Mega Urban Transport Projects as a Catalyst for Sustainable Urban Regeneration and the Role of Mega Events

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DECLARATION

I, Yen-Ning Tseng confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

[Signature]
This thesis focuses on identifying inter-relationships between three different types of mega projects, including mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration schemes and mega events, such as the Olympics. This research attempts to test the hypothesis that ‘MUTPs can be an effective agent for sustainable urban regeneration and mega events’. It further assumes that ‘A well-functioning co-operation within this cluster of mega project can bring about a favourable outcome, i.e. maximum benefits and minimum costs’. The premise of the research discussed is that an appreciation of institutional arrangements and power relationships is vital in understanding the nature of complexity in decision-making regarding MUTP planning and delivery, and their associated developments. The methodology outlined is essentially a two-strand approach applied for purposes of illustration to a case study (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link). Strand one of the methodology is pre-hypothesis led - based on an analysis of the narrative, whilst the other is hypothesis led - based on an analysis of the returns to conventional interview questionnaires. This methodology of case study is designed to answer the primary research questions, which are: (a) Can MUTPs play an effective role in delivering sustainable urban regeneration and mega events? (b) Can MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events be implemented in parallel? And if so, (C) in which contexts these three domains can co-operate well and contribute to the visions of sustainable development?

This study concludes that conditions which allow one to coordinate the delivery of these three different types of mega projects include having a proactive partnership between the public and private sectors, a brokerage role played by local authorities, visionary politicians, streamlined planning powers, good stakeholder management, and continuous political commitment. Moreover, the locomotive role played by the MUTP which enables the urban regeneration schemes and mega events to happen could not implement without existing brownfield sites and the injection of significant public investments. In addition, the coalition of interests that forms itself around these projects is a leading dimension of these major developments. This coalition is mostly constituted by elite groups. It is also suggested that the coordination between these major projects remains rhetoric which is achieved by the interdependency between project discourses.

Key words: mega urban transport project; sustainable urban regeneration; mega event; institutional arrangement; political power; decision-making
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1 Introduction

1.1 Research Aims

This research aims to address the question that when multiple mega projects are instigated in the same timeframe and same spatial context whether they can be integrated to produce synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts? It seeks to identify the critical factors influencing the decision-making process within developments that are designed to encourage sustainable development and which have mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) at their core. It highlights the relationships between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events in terms of their planning frameworks. Furthermore, the research attempts to discover the extent to which the assumption that the major success of mega-project decision-making rests on institutional arrangements and power relations.

MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega-event orientated development have long been used as strategic drivers of urban development, catalysts for economic growth, and as solutions for the current concerns regarding sustainability (Bianchini et al., 1992; Dimitriou, 2010; Burbank et al., 2001; and Roche, 2000). Many studies that highlight the major issues of the relationship between transport infrastructure construction and urban development (e.g. Banister and Berechman, 2001; Gospodini, 2005 and Graham and Marvin, 2001) and also the relationship between mega events and urban planning (e.g. Burbank et al., 2002; Carrière and Demazière, 2002, and Hiller, 2000). However, the discussion of the interrelationship between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events in terms of encouraging sustainable development is notably lacking. This is notwithstanding the works of Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) - who focus on the historic review of urban politics and mega-project investment; Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) – who emphasise mega-project risks and accountability in the decision-making process; and Vickerman (2008) – who deals with cost-benefit analysis and wider economic benefits from mega-project investment.

Mega projects have been defined by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) as physical, very expensive, and public. The general perceptions of mega projects, as paraphrased from the definition in SMEC, 2001, are that:

- they absorb enormous amounts of capital over long periods;
- they have less flexibility in development planning;
- they are extremely complex to manage and seem in some cases to be beyond anyone’s control;
and

- they create substantial environmental impacts which are often not readily calculable in advance.

In addition, the debate over maintaining existing infrastructure versus embarking on new constructing has been growing, particularly in light of current budgetary pressures (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; and Priemus et al., 2008). There is, as a result, increasing recognition of the need to broaden the scope of project evaluation, placing concerns of complexity, uncertainty, and risk-taking at the heart of mega-project analysis and decision-making (Dimitriou, 2005).

Vickerman (2002) also raised issues about the risks involved in the public and private provision of infrastructure. He summarises those as construction risks, revenue and maintenance risks, and planning and political risks. These compound the problem of inefficiencies in the management of mega projects. In order to evaluate the surplus of social-asset investments, actual capital involvement and the encumbrance of future generations as a result of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events, the relationship between investments in these projects, the promotion of economic growth and the cities’ long-term development should be taken into account together.

It is suggested that a supportive business environment to mega-project investments is crucial for the delivery of MUTPs (Banister and Berechman, 2001; Janelle and Beuthe, 1997; World Bank, 2002) and urban regeneration schemes (Bianchini et al., 1992; Loftman and Nevin, 1995; Percy, 2003). However, the uncertainty caused by political change seems to be the inevitable features of the planning environment. These factors, stemming from institutional contexts, are assumed to be of major significance and cannot be neglected (Banister and Berechman, 2001; Dimitriou, 2005). These issues, along with the noted gaps in the literature, prompted the hypotheses and research at the core of this thesis.

Mounting evidence shows that these three types of mega project often fail to fulfil the initial project visions and promises when they are developed in isolation (e.g., Banister and Berechman, 2001; Hall, 1985). It is significant to pursue whether project outcomes can be greater than the sums of the individual parts if these three types of urban developments can act in concert rather than in a competing environment. On top of this enquiry, this research looks into which is the optimum model of institutional arrangements for multiple mega project coordination as regards achievement of sustainable development visions. Throughout searching for answers to these enquiries, the new knowledge contributed by this research includes several developments:

- The analysis of the stakeholder networks of mega-project development can identify the role of key stakeholders in decision-making process and the power distributions in the project-led network.
- The analysis of the determining factors of mega-project decisions enhances our understanding of
the functions of institutional arrangements, the evolution patterns of the associated development policies, and the treatment of risks, uncertainty, and complexity.

- The analysis of mega-project discourses explores the rationale underlying the use of such discourse. The findings reveal the principles behind how to eliminate the gaps between project rhetoric and the reality.

- This research provides a new exploration of the integration of multiple mega projects. The research of the interrelationships between mega projects has increasing importance especially when major infrastructure investments are expected to surge in response to climate change, poverty, famine, natural disaster, and the shortage of energy resources.

This chapter proceeds in 7 parts. Following the introduction of research aims, Section 1.2 explains the motivation to conduct in-depth research to uncover the potential synergies and impacts in coordination among multiple mega projects. Section 1.3 discusses the emergent issues which are the basis upon which the research premises and dimensions are built. It then presents the research questions and hypotheses, which are elaborated in Sections 1.4 and 1.5. The overall research methodology, the rationale behind case study selection, and the types of data sources used are illustrated in Section 1.6. This chapter concludes by offering the thesis structure.

Figure 1.1: Overall Research Process
1.2 Research Motivation

The three different types of urban development described above involve varied issues, ranging from the management of massive budgets, the clearance of large tracts of land to a wide range of stakeholders. Project development of such mega projects almost invariably draws controversy. Advocates hope that these developments can bring regional or sub-regional economic benefits in terms of jobs, real estate, and brownfield regeneration. Conversely, opposition concerns include the risks and the costs of the projects to the public, the negative impacts on the environment, and doubts about project-related promises on social equality and cohesion. A recent case in point is the building of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) in Britain, which section 1 started in 2001 and section 2 completed in 2007 (see Figure 1.2). This project has been surrounded by controversy since its early promotion (see Faith, 2007; Gourvish, 2002; Pollalis, 2006). These controversies were amplified by the introduction of an innovative concessionary contract containing two major railway land regeneration schemes (Pollalis, 2006) that later was modified to incorporate concerns of the 2012 London Olympics. These events triggered my interest to discover what are the main issues emerging from the interaction between these major developments and how are mega-project decisions made, particularly from the perspectives of the influence of institutional arrangements and political power relations.

Figure 1.2: High Speed 1

1.3 Research Premises

This section focuses on the research premises that frame the scope of the research. According to the primary research question addressed at the outset of this chapter, the associated premises are elaborated here. This section is accompanied by a diagram of research scope, as presented in Figure 1.3 below.

1.3.1 Positive correlations

Whether MUTPs can be a driver for urban regeneration is a context-specific question (see Banister and Berechman, 2001; Gospodini, 2005). Gospodini’s (2005) study attempts to examine the potential of urban transport infrastructure projects as a catalyst for urban development, redevelopment, and regeneration. The outcome of her research shows that, although urban transport infrastructure may have a catalytic effect on urban development, other influencing factors cannot be ignored. They include economic and political contexts. Gospodini (ibid.) further declares that the construction of new transport infrastructure projects encourages private investment by building a climate favourable to development. This phenomenon is especially evident when cities are being prepared to host global mega events. Here she implicitly indicates that the correlation between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events can be mutually beneficial. Moreover, the commitment to deliver mega events can stimulate reform of politics in urban governance and the policies of mega projects, including transportation, urban regeneration, and sport and cultural events. A typical initiative governance reformation is the establishment of a fast-tracking process of project delivery associated with the mega events. Newman (2007) claims that the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games proposals reinforce the vision of the Mayor of London and Central Government through prioritising the urban regeneration policies in south east London.

In this sense, whilst MUTPs encourage regeneration by introducing a more attractive climate for investment, mega events enhance the level of attractiveness for business through special policies and institutionalised processes, thus boosting the delivery of both transport and regeneration projects. This complex correlation needs to be better understood and considered in different contexts, a task this research seeks to undertake.

1.3.2 Urban regeneration encouraged by mega urban transport projects

Two most significant factors for successful urban regeneration encouraged by transport project investments according to Gospodini’s (2005) research are a flexible institutional framework and a positive political milieu. These factors heavily influence the impacts of urban regeneration in terms of economic development (see also Banister and Berechman 2001; Parkinson et al., 2006). Other conditions, also mentioned by Gospodini (2005), which are likely to determine the intensity and
efficacy of transport infrastructure projects on urban development, redevelopment, and regeneration (UDRR), include:

- The stability of the local economic situation, which influences whether the effects of transport infrastructure projects can be predicted.
- Large scale transport infrastructure tends to have a relatively bigger development potential in terms of effects upon UDRR.
- New transport infrastructure projects have stronger effects in urban areas that are in decline or have declined rather than in well-developed already prosperous areas.
- High existing local market demand for new space and the accommodation of new land uses will make new transport infrastructure projects a more effective catalyst for intensifying the redevelopment process of the area.

Discussion of these issues will draw attention to which form of institutional arrangements can realise sustainable urban regeneration when using MUTPs as the core strategy. The role of political power will also be examined in terms of bargaining powers that operate within the project-led networks.

1.3.3 Influence of politics in mega-project decision-making

This research postulates that institutional arrangements and political power relations are two crucial factors of mega-project planning. Although the issues of inequality among various participants in the decision-making process and the misinterpretation of democratic processes have been much debated, the decision-makers continue to be those who hold more resources, i.e. investors with greater investments and politicians who have more influence (see Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). The argument lies in the ultimate determining factor of the mega-project decision-making, which is political power rather than the power of the rationality of technocrats.

This aspect needs in-depth study by way of three approaches. Firstly, the research draws on the characteristics of decision-making, including ‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963) and path-dependent decision-making (Pierson, 2000). Secondly, the research identifies contextual factors requiring further analysis in order to gain more insights into decision-making processes, such as institutional settings, political environment, and social and cultural milieu, which can contribute to the complexity and uncertainty of mega-project delivery (see Ben-Haim, 2001; Catlaw, 2006; Hajer, 2003a). Finally, the research studies how the mechanism of mega-project decision-making, which embraces the use of discourse power (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003a; Roche, 2000) and a project-led networking (see Ansell, 2000; Beauregard, 2005; Castells, 1996; Low, 2005), can validate the premise which suggests that political power in mega-project decision-making is reinforced by the use of project discourse and project-led networking. Chapter 2 includes in-depth
discussion on these theoretical concepts.

1.3.4 Visions of sustainable urban regeneration

Sustainable urban regeneration, which has become a vision of policy-makers seeking to overcome urban problems in declining areas, encompasses issues such as poverty, inequality, economic decline, and the deterioration of the quality of life (see Dixon, 2007). Examples of the emergence of sustainable urban regeneration as a forefront issue can be seen in 2005 Planning Policy Statement 1 (PPS1) (ODPM, 2005), The London Plan (2008), and the 2007 Planning White Paper (HM Government, 2007). Sustainable urban regeneration is seen as a means which leads to continuous urban operations accompanied by long-lasting improvements in economic, physical, social, and environmental conditions (Roberts, 2000; see also Healey, 1995; Hemphill, 2006; and Rydin, 2003). According to previous literature (for example, Camagni et al. 1997; Hjorth and Bagheri, 2006; Newman, 2006; Rydin et al. 2003), the achievement in sustainable urban regeneration in terms of economic growth, social equity, or environmental protection is driven, under the transformation process, by changes in economic structure, urban governance, and public perceptions. The importance of social equity and environmental protection is meanwhile rising. These factors influence MUTP developments, so we can assume that sustainability of urban regeneration where MUTP is the main strategy depends on the visions of decision-makers.

Economic growth still remains the prime goal of many urban regeneration schemes, although the issue of the sustainability of such development has arisen over recent decades (Davies, 2002; Dixon, 2007). In this context, the economic performance influenced by MUTP development plays an essential role in sustainable urban regeneration. Banister and Berechman (2001) have investigated the conditions in which transport investment leads to economic development, and conclude: “the measurable and additional economic development benefits from transport development can be found only when economic investments, political policy, and institutions operate at the same time.” Economic performance may be catalysed effectively by the delivery of a mega project. However, the economic growth is merely a partial improvement for cities in terms of sustainable urban regeneration. It lacks comprehensive benefits and social integrity for the majority of city residents. For instance, many city regeneration projects in the USA and the UK show that, although urban regeneration policies successfully transform some urban zones into a business environment attractive to investors, the benefits of the output and jobs generated often did not trickle down to local people (Healey, 1995). Under this circumstance, it seems that there is a gap between sustainability and actual performance.

According to the previous studies (e.g. Banister and Berechman, 2001; Gospodini, 2005), we may assume that sustainable urban regeneration could be attained when MUTPs act as the main strategy. This research assesses how the objectives of institutional arrangements and the vision of the actors in
the mega-project decision-making process impact on the level of achievement in sustainability. It also analyses how the stakeholders respond to the gaps between the sustainable development visions and the outcomes of the projects studied.

1.3.5 Public-private coalitions and overcoming institutional barriers

There has been much debate about the strength and misperception of public-private coalitions (e.g. Davies, 2003) as well as the criticism about the silo thinking and closed system within an institutional network (see Kingdon, 1995). When considering the role of MUTPs in urban regeneration planning, it is important to analyse the stakeholders network on a basis that the network structure is not only elite-based but also pluralist-based (Judge, 1995; McCann, 2001; Ward, 2000).

Thus the institutional networks, stakeholder power diffusion, urban change, and policy response, which are interdependent issues, need to be considered together. One of the objectives of this study is to analyse the pattern of stakeholder coalition and see how the institutional barriers built up by the path-dependent behaviour from the dominant actors impact on mega-project decision-making.

Figure 1.3: Research Scope

1.4 Research Questions

Based on the associated premises and the research dimensions listed above, the primary research question and the sub-questions that this thesis seeks to answer are as follows:
When multiple mega projects are instigated in the same timeframe and same spatial context, can they be integrated to produce synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts?

The following sub-questions elaborate on the primary research question:

(1) What is the role of mega urban transport projects in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events; and what are their relationships given the institutional contexts and frameworks that they have been planned, appraised, and delivered within?

(2) How do institutional arrangements and decision-makers respond in order to manage changes of contexts and environments in the planning of MUTP, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events?

(3) Can several synchronised mega projects deliver a favourable outcome to stakeholders if they integrate and mutually reinforce each other, rather than compete for limited social, economic, political, and environmental resources?

(4) Have mega project discourses been used as tools by key champions to convince others of the validity of the mega projects in the expectation that these discourses will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of these champions and empowering the project delivery network?

1.5 Research Hypotheses

The main hypothesis and its sub-hypotheses are elaborated in line with each research question and their associated premises (see Section 1.3). Also, on the basis of the previous discussion on MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events, the hypotheses focus on the role of MUTPs in promoting sustainable urban regeneration schemes and international mega events. The interplay between the roles of these three types of mega projects is also presented. In responding to the primary research question, the author hypothesises that:

MUTPs can be an effective factor for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and international mega events; furthermore, mega events can positively catalyse both MUTP development and sustainable urban regeneration. Notwithstanding this, it is assumed that there are many other influencing factors which will lead to different outcomes for urban regeneration and mega events despite the use of MUTPs as a major strategic vehicle.
In accordance with previous study on ‘path dependency theory’ (North, 1993; Pierson, 2000), the research premise is that path-dependent institutional arrangements embedded in public-private coalitions and inter-organisational co-operation obstruct the process of the transformation of the decision-making mechanism into a more efficient form. Moreover, this inefficient structure will impede the progress of effective sustainable urban regeneration policies because vested interest groups who hold the power to shape the policies are in control of the main decisions, which they influence according to maximise their private benefits.

There is evidence to suggest that previous patterns of urban political structures preserve influential “paths” for current or future urban development decision-making mechanisms (see Greener, 2005; Kallis, 2005; North, 1993; and Pierson, 2000). The transformation process of mega-project decision-making needs to be evaluated over time in order to understand how mega-project policies respond to changes in urban political structures, and what the approach to sustainability within a bottom-up, place-specific, longer-term, and pluralistic environment. Within this context, the main research hypothesis is restated as the following three sub-hypotheses:

(1) MUTPs have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration development. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and the Olympic development associated with its transport hubs.

(2) Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega-event-related development (see Jones and Evans, 2006; Rydin et al., 2003; Walter and Scholz, 2007; Roche, 2000).

(3) Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events can effectively foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.

(4) Key champions of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with limited sense of corporate social responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003a; Roche, 2000).
1.6 Overall Research Methodology

This section describes the overall research methodology. In order to answer the research questions, this research focuses on the analysis of institutional arrangements and power relations in mega-project decision-making processes and seeks to detect whether the collaboration between MUTP development, urban regeneration, and mega event planning can lead to sustainable development. The investigation will be undertaken by means of case study on a contextual analysis basis. This research proceeds in three phases (see Figure 1.1):

Phase 1 constitutes a literature review following two parallel tracks:
- a literature review of practice to identify the critical issues in the scope of MUTPs connected with urban regeneration and mega events; and
- a literature review of theory relevant to the mega-project decision-making process.

Phase 2 consists of a UK case study to be examined using the theoretical framework and an analytical model generated from Phase 1.

Phase 3 assesses the research hypotheses on the strength of the previous two phases and interprets the context-dependent lessons for future delivery of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events.

Figure 1.4: The Two-Pronged Approach of Case Study Methodology

Source: OMEGA Centre (2007)
The methodology of case study is a two-pronged approach (see Figure 1.4) which involves pre-hypothesis investigations and hypothesis-led interviews. Both prongs are based on the implementation of story-telling (see Hajer, 1995) for data collection in order to gain more insights into the decision-making process of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events. The detailed rationale of the case study method is elaborated in Chapter 3.

### 1.7 Case Study Selection

Criteria for case selection are:

- to elucidate the interrelationships between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events;
- to explore the possibility of the synergy between these three types of urban development; and
- to detect the complex power relations and institutional arrangements among multiple layers of players.

With these criteria in mind, the case selected for this research involve a wide range of stakeholders aiming at the delivery of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and international mega events. The UK case of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) is an ideal candidate. It has two major urban regeneration schemes and the 2012 London Olympics as the mega event adjacent to the stations (hubs), i.e., King’ Cross Central scheme next to the St Pancras International station and Stratford City scheme surrounding Stratford International station. A brief summary of this case follows (more detail is addressed in chapters 4-6):

CTRL is the first high-speed railway link in Britain. The line is 109km in length and is split into two construction sections. Section 1 opened in September 2003 and runs from the Channel Tunnel to Fawkham Junction in north Kent. The majority of the new high-speed line runs alongside the M2 and M20 motorways through Kent. Section 2 of the project was opened on 14th November 2007. The track stretches from Ebbsfleet in Kent to London St. Pancras. All Eurostar trains used suburban lines to enter London at the Waterloo International Terminal until section 2 opened, at which point the Eurostar trains were routed to St. Pancras International.

Delivery of the CTRL has prompted several vociferous debates relevant to the main theme of this research. These debates include, for instance, whether the urban regeneration promises accompanying the project are achievable; whether the Link was a key factor in London’s successful 2012 Olympic Bid; and whether sustainable development goals have modified decisions about the CTRL. According to the CTRL developer (London and Continental Railways Ltd.), urban regeneration benefits are vital as to justify the project delivery and to sway stakeholders. King’s Cross Central and Stratford City are located in the two main brownfield regeneration sites promoted by CTRL. Additionally, the 2012 Olympic Park venue is located in Stratford, which also prompts significant issues associated with the
mega-event intervention.

This investigation discusses the interrelationships between the CTRL project, the King’s Cross Central and the Stratford urban regeneration schemes, and the preparation for the 2012 London Olympics. It aims to identify the interaction within the cluster of this urban development and to further assess its effectiveness in realising sustainable development.

1.8 Thesis Structure

This thesis comprises 7 chapters. The first chapter consists of an introduction to the overall research methodology, including research background, scope, hypothesis setting, primary research questions, and a brief description of the research method. It is followed by a literature review on MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, mega events, and the theories of decision-making in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, a methodology for the case study is introduced. The case study methodology employs a two-pronged approach comprising, the pre-hypothesis research based on the Cognitive Edge\(^1\) method and the hypothesis-led research based on a conventional structured questionnaire. The core of the case study methodology is based upon narrative analysis through capturing narratives among stakeholders. The term ‘narrative’ is used in a broad sense to include written articles and transcripts of spoken material. The Cognitive Edge methodology seeks to identify narrative patterns for dealing with complexity, uncertainty, and risk in order to facilitate decision-making rather than traditional strategies, which involve assumptions of order, of rational choice, and of intent. The data collection method, the analytical framework, and the comparative framework are also elaborated in this chapter.

Chapters 4 through 6 consist of the case study, conducted in order to test hypotheses, reveal new issues, and ultimately answer the research questions. Chapter 4 covers the CTRL project with associated urban regeneration projects in King’s Cross area, known as King’s Cross Central (Chapter 5), and Stratford City development in east London. The King’s Cross area contains the King’s Cross Railway Lands, home to the CTRL terminus at St Pancras International Station, while the Stratford City development is dominated by the Stratford International Station, another CTRL terminus in the heart of its developing site. The Stratford City regeneration scheme also plays a significant role as a gateway to the main 2012 London Olympic Games venues. The Stratford City scheme and the 2012 London Olympic Games form the third part of the case study, discussed in Chapter 6. In the final layer, Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the findings of the overall research and case study, and recognises generic and context-sensitive lessons for future planning of major transport projects, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events.

\(^1\) Cognitive Edge Pty is a consultancy set up by David Snowden that addresses problems of complexity through knowledge management (see http://www.cognitive-edge.com/).
2 Literature Review of Mega Projects and their Decision-Making Process

2.1 Introduction

A core research question within this PhD investigation is “what are the critical interrelationships between mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration, and mega-events?” In seeking answers to that question, this chapter includes a literature review of these three types of mega projects and the theoretical dimensions of decision-making in mega project development.

The discussion proceeds in six main phases: Section 2.1 gives clear definitions of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, mega events, institutional arrangements, and power relations for this study. Clarification of these research subjects helps to establish a solid basis for discussion about the decision-making process in mega-project investments. Section 2.2 presents an analysis of key issues relating to the three types of urban development studied in this research. These key issues include initiatives of mega-project promotion, transport and mega-event investments for urban economic growth leading to regeneration, and forces of globalisation on mega-project investments. Section 2.3 reviews relevant mega-project literature and establishes a theoretical framework for the case study analysis. This is followed by a discussion of gaps in the existing literature and how this research can fill them (Section 2.4). Section 2.5 summarises the emergent issues and the questions arising from these issues. These questions closely relate to the research questions and are the basis of the questionnaire design. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.

2.1.1 Defining mega urban transport projects

This section gives the definitions of MUTPs. MUTPs provide the focus of this study along with their potential contributions to sustainable urban regeneration and mega events. This PhD research was conducted as part of the OMEGA Centre research programme in MUTPs financed by VREF ², therefore the definition and case study examined here reflects the set of criteria provided by the OMEGA Centre (Dimitriou et al., 2008). The study by Bruzelius et al. (2002: 144) of large infrastructure investments in Denmark and Germany highlights certain features of mega projects. According to the two research programmes above, MUTPs are characterised as:

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² See OMEGA Centre website: http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/ and the VREF website: http://www.vref.se/
- Land-based transport infrastructure investments within and connecting ‘urban areas’ (as defined in the VREF FUT Policy Statement) in the form of bridge, tunnel, road and rail links, or combinations of these.
- Projects that entail a construction cost of over US$ 1 billion at 1999 prices.
- Projects that are perceived as critical to the success of major urban and metropolitan development initiatives.
- Long life time of 50 years and more
- Considerable uncertainty with respect to demand forecasts and cost estimations
- A substantial role of project funding played by the state
- Considerable share of indirect benefits which cannot be captured by the operator (benefits not occurring to the users of the project rather than to third parties).

In the interests of manageability, the scope of this study is confined to land-based transport projects. The physical structure of these projects may be simply represented as a series of transport nodes, a transport line-haul, and their affiliated developments including regeneration schemes and mega events as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: CTRL Line-Haul and Its Affiliated Developments

Source: Author

2.1.2 Defining sustainable urban regeneration

Sustainable urban regeneration has become the dominant agenda of contemporary urban development policy that aims to facilitate cities maintaining and improving their competitiveness (see National Planning Policy Guidance: General policy and principles, 1997; The London Plan, 2004 and The Planning White Paper: Planning for a Sustainable Future, 2007). According to Roberts (2000: 17), urban regeneration is defined as “comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change.” The varied contexts include physical conditions, economic systems, the political situation and global trends attributed to different urban problems. Notwithstanding how diverse the problems are, the definition supports the premise that there is a common desire to prevent cities from declining, and that there is a need to attract inward investment and improve competitiveness.
From the wide range of urban regeneration projects, this research focuses on prestige urban regeneration schemes, with ‘sustainable development’ at the heart of their discourse. These projects are defined by Loftman and Nevin as “a pioneering or innovative, high profile, large-scale, self-contained development which is primarily justified in terms of its ability to attract inward investment, create and promote new urban images and act as the hub of a radiating renaissance - facilitating increases in land values and development activities to adjacent areas” (1995: 300). According to Bianchini et al (1992) and Loftman and Nevin (1995), these prestige urban regeneration projects are characterised by the following features:

- They are important instruments for the transformation of entrepreneurial urban governance;
- They are the extension and reinforcement of property-led development;
- They are adjacent to flagship architecture, landmark buildings, major office complexes, pivotal transport hubs or leisure and sporting facilities;
- They involve the “rhetoric of partnership” and elite-dominated urban policy formation (Some would argue this is a biased observation in that “real partnership” have also taken place);
- They are usually located in areas conducive to business opportunity and equipped with a ‘convenient’ regulatory environment for attracting private-sector money, such as a central business district;
- The public sector provides initiatives to attract private sector capital for the delivery of these projects by concessionary contracts;
- They marshal powerful vested interests, elite groups, and politicians to form a project-led network;
- They involve massive investment and high financial risk; whereby
- They are financed by mechanisms including public-private partnerships, joint ventures or through the extensive provision of public grants or subsidies.

2.1.3 Defining mega events

This research concentrates on mega cultural and sporting events which are plan-led and which are supported by designated policies at local, national, and international levels, and examines the decision-making process at each level. Mega events can be defined as events which lead to radical changes in public perceptions (for example, in consumerism and modernity), local needs, and political demands, and which typically result in economic restructuring and the changing of policies in mega infrastructure investments (see Altshuler and Luberoft, 2003: 18). In this sense, mega events may be regarded as nodes on the historical path of economic and urban developments which shape the current context (see Arthur, 1994).

Roche’s (2000) analysis considers the cultural aspects of mega events, including the changing cultural powers (of capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism), the role of cultural citizenship (consumerism
and internationalism), the mobility of tourism, the competition of the media, the localised identity as it sits with the global society, as well as the connection between the mega events and significant human life-style changes.

According to Burbank et al. (2001: 7), a mega event is “a political production adopted for given agendas across different levels of stakeholders”. According to a number of scholars (see Andranovich et al., 2001; Burbank et al., 2001; Carrière and Demazière, 2002; Poynter, 2009; Preuss, 2004; Roche, 2000; Shoval, 2002), mega events are characterised by the following features:

• They are created, organised, and controlled by elite groups;
• They are reinforced by ideological and propagandist discourses;
• They have high adaptability toward the global political environment;
• They benefit from a kind of ‘sacredness’ and protectionism that is inherent in the mega events;
• They play an important role in nation-building, national identity reinforcement and national marketing; and
• Mega events, especially the expos, lead to the initiation of touristic consumerism.

2.1.4 Defining institutional arrangements and power relations

According to Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999), institutional arrangements constitute a system that locates multiple project stakeholders and distributes powers of decision-making among them. This is not to say that institutional arrangements can necessarily empower all actors equally, for balance is often achieved by relying on the dominant powers within the hierarchical relationships of stakeholders. In this regard, institutional arrangements can be seen as a variety of coordinating mechanisms which “provide actors with vocabularies and logics for pursuing their goals, for defining what is valued, and for shaping the norms and rules by which they are to abide” (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1999: 3).

Discussion of power relations in this thesis focuses on the dynamics that produce distinctive patterns of stakeholder interactions and what effects these forces have on mega-project decision-making. Bruno Latour (1986) looks at power in the pursuit of understanding the power relations with a sociological approach. He introduced a ‘translation model’ which is premised on the belief that successful command transmitted results stem from “the action of a chain of agents each of whom ‘translates’ it in accordance with his/her own projects [interests]”. In this sense Latour argues that this translation model has power composed by enrolling many actors in a given political and social scheme. His view differs from the traditional explanation of power which employs a ‘transmission model’ that transmits the same power albeit deflected or slowed down by various sources of frictions (lack of communication, ill will, opposition of interest groups, indifference, etc.) (Law, 1986: 264-280). Both in the translation model and the transmission model of power, power relations within mega project decision-making processes are signified by a mobility of impetus within command and information networks and the reaction of stakeholders to these.
Latour’s translation model shows clearly that the way project stakeholders’ act determines the provisional bonds made in stakeholder networking. Because a healthy stakeholder network requires consistent engagement by all parties, Latour stresses this point by saying that power can be treated as the consequence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing, and enlisting in practice (Latour, 1986: 273). Under this concept, the primary initiative for a mega-project stakeholder to positively react is whether the given project discourse (i.e., project objectives, visions, and policies) can help him/her achieve their agendas and whether the institutional arrangements can give them opportunity to exercise their negotiation powers.

As Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) illustrated in their model (see Figure 2.2), institutional arrangements combine two-dimensional elements: the nature of the action’s motive and the distribution of power it reflects. They pose six categories of institutional arrangements in their model: markets, hierarchies, communities, states, networks, and associations.

**Figure 2.2: Institutional Arrangement Model**

Source: Author, edited from Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 12)
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 10) stress that institutional arrangements are constrained by the social context within which they are embedded. They suggest that in order to understand the structure of institutional coordination and its related power distribution, one needs to be sensitive to this social context and the features of their embeddedness.

2.2 Key Issues

In this section issues emerging from the published literature are explored. These include the impacts of institutional arrangements and power relations in the decision-making process and the interrelationship between large-scale investment in transport and mega events and the achievements of sustainable urban regeneration enabled by them.

2.2.1 Initiatives involving the promotion of mega projects

MUTP investments are often considered critical to enhance competitiveness in this era of economic globalisation. Such investments have the potential to tackle the twin challenges of recession and climate change (see Dimitriou, 2010; Greengauge 21, 2007a). Economic growth and development has been the rationale driving capital investment in large-scale transport infrastructure.

We are in a phase of intense global competition, yet perversely we are in dire need of global coordination better to tackle challenges of poverty, famine, energy shortages, financial crisis and climate change at the global level (see Dimitriou, 2010). As a result of globalisation, there is an increasingly integrated global economy with international trade agreements and higher labour mobility together stimulating demand-sensitive logistical transportation (see Janelle and Beuthe, 1997). These are consistent with many trends in global economic restructuring with deregulation and privatisation combining to enlarging the role of multinational corporations (ibid.). According to Dimitriou (2009), prior to the world economic downturn of 2008 global investment in infrastructure increased enormously in the preceding 10 years. He observes these investments are promoted by a global elite of players who are often ‘national champions’, politically well-connected and frequently pan-European. He argues that such investments not only produce financial returns but, more importantly, perhaps landmark projects seen to symbolise the economic virility of national or city economies. Multinational corporations or global investors (of which Deutsche Bank Group and Macquarie Bank Group are prime examples) have gradually come to play a primary role in the transport infrastructure development of many emerging economies by forming a strategic relationship with nation states that are eager to demonstrate themselves as successful sovereign nations. Janelle and Beuthe (1997) point out that states are proactive in providing these investment giants a supportive business environment and many such bodies play an active role in financing, marketing, and protecting the infrastructure market as well as endeavouring to attract more international businesses to locate their headquarters in their jurisdiction. The same trends also affect the initiatives of the
development of sustainable urban regeneration schemes.

In the case of those prestige urban regeneration projects, certain styles of buildings and design seem dominant in many of the late 20th century regeneration schemes worldwide (Bianchini et al., 1992). This may be as a result of the influence of the global corporations involved in such developments, reinforced by the global financial interdependence and the trans-national values they bring with them in design, decision-making, marketing, and production. This trend has continued into the 21st century with corporations, such as Westfield Group, Lend Lease Group, and Mott MacDonald Group, are highly competent in pursuing the development opportunities of areas with high investment potential and a convenient regulatory environment. City leaders concurrently have a strong desire to retain designers with international reputations, deploy advanced technology and innovative building materials in their developments as well as the tendency to imitate models of development from other cities. These are factors in generating homogeneity in the vision of cities. The role of prestige urban regeneration schemes as a cornerstone for place-marketing, tourism, and a consumption-based city image has long been criticised by groups that support the idea of more organic and community-orientated development. This is a long-standing perennial controversy for policy-makers who are all too often constrained by the need for quick and visible solutions to local economic challenges of decline.

Advocates of the ‘trickle-down’ ideology maintain that the implementation of prestigious projects acts as a stimulus to positive impacts on urban regeneration. The results can, however, be mixed. Bianchini et al (1992), for example, argue that those prestige projects that are usually associated with prime property-led development actually bring more difficulties to small local businesses and low-income residents by virtue of increased land and property rental values that they can ill-afford (ibid.: 251-252).

Proponents of mega events argue that they can spawn development that may otherwise not come about or certainly not at the speed generated by the mega-event timescales. Hiller (2000) argues that the advocacy of mega events can camouflage other interests hidden in the rhetoric about development. There is plentiful evidence of pressures emanating from diplomatic sources that suggests that these bids are more politically-driven than many others (Shoval, 2002). The promotion of economic growth as a justification for hosting mega events remains a point of contention across the world (see Shoval, 2002). The premise postulated here is that other intangible objectives, such as global media exposure, national image and identity-building, establishing civic pride, and reinforcing government authority become major drivers for local and national political leaders to pursue such events.

In times of recession in both USA in the 1930s and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s, mega project investments played a crucial role as economic stimuli (Dimitriou, 2009). Arguments in favour of the development of mega projects were addressed by SMEC (2001: 2) and are summarised as follows:
• mega projects are likely to attract development planners and political leaders as a single solution to interdependent and complex problems;
• they are regarded as national symbols resulting from government developments;
• the process of globalisation creates an enhanced global institutional capacity and financial network that encourages such large-scale projects to be built by international co-operation;
• technological advancements underlying the change to a modern lifestyle and the increased dependency on technology; and
• increasing demands on comprehensive transit networks which highlight the inter-dependency of transport projects and thereby augment the scale of mega projects.

2.2.2 Transport investment for urban economic growth

Dimitriou (2010) argues that the opportunities brought by the strategic investment in transport infrastructure can significantly boost an economy confronting great uncertainties. This was demonstrated in the US as part of the ‘New Deal’ in confronting the challenges of the recession in the 1930s; in France where the investment in the high-speed railway network boosted its international economic competitiveness and continues to stimulate its economic vitality and sustainability; and in Hong Kong, where its massive port and airport infrastructure programme of projects in the years immediately before its handover to China created economic certainty and optimism where otherwise little would have existed.

There is a large body of research investigating whether transport investment can significantly assist urban regeneration. The consensus is that transport investment alone cannot have a decisive influence (see Banister and Berechman, 2000 and 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Gospodini, 2000; TTD and AITD, 2007). It is instead generally believed that infrastructure investments, particularly in transport are essential in enabling and supporting economic growth and boosting competitiveness in association with other measures. Rietveld et al. (2001) emphasise the interdependence between transport infrastructure and economic growth. They contend that transport infrastructure is a necessity for the functioning of an economy through this vital support of the production and consumption processes. Rietveld et al. (2001) offer a brief review of practices in the economic evaluation of MUTPs in several countries, including UK, Germany, France, EU, Japan, and USA. The findings of the OMEGA Centre broadly endorse those of Rietveld et al, in particular that there are deep-rooted problems in the usage of traditional regional economic impact methodologies (such as Cost Benefit Analysis) to assess transport infrastructure investment. Rietveld et al., (2001: 7) see that “...changes in transport provision may lead to specific local growth, but [that] much of this will be a redistribution of economic activity between regions or localities rather than net overall growth” The work of the OMEGA Centre suggests that broader multi-criteria appraisal methodologies can provide a more appropriate and transparent framework for MUTP appraisal with the additional benefit that it can track changes in political decisions as they transpire. This is seen to be especially useful when (despite
the rhetoric) the ‘sustainable business case’ is overridden by conventional more short term interests associated with ‘business as usual’ practices (Dimitriou et al., 2010).

Gospodini’s (2005) study of twelve European cities, suggests there are five influencing factors, apart from the size of investment, on which the scale of the effects of urban development, redevelopment, and regeneration depend. These are:

- The type of the transport infrastructure project
- The condition of the built environment in the greater corridor area
- Existing local market demand for new space and the accommodation of new land uses
- The local economic situation
- The local institutional framework and political milieu

According to Banister and Berechman (2001), a “supportive business environment” embraces the contention that only when investment conditions and political and institutional conditions operating at the same time are measurable and the additional economic development benefits generated by transport investment can be identified will such a supportive business emerge. Buck et al. (2002) argue that the ‘urban triangle’ constituted by competitiveness, cohesion, and governance strategically shape the ideal sustainable function of urban environment. This issue is supported by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003: 72) who claim that, although the common situation for proponents of MUTPs is to claim that such projects will result in substantial development effects, the empirical evidence shows that such claims are rarely justified. The conditions required, they suggest, are similar to those identified by Banister and Berechman (2001) and Buck et al. (2002) in that they all include not only investment conditions but also the institutional and political environment. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003: 71) emphasise that “only under a number of specific conditions can one expect a significant positive impact of investments in transport infrastructure on regional economic growth.” According to the same source, these conditions include:

- if serious capacity problems exist;
- if there is a relocation of households and companies triggered by new capacity and significant transport savings; and
- when there is a combination of various types of investments in both infrastructure and social capital attracted by proactive development policies.

2.2.3 Mega event development for urban economic growth

In the wake of the financial success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, U.S. cities began to see the Olympics as a vehicle for a city’s transformation without consuming large sums of taxpayers’ money (Burbank et al., 2001: 7). Andranovich et al. (2001: 113) refer to the importance of mega events in economic development: “As cities compete for jobs and capital in the context of limited federal aid and increasing global economic competition, a new and potentially high-risk strategy for
stimulating local economic growth has emerged. This strategy, called the mega-event strategy, entails the quest for a high-profile event to serve as a stimulus to, and justification for, local development”. People turning their attention toward activities in leisure, entertainment, tourism, and sports is an irreversible tendency. This is one of the stimuli to enhance the attraction of the mega events (Andranovich et al., 2001). Although cities will take risks in hosting a mega event since even bidding for the events is not without considerable cost, the allure of hosting a mega event will remain. This illuminates some questions, such as how are policies concerning mega events made? What roles do promoters of mega events play? One way to decrease risks is to extend the planning in the bidding stage; if a city loses out in the bidding, the substitute plan can be introduced to carry on improving the city’s development. However, there is no simple answer to reducing the risks for cities competing to host mega events.

Burbank et al. (2001) claim that advocates of mega events as attractive generators of competitive economic growth will continuously use the symbolic value of such events to try and influence policy-making and to claim that, with careful planning, this in turn will fulfil the local agendas, such as urban regeneration benefits. The same source also claims that in the case of the Olympics, they are explicitly used to promote consumption-oriented goals of economic development and not for establishing better public-private partnership mechanisms to implement Olympic developments that entail meaningful citizen participation in the process of Olympic delivery. This they claim has led to the needs of the locality often suffering in the pursuit of the visions of the Olympics ideal.

The success of the Barcelona 1992 Olympics has become an exemplar for many followers. It dramatically illustrates the transformation, as a result of the Games from a city with a declining local economy to one that has subsequently flourished as a new international centre for service and tourism (see Monclus, 2003). A mega-event is not a panacea. Olympic host cities Montreal (1976) and Athens (2004) incurred major financial deficits in staging the Games and subsequent venue maintenance throwing a long-term financial burden on local taxpayers and a legacy of ‘white elephant’ facilities.

Mega events in different ways can be instrumental in creating a plausible new vision of the urban development for the city and inspire others to follow it. Once investors are attracted, large amounts of international investment are expected to flow into the city that otherwise would not have been received. What is less appreciated however, is that the success in the competition for international funds for the successful host city can bring with it competition at the local level, resulting from the diversion of funds from earlier earmarked local investments. This has been the case of the 2012 London Olympic where the high costs of this mega-event are largely being raised by the National Lottery in conjunction with private sector investment and increasing levels of government funds. How decisions were made to divert these resources ultimately relates to the discoursing power which will be further illustrated in the case study chapter (Chapter 6). There is finally the question of whether the economic growth brought about by the mega event subsequently can be modified to meets local needs
and, if so, whether the same outcome could be achieved without involving such grandiose plans, involving far less risk and much less cost.

### 2.2.4 Forces of globalisation on mega-project decision-making

We are in a phase of intense global competition, and are in a dire need of global coordination to better tackle the global challenges of poverty, famine, energy shortages, financial crises and climate change (see Dimitriou, 2010). As a result of globalisation, there is an increasingly integrated global economy with international trade agreements and higher labour mobility all provoking demand-sensitive logistical transportation and infrastructure investments (see Janelle and Beuthe, 1997). These are consistent with many trends in global economic restructuring with deregulation and privatisation collectively enlarging the role of multinational corporations (ibid.).

Multinational corporations and global investors (such as Deutsche Bank Group and Macquarie Bank Group) have come to play a primary role in mega project development in many emerging economies by forming strategic relationships with nation states that are eager to prove themselves as viable sovereign nations. Janelle and Beuthe (1997) point out that states are proactive in providing these investment giants a supportive business environment and many such bodies play an active role in financing, marketing, and protecting the infrastructure market as well as endeavouring to attract more international businesses to locate their headquarters in their jurisdiction. The reasoning behind these state investments still focuses on the competitiveness of the cities in the global arena. Large-scale infrastructure investments raise the issues of the rise of the private sector with their over-empowerment as a result of the effects of globalisation and weakened allegiance to public interest through mega-project decision-making process.

The globalisation phenomenon is ignited by the reinforcement between hard and soft networks (see Castells, 1996). There is then a growing regional economic cooperation in large infrastructure developments which is incentivised by the forces of globalisation, which, in return, reinforce the trends of globalisation. The following quotation from TTD and AITD (2007: 39) summarises this situation:

*There has been a proliferation of overlapping bilateral and multilateral infrastructure-related agreements, which highlights the increased importance of coordination and harmonization at the regional level.*

The influence of globalisation is pervasive, especially on the creation of (new) regionalism. The combination of these two characterises a specific kind of risk that large infrastructure investments face. They are known as “systemic risks” (TTD and AITD, 2007) that include the issues of political relations in a complex transnational infrastructure project network where certain groups grow to posses the power to control key infrastructure links and nodes. For example, the project proponent...
groups become dominant actors that have the potential to capture most of the resources within the network and step by step take control of the decision-making process if unchallenged. This regional coordination which involves the integration into an increasingly homogeneous body of cross-nation standards for transport implementation and governance which according to Janelle and Beuthe (1997) displays a certain degree of path-dependent effect derived from locking-in standards that discourage innovation.

Janelle and Beuthe (1997) further suggest that flexibility and mobility in following the markets - for capital, human resources, raw material resources, favourable regulatory and taxation environments, labour and consumption patterns - as the properties of multinational corporations, provide them with a superior negotiation position and persuade them to involve large-scale transport infrastructure developments. The interests in efficiency and liberalisation of international trade, both encouraged by the development of infrastructure, favour less state intervention. Nevertheless, the environmental and social concerns for the consequences of mega project development urge the government to take further action. In addition, the regional entities, such as NAFTA, the European Union and the World Bank, already impose more rigorous standards, protocols, transparency and accountability mechanisms to place environmental and social sustainability firmly in their development paradigm (Infrastructure Network, 2006).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This section includes discussions on decision-making in mega-project planning, appraisal, and delivery, and the theories of ‘institutional arrangements’, ‘power relations’, ‘disjointed incrementalism’ and ‘path dependency’ as applied in the analysis of the mega-project decision-making process. Section 2.3.1 reviews several scholars’ works on mega-project planning, appraisal, and delivery. The section is comprised of the main issues raised in the literature and a discussion of the treatments of risks and uncertainties in mega-project decision-making and the factors that determine project success or failure. Section 2.3.2 shifts the focus to a review of the theories and key lines of reasoning for certain distinctive types of institutional arrangements and power relations which have significant impacts on mega-project decision-making.

2.3.1 Literature review on mega-project planning, appraisal, and delivery

Friend and Jessop (1969) in ‘Local Government and Strategic Choice’ develop a typology of uncertainties characteristic of planning issues. Peter Hall in ‘Great Planning Disasters’ (1980) suggests that mega-project decisions are often made on the basis of prioritising political interests before considerations of costs. Friend and Hickling in ‘Planning under Pressure: the strategic choice approach’ (1987) introduce ‘sustainable development’ as a criterion in their perspective on the public planning process, though they continue to focus on the interactions between central and local
governments. Peter Morris (1994) in ‘The Management of Projects’ focuses on the process of project management from its earliest stages of conception to its post-commissioning phases, although he ascribes factors of success and failure of mega project delivery to broader contexts. Kris Olds in ‘Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim Mega-Projects’ (2001) refers to the influence of the forces of globalisation on mega-project decision-making. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) in ‘Megaprojects and Risk: an anatomy of ambition’ share the opinion that project cost overruns and over-optimistic projections of project demands and effects are the result of fulfilling project advocates’ agendas. Altshuler and Lubero (2003) in ‘Mega Urban Transport Projects: the Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment’, though have a different focus. They suggest that the projects they analysed were all initiated by civil servants and interest groups who formed political coalitions. Dimitriou’s research (2009 and 2010) focuses on the contextual factors that impact mega-project decision-making and stresses the influences of globalisation.

John Friend, Norman Jessop, and Allen Hickling

Friend and Jessop (1969) conducted a case study of decision-making within local government and developed a typology of uncertainties encountered in planning decision-making:

- **UE** - uncertainties in knowledge of the present and future environment,
- **UR** - uncertainties as to intentions in related fields of choice, and
- **UV** - uncertainties as to appropriate value judgements

They claim that their analysis of the public planning process has some validity at different levels of governmental agencies, including international, national, regional, and local levels. They indicate that the dynamic of planning is regarded as a process of strategic choice (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 101). The ‘dialogue’ model between governmental system and community system \(^3\) consists of “a continuing interchange of information and influence across the interface between them” (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 102). In the model, it indicates that pressure for a particular kind of change in the context of operations is created from a perception of significant uncertainties in any one of the three directions UE, UR, and UV (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 107).

STRATrisk (Einstein Network, 2006) published its guide to project risk management in 2006. It suggests that system thinking is the appropriate strategic approach project risks because traditional reductionism in science by which problems are decomposed to manageable elements is inappropriate to the analysis of strategic risk in complex behavioural systems. This is similar to what Friend and Jessop contend: robust planning solutions, must incorporate the widest possible set of full solutions by providing flexibility under uncertainties (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 112; also see Hall, 1980: 252).

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\(^3\) Friend and Jessop (1969: 102) claim that the definition of “governmental system” should extend beyond its formal and legal aspects and a combination of social, political, economic, functional, and many other frames of references is needed to adequately describe it. As to “community system”, the authors suggest it includes a rich network of relationships between people and the environment in which they live.
Friend and Hickling (2005) describe their philosophy of a broader view of planning as a continuous process of making strategic decisions through time. They contend though, that any process of strategic decision-making should be holistic in its vision and in its time span; such idealistic aspirations are rarely achieved in practice. This can be compared to Lindblom’s (1959) “successive limited comparison” which will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter. These three authors share the view that a comprehensive comparison of alternatives of decisions is not manageable and brings inefficiency, especially when under the pressure of issues requiring immediate attention.

Using the case study on Coventry County Council between 1963 and 1967, Friend and Hickling (2005: 5) describe four features of dilemmas in decision-making in complex circumstances:

- First, in the decision-making process, people often held varied and continually shifting perceptions of the issues;
- Secondly, there were constant pressures for decision-makers to commit to actions in an incremental way although there was a willingness to take a more comprehensive approach if they could;
- Thirdly, associated with the above, there was a continuing dilemma of balancing urgency against uncertainty in decision-making processes; and

In the third edition of Friend and Hickling (2005: 367), the authors include the broader consideration of sustainable development connecting to local capacities to fulfil visions of sustainability and sustainable urban regeneration. Their emphasis still lies on the reciprocal relationship between local demands and central policy sources. In their study, there is growing awareness of increasing interdependence of mega project planning between nations, such as impacts of global markets and reliance on funding from international financial agencies.

**Peter Hall**

Hall (1980) reviews several mega projects and evaluates factors contributing to their failure. He illustrates the lessons from these case studies in the light of his eclectic theories which explain how people behave, and their motivations when seeking to influence decision-making processes. He concludes by presenting a normative theory of decision-making and discusses how the decision-making process might be improved.

Hall asserts that failures in tackling uncertainty in the environment are attributable to bad forecasting particularly of demand and cost. He suggests that the most appropriate approach to forecasting will combine quantitative and non-quantitative exploratory and self-critical methods (Hall, 1980: 253). The reason for inaccurate economic forecasts in Britain, Hall points out, is essentially over-optimism,

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4 The first edition was published in 1987.
furthermore, and the cost-escalation problem is often exacerbated by a failure of demand forecasting (Hall, 1980: 7). This is pertinent to the discussions on the difficulties and constraints of monetisation of factors of project delivery in the OMEGA study (Dimitriou et al., 2010). It also reflects the argument about claims of urban regeneration benefits that can be brought about by major transport investment. Similarly, these inaccurate forecasts cast doubt on political promises about economic growth and job opportunities encouraged by mega events.

Hall’s observation on the third London airport indicates that a clear political decision can be a critical impetus to mega-project delivery, especially when it is in an environment of high uncertainty. This case also demonstrates the influence of value judgements when society’s judgement of risk is profoundly affected by prevailing feelings of optimism or pessimism about the future (Hall, 1980: 55). This shares some similarities with issues on challenges of project financing during economic downturn and the significant amount of mega-project investments in the “great mega-project era” identified by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) in the 1950’s and ‘60’s (see below).

The discussion of London’s orbital motorway (the M25) in Hall’s book concludes that hard planning solutions are inappropriate to deal with the uncertainties in mega projects; instead, a more flexible system in which policies are consistently adjusted by changing Zeitgeist (Hall, 1980: 86) can be more capable of tackling the complex risks and uncertainties in mega-project delivery.

Another incentive of mega-project decision-making mentioned in Hall’s book is ‘prestige’ in which, under this mindset, interest groups pay no attention to mundane market realities. In the case of the Anglo-French Concorde, there was intense lobbying to convince the government to move from the stage of espousal of a project policy to government commitments. According to Hall, this is a major step and it requires heavy lobbying and bargaining. This is echoed in the arguments of SMEC (2001), Altshuler and Luberoff (2003), and Dimitriou et al. (2008) that the role of a visionary and persuasive ‘project champion’ accompanied by intense lobbying and negotiation is essential in mega-project decision-making.

Peter Morris
Peter Morris (1994) through examining the management of mega projects concludes that factors of project cost overruns include:

• Poor estimating;
• Increased order quantities;
• Poor technology management;
• Design faults;
• Contracting and legal difficulties;
• Governmental, labour, or social issues; and
• Geophysical problems

Although he addressed the issues relating to project externalities that have impacts on mega-project decision-making, such as the changing context in varied project sectors, the political risks, the increasing awareness of environmental protection, and the growing trend for sourcing financing from private sector and through international finance agencies, the main factors that he suggests for the success of mega projects remain in the field of project management.

Morris highlights emerging patterns of mega project development that include:
• The fluidity and uncertainty of today’s project environment, mean that mega projects will more frequently be carried out in a modular form where integration of these modular parts of the project becomes a new challenge (p.289).
• There is increasing attention to the role of the project owner whose responsibilities and performance often becomes the dominant influence on the way the project will be managed (p.290).
• Human resources have much greater significance on project development strategies.
• Education and fuller participation of all in the stages of the development process will enhance the chances of project success.
• Increasing co-option of, or alliances with, opinion shapers; thereby tune in closer to the political environment; feed politicians ideas and relate project schedules to political timetables are inevitable as part of the project development process.

Kris Olds
The forces of globalisation to mega-project decision-making are addressed by Kris Olds (2001) in his book “Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim Mega-Projects”. He maintains that mega-project developments are likely to be influenced by globalisation and he identifies five classes of impacts (Olds, 2001: 20):
• The development and restructuring of the international financial system has changed the nature of finance capital availability;
• Property markets have become interwoven with trends of the global economy and patterns of regional development processes;
• The transnational corporation is the main project stakeholder that benefits from the restructuring of the global financial system and of the development of world property markets;
• The stretching of social relations, world social networks and epistemic communities5 forming knowledge-based experts networks that have the resources and power (or access to power) to impact on decisions of, for example, economic policy, property development and mega-project

5 According to Olds (2001: 26), “epistemic communities” are “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area (Haas, 1992: 3)”.
planning; and

- The increasing amount of travelling and networking being undertaken by project stakeholders (such as politicians, developers, architects, and planners) allows the acquisition of direct knowledge about the sites and sources.

Kris Olds (2001) emphasises the importance of both the most localised details and the most global structures in the study of mega projects. He suggests that, given the legal, financial, and regulatory trends in globalisation, greater attention should be paid to transnational cultures and their effects on both the host cities and patterns of mega-project investments.

**Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff**

Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) chronicle the shifts of politics and policies of large-scale public investments in and around major American cities (including Boston, Denver, Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, Portland, and Seattle) from the 1950s to the start of 21st Century. They identified four distinct eras of mega project development, as follows (*ibid.*: 220-221):

- The ‘pre-1950 era’, when the Federal Government was dominant in mega-project development process and local communities were passive recipients of the Federal proposals;
- The ‘great mega-project era’, when there was an unprecedented surge of mega public investments in American cities during the 1950s and 1960s;
- The ‘transition era’, when many mega projects were derailed as they were swept aside by a wave of social upheavals during the late 1960s and early 1970s; and
- The ‘do no harm era’, in which post-1970’s political impulses shaped a new pattern of mega-project planning, appraisal and delivery processes.

Their research on mega-project planning from the 1970s observed the evolution of a ‘do no harm’ paradigm which involved greater expenditure on mitigating negative impacts generated by these projects. This was mainly due to mega-project policy-makers responding to rising environmental consciousness and the growing demands for wider community consultation on planning issues. The priorities in mega project delivery changed in an effort to offset all harmful consequences. Therefore, understanding the underlying political and social processes that determine the motivation and behaviour of stakeholders can help to eliminate the risks embedded in the design and implementation of project initiatives.

Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) emphasise the role of local politics as a mediator that brings government power to induce private investments for mega-project development. They claim that the system of urban governance in American cities has continually been very adaptive to changes in the broader contexts, such as society, economy, and national polity; however, they make no claim about the influences of global trends and the challenges at international level.
Altshuler and Luberoff’s (2003) comprehensive observations on mega-project history in American cities include that:

- business-led growth coalitions are central in urban development politics and often proposals that succeed are tailor-made from the outset to attract business support;
- the important role of public entrepreneurships lies in political executives who mobilise and nurture private support coalitions;
- the disposition of cities to compete proactively for investments;
- after the transition era of mega-project development constraints occurred and stimulated alterations in the process of mega-project planning, appraisal, and delivery
- the related point is that these same changes, simultaneously, represent the responses of mega-project policies to the shifts in the overall character of urban politics over time;
- project robustness is essential to the treatment of uncertainties relating to mega-project development; and
- the consistent underestimation of costs and timescales damages public confidence and trust in government when developing mega projects.

In all areas addressed by Altshuler and Luberoff, mega-project decisions are controlled by political power rather than the identified demand for the infrastructure, which has ‘seemingly’ become the basis of the arguments of the key actors.

**Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter**

Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) assert that more and larger mega projects are built despite the poor performance record of many projects because of risk-negligence, meaning inadequate, or deliberate lack of attention to risks, and lack of accountability in the project decision-making process. Flyvbjerg et al. claim that project advocates and promoters are likely to have self-serving interest in being over optimistic about costs and demand as well as in overlooking environmental impacts and over-promising in development benefits resulting from the construction of projects. In this context, Flyvbjerg et al. focuses on conspiracy theory within which decision-makers ignore project risks by using biased Cost-Benefit Analysis in order to promote their political ambitions.

Flyvbjerg et al. (2003: 77) identifies four types of risk of relevance to both a financial and an economic perspective in mega-project development. They are:

- project-specific risks,
- market risks,
- sector-policy risks and
- capital-market risks.
The same source claims that these risks and associated costs are not avoidable, no matter whether they involve a private concession company or a state-owned enterprise or those promoters of projects backed by sovereign guarantees. They further emphasise this by raising an issue regarding sovereign guarantees addressed by the World Bank, namely that lenders backed by sovereign guarantees tend to transfer their stress, risk and supervision responsibility for a project to the government, thus in some respects offsetting risks as a result of such relaxed pressure.

Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) cite the application of inaccurate methods, poor data quality, and unexpected changes in exogenous factors not directly relevant to policy-makers’ behaviour as additional reasons. They conclude that more account should be taken of poor performance in mega-project delivery that results from power interventions by politicians and key decision-makers. One of the factors cited by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003: 30) is the “unexpected political activities or missing realisation of complementary policies”. They further point to the use of default scenario forecasts that depend heavily on a political description of what the future will look like. When unexpected political activities and unfulfilled political promises occur, however, this scenario is never achieved and a gap emerges between predicted and actual outcomes that colour judgments about a project’s success.

**Harry Dimitriou and the OMEGA Centre**

In the ten years leading up to the world economic downturn of 2008, global investment in infrastructure increased enormously. Dimitriou (2009) points to trends suggesting that these investments were promoted by a global elite of players seen as ‘national champions’, politically well-connected and often pan-European. He argues that such investments not only produce financial returns but, more importantly, perhaps landmark projects seen to symbolise the economic virility of national or city economies.

The OMEGA research (Dimitriou et al., 2010 and 2011) indicates that project appraisals are determined by path dependency as in the case of the use of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) which focuses on monetisation the factors of project delivery. The same source demonstrates that the factors get monetised are likely to be the more accessible ones and even within these factors there is a tendency to constraint its measurement to the direct effects (Dimitriou et al., 2010: 8). If policy-makers then follow the results of the CBA, their decision-making processes are subjected to the ‘limited information’ (Woodlef, 1998) component of Path Dependency Theory discussed later (see Section 2.3.2). In this context, barriers within policy-making are thus built as key actors function in this decision-making cycle which is locked into a dominant pattern over time.

The OMEGA Centre research (Dimitriou et al., 2008 and 2010) concludes that risks of MUTPs derived from some of their nature which can be summarised as follows:

- Certain components of the MUTP are ‘frozen’ during different phases in order to make
implementation more comprehensible. This constrains its ability to respond to changing contexts.

- MUTPs are often considered as ‘closed systems’. Similar to the above, this is the case where the project outcomes are expected to be both controllable and in accordance with pre-determined programmes. This is why that past MUTP planning and delivery having frequently failed to deal with or adapt to the complexity of the environment which they are placed.

The characteristics of the ‘frozen components’ and ‘closed system’ of the MUTPs also contribute to the path dependency which features a lock-in effect irrespective of higher cost than if apply new system.

**Figure 2.3: The Scope of the Issues in Selected Mega-Project Literature**

Discussions of mega infrastructure investments at the international level are relatively fewer and less detailed in the literature discussed above (see Figure 2.3). According to the empirical literature review in earlier section (Section 2.2), we can see there are emerging issues that are at global level. For example, there are increasing number of international co-operations or cross-national joint ventures that play an important role in mega infrastructure investments; also there are concerns over urban regeneration projects which are highly influenced by global trends and are often overly dependent on international financial markets and consumer behaviour trends; and needless to say there is the case of mega events which are closely related to international relations, reputations of nations at the global stage and national competitiveness.

Using the above literature review on mega projects as a starting point, we can now look more critically at some of these elements of mega-project decision-making theories. This review of the literature on theory is used to guide the structuring of the PhD investigation and to explain patterns
and shifts in mega-project decision-making with which the research questions are concerned.

2.3.2 Theories on institutional arrangements, power relations, and decision-making

Institutional arrangements

Concerning the principal research questions posed by this study (see Section 1.4) and the scale of mega projects in which globalising tendencies are omnipresent, the institutional arrangement model, this research borrowed and edited from Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) shown in Figure 2.2, manifests itself at the global level. It shows a line crossing the overall model with the ‘market’ at one end, and a ‘hierarchy’ at the other end. The main issue that is raised involves the position in which the market and the state should locate themselves when the institutional arrangements regarding the efficiency and productivity of the outcomes of mega-project delivery are set up. Neo-liberal theorists believe that market-led institutional arrangements should govern the capitalist economy; however, while Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 10) claim that the rules codified by the public authority are essential taking precedence to the patterns of coordinating economic transactions with the result that governmental intervention in mega projects is all important. Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 13) make reference to Romer’s New Growth Theory (see Romer, 1986, 1990, 1994) which “considers the spillover effects of innovations, educations, and various types of infrastructure, [and argues that] some supply-oriented interventions by the state may promote efficiency and long run growth”. Whereas, Catlaw (2006) claims that the shift of our trust to the market (as advocated by neo-liberalism) is based on a belief that markets can resolve problems of uncertainty and that by implication public sector intervention can disturb these solutions and thus often inject uncertainty into decision-making, he argues that the reality of the market model is actually underlined by higher uncertainty. He concludes that, “markets certainty disperse authority and decision and challenge the dominion of political representation, but they entirely neglect the other critical, generative functions that authority serves” (Catlaw, 2006: 114) namely: regulations, government financing, etc.

Patsy Healey’s studies (1990, 1992, and 1994) look into development with regard to institutional arrangements. Healey recognises the importance of a variety of agencies, agency relations, activities, and events involved in development projects. She stresses that considerations of development processes should embrace the general tendencies in social relations connecting to macro-economic and political questions. Her approach, which aims to identify models that reveal economic processes, event sequences, and agency behaviours, is based on neoclassical and Marxist economics. The institutional model established by Healey (see Healey, 1992) seeks to assess whether particular driving forces produce distinctive patterns of stakeholder interrelationships and project externalities.

Healey (1992) introduces four levels of observations on development processes with the institutional arrangements and agency power relations as the core:
• Identification of key events and agencies involved and the outcomes produced through a mapping exercise of the development process.
• Identification of roles and power relations that evolve between the agencies in the production and consumption of the development.
• Development of theories regarding the strategies and interests of actors in determining the way different roles are played and how relationships develop.
• Formulating theories on the nature of project development and identifying the societal circumstances in which the development is embedded.

The third item above suggests that resources, regulations, and ideologies (Healey, 1990), which constitute the institutional arrangements and determine stakeholder power relations, need to be taken into account. The theorisation step forms a framework within which how actors reproduce, reinforce, and transform their power relations can be observed and interpreted. With regard to the institutional relations, government intervention is one of the significant factors impacting the development process (Healey, 1994). Healey (1994: 178) believes that the public sector plays an important role in providing initiatives that aim at breaking development inertia and further allowing the development industry to respond to market demand. The current research is based on Healey’s concepts of conducting case studies which focus on the roles and power relations of key stakeholders, the planning contexts and institutional structures of mega-project investments, and the forms and strategies used by actors to command better negotiation power.

Power relations

This research hypothesises that the dynamics of a stakeholder’s power to manoeuvre in mega-project decision-making are greatly determined by the use of discourses. According to Hajer (1995), the concepts of prevailing terms, such as ‘sustainable development’, ‘sustainable communities’, and ‘corporate social responsibility’ have all become dominant in discourses for urban development internationally since the mid 1990s. However, there is growing evidence of increasing barriers to sustainability implementation within and outside the UK (Dixon, 2007). These barriers are characterised by institutional, technical, and financial complexities involving significant uncertainties and risks. This is crucial since mega projects usually require investors to provide long-term capital and attract sustained political support. This makes any lack of financial resources a major obstacle in mega project development that seeks to promote sustainable development. Another challenge to mega projects stems from the complex stakeholder networks involved. Here the plethora of agencies operating at so many different levels is frequently denounced (see Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 2007) as is the excessive bureaucracy leading to rhetoric and lack of efficiency (Adair, 2002: 2391; also see Adair, 2003 and 2005).

Discourse among decision-makers cannot itself guarantee to make a difference. Those stakeholders
who possess superior credentials and power should empower other less privileged stakeholders. In so doing, discourse is often employed as a tool by vested interest groups to promote and protect their positions and power. In so far as this is the case, “… the organisational contexts in which discursive practices operate are also sites of power relationships and contestation” (Atkinson, 1999: 60). Because discourses occur in a discursive context - reflecting relations of power and domination (ibid.: 61) - a dominant discourse can restrict other possibilities and steer other discourses congruent with it.

According to Hajer (1995 and 2003), “discourse power” is defined as a force with the following attributes:

- is constitutive of a network;
- pulls all actors together and gives them political identities;
- can discursively reduce the complexity of policy issues;
- allocates or redistributes resources;
- can reinforce the structure of a network and create exclusionary effects;
- provides initiatives to institutionalise political interests; and
- can link up discourses in different policy domains and generate a more powerful effectiveness.

Each of these functions is elaborated in this section. The first three are associated with the formulation of relationships between agents (stakeholders) and structures. For the first two functions, Hajer (2003) claimed that policy intervention triggers the awareness of “stand-by politicians” (ibid.: 98) who then become politically active. He suggests that this ignites the creation of political community networks that share the same interests and recognise a bond because they are all affected by a particular policy intervention of mega project development. Hajer suggests it is the practices of policy making that provides the sites for people to deliberate over political issues and form political communities. In terms of reducing the complexity of policy issues - story lines embedded in a particular discourse allow an individual contextual background (i.e. knowledge, experience, or expertise) to connect with the wider scope of a policy debate (Hajer, 2003; Browning and Boudès, 2003; Kurtz and Snowden, 2003; Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000). Under the context of mega-project decision-making, it means that the force of discourse power can simplify complex policy issues and focus on certain dominant ones supported by powerful project advocates.

The third function is associated with the fourth and fifth functions of discourse power cited by Hajer are about how it mobilises visions, ideologies, and resources. They represent the process of structuring a network and prioritising particular interests. Through amplifying the political agenda, the main proponents gain sway over the limited resources for which many are competing, and while this is unlikely to reveal new resources it can change their dynamics in favour of vested interests. This kind of network is in effect a by-product of particular policy-making; therefore the process of reinforcing and marginalising is never concluded until a new policy replaces the prevailing status of
the current one. For example, transport planning at the local level often adapts to the planning of large-scale transport projects which are accompanied by more investments and opportunities. (This idea can be extended to urban planning schemes, which tend to adapt to mega projects for the same reason.) The concept of reinforcement and exclusion highlights the concept of ‘project-led networks’ which is a mechanism in mega project development decision-making that has the potential to grow bigger if the project-oriented discourse performs well. The components of the project-oriented discourse may change from time to time since they strongly rely on temporal contexts.

The sixth and seventh functions signify a more mature state of discourse power. After engaging scientific evidence to justify political positions, discourse power is further strengthened and moves into the process of institutionalisation. Institutionalisation then leads into the delivery of higher certainty whereby advocates are more likely to be able to achieve their goals. This can streamline and accelerate resource distribution and lead to several privileged domains of different policy discourses seeking to link up and reinforce the various discourse functions. This development is illustrated by the planning and delivery of the Olympic Games (see Chapter 6).

**Disjoined Incrementalism**

The term “disjointed incrementalism” was introduced into the policy-making literature and coined by Lindblom in the late 1950s and elaborated subsequently (see Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 1959 and 1979; Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962) in the form of a successive limited comparison (Lindblom, 1959) in the policy-making process. He argued that the essence of the policy-making process is mostly achieved by continually building out from the current situation (ibid.: 174).

Lindblom (1959) described the rational-comprehensive method (as advocated by March and Simon, 1958) as a root method which begins its approach from fundamentals anew each time and criticises this for being very costly. Lindblom (1959) justified his argument by explaining that decisions on policies are essentially choices between different combinations of objective values. He claims that because the values of social objectives are varied in different circumstances, policy-makers have difficulty in clarifying one value over another. Hence, he believes that the most effective discussion of the ‘correctness’ of policies takes the form of a limited comparison as a comprehensive comparison is unmanageable to this level of efficiency. In the same source, Lindblom (ibid.) argues that the agreement on policies among policy-making agencies becomes the only practical test of the policy’s correctness (ibid.: 180) and that every important interest has its own watchdog to protect it (ibid.: 184). Lindblom concludes that successive limited comparisons are equivalent to ‘comprehensiveness’ with the added note that government agencies are often sensitive to the pressures of other influential groups who pursue their common interests (ibid.: 184).

Lindblom claims that bargaining - a form of mutual adjustments to be achieved among government agencies and interests’ watchdogs (see Lindblom, 1955 and 1959) is the ultimate basis of decision
making in public policy. He emphasised that this mutual adjustment as a negotiation process can better adapt to a wider range of interests than ‘silo thinking’ (1959: 184). Lindblom’s theory of disjointed incrementalism of policy-making decisions may be summarised as an on-going process that is in fact remedial, serial, and fragmented (Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962). The same source claims that both intentionally- and accidentally-neglected repercussions of chosen policies and decisions are often readily regarded as a remedy for the original policy or other stakeholders whose interests are affected and that current policies are the accumulation of historical policy-makers’ decisions as a whole, instead of an individual, or a particular period of time (Lindblom, 1959: 208). This implies that mega-project decision-making processes exhibit similar characteristics.

There are some issues in Lindblom’s theories that require further examination in the light of earlier discussions about MUTPs, mega sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega events.

• First, the claim that every interest has its watchdog: In the case of mega project developments, it is apparent that key stakeholders seek to obtain more bargaining power during the project negotiation process better to secure their positions, while less influential stakeholders, such as those who have access to fewer resources, are more easily compromised (see Greener, 2005). Lindblom argues that the neglected interest can however (sometimes) become the centre of the policy-making process later. He believes that adjustments in decision making will be continuously propelled by the bargaining powers exerted and only reach an optimal degree of imbalance (Lindblom, 1959: 193) between the values various interests.

• Second, the claim that the mutual adjustments process is more likely to happen when there is sufficient trust existing within the policy-making network (see Burt, 2000; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). ‘Trust’ is the element binding the project stakeholder network together yet trust does not happen overnight; it takes time to develop between agencies and players. It is built on a good track record between project partners and experiences gained from previous co-operation.

• Third, the claim that if policy-makers prefer to confine their pattern of decision-making to that stemming directly from their familiar historical experience and knowledge then the policy-making processes are likely to be locked into a ‘silo-thinking’ and path-dependent culture. Lindblom explains that the barrier to effective decision making lies in poor communications (Lindblom, 1959: 189). However, even this could progress at a too slow pace in mega-project delivery, especially when analysis and policy making are remedial. Policy-making agents tend to direct policies toward the removal of ills rather than toward known objectives.

• The fourth claim is that uncertainties, accidents, even catastrophes can impel dramatic step-

6 “Optimal degree of imbalance” is a term borrowed from Hirschman’s (1958) theory of economic development.
changes of policy. Lindblom and Hirschman assert that, because of all the unforeseeable uncertainties, a system is never complete; instead, it is on a constant configuration and development process (Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962). They go on to indicate that “the incompleteness of the system is forcefully brought to our attention through accidents, eye irritations, and through new types of infections” (ibid.: 201). In their opinion, one way to overcome situations when we cannot afford to learn the “hard way” is to develop special institutions to detect existing and emerging system imbalances. This reinforces the claim that practitioners and policy-makers need to devise strategies for mega-project developments that are highly adaptable to uncertainties, global trends and political environment.

**Path Dependency**

‘Path dependency’ has two properties that are especially relevant to this research (see Arthur, 1987, 1988 and 1994; Greener, 2005; Kay, 2005; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; and Pierson, 2000):

- First, its power of reinforcement which can be recognised in what has been described as “bandwagon behaviour” and network effects. This exhibits parallels with the ‘tipping point’ thesis of Malcolm Gladwell (2000).
- Secondly, the critical junctures, which are composed of accidental events and the actions taken to respond to them.

Both of these properties are elements of decision-making and policy formulation that are echoed by the serendipity arguments advanced in the work of the OMEGA Centre (OMEGA, 2008).

The concept of path dependency is widely used in many disciplines, including technology, economics and politics. This research focuses on the discussion of its adaptation to political process, including institutional arrangements for stakeholder network formation, reinforcement of political power, and discourse power in bargaining processes that affect the decision making in mega projects.

Greener (2005) provided a review on the use of ‘path dependency’ in theoretical contents and empirical applications as it is applied to the fields of political studies. He argues that the lack of an explicit analytical framework and a consistent approach in the usage of the term ‘path dependency’ put it in danger of becoming meaningless. Greener postulates that a path-dependent system is most likely to emerge where both structural (the realm of institutions) and cultural (the realm of ideas) vested interest groups have strong interdependency in obtaining power. This echoes the empirical literature review in section 2.2 that project advocates and project promoters are likely to form a strong coalition as the core decision-makers of mega-project developments. He further suggests that the combination of these powerful structural interests and mutually compatible ideas creates the most stable “morphostatic cycles” for ‘path dependency’ to occur. Greener (2005) offers a framework for analysing ‘path dependency’ in the political process which requires an appreciation of the following:

- First, Greener argues that there should be a number of alternatives for policy formulation or
decision-making in its inception.

- Second, ‘path dependency’ should occur as contingent events\(^7\) within political processes. Greener argues they play a substantial role in establishing policies and creating political outcomes.
- Thirdly, recognition that path-dependent systems spawn increasing returns\(^8\) and are characterised by a lock-in effect.

Pierson (2000) demonstrates that the sequence, timing, and critical junctures are critically important aspects of a path-dependent analytical framework. He argues that ‘increasing returns’ is an essential base when employing “‘path dependency’” to describe political processes. He introduces the characteristics of the ‘increasing returns processes’ summarised by Arthur (1994: 112-113), namely: unpredictability, inflexibility, nonergodicity\(^9\), and potential path inefficiency. Because the events that happen in the process are important but partly random, the outcomes are unpredictable. Pierson further argues that inflexibility is caused in the process by the situation in which it progresses, making it harder to shift from one path to another, resulting in it being trapped in a lock-in situation. Pierson uses Levi’s interpretation (see Levi, 1997) to emphasise this characteristic:

“... once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice” (Pierson, 2000: 252).

Arthur (1994) points out that potential path inefficiency stems from the long-term result, with benefits that may be lower than for a previous alternative while the outcome becomes locked in. Pierson adds that another feature of increasing return processes, namely, the claim their lock-in character has greater importance earlier than later in the process (Pierson, 2000). This lock-in effect contradicts Lindblom’s concept of mutual adjustments in policy-making. The lock-in effect indicates that the earlier the interest group declares the importance of policy values, the harder it is for the other opposition groups to remove or change them. Meanwhile, Lindblom’s concept of ‘mutual adjustments’ suggest that there will always be interest guardians who protect important interests and values while adjustments are negotiated over time. In path-dependency theory, the overthrow of this reinforcement relies on influential negotiation power or, more effectively, depends on unforeseen external forces, such as disasters, failures, and catastrophes.

This point is echoed in ‘critical juncture’, characteristic of ‘path dependency’. Here accidents or crises

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\(^7\) According to Pierson (2000: 263), contingent events are relatively small events, if they occur at the right moment, can have large and enduring consequences.

\(^8\) Pierson (2000: 251) illustrates that “increasing returns”, which is used by economists, “could also be described as self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes”. He further claims that increasing returns capture two key elements that are essential to making sense of path dependence: “First, they pinpoint how the costs of switching from one alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time. Second, and related, they draw attention to issues of timing and sequence, distinguishing formative moments or conjunctures from the periods that reinforce divergent paths”.

\(^9\) Pierson (2000: 253) explains “nonergodicity” means: “accidental events early in a sequence do not cancel out. They cannot be treated (which is to say, ignored) as “noise,” because they feed back into future choices. Small events are remembered”.
that happen on the trajectory of a political decision-making process cause critical junctures and can often divert the political decisions such that previously neglected or compromised interest values are revived. Greener (2005) stresses that the mechanisms for change in the path-dependent system reside in the interactions between cultural and structural spheres of decision making and institutional arrangements. He believes that there are constant changes in path-dependent systems as a result of the accumulation of increasing returns with the result that the concept of ‘path dependency’ cannot be about consistency; instead it is more about constant changes resulting from historical events. In this respect, the system is actually open to intrusions and diversions. Greener calls them ‘emergent properties’. This notion is similar to the concept of ‘emergent order’, a fundamental of complexity theory (see Snowden, 2003; Batty, 2007; Dimitriou et al., 2008). He argues that it is very difficult and costly to keep a system on its particular path, a direct contradiction of Pierson’s (2000) argument.

At the outset of this section, ‘disjointed incrementalism’ theory and ‘path dependency’ theory were both presented as two main elements that could characterise the theoretical decision-making processes for mega projects. If we compare the two, one may conclude that ‘disjointed incrementalism’ concentrates on the policy-makers’ mindset and behaviour. ‘Path dependency’, however, represents the nature of a mechanism by which related political outcomes are generated and policies formulated.

2.4 Gaps of Existing Literature and Knowledge Contribution

The literature reviews on each type of mega project studied in this research, reveal that the current body of literature offers little insight into whether a cluster of mega projects such as MUTPs, mega urban regeneration schemes, and mega events can be progressed through a process of integrated planning and whether they can significantly reinforce each other. They suggest this mutual supportive relationship is more an ideology since the scale of mega projects and their associated uncertainties generate massive difficulties for their coordination. A possible response is that in reality, it is probably not appropriate to pursue a fully coordinated programme as, according to Lindblom and Hirschman (1962), projects will evolve into a “better imbalance” over time of their own volition. Others would argue that this more evolutionary approach can result in excessive costs and irremediable damage that might have been avoided by conscious attempts to learn lessons from past experience. A detailed investigation of this issue will be shown in the case study featured in Chapters 4-6.

The ‘disjointed incrementalism’ theory is used as a model to map the decision-making process of each case study. It aims to discover what factors along the trajectory of the accumulative process determined the final outcomes we see today. Hall (1981) claims that using an incremental model to explain observations of decision-making is over-simplistic because it ignores social change and innovation which comes about through incorporation of new social values. This research also employed the theoretical perspective of ‘path dependency’ theory to complement the use of ‘disjointed incrementalism’ theory in terms of evaluating the ‘critical junctures’ (i.e., key events that
change the path of decision-making). This combination of theoretical aspects facilitates more understanding of the research questions of this thesis. This literature review confirms that the study of historical events and development trajectories is necessary in order to gain greater insights into the determining factors of mega-project development over time.

An investigation into the role of each of the three types of project in this integration can enhance the body of mega project research. It will also partly fill a gap in the existing literature on research into coordination between different types of mega projects. Based on the review in this chapter, the preliminary conclusion suggests that MUTPs are the essential element of urban regeneration and economic growth. In addition, it implies that the objectives set by these mega projects are unlikely to be achieved by an individual project. Under these circumstances, many project visions and promises remain merely rhetoric. This research will strengthen the knowledge about the different roles of the three types of mega project that can improve efficiency and outcomes of integration within a synchronised timeframe. Friend and Hickling (2005) in their case study highlighted that there was persistent competition between technical and political power in influencing decisions. This research contributes much needed evidence in comparing these two aspects of power in decision-making process through the selected cases.

As stressed by Banister and Berechman (2000) and Gospodini (2000), institutional framework which is composed of plethora of agencies and power distributions has significant impact on mega-project development. There is still a lack of understanding of the dynamics of the power relationships among the key stakeholders of these mega projects, in particular, when the institutional arrangements are further complicated by the coordination of several mega projects. The research of this kind should seek out the views of a wide spectrum of stakeholders, and not rely on the views of those who ‘shout loudest’ such as opposition groups and the leading proponents of the projects.

The findings relating to discourse power have revealed its function in mega-project decisions, including the claim that discourses can link up different policy domains and generate greater effectiveness. One outstanding question, not informed by the literature, relates to the extent to which the force derived from the combination of mega-project discourses changes over time in response to risk, uncertainty, and complexity. Surmounting this, the research on mega-project decision-making processes should address ways to harness the force of integrated mega-project discourses in order to negate ill-founded criticism that project visions and promises are nothing more than rhetoric.

2.5 Emergent Issues and Related Questions

Through the articulation of the many issues of mega projects set out above, we may conclude that the rational justification for building transport projects of this kind is mainly driven by economic and political forces to achieve economic and political ends. However, the overarching question that
continually arises in project reviews is whether these projects deliver what has been promised and whether there are alternative and better ways to achieve the same public interest objectives. This leads to further related questions, including how is it best to identify objectives, how should they be prioritised what negotiation process is needed to resolve competing and conflicting objectives? These discussions, which are closely associated with the research questions posted in Chapter 1, are summarised as a list of emergent issues and questions presented in this section.

The primary research question is elaborated on the following sub-questions and accompanied by the issues and their subsequent questions identified through the literature review in this chapter.

**Research question #1**
What is the role of mega urban transport projects in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events; and what are their relationships given the institutional contexts and frameworks that they have been planned, appraised, and delivered within?

**Related issues and questions**
The extent to which sustainable urban regeneration and mega events can be facilitated by major urban transport investments, particularly MUTPs is driven as much by a belief and a concentrated commitment of joint and reinforced investment as it is by quantifiable evidence. According to this literature review, initiatives of sustainable urban regeneration should be linked with transport infrastructure investment, since in a number of cases transport development is seen as a catalyst to other inward investment. In addition, urban regeneration benefits are increasingly the prime justification used by MUTP and mega-event proponents for the promotion of their projects. Inevitably, this regeneration-led discourse requires a political agenda and sustained political commitment that can add credibility beyond the mere rhetoric of urban regeneration.

There is mounting evidence that many mega-project decisions are driven by political reasoning rather than by their engineering or accounting dimensions. It also follows that the main causes of escalation and underestimation of the costs of mega projects stem from political decisions and that by-and-large they are not attributable to technical errors. The appropriateness of CBA as the principal project appraisal tool is brought into question (see Dimitriou et al., 2010). This research explores how the key stakeholders of these projects respond to the gaps between the expectations encouraged by project promoters and the outcomes derived from the synchronisation of multiple projects.

**Research question #2**
How do institutional arrangements and decision-makers respond in order to manage changes of contexts and environments in the planning of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events?
**Related issues and questions**

This chapter reveals that optimum mega-project governance is through public-private partnerships. The imperative of private sector involvement is intended to avoid imposing risks onto the taxpayers and to eliminate the over-dependency of the private sector on public sector and government guarantees. Within this, governments have an important role to provide the appropriate regulatory and enabling environments to safeguard and promote the public interest. In the absence of those provisions, legal challenges could lead to costly time delays. As to the public, they become active only when they are aware of a policy intervention of mega-project development affecting their interests. At the time when the project proposal is made widely known, especially to those on whom it will have immediate impacts, the network closure starts to be challenged. The degree of network inclusiveness is tested by opponent groups.

This research is looking into ways in which institutional arrangements should be reformed in order to meet these objectives. What is the most appropriate leadership model in mega-project decision-making? Should it be based on project champions or an equilibrium of stakeholders with no single dominant player?

**Research question #3**

Can several synchronised mega projects deliver a favourable outcome to stakeholders if they integrate and mutually reinforce each other, rather than compete with limited social, economic, political, and environmental resources?

**Related issues**

Most recent major urban development initiatives have become project-led, involving large mixed-use developments and flagship projects, rather than relying on a more confined property-led approach. Moreover, given the characteristics of most MUTPs and prestige urban regeneration projects, they are typically planned, promoted, and controlled by elite groups of investors and political supporters who ultimately have to confront the trade-off dilemma of retaining business profits or addressing social and environmental concerns of sustainability. Under these circumstances, the outcomes of synchronised mega projects are constrained by financial reality.

Based on the issues above, who are the pre-eminent actors, when and why are they engaged in the complex project-led network of stakeholder agencies typically associated with mega-project developments?

**Research question #4**

Have discourses of mega projects been used as a tool by key champions to convince others of the validity of their positions in the expectation that these will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of these champions?
and empowering the project delivery network?

**Related issues and questions**

It is claimed that, from this literature review, while mega projects increasingly stress the concern of the emerging crises of the global economic recession and climate change challenges, this influence is all too often merely part of the rhetoric that surrounds the mega-project discourse for promoting and marketing these investments. Also, based on the path-dependent process in mega-project decision-making, discourses can produce self-reinforcing policies and obstructs the possibility of policy improvement for more effective project planning, appraisal, and delivery.

There is widespread public scepticism surrounding political promises on major infrastructure investments, especially, when financing is inevitably an issue for mega projects given the scale of their costs. How realistic is the common claim that the returns will pay off the costs of construction and operation? To what extent are there genuine trickle-down effects from mega project investments? Is the ideology of mega project delivery simply a ploy to convince the public sector and investors that specific benefits are both achievable and sustainable?

These questions are addressed in this research and generate the criteria for the questionnaire design in the hypothesis-led investigations. The issues and subsequent questions revealed in this chapter are reviewed and validated by the case study. The rational linking the research questions, the research methodology, and the questionnaire design is described in the next chapter (Chapter 3).

### 2.6 Conclusions

This chapter has introduced the three major urban developments that are the subject of this research. Each has been defined and characteristics described. The motivations and agendas behind promoting such projects are addressed based on an examination of the issues that typically surrounds them. These include public initiatives of mega-project investments, MUTPs and mega events as agents of economic growth and urban regeneration, and the role that the power of discourse plays in the decision-making process.

The review of the published literature and the associated cases sheds light on the overarching issues and obstacles of mega-project development. It also reveals the gaps in the existing literature and where this research can contribute new knowledge. ‘Disjointed incrementalism’ and ‘path dependency’ are two theories that are brought together to form the theoretical framework against which selected cases are analysed and interpretation of the findings is facilitated. The issues and concerns underpinning the rational of the questionnaire design have also been addressed.

The case study approach is employed in order to answer the research questions posted in Chapter 1
and fill the gaps of the existing literature in the mega-project research. The detailed articulation of the relationship between the research questions, hypotheses, and dimension of the case studies is presented in next chapter. Chapter 3 describes how the findings from the mixed method of data collection and data analysis are synthesised, and describes the contributions this makes to the overall research conclusions.
3 Research Methodology for Case Study

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology employed in the case study. The methods comprise a two-stranded approach to data collection and analysis plus the use of a ‘mixed method’ of data analysis (see Figure 3.1). The two-stranded approach involves, on the one hand, traditional hypothesis-led questionnaire approaches for collecting pertinent case study information regarding the principal questions and hypotheses of the overall research posed in Chapter 1, and on the other hand, the collection of information through the use of unstructured (pre-hypothesis) questionnaires. Both approaches focus on a case study of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL, also known as High Speed 1) and two of its associated hub developments at St. Pancras/Kings Cross and Stratford. The relationship of the case study to the overall research study approach was explained in Chapter 1. A distinctive feature of the case study data collection and analysis is a strong reliance on narrative ‘storytelling’, which proved to be especially informative with regard to the importance of institutional structures and power relations that surround mega-project discourses (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003).

To reiterate, this research aims to investigate the relationship between the objectives and investments of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, and the extent to which these can be made mutually reinforcing. An appreciation of the key institutions and their frameworks together with their connectivity and interaction is vital to understanding the nature of complexity in decision-making involving mega project planning, appraisal, and delivery. The research utilises the CTRL case study to draw out specific evidence-based conclusions. The questions this research seeks to answer are:

- What kind of role can MUTPs play in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events?
- What are the prerequisites for MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events needed to establish a consolidated and collaborative network?
- Who provides leadership in this network?

10 Pre-hypothesis questionnaire is introduced by Cognitive Edge which advocates the use of pre-hypothesis techniques, “namely to provide a quantitative technique, which is supported by the rich context of supporting self-interpreted narrative” (Snowden, 2010: 8). Unstructured questions or prompting questions are based on the following principles that established by Cognitive Edge method (Snowden, 2010: 9):
- “They should be about the whole of the experience and should be designed to elicit narrative material rather than a simple statement.
- The question should be asked in such a way as to elicit a meaningful context in the imagination of the subject.
- The question should not privilege positive or negative experiences but should seek both.
- The subject should be allowed to answer in the third person.”
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

- Which type of project should be the engine to drive this consolidated network to a better overall outcome?

The answers to these questions potentially offer a greater understanding of the interrelationships between these three different types of mega projects. The focus of the case studies will be on the decision-making processes, the key project stakeholders involved, and the rationale that underpins the key decisions. The case study methodology seeks to harness the ways in which human beings exchange knowledge through storytelling where the story-tellers not only express perceptions, emotions, and the dynamics of situations, but also construct the sequence of episodes according to their beliefs and intentions. An underlying premise of this approach is that the more comprehensive the understanding of the context of the case in question, the more insights the investigation offers in the discovery of the root causes of the issues embedded in it.

The following discussion provides an overview of the two-pronged approach adopted for the case study and the rationale behind interviewee selection (see Section 3.2), supported by details of the philosophy underlying this kind of approach. It is followed by an overview of the significance of data sources and the methods of data collection and analysis (see Section 3.3). Section 3.4 outlines the relationship between the questionnaire design and the research aims, questions, and hypotheses. Section 3.5 explains the comparative framework of the findings derived from the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations, how any synergies between the two different approaches are identified, and what contributions they make to the overall conclusions. Section 3.6 includes conclusions from this chapter.

3.2 Two-pronged Approach

The principal components, tasks, and sequences employed for the case study are shown in Figure 3.1. This illustrates its dual reliance on pre-hypothesis investigations and hypothesis-led investigations, disaggregated for data collection, data analysis, and synthesis. The approach is akin to that developed by the OMEGA Centre Team at UCL (2005), of which the author was a member, which was used to compare and contrast decision-making in other fields in thirty mega urban transport cases studies in ten countries.

To compare the two strands of this case study investigation, the pre-hypothesis research extracts anecdotes and experiences from a wide range of stakeholders through naïve interview\(^\text{11}\) (Cognitive Edge, 2006) with prompting questions\(^\text{12}\), whilst traditional hypothesis-led investigations use semi-

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\(^{11}\) Naïve interview is one of the techniques suggested by Cognitive Edge (2006) method for collecting data. Cognitive Edge favours that Naïve Interviews conducted by students or people who are not involve in the subject case directly or have limited knowledge. It claims that, in this way, the interviewee can better avoid researchers’ bias and elicit more insights into the case.

\(^{12}\) According to Cognitive Edge (2006: 2), a prompting question is: “an indirect question which places people in a context they can understand and which allows them to tell a story about themselves or someone they know.”
structured interviews to target those who are most involved in MUTP decision-making process. The aim of the former approach is to employ the wider scope and non-hierarchically nature of storytelling to elicit ‘hidden signals’, which, as claimed by Kurtz and Snowden, could be easily ignored in hypothesis-led investigations. According to the Cognitive Edge Pty website\footnote{See http://www.cognitive-edge.com/} (2007), this “provides [a] natural and intuitive approach to gaining multiple perspectives and new insights into complex problems that have hitherto proved intractable for both strategic management methods and software.”

The aim of the latter approach, the hypothesis-led research (see Creswell, 2003; Punch, 2005), is to use research questions as interrogative statements, based on hypotheses, which investigators seek to answer through exploration in interviews, observations, documents, and archival material.

**Figure 3.1: Case Study Process**

The majority of data is collected by interviews. The literature reviews in Chapter 2 indicate who should be chosen as key types of stakeholders for the case study. To comply with the aims of this research, the interviewees were chosen from core stakeholder parties who were close to the decision-making process affecting one or more of the studied mega projects. These were representatives of organisations or groups, ranging from international organisations, central government, governmental agencies, local government authorities, developers and consultancies, private sector interest groups, and local communities (see Appendix 1 for list of interviewees). Senior stakeholders are defined as key decision makers in the development of the projects studied. In this study, the cases include the CTRL project, King’s Cross Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes, and the 2012 London Olympics.

Although there are differences in the two research approaches, they have some conceptual ground in common. This section elaborates the central idea of ‘storytelling’ as employed in both the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations through three aspects, namely:

- the concepts of the Cynefin model (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003),
- the role of narratives in decision-making, and
- the power of discourses in mega-project developments.

The following three sub-sections explain the connections between the methodology of case study and the research questions. The final part of this section concludes with a review of the principles of Content Analysis used in hypothesis-led investigations and Narrative Pattern Analysis employed in pre-hypothesis investigations.

### 3.2.1 Sense-making in complex decision-making processes

The incentive to employ a sense-making approach to the research enquiry pursued here came from working in the OMEGA Centre at UCL and the specific exposure to the work of Kurtz and Snowden (2003) and their development of the Cynefin framework (see Figure 3.2). Kurtz and Snowden consider this framework to be particularly useful in collective sense-making of observed phenomena, and, in the context of decision-making analysis, it is seen to offer constructs that make better sense of complex problems and how these problems may be tackled in innovative ways. According to its authors, the essence of the framework is that it focuses on the dynamics of situations, decisions, perspectives, conflicts, and changes so as to build up consensus amidst uncertainty in decision-making (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003: 468).

**Figure 3.2: Cynefin Framework**

Source: Kurtz and Snowden (2003: 468)

The case study of the three mega projects investigates the known, complex, knowable, and chaotic domains of decision-making through both pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations. The premise of the Cynefin Framework is that pre-hypothesis investigations offer more insightful results than the hypothesis-led investigations because the latter confines itself to enquiries of the ‘knowable’
domain.

The case study seeks to identify and make sense of a variety of issues through the observations generated by its pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations and to plot these against the Cynefin framework, with a view to exploring types of situations that require intervention in the mega project decision-making process.

3.2.2 The role of narratives

Much has been made of the potential value of the narrative as a source for understanding decision-making in mega project developments, where the ‘narrative’ may be defined as “a type of communication that happens in conversation, appears in a sequence, and is interpreted retrospectively” (Browning and Boudès, 2005: 32). In this sense, storytelling is one kind of narrative. Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2000) claim that by telling stories people can put experience into sequence and find explanations within their own intentions or knowledge. It gives them the power to play with the chain of events that shape individual and social life. In the narrative, the hidden information they contain is primarily considered a potential knowledge base to be explored, a concept shared by Kurtz and Snowden (2003).

In order to collect valuable data from an interviewee, Kurtz and Snowden emphasise the importance of noting history, identifying turning points (also see Gladwell, 2000), and uncovering small events that caused large changes (see Taleb, 2007). This is compatible with the theory of ‘path dependence’, as expounded by Arthur (1987) and Pierson (2000), which emphasises that ostensibly small events may be highly influential, and may lead to large scale changes (see Chapter 2). The pre-hypothesis research advocated by Kurtz and Snowden and employed for the case study uses prompting, tacit, and indirect questions in interviews (see Appendix 2) to extract hidden information. The questions posed in the questionnaire are purposely void of hypotheses so as to avoid interviewer bias in the investigation.

3.2.3 Discourse and power

As reviewed in the previous chapter, this research attempts to examine the force of mega-project discourses in negotiating and lobbying in the decision-making process. This section explains the theoretical background to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2003) which is a potentially useful tool for analysing discourse in a mega-project decision-making network. Discourse patterns emerging within institutional environments represent the positions of discourse generators, such as project promoters.

The purpose of employing the concept of CDA in this investigation is twofold:
to gauge political power by examining discourses produced by diverse stakeholders interviewed for the case study; and

to see how the power of discourse performs in the competing or co-operating relationships between stakeholders observed in the case study.

Fairclough (2003) states that the study of relations between different organisations is an analysis of the relations between different ‘orders of discourse’. This research will analyse the discourses employed in the case of CTRL, hub development, and the 2012 London Olympics. Fairclough (2003) claims that inter-discursive analysis is the most significant feature of CDA because:

- It allows the contextualising of the analysis of texts – in this case the mega-project planning, appraisal, and delivery framework in the UK; and
- it shows the relationships between the social events and social practices that have moulded the project under study.

According to Fairclough’s (2003) interpretation of CDA, the study of mega-project decision-making requires examination of ways in which mega-project policies are articulated in terms of institutional arrangements and project stakeholder networks and the relationships between them. Thus, the study of mega-project discourses and their evolution aims to analyse key stakeholders’ power values in the institutional framework. Also, based on Atkinson’s (1999:59) argument, the study of mega-project discourses and power relations in decision-making means the study of the process of privileging official discourses, as this process helps the stakeholders create boundaries and control directions for others.

The concept of CDA is applied to identify the role of power intervention in the decision-making processes of the selected projects studied in this research. Discourses are generated for an act of performance and the production of stakeholders’ agendas (Browning and Boudès, 2005; Hajer, 1995). The data analysis for the case study in this thesis critically reviews the interview transcripts from the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations, and examines features of the project discourses as well as their advocates.

3.2.4 Content Analysis and Narrative Pattern Analysis

Content Analysis, according to Krippendorff (2004: 3), is “a systematic reading of texts, images, and symbolic matter”. Data collected by hypothesis-led research is analysed using Content Analysis, an approach appropriate to the research objectives. Krippendorff (2004: 18) defines Content Analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.” Here Krippendorff stresses that ‘text’ is not restricted to written material, but rather includes those data that can be sensed or observed, such as images, maps, sounds, signs, symbols, and numerical records (see Krippendorff, 2004: 19).
Based on the same source (Krippendorff, 2004: 32), Content Analysis features specific contexts from which data is derived by compensating for analysts’ inability to observe the following:

- phenomena pertain to the characteristics of writers or readers;
- happenings hidden behind intentional information barriers; and
- events in a distant past or future.

Krippendorff (2004: 40) uses Heisenberg’s uncertainty principles to interpret the constraints of using Content Analysis, namely measurements that interfere with the data assessment which then results in biased observations. Narrative Pattern Analysis is distinct from Content Analysis in its potential to identify weak signals by analysing narrative patterns of knowledge and by avoiding researcher biases.

A comparison of Narrative Pattern Analysis and Grounded Theory (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as presented suggests that the former has similar features to the latter as they do not rely on literature review as a source for the formation of hypotheses. Indeed, Glaser and Strauss specifically argue that in order to understand the complexity of social phenomena, facts should be investigated as they present themselves in the real world and data analysis should be undertaken without preconceived hypotheses. As in the case of Narrative Pattern Analysis, they believe that hypotheses and theories should be generated during or after the investigation and not prior to the investigation.

Grounded Theory sets out to identify the hypotheses and theories behind the social phenomena observed through survey data coding, issue conceptualising, and data categorisation. From this perspective, Narrative Pattern Analysis may be regarded as an extended version of Grounded Theory because it aims to identify narrative patterns of knowledge by systematising sense-making items. The principal distinguishing characteristic between these two qualitative research methods (see Table 3.1) lies in the Grounded Theory’s use of coding by practitioners as opposed to the self-indexing methodology of the interviewees employed by Narrative Pattern Analysis.

The similarities between the two approaches may be summarised as follows:

- They both look for patterns in observations, collect qualitative data, and seek to translate this into quantitative data by systematising them.
- They both try to understand observations without preconceived hypotheses.
- They both use any material bearing on the topic which can help make sense of the world.
- Finally, in each case data collection is mainly, but not exclusively, through interviews.

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14 See Section 3.3.1 for the definition of sense-making items.
Table 3.1: Comparison of Pre-hypothesis Investigations and the Grounded Theory Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Approach</th>
<th>Pre-Hypothesis Research (Narrative Pattern Analysis)</th>
<th>Grounded Theory Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Looking for</td>
<td>Narrative Patterns</td>
<td>Codes/Concepts/Categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>No pre-set hypothesis</td>
<td>Investigate the actualities in the real world and analyse the data with no preconceived hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data type</td>
<td>Sense-making items, including anything that helps people make sense of the world they live in</td>
<td>Use any material bearing in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection</td>
<td>Naïve Interviews</td>
<td>Data collection mainly from interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indices</td>
<td>Self-indexing / Camouflage of hypothesis</td>
<td>Codes are identified by practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data analysis</td>
<td>SenseMaker software</td>
<td>Micro study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilemma</td>
<td>How many sense-making items should be collected</td>
<td>When to finish the analysis: when the theory is emerging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Data Collection and Analytical Methodologies

The following discussion summarises the types of data sources and the steps undertaken in the data collection and analysis for both the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations.

3.3.1 Data sources and collection methods

Data are collected by a mixed-method approach, including interviews and documentary sources such as organisational reports, governmental study reports, published literature, newspaper articles, and electronic archives. In addition, data include a subset of interview transcripts from the OMEGA study. For the pre-hypothesis investigations the primary data is mainly drawn from naïve interviews whilst the hypothesis-led research uses semi-structured open-ended interviews. Official reports and archives were also examined to help build the project profile.

This section describes the utility of these data sources to the research and the reasons for choosing these methods of data collection, as well as their limitations in practical use. The large number of anecdotes collected from desktop study and interviews help to piece together a miscellany of data. With appropriate analysis, this confluence of data facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of the key stages and interrelationships among the MUTP under study, the hubs’ development, and the 2012 London Olympic preparations.

Data collection for pre-hypothesis investigations (after Cognitive Edge, 2006)

Data was collected through ten naïve interviews eliciting anecdotes and narratives of experiences through the concept of storytelling. These stories contain themes and issues according to the different emphases for participants and representatives from a variety of organisations, helping to disclose
diverse information relating to the case studies. Prompting questions were employed to encourage the interviewees to give detailed information while allowing the investigator to detect correlations between issues and events. Data of this kind has been proved invaluable when later conducting data analysis to find out emergent issues, themes, and hypotheses.

_Naïve Interviews_

An interviewer conducting the pre-hypothesis investigations should have only limited knowledge about the research subject in order to avoid pre-perception of the research question that can lead to a biased attitude and subjective opinions imposed into prompting questions. This PhD candidate was also the interviewer for the Naïve Interviews and this compromised the method through prior knowledge of the research topic and research questions, possibly introducing bias into the prompting questions posed during the interview process.

_Prompting Questions_

The questions asked in the pre-hypothesis research (see Appendix 2) were devised to prompt participants into a narrative form of disclosure on topics relating to the thesis research questions. The essence of Cognitive Edge methodology is to minimise the intervention of expert opinion or bias, which can often corrupt the original data. The interview technique is to ask ‘indirect’ questions and give participants a third-person role that allows them to produce sufficient story material without necessarily taking responsibility. In this writer’s experience as an interviewer, it is necessary to introduce supplementary questions in order to elicit responses of sufficient breadth and depth.

_Sense-making Items_

Sense-making items are defined by Kurtz and Snowden (2010: 9) as “anything that allows people to make sense of the complexity.” They range from anecdotes, drawings, and pictures to other digital forms, including governmental documents, reports, websites, minutes, and archives. The employment of the Cognitive Edge sense-making software (SenseMaker) for the case study analysis enabled narratives to be extracted from the manuscripts of the pre-hypothesis interviews without expert-led supervision. This collection of large numbers of narratives was undertaken in order to detect ‘weak signals’ among the observations reported that would otherwise not have been identified in conventional interview data collection methods. In practice, this writer believes that the small number of interviews conducted in this study limits the effectiveness of this analytical tool which was designed to be applied to larger data sets.

_Indexing_

15 According to Snowden (2010: 7), the reason Narrative Pattern Analysis can more easily elicit important, yet weak, signals is based on the concept presented by Lazaroff and Snowden (2006) “that human brains are more sensitised to narrative forms of knowledge about a situation than they are to analytical processes, in effect agreeing with the general criticism of sense-datum processing as a model of human intelligence.”

16 Four types of indexing are used. They are as follows (Cognitive Edge, 2006):

- **Abstract indicators** – these are used when issues cannot be covered by questions with a range of options.
- **Multi-choice questions**: Generic / Hypothesis-type – generic questions are generic in nature and provide useful search
The Cognitive Edge methodology stresses the importance of self-indexing of observations because it is believed that anecdotes themselves do not fully represent reported experiences. The process of constructing a set of indices for the case study allows the storyteller to add comments to their own story. The anecdotes indexed by the interviewees provided a greater understanding of the reported experiences about mega-project decision-making. This operation helps reduce ambiguity and helps respondents’ understanding of the questions. This author encountered a number of difficulties using pre-hypothesis method at this stage. One was the issue of striking the right balance in index design, which should reflect the research questions but must avoid leading interviewees to predetermined responses. Another was the procrastination of interviewees in response to the indexing task, which was most frustrating for the author.

Data collection for hypothesis-led investigations
There were nine respondents to the hypothesis-led semi-structured questionnaire. Each was a stakeholder closely involved in at least one of the projects in question. The questionnaire was designed around the research questions and the hypotheses described in Chapter 1. The detailed questions and the rationale that underpins each of them are covered in the Section 3.4.2. Data collected by this method were used to gauge the extent to which there was any synergy between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega-event-related developments. In addition, a number of hypotheses that were cited at the outset of the study are included here to help explain how the CTRL and its transport hubs at King’s Cross and Stratford were developed and what relationships, if any, were established with the 2012 London Olympics project.

Semi-structured open-ended questionnaires
This approach is based on the principles of qualitative research described by Creswell (2003). The hypothesis-led research undertaken for the case study was divided into two parts (see Appendix 3). Part one focuses on the overarching research questions derived from the literature and documentation reviewed. Part two focuses on the hypotheses and questions about the developments of the CTRL itself and its transport hubs at King’s Cross and Stratford, and their expected associations with the 2012 London Olympics. The questions posed in part two invited interviewees to respond to the plausibility of each of these hypotheses. The terminology used in the questionnaires requires clear definition in order for interviewees to understand the questions and reduce ambiguity.

Indexing
In the hypothesis-led investigations of CTRL / King’s Cross Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics, criteria and points of analysis. Hypothesis-type questions are based upon indirect questions and ask originators to index their own stories elicited from the participation process (questionnaire or interview). Key word identification – the storyteller or indexer decides which words in the story are significant according to their understanding of the story. Thus, this process is not performed by a computer programme working on universal assumptions about the nature of language. Free text – the making of comments or clarifications is allowed, especially when the material has not been indexed by the originator.
Olympics (referred to as the ‘Mega Projects’), an index sheet (see Appendix 3) was designed for the interviewees to complete in order to facilitate the analysis of interview data. The indices are divided into two parts:

- About the interviewees - questions about interviewees and their involvement in the Mega Projects and/or its associated developments (see Appendix 3, Questions 1-3);
- Interviewees’ views on Mega Projects (see Appendix 3, Questions 4-6);

The statistics of the indexing results are quantitative evidence which can be used to support the following inquires:

- Which types of contextual factors are the most important in the planning of the Mega Projects?
- Which aspects of the sustainable development challenges are addressed and how successfully have the Mega Projects coped with them?
- Which attributes are the most important for an efficient and effective stakeholder network to deliver Mega Projects?

The request to the interviewees to carry out their own indexing met with difficulties similar to those encountered in conducting the pre-hypothesis investigations. The hypothesis-led questionnaire contains a total of 14 questions, although the second part allowed the interviewees to select which they wished to answer. Most opted to answer all of them. Each interview took more than one hour. This lengthy process brought a general reluctance to invest additional time in completing the indexing sheet. In this situation, five (out of nine) responses were indexed by the researcher. Despite every effort to faithfully reflect the views of the interviewee, this intervention is bound to have compromised results.

Data extracted from the OMEGA study

In addition to the primary data sources addressed above, the data analysis was supplemented by access to transcripts and results from 25 further interviews covering related fields of enquiry undertaken by the OMEGA Centre at UCL, where the author held a PhD research fellowship. Data was extracted from the OMEGA enquiries where two of the questions overlapped with this PhD hypothesis-led questionnaire design (see Appendix 3, the overarching research question #1 and the hypothesis-led research question #3). Access to these hypothesis-led interview transcripts was highly instructive. Several findings quoted in the case study chapters (Chapters 4-6) are referred to the OMEGA study. Data extracted from the OMEGA pre-hypothesis investigations was not used extensively because the questionnaire and indexing design were based on different research questions. However, this data did supplement basic knowledge and understanding of the projects.
Data analysis

Types of data analysed here include interview recordings (written transcripts), questionnaire responses, and varied texts from secondary sources. For the pre-hypothesis research, a data analysis framework was constructed by the SenseMaker program and NVivo program (see Appendix 7 for the data analysis by these two software applications). The main function of SenseMaker program is to select key sense-making items for further studies, whilst the NVivo program helps to identify emergent issues and emergent hypotheses. The NVivo application subsequently proved valuable in the comparison between, and synthesis of, the pre-hypothesis investigations and the hypothesis-led interviews (see Appendix 8).

The results derived from the application of the two packages provided the basis for identifying distinctive narrative patterns and the interrelationships between the given narratives collected for the overall research questions. These findings were found to be of value for the further analysis of institutional networks and for insights into the power relations between stakeholders that became evident in specific decision-making scenarios in the case study. For the hypothesis-led research, the concept of Content Analysis was applied to the analysis of the interview transcripts collected from hypothesis-led interviews. This involved manually categorising the interview transcripts according to the questions posed in the questionnaire and the hypotheses. The grouped data was later compared with the findings of pre-hypothesis investigations. This comparison brought further insights into the research questions.

The issues and themes identified through the methods above are, in part, compatible with the arguments established in this research (see Chapter 1). Some, however, are newly developed through this exploratory analysis approach. An iterative process of reviewing data was adopted in all the analytical methods used in order better to incorporate new elements emerging from data with those previously identified.

The small number of the interviews casts some doubt on the level of confidence one can have in the reliability of the research findings as a basis for further action. The selection of interviewees was based on the literature reviews and desktop research on the projects, and the content of the research questions. Personal participation in the OMEGA pilot study also helped the author identify potential interviewees. This list was supplemented when the author attended the public enquiry of the King’s Cross Central project. Each interview is detailed and rich in content, and categorisation and analysis was a protracted process. As a result of time, manpower, and social connection constraints, only 20 individuals agreed to be interviewed for this research. One individual from the private sector was reluctant to answer my questions on the grounds of commercial confidentiality. The small number of interviews was offset to an extent by using the data extracted from the OMEGA pilot study.
3.4 Questionnaire Construction

This section explains the rationale of the questionnaire design and the relationship between the research questions, hypotheses, and the questionnaire. It first explains the rationale of indexing design in the pre-hypothesis investigations to show how these indices can help to identify key stories from the interview data and why these stories are most closely related to the research questions. The second part of this section focuses on the explanation of the relationship between the research questions, hypotheses, and the hypothesis-led questionnaire. It describes the reasons behind posing these questions in the questionnaire.

3.4.1 Indexing design of pre-hypothesis investigations

As indicated earlier, questions used in pre-hypothesis investigations were designed to encourage interviewees to relate stories about their experiences when involved in the projects in question. At the same time, these questions had to be free of bias, without imposing hypotheses, and the investigator’s opinions (see Appendix 2). Thus, the connection between the research questions and the pre-hypothesis investigations lies in the indexing design. Appendix 2 shows that there are 10 sections of indices. Among these, indices 8 and 9 directly connect to the research questions. The former asks what themes are relevant to the stories the interviewees provide, whilst the latter explores what kind of situations are most suitable to represent these stories. With these aims, selections in index 8 include the themes of ‘political intervention in the project’, ‘sustainability concerns’, ‘institutional arrangements’, and ‘bargaining power’; selections in index 9 range from ‘forming the vision for the project’ and ‘reaching agreement on project financing’ to ‘experiencing project under performance’ (please see Appendix 2 for the complete selection of indices). Other indices were designed for latter stages to identify the most relevant stories relating to a range of topics. For example, indices 5, 10, and 11 focus on the identification of stakeholders, their roles, and influences in the project development process. Index 4 asks about the timing of events referred to in stories. This assists the construction of a project timeline. Index 7 asks the interviewees to highlight keywords or phrases about the stories they offered in order to indicate major issues in the projects.

The purpose of this operation was to reduce ambiguity of the data and to assist the respondents’ understanding of the questions. This process was not without difficulties. For example, indices 8 and 9 incorporated too many selections, leading in part to the protracted indexing period and the reluctance of others to engage in the process in any way. Notwithstanding this, the stage of self-indexing is critical to identify key data for the analysis in the pre-hypothesis investigations, as these indices are different from the hypothesis-led questionnaire design and exhibit clear links between the research questions, hypotheses, and the interview questionnaire.
3.4.2 Hypothesis-led questionnaire design

As indicated earlier, there are two parts of the questions in the hypothesis-led investigations. Part one is composed of overarching research questions that are designed to detect the synergistic effects between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events. Part two comprises the questions that are employed to test the hypotheses and focuses on the interviewees’ experiences and insights into the case studies. This section describes the contents of these questions and the reasoning behind them.

**Overarching Research Question (ORQ) #1: Do you agree that MUTPs are impacted significantly by mega events, if so, why and how?**

This question aims to find out the role of mega events in MUTP development in order to answer the primary question and to reveal the interrelationship between the cluster of the three types of mega projects. Many mega events claim positive impacts on transport infrastructure development in the host cities, especially for pre-existing long-term development projects which lack political support and financial resources. It is suggested that the example of 2004 Athens Olympics concentrated a 25-year transport development programme into a five-year timeframe (Bovy, 2006b). This question attempts to answer whether these mega events give reasons and justifications to approve and implement plans that have been dormant for many years. In this research, this question aims to discover the degree of impact of the 2012 London Olympics on public transportation.

**ORQ #2: In your view, under which circumstances can one coordinate the delivery of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, and simultaneously achieve visions of sustainable development?**

One of the premises of this research is that institutional arrangements and power relations are the most influential factors in mega-project decision-making. This question aims to prove this premise and also reveal any other factors that are of significance to this decision-making process. It also seeks to discover what kind of context can bring all actors to work together within the mega-project network, and what model of coordination can function most effectively and efficiently. Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, the visions of sustainable development depend on the degree of consensus on the meaning of ‘sustainable development’ among the relevant actors and the interpretation they adopt. This question simultaneously shows the stakeholders’ understanding of this term in mega-project development.

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17 Interviewees should have their own perception of Sustainable Development. If not, we can use Brundtland Report which is well known and often cited: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
ORQ #3: Where this trilogy of development exists, which agency or institution provides or should provide leadership? Which of the three types of developments studied here becomes the locomotive of change that drives the others to achieve favourable and integrated outcomes for the principal stakeholders?

This question seeks to find out which form of coordination between these three types of mega projects can produce the most favourable and integrated outcome. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that a proactive partnership is the most effective form of mega-project governance. Within this, the responsibility between the public and private sectors needs to be articulated. This question aims to find out which of the three types of developments is the most influential within the multiple networks and which agency can furnish the strategy to maximise the synergy between these three types of development.

ORQ #4: Do MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events share resources at the local, regional, and national scale, or is one promoted at the expense of the others?

The issue is whether resources are shared among these three types of mega projects, or does one type of project dominate in the allocation of resources. Thus, Question #4 aims to find out if any resource diversion or programme reprioritisation exists within mega-project integration in order to fulfil demands of any one of the developments to the detriment of the others. If this is the case, what kind of impact does it have on the subordinate projects and any programmes that are omitted or postponed during this process? This leads to questions about which forces contribute to resource allocation decisions.

Hypothesis 1: Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and the Olympic developments associated with its transport hubs.

This hypothesis is readdressed into two related questions:

Hypothesis-related Research Question (HRQ) #1: Do you agree with this hypothesis in general terms and as it relates more specifically to the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project?

HRQ #2: What are the distinct roles of the CTRL in terms of the urban regeneration process of KX Central and Stratford City, and what role (if any) has the CTRL played in the Olympic Games Project?
This research hypothesises that under certain circumstances a MUTP can drive the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration schemes, while mega events have a temporal imperative in the shape of a strict timeframe which can drive event-related transport projects and urban regeneration schemes in the prioritisation and scale of investments. This research further premises that the realisation of mega events prevails so that more political resources will ultimately be concentrated in completing these projects. The second question posed to test this hypothesis is more straightforward. It aims to clarify the role of the CTRL in the hub developments and the 2012 London Olympics. The literature review on the catalytic role of MUTPs in urban development and economic growth already suggests that the transport projects alone cannot fulfil expectations, such as improvement of economic growth, enhancement of social cohesion, and achievement of sustainability. However, this research premises that MUTPs can act as an agent which can drive changes and helps to achieve the envisaged goals in long term.

**Hypothesis 2:** Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of Mega Urban Transport Projects, sustainable urban regeneration and mega event schemes.

**HRQ #3:** Is the ultimate determining factor of the decision-making process in MUTP planning, appraisal, evaluation, and delivery that of political power and not the power of the rationality of technocrats?

According to the ‘path dependency’ theory, key decisions are determined by political power at a specific conjuncture of events and circumstances. Pierson (2004) claims that “once a dense network of institutions and interests develop”, such as patterns of political mobilisation, institutional settings, and the public perception about the political world, it will often generate self-reinforcing dynamics to decision-making. He further contends that policies that once looked promising may become irrevocably lost (ibid.), leading to negative impacts on political outcomes or massive costs to the public. The aim of testing this question in various contexts is to elicit information that establishes whether political or technocratic rationality is the dominant power in the mega-project decision-making process.

**HRQ #4:** What factors can enhance stakeholders’ ‘bargaining power’ in the delivery of CTRL as a whole, the KX Central, Stratford City schemes, or 2012 London Olympics and why?

This question aims to examine the power relations between project stakeholders and the ways in which they gain and strengthen their bargaining power in the decision-making process. Bargaining power, in Lindblom’s (1955) opinion, is inevitable and is the alternative to hierarchy and the price
mechanism (i.e., market). He argues that higher hierarchical authority does not necessarily equate to higher bargaining power, since hierarchical authority is merely one weapon among many, including personality, characteristics, and articulacy. He furthermore regards these as minor factors. The most influential factor to bargaining power, he argues, is one’s position in the market. Another interpretation is that the value of bargaining power relies on the role of one actor within the bargaining field. He goes on to suggest that the way one pursues bargaining power is through alliances. Here he implies the importance of inter-governmental and inter-organisational networks. Although there is a belief that the public interest and common value should be taken into account in the decision-making process, a problem emerges in the difficulty of determining any consensus on what constitutes public interest across stakeholders. The needs of the least vociferous tend to be ignored. Hence, the so-called public interest is represented by an agreement between a narrow group of bargaining players who are active in the decision-making process (Lindblom, 1955: 151-158).

Hypothesis 3: Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.

HRQ #5: Will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics project significantly divert resources away from other major development initiatives? If so, are the spin-off benefits of this re-prioritisation justified?

This question explores under what circumstances, if any, consolidation of the three types of mega projects can generate synergies and efficient and effective co-operation. According to the review of mega events in Chapter 2, HRQ #5 premises that coordination can result in ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’ since mega events are likely to divert finite resources away from other projects. In addition, while the prioritisation of mega events reallocates resources which are initially scheduled for other projects, we should ask whether this is a result of multi-project co-operation or compromise. Lindblom (1955) compared bargaining arrangements and hierarchical arrangements, and concluded that policy-makers are more mobile in bargaining settings which allow them to change their policy focus quickly according to prevailing political agenda at the time. Hierarchical arrangements, in contrast, contain a more rigid designation of responsibility, with the authority of individual policy-makers confined to closely specified domains. This signifies that certain special institutional arrangements need to be made to legitimise the prioritised project, invariably the mega event. Under these circumstances, mega events can be regarded as products of the concentration of political, financial, and institutional resources. This question explores whether this re-prioritisation process can be justified by the outcomes of mega events.
HRQ #6: Do you agree that some important aims of the CTRL project, the 2012 London Olympics project, and the urban regeneration schemes for Stratford City and King’s Cross are in reality mutually reinforcing, or are the product of important compromises?

Responses to this question are informative as to whether the integration of this cluster of mega projects is a win-win strategy for the projects and for the wider range of stakeholders. According to the theory of bargaining power (Lindblom, 1955), the outcome of political decisions is achieved as a result of compromise after bargaining among many conflicting interests. Reflecting research question #3 posed in Chapter 1, this question looks into whether synchronised mega projects can complement each other and generate favourable, synergistic outcomes for stakeholders. This question attempts to discover the extent to which integration involves competition for limited social, economic, political, and environmental resources, and which of the projects is dominant and for what reasons.

HRQ #7: How effective will the new CTRL Stratford Station be as a catalyst for new development? Will it attract new public and private sector development in east London or merely encourage the further concentration of such development in central London?

Responses to this question reveal the extent of the impacts of Stratford International Station on the development of the new CTRL hubs. It also examines the promises and visions promulgated by promoters of Stratford International as catalysts for development in east London. The associated research question challenges the definition of sustainable development. One level of enquiry is the extent to which any synergy between these three types of mega projects can bring favourable outcomes to stakeholders. A second level of enquiry examines the extent to which integrated development leads to sustainable development. Within this, coordination between these mega projects may foster a robust, resilient, and impervious network that constitutes an institutional barrier, as suggested in Chapter 2. This closed network can become self-reinforcing, but can also weaken those lower-profile projects by occupying major resources to the exclusion of other claims.

HRQ #8: How would you respond to the claim that there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality in the vision that mega events, such as the 2012 London Olympics, can significantly stimulate sustainable urban regeneration?

According to the literature review in Chapter 2, many global concerns, such as world peace, human rights, sustainable development, and climate change, are cited in the case for mega events. However, in today’s business and political environments they remain as little more than part of the promotional and marketing rhetoric prior to major decisions. In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, the goals emphasised by the project organisers are to promote sports, reduce unemployment, incentivise development investments, and stimulate sustainable communities in east London. However, the many
mega-event impact studies (see Blake, 2005; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005; Experian, 2006; Kornblatt, 2006; UBS, 2006; Atkinson et al, 2008; Collins and Jackson, 2008) indicate that there will be gaps between the initial visions and the eventual outcomes. Here, the author aims to find out reasons behind these gaps, and how stakeholders handle unfulfilled promises.

Hypothesis 4: Key champions of mega urban transport projects, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas.

HRQ #9: Do you agree that discourses of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events have been used as tools by key champions to convince others of the validity of their positions in the expectation that these will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of these champions and empowering the project delivery network?

HRQ #10: Who are the primary champions and decision-makers that supported and opposed: the CTRL project, King’s Cross Central, Stratford City or 2012 London Olympics? And what were their major intentions?

Low (2005: 9) argues that “discourse is what forms a network, allowing ideas to travel, rather than the network shaping discourse. It is the discursive factor in networks, I want to propose, that makes them such formidable and impenetrable barriers to paradigm change”. The research question #4 posed in Chapter 1 focuses on usage and forces of mega-project discourses in the decision-making process. HRQ #9 and #10 aim to uncover whether these discourses have been used as a tool by key project champions to convince others of the validity of their positions. The expectation is that these discourses will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, will marginalise those who do not share the interests of these champions, and will ultimately empower the project delivery network.

Low (2005) stresses the importance of storylines, which include the visions, promises, and objectives of promoters when marketing a project. Based on Low’s (2005: 51) argument, discourses composed of storylines are prime vehicles of change to political agendas. They can legitimise political stances, position actors, exclude others who do not subscribe to the same discourses from influence and facilitate coalitions within the project-led network. This research expects to discover more insights into this mega-project discourse coalition through the case studies. At the same time, these two
questions aim to identify the primary decision-makers and the motivations behind their propositions.

3.5 Comparison and Synthesis of Findings

This section explains the framework within which the findings generated from the two strands of research are compared, and how the synthesis of the outcomes can help to answer the research questions.

3.5.1 Theory generation and verification

These terms, pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led research, are equivalent to the terms used by Punch (2005) as theory generation and theory verification research. This research does not favour one over the other, but employs both of them and uses their synthesis in order to achieve more comprehensive results. The author believes both approaches are legitimate and necessary. Moreover, the synthesis of findings from each strand, when combined, strengthens confidence in the overall research results. There is a general correlation between style and approach, which is well captured by Punch:

“Theory verification research, by definition, is more likely to have clear-cut research questions leading to hypotheses, a tightly structured design, and pre-established categories for data. Theory generation research, by contrast, will more likely use an approach where specific research questions unfold as the study develops, and where codes and categories for the data are empirically derived” (Punch, 2005: 25).

In this research, pre-hypothesis fieldwork was undertaken, and, in parallel hypotheses were drawn-up which were derived from the literature review as part of the hypothesis-led investigation. The concept was to devise hypotheses without using the emerging issues generated from the process of pre-hypothesis investigations, and then eventually to bring the two strands of findings together for comparison. The heart of the process is to compare the established hypotheses with the emergent hypotheses generated from the pre-hypothesis investigations.

3.5.2 Comparative framework

The comparative framework is constructed to generate answers to the respective research questions and to test the hypotheses by hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis research. The comparison is based upon hypotheses and hypothesis-led questions. It includes two comparison methods which are described below and accompanied by the table of summarised steps (see Table 3.2):

Comparison with the aid of the NVivo software application

This comparison aims to identify relevant anecdotes in the pre-hypothesis investigations that correlate to questions posed in the hypothesis-led questionnaire (see Appendix 8). It shows the extent to which
the relevant data in the pre-hypothesis investigations substantiate the responses collected from hypothesis-led investigations.

Manually comparing and analysing the responses collected

According to the interviewees’ responses to the hypothesis-led questions, the researcher assigns a rating which reflects degree of agreement to the hypotheses and the questionnaire questions. This helps to gauge the strength of the confirmation or rejection towards each hypothesis and question. Also, this comparison approach discovers the extent to which the relevant data in the pre-hypothesis investigations are consistent with the result of the hypothesis-led investigation by way of reviewing sense-making items identified by the relevant indices.

Table 3.2: Comparative Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Comparison with the aid of NVivo software application</th>
<th>Manually comparing and analysing the responses collected</th>
<th>Related data in the pre-hypothesis investigations identified by NVivo</th>
<th>Responses from the hypothesis-led interviews</th>
<th>Related data in the pre-hypothesis investigations identified by SenseMaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>• Identify keywords.</td>
<td>• Identify data coded to the keywords derived from the questions.</td>
<td>• Summarise each response.</td>
<td>• Identify data relating to the questions among the key sense-making items which were derived from narrative patterns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes</td>
<td>• Keywords are as codes used in next step to detect pre-hypothesis data</td>
<td>• Identify confirmatory and disconfirming data between these two-stranded research approaches.</td>
<td>• Recognise the strength of the confirmation / rejection towards each hypothesis and research question.</td>
<td>• Identify confirmatory and disconfirming data.</td>
<td>• Identify emergent issues and hypotheses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6 Conclusions

The methodology for the case studies has been introduced in this chapter. The case study methodology employs a parallel approach, one side being the pre-hypothesis research based on the Cognitive Edge method, the other being hypothesis-led research based on a conventional questionnaire. The core of the case study methodology is based upon narrative analysis through capturing narratives among stakeholders. The term ‘narrative’ is used in a broad sense to include written articles and transcripts of spoken material. In order to facilitate understanding of decision-making process, Cognitive Edge methodology was employed to identify narrative patterns. This innovative approach was selected over more traditional strategies, which involve assumptions of order, rational choice, and intent (see Kurtz and Snowden, 2003). The significance of the data sources, data collection methods, analytical framework, and comparative framework were all described in this chapter.
Case study methodology is applied to gain insights into the CTRL project and its station developments. Chapters 4-6 describe the context of the selected projects together with their prevailing issues and findings. These observations are drawn from the exploration of the CTRL project, King’s Cross area development, Stratford City regeneration scheme, and 2012 London Olympics. They are compared with the conclusions derived from the literature reviews of the three development types (MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events) and theories concerning decision-making, power relations, and institutional arrangements (see Chapter 2).
4 Case Study of Channel Tunnel Rail Link

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents, as a case study, the UK Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) - also known as ‘High Speed One’. It comprises of four elements (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2): the line haul (i.e., the railway link from the Channel Tunnel to London St. Pancras) which for the purposes of this study is seen as a mega urban transport project (MUTP), two major urban regeneration schemes (around the CTRL stations of Stratford and London St. Pancras), and an international mega event (the 2012 London Olympic Games) and its associated development. This chapter begins with an introduction to the context of the CTRL as a MUTP, its champion protagonists, and the role of the various main stakeholders (Section 4.1). It is followed by an account of the project’s storyline and timeline of key stages of the project’s development in Section 4.2. This provides insights into the CTRL decision-making process, the project initiatives, and aspects linked to the project’s periods of stagnation and breakthrough. Section 4.3 examines the inter-relationships between the station developments and the CTRL project, paying particular attention to the Stratford and London St. Pancras stations along with the related political debates. Section 4.4 investigates the gap between the project promises on sustainability and the financial realities. The prospects of the UK high-speed railway network are examined too. Section 4.5 analyses the issues which emerged from the CTRL decision-making process and negotiation powers involved in route selection and its financing arrangements, including the concessionary contract, negotiating power, risk transference, and the over-optimistic transport forecasts. Section 4.6 highlights the results of the hypothesis-testing and summarises the emergent issues and insights into theories that have been derived from the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations, and discusses these in the light of the observations made in Chapter 2. The chapter closes with a summary of the key findings.

The presentation of the case study is based to a great extent on a large number of anecdotes collected from various sources (as outlined in the previous chapter). These are compiled to form a miscellany of information in order to help build a more comprehensive picture of the development of the key stages and interrelationships of the MUTP under study with its two most northern stations and the 2012 London Olympic preparations. In presenting this material this chapter seeks to analyse the principal issues and challenges encountered through a review of related literature and other secondary data, complemented by findings from primary questionnaire investigations, in an attempt to answer to the
research questions and test the hypotheses raised at the outset of the research.

4.1.1 Project facts

The Channel Tunnel Rail Link is a highly complex MUTP which comprises the following components:

- **A double track high speed rail link between the Channel Tunnel and London St Pancras International (opened on 14th November 2007).** This represents the ‘Line haul’ component of the project.

- **Stations/Transport Termini, comprising:** the London Terminus (the International Station at St Pancras) and Intermediate Stations located at: Stratford International (east London); Ebbsfleet (north Kent) and; Ashford International in mid-Kent (see Figure 4.1).

- **Construction Structures of the CTRL:**
  - The total length of the CTRL is 113 km, including Section 1: 74km and Section 2: 39km
  - 60% of the route (55km) is built within existing road or rail transport corridors
  - 152 bridges along the route
  - 25% (26km) of the route is in tunnel
  - 51% of CTRL Section 2 is in tunnel since it mainly runs across already packed central London
  - Majority of Section 1 runs across open countryside with numerous bridge crossings. The route formation was ardently debated from late 80s to early 90s. One of the issues was environmental impact on the Kent landscape which is often described as garden of England. The Section 1 route does however include massive cut-and-cover works required to bring the CTRL through the centre of Ashford and the North Downs tunnel.
  - The CTRL is one of the 30 priority projects of the TEN-T High-speed railway. The axis Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London (the ‘PBKAL network’) (EC 2005, Trans-European Transport Network: TENT-T priority axes and projects, Belgium)

- **Major regeneration schemes around the intermediate stations/transport hubs associated with CTRL at:**
  - King’s Cross/St Pancras Station in central London

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35 This discussion is based on data and literature provided by the OMEGA Centre, at UCL (see OMEGA Centre, 2008). The major part of this text has been drawn from: London and Continental Railways ‘LCR – An Incredible Journey’. [WWW] available from: [www.lcrhq.co.uk](http://www.lcrhq.co.uk) [Accessed: 24/10/2006].
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| | Stratford International Station in east London |
| | Ebbsfleet International Station in North Kent |
| | Ashford International Station in mid-Kent |

Figure 4.1: Location of CTRL Route and Its Stations

Source: Faith (2007: 159)

St Pancras International Station is the largest of its kind in Europe and is expected to handle some 50 million passengers per year. In terms of construction phasing, the CTRL was split into two principal sections (see Figure 4.2).

**Section 1** – Channel Tunnel to Fawkham Junction. Construction of this section commenced in October 1998 and opened for use in September 2003. Earlier international services made use of primarily existing lines and connected the Channel Tunnel with Waterloo Station which was the temporary London Terminus for Eurostar services from 1993 until St Pancras opened in November 2007, although the initial plan was that Waterloo International would continue to operate in alongside the St Pancras Terminus.

**Section 2** – Southfleet Junction to St Pancras. Construction commenced in July 2001 and was completed in November 2007.
4.1.2 Key stakeholders and their power relations

The role of several stakeholders who were most influential in the evolution of the CTRL decision-making process is explored in this section. They include consultancy Ove Arup, Kent County Council, Newham Council, British Rail, and the political champions, Michael Heseltine\(^\text{36}\) and John Prescott\(^\text{37}\). The key stakeholders and their network links are shown in Figure 4.3.

According to Faith (2007: 120), one of the crucial factors of Ove Arup’s success in promoting their easterly route was their strategic hiring of a specialist Maureen Tomison as their public affairs consultant. Tomison’s role was to ensure that Arup’s proposal had the backing from all the MPs affected by the route of the CTRL. Another influential factor was the special interest and competence of Kent County Council which demonstrated strong negotiating powers. In retrospect, many regard

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\(^{36}\) Michael Heseltine was a Member of Parliament from 1966 to 2001. He entered the Cabinet in 1979 as Secretary of State for the Environment and became Secretary of Defence by 1983. Under John Major, in 1995 to 1997, Heseltine became the Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State. He was also the key advocate of the Millennium Dome (see Heseltine, 2000).

\(^{37}\) John Prescott is a former Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State of the UK after the Labour’s victory in the 1997 election.
this as the impetus that forced Government to accept the need for a new link to the Channel Tunnel. Another party that displayed admirable negotiating skills during the planning and development of the CTRL was Newham Council, notably in its lobbying efforts for the Stratford station.

An organisation that displayed less competence in the CTRL development experience was British Rail (BR) which clearly struggled throughout the CTRL project development and always seemed to be in a quandary as regards its main direction. Gourvish (2002: 328) explains this by arguing that the BR Board “often found itself sandwiched between the Government’s ambitions on the one hand, and the commercial interest of Eurotunnel and speculative investors from the private sector on the other”. Factors which in particular weakened BR’s negotiation power and put them into the difficult situation were (after Fiath, 2007; Gourvish, 2002):

- its lack of professionalism;
- the on-going distractions of the threat of the privatisation and fragmentation of the organisation;
- the Government’s unwillingness to pay for a project given its large scale;
- the economic recession during 1989-93;
- BR’s organisational culture.

The battle between the key stakeholders during the CTRL decision-making reflects the analysis of the power of discourse in Chapter 2. The findings of this case study reinforce points mentioned earlier in the exploration of the functions of discourse power, as follows:

- Discourse among decision-making parties is empowered by those stakeholders who obtain superior credentials and power to other less privileged parties.
- The force of discourse power can simplify complex policy issues and focus on certain dominant ones supported by powerful project advocates.
- Project discourses represent the process of structuring a network and prioritising particular interests. Through amplifying the political agenda, the main proponents gain sway over the limited resources that many are scrambling for.
- Key mega project stakeholders adhered to the discourses set out in the various changing agendas with government commitments and political support gaining a stronger negotiation position over time.

Discourse functions are explored and illustrated in the following sections. According to the synthesis of findings from this research, it can be concluded that effective bargaining powers possessed by stakeholders, underpinned by negotiation, lobbying, and the use of discourse, are critical in mega project decision-making.
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Figure 4.3: CTRL Stakeholder Network

- **Project Development**
  - Department for Transport
  - Railtrack, now Network Rail (bought Railtrack plc on 3 October 2002)

- **Project Implementation**
  - London & Continental Railways Ltd
  - Shareholders/Subsidiaries

- **Project Operation**

  - **Contractual Framework**
    - Interface Agreements
    - Protective Provisions
  - **Owner**
    - HS1
  - **NR (CTRL)**
  - **Code of Working Practices**
    - TOCs/FOCs

- **Stakeholders influencing decision-making**
  - Michael Haselton
  - Kent County Council
  - Ove Arup
  - Newham Council
  - Stratford Promoter Group
  - John Prescott
  - King's Cross Railways Group

4.2 History of the CTRL Project Development

This thesis seeks to identify the role of MUTPs in providing sustainable urban regeneration schemes and effectively delivering a major international mega event. King’s Cross Central and Stratford City are two of the main regeneration projects fostered by the CTRL. The 2012 London Olympic Games development, which has a much shorter history than the CTRL, potentially offers enormous development momentum for east London. To understand the interrelationships that have developed among this cluster of mega projects, we need to briefly trace the histories of each project; commencing with the CTRL (explained in this chapter) and the elaboration of the others (subsequently in Chapters 5 and 6).

4.2.1 Background

The project development timeline (see Table 4.1) effectively illustrates the evolution of the project, given its large scale and long history. An examination of the project’s history is important because it may offer important lessons for future MUTPs. The CTRL project timeline illustrated in Table 4.1 is drawn from the work of the OMEGA Centre (2008: 68-78) and places all the key events into a detailed sequence of development.

Beginning in 1971, the idea of the CTRL first appeared during the study of Channel Tunnel proposal between BR and SNCF (see Pollalis, 2006). The UK Government abandoned the plan to build a tunnel under the Channel and the links to other cities in 1975, as it bowed to political pressure and took an easier political option38 (Pollalis, 2006: 4). According to Gourvish, the CTRL main development era can be viewed in three phases; each based on the involvement of BR’s activities (Gourvish, 2002: 328-340; summarised by OMEGA Centre, 2008):

- Period 1: 1988-1990: initial identification of possible routes and establishment of a JV with Eurorail that was scuppered by the government in the summer of 1990,
- Period 2: 1990-autumn 1991: further study of possible routes which the government rejected,
- Period 3: BR’s subsidiary (Union Rail) undertook further development work until the government announced its preferred route in 1994 (see Figure 4.4).

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38 At that time, there were overwhelming public opposition and environment concerns of the negative impacts arising from faster and more frequent trains.
The decision to build the Channel Tunnel provided the early impetus for the CTRL since the agreement between British and French Governments obliged both countries to provide sufficient links to their respective capital cities. Although it did not require delivering a high-speed link in this circumstance, the British Government were embarrassed by the contrast with the success of its partners who delivered their high-speed network successfully. Only when the publication of ‘Kent Impact Study’ in 1987\(^{39}\) (see Hay et al., 2004) demonstrated that the existing capacity would not be sufficient by the end of the century (20th), did BR carry out a review of the CTRL route and terminal capacity and subsequently published a report in July 1988 entitled ‘Channel Tunnel Train Services’ in which four routes were identified (see Figure 4.5). In 1989, BR decided that the second terminal (after Waterloo Station) would be built as the lower-level station at King’s Cross. This decision was rather suddenly announced at the time and some argue that BR’s intention was to take advantage of the property-oriented proposal submitted by the London Regeneration Consortium (LRC), assembled by Rosehaugh and Stanhope, to develop the unoccupied railway lands around the King’s Cross and St Pancras area (Faith, 2007: 69).

Route formation

In March 1990, Ove Arup published an alternative route proposal (see Figure 4.6) which suggested penetrating London from the east via Stratford. Representatives of the BR-Eurorail joint venture argued that the proposal could not be funded commercially due to high tunnelling costs with the result that it was decided to defer the CTRL Bill and instead submit an alternative Bill in November 1990. Until October 1993, the Government and BR were still unable to decide between the two terminal options presented, namely King’s Cross and St Pancras. Meanwhile, the Stratford Promoter Group\(^40\) was constantly lobbying for Stratford International and submitted proposals for a combined

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\(^40\) This group is made up of (Florio and Edwards 2001: 106):
- Land Securities Properties—owners of the Stratford shopping mall
- Carpenters Company—a City of London charitable company owning land in the area
- P&O Developments—major development and construction company
- Link Parks
- University of East London
- Regalian Groups of Companies—developers
- Tarmac Construction—developers and house builders
- John Mowlem & Co. Plc—construction and civil engineering company
- Laing Civil Engineering—civil engineering company
- London Docklands Development Corporation
- Stratford Development Partnership Ltd
- London Borough of Newham
- Rialto Homes Plc—house builders
- Fairview New Homes Plc—house builders
- Persimmon Homes—house builders
International and Domestic Station at Stratford at the time. In January 1994, the Secretary of State for Transport, Brian Mawhinney, declared the choice of the east London route over the other options with St Pancras as the London terminus and the provision of an intermediate station between Ashford and London. In 1996, with the appointment of London & Continental Railways (LCR) came the decision to include the station at Stratford, which was to be a key part of the commercial arrangement between the Government and the LCR (LCR was awarded the development rights at King’s Cross and Stratford Railway Lands). The political fight between the Kent County Council and BR as well as the hard lobbying from the Stratford Promoter Group over the route selection and decision of terminal serves to highlight the part played by powerful political intervention in complex decision-making on the CTRL project.

**Figure 4.6: The Four Routes Proposed in 1990**

Source: Pollalis (2006: 5), Figure 4

**Selection of a private sector partner**

In early 1995, after the evaluation of the bids for the construction of CTRL, Eurorail CTRL Ltd. and London & Continental Railways (LCR) were invited to proceed to the final stage of the competition. Ashford International was selected as the most southern station in East Kent and opened for Eurostar train services in early 1996. In February 1996, the Government and LCR signed the contract for the project to design, build, finance, and operate the CTRL, with LCR acquiring ownership of Union Railways Ltd (by now a Government company) and European Passenger Services Ltd (the UK arm of the Eurostar train services). LCR won the competition because its bid had the lowest requirement on Government’s direct grants, and, in the Department’s view, the LCR proposal had a more favourable
distribution of risks than the other bidders. Its forecast of Eurostar UK revenues subsequently proved to be over-optimistic. The hypothesis-led interview shows that mega projects are easily affected by optimism bias in projections of traffic and revenue. According to the literature review in Chapter 2 and the interview data, it presents that these optimistic demand forecasts are largely affected by the political agenda (see Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). With the contract signed, Stratford International station was also confirmed following a long and hard lobbying process (see Florio and Edwards, 2001 and detailed discussion in Chapter 6).

Opening of the High Speed 1

Not long after the CTRL public-private partnership contract was signed between the Government and the LCR, LCR soon realised that they were unable to raise the financing needed for the CTRL project and approached the Department for Transport with a request for £1.2 billion of additional direct grant money. The Deputy Prime Minister of the time (John Prescott) refused to agree to this request and instead suggested LCR prepare a revised proposal. In June 1998, after negotiation between the Government and LCR, the proposal for financial restructuring was accepted by the Government and a new financial arrangement announced. In this, the CTRL project was to be phased in two stages instead of the original one. Work began on site to construct Section 1 in October 1998 under a five-year contract to be completed by 30 September 2003. In 2000, Argent St George was appointed as the developer of the King's Cross Railway Land. September 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair opened Section 1 for commercial services and claimed that the project was on time and on budget. From the development trajectory of the CTRL project, we can see that this claim ignores the financial restructurings, project re-phasing, and the overall cost of the associated development at the hubs. Furthermore, the actual cost is still unknown (see OMEGA Centre, 2008). This is what one interviewee had to say on the matter:

“We ended up with a more matured system, which will validate the claims of the people who delivered it that it was a great victory and what they had always intended, whatever little relationship it has got

41 Argent St George later changed to Argent (King’s Cross) Limited because of St George’s withdrawal from the regeneration scheme. The two developers, Argent and St George, were in a contract involving the £1bn regeneration scheme for King’s Cross in 2001. Argent St George, a joint venture between the two developers, has entered into an acquisition and development agreement with London & Continental Railways (LCR) and Exel over the 67-acre site, which is north of King’s Cross mainline station (source: The Lawyer website (2001) Argent St George sticks with Lovells for £1bn job. [WWW] available at: http://www.thelawyer.com/argent-st-george-sticks-with-lovells-for-%C2%A31bn-job/103497.article accessed 22/09/2008).

42 According to the Department for Transport: “The total cost of the [CTRL] project is approximately £5.9 billion, of which the Department for Transport is committed to give a total of £1.8 billion (NPV) of grants after taking account of the expected net recoveries from the Government's share of property sale profits and rental income. It was agreed that the remainder of the money would be raised by the promoter who would be given permission to issue Government Guaranteed Bonds to raise £3.75 billion”.
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with the original aims because they always rely on people forgetting them.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a person from the local community group, 12/06/2008)

Section 2 was completed and opened to operation in November 2007 when the CTRL project changed its name to High Speed 1.

4.2.2 Project initiatives and obstacles

The high-speed domestic services from Ebbsfleet to St Pancras began in 2009. Being the first high-speed rail line in the UK, CTRL was only really approved when BR was convinced that there was a necessity for a high-speed rail service to meet the demands of the international passenger services from the continent to London. Tracing the project back to its project initiation, whilst BR worked in conjunction with French Railways (SNCF) on a combined scheme for the Channel Tunnel, respective rail links to their capital cities were also considered in 1971. One decade later, in 1981, BR and SNCF reached agreement to build a tunnel and to be responsible for certain levels of accessibility to each end of the Tunnel. Owing to the Thatcher government’s aversion to major public sector project investments at the time and its subsequent favouring of privatisation, the Channel Tunnel Act 1987 specifically stipulated that no UK Government support would be forthcoming for the construction of a new rail link.

There is considerable evidence (see Faith, 2007; OMEGA Centre, 2008) to suggest that the real impetus for the project came from Kent County Council where there was at the time a strong professional team and strong political commitment for promoting the high-speed rail link. The 1987 Kent Impact Report challenged the BR view on the transport capacity forecast commissioned in 1986. The subsequent process on the CTRL route selection was a protracted one and involved numerous issues, which are described in Section 4.5.1.

The birth of UK’s first high-speed rail suffered from a number of prolonged and intractable problems in addition to those related directly to the delay of Channel Tunnel project. These include (after Faith, 2007: 21):

- the Treasury’s obsession with cutting costs;
- the opposition from the residents in Kent;
- the lack of incentive for BR to promote the CTRL project;
- the frequent changes of ministers at the Department of Transport;
- the capacity of BR to deal with the large scale of investment worsened as a consequence of tension derived from BR’s 1993-1997 privatisation;
• the pessimistic forecasts of traffic impact that preceded the opening of the Tunnel;
• the cultural perspective, whereby the public perception and attitudes in the UK at the time appeared less supportive of grand infrastructure projects of the kind more readily accepted by the French and Japanese public.
### Table 4.1: CTRL Project Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>British Rail (BR) worked in conjunction with SNCF on a combined scheme for the Channel Tunnel and respective rail links to their capital cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>BR confirmed that existing links had sufficient capacity for extra traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>BR and SNCF reached agreement to build a tunnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>The Channel Tunnel Act received Royal Assent in February. Waterloo is named the first terminal for international services. BR begins a study of long-term capacity needed for Channel Tunnel services. King’s Cross is chosen as a second station. Kent Impact Study published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>BR identifies 4 possible routes. BR’s Channel Tunnel team is set up and a joint venture with Eurostar Trafalgar House &amp; BICC is announced to take the project forward between 1988 and 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>BR announced that King’s Cross would be the location for the second terminal (after Waterloo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Arup published alternative route proposal which proposes to penetrate London from the east via Stratford.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>In May, BR announces a southerly route which is rejected by Ove Arup who advocate an eastern approach. The eastern approach route is chosen by the Government in October because of its regeneration benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Eurostar International terminal opens at Waterloo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ashford International Station opens. The CTRL contract is awarded in February. The appointment of LCR comes the decision to include the station at Stratford in May. The Channel Tunnel fire in November. On 18 December the Hybrid Bill receives Royal Assent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>John Prescott (the Deputy Prime Minister) announced that LCR are unable to raise the finance for the CTRL. DoT and Railtrack have signed an agreement in principle regarding the operators’ input to the project. Construction begins on Section 1 in October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>John Prescott announced financial restructuring deal with LCR. The CTRL is now to be constructed in two stages. Argent St George are appointed developers of the King’s Cross Railway Lands. The formal decision to build a CTRL Station at Stratford is made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Construction begins on Section 2 in July. Railtrack enters railway administration. Network Rail bought Railtrack plc on 3 October 2002. The Prime Minister opens Section 1 for commercial services ‘on time and on budget’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Outline planning consent for Stratford City was granted in Feb 2005 and application made for consent at King’s Cross Central.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Commencement of domestic services from Ebbsfleet. The line was transferred to government ownership in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>London to Folkestone of the CTRL has been put up for sale by the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, based on DfT website [WWW](http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/ctrl/chronologyofthechanneltunnell) [Accessed on 27/10/2010]
4.3 Coordination between Railway and Hubs’ Development

This section examines whether the developments surrounding the CTRL hubs have been significantly influenced by the high-speed rail project. It should be noted that each hub has its own context, including local planning aspirations, development plans, local political culture, planning pressures, opportunities, and constraints. Some of these considerations have to be analysed separately, and eventually an integrated view taken on their development, especially concerning competition between passenger numbers, franchisers, and inward investment.

4.3.1 History of the coordination

Sir Michael Heseltine, the Conservative Party politician and a shareholder of Blue Circle (which owned much land in the Thames Gateway), was an influential figure in the Thames Gateway development (also see Chapter 6). As a result of his believe that the new high-speed railway project could play a role to assist the continuous growth in the East End Corridor, he became a strong and influential advocate of the high-speed link’s easterly route through North Kent.

In the 1980s, Michael Heseltine established a property-oriented and state-funded agency, the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC, operated between July 1981 and March 1998 as one of several UDCs in the country), which transformed the north and south banks of the Thames in east London into a modern business zone. The government’s designation of the organisation as an Urban Development Corporations (UDC) along with others in the UK was at the time seen as one of the means of marginalising and weakening the local authorities. The creation of the LDDC was undoubtedly a threat to the radical opposition of the boroughs who lost control of the docklands. In 1987, on the basis of a joint campaign for the ‘East Thames Corridor’ (later ‘Thames Gateway’) promoted by the Government, Newham Council and LDDC showed more consensus and willingness to cooperate as they subsequently both came to believe that an international station at Stratford could help the borough attract more private investment and encourage initiatives for the remaining development on the site of the Royal Docks (Florio and Edwards, 2001).

The Pieda report (1991) also argued that all of the proposed CTRL routes are likely to make similar contributions to the development of East Kent and would be unlikely to be a significant factor in redressing the imbalance of economic activity between west and east London. The Pieda study was commissioned by BR in 1991. It seems that the Pieda report demonstrates a lack of fairness in making judgements since BR was keen to justify their southerly route during late 1980s and early 1990s.

In short, the process of the CTRL route selection and the promotion of development benefits reflect
the analysis in power relations and the influence of institutional arrangements in Chapter 2 which claims that the power of discourse generated by the dominant stakeholder can a) allocate or redistribute resources; b) reinforce the structure of a network and create exclusionary effects; c) provide initiatives to institutionalise political interests; and d) link up discourses in different policy domains and generate a more powerful effectiveness. The argument reveals that, as far as the main research question about the relationships between multiple mega projects is concerned, they were more likely to be in a competitive rather than cooperative environment, particularly as economic circumstances deteriorated.

4.3.2 Role of CTRL

King’s Cross Station
King’s Cross was long favoured as one of the hubs by British Rail in the early stage of the project history. According to the evidence collected by the desktop research and the pre-hypothesis investigations, some argue that the reasons for British Rail’s choice of King’s Cross as the CTRL terminal was that it was a convenient decision for themselves because they were keen to use the existing line to run the Eurostar to central London. In 1989, however, BR suddenly announced their preferred second London terminal for the CTRL as King’s Cross (after Waterloo) (Faith, 2007: 69). This is despite the fact that it was originally said to need a two-year study before arriving at such a decision. It has been argued that the property development initiatives prevalent at the time helped to speed-up the pace of their decision-making since they were eager to rely on the property developers to pay for the construction of the terminal in King’s Cross. At the time, the LRC was proposing to develop the derelict railway land between King’s Cross and St Pancras stations. The Pieda report “Socio-Economic and Development Impacts” published in 1991 for BR paradoxically showed that the CTRL was likely to play no definitive role in developing these prospects (Pieda, 1991).

St Pancras International Station
The emergence of St Pancras station as an alternative London terminus to King’s Cross was only mentioned in the report submitted by the Union Railways (BR’s subsidiary) to the Secretary of State as late as January 1993. This report mentions that further work was undertaken to address an alternative option from Stratford to a terminus at St Pancras. This work is only described in the final chapter of that report (Chapter 8), but is not taken into account elsewhere in the report which advocates abandoning the proposed high-cost, lower-level station at King’s Cross.

Ashford and Waterloo International Station
Ashford and Waterloo stations both suffered from the shift of the Eurostar international services to the
St. Pancras destination. Incentives provided for business by the introduction of international high-speed rail services in Ashford were heavily diluted when Eurostar reduced its services to Ashford and closed the station at Waterloo (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8). The International Station at Ashford was built in 1996 at a cost of around €120 million (£100 million). Railfuture director (Trevor Jones) expressed concern that the interests of the local community and business in Ashford were being ignored in the Cross-border Working Group of the European Passenger Federation with both Eurostar and the Government. He argued: "The cuts will cause a massive loss of revenue for local businesses which rely on these passengers’ custom. People are indignant that they have not been properly consulted and that a service like Eurostar, which has been built on public funding, should be able to completely overlook the needs of the community" (Railfuture, 2008). It could be asked why the operator or the Government did not foresee these consequences earlier in a risk assessment exercise as this has major opportunity cost implications.

Figure 4.7: Waterloo Opportunity Area

Source: Waterloo Opportunity Area Planning Framework (2007: 13), Figure 5

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43 In September 2006, Eurostar announced that it was to halve Ashford’s train links with Paris and stop the Ashford service to Lille and Brussels completely in 2008. This somewhat undermined the Government’s earlier initiative of declaring Ashford a major priority urban development area for South East England.
Figure 4.8: Waterloo Opportunity Area Aerial View


**Ebbsfleet International Station**

Ebbsfleet international station was chosen as a key hub on the CTRL route in 1993 because of CTRL’s important role in transport improvements and the regeneration stimulus it offers in the Thames Gateway, especially following the 1991 housing market slump where extra impetus was needed to meet the additional predicted housing needs of the Greater London Area. Land adjoining the CTRL at Ebbsfleet International station is part of the Ebbsfleet Valley development area (see Figure 4.9). The major land holder and developer in Ebbsfleet Valley is Land Securities, one of the UK’s leading real estate and commercial developers. The campaign groups⁴⁴ who urged Eurostar to reconsider their plan argue that it is *not* appropriate to concentrate international services at Ebbsfleet on the grounds that the motorway network is already highly congested and that the train links to surrounding areas at Ebbsfleet International are rather limited. Such circumstances reflect theories of path dependency that institutional barriers are formed and reinforced by the effect of ‘increasing returns’ (see Pierson, 2000). The observation of this case study also suggests that discourses occur in a discursive and incremental manner where the dominant discourse by the more convincing stakeholder can stifle some and steer yet other stakeholders to comply with it (see Hajer, 2003).

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⁴⁴ These include: Railfuture, in conjunction with European rail passenger organisations; and also many others including local MPs, Kent County Council, Ashford Council, etc.
Stratford International Station

Stratford international station was the subject of heavy lobbying by the Stratford Promoter Group, particularly Newham Council, from the late 1980s after BR announced in 1989 that the second London Terminal would be in King’s Cross. At the time, the concentration of development benefits which the Newham Council long sought had shifted to Stratford after they lost control of docklands to the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). Following these developments, the Council sought to exploit transport improvements as a strategic planning instrument to counter the downturn in the property market experienced since the 1980s. They believed that an international station located in Stratford would attract more investment to the locality and even the region – a conclusion not shared by the Pieda Study (1991). The Pieda Study suggested that a considerable investment from the public sector in the wider Stratford and Lea Valley area was a necessary condition to bring development benefits. In this sense, the consultants argued that the development impacts of the high-speed railway were being overstated and that the further development benefits, if any, should be credited to the Government’s wider urban regeneration investments (as in the case of the Kings Cross regeneration proposals).

Since 2005 Olympic development at Stratford City (see Figure 4.10) has become one of the overriding objectives, as have the associated developments at Stratford International. After the announcement of 2012 London Olympics in 2005, the planning power was handed over to the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA). The reprioritisation of project programme caused by the Olympic development and the planning power intervention in Stratford City decision-making have had significant impacts on the allocation of planning, political, and financial resources which further affect the nature of the Stratford
City regeneration scheme and the operation of Stratford International. The related issues are described in detail in Chapter 6.

It was argued that international services calling at Stratford would add eight minutes to the journey time between London and Paris (stopping only 7 minutes after leaving St Pancras) and that this undermined journey time improvements of Eurostar services. This could lead to the use of Stratford International station being confined to domestic services (HST Impact Study Consortium, 2008: 24). This, it has been claimed, would repeat some of the same drawbacks experienced with Ashford International where the investment in the station area became undermined by changes to train operations. The impacts of revoking the original plan for the international service trains calling at Stratford International could thus severely undermine value to investors. This claim that Stratford International could be a ‘white elephant’ has been a prominent topic in the interview data from the pre-hypothesis investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Stratford International Station is a white elephant”).

What can be concluded at this stage is that CTRL (i.e. a MUTP) alone cannot be regarded as the sole contributory factor generating urban development, but that it is certain to play a role as an agent to stimulate other investments and developments in the associated areas of the project. Context-specific discussions concerning the CTRL case and development at its hubs, as addressed in the following two chapters (see Chapters 5 and 6), illustrate this conclusion. Although some believe, according to the interview data, that the development of an international station in Stratford is of little consequence (since the urban regeneration will happen anyway), it is worth noting that the CTRL project provided an impetus for people in Newham to embark on building a supportive local business environment with the assistance of many urban regeneration schemes, such as the Stratford City Challenge45.

An interviewee offered views on the role played by the CTRL project as the catalyst for urban regeneration:

“CTRL is primarily a catalyst for the regeneration which is taking place here in King’s Cross and Stratford and further east through the Thames Gateway. This is a catalyst project with 3 objectives: providing international train travel, to improve commuting train travel from Kent, and to provide a catalyst for regeneration.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a private sector developer, 11/06/2008)

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45 According to Roberts (2000: 31), City Challenge, introduced in May 1991, was a regeneration fund “invited local authorities to bid for funds in partnership with other public sector, private and voluntary bodies.”
Figure 4.10: Stratford City in the 2012 London Olympic Context

Source: Author, the image was edited from Westfield Stratford Shopping Centre website available at: http://uk.westfield.com/stratfordcity/vision/olympic-context/ [Accessed on 14/03/2011]

4.4 Visions and Sustainability of the High-Speed Railway Network

The urban regeneration developments and opportunities at the four hubs (St Pancras, Stratford, Ebbsfleet, and Ashford) each present very different experiences. Both the King’s Cross Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes are part of the concession agreement to attract private sector involvement through PFI financing mechanisms. The impacts of the CTRL project on sustainable urban regeneration and the achievements of sustainability visions of the high-speed railway network in the UK are illustrated in the following two sections. They include the explorations of the political promises on economic growth which are suggested will be stimulated by the CTRL. Also, the observations of the expected contributions to sustainability by the future high-speed railway network that are currently under scrutiny will enhance our understanding of the anatomy of project discourses and negotiation powers among the stakeholders.

4.4.1 Impacts and legacy of the CTRL project

While it is commonly presumed that the construction of a major fast train rail link can bring with it positive economic growth to its station areas, the cases at St Pancras and Stratford present very different experiences. Not every impact of urban regeneration can be assessed in monetary terms; nevertheless, several official studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s attempted to use monetary measures as a principal basis to inform their decision. These were commissioned by BR in circumstance when evidence-based justifications for the project were desperately required to convince the Treasury and the Secretary of State for Transport for the cases made46.

46 Reports referred to this section are: a) The Channel Tunnel High Speed Link And Terminal: Is There A Commercial Option?
The impacts of the CTRL project on sustainable urban regeneration are categorised as the follows: employment, land value, sustainability, drivers of urban regeneration delivery and investment:

**Employment**
The Pieda’s Report (1991) argued that, although the easterly CTRL approach schemes predicted an enhancement of employment opportunities, it saw the future provision of development-related employment creation mainly in terms of a redistribution of economic activity in Kent and London, rather than the creation of new job opportunities.

**Land value**
Whether land values or property developments have increased because of the CTRL station development at King’s Cross and Stratford remains a controversial issue. The argument presented by some is that the development of the King’s Cross Railway Lands have long been planned and that the delayed decision of the London CTRL Terminal, if anything, had blighted the progress of the King’s Cross development for many years with the result that property owners have experienced difficulty in deciding what to do with their assets. With these missed deadlines and opportunities, and the subsequent rising costs, the interviewees who support this point of view see things very differently from those who argue that the CTRL has acted as a development stimulus. As regards to Stratford, the difference in land values of areas around the station before and after the international station was announced is far more obvious. In large part, this is because of its initial lower land values and because of the 2012 London Olympic Games investment pouring into this area. It is thus very hard to distinguish which factor is more influential in raising the property values. What is clear is that the increases on the scale predicted could not have been achieved in the absence of the CTRL and an international mega event such as the Olympics.

**Sustainability**
Sustainability as a vision and as a basis for a development agenda has become a *lingua franca* in recent years for a very wide range of development initiatives in the UK and wider afield, including for community development, infrastructure development and regeneration schemes. The Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) Planning Awards for 2008 included an award for the performance of the

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CTRL project as a key facilitator of sustainable urban development. Its contribution to heritage conservation has been especially noted in the Kings Cross area, particularly the rebirth of Barlow’s Grade 1 listed St Pancras Station. Other mentioned contributions include the promotion of environmental sensitivity in the CTRL code of construction practices, including spoil disposal strategy, measures to mitigate noise, and creation of wildlife habitat. This involved imposing the concept of not introducing worse environmental standards than exist at present (NEWT) and employing a baseline design assessed on these terms in the Environmental Statement (see RTPI 2009: 3, 34). Here the sustainability credits assigned to the CTRL project merely focus on environmental aspects and are narrower than the project’s declared objectives, which also include social and economic perspectives. The question of whether the CTRL project has actually complied with its sustainable development targets, rather than merely using sustainability rhetoric for marketing purposes, requires further investigation in order to secure more solid evidence.

Drivers of urban regeneration delivery

The goal of providing a regeneration stimulus to its surrounding areas has been at the core of the CTRL’s development objectives in recent decades. As already mentioned, this aim is particularly significant to the Thames Gateway, as Michael Heseltine, Professor Sir Peter Hall, the Stratford Promoter Group, and many other champions of the project have long argued. The RTPI Judges suggested that the regeneration benefits brought by the project are significant not only for the Thames Corridor but also for North Kent. They also applauded the fact that the CTRL was mentioned by the Olympic International Committee as a favourable contributing factor that led to the UK winning the right to host the 2012 Olympic Games. However, the assessment undertaken by Pieda in 1990 indicated that regeneration gains are attributable to any of the proposed route options. Although the Pieda Study did conclude that the easterly approach schemes (favoured by Ove Arup and Rail-Europe) have more opportunities in assisting urban regeneration by enhancing the property value, it further depreciated the significance of the construction of the Rail Link for the East Thames Corridor (as discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis). Notwithstanding the vagueness of the urban regeneration benefits and the difficulty of expressing the benefits in monetary terms that could be captured directly by the Rail Link operator, the regeneration benefits became an essential component of the public spending justification during the financial restructuring in 1998. Despite the time that has elapsed since this period, there remains a continuing debate on the criteria that should be considered when scrutinising a mega project such as CTRL (see Dimitriou, 2010).

Positive legacy of the CTRL project development

Aspects of the CTRL project offer a positive legacy and lessons that could be emulated by future projects. For example, the high degree of partnership engagement between the developers and the
other CTRL stakeholders (notably, the other 25 local authorities along the route) received much attention. The RTPI Judge’s report concluded that this partnership (between Central Government, Local Government, and the private sector) was the key to making the project a “success”. The extent to which public consultation and involvement had been encouraged along the route, especially with residents around St Pancras station, had attracted much support. Once again, the RTPI Judges were especially impressed by the capacity and commitment of the team when dealing with efforts to accommodate the people’s concerns about the project’s development.

4.4.2 Visions of the UK high-speed railway network

The financing arrangements were unprecedented and considered as effective for securing the CTRL project (see Bayley, 2003). Bayley (2003) argues that it can offer a template for future PFI/PPP projects for MUTPs, especially the later innovative mechanisms, concerning:

- the segregation of the construction and revenue risks;
- implementing the project in phases;
- the introduction of a cost overrun protection programme; and
- the special-purpose vehicle, which rescued the project in three restructuring efforts.

Following the completion of the CTRL, an impetus emerged for the development of a High Speed Rail Network in the United Kingdom. This idea was actually implied in Section 40 of the Channel Tunnel Act (1987), which required BR to produce a plan (by the end of 1989) showing how it intended to secure the provision of international rail services to various parts of the UK. This ‘regional service’ role, however, has never been fully exploited by the provision of a direct link between the CTRL and cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, and Edinburgh. Related to the previous section, the same criticism was raised in the responses to the pre-hypothesis interview which indicates that political promises are likely to become rhetoric on the basis of narratives for building a more attractive business case. BR’s proposed through service was largely seen as nothing more than a tantalising gesture and a means of gaining support. One of the interviewees points out that:

“At the time, there was much opposition from the North of England, Scotland, and Wales against the high-speed railway construction unless it provided services for the whole of the country. So British Rail were required to produce a proposal for through services, which they were not prepared to do. The hypocrisy of pretending that there would be high-speed services for the rest of the country locked-in the decision to have the station at King’s Cross/St Pancras. This is a sub-optimal solution, and it provides an example of path dependency. The intention behind this promise is derived from the
property development potential of the King’s Cross derelict railway lands.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a person from the local community group, 12/06/2008)

Figure 4.11: The Five Proposed Routes for High-Speed Railway Network

Source: Greenguage 21(2007: 4)

The lobby group Greengauge 21 launched a study in 2007 to investigate the feasibility and potential for five high-speed lines across the UK (see Figure 4.11). This formed the starting point of a study commissioned by Greengauge 21 and Birmingham City Council and undertaken by Steer Davies Gleave in 2008 (see Greengauge 21, 2009) to look at a second high-speed rail line in Britain along the North West Corridor, which would connect the centre of London with the centre of Birmingham and with the North West. This study argues that the new project has the potential to deliver significant benefits to the national economy, and contribute significantly to the regeneration of Birmingham and the West Midlands.

This so-called ‘High Speed Two’ project is estimated to cost £32.7 billion (in 2011 prices) and would give access to Heathrow international airport for the whole country. The competition between air and high-speed rail has in recent years become more intense in Britain, especially given the recent fuel price changes (in 2007/2008). This increased interest in a national high-speed rail network has put extra pressure on aviation companies both in terms of domestic movements and fast and easy access to

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47 These include from London to Manchester via Birmingham, London to the North East via Cambridge, London to Cardiff and Trans-Pennine and Anglo-Scottish routes.
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

the country’s main international airports. The Government gave go-ahead to the High Speed 2 project (Figure 4.12) on 10th January 2012. The first phase (about £16.4 billion) from London to Birmingham is expected to be completed in 2026. The second phase, taking High Speed 2 to Manchester and Leeds is expected to be completed in 2032/33. The Government estimates that the new high-speed railway can generate economic benefits of £47 billion and fare revenues of £34 billion over 60 years. It also asserts that the completion of High Speed 2 will bring significant additional wider economic benefits as it will enable businesses to operate more efficiently. The value of these additional benefits is projected to be approximately £6 billion to £12 billion. However, the Government also notes that there are also additional drawbacks, such as the impact on the natural landscape, which is difficult to be quantified.

Figure 4.12: The High Speed 2 Network

Source: DfT (2012: 15)

In terms of long-haul international flights served by Heathrow Airport, it is argued by advocates of the proposed expansion of the high-speed rail network that providing fast and efficient train access to
Heathrow would reinforce its value. This raises broader questions as to whether faster and bigger transport projects are an inevitable phenomenon of our long-term future, and if so, which modes of transport best meet the transport challenges in terms of financial and environmental costs. The expansion of an airport means more flights and more disturbances to the surrounding neighbourhoods, as well as more carbon emissions. In the case of high-speed rail links, the more that are built, the more blight they will cause along their corridors. Given these circumstances, it is important to identify whether there are alternatives available to MUTPs of this kind, and if so, whether MUTP advocates can accept them as part of their development agenda for a sustainable future.

4.5 Decision-Making Process and Negotiation Powers

Section 4.5 describes issues raised by the restructuring of the CTRL finances. It focuses on the root causes of the project’s financial crisis in 1996, which almost sabotaged the entire project. It examines how ‘solutions’ were arrived at and the justification for the three attempts48 to restructure finances in order to restore viability to the project. This examination demonstrates the significance of the political champions, their negotiation powers, and the institutional arrangements that impact on the decision-making process. In retrospect it is very clear that the Government backing, particularly as provided by John Prescott, had a pivotal role in the delivery of the project.

4.5.1 Political champions

As a result of conflicting agendas from different stakeholders (see Section 4.1.2), the lengthy and complicated route and terminal selection process can well represent the influence of the political champions. Political support from the highest level of government is required to make mega projects happen because of their financial scale and high risk profile. Often the private sector is unable and unwilling to tackle them alone. There is much evidence to suggest that individual political champions of MUTPs are also a vital constituent to driving a project forward (see OMEGA Centre, 2008). In the case of the CTRL project, for example, under a Conservative government Michael Heseltine’s involvement was critical in deciding the alignment of the CTRL in 1980s. Later under the Labour administration John Prescott was subsequently important, particularly after he became convinced by the Newham lobby group of the merits of an international station at Stratford.

Gourvish (2002: 340) argued that the prolonged CTRL project delivery could be blamed on the government’s attitude. The government at the time struggled to appease opposing interests in Kent, South-East London, and the Regions; in fact the authors suggest that their response appeared to

48 There were three times financing restructuring. They were in 1998, 2001, and 2002.
produce further difficulties. The political benefits of the project seemed to be obscure and the risks hard to ameliorate. This led to an increased reliance on further consultancy studies, which grew more numerous and led to much more time and resources spent on preparations. This issue was confirmed by the findings of the OMEGA pilot study Hypothesis 2 Question #14 (Wright, 2008). However, the more appraisals that took place, the more the financial viability of the project was presented in pessimistic terms. According to the evidence derived from the hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 5, ORQ #2), this prolongation of CTRL delivery was ultimately overcome by a bold, visionary political commitment, and substantial political influence was generated as a result of the project breakthroughs. This was despite studies which argued that the CTRL project did not have a positive business case as diagnosed by conventional appraisal methods. Later, when the project was confronted with its financial crisis in 1996, the evidence-based forecasts were shown to be unreliable and led to political vision overriding economic rationalism (see Dimitriou et al., 2008). The hypothesis-led investigations of Hypothesis-related Research Question (HRQ) #3 also supports this finding on the dominating influence of political power over the rationality of technocrats in mega project decision-making. Here are some quotations from the interviewees responding to HRQ #3:

“Political output is a dominant concern and far more influential than the cost that it takes to deliver that outcome.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a private sector developer, 13/08/2008)

“Without political buy-in and delivery of that project, it is not going to happen irrespective of whether it is a fantastic idea or technical requirement.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the government agency, 13/08/2008)

“The political decision might be based on something that isn’t proven in that kind of rational way, but politically it is a good idea.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

This raises the issue of appraisal criteria for assessing MUTPS and this is addressed below in the section on “Financing arrangements”. Over and above these challenges, indecision over the CTRL route and terminal selection added to the uncertainty surrounding the project and had a major impact on the King’s Cross Railway Lands development, as examined in the next chapter.

4.5.2 Political power and institutional arrangements

This section describes how the CTRL financial arrangement overrode the government’s ideological aversion to public funding, how the role and the political power of the public and private sectors changed over time, and the lessons learned from the CTRL for future institutional arrangements for MUTPs.
Over-optimistic forecasts
The CTRL financing arrangements presented in 1998 complied with the Private Financial Initiative (PFI) mechanisms introduced by the Government of the time which believed that the risks inherent in large-scale infrastructure projects would be better managed by the public, rather than private, sector. Looking back\(^{49}\), when the Government announced the launch of the competition for the CTRL tender, two specific criteria were laid down to assess the qualification of the candidates. The first was the amount of the Government grant required by the bidder. The second was the willingness of the private sector to take on the financial risk that the project posed. In this sense, according to Faith (2007: 157), the amount of direct grants proposed in the LCR bid was closely related to its forecast of Eurostar UK revenues, which were subsequently (in 1996) proven to be over-optimistic. In retrospect, not only were the traffic forecasts by Eurostar UK inaccurate, but so were those made by the consultants and issued by the Government to potential bidders (see Figure 4.13). The forecasts of passenger traffic were grossly in excess of the actual number when in operation, which was unavoidable to some extent given the unforeseen deregulation of air travel and the subsequent emergence of the low-cost airlines, which had a major impact on the market share that rail had been forecast to attract (Pollalis, 2006: 8, 10). The factors of over-optimistic forecasts in mega-project development are addressed in an earlier chapter of this thesis (see Chapter 2, the discussion of the works of Peter Hall, Harry Dimitriou, and Flyvbjerg et al.).

Figure 4.13: Planned vs. Actual Passenger Traffic for Eurostar


Unconventional concession contract
With over-optimistic passenger forecasts and the evidence that actual revenues of Waterloo-based

\(^{49}\) On 29th February 1996, LCR was announced the winner to build the Link and operate Eurostar UK under a 999 year concession. The legal title to the rail link - held by the Government - signed over a 90-year lease to LCR, ending in 2086.
Eurostar UK were growing far slower than projected (see Figure 4.13), the CTRL project was no longer seen as a good investment by the private sector. In 1996 LCR found it was unable to raise the financing needed from the private sector to construct the line and operate Eurostar UK (NAO 2001: 11) with the result that it sought and received government support in the form of guaranteed bonds. This experience embodies lessons for the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) financial arrangement between the Government and the consortium. Professor Pollalis at the Harvard Design School identified three unconventional terms in this contract that highlighted the risk transfer-pathway, as follows (Pollalis, 2006: 7-8):

- The developer was given the ownership of Union Railways Limited and its 100-person team, which had worked on the CTRL project from its inception. Hence, the continuity of the team meant that the direct access to substantial intellectual capital and the capacity to deal with the interface that this project had to confront was maintained. One of the interviewees in pre-hypothesis investigations addressed the same issue and stressed the importance of continuity in staffing and institutionalised knowledge (see Appendix 4 under the topic “Institutionalise knowledge”).

- It granted large areas of land and buildings to LCR, mainly at King’s Cross and Stratford, which offered development opportunities. This is echoed by the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations, which highlight that the convergence of interests that forms around these projects is a leading dimension of these major developments. This coalition is mostly constituted by politicians and developers, and, as found in the literature review (Chapter 2), authorities are often proactive in providing developers a ‘convenient’ regulatory environment (Janelle and Beuthe, 1997).

- It combined the CTRL project and the operation of Eurostar UK. This was the most influential term of the concession. This is claimed by Pollalis to be the first public-private partnership deal to include an operating business in loss, which, as a result of the poor performance of Eurostar UK, forced the 1998 financial rearrangement.

One of the motives behind the PFI mechanism, which was designed to deliver mega projects, was the jaundiced view towards nationalised industry. Gourvish (2002) argued that the Treasury held the most negative attitude towards the capability of nationalised industry to manage large-scale projects. According to the findings from both of the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 8, Table A8.13), these circumstances, including the public’s lack of trust in less-powerful local authorities, have in turn created an adversarial culture surrounding mega projects. The challenge to the developers is then how to breakdown this mistrust and suspicion. One of the statements from an interviewee highlights the expectation of a gap between mega-project promises and reality:
“David Cameron said he wants High Speed 2 and this is about selling the political vision. It hits a lot of buttons, quite clever. There is always going to be a gap but I think the gap is around what is needed to sell the projects, to make sure that they happen.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

On this basis, it then argued that large-scale investment is inherently risky for both public and private sectors where flawed investment appraisals were all too familiar (Gourvish, 2002). The CTRL experience has shown that the Government intervention and strong monetary backup were key elements contributing to the project’s completion. This finding supports the theories of (Healey, 1994) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) who claim that governmental intervention play significant role in mega project development (also see Chapter 2). Thus, the roles of the public and private sectors need to be redefined in terms of handling major investment in such projects.

**Best negotiation position for risk transferring**

In the original financial arrangement for the CTRL prior to 1998, the financial risk was planned to be transferred from the Government to the private sector. Initially, LCR intended to raise the required funding (about £800 million), from the London Stock Exchange through an Initial Public Offering (IPO). According to Pollalis (2006: 10), this showed LCR’s attempt to transfer the risk of the CTRL operations to the investors in the stock market. However, the financial restructuring changed LCR’s original idea of risk transfer to the new financial arrangement whereby it separated the risk of Eurostar’s performance and the risk of the rail link construction into different strands. By this arrangement, the risk of Eurostar’s performance was shared by InterCapital and Regional Railways Limited (ICRR), whose shareholders are National Express Group, SNCF, SNCB, and British Airways (see Table 4.2).

The other strand of risk was generated from the construction work and was shared by Railtrack (a new organisation, ostensibly a private company but set up entirely with public funds in 1994), which took up the responsibilities of the infrastructure assets of BR (i.e. rail network, stations and associated lands). The entire CTRL project was phased into two sections in order to enable Railtrack to contribute to the project according to phases. By these arrangements, Railtrack agreed to purchase Section 1 of the Link at a price linked to the actual construction cost. It also opened the option for Railtrack to purchase Section 2. Although these arrangements gave Railtrack the incentives for purchasing Section 2, they did not exercise this option, and in 2002 withdrew altogether from the project following the entry of its subsidiary, Railway Plc, into administration. During the pre-hypothesis interview, one of the interviewees revealed that Railtrack exploited the CTRL’s financial crisis and attempted to extract a better deal from the Government, as quoted below:
“When Railtrack was invited to participate in the arrangement to buy the railway, they clearly saw that they were in a very advantageous position in negotiating the terms. They certainly exploited that situation. Again when it came to putting in place arrangements to proceed with Section 2, Railtrack were reluctant to concede that they were not able to exercise their option and again attempted to extract from the government a revised better deal which government assessed to be completely unacceptable to them.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a private sector developer, 11/06/2008)

This Railtrack instance aligns with the theories of ‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962) and ‘path dependency’ (Pierson, 2000) which suggest that crises and major problems can sometimes in fact trigger opportunities (see Chapter 2).

**Table 4.2: Shareholdings in Inter-Capital and Regional Rail (ICRR)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Percentage shareholding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Express Group*</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF*</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCB</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Airways</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NEG and SNCF are also shareholders in LCR

Source: NAO (2001: 18), Figure 9

With the under-performance of Eurostar UK, the project came under pressure from negative public opinion and failed to secure project investment from the private sector. This led to the potential regeneration benefits associated with the project emerging as an important economic justification for this project during the government’s appraisal as part of the 1998 financial restructuring. In 2001, the Treasury conducted a new appraisal of the costs and benefits of Section 2 which embraced regeneration benefits as one of the economic justifications for the project, thereby moving the goalposts of rail project appraisal in the UK (unlike in France, where this has long been standard practice). The potential achievement of regeneration benefits have since been consistently promoted by Government as a key indicator of the success of the CTRL project with associated schemes mainly in the Thames Gateway and the lands surrounded the international stations at St Pancras, Stratford, and Ebbsfleet (NAO, 2006: 5). Similar arguments have been advanced to justify the London Olympic Games and, according to the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations, the regeneration benefits are the major point in promoting the Games, although many argue that such benefits are
marginal whilst others insist that the future benefits of the Olympic legacy cannot be overstated. Since 2008, with the continuing economic downturn in the UK, these potential gains also are regarded as over optimistic.

The core of this restructured agreement (based on the Government guaranteed bonds) meant that the taxpayer was subsequently exposed to considerable financial risk if Eurostar UK did not perform as well as expected against the revised forecasts. Myddelton (2007) criticised the excessive Government subsidy (reported to be at least £3 billion) on the grounds that it contradicted the zero government spending idea of a ‘fully commercial’ project (Myddelton, 2007: 152).

In summary, it is clear that the risk of the CTRL project was not genuinely transferred from the public to the private sector, nor was risk optimally shared according to the declared PFI financing mechanism in this project. Wolmar (2005) argues that there is a very inaccurate perception of the PFI or PPP mechanism. In this regard, Bing et al. (2005) claimed that PPP should not be seen as a device for finding “new money” for investment in public services, but instead should be expected to improve efficiency or creativity for delivering services, and in this sense it sees the investment of public funds in the CTRL as misconceived. The literature review (Chapter 2) showed that mega projects are often recognised as projects of national significance and, as such, attract special planning, as well as a different level of institutional, and financial resources. Prioritisation processes frequently favour the promotion of high profile mega projects and are likely to be locked into the path in which any cancellation option carries unacceptable financial and political consequences. The findings of the hypothesis-led research suggest that in the UK, neither the technocrats nor the politicians has absolute power in decision-making for major infrastructure investments largely because they are constrained by financial realities. Inevitably, taxpayers are the ultimate risk-takers.

4.6 Hypothesis Testing and Theoretical Insights

This section brings together findings from the commentary above, the literature review of the projects and both strands of field based research, in order to test the hypotheses and address the overall questions posed at the outset of the study (Section 4.6.1). Section 4.6.2 covers insights into theory and new issues emerging from this case study investigation.
4.6.1 Testing findings against hypotheses

**HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs**

Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and ME developments associated with its transport hubs.

This first hypothesis is based on the premise that MUTPs such as the CTRL have the potential to act as significant agents for the delivery of both sustainable urban regeneration and mega events such as the Olympic Games, and that while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTPs and sustainable urban regeneration developments, this is very much dependent upon the institutional collaboration among the various parties and the frameworks in place to facilitate such coordination. The follow-on hypothesis is that the CTRL as a catalyst offers specific opportunities for both sustainable urban regeneration and mega event development associated with its transport hubs.

According to the literature review of the CTRL project in this chapter, the positive evidence for proving that the CTRL is an effective vehicle for sustainable urban regeneration and mega events remains elusive. Based on Chapter 2, this premise should be accompanied by other conditions, such as vast public investment in other infrastructure and facilities which can entice investors to inject cash into the regeneration area, thereby making the area attractive to businesses and residents alike.

The findings of the hypothesis-led investigations reveal a widespread perception, that in reality, the operational meaning of sustainable development and public engagement remains ‘fuzzy’, imprecise and ill-defined, though much propelled by rhetoric, particularly as it pertains to the King’s Cross Central and Stratford City schemes (see Appendix 4 under the topic “Property-oriented development” and Appendix 5 for summary responses to HRQ #2). The pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations revealed that profit-driven MUTP developments often strain the credibility of claims made by the government and subsequently reduce the confidence of the public toward sustainable urban regeneration projects. This perception that there is more rhetoric than reality in efforts to achieve sustainability was confirmed by a number of respondents to both the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led enquiries (see Appendix 4 under the topic “Rhetoric and political promises” and Appendix 5, HRQ #8). The following quote is an example of this claim:

"The vision of sustainability was not a strong driver, although it did help the narrative around the
As regards the 2012 London Olympics, because the initial agenda of the CTRL had never considered a role as a facilitator for a mega event such as the Olympic Games, the role of the CTRL in the Games is viewed more as an opportunity. In this regard, the CTRL project (as a project that strengthened the London Bid) was fortuitous for the Olympic bid being ‘in the right place at the right time’ rather than strategically planned with the event in mind. This view was reflected in the responses to HRQ #1 in hypothesis-led investigation and the findings on ‘window of opportunity’ in pre-hypothesis investigation undertaken in connections with this research.

The 2012 London Olympics appeared to take advantage of the introduction of the high-speed rail link to Stratford. It is suggested by many interviewees that the existence of the CTRL project was a determining factor for London to become the host city of the 2012 Olympic Games. Mega events are often seen as opportunistic. Here the Olympics were developed and created on the foundation of available site and a major transport link. These points are illustrated by selected quotes from the interviewees:

"As far as the mega events, they are quite often opportunistic. They see an opportunity has been created by having the site and the big transport link and they ride on the back of that.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from local authority, 23/07/2008)

"The high-speed railway station at Stratford triggered a chain reaction. The Stratford International Station helped the decision made about the Games. Then the Olympics helped to speed up other projects and gave certainty to the Stratford City development.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the Olympic Delivery Authority, 31/07/2008)

**HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political Decision**

Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration and mega event schemes.

This hypothesis states that the institutional arrangements which provide the delivery framework for mega projects are dependent upon the power relations that safeguard the decision-makers’ agenda, and that these are ultimately the most significant factors influencing the delivery and performance of mega
projects. This argument was reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigation which showed that political power overrides other concerns but that the power of the rationality of technocrats cannot be neglected either (see Appendix 5, HRQ #3). One of the interviewees stated that:

“Political decisions are vulnerable to global economic forces and the perception of a city’s image. Therefore these high-profile major projects are inter-connected with the highest level of strategic politics and political decisions where things like financial viability are secondary.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a community planner, 22/08/2008)

The dominance of these two types of power (i.e., the political power and the power of rationality of technocrats) periodically attributed these problems to the sectoralisation and privatisation of the railway industry in the 1980s. One could argue that these developments were reasons why opportunities to build the CTRL project earlier and at lower cost were squandered. Another conclusion from the case study review in this chapter is that the process of project tendering resulted in defaults on financing arrangements. Gourvish (2002) claims this outcome reflected the problems with the government’s public-private partnership mechanisms for the project, and on this basis urged that this kind of institutional arrangement should be re-assessed and re-defined. In commenting on power relations among the various mega project stakeholders, Gourvish claims that “many of the difficulties created by the Channel Tunnel project stemmed from political machinations and from the overblown expectations of the British regions that direct services would be viable” (Gourvish, 2002: 447). This was also reinforced by the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations. An example is shown below:

“CTRL has failed so far as something that is going to serve the regions in this country and yet it is all designed that you can just go straight from Stratford up to the North East, and to the North West without even stopping at St Pancras. … The promise of those regional connections to Europe is not delivered.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

Discussions relating to this perspective are seen to be associated with ‘wrangles’ within the negotiation process. Findings from this fieldwork (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Path-dependent behaviour” and Appendix 5, HRQ #3) reveal that project stakeholders did not feature as a countervailing force in the negotiations. Instead, some key players were dominant. In the case of the CTRL project in particular, the case study review suggests that the major stakeholders were locked into a series of agendas over the period of the development of the project. One of the path-dependent behaviours identified by the pre-hypothesis investigation is the legacy of the Thatcher government: privatisation. The ideology of privatisation appears to be a feature of the UK government’s culture and is reinforced by its institutional arrangements. Although there are doubts about the principle of no
public funding for the CTRL project, the new Labour government did not modify its predecessor’s policy. It is suggested that the concern was that there would be further delay if it were to be re-negotiate and re-tender the contract. Notwithstanding, the financial restructuring could be an opportunity to adjust the roles of the government and the developer

The Government’s commitment to deliver the CTRL project was sustained however and its negotiation power shifted over time as a result of changing agendas in Government policies. The regeneration discourse formed by the coordination between the CTRL project and the regeneration of the East Thames Corridor successfully facilitated Arup’s east route proposal and fulfilled the regeneration objectives of Kent County Council and Newham. This indicates that key project stakeholders adhered to the discourses set out in these various changing agendas with government commitments and political support they gained a better negotiation position over time. The discourse also positively affected the LRC’s proposal for the King’s Cross Railway Lands Redevelopment Plan. Camden Council, which is responsible for the King’s Cross Area Development, necessarily adjusted its attitudes to this new agenda with the purpose of sharing benefits derived from the mega regeneration project, namely reputation and prestige for the locality and the local authority. This is illustrated by quotations from hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations respectively:

“In the case of KXC project, a willing council who dedicated planning resources to the project and the developer who were prepared to play the lead role are two key factors.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from local authority, 23/07.2008)

“All they [the Camden Council] are getting are the things they got in Section 106 because they thought that was their job to agree what the developer proposed more or less. The Camden Council negotiated very poorly because the developers knew they will push and open the door.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a person from the local community group, 12/06/2008)

**HYPOTHESIS 3 – Synergy of Network**

Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.

While a full discussion on related issues is better offered at the end of this study (see Chapter 7), the preliminary conclusion from findings within this chapter suggests that in order to achieve sustainable development visions, consensus, and compromise needs to be achieved among the stakeholders of the
three categories of mega projects. This conclusion was reinforced by the hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 5 for summary responses to Hypothesis 3) as were the conclusions offered by the NETLIPSE Project (see Hertogh et al., 2008: 37) which indicates that “an open culture within and between project delivery organisations and with external parties and stakeholders is critical to the smooth progression of a scheme”. The interviewee reinforced the point that the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of a sustainable development vision can be concealed by saying that:

“There is little relationship [of the final project outcome] with the original aims because they always rely on people forgetting [what project promises have been made]. Some bits of [project outcomes] will be better and some will be worse. It depends on who gets the bits that are worse”. (Pre-hypothesis interview, a person from local community group, 12/06/2008)

The exploration in this chapter as well as from Chapter 2 show that the characteristics of many mega projects in the UK lead to a less conducive climate and a less constructive framework for achieving sustainable visions and public participation.

The CTRL project per se offered a window of opportunity which led to multiple project coordination. Once this window opened, many existing proposals congregated around it, including station area developments at Stratford, Ebbsfleet, and Thames Gateway. These proposals have long been planned but they linked themselves to the CTRL project and became part of the agenda. This mutual aggrandisement between the CTRL project and its associated developments formed a better business proposition as a whole package. With all the stakeholders eager to share in the opportunity, they made a lot of political noises as they began positioning themselves. Similar to the concept of the ‘window of opportunity’, one of the interviewees indicated that the major project development relies heavily on the ‘planetary alignment’ concept which requires that all the components of the project are correctly positioned in time and space. It implies that the major project developments also need the elements of both serendipity and planning.

**HYPOTHESIS 4 – Discourse Power**

Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas.
The review of the case study suggests that there is a delicate balance between the effectiveness of institutional arrangements to control the delivery of mega projects and the mobility of power relations for decision-makers to retain the efficiency of the stakeholder network.

In accordance with the hypothesis the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations reveal that the CTRL case was bounded with several different discourses over time but also suggested that it is the nature of business (see Appendix 5 for summary responses to Hypothesis #4). The transformation patterns of these discourses depended very much on the changes in Government’s policies and its project agenda for the CTRL. One of the early key stakeholders for the project was its delivery organisation (namely British Rail), which was responsible for establishing a framework that conformed to government policies, and was consistent with the PPP mechanism at the time. As observed earlier in this chapter, the agenda of the CTRL project delivery changed from an obligation of the Channel Tunnel agreement with the French to one that sought to fulfil the demands of transport capacity, the engagement of the private sector for investment, the coordination of property development and station development, the striving for public funding by improving commuter services, and the regeneration of the East Thames Corridor. What may be observed from the returns to the hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Changing the discourse”) is that the substance of the MUTP discourse for the CTRL consisted of all these agendas having different impacts in different places over different periods throughout the project timeline (see Table 4.1). It is evident that the institutional arrangements and associated political powers were both essential and mutually reinforcing elements to strengthen mega project discourses.

One type of mega-project discourse cited in this set of findings is the coalitions of leading local businessmen and politicians who market mega projects based on the belief that what is good for business is good for all. Several respondents to the pre-hypothesis investigations suggested that in reality these entrepreneurs neglect (or choose to overlook) the negative social impacts caused by many such projects, especially on disadvantaged groups in the project neighbourhoods.

4.6.2 Discussion

The previous section contained an examination of the four hypotheses posted in this thesis. It presents the corroborating and conflicting evidence relating to these premises, and this is covered in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6.

There are several insights into theoretical concepts and issues that have emerged from the investigation of the CTRL project. These are described below:
Flexibility is a prerequisite for mega projects to adapt to the changing political agendas

Looking back at the CTRL’s project timeline (Table 4.1), Governments changed their agendas on several occasions throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

- Initially, the Government was pressured to build a link which could fulfil the agreement with the French to accommodate the traffic generated by the Channel Tunnel.
- The Kent Impact Study published by Kent County Council in 1987 then proved that there was the necessity for a high-speed link to serve the increasing demands.
- Before 1988, the justification for the project was essentially transport-oriented and mainly based on efforts to improve the traffic capacity in order to meet the forecast passenger numbers.
- By 1989, the Government was keen to have private investment involved in the project and even speeded up the King’s Cross lower-level terminus decision (Faith, 2007: 150).
- Subsequently, in 1990, the commuter benefits received greater attention because BR wanted to convince the Government of the need for releasing a subsidy.
- Later, the urban regeneration benefits emerged as highly significant, especially in the Thames Gateway, and consequently around the station areas.

One of the interviewees in hypothesis-led investigations claimed that:

“Overall, there is constant strategic allocation of resources between projects, which depends on their scale, stage of progress and their position on the political agenda. As the result of a combination of strategic and political alterations, these resource allocations are not static but change over time.”

(Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

This behaviour fits the theory of ‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Lindblom, 1959) in that this research reveals that policies associated with mega project development are continuously adjusted as new crises or major problems occur, and as contextual changes come about (see Chapter 2).

Loss of value of the mega projects stemming from the time lags involved

The original purpose of the CTRL project was to connect London and the Continent so as to enhance commercial and economic benefits across Europe. Because the CTRL project is part of the trans-European transport network, the delay of the CTRL project decision-making at the planning stage (1971-1996) not only increased the cost of the project but also led to a diminution of the overall (trans-European transport network) project value. This may also be the case for the Britain’s high-speed railway network. The plan for High Speed Two - the national high-speed link from London to the north of England - is still in its infancy and battle lines have been drawn between those in support
of the project and the wider vision of a national fast train network and those against. High Speed Two is proposed for the early 2020s, in which case its advocates argue that work would need to commence immediately. As already indicated, the high-speed rail campaign group (Greengauge 21) have argued extensively that the high-speed rail network is imperative for the country’s economy and that it can, by substitution of mode, do much to assist in reducing carbon emission from other forms of transport. Its proponents argue that the urgency of the project means that the lengthy approval process of the current planning system needs to be radically overhauled if it is to deliver speedy and efficient decisions on its implementation. This topic has been long-debated with the result that in 2007 the Government proposed the establishment of a new Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC)\(^5\) to provide a streamlined planning process that would speed-up the planning process of mega infrastructure projects of all kinds (see HM Government, 2007). This proposal (now implemented) however, attracted considerable criticism on the grounds that the resultant speeded-up approval process would remove certain planning powers from local authorities, erode local democracy, and undermine the Government’s decentralisation agenda.

The Killian Pretty Review of 2008 sought to investigate opportunities for improving the planning application process of all critical major infrastructure projects. It made a number of very broad-brush recommendations, (see Killian and Pretty, 2008) as follows:

- make the planning process of national critical mega projects more proportionate;
- make the planning process of national critical mega projects more effective;
- improve stakeholder engagement and public consultation;
- clarify the role of Council members;
- ensure developments meet the needs of the whole community;
- achieve changes in culture to provide incentives for better quality applications; and
- remove unnecessary complexity in the planning policy and legislative framework.

The government’s response to these recommendations (see DCLG provided in March 2009) defended the perspective that people are sceptical about the level of democracy involved in the new planning system but stressed the importance of the IPC working with stakeholders so that a way to provide a genuinely streamlined process that is practicable, fair, and transparent to all parties can be found. A new Planning Partnership guide to speed up new large-scale developments was published in June

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\(^5\) The IPC began operating on 1st October 2009 as the examining and decision-making body for proposed nationally significant infrastructure projects in the UK. Following the General Election of May 2010, the Coalition Government intends to abolish IPC consenting through the Decentralisation and Localism Bill. The IPC will become a Major Infrastructure Unit (MIU) within the Planning Inspectorate. If the Bill comes into force, it is proposed that the MIU will be given power to administer applications for mega infrastructure development from April 2012. (Source: IPC website: [http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/](http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/) Accessed: 29/09/2010)
2008 by the Planning Minister, while up to date developments suggest that the future destiny of the IPC under a new political administration may be a little different to that initially expected under New Labour. Here, the significance of institutional arrangements, which determine patterns of mega-project decision-making and stakeholder power relations, echoes Healey’s (1994) view on the actors’ interrelationships (see Chapter 2). The policy intervention for more efficient mega-project development is also stressed by the works of Healey (1994) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999).

**Unintended consequences of CTRL decisions**

The detailed examination of the CTRL project reveals several decisions that led to problematic unintended consequences for the later development of the CTRL:

The first of these problems was the much-debated decision over tender selection scrutiny, particularly the highly optimistic passenger number forecasts (see Section 4.5.2). It is very common that revenue forecasts for start-up businesses are subject to great uncertainty and risk and yet the forecasts were afforded too much credibility in the decision-making process and there was little or no attention to contingency planning which led to bouts of crisis management at a later date.

The second of the problems concerned Eurostar’s announcement on switching their international services to Ebbsfleet in 1996, which greatly upset many local MPs and business groups in and around Ashford who had invested heavily on the clear understanding that an international train service would be provided. This dramatically illustrated to stakeholders the critical difference between the provision of infrastructure and the provision services using that infrastructure, and the difficulties that stem from each being the responsibility of separate independent enterprises. How Eurostar and the Government respond to the problems resulting from this change of commitment has yet to be resolved.

The third problem relates to the consequences of re-routing of the CTRL terminus to St. Pancras away from Waterloo Station. Maintaining a balance between the rationale of needing to operate the high-speed train business and the interests of local communities and businesses around stations has proven an extremely difficult challenge. The outcomes of the newly published masterplan for the Waterloo Opportunity Area (see Figures 4.8 and 4.9) and whether this regeneration programme is as appealing as the international stations has yet to be tested.

These three consequences partly resulted from what Hall (1980) and Flyvbjerg *et al.* (2003) criticised as ‘over-optimism’ about economic benefits that can be derived from mega-project development (see Chapter 2).
High-speed railway network represents challenges and opportunities for green infrastructure in the UK

As mentioned above (see Section 4.4.2), the proposal for a national high-speed network in the UK re-entered the debate after the opening of St. Pancras International station among both Labour Government spokesmen and Conservative Party representatives. The Conservative Party leader, David Cameron (now Prime Minister), for instance, pledged the idea of using high-speed rail transport to boost the regional economy at the 2008 Conservative Party conference. The idea of a high-speed national network is further reinforced under two current pressing issues of the government: climate change and economic recovery (see Section 2.2). With green infrastructure now ostensibly embraced by all parties in their rhetoric and policies to deal with the UK’s current economic growth challenges, it increasingly features as an important topic in political statements.

A critical question, however, is whether the green infrastructure discourse can be extricated from the realms of rhetoric and translated into reality. Shilleto (2009) claims that three pre-requisites are needed to move green strategic plans into delivery. The first is to gain political support for making this change, the second is to engage interested parties in partnership arrangements, and the third is to promote a more co-operative approach to green problem resolution. The three elements need to be underpinned by well-functioning institutional arrangements and power relations to establish efficient project networks and further enable improved project delivery. This phenomenon of promoting high-speed rail fits the theory of discourse power, as defined by Hajer (1995 and 2003), which suggests that discourse plays the role of establishing networks where all actors share common interests or ideology. This process of pulling like-minded actors together through discourse power results in the strengthening and streamlining of networks, but also leads to the exclusion of differing voices (see Chapter 2).

Lessons learned from the innovative CTRL contract arrangements

Mega infrastructure projects, with their typical complex contexts, offer major opportunities for innovative contract arrangements as witnessed by the CTRL case which provided several novel financing mechanisms to secure its delivery, such as segregating construction and revenue risks, implementing the project in phases, introducing a cost overrun protection programme and employing special-purpose financing restructuring vehicles in 1998, 2001, and 2002. Lessons in relation to the PPP arrangements are especially important. Findings of the hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 5) confirm that the delivery of public services should not overly rely on financial resources from the private sector. They also indicated, more importantly, that the provision of substantial monetary support from Central Government fostered confidence for the investors and encouraged sponsorships but that this meant the public sector was obliged to take on a greater share of the risk.
than was its initial intention. Responses from the hypothesis-led investigations suggest that, in these circumstances, the private sector can be expected to further improve its efficiency and creativity in delivering mega projects, particularly with regard to contract management arrangements and the respective responsibilities of the public and private sectors (see Appendix 5). A network with clearly defined roles and responsibilities among stakeholders can facilitate effective power interactions between actors. Such project-led networking reflects what Latour (1986) claimed is the consequence of the intense activity of enrolling, persuading, and enlisting, which in practice constitute ‘power translation’ in stakeholder network (see Chapter 2).

4.7 Conclusions

This chapter has analysed several issues ranging from route planning, financing, political intervention, risk sharing, and public-private partnerships to concerns about its environmental, economic, and social impacts. This case study focuses on institutional arrangements and power relationships between senior project stakeholders, i.e., the ‘hierarchical power relationships’ they displayed over time, each possessing their own agendas. This relates back to the discussion provided in Chapter 2 where a more generic literature review of institutional relationships and decision-making for MUTPs is included.

Since 1971, the idea of a CTRL project has been a component in the appraisal of the viability of the Channel Tunnel project. The completion of this high-speed railway was delayed for another three decades. This prolonged gestation came about through factors such as lack of political will, government risk aversion, financial barriers, local opposition, lack of trust in forecasts, and lack of operator ambition.

The coordination between railway and station developments appears to be an ideology that took early root in CTRL project development. However, ignoring the public voice and the over reliance on property market and the private sectors financing triggered many obstacles to the project. This also further downgraded the promises on economic growth offered by the high-speed railway and raised doubts on the expected urban regeneration benefits promoted by the mega-project advocates.

This chapter has proved that CTRL played an influential role in urban development in terms of attracting investments and developments. The complex stakeholder network and the hierarchical negotiation power in the decision-making process reinforce the use of the project discourses and at the same time highlights the significance of political champions and continuity of political support.

The outcomes of the UK high-speed railway network’s development are yet to be known, and under
the current planning system and power structure may take decades to unfold. Although the CTRL project is unique in many respects, a number of lessons can be derived from the project’s experience, particularly from its financial arrangements, and borne in mind for future similar projects.

Chapter 5 focuses on the development of one particular CTRL hub. It explores the interaction between the railway development and the sustainable urban regeneration scheme, the dynamics of the negotiation power within the stakeholder network, and the visions of sustainability promoted during the formation of project discourses. Through the analysis, the links between the theoretical framework established in Chapter 2 are examined, and the hypotheses postulated at the outset of this thesis are further tested.
5 Case Study of Urban Regeneration in the King’s Cross Area

5.1 Introduction

This chapter covers in detail the second major investigative theme of this thesis by posing the question whether the CTRL project can stimulate sustainable urban regeneration at its hub areas. The focus of this chapter is on development around the St Pancras International, terminus of the CTRL in London. Another case study for the CTRL hub development, the Stratford City scheme, will be discussed in the next chapter. These two were chosen, from the four CTRL hubs, for the following reasons:

- First, there is a legal obligation of site development embedded in the CTRL contract, which stipulates that the ‘developer’ (i.e., LCR), owns the property and development land interests both at King’s Cross area\(^{51}\) (see Figure 5.1) and Stratford.
- Second, the regeneration scheme timetable coincides with that of the CTRL delivery.

The King’s Cross Central scheme, adjacent to St Pancras, and the development at Stratford (home to the 2012 London Olympics) offer an opportunity to observe institutional arrangements and power relationships, such as

- whether the CTRL project is considered to be a hindrance or stimulus to the King’s Cross and Stratford redevelopments;
- whether globalisation forces impact differently on the King’s Cross and Stratford redevelopments, and
- whether there are significant differences between the competitiveness of contextually different and geographical divergent (inner-city and edge-city) redevelopments with dissimilar institutional structures.

This chapter is structured in six parts and takes the King’s Cross Central regeneration scheme as its case study. Section 5.1 provides an introductory setting to the context of the King’s Cross Central scheme and the key stakeholders involved. In Section 5.2, the historical background of the King’s Cross Central development is outlined together with its project timeline (see Table 5.2). Section 5.3 explores the changing underlying principles of railway development and urban development. Based on the first three sections, Section 5.4 investigates the visions and the political promises of sustainable urban regeneration at King’s Cross Central. The observed negotiation powers embedded in the

\(^{51}\) St Pancras International Station as the London terminal of the CTRL project located at the King’s Cross area and also next to the King’s Cross Station.
decision-making of the King’s Cross Central scheme are summarised in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 deals with testing the hypotheses according to the findings of the literature review and the findings of hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations together with insights into theory revealed through this case study. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter with a summary of the key findings, including the emergent hypotheses and issues which have arisen from the case study and its two streams of investigation.

**Figure 5.1: King’s Cross Area**

Source: Argent St George, LCR, and Exel (2004: 11), Figure 5

### 5.1.1 Project facts

According to Edwards (2008), the King’s Cross area became prosperous during the period of rapid industrial growth in the 1850s, and was regarded as a prime example of British industrialisation. However, following the decline of industry, deprivation, crime, drug dealing, and prostitution became the image of the King’s Cross area for decades (see Holgersen, 2007). There was a surge in the land values in the King’s Cross area during the boom in the property market from 2000 to early 2007 (Edwards, 2008). It further prompted the issue of gentrification. At present, the population of the King’s Cross area is mixed in terms of income and ethnicity.
King's Cross lies at a major public transport interchange in central London and was identified by the London Plan (2004) as offering the best public transport accessibility in London. The completion of the CTRL in 2007 extended its transport services to north Kent and to Europe at the same time as London Underground Ltd was undertaking a major refurbishment and expansion of the existing King’s Cross-St Pancras underground station. This involved development of a new Thameslink station at St Pancras, intended to provide high public transport accessibility to the high density and mixed-use developments in the King’s Cross Opportunity Area, covering parts of the boroughs of Camden and Islington (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: King’s Cross Opportunity Area

Source: Camden Council and Islington Council (2004) King’s Cross Opportunity Area Planning and Development Brief

The King’s Cross Central Planning Permission (see Table 5.1) was granted in December 2006 for a high density development of nearly 8 million sq ft. The site includes two major rail termini - St Pancras International and the adjacent King's Cross Main Line station (see Figures 5.1) serving east coast routes. They provide London with high-accessibility public transport including 10 different rail and London Underground lines.
Table 5.1: Elements of King’s Cross Central Planning Permission

- 67 acres brownfield development site;
- 750,000 sq m (8m sq ft) of mixed use development;
- 25 new office buildings totalling some 4.9 million sq ft.;
- 2,000 homes and serviced apartments;
- 25 acres of 20 new public routes and 10 new open spaces;
- the restoration and refurbishment of 20 historic buildings and structures;
- the development of 250 new businesses;
- the creation of 30,000 new jobs; and
- the provision of up to 50 eating establishments.


The outline of the King’s Cross Central planning applications was submitted by Argent St George, London & Continental Railways (LCR), and Exel PLC in May 2004. The land for the King’s Cross Central development covered 67 acres and was categorised as the “Main Site” in Camden and the “Triangle Site” in both Camden and Islington. There were separate applications submitted respectively for the two sites. In addition, four listed building consent applications were made and four conservation area consent applications requested.

5.1.2 Key stakeholders and their power relations

This section analyses the role and negotiation power of each key stakeholder in the King’s Cross Central development process in order to see whether there is a dominant power in this project-led network (see Figure 5.3). Also, this section explores circumstances in which some stakeholders have become powerful while some have been marginalised.

King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG)

KXRLG, which was founded in 1987, is a local pressure group that has been both an influential and active community campaign group. It represents the interests of groups and individuals living or working in the areas around the Railway Lands in Kings Cross and St. Pancras. It campaigns for the regeneration of the Railway Lands in the area and the needs of the local population throughout the project development process. KXRLG played an effective role by engaging in public consultation and debates on the LRC scheme, the CTRL second London Terminal selection and the KXC planning application (see KXRLG, 2008).

As already indicated, in the mid 1990s the inability of Central Government to implement its policy on transport and its neglect of social concerns surrounding the sector prompted community groups to
unite and dedicate themselves to a series of campaigns to seek to influence proposals. This phenomenon fits Hajer’s (2003a) theory of “stand-by politicians” (see Chapter 2). Their efforts and skills to exploit publicity opportunities through the media had significant impacts on the King’s Cross area development, especially the LRC scheme in the late 1980s to early 1990s. This influence was facilitated by a combination of changing political agendas and growing awareness on all fronts of issues of sustainable development. The alternative schemes submitted by the Railway London Group in 1991 (see Edwards, 1992) emphasised the benefits that could be enjoyed through a more bottom-up planning approach to the area. These proposals were recognised by the RTPI and RIBA for the London region by with prizes for innovation on the work undertaken. This story, as illustrated by the pre-hypothesis investigation through the representative of the KXRLG and the bottom-up approach to planning, is echoed by the interviewee from Planning Aid for London in the hypothesis-led investigation:

“It does not help to achieve visions of sustainable development if sustainability is not owned by local population.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a community planner, 14/08/2008)

The Mayor of London
The London Mayor (Ken Livingstone initially, and then Boris Johnson more recently), upon taking office, became head of the planning authority of all the London Boroughs in 2000. This position was to become highly influential in the decisions about development projects in the Greater London area, including King’s Cross. The Mayor published the draft London Plan in 2001 followed by the London Plan in 2004. Both of the reports identified King’s Cross as one of its so called ‘Opportunity Areas’. The London Plan envisaged that the King’s Cross Opportunity Area could maximise its redevelopment value by pursuing a mixed-use, high-density development project adjacent to a major transport node. Given that the local authority (Camden Council) is obliged to comply with planning and policy guidance set by the Mayor, this document was to prove very important to all parties involved in the project.

52 Ken Livingstone is the first Mayor of London from 2000 to 2008. Boris Johnson is the second Mayor of London from 2008 to the present.
Figure 5.3: King’s Cross Key Stakeholder Network


* Former DHL Exel Supply Chain. Deutsche Post acquired Exel on 14 December 2005 and formed the name DHL Exel Supply Chain. It subsequently dropped "Exel" from the Supply Chain branding in 2009.
Camden Council

Although the London Boroughs’ role had been weakened after the first directly-elected London Mayor assumed power, some of the local boroughs still played a mediator role in the decision-making process by bringing all stakeholders together in order to build consensus. Camden Council is the prime example in the King’s Cross Central scheme. The political commitment and support that the developer received from Camden Council was critical to the realisation of this regeneration scheme. So critical, in fact, that many of the community groups argued it to be too close and neglectful of their interests. This is evidence of the ‘discourse power’ referred to in Hypothesis 4 (as outlined in Chapter 1). This hypothesis assumes that a network formed by the central stakeholders (i.e. developers) is constantly strengthened by the discourse that they establish which in turn further marginalises others who do not advocate the same discourse as their own. Organisations or groups need to affiliate themselves with the mainstream network in order to influence the decision-making process. The following quotation from the pre-hypothesis investigation reflects the change of power relations in project decision-making that is affected by the changing institutional arrangements:

“Camden was the planning authority for King’s Cross whereas now it is the Mayor. The new planning rules changed everything. The Mayor or the GLA in the early days were very keen to take control of the project. We needed the agreement of GLA and support of the GLA. The GLA will often try to control the key things. They didn’t succeed but the law has now changed. If we were starting now, the Camden council would have much less role in King’s Cross.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a planner from the local authority, 25/06/2008)

London & Continental Railways (LCR)

LCR won the contract to deliver and operate the CTRL project in 1996 (see Chapter 4). It was also awarded the concession agreement that included the Eurostar European Passenger Service between London and Paris/Brussels plus the development rights to a number of key sites and buildings adjacent to some of the CTRL stations. These assets - previously in public ownership – included: Waterloo Station, St Pancras Chambers, St Pancras Station, 120 acres of land in Stratford, 635 properties along the route and King’s Cross Railway Lands (Holgersen, 2007: 64). The power and influence of the LCR was ultimately circumscribed by, driven by, and dependent on the CTRL project agreement with the government, mostly (as indicated in Chapter 4) as a result of the concessional contract and later the government backing of guaranteed bonds in 1998. This resulted, to a great extent, from a shared vision of railway development related urban regeneration benefits by selected private sector interests and leading politicians, particularly Heseltine and Prescott (see Dimitriou et al., 2010). This is reflected in the data from the pre-hypothesis investigation:

“The reason that John Prescott supported the CTRL project, probably the most important thing, however, was the ability of the new railway to support regeneration. In that, he was continuing a
Argent (King's Cross) Limited

Argent St George (now Argent King’s Cross Ltd.) was selected as the preferred developer for the King’s Cross Central scheme in March 2000 from an initial shortlist of 17 major developers by the landowners, LCR, and Excel. The Argent Group PLC was founded in 1981 as Argent Estates Limited. In 1997, the British Telecom Pension Scheme acquired the Argent Group PLC and subsequently established a firm foundation for the financing challenges ahead which proved essential to the development at King’s Cross given market uncertainties at the time. As already indicated, Argent’s property-oriented scheme for the King’s Cross Central was criticised by several parties, especially local community groups, for an excess of office space, and too little affordable housing. These groups expressed a fear that the development would mean displacement of many existing businesses and local residents, and destruction of ethnic minority communities in the area as a result of subsequent increases in land value. Argent King’s Cross Ltd together with Camden Council held a very different view of the future from that of the community groups. The two believed that the regeneration scheme would bring new economic benefits that would contribute to changing the image of the area in such a way that new investment would be attracted to it, and that this in turn would generate new wealth for the area.

In 2009 the banking crisis (see Brown, 2009) generated doubts whether the scheme would survive. However, the King’s Cross Central Limited Partnership injected £150 million of its own funds to safeguard Phase One of the scheme in March 2009 and later, in October the same year, a £42 million public funding package was granted from the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) for 284 affordable homes. Again, in March 2010, the Partners committed a further £50 million for vital infrastructure across the King’s Cross Central site (see King’s Cross Central Limited Partnership, 2010). The King’s Cross Central scheme embodies many advantages through its highly accessible location and adjacency to St Pancras International Station. Argent, which is soundly funded and has demonstrated sufficient economic strength to (so far) cope with the fall-out of the recent banking crisis, has enhanced its negotiation powers with all parties involved in the scheme. This contributes to the research question in hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Determining factors and features of mega project decision”) relating to the attributes that are most important for an efficient and effective stakeholder network to deliver the King’s Cross Central project. The responses of Hypothesis-related Research Question (HRQ) #4 also revealed that the coalition between leading businesses, politicians, and local bureaucrats is likely to shape public policies to benefit businesses due to their command of economic resources (see Appendix 5).
5.2 History of the King’s Cross Central Project Development

5.2.1 Background

The regeneration potential and needs of the King’s Cross railway lands were recognised for over 30 years prior to planning permission being granted in 2006. However, the planning policy impetus for large-scale regeneration of the main site was protracted in part for economic reasons, because of uncertainty over the alignment and delivery of related mega transport projects; namely: the CTRL, Thameslink\(^53\), the East Coast Mainline upgrading programme, Crossrail 2 and (to a lesser extent) the Cross River Tram.

The King’s Cross District sits in central London (see Figure 5.4) and possesses high accessibility with varied transport systems, including railway links to Scotland, and to the North East and Midlands of England. It has access to the biggest London Underground interchange station (King’s Cross St. Pancras tube station) which has six lines connecting it to the city, and to Thameslink railway routes to south east London. Moreover, Kings Cross is a node on an extensive bus network for Greater London. The King’s Cross District, however, remains one of the poorest areas in London. It has 10 per cent unemployment (higher than the average national rate of seven per cent) and about 60 per cent of its households earn an annual income of less than £20,000 (Edwards, 2008).

This section demonstrates the key events of the King’s Cross railway lands development as a context for better understanding of the issues associated with this regeneration scheme. The detailed project timeline is displayed in Table 5.2.

There is clearly tension between the developers’ more commercially oriented scheme and the local community’s more resident friendly plans. One prominent and emerging issue is whether it is the developer’s responsibility to tackle the areas’ many local poverty problems; It is a matter of debate whether urban regeneration projects on the scale of the Kings Cross proposals can claim to have a genuine sustainability vision if they do not address these problems. According to the responses of Overall Research Question (ORQ) \#2, the responsibility to secure local needs lies on the local authorities which should play a proactive role as a bridge among stakeholders in mega-project decision-making processes (see Appendix 5). Also, a streamlined planning power is shown to be necessary in mega-project development. However, if this power does not safeguard the general interests while protecting minority interests, it is deemed unsustainable (see Appendix 4, under the

\(^{53}\) Thameslink (known as Thameslink 2000) had been through a complex and prolonged planning process, which officially began in November 1997. On 18th October 2006, Network Rail was finally given planning permission and legal powers. The funding for the required work was approved on 24 July 2007. Construction began on 24 October 2007 and the provisional completion date is 2015.
topic “Property-oriented development”). More detailed analysis on these questions is presented in Section 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Kings Cross Central Illustrative Model


5.2.2 Project initiatives and obstacles

The initiation of the King’s Cross Railway Lands’ development can be traced back to when the BR Board announced in July 1987 that King’s Cross Station was to be the second terminal of the CTRL. In the following year, it chose the London Regeneration Consortium (LRC) - composed of Rosehaugh and Stanhope (two major property developers) - to develop the 135 acres of derelict railway lands at King’s Cross with Foster Associates as the master planners (see Edwards, 1992: 129). LRC made an outline planning application for the redevelopment of the railway lands in April 1989, but this was eventually withdrawn in 1994 due to the poor economic climate at the time and the then Government’s decision to bring the CTRL to St Pancras station (Holgersen, 2007). The local authority fast-tracked the planning decision process for LRC, but the decline of the property market in early 1990s eventually paralysed this plan. A revised CTRL route option proposal was submitted in 1991 by BR which sought to reduce costs by taking the line via south Kent to King’s Cross in the hope that LRC would pay for the station construction. However, in 1994, the Government decided to bring the CTRL into St. Pancras station mainly due to the prohibitive cost of low-level station at King’s Cross.
In April 1996, The King’s Cross Partnership was formed and acted as a framework for a £3.75 billion, 7-year regeneration programme (1996-2003) under the Government’s Single Regeneration Budget\textsuperscript{54} initiative. In May 2004, Argent King’s Cross Limited, LCR, and Exel submitted the planning and heritage applications for the King’s Cross Central Regeneration Project. In March 2006, Ken Livingstone, as Mayor of London, gave the Argent scheme his go-ahead. However, at the end of the same month, John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister, called in the proposal in order to have more time to consider the scheme in response to a deluge of objections from a variety of parties\textsuperscript{55}. In July of the same year, the King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG), in alliance with member groups and others, campaigned for a re-think about the proposals for the railway lands.

The campaign groups raised numerous issues about the King’s Cross Central project and hence attracted public inquiries and Judicial Reviews. These interruptions are criticised by some interviewees from the pre-hypothesis investigations. The respondents claimed that the public inquiry and Judicial Review are the tactics used by the opposition groups in order to derail the project:

“\textit{The process of setting up the public inquiry and especially one involving local authorities, the developer, and the local residents, took a great deal of time and that’s the delay. Judicial Reviews have a high potential for delay and that’s part of the motivation for people who call for a Judicial Review. Delay can kill the scheme. That’s where you sabotage [the project] even if you are not successful in Judicial Review. The fact that you delay things, it can mean that confidence [towards the project] is lost or the project is in its down turn or banks will call in the debts. It is the delay that causes problems.}” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a planner from the local authority, 25/06/2008)

The proposal for the King’s Cross Central scheme was that a 3-phase (15-20-year) development plan would be launched in 2007, after the scheduled completion of the railway works. The plan was to

\textsuperscript{54} According to Rhodes et al. (2003), in 1994, the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund moved forward the concept of partnership working in delivery of regeneration projects and extended the breadth of the partner-base to include many different parts of government and at a more locally devolved regional level.

\textsuperscript{55} Quoted from King’s Cross Railway Lands Group website (2006): “Following Camden Council’s decision on 9 March 2006 to grant planning permission to Argent, many organisations and individuals in the area have written to Mr John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister (and the minister in charge of planning) calling on him to “call in” this decision and make it himself on the basis of a public inquiry held by the independent Planning Inspectorate. The following organisations have written to Mr Prescott, or to the Government Office for London (“GOL”) which administers his powers locally.
• King's Cross Railway Lands Group KXRLG
• King's Cross Conservation Area Advisory Committee
• Cally Rail Group
• Regent's Canal Conservation Area Advisory Committee
• SAVE Britain's Heritage
• The Goldington Street Tenants and Residents’ Association
• Coopers Lane Tenants and Residents Association
• Churchway Estate and Residents from Chalanon St, Medburn St, Penrhy St and Goldington St NW1
• Regent's Network
• Camden Green Party
• Industrial Buildings Preservation Trust”

Source: KXRLG website (2006) Local organisations call for a public inquiry. Available at www:
transform the long-abandoned lands behind the CTRL Terminus, St. Pancras station, and King’s Cross station into a ‘mixed’ commercial, residential, and leisure activities regeneration area at the same time as local opposition groups endeavoured to ensure that these proposals met local needs.

### Table 5.2: King’s Cross Central Regeneration Scheme Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Kings Cross Railway Lands Community Development Group is formally constituted and is awarded funding by Camden Council. [Later King’s Cross Railway Lands Group – KXRLLG]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>The plan of the LRC was the winner from the King’s Cross railway land development competition issued by British Rail. British Rail lodged its Parliamentary Bill authorising the construction of a Channel Tunnel terminus at King’s Cross.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>LRC made an outline planning application for redevelopment of the railway lands in April 1989, revised in October the same year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>KXRLLG published Towards A People’s Plan, a viable alternative to LRC’s office city, which receives an award from the Royal Town Planning Institute. It proposes a CTRL terminal at St Pancras, not King’s Cross.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Camden Council decided to stop negotiating with LRC. The office property market collapsed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The Kings Cross Bill finally died in 1994 and the CTRL Bill was launched. LRC’s outline planning application for the railway lands was eventually withdrawn in 1994. In the face of poor economic conditions and the Government’s decision to bring the CTRL at high level, Info St Pancras station.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>King’s Cross Partnership was formed. It acted as a framework for a £3.6 billion, 7-year regeneration programmes under the Government’s Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) initiative.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>From an initial shortlist of 7 major developers Argent St George were selected as preferred developer for the site in March 2000.</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Mayor, Ken Livingstone, declared the initial proposals of “Toward the London Plan”, which including King’s Cross/ St. Pancras is one of a number of “Mix Use Strategic Opportunity Area”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>King’s Cross Partnership came to an end in 2003. Many of its projects have since been mainstreamed by the two local authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>On 31st Mar, in response to a deluge of objections, Mr John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister (and Minister responsible for planning) announced that decides to take a bit more time to consider the objections and to decide whether to have a public inquiry. Permission confirmed. On 16 November Camden council’s Development Control committee confirmed the grant of planning permission, and approved £105 million agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The Judicial Review hearing was held on 24 and 25 May 2007. The High Court has ruled that Camden Council went through due process when deciding on the application by developers Agent to redevelop the King’s Cross site. The development can now proceed. On 19th November 2007 Camden’s Development Control Committee granted planning permission for works to King’s Cross station, the western concourse, subject to a £106 million legal agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Argent has appointed Caflin with the £90m contract to build the first phase of the railway lands development behind the station. The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government has upheld a recommendation by Planning Inspector, David Lovender, to allow the appeals made by the developers of King’s Cross Central over the Triangle site. Work is due to start on site in November 2008 and is scheduled for completion within two years ready for occupation in 2011.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>£150 million from King’s Cross Central’s investors. Over £103 million construction contract for University of the Arts London.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Detailed plans for the first fully residential building at King’s Cross Central have been given the green light by Camden Council.</td>
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5.3 Coordination between Railway and Urban Development

An examination of the trajectory of the King’s Cross development from 1945 to 1990 (see Table 5.2) reveal that several factors prolonged delays and contributed to several missed opportunities to incorporate new initiatives into the development (see Haywood, 2005). For example, according to Edwards (2008), the uncertain system, which resulted in many long term planning uncertainties pertaining to this land, discouraged prospective investors from becoming involved in the project. Long negotiation battles among the various stakeholders (centred on the commercial and community divide) also contributed to delays, as did the construction blight that stemmed from the CTRL project. For although the initial impetus to the Kings Cross development came from a mutual reinforcement between the railway station development and property development, it was seriously jeopardised by both the gloomy office market of the early 1990s and the delays incurred by alterations in the CTRL route and termini selection (between 1989 and 1996), as well as by the financial restructuring of the project (see Chapter 4). The following two sections elaborate on the issues emerged from the evolution process of the coordination between railway and urban development. Also, the role of St Pancras International in the King’s Cross area development is illustrated.

5.3.1 History of the coordination

The pattern of changes in government attitudes towards coordination between railway development and urban development helps understanding of the way in which the project evolved. According to Haywood (2005) a number of periods in UK history clearly show when the ideology of coordination between railway development and urban development occurred. He explained that the earliest signs of interest in integrating railway and urban development emerged soon after the Railway Age began in the 19th Century when market forces generated numerous new rail-accessible locations. He argued, however, that these developments subsequently ground to a halt because of increasing concerns over urban sprawl and competition from trunk roads after 1918. In 1948, a new UK statutory planning system was introduced against a backdrop of the development of a nationalised rail industry which was supposed to bring greater coordination between railway development and urban development. However, the reality of the time was that post-war thinking on rail planning lagged behind overall strategic planning. Instead, railway management continued its path-dependent traditional focus on operations and was reluctant to go beyond this realm of focus. The economic recession in the mid-1970s contributed further to the lack of coordinated planning, and although the economy recovered in the mid-1980s, the Thatcherite ideology of privatisation had no intention of seeking greater integration between railway development and urban development (Haywood, 2005: 75).

There was, furthermore, no additional commitment to the initial investment in rail from the public sector whilst the privatisation of British Rail took place under the Conservatives between 1994 and 1997. This period saw railway management becoming more business-driven, with the result that, in
order to sustain railway profits, the sale of station lands to property developers and railway developers became widespread throughout the country. This did, however, lead to several new schemes that introduced much greater integration of development around some major stations. The most notable recent example was the Broadgate Development Scheme adjacent to Liverpool Street station in London. Construction began in 1985 and was completed in 1990. This project was developed by Rosehaugh Stanhope and BR, with BR receiving a generous share of the development profits (Bertolini and Spit, 1998: 183).

The later sectorisation of BR, whereby franchises were sold off to train operating companies, attracted large international investment interests to the UK railway industry. This was especially promoted by the office market boom in the mid-to-late 1980s (Haywood, 2005). The commercial success of the Broadgate project was to prove difficult to replicate as economic recession hit in the early 1990’s. Wider objectives in the shape of social-economic sustainability through integrated urban and railway developments were not on the agenda at that stage. Nevertheless, about that time Professor Sir Peter Hall (1985: 169) pointed out:

“Rail cannot save the city, if the city is going down (economically), because the forces that are taking it down are far wider and far deeper than mere questions of accessibility. That is not to deny the potential importance of transport investments to the regeneration of a city’s economy. It is to say that they would need to be planned in the context of a far better understanding of that city's malaise.”

Haywood (2005) emphasises that the increasingly complex institutional arrangements within the rail industry and management after BR’s privatisation contributed to the failure of coordination between railway and urban development. Privatisation and fragmentation of the railways presented a complicated interface between the railway industry and local authorities, the opposite of the simple and well-focused institutional arrangements that were needed to foster effective integrated development (Haywood, 2005: 77). The laissez-faire management approach of the railway industry erected a high institutional barrier towards integration between urban and rail planning.

5.3.2 **Role of St Pancras International**

This section examines the role of St Pancras from two perspectives: the first is the impact the selection of St Pancras International Station (as the main London terminal for the CTRL) had on the King’s Cross Central scheme at a time of global and national economic downturn. The second is the impact that protracted decision-making on the location of the London Terminal for the CTRL has had on the King’s Cross Central development.

Although the King’s Cross Area has been designated as a site with a high potential for ‘mixed use development’, the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC) in 1991 expressed a concern that
the redevelopment in King’s Cross would have the effect of further concentrating development in central London. This, it was argued, would result in expanding employment and population beyond the capacity of its transport network and of its housing stock (Edwards, 1992: 175). Others argued that a better outcome would be achieved by relocating employment from the current over-crowded central London to east London, where government policies were geared to encourage further regeneration on a substantial scale. The competition for planning resources brought about by these debates was reflected in a report prepared by Colin Buchanan and Partners for Newham Council in 1989 (see Colin Buchanan and Partners, 1989), when the consultants were invited to examine the benefits of Stratford International Station over King’s Cross.

The responses to the associated question (HRQ #7) on the distribution of development resources between the east London and central London indicate that St Pancras International is far more powerful than Stratford International in attracting further investments in development. One of the responses is quoted here to explain this concern and shows that the King’s Cross District is more attractive to investors.

“Stratford is hardly able to compete effectively with central London at the moment. The Olympics diverted resources away from the Thames Gateway area. The Thames Gateway needs a streamlined and fully-empowered body to deliver the development because if the market is to be depended on to develop in a commercially sensitive environment, the investors are likely to go to the west.”

(Hypothesis-led interview, a community planner, 22/08/2008)

Notwithstanding the above, not all impacts on St Pancras International Station and on the King’s Cross development area have been negative – far from it. Many of the projects affected by the CTRL accumulated stronger attraction for investors and brought positive reputation to this area. For example, the restoration of King’s Cross station, the construction of the Western Concourse (see Figure 5.5), and the refurbishment of St Pancras International Station, have transformed the two stations as landmarks of London. The restoration and conversion of the Grade 1 listed building to a 5 star Renaissance Marriott hotel (see Figure 5.6) and the transformation of the Greater Northern Hotel into a luxury boutique hotel with some new apartments (see Figure 5.7) are also expected to effectively add value to the King’s Cross area. Camden Council considers the reconstruction and refurbishment of the St Pancras International to be an early beacon of regeneration for the Opportunity Area (Camden Council and Islington Council, 2004: 89) and a remarkable feat of engineering with great aesthetic value. The positive effects of the St Pancras International are echoed by the response from the hypothesis-led investigations:

“Everybody has an interest in that land [King’s Cross Railway land], and arguably all those interests are aligned. ... The commercial companies worked out that they want to put King’s Cross and St Pancras into their portfolio and they want to maintain their networks and positions because they have
good contacts in government, good contacts with banking, and good contacts with everything else. They traded off the success story of King’s Cross.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

**Figure 5.5: King’s Cross Station Western Concourse - Under Construction**


**Figure 5.6: St Pancras International**

St Pancras International Station has now become one of London’s attractions irrespective of the need to travel. The architectural restoration, at a cost £800 million, has brought a more attractive investment climate to the area and very much enhanced its image. The fit-out of the Thameslink station, built beneath St Pancras station, did not receive government funding until February 2006. As a consequence, it was completed by LCR in December 2007, soon after the St Pancras International Station officially opened in November the same year. Additional government funding for the Thameslink St Pancras station was set to be further delayed, however, as the thrust of the St Pancras International and London 2012 Olympics added urgency to the release of capital. This is evidenced in the hypothesis-led investigation:

“The 2012 Olympics are a mega event and clearly provide a new imperative to complete CTRL and LUL works at King’s Cross.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

As suggested by Peter Hall (see Section 5.3.1), it is both impossible and unwise to rely on railway stations alone to address complex urban regeneration problems in an area such as Kings Cross and St. Pancras. Their environs are more closely associated with urban decay, social deprivation, drugs, prostitution, crime, unemployment, poverty, etc. Effective responses to these problems instead require additional supportive policies funded with central government assistance in association with concerted efforts by local authorities with sufficient resources. According to Michael Parkinson (2009), at the time of writing, many developers are seeking to renegotiate their Section 106 deals as a result of the recession in an effort to cut their obligations. This suggests that local authorities need carefully to guard their balance sheets when it comes to the local benefits that such 106 agreements are supposed to ensure. Current economic circumstances can easily provide an excuse for developers not to fulfil their obligations and commitments which, in turn, will increase the obstacles in the negotiation process associated with regeneration projects. The real decision-making powers underlying collaborative urban regeneration efforts lie in the establishment of a well coordinated...
network composed of effective negotiating entities and is well resourced by institutional arrangements. This hypothesis is discussed in further depth in Section 5.5.

5.4 Visions and Sustainability of Urban Regeneration

Quite apart from the commercially-oriented coordination addressed in the previous section, a vision of sustainable urban regeneration that links railway and urban development has been revived in recent years. This is a concept that looks to providing communities with better accessibility to ‘brownfield’ sites in order to enhance their use in a sustainable manner. However, visions of sustainable urban regeneration are often assumed to be nothing more than rhetoric because of a shortage of public funding and the dominance of concerns about commercial revenues, which tend to conflict with issues of sustainability.

An underlying premise of this PhD research postulates that the general criteria for assessing sustainable urban regeneration schemes concentrate on those that claim to construct and maintain sustainable project lifecycles within an institutional framework that is capable of sustaining its economic activities, environmental assets, and social well-being.

The objectives of the King’s Cross Central project as defined by Argent St George, LCR, and Exel (see Argent St George et al., 2001: 10) are fourfold:

- To have King’s Cross play a major part in facilitating economic development and contributing to the capital’s continued economic growth.
- To have the regeneration of King’s Cross deliver significant benefits to existing local communities and assist in the improvement of local opportunities for jobs, training, and housing and facilitate better access to healthcare, education, and other services.
- To assist in the redevelopment of the King’s Cross lands so as to present opportunities that greatly enhance the quality of the townscape and public realm.
- To infuse the area with wider sustainability principles in terms of, for example, energy efficiency, water conservation, and the recycling of materials.

Private sector developers inevitably emphasise the economic aspects of urban regeneration schemes as a result of the commercial imperative they employ. In the case of the Kings Cross railway lands development, for example, the developers argued that fulfilling the commercial imperative optimises the economic value of the King’s Cross land and its redevelopment, which, in turn, automatically facilitates the optimisation of community benefits and the meeting of local needs (Argent St George et al., 2001: 11).

The developers have on many occasions presented themselves as ‘champions’ of sustainable urban regeneration, where such schemes are seen as means of creating “long-lasting places that can adapt to
people’s changing patterns of social and economic behaviour over time” (Argent St George et al., 2001: 11). They claim, for example, that they have been very responsive to the political agenda in relation to sustainable development and socially inclusive regeneration. The developers have referred to their efforts to reduce their carbon footprint during the construction period, meeting standards of high efficiency buildings\(^{56}\), and being respectful and caring of public realms and the conservation of historic assets.

On the above grounds, although sustainable urban regeneration is a very abstract and ambiguous concept, there is evidence to suggest that the Kings Cross regeneration scheme has done much to facilitate sustained economic benefits for this area, as well as to make significant progress in meeting local needs in the longer term. This is despite reservations surrounding the debate as to whether the commercially-oriented approach pursued by the developers and favoured by many national governments, the London Mayor and Camden Council, will acknowledge the needs of the poor. The transformation of the area currently underway is not only physical but also involves a displacement of the population. A bias exists which favours middle-class households and flagship businesses who can afford the housing and rental prices in the new developments.

Those who doubt the ability of a property-led commercial approach to deliver sustainable urban regeneration schemes typically advocate a bottom-up (grass-roots) approach to planning rather than a top-down more centralised approach. This reflects the review of the characteristics of mega projects in Chapter 2 - they are usually dominated by a powerful set of key stakeholders that controls the decision-making powers of the mega project and ultimately marginalises the less privileged and less influential. Michael Edwards who has been involved and worked with local communities in Kings Cross for many years has argued that many disagreements were dismissed and regarded as unrealistic by the key decision-makers. He argues that even the local politicians, who challenged the business-led development plan for the King’s Cross railway lands, have been marginalised or excluded from decision-making committees (Edwards, 2008: 11). Referring to the findings of the pre-hypothesis investigations, in the process of King’s Cross regeneration, the various local community campaign groups had welcomed the CTRL project and King’s Cross Central development project in principle, in the hope of these mega projects delivering ‘real regeneration’ that would meet local needs.

5.5 Decision-Making Process and Negotiation Powers

Section 5.5 includes an analysis of the negotiation powers and interactions among the various key stakeholders in the process of King’s Cross development. It describes the power relations that emerged, the role and features of the institutional arrangements, and other contextual factors, including global economic forces.

\(^{56}\) All new buildings were designed to achieve high BREEAM and EcoHomes ratings (Argent St George et al., 2004: 16).
5.5.1 **Contexts of negotiation process**

This analysis of the key events in the negotiation process of the Kings Cross development draws on the writings of both Edwards (1992) and Bertolini and Spit (1998). Edwards (*ibid.*) offers a clear interpretation of the ‘context’ of negotiation powers between players of the King’s Cross area redevelopment during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. He pinpointed five significant contextual issues:

**Revenue-focus development**

Edwards (*ibid.*) raised concerns about the proposed production of large floor-plate office buildings. He argued that building production in the UK does not follow a demand-supply logic but is instead dependent on the continuing scarcity of office buildings and on the confidence of property value growth. This revenue-focus development resulted in the opening of room for negotiation over planning proposals for financiers of the development, especially when local authorities are eager to attract investment from the private sector. It also shaped, he argued, an already fragile market which could quickly topple into a downward spiral, such as in the case of the early 1990s’ recession and the current economic downturn (as at 2011 in the UK). Edwards concludes that in this context, commercial-oriented development has an unfair dominant position. Financiers are better placed in negotiating terms because local authorities will often readily streamline the planning decision process in order to facilitate the attraction of additional funding from the private sector.

The privatisation of BR led the new institutional arrangements (led by Railtrack) to adopt private-sector accountancy practices which favoured short-term financial returns more than long term benefits. This short-term mentality, Edwards (*ibid.*) contends, unfairly underpinned the decision-making judgements of Railtrack, the Government, and, needless to say, the various franchised operators. This phenomenon was, and continues to be, a driving force in the negotiation process, prevailing in the market-driven planning environment that has such an impact on mega project decision-making.

**Ignorance of corporate social responsibility**

The tender evaluation criteria for development rights established by landowners were based on profitability. The market-driven planning environment for mega projects is characterised by property developers who pursue quick revenue returns by seeking to maximise the amount of expensive residential and office floor space. In this regard, some local community groups claim that these developers ignore their corporate social responsibility (CSR). They justify their actions by blaming the inevitable reality of market forces. This kind of competition generates pressures for developers to downgrade their standard for sustainable development in order to enhance profitability. In terms of negotiation power, landowners and developers are able to build a strong relationship in this context.

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57 Railtrack set up in 1994 took over the ownership and management of all track, signalling, infrastructure, buildings and operational land as BR was privatised (Bertolini and Spit, 1998: 193).
Fiscal pressures on the local authorities
The abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986 removed the obstacle to King’s Cross’ redevelopment as the planning approval powers were subsequently transferred to the London Borough of Camden. However, at that time, London boroughs were suffering from fiscal problems under the Thatcher Administration. These fiscal pressures put Camden Council in a position where it was ready to be convinced by the developers that the alternatives to their proposals were not realistic and that a public inquiry would prove too costly to the Council. An unspoken consensus emerged between the developers and the local authorities to pursue the developers’ vision.

Fragmented institutional arrangements in the government
The dislocation of Central Government departments and fragmented institutional arrangements in spatial planning in 1980s were the fifth contextual factor. For example, policy and action on land use, transport, industrial growth, and labour markets and training were the responsibility of four separate government ministers (see Edwards, 1992: 175). This dislocation brought about the failure of matching the investment and demand in transport policy for the King’s Cross development. The deep resentment from the community groups against Central Government during 1980s developed as a result of the uncertainty over decisions on the CTRL routes and the London terminal. This climate did much to encourage the orchestration of local resistance that successfully delayed the King’s Cross Bill, which was portrayed as ignoring demands made by the local community. This development seemed to enhance the negotiation power of community groups at the time and saw it as germinating continuous subsequent endeavours to monitor the regeneration process at King’s Cross thereafter.

Many of these concerns discussed above, according to the findings of this research, remain the same. Proposals for the regeneration of the King’s Cross area from the early 1990s until today are discussed and analysed below as they relate to the CTRL project. The changing planning policy contexts which subsequently enabled or constrained the King’s Cross development are also investigated.

5.5.2 Political power and institutional arrangements
It is notable that one of the essential components of an urban regeneration partnership of the kind pursued for the King’s Cross development is a capability of all parties to compromise. A laudable aim of the partnership process is thus to minimise conflicts that can cause increased costs. On this basis, if any player in the partnership obtains dominant power, it will turn the policy of partnership into a token rather than a practical reality. According to Bertolini and Spit (1998: 186-195) the transformation of political power and institutional arrangements in decision-making of King’s Cross area regeneration proceeded in four phases:
1987-1992
This is the era of the rise and fall of a property-led approach. There was a complicated, multilateral dispute between Central Government, the Borough of Camden, LRC, BR, and the local community groups. As a result of the perception that profits from an office-oriented development was the only solution to the spiralling costs of the King’s Cross area development, the decisions made in negotiations between the Borough of Camden and LRC overlooked the risks that office bias brought to the project.

1993-1995
This is the phase that involved withdrawal and new planning proposals to redefine the objectives of King’s Cross development. The significant changes in the Government agenda (see LPAC, 1993) provided new strategic planning objectives for King’s Cross area and emphasised the importance of the delivery of all the planned infrastructure. Although at the time LRC and BR were perceived as having strong negotiating positions, the later CTRL Bill presented by Union Railways in November 1994 ended the prospect of an international station at King’s Cross underground. The successful September 1995 bid to the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) drew the spotlight onto King’s Cross railway lands as well as the CTRL London terminal at St Pancras.

1996-1997
This is a period of movement towards parallel transport- and regeneration-led approaches. The prolonged CTRL Bill finally received its Royal assent in 1996 thereby removing legal uncertainty from King’s Cross development. However, the scheduled CTRL construction timetable meant that King’s Cross Central regeneration project could not be started until the completion of the CTRL.

1998-2003
This is the original planned implementation period. At the time, Bertolini and Spit (1998) recorded that LCR planned to begin the building of the CTRL in 1998 and complete it by 2003. This reveals that the claim made by the Government and LCR that the CTRL project was completed in time and on budget was only valid in relation to the revised timetable post the financial restructuring (St Pancras International was opened in 2007).

Overall, plans for the King’s Cross area from 1987 to 1997 were widely seen as a weak institutional framework for negotiations (see Ball, 2004; Bertolini and Spit, 1998; Edwards, 1992 and 2008). From the mid-1980s, there were increasing pressures to take socioeconomic issues into account. Affordable housing became a prerequisite for development, at least on paper. The concept of sustainability at the

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58 According to Bertolini and Spit (1998: 190), Union Railways was the independent company set up in 1992 by BR to develop the high-speed link to the continent.

59 Borough of Camden and Borough of Islington were in conjunction with local community, voluntary sector, private sector participation (P&O) developments, National Freight Corporation, Railtrack and Union Railways bid to the SRB and later set up King’s Cross Partnership for a 7-year regeneration initiative (see Bertolini and Spit, 1998: 192-193).
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

time was in its infancy and the objectives of achieving a sustainable community were continuously developing but remained vague. Although the 1987 Camden Borough Plan tried to embrace social aims, this plan lacked quantification, which left it open to negotiation with future developers (ibid.: 188). This reveals that the discourse about sustainable urban regeneration was not yet deeply established in government or the built environment professionals. Negotiating power in the realm of mega project developments such as the King’s Cross urban regeneration scheme therefore remained with the key stakeholders committed to profit-making rather than any sustainability agenda. The events addressed below explain the ebb and flow of the negotiation process of the King’s Cross Central project:

The Negotiation set-up
According to Bertolini and Spit (1998), in the first phase of the negotiation process for the Kings Cross development, two submissions from BR established the backdrop for all the debates which followed. One was the King’s Cross Railways Bill which BR submitted to Parliament in November 1988. The other was the outline planning application (OPA) to the Borough of Camden in April 1989. Negotiations between BR and the London Borough of Camden were more likely to reach a consensus at the time since between them they possessed the necessary legal and financial resources to make an agreement work. They each had sound negotiation positions and they were able to conduct fruitful negotiations on the King’s Cross development.

Market-driven development and sustainable urban regeneration
There is no doubt that the negotiating position of LRC was greatly strengthened by the widely held view that profit-driven property developments was ‘the way ahead’. The collapse of the property market in 1992 did little to dampen this perception. The influence of social dimensions of sustainability started to emerge in mid 1970s (see Chapter 2), partly because of the negotiation power that was derived from the collaborative efforts of local groups, and partly because of the globalisation forces that increased the awareness of sustainability. The ‘do no harm era’ observed by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) highlights how the priorities in mega-project delivery changed in an effort to offset harmful consequences (see Chapter 2).

The findings of the pre-hypothesis research also indicate that the market-driven approach became progressively disguised by rhetoric about sustainable development, leading some to wonder whether the sustainable development discourse had actually overturned the vision of integrated property and railway development (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Property-oriented development”). The integration of these two sectors was unlikely to be beneficial following changes to the political and financial contexts whereby the ideology of integrated planning had been weakened with an increased reliance on fragmented delivery mechanisms and on the private sector to deliver public goods and services.
Interventions in the CTRL project and its impact on the King’s Cross development

The decision to make St. Pancras the London terminal of the CTRL and to change the route alignment of the link through east London had a major impact on the prospects of King’s Cross as a mega urban regeneration area. The new agenda that CTRL introduced - which was to coordinate the development of a high-speed rail link project and urban regeneration in east London - was promoted by Michael Heseltine and his advisor Professor Sir Peter Hall (see Chapter 4).

Uncertainties surrounding the King’s Cross development were expected to evaporate after the CTRL Act was passed in December 1996 (Bertolini and Spit, 1998). On the contrary, the influence of the King’s Cross Partnership was undermined by the construction of the CTRL because the negotiating power of the King’s Cross development shifted to its new landowner (London & Continental Railways). The following quotation from the hypothesis-led investigation highlights the merits and obstacles the CTRL brought to the King’s Cross District development:

“CTRL is a driver of change, but it also brings uncertainty because of the blight it has created. It delayed the King’s Cross redevelopment for 20 years. The railway is a driver of change because it means you can deliver better and bigger regenerative development, along with the international dimension, etc. People were arguing that the gentrification problems will be brought about by Argent’s plan, but you can’t do much about it then because it is the market, and it was the railway that made the change initially, not the development.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

Difficulties in achieving inclusive urban regeneration

Ball (2004) identified a number of issues concerning the engagement of the public in urban policies such as the King’s Cross development scheme. The difficulties of public engagement occurred in both the community groups and non-community partners. Within the community group, the difficulties were summarised as:

- over-representation,
- clearly defining communities,
- high levels of public apathy, and
- the lack of accountability of community leadership.

The diverse local agendas were also seen by Ball (2004) are causing conflicts and damaging the trusting relationships between stakeholders. The limited incentives for the local community compared to other non-community partners who had statutory requirements or financial pressure also had a bearing. The non-community partners, especially developers, furthermore, were also seen by Ball (ibid.) often confront extreme or intransigent positions in community politics which coloured their response to the community cause. The potential of community groups to delay a project and thereby
diminish revenues in some cases lead to scepticism about the project’s viability. In this respect, Ball asserts that community groups are in a far stronger negotiating position than is normally assumed in the regeneration literature (Ball, 2004: 128). Opposition groups use the tactic of delay to leverage their negotiating power as indicated in Section 5.2.2. Imrie (2009) concludes that the King’s Cross Central scheme failed to provide an adequate institutional framework which would also help to transform the power inequalities involved or the hierarchical social relations in the development process. Under this circumstance we may judge that the engagement from the local groups did not realise the inclusive policy agenda that had been outlined in the Urban White Paper for urban regeneration (Imrie, 2009: 95).

The challenges for a contemporary urban regeneration scheme lie, therefore, in steering a balanced course between the nature of the market and the local demands, including those of minorities, in order to maximise benefits and minimise negative impacts. Taking one issue at the expense of others could result in displacing problems to other areas of the project, allowing unemployment or the lack of affordable housing, for example, to emerge elsewhere in the development process. One may conclude from this that local issues should be looked at collectively by the local communities, the developers, and the local authorities. Adequate resources, including planning powers and financial support, should be given to local authorities to tackle these local issues. It is very important not to expect a single property-led regeneration programme to solve all problems.

The role of local authorities
A visionary local authority can play a strategic role in improving the quality of life for the communities and also the image of their locality. As mediators between the players at the strategic planning level (i.e., the level of concern of the Mayor of London, the private developers, and the local communities), these local authorities can promote mega projects and encourage private investment into their areas. In the current UK planning system, planning powers are more centralised than in its European counterparts. This has significant impacts on the efficiency and performance of the delivery of urban regeneration schemes. Notwithstanding this, a report published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 2008 (see Cadell et al., 2008) suggested that UK local authorities have played a crucial role in providing leadership for urban regeneration, and contributed to many notable successes. Couch et al. (2003) suggest that this success has much to do with recent initiatives by Central Government that stress the importance of the devolution of power to the local authorities working in partnerships with local communities. The authors also identify a well-funded local leadership and an environment of mutual trust as pre-requisites to securing a successful urban regeneration scheme (see Cadell et al., 2008).

The merits of locally-controlled regeneration schemes and centralised development powers need to be discussed in context. In some cases, streamlined powers given to government-appointed bodies offer a mechanism for effective project delivery, especially when the project involves multiple local
authorities and varied levels of stakeholders. The London Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC) is one of the examples where streamlined bodies are in a better position to control project delivery. This reinforces the idea that a simple institutional structure is an essential attribute of successful project delivery in that it can provide a more comprehensible interface for partnerships (see the discussion in Section 5.3.1).

Various attempts have been made to distribute more powers to local government on regeneration projects at a local level. Heseltine claimed that the Urban Programme\(^6\) was a strategy that relied on local initiative and public-private partnerships (PPPs), which proved to be significant in the later City Challenge initiatives and Michael Howard’s City Pride projects (Heseltine, 2000: 205). Michael Heseltine, during his second term as the Secretary of State for the Environment, strongly advocated devolution and partnerships between central and local government, as well as professionals within the public and private sectors. His philosophy of enabling local government and his favouring of public-private partnerships is illustrated by the following quotation (Heseltine, 2000: 204):

“My personal instinct was – and remains – to grant local government considerable freedom to initiate policies and experiment between different ways of delivering services. I like the idea of enabling authorities. Their responsibility should be to make sure that services of quality are delivered, rather than providing them themselves. They will usually be well advised to buy in these services, their quality defined contractually, from outside providers after competitive tendering. It is a question of political philosophy. Is local government to be more an agent than an initiator, carrying out the wishes of an all-powerful central government? Or should it be seen as relatively free to pursue a local agenda, devised by local councillors responsible to a local electorate? I believe we are an over-centralised society with decision-making too tightly controlled by Whitehall.”

**Institutional arrangements for resource allocation**

According to Robson et al. (2000), Heseltine’s approach to urban regeneration contains a mix of merits and defects. The institutional arrangements, promoted by Heseltine, that relied on partnership as the key principle which fostered collaboration that crossed disciplines, local politicians, businesses, and officials, highlighted the importance of lobbying skills and encouraged strategic thinking. However, the resource allocation mechanisms, which were based on competition rather than needs, generated many tensions and provoked many doubts. ‘The State of English Cities’ report, prepared for DETR by Robson et al. (2000), reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of these government commissioned initiatives and concluded that the Single Regeneration Budget scheme diluted the effectiveness of resources by being spread too thinly across many projects and regions, resulting in a failure to target regeneration programmes (Robson et al. 2000: 29, 30). This point was also reinforced by Parkinson (see Parkinson et al., 2006: 15). He claims that the institutional arrangements

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\(^6\) The Urban Programme was first launched by Michael Heseltine when he was the Secretary of State for the Environment between 1979 and 1983.
must have a balance between control and constructive interaction for mega-project decision-making to be efficient and effective, but that this must be accompanied by provisions for government intervention, as necessary, to ensure economic growth compatible with social and environmental considerations.

The synthesis of findings derived from both strands of investigation addresses the issue of which institutional arrangements are best suited to mega-project decision-making. Of the respondents to the hypothesis-led investigations, two related to HRQ #3 conveyed a belief that the mega project decision-making process in the UK depends very much on a democratic mechanism. It was pointed out that, on the one hand, it can prove to be an obstacle for project delivery, while on the other it can also help to prevent an overconcentration on narrow interests. This conclusion was similarly reinforced by the findings of the OMEGA Study (Wright, 2008). Overall, the respondents agreed that the consequences of the existing democratic system in the UK prevent politicians from making long-term major decisions for mega projects and lead to prolonged process of project delivery. Two of the respondents of the Omega Centre interview pointed out that there are no long-term national plans for mega projects in the UK, and that this contributes to an observed ‘muddling through’ approach to mega-project planning and the lack of visions for such developments in this country.

5.6 Hypothesis Testing and Theoretical Insights

After the exploration of the King’s Cross Central scheme, Section 5.6.1 examines the findings derived from this chapter against the findings of both strands of research investigations. The examination is presented in accordance with the four hypotheses postulated at the outset of this thesis. Section 5.6.2 further illustrates insights into theory and new issues revealed from the observations of King’s Cross Central case study.

5.6.1 Testing findings against hypotheses

**HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs**

Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration development. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and mega-event development associated with its transport hubs.

The premise within the first hypothesis is that the CTRL project constitutes an influential positive catalyst for the sustainable urban regeneration of the King’s Cross area on the basis that the CTRL acted as an agent for the delivery of sustainable regeneration. Based on the observations from the literature review, the results of testing Hypothesis 1 show firstly, that there is a discrepancy in the way
sustainable urban regeneration is perceived and subsequent actions formulated between the bottom-up and top-down planning approaches employed by the developers and local authorities, on the one hand, and the local community groups on the other. This was confirmed by the findings of the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis led investigations (Also see Section 5.4). Secondly, according to the both strands of investigation, the CTRL project, although providing long-awaited certainties to the King’s Cross Railway Lands development, was also a cause for the delayed land development and in this respect held-up prospective investments. Ultimately, as a result, the key stakeholders of the King’s Cross Central scheme had to compromise on its progress in light of the CTRL delivery. Under these circumstances, it may be concluded that the CTRL project did produce the thrust to overcome political conflicts and provided a backdrop conducive to compromise, negotiation, and consensus. However, it also contributed to significant problems, including missed development opportunities and increased costs and complexity of the project.

**HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political Decision**

Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega event schemes.

In Chapter 1, the author hypothesised that one of the most effective factors of a ‘successful’ mega-project delivery lies in the institutional arrangements and power relations between project stakeholders. The review of the King’s Cross redevelopment history reaffirms the view that the inadequate institutional structures that framed the cluster of mega projects damaged the opportunities for successful outcomes to the coordination between railway development and urban regeneration schemes. The institutional arrangements also play the role for the transformation of stakeholders’ power and the allocation of resources which determine a mega project development timeframe. Mega-project power relations were complex and dynamic. In some cases, they were constrained over time by changing political agendas, changing property markets, and conflicting aspirations between the local community and the principal project stakeholders, particularly the developers. In addition, a limited commitment to sustainability and inclusive urban regeneration also impacts such power structures. These conclusions were born out by the findings of the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations as discussed in Section 5.1.2 (also see Appendix 8, Table A8.8). Nonetheless, further study is needed for more concrete evidence to demonstrate the importance of institutional arrangements and power relations in mega-project development. The result is presented in Chapter 6.
HYPOTHESIS 3 – Synergy of Network

Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.

The anticipated synergy of urban regeneration and transport station development cited in study Hypothesis #3 is, according to the results of the literature review, too simplistic a view. The case of the King’s Cross area redevelopment instead shows that achieving such synergistic qualities was undermined by two types of problems. One was its heavy reliance on property and land value gains. The other problem relates to the prolonged project delivery both of the CTRL project and the King’s Cross development. The latter delay resulted from the many uncertainties arising from the planning policies for the King’s Cross Railway Lands and the progress of the adjacent transport projects. As to the interaction between the King’s Cross development and the 2012 London Olympics, the literature review suggests there is a lack of evidence indicating that these two mega projects have a strong linkage. This finding is not, however, substantiated entirely by the findings of the hypothesis-led investigation where some interviews argue that the Games-oriented development gave strong thrust to the associated transport projects development in King’s Cross area.

Compromise agreement embedded implicitly in the negotiation that underlined the inter-agency co-operation was one of the components of the synergistic relations. In the King’s Cross case, the CTRL project predominated and it was influential in the characteristics and timeframe of the King’s Cross redevelopment. The test is whether the network between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events brings synergistic benefits to the integration of development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects. Is there a shared vision of integrated development and of sustainable development that brings far-reaching benefits for everyone? This evaluation relates to Hypothesis #3 on the factors of an effective project-led network in the hypothesis-led investigation (see Appendix 5). One of the interviewees who disagrees with this premise stated that:

“CTRL is an unsustainable project in terms of encouraging the development along its stations. They all follow the modern model and create disadvantages to local communities.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the local community, 10/07/2008)

This resonates with the analysis of mega project promotion activities in Chapter 2. It claims that such development is increasingly encouraged by global trends, cross-national firms, and investment banks. This case study concludes that within the context of democracy, the multiple levels of stakeholders and their different agendas are obstacles to inter-agency co-operation, and far from being the
HYPOTHESIS 4 – Discourse Power

Key champions of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas.

Whatever the good intentions and willingness of the planners, policy makers, and developers involved in the mega projects reviewed, their overriding concerns were ultimately determined by profit-sustaining and cost-reducing issues. This has been amplified by the circumstances of the economic recession present at the time of writing. This observation was substantiated by the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Property-oriented development”; Appendix 5, HRQ #9) as discussed in Section 5.5.1. It is illustrated, as already indicated in Section 5.3.2, by the present rush of developers seeking to renegotiate Section 106 agreements in order to reduce the costs of their obligations of contributing to the locality.

Despite ‘inclusive’ urban regeneration being regarded as one of the essential approaches to a real sustainable development vision, the findings of the case study analysis presented thus far suggest that considerable difficulties were encountered in this area. These were found to essentially stem from a profit-driven property development and did much to distort the principle of inclusion in planning decision-making. For instance, in the case of community development, it was noted there were substantial difficulties in defining communities socially, geographically, and temporally. The case study highlighted problems of over-representation (even suspected mis-representation) which emerge as especially problematic where public apathy prevails and when deciding whose concerns should ultimately be considered when formulating the project response. These issues were reflected in the hypothesis-led investigation carried out by the OMEGA pilot study (see Wright, 2008). An interview transcript states that the local campaign group that opposed the King’s Cross Central scheme does not represent the wider community. According to the developer’s own survey, the majority of local people they talked to expressed their concerns about the prolonged debate and acrimony on the regeneration project. The local people hope the scheme can go ahead. For the non-community perspective, the motivation to reach a consensus and to manage dissent led to a closure of the public participation process that ultimately enabled properties within the King’s Cross Central scheme to be developed from a basis of developers’ self-interest (Imrie, 2009). One may conclude from this that the visions of sustainable development employed ultimately become inextricably entwined with the discourse used and that this discourse in turn was employed in a manner that reinforced the dominant powers of the project discourse network and marginalised local group interests.
5.6.2 Discussion

Based on the review of literature on theory in Chapter 2, the evidence found in the King’s Cross Central case study supports the arguments regarding the role of institutional arrangements and power relations in mega-project decision-making, and endorses the characteristics of such decision-making processes (i.e., ‘disjointed incrementalism’ and ‘path dependency’) and the use of project discourse.

Apart from the discussions presented so far in this chapter, there are several additional hypotheses or issues that emerged from the investigation of the King’s Cross Central scheme. These are described below:

Inequality in bargaining is a necessary element for achieving mega project delivery
Both Chapters 4 and 5 reveal that the consensus in the decision-making process for mega projects is achieved by constant bargaining and compromises in a manner that conforms to the ‘disjointed incrementalism’ theory of Braybrook and Lindblom discussed in Chapter 2. The investigation of the case study demonstrates that this bargaining power was not equally distributed among the various stakeholders of the CTRL project and the King’s Cross Central scheme and that the compromises and consensus reached were often undertaken with a marginal involvement of local community groups. What is apparent is that, according to Edwards (2008), the existing institutional arrangements do not offer equal power to each stakeholder in the network – some actors play a more dominant role as a result of the scale of their financial investment and risks – and that advantageous positions can be re-enforced over time as the project develops. As concluded by Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) and Catlaw (2006), a certain level of central control and government intervention can contribute to an effective project-led coordination, even while there is increasing emphasis on networking among multiple stakeholders (see Chapter 2). This can be seen in the responses from the ORQ #3 in the hypothesis-led investigation relating to the issue of where leadership should reside within a cluster of mega project developments.

The King’s Cross Central urban regeneration scheme is over reliant on developer contributions
A review of the case study literature reveals a notable scarcity of funds to deliver the various mega projects and how this impeded progress in both new MUTP investments but also urban regeneration projects. The case study analyses also reveal how competition-based funding schemes, such as the City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget, have revealed negative impacts, including the dilution of financial and planning resources by being spread across too many regions and projects. The challenge subsequently lies in how to identify regeneration schemes that are most needed and make decisions that incorporate a strong public interest and at the same time manage the realities of short-term political or business benefits. It was also noted from the investigations of the case study that the current project financing mechanism locked politicians, developers, and other stakeholders into a financial cycle which lead to expensive housing, high-rise offices, and over-development. This
over-reliance on developer contributions constrains the local authorities’ negotiation power which is supposed to ensure that private sector developers fulfil their social responsibility. Such constrains accompanying prestigious projects are often the result of policy-makers seeking high-profile, short-term benefits to stimulate economic growth. Furthermore, the investments of prestigious projects are at inordinate risk to be locked into high political and financial costs. These costs can be greater than the prices if withdraw the projects (Pierson, 2000; also see Chapter 2).

**There is a lack of an integrated planning strategy between transport and property development**

It is very apparent, both from the case study examined here and the UK experience overall, that there is little evidence to support claims that urban transport and property developments in the UK have been integrated efficiently and effectively over any significant period of time. This, it is understood, can be attributed to fragmentation and lack of coordination between the institutional parties responsible for planning and delivering projects in each domain. The problem highlights the critical need for a better planning framework which contains long-term development visions that provide integrated urban transport and land-use planning. This topic has long been discussed and researched both in the UK and overseas but, unfortunately, remains an elusive vision in the UK. Coordination between the sectors is highly desirable. It requires, however, sufficient and sustained public funding and pressure to resist the market forces of short-term gain.

**5.7 Conclusions**

This chapter has explored the sustainable urban regeneration scheme - King’s Cross Central – in detail. In particular, it has examined its development history and the evolution of power relations in the decision-making process. It has shown the dynamics of the coordination between rail and urban development, as well as the controversy between political promises on sustainable development and the financial constraints.

It remains a matter of debate whether the CTRL project can stimulate *sustainable* urban regeneration at its hub areas. The King’s Cross Central scheme has been greatly affected by the high-speed railway decision-making timeframe. The indecisive and prolonged decision-making of the CTRL had delayed the King’s Cross development for two decades. The uncertainties generated by the extended planning process discouraged prospective investments. There are also positive impacts of the CTRL project on the King’s Cross area, such as the newly refurbished St Pancras International which has become one of the London’s visitor attractions in its own right. This CTRL terminal has also revived investor confidence in the area.

The actions taken by the opposition groups conform to Hajer’s (2003a) theory of “stand-by politicians” who then became politically active (also see Chapter 2). The dynamics of negotiation powers showed that the community groups committed themselves to a series of campaigns in order to
make changes to the project specification. However, under the existing planning system, political climate, and economic situation, the developers remain in the most powerful position in the negotiation process.

Sustainability remains part of the urban regeneration discourse which is used to promote the project. Camden Council, in the promotion of sustainable urban regeneration at King’s Cross area, played a mediator role which has been very influential. It concludes that if there can be an input of resources, this can further help to gain influence. Although this does not provide absolute power, the local authority can participate in decision-making on project specifications and securing local needs by proactive involvement, or as one interviewee put it:

“If you are not at the table, you are on the menu.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

The integrated development between MUTPs and sustainable urban regeneration schemes has generated two opposite opinions. On the one hand, there is criticism that collaboration between mega projects is inevitable since project champions all copy similar modern models of development styles. The force of globalisation and the increasing interdependency of international economics have persuaded mega-project decision-makers to follow the trend while ignoring the local context. On the other hand, this kind of development integration is considered beneficial by some interviewees who explained that a stronger business case could be built through mega-project integration, although some beneficial outcomes might be intangible and others emerge only after a lengthy passage of time. There is a degree of cynicism towards the achievement of sustainability visions in terms of its essence, manoeuvring, and ownership.

After the examination of the relationship between the MUTP and its associated sustainable urban regeneration scheme, the next chapter will focus on another CTRL hub development – Stratford International – and the 2012 London Olympics site which is located next to the high-speed railway station. Apart from the King’s Cross railway lands, the Stratford City is the second part of railway real estate assets given to a developer, the LCR, for its property development. However, the introduction of the Olympic-oriented projects within the same neighbourhood has caused controversy and problems to the already complex project decision-making network. Chapter 6 explores the decision-making process of the Stratford City scheme and the London Olympics as well as the dynamics of the negotiation battle among its stakeholders.
6 Case Study of Urban Regeneration in Stratford and the 2012 London Olympic Games

6.1 Introduction

This chapter comprises a critical review of the role of a mega event – the 2012 London Olympics – as the third main theme of the case study, and studies its impact on the urban regeneration scheme at Stratford in the vicinity of the new CTRL station. Stratford City, under construction at the time of writing (see Figure 6.1), is an urban regeneration scheme situated adjacent to Stratford International Station. It is located within the main site of the 2012 London Olympic Games (see Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.1: Stratford City – Under Construction in May 2010

Source: Author, the image is edited from the website of Westfield Stratford City (2010) Site Progress. Available at: http://uk.westfield.com/stratfordcity/vision/site-progress/ [Accessed on 13/06/2010]
For the purpose of this study, the term ‘mega events’ are defined as (also see the definition in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3) “large-scale cultural, including commercial and sporting, events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal, and international significance. They are typically organised by variable combinations of national governmental and international non-governmental organisations and thus can be said to be important elements in ‘official’ versions of public culture” (Roche, 2000:1). In the context of this case study the Games are both a mega event and a mega project that are being completed as the final phase of the development of the CTRL, alongside its other principal transport hub developments. This cluster of mega projects and their interrelationships over time, in space, and institutionally is the subject of this case study. The role and impact of the Games and the urban regeneration around Stratford International Station on this cluster of developments are examined.

Stratford City and the 2012 London Olympic Games are chosen in order to address the research questions posed in this study. Section 6.1 outlines the conception of the Stratford City scheme and the 2012 London Olympic Games project. This involves an examination of the complex inter-relationships among the key stakeholders, and their negotiating positions during the decision-making process. Section 6.2 delves into each of the project development history and the pivotal events along the way, including its rising costs, impacts, opportunities, and the institutional power relations among the various project stakeholder networks that moulded both mega projects. This discussion is
accompanied by a presentation of the timeline for both projects (see Table 6.2). Section 6.3 elaborates on the main issues and challenges associated with the coordination between the High Speed 1 terminal, the Stratford City scheme, and the 2012 Games. It explores the rationale behind reprioritising resources and the contextual forces operating in collaboration or competition that ultimately helped all of these three projects to be implemented. Section 6.4 focuses on the visions and political pledges of the 2012 Games. It closes with a review of several studies critical of the impacts of the Games, and views this alongside the synthesis of the case study investigations. Particular emphasis is placed on the forecasts of economic growth and job creation to be generated by the Games. Section 6.5 evaluates influence of political champions and dynamics of political power in the negotiation and decision-making process among the complex stakeholder networks. Section 6.6 summarises the results of the hypothesis-testing and highlights the emergent theories and issues derived from the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations. They are discussed in light of the observations made in Chapter 2. The final section concludes the chapter with a summary of the key findings.

6.1.1 Project facts

Facts and figures of the Stratford City scheme
Stratford City is one of several urban regeneration schemes stimulated by the CTRL project (see Table 6.1). The 73-hectare new development is dominated by the Stratford International Station in the centre of the site (see Figure 6.3). Stratford Regional Station is only 400 metres away and provides access to domestic public transport services, including buses, railways, light rail (Docklands Light Railway) and London Underground. The domestic passenger line began operation in 2009 as part of the CTRL services. Stratford City is also intended to become a major gateway for those attending the 2012 London Olympic Games. In 2012, the Olympic Javelin train service will run through Ebbsfleet, Stratford, and central London carrying spectators to and from the Olympic site (Figure 6.4).

The construction work for Stratford City began on site in early 2007. After the announcement of 2012 London Olympics in 2005, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), London Development Agency (LDA), and London & Continental Railways (LCR) entered into a collaborative agreement to manage and monitor the delivery of the Stratford City Scheme. The Stratford City site (see Figure 6.3) is the former railway marshalling yards. This area is ‘brownfield’ land (previously built upon but cleared for development), adjacent to excellent transport links and in an urban regeneration priority area that is eligible for government and EU funding.
Table 6.1: Stratford City Regeneration Scheme Facts and Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Highlights</th>
<th>The largest single mixed-use urban regeneration project in Europe (LCR website)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site of Project</td>
<td>73 hectares (180 acres) of former railway marshalling yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Connectivity</td>
<td>• Regional rail services into Liverpool Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Several underground lines: the North London Line, the Central and Jubilee Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Docklands Light Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A CTRL international and domestic station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic context</td>
<td>LCR and the developers of Stratford City are working with the LDA to construct the Olympic Village and the Olympic International Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project phasing</td>
<td>• Phased over time, the development will establish a new, dense, urban quarter nearby to major retail and leisure facilities for east London, together with significant new office development and around 4,850 new homes (7,000 homes after the 2012 Olympics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Phase 1 of the development programme will deliver 140,000 m² (1.5m ft²) of retail space, 37,000 m² (400,000 ft²) of leisure space and 500 homes by 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>• Construction is due to start in late 2006/early 2007, with the first phase of the development due for completion in late 2009. The entire development is scheduled to be complete by 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project key features[^61]</td>
<td>• 1.25 million sq m (13.5m sq ft) of regeneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• £4 billion investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 4,850 new homes of which 1,455 will be affordable housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 930,000 sq m (10m sq ft) of commercial &amp; residential property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 140,000 sq m (1.5m sq ft) of retail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 37,000 sq m (400,000 sq ft) of leisure space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2,000 hotel bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 34,000 new jobs generated for the regional economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OMEGA Centre (2008)

Preparations for the 2012 bid had been underway since 1997 with the country’s intention to submit a bid officially announced by Prime Minister Tony Blair and London Mayor Ken Livingstone on 15th May 2003. The announcement by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that London had won the right to host the 2012 Olympics was made by its President on 6 July 2005. This was merely eight years after the declared intention to bid. In terms of mega project development, this represents a very fast-track set of decisions as the incubation period of many mega projects spans several decades.
Following the IOC announcement the UK Government set up the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) in 2006\textsuperscript{62}, and subsequently assigned to it planning powers in its own right. Its overall responsibility, as its name suggests, is to develop and deliver the new venues and infrastructure for the conduct of the Games, and planning for legacy use after 2012. The organisation structure of the ODA is shown in Figure 6.6. It began operating on 1st April 2006. Table 6.2 illustrates the pivotal events of the development history of the Stratford City scheme and the 2012 Olympics. A detailed discussion of these events is presented throughout this chapter.

Figure 6.4: 2012 London Olympic Stadium under Construction


[Accessed 04/08/2010]  

\textsuperscript{62} The ODA is a corporate body established by Section 3 of the London Olympic Games and Paralympics Games Act of 2006.
Table 6.2: Timeline of the Stratford City Scheme and the 2012 Olympic Project Developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Stratford Development Partnership (SDP) was set up to manage Stratford City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Preparations for the 2012 bid have been underway since 1997. London Lea Valley Partnership (led by Newham Council) published the draft plan for the Stratford Railway Lands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>London Development Agency (LDA) was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Newham, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Lea Valley Regional Park, TfL and GLA formed the Rail Lands Working Group and published a 2020 vision as Stratford Rail Lands Framework. Corporation LTGDC came into existence on 26th June 2004. The Stratford City development was granted planning permission by Newham Council and was approved by the Mayor of London and the Government Office for London in October 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7th July 2005, International Olympic Committee President Jacques Rogge has announced that London will host the 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games. November 2005, LDA and LCR confirm that all parties have reached a successful outcome to their negotiations on land issues regarding Stratford City and the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The ODA was established by the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 on 30 March 2006. Westfield has fallen out with the Reuben Brothers over the development in Stratford. On 13 June 2006, the Westfield Group acquired from its co-owners, the 75% interest in the Stratford City development in east London which it did not already own. The final masterplan for the Olympic Park was published in June 2006. LCR and the ODA announced the shortlist of three bidders competing to deliver major elements of the Stratford City scheme (Zones 2-7).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.3: Parameters of Olympic Park Developments (OPDs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>- 246 hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Olympic Park is built around the valley of the river Lea which runs from the Eurostar train station at Stratford to the Thames.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy</td>
<td>- In order to recoup costs for the event, the Olympic park will narrow and much of the land is going to be sold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Olympic Park will open to the public in 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 4,500 housing are going to be converted from the Athletes Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>- Approximately 4,500 homes from the conversion of the Athletes Village;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 150,000 sq metres of new retail space at Stratford City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 465,000 sq metres of new offices space</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ODA (2007: 6)

6.1.2 Key stakeholders and their power relations

Key project stakeholders of the Stratford Centre scheme are not easily distinguished from those of the Games (see Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6); this overlap will be addressed in the discussion which follows. Identifying the key stakeholders of each of these mega projects is needed to compare and contrast
their respective roles, interrelationships, and their individual strategies for improving their negotiating positions.

**Central Government**

The London Olympics Bill (Barclay et al., 2005), as introduced in the House of Commons, designated the UK Government as the Guarantor for the Games, which includes meeting any ultimate shortfall between costs and revenues of the ODA and LOCOG from the Games (NAO, 2008: 7). The UK government at the time subsequently set up the Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) to provide the government’s leadership and overall responsibility for the Games. Its main responsibility is to meet the obligations of the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006, the overall finances of the Games and sponsorship of the Olympic Delivery Authority.

Political support from central government is essential for all mega projects, including mega events, largely because they incur such high cost and high risk that the private sector could not and would not take them on. The mix of support from government varies from country to country, with regional and local authorities also playing significant roles. In the UK, while the Central Government tends to dominate these decisions, local support is an essential ingredient. The UK’s top-down approach facilitates interventions from the Central Government that enable procedures and decisions to be more easily streamlined in the interest of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of project delivery. The case of the regeneration in east London is an example of this top-down approach. Findings from the hypothesis-led investigations suggest that if the vision is to attract more investment to east London rather than concentrate all resources on central London, some degree of government intervention is needed, because, left to the market and the private sector forces, development would gravitate towards West London (see Appendix 8, Table A8.11). This finding confirms the results of the CTRL case study (see Chapter 4) as well as the theories claimed by Healey (1994) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) on the significance of governmental intervention in mega project development processes (see Chapter 2).
Figure 6.5: Stratford City Urban Regeneration Scheme Key Stakeholders

Source: Author
Figure 6.6: Stakeholder Network of the London 2012 Olympic Project

Source: Author, based on NAO (2008: 12, 13)
Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA)

Given the responsibility for delivering the Games, the ODA is permitted to buy, sell and hold land, develop and build the new venues and infrastructure for the Games, and develop a transport plan for the Games. Other agencies are obliged to cooperate with the decisions of the ODA. Its existence represents an incursion into local authority powers and has created some conflicts and tensions while at the same time opening up new areas of collaboration. While the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 underpins the legal powers of the ODA to be the local planning authority for the Olympic Park, there is a lack of distinction between the powers of the LDA and those of the local authorities on some aspects of land use planning and transport infrastructure development. This has led to a number of political disagreements, most of which have been resolved over time. The ODA Board consists of representatives from the public and private sectors and works with the LDA, Transport for London (TfL), Thames Gateway, and five designated Olympic local authorities.

The ODA, with its ultimate goal of the delivery of the 2012 London Olympic Games, also simultaneously pursues a number of other development objectives which can be viewed as providing the building blocks for the 2012 Olympic discourse. However, both the delay in producing the final budget and the more than doubling of the cost of the Games has had a significant impact on the credibility of the Olympic programme in London and its subsequent attractiveness to potential sponsors. These circumstances have been exacerbated by the economic recession at the time of writing which makes it difficult for the Games to obtain the level of private funding support it had initially envisaged. What is most significant about these developments is that they have together weakened the ODA’s negotiating power in its dealings with the private sector, with likely future repercussions in project outcomes. This was substantiated by the findings of both streams of the investigations which suggest that private entities obtain better negotiating positions because uncertainties and risks are written off by the government in the case of the 2012 London Olympics (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Mega events provide certainty” and Appendix 5, HRQ #4). Below is a quotation from the hypothesis-led interviews:

“There is a debate about the IOC wouldn’t grant us the privilege of the host city contract without almost being seduced by large brand new railway station. The Games has hugely accelerated the interests and increased the certainty of the development.” (Hypothesis-led interview, government agency, 31/07/2008)
The Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority Group, and the London Development Agency

As the first directly-elected Mayor of London in March 2000, Ken Livingston was regarded as the key figure for London engaging in the 2012 Olympic Bid. He stated that the Games could bring significant regeneration benefits to east London. Boris Johnson succeeded Livingston as Mayor on 4th May 2008, and he co-chairs the Olympic Board to oversee the 2012 project. The Mayor of London works with the Greater London Authority (GLA) Group to oversee the Olympic project. As the landowner, the LDA is responsible for leading skills and employment initiatives and programmes to increase grass-roots sport participation and promote London as a place for business investment. The LDA is also responsible for the physical, social, and economic legacy of the Olympic Park area, and more generally, the delivery of sustainable communities and regeneration of Greater London overall. It undertook the land acquisition for the Olympic Park which includes the Athletes Village as part of the Stratford City scheme.

As indicated in Chapter 5, the role of the Mayor in London is particularly influential at the strategic planning level. The London Plan is the Mayor’s spatial development strategy for London and it provides high-level guidelines for the local planning policies within London boroughs. The Stratford City plan is located in an area designated as the east London sub-region\(^63\). It acknowledges that one of the key strategic priorities is to promote and enable the comprehensive development of Stratford as a “mixed-use area” of London. It further suggests that the pivotal role of Stratford (as the connection between European links, the London-Stansted-Cambridge corridor and the Thames Gateway growth area) is highly strategic.

Under the Mayor’s direction, TfL is investing £10 billion to deliver a transport legacy for east London before 2012. The invested projects include: the east London Line extension, the Docklands Light Railway extension, and the upgrading of the Northern Line (tube). Relevant issues of the relationship between the Games and these transport developments are discussed in Section 6.3.2. The Mayor of London has set up an Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group (OPRSG)\(^64\) to provide the overall direction for the Olympic legacy agenda for east and southeast London. This focuses particularly on the development and delivery of the Legacy Masterplan Framework. The Olympic Park Legacy Company\(^65\) was set up in May 2009 by the Mayor of London and Central Government as a quango


\(^{64}\) OPRSG consists of the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson; Olympic Minister, Tessa Jowell; Housing Minister, Margaret Beckett; Leader of Greenwich Council, Chris Roberts; Mayor of Hackney, Jules Pipe; Mayor of Newham, Sir Robin Wales; Leader of Tower Hamlets Council, Jurfur Rahman and Leader of Waltham Forest Council, Clyde Loakes.

\(^{65}\) The Company’s partners include the five Olympic host boroughs, LOCOG, ODA, LTGDC, LVRPA (Lee Valley Regional
Apart from the physical legacies of mega events, other significant impacts are the institutional reforms and strategic governance that take place within the host city and its central government. Mega events can be used by authorities as an instrument to reinforce the political powers of incumbent administrations through successfully delivering such events with newly-established or amended policies. This argument is subscribed by Newman (2007:265) who claims that both the Mayor of London and the Prime Minister very much shared the Olympic stage for the 2012 Olympic Games bid and took the opportunity to introduce new aspects to their vision of city governance. In London’s case, the Olympic bid took place at the time when the power of the Mayor had just been enhanced and some new institutional arrangements emerged between London and Central Government. The current Mayor, Boris Johnson, has been able to use the potential of delivering the mega event to consolidate his power, whilst the politicians have strengthened their positions and ideologies by favouring the event (see Hill, 2010). This observation also echoes the theories of discourse power reviewed in Chapter 2. It suggests that key actors employ dominant discourse, such as the Games discourse, to restrict other possibilities and steer other stakeholders to be congruent with it (Hajer 1995 and 2003). The same argument is reflected in the findings from the hypothesis-led research questions (HRQ) #9 and #10 (see Appendix 5). Here are two quotations derived from the responses made by the interviewees:

“Ken Livingston had the power to tell people what a great idea it would be to bid for the Olympics so he persuaded the government and ensured that a bid was made. He had no money, only personality, charisma, connections, and energy. Moreover, Ken Livingston, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, and Sebastian Coe were all simultaneously in agreement. Their political commitment and determination pushed the Olympic project through. In this process, the discourse might prove effective and other concerns might be neglected unintentionally.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

“Politicians want to be associated with successful sports for the sake of their reputation and identification. They are seeking the ‘feel good’ factor.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the local community, 10/07/2008)
**Local Authorities**

There are five London Boroughs directly involved in the Games, these are: Newham, Waltham Forest, Hackney, Tower Hamlets, and Greenwich. While they are reported to be pleased to see resources concentrated in their localities to meet the development needs of the Games and its legacy, other local authorities within London are reported to feel indifferent to the Olympic Games despite being represented within the GLA.

As already addressed in Chapter 4, the importance of Newham Council and the Stratford Promoter Group (see Table 6.4) in the promotion of Stratford International Station and Stratford City urban regeneration emerged under the transformation of the planning context of east London throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This change was developed when confrontation pressures occurred between central and local government, especially in terms of the centralised control of planning power and the reduction of local budgets. The 1980s, more particularly, saw tensions develop between Newham Council (a Labour controlled London Borough) and the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC, established by a Conservative Government). As already indicated in Chapter 4, this streamlined planning power led Newham Council to turn what remained of its planning powers away from the Docklands area, and instead towards Stratford, one of the main town centres in its jurisdiction. Newham Council began to support the idea of Stratford International in 1987 after British Rail announced that it was considering Stratford as a station on the CTRL. Newham became a serious opponent of the King’s Cross Bill, and in November 1989 organised a conference, ‘A National Focus on the Channel Tunnel’, as part of its efforts to promote an easterly approach with a station rather than a terminus at Stratford – an idea supported by John Prescott, the Labour shadow Secretary of State for Transport.

According to the pre-hypothesis investigations, their efforts triggered a chain-reaction of key decisions which began with CTRL route selection, the designation of Stratford International, the Stratford City scheme, the Olympics, and then the go-ahead for Crossrail. Some argue that the Games can also represent a massive ‘opportunity cost’ when resources are diverted from other critical projects to meet the needs of the Olympics. Below is a quotation from one of the members of the Stratford Promoter Group:

“We thought this is the project that can really unlock that area. We consistently worked from 1988 through to 1997/8 to promote the idea that it would bring the engine, the catalyst for changing at Stratford.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, an officer from the local authority, 23/06/2008)
Table 6.4: Partners of Stratford Promoter Group

- Land Securities Properties—owners of the Stratford shopping mall
- Carpenters Company—a City of London charitable company owning land in the area
- P&O Developments—major development and construction company
- Link Parks
- University of East London
- Regalian Groups of Companies—developers
- Tarmac Construction—developers and house builders
- John Mowlem & Co. Plc—construction and civil engineering company
- Laing Civil Engineering—civil engineering company
- London Docklands Development Corporation
- Stratford Development Partnership Ltd
- London Borough of Newham
- Rialto Homes Plc—house builders
- Fairview New Homes Plc—house builders
- Persimmon Homes—house builders

Source: Florio and Edwards (2001: 106)

London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC)

LTGDC is a government agency established to oversee the developments in the Thames Gateway development area, within which Stratford stands at the western end. The original idea of the regeneration for the Thames Corridor (see Figure 6.7) in east London came from Michael Heseltine (see Chapter 4). LTGDC came into existence on 26th June 2004 and it was sponsored by the Department for Communities and Local Governments (DCLG) with an indicative lifespan of 10 years. It is designated as a vehicle to deliver jobs and housing to meet the aspirations of the government’s Sustainable Communities Plan. The planning control powers given to the LTGDC, excluding the Stratford City and the Olympic zone, have been in effect since 31st October 2005. As indicated earlier, between 1997 and 2010, according to Poynter (2009: 136), the LTGDC received strong support from the Labour government through the DCLG, as well as through other London agencies including the London Mayor’s Office, the GLA, the LDA, and the local authorities located within the region. However, the fragmented nature of this governance and its lack of integration of stakeholder interests did much to undermine the effectiveness of the LTGDC (see Raco, 2005). The LTGDC now claims that the project needs more financial support from Central Government in order to make more rapid progress. The friction between the LTGDC and Central Government has intensified since the Conservative Party Mayor, Boris Johnson, was elected.

When still in Government, the New Labour administration was wary that the devolution of more
powers to the LTGDC would confer too much influence on the new London Mayor (Branson and Walker, 2008) with the result that the Mayor would take over the control of Thames Gateway development. The argument against these current developments is that these stimuli are primarily contained within the London area of the Thames Gateway and that the momentum behind the remaining areas outside London is insufficient to meet local priority needs. Given the fact that the LTGDC has failed to meet its targets of housing development and the fact that the 2012 London Olympics has diverted resources from Stratford, there are accusations circulating that this has contributed to significant delays of development in other parts of the Thames Gateway and that the gains as presented by Government are not what they appear or as the rhetoric suggests. This was substantiated by both of the findings of the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations undertaken in support of the research (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Impact of the 2012 Olympic Games on the Thames Gateway Development” and Appendix 5, HRQ #8). Here is one of the interviewees’ statement quoted from the pre-hypothesis investigations:

“\[the 2012 Olympics\] will have significant implications to the Thames Gateway because Thames Gateway is also a provider of lots of new housing over a period of time and clearly in the immediate time after 2012, they are not going to be in the position to bring on to the market further additional housing. The re-phasing of the delivery of Thames Gateway is also going to be significantly impacted by the 2012 Olympics.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a private sector developer, 11/06/2008)

Figure 6.7: Thames Gateway Development Area

The Developers

The Stratford City Development Partners was a partnership (before July, 2006) consisting of Aldersgate, London & Continental Railways (LCR), Multiplex, Stanhope and Westfield, responsible for developing major plans to transform the Stratford Railway Lands into a new piece of city. Until 2006, the owners of Stratford City site included Multiplex, Westfield, Stanhope and the Reuben brothers. In June 2006, the Westfield Group acquired from its co-owners a 75 per cent interest in Stratford City Development Partners and became the individual developer for the Stratford City Development scheme. This buy-out was caused by a dispute between the Westfield Group and the Reuben brothers. Before the dispute, the Multiplex Group was already minded to sell its interest in Stratford City site after it met huge losses building Wembley stadium (Waples, 2006). Westfield, which preferred to focus on retail-led development, then sought partners with experience in creating large-scale mixed-use developments. In March 2007, the ODA and LCR chose Lend Lease Corporation and partners First Base and East Thames as their preferred development partners for Stratford City. Since the outline planning permission for the site was granted in January 2007, the site has been split into seven development zones with Westfield being responsible for Zone 1 and the Lend Lease Group being responsible for Zones 2-7, including the Olympic Athletes’ Village (see Figure 6.3). This observation confirms one of the characteristics revealed in Chapter 2 which suggests that mega projects obtain complex stakeholder networks and they change over time.

Opposition Groups

By the time the announcement was made that London was to host the 2012 Olympic Games, the courses of action open to opposing groups were limited to monitoring the development process and campaigning against land and premises relocations as the pace of issuing compulsory purchase orders intensified (Evans, 2007: 308). Others, campaigning on issues of negative social and environmental impacts, spiralling costs, and general resistance to this kind of mega event, seemed to be confined to background ‘noise’ devoid of influence to change the course of the Olympics (see Gaus, 2007; Cheyne, 2010)66. Much of this opposition is based on the argument that the investment of the Olympics is not sensible given the likely marginal benefits from the Games and the scale of expenditure on a single elite 17-day sporting event. This will not only divert public finances away from other important areas of public expenditure but also increase the national deficit for decades ahead. For Britain, which at the time of writing is enduring much more constrained economic circumstances, public support for the Games is more subdued with much greater concern about opportunity costs.

In the view of several project stakeholders, individuals within the local community could exert greater

66 Many examples are addressed in the Games Monitor website: http://www.gamesmonitor.org.uk/
influence during the negotiation process by lodging formal appeals against the mega project decisions. In doing so, these legal challenges could lead to costly time delays and even jeopardise the project (also see Chapter 5). This was apparent from the CTRL and the King’s Cross development case study material, and to a lesser degree for the 2012 Olympic Project. In the case of the Games, these objectors lacked genuine power and ultimately were obliged to adopt major compromises. In the CTRL and the King’s Cross development cases, the findings suggest that well-organised, local community groups can play a role in the choice of planning options and seek to ensure that the outcome is not excessively one-sided. As Lindblom (1988: 142) suggests: “Many will still look upon government as essentially corrupt and incompetent, but the voice of the mass of the people will demand with increasing insistence strong and effective government to cope with the problems of society”.

The views of local community groups are also ostensibly important in the Olympic Games as the IOC awards the host city partly by judging the public support for the Olympics in the host city under question. At the time of the 2012 bidding process there was very little opposition to the proposal, with many inherent reservations hidden beneath a positive discourse and the ‘feel-good factor’ that was presumed would emanate from a successful bid. This is reinforced by evidence from the hypothesis-led investigation which reveals that there was some feeling that the government employed a PR strategy to foster a close relationship with the media and use this to amplify the effect of their Olympic rhetoric (see Appendix 5, HRQ #9). It was not until the budget escalation became known in 2007 – the estimated cost of £2.375 billion rose to £9.3 billion – did the media reverse their earlier favourable position and start to criticise the costly taxpayer-funded event. Thus the power of the local opposition to these projects was limited for several reasons despite the claims of several project stakeholders to the contrary.

The Stratford Renaissance Partnership (SRP)\(^{67}\)

SRP was established in January 2007. Its remit covers a broad zone within the borough of Newham, covering the Olympic Park, Stratford City, the Island Site, Stratford High Street, and the two conservation areas (see Figure 6.8). It is composed of a range of stakeholders. Its purpose is to promote the regeneration of the wider Stratford area through partnerships and to operate over a period of not less than ten years (2007-2017). SRP is a ‘not-for-profit company and has on its Board ‘subscribing’ or grant-aiding member organisations with interests in the Town Centre and Stratford’s Cultural and Community Forums. SRP has published its own ‘Strategic Plan’ (see SRP, 2007) which sets out its key objectives for the next ten years, together with a ‘Business Plan’ which sets out how

\(^{67}\) See Stratford Renaissance Partnership website: http://www.stratford-renaissance.co.uk/stratford-city
SRP will take forward the objectives identified in its Strategic Plan. The significance of SRP’s role is undermined by the London Development Agency, which is responsible of the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) which began preparation in 2007 and will be a key driver for change and growth in the area.

**Figure 6.8: Stratford Renaissance Partnership Area of Interest**

Source: SRP (2007)

### 6.2 History of the Stratford City Scheme Development and the 2012 London Olympic Games

#### 6.2.1 Background

Stratford is located at the edge of London and also at the western end of the Thames Gateway development area (see Figure 6.9). The magnetic attraction of central London makes it very difficult for Stratford to compete both in terms of business investment and tourism development. Canary Wharf has, furthermore, emerged as a second Central Business District for London after the City itself and presents strong competition to Stratford should it wish to develop as a business centre. Under the Thames Gateway Development Framework, Stratford is defined as its new West Metropolitan Area. Notwithstanding this, the likelihood and extent of Stratford regeneration benefits being stretched to other areas of the Thames Gateway are worthy of debate. Another uncertainty is the extent to which the present economic downturn and the recent slump in the housing market (2007 to the present) will
impact on future public investments and the prioritisation of short-term, revenue generating, projects within Stratford. There is no doubt, however, that the London Olympics has injected a significant degree of certainty into this uncertain environment as well as an immutable timeframe for projects in Stratford, compared to the conditions for developments elsewhere.

The planning of Stratford City is an outcome of a multiple-tiered set of policy and contexts directed from a number of levels ranging across central, regional, and local government guidance (see Table 6.5). These policies all highlight Stratford as central to the regeneration of the Thames Gateway (see Figure 6.7), east London and the London Borough of Newham. The Stratford City scheme evolved from early initiatives including the City Challenge (see Chapter 4) and Single Regeneration Budget programmes (see Chapter 5) in the 1980s and 1990s, through to the current momentum generated by the CTRL and the imperative of the London 2012 Olympics. The plans for Stratford City seek to integrate Stratford Railway Land regeneration and the Stratford International Station development, as well as simultaneously redevelop the surrounding neighbourhood, with the wider ambition contributing to the development of London as an exemplary sustainable world city.

**Figure 6.9: Stratford as the West Metropolitan Edge of the Thames Gateway**


The third mega project under scrutiny is the 2012 London Olympic Games. The Games advocates claim that this particular kind of international mega event will have significant impact on sustainable development within the urban regeneration schemes of east London in general, and Stratford in
particular, including those underpinning the event or triggered by it. As the subsequent discussion will reveal, these developments have in turn led to the evolution of a dynamic institutional network that has greatly increased in complexity since this site was decided and included within the Olympic site for London.

The London Games Act of 2006 addressed the responsibilities and obligations for the UK to deliver the 2012 Olympics. It established the ODA and defined its responsibilities, stipulated the requirements of the Olympic Transport Plan, and introduced regulations for advertising and for street trading. The theme of the London Games is ‘towards a one planet 2012’. This is intended to reflect the Games’ delivery partners’ commitment to present an event which can maximise the sustainable economic, social, health, environmental, and sporting benefits and legacy for both London and the UK overall. The plans for the London 2012 Games comprise eight interrelated and interdependent aspects of delivery, including plans for the Olympic Park, transport, sustainability, ceremonies, technology, security, ticketing, and accommodation.

Table 6.5: Stratford City Planning Policy Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Sustainable Communities Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The then Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, launched the Sustainable Communities Plan in February 2003. This plan sets out a long-term programme to address housing supply issues in the South East, low demand in other parts of the country, and the quality of the public spaces. It conforms to the Regions’ White Paper, ‘Your Region, Your Choice’, which set out the government’s plans to decentralise power and strengthen regional policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Thames Gateway development is located in London and the South East region, two of the fourteen zones identified by the Sustainable Communities Plan, and presents a huge development opportunity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The London Plan represents the strategic planning framework for the integrated social, economic and environmental development of the city over the next 15–20 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The London Plan identified the Lower Lea Valley and Stratford as ‘Opportunity Areas’ in the ‘East London Sub-Region’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The key strategic priorities include the housing, employment and mixed-use developments in the Thames Corridor with the vision that this sub-region can contribute to London’s world city role and the 2012 Olympics bid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|

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68 These include the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), along with HM Government, Greater London Authority (GLA), British Olympic Association (BOA) and British Paralympic Association (BPA).
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

- The LLV OAPF outlines a vision for future development of the LLV area under thematic principles and needs to be incorporated into the Local Development Framework (LDF).
- The LLV OAPF provides a planning policy context for the assessment of planning applications for non-Olympic and legacy proposals as well as for the wider LLV regeneration area (Newham website and SRP, 2007: 38-39).

### Stratford and Lower Lea Valley Area Action Plan (AAP) (2010)
- This has been commissioned jointly by the London Borough of Newham and the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (Newham website and SRP, 2007: 38-39).

### Newham 2001 Unitary Development Plan (UDP)
- The 2001 UDP provides a number of site-specific policies, including the ‘Arc of Opportunity’ within which Stratford sits (SRP, 2007: 38).

### Newham Local Development Framework (LDF)
- The LDF is required since there are changes to the planning system. The LDF will replace the existing Unitary Development Plan and set the scene for the development and regeneration of the borough over the next 20 years.


### 6.2.2 Project initiatives and obstacles

**Heavy lobbying over the Stratford International**

In the 1980’s the LB of Newham embarked upon a strategy of seeking to locate an international station for the CTRL in Stratford as it was convinced that the involvement of private sector was the only way to secure funding for development, which in turn would attract more investment to the area. This strategy was pursued, incidentally, at the same time that the LDDC’s docklands development became mired in the property market collapse at the end of the decade. In proposing Stratford International, the Newham Council saw the opportunity of linking Stratford to the CTRL as an initiative that would not only foster further development in the LDDC’s territory but also spawn more development in the wider area of the Thames Gateway scheme. Through shared interest, Newham Council, the LDDC, and several other public and private organisations formed the Stratford Promoter Group (SPG) in 1993 to lobby for the idea of Stratford International. The SPG vision for this CTRL hub, however, was undermined by the government’s concern about the troubled PFI arrangement for the CTRL project itself (see Chapter 4). This experience led government to opt for monopoly control over the Stratford Railway lands in order to use the potential profitability from going ahead with the Stratford International project to enhance the attractiveness of the entire PFI package of the CTRL.
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project to investors and developers. In July 1992, the Stratford Promoter Group won the City Challenge Bid for the Stratford Railway lands regeneration, and it formed the Stratford Development Partnership (SDP). As mentioned in Chapter 4, following sustained lobbying by the Stratford Promoter Group, in January 1994 the Secretary of State for Transport declared the choice of the east London route via Stratford in preference to the other options. The Government chose the more expensive option – the east London route – despite the £175m already expended by BR on the route through South East London. The east London route also meant an increase in travel time for passengers (by some 20 minutes) (See OMEGA Centre, 2008). A very insightful discussion of this and the urban regeneration movement overall in Stratford is given by Florio and Edwards (2001).

The impacts of the Olympic Games on the Stratford City scheme

The Games’ organisers claim that the Stratford City regeneration scheme is attributable to the “Games effect”. This scheme, however, was already enshrined in the CTRL Act 1996 as part of the “CTRL development package” with the result, it has been argued (see Blake, 2005; DCMS and PwC, 2005; Experian, 2006; Kornblatt, 2006; UBS Investment Research, 2006; Atkinson et al, 2008), that the consequent housing construction and job creation cannot legitimately be attributed to the Games. The notion presented by the Games organisers is that this mega event functions as a catalyst to other important projects by prioritising and concentrating the financial, political, and institutional resources to the Olympic-related projects in which the Stratford City scheme is included. It is argued that this has led to the acceleration of the Stratford City programme which was originally phased over 15-20 years from 2007. This has brought benefits, especially for private sector developers seeking short-term returns from their developments.

Three respondents from the interviews claimed that Ken Livingston and others in central and local government as well as in business at the time who promoted the Olympic Bid, in effect recycled the urban regeneration benefits of Stratford City scheme which preceded the Olympic project. They argued that the public are confused by the separate claims for these two projects where they have very different development paths and genesis; namely the Stratford City scheme emerged under the transformation of the planning context of east London throughout the 1980s and 1990s whilst the Olympic promoters started their preparation in 1997 and only officially announced London’s participation in the 2012 Olympic bid in 2003. This, however, contradicts one of the returns of the OMEGA Centre interviews where it is suggested that the idea to exploit the high-speed rail

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connections, airport connections, land availability and proximity to the populous of London in east London to host major sporting event was established in the outset of Thames Gateway or East Thames Corridor development.

Housing development within the Stratford City scheme comprises approximately 7,000 dwellings, which includes 4,850 new homes for the Athletes Village. According to the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations conducted for this research, the original promoters of the Stratford City scheme claim that the phasing of the Stratford City delivery programme was disrupted by the Games and thus forced its investors to put a large amount of housing on the market only after the Games (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Impact of the 2012 Olympic Games on the Thames Gateway Development”; Appendix 5, HRQ #7). Although it would be sensible for the developers to leave sufficient flexibility in order to properly accommodate the post 2012 housing market, the force of the Olympic project can be said to enhance the artificial pressures on the already uncertain and fragile property market and thereby distort it. The issue became more intricate when the developer for the Athletes Village revealed in 2009 that it needed a bailout from European Investment Bank and direct government fund due to the recession curtailing private sector interest in participation (see Webb, 2009). The fact that the Government consequently nationalised the athlete village project in the end of 2009 showed that the Games may guarantee the delivery of the Stratford City scheme but not without reconfiguring its programme and characteristics. This reflects to the findings of the pre-hypothesis investigations which suggest that, initially, the housing development of Stratford City made compromise for the Olympic Games by reprioritising its development resources, but after the collapse of the property market, the Government made financial compromise to sustain the project in order to deliver the Olympics. The pressure is then on to the UK taxpayers’ shoulder.

**Financing arrangements and the spiralling costs of the 2012 Olympic development**

The London 2012 project is delivered by the LDA and the LOCOG with respectively private and public funding. The former has a £2 billion budget raised from the private sector while the latter represents public sector interests in the mega event with a budget drawn entirely from public funds from the DCMS, the GLA, and the Olympic Lottery Distributor (see Table 6.6). Some of the £2.2 billion National Lottery fund has already been diverted to help finance the Games. The Lottery will, however, share profits made from the land and property sales post-Games in an effort to repay some of this funding. The GLA is contributing £925 million (mainly drawn from Londoners’ Council Tax), while the LDA is providing £250 million toward the costs of the infrastructure and venues for the Games. It is also investing some £220 million in the clean-up of the land assigned to the Olympics Park.
In March 2007, Tessa Jowell (the then Minister for the Olympics) announced that the budget for the London Olympics had risen to £9.3 billion. The estimated gross cost at the time of the bid was just over £4 billion, to be met by £3.4 billion in public funding and an anticipated £700 million from the private sector (see BOA, 2004). The revised budget of £9.3 billion includes a number of higher costs in the ODA’s programme management budget – in the form of increased contingency funds, tax, and security costs. The £700 million anticipated from the private sector proved to be far too optimistic and only £165 million was generated. The shortfall had to be met by public funds (NAO, 2008). According to NAO sources (see NAO, 2008), the contingency funds had to be increased to £2.747 billion because of uncertainties about final design specifications, the impact of construction price inflation, and the responses of potential suppliers to invitations to tender.

Kornablatt (2006) gave early warning of the problems with the budget estimate(s) by highlighting imprecise costings in the Olympic Bid. He claimed that any subsequent discrepancies would undermine the goodwill behind the Games. The NAO report of February 2007 on risk assessment and management of the budget argued that the budget needed urgently to be clarified and effectively managed because the longer the delay in finalising the budget, the greater the risk of it having an adverse impact on the Olympic programme (NAO, 2007a: 16). The early highly-inaccurate cost estimates, at a later date, did much to discredit the accountability of the London Games’ delivery team.

### Table 6.6: The Budget for the Games at March 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>£ million</th>
<th>£ million</th>
<th>Change from the funding at the time of the bid £ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exchequer funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Lottery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceeds from designated “Olympic” lottery games</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending by the sports lottery distribution</td>
<td>340¹</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General lottery proceeds transferred from the National Lottery Distribution Fund to the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund²</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>675</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>675</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council tax precept</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional contribution</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Development Agency</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>9,325</td>
<td>5,906</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: NAO (2007a: 18)
and as predicted eroded much of the ‘feel-good factor’ that the promoters built up with the help of the media during and immediately following the bid.

The cost estimates in the Candidate File were based on the review conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), who were commissioned to identify the economic impacts related both to the Games and to the regeneration benefits of the Lower Lea Valley. PwC was also the consultant used to prepare the visitor forecasts and impact assessment for the Millennium Dome in 1994 (see BOA, 2004: 103). Both the Games and the Millennium Dome forecasts did not ultimately materialise in that there were significant shortfalls, thereby illustrating the many tribulations and uncertainties involved in producing accurate forecasts for major projects.

Financial responsibility for the Athletes’ Village, developed by the Bovis Lend Lease consortium, was taken over by the government after private investment dried up in May 2009 due to the recent property price downturn and bank lending problems (in 2008 and 2009). The prevailing financial conditions made it very difficult for any company to raise the £2 billion required for the Olympic Village, demonstrating that even a prestige project like the Olympics could not generate sufficient investor confidence. Bovis Lend Lease, has a sound reputation and a well respected track record. With the downturn of the housing market at the time of writing, however, the company faces further uncertainty about its ability to secure financing for the apartments after the Olympics under the profit-sharing arrangements with the government (Helm, 2008a). The author suggests that the NAO’s warnings of the risks of private sector funding (see NAO 2007c: 16) have already been vindicated. This is reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations which indicate that neither the powerful decision-makers from the public sector nor the influential investors from the private sector are able to predict and control the outcomes of mega projects because they are ultimately at the mercy of volatility in the financial sector (see Appendix 5, HRQ #3; Appendix 8, Table A8.7).

Evans (2007) explained that one of the reasons for the gulf between the bid estimates and the realities is that budgeting usually lacks transparency, with much investment and expenditure ‘off-the balance sheet’, resulting in understatement of the true costs and impacts. Evans presents a much less favourable picture of the 2012 London Games preparations than the government accepts in claiming that the London 2012 experience presents this same kind of credibility gap between promises and naïve assumptions, leading to negative impacts on the final costs of delivering the Games. Views of this kind have been fuelled by scepticism in the UK, evoked by evidence from many previous international mega projects and mega-event facilities which have invariably been characterised by cost overruns, contract disputes, and political controversy (see Flyvbjerg, et al., 2003; Altshuler and LuberoFF, 2003; OMEGA, 2010). In the UK, there are parallels in the examples of the Channel Tunnel,
Pickett’s Lock, the Millennium Bridge, the Dome, the Scottish Parliament building, the Jubilee Line Extension, Wembley Stadium, and Heathrow Terminal Five (Evans, 2007; Financial Times, 2008).

Overall, the origins of the large gap between the initial bid and the 2007 cost announcement may be attributed to a combination of the lack of transparency, optimistic, and biased estimates prior to the Games, and the complex impact study methods. This argument is echoed by the responses to the Hypothesis-related Research Question #8 (see Appendix 5, HRQ #8; Appendix 8, Table A8.12), and illustrated by one interviewee’s statement:

“If you want to spend public money in large amounts on any project, you talk about that project furiously because that’s what politics is about. It is actually about selling. So the aftermath is not going to be as exciting as the vision.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

6.3 Coordination between MUTP, Sustainable Urban Regeneration, and Mega Event

Evans (2007: 303) suggests that the combination of a number of major transport projects, several regeneration schemes and the forces associated with a mega sporting event of the kind that the Olympics unleashes will inevitably multiply capital risks. This reflects to the theory of Lindblom and Hirschman (1962) who claim that projects are not necessarily fully coordinated, instead they will evolve into a “better imbalance” relationship to avoid excessive costs and irremediable damage. The following two sections reveal the insights into the prospects of the coordination between the three types of mega projects studied. It also demonstrates the findings of this case study about the role of the 2012 Olympic Games in MUTP development (in response to Hypothesis #1).

6.3.1 History of the coordination

Ken Livingstone’s ambition for regenerating the East End of London increased the cost pressure on the Games, and this represents a misapplication of the ‘Games effect’ if it does not help promote urban regeneration. This viewpoint has been supported by the findings in the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations. They reveal charges that unnecessary pressures were created on the regeneration projects already in the pipeline and that this in turn distorted the sustainability visions of the developments, including the democratic process of public engagement and a sensible rhythm for incremental developments (see Appendix 5, ORQ #1). Added to this is the claim that the mega-event
strategy as an instrument for regeneration plans is not as effective as envisaged. The author argues that, in order to be effective integrated, a planning framework would need to be introduced which is led by regeneration projects instead of being dominated by the Olympics event. Evidence in support of this position is reflected in the findings of the pre-hypothesis investigations undertaken for this thesis (see Appendix 4, under the topic “discourse coalition”). The findings suggest that regeneration should have a separate rationale and a business case different from those of the Games. Wrapping up the promises of housing and employment into the Olympic discourse is likely to lead to disappointment and unmet expectations for the Games legacy.

A further observation is that the London Olympic project violates the policy of the UK Government’s Communities Plan which aims to devolve powers to local authorities. It also contradicts any espoused vision to shift away from excessively commercially-oriented development. The forces behind the London Olympics’ highly state-controlled governance have offered little room for public participation. Poynter (2009) predicts that the London 2012 Games are likely to fail to provide sustainable urban regeneration that aspires to reduce any prevailing social disadvantage. These issues are reported to have been aggravated by the economic downturn at the time of writing, given that the business climate has become harsher and that sustaining profits has taken precedence over efforts at achieving sustainable urban regeneration.

Burgeoning uncertainty surrounds many projects in the UK. It has the potential seriously to undermine the viability of many urban regeneration projects in the country, including that of Thames Gateway. Under these very difficult economic circumstances for developers and house builders in particular, it may be concluded that while the voices that have pressured governments and developers to incorporate sustainability measures will not disappear, the private sector players are increasingly concerned about their own survivability. This may be an opportune time for both government and the private sector to revisit the meaning of sustainability as it applies to business organisations in order to reach a consensus on an operational definition that goes beyond mere rhetoric. Evidence in support this position is reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations ORQ #2 for this thesis. As indicated in previous chapter, the term ‘sustainable’ is treated with cynicism. One of the responses relating to this issue is quoted below:

“I think the problem with sustainable development is that it’s one of those hackneyed phrases now. Sort of dressed up, it means different things to different people.” (OMEGA Centre study, hypothesis-led interview, a private sector developer, 30/06/2008)

One of the principal issues of this thesis is the relationship between the Games and the Stratford City...
regeneration scheme which became much entangled. According to both sets of findings, the London Olympics created a powerful intrusion which reprioritised the allocation of political, financial, and planning resources. This argument is echoed by the findings of the pre-hypothesis investigations where it was revealed that the Games re-phased the Stratford City plan in order to confine it to the Games’ requirements. The evidence from the hypothesis-led investigation indicates that there are conflicts between the Stratford City scheme and the Olympic project in terms of project implementation since the construction sites are next to each other.

To sum up, the question of whether Stratford International has stimulated sustainable urban regeneration in the hub’s area can be resolved from both strands of the case study investigations. As indicated in Chapter 4, the case for the construction of Stratford International is less than convincing in terms of the high-speed railway operations alone. Stratford International has been criticised by many interviewees as a ‘white elephant’ and they have further contested its effectiveness on encouraging development in its surrounded area. The influence of Stratford International on the Stratford City urban regeneration scheme is similarly viewed as limited. However, its influence on the outcome of the 2012 London Olympic Bid is widely acknowledged. Of particular significance, it has been further argued, is that the Olympic Delivery Authority cannot afford for the joint programmes to fail, making it imperative that the joint projects should be fully completed on schedule and thus closely synchronised. Under these circumstances, although under stress due to the unforgiving deadline, the developers of the Stratford City enjoy the umbrella of the government’s support or guarantee which in turn reduces their risks.

The following quotation from the interviews reveals how the CTRL project discourse on regeneration benefits has been treated with scepticism:

“The catalyst effect in Stratford from the CTRL is very marginal. Westfield as a foreign developer is attracted by the available land and the good transport connections to other centres in London.”

(Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the local community group, 10/07/2008)

6.3.2 Role of the Games

As stated at the outset of this thesis, one of the aims of this research is to establish whether or not the London Games have boosted the prospects of MUTPs in its vicinity as well as those of urban regeneration schemes, and whether these efforts are likely to contribute to sustainable urban regeneration outcomes. While the decision to construct a new £70m Thames-link overground rail station linked with the Eurostar terminal at St Pancras was pending in 2005, the announcement giving
the green light to London as the Olympic host city on 6th July 2005 seemed to boost the prospects of the Thameslink project, and, in retrospect, accelerate the decision. In February 2006, the government unveiled a £63 million cash boost to complete the new Thameslink station beneath St. Pancras station. This programme was considered part of the Olympic Transport Plan package (see O’Connell, 2007) together with an extension of (Phase 1 of) the East London Line from Canning Town to the new Stratford International Station intended to link the Docklands area with domestic and international high-speed services on High Speed 1 (see Figure 6.10).

In addition to these two major transport projects, a 2.6 km extension of the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) is also seen an important component of the Games Transport package, together with the upgrade of Stratford Regional Station and the enhancement of West Ham Station capacity. These latter two stations together with the Stratford International Station are identified as the major ‘Olympic Park Gateway Stations’ by the ODA. The major influence of the Games here is associated with efforts towards accelerating the planned programmes to ensure they come online before 2012. The influential role of the CTRL in contributing to London winning the Olympic Games bid is well-known and widely accepted. The fact that the Games could not have become a reality without exploiting the available lands, the existing transport network, and political determination in east London is all too often taken for granted.

From the evidence provide in the literature review, it would appear that the London Games did indeed trigger the re-allocation of resources and speed up some already announced programmes, but that the Games in themselves could not have generated enough thrust to influence the creation of a plan for a new MUTP; instead, it probably impacted on programmes of mega projects (including MUTPs and urban regeneration schemes) by prioritising and promoting them to meet the Olympic demands. Evidence in supporting this position is reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations ORQ #1 which asks whether mega events have significant impacts on MUTP development. Here is one of the responses to this question:

“Mega events accelerate plans by concentrating political commitment and investments that will otherwise take much longer to materialise.” (Hypothesis-led interview, an advisor from the international organisation, 02/09/2008)
Figure 6.10: Public Transport Links to Main 2012 Olympic Games Venues

Source: House of Commons Transport Committee (2006: 71)

Five out of nine respondents expressed a strong positive support for ORQ #1. These respondents agree that mega events can be an important catalyst that accelerates projects and concentrates political, financial, and planning resources into particular areas. The remaining four respondents instead indicated that mega events can only have impacts on existing plans for MUTP programmes. Among these programmes, some are re-prioritised especially when they are designated to support and coincide with mega events, while other programmes are postponed or cancelled due to limited time and financial resources. These findings are reinforced by the results of the OMEGA Centre interviews, of which 20 out of 23 respondents indicate that there are strong relationships between MUTPs and mega events.

Notwithstanding the discussion above, one of the interviewees from the OMEGA Study suggests that London won the host right of the 2012 Olympics based on a series of events which conform to the ‘critical juncture’ phenomenon in Path Dependency Theory (Arthur, 1987 and Pierson, 2000; also see Chapter 2). Here is the quotation extracted from this response:

“The London Dockland Development Corporation begat the Docklands Light Railway (DLR). The DLR begat the DLR extension London to the city, the extension begat Canary Wharf, Canary Wharf begat the Jubilee Line extension, the JLE begat the route for the CTRL. The combination of all those
begat Britain’s chance of having an Olympic Games.” (OMEGA Centre study, hypothesis-led interview, a person from academic group, 25/06/2008)

6.4 Visions and Sustainability of the 2012 London Olympic Games

Whilst the advocates of the Olympic Games’ promote them internationally as an opportunity for creating a unique occasion for a local economic bonanza, many studies (see Blake, 2005; DCMS and PwC, 2005; Experian, 2006; Kornblatt, 2006; Collins and Jackson, 2006; UBS Investment Research, 2006; Atkinson et al., 2008) show that there are fewer and lower economic gains for the host cities than widely suggested. And while some studies share the sentiment of the Games’ promoters that long-term and intangible benefits are more beneficial than the direct economic gains, experiences from previous Games leave many doubts. The relevant issues are examined in the respectively following subsections.

6.4.1 Regional economic growth

For London, the role of the 2012 Olympic Games has been a powerful force for the concentration of public resources and project prioritising both for the capital and the UK as a whole. Given the prevailing economic circumstances, the businesses and contractors paid to be involved in the delivery of the Games are in the advantageous position where they can retain vital profit-share at a time when other companies are hit by a recession. However, complaints resulted from the introduction of a “no marketing rights” agreement which businesses involved in the Olympics must sign. The purpose for this protocol, devised by LOCOG and ODA, was intended to protect the rights of the event’s official sponsors, which generate £2 billion in commercial sponsorships.70 Benefits to regional contractors of the Olympic Games have been constrained by this protocol. The Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) have found that this frustrates their efforts to encourage regional businesses to become involved in the Games and to try and win Olympic-related work. Countering this accusation, the ODA has claimed that they are pursuing good practice in adhering to competition and sustainability guidelines implemented through its contractors’ supply chains. Supporting this position, the NAO point out that both the “effective contract management” arrangements set up by the ODA and the “timely and accurate information” provided by contractors and their suppliers represent two successful implementation elements of these arrangements (ODA, 2008: 7). Notwithstanding these claims and observations, the intention of spreading the benefits of the ‘Games effect’ to support regional economic growth could be undermined if the scepticism about the business potential of the £9.3

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70 There are three tiers of the sponsorship: tier one sponsors are contributing £40 million plus each; tier two sponsors is putting £20 million plus each and tier three is paying £10 million on average.
billion (the 2012 London Olympics budget announced in 2007) publicly-funded event was proven to be encouraged by protectionism practices – the ‘no marketing rights’ protocol – which restricts opportunities to vested-interest businesses.

The Experian Report 2006 contained doubts about the direct benefits that could be generated by the Olympics as espoused by the Olympics’ champions (such as the Mayor of London, the ODA, and the LDA.). Kornblatt (2006) published a discussion paper in the same year expressing similar concerns. In his paper, Kornblatt concludes that the expectations of the Games in terms of its regional economic impacts should be ‘managed’ to avoid creating a big gap between perceived and actual gains in regional economic development. The same source has suggested that many jobs created by the Olympics will go to those living outside the host Boroughs. Benefits, however, to other regions outside London have been acknowledged to be far more marginal, with the result, some have argued, that it is more realistic to focus on ‘soft’ impacts such as the long-term legacy and fast-tracking function, to accelerate infrastructure investment and delivery, and to concentrate resources on east London (Kornblatt, 2006: 1).

6.4.2   Job creation

The Bid Document for the 2012 London Games refers to the regeneration prospects in the Lower Lea Valley area (BOA, 2004) and enhanced job prospects in the five host boroughs. The award of the Games to London was followed by several studies (see Blake, 2005; DCMS and PwC, 2005; Experian, 2006; Kornblatt, 2006; Collins and Jackson, 2006; UBS Investment Research, 2006; Atkinson et al, 2008) which explicitly or implicitly indicated that the direct economic benefits from hosting the Olympics were likely to be marginal, but pointed more towards indirect qualitative impacts, such as redevelopment opportunities, city image enhancement, civic pride, and investment confidence – all rather qualitative assessments.

The 2006 Experian Study (see Experian, 2006) provided a rather euphemistic comment on the impacts of the 2012 Games. The report states: “One wonders if this was a strategy of anodyne evasiveness”. The report focuses on the criteria of job creation by the Games, looks into five other cases as comparative studies, and emphasises two key factors that were likely to generate different results when comparing the employment impacts of previous Games. The first is the contextual differences, including economic conditions, political objectives, infrastructure needs, and funding arrangements. The second is how the impacts of the Games are defined, measured, and modelled, since each case is assessed against different criteria. Drawing from these other experiences, the study concluded that the number of London Games-related jobs is likely to be relatively small in east London. It further
contends that if there is disappointment about the number of new jobs created by the mega event, it should be blamed on the generation of unrealistically high expectations as a result of exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims based on job creation from previous Games.

Also referring to other research, the Experian Study suggested that writers of mega event impact studies might be motivated to project favourable results before the Games because of the political biases and over-optimism towards the ‘Games effect’. It implied that such studies were part of an orchestrated promotions exercise as they commonly presented excessive claims about the economic impacts of the mega event before they took place (Experian, 2006: 14; Kornblatt, 2006: 2). This observation fits to the work of Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) who claim that biased measurements are used to support political ambition which is the real factor underpins the mega project development (also see Chapter 2).

Notwithstanding the reservations it expresses, the Experian Report suggests that past Games experiences indicate that they may well have a much larger transformational impact than that identified by the official modelling measures in that they have different impacts not captured by the modelling. To enhance these transformational impacts, the report suggests that targeted interventions are needed. It advocated a role for the Games as a lever or catalyst that can provide the initial momentum to an ongoing fostering strategy that is vital for a long-lasting legacy. This recommendation is echoed in an earlier UBS Study conducted in 2006 (see UBS Investment Research, 2006) which predicts a net economic benefit of the 2012 London Games as being between £5.9 billion to £7.8 billion, but with the direct benefits to east London being relatively small. It further suggests that the beneficial impact of hosting the Olympics is largely in the legacy effects. These legacy effects, it is included, are more important for outlasting the Games than judgements about the short-term and tangible Olympic benefits to the east London. These conclusions were substantiated by the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations undertaken for this thesis (see Appendix 5, HRQ #5; Appendix 8, Table A8.9). One of the interviewees gave the following statement that emphasises the importance of the Games’ legacy plan:

“The government has not thought through the legacy plan yet. If they simply put some flats and apartments, it is not necessarily equal to regeneration. It [the legacy plan] forces some people to stand back for a bit and think more imaginatively toward what we can do here.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a councillor from the local authority, 23/06/2008)

Kornblatt (2006) suggests that local residents can expect only a limited number of jobs associated with the 2012 London Games since they are likely to be largely displaced by people from outside the
host boroughs, particularly by highly skilled employees. He suggests that even the low-skilled workers are likely to be replaced by labourers commuting from distant regions if they are insufficiently competitive. This has led Crookston (2006) and others to urge relevant authorities, when setting up training programmes, to recognise the complexity of these challenges. The objectives of the job training programmes prepared by the London 2012 Employment and Skills Taskforce (LEST) Pathfinder Partnership were criticised for their unrealistic job targets in light of the relatively few local residents who ultimately became involved in the Olympics (see Kornblatt, 2006; Evans, 2007).

This section discussed the visions and political promises for regional economic growth and job creation generated by the Games. The following section explores the importance of negotiating power, and evaluates the transformation of political power and institutional arrangements of the three mega projects (the CTRL project, the Stratford City scheme, and the 2012 London Games) in this regard.

6.5 Decision-Making Process and Negotiation Powers

This section focuses on the Olympic Games' decision-making process by closely examining the negotiation powers of the various stakeholders involved, what they advocated, and what the impacts are likely to be. It attempts to disentangle the interrelationship between the Games and the associated regeneration schemes, such as Stratford City regeneration, the Thames Gateway, and the Lower Lea Valley developments in order to draw conclusions about institutional arrangements and power relations based on the hypothesis and pre-hypothesis investigations.

6.5.1 Political champions

Finally, from the exploration in the Chapters 4, 5, and 6, particular focus was placed on the findings of the influence of political champions in mega-project decision-making process. Both general literature reviews on mega project developments and the case study material examined here revealed that in many cases certain individual political champions of mega projects are very important to their success. This observation is very apparent in the case of the urban regeneration strategy advocated by Conservative minister Michael Heseltine in his vision for the future of the Thames Gateway. His political position, personality, and sustained commitment are widely recognised to have heavily influenced decisions concerning the ultimately-adopted CTRL alignment and choice of locations of international stations during the 1980s. When New Labour came to power, John Prescott was similarly a very important political figure who acted as a champion for the sustained pursuit of the interwoven visions of both the CTRL and the Thames Gateway. He was convinced by the Newham lobby group to support the idea of having an international station at Stratford. This view was also supported by
Professor Sir Peter Hall, a respected academic and planner who supported the vision of regeneration in east London and the Thames Gateway (as in the latter case, previous advisor to Michael Heseltine). According to Faith (2007: 120-123), until 1991 Arup’s proposal had received the support of 331 MPs, including those not directly affected by the BR route, because of the strategic approach by Ove Arup. These political champions were pivotal in securing the necessary political support through a combination of lobbying and using of project discourses, facilitating mega-project developments and at the same time fulfilling their own agenda. This illustration of discourse power and bargaining power reflects on the kind of negotiating practices alluded to by Lindbom (1988) and Hajer (1995) and referred to by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) in their works (also see Chapter 2).

6.5.2 Political power and institutional arrangements

The political power that accompanies the Olympics movement has developed by virtue of its global monopolisation and protectionism of the Olympic brand which as a result has the ability to reprioritise and relocate resources. As with previous Games (see Chapter 2), the many aspects of the 2012 Olympic discourse, including predicted improvements in regeneration benefits, grass-root sports, employment, civic pride, city image, inward investment, and tourism, have almost all been overstated. Despite this, the recognition for hosting the Games remains very popular with government and city leaders world-wide. The prospect of acting as host to the Games also frequently appears to attract substantial public approval within bid cities. In other words, the experiences of previous Games do not seem to deter prospective host cities from aspiring to host the costly Olympics. The 1976 Olympic debt from the Montreal Games took the city 30 years to pay off, yet the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games look to repeat this history (Gaus, 2009). Atkinson et al. (2008) suggests that the degree of public support for hosting the Games would be very different if the direct costs of these mega events were disclosed in advance. A similar argument was also mentioned in both strands of the investigations that criticise the conspiracy over the 2012 London Olympic budget scandal (see Appendix 8, Table A8.10 and A8.13). Findings identified from the pre-hypothesis investigations, for example, indicate that economic impact studies for mega events are prone to misrepresentations because of the double-counting of regeneration benefits. The same source argues that these studies also neglect ‘opportunity costs’ where funds are reallocated to a budget for the London Olympics, and are taken from the National Lottery funds earlier earmarked for the development of community sport projects. A respondent claimed that:

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71 This is the case with the exception of Colorado, Toronto, Berlin and Nagoya. “In an anti-sprawl mood, Colorado voters rejected the 1976 Denver Winter Games after it was awarded them. Local opposition in Toronto, Berlin and Nagoya, Japan, is credited with preventing the Olympics from landing on those cities” (Gaus, 2007).

72 The official figure for the final cost of these Games has yet to be formally announced at the time of writing and thus remain a mystery.
“In the Olympic public enquiry, we said we don’t believe this budget and it makes absolutely no difference. The inspector ignored the budget issue. In the beginning, the media and politicians formed a chain to market the Olympics. Their [the London Olympic agencies’] attitude is defensive from day one. To even suggest the Olympics might not be a good thing is considered as slightly baddy. The Olympics, conceived as a brand, manage to market itself effectively. The fundamental argument that the Olympics is needed for the regeneration is still not being challenged. All these assumptions about the synergy which has been put forward here, the mutual benefits of the way things linking together, the public-private partnership argument are still up there running.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the local community group, 10/07/2008)

Given that a major interest of this study is how the forces of ‘mega-event discourse’ (more specifically, that of the ‘Olympic discourse’) (see Chapter 2) is formed, strengthens and collapses throughout the development of its project-led network. Of particular interest to this research is to discover what actually motivates national and local politicians desire to promote the Games. This case study has revealed that political gain is the determining factor. One of the responses from the hypothesis-led interviews highlighted that:

“Political power is the gear of the decision to run for the Games. In the case of London, the Olympics have support from the Labour party and the Tories. With the power of rationality, probably Britain would not have the bid in the first place.” (Hypothesis-led interview, an advisor from the international organisation, 02/09/2008)

For the previous Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, his intention was to use the Olympics to attract more public funds for the regeneration of east London on the premise that there was probably no alternative way to secure such a large sum of money and attention to one area. To some degree, this strategy has been used elsewhere in the UK when Manchester and Birmingham managed to attract substantially more central government funding (which in turn enticed greater investment from the private sector) in the case of the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester, the Manchester Olympic bids in 2000 and 1996, and the Birmingham bid in 1992.

It is widely believed that to be able to foresee the project outcomes, both positive and negative, and to gain support for the project from a majority of the stakeholders, a powerful negotiating position must be commanded as part of project-led network composed of well-organised groups who possess a strong commitment and sufficient resources. The negotiation process of the King’s Cross Central scheme displays a lack of consensus on sustainable urban regeneration, resulting in continuing tensions and conflicts in decision-making. The principal stakeholders (the developers and Camden
Council) all look to select planned major economic changes that will foster improvements to local welfare and economic growth. Local community groups look to a more democratic way of achieving this change and applaud the “wisdom of crowds” thesis (Surowiecki, 2004) which claims it is important to have public participation rather than just “managing public opinions”. However, in the case of the London Olympic Games development, the absolute power of the mega event excluded the voice of grassroots activists and the authorities.

Overall, effective partnerships between project stakeholders have always been at the forefront of successful project delivery – particularly for mega projects. An effective partnership can only be arrived at through a process of negotiation, compromise, and professional performance that aims to meet the demands of every sector. Such partnership, in which high institutional barriers are the norm, appear to be an indispensable mechanism in mega-event development. The synthesised findings of the two strands approach indicate that the streamlined planning power is one of the prerequisites in mega-project development. This observation reflects the literature review in Chapter 2 which reveals that power relations within a policy-making process will continuously change and evolve into a “better imbalance” (Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962). The embedded discourse power in the network is thus a force to heighten negotiating positions. In the cases of the King’s Cross and the Olympic development, the discourses of sustainable development and inclusive urban regeneration are perceived by every sector as important. These discourses reinforce the coalition within the partnership and achieve outputs in a more coordinated manner. This observation is echoed by the responses of HRQ #9 (see Appendix 4) which indicate that stakeholders can obtain their most advantageous position in project negotiation during times of crisis. This situation is further strengthened by politicians’ wariness of damaging political reputation and their need for popularity. Their attitudes put the government in a disadvantageous position in negotiation with private sectors and raise barriers for the treatment of risk.

### 6.6 Hypothesis Testing and Theoretical Insights

When multiple mega projects are instigated in the same timeframe and spatial context so that they overlap in their planning, appraisal, and delivery period, can they be integrated to produce synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts? The exploration above, together with the investigations in Chapters 4 and 5, conclude that if visionary and decisive leadership exists, a streamlined planning power is assigned, and there is continuous political supports from high levels committed to these investments, such coordination between multiple mega projects can better overcome the issues of institutional barriers, fiscal difficulties, and pressures to generate short-term returns. This can further encourage the achievement of sustainability visions and meet the broader
range of stakeholders’ needs.

The content of the next two subsections is as follows: the first describes the test of the four hypotheses postulated at the outset of this research in line with the case study conducted in this chapter; the second covers theoretical insights and emergent issues derived from the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations.

### 6.6.1 Testing findings against hypotheses

**HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs**

Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and ME developments associated with its transport hubs.

The arrival of the high-speed rail link is regarded as an impetus to the Stratford City regeneration scheme where the proponents believe that the new international station at Stratford can boost confidence in inward investment. The CTRL project has been a strong vehicle to lead the Stratford City scheme despite less-than-ideal circumstances, including the conflict between the state-controlled development agency and the local authorities, the housing market slump and the desperate need for new economic stimuli for both the Thames Gateway development and the Newham’s regeneration strategy. However, the PFI package designated to deliver the CTRL project challenges the adaptability of the local agenda which eventually compromised in order to share benefits from the project. This shows that if a MUTP is to be the engine for urban regeneration schemes, a certain compromise of the local stakeholders’ interests needs to be made in order to achieve consensus. This argument was echoed in the case of the King’s Cross Central scheme (see Chapter 5) where the local authorities needed to comply with the MUTP general policies first in order to gain more room to influence the decision-making process once it integrated into the project network.

The London 2012 Olympic Games Bid was driven by political determination to deliver urban regeneration in east London, with its available lands and well-connected transport network. The initiative to bring the Games to London was also determined by the British Olympics Association (BOA) after the failures of the Birmingham and Manchester bids for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 Games. The BOA was convinced that only a London-based bid was likely to be taken seriously by the IOC (Poynter, 2009: 140). This, in turn, reinforced polarisation of the position of London in relation to other regions in the UK, inevitably leading to further concentration of resources in the capital. The
existence of the CTRL project was a positive factor in the decision of the IOC to stage the 2012 Games in London. It was integrated into the Bid documents along with other justifications, such as existing regeneration schemes, by the Games promoters to convince the IOC. Though in reality its role in the provision of transport services during the Games period may be limited, it nevertheless proved to be a powerful symbol in creating the climate for a positive outcome to the decision. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the impact of the CTRL project on the London Bid in 2005 was rather fortuitous, and created a ripple effect. According to the case study findings with regard to the regeneration benefits which were claimed by both the CTRL project and the 2012 Games, the causal relationship is not as apparent and direct as argued by the champions of the two projects.

The importance of the relationship between urban regeneration and the Olympic Games was applauded in a House of Commons Report entitled *London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games: funding and legacy* (2007). Given that the Thames Gateway is recognised by the Government as a national regeneration priority, as indicated earlier, it had long been prioritised by the LDA for regeneration before the 2012 Olympic Bid. According to the ODA, change was already coming to the Thames Gateway area through its existing regeneration plan. The 2012 London Games project accelerated the delivery of higher quality infrastructure in a more systematic way. On this basis, Poynter (2009) further argues, the Olympics would not have become the dominant project in east London if it had not been part of an existing urban regeneration area with substantial political commitment. In these terms, the development of the Olympic Park and Lower Lea Valley are presented as an “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” for significant infrastructure investment and policy attention. This exploration is reflected by the findings in both streams of the investigations which identified that mega-project development relies on a narrow ‘window of opportunity’ (Appendix 4, under the topic “Window of opportunity”) and the analogy of ‘planetary alignment’ (Appendix 5, ORQ #2).

**HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political decision**

Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration and mega event schemes.

There is concern about the number of plans and planning agencies involved in the Stratford, Lower Lea Valley, Olympic Park and Thames Gateway regeneration projects in east London. The plethora of responsible bodies and the unclear role of each organisation makes progress of the Thames Gateway very difficult. This kind of institutional arrangement also creates confusion and obscures the interface for the prospective investors. The mega-event strategy seems an opportunity to coordinate the
fragmented institutional governance and thus deliver sustainable urban regeneration. However, the character of mega-event planning connects to tight temporal and spatial constraints which make it impossible to reconcile the ambitions of market-orientated interest groups with the aspirations of sustainable communities. The constraints brought by the London 2012 Games, including fiscal scarcity, eliminated the promise of the Games’ sustainable legacy. On the contrary, it reinforces a state-controlled institutional arrangement which bolsters a commercially-driven Games as well as the adjacent regeneration projects geared to market-led profits and short-term returns. The carefully established organisational structure for the Games delivery epitomises how power relations are deployed in order to gain control of political, financial and institutional resources. Under these conditions, the institutional arrangements and power relations designed for the Games are unlikely to deliver the promised sustainable legacy, let alone a sustainable urban regeneration project.

**HYPOTHESIS 3 - Synergy of network**

Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration and mega events can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.

If the synergy of these three elements aims to achieve the vision of sustainable development, in practice it has proved to be difficult because of the constraints brought about by the market-driven nature of the urban regeneration schemes and the consumer-orientated mega-event strategy. The potential for strength through synergistic relations via inter-agency co-operation was undermined by numerous difficulties. In the case of the regeneration in Stratford, it involved many agencies charged with responsibilities, including those connected to Thames Gateway Development and the Olympic projects. Some argue that strong leadership which can co-ordinate the multiple agencies is needed. The intervention by the Games, however, did not provide the expected solution – integration of interests from wider-scope stakeholders. Instead, it has formed a platform for the Games-led organisations to monopolise resources. There is certain inevitability about this situation given the global spotlight and the immovable deadline of the Games, and the imperative to eliminate any risk of failure to deliver. In Games-related policies, this serves as a deterrent towards taking into account a broad range of stakeholder needs in the streamlined decision-making process. The synergy generated by the three elements acting in concert may exist, but it establishes a market-driven and short-term profit imperative which is not compatible with the visions of sustainable development that aims to ameliorate social disadvantages.

The HRQ #7 in the hypothesis-led investigations asked whether concentrating the resources to deliver the Olympic Games can help the progress of redevelopment in the South East Region or, on the
contrary, reinforce the development in an already crowded London. The government’s ambition is to use the investment leverage opportunity provided by the Games to meet house-building targets and to accelerate the development pace of urban regeneration in the wider Thames Gateway region. There are conflicting views on how well this is being achieved. Evans (2007: 313-314) argues that what the Olympics are doing is still confined to the area inside the London segment of the Thames Gateway and that it is actually “casting a shadow over the outer Thames Gateway region”. What critics have pointed out is that the Olympic Games needs to be hosted in an area which is conceived as part of London overall, determined by the availability of land, the accessibility, and regeneration strategies pursued by east London. The overall conclusion, such critics contend, is not only that the ambitions of using the Games to boost the progress of the Thames Gateway development as a whole seems to be overstated, but that prioritising the financial, political, and institutional resources to support the Games’ development in the manner executed is creating a negative impact on the Thames Gateway (Poynter, 2009).

These conclusions were substantiated by the responses of HRQ #5 which asks will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics divert resources away from other development initiatives? If so, are the spin-off benefits of this re-prioritised justified? (see Appendix 5, HRQ #5; Appendix 8, Table A8.9). Seven out of nine interview respondents supported the notion that the 2012 London Olympics diverted resources away from other developments. Among these responses, three felt that there would be significant spin-off benefits from this resource prioritisation. The remaining two stressed that the success of the London Olympics will ultimately be judged by its legacy plan, which is regarded by some as a strongly competitive development project with its high profile and publicity. In the interviews conducted by the OMEGA Centre, some respondents (5 out of 23) used the example of previous mega events, such as 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics, 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympic, 2006 Turin Winter Olympics, etc. as evidence that mega events - under certain political and institutional contexts - were important catalysts for mega infrastructure investments.

Findings from the pre-hypothesis investigations endorsed those found from the hypothesis-led investigations in relation to the long-term justification and wider benefits that the investment for the Olympics project could potentially bring. Some respondents suggested, however, that this conclusion is very much moulded by how economic benefits are quantified and how these values are then fed back into the economic appraisal equation. This viewpoint brought to the forefront the question of which measurements to use and how to interpret the appraisal and assessment data. One respondent claimed that the UK system enables politicians always to be able to take credit for these benefits. A respondent offered views on the role played by the Olympics as the catalyst for urban regeneration:
“It [The London Olympics] will take resources away but I am not sure in what form. The most obvious place to be influenced will be the Thames Gateway. The test is not the Olympics itself but the legacy. If it delivers the legacy then arguably it is worth it.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008)

HYPOTHESIS 4 - Discourse Power

Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas.

In the case of the Olympic Games, the agenda has become entangled with those of urban regeneration and sustainable legacy. The London 2012 authority claims that the Games effect contributes positively to the Stratford City scheme and Lower Lea Valley regeneration. Successfully marketing the Games brand with its established discourse demonstrated the partnership between LOCOG, the ODA, the Mayor of London, and the local host authorities. Without a coherent set of policies to realise sustainable development programmes, the mega-event strategy has resorted to slogans and empty rhetoric.

The mega-event discourse power is usually then strengthened by the legitimisation process of conferring legal power and obligation at the same time. There is plentiful evidence from previous Games to show that the direct benefits from the Games effect are marginal and long-term and indirect benefits are also very limited. The mega-event discourse power is dominant in controlling limited resources of that region or nation to fulfil the demands of hosting the event. However, this power is also risky and costly at public expense. It can leave the host city with a legacy of debt for many years. The more rational reason for decision-makers to support cities staging the Games is political gain. Under this circumstance, mega-event discourse is exploited as a tool but not as a means for pursuing achievable goals as it suggests. Once a city decides to enter a bid for the Games, then its decision-makers need to be aware that they are entering into a minefield of political and financial hazards that may be beyond their expectation. The extreme power of this discourse forces stakeholders to subscribe to it, to adjust their agenda and to adapt in order to share interests rather than being excluded from the network.

The analysis and discussion thus far suggests that the stakeholders in the discourse network that
adhere to the same discourse are in some regards rivals to each other when their agendas are different, but mutually reinforcing where they share a common agenda. According to the findings of the investigations, some argue that much of the discourse employed by the dominant stakeholders is more rhetoric than reality, while others argue that it reflects a strategy for the promotion and marketing of the project that requires adjustment in line with changing audiences and circumstances. What is clear, however, is that the interpretation of stakeholder behaviour very much depends on the interests and agenda of the party making the judgements.

The discourse employed by the project champions aims to strengthen their project delivery network in order to fulfil their agendas. In other words, they strategically impose a discourse on the network to enhance their negotiating power. This premise is disproved by the findings of hypothesis-led investigation which suggest that the claim of marginalising other stakeholders is overstated. One interviewee from the Olympic organisation suggested that any marginalisation probably occurred unintentionally. Another respondent implied that the mega project discourse is not as powerful as the premise suggests because there are always people who are impervious to the blandishments of the project advocates despite the tempting promises that partly constitute the discourses of mega projects to gain more support. However, an interviewee from the local community strongly supported Hypothesis #4 and argued that:

“This premise does come down to the heart of how decisions have been made in Britain.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the local community, 10/07/2008)

The conclusion of findings in HRQ #9 highlights that mega-project discourses work best when they are robust and there is substantive content rather than merely ‘froth’ and ‘public relations speak’. This is echoed by the response derived from the hypothesis-led investigations:

“This contains a suggestion of “the Emperor's New Clothes” agreement. But of course everybody likes the boy in the Andersen fairy tale. The CTRL and the Olympics are so political in nature with no commercial profit; people are not all in wonder at the sight of the Emperor, there are always some people who, like that little boy, point out the truth.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a community planner, 22/08/2008)

6.6.2 Discussion

The examination of the interrelationship between the CTRL hub development at Stratford and the 2012 London Olympics oriented projects have revealed many insights into the research questions.
These comprise the role of Stratford International in the development of the locality, the impacts of the Olympic Games on the integration of the synchronised mega projects studied and the factors that determined decisions on these projects. After the in-depth exploration via the case studies, the findings directly related to the research questions are demonstrated above. In addition to these findings, there are several theoretical insights and emergent issues as described in the following paragraphs.

**The initiative of hosting mega events is political**

As identified in Chapter 2 and the findings in this case study, a mega event is defined as a political production, which is adopted for given agendas across different levels of stakeholders. The question posed here is what is the initiative to host the Olympics for nations and cities in the modern era? The answer echoes the review of previous mega events, including expos and the sporting events highlighted in Chapter 2. Although each nation and city claims distinctive agendas and goals in their mega-event discourse when bidding to host an event, the underlying motive is criticised as political and macho leadership (Jenkins, 2004). The 2012 London Olympics shows the political ambition of the previous Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, who used the mega-event strategy to seize public funding and to coerce the government to reprioritise its development agenda towards east London. In addition, the Olympics offered the opportunity to strengthen the institutional arrangements and the power of the office of Mayor, newly established in 2000. The prospect of the Games attracted many other political advocates, some no doubt motivated to improve their popularity. This conclusion echoes the conclusion of Shoval (2002) that the motivations to host mega events are mostly politically driven (also see Chapter 2).

**The monopoly of global firms**

Those multinational corporations, highly driven to pursue areas with high investment potential and a lenient regulatory environment, typically manoeuvre the major urban development to form a pattern that is conducive of modernisation and consumerism. The success of these firms is fostered by the force of globalisation, mobilisation of capital and professionals and increasing coalition among international stakeholders who attempt to lower the competition in the shared market. For instance, the developers of Stratford City are the Westfield Group and Lend Lease. Both are based in Australia. The former is the world’s largest listed retail property company with over 100 shopping centres worldwide. The latter is one of the world’s largest property development companies. This phenomenon reflects the criticism documented by Janelle and Beuthe (1997) that these multinational corporations obtain superior negotiation position in mega project developments. As a result of these leading positions in the global market, there is a stereotypical city image emerging in many urban regeneration schemes.
The responsibility lies with the local authorities to safeguard local identity and to ensure the value of local contexts is not compromised by the momentum to imitate models from other cities.

**Is the mega-event effect amplified in less developed economies?**

As addressed in Chapter 2, Spain’s economic and political situation in the 1990s largely contributed to the success of 1992 Barcelona Olympics. London as a world city has very different contextual factors that will determine the impacts of the 2012 Olympic Games. While some mega-event promoters claim that the mega event drives the delivery of certain major projects which are important to economic growth, critics from the interviews conducted in this research argue that investment should also be made in social infrastructure rather than only on projects accessible only to high-income groups. For developing economies, where there are many aspects that require improvement, many infrastructure developments are urgently needed in order to improve the quality of life and help long-term economic growth. The mega-event strategy can be seen as a significant injection in terms of political and financial resources, with other interests inevitably being marginalised. If the mega-event strategy remains a means to encourage consumption-oriented economic activities, it remains to be seen whether this strategy will be more effectively and efficiently applied in decayed areas and less developed economies.

### 6.7 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the role of the 2012 London Olympics and its impacts on the urban regeneration scheme at Stratford. These two case studies have reinforced the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 on the importance of political support from the central government for such mega projects. Especially in the UK, this dominant power is one of the prerequisites for efficient mega-project decision-making. Political determination and powerful intervention is also proved to be an essential facilitator in development investments in east London.

A critical insight has been gained into the various roles and responsibilities of the key stakeholders, highlighting important interactions and their consequences. Following this critical review, a detailed evaluation of the nature and dynamics of the discourse that has taken place was provided, shedding some light on the function, accountability, and feasibility of the Olympic discourses. It revealed that, although it has exclusivity of public sector planning power, the ODA does not have a strong negotiation position when dealing with the private sector over the issues concerning the commercial arrangements. This is mainly because they are ultimately restrained by the force of the IOC and the urgency of delivering the Games on time. The ODA’s negotiation power was further eroded by the
Games’ budget issues. The gulf between the initial estimate for the 2012 London Games and the 2007 cost announcement is the result of over optimistic and biased estimates, the complicated but inaccurate impact studies, and lack of transparency.

Stratford City scheme is stimulated by the high-speed railway station and then complicated by the arrival of the 2012 Games-related projects in terms of reprioritising resources, rephrasing its programme, conflicts on the project implementation and the already competitive and unhealthy housing market in east London. Thus, in this case, the Olympics project has opportunistically been able to take advantage of available land and transport connections. There is limited connection between the catalyst effect of the Games and the Stratford City scheme although they are enmeshed in the presentation of the Olympic discourse.

With reference to the characteristics of mega events reviewed in Chapter 2, the 2012 London Olympics fulfil the following criteria:

- They are created, organised, and controlled by elite groups;
- They are reinforced by ideological and propagandist discourses;
- They have high adaptability toward the global political environment;
- They benefit from a kind of ‘sacredness’ and protectionism that is inherent in the mega events; and
- They play an important role in nation-building, national identity reinforcement, and national marketing.

The Mayor of London and the Prime Minister shared the glory of the successful 2012 Olympic Games Bid and took the opportunity to reinforce their visions of urban governance and the agenda of urban regeneration in east London. Since the discourses about the co-ordination of regeneration benefits and the Games were well promoted, politicians favoured it until the upwardly revised budget was revealed.

This chapter has again highlighted the effectiveness of lobbying. The efforts made by the Newham Council and the Stratford Promoter Group have created and accelerated development in the locality. These include the Stratford International, the Stratford City scheme, the 2012 Olympic Games and the recent decision on Crossrail.

Finally, this chapter has revealed that the premise of the coordination between multiple mega projects is more likely to bring aggravation rather than multiplied benefits because such integration can dramatically amplify capital risks. This finding echoes Lindblom’s theory which contends that the
integration between several mega projects is more an ideology since the high levels of uncertainty can generate great barriers for this kind of coordination.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have examined the CTRL project as a MUTP, the King’s Cross Central urban regeneration scheme, the Stratford City scheme, and the 2012 London Olympic Games. This thesis has revealed the answers to the primary research question on what role of MUTPs play in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, and what are the relationships between these projects given the institutional contexts and power relations of the stakeholders as the backdrop to the decision-making process. The final chapter will conclude this thesis. It will summarise the answers to the research questions and the results of hypothesis testing, highlight the findings which add new knowledge to the understanding of mega-project investments. It will also review the strengths and limitations of the research methodology employed, and finally conclude with the lessons of potential value for application to future mega projects.
7 Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to identify and clarify the interrelationships among a cluster of three different types of mega projects, conceived and executed in the same timeframe and the same spatial context, with a view to establishing whether well-functioning cooperation between these projects can bring about more favourable synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts for the key stakeholders involved. The research also sought to examine the extent to which institutional arrangements and power relationships are vital in understanding the nature and complexity of decision-making with regard to mega-project investments. It assesses the validity of a theoretical framework and a series of hypotheses which address the role of power relations and institutional arrangements in decision-making processes of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration projects and mega-event related development, using as case studies the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and its associated hub development. Rigorous examination of the case studies has identified which theoretical concepts are consistent with the research findings and helpful in their interpretation. These links are demonstrated throughout this concluding chapter.

This final chapter is presented in three parts:

- The first provides a synthesis of the findings from case studies and literature reviews regarding MUTPs, mega urban regeneration schemes, mega events, and their related decision-making. The synthesis contributes to a better understanding of the decisions taken as a basis for informing future mega project developments.

- The second offers a summary of the synthesis of the case study findings derived from both primary and secondary sources framed against the thesis’ key research questions and hypotheses. It concludes with a review of the case study methodology and recommended improvements for future study.

- Finally, the third part concludes with insights derived from the case studies that offer potentially valuable lessons for application to future mega projects.

The cluster of mega project developments examined in this research demonstrates strong interrelationships in terms of the restricting and reinforcing influences on project planning, appraisal,
and delivery. Given the effective stakeholder collaboration observed, it is apparent that a number of opportunities have not only enhanced the business case for each of the three mega projects examined but also offer more attractive investment opportunities overall. The findings point to opportunities to contribute to goals of sustainable development, subject to the availability of an appropriate policy framework, suitable governance, and leadership. While it is clear that such collaboration inevitably involves higher risk and an extensive degree of compromise among stakeholders, it is an approach to be recommended, albeit with some reservations. As an example, it is a process likely to be dominated by elite groups, and this has the potential to marginalises disadvantaged groups if compensatory actions are not taken. Furthermore, under the current planning environment in the UK, both the public and private sectors are constrained by the movements of the market which can produce difficulties for project financing in certain economic conditions. These problems are sometimes accentuated by the government Treasury’s over-cautious desire to save money rather than time which can lead to delays in decision-making for mega projects. Invariably, neither is saved.

7.2 Synthesis of the Findings from the Literature Reviews and Case Studies

This section draws together the evidence presented in the literature reviews of the three types of mega projects (namely: MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega events) and theories of decision-making relating to the attributes, trends, challenges, and issues of mega-project investments as presented in Chapters 2. The common characteristics of these three types of mega urban development projects are identified and established, and issues drawn from the literature about mega projects are validated with the assistance of observations from the case studies. Context-sensitive cases are used where appropriate to highlight key points. The links between the decision-making theories and the three types of mega projects are elaborated in this section.

7.2.1 Common features of mega projects

Given the very nature of the mega projects, especially their characteristic high financial risk and longevity in the planning process, the cases investigated have the following common features that reflect the theories reviewed in Chapter 2 regarding the prevailing political, institutional, social, and financial environments.

Mega-project decisions are dominated by elite groups

According to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, it was revealed that mega projects rely strongly upon vested interest partnerships and elite-dominated urban policy formation. The evidence gathered
from the case studies shows that problems arise from the close relationships between local authorities and developers. Because of the high institutional barriers associated with project-led networks, local authorities are likely to be in a disadvantaged position when negotiate with developers for commercial arrangements, resulting in diminished corporate social responsibility. This situation is more evident in the case of the Stratford City regeneration scheme, which is constrained by the timetable of the 2012 Olympics-oriented development. The network of the Games development, composed of specially-designed institutional structure and power distribution mechanism, has little space for local authorities and grassroots groups to participate in the decision-making process. This mirrors the theory of Path Dependency (Pierson, 2000). Pierson (2000) cites that ‘increasing returns’ in the political process as the dominant players reinforce their power in the network. This also confirms the initial premise that institutional arrangements and power relations are significant factors in mega-project decision-making.

The powers which can manipulate mega-project investments are reinforced by project discourses, which tightly attach to political agendas

The case studies reinforce the findings in the literature review that mega projects are empowered and governed by dedicated agency and streamlined planning powers which are strengthened by project discourse that is designed to promote the projects (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003). Such supreme power is legitimised by policies associated with mega-project development that are continually amended when new crises or major problems occur. Under this circumstance, mega projects are inevitably attached to prevailing agendas, often with privileged access to resources. According to the findings of the case studies, project discourses are regarded as a means to market projects. The process of using discourses to sell such mega projects is a very project-focused procedure, coordinated within the project delivery network. The discourse of mega projects can change over time and depends on prevailing issues such as cost efficiency, sustainability, and visions for urban regeneration. The research findings also point out that there is propensity of unmet promises resulting from mega-project discourses. For the purpose of gaining support from the public, and to further entice investments for projects, project discourses are likely to contain promises that provoke excessively high expectations from the delivery of these mega projects.

On-going government commitment and significant public investments are prerequisites of mega-project development

Mega project delivery needs the assurances of bi-partisan government in order to continue its development throughout changing political environments. Government commitments are responsible for enabling the necessary initiatives and concessionary contracts for attracting private sector
investment. In addition, a mega project on its own cannot be sufficient to fulfil the vision of sustainability to an area. Public investment in general infrastructure supporting the overall development is a prerequisite for the success of a MUTP project, sustainable urban regeneration scheme, and a mega-event legacy plan. Most importantly, any such mega project needs to be planned in the context of its city, region, and nation. The context includes political culture, planning systems, economic environment, and public perceptions. In the case of Stratford International and the 2012 Olympic Games, the determination of the political champions to develop east London is one of the main factors for the delivery of the projects.

**Sustainable development as an element of mega-project discourses remains rhetoric**

The “sustainability vision”, although highlighted in the promises espoused in all the studied mega projects in this research, was found to remain in the realms of rhetoric rather than being a proven core driver for mega-project development. The findings of this research point to the view that disputes over sustainable development can undermine the viability of the projects and the value of what can be achieved or delivered together as a package of mega projects rather than a set of individual investments. The lack of consensus on what constitutes solid ground for the implementation of the sustainability approach leaves mega projects vulnerable and compromises economic growth over concerns about intra-city competition. The post-2008/2009 global financial crisis and the financial disarray across Europe at the time of writing amplified the barriers to sustainable development. It is concluded that the “sustainability vision” is nothing more substantial than part of the project discourse that is used to promote such mega projects. Many in local communities favour piecemeal development, an approach which they claim is more sustainable and compatible with the needs of local communities and businesses. They argue that comprehensive development projects, such as those reported in this research, do not appreciate the essence of organic growth of cities. These mega projects contribute to rises in land and property values, and in turn lead to gentrification and displacement, along with other negative impacts.

### 7.2.2 Interrelated issues

In accordance with the previous section, there are a number of interrelated issues that are consistent across the three types of mega-project-oriented urban development. The following is a summary of the findings from the literature which offer further reinforcement from the case studies.

**Urban regeneration benefits are packaged into MUTP and mega-event development**

The literature shows that, in recent years, urban regeneration projects, with the changes of priorities in
public initiatives and investments, political climate, and global trends over time, have become project-led initiatives, packaged into MUTP and mega-event projects involving large mixed-use development and flagship projects. This observation is supported by the case studies, which indicate that regeneration benefits have become an important financial justification for high-speed rail projects as well as for the Olympic Games. However, the lack of concrete evidence to show positive economic impacts and the scepticism stemming from the conflicts between market- and community-led developments cast doubt on whether mega-project discourses relating to regeneration benefits can be meaningful. As seen in the case study findings, arguments were made that the London Olympic delivery team intertwined the Olympic project with the Stratford City scheme to the extent that it presented a misleading double-counting of benefits. This ‘double counting’ of regeneration benefits is seen by such critics as an overstatement of the Olympic effect and ignores the negative impacts brought to the Stratford City scheme. This argument reflects characteristics of the prestige urban regeneration projects reviewed in Chapter 2.

The benefits and costs of project-led networking are perceived differently by different stakeholder groups

Project-led networks inevitably involve a wide range of stakeholders, thus mega-project delivery requires strong leadership, proactive engagement from all actors, and an effective communication interface. This represents a challenge in terms of whether such networks can, with government intervention, ensure that project outcomes fulfil broader stakeholders’ needs. Although mega-project discourses often suggest that large-scale infrastructure investments can exhibit significant trickle-down benefits to the local communities and to local businesses, this assertion has shown in this research to be overstated. This is mainly the result of over-optimistic claims and forecasts encouraged by political ambition and the use of inaccurate methods for project appraisal. This finding echoes the conclusions of Hall (1980) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) that the root cause of project cost overruns is over-optimistic attitudes towards project development. As demonstrated earlier, the power of project discourse, as a combination of political determination and the selective use of project study evidence by dominant decision-makers, is employed to promote mega projects. The synthesis of the findings from the review of Hajer’s (1995 and 2003) work and the case studies shows that project-led networks with streamlined planning power can produce optimal results that are closer to expectations of the members of the project networks. On the contrary, a fast-track and efficient style of development is not attractive to some parties who are in favour of organic and incremental growth.

In addition, a fully integrated programme of the kind that comprises multiple mega projects and stakeholders is criticised by Lindblom and Hirschman (1962) because of the extensive difficulties for
network coordination presented by the scale and uncertainties inherent in these projects (also see Chapter 2). This view is substantiated by some stakeholders of the projects studied. It is indicated by the findings of the case studies that coordination between several mega projects can only be realised in an authoritarian regime. Two main objections arise regarding this proposed idea about mega-project coordination. One is that the oversize scale of coordinating multiple mega projects can lead to irreversible catastrophe that is beyond anyone’s control. The other is that the coordination between mega projects is in some way inevitable under the prevalent trends toward modernity – the pursuit, for example, of high-speed mobility, robust and attractive infrastructure, and advanced technology – which are not necessarily sustainable. As a result, disadvantaged groups are most vulnerable and stand to lose the most in the development process.

**Mega projects bring prestige to localities, leading some stakeholders to redirect resources away from much needed, though lower-profile, programmes**

Mega projects represent national or city symbols of economic virility and national unity which are traded-off by project stakeholders who are involved in different stages of the project lifecycle. These include decision-makers, developers, contractors, local authorities, and residents. Politicians are eager to be associated with project ‘success’ and with boosting their popularity, while local communities gain in civic pride and identity with the fame and reputation of such projects. The prioritisation of high profile mega projects inevitably has an impact on lower-profile investment programmes in public services and infrastructure in the form of delays and reduced specifications or cancellations, often to the detriment of minorities and other disadvantaged groups whose needs are more easily marginalised.

The evidence of this claim is more apparent in the mega-event-related developments where the ‘opportunity cost’ should be taken into account. The findings of the research argued that the Olympic project represents a large-scale opportunity cost for London that has diverted scarce resources from more pressing projects, and cited as an example the diversion of funds used for local social projects from the National Lottery.

**7.2.3 Context-sensitive features**

Following up on the summary of the general features and the consistent issues of the studied mega projects, this section focuses on the main context-sensitive features relating to mega project developments which are revealed in both the literature review and the case studies. The results highlighted here endorse the findings of the investigations conducted in this research.
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

**MUTPs are involved in large and interdependent networks**

Based on the evidence from this research and the literature review, the project-led networks that drive MUTPs are increasingly likely to be part of larger national and international networks, resulting in increased interdependence and increased vulnerability to delays introduced by individual component parts. As to urban regeneration and mega-event related developments, they are essentially locally focused, particularly in terms of their catchment areas which are not as wide as the transport network which serves them. The impacts of these three types of projects differ in geographical scale and nature. Mega events, in particular, are dependent on MUTPs and urban regeneration schemes. They rely heavily on the existing infrastructure, especially the existing transport system, and on available land for redevelopment. For this reason, mega events were characterised by many of those interviewed as opportunistic (perhaps even speculative), waiting for opportunities while at the same time opening windows of opportunity for other projects and triggering a spate of opportunistic behaviour from those seeking benefits out of the association with mega events.

Both strands of the research enquiry endorse that MUTPs are seen as the prerequisite for successful urban regeneration and mega events, although they bring no guarantee of success. The CTRL, for example, enabled the delivery of other projects and provided a chain of events that no one individual mega project could deliver on its own. These findings suggest that whilst CTRL allows other projects to happen, the MUTP also has a dependency on these other projects, (e.g., urban regeneration schemes and other service transportation projects), to both sustain their momentum of development and justify the levels of investment made.

**Local authorities are responsible for securing local needs and interests**

Owing to the strong interrelationship between impacts of urban regeneration schemes and their localities, local authorities play a particularly important role in seeking to secure local interests. Strong partnerships between local authorities and private sector developers in urban regeneration schemes are essential because the private sector has access to a wider range of financial resources. The expectation, however, of a greater shouldering of financial risk by the private sector is compromised within Public Private Partnerships on account of project reliance on new funding from the private sector.

The delivery of mega-event related development is driven by a time related imperative. This intensifies the pressure and tends to lead to higher risk and increases in overall costs. Furthermore, mega events involve stakeholders operating more prevalently at the national level. Local authorities are not sufficiently powerful to lead mega-event development, but they do significantly contribute their views and frequently exert influence on the ultimate decision-making that takes place. The
ultimate decision-making power, however, lies in the specially-designated agencies created by the government.

In the UK, the decision-making powers related to MUTP development are highly centralised, and financial initiatives or approvals rely heavily on the HM Treasury. Under these circumstances, once a project receives the ‘green light’ by Government and is subsequently legitimised by central government agencies, there is little additional influence that local authorities can exert.

Findings derived from both the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations reveal that no matter who provides the leadership in the coordination of mega project developments, and irrespective of which type of project is the primary driver, ultimately, in the negotiation process, local authorities have the responsibility to shape the agenda and insist on attention to local needs.

7.3 Synthesis of the Case Study Findings

This section recaps the research questions and their findings. It is organised according to the sequence of results of the hypothesis testing. The comparison of the findings from the Narrative Pattern Analysis and the Content Analysis helped to integrate the outcomes of the research investigations in a manner that can either re-affirm or cast some additional new light on identified issues. The purpose of the comparative analysis is to see how these research outcomes from the different strands of enquiry respond to the questions posed at the outset of this PhD study in order to take a position on whether they are compatible or have major conflicts, with a view in both cases to allow the hypotheses to be tested and the principal conclusions to be drawn.

The primary research question of this thesis is:

When multiple mega projects are instigated in the same timeframe and same spatial context, can they be integrated to produce synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts?

Based on this research question, the primary hypothesis is as the follows:

MUTPs can be an effective factor for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and international mega events; and, furthermore, mega events can positively catalyse both MUTP development and sustainable urban regeneration. Notwithstanding this, it is assumed that there are many other influencing factors which will lead to different outcomes for urban regeneration and mega events despite the use of MUTPs as a major strategic vehicle.
The case study findings have revealed that the coalition of interests that forms around these projects is a leading dimension of major development. This coalition is mostly constituted by politicians and developers. Moreover, given the combination of globalisation forces and concerns about city image in the context of competitiveness, MUTPs always go hand-in-hand with commercially-oriented urban regeneration. It also shows a general belief that the government or a well-equipped public agency should provide leadership with sufficient investment in such coalitions. Local authorities in this type of mega-project network need to be proactive and commit adequate resources at all levels in order to reach a position where they can shape the project design, manage the construction impacts and participate in the decision-making process.

The use of regeneration benefits to finance the building of an MUTP is overstated because the regeneration benefits are difficult to monetise and revenues are generated far into the future. As such, these benefits are only useful to help defray the transport infrastructure operation cost but not the project construction cost. Within this coordination of these three types of mega projects, mega events can provide a greater degree of certainty, in particular, for effective regeneration in times of an adverse economic climate. According to the case studies, uncertainties on project timeframe and investments surrounding the development programmes for King’s Cross area and the Stratford City scheme were significantly reduced because of the dependency of the Olympics on their services. However, this certainty provided by mega events simultaneously generates enormous time pressures on some projects that result in cost escalation because of the ‘non-negotiable’ timeframes for completion.

Notwithstanding the above, the research reveals that disputes over visions of sustainable development, especially its meaning and practical applications, cloud the issue of mega project viability. It shows that the general public and some mega project stakeholders have become cynical about the interpretation and utility of the concept. They claim that the coordination of these three types of mega projects does not help to achieve visions of sustainable development if sustainability is not owned by a wider range of stakeholders. The findings of this research reveal a concern that cynicism regarding ‘convenient’ interpretations of ‘sustainable development’ can undermine the value of the concept and can even, for some, render the term meaningless.

To better understand the answer of the primary research question, the findings of its sub-questions and associated hypotheses are elaborated below.
7.3.1 Research question #1 and hypothesis #1

**Research Question #1**
What is the role of MUTPs in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events; and what are their relationships given the institutional contexts and frameworks that they have been planned, appraised, and delivered within?

**Hypothesis #1**
MUTPs have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration development. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and the Olympic development associated with its transport hubs.

**Findings**
Do MUTPs act as agents of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events? The research shows that, in the case of the King’s Cross Central scheme, the CTRL project did produce the thrust to overcome political conflicts and provided a compromising backdrop for negotiation and for reaching a consensus on the scheme. However, the CTRL also contributed to significant problems including: missed developing opportunities, increasing costs, and intensifying the complexity of the project. The Stratford City scheme would have gone ahead regardless of an international station because the area was seen as being important enough and sufficiently economically enticing in its own right to attract such development independently. However, the high-speed terminal provided certainty which allowed the regeneration project to go ahead much earlier than would otherwise have been the case.

The assertion that MUTPs are a catalyst for mega events is overstated in the case of the CTRL project, although it did significantly facilitate the success of the Olympics bid; it was however only one of the significant factors. In this regard, that the CTRL project strengthened the London Bid was largely fortuitous and was ‘in the right place at the right time’ rather than strategically planned to help strengthen the Games proposal. The OMEGA Study interviews indicate that mega events have the power to convert planning into political imperatives for MUTPs that are already underway, or forcefully distort and modify existing projects to suit the temporary needs and the attendant political egos.

A comparison of the findings of both streams of enquiry suggests that the CTRL project had the following effects:
• It brought certainty to the development of the derelict railway lands.
• The St Pancras international railway terminal changed the image of the King’s Cross area, which has made the King’s Cross Central scheme assume a higher profile.
• The local authority, contractors, and developers involved in the St Pancras station project trade off it and earn a good reputation.
• The Stratford International Station project made a positive contribution to the London Olympics decision.

Overall, CTRL is primarily a catalyst for the larger regenerative schemes which are taking place at King’s Cross and Stratford and further East through the Thames Gateway, but the vision of sustainability has been too weak and imprecise to be the driver of the project specifications. It was found merely to help the narrative around the business case for the high-speed rail development.

7.3.2 Research question #2 and hypothesis #2

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<th>Research Question #2</th>
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<td>How do institutional arrangements and decision-makers respond in order to manage changes of contexts and environments in the planning of MUTP, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events?</td>
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<th>Hypothesis #2</th>
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<td>Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega-event-related development.</td>
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Findings

Based on Path Dependency theory (North, 1993; Pierson, 2000), this research premises that institutional arrangements can erect high barriers that inhibit efficient decision-making. This constraint is further strengthened by the influence of the vested interest groups who constantly seek to protect their own particular benefits. The findings of the case studies reveal that the decision-making is influenced by political power and the power of technocratic rationality at different stages of a project life cycle. Also, based on the realisation that a project appraisal can never be all-encompassing and sufficiently accurate, visionary, and decisive politicians are often the main force behind such projects even though evidence generated by technocrats may show low viability potential as defined by traditional appraisal criteria. However, the findings conclude that the absolute decision-making
power is not vested in any one individual stakeholder because major infrastructure investments are ultimately constrained by financial realities.

Findings from the CTRL case study suggest that it is imperative to have a political decision-making structure in place in order to be able to implement any financial restructuring and to deliver new fiscal measures of the kind that were implemented for the CTRL. The research investigations suggest that much of the decision-making process of the CTRL appeared to be conducted on an ad hoc basis and that the process had little to do with planning but rather more with the need for a political outcome. From another perspective, the lengthy evolution of the CTRL project appeared to adjust itself over time to reflect the different political environments and changing emergent political agendas, a process which was considered by many respondents as a positive achievement.

With regard to strategies employed to strengthen the negotiation powers of mega-project decision-making, the findings have shown that the development process of power relations was complex, dynamic, and in some cases constrained over time by shifting political agendas and dynamic property markets. These power relations produced a conflict of aspirations between various stakeholders and a limited commitment to sustainability and inclusivity in urban regeneration participation. Under these circumstances, key mega-project stakeholders adhered to the discourses set out in the various changing agendas, with government commitments, and political support gaining a stronger negotiation position over time. In particular, a coalition of leading businesses, politicians, and local bureaucrats is likely to give the former the best negotiating position and to shape public policies to benefit businesses through their access to economic resources.

Additionally, the findings derived from the case study investigations also indicate that good stakeholder-management skills are important, particularly in mega projects with a large number of actors in the project network. This includes the willingness to understand different styles of thinking, an effective mutual communication, proactive partnership, and commitment to provide resources. It was suggested that these elements in a stakeholder network can facilitate more joined-up solutions and enhance influence in negotiation where trust and consensus among stakeholders can be established.

Tight time, fiscal, and spatial constraints brought by the London 2012 Games, in reality eliminated the promise of the Games’ sustainable legacy. On the contrary, it reinforces a state-controlled institutional arrangement which bolsters a commercially-driven Games and regeneration projects that are primarily geared to market-led profits and short-term returns. Opponents of the Games played a major ‘watchdog’ role by pointing out many of the flaws in the mega-event discourses and highlighting
many negative shared experiences, including being displaced or having their lives disrupted. It is concluded, however, that the political determination that made the mega event happen and the realities of the execution of the project, plus the nature of the international contract the government has entered into with the international Olympic movement, dramatically curtailed the power of the opponents. Also, in both the CTRL project and the London 2012 Games, the case studies reveal that crises and problems can sometimes trigger new opportunities, especially where the risk for developers is largely underwritten by the government.

7.3.3 Research question #3 and hypothesis #3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question #3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can several synchronised mega projects deliver a favourable outcome to stakeholders if they integrate and mutually reinforce each other, rather than compete with limited social, economic, political, and environmental resources?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis #3</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events can effectively foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings

It was found from this research that synergies may exist where the three types of projects act in concert. However, these constructs are likely to establish a market-driven and short-term profit imperative which is at odds with the visions of sustainable development that aim to ameliorate social disadvantages. The findings show that there is a degree of resource sharing between these three types of mega projects in terms of institutional arrangements and political commitment, while other aspects (such as manpower and suppliers in project implementation) are in competition. Critics point out that resources are shared in a way that especially generates a favourable outcome for the project promoters, organisers, and advocates. Moreover, MUTPs tend to lead this level of integration in terms of the scale of its impact. Other projects will adjust themselves to be compatible with the large-scale project in order to gain a better chance of reducing their own level of uncertainty of achieving their objectives by incorporating some elements of compromise and mutual reinforcement. Evidence from this research investigation suggests that many mega project decision-making processes in the UK are overly opportunistic, with key parties willing to enter into compromises. These processes are more likely to yield sub-optimal project outcomes than if they were planned in an integrated manner from
Another obstacle to such coordination revealed in this research is the dynamics of large numbers of stakeholders and their diverse interests within the context of democracy, where a good stakeholder management is one of the prerequisites for mega-project integration. This research has shown that the most effective form of mega-project governance is a partnership that embraces the qualities of trust, risk sharing, transparency, and proactive communication. Within this, in mega-project integration, it is vital to have strong leadership that provides both a clear vision and is properly accountable. Key actors may not be the most powerful in terms of the established hierarchy but are likely to be the most influential if they have strong and regular connections to all stakeholders within the network. The local authorities of King’s Cross Central scheme played the mediator role effectively and are widely considered as an essential driver for the regeneration project. The case of the King’s Cross Central regeneration project shows that achieving such synergistic qualities was undermined by over-reliance on commercial property and land value gains and the protraction of CTRL project decision-making, resulting in high degree of uncertainty. The CTRL stations and their associated regeneration efforts became more integrated as a result of premeditated intentions and justifications during the construction phase of the CTRL.

Based on research question #3 and hypothesis #3, the research particularly looked at the interrelationship between the Stratford International Station, the Stratford City scheme, and the London Olympics. It revealed that the Stratford International Station was approved according to enthusiasts’ passionate belief in claims made by local authorities as to the catalytic effect of the international station on the Stratford development. There is a danger, however, for the Stratford station to become a ‘white elephant’ after the Games if the international high-speed train does not stop in Stratford. Despite the likelihood of the London Olympics changing the image of Stratford, the territory of Central London is in reality expanding, and though Crossrail will further improve the Stratford International Station’s passenger numbers, it is expected to take some time for Stratford to become more competitive. Government intervention and commitment is seen here to be critical to improve the attractiveness of investing in east London. This finding reflects the claims of Healey (1994) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) that government intervention in mega projects is an important force for breaking development inertia and for setting up rules for effective resource allocation. Significant government financing is essential because without this form of government intervention in the market the timing and patterns of developments will be driven purely by the market, which may not be in the interest of public sector, in particular because this is likely to lead to a much longer timeframe of development and more fragmented development. To sum up, the synergistic
relationship between the Stratford International Station, Stratford City regeneration scheme, and the London Olympics was found not to be strong enough either to foster integrated development or to achieve sustainability.

This research posed the questions about the extent to which these projects are mutually reinforcing, whether there is a credibility gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the discourse surrounding the London Olympics, and, if so, what impact this has had on the other two mega projects. This thesis concludes that the gap between initial expectations and final results is a process of rebalancing the equation with individual actors negotiating whilst seeking to limit their exposure to risk, which is the nature of business itself. This reflects what was emphasised by Lindblom, who believes that ‘adjustments’ in decision making are continuously propelled towards an optimal degree of imbalance by the exertion of bargaining powers (Lindblom, 1954). Developers claim that failure to achieve anticipated benefits is mostly due to unforeseen circumstances and events rather than any sort of conspiracy. As for politicians, the political promises and many of their rhetorical visions are often the means of assembling wider support in order for the project to gain legitimacy. Under these circumstances, the UK public and political communities tend to be sceptical about project benefits that are promised by promoters and are well aware that many extravagant claims will inevitably disappoint. In addition, Games-related policies, because of the global spotlight and the immovable deadline of the Games, as well as the imperative to eliminate any risk of failure to deliver, serve as a significant deterrent to taking into account a broader range of stakeholder needs during the streamlined decision-making process. As such, it is suggested that countries host the Olympics should solely for reasons of national celebration, since the economic rationale is too weak and the associated promises are almost always overstated.

7.3.4 Research question #4 and hypothesis #4

**Research Question #4**

Have mega project discourses been used as a tool by key champions to convince others of the validity of the mega projects in the expectation that these discourses will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of these champions and empowering the project delivery network?

**Hypothesis #4**

Key champions of MUTP, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or
more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with limited sense of corporate social responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003; Roche, 2000).

Findings

Does mega-project discourse reinforce the power of key mega project champions in project development? The thesis’ research findings conclude that marginalisation by dominant actors of those who do not support their discourse may occur unintentionally as a result of the power of the expanding project-led network. This is to say that mega project discourses are not packaged in an overtly subversive way, but rather reflect the human factor and the contextualisation of the project. Undeniably, these discourses work better with robust dialog and substantive content rather than ‘froth’ and public relations ‘speak’.

When considering mega-project coordination discussed above, the findings reveal that a coalition between these three types of mega-project discourses can result in a more attractive and persuasive business case. Also, an influential champion with the political leverage to streamline planning powers can add significant value by bringing about improved coordination. Collectively, they move towards a more powerful discourse to reduce the force of any objections. As the power dynamics of the discourse grow, especially throughout the institutionalisation phase, other discourses are likely to acknowledge their allegiance to it in order better to pursue their own agenda.

Mega-event discourses are able to attract significant resources and redistribute them according to the demands of hosting the event. As mentioned earlier, mega-project discourses are often exploited as a tool aimed to market the projects, often leading to disappointing results. The findings show sympathy among the respondents to the gap between the Olympic promises and the emerging outcomes. It is suggested that the narratives surrounding the mega-event discourses or mega projects in general are for the purpose of helping to promote such projects, and consequently that the gap between the promises and final outcomes should not surprise the public. The components of the London 2012 discourse were effectively communicated to the public. The successful marketing of the Games brand with its established discourse demonstrated the partnership between LOCOG, the ODA, the Mayor of London, and the local host authorities. Unfortunately, such mega-event discourse power can be risky and costly when financed by the public purse. This suggests that without a coherent set of policies to realise sustainable development programmes, the mega-event strategy has resorted to soothing words, slogans, and empty rhetoric.
This research concludes that the power of discourse is not as strong as that assumed in this study’s premise. Some players are impervious to the blandishments, tempting talk, and political promises. The democratic system provides a platform for different interests to join the discussion, though sometimes leading to stalemate and lengthening of the planning process. Although a certain degree of rhetoric can be attributed to the discourses used for mega project promotion, there will always be people, especially those directly affected, who closely scrutinise project policies.

7.4 Review of the Case Study Methodology

This section reviews the effectiveness of pre-hypothesis research methodologies and tools for the analysis of case studies alongside the more traditional hypothesis-led investigations. As presented in Chapter 6, this methodological approach entails an information-gathering and knowledge-building approach to mega project decision-making analysis that has proved to be highly fruitful as well as challenging throughout the empirical investigation of case study experiences.

7.4.1 Strengths

The results of employing the pre-hypothesis led investigations suggest that:

- The pre-hypothesis approach has much in common with the general principles of Grounded Theory where hypotheses are built from the bottom up (data first). The methodology uses systematic detection techniques which allow the analyst to look for patterns of knowledge (and therefore build hypotheses) derived from large quantities of data, providing an approach not otherwise possible by more traditional hypothesis-led investigations.

- The analytical tools employed for the pre-hypothesis research (i.e., SenseMaker Suite software developed by Cognitive Edge Pty.) successfully allowed the conversion of qualitative data derived from secondary data and interview transcripts to be displayed and interrogated from more perspectives and scales than would otherwise have been possible.

- The methodology requirement for self-indexing by the respondents of the pre-hypothesis investigation was found to represent the most significant feature of the Narrative Pattern Analysis, as it facilitated a rich understanding of each interview’s data from the interviewees’ point of view.
7.4.2 Limitations

Despite the considerable value added to this research by utilising this pre-hypothesis investigation, there were several issues which caused problems during the practical application of this method that merit consideration in future investigations. The following should be considered in any future research using this methodology:

- The indexes need to be designed in a way which is more specific and concise because interviewees can be easily confused by lengthy indexes. The complication and the number of indexes employed appeared to undermine the effectiveness of the self-indexing exercise by, on the one hand, deterring the willingness of interviewees to complete the indexing process for all anecdotes, and, on the other, making the data analysis process longer and more complex.

- The idea of employing Naïve Interview and Prompting Questions in order to disclose weak signals which can help to gain insights into the selected cases did not prove effective in this context. These general questions tended to attract loosely-focused responses which were not always sufficiently related to the underlying research questions.

- The claim made by the advocates of pre-hypothesis analysis about avoiding its propensity to bias interviewees by masking hypotheses was found to be questionable since the indexes employed could give hints to respondents as to the underlying hypothesis as the interview progressed.

Notwithstanding the above, the employment of the two stranded approach has, overall, helped provide a more balanced set of findings than an approach solely reliant upon a hypothesis-led investigation would have offered.

7.5 Theoretical Insights and Lessons Learned

After the summary of the synthesis of the findings from the literature reviews, the synthesis of the outcomes from the empirical studies and a review of the case study methodology, this section shifts attention to the theoretical insights and lessons that were identified by this research.

7.5.1 Summary of theoretical insights

There are several circumstances revealed in Chapters 4 through 6 that reflect the theoretical concepts reviewed in Chapter 2. This section highlights the key evidence in order to summarise the argument of
this thesis and highlight the theoretical concepts that are most compatible with the research findings and most helpful in their interpretation.

Mega projects are realised through constant negotiation and compromise among stakeholders

Related to the need for continuous negotiation and compromise is the principle of ‘inequality in bargaining’ as identified in the case study of the King’s Cross Central scheme. This finding mirrors the theory of Disjointed Incrementalism (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962) which contends that policy-making decisions can be summarised as an ongoing process that is remedial, serial, and fragmented. The research findings reveal that inequality in bargaining is a necessary element for achieving mega-project delivery. The bargaining power is not equally distributed in the project-led network. Also, a dominant power or government intervention in this network is critical to mega-project development. The issue analysis in Chapter 1 raised the question which can be answered by this theory. The question is whether the equilibrium of stakeholders or dominant players can form the most appropriate leadership model in mega-project decision-making. It has proved that a streamlined planning power and government intervention are essential to effective mega-project development.

Mega-project discourse is used as an instrument but not an achievable goal

In terms of the related observation about the project-led networking and bargaining power, mega-project discourse is the main component which holds the network together as well as an instrument that enforces bargaining positions. The marginalisation effect caused by mega-project discourses in such networks has been proved to be inevitable and unintentional as a result of strengthening the network. However well-intentioned the project promoters may be towards a wider agenda, according to the case study findings, their ultimate decisions are determined by narrow profit-sustaining and cost-reducing concerns. Under these circumstances, mega-project discourse is exploited as a tool but not as an achievable goal as it might suggest. These findings echo the attributes of discourse power identified by Hajer (1995 and 2003) as discussed in Chapter 2.

The planetary alignment analogy

The ‘planetary alignment’ analogy and the ‘window of opportunity’ principle were identified by the hypothesis-led and the pre-hypothesis investigations respectively, and also confirmed by the findings of the OMEGA Centre research. As illustrated in Chapter 4, the CTRL project provided a window of opportunity which triggered many existing proposals to align themselves with this limited opportunity. Within this, all the stakeholders made a lot of political noise in order to position themselves for a better share of interests. This research concluded that the planetary alignment analogy, which signifies
that all elements, including serendipity and planning, of mega projects should be correctly positioned, is one of the main factors for mega-project development. This is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. That is to say, a sufficient range of conditions should simultaneously converge to form a favourable arrangement to facilitate the project.

**Diverse measurements of economic benefits and their accountability**

Measurements of projected economic impacts for major infrastructure investments and mega-event developments have been challenged by Hall (1980) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003). Findings of the investigations in this research also show that stakeholders do not have sufficient confidence in these measurements. Economic impact studies are often filled with misapplications of economic theory that virtually guarantee that their projections will be favourable. Large-scale projects have relatively long planning timeframes, which increase the difficulty of project appraisal. The high degree of uncertainty involved in these projects often results significant gaps between the estimates in the initial planning period and the project cost at the end. These gaps attract criticism for over-optimistic forecasting, as noted by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003). They claim that excessive optimism and over-promising with regard to project costs and benefits is the result of decision-makers intentionally ignoring risks and using biased measures in order to promote their political agenda. Some respondents argued that the selection of modelling traffic capacity or measurements of transport demand as a means of evaluating a project has automatically excluded certain other concerns. There was a general sense in the interview responses that mega projects of the kind discussed can never be fully comprehensive nor fully accurate, partly because these projects are complex by nature and partly because they evolve over long timeframes where contexts change over time. The research findings also assert the diminishing returns from more and more preliminary studies and forecasts, which are sometimes used as an excuse for decision-makers to prevaricate, resulting in more wasted resources. Given these circumstances, the role of visionary and decisive politicians, often seen as the main force in pushing these projects through, becomes increasingly pivotal.

**Opportunism in mega-project development**

Opportunistic behaviour has been cited several times in the interview responses in the case studies. Some respondents have argued that the Olympic Games is a significant platform for opportunistic behaviour. It relies on available land and existing or planned transportation systems. Many of the conditions contributing to the genesis of the CTRL and the 2012 Games were generated by chance and not by long term strategic planning. In the current planning environment, many major projects come to fruition by a process of ‘muddling through’ amidst changes in urban politics, evolving public issues, and the increasing force of globalisation. Some may criticise this as a process lacking planning and
encouraging opportunistic behaviour, whilst others believe this to be the true nature of large-scale project evolution given the longevity of project development.

7.5.2 Lessons learned

The mega-project decision-making process is characterised by a number of accumulated forces vying for political power, seeking different outcomes, and relying on considerable lobbying, negotiation, and compromise. The research process presented in this thesis highlights the importance of assembling a sufficient number of narratives from different sources in order to clearly identify critical decisions and the factors at play behind them. To what degree are the factors influencing the proliferation of prestige developments, including MUTPs, large-scale sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega-event oriented projects interrelated? This research shows that the adoption of important infrastructure investments is typically encouraged or stimulated by four main sets of forces:

- the restructuring and the increasing interdependency of the global economy;
- the intensification of inter-city competition for international and domestic capital flow;
- the increasing magnitude of city-region economic activities; and
- the high mobility of the workforce and capital.

Against the backdrop of these conclusions, there are generic lessons for policy makers and investors in future mega-project development:

Mega projects are magnetic to political agenda and varied objectives

Mega projects may attract ‘big ideas’ and ‘gambl es’, and these ideas may change throughout a project’s development cycle. An important feature of mega projects is the ‘stickiness’ or ‘gravitational pull’ they generate, which means that other projects will adjust themselves to be compatible with these large projects in order to gain a better chance to achieve their own agenda. This is how the project-led network is built and reinforced. Based on the conclusions from this research, however, the visionary political champion is one of the prerequisites for mega-project development. The decisions made by these political champions are essential.

Concerning the rhetoric surrounding CTRL’s propensity to facilitate property development and urban regeneration surrounding the hubs, the only benefit the CTRL can conceivably provide the station areas is an accessibility advantage that in turn increases its surrounding land values. The growing doubt about the decisions on the CTRL stations revealed two facts. On the one hand, it showed that there was a lack of an integrated decision-making framework between the construction and operation
sectors, resulting in inefficiencies. On the other hand, returning to the research question about the power of technocrats, it reinforces the view that political outcome is the ultimate determinant of project decision-making.

**Mega project delivery relies on imperfect information and good political decisions**

Closely relates to the above, from the experience of the CTRL project, this research reveals that project information will never be perfect. In a complex and dynamic environment it is not prudent to spend vast amounts of time and money on exhaustive studies in vain attempts to resolve uncertainty. Studies are frequently commissioned in order to legitimise political decisions, so that politicians are often told what they want to hear. This results from a built-in bias in the political system that people tend to produce information that is politically acceptable. Decision-makers must make time-sensitive judgements based on imperfect information. Within this, the government often uses the information-assembling process as a delaying tactic to avoid politically difficult decisions. Information gathering can be a prop for those who are reluctant to make decisions, and the associated bureaucracy wastes resources. In this sense, whilst a resolute political decision may seem impulsive and ill-considered, it may ultimately be the most rational approach.

If project promoters are determined to push a project through, the use of information may involve manipulation, communication, or other persuasive activities. While some may perceive deception or sins of omission, others see dialog based on imperfect or incomplete information, understanding that perfectly correct data do not exist. The premise here is that there can never be perfect information on which to make judgements. Evidence-based research is often used selectively and translated into political pressure.

**Challenges in public engagement**

Although local needs and considerations are always at the forefront of the mega project discourse, local needs and community benefits are, in reality, often resistant to clear definition. This contributes to accusations that such promises are likely to become tokenistic and possibly even very costly and hard to retrofit in light of the damage to the credibility of such claims. Project promoters have, as a result, found it is difficult to move up the ladder from ‘consultation’ to the ‘engagement’ stage, exhibiting so called ‘consultation fatigue’. This phenomenon is related to the lack of trust in emasculated local authorities, which is seen by some parties to impede the engagement of the public. These circumstances have in turn created an adversarial culture surrounding mega projects.
The research findings reveal (see Chapter 5) that in this climate of distrust, public inquiries, and judicial review are employed by opponents of mega projects as delaying tactics, as in the case of the King’s Cross Central scheme. The analysis in Chapter 4 has shown that fast-tracking a project has an element of *fait accompli* which minimises consultation and discussion and speeds up project developments, but also runs the risk of being challenged by more public appeals that costing time and money, especially in the UK context. The challenge to the developers and project proponents is how to break-down the mistrust and suspicion surrounding such projects.

Another related issue is that of the ‘vocal minority and silent majority’. The local stakeholders who ’shout loudest’ tend to be those who oppose development, and tend dominate local community responses. In reality, there is a broader spread of community opinions that goes beyond those voluble views and interests. Others in the more transient population are indifferent because these projects are so far in the future that they are irrelevant to their current day-to-day lives. Nonetheless, there may be benefits to those who have not yet moved into the area and who therefore have no voice at present. There is then an issue about representativeness and accountability in local community response to these mega project developments and whether the groups involved have sufficient legitimacy to represent the general view of current local communities.

**The treatment of risks and uncertainties in mega project development**

In the UK, project implementation is complicated by regulatory and enabling legislations, which add to uncertainty and ultimately to costs. As indicated in Chapter 5, a simple and well-focused institutional arrangement is one of the components of achieving a better outcome for the delivery of mega projects. Such an institutional arrangement is not necessarily equivalent to a fully authoritarian decision-making structure, but rather a network with well-defined responsibilities. The combination of streamlined planning powers and an inclusive stakeholder engagement process has proved to be optimal for mega project delivery by the research findings.

This research also reveals that another strategy to reduce mega projects’ exposure to risks is to ‘institutionalise knowledge’. The continuity of staffing is critically important in mega project planning, appraisal, and implementation. The reality is that few if any individuals can remain with a mega project team throughout all its stages because these projects, by definition have a protracted timeframe. To safeguard against the loss of this institutional knowledge, the research concludes that it is essential to institutionalise the knowledge accumulated in such projects in order to pass it on to others in later stages of the project lifecycle and other similar mega projects. Also, under the contexts of globalisation and high mobility of capital and professionals, transnational corporations can transfer
this knowledge to other projects and teams rather than discounting it and risking ‘reinventing the wheel’. This process can influence how experiences and knowledge are carried forward from one project stage to another, how relationships are carried forward through time and how the stakeholder management strategies need to evolve.

**Flexibility is a prerequisite for mega projects**
The findings derived from the CTRL case study show that flexibility is a prerequisite for mega projects to adapt to the changing political agenda. That is to say that mega-project-related policies are unceasingly adjusted according to prevailing priorities of public investments and initiatives throughout a projects’ life cycle. This is confirmed by the conclusion in Chapter 5, which suggests that mega-project decision-making is achieved by a continuously changing combination of negotiation and compromises among stakeholders. Flexibility is one of the important qualities in mega projects and it is crucial when confronting problems and crises. Both the hypothesis and pre-hypothesis investigations concur that, overall, there is constant strategic allocation of resources among projects, which varies in scale and level depending on the project in question. As decisions are made and are transmitted from national to local levels, the assigned resources tend to become diluted if these projects are not at the core of the dominant political agenda of the time. Through a combination of strategic and political alterations, the resource allocation changes over time.

The research findings suggest that mega events featuring immovable timescales create immense tension among associated development projects, and generate higher costs. The Olympics project is extremely time sensitive, which is not conducive to good planning. Also, to have a mega event rely too heavily on the completion of MUTPs carries a high level of risk and uncertainty, since mega projects need a certain level of flexibility in order to adapt to the changing contexts, whereas time-sensitive projects do not provide this.

**New meaning of sustainability**
There is no doubt that modern society is highly dependent on major infrastructure systems, and that these systems are subjected to the risks and uncertainties of the environments and societies they serve. There are many unknowns with which any approach to sustainable development may have to contend. It needs to be robust, constantly monitored, and adjusted to adapt to changing environments. Our growing understanding of the impacts of climate change and how it might impact or threaten our daily life suggests that the retrofitting of existing mega infrastructure to address these concerns is critical to ensure a better future quality of life. Planners, designers, engineers, and policy-makers should broaden the consideration of the burden on our environment when planning, appraising, and delivering mega
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infrastructure investments and their associated developments, including the means to retrofit existing mega projects to meet the requirements of sustainability.
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APPENDIX 1:

List of Interviewees
Pre-Hypothesis Interviews

Richard Brown, CEO, Eurostar UK
Robert Holden, Chief Executive, London and Continental Railways
Phil Jeffries, Founder, King’s Cross Railway Lands Group
Michael Johnson, Planning Obligations Manager, Transport for London
Keith Lindblom QC, Francis Taylor Building
Conor McAuley, Councillor, Cabinet Member for Regeneration, LB Newham
Richard McGreevy, Principal Policy Officer – Transport, Greater London Authority
Martin Slavin, Researcher, Games Monitor
Hugh Sumner, Director of Transport, Olympic Delivery Authority
Anonymity, Camden Council

Hypothesis-Led Interviews

Philippe Bovy, Professor emeritus of Transportation at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL) Switzerland, Transport advisor, International Olympic Committee
Robin Buckle, Urban Renaissance Design Manager, London Development Agency
Julian Cheyne, Local resident, Olympic host borough
Debbie McMullen, Principal Planner & Policy Advisor (Planning and Housing), Greater London Authority
Niall McNevin, Head of Town Planning, Olympic Delivery Authority
Michael Parkes, Planner, Planning Aid for London
Tim Urquhart, Project Director, Bovis Lend Lease
Bob West, Head of Urban Design & Renewal, Camden Council
Anonymity, Transport for London
APPENDIX 2:

Pre-Hypothesis Interview Invitation Letter, Questionnaire and Indexes
Investigation of Relationships Between Mega Urban Transport Project Planning and Delivery, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events

I have been given your name as a key contact by Mr. Michael Edwards and am hoping that you will be able to help me with my research by agreeing to a short interview.

I am a PhD student at the Bartlett School of Planning, UCL. My research focuses on investigating the relationship between the aims and investments of Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Events (MEs) in the planning and appraising of MUTPs, and the extent to which these are/ can be made mutually reinforcing.

The study focuses on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) and its contribution(s) to the regeneration of Kings Cross/St. Pancras and Stratford in East London, plus the 2012 London Olympic Games. It intends to draw from these case studies generic and context-specific lessons for future projects in the UK and elsewhere. I propose to conduct a series of interviews with persons such as yourself who in the past have acted/ are currently acting on behalf of stakeholders of the CTRL, KX Central, Stratford City or 2012 London Olympics and their affiliated developments, to elicit narratives (stories/anecdotes) based on your experiences.

A particular aim of my research is to ascertain what kind of institutional networks and power relations among key stakeholder organisations can be deemed a 'pre-requisite' to the delivery of desirable outcomes.

I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to be interviewed - either at your premises or here at the OMEGA Centre at UCL, whichever suits you best. I would be especially grateful if you would allow me to record the interview on the understanding that you will not be quoted without your permission in any publications and/or findings that emanate from my work. I will provide you with a transcript of the interview for your checking and approval.
Please find attached the questionnaire that I propose to use for the interview.

If you feel able to accept my invitation, I would be most grateful if you could please contact me by email (yen-ning.tseng@ucl.ac.uk, 020 7679 4877) to arrange a mutually convenient time/date for the interview. In the meantime, if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours Sincerely,

Yen-Ning Tseng
PhD Research Student & VREF Scholarship Holder
Enc.
PRE-HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS, INDEXES AND FILTERS

A. Opening Question (to be asked in all interviews)
   Interviewees’ relationship to the project
   - “What is your relationship to the [CTRL/ KX Central/ Stratford City/ 2012 London Olympics] project. Please explain which aspect of the project you were responsible for, involved in or affected by.”

B. Prompting Questions

QUESTION 1 (to be asked in all interviews)
   Looking back, what in your mind were the most pivotal events that shaped the [CTRL/ KX Central/ Stratford City/ 2012 London Olympics] project? (Turning points or triggers of significance, not necessarily project milestones) Please consider:
   - Which of these were most surprising? Most predictable?
   - Which of these were planned? Which were unexpected?
   - Specify the date the event occurred, who were the main people involved, where it took place and why it took place.

QUESTION 2 (to be asked in all interviews)
   Tell me about a time when someone changed the course of the project for better or for worse?

QUESTION 3 - Tell me about a time when this project was rescued or sabotaged?

QUESTION 4 - When were the moments of stagnation or breakthrough? What happened?

QUESTION 5 - When have you or members of your community suffered or been inspired as a result of this project? What happened and why?

QUESTION 6 - Imagine this project, 10 years ahead, is perceived as:
   - a total disaster or
   - a resounding success
   - What stories would you share with others to convince or dissuade those who felt that way?
C. Indexes & Filters- to be completed for each anecdote / story

1. Project (please tick which project your story most relates to:)

- Channel Tunnel Rail Link
- Urban regeneration of King’s Cross Central
- Urban regeneration of Stratford City
- 2012 London Olympics

2. Is this? (please tick appropriate box):

- Your personal experience?
- A newspaper, magazine article, or other document?

3. How does this story make you feel? (please tick appropriate box):

- Elated
- Proud
- Hopeful
- Don’t Care
- Disappointed/Sad
- Angry

4. Roughly when did the events in this story happen? (please place mark on the timeline below)

![Timeline](image)

5. What roles are represented in this story? (you may tick as many boxes as you think appropriate)

- Advisor - Finance, Legal, Design, Technical, Business etc.
- Entrepreneur/Business Person
- Planner
- Financier
- Other Design Professional
- Scientist/Researcher
- Advocate/Representative
- Media/Journalist
- Politician
- Contractor/Constructor
- Bureaucrat
- Consultant
- Lobbyist/Stakeholder Advocate
- Ecologist/Environmentalist
- Engineer
- Developer
- Community or social worker
- Local Resident
- Commuter
- Other

6. How relevant do you think your story is to the outcome of the project in index 1? (please tick appropriate box)

- Very Relevant
- Relevant
- Not Relevant
- Don’t know

7. What key words or phrases would you associate with this story?
8. Which of the following themes are relevant to this story? (Please select relevance on a scale of 1 to 10. 1 being less relevant, 10 being extremely relevant - for all boxes):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector power</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private sector power</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political intervention in the project</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<td>Political will</td>
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<td>Leadership</td>
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<td>Bureaucracy</td>
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<td>Technical solutions to unforeseen problems/issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visions and ideas</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<td>Scale of impact of the project</td>
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<td>Public participation or consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of public money</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of private sector money</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tensions between economic-social-environmental values</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree to which project centrally controlled/driven versus ad hoc decision making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainability concerns/environmental impact</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treatment of risk, uncertainty, complexity in decision making</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<td>Globalisation forces</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roles and responsibilities</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financing projects/development</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-operation amongst those involved in the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real estate development associated with/triggered by the project</td>
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<td>Institutional arrangements</td>
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<td>Path dependency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bargaining power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
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9. The following situations are represented in this story (Please select relevance on a scale of 1 to 10. 1 being less relevant, 10 being extremely relevant – for all boxes):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reaching agreement on project financing/funding</td>
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<td>Experiencing financial failure/under performance</td>
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<td>Forming the vision/objectives for the project</td>
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<td>Project start-up/mobilisation</td>
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<td>Agreement about project specifications</td>
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<td>Public outcry about the project</td>
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<td>Programme slippage/advancement</td>
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<td>Major change in project scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political intervention into the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alleviating project impacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deciding on developments associated with the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing developments associated with the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance of organizations responsible for the project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changing partners</td>
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### 10. ‘About Your Role on the Project’

(please tick the box that best describes your influence on the project)

- [ ] I influenced decision-makers
- [ ] I influenced project stakeholders
- [ ] I helped to build relationships/consensus
- [ ] I helped to implement the project
- [ ] I supported/advocated the project
- [ ] I observed/reported on the project
- [ ] I opposed the project
- [ ] Other

### 11. ‘What You Do’

(please tick the box that best describes what you do)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>Non-Government Organisation/Other</th>
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APPENDIX 3:
Hypothesis-Led Interview Invitation Letter, Questionnaire and Indexes
Dear,

**Hypothesis-led Questionnaire on Relationships Between Mega Urban Transport Project Planning and Delivery, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events**

I have been given your name as a key contact by my primary supervisor Prof. Harry Dimitriou and am hoping that you will be able to help me with my research by agreeing to a short interview.

I am a PhD student at the Bartlett School of Planning, UCL. My research focuses on investigating the relationship between the aims and investments of Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events in the planning and appraising of MUTPs, and the extent to which these are/ can be made mutually reinforcing.

The study focuses on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) and its contribution(s) to the regeneration of Kings Cross/St. Pancras and Stratford in East London, plus the 2012 London Olympic Games. It intends to draw from these case studies generic and context-specific lessons for future projects in the UK and elsewhere. I propose to conduct a series of interviews with persons such as yourself who in the past have acted/ are currently acting on behalf of stakeholders of the CTRL, KX Central, Stratford City or 2012 London Olympics and their affiliated developments.

A particular aim of my research is to ascertain what kind of institutional networks and power relations among key stakeholder organisations can be deemed a ‘pre-requisite’ to the delivery of desirable outcomes.
I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to be interviewed - either at your premises or here at the OMEGA Centre at UCL, whichever suits you best. I would be especially grateful if you would allow me to record the interview on the understanding that you will not be quoted without your permission in any publications and/or findings that emanate from my work. I will provide you with a transcript of the interview for your checking and approval.

Please find attached the questionnaire that I propose to employ for the interviews. It contains:

- Part 1 - A series of core questions (Overarching Research Questions) which we would like all of our interviewees to address;
- Part 2 - A list of questions relating to a series of hypotheses about the CTRL / KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics, from which we would like you to please select those which you feel best able to answer. You may choose as many as you like.

If you feel able to accept my invitation, I would be most grateful if you could please contact me by email (yen-ning.tseng@ucl.ac.uk) or telephone (020 7679 4877) to arrange a mutually convenient time/date for the interview. In the meantime, if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours Sincerely,

Yen-Ning, Tseng
PhD Research Student & VREF Scholarship Holder
Enc.
PART 1: Overarching Research Questions derived from the CTRL experience

The questions in Part 1 are posed to help ascertain the extent to which the synergy of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration (SUR) and mega events (MEs) could effectively maximise benefits and minimise costs even though at some stage these projects will be implemented in a competing environment.

Question 1:
Do you agree that MUTPs are impacted significantly by mega events, if so, why and how?

Question 2:
In your view, under which circumstances can one coordinate the delivery of MUTPs, SUR and MEs and simultaneously achieve visions of sustainable development?

Question 3:
Where this trilogy of development exists, which agency/institution provides leadership and which of the three types of developments (MUTPs, SUR and MEs) become the locomotive of change that drives the others to achieve favourable (integrated?) outcomes for the principal stakeholders?

Question 4:
Do MUTPs, SUR and MEs share resources at the local, regional and national scale, or is one promoted at the expense of the others? If so, please provide an illustration of this.

1 MUTP: Transport projects involve high investment expenditures (i.e., over US $500 million); long life time of 50 years and more; and are land-based transport infrastructure investments within and connecting ‘urban areas’ in the form of bridge, tunnel, road and rail links, or combinations of these. They usually involve considerable uncertainty with respect to demand forecasts and cost estimations; considerable share of indirect benefits which cannot be captured by the operator (e.g., urban regeneration benefits) (Bruzelius et al. 2002: 144).

2 SUR: Definition employed in these questions is derived from the visions of King’s Cross Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes which are provided by the developers. To summarise, they should be able to facilitate economic development and contribute to the capital’s continued economic growth; deliver benefits to existing local communities; adopt wider sustainability principles, for example in terms of energy efficiency, the use of water and the recycling of materials.

3 MEs: For the purposes of this research, mega events focus on cultural and sporting events, for instance, Universal Exposition (EXPO) and Olympic Games.

4 Interviewees should have their own perception of Sustainable Development. If not, we can use Brundtland Report which is well known and often cited: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

5 Resources: It includes financial, political, institutional and planning resources.
PART 2: The Channel Tunnel Rail Link and its Transport Hubs (at King’s Cross and Stratford) and 2012 London Olympics: Some hypotheses and questions about their development

A number of hypotheses are forwarded here to help explain how the CTRL and its transport hubs at King’s Cross and Stratford were developed and what relationships (if any) were established with the 2012 London Olympics project? The following questions invite interviewees to respond to the plausibility of each of these hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs

Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Events (MEs), while MEs in turn can speed-up MUTP and SUR developments. On this basis CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both SUR and ME developments associated with its transport hubs.

Question 1: MUTP is a positive catalyst

Do you agree with this hypothesis in general terms and as it relates more specifically to the CTRL?

Question 2: CTRL – A driver of change?

What are the distinct roles of the CTRL in terms of the urban regeneration process of KX Central and Stratford City, and what role (if any) has the CTRL played in the Olympic Games Project?
HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political decision

Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Event (ME) scheme.

Question 3: Politics in time (after Paul Pierson, 2004)

Is the ultimate determining factor of the decision-making process in MUTP planning, appraisal, evaluation and delivery that of political power - not the power of the rationality of technocrats?

Question 4: Bargaining power (after Charles Lindblom, 1988)

What factors can enhance stakeholders’ ‘negotiation power’ in the delivery of:

- CTRL as a whole
- the KX Central / Stratford City transport hubs or
- 2012 London Olympics

and why?

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6 For the purposes of this study the discussion of institutional arrangements is more emphasised on the planning aspect.
HYPOTHESIS 3 - Synergy of network

Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergetic relations between MUTPs, SUR and MEs can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.

Question 5: Robbing Peter to pay Paul
Will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics project significantly divert resources away from other major development initiatives? If so, is the spin-off benefits of this re-prioritisation justified?

Question 6: ‘Win-win’ strategies?
Do you agree that some important aims of the CTRL project, the 2012 London Olympics project and the urban regeneration schemes for Stratford City and King's Cross are in reality mutually reinforcing, or are the product of important compromises?

Question 7: Concentration or de-centralisation
How effective will the new CTRL Stratford Station be as a catalyst for new development?
Will it attract new public and private sector development in East London or merely encourage the further concentration of such development in Central London?

Question 8: Reality or Rhetoric
How would you respond to the claim that there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality in the vision that mega events, such as the 2012 London Olympics, can significantly stimulate sustainable urban regeneration?
HYPOTHESES 4 - Discourse\(^7\) Power

Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas.

Question 9: Networked Polity (after Chris Ansell, 2000)

Do you agree that discourses\(^7\) of MUTPs, SUR and MEs have been used as tools by key champions to convince others of the validity of their position(s) in the hope that this will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the same interests and empowering the project delivery network?

Question 10:

Who are the primary champions and decision-makers that supported and opposed:

- the CTRL project?
- KX Central
- Stratford City or
- 2012 London Olympics?

And what were their major intentions?

Thank you

\(^7\) Discourse is widely defined as storylines, actions, policies, and visions that are used to persuade, convince, attract or even point people to certain dimensions.
INDEX

By completing the following indexes you will be greatly helping us to analyse the data collected in your interview. The indexes are divided into two parts:

- About You - questions about you and your involvement in the CTRL / KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics and/or its associated developments (Questions 1-3 below);
- Your Views on CTRL / KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics (Questions 4-6 below);
- Please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply to.

About You

1. What You Do (please tick the box(es) that best describes what you do)
   (✔ You can copy and paste this symbol to the box)

<table>
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</table>

2. Your Role on CTRL / KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics (please tick the box that best describes your influence on the project)
   (✔ You can copy and paste this symbol to the box)

- I influenced decision-makers
- I influenced project stakeholders
- I helped to build relationships/consensus
- I helped to implement the project
- I supported/advocated the project
- I observed/report on the project
- I opposed the project
- Other
3. **Your period of involvement in CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics** (please place mark on the timeline below - you may show more than one period; please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply to)

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**Your Views on CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics**

4. **Which of the following types of context do you consider most important in the planning of CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics?** (please rank each one out of ten in terms of importance, where one represents the highest priority and ten the lowest; please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply to):

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<tr>
<th>Types of context</th>
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<tr>
<td>National background, policy, planning and funding frameworks?</td>
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<td>Sustainability visions to be serviced?</td>
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<td>Cultural contexts?</td>
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<td>Temporal contexts? (They could be project time frame, history of project development, and timing for key-decisions)</td>
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5. **How successfully do you consider the CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics project has coped with the Sustainable Development Challenges below?** (please assign a value of one to ten to each, where one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest; please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply to):

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainable development challenges</th>
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<th>7</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ensuring accountability in decision-making</td>
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<td>Providing transparency in decision-making</td>
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<td>Ensuring institutional capacity building &amp; public consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Addressing concerns of biodiversity</td>
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</table>
Addressing concerns of **ecology**
Promoting **health**

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<tr>
<th>Sustainable development challenges</th>
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Addressing concerns of **safety**
Promoting **energy saving**

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<tr>
<th>Contributing to social cohesion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to goals of equity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promoting economic <strong>competitiveness</strong></td>
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<td>Successfully involving the <strong>private sector</strong></td>
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<td>Addressing forces of <strong>globalisation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhancing operations efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guaranteeing <strong>affordability</strong> of project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensuring economic <strong>viability</strong> of project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promoting enhanced <strong>accessibility</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contributing to planned <strong>spatial &amp; territorial restructuring</strong></td>
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<td>Addressing concerns of <strong>subsidiarity</strong></td>
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| Others (please specify) | |

6. **Which of the following attributes do you consider most important for an efficient and effective stakeholder network to deliver CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics?** (please assign a value of one to ten to each, where one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest; please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply to):

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<th>Attributes of Stakeholder Networks</th>
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<td>Power: distribution or concentration / negotiation</td>
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<td><strong>Interests</strong>: project incentives / business environment</td>
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<td>Strategic leadership: bring actors together</td>
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<td>Institutional arrangements: network structure / policies</td>
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<td>Level of involvement: decision-making / consult / keep informed</td>
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APPENDIX 4:
Pre-Hypothesis Interview Responses
For the purpose of this research, the issues and themes presented below are by no means exhaustive, but instead focus on those aspects that have strong relevance to the main aim of this research: to identify interrelationships between mega urban transport projects, sustainable urban regeneration and mega events. Moreover, it appears that the correlations between issues are numerous, hence the summary below compresses the main areas of interests of this study.

Summary of Interview Responses
From the narrative patterns identified by the analytical tools described in Chapter 3, the predominant issues and their interrelationships can be ascertained. The interrelationships of these issues are crucial linkages for shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the studied mega-project decision-making process. In this section, the summary of these relations is illustrated and accompanied by brief extracts from the data. Moreover, issues are characterised into six areas of interests: decision-making, institutional arrangements, discourse power, uncertainty, interrelationships between these three types of mega projects and the related issues.

- Determining factors and features of mega project decision-making
  - Difficulty in quantifying benefits from the CTRL project development
    A prevailing argument is about how to appraise a business case like the CTRL project. The measurement of regeneration benefits is difficult, partly because it requires a long-term view and partly because the value can be different depending on whether it was judged from an optimistic or pessimistic perspective. It is argued that the externalities derived from the development of the CTRL project need to be taken into account. Additionally, wider benefits that are expected to trickle down to the communities are not certain and can easily be compromised. For example, the financial contributions from the developers of the station areas (St Pancras and Stratford in this case) were negotiated and legitimised as Section 106 agreements; however, the 2008/2009 worldwide credit crunch and scarcity of bank lending provided an excuse for the private sector to renegotiate the deal. The negotiation for the Section 106 agreements involves elements of developers’ social responsibility and flexibility required by mega projects. The agreement set up an overarching, long-term, planning framework and enabled a market-driven development logic. The challenge for the public sector, including the Central Government and the local authorities, is to keep the project alive without losing control. At the same time, the project might be slowed down or re-phased and the distortion or degradation of sustainability objectives by financial difficulties is expected.

  - Diverse measurements of economic benefits and their accountability
    The accountability of the measurements for major infrastructure investments and mega event developments has been challenged. Economic impact studies are often filled with misapplications of economic theory that virtually guarantee that their projections will be large. Large-scale projects have relatively long planning timeframes, which increase the difficulty of project
appraisal. The high degree of uncertainty involved in these projects results in big gaps between the estimates in the initial planning period and the project cost at the end. These gaps attract the criticism of over-optimistic forecasting.

- Government indecisiveness and ‘least cost logic’
Mega projects inevitably involve a large sum of capital investment and when the Government needs to face decisions relating to project financing, they tend to be very indecisive or reluctant to face confrontations. The decisions at the early stage of the CTRL were made by British Rail and were mostly based on relatively narrow and safe aspects of their organisational interest. Thus, the profits from the property development linked to the station areas were a major incentive for their decisions. In addition, their decisions were greatly constrained by the Treasury’s predominant “least cost logic” when investing in public services.

- Endeavour by the partnerships between business groups and the local authorities
Ove Arup played a creative and proactive role in the private sector and did their utmost to lobby for the CTRL easterly route. Kent County Council at the early stages endeavoured to push the CTRL project through. Newham Council, development agencies and local businesses jointly lobbied furiously for the easterly route and Stratford International Station. The combination of professionals, institutional capacity, lobbying skill, intensive communication and consensus building was the critical impetus which drove and shaped the CTRL project. According to the narrative provided by the interviewees, Newham Council argued vehemently with a lot of the other people vote at least it needs to be a station in Stratford. That proposal was resisted very strongly by the Government and by Union Railways. They thought it would simply slow the journey times down. Initially, they thought their development profit would come from the Ebbsfleet and King’s Cross areas. Newham Council and the Stratford promoter groups did not see the loss that it would make by having extended service times because of Stratford and thought that the cost of building the station there will be offset by the development potential at Stratford. Consequently, the decision in favour of Stratford International was supported by John Prescott who was persuaded and lobbied by Newham Council. Interestingly, the development profits of the Stratford railway lands emerged as one of the critical elements for the CTRL concessional contract / commercial arrangements to attract the private sector.

- Political power and determination
Apart from the united effort made by the local authorities, developers and business groups, political power was a strong thrust that is crucial to the CTRL project proposal approval. The most-mentioned politician is Michael Heseltine who used his concept of the creation of London Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC) to promote the idea of integrating the CTRL project and the Thames Gateway development (see Section 9.4.2). Many interviewee responses (including people from the local authorities, the developers and the community groups) indicated
that the political determination and cross-party support is the essence of the force that drove the CTRL project through. Once the project obtained a certain level of political determination from powerful advocates and prevalent approval within the government, the project has built up enough momentum to proceed and has become too costly to abandon. Political determination was also a critical driving force for the 2012 Olympic Games. The three main political parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats) committed to the Games during the Bid phase. The Olympics have achieved the degree of political commitment presented to the IOC, which has given the Games a reasonable chance of attracting very high levels of local and institutional support.

– Government intervention
It is argued that the private sector expected that the government could not afford to abandon the CTRL project or run through the tendering process again, and therefore they offered an over-optimistic business case in their bid offer. The project then ran into financial difficulties in 1996 and was secured by the 1998 financial restructuring which obtained strong government backing. Without John Prescott’s support for the project, this government intervention would have been unlikely. Although the advocates’ effort to lobby and brief John Prescott was a critical dynamic to persuade him to support the CTRL project when the Labour government took office in 1997; there are some suggestions that the new government held an attitude that “no projects died on my watch”. Therefore, a unique government backing mechanism was forthcoming something which previously had not existed and has not been replicated in other projects since. Another relatively subtle instance of the government’s intervention in the CTRL project is the elements of its Private Finance Initiative (PFI) mechanism. The government’s no-public-funding ideology contradicts the financing mechanism in the CTRL project. The lucrative development rights of the railway lands at King’s Cross and Stratford were given to the LCR as part of the concessionary contract. It is seen as a necessary initiative from the government when seeking private sector resources to build the CTRL. Under this circumstance, the commercial agreements between the government and the developers could represent a different form of public subsidy.

– Window of opportunity
The CTRL project per se can be seen as a window of opportunity. Once this window opened, many existing proposals flocked into this limited opportunity, including station area developments at Stratford, Ebbsfleet and Thames Gateway. These proposals have long been planned but they linked themselves to the CTRL project and became part of the agenda. This mutual aggrandisement between the CTRL project and its associated developments formed a better business case to justify the project as a whole package. With all the stakeholders eager to share the window of opportunity, they made a lot of political noises as they began positioning themselves. The 2012 London Olympics appeared to take advantage of the introduction of the high-speed rail link to Stratford. It is suggested by many interviewees that the existence of the
CTRL project was a determining factor for London to become the host city of the 2012 Olympic Games. Mega events are often seen as opportunistic. Here the Olympics were created based on an available site and major transport link and they rode on the back of this foundation. Within this context, the mega event triggers the opening of another, but much smaller, window of opportunity. It is widely agreed in the case of the 2012 London Olympics, given the nature of the mega event with its relatively shorter timeframe for planning, that projects catalysed by this mega event are on a smaller scale or are existing ones with only their programmes changed. Further discussion of the impacts of mega events is presented below. In this case study, Newham seems to be the biggest winner. The interviewee described the arrival of Stratford International, the 2012 Olympics and the Crossrail project as being like a Christmas present to the locality. If there is any lost momentum in terms of building on the development platform left behind by the Games, the Crossrail project will act as further impetus. In their position, they are happy to see the Olympic-related money being spent on them although it costs a lot.

- Path-dependent behaviour
Path-dependent behaviour may be pervasive in many situations and organisations. Partnerships in delivering the CTRL project were easily frustrated by the silo thinking which is characterised by path dependency. However, the co-operation within the CTRL project network had overcome the barrier to some extent. The most-criticised path-dependent behaviour was from British Rail. Their inexperience and silo thinking caused them to become locked into the approaches that they are familiar with but which were incapable of dealing with a crisis. Another notorious path-dependent behaviour is the legacy of the Thatcher government: privatisation. The ideology of privatisation appears to be a feature of the UK government’s culture and reinforced by its institutional arrangements. Although there are doubts about the principle of no public funding for the CTRL project, the new Labour government did not modify its predecessor’s policy. It is suggested that the concern was that there would be further delay if it were to be re-negotiate and re-tender the contract. Notwithstanding, the financial restructuring could be an opportunity to adjust the roles of the government and the developer.

- Institutional arrangements
  - Negotiation powers are controlled by senior decision-makers
It has long been argued that the current planning system and consultation framework favours the core decision-makers and excludes oppositions (see Section 9.4 and 9.5). According to the local campaigners, their negotiating power was constrained by the key decision-makers. Opinions which did not subscribe to the same vision as the project advocates are likely to be marginalised within the decision-making network. On the contrary, the actors from local government and developers argued that the consultation process gave a fair opportunity for people to comment on the proposal, except for the early stage of BR’s plan where they neglected the importance of public consultation, which they lacked the capacity to undertake. The long campaign of the
opposition group is also criticised for its loss of focus and unclear demands.

– Streamlined planning power
Camden Council as a planning authority aimed to push the King’s Cross redevelopment project through. They were the drivers for the King’s Cross Central scheme along with the developers. There were various attempts to derail projects and there were various attempts by others to take over the King’s Cross Central project. The local authority was a key decision-maker until the planning system was changed in 2001. The Mayor of London is now the planning authority for King’s Cross. The GLA in the early days were very keen to take control of the King’s Cross Central project. They did not succeed then but the law has now changed. Camden Council played a crucial role in the King’s Cross Central scheme. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is now one of the world’s iconic institutions. It deployed the Olympic Games to dominate the business world and maintain its identity without compromising its core values. Moreover, it established many of the ground rules of today’s sports marketing industry. The force of having to guarantee things to the IOC forces the decision-making to become institutional. The contract signed between the host country and the IOC is very powerful. The Olympic Delivery Authority is bespoke and has streamlined planning powers in the Olympic Park area.

– Organisational performance
Opponents of the 2012 Olympics criticised the Government and the Games organisations’ poor performance. One of the examples stemmed from the delay of the compensation payment by the London Development Agency (LDA). They claimed that the LDA is a chaotic organisation and very difficult to deal with. Another example was quoted from the report published on 23rd April 2008 by the House of Commons Select Committee which is responsible for reviewing the performance of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport: “such a radical revision of cost estimates has been damaging to confidence in the management of the overall programme. It has also exposed the Government and Games organisers to the charge that the initial bid was kept artificially low in order to win public support.”

– Political decision
The role of the high-speed railway network can probably encourage cluster cities / agglomerations since it connects major cities as a centre for each cluster. Other subsidiary transport networks link up all the smaller cities within each agglomeration, which forms a self-sustaining cluster that might, for example, specialise in a particular industry. The campaign for the High Speed 2 has long argued that the high-speed railway network can facilitate economic growth and stimulate regeneration. The advocates of the high-speed railway also claimed that in the future, if we are looking towards a lower carbon economy, then there is a demand for their services. However, the planning process in the UK is long and complicated and the infrastructure cost is so high that it would take a long time for this to be realised. According to the sense making
item, the idea of high-speed railway networks in the UK is supported by the three main political parties. The Tories and Liberal Democrats have spoken in favour of a high-speed line north of London, in part to avoid the expansion of Heathrow Airport by offering an alternative to domestic air travel. It noted that while there are 5,570km of high-speed line in operation in Europe and almost 12,000km under construction or planned; the UK boasts a mere 110km. This indicates that national pride is partly responsible for politicians’ urge to support the high-speed railway network development. As a political consensus is emerging, the remaining issue is the cost. Building high-speed railway networks in the UK is evidence of the competitiveness of the nation as well as its political output.

– Trust is the key element in partnership
Many interviewees claimed that mutual trust is the key to delivering the project and trust is developed over time and after more understanding obtained by each actor in the network. The notion is of a ‘trust circle’, the local community group is excluded because the opposition groups distrust the developers and the local authorities. As to the development process of major projects, the public tends to hold a certain level of scepticism and believes that there will always be gaps between the project outcome and the political promises. This also signifies the lack of trust in the government and the project’s promoters.

• Discourse power
– Rhetoric and political promises
The interviewees from the local communities indicated that, in the case of the mega project developments in the UK, the mature institutional system allowed the people who deliver them to claim them as a great victory providing all they ever intended. However, there is little relationship between the outcome and the original aims because they always rely on people forgetting them. Some bits of the outcomes will be better and some will be worse than those originally promised. It depends on who gets the bits that are worse. A related issue mentioned by most of the interviewees is the promise of extending the CTRL services north of London. At the time, there was much opposition from the North of England, Scotland and Wales against the high-speed railway construction unless it provided services for the whole of the country. So British Rail were required to produce a proposal for through services, which they were not prepared to do. This was largely seen as nothing more than a tantalising gesture and a means of gaining support. The hypocrisy of pretending that there would be high-speed services for the rest of the country locked-in the decision to have the station at King’s Cross/St Pancras. This is a sub-optimal solution, and it provides an example of path dependency. The intention behind this promise is derived from the property development potential of the King’s Cross derelict railway lands.

– Changing the discourse
The development of mega projects in the UK takes a relatively long time. In the case of the CTRL,
it took two decades from the inception of the debate to the project completion. The initiatives for building this project changed throughout the development process. When this project was conceived, the objective was less focused on transatlantic economic linkage. At that time, the concern of London’s position as a world city probably was a more dominant rationale because the British high-speed railway infrastructure is far behind those of other countries. However, the various points of this development journey, such as the objective of European trading, the UK’s position in Europe and the regeneration in Thames Gateway all exerted an important influence over time. The Games are often attached to certain themes and messages, which are part of the marketing strategy. Hence the discourse can change over time depending on the prevailing issues, such as cost efficiency and sustainability. One common attribute of the 2016 Olympics bid cities is low cost and using existing facilities. The interviewee asserted that the Olympics are moving away from the Olympic Park concept. Host cities are realising that concentrating enormously large numbers of people in a particular area creates a huge number of transportation issues. It also means that cities end up spending a lot of money on building venues that are only temporary or later need to be downsized. Sustainability will mean that, for mega events like the Olympic Games, it will be a case of using existing facilities much more widely or upgrading existing systems, such as using existing accommodation and transportation systems. Otherwise it will be financially and environmentally unsustainable.

– Stratford International Station is a white elephant
The elected politician of Newham claimed that three factors constituted a strong case for Stratford International: First, Stratford can provide a necessary safety case for the Eurostar train between Barking and St Pancras when it needs to dispatch trains at night in an emergency. Second, there is a railway yard north of Stratford - Temple Mill - which provides suitable conditions for the construction of a railway depot. Third, Stratford provides better operational conditions for future high-speed train expansion to the cities to the north of London by connecting to the West Coast Main Line. However, other interviewees’ narratives collide with the latter two points. According to one interviewee, the demand for a railway depot was recognised at a very late stage of the CTRL development. Eurostar presented the case to the Government in 2004 and lobbied seriously, but the Government was reluctant to make a decision that involved more expenditure. The decision of giving approval to the Temple Mill depot was eventually made after two years. The decision on Stratford International was made much earlier (in 1998) than that on the depot. Additionally, the argument about the railway connection with the West Coast Main Line was in opposition to the suggestion that the future connection is likely to be from King’s Cross (The 2010 published High Speed 2 proposal demonstrates that the connection from London will be from Euston Station which is close to the St Pancras International Station). Some interviewees suggested that Stratford International is a white elephant given the relatively short distance

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between the St Pancras terminal and Stratford International.

– **Property-oriented development**

In 1984, the Thatcher Government started instructing nationalised industries to make up their expenses by selling their assets. British Rail in particular was instructed as a former Tory Prime Minister said in the House of Lords “to sell the family silver and to make their books balance.” The British Rail Property Board was looking at all the lands that they could probably sell. From the perspective of the developer and railway manager, the integration of railway and land development is a win-win solution. However, this mechanism would inevitably cause gentrification and displacement. The disadvantaged groups would be the losers to be sacrificed on the alter of a capitalist society. This is a protracted debate between market-driven and community-friendly development. Furthermore, the vision of sustainable development which was emphasised by the regeneration projects in King’s Cross and Stratford seems to be easily derailed by the commercially-focused development. Developments at the CTRL station areas, i.e. King’s Cross Central and Stratford City schemes, are under significant pressure because profits generated from the developments are designated to pay back the construction cost. This has stressed the need for developers to maintain their profit level by raising the development density and therefore leading to over-development. Even worse, it is suggested that the profits generated from the regeneration benefits are highly uncertain and can merely keep the operation cost in balance if the regeneration schemes successfully attract more patronage.

– **Strategies to win support**

In order to win support for the Channel Tunnel in the 1980s, the government made various concessions. There was an argument about that it would undermine the very companies who carry most rail and road traffic over to the Continent at that time if there was any government subsidy. So the Channel Tunnel was debarred from receiving any public subsidy and this has become a legacy which impacted on the CTRL project. The then domestic public service was used to validate putting public funding into the CTRL project financing. The ‘no public funding’ policy is a political ideology. As mentioned earlier, the promise of a high-speed railway link to the north of London was merely a political gesture which aimed to win the support of the MPs in the northern constituencies. The LCR’s bidding was criticised because it was felt that they deliberately kept the requirement on Government’s direct grants low in order to win the bid. A similar criticism was levelled at the cost estimation for the 2012 Olympics where it was argued that the initial Olympic bid was kept artificially low in order to win public support. One sense making item alleged that key evidence from the Olympic impact research was suppressed or ignored by the Olympic organisers. This revelation about Olympic impacts and actual costs raised the question of why ministers endorsed a bid citing a justification dismissed by their own experts.
• Uncertainties
  – Opportunistic behaviour
In the period of financial restructuring, Railtrack was regarded as opportunistic. When they were invited to participate in the arrangement to buy the CTRL, they clearly saw that they were in a very advantageous position to negotiate the terms. They exploited the financial crisis of the CTRL project. Again, when it came to the point of setting in place the arrangements to proceed with section 2, Railtrack were reluctant to concede that they would not be able to exercise their option and attempted to extract from the Government a revised better deal. At the same time, the Department for Transport was also reluctant to acknowledge that Railtrack would not exercise that option. Therefore the CTRL developers (i.e. LCR) were working very much by themselves making sure that they were ready for to go forward as quickly as possible once people accepted and acknowledged that Railtrack would not exercise their option. The LCR were working in the background on alternative plans. This also reveals that sometimes a government can be the source of uncertainties.

Another instance of opportunistic behaviour is the transport project associated with the St Pancras International terminal. The interviewee claimed that the Thameslink Station is a typical example of opportunism. When that plan had gone wrong, it was abandoned leaving a sub-optimal transport system as a result. Thameslink Station was initially designed to be built underneath King’s Cross Station. However, the Government subsequently realised that it was too expensive and risky – the same logic as with the high-speed terminal underneath King’s Cross Station. Thameslink now has its 12 carriage platform at St Pancras but at the cost of an immense battle to sort out problems in Borough Market and London Bridge stations to get longer platforms. Thameslink is running today but with shorter trains. It has become very costly to build longer platforms. Hence its capacity is currently restricted by this circumstance. The benefits of Thameslink, as originally designed, are missing.

  – Planning blight caused by uncertainties
Related to the factor of “indecisiveness and least-cost logic”, the long drawn out CTRL planning process contributed to uncertainties and planning blight. It is blamed on the uncertainties about the delivery of the CTRL project, which delayed the King’s Cross regeneration programme for many years. Given the conditions in the King’s Cross area, the impetus of urban regeneration was not heavily dependent on whether there is a high-speed rail terminal or not. Instead, without the intrusion of the CTRL project, King’s Cross regeneration would have started sooner and cost less. The same reason also caused the planning blight along the potential routes before the actual route was determined.

  – Mega events provide certainty
In the current uncertain climate, particularly during the world economic recession, the threat of
delays to some projects due to funding constraints is a real concern. However, the connection of some schemes to the 2012 London Olympics will serve to ensure a strong infrastructure growth in demand over the next couple of years. The Athlete Village is one of the examples. Apparently, the Olympic Games placed immense pressure to the surrounding development area, and when the economic tsunami arrived, the developers grabbed the window of opportunity created by the crisis. As a result of government intervention, the housing project in the Village was secured and is progressing.

- **Interrelationships between mega urban transport projects, sustainable urban regeneration and mega events**
  
  **Discourse coalition**
  Ken Livingstone, the then Mayor of London, pushed for London to have an Olympic Bid and the only place that the Olympic stadium could really be developed in terms of space and regeneration potential was in Stratford. Stratford became very attractive to the Olympics because they could add the regeneration of the area onto that bid, which is something required by the International Olympic Committee. A lot of the developments, particularly the housing developments that are now taking place around the Olympic site, are developments that are facilitated by the local authority. The local authority will give them planning permission very readily because local authorities, particularly the London boroughs in the area surrounding the Olympic park, now no longer have access to significant sums of money to initiate their own public developments. However, some argued that regeneration benefit was a dangerous rationale for supporting the Olympic project. Regeneration is something that should have a separate rationale and a business case from those of the Games. Wrapping up the promises of housing and employment on the back of the Olympic project is a recipe for failure and disappointed expectations for the Games legacy.

  **The Olympic Games and the Stratford City scheme**
  The government needed to merge the Stratford City scheme to justify its decision on hosting the Games and site selection. They recycled the benefits of urban regeneration and people became confused about these two projects. The Stratford City scheme was already planned when the Olympic Games site decided. Newham Council claimed that these two have different initiatives and different resources. There is competition when these two mega projects happened at the same time on adjacent construction sites. In order to present a good image of the Olympic park, the Government did not kill the Stratford City scheme when conflicts arose. Apparently, the developers are under significant pressure caused by the Games. As a result of the global economic recession, the developer of the athlete village (i.e., Lend Lease) cannot access sufficient bank lending. The Government consequently nationalised the athlete village project in 2009. In this sense, the Games may guarantee the delivery of the Stratford City scheme but not without reconfiguring its programme and characteristics.
Impact of the 2012 Olympic Games on the Thames Gateway development

In terms of housing development, the 2012 Olympic Games will have a significant influence on the Thames Gateway because the Thames Gateway is also a provider of lots of new housing over a period of time and especially in the years immediately after 2012. They are not going to be in a position to bring onto the market further additional housing. The re-phasing of the delivery of the Thames Gateway is also going to be significantly impacted by the 2012 Olympics. The mega event in this sense is competing for resources with other mega projects. If projects are not associated with the mega event, they are likely to be impacted negatively since mega events tend to have overriding power.

The impact of the CTRL project on urban regeneration

Some claimed that the CTRL’s prolonged planning process and decision-making caused planning blight for the King’s Cross area rather than bringing forward the King’s Cross redevelopment scheme. As time was wasted, higher costs occurred when the high-speed railway terminal was finally decided. Conversely, some interviewees believe that the CTRL project is primarily a catalyst for the regeneration which is taking place in King’s Cross and Stratford and further east through the Thames Gateway. The CTRL developer defined three objectives for this project: providing international train travel, to improve commuting train travel from Kent and to provide a catalyst for regeneration. The new St Pancras station did improve the image of the locality. Local campaigners and community developers criticised the way in which the privilege and reputation of the local authority seemed to form an important part of the incentives for local authorities working in partnership with the developers.

One interviewee argued that “today, and in 10 years time, the far more important issue would be the catalyst project for the regeneration. Back in 1998 / 1999, government was only allowed to include half a billion pounds worth of further regeneration from this railway, whilst today, with King’s Cross and Stratford, there would be over £10 billion worth of regeneration - effectively 20 times higher and with the potential to become even greater on completion of the project.” Regeneration benefits have become an important financial justification for the high-speed railway project. The lack of concrete evidence to show the economic impacts and scepticism stemming from the collisions between market- and community-led developments posed questions about whether this mega-project discourse can materialise.

Newham Council believes that having an international station at Stratford with links to Europe will be a real catalyst for redevelopment/regeneration in the east of London. Although Newham is one of the most deprived areas of the UK, the local authority thought the international station was the project that could really unlock the potential of the area. Hence, from 1988 to 1998 they consistently worked to promote the idea that the international station would become the catalyst for change at Stratford.
In addition to the high-speed domestic services connecting north Kent to central London via Stratford, Crossrail would appear in 2016. Transport infrastructure will make Stratford a very attractive and fast business gateway. This was always the ambition of the Newham lobbying group’s backing 20 years ago making Newham a place where investors would come to build their businesses. One sense-making item shows that, regarding the Thames Gateway development, the area inside London makes a strong case for developing housing rather than in Kent and Essex. Although the Government often quoted the Crossrail project and the Eurostar domestic services, they cannot properly serve the Thames Gateway areas that are outside London. The transport expenditure in the Thames Gateway areas outside London is heavily weighted towards roads. Conversely, in the London Thames Gateway, most transport expenditure went on public transport. Transport infrastructure improvement has been a perennial challenge for 25 years in the South East. Additionally, major infrastructure is a prerequisite for successful regeneration.

- **Mega-event-related issues**
  - Entrepreneurialism in urban politics and the promotion of mega events

Entrepreneurialism emerged from the transformation of both the character and the content of urban politics since the mid 1970s. Mega events are one of the instruments to realise the idea of public-private partnership formation. However, some suggested that the close relationship between business leaders and local politicians lead to too much focus on commercially-oriented development. In this research, opponents remonstrate against the approach of the developments both in the high-speed rail station areas and Olympic-related programmes. The notion is that the opponent groups generally agreed that developments are necessary and inevitable, but they are dissatisfied with the patterns of development that are predominant in the partnership between politicians and developers. The expected bottom-up development approach, which is also propagandised by the government, is derailed when developers seek profits to pay off the bills of mega project development. This situation is worse in the case of the 2012 London Olympics in which the developers face significant pressure and time constraints.

Although the Government advocates public-private partnerships (PPPs) when deliver mega projects, the PPP does not necessarily seem to be a peaceful process. The interviewees from the public agencies and the government expressed their frustration when dealing with the private sector and described the partnership is an application of Game Theory. This was partly caused by the stakeholders’ different aspirations but mainly because the public sector is in a disadvantageous position when there are rigorous time constraints.

The identified theme of ‘entrepreneurialism’ in the OMEGA study suggests a different aspect of this concept. Some stakeholders consider that major infrastructure investments need to be led by those with an entrepreneurial approach, and are thus able to see the wider potential gains and
losses of key decisions.

– **Timeframe**
According to ODA, the Olympic project has never gone stagnant because it is always driven by deadlines. There is huge pressure to deliver results at every stage. The Olympics accelerate the focus on time, which concentrates the mind. The Games’ organisers stated that the Olympics brought forward investment and regeneration within a certain timeframe which is a significant feature of the Olympic Games. On the one hand, it draws financial, political and planning resources to one place; on the other hand, the Olympic timeframe reveals that the associated projects are mostly planned long before the Games development. This echoes its opportunistic characteristic whereby the Olympic Games rely on existing infrastructure projects and planned development.

– **The 2012 Olympic Legacy Plan**
The local boroughs think that the Games organisers and developers do not understand the local needs. They presume that the stadium is likely to become a white elephant after the event. Connectivity is also a concern to the Olympic boroughs. The current thinking of the Olympic Park is as an island not really merged with its neighbourhoods. However, the Olympic Games created a new shopping list for the locality and lead to more money coming in from the government contingency funds. It is suggested that many investments have followed the Olympic decision, for example, the rolling stock of the High Speed One, the East London Line, some of the DLR extensions, the re-fit of the Stratford Regional Station, the underground power cables, land assembly which would have taken 20 years otherwise and West Ham’s has received £35 million project to make over its entrances and ramps.

• **Other issues**
– **Stakeholder management is the key to mega project delivery**
The interviewees from local authorities, public agencies and the Olympic organisations all stressed the importance of stakeholder management in large-project development, which they believe to be the key to success for mega projects and mega events. Ultimately, the rest of it is just noise as people try to position themselves for commercial advantages. Everything else is about money, which you can always work through. The difficulty is about managing stakeholders in that particular environment: how to bring all these stakeholders into roughly the right alignments and how to carry the relationships forward through time.

– **Institutionalise knowledge**
Mega projects have the pattern of going through a lot of chopping and changing, for example, different partners have been in and out of the Stratford City project. This further complicated the project and increased costs in terms of knowledge transfer and commercial arrangement
renegotiations. The continuity of personnel and partnership are identified as an important element in mega-project delivery. However, this remains ideology given the longevity of this kind of project. Therefore, one interviewee indicates that the solution should be to institutionalise knowledge in order to cope with changing personnel and partners.

Accumulating momentum for the 2012 London Olympics
Contradicting the argument about the Olympic timeframe, one interviewee indicated that actually the process of assembling a bid for the Olympics is a long process. There were a series of failures where other UK cities had been involved in Olympic bids before the 2012 London Olympics. Although these bids failed, they exhibited the process of the accumulation of momentum for building the project. The interviewee suggested this is known in some literature as a ‘growth coalition’. The theory of growth coalition reflects the affiliation of project champions. Regarding the issue of the Olympic timeframe, the level of risk should be taken into account. Whether a city can win the hosting rights for the Olympics is highly uncertain, major project developments, such as transport and regeneration, cannot only rely on the Games to bring them about. From the announcement of a host city to the opening ceremony, there are only 7 years, which is too short a timeframe for major transport and regeneration schemes. Hence, the author would support the argument that the Olympics relied on existing infrastructure or already-planned facility programmes.
APPENDIX 5:

Hypothesis-Led Interview Responses
Question 1:
Do you agree that MUTPs are impacted significantly by mega events, if so, why and how?

Around half of the respondents (5 out of 9) to this question expressed strongly positive support for this premise regarding the impacts of mega events on MUTPs. There appears to be general agreement that mega events can be a catalyst that accelerates projects and concentrates political, financial and planning resources. Conversely, another half of the respondents expressed strong disagreement with this question. They indicated that mega events can only have impacts on existing plans for MUTP programmes some of which are then prioritised and some left out.

- Respondents from government agencies, Olympic organisations and local authorities support this premise for the reasons summarised below:
  - It is about national pride as a world contest to provide the best transport system for a world event;
  - Mega events tend to have immediacy, funding, political reputation and political prioritisation attached to them;
  - Without the 2012 London Olympics’ role as a driver establishing an end date, you would not have had the CTRL project completed in its entirety, including the associated underground infrastructure;
  - Mega events prioritise the way the government and others are going to spend the resources;
  - Mega events have effects on transport capacity and demand;
  - Mega events accelerate plans by concentrating political commitment and investments that will otherwise take much longer to materialise;
  - Mega events create a long-term infrastructure legacy;
  - In the case of the Olympics, they act effectively as a catalyst.

- Respondents from both public and private sectors and local communities indicated their argument as follows:
  - Mega events can only push those projects which are already on the drawing board, but to which the political will or the necessary funds have not been allocated;
  - In the case of Crossrail, which has long been planed, the excitement around the Olympics probably gave that a boost;
  - The London Olympics is relying on the existing transport infrastructure programme to accommodate them;
  - Given the lengthy planning period for MUTPs, the relatively-short planning time of mega events cannot have a significant impact on them;
In parallel, mega events complicate the already-complex MUTPs. They cause immense pressure on the transport projects and really make the cost escalate because of their different timeframe.

**Question 2:**
In your view, under which circumstances can one coordinate the delivery of MUTPs, SUR and MEs, and simultaneously achieve visions of sustainable development?

Most of the interviewees (6 out of 9) responding to this question agree that coordination between these three things can provide a better outcome. Two of these responses suggested that a mega-event organiser with overriding planning powers could coordinate these projects and lead to sustainable development. One response emphasised that an influential champion with streamlined planning powers can bring the coordination. Three comments indicated that the planning authority for urban regeneration could better coordinate the other two types of project. One interview transcript pointed out that the coordination between these three is inevitable under the prevalent fashion for modernity, i.e. pursuing high-speed transport, sumptuous infrastructure and advanced technology, but it is not sustainable. Some of the responses from both the public and private sectors expressed a degree of cynicism toward sustainable development in terms of its essence, manoeuvring and ownership.

- Below is a summary of the respondents’ perceptions which supported the idea of coordination of mega urban transport projects, urban regeneration and mega events:
  - A strong champion who is in charge of a powerful regional development agency can make project delivery easier than purely relying on the market.
  - Once the political support, funding strategy and fundamental programmes are all in place, an event can tie these three things (i.e., MUTPs, SUR and MEs) together and potentially deliver a broader and faster outcome.
  - Mega events consist of a series, a group and a package of projects; therefore, mega events *per se* create the environment to coordinate other associated elements of development.
  - The context of Stratford shows coordination within the symbiotic relationship between the transport hub, urban regeneration and the Olympic project, which has helped achieve the vision of sustainable development.
  - Only by means of a highly undemocratic and strongly authoritarian process could this kind of coordination otherwise be achieved.
  - Continuous commitment from all stakeholders and co-operation between public and private sectors are the key factors to realise the vision of sustainable development. A planning authority could coordinate these three things. Local authorities and government each have significant roles to play in providing a framework.
The leader of the local planning authority plays an important role as a broker. In the case of King’s Cross, Bob West, who played a crucial mediator role in the redevelopment, had constructive communication and proactive engagement in the decision-making process of the King’s Cross regeneration scheme with the continuity of strategic planning and technical professions. The coordination between diverse stakeholders from different projects was a key factor in realising the projects and minimising risks.

The coordination of all these three things provides a much stronger case; none of them exists on its own. This highlights the interdependence of projects, which helps them sustain each other, delivering savings and synergies for a better overall outcome.

Below is a summary of the respondents’ perceptions with different ideas about the coordination of mega urban transport projects, urban regeneration and mega events, which further addresses some issues related to sustainable development:

There is a fundamental issue concerning the features of major projects and about their nature that can actually prevent or hinder the realisation of sustainable development. Hence, there is no necessity to co-ordinate these three. It does not help to achieve visions of sustainable development if sustainability is not owned by the local population.

Under the force of globalisation, city competitiveness and the desire for modern and large-scale infrastructure projects, these high-speed infrastructure projects will inevitably accompany modern regeneration. Replacement will subsequently happen to existing communities and businesses. This is not sustainable development; instead, it is about the image that a city wants to present.

Sustainable development is over-used and has become a ‘buzz term’, despite never being properly defined.

The vision of sustainability was not a strong driver, although it did help the narrative around the business case for the high-speed rail link.

The challenge and risks that Stratford City faces are higher than King’s Cross, because it is not prime development land. Within the current market, there are more uncertainties. Certainly designating that site for the Olympics helped to give the extra push that was needed to get that project through.

Similar to the concept of the ‘window of opportunity’, interviewees indicated that the major project development relies heavily on the planetary alignment analogy which requires that all the components of the project are correctly positioned. It implies that the major project developments also need the elements of serendipity and planning.
– In the case of the CTRL project, the timing occurred twice over about 14 years. However, some opportunities were missed as decisions were made to save money rather than time. Ultimately, neither was saved.

**Question 3:**

Where this trilogy of development exists, which agency/institution provides/should provide leadership?

Which of the three types of developments (MUTPs, SUR and MEs) becomes the locomotive of change that drives the others to achieve favourable outcomes for the principal stakeholders?

Concerning the question about the source of leadership, three (37.5% from private developer, government agency and local authority) out of eight responses suggested that the Central Government should play the lead role and coordinate this trilogy of development. The other three (from a government agency, an international organisation and the local community) indicated that a powerful public agency is the leader if multiple development projects exist in one area. Two interviewees (from a government agency and the local community) stated that a coalition between interest groups would be dominant in the project delivery process.

As to which of the three types of developments could be the locomotive and achieve the predominant agenda, there were two respondents who claimed that the integration of mega urban transport projects and sustainable urban regeneration schemes is the key locomotive. Two suggested that mega urban transport projects or a similar grand project with a major injection of public funding are the most powerful driver. Two responses from the mega-event organisations believes that a mega event is the ultimate locomotive which can drive other associated projects forward to reach their goals at a quicker pace with certainty.

A few emerging issues extracted from the responses to question 3 are highlighted below:

- Initial commitment from the Central Government level should provide the leadership. The bi-partisan political support is needed to ensure the long-term view.
- In the case of London, the Mayor and the London Development Agency (LDA) are the strong champions and well-equipped public agencies that can provide leadership in this trilogy of development.
- It requires a specially-designated, supra-national body to be in control.
- Leadership comes from the championship and governance of sponsorship.
- Leadership is where initiative, drive and backing for the projects lies.
- The British are notorious bad at grand projects. The only time this trilogy of development has ever been managed, although not at all successfully, was the London Docklands.
Development Corporation. The current Olympic Delivery Authority, as an undemocratic authoritarian body, may be able to successfully manage the Olympic projects.

- The coalition of interests that comes together around these projects, especially the coalition between politicians and developers, is the means to control these major projects. Policy-makers provide the ground rules and the developers have to find a way of fitting their projects into that framework in order to manipulate that situation. However, these major projects are always out of anyone’s control.
- The time scales of these projects determine the characteristics of this trilogy. Fundamentally, mega events cannot be the strategic driver because mega urban transport projects and major sustainable urban regeneration schemes take a long time to plan.
- Transport projects and sustainable urban regeneration schemes should be closely integrated. This integration is the locomotive to drive other associated developments.
- Mega events are often opportunistic. They rely heavily on the opportunity created by having the site and the large transport link.
- This trilogy of development is likely to exist when there are brownfield sites and they are the locomotive.
- Stakeholders need to be sensitive to the wider political context.
- A strong and effective personality heading up the project itself would turn out to be the main driver. Someone who is fully empowered to make decisions for the project and who can persuade and manoeuvre stakeholders into position.
- Seeking for political reputation and political benefits will be the main motives for the local level.
- Major infrastructure investment or large injections of public funding to some projects is a strong catalyst; otherwise the market would see to it and take control of the timing and patterns of that area’s regeneration.
- How effectively local authorities shape the agenda and insist on attention to sustainability-related issues determines the sustainability of a regeneration scheme. After all, the regeneration scheme is more a local-scale project.

**Question 4:**

Do MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events share resources at the local, regional, and national scale, or is one promoted at the expense of the others?

Within the nine interviews, two responses (22.2% from the Olympic organisation and the community planner) believed that resources are shared between these three main elements (MUTPs, SUR and MEs). Further, the community planner emphasised that they share resources in a way that brings a

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1 It includes financial, political, institutional and planning resources.
favourable outcome for the project organisers and advocates. There were three stakeholders (33.3% from the private developer, local community and government agency) who agreed that, to some extent, there is a degree of resource sharing, but with certain other aspects are in competition. Two responses, both from the government agencies, indicated that these developments do not share resources but in a competitive situation. The interviewee from the local authority commented that these developments are rather independent in terms of resources.

Brief illustrations of stakeholders’ views on question 4 are presented below:

- Political resources are shared but financial resources are separate. Institutional planning resources are streamlined in order to improve efficiency.
- It requires a strong figure to reprioritise the resources in the environment where these projects compete for resources.
- Long-term legacy and urban regeneration benefits are justifications for the Olympics taking a large share of the resources in London.
- In the case of the 2012 Olympics, the stakeholder noted that Britain is a democratic country and the government knew how far they could go to make the Bid attractive whilst not ruining the country.
- If these developments can be combined and in a communist society, they can share resources.
- This issue depends on project scale. Mega urban transport projects are often at a national level. They cause the greatest impacts and may provide the greatest benefit. Sustainable urban regeneration investments impact on relatively smaller areas. In the case of the CTRL and Crossrail, they do share resources with the Stratford City project. As to the Olympics, it further reinforces the imbalance between developments in London and other regions.
- There are elements for sharing in planning resources and planning constitution, but competing in respect of implementation, i.e., labour.
- The costs to local authorities are generally underestimated. The local authority claimed that they pour in resources at all levels in order to be in a position to shape the project design, manage the construction impacts, negotiate, cajole and consult.
- Many Councils would baulk at paying millions of pounds or more to be part of the project, but the benefits to Camden of having an international terminus there are huge and well worth it.
- Strategic allocation of resources is constantly going on. However, as the decision of the project goes down the line from national level to local level, the assigned resources are already diluted. If the project is sabotaged, it is the resulted of a combination of strategic and political changes. Because there is a long timeframe for project delivery, it is possible for a project to stop and start several times.
HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs

Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and the Olympic developments associated with its transport hubs.

**Question 1: MUTP is a positive catalyst**

Do you agree with this hypothesis in general terms and as it relates more specifically to the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project?

The majority (eight out of nine) of the respondents supported this hypothesis and agreed that the CTRL project is an agent for urban regeneration. However, two of them disagreed that it is a catalyst for the Olympics. They suggested that the CTRL did facilitate the success of the Olympics bid, but it was only one of the factors. This assertion about the MUTP being a catalyst for mega events is overstated. One response indicated that the impact of the CTRL on urban regeneration and the Olympics is marginal. The CTRL could merely justify the rationale for choosing that Olympic site but the majority of transportation will depend on domestic services. Furthermore, the Stratford City and King’s Cross Central will be delivered anyway no matter whether there is an international station or not because those lands are big enough and economically enticing.

The respondents’ pros and cons to question 5 are summarised below:

- In the London context, the Dockland Light Railway and Jubilee Line Extension for the Canary Wharf are good evidence for Hypothesis 1.
- Mega urban transport projects are not necessarily the catalyst for mega events, but they allow the events to happen.
- In the case of the planning process, the CTRL has no direct relationship with the London Olympics because they happened at different times.
- The Olympics will benefit from the Stratford International Station and the internal transport network that the CTRL provided. The high-speed link is the determining factor for London to convince the IOC visitors.
- The high-speed railway station at Stratford triggered a chain reaction. The Stratford International Station helped the decision made about the Games. Then the Olympics helped to speed up other projects and give certainty to the Stratford City development.
- Major transport projects are planned deliberately to catch every possible regeneration opportunity, which is part of the rationale for their planning.
- The land development of Stratford City is going to recoup the CTRL construction debt but there is no benefit contributing to sustainable urban regeneration.
Mega events require a variety of conditions and mega urban transport projects are probably one of those necessary elements.

Mega urban transport projects are usually a positive catalyst because they improve accessibility and the image of that site. The case of King’s Cross / St Pancras is certainly changing the whole image of that area of London.

**Question 2: CTRL – A driver of change?**

What are the distinct roles of the CTRL in terms of the urban regeneration process of King’s Cross Central and Stratford City, and what role (if any) has the CTRL played in the Olympic Games Project?

Question 2 is closely related to question 1. All (nine) of the respondents agreed that the CTRL is a driver of change, but there were different outcomes of these changes, i.e. for better or for worse. Seven stakeholders expressed their agreement that the CTRL project had positive impacts on urban regeneration and the Olympic project. Two of the respondents commented that the sheer lengthy of the CTRL project planning process caused planning blight which brought uncertainty to the King’s Cross area development. One respondent argued that the CTRL brought unsustainable patterns of development to the hub areas because the concessionary contract imposes great pressure on their development, which results in a commercially-focus and over-dense development. In addition, six responses stressed the determining role of the CTRL in the Olympic Bid decision.

Below is a summary of the views of the stakeholders:

- CTRL has significant impact in terms of the public and private investment in King’s Cross Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes.
- The Railway is an old and faithful transport system and the impact on the cities is tremendous.
- CTRL provided a window of opportunity for King’s Cross and Stratford to develop good commercial regeneration schemes.
- Accessibility is a major determiner for London land and rental values because these land and rental values in turn are major determiners of land use. There will be many large-scale enterprises located in King’s Cross. The impacts of the ripple effect of the gentrification have already happened in St Pancras.
- CTRL is an unsustainable project in terms of encouraging those property-led developments along its stations. They all follow the modern model of development and create disadvantages for existing local communities.
- The uncertainty of the blight created by the CTRL delayed the King’s Cross Central project and other developments along the proposed corridors for decades. The Stratford City regeneration scheme, although it has the international station, is not as competitive as King’s Cross Central in terms of its geographical conditions. Furthermore, the projected number of
patrons expected for the international station there is risky because of competition from St Pancras Station.

- As to the 2012 Olympics, the CTRL is like the icing on the cake. The importance for people to get to the Olympic site by the link provided by the CTRL will not register in the public perception.
- The railway facilitates the delivery of better and bigger regenerative development along with the international stations. There is an argument about the gentrification problems that may result from the King’s Cross Central plan, but it is controlled by the market and it was the railway that made the change initially, not the property development.
- The effect of the CTRL terminal is more dramatic and obvious at Stratford as the land value there is relatively low and with little prospect of economic success. The CTRL project is a strong injection to that area.

HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political decision

Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Event (ME) schemes.

Question 3: Political power

Is the ultimate determining factor of the decision-making process in MUTP planning, appraisal, evaluation, and delivery that of political power and not the power of the rationality of technocrats?

Two thirds of the stakeholders (6 out of 9 comments) responding to this question expressed strongly positive support for this premise regarding the influence of political power in the decision-making process for major projects. The other one third of the respondents held an opposing opinion suggested that there is a fundamental flaw in this premise. Both of these two sides provided illustrations for their arguments, which highlight emergent issues.

- The statements which support this premise:
  - Political output is a dominant concern and far more influential than the cost it takes to deliver that outcome.
  - Politics are about priority and it comes from government level. Without political support, major projects are not going to happen irrespective of the merits of the idea or technical requirements.
  - In the case of London, political power at the heart of the decision to bid for the Games. Without cross-party support and based on the power of rationality, Britain would probably not have bid in the first place.
  - Political decisions are vulnerable to global economic forces and the perception of a
city’s image. Therefore these high-profile major projects are inter-connected with the highest level of strategic politics and political decisions where things like financial viability are secondary.

- It is difficult to have a fully rational technical case because even the results of thorough evidence-based research may change over time. The political decision might be based on something that is not provable in a rational manner, but is a good idea politically.

- The views of the stakeholders who disagreed with this premise:
  - The power of the rational technocrats is not divorced from political power in the MUTP decision-making.
  - Neither the technocrats nor the politicians have that much power in decision-making for major infrastructure investments. Decision makers and politicians are often constrained by the financial realities unless they perceive strong willingness from people to pay more tax or they have a strong ideology in favour of public provision driven either by an authoritarian or a democratic state. The private market ideology will limit the capacity as a politician to push the project through. Political and financial contexts of the time need to be taken into account if one wants to devise a programme. There is no difference between political power and technocratic rationality concerning the development and delivery of major projects.
  - Politicians make decisions but these are not overriding decisions. Decisions for major infrastructure investment also involve elements of lobbying. Appraisal and evaluation reflect the benefits of that project in the real world. This evidence is translated into political pressure and political interest.

### Question 4: Bargaining power (after Charles Lindblom, 1988)

What factors can enhance stakeholders’ ‘negotiation power’ in the delivery of:

- CTRL as a whole
- the KX Central / Stratford City transport hubs or
- 2012 London Olympics

and why?

Nine stakeholders all have their own views on this question as summarised below.

- Concerning stakeholders’ negotiation power in the delivery of a wider range of major projects:
  - Good stakeholder management and wide-ranging stakeholder support are important when negotiating terms.
- Good communication skills for letting all stakeholders fully understand the benefits that the project can deliver are an important strategy to gain more negotiating power.
- Being sensitive to the political climate enables the programme to be adjusted to gain a better position in negotiation.
- Some designated agencies are empowered to override other stakeholders’ concern to some extent in order to deliver the key agenda. Wherever these agencies can bring into play something that the principal stakeholder wants to achieve, they will be well advised to do so. They obtain significant negotiating power because of their strong support from all other principal stakeholders.
- In terms of the CTRL project, the power of the government or the agency which is buying the project is much greater. This is down to political will and ideology.
- Government investment is a key factor for the project delivery. Particularly in an economic downturn, it is the right timing for the Government to step in and stimulate investment.
- Once the certainty of the major projects has been built into legislation, the negotiating power of the local authority lies in the ability to slow a programme down and sometimes generate negative publicity. But a proactive role of the local authority in supporting the project or in providing an arena for consensus-building, is evidence of valuable, and hopefully appreciated, good will. This helps to build trust among the stakeholders. If there can be an input of resources, this can further help to gain influence. Although this does not provide absolute power, the local authority can participate in decision-making for the project specification and secure local needs by proactive involvement.

In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, the stakeholders’ negotiating power is determined by the following factors:
- London has provided one of the best transport plans and accompanied it with 3000 consultation entities. This is very convincing, especially since transport in London is always a difficult issue.
- Urban regeneration and legacy benefits put the Games in a strong bargaining position.
- National pride and a public perception of the UK’s world image is one of the significant factors to enhance the power of the Games.
- The government and Mayoral commitment is the key factor in the delivery of the Olympic project. The stakeholder negotiations almost achieve a conclude transaction of interest-sharing before the Bid. It could be seen as a political movement. At the time, all decision makers from the central government, the Mayor of London and the four Olympic local boroughs were in the Labour party. The negotiation represents sharing benefits between these principal stakeholders. It is a
win-win situation for them if everyone obtains certain benefits that they desire in their area.

- Crisis can trigger the opening of an opportunity window. Sometimes, problems or failure would enhance certain stakeholders’ negotiating power. For example, the credit crunch provided a better position for developers to re-negotiate their obligations under the Section 106 agreements.

- The champions of the Olympics are very good at lobbying. It is a very good example of how to use negotiating power.

**HYPOTHESIS 3 - Synergy of network**

Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, SUR and MEs can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.

**Question 5: Robbing Peter to pay Paul**

Will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics project significantly divert resources away from other major development initiatives? If so, are the spin-off benefits of this re-prioritisation justified?

There was almost overwhelming support by all sectors for the notion that the 2012 London Olympics diverted resources away from other developments. There was only one (out of nine) respondent from the Olympic organisation who did not agree with this premise. Among these responses, four stakeholders (from the developer, government agency, Olympic organisation and local authority) indicated that there would be significant spin-off benefits from this resource prioritising. Two of the stakeholders stressed that the success of the London Olympics will be judged by its legacy plan, which was regarded by another respondent as a competitive project if compared to other lower profile developments.

- Summaries from the responses to this question:
  - The justification is that a mega event condenses the timeframe, which will produce a more efficient outcome than piecemeal developments.
  - It is not really robbing Peter as such; it is only diverting financial resources, delaying expenditure on one area. The investment for the Olympic project is justifiable if looked at long-term and for its wider benefits. It also depends on how you quantify economic benefits and how they then feed back into the economic equation.
  - The spin-off benefits are big considerations for the Olympics decisions. Legacy, such as capturing the imagination of the nation and driving improvements in sport awareness, and urban regeneration benefits are considerations.
  - Although the infrastructure budget is more problematic, it is justifiable. The
investment is more concentrated in space and time.

- We have to look at the long-term regeneration benefits. There has been an absolute quantitative and qualitative improvement in Barcelona’s global and European position, tourism and jobs because of the ’92 Games. London will also have the same reaction to that catalyst.

- These big projects actually help to stimulate the local economies because they are very useful for making sure that there are new suppliers and new markets.

- The test is not the Olympics itself but the legacy. If it delivers the legacy then arguably it is worth it.

- Some relevant issues were emerging as follows:
  - The planning resources of King’s Cross, Stratford and Ebbsfleet will not be diverted by the Olympics, but other, regional, sport-related developments will lose their share to the Olympics.
  - Having several major projects going on at the same time may inflate the cost.
  - Highly-specialised engineering skills can be used for one project and then moved on to the next.
  - The most obvious area to be influenced by the Olympics will be the Thames Gateway development.

**Question 6: ‘Win-win’ strategies?**

Do you agree that some important aims of the CTRL project, the 2012 London Olympics project and the urban regeneration schemes for Stratford City and King’s Cross are in reality mutually reinforcing, or are the product of important compromises?

All the respondents (eight) agreed that there are elements that are mutually reinforcing. Among these eight responses, half of them (from community planner, local community, government agency and local authority) suggested that to some extent there are also compromises within these developments.

- Summaries extracted from the interview transcripts are presented below:
  - There is a win-win situation in terms of transport mode shift. The CTRL is a transport-oriented development and the Games heavily rely on public transport services. Both of them encourage urban regeneration.
  - In terms of the viability of all the projects, there is a need for compromises and it is just more like reality. However, in the process of deciding which interests are to be compromised, the private developers usually have a better negotiating position.
  - The synergy between these elements is there, but the CTRL project alone is not the decisive factor for the King’s Cross redevelopment or the Stratford City scheme.
The urban regeneration schemes came because the CTRL project was made available to a commercial organisation prepared to take the risk and develop it. The overall transport network to those sites is more crucial and then the Olympics have provided the impetus to take Stratford City forward. However, there are compromises between Stratford City and the transport design. The way Stratford City was designed held back the quality of some of the transport infrastructure interchange.

- The two regeneration schemes make the rail project a strong business case. King’s Cross could have been redeveloped without the CTRL; it only needed certainty. Stratford City probably could have been developed without the CTRL but it would have taken much longer because Stratford had a lower economic viability.

- The CTRL ties into the King’s Cross Central scheme. They are mutually reinforcing, but they do not produce sufficient benefits to claim a win-win strategy. The Stratford City and the Olympics entangle together so there is compromise going on there that is completely unnecessary. Therefore, there is no win-win consequence.

**Question 7: Concentration or de-centralisation**

How effective will the new CTRL Stratford Station be as a catalyst for new development? Will it attract new public and private sector development in East London or merely encourage the further concentration of such development in Central London?

Eight stakeholders responded to question 7. Three of them (from the government agency, the Olympics organisation, and the local community planner) strongly supported the claim that Stratford International Station is the main catalyst for the development in that area. One of the stakeholders (from the local authority) supported the premise that the International Station at Stratford is the impetus for the development but suggested that the impact is not immediate. It is believed that it will takes longer than they expected for the effect of the Stratford International Station to be realised, but the Station allows London to host the Games, which has instant results in attracting investments. There were three responses (from the local authorities and the government agency) that said that the real catalyst for the Stratford development is the Olympics rather than the CTRL station because the majority of transport to Stratford relies on tubes, buses and cars. As regards the issue of competition between east and west London, there were three stakeholders (from the local community, the international organisation and the local authority) who pointed out that the concept of central London is changing, the territory of central London is expanding, the geographic centre of London is shifting eastwards.

- Apart from the summary of the responses above, there are several emergent issues addressed by the stakeholders:
- The Stratford International Station has been designed around the development of the Chelsfield (original) regeneration scheme. It is a natural place for the development to grow.
- The quality of the Olympic Bid was to attract investment and development to east London. However, in the Bid, Stratford was presented/regarded as part of central London.
- Stratford is hardly able to compete effectively with central London at the moment. The Olympics diverted resources away from the Thames Gateway area. The Thames Gateway needs governmental intervention and a fully-empowered body to deliver the development because if the market is to be depended on to develop in a commercially sensitive environment, the investors are likely to go to the west.
- The catalyst effect in Stratford from the CTRL is very marginal. Westfield as a foreign developer is attracted by the available land and the good transport connections to other centres in London.
- The Olympics may change the public perception of the Stratford area and show how easily it can be reached from the Jubilee Line or the high-speed domestic services.
- People need to take a long-term view because, over time, the geographic centre of London is shifting eastwards. The wave of movement further east will continue.
- Crossrail is very important to Stratford International. It should increase the number of passengers of the CTRL and generate new investment in east London rather than concentrate on an overheated central London.

Question 8: Reality or Rhetoric

How would you respond to the claim that there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality in the vision that mega events, such as the 2012 London Olympics, can significantly stimulate sustainable urban regeneration?

Three out of eight interviewees (from the government agency, the international organisation and the local authority) believed that people should hold a long-term view and look at the regeneration benefits that have already happened and will happen in the future. In their opinion, the 2012 London Olympics is probably the only mechanism to boost investment in east London and develop derelict lands efficiently and effectively. The respondent from the local community planning organisation criticised the claim that the Games can stimulate regeneration in that area because it was felt that this would not be sustainable. Three other interviewees (from the Olympic organisation, the local community and the local authority) indicated implicitly that there were gaps between the reality and the political promises and they are as a result of political determination and the consideration of political outputs. Also, two of the responses (from the government agency and the local authority) suggested that this phenomenon is in the nature of the major projects; hence there are always gaps. One of them highlighted that the promoters of major projects need to use rhetoric that is over and
above the real value of the project in order to sell such mega projects as an attractive idea.

- Interviewees’ responses are summarised at some length below:
  - The politics in the Olympics output is always constant political motivation.
  - There is no connection between the rhetoric and the realities. It is more about political determination for regenerating East London, not the mega event. The mega event is a false strategy to encourage a streamlined planning body to develop Stratford at a much faster pace because the piecemeal development is more compatible with the needs of local communities and businesses. Furthermore, the piecemeal development might achieve housing creation targets at lower cost.
  - We do need our visionaries and leaders to improve the prospects of London and Britain. Ken Livingston was one of these people.
  - If you want to spend public money in large amounts on any project, you talk about that project furiously because that’s what politics is about. It is actually about selling. So the aftermath is not going to be as exciting as the vision.
  - CTRL has failed so far as something that is going to serve the regions in this country and yet it is all designed that you can just go straight from Stratford up to the North East, and to the North West without even stopping at St Pancras. There is no train service, however, but the train paths on the track are still there for Eurostar to go all the way from Manchester to Paris without stopping at St Pancras - which is the reason why Stratford is important; Eurostar will stop in Stratford. The promise of those regional connections to Europe has not yet been delivered. In the long term, it may well happen. David Cameron (Leader of the Tory Party) said he wants High Speed 2 and this is about selling the political vision. It hits a lot of buttons, quite clever.

HYPOTHESIS 4 - Discourse Power

Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas.

Question 9: Networked Polity (after Chris Ansell, 2000)

Do you agree that mega project discourses have been used as tools by key champions to convince others of the validity of the mega projects in the expectation that these discourses will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests
of these champions and empowering the project delivery network?

There were only five interviewees who responded to this question and all of them agreed that advocates of major projects used discourses as a tool to promote those projects. But there were three (from the local community planning organisation, the government agency and the local authority) who suggested that the claim about marginalising other stakeholders was overstated. One interviewee from the Olympic organisation thought the marginalising behaviour probably occurred unintentionally. One response implied that there are always people who are impervious to the blandishments despite the tempting promises that partly constitute the discourses of major projects to gain more support. The interviewee from the local community argued that this premise does come down to the heart of how decisions have been made in Britain. The media and politicians formed a chain to market the Olympics from their inception. The Olympics is conceived as a brand that manages to market itself effectively. The stakeholder from the local authority regarded this process as very project-focused with nobody losing in the project delivery network.

- Some statements and issues worth noting are listed below:
  - Ken Livingston had the power to tell people what a great idea it would be to bid for the Olympics so he persuaded the government and ensured that a bid was made. He had no money, only personality, charisma, connections and energy. Moreover, Ken Livingston, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair and Sebastian Coe were all simultaneously in agreement. Their political commitment and determination pushed the Olympic project through. In this process, the discourse might prove effective and other concerns might be neglected unintentionally.
  - As regards the premise that major project discourses are a tool for the key champions, this contains a suggestion of “the Emperor's New Clothes” agreement. But of course everybody likes the boy in the Andersen fairy tale who said: “but the King is in the all-together, the all-together … naked as the day that he was born”. The CTRL and the Olympics are so political in nature with no commercial profit; people are not all in wonder at the sight of the Emperor, there are always some people who, like that little boy, point out the truth.
  - The statement about marginalising the others is a bit too black and white. In modern society, especially in London, people cannot ignore the power of the community networks and the media.
  - In the Olympic public enquiry, the Olympic budget was challenged and it made no difference. The inspector ignored the budget issue.
  - The Olympic project delivery network showed a defensive attitude from day one. To even suggest the Olympics might not be a good thing was considered as slightly baddy.
  - Everybody has an interest in that land, arguably all those interests are all aligned.
The actual companies involved in doing things are people like Bechtel, Arup and some others. The commercial companies worked out that they want to put King’s Cross and St Pancras into their portfolio and they want to maintain their networks and positions because they have good contacts in government, good contacts with banking and good contacts with everything else. They traded off the success story of King’s Cross.

Question 10:
Who are the primary champions and decision-makers that supported and opposed:
- the CTRL project?
- KX Central
- Stratford City andf
- 2012 London Olympics?
And what were their major intentions?

- Statements concerning the champions and opponents of the CTRL project:
  - The LCR championed the CTRL because of the benefit from the land. Other champions include Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Blair. Also, the Northern and Scottish MPs and the local and regional authorities were championing it because they thought it would bring them direct services to London and Europe.
  - Most of the landowners and community groups up and down the line opposed the project because they suffered from the construction blight. The Treasury opposed the original proposal until it added in the regeneration benefits.
  - The CTRL project did not have strong opposition. Some small local community groups were concerned about the impact and the way it would be built. They were not against the railway itself.

- Statements concerning champions and opponents of the King’s Cross Central scheme:
  - The primary champions for the King’s Cross Central were the LCR and Camden Council who enjoyed the reputation and prestige brought by St. Pancras station.
  - This project does not have strong opposition. Certain local communities were opposed, fairly small community groups who, although small, were competent and quite effective about what their communities were opposed to.

- Statements concerning champions and opponents of the Stratford City scheme and the 2012 London Olympics:
  - The organisations include the Mayor, the British Olympic Association, the London Development Agency, Greater London Authority, Transport for London and Sport
England as the main champions.
- The Games is guaranteed by the nation not the government. Once the bid document was signed, the commitment of the country was assured. The conditions for decision-makers are unlike other projects that have become technical.
- The individual figures like Lord Sebastian Coe, Ken Livingston, Tony Blair and Tessa Jowell are the key champions.
- The five London boroughs which benefit from the Olympic-related investments support the Olympics.
- The Ministers for Sport needed to support the Bid, although they didn’t expect to win but they did so eventually.
- Ken Livingston, the London Mayor at that time, was regarded as the key person who promoted the idea for London to participate in the Olympic Bid.

- Emergent issues derived from the responses to this question:
  - Politicians want to be associated with successful sports for the sake of their reputation and identification. They are seeking the ‘feel good’ factor.
  - A nation, like China, which supports sports because they see them bringing benefits and economic power, can use military power or sporting power to justify their system and claim their success.
  - The pressure of competing with other cities for the World City status is also one of the reasons to encourage the championship either for the major projects or the mega events.
  - The IOC markets the Olympic strategy, but it is just a big publicity blur. It is like The Emperor's New Clothes. It is noted that the expression of “The Emperor’s New Clothes” was mentioned by different stakeholders in the issue of discourses of major projects. This signifies that the opposition groups, who do not agree with the development mode of major projects, fundamentally disagree with the ideology of championships involved in these major projects.
  - Opponents from the local communities do not want too much commercial development and high-rise on their doorstep, but they are not against the idea of regeneration.
  - Mega transport projects start with the advantage of usually being desirable in the first place as long as they are public transport ones. The special things like trains and trams have some romance about them. There have been no railway projects that people have regretted after seeing them built.
APPENDIX 6:
Statistics of Hypothesis-Led Investigation Index
Which of the following types of context do you consider most important in the planning of CTRL/KX Central/Stratford City/2012 London Olympics
(For the importance of each index, one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Context</th>
<th>Indexing number</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National background, policy, planning and funding frameworks</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability visions to be serviced</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical, spatial and location considerations</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural contexts</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal contexts (such as project time frame, history of project development and timing for key decisions)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How successfully do you consider the CTRL/KX Central/Stratford City/2012 London Olympics project has coped with the Sustainable Development Challenges below?
(For the importance of each index, one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainable development challenges</th>
<th>Indexing Number</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring accountability in decision-making</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing transparency in decision-making</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring institutional capacity building &amp; public consultation</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing concerns of biodiversity</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing concerns of ecology</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting health</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing concerns of safety</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting energy saving</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to social cohesion</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to goals of equity</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting economic competitiveness</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successfully involving the private sector</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing forces of globalisation</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing efficiency of operations</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaranteeing affordability of project</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring economic viability of project</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting enhanced accessibility</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to planned spatial &amp; territorial restructuring</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing concerns of subsidiarity</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Which of the following attributes do you consider most important for an efficient and effective stakeholder network to deliver CTRL/KX Central/Stratford City/2012 London Olympics
(For the importance of each index, one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes of Stakeholder Networks</th>
<th>Indexing Number</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power: distribution or concentration / negotiation</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests: project incentives / business environment</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic leadership: bring actors together</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes: stakeholder's agenda / visions</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship: trust / transparency / communication</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to contribute: professions / financing</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional arrangements: network structure / policies</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of involvement: decision-making / consult / keep informed</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 7:
The Use of NVivo 8 and SenseMaker Suite Analytical Tools, Some Results, and Systematic Manual Data Analysis
Appendix 7 continues from Chapter 3 with more details of the analysis by SenseMaker and Nvivo applied to the data collected by the pre-hypothesis investigations. The concept of Content Analysis and its application to the hypothesis-led research is explained here too.

**Steps of Using NVivo 8 Software**

The NVivo software application was used to analyse the pre-hypothesis data to complement the use of SenseMaker. This process involves systematically categorising and coding data collected by pre-hypothesis investigations. This forms the basis for a comparison and synthesis of data from the two research approaches at a later stage (see Appendix 8).

**Step 1: Open coding**

The process of transforming raw data by labelling them according to meaningful criteria is known as coding. Open coding is identifying, naming and describing phenomena found in the data by reading through each line of the text (in this case interview transcripts, newspaper cuttings, journal articles). There is no preset coding scheme in this process which is different from the approach introduced by Cognitive Edge. Issues, roles, events or concepts are identified through the open coding. This exercise is to identify all possible clues for the research questions.

![Figure A7.1: The most-coded nodes in the pre-hypothesis interview data](source: Author, with the aid of Nvivo 8 software application)

**Step 2: Identifying the most-coded nodes**

The outcomes of this step present a series of the most mentioned issues that helps to streamline the analytic process. Contents associated with these most-coded nodes were recalled with the aid of the software in order to see other nodes which have also been coded in the same contents. Further, the Selective Coding (Borgatti, 1996) technique was used to compare a core node with other nodes. This
is to develop storylines of this node around all other themes, issues, concepts and players.

With the aid of the NVivo 8 software application, the list of the most-coded nodes was identified (Figure A7.1). The chart below displays that the most-coded nodes are “financing and cost”, “decision making”, “benefits”, “negotiation power”, “partnership”, “timeframe”, etc.

**Step 3: Identifying correlations between nodes**

This step is to discover the properties of nodes in a way that helps to relate the nodes to each other. The types of the properties of the interrelationships between the nodes are borrowed from (Borgatti, 1996) discussion drawn from Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1998). They are:

- Concepts that hold these nodes together;
- Events or variables that lead to the occurrence or development of the phenomenon;
- Context that is considered as background variables;
- Intervening conditions that are also regarded as mediating variables;
- Actions that agents perform in response to the phenomenon and intervening conditions; and
- Consequences of the action strategies.

Following the identification of the most-coded nodes, the node “decision making” was chose as the core node for comparison since it is most relevant to the major research questions. With the software aid, the contents coded by “decision making” were recalled in order to examine what other nodes were also coded to the contents. This represents certain relationships existing between these nodes and decision-making. Through this process, the characteristics and contexts of decisions were revealed. It helped to identify the actors involved, the events related and time and spatial elements.

**Step 4: Identifying emergent issues, themes, and hypotheses**

Prevailing issues, themes and hypotheses will emerge through progressively refining the attributes of each node, systematically organising raw data and meaningfully comparing the filtered information. Some of these issues and themes are compatible with the theoretical framework established in this research (see Chapter 2); however, some are newly developed through this exploratory analysis approach. An iterative process of coding was adopted in order to better incorporate new elements emerging from data with those previously identified. This provides an integrated debate on the agglomeration of issues attached to relevant themes.

There are three methods used for identifying emergent issues, themes and hypotheses. First, revisiting the data coded by the most-coded nodes. By looking at the data and the corresponding nodes, the preliminary findings can be drawn (Figure A7.2). The second way to explore the data is to re-read the
data organised by the nodes selected according to the research questions. These nodes were decided by core issues derived from decomposing each hypothesis-led question. In accordance with the key elements of these questions, the text-rich data collected by the pre-hypothesis investigation approach is better structured. The third method to identify key contents from the data for further analysis is to review the data coded by multiple nodes selected in the previous step.

Figure A7.2: Identifying interrelationships, emergent issues, themes and hypotheses

Source: Author, with the aid of Nvivo 8 software application

Steps of Using SenseMaker Suite Software

Each of the ten naïve interviews was transcribed verbatim from the digital recordings made during the interviews. Each interview transcript was divided into a series of anecdotes which, in the researcher’s view, comprise stories about the same event, topic, time period, decision, etc., or any combination thereof.

The SenseMaker software provided many ways of presenting identified interrelationship between indices (see Appendix 2 for the indexing sheet of the pre-hypothesis investigation). There are three functions involved in the application of this software that assist the selection of stories (sense-making items) for further study. These functions include:

- Identifying strong bi-variate correlations which are presented in scatter graphs.
- Mapping patterns with strong multivariate correlations which are presented in sense-making item clusters.
- Identifying high indexing-frequency variables which are presented in sense-making item browser.
To illustrate the interrelationships between the indexes, visualisations were presented of identified correlations using scatter graphs (see A7.3), sense-making item clusters (see A7.5) and sense-making item browser (see Table A7.1) to facilitate the exploration of narrative patterns. The selection of indexes used for discovering narrative patterns in SenseMaker software is dependant on the strength of the correlation coefficient value R and the frequency of indexing of observations.

**Step 1: identifying strong bi-variate correlations** (which are presented in scatter graphs)

The strong bi-variate correlations were presented in the form of a juxtaposed scatter graph and a supporting report of significant correlations, which shows correlation coefficient R (see Appendix 9). It represents the strength of correlations between each pair of indexes with the strong bi-variate correlations representing connections between two indexes.

**Figure A7.3: Juxtaposed Scatter Graph**

Source: Author, based on the OMEGA study and with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application

**Step 2: mapping patterns with strong multivariate correlations** (which are presented in sense-making item clusters)

From the report of correlation coefficient R (Appendix 9), we can see the significance of correlations with each selected index. In order to effectively select sense-making items from the case study data
mass\(^1\), we only choose the seven\(^2\) most significant correlators of each index to compose the ‘sense-making cluster graph’ (see Figure A7.3). For instance, if chosen the index ‘treatment of risk, uncertainly and complexity in decision making’ as the core index, together with another seven indexes which reveal the most significant correlation \(R\), they form the sense-making item cluster graph where each dot in the middle of the figure represents each anecdote.

Unlike NVivo, the indexes (or nodes in NVivo) were pre-designated, and hence this analytical approach focuses on finding correlations between the indexes (i.e. issues, themes and topics). Multiple correlations can be identified by detecting “strong bi-variate correlations” (Figure A7.4), “multivariate correlations” (Figure A7.4), and “high indexing-frequency variables” (Table A7.1).

**Figure A7.4: Bi-variate correlations**

![Bi-variate correlations](image)

Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application

The variables with the highest number of significant correlations with other variables are (in descending order):

- Theme- Financing projects/development (39)

---

\(^1\) 120 sense-making items collected by the research plus 270 sense-making items collected by the OMEGA Centre. In the application of SenseMaker software, data collected from this PhD research and the OMEGA Centre are analysed separately.

\(^2\) The choice of the seven most significant correlators is not an absolute way to form the sense-making cluster graph, but in terms of a technical approach an octagon helps the researcher to identify key sense-making items from the cluster graph. The angles of the octagon are formed by eight indexes, including the selected one and its seven most significant correlators.
- Theme- Use of public money (37)
- Theme- Public sector power (36)
- Situation- Experiencing financial failure/under performance (34)
- Situation- Political intervention into the project (34)
- Theme- Technical solutions to problems (33)
- Theme- Tensions between values (33)
- Theme- Private sector power (33)
- Theme- Political intervention (33)
- Situation- Public outcry about project (33)
- Situation- Performance of organisations responsible for the project (32)
- Theme- Globalisation forces (31)

**Figure A7.5: Sense-making item cluster**

Following the identification of the seven most significant correlations, a process of further filtering the strength and value of these correlations were undertaken together with efforts to ascertain ‘connection density’ are used to further filter the anecdotes which aims to find out most related anecdotes. Where these two sets of criteria are prevalent, they exhibit those sense-making items which obtain higher values to certain indexes. It means these sense-making items have relatively stronger relationships to some issues (which are represented by the indexes) (See Figure A7.6).
Other examples of visualisations that show multivariate correlations are presented as Figures A7.7 – A7.10:

**Figure A7.6: Key Sense-making items cluster with filter strength value 50-100%¹ and connection density of filters**

![Diagram showing visualisation of key sense-making items with filter strength value 50-100% and connection density of filters.]

Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application

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¹ Filter strength value: this is the correlation value between two indexes.
Figure A7.7: Cluster of filters of strength value 0-100 % with legend of ‘occupations of the interviewees’

Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application

Figure A7.8: Sense-making items filtered by cluster of filters led by ‘Path-dependency’

Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application
Figure A7.9: Sense-making items filtered by cluster of filters led by ‘Globalisation forces’

Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application

Figure A7.10: Sense-making items filtered by cluster of filters led by ‘Experiencing financial failure’

Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application
Step 3: identifying high indexing-frequency variables (which are presented in sense-making item browser).

The identification of high indexing-frequency variables in SenseMaker software is an exercise similar to the step of ‘identifying most-coded nodes’ in NVivo where it sought to discover which issues were of most concern to the interviewees in the studied case. Here the anecdotes indexed by the variables with the highest indexing-frequencies were recalled for further analysis in order to identify important themes and emergent hypotheses associated with these issues. Example can be seen in Table A7.1 below where the data was extracted from the OMEGA Study and it shows that the highest indexing-frequency is located in ‘roles and responsibilities’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filter</th>
<th>The list of the 10 most indexed filters in descending order is:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (129 items)</td>
<td>1. Roles and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (66 items)</td>
<td>2. Public sector power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical solutions to unforeseen problems/disasters (64 items)</td>
<td>3. Performance of organizations responsible for the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solutions to unforeseen organisational issues (67 items)</td>
<td>4. Visions and ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visions and ideas (148 items)</td>
<td>5. Scale of impact of the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of impact of the project (138 items)</td>
<td>6. Co-operation amongst those involved in the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public participation or consultation (63 items)</td>
<td>7. Private sector power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of public money (114 items)</td>
<td>8. Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of private sector money (125 items)</td>
<td>9. Forming the vision/objectives for the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political will (101 items)</td>
<td>10. Use of private sector money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political intervention in the project (112 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector power (135 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector power (146 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial between economic, social environmental goals (105 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree to which project centrally controlled/drove versus add to decision making (100 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (91 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of risk, uncertainty, complexity in decision making (113 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other mobilisation forces (94 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles and responsibilities (459 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing project/development (113 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation amongst those involved in the project (128 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching agreement on project financing/funding (52 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing financial behaviour/performances (79 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forming the vision/objectives for the project (117 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project start-up/mobilisation (67 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement about project specification (114 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public scrutiny about the project (53 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme phase/adaptment (61 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political intervention into the project (102 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoiding project impact (91 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing the project (110 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding on developments associated with the project (112 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing developments associated with the project (93 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance of organisations responsible for the project (185 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major change in project scope (87 items)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, based on the OMEGA study and with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application
Table A7.2: Number of SMIs indexed by each filter

| Leadership (68 items) | Visions and ideas (115 items) | Scale of project impact (113 items) | Tensions between values (64 items) | Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (63 items) | Globalisation forces (24 items) | Bargaining power (114 items) | Coordinating financial stakeholder performance (60 items) | Implementing the project (89 items) | Performance of organisations (109 items) | Public sector power (94 items) | Private sector power (93 items) | Political intervention (92 items) | Political will (55 items) | Bureaucracy (52 items) | Solutions to unforeseen organisational issues (55 items) | Public participation or consultation (54 items) | Use of public money (101 items) | Use of private sector money (95 items) | Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (100 items) | Treatment of risk in decision making (11 items) | Roles and responsibilities (125 items) | Financing projects/development (104 items) | Co-operation (76 items) | Real estate development (77 items) | Institutional arrangements (96 items) | Public dependency (91 items) | Agreements on financing and funding (93 items) | Planning inputs/outputs for project (95 items) | Project start/optimisation (92 items) | Agreements about project specification (85 items) | Public outcry about project (71 items) | Programme slippage/development (90 items) | Major change in project scope (57 items) |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|

The list of the 10 most indexed filters in descending order is:

1. Roles and responsibilities
2. Visions and ideas
3. Bargaining power
4. Scale of project impact
5. Technical solutions to problems
6. Treatment of risk in decision making
7. Performance of organisations
8. Degree of central/ad hoc decision making
9. Financing projects/development
10. Use of public money

Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application

The above three different applications for mapping narrative patterns facilitated not only the identification of correlations between indexes, but also assisted the identification of key sense-making items. There is no rigid way to proceed with this, ideally, practitioners using this analytic software program are encouraged to try as many of the functions provided as possible until the patterns appear and the key data can stand out. As this exercise proceeds, the issues and themes become more refined in order to address the research questions. The research questions are considered as the lens for analysis at one stage accompanied by an exploration of new issues or hypotheses during the analytical process.
Data analysis for hypothesis-led investigation: Systematic Manual Data Analysis

The data collected from the hypothesis-led investigations is analysed systematically by manual categorisation and critical reviews (see Appendix 8). It involves three steps:

**Step 1: Cluster the responses according to each hypothesis and research question**

This process is to summarise the responses of the interviewees against each question according to the hypotheses and the associated research questions. It facilitates the identification of the relationship between the different points of view from varied project stakeholders.

**Step 2: Give rankings to the degrees of agreement toward each hypothesis and research question**

This step aims to build up statistical evidence which presents the strength of acceptance or rejection for the statements in hypotheses and research questions. This is seen as a supporting the qualitative data in previous step.

**Step 3: Identify pre-hypothesis data coded by indexes that are associated with the established hypotheses and research questions.**

Using certain indexes in SenseMaker software to find anecdotes in the pre-hypothesis investigations that pertain to hypotheses and research questions addressed in the hypothesis-led investigations. For example, anecdotes indexed by ‘political intervention in the project’ are have relatively high connection with Hypothesis 2 (see Section 1.3). These identified sense-making items are analysed to see whether there is substantiated or rejected evidence against hypotheses or research questions.
APPENDIX 8:
Comparison of Data Derived from Pre-Hypothesis and Hypothesis-Led Interviews
Table A8.1: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH Data detected by NVivo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PART 1: Overarching Research Questions derived from the CTRL experience</td>
<td>Yes, but only modestly (TU)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>PHR Dataset _Kws(x) _y=Interviewees; _Kws(x)= Key words and themes in Qx; x=1-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, in terms of transport capacity and demand. In terms of workforce that requires delivering the projects will compete for that labour resources. (RB)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, in terms of transport capacity. It is also a world contest to provide the best transport for a world event. Each city competing is in fact developing a special transport plan or even projects normally would take 10 years or 20 years in the pipeline to be produced are accelerated. The political commitment and investments are results of building a long-term legacy. (This implies to globalisation and accelerating project delivery.) (PB)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Kws(1)=Interrelationship (between MUTPs and MEs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, the Olympics act effectively as a catalyst. (NM)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>PHR Dataset _Kws(1)_x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No, it should be the other way round. The presence of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, particularly the Stratford International Station let the success of the Olympics bid for London. (MP)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1: Do you agree that MUTPs are impacted significantly by mega events, if so, why and how?</td>
<td>In the case of Crossrail, the excitement around the Olympics probably gave that a boost. MEs can only push those projects which are already on the drawing board, but the political will or the necessary funds not being allocated. The same thing applies to the East London Line. In Stratford, the main transport infrastructure is already present, so rather than the MEs creating transport links in this case, it is another way around; the transport links have facilitated the MEs. (JC)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Interview dataset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*SMIs- Sense-Making Items
* The table below shows two sets of data that extracted from PHR interviews and together with other SMIs collected from newspaper, online articles, documents, etc.
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

| Mega events will have significant impact on many things, but in the case of CTRL, it is planned and built prior to the Olympics. The London Olympics is relying on the existing transport infrastructure programme to accommodate it. (HB) | x |  |
| I don’t agree that’s necessarily the case because MUTPs are very long term in the planning. They are very complex and involve a lot of money. Quite often a mega event has short time scale. Mega event actually impacted negatively on the project because it has to be completed at certain time. It put terrible pressure on the transport projects and really makes the cost escalate. (DM) | x |  |
| They are because the mega events tend to have immediacy attached to them, which means your transport project has a different deadline that it might otherwise have. They have funding attach to them. They have political reputation attached to them and political prioritising. Without the Olympics as a driver setting up an end date you wouldn’t have had the CTRL project completed in its entirety; it would probably have CTRL into St Pancras but you wouldn’t have the associated underground infrastructure built. Mega events setting up the priority for the way the government and others are going to spend the resources. (BW) | x |  |

Summary:
The most important thing is the way the Games accelerates the focus on time. It concentrates the mind. July 27, 2012, 7.30pm, the Games are going to start and that has brought forward infrastructure investment, it has brought forward regeneration in East London. It is how to use it as a reasonable way to change the world. The key question is can you change the world around the Games. That is where we are going to succeed in Legacy because we are going to create a very difference place consequently. (HS)

The key to success for mega projects and mega events is stakeholder management. Ultimately the rest of it is just noise. Everything else is about money which you can always work through. The difficulty is about managing stakeholders in that particular environment with a big P and a small p. (HS)
The Arup report relied too much on bus and coach travel for Olympic visitors and it really underestimated the cost of some of the heavy infrastructure; relied quite a lot on the temporary measures which we thought it would be underestimated and the costs were too low. (RM)

Although those transport projects were at good business cases, there were still uncertainties about their funding. The Olympics gave them the certainties of that funding but also probably prioritise them and make them happen 3 or 4 years earlier than they would happen otherwise. (RM) [The example here is the Docklands Light Railway extensions.]

Potentially after the Games, Stratford International would be white elephant if it is not effectively utilised. If the plan for Stratford City fully realised with the office and residential development will take place there, then it could be a destination on its own right for the high speed services. We must look beyond the usual 5 or 10 years horizon and look towards 20 or 25 years to see how it will be realised. (RM)

The Olympic decision set the timeframe which didn’t exist before. Now King’s Cross is tied in to delivering not only Eurostar, national rail, regeneration but also transport infrastructure for the Olympics 2012. (RK)

What Olympic does is imposing the timetable on delivering the key elements in the area. The opening of Eurostar station itself was a timetable to pre-exist but the Olympics set another level. (RK)

When London won the Olympics, the decision came out the day before the London bombings, the developers said, I am sure it is just a piece of rhetoric, but it’s a ring
true that the bombings cancel out the benefits of the Olympics. So it is neutral. The Olympics had 10% to the investment, but the bombings wound that 10% up because the uncertainty. (RK)

CTRL owned the important components for winning the Olympics for London. Olympics will kick start lots of investments in regeneration around Stratford. (RB)

Debate over the pursuit of a mega-event tends to focus on its economic impact—the cost of the stadium, the value of a new hotel, or the tax revenues generated—but rarely on the broader political and social ramifications.

We believe that the study of urban mega-events can illuminate questions of enduring importance in urban politics such as what strategies do cities use to pursue economic growth, what role does local government play, and who benefits? (MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001)

These mega projects are usually consortiums of businessmen and politicians in these cities, who form a ‘growth coalition’ which appeals for public grants to help finance these projects. (MS quoted from Jeffery Owen, 2005)

The potential for long term economic benefits from the Beijing Games will depend critically on how well Olympics related investments in venues and infrastructure can be incorporated into the overall economy in the years following the Games. (MS quoted from Jeffery Owen, 2005)

What they were looking for was a subsidy from the city within which they wanted to build their projects, so they approached city administrations, with a business plan.
Low land prices and changes in the industrial economy of those cities meant that those areas were in economic decline and needed investments. (MS) (This is the initiative of mega-event strategy)

A great construction pressure is in the King’s Cross area, they may need to rush the planning permission of the Western Concourse finished ahead of the Olympics. (JF)

LCR initially did not want to have station in Stratford. The winning of the Olympics host right was credited to the CTRL services. It is good commercial opportunism but it wasn’t on their agenda. (JF)

The cost and benefit analysis on this massive expensive station (Stratford International) falls pieces. It has low economic viability since it will compete with St Pancras for passenger numbers. It would be more sensible when the Kent Commuter services start. (JF)

We do know in these projects as projects have manifested the success of partnership working and that is a success story and that is not going to go away. (KL)

"Most of the infrastructure growth will come from public spending and in the current uncertain climate the threat of delays to some projects due to funding constraints is a real concern," finds BCIS. "However, the size of the current commitments and the connection of some schemes to the 2012 Olympics should ensure a strong growth in demand over the next three years." (SMI 20)

In response to the threat of rising unemployment, Brown’s new deal is beginning to sound like Franklin D Roosevelt’s public works solution from 1930s America. Big planning projects such as the Olympics, the Thames
Gateway and eco-towns should benefit, but so should power stations, investment in energy alternatives and energy-saving technologies. (SMI 45)

Regeneration is something which should have a rationale and a business case all of its own. Wrapping up the promises of housing and jobs on the back of the Olympic project is a recipe for failure and disappointed expectations. (SMI 47)

London 2012 represents a major opportunity for the new Mayor. It also has the potential for huge distraction and political aggravation. There are some who argue that the whole enterprise represents a large scale ‘opportunity cost’ for London diverting resources from other critical projects (perhaps delaying the start of Crossrail and placing emphasis on upgrading the parts of the transport system on which the Olympic project depends rather than on the urgent need to improve the whole). Hence the need for rigorous focus on delivering to budget and being clear eyed and realistic about what the Olympics project is really about. (SMI 47)

Table A8.2: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH Data detected by NVivo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q2: In your view, under which circumstances can one coordinate the delivery of MUTPs, SUR and MEs and simultaneously achieve:</td>
<td>Concerning the project nature of long timeframe, political support, funding strategy, and fundamental programmes have to be in place, and an event can actually tie these three things together and potentially deliver that broader and faster outcome. (TU)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Impartial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**visions of sustainable development?**

A strong champion and who is in charge of a powerful regional development agency can make things easier than purely rely on the market. (RB) *(This implies to the political power and streamlines the development process.)*

The Olympics is the strongest catalyst for developments, not only for mega urban transport, but also for sustainable urban regeneration. Mega events have totally different timeframe and it enforces the government to deliver it on time. They consist of a series, a group, a package of projects. (PB)

CTRL is public transport oriented and the Olympics heavily rely on the public transport. They both aim to deliver urban regeneration. The context of Stratford is coordination as a symbiosis of the two things and that achieved sustainable development vision. (NM)

Under highly undemocratic and strongly authoritarian process could you achieve that. There is no necessary to co-ordinate these three. It does not help to achieve visions of sustainable development if sustainability is not owned by local population. (MP)

There is growing demand on faster travel. Air transport will compete with high-speed rail to build bigger and faster planes which require bigger airport. This is also as a result of the image of London that London wants to stay in the world city position. These modern and high-speed infrastructure projects will inevitably go along with modern regeneration and replacement will happen to existing communities and businesses. This is not sustainable. It is about the image that a city wants to present. (JC)

---

**other most codings:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview dataset</th>
<th>Interview dataset + Secondary dataset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>partnership (11)</td>
<td>partnership (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mega event (8)</td>
<td>opportunity (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefits (7)</td>
<td>catalyst (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opportunity (7)</td>
<td>urban regeneration (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catalyst (6)</td>
<td>major infrastructure (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban regeneration (6)</td>
<td>negotiation power (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negotiation power (5)</td>
<td>decision making (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local government (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary:**
The vision of the Olympic Games is changing much more to be the themes of sustainability and cost effectiveness. (HS)

The construction of the Olympic projects is opening a suggestion to burn money. It is important to blend mega events into existing fabrics, existing facilities so you can make it more sustainable. (HS)

It is like Game Theory when you deal with all those different stakeholders with different agenda. You just try to work the overlaps. Those areas of commonality which goes even though you might have to bury your own particular aspiration for everything you get most of what you want by actually cooperating. How do you create enough of a win-win or in this case win-win-win when people are prepared to shut up and just to get on
I have a degree of cynicism about sustainable development, it is over hyped and it’s not clear what it means. Obviously the planning authority can coordinate regeneration around both mega events and transport projects. Local authorities have role to play, as well as government in providing a framework. (HB)

Leadership is one of the key elements for the KXC project. There are strong commitments from the local council, the Mayor and the developer. They did have had that coordinated group of interests working together in order to realise that the project and basically minimise the risk that they were facing. Bob West had that continuity of strategic planning and technical employee. He was able to be there to coordinate thinking of other stakeholders. The coordination between public sector and private sector was a very key factor. Bob was instrumental in that.

The challenge and risks that Stratford City faces is higher than KX, because it is not a prime development land. With the current market, there are more uncertainties. Certainly designating that site for the Olympics help to give that extra push they needed to get that project through. (DM)

The reason that John Prescott supported the CTRL project, probably the most important thing, however, was the ability of the new railway to support regeneration. In that, he was continuing a policy which his predecessor Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine supported in the previous Tory government what gave rise to the current route of the railway through east London as opposed to the original BR route which brought the route via south London. Regeneration, at King’s Cross Central, Stratford City and 2012 Olympics, all those things being possible because of the project we are talking about today. (RH) (Visionary politician is vital to the delivery of mega projects. The CTRL provided locomotive for other projects.)

King’s Cross and Stratford have the old railway lands which were delegated for many years waiting for a kick start as the railway provided. The 2012 Olympics closely
You can call this planetary alignment, where all the main ingredients all line up. They all have a cyclical nature, with good and less good periods. If you are lucky, they can come into alignment at a good moment for the mega project, but it is luck and very hard to organise. Having an overarching vision of sustainability can help this coming together, because it is a theme that applies to all projects and stakeholders and might be strong enough to help stakeholders focus or re-prioritise around a common project, but it is a gentle push rather than decisive.

In the case of CTRL, the planetary alignment of stakeholders, funding, political will and project timing occurred maybe twice over about 14 years, and some opportunities were missed as decisions were made to save money rather than time – ultimately neither was saved. Sustainability wasn’t a strong driver, although it did help the narrative around the business case for high speed rail. If you do coordinate all of these things, you have much stronger case; none of them exists on its own. That’s possibly another lesson to learn, about the interdependence of projects which helps sustain each one, delivering savings and synergies for a better overall outcome. (BW) (Sustainability itself as a discourse is not strong enough to push the project through. Sustainability is one of the components of the discourse attached to MUTPs. The MUTP discourse is a tool to strengthen the project-led network. Political power might eventually be the key to bring all the elements together. However, political power could be defeated by the macro economy. Hence the new discourse is (re)emerging to reinforce the MUTPs’ position, such as recent ‘Green Infrastructure’ which claims it can tackle both problems of economic downturn and climate change.)

now integrate with the development of Stratford City and arguably the 2012 Olympics re-phased Stratford City in a way which made the delivery of Stratford City more difficult longer term, but arguably some would say brings forward some aspect of the Stratford City development sooner than would otherwise be the case. (RH)

CTRL, KX Central, and Stratford City, are inter-related. The justification for the investment for the CTRL today is predicated on what is happening in King’s Cross Central and Stratford City. CTRL is not primarily a transport project. CTRL is, in my view, primarily a catalyst for the regeneration which is taking place here in King’s Cross and Stratford and further east through the Thames Gateway. (RH)

There has been difficulty between Stratford City developers, now is Westfield, and the Olympic Delivery Authority because there are competing demands. The hearts of two sites next to each other really don’t work together in transport terms and even in terms of building work in the two sides of the site, delivering the materials to the work and workers on the site. It is quite difficult that two extremely large building projects taking place next door to each other simultaneously. The negotiation between Westfield and the ODA has been difficult sometimes because they have different priority. (CM)

We represent the people in this area and we do understand what people needs. The boroughs surrounding the Olympic site come together with five borough organisations. We try to promote different approach to see how the legacy is dealt with and working through the boroughs not separate from the boroughs. (CM) (Understanding local needs and collaborate with other local authorities will make sure the delivery of the...
The government has not thought through the legacy plan yet. If simply put some flats and apartments, it does not necessary equal to regeneration. It forces some people to stand back for a bit and think more imaginatively toward what we can do here. (CM) (Vision is important to integrate mega events and regeneration in order to achieve sustainability.)

I think at the time it was collective. There was general willingness from all the parties involved. It is an attitude of what can we do to help rather than this is going to be a problem. (RM)

We make sure both parties were making the same assumptions. If one party had a concern or an issue that affect the other party we raised it and sorted out. In order to ensure that our planning was coordinated and the risks were managed together rather than push on to the other. (RB)

This is the advent of the Neo-liberal economy. “Clarke and Gaile identify the period after 1984 as the “postfederal” era of local economic development. This period is characterized by greater willingness of local governments to take risks, increased cooperation among governments on a metropolitan or regional level, and greater reliance on public-private partnerships or quasi-public agencies to implement development projects. Thus, just as American voters elected a president committed to ending the flow of federal money to U.S cities, Los Angeles was showing how to attract money and attention to a city through a high-profile sporting event.” (MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001)
I think the developers clearly led the process in co-operation with the London Borough of Newham Council. In my impression, that was challenging but ultimately very successful relationship. (KL)

Politician had to make commitments. Sometimes commitments where difficult perhaps all challenging to make against the background of local opposition to particular aspect of projects. None of these could happen, however, without active partnership and co-operation between public and private sectors. (KL)

The granted permission by the London Borough of Newham Council as culmination over a very long period co-operation between developers, officers and members of that authority and the commitment was last made to a hugely important regeneration project to East London. (KL) (Political commitment. Co-operation and partnership with senior stakeholders are vital to deliver the project.)

Essentially local authorities have the co-operative role, a questioning and challenging role when it is necessary, a scrutiny role, a partnership role, and a role that properly reflected both the local interest and also the wider public interest in these projects coming successfully through their processes. Without that commitment, without that bridge position these projects would not have made it to the successful outcome that we are beginning to see. (KL)

The Coe vision sees the Olympics as a catalyst to transform sporting participation in London and across the UK, providing inspiration for a whole new generation of young people who will experience London 2012. The vision was compelling. The reality has proved to be a lot more prosaic. (SMI 47)
### Table A8.3: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH Data detected by NVivo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Where this trilogy of development exists, which agency/institution provides leadership and which of the three types of developments (MUTPs, SUR and MEs) become the locomotive of change that drives the others to achieve favourable (integrated?) outcomes for the principal stakeholders?</td>
<td>Yes, there are a lot of examples. The existing brownfield sites are the locomotive. Some initial commitment from the central government level should provide the leadership. The bi-part political support is needed to ensure the long-term view. (TU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kws(3)=Leadership, Locomotive, Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A strong champion and a well equipped public agency are important; in the case of London is the Mayor and the LDA. (RB)</td>
<td></td>
<td>PHR Dataset,Kws(3)=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It requires a special body specially designated which will organise the Games. This body is beyond national level. In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, the LOCOG is the body established by IOC laws. (PB)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The most codings in the data which coded by one of the Kws(3) need to exclude codes “major infrastructure”, “urban regeneration”, “mega event” and “successful projects” in order to identify a meaningful list of most codings. These four nodes are themes of the PHR questionnaire; hence they are likely to be repeated when interviewees responded to the questions. However, when summarising PHR dataset, these materials were included because the relevant signals could be found in them. The most codings are as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership comes from championship and governance of sponsorship. Mega event is the catalyst for change. The Games has made it all happen at very quick pace</td>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Impartial</th>
<th>Positive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview dataset</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview dataset + Secondary dataset</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British are notorious bad for grand projects. The only time we ever managed to achieve this is where, not at all successfully but the best example I can think of is London Docklands Development Corporation or Olympic Delivery agency, these undemocratic authoritarian bodies. Within these three elements, transport project is the most important. (MP)</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>catalyst (7)</th>
<th>catalyst (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of interests that conforms themselves around mega events, especially the coalition between politicians and developers, is the means to control these major projects. In the case of the Stratford City, policy-makers provide the ground rules and the developers have to find a way of fitting their project into that framework and manipulate that situation. Transport projects, obtained clear cut, are about controlling the contract and the SUR to the government is about standing back from the project. Mega event is you stuck with it. These major projects are always out of anyone’s control. [JC]</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>justification (5)</td>
<td>decision making (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government usually funds for the transport projects and mega events. SUR schemes respond to transport projects. MES build on MUTPs and SUR and need to be integrated by both the planning and practical activities. (HB)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>politicians/champions (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This depends on time scales on these projects. There desirably should be close integration between the transport projects and the sustainable urban regeneration projects. That is where the strategic planning comes in. As far as the mega events, they are quite often opportunistic. They see an opportunity has been created by having the site, by having the big transport link and they ride on the back of that. Mega events cannot be the strategic driver because the</td>
<td>x</td>
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Summary:
They are doing it because they were retired or they want to change the world or that used to be their old area where they grew up in and they want to change that. Most people are here because they want to do something different, not because they just like big projects. (HS) People feel that participation of the Olympic projects is a prestige. The feel-good effect is the key driver for people working on the project. Mega-event provides the opportunity for change.

Political champions, John Prescott and Michael Heseltine supported the current route of the CTRL through east London. Regeneration, at King’s Cross Central, Stratford City and 2012 Olympics, all those things being possible because of the project we are talking about today. (RH)

(This complies with one of the HLR responses that leadership comes from political champion. In this case, MUTP is the locomotive of other major projects.)

The decision to bring the CTRL into St Pancras removed the uncertainty about the routes of rail over those lands and the additional factor bringing the UK’s only international railway terminus into St Pancras provided a further catalyst for the regeneration of those lands in providing better transport links, particularly important to business. (RH)

The CTRL project was used to prove to the IOC evaluation
MUTPs and major SUR do take long time in planning. (DM)

Generally speaking the government has the big funding contribution and the ability to delay/withdraw it and it has a strategic political overview. It was always surprising to me how easily decision-making rises to ministerial level, so that stakeholders do need to grasp the wider political scene. I think a strong and effective personality heading up the project itself would turn out to be the main driver: someone who is fully empowered to make decisions for the project and who can persuade and manoeuvre other stakeholders into position. When you are talking about all three major elements, which at King’s Cross are the Olympics, the regeneration and the railway, you can’t avoid government being seriously instrumental. The bigger the scale, the more the government gets involved. The leadership is where initiative lies, where the drive lies, wherever the backer of the project lies. Local motives will be much more towards looking for political reputation, political benefits they would want to take for themselves.

In terms of which project can provide locomotive, I would say sustainable urban regeneration is not enough on its own. There’s usually a catalyst like an MUTP or some other piece of infrastructure or some major injection of public funding. Otherwise the market would see to it that the area would be regenerated. What makes regeneration sustainable is, however, very

committee that transport arrangements were not an issue and that the UK could deliver major infrastructure. (RH) (The role of the CTRL project represents the capacity of project delivery of the UK.)

CTRL is not merely a transport project, but an important driver of regeneration in King’s Cross, Stratford and further east through the Thames Gateway. (RH) (A different aspect to look at the project as a regeneration package shifts the characteristic of the MUTPs which can be good business cases.)

The first was the speech by Malcolm Rifkind, when he was the Conservative Transport Secretary, announcing the High Speed line coming from the east. Just change the route that made all the difference. The second one would be John Prescott insisted that there should be a station at Stratford when he rescued the project in 1997/98. Although they didn’t put the details in the nature of the Channel Tunnel Bill, they made a requirement about there should be a station at Stratford. Merely making that requirement, everything flows from that. There would be an Olympic Games above the International Station at Stratford. They are able to convince the IOC that they can get people from central London. (CM) (The decisions made by the Government and the support from John Prescott put the project through and the project has proved to be the driver of other major projects in Stratford.)

A lot of projects because they already have very good business cases, such as Docklands Light Railway extension from Canning Town to Stratford, the three car upgrade East London line. Olympics just give that surety and certainty that they will be delivered. So they won’t be any white elephant left after the Games in terms of
much around how effectively local authorities in particular shape the agenda and insist on attention to climate change. The 2012 Olympics are an ME and clearly provide a new imperative to complete CTRL and LUL works at King’s Cross and Stratford. (BW)

King’s Cross tied into regeneration scheme, transport projects and the Olympics. The Olympic decision set up a different level of timeframe for these associated projects. (RK)

The leader’s charisma and well connected to both the political and professional networks are two key elements of project delivery, such as the Director of planning who came to Camden very much to handle King’s Cross and my prime boss, Bob West. (RK)

What we did as a planning authority was pushed project through. We were the drivers for the project along with the developer. There were various attempts to derail project and there were various attempts by others to if not this derail but to take this project over. The local authority was key decision-maker but I don’t think it is anymore. It wouldn’t be now because the planning system has changed since 2001. Camden was the planning authority for King’s Cross where is now the Mayor. The new planning rules changed everything. The Mayor or the GLA in the early days were very keen to take control of the project. We needed the agreement that of GLA and support the GLA. GLA often will try to control the key things. They didn’t succeed but the law has now changed. If we were starting now, the Camden would have much less role in King’s Cross. (RK) (This statement shows that the importance of the local authority in the KXC project and the institutional arrangements which gives planning power to the Mayor.)

It is CTRL which enables Eurostar, which facilitate others.
It is a chain and no one component on its own would work, but together, it works. (RB) (MUPTs can be the locomotive but they need other projects to justify their value.)

Stratford International decision was tied in with changes for train depot arrangements which originally intended to be at the North Port Depot and they moved to Temple Mills near Stratford instead. The idea of building a proper railway link from Stratford runs to the Temple Mills would enable the West Coast Main Line started creating a proper High Speed network. The possibility of building a proper link which would mean to interfere the development potential. Also, it was required the commitment to build proper high speed line north of London and that was something they did not prepare to do. (PJ)

Regional Shopping Centres (RSCs) have much to offer in the future planning of their areas. They are huge wealth generators in their local and regional economies. They are served by excellent public transport infrastructure and provide a wide range of shops, services and facilities. Most have development land available nearby. They are ideally suited to drive a new wave of regeneration and meet the housing delivery agenda. If planned properly, they will become focal points for sustainable mixed-use communities, knitting into the existing urban fabric. (SMI 36) (Can the retail-oriented development Stratford City be the lead for regeneration? It seems existing transport network and available lands are prerequisites for the RSC development.)
Table A8.4: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #4

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Q4: Do MUTPs, SUR and MEs share resources at the local, regional and national scale, or is one promoted at the expense of the others? If so, please provide an illustration of this.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>They do share political resources. Financial resources are separate. Institutional planning resources are streamlined in order to improve efficiency. (TU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>They compete for resources. It requires a strong figure to reprioritise the resources. (RB)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It depends on the scale of the city in terms of population. If it is a small country then the Olympics can take a large share of the resources. What spent in London is justifiable because it is for long-term legacy and urban regeneration benefits. Britain is a democratic country and the government knows how far they can go to make the Bid attractive but not ruin the country. (PB)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the case of Stratford, the CTRL and Stratford City development share resources. There is a debate about the IOC wouldn’t grant us the privilege of the host city contract without almost being seduced by large brand new railway station. The Games has hugely accelerated the interests and increased the certainty of the development. (NM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If they can be combined and in communist scale, they can share resources. The case of the CTRL caused the rise of land value and that generates regeneration and mega events. In the case of London, the CTRL helped London Bid. The Olympics are far from taking resources away from the urban regeneration; they are actually bringing in or helping to stimulate resources to the urban regeneration (MP)</td>
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<td>x</td>
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Although there are two sets of the most codings identified below, the contents of identified data do not relate to the theme of HLR question 4. The summary can assist to distinguish the reliability of the most-coding-nodes list. In this case, financing and cost is the most mentioned issue when talk about resources. The summary also shows some sharing resources contain intangible elements.

Summary:
The KX Central and Stratford City, that government currently own the land but as part of the arrangements for the CTRL that land gets transferred to London & Continental Railways. So as well as being responsible for the delivery of the CTRL, my company is also working in partnership with Argent, the developers for King’s Cross Central, and we are working in partnership with the Olympic Development Authority and with Westfield.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>It depends on project scale. MUTPs provide the most impacts and may provide the most benefits. They are national level. As to the SUR projects, they relatively impact on small areas. In terms of the CTRL and the Crossrail, they do share resources with Stratford City project. The Olympics further reinforces imbalance between London and other regions. (JC)</th>
<th>x</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, there is element for sharing. There are shared planning resources, shared planning constitution, but obviously in terms of implementation, the building, the labours, they are to some extent competing. (HB)</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>In the case of KXC project, a willing council who dedicated planning resources to the project and the developer who were prepared to play the lead role are two key factors. In KXC, it was absolutely essential to have that private sector commitment and their willingness to make that long term investment. But what work there may not be replicated on another site. (DM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>I am not sure about sharing resources, but we pour in resources at all these levels. I don't think there's much sharing of resources as such; we each have roles and fund them accordingly. Your first level of political activity is to decide whether you are going to spend time and money in this way. Secondly, how resources go in depends also on how the stakeholders are getting on. Third, the MUTP costs on local authorities are generally underestimated. We have a duty of care to local communities. So we have to put in resources of our own to shape the project design, manage the construction impacts, negotiate, cajole, consult, etc. Many councils would balk at paying a million pounds or more to be part of the project, but the benefits to developers for Stratford City. These three, CTRL, KX Central, and Stratford City, are inter-related. (RH) (From this statement, MUTPs, SUR schemes and MEs can share resources in terms of planning resources and financial viability) It will have significant implications to the Thames Gateway because Thames Gateway is also a provider of lots of new housing over a period of time and clearly in the immediate year of time after 2012, they are not going to be in the position to bring on to the market further additional housing. The re-phasing of the delivery of Thames Gateway is also going to be significantly impacted by the 2012 Olympics. (RH) (The mega event in this sense is competing with other major projects for resources. If projects are not associated with the mega event, they are likely to be impacted negatively since mega events tend to have overriding power.) You need selling point for the Games in London. There is no way for London we can all assemble all those components close to each other and that's why it has to be Stratford. (CM) (The available land in Stratford provided the London Olympics a selling point to win the Bid.) Most of the infrastructure growth will come from public spending and in the current uncertain climate the threat of delays to some projects due to funding constraints is a real concern. However, the connection of some schemes to the 2012 Olympics will facilitate to ensure a strong growth in demand over the next three years. (SMI 20) (Event-related projects share the economic viability with the mega event. The sharing element is intangible.)</td>
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Camden of having an international terminus here are huge and well worth it.

There is a lot strategic allocation of resources going on. As the decision of the project goes down the line from national level to local level, it is already diluted. If the project dies or stops, it is combination of strategic and political change and, because it is a long timeframe for project delivery for railways, it is possible for a project to stop/start several times. (BW)
### Table A8.5: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #1

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART 2: The Channel Tunnel Rail Link and its Transport Hubs (at King’s Cross and Stratford) and 2012 London Olympics: Some hypotheses and questions about their development</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yes, I do agree with all of that. (TU)</td>
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<td>Kws(5)=Catalyst</td>
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<td>Certainly in the London context. Dockland Light Railway and Jubilee Line Extension for the Canary Wharf is a good example. MUTPs are the catalyst for urban regeneration. They are not necessarily the catalyst for mega events but they allow the events to happen. (RB)</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In the case of the CTRL, it has no direct relationship with the Olympics. They happened at different timing. The Olympics is benefited from the Stratford International and the internal transport network that the CTRL provided. The high speed link is the determining factor for London to convince the IOC visitors. (PB)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The case of the Stratford International helped the decision made about the Games. The Olympics helped to speed up other projects and it gives certainty to the Stratford City development. Another example is the Øresund Bridge which facilitated economic development. (NM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Major transport projects are planned deliberately to catch every possible regeneration opportunity which is part of the rationale for their planning. The CTRL constituted some important catalyst for both urban regeneration and the Olympics. (MP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The impact of the CTRL is very marginal. It could justify the reason to choose that Olympic site but the majority transport will depend on domestic services. (MP)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>H1: The role of MUTPs</strong></td>
<td>Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs) have the</td>
<td></td>
<td>Summary:</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regeneration, at King’s Cross Central, Stratford City and</td>
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Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

| Potential to act as an agent for the delivery of Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Events (MEs), while MEs in turn can speed-up MUTF and SUR developments. On this basis CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both SUR and ME developments associated with its transport hubs.  
**H1Q1: MUTF is a positive catalyst**  
Do you agree with this hypothesis in general terms and as it relates more specifically to the CTRL? | Furthermore, the SC will be delivered anyway no matter whether there is an international station or not because that land is too big and very enticing. The land of SC is going to recoup the CTRL construction debt but there is no benefit contributing to sustainable urban regeneration. (JC) | Yes, MUTPs can act as an agent for delivery of SUR or UR but not catalyst for mega events. The word, catalyst, is too strong. Mega events require a variety of conditions and MUTP probably one of those necessary elements. (HB) | MUTPs are usually a positive catalyst because they improve accessibility and image of that site. KX / St Pancras is certainly changing the whole image of this quarter in London. MEs can in some circumstances to help MUTPs speed up but MEs also created unnecessary construction pressure and increase projects' costs. (DM) | Yes, H1 is fine by me and CTRL is a good example. (BW) |  

| 2012 Olympics, all those things being possible because of the CTRL project we are talking about today. (RH)  
The decision to bring the CTRL into St Pancras removed the uncertainty about the routes of rail over those lands and the additional factor bringing the UK’s only international railway terminus into St Pancras provided a further catalyst for the regeneration of those lands in providing better transport links, particularly important to business. What it effectively becomes is a transport hub because a number of underground lines, as well as a number of overground UK railway lines which come to King’s Cross / St Pancras or indeed Euston which is very short walk away. Similarly, Stratford City, the catalyst for Stratford City again is railway land, and the connection between the new international station and the Continent, and the improved connections from Kent through Stratford into central London. (RH)  
CTRL is primarily a catalyst for the regeneration which is taking place here in King’s Cross and Stratford and further east through the Thames Gateway. This is a catalyst project with 3 objectives: providing international train travel, to improve commuting train travel from Kent, and to provide catalyst for regeneration. (RH)  
This is a catalyst project with 3 objectives: providing international train travel, to improve commuting train travel from Kent, and to provide catalyst for regeneration. Initially they were in that order. International train travel was by far the most important. Today and in 10 years time, the far most important issue would be the catalyst project for the regeneration. Back in 1998 / 1999, government was only allowed to include half billion pounds worth of further regeneration from this railway whilst today with King’s Cross and Stratford, there would | x | x | x | x |
be over 10 billion pounds worth of regeneration effectively 20 times higher and could be even greater than by that time it’s finished. (RH)

To set upon as a project we ought to support amongst part of number of reasons: we believed having a station at Stratford, an international station that links to Europe will be real catalyst for redevelopment / regeneration in this part of London. Because we are one of the most deprived authority areas of this country. We want something that brought jobs as well as opportunism, training, education and new commercial ideas as well as new housing. We thought this is the project can really unlock that area. We consistently work from 1988 through out to 1997/8 to promote the idea that it would bring the engine, the catalyst for changing at Stratford. (CM)

CTRL will deliver potential commuter from north Kent to Stratford. Crossrail will come through in 2016/2017. Transport infrastructure will make Stratford a very fast business gateway. That was always our original ambition we always talk about backing 20 years ago making this place where investors will come to build their businesses. (CM)

The CTRL route and station are most significant decisions from Rifkind and Prescott. For us, those were two key things and everything flows from that. (CM)

That’s the catalyst. That was put this area of London on the map. Without Eurostar, I think it would be much harder. That will just be another area that London to regenerate. It puts it on the media spotlight worldwide and therefore on the radar of a lot of property developers and companies think about locations. (RB)
I think where very important decisions to be made not only about land use and disposition of land uses within that a huge scheme of regeneration on railway land, but also infrastructure. One of the greatest challenges in East London has been to improve the public transport infrastructure. That has been a perennial challenge for at least 25 years since the regeneration in London Docklands began and through the work of the London Docklands Development Corporation in the early 1980s. The introduction of the Docklands Light Railway has been an extremely important influence and stimulus to regeneration. That network continues to be expanded. It too will have function, specifically serving not only on the Stratford City, but also the London Olympics. The improvement of major infrastructure in East London is a prerequisite for a successful regeneration. (KL) *(The domestic transport network is more influential than the international railway services.)*

Following the success of the CTRL project, further impetus has been given to the debate for a High Speed rail network in the United Kingdom. A High Speed corridor has been identified by Greengauge 21 between London and Birmingham/Manchester, including a spur to Heathrow. This scale of this improvement in connectivity would result in significant productivity gains to the national and regional economy, with overall GDP gains of over £5bn (2002 prices) forecast over a 60 year period, calculated in line with the Government’s ‘Wider Economic Benefits’ (WEBs) Guidance. A significant proportion of these benefits would accrue to Birmingham and the West Midlands, and in particular would support the expansion of the high value financial and business service sectors, with related spin off benefits to the property and retail sectors. This provides further strong evidence of the potential role high speed rail can play in supporting
economic growth in the UK, and in stimulating regeneration in our major cities. (SMI 16) [The role of HSR network can probably encourage cluster cities / agglomeration since it connects major cities as a centre of each cluster. Other sub transport network is to link up all smaller cities within each agglomeration which forms a self-sustain or certain industry specialty cluster.)

China is trying to boost domestic consumer spending by injecting money into the economy in hopes of insulating it from a sharp drop in global demand for its exports. Following Beijing’s launch of a massive stimulus plan to revive slowing economic growth, the China’s provincial governments have proposed more than 10 trillion yuan ($1.4 trillion) in infrastructure spending. The provinces’ planned spending is mainly focused on projects involving rail, road, port and low-income housing construction. (SMI 21) (The role of MUTPs is a stimulus in economic downturn.)

### Table A8.6: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRQ 2: CTRL – A driver of change?</td>
<td>CTRL is the determining factor for London won the Bid. (TU)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>PHR Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the distinct roles of the CTRL in terms of the economic growth in the UK</td>
<td>CTRL has significant impact in terms of the public and private investment in KX Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes. (RB)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup>This set of data is overlapping with the previous one. The extra information identified will supplement HLR question.
urban regeneration process of KX Central and Stratford City, and what role (if any) has the CTRL played in the Olympic Games Project?

| It does steer enormous activities around those railway stations. The example in Japan and Hong Kong is the case. Those lands around railway or subway stations became very high value. Railway is an old and faithful transport system but the impact even for the future of the cities is tremendous. The CTRL service is the determining factor to convince the IOC visitors (PB). | x | x | 5 and 6. |
| CTRL is an important factor on the Games decision. It also plays a significant role in urban regeneration. (NM) | | | |
| Access is a major determine for London land and rental values because land and rental values in turn are major determine of land use. There will be many large scale enterprises locate in King’s Cross and the impacts of the ripple effect of the gentrification already in St Pancras. Without the Stratford International Station, we couldn’t have a) found the land and b) claimed that the Olympics will lead to regeneration in that whole part of London. The CTRL played a major part in the London Bid. (MP) | | | |
| CTRL is an unsustainable project in terms of encouraging the development along its stations. They all follow the modern model and create disadvantages to local communities. (JC) | x | x | |
| CTRL provided window opportunity for King’s Cross and Stratford to develop good commercial regeneration schemes. CTRL is a necessary aspect providing access capacity to the Olympics. (HB) | | | |
| The uncertainty of the CTRL delayed the KXC project for many years. The CTRL is helping the SC, but SC is not as competitive as KXC. There is also risk of the station there because it makes it easier for people to travel away rather than travel to it. In terms of the Olympics, CTRL is like the frosting on the cake. I don’t think the importance for people to get the Olympic site registers | | | |

Summary:
CTRL makes the Olympic site more accessible, accessible enough to compete with Paris. (P1)

As regeneration project on the back of the transport, it is already successful. CTRL is also an important component to win the Olympic Bid for London. (RB)

It is CTRL which enables Eurostar, which facilitate others. It is a chain and no one component on its own would work, but together, it works. (RB)

HSR could have very important future and the existing CTRL is a great example of what we can build and obviously quite well patronised. There is demand. I think in the future if we are looking towards lower carbon economy then definitely there is need for it. But the planning process in this country is so long and complicated. Also infrastructure cost is so high that it would take long time to realise it. (RM)
CTRL was used to convince IOC that the capacity of building major infrastructure in the UK. They can see what promise has been made and they can see the rail link has been built. (CM & RH)

The idea of HSR networks in the UK might have remained mere speculation, particularly as Sir Rod Eddington’s review of transport infrastructure in 2006 was notably lukewarm. “High-speed rail networks in the UK would not significantly change the level of economic connectivity between most parts of the UK, given existing aviation and rail links,” he concluded. But three years is a long time in politics. Both the Tories and Liberal Democrats have voiced support for a high-speed line, in part to avoid expansion of Heathrow Airport by offering an alternative to domestic air travel. In January, the government got behind the idea too. The paper noted that while there are 5,570km of high-speed line in operation in Europe and almost 12,000km under construction or planned, the UK boasts a mere 110km. A political consensus is thus emerging. The question is where the line would run and consequently what it would cost. (SMI 48) (Building HSR networks in the UK is also showing the competitiveness of the nation and also as political output.)

| CTRL is a driver of change, but it also brings uncertainty because of the blight it has created. It delayed the KX redevelopment for 20 years. The railway is a driver of change because it means you can deliver better and bigger regenerative development, along with the international dimension, etc. People were arguing about the gentrification problems will be brought by the Argent’s plan, but you can’t do much about it then because it is the market, and it was the railway that made the change initially, not the development.

The effect is more dramatic at Stratford, probably, as there is a lot of land there with low values and little prospect of economic success without something dramatic like CTRL happening.

As for the Olympics, the capacity for a high speed link between central London (St Pancras) and the Olympic village at Stratford on the CTRL line probably won the bid for London. (BW) | (will ever register) in the public perception. (DM) | x |
### Table A8.7: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH QUESTION</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH</th>
<th>Data detected by NVivo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Impartial</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: Political Decision Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the effective delivery and performance of Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Event (ME) scheme.</td>
<td>I agree. Political output is a dominant concern and far more influential than the cost that takes to deliver that outcome. (TU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRQ 3: Politics in time (after Paul Pierson, 2004) Is the ultimate determining factor of the decision-making process in MUTP planning, appraisal, evaluation and delivery that of political power - not the power of the rationality of technocrats?</td>
<td>Political decisions are fundamental. Politics is about priority and it comes from government level. Without political buying and delivery of that project, it is not going to happen irrespectively whether it is a fantastic idea or technical requirements. (RB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political power is the gear of the decision to run for the Games. In the case of London, the Olympics have support from the Labour party and the Tories. With the power of rationality, probably Britain would not have the bid in the first place. (PB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The power of the rationalitative technocrats is not divorced from political power. This is a fault premise. (NM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This kind of project is inter-connected with the highest of all strategically politics and high political decisions where things like commercial viability are secondary. We have to have it because ultimately a country is competing in an ever smaller global economy. It depends on the perception of city image. (MP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-makers and politicians are stuck with the financial realities; hence they actually do not have that much power. Unless you get strong willingness from people to pay more tax or you have strong ideology of public provision either driven by an authoritarian or a democratic state. The private market ideology will limit</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Summary:**
The search for a single critical path is very difficult. If you look at the planning of a project like the Olympics, the first thing you become aware of is the sheer scale of it, the large number of people who are involved and the fact that the process of assembling a bid for the Olympics is a long
the capacity as a politician to push the project through. People who want to devise a programme they have to take into account the political and financial realities of the time. There is no difference between political power and technocrats concerning development and delivery of mega projects. (JC) [This can be referred to path-dependency. The agenda has already been set before the politicians even get involved. The planning structure once established, it is not easy to change. There are many factors of this framework, including macroeconomic environment, global trends, political conditions, local challenges, institutional arrangements, etc.]  

| Politicians make decisions but they are not overriding decisions. There are also elements of lobbying. Appraisal and evaluation reflect benefits out of that project in the real world. They get translated into political pressure and political interest. (HB) | x |  
| Yes, entirely. These are incredible expensive projects unless the government is prepared to provide commitment to that long range funding. (DM) | x |  
| Yes, indeed. Some case like the nuclear power, technically the case is absolutely clear, but politically it is not all clear because the political risks are really hard ones. To get to a fully rational technical case, you have to do an awful lot of evidence-based research and your evidence may change over time which means whatever you say today may not be the same next year. That means you have to make a political decision on the bulk of the evidence rather than on the fully rational case. And it is not always negative. The political decision might be based on something that isn’t proven in that kind of rational way, but politically it is a good process. Before London 2012 there were a series of failures where people have been involved in other bids from England for the Olympics. Those bids failed but although they failed, they exhibited the process of the accumulation of a coalition for building the project. In some of the literature this is described as a ‘growth coalition’. You won’t know what the critical decisions are until you’ve gone through a very long process of assembling some narratives of this process from a great deal of different sources. I think that these events are on such a large scale that you first of all have to establish a narrative of how they take place. You could not put your finger on a single critical decision. (MS) (This statement signifies three important aspects: first is the importance of using narratives to understand the decision-making process. Second is the theory of growth coalition which reflects to affiliation of project champions. Final is the impact of previous failures on the London 2012 Olympics.)  

Economic impact studies confirm these expectations by forecasting economic benefits in the billions of dollars. Unfortunately these studies are filled with misapplications of economic theory that virtually guarantee their projections will be large. Ex-post studies have consistently found no evidence of positive economic impacts from mega-sporting events even remotely approaching the estimates in economic impact studies. (MS quoted from Owen, 2005) (Forecasts are likely to have optimistic bias.)  

These mega projects are usually consortiums of businessmen and politicians in these cities, who form a ‘growth coalition’ which appeals for public grants to help finance these projects. They produce something called an ‘economic impact study’. These impact studies are always a study shows that mega event will be both good for urban finances and good for business. (MS) (Consortiums of businessmen and politicians form a certain
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

Choices between mega projects and their significance are going to be political ones.

The government did not want to win the Olympics, because they knew it would cost them billions one way or the other. So they are forced to make political choices as a result of winning the Olympics. That’s pretty half-hearted government support. The reputational damage of not running the Olympics, and not supporting sports throughout the country around such catalyst, is far too high. They cannot afford not to be very much involved. (BW)

One of the critical economic changes happened as part of the political process. The critical change that took place was the overturning of the predominant theory of Keynesian economics or welfare capitalism, which was developed in 1930s and was a product of the Great Depression. It said, among other economic policy prescriptions, that the state should spend money during a recession in order to stimulate the economy and get it going again. This is the birth of Neo-liberalism. (MS) Is this the similar situation happening today? Nations are spending money to stimulate the economy and bail out banks and car industries. This also caused restructuring of financial regulation internationally and nationally.)

"The essential features of regime theory stipulate[s] that business leaders have a privileged position in local politics because of their command of economic resources. Because business leaders are affected by local political decisions, not just at the level of property taxes but by the business climate of the city as well, they attempt to shape public policies to benefit business. In order to shape an agenda and bring results, business leaders need the cooperation of elected officials. Local elected officials and local bureaucrats seize the opportunities afforded by cooperation with business leaders."

(MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001)

Decisions of the CTRL project were taken by chance not with intention and planning has very little to do with that. (PJ) (Ad-hocery decision-making.)

Because Ken Livingstone pushed for London to have Olympic Bid and the only place that the Olympic stadium could really be developed in terms of big development space and regeneration potential is Stratford. Certainly Stratford became very attractive to the Olympics because they can tag the regeneration of the area onto that Bid
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

and makes it on the Bid because the International Olympic Committee require about such things. (PJ)

The Government resisted the idea of having station in Stratford but later they changed their mind. It was mostly because the Newham council fought for it and also we had changed our government finally. Then Labour comes to power. Transport Secretary, John Prescott, forced for the project when the developer had financial crisis. You end up with the Government backing the private sector partners who are taking the risk building a profitable development and agreeing that the single project will be built in 2 phases. (PJ)

There was no down side for the private sector side. They shouldn’t be allowed to go bankrupt; the Government should take it in, should have done itself and got the profits. But instead, they decided to get this money back through the development agreement which tied up with the lands at King’s Cross / St Pancras and Ebbsfleet. That meant it put artificially high valuations of on what the lands worth. This has forced the developers to up how much they build to maintain their profit level leading to over development. Of course that’s pushed through because it is central to the Channel Tunnel project. But the whole thing all the way along has been tailored accident happenstance. There is no mega transport project. That is a collection of bits and pieces that happened to be fashionable at the time. Just as the Crossrail Bills, now almost finished going through the Parliament making all the same mistakes. (PJ) (The interviewee opposed over development which caused by the PPP delivery mechanism.)

Stratford has good connections that would make sense for Kent Commuter to get off Stratford but the Stratford station will slow down the journey times and massively reduce the number of passengers who do come through the St Pancras because they get off the Stratford station which is more useful. The cost and benefit analysis on the massive expensive St Pancras station falls pieces. (PJ) (Technocrat evidence cannot justify the Stratford
What happened was in reality that they pretended that would be high speed services and the rest of the country locked in the decision to have the station at King’s Cross/St Pancras. It’s not the best solution. It’s a sub-optimal solution but I think it is a very good example of what economist called mode-locking (path dependency). So the second rate solution became the market dominant one. All these chopping and changing that we have been talking about all because of the decision of property development. The Thameslink, the Kent Commuters, the Olympics, all the rest of it are example after example of generating sub-optimal solutions which themselves fix as in what can happen next and set it up for next sub-optimal solutions. (PJ) Sub-optimal solutions are locked in by the desire of profit-making out of the railway lands development. Is it really a bad approach to employ the sub-optimal solution when it can better meet the demands of all parties? This is back to the debate that whose agenda needs to be prioritised.)

Governments have different set of priorities and perspectives. Basically the Governments they don’t want any bad news. They don’t like difficult decisions and dilemmas. They have slightly negative influence on all of these things because they want to put bad news under the table and not let it happen. If you confront them with difficult decision, like the decision on the depot in east London. When they have to spend some more money, they didn’t like it. It took them two years to make that decision. They delayed it by two years because it was the decision that they didn’t like. They have different set of objectives and perspectives. They have no sense of urgency either because they haven’t got to open up train services 5.30 every morning. I mean they just go to work and they operate completely different time scale. (RB) (This sounds more like a issue of bureaucracy.)

Behind the scenes we had build a new maintenance depot which is actually in Stratford, east London, because old maintenance depot was in west London and not...
accessible from new line. That was a big strategic decision because it was not included in the original project. No body really thought how they are going to maintain the trains. Because it was variation to the project, the Government had to pay and the Government didn’t want to pay. So that was really quite a big strategic decision to make it work. (RB) (What RB suggests here that the reason of moving the maintenance depot to Temple Mills is operational and it confirms that once the project is underway, technocrats have power to modify the project. However, lobbying is an indispensable element in decision-making process.)

What was critical for different stakeholders was their influence. The Islington west area sub committee refused planning permission for the Triangle. I think it was purely political because all the reports of west are sub committee has received said the planning permission should be granted. It is very a perverse committee because it is a committee of opposition. It doesn’t really represent Islington Council that opposition because it is a peculiar way that Islington set itself up. The opposition party controls the west area sub committee. The west area sub committee can’t constantly play to the popular vote without taking the consequences. I think the west area sub committee refused the planning permission for Triangle was purely political and purely opportunist. (RX) (Political outputs and political opportunism: using a situation to get power or an advantage)

The decision of having International Stratford Station in transport terms was slightly odd decision. I think it was based on the fact that regional Eurostar services which are going to serve the rest of the United Kingdom. When the regional Eurostar were cancelled, because of both the forecast show lack of patronage, Stratford International becomes white elephant. Why has an international station so close to St Pancras? Eurostar, I don’t think they are going to start many international services at Stratford. That’s obviously that a need was demonstrated once for the domestic Eurostar services to come from Manchester and stop in Stratford and then go into Paris, but then in
the process somewhere someone has demonstrated that business case was flawed so those services have been withdrawn but they still went ahead to build the station. (RM) (This is evidence showing that technocracy is not the central factor of key decisions.)

Again we worked with partners, we lobbied and we realised in the end that Stratford can do two things for the route that couldn’t be done anywhere else. One was there was a safety case for station in Stratford. If there is problem of the Tunnel Link in Barking and King’s Cross, the safety case we built that you need somewhere in the middle. Similarly, if they want to stable both of the trains, these are very long trains that used for the Eurostar services, there was a railway yard at north Stratford, Temple Mills, which is long enough. The other issue was making connection to the West Coast Main Line. At the moment the High Speed line just stops at St Pancras and doesn’t bring to the north. If it goes further north, it needs to access West Coast Main Lines. It is easier to access West Coast Main Lines from Stratford than from St Pancras. Those are the three factors that we believe ultimately made the case for building the Station at Stratford. (CM) (According to RB, the depot at Temple Mills was decided in 2006 but the decision of Stratford International was in 1996 (OMEGA, 2008) or 1998 (CM). CM used the safety case, maintenance depot and HSR service to the north to justify the benefits of Stratford International.)

What is very difficult in anything this big is how you weld local government, at its various levels, at a borough level, at a city level, with the national government agenda, with the private sector agenda where you have, I am not saying mutually opposed agentives, but you all have different set of objectives. So the private sector is there fundamentally to make profit and ideally to generate a bit good will about the individual. Central government is there to consider can they achieve short-term expedience in political outputs ideally with no costs itself. Also think how you get credibility and points with the electorate for spending nothing. City-wide is how you ensure that you
convince everyone else insight to do your own political agenda at no cost to yourself. At the local borough level, it is how I get as much into the borough as I can ideally with no disbenefits and with my own electorate thinking I’m wonderful. (HS)

That’s why the S106 agreement is so thick and complex because it’s assuming that certain events may happen in the future, but if they don’t happen then there is a fallback position. (MJ) (Flexibility and uncertainty)

The Olympics can’t change the world or China, but the power and the magic of the Olympics has always transcended political issues. (SMI 10)

This scale of this improvement in connectivity for HSR networks would result in significant productivity gains to the national and regional economy, with overall GDP gains of over £5bn (2002 prices) forecast over a 60 year period, calculated in line with the Government’s ‘Wider Economic Benefits’ (WEBs) Guidance. (SMI 16)

Opposing a third runway at Heathrow Airport and a second at Stansted will certainly boost Tory leader David Cameron’s green credentials, drawing a clear line between his party and the Labour government on the issue of airport expansion. (SMI 26)

New income streams for local authorities to tackle pollution and congestion have been a great success in London but you need to have the political decision-making structure in place to deliver new fiscal measures. Progress outside London has been slower, fuelled by nimbyism. Council members are under pressure to support the local electorate, even if the transport proposal is not the most logical or pragmatic solution. (SMI 29)

Further work by Michael Parkinson for the Core Cities has argued that differences in organisational and financial structures lie at the heart of differences in the
performance of cities (Parkinson et al., 2004). However, many of the changes required are highly controversial. They affect the fundamental distribution of power between different levels of government, and how different communities are empowered. Even the smallest changes, such as those put forward in the Local Government White Paper, seem very hard to implement as they require a climate of trust, not rivalry. (SMI 43)

Instead it was quietly forgotten when it did not present a strong case for a bid. Civil servants watered down the findings but the final draft was still unhelpful to bid champions within the Government. “The justification for bidding should have been based on evidence placed in the public domain. Instead key evidence was suppressed or ignored.” The revelations raise the question of why ministers backed a bid citing reasons dismissed by their own experts. (SMI 44)

The successful delivery of the games will be critical to the success or failure of Boris Johnson’s first term in City Hall and may determine whether Londoners’ entrust him with a second. Despite broad support for the games from voters during and immediately after the successful bid, skepticism has steadily grown as to whether the games will bring the benefits promised by politicians. (SMI 47)

The bottom line is, though, that it is the Mayor, as the dominant and most powerful political figure in London, who will be seen as responsible for the games the success or failure of which will rebound significantly on his political reputation. It is encouraging that the new Mayor has taken immediate steps to exert his influence on the games by appointing David Ross, a successful entrepreneur with the Carphone Warehouse to be his representative for London 2012. The management of the games is crying out for a more business like approach. (SMI 47) (The irony is David Ross was resigned later on because of financial scandal.)

The previous Mayor was not exactly surrounded by people with a great deal of commercial acumen. It is no surprise,
therefore, that the £1.8 billion of land sales projection is at the most optimistic end of the spectrum. Given the radically changed economic conditions that now prevail and which are likely to set the financial and economic context for the next 3 to 4 years, these optimistic assumptions need to be ripped up. Mayor Johnson owes it to London taxpayers to ensure that all aspects of the finances of the games are on a realistic footing and are not the product of political fantasy. (SMI 47) (Optimism bias)

The reality is, though, that these benefits are pretty intangible. When the original cost/benefit analysis was presented to the government prior to the decision to bid for the games there was very little evidence that the Olympics would bring any direct economic benefits to London. Yet, there is no point in re-opening old wounds. London 2012 needs to be a success and enhancing London’s reputation is the single most important objective. That is fine. The debate about the so called legacy of the games is much more contentious. (SMI 47)

The idea of extending the UK’s high-speed rail network is making headway on the political front but a welter of financial and procedural issues need resolving. A political consensus is thus emerging. The question is where the line would run and consequently what it would cost. (SMI 48)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRQ 4: What factors can enhance stakeholders’ ‘negotiation power’ in the delivery of: • CTRL as a whole • the KX Central / Stratford City transport hubs or • 2012 London Olympics and why?</td>
<td>One is to have all range of stakeholders support and the other one is the benefits of the project can deliver are fully understood by the stakeholders. (Here it implies stakeholder management and well equipped communication skill.) The stakeholder’s scale of the Olympics is global level. (TU)</td>
<td>Negative: N/A Impartial: N/A Positive: N/A</td>
<td>Kws(8)= Negotiation power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political climate would be an important factor. Whether is the funding available? What priority and promises have been made by politicians? (RB)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PHR Dataset/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, London has provided one of the best transport plans and accompanied with it were 3000 consultation entities. This is very convincing especially transport in London is always a difficult issue. Urban regeneration and legacy put the Games in a strong bargaining position. The world image is another factor to enhance the power of the Games. Beijing has used Olympics to extreme to present itself to the world. (PB)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Interview dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the case of 2012 London Olympics, the government and Mayoral commitment is the key factor to deliver the project. The stakeholder negotiation almost put before the Bid and submitting the candidate files. The power of Ken Livingston as the Mayor played an important role. It could be seen as a political movement and at the time, all decision makers are in the right colour. From the central government, the Mayor to the four local boroughs, they are all Labour party. If everyone gets certain things that they want in their area, it is a win-win situation. (This opinion</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Interview dataset + Secondary dataset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary:**

“[The essential features of regime theory stipulate] that business leaders have a privileged position in local politics because of their command of economic resources. Because business leaders are affected by local political decisions, not just at the level of property taxes but by the business climate of the city as well, they attempt to shape public policies to benefit business. In order to shape an agenda and bring results, business leaders need the cooperation of elected officials. Local elected officials and local...
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<th>Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>358</strong></td>
<td>bureaucrats seize the opportunities afforded by cooperation with business leaders.” (MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001)</td>
</tr>
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<td>There was a lot opposition from North England, from Scotland, and from Wales that Channel Tunnel shouldn’t be built unless it provides services for whole of the country. So the requirement was put on British Rail to cover with proposal for through services. (PJ) (In order to get support, the promise of the CTRL proposal contained to provide HSR network service to the north England.)</td>
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<td>The changes we want would have to put the whole thing properly underground and only came up on the Railway Lands. They wouldn’t admit that and one of the reasons is that would reduce the property development potential. But the reason they really apposed that was because of the consortium that had won included Virgin Trains. Virgin wants to run trains from Kent up to Manchester and Birmingham because they had West Line concession. Virgin was part of London &amp; Continental Railways at that time. That meant Virgin wanted easy connection from the Rail Link there. (PJ) (Property development is the main agenda for the CTRL project. The interest of Virgin Trains had influenced the decision-making on double-track escape route, but it is not clear the influence was on Stratford or St Pancras station or whether it is the same thing in Temple Mills.)</td>
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<td>It was there as a possible station and Newham Council argued vehemently as a lot of the other people vote at least it needs to be a station there. That proposal was resisted very strongly by the Government and by Union Railways. Later, the Government changed their mind. Mostly because the Newham council fought for it and also</td>
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<td><strong>We are already at this mega level whether it is LCR or TFL or the ODA, these agencies in the sense have to override any other stakeholder’s concern to some extent. Wherever a stakeholder can bring to play something that the key stakeholder wants to achieve, and then he or she will be well advised to do so. (This argument is the same with NM’s opinion) [MP]</strong></td>
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<td>Sometimes problems or failure would enhance certain stakeholders’ negotiating power regarding the London Olympics. (This also implies to CSR to business. Bob West also mentioned that the current financial climate gives excuse to private sector to renegotiate the Section 106 deals.) In the case of the CTRL, the power of the government or the agency which is buying the project, buying the goods, is much greater. In terms of hub development, developers have the most power. It is down to political will and ideology. [JC]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>To meet planning requirements is vital so the planning permission is important. Political support is also important. (HB)</td>
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Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

| Government should believe in investment because it is so important to make the country more competitive. Particularly in the time of economic down turn, it is the right time for the Government to step in and stimulate investment. Some have very short-sighted view of the funding of the Olympics. That is going to be a fantastic asset. The branding of that will be so much more valuable. The champions of the Olympics are very good at lobbying. It is a very good example of how to use negotiation power. (DM) |  | we had changed our government finally. (PJ) (Lobby and change of political climate are two of the factors of building the Stratford International) There was no down side for the private sector side. They shouldn’t be allowed to go bankrupt; the Government should take it in, should have done it itself and got the profits. But instead, they decided to get this money back through the development agreement which tied up with the lands at King’s Cross / St Pancras and Ebbsfleet. That meant it put artificially, we don’t know how much because the number is secret, high valuations of on what the lands worth. This has forced the developers to up how much they build to maintain their profit level leading to over development. (PJ) (This is the issue of PPP mechanism. If the CTRL project is public funded, will it has more community friendly design is still a question. Inevitably, the government needs to find money and pay back since it is taxpayers’ money.) All they getting are the things they got in Section 106 which because they thought that was their job to agree what the developer proposed more or less. The Camden Council negotiated very poorly because the developers knew they will push and open the door. (PJ) They probably try to get more big players, like Sainsbury’s and tie down so they can be sure they won’t fall over. (PJ) You have different style of thinking. You need to allow for that and work on each side of understanding the others thinking and constrains better, if you are going to get the right jointed decision. It doesn’t just happen; you have to work on it. That’s why I said it is difficult but that’s natural and it is state of humanity. We are all different and we all got different perspectives. You have to build bridges understanding the other organisation’s or the other person’s point of view; explain your point of view clearly in order to get a better jointed solution. (RB) That’s whole nature of development industry. It’s negotiation. Yes, there are endless issues between all of |  |  |
| The certainty of the CTRL project has been built into legislation so the negotiation power of the local authority lies in the ability to slow a programme down, and sometimes generate negative publicity. But if the local authority takes a pro-active role in supporting the project, or in providing an arena for consensus to be reached, then the goodwill is valuable. We chose to be very proactive in helping the railway because we wanted certainty about King’s Cross but also we wanted to protect local residents. The proactive involvement increased the negotiating power. There is a saying: If you are not sitting at the table then you are on the menu. Our role became master ring, mediation. We got quite a good reputation for that, for mediation, being sensible and we traded off that. This helped us to gain trust of the stakeholders. This is not absolute power but influence. We also gained influence because we put in resources. Moreover, we showed our ability to collaborate other local authorities down the CTRL route as a unity. We convinced the Treasury to look at the business case in a different way. (BW) |  |  |
these among different aspects. Because it is expensive and because you are asking financial contribution from the developer, then that’s always an issue. That applies to all of them. This is where the Network Rail said “we are public sector body, we don’t have to commit any contribution at all to the wider regeneration or engaging wider regeneration”. But we said they did, they accepted that. All the discussions with Network Rail on going took 3 or 4 years for Argent to get planning permission. That was because we are in negotiation throughout that period. We negotiated, we discussed, we argued about the form of the application, the elements within the application and 106 agreement. (RK)

The process of setting up the public inquiry and especially one involves local authorities, the developer and the local residents takes great deal of time and that’s the delay. JR potentially delayed and that’s part of the motivation for people who did JR because of the delay. Delay can kill the scheme. That’s where you sabotage even you are not successful in Judicial Review, the fact you delay things. It can mean the confidence has lost or it is down turn or banks stop calling the lets. It is the delay that causes problems. (RK)

In the run up to put in the Bid, we had to have financial certainties with all those projects and that was negotiation between central government and the GLA to underwrite the funding for the transport projects. There was potential if that agreement wasn’t in place. The Olympic Committee could think that bid wasn’t serious. (RM)

When Railtrack was invited to participate in the arrangement to buy the railway, they clearly saw that they were in a very advantageous position in negotiating the terms. They certainly exploited that situation. Again when it came to putting in place arrangements to proceed with section 2, Railtrack were reluctant to concede that they were not able to exercise their option and again attempted to extract from the government a revised better deal which government assessed to be completely
Because of what is giving rise to that is property market issues we have a combination of the recession in the property market and a shortage in the supply of debt financing which is clearly having impact on how we and Argent take forward King’s Cross. Companies find it is more difficult to raise money to support property developments. This is likely to have some impact on the timing of the delivery of the King’s Cross Central. Stratford City is part immune from the stage because of the need to deliver the infrastructure for the 2012. (RH)

You just have to manage what I might call political noise as people try to position themselves for commercial advantage, and maintain a straight bat. You just try to work the overlaps. Those areas of commonality which goes even though you might have to bury your own particular aspiration for everything you get most of what you want by actually cooperating. (RH)

I would say whether the Stratford City or any other major development from what I’ve seen in the past when negotiating with developers, some of the most difficult things to agree on are very much the existing situation in terms of the transport network in the existing patterns of train frequencies or buses numbers. Once you agree that position, you then go through probably a fairly protracted debate with developer to establish the modeling that they will need to do to look at and how their proposed development may or may not be accommodated on the transport network. (MJ)

The reason I used “debate” not “negotiate” because my experience of modeling is the ‘best guess’, and so the debate is ‘whose guessing is better’. That’s why I said there is a debate; because I think having established that you are in an agreement with the modeling, and then you move into the negotiation bit. (MJ)

With the big schemes where we are looking at the future mitigation, there needs to be a degree of flexibility written
into any agreement to allow those improvements to happen when they are needed. But you often find the developers still want to have been the party to agreeing how that money will be spent even ten years in the future. Because I can understand they just don’t want to hand money over. They have got responsibilities to their shareholders and investors. That then means you’ve got to have some thought about the S106 money and what they deliver are going to be for sometime in the future, you then argue about, debate or negotiate as to what triggers are going to be the legal agreement which then trigger those payments. (MJ)

Gordon Brown is expected this month to approve a new third runway at Heathrow, but ministers will try to limit the environmental and political fallout of the decision by proposing improved high speed rail links to the airport. (SMI 04)

Madelin has little time for the arguments. He said: “They can’t be more passionate than me about retaining the heritage here and they can’t dismiss the views of English Heritage and the Victorian Society, who we have been working with. (Those organisations) have dismissed out of hand the proposals the KCCAAC have put forward in a detailed and articulate way. It’s not an option that works.” “We comply with local and national planning policy. And we have the backing of the likes of English Heritage. It would mean a two to three-year delay and would cost us several million in lawyers’ fees. We would get there — not because I’m arrogant but because we meet all the policy objectives.” (SMI 05) (To collaborate with other influential organisations can strengthen negotiating position.)
Table A8.9: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH DATA detected by NVivo</th>
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<td>H3: Synergy of Network Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergetic relations between MUTPs, SUR and MEs can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.</td>
<td>Yes, I agree with the Hypothesis. (TU) It is not really robbing Peter as such. It is only diverting financial resources, delaying expenditure on one area. (The interviewee believes it is justifiable if look at long-term and wider benefits.) It also depends on how you quantify economic benefits and how does that then feed back into economic equation. Another justification is that mega event condenses the timeframe which will produce a more efficient outcome than piecemeal developments. (TU)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Impartial</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yes, the Olympics will divert resources. The spin-off benefits are big considerations for the Olympics decisions. Legacy, such as capturing the imagination of the nation and driving improving sport awareness and urban regeneration benefits are considerations. (RB) (Interviewee seemed to avoid using “justification” and stressed the measurement of the Olympics outcome will be judged after the event.)</td>
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<td>There are two separate budgets: one is the operating budget and another one is the long-term infrastructure budget. The operating budget is paid by the selling broadcasting rights and tickets, as well as sponsorships. Although the infrastructure budget is more problematic, it is justifiable. The investment is more concentrated on space and time. (PB)</td>
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<td>I don’t think so. We have to look at the long-term regeneration benefits. There is absolute quantitative</td>
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<td>HRQ 5: Robbing Peter to pay Paul Will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics project significantly divert resources away from other major development initiatives? If so, are the spin-off benefits of this re-prioritisation justified?</td>
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and qualitative improvement in Barcelona's global and European position, tourism and jobs because of the '92 Games. London will have the same reaction of that catalyst as well. (NM)

If concerning the planning resources between King's Cross, Stratford and Ebbsfleet, these three are geographically so different in terms of their location and characteristics. They will locate different markets. The Olympics could not divert their resources away. It might divert resources away from other regional sporting type developments. The Olympic legacy will be very competitive compared to other less high profile development opportunities. (MP)

Yes, the Olympics diverted resources from the grassroots' sports and art development. The Olympics has no spin-off benefits. (JC)

It is obvious there is only one pot for tax payers' money, but so far TfL hasn't seen any major diversion as such. (HB)

There is concern about having several major projects going on at the same time will make the cost go up, but the very specialised engineering skill can then be used for one project and moved on to next project. Probably these big projects actually help to stimulate the local economies because they are very useful for making sure that there are new suppliers and new markets. (DM)

I agree with the hypothesis. It is kind of self-obvious. It will take resources away but I am not sure in what form. The most obvious place to be influenced will be the Thames Gateway. The test is not the Olympics itself but the legacy. If it delivers the legacy then arguably it is worth it. (BW)

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<th>opinion</th>
<th>businesswomen.)</th>
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<td>Think in all sorts of levels, it already got all the ingredients of being very successful. It is CTRL which enables Eurostar, which facilitate others. It is a chain and no one component on its own would work, but together, it works. (RB)</td>
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<td>They realise that the Olympic site next to the Stratford City site, but they wanted/needed to almost merge the two projects. A lot of development in Stratford City has nothing to do with the Olympic Games but people will not understand that it has nothing to do with the Games. (CM)</td>
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<td>The 2012 Olympics closely now integrate with the development of Stratford City and arguably the 2012 Olympics re-phased Stratford City in a way which made the delivery of Stratford City more difficult longer term, but arguably some would say brings forward some aspect of the Stratford City development sooner than would otherwise be the case. (RH)</td>
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<td>Railfuture agrees with critics who view Eurostar as &quot;an airline on wheels&quot; which refuses to co-operate with ordinary train operators. Eurostar does not co-operate with Southeastern to promote Ashford as an interchange station. (SMI 17)</td>
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<td>One result of this rapid influx of development was a lack of integration of land uses around some centres. This presents an opportunity to bring about greater integration of land uses and better use of public transport facilities. (SMI 36) (Integration between Retail-oriented development and public transport planning)</td>
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Table A8.10: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #6

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<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH Data detected by NVivo</th>
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<td>Do you agree that some important aims of the CTRL project, the 2012 London Olympics project and the urban regeneration schemes for Stratford City and King’s Cross are in reality mutually reinforcing, or are the product of important compromises?</td>
<td>Some of them, I suppose they do. (RB)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Impartial</td>
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<td></td>
<td>They are mutually reinforcing. (PB)</td>
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<td>Yes, I agree. There is win-win in terms of transport mode shift. The CTRL is a transport oriented development and the Games heavily rely on public transport. Both of them encourage urban regeneration. (NM)</td>
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<td>I would think to some extent those three elements are mutually reinforcing. The need to make to up the viability of the whole project is compromise or just more like reality. For those private developers, they can have a better negotiation position. (MP)</td>
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<td>Impartial</td>
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<td>There is no win-win consequence. The CTRL lies into the KXC project. They are mutually re-enforcing, but they do not produce benefits used as a win-win strategy. The SC and the Olympics entangle together so there is compromise going on there which is completely unnecessary. (JC)</td>
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<td>Impartial</td>
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<td>CTRL alone is not the decisive factor for KXC or SC. The urban regeneration scheme for Stratford and King’s Cross come because that line was made available to a commercial organisation prepare to take the risk and develop it. The overall transport network to those sites is more crucial. The Olympics has provided the impetus to take Stratford City forward. So the synergy there. There are compromises, the way Stratford City was designed leads back the quality of some of the transport infrastructure interchange. (HB)</td>
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Summary:
What Jeffery Owen did was demonstrate that when you look at these economic impact studies they contain basic misrepresentations. They do double counting. Another thing they don’t count is called the ‘opportunity cost’. An ‘opportunity cost’ occurs where money which is put into a budget for the London Olympic Games project, for example, is taken in this case from the National Lottery funding of community sport projects. The opportunity to use that money for grass roots sport is lost to the benefit of elite sport. (MS)

In the Lea Valley before the Olympic project came along if you wanted to buy some land in order to set up a business it would have cost you about £1 million per acre. Once it has been Compulsorily Purchased by the London Development Agency and that land is then rezoned for housing that land is then overnight worth £8 million per acre. It is a classic way of doing business, buy cheap and sell dear. You use public money to do it. You use legal power to force people to sell their land and move their
It’s probably more that they are more mutually reinforcing. I am not aware of compromising being made in these projects. (DM)

Yes, they are mutually reinforcing and there are important compromises. The two regeneration schemes make the rail project a strong business case. King’s Cross could have redeveloped without the CTRL; it only needs certainty. Stratford City probably could be developed without the CTRL but it will take much longer because Stratford has lower economic viability. (BW)

businesses. In the case of the London Olympic Games, there is huge displacement of economic activity which is again not properly counted as part of the costs. I think there were something like 350 businesses that have been displaced. Most of the businesses had competitive edge because of their location, close to the centre of London. Many have lost their competitive advantage as a result of being displaced. There are significant displacement costs to those businesses which is not included in the the disbenefits of the Games. (MS)

Olympic Turnaround tells for the first time how the future of one of the world’s iconic institutions was secured. It is the story of a fine balancing as an amatuer organization struggled with and eventually embraced the business world. But it did so on its own terms maintaining its identity, not compromising its core values and in the process establishing many of the ground rules of today’s sports marketing industry. (MS quoted from the blurb of Michael Payne’s book, 2006)

But the whole idea of putting station under King’s Cross was so risky and therefore financially unjustifiable. The decided putting Thameslink Station underneath St Pancras where the existing terminal is. The model for everything will come after it. The model down of it needs specially build trains with shorter carriages than standard in order to run it all because any other trains will bang into the side of the tunnel and couldn’t get around safely. This is just one that alone the way of the main story. That is a typical case of if opportunism gone wrong compromise out and left the third rate transport system as a result. Of course Thameslink now has its 12 carriage platform at St Pancras but they had immense battle to sort out what are they going to do at the Borough Markets and London Bridge to get longer platforms. It becomes immensely expensive. It is running today but with shorter trains. It is providing links to Luton Airport and Gatwick Airport. It’s providing those commuter connections. Until the South of the River stuff and sort out the Borough Market area, they can’t start running longer trains. Its capacity is restricted by that. That
becomes important in relation to St Pancras. (PJ) (A story about the solution of integrating Thameslink in St Pancras International. It suggests that Stratford could be a better solution without the HSR running into King’s Cross area.)

So much of this is decisions taken by chance not with intention and planning has very little to do with that. When it came to that West Coast Main Line connection, it was because that was what Virgin wanted. Virgin was known as part of the consortium then they are no longer part of the consortium. Now the connection is there, but nobody is talking about running trains from Ashford or Ebbsfleet to Manchester or Birmingham. It is all clear what mistake they did. (PJ) (One of the CTRL promises is to provide HSR network for the UK. This has been used to win supports from other regions outside south east. Although the HS 2 is not yet coming, the opportunity to realise the connection is there. The argument raised by champions from Newham suggested that the Stratford International station can be better used to connect to the north of the UK in the future is not true. From my source (RH) suggested the Stratford International is a white elephant and Eurostar will not loose the journey time by stopping there. The future extension of the HSR to the north will be around St Pancras / King’s Cross.)

What happened was in reality that they pretend that would be high speed services the rest of the country and it locked in the decision to have the station at King’s Cross/St Pancras. It’s not the best solution. It’s a sub-optimal solution but I think it is a very good example of what economist called mode-locking. (PJ) (The intention behind this compromise is derived from property development potential. From the perspective of the developer and railway manager, the integration of railway and land development is a win-win solution. However, this mechanism is inevitably cause gentrification and displacement. The disadvantage groups are the losers who have been sacrificed from the capitalism society. This is a protracted debate between market-driven and community-friendly development.)
The 2012 Olympics closely now integrate with the development of Stratford City and arguably the 2012 Olympics re-phased Stratford City in a way which made the delivery of Stratford City more difficult longer term, but arguably some would say brings forward some aspect of the Stratford City development sooner than would otherwise be the case. (RH) (For the housing market, the Olympics created artificial pressure to the Stratford City and to the Thames Gateway. There will be problems in property market post Games in terms of demand and paying off Olympic debt. As to the developer, Lend Lease, since the athlete village has been nationalised resulted from current credit crunch. The pressure is entirely on the UK taxpayers’ shoulder. In the beginning, it seems housing development of Stratford City made compromise for the Olympics. After the collapse of the property market, the government made compromise to sustain the project in order to deliver the Olympic event.)

There was the whole of Stratford City going into receivership and the change of the land ownerships. It changes in terms commercial requirement. I think what it means a learning point from that is how to institutionalize the knowledge; how you carry people forward from bid into exit works; how do you carry the relationships forward through time; how do you need to change the stakeholder management process every time. This all sort of things you need to do if you were starting all over again. (RH) (The way to cope with uncertainties is to institutionalise knowledge.)

Eurostar chiefs had been weighing up keeping open two London terminals, but decided Waterloo was too expensive to keep as a standby. Eurostar Waterloo International station - which cost £130million and opened only 10 years ago - is to close. The closure will prove a major boost for more than 200,000 beleaguered South West Trains commuters who suffer regular delays as services wait to use the busy Waterloo terminal. When the international section opened SWT was forced to surrender two of its platforms. (SMI 09) (The initial
decision of Waterloo International was considered under the need of a terminus in the southern London and Waterloo was the only one having sufficient space and cheap land price. The aim of encouraging property development at the surrounding area is not the primary reason. Currently, the Waterloo International station is not used mainly because the issue between SWT franchise.)

"Officials admit that building a park is essential for increasing the value of neighbouring development." This is no bad thing if both the park and surrounding development bring major benefits to existing communities. However, the current idea of ringing the park with apartment buildings - should the market for them still exist after 2012 - and a media-based complex will create a wall between the "new East End" and the old communities. Already the Clays Lane residents are being moved out to make way for the athletes village. (SMl12)

Eurostar travellers in Kent are protesting the axing of most of the Eurostar calls at Ashford International station, in favour of Ebbsfleet in north Kent. The changes were prompted by the closure in November 2007 of Waterloo International and the opening of St Pancras International. (SMI 17) (Decisions between Ashford and Ebbsfleet; St Pancras and Stratford all challenge the rationale of locating those stations at the first place. How was the decision of Ashford made? CTRL Domestic services will also be a key driver in the development of Ashford, one of the four growth areas identified in the Sustainable Communities Plan. Ashford's strategic location and role as a gateway to Europe will be strengthened with the completion of CTRL Domestic services. In August 1987 Government approved £550m expenditure for Phase 1 (excluding the international station at Ashford which government felt could not be justified commercially) but said it could not commit to Phase2. (quoted from OMEGA, 2008) RH argues that the decision of shifting Eurostar service from Ashford to Ebbsfleet is a bad decision. The transport network and
The DfT said the responsibility lies with local authorities and it has no plans for a blanket approach to safeguarding all potential alignments or disused lines. “We need to balance the public interest in releasing land for development with safeguarding land for future transport,” it maintained. Campaign for Better Transport public transport spokeswoman Cat Hobbs said: “The government’s lack of interest in expanding the rail network is disappointing. It does not come from an honest assessment of passenger need but from a desire to keep costs low.” (SMI 22) (This relates to the issue of Treasury’s culture in the UK.)

Table A8.11: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #7

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<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH Data detected by NVivo</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRQ 7: Concentration or de-centralisation</td>
<td>(Skip) (TU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Impartial</td>
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<tr>
<td>How effective will the new CTRL Stratford Station be as a catalyst for new development?</td>
<td>Yes, it has already. The CTRL Station at Stratford has been designed around the development of the Chelsfield scheme. It is sort of natural place for the development to grow. (RB)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Will it attract new public and private sector development in East London or merely encourage the further</td>
<td>No, this is the quality of the bid. You don’t give it to central London which is already extremely developed. Stratford is regarded as a part of central London. (PB)</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Stratford International has played an important role in the Stratford City development. (NM)</td>
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\textsuperscript{a}Kws(11)= Competition, Competitiveness

PHR Dataset\textsuperscript{a}\textsubscript{Kws(11)}=
| concentration of such development in Central London? | Apparently it is very effective. My own suspicion is that those nodes of high public transport accessibility that are within a certain distance from Stratford might benefit from the ripple effects of Stratford. I just at the moment find it is hard to believe that Stratford would compete effectively with central London. Thames Gateway needs a streamlined body to deliver regeneration if it depends on market to develop in the commercially fragile environment; investors are likely to go to the west. (MP) |  | x | | | Interview dataset | Interview dataset + Secondary dataset |  |  | • transport service (5) | • major infrastructure (8) | • transport service (6) | • mega event (6) | • resources (6) | • market (5) |
| | The catalyst effect in Stratford from the CTRL is very marginal. Westfield as a foreign developer is attracted by the available land, well-connected transport to other centre in London. The concept of Central London is changing and the territory is expanding. It is difficult to distinguish central London and East London. (JC) |  | x |  |  |  |  |
| | The major catalyst for the SC was the Olympics rather than the International station. The majority of transport to Stratford relies on tubes, buses and cars. Having good retail in Stratford potentially will create a good centre. (HB) |  | x |  |  |  |  |  |
| | The catalyst effect of the station to Stratford will take longer than we hope. Hopefully the Olympics will change the public perception of that area and see how easily you can get there through Jubilee Line or the CTRL. We need to take a long-term view because over time the geographic centre of London is shifting eastwards. The wave of movement further east will continue. (DM) |  |  | x |  |  |  |  |
| | The Stratford International allows you to host the Olympics for start but probably the real catalyst is the Olympics. Crossrail is very important to Stratford. It increases the number of ridership of the CTRL and if you have a business address or a home address which is on the international railway line, that's also worth that |  | x |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Summary:
'Urban entrepreneurship, corporate interests and sports mega-events: the thin policies of competitiveness within the hard outcomes of neoliberalism.' Mega-events are therefore one of the means by which places seek to become 'sticky' (Markusen, 1996) – that is attract and retain mobile capital and people – through place enhancement and regeneration and the promotion of selective place information (Hall, C.M., 2005a, b). (MS quoted from Hall, C.M., 2005)

How can we explain this mega-event obsession? First of all, we must realize that this kind of competition is nothing more than the most conspicuous form of global competitiveness. This competition between cities and regions is a consequence of the political and economical changes that have occurred in approximately the last thirty years. The concentration of urban environment transformation and devotes itself to the construction of infrastructures of whatever kind that are highly valuable for corporations and quality customers. In this frame of competitiveness and in this process of converting a city into a spectacle is where we must set the recent obsession with mega-events. The strategy has only worked with the help of a continuous and huge public investment in private business. In the case of Spain, the leftwing political parties usually carry the burden of an uncritical believe in the idea that good macroeconomic figures entail benefits for the people. As John Logan and Harvey Molotch said, "a skilled politician delivers growth while giving a good
a little bit more. It will generate new investment in east London. It won’t concentrate on an overheated central London. (BW)

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<tr>
<th>circus” (MS recommended reference of Carolina del Olmo: The role of mega events in urban competitiveness and its consequences on people)</th>
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<tr>
<td>If I remembered correctly, the Lord who chaired the House of Lords, the Select Committee of the Bill described it as a non-runner. But in order to win support for the Channel Tunnel, the Government made various concessions. In particular, there was eventually that it would undermine the very companies who carry most rail track and road traffic over the Continent at that time, if there was any Government subsidy. (PJ)</td>
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<td>We’re currently involving another around of legacy planning. I mentioned earlier at the initial stages, we ensure the site is going to have excellent accessibility so there is an argument said that those regeneration sites in East London got to have accessibility which is as good as, probably better than the West London or part of Central London. Ultimately, it’s all about creating conditions for private development to take off there. You can create those conditions but you also depend on the general economy. (RM) (The general economy is more important.)</td>
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<td>Livingston and people who promoted the Olympic Bid did so telling people that is to regenerate this part of east London. They chose to ignore the fact that there already was a large programme for regeneration around Stratford, the Stratford City project. Even today, people confuse two projects. Stratford City was a quite separate project with quite separate route and quite separate genesis. It is coming from different source and when the Olympic Bid was proved and they had cycled work for this. (CM)</td>
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<td>Hyde Park is and will remain a great metropolitan open space in the heart of one of the richest and most visited cities in the world. East London, meanwhile, has always been the poorest part of the city, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, despite the Olympics. The London Development Agency is intent on retaining the</td>
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media complex as studio facilities. The mayor has been trying to sell it to Bollywood. But west London, with its dynamic Asian business community and proximity to Heathrow, would seem much more attractive. (SMI 12)

The business lobby agrees. London First chief executive Baroness Valentine, whose group represents 250 firms in the capital, says: "London could lose its crown to New York or to the increasingly influential Dubai or Shanghai. Ruling out making Heathrow bigger is a bad decision for a global city and the UK economy." Heathrow operator BAA says HSR will only form one part of the solution to the UK’s long-term airport capacity needs. "Our overseas competitors are investing in airports and rail," it notes. (SMI 29)

The head of one of the world’s fastest growing airlines has backed plans for an airport in the Thames Estuary so the UK can compete with foreign rivals threatening to eclipse Heathrow, according to The Sunday Times. Tim Clark who is president of Dubai’s national airline Emirates, claimed that building the hub would allow Heathrow and Gatwick to close, free up land for development and bring environmental benefits across the South East. (SMI 35)
Table A8.12: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #8

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>HRQ 8: Reality or Rhetoric</th>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH Data detected by NVivo</th>
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<td>Probably it hasn’t been as successful as it might have been, but certainly I think the London Olympics will see significant regeneration in the area. (RB)</td>
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<td>Regeneration of derelict land is the justification of the 2012 London Olympics. (PB)</td>
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<td>I feel confident that they will be successful outcomes. What has been showing around the area is beginning to be interesting which is related to the Olympics. The politics in that output is always constant political motivation. (NM)</td>
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<td>It can stimulate urban regeneration but not sustainable urban regeneration. (MP)</td>
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<td>It is impossible to see any connection between the rhetoric and realities. They argued it needs a streamlined body to develop Thames Gateway or the four boroughs in East London. They already exist but not very effective. It is more about political determination, not the mega event. Furthermore, there is nothing wrong with piecemeal development. It might achieve housing creation targets with less cost. (JC)</td>
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<td>The Olympics has already encouraged or sped up the retail centre in Stratford. It is too early to answer this question but there will always be gaps between rhetoric and reality. It depends on what legacy they deliver and one what cost. (HB)</td>
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Summary:
They promote themselves as looking after the interests of those who have been displaced but what they actually deliver is far short of their rhetoric. They perform even worse if you dispute your outcomes with them. They are also quite chaotic in operation. They are an organisation which functions rather chaotically. They can be appalling to deal with. (MS)

*“On 23 April 2008 the House of Commons Select Committee responsible for reviewing the performance of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport published its report London 2012 Games: The next lap. This report contains the following judgments:* **“such a radical revision of cost estimates has been damaging to confidence in the management of the overall
I would probably disagree with that claim. I think that we do need our visionaries and we do need leadership and I think the Olympics will be fantastic for East London. I cannot think of any other way that East London would receive this amount of injection of investment without the Olympics. A lot of that was down to Ken Livingston. (DM)

Yes, there is gap between rhetoric and reality. That’s partly because mega events tend to attract a rhetoric which is over and above of the real value of the project: arguably it needs to be so that the mega project sells well as an idea.

If you want to spend public money in large amounts on any project, you talk about that project furiously because that’s what politics about. It is actually about selling. So the aftermath is not going to be as exciting as the vision. But CTRL has failed so far as something that is going to serve the regions in this country and yet it is all designed that you can just go straight from Stratford up to the North East, and to the North West without even stopping at St Pancras. You should have Leeds, Manchester or Glasgow to Paris directly, and this was a big selling point in the vision. There is no train service, however, but the train paths on the track are still there for Eurostar to go all the way from Manchester to Paris without stopping in St Pancras - which is the reason why Stratford is important; it will stop in Stratford. The promise of those regional connections to Europe is not delivered. In the long term, it may well happen. David Cameron said he wants High Speed 2 and this is about selling the political vision. It hits a lot of buttons, quite clever. There is always going to be a gap but I think the gap is around what is needed to sell the projects, to make sure that they happen. I don’t argue about that gap too much because I know you need to sell the project to make it happen. (BW)

programme. It has also exposed the Government and Games organisers to the charge that the initial bid was kept artificially low in order to win public support." "The effect is to introduce an element of uncertainty into a long-term funding programme, hobbling financial planning. We believe that it will turn out to be a misjudgment and an unwelcome diversion of effort." (MS)

If you listen to the LCR, the CTRL was built in order to service the Olympics. It is always part of their shining visions to serve the Olympic site Stratford, the place they didn’t even want the station. (PJ) (Stratford station was decided according to enthusiasts’ belief in the catalyst effect of the international station on the Stratford development. However, in terms of HSR operational rationale, the station is not welcome and likely to be white elephant.)

Whatever we have got then we got a more matured system will valid the people who deliver it decline it to be a great victory and what they always intended. However little relationship it has got with the original aims because they always rely on people forgetting them. Some bits of it will be better and some will be worse. It depends on who gets the bits that worse. (PJ)

The 2016 Games are being marketed as an opportunity to bring the West and East closer together. 'These could be a landmark Games - helping leading to better understanding of Arab culture,’ said Hassan. ‘Bringing the flame to the Arabic-speaking world for the first time, extending the Olympics ideals to millions of new hearts and minds, will engage and inspire the Arab youth and help them understand the wider world and help the rest of the world gain a true picture of Arab culture and hospitality.' (SMI 37) (Olympics are marketed as a medium which bring together the West and the East nations. This is an issue of geopolitics. It is can be seen a rhetoric under the force of globalisation.)

Ministers ignored evidence from their own experts who
found scant social or economic justification for bidding for the 2012 Olympics, *The Times* has learnt. A 250-page strategy document, signed off in December 2002 by Tony Blair as Prime Minister but selectively distributed, found little support for the claim that the Games would produce significant economic returns or more people playing sport. John Clark, the report's chief author, told *The Times*: “We concluded that countries should host the Olympics only for reasons of national celebration because the economic rationale is weak.” Yet just a few months later, the Cabinet backed a bid on the ground that it would increase sports participation and regenerate East London, and Lord Coe sold the message to the International Olympic Committee in 2005. ([SMI](#) 44) (This reflects to the Giddens’ theory of power that power is equivalent to the capability of human beings to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course)\(^1\) (Allen, p.43)

The previous Mayor was not exactly surrounded by people with a great deal of commercial acumen. It is no surprise, therefore, that the £1.8 billion of land sales projection is at the most optimistic end of the spectrum. Given the radically changed economic conditions that now prevail and which are likely to set the financial and economic context for the next 3 to 4 years, these optimistic assumptions need to be ripped up. Mayor Johnson owes it to London taxpayers to ensure that all aspects of the finances of the games are on a realistic footing and are not the product of political fantasy. ([SMI](#) 47)

The successful delivery of the Games will demonstrate a high level of practical competency which will show that he is on the side of London’s taxpayers and is prepared to be honest and straightforward with them about what this huge project is all about. Londoners do not want extravagant promises that will inevitably disappoint. ([SMI](#))

### Table A8.13: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Impartial</td>
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<tr>
<td>H4: Discourse power</td>
<td>(Skip) (TU)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Skip) (RB)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Olympics is a brand of 4000 years old and has been carefully protected. It is a commercial business which requires sponsorship (PB).</td>
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<td>Perhaps unintentionally, the example would be Ken Livingston. His power of telling people what a great idea would be to bid so he tried to persuade and ensure the government did bid and they did. He has no money and all he had was personality, charisma, his connections and energy. We had Gordon Brown, Ken Livingston, Tony Blair and Sebastian Coe. All of them at the same page at the same time. (NM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>This is a bit the sort of “the Emperor’s New Clothes”, but of course, anybody likes the boy in the Andersen’s fairy tale who said: “but the King is in the all together, the all together is naked as the day he was born.” The CTRL and the Olympics are so politically nature, no commercial profit; people are not in all wonder in the sight of the Emperor, there are always some people who like that little boy point out the truth. The statement about marginalising the others is a bit too black and white. In modern society, especially in</td>
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**Summary:**
I learnt that the Olympic Games were but one version of a
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

though they may have different agendas.

HRQ 9: Networked Polity (after Chris Ansell, 2000)

Do you agree that discourses of MUTPs, SUR and MEs have been used as tools by key champions to convince others of the validity of their position(s) in the hope that this will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the same interests and empowering the project delivery network?

| London, people cannot ignore the power of the community networks and the media. (MP) | This does really come down to the heart of how decision has been made in a country like Britain. In the Olympic public enquiry we said we don’t believe this budget and it makes absolutely no difference. The inspector ignored the budget issue. In the beginning, the media and politicians formed a chain to market the Olympics. Their attitude is defensive from day one. To even suggest the Olympics might not be a good thing is considered as slightly baddy. The Olympics, conceived as a brand, manage to market itself effectively. The fundamental argument that the Olympics is needed for the regeneration is still not being challenged. All these assumptions about the synergy which has been put forward here, the mutual benefits of the way things linking together, the public-private partnership argument are still up there running. (JC) | range of so-called mega-events which coalitions of leading local businessmen and politicians in various cities have been promoting to profitably reconstruct decaying districts. These spectacular redevelopment projects are marketed on the theory that what is good for business is good for all. But unfortunately for the poor of these areas these entrepreneurs have not properly followed up the social outcomes of the projects to see if their theories are validated. (MS) |
| They have been promoting themselves. I don’t particularly think they marginalise those don’t agree with them. (HB) | x | 
| (Skip) (DM) | x | The theme we will develop in this book is that efforts by U.S. cities to attract events such as the Olympics are the product of a deliberate strategy for promoting local economic growth—the mega-event strategy. (MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001)

Mega-events are therefore one of the means by which places seek to become ‘sticky’ (Markusen, 1996) – that is attract and retain mobile capital and people – through place enhancement and regeneration and the promotion of selective place information (MS quoted from Hall, C.M., 2005).

Manchester is very often held up as the very epitome of entrepreneurialism and dynamism in urban governance, as one of the proving grounds of what has been labelled the ‘new urban politics’. Indeed, the city has been the site of frenzied public-private partnership formation in recent years, while, as the previous chapter demonstrated, both the character and the content of local-government strategies have in many ways been transformed since the 1980s. To be sure, this has been a complex process, and one in which there have been notable continuities as well as marked breaks with the past, but it is difficult to escape the conclusions that over the last two decades Manchester has witnessed a dramatic shift in the means and ends of urban politics. More than any single episode in this long
and others, commercial companies working out that they want to put King’s Cross and St Pancras into their portfolio and they want to maintain their networks, positions because they have good contacts in government, good contacts with banking and good contacts with everything else. They traded off the success story of King’s Cross. Generally speaking, I don’t think anybody loses after this process. [BW]

process of transformation, perhaps, the city’s bids for the Olympic Games stand out as crucial moments. The second Olympic bid in particular – the focus of this chapter – came to symbolise and to crystallise many of the new urban-political forms in an especially vivid fashion. And political change was not a mere side-effect of the Olympic bidding process in the city. On the contrary, the transformation of decision-making structures and governance systems was very much part and parcel of what key ‘players’ in the city would refer to as the Olympic process. (MS quoted²)

It was there as a possible station and Newham Council argued vehemently as a lot of the other people vote at least it needs to be a station there. That proposal was resisted very strongly by the Government and by Union Railways. They thought it would simply slow the journey times down. They thought their development profit is coming from the Ebbsfleet area and from King’s Cross; they didn’t see the lost that they thought they would make on having extended service time because of Stratford and the cost of building the station there will be offset by the development potential at Stratford. [PJ] (The decision of Stratford International was supported by John Prescott who lobbied by Newham Council. However, the development profits of the Stratford railway lands emerged as one of the critical elements for the CTRL concessional contract / commercial arrangements to attract private sector.)

Today and in 10 years time, the far most important issue

would be the catalyst project for the regeneration. Back in 1998 / 1999, government was only allowed to include half billion pounds worth of further regeneration from this railway whilst today with King’s Cross and Stratford, there would be over 10 billion pounds worth of regeneration effectively 20 times higher and could be even greater than by that time it’s finished. (RH) [Regeneration benefits become an important financial justification for the HSR project. The lack of concrete evidence to show the economic impacts and scepticism stemmed from the conflicts between market- and community-led developments posed questions to whether this mega-project discourse can be materialised.)

The 2016 Games are being marketed as an opportunity to bring the West and East closer together. (SMI 37) [The Games are often attached to certain themes and message which is part of the marketing strategy. Hence its discourse can change over time and depends on prevailing issues, such as cost efficiency and sustainability.)

The legacy promise for London 2012 is predicated on two assumptions. The first is that the building of significant infrastructure in some of East London’s most deprived areas will leave lasting social and economic regeneration over the next half century.

Mayor Livingstone, who was no sports fan, said that he only supported the games because of its potential as a catalyst for regeneration. This was a dangerous rationale for supporting the Olympic project. Regeneration is something which should have a rationale and a business case all of its own. Wrapping up the promises of housing and jobs on the back of the Olympic project is a recipe for failure and disappointed expectations. The second is that the games will provide a specific sporting legacy in terms
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

Table A8.14: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #10

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<th>APPROACH</th>
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<td>HRQ 10:</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>Kws(14)= Champions, Decision-makers</td>
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<td>For 2012, British Olympic Association is the major champion, the Mayor, the London Development Agency, GLA, TfL, and Sport England. People have different intentions for their support of it. For LDA, it was about regeneration. (RB)</td>
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<td>The Games is guaranteed by the nation not the government. Once you signed the Bid document, the commitment of the country has been dedicated. The condition for decision-makers is not anymore like other projects that have become technical. The Games provide chance to realise major projects in short time by dedicating political will. The world competition between host cities is another pressure. The Games also can provide innovation possibilities such as special traffic management concept which can be applied in the future. (PB)</td>
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<td>Lord Sebastian Coe, Ken Livingston, Tony Blair and Tessa Jowell who was the Secretary of the State and now the Olympic minister, and the five local boroughs, they are champions. The idea is to develop this piece of land. (NM)</td>
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of infrastructure and participation. (SMI 47) [Ken Livingstone said his intention to host the 2012 Olympics is to get more money from the central government to invest in London.]
The LCR championed the CTRL because of the benefit from the land. Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Blair, who was the firmament indicated by his predecessor, Mr. Major initially. The Northern and Scottish MPs and local and regional authorities were championing it because they thought it will go there. Most of the landowners and community groups up and down the line opposed the project because they suffered from the construction blight. The Treasury opposed the original proposal until it added in the regeneration benefits.

The primary champions for the King’s Cross Central are the LCR and the Camden Council who enjoy the reputation and prestige brought by the St. Pancras station.

Mr. Ken Livingston and the five London boroughs support the Olympics. I image the Ministers of sports although they didn’t expect to get it but they did get it. For the available land and regeneration claim, they could not put the Olympic site at King’s Cross but Stratford which is still within London area. (MP)

Politicians want to be associated with successful sports for their reputation and identification. They are eyeing for ‘feel good’ factor. For a nation who supports sports because they see they have muscles of economic power, military power or sporting power which is to justify their system. The pressure of competing with other cities for the World City status is also one of the reasons. The IOC markets the Olympic strategy, but it is just a big publicity blur. It is like The Emperor’s New Clothes. (JC)

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<td>LCR</td>
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<td>CTRL</td>
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<td>Mayor</td>
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so-called mega-events which coalitions of leading local businessmen and politicians in various cities have been promoting to profitably reconstruct decaying districts. ... What they were looking for was a subsidy from the city within which they wanted to build their projects, so they approached city administrations, with a business plan. Low land prices and changes in the industrial economy of those cities meant that those areas were in economic decline and needed investments. (MS)

Hosting a premier event such as the Olympics or a world’s fair is central to this strategy because city leaders are seeking not just short-term tourist revenues but to change their city’s image and perhaps even the city’s physical structure. (MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001)

Olympic Turnaround tells for the first time how the future of one of the world’s iconic institutions was secured. It is the story of a fine balancing as an amateur organization struggled with and eventually embraced the business world. But it did so on its own terms maintaining its identity, not compromising its core values and in the process establishing many of the ground rules of today’s sports marketing industry. (MS quoted Payne, 2006)

A lot of the developments, particularly the housing developments which are now taking place around the Olympic site, are developments which are facilitated by the local authority. The local authority will give them planning permission very readily because local authorities, particularly the London boroughs in the area which surrounds the area of Olympic park, now no longer have access to significant sums of money to initiate their own public developments. (MS)

London mayor Ken Livingstone has said he “ensnared” ministers over the bid to host the 2012 Olympics in an effort to get money for East End redevelopment. (MS)
CTRL and King’s Cross Central, they do not have strong opposition. Certain local communities were oppositional, fairly small community groups, small but competent and quite effective about what communities were opposed to. They were concerned about the impacts and the way would be built. I don’t think they were against the railway itself or the regeneration. They do not want to see high-rise and too much commercial development on their doorstep.

I think mega transport projects start with the advantage of being desirable usually in the first place as long as they are public transport ones. The special things like trains and trams, they have some romance about them. Show me a railway project that people regret after it has been built.

(BW)

In 1984, the Thatcher Government started instructing nationalising industry to make up their expense by selling their assets. British Rail in particular was instructed as former Tory Prime Minister said in the House of Lords to sale the family sofa and to make their books balance. The British Rail Property Board was looking all the lands that they can probably sale anywhere. There was a useless land in King’s Cross. It decided to have a development competition to decide who should develop for it with the view to maximise the profit. (PJ) (This encouraged railway lands development and as the inception of integration between railway and property development.)

Ove Arup who had been part of the consortium that might have taken the private sector risk pulled out themselves came up with an alternative line, still came to King’s Cross but via Stratford. They kept lobbying the Government to stop there instead of what was called the Southerly Approach which caused a big problem through King’s Cross using the Snow Hill Tunnel which needs to go through the South London and that will cause massive demolitions in lots of contingency, mostly Tory. There was opposition from bits of all political parties even though the majority of MPs … the principle were concerned about the local impacts. (PJ) (Local political impacts?)

Ken Livingstone pushed for London to have Olympic Bid and the only place that the Olympic stadium could really be developed in terms of big development space and regeneration potential is Stratford. Certainly Stratford became very attractive to the Olympics because they can tag the regeneration of the area onto that Bid and makes it on the Bid because the International Olympic Committee require about such things. (PJ)

It appears to be unique piece of government backing which without John Prescott’s support for the project was unlikely to be forthcoming. Probably the most important thing, however, was the ability of the new railway to support regeneration. Regeneration of the King’s Cross land behind me, regeneration of the land out at Stratford
Newham are desperately keen for the Games. They will do whatever it takes and they will take whatever it takes. (HS)

The important thing is - I mean what’s really driven this thing - is you have this situation in which 3 political parties, Conservative, Liberal Democrats and Labour - have committed to the Games. They committed to the Games during the bid phase. Once you’ve got that degree of political commitment and it is on video being played to the IOC, you stand a reasonable chance of everyone else coming to the party. (RH) (Reinforcing network)

A recently completed study, undertaken by Steer Davies Gleave on behalf of Birmingham City Council and Greengauge 21, shows that High Speed Rail has the potential to deliver significant benefits to the national economy, and to contribute to the regeneration of Birmingham and the West Midlands. (SMI 16)

“The justification for bidding should have been based on evidence placed in the public domain. Instead key evidence was suppressed or ignored.”

The revelations raise the question of why ministers backed a bid citing reasons dismissed by their own experts. Tessa Jowell, the Olympics Minister who sponsored Game Plan, admitted this month that a bid would probably not have been pursued if a recession had been foreseen. (SMI 44)

Both the Tories and Liberal Democrats have voiced support for a high-speed line, in part to avoid expansion of Heathrow Airport by offering an alternative to domestic air travel. In January, the government got behind the idea too. (SMI 48)
APPENDIX 9:
Pre-Hypothesis Investigation Data
Analysis Correlation Coefficient R
Report
Each significant correlation is shown here with its correlation coefficient R. Positive values are shown first; order is from strongest to weakest.

(NP) Indicates a non-parametric Spearman ranked correlation test was used.

1 Theme - Financing projects/development

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<th>Correlation Coefficient R</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.840 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.830 Theme - Use of public money (NP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.758 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.719 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.707 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.697 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.693 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.686 Theme - Real estate development (NP)</td>
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2 Theme - Use of public money

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3 Theme - Public sector power

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Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

12) 0.620 Theme - Public sector power (NP) 19) 0.452 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP)
13) 0.620 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 20) 0.432 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
14) 0.613 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 21) 0.428 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
15) 0.612 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 22) 0.421 theme - Public sector power (NP)
16) 0.573 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 23) 0.416 Implementing the project (NP)
17) 0.572 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 24) 0.353 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
18) 0.545 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 25) 0.353 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP)
19) 0.534 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 26) 0.338 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
20) 0.531 Theme - Political will (NP) 27) 0.328 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
21) 0.521 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 28) 0.323 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP)
22) 0.491 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 29) 0.322 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
23) 0.480 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 30) 0.322 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
24) 0.477 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 31) 0.313 Theme - Political will (NP)
25) 0.409 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 32) 0.284 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP)
26) 0.407 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 33) 0.272 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
27) 0.398 Theme - Leadership (NP)
28) 0.384 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 5 Theme - Tensions between values
29) 0.368 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 1) 0.845 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
30) 0.338 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 2) 0.802 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
31) 0.296 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 3) 0.789 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
32) 0.282 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 4) 0.784 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
33) 0.278 Implementing the project (NP) 5) 0.750 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
34) 0.268 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 6) 0.740 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
5 Theme - Technical solutions to problems
1) 0.776 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 7) 0.734 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
2) 0.733 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 8) 0.722 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
3) 0.723 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 9) 0.681 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
4) 0.701 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 10) 0.676 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
5) 0.691 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 11) 0.665 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
6) 0.660 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 12) 0.628 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
7) 0.658 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 13) 0.616 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
8) 0.637 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement(NP) 14) 0.601 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
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17) 0.484 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 23) 0.425 Theme - Leadership (NP)
18) 0.480 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 24) 0.419 Theme - Political will (NP)
25) 0.403 theme - Public sector power (NP)
26) 0.364 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

5 Theme - Private sector power

1) 0.943 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
2) 0.626 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
3) 0.619 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
4) 0.614 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
5) 0.608 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
6) 0.607 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
7) 0.605 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
8) 0.599 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
9) 0.576 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
10) 0.573 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
11) 0.569 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
12) 0.554 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
13) 0.544 Theme - Leadership (NP)
14) 0.542 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
15) 0.531 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
16) 0.531 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
17) 0.520 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
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20) 0.500 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
21) 0.497 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
22) 0.497 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
23) 0.486 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
24) 0.478 Implementing the project (NP)
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26) 0.472 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
27) 0.452 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
28) 0.443 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
29) 0.442 Theme - Political will (NP)
30) 0.429 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
31) 0.428 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
32) 0.422 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
33) 0.384 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
34) 0.383 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
35) 0.366 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
36) 0.362 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
37) 0.347 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
38) 0.304 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)

5 Theme - Political intervention

1) 0.920 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
2) 0.759 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
3) 0.728 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
4) 0.724 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
5) 0.696 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
6) 0.642 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
7) 0.639 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
8) 0.633 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
9) 0.629 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
10) 0.624 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
11) 0.618 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
12) 0.607 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
13) 0.605 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
14) 0.583 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
15) 0.578 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
16) 0.568 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
17) 0.554 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
18) 0.536 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
19) 0.527 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
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21) 0.514 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
22) 0.497 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
23) 0.468 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
24) 0.462 Theme - Real estate developments (NP)
25) 0.397 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
26) 0.397 Theme - Leadership (NP)
27) 0.363 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP)
28) 0.349 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
29) 0.306 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
30) 0.269 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
31) 0.265 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
32) 0.256 Implementing the project (NP)
33) 0.235 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP)

5 Situation - Public outcry about project

1) 0.834 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
2) 0.805 Theme - Political intervention into the project (NP)
3) 0.782 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
4) 0.726 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
5) 0.718 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
6) 0.645 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

7) 0.642 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
8) 0.633 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
9) 0.625 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
10) 0.604 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
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25) 0.448 Theme - Leadership (NP)
26) 0.432 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP)
27) 0.332 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
28) 0.324 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
29) 0.308 Implementing the project (NP)
30) 0.299 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
31) 0.290 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
32) 0.285 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
33) 0.275 Theme - Co-operation (NP)

6) Situation - Performance of organisations responsible for the project

1) 0.687 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
2) 0.654 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
3) 0.615 Situation - Implementing developments (NP)
4) 0.574 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
5) 0.537 Implementing the project (NP)
6) 0.533 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
7) 0.529 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
8) 0.527 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
9) 0.516 theme - Public sector power (NP)
10) 0.510 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
11) 0.488 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
12) 0.488 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
13) 0.477 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
14) 0.454 Theme - Real estate development (NP)

15) 0.442 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
16) 0.427 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP)
17) 0.414 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
18) 0.405 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
19) 0.389 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
20) 0.377 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
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22) 0.367 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
23) 0.364 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
24) 0.358 Theme - Leadership (NP)
25) 0.350 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
26) 0.335 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
27) 0.331 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
28) 0.326 Theme - Political will (NP)
29) 0.323 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
30) 0.314 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
31) 0.285 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
32) 0.279 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)

7) Theme - Globalisation forces

1) 0.860 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
2) 0.844 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
3) 0.817 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
4) 0.804 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
5) 0.773 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
6) 0.769 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
7) 0.747 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
8) 0.716 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
9) 0.710 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
10) 0.695 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
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12) 0.685 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
13) 0.683 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
14) 0.674 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
15) 0.667 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
16) 0.659 Theme - Political intervention - Political intervention 1 (NP)
17) 0.571 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
18) 0.524 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
19) 0.512 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP)
20) 0.475 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP)
21) 0.466 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP)
22) 0.433 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
23) 0.452 Theme - Political will (NP)
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

24) 0.446 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
25) 0.414 theme - Public sector power (NP)
26) 0.370 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
27) 0.369 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
28) 0.364 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
29) 0.348 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
30) 0.319 Theme - Leadership (NP)
31) 0.317 Implementing the project (NP)

7 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement

1) 0.743 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
2) 0.726 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
3) 0.691 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
4) 0.674 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
5) 0.659 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
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7) 0.651 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
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14) 0.542 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
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23) 0.375 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
24) 0.375 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
25) 0.344 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
26) 0.316 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP)
27) 0.302 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
28) 0.287 Situation - Implementing developments (NP)
29) 0.281 Theme - Leadership (NP)
30) 0.277 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
31) 0.246 Theme - Political will (NP)

8 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making

1) 0.673 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
2) 0.645 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
3) 0.569 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
4) 0.565 Implementing the project (NP)
5) 0.551 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
6) 0.522 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
7) 0.514 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
8) 0.501 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
9) 0.499 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP)
10) 0.495 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
11) 0.489 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
12) 0.483 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
13) 0.463 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
14) 0.461 Situation - Implementing developments (NP)
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16) 0.380 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
17) 0.365 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
18) 0.361 Theme - Political will (NP)
19) 0.351 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
20) 0.340 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
21) 0.339 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
22) 0.336 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
23) 0.331 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
24) 0.327 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
25) 0.310 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
26) 0.308 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
27) 0.304 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
28) 0.273 Theme - Leadership (NP)
29) 0.261 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
30) 0.230 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)

8 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making

1) 0.779 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
2) 0.663 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
3) 0.603 Implementing the project (NP)
4) 0.601 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
5) 0.597 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
6) 0.575 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
7) 0.562 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
8) 0.558 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
9) 0.529 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
10) 0.528 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

1) 0.523 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
2) 0.513 theme - Public sector power (NP)
3) 0.507 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
4) 0.505 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
5) 0.503 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
6) 0.492 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
7) 0.480 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
8) 0.471 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
9) 0.465 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
10) 0.454 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
11) 0.447 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
12) 0.430 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
13) 0.427 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
14) 0.380 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
15) 0.344 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
16) 0.317 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
17) 0.290 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
18) 0.285 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
19) 0.280 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
20) 0.217 Theme - Political will (NP)

8 Theme - Real estate development

1) 0.701 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
2) 0.620 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
3) 0.619 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
4) 0.606 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
5) 0.591 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
6) 0.570 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP)
7) 0.561 theme - Public sector power (NP)
8) 0.505 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
9) 0.500 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
10) 0.498 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
11) 0.488 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
12) 0.482 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
13) 0.471 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
14) 0.469 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
15) 0.465 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
16) 0.424 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
17) 0.400 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
18) 0.386 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
19) 0.375 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
20) 0.370 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
21) 0.355 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
22) 0.340 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
23) 0.332 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
24) 0.304 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
25) 0.290 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP)
26) 0.285 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP)
27) 0.279 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
28) 0.262 Theme - Political will (NP)

8 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding

1) 0.718 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

2) 0.697 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
3) 0.683 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
4) 0.622 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
5) 0.590 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
6) 0.578 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
7) 0.569 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
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9) 0.529 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
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17) 0.452 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
18) 0.450 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
19) 0.449 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
20) 0.447 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
21) 0.415 Theme - Performance of organisations (NP)
22) 0.404 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
23) 0.399 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
24) 0.376 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
25) 0.350 Theme - Leadership (NP)
26) 0.350 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
27) 0.323 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
28) 0.306 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)

9 Situation - Changing partners

1) 0.806 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
2) 0.766 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
3) 0.733 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
4) 0.700 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
5) 0.678 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
6) 0.652 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
7) 0.649 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
8) 0.624 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
9) 0.614 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
10) 0.613 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
11) 0.546 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
12) 0.525 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
13) 0.508 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
14) 0.507 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
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16) 0.492 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
17) 0.490 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
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26) 0.376 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
27) 0.350 Theme - Leadership (NP)
28) 0.350 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
29) 0.323 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)

10 Theme - Institutional arrangements

1) 0.607 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
2) 0.585 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
3) 0.556 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
4) 0.554 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
5) 0.521 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
6) 0.516 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
7) 0.470 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
8) 0.465 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
9) 0.456 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
10) 0.429 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
11) 0.420 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
12) 0.416 Implementing the project (NP)
13) 0.414 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
14) 0.405 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
15) 0.396 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
16) 0.382 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
17) 0.377 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
18) 0.371 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
19) 0.366 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
20) 0.356 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
21) 0.353 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
22) 0.352 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
23) 0.349 Theme - Leadership (NP)
24) 0.338 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
25) 0.334 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
26) 0.324 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

11 Situation - Implementing the project

1) 0.606 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
2) 0.590 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
3) 0.589 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
4) 0.554 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
5) 0.548 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
6) 0.539 Situation - Implementing developments (NP)
7) 0.534 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
8) 0.525 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
9) 0.519 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
10) 0.518 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
11) 0.515 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
12) 0.464 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
13) 0.415 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
14) 0.414 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
15) 0.413 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
16) 0.410 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
17) 0.386 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
18) 0.378 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
19) 0.362 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
20) 0.351 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
21) 0.350 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
22) 0.348 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
23) 0.348 Theme - Leadership (NP)
24) 0.344 Theme - Policies on public money (NP)
25) 0.343 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
26) 0.342 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
27) 0.341 Theme - Political will (NP)

11 Theme - Bureaucracy

1) 0.827 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
2) 0.812 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
3) 0.780 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
4) 0.716 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
5) 0.708 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
6) 0.704 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
7) 0.692 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
8) 0.681 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
9) 0.671 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
10) 0.637 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
11) 0.628 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
12) 0.616 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
13) 0.606 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
14) 0.551 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
15) 0.541 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
16) 0.517 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
17) 0.509 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
18) 0.483 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
19) 0.439 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
20) 0.432 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
21) 0.412 Theme - Leadership (NP)
22) 0.378 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
23) 0.364 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
24) 0.363 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
25) 0.298 Theme - Political will (NP)
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<th>26</th>
<th>-0.328 Situation - Implementing developments (NP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Situation - Major change in project scope</td>
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<td>1) 0.806 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)</td>
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<td>25) 0.233 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)</td>
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1) 0.582 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
2) 0.581 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
3) 0.562 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
4) 0.559 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
5) 0.536 Situation - Forming partnerships - Forming partnerships 1 (NP)
6) 0.517 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
7) 0.500 theme - Public sector power (NP)
8) 0.448 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
9) 0.443 Theme - Leadership (NP)
10) 0.422 Implementing the project (NP)
11) 0.398 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
12) 0.373 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
13) 0.344 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
14) 0.338 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
15) 0.317 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
16) 0.302 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
17) 0.299 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP)
18) 0.281 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
19) 0.279 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
20) 0.250 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
21) 0.243 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
22) 0.239 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
23) 0.223 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
24) -0.284 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP)

13 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organisational issues

1) 0.830 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
2) 0.637 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
3) 0.585 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
4) 0.564 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
5) 0.557 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
6) 0.535 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
7) 0.517 theme - Public sector power (NP)
8) 0.502 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
9) 0.458 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
10) 0.450 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
11) 0.446 Implementing the project (NP)
12) 0.422 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
13) 0.409 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
14) 0.409 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
15) 0.399 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
16) 0.393 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)

18) 0.363 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
19) 0.355 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
20) 0.354 Theme - Leadership (NP)
21) 0.334 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
22) 0.320 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
23) 0.315 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
24) 0.313 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)

13 Theme - Use of private sector money

1) 0.871 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
2) 0.748 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
3) 0.727 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
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5) 0.656 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
6) 0.653 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
7) 0.639 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
8) 0.577 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
9) 0.567 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
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12) 0.486 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
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15) 0.436 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
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18) 0.404 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
19) 0.339 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
20) 0.337 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
21) 0.315 theme - Public sector power (NP)
22) 0.299 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
23) 0.299 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
24) 0.285 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)

14 Theme - Public participation or consultation

1) 0.837 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
2) 0.662 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP)
3) 0.656 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
4) 0.647 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
5) 0.606 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
6) 0.606 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events

7) 0.573 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
8) 0.552 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
9) 0.550 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
10) 0.536 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
11) 0.517 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
12) 0.511 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
13) 0.498 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
14) 0.484 theme - Public sector power (NP)
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16) 0.466 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
17) 0.459 Theme - Leadership (NP)
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19) 0.337 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
20) 0.320 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
21) 0.306 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
22) 0.287 Theme - Political will (NP)

14 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact
1) 0.864 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
2) 0.784 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
3) 0.750 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
4) 0.749 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
5) 0.689 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
6) 0.650 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
7) 0.636 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
8) 0.633 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP)
9) 0.596 Theme - Use of public money (NP)

14 Theme - Leadership
1) 0.592 Theme - Political will (NP)
2) 0.569 theme - Public sector power (NP)
3) 0.533 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
4) 0.519 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
5) 0.465 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
6) 0.464 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
7) 0.434 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
8) 0.398 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
9) 0.396 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
10) 0.388 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP)
11) 0.380 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
12) 0.379 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
13) 0.376 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
14) 0.362 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
15) 0.351 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP)
16) 0.345 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
17) 0.345 Implementing the project (NP)
18) 0.341 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
19) 0.311 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
20) 0.295 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
21) 0.285 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
22) 0.284 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
23) 0.284 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
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| 17 | 0.317 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) | 9 | 0.490 Theme - Co-operation (NP) |
| 18 | 0.314 Theme - Path dependency (NP) | 10 | 0.461 Theme - Public sector power (NP) |
| 19 | 0.292 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) | 11 | 0.460 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) |
| 20 | 0.277 Theme - Real estate development (NP) | 12 | 0.425 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) |
| 21 | 0.272 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) | 13 | 0.406 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) |
| 22 | 0.253 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) | 14 | 0.395 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) |
| 23 | 0.232 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) | 15 | 0.390 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) |

14 Theme - Co-operation

1) 0.831 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP)
2) 0.695 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
3) 0.533 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
4) 0.533 Theme - Leadership (NP)
5) 0.521 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
6) 0.509 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
7) 0.505 Implementing the project (NP)
8) 0.498 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
9) 0.473 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
10) 0.466 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
11) 0.449 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
12) 0.446 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
13) 0.408 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
14) 0.390 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
15) 0.377 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
16) 0.360 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
17) 0.358 Theme - Political will (NP)
18) 0.357 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
19) 0.343 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
20) 0.330 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
21) 0.329 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
22) 0.318 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
23) 0.284 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP)

15 Situation - Forming partnerships

1) 0.840 Theme - Co-operation (NP)
2) 0.719 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP)
3) 0.601 Implementing the project (NP)
4) 0.564 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP)
5) 0.544 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP)
6) 0.531 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP)
7) 0.523 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP)
8) 0.500 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP)
9) 0.499 Theme - Private sector power (NP)
10) 0.498 Theme - Bargaining power (NP)
11) 0.457 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
12) 0.455 Theme - Leadership (NP)
13) 0.455 Situation - Changing partners (NP)
14) 0.442 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP)
15) 0.379 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
16) 0.375 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
17) 0.369 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
18) 0.367 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP)
19) 0.361 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
20) 0.336 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
21) 0.277 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)

16 Theme - Scale of project impact

1) 0.625 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)
2) 0.605 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP)
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3) 0.590 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
4) 0.577 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP)
5) 0.563 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
6) 0.525 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
7) 0.518 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
8) 0.517 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
9) 0.493 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
10) 0.464 Theme - Political intervention into the project (NP)
11) 0.456 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
12) 0.448 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP)
13) 0.424 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
14) 0.394 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP)
15) 0.378 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
16) 0.377 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
17) 0.314 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
18) 0.276 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
19) 0.261 Theme - Political will (NP)
20) 0.254 Theme - Private sector power (NP)

16 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation

1) 0.540 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP)
2) 0.534 Theme - Political intervention (NP)
3) 0.515 Theme - Political will (NP)
4) 0.506 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)
5) 0.489 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP)
6) 0.444 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP)
7) 0.436 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP)
8) 0.391 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP)
9) 0.390 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP)
10) 0.354 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP)
11) 0.351 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP)
12) 0.349 Theme - Use of public money (NP)
13) 0.327 Theme - Tensions between values (NP)
14) 0.309 Theme - Public sector power (NP)
15) 0.293 Theme - Path dependency (NP)
16) 0.293 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP)
17) 0.288 Theme - Real estate development (NP)
18) 0.278 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP)

17 Theme - Visions and ideas

1) 0.563 Theme - Scale of project impact - Scale of project impact 1 (NP)
2) 0.498 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP)