Induction, simplicity and scientific progress.
In a recent work, Popper claims to have solved the problem of induction. In this paper I argue that Popper fails both to solve the problem, and to formulate the problem properly. I argue, however, that there are aspects of Popper's approach which, when strengthened and developed, do provide a solution to at least an important part of the problem of induction, along somewhat Popperian lines. This proposed solution requires, and leads to, a new theory of the role of simplicity in science, which may well have helpful implications for science itself, thus actually stimulating scientific progress.
|Title:||Induction, simplicity and scientific progress|
|Keywords:||problem of induction, Karl Popper, simplicity in science, metaphysical assumptions of science, scientific progress, proposed solution to the problem of induction|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of BEAMS
UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Maths and Physical Sciences
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