Maxwell, N; (1974) The rationality of scientific discovery, part II: an aim oriented theory of scientific discovery. Philosophy of Science , 41 (3) 247 - 295. 10.1086/288579.
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In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No.2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself.
|Title:||The rationality of scientific discovery, part II: an aim oriented theory of scientific discovery|
|Open access status:||An open access version is available from UCL Discovery|
|Additional information:||Philosophy of Science © 1974 Article made available with permission|
|Keywords:||scientific rationality, scientific method, aims of physics, scientific progress, problem of induction, metaphysical assumptions of physics, theoretical simplicity, theoretical unity, physical comprehensibility, theory of everything|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Maths and Physical Sciences > Science and Technology Studies|
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