THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY
AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR
MODERN IDEALISM

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

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APRIL
1933
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ABSTRACT of the Thesis on

'THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY
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Chakradhar Dharmidhar Deohmukh. April, 1933.

It is characteristic of Idealism to study the nature of individuality by an examination of knowledge and value. The basic principle of individuality is revealed in the structure of experience. The organisation of the contents of human experience - theoretical and practical - can only be understood in terms of value. Value is the main clue to understand the nature of individuality. Even the apparent evil in life can be understood in terms of value.

The essence of the concept of teleology consists in the presence of value in the result and not in the full anticipation of the end. In the light of this analysis it is possible to understand the lower types of individuality in terms of the higher.

Human personality is distinguished from the lower types of individuality by the presence of self-consciousness. The development of the 'me' is largely a result of social intercourse, and the unification of the constituent 'selves' in the 'me' posits the operation of the Ideal Norm. The trans-subjective reality of the Norm is also responsible for the objective significance of human values.

The finite individual has a relative independence of his own. But the development of human personality is throughout conditioned by the sharing in the social and the divine life. The religious consciousness reveals the spiritual unity of all the finite individuals in an Infinite and supra-personal Life.

From the finite point of view the world of manifestation is characterised by its differentiation into a multiplicity of relatively independent and mutually distinct finite individuals. But it seems impossible to carry this multiplicity into the Eternal Manifestation which is the ground of Manifestation.
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THE TERM 'IDEALISM' has not any definite connotation on which its exponents or critics might be said to have been agreed. Idealistic philosophy has proved so elastic in the hands of philosophers that it has given rise to widely different systems which come into conflict with each other owing to their divergent doctrines on many important questions. Some philosophers have refused to use the term. Bosanquet, for instance, speaks of his philosophy as being speculative instead of idealistic. There is not any particular full-fledged system of doctrines which can exclusively call itself idealistic. At the same time it is possible to group together under that appellation a variety of systems animated by a common spirit and embodying certain fundamental tendencies.
Idealism may be broadly defined as a philosophy which attempts to understand man and the universe chiefly through the examination of the nature and the significance of ideas and ideals — of knowledge and value.

It is characteristic of idealism to regard the relation between the subject and the object as a starting point of philosophy and give in this relation a certain primacy to the subject. Descartes may be said to have founded Modern Idealism by his insistence on his dictum 'Cogito ergo sum'. In his conception of the subject as the only indubitable reality and as such a necessary starting point for philosophy he initiated a tendency of thought which was carried further by successive idealist thinkers with new results.

In England, Berkeley gave an unique expression to this tendency by evolving a system of spiritual pluralism in which matter came to be displaced by mind-dependent ideas. The world of objects is, on his view, entirely dependent on some mind — human or divine.

Berkeley arrived at this conclusion through the criticism of the representative theory of ideas. On this theory the individual was supposed to be enclosed
within the circle of his own ideas. It was only through the medium of his ideas that he could have any access to the world of external reality. But if the separation of ideas and the objects to which they refer is once accepted in principle, the existence of objects external to the individual becomes questionable since, ex hypothesi, he has access only to his ideas. Berkeley, therefore, dropped the world of external objects altogether and maintained that the esse of things is percipi.

The general criticism of this epistemological doctrine has been that while the act of perception is mental the object of perception is not mental. The object is certainly dependent on the subject for being known; but it is not for that reason so dependent for its existence. The cognitive relation is an external relation between the subject and the object, and both of them might exist even in the absence of that relation. The existence of any object, therefore, need not be dependent on any mind — human or divine.

We cannot hope to prove anything of great consequence to philosophy by insisting that we cannot know anything to exist unless by that very act it enters
our field of knowledge. This only means that the unknown thing cannot be proved to exist. So far as the actual dependence of the object on the mind is concerned we do not seem to be able to prove anything conclusively. On the one hand, the doctrine 'esse is percipi' may be true although it cannot be proved to be true. But whether true or false it does not help us to understand the true significance either of the subject or of the object.

The fundamental idealistic position is not so much staked upon this doctrine of Berkeley as upon the recognition of the self-validity and objectivity of knowledge. But on this point the idealistic position remains unshaken.

The validity or the objectivity of knowledge is intrinsic to itself and is incapable of being derived from anything else. It is quite legitimate to give a natural or physiological explanation of knowledge in so far as it is, from the limited point of view of psychology, a course of events in the mental history of some individual. But such an attempt will clearly break down when it comes to explaining the cognitive function of these mental events. The fact of there being a
judgment may possibly be explained on the lines of evolutionary naturalism, but the truth-value of judgment will still remain a mystery. But knowledge is not just one fact among others. It is a unique fact with a cognitive function. Any naturalistic explanation will fail to explain the capacity of mental events to be the medium of judgments which have an objective reference to a common world.

Nor can this result be avoided unless evolutionary naturalism involves itself in a circular argument. For any theory which pretends to explain the validity of knowledge presupposes that validity in claiming to be itself true. And if it throws doubt upon the general validity of knowledge it throws doubt upon its own validity, since it claims to be itself a part of knowledge. We are, therefore, driven to hold that while the genetic method may be legitimate for all the objects of knowledge, it is inapplicable to knowledge itself, qua knowledge, i.e. in its capacity for validity and objectivity.

Berkeley did not clearly see the full significance of the intrinsic objectivity and validity of knowledge. His epistemological doctrine that the
esse of things is percipi, which is sometimes supposed
to be the cardinal theory of idealism, had a tendency
to make knowledge a subjective attribute of the indivi-
dual.

The truth is that it is possible to look
upon ideas as mental events within the mind of the indi-
vidual or to look upon them as having a necessary objec-
tive reference to objects which are outside the indi-
vidual. When they are considered only from the former
point of view, in abstraction from the latter, we tend
to undermine the validity of all knowledge and pave the
way for some form of solipsism in which the individual
is imprisoned in his castle of private dreams without
any relation to other individuals or to the universe
at large.

When the ideas in the mind of the indivi-
dual are, thus, taken in complete abstraction from their
logical import they become one kind of facts among other
facts and are incapable of comprehending any part of
reality in the sense in which the object of knowledge
must be said to be included in knowledge. If we start
from the position of subjective idealism it is impossible
to know the inner mental states of the individual by
somehow bringing them mechanically into relation with reality.

The only way out of the impasse of subjectivism is to retrace our steps and attend to the logical import of ideas. From the epistemological point of view knowledge is the very opposite of a cage isolating the individual from reality. It takes him out of himself and directly establishes a contact with reality. Without such objective reference it would not only be incapable of being true but it would also be incapable of being false. In complete subjectivity there is no room either for truth or for a genuine falsehood.

Owing to the failure of Berkeley to recognise the intrinsic objectivity of knowledge, he could restore objectivity to his ideas only by reverting unconsciously to the representative theory of ideas which he himself attacked. Knowledge, in his view, was a result of the participation by the individual in the divine ideas. In knowledge the individual was supposed to participate in the mind of God. Being in the mind of God, ideas were not encased in the mind of any particular individual but were accessible to all individuals.

But although these ideas are supposed to exist in the mind of God they do not exist by themselves. They
are dependent on the mind of God for their existence. The only self-existing entities in the metaphysics of Berkeley are the spirits of finite individuals and God. Everything else is dependent on and derived from them. This idealistic principle of the primacy of the subject was, however, lost sight of in the system of Hume who carried the doctrine 'esse is percipi' to its logical extreme by resolving the spirit itself into a mere bundle of ideas.

On the continent idealism allied itself with rationalism and sought to counteract materialism. It is true that in Spinoza's pantheism the category of subject came to be replaced by the category of substance, which swallowed the individuality of man and God. But the rights of the subject were emphasized again by Leibnitz and Wolff even went so far as to attempt to deduce the world of objects from the laws of thought. We thus find in Wolff a logical fanaticism which exaggerates the importance of the mind at the expense of its objects. Kant, however, made the critical effort to adjust the rights of both.

Kant's critical idealism is built on the ruins of formalism and empiricism in their extreme forms. His main contribution to the study of the
nature of the subject has been to emphasize the part played by the activity of the human mind in the construction of the objects of experience. He showed that no experience is possible apart from the function of the Unity of Apperception through the application of the categories of the Understanding to the sensuous manifold. And this Unity of Apperception is not abstract but synthetic, not an entity but a function which lives in the synthesis of the objects of experience. Yet it is the very condition of there being any experience at all. This answered Hume and reinstated the subject.

Kant was, however, not equally successful in the attempt to reinstate the object. In spite of his uncompromising condemnation of subjectivism he himself gave the impression that the world of objects of experience is solely the work of the individual mind. He failed to emphasize the universality of the activity which creates the world of experience. Here Berkeley had the advantage of attributing the activity which creates the objective order not to any finite mind but to God. It has been said that Kant should have allowed to the principle which is not within us more kinship with the intelligence which is; Berkeley to us more kinship with the intelligence
which is not'.(1)

In his enthusiasm to emphasize the function of the individual mind in building the world of experience, Kant even went so far as to make the whole of knowledge a transcendental illusion. The distinction between the world of knowledge and an unknown reality behind it is a fundamental part of his philosophy. But as all agnosticism is a 'bed-ridden compromise' he was driven to seek some light on the nature of the noumenon by turning to the field of practical reason. He based his conclusions about the nature of reality on the implications of practical life. He thus initiated a line of thought which seeks in value the clue to the nature of reality.(2)

In the later development of German philosophy the unknown reality behind the known phenomena was quietly dropped and attempts were made to substitute for it the Ego as an Act, as in Fichte's practical Idealism, or a blind Will, as in Schopenhauer's

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(1) 'A comparison of Kant's Idealism with that of Berkeley.' Annual Philosophical Lecture to the British Academy by H.W.B. Joseph, p. 20.
(2) Kant's clear-cut distinction between faith and knowledge was an outcome of his view that knowledge is true not of the noumena but only of the phenomena.
system. It was, however, given to Hegel to take over the result of his predecessors and work out an imposing system of Objective Idealism.

Hegel insists that the Absolute is not to be conceived as a substance but as a subject. It is an immanent reality which is self-conscious. It lives in the development of Nature and Mind, but it is at the same time self-complete. It is 'the result together with its becoming.' It is both an eternally self-realized and complete self-conscious whole and the principle immanent in the process of development, characteristic of natural and human history.

The Absolute of Hegel is not a mere subject. Mere subject and mere object are abstractions. Both presuppose each other and are only aspects of one whole. The object is only an expression of the subject. The subject recognizes itself in the object and comes to self-consciousness through it.

All the manifestations of the spirit in Art, Morality, Religion, or Philosophy are, therefore, data relevant for the study of the subject. Every experience reveals the nature of the spirit. It is, therefore, full of significance for the attempt
to form a comprehensive notion of the self-conscious subject.

Hegelianism has been a powerful influence in modern British philosophy. But at the same time Berkeleianism, which sprang from the same soil, also remained an animating principle of thought. We can, thus, notice two tendencies of thought which have on the whole remained distinct. They give rise to two types of idealism.

The main difference between these two types has been clearly indicated by Hoernle. As he says, 'the type which follows Berkeley throws emphasis on the problem of existence, whereas the type which follows Hegel throws emphasis on the real nature of that which exists. The former builds its theory on the definition of existence. The latter strives to elicit a comprehensive view of the nature of the world as a whole from a reflective survey of all different forms of experience.' (1) The former culminates in some form of pluralism (theistic or atheistic) while the latter leads to some form of absolutism.

(1) Idealism, p. 146.
In T.H. Green we have one of the earliest and most prominent British Hegelians. In a review of John Caird's philosophy of religion he says, 'that there is one spiritual self-consciousness being of which all that is real is the activity and the expression; that we are related to this spiritual being not merely as parts of the world which is its expression, but as partakers in some inadequate measure of the self-consciousness through which it at once distinguishes itself from the world; that this participation is the source of morality and religion; this we take to be the vital truth which Hegel had to teach.' (1)

It is, however, interesting to notice that along with his strongly pronounced Hegelianism Green had a curious resemblance to Berkeley. Berkeley also held that real things are the expression of God's activity. For Green, however, God is not something essentially outside us and concealed behind his ideas. He is within us "communicating" his nature to us in Art, Morality, Philosophy and Religion.

Green followed Kant's lead in rejecting the sensational atomism of Hume. He brought out clearly that instead of regarding self-consciousness as one term in the series of impressions which it connects we must regard it as being basal for knowledge as well as morality. He also rejected the naturalistic explanations of consciousness which make it only one of the events in a succession of natural events, because these explanations could not account for the consciousness of succession. The unifying spiritual principle of self-consciousness has to be equally present to all the terms of the succession and is, therefore, essentially out of time.

Soon after Green's death a number of philosophers - among them Seth, Haldane, Bosanquet and Sorley - published 'Essays in Philosophical Criticism.' The dominating idealistic tendency of these writers was symbolized by its dedication to the memory of Green, and was brought out by Edward Caird in the preface. There he speaks of an agreement among them 'as to the direction in which inquiry may most fruitfully be prosecuted, rather than a concurrence in any definite results that have yet been attained by it.'
Inspired though these thinkers were by common idealistic principles it is but natural that they did not arrive at identical conclusions. While accepting self-consciousness as an ultimate category, Seth in his second series of Balfour Lectures rose in revolt against some aspects of Hegelianism. His protest was mainly directed against its 'radical error' in the 'identification of the human and the divine consciousness; or, to put it more broadly, 'the unification of consciousness in a single self.' (1)

This identification, he pointed out, depends upon the tendency 'to take a mere form for a real being - to take an identity of type for a unity of existence.' The doctrine of the universal self is thus accused of substantiating an abstraction, of taking for a real existent the notion of the logical unity of all knowledge. In one school of Idealism there is thus a deep suspicion of the abstract universal and an unwillingness to surrender the rights of man and God.

But the question of the nature of the individual

(1) Hegelianism and Personality, p.215.
was also taken up by another Idealistic school of thought whose chief exponents were Bradley and Bosanquet. This school was more closely allied with Hegelianism although it was equally critical about some of its aspects. It sought to analyse the content of the consciousness of the individual and put it to the severe test of inclusiveness and consistency. Bradley employed his damaging dialectic to undermine the validity of the concept of the self as something ultimate, on the ground that it is riddled with contradictions. In his Absolute, therefore, all the finite selves are somehow transmuted. And it is in itself far from being anything like a self. In the metaphysics of Bosanquet the absolute is conceived as a kind of individual but it leaves no room for any finite individuals. It includes all finite individualities but they are so transmuted in its existence that they have no independent existence of their own. The problem of individuality thus becomes the central problem in Modern Idealism.
The concept of individuality.

All that exists is individual. Neither the particular nor the universal can exist by itself. Both are abstractions from the total nature of existents. The particular exists in and through the universal and the universal exists in and through the particular. Nor can we form an adequate concept of the individual on the analogy of a bare point of existence in space or of a kind of indivisible atom. There is no 'that' without a 'what'. Individuality is not constituted by a kind of centre without a circumference. It is both the centre and the circumference. And the problem is whether there is any principle by which to determine what that centre or circumference is.

It seems that with regard to the consti-
tuents of so-called inorganic nature much of what little of individuality we see in them is really projected into them by us, according to the specific purposes, with which we are at the moment concerned. Thus, a page is regarded as one, while we are engaged in reading the book; but if we want to place the book in the shelf, the individuality of the page is swallowed up in the individuality of the book. What is called a 'thing' is that part of reality which serves some purpose — (practical or theoretical) — of the person who is concerned with it. An electron is a 'thing' from the point of view of the physicists in so far as it subserves some theoretical purpose. A mountain is a 'thing' in so far as it obstructs the way or protects the frontier or shelters the people from cold winds.

But the vast immensity of 'inanimate' nature does not necessarily break itself into such 'things'. There are many portions of nature which seem to have no real and direct relation to purely human purposes, except perhaps in a remote and purely theoretical way. And the question arises as to the kind of individuality, if any, which belongs to these portions or their constituents.

It will be seen in the chapter on Teleology that there is
nothing that excludes the possibility that these constituents are really some kind of rudimentary organisms whose nature as organisms we are unable to appreciate owing to our incapacity to understand or enter into their purposes. On the contrary, it is very probable that this is so.

It is only when we come to the bona-fide organisms of which biology takes cognisance, that we seem to get some principle helping us to determine the individuality inherent in the object itself, apart from the obstruction or furtherance of the purposes of others. An organism does seem to have, through its sensibility, a certain capacity to appreciate, in some rudimentary way, the round of its life. It comes to have individuality in virtue of this capacity. The individuality of an organism is not primarily due to the structure of its body but to its capacity to appreciate in some way its own existence. (1)

(1) From the point of view of merely bodily existence, the unity of the organism is a matter of degree and may be included in or inclusive of similar unities. The relation between the parent organism and the embryo is, for example, an instance of indistinct entities, the former including the latter. The mere presence of differentiation and integration cannot make of the body a genuine whole. It would still lack real individuality if it is totally devoid of value.
The organised body is the condition of the vital activities of the life of the organism; but it does not in itself constitute the essence of its individuality. Apart from its life and in the capacity of being a mere body the organism cannot have, on the ground of its special structure any more claim to individuality than the 'thing'. But life or any vital activity can ultimately be distinguished from the motions in inanimate nature by introducing, in some sense, the notion of value. Only in so far as an organism has or can have some kind of value can it, therefore, have any individuality.

In human personality, the principle of individuality is more clearly expressed because of the presence of self-consciousness. Man not only has value but he knows himself as having value. He exists for himself and has value for himself. It is self-consciousness that distinguishes personality as such from other types of individuality. The existence of self-consciousness, however, makes possible the emergence of a type of individuality which is not only different from, but higher than the type of individuality which is possible below the level of self-consciousness. The individuality of a person is higher in virtue of his capacity to pursue
and realise the higher values of moral and religious consciousness.

There seem to be two ways of looking at human personality. It is possible to look upon a man from the standpoint of an observer or from the standpoint of the man himself. From the standpoint of the observer the individuality of a person consists of an evergrowing series of events or effects partly or wholly initiated by him. But as the causal series of events is never complete but always in the making, any limitation of the reality or the individual is, from this point of view, bound to be more or less artificial. From the standpoint of the man himself, his reality is constituted by his own direct experience. It will be seen that the contents of his experience are also constantly increasing. The contents of his experience are not a fixed quantity. (1) It is, therefore, not possible to assign any definite limits to his existence on the basis of these contents of his experience.

(1) It is even unscientific to look upon either birth or death as necessarily limiting the scope of his experience. His linear existence as an experient admits of indefinite extension at both ends, from a theoretical point of view.
It is true that everyone feels within himself that he does exist for himself and is aware of his self-identity in spite of and in and through the changing contents of his experience. But as this amounts to a bare affirmation of his existence we have to look to something else to determine his nature. One promising way of understanding his nature is to examine not the specific contents but the general structure of his experience. The examination of this structure reveals that in spite of the diverse and sometimes even conflicting elements of his consciousness, there is in him a principle of organisation. This principle introduces some order into the contents of his theoretical as well as of his practical consciousness. And the essence of this order consists not in the bare absence of inconsistency or conflict but in the significance it has for the individual. The individuality of human beings, no less than that of other organisms, is constituted by their capacity to be bearers of value. Value, then, is the clue to the understanding of individuality.

Whatever is individual is unique in some sense. In the lowest types of individual existents this uniqueness is probably mainly constituted by the occupation of a special place in space or by living through
a particular period. This, however, does not give us really significant uniqueness. Significant uniqueness is not a matter of merely being in some way different from any other than these existents. Therefore, in order to get clear instances of significant uniqueness we have to come to the realm of persons or self-conscious individuals. Their uniqueness is mainly constituted by the uniqueness of the purpose or the purposes animating their life. But the concept of purpose throws us back upon the value towards which it is directed. Value is, therefore, the principle which makes any existents either individual or unique.

Since value is most clearly expressed in human individuality, it seems obvious that analysis of the nature of human personality would yield fruitful results in the interpretation of the nature of the individuality of organisms or of the constituents of what is usually considered to be inanimate nature. But sometimes an attempt is made to explain the realm of persons in biological terms or to understand the realm of persons as well as the realm of merely organic life with the help of naturalistic categories.

The naturalistic explanations make light of the
prima-facie variety and the individuality which characterise the concrete world of facts. In this procedure all facts come to be treated as mere instances of some blind and invariable abstract general law. The operation of some mathematical and mechanical uniformities together with some primary constituent elements of an identical type is supposed to be the reality of that which appears as varied and individual. The naturalistic explanations are inspired by the old and faulty logic of abstract universals which have a multiplicity of instances. And this implies a grudging recognition of the individuality of the actual existents. But the aim of knowledge is not to stamp out or explain away the multiplicity and the variety of the world of experience but only to introduce order into it. A true explanation of the world of experience must do justice both to the unity and the multiplicity of the concrete world of facts. Any adequate explanation, therefore, needs to be governed by the concept of a 'concrete universal' running in and through the multiplicity and the differentiations of its constituents. It is a dominant principle which at once sustains and explains the individuality of its parts.
WE HAVE SEEN that naturalistic explanations involve a faulty logic and erroneous assumptions. It is not, therefore surprising that they meet with a limited measure of success in the realm of what is generally taken to be inanimate matter, where individuality is least pronounced. But even in this realm the limited success is attained by deliberately omitting from consideration those characteristics which make the existents individual. And the fixity of laws which is apparently characteristic of this realm may be due to this deliberate abstraction. The natural sciences, as distinguished from history, are not primarily interested in the constituents of their subject-matter, qua individual existents. They are explicitly concerned with general laws.
But even if we examine the ideal of a purely mechanical explanation it will be seen that such an explanation cannot explain everything in terms of only general laws or fixed uniformities. It posits along with these uniformities some kinds of ultimate constituents of matter. The uniformities are conceived to operate on and through some molecules or atoms or electrons. And whatever else these ultimate constituents of matter might be they are individual existents which are as much requisites of a mechanical explanation as the uniformities themselves. They cannot themselves admit of a further explanation in terms of mechanical uniformities, and have to be accepted for what they are. These ultimate constituents are supposed to be exactly like one another for the sake of convenience. And in so far as science is not interested in them as individual existents the supposition might be perfectly legitimate for its own purpose. But the supposition might nevertheless be wrong from the philosophical point of view since the uniqueness of the constituents may be indiscernible but not non-existent. Like organisms they too have a structure of their own. And they might all be having some degree of individuality.
But whatever limited success the purely naturalistic categories may have in the realm of matter they clearly break down when we come to the consideration of higher types of individuality.

In the organic order, the realm of life the application of naturalistic categories becomes quite indefensible. It is true that even here it is possible to consider only some of the aspects of the living beings and apply the naturalistic categories to them with a certain measure of success. But this method leaves unexplained the special characteristics of organic life.

It is not possible to look upon the organism as a kind of a machine. Unlike a man-made machine the organism keeps itself in a working order in spite of — or rather in and through its metabolism. The organism is constantly changing the material of which the body is constituted. There is the assimilation of new matter in the form of food and there is a constant elimination of worn out or unnecessary matter. But although the organism is thus constantly recreating its own material, it yet remains a self-maintaining whole. But a man-made machine does not, like this, maintain itself through the constant creation of its parts.
There is also a radical difference of principle in the manner in which the organism comes into existence and the manner in which the machines come to be created. A machine is built by the bringing together of parts which exist previously to the machine. But the constituent parts of the organism are creations of a process of dissociation of the germ-cell. The parts of a machine are, therefore, relatively independent of the whole in which they enter. The organism, on the other hand, is in a sense prior to its parts. It creates its own parts for the sake of itself. To put it paradoxically it creates itself.

The breakdown of the mechanical categories in the explanation of biological reproduction has been well brought out by J.S. Haldane, in a symposium of the Aristotelian Society. 'For a mechanical explanation,' he says, 'the reacting parts must first be given. Any mechanism there may be in the parent organism is absent in the process of reproduction and must reconstitute itself at each generation from a mere tiny speck of its own body.' There can, therefore, be no mechanical explanation of the coming into being of a new organism.
But even if we examine the structure of its body when it is fully built up, we have to postulate a teleological as distinguished from the purely mechanical action in the processes of which it is the outcome. The constituent parts of the individual organism are adapted to the interests of the whole. The life of the organism is something over and above the life of its constituent parts. It has a unity of its own which it maintains in and through the variety and multiplicity of its parts.

It is true that a machine, too, seems to be a whole of a kind, having unity of its own, over and above the multiplicity of its parts, owing to some specific purpose through the instrumentality of its parts, but none of the parts can by themselves serve that function. But the unity of the organism is of a kind different from this unity of a machine. The machine serves the purpose of its designer without in any way sharing that purpose itself. The purpose of the machine is thus completely extraneous to itself. But in the case of the organism there is no extraneous purpose to serve. Even when it serves the purpose of its species it does so by making that purpose its own. Any purpose, therefore, which the organism may have is entirely immanent in itself. The organism, unlike
a machine, has an intrinsic value of its own, and its parts are so adapted as to subserve and maintain this value which belongs to itself as a whole.

The purposive adaptation of the parts of the organism to its interests is discernible under such a variety of circumstances and becomes effective in the face of so many obstacles that it cannot be an accidental result of mechanical interaction between the organism and its environment. To take only one instance given by Driesch, if I cut the head of a Tubularia 'a new head is restored by the combined work of many parts of the stem... Furthermore if you cut out of Tubularia stem pieces which are less than ten millimeters in length you will find the absolute size of the head restored to be in close relation to the length of the stem-piece.'

We have here an analogue of intelligent and purposive behaviour of the organism as a whole. An organism goes on making all kinds of effort until the particular purpose of its activity is served. If a particular kind of action does not subserve its purpose it tends to vary its efforts within the range of its imagination until the purpose of the initial activity is thereby attained. And the specific efforts are adapted to the needs
of the situation within the limits of its intelligence. In more or less the same way, the organic processes seem to be controlled by the operation of some principle(1) of selective synthesis, which is guided by the interests of the whole. Organic activity, thus, seems to be essentially teleological.

(1) Driesch suggests that this something which controls the organic processes is a non-spatial entelechy. The principle of 'individualising causality' which is responsible for the 'dynamic-teleological processes' within the organism must not be conceived as being an extraneous entity. It is not just one element interacting with other elements. Although Driesch emphasises the non-spatial nature of the entelechy it remains something external to the natural processes within the organism, acting upon them, as it were, from outside. This action of the entelechy ab extra would be very much like mechanical action - the protests of Driesch notwithstanding.

The principle which controls and directs the processes is immanent to the organism. The conception of the 'elan vital' or life force, avoids the necessity of importing a host of entities from outside, since it is not an extraneous entity but an immanent principle. But the concept of 'elan vital' is vague. It is supposed to be an immense potentiality to cope with matter, and is essentially creative. But its adaptability as well as creativeness remain vague until they are related with the concept of value. The concept of 'nirvana' suggests a rising in relation to some value and emphasises the essentially teleological nature of the immanent principle and is, therefore, more comprehensive and adequate than the concept of the 'elan vital'.
It is not possible to account for the function of the parts by reference to a structure existing prior to such a function as a result of accidental modifications introduced in the organism by a mechanical impact of its natural environment. It is true that the function cannot exist without structure. But the function is not a result of a de-facto structure existing on its own account, without any reference to the function. The function is on the contrary that for the sake of which the structure comes into being. The development of any organs of the organism is controlled and directed by the specific features of the environment with which it has to cope. But the creation of a useful organ presupposes an operation of a principle which responds to its environment not in a mechanical and blind way but in a way which will secure the maintenance of itself and its species. There is, thus, purposive adaptation of the organism to its environment. As a matter of fact, the essentially creative purposiveness of the principle which is immanent in the life of the organism becomes clear when we take into consideration the fact that it not only adapts itself to its environment but also adapts the environment to itself, within certain limits.

The teleological action of the organic processes,
however, seems to be different from the teleological action characteristic of any consciously purposive behaviour. The category of teleology in biology is different from the same category as used in psychology. The vital phenomena seem to be 'blind'. It is misleading to interpret them on the analogy of a person who realises his conscious purpose with a deliberate plan and foresight. In the development of an embryo the germ does not seem to have any conscious plan about the type of organism which it seeks to become. The constituent parts of the organism serve some useful function in the life of the organism, but they cannot, therefore, be considered to be the work of an intelligent similar to that of the architect. The germ-cell cannot be credited to have foreseen its own needs and to have provided for them in advance by evolving suitable organs.

When, however, we come from the field of biology to the field of psychology, we find that the conscious behaviour of an individual organism involves the operation of a planning intelligence which has a foresight of the end which it is sought to attain through the activities. The activity of planning as seen in human behaviour, involves
the anticipation of a potential future and acting in reference to it. (1)

Owing to this influence of the future on the present in human behaviour, we have in the realm of persons not only the breakdown of purely naturalistic but also of biological categories. The prima facie difference between the purposive action of human beings on the one hand, and the mechanical or organic action on the other hand was also shown clearly by J.S. Haldane, in the same symposium of the Aristotelian society to which I have already referred. 'In the physical or physiological actions,' he points out, 'one object reacts directly with another in space; the reaction is immediate or blind. Into conscious action both the actual past and the potential future enter directly also.... A psychological object is, thus, in dynamic relation with other objects not only in space, surrounding it, not only in space but also in time.' The object of the plan cannot be in a physical

(1) The capacity of planning belongs perhaps even to some higher animals; but it is most pronounced and clear in human beings.
or mechanical relation with the individual simply for
the reason that it does not exist prior to its realisation.
It exists, in a sense, not in the present but in the future.

It is true that the plan of the object as distin-
guished from the object of the plan is a force which is
operative in the consciousness of the individual in the
present. But it is not the sensory or motor constituents
of the idea but its meaning which can really help us to
understand the planned action. (1) And the content of

(1) That is the meaning of an idea and not merely its
psychic constituent elements which really accounts for the
consciously purposive acts of the individual. This will
become clear from the following instance. An individual
might be warned that his life is in danger and as a result
of this warning he might take some course of action which
is calculated to save himself. His action is solely guided
by the meaning of the warning, irrespective of whether it is
communicated to him by some gesture or in writing or by speech
and whether it is given to him in English, Chinese Hebrew or
Esperanto; (assuming that he is a linguist); although his
sensory constituents of the idea in these different cases
will be different.

Coming to the motor-constituents of his idea, we find
that the course of the action, which the individual takes
can be truly purposive only when it is determined by
the automatic release of the impulse excited by the warning.
in order to be truly purposive, the individual must control
his action by an intelligent appreciation of the nature of
this situation and an insight into its potential development.
If he can save his life by combating the particular situa-
ton he will try to overcome it; but if he can save his life
only by escaping he will take resort to a different mode of
action.
this meaning is not merely an object in the present but a probable object in the future.

In the realm of persons, therefore, it is seen that the action of the individual can be controlled by an intelligent appreciation of the results which they tend to bring about. In other words, the notion of value

It is, therefore, the meaning which the individual reads in the situation, as a result of the warning which can ultimately explain his purposive behaviour.

This is not to suggest that the warning or the situation can have any meaning for the individual in the absence of certain de facto psychic factors in his mind. The intelligent purpose does not just hang in the air but is necessarily connected with the psychic apparatus of the individual. But although the existence of a purpose is, thus, conditioned by the existence of such an apparatus, it does not constitute its meaning. The meaning involves an objective reference to the situation. And the reference is not merely to the existing situation but also to the potential future implicit in it.
alone helps us to understand the action of the individual.

It is not, therefore, surprising that the naturalistic accounts of human individuality are not adequate to account for its specific features. It would be a miracle if either knowledge or value emerged accidentally as a result of the operation of blind and mechanical uniformities on 'thoughtless' atoms or electrons. It seems that mechanical categories do not do full justice even to the constituents of the physical world, when they come to be considered in their individuality, instead of as mere types or instances of some concept. But the breakdown of the mechanical categories becomes more evident when we come to the realm of organic life or the realm of persons.

We thus find that it is futile to try to understand the higher types of individuality with the help of categories which are primarily divided to understand the lower types of individuality. Organic individuality cannot be explained in purely naturalistic terms. Nor can the realm of persons cannot be adequately explained in purely naturalistic or biological terms.
IV.

TELEOLOGY.

IT WAS SEEN in the last chapter that any attempt to understand the higher types of individuality with the help of such categories as may be adequate for the lower types of individuality must fail. The specific features of the conscious behaviour of persons as well as those of the vital activities of organic life demand the introduction of new categories. We are, therefore, unable to discern any intelligible principle of continuity running through the various types of individuality, by following the procedure of explaining the higher by the lower. It, however, still remains open for us to seek for that principle of continuity between the different types of individuality by an attempt to understand the lower type of individuality in terms of the higher. By following this new procedure it may be possible to bridge the gulf between
the planning teleology of human behaviour, the immanent
teleology of organic processes and the apparent mechanism
of inorganic nature.

A close examination of the planning teleology reveals that it is instrumental to the realisation of an
immanent purpose largely beyond the consciousness of
minds which contribute to its realisation. Human acts
seem to subserve a purpose which is larger and sometimes
very different from any different purpose which might
have been contemplated by any of the agents. The inven-
tion of the steam engine and the spinning jenny was
certainly paving a way for the industrial revolution
and yet we cannot attribute any such intention to the
inventors. Similarly we find that Darwin paved a way
for Bergson, Newton for Einstein, or the discovery of the
Hertzian waves for the widespread use of the wireless
in education and politics. As Bosanquet has pointed out,
in history we discern the principle of a teleology beyond
though exhibited in finite consciousness. * (1) *It is

(1) The principle of Individuality and Value, p. 154.
impossible,' he says 'to attribute to finite consciousnesses as agents the identity of agents within finite consciousness as a whole. This identity is exhibited in a development which springs from a linked action of separate and successive finite consciousnesses in view of the environment.' (1)

'Every step of this development, though in itself intelligent and teleological is in relation to the whole unconscious; and the result is still a 'nature' though a second and higher nature.' (2)

It is true that we do not find from our observation of the course of human history a complete and unbroken harmony and correlation of all human actions so as to exhibit some definable and coherent purpose. But it is equally true that with the increase of rational and moral element in human action elimination of all unmeaning conflict and a gradual emergence of significant harmony becomes possible. All human acts in so far as they are rational - however independent in origin - have, in fact, such significant bearings on each other that they actually make for a condition of life which in

(1) The principle of Individuality and Value, p. 154.
(2) Ibid. p. 153.
its totality is found to realise greater value than could have been contemplated by any of the agents of these acts. (1)

The prevision of the ends which human agents contribute to realise is on their part very limited and sometimes even faulty. And yet the history of their acts seems to involve an operation of an immanent purposiveness which is very largely above any or all of them. We thus find that certain phases in the history of mankind have value and that these are necessarily conditioned by the existence of certain previous phases. And these previous phases are constituted by acts of human agents who are consciously purposive, although their anticipation of the future is limited and imperfect in varying degrees.

A fruitful way out of this difficulty would be to disassociate the idea of teleology from full conscious

(1) It is not here suggested that human beings are merely tools in the hands of some external power which works like human minds, by having a conscious design about some 'far-off divine event'. They do not seem to be used merely as a means to an end which is entirely extraneous to themselves. They seem to be sharing, to a certain extent, in the creative and significant activity of the universe. They share its End, in some degree, however imperfect that sharing may be.

In fact, it seems that at the higher levels the creative activity exists only in and through the universe finite individuals.
anticipation of the end realised. What is necessary for justifying a teleological interpretation of living beings is not the full conscious anticipation of the result actually attained but the presence of value in the result. In the words of Hoernle, 'Where B requires A as the condition of its existence, there B has value, we can reasonably say that B is that for the sake of which A exists.' (1)

In fact, the mere presence of conscious anticipation of the end is not sufficient to justify the application of the category of teleology unless the end attained has a value. This will be clear from the consideration of some types of ideomotor action. An individual who is learning to ride a bicycle, for instance, may actually drive it against a tree in his anxiety to avoid it, owing to his attention being fixed upon it. The collision with the tree is, in this case, brought about by the individual himself with full conscious anticipation of the result. But in so far as there is no value in the result the action

The only requisites of teleological action, then, seem to be that:

1. the action should be accompanied by some degree of consciousness,
2. that it should be the outcome of a conative attitude,
3. that it should result in the creation of some value whether it happens to be partly or fully beyond the anticipation of the consciousness of the agent.

In the light of such analysis it seems possible to bridge the apparent gulf between the immanent teleology which is characteristic of organic activity and the conscious purposiveness which is characteristic of human individuality.

It is characteristic of organic individuality that the functioning of the parts of the whole is determined by the 'requirements' of the whole. But as Hobhouse pointed out (1), the organic activity will resolve itself into mechanical activity if the 'requirements' of the whole express themselves as a

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force, a push or a pull, or

2- it will resolve itself into a species of
purposive activity if it expresses itself as
'uneasiness' or a felt want.

it has been seen that the first alternative of
interpreting the way in which the 'requirements' of the
organism express themselves has to be given up as being
unsatisfactory. Blind mechanism cannot in any way lead
to the creation of a value. But the organism which
comes into being as a result of organic activity has a certain
value of its own. And in so far as the organic activity
leads to the creation of an individual existent which has
value, it cannot be purely mechanical. But the other
alternative of interpreting the way in which the 'require-
ments' of the organism are met still remains open. (2)

The analogy between the conscious purposiveness of
human behaviour and the immanent teleology of organic pro-
cesses is further strengthened by two considerations.

(1) It would even seem to be indicated by the fact that
the organic processes (as in the case of Driesch's Tubula-
ria) like conscious purposive behaviour, seem to exhibit
the evidence of persistence with varied efforts until a
particular end, with some value, is reached.
1- On the one hand, as seen in the last chapter, the constituents involved in the organic processes cannot be credited with any full prevision of the ends actually attained through them. But even the planning of human beings itself seems to contribute a greater immanent purposiveness which is at times totally beyond their consciousness.

2- On the other hand, since conative activity might exist along with varying grades (1) of consciousness, a very rudimentary conative activity may be experienced even by the constituents of organic processes.

(1) Compare, for instance, the habitual and deliberate purposive actions in human behaviour.

(2) The major difficulty in attributing even a very low grade of consciousness to the constituents involved in organic processes would probably be the absence of the nervous system. But as the nervous system is only an instance of the specialisation of function, it seems to be the condition only of the higher grades of consciousness.

There are no traces of nervous organisation in the lowest known organisms, (the amoeba for instance). And these must be credited with some kind of consciousness, unless there is a fundamental discontinuity of principle between the lower and the higher organisms. The constituents involved in organic processes, e.g., cells, seem to be themselves organisms in so far as they live on some kind of food and reproduce themselves. But if the amoeba may have some rudimentary consciousness, why can the cells not have it?
In view of these facts a comparison—drawn by MacDougall—between a low form of conative activity like the construction of the comb by the bees and the organic activity of the construction of the bone by the cells becomes very illuminating. As McDougall says, 'None of the bees ... consciously forms a plan of the whole structure and directs the building operations as a whole. But each bee is a teleological agent exercising a lowly form of intelligence and purpose and the natures of all the bees are so nicely adjusted to one another that their joint efforts bring about, in a new way which we do not fully understand, the adaptations of the growing system structure to all the special circumstances that obtain and arise in the course of the work. (1) The construction of a bone might be essentially of the same nature as the construction of a comb.

The cells do not have a conscious plan about the entire structure which they build, but their activity may nevertheless be teleological like that of the bees, although at a still lower grade of consciousness.

(1) Modern Idealism p. 160-1
The cell, the bee and a human being are all alike in their capacity to produce values beyond their consciousness. It therefore, seems possible to assimilate organic teleology to purposive activity.

When we come to consider the physical nature which is generally looked upon as inanimate, the extension of teleology to this realm involves some difficulties but is by no means indefensible. The concept of the mechanical as distinguished from the teleological action is regarded by science to be more adequate for this realm. But it might help us to resolve the antithesis of the mechanical and teleological action by submitting the concept of mechanical action to logical criticism. The concept of mechanical action is inapplicable when we are concerned with any genuine whole. It posits a mere aggregate of parts which can exist independently of the aggregate. They are also supposed to be capable of existing independently of each other. The action of the aggregate as a whole may be very complex, but, is explicable in terms of mathematical laws, as it is determined by the forces which are exerted by all the parts. But in the light of such analysis it is clear that (1) the very possibility of the action and interaction between the different parts of an aggregate, implies
that their independence is not absolute but relative and, that the action of the parts themselves cannot itself be mechanical, in so far as there are no further parts of the part to determine their action.

In fact, some eminent scientists, like Sir Arthur Eddington, believe that ultimately all uniformities fail us in explaining even purely physical actions. All that we can do is to draw a forecast of a probable action basing it on the averages drawn from empirical observation. But there is no rigid and invariable determination of action even in the physical realm. The principle of indetermination seems to be at the very heart of physical reality.

Apart from the logical difficulties involved in the concept of mechanical action, and the practical difficulties in actually understanding physical action with the application of that concept, there are other philosophical reasons why the mechanical categories should be given up even from the realm of physical nature. Philosophy seeks to find out a principle of continuity between the various orders of reality. We cannot look upon them as discontinuous and unrelated to each other. In the light of this consideration the concepts of mechanical and teleologi-
cal action have to be treated as being incompatible with each other. The mechanical action is blind, in the sense that it has nothing to do with value. While as we have seen, the essence of teleological action consists in its capacity to lead to the production of some value, we must look for some comprehensive and unitary principle which will bring together the different realms of reality, we are entitled to be less suspicious about teleology than about mechanism. For we are directly and intimately acquainted with teleological action in our daily life, while mechanism is at best a postulate of science for its limited purposes.

Moreover, while we cannot explain teleological activity if we start from purely blind uniformities, we can explain the appearance of mechanism — and it may be, for all we know, only an appearance — if we start from teleological action. In the words of James Ward, 'while it may be possible setting out from mind to account for mechanism, it is impossible setting out from mechanism to account for mind.' (1)

(1) Realm of Ends, p.18.
When an action which in the beginning is completely purposive is repeated again and again it becomes habitual. Walking, for instance, involves in the beginning a deliberate and purposive control and movement of the muscles. When a child learns to walk we do not get the same type of more or less uniform and almost automatic movements which are characteristic of the walking of a man. It has to make several attempts and deliberately stamp out unsuccessful essays in walking until it learns to walk, without much specific attention on its part. Walking, as an expression of habit is characterised by a certain amount of regular and uniform action which is varied only when the man encounters some out-of-the-way situation. If, for instance, he is crossing the rails while a train is coming towards him he walks more quickly than is usual with him. So, in spite of apparent mechanisation of his behaviour, he is able to vary it purposively in case there is any need for such variation. This shows that the mechanical uniformity is only an apparent feature of his really purposive action.

The mechanical uniformities of nature might be, for all we know, essentially of the nature of long-standing habits. Instead of saying that habit is second nature, we
might with truth say that nature is probably second habit. It therefore seems that like organic teleology, mechanical action is also capable of being assimilated to purposive behaviour.

As we have seen, the idea of the machine itself is bound with the notion of a purpose. But as in the case of the machine the purpose involved in external, it is possible to consider it in complete abstraction from the purpose for which it exists and to consider its working as being due to forces which have no reference to this purpose. It is not unlikely that the constituents of matter are some kind of wholes which have a capacity of having some dim and rudimentary purposes the nature of which we are not in a position to understand or appreciate. And in treating them as having a capacity only for mechanical action, we might be unconsciously looking upon them in abstraction from their purposiveness.

It is not improbable that the constituents of the so-called 'inorganic nature' might themselves be some kind of rudimentary organisms, although we are unable to determine their nature or structure. As Bradley asks, 'Can we assume, because we have found out the nature of some
organisms, that we have exhausted that of all? (1) 
The parts of nature might be constituents of some kind of organisms which are not like our bodies.

The important features of an organism are
1- the organisation of its body, and
2- the presence of value.

The organisation of the body is, when viewed in abstraction from value, only a definite pattern or structure. But some kind of structure is also characteristic of crystals or molecules on atoms. As far as value is concerned it is not possible to ascertain its non-existence in the constituents of matter. All that may perhaps be said about their value is that we do not definitely know that it characterises these constituents. But even this ignorance is not so complete as it is supposed to be. The great nature poets and the mystics have intuitively felt the value of physical nature.

Philosophical speculation cannot rest satisfied in an unreconciled dualism of the animate and the inanimate

(1) Appearance and Reality, p. 271.
world and must seek to introduce intelligible continuity in the diverse orders of reality. Any dualism between the two orders confronts us with the enigma of the origin of life. It has also been seen in the last chapter, that the naturalistic attempt to assimilate life to mechanical action is bound to fail. On the other hand, the extension of teleological activity and life to the inorganic realm involves no theoretical difficulties and seems on the whole justified on philosophical grounds. (1) The attempt to understand the lower types of individuality in terms of the higher is thus more successful.

(1) Even from the purely scientific point of view the distinguishing line between the 'animate' and the 'inanimate' is ever receding further and further into the domain of the latter.
V.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

WE HAVE SEEN that the principle of interpreting the lower types of individuality is more sound and fruitful than the principle of interpreting the higher types by the lower. In human beings we get the highest type of individuality known to us. The distinguishing feature of human individuality is not so much consciousness as self-consciousness.

The individual becomes aware of his self-identity only through the activity which helps him to build a systematic world of diverse and related objects out of the flux of presentations given to him through his senses. It is through the awareness of the identity of his object of knowledge that the self comes to be aware of its own identity.
It is as if the self were to say to itself, 'I have seen this thing yesterday and I see the same thing today, therefore I am while seeing this thing today the same person as when I saw it yesterday.' It is not here suggested that the self comes to be aware of its own identity through any such conscious and explicit inference. Its awareness of self-identity is conditioned by its awareness of the world of objects but it proceeds pari passu with the same. If a person is confronted with a plethora of sensations without any rhyme or reason so as to make it impossible for him to lay hold of any significant and intelligible object he will probably never arrive at any awareness of self-identity.

The unity of the world and the unity of the subject are thus distinct but complementary aspects of one whole. Through the world the subject knows itself, and through the subject the world knows itself. The subject is in a sense a part of its world, but it is a part in which the world reflects itself. In the world of Höenle, 'the life of the whole pulsates in the part.'

(1) *Studies in Metaphysics*, p. 292.
The subject and the object of knowledge cannot, however be regarded as being co-ordinate with each other. It is true that they are essentially correlates. The subject implies the object of which it is the subject and the object implies the subject of which it is the object. But at the same time, in this relation of the subject and of the knowledge, the subject has a certain amount of primacy. Qua subject it must have some object. But it need not have any particular object. The objects of knowledge are constantly changing. But the subject remains the subject in spite of this change of objects. And even if there is no object of knowledge for it, it will not necessarily be reduced to nothing. It can of course, no longer remain a subject of an object of knowledge. But it does not therefore follow that it will have no reality whatsoever. Empirically speaking there are practical difficulties in being conscious of the subject except as having some object of knowledge. But there is no reason in theory why a subject having no object for its consciousness except itself, should be inconceivable.

Can the subject know itself? Some theoretical objections have been raised against such a possibility.
Hume said that we do not and cannot know any subject because whenever we look within the stream of consciousness we find nothing except ideas. It is not surprising that looking, as he did, for the subject among the objects of his consciousness he did not find it there. Had the subject been one of its own ideas there would have been some possibility of his hitting upon it in this way. But as the subject is not one of its own ideas he missed it.

The essence of the logical difficulty in knowing the subject seems to be that whatever falls within knowledge becomes by that very fact an object of knowledge. Since it is by the subject that everything else is known whom can the subject be known by? But if the subject can know everything why should it not be able to know itself as well? It is only an uncritical dogma that in all cases of knowledge the object must be different from the subject or that the subject and object of knowledge can in no case be the same.

There is no reason for the view that the distinction between the subject and the object of knowledge holds good for all forms of knowledge. Such a distinction seems to be legitimate and necessary in the case of the knowledge of any objects other than the subject. But it is out
of place in the case of that form of knowledge where the object of knowledge happens to be the subject itself.

It is true that even here it is possible to distinguish between the subject as knower and the subject as known. But it is not legitimate to go further and maintain on the strength of this logical distinction that the subject as known is different from the subject as knower. The two terms in the relation of knowledge which ordinarily stand for and indicate different things refer in this case to one and the same thing. The distinction between the knower and the known in this case emphasises two different logical properties of one and the same thing. (1) In its capacity to know it is the subject; in its capacity to be known it is the object. In self-knowledge the knower is the known and the known is the knower. In other words the knower knows itself.

The subject, therefore knows itself as well as the objects of its knowledge, and knows itself as a subject in and through the objects of its knowledge. But there seems

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(1) I do not of course wish to imply that the subject is a kind of a substance. The relation of the subject to its object is entirely different from the relation of the substance to its attributes.
to be no theoretical difficulty about its knowing itself even without knowing its objects at the same time. It is true that if the subject could know itself without knowing its objects and also forget the implications of the fact that it can know objects, it would know itself, but not as a subject. For, to know itself as a subject, it must think about it in relation to its actual or potential objects of knowledge. But there is still a theoretical possibility of the subject having pure self-awareness in which it does not know itself as being a subject or as having any logical properties. It would be self-awareness only in the sense of being aware of itself. But it will nevertheless not be aware of itself or aware of itself as a self or a subject.

In order to distinguish such self-awareness from the subject's knowledge of itself as a subject it is better to refer to it as a Pure Awareness.

It is, however, important to consider the exactly is the nature of this Pure Awareness. It is not analogous to a judgment in which something is predicated of something. In Pure Awareness we cannot have any distinction of the 'that' and the 'what'. All that we could say on its authority would be to say that it exists as self-knowledge. But further than this we could not say anything about it. The subject
know itself directly in a primary intuition and not
intermediately, through ideas or predication.

But if we posit such Pure Awareness and start
from it, we cannot even call it a subject, for to call it
a subject is to consider it not in itself, but in its
relation to the objects of knowledge. The subject as well
as the object are both distinctions within the knowledge
of which it is an immanent ground. In itself, therefore,
there is no reason, why it should be called a subject any
more than an object.

It seems that this Pure Awareness is as much
behind the objects of consciousness as it is behind the
subject of consciousness. It would, of course, exist as a
back-ground of those particular objects of my consciousness
which are represented by other human beings. But there is
no reason why this should not be true of even those objects
of consciousness which do not seem to be subjects. A
philosopher is apt to identify the pure consciousness with
the subject rather than the objects, because he arrives at
it through his knowledge of himself as a subject. But this
is only a psychological and not a logical necessity. If we
therefore posit Pure Awareness behind consciousness, they
at once assume the character of subjects and all knowledge takes the form of a self-communion of that Pure Awareness through the medium of subjects who are, as it were, its own modifications.

The conception of a Pure Awareness behind all the subjects and the objects of knowledge need not make unreal the individual unity, centrality and integrity of the subject. It is not a kind of a universal thinker which thinks in all and knows all that is to be known. It knows only itself. And its knowledge of itself is different from the knowledge which the subjects which appear in it have of the world of objects which also appear in it. The activity of knowing through the medium of subjects is different from its direct self-awareness.

From the standpoint of the knowledge of the world of the objects by the different subjects, the subject looks upon himself as an 'I' which is distinct from other subjects. It is true that every other subject also looks upon himself as a similar 'I'. But this use of the

(1) This need not be startling since, as we have already seen, consciousness is probably immanent in all the orders of reality.
same term by all in indicating the nature of their
existence does not imply their identity. Nor does the
term 'I' stand for some abstract universal having
so many instances. It indicates an individual existent
different from other similar existents.

But at the same time Pure Awareness seems to be
more than a substantiated abstraction. It is a necessary
postulate of knowledge, in so far as it accounts for the
fact that the subject can know the object at all and also
the fact that the different subjects can understand
each other.

The unity of all knowledge implies a unity
of the world of objects as well as the unity of the world
of objects. This unity, however, is a unity in difference
and therefore does not swamp the individual existence of the
subject as an 'I'.
VI.

THE EMPIRICAL SELF.

WE HAVE SEEN that the subject of knowledge knows itself as an 'I' or an individual existent distinct from other subjects or objects. But the awareness of self seems to be a feature only of human beings. In all probability animals do not have any consciousness of themselves. They are directly aware of the perceptual world and live and act with reference to it without introducing anywhere the idea of a self. But owing to the capacity of man to rise from the merely perceptual to the reflective consciousness he comes to build up an idea of himself. His 'me' is a logical construction. He does not start with any knowledge of himself any more than he starts with
knowledge of anything else. The consciousness of the self
or the 'me' has a psychological genesis and development.

When the individual is only a newly born child
he does not seem to have any consciousness of self. From
all sides sensations beat upon him. He has not yet learned
to distinguish between different kinds of sensations.
The world is, for his consciousness, a single blurred 'presen-
tation continuum' without any significance or meaning. His
innate instinctive apparatus, however, helps him to
distinguish different wholes within this continuum. This
activity of differentiation and integration within the
continuum is throughout guided by a principle of selection
based upon his interests. Touching his own body is
different from touching something else. Resistance
offered by his body feels different from the resistance
offered by other things. The falling of a thing upon
his body is different from its falling upon something else.

Soon he learns to distinguish between the sensations which
he has of his own body through its exteroceptors from the
sensations which he has of other things. Besides while
other sensations come and go there is a certain amount of
permanence about the organic sensations coming from the
interior of his body, like thirst, hunger or coenesthesia. A complex of sensations, therefore, becomes isolated from the main continuum and is integrated into a system, an entity (his body) with which he is concerned with a greater warmth than other entities which also come to be distinguished within the continuum.

At this stage the individual might become aware of his body but he can hardly be said to be aware of his body as being his own body. He might feel towards his own body in a different way from the way he feels towards other bodies just as he might feel towards his playthings, in a way different from the way he feels towards a book on relativity. But this does not mean that he is aware of his body as being his own. Such a possibility can only arise when he has come to have some idea of self. The 'me' cannot appropriate anything before it itself comes into existence.

The individual begins to have self-consciousness only when he has learned to recognise other persons and distinguish them from other things. His mother responds to his needs in a way which is very different from that of his cradle. Before he is conscious of himself he is
conscious of her loving eyes and cheerful smile. The warmth of her bosom and the kiss of her lips have for him a kind of reality which is unique. If he is hungry his mother is always there to feed him. When he is in suffering nothing treats him so tenderly as his mother. He therefore begins to recognise his mother and others as individuals. And very soon he begins to think of himself as an individual on the analogy of these individuals whom he has come to know.

It must not be supposed that the individual arrives at the consciousness of his self-hood through a process of conscious inference. He does not say to himself 'A's reactions and behaviour are unique and, therefore, A is a unique entity. My reactions and behaviour are more or less similar to A's and I'm also therefore, a unique entity.' Such a process of inference would be impossible without consciousness of self-hood. What really happens during this process of arriving at self-consciousness is much simpler. The individual begins to find meaning in the 'entities' represented by his mother and others and pari passu begins to find meaning into himself. The complex of sensations, which is his mother, is not for him
a mere organisation of sense-data. She has a special meaning. And as he begins to understand more and more the meaning that belongs to different individuals he is able to find meaning in himself. The process is unconscious and implicit rather than conscious and explicit. The awareness of other individuals and the awareness of himself develop simultaneously.

There is probably a period of confusion preceding the awareness of the self as distinct from others. This point might be illustrated by the confusion in the mind of a baby whom I happened to know. Whenever she was asked by another 'What is your name?' she used to reply 'you'. Whenever she was asked by another (pointing to himself) 'What is my name?' she used to reply 'I'. The baby was very alert and used to give these replies with persistent tenacity.

The explanation is not far to seek. Everyone referred to the baby as 'you' as when telling her 'you mustn't cry!' So she came to think by a kind of unconscious empirical generalisation that her name was 'you'. On the other hand everyone, while talking to her referred to himself as 'I', as when saying 'I will be angry with you if you cry!' So a similar process led her to believe that
the name of everyone is 'I'. In the light of these considerations her replies seem to have had some logic behind them.

The individual cannot be paid to become clearly conscious of his selfhood unless he has learned to use the word 'I' or its equivalent accurately. In the above case the baby had certainly made an effort to ascertain the meaning of the words 'I' and 'you' and had made a mistake about their meaning. But it was more than a mere effort to understand the language used by others around it. Language and thought are so closely wedded together that understanding one is the same as understanding the other. The baby had probably learned that the words 'I' and 'you' are used to signify persons but she had not yet understood the distinction between them. The distinction between 'You' and 'I' cannot be apprehended before the rise of conscious self-hood. It is almost certain that in the experience of a baby self-hood is a gradual growth and is considerably helped by its intercourse with other persons.

The growth of self-consciousness, however, does not terminate with learning the use of the word 'I' or 'me'. In a sense, it begins there. The 'me' only gives
the form of the self. But the contents of the 'me' are always growing. It is very interesting to trace how the 'me' gradually comes to be filled with a more and more varied content.

The development of self-consciousness like its birth is throughout conditioned and influenced by the social environment. The opinions which other people have or will have enter imperceptibly into the idea of the 'me'. To-day the individual receives a gown from the university and to-morrow he finds it below his dignity to be churlish. In the morning he becomes a Lord and in the evening he refuses to dine with a commoner. Somebody praises him for his valour and so he feels ashamed to exhibit cowardice, at least in that person's presence. It has been said that the individual has as many selves as there are persons who know him. (1)

The denunciations and the praise of others as well as their expectations about him enter into his idea of 'me' and they become motives of his actions.

(1) William James, Textbook of Psychology, p. 179.
Through memory imagination and reflective consciousness the individual comes to think of himself not only as one who has some experiences in the present but also as one who has had certain experiences in the past, and also as one who is looking forward to other experiences in the future. Thus Napoleon's idea of himself on the battlefield of Waterloo probably was, 'I have triumphed in many a stormy battle and I will certainly win this one too.' All the joys and sorrows of the individual, his tears and smiles, his successes and failures, his humiliation and glorification, his anxieties and fears and hopes and plans enter into the 'me' as its constituent contents.

The 'me' of the individual is thus constantly expanding. In fact, it includes everything that he can call 'mine'. He feels hurt if his enemies pull down his house. He is annoyed if any one casts a slur on his college. He is happy if his clothes are well ironed. He likes to see his fields yield a good harvest. He wants his gardens to produce plenty and his friends to prosper. He wants his particular theory or system of belief to be universally accepted and he feels that his fate is closely bound up with the way in which it is
received by the eminent and the learned. In short, anything he calls his in virtue of his interest in it becomes a part of 'me'.

What happens to that which he cannot call 'mine' because it runs counter to his interests? He might find that the existing structure of society twarts his ambitions. Or an epidemic of influenza might sweep away several of his personal friends. Things of this kind do not admit of being incorporated into the 'me'. His enemies are his, in a sense, and yet cannot be a part of his 'me'. They are a part of 'me' in the sense that there are in the 'me' many desires and activities directed towards them. But they are regarded throughout as 'not-me'. So everything within the experience of the individual which does not admit of being assimilated to the 'me' is converted into the 'not-me'.

When the 'me' and the 'not-me' are formed there is a tension between them. This tension has a tendency to modify both the 'me' and the 'not-me' in such a way that they become more and more harmonised with each other and the discord between them is gradually
diminished. The changes in the 'me' and the 'not-me' are brought about through their interaction.

The contents within the 'me' as well as within the 'not-me' are constantly changing. Sometimes the contents within the 'me' are expelled from it and incorporated within the 'not-me' and sometimes the contents within the 'not-me' are isolated from it and taken up into the 'me'. As Bradley has pointed out 'well-nigh everything contained in the psychical individual may be at one time part of self and at another time part of not-self' (1) Some such thing happens for instance in the case of a member of the Opposition Party who is offered a seat in the government and accepts it. He begins to justify a course of action which he would have denounced in his former capacity. A similar change is illustrated by the story of a pedestrian. He used to complain bitterly that motor-cars are merely a nuisance on the road. But some time later he happened to purchase a car for himself. And then began to complain that pedestrians are merely a nuisance on the road. What was formerly a part of himself became a

(1) Appearance and reality, p. 81.
'not-self' and what was a part of his 'not-self' became a part of himself.

Is there any content in the self which is permanent? It seems that there is nothing in the contents of the psyche which is not capable of being made an object of theoretical or practical consciousness. Everything that is 'mine' can also often be a part of the 'not-self'. Feeling and ideas seem to belong to the self more intimately. But it is possible to think about the innermost feelings or ideas as being something apart from our self and desire certain changes in them. It is only so long as we identify ourselves with any feeling or an idea that the feeling or idea is really a part of the empirical self. As soon as the subject apprehends it as an object or distinguishes itself from it, it becomes a part of the 'not-self'. It would seem that a disposition to think or feel in a particular manner is more intimately a part of the self than particular thoughts or feelings which are its manifestations. But it is possible to put ourselves out of our dispositions and contemplate and desire a change also in them.

The physical body of the individual seems to belong
to the 'me' exclusively. Through coenneesthesia it is more or less constantly present as a background for anything of which he may happen to be conscious. Moreover it is present to consciousness in a way in which other things are not. But it is also possible to look upon the body as an external object and desire certain changes in it. In doing so the individual puts his body into the 'not-self'. So far as the contents of consciousness are concerned there seems to be nothing that can exclusively belong to the self as against the not-self.

How then are we to understand the relation between the 'me' and the 'not-me'? The 'me' is that provisional organisation of some contents of the psyche which becomes the nucleus of special significance for the organisation of all the contents of the psyche. It might be compared with the fulcrum of a lever with which a man can lift a stone. Although the assignment of particular contents to the 'me' and the 'not-me' is provisional, it is neither accidental nor unnecessary. Such a division of the psyche into the 'me' and the 'not-me' is essential for the rational life of the individual.

When we look at the 'me' not merely from
the point of view of the linear succession of its contents
but also laterally by taking a cross-section in its linear
life, we find that the contents of the 'me' are not only
changing in time but that they may be so diverse as to
break up into various 'selves'. And some time these various
selves of the individual may be so antagonistic to each other
and yet so persistent in their claim to be the sole
dominating factor in his life that the contents of his
psyche might actually break up into several 'me's'. This
is how we get the abnormal phenomenon of an alternating
or a multiple personality. But modern psychoanalysis
has proved that the difference between the so-called
normal individual and the abnormal individual is only one
of degree.

It is true that the overt behaviour of an
average individual falls within certain expectations and this
implies a certain capacity to control and direct the inner
sub-stream of consciousness. But deep down in his conscious-
ness mind there are complexes which persistently shape and
influence the course of his consciousness and the pattern of
his behaviour. He, too, has compulsions and discordant
elements in his consciousness. And at times the oscillations
of his moods may be so pronounced that he can hardly know with which mood to identify himself. And in the mind of a philosopher such a situation is often represented by conflicting conceptions of life.

The normal individual, then, goes through the same storm and stress which leads an abnormal individual to insanity. The only difference between them is that the one has been comparatively successful in resolving his conflicts while the other has failed in the attempt to do so. In the long run, the individual in charge of an asylum and its inmates sail in the same boat.

Unless by normal we mean an individual who conforms to the average type, most people will have to be considered abnormal. True normality is an attainment and not a gift.

In the life of an average individual there is continually some rivalry and conflict between the different selves. As William James has vividly pointed out, everyone would, if he could, like to be a millionaire and a saint, the bonvivant and the philanthropist, the philosopher and the lady-killer at one and the same time. But, as he says, 'the millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's, the bonvivant and the philanthropist would trip each other...
up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay. (1) As it is not possible for any man to be everything, he has to go through a process of self-crucifixion.

But the very fact that these different selves can come into conflict implies that there is a single subject which owns both of them. Had it not been for such an identical point of reference, no such conscious conflict could ever have arisen. If A wants to be a lady-killer and B wants to be a philosopher, they can have no consciousness of internal conflict although in fact they might in their actual life be involved in a mutual conflict. But the peculiarity of the conflict of the different selves within the individual is that it is felt to be peculiarly internal. Although in a moment of drunkenness A might be involved in some unworthy action, in a moment of sobriety he feels ashamed of it. In other words he does not altogether disown the action by his lower self but

accepts responsibility for the same and tries to subordinate his lower self to his higher self.

The individual makes his ownership of these different selves felt through a deliberate choice between them, if they are involved in a conflict. He takes a wide perspective, considers all the alternatives suggesting themselves to him, makes up his mind about the line of action he is going to take and rejects everything which is not in harmony with his decision. Philip sober admonishes Philip drunk.

The individual is thus able to choose between his various selves. In the light of his ideal his selves arrange themselves in a hierarchy. And when the competing selves are thus arranged with reference to their axiological status, the individual has a principle of selection whereby he may resolve the conflict between his various selves.

The principle of the unity of consciousness thus expresses itself in a general tendency towards greater and greater integration in the life-history of the average individual. The various 'selves' gradually tend to be subordinated to some dominant purpose of life which is
regarded as central, until the teleological unity animating them may be so strong as to make it impossible for any self to exist except as an harmonious element within the whole. (1)

The unity of consciousness, therefore, is not, as suggested by an eminent psychologist, merely 'a cant expression uttered by some unsophisticated ancient philosopher and repeated like an article of faith by each successive generation.' (2) It is manifest not only in the integration

(1) It is true that there are instances in which some abnormal individuals seem to have moved towards the disintegration of their personality. But in such cases almost always there is some psychological abnormality which prevents integration. The unity of consciousness is thus the dominant functional unity running in and through the variety of the contents of the psyche and expresses itself as a principle of organisation creating a growing harmony within the constituent elements of the empirical self.

(2) The Unconscious, by Morton Prince, p. 643.
of the conflicting selves but is the very condition of there being any conflict between them at all.

Integration implies the activity of integration and there cannot be any activity of integration unless there is some agent of this activity. Nor is it possible to look upon this activity as a mere content of the 'me' or a part of the stream of consciousness (1) which is on the same level as other similar contents or parts. It is the principle of their organisation.

By the unity of the self we might mean either the actual integration which has been accomplished within the constituent contents of the 'me' or the principle of integration itself. In the former sense the unity of the self is always in the making. It admits of degrees. In its fullness it is always coming to be, but not actually existent. In other words the unity is in this sense an Ideal. But in the latter sense the unitary principle of

(1) It seems that the activity as such cannot be, like other contents of the 'me', an object of consciousness. When we speak of being conscious of activity a careful analysis of the experience shows that it is only some sensations which accompany activity, which can be the objects of consciousness, and not the activity as such. The pure
integration is not something that is going to come into operation in future, but is actually operative in the present and is necessary for the increasing accomplishment of integration. But these two different senses of the unity of the self do not imply two distinct selves. Because it is the ideal which is operative in the present as a principle of organisation. And it is the nature of an ideal to be capable of being an operative principle without itself being necessarily realised in actuality.

activity implied in the awareness of objects or the integration of the various constituents of the 'me' is not itself a constituent content of 'me'. A distinction is, therefore, sometimes drawn between the transcendental self which is the source of this pure activity and the empirical self or the 'me' which is a growing individual existent.
THE STATUS OF VALUES.

WE HAVE SEEN that the unity of human individuality as implying an accomplished integration of the contents of the psyche is essentially 'intentional'. These diverse contents - theoretical and practical - come to be integrated and harmonised owing to the operation in them of a principle which is essentially teleological. The concept of teleology thus gives us some insight into the fundamental principle immanent in individuality. But it has also been seen that the concept of teleology is itself inextricably bound up with the notion of value. The principle of teleology will, therefore, remain an obscure and empty formula until it acquires some meaning by a study of its end or ends. And the best that can be done
here is to study the expression of teleology in human individuality by considering the values realized through conative processes. Owing to the growth of self-consciousness human beings not only live under the rule of law but they can also live, as Kant said, under the idea of law. They not only strive to attain values but are also -- to some degree at least -- conscious of the values which they strive to attain. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the nature of values. All values are something regarded as being purely subjective creations of the human mind. It is, therefore, argued that they have no objective or cosmic significance. On this view value becomes an accidental product of the satisfaction of certain desires of the individual and is entirely subjective.

Before doubting this subjectivity attributed to values it would be well to see how much such a view of values would prove even if it were in essence true.

The value-situation

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D \rightarrow O \rightarrow S
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Desire Object Satisfaction

The total value-situation may be analysed as
consisting of a specific desire $D$ for a specific object $O$ and the specific satisfaction $S$ derived from the attainment of the object $O$. Even if value is tentatively identified with $S$ it is not completely devoid of some kind of rudimentary objectivity. Even the most confirmed subjectivist cannot pretend to know any way of going from $D$ to $S$ except through $O$. But, while $D$ and $S$ are subjective, $O$ is clearly objective; and yet no value can arise unless $O$ is one of the terms in the total situation DOS.

It may be granted that in many cases the object might be capable of being substituted by some other object without any detriment to the value arising in the situation. This is, however, only true in the case of those desires of the individual, which are directed not towards any specific object, but towards any object of a specific kind. Thus, it is not any object, but only any object of a specific kind, which can enter into the situation without detriment to the value arising in it.

This capacity of an object to satisfy a desire cannot be a mere accident and must ultimately be derived from some inherent characteristics of the object itself. And
in the sense that the object has such a capacity value may be said to belong to the object. A certain amount of rudimentary objectivity must be said to belong to value, even if it is identified with the satisfaction of a desire.

The identification of value with satisfaction, however, rests upon a false theory. Valuation is more than a mere recognition of some relation between the attainment of an object and the psychic state which follows such attainment. Whatever might be the view of a 'thinker', an unsophisticated view of valuation would recognise that when we say that 'A is good' or 'B is beautiful' we do not merely mean that A gives us satisfaction or that the sight of B causes in us a pleasant emotion.

When a philosopher begins to analyse the notion of goodness or beauty he might try to reduce our notion of goodness or beauty to certain pleasant sensations and then later account for these as being a result of the satisfaction of certain desires, but this certainly is far from being the original meaning in the mind of an individual who is engaged in the act of valuation.

Such is not. The original import of any acts of valuation is entirely different. In the words of Sorley, 'Their meaning is not that the
subject desires a certain object or is pleased with it, any more than the judgment of sense-perception means that he has certain sensations.' (1) In fact, the individual making value-judgments is not thinking about himself at all. A is good and B is beautiful are, in fact, genuine judgments attributing some kind of value to the object A or B. And the prima-facie validity of such judgments need not be doubted unless there are very good grounds for doing so.

The denial of objectivity to values is a result of confusing the psychological processes of desire or being pleased, with the import of the judgment of value which has an objective reference. But just as we can never get any truth if we start with a mere idea or sensation we can never get any judgment of value if we start with a purely subjective desire or feeling. Starting with pure subjectivity we can never get at objectivity. But pure subjectivity is a fiction of the mind. There is no more desire or feeling any more than there is mere idea or

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sensation. Just as an idea or sensation is always of something the desire or feeling is always for something.

This does not mean that every desire or feeling *ipsa facto* reflects accurately the value-judgment which is completely adequate to the nature of the object to which it refers, any more than merely having an idea or a sensation or a belief about an object is tantamount to knowing its nature correctly. But just as there may often be some discrepancy between the content of the judgment of fact and the nature of the object to which it refers, there may often be some discrepancy between the judgment of value and the real value of the object to which it refers. But all the judgments of value like those of fact, always claim to be adequate for the nature of the objects to which they refer and also aim at being completely adequate for this purpose. And neither the truth nor the value of anything can ever be revealed to us except in and through such judgments. In making judgments of value, therefore, as in making judgments of fact, the individual has a grip upon the nature of objective reality.

Is value a quality? In the light of the analogy between the judgment of fact and the judgment of value, value
seems to belong to the object to which it seems to belong at least as much as any sensory quality. But it is quite a different question as to whether it may be said to belong to the object in the same way as a quality. The analogy between the judgment of fact and the judgment of value may be passed only within certain limits, since the theoretical and the practical aspects of the consciousness of the individual are not exactly co-ordinate activities running, as it were, parallel to each other, but on the contrary are related to each other in a special way.

It is quite true that in an important sense a judgment of value has to be a judgment of fact also. When we say that A is good we are certainly adding to our knowledge of what A is. It might further be maintained that a value must have some reference to actual or potential existence or it is no value at all. It is quite impossible to believe that X has neither actual nor potential existence and yet to maintain that it has value. Suppose we imagine that X has value and at the same time believe that X has neither actual nor potential existence. A critical analysis of the belief will show that what we really mean is that X would have value if it had actual or potential existence.
It therefore seems that value must characterise the realm of individual existents in order to be value at all. And if it is thus a feature of existents it seems to be a kind of quality belonging to them.

If value is regarded as a quality, the judgment of value becomes only a kind of a judgment of fact. It would differ from other judgments of fact only in having the specific function of expressing that particular quality which we call value. And there would be no reason for distinguishing between a judgment of value and a judgment of fact any more than there is any reason for distinguishing between the judgments about the colour and the size of an object.

To say that an object has the quality of value is to say that it is worthy to be or that it is as it ought to be. Some very awkward consequences, however, seem to follow if we treat value as being merely a quality. As Sorley has pointed out, 'if this predicate were simply a quality constituting the nature of the object, then the assertion that the object ought to be as it is would be equivalent to saying that it is as it is, which would be a tautology as Croce holds the assertion of positive value to be. Or again, when we call an object bad or ugly,
if its negative value were simply one of its constitutive qualities this assertion would be a logical contradiction, as Croce holds is always the case with the negative value-judgment.' (1)

This objection can, however be answered from the logical point of view. The judgment 'A is what it ought to be' would not be a tautology, even if value is a predicate, because it means explicitly recognising that A has a particular quality which is value. Nor is the judgment 'A ought not to be what it is' a contradiction because it simply means that A has not got a particular quality which is value.

The first judgment is not a tautology any more than any pure judgment of fact, like 'A has a green colour'; nor does the second judgment involve a contradiction any more than any pure judgment of fact like 'A has not got a green colour.' From the logical point of view such an explanation removes the 'tautology' and the 'contradiction' from the judgments involving respectively 'ought' and

(1) Moral Values and the Idea of God. p. 77-8
'ought not'.

The really important feature which distinguishes value judgments from judgments of fact is that they are not merely descriptions but imply approval or disapproval. The judgment 'A is what he ought to be' implies a desire on the part of the individual that A should continue to be what he is and the judgment 'A ought not to be what he is' implies the desire that A should be different from what he is. But the judgment 'the triangle has three sides' does not imply any desire on the part of the individual that the triangle should continue to have three sides. Nor does the judgment 'the triangle has not four sides' imply any desire on his part that although the triangle has three sides it would be better if it had four.

It is not here suggested that the individual who says 'A is what he ought to be' always consciously owns to himself any desire with regard to A; but such a desire is implicit and incipient in his judgment. His emotional and conative response to the situation is a condition of his making a value-judgment. The judgment is really made by his practical consciousness and it is only for the purposes of communication that it takes the form of a proposition which seems
to be a mere recognition of fact.

We now come to see why on the view that value is a mere predicate the judgment 'A ought to be what he is' looks like a 'tautology' and the judgment 'A ought not to be what he is' looks like a 'contradiction'. In fact, the 'tautology' and the 'contradiction' are not of a logical but of a practical kind. As soon as we treat the judgment 'A is what he ought to be' as a mere description of A, we eliminate from it the import which it has in virtue of the approval of the practical consciousness of the individual. But as such an approval constitutes the very life-blood of the judgment 'A ought to be what he is', when we omit it, it is as if we have said nothing. It assumes the appearance of 'tautology'. Similarly if we look upon the judgment 'A ought not to be what he is' as a mere description we omit from it his disapproval. This practical demand that A should be different cannot be a constituent element in a purely descriptive judgment and creates in it an appearance of 'contradiction'.

Prima-facie the judgment of value seems to be exactly like the judgment of fact. The kind of cognition involved in saying 'A is good' seems to be similar to the cognition involved in saying 'A triangle has three
sides.' But the similarity can only belong to the language in which they come to be expressed as propositions. Valuation or the recognition of existing values is only a reflection in theoretical consciousness of what has been brought into existence by a creative will. The practical consciousness in which the judgment of value is ultimately rooted is different in kind from the theoretical consciousness in which a judgment of fact is rooted.

Value, then is entirely different from quality and yet it must, like quality, characterise some existent. It is, therefore, important to ask what exactly is the nature of those existents which can support value. Apparently value seems to belong to such diverse things as money, machines, pictures, musical compositions, poems, natural scenes, experiences or individuals. But it is a difficult thing to decide whether a poem or a picture or a musical composition has any intrinsic value. It seems that these have value only in virtue of their being the expression or embodiment of some experience or other. The experience which is thus given a form need not be such as can be surveyed through the medium of intellectual concepts. Beethoven, for instance, might through his compositions cause in our hearts a deep stirring without our being able to name.
that which has thus affected us. Every form of art might seize upon some aspect of experience which it alone can adequately express. But although ordinary language may fail to describe accurately that particular aspect of experience, it is nevertheless by virtue of expressing some aspect of experience that any art has value. It is therefore, very misleading to say that works of art have an intrinsic value.

Even the beauty of nature is probably felt owing to some kind of subtle contact with the life behind it. Those who had a great capacity to enjoy the beauties of nature have interpreted them in some such way. (1) Wordsworth in his Intimations of Immortality says:

'\text{To me the meanest flower that blows can give thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.}'

It goes without saying that if the 'thoughts' are too deep for tears they might also be too deep for words.

(1) Even a biologist like Sir Arthur Thompson suggests a similar view. 'It may be,' he says 'that the extraordinary beauty of flowers and corals is an expression of their dreaming mentality. Perhaps the beauty of crystals and corals is also an expression of their metakinetic aspect.' Contemporary British Philosophy, 2nd Series, p.327.
or any kind of intellectual formulation. In fact they might not be thoughts at all - in the ordinary sense of the word. The essential point is that the aesthetic value which belongs to Nature is probably due to some type of experience of which it is an expression. (1)

Can any experience be said to have any intrinsic value? Love, for instance, is good or has value. It has been suggested that what we mean in such a case is that "love is 'worth having for its own sake'" (2) It will be a good thing to have loved even if it led to no further results. It is good in itself. But a more careful analysis will show that these phrases of ordinary life conceal the bearing which an experience has upon the individual who has it. When it is said that love is worth having for its own sake what is really meant is that it would be worth having by an individual, even if there was nothing else in addition to it. An individual

(1) The probability that the constituents of nature are some kind of organisms has been defended in the previous chapter.

(2) G.E. Moore. Aristotelian Society, Symposium on 'Is goodness a quality.' (1932) P. 123 at Reading.
conceived in total abstraction from his experience is probably a nonentity. But at the same time an experience is equally an abstraction apart from the person having it. Love cannot, therefore, exist apart from the individual experiencing it nor can it have any value by itself. It is more proper to say that value would belong to the individual experiencing love, even if he had or did nothing else. But at this point of analysis it is not so much the experience as the individual having it that emerges as the true bearer of intrinsic value. It therefore seems that individuals are the only bearers of intrinsic value. Even animals or plants or the constituents of nature may be bearers of value in so far as they are individuals. We have thus arrived at the identity of individuality and value from another point of view.

Owing to the presence of self-consciousness, persons are capable of being the bearers of values which are higher than the values that might belong to lower types of individual existents.
WE HAVE SEEN that the essence of valuation is primarily an expression of our practical consciousness and is constituted by approval or disapproval. But it would here seem that this really involves going back upon the position that values are objective. It might be said that the subjectivist contention is exactly the same. Those who look upon values as subjective are also emphasising the essential relation of values to approval or disapproval. It is, therefore, important to enquire whether there is any contradiction in recognising that approval or disapproval constitutes the very essence of valuation and at the same time holding the view that values are nonetheless objective.
A careful examination of the question, however, reveals that the appearance of contradiction is largely due to a narrow conception of objectivity.

On the first view it seems as if there is not principle in our approvals or disapprovals, but that they are all unrelated to each other. Chaos seems to be the most striking feature of our value-judgments. But it is possible to discern in them evidence of increasing reference to an objective norm. And this norm is seen to have claims upon all individuals alike. As this norm is not something private to a single individual but is a universal regulative principle, all value-judgments made by reference to it are objective.

The objectivity of values is thus ultimately derived from the operation in practical consciousness of a universal principle. Some such universal principle giving unity to the realm of values is a necessary postulate of all moral science. Philosophical speculation cannot rest satisfied with an unresolved pluralism of values. It seeks to discover some common meaning in and though them.

It is possible to look upon the unitary principle of values as the Ultimate Goal of the life of the
individual who eventually attains it through the pursuit of the apparently diverse and unrelated values of his practical consciousness. They are not like so many will-o' the-wisps leading him nowhere. They might all in the long run bring about some kind of attainment which has an ultimate and eternal significance. (1)

It is sometimes argued that the pursuit of values is in its nature neverending. The individual can at best hope to approximate to his ideal increasingly, though the ideal always eludes him and remains beyond his reach. He must, therefore, learn to take delight in the progress towards perfection. Not perfection but progress towards perfection is his real concern. From the philosophical point of view, such a position seems untenable. Life cannot be a perpetual going on and on without arriving anywhere. There can be no approximation or progress towards the ideal unless it can be attained at some stage. If it always remains as unattainable as ever how can it be held that he ever comes nearer to it than before? On this view then all

(1) The possibility of immortality leaves enough time for this
progress becomes illusory. There is no escape from positioning a perfection which is the goal of human endeavor.

But at the same time that ultimate perfection is not a purely transcendental goal to which the ordinary values of practical consciousness are merely instrumental. The end is also in a sense in the process. We cannot deplete the present life of the individual of all true value and make of his dim future its real repository. The goal is also immanent throughout the process of attaining it. And from this standpoint the realm of values is a kind of differentiated whole, a unity in difference, expressing itself in diverse values which are so many moments in its totality.

The so-called 'conflict of values' is a misleading expression. There is no real conflict between true values. If there seems to be a conflict among the diverse values of practical life it is due to the lack of the true understanding of their real meaning. In fact, the conflict really exists not between different values but between the different 'selves' within the individual. They tend to run in diverse directions owing to a confusion born of the ignorance of the true value.

The realm of values must not, however, be
looked upon as being a rigid system from which the individual might derive fixed and eternal rules for the guidance of his practical consciousness. There is no standard outside the individual with which he might measure everything and give it its proper place in the scheme of life. Nor is life, properly speaking a scheme of life, comparable with some accurately scanned and a definitely outlined map. It is essentially a creative process.

In life there are no recurrent instances of a particular type. Every situation in life is unique and demands a unique solution, a specific response for which there is no precedent. An earnestness to respond to the situation in a way that would express the true value is in such cases more helpful than an allegiance to some dead formula. It is through the movement of life itself that it is possible to see and realise the true value.

The norm, then, is not some principle external to the individual. It is operative within the individual as his innermost being. In a very important sense it is the very reality of the individual. The individual becomes an utterly false abstraction when he is regarded as complete apart from the Ideal which he tries to realise. He is a continuous becoming and that which he tries to become is the
clue to understand the process of that becoming. The norm is, however, not always explicitly present to human consciousness. When new values are created the individual does not begin by apprehending them in the realm of facts. A negative value-judgment on a situation always seems to precede any attempts to create a new value. All that the practical consciousness is aware of is that a particular situation is unsatisfactory. This starts the movement for altering the situation. But the very possibility of the individual being dissatisfied with a situation presupposes an implicit awareness of that which will bring him satisfaction. The norm is thus clearly necessary for any significant practical activity.

It is true that the individual cannot know the actual contents of this norm in their fullness. All that is signified by words, like 'goodness', 'truth' or 'beauty', can give him only the formal features of the norm. They do not help the individual to know in advance what things are really good or beautiful or true. Nor can the individual know the total contents of the norm by actual observation of everything which is good or beautiful or true, even if it were possible for him to do so. For life is not
like a sealed book. It is dynamic and creative, not static and complete. The creation of new values is an important feature of practical consciousness.

There can be no doubt that the individual can create new values. But the values are not, therefore, his private creations. The creation of the sense of realising values in the realm of existents is an indubitable fact. But the creation is not lawless. Values are not the products of the unrestricted fancy of the individual any more than the truths revealed to him through his activity of thinking. The individual creates values in the sense of being the author of the activity which brings them into existence. But he can bring them into existence only by virtue of the operation in him of a universal norm.

The reality of the operation in practical consciousness of a norm, may be doubted on the ground that no such norm is explicitly present to human consciousness. But it is the paradox of moral and spiritual life that the good has to be realised before it is known. The moral life comes before the science of ethics. It is not at all the business of the moral philosopher, qua philosopher, to provide life with a standard or create a value which is non-existent. His task is simply to analyse the lives of moral
people and bring out the concept of the good which is already implicit in them. The concept of the 'good' is in a sense an outcome of post-mortem examination. It is not qua concept that the good can become a dominating factor in shaping the life of the individual, but rather as a kind of reality which invites him to itself. The moral philosopher wanting to have a science about it tries to isolate it from the material in which it has got inextricably woven, names it and turns it into an abstract concept and sometimes finds to his own astonishment that the phantom of his mind can not explain the many-sided facts of life.

The norm can only be known through its realisation. Human beings are mostly in the process of realising it. The self-integration or self-knowledge of an individual admits of degrees. The individual tries to attain it piecemeal. A clear-eyed understanding of the supreme good in its completeness can only come to those who have carried on the pursuit of self-knowledge and self-integration to its successful termination.

In order to achieve it he probably wants to found some institution. For the sake of the institution he wants a building. In order to get the building erected he
It is possible for an individual to pursue the norm unconsciously for a long time and become conscious of it only towards the later phases of the whole process of realisation. That such a thing can happen to a man need not be startling. The possibility of such an unconscious pursuit of the norm becomes more plausible when we examine somewhat similar cases in ordinary life. It is certainly true of all instinctive activity. The child which feeds itself instinctively does not do so with the knowledge that feeding is necessary to keep his body going. This knowledge comes to him later as a result of empirical observation.

The norm might be operative in the practical activities of the individual more or less in the same manner as a wider purpose controls a smaller purpose related to it. A wider purpose can comprehend a smaller purpose without always remaining before the mind.

Let us take for instance an individual who wants to be a social reformer. He wants to remove certain evils in the life of his society. This is his real purpose. But in order to achieve it he probably wants to found some institution. For the sake of the institution he wants a building. In order to get the building erected he
may issue an order to some contractor. While he is thus issuing an order to the contractor the evils of the society which he wants to remove may be far from his mind. But although these evils are not there consciously, it is impossible to read the complete significance of his order to the contractor except in the light of his prior purpose. It is literally true to say that in issuing his order to the contractor he is really taking steps to remove the evils of society. His wider purpose of social reform is in his mind though not before his mind.

It is not here suggested that the norm is present to the mind of the individual in the way in which this wider purpose is present to the mind of the social reformer. The difference between the two cases is obvious. The social reformer was once clearly conscious of his wider purpose and decided to give the order to the contractor as a means to an end. The means were decided upon after considering the manner in which he could achieve his wider purpose.

In the pursuit of the supreme good there seems to be no such conscious apprehension of the ultimate objective.
through a deliberation of the conditions of the attainment. But the example of the social reformer does prove that at any particular time particular actions can actually be significantly related to a purpose although neither the purpose nor the relation are explicitly present to the consciousness at that time.

The analogy of the social reformer is not given to describe the modus operandi of the norm in the practical consciousness of the individual. The operation of the norm in practical consciousness is unique and has no analogies which can be completely adequate to its nature. The analogy of the social reformer, however, in spite of its limitations establishes the plausibility of a probable modus operandi of the norm which may have an effective reality without being present to human consciousness.

As the norm is not present to human consciousness in the same way in which other facts are, the reality of the norm is essentially different from the kind of existence which belongs to facts. It is always something that ought to exist. It may or may not be realised in factual existence. As a rule it is only partly realised in existence. But that which ought to exist is not in
any way less real than that which merely exists. The world of the ought has a certain amount of independence of its own and cannot be derived from the realm of facts as such. There is no transition from the merely 'is' to the 'ought'. The norm, therefore, is both real and universal in spite of the fact that it is not explicitly present in our cognitive consciousness in all its completeness.

As seen above, the reality of the norm is different in kind from the reality of facts. But the norm is not something altogether unrelated to the realm of facts. It is always being realised in the realm of facts. Individual existents become significant by virtue of their capacity. Value is that for the sake of which facts exist. [As Lotze points out we are on the right track when we 'seek in that which should be the ground of that which is.]

Corresponding to this essential relation of

(1) Quoted by Sorley in Moral Values and the Idea of God, p.3.
value to individual existents there is the primacy of practical consciousness over the theoretical. There is a very real sense in which love for 'knowledge for its own sake' might be compared with the love of a miser for his hoarded wealth: in both cases there is a preponderance of means over ends.

But knowledge for its own sake is itself in an important sense a part of practical consciousness. It cannot come to exist except as a result of a desire to know the truth. But truth becomes an object of a conative attitude only when it is recognised as a value.

In the wider sense, therefore, value explains the total conscious life of persons - the theoretical as well as the practical consciousness.
IX.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

The real and ultimate bearers of values are the individuals. We thus got from another approach a confirmation of our general guiding principle which attempts to understand the essential nature of individuality with reference to value. But while the realisation of values is the fundamental characteristic of individuals, the presence of evil in their lives presents some difficulties. The problem of evil, however, breaks itself into two distinct parts. There is, on the one hand, the purely natural evil, like pain and suffering and death. And on the other hand, there is the moral evil,
which - in a broad sense - includes facts like selfishness, cruelty, hatred or injustice or ignorance or ugliness.

Of the two kinds of evil, moral evil presents a more acute problem. But natural evil also needs to be understood. What meaning, if any, can these two kinds of evil have for the life of the individual? Are they only hindrances in the development of individuality? Or is it possible to look upon them as having some significance for the life of the individual?

The existence of evil is a condition of some kind of good which cannot exist except through its negation. Just as an individual cannot acquiesce in the existence of evil, as such, he can get satiated with a perfectly rounded paradise. Even if a man could live in a world which is, in the words of William James, 'without a sin without a victim, without a blot, without a tear,' he would still pine to desert such a rounded paradise in order to take chances 'in the big worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings.' There can be room for courage enterprise, sympathy, and sacrifice in a world from which all evil is completely eliminated.
Evil is, thus, from another point of view, an opportunity. This recognition, however, need in no way result in the acquiescence of the individual in the existence of evil. For it is not in the bare existence of evil but in the overcoming of it that some of the highest moral values come to be realised.

Any estimate of the ultimate value of life is bound to remain shallow until the idea of value itself is purified from the limitations of an unqualified and insipid hedonism. Why is it that we instinctively look with disdain upon the gods of the lotus-eaters? They 'lie beside the nectar and

'..............................smile in secret,
looking over wasted lands,
Blight and famine, plague and earthquake,
roaring deeps and fiery sands,
Clanging fights and flaming towns
and sinking ships and praying hands.'

It is not merely selfish resentment for being neglected that impels a man to recognise that the existence of the gods lacks something which gives dignity and worth to the life of an ordinary individual who prefers to fight the precarious battle against the existing evil and share the sufferings of
his fellow-men. The truth about the matter is that perpetual basking in sunshine is not congenial for the development of the kind of individuality which is characteristic of a spiritual being. If an individual is to be more than a drowsy and a dreaming idol he must evolve through the storm and stress of suffering and evil. He grows as much through the sorrows, tears and struggle as through the joys, smiles and rest.

Moreover the individual himself is partly responsible for a great deal of suffering which appears in his life. He might, in his ignorance pursue lines of action which are not in consonance with his own highest good and eventually suffer through his mistaken essays for happiness. In such cases suffering has a great educative and purifying effect. Coming to the specific question of moral evil as distinguished from the natural evil, one may ask whether this also is in any way necessary for the spiritual growth of the individual. And it seems clear that although moral evil is not in any sense necessary, it is inevitably present as a possibility in securing the very fundamental condition of there being any individuality in any genuinely moral values that can ever appear. Moral evil can be traced to the
freedom of the will of the individual. No individual can be capable of realising any genuinely moral values in the absence of such freedom. It is the voluntary renunciation of the evil in favour of the good which gives worth to the individual who chooses the good. And there is of course the real possibility that all the individuals might make that choice. The universe which makes moral evil possible is, therefore, better than the one which would make it impossible.

Besides, it seems quite legitimate to hope that on the whole there is the preponderance of the good over the evil - natural and moral - in the totality of existence. It is true that this implies freely drawing cheques upon the unlimited and the unknown immensity of the past and the future of the universe. But in the absence of any knowledge to the contrary such a hope is not less legitimate than the absence of such a hope. (1)

(1) At this point it will be well to consider some of the warnings of philosophers, like Bertrand Russell. We are told that it is none of the business of philosophy to flatter or console the individual. Philosophical reflection must not be allowed to deflect by the influence of his private hopes or desires. It should be inspired by the austere search
If there is such a considerable preponderance of the good over the evil the presence of evil might assume the role of increasing the worth of the totality of existence by accentuating the goodness of the good by contrast instead of the role of taking away from its worth by negation. From a quasi-aesthetic point of view, it

after the truth and nothing but the truth. The true philosopher accepts and faces the truth with a stoic resignation whether or not it is palatable. The noble function of philosophy should not be degraded to the building of a world of flattering illusions.

Psycho-analysis has revealed to us how an individual inevitably tends to rationalise desires which are often prior to the reasons with which he tries to justify them. And sometimes huge metaphysical systems in the history of philosophy have been vitiated by the domination of unconscious desires. As Bradley has pointed out, philosophy is often giving bad reasons for what we already instinctively know.

This line of thought has in it a good deal of truth. It is true that wish is often the father of the thought. Nothing is so tragic as self-deception nourished by an unreasoning desire. But at the same time we have no right to start with the assumption that the knowledge of truth will frustrate the whole conative nature of the individual. The truth need not make all his striving utterly irrational. If the truth happens to be satisfactory it need not on that account suffer in its validity. It cannot suddenly become untrue in virtue of its being favourable for the realisation of the highest aspirations of the individual.

There is a psychological side to all beliefs, true
would enrich the existence, more or less like the presence of tragedy in art or an undertone in a composition of music.

There is, however, every justification for anyone to refuse to be content with an hypothetical preponderance which no individual in particular seems to enjoy in its concreteness. There is also further restlessness in the fact that in the lives of the finite individuals who are the actual centres of feeling, moral goodness and happiness do not always seem to go together.

But the possibility of the immortality and preexistence puts the whole question in a different perspective. The existing discrepancy between moral good and happiness in the lives of individuals may then be

1- partly compensated for in the lives to come, or
2- as in some oriental religions, it may be partly attributed to their actions in their previous lives.

or false. It is possible to treat them from the psychogenetic point of view and explain them free-the as events in the history of the mental life of a particular individual. But since this procedure is capable of being applied equally to true or false beliefs it cannot be, in itself, a deciding factor in determining their validity.
And in the absence of any proof about the impossibility of these two alternatives any empirical observation of the discrepancy is not enough to shake the faith in the 'moral order' of the world of individuals.

It seems that we need not treat the facts of natural and moral evil as either ultimate in themselves or inexplicable in terms of values. It is possible to go beyond them and treat them as having some important significance for the life of the individual. In a sense they are indispensable for the full development of human individuality.
BELIEF IN THE immortality of the individual is often criticised for involving the withdrawal of interest from our world and the pinning of all hopes upon the other world. The force of the 'ethical' objection against taking an interest in the other world depends to a considerable extent upon the assumption that there is no world except the one with which we are ordinarily familiar. Moreover, any exception that could be taken to an interest in the other world on moral grounds assumes that it must inevitably result in the withdrawal of interest from our world. And the objection really hits only those individuals who neglect the possibilities and the opportunities of this life and keep hoping for the best in the life after death. But indifference towards this life is not only a non-essential accompaniment to the religious faith but is the very antithesis of what it stands for. Here and now is the
opportunity for the individual. He must make the best of the world in which he finds himself, instead of pining after new worlds. But this fact does not in any way tend to disprove the immortality of the individual.

Immortality of the finite individual may be legitimately postulated on the strength of the implications of moral and religious consciousness. If we start with the faith that every finite individual will ultimately attain the highest that is possible for him or that there is at the heart of reality a spiritual principle expressing itself in a moral order, the logical postulate of this faith would be a belief in the immortality of the finite individual, so that death should not prevent the ultimate fruition of his life and the reign of moral law should reassert itself by suitable compensations.

In fact, there cannot be for immortality any proof which is stronger than the one which is based on adequate philosophical grounds. Psychical research or any scientific investigation into the nature of life after death can at best only prove the survival of the
finite individual after his death and not his immortality. We should still be wanting a further guarantee that the life after death will not itself come to a termination. And no amount of scientific investigation into the past or the present is enough to entitle a confident forecast about the future. It is a matter of a primary faith in life.

But, it might be argued that life after death is not a logical postulate of the ideals and aspirations of the individual. The individual can be content with the survival of values, as such, as distinguished from the survival of the individuals. Is it not enough that the individual contributes to the immortality of the species and also leaves behind him a spiritual heritage of books, inventions, institutions, and a subtle but real influence on all that comes into contact with him? He lives in the memories of his friends for a considerable time; but even when he is utterly forgotten by everyone the effects of his actions or thoughts remain indestructible. Such influence on the society may not be very appreciable but may nevertheless be real. And in so far as this influence might be preserved through-
out the human history which is in the making, the individual might be said to have only a vicarious immortality through others. But the individual need not attach any importance to his personal immortality.

There is a good deal that is admirable in this attitude to life. The moral elevation of the tone given to life by eliminating all personal considerations including any hope for personal immortality is unquestionable. But the immortality of the individual is not postulated on the ground that he desires it at his highest. But it is postulated that the highest that he desires is not necessarily attainable within a lifetime, and cannot come into existence except by a gradual realization of his ideal. Mere continuity of the individual in time cannot, as such, have any value. But as it has been already seen, value as such cannot itself have any meaning if it is taken in abstraction from the individual existents which it characterizes. It is, therefore, not possible to set up the survival of values as a better and a higher ideal than the survival of individuals.

In fact, the higher spiritual values cannot be automatically inherited by one individual from another.
They have to be cultivated and built up into the personality by every single individual for himself. All that the social environment created by the acts of an individual can do for other individuals is to create for them an atmosphere in which they will have opportunities to see and realise the values which he saw and realised. But the real values are themselves quite inalienable from the individual in whom they come to be realised. There is, therefore, no survival of values, in a genuine sense, except in the survival of the individuals in whom they are realised. The individual cannot be looked upon as a mere instrument for the life of the society.
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

WE HAVE SEEN that the real significance of the individual is not exhausted by the mere fact of his being in some ways instrumental to the realisation of some values by other individuals. But the relation of the individual to society is very intimate and pregnant with important implications for the understanding of the essential nature of the individual.

An actual individual always exists as a member of some whole. Conceived as being in complete isolation from some natural and social environment he is only a figment of imagination. He does not and cannot exist in a vacuum. He is always an element in some wider whole which at once includes him and makes him what he is.
In the long run, any limits which we give to the whole of which he is a part will be found to be artificial. These limits have very often some validity for practical purposes, but from the philosophical point of view they are ultimately indefensible. The real background for the study of the individual is the whole of the universe in its entirety. It is, however, fruitful to consider, in particular, the individual in relation to his social environment: for he is constantly being moulded by his dynamic action and interaction with his fellow beings.

Apart from the interest directed towards his family, his friends, his country or other social institutions, his life becomes, in the well-worn words of Hobbes 'sultry, poor, nasty, brutish and short.' All the contents of his life which give meaning and direction to his practical activities are derived from his social environment. A man is, for instance, a teacher, a lawyer, a writer, a doctor, or a member of Parliament. But he can only be any of these in a special social context. The needs of the society have created the demand for these functions and he fits himself into such of these as commend themselves to him, by virtue of his capacities
or interests. His 'station' in society has thus a profound influence on the course taken by the life of the individual.

The pattern of the behaviour of the individual is as a rule largely determined by the conventions of the society in which he happens to move and even his conceptions of morality and his general outlook on life is shaped by the influence of the various institutions of which he is a member. The atomic conception of society as being constituted of ready-made individuals is erroneous. No individual can be what he is without the influence which he absorbs from his social environment. He cannot live apart from society any more than a plant can live apart from the soil from which it grows.

It is true that the iconoclast or social reformer does not accept the existing customs, institutions or views without criticism. He applies a fresh and vigorous mind to his social heritage and examines in the light of his searching criticism everything that others accept without question. And as a result of this examination he may come to reject the general
notions of right and wrong which are current in the society he lives in. And he might even initiate great movements which modify the general structure and the conventions of the society. He is 'original' in his outlook.

The essence of originality, however, does not consist in being merely different from others. If originality is equated with mere difference from others there would be nothing to distinguish it from the aberrations of the human mind. Novelty is often a striking feature of the results and actions of an original mind. But this is due to the fresh approach that an individual may make for the solution of old problems and the sincerity with which he might think for himself. Originality thus consists of thinking for oneself, and not of thinking differently from others, although as an incidental result of his thinking for himself, an individual may think (or act) differently from others. Even the individual with an original mind, however, has to take his start from his social heritage and begin by assimilating whatever is true and worth in it.
The society, however, is not merely the source of the contents of the life of the individual. It is not merely the background for his life or an environment inviting his action and determining its specific nature. Other individuals are for him more than a means to an end. As they are themselves centres of action and feeling, all his actions and reactions towards them come to be modified in the light of this understanding. Such a gradual transformation of the general attitude towards other individuals is best illustrated by the development of the relationship of the master to his slave.

The master probably starts with certain interests of his own and begins by looking upon his slave only from the point of view of his capacity to further his interests. The slave has at this stage an instrumental value, like that of the tool. The master looks after his needs as an engineer might look after his engine. But through his own experience of dealing with the slave he might admire his talents so much that he begins to consult him about his own plans occasionally. Further, through greater understanding, he might cease to look upon the slave as a means to his end only. At this stage
the slave has come to be regarded as an end in himself. He has the same status as the master and becomes his equal. But further, through increased association he might even come to have real affection for him and might begin to enter into his purposes and help him to realise them. At this stage the slave has become his friend.

Utility is of course the part of the value of the slave. But so long as the master is thinking only of his utility and is oblivious of his personal worth, his behaviour is bound to express only an imperfect appreciation of the real value of the slave. Elimination of all personal bias is almost always a true understanding and appreciation of other human beings, and personal bias is usually due to the stress of personal interests.

The same social situation can look entirely different when it is seen from the different points of view of the individuals entering into it. Robert Browning's development of the Roman murder story in his 'Ring and the Book' brings out this point very effectively. The same story is told ten times in the form of monologues by ten of the leading personages appearing in the story from their own point of view and each time our understanding of that
particular social situation is supplemented and corrected by a new perspective. All that Browning does is to give a voice to each principal character and allows him to reveal himself as he truly is, in the course of such a narration. As we begin to see how

'Our human speech is naught,
Our human testimony false, our fame
And human estimation words and wind.'

This is, of course, the poet's way of emphasising the enormous discrepancy that sometimes exists between the prima-facie estimation of a social situation which is very often partial and superficial and only relatively true, and an adequate appreciation, which in its impartiality comprehends it in its entirety. We are, however, apt to forget that the true appreciation of the social situation involved in the story is not made by some abstract monster in whom the different versions of the same incidents are piled together. It is made only by a Browning who has the imaginative sympathy to grasp the significance of the actions of every character, as it were from within, and who is at the same time free from the personal bias which belongs to them.
We do not set the truth of a social situation by merely bringing together the different points of view. It is only when these different views are allowed to supplement and correct each other that there is an increasing approximation towards the true appreciation of any social situation. It is quite conceivable that one of the characters in the story might himself in a calm moment overcome the limitations of his view caused by the stress of his own private interests and appreciate the social situation in its truth.

In fact, although personal bias is a great hindrance to a true appreciation of a social situation personal experience — direct or indirect — is the only way of arriving at it. In so far as the individual has the capacity to eliminate all personal bias and do justice to the points of view of other individuals he tends to become 'impersonal'. To say, however, that he becomes impersonal is somewhat misleading since in becoming 'impersonal' the individual is only carrying further an activity which is inherent in his personality. The phrase 'impersonal personality' is a paradoxical way of bringing out the capacity which an individual has to judge and react to situations objectively.
Every individual has some capacity to appreciate the intrinsic value and significance of other individuals quite apart from any bearing which they may have upon his own personal interests. And the recognition of the intrinsic personal worth of every individual tends to bring into existence an ideal society which would be in Kant's famous phrase 'a kingdom of ends'. In this conception of the ideal society we have in a sense a direct antithesis of the purely organic conception of society.

It is characteristic of the organic conception of society to look upon the individual as having no worth in himself. Any value which he may have is derived from the contribution which he makes to the life of the society. Society is, on this view, like an organism of which every individual is a part. It has a life of its own over and above the life of the individuals of which it is constituted. And just as in an organism the part is completely subordinate to its self-maintenance the individual also has a similar instrumental significance to the society.

But the analogy between the society and the organism has obvious limits. Unlike the organism, society
has no life of its own apart from the lives of the individuals of which it is constituted. It has no separate centre of consciousness in which it could reap the benefits of the contributions of the individuals. It is true that the life of the individual would be extremely poor and even impossible unless he lives in association with other individuals. But it is the individual who is the real and the only centre of life. And it is a mistake to look upon him as having no worth in himself. He is not merely a cog in some huge machine. But he would not resent any complete subordination to some other individual or individuals. We thus get the assertion of the 'rights' of the individual from time to time. The great democratic movements of history take their stand upon the equality and liberty of all individuals.

In an ideal society the individual will accept for himself a differentiated function, as in the case of the different parts in an organism. And the function would be determined by his capacities and the needs of all the individuals taken together.

But from the philosophical point of view, the
The equality does not mean an identity or similarity of functions, but the recognition of the intrinsic worth of the individual, and the liberty amounts to his claim to be given adequate opportunities for the fullest development of which he is capable.

If, however, the individual is to represent an autonomous unit having an intrinsic worth it would seem impossible to avoid an utter chaos and conflict of wills in a society where many individuals have to live together. But such a result does not follow, because the individual is not an impervious entity but has the capacity to enter into the experience and the purposes of his fellow-beings and accept them as his own. From the point of view of his own good he finds it necessary to identify himself with others. It is by living for others that he can realise himself. It is by losing his life that he gains it. His is a life of self-maintenance through self-transcendence. His life is as naught until he voluntarily dedicates it for the service of other individuals among whom he happens to live.

He comes to accept the common good as
his own good. His own highest good is not anything private to himself, but is essentially trans-subjective. The good is of course personal, in the sense that it can be realised only in and by the persons; but it is more than personal in the sense that it comprehends the good of all. If we eliminate from his consciousness the interest he takes in his family, friends, institutions, country church, etc., there remains practically nothing in which he can really interest himself.

It is quite common to look upon the individual as having within himself two utterly different kinds of interests. One set is supposed to be constituted by self-regarding interests and the other by other-regarding interests. This distinction between egoism and altruism is very important for practical purposes but from the philosophical point of view any such classification of interests cannot be considered as being ultimate. On the one hand, even the other-regarding interests make the personal life of the individual rich and fulfill its deepest needs. On the other hand, in any normal practical activity there is no conscious reference to the ego.
Egoism in the sense of a direct reference to the ego, cannot and does not exist because there is no such entity as the ego. In considering the ego as a permanent entity we are really substantiating an abstraction. The ego is essentially of the nature of a powerful complex in the mind, perverting the outgoing activity characteristic of all the manifestations of the spirit. It is like a vortex in the current of a river. Its reality is constituted by its capacity to restrict the field of interests and shut out the larger possibilities of life.

The problem of developing a comprehensive individuality is, therefore, to be conceived as consisting in securing a balance between the self-regarding and the other-regarding interests by a kind of mechanical adjustment with reference to some third extraneous standard. But the essential feature of comprehensive individuality is the dissolution of the ego which is a hindrance to the fuller and freer life of the individual. It is the condition for a freer and fuller life that the distinction between the self and the others has to be completely transcended. It cannot
provide us with any scientific basis for organising the purposes of any individual.

The higher reaches of the human spirit include experiences in which there is a more or less complete absence of the distinction between the self and the other. In love, for instance, the individual is completely 'impersonal' in the sense of having no thought of himself. It is a mistake to consider love as being only an instance of selfishness on the ground that in love the individual realises a value. The realisation of a value for himself is far from being a motive in genuine instances of love, although it is, so to say, an incidental - because unconsidered - result of love. In love the individual is concerned with the good of the objects of his love and not with any significance which it may have for himself. But at the same time the object of love is not explicitly regarded as being an other. The sense of separate consciousness is not a constituent element in love.

The structure of society as revealed by such manifestations of the human spirit as love, is almost the antithesis of the ordinary legal conception of society.
In law and everyday morality, society is looked upon as being essentially a world of claims and counter-claims. Social justice, on this view, consists in the proportionate adjustment of claims and counter-claims. The contribution of the individual to the society must be adequate to the benefits which he derives from the society. The idea of measurement or proportion between the give and take of different individuals is the basis of social justice, from the standpoint of law.

But any such conception of individualistic justice breaks down in the light of philosophical criticism. Properly speaking there is no way of measuring or comparing the real contributions of different individuals. The device of money which is meant to facilitate social give and take tends to obscure this fact. It is the nature of money to admit of being measured and to measure everything else in its terms. But any assessment of the contribution of the individual in terms of money is only a provisional device for the practical purposes of life. It does not indicate that the different contributions of different individuals are really capable of being compared with
In the world of spiritual membership, as Bosanquet has pointed out, 'there are no claims and counter-claims.' (1) In this attitude the individual makes no claims for himself. Nor do we expect that he will make any such claims. The ablest man in society does not and may not ask for rewards. His contribution to society is quite out of proportion to what he may gain from it in return. The true conception of social justice might, therefore, be summed up in the well-known formula 'for each according to his needs, and from each according to his capacities.'

On the one hand, the society is constituted of individuals who have an inalienable and intrinsic worth of their own. But on the other hand, the individual at his highest makes no personal claims for himself. An ideal structure of society will, therefore, have to be based upon the full recognition of these two

(1) The Value and Destiny of the Individual, p. 155.
important features. There will be no room in such a society for any actions private or political, in which the individual comes to be regarded as a means only. But on the contrary there will be opportunities for all for complete self-development. And the individual will be helped to develop his own lines and make his own unique contribution to the life of society.

In fact each individual has the capacity to make to the life of society a contribution which no one else can make. It is true that any individual might serve a particular purpose in a factory. And from the point of view of that purpose it may be often immaterial whether some other individual takes the place of that individual. But this feature of one individual being capable of being substituted by another applies only to that kind of work which may be done even by a machine. It does not apply to the functions which are specifically human. In a family or an educational institution, or the political framework of the society, it may often happen that one individual cannot be substituted by another without a
complete transformation of the specific function which he is expected to perform.

The contribution of every individual is unique. There is, therefore, no possibility of there being any individualistic justice based upon a legal conception of an exact mathematical proportion between what the individual receives from the society and what he gives to it.

Nor is it possible to look upon the society as a world of claims and counter-claims, from the point of view of the individual himself.
RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.

We have seen that throughout social life the individual realises himself in and through his social relationships and that any 'self-centredness' in his outlook excludes from his life many valuable possibilities of his life and on the whole makes it poor. This feature of self-transcendence which is so characteristic of a developing personality is still more pronounced in religious experience. In religious consciousness there is self-maintenance through complete self-surrender.

Religious consciousness must be carefully distinguished from the pursuit of moral values.
in social life, and also from the pursuit of impersonal values like scientific truth or beauty. Moral values as well as other impersonal values are looked upon as creations of the finite individual in time, although these values may be regarded as having their source in an eternal reality. But in religious consciousness the ideal is regarded not as a creation of a finite individual but as an eternal reality, although the act of his contacting that reality may be in time. The implications of religious consciousness, therefore, need separate discussion.

Any account of human individuality which does not consider the significance of religious consciousness is bound to be incomplete. Like other aspects of human experience religious experience also has its own validity. But here also as in other spheres of experience the only way to establish validity is to bring out the internal inconsistency in the diverse deliveries of the experience, and to show that these are not contradicted but supported by other findings based on other aspects of human experience.

Religious experience has an important con-
tribution to make to any complete philosophical theory about the nature of the universe or of the individual and to treat it as an unimportant and illusory subjective phenomenon is to fail entirely to grasp its real significance. As Bradley has pointed out, 'the man who demands reality more solid than that of religious consciousness knows not what he seeks.' (1) With regard to the nature of the individual, too, we must view with distrust and suspicion any merely 'a priori' theories which do not do justice to the concrete forms of experience characterising his conscious life; and religious experience is the deepest form of human consciousness.

Religion cannot and need not be 'based' on anything except religious consciousness. It cannot be derived from any philosophy which does not in its data already include religious consciousness. All that philosophy can do and must do is to interpret religious experience and make it yield its contribution to the

(1) Appearance and Reality, 449.
theory of individuality.

The essence (1) of religious experience centres round the relation of value to reality. As Hofding has pointed out, 'the feeling which is determined

(1) It is necessary to submit the available data of religious consciousness to constructive criticism. The data consist of intellectual and non-intellectual elements. So far as the intellectual elements are concerned there is very little unanimity among the followers of different historical religions. But the specific contribution of religious experience to the life of the individual is in its non-intellectual elements.

Every concrete religious experience is usually accompanied by some myths, dogmas, creeds, beliefs or tenets. And the feeling of certainty which originally belongs to the non-intellectual elements in religion is as a rule usually communicated to the intellectual elements connected with these non-intellectual elements by a law which is psychological rather than logical. And such extension of the sense of certainty is in many cases quite indefensible.

But it would be equally unreasonable to allow, without sufficient justification, the distrust created by noticing the discrepancies in the intellectual elements to spread over to the non-intellectual elements in religious consciousness. A critical analysis of the data of religious experience reveals that the discrepancies in the intellectual elements exist mainly owing to the influence of traditions in interpreting religious experience. The non-intellectual essence of religious experience, however, remains largely untouched by these discrepancies.

The task of adequately interpreting the essence of religious experience and building on its basis a theory
by the fate of values in the struggle for experience is the religious feeling.' (1) The individual asks with a certain amount of uneasiness whether life is meant to realise some eternal significance or whether it is merely an accidental episode in the blind hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity.' (2) And religious faith answers that in spite of all the appearances to life the contrary the individual must act as if all the drama of his life has some meaning. It assumes that the ultimate nature of reality is such that it will not make the appearance of human values impossible, but will on the contrary permit their appearance and preserve them.

of the nature of the individual belongs, properly speaking to philosophy. In order to achieve this purpose, however, philosophy must set about to disentangle the essential elements in religious consciousness from the inessential elements which usually get mixed up with them.

(1) Philosophy of religion, p. 107.

(2) Russell's article on 'Free man's worship.'
In this form faith is not peculiar to religious consciousness. Even science and everyday life proceed upon a similar faith of their own. It is true that if the individual discovers in science some exception to a law which he believes to be true he is ready to revise his notion of the law. But there would be an end to science if he surrenders his faith in the conception of the necessary law. If he cannot find the law in a particular complex of events he does not rush to the conclusion that there is no law operating in them. But on the contrary he assumes that there is a law there if only he knew it.

In the same way religious faith is not staked so much on any specific values as on the principle of value. It admits that many particular values might be incapable of being realised by the individual. But it uncompromisingly rejects the view that

"Life is a twice-told tale
Told by an idiot,
Full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing." (1)

(1) Macbeth.
It takes its stand on the harmony of reality with some value, which would belong to the life of the individual under all possible circumstances. The religious faith at its minimum does not say that any specific values must ultimately prevail in the future but that the general principle of value does always prevail. The real formula in this case is not that the 'truth will prevail' but that 'truth prevails.'

Such a religious faith, however, is not explicitly present in the minds of all the individuals. It is often preceded by a feeling of uneasiness resulting from the contemplation of the fate of the values. In the absence of religious consciousness, contemplative individuals almost always have a sense of insecurity about the fate of human values. (1) There seems to be no guarantee

(1) This sense of uneasiness has been very effectively expressed by Bertrand Russell. Referring to the life of the individual on the earth he says, ‘On this tiny dot, tiny lumps of impure carbon and water, of complicated structure, with somewhat unusual physical and chemical properties, crawl about for a few years until they are compounded. They divide their time between labor designed to postpone the moment of dissolution for themselves and frantic struggle to hasten it for others of their kind. Such is man’s life viewed from the outside.’ Quoted by Hoernle in Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics.
that the universe at large has any sympathy for the ideals of the individual. And this apprehension mental produces some unrest.

But it is possible to exaggerate the practical importance of this mental unrest. It has rarely that vital significance which might damp man's enthusiasm in his life or its ideals. Strictly speaking even in the extreme case of a would-be-suicide, there is some kind of faith in the possibility of life itself. Hope, however, dam, reigns in the hearts of all even when they are in the presence of death or suffering. Men would not otherwise go to battlefields or welcome martyrdoms or live in the vicinity of active volcanoes. The sense of uneasiness about the fate of human values is not by any means a fundamental trait of human nature; where it exists it is —so to speak— super-induced by reflective consciousness. It is very curious and significant that even at this stage the individual does not surrender his aspirations, but in a stoic spirit builds them 'on the firm foundation of unyielding despair.'

(1) Russell in 'Free man's Worship.'
He begins by facing and accepting the facts of life, such as death and impermanence and makes himself immune from the tyranny of his environment, renouncing of his own accord many of his desires. Here again Russell's remarks are instructive. He says, 'To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things, this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship.' (1)

There are thus beginnings of a religious faith even in instances where religious consciousness is not particularly pronounced. But the fully developed religious consciousness faith is a characteristic of the religious consciousness only and it is generally reached through the experience of 'conversion'. In this experience the individual gets rid of his mental unrest concerning the fate of values and becomes secure in the faith and the conviction that in spite of many events and facts which seem to suggest the contrary, life has an ultimate meaning, which can be, must be, and will be realised.

In conversion, the individual begins by recognising
that life as it is can be made worth living by welcoming within himself a complete change of outlook. He therefore entirely recreates his character and goes through a spiritual rebirth. During this process he identifies himself with his higher self, becomes conscious, as William James has pointed out, that 'this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a more of the same quality which is operative in the universe outside him.' On this more he relies in undisturbed confidence for the ultimate success of his spiritual enterprise in all moments of crisis.

From the psychological point of view it is important to ask whether this more is really external to the individual or whether it is only a part of himself. It is widely accepted by modern psychology that the waking consciousness is only a slice of the total personality. And from the point of view of waking consciousness this more is clearly both external and real. Religious consciousness is, therefore, justified in regarding this more as external. Psychology may at the same time be justified in trying to show continuity between the conscious part of the individual and this more.
And from the metaphysical point of view the hypothesis of a collective super-consciousness which does not belong to a single individual remains an open question.

In religious consciousness the More is conceived as an eternal Ideal or a Divine Person. In the former case the technique of achieving this More consists of persevering fidelity and in the latter case it consists of love and self-surrender. (1) The distinction between these two types of religious consciousness is strictly speaking created by a difference of emphasis on some elements of religious consciousness rather than other elements. They are however not necessarily mutually exclusive.

In the first type the individual almost always has before his mental eye some historical or imaginary person whom he believes to be the eternal ideal of man. And in the second type the divine person is

(1) The flood of devotion which is characteristic of religious consciousness might overtake the individual in almost any setting of intellectual theories about the nature of the universe. It cannot be silenced by the opposition of any intellectual arguments. Its battle-cry is, in the words of Emerson, 'Leave your theory as Joseph his coat, in the hands of the harlot and flee.'
always taken to embody and symbolise the eternal ideal. In a fully developed form of religious consciousness both of these aspects are found equally developed in the concept of the higher.

In the beginning this Higher is supposed to be essentially external and at a considerable distance from the individual. There is, however, no unbridgeable gulf between this Higher and the individual. It can be realised by him. And having attained the Higher, the individual is so much impressed with its reality that he considers himself as having either an illusory derivative reality; and he is so much impressed by its value that he looks upon himself as having no worth in himself when taken in isolation from this Higher. Whatever real worth he has he owes it to his being an embodiment or a vehicle of this Higher.

The derivative reality and worth of the finite individual in religious consciousness follows from the recognition that the Highest alone has absolute reality and final value. There is, therefore, an illuminating and striking contrast between the formulae of moral and religious consciousness. The former speaks of self
realisation while the latter prefers to speak of the realisation of the 'Self' which is the self of selves, or the realisation of God, or 'The Truth' or, in more mystic moods of the realisation of 'It' or again in more daring moods of 'nothing' or 'nothingness', or sometimes only of plain 'Realisation'. (1)

The Highest revealed in religious consciousness is conceived as a reality which is at once transcendent of and immanent in all that exists. It is in some such manner that the individual tries to grasp from within the unity of Being which runs in and through the diversity of its manifestations. The 'Brotherhood' of the living and the 'Fatherhood' of God thus becomes only two aspects of one single integral experience.

(1) 'Nothing' is probably an unfortunate expression for the Highest which the individual seeks to realise in religious consciousness. Some mystics have, however, used it to indicate, not the non-existence or the poverty of the object of religious aspiration but the incapacity of the intellect to describe it adequately. 'Nothing' is here equivalent to 'ineffable' or 'indescribable'.

In the light of this analysis of religious experience, it is now possible to find out its implications (1) on the nature of the individuality of the object of religious experience, and also (2) the nature of the individuality of the finite individual.

It is characteristic of the religious attitude to look upon the object of religious experience not as some abstract law or a concept, but as an eternal reality which is not less but more real than the finite individual who seeks to be one with it. This eternal reality is further not mere Being. The concept of pure Being is arrived at through a process of abstraction from all the individual existents, by omitting every quality which they have in their concreteness. Being in this sense is a feature of everything that exists. The Eternal Reality of religious consciousness is not such mere being but is a Universal Consciousness.

But the Universal Consciousness cannot again as in some types of idealism be depleted of all characteristics except the intellectual. Any such bloodless
category is far from giving us the correct description of the reality as revealed in religious experience. It is more than universal consciousness. It is Universal Life.

Further, in so far as there is in the religious attitude the distinction between the subject and the object, the eternal reality is even regarded as the Infinite Person who is from His side as much interested in realising Himself in and through the finite individuals as the finite individuals are interested in realising themselves in and through Him. Man loves God and God loves man. There is thus in religious experience complete reciprocity between the subject and the object. (1) In the words of M. Tagore, 'The love that tunes the strings of existence breaks out in music when my heart is won.' (2)

In attributing personality to God as revealed in religious consciousness there is some risk of our transferring to him en bloc that limited concept of personality which we come to form by an analysis of the nature of the

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(2) Vishwabharati News, December 1932.
(1) The distinction between the subject and object, however, need not be regarded as ultimate in love any more than in knowledge. See p. 61. (Chapter on Self-Consciousness.)
finite individual. The analogy of the finite individual cannot be used in this context without some necessary modifications.

God cannot be adequately conceived as being confined within the limits of any finite form. In so far as He is immanent, His life flows in and is shared by every living thing. And in so far as He is transcendent He is the Formless or the Unmanifest which is the eternal ground and source of the entire world of manifestation.

But because God is in one aspect transcendent and unmanifest and in another aspect lives in and through the entire realm of finite individuals, it does not follow that He is not personal. If it is a mistake to transfer the limitations of finite individuality to God, it is a greater mistake to look upon Him as less than personal. For religious consciousness God must be capable of loving and of being loved. But as His love is all-comprehensive and embraces in its fold all the finite individuals He is not just one person among others. He is 'the infinite apprehended as personal, and derives from our immediate experience of the infinite in finite persons.' (1)

(1) John Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, p. 124.
The term supra-personal which has been suggested (1) in this connexion is perhaps the best to describe the individuality of God;

1- if sufficient care is taken not to allow its meaning to dwindle down imperceptibly into that which is merely impersonal, and

2- if, at the same time, we guard ourselves against the mistake of making the personality of God completely external to the life of the finite individual.

'Communion' of man and God is not a kind of mechanical contact between two mutually exclusive entities. It is an instance of a unique and intimate relationship in which the 'sharing' of life is so complete as to invalidate all theories which find a fundamental dualism between God and man and try to set one against the other. In religious consciousness we have the experience of God in the finite individual and of the finite individual in God.

Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 533.
experience for the nature of the finite individual we find that his consciousness points but to a completeness which does not belong to him qua finite. Indeed in the light of the analysis of the religious experience it becomes impossible to look upon him as merely finite. 'Merely finite' is an abstraction from his concrete reality. He is an integral part of a greater reality in which 'he lives and moves and has his being' and is not an absolutely self-sufficient and self-contained entity. He is, therefore, essentially Janus-faced, human-divine, finite-infinite. Just as the infinite exists in and through the finite the finite also exists in and through the infinite.

In religious experience the 'nisus' for self-knowledge and self-realisation leads the finite individual to turn away from the finite to the infinite. The process does not consist in the bare negation of the finite but in an increasing awareness of the self-affirmation of the infinite in and through the finite. It is, therefore, a process of a gradual release from the thraldom of abstractions and partial views. It is an entering into a fuller understanding and apprecia-
tion of the One in the many, which is not merely a one
by the many, or in William James' striking phrase,
'one of the eaches'.

In the conscious realisation of the infinity
of which he is an heir, the individual finds at once
the complete satisfaction by his total personality
and the only absolute basis for integrating all his
activities in relation to other finite individuals.
Thus through religious aspiration and experience the
individual gradually enters into the possession of his
own highest value. The culmination of this process
is his destination. In that culmination he realises
the ultimate meaning of his life, the final purpose
of his individual existence. 'The task is done.'
THE PROBLEM of the nature of human personality is complicated by the fact that although from the point of view of bodily existence it has, like other organisms an appearance of independence and completeness, from the point of view of his consciousness or his values his life is seen to be woven with the social and the cosmic life very intimately. It is, therefore, necessary to study his nature in the light of the interpretation of his experience.
His experience is, in a very important sense, sharable by others. It is true that considered from the psychological point of view, as constituting some events in the mental life-history of an individual the experience of a man is strictly private to himself and is, as such, in its very nature, entirely in-communicable to any one else. But from the logical and axiological point of view, the meaning and significance of his experience are communicable. And this raises the question as to whether human beings can be adequately described as walled monads without any windows.

It is characteristic of pluralistic philosophies to look upon the finite individual as a unique existent characterised by imperviousness, independence and privacy, and to insist upon the full recognition of the reality and the importance of his freedom of will and of his initiative. It is not uncommon that in this endeavour to preserve the status of the finite individual in his own right the implications of the concrete contents of the life of the individual tend to be ignored. But a careful
examination of the contents of the life of the finite individual brings out the inter-twining of his life with that of others. It is, therefore, necessary to consider not only the 'linear' but also the 'lateral' life of the finite individual, in order to estimate his real status, and to make at least as much of coexistent being as of continuous succession.\(^{(1)}\)

But when we examine critically the 'lateral' life of the finite individual, it is found that the apparent isolation, which seems to belong to him is not illusory but deceptive. The simple fact of the sharing of ideas, purposes or experiences would be quite impossible in a world where the individuals did not, in some way, enter as elements into a genuine whole.

The interrelation implied in any sharing of 'spiritual goods' is not primarily a matter of external and mechanical contact. It is not possible to explain such sharing on any purely physiological or naturalistic theory. It is a unique phenomenon rooted in the structure of the world.

\(^{(1)}\) Boscouget, \textit{Life and Finite Individuality (The Aristotelian Society Symposium)} by H. Carr.
of spiritual membership. All the paraphernalia of psychophysical apparatus, (the stimulus, language, nervous impulses, images, etc.,) is at best only a part of the conditions of there being any such sharing in 'spiritual goods.' The most important condition of there being any such sharing by the different finite individuals is that they should not only have a similar spiritual nature and a common world, but that they must also be parts of a spiritual unity which includes them in itself.

Even apart from the implications of sharing, the further examination of the nature of the purposes which they share also points to the same conclusion. We have seen that the supreme good of the finite individual is a common good and as such is essentially trans-subjective and that in religious consciousness, the finite individual recognises his fundamental unity with that infinite spiritual reality which includes all other finite individuals. Not only does the finite individual recognise his unity with this reality but he has, as against it, no personal claims and
finds that his own reality and worth are, in some sense, derived from it. It is, therefore, necessary to determine the precise sense in which we may recognise the independence of the finite individual.

Owing to this impersonality and universality of the content of human consciousness, some monistic philosophies regard the separateness of selves as unreal and unimportant. In Bosanquet's well-known Gifford Lectures, for instance, the numerical difference between the various finite individuals is regarded as being rooted in their 'impotence' only. The 'impotence' which keeps them apart is apparent in the self-contradictory and fragmentary nature of their experience; but these features are, at least theoretically, capable of being removed. But for this 'impotence' then, they might 'coalesce' with each other or even with the Absolute, which is the only perfect Individual. He, therefore, insists upon 'the precarious and superficial nature of their distinctness' and holds that there are 'distinct indications that something deeper and more real underlies them.' (1)

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(1) The value and Destiny of the Individual, p. 58.
It is only in their formal aspect that they are distinct and different; but from the point of view of the concrete content of their experience there is in them a growing tendency to come to share a common experience. It is, therefore, not very helpful to attach too much importance to the distinctness of their bodies and interpret their nature on the analogy of 'things'. As pointed out by Professor Hocking, 'their existence is spent not behind the walls of their bodies, 'fraternising with chemical processes', but in front of them in a common world. 'They, therefore,' meet and share their identity not through ineffable depths (alone) but here through the foregrounds of common experience.'

It is, therefore, suggested that the finite individual is only 'adjectival' to the reality of which he is a part. By using the term 'adjectival' Bosanquet does not wish to suggest a relationship similar to that of the attributes to

(1) Quoted by Bosanquet in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 9.
an existent(1). But what he means to indicate by that phrase is that the interrelatedness of the finite individuals is not an instance of 'co-ordinate relatedness,' between existents which might be what they are even prior to this relation, but on the contrary implies 'the plain fact', of 'super and subordinate reals!(2) The finite individual does not exist in his own right when taken in abstraction from the superior whole of which he is a part. He is, therefore, 'adjectival' to that whole.

As against such a monistic view which tends to swallow the reality of the finite individual, pluralism takes its cudgels to defend the independence of the finite individual. It takes its stand on the fact that the content of experience of the finite individual is as

(2) Ibid. p. 83.
much of an abstraction when taken apart from the
centre in which 'it comes alive' as this
centre would be when taken apart from the contents.
Besides, it is a mistake to look upon this
centre as a kind of passive receptacle into
which the contents of common experience pours itself. The unity of the self is not to be
looked upon as being the same kind of unity
which might belong to any object of conscious-
ness. The self exists for itself and, when
viewed from within, has an inalienable integrity,
in spite of the fragmentary character of its contents.
The finite individual is an active centre of
consciousness with a genuine freedom and crea-
tiveness with regard to his acts, for which he
is in a real sense responsible. He is not
merely a vehicle of the superior life of the
Absolute, but has a will of his own. The
numerical difference of the finite individuals,
therefore, is not a merely 'superficial' feature
of the world, but is the basal characteristic of
concrete existence(1).

We thus get two types of theories about the nature and the status of the finite individual. The monistic trend of thought leads to a form of Absolutism in which the reality of the Absolute leaves no room for any independent reality and status for the finite individual. The pluralistic trend of thought leads to a world in which the finite individuals have relative independence of existence and action against each other and to a certain extent even against God. 'Our wills are ours to make them thine'. But this offer itself is taken to imply the prior possession of our wills by ourselves. Both monism and pluralism appeal to the same great experiences of life and take these as their starting point. For the former the existence of a common purpose and the common good, the facts of love and self-sacrifice, and the

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(1) Pringle-Pattison in the Symposium of the Aristotelian Society: Life and Finite Individuality, p. 109
religious experience of God's all embracing love and reality, indicate the existence of the Absolute in which all the mundane differences vanish. For the latter these very experiences imply a real differentiation of the Absolute into a number of finite centres.

In the pluralistic scheme, God is regarded as being one such centre of experience among other similar centres. This conception of God does not necessarily exclude his being infinite, in some sense, 'God is infinite', says Professor Dawes-Hicks, in the abstract of the fourth of his Hibbert Lectures (1931), 'not because He is the world, nor because the world is part of Him, but because in and through Him the world has meaning and significance.' It is true that God can have such meaning and significance for all only if the fact of his having a separate centre of life does not preclude him from including them in his love and life; but since out-going love and an objectively directed and an
inclusive life is or can be - at least to a certain extent - within the reach even of the finite individual, in spite of his having a separate centre of existence, there is no reason why the same should not be true of the Divine Life.

The truth about the issue between the monistic and the pluralistic views seems to be that we have to credit the finite individual with a certain amount of freedom and independence. But this freedom or independence is not absolute and unqualified but only relative and limited.

On the one hand, it is true that he would be nothing apart from the social and the divine life, which gives him the very substance of his own life. His activity does not exist in a kind of vacuum but is conditioned by his natural and spiritual environment. He gains his active life only in and through the participation of an objective content which, in some sense, is independent of him. He is reduced to the bare
potentiality of activity unless he is confronted with a determinate situation requiring a specific response or solution. Not only is his action thus conditioned by his circumstances, but the very nature of his action is, so to say, dictated by them. Nor can we escape from this position on the ground that his concrete action is always a resultant of the nature of the circumstances as well as his own nature (including his ideals); for his own nature (including his ideals) is in sense ultimately not a creation of his own, but is rooted in the nature of the universe.

But, on the other hand, it is equally true that all this does not, in any way, interfere with his real freedom (1) which consists in

(1) The different senses in which the term freedom is usually used is a fruitful source of confusion. The freedom of the will for which the libertarians contended is the capacity of the will to choose any line of action without the operation of a motive. Such a mysterious and completely inescapable and
his genuine authorship of his own acts.

Things do not simply happen in him in spite of him and, so to say, without his active co-operation. He is a genuine centre of a creative lawless capacity is sometimes supposed to be the essence of the freedom of the will of the individual. But no individual really can act in a complete vacuum, and freedom in this sense cannot be said to belong to his will.

The attempt of the libertarians to save the freedom of choice in this sense was motivated by the desire to make the individual responsible for his own actions, since the opposing school of determinism made the individual a tool in the hands of his isolated desires. But the lawless freedom of the libertarians is equally incompatible with a real responsibility of the individual for his actions.

There is, then, no ultimate freedom of choice as distinguished from the freedom which is realised in choice. The fact of choice is undoubtedly a characteristic of human individuality. But the choice is exercised by an elimination of some alternatives in favour of a particular line of action, owing to the pressure of the whole self against its parts. Freedom in this sense is another name for self determination.

In its negative aspect freedom implies the overcoming of some limitations of obstacles. But there can be no obstacles or limitations to overcome unless there is some positive endeavour. In its
response to his natural and social environment of action and initiative. He is not a telephone wire along which the Absolute actor thinks. (1). In this sense he is a real agent with his own relative independence. The system of distinct and separate centres of finite experience is, therefore, not a merely accidental or 'superficial' feature of the world of manifestation (2) but is the very condition of its being what it is.

positive aspect, therefore, freedom implies the capacity to will and act. Concrete freedom, as distinguished from a purely formal freedom, seems to be a matter of degree. It will depend upon the amount of internal harmony and comprehension, which an individual can introduce in the conative tendencies which are a part of his nature.


(2) From the point of view of the Unmanifest there is, of course, no multiplicity. It seems that we cannot carry our personalities or even the personality of God into the Eternal. It is not possible to look upon them as eternal differentiations of the unmanifest. The personalities of men and God need not have any beginning or end in time, and the multiplicity of the
If we remember here that the real and ultimate bearers of values are only finite individuals it will be apparent that they — including the human and the non-human, the sub-human and the super-human — are in a genuine sense the end or the raison d'etre of the universe. Here conservation of abstract values, as such, is inconceivable apart from the centres of consciousness. It is only when they are realised in concrete and actually existents, different individuals may even be an inalienable feature of the world of manifestation. But such a multiplicity cannot be present in reality, in its eternal aspect, as distinguished from its temporal aspect, which is characteristic of the world of manifestation.

It is not possible to understand time without postulating also the eternity which goes beyond it, and at the same time includes it. Eternity is not the same as time without a beginning or end. It is the timeless aspect of time. Eternity and time do not and cannot exist apart from each other. They are, like the unmanifest and distinguish the world of manifestation, distinguishable but inseparable aspect of one integral whole.

The terms 'Unmanifest' and 'Manifestation' seem to be less misleading than the terms 'Reality' and 'Appearance'.
who are capable of appreciating them, that they even become values at all. It is true that the finite individual, as he actually is, may be very imperfect; but what he actually is now is only a fragment of his possibilities. And the worth of the life of the finite individual is to be estimated by the entire span of his life and the final attainment of his endeavours.

It was seen in the last chapter that the ultimate purpose of the life of the finite individual is the realisation of that Eternal Reality which embraces in the unity of its life all the finite individuals.

And we now find that the finite individuals are themselves, in a sense, the end of the universe. But this position does not involve any contradiction, and it does not involve moving in a circle. It only brings out
the Reciprocity which is fundamental to the structure of the Universe.
XIII.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

IT IS NOW TIME to sum up the argument of the thesis. It is characteristic of idealism to understand man and the universe chiefly through the examination of the nature and the significance of ideas and ideals, or knowledge and value.

It has been the tendency of successive
idealistic philosophers, from the time of Descartes, to bring out the primacy of the subject over the object. In England Idealism takes the form of theistic pluralism, under the inspiration of Berkeley or of Absolutism under the influence of Hegel. In both types, the problem of Individuality becomes central.

THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUALITY.

The individuality of a 'thing' is borrowed from and is relative to human purposes. But when we come to an organism we have a clear instance of intrinsic individuality. The individuality of the organism is not primarily due to the structure of its body, but it is due to its capacity to have value. The presence of self-consciousness in man makes possible a type of individuality which is higher than the individuality of the lower organisms.

We can elicit the principle of individuality by examining the structure of human experience. Human
experience exhibits the operation of a synthetic principle which organises the contents of consciousness - both theoretical and practical - with reference to value. Value then is the main clue to the understanding of individuality.

NATURE LIFE AND MIND.

It is characteristic of naturalistic explanations to ignore the principle of individuality and to try to reduce everything to instances of some abstract, unchanging, blind and mechanical uniformities. But such a procedure is governed by the old and faulty logic of an abstract universal which makes light of the multiplicity and uniqueness which characterises the world of concrete existence. The concept of 'a concrete universal' sustaining and explaining the individuality of its constituents is more fruitful.

It is not possible to understand the higher types of individuality by applying to them the categories which are primarily devised to explain
the lower types of individuality. In the realm of organic life, the category of blind mechanism breaks down, owing to the operation of immanent teleology. And the biological category of immanent teleology breaks down in explaining the conscious purposiveness of human beings who can act with reference to an ideal in the future.

**TELEOLOGY.**

But it seems possible to understand the immanent teleology of organic life or the uniformities of nature, in the light of the analysis of the nature of human purposiveness. In human beings purposive activity is characterised by conscious anticipation of the end; but at the same time, it is possible to discern in human history the emergence of values, which were largely beyond the conscious plans of any individual whose conscious purposive acts are nevertheless contributary to the realisation of these values.
we may find it, therefore, necessary to disassociate the concept of teleology from full anticipation of the end. The provision of this end may be partial only. The most essential requisite of teleological activity is that it results in value.

But if the nature of teleological activity is analysed in this way, it is possible to assimilate to it the immanent teleology of organic activity. The constituents of organic processes, e.g. cells, might have a rudimentary form of conscious cohesion which is contributary to the realisation of a 'whole' which has value but which is at the same time beyond the plans of any of them.

The realm of nature which is usually considered to be inorganic offers more difficulties in this process of understanding the type lower type of individuality by the higher. But for all we know, the constituents of this realm too may be some kind of organisms whose nature we cannot fully understand. And the 'mechanical' uniformities of nature
might be essentially of the nature of habits which are originally due to teleological action.

Teleology, then, seems to be that synthetic and synoptic principle which helps us to see the different types of individuality in their continuity.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

The principle of interpreting the lower types of individuality in terms of the higher is, therefore, more fruitful than the principle of interpreting the higher by the lower. In human beings we get the highest type of individuality. The distinguishing feature of human individuality however, is not the presence of consciousness, but the presence of self-consciousness. He is conscious of being a self-identical subject in and through his experiences.

From the epistemological point of view the awareness of self-identity is conditioned by and
proceeds *puri passu* with the awareness of the unity of the world of human experience. The self knows itself through the world and the world knows itself through the self. The subject and the object are essentially correlates.

The possibility of the subject knowing itself is sometimes questioned on the ground that whatever falls within the knowledge of a subject must be an object. But there is no real difficulty in one and the same thing being a subject and an object at the same time.

If the subject could know itself without knowing its objects or forget its relation to the object, it would not know itself as a subject. It is better to call this type of self-awareness *Pure Awareness*. The distinction between the subject and the object seems to arise within this *Pure Awareness*.

Such awareness is at least as much behind those objects of consciousness which are themselves other subjects. But since consciousness might also be to some degree a feature of the organic
as well as the physical world every object could be treated as a kind of a subject. And in the light of such analysis all knowledge appears to be the self-communion of that Pure Awareness which differentiates itself into a multiplicity of subjects.

THE EMPIRICAL SELF.

The spiritual unity of all subjects to which this analysis points does not, however swamp the individuality of each subject who is conscious of being an 'I' as distinguished from every other subject. The consciousness of being a self, however, is not something with which a man is born. From the psychological point of view it has a genesis and a development. It is through the constant intercourse with other individuals that the child comes to know itself as a unique self.

The empirical self or the 'me' has not any inalienable or constant contents. Any of its might be incorporated into the 'not-me'. But the division of the psyche into the me and the not-me is essential for the rational life of the individual,
because the 'me' is that provisional organisation of some contents of the psyche which becomes a nucleus of special significance for the organisation of all the contents of the psyche.

The 'me' tends to be broken into different conflicting 'selves'. But the presence of such a conflict cannot amount to the negation of the unity of the individual. The very possibility of there being any conflict between these various 'selves' presupposes the fact of their being owned by a single individual. Moreover, the tendency of these 'selves' to enter increasingly into an integrated and harmonised whole also points out to the operation of a unitary principle in consciousness.

The accomplishment of an integrated self is an ideal. But the activity of integration posits the operation of a teleological principle in human individuality.

But the concept of teleology remain an empty formula until it acquires some meaning by a
study of the values it creates.

THE STATUS OF VALUES.

It is a mistake to look upon values as purely subjective and private creations of the human mind. The denial of objectivity to values is a result of confusing the subjective processes of desire and being pleased, with the primary import of a judgment of value which has, like the judgment of fact, an objective reference. But at the same time value cannot be said to be a kind of quality belonging to the object. A value judgment is not in its essence merely descriptive or an expression of a purely theoretical consciousness, but implies an approval or disapproval which have their origin in the practical consciousness of the individual.

It is essential to determine the essential nature of that which may, thus, be a bearer of value. Apparently value seems to belong to such diverse things as money, machines, a work of art, human experience, natural beauty, or individuals.
But money or machines have no intrinsic value of their own. Their value is derivative. A work of art has value in virtue of being an expression of some experience. But an experience as such can have no value of its own apart from the individual having it. It, therefore, seems that only the individuals can have value. We have, from another approach, an affirmation of the identity of individuality and value.

PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

The essential objectivity of values might be doubted on the ground of their being rooted in the practical consciousness of the individual. But the objectivity is derived from the operation in practical consciousness of a Universal Norm which has its claims on all individuals alike. Philosophical speculation cannot accept as ultimate the apparent diversity of the values of the practical consciousness.
Although the Norm operative in the practical consciousness is not explicitly present to the consciousness of the individual, it is only in relation to this unitary ideal that we can understand him as a continual becoming. Even his theoretical consciousness must, in the long run, be treated as an expression of his conative urge to realise the value of truth.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

If then the realisation of values is a fundamental characteristic of the entire life of the individual, the problem of evil in his life presents some difficulties.

Evil is either natural or moral. The difficulty about natural evil is rooted in the purely hedonic conception of value. But suffering makes possible the higher moral values like courage or sympathy. And it has often also a good deal of educational value for the individual.
Moral evil, on the other hand, does not seem to
be in any sense necessary for the full development
of individuality. But it can be traced to the
free will of the individual and is not inevitable.
The possibility of moral evil, however could not
be eliminated by restricting the free will of the
individual, and thus making the appearance of moral
values impossible.

IMMORTALITY

We thus find that we need not treat
evil in the life of the individual as ultimate. We
can interpret it in terms of value. Even the
cutting short of the life of the individual, before
the attainment of Perfection, an evil which must
be accepted as ultimate. The possibility of the
immortality of the individual is indicated by the
implications of moral and religious consciousness.

It is sometimes argued that the
moral and religious consciousness can remain satis-
fied with the survival of human values in the society.
after the individual, who created them is dead.

But the higher spiritual values are an inalienable part of the personality of the individual. The survival of values, therefore, can have no meaning apart from the survival of the individuals. The total significance of the individual is not exhausted by looking upon him as being merely instrumental to the life of the society.

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

The organic conception of society does not do full justice to the personal worth and the relative worth of the individual. The society has no life of its own apart from the lives of the individuals.

At the same time the individual cannot be what he is apart from his place and function in society. The atomic conception of society as being constituted of ready-made individuals
is erroneous. Society is the source of the contents of the life of the individuals. It is, indeed, more than a mere source of the contents of his life, in so far as the individual can and does share the purposes of his fellow-beings. He comes to accept the common good as his own. And he might identify himself with the society so completely that the legal conception of society as a world of claims and counter-claims is not adequate for understanding its essentially spiritual structure.

The individual realises himself by living for others.

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

THE RELATION of the individual to God, as we get it in Religious experience, is also very significant. We cannot understand the nature of the individual apart from his experience.
And religious experience is the deepest form of his consciousness. In religious experience the individual retains his faith in the ultimate significance of life in the face of any appearances to the contrary, by recognising that the source and the ground of his life is ultimately a spiritual reality which is a congenial home for values.

It is characteristic of religious consciousness to look upon this reality as not less but more than personal, and as such including in its life all the finite individuals.

The implication of religious consciousness for human individuality is that man is essentially Janus-faced, finite-infinite.

Through religious consciousness the finite individual realises the infinity of which he is, with other finite individuals, an heir; and thus finds here the only basis for integrating his
life, as well as the ultimate purpose of his existence.

HUMAN PERSONALITY.

The problem of human personality is thus complicated by the fact that life is intimately intertwined with the social and the cosmic life. Pluralism and monism have the same data in common although their conclusions are divergent. But out of the controversy some definite truth does seem to emerge.

The capacity to share experiences and purposes as well as his capacity for communion with God points out to a hidden unity, to the fact of his being a member of a Spiritual Reality. He is, however, not merely 'adjectival' to this reality but has a relative independence of his own. He is a real agent, with a genuine and unique creativeness. It might even be said that just as the goal of the life of the finite individual, is the Spiritual Reality of which they are members, the goal of that
Spiritual Reality is, in a sense, the creation of finite individuals. Both exist for the sake of and in and through each other.

APPENDIX

GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE

The multiplicity of finite individuals is thus the most fundamental feature of the entire world of manifestation. And in so far as the distinction between the subject and object is retained in the apprehension of this world of manifestation the concept of God is richer and not poorer than the concept of the Absolute. But although in forming the concept of the Absolute the idea of value may be incorporated into it, still it leaves no room for the attitude of worship and love through which alone the true value can be appropriated. But in the communion with God there is room for the response of the total personality of the finite individual to the universe as a whole.

The forming of the concept of the Absolute also implies a distinction between the subject and object, as much as as forming the concept of God. It is always some finite subject who forms the concept and in doing so conceives it as an object
thought. The concept of the Absolute, therefore, is as much conditioned by the distinction between the subject and object as the concept of God.

The concept of the Absolute tries to include within itself the totality of the universe including the subject as well as the object. And it is, therefore, strictly impossible to form a concept which will be completely adequate to the nature of the Absolute. Moreover all that can be included in the concept of the absolute is only an idea of value. And a complete response to value does not consist in merely apprehending it in an intellectual proposition. Indeed, it is not possible to apprehend anything as having value if the conative-emotive functions of human personality are compelled to lie in abeyance. We might, therefore, say that the Absolute is more intimately known in the fullness of the concrete life of the finite individual than in the elaborate systems of armchair metaphysicians. It seems to be a matter for a realisation and not merely for academic knowledge.
The distinction between the subject and object, however, need not be considered as being ultimate and final. It pertains to the finite individual as finite. But there is no reason for holding that it is not possible for consciousness to transcend the limitation of finiteness, and make an increasing approach towards the infinite. The limitations which exist for the actual manifestation of life on the physical plain in its practical aspect need not be taken to indicate the possibilities which lie open for inner consciousness. There is always a theoretical possibility of the individual being able to drop in his consciousness the limitations introduced in his point of view by being an 'I' of an individual existent different from other individual existents. Such a possibility is further corroborated by the utterances of mystics. And if we recognise the possibility of thus entering into the Cosmic or the Infinite Consciousness it may claim for itself a validity which is even greater than the ordinary consciousness of the finite individual.
It is quite true that this is a mere possibility for most finite individuals. And any guesses as to the nature of the contents of such a consciousness will have to be purely hypothetical. If the idea of knowledge or value is freed from the distinction between the subject and the object we get the nearest approach to the contents of such a consciousness. Our discussion about Pure Awareness (1) lends great plausibility to the possibility of such a Consciousness. All that we can definitely say about it is that if it exists or can come into existence, it is not necessarily less valid in its claims for giving us the essential and ultimate nature of reality than the ordinary consciousness of the individual. What is psychologically last may be epistemologically ultimate, just as our revised judgments may be truer than our un-revised judgments although from the psychological point of view

(1) See a discussion in the Chapter on Self-Consciousness pp. 61-64.
they might come much later than the revised judgments.

It, therefore, seems that any differentiation into the multiplicity of individual existents which seems to characterise the ordinary world of our experience is only a feature of the world of manifestation which exists in relation to the point of view of the finite individual as finite. The Unmanifest source and ground of the world of Manifestation need not have any such differentiation or multiplicity within itself. From the point of view of the world of Manifestation finite individuals may have neither any beginning nor any end in time, and they might stand out as mutually distinct throughout the entire history of the world of Manifestation. But it would still be impossible to carry their distinct individualities into the Eternal, which is the timeless aspect of Time.