturally had implications for methods of resolving theological problems. That this was in fact the case is demonstrated by the existence of works on logic written specifically for the practical use of theologians. At the level of practical application, de Rijk has established that specific types of argument, such as fallacies and counter-arguments, were used by Peter of Poitiers in his Sentences (c. 1170).

Peter of Poitiers, however, was by no means the only practitioner. Such methods of argumentation were not merely commonplace in the second half of the twelfth century; they were absolutely integral to the kind of theology being taught and written at that time. The Sentences (1155/6-1163/4) of Robert of Melun provide some indication of the future role of technical types of argument. Robert’s debt to Peter Abelard is considerable. In the Sentences, he defended Abelard’s view of power, wisdom and goodness as the special properties of the three divine Persons and similarly followed Abelard in his predilection for long and complex analogies. But at the same time, Robert was far from being a slavish imitator. Indeed, Robert is

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152De sophisticis elenchis, Aristoteles Latinus VI 1-3, ed. B.G. Dod (Bruxelles-Leiden, 1975).


154Logica Modernorum I, pp.163-78.


cited in his own right by other authors, most notably by John of Cornwall in the context of christological debates,\textsuperscript{158} and by Master Hubertus for his views on the Trinity.\textsuperscript{159}

But I am concerned less with Robert’s direct influence than with the compatibility of his approach, namely his use of argument, with that of subsequent authors. This may well constitute a direct influence. However, we cannot be sure whether the arguments used by Robert, and then in later writers, were his own or whether they were in general circulation at the time, and merely appropriated by him and his contemporaries. Knowing the original source would be a bonus, though it is probably wrong even to think in terms of original sources. What is important for my purposes is the fact that certain arguments are used by a number of authors, pointing to a common approach to theological problems.

A contemporary of Peter Lombard, Robert adopts the \textit{quaestio} technique in his approach to theological problems. And like the Lombard, he is also preoccupied by a number of questions relating to the doctrine of divine generation, firstly, ‘whether it is true that God begot himself or another God, since it is true that God begot God.’\textsuperscript{160} Robert briefly recapitulates Abelard’s original argument.\textsuperscript{161} Firstly, the proposition ‘God begot another God’, is totally inadmissible, since there is no doubt that there is only one God. The remaining proposition, that ‘God begot himself’, is equally absurd, since as Augustine states, no thing begets itself. Robert states the solution to the problem clearly and succinctly: in the orthodox statement, ‘God begot God’, the word ‘God’ indicates Person, not essence.\textsuperscript{162} This is because ‘God’ is a


\textsuperscript{160}ISent. 4. XXI. p.141.6-8: ‘Queritur enim an verum sit. Deum se vel alium Deum generasse: quia verum est Deum genuisse Deum.’ It is notable that Robert should elsewhere (\textit{ISent. 3.I, pp.3-5}) identify errors concerning the Father’s generation of the Son with Arianism.

\textsuperscript{161}TCfr III.110-11, pp.235-6; TScH II.64, p.440; Hist. calam., pp.84-5.

\textsuperscript{162}ISent. 4.XXI. p.141.17-19: ‘Deus nec se genuit, nec alium Deum, facile resisti potest hoc cognito quia hoc nomen "Deus" in predicta locutione personas distinguist et non essentiam.’
type of common name which can often refer to Person. Thus the difficulty in interpretation lies in the fact that the word ‘God’ is equivocal in meaning; it can signify essence or Person, common or proper names. Its exact meaning in this case can only be determined from the context, which here excludes ‘God’ from signifying as a common noun.

Robert does not use the language of supposition as such, but his point about diverse signification comes very close to supposition theory without actually employing the technical terminology. Robert reinforces his position in a non-technical way with a number of analogies whose form corresponds to the instantiae used by other authors. These are used to show just how absurd it would be to attribute exactly the same meaning to the same term used in different contexts:

When I say, ‘the Apostle wrote to the Romans’, meaning Paul, a relation cannot be made of this so that it is either the one who wrote to the Corinthians or another Apostle. For this name ‘Apostle’ does not retain the same signification in the second instance as it had when it was used in the first. Whence the entire sentence is inappropriate on account of its [Apostle’s] diverse signification.

Robert also has to deal with the Porretan view that if the Persons are predicated of the divine essence or even the properties of the Persons, it follows that the divine essence is begetting, begotten and proceeding. The logical sequence which they reject would be: ‘the Father is begetting’ (pater est generans), ‘the essence is the Father’ (essentia est pater), ‘the essence is begetting’ (essentia est generans), therefore ‘the essence begets’ (essentia generat). In other words, since the Father and the essence are identical, any property of the Father must also be attributed to the essence. And

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163Sent. 3. XXIII, p. 77; Sent. 4. XXXI, pp. 222-3.

164Sent. 4. XXI, p.141.19-22: ‘Unde cum queritur, an Deus se ipsum genuerit vel alium, questioni locum tollit nomen Trinitati commune personaliter acceptum. Nam non convenienter ad nomen commune in loco proprii positum relatio fieri potest.’

165Ibid., p.142.4-10: ‘Item cum dico: Apostolus scribit Romanis, Paulum proprium designans, non recte ad hoc talis fit relatio: ergo vel ille qui scripsit Corinthis vel alius apostolus. Hoc nomen enim “apostolus” secundo positum non eandem retinet significacionem quam habuit cum primo ponenerut. Unde locutio tota inconveniens est proper eius diversam significacionem.’

yet this is only true in a very restricted sense, which only becomes clear when the distinction between substantival and adjectival predication is introduced by other authors.\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Essentia est generans} is perfectly valid so long as \textit{generans} is predicated substantivally of \textit{essentia}, i.e. indirectly through the essence, and not adjectivally.\textsuperscript{168} Accordingly, the only statement which can be inferred from \textit{essentia est generans} is \textit{pater est generans}, not \textit{essentia generat}. According to Robert, it is not because the personal properties are neither predicated of the Persons nor of the essence that we say that the divine essence does not beget, but because these properties take on an entirely different signification when they are predicated of the essence from when they are predicated of the Persons.\textsuperscript{169} It is a feature of adjectival words, such as ‘begetting’, that they are hardly ever used without indicating some sort of relation.\textsuperscript{170} To illustrate, Robert cites the following argument which commits the same error as those who try to prevent the essence from begetting by denying it is the subject of the personal properties:

This man and this body are indeed the same thing. Yet not just any word can be correctly joined with the expression ‘this man’ and with the expression ‘this body’. It is correct to say ‘this man is rational’, but it is not correct to say ‘this body is rational’.\textsuperscript{171}

In the technical language of the fallacies, this would be the fallacy according to accident, whereby a property which is attributed to the subject is then falsely attributed to all other predicates of that same subject.\textsuperscript{172} The reason for expressing Robert’s

\textsuperscript{167}See Peter of Poitiers, \textit{ISent.27}, p.219 and Appendix A.3.


\textsuperscript{169}\textit{ISent.4.XXIII}, p.147.21-9: ‘Nam proprietates sunt ipse persone. Ideo sicut persone a divina non removentur essentia, ita nec proprietates; et sicut persone de ea enuntiantur, ita et proprietates. Sed non quibuscumque vocibus de ipsis personis enuntiantur, eiusmod possunt de divina essentia enuntiari. Hic enim vocibus; “generans”, “genitus”, “procedens”, de ipsis personis dicuntur, quibus de ipsis essentia divina nequaquam enuntiari possunt, eo quod hec voces cum hac voce “divina essentia” copulate ad aliam transirent significationem’.

\textsuperscript{170}\textit{ISent.4.XXIII}, p.148.9-11: ‘Quod unde contingat, ei dubium esse non estimo qui non ignorat vim dictionum adjectivarum, quae raro sine vi relationis ponuntur.’

\textsuperscript{171}Ibid., p.148.13-17: ‘Idem quippe est hic homo et hoc corpus; non tamen quecumque dictio cum hac voce “hic homo” vere copulatur, et cum hac voce “hoc corpus” vere copulari potest. Vere dicitur hic homo est rationalis, non tamen vere dicitur hoc corpus est rationale.’ Merely the first of an entire sequence of examples which expose the same error.

\textsuperscript{172}\textit{De sophisticis elenchis}. p.11 166b29-166b37.
method in these terms is to show that there is already an in-built tendency in academic theology towards this kind of argumentation even before the explicit use of technical types of argument such as fallacies.

Such extensive use of logical examples is also found in the Glossa on the Lombard’s *Sentences*, which dates to the 1160s. In his gloss on Distinction IV of the *Sentences*, the author highlights the problem of the diverse signification of the word ‘God’. Taking as his starting point the proposition found in the Lombard’s *Sentences* that ‘If God the Father begot God, either he begot God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father’. Our author, following the Lombard, rejects the first inference, i.e. ‘God who is God the Father’, because in the sentence ‘God begot God’, the word ‘God’ is being used personally and refers to Father and Son respectively. Alongside this argument the author cites an analogous problem based on *Psalm* 109, 1, which is also used by Robert of Melun, *The Lord spoke to my Lord*, therefore, either to himself or to another Lord. In other words, it is as ridiculous to say ‘God begot God’, therefore himself, as it would be to say someone called Lord spoke to someone called Lord, therefore to himself.

A more technical kind of argument occurs during the author’s refutation of the view that the essence begets. The difficulty which the opposing argument aims to expose is that identity of substance between the Father and the divine essence is incompatible with the Father begetting and the essence not begetting. The argument runs as follows: the signification of the term ‘pater’, because it has only one signification, must have the same sense for ‘pater’ as for ‘divina essentia’; the consequence of predicating ‘pater’ of ‘pater’ is that the Father begets; similarly,
therefore, the same should follow when 'pater' is predicated of 'divina essentia', i.e. the divine essence should beget.\textsuperscript{177} ‘It does not follow’, retorts our author, because even though 'pater' signifies the same thing when it is predicated of both the Father and the divine essence, it is stated of the Father respective, but not of the divine essence.\textsuperscript{178} In other words, the essence is identical with the one who begets (the Father) but it does not follow from that that he has the property of begetting. To prove his point, the author gives an \textit{instantia}, a type of argument which has the same line of reasoning as the argument to be refuted, but whose logic is found seriously wanting:

The term ‘having a son’ applies with the same signification to this man and this woman, but when it is predicated of the woman, it follows that she has conceived.\textsuperscript{179} If we were to pursue the same line of reasoning as adopted in the first case we would, of course, run into the blatantly absurd conclusion that the man has also conceived. \textit{Instantiae}, or counter-arguments, are an integral part of the refutation of arguments in the \textit{Glossa}, and other works such as the \textit{Sententia Udonis} and the \textit{Summa} of Peter of Capua. Recent research has shown that the use of \textit{instantiae} was a standard feature of the study of logic, and to a lesser extent, grammar and theology, in the second half of the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{180} For every question that was addressed, several objections were reported. The defective logic of these objections was then revealed by producing arguments which proceeded along the same formal lines but whose conclusions were indisputably false. The \textit{Glossa} on the \textit{Sentences} seems to have been particularly important in this respect since a number of its arguments recur in subsequent

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\textsuperscript{177}BM Royal 7F XIII, fol.7va: ‘Quod tarnen essentia generet et generetur, sic videtur posse probari: iste terminus "pater" in nulla significatione convenit patri in quantum non conveniat divine essentie, quia unam tantum habet significacionem in quantum personam patris significat. Sed ad predicacionem illius termini de patre, sequitur quod pater generet; ergo ad predicacionem huius de divina essentia, sequitur quod divina essentia gigneret.’ For this argument, see Appendix A.2.

\textsuperscript{178}BM Royal 7F XIII, fol.7va-b: ‘Non sequitur. Et est ratio, quia licet utrobique idem significat hoc nomen "pater", tamen cum respective dicatur de patre, et de divina essentia non dictur respective.’

\textsuperscript{179}Royal 7F XIII, fol.7vb: ‘Instantia. Iste terminus "habens filium" in eadem significatione convenit viro huic et mulieri huic, sed ad predicacionem de muliere, sequitur quod concepisse. Ergo etc.’

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theological works.\textsuperscript{181} The author of the Glossa also seems to have been the first theologian to argue \textit{a simplici conversa}. This argument exposed as false the premise that the position of the subject and the predicate in a sentence can be simply reversed without effecting any change in meaning. For example, ‘the Father of the Son of God is God’ changes to ‘God is the Father of the Son of God’. And because ‘God’ and ‘divine essence’ are the same, we would then be able to say ‘the divine essence is the Father of the Son of God’ and thus ‘the divine essence begot the Son’.\textsuperscript{182}

The use of fallacies seems to be a slightly later development. It was based on a number of Aristotelian works: the \textit{Categories}, the \textit{De interpretatione} and especially the \textit{De sophisticis elenchis}.\textsuperscript{183} The most common were the fallacies of univocation and equivocation which theologians seem generally to have used interchangeably, without regard to the technical distinction drawn between the two by commentators on the \textit{De sophisticis elenchis}, where univocation was classified as a type of equivocation.\textsuperscript{184} Theologians used equivocation and univocation in their most general sense, to indicate that the same word does not always retain a single unchanging meaning, either because its varied impositions result in diverse significations, or, because the same word, though having a single imposition and thus signification, could have different significations according to its use in a particular context.\textsuperscript{185} It is this innate link between fallacies and signification which explains the close development between the theory of supposition and the use of fallacies.\textsuperscript{186} Wherever the signification of a word is not stable (i.e. most cases), its supposition (meaning-in-context), will vary from one sentence to another. If anyone should fail to take notice of this variation, they will be in danger of committing the fallacy of equivocation by misconstruing that term’s signification and consequently its supposition.

\textsuperscript{181}See Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{182}See Appendix A.3.


\textsuperscript{184}Ibid., pp.131-57.

\textsuperscript{185}For this definition of equivocation, \textit{ibid.}, pp.132-3. Also the definition of the \textit{Fallacie Parvipontane} from the second half of the twelfth century. See de Rijk, \textit{Logica Modernorum} II.1, pp.494-7.

\textsuperscript{186}Ibid., p.491.
One of the most common causes of the fallacy of equivocation was the signification of the word 'res'. In his *Summa*, Alan of Lille rejects the proposition that the divine essence begets by demonstrating that one of the arguments proposed in support of it is based on the fallacy of univocation: only one thing (res) is the divinity and that is the Father, therefore that thing (res) which is the divinity begot, therefore the divinity begot. The argument is false because the meaning of thing (res) has been confused by its use both essentially, 'only one thing is the divinity', and personally, 'the thing which is the divinity' (the Father who is divinity). Commenting on the same danger of misconstruing the meaning of 'res', Peter of Capua observes how its use in the singular to signify essence and in the plural to signify Person, could lead not to the fallacy of univocation, but of equivocation. According to Master Hubertus, the fallacy of univocation occurred whenever the normal supposition of a word was either restricted or relaxed. Hence, to proceed from 'God begets and he is' to 'God is and he begets' is a clear example of the fallacy of univocation: the word 'God' signifies essence first and foremost, but signifies Person when placed with the verb 'to beget'; but this signification, and thus supposition, of 'God' for Person is relaxed when the two parts of the first sentence are reversed; now 'God' (God is) stands for essence and consequently 'God is and he begets' would mean that the divine essence begets.

In addition to the use of fallacies by theologians for the purpose of solving individual problems, we find several treatises expressly concerned with providing guidance to theologians on the correct employment of fallacies. The most famous of

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these is Peter the Chanter’s *De tropis loquendi*. Less well-known is the late twelfth-century textbook on fallacies, the *Fallacie magistri Willelmi*. The author divides the work according to the thirteen fallacies, giving a number of examples of each. Particularly interesting from the point of view of trinitarian theology is the fallacy according to accident. William defines this fallacy in several ways, but in general the error arises when an accident or property attributed to the subject of a proposition is also assigned to the predicate of the same proposition or vice versa. The classic example, cited by William, in trinitarian theology was ‘God is the Father’, ‘God is the Son’, therefore, ‘the Father is the Son’. Master Hubertus makes effective use of the fallacy according to accident in his refutation of the Porretan argument that the Persons cannot be predicated of the divine essence since it would follow from this that the essence begot, i.e. if the Persons are predicated of the essence, so must the properties of the Persons, and with the same result, that the essence begets. By the same token, counters Hubertus, it could be said that since a property of bronze is that it is natural, and a statue is bronze, it follows that the statue is natural.

We can see then that theologians made extensive use of a common store of stock arguments which were generally recognised to have a valid place in theological discussions. These arguments worked on the principle that parallel lines of reasoning ran through arguments which treated of different subject matter, but that this difference in content was of no consequence as long as the formal structure of the arguments was the same. It is also possible to detect a growing preference for these kinds of arguments in favour of the citation of authoritative authors. Authorities were immobile; they could only be pushed so far convincingly to say what a twelfth-century writer thought that they should say. Argument, conversely, was alive and adaptable.

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190 Ed. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II.2, pp.683-702. De Rijk (ibid. II.1, pp.34-5) suggests that William de Montibus (d. 1213) may be the author. J. Goering, *William de Montibus (c. 1140-1213). The Schools and the Literature of Pastoral Care* (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto, 1992) does not mention the tract in his discussion.

191 *Fallacie magistri Willelmi*, p.692.11-15: ‘Incident autem hec fallatio in argumentatione quandoquem aliquod assignatur subiecto quod non potest assignari predicato, vel e contrario; aut quando subiectum assignatur alciui cui non potest assignari predicatum, vel e contrario; aut quando aliquod ponitur cum subiecto quod non potest ponit cum predicato, vel e contrario.’


193 *Summa*. Munich Clm. 28799, fol.8va.
In addition, the methods for reconciling written authorities, once established, were fairly straightforward, but also limited to a certain extent in their application to those problems discussed by patristic theologians. For many of the issues discussed in the twelfth century there were no directly relevant authorities. Or rather, citing Augustine or Pseudo-Jerome, for example, to the effect that the personal properties are identical with the Persons themselves, may have sufficed to establish the official position on the matter, but did not advance understanding of why this was the case. In many instances, an awareness of the process of argumentation itself was the most effective means of responding to awkward questions and objections. By far the most convincing and fool-proof explanations of difficult questions took place within this framework of technical argument. The central authorities on any given issue were always hovering in the background as a constant reference point, but they are no longer the momentum of a debate. Effective use of argument and the conceptual categories drawn upon in the process come to take pride of place.

It should be apparent from the sheer volume of material included in this examination of twelfth-century trinitarian theology that a wide range of academic theologians shared a significant body of common methods, assumptions and preoccupations. This common ground constitutes nothing less than a distinct and coherent tradition of thought in trinitarian theology. Repeated encounters with the same arguments and objections, distinctions and solutions in the works of different theologians show that these thinkers were engaged in a genuine dialogue. They made considerable progress in answering many of the questions raised about the doctrine of the Trinity since Roscelin of Compiègne had in the late eleventh century first highlighted the problem of how to reconcile identity of substance and distinction of Person from a logical point of view. They achieved some measure of coherence by approaching the problem from within a logico-semantic framework which allowed them to iron out many of the logical inconsistencies which plagued the doctrine without having to sacrifice divine simplicity and unity. It is this academic tradition of thought on the Trinity which will provide the basis for thirteenth-century interpretations of the Fourth Lateran Council’s decree on the doctrine. This tradition accounts for their misunderstanding of the decree.
Excursus on Frege

The distinction between signification and supposition may in some cases be compared to that between sense and reference. In particular, it bears some resemblance to the philosopher Frege's distinction between sense and reference, which is current in contemporary logic and philosophy of language. Frege argued that every word or sign expresses its sense, but designates its reference. This distinction between sense and reference creates a certain flexibility in use so that two different terms may have the same reference, but different senses, that is, each convey a different aspect of the nature of the thing in question. In this way, 'we connect the name with a particular way of identifying an object as the referent of the name'. The relevance of this for medieval supposition theory is that even if two terms have the same reference, if they also have different senses, which according to Frege they will, the substitution of one term for another in a given context will be invalid. That is why the statements a=a and a=b are not tautologies, but have genuinely different cognitive values as long as 'the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the thing designated.' A good example of what Frege was driving at is that of two different expressions used to describe the same person. 'The author of the Poetics' and 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' both refer to Aristotle but are far from being identical in meaning.

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194 My interest in Frege is much less technical than P. Geach, Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories (3rd edition; Cornell Univ., 1980) which is mainly concerned with questions of distribution, particularly the problem of indefinite pronouns.


198 Frege, 'On Sense and Meaning'. p.57.
Frege’s main interest was in explaining how two different terms could faithfully represent the same thing. Medieval theologians shared this preoccupation. In trinitarian theology, their interest focused on the problem of how the terms ‘God’ and ‘essence’ could refer to the same thing and yet not be exactly equivalent and thus interchangeable. But they were also interested in the additional problem of the varied signification and supposition of the same term in different contexts. The central problem of this type in trinitarian theology was the diverse signification of the word ‘God’ which meant that sometimes ‘God’ stood for essence and sometimes for Person. It is at this point that the comparison with Frege proves less helpful and convincing.
VI THE LATERAN DECREE ON THE TRINITY IN ITS SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT

The doctrinal statement on the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council was the first general statement and clarification of the doctrine for centuries, and the first issued by an ecumenical council¹ since the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. Indeed, apart from the decrees on the Trinity issued by the councils held at Toledo in the early Middle Ages, the Lateran decree on the Trinity constitutes both the most detailed and the most authoritative statement on the doctrine of the entire Middle Ages, and since its first formulation at Nicea and Constantinople in the fourth century.² In terms of its size and scope the Council was, moreover, the first truly general council of the Middle Ages. There is clearly a sense in which Pope Innocent III, and no doubt others, felt it was appropriate that the first of the decrees issued by such a large and prestigious assembly should concern itself with a definition of the faith in the tradition of the early conciliar creeds; it was the least the occasion demanded. Nor is it perhaps surprising, given the prominence of the doctrine in the councils of the early Church, most notably Nicea and Constantinople, that at the head of this credal-type statement should stand a definition of trinitarian orthodoxy in its absolute essentials. It is the second decree, however, in which Joachim’s doctrine is condemned, which provides the most detailed treatment of the doctrine.

It would seem, therefore, that Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard was not merely the result of a misunderstanding on his part, but went so far as to pose, or to be seen to pose, a serious threat to the very foundation of trinitarian orthodoxy as it had been thrashed out during the course of the twelfth century: his critique threatened the fine balance which had been struck between a satisfactory position on divine generation on the one hand, and a watertight conception of divine unity on the other.


²Foreville, ibid., pp.280-1 suggests that the doctrinal decrees may have been modelled on previous conciliar definitions, especially Toledo XI.
Joachim’s ‘error’ was no more serious than those attributed to Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers. It came at a time, however, when the intellectual and institutional conditions were more favourable to a definitive condemnation. For one thing, the emerging doctrinal consensus among increasingly professional theologians at Paris meant that they were of a frame of mind to press for a detailed clarification of the doctrine. In addition, the continued expansion of papal jurisdiction and the greater awareness of the scope of a general council as touching upon not just issues of reform and ecclesiastical discipline, but matters of faith as well, meant that the relevant institutions were equipped and prepared to take the matter all the way to conciliar proclamation.

This chapter is concerned with the meaning of the decree in its widest possible sense. For this reason much of the discussion anticipates issues which really belong to the next chapter, namely how far and in what sense are thirteenth-century interpretations of the decree a case of misunderstanding. I take the view here and throughout the thesis that they are a misunderstanding shaped by the strength of the academic tradition from which they emerged, but at the same time, there are reasons for thinking that the decree itself pointed these theologians in precisely this direction.

1. The decision making process and the role of Pope Innocent III (1198-1216)

None of the sources for the Fourth Lateran Council tell us precisely how the canons were prepared and approved before their official presentation to the assembly. But it is almost inconceivable that the final list was arrived at during the Council itself. The sheer scale of the gathering severely limited the opportunity for serious discussion. It was simply not feasible for an assembly consisting of 412 bishops (including 71 primates) and over 800 other dignitaries, ecclesiastical and lay, from all over Latin Christendom to consider in detail each of the 71 canons in the Council’s three sessions (11, 20 and 30 November). But logistics aside, the two eyewitness

3For the list of participants, see Hefele-Leclercq, V. 2, 1722-33. According to F.-J. Schmale, ‘Systematisches zu den Konzilien des Reformspapsttums im 12. Jahrhundert’, Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum 6 (1974), p.27 the length of councils varied from 1 day to more than 2 weeks. On the religious significance of holding the Council in November, a month notable for the number of feast days in Rome, see B.M. Bolton, ‘A Show with a Meaning, Innocent III’s Approach to the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215’, Medieval History 1 (1990), p.61. On the steady increase in the number of participants in twelfth-century councils, see R. Foreville, ‘Procédure et débats dans les
accounts suggest that any time for discussion was in any case given over to ecclesiastical and political disputes. Both Richard of San Germano and the anonymous, probably German, eyewitness state that the canons themselves were only read out on the last day for ‘ratification’ by the assembly, which seems to have been a mere formality. Ratification of Joachim’s condemnation was no exception. Richard of San Germano relates that the session in which Joachim’s doctrine was condemned began with a sermon by Innocent III in which the Pope spoke first of the case of Raymond of Toulouse, pronounced the sentence concerning his lands and then condemned the book of Joachim of Fiore. According to the recently rediscovered anonymous eyewitness account, at the third and final session of the Council the Pope ordered the articles of faith relating to the Trinity to be read out to the assembly, which accepted them unanimously. After this all heretics were condemned. The doctrines of Joachim and Amalric of Paris were singled out for particular rebuke, the accusations against them read out and the assembly asked if they reproved these opinions. They shouted ‘even more fiercely’ that they did.

This view of the Council’s role as one of formal endorsement of a predetermined programme of legislation is entirely consistent with twelfth-century developments in conciliar procedure, most notably the progressively central role of the pope. Increasingly, particularly as the scope of papal conciliar legislation ranged ever

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5 Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p.73.15-16: ‘Et sancta synodus LXX capitula promulgavit.; Kuttner and Garcia y Garcia, ‘A New Eyewitness Account’, p.128.184: ‘Deinde leguntur constitutiones domini pape.’ The editors interpret this to mean that the canons ‘were read and adopted, not debated in the council.’ (p.164). The reading out of the decrees on the last day was established practice in the twelfth century.

6 Chronica, p.73.2-12. Innocent’s sermon is not the spurious one published by Mansi 22, 973-8, but a sermon once extant in the lost register of his 18th year as Pope. See the reconstruction of the lost register from the index of Reg. Vat. 8A in A. Theiner, Vetus Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium Historiâ illustrantia 2 vols. (Rome, 1863-75; reprinted Osnabrück, 1968) I, p.63: ‘Sermo de Trinitate in concilio suo sancta universalis synodo Rome in ecclesia sancti Salvatoris celebrato: in quo sermone fuit reprobatus libellus sive tractatus Abbatis Joachim contra Magistrum P. Lumbardum.’

wider, councils functioned as forums for ratification rather than debate. There was no voting or discussion; instead, the assembled participants would express their consent by exclaiming Placet. At best the assembly might be able to make some recommendations as to the particular form of individual canons. This process is already detectable by the pontificate of Urban II (1088-99), and by the time of Calixtus II (1119-24) the role of the council had been reduced to the ceremonial acclamation of the pope's decision.

Although the council's function was largely formal thereafter, it was not entirely superfluous. According to twelfth-century canonists, the authority of a general council, especially of the first four (Nicea, Constantinople, Ephesus and Chalcedon), was based on Scripture itself. This was true, above all, of doctrinal decrees which, unlike disciplinary measures, were eternally binding. Moreover, according to the early commentators on Gratian's Decretum, no single individual, including the pope, had the same authority on questions of faith as the early councils. On doctrinal issues, the authority of a general council of the Church was thought by some to be superior to that of the pope alone. By the early thirteenth century, moreover, the idea was gaining rapid acceptance among canonists that the authority of a council derived not only from its being part of tradition, a fact which was always bound to work against the more recent councils, but in its being truly representative,

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8 Schmale, 'Systematisches zu den Konzilien', p.29.
9 Ibid., p.35.
11 Foreville, 'Procédure et débats', p.29: 'La simple énumération des questions de foi débattues dans les grands conciles (de 1119 à 1215) montre que, si le pape a un rôle éminent (Innocent III fut théologien à Paris et canoniste à Bologne; disciple de Pierre le Chantre et d'Huguccio); que si la Curie a souvent préparé les thèmes et ordonné certains débats, l'assemblée épiscopale conservait son autonomie: des mouvements s'y manifestaient, des oppositions y prenaient corps, parfois victorieusement; elle pouvait, dans certains conditions, imposer son point de vue. '  
especially if any statement of doctrine was to be issued.\textsuperscript{15} In this respect, Innocent III chose an extremely propitious moment at which to convene such a vast assembly.

The role of the pope as supreme legislator and of the council as giving formal consent does not mean, however, that the pope alone was the sole source of all conciliar legislation. Many of the measures instituted by the Fourth Lateran Council were not merely developments of Innocent’s previous pronouncements and of the legislation of the Third Lateran Council, but were also responses to a wide range of opinion within the Church.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, Innocent was clearly not able to impose his will in every instance: Canon 13 broke with Innocent’s policy till then of encouraging a wide range of religious movements by prohibiting the formation of new religious orders.\textsuperscript{17} This might seem an obvious point, but it is worth stressing for the Fourth Lateran Council. For it is usually taken for granted that the Lateran decrees of 1215 constitute in every respect the formal expression of Pope Innocent III’s personal position.\textsuperscript{18} Particularly compelling is Maccarrone’s observation that the formulation of the decrees in the first person reveals ‘the authoritative and personal tone of Innocent III and shows how the conciliar legislation was the fruit of his work and of the Curia’.\textsuperscript{19} But again, aside from the improbability that one individual could single-handedly generate such a wide-ranging programme of legislation, twelfth-century developments in the conciliar decision-making process suggest that the crucial stage was often one in which specially commissioned groups of experts were entrusted with

\textsuperscript{15}Tierney, 	extit{Origins of Papal infallibility}, pp.48-9; Foreville, ‘Procédure et débats’, p.37.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp.32-4. See Garcia y García, 	extit{Constitutiones Concilii quarti}, pp.12-14 for explicit and implicit references to the Third Lateran Council and Gratian’s 	extit{Decretum} in the canons.


\textsuperscript{18}See especially, H. Tillmann, 	extit{Pope Innocent III} (1954; trans. Amsterdam, 1980) who throughout her study identifies Innocent’s personal will as the force behind the decrees in almost every case with the repeated use of expressions such as ‘he pronounced’ and ‘he decreed’. G.R. Evans, ‘The Attack on the Fourth Lateran Council’, 	extit{Annuario Monastici Conciliorum} 21 (1989), p.243 notes that subsequent critics in the Middle Ages assumed that the legislation was Innocent’s personal contribution.

\textsuperscript{19}M. Maccarrone, ‘II IV Concilio Lateranense’, 	extit{Divinitas} 5 (1961), p.284; supported by Garcia y García, 	extit{Constitutiones Concilii quarti}, p.6 whose position is that the canons were drawn up by Innocent before the Council. Garcia y García mentions the further point that all of the manuscripts which carry a title attribute the canons to the Pope. Also Evans, ‘The Attack on the Fourth Lateran Council’, p.243.
the task of preparing a report on a given issue. Certainly there was ample time for such a commission, whether formally or informally constituted, to do its work in time for the Council in November 1215. The Pope had announced his intention to hold a council on 19 April 1213, two-and-half years in advance of the actual event. Moreover, in the same circular letter he explicitly referred to the formation of such investigatory groups:

Because, however, a universal council cannot practically be assembled for another two years, we have meanwhile arranged for men of sound judgement in every province to examine fully any questions which urgently require the attention of apostolic care.

The need for preparation was particularly true of doctrinal questions which would, by their very nature, demand detailed investigation. Such a procedure certainly seems to have been set in place at the consistory of Paris in 1147 when Godescalc of Saint-Martin was asked to prepare the case against Gilbert of Poitiers in time for the Council at Reims the following year. John of Cornwall’s *Eulogium ad Alexandram*, which recommended that Peter Lombard’s teaching on Christology be condemned, may fall into the same category of specially commissioned report. It is almost unthinkable that such preparation did not play an important part in the formulation of the doctrinal decrees.

In addition, an important role was almost certainly also played by the cardinals. The college of cardinals had been established as the highest governing body of the Church since the papal schism of the 1130s. The scope of its jurisdiction had increased throughout the twelfth century, as Robinson indicates:


Schmale, ‘Systematisches zu den Konzilien’, p.25 notes that councils were usually announced no more than one year in advance. On Innocent’s determination that the Council should be well-prepared, see Maccarrone, ‘Il IV Concilio Lateranense’, pp.276-8 and Bolton, ‘A Show with a Meaning’, pp.55, 58.

*PL 216.824C*: ‘Quia vero ante biennium universale non posset concilium commode congregari, disposuimus interim per viros prudentes in singulis provinciis plenius explorare quae apostolicae provisionis limam exposcunt’.


The intensification of the judicial functions of the curia increased the pope's dependence on the collaboration of the cardinals and gave particular prominence to the *magistri* in the college. Simultaneously the cardinals became involved in the resolution of questions concerning the catholic faith.  

This is not to say that the authority of the pope, especially one as conscious of his inheritance as Innocent III, was limited by the college of cardinals, but that they had certain rights of consultation as participators in papal *plenitudo potestatis*. Indeed, the significance of the cardinals' resistance to the accusations brought against Gilbert of Poitiers at Reims lies not so much in their support for Gilbert, as in their sense of outrage at Bernard of Clairvaux's attempt to control the proceedings in flagrant contravention of their own rights. That the views of the cardinals could not be ignored for the purposes of formal pronouncements upon the faith is also suggested by Walter of Saint-Victor's account of the failure of Pope Alexander III's attempt to condemn Peter Lombard's christological teachings. If Walter is to be believed, it was the cardinals' opposition to the condemnation which eventually led Alexander III to abandon the proceedings. Conciliar decisions were not always a foregone conclusion. Pope Innocent III would almost certainly need, in that case, the full support of his cardinals for any doctrinal statement issued by a general council. It must surely be of particular significance in this connection that the formula which indicates papal consultation with the cardinals, *de fratriorum nostrorum consilio*, is used by Innocent III in several of his letters announcing the forthcoming Council. The canonist Huguccio stated that the decision of the pope in conjunction with his cardinals was more authoritative in such cases than the decision of the pope alone.

Securing the support of the cardinals was unlikely to prove problematic in Innocent's case. He and several prominent members of the cardinalate had studied

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26 Maleczek, *Papst und Kardinałskolleg*, pp.284-5 rejects any suggestion that Innocent considered the power of the cardinals as anything other than dependent on his own.


theology at Paris and could therefore be thought likely to hold similar views. According to his biographer, Innocent ‘pursued academic studies first at Rome, then at Paris and finally at Bologna, and he surpassed his contemporaries in both philosophy and theology.’ Innocent’s studies at Paris probably extended from c. 1180 to July 1187 when he became a subdeacon under Gregory VIII. As Pope, he referred on several occasions to his student days in Paris in affectionate terms. He showed his gratitude to his former teacher, Peter of Corbeil, by promoting him three times within the space of three years. His unwavering support for the corporation of masters at Paris during the crucial years from 1207 to 1216, is further cause for thinking that as a faithful product of Paris theology, he would be more likely than not to share the same assumptions as Paris masters and their unofficial representatives on the college of cardinals, Robert de Courson and Stephen Langton.

An integral part of Paris theology was support for Peter Lombard. Hence the cause-effect argument adduced by scholars: Innocent studied at Paris, therefore he was responsible for condemning Joachim's attack on that institution's most illustrious representative, Peter Lombard. Even accepting that Innocent himself was not

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30 See Maleczek, Papst und Kardinalskolleg for cardinals educated at Paris: Hugolino, Cardinal-Bishop of Ostia (pp.126-33); Robert de Courson, Cardinal-Priest of S. Stefano in Celio Monte (pp.175-9); Stephen Langton, Cardinal-Priest of S. Crisogono (pp.164-6). Maleczek also stresses the importance given by Innocent to education: 14 of the 30 cardinals promoted by him were noted for their education (p.294).

31 Gesta Innocentii papae III c.II, PL 214.xvii. On Bologna, see K. Pennington, 'The Legal Education of Pope Innocent III', Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law N.S.4 (1974), 70-7 who argues that Innocent’s studies at Bologna were of insufficient duration for him to have gained any significant expertise in canon law. Pennington’s position has been rejected by W. Imkamp, Das Kirchenbild Innocenz I (1198-1216), Päpste und Papsttum 22 (Stuttgart, 1983), pp.39-46 and Maleczek, Papst und Kardinalskolleg, p.103.


34 In 1198 the Pope intervened in favour of Peter of Corbeil in his application for a prebend at York, (PL 214.442-4 and Register I 478-80, pp.700-2). Peter was soon promoted to Bishop of Cambrai in 1199 (Gesta c.LVI, PL 214.ciii) and finally Archbishop of Sens c. 1200 (Potthast I, 1196). None of Peter’s writings survive, but for contemporary references, see Imkamp, Das Kirchenbild, pp.28-30 and E. Rathbone, ‘Peter of Corbeil in an English Setting’, in J.J.G. Alexander and M.T. Gibson edd., Medieval Learning and Literature. Essays Presented to Richard William Hunt (Oxford, 1976), 287-306.

35 The Pope supported the masters in a number of test cases, for which see CUP I, pp.67-8, 73-4, 82-3. See also G. Post, 'Parisian Masters as a Corporation, 1200-1246'. Speculum 9 (1934), 421-45; H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages 3 vols., rev. ed. F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden (Oxford, 1936) I, pp.300-9; Ferruolo, The Origins of the University, pp.294-5.
individually responsible for all of the Lateran canons, his personal attachment to Paris theology would seem to provide an extra strong motivation for his protection of Peter Lombard. The words of the great scholar Marjorie Reeves eloquently present this general view:

Innocent III, himself a product of the Paris theological school, was determined to establish the Master of the Sentences as the authority. The strong opposition of the great Calabrian must have been well known and thus his work against Peter Lombard was selected for formal condemnation at the Fourth Lateran Council.36

This argument functions on two distinct but interrelated levels. It attributes Joachim’s condemnation to Innocent’s accession as Pope and, in so doing, it trivialises the substantive theological issues addressed in the decree. Thus the idea that the intellectual and logical problem posed by the Trinity, which had been the subject of vigorous discussion since the late eleventh century, in any sense stimulated such an official statement of doctrine is simply not taken into consideration. Instead we are offered a scenario in which only the preferences, loyalties and reputations of a few individuals count.

But simply showing that the traditional argument depends on a series of questionable assumptions rather than on conclusive evidence still does not prove that Innocent was not predisposed towards supporting Peter Lombard as scholars have assumed. It only suggests that his probable support for the Lombard does not explain the decreee on the Trinity in its entirety, or even for that matter, Joachim’s condemnation. But what does raise serious questions about the nature of Innocent’s involvement in Joachim’s condemnation are his extensive borrowings from Joachim’s writings on the Trinity. This influence is apparent in at least two of the Pope’s letters and sermons.37 The occasional nature of these writings on the Trinity makes it

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37 *PL* 215.213-20; 217.465-70.
particularly difficult to define Innocent's approach to the subject. Their most characteristic feature is the citation of scriptural authorities which are then subjected to a comprehensive symbolic reading consistent with the more personal theology of the religious orders. Indeed, judging from Innocent's entire theological output one would be hard-pressed to find anything resembling the scholastic method in theology: Maccarrone defines Innocent's approach as 'timidità teologica'; Imkamp not only identifies Innocent's greatest affinity with symbolic theology, but detects a positively anti-scholastic tone in his writings.

How can we be sure that Innocent is the author of these writings? The sermons at least are almost certainly of Innocent's own creation and were even put together by him as a collection between 1202 and 1204. The letters, which are arranged in Registers according to pontifical year do, however, pose a problem. As records of the daily business of the curia, as well as of the Pope's personal correspondence, by no means all of the letters contained in the Registers will be of papal authorship. But letters concerned with doctrinal questions by their very definition do not fall within the brief of daily administration or formulaic response. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that these letters and sermons on the Trinity were written by Innocent himself.

The most striking instance of borrowing is Innocent's reply of December 1203 to a letter from the former Archbishop of Lyons, Jean des Bellesmains (d. 1204), who had retired to the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux in 1195. The former Archbishop, whose original letter does not survive, had earlier written to the Pope

38 Studi, p.370.
39 Das Kirchenbild, p.92.
40 Ibid., p.64.
41 The Registers are incomplete. See Ibid., pp.72-3.
43 This is one of the criteria listed by Imkamp, Das Kirchenbild, pp.87-8 for establishing Innocent's personal authorship.
44 PL 215,213-20. Imkamp, Das Kirchenbild, p.87 n.623 cites this letter as an example of Innocent's personal response on a theological issue.
with two queries, one concerning the Psalms, the other a liturgical question relating
to the Holy Spirit. It is Innocent's response to his first question which directly
concerns us here. The former Archbishop had asked the Pope why the Book of Psalms
prescribed no Psalm for the third day of the week. The question provides Innocent
with the occasion for a lengthy exposition on the Trinity. For according to him, this
omission is due to the holy mystery of the Trinity, which even the Psalmist was not
able to express adequately, choosing instead to say nothing rather than do it an
injustice. 47

Innocent presents his conception of the progressive revelation of the Trinity
throughout history. To this end, the sacred name of Adonai has been designated: *And
the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: I am the Lord, that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac,
and to Jacob; and my name Adonai I did not show them.* (Ex 6, 2-3). It is at this point
that Innocent's use of Joachim becomes explicit. He immediately identifies the name
Adonai with the Greek Tetragrammaton which he gives as IEUE. 48 This transcription
of one of the Hebrew names of God as IEUE is one of the most characteristic features
of Joachim's trinitarian thought. 49 But even more compelling is how closely
Innocent's analysis here resembles Joachim's in the *Expositio in Apocalypsim.* 50
Innocent mirrors Joachim when he says that although the sacred name is spoken as
Adonai, it is written down with only four letters as IEUE. 51 But what is most striking
about Innocent's usage is his literal borrowing from the *Expositio*, which is worth

45 On Jean des Bellesmains, see P. Pouzet, *L'anglais Jean dit Bellesmains (1122-1204?)* (Lyon, 1927).

46 According to Jewish devotional practice, continued in the Christian Church, each day of the week had its own

47 PL 215.214B.

48 On the Tetragrammaton, see A.A. Maurer, 'The Sacred Tetragrammaton in Medieval Thought', in *Actas del V

49 Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, *Figurate*, pp. 39-43. On later omissions of this name from some manuscripts of the
*Liber figurarum* on the grounds of its association with Joachim's opposition to Peter Lombard, see *ibid.*, pp. 200-1.

50 Venice. 1527.

nomen illud, ipsum proferre non audent, sed alium proferunt loco eius. Nam hoc nomen Adonay sex litteris
Adonay, et tamen in hebreo non eisdem caracteribus quibus scriptum est, pronuntiatur, sed alii. Scribit enim
quatuor litteris propter quod et apud grecos tetragrammaton nominatur cuius inscriptio ista est, IEUE.'
quoting fully in the original Latin:

Est enim hoc nomen IEUE tante virtutis, sicut peritissimi asserunt Hebreorum quod si distinguatur in tres dictiones, ut singillatim quilibet proferatur, integritatem sui nominis representet.  

And Joachim:

Est autem nomen istud ut tradunt peritissimi hebreorum tante virtutis, ut si distinguatur in tribus dictionibus ad hoc ut singillatim proferatur IE, singillatim EU, singillatim UE, singula distinctio integritatem sui nominis habeat.

The above two passages are irrefutable evidence of textual borrowing. A further possible example of Innocent's concrete debt to Joachim is his figural representation of the Trinity in the form of a triangle, with the letters IE, EU and UE each positioned at one of the corners, and the full IEUE symbol placed in the centre. Innocent's use of the Expositio makes it likely that Joachim is also his source for the triangle-IEUE figure. It is not, however, a foregone conclusion since Innocent, as we shall see, may himself be drawing from Joachim's own source for the diagram.

The trinitarian interpretation of the equilateral triangle is not absolute proof of Joachite influence, since it was an increasingly common tool in trinitarian theology around the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But this particular version of the triangle as an image for the Trinity may be derived from Joachim's trinitarian interpretation of the Alpha and Omega figures in the Expositio, and of the psaltery in the Psalterium decem chordarum. The parallels with the Expositio, as we might expect, are much stronger than with the Psalterium. In the Psalterium, the discussion of the triangular representation of the Trinity is somewhat divorced from the IEUE

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32 PL 215.216D-217A. The same passgæ is also found in Innocent's sermon on the circumcision of the Lord, PL 217.467C. See below, pp. 386-9.

33 Expositio, fol.35va.

34 In the Migne edition the figure appears in the main text at PL 215.216A, but in the MS. of the Register it is found in the margin. Microfilms of the Papal Registers are held by the Seeley Historical Library in Cambridge. For the triangle, see Box 1502, Reg. Vat. lat. 6, fol.118va.


symbol. *IEUE* is discussed only once in the work and is represented once with the Alpha and Omega figures. It does not appear in conjunction with the triangle. In the *Expositio* on the other hand, Joachim spells out the triangle-*IEUE* conjunction. He says that *IEUE* can be written in triangular form, two letters (*IE, EU, UE*) at each corner, and the entire name in a circle. The other possible Joachite source is the psaltery figure in the *Liber Figurarum*.

That Joachim should be Innocent’s source for the triangle-*IEUE* figure is an extremely attractive proposition since it fits in well with his textual borrowing from the *Expositio*, but it is one not altogether without its difficulties. For one thing, although Joachim describes at length this triangular representation of the Trinity and the trinitarian import of the *IEUE* symbol, this specific triangle-*IEUE* combination in the figural form as used by Innocent is not found in any of Joachim’s works. The problem is not of course insurmountable since the Alpha and Omega figures and the psaltery figure constitute fairly close approximations and it is not difficult to see how the triangle-*IEUE* figure might be a development of them. But an almost exact prototype, rather than a mere approximation, of Innocent’s drawing is to be found in Joachim’s own source for the *IEUE* transcription, Petrus Alfonsi (c. 1040-c. 1140), a Spanish Jewish convert to Christianity. Beatrice Hirsch-Reich correctly identified Alfonsi’s *Dialogus* (written in 1110) as the source for Joachim’s own version of the *IEUE* transcription. Relying on Migne’s imperfect edition, however, Hirsch-Reich took Alfonsi’s diagrammatic representation of the Trinity to be a series of interlaced circles placed within a larger circle. But according to the editor of a modern edition of the *Dialogus* based on a twelfth-century manuscript, the figure printed by Migne and used by Hirsch-Reich is not found in either this or any of the other manuscripts.

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57 Fols. 277rb and 257r respectively.
58 *Expositio*, fol. 36rb.
59 *Liber Figurarum*.
60 See Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, *Figurae*, pp. 199-201.
61 I would like to thank Dr Michael Evans for having drawn my attention to the Alfonsi figure.
63 "Die Quelle der Trinitätskreise". p. 172. The figure is at *PL* 157.611C.
which he examined. In its place is a triangular-IEUE figure which is almost an exact copy of that used by Pope Innocent in his letter to Jean des Bellesmains.

It is certainly quite conceivable that Petrus Alfonsi is Innocent’s source for his triangular representation of the Trinity. Besides the striking similarity between their drawings, there is additional evidence that the Dialogus was drawn upon elsewhere in precisely this trinitarian context. In a sermon on the Trinity written c. 1208-10, Garnier of Rochefort (c. 1140-1225/6), the former Bishop of Langres who had retired to the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux in 1199, is almost certainly drawing upon the Dialogus for his trinitarian exposition of the IEUE symbol. Reeves and Hirsch-Reich assumed that Garnier’s source was Joachim, but extensive textual correspondences with Alfonsi’s Dialogus suggest that Garnier is borrowing directly from Alfonsi himself. Moreover, one of the thirteenth-century manuscripts of the Dialogus originated from Clairvaux, Garnier’s own monastery, and two others, dating from the twelfth or thirteenth century came from Citeaux. A further direct link between Alfonsi and Garnier is provided by Garnier’s own adoption of the same triangle-IEUE figure used by Alfonsi in a work generally attributed to Garnier, the Contra Amaurianos.

There are no textual parallels, however, between Innocent’s letter and the Dialogus. Even if, therefore, Alfonsi, rather than Joachim, is Innocent’s source for the triangle-IEUE figure this detracts neither from Innocent’s direct borrowings from Joachim’s Expositio nor from his general affinity with Joachim’s commentary on the

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63Mieth, Der Dialog, pp.xlviii-il.

64See Mieth’s edition, Der Dialog, p.78. Another twelfth-century ms. of the Dialogus, London BM Harley 3861, fol.53va, has exactly the same illustration. The thirteenth-century London BM Royal 15 C II, fol.151ra contains a very basic sketch.

65PL 205.710-25. On Garnier, see N.M. Häring, ‘The Liberal Arts in the Sermons of Garnier of Rochefort’, MS 30 (1968), 47-77 and Dictionnaire des Auteurs Cisterciens, edd. E. Bronette et al., La Documentation Cistercienne 16.1, fasc.1 (Rochefort, 1975), 272-3. Garnier himself cannot be Innocent’s source for the triangle-IEUE figure since he is writing c. 1208-10, that is, after Innocent. Even if borrowing could be proved, however, we still have Innocent’s clear use of the passage from the Expositio.

66Figurae, p.297. See Appendix D.

67Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 509, fols.1r-57v; Dijon, Bibliothèque Publique 228, fols. 2r-92r; 230, fols. 2r-101v. See Mieth, Der Dialog, pp.xxix-xxxv.

68Ed. C. Baeumker, BGPM 24.5/6 (Münster, 1926), p.35.
figure, assuming that there is no common textual source for which there is as yet no evidence. Innocent’s interpretation of the triangle-IEUE figure is, moreover, in exact conformity with Joachim’s exposition as found in the *Expositio*. He writes that each distinction (IE, EU, UE) possesses something in common with the other two and is in no way separate from them. Each divine Person is shown to be consubstantial to the other two. Moreover, the fact that the second distinction receives its first letter from the first distinction and the third distinction receives its first letter from the second is a parallel to the Father’s begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both. This accurately conveys Joachim’s thought on the matter. Innocent has grasped Joachim’s essential point, that each of the three distinctions, because of its indivisibility from the other two, recalls IEUE in its entirety and that this is an analogy for the consubstantiality of the three divine Persons. The Pope also follows Joachim when he says that IEUE truly indicates that there are three Persons, since its four letters are really only three due to the repetition of the letter E. One final point of similarity is Innocent’s conviction that the mystery of the Trinity can be best conveyed through the means of figures as opposed to words. This preference for figures is one of the fundamentals of Joachim’s approach and a point to which he also explicitly refers in this section in the *Expositio*.

Innocent’s sermon on the circumcision of the Lord (Luke 2, 21) is another instance of probable borrowing from Joachim. The passage from Luke is Innocent’s point of departure for a meditation on the symbolic power of the name Iesus. Foremost among these mystical properties is a series of numerical symbolisms

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69 *Expositio*, fol.35vb: ‘Et ita secundum nomen propagatur a primo, tertium a secundo, ut alius sine alio pronuntiari nequeat, tanquam si E litera que scribitur post I communis sit primo nomini, et secundo V litera communis sit secundo et tertio quatenus et per hoc quod secundum nomen pendet ex primo, unigenitus dei filius consubstantialis ostendatur illi a quo genus est, et per hoc quod tertium nomen pendet ex secundo, ostendatur spiritus sanctus consubstantialis esse filio qui consubstantialis est patri.’


71 PL 215.217A: ‘Quod ad exprimendum trinitatis et unitatis mysterium, in subjecta figura potest plenius denotari.’

72 Fol.35vb: ‘quod quidem melius figuris ipsis ostendere quam verbiis congruentibus reserare valemus.’ On this preference, see Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, *Figurae*, p.20; Obrist, ‘La figure géométrique’, pp.310-12.

73 PL 217.465-70.
generated by the name itself: it has two syllables, five letters, three vowels, two consonants and three inflections (Iesus, Iesu, Iesum).\textsuperscript{74} The two syllables represent Christ’s two natures, divine and human;\textsuperscript{75} three vowels in one name evoke the idea of three Persons in one divinity; two consonants signify the union of God and man in Christ, the assumption of human nature by a divine Person. But the most important signifying property of the name Iesus from the point of view of Joachite influence is that this name has exactly the same vowels (I, E, U) as the sacred name of the Lord, the Tetragrammaton. These same letters were embossed in gold plate on the forehead of the High Priest of the Temple because no one dared to speak that sacred name.\textsuperscript{76} Instead the name Adonai was spoken in its place.\textsuperscript{77} IEUE conveys the mystery of trinity and unity, three Persons in one substance, just as Abraham saw three angels, but worshipped only one (Gen 18).

The guiding principle of Innocent’s thought here is exactly the same as that in his letter to Jean des Bellesmains, down to the actual wording in some sections. He repeats the passage from Joachim’s Expositio that the name IEUE is of such excellence that, as the most learned of the Jews realised, if it is distinguished in three symbols (IE, EU, UE), each one recalls the full name IEUE.\textsuperscript{78}

Innocent himself wrote in friendly terms to Joachim and followed his predecessors in supporting the Abbot’s Order of Fiore.\textsuperscript{79} Several prominent members

\textsuperscript{74}\textit{PL} 217.466B.

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{PL} 217.466C: ‘Hoc igitur nomen Iesus duas habet syllabas, quia Iesus duas habet naturas, scilicet divinam et humanam’.

\textsuperscript{76}Exodus 28, 36-8. For this detail, see Augustine, \textit{Quaestionum in Heptateuchum, PL} 34.638; Bede, \textit{De tabernaculo et vasis eius, PL} 91, 478C, who mentions that the Hebrew divine name is written with four letters (IHVH); Gerhoch of Reichersberg, \textit{Letter to Pope Hadrian about the Novelties of the Day}, ed. N.M. Häring (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto, 1974) X.1, p.53; Garnier of Rochefort, \textit{PL} 205.716D who transcribes the name as Ieue; Alexander Nequam, \textit{Speculum Speculationem I.xxxii, p.105.

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{PL} 217.467AB: ‘Habet autem hoc nomen Iesus illas easdem vocales, quas habet illud nomen Domini Tetragrammaton, et erat scriptum lamina aurea super frontem pontificali cidari pendente, videlicet I, E, U, sive Ioth, Eth, Vau, quod nomen Dei dicunt ineffabile, unde non audent illud proferre, sed pro eo scribunt et proferunt hoc nomen Adonay’.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{79}\textit{PL} 217.467C: ‘Hoc autem nomen tante virtutis existit, ut peritissimi asserunt Hebreorum, quod si distinguatur in tres dictiones, quelibet illarum significt illud quod totum, ut si dicatur, Ie, Eu, Ue, quelibet nomen est Dei, sicut videlicet et totum, I, E, Ue: quia mirum, quelibet trium personarum, sicut et ipsa natura, est unus Deus.’

\textsuperscript{79}Register I 524, p.757; \textit{PL} 214.480. For Innocent’s confirmation of the Florensian Order’s privileges, see \textit{Pothast} I, 2092. On papal support in general, see McGinn, \textit{Calabrian Abbot}, pp.22-5.
of the curia during Innocent’s pontificate were among the first patrons of the Order.  

Innocent may have gained access to Joachim’s works after 1200, the date of Joachim’s testamentary letter, in which Joachim mentions, as proof of his submission to papal authority, his intention to send his major works to Rome for approval. But perhaps the most direct way of explaining Innocent’s acquaintance with Joachim’s ideas and writings is the presence of Rainier of Ponza (d. 1207/9), a former companion and disciple of Joachim, at the papal curia during the first half of the pontificate.

Rainier had accompanied Joachim during his retreat to the Sila mountains in 1188 and is mentioned along with him as a fugitivus by the Cistercian General Chapter in September 1192. By 1198 Rainier was papal legate in Spain and Languedoc. Several contemporary sources testify to his close links with the Pope. Caesarius of Heisterbach refers to him as the Pope’s confessor, a testimony which is confirmed by the grief-stricken letter written by Cardinal Hugolino, the future Gregory IX, upon Rainier’s death c. 1207-9. Innocent himself speaks of Rainier in terms of the highest esteem. Given his close links with both Joachim and Innocent, it is quite possible that Rainier acted as a kind of mediator between the two men.

Joachim’s continuing influence on Rainier at this time is visibly demonstrated

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80 See F. Russo, Gioacchino da Fiore e le Fondazioni Florensi in Calabria (Naples, 1958), esp. for Cardinals Cencio Savelli (Honorius III) and Hugolino (Gregory IX), pp.226-32. Also F. Russo, Regesto Vaticano per la Calabria I (Rome, 1974) for Honorius III’s letters of 1216 (588) and 1220 (665) in support of the Florensic Order.

81 Only the Liber de Concordia had been submitted by this date. As part of this possible acquaintance, see R.E. Lerner, ‘Joachim of Fiore as a Link between St. Bernard and Innocent III on the Figural Significance of Melchisedech’, MS 42 (1980), 471-6.


83 For the relevant correspondence, see Register I 92-4, pp.132-8; 99, pp.145-7; 165, pp.234-5; 239, pp.338-9; 249, p.352; 395, p.594; 449, pp.672-3; 494, pp.722-3.


85 For example, Register I 395, p.594, PL 214.373: ‘Gratus tui nominis odor, et suavis tue fama dulcedo, per quam tue religionis honestas dignus undique laudum preconis exaltatur’.
in the form of a letter, written by Rainier on the Pope’s behalf, to the head of the Cistercian Order, Arnald-Amaury (1202-12). Significantly perhaps, this letter was written in 1203, the same year that Innocent wrote to Jean des Bellesmains. In it Rainier admonished the daughter houses of Citeaux for their quarrel with the mother house, firmly reinforcing the Pope’s own hard line of the previous year. Rainier’s tone, at once both reproachful and laudatory, reflects Joachim’s own ambivalent attitude towards the Order. Rainier, like Joachim, attributes a crucial role to the Cistercian Order as the mediator between the second and third status. Both men identify the first five monasteries of the Cistercian Order with the first five monasteries of the ordo monachorum, but seem to exclude them from the final and perfect seven. Other borrowings could be enumerated such as his typology of Bernard of Clairvaux as ‘another Moses’. At the same time, however, Rainier’s criticism is unsparing. He predicts in apocalyptic terms typical of Joachim the Order’s decline unless internal reforms are instituted. The comprehensiveness of Rainier’s borrowing is quite remarkable and must be one of the earliest written examples of Joachim’s growing influence.

Having established that Innocent made forays into Joachim’s trinitarian theology and that this borrowing invalidates the argument that the Pope was bound to support Peter Lombard, it remains to determine more precisely the extent of Innocent’s involvement in Joachim’s condemnation. As a starting point, it seems reasonable to assume that Innocent himself did not actively seek out Joachim’s condemnation. He must have been responding to someone else’s initiative. The Pope himself had made provision for precisely such initiatives when he first announced the holding of a

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general council in April 1213. Despite the absence of documentation to the effect, we
know from certain discrepancies between papal policy before 1215 and the conciliar
decrees themselves that at least some of these initiatives were positively received and
acted upon. Canon 13 prohibiting the formation of new religious orders is the most
impressive instance of this.

A further point is that a reluctance on Innocent’s part to condemn Joachim
would account for the extremely measured tone of the condemnation. There is a
genuine concern to ensure that Joachim and his followers do not suffer unfairly as a
result of the judgement. Joachim’s orthodoxy is treated at considerable length. His
willingness to accept papal authority by ordering the submission of all his works is
referred to, as is his testamentary letter of 1200 in which he professed his unreserved
obedience to Rome. Further mention is made of Joachim’s achievement as a monastic
founder and the discipline observed at the monasteries founded by him.

Joachim, moreover, is not named as a heretic; only someone perpetrating his
error now that it has been condemned will be treated as such.91 The same point was
one of the those singled out consistently in the commentaries of canonists on the
decree.92

If, as now seems certain, the Pope was not responsible for Joachim’s
condemnation, two serious possibilities remain, neither of which can be proven. The
first, that the condemnation was the result of Cistercian hostility to Joachim’s Order
of Fiore, has been proposed by several Joachite scholars.93 There is really no
evidence to support this view except what we know of Cistercian disquiet at
Florensian success in southern Italy.

The other possibility is that Innocent, in condemning Joachim, was acting upon
the expert advice of Paris-trained theologians, particularly their influential colleagues
in the cardinalate, Stephen Langton and Robert de Courson. Again, there is no
documentary proof to substantiate this. But the language of the decree itself and the

91Russo, Gioacchino da Fiore e le Fondazioni Florensi, p. 31; Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore, p. 70 and G. di
draw attention to this distinction between those who err in good faith and those who err persistently.

92Garcia y Garcia, Constitutiones Concilii quarti, pp. 188, 289, 466, 483.

93See below, pp. 194-5.
conditions at the emerging university of Paris both point to the involvement of Paris theologians in the drafting of the decree. The problem with this hypothesis is the glaring discrepancy between the Lateran decree and thirteenth-century interpretations of it. If the decree was drafted by theologians at Paris, it would be difficult to explain how their successors managed to be so wide of the mark in their assessment of it. One possible explanation may lie in the Council's apparent concern, having once condemned Joachim's doctrine of unity of collection, to eliminate the other obvious alternative position to the Lombard's *quaedam summa res*, that the divine essence begets. The rejection of this doctrine in addition to Joachim's unity of collection facilitated the confusion in subsequent commentators. Add to this the strong likelihood that the prime movers were busy cardinals rather than full-time academics constantly immersed in theological debates, and a way round the problem begins to take shape.

2. The Lateran decree

Before proceeding to discuss in detail the substantive theological issues raised in the second decree, a brief summary of its main points may prove useful here.

The decree begins with the condemnation of 'the libellus or tractatus which Joachim of Fiore published against Master Peter Lombard'. The Council singles out Joachim's objection to the Lombard's concept of the divine essence as a *quaedam summa res* which is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding. By this Joachim understood the Lombard to have separated the divine essence from the three Persons, thereby introducing a fourth thing into God. Hence Joachim's accusation of Quaternity.

The Council draws a crucial link between Joachim's accusation of Quaternity and his erroneous conception of divine unity. The one, opposition to Peter Lombard, is merely the symptom of the other, unity of collection. Joachim has reduced divine unity from a unity of essence to a mere unity of will. The case against Joachim is anchored not only in his attack on Peter Lombard, but also in his use of biblical analogies to demonstrate that the unity of the three Persons is a spiritual unity, similar to the unity of the faithful in one Church.

Having exposed Joachim's error, the Council proceeds to approve formally
Peter Lombard’s doctrine. It affirms the Lombard’s concept of the essence as a *quaedam summa res* and his assertion that the essence does not beget. There follows a detailed clarification of the orthodox doctrine on divine generation, i.e. the divine essence does not beget, rather it is the Father who begets the Son.

The Council issues a statement to reinforce the point that Joachim’s analogies go beyond the permissible degree of similarity between God and creation. When Christ prays to his Father ‘that they might be one as we also are one’ (*In 17, 22;* already cited as an example of Joachim’s misuse of analogy), the first ‘one’ refers to the spiritual unity of the faithful; the second ‘one’, on the other hand, refers to the identity of nature which unites the divine Persons. The point is that however perfect the unity of the faithful may be, it is nevertheless of a completely different and inferior order from the unity of essence among the three Persons.

Despite the detail of its criticism, the Council clearly does not regard Joachim as a heretic. Finally, the Council condemns the doctrine of Almaric of Bèze. This consists of one sentence tagged onto the end of the decree and no explicit link is made with Joachim’s doctrine.

3. The authenticity of the lost libellus

The sheer complexity of the Lateran decree on the Trinity is evoked in the very first sentence which alone has generated an enormous amount of research and debate:

We condemn, therefore, the book or tract on the unity or essence of the Trinity which Abbot Joachim published (edidit) against Master Peter Lombard.

Excluding chronicle and other accounts which are themselves based on the decree, this is the only contemporary reference to a *libellus* or *tractatus*, called *De unitate seu essentia Trinitatis*, issued by Joachim exclusively as a polemic against Peter Lombard. Joachim himself never refers to such a work. Even more remarkable is the absence of any reference to this work in the report on Joachim’s many alleged errors compiled by the Commission at Anagni in 1255 in the aftermath of the condemnation of the

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94 Two letters of Honorius III which refer to the lost work are clearly also based on the decree. See Russo, *Regesto Vaticano* I, 588; 665.
Joachite Gerard of Borgo San Donnino’s *Introductorius in Evangelium Aeternum*.95

Scholars have responded to the elusiveness of the *libellus* in the historical record in several ways. By far the majority accept that it is both an authentic and a separate work by Joachim, which is now lost. Accordingly, there have been numerous attempts to identify the *libellus* with a variety of anonymous works from the period.96 The first to do so was Paul Fournier, whose identification of the Porretan *Liber de vera philosophia* (c. 1179) as Joachim’s lost work had an enormous impact upon subsequent research.97 Fournier later retracted this claim, but maintained that Joachim was indirectly influenced by Gilbert of Poitiers via the author of the *Liber*.98 Apart from the anonymous author’s alleged tritheism, Fournier found an impressive resemblance between the *Liber’s* and Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard.99 The attractiveness of Fournier’s thesis lay, therefore, not only in the *Liber’s* resemblance to the Lateran decree’s account of Joachim’s lost work, but in its placing of Joachim’s attack on the Lombard in a plausible historical and intellectual context, that of the controversy between the Lombard’s and Gilbert’s respective followers. Fournier’s line of inquiry, including his assignation of Joachim to the school of Gilbert of Poitiers, was adopted by a number of subsequent scholars who regarded Joachim’s condemnation as the final episode in the rivalry between the supporters of Peter Lombard and Gilbert of Poitiers.100 Antoine Dondaine in particular drew Joachim into the circle of Gilbert’s followers active in the 1170s and 1180s. He suggested that an anonymous *Brevis controversia modernorum Latinorum de unitate sancte Trinitatis*,

95 The *Protocol* is edited by H. Denifle, ‘Das Evangelium aeternum und die Commission zu Anagni’, *ALKM* 1 (1885), 49-142. It mentions and cites from all of Joachim’s major works. For Gerard’s condemnation by Alexander IV, see *CUP* I, p.297.

96 The misleadingly entitled *Liber Contra Lombardum. (Scuola di Gioacchino da Fiore)*, ed. C. Ottaviano, Reale Accademia d’Italia Studi e Documenti 3 (Roma, 1934) is not one of them. The ms. dates from the early fourteenth century. Ottaviano dubiously assigned the work to the ‘school of Joachim’, the very notion of which has been criticised by subsequent scholars. See for example, di Napoli, ‘Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo’, pp.636-7. But no scholar has so far suggested an alternative explanation for the *Liber*.


99 Ibid., pp.93-4.

which breaks off abruptly after a few lines, might be a fragment from the lost work. In his recent exhaustive research on the subject of the lost work, Axel Mehlmann rejected Dondaine’s suggestion and concluded that the Brevis controversia was not a passage from the lost libellus, there being little resemblance with Joachim’s opposition to Peter Lombard. Further, Mehlmann has shown that another proposed candidate for the lost work is in fact an excerpt from Gandulph of Bologna’s Sentences. In two catalogues from the papal library at Avignon under the years 1375 and 1407 this text is referred to as Ioachim Florensis de unitate Trinitatis, quae sit differentia inter nomina essentialia et nomina relativa.

Those who accept the authenticity of the lost work think it must have been an early work. Two very different types of evidence would seem to point towards this conclusion. In the Dresden manuscript of the Liber figurarum there is a group of figures entitled perfidia Petri, known as the anti-Lombard figures. The roughness of their conception suggests that these figures may represent an early stage in Joachim’s articulation of his opposition to Peter Lombard and that they originally belonged to the lost De unitate.

Secondly, historians refer to the lengthy account of the events leading up to Joachim’s condemnation given by Matthew Paris (d. 1259) in his Historia anglorum. Here Matthew dates Joachim’s attack on the Lombard to the pontificate


103Ibid., pp.369 ff. on Biblioteca Allesandrina, MS. 81, fols.94ra-98vb. Di Napoli, ‘Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo’, p.636 had also denied the authenticity of this fragment.

104A. Maier, ‘Zu einigen Handschriften der Biblioteca Alessandrina in Rom und ihrer Geschichte’, Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia 18 (1964), p.7. Maier argued that the passage was from the lost work (pp.8-9).

105Lee, ‘The Anti-Lombard Figures’, p.137; McGinn, Calabrian Abbot, p.166 follows Lee. K.-V. Selge, ‘L’origine delle opere di Gioacchino da Fiore’, in O. Capitani and J. Mietheke, L’attesa delle fine dei tempi nel Medioevo, Annali dell’Istituto storico italo-germanico 28 (Bologna, 1990), p.91 argues that Joachim’s extraordinary literary output of the 1180s must have been preceded by lengthy study and probably also the drafting of now lost opuscula. The libellus against Peter Lombard would have been one of these (p.115 n.62).


of Alexander III, a dating which has been generally accepted.\textsuperscript{108} Antonio Crocco, for instance, accepts Matthew’s dating of Joachim’s attack to 1179, the year of the Third Lateran Council, citing in support the notes of the early seventeenth-century scholar, Severinus Binus, contained in Mansi’s conciliar collection.\textsuperscript{109} According to Binus’ interpretation of Matthew’s account, Alexander III, who had already accepted the accusations against Peter Lombard’s Christology, encouraged Joachim (directly or indirectly) to take issue with the Lombard.\textsuperscript{110} Crocco takes this to mean that Joachim’s attack was written at the instigation of the Pope.\textsuperscript{111} This is an extremely attractive hypothesis since the lost work would consequently belong in the context of the wider opposition to Peter Lombard’s teachings, which is well-documented.\textsuperscript{112} There are several problems with using Matthew Paris’ account, however, which have not previously been noticed. Matthew simply reproduces the account of Roger of Wendover (d. 1236), his predecessor at St Albans.\textsuperscript{113} But no one has attempted to identify Wendover’s own sources. Wendover’s account of Joachim’s condemnation does not in turn depend on any other chronicler, including his own usual sources, Ralph of Diceto or Roger of Howden.\textsuperscript{114} Close examination reveals that he has reconstructed, from his own vantage position, a coherent narrative which conforms to a plausible sequence of events. Under the same year, 1179, he records the following events: the Third Lateran Council; a letter of Alexander III to William, Archbishop

\textsuperscript{108} Mansi 22. 1081 contains the relevant section from Matthew Paris and is the source for most modern accounts. F. Foberti, Gioacchino da Fiore. Nuovi studi critici sulla mistica e la religiosita in Calabria (Florence, 1934), pp.85-8 is virtually alone in his sceptical attitude to Matthew Paris’ account and its use by historians; he rejects outright suggestions that Joachim presented his work to the Third Lateran Council.

\textsuperscript{109} Gioacchino da Fiore, p.65. On Severinus Binus, especially contemporary criticism of his interpretation of sources, see H. Quentin, Jean-Dominique Mansi et les grandes collections conciliaires (Paris, 1900), pp.21-4.

\textsuperscript{110} Mansi 22, 1081: ‘Causam scribendi contra Petrum Lombardum ei dedisse videtur Alexander papa’.

\textsuperscript{111} Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore, p.65.


of Sens, against the christological doctrine of Peter Lombard; Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard, which in fact paraphrases the first part of the text of the Fourth Lateran Council decree, and finally the Fourth Lateran condemnation itself, which begins at the point where the previous paraphrase left off, and the order of which does not correspond to that of the original decree.

It is extremely significant that, apart from the Third Lateran Council itself, none of these events occurred in 1179. Pope Alexander's letter to William of Sens was actually written on 28 May 1170 and belongs to a series of letters against the Lombard's christological doctrine issued by the Pope to northern French prelates from the time of the Council of Tours in 1163. This letter does not appear in any of Wendover's usual sources. This same letter of May 1170, however, was reproduced by John of Cornwall in the second edition of his *Eulogium ad Alexandrum papam*, written around the time of the Third Lateran Council. Of the five surviving manuscripts of the *Eulogium*, moreover, four are English. Roger of Wendover's inclusion of the letter of 1170 rather than the most recent one of February 1177 together with the strong manuscript tradition of the *Eulogium*, in which the letter of 1170 is published, in England, suggests that the *Eulogium* is his immediate source. If this is the case, it perhaps shows a special interest on the part of Wendover in changing attitudes to Peter Lombard. The sources cited by Wendover therefore reveal absolutely nothing about the existence, date or composition of the lost *libellus*.

Alexander III's letter together with the two separate accounts of the Fourth Lateran Council decree, one under the year 1179 and the other under 1215, form a

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115See M. Gibbs and J. Lang, *Bishops and Reform 1215-1272 with special reference to the Lateran Council of 1215* (Oxford, 1934), p.105 for the dissemination of the Lateran decrees in England. A copy may have been brought back to St. Albans by Abbot William (1214-1235) who attended the Council. See *Gesta abbatum monasteri Sancti Albani* 3 vols., Rolls Series 28.4 (London, 1867-9) I, p.261. M.W. Bloomfield and M. Reeves, 'The Penetration of Joachimism into Northern Europe', *Speculum* 29 (1954), p.785 assume that Wendover is citing from Joachim's lost work on the grounds that his citations are the same as those found in the Lateran decree. It would seem more likely, however, that Wendover's source is the decree itself.

116PL 200.685. See *Hefele-Leclercq* V.2, 1110-11 for the previous confusion of this letter of 1177 with the acts of the Third Lateran Council.

117*Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam*, p.257.


119Reeves, *Influence*, p.45 says Wendover's account 'shows more than a formal interest.'
A coherent narrative from beginning to end: the first signs of opposition to Peter Lombard, as revealed by the letter of Alexander III; Joachim’s attack, associated both thematically and chronologically with that of Alexander III; ultimately, the passing of time along with a change in papal attitude from the days of Pope Alexander to those of Innocent III which accounts for the reversal of papal policy and Joachim’s eventual condemnation at the Fourth Lateran Council. Wendover’s main sources, therefore, are Alexander’s letter to Archbishop William and the Lateran decree itself. There is no citation from the lost work which is not mediated through the text of the conciliar condemnation. It is in his rationalisation of events that the significance of Wendover’s account lies; as evidence for the authenticity of the lost libellus it is not only irrelevant, but misleading.

Other chroniclers mention in passing Joachim’s lost work, but are nowhere near as detailed as Wendover’s account. Again all the signs point towards a dependence on the Lateran decree rather than independent access to the libellus.

A second approach to the problem of the libellus mentioned in the Lateran decree is to deny its authenticity altogether. The starting premise here is that the Lateran Council’s representation of Joachim’s doctrine is totally incompatible with the doctrine found in his extant works, particularly the Psalterium decem chordarum. The most important exponent of this view is Francesco Foberti who argued that the lost work was a Cistercian forgery, fabricated with the aim of discrediting Joachim’s name and thwarting the success of his rival Order of Fiore. He went so far as to deny that Joachim had ever attacked Peter Lombard. Foberti’s thesis highlighted the

120 Flores historiarum I, p.121: ‘Scripsit etiam eisdem diebus contra eundem Petrum Lumbardum abbas Joachim Florensis coenobii libellum’.

121 Ibid., p.122: ‘Stetit autem haec indeterminata altercatio a diebus Alexandri papae usque in tempora Innocentii papae per annos multos’.

122 For other accounts, see E. Pispisa, Gioacchino da Fiore e i Cronisti Medievali (Messina, 1988), pp.41-71; Reeves, Influence, pp.65-6.

123 See especially, F. Foberti, Nuovi studi and Gioacchino da Fiore e il Gioachinismo antico e moderno (Padua, 1942); also, J. I. Saranyana, Joaquin de Flore y Tomás de Aquino. Historia Doctrinal de una Polemica (Pamplona, 1979).


125 Nuovi studi, pp.81-105.
crucial opposition of the Cistercians to Joachim’s monastic reform. It failed, however, to explain Joachim’s own references to his opposition to Peter Lombard. The Lombard is explicitly named in an early work, the *De vita sancti Benedicti*, and there are various textual references to his *Sentences* in other works. But now that Innocent III has been eliminated as the chief instigator of the condemnation, the role of Cistercian opposition must be reassessed.

A variation on this hypothesis is the argument that the lost work is indeed authentic but that it, and by extension Joachim’s doctrine, is misrepresented by the Lateran Council. This hypothesis has the advantage of preserving Joachim’s orthodoxy without resorting to an outlandish conspiracy theory. One final alternative is that the work mentioned in the Lateran decree is none other than the *Psalterium decem chordarum*, Joachim’s main extant work on the Trinity. Whether, as Giovanni di Napoli tentatively suggests, selections from the *Psalterium* were made and submitted by the Cistercian Order, is another matter. The important point is that the similarities between the *libellus* and the *Psalterium* are numerous and striking enough to make this a serious possibility. It also forces us to reassess one massive assumption of the entire debate, that by the phrase, ‘the book or tract on the unity or essence of the Trinity which Abbot Joachim published against Master Peter Lombard’, the Lateran Council is referring to a work against Peter Lombard under this specific title. Since the decree is the only source for the existence of such a work, there is no way of knowing whether the title *De unitate seu essentia Trinitatis* is authentic or one

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127 Edited by C. Baraut, ‘Un trattato inédito de Joacquin de Fiore: *De vita sancti Benedicti et de officio divino secundum eius doctrinam*’, *Analecta sacra tarraconensia* 24 (1951), pp.76-7: ‘abolita primo impietate Sabellii, qui personas negavit, secundo pravitate Arrii, qui unitatem scidit, tertio blasphemia Petri, qui unitatem a Trinitate dividens, quaternitatem inducit.’ Foberti, *Nuovi Studi*, pp.98-105 argued that this passage was not authentic.


130 -Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo’, pp.679-85. A suggestion treated with scepticism by Selge, ‘L’origine delle opere’, p.115 n.61, who is otherwise receptive to the idea that the first book of the *Psalterium* is the lost work (pp.113-15).
adopted by the drafters of the decree for purely descriptive purposes.\(^ {131}\) The extent to which the *Psalterium* is concerned with refuting the error of Quaternity and the number of literal correspondences between it and the work referred to in the Lateran decree really does throw doubt on the existence of a work directed specifically against Peter Lombard and distinct from the *Psalterium*.

The strongest argument against the identification of the lost *libellus* with the *Psalterium* is that the obvious similarities could very well be explained by Joachim’s tendency to re-use the same images and analogies throughout his works. The resemblance between the decree and the *Psalterium*, therefore, is by no means absolute proof that the work referred to is in fact the *Psalterium* rather than another work. Thus, for example, scholars agree that all the figures found in the *Liber figurarum* are based on textual or drawn figures taken from earlier works but since no figures in Joachim’s extant works correspond to the anti-Lombard figure found in one manuscript of the *Liber figurarum* it is reasonable to assume that these figures must have belonged to the lost work.\(^ {132}\) Moreover, the text which accompanies the figure includes the phrase ‘the essence is a certain supreme reality which is common to the three Persons, and which is neither unbegotten, nor begotten, nor proceeding’.\(^ {133}\) Both drawing and text together, therefore, constitute another reference to the Lombard’s doctrine. If this figure was indeed part of the lost work it would explain its survival in only one manuscript of the *Liber figurarum* and what seems to be its deliberate omission from the other surviving manuscripts.\(^ {134}\)

Similarly, Joachim’s reference towards the end of the *Psalterium* to the passage from the *Sentences* also cited in the decree may just be the repetition of a previous

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132Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, *Figurae*, p.73. For the figure, see Dresden, Landesbiblioteck A. 121, fol.89r; Tondelli, *Il libro delle figure* I, p.61 and II, XXVIa; Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, *Figurae*, pp.212-23.

133Tondelli, *Il libro delle figure* I, p.61: ‘essentia est quaedam summa res communis tribus personis, nec ingenita, nec genita, nec procedens.’

134Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, *Figurae*, pp.100, 103-4, 212.
attack. Not only does Joachim attack the view that ‘the one divine substance is a certain supreme reality (quaedam summa res) which is common to the three Persons, and that each individual Person is that same substance’, he calls this doctrine insane (vesaniam). This passage finds an almost literal echo in the Fourth Lateran Council’s account of Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard’s doctrine of a quaedam summa res as insania.

The evidence, then, either for the existence of an independent work, now lost, attacking Peter Lombard or for the lost work being none other than the Psalterium is inconclusive. The only contemporary reference to the lost work is in the decree itself. As to the theory that the Psalterium is the lost work, again this is undermined by Joachim’s recycling habits. Either way, it is fair to say that the description of the lost work in the decree is at least consistent with Joachim’s extant works on the Trinity.

4. Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity against Peter Lombard

The subject of Joachim’s attack, according to the Council was Peter Lombard’s statement in the Sentences that ‘a certain supreme reality (quaedam summa res) is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that reality is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding’. This is not in fact a literal citation from the Sentences but a paraphrase based on several of the main arguments from the section in which the Lombard discusses the question of whether the divine essence begets. Now whether the lost libellus or the decree itself is the source of this paraphrase is impossible to say without access to the libellus for comparison. Certainly, the text which accompanies the anti-Lombard figures in the Liber figurarum closely resembles the


136.Compare ISent.V.1.6, p.82.19-21: ‘cum enim una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia, si divina essentia essentiam genuit, eadem res se ipsam genuit, quod omnino esse non potest’; with canon 2, Conciliorum, p.231.10-12: ‘Quoniam quaedam summa res est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et illa non est generans neque genita nec procedens’. Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.253 says that the omission of the word una in the Council’s version suggests that the reference is to Joachim’s attack in the libellus in which Joachim himself refers to this section from the Sentences, rather than to the Sentences themselves.

137.Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.247 n.45 takes the view that this account of Joachim’s opposition is most probably a reference to the lost work rather than a literal citation from it.
passage cited in the Lateran decree.\textsuperscript{138} Whatever the source of this conflation, however, there is a clearly stated progression from the concept of a \textit{quaedam summa res} to that \textit{res} as neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding. In other words, one of the presuppositions of the view that the essence does not beget is that it is a \textit{quaedam summa res}. This connection between the \textit{quaedam summa res} and the generation of the essence is implicit in the Lombard’s entire approach and reflects the interdependency between the doctrines of divine unity and divine generation. Precisely the same link between these two doctrines is made in the decree, either because this passage is a genuine citation from Joachim’s \textit{libellus} or because the framers of the decree have so understood Joachim’s opposition. At the same time, the Council addresses only the first aspect of Joachim’s opposition, the Lombard’s concept of a \textit{quaedam summa res}, and neglects to comment on the second, the essence as non-begetting etc. In this respect, at least, the decree faithfully reflects Joachim’s position since to judge from his extant works it is true to say that Joachim’s wholehearted opposition was explicitly directed only against the Lombard’s concept of a \textit{quaedam summa res} and never against his position that the divine essence does not beget. In the mind of the framers of the decree, however, not begetting or being begotten belongs to the concept of the \textit{quaedam summa res}. But this implicit link in the decree is still far removed from the interpretation of thirteenth-century theologians and does not alone account for the discrepancy between the explicit concerns of the decree and their exclusive focus on the question of the essence as begetting. Thirteenth-century readings still constitute a significant misunderstanding.

Joachim understood the Lombard’s statement to demonstrate not so much a Trinity as a Quaternity in God, as though the common essence were a fourth thing separate from the three Persons. This is Joachim’s famous accusation of Quaternity against Peter Lombard which is well-documented in his surviving works. The first book of the \textit{Psalterium} is dominated by Joachim’s preoccupation with the error of Quaternity and the spiritual blindness which he regards as its root cause. Joachim’s opposition to the Lombard on the issue of Quaternity thus provides a focal point both

\textsuperscript{138} Tondelli, \textit{Il libro delle figure I}, p.61: ‘essentia est quaedam summa res communis tribus personis, nec ingenita, nec genita, nec procedens’. See Mehlmann, \textit{De Unitate Trinitatis}, p.543 for a detailed analysis of this text and how closely the understanding Quaternity here corresponds to that found in the Lateran decree.
for his particular opposition to the Lombard and for his hostility to the kind of theological approach which his opponent represents.\(^{139}\) He nevertheless accepts the validity of certain of the techniques characteristic of scholastic theology. For example, when making the point that God is one but not singular, he cites with approval an example used by grammarians which illustrates a similar point about how a singular subject may signify a unified plurality, e.g. ‘the people run’ \((\text{populus currunt})\).\(^{140}\) At the same time he makes clear that such rules are subordinate to the \textit{intellectus spiritualis}.\(^{141}\) Indeed the title and structure of his main work on the Trinity, the \textit{Psalterium decem chordarum}, derive from a vision experienced by Joachim at Pentecost during his stay at the Cistercian monastery of Casamari in 1183/4.\(^{142}\) Joachim stresses that the necessary precondition for his insight into the trinitarian mystery was his renunciation of the attempt to know God through academic study.\(^{143}\) In his view, doctrinal heresy is the inevitable outcome of contempt for the contemplative route to God.\(^{144}\) It is born of the carnal intellect which harbours the misconception that God must be made to conform to the same conditions which


\(^{142}\)Psalt., fol.227va: ‘Igitur donante ipso mox subscripti operis librum primum in ipso monasterio positus inchoavi et ex parte perfici; secundum vero et tertium, non ibi tunc, nec eodem tempore, sed quasi post annos duos.’ See also the anonymous \textit{Vita} ed. by Grundmann, p.532: ‘Tunc cum esset in dicto monasterio Casamarie, revelatum est ei mysterium Trinitatis et scripsit ibi primum librum Psalterii decem cordarum.’ According to Luke of Cosenza (\textit{Vita}, pp.539-40), it was at Casamari that Joachim also began work on the \textit{Expositio in Apocalypsim} and the \textit{Liber de Concordia}. Reeves, \textit{Influence}, p.23 n.1 says the \textit{Expositio} and \textit{Concordia} were begun before the \textit{Psalterium}. Recently on the chronology of Joachim’s works, see Selge, ‘L’origine delle opere’, pp.112-13.

\(^{143}\)Psalt., fol.227ra: ‘Eram aliquando ego ipse anxius ad verba dei, et querebam per exercitium lectionis ad veritatis notitiam pervenire; cumque ad eum per legendi studium properare flagrem, assumens sibi pennas velut aquile, longius quam erat recedebat a me. Cum autem posuit in ferore novissimo [novicio], cepi Dei causa diligere psalmodiam multa michi in scriptura divina psallenti sub silentio reserari cepernunt, que antea legendo vestigare nequiveram’.

Joachim's ob session with the error of Quaternity derives from the interaction of his trinitarian theology with his theology of history. His understanding of history as the realisation of the immanence of the three divine Persons in the historical process rendered any hint of something fourth particularly intolerable. The genius of Joachim’s use of the psaltery-triangle figure lies precisely in its demonstration that unity and trinity are compatible ideas, rather than mutually exclusive ones leading to Quaternity. The indivisibility of the psaltery’s triangular form means that undivided unity runs seamlessly into trinity in such a way that three seem to be one and one to be three. Each corner, because it consists of two lines converging in one distinct angle, conveys simultaneously the idea of threeeness and unity. The entire figure satisfies the requirements of trinity and unity, since the three corners are nothing if not the entire figure and vice versa. In this way, unity is not divorced from trinity, but they are one and the same thing.

Joachim’s most important attack on Quaternity has not received the attention it deserves given its close resemblance to the account of his doctrine found in the

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145 Psalt., fol.229ra: ‘Nec negamus trinitatem in unius confessione substantie, sed partium scissiones, quas camalas sibi fingit intellectus horremus’.


149 Psalt., fols.230vb-231ra: ‘Non enim aliquod trium si totaliter horum quod libet contemplari volueris hoc est pro quantitate duarum linearum que conveniunt in angulo uno distincte ibi occupat partem suam et aliquid secum a duabus attingit, sed ipsa indivisa simulaturo substantie mirabiliter sufficit ad ipsa tria, ita ut in uno quolibet duo necessarie accipientur.’

Lateran decree. Having railed against the monarchianism of Sabellius and the subordinationism of Arius, Joachim lashes out once again against the error of Quaternity:

But how perversely in every way did he correct both these errors, who said that one divine substance is a certain supreme reality (quaedam summa res) common to the three Persons, and that each individual Person is that same substance. For by that it is as if the number one hundred was understood for the substance, but three tens (denarii) for the Persons. Or, if he did not mean to say that the substance is greater than each of the Persons, it is as if the three denarii were understood for the Persons, and a fourth denarius for the substance, just as if God were not Trinity but Quaternity. Yet they endeavour to conceal this insane doctrine (vesania) in this way, and thus they say that each one of the Persons is the substance, as if they said that three denarii are one denarius, and one denarius is three. But in both of these positions there is an inequality. For one denarius pertains to the Father, one to the Son, and one to the Holy Spirit. Thus all three (trinarius) together pertain to the Trinity [...] the value of the denarius is meant to designate the perfection of the Person, and not to signify quantity. Similarly, three denarii (ternarius) are used to designate trinity, not to signify quantity. For where there is no limit [in terms of quantity], no such signification can be given [...] Therefore, three denarii designate the three Persons, of whom each one is perfect God. Thirty (unus tricenarius), which is the collection of the denarii, designates the Trinity of one substance, because perfect God is the Trinity and perfect God is each individual Person. Consider the end of the matter in that sacred name of God which is IEUE: IE is one name and is referred to the Father; EU is one name and is referred to the Son; UE is one name and is referred to the Holy Spirit; IEUE is one name, but not because it can simply be referred to the Father alone, or to the Son alone, or to the Holy Spirit alone, but to all three together.

This passage is an extremely rich source both for the nature of Joachim’s opposition to Peter Lombard and its possible relationship with his alleged doctrine of unity of collection as understood in the Lateran decree. Clearly Joachim thinks that by calling the essence a res, Peter Lombard has established it as a distinct thing with a numerical value. This number does not equal the Persons either together or separately. For the number 100 (essence) is not equal to 3 x 10 (Persons), nor does 3 x 10 (Persons) equal 10 (essence). But 3 x 10 (Persons) does equal 30 (collection of Persons/unity of essence), the collection of the denarii. Whether or not Joachim’s numerical comparisons are heterodox is something which can and has been endlessly debated. The important point is that they are certainly ambiguous. There is no doubt that this passage could be construed as putting forward a doctrine of unity of collection. What is particularly significant in this connection is the way in which Joachim’s

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152 Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.555 defends Joachim: ‘Weil Joachim kein quantitativ-numerisches Verständnis der göttlichen Einheit hat, liegt ihm ein kollektiver Begriff der Einheit der Trinität von vornherein fern!’ Joachim’s own orthodoxy is not the issue here; my argument is that this passage is susceptible to a tritheistic reading.
polemic here is echoed, sometimes literally, in the Lateran decree. Firstly, there is the reference to the offending passage from the Lombard’s Sentences, which approximates fairly closely to the citation in the decree. In addition Joachim describes the Lombard’s position as utterly insane (insania), an accusation which is also reported by the Council (insania). Moreover, it is quite possible from this passage to see how Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity against Peter Lombard might both alert someone to a tendency towards unity of collection and also be interpreted as the tangible result of an unconscious and not always articulate tritheism. Joachim’s objection to the Lombard’s concept of the essence as a res may seem to proceed from his own concept of the essence as the collection of the three Persons, which is encapsulated in his use of arithmetic to bring out the difference between his own and the Lombard’s position. In other words, Joachim’s own inadequate concept of unity of essence could conceivably account for his reaction to the Lombard’s quaedam summa res as a fourth thing.

This constant polemic against the error of Quaternity begins to look less like a conceptual difficulty with the Lombard’s terminology, as di Napoli maintains, than a real difference in doctrine. Joachim’s doctrine is rooted much more in the circumancession and interpenetration of the three Persons than in the Lombard’s solitary res of unity. In this context, his obsessive preoccupation with Quaternity might appear to those who agreed with the Lombard as nothing other than the expression of a much more fundamental error of unity of collection. This, at least, is the reading found in the Lateran decree.

Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity, far from being a ‘confused protest’ against the triumph of scholasticism expresses a real concern in trinitarian theology. It

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153The term insania was a common one in accusations of heresy. For example, Abelard, TChr IV.77, p.301 and Dialectica, pp.554-5; Robert of Melun, ISent.3.I, p.2.7-9; Walter of Saint-Victor, Contra Quatuor Labyrinthis, p.319.6, 319.10.


belongs to a series of similar accusations dating back to the charge levelled by Bernard of Clairvaux against Gilbert of Poitiers, that he had made God a Quaternity by separating God from his divinity. The accusations of Bernard and other ‘traditionalists’ arose from an uneasiness about the new way in which some of their contemporaries were talking about the divine essence or nature. It seemed to them that to acknowledge the common divinity shared by the three Persons, some people had inflated it to something greater than the Persons and consequently God himself. The Porretani countered that Gilbert’s distinction between essence and Person was a conceptual one and did not therefore imply Quaternity. Far from being a disciple of Gilbert, Joachim actually takes his inspiration from Gilbert’s accusers.

One strand in twelfth-century preoccupations with the error of Quaternity centred, therefore, on the sensitive issue of a distinction between essence and Person or the essence and the personal properties - either way making the essence a separate thing. Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard certainly belongs in this category and is particularly closely connected to Bernard’s critique, of which Joachim almost certainly would have known. But the other, closely interrelated theme in accusations of Quaternity may also have a significant bearing on how contemporaries understood Joachim’s attack. Several authors, both scholastic and anti-scholastic, anchor their understanding of Quaternity in one aspect or another of the doctrine of divine generation. This suggests that it was not always possible or even useful to separate the question of the unity of the essence from the generation of the essence when identifying the error of Quaternity.

Most intriguing of all is the vitriolic attack of Walter of Saint-Victor on Peter Lombard, among others, in his Contra Quatuor Labyrinthes Franciae, written around


158 Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.349 describes the De consideratione as Joachim’s ‘trinitätstheologisches Lehrbuch’.

159 Simon of Tournai, Disputationes LXXVII.2, p.251: ‘Si ergo potest generare alium a se et Patre et Filio, ergo quaternitas potest esse in trinitate.’ Quaestiones Varsaviensis, p.297.
the time of the Third Lateran Council. If the lost *libellus* is indeed an authentic, early work, it probably postdates Walter’s tract by a few years. Walter takes extreme exception to the Lombard’s view, which he attributes to the influence of Abelard, that the divine essence does not beget because since it is *una et summa quaedam res*, if essence begot essence, the same thing would have begotten itself. The Lombard thereby commits both the errors of Sabellius, by saying that the same thing (*res*) is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the error of Arius, by denying that the Son is begotten from the Father’s substance. Walter then cites some long passages from Augustine and Bernard which reject any assimilation of the common essence or divinity to a fourth Person. A series of citations from the ‘errors’ of Gilbert of Poitiers (actually the *Sententie divinitatis*), Peter of Poitiers, John Damascene and Peter Lombard follow in which these authors firstly discuss the relation of essence to Person and, secondly, put forward, in one form or another, the view that the essence does not beget. From this it would seem that Walter’s opposition is simultaneously targeted at the idea of a *quaedam summa res* non-begetting and a *quaedam summa res* as a fourth thing.

In several passages Walter identifies the error of Quaternity as one of the consequences of Peter Lombard’s assertion that the essence does not beget. He objects that there is no fourth divinity or essence common to the three Persons, but

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162 *Contra Quatuor Labyrinthes*, p.310.14-19, citing from the Lombard’s *Sentences*.


166 *Ibid.*, p.317.16-24: ‘Quod vero sequitur: an essentia genuit essentiam, quid ad Spiritum Sanctum pertineat omnino nescitur cum non sit genus, nisi sicut Abellardus et iste sentit: si Spiritus Sanctus de substantia Patris est duos filios habet; si inquam, ita proposuisset non fecisset fucum ut dicit Ambrosius, timens proferre quod sentit nec consequentia sua diabolic a illam quartam divinitatem quam Augustinus et veritas damnant, et ipse sub nomine divine essentie denuo ressuscitatem introducere auideret personis tribus communem nulli autem propriam, quasi alius sit persona, aliud essentialis natura.’
proper to none of them, which is neither begetting nor begotten.\textsuperscript{167} This point is made explicitly a number of times; the link is also implicit in this whole section and is one of the salient points in Walter's summary of these and various other errors.\textsuperscript{168} It is as though Walter's hostility to the concept of a \textit{quaedam summa res} is further exacerbated by the Lombard's denial that the essence begets (and vice versa).

Walter's attack on the Lombard's trinitarian theology demonstrates that the accusation of Quaternity could conceivably be linked both to the concept of a \textit{quaedam summa res} and the essence as non-begetting, and legitimately so given that these two doctrines are so closely linked by the Lombard himself. It reveals the strong association of ideas between the \textit{quaedam summa res}, the generation of the essence and the accusation of Quaternity in such a way that any one of these three would naturally bring to mind the other two. Although, therefore, Joachim never discusses the question of whether essence begot essence, his accusations of Quaternity against Peter Lombard could be interpreted as another traditionalist attack on the view that the essence does not beget. From this it could be inferred that Joachim thought that the essence did beget.

Joachim's perspective on the generation of the essence is not in fact dissimilar to that of Walter's predecessor as prior at Saint Victor, Richard of Saint-Victor.\textsuperscript{169} In his \textit{De trinitate}, written some time after 1162, Richard, like Walter, also attacked the Lombard for denying that essence begot essence, though he did not accuse him of Quaternity.\textsuperscript{170} There is general agreement that Richard's concept of \textit{persona} is the

\textsuperscript{167}Ibid., p.322.5-9: 'Que cum ita sint, manifestissimis rationibus et auctoritatibus conuincuntur isti falsum introdurre trinitatem per nescio quam divinitatem siue essentiam quartam, tribus quidem communem, nulli autem propriam, que nec gignit nec gignitur.' Mehlmann, \textit{De Unitate Trinitatis}, p.276 draws particular attention here to the resemblance with Joachim's attack.

\textsuperscript{168}Contra Quatuor Labyrinthes, p.333.13-17: 'Quod Pater et persona Patris gignit, sed non de natura. Quod Filius et persona Filii gignitur, sed non de natura. Quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit de utroque, sed non de natura. Quod persona et gignit et gignitur et procedit; natura nec genuit nec genita est nec procedit. Quod una est trium personarum quarta divinitas tribus communis, nulli propria'.

\textsuperscript{169}Richard was appointed prior in 1162. For his biography, see C. Ottaviano, \textit{Riccardo di S. Vitore. La vita, le opere, il pensiero} (Rome, 1933), pp.411-22.

anchor of his entire trinitarian theology.\textsuperscript{171} This may account for his attack on the Lombard, since underlying his revision of Boethius’ classic definition of Person is a conception of substance as something concrete unlike the Lombard’s rather abstract view of the divine essence as a \textit{quaedam summa res}.\textsuperscript{172} Richard does not think, therefore, that the essence as \textit{quaedam summa res} begot, but that the essence as Person or hypostasis begot. Accordingly, it could be argued that Richard and Peter Lombard really agree, since neither thinks that the essence as \textit{quaedam summa res} begets, and that Richard’s attack is the result of a terminological misunderstanding. Consequently, Richard would not be implicated in the Lateran condemnation of Joachim’s attack.\textsuperscript{173}

For Joachim the fact that the Father begets the Son also presupposes that there is a \textit{substantia genita}.\textsuperscript{174} His clearest statement on the question occurs in his \textit{Professio fidei}, which the Protocol of Anagni wrongly referred to as the last chapter of the \textit{De articulis fidei}.\textsuperscript{175} Like Richard of Saint Victor, Joachim refers to patristic usage: ‘God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom and essence from essence.’\textsuperscript{176} The Son is from the unbegotten substance of the Father, i.e. from the Person of the Father, \textit{not} from the common substance of the whole Trinity.\textsuperscript{177}


\textsuperscript{174}Psalt., fol.233vb-234ra: ‘Est enim substantia genita in ingenti et enconverso, et nihilominus procedens substantia in genita et in ingenita et eonverso; ita tamen ut propter summam unitatem, sic alia persona dicatur et sit substantia ingenita, alia sub genita, alia procedens, ut tamen simul tres persone non sint tres substantie, sed una substantia.’

\textsuperscript{175}Protocol, p.139. The \textit{Protocol} does not comment on the question of the essence as begetting. An edition of the \textit{Professio} and a discussion of its authenticity is provided by P. de Leo, \textit{Gioacchino da Fiore. Aspetti inediti della vita e delle opere} (Soveria Mannelli, 1988), pp.165-75.


\textsuperscript{177}\textit{Professio}, p.173.15-17: ‘confiteor Filium esse de substantia Patris, id est, de substantia ingenita, quam Greci dicunt ypostasis, Latinii vero personam Patris; non, quod absit, de substantia totius Trinitatis, quasi de communi’.
Elsewhere he finds it useful to spell out this distinction between the essence of each Person and the common essence of all three Persons. Joachim use *substantia* in the sense of *persona-hypostasis*, not in the sense of *quaedam summa res*. Joachim even anticipates the objection that his position implies that there are two separate substances, the substance of the Father and the substance of the Son. His language is entirely consistent with the view that Person not essence or substance begets and is thus not in friction with the Lombard’s position or that of the Council.

It is possible to see in the light of both Richard’s and Walter’s attacks how Joachim’s uneasiness at the Lombard’s concept of a *quaedam summa res* might have been still further aggravated by his opponent’s assertion that the essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, especially since Joachim, like Richard held the view that the essence as Person or hypostasis did beget. The addition of the essence as non-begetting to the already objectionable *quaedam summa res* was bound to sharpen Joachim’s sense of the Lombard’s *res* as a fourth thing. But for Joachim the Lombard’s denial that the essence begets is not the main issue, but only the necessary consequence of his more basic error: his concept of the essence as a *quaedam summa res* and its resultant separation from the three Persons. In this sense, it could be argued that one’s position on the generation of the essence is merely symptomatic of a much more fundamental position on the question of divine unity.

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178 *Psalt.*, fol.234ra: ‘sed ad differentiam unitatis. hoc est. unius substantie trium personarum. ne quis. quod absit. sic accipiat unam trium personarum essentiam. quomodo essentiam cuiscumque persone. cum ibi nomine essentie inelligamus simul ingenitum et genitum et procedentem; hic aut solum Patrem. aut solum Filium. aut solum Spiritum Sanctum.’

179 See Mehlmann, *De Unitate Trinitatis*, p.263 for Joachim.


181 Mehlmann, *De Unitate Trinitatis*, pp.244-5. 257. 264-7.

182 Mehlmann, *De Unitate Trinitatis*, p.253 n.109 considers that Joachim’s opposition was not to the concept of *quaedam summa res* as such but to a *quaedam summa res* as non-begetting etc.; only this could account for the accusation of Quaternity.
Joachim objected to the Lombard's *quaedam summa res* and elsewhere used the language of *substantia genita*. The Lombard and the Council affirmed the *quaedam summa res* and rejected the begetting essence. Thus to attack the *quaedam summa res*, as Walter's example shows, was to attack the entire *quaedam summa res/*non-begetting essence axis.
5. Unity of collection and use of analogy

A causal link is drawn in the Lateran decree between Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity against Peter Lombard and the allegation in turn levelled against him, that his concept of divine unity amounted to nothing more than a unity of collection:

namely three Persons and the common essence as though a fourth [Person], manifestly protesting that there is no thing (res) which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, nor essence, substance or nature, although he concedes that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one essence, substance and nature; and yet in this way he does not confess a true and proper unity, but one of collectivity and resemblance.

Thus, to follow the progression of thought laid out in the decree, Joachim takes exception to the Lombard’s concept of a quaedam summa res (which is neither begetting etc.) because he himself has no place for a res as the subject of the three Persons, only as their predicate.1 And this distinction between the res as subject and the res as predicate is tantamount to unity of collection. The distinction being made here is in fact a technical one which would have been immediately recognised by contemporary scholars; to an untutored eye it might seem as though the propositions ‘there is a res which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit’ (which Joachim allegedly denies) and ‘Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one essence’ (which Joachim allegedly concedes) amounted to the same thing.2 But clearly the framers of the decree discerned a real difference between the two statements, otherwise not only would there have been no reason for them to mention it, but to do so would have weakened their case against the Abbot. Instead, the fact that Joachim denies that there is any res which is the three Persons is indicative of unity of collection.3

More or less the same interpretation of Joachim’s and Peter Lombard’s

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2This is di Napoli’s argument, ‘Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo’, pp.651-2, 681-2. Accordingly Joachim and the Lombard differ merely in their point of departure, from Persons and essence respectively, and not in their actual concept of unity.

3Di Napoli, ‘Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo’, pp.652-3 disputes both this and the logic of the decree here. The position attributed to Joachim is not indicative of unity of collection since he still professes an identity between the three Persons and the essence predicated of them. Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.544 agrees, citing di Napoli.
The reason why this distinction attributed to Joachim is significant to the framers of the decree and reveals so much about their understanding of his concept of divine unity is because it presupposes adherence to a theory of predication and of universals in which such distinctions would make a real difference. The point is that the accusation levelled here against Joachim is essentially the same as that levelled against Gilbert of Poitiers at the Council of Reims. One of the charges brought against Gilbert was denying that ‘God’ or ‘substance’, i.e. any term denoting unity, could be the subject-term of a proposition. Words which fall into this category, i.e. words being used in an abstract rather than concrete sense, could never be the subject according to Gilbert, since by its very definition a subject was a concrete individual, it was ‘subject’ to other conditions. Gilbert, like Joachim in his comparison of the Lombard’s teaching to someone trying to make the number 10 (essence) equal to 3 x 10 (Persons), denies that there is one thing which is the three Persons since this would be like saying one thing is three things. It seems that the authors of the decree have inferred this from Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard, not so much because it is really an issue for Joachim himself, but more because such a position would be entirely consistent both with Joachim’s opposition to the Lombard’s quaedam summa

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5Ibid., p.43.

6Ibid., pp.53-5.

7See chapter 4, pp.97-8.
res and his doctrine of unity of collection as understood by the Council." And the reason that they are able to make this assumption is surely because for them all these ideas are part of the same logico-semantic position.

The task then is not so much to establish Joachim's orthodoxy or heterodoxy in absolute terms, but to establish how his doctrine may have been construed (or misconstrued) as heterodox by the authors of the decree, and whether they even understood his basic question. In particular, it is to ascertain how far twelfth-century discussions of the Trinity may be informing the Council's reading of Joachim's position. Of course to do so is to make certain assumptions about the authors of the decree based not on concrete evidence, but on a 'most likely scenario' approach.

Firstly, the doctrine of unity of collection, both in its logical and theological forms, would be familiar to most school-trained theologians. It may be anachronistic of us to associate it so closely with tritheism, but it is legitimate to do so insofar as both unity of collection and tritheism denote not only a loose concept of unity but also the absence of true oneness.9 The 'arch-tritheist' of this period, Roscelin of Compiègne, is really closer to the position of unity of collection than to out and out tritheism. Part of the difficulty posed by the notion of collection was that it was often genuinely helpful, if not indispensable, in clarifying certain aspects of the doctrine. In his De trinitate, Walter of Mortagne argued that the term 'trinitas' could not be predicated of any one Person alone, but of all three together, by virtue of which it ranked as a collective name.10 Again Thomas Aquinas, writing after the Lateran condemnation, defended the use of 'trinitas' as a collective term, even though this would seem to undermine divine unity. He argued that although the idea of collectivity usually excluded any possibility of there being a true unity of essence, the term 'trinitas' differed in precisely this respect of designating a unity of essence:

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9It is true that in his extant works Joachim hardly ever predicates the three Persons of God, essence or substance. But see, for example, De articulis fidei, p.4.3: 'Ante omnia intellige Deum tuum esse tres Personas plenas'.

10De Régnon, Etudes de théologie positive II, pp.255-7 and Fournier, Etudes, pp.15-16 consider Joachim a tritheist. Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, pp.339-40 says the allegation has been uncritically accepted by generations of scholars and takes the view that Joachim is not a tritheist.

10PL 209,584: 'Potest autem hoc homen "Trinitas" collectim appellari, cum de nulla personarum per se dicatur, sed simul de omnibus'. Also Robert of Melun, Scond.3.X, p.50; BM Royal 9E XII, fol.148va: 'Alia quedam numeralia sunt vel collectiva [...] ut "unus", "duo", "tres", "trinus", "trinitas".'
A collective term has two implications, namely plurality of subjects and some sort of unity, namely some kind of co-ordination; a 'people', for instance, is a multitude of men somehow ranked together. In the first respect 'trinity' is like other collective terms; but in the second respect it differs since in the divine Trinity there is not only unity of order, but with this also, unity of nature. 

There has been much debate about the justness of the charge of unity of collection levelled against Joachim. Part of the problem in assessing his orthodoxy lies in various attempts to identify the source of his alleged tritheism with that of other 'heretics', especially those under the influence of Greek theology with its emphasis on the trinity of Persons over and above the unity of essence. The most important of these was Fournier's thesis that Joachim was indirectly influenced by Gilbert of Poitiers via the Porretan Liber de vera philosophia (c. 1179), and perhaps even met its author. The first point of similarity to be noted between Joachim and the Liber is the latter's opposition to the recent resurgence of Sabellianism, i.e. his abhorrence of the super unity proposed by contemporaries which threatened to engulf any real trinity. These criticisms resemble Joachim's dislike of the Lombard's quaedam summa res, though they are made from a distinctly Gilbertine perspective. The modern Sabellians not only confuse the Persons with one another by saying that one res is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, they also confuse the Persons with their properties. In this way, they confuse everything together (Persons, properties, nature) in one fictitious, non-existent unity.

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14 *Liber*, Grenoble 1085, fol.62ra-78vb.

15 *Liber*, Grenoble 1085, fol.63vb: 'Modemi vero non solum confundant personas in se invicem, dicendo rem unam esse patrem et iliam eandem numero esse filium et ipsum eandem numero esse spiritum sanctum, sicut Sabellius, sed etiam confundunt personas ipsas in ipsis proprietatibus personarum, dicentes personas ipsas esse ipsas proprietates personarum.'

16 *Liber*, Grenoble 1085, fol.63vb: 'Sic ergo confundunt hec omnia simul in his simul omnibus, scilicet personas, proprietates, naturam, deum ipsum, et unitatem in hane unitatem ficticiam.'
And the cause of this extreme form of Sabellianism is a failure to distinguish the manifold signification of the words unus, una and unum.\(^{17}\)

The author of the Liber thus rejects any view of divine unity as una res. Instead, divine unity is the collection of the three Persons and is nothing other than divine trinity.\(^{18}\) The three Persons are one according to the communion of majesty.\(^{19}\)

Unity is not trinity nor trinity unity since only the unity of nature, not the trinity of Persons, is numerically one.\(^{20}\) And since a trinity is of three Persons, a duality of two and a unity of one, if trinity is unity, it must follow that three Persons are one Person.\(^{21}\) This comes very close to Joachim’s argument that a quaedam summa res cannot be the three Persons because that is like saying 1=3.

In this Porretan work, one of the errors imputed specifically to Peter Lombard is his denial that the divine essence begets.\(^{22}\) In terms of the Liber’s possible affinity with Joachim, however, this is a red herring. Joachim does not attack Peter Lombard because he denies the generation of the essence but because of his quaedam summa res. Another similarity made much of by Fournier is the author’s use of biblical analogies which he cites against the modern Sabellians as evidence that divine unity is not una res, but a collection of several things.\(^{23}\) By this the author reveals the kind of unity which he has in mind: it is not an individual unity such as the unity of one man, but, using a comparison cited by the Council against Joachim, the unity of the

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\(^{17}\) Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.64rb: ‘Causa vero huius erroris eorum, quo scilicet incidunt in heresim Sabellianam, hec est, quia, scilicet videntur ignorare multimodam significationem huius nominis “unus”, “una”, “unum”.’ Cf. Joachim Psalt., fol.231rb.

\(^{18}\) Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.68ra: ‘unitas est collectio tritim personarum que nihil aliud est quam trinitas’.

\(^{19}\) Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.68ra: ‘unum propter maiestatis communionem’.

\(^{20}\) Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.68rb: ‘nec trinitas est unitas. nec unitas est trinitas. Trinitas enim est proprietas simul trium personarum non nature. Unitas quoque proprietas est nature, non personarum. Persone enim tres sunt numero non una. Natura quoque una est numero, non tres.’

\(^{21}\) Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.68rb: ‘sicut trinitas est tres persone, ita dualitas due persone, et unitas una persona. quare cum trinitas sit unitas et eonverso, et dualitas sit unitas et eonverso, tres persone sunt una persona et eonverso’.

\(^{22}\) Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.89rb. See Fournier, Etudes, pp.88-91.

\(^{23}\) Fournier, Etudes, pp.82-3 for references.
faithful in one Church. It is the unity of I Cor 3. 8 (He that planteth and he that watereth are one).

There are certain points of contact between the Liber’s and Joachim’s criticism of the una res doctrines of their contemporaries, particularly Peter Lombard. But there are no compelling textual similarities or significant usages of the same texts. Both object to any hint of super unity, but only Joachim accuses Peter Lombard of Quaternity. The Liber’s criticism is definitely from a Gilbertine perspective, whilst Joachim’s is much more traditionalist. It is nevertheless important for our overall understanding of the Lateran decree that many of the issues raised by the Council, particularly the denial that una res can be the subject of the three Persons, are discussed in the Liber. In this way, Joachim’s worry about Peter Lombard’s quaedam summa res takes on even greater significance despite and, indeed, because of the extreme unlikelihood of any Gilbertine influence. Joachim’s attack can no longer be merely attributed to the influence of a doomed theological school, but is an independently worked out assessment.

Rejection of this Gilbertine influence has been absolutely central to Joachim’s ‘rehabilitation’ and the assertion that his position is essentially Augustinian. Particularly compelling is the argument that Joachim’s anti-scholasticism and veneration for Bernard of Clairvaux, whom Joachim casts as the harbinger of the new age, is irreconcilable with any borrowing from Gilbert of Poitiers. But proving that Joachim is not consciously influenced by Gilbert’s doctrine does not exclude the possibility that contemporaries may have discerned some general link between them.

Several scholars have recently argued that Joachim conceives of divine unity

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24 Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.68rb.
25 Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol.64va.
27 Liber de Concordia, pp.416-17.
in terms of the circumincession or interpenetration of the three divine Persons. But whether this view of divine unity constitutes adequate grounds for the Council’s accusation of unity of collection or even for a real difference with Peter Lombard’s concept is another matter.

But whilst most scholars argue that Joachim merely misunderstood the Lombard, Schachten detects a real difference between them. At one point, Schachten seems to turn Joachim’s doctrine of circumincession into one whose logical conclusion, via the fourteenth-century Liber contra Lombardum, is tritheism. According to Schachten, Joachim assumes that every property attributed to a Person must be attributed to the divine essence. And so, if Joachim wants to avoid the Sabellianism to which this doctrine, whereby no one Person has any stronger claim than the other two to a particular property, will inevitably lead him, he is driven to a form of tritheism in which three identical essences are joined in kind of communion but not in a numerically single unity. At least, Schachten tells us, this is the interpretation offered by the Council and Aquinas. This is a rather dubious assertion given that no textual references are provided in support. Even worse, is that Schachten should use the Liber contra Lombardum, which scholars now agree has nothing to do with Joachim, as confirmation of Joachim’s tendency towards tritheism. This hardly amounts to an argument at all: a fourteenth-century text with trithesitic tendencies and no proven link with Joachim is used to substantiate thirteenth-century assessments of Joachim’s orthodoxy, as though the fact that the Liber’s alleged tritheism would in any case be proof of Joachim’s.

The charge of unity of collection depends in large part upon the Council’s representation of Joachim’s use of biblical texts as analogies for divine unity, and it

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31 Ordo Salutis, p.56.

32 Ibid., p.55.

33 Ibid., p.56.
is upon the accuracy of this judgement that scholars have focused their attentions.\textsuperscript{34}

The Council summarises Joachim’s position:

But he does not confess in this way a true and proper unity, but one of collectivity and resemblance, in the way that many men are called one people, and many believers one Church, according to: \textit{The multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul (Acts 4, 32), and: He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit with him (I Cor 6, 17); also He that planteth and he that watereth are one (I Cor 3, 8), and all of us are one body in Christ (Rom 12, 5); again in the Book of Kings: My people and your people are one (I Kings 22, 4). But above all to prove\textsuperscript{13} this opinion, he refers to what Christ says in the Gospel concerning the faithful: I wish, Father, that they may be one in us, as we also are one \textit{Un 17, 22}, that they may be made perfect in one \textit{Un 17, 13}). For, as he says, the Christian faithful are not one, that is a single reality which is common to all of them, but they are one in this way, that is one Church on account of the unity of the catholic faith and finally one kingdom on account of the indissoluble union of charity.

It would seem that the Council is merely summarising Joachim’s own use of these scriptural texts, i.e. Joachim himself says that Father and Son are one in the same way that many believers are one Church - this is not the Council’s gloss. Virtually all these passages are indeed used by Joachim as analogies for divine unity. In particular, the following section from the \textit{Psalterium} corresponds in considerable detail to the passage from the decree:\textsuperscript{36}

Because God is triune in unity, he has always desired that many men and different peoples should be joined together as one, because he knows that there can be no joy wherever there is separation and diversity.\textsuperscript{37}

This forms the preamble to Joachim’s exegesis of \textit{In} 17, 11 and 20-22, cited against him in the decree:

The Son prays for his elect that they might be one according to the resemblance of his unity with the Father, speaking thus: \textit{Holy Father keep them in thy name which thou hast given me that they may be


\textsuperscript{36}Otto, ‘Die Denkform des Joachim’, p.107 says that this section was either copied from the lost work or represents the first draft.

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Psalt.}, fol.233va: ‘Quocirca quia ipse in unitate trinus est, quesivit semper et queret, quonodo plures homines et diversi populi convenirent in unum, sciens quod nulla possit esse felicitas ubi scissio et diversitas est’.
one, even as we are one (Jn 17, 11).38

He continues:

Certainly we have heard from the Word of truth how the Son wishes us to be one after the image and resemblance of that unity by which he and the Father are one. That unity, however, is in the spirit, according to what is written in the Acts of the Apostles: the multitude of believers were of one heart and one soul (Acts 4, 32). According to this mode of unity, we should understand what the Apostle said: He that is joined to the Lord becomes one spirit with him (I Cor 6, 17).39

When Joachim says ‘that unity is in the spirit’, he is probably referring, as his scriptural citations suggest, to the unity of the faithful in one Church as the fulfilment of the human potential for unity and the human equivalent of divine unity.40 This would make divine unity, not Christian unity, the model; in this case the Council has misunderstood him. But he could instead be referring to the unity between Father and Son because he seems to equate ‘that unity by which he and the Father are one’, with ‘that unity is in the spirit’; in that case he would indeed be saying that divine unity is like the unity of the faithful, as the Council alleges.

According to the first reading, the analogy would take full account of the fact that there are different types or degrees of unity and oneness.41 Joachim himself shows that he understands this when he cites Augustine’s comments on different types of unity which vary according to their strength of cohesion from division, through the joining of separate things (one body to another), to the natural unity of things of the same nature.42 Thus ‘separation causes division, conjunction a certain unity’.43 But

38 Psalt., fol. 233va: ‘Inde est quod filius orat pro electis suis, ut sint unum ad sue et patris sui similium unitatis, dicens sic: Pater sancte serva eos in nomine tuo quos dedisti mihi, ut sint unum sicut nos’.


40 Schachten, Ordo Salutis, p.25: ‘Wienun Joachim die “unitas in spiritu” verstanden wissen will, ist schwer zu deuten.’

41 For a systematic exposition of this idea, see Dominicus Gundissalinus, De unitate, ed. P. Correns, BGPM I.1 (Münster, 1891), who describes a descending scale of unity from unity of essence through to unity of will (pp.9-10). On Gundissalinus, see J. Jolivet, ‘The Arabic Inheritance’, in Dronke ed., History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, pp.134-45. Compare also Bernard of Clairvaux’s delineation of different degrees of oneness, De consideratione V.18-19, Opera III, pp.482-3.

42 Psalt. fol. 233vb. The reference to Augustine does not seem to be a literal citation, but gives the sense of De trin. VI.4-8, CCSL 50, pp.231-7. PL 42.926-9.
the most ineffable unity is that in which three Persons are one spirit and one substance.\footnote{Psalt., fol.233vb: 'liquet quod scissio divisionem facit. coniunctio unitatem quidem [sic]'\textsuperscript{.}}

The purpose of the biblical analogy seems to be didactic, as though the consubstantial unity of Father and Son is the ideal to which Christians should aspire.\footnote{Psalt., fol.233vb: 'Quanto ineffabilius una substantia sunt et unus spiritus, siquidem Deus spiritus est, tres persone Deitatis'.} Such a reading would also be supported by the patristic tradition of using these passages as exhortations to the faithful to overcome their internal divisions and attain unity insofar as it is possible for them.\footnote{Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore, pp.136-7; di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', pp.655-6; Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.580.} Hilary of Poitiers denied that Acts 4, 32, I Cor 3, 8 and Jn 17, 20-1 were evidence of a mere unity of will between Father and Son as his Arian opponents alleged.\footnote{De trin. VIII.5-17, CCSL 62A, pp.317-29, PL 10.240-9.} He even countered that the unity of will described in Acts 4, 32 could indeed be thought of as a unity of nature, since where a multitude of believers share the one true faith, a natural unity is achieved through the nature of the unity of the one faith.\footnote{De trin. VIII.7, CCSL 62A, p.319.7-9, PL 10.241B: 'Si ergo per fidem, id est per unius fidei naturam, unum omnes crant, quomodo non naturalem in his intelligis unitatem, qui per naturam unius fidei unum sunt?'\textsuperscript{.}}

Augustine also used Jn 17, 20-22 to assert the consubstantiality of Father and Son.\footnote{De trin. IV.12; CCSL 50, pp.176-8; PL 42.896.} He interprets the passage as signifying God's will that humanity should be one in their belief in him, since it is only through Christ that they can overcome their own conflicting desires, and thus achieve a unity in God. This tradition seems to have been very much alive in the twelfth century when the unity of the three divine Persons was still considered a model for Christian unity.\footnote{Javellet, Image et Ressemblance I, pp.447-50.}

But if Joachim, on the other hand, really does say that the unity of Father and
Son is a spiritual unity like that of the faithful then he does, as the Council says, exceed the bounds of propriety in his use of analogy. That is why the Council reminds us that the difference between God and creation is so great that the principle of analogy must be one of dissimilarity rather than similarity.  

Just as Joachim’s application of analogy is ambiguous, so his theory of analogy is susceptible to a number of readings and may not, therefore, have served as a strong counterbalance. His position seems to be in perfect harmony with the Council’s own emphasis on dissimilarity. He also speaks of using concrete things in order to penetrate the meaning of a word, not in order to show the truth of resemblance. His doctrine of dissimiles similitudines suggests a level of sophistication in the use of analogy entirely compatible with the Council’s position.

Stephan Otto has suggested that the discrepancy between Joachim’s method of analogy and the Council’s interpretation of it may lie precisely in Joachim’s failure to put his own rigorous theories into practice. The failure is thus one of application in the particular case of divine unity rather than of general method.

It may be the case, as some scholars suggest, that the images and analogies in the lost libellus to which the decree refers were much less clearly expressed and formulated than those which we find in the Psalterium. Even in the Psalterium

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51 Conciliorum, p.232.34-5: ‘inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda.’

52 See Otto, ‘Die Denkform des Joachim’, p.109; Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.582. The passages in the Psalterium are too numerous to cite, but for example Psalt., fol.234rb: ‘Quamvis autem Deus omnipotens sine quantitate magnus sit, res tamen quibus eum assimilando intelligere querimus quantitate necesse est terminentur’; also, fol.230va: ‘necesse est ut cedat quantitas illi magnitudini que quantitatem non habet, et visibilis forma invisibili nature, et comprehensibile corpus incomprehensibili deitati’.

53 Expositio, fol.36va: ‘At quia res palpabiles et grossiores infirmis intellectibus capaciores sunt, loquimur de eis ad insinuandam virtutem vocis, non ad ostendendam veritatem similitudinis.’

54 Esp. Psalt., fols.233rb-va. In general, see Javelet, Image et Ressemblance, p.1.36: ‘L’expression qui traduit le mieux le rapport entre le Créateur et les créatures, est celle de Dissemblance ressemblante ou celle de Ressemblance dissemblante. L’affinité peut donc exister, mais il convient sans cesse de rappeler que le ciel est “incomparable” à la terre.’


56 Die Funktion des Bildbegriffes, p.299.

57 See Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p.585.
though, Joachim’s use of certain analogies is susceptible to the kind of reading found in the decree.58 His recurrent use of the term *collectio* and his predilection for collective analogies to which the Council itself refers would intensify rather than allay any doubts about his orthodoxy.59 One analogy bordering closely on unity of collection is the image of the three golden statues which are made from one lump of gold.60 Joachim’s coin/number analogy in which $3 \times 10$ (Persons) equals 30 (essence) is also susceptible to a reading in terms of unity of collection and it is also possible, moreover, that this passage was part of the lost *libellus*, since it refers to the offending passage from the Lombard’s *Sentences*.61

6. General statement on the doctrine: the Father’s generation of the Son

Having explained Joachim’s opposition to Peter Lombard and summarised his errors on divine unity, the Council proceeds to issue a clarification of the doctrine giving special attention to the question of divine generation. The reason for this may be that, having rejected Joachim’s unity of collection, the Council wished to eliminate a further possible contender to the Lombard’s *quaedam summa res*, the position that essence begets essence. Also underlying this section is an awareness of the interdependence between divine unity and divine generation. The affirmation of the

58Mehlmann, *De Unitate Trinitatis*, p.582: ‘Mann kann nicht ausschliessen, dass manche Begriffe, Bilder und Vergleiche, die Joachim in seinem *Libellus contra Petrum Lombardum* benutzt hat, Anlass zu Missverständnissen gegeben haben könnten’. Schachten, ‘Die Trinitätslehre Joachims von Fiore’, p.57 points out that Joachim’s images of three trees, three tribes of David and the psaltery do not convey the idea of personal circumscription and that this accounts for the charge of unity of collection. It would be unwise, however, to push this too far given that the Council uses not these but Joachim’s biblical analogies as evidence of unity of collection.

59For example, Psalt., fol.231rb: ‘potest unus accipi de collectione multorum, ut unus populus, una plebs’; *ibid.*, fol.232va: ‘tribus Juda, et tribus Benjamin, et tribus Levi que remanserunt filiis David et templo domini unus simul populos dicte sunt.’ (Mehlmann, *De Unitate Trinitatis*, p.561 defends this image); *De articulis fidei*, p.5.3-6: ‘unum tamen dicimus non singularum, non utique, sicut dicimus unum sydus, unum iaspidem, unum smaragdum, set unum ab unitate utpote cum dicimus unum gregem, unum populum, unam turbam.’

60*De articulis fidei*, p.7.4-8: ‘si una massa auri distinguishetur in tres status, maxime si ut solent fieri in arte fusoria, tote tres essent coniuncte; si dicereetur singula statua esse unum aurum ut tamen simul tres non dicereur nisi unum aurum? et miratur homo si singula divinitatis Persona dicitur versus Deus, et simul tres unus Deus?’; *Professio fidei*, p.173.22-6: ‘unum sunt unitate non singularitate, ac si tria vasa ex una fornace procederent dicercetur unum aurum. Ac per hoc, etsi singulur dicatur et sit aurum et unum aurum, differt tamen hoc unum ab illo uno, quia illud unum non dicitur collective, set singulariter de singulo, istud dicitur collective de tribus’. Cf. Augustine, *De trin.* VII.11, CCSL 50, p.264, PL 42.944.

61Psalt., fol.277rb. See below, pp.201-2.
quaedam summa res excludes any possible generation of essence.

The Council confesses 'with Peter' that there is a quaedam summa res which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, three Persons together and each individually. For this reason there is only a Trinity in God, not a Quaternity, since each of the Persons is that res, namely substance, essence or nature:

That thing is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, because there are distinctions in the Persons and unity in the nature.62

The decree then proceeds to elucidate in considerable detail how it is that the Father’s generation of the Son, the very principle of distinction in the Trinity, does not affect the absolute unity and simplicity of essence which has just been so unequivocally underlined. In begetting the Son, the Father neither divided his substance with the Son nor gave it to him wholly, but begot the Son without any reduction to his own substance. This focus on the Father’s generation of the Son assumes that the problem of divine generation lies at the very heart of trinitarian orthodoxy, and also that it is indispensable to a true and proper concept of divine unity.

There is little indication from his extant works that Joachim would have differed from this statement on the doctrine issued by the Council.63 His own position on the Father’s generation of the Son is characteristically delivered through the means of analogies. His preferred analogy is the fire image, one which has a natural affinity with the absolutely uncontroversial image of light proceeding eternally from light.64 The flame which proceeds from the burning bush in Exodus 3, 2 corresponds to the Son, and the heat which proceeds equally from both corresponds to the Holy Spirit, and yet the three are one fire.65 Like the image of light from light, the function of this image is to show that one thing can proceed forth from another


63See esp. Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, pp.571-3 who stresses the agreement between Joachim and the Council on the question of consubstantiality.

64Joachim is aware of use of the light image by the Church Fathers. Psalt., fol.231vb: 'Antiqui tamen patres disputantes adverso Arium qui filii negabant etemitatem flamman sive ignem similiudini paterne dederunt lucem filio qui coeptemus patri.'

65Psalt., fol.231vb-232ra; also De articulis fidei, pp.7-8.
without there being a consequent loss of nature in the source. In this respect, it has no implications for Joachim’s position on the generation of the divine essence, but was simply a traditional means of expressing the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son.

It could, however, be inferred from the decree that part of the Council’s criticism of Joachim’s doctrine of unity of collection was motivated by a sense that his doctrine jeopardised not only divine unity, but the Father’s generation of the Son. Or it may be that, to avoid confusion, the Council wished to reject unequivocally the view that essence begets essence, since it also threatened both divine unity and divine generation. Three issues mentioned in the decree point towards this conclusion. The first is the early reference to the Lombard’s Sentences. The Council cites the Lombard’s doctrine of the *quaedam summa res* and the non-begetting essence as though these two issues were inseparable. The Council then goes on to affirm the orthodoxy of the *quaedam summa res*, and that it is neither begetting, begotten or proceeding. Finally, there is the significant clarification of divine generation which suggests that this issue, as well as the issue of divine unity, is one being dealt with in the decree. It is this clarification which may have misled later commentators into thinking that this was Joachim’s error.

7. *The involvement of Paris theologians in the framing of the decree?*

Theologians at Paris are by far the most likely candidates for the framers of the Lateran decree on the Trinity. This would be true even without Pope Innocent III’s startling debt to Joachim’s trinitarian theology and the consequent abandonment of the traditional thesis that Innocent was the main force behind Joachim’s condemnation. For it is most unlikely that the Pope would have personally drafted and approved all of the canons without some degree of consultation with the appropriate experts. Added to which is the visible evidence of Innocent’s borrowing from Joachim, which makes it difficult to imagine the circumstances in which the Pope would have actively sought

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*Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis,* pp.244-5 argues that Joachim’s position on the generation of the essence was totally uncontroversial and not one taken into consideration by the Council.
out Joachim's condemnation. The hypothesis that the Cistercians were somehow involved seems far-fetched. This leaves Paris theologians as the group most qualified and with the greatest interest in drawing up a statement on the doctrine.

A brief consideration of current and former Parisian masters of theology alive in the period from April 1213, when Innocent requested submissions, to November 1215, when the Council was held, reveals particularly close links between Paris and Rome which must strengthen the case for the participation of Paris theologians at some stage. At least three masters of considerable distinction in the field of doctrinal theology were cardinals during this period: Peter of Capua, Cardinal-Priest of San Marcello (1200-14); Robert de Courson, Cardinal-Priest of San Stefano in Celiomonte (1212-19), and papal legate in France; and Stephen Langton, Cardinal-Priest of San Crisogono (1206-28). They were ideally placed to petition the Pope about any concerns of Parisian masters. Innocent's cardinalate was still dominated by individuals of Roman origin and remained oriented towards Italy. But individuals with some form of higher education were beginning to be appointed in greater numbers and to have a greater impact. Of the 30 cardinals either created or promoted by Innocent, 14 either used the title magister or were known to have followed some course of learning at one of the emerging universities.

In addition, Innocent's former teacher of theology at Paris, Peter of Corbeil (d. 1222) was Archbishop of Sens throughout this period. He had, moreover, already presided over the investigation and condemnation in 1210 of the Parisian-based sect, the Amalricians. Unfortunately, we have no information as to his approach or attitude to trinitarian theology, a situation which also applies to many of the other theologians active at this time.

Developments at Paris itself provide further grounds for seriously considering the role of its theologians in the drawing up of the Lateran decree. The emergence of a doctrinal consensus on the Trinity in the second half of the twelfth century opened

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70 See the list of masters at Paris provided by Glorieux, *Répertoire* 1, p.228.
the way for the public expression of a common body of opinion on the doctrine. Add
to this the formation of a corporation of masters and we have the social and
intellectual conditions necessary for the participation of Paris theologians in the
process of formulating official Church doctrine. As the distinguished canonical
historian Raymonde Foreville writes of the Lateran decree on the Trinity:

Cette profession de foi trinitaire est complétée par une ecclésiologie. Expression collégiale de la foi
catholique elle est conçue par des théologiens de l'Ecole parisienne.71

The social context in which debates on the Trinity at Paris in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries took place is essential both to understanding the nature and course
of these debates and to a fuller contextualisation of the Lateran decree on the Trinity.
Like any other phenomenon, theology is in part 'a socially constructed reality' and as
such there is reason to think that factors which may be broadly described as
sociological may impinge on the actual content of doctrine as it eventually comes to
be formulated.72 This is certainly true of the quaestio technique which grew out of
both intellectual and institutional practices.

The task here is to determine as specifically as possible how social relations
within the schools and, more importantly, between the schools and the outside world,
impinged upon the formulation of trinitarian doctrine. In my view, the most important
element is not the one which is usually discussed - professional and intellectual rivalry
within the schools themselves - but the masters' desire for professional recognition as
a distinct body within the Church. The on-going rivalry between the schools of Peter
Lombard and Gilbert of Poitiers has been used to account both for Joachim's attack,
as an intellectual disciple of Gilbert of Poitiers, on Peter Lombard, and for his
condemnation at the Fourth Lateran Council at a time when the Lombard's supporters
were at last strong enough to overwhelm their rivals. But if anything, it is the triumph
of professional unity over disunity which brought about the possibility of exercising
authority outside the narrow confines of the schools.

At the heart of this process is the emergence from about 1170 of what is

71 'Procédure et débats', p.28.
generally described as the corporation of masters. The formation of a group of masters conscious of their professional vocation and rights is in turn closely associated with the *licentia docendi*, the right to teach. The right to grant the *licentia docendi* became a contentious issue between the chancellor and the masters who were increasingly aware of their professional status. The changing status of the *magister* seems to have engendered a self-conscious pride which precipitated a desire for professional recognition. Fired by the conviction that the right to teach should therefore be dependent on their professional suitability and not left to the discretion of the chancellor, the masters contested the chancellor’s exclusive right to confer the *licentia docendi*. The dispute had probably been continuing for some time when Pope Alexander III intervened in 1170-72. His decree forbade officials in all cathedral schools either to demand a fee for conferring the *licentia docendi* or to refuse it to any qualified person. In this way the ‘masters achieved the earliest formal recognition of their distinct status in the ecclesiastical system.’ The issue of the *licentia docendi*, the outcome of which would really decide the question of the masters’ professional status, was resolved in their favour and was officially confirmed in the statutes of the Third Lateran Council. The regulation evidently, though, was not enforced, to judge by a dispute in 1212-13 over the continued charging of fees by the

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74 A good summary of the question of the *licentia docendi* can be found in E. Lesne, *Histoire de la propriété ecclésiastique en France V, Les écoles de la fin du VIIIe siècle à la fin du XIIe*, Memoires et Travaux publiés par des professeurs des facultés catholiques de Lille (Lille, 1940), pp.425-30, 489-92; also Weijers, *Terminologie des universités*, pp.46-51.


77 For the text, *CUP I*, pp.4-5.


chancellor in return for the *licentia docendi*. But by this time, it seems that the final recognition of the right to teach was dependent in reality not on receiving the *licentia docendi*, but on the practice of inception which lay with the masters not the chancellor.

To claim the *licentia docendi*, therefore, because teaching lay at the very heart of the master’s distinctive function, was to claim entry into a distinct professional group. Though having attained this first recognition of their distinctiveness as a group, the masters collectively were still far from the kind of internal organisation and self-regulation which, according to Weber, is essential before corporate action or rather the enforcement of corporate action is conceivable. Much of this effort at self-regulation converged on the procedure for admission to the masters’ guild, which also dates from the 1170s. Although, because of sheer numbers, it seems most plausible that the masters of the arts were the principal force behind the quest for corporate recognition, this does not mean that theologians did not play a part or have their own reasons for wishing to form a more cohesive professional group. In their case, the attempt to restrict entry to their numbers and to allay fears within the Church at large of the preponderance of doctrinal heresy at Paris are the most tangible manifestations of their desire for a more responsible public role and profile. The accusations throughout the twelfth century against various masters connected with the schools at Paris, most notably against Peter Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers and Peter Lombard, left many ecclesiastical authorities suspicious and critical of the activities of theologians. In fact, despite the standardisation of teaching practice and the growing consensus over many issues, the general perception of the masters of theology at Paris was still a negative one. Superfluous disputations in the schools were the subject of

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50*CUP* I, p.73.


52See Verger, ‘Des écoles à l’université’, pp.820-1 on the identification by contemporary chroniclers of *scolares* as group distinct from both clerics and lay citizens of Paris.

forceful attack in a letter from Stephen of Tournai to the pope c. 1192-1203.\textsuperscript{84} McLaughlin writes, 'Not until the early thirteenth century, when an outburst of speculation bold to the point of heresy coincided with the emergence of the university as a recognized corporation of masters, did the problems raised by their freedom become acute.'\textsuperscript{85} The investigation into the doctrines of Amalric of Bèze as propounded by his followers was an example on a impressive scale of corporate self-regulation.\textsuperscript{86} Among the adherents of Amalric who were condemned in 1210 were several former students and masters of theology at Paris.\textsuperscript{87} The association of Paris-trained theologians with this public scandal might have proved fatal to the institution's future had not the authorities acted so swiftly and decisively.\textsuperscript{88} Not only were these men expelled from the masters' corporation, but, in an attempt to block off future breeding ground for heresies, Aristotle's works on natural philosophy and commentaries on them, which were strongly associated with the Amalrician sect, were forbidden under pain of excommunication. The condemnation reveals the deep anxiety of Paris theologians that intellectual heresy was penetrating their ranks. Their collective action was an attempt to prevent further heresy and shows a determination to purge their members of any element which might damage their reputation or jeopardise their potentially wide influence in the Church. The confirmation of Amalric's condemnation at the very end of the Lateran decree seems to point towards a further link between the drafting of the decree and events at Paris.\textsuperscript{89}

The condemnation of the Amalricians, moreover, coincides with the period, roughly 1207-10, when the masters at Paris received official papal recognition of their,  

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{84}CUP I. pp.47-8. Trans. in Thomdike, University Records, pp.22-4.
\item \textsuperscript{85}Intellectual Freedom, p.19.
\item \textsuperscript{86}For the text, see CUP I. p.70; trans. in Thomdike, University Records, pp.26-7.
\item \textsuperscript{88}Dickson, 'The Burning of the Almariciens', p.348.
\item \textsuperscript{89}Dickson, 'The Burning of the Almariciens', p.363 comments that the addition of Amalric's condemnation is indicative of the intellectual nature of Joachim and Almaric's respective heresies rather than of Joachim's alleged influence on Almaric.
\end{itemize}
in practice, already established corporate status. The role of Pope Innocent III, himself a former student of Paris and one who kept a close eye upon events there, was crucial in this process. A series of decrees issued over the years 1207-16 marks the confirmation of important legal rights. The Pope took the side of the masters in their case against a certain Master G. who had refused to take an oath of obedience which committed him to abiding by the statutes of the society of masters. This points to papal recognition of the legitimacy of the masters acting collectively to enforce their corporate rules. Innocent's decree also uses several expressions which signify implicit papal acceptance of this legal status: universitas was used for the first time in the sense of university; consortium and societas reinforce the sense that a discrete social organisation is being referred to.

Further confirmation of rights and public powers was to follow. All these rights were collected and confirmed in Robert of Courson's statutes of 1215, addressed to the universitas magistrorum et scolarium, and themselves an example of internal self-regulation and of co-operation between the masters and papal representatives.

Despite the widespread view that the organisation of teaching at the cathedral schools, and by extension at the emerging university, reflects a more general twelfth-century movement towards communal organisation, it has been argued that this corporate instinct cannot alone account for the formation of a corporation of masters at Paris. Instead, Ferruolo argues:

The formation of the first 'university of masters and scholars' in Paris resulted not so much from the pragmatic need of scholars to band together to secure their interests against an external adversary as

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9Rashdall, The Universities of Europe 1, pp.300-9; Post, 'Parisian Masters as a Corporation'; Ferruolo, The Origins of the University, pp.294-5.

9CUP I, pp.67-8.

9On these and other terms which express the idea of community amongst the masters, see Weijers, Terminologie des universités, pp.15-45. See also P. Michaud-Quantin, Universitas. Expression du mouvement communautaire dans le moyen-âge latin (Paris, 1970).

9CUP I, pp.73-4, 82-3.


9Ferruolo, The Origins of the University, p.310.

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from the prevailing influence within the schools of certain exalted educational principles and values. 96

It was the masters' common recognition of their professional vocation as teachers, that is, purveyors of knowledge and truth, which propelled their pursuit of regulations ensuring and protecting their common interests.

The emergence, from the last quarter of the twelfth century, of some kind of associative society of masters had its repercussions for the study of theology. Increasingly, masters of theology began to regard themselves as a group with common aims, interests and doctrinal views. Instead of the kind of confrontational approach characteristic of the early and even of the middle of the twelfth century, there is a growing sense that theologians share a basically similar approach to theological language and doctrine. This similarity of approach cleared the way for substantial agreement on a range of theological issues, what Chenu has called 'the formation of a common opinion of masters'. 97 In his Summa, Prepositinus indicates his awareness of the general consensus on a given issue by means of the expression magistri nostri, the received opinion of the masters as a body. 98 It is even possible to detect a compunction to conform with the view of the magistri nostri. At the least, Prepositinus goes to considerable lengths to gloss over any apparent divergence between his and their respective views on specific issues. This comes through particularly well in his treatment of the question of how divine will seems, contradictorily, both to prohibit and to permit fornication: 'But lest we seem not to follow the view of our masters, we grant that it is the case', i.e. that permissio is a sign of the divine will. 99 In a similar vein, Alan of Lille conceives of theology as a professional discipline requiring a highly trained mind and a considerable degree of

96Ibid., p.5.
97La théologie, p.328.
987.1, p.240.18; 7.2, p.241.9; 10.2, p.259.1; 10.4, p.260.1; 12.1, p.275.1. Angelini, L'ortodossia e la grammatica, pp.103-4 argues that the expression magistri nostri does not include Porretani such as Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai. On this consensus and its corresponding expressions, see Chenu, La théologie, p.359.
technical knowledge. Theology is not a suitable subject for the uneducated and uninitiated, but is only fit for those who, in the possession of a higher intellect, may ascend to the ineffable mysteries and perceive with a pure eye the secrets of philosophy.

As a university education increasingly meant a career in either civil or ecclesiastical administration and similarly as the proportion of public office-holders with a scholastic education increased, there seems to have been a growing desire on the part of the Paris theologians for some measure of respectability. As Baldwin says, they sought 'to legitimate their contributions to society.' Before academic theology could have any influence outside the confines of the classroom, its practitioners would have to be perceived as serious and responsible individuals, capable of arriving at agreement in a mature way. An unruly group of ambitious and argumentative theologians, interminably debating without ever reaching any kind of consensus, would be unlikely to secure the kind of authority which they sought. Agreement on doctrinal issues, regulation of teaching practice and a sense of common mission among theologians were the essential preconditions for the exercise of power. There are, therefore, good reasons for thinking that theologians at Paris were both willing and able to become involved in the process of drawing up a major and official definition of trinitarian orthodoxy along the lines of the Lateran decree.

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100 *Regulae*, prologus n.7, p.123: 'Unde Boethius librum inscrisit De ebdomadibus quasi de subtilissimis theologorum propositionibus. Iste propositiones quanto intelligentiam habent altiores tanto magis peritum exigunt auditorem.'

101 *Regulae*, prologus n.8, p.123: 'Unde non sunt rudibus proponende et introducendis qui solis sensuum dediti sunt speculis sed illis, qui ductu purioris mentis ad ineffabilia conscendunt et puriori oculo philosophie secreta perspiciunt. Hec enim propositiones in peritiori sinu theologie absconduntur et solis sapientibus collocuntur.'


103 Baldwin, 'Masters at Paris', p.158.
VII  THIRTEENTH-CENTURY RECONSTRUCTIONS OF THE LATERAN DECREE

Virtually all academic interpretations of the Fourth Lateran Council’s decree on the Trinity took place in the context of the debate on ‘essence begot essence’. This concentration is quite extraordinary given that the question of whether the divine essence begets is at most secondary in the decree itself. The fact that the decree cites from that section in the Lombard’s Sentences in which this question is discussed was, of course, a determining factor in subsequent treatments. A large proportion of the thirteenth-century discussion takes place, after all, in Sentence commentaries. Even if the issue is implicit in Joachim’s condemnation for unity of collection insofar as some view of the essence begetting is not incompatible with Joachim’s position, the fact remains that Joachim was not condemned for his position on the generation of the essence but for his concept of divine unity. One cannot avoid the conclusion that a significant misunderstanding has occurred.

Apart from the conceptual link between the main issue of unity of collection and the tangential one of whether or not the essence begets, there is also the question of the begetting essence as another rival to the Lombard’s _quaedam summa res_. Like Joachim’s unity of collection, this position was also rejected by the Council. It is not so strange, therefore, that thirteenth-century commentators, taking their lead from the decree itself, as well as their own long standing preoccupation with the essence begot essence debate, should reconstruct the decree in these terms. Thus they take the view that Joachim attacked Peter Lombard because he objected to the latter’s argument that the essence does not beget.

The question of whether the essence begets was at the heart of twelfth-century scholastic solutions to the problem of unity and trinity in God, but also functioned as an effective vehicle for discussion of the central preoccupation of scholastic theologians, the problem of theological language itself, and it is this which accounts

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1There is an excellent survey of this discussion, including extensive excerpts from manuscripts, in M. Schmaus, _Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus_, BGPTM 29 (Münster, 1930), pp.48-65. It is highly significant that Schmaus himself takes it for granted that these authors are dealing with the main subject of the decree.
for the durability of the discussion. The apparently unsustainable position that ‘God begot God’ was orthodox, but that ‘essence begot essence’ was not, focused attention on the problem of how linguistic usage could be made to accommodate divine reality. A semantic approach to the problem demanded a semantic solution. Hence, twelfth-century theologians developed the distinction between the signification and the supposition of a word, differentiating in this way between what a word means and what it stands for. Even though, therefore, the terms ‘God’ and ‘essence’ refer to the same thing, they signify it in different ways. Further, the word ‘God’ was found to have a variety of significations which explained its different uses in particular contexts.

This approach was the dominant one by the late twelfth century and was adopted by scholastic theologians writing before and after the Fourth Lateran Council. The problem of why ‘God begot God’, but not ‘essence begot essence’ was the exemplary case of its application. The solution developed by scholastic theologians highlighted all the advantages of the semantic approach without exposing its flaws. In this sense, the issue provided an effective form of polemic; it was relatively easy to win an argument by showing that the premises of an opponent led unavoidably to the conclusion that the essence begot.

This distinct academic tradition of thought on the Trinity was not disrupted by the Lateran decision. Instead, an essential continuity links twelfth- and thirteenth-century approaches. By the time theologians come to give their views on the Lateran decree, they are in fact drawing on an extremely well-established tradition of trinitarian theology which was bound to inform significantly their understanding of the decree. Unless we realise this, we cannot understand their reading of the decree. We are, moreover, likely to mistake Peter Olivi’s controversial views on the question as something peculiar to him alone, rather than as part of a much wider debate in trinitarian theology. When placed in this context, thirteenth-century commentaries on the Lateran decree become infinitely more comprehensible: we can understand how and why it was that these theologians took a seemingly minor issue and placed it at the centre of their explanation of Joachim’s error, even if they thought that this issue was in any case related to the charge of unity of collection. Although they are, in a manner of speaking, imposing meaning on the decree, rather than merely activating
already dormant meaning, their motives for doing so, and the particular form the
collection takes, are understandable when placed in this wider context of their
underlying assumptions and intentions. Thirteenth-century interpretations are, to
borrow an expression from reception theory, determined by the ‘horizon of
expectations’ of their authors.² The fact that the question of whether the essence
begts is mentioned in a prominent place at the beginning of the decree along with the
implicit link with the question of divine unity seems to have triggered a whole chain
of expectations on the part of thirteenth-century readers. As Hirsch, one of the most
influential thinkers in the field of genre theory, writes:

an interpreter’s preliminary generic conception of a text is constitutive of everything that he
subsequently understands, and that this remains the case unless and until that generic conception is
altered.³

It is only because scholastic theologians attached so much importance to the debate
about the generation of the essence that they could give it such a prominent place in
their discussions, regardless of its place in the decree itself.

1. The appropriation of Joachim’s condemnation in Sentence commentaries and
summae

The first theologian to comment on Joachim’s condemnation was William of
Auxerre (d. 1231). William taught at Paris and his major work, the Summa Aurea,
written between 1215 and 1229, reproduces his teaching there.⁴ The Summa was
widely read; more than 120 manuscripts have been located to date.⁵ William was
clearly, therefore, an extremely valued writer. His influence is apparent in subsequent
discussions of the Lateran decree, for it is his interpretation of the questions at issue

²H.R. Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception (Univ. of Minnesota, 1982), esp. pp.22-3; R.C. Holub, Reception
p.16.
there which is echoed in later thirteenth-century commentaries, evidence surely of his 'pivotal position between the earlier scholastic theology of the 12th century and the full flowering of scholastic genius in the thirteenth'.

William's discussion occurs during the course of his treatment of a question which probably belongs to a debate on proper and appellative nouns, 'Whether the noun "God" in its primary signification can have a plural'. A modern scholar looking for William's reaction to the Lateran decree could be forgiven for overlooking this section of the work. There is no immediately obvious connection between Joachim's concept of divine unity, which was the principal object of reproof in the decree, and the signification of the word 'God'. But, as we have seen, the signification of 'God' was the subject of lengthy and complicated discussions in the twelfth century and after. Towards the end of the twelfth century it was standard practice to draw a distinction between the signification and the supposition of terms such as 'God' and 'essence' in order to show why these terms could refer to the same divine reality and yet describe it in different ways. This is the main theme of William's chapter and one which he links explicitly to the issue of contention between Peter Lombard and Joachim.

William wants, of course, to show that the term 'God' does not have a plural. However, both reason and authority would suggest the contrary. The opposing arguments work on the premise that since 'God' has the same signification as something else (essence or Person), and this something has a plural, it follows that 'God' has a plural. Hence, because God is identical with the divine essence and the divine Persons, it must have a plural. The scriptural authority for the view that 'God' has a plural comes from passages where the word is used metaphorically, as in Gal 4, 8, *You served these who were not gods*.

Against all this, however, is the argument that 'God' is a proper name (*proprium nomen*) and as such cannot be plural. William's explanation hinges on the distinction between the signification and supposition of a noun. Although 'God' and 'author of creation' are equivalent in terms of supposition (i.e. they denote the same

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5Summa I.IV.6, pp.53-7.
thing), they are not equivalent in terms of signification (i.e. they signify the same thing, but in different ways). Although in actuality neither the term ‘God’ nor ‘author of creation’ is predicated of more than one thing, in the case of ‘God’ it is not even conceivable that it could be plural. It is precisely in this respect that it differs from ‘author of creation’. The analogy William uses is between Socrates and the sun, i.e. Socrates could under no circumstances even be thought to be more than one thing, whereas it is possible to imagine more than one sun.

This is a curious argument, but one which nevertheless makes the point that a term’s supposition and signification imply different things respectively. William uses this principle to reject the other objections regarding ‘essence’ and ‘Person’:

sometimes two terms are equivalent and yet one of them [i.e. God] can be used to stand for the other [i.e. essence and Person] whilst the other cannot in turn stand for it.

After having explained the true import of the scriptural and patristic texts, William cites a further objection, which he notes is a standard one, to the singularity of God:

Since the noun ‘God’ is purely essential and is nevertheless used to stand for Person, why, since similarly the noun ‘essence’ is purely essential, can it not be used to stand for Person?

The explanation offered by William was by the early thirteenth century a familiar and well-rehearsed argument but his is the clearest so far:

It is now clear from what has been said that the noun ‘essence’ is only assigned to essence or nature. The noun ‘God’, however, is assigned to something possessing the divinity and for that reason it accepts supposition for each Person which possesses the divinity. But since the noun ‘essence’ is assigned to nature or essence, under no circumstances can it stand for anything except the essence.

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9 Ibid., p.54.35-7: ‘Nec est verum quod hoc nomen “Deus” et iste terminus “principium primum creaturarum” equipollent quantum ad significationem, licet equipolleant quantum ad suppositionem.’

10 Ibid., p.54.47-9: ‘Ad secundo objectum potest patere solutio ex predictis, quia quandoque duo termini equipollent et tamen unus potest trahi ad supponendum pro aliquo, alius autem non pro illo’.

11 Ibid., p.56.81-3: ‘Cum hoc nomen “Deus” sit pure essentiale et tamen potest trahi ad supponendum pro persona, quare similiter hoc nomen “essentia”, cum sit pure essentiale, non potest trahi ad supponendum pro persona?’

12 Ibid., p.56.86-90: ‘Patet ex iam dictis quia hoc nomen “essentia” impositum est soli essentie sive nature, hoc autem nomen “Deus” impositum est habenti deitatem et ideo habet supponere pro qualibet persona que habet deitatem. Sed cum hoc nomen “essentia” impositum sit nature sive essentie, nullomodo habet supponere nisi pro essentia.’

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This is absolutely axiomatic for William: the *impositio* of ‘God’ allows it to stand for Person, but the *impositio* of ‘essence’ does not. Despite this, Joachim had argued, according to William, that ‘essence’ does indeed stand for Person.\(^{12}\) William goes so far as to identify what he believes to be Joachim’s view that essence begets essence as the cause of his attack on Peter Lombard. Consequently, it is this question of the generation of the essence which is the real point of contention between them, and not, as we might expect from Joachim’s works and from the decree, the Lombard’s *quaedam summa res*. For nowhere, either in his own works or even according to the Lateran Council’s account of his position, does Joachim ever discuss this question, never mind explicitly put forward the argument William attributes to him. It seems safe to assume, moreover, that William is not in any case basing his judgement on Joachim’s actual works but rather on the Lateran decree which would have been easily available to him, and so it must be from this document that William has inferred his understanding of Joachim’s position. In other words, the views which William attributes to Joachim are for him implicit in the decree. Certainly, the specific argument which William attributes to Joachim could not be inferred from the decree: this is something which William imports from his own immersion in that particular debate. What is not so clear is whether William’s reading of Joachim’s position could be reasonably inferred from the decree alone given that, although the Council affirms that the essence does not beget, it does not expressly attribute the opposite view to Joachim. It seems that William has misread the Council’s rejection of the begetting essence towards the end of the decree as yet another of Joachim’s errors.

William cites the statement in the Lombard’s *Sentences* to which Joachim allegedly objected, that ‘since the essence is unique, if essence begot essence, then the essence begot itself, which is impossible.’\(^{13}\) According to William, Joachim’s argument against the Lombard’s assertion proceeds as follows:

\begin{quote}
But Joachim objects to this proof, since in the same way you could have said Peter: God is unique, therefore if God begot God, God begot himself; but this is impossible, therefore God did not beget God. Therefore, just as, though God is unique, God nevertheless begot God, and it does not follow from this
\end{quote}

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p.56.91-2: ‘Joachim tamen dicit quod hoc nomen “essentia” bene potest supponere pro persona.’

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p.56.96-7. William is certainly referring to the *Sentences* rather than the decree’s paraphrase of them. Cf. Lombard, *Sent.* V.1.6. p.82.19-21.

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that God begot himself, [so too] in the same way, although the essence is unique, nothing prevents the essence from having begotten essence, since it does not follow from this that the essence begot itself.\textsuperscript{14}

Again, not only is this not a direct citation from any part of Joachim’s writings, it is not a question which Joachim discusses, even incidentally. Neither is the issue explicit in the Lateran decree. Clearly, then, William has somehow inferred from the text of the decree that Joachim’s real objection to Peter Lombard’s view was not the Lombard’s concept of a \textit{quaedam summa res}, but his opposition to the Lombard on the issue of the essence as begetting. William correctly reports that the Lombard denied this, but thinks Joachim affirmed it.

It seems that William’s immersion in the scholastic discussion on why ‘God begot God’ but not ‘essence begot essence’, and the distinction between signification and supposition which grew out of that, predetermined his reading of the dispute between Joachim and Peter Lombard as represented in the Lateran decree. Regardless of any implicit link there might be between Joachim’s unity of collection and the generation of the essence, or of the Council’s own rejection of the begetting essence as an alternative to the Lombard’s view, nowhere in the decree is the view that the essence begets attributed to Joachim. By concentrating on the question of whether or not the essence begets, William not only adopts a more effective framework for refuting Joachim’s opposition than the more problematic question of the \textit{quaedam summa res}, he also choses an issue which is consistent with his own interests and with the demands of the immediate question under consideration.

William gives full credit to Joachim’s argument. In his \textit{solutio}, he comments that Joachim had good reason to oppose the form of the Lombard’s argument and the logical premises which underlay it, i.e. something is unique, something begot something, therefore something begot itself, which is impossible. But, says William, Joachim did not pay sufficient attention to the nature of the terms with which he was dealing:

Because indeed the noun ‘essence’, since it is assigned to essence only, is of such a nature that it cannot

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Summa} I.IV.6, p.56.98-104: ‘Sed obicit loachim contra hanc probationem quia eodem modo potuisti, Petre, dicere: unicus est Deus, ergo si Deus genuit Deum, Deus genuit se ipsum; sed hoc est impossible; ergo non Deus genuit Deum. Sicut ergo licet unicus sit Deus, tamen Deus genuit Deum, nec inde sequitur quod Deus genuit se; eodem modo, licet unica sit essentia, nihil impedit quin essentia genuerit essentiam, nec inde sequitur quod essentia genuit se.’

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Thus, William implies, even though the Lombard’s argument is basically flawed, it
nevertheless holds good because of the property of the term ‘essence’ to stand for
essence only. And it is precisely in this respect that the term ‘essence’ differs from
the term ‘God’. That is why there is no necessary equivalence in the arguments which
Joachim allegedly parallels, i.e. God begot God, but not therefore himself; essence
begot essence, but not therefore itself. For the term ‘God’ stands for both essence and
Person. 16 And even though we might think that essence should stand for anything
which possesses divinity (meaning the Persons), this is prevented by the signification
of essence as that which informs existence, and this signification excludes essence
from standing for Person, since Person does not convey this sense. 17 In a previous
section William had defined ‘persona’ as signifying both essence and relation, and it
is presumably this two-fold signification which disqualifies ‘persona’ from having
essence as its supposition in certain contexts. 18 Joachim was wrong to argue as he
had and was therefore, William concludes, rightly condemned by the Council. 19 But
this was certainly not the main reason for Joachim’s condemnation as William claims.
The Council at no point explicitly accused Joachim of maintaining the view that the
essence begot, even though this charge might be thought to be implicit in their
affirmation of the Lombard’s doctrine of the non-generation of the essence.

The first Franciscan scholar to write about Joachim’s condemnation was

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15Ibid., p.56.105-8: ‘Dicimus quod Ioachim bene oponit quantum ad formam argumentationis, sed non bone
oponit quantum ad naturam terminorum. Quoniam enim hoc nomen "essentia" talis nature est quod non potest
supponere nisi pro essentia cum soli essentie impositum sit’.

16Ibid., p.57.112-14: ‘Sed non tenet hec forma argumentandi in hoc nomine "Deus", quod habet supponere tam
pro essentia quam pro persona.’

17Ibid., p.57.125-31: ‘Quamvis forma huius nominis "essentia" insit personis, tamen non eis convenit secundum
quod significatur per hoc nomen "essentia". Idem est enim essentia quod natura faciens esse sive informans ens
secundum quod significatur per hoc nomen "essentia". Idem enim est essentia quod natura faciens ens vel
informans ad esse; informare autem vel facere esse non convenit personis, licet illa factio vel informatio nihil
aliud sit quam ipsa essentia.’ See W.H. Principe’s comments on this passage and on William’s concept of esse.
in William of Auxerre’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto, 1963),
pp.22-3.

18Summa I.VI.3, p.85.24-5: ‘dicimus quod hoc nomen "persona" partim dicitur secundum essentiam, partim
secundum relationem’.

19Ibid. I. IV.6, p.57.117-18: ‘merito damnatus fuit propter hoc dictum Ioachim in concilio sub Innocentio
tertio.’
Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), who began his lectures on the Lombard’s *Sentences* sometime in the 1220s, and probably after William of Auxerre had completed his *Summa Aurea*. These lectures have been preserved in what have been identified as student *reportationes*. Alexander’s fullest discussion of the Fourth Lateran Council’s doctrinal statement on the Trinity is to be found in Distinction V of this commentary. He pays much closer attention than William of Auxerre to the explicit point of contention between Joachim and Peter Lombard:

But if the divine essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding (*non gignens nec genita nec procedens*), there is therefore something (*aliaquae res*) which is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding. Also the begetting thing is not the same as the thing which is not begetting, that is the Son; neither is the proceeding thing simply the begotten thing and so forth. Therefore, the thing which is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding is not something which belongs to the three Persons; therefore, there will be four things in the Trinity. This is the view which Joachim attributed to Peter Lombard.

At the same time, Alexander, no less than William, is drawing out what he sees as the assumptions underlying Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard, the ideas without which it would be inexplicable. He does not mention the Lombard’s concept of a *quaedam summa res*, only his view that the essence is not begetting etc. It is only by drawing out on Joachim’s behalf the potentially undesirable implications of Peter Lombard’s view that the essence does not beget that Alexander can make sense of Joachim’s opposition. He can reconstruct the impulse behind Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity only with reference to the idea of the essence as neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, rather than to the essence as *quaedam summa res*, the real cause of offence. But, says Alexander, although it is true that, because the divine essence is not begetting it follows there is a ‘thing’ which is not begetting, it does not also follow

20 On Franciscan scholars in general, see A. M. Hamelin, *L’ecole franciscaine de ses débuts jusqu’a l’occamisme*, Analecta Mediaevalia Namuroensia 12 (Louvain, 1961); Glorieux, *Répertoire* II.


23 *Ibid.* I.V.1, p.79.11-18: ‘Sed si divina essentia non est gignens nec genita nec procedens, ergo aliqua res est quae nec est gignens nec genita nec procedens. Item, res gignens non est res quae est non-gignens, ut Filius, nec res procedens simpliciter est res genita, et ita de aliis. Ergo res nec gignens nec genita nec procedens non est aliqua trium personarum: ergo erit quaternarius in Trinitate: quod Ioachim imposuit Lombardo.’
that this is a something, an *alia res*. For ‘*alia res*’ properly refers to Person, i.e. something distinct. Moreover, we can say ‘the divine essence is a *res gignens*’. where ‘*res*’ is taken to mean hypostasis (i.e. the Person of the Father) without this forcing us to conclude that the divine essence itself begets. And this does not mean that there are four *res* because the *res* which is not begetting is identical with the Person which is begetting. There is absolute identity between essence and Person, therefore, such that the non-begetting essence is the same as the begetting Person, the Father. Thus a central factor in Joachim’s misunderstanding, according to Alexander’s account, would be the ambiguity of the term ‘*res*’. As a *res* in itself, the essence does not beget. Nevertheless the essence is a *res gignens* where ‘*res*’ here means the Father who begets. This conception of the divine essence as a *res* which does not beget, but which is not therefore an *alia res* (a distinct thing), may link in with Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity and his condemned doctrine of divine unity. The drafters of the Lateran decree could only explain Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity as a consequence of his doctrine of unity of collection. For, it could be argued, Joachim could not have mistaken the Lombard’s *quaedam summa res* for a fourth thing unless he had no proper concept of divine unity but only a unity of collection. They might also have thought that a counterpart to unity of collection, as well as another alternative to the Lombard, would be the view that the divine essence begets. That is, there is nothing to prevent someone who has no concept of the divine essence as a *quaedam summa res* from thinking that the essence begets.

A further problem is that since the divine essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding it is in a position of opposition with respect to the three Persons and as a result identity between essence and Person through predication is not possible:

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25 *Ibid.*, p.80.3-7: ‘Concedenda tamen haec est "divina essentia est res gignens", nam "res" sumitur pro hypostasi; haec autem est vera "divina essentia est hypostasis gignens". Nec sequitur: est res gignens, ergo est gignens vel gignit."

26 *Ibid.*, p.80.7-9: ‘Ad aliud dicendum quod non est quaternarius rerum, nam res quae non est gignens etc. est persona gignens etc., et ita non facit numerum in eo quod est "res"’.

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'to beget' and 'to be begotten' are relatively opposite; similarly 'not to beget' and 'to beget' are relatively opposite. Therefore, those things to which these properties are attributed are also opposite. But a begetting thing is not the same as one which is begotten etc. Therefore, since the non-begetting and the begetting are more opposite than the begotten and the begetting (and similarly with regard to the other hypostases), it follows that the divine essence, which is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, will be opposite to the individual hypostases. Therefore, the divine essence is not appropriately predicated of a hypostasis. Therefore, this is false: the Father is the divine essence.

We answer that just as in man there is an essence, namely by which he is (quo est), there is also a quod est. And this is the cause of the quo est being the predicate, and the quod est the subject. But in no creature are these identical. In God, however, they are the same, and yet each has its own mode. Therefore, this argument does not follow: in man the quod est and the quo est are not identical, but man is the subject by virtue of his quod est, and the predicate by virtue of his quo est, and, therefore, man is not a man. Rather what ought to be inferred from this is that the mode of the subject is not the same as the mode of the predicate. This confused the abbot Joachim. For when I say that 'man is an animal', not animal but man establishes man as rational or irrational. Therefore, this is false: 'animal is man'. Similarly, going back to the first argument, it does not follow: the divine essence is neither begetting etc., because essence neither determines this or that thing, nor is it this or that thing, since the act of begetting is not attributed to the essence. 27

Alexander’s point is that although we distinguish in created things between the quod est and the quo est so that they are different, this does not mean that we should be led into absurdities such as ‘man is not a man’. It is not that man as quod est or subject is different in essence from man as quo est or predicate, but that their modes of signifying are different. When we say that in man the quod est and the quo est are different, we are not talking about two discrete and separate things but two different modes. Having established this semantic principle, Alexander proceeds to use it to explain why Joachim’s objection is invalid, although it is not clear precisely what connection he is making. His point would seem to be that the simple fact that the divine essence is neither begetting etc. does not establish the essence as a separate entity from the begetting, the begotten and the proceeding for the very reason that this is just a mode of signifying, not a means of actually separating essence from Person. Thus, just as man is rational by virtue of being man rather than by virtue of being animal, so the Father is begetting by virtue of being the Father, not by virtue of being the divine essence. Therefore, it is neither here nor there in terms of the number of personal distinctions within the divinity that the divine essence does not beget, just as saying that animal is not rational would not affect the issue of man’s rationality. The definition of essence as something common to the three Persons, just as the definition of animal as something common to all men, means that the essence has no

27Glossa I.V.2. pp.80-1.
determining effect on the distinguishing properties of the Persons, just as animal cannot determine the distinguishing characteristic of man, his rationality. The fact that the essence does not beget, therefore, makes no difference to the number of Persons in God.

Alexander’s discussion of ‘essence begot essence’ in his Summa picks up some of the same points found in the Glossa, but has much stronger parallels with William of Auxerre’s treatment.\textsuperscript{28} Anticipating the arguments of Bonaventure and Aquinas, Alexander makes the point that the property of begetting is only attributed to a term whose mode of signifying is concrete rather than abstract.\textsuperscript{29}

The first objection considered by Alexander against the view that the essence does not beget is attributed to Joachim. ‘Me argument reported, down to the actual wording, is a version of the one also given by William of Auxerre:

If, therefore, God begets God, it follows that essence begets essence. Moreover, it does not follow from this that the essence begets itself, just as it does not follow that God begot himself. Now Joachim, who was of this opinion, argued in this way against the Master of the Sentences: ‘Peter, you say that if essence begets essence, since the essence is undoubtedly one, it follows the same thing begets itself.’ Therefore, in the same way, since there is only one God, it follows: ‘God begets God, therefore the same thing begets itself’. But this is false because it does not follow; therefore, nor does the other.\textsuperscript{30}

Alexander formulates Joachim’s argument in precisely the same terms as William of Auxerre. It is impossible to say whether he is borrowing directly from William himself or indirectly through the academic grapevine of stock arguments. Of course, the argument itself is not William’s creation, but dates back to the later twelfth century. But its attribution to Joachim and the form of personal address allegedly used by him is introduced by William and becomes one of the characteristic features of the discussion in the thirteenth century.


\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p.421: ‘In eis quae dicuntur de formis, ita ut quid si volumus eis attribuere actum, hoc non est nisi in quantum dicuntur concretive, sicut caliditas non cale facit, sed calidum; ergo similiter "generare, generari" non dicuntur de essentia prout significatur ita abstractive, scilicet per hoc nomen "essentia".’

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p.422: ‘si ergo Deus generat Deum, ergo essentia generat essentiam. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod essentia generet se, sicut nec sequitur quod Deus generet se. Nam Joachim, cuius fuit haec opinio, ita argumentatur contra Magistrum Sententiarum: "Petre, tu dicis quod si essentia generat essentiam, cum non sit nisi una essentia, ergo idem generat se." Ergo a simili, cum non sit nisi unus Deus, sequitur: "Deus generat Deum, ergo idem generat se"; sed hoc est falsum, quia non sequitur; ergo nec illud.’

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Alexander’s response is to formulate a general rule about theological language which disqualifies Joachim’s argument and which is a good example of grammatical theology coming to the rescue. He says that notional verbs (‘to beget’ etc.) are only predicated of those nouns which signify the divine essence as a *quod est*, for example, ‘God’ in ‘God begets God’. 31 Words such as *deitas* and *essentia*, however, do not signify the essence in this way, but absolutely. The general rule is that notional or personal verbs cannot be predicated of words which signify the divine essence absolutely because such absolute words designate an order of nature which is the opposite state from the notional. 32 Joachim’s mistake was failing to recognise this distinction between words such as ‘God’ and ‘essence’ when it came to the question of the divine generation. 33 For a verb signifying *notio* is never predicated of the essence, because the essence defies all manner of existence characteristic of individual things. Hence, even though in God, essence and Person are the same thing, their modes of signifying differ markedly. 34

Alexander’s approach, therefore, is to define the divergence between the correct view of Peter Lombard and the Lateran Council on the one hand, and the mistaken view of Joachim on the other, in terms of language and modes of signifying. His criticism, also found in William of Auxerre’s *Summa Aurea*, that Joachim’s error was the result of a lack of technical understanding, is extremely significant. This motif is also present in subsequent commentaries. It is significant for what it reveals of the attitude of these authors that only men trained in the schools will have the intellectual

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32 *Ibid.*, p.425: ‘Absolute significatur divina essentia per hoc nomen “deitas”, per hoc nomen “essentia”. Generalis ergo regula est, quod de illis nominibus divinis, quae significant divinam essentiam absolute, non possunt dici verba notionalia sive personalia, quae dicunt habitudines personales, quia essentia sic designata absolute significatur absque designatione ordinis naturae; et ideo nunquam convenit ei modus comparatus, qui est modus ordinis, quia modo opposito significatur, scilicet absolute; ideo nullo modo dicitur essentia generare nec generari, nec deitas, quia verba ista dicunt habitudines ordinis naturae in personis; et ideo non sunt haec vocabula extendenda nisi ubi significatur essentia cum ordine naturae, qui est ordo personalis.’

33 *Ibid.*, p.425: ‘Fuit autem deceptus Joachim credens omnia vocabula circa istam materiam esse eiusdem ponderis; sed quia verbum notionale semper est aliiquis ordinis, ideo nunquam dicitur de essentia, quae significat quid absolutum ab omni ordine in ratione dicendi, sed de aliis.’


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equipment necessary for a correct understanding of the *Sentences*. In this sense, Joachim is portrayed very much as an misguided outsider, someone totally unqualified to make an accurate assessment of a work such as the *Sentences*.

There is a greater sense of exasperation in the commentary of another influential Franciscan theologian, Bonaventure (d. 1274). His discussion is again found in his commentary on Distinction V of the *Sentences*. At the beginning of his discussion Bonaventure highlights the familiar but important distinction between concrete and abstract essential terms which corresponds to Distinctions IV and V of the *Sentences*. Thus ‘*deus*’ is a concrete essential term and ‘*essentia*’ an abstract essential term.

When he comes to consider Joachim’s objection Bonaventure, like William of Auxerre, notes that Joachim attacked both the opinion and the argument of the Lombard. Joachim first attacks the Lombard’s opinion that the divine essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding because this is tantamount to saying that the essence is a fourth thing in addition to the three Persons. Bonaventure’s analysis here is consistent with the judgement delivered by the Fourth Lateran Council, which he mentions by name, insofar as he recounts Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity. But, following his predecessors, he neglects to mention Joachim’s hostility to the idea of a *quaedam summa res*, the issue which was most fully developed by the Council.

Bonaventure’s version of Joachim’s objection to the Lombard’s *reasoning* belongs without question to the tradition of commentaries on the dispute inaugurated by William of Auxerre. Thus Joachim is made to argue, addressing the Lombard by name, that if the consequence of ‘essence begot essence’, where the essence is one

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36 *Comm. in Sent.*, p.110: ‘In praecedenti distinctione movit Magister questionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentiale concretum, qualis est hic nomen "Deus". In presenti movet questionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentiale abstractum, qui est "essentia."’


thing, is that something begot itself, the same should follow for ‘God begot God’. For the same conditions apply in each case, i.e. something begot something, and therefore the same consequences should also follow on, i.e. that the same thing begot itself. As much as ‘essence begot essence’ implies ‘essence begot itself’, so ‘God begot God’ should imply ‘God begot himself’. 

According to Bonaventure, therefore, the principal target of Joachim’s objection is the Lombard’s doctrine of Quaternity, but this accusation in turn is really due to Joachim’s opposition to the Lombard’s view that the essence does not beget, not his concept of a quaedam summa res. If the essence does not beget it is something in addition to the three Persons, i.e. a fourth thing. This is the accusation of Quaternity found in the Lateran decree. But Joachim also supposedly challenges the Lombard’s reasoning on the crucial argument ‘God begot God’ but not ‘essence begot essence’, the subject of lengthy discussions in the schools throughout the twelfth century, but not of the Lateran decree as such. Again, therefore, Joachim’s opposition to the Lombard is being assimilated into the language and concerns of this academic debate, his argument being adapted accordingly. At the same time, Bonaventure also implies that Joachim thought the Lombard’s opinion’s led to Quaternity precisely because he (Joachim) is of the view that the essence does indeed beget.

Bonaventure attempts to make sense of Joachim’s attack. On one level, he attributes it to Joachim’s deficient reasoning which led him to misunderstand Peter Lombard’s use of the term ‘res’, an implicit reference to the controversial quaedam summa res. For ‘res’ is not univocal; it can mean both hypostasis (Person) and the divine nature. In other words, there is a res generans (the Father), a res genita (the Son) and a res procedens (the Holy Spirit), but the res which neither begets nor is begotten nor proceeds (the divine nature) is not therefore a thing distinct from the three Persons and to be added to them since it is the common nature held by all three and not something separate from them. What is ironic about this is that this is also

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40Ibid., p.121: ‘Dicendum, quod loachim non recte arguit, et deficit sua ratio, quia “res” non accipitur uniformiter, quia cum dicitur “res” primo modo, ibi accipitur “res” pro re naturae; sed cum dicitur secundo modo, accipitur pro ipsa natura divina.’
Joachim’s view: the divine nature is not distinct from the three Persons, it is not a fourth thing. This raises the question of whether indeed, as has been suggested, the real difference of opinion between Joachim and Peter Lombard came down to nothing more than different understandings of the term res.\textsuperscript{41}

But Bonaventure accuses Joachim not only of misunderstanding the Lombard’s use of the term ‘res’, but also of generally lacking sufficient reasoning powers. The fact that ‘begetting’ is predicated of one thing (the Father) but not of another (the divine essence) does not mean to say that consequently there must be a numerical distinction between the Father and the divine essence. This is a point about predication which goes back to Abelard but which really takes root in the Glossa on the Sentences.\textsuperscript{42} Bonaventure exposes the absurdities of this position through the same technique as the author of the Glossa, by showing how if the same reasoning were applied elsewhere, unacceptable conclusions would ensue: Peter is an individual thing, man is not an individual thing; therefore Peter and man are two things. Possessing or not possessing a property, therefore, does not amount to a distinction of number (i.e. of substance) between two such things.\textsuperscript{43}

As for Joachim’s counter-argument \textit{(instantia)}, again it is not correctly thought out. The word ‘essence’ differs from the word ‘God’ precisely in standing for and signifying the same thing; it never stands for Person, but only for the divine nature, whilst ‘God’ can stand for many things.\textsuperscript{44}

For this reason Joachim ignorantly censured the Master and because, being simple, he did not revere the Master, therefore by the just judgement of God his book was condemned at the Lateran Council and the position of the Master approved.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{42}Appendix A.2-3.


\textsuperscript{44}Comm. in Sent., p.121: ‘Ad instantiam, eitis dicendum, quod non recte instat; quia essentia est res una quantum ad suppositum et significatum; non enim supponit personam; sed Deus est res una quantum ad significatum, sed plures quantum ad suppositum.’

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., p.121: ‘Et ideo ignoranter Joachim reprehendit Magistrum, et quia, cum esset simplex, non est reveritus Magistrum, ideo iusto Dei iudicio damnatus fuit libellus eius in Lateranensi Concilio, et positio Magistri approbata.’
Bonaventure is still following the actual text of the decree to some extent. In some Franciscan authors, however, Joachim's original accusation of Quaternity has become entirely divorced from the conciliar condemnation. In Odo Rigaldi's (d. 1275) commentary on the Sentences one of the unattributed arguments against the Lombard is in fact none other than Joachim's accusation of Quaternity. Joachim himself is mentioned as the perpetrator of the objection that essence begot essence does not mean something begot itself since the same does not apply to God begot God. But it is almost as if Joachim's personal reputation and orthodoxy is no longer of any interest. Odo does not mention the Council; his main interest is in grappling with issues which still had the capacity to raise a number of extremely complex questions.

The first Dominican master of theology at Paris, Roland of Cremona (d. 1259), also commented upon the dispute between Joachim and Peter Lombard during the course of his Summa (written before 1234). Roland's source for Joachim's opposition to the Lombard seems to be William of Auxerre, and the scholastic tradition to which both belonged, rather than the decree itself. This usage is consistent with Roland's extensive dependence on William's Summa Aurea. Roland himself never refers to the Lateran decree and it is not inconceivable that the conciliar text was not among the sources of his exposition.

Roland begins his discussion of the question with the argument attributed to

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46BN lat. 14910, fol.16vb (cited in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, p.50 note 13): 'Essentia est res, constat non generat. Ergo est res non generans eadem ratione nec genita nec procedens. Ergo aliqua ibi sive in Trinitate, quae nec est generans nec genita nec procedens. Ergo aliqua res est ibi, quae nec est Pater nec Filius nec Spiritus Sanctus. Ergo ibi est quaternitas'. On Odo, see Hamelin. L'cole franciscaine, pp.18-22; Glorieux, Répertoire II, pp.31-3.

47Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, p.52 n.13: 'Item Magister opponit sic: si divina essentia essentiam genuit, cum non sit nisi una essentia, idem genuit se. Sed contra eum arguit Iochim sic: si deus genuit deum et non est nisi unus deus, ergo idem genuit se, quod falsum est. Ergo argumentum non sequitur. Ergo similiter nec tertium. Ad hoc dicendum, quod non est simile, quia hoc, quod dico "essentia", dicit essentiam per modum essentiae, quae simpliciter intelligibilis est, prout sic significatur. "Deus" autem dicit essentiam sive formam ut in habente. Plures autem sunt habentia divinam essentiam et ideo hoc, quod dico "deus", licet non multiplicetur in forma, tamen multiplicatur in et ideo pro diversis suppositis posset supponere hoc, quod dico "deus", a parte suppositi et a parte appositi'.

48On Roland. see E. Filthaut, Roland von Cremona O.P. und die Anfänge der Scholastik im Predigerorden (Vechta i. O., 1936). Filthaut argues that MS. Paris Mazarine 795 is not a collection of quaestiones, but a summa (pp.38-9).


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Joachim by William of Auxerre. His tone is very detached. He recounts three arguments supposedly used by Joachim and even adduces a fourth on his behalf, remarking that Peter Lombard did not provide strong enough arguments in defence of his position.

Roland’s pupil, Hugh of Saint-Cher (d. 1263), who completed his commentary on the *Sentences* in the early 1230s, takes a similar line. He takes his cue from William of Auxerre, but also mentions the importance of the Lombard’s *quaedam summa res* to Joachim’s opposition. For Hugh indeed, the concept of a *summa res* is interchangeable with the concept of something being unique. The point of Joachim’s objection as formulated by William of Auxerre was that if the essence cannot beget because it is unique, the same should follow for God since he is unique. Hugh produces a variation on this, replacing uniqueness of something with the concept of the *summa res*: if essence does not beget essence because it is a *summa res*, it follows that God does not beget God because God is also a *summa res*. Despite this slight variation, the thrust of Hugh’s exposition, that the word ‘God’ can stand for several things, but that ‘essence’ can only stand for one, the essence, goes back to William of Auxerre.

In his *Summa theologiae*, Albert the Great (d. 1280) follows much the same path as his predecessors by treating Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard as an
expression of his opposition to the view that the essence does not beget. Albert’s point of departure is the Lombard’s discussion in Distinction V of the Sentences, supplemented by an extensive reading of Aristotelian natural philosophy. The divine nature cannot beget because it is ‘indistinct’ (indistincta) and common to the three Persons, whereas the begetter and the begotten are distinct through their relation to one another. The point is that something which begets must be discrete, not abstract. Again, a nature, i.e. the nature common to several things, by definition subsists not in itself but through an individual and thus does not fit in with the singular mode of existence proper to something which begets or is begotten.

Albert proceeds to list a number of objections, based on both authority (all from the Sentences) and reason, to the view that the essence does not beget. The penultimate objection (no.10) is identical with that attributed by Alexander of Hales to Joachim, i.e. that if there is a thing which is neither begetting nor begotten, there will be four things in the Trinity. But the argument which Albert himself attributes to Joachim is taken from William of Auxerre.

The reaction of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) to Joachim’s condemnation has received considerably more attention than that of his predecessors. McGinn describes

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56 Ibid., p.231.48-51: ‘Adhuc, omne generans et generatum in divinis distinctum est relatione originis; natura penitus indistincta est, sed semper tribus communis; natura ergo nullo modo generat nec generatur.’
57 Ibid., p.231.54-9: ‘natura numquam est existens per se solum, sed semper in communicacione alterius acceptum et ab illo nec divisum nec separatum, ut existentiae singularis modum habere possit; ergo impossibile est essentiam divinam sive naturam vel generare vel generari’.
58 Ibid., p.232.
Aquinas' attitude to Joachim as 'by far the most consistently hostile.' This hostility was at least partly conditioned by the condemnation of Gerard of Borgo San Donino's *Introductorius in Evangelium Aeternum* in 1255 at a time when Aquinas was studying at Paris for his master's degree. Aquinas' criticism of Joachim's trinitarian doctrine must accordingly be seen in the context of his whole-hearted rejection of Joachim's entire philosophical system, particularly Joachim's theology of history and approach to biblical exegesis. The implication of all this is that Aquinas' critique was simply part of his general antipathy to the kind of extremism which he associated with Joachim and his followers. Without denying this more general feature of Aquinas' criticism, we must at the same time take into account the important role which the tradition of thirteenth-century commentaries on the Lateran decree play in Aquinas' interpretation of Joachim's condemned trinitarian views. It would be wrong to assume that Aquinas' understanding of Joachim's condemnation belongs to only one strand of thirteenth-century thought, hostility to eschatological movements, and not to others, in this case the academic debate on the Trinity which had its roots in the early twelfth century.

In his *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas considers Joachim's views as part of a general section concerned with the controversial question of the relation between essence and Person in God. His discussion in Articles 4 and 5 is very similar to Bonaventure's in his commentary on the Lombard's *Sentences* and belongs in general to the tradition of commentaries and *summae*. In Article 4, he asks whether concrete essential nouns, such as 'God', can have Person as their supposition. The main illustration of this problem is again the proposition 'God begot God' and the objections which he lists against 'God begot God' being true also correspond to those


[62] Ibid.


[65] *Summa* 1a.39.4, p.311.
which were standard by the last quarter of the twelfth century. Thus, since God is a
singular term and singular terms, according to the logicians' dictum cited by Aquinas,
both signify and stand for the same thing (terminus singularis idem significat et
supponit), it follows that 'deus' must stand for whatever it signifies, i.e. essence.66
It would seem, therefore, that 'God begot God', is untenable by virtue of its
consequence, that is, 'essence begot essence'.

However, the credal statement 'God from God', which Aquinas clearly takes
as synonymous with the statement 'God begot God', stands in the face of all
objections. Aquinas explains that the properties of language itself require that we
consider not just the reality signified (res significata), but also the mode of
signifying.67 For just as 'man' signifies humanity subsisting in some individual, so
'God' signifies something which has the divine essence (i.e. something distinct, like
an individual man) and thus, according to this mode of signifying, 'God' properly
stands for Person.68 Thus 'God' can stand for either essence or Person depending on
the context, i.e. depending on how its particular signification may restrict its
supposition.69

In Article 5 Aquinas considers the question, during the course of which he
deals with Joachim's opposition, of whether abstract essential names, such as essence,
can stand for Person.70 Earlier on in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas had accepted
the Boethian definition of Person as an individual substance of rational nature and had
placed particular stress on the individuality of Person as a hypostasis or first
substance.71 Now he is asking whether an abstract term (essence) can stand for a

66 *ibid.*: 'Quia, ut sophistae dicunt, "terminus singularis idem significat et supponit". Sed hoc nomen "deus"
videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter praedicari non possit, ut dictum est. Ergo cum significet essentiam,
videtur quod supponat pro essentia et non pro persona.'

67 *ibid.*: 'Sed in proprietatibus locutionum non tantum attendenda est res significata, sed etiam modus
significandi.'

68 *ibid.*: 'Et ideo quia hoc nomen "deus" significat divinam essentiam ut in habente ipsam, sicut hoc nomen
"homo" humanitatem significat in suppositio, aliis melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen "deus" ex modo significandi
habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona, sicut hoc nomen "homo."'

69 *ibid.*: 'Quandoque ergo hoc nomen "deus" supponit pro essentia, ut cum dicitur, "deus creat", quia hoc
praedicatum competit subiecto ratione formae significatae, quae est deitas. Quandoque vero supponit pro persona'.

70 *Summa* 1a.39.5, pp.313-15. Articles 4 and 5 correspond to Distinctions 4 and 5 of the Lombard's *Sentences.*

concrete one (Person). Again the main proposition considered in this section concerns
divine generation, this time whether ‘essence begot essence’ is true. The problem is
that just as the Nicene creed had provided the authoritative statement ‘God from God’,
which was taken to be identical with ‘God begot God’, so Augustine states ‘essence
from essence’, which similarly, therefore, should be equivalent in meaning to ‘essence
begot essence’. Further, since God and his essence are identical, for reasons of
consistency and of preserving divine simplicity, if ‘God begets God’, it should follow
that ‘essence begets essence’. Other arguments function on the same principle that
for divine simplicity to be preserved it must follow that if God begets, so does the
essence.

Aquinas’ counter-argument repeats the Augustinian principle, which had come
to occupy such a central place in the Sentences, that the essence cannot conceivably
beget since no thing begets itself. The introduction of this argument is Joachim’s cue
in the scenario that Thomas presents:

We answer that the Abbot Joachim fell into error on this point. He argued that, just as we say ‘God
begot God’, so we can say that ‘essence begot essence’. He reasoned that, on the basis of divine
simplicity, it cannot be the case that God is anything other than the divine essence. But in this respect
he was deceived, because in order to take account of the true meaning of language, we must consider
not only the thing signified, but also the mode of signifying, as has already been stated. Although God
and the divinity are identical in terms of the thing signified, their mode of signifying is not identical.
For the noun ‘God’, since it signifies one who possesses the divine essence, naturally stands for Person
by virtue of its mode of signification. Therefore, those things which are proper to the Persons can be
predicated of the noun ‘God’, such that we may say ‘God is begotten or begetting’, as has been stated.
But the noun ‘essence’, since it signifies the essence as abstract form, does not possess from its mode
of signification that which would allow it to stand for Person. And for that reason, those things which
are proper to the Persons and by which they are distinct from one another, cannot be attributed to the
essence. For if the essence were thus signified as having these properties, there would be distinction
in the divine essence, just as there is distinction in the things for which God supposits, that is, the
Persons.72

In its essentials, Aquinas’ explanation follows that of his predecessors, even repeating
such motifs as sed in hoc deceptus fuit.74 In general, therefore, the theologians who
discuss Joachim’s attack on Peter Lombard in Sentence commentaries or theological

generat deum”. sicut dictum est. Ergo haec est vera, “essentia generat essentiam.”’

73Ibid., pp.313-14.

74Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p.425: ‘Fuit autem deceptus Joachim’; Hugh of Saint-Cher, Commentarius,
BN lat. 3037, fol.10rb: ‘ille deceptus fuit’.

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summae tend to emphasise the issue of the generation of the essence, often, though not always, to the exclusion of the main points mentioned in the decree. It could be argued that the immediate context, namely Peter Lombard’s own discussion of the problem in Distinction V, was bound to affect their understanding of Joachim’s opposition in the way that it did. But Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity would have served just as effectively as a counter-argument to the Lombard’s quaedam summa res, not to mention being faithful both to Joachim and to the decree. What made the argument actually attributed to Joachim, that the essence does indeed beget, decidedly more attractive to theologians was that in this way the condemnation could be added as yet another episode in the on-going saga of the signification and use of the terms ‘deus’ and ‘essentia’. The Lateran decree seemed to provide the first known case of anyone actually putting forward the view that the essence begot.

2. The Commentary of Thomas Aquinas on the Lateran decree

Aquinas’ most detailed discussion of Joachim’s trinitarian theology is to be found in his Expositio super secundum decretalem. The Expositio is quite unique within the tradition of thirteenth-century scholastic interpretations of the Lateran decree in that it is, first and foremost, a fully comprehensive textual commentary, rather than an appropriation of the dispute for the purposes of another argument. By closely following the order and contents of the decree, the Expositio differs from all other scholastic interpretations by eschewing their highly selective criteria. But although the issue of the generation of the essence plays nowhere near the dominant role in the Expositio as it does in other writings, including for that matter Aquinas’ own, there is no doubt that it still enters into Aquinas’ assessment at very significant junctures.

Aquinas begins by placing Joachim’s doctrine, as revealed in his attack on Peter Lombard, in direct contradistinction to the catholic doctrine on the Trinity as expounded in the first decree of the Fourth Lateran Council. In the first decree the

doctrine of the Trinity is put clearly and succinctly, thus creating a frame of reference for the dispute between Joachim and Peter Lombard. Certainly, this is how Aquinas uses it for his present purposes, ‘so that the intention of each might be seen more fully, what is stated in the preceding should be understood’. The first decree established the Trinity as undivided according to the common essence and distinct according to the personal properties. Aquinas places considerable stress on the fact that the Persons are distinct only through these properties; that these properties are the very cause of any distinction in God.

It is this principle of the first decree that what is common cannot be distinct and vice versa which Aquinas takes as the foundation of trinitarian orthodoxy. Immediately carrying on from this, he makes the following assertion about the impossibility of the self-generation of the essence: ‘if therefore the divine essence begets or proceeds, it follows that just as the Father is one Person, the Son another and the Holy Spirit yet another, so too would their own essence or substance be still yet another.’ The decree does not itself say that if the essence begot it would, like the Persons, be distinct; it merely reiterates the Lombard’s position that the essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, because there are distinctions in the Persons and unity in the nature.

Aquinas, on the other hand, uses this principle to eliminate the generation of the essence right from the beginning. He places Joachim with Arius, presumably on the grounds that both in different ways deny the consubstantiality of the Persons established at Nicea. Peter Lombard, on the

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78 Expositio 1187, p.428: ‘persona Patris non distinguitur a persona Filii nisi paternitate, et Filius distinguitur a Patre filiatione, inquantum scilicet Pater genuit Filium et Filius genitus est a Patre; et similiter Spiritus sanctus distinguitur a Patre et Filiro, inquantum procedit ab utroque. Persona igitur in divinis distinguitur, inquantum persona generat, vel generatur, vel procedit.’ Cf. canon 1, Conciliorum, p.230.5-8: ‘Pater a nullo, Filius autem a solo Patre ac Spiritus sanctus ab utroque pariter, absque initio semper et fine. Pater generans, Filius nascens et Spiritus sanctus procedens’.

79 Expositio 1188, p.428: ‘Si ergo essentia divina generat vel procedit, consequens est quod sicut est alia persona Patris, alia Filiro, alia Spiritus sancti, ita etiam sit eorum alia et alia substantia vel essentia.’

80 Conciliorum, p.232.11-14: ‘et illa res non est generans neque genita nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, Filius qui gignitur et Spiritus sanctus qui procedit, ut distinctiones in personis et unitas in natura.’

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other hand, upheld the Nicene creed by teaching that one essence is common to Father, Son and Holy Spirit and does not beget etc., but is utterly 'indistinct' (indistincta).  

Aquinas thus identifies the consubstantiality of Nicea with the *quaedam summa res* of Peter Lombard and the Fourth Lateran Council. He firstly attributes Joachim's attack on the Lombard to his lack of training in dogmatic theology (*utpote in subtilibus fidei dogmatibus rudis*). Accordingly, Joachim's inability to understand the Lombard's statement (*non bene capiens verba*) led him to his accusation of Quaternity since he thought the Lombard had made the common essence a fourth thing distinct from the three Persons. In particular, Joachim thought that the statement, 'the divine essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding' distinguished the essence from the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, and his view that in God there was no *alia res una* which was Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In other words, Joachim's accusation of Quaternity stems both from his opposition to the Lombard's position on the generation of the essence and to his *quaedam summa res*. The emphasis here is subtly different from that found in the Lateran decree. True, Aquinas is merely reformulating the principle established in the first decree and repeated in the second, that there are distinctions in the Persons and unity in the essence, to cover the issue of the generation of the essence. For if something begets, it is distinct; therefore, if the essence begets, it is distinct; but the essence is common, therefore it cannot beget. This is really the first gloss which Aquinas places on the text, i.e. the first consequence of this principle is that the essence is non-begetting. It is almost as if the principle laid down in the first decree were being used to resolve the dispute in the second. Further, he attributes Joachim's opposition first to the Lombard's denial that the essence begets, and only latterly to his concept of the essence as a *quaedam summa res*. The issues are almost impossible to separate in the  

81*Expositio* 1188, p.428: 'Quod magister Petrus sequens docuit quod una est essentia vel substantia communis Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, quae nec generat, nec generatur, ut sit penitus indistincta, ut patet in V distinctione I Sententiarum eius.'

82*Expositio* 1189, p.428: 'Credebat enim, quod ex hoc ipso quod dicitur: Essentia divina nec est generans nec genita, nec procedens, distinguatur a Patre qui generat et a Filio qui generatur et a Spiritu sancto qui procedit. Et ideo ipse Ioachim protestatur quod in divinis non est aliqua res una quae sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus.'
decree itself; nevertheless, the stress there is definitely on the quaedam summa res rather than on the essence as non-begetting. With Aquinas, this order is reversed.

The next line in the decree had reported Joachim’s denial that there was any res which was the three Persons, although he conceded that Father, Son and Holy Spirit were one essence. Aquinas, however, renders Joachim’s position much more strictly in logical terms, translating it into an identifiable logico-semantic position:

But so that he did not seem to diverge totally from the Nicene faith, he conceded that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one essence, one substance, one nature, as though the one essence could be predicated of the three Persons, so that we can say ‘three Persons are one essence’, but not the converse, so that it could be said, ‘one essence is three Persons’.

This constitutes a significant expansion upon the original text condemning Joachim’s view. Aquinas has drawn out in clear-cut terms what he sees as the absurdity of Joachim’s position (non habebat sanum intellectum). But more than that, Aquinas’ representation of Joachim’s position is exactly comparable to one of the accusations against Gilbert of Poitiers, that we could say ‘three Persons are one essence’, but not that ‘one essence is three Persons’. In particular, Aquinas’ interpretation of Joachim’s position as recounted by the Lateran decree resembles Peter Lombard’s description of Gilbert’s view in the Sentences, of which Aquinas would certainly have been aware. In his account, therefore, there is an unstated link between the discredited views of Gilbert and Joachim which may be implicit in the decree even if it was unintentional. It is certainly quite reasonable for Aquinas to have drawn the inference which he did from the decree since anyone with any acquaintance with the importance of predication for the meaning of propositions would have understood the Council’s distinction in precisely the same way.

The consequence of Joachim’s view, that ‘essence’ is not the subject of the three Persons in a theological proposition, is that the unity of the divine essence is

83 Conciliorum 2, p.231.14-17: ‘manifeste protestans, quod nulla res est quae sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, nec est essentia nec substantia nec natura, quamvis concedat quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt una essentia, una substantia, unaque natura’.

84 Expositio 1189, p.428: ‘Sed ne videretur totaliter a fide Nicaenae Synodi recedere, concedebat quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt una essentia, una substantia, una natura, quasi una essentia possit praedicari de tribus personis, ut dicamus: Tres personae sunt una essentia, non autem e converso, ut dicatur: Una essentia est tres personae.’

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reduced from something true, real and simple to a unity of collection and similitude.\textsuperscript{55} Aquinas' point is that it is simply not enough for Joachim to have conceded that the three Persons are one essence. To ensure true and proper unity of essence, he would have to admit the essence as the subject as well as the predicate of the proposition. Again, this is faithful to the decree, although rephrased in slightly more technical language. From a discussion in the \textit{Summa theologiae} on the apparent impropriety of defining \textit{trinitas} as a collective noun, it is clear that Aquinas, like the Council, understands unity of collection to be a much inferior kind of unity to unity of essence.\textsuperscript{86} He even cites '\textit{populus}' as an example of a collective noun signifying a multitude of men united by some kind of associative bond. This is the kind of unity meant by unity of collection. It is not appropriate to God where there is only unity of essence.\textsuperscript{87} Here in the \textit{Expositio}. Aquinas reproduces the analogies of collection allegedly used by Joachim.\textsuperscript{88}

By denying that the divine essence is non-begetting etc., and that it is not the three Persons, Joachim is saying that the unity of the Trinity is nothing more than the unity of the three Persons and there is nothing other than the three Persons. In the next section, Aquinas introduces a new element which is not in the Lateran account, when he compares the use of scriptural texts as analogies for divine unity by both Joachim and the Arians.\textsuperscript{89} Singled out for particular discussion are Jn 17, 22-23 and I Jn 5, 7-8, both of which were used by the Arians - according to Hilary of Poitiers - as well as by Joachim.\textsuperscript{90} Both Joachim and the Arians allegedly use Jn 17, 22-23 to show that divine unity is not an essential unity in the sense of '\textit{aliaqu a res}', an actual thing.

\textsuperscript{55}Expositio 1190, p.428: 'Sed in hoc ipso quod concedebat tres personas esse unam essentiam vel substantiam vel naturam, non habebat sanum intellectum. Non enim ponebat unitatem essentiae trium personarum esse veram, realem et simplicem, sed quasi simulitudinariam et collectivam'.

\textsuperscript{86}Summa 1a.31.1, p.263: 'hoc nomen "trinitas" videtur esse collectivum, cum significet multitidinem. Tale autem nomen non convenit in divinis, cum unitas importata per nomen collectivum sit minima unitas; in divinis autem est maxima unitas. Ergo hoc nomen "trinitas" non convenit in divinis.'

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid: 'nomen collectivum duo importat, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum et unitatem quandam, scilicet ordinis aliquis; "populus" enim est multitudino hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum. Quantum ergo ad primum hoc nomen "trinitas" convenit cum nominibus collectivis; sed quantum ad secundum differt quia in divina trinitate non solum est unitas ordinis, sed cum hoc etiam unitas essentiae.'

\textsuperscript{56}Expositio 1190, p.428.

\textsuperscript{88}Expositio 1191, p.429.

\textsuperscript{89}For their use by the Arians, see Hilary of Poitiers trin. VIII.11-13, CCSL 62A, pp.322-6. PL 10.243-6.
that a unity achieved through consent and will, just as the unity of the faithful is a unity resulting from mutual love and charity. Aquinas does grant, however, albeit somewhat grudgingly, that Joachim was unwittingly, rather than obstinately, led into the Arian heresy since he submitted his works for papal approval. On balance his reading of Joachim’s concept of divine unity follows the decree apart from this section on Joachim’s affinity with Arianism.

In order to clarify the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, the Lateran Council, according to the interpretation of Aquinas, established five points (Aquinas actually lists six). The first two are particularly interesting for the use they make of ideas about universals and how these impinged on trinitarian doctrine. Firstly, the Council affirms the doctrine taught by Peter Lombard, namely that the divine essence is a certain supreme reality (quaedam summa res) of which the three Persons are predicated both together and individually. Aquinas is here concerned to emphasize the essential unity peculiar to God in contrast to all other forms of existence. In man, for example, the essence of the individual man Peter is not Peter, since he is composed of many different things. In God, however, the essence of the Father is the Father himself.

Secondly, the Council reaffirmed that in God there is only Trinity, not Quaternity and also explained why Joachim’s objection to Peter Lombard was invalid. The Council dealt with Joachim’s objection by showing that only if the essence were distinct, rather than common, could it be numbered as a fourth thing in addition to the three Persons. Aquinas also says that nothing can be numbered with other things.

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91Expositio 1191, pp.429-30: ‘Arianis utebantur illa auctoritate illa auctoritate, ut sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sunt, ad ostendendum quod Pater et Filius non sunt unum nisi secundum consensum amoris [...] Unde manifestum est quod Joachim in erroretim Arrianortim incidit.’


93Expositio 1192, p.429: ‘Quod quidem in nobis non accidit: non enim essentia Petri est Petrus: sed essentia Dei Patris est ipse Pater: quia Petrus est ex multis compositus, non autem persona Patris, neque persona Fili, nec persona Spiritus sancti.’

94Conciliorum 2. p.232.8-11: ‘ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo non quaternitas, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia sive natura divina, quae sola est universonum principium, praeter quod aliud inventiri non potest’.

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unless it is distinct from them (*nihil connumeratur aliis nisi quod ab eis distinguatur*). He uses an extremely revealing analogy between different species of animal to make this same point:

since animal is not distinct from man, horse and cow, each of which is a type of animal, for that very reason we cannot say that man, horse, cow and animal are four things, but three only, because each one of them is an animal. Thus, because each of the three Persons is that *res*, namely the divine essence or nature, it cannot be said that the three Persons together with that *res* are four, since that *res* is not distinct from the three Persons.95

And so as to prove even further that Peter Lombard had not introduced a fourth thing, the Council reaffirmed his view that the essence is neither begetting, begotten nor proceeding:

But because Joachim believed that it would follow from the Master’s statements that the essence was distinct in three Persons, for that reason when it says thirdly: ‘and that *res* is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding’, it shows that this does not follow.96

That is, just because the divine essence is non-begetting, it does not follow from this that it is therefore distinct in the three Persons, i.e. that the three Persons are really three separate essences. And yet, the divine essence is still the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten and the Holy Spirit who proceeds. The distinctions introduced by the adjectives *generans*, *genitus* and *procedens* determine the Persons only, not the essence.97 Thus Joachim’s argument against the Lombard does not follow: the essence is non-begetting, but the Father is begetting, therefore the essence is not the Father.98 This is not an argument found in the decree nor could it be said to be implicit there. Rather Aquinas is drawing out the logical premise of Joachim’s view

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95*Expositio* 1193, p.429: ‘Unde cum animal non distinguatur ab homine, equo et bove, quorum quodlibet est animal, ideo non possimus dicere quod homo et equus et bos et animal sunt quatuor, sed sunt tria tantum, quia quodlibet illorum est animal. Ita, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, scilicet divina essentia vel natura, non potest dici, quod tres personae et illa res sunt quatuor, quia illa res non est aliquid alius a tribus personis.’


97*Expositio* 1194, p.430: ‘distinctiones importatae per haec tria adiectiva, generans, genitus et procedens, determinent ipsas personas, de quibus praedicantur praedicta adiectiva, non autem essentiam vel naturam quae non distinguitur.’

98*Expositio* 1194, p.430: ‘Non ergo sequitur quod loachim putabat: Essentia non est generans; Pater est generans; ergo essentia non est Pater’.
in terms of the familiar argument that if the essence and the Father are identical, and if the Father begets, so too must the essence. But again, Aquinas reiterates, even though the essence does not beget, nevertheless, the essence is the Father who begets. 99

The fourth point established by the Council, according to Aquinas, is that correct theological language has a role to play in securing orthodoxy. For in the divinity the masculine gender must be used to refer to distinction (alius) and the neuter to the common nature (idem). Aquinas' commentary constitutes a significant expansion on the originally brief point made in the decree that although the Father is alius, the Son is alius and the Holy Spirit is alius, they are not aliud. 100 The point is important because it expresses the necessity that language must conform to faith and that correct linguistic usage is a guarantee of orthodoxy. Therefore, because the essence is indistinct and the Persons are distinct, words signifying distinction are used in the masculine, and words signifying unity of essence in the neuter. 101

The penultimate section reiterates the Council's position on the Father's generation of the Son as not entailing a division of essence. 102 Finally Aquinas, again closely following and citing from the text of the decree, rebukes Joachim for his misunderstanding of Jn 17, 22. 103 Essentially he makes the same criticism of Joachim as the Council, alleging that Joachim has drawn an absolute parallel between divine unity and the unity of the faithful in one Church, as if there were no difference in the kind of unity in question in each case. 104 Joachim's interpretation of these passages goes beyond any acceptable degree of similitude between God and

99 Expositio 1194, p.430: 'quia etsi essentia non generet, est tamen ille qui generat, id est Pater.'

100 Expositio 1195, p.430, citing Conciliorum 2. p.232.14-15: 'Licet igitur alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus, non tamen aliud'.

101 Expositio 1195, p.430: 'in divinis masculinum genus refertur ad personam, neutrum autem genus refertur ad essentiam vel naturam'.

102 Expositio 1196-7, p.430.

103 Expositio 1198, p.431.

104 Expositio 1198, p.431: 'sic inducebat Joachim ac si eodem modo accipiendum esset hoc quod dicitur unum, in nobis et in divinis personis.'
creation.  

Perhaps the most striking feature of the *Expositio* is how much it differs from the *Summa theologiae*. In these two works, Aquinas offers two quite different interpretations of the Lateran decree. In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas, like his predecessors, couches Joachim’s objection in terms of the essence begot essence debate. But the *Expositio* shows that he was intellectually capable of giving due regard to the main issues as discussed in the decree.

It is of course possible that the issues raised in the *Expositio* had receded from his mind when he wrote the *Summa*. The discrepancy between the two works can also at least be partly explained by their different objectives, one to provide a literal commentary of Church doctrine, the other to give a systematic treatment of a range of theological issues in a technical language. But without underestimating the very different emphases of the two works, I would suggest that there is also a significant element of consistency between them. In the *Expositio*, Aquinas cannot fail to mention the error of Quaternity, as he does in the *Summa*. And yet given that it is a literal commentary, there is still a surprising amount of attention given over to the issue of the generation of the essence. Aquinas does not state explicitly that Joachim thought the essence did beget, but he proceeds as though this was one of the presuppositions of Joachim’s accusation of Quaternity. That is why Aquinas spends so much time spelling out the principle laid down in the first decree, that what is common cannot beget. For this destroys the entire premise of Joachim’s argument, that the essence must be something fourth if it is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding. The element of invention is undoubtedly much stronger in the *Summa* due to the influence of previous commentaries, but in the *Expositio* there is already a discernible predisposition to the later interpretation.

3. **Renewed controversy: Peter Olivi (d. 1298)**

One final episode in thirteenth-century interpretations of the Lateran decree is the extraordinary flurry of polemical activity surrounding Peter Olivi’s position on the

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105 *Expositio* 1198, p.431: ‘Non tamen est idem modus perfectionis humanae et divinae, quia non potest esse tanta similitudo inter creatorem et creaturam, quin maius inveniatur ibi dissimilitudo’.
question of the generation of the essence. What is so remarkable about this late thirteenth-century discussion is that both Olivi and his opponents regard the Fourth Lateran Council decree on the Trinity as the main obstacle to Olivi’s view that the essence, in some sense, does beget. Olivi’s efforts are aimed at showing that there is no real disagreement between his view and that of the Council, whilst his opponents cite the decree as the definitive statement on the non-generation of the essence. Also relevant from the point of view of the formation of an enforceable consensus among theologians is the way in which masters of theology within the Franciscan Order appoint themselves as the arbiters of orthodoxy without, as Olivi himself complains, the backing of papal authority.

Like many of his Franciscan colleagues, Olivi studied at Paris in the 1260s, before teaching in southern France, probably at Montpellier, in the late 1270s. It seems that some of his views on the Immaculate Conception came under suspicion at this time, but it was not until 1283 that the Minister General of the Franciscan Order, Bonagratia of San Giovanni in Persiceto ordered an investigation of a number of issues. This commission, which consisted of four masters and three bachelors of theology, all Franciscans at the University of Paris, censured several of the opinions imputed to Olivi. They issued their judgement in the form of a rotulus, a no longer extant series of excerpts from Olivi’s writings, along with a definition of the orthodox position on these questions, known as the Littera septem sigillorum, so-called from the seals of the seven authorising theologians.

One of the principal areas of Olivi’s theology thrown into doubt by the Order’s theologians concerned the divine essence. The seven, named at the beginning of the


107 On the events of 1283-85, the period of the first investigation into Olivi’s teachings, see Burr, Persecution of Peter Olivi, pp.35-44.

affirmed (1) 'that the divine essence is one in three supposita, in no way divided into three parts, or repeated, unfolded, repeatedly posited, or multiplied; and we state and affirm the opposite view to be incorrect'; and (2) 'that in the divinity there is no place for a producing and a produced essence; and the opposite view is incorrect'.

It can be seen from the fact that the issue of the generation of the essence follows immediately upon the issue of the unity of essence that the two questions were regarded as interconnected. Olivi’s view of the essence as replicata in the three Persons is taken to account for his view that the essence is begetting and begotten. One of the official investigators drew such a link, as did Giles of Rome (d. 1316) in his systematic *Impugnatio* of Olivi’s errors.

That year, 1283, Olivi was summoned by the Minister General to Avignon where he was forced to submit to the articles of the *Littera*, including those on the generation or production of the essence, as if, he complains, ‘everything there was satisfactory and was the pure faith or authentic definition of the Roman Pontiff or a general Council’. Indeed, one of Olivi’s chief grievances concerning his treatment was the fact that the commission had no ecclesiastical authority with which to judge these matters, having the support neither of Scripture, pope, nor general council.

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109Droco, minister of France; John of Wales; Simon of Lens; Arlotto of Prato; Richard of Middleton (d. c. 1295); Giles of Bensa; John of Murrovalle, later Minister General during the next major prosecution of Olivi’s teachings in 1309-11. On Richard of Middleton, see E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine*, SSL 7 (Louvain, 1925), in whose writings, according to Hocedez, there is no personal reference to Olivi (p.443).

110 *Littera*, p.51: ‘Firmiter enim credimus, dicimus et tenemus: 1. quod divina essentia est una in tribus suppositis, nullo modo tripartita vel geminata vel replicata vel iterato posita vel plurificata; et contrarium dicimus et affirmamus erroneum. 2. Item quod in divinis non est ponere essentiam producentem et productam; et contrarium est erroneum.’

111 See the list of errors, probably by Bonagratia of Bergamo c. 1328, ed. L. Amorós, *‘Series condemnationum et processum contra doctrinam et sequaces Petri Ioannis Olivi’*, AFH 24 (1931), 495-512. Like Aquinas in his *Expositio*, Bonagratia cites the Nicene definition of consubstantiality, concluding ‘Ex quibus patet, quod dictus error dogmatizatus in scriptis dicti fratris Petri Ioannis repugnat primo articulo fidei, qui pertinet ad divine essentie unitatem, in quantum dicit essentiam divinam generare, gigni et procedere et distinguiri’ (p.512).


113 This information is provided by Olivi, *Responsio* II, p.133.8-15.

114 *Responsio* II, pp.131-2.
Denied the opportunity to defend himself at this hearing, Olivi issued three apologetic texts, one in 1283 and two in 1285.\textsuperscript{115} His 1285 Responsio was issued along with an Amplior declaratio exclusively devoted to clarifying his position on the generation of the essence.\textsuperscript{116} This proved to be one of the recurring themes in the disputes surrounding Olivi’s views which continued long after his death into the fourteenth century and which endured even after his views on poverty had been adopted by the Spiritualist wing of the Franciscan Order.\textsuperscript{117} According to Ubertino of Casale (d. c.1329-41), one of Olivi’s supporters writing in 1311 during the second wave of attacks on Olivi’s teachings, the question of the divine essence was one of three issues - the others being Olivi’s views on the rational soul and Christ’s side wound - which remained controversial from the 1283 condemnation.\textsuperscript{118} At the same time, it was singled out by critics such as Augustinus Triumphus (d. 1328), one of the theologians commissioned by Pope Clement V in 1310 to examine Olivi’s doctrines yet again.\textsuperscript{119} Of the twelve errors which he attributes to Olivi, the first two concerned the triplication and generation of the divine essence.\textsuperscript{120}

In his 1283 Responsio, Olivi accepted both the propositions about the essence laid down in the Littera, whilst pointing out that although he does not believe that he has said anything contrary, if he has retracts it. To the first point that the divine essence is one in three supposita but not divided in three parts, he consents, explaining that any multiplication is not in the essence itself but in the modes of being which the

\textsuperscript{115}Olivi’s first defense, Responsio quam fecit Petrus ad litteram magistrorum, praesentatam sibi in Avinione [Responsio II] is also edited by D. Laberge, AFH 28 (1935), pp.126-30.

\textsuperscript{116}[Amplior declaratio] quinti praecedentis Epistolae articuli qui est de divina essentia, ed. D. Laberge, AFH 29 (1936), 98-141, 365-95.

\textsuperscript{117}See D. Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the Usus Pauper Controversy (Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1989).

\textsuperscript{118}Declaratio, ed. F. Ehrle as part of the series of documents, ‘Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne’, ALKM 3 (1887), p.191.12-15: ‘Nam illa, que imponunt sibi, non inventuntur ponderis notabilis per magistros visis suis dictis nisi in tribus articulis, scilicet de essentia divina, de anima rationali et de vulnere laterali’. On the events of 1309-11 and the Council of Vienne, Burr, Persecution of Peter Olivi, pp.73-80; Hefele-Leclercq VI.2, pp.666-70.


\textsuperscript{120}Tractatus contra divinatores et somniiatones, ed. R. Scholz, Unbekannte Kirchenpolitische Streitsschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs Bayern (1327-1334), Königlich Preussisches Historisches Institut in Rom 9-10 (Rome, 1911-14), p.485. Dated to 1310 by Ministeri, De Augustini de Ancona, p.219.
essence receives through the Persons.\textsuperscript{121} As to the second point, that the essence is neither producing nor produced:

I accept this doctrine, when essence is understood in the abstract according as it is common to the Persons, and if I have said the opposite, which I do not believe so, I revoke it. I have, however, put forward the view which maintains that the essence, insofar as it is the essence of the Father, produces, and insofar as it is the essence of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is produced. And I do not believe that this is incorrect nor contrary to the decree of Lord Innocent.\textsuperscript{122}

This implies that the issue of the generation of the essence was one addressed in the Lateran decree on the Trinity, but that Olivi's view can nevertheless be reconciled with it. Indeed, throughout his apologetic writings as well as in an earlier \textit{quaestio} on the Trinity, Olivi regards the Lateran decree as the authoritative statement on the issue and he goes to considerable lengths to prove that any disagreement between himself and the conciliar proclamation is only apparent.\textsuperscript{123} Particularly significant is that Olivi begins his detailed defence of his position on the generation of the essence with an extensive reference to 'the decree of Pope Innocent III'.\textsuperscript{124} Moreover, the main purpose of the crucial distinction here referred to and present throughout Olivi's writings on the subject, between the common essence and the essence of each of the Persons, is to avoid directly clashing with the decree. Olivi's aim is to show that the Council, and for that matter, Peter Lombard, is using the word essence in one way, in its abstract sense, whilst he, along with many sancti and doctores before him, is using it in another, in its concrete sense. By applying this distinction, Olivi can portray the apparent difference between himself and the Council as a linguistic rather than truly doctrinal one. His critics rejected this as an outright excuse for blatantly

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Responsio} I, p.126.8-10: 'non intellixi quod haec plurificatio vel geminatio significarent in ipsa Dei essentia nisi plurificationem modorum essendi, quos accipit essentia in personis'.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Responsio} I, p.126.14-19: 'Istam sententiam accepto, sumendo essentiam in abstracto prout est communis personis, et si contrarium dixi, quod non credo, revoco. Recitavi autem opinionem quae ponit quod essentia in quantum est essentia Patris producit, et in quantum est essentia Filii et Spiritus Sancti producitur, et hanc non credo esse errorem nec contrarium decretalium domini Innocentii.'

\textsuperscript{123} The decree is Olivi's constant point of reference. See esp. \textit{Responsio} II, pp.147-50; \textit{Amplior declaratio}, pp.98-9, 368-70; \textit{Quaestio de trinitate} (written before 1283), ed. Schmaus, \textit{Der Liber Propugnatorius}, p.176*. See also Ubertino of Casale, \textit{Responsio} to Raymond of Fronsac and Bonagratia of Bergamo, ed. F. Ehrle, \textit{ALKM} 2 (1886), pp.389, 392-3.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Amplior declaratio}, pp.98-9.
contradicting the decree.  

In his 1285 Responsio, Olivi dealt at greater length with the accusations levelled against him. He says that the source of the allegation that he had divided the essence into three parts were extracts made from his quaestio on the Trinity, in which he asks whether there is a personal production in the divinity. There Olivi had argued that the essence could not be the essence of three supposita unless it had in some way the force of three essences and for this it would have to be repeated. Thus, says Olivi, he stands accused of asserting that the essence is repeated in the three supposita, rather than saying that the essence is one in three supposita. Olivi counters that he has not spoken of the divine essence as repeated in any straightforward way (simpliciter) but according to a certain definition whereby it is legitimate to say that it is repeated in several supposita. For any repetition concerns the mode of personal existence only. And if his opponents charge that such words as replicata and geminata are improper and should under no circumstances be attributed to the essence, then they are in the same breath also condemning the

\[125\) Bonagratia of Bergamo, Series condemnationum, p. 510: ‘Primus error est, quod essentia divina ut est Patris sive in Patre generat […] adicens in suis excursionibus quod concilium generale positum Extra, de summa Trinitate et fide catholica, capitulo Danpnamus in quo dicitur: “quod essentia divina non est generans, genita nec procedens”, intelligitur et debet intelligi, secundum eum, solummodo de essentia in communi, scilicet prout est simul communis tribus Personis, et non de essentia prout est sigillatim in qualibet trium Personarum.’

\[126\) Responsio II, p. 141.4-5: ‘Post hoc ponitur aliud dictum meum sumptum ex quaestione “an in divinis sit personalis productio”’; Quaestio de trinitate, pp. 143*-228*.

\[127\) Responsio II, p. 141.6-10: ‘divina essentia non potest esse essentia trium suppositorum, nisi habeat quodammodo et per quandam aequivalentiam in se vim trium formarum seu trium essentiarum. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi sit pluribus modis in esses posita, et nisi sit ter, ut ita dicam, replicata et geminata.’ Cited from Quaestio de trinitate, p. 184*.


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many sancti who used similar expressions. Olivi cites a number of authorities in his favour, including Boethius, Hilary of Poitiers and Saint Anselm. From this he concludes:

it is clear that the aforementioned saints and doctors have stated that the essence is repetita, replicata, iterata and geminata [...] for it is certain that those words, understood according to the aforementioned definitions, do not signify any essential diversification, numeration or mutation in the divine essence, but only its personal production or communication or its acceptance of the diverse modes of existence of the Persons.

Finally, Olivi denies that this is tantamount to Joachim’s error of reducing divine unity to a unity of will. He himself advocates a superreal (supersumma) unity of essence in the Persons, citing as proof a statement from his quaestio on the Trinity. He refutes utterly the charge of tritheism (nomen triplicationis respectu essentiae).

If we did not know about the thirteenth-century interpretative tradition spawned by the decree, we might misconstrue Olivi’s concern to distance himself from Joachim’s position as simply a concern not to be identified as a Joachite, rather than participation in a doctrinal debate which had nothing to do with Joachim’s theology of history.

Olivi moves onto the second point concerning the divine essence raised by the

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131 Responsio II, p.143.36-40: ‘Forte adhuc contra me dicitur, quod praedicta verba sunt tantae improprietatis, quod nullo modo nec sub aliqua determinatione debuenint attribui divinae essentiae. Sed qui hoc dicit sanctos arguit, et, meo iudicio, rationem dicendi cogentem non habet. Sanctos quidern arguit quia ipsi verbis et similibus aliquando utuntur.’

132 Responsio II, p.146.26-38: ‘Patet igitur sanctos et doctores praedictos dixisse essentiam in personis repetitam, iteratam, geminatam [...] certum est enim quod verba, sub praedictis determinationibus sumpta, nullam essentialem diversificationem aut numerationem aut mutationem significant in essentia divina, sed solum personalem eius productionem vel communicationem sive acceptionem diversorum modorum existentii personalium.’

133 Responsio II, pp.146-7: ‘Si vero dicatur ab aliquo mihi malivolo, quod ego dolose talibus verbis usus sum, quasi voluerim per hoc disseminare errorem, quem decretales Innocentii III abbati Joachim imponit, scilicet quod in personis divinis non est unitas essentiae secundum rem et naturam, sed solum secundum concordiam voluntatis eo modo quo duo amici dicuntur habere unum cor, iniquissime hoc in me impingueretur, cum ego in tota quaestione illa et in tota quaestione sequenti, et in tota quaestione praecedenti, totis viribus nitar astruere summam et realissimam, immo supersummarum unitatem essentiae divinae in tribus personis. Unde, inter caetera, in responsione ad vigesimum quartum argumentum dixi quod “personae divinae sunt unum et idem realiter, et conveniunt in una essentia numerali, quae potent dicas una numero numerositate essentiae”. See Quae, de trinitate, p.209*. For the same assessment of Joachim’s error, see Amplior declaratio, p.379.19-21: “periculum erroris illius quem decretales imponit abbati Joachim, quod scilicet in personis divinis sit sola unitas voluntatis et concordiae”.

134 Responsio II, p.146.15.

On Olivi’s borrowing from Joachim’s trinitarian conception of history, see Reeves. Influence, pp.194-201.
commission, his view that the essence is producing and produced. He retorts that on this issue he was merely repeating the main opinions, not giving his own (absque assertione utramque opinionem recitavi). Even so, the view that the essence is producing and produced is not contrary to Innocent III’s decree but on the contrary is necessary if the decree is to be reconciled with the statements of the Church Fathers. This harmonisation is brought about by distinguishing in speech between the essence which is common to the three Persons and which is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding on the one hand, and the essence which is proper to this or that Person and which is begetting in the Father, begotten in the Son and proceeding in the Holy Spirit on the other. ‘It is according to the first mode that the decree seems to be speaking’, that is, the decree correctly upholds the view that the essence does not beget because it is using essence in the sense of the common essence. In response, Giles of Rome remarked that those sayings of the Fathers which contain some impropriety are to be exponenda non extendenda.

Olivi bases this judgement, that in the decree the word ‘essence’ is used in the sense of what is common to the Persons, firstly on the fact that the Council was concerned to condemn Joachim’s erroneous conception of divine unity, his view that there is no thing which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is only if we take the essence in its abstract sense that the full force of the condemnation becomes clear:

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136 Responsio II, p.147.27-8. Olivi cites from his own Quaestio de trinitate, p.185.

137 Responsio II, p.148.1.

138 Responsio II, p.148.3-25: ‘Ista autem opinio secundum modum, secundum quem ipsum ibi recitavi, non vadit contra dictum decretalis Innocentii III, editae in concilio generali, sed potius concordat dicta sanctorum cum dictis decretalis, tollens contrarietatem quae apparenter inter dicta sanctorum et dicta decretalis esse videtur per quamdam distinctionem, ante me datam ab aliquis magistris, videlicet quod est loqui de essentia, prout est communis tribus personis et omnes tres in se simul comprehendens, et in qualibet trium simul tota existens, et sub hoc modo sumpta non est genita, nec generans, nec procedens [...] Secundo modo est loqui de essentia, prout est propria huius vel illius personae, utpote de essentia Patris, prout est propria Patri. et prout est in eo non communicata sibi ab aliquo; et consimiliter de essentia Filii prout est propria Filii et prout est in eo per actum generationis communicata, et sub hoc modo sumpta, est secundum istos vere generans in Patre, vere genita in Filio, et spirata in Spiritu Sancto.’ Also Amplior declaratio, pp.98-9.


140 Impugnatio, p.422.

141 Responsio II, p.148.27-30: ‘Primo quidem quia loquitur contra errorem ibi praemissum, quo dicebatur quod nulla res est quae sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et quod in divinis non est secundum rem aliqua una essentia communis tribus personis.’

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And for this reason they [he?] stated that to say that *una quaedam summa res* is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that it is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, is heretical and insane because, as they [he?] said, it would follow from this that the common essence was a fourth Person.¹⁴²

There seems to be either a scribal error or one in transcription, since the position described here is clearly Joachim’s not the Council’s, as the plural subject would indicate. It is probably safe to emend the passage accordingly, replacing ‘they said’ with ‘he said’. In any case, the point is that precisely because Joachim is using essence according to its common sense, that the Council was, in condemning him, also bound to use it. This interpretation at least is consistent with Olivi’s following remark. And so, he says, when the Council affirmed with Peter that *una quaedam res* was the three Persons together and each of them separately, it added ‘that res is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding’, not meaning to deny those acts of the essence except insofar as it is common to the three Persons.¹⁴³ A further proof that the Council’s prohibition applies only to the common essence is that Peter Lombard can only be using ‘essence’ in this way. His argument, for example, that if the essence was begotten it would then be stated relatively of the Father, must only refer to the common essence. For if he meant to include the essence which is proper to the Son, he would be saying that the essence of the Son is not communicated or received and that the essence of the Father had no greater claim to the act of begetting than the essence of the Son.¹⁴⁴ The same distinction between the common essence and the


¹⁴³ *Responsio* II, p.148.37-41: ‘confitemur cum Petro quod una quaedam summa res est incomprehensibilis quae veracier est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, tres res simul personae ac singillatim quaelibet earum. Et post paucu subditur: et illa res non est generaes, nec genita, nec procedens, ex quo patet quod non negat illos actus de essentia, nisi prout est communis tribus’. Olivi is clearly referring directly to the decree here, *Conciliorum*, p.232.4-12.

¹⁴⁴ *Responsio* II, p.149.2-15: ‘Tertio quia rationes quas magister Petrus facit ad hoc, primo Libro Sententiarum, distinctione quinta, non cogunt nisi solum de essentia primo modo sumpta, quod ad praelens do, verbi gratia, de prima ratione eius quia conclutid quod, si essentia esset genita, dicetur relative ad Patrem, et tunc ex hoc sequeretur quod non indicaret substantiam. Si enim haec ratio bene arguit non solum de essentia communiter sumpta, sed etiam ultra hoc de essentia, prout est prorsa Filio, tunc nec essentia prout est prorsa Filii debet dici communicata, vel data, vel per generationem accepta. Constat enim quod communicatum referatur ad communicantem, et datum ad danten, et acceptum ad illum a quo est datum et suscepet. Secundum hoc etiam essentia prout est in Patre subsistens non plus haberet ordinem ad actum generandi active summum quam prout est in Filio vel Spiritu Sancto subsistens, quod nullus concedit.’ For Peter Lombard’s argument, see *Sent.* V.1.2, p.81.
essence proper to each Person must also be assumed in the argument that if the Father begot the essence he would be begetting his own cause. This is the Lombard’s position only because he defines ‘essence’ abstractly as the divine nature which is common to the three Persons. 145 Finally, no one could seriously suppose that the decree intended to contradict the statements of the Fathers, many of whom stated expressly that the essence begets. 146 The objective which Olivi’s solution achieves, in true Abelardian spirit, is to preserve the sayings of the Fathers in their idiom and the decree’s in its without falling into contradiction. 147

Thus both Peter Lombard and the Council only meant to deny that the essence understood in its most absolute being, not that the essence as understood by the other authorities, in the sense of the mode of personal existence, was begetting. 148 In fact, when we are talking about the act of generation in this mode of personal existence it is absolutely necessary that the essence is begotten if the integrity of the very concept of Person is to be maintained:

For ‘Person’ does not only state a personal property but along with this it also signifies some essence or nature. Therefore, to say that ‘Person’ is begotten is the same as to say that its essence is begotten with its personal property. Otherwise, if only its personal property but not its essence is begotten, then the whole Person is not begotten. 149

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145 Amplior declaratio, pp.373-4, citing I Sent. V.1.1, p.82.5-6: ‘Hic autem nomine essentiae intelligimus divinam naturam, quae communis est tribus personis et tota in singulis’; also Quaestio de trinitate, pp.202*-3*: ‘Quod etiam Magister hoc intenderet, arguunt ex hoc, quod in principio rationum istarum dicit se loqui de essentia, prout dicit unam naturam communem tribus, et quia unam rationem suarum ostendit, qua probat, quod secundum hoc Pater esset causa suae essentiae et quod genitum esset causa existendi suo gignenti [...] et ideo videtur, quod Magister non intenderat astuere essentiam nullo modo esse genitam, sed quod essentia universaliter et in omnibus non sit genita, utpote, prout est in Patre.’


147 Responsorio II, p.149.21-3: ‘ergo videtur quod illa positio sit magis catholica, quae simul absque omni contrarietate salvat dicta sanctorum in sua expressione, et dictum decretalis in sua.’

148 Responsorio II, p.150.10-19: ‘Primo modo solum intendit Magister Sententiarum hoc negare et decretalis cum ipso, sicut ex dictis eorum aperte probari potest, et sub hoc sensu nunquam dicunt sancti quod essentia sit generans vel genita vel procedens. Secundo autem modo hoc innumeris auctoritatibus et expressissimis verbis affirmare videntur et contra hunc modum non loquitur decretalis, nec contra hunc modum vadunt rationes Magistri Sententiarum, quin potius tam Magister quam decretalis pro isto modo pro tanto faciunt, pro quanto tenent et asserunt quod essentia est de principali intellectu personae.’

149 Responsorio II, p.150.19-23: ‘Non enim persona solum dicit proprietatem personalem sed etiam cum hoc significat aliquam essentiam vel naturam, ergo dicere quod persona gignitur est idem quod dicere quod essentia eius cum sua proprietate personalis gignitur: alias si sola eius propietas personalis gignitur non autem essentia eius
Moreover, Peter Lombard himself introduced a similar distinction in order to refute the argument of those who said that the Father’s unbegotten wisdom by which he was wise was separate from the Son’s begotten wisdom by which he was not wise. As the Lombard himself says, the unbegotten wisdom is understood as the Father and the begotten as the Son, both being one and the same wisdom which is understood as the common essence. Hence, comments Olivi, Peter Lombard understands sapientia in two ways: as it is proper to the Father or to the Son and thus as it is unbegotten or begotten; and as it is common to the three Persons and thus as it is neither unbegotten nor begotten. Besides, this distinction between the common essence and the essence of each of the Persons is the only means of avoiding the entire array of trinitarian errors from Arianism and Sabellianism to Quaternity.

Olivi’s Amplior declaratio is devoted exclusively to this question of the generation of the essence. As in the Responsio, he runs through a series of biblical texts, ecclesiastical authorities and rational arguments which support his position. This includes an important section on Richard of Saint-Victor, in which Olivi cites Richard’s attack on Peter Lombard’s denial that essence begets essence. Like many of his contemporaries, Olivi sensed that Richard’s view was not entirely

tunc non tota persona gignitur.'

150 Responsio II, p.150.29-34: 'ponit Magister distinctionem praedictam ubi respondet quibusdam argumentis sophisticis, quibus quidam probare nitebantur quod non esset tantum una sapientia Patris, quia, ut dicebant, Filius est sapientia Patris genita, qua Pater sapiens non est. Est autem et sapientia Patris ingenita qua Pater sapiens est, et ita Pater habet duplicem sapientiam; unam qua sapiens est, et aliam qua sapiens non est.'

151 Responsio II, p.151.1-6: 'Una est tamen sapientia Patris, quia sapientia genita est eadem sapientia, quae et ea qua sapiens est, sive ea qua sapiens est intelligatur persona Patris, sive essentia Patris; quia persona Patris, quae intelligitur, cum dicitur sapientia ingenita, et persona Fili, quae significatur, cum dicitur sapientia genita, una eademque sapientia est, quae essentia divina intelligitur communis tribus personis.' Cited from ISent. XXXII. 4.3, p.237.28-33.


153 Amplior declaratio, p.379.31-2: 'sententia praedictae distinctionis omnes errores praedictos patenter evacuat et a se manifeste excludit.'

reconcilable with the Lombard’s. According to Duns Scotus (d. 1308), however, the Lombard’s position carried greater weight since it had the support of a general council.

Olivier’s fourth task is to establish whether any authority might seem to overthrow his narrow understanding of the sense in which the essence begets. He concludes that there are none ‘unless perhaps, as it seems to some, the decree of the Lord Pope Innocent III, issued in the general Council, was against it, because there it is stated that the essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding’. This must be a reference to the interpretation of the majority of Paris theologians, since Olivier cites some of their most characteristic arguments. Even though, Olivier comments somewhat wearily, he has already shown that the decree is not incompatible with the position he has laid out, he will nevertheless undertake to demonstrate this more clearly.

Again, it is because the main subject-matter of the decree is the question of divine unity, that it only speaks of the essence as non-begetting, since only this would be consistent with preserving unity of nature. In order to show that the Council’s


157 Amplior declaratio, pp.368-9: ‘Et quidem nulla textus sacri vel sanctorum auctoritas aut Romani Pontificis aut universalis Ecclesiae contra hoc penitus invenitur, nisi forte, secundum quod quibusdam videtur, decretalis domini Innocentii papae III, edita in Concilio generali, esset contra istud, quia ibi dicitur quod essentia non est generans nec genita nec procedens.’

158 Amplior declaratio, p.369.13-18: ‘Licit autem in quinto articulo Litterae praedecetis ostenderit quod verba praedictae decretalis non obviant sententiae distinctionem superius praebilaevae, quoniam potius ipsa distinctio plenius salvat et concordat dicta decretalis cum dictis sanctorum, et e converso, quam sententia praedici distinctione opposita, nihilominus hic plenius et clarius hic monstrare conabatur.’

159 Amplior declaratio, pp.370-1: ‘Sed ratio, proper quam decretalis ponit in divinis unam essentiam quae sit tres personae et quae in quantum talis non sit generans nec genita, est ut salvetur unitas naturae divinae et distinctio personarum’: also Quaestio de trinitate, p.176*: ‘Locuntur enim contra Ioachim, qui visus est dicere, quod tres personae non sunt aliqua una res, quae vere una et eadem sit in tribus simul, cuius contrarium secundum fidem
position is not different from his own. Olivi takes a long passage from the decree and replaces the word ‘essence’ with the word ‘God’. Following this procedure, the assertion that the essence is non-begetting becomes the assertion that God is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding which, he says, is clearly not the intended meaning.\textsuperscript{160} Of course, this is precisely the kind of device which would be considered illegitimate by scholastic theologians who would consider that Olivi had committed exactly the same error as Joachim: the word ‘God’ cannot indiscriminately substitute the word ‘essence’ without paying regard to the immediate context. Olivi even reproduces the very argument which scholastic commentators had attributed to Joachim, namely that if it is objected ‘essence begot essence, therefore another essence’, it should similarly apply that for ‘God begot God’ it follows there is another God.\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, Giles of Rome in his \textit{Impugnatio} against the errors of Olivi, did not fail to expose the central flaw of Olivi’s argument from the point of view of grammatical theology. The comparison between the terms ‘God’ and ‘essence’ did not hold since what applies to concrete words such as ‘God’ cannot be transferred to abstract words such as ‘essence’. Thus it does not follow from ‘God begot God’ that

\textsuperscript{160}\textit{Amplior declaratio}, pp.369-70: ‘Ut igitur cuivis appareat quod verba ista non destruunt distinctionem praedictam sed potius salvant, repeto verba praedicta mutando nomen “essentiae” in hoc nomen “Deus”, sic dicendo: unus solus Deus est incomprehensibilis, qui veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, tres simul personae ac singillatim quaelibet earundem; et ille unus Deus, qui scilicet est simul tres personae, non est generans nec genitus nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat et Filius qui gignitur et Spiritus Sanctus qui procedit, ut distinctiones sint in personis et unitas in uno Deo, qui est tres personae.’

\textsuperscript{161}\textit{Amplior declaratio}, p.373.3-5: ‘si essentia gignuit essentiam, ergo aliam essentiam, dicendum quod si haec consequentia bona est, tunc eadem ratione sequitur: Deus generat Deum, ergo aliun Deum’; similarly, \textit{ibid.}, p.380.32-7: ‘Et certe sicut nulla est contradictio dicere quod est Deus generans et Deus genitus et Deus Trinitas, quamvis in primis duabus li Deus sumatur singulariter, scilicet in prima pro solo Patre et in secunda pro solo Filio, in tertia vero sumatur communiter, sic nec oportet quod huius praedicta respectu essentiae sibi invescem contradicant.’ Olivi also contravenes another axiom of grammatical theology, that ‘essence’ never stands for Person. \textit{ibid.}, p.378.28-36: ‘essentia stat aliquando pro tribus personis simul [...] Aliquando stat pro duabus tantum [...] Aliquando stat pro una sola persona, ut cum dicitur essentia de essentia’. 

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'essence begot essence'.

Although, according to Olivi, it is false that 'essence or God who is three Persons, is begetting or begotten', it is true that 'essence or God, who is the three Persons, is the Person of the Father, the Person of the Son and the Person of the Holy Spirit', which is why the decree says 'that res is the Father who begets and the Son who is begotten'.

Thus:

it is clear from the words of the aforementioned decree that generation is not altogether universally denied of the essence of God, but only denied of it as it is common to the three Persons and encompassing the three together.

The judgement of the Fourth Lateran Council is also a consistent theme for the other protagonists in the controversy surrounding Olivi's views. When as Minister General, John of Murovalle, one of the seven original investigators in 1283, called for further examination of Olivi's writings in 1309, much was made of the alleged incompatibility of the respective positions of Olivi and the Council on the generation of the essence. The list of errors produced in 1311 by Raymond of Fronsac, the Procurator of the Franciscan Order and Bonagratia of Bergamo made several references to the contradiction between Olivi and the Council. Giles of Rome, in a typically cutting remark, wrote:

it is the doctrine of Peter Lombard, not of Peter John, that the divine essence neither begets nor is begotten nor proceeds, which is approved by the authority of the sacred Council. This authority, after

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162Impugnatio, pp.428-9: 'Sed licet hæc catholice concedatur in concreto, debent catholice negari in abstracto, quia divinitas, id est divina essentia vel natura, nec gignit nec gignitur nec procedit, ut dicit Magister in Sententiis, et ut Decretalis confirmat. Omnino ergo proprie dictum est quod "Deus generat Deum"; et quod ibi dicitur "Deus est de Deo, lumen de lumine, Deus verus de Deo vero". Hec ergo conceditur in concreto quod ibi est Deus de Deo, et quod ibi Deus generat Deum; sed ibi non conceditur in abstracto quod deitas generet deitatem, vel quod essentia generat essentiam'.

163Amplior declaratio, p.371.40-4: 'Quamvis autem hæc, scilicet "essentia vel Deus, qui est tres personae, est generans vel genus", falsa sit, nihilominus hæc est vera: "essentia vel Deus, qui est tres personae, est persona Patris et persona Filiæ et persona Spiritus Sancti". Et ideo bene dicitur in praedicta decretali quod "illa res est Pater qui generat et Filius qui gignitur"'.

164Amplior declaratio, p.372.3-6: 'Ex praedictis autem patet quod per verba decretalis praedictae omnino universaliter non negatur generatio de essentia Dei, sed solum negatur de ea, prout est communis tribus et tres simul comprehendentes'.

the compilers of the canonical Bible, is greater than the authority of any doctor or even saint.\textsuperscript{166}

The Council’s expressed position on this question, therefore, takes precedence over the fact that none of the Fathers stated outright that the essence is non-begetting.\textsuperscript{167}

The presence of the Council’s explicit judgement carries greater weight than the absence of the same judgement in other authorities.

It turns out, then, that Olivi’s view is substantially the same as the one being attacked by thirteenth-century theologians in their interpretations of the decree. As far as they are concerned, there is no room for a concept of the essence as begetting no matter how we understand the word ‘essence’. They rejected Olivi’s claim that the decree was using ‘essence’ only in the sense of what is common not proper to the Persons because they had virtually eliminated any use of the word ‘essence’ to stand for Person.

Olivi also argued that his positive stance on the generation of the essence was, in any case, an entirely different issue from Joachim’s doctrine of unity of collection. It was not inconsistent to affirm a unity of essence and a generation of essence, a possibility which most other theologians did not consider.

Do thirteenth-century interpretations throw any light on the issues which originally elicited the Council’s clarification of trinitarian doctrine or do they represent nothing more than the continuation of a peculiarly obsessive debate about an issue which is only mentioned in the decree because it just happened to be part of a citation from the \textit{Sentences}?

There is no question that thirteenth-century theologians privilege one seemingly marginal aspect of the condemnation. They mistake the Council’s affirmation of the \textit{quaedam summa res} as non-begetting towards the end of the decree for one of

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Impugnatio}, p.431: ‘Approbatur ergo sententia Petri Lombardi, non Petri Ioannis, quod divina essentia nec gignit nec gignitur nec procedit auctoritate sacri Concilii, quae auctoritas, post compilatores canonis Biblie, est maior quam auctoritas cuiuslibet doctoris vel etiam sancti.’

\textsuperscript{167} Giles of Rome, \textit{Impugnatio}, p.431: ‘dato quod auctoritas nullius sancti hoc assereret, quod divina essentia nec gignit nec gignitur nec procedit, tamen ex quo approbatur auctoritate sacri Concilii, que post compositores canonis Biblie est maior quam auctoritas cuiuscumque sancti.’
Joachim's errors rather than what it seems to be, a clarification of the doctrine of divine unity/generation raised by Joachim's attack. That explains why they think Joachim is being condemned for thinking that the essence does not beget. And even when theologians do address the main issues of Quaternity and unity of collection, the debate on 'essence begot essence' is never far away, as in Aquinas' *Expositio*. Only Olivi is able to see how Joachim's condemnation does not exclude all talk of the essence as begetting. His position is that (1) the doctrines of the *quaedam summa res* and the generation of the essence are not mutually exclusive; (2) this position does not contradict the Lateran decree; and (3) this position does not entail unity of collection. In principle, (1) and (3) were sustainable, but not as far as the decree was concerned, which is why Olivi's opponents were so persistent in drawing attention to the decree's prohibition of the generation of the essence.
CONCLUSION

Rather than simply reiterate what has already been said, it is more worthwhile to use this opportunity to outline the wider significance of some of the main problems which I have been discussing. The most important general point which has emerged is how essential it is for the modern scholar to possess a detailed knowledge of certain theological issues if a number of historical 'events' and phenomena are to be understood. The most striking example of this, and one which I have been at pains to stress throughout, is the Fourth Lateran Council. It seems indisputable that what is at stake in the Lateran Council's pronouncement upon the Trinity is not only the personal orthodoxy of a few individuals, although that is undoubtedly important, but also a wider consensus of thought on the doctrine as it had emerged in the schools during the course of the twelfth century. Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard represented a serious challenge to this consensus, and was the immediate cause of the Council's statement. However, to see this as an isolated confrontation, or another example of Joachim's highly fertile imagination, is to dismiss both the genuine importance of Joachim's own concerns and the role of sustained discussion on the doctrine, which had been proceeding for more than a century. Such a view reduces the particularity of the issues themselves to nothing more than a device for issuing a condemnation or for raising one theologian's views per se to the status of official doctrine.

If the study of trinitarian theology in this period teaches us anything it is surely that ideas do have a life outside the academy, and do sometimes have a 'knock-on' effect elsewhere. It might seem as though the only justification for the study of intellectual history is as an end in itself, but this strikes me as a kind of defeatism. Intellectual history can provide us with a deeper understanding of society at large. After all, the Lateran decree on the Trinity demonstrates that intellectual discussions could influence 'policy'.

Another outstanding example of how a knowledge of contemporary theological debates is not only desirable but, in certain cases, necessary is the tradition of
thirteenth-century misunderstandings of the Lateran decree. It can be fairly quickly and
painlessly established by straightforward textual comparison that thirteenth-century
commentators concentrated on one particular aspect of the decree, and misrepresented
its relation to Joachim. But unless one knows something of the preoccupation of
academic theologians prior to 1215 and the extent to which they hammered away at
certain issues, the full meaning and scale of subsequent appropriations of the decree
could never even be penetrated, let alone understood. It is one thing to realise that
these commentators are biased in their interpretations, another to identify the cause of
that bias and misunderstanding in the academic tradition of thought on the Trinity
which they inherited, and yet another still to notice that at the same time these
interpretations were, paradoxically, implicit in the decree itself, which had rejected
both Joachim’s unity of collection and the view that essence begets essence as
alternatives to the Lombard’s quaedam summa res. Only by entering the rationality
of a theological system is it possible to identify and explain the various levels of
misinterpretation to which that system is prone.

Other examples of the tangible rewards of intellectual history could be
enumerated. We cannot understand the true nature of the controversy surrounding
Peter Olivi’s views on the Trinity, unless we realise that he was propounding a
doctrine, that essence begets essence, which had been ridiculed by the vast majority
of theologians up to that time. Olivi’s opponents did not isolate this issue simply
because they wanted to attack him, but because they considered his view to be
nonsensical. Of course, this point, once Olivi’s views have been contextualised,
appears blindingly obvious, and yet it has not been noticed before. What this suggests
is that more attention needs to be given to the wider connotations of the specific
issues in question.

There is the further interrelated point that, unless we know exactly what
theologians were talking about, we can hardly begin to say what it is we mean when
we talk about them. This sloppiness with regard to detail accounts for such deeply
entrenched ideas as the construction of a conflict between the ‘followers of Gilbert of
Poitiers’ and ‘the followers of Peter Lombard’. Theology on the Trinity in the second
half of the twelfth century was in reality much more fluid than this. The Lombard
himself was ambiguous about one of the most characteristic features of Gilbert’s
trinitarian theology, namely the need for a conceptual distinction between essence and Person. This ambiguity allowed subsequent theologians, who were not interested in engaging in a polemic about the respective merits of Gilbert’s and the Lombard’s theology, to turn a blind eye to any reservations the Lombard may have had about such conceptual distinctions. Their approach was overwhelmingly pragmatic and empirical rather than ideological: certain conceptual tools had undeniable practical applications, and they were not prepared to reject them simply because they had Gilbertine connotations. By the same token, many theologians, following the lead of Peter Lombard, felt that some of Gilbert’s distinctions went too far in jeopardising divine simplicity. Distinctions between the Persons and their properties, and the properties and the essence were, in their view, fatuous attempts at avoiding certain unwelcome consequences, such as that essence begets essence. Opponents of these distinctions argued that it was not necessary to go down this road in order to avoid the conclusion that the essence begets; a clear distinction between essence and Person was all that was needed. The importance of this distinction between essence and Person was not new in itself but was given additional emphasis by the apparatus of supposition theory, and was also the guiding principle of the Lateran decree. The introduction of a classification system in theological language sharpened the boundaries between correct and incorrect usage, and facilitated the recognition of theology as a science with a distinct methodology.

This attention to detail has opened up new avenues for future research. This is particularly true of the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The indications are that theologians during this period were still preoccupied with some of the same issues which had been taxing minds since the early twelfth century. A knowledge of these debates can help clarify some problems of intellectual orientation which have never been fully resolved. The most compelling case here is the anonymous Liber contra Lombardum, which has been dated to the early fourteenth century. In the light of the tradition of academic thought on the Trinity, it now seems certain that, far from being a belated and somewhat curious eruption of pro-Joachite feeling, the Liber is in fact very much part of the on-going debate about the generation of the essence. It may turn out that the anonymous author’s opposition to Peter Lombard’s position on this question was influenced, either directly or indirectly, by Olivi, but this still does not
permit us regard the work as Joachite, since Olivi himself was far from Joachim in this context. The particular place of the Liber in the development of trinitarian theology at this time is itself probably of minor significance. What matters is that understanding the theological issues themselves can often provide a means of separating out the strands of intellectual influence which have become entangled in the scholar’s mind; to do so must constitute an advance in clarity.

Such insights can only be gleaned from a combination of horizontal and vertical approaches to a subject. Putting something in its historical context means precisely this, that is, looking at it from every conceivable angle, backwards, forwards and sideways. This is especially true of the historical study of any aspect of Christian doctrine. After Greek philosophy, the Christian traditions are the most deeply embedded in European culture. This makes the task in studying any element in those traditions both exceptionally daunting and rewarding, regardless of one’s own personal beliefs.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Texts showing links with the *Glossa super Sententias*

1. The argument, *Deum genuit deum, ergo se deum vel alium deum.*

*Glossa*, BM Royal 7F XIII:

[fol.7va] *Dixit dominus domino meo*, ergo se domino vel alii domino. Vel, alius assumpsit hominem, ergo se hominem vel alium hominem.

Robert of Melun, ISent.4.XXI, p.143.1-4:

*Dixit Dominus Domino meo*; nec ex hoc sequitur quod alii vel sibi. Nam neque sibi dixit quia se ipsum non genuit nec alii Domino, eo quod non est alius Dominus ille qui genitus est et alius ille qui genuit, sed genitor et genitus unus et Diminus [sic].

Anonymous Summa, BM Royal 9E XII:


*Sententie Udonis*, Munich Clm. 7622:

[fol.4ra] Constat ergo quod deus genuit deum, nec tamen se deum vel alium deum, quia multe possunt dari instantie tales: filius est lumen de lumine, ergo de se lumine vel alio lumine [...] Item: Verbum assumpsit hominem, ergo se hominem vel alium hominem.

Peter of Poitiers, ISent.27, p.218.83-86:

Deus gignit Deum, ergo se Deum vel alium Deum, feratur instantia sic: istud est lumen de lumine, ergo de se lumine vel de alio lumine; vel: Verbum assumpsit hominem, ergo se hominem vel alium hominem.
Magister Hubertus, *Summa*, Munich Clm. 28799:
[fols.3ra-b] *Dixit dominus domino*, ergo sibi domino vel alii domino, vel sic: filius assumpsit hominem, ergo se hominem vel alium hominem.

Prepositinus of Cremona, *Summa* 4.4, p.217.21-2:
Instantia: *dixit dominus domino meo*, ergo sibi domino vel alii domino.

2. *Glossa*, BM Royal 7F XIII:
[fol.7va] Iste terminus ‘pater’ in nulla significacione convenit patri in quantum non conveniat divine essentie, quia unam tantum habet significacionem, in quantum personam patris significat; sed ad predicacionem illius termini de patre, sequitur quod pater generet; ergo ad predicacionem huius de divina essentia, sequitur quod divina essentia gigneret. Non sequitur [7vb] et est ratio: que licet utrobique idem significat hoc nomen ‘pater’, tamen cum respective dicatur de patre, de divina essentia non dicitur respective. Instantia talis: iste terminus ‘habens filium’ in eadem significacione convenit viro huic et mulieri huic, sed ad predicacionem de muliere, sequitur quod concepisse; ergo etc. Vel ita esse eiusdem essentie cum patre, in eadem significacione convenit filio et filiationi, sed ad predicacionem illius de filio, sequitur quod filius sit in patre.

Magister Martinus, *Quaestiones*, BN lat. 14556:
[fol.280ra] Iste terminus ‘pater’ non convenit in alia significacione patri inquam non conveniat divine essentie, quia tantum unam significacionem habet. Significat enim personam patris, sed ad predicacionem illius de patre, sequitur quod pater gigneret, quia si aliquis est proprie generat, ergo ad predicacionem illius de divina essentia, sequitur ipsa generat. Quidam tamen dicunt quod isti termini ‘persona’, ‘pater’, idem predicant de patre et de divina essentia, respective tamen dicitur ad patrem, sed ad divinam essentiam nequam dicitur respective. Unde ab eis dicitur illa predicatio, scilicet essentia divina est pater accidentalis, ista vero pater est pater propria quoniam scilicet duo predicantur conjunctim ita quod non uterque predicetur de subiecto divisim [...] Dicunt tamen quidam hanc propositionem ‘divina essentia est pater’
duppliciter posset intelligi: si enim hoc nomen 'pater' tenetur adiective. cum dicitur 'divina essentia est pater', falsum est, est enim sensus: 'divina essentia est generans'; si vero substantive teneratur, verum est, ut sit sensus: 'divina essentia est ille quod est pater. [280rb] Obiecto argumenti. Iste terminus 'habet filium' in eadem significatione convenit isti mulieri et isti viro, sed ad predicationem istius termini de muliere, sequitur quod ipsa conceperit prolem, ergo ad predicationem istius termini de viro, sequitur quod ipsa prolem conceperit. Ne mireris si huiusmodi instantiis repellamus.

Anonymous *quaestio*, Munich Clm. 7622: [fol.46rb] Iste terminus in eadem significatione convenit patri et divine essentie vel in diversa. Si concedatur in diversa, ergo in ea significatione qua convenit patri removetur a divina essentia, ergo divina essentia non est pater, quod falsum est. Ergo in eadem significatione convenit patri et divine essentie, sed ad predicationem illius termini de patre, cum dico pater est pater, sequitur ergo generat. Ergo ad predicationem eiusdem termini de divina essentia, sequitur, si divina essentia est pater, ergo generat.

Anonymous *Summa*, BM Royal 9E XII: [fol.151va] in nulla significatione convenit patri iste terminus 'pater' in quam non conveniat divine essentie, sed ad predicationem istius termini de patre, sequitur quod pater generet; ergo ad predicationem eiusdem de divina essentia, sequitur quod divina essentia generet. Quare non provenit, cum de patre et non de divina essentia respective dicatur hoc nomen 'pater'. Obiecto. Iste terminus 'habens filium' in eadem significatione convenit viro huic et mulieri huic, sed ad predicationem de muliere sequitur quod concepit, ergo etc. Vel ita: esse eiusdem essentie cum patre in eadem significatione convenit filio et filiationi. Sed ad predicationem illius de filio, sequitur quod filius sit in patre, ergo etc.

3. *Glossa*, BM Royal 7F XIII: [fol.7vb] Item. Proprietas que predicatur de patre. cum dicitur 'pater generat', predicatur de divina essentia; igitur 'qui generat' predicatur de ea nomine. Sed iste
terminus 'generatio' quid significat eandem proprietatem quam hoc verbum 'generat'.

Instantia. Species que significatur hoc nomine 'homo', predicatur de omnibus hominibus; ergo omnes homines sunt homo.

Item. Idem esse patrem est generare. ergo cuicumque convenit hoc et illud. Sed divine essentie convenit esse patrem, ergo generare. Non sequitur. Non enim ait Augustinus: 'idem esse patrem et generare', sed: 'idem est patri esse patrem et generare.' Hec est intelligendum: idem essentia vel significatione, sed consecutione quia unum sequitur ad aliud. Vel, idem est etc., id est eiusdem proprietatis est uterque terminus, scilicet 'pater' et 'generare'.

Item. Bonum est argumentum a simplici conversa: pater filii dei est deus, ergo deus est pater filii dei; ergo quod predicatur in prima, subicitur in secunda, ergo divina essentia est pater filii dei, ergo filius dei est filius divine essentie, ergo divina essentia genuit filium. Ad quod dicimus quod licet argumentum bonum sit, non tamen quod predicatur in prima, subicitur in secunda. Instantia. Creator est deus, ergo deus est creator. Bonum est argumentum a simplici conversa; ergo quod subicitur in prima, predicatur in secunda, ergo idem est deum creatorem esse et deum esse quod filium est.

Item. Iste terminus 'pater filii dei' tantum hanc personam significat, ergo in eadem significatione predicatur de divina essentia vel removetur de divina essentia; si predicatur, ergo divina essentia est pater filii; si removetur, ergo divina essentia non est illa persona. Instantia. Hoc nomen 'homo' significat hanc speciem homo, ergo in illa significatione predicatur de istis hominibus vel removetur ab illis; si predicatur, ergo isti homines sunt homo; si removetur, ergo hec species homo non predicatur de eis. Nota quod iste terminus 'pater' accipitur substantive et adiective: substantive accepit, dicitur de divina essentia, adiective non. Unde iste propositio 'divina substantia est pater' sic potest distinguiri: 'divina substantia est pater', id est ille qui habet filium, sic verum est. Sed habet filium, si non est, et ut substantive accipiatur, concedi potest 'divina essentia est pater filii', adiective non.

Anonymous *Summa*, BM Royal 9E XII:

[fol.151va] Item. Proprietas que predicatur de patre, cum dicitur 'pater generat'. predicatur de essentia, ergo divina essentia generat. Obiecto. Species quod significatur
hoc nomine 'homo', predicatur de pluribus, ergo plura sunt homo. Item. Idem est esse patrem et generare.

Resepondemus, non habet auctoritatem idem esse patrem et generare, sed idem est patri esse patrem et generare, id est eadem est patris proprietas paternitas [151vb] que generatio et eiusdem proprietatis sunt isti termini 'pater' et 'generare'. Item. Divina essentia est pater filii dei, ergo filius dei est filius divine essentie, divina igitur essentia genuit filium. Item. Deus est dominus diaboli, ergo diabolus est servus dei. Vel divina essentia est spirator spiritus sancti, ergo spiritus sanctus spiratur a divina essentia vel negetur prima. Que tamen ita probari videtur. Necessarium est argumentum a simplici conversa: pater filii dei est deus, ergo deus est pater filii dei, ergo quod predicatur in prima, subicitur in secunda. Obiecto. Creator est deus, ergo deus est creator. Conveniens est argumentum a simplici conversa, ergo quod subicitur in prima. predicatur in secunda. Idem est ergo deum esse creatorem et esse deum. quod non concedunt.

Item. Iste terminus 'pater filii dei' tantum hanc personam significat, ergo in eadem significacione predicatur de divina essentia vel removetur ab ea. Si predicatur, ergo divina essentia est pater filii dei; si removetur, ergo divina essentia non est illa persona. Obiecto. Hoc nomen 'homo' significat hanc speciem homo, ergo in ista significacione predicatur de istis, vel removetur ab istis. Si predicatur, ergo duo homines sunt homo; si removetur, ergo hec species homo non predicatur de eis. Hoc quod iste terminus 'pater' sive 'pater filii' substantive accipitur secundum quod divina essentia est pater sive pater filii dei, id est ille quid habet filium; et adiective secundum quod non dicitur hic terminus de divina essentia, designato videlicet divinam essentiam habere filium sive generare.

Anonymous quaestio, Munich Clm. 7622:
[fol.46va] Instantia. Hec species homo predicatur de istis duobus, ergo isti duo sunt homo. Item. Pater filii est deus, ergo deus est pater filii. Bonum est argumentum a simplici conversa, ergo quod predicatur in prima, subicitur in secunda, et quod subicitur in prima, predicatur in secunda; ergo divina essentia est pater filii. Item. Divina essentia non est pater filii, hic removetur iste terminus 'pater', ergo illa propositio falsa est, ergo sua contradictoria est vera, scilicet essentia divina est pater
filii, ergo filius est filius divine essentie. Non sequitur. Licet enim homo et homines significant eandem speciem, non tamen removetur, illa species homo non est homines, vel potest falsum primum argumentum: Creator est deus, ergo deus est creator. Locus est a simplici conversa, ergo cum essentia divina in prima subiciatur, in secunda predicatur. Non sequitur, quia idem iam esset deum esse deum et esse creatorem.

Prepositinus of Cremona, *Summa* 4.5, p.218.11-15:

Peter of Capua, *Summa*, Munich Clm. 14508:
[fol.2rb] Nos vero sicut in subiecto, ita et in predicato concedimus divina essentia est pater filii, nec inde sequitur, ergo habet filium, nam coneditur secundum quod hoc nomen 'pater' ponitur substantive. Unde est concedendum, ergo est persona que habet filium, ipse vero concludit ac si teneretur adiective.

**APPENDIX B: Peter of Poitiers and the Sententie Udonis**

*Sententie Udonis*, Munich Clm. 7622:
[fol.4ra] Hac locutione fit sermo de filio; ergo illa locutione fit sermo de deo, quia de eo de quo fit sermo, dicitur veraciter quod sit alius a patre; ergo de eo veraciter dicitur quod sit alius a patre; ergo vere deus est alius a patre; sic igitur sunt plures dii. Quod tamen instantia potest falli: iste sacerdos cras suspendetur; hac locutione fit sermo de isto sacerdote; ergo de quodam homine; ergo de eo de quo veraciter fit sermo. Dicitur quod cras suspendetur; ergo de homine. Hoc dicitur veraciter; ergo homo cras suspendetur.

Peter of Poitiers, ISent.27, p.218.87-91:
Item, hac propositione fit sermo de deo: Filius est alius a Patre, et pro eo est vera de
quo sit sermo; ergo Deus est alius a Patre. Fallacia: iste sacerdos cras suspendetur; hac propositione fit sermo de homine, et de eo est vera pro quo fit sermo; ergo iste homo cras suspendetur.

APPENDIX C: Prepositinus of Cremona and Master Hubertus.

1. Prepositinus of Cremona, *Summa* 3.8, pp. 212-13:
Unde queritur in hoc loco utrum aliquid sit verum de essentia quod sit verum de persona. Et videtur quod nihil.

Si dicas quod aliquid sit verum de essentia quod sit verum de persona, quero quid. Si dicas essentiam esse verum est de persona, probo quod non; quia hoc nomen essentia non supponit pro persona, ergo essentiam esse non est verum de persona.

Forte dicet de essentia est verum ipsam esse, et de persona est verum ipsam esse, et ita idem. Sed contra sic: cum dico de essentia verum est ipsam esse, hic est sensus: de essentia verum est essentiam esse, et hoc est verum de persona; ergo essentiam esse est verum de persona; sed hoc nomen essentia non supponit pro persona; deinde ut supra.

Si dicat deum esse verum de essentia et idem de persona, probo quod non. Hoc nomen deus significat essentiam et supponit pro ea, ergo est proprium nomen eius. Ergo vel tantum supponit pro ea, vel equivoce accipitur. Sed non supponit tantum pro ea. Ergo equivoce accipitur, cum supponat pro essentia et cum supponat pro persona. Ergo non idem enuntiabile quod est verum de essentia et quod est verum de persona. Contra. Nihil est verum de essentia quod sit verum de persona. Ergo essentia non est persona.

Item, is aliqua res est persona, illa est essentia. Ergo si aliquid est verum de persona, illud est verum de essentia. Sed de persona patris est verum ipsam non esse filium. Ergo de essentia est verum ipsam non esse filium.

Solutio. Quidam dicunt nihil esse verum de essentia quod sit verum de persona. Unde dicunt non sequi: ergo essentia non est persona. Instantia: aliquid est verum de hoc nomine albus quod non est verum de hac voce albus; ergo hoc nomen non est hec vox. Vel sic: aliquid est verum de hoc sacramento quod non est verum de hac specie;
ergo hoc sacramentum non est hec species.

Alii dicunt quod quidquid est verum de persona, est verum de essentia, sed non convertitur. Unde dicunt: patrem non esse filium est verum de essentia. Ad illud argumentum - scilicet hoc; si aliquid est verum de persona, illud est verum de essentia; sed de persona patris est verum ipsam non esse filium; ergo de essentia est verum ipsam non esse filium - sic respondent. Quidquid est verum de patre est verum de deo. Sed de patre est verum ipsum non esse filium. Ergo de deo est verum ipsum non esse filium.

Master Hubertus, Summa, Munich Clm. 28799:

[fol.7ra] queritur an aliquid sit verum de persona quod non de essentia. Quod nichil probatur. Si enim dicat aliquid, queritur quid forte dicet essentiiam esse est verum et de persona et de essentia.

Sed contra. Quia hoc nomen ‘essentia’ non supponit pro persona. Si pro essentia, ergo essentiiam esse non est verum de persona. Quod si dicat ipsam esse est verum et de persona et de essentia. Sic contra, cum dico de essentia verum est ipsam esse, hic est sensus: de essentia verum est essentiiam esse et hoc idem verum est de persona, ergo de persona est verum essentiiam esse. Sed hoc supram improbatum est, vel sic, cum dicit de essentiia verum est ipsam esse hoc pronomen ‘ipsam’ refert essentiiam. Cum autem dicit de persona verum est ipsam esse, tunc refert personam. Sed non est idem esse personam et esse essentiiam; ergo non idem enuntiabile significatur utroque hic enuntiabile ipsam esse. Quod si dicat deum esse est verum de essentia et de persona. Sic contra. Hoc nomen ‘deus’ proprie et principaliter significat essentiiam et pro ea supponit; ergo est proprium nomen eius vel tantum supponit pro ea vel equivoce accipitur. Sed non tantum supponit pro ea, ergo equivoce [fol.7rb] accipitur cum supponitur pro persona et cum supponit pro essentia non ergo idem enunciabile quod est verum de essentia et quod est verum de persona. Ergo essentia non est persona. Item. Si aliqua res est persona, ipsa est essentia; ergo si aliquid est verum de persona, idem est verum de essentia.

Solutio. Quidam dicunt nil esse verum de essentia quod non sit verum de persona, nec tamen sequitur, ergo essentiia non est persona et hoc solum tale esse. Alii
dicunt quod quicquid est verum de persona est verum de essentia, sed non convertitur; unde patrem dicunt non esse filium, est verum de essentia. Ad primum ergo argumentum, scilicet quicquid verum de persona est de essentia et non e converso etc. Sic instant. Quicquid est verum de patre est verum de deo, sed de patre verum est ipsum non esse filium; ergo de deo verum est ipsum non esse filium.

2. Prepositinus of Cremona, *Summa* 3.1, pp. 207-8:

Et hoc probat auctoritas Augustini, qui dicit: 'Deo nihil aliud est esse essentiam quam esse personam, sed omnino idem'. Ergo, hoc nomen persona significat essentiam. Item, cum dico personam patris nihil aliud dico quam substantiam patris, ergo hoc nomen personam significat substantiam vel essentiam. Item, idcirco pater est persona, filius est persona, spiritus sanctus est persona, quia communis eis est id quod est persona. Sed nihil est eis commune nisi divina essentia. Ergo hoc nomen persona significat divinam essentiam [...] 

Item, pater est persona, hic est sensus: pater est essentia; filius est persona, similiter. Ergo cum dico: Pater et filius sunt persona, hic debet esse sensus: pater et filius sunt essentia. Et una est vera, ergo et alia, ergo ille due propositiones sunt vere. Vel sic: una est falsa, ergo et reliqua, ergo sunt simul false.


Master Hubertus, *Summa*, Munich Clm. 28799:

[fol. 5va] questio utrum idem sit deo esse essentiam quod esse personam. Quod probatur auctoritate Augustini qui ait: deo nihil est aliud esse essentiam quam esse personam, sed ominino idem. Idem alibi: cum dico personam patris nil aliud dico quam substantiam patris. Item. Idcirco pater est persona, filius est persona, spiritus sanctus est persona, quia commune esse eis id quod est persona. Sed nichil est eis
commune esse nisi sola divina essentia, ergo idem est deo esse personam quod esse essentiam [...] Item. Cum dico pater est persona, hic est sensus: pater est essentia. Similiter, cum dico filius est persona, sensus est: filius est essentia. Ergo cum dico pater et filius sunt persona, hic est sensus: pater et filius sunt essentia; sed una est vera, ergo et alia. Ergo ille due similes sunt vere, vel si una est falsa et reliqua. Item. Pater est persona. sensus est: pater est essentia, ergo in eius conversa, scilicet persona est pater, sensus est: essentia est pater vel hoc nomen ‘persona’ improprie accipitur in predicato; sed non ponitur improprie, cum nichil ibi ponatur quod trahat ad improprietatem, ergo cum dico persona est pater et filius, sensus est: essentia est pater et filius, ergo et hec: persona est pater et filius, ergo aliqua persona est pater et filius.

APPENDIX D: Garnier of Rochefort’s borrowing from Petrus Alfonsi

1. Garnier, PL 205.717A:
Octavam vero, quod est, ‘Elohim’, idem est, ac si dicerem, ‘Dii nostri’, et cuius singulare est ‘Eloah’.

Alfonsi, Dialogus, pp.75.36-76.1:
‘Eloym’ enim pluralitatem demonstrat, cuius singulare est ‘eloa’. Cum autem dico ‘elohay’, tale est, ac si dicerem ‘dei mei’, pluralitatem signando deorum et unam tantum dicentis personam, cum vero ‘elohem’ dico, quasi dicerem ‘dii nostri’.

2. Garnier, PL 205.217A:
Hinc etiam Laban ad Iacob ait: ‘Cur furatus es elohim’ (Gen 31, 30), id est deos meos. Et Moyses: ‘Non habebis elohim elim’ (Exodus 20, 3), id est deos alienos. Lot quoque illos duos, qui cum eo loquebantur, angelos, Adonai appellavit, id est Domini mei.

Alfonsi, Dialogus, pp.76.33-77.3:
invenimus in Genesi Loth angelos appellasse ‘adonay’, hoc est ‘domini mei’. quia


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