Linked Hybrid in Beijing

Placing an American Building and its Architectural Concept in its Chinese Context

BY

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Tat Lam
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ABSTRACT

This thesis takes the American architect Steven Holl’s design in Beijing, Linked Hybrid, as a case study to investigate the social, political and cultural context of China’s contemporary architecture. The research focuses on the development, in an urban zone in the Dongzhimenwai area of Beijing, of a socialist paper mill community from the late 1980s into the Beijing Linked Hybrid community in 2010. The urban development process was analysed through six emic concepts, which were discovered in the course of ethnographic fieldwork research. These concepts are *dayuan* (big community or 大院), *guanxi* (personal connection or 关系), *mianzi* (face or 面子), *shi* (trend or 势), *mofan* (exemplary model or 模范) and *shanzhai* (fake product or 山寨).

Fieldwork trips were undertaken between 2007 and 2010 to understand how the local community members of the paper mill and Linked Hybrid perceived the changes in their living environment. Key community members and architectural practitioners were traced and interviewed during the period of research. Written documentation from the paper mill’s propaganda department archives and the personal archives of an ex-worker about the area before the construction of Linked Hybrid, provided the historical context for the case study.

The Linked Hybrid occupants eventually built a wall to enclose their new residential community, which was specifically designed to be an open community to solve China’s problematic urbanism. Thus, the architect’s architectural ideals became ineffective when his architecture was situated in the Chinese context that is described in this thesis.
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DECLARATION OF ANONYMITY

In order to maintain the anonymity of some of the informants in this research, the pseudonyms Wang Ji, Zhang Lian, Qiu Lai, and Shao Xiao are used in this thesis.
Figure 2: The transformation of Beijing First Paper Mill to Linked Hybrid. (Drawing the author).

Figure 3: Spatial organisation of Beijing First Paper Mill and MOMA communities. (Drawing the author).
INTRODUCTION

FROM SHAO XIAO TO WANG ZHENFEI

Beijing First Paper Mill was, and remains, a typical socialist work unit in Beijing (Figure 4). Located immediately outside the historical city wall, it was one of the industrial factories that followed Mao Zedong’s policy of industrialising Beijing. This research closely examines Beijing Linked Hybrid (Figure 5), the urban redevelopment of the industrial site in Beijing’s city centre that was occupied by Beijing First Paper Mill before it moved to another site further away in Shunyi Development Zone (Figure 6). The industrial zone of the factory complex was purchased by a private developer for the construction of Linked Hybrid and other housing developments, and the factory workers’ residences were left in place behind the new developments (Figure 7). As a result, two communities composed of two totally different social groups found themselves living next to each other, separated only by a single brick wall that had originally separated the industrial zone from the residential zone of the factory. These two social groups share very different understandings of urbanism and of society due to their different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, as well as due to the different experiences and ways of thinking of their respective generations.

I consider Linked Hybrid to be an exceptional case in China because the American architect, Steven Holl, attempted to introduce significantly different ideas from those that Chinese developers and residents were used to. In particular, Holl’s vision was to bring a gateless, open community scheme to this urban industrial land redevelopment project. In the end, the residents and the developers enclosed the community with walls
Figure 4: Beijing First Paper Mill in the early 1990s. The photo shows a railway separating the factory into two manufacturing zones. The right hand side of the photo is the northern zone of the paper mill, which was to be developed into the Linked Hybrid community. (Photo provided by Zhang Lian).

Figure 5: Beijing Linked Hybrid under construction. (Photo the author, 14 December, 2008).
Figure 6: Beijing First Paper Mill Shunyi Development Zone campus. (Photo the author, 17 December, 2008).

Figure 7: Linked Hybrid behind the paper mill workers’ community. (Photo the author, 13 December, 2008).
and gates. In the process, Linked Hybrid brought cross-cultural, social, and political conflicts to the surface, providing a case study to evaluate practices of space development in contemporary China, as well as to understand the culture of China from an architectural perspective. Holl wrote:

Rather than a preoccupation with solid, independent object-like forms, it is the experiential phenomena of spatial sequences with, around, and between which emotions are triggered. There is a scale of distances walked and seen and passages available in the area around rue du Bac in Paris that offers a gentle urban porosity of movement. The pedestrian can change direction in seconds; the pedestrian is not blocked by large urban constructions without entry or exit. This freedom of pedestrian movement, championed by Jane Jacobs as the ideal matrix, is based on the case of Greenwich Village in Manhattan and can be envisioned in different ways for the twenty-first century. For larger urban projects made up of several buildings, porosity becomes essential for the vitality of street life. Especially in the city of Beijing where the urban grid layout (inherited from the hutong blocks) tends toward ‘superblock’ dimensions, urban porosity is crucial (Holl, 2010, 22).

Holl thus applied the Greenwich model to his critique of Chinese contemporary urbanism. Thus, Linked Hybrid was designed as an open community with much emphasis on the concept of ‘linkage’, by which concept Holl meant to connect his design

1. Greenwich Village in New York is a large-scale residential community in lower Manhattan. It is a well-known artists’ area from the late 19th to the early 20th century. The community is famous for its particular lifestyle.
to the surrounding neighbourhood by allowing people to walk through the community.\(^2\)

His intention for the project was highly praised by the editors of international architectural journals as a possible alternative solution to the problematic layout of Beijing (e.g. Abrahams, 2007; Capezzuto, 2004, Ho. C. L. 2007; Pearson, 2008; Weeb, 2004). However, these positive reviews isolated the new architecture from its context.

The purpose of this research therefore is to describe the Chinese social and cultural contexts in which the project was undertaken, and the very different understandings of urbanism and society of the two communities who found themselves face-to-face when it was built, with resulting cross-cultural, social, and political conflicts.

Also and very importantly, the design, building and inhabitation of Linked Hybrid are having an effect on architectural design in China today because it is being constantly appropriated as an architectural model to be followed. This typical process of appropriation of Linked Hybrid as a foreign model also forms part of the Chinese context and of Chinese culture, and it too therefore is an important part of this research.

The history of Beijing First Paper Mill can be traced back to 1944, but its heyday was during the Cultural Revolution, due to the huge demand for paper for Mao’s *Little Red Book*.\(^3\) One of Beijing First Paper Mill’s workers, Shao Xiao, who entered the factory in the 1970s and left in the 1990s, represents a specific social group and a

\(^2\) Holl (2010, 137) wrote that, “the ground level offers a number of open passages for residents and visitors to walk through. These passages include ‘micro-urbanisms’ of small-scale shops which also activate the urban space surrounding the large central reflecting pond.”

\(^3\) Mao’s *Little Red Book* was firstly published in 1964 by Liberation Army Post in China. It documented 427 quotes from Mao Zedong. The classic edition of the book was with red plastic covers, so during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese called it *hongbaoshu* (*Red Treasure Book*), and in English *Little Red Book*. 
generation of citizens in contemporary China. Shao Xiao, now in her 60s, described her memories of how she entered the factory:

I was nervous for the whole morning on the day of December 22, 1971. At that time, I was 14. At around 10 a.m., the teacher in my class called out my name. I was asked to wait in the school office. Together with me, there were a few classmates sitting quietly. My teacher told me that someone from a paper mill was recruiting workers. The workers briefly introduced the situation to us, but I really cannot remember any of their talk. We were asked to jump onto a Liberation truck. It all happened so suddenly; I even left all my belongings in my classroom.

It was a cold winter. The truck was driven on a rough road towards the factory. At that time, the Second Ring Road was not yet built. So the truck had to drive through the Moon Temple (Yuetan), Fuchengmen Gate to reach the Dongzhimen Gate. The children were trembling in the cold air. We tried to sit together to keep ourselves warm. I remember that the driver was a woman; the person who gave us the introduction was sitting in the truck. This gentleman saw we were trembling, so he told us that we could use the military coats in the truck. I eventually figured out that these coats were from the factory for the paper-manufacturing process. They were dirty, but we all put them on in the cold air. Even though we had the coats on, my body felt frozen. I cannot remember how I jumped out from the truck at the end. After I started working, I realised that the temperature in the workshops was so high that workers only wore a shirt. Everyone had one of those coats to put on when they left the building. Some old workers even dyed the coat black so that they could wear them every day.

The worker led us around the factory to explain the manufacturing process to us. It was the first time that I saw the gigantic machines and spacious workshops in person, prior to that I had only seen them in my textbook. I tried to remember every detail because I knew my family would ask about
them. After someone told us about the recruitment process, we were sent back to school. It was 2 p.m. in the afternoon.

After I went home, my mother had already heard the news from my classmates. She also discussed them with our neighbours. As I expected, she had many questions. She asked how far the factory was, how big the factory was, if people still used their feet to make paper, etc. That day, my mother treated me extremely well. To my recollection, it was not usual at all.

This was a big event for my family. Two of my older sisters were assigned to northeast China. I could stay in the city with my family, and I could work in a big factory. My mother prepared many pancakes for me, with egg stuffing. I also tried to describe every detail of the factory: the factory was big, there were many workers, the workers wore blue uniforms, female workers had white hats, and everyone wore Liberation shoes. The thing that gave my mother the most pride was that the paper was manufactured by machine, not with people’s feet. Many neighbours came to my home, and my mother encouraged me to tell them about my job again and again.

At that time, working was not a choice for us. Except for government officials’ children, nobody could control their future. But one thing was for sure, government officials’ children could be assigned as soldiers. I envied them a lot at that time.

Before I worked in the factory, I studied at a secondary school run by my father’s railway danwei [work unit]. It was the time of the Cultural Revolution. My economic and spiritual well-being was poor. The Cultural Revolution’s ideology was to persecute intellectuals and totally deny the value of knowledge. The movement was unprecedented. Therefore, my secondary-school life was all about organising political events and criticising others. Humiliating words aimed at relatives, teachers, or even towards myself. Real learning was insufficient. Just take English classes
for example; we repeated “Long Life Chairman Mao, Long Long Life to Him” and “our party is a great party”. After decades, I still can remember them all. I really cannot remember what we learnt in other subjects. . . .

Why did I join the factory? No teenager had any idea about their future at that time—at least I was like that. My only desire at that time was not to leave the city. Working for government units was not an option for me because such jobs did not match my social class. I was only an ordinary person living in the dormitory housing in a railway danwei. Listening to the Party, obeying the assignment—these actually were equal to allowing oneself to be exploited [ren ren zai ge]. Continuing to study was not an option either because the teacher would only choose a few who could go to high school. Moreover, there was an organisation, called the ‘worker-propaganda team’ [gongxuan dui]. This organisation inspected everyone’s background in schools and in danwei for high-school education opportunities. The inspection criteria went by family background, political appropriateness, ideological deliberateness, and high scores in school. In the end, there were only a few students in a 40-student class allowed to continue their studies.

However, in such a politicised atmosphere, continuing to study was not an enviable situation. The development of society was halted by the Cultural Revolution for a long period, so there were many classes of graduates waiting for jobs; plus many people who had been assigned to work away from the city would have liked to have come back. This meant that working for money was more important than anything in such a competitive period. The education of ‘the working class leading society’ influenced me a lot at that time. So being a worker was something to be really proud of. . . .

Moreover, Beijing First Paper Mill was one of the biggest state-owned enterprises. Even though those secret factories, such as 798 or 251, were more competitive, it was a lot better than being assigned to work in the
tertiary cities. Two of my sisters were sent to Helongjiang Province; the painfulness of separation at that time gave my family a sense of horror. My job was also a lot better than the rest of my classmates’ jobs, who were assigned to work in the Bureau of Commerce. Their titles seemed attractive, but actually their jobs were to sell food and recycle rubbish. At that time, all these businesses in the planned economy were controlled by the Bureau of Commerce. After I entered the factory, I realised it was also the headquarters of Beijing Paper Mills. Its site was not small: there were many shops, small restaurants, workers’ hostels, a day care, and other basic facilities. So it was like a small city. This job also differed from my classmates’ assignments to Beijing Second Paper Mill or Beijing Third Paper Mill. Those factories were squeezed into small alleys. All these facts made me really proud of my job at that time (Shao Xiao, personal Communication, 15 December, 2010).

Shao Xiao left the factory in the early 1990s due to her health problem. But she still kept close relationships with her past co-workers. Moreover and importantly for my research, she is a member of my family. She therefore introduced me to all her past co-workers, including Wang Ji, Qiu Lai, and Zhang Lian, who became major informants in my research. Except Zhang Lian, all of them left the factory in the late 1990s, when it was developed for high-class residential housing. It is still, however, very easy for Shao Xiao to get in touch with her friends, because all of them are still living in the paper mill workers’ community.

There are two major changes to the workers’ community. The first one is that only a few workers in the workers’ community are still working for the paper mill enterprise. The second is that the area south of the workers’ community, which used to be the paper mill factory, became a private residential community, with connecting bridges
located at high level (Figure 8 and Figure 9, also see Figure 1 for location of Linked Hybrid). The workers found the appearance of this architecture *qiguai* (strange). During my fieldtrip in the summer of 2009 to the workers’ community, a few residents expressed their feelings about Linked Hybrid. One of them even told me they found the form of the architecture brought bad luck to them according to the Chinese *fengshui* theory. In the new Linked Hybrid community, there is a totally different social group and generation of citizens. Wang Zhenfei from this new community told me about himself and the story of entering this community:

I was originally from Tianjing. I was born in 1977. I am a typical Tianjing person, who tends to stay in the city. All Tianjing people are relatively honest and timid. So, I stayed in the city for my undergraduate degree at Tianjing University. After school, I continued to work in the city, at Huanhui [Architectural Design Institute]. Actually, I started working there since I was a student. After working for six years, I left the country in 2005 and went to Holland. I studied there for two years, and worked at UN Studio for one year.

When I returned to China, I was deciding whether to go to Shanghai or to my home town of Tianjing. If I went to Tianjing, I would have worked in the Huahui head office. However, after some hesitation, I felt Tianjing might not be such a fertile soil [for practicing architecture]—not such a productive atmosphere. So, finally, I decided to come to Beijing, and started a branch of Huahui here.

I have two office rooms here. I moved approximately this time last year, in January. I started my design studio in 2009. At the beginning, I set up my

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4. *Fengshui* is a traditional Chinese system of geomancy. It is literally translated as ‘wind and water’. It is a study of how to position one in the natural environment, in order to improve one’s life.
Figure 8: Bridges in the Sky. The photo shows how Linked Hybrid is seen from the workers’ community. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).

Figure 9: Bridges in the Sky. The photo shows how Linked Hybrid is seen from its courtyard. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2009).
office at Jianwai SOHO and then I moved to here, Linked Hybrid. Because Jianwai SOHO has some problems: it is too crowded. Indeed, it is interesting [architecturally], but there are too many people. So you feel you are in a battle every day, fighting for elevators, fighting for food, and fighting for parking lots. It was so painful. There was an opportunity in the beginning of last year, so I decided to move here. At that time, the construction had just finished. The rent was not that high. I liked this place, because it is quiet and not that crowded. At the beginning, there was really no one in the complex; it is a lot better now. I feel the space is more suitable for an office, especially when your office is smaller scale. If you want to live here, it is impossible. The size of this apartment is 220 square meters, with only two bedrooms, three toilets, and one gigantic corridor. The corridor will cost you a few millions yuan. So I think the design is not for living. I heard from my friends that the design criteria for Linked Hybrid at the very beginning accorded to the standard of the ‘tertiary apartment’. So if you observe closely some details, such as the open kitchen design, it is definitely not for a normal family. It is more for occasional living or as an investment. I have been staying here for a year; I personally feel the design is good. I cannot discover any big mistakes, such as being annoyed by the spatial quality. The only problem is its transportation connection to the city: it seems close to everywhere on the map, but you cannot reach anything easily.

My story about finding this place is interesting. At the beginning, I was cheated by a real-estate agent. When I was looking for somewhere to move, the advertisement said this place was very cheap. So I met with the owner, and checked out the space. I found the space was good too, so I

5. By ‘tertiary apartment’, Wang Zhenfei meant that apartments in Linked Hybrid are not for basic living needs, nor for investment needs. Real estate products for these two types of needs are considered as the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ apartments. Linked Hybrid is considered as the tertiary type, which is only for possession, like luxury antiques. I will discuss this idea later on in the thesis.
asked again about the rent. The owner told me a number almost double the advertised amount. The difference between what the agent told me and the reality was so big. I told the owner that I think that what he proposed as rent was reasonable for the space, but I did not want to pay that much. At that time, it was very difficult to find tenants, because it was the end of the year and the building was too new. But the owner was very keen to rent it out. So he asked how much I would like to pay. I said the advertised amount was affordable for me and I could only rise a few thousands more. The owner finally agreed the deal, so I moved to here from Jianwai SOHO.

To use the space as an office, I found there was another good thing about it: the interior design of the room is very elegant and complete. You just need to bring your things here, and you can start working. Another good thing is its view. The courtyard view makes me feel comfortable. Actually, when you talk about the views, I think about this every day: I look at the housing just across the wall; they are so different from this community. Across the wall, there are different communities, different people and different things happening every day. No one knows who is doing what. People from this side may think those people are monsters, and people from that side may think people here are monsters… I have never entered their community. But I have the feeling that they are different. So I think architects, or developers, may actually do something about it. Sometimes, we need to contribute to the society (Wang Zhenfei, personal communication, 10 December, 2010).

These seemingly unrelated life histories of two individuals from the two different generations –the stories of Shao Xiao and Wang Zhenfei– will continue to reappear throughout this thesis and to help form many arguments in my thesis about a modern residential development, such as the struggle for reform, architectural agency, and the eventual sacrifice of one generation and the rise of another one.
CHAPTER I

DAYUAN

Dayuan Defined by Wang Ji

Wang Ji was the informant in my fieldwork directly using the word dayuan, when I asked him to describe the original workers’ community before the construction of Linked Hybrid. Dayuan is how the Chinese typically refer to their communities in the socialist danwei period. Dayuan literally means ‘large compound’, and the term is associated with a large-scale, enclosed, industrial community. People often use dayuan and danwei interchangeably; however, I argue that the two concepts are different.

Wang Ji worked in the factory since he was 20. He was laid off in the late 1990s along with almost all of his co-workers. He gave the following description of the workers’ community, after it had already been demolished for Linked Hybrid. When describing the community, he needed to sketch on a piece of paper to recall his memories (Figure 10). The following is his description of the factory:6

[Dialogue 1]

This is the road; this is the gate; and this is the railway. [Pauses to think.]
The situation is like this: when coming in from here [the gate], this side is

6. The interview was conducted by the author with Wang Ji, an ex-factory worker of the paper mill. The interview was held at a hotel coffee shop close to where Wang Ji worked after being laid off from the paper mill. The interview place was about five minutes bicycling distance from the original site of the paper mill and where Wang Ji lives. Wang Ji offered responses to five questions about his memories of places and locations. When Ji started to answer those questions, he began to draw in a sketchbook to help clarify his explanations. The interview with Wang Ji was conducted on 14 January, 2009 at Yuyang International Hotel coffee shop.
the residential zone, for living. Once getting into the gate, this was a workshop. On this side, there was the factory manager’s office, a place for administration. What was behind it were some small machine shops and places for repair and maintenance. I mentioned that this is the entrance, right? So this is a machine shop: machine no.3, machine no.2 and machine no.1 were next to each other. Across the road, this was machine no. 4. [Points back to machine no. 3.] There were more when walking towards this direction. On the side there was a special machine called youjiang yuanzhi, another machine shop. If walking continuously, the area was all about youjiang yuanzhi [a type of paper manufacturing machine]. This was all territory of the factory. If you moved further into this area, this was the power unit, which was on the other side of the road, at the corner, for the power supply. . . . Once you passed through the gate, this was another office, and some more offices, and finally there was the cutting room for machine no. 3.

[Dialogue 2]
This was the southern factory. Crossing the railway, this was the northern factory. For the northern factory, after going in, there were two machines. One was called 1880 and one was called 1860. There was also another copper plate paper [machine]. So that was the general description of the place.

Points for Landmarks
In Figure 11, I try to put Wang Ji’s words into a diagram. The worker used a few components, including points, lines, surfaces, space, and time, to describe the factory. His descriptions read almost like a journey. If we read his descriptions again separately, they can be thought of as five distinctive journeys. In this type of description, the starting points and finishing points are extremely important. The starting points are usually
Figure 11: Wang Ji’s presentation of the space. (Diagram the author).
something iconic, big, or significant in his everyday life, such as the road, the gate and the manager’s office. These things can be special architecture, political or symbolic items, or simply indicative objects. All of these things act as landmarks that allow him to navigate through his memories of spaces. This phenomenon was particularly obvious when I asked Wang Ji to describe the spatial organisation of the factory (see dialogue 1). Before giving the description, he needed to locate three important elements on the map: the road, the gate and the railway. The road is the main one running along the southeast end of the southern zone of the factory, and the gate is the main gate of the factory. These two elements can be understood as the front of his dayuan community. The importance of these two elements stem from their frequent exposure to the worker in his daily routine, because he used to live across the road in his single-story dormitory. Unlike the everyday life landmarks, the railway line that entered the factory shows another kind of landmark, an iconic and monumental one. Indeed, because Wang Ji worked at the southern zone of the factory, he seldom crossed the railway to enter the northern zone. He mentioned the railway not because it was an important part of his daily routine, but because the sheer scale of the railway’s infrastructure gave it landmark character. In his narrative, these landmarks were always the starting points of the journey.

Linear Journeys

After these three points were located, Wang Ji was able to imagine the space in a three-dimensional sense through which the navigation process was linear and sequential. If we continue to examine dialogue 1, Wang Ji started from the gate, a place he is very familiar with, and he described what he could see from the position—the housing zone on
the other side of road. After he described entering the gate, he continued with what he
could see: the manager’s office on one side and machine shops on the other side. He used
the words ‘entering’, ‘coming’, and ‘getting into’, to emphasise his movement in the
space. Linear movement is not his only mechanism of spatial remembrance: the imagery
at different spots creates a secondary layer of points, where he stopped in his mind.

More interestingly, once he finished his first journey, he needed to return to those
landmarks again, and in the case of the first dialogue, the relevant landmark was the gate.
The gate provided a reference point to identify a series of other points, in particular
machine houses no. 3, no. 2 and no. 1. The cardinal directions in these descriptions are
weak because throughout them, Wang Ji never used any terms such as east, south, right
or left. Instead, he used scenes and different levels of detail in his descriptions. This
reading of space is cinematic in that the perceived spatial organisation consists of
sequential snapshots linked by zooming in and zooming out.

**Sense of Territory**

Certain boundaries stopped Wang Ji’s linear movement in the space. In dialogues
1 and 2, once he had reached the boundaries, he suggested that the territory had ended,
and he then shifted his description to a more zoomed-in view within that boundary,
introducing the special machine area.

**[Dialogue 3]**

Here was the land for housing. Behind it was all the housing. Basically, all
the land was part of the factory complex; this was the extension of the
factory. Later on, we walled this part. [This is] the factory housing, the
residential zone. All these residences are still there now; we all live at this
place. This part of the housing at the south end has been demolished and replaced with a green park.

The perceptual boundary is constructed by symbolic architectural elements, such as, very importantly, walls. The above transcriptions show the importance of boundaries in the conception of dayuan. The residential zone belonged to the factory, but there was no wall at the beginning. To indicate the ownership of the extended piece of land at the north end of the factory, the management first walled it off. The land was developed later. The ideas of boundary and wall are thus very important in the reading of dayuan space. I will further discuss the implications of these ideas later in the thesis.

Time and space

Finally, time plays a very important role in this spatial conceptualisation process. Wang Ji mixes up memories from different times. The synchronisation of spatial memories constructs a very complex idea of dayuan. During the interview, I was very confused by Wang Ji’s description when, several times, he jumped from one moment in time to another.

[Dialogue 4]
There [the northern zone] experienced a lot of changes. In the past, there was no paper machine; here was just a warehouse. After some redevelopments, the warehouse was no longer there. Nothing big was there, just some small storage facilities (Figure 12).

[Dialogue 5]
[There are] two dining halls. In the northern zone—the railway has become a road, but before there was a road beside the railway—a dining
hall was located along the road. In the southern zone—this was the machine no. 3, see?—there was a road beside machine no. 3 and machine no. 4, leading people inside. There is supposed to be a great conference hall here, but it was demolished a long time ago. When we were in the factory, the conference hall was there, but it was demolished. There was a dining hall beside the conference hall. This used to be a kindergarten here (Figure 13).

This fourth dialogue is a description of the northern industrial zone of the factory. The northern zone was developed in the early 1990s. Before that, this area was a warehouse for storing raw materials. Wang Ji’s description shows a mixture of temporal elements when the worker imaginatively stopped at some position in his description (Figure 12). Thus Wang Ji’s descriptions are like cinematic spatial-temporal organisations: the imagery shifts back-and-forth between periods in time. The fifth dialogue demonstrates this shifting more explicitly. When Wang Ji was describing the location of the two dining halls, he began to refer to historical landmarks. The information given by him mixed with his memories across several decades. For example, he used a historical building, the conference hall, to locate the position of the dining hall in the southern zone of the factory compound (Figure 13). But he also told how at night he usually went to the conference hall to watch a movie after eating in the dining hall. This routine also influenced his conceptualisation of the spatial organisation of the area.
Figure 12: Wang Ji’s description stopped at the railway to describe two scenes from different times. (Diagram the author).

Figure 13: Wang Ji’s mixing up of memories of different times. (Diagram the author).
Dayuan Place Making

In this respect, Wang Ji’s description of the paper mill space fits Bray’s study of the spatial organisation of danwei (Bray, 2005). Bray (2005, 147) stated two central aims in the designing of danwei: first was to symbolise and to reproduce in miniature the order of the socialist state and secondly was to promote a socialist, collectivist lifestyle. Bray also explained that the basic design principle was to align key architectural elements along a central axis. But, to Bray’s study, I want to add that dayuan is a different concept from that of danwei because it has to do with the everyday experience of community and place making.

I argue that a different rationale lies behind the spatial organisation of the dayuan as presented by Wang Ji and that this has been overlooked by previous studies. From the analysis of the four different space description systems by Wang Ji when he tried to reconstruct the place of his dayuan (Figure 14); dayuan space is organised through subjective experiences and personal memories. Frequently visited or spatially defining physical structures, such as the gates and the walls, are used as reference points. The connection of spaces is linear and sequential. Each stop in this linear sequence of reference points is an image from memory. The images span different temporal frameworks. This system constructs a map of a place, blurring the boundary between synchronicity and diachronicity. The presentation of the space is very episodic, so that

7. Bray suggested that the symbolic meaning of the central axis was quite different from that of traditional Chinese architecture; specifically, danwei communities were generally organised with the principal architecture at the front to create an immediate and dominant focal point. This strategy aims to create a timeless imagery for danwei communities. In danwei communities, architecture and physical structures in general are designed to symbolise power.
Figure 14: Four space description systems to reconstruct the place of *dayuan* by Wang Ji. (Diagram the author).
one could imagine Wang Ji actually walking in the space across history. Moreover, a sense of nostalgia is very strong in Wang Ji’s narrative. For example, when Wang Ji mentioned (in dialogue 5) that the conference hall used to be there but has been demolished, he was saddened. Much of his leisure time had been spent in this place. He could not find such place in the new development. Wang Ji’s description of the past was very critical of the contemporary development of Linked Hybrid.

I would like to provide another example to support my argument about the differences between dayuan and danwei. I interviewed other workers about their memories of the original spatial organisation of the factory before the construction of Linked Hybrid. Though the descriptions were very personal and varied, similar landmarks always played important roles in their narrations. In another interview, Zhang Lian began explaining the original organisation by referring to three structures, which still exist: a school at the east side of the factory, the wall between the residential zone and the industrial zone, and a local power supply building between the two new developments (Figure 15). “I always use these three things to locate my memories”, said Zhang Lian. The comparison between the old and the new, and the emphasis on the surviving structures, forms the basis of Zhang Lian’s criticism of the new development of his living environment.

8. For a more detailed discussion about episodic memory and semantic memory, see Fentress and Wickam (1992).
Figure 15: Three elements did not change in the redevelopment of the area. They are the school (left), electricity transformer (middle), and the wall (up). (Diagram the author).
Collective Memories in Dayuan Community

Other than mundane memories of the place, some historical events happened in the dayuan community, which also helped to reinforce the neighbourhood bonds between workers. Because of the importance of the paper mill during the 1990s, different generations of Chinese government leaders visited the factory. The stories of their visits, reconstructed through a combination of official documentations and community gossip, were told by the workers. The telling of these stories helped to further define the dayuan community. Wang Ji told how,

The government official Zhao Ziyang came to our factory once. Another official Li Peng might have come even earlier than him. Jiang Zhemin came as well; he is the one I remember most clearly (Wang Ji, personal communication, 14 January, 2009).

The propaganda cadre Zhang Lian and the worker Wang Ji told me the same story when they were asked to share any interesting memories from their dayuan communities. Zhao Ziyang’s visit was recorded in an internal documentary video (Figure 16). The visit took place on 30 May, 1986. The intention of this visit was to inspect the development of a new machine at the factory. The video documented the whole process of how Zhao Ziyang talked to the supervisors of different production departments and to the factory manager. The voices of the people in the video are not audible. Instead, a narrator speaks throughout the video, describing the inspection and what the people were saying. The narrator in the video says,

The prime minister asked, ‘Where was this paper manufactured?’ Manager Guo answered, ‘This was made in Shanghai, a Chinese product’. In front
of a machine, Prime Minister Zhao picked up a piece of paper and asked, ‘What is this paper?’ Manager Guo answered, ‘This is writing paper for students. Although this paper is not marketable, we keep manufacturing it’. The prime minister was happy and nodded his head.\(^9\)

The other special visitor mentioned by Wang Ji was Jiang Zemin, the state chairman. Wang Ji could not remember the exact year of the visit when he was asked to tell the story, but in the interview transcription, he placed it in the 1990s. Jiang Zemin’s visit was recorded in the factory newspaper the day after his visit (Figure 17). It was recorded that, First, chairman Jiang and other cadres listened to a presentation from the factory manager, Guo Chunguang, about the new technology of a water-coal boiler machine. Chairman Jiang was also concerned about the production situation of the paper mill, so he asked about the factory’s product marketing and the raw-material-supply situation. Manager Guo Chunguang briefly explained the factory achievements of the water-coal boiler project in the sixth, seventh and eighth Five Year Plans and how this machine was used in the factory. During the presentation, Chairman Jiang asked about the spraying mechanism and the efficiency of the machine (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1996).

The newspaper article recorded Jiang Zemin’s interaction with factory managers. The report presented the historical events in a style of writing that was meant to appear neutral and unemotional, though government officials edited and censored the story, ensuring that it served as a propaganda and governance tool. These kinds of stories

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9. Video of Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang inspecting Beijing First Paper Mill, from the digital archive at the Beijing First Paper Mill’s Propaganda Department. The video is called ‘Qianjinzhongde Zhaozhiyichang’ (First Paper Mill Moving Forward).
Figure 16: Zhao Ziyang’s (waving hand in the photo) visit documented in an internal documentary video of the paper mill. (Photo captured from ‘First Paper Mill Moving Forward’ video provided by Zhang Lian).

[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]

Figure 17: Jiang Zemin’s visit was documented in the paper mill internal newspaper. (Photo capture from Beijing First Paper Mill, 1996).
appeared in all types of media, including newspapers and videos. In the same new report article, it was recorded that,

Jiang came to look at one of our new machines, perhaps because this project was internationally famous. He came and had a very quick look. Before he came, we needed to prepare for a lot in advance. I think the preparation work started two years before when we knew he was coming. Some of the stores on the street were renovated.

When Jiang came, the factory manager, Guo Chunguang, attended to him. We saw him from machine house no. 3 coming with a ‘Red Flag’ car. We saw him immediately enter the factory office. The diplomatic standard for him was extremely high, so all those who served him were department supervisors from our danwei. He did not drink the tea served to him though. He took a very quick look at some machine shops. We needed to make sure all those fixtures hanging from the ceiling were safe for him before he came. In any case, he did not stay long, perhaps only around one hour. He just walked around the factory briefly. Afterwards, he was shown our new machine. I think this trip was meant to inspect some energy-saving technology and improvement at our danwei.

During the visit, all workers needed to do their routine tasks as usual. Some workers lined up and waited for him, but he just nodded his head from far away. He did not come to shake hands with them (Wang Ji, personal communication, 14 January, 2009).

The story above was recounted by Wang Ji. The video of Zhao Ziyang’s inspection, the newspaper report of Jiang Zemin’s visit and the personal narration by Wang Ji have different tones. In particular, Wang Ji’s personal narration is concerned more about the details of the historical event; for example, how the preparation work took two years, the
car’s brand was ‘Red Flag’, the tea was served but not touched, the fixtures needed additionally security, and finally how Jiang Zemin did not shake hands with the workers.

Thus Wang Ji’s description of his memory implicitly counteracts the official history. The concept of ‘counter memory’ introduced by Foucault (1977) helps explain why Wang Ji shifted from a simple description of the official record to a critique of the manpower and resources invested in a one-hour meeting. By ‘counter memory’, I refer to the particular type of narrative that attempts to dismantle the authority of people and events of official history, which in my case, is the newspaper version of Jiang Zemin’s visit of Wang Ji’s community, by focusing on the mundane characteristics of the event, such as the details remembered by Wang Ji.10 Thus, Wang Ji’s story contradicted and challenged the political hegemony of the government, reversing the relationship between himself and the centralised political power. The worker’s memories closely relate to his personal experiences and observations. For example, the brand of the car and the task of making sure all hanging fixtures were safe. However, some memories were about other people’s interactions, such as the story about Jiang Zemin not drinking the tea served to him. This kind of memory recalls stories and gossip in the dayuan community.11 Jiang Zemin’s visit was treated as a big event in the community, and the residents were buzzing with discussion about it at the time. Through informal networks in the community, an

10. ‘Counter memory’ or ‘effective history’ from individuals is the idea proposed by Foucault (1977) to describe the opposition of ‘traditional history’ from the political hegemony.
11. In Chapter 3, I also introduce gossip about the reason why part of the workers’ community needed to be demolished.
unofficial history was established and mixed up with personal experience as a collective memory of the community.

Francesca Cappelletto (2003) used the concept of ‘mnemonic communities’ to describe a fusion between autobiographical and historical memory, which meant telling what apparently happened with a combination of personal experiences and stories told by others. Consequently, a web of stories was synthesised into a shared memory of the community. This shared memory, comparable to the official history of the visit by Jiang Zemin to the factory, also involved a selection process. Usually these memories are highly critical, not solely as counter memories that challenge the hegemony of authorities, but also as intentional demonstration of individual consciousness. Therefore, the concept of dayuan does not need to present a stable and unified society like the concept of danwei, but, instead, dayuan refers to a more chaotic living environment and more dynamic social relationships. Further support for my argument about the difference between dayuan and danwei is to be found in another story by Wang Ji about the death of a co-worker when he was asked about his feelings about the neighbourhood relationships in the community. The story was about one of Wang Ji’s neighbours and co-workers, who died due to a heart attack while he was playing a card game in the community. When he was dying and after he died, Wang Ji said no one in the community wanted to help his family. In that story, Wang Ji focused on the fading of neighbourhood affection in his dayuan to demystify a common belief in harmonious neighbourhood relationships and to express his individual thoughts.
Li Long’s Travelling Journals

Around the mid-1990s, China’s open market finally reached the workers’ community. Thanks to this, one normal factory worker, Li Long, got the opportunity to travel abroad, and, through his diary, other workers were able to read about the idea of the modern city and of modernity (Figure 18). In 1995 and 1996, Li Long, who was a staff member of the Beijing First Paper Mill’s propaganda department and a factory leader, published a series of journals in the paper mill’s community about his experiences travelling to a xiandaihua (modernised) country—Japan. His friends in Japan invited him to visit several cities over fifteen days. In his journals, he expressed his admiration for these modern cities and their cultures, and he also openly criticised the urbanism of China. Li Long’s critical thinking differentiated him from the rest of the workers. I use his writings to illustrate how some new contemporary ideologies in Chinese society, such as consumerism, the market, management, and even modernity, emerged in the paper mill dayuan in the mid-1990s. These critical ideas from Li Long planted the seeds of modernity in the workers’ community.

State of Politeness and Kingdom of Automobile

Li Long was fascinated by both the qualitative and the material sides of modernity. On the qualitative side, he wrote that his first positive impression of Japanese cities was suzhi (quality), or wenming (civility), of people. He compared the Japanese people he met on the trip and Chinese people in general. At Fukouka airport customs, he found Japanese officials to be extremely polite and friendly. One official tried to talk with him even though they were speaking different languages. He also recalled in his journal that just
Figure 18: Li Long’s journal publication in the paper mill’s internal newspaper. The Chinese expressions of ‘state of politeness’ (left) and ‘kingdom of automobiles’ (right) are highlighted by the author. (Photo captured from BeijingYiqing Bao, Li L., 1995a).
three hours previously, when he had left Beijing airport, the Chinese custom officials just checked his document but did not even look at him. He called Japan liyi zhibang, or a state of politeness. He continued:

There were many colourful and beautiful buildings and many automobiles following each other on the roads and streets (Li L., 1995a).

Also on the material side, Li Long wrote about his view from the airplane before landing at Fukouka airport. The number of automobiles on the street caught his attention first. His surprise did not decrease when he was sitting in his friend’s private car driving along the airport highway. At this point in his journal, he referred to Japan as qiche wangguo, or a kingdom of automobiles. ‘A state of politeness’ and ‘a kingdom of automobiles’ contributed to the qualitative and material aspects of Li Long’s fascination with modernity, or in his words, xiandaihua.

On both sides of the roads and along the highways penetrating the suburban and village areas, I saw small private cars parked in front of every house. This was my first impression of a Japanese city (Li L., 1995a).

Li Long wrote that, on his way to his friend’s home, he found Japanese suburban and rural areas very different from Chinese ones: they were so xiandai, or modern. I will discuss this particular idea in the following passage. Suburban lifestyle for Li Long, and generally for Chinese people then, was an ideal. When he arrived in the Japanese city of Fukouka, Li Long made another comparison with Beijing: both cities were full of automobiles, but almost all of them were private cars in Fukouka, whereas public
transportation vehicles were in a majority in China. With this comparison, Li Long implied the backwardness of the Beijing transportation system and his appreciation of popularisation of the private automobile in Japan.

To conclude, the image of the modern city for Li Long is composed of a few elements: endless urban sprawl in suburban areas, large-scale infrastructural constructions, automobiles, quiet pedestrian streets and more importantly, the concept of private property. All these elements make up the contemporary urbanism in Japan.

**Technology and Infrastructure**

Japan’s highways connect everywhere. Drivers pay for how long they drive. At the toll entrance, everything is automatic without a human attendant. At the end of the highway, some workers collect the fee according to how long you drove. The driver can pay with some magnetic cards (Li L., 1995b).

In part of Li Long’s journal, he wrote about his experience at the highway toll station. He described the advanced technological equipment and infrastructure in detail. He also observed that drivers in Japan were more obedient to the rules and signs on the highway than drivers in China. Finally, he compared the system of alleyways in both cities. In particular, he noted that cars could pass through alleyways easily in Fukouka, but Beijing alleyways (hutong) were narrow, lacked signage and often ended unexpectedly. He also implied that Chinese drivers would not be as polite as those in Japan in such narrow alleyways.

Li Long’s comparisons not only highlighted modern and nonmodern dualities as he saw them, but also a difference in the level of civility between the two countries. In
particular, he noted that drivers were openly polite to each other in Fukouka’s alleyways, while such behaviour was not present in Beijing’s hutong. Paradoxically, in Chinese, the term for modernised Beijing (xiandai) strongly implies civility (wenming). This conceptual relationship further develops the Chinese concept of modernity, or more precisely xiandai in Chinese.

Firstly Becoming a Consumer

Among those of Li Long’s journal entries, which were published in the paper mill’s newspaper, one of the most prominent themes was how Li Long first engaged in consumerism. His writing style was ironic and critical of Chinese society at that time. In his journal, Li Long drew comparisons between the consumerist phenomenon in Japan and his personal experience. For instance, he could not find any fast-food restaurants in Beijing, but these restaurants proliferated in Japan (Li L., 1996a). He wrote that the majority of citizens in Japan seemed to belong to the ‘labour class’. By ‘labour class’, Li Long particularly referred to those employees who are paid by the employers in the society of the market economy.12 This group of people needed affordable and quickly prepared food to save money and time. Therefore, in Japan the restaurants tended to be small and low profile because that kept costs down. This type of business model was very different from Beijing, where restaurants always tried to cater for the upper class in settings with grander decorations.

12. Being an employee and paid by an employer was a new concept in socialist China. Even though the workers are paid by the factory, many of their living necessities were still taken care by the state welfare system. Therefore, being a real ‘labour class’ means to totally engage in a market economy, which Li Long considered as more advanced and modernised.
While he was in Japan, Li Long went to a local restaurant with his friend. Being in that restaurant was a completely different experience than he was used to in Beijing. First, he was pleasantly greeted by all the restaurant staff, even the manager. This also echoes his civility argument. He was surprised that there was no guard to watch the customers entering and exiting the restaurant. In other words, he tried to criticise Beijing’s restaurants for always being guarded to prevent people from leaving without paying. He was also surprised to observe that payment in the *sushi* restaurant that he visited was conducted on a system of trust with the customers. Specifically, the restaurant used a conveyor system to present a steady flow of individual plates to its customers. Different colour plates represented different prices, and the restaurant calculated the bill based on the number and colour of empty plates that the customers left at their table. The restaurant even allowed people to eat outside, confident that they would pay on their own at the end. The restaurant put out sample plates with clearly marked prices, which Li Long liked very much because it gave him confidence that he would not be overcharged.

In another journal entry (Li L., 1996b), Li Long described his shopping experience in Tokyo. He was surprised by how free he was in the Japanese supermarket. The experience was different from shopping in supermarkets in China; rather, it was closer to the experience of an informal street market. The supermarket was large and crowded, but no guards were stationed at the entrance and no bags had to be checked. In the supermarket, no one was monitoring the customers. He found that cashiers were located at different spots in the supermarket, so guests could pay anywhere in the supermarket at their convenience. The cashier calculated goods by scanning the barcodes
and never checked if the notes were real. After paying, there was even a bagging station to provide free boxes and bags.

Li Long’s experience as a consumer touched on, again, the civility of the Japanese people. In general, his praise of the moral standard of the Japanese business operators and customers was an indirect criticism of his Chinese community members. More importantly, he also disseminated the ideology of consumerism by describing the pleasure of consuming in a civilised or modernised society. The ideology of consumerism was totally missing in Beijing in the early 1990s, but it became the most powerful force behind the development of the city and the state.

Discovering Disharmony

Li Long developed a long paragraph to describe the ‘yuppies’ phenomenon in the Kasumigaseki area of Tokyo (Li L., 1996b). It was the first time that he had personally experienced a subculture that conflicted with his ideal of a harmonious and civilised society. He spent the majority of his life in a socialist planned economy and society, in which the state regulated people’s behaviour and thought. In Japan, he observed that some girls gathered together in groups of two or three at a park. All of them wore black dresses, black shirts, leather shorts and boots. They also had their hair dyed red or yellow. Some of them were smoking and talking to each other, and some of them were playing with dogs and joking around. He asked his friend who these people were. His friend could not give him a good answer, but explained that these kinds of people were more common in the Shinjuku area, where they liked to dance and sing all night. Li Long thought they were not students but yuppies, a concept he had come to know by watching
Western movies and television shows. His observations of their dress and behaviour suggested that this group of people were not poor, and they seemed to lead a very materialistic life. They did not seem to exude the same civility he saw in the sushi restaurant or supermarket. He finally wrote his criticism about these people and their lifestyle:

They smoke, chat, and play with dogs to kill their time; I think their hearts must be very empty. . . . These people are equivalent to gangsters and bullies in our city, who fail to graduate from their schools and are not even able to find a job. They might be involved in many illegal activities, not individually but in groups. This culture, which is the dark side of Japanese society, had a big influence on the productivity of the society (Li L., 1996b).

Modern Community

Li Long explained that the reason why Japanese cities were cleaner than Chinese cities was because, in Japan, the municipal waste-treatment system was very well developed. As emphasised in his journal entry (Li L., 1996c), the common Chinese term used to refer to waste treatment was dao, which means pouring away the waste. Li Long thought that the emphasis of the word dao illustrated the fundamental difference between the overall appearance of Chinese and Japanese urban areas. Japanese residents put all their waste into two kinds of big plastic bags, combustible and non-combustible. A truck collected all the bags at some particular spots in the community; in other words, the concept of dao did not exist in Japan. In his hometown of Beijing, he was very upset by the environmental situation—he was able to find rubbish everywhere in his community.
He blamed this situation on the Chinese government. In the early 1990s, the government advocated using waste plastic bags to wrap domestic rubbish before disposal. However, the government did not provide enough free plastic bags to encourage the movement. He argued that if a developed country such as Japan considered the affordability and the self-discipline of the citizens as reasons to provide enough free plastic bags, China as a developing country should definitely consider those issues. Otherwise, everyone will just dao rubbish everywhere.

Li Long found another reason for the better environmental qualities in Japan. Unlike Chinese residences, Japanese homes all used coal-gas. Because they did not have to burn charcoal, there was no dust. In addition to a better infrastructural system to operate the city more efficiently and sustainably, the government also actively intervened in communities. Community residents had to pay 520 yen to the local municipal department every month, three hundred of which were used to organise sports activities, and the rest was used for managing the community.

For Li Long, dao and recycling were two notions about how civilised or modernised one’s community was. I suggest that Li Long’s journals also represented the emergence of Chinese society’s desire to upgrade their community. My analysis of Li Long’s article indicates an ideological linkage between management and social class: well-managed community means a more modernised and civilised community, and in turn the community will be perceived as being of a higher social class.
Market Economy is the Future

To summarise the above description from Li Long, on the one hand, advanced technology, endless highways, the suburban lifestyle, automobiles, and large-scale infrastructure construct the material urbanism of modernity. On the other hand, social integrity, a civilised working class, consumerism, and community management make up the qualitative side. In his last journal entry, Li Long tried to conclude his experiences about his appraisal of the market economy (Li L., 1996d). He attributed all the credit for the Japanese achievements in urban and social development to the country’s free-market policies. He believed that only the market economy could improve and modernise the life of people in China. The freedom of choice and the better services in Japan were results of competition. His observations of Japan’s domestic utility services convey this idea:

The [domestic] boiler was just the size of a Chinese radiating heater. Three gas tanks were connected to it. [The heater] supplies hot water to the kitchen and bathrooms. Residents living in towers have their individual water boiler in the bathroom connected to the central coal gas system. A ventilation system was installed to exchange fresh air. My friend told me how convenient it was to have all this equipment and also how good the service was from the gas, telephone, and electricity companies. My friend told me that this was because the market in Japan is highly competitive, so if you are not satisfied with one company, you can change to another one anytime (Li L., 1996d).

Li Long believed that the Japanese benefited by the competition of the market economy. Because of this, the Japanese residents did not need to worry so much about issues that were of daily concern to many people in China. For instance, in China, people
always had trouble exchanging gas tanks, and some poor people living in single-story housing had to pay for expensive fuel. He blamed all those problems on the domination by a single fuel company in the planned economy. He suggested that there should be deep reform, so that the fuel companies would one day compete with each other and provide better services to the residents. In his eyes, the market economy was the future. Li Long’s ideas were widely disseminated in the workers’ community through the internal newspaper, but how did all these ideas actually become realities in the workers’ community?

**He Xuezhi’s Xiandai Dream**

Deng Xiaoping, generally recognised as a pragmatist, was the political leader who proposed a total modernisation of Chinese culture and cities. Though he died in 1997, the transformations in the everyday lives of the workers of Beijing First Paper Mill continued. Li Long’s diary and his fascination for Japanese modernity was a representation of the mainstream ideology at that time, in both his workers’ community and throughout Chinese cities. The process eventually led to the total redevelopment of the factory and the construction of Linked Hybrid. The following transcript is from a factory worker, He Xuezhi, about his experiences of the transformations in his domestic environment by technological upgrades in 1998, one year after the death of Deng Xiaoping:

13. Shambaugh (1995, 104) holds a different view than the mainstream description of Deng Xiaoping as a pragmatist. He argued that it was Deng’s intention to present himself as a pragmatist in front of the media, though he was unlikely to be more pragmatic than other international political leaders at the time.
From the fourteenth National Congress in 1992 until now, our country has developed dramatically, and the state’s high productivity surprises the world. The living environment of my family, as well as all other families, has also been improved. We have our own refrigerator, television, and washing machine, and now we are going to have our next three big pieces [san-da-jian]: telephone, stereo and computer. The telephone has just recently been installed in my home, and my dream of owning a telephone at home has finally been realised (He X. Z., 1998).

He tried to recall his childhood memory of when making a private telephone call was something beyond his imagination in 1980s China:

In 1980, I went to a business trip to Sichuan. Right after I arrived at the danwei compound at Sichuan, I got a telegraph from Beijing. I was notified that my wife was seriously ill. At that time, the fastest way to get back to Beijing would take at least three days. So I decided to make a long-distance phone call. I went to the only post office in the town, where a long-distance phone-call service could be found. The connection operator in the phone was speaking in the Sichuan dialect and it was very difficult for me to understand. The process was extremely difficult. Finally I was connected. However, I still needed to wait for my family to go to a particular place to pick up the phone. After one and a half hours, I finally talked to my family member, and his voice was as small as a mosquito’s, so I needed to yell into the phone. Fortunately, I heard what the other side was saying and knew my wife was fine (He X. Z., 1998).

He Xuezhi applied to install a private telephone in his home in 1996, but he found out that he could not afford the installation fee at that time. Moreover, the application process might take a year to have a technician to do the installation. Therefore, he gave up his dream at the time. Just two years after his first attempt, he was finally able to
install a private telephone in his home, so he wrote an article to express his happiness in the paper mill’s internal newspaper. The installation waiting time had also shortened to about a month. The installation fee and the telephone bill became affordable to him, and his income had increased dramatically. He Xuezhi described in his writing that his “dream could now be realised easily (He X. Z., 1998)”. This story shows how fast the transformation and modernisation was in the workers’ community.

He Xuezhi recognised the change of his social life before and after the installation of a private telephone. He described the telephone as “a window to connect the world outside his family” because it dramatically shortened the distance between himself and his friends, relatives and co-workers. Some of his perceptions had also changed. For instance, he described how he used to laugh at people who spent a lot of time talking on the telephone, but after installing a telephone himself, he thought his son and daughter talking on the phone for twenty minutes at a time was normal. When his wife and father were sick, the telephone became very busy and helpful. In the Spring Festival (the Chinese lunar calendar New Year), he could also call his brother in the westernmost Xinjiang province to give him his blessing. He was surprised that the long-distance call was as clear as a local call. Finally, He Xuezhi connected these changes in his life to the reform leader, Deng Xiaoping. He believed in the idea that development should be the core principle, as proposed by Deng Xiaoping, to develop the country towards a new era.

_Xiandai Versus Xiangzhen_

Li Long, in addition to his Japan travel journal, was a prolific writer in the community’s internal newspapers. In another article written by him in 1996, entitled
‘Confronting Xiangzhen Phenomenon in the Urban Area’, he criticised some ‘backward’ phenomena in his neighbourhood, referring to the workers’ community at the north end of Linked Hybrid (Li, L., 1996e). As he described, there were many illegal hawkers “occupying pedestrian walkways, open spaces, and streets in his community; these hawkers constructed temporary structures for commercial activities, and these activities resulted in inconvenient, circuitous walking paths and disruptions in the daily lives of the residents”. He described the environment was zang, luan, cha (dirty, messy, low quality). At the end of the article, he labelled this kind of negative environment as the xiangzhen phenomenon.

He realised that the positive side of those informal commercial activities was that they made goods more accessible to the residents. However, from the perspective of the appearance of the city (shirong), he argued that the commercial activities were not compatible with constructing a xiandaihua, or modernised city. He even questioned whether any other modern city in the world shared the same phenomenon presented in his community. He suggested that Beijing municipalities should eliminate the informal economy to achieve a more ‘orderly’ and ‘gorgeous’ city, so that Beijing could actually progress towards its goal of being an international modern metropolis (guojixing xiandai daduhui).

What is xiangzhen? The closest translation of the term is probably county or village. Li Long used this concept as a metaphor in an article describing undeveloped rural conditions in urban areas. On the one hand, xiangzhen is a governing administrative
concept of the smallest unit in China. On the other hand, people from small county or villages are generally not seen as being as advanced and civilised as those from big cities, so that conceptually Chinese society can be separated into two social groups, the prestigious urban group and the poor nonurban xiangzhen (Lu D., 2006a, 155). I say that it is a perceived difference because a person does not necessarily have to be from a country village to be labelled as xiangzhen. This labelling is a subjective judgement about the behaviour and appearance of people, and the dichotomy between xiandai and xiangzhen is entirely evaluative.

Li Long called the other side of xiangzhen the international modern metropolis (guojixing xiandai daduhui). Ten years after Li Long’s criticism of xiangzhen and after the total redevelopment of the site with Linked Hybrid, the xiangzhen phenomenon still actively influences the urban-development process, and Chapter 6 discusses the dynamics of the xiangzhen phenomenon in emergent forms of Chinese society.

Steven Holl to Open Up Chinese Communities

Having seen the factory workers of Beijing First Paper Mill, who wished to transform and modernise their built environment, I now turn to the other protagonists, the architect and the developers of the new community of Linked Hybrid. So what did the practitioners think?

14. Xiang, or village government, is under the control of the country government. If a village’s non-agricultural population makes up two thousand people or more than 10 per cent of its total population, the village can be upgraded to form a zhen, or town.
The developer’s marketing booklet for Linked Hybrid told the potential tenants that their development would help them realise their dream of living in an international metropolitan residential community, or *guoji duhui zhuzhai shequ* in Chinese (Figure 19 and Figure 20). It is as if the developer of Linked Hybrid had read the journal entries of Li Long and were responding to what Li Long imagined about a more civilised, modernised and international community:

In the history of Chinese residential housing, there has never been such a pioneering plan envisioned for the residential community and such epoch-making superior work featuring sustainable development and sufficient space.

Our project does not only strive to be the highest in quality; it also has a long-term perspective, and it will become one of the finest international urban residential communities. The Grand MOMA [Linked Hybrid] will display an unprecedented level of housing community design, create a new architectural vision, present the first international town, create a landmark, and aim for farsighted visions (Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 4).

The above description of Linked Hybrid emphasises the two marketable concepts: sustainability and international connection. In particular, I will discuss how the developer defined the ‘residential community of an international metropolis’ in the marketing publication. The marketing material also included the following description (Figure 21):

15. The marketing publication is called ‘Realise Your Dream in the Residential Community in the International Metropolis’. The year of the publication cannot be found in the book, but the earliest electronic version of it dates back to 2004.
Figure 19: Marketing material of Linked Hybrid in Chinese (top) and English (bottom). The painting, *The Dance* (1910) on the left hand side of the image is by French artist Henri Matisse. The painting was used by the developer to be a metaphor of Linked Hybrid. Steven Holl did not mention any connection of Linked Hybrid to that painting in his publication materials. (Image captured from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 1-2).
Figure 20: The use of the Linked Hybrid model in the marketing material. At the time when this marketing material was made, Linked Hybrid was not yet finished, therefore the developer could only use the model of Linked Hybrid to present the project to the potential buyers. (Image captured from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 3-4).
Figure 21: The image presents Louis Vuitton as part of the international lifestyle to emphasise the importance of consumerism in the marketing strategy of the project. (Image captured from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 11-12).
Snap-shot of a Metropolis, the Domain of International Life

How should people live when we step into the twenty-first century? What are the lifestyles of different international metropolises? Looking at international metropolises, such as New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, and Beijing, the novel residential domain of the twenty-first century is clear—a long-term and attainable international living venue! The eternal heart of the America is New York, and the eternal centre of New York is Manhattan. The capital city Tokyo leads Japan towards the world, and the Roppongi Hills are located in Tokyo. Shanghai is the focus of China facing the world, and the new Pudong district was constructed in Shanghai. Turn our face towards China’s capital, Beijing. The area in Beijing that is able to compete with other international metropolises is Dongzhimen. Say goodbye to the traditional model. Today’s Dongzhimen has become the most gorgeous urban living space. The combination of international headquarters, global business centres, and multiple and materialistic urban consumerist lifestyles, perfectly demonstrate the richness of the international metropolitan lifestyle. The high-quality international living atmosphere is comparable to any international metropolis. Beijing’s second national gate, Dongzhimen, enjoys an international living environment (Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 12).

The author of the essay in the marketing booklet emphasised several times the internationally recognised status of Linked Hybrid. The marketing strategy for the architecture was through the branding of a new lifestyle. To achieve this objective, an international architect, Steven Holl, was commissioned for this project. In 1985, Steven Holl wrote about ‘Hybrid Buildings’ in Architecture Pamphlet No. 11:

What pressures specific to the twentieth century does the combination of program impose on architectural form? Concentration of many social activities within an architectural form distends and warps a pure building type. Certain previously neglected forms of associations have been wrenched together in the modern city so as to generate buildings which might stand as an anti-typology, if examined under current theoretical preoccupations. . . . Although there are examples of combined function buildings throughout history (the house over the shop is prevalent in many ages and cultures), Hybrid Buildings developed most rapidly in the twentieth century. The modern city has acted as fertilizer for the growth of architectures from the homogenous to the heterogeneous in regard to use. Urban densities and evolving building techniques have affected the mixing of functions, piling one atop another, defying critics who contend that a building should ‘looking like what it is’.

Geographic dispersion has had a centrifugal effect on American cities. Dispersion, evident in the countless examples of freeways deformed towns, has been the typical mode of development in the past three decades. Free-standing corporate headquarters, industrial ‘parks’, shopping centres and suburban housing are now scattered throughout what was once rural countryside, the negative consequence of this type of development have now become apparent: the dissipated centres of towns, drained of activity, call for revitalization. New concentrations of activities would invigorate the towns socially as well as providing the physical architecture to rebuild common spaces (Holl, 1985, 3).

Holl related the hybrid function building typology to the American suburban crisis. His argument suggested that the homogeneity of suburbia is the basis of asocial and developmental crisis, but also that the mixed programmed (or in Holl’s word, hybrid) building typology is a possible solution to the suburban situation. This writing from Holl
from 1985 helps us to understand his conceptualization of Linked Hybrid. From 1988 to 1991, Holl worked with his colleagues on a series of hypothetical projects and published them in *Edge of a City* (Holl, 1991b). In these projects, the link between his critique of suburbia and the hybrid typology become more obvious and direct. Ten years later, all of the concepts from this research were amalgamated in the Linked Hybrid project (Figure 22).

In terms of scale, Linked Hybrid was the largest project for Holl’s office at that time (Ho C. L., 2007). The design attempts to combine two types of Chinese urbanism—the ‘horizontality’ of the urban form before the 1980s and the ‘verticality’ of the urban form after the 1980s. The design also tried to rearrange (as will be discussed later in this research) the public and private configuration of a traditional Chinese gated community within a new architectural framework. The complexity of the architectural programme responding to the suburban context had been developing in Holl’s thinking for more than a decade:

Urban space has a vertical ‘Z’ dimension equal to or more important than the horizontal ‘X-Y’ plane. This perpendicular spatial order is amplified by a range of viewpoints, from various levels… Isolated buildings with single function, the suburban norm, typical at the modern city’s periphery, give way to these projects to hybrid buildings, with diverse programs.

17. See also Holl (1991a). The first actual trial of a hybrid building by Steven Holl is perhaps the Gymnasium Bridge project of Holl in 1977 (Holl, 2010, 41). The Gymnasium Bridge project is also the start of the horizontal skyscraper scheme, that is, tall buildings with high-level bridges.
Figure 22: Towers linked by bridges in the sky in Linked Hybrid. At the back of this image, it is the workers’ community. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2009).

Figure 23: Steven Holl’s diagram of the Linked Hybrid idea as a hybridity of two architectural typologies for Chinese cities. The upper diagram represents the horizontality of traditional urbanism, the middle line represents the verticality of point-towers in modern China, and the bottom line represents the mixture of these two typologies of architecture in the Linked Hybrid design. (Diagram captured from Steven Holl Architects’ website).
Figure 24: Parallax Tower designed by Steven Holl (Image captured from Holl, 1991a).
An effort towards programmatic richness—an open association of spaces to program suggestions—is fertilized by gathering and juxtaposing a variety of activities (Holl, 1991b, 13-15).

Holl’s 1989 Parallax Tower hypothetical project for the Hudson Yard of New York City, as one of the city-edge projects, was the prototype of Linked Hybrid (Figure 24). The design included buildings with multiple functions and hybrid programmes connected by horizontal underwater urban-transit infrastructure and high-speed elevators, as well as floating bridges with public spaces, such as concert halls, movie theatres and banquet halls (Holl, 1991b).

Beijing architect Wang Hui (2009) suggested two notions of ‘hybridity’ in Linked Hybrid: the hybridisation of urbanism and community, and the hybridisation of verticality and horizontality (Figure 23). He stated that both of these hybridities have sociological implications for public space in the Chinese context. The latter hybridity even redefined the location of public space in vertical towers. He claimed this concept is relatively easy to accept, but that the former hybridity is more controversial for the Chinese and he defends the gated community critique of Chinese communities because of the different sizes of Chinese and Western housing communities. Very similar to the ‘minor public spaces’ (xiaogong) argument discovered by political scientist Xiaobo Lü (1995) in the danwei system (see Chapter 2 for more discussion), Wang Hui (2009) argued that the size of the housing community is instrumental in forming neighbourhoods and enhancing security. The opening up of the community also helps to sustain its ‘minor public spaces’. Thus, instead of literally opening up the gate of the community, the design opened up the doors of individual families. By opening up the individual’s door, Wang Hui refers to the
individualisation of domestic space in contemporary China. The shift from the previous *danwei* communities to contemporary China’s private communities is not about the enclosure of community, because communities from both eras are closed. In general, Wang Hui believed that the closed community is the original community form in China. Therefore, the Linked Hybrid design actually allowed individual families or units to become more intimate, comparing to other private developments in China.

**Walls and Bridges**

Walls and bridges have their own symbolism in architectural language. Often, a wall represents a border, which has a defensive connotation. All Chinese communities are walled. Bridges symbolise a linkage or openness. There is no wall in this project, but there are many bridges. In this regard, we would like to thank the architect, but this design also gives developers many problems (Chen Yin, speech at Megablock Urbanism symposium, 15 March, 2011).

The concept of implanting the ‘third space’ creates a sense of a boundless mystery and brings happiness to your soul.[18] Dangdai MOMA [Linked Hybrid] is an open space; it is a pedestrian-friendly community. On the ground floor, all essential living services can be accessed on foot. Besides that, there is also a corridor in the air on the twentieth floor. With different extra functions, the corridor in a certain sense is a dreamlike city in the sky. Living here, residents cannot sense the feeling of a condominium [*gongyu*]; instead, they can experience a novel world: fulfilling all

18. The idea of ‘third space’ in this paraphrase refers to the space between public and private space.
memories, comforts, experiences, and changes in life (Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 58-59).

Chen Yin, from the development company, is the primary supporter of the architect’s open community idea. In Chen Yin’s words, the goal of constructing an open community is very clear: “to express a sense of openness and to critique the defensiveness of other residential development projects” (Chen Yin, speech at Megablock Urbanism symposium, 15 March, 2011). In one of the marketing booklets from the development company, I even found the definition of ‘open community’ to be equivocal, because it can be interpreted as resident-oriented. But what is the architect’s own interpretation?

When I first designed Dangdai MOMA (Linked Hybrid), I tried to create an open space and a pedestrian-friendly atmosphere. On the ground floor of the community, all daily-life necessities, including a full-service laundry centre, banks, and supermarkets, can be found. Residents do not need to rely on cars, but they can walk to their destinations…. In a typical suburban environment, residential areas are scattered and far away from commercial areas, so people need to spend a lot of time in traffic. This is what we need to reconsider and transform. In many of my designs, I tried to allow residents to live collectively and reduce the vehicular traffic. This idea tries to connect different parts of the city on a macro level and connect everyday life and architecture on a micro level (Steven Holl, recorded in Ho, C. L., 2007).

In the above interview, Holl directly linked other private developments in China to the suburban gated communities in the United States (Ho, C. L., 2007). In particular, he compared the contemporary large-scale developments in Beijing with the suburban
landscape in America because they share the similarity of heavy dependence on vehicular transportation and on the separation of zones with different programmes. As a response to those phenomena, he attempted to integrate his large-scale urban development, Linked Hybrid, with the rest of the city. Indeed, architectural critic Clifford Pearson (2008) described this project as a reaction to the prolific, isolated and high-rise housing projects in Beijing, emphasising the connections between the various buildings and the city around them. On the one hand, the architectural design was a criticism of the closed superblock (large-scale closed community) urbanism in contemporary Beijing, while, on the other hand, it attempted to provide an alternative model and to challenge the superblock perceptions of the developer and the residents. Linked Hybrid was an open superblock with hybrid programmes, which allowed it to serve other superblocks around it, instead of only functioning for its own residents. This model thus also attempted to establish inter-superblock connectivity and to enhance continuous social networking.

Architect’s Intention

From the architectural perspective, Holl, as the architect, was the main agent in the making of Linked Hybrid.19 Throughout the process, he demonstrated independent and reflective thinking, and creative design input. More evidence of Holl’s architectural intentions can be found in his journal entries in a Chinese architectural magazine from his 2001, 2003, and 2005 trips to China (Holl, 2007). Holl’s first trip was a short visit in 2001. His first stop was Hong Kong, where he met his client for another residential

19. Here, I stress the influence of Holl only from the design perspective, because, later in the research, I rethink his importance from the social perspective, when Holl’s critical and independent thinking is seen to become in reality ineffective.
design project. After a relaxing two-day tour in Hong Kong and the celebration of his fifty-fourth birthday, Holl arrived in Nanning, a moderately developed city in southwest China on 10 December, 2001. This date marks Holl’s first real experience with Chinese society in his diaries. The next day he went to Shanghai. In his journal, he compared the two cities:

Like Nanning, the direction of Shanghai growth is sprawling: chaotic and wasteful in disregard to land and infrastructure. It is automobile-driven, almost anti-pedestrian. This contradicts the history of a culture whose written tradition was opposed to indiscriminate scattering of objects across the landscape. 2,500 years ago, Kaogongji’s ritual prescribed compact urban organisms—square, walled, and gated—to create an urban habitat, and [the people] filled it. This led to an economic use of mass and void and protection of landscape. New capitalism is a kind of ‘invader’ turning old horizontal cities into chaotic spreads of peaks and voids. I am trying to like the smiling optimistic energy of Shanghai, but the new lack of connections of buildings to street is a crucial broken condition now destroying urban tissue (Holl, 2007, 24).

The Linked Hybrid scheme was cultivated from his first day of contact with Chinese urbanism. Reconnecting destroyed urban tissues by privatised land properties was his biggest focus. Still, his design scheme was also influenced by his ‘edge of city’ solution to the American urban sprawl from the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In that research, Holl designed mixed-use, large-scale housing to react against the single programme planning strategy of American suburbia. During this same trip, Holl’s Chinese friend, Ma Qingyun, told him about the ‘Chinese speed of practice’ and, in his journal, Holl wrote what he had learned from Ma Qingyun, that the average housing
block in China was designed in about four months, a little more than half the time used for similar projects in the United States. Holl’s critique of suburban housing and his knowledge of the ‘Chinese speed of practice’ foreshadowed the future architect-developer dynamics in this project.

Informal Activities and Street Life

Holl’s second trip to China began on 20 August, 2003. This time, he travelled directly from San Francisco to Shanghai. The primary objective of this trip was to participate in an international architectural forum at Nanjing, a city that is a three-hour drive from Shanghai. Holl decided to stay at Shanghai for one night after the long flight from San Francisco. In his journal, he wrote about his experience travelling from Shanghai airport to the city centre:

Arriving Shanghai at 6:00 p.m. and taking a car into the city. By 7:30 p.m., it’s very dark. The city seems surreal in darkness. They turn off almost all lights in office buildings. The few lights in apartments grow meekly maybe long fluorescent tube in a few kitchens. The hot August night is breezy. The air blows quite wonderfully, I notice the people sitting pushed back in a darken(ed) barbershop (Holl, 2007, 26).

The airport Holl referred to was Pudong airport, which is about a one-hour drive from the city centre. The drive takes people through the new development area south of the Pudong business district. This area consists of a mixture of old danwei (work unit housing compounds), ready-to-demolish linong (a type of traditional Shanghai housing), and new developments of office skyscrapers. It supposed to be the most modern and advanced part of the city. For Holl, the darkness of the city in the late afternoon pointed
out problems of modernised urbanism in China. However, at the end of that paragraph, Holl’s attention was drawn to the humanity of the city. In his journal, he wrote:

Traditional instrument music blares very loudly into the street. Looking out to the river, I see boats crossing all over, back and forth. People on the riverfront doing sunrise Tai Chi. A woman crossing the street in a black dress with a white parasol tilted toward the morning sun, but it is so windy that the parasol is blown inside-out. She closes it. Several kites fly in the sky over the river. All this with only a few horns: the loud traditional music dominates over an occasional loud boat horn honk (truly an urban scene!) (Holl, 2007, 26).

Holl wrote about another experience the next morning after his arrival. His phrase in the parentheses, “truly an urban scene!”, is intriguing; I suggest this sentence has two layers of meaning: the first idea is that the traditional overpowers the modern while the second is that the scene demonstrated how rich urban activities can be and how conflicting ideas can mix harmoniously.

Beyond Cultural Boundary

On 23 August, 2003, Holl arrived at Nanjing for the forum. It was organised by the Japanese architect, Arata Isozaki, who is a friend of Holl. The project invited many architects from around the world to design exhibition pavilions at a rural site. This was Holl’s first architectural design in China. His first sketch was based on his understanding

20. The problem of a high unoccupancy rate is actually widely reported by the media. Around the period when Holl visited Shanghai in 2002, Morio (2006) found that the sold-but-empty rate in China was around 26%. The author also quoted former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s speech about his concern about the high vacancy rate and the real estate bubble.
of the axonometric perspective in Chinese painting to capture the essence of Chinese culture (Figure 25 and Figure 26). Holl’s intention to learn from different cultures seems clear. In the public forum, one of the most frequent questions that Chinese journalists asked Holl was how traditional Chinese culture would fit into contemporary Chinese architecture. These questions represented the struggle of Chinese local culture to persist in the face of globalism. The questions also demonstrated the anxiety and scepticism of the general public about the unusual-looking new urban developments following the shift to the open market economy. Holl answered those questions in his journal:

What about a new Lebanese architecture? A new Australian architecture? A new American Architecture? The issue of the local and the global is not to be solved in a shallow opposition between regionalism and globalisation. However, in some deeper considerations—more carefully considered relations—and with the architecture of our time, together on this earth, a focus. It is the dilemma of central concern in international exhibitions of this type—the six dynasty capital city of Nanjing and its relation to silk, China’s greatest export for centuries (Holl, 2007, 27).21

Beijing Linked Hybrid

On 20 August, 2003, Holl received a phone call from the developer in China. He was invited to participate in a project designing eight housing towers in Beijing. His first reaction to this call was concern about the scale of this architectural project in China. He wrote in his journal, “When a society like China is retooling, urban architecture should be

21. Steven Holl responded similarly to one of my interview questions. For more discussion about the East–West debate, please see Chapter 6.
Figure 25: Holl’s sketch of Nanjing Museum of Art and Architecture. In this sketch, Holl tried to use parallel projection axonometric to draw the architecture, and Chinese landscape ink-painting style to draw the mountains behind the architecture. (Sketch capture from Holl, 2010, 131).

[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]

Figure 26: Nanjing Museum of Art and Architecture. (Photo captured from Steven Holl Architects website).
one of its first concerns”. On 23 August, Holl and his Chinese partner, Li Hu, were invited to the developer’s office to discuss the potential housing project. The meeting was held on the fourth floor of a converted building, which used to be an office building of the paper mill in the northern industrial zone. After the project was presented by the president of the development company, Zhang Lei, the only comment noted by Holl in his journal was about the impossible schedule of the project—to be completed by 2006 so that it could be sold and rented out by 2008 for the Olympics. This requirement reminded Holl about his friend’s information about the incredible design speed requested by Chinese developers. After the meeting, Holl and his team were given a tour of the first phase of the development in the southern zone, Wanguocheng MOMA. Holl expressed his disagreement with the postmodern style and the typical introverted housing community. He described it as a “depressingly anti-urban work” (Holl, 2007, 27). In contrast, he proposed his own idea to the developer: open, urban architecture with a real public dimension. The vision of the architecture should set a new example for Beijing. The following statement about this new idea marked the cornerstone of the development:

A fragment of a city within a city with all functions needed to live, work and recreate without needing to get in a car and drive (Holl, 2007, 27).

22. Although this schedule was set up, the major construction work of Linked Hybrid was finished in 2009, after the Olympics. The government requested the developer to finish the exterior of the architecture before the Olympics.
Walling Linked Hybrid by Occupants

Having now seen some protagonists from both the old factory community, Beijing First Paper Mill, and the new proposed residential community, Linked Hybrid, it is interesting to note how the idea for a modern community, which was described by the factory worker, Li Long, echoes the intentions of the developer; and, equally interesting, how Steven Holl interpreted the project in his own way. To recall Holl's intention, the housing complex was originally designed as an open community, so that spaces and programmes in the community could be shared with its neighbourhood. The Chinese residents, however, did not appreciate Holl's intended architectural innovation. They felt that the design was antithetical to their ideas about what a housing community should be. Consequently, they transformed and appropriated the architecture, turning it back into a closed and big compound community, or dayuan in Chinese. It is the attempt to understand the nature of this antagonism between Holl's architectural intentions and the responses of the local people from both the old factory community and the new residential community; as well as the resulting processes of conflict, change, and adaptation, which is the topic of my study and the reason for the development of my research approach and methods. At times, my topic and my research strategies overlapped, as with the concept of guanxi. Concerning guanxi, I studied, for example, the system of control of the entrances around both the workers' community and the Linked Hybrid community during several field visits. On 16 December, 2008, I was conducting fieldwork around and inside the Linked Hybrid community. At the beginning, the research was not interrupted, even though some security guards saw that I was taking pictures of the community. However, later on, the guard at the entrance started to ask
what I was doing. He told me that the reason for not allowing me to enter the Linked Hybrid community was due to the community regulations. The following year in 2009, I was involved in the organisation of a public event in the Linked Hybrid community from 13 to 19 March, 2009, with the senior operating manager of Modern Group Development Company, Wang Jingli. During this period, I attempted to enter the community in different ways. On 13 March, Wang Jingli tried to bring me to the theatres which are located at the centre of the complex, in order to let me see the venue of the event. We walked together from the development company, located at Wangguocheng MOMA, across the river and under the airport expressway bridge, to the south gate of Linked Hybrid. A security guard was standing at the entrance. When he saw me, he tried to stop me. Before he started talking, Wang Jingli said, ‘zijiren’ (our people). The guard then smiled to me and walked back to his stand. On 17 March, at 9:30 a.m. in the morning, I was supposed to meet Wang Jingli again for the event, but this time the meeting place was in Linked Hybrid. I drove into the community by myself. There was one security guard standing at the entrance. He did not stop the car but just observed me from a distance. After I parked the car inside the community, another security guard walked towards me and asked if I was going to the sales office, which is located by the other entrance of Linked Hybrid. I told him that I was going to have a meeting with someone from the development company. He did not inquire further and instructed me to park the car in a designated spot. On 19 March, I drove into the complex again for the event. Because the management and security offices had been informed that there was a public event in the community on that day, the security guard did not prohibit me from entering the complex, but he did keep a watchful eye on me from a distance. These fieldwork
experiences revealed that the control system at Linked Hybrid was based on another important Chinese concept, *guanxi*, which I will discuss further in the next chapter. The categorisation by Wang Li of me as ‘*zijiren*’ placed me inside their own social circles, or more precisely their *guanxi* network. Therefore, I was allowed to ‘get things done’.23

As to the system of control of entrances at the new community of Linked Hybrid, there were two main steps in closing the open community designed by Steven Holl. The first step was to tighten the control at the openings with intensive security. The vice president of the Modern Group Development Company, Chen Yin, explained that the architectural purpose of having bridges instead of walls was to show “openness” instead of “defensiveness”. However, this design introduced a number of unprecedented problems, particularly that of managing an open superblock community for upper-class residents. A strict system of control proved essential for managing such a community. Thus, the Linked Hybrid community was closed by a security guard system.

Holl’s design to eliminate walls and to provide public spaces in the Linked Hybrid compound had paradoxical consequences. During my fieldwork one day, I discussed these issues with a real estate agent who was selling apartments in the Linked Hybrid community. She mentioned how open the community was to show its difference from other housing products. However, she also had to mention the security system. To turn this into a selling point, she emphasised that tight security is a mark of a luxurious

23. See Ledeneva (2008, 122) for more discussion about the idea of being in someone else’s social circle in order to get things done. Particularly she wrote about the concept of *shouren* (familiar person) and *banshi* (get things done). The idea of *zijiren* is very similar to *shouren*. 

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lifestyle. About this paradoxical reality, the in-house architect of the development company, Ke Jin, said in an interview:

This is a very unusual design in China. The idea is to attract people to the community, especially the high-end customers. The design is very challenging for the developer, as it gives the developer a problem to solve: how to promote this open community concept and how to manage it. Gated communities in general tend to avoid these issues. Now we are thinking about how to operate those bridges, who is going to operate them, how to make it economically viable, and how to establish the interactions between residents, retail shops, and cinemas and so on, rather than make them function on their own (Ke Jin, personal communication, 15 January, 2009).

Other paradoxical results were the provision of public space in a private community, the issue of managing those public spaces, and of making public space economically viable. A community with good management is a representation of luxury, social prestige, and higher status in China (Wu F., 2005). The management of the public bridges, three towers, and theatre in the Linked Hybrid community was to be subcontracted to a five-star hotel and a cinema company from Hong Kong, respectively. In other words, some of the public spaces needed to be privatised even before they were open to the public. Ke Jin raised concerns about emphasising the community as open as it was very unusual in the market. In his opinion, it was very risky for a developer to sell an openly accessible community. The developer eventually could not resist the pressures from the clients and

24. The selection of the hotel management has not yet been decided as of October, 2011.
the management office to close the community, even though some of the important staff members in the development company wished to maintain the open design.

But the residents’ appropriation also indicates that the idea of an open community goes fundamentally against the Chinese perception of a desirable living environment. In one of Linked Hybrid’s sales publications, the concept of public space has been interpreted as communal space linking residents from different towers together and creating a shared community (Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 2). A membership system was introduced to make sure the users of the public spaces, such as the theatres at the centre of the complex, were all high-class customers. The system was designed for those who could afford to buy property from the development company. With this system established, luxury service providers and retailers can find a reason for locating their businesses in this community. In other words, the commercialisation of public space makes the notion of an open community marketable to a certain social class. The shared perceptions of the developer’s management office and of the residents essentially reclaimed Holl’s conceptualization of space.

This led to a second step in 2009, which was much more radical. Linked Hybrid was further appropriated by adding architectural structures and ornamentation (Figure 27 and Figure 28). The developer and the management office changed some small details of the building to diminish the sense of modern architecture. These interventions included the addition of wood craftsmanship to the metal door-handles and the interiors of the elevators, and installing Chinese-style wood furniture in the interior spaces of the public lobbies and the theatre (Figure 32). The intention behind these changes was to accommodate the demands of the market because the development company was
concerned that the modernistic style was “too cold” for the potential tenants (Li Hu, personal communication, 17 September, 2009). Other than these decorations, the residents also requested that a wall be added to enclose the open community (Figure 29 and Figure 30). In July 2009, a traditional Chinese-style wall was constructed. Holl refused to design the wall, so the developers contracted a Chinese architect and his wife, a Chinese architectural historian. The construction of the wall was in the style of the Ming dynasty, with delicate wood construction details (Figure 31).

Workers: Justifying the Wall Construction

How did the residents from the workers community react to this wall? In my interviews with them, they justified using a wall to separate them from the upper class. Before further discussion, we should understand the general demographic background of the workers’ community. Many of the workers and ex-workers, at the paper mill have very limited formal education. They gave up school and joined the factory during the Cultural Revolution or were assigned to do so by the government, as in the case of Shao Xiao, whom we met at the beginning of this research. Even though they could have continued their education in the 1990s, when the economy was growing rapidly, they could not afford to take advantage of the opportunity. Additionally, the residents of the paper mill workers’ community were basically all near or past retirement age at this time. This was because eligibility for housing in the workers’ community was based on the number of years of service to the factory.

25. The story of Zhou Guangquan and his wife (Chapter 5) is a good example of the education situation of the workers.
Figure 27: Construction of the wall. (Photo the author, 13 July, 2009).

Figure 28: New wall and gate constructed to enclose Linked hybrid. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009).
Figure 29: Linked Hybrid without wall before August, 2009. (Photo the author, 16 December, 2008).

Figure 30: Linked Hybrid with wall after August, 2009. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009).
Figure 31: Ming-dynasty style wall with wood craftsmanship details. (Photo the author, 13 July, 2009).

Figure 32: Interior intervention of elevators in Linked Hybrid. (Photo the author, 14, September, 2009.)
When I raised concern about the new wall, former factory worker Wang Ji did not react to the question directly. Instead he began by explaining the differences between his own community and the new community. He called his community *jicengfang* (grassroots housing) and the new community *gongyu* (high-end condominium). His perspective of the Linked Hybrid community was based on his daily observations in the restaurant in the surrounding area where he worked; he noticed that many residents living in the new community were Westerners, especially Russian. The only person he knew from the new community was his boss at the restaurant where he worked. He also described how the new community had private elevators for some particular luxury apartments, and the neighbours seemed to be more distant from each other. He said, “even when they meet, they seem to not know each other, and they do not even nod their heads”. Because of the physical wall between his community and Linked Hybrid, and the psychological wall between his social class and the higher social class in Linked Hybrid, these descriptions are based on Wang Ji’s imagination.

The housing manager, Qiu Lai, also described the two communities as belonging to two different *dangci*, or levels of social class. He speculated that there would be no connection between these two communities due to the difference in *dangci*. The developer would not open the Linked Hybrid community to them, but they might open it to the south, where their other development projects (MOMA phase 1 to 3, also see Figure 1 and Figure 2) are located. Qiu Lai speculated that the clubhouse and the theatres would never be open to them. During his meeting with the developer at the new community’s clubhouse, the housing manager representing the workers’ community pointed out that the prices at the restaurant were not accessible to the general population.
He perceived that, on the one hand, the developer did not want to mix their upper-class community with the workers’ community, because they belong to two different dangci; and, on the other hand, that residents from the workers’ community could not afford the consumption level of the new community. Due to the tightened security system of the new community, the residents from the workers’ community could only speculate about the new urban space through indirect social networks. The closed community prevented the residents from the workers’ community from interacting with the residents in the new community.

Contrasting the workers’ community to the Linked Hybrid community, the walls and gates of workers’ community do not imply control because everyone can walk in freely. Although Qiu Lai mentioned that the community is co-managed by an external management office and the residents’ committee (jumin weiyuanhui), strangers could easily enter the community. The social homogeneity and the tight-knit social networks—the residents know each other very well (Feng L., 1989)—of this kind of work-unit community provides a system of control through the guanxi informal social network. The housing manager stated that the increasing diversification of the community’s demography was making the management more difficult. By comparing the two cases of the workers’ community and the Linked Hybrid respectively, it is clear that the walls and the gates in both cases do not only provide a real physical barrier; rather, they create a symbolic division of the communities. I found it interesting that both Wang Ji and Qiu Lai actually justified the building of the Linked Hybrid’s wall in order to separate them from the new community. The workers naturally put themselves into a different dangci from those living in the Linked Hybrid community.
Architects: Absurd Urbanism

When I interviewed Steven Holl (12 October, 2010), he appeared to be indifferent to the wall. However, architects in his Beijing office were critical and even angry about the addition of the wall. The project manager of Linked Hybrid, a Japanese architect called Hedeki Hirahara, expressed his frustration with the change in the project:

It does not only happen in China, all the countries are the same: the architects’ dimension [conflicts with] the developer’s dimension. The project needs to be productive—this must be understood. First, they want to make a profit, which is the main issue, and second…to realise the project…. We reduce the floor area and use some of the floor area for public space so that it can engage people [the public], such as by having schools [on the ground floor], and make the sky [floor] do the same thing. And also, in our concept, we try to open [the superblock] to the public because it ends up being a city within a city; this can keep the life of our city alive, right? …[Today], their interest in this project is totally different. So the cinema, [managed by a company] from Hong Kong, will open in the Chinese New Year. And now also the developer wants the Hyatt to manage all the apartments in the three towers.26 They are also interested in the swimming pool, the gym, and the bar. It is not finalised yet, but we are having so many meetings already. But the issue is totally different. If [the superblock] is closed, the original project is lost. If we can keep it open, it

26. During the time of the interview with Li Hu, Hyatt was the most possible hotel management company to take over Linked Hybrid management. However, the selection was not confirmed yet.
will be so different (Hedeki Hirahara, personal communication, 13 January, 2008).\textsuperscript{27}

Even the developer, Chen Yin, the primary supporter of Holl’s novel design, expressed his disappointment to me during a private discussion on the Linked Hybrid bridges.\textsuperscript{28} But he could not continue to maintain the original design against the louder voices of opposition in the office and the market, mainly from the younger-generation leadership.

This is certainly not the first time that residents have appropriated an architect’s design.\textsuperscript{29} Still, opposition to the addition of the wall did exist, and one prominent critic was Liang Jingyu, an occupant of the Linked Hybrid community and one of the most avant-garde architects and spatial artists in Beijing.\textsuperscript{30} He is very interested in critical theory, especially the discussion of the public sphere in modern China. When I visited his office at Linked Hybrid, there were four to five staff members working in his living room.

\textsuperscript{27} Hedeki was the project manager of Linked Hybrid in Steven Holl’s Beijing office. He is originally from Japan.
\textsuperscript{28} Chen Yin is the vice president of the Modern Group Development Company. We came in contact after I translated a few symposia and forums for him. The day of the discussion was not an official interview. I was walking with several students from Columbia University for a site visit at the Linked Hybrid community, and Chen Yin was walking from his office across the street of the community to meet with the management office. He recognised me because of the public events. He was afraid that our visit would be interrupted by the management office, so he took us to the elevator and the public floor on the bridge. He mentioned that he was disappointed about the addition of the wall and frustrated by the tightened security requested by the residents. However, he could not do much about the situation because of the internal politics in the development company.
\textsuperscript{29} A classic case is the occupants’ modification of the Pessac development designed by Le Corbusier (Boudon, 1972). More discussion about appropriation of architectural designs by users can be found in the ‘flexibility’ idea proposed by Forty (2000).
\textsuperscript{30} Liang Jingyu was working in Linked Hybrid when I interviewed him in December, 2009. However, he left Linked Hybrid in December, 2010.
He explained that one of the reasons that he moved his office to Linked Hybrid, other than the architectural design, was because the community was designed to be open. The enclosure of the community brought with it some inconvenience, as visitors and staff always needed to report to the security guards. His thought was that walls, gates, and public spaces in China are the expression of the absurdity of modern Chinese society: “the developers are unaware of the implications of the wall and the gate, but they just build them” (Liang Jingyu, personal communication, 14 September, 2008). Li Hu, the Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, expressed a similar view. In my interview with him, he stated that

sometimes, when something is really absurd, it becomes humorous. Good-looking or bad-looking is irrelevant, because it is absurd. This consequence [of enclosing Linked Hybrid with a Chinese postmodern-style wall] is perhaps better than if the developer really finds a good architectural office, such as Urbanus, to do it. Because at least everyone feels absurd, so I think this ending is good. [Laughs.] If they build the [more modern style] gate on our side of Linked Hybrid, that would be a disaster, and that is worse than absurd. In that case [the architecture] would be like a comedy movie—the Linked Hybrid comedy. I think that many things that the developer is doing now belong to this comedy movie (Li Hu, personal communication, 15 July, 2009).

Liang Jingyu’s and Li Hu’s explanations demonstrated a type of thinking in China which criticises the use of walls in contemporary China. Specially, they believe that developers, residents, and some architects support this practice for no good reason.

31. Urbanus is a Chinese private architectural office in Shenzhen and Beijing.
However, is the Chinese practice of walling really without a reason? I will suggest another concept, *shanzhai*, to explore this question in detail in Chapter 6 by locating it in its Chinese context. However, in this section, I would like to reveal another irony in the Linked Hybrid reality: the workers, who have been excluded by the wall, justified the wall; but the users of Linked Hybrid criticised the wall, which is supposed to protect them from the lower *dangci* social class. If we can analyse this ironic reality closely, we can also perceive the background of the residents of Linked Hybrid, given that the background of the workers was usually their socialist *danwei* working experience and *dayuan* lifestyle. Conversely, the young elites, like Liang Jingyu, who can afford Linked Hybrid, are usually educated internationally with more foreign ideologies.

**Steven Holl: Designing Timeless Architecture**

Steven Holl was surprisingly indifferent to the appropriation of his design by the users:

> This project will stand for one hundred years, and who knows what kind of frustration the government leadership will have. So try to build the best possible building, the highest sustainability and the most public space, and hope the ethical climate of the leadership in China improves (Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 October, 2010).

He argued that, compared to the of time scale of political regimes, architecture should be seen as apolitical. However, Holl was actually very aware of the problems of China’s urban development. He stated in the interview that he had three principles when practicing architecture in China: (a) never demolishing an existing residential community,
(b) never mistreating workers, and (c) being highly selective in choosing projects with potential (Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 October, 2010). Additionally, he also refused to only design the façade of the building, as he was asked to do by the developer at the beginning; instead, he proposed inserting his critical ideas about Chinese urbanism into the entire residential design. Thus, Holl attempted to demonstrate his individuality and criticality in his architectural practice. He was also very careful about developers using his name for the marketing purposes. However in reality, Holl’s name and reputation were used by the developer for marketing. Linked Hybrid received the ‘Ten Greatest Building’ awards from Business Week. The image of Linked Hybrid and Steven Holl were used in all marketing materials (Figure 33 and Figure 34).

However, he understood that it was because of his reputation that the developer agreed to follow his proposal. Open and shared public spaces, and other innovative ideas from the American design team, could only solve half the marketing problem for the developer. Those ideas could establish a different image in the market for the product, but the insistence on ideal concepts does not always coincide with the demands of the market. For Linked Hybrid, the developer needed to seek other ways to reconfigure a nostalgia for the past with a postmodern style.

Holl’s initial intentions to create a hybrid typology of architecture and to promote a pedestrian-friendly living environment with Linked Hybrid were widely disseminated

32. Li Hu proposed another reason why the developer agreed to try the new housing model. He thought that, due to the economic boom, the developer was willing to try anything at that time (personal communication, 17 September, 2009).
Figure 33: Reportage of Linked Hybrid as one of the ten greatest of China’s architecture in the marketing booklet of Linked Hybrid. The titles are “American Business Week Selected China’s 10 Architectural Miracles” (left) and “Dangdai MOMA [Linked Hybrid]: New Gateway Landmark, Sustainable City within City” (right). (Image captured from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 55-56).
Figure 34: One of the five special features of Linked Hybrid introduced by the developer. The translation of the title is: “Transnational Agent: Project by World Class Architectural Master and His Team, To Accomplish the Grandest Architectural Culture with Technology and International Horizon”. The other four special features are creativity (bridge design), heritage (neighbourhood making), new wave [trend] (international lift style), and art (object for collection). (Image capture from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Modern Group, n.d., n.p.).
in architectural circles. The intentions were straightforward and represented a fundamental critique of the phenomenon of Chinese urban sprawl and suburbanisation of the city. But eventually, Linked Hybrid was redeveloped as an enclosed and single-function luxury housing block. The project failed to achieve its explicit goal. Yet, despite the failure of its intention, Holl’s idea of designing the best architecture for the transformation of Chinese society has been, and is being, appropriated and adapted according to the concept of *shanzhai*, which I will introduce in the last chapter of this thesis. However, I need to look more in detail at those concepts of community, such as *dayuan*, that were mentioned by my informants during fieldwork, in order to see what lies behind them, which will lead to the next chapter, which is a study of *guanxi*.

**Implications of the Gate and the Wall**

Before the end of this chapter, there are two additional articles in the archival materials provided by propaganda cadre Zhang Lian that show interesting perspectives from different generations. One is from the paper-mill era and one is from the private-housing era. The similarity is that these two stories are both about conflicts at the gate.

In 1996, the northern gate (Figure 35) of the paper mill was guarded by a new, young migrant named Small Zhang. Small Zhang stopped a female worker on her bicycle

33. In the Chinese way of speaking, urban sprawl is called ‘*tandabing*’, or pan-frying a big pancake. Wu points out three forces operating within contemporary suburbanisation: first is housing development driven by land and housing reform; the second is developer-driven, luxury and low-density housing projects attracting upwardly mobile households; and the third is the development of new economic sectors from which arise suburban industrial development (Wu & Phelps, 2008). Luxury gated communities with a Western architectural style became the most popular product on the market in post-reform China, as living in such suburban gated communities and owning a car became a status symbol (Wu F., 2009).
at the gate and asked for her bicycle entrance permission. The woman did not respond to him and insisted on cycling into the factory. After giving her a full salute, Small Zhang told her that she was breaking the law. The woman used her bicycle to hit Small Zhang’s leg and refused to listen to him. The supervisor of the security team came to deal with the situation. Small Zhang sent the woman to his office and asked her to fill out a rule-violation form. Even though the woman became angrier, she had no choice but to sign the form and place her bicycle outside the factory under the pressure of a large crowd of spectators. The news article on the incident noted that the woman apologised for her behaviour the next day in front of her daughter (Jiuwei, 1996).

In 2009, ten years later, the management office of Wanguocheng MOMA decided to enclose their community.\(^{34}\) To change the management regulation, more gates and control systems needed to be built. At the main entrance of the southern end, a 40 meters wide entrance open to all traffic and pedestrians was changed to a 15 meters wide vehicle entrance for the garage. Pedestrians were requested to walk on a narrow road beside the main gate. Moreover, residents were asked to show their residence card to the guard (Figure 36). All of these modifications are very common in Chinese residential communities, but residents at Wanguocheng could not get used to the new system of control. Debates and quarrels occurred at the beginning at the gate between the security guard and the residents. During the last day of my stay in the MOMA community, the new rule was implemented. During my stay in Wanguocheng MOMA, I saw a few foreign residents complaining at the gate to the guard about the new system. These

\(^{34}\) At the same time, the Linked Hybrid community was also walled off to prevent public access to the complex.
Figure 35: Paper mill gate with security in the 1990s. The security guard was standing at the gate to control pedestrian and vehicular circulations. (Photo provided by Zhang Lian).

Figure 36: Wanguocheng MOMA gate control by a security guard. The security guard in the image stopped three people in front of the gate. They worked for a residential cleaning company. The security guard was waiting for confirmation from the resident through an intra-community telecommunication system. (Photo the author, 13 July, 2009).
residents did not bring their residents’ card, so the security guard did not allow them to enter. On an internet bulletin board, residents expressed their dissatisfaction with those changes to the management office. These modifications also motivated some residents to organise a residents’ committee.\(^{35}\)

The local view of gated communities is not so much a critique of capitalism but more a discussion about the conflicts between two power systems. On the one hand, the issue addresses the influence of the traditional legacy of power to govern and control the community (by the management office), and, on the other hand, the issue highlights the residents’ newly acquired power as consumers. The role of the security guard transformed as Chinese society moved from the socialist age to the market-economy age. Currently, security guards at residential units act as intermediaries between law-enforcement agencies and service-management agencies. The ubiquity of the security unit at the gated community was first encouraged by the government when the government tried to move some of its social responsibilities to individual communities due to the increase in the urban population and to rapid urban development. The architect occupant of Linked Hybrid, Liang Jingyu, explained through his own research that the government did not have enough labour power to maintain the security of all residences in the city under the new policy, so the management and security offices took on that role in individual communities.

\(^{35}\) In the online bulletin board, residents called the management office a “rogue manager” because the office was not controlled by the residents and the new modifications were very inconvenient for them (see, http://house.focus.cn/msgview/122/173797419.html, accessed on 5 January, 2010).
Chinese contemporary urban design has been widely studied by scholars. Four different approaches study Chinese urban form in the contemporary literature: from the perspective of history and anthropology (Bjorklund, 1986; Trewartha, 1952), from the perspective of planning (Lu D., 2006a; Lu D., 2006b; Miao, 2003; Wu F., 2005; Bray, 2005 and 2008; Yan & Gao, 2007), from the perspective of gated community crises (Blakely & Snyder, 1997; Giroir, 2006) and from the perspective of land transactions (Monson, 2008). All these research approaches try to explain the large-scale urban block development in China. This phenomenon was also criticised by Steven Holl when he designed Linked Hybrid. Gated communities, which are recognized in China as a product of capitalist development (Miao, 2003) – that is, the artificial segregation between bourgeois and working classes during the age of the industrial revolution (Souza, 2009) – is only one of many discussions. Research shows the social structure and the spatial organisation of the society has become more heterogeneous in the 2000s than in the 1980s (Feng, Wu, & Logan, 2008). Gating, policing, governance, and isolating communities are the most direct responses to the diversifying social structure in China: members of the upper classes attempt to differentiate themselves from the lower classes living next to them in the dense city (Soja, 2000). Fulong Wu and Webber (2004) understand that the gated-community phenomenon in China is not necessarily related to the issue of crime as it often is in the Western world. They first found that the use of the wall and the enclosed environment for foreign-immigrant housing in Beijing was due to income inequity, differences in social status, the quality of the construction of the housing, and the provision of a sense of community. Then, Fulong Wu (2005) in another study explained that the need for gates is mainly to assure higher selling prices because
the search for prestigious and exclusive areas is always the motivation behind renting and owning luxury villa estates. Once again the rapid real-estate market and the consumerist mentality triggered the appearance of the gate. But are these two trends really the source of the phenomenon of the gated community?

In the following chapter, I will further explore the notions of *dayuan* and *xiaqu*, and the notions of gate and wall, by considering the Chinese idea of *guanxi*. I will explain how, at Beijing First Paper Mill, *dayuan* style communities were formed on the basis of special *guanxi* networks, and how *guanxi* adapted to the new social structures and communities in contemporary China.
CHAPTER II

GUANXI

My Guanxi Network in the Research

Guanxi is a Chinese concept about the social practice of building personal relationships with other people. Yang (1994) described the practice of guanxi as involving the practices of exchanging gifts, favours, and banquets; the cultivation of personal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and, more importantly, the creation of obligations and the avoidance of direct confrontation. Guanxi does not only explain many subtle social and cultural phenomena, it can also be an important strategy of research (So & Walker, 2006).

Field research in China always requires special fieldwork adaptations to be sensitive to the local culture. For instance, Ole Bruun (1993) discussed a bureaucratic obstacle that prevented the researcher from reaching a certain

36. A common reaction when I presented this chapter at conferences was the comparison of the Chinese guanxi phenomenon with Western or international interpersonal relationships, particularly in the field of business and political studies. Questions were often about the uniqueness of the guanxi system given certain similarities with international business and political practices. Indeed, many phenomena in the following section, including the referral system for this research, the cultural sense of obligation, the indirect style of presenting gifts, being superstitious, and presenting uncritical ideas in front of senior supervisors can be found in many cultures throughout the world. However, this thesis attempts to provide an indigenous explanation of these phenomena in order to further develop the field’s knowledge by providing a specifically Chinese perspective. Moreover, guanxi is still a complex and ambiguous concept to explain because such explanations are a collection of theories from different disciplines, such as social-exchange theory to explain gift giving, such as power dependence to explain transactions of individual agency to others, or transaction cost analysis (TCA) to explain concepts of exchange and equality behind guanxi. See Wong & Leung, 2001, Chapter 2 for more discussion about Western perspectives on Chinese relationships between organisations. I argue that those theories do not consider emotional aspects, the concept of saving face, and favouritism. Guanxi theory develops the less rational side of social relations.
depth of society. Throughout Chinese history, ordinary people have made use of *guanxi* to bypass the bureaucratic obstacles in both Chinese imperial and socialist societies. Businesses have also used it to increase the efficiency of their operations in the market.\(^{37}\)

For scholars to be able to access information from a given community, they also need to participate in the *guanxi* system.

So and Walker (2006) introduced two methods of achieving *guanxi*: prescriptive sources and achieved sources. The former relates to inborn relationships such as those of kinship, hometown or village, and even with people of the same dialect; whereas the latter come from relationships with classmates, co-workers, neighbours, and from superior-subordinate relations. The objective of both types of *guanxi* is to achieve a ‘category of sameness’ with others (Landa, 1981, 1983). There is no prioritisation between prescriptive (or kinship) *guanxi* and achieved *guanxi*: this means that family relations and social relations are considered equally important, which facilitates the instrumentalisation process of *guanxi*.

Because the art of *guanxi* is about both appropriately positioning oneself within, and manipulating, the dynamics of interpersonal relations, the practice of maintaining this dynamic social system is as important as the act of achieving it (for political and social positions). To maintain a *guanxi* relationship, exchanging favours, giving gifts, and inviting others to banquets is essential (Yang, 1994). This process should be continuous and consistent. Once *guanxi* is not maintained for a long period, the interpersonal bond will break.

\(^{37}\) See Y. Luo (2000) for a discussion about the relation between business and *guanxi*. 
My Guanxi in the Research

Staff members of the old Beijing First Paper Mill were connected to me through one of my family members, Shao Xiao, who used to work in Beijing First Paper Mill until the early 1990s. In Shao Xiao’s guanxi network, Wang Ji, Zhang Lian and Qiu Lai are important members.

First, Wang Ji used to be a close friend of Shao Xiao. They worked together for twenty years in the same team since the 1970s. Wang Ji was an electrician at the paper mill. After he was laid off in the late 1990s, he repaired electronic appliances for several other factories. In early 2000, he started a new career as a restaurant procurement (Figure 37). In the 1990s, his flat was a reward for his excellent performance (a model worker award) at the paper mill. In 2009, he was asked to rejoin the new paper mill at its new location. Wang Ji lives with his wife and his daughter in the workers’ community.

Second, Zhang Lian is a cadre of the paper mill’s propaganda department (Figure 38). He used to serve in the army before he entered the factory in the 1970s. Because of his military background and his advanced writing skills, he was assigned to work in the propaganda department. He was one of a few old staff members to work at the new location. Zhang Lian lives with his wife in the workers’ community. His son has just moved away from home.

Third, Qiu Lai used to be the human resource department supervisor in the paper mill, managing my relative and Wang Ji. Qiu Lai’s original responsibility in the paper mill was to assess the performance of the other workers. After the industrial reform in the 1990s, he changed positions to the housing management department to manage the workers’ dormitory and set up housing policies (Figure 39). Eventually, Qiu Lai gave up his apartment in the workers’ community, and currently he
Figure 37: The restaurant that Wang Ji is working at. Wang Ji works in this restaurant currently. He spends six hours every night to take care of the procurement of raw materials for the restaurant. After our first meeting, he invited me to come to his restaurant. (Photo the author, 17 June, 2009).

[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]

Figure 38: Zhang Lian’s office at the new paper mill campus. He shares this office room with another colleague. In his office, there was a discussion area with sofas and coffee table. (Photo the author, 21 June, 2009).
Figure 39: Qiu Lai’s office in the workers’ community. Qiu Lai is the housing manager of the workers’ community. His office is located in the basement of one the buildings in the workers’ community. (Photo the author, 18 June, 2009).
lives in an affordable-housing community in Tiantongyuan. He drove every day to the workers’ community to work at the management office.

I mainly obtained information about the workers’ community from these three former or current workers from the paper mill. My family connection was the most effective way for me to participate in the workers’ community. I conducted interviews and home visits with the worker informants to understand their reactions to different stages of the spatial development process. Part of Zhang Lian’s work is to record the history of the paper mill. Therefore, he is the major source of the historical background of the site. Qiu Lai, as the housing manager, is the only person linking the two communities together. His information is essential for the analysis of intercommunity dynamics. These informants’ interviews helped me to assemble the majority of the information in this chapter.

Archiving and Maintaining Guanxi in Research

As researchers, how can we facilitate field research in China with the practice of guanxi? This question touches a fundamental concept in ethnographic research—being an insider in a social circle. This topic was central to this research because one of my objectives was to understand how insiders think about their built environment.

Many ethnographers, such as Solinger (2006), have recognised that guanxi is an essential concept in conducting research in China. Even quantitative researchers need to go through certain personal referrals or guanxi to obtain reliable and complete datasets. In this sense, it is important for me to define my role and relationships with all of the study’s informants. As mentioned above, Shao Xiao worked in the factory. Through her guanxi, I
was able to connect with Wang Ji (a close family friend and long-time co-worker of my relative) and thus the housing manager Qiu Lai (a former supervisor of my relative) and the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian. Moreover, through Shao Xiao, I had met all of these people during my childhood. With a reference from an insider who had known the workers’ community members for a long time, I was immediately considered an insider in the community. The propaganda cadre Zhang Lian said, when I first met him in the winter of 2008, that a “relative of a former co-worker should be helped.”

To work within the guanxi system, I had to handle the relationships appropriately. As one of the seven features of guanxi suggested by Y. Luo (2000), the concept of ‘context specialty’ is the most difficult one to handle appropriately. The same action may have different meanings in different situations. Because guanxi requires intentional intangibility or indirectness, the actual intention of giving a gift is usually manifold, but always justified. For example, to maintain my guanxi with my worker informants, I also practiced guanxi by purchasing chocolates for them from Belgium to express my thanks for providing information for my research and to ask them to continue to help in the research process. However, telling them that I intentionally bought the chocolates for them would overemphasise the guanxi practice. To be more appropriate and indirect about setting up a guanxi relationship with them, I gave them the gifts during the Mid Autumn Festival in September and told them that I found the gifts when I was travelling. My relative even called me to tell me the strategy of presenting the gift. By doing so, the

38. Y. Luo (2000) used the example of a worker giving a cigarette to his boss. This action is acceptable if the boss and spouse just had a baby. The action is important if the worker is up for a promotion. However, the action is considered a bribe if, for instance, the worker’s shiftless brother-in-law needs a job.
meaning of a gift is manifold. First, I was expressing that I wanted to build an intimate relationship with them. Second, the gifts were instrumental as an exchange for further help. Finally, giving the gift during a festival provided a justification for the action. Their acceptance of the gifts meant an agreement to develop a personal relationship with me and a confirmation for further help, but these words did not need to be spoken out.

Another example is that, when I first met Wang Ji for my research project, he paid for the coffee at the cafeteria in a hotel for both of us. When I met him again in the restaurant where he was working, he paid the bill secretly. The reason why he treated me to all these meals was because of his relationship to my relative. For my relative, Wang Ji would be seen as an honest and generous person. These two meals gave me a reason to meet and talk to him, because I needed to return his kindness. Through the exchange of gifts and favours on several occasions, we had more opportunity to communicate and thus cultivate a stronger guanxi bond.

Two Languages in the Field of China

The implication of fabricating guanxi with informants is linked directly to the technique of interviews in the Chinese context. One of the immediate differences made for different types of guanxi is the different types of language spoken in conversation. For example, the housing manager Qiu Lai always tried to avoid political comments. The in-house architect at the development company, Ke Jin, framed every issue of the development positively in the interview. How can we assess the true reactions of these informants?
Thøgersen (2006) discussed two types of language in Chinese society: baixing-nese and ganbu-nese. Ganbu-nese, comes from the word ganbu, or cadre, and refers to language or interpretation that has been modified to achieve the political and ritual appropriateness. This type of language is spoken during public occasions or to people who are not trusted. Baixing-nese comes from the word baixing, or ordinary people, and refers to a language of criticism and wisdom from the very bottom level of society. These two language systems are not restricted by who the speaker is, because both ordinary people and cadres can choose to speak in either type of language. In Thøgersen’s article (2006), his naming of these two language styles may lead to the misunderstanding that ganbu-nese only belongs to cadres (ganbu) and baixing-nese only belongs to ordinary people (laobaixing). In my research, ex-worker peasants were able to speak in ganbu-nese if they felt uncomfortable being critical towards a system, and a propaganda official could speak in baixing-nese if he felt secure and the audience was trusted.

The condition of choosing which language system depends on the guanxi between the speaker and the audience. A closer informant-researcher guanxi facilitates a stronger insider sense for the researcher with the informant’s community. Therefore, the conversation can be more informal, and thus closer to the tone of baixing-nese. Usually a situation involving more people, especially the public, will end up with a more formal tone of conversation, or tends to be closer to the tone of ganbu-nese. Moreover, the higher the political position the individual occupies, the more careful the individual is, and thus more formal ganbu language is used.

During one of my interviews with Zhang Lian in the spring of 2009, the manager of the factory suddenly stopped by Zhang Lian’s room and joined the conversation.
Before the manager came, Zhang Lian was describing the situation and the demographic composition of the new factory. The manager might have known that we were talking about the reform of the factory. He then interrupted Zhang Lian by telling me how Zhang Lian was experienced in the topic of state-owned enterprise reform because he had been involved in it for more than forty years. The manager also directed the topic towards how difficult it was for them to purchase properties in the city and compete with the wealthier national and international newcomers to Beijing. Finally, he touched the relatively sensitive topic of layoffs. The following is part of our conversation:

Researcher: Is it [the high property price in the market] a problem for you?
Manager: This is not a problem, but I think this is the trend. Survival of the fittest. Incomers are hardworking and they work nonstop. I talked to some of them. They told me that the locals of Beijing only know how to daydream; they always expect to pick up gold from the street. Incomers use their sewing machines to earn cent by cent. In the 2002 reform of our factory, the average compensation for one year of service at the factory was 2,750 yuan. If I have thirty years of service at the factory, I can make around thirty thousand yuan.

Zhang Lian: Take me as an example. If I was ‘distributed (fenliu)’ in 2002, and I have served for thirty-three years, I could make ninety-seven thousand yuan.
Manager: That’s right. During that time, it was the hottest time of the year. On the street, 90 per cent of the people who wore suits and walked their dogs were from the factory. After getting some money, they were too excited to even know which side is the north [you dianqian jiu zhaobuzhao bei le].

[Manager leaves]
Zhang Lian: He is the current manager at the marketing department and used to be the manager of Beijing First Paper Mill. He’s right, the change was dramatic. More than two thousand workers were involved in the personnel redistribution movement \textit{[renyuan fenliu]} at that time. Researcher: What is a personnel redistribution movement? Zhang Lian: It means to terminate the labour-enterprise relationship \textit{[jiechu laozi guanxi]} by paying you some money, or ‘buying out’ the contract \textit{[maiduan gongling]}. It is forbidden to use this term now. All machines were stopped at that time, so we did not need such a big team of workers. Only some thirty people were kept as the backbone; all those others left after taking the money. They become free agents and controlled by the government street office. The overall redistribution movement involved more than ten thousand workers.

When the meaning of \textit{renyuan fenliu} (personnel redistribution) was mentioned, Zhang Lian suggested two other synonyms, \textit{jiechu laozi guanxi} (contract elimination) and \textit{maiduan gongling} (contract buy-out). \textit{Maiduan gongling} is \textit{baixing}-nese because it precisely criticises the business monetary notion behind the layoff. Zhang Lian explained that it was forbidden to mention the term. \textit{Renyuan fenliu} or \textit{jiechu laozi guanxi} are \textit{ganbu}-nese because they sound more neutral. These terms can be found in official writings and speech transcripts. Contract buy-out connects monetary compensation to the moral idea of serving the enterprise. As a propaganda official, Zhang Lian knows how to speak in \textit{ganbu}-nese. Even in front of other staff members at the factory, he adjusted his language and spoke appropriately in certain situations. After the manager left, he could talk in the more critical \textit{baixing}-nese.

The intention of discussing the difference between the official and informal languages here is not simply to articulate the specificity of the distinction of two
languages in Chinese society. Rather, I would like to introduce the implications behind these two languages and apply these to the interviews. Moreover, the discussion also implies a certain research strategy, that of being, to some extent, an insider to the community.

Becoming an Insider

My family member’s connection to Zhang Lian, as well as to all other worker informants, facilitated shifting their language from the neutral *ganbu*-nese to the more critical *baixing*-nese because it was the language in which my family member and the other workers spoke to each other. The intimacy or the strong *guanxi* between my family member and the workers was transferred to the relations between the workers and to me. To conduct research in China, participation in the *guanxi* system is very important because it is one of the most efficient ways to allow people to speak in *baixing*-nese. What is the mechanism behind this referral system, which immediately transferred the workers’ trust of my family member to me? In this case, a personal reference is a fundamental way to achieve *guanxi*. In this referral system, Person A can establish some *guanxi* relations with Person B through X. X as the middleman takes all the responsibility of A for B, which means if the *guanxi* dynamic between A and B is bad, X will be blamed. However, the accountability of X also facilitates the transfer of the strong *guanxi* between X and B to the relationship between A and B.

This *guanxi* transaction system has two implications for conducting research in China. First, X’s referral in the *guanxi* system is both constrained and enabled by the Confucian culture. The responsibility of B is reinforced by the Confucian teachings of
righteousness and sincerity. Therefore, a poor reference is a sign that X cannot handle his interpersonal relations properly. The blame comes not only from a moralist point of view, but also from a realist point of view— that X is not a complete human being to work with. Therefore, this moral reading of guanxi differentiates from simple nepotism. The referral system is also enabled by the Confucian teachings that the capacity of referring (as in X’s case) is a representation of X’s more powerful agency. X is referring A to B, probably at the request of A. In this sense, the better interpersonal connection of X represents a more complete human being than A, and this directly adds value to the agency of X. If we examine the situation closely and consider guanxi as a power system, the power of B is transmitted implicitly to X and is devolved on A. In short, the connection of X to B comes from X’s social capital,\textsuperscript{39} which it is possible to transform to economic (monetary) or political (power) capital. This implies that the more connections one has, especially with the upper levels of the power system, the more social capital one will have.

**Understanding Baixing-nese**

When I was conducting fieldwork at the workers’ community in 2010 summer, a 40-year-old man, who made his living hawking fruits illegally at the gate of the community with his family, spoke to me. Perhaps he did this because I had some foreign friends walking with me. I told him my friends were tourists visiting the city and I was

\textsuperscript{39} The idea of ‘social capital’ was proposed by Bourdieu as an expansion of ‘capital’ from the economic sense (see Bourdieu, 1986). Smart suggested that ‘capital’ included economic capital, symbolic capital, social capital and cultural capital. Among them social capital is defined as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition … a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986, 249; quoted by Smart, 1993, 393).
showing them some local communities to understand Chinese society. The hawker then spontaneously launched into his story. He used to work in the paper mill factory. After the reform, he was laid off. He could not find a job, so he started to sell fruits at the entrance gate to other units. He described his type of job as a self-sought profession, or *zimo zhiye* in his own words.

*Zimo zhiye* is not a formal language, although it sounds like it. The illegal hawker’s use of this term carried an ironic connotation. In the Chinese language, a four-character idiom or set phrase usually expresses something profound. Following this logic, the four-character terms *zimo zhiye* (自谋职业) meant something beyond simply a description of his freelance profession. One thing is clear about this ironic phrase: the hawker was not content with his current situation after the transformation of society, but he felt helpless about his situation. In this thesis, I will also examine the meanings that hide between the lines of the residents’ speech, and in this way I seek to explain the emergence of some important ideas in contemporary China, such as ‘consumerism’, ‘market’, and ‘modernity’. These ideas actively interact with and shape the built environment.

The two fieldwork languages I mentioned before, *ganbu*-nese and *baixing*-nese, represent the strategy of how the public reacts to governmental politics. *Ganbu*-nese tends to hide unwanted phenomena. Even in the majority of Chinese academic essays, *ganbu*-nese is the mainstream and appropriate language to use. However, if we attempt to read between the lines of the *ganbu*-nese, the concept of *harmony* (*hexie*) become more ironic, because it represents the appearance but not the reality of society. I will discuss
this in detail in chapter 3. The other implication of *baixing*-nese is that this daily language contributes to the making of some specifically Chinese concepts.

**Dayuan Style Guanxi**

Qiu Lai, the housing manager at the workers’ community, met with the representative from the Linked Hybrid development company several times to coordinate between the two gated communities of the paper mill and Linked Hybrid. These two communities were separated by a brick wall, which used to separate the residential zone and the manufacture zone of the socialist paper mill. Qiu Lai was also invited to a banquet at the clubhouse of the new development, which was the only time Qiu Lai entered the new community adjacent to his lower-class workers’ community. Due to his special position as the only mediator for the workers’ community and the development company, he was given special treatment by the development company. Qiu Lai mentioned many times to me that he was close to many staff members from the development company, especially the construction department manager, because they needed to work together to coordinate many issues during the construction period. Previous tasks that brought them together included fixing the plumbing system of the workers’ community, which had been damaged by the construction of Linked Hybrid, and borrowing a piece of land from the workers’ community to allow trucks to enter the construction site.

Qiu Lai described that his *guanxi* with these staff members used to be very good. Qiu Lai did not receive favouritism personally per se; rather, he was treated specially because of his *guanxi* with the management office. The development company paid for
the replacement of all of the steel gates of the building entrances at the workers’ community. The development company also helped the workers’ community renovate the bicycle parking canopy and the storage structure (Figure 40 and Figure 41). The wall between the new and workers’ community was also repainted by the development company. This extra support helped Qiu Lai’s management office save a large amount of money to improve the workers’ community. The development company restructured after the successful development of Linked Hybrid, and new-generation leaders, usually with international backgrounds, replaced the old-generation leaders. Qiu Lai mentioned that his guanxi with the new-generation leaders at the development company was not as friendly as before. Why?

Qiu Lai blamed the worsening guanxi on the lack of a state-owned danwei background among the new leaders in the development company. Specifically, the new set of social dynamics by young professionals caused the guanxi communication system between Qiu Lai and the development company to break down. This somewhat subtle transformation raises several important questions about the construction of contemporary Chinese communities and urbanism in general. First, how was this interpersonal dynamic of guanxi formed in and between communities in the socialist period? Second, how does
Figure 40: Bicycle canopy before renovation. The old bicycle storage structure is highlighted in the image. Only part of it had a roof. (Photo the author, 16 June, 2009).

Figure 41: Bicycle canopy after renovation. The new bicycle storage structure, in the highlighted area, was renovated and painted, and has a complete roof. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).
the guanxi system transform and influence the urban-development process in the contemporary period?

Let us start with the first question: how was this interpersonal dynamic of guanxi formed in and between workers’ communities in the socialist period? With the mixture of institutional organisation and community neighbourhood in the workers’ community before the 1990s, I will suggest beneath that dayuan (big compound), instead of danwei (work unit), more precisely contextualises the atmosphere in which guanxi was formed between workers. I would also like to argue that these two concepts are closely related to the ‘community’ and ‘society’ concepts proposed by Tönnies (2004). In Tönnies’s word, community or dayuan refers to the natural will of the worker residents, and society or danwei refers to the rational will of the state. To further elaborate, dayuan consists of the collective of many everyday and neighbourhood and neighbouring activities; danwei system was based on how a society should operate instrumentally.

I have discussed the relationship between the concept of dayuan and the workers’ community in Chapter 1. In short, dayuan puts more emphasis on community everyday life, whereas danwei emphasises the institutional system or the society. To further develop the idea of dayuan with the research on guanxi, below I discuss how a particular kind of guanxi relations formed within the paper mill’s dayuan community spatially, socially, and ideologically. The specific guanxi relations also contributed to further define the concept of dayuan. These three notions include a mixture of private and public space, institutional and neighbourhood relations, and patriotism and neighbourhood affection, respectively.
Mixture of Private and Public Space

Political scientist Xiaobo Lü (1995) suggested the concept of ‘minor public’ worked within the macroscopic environment of ‘large publics’ in China. A ‘minor public’ is a unique realm created by the Chinese government to support the central planning of society (Lü, 1995). Within minor publics, collective identity and community were established. Moreover, the concept of privacy was not in the minds of the workers at that time.

Wang Ji described his life in the factory as “extremely simple” because it only involved sleeping and working. However, every detail of his daily interactions was marked by a larger, complex collectivist culture. Almost all of Wang Ji’s daily activities required him to interact with other people in public spaces. When he was living in the row-house dormitory, privacy was out of the question. Many public facilities were provided by the factory for these workers. The reason for constructing numerous public facilities was twofold. From a utilitarian perspective, the lack of domestic infrastructure was a common problem in this kind of row-house dormitory designed in the 1980s (Veeck, 2007). The core idea of socialism in early-1980s China put a great deal of emphasis on collectivism, or simply sharing. Wang Ji spent twenty years in the row house. He explained that because his family apartment did not have enough space, he decided to live at the paper mill’s dormitory. For single workers, they shared a room, but for married workers, the whole family lived in one room. Wang Ji shared his 20 square meters room with a migrant worker who did not have family in the city. Workers constructed informal kitchens in the walkways around the row houses. Two public lavatories were built at the
two northern entrances of the property. The community also had public water taps and hot drinking-water supply points.

Public facilities were not constrained to the living zone. Wang Ji also mentioned the facilities in the manufacturing zone. He described that he usually woke up at 7:30 a.m. in the morning. He walked to the factory across the street. Usually, his tasks could be finished before 5:00 p.m. He seldom cooked, instead eating at the public dining hall with his co-workers. He mentioned two places he would use in the night. One of them was the entertainment hall, which he called a club. It was a place for events, including dancing competitions, performances, and ceremonies (Figure 42). Wang Ji usually watched movies with his co-workers before going back to his dormitory. The other notable facility was the public bath. Public baths were one of the most important facilities in the dayuan communities of northern China, whereas hot-water systems were not popular at that time. At Beijing First Paper Mill, the public bath was originally located in the southern industrial zone. In 1994, the bath was demolished and a new one was built at the northern zone. Workers modified an industrial boiler from the paper mill’s manufacturing facility for the public bath. The bath provided 24-hour service, and it was famous for its consistent hot water around the whole area, even in other dayuan communities. Workers were allowed to bring friends and relatives from other dayuan communities to enjoy the hot bath. So it was not only a place for people from the same dayuan to interact, but also a place to open up the otherwise closed dayuan social circle. A new worker described in an article published in the internal newspaper of the factory that the public bath is “not only a place to take bath, but also a place for
Figure 42: Dancing competition in the workers’ community. Zhang Lian showed me an album consisting of pictures of events organised by the Propaganda Department. The image shows a dancing competition, which was organised every year. (Photo provided by Zhang Lian, the photo was taken in 1996).
socialising and relaxation” (Li L. & Ke, Z., 1994). In the article, the author related dialogues from the public bath about how “People discussed business, sang songs and had daily conversations” (Li L. & Ke, Z., 1994). He pointed out that the atmosphere in the public bath represented a harmony of the interpersonal relationships in the factory. After the public bath at the northern zone was demolished due to the private housing development project, workers constructed a temporary small one by themselves at the factory’s southern zone.

Mixture of Institutional and Community Bonds

Thus, public facilities created the physical environment in which guanxi could evolve. A special social bond between community members also contributed to the formation of guanxi, not just between supervisors and workers or among neighbourhood residents but a mixture of the two. The closed and constrained environment of working and living in a dayuan community facilitated this development. The mixed relationships were also created by the mingling of two identities: being part of a work unit and being part of a community. The internal newspaper of the paper mill published two stories on this issue in the late 1990s.

In 1997, while Zong Huaicheng, a staff from the factory’s marketing department, was waiting for his client outside the Sanchan Hostel on the east side of the factory, he saw three teenagers follow a woman and attempt to steal her purse. At first the woman did not realise her purse was stolen. Zong Huaicheng immediately ran after the teenagers. He caught one of them, but the other two came to help. Zong Huaicheng understood that it was impossible to win a fight against all three of them, so he tried to push everyone
towards the gate of the factory to attract the attention of the other workers. The other workers recognised Zong Huaicheng, and many of them came to help him. The three teenagers eventually ran away. Zong Huaicheng found a note in the purse with a telephone number to contact the woman.

On 2 April, 1999, a factory worker, Wang Linfang, was knocked down by a motorcycle at 1 a.m. when she was riding her bicycle to work the overnight shift. The motorcyclist ran away after realising that Wang Linfang was unconscious. The accident occurred on Dongzhimen Street, several kilometres south of the factory. A pedestrian found Wang Linfang lying on the ground. He immediately called Wang Linfang’s supervisor, Yang, with a number he found in her handbag. Yang sent Wang Linfang to a hospital. He asked his sister’s husband to bring cash to pay for the medical treatment and two other co-workers to look after Wang Linfang at the hospital. Wang Linfang’s injury presented a serious problem for her family. Her father, who used to work at the same danwei, had retired due to sickness, and her mother had quit her job to look after him. Wang Linfang’s husband was laid off by another company, so Wang Linfang was the only source of income for her home. Furthermore, the family also had to take care of their two-year old son. Factory managers and other workers visited Wang Linfang in the following days and recognised the difficulty of her situation. Some of Wang Linfang’s co-workers posted a notice to ask for help, and the self-organised fundraising activity collected donations from 89 people and raised 2,860 yuan. Some of the people who contributed did not even know Wang Linfang personally (Zhang & Li, 1999).

Zong Huaicheng tried to push the teenagers towards the gate of the factory because he believed other workers from the same dayuan community would stand up for
him, even though he might not know all of them. The first person informed about Wang Linfang’s tragedy was her supervisor, not her family, because *danwei* is responsible for the personal affairs of their members. These two cases suggest two sides to the living environment of the workers. In Zong Huaicheng’s case, he saw himself as belonging to a community that shared the same identity, and in Wang Linfang’s case, she belonged to an institution that would help her. This institutional and community space constructed the complex notion of *dayuan*, connecting social agents with a special social bond. Wang Linfang’s supervisor Yang was high up in the bureaucratic system (an institutional relationship with the workers), but he was also a neighbour in the workers’ residential community (a personal relationship with the workers). Therefore, Yang’s social role was constantly shifting. In response to Wang Linfang’s tragedy, as a supervisor, Yang ordered two other workers to take care of her, and as a neighbour, he borrowed money from his wife’s brother to pay for the medical treatment.

**Mixture of Patriotism and Neighbourhood Affection**

The mixture of private and public space provided the venue for daily programs, such as the public bath and public dining hall, which facilitated *guanxi* relations between workers. The mixture of institutional and community bonds between workers suggests the balance between disciplinary control and community response. Ideologically, the patriotism education propagated by the state also contributed to the establishment of the interpersonal relations between workers and the strong sense of belonging to the community. The government attempted to form a *guanxi* network between workers and companies’ central management by organising public events (Kipnis, 1997). Once
workers were affiliated with a *danwei*, the relationship would be considered a permanent one (Verma, Kochan, & Lansbury, 1995). As was the case with Wang Linfang, the public sees an individual as being more tightly connected to the *danwei* than to the family. An individual’s identity was tied to a collective institution.

From an institutional perspective, personnel documents, including household registrations, would be transferred from the individual street office to the collective archive of the factory. The reason for doing this was to increase the efficiency of transferring public resources from the state to the individual through an intermediary, the collective identify of the *danwei*. For such a system to work, the public had to have a strong sense of belonging to their *danwei*. To facilitate this thinking, the government required that workers live in worker communities, thereby heightening the mixing of work and personal relationships. The government also propagated an ethics of patriotism to the state and loyalty to the *danwei*, inculcating the belief that the two were the same.

Communities of *danwei* were viewed as part of the state (Lü & Perry, 1997). Many propaganda essays in the internal publications of the paper mill provide evidence for this position. For instance, during the Chinese New Year celebration of 1990, one of the programs was a lecture series entitled ‘Four Loves’. The *Beijing Daily* reported that the lectures included the teaching of ‘love the state, love socialism, love the *danwei*, and love the job’ (Yu, 1990). The lecture series explicated the idea that the *danwei* was a socialist mechanism that served the overall operation of the state. Another essay, which related professionalism to patriotism, stated that “to emphasise professionalism does not mean workers should take professionalism as the ultimate goal of working in our
enterprise because professionalism should come from our patriotism. These two concepts cannot be separated (Yu, 1990)".

This interpretation of professionalism connects the workspace of the *danwei* to the political space of the state. Together with the community space of *dayuan* mixed with the workspace of the *danwei*, loyalty to a community and commitment to the job connect with a fundamental value of Confucianism unchallengeable in Chinese society: patriotism.

**Guanxi Efficiency**

The fourth notion of guanxi organisation in the workers’ community, which balances governmental politics against ordinary people’s desires, provided high efficiency to solve unexpected problems at the community level. With Wang Linfang’s tragedy, I discussed how her supervisor helped her by making use of the bureaucratic system on the one hand, and on the other hand, how her co-workers organised fundraising programs for her. Some of the contributors might have seen her as a co-worker, friend, neighbour, or any combination of the three. Donating to her can also be understood as an expression of sense of belonging to a community, an expression of loyalty to the *danwei* institute, or an expression of patriotism to the state. For those donors who did not know Wang Linfang personally, their contribution may have been driven by the latter two sentiments.

The fundraising activity was not unique to Wang Linfang’s tragedy. On 17 February, 1998, there was a fire at one of the workers’ homes. The following day, the factory asked the paper mill’s housing management department and the Jianyu Company to clean up and repair all damaged parts of the building. Several families lost their
property and some of them needed to find other accommodations during the restoration. To help the residents affected by the fire, other workers from the same dayuan organised fundraising activities. In the end, a total of 13,000 yuan was collected and distributed to the affected families.

Special social bonds between workers produced support in self-organised community events. The emergence of these events was to compensate the inefficiency caused by the centralised-power system and the bureaucratic-governance system of the state. The mixed nature of space, social bonds and ideologies echoes the obligation and indirectness of the nature of governmental agency—guanxi—in Chinese society.

**Qiu Lai Becoming an Agent of Guanxi**

Factory worker Li Long wrote an article about using his private bath and published it in the internal newspaper *Beijing Yiqing Bao*:

Perhaps in the future, every family can move into the new tower housing, and every family can have their own bathroom. After work, you can choose to take the bath here or at home. But frankly speaking, even though that will happen very soon, I think taking a bath at my home may be too boring for me (Li & Ke, 1994).

Factory worker Li Long’s was struggling between the ideal modern lifestyle in other more developed cities in China, which he knew about through the media, and the collective dayuan lifestyle, which the Chinese government had propagated to him as the ideal lifestyle when he was young. Li Long’s concern about taking a private bath raised big questions about the dayuan lifestyle in reformed China.
The new towers in the workers’ community were finally finished in 1995, and some of the workers, including Wang Ji, moved from the row housing to the tower housing. As a common urban phenomenon in China, welfare housing was severely insufficient to fill society’s need. One problem was that only senior staff members and workers with outstanding work performance were allowed to move. Wang Ji belonged to the latter group. He stated that the selection process involved many conflicts and arguments in the workers’ community:

I had some daily conversation with my neighbours when I was living in the row-housing dormitory. But, since moving to the tower housing, I seldom do that. I do not like to do that personally. I barely connect with them [my neighbours]. But sometimes in the summer, we play card games in the garden. Certainly, I know everyone, but I just greet them on the street (Wang Ji, personal communication, 14 January, 2009).

When I asked Wang Ji about his guanxi with other workers in the workers’ community, he gave me an unexpected answer. He maintains close guanxi relationships with his neighbours in the workers’ committee because the majority of them still live in the close-knit guanxi way. However, Wang Ji noted that the neighbourly affection is definitely fading from the past decade.40 He also realised that people are more indifferent to the collective dayuan lifestyle. He did not know why others were so disinterested in the lifestyle, but he explained that his indifference was due to his introverted personality.

40. In Forrest and Yip’s research (2007), they also found out that there is more of a sense of neighbourhood and neighbouring activities in older communities than in newer communities.
On the interpersonal level, *guanxi* involves visiting, exchanging favours, and helping others (Kipnis, 1997). However, in contemporary Chinese society, these daily practices have become either unnecessary or inappropriate. Tower housing has provided independent apartments with private utilities, which has changed the collective lifestyle. The institutional reform of the *danwei* triggered massive layoffs and broke the strong institutional bonds between workers. Finally, the decentralization of the state’s political power created new common values in society: the construction of self-identity and a desire for private space. The ease of accessing services in the market also diminished the necessity of helping others. Wang Ji’s indifference to neighbours he knew shows how the *guanxi* from the *dayuan* community became a legacy of socialist history.

**Transforming Urbanism**

Both Wang Ji and Li Long recognised the disappearing of *guanxi* in contemporary community. However, the fact that *guanxi* may have disappeared from residential communities does not mean that the old relationship style has vanished from Chinese society; indeed, *guanxi* relations continue to be a presence in the area of business management and administration. So I would like to answer the second question that I

41. In Forrest and Yip’s study (2007) on Guangzhou communities, they found out there is less neighbourly contact and mutual assistance in commodified communities, compared to *danwei* communities.
42. Yang (1994) suggests that the system of *guanxi* declined somewhat in everyday life in ancient Confucian China and the period of the Cultural Revolution but rapidly flourished in the areas of business and government in the post-Deng era. Yang (2002, 469) also states that, after the Cultural Revolution, *guanxixue* reversed the government control of everyday life, which essentially was a way to subvert state power.
asked in the previous section: how does the guanxi system transform and influence the urban-development process in contemporary times?

Spatially, Wang Ji noticed that socialist dayuan (large-compound) communities became privatised into market-oriented xiaoqu (small-zone) communities. Xiaoqu development usually takes the place of an entire dayuan compound for private housing, so instead of forming small communities, xiaoqu compounds have become the major component in the superblock urbanism of contemporary China. Xiaoqu communities, as new real-estate products of superblocks, broke through the institutional constraints in dayuan urbanism by allowing residents to choose their own private community. However, these new superblocks are more introverted and enclosed than the dayuan communities. I attempt to identify guanxi in both the intra-community and inter-community scales. The reason for doing so is twofold. First, the privatisation of individual space in closed large-scale community separates residents and thus makes the residential sphere disconnected and apolitical. Second, the emergent real estate practices has created competition among residential developments. Neither of these phenomena existed in the socialist danwei social system or dayuan community.

The most dramatic transformation around the workers’ community is the construction of the new Linked Hybrid community, including the adjacent developments of Linked Hybrid.43 Modern Group Development purchased the entire paper mill industrial zone for its housing development in 2000. The two communities that the company developed, located at the southern zone (Wanguocheng MOMA and POP

43. Linked Hybrid is the last phase of the MOMA community (see Figure 1).
MOMA) and the northern zone (Grand MOMA or Linked Hybrid, see Figure 1 and Figure 2) of the old paper mill, were isolated from the surrounding areas to separate them from the lower-class communities. Within the same development project, residents from the southern zone have been prohibited from entering the northern zone. The developer has attempted to create a socially superior community at the Linked Hybrid site. Certainly, the existing workers’ community is also separated from the rest of the new communities. The limitation between communities was clearly defined by a ‘red line’ (property line) in the blueprint. 44

Limits and Linkages in Chinese Urbanism

The closed community and the red line (property territory definition) mentality tend to emphasise the intra-community planning and design process but cannot fully respond to the desire for interaction between communities. The Chinese word of ‘red line’ used to be a planning technical term to describe property territory in planning drawings. The line in the planning drawings is red in colour. China’s planning departments evaluate the size of the area within the ‘red line’ to calculate the cost of the land. ‘Red line’ also defines who is responsible for the space. Because of the importance of this idea, ‘red line’ became an everyday word for developers, architects and residents to communicate. By ‘red line’ mentality, I mean the mentality of practitioners or users to only be responsible for the space within their own territory, and to neglect the importance of interacting with other owners.

44. Responding to the red line, the Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, Li Hu, proposed a paper project called Red Line Park, to challenge this closed community mentality. This project will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Indeed, problems have surfaced given that the social and demographic structure of urban China is no longer as monolithic as it was in the danwei period. In the case of Beijing, research has found that the city’s social structure has become more heterogeneous from the 1980s to the new millennium due to the new system of commodities and land leasing, a more relaxed registration system, greater residential mobility, and more migrants (Feng, Wu & Logan, 2008). Moreover, other research has shown that communities have become more homogenised in terms of social classes (Wu F., 2005). The combination of these two findings illustrates the dynamic of spatial segregation. The paper mill redevelopment project exemplifies these findings, as the workers’ community belongs to the lower social class and the residents in the new development belong to the higher social class.  

Qiu Lai explained that,

We have such a big conflict. Their towers blocked our sunlight. . . . After they finished their towers... Due to the loss of sunlight, some apartments in our towers immediately depreciated in value. Our residents did not recognise it at first, but once someone wanted to sell their apartment, they found that their apartment was worth less money. . . . They are just too close to us (Qiu Lai, personal communication, 19 March, 2009).

The twenty-two story towers of Beijing Linked Hybrid are located on the south side of the workers’ community. The transformation of the building density, from an average of two- or three-story factory buildings to tall towers, influences the built environment.

45. In 2009, the propaganda department director estimated that the monthly salary for a common worker who was still working at the factory’s new site was around 3,000 yuan. At this time, a two-bedroom apartment at the new development cost 3 million yuan, which is equivalent to almost 84 years of the common worker’s salary.
environment not only within the site but also in the surrounding area. During the most of the day, especially in the winter period, the lower floors of three towers in the workers’ community lose their sunlight because they are blocked by Towers 7, 8, 9, and 10 in the Linked Hybrid community (Figure 43). Zhang Lian, the paper mill’s propaganda cadre, lives in one of the obstructed flats (Figure 44). Because the whole west side of the east-west oriented linear building was designed as public corridors, all windows are facing east, towards the Linked Hybrid tower. Zhang Lian complained that originally he could only enjoy two hours of sunlight in the morning, but now the Linked Hybrid towers block the small bit of sacred sunlight. Around two hundred households were involved in this conflict, and the housing management office helped to negotiate with the developer to resolve the conflict. The most recent outcome of the negotiation was that the developer proposed compensating each person in the affected units with 5,000 yuan.\textsuperscript{46} However, the residents refused to accept the offer, and the two communities are still in the negotiation process, which has lasted for more than two years.

The biggest difficulty of the negotiation is the large number of households in the workers’ community whose sunlight has been blocked. The developer did not anticipate this conflict because in the original development scheme, the affected building was

\textsuperscript{46} 5,000 yuan = 460 GBP = 730 USD.
Figure 43: Workers’ housings at the northwest corner of Linked Hybrid. The building in the image is severely blocked by Linked Hybrid. Zhang Lian is one of the tenants living in the building (highlighted area). He told me that because the building is facing east, Linked Hybrid at its east will block the only two hours sunlight of their apartment. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2009).

Figure 44: View from Zhang Lian’s apartment (Photo the author, 16 September, 2009).
planned to be torn down. The negotiation between the developers and the residents failed. The worker residents did not agree to the monetary compensation proposed by the developer; instead, they requested the relocation of the entire workers' community to the new residential development of Linked Hybrid. The developer argued that he could not afford to move everyone and remain competitive in the real-estate market.

This case shows three consequences of the current large-scale development model in China. Firstly, the developer economised within his site to maximise the market return and compete with other closed communities. This led to one of the most direct consequences of Chinese residential developments in modern China: the lack of inter-community planning and strategy. Secondly, the residents from the worker's community became more aware of their own space. This awareness was generated by the history of being a closed dayuan community. As a social consequence, close community perception tends to polarise members from different communities. Finally, the current failure of the negotiations represents the lack of a mature system to deal with inter-community affairs. The residents of the workers’ community complained that the compensation was insufficient to cover the losses they suffered from the depreciation of their property, whereas the development company argued that it could only afford 5,000 yuan per apartment unit, as too many units were involved in the conflict. In the end, the paper mill’s housing management office needed to bridge the two communities and acted as a mediator in the negotiation process.

47. The propaganda department cadre Zhang Lian, who is still living in the affected building, recalled the story on 15 September, 2009.
Discovering Guanxi

The link that the housing manager provided between the developer and the residents at the workers’ community was based on the informal social networking system of guanxi. In the era of the market economy in China (1978-present), guanxi relations have resurfaced, only this time they are creating a link between two communities instead of within one community. Using guanxi relations in the market and in management strategies is not a new scholarly finding, but in this case, it seems that the notion of guanxi has also changed following the heterogeneous organisation of different social groups (Wong & Chan, 1999).

I discussed how Qiu Lai had opportunities to enter the luxury community, join the banquet at the clubhouse, and was invited to visit the bridges at Linked Hybrid. I also discussed why he felt uncomfortable with the gunaxi style with the young generation of leaders at the development company. Qiu Lai’s practice of guanxi compensates for the limitations of the intercommunity planning system. A more precise explanation is that the traditional guanxi relations and the institutional urban planning strategies work together to construct the urban system in contemporary China. The rediscovery of guanxi in urban China reveals a new way to envision Chinese urban space. Due to the combination of enclosed communities, social segregation, and marketisation of community governance, superblocks of different communities become different business entities or enterprises. The movement of enterprising communities changes the dynamics between communities from purely neighbourhood relationships to business relationships. Therefore, traditional urban planning mechanisms are no longer valid for responding to the modern social and
spatial interactions. Between businesses, *guanxi* can be understood as an instrument to gain organisational competency (Luo, Y., 2000).

**Learning from Linked Hybrid Guanxi**

_Guanxi_ can be translated literally as ‘personal relations’, but this translation is not really able to capture the essence of the Chinese concept and indeed would oversimplify its complexity (Lee, 2003, 146). So and Walker (2006) attempted to translate this term more precisely as a “personalistic and particularistic relation”. They suggested that the concept is based on “emotions and affections” of social agents but operates as “the utilitarian” side of the society. In Yang’s (1994) fieldwork from the early 1980s and 1990s, she discovered that many people defined _guanxi_ differently in their daily language, especially people with different regional dialects. In this chapter, I showed how factory workers, especially Qiu Lai, defined the concept of _guanxi_. Learning from his definition, I would like to propose three implications of _guanxi_ in the making of contemporary Chinese communities.

**The Survival of Confucianism**

Firstly and most straightforwardly, the discovery of _guanxi_ in both socialist workers’ communities and modern communities in China suggests the continuation of Confucian ideology in the contemporary age. _Guanxi_ is believed to have originated in part from the teachings of Confucius in the Spring-and-Autumn Dynasty (722BC to
Confucius did not specifically mention the term *guanxi* in his teachings; however, his teachings contributed to the establishment of the concept in Chinese culture. The overarching philosophy of Confucianism is the question of how to achieve humanity, or the character of *ren* (仁). This character can be translated literally as mankind or the good quality of humanity, and the Confucian belief is that the good quality of humanity is embedded in mankind. So and Walker (2006) concluded that the quality of *ren* very much depends on the behaviour of interpersonal transactions. Kinship is the starting point of the interpersonal relationship, and a set of relational rules with other social agents and structures develops from that. Confucianism also advocates pushing those kinship-oriented practices towards social-oriented practices. By mimicking the family kinship structure, a moral society can then be constructed.

48. Other Chinese scholars have argued about the origins of *guanxi*, preferring modern origins. One idea is that the practice of *guanxi* originated from the unique political ecology of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s. Individuals with this point of view are usually orthodox, native-born Chinese scholars. These local scholars generally believe that the emergence of *guanxi* is directly connected to the appearance of the ‘gang of four’, whose interpersonal manipulation strategies destroyed the harmony of Chinese society during the Cultural Revolution. The local scholars also argue that through the re-institutionalization of the state power system, the practice of *guanxi* will diminish and society will return to harmony. However, despite the re-institutionalization of the state after the Cultural Revolution, *guanxi* still seems to be operating as one of the main social practices in contemporary China. A viewpoint held by other scholars is that *guanxi* originated from the economic transformation period in the post-reform period of the 1980s. This line of thinking understands *guanxi* as a new way of everyday interaction learnt from the rest of the world, especially the capitalist West (for a detailed discussion of the origins of *guanxi*, see Yang, 1994, Chapter 4).

49. “Treat your family’s elders with reverence so that the elders in other families shall be similarly treated; treat the youth in your family with kindness so that the youth in other families shall be similarly treated. Do this, and the kingdom may be made to go round in your palm’(Book of Mencius, Liang Hui Wang I.) Scholars believe that this kinship-oriented Confucian relationship doctrine fused with other theories of interpersonal tactical intentions, such as the politically unorthodox Chinese scholar Li Zongwu’s theory...
_Guanxi_ is instrumentalised by Confucians to mimic kinship structures in society. Even though the origin of _guanxi_ is about following an ancient and ideal model of society, the practice of _guanxi_ can be used for manipulation. Indeed, specific _guanxi_ can be fabricated to achieve a particular goal. The _wulun_ idea (five orders) in Confucianism explicates the relations between ruler and subject, parent and child, siblings, husband and wife, and friends as righteousness (_yi_), order (_xu_), affection (_qin_), distinction (_bie_), and sincerity (_xin_).\(^5^0\) M. Chen (1994) puts these five relations into two categories: predetermined relations and voluntary relations. Parent-child, siblings, and husband-wife are predetermined relationships. M. Chen (1994) suggested that within the predetermined category, the concept of ‘self’ in China is severely undeveloped because individual behaviour is dictated by fixed status and responsibilities. The influence of this category of relations enmeshes Chinese people within a social network from birth. Ruler-ruled and friendships belong to the voluntary category. In this category, the self takes an active role because agents can choose how to treat their rulers and connect with friends. Individuals of the historical formation of _guanxi_. Li Zongwu suggested three periods of this formation process: in the Yao-shun period (the 23rd to the 22nd Century B.C.) to the Confucius-Mencius period, the ideology behind society was about the pure and simple goodness of humanity. In the Three-Kingdom Dynasty (220 to 280 A.D.), the ideology was about tactics and interpersonal actions, epitomised by two competing politicians, Cao Cao and Liu Bei. In the period after the Three-Kingdom dynasty, tactics and machinations continued to develop. However, Li Zongwu argued that the development of the concept of _guanxi_ in the third period assimilated ideas from the first two periods: the tactical side of _guanxi_ needed to be replaced by the principle of Confucian-Mencian ethics. Li Zongwu’s explanation of the tactic-humanity mixture of the _guanxi_ practice in contemporary China suggests another perspective of the realism-moralism hybridization in the Chinese social structure discussed in chapters 1 and 2.

\(^5^0\) _Wulun_ also teaches that we have to treat our ruler with _zhong_ (regality or royalty), treat our parents with _xiao_ (filial piety), treat our brothers with _ti_ (respect), treat our wives and husbands with _ren_ (patience), and treat our friends with _shan_ (kindness). This _ren_ (忍 or patience) is different from _ren_ (仁 or compete human being).
are capable of defining their own role by placing themselves at the centre of a social
network system. Finally, in the wulun order, predetermined and voluntary categories of
guanxi are equally important because the society is portrayed as an image of the family in
Confucian teaching. Therefore, researchers should consider the specific kinship-oriented
social networks in Chinese communities and urban studies.

‘Oily’ Position in Guanxi System

Secondly, the objective of guanxi is to construct a more efficient and stable
society amidst bureaucracy and totalitarianism. In other words, guanxi is able to create
shortcuts in the inefficient bureaucratic governance and balance the politics of a
totalitarian government. However, one needs to pay the cost of creating shortcuts. This
also means that one will gain by providing shortcuts. Those who are situated in this
position, which Chinese people describe as ‘oily’, are ones to gain extra benefits.

The housing manager of the paper mill’s workers’ community, Qiu Lai, and the
ex-worker, Wang Ji, both described the housing-allocation system as prioritising the
merit-based conditions of length of service in the factory and honours received more than
the need-based conditions of family size and financial status. These criteria ended up
creating a very monolithic demography of the community members in the workers’
community because almost all of them had served the factory for more than twenty years.
Wang Ji was an exceptional case. He was granted his apartment when he was in his late
thirties, an age considered too young to obtain such private welfare housing, because he
had received the Beijing municipal honour of model worker in the early 1990s. Wang Ji
had no choice other than joining the paper mill danwei under the socialist planned-
economy framework. To obtain a more prestigious social status (being allocated welfare housing), he was requested to demonstrate his loyalty to the political system, either by serving his *danwei* for a long period or working extraordinarily hard to receive honours. Yang (1994, 181) also used an example to analyse the ideology behind the preconditions for the allocation of welfare housing in the 1980s. She found that the notion of ‘neediness’ is always intertwined with the normative category of ‘deserving’. Moreover, in the socialist planned-economy framework, the way that disciplinary power controlled workers and assigned workers to *danwei* was a kind of normalizing technique. State politics were directly executed to the workers through the *danwei* production system and urban control system.

In the case of Qiu Lai, his use of *guanxi* suggests the alternative route of constantly challenging the normative *guanxi* practiced by Wang Ji. *Guanxi* relations in *danwei* were able to increase the likelihood of upward job mobility, the opportunity to go abroad, and most important, the receipt of welfare housing (Luo Y., 2000). As the person-in-charge of the housing-allocation affairs, Qiu Lai obtained benefits from this position. His position was described by other community members as one with many extra benefits, or ‘oily’ in Chinese (*you youshui’r*), including both tangible benefits such as money and gifts and intangible benefits such as fame and respect. The source of these extra benefits was his position at the meeting point of the centralised politics and the grassroot *guanxi*. Wang Ji’s hardwork, which fulfilled the techniques of socialist

51. *Youshui’r* is a Chinese expression, literally translated as fatty and oily. In this situation, it means the position of Qiu Lai is profitable. Also see Ledeneva (2008, 121). This expression was used by another ex-worker, Shao Xiao.
politics, was not the only way to receive special treatment. Workers can also use guanxi to go around the complicated bureaucratic or technocratic political structure and obtain exceptions to the rules. As a mediator between the social resource and workers, Qiu Lai was able to facilitate such a shortcut from the grassroots. This is what Yang (1994) called the gift-economy and counter-politics. Most important, the power of the guanxi system is that it is an open system. This means that facilitators such as Qiu Lai and others who share guanxi with him are able to execute power without having a formal political or other high-level position in society.

However, Qiu Lai’s ‘oily’ guanxi position made the interpersonal relationships in the Chinese community more complicated. On the one hand, the members of the workers’ community respect Qiu Lai due to his capacity to facilitate short-cuts in the bureaucratic system, but on the other hand, the community members feel that it is unfair when they know that Qiu Lai is able to obtain ‘oily’ benefits. Yang (1994) also found out that the notion of guanxi is usually associated with a sense of badness, deception, and

52. Yang (1994) argued that guanxi has been an oppositional force to the socialist state power of China from the 1980s. The sources of state power come from techniques of discipline and normalization (such as the working and living environments at socialist danwei). However, against these state techniques, another kind of power system, primarily constructed by the concept of guanxi, operates on the grassroots level of society to compensate for the limitations of governance techniques. Yang explained the opposition between centralised power governance and decentralised guanxi system as a duality. While the state power system only provides fixed class categories (such as the ranking of workers) and universal ethics (such as nationalism and patriotism) to obtain maximum productivity, guanxi provides another system based on Confucian relational ethics, which provides alternative methods for individuals to operate within the state power system. Moreover, the importance of the guanxi system in Chinese society is that it always balances total governance against community reactions. This is typical of the vertically democratic society of China, as it is commonly described by economists and political observers (Naisbitt & Naisbitt, 2010, especially see Chapter 2).
instrumental manipulation and is considered to be the dark side of society and a symptom of the declining moral standard in contemporary society. This is mainly because *guanxi* is closely associated with nepotism, which is a serious source of corruption in Chinese society (Tian, 2007). Exchanging gifts, favours, and banquet invitations can be taken as acts of bribery, and the privileges gained through certain personal connections can be viewed as social injustice. Y. Luo (2000) explained the difference between *guanxi* and corruption in two ways. First, *guanxi* is a social norm in Chinese society, whereas corruption deviates from the norm. Second, *guanxi* is in general legal, whereas corruption is illegal.\(^\text{53}\) Therefore, the practice of *guanxi* makes it difficult to differentiate between illegal corruption and legal relationship-making.\(^\text{54}\)

*Guanxi in Architectural Practice and Business*

Thirdly, the Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, Li Hu, mentioned to me that part of his job was to handle all the *guanxi* in the project. He used a hand signal to make a fish to illustrate how he manoeuvred among the many *guanxi* networks in the community:

I was like a fish swimming through the *guanxi* gaps to get by (Li Hu, Personal communication, 1 January, 2009).

\(^{53}\) Also see Y. Luo (2000, Chapter 7).

\(^{54}\) A full discussion of corruption is beyond the scope of this thesis. Indeed, I found no evidence of corruption in the *guanxi* in my case study, and some other behaviours discussed in this thesis are arguably informal social practices and not corruption per se. I try not to judge these informal practices; instead, I search for the productive side of those practices and understand how they contribute to or reveal architectural practices. On corruption in China, see Lü (2000) and Kwong (1997).
Given that guanxi relations grew out of a complex mixture of Confucian thought and socialist practices, in Yang’s (1994) words, he would be handling cultural factors such as people’s sense of obligation and indirectness in their social behaviour. However, scholars found that guanxi in the transforming society of China created an exclusive system, operates behind the social-reform process in China and raises critical questions about the equality of society under the new open system (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002). I submit that this is a fundamental reason for the current widening of the economic gap and the emerging social segregation and spatial demarcation in urban China two decades after the social reforms in the early 1990s. These dynamics are particularly apparent in the case of Linked Hybrid’s development.

Thus the architectural practices around Linked Hybrid can be considered as general business activities in China, rather than strictly architectural activities. Guanxi practice moved from the focus on everyday need in socialist society (e.g. the need for welfare housing by Wang Ji and Qiu Lai) to the focus on business transactions between entrepreneurs and businessmen (Li Hu’s guanxi practice to design Linked Hybrid). One can easily relate this idea to business relationships that take place all around the world. However, Y. Luo (2000) informs us that we should not view guanxi simply as a commercial activity, but also social activity that involves an exchange of social obligations. To further develop this definition, guanxi is the personal network and everyday practices for particular interpersonal transactions of members of society. The

55. Ledeneva (2008, 136) also explained that the neediness in socialist times, due to the scarcity of everyday items, does not exist in contemporary society, because they can be supplied by the market. Therefore, guanxi is no longer needed in order to obtain those items.
usefulness of guanxi is to simplify and seek shortcuts in the complexity of the bureaucratic social structure established by both the Confucian and the modern state-governance order. The informality of the guanxi social organisational system, influenced by its social norms of obligation and indirectness, provides more power to act in the existing social structure of China. In other words, guanxi is an informal practice to compensate the inefficient bureaucratic system based on Chinese Confucianism and socialism.

Much business management research has also found the notion of Chinese guanxi is far more complex than Western interpersonal relationships (e.g., Chung & Hamilton, 2001; Davids et al, 2003; Richter, 2002). In the business relationship research, we can easily relate Chinese guanxi to the social exchange theory from the West. However, Wong and Leung (2001) pointed out that there are differences between Western perspectives and Chinese perspectives about business relationship. The Western perspectives emphasise the issues of social exchange and power dependence, transaction cost and interaction, but Chinese business emphasises more affection, personal relation and face-saving. Chinese businessmen also attempt to develop a new concept of inter-firm adaptation based on the indigenous Chinese concept, and departing from the Western model of social exchange theory. In my words, the concept of personal affection, or renqing in Chinese, which contributes to the core value of guanxi, invalidates social exchange theory because renqing is a concept unable to be measured and quantified.

56. The seven facets suggested by Y. Luo (2000)—transferability, reciprocity, intangibility, utilitarianism, context specialty, long-term futurity, and personality—further differentiate this Chinese concept from the simple conception of interpersonal relations.
Therefore, the decision-making process in *guanxi*, which mainly depends on this concept, becomes difficult to understand if we do not take affection into account. As Y. Luo (2000) suggested, the context specific nature of *guanxi*, the value of favour, banquet or gift can be extremely high in one context, but the same thing can be totally meaningless or even harmful in another context. Therefore, to understand *guanxi*, we have to understand how interpersonal networks were created.
CHAPTER III

MIANZI

Architecture and Mianzi

The goal of guanxi is to achieve relational harmony between people, and thus stability and productivity in society. In the previous section, I introduced some implications of guanxi based on archival materials and interviews in the communities of Beijing First Paper Mill and Linked Hybrid. In this section, I extend the discussion to another native concept – mianzi, which directly relates to guanxi, in order to discuss the formal, spatial organisation of Linked Hybrid.

In order to understand this Chinese concept of mianzi (a direct translation would be ‘face’), we should first understand the idea of li (ritual appropriateness), which forms the core of the mianzi concept. Li refers to the constraining of the social behaviour of an individual to maintain correct relationships with other individuals and society. Mianzi refers to protecting an individual’s ‘face’ (i.e., image) or one’s dignity, self-respect and prestige (Chen M., 1994). Li and mianzi are two important social norms for a harmonious society. These two concepts institutionalise and normalise the abstract and intangible relationships in guanxi, because li and mianzi provide solid and rigid guidance to what people should, or should not do, to maintain better interpersonal relationships, or guanxi. Li and mianzi will help to explain, and provide evidence for, the spatial practices that were observed during fieldwork for my research.

57. Another concept of correct relations is the Confucian wulun idea that I have discussed previously in Chapter 2.
Urbanism Based on *Li*

The most well-known historical example of applying *li* to architectural space is *Kaogongji* (Figure 45 and Figure 46, see Sit & Xue, 2010, 94-101 for more discussion) from the late Spring and Autumn Period of the Zhou Dynasty (722BC – 479 BC), which set up a guide for architectural design, urban design and construction methods, according to the socially accepted *guanxi* between agents with different social or political status. The tradition of representing *guanxi* spatially continues today. As I discussed in the last two chapters, the intention of constructing the community wall was to maintain the privacy and secrecy of the upper-class community. In this way, their social prestige could be distanced from the poor, thus maintaining appropriate relationships between different social classes according to *li* guidelines and the *mianzi* notions. Indeed, in Chinese ways of thinking, the mixing of classes makes the higher-level social class lose their dignity, or *mianzi*. For the lower-level social class, it is inappropriate to mix with the higher-level social class, because the social order set up by *li* is challenged.

Now, when Linked Hybrid started to attract more and more attention, a paradoxical situation arose. On the one hand, the developers and the politicians were happy about the publicity that was brought by the international architect; but, on the other hand, they were also afraid that the building’s increasing popularity (resulting in architectural tours and media coverage) would displease the upper-class residents and

58. *Kaogongji* is a book showing classic works of science and technology in ancient China. Architecture and urban design strategies are only part of the contents. The ideal city form showed in Figure 45 was described in a few ancient books, including *Kaogongji* and *Li Ji* (the Book of Ritual). Sit and Xue (2010) understood that the majority of the descriptions were about ritual and symbolic significances of the urban structure.
Figure 45: Wangcheng (Imperial City) drawing in *Kaogongji*. The drawing showed how to construct a city in ancient China. The original description of the drawing in *Kaogongji* is: "匠人營國, 方九里, 旁三門。國中九經九緯, 經途九軌, 左祖右社, 面朝后市, 市朝一夫。" (考工記: 工人營國). Or, in English, "the craftsman constructs the state capitals, with a square nine *li* [a Chinese unit of length] on each side. Each side has three gates. Inside the capital city, there are nine north-south and nine east-west streets. The north-south streets should fit nine carriages in width, with Ancestral Temples on the left, and Altars on the right. In the front is the Hall of Audience and behind the markets (Image captured from *Kaogongji*, Chapter Jiangrenyingguo)."
Figure 46: Interpretation of the ‘Wangcheng’ ideal city from *Kaogongji* and *Li Ji* by Sit and Xue (2010). (Diagram captured from Sit & Xue, 2010, 97).
would expose problematical spaces in Linked Hybrid to visitors. Before going into this paradox, I would first like to explain how Linked Hybrid was exposed to the public.

Exposure of Linked Hybrid

Located at the north-eastern corner of the Second Ring Road, the former city wall of imperial Beijing, Linked Hybrid occupies one of the last pieces of land in Beijing with a view of the entire imperial city. Estate agents always try to tell potential buyers that it is possible to see the Forbidden City from the Linked Hybrid residences if the sky is clear. In Holl’s public presentations, the relationship between the Linked Hybrid site and the Forbidden City is always in the first few slides.  

Holl also commented on the location in my interview with him:

The site is an important site. On Second Ring Road, you can see the Forbidden City from a distance, which is equivalent to a site at Fifth Avenue at Central Park. And it also connects to the airport, so you are on the main link (Figure 47; Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 October, 2009).

The importance of the Linked Hybrid site is due to its visibility from many places in the city. In Beijing, buildings in the inner city (inside the Second Ring Road) are strictly regulated in terms of height for security reasons. So, located just outside the Second Ring Road, which used to be the imperial city wall, Linked Hybrid can be easily seen from inside the Second Ring Road.

59. Steven Holl presented Linked Hybrid at Columbia University in 2008. In the very first slide, he showed the location of Linked Hybrid and stressed the geographical significance of the building.
Figure 47: Linked Hybrid location in Beijing. The circle is the location of Linked Hybrid at the north-eastern corner of the Second Ring Road. At the left bottom corner of the image, is the Forbidden City, which is the centre of Beijing. (Photo captured from Steven Holl Architects Website).

Figure 48: Linked Hybrid from the North Second Ring Road. In the highlighted area is the Linked Hybrid complex. (Photo the author, 06 July, 2010).
Figure 49: Airport expressway in front of Linked Hybrid. (Photo the author, 06 July, 2010).

Figure 50: Airport express highway in front of Linked Hybrid. (Photo the author, 17 December, 2008.)
There are two main perspectives along which Linked Hybrid can be observed. The first one is from the west side of the North Second Ring Road. Linked Hybrid is located exactly at the vanishing point of this perspective. The long and busy North Second Ring Road forces more than one hundred thousand vehicles to look at it every day (Figure 48). From this perspective, the typological distinctiveness of the building is clear. Compared to buildings with similar heights and mass, the bridges connecting the towers in Linked Hybrid show that a distinctive and different product of real estate development or architectural design is present. The second perspective is from the elevated highway linking Second Ring Road to the Airport Expressway (Figure 49). This elevated highway separates Linked Hybrid from the southern zone of the development (MOMA developments). Since the construction of the wall, this is the only angle from which people can see what is happening inside the Linked Hybrid community.  

The new elevated highway, which connects the Second Ring Road and the airport expressway, was completed in 2005 (Figure 50) to prepare for the Beijing Olympics in 2008. This infrastructural construction changed the relationship of the Linked Hybrid site and its surroundings by exposing the site to a wide international audience. Moreover, this noticeable architectural design by a high-profile architect attracted popular and widespread attention as well as attention from professionals in architectural design and planning. To start, the success of the project gained a substantial reputation for the developer. And the government was happy about the placement of the building at this important point in the city, as a gateway to Beijing, especially during the period of the

60. This view could also be experienced from the ground level until the wall was built to enclose the community in July, 2009.
Olympics. However, once the Linked Hybrid site began to attract attention, the continued existence of the poor workers’ community around the site also attracted attention and became problematic.

The construction of the highway and of Linked Hybrid transformed the intangible guanxi of different areas in the site. During the urban redevelopment process, two political signs were printed on the walls of the buildings on and around the Linked Hybrid site, ‘hexie’ and ‘chai’. These two signs played very important roles in terms of the guanxi of the development processes, given that some of the results around the Linked Hybrid site were considered inappropriate. These signs were an indication of the political agendas behind the scenes of redevelopment projects in China. The discussion of these two signs, which follows beneath, reveals the paradoxes of li and mianzi that I mentioned before. The following two fieldwork accounts will help to explain these paradoxes and the concepts of li and mianzi in urbanism.

**Wang Qishan’s Decision in His Car**

In 2007, a story was widely told in the workers’ community about the sudden demolition of the workers’ dormitory located at the southern end of the MOMA sites. I heard this story from Qiu Lai during my interview with him on 14 March, 2009. This story is the same type of community gossip that I introduced in Chapter 2 (about Wang Ji telling that the government chairman, Jiang Zemin, did not drink the tea served to him in the manager’s room during his visit). Both stories have no supporting evidence but, instead, they show the history constructed by the local community members. These
community stories can therefore help to reveal how they think about the redevelopment of their old communities and the impact of the new communities on them.

The story widely told in the workers’ community is that, during the Olympics, the Beijing government attempted to project a new image of the city as one of modernity and civility. In early 2007, two Beijing mayors, Wang Qishan and Liu Qi, were in a car on their way to the airport. When they passed the area of Dongzhimenwai, on the newly constructed highway, the whole area was completely exposed to the two mayors. They were delighted about the modern and contemporary style of Linked Hybrid and the rest of MOMA’s developments at this particular location in the city. However, they also saw the single-story workers’ dormitory (pingfang, see Conclusion Chapter) to the south. They issued the immediate order to clear the area and convert it into a park to provide an appropriate scene for visitors to Beijing. In the interview, Qiu Lai said,

The area was demolished in 2007. They started in November, and basically emptied the whole site by the end of December. It was really fast (Qiu Lai, personal communication, 14 March, 2009).

The housing manager of the workers’ community, who was in charge of the demolition process, described the demolition as ‘dazhishang hexie’ (generally harmonious) in Chinese. Over two hundred households from the paper mill were relocated, and their houses were demolished within two months (Figure 51). The compensation amount was raised dramatically to shorten the negotiation period. The

61. When the story was told by Qiu Lai, he stressed the political influence of these two people. He said that during the demolition, there were rumours that Wang Qishan was going to have an opportunity to be promoted from the local city government to the central government.
community members believed that the urgency and high compensation rate were due to the arrival of the Olympics in 2008:

The Olympics brought them luck. It was very urgent. The government needed to empty this piece of land. If not, the Olympics [were coming], and [cars] would drive by, so the area should be a nice park. So, many extra requests from the former residents were agreed to. Some of them used to be prisoners. If you came out from a prison, an extra 10,000 yuan were added as an incentive. Street office officials would have an extra 8,000 yuan added. There were some other special incentives. The most important thing is that the government was afraid of any disturbance. Therefore, they tried to give certain kinds of people more money, if they showed agreement. From this point of view, it shows how urgent it was. The government needed to fulfil the agenda of a 'harmonious Olympics [hexie aoyun]'. Disturbance was not acceptable (Wang Ji, personal communication, 14 January, 2009).

The political rhetoric of a 'hexie aoyun' (harmonious Olympics) follows the general political instructions from the central government of China. The Chinese sign of 'hexie' (harmony) in the Chinese context connects to very profound and complex political, cultural, and historical meanings. The origin of its recent use in politics was

62. A street office is a government unit that controls the day-to-day activities of urban China. It operates at the grassroots level of the government’s bureaucratic system. Each street office controls several streets and housing complexes. It also acts as a registration office to collect information on the local residents. Street office administrators are usually from the area. The worker here suggested that the staff members from the local street office received more compensation for relocation.
Figure 51: The first demolition notice for the workers’ community issued on 25 October 2007. The highlighted area states the demolition period, from 25 October 2007 to 23 December 2007. If residents leave their place before 3 December 2007, they will get extra compensation fee. (Document accessed from Qiu Lai’s housing management office).
from the 2005 China National People’s Congress. During that meeting, China’s Communist Party leader, Hu Jintao, first introduced the state’s new guidelines and socio-economic ideology: “constructing a harmonious society”. The government claimed that the concept addressed the “mounting contradiction between the increasing desire for material culture of the Chinese people and the primitive production system” (China State Council, 2006). But this policy change was more of a reaction to the “inharmonious factors...[caused by the] open and reforming ideology, which had led to uneven economic development and unequal distribution of the public resources in terms of social welfare and land-resource allocation” (China State Council, 2006). After the Chinese Communist Party’s announcement of this new ideology, varying interpretations circulated among politicians, Chinese conservative scholars, cultural and political critics, and others.

It would seem that the idea of a ‘hexie shehui’ (harmonious society) operated in three different ways. Politically, the factory worker Wang Ji believed that the housing demolition was a result of the need for a “harmonious Olympics”, thereby revealing the effectiveness of the notion of ‘harmony’ as a strategy to transmit political directives from central government to local authorities and individuals. Socially Wang Ji talked about the mechanisms employed by the Beijing municipal government to avoid social disturbances in order to ensure a ‘hexie aoyun’ (harmonious Olympics) by avoiding inevitable exposure of the site to foreigners, given its location next to the airport highway. Financially, Wang Ji suggested that the two tactics of the government to achieve ‘harmony’ were high compensation amounts with extra incentives for those relocated
residents who could cause trouble because they held political power or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, were potential trouble-shooters because they held criminal records.

*Hexie* as a Rhetorical Practice

Rhetorical practice as one of the strategies of governance in China is a legacy of both Confucianism and socialism, and this point echoes with my previous argument in the *guanxi* chapter. Xiang Lu (2004) divides the contemporary literature on rhetoric in China into two groups. The first group emphasizes Confucianism in China’s contemporary rhetoric. The second group focuses on the impact of rhetoric on the country’s social and economic conditions. These two groups of literature reflect two approaches to the origins of the rhetorical tradition in China: the former makes a connection with the distant literary legacy of Confucian China, while the latter makes a connection with recent socialist (or communist) political propaganda during Maoist China and the Cultural Revolution. The former argues that, in terms of the Confucian legacy, the rhetoric of moralism and loyalty ensured the strong institutional structure of the state, as well as the stability of society. The advantage of this imperial utilization of moral rhetoric allowed leaders to implement reforms without worrying about losing the support of their constituents. It is argued that this tradition of moral rhetoric extended to Mao’s ideological control. In terms of Maoism, politicians legitimatised power by two means: narratives about Mao’s acts of sacrifice, and moral justifications of communist ideology (Lu X., 2004). In contemporary China, rhetorical power is still controlled mostly by the party-state. Rhetoric, in propaganda programs and in the mass media, are

63. For full bibliographical references, see X. Lu (2004).
still the most powerful political instruments of governance in China. Xiang Lu (2004, 160-161) concludes that there are several features of Chinese political rhetoric: ambiguousness and abstraction, openness to interpretation, and the use of numbers to present policies and articulate programmes. Because urban and architectural development projects are some of the most strategic, and visually dominant, means to disseminate political ideologies, the rhetorical tradition of the political sphere extends to planning discourse. The empirical evidence about these dynamics is lacking, however, because the study of Chinese political rhetoric as it applies to urbanism and urban development is a relatively new and undeveloped field of research. 64

Open interpretation plays an important role in the politics of China because it can actively determine the upward or downward mobility of an individual in the political arena. *Hexie* (harmony) thus becomes a highly critical word in Chinese politics. 65 Even Chinese architectural historians and architects always use this concept to justify their design proposals and academic critiques. Therefore, the hexie sign symbolises a form of political appropriateness. The popular and widespread interpretation of this notion has

64. In the current literature, there are two main types of research into rhetorical practices in urban planning and development. The first is the study of how the change in architectural rhetoric in post-reform China influenced the appearance of urbanism (Arkaraprasertkul, 2008; Wu F., 2004). The second is the study of how the tradition of political rhetoric influenced processes of urban planning and development after their appearance (Ng & Tang, 2004). The former type of analysis, mainly conducted by architectural theory, contributes to an understanding of the change in language of Chinese urbanism after the reform. The latter type of analysis, mainly conducted by planners and geographers, helps to understand the political agenda behind planning schemes and strategies.

65. Ideas such as harmony and efficiency may be considered the economic consequence of large-scale marketisation in China. There are, however, different key cultural notions in China, which are ignored or misunderstood in the West, of which ‘harmony’ is one.
further developed ‘harmony’ beyond its initial meaning in the political sphere to eventually become a cliché.

Harmonious Society and Sustainability

Its open interpretation has further muddied the initial definition of hexie. ‘Hexie shehui (harmonious society)’ relates to, and appropriates, every corner of society to central politics, including interpersonal politeness, public education and even the control of private parking lots. In the Linked Hybrid case, the billboard on one of its towers reads “Contributing to clean energy; constructing a harmonious society” (Figure 52). This billboard on a Linked Hybrid tower attempted to market the concept of green architecture to the public. Both the architect and the developer insisted on this point in their presentations of the project. Holl, in his presentation, emphasised the importance of the geothermal pipes and the importance of ecological considerations in modern architectural design. The in-house chief architect of the development company, Ke Jin, also mentioned the importance of all the energy-saving features:

On the architectural level, we have paid extra attention to the design of a low-energy and eco-friendly system since the second phase of the development. We learnt from some other architectural technological systems and finally applied the system of slab heating and cooling, centralised ventilation, and exterior façade design to minimise the loss of energy. Our solar-shading device has this objective. Our design is far

66. Because the English and the Chinese versions on the billboard are slightly different, I translate the Chinese version into English in my own words.
beyond the standard in modern architecture, as well as the regulation of the state (Ke Jin, personal communication, 15 September, 2008).

This connection at Linked Hybrid between ecological sustainability and ‘harmonious society’ shows two important aspects of architectural and planning practices in China. First, *hexie* is an expression of the docility of the developer in relation to the larger power system. The use of this sign on the billboard may not attract more buyers, but it diminishes the sense of commercialism by presenting a politically appropriate intention. Secondly, it justifies the ecological endeavour by referring to a Confucian tradition of being in harmony. According to the argument, which I made early in this section, that the political rhetoric of ‘harmony’ is to deactivate any ‘disharmony’ in society, where is the ‘disharmony’ in Linked Hybrid?

**The Old Woman with her Deaf Boy in the Ruins**

During the urban redevelopment process, some of the workers’ community was demolished (Figure 53) and tensions arose between the urban developers and the workers. Tensions in many other urban redevelopments, demolitions and relocation projects have been recognised also in other research (Wu F., 2002). Scholars have focused on the ethical, political, and legal issues of demolition practices. Among them, Fulong Wu (2004) explains the demolitions and relocations that are caused by urban redevelopment as a process through which socialist tenancy is commoditised differently according to
Figure 52: Harmonious society billboard on Linked Hybrid during construction (see the highlighted area). The billboard was placed on the west side of the building. It translates as ‘contributing clean energy and constructing a harmonious society’. By clean energy, the sign might have been referring to the sustainable technologies applied in the architectural design. (Photo provided by Matthew Niederhauser).

Figure 53: Demolition of the workers’ community with linked Hybrid in the background. (Photo Cressica Brazier, 14 June, 2008).
households’ positions in a complex system of housing tenure. This, as will be seen, fits the case of Linked Hybrid.

Indeed, in response, the *chai* character, which I found on the demolition site of the workers’ community, expresses the authoritarianism that is involved in the practice of ‘harmonious society’ (Figure 54). *Chai* also exposes the presence of disharmony in society. The character was inscribed on the walls of buildings ready to be demolished. Characters usually function as a classification system, an icon, and a symbol to indicate to the demolition workers which parts of the structure to destroy. These are iconic due to the hieroglyphic nature of the Chinese character, and they also symbolise political positions, historical incidents, and the hegemony of the government. Unlike the *hexie* character, putting the *chai* character on a building indicates political inappropriateness or incorrectness. This label also puts their residents in a difficult situation because they are then seen as living in buildings that go against social norms such that they are essentially in violation of social morals.

**The Violence of a Chinese Sign**

During a fieldtrip to the demolition site, a residential building marked with *chai* caught everyone’s attention when they were passing. The residents, a family, became the subject of discussion. The family consisted of an elderly couple and a teenager. The

67. Fulong Wu (2004) also explains Beijing’s urban redevelopment projects as involving historical preservation issues of traditional urban fabrics and *hutong* (alleyways of courtyard houses in English) urbanism: the demolition projects are usually focused on the redevelopment of *danwei* housing units or traditional *hutong* areas into private housing so that this transformation has triggered social inequity in urban China, and ‘harmonious society’ therefore becomes an implicit mechanism to resolve the conflicts and tensions that surface in the redevelopment process.
teenager was deaf. He often sculpted warrior figures with mud, probably taken from his neighbour’s abandoned house. Their building was one of the few remaining structures on the abandoned site (Figure 55). When I asked the old woman why she was still here, she replied:

We are not satisfied with the compensation amount. We are still negotiating with them. Because we have no other place to live, we need to live here... There is still no agreement. But we will leave, once the conditions are agreed upon (old woman at demolition site, personal communication, 14 June, 2007).

The most important aspects of this woman’s remarks were the emphasis and tone she used to assert her decision to leave (see underlined words in the quotation). Other than the function as an index to tell workers what to demolish, having the chai character on one’s wall creates a strong political pressure on the resident. Chau (2003) called this the ‘symbolic violence’ of Chinese public writing. His explanation about the violence of this word is from the imperial legacy of literocracy.68

Other than the imperial legacy of literocracy, the origin of ‘written violence’ also relates to media broadcasts about other demolition protests and incidents. Urban redevelopment projects have ballooned since the early 1990s. And these usually involve the demolition of old urban structures, such as traditional hutong and old danwei housing.

68. In his research on the chai character, Chau discovered that the sign functions to avoid residents renting or selling their apartment to others, in addition to indicating to the demolition crews which structures need to be knocked down. However, the sign also exacts accommodating behaviour from those subjects (Chau, 2003). Chau continued that this behaviour can be traced back to the literocracy of ancient China, that is a society, governed by scholars. Writing was the instrument of the ruling class and of the authorities, so writing itself represented political power.
Figure 54: The sign of *chai* on a ready-to-be-demolished structure in the workers’ community. The structure is a restaurant at the entrance of the workers’ single-story dormitory at the south-western end of the development property shared by Linked Hybrid. After an interview with Li Hu, he recommended that we see the demolition site. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2008).

[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]

Figure 55: The old woman and her deaf boy living on the site during our fieldwork. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2008).
Some residents attempt to resist and to express their disagreement with the government’s decision to demolish their communities. These actions usually have involved physical and legal violence as responses to the political violence of the government. Therefore, living in a building with the *chai* sign can easily be associated with an anti-government position. This is why the elder woman clarified her intention to leave once a mutually acceptable deal was reached between her family and the government.

**Implications of *Li* and *Mianzi***

Based on Chinese perspectives, the construction of Linked Hybrid at the gateway to Beijing respects the social order suggested by *li*, because hosts should always show respect to visitors by presenting their best aspects; thus, the exposure of the old and messy workers’ dormitory to a visitor would make the host lose *mianzi*, or dignity. The workers’ dormitory should therefore be torn down. *Hexie* was the strategy to manipulate people’s ideology and *chai* was the strategy to transform reality. What more, therefore, do we learn from these Chinese perspectives?

**Confucian Moralism and Social Control**

The discussion of *guanxi* in the last chapter emphasised the continuation of Confucianism in contemporary Chinese society. The discoveries of *li* and *mianzi* in my case study also support this. To achieve socially acceptable relationships with others in society, one should understand the art of *li*, or ritual appropriateness. Such ritual appropriateness is related to the guidelines provided by Confucianism about behaviour in society. Thus, *li* shapes the everyday social structure of everyday people.
Confucius’s teaching of *li* prescribes the concept of harmony—never going to the extreme, forgiveness, loyalty and trustworthiness—and the emphasis on deeds rather than words (Li & Wu, 1996). Or, from another perspective, and in reverse, harmony defines the conduct of *li* (Jacobs, Guopei, & Herbig, 1995). A harmonious state of society is a means towards the Confucian objective of constructing a utopian society (Tyng, 1934). At the societal level, the Confucian ideal is that everyone behaves according to *li*, and therefore no punishments are needed (Greer & Lim, 1998). If *li* affects the social structure, can we compare Chinese *li* to the Western concept of law, or *fa* in Chinese? It has been argued that, while *fa* is an external and categorical element in society, *li* is a form of personal practice in everyday life (Sitaraman, 2008). Indeed, in Chinese history, the moralism and Confucianism oriented social control system of *li* and the totalitarian legal system of *fa* intermingled with each other: the Confucianisation of law and the legalisation of Confucianism.

69. Confucianism (*Rujia*) and Legalism (*Fajia*) are two major ancient ideologies in China. A state of harmony also facilitates the ideal of Chinese Legalism of achieving efficient and effective governance (Ip, 2009). I will further discuss the presence of these two Chinese ideologies in contemporary Chinese culture in the next chapter.

70. The concepts of Confucianism and *li* were widely disseminated throughout imperial China by the Confucian-oriented examination syllabus, or the *keju* system. These concepts were essential knowledge for the examination (Jacobs, Guopei, & Herbig, 1995). Additionally, because the only purpose of the examination was to select government officials, the concept of *li* infiltrated the entire administrative system of China; still today, without a Confucian-oriented education system, loyalty and political correctness remain the most important behaviours if one plans to enter government (Shenkar, 1984).

71. This moralism-oriented social control system was devised as early as the Han dynasty (206BC to AD220), when the emperor Wu of Han (141BC – 87 BC) decided to endorse the Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu’s suggestion to Confucianise his country’s governance. This Confucianisation process was massive and reached every corner of society. Modern scholars disagree about whether the social control system in modern China is the Confucianisation of a legal system, that is, the incorporation of the legal
In the Linked Hybrid case, the discovery of *hexie* and *chai* in the field helps to understand this complex social control system in contemporary China. For the explicit intention, people always try to display the moralist image (the expression of *hexie*); for the implicit intention, people always try to control or eliminate the unwanted parts (the practice of *chai*). With the first intention, the Confucian concept of harmony enhanced social control; with the second intention, the legal system was to regulate the disharmonious urban conditions. The discovery of both ideas in the field tends to show that the Confucianisation of law and the legalization of Confucianism operate at the same time. The former intended to archive dignity of the political leader and the latter intended to maximise efficiency. This double-layered social control system results in *mianzi* culture (a culture with two different expressions, both external and internal).

**Two Notions of ‘Face’**

The direct translation of *mianzi* is face. But there is another Chinese word, *lian*, also meaning face, which carries slightly different meanings. *Mianzi* is an achievable value. It is associated more with some attributive concepts, such as social status, political power and individual wealth. So one needs to pretend to have higher social status, more political power and greater wealth. *Lian* is associated more with personal behaviour and individual ethical standards, and basic compliance with the social order of *li* (Chen M.,

regulations of totalitarianism, bureaucracy and ethical standards within Confucianism; or, on the contrary, the legalisation of Confucianism, that is a mechanism to institutionalise appropriate acts and ensure the subordination of the individual to the collective (for more discussion about these two concepts, see Sitaraman, 2008).
1994). Usually, if an individual is subject to social criticism, the person has no lian and is thus considered to be morally shamed.

In my case study, to demolish the workers’ dormitory was the strategy of the city government to avoid being socially criticised, having no lian and being morally shamed. Mianzi can be given as social currency to someone as a strategy to establish a positive guanxi relation; so giving mianzi becomes an everyday transaction in Chinese society. At Linked Hybrid, the hexie billboard was the social offering of the developer to the political leaders, in exchange of more efficient and effective management of the construction.

At Linked Hybrid, the two Chinese notions of ‘face’ can explain several events. The reverse side of the coin of the demolition tensions is the glowing story of Linked Hybrid. Linked Hybrid is the flagship project of Modern Green Development. This project has not only brought the development company international fame, but it has also provided them with an advantageous marketing niche for their future products. Steven Holl was originally hired to design the exterior of the building, but this request from the developer was refused. Then, Holl also realised that the value for the developer in collaborating with him was in having his name on the project (Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 October, 2010). Having an internationally recognised name on the project gave a lot of lian (appropriateness of individuals) to the developer. However, refusing to construct the wall to enclose Linked Hybrid, Steven Holl did not participate in Chinese social norms in order to give the development mianzi. The project became superficial because the design concept and its materialisation were at odds with each other.
**Mianzi Urban Paradigm**

There is a Chinese way to criticise this type of superficial urban development: ‘xingxiang gongcheng’ (image engineering). In everyday usage, people also call it ‘mianzi gongcheng’ (face engineering). The concept, which is seldom discussed in Western studies of Chinese urbanism, is one of the most popular topics in Chinese academic circles on this topic.

The Chinese notion of ‘mianzi gongcheng’ has at least two origins. The first is rooted in architectural and planning theory and the second more in management strategy. The Chinese planning scholars Leng and Yuan (2003) suggested that Kevin A. Lynch’s book, *The Image of the City* (1960), was reminiscent of ‘mianzi gongcheng’ practices in China. In his book, Lynch studied how people perceived urban space using materials from his five-year research in Los Anglos, Boston and Jersey City. He argued that people perceived the image of the city through five fundamental elements in their mental map: paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks:

There seems to be a public image of any given city which is the overlap of many individual images. Or perhaps there is a series of public images, each held by some significant number of citizens. Such group images are necessary if an individual is to operate successfully within his environment and to cooperate with his fellows. Each individual picture is unique, with some contents that is rarely or never communicated, yet it approximates the public image, which, in different environments, is more or less compelling, more or less embracing. … The contents of the city

72. I will rely on Chinese academic papers as secondary sources for the argument of this part of the thesis as they provide the only analyses available.

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images so far studied, which are referable to physical forms, can conveniently be classified into five elements: paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks (Lynch K. A., 1960, 46-47).

Leng and Yuan (2003) further suggested the application of Lynch’s concept to planning theory in China in order to construct identity, structure and meaning to the city. In this perspective, identity refers to recognizable forms and features of buildings or urbanism; structure refers to the spatial organisation and logic; and meaning is the interpretation of the observers. In this way, planners can approach urban design by using landmark architecture, green spaces, roads, plazas, urban blocks and scenes within those street blocks.

The second origin of ‘mianzi gongcheng’ (face engineering) came from the marketing identity design firm, Corporate Identity, commonly referred as ‘CI’ by Chinese urban scholars. Chinese planners then borrowed the term from marketing and applied it to urban planning and design. Chinese scholars Li, An, and Yu (2009) argue that the practice of CI involves integrating different individual’s perception of urbanism to form a coherent image of the city, and, through the communication of that image via multiple media, establishing the identity of the city. In that process, ideology is required to shape the direction of a city’s development, while behaviour is required to conform to accepted norms such as sincerity and politeness, while, finally, perceptions are moulded by natural

73. Chinese scholars commonly use the term CI to describe the process of designing the image of the city. Only a few of these scholars explicitly make the connection between CI or Corporate Identity. The German architect Peter Behrens first advocated the idea of CI when designing the logo for AEG (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft) in the early 20th century.
artificial scenes in the city. Chinese scholars Song and Wang (2003) argued that the advantages of CI’s urban-design strategies come from its quick return-on-investment and its development process than that of economic or societal development strategies. The strategy can also be easily disseminated through publicity, so it is a very effective propaganda device.

Government officials are keen on the *xingxiang gongcheng* strategy because it helps them to achieve upward mobility in the government bureaucracy. At the same time, criticisms of the superficial image-making of CI urbanism is widespread in the academic world in China. Chinese scholars Wang and Tian (2008) voiced three criticisms: first, CI is a very superficial planning strategy because it focuses only on ideological strategies and not on actual social problems. This relates to Wang and Tian’s (2008) second point that CI looks at the appearances and ignores the contents. Thirdly, scholars argue that CI fails to use historical analyses or comparative studies to define the image of the city.

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74. Scholars from different fields refer to these three elements by other terms. Chinese planners Wang and Tian (2008) called them the software and hardware of urbanism; government officials He and Chen (1997) called them structural, intermediate, and surface layers, respectively.
75. Still, Song and Wang (2003) distinguished the application of CI for businesses and government agencies. For businesses, CI focuses on the branding of products to obtain economic benefits; for government, CI constructs a city identity and improves the citizens’ quality of life.
76. Some other criticisms have been voiced of large-scale image-engineering projects with limited practical meaning. The Chinese saying *jiadakong*, or ‘big empty fake’ in English, has been coined to describe such projects (Li, An & Yu, 2009). Other arguments include regional critiques about disappearing traditional identities (Cheng & Li, 2007), and political critiques about the preference of Chinese officials for ‘*mianzi gongcheng*’ (face engineering) and ‘*zhengji gongcheng*’ (politician’s career engineering; Zhang F., 2005).
*Mianzi gongcheng* is a Chinese planning theory, which combines local culture and Western urban theory. *Mianzi gongcheng* is the basis of a criticism of Chinese culture as being speculative, superficial and hypocritical, and of a criticism of those urban development projects that only emphasise or show fake external expression, and neglect or hide the internal problems. Describing Linked Hybrid as a *mianzi gongcheng* project might be the biggest criticism of the project, because this suggests that the project is superficial, speculative and hypocritical, which, of course, is not any one individual’s fault but, instead, the result of the structure and culture of architectural and urban development practices in contemporary China.
CHAPTER IV

SHI

Zhang Lian’s Personal Archive

Almost all archival materials that I discuss in this chapter were found at the paper mill factory. The archive was under the control of the Propaganda Department because it was responsible for the management of historical publications. When I visited the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian in 2009, he was editing a paper about the history of the paper mill for a publication on the thirtieth anniversary celebration of the ‘Reform and Open Policy’. Unlike other larger and more important state-owned enterprises, the paper mill does not have an institutionalised process to manage historical materials. Zhang Lian explained how all the materials were personally collected by the propaganda staff, especially himself. He also explained that the archiving process was never given serious attention.

Even though all of the materials were located in the paper mill’s office, the majority of them were actually personal belongings of Zhang Lian. The new paper mill factory site at the Shunyi Airport Development Zone has two propaganda office spaces. One is Zhang Lian’s private office, and the other is an open office for three to four other staff members. Steel cabinets are installed in both rooms. The open office’s cabinets contain many old pictures of the paper mill community. Zhang Lian has organised the documents into different folders, which he arranged chronologically. Some materials, such as old movies and video clips about those political leaders’ visits I introduced in Chapter 1, are digitalised and stored on computer hard-drives. These materials serve as
no more than a database for the graphic design of the paper mill’s publications. In the steel cabinets in Zhang Lian’s private office, I found a collection of old newspapers and documents that was more complete than that in the open office. All of these documents were part of Zhang Lian’s personal collection (Figure 56). While working for the propaganda department at the paper mill for more than thirty years, Zhang Lian had carefully collected internal materials from, and outside materials about, the paper mill. In this newspaper collection, reports are organised in chronological order from 1989 until 1999 (Figure 57). Many of the news articles were his personal essays and poems. He was also proud to show me a special poem he had written in the form of a circle in 1997 (Figure 58). He told me that the newspaper at that time provided a small space for him to develop his writing interests. Other than newspapers, he also collected many other publications and documents released by the enterprise. These materials helped him to write about the paper mill. He kept many publications at his home rather than in the cabinets, which again shows that many materials constituted a personal collection rather than the company’s official archives.

This personal archiving practice raises three implications for archival research in China. First, the archival materials are not selected politically; rather, Zhang Lian is in total control of the materials. Zhang Lian actually stood behind me for the whole archival research process to ensure that I did not see any particularly sensitive documents. Secondly, as the archiving is not undertaken professionally, the organisation of the materials is very personal. In other words, only Zhang Lian knows where to find what kind of materials, and even that system has its limitations—he wished to show me some documents but he forgot where to find them. Finally, the accessibility of this kind of
Figure 56: Sensitive article covered by hand. When I was reading Zhang Lian’s personal archive about the factory, he stood behind me and attempted to explain individual pieces of material to me. When I flipped to the above page, Zhang Lian stopped me from reading and documenting one article. He told me the article was very sensitive and, after many years, there are still aftershocks about the article. I agreed to cover the article with my hand when other articles were being recorded. The article told the story of a Communist Party member in the paper mill. When just reading the story, I could not see anything unusual about it. (Photo the author, 29 July, 2009).
Figure 57: The newspaper articles collection of Zhang Lian. (Photo the author, 29 July, 2009).

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Figure 58: Round-shaped poem by Zhang Lian. Zhang Lian introduced this round-shaped poem to me when I was reading the rest of his personal archive. The poem consists of four seven-word sentences. The last four word of the first sentence are the first four words of the next sentence. Therefore, the whole poem only uses 14 words and it can be read in its circular form. Zhang Lian was proud of his writing. Other than this piece, there are many small writings by Zhang Lian published in the internal newspaper. Zhang Lian thought the internal newspaper provided a space for him to write and publish. (Photo the author, 29 July, 2009).
archive is seriously limited to personal relationships, or guanxi, between the researcher and the archivist. He told me that I was just the second person in thirty years to see his materials. The first was a Chinese Ph.D. student majoring in Business Administration, who was also a relative of one of the company’s staff members.

Archive Materials

The reconstruction of the paper mill history in this chapter depends on many newspaper articles. These newspapers can be separated into three categories, including party-organisation newspapers, ministerial level professional newspapers, and local enterprise community newspapers. It should be noted that the three types of newspapers I used in this thesis were all considered to be part of the government’s propaganda practices. All newspaper publishers were obliged to be linked to government-licensed organisations (Wu G., 2000). The newspaper industry was both sponsored and regulated by these organisations. The publishing industry was danwei-based, so newspaper contents would be consistent with function and location. First, the party-organisation newspapers directly brought political and ideological instruction to the society. This type of newspaper dominated the printing media of China up to the 1980s. However, the economic reforms and the larger-scale marketisation of China in the early 1990s also

77. The first type includes Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], Beijing Wanbao [Beijing Evening], and Xianchuan Shouce [Propaganda Handbook, an internal publication of the Beijing Paper Mill]. The second type includes Beijing Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth Daily], Gongren Ribao [The Workers’ Daily], Jingji Ribao [Economy Daily], Keji Ribao [Technology Daily], Shoudu Jingji Xinxi Bao [Capital Economics and Information Post], Xiaofei Shibao [Consumer Times], and Zhongguo Qiyebao [China Enterprise News]. The third type includes Beijing Yiqing Bao [Beijing First Light Industry Bureau News].
weakened the power of the party-organisations’ print media and led to the proliferation of the second and the third types of newspapers.

The second and third newspaper groups targeted more specific professional and geographic audiences. For example, many articles used in this thesis were from *Consumer Times* and *China Enterprise News*, which were only distributed to consumers and company staff, and the *Beijing First Light Industry Bureau News*, which only circulated within the Light Industry Bureau and professional community. The amount of articles from the second and third newspaper groups ballooned in the mid-1990s during the transformation of the newspaper industry. Guoguang Wu (2000) understands the industry’s transformation as a three-faceted process: socialisation, decentralisation, and marketisation. For Guoguang Wu, socialisation was the breakup of the party-state’s monopoly of the social structure and the increasing significance of non-party participants. This created many professional societies and institutes whose printing media were oriented specifically to professionals. In addition to the increasing significance of non-party professional societies, ministries and bureaucracies also developed their own agencies through the decentralisation process. After the reform of the media, all ministerial and semi-ministerial levels of bureaucracy had their own newspapers (Wu G., 2000). These newspapers were more community oriented, and the news reports focused on their internal and community affairs.

The appearance of the second and third types of newspapers was not a threat to the party-organisation newspapers; indeed, the new newspapers strengthened the political power of the party-state. By regulating the second and third types of newspapers, the party-state’s propaganda could easily penetrate the community and professional-practice
levels of society. Ministerial- and semi-ministerial level institutes became local authorities, and political policies were implemented by them. The content of these types of newspapers was strictly regulated and only allowed party committee members to publish articles of general interest (Zhao Y. Z., 2000), such as Zhang Lian, Li Long and other workers who published in the newspapers.

**Workers ‘Jumping into the Sea’**

In this chapter, I focus on the historical development of the Linked Hybrid site through the newspapers in the factory archives. At the same time, I also make use of a Chinese philosophical idea, *shi*, to explain the different ways in which the workers adapted to the transformations in their lives. I will start by examining how ordinary Chinese people handled the transformations in their living environment. These people are the workers at the paper mill who originally worked at the site where Linked Hybrid is now located. Their lives changed in the early 1990s, when the state owned paper mill was reformed and eventually the factory was redeveloped by private developers.

Among many facets of the area’s history, a small occurrence from 1992 was the seed of the development of Beijing Linked Hybrid. In the summer of 1992, a set of industrial boilers broke down. Because the demand for paper had decreased dramatically, the management of the paper mill decided not to repair the boilers and demolish its structure (Figure 59). After that, a series of effects followed. The paper mill’s department of electric generation and supply was also closed. Electricians with professional licenses
left the factory for other jobs in the newly established open career market. This may seem like small news in the workers’ community, but it was an important moment in a larger movement of workers who would quit the company in the following years. In 1993, a news article was published about the paper mill:

Today the term xiahai is indeed the most popular term. Usually we can hear someone jumps into the sea. However, compared to these kinds of individual stories, workers in one of the Beijing 100 strongest enterprises, Beijing First Paper Mill, jump into the sea together. This phenomenon goes beyond what is happening in other enterprises (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1993).

Xiahai was a common expression used by the workers to describe their decision to leave a relatively stable job in a state-owned enterprise under a planned economy and social structure to seek new, more profitable but riskier job opportunities in the free market. The term xiahai uses the image of ‘jumping into the sea’. This was the most direct reaction of the workers towards the marketisation of their society. The ‘sea’ symbolises the uncertainty and risk involved in the free market. However, people believed there was wealth, power, happiness and a better life on the opposite side of the ‘sea’.  

78. The majority of positions in the paper mill were assigned by the government to workers after they graduated from school or returned from military service. My research informants, including the electrician Wang Ji, propaganda cadre Zhang Lian, manager Qiu Lai and worker Zhao Xiao, all followed this practice in the socialist system. Since then, one fundamental change from the planned economy to the market economy is that workers can choose their employer.

79. There are many studies on the topic of xiahai, including Jeffery (2001), Efrd (2001), X. R. Liu (2001, especially chapter 2 to 5), Guo (2010, chapter 6), and D. D. Li (1998).
Figure 59: The demolition of the chimney of the old boiler structure. The image was taken by the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian in 1992. During the interview, he showed me this picture and explained to me that this photograph presents the end of one era and the start of another era in the paper mill. He told me the demolition of the chimney and the boiler symbolised the start of the decline of the factory in 1992. (Photo provided by Zhang Lian).
First Experience of the ‘Sea’

Before the large xiahai movement, the factory had already stopped paying salaries to some workers who did not have assigned positions and duties. The workers’ first reaction was to run personal businesses in the factory community in addition to their official duties. Three stories were found in the internal newspapers of the workers’ community at that time (Ji W., 1993). The people involved in those stories were praised as creative and hardworking and considered to be role models for other workers.

First, a group of women organised a small team to sell hand-woven wool sweaters to their co-workers. These women were not assigned any factory duties and were not being paid salaries at that time. Their service was welcomed by the majority of the workers’ community. The extra income helped these women meet their basic needs.

Secondly, some other workers started their own shops in the factory to sell snacks and foods in the official dining hall. One of the owners was Yu Zongli, who used to be a staff member of the deputy-affairs department (xingzhengke), which was responsible for managing the cleaning and maintenance duties in the factory. Because his salary was not sufficient to meet his daily needs, he quit his official position and started his private food store in the dining hall. Yu Zongli and the paper mill came to an agreement, which required that he pay a 1,000 yuan contracting fee to the factory every month. This was the starting point of a larger scale of decentralisation and privatisation in the paper mill by contracting out some parts of the factory’s business from the central management. I will discuss more extreme cases of how workers contracted the whole manufacturing department of the factory for their own businesses in the next section of this chapter.
The third story in the internal newspapers of the workers’ community was triggered by the closing of an entire production line in 1993. Two hundred workers from that production line were transferred to a newly established company. This new company, the Beijing Paper Supplying Union Company, required the transferred employees to work on certain manufacturing processes that were planned to be outsourced to other companies. This strategy solved the problem of laid-off workers by providing 200 extra working positions.

These small stories from the internal newspapers of the workers’ community were the prelude to a general layoff and relocation of workers in China’s transformation from socialist planned economy to new market economy. We can see that the scale of the ‘jumping into the sea’ movement increased from small-scale businesses (e.g., the knitwear business) to larger-scale businesses (e.g., the contracting of a small snack bar) to the total privatisation of a part of the factory. The concepts of ‘private’ and ‘ownership’ had entered the paper mill. Xiahai meant not only the retreat of the public welfare system of the factory management, but, more importantly, the beginning of the private market. This movement separated the urban population into two halves: those who still lived in the public welfare system (e.g., the residents of the paper mill’s worker community) and those who lived in the newly emerging private market (e.g., those residents who eventually earned enough money to move to Linked Hybrid).

80. The Chinese name for this new company was 北京纸联物资供应公司.
From the layoffs in the decade between 1993 and 2003, more than 90 per cent of the workers from Beijing First Paper Mill were forced to leave their jobs (Wang W., 1991). The factory president Guo Chunguang (Figure 60) recognised this situation in 1992:

The enterprise is facing the tremendous challenge of leaving government support and entering the private market. So we have to build up the concept of ‘market’ among our workers and emphasise the importance of ‘customer’ and ‘marketing’ in our management. Even though the factory’s famous brand – Sanyi copier machine paper – was still dominating 22 per cent of the national market, the financial situation of the factory was not optimistic. The main reason for this was believed to be the inefficiency of using state-owned resources (Speech by Guo Chunguang, recorded in Zhang L. G., 1994).

**Overcoming Conjunctures**

‘Jumping into the sea’ was not the phenomenon that the management liked to see. Therefore, there were some strategies for the paper mill management to save itself. The paper mill reached its peak in the 1980s. In 1989, *Consumer Times*, a Beijing industrial newspaper, reported that the amount of tax paid by the factory had been increasing by more than 11 per cent for several consecutive years (Lin L., 1989). The amount of tax paid peaked in 1988, when the factory paid 20 million yuan to the government. However, following the heyday of the paper mill came the general economic recession in China in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this time, the management began to worry about the financial situation of the factory. In just a few years, by 1990, the paper mill had accumulated 19 million yuan in external debt (Wang W., 1991). In the same year, the slogan of the Chinese New Year ceremony in the workers’ community was to ask
Figure 60: Introduction of the factory president Guo Chunguang. President Guo Chunguang was one of the board committee members of *Beijing Daily*. In the introduction, it explains that Guo Chunguang was trained as an economist in the Beijing Light Industry Institute. He was assigned to be the president of Beijing First Paper Mill in 1988, when he was 43 years old. (Image captured from *Xiaofei Shibao*, Zhang L. G., 1994).
workers to prepare for tremendous challenges in the coming years: “Dance to celebrate happy New Year and be ready to overcome difficulties” (Zhenfen Jingshen, 1990). In the slogan, the management used the expression *chuangguan*, which means ‘breaking through barriers’. Afterwards, this expression reappeared in numerous articles and speeches in the workers’ community.

Evidence of the decline of Beijing First Paper Mill can be found in 1989, when the Beijing paper market declined and Beijing First Paper Mill accumulated a debt of over 19 million yuan (Wang W., 1991). The entire Beijing paper-manufacturing industry suffered a severe blow with this budget deficit. Then finally the abandonment of the boiler brought the problem to the surface in 1992. Another reason for the decline was a mistake in the instructions from the Beijing Bureau of Commerce, which was still operating under the old planned-economy system. In the 1986, the Bureau of Commerce instructed the factory to produce 120 thousand rolls of printing paper. However, the market did not have such a large demand. Eventually the factory needed to lower its prices. At the end of the same year, the paper mill had lost hundreds of thousands of yuan because the product distributors of the factory could not find any buyers (Du, 1991).

This situation improved slightly in the early 1990s. Following the recovery of the economy as a whole, the demand for paper increased. In 1991, demand even surpassed the manufacturing capacity of the paper mill (Du, 1991). The management therefore were led to believe that they had succeeded in breaking through the barriers brought by the social transformation. However, until 1994, the morale in the workers’ community was

81. The Chinese was “*Zaige zaiwu chuangnanguan, zhenfen jingshen chuangnanguan*” or “载歌载舞闯年关，振奋精神创年关”.
reported as still extremely unstable (Shi, 1994). This situation alerted the management to the fundamental problem behind the ‘chuangguan’ (breaking through the barriers) rhetorical movement (Zhenfen Jingshen, 1990).

**Guo Chunguang’s Reform**

The management of Beijing First Paper Mill believed that changing their company model was the only solution to respond to the structural transformation of Chinese society, particularly during the reform age in the 1990s. In the late 1980s, the paper mill president Guo Chunguang recognised the problems of the old management model. First, he did not agree to blindly follow the instructions of the senior bureaucracy, who generally adhered to the planned economy legacy. Secondly, he thought that depending only on assigned distributors to market their products was too passive. Instead he independently began to develop a research unit in the company to uncover new marketing strategies and management models.

Not surprisingly, Guo Chunguang’s reform campaign was criticised by groups of conservative leaders and Communist Party members in the paper mill. These groups believed that the production model should still follow the centralised instructions from the government. They resisted increasing production levels even though research predicted a potential increase in demand.\(^\text{82}\) It seems that Guo Chunguang won the political debate because many critical comments are to be found in the internal paper-mill newspaper about the conservative campaign, which also described the eventual demise of

\(^\text{82}\) This research was conducted by an internal research team in the paper mill, focused on the strategic plan for Beijing First Paper Mill in 1987.
this conservative campaign. These conservatives were described as cadres with an old ‘bureaucratic-business mentality’, or guanshang sixiang in Chinese (Lin L., 1989).

In 1991, Beijing First Paper Mill president Guo Chenguang introduced a radical idea with his reform campaign:

On the one hand, state-owned enterprises are responsible for protecting the planned-economy system set up by the government, but enterprises should not depend on it (Speech of Guo Chenguang, recorded in Wang Y., 1991).

His vision for the paper mill initiated a wave of reforms. In his reform campaign, he used the political rhetoric, yibao erbukao, or literally ‘first to support [the state] and second to free [from the state]’. This attitude to the government mixed concepts during the reform age (especially in the early 1990s)—moralism mixed with pragmatism. In the past, these two concepts were hierarchical: being loyal to the party-state was more important than being pragmatic for one’s business. However, the new rhetoric was critical of the old model, citing the ineffectiveness of being blindly loyal to the government.

The expression chuangguan also rippled out from the ideological and managerial levels of the paper mill to the community’s everyday life. The rhetorical power was fully utilised by the government in its propaganda strategy. Many workers were involved in Beijing First Paper Mill’s discussions of how to make breakthroughs during the reform period. A conservative worker wrote an article in Beijing Daily entitled ‘Hearts We Align with our Party, Guarantees We Promise to Break through Barriers’ (Zhenfen Zhigong, 1990). In his article, the worker criticised the mentality of workers who blindly followed
the Western business model but did not recognise the specificity of the local environment of China; moreover, some other workers spent too much time thinking and talking instead of working. Undoubtedly, the counterattack from the reform side took the position that learning from the modernity of the West would bring efficiency to China’s development. Having this kind of debate during the reform period was inevitable. One thing was clear: the society’s transformation was spreading from the topmost political layers right down to the lowest social classes.

**Three Private Bosses in the Paper Mill**

The workers developed strategies to attempt to adapt to the totally new societal structure of the market economy in even more radical ways than the small-scale businesses that I described above. During the overall economic downturn in the 1990s, some of the paper mill’s production lines, especially those for the high-end paper products, were stopped to minimise daily operating costs. Consequently, three hundred workers belonging to those production lines had to seek other available tasks in the paper mill. It was reported that these workers were encouraged to submit their own proposals for new tasks (*Changlingdao Caiman*, 1990). Many proposals were submitted, and fifty-four were approved by the management. These proposals comprised three new areas: tasks originally belonging to outsourced companies (e.g. the packaging of the paper products); the construction and repair of facilities, such as a new public bath; and the creation of steel and wood workshops to service the community. These innovative ideas was highly praised by the media; however, these new projects only helped a relatively
small amount of people—most of the three hundred workers had to leave the paper mill and find other ways to survive.

What did people think about these new developments and about these drastic changes to their lives and working conditions? In the Chinese perspective, the term *xiahai* has a negative connotation, referring to someone who gives up his or her moral standards and acts materialistically. In a more practical sense, the term also implies giving up a relatively easy situation and entering an area of uncertainty. It is interesting that the description of this practice can also be perceived as creative. The opposite of *xiahai* is *daguofan* (giant wok fire) or *tiefanwan* (iron rice bowl). The former is a metaphor for a system of collective responsibility and the latter is a metaphor for the stability and security of the job. The concepts of *daguofan* and *tiefanwan* both imply a lack of motivation to work. Workers believed that the lack of motivation was a legacy from socialist collectivism, because resources were distributed on the basis of collective, and not individual, effort, so no one wanted to contribute more than was necessary.

*Siren Laoban*

The large-scale *xiahai* movement in the paper mill did not start until several stories of successes in the private market were disseminated throughout the community. These stories proved that *xiahai* was more favourable than *daguofan*. In other words,

83. Timothy Brook (1999, 28-29) also suggested that there is a moral ambiguity about wealth in the Confucian ethical system; thus working for wealth was questionable in Confucian times. He also pointed out that even in the reform age, Confucianism’s critique of wealth was applicable, especially for the elites.

84. For more research about the culture of China’s state-owned enterprises and the concept of *daguofan*, see Chiu & Lewis (2006, Chapter 1 and 2) and A. K. Ho (2004, Chapter 5).
through the spreading of successful stories of some pioneers ‘jumping into the sea’, the
notion of individual inventiveness was developed.

The *Capital Economic Information Post* and *Beijing Evening Post* reported three
stories about the paper mill community in 1993 (*Baxian Guohai*, 1993; *Beijing First
Paper Mill*, 1993). The first story was about the head of the marketing department of the
paper mill, Yu Zaixian. Zaixian transformed his department to a private marketing firm.
Instead of only working for the paper mill, he also obtained external projects from other
paper mills. His own private business immediately expanded nationwide. In 1992, he had
a 170,000 yuan quota to meet at the factory. In 1993, his private company planned to
make 5,000,000 yuan in addition to the required quota from the paper mill.

The second story was about the manager of the supply department, Zhao Jinxing.
In 1993, Jinxing also established his own business using existing personal connections
from the paper mill and his experience and expertise. He hired a team of new staff and
expanded the original business of the department from only supplying raw materials to
the paper mill to supplying all factories in Beijing. Jinxing realised the constraints of the
planned economy and of the centralised-instruction business model. In the past, *Beijing
First Paper Mill* had only asked him to trade with selected companies, but in his private
business he could choose among many other companies to locate the best materials at the
lowest prices. For Jinxing, this change was not only about autonomy in decision-making
but also about efficiency and profitability. He did not disappoint other people. The first
month’s profits were already able to cover the start-up costs of the company. After the
second month, he invested all the profits to purchase his own minivans for business use.
In the interview, he claimed he achieved his next milestone—paying back the 360,000
yuan he had borrowed from the paper mill—a goal he achieved within three months. Then the company could truly become his property. As one of the first innovators of the market economy, Jinxing not only earned his own *diyitong jin* (first bucket of gold), a popular idiom describing initial business success in China, but his company also helped the paper mill save 220,000 yuan per month due to his efficient management (Ji W., 1993; *Xiaohecaiku Jianjian*, 1993).

The third story is about the most successful case. The starting point was almost the same as the first two. Chang Jiantai, the manager of the transportation department of the paper mill, contracted from the paper mill his own department and started his own transportation company, which he named after himself. He and his business partner, Wang Shaojun, invested 50,000 yuan to contract the transportation department from the paper mill. The transportation department originally lost 40,000 to 50,000 yuan a month. The transportation department used to have a serious deficit because the paper mill’s manufacturing activities were slowing down. Sixty per cent of the work in the transportation department was lost due to this reason. However, the *tiefanwan* (iron rice bowl) management model required the enterprise to take care of the workers even though there was not enough business. Therefore, workers in the transportation department became the burdens of the enterprise.

At the beginning, Jiantai and his partner rented all twenty-five trucks and the three 3,000 square meters space from the paper mill. In the contract, they also promised to

85. By contracting, the workers needed to contribute an agreed amount of profit to the paper mill. This management model, but on a smaller scale, was already introduced in the earlier part of this chapter about the worker who ran his own business at the restaurant in the early 1990s.
contribute 4,000 yuan annually to the paper mill. In an interview, Jiantai described his decision as *xiashenhai* (jumping into the deepest sea). This expression showed his commitment to his decision. On 18 February, 1993, his application to privatise the transportation firm was approved by the Beijing Bureau of Commerce. He then set to work on his business. Immediately after Jintai’s success, his business model and his story spread to the workers’ community. He was reported to be a businessman as famous as the paper mill’s president, Guo Chunguang. He was the first successful business operator to be called ‘*siren laoban*’ (private boss) by the community members in the paper mill (Zhang L. G., 1994).

In his private company, another level of business existed further down the line because trucks were also rented out by individual drivers. These workers needed to maintain the vehicles and seek out their own tasks. By his estimate, according to the condition of the vehicles, the monthly contracting payment varied from 2,700 to 3,200 yuan. Other than that, drivers also needed to take responsibility for fuel, maintenance fees and taxes. The remaining profit belonged to the individual drivers (Wang Y. X., 1994).  

**Forced to Jump into the Sea**

The privatisation movements led by the three department managers were surrounded by voices of praise, but they also had their critics. Many workers at the beginning could not adapt to the new, self-motivated system. The reason was explained by the local newspaper: they perceived the contracting idea as a risky and long-term

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86. Other stories about China’s state enterprise reform and individual adaptation can also be found in You (1998, especially chapter 11); Xiao (2004, 92-134); Lin, Cai and Li (2001) and Hassard (2007, especially Part Three).
adaptation to the new life. They also complained about the heavier pressures resulting from the new work responsibilities (Zhang L. G., 1994). An article at that time reported this in the *China Youth Post*:

> Although the model of ‘state owned, privately operated’ is not new to our society, workers still need to change their attitude. They have to shift from only working for the socialist party-state to serving a ‘private boss’. Some of the workers cannot change their psychology to adapt to the new pressures. Moreover, other than facing heavier workloads and more tiring tasks, it is also possible for workers to lose their secure iron rice bowl. Therefore, many of them have expressed their concerns. For those drivers belonging to the original transportation department, if they have not joined the new private company, they would need to change their profession. One can interpret this as rehiring, but one can also say that these people were forced to jump on board (Zhang L. G.,1994).

The case of the transportation department was the most thorough privatisation of the paper mill. The first *siren laoban* (private boss) I introduced above, Jintai, also expressed his concerns in an interview with *China Youth Post* (Zhang L. G., 1994). The origin of his pressures was different from that of the workers; whereas the workers thought they were forced to jump on board, Jintai still needed to face the harsh reality of managing one hundred workers, twenty-five trucks, and the 100,000 yuan per month of rental fees for the paper mill. He also mentioned that, to survive, pressures needed to be overcome, and all possible resources to be exploited.

At the end of the first month of the new transportation company, the workers’ concerns were eliminated as they saw their monthly salary triple, from 300 to 1,000 yuan. A particularly hardworking worker even earned as much as 4,000 yuan in one month. The
complaints and criticisms ceased. A community newspaper editor explained that the workers had finally found their “psychological balance point” (Zhang L. G., 1994). The opportunity to join the private transportation company was envied by the rest of the worker community, many of whom would like to take on more risk to transform their lives. So, any newly created vacancies in the private company were quickly filled up by others from the factory community.

Competition was introduced by the new management model; the contracting system helped to raise the motivation of the workers to better maintain company equipment; by the end of 1993, almost one year after the establishment of the company, Jintai contributed a 400,000 yuan contracting fee to the paper mill, made a profit of 50,000 yuan, and purchased a crane costing 220,000 yuan. On top of all of this, the company managed to pay salaries of an average of 60 per cent above their previous wages to 140 workers.

Xiahai of the Communist Party

The movement of xiahai was also irresistible to the party-state. The concept of xiahai applied not only to individuals but also to entire government departments. The government’s propaganda department also needed to change its working model. Originally, the propaganda department’s only responsibilities were to run the communism- and patriotism-education programs in the workers’ community. One propaganda cadre of the paper mill explained that the responsibility of the propaganda department of the paper mill was to create a bridge between the grassroots workers and the company. This process included collecting information from the workers’ community
for the company’s decision-makers, molding the psychology of the workers, transmitting ideological instructions to the workers, and other related tasks (Wang Y. X., 1994).

Representing the party-state, the propaganda department was the invisible second core of the power in the organisation.

While workers were struggling to adapt to the new social system, the paper mill’s own propaganda department also announced its plans to change its role within the company. Beginning in the early 1990s, the propaganda department started to handle the paper mill’s public relations as well as advertising and marketing the company’s products. In 1992, the department organised the first client-company comment exchange forum, in which the customers of the paper mill were invited to talk to the enterprise leadership. The event’s aim was to maintain positive relationships with old clients while also approaching new clients (Liu S. Y., 1993). To fulfill the new demands of the market, staff members in the propaganda department were asked to learn new skills, including graphic design, photography and journalism. Today, the propaganda department still incorporates the political agenda of the party-state and the marketing activity of the paper mill.87

**Operated by People**

An article about the transformations of the paper mill community entitled ‘Bigger Boats Are Harder to Turn Around’ explained the general attitude towards enterprises like the paper mill (Gao W., 1993). Workers generally believed that larger enterprises would

87. The emergence of those contracting and privatisation mechanisms was not only a reaction from the workers’ community, but also a larger-scale reform movement called ‘Learning from Shougang’. I will discuss this political movement and its implications for the role model following practice of the Chinese in the next chapter.
face more severe challenges during the social transformation. The three successful stories above, which illustrated how privatisation of parts of the enterprise improved the life of workers, were exceptional cases. In general, the management of the paper mill suffered from the new social system. Moreover, Beijing First Paper Mill was only one of the cases in Beijing’s Light Industry Bureau (Liang Y., 1993). The vice-president of the paper mill, Wang Xi, explained the attempt in a newspaper interview:

The mechanism we are operating with is called ‘owned by and operated by the people [guoyou minying]’. This means that if we are able to contribute sufficient taxation to our senior-level enterprise, the Beijing Light Industry Bureau, we can keep the remaining profit. We can use the resources from the state, but we are responsible for all its expenses. If we can put this new concept into practice, our society will make a big jump. After implementing this system, two-thirds of our labour power, which was originally idle, is fully utilised. So, on the one hand, the state’s income can be guaranteed; on the other hand, private firms and those drivers can legally earn their own money with their hardwork. Why would we not do this (Liang Y., 1993)?

The president of the paper mill, Guo Chunguang, also agreed with the attitude of his staff. He used Deng Xiaoping’s idea of economic special zones as a metaphor for the situation at the paper mill. In a newspaper interview, he explained how privatised units in the paper mill were like special zones in China (Si, 1993).88 These administrative regimes were benefiting from special and beneficial policies. Autonomy in economic special zones provided the advantages of such special policies to speed up regional development.

88. The privatisation phenomenon was described as breaking down of the large-scale management model of the factory to micro ‘tequ’ (special zones).
Just as with policy changes within the paper mill, good and timely policy reform, generally from the autonomous management, could help to bring hopes to the industry as a whole. In addition, Guo Chunguang also found that, before the reform, workers had already worked on their own to earn extra money *toutou-momo* (under the table) (Si, 1993). So the reform was not a purely managerial policy but also a response to a desire from the workers. Guo Chunguang mentioned in the same interview that the new policy therefore allowed workers to *gongkaide* (openly) establish their second careers through their own hardwork (So, 1993).

The case of Beijing First Paper Mill was recognised by Beijing’s Light Industry Bureau. Beijing First Paper Mill was also touted as a model for other enterprises to follow (Liang Y., 1993). Beijing’s municipal government, including the Bureau of Commerce and the Bureau of Transportation, all expressed their encouragement of the kind of transformation that had taken place at Beijing First Paper Mill (Shi, 1993). Mentioned in the interview with the vice chairman, this model was named *gouyou minying* (Figure 61), or literally ‘state owned, privately operated’. Soon after the Beijing First Paper Mill’s changes in 1993, the stories in the paper mill became the model and were disseminated to other enterprises (Zhang L. G., 1994).

The popularisation of privatisation brought dramatic changes to the lives of many workers. However, just like the *tequ* (special economic zone) metaphor used by Guo

89. This slogan was ‘国有资产，私人经营；交足资金，多收归己；内外结合，灵活经营；财产抵押，风险自负’ in Chinese, which means “Operating state’s asset by private entities; obtaining extra income after paying the rent; integrating internal and external resource for flexible management; mortgaging properties and being responsible for investment risk.”
Figure 61: Article on the new business model in China (Liang Y., 1993). 'Owned by the state, operated by the people, the birth of a new enterprise reform model'. (Image captured from Shi, 1993).
Chunguang, the transformation only benefited a selected minority of people who used to have more power in the paper mill.

*Guoyou minying* (owned by the state and operated by the people) reveals the mechanisms of the decentralisation: (a) property is owned by the state but the individual is allowed to utilise the property for business; (b) the individual is responsible for the contracting fee and is allowed to keep the remaining profit; (c) private units are allowed to work on both internal, state-owned enterprise tasks as well as external projects; and (d) private property should be insured to compensate the risks of private businesses.

The aim behind this system was to further decentralise the control of social resources to the people. With a less centralised administrative influence, contractors gained more autonomy and freedom to modify their business models, which helped them adapt to a rapidly transforming social and market structure. An annual or monthly contracting fee guaranteed the income of the state-owned enterprises and also generated motivation among workers because of the higher salaries. In 1993, the highest monthly salary in a privatised unit in the paper-mill community was recorded to be as much as 4,000 yuan, which was more than ten times a regular worker’s salary. In *Capital Economic Information Post* and *China Youth Post*, it was explained respectively that

The main body of economic activity has been shifted from the government to private enterprises, and the method of distributing resources has been shifted from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy. But there are still a number of enterprises handicapped by the old ideas and habits. They only talk about their ideals with old dictums. This is why there are still many large-scale enterprises unable to carry on an in-depth reform (Si, 1993).
The social-welfare system has been threatened. . . . In China, commercial policy, the banking system, and the taxation system were still immature. But more importantly, a value-appraisal system of state-owned properties was absent...Therefore, the consequences of such institutional changes will be that the real value of state-owned property, amount of mortgage, and amount of deposit cannot be judged fairly...The control of personal salaries will become problematic in the future as well (Liang Y., 1993).

Debates emerged again in the workers’ community. The reform side criticised what they called the closed-mind mentality of the conservatives. The conservative side was concerned about the influence of the privatisation of the social-welfare system. Again, considering the overall societal trend of the reform atmosphere in China at that time; the reform campaign won the debate. However, privatisation could not help many workers. The majority of them were laid off from the paper mill during the reform process. They could not find new jobs in the more competitive and knowledge-based free-market society.

The development of the real estate market also contributed to the decline of the enterprise. In 2000, the management of Beijing First Paper Mill decided to sell its industrial land to a private developer for 800 million yuan (Zhang Lian, personal communication, 29 July, 2009). The value of the land was seriously underestimated due to the immature real estate market at that time.

Alongside what was once an historically glorious enterprise, a new internationally prominent architectural project was to be constructed: the future Linked Hybrid. We can now clearly see how the entire social and economic situation, and many of the old
surviving Chinese concepts and notions and traditions, as well as all the new concepts and notions that were being developed and disseminated at the time, are all highly relevant to the future project of Linked Hybrid, whose production, development, inhabitation and use this thesis explores. Its fortunes, which are intertwined with its contexts, cannot be understood without those contexts, which form the topic of this research and shape its methods of research.

**Xingshi in an Internal Article of the Paper Mill**

An internal document of Beijing First Paper Mill (2009), entitled ‘Research to Respond to the Current Transforming Xingshi’ (developmental trend), analysed directions for the future development of the enterprise (Figure 62). This internal article was written in 2009 as an open letter from the paper mill to all of the workers in the paper mill. During that time, the paper mill was facing serious problems due to its insufficient competitiveness in the market economy. Moreover, after leaving the original site in the Dongzhimenwai area, Beijing First Paper Mill moved to an industrial development zone in Beijing’ suburbs in Shunyi. The company’s business also shrank to only processing some semi-finished products. The number of workers decreased from approximately 3000 people in the late 1990s to around 300 people.

About all these facts, the author of ‘Research to Respond to the Current Transforming Xingshi’ argued that the factory’s decline was related to the transformation of China’s market environment triggered by the global financial crisis. Moreover, reforming the factory was the only way to keep up with the larger societal trend. According to the article, the enterprise tried to first understand the large-scale
Figure 62: The internal article of the paper mill. The highlighted characters are *xingshi*. (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009).
developments in society and then to adjust its own position to them. This specific way of thinking is called *xingshi*, or simply *shi*, which suggests a culture of compliance and manipulation in both ancient and contemporary China. The internal article continued to explain the *xingshi* of the factory:

From the third quarter of last year until now, the unpredictable hurricane of the financial crisis dispersed rapidly throughout the world, and it triggered increasing uncertainty about the global economy. Because of the new financial policies, the economic development of our country is influenced by the global financial crisis seriously. Compared to the rest of the world, the development of China’s economic system is rapid and the mechanism behind the market becomes more complicated. Especially for those grassroots enterprises in the new competitive market, the rapid changes may influence their potential and sustainability. Learning from scientific development [*kexuefazhan guan*], factors from both the macro level of society and the local scale of individual enterprise should be understood. Thus, problems can be discovered, corresponding measures can be taken, and opportunities can be found in crises. The most important task is to maintain the development tendency [*xingshi*] of the enterprise. To do that, the management of the paper mill conducted research to understand our current situation and potential problems and predict the future development. The research is based on scientific development and the central government’s instructions. By synthesising the implications of this research and the historical development trends of the enterprise, the management reached a consensus about the new model of business, new model of development, and new model of management (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 1).
Two pieces of evidence were provided to convince the public that Chinese society as a whole was transforming as a result of global dynamics, namely the international financial crisis and the national change in China’s market structure. The former dynamic was new and unpredictable, so it was beyond the control of the factory management; the latter trend was a problem that the factory had faced since the early 1990s but had yet to solve. Both trends suggested an urgent need to re-evaluate the current business model at the paper mill. The internal article suggested that the strategy to mend the situation was to make the best of the factory’s current development potential and maintain its ability to adapt to changes in the future. Therefore, the letter’s strategy directly responded to the challenge of the increasing complexity of the market. Losing the potentiality or dynamism to change the enterprise’s structure would have meant an incapability to adapt to any further change in the larger environment of the market.

From the above excerpt of the internal article from the newspaper of the paper mill, we can further analyse the Chinese way of thinking. A few important ideas can be found in the internal article in this regard. First, the environment is always dynamic and transforming. Secondly, the way to survive in such environment is to adapt to the changes. Thirdly, being unable to adapt to changes in the larger-scale environment has been a fundamental challenge for businesses as they try to adapt to China’s new market economy. In the next section, I explain how these ideas construct a particular way of thinking in China.
Shi Philosophy

I will use the Chinese philosophy of shi to further understand these transformations and adaptations. The Chinese philosophy of shi will, later on in the thesis, help to also explain many contemporary community actions and reactions, thus proving evidence of its relevance. François Jullien (1995) explored native Chinese philosophies. His study is a central reference in my study of Linked Hybrid. Therefore, I will discuss his work at some length. Jullien analysed the character shi, or 势, to understand the Chinese conceptualization of the relationship between social structure and individuals. The meaning of the shi character is manifold and includes ideas of position, circumstances, power, and potential. Jullien (1995, 17) describes the ambiguous, ambivalent, and transformative characters of Chinese culture as “a configuration or disposition of things operating through opposition and correlation”. His description suggests that Chinese culture is a process of transformation and implies a strategy to manipulate the process. This method becomes a guide for understanding the daily practices of Chinese people in different levels of society. Zhu (2004) applied this idea to explain the spatial organization of imperial Chinese urbanism. In Zhu’s study, he used the philosophy of shi to explain the intangible power behind different type of spaces in the imperial Chinese city. But Zhu’s study only connected the ideas in the shi philosophy with the imperial spatial organisation. I will apply Jullien’s ideas about this important Chinese philosophy to the design of urban spaces in our contemporary age.

It is important to know that shi originated from ancient Chinese military and strategic philosophy. Jullien synthesized arguments from different scholars and
concluded that this way of thinking is different from the strategic philosophy of the West. Jullien compared styles of wars between ancient China and ancient Greece:

[The Chinese strategy] aimed to use every possible means to influence the potential inherent in the forces to its own advantage, even before the actual engagement, so that the engagement would never constitute a decisive moment, whereas the Greeks took an ‘all or nothing’ strategy of pitched battle (Jullien, 1995, 35).

In other words, the Chinese perspective emphasised what comes before the action, that is, its context, whereas the Greek perspective emphasised the action itself. The case of Linked Hybrid, as we will see, shows that Jullien’s idea can help us to understand the sources of the desire for speed in urban developments, the production of massive and visionary plans, and why the Chinese do not care to evaluate the results of urban developments.

The Origin of the Shi Philosophy

Jullien (1995) searched for the origins of the shi philosophy. He suggested that this warfare philosophy was introduced in the fourth-century B.C. by the military strategist Sunzi. Extending from a purely military strategy, shi also operated on the political and social levels afterwards. The definitions of the shi character discussed above—position and circumstances, power and potential—indicate two different ways of conceptualizing the environment. In the environmental or cosmological sense, the Chinese believe that the existence of objects and individuals is based on their relations to other objects or individuals or to collectives of objects or individuals. Thus we can
understand that the Chinese concept of human agency involves relationships to others and to collectives of individuals. Jullien’s analysis of shi is supported by the guanxi and mianzi social practices of individuals in the making of Linked Hybrid, which I introduced in the previous chapters.

Legalism (Fajia) and Confucianism (Rujia) were two main philosophical institutes in ancient China. They, however, held very different interpretations of the concept of shi and of the relationships between large-scale social structures and individual agency. As Jullien (1995, 44-45) argued, Confucianism believed that the authority and power of rulers were heavenly mandates, whereas Legalism believed that authority and power were assigned by rulers to themselves. Due to the effectiveness of the Legalist’s governance, Confucianism, which projected a moral utopia constructed only with loyalty, love and ethics, underwent several compromises. One compromise was the acceptance of shi to create a smoother and more efficient hierarchical system, while maintaining the superiority of the wisdom of shi.

Extension of the Shi Discussion

The unification of China as one cultural system and sovereign entity required totalitarian control from the Legalist strategy; but the management of this unified but complex entity required the sophisticated bureaucratic system of the Confucian moralist tradition. Once these two philosophical traditions combined to work together, the shi notion of foreseeing tendencies of development formed a complex social system in China.

90. This supports my argument that mianzi has two layers of intentions: a superficial layer about moralism and harmony, and an implicit layer about strategy and practicality.
Thus shi is a mixture of the compliance that is characteristic of Confucianism and the tactical approach of the Legalist perspective. Jullien (1995) used three metaphors to illustrate the difference between the early Confucian moralist perspective, the early Legalist tactical perspective, and a hybrid of the two. In a purely Confucian perspective, how fast the chariot, representing sovereignty or society, runs depends more on how good the driver is, hence the morality of the authority, than on how good the horse is, that is the political position and shi. In a purely Legalist perspective, if a horse-team is good, it is pointless to wait for a supremely gifted driver. However, the integration of the two perspectives would requires a good driver with moral standards who also knows how to handle the reins and the horses.

Jullien’s translation of shi is ‘situation-tendency’ (Jullien, 1995, 117). This translation suggests two important elements in shi: the actual situation and its tendency. These two elements echo the term, xingshi, used in the internal article from the paper mill (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009): xing refers to a real situation, while shi means the possible tendency of the situation. But before further analysing shi in relation to Linked Hybrid, I will summarise some important points from Jullian’s writing about shi, mainly from his book Propensity and Things (1995).

First, Jullien argues that the Chinese believe that there is an irresistible tendency in events, called shi. Secondly, on the one hand, Confucianism asserts the irresistibility of this developing tendency by suggesting the concept of ‘heavenly mandate’. On the other hand, Legalism asserts that individual wisdom can manipulate the developing tendency. So, in other words, Confucianism prevents the individual agency, but Legalism advocates it. Thirdly, the ultimate goal of individuals and society is to obtain both efficiency and
effectiveness by following *shi*, or *shunshi* in Chinese. Fourthly, the dynamic view of society negates the concept of human agency, or in Jullien’s words, the *shi* concept ‘dehumanises’ power in society (Jullien, 1995, 54). To elaborate, power according to *shi* does not belong to agents but to positions in the power system. Fifthly, this position of power is relational. This means that an official political position does not necessarily give power. Power does not require an official political position. The Chinese concept of *guanxi*, which I introduced in Chapter 2, explains the relational idea behind this power system. In Chapter 2, the housing manager Qiu Lai obtained power due to his personal relationships with people that were more powerful. His power did not come inherently from his position as the housing manager but through those relationships. This means that a new housing manager would have to cultivate relational power instead of automatically obtaining power by working as the manager. Finally, the Legalist perspective constructs *shi* philosophy as the art of manipulation or a philosophy of tactics.

In the discussion above, *shi*, or in Jullian’s words the situation-tendency, also conceptualises the social system in everyday living. There are always two levels to this structure, local and global. For the paper mill, the business environment is global and the structure of the enterprise is local. The local scale for a manager is the enterprise but the local scale for a worker is his family or himself. Global-scale *shi* is uncontrollable, but local-scale *shi* is controllable through mechanisms that control less-powerful individuals. In other words, the use of the collective is the most effective way to manipulate local *shi*.

Because power depends on positions with a higher potential to adapt to the tendencies in the social structure, the concept of agency in the Chinese context refers to a set of strategies and tactics to obtain certain positions in the imaginary social structure.
and to predict the next best position following the *shi* tendency. In this sense means, one improves survival by manipulating and following tendencies.

**Shi for Persuasion, Justification and Manipulation**

In this section, I will show how an internal research report document published by Beijing First Paper Mill (2009) uses *shi* as rhetoric to convey persuasive ideas and arguments. The target readers of this research report were a specific group of management staff. In the document, the author first identified the *shi* in the global environment because it was always the driving force for the transformation of *shi* on the local scale. The document’s contents involved speculation of the future development tendency in Chinese society and suggestions of ways to transform the factory to adapt to this trend. I will conclude with three uses of *shi*.

In 2002, three significant events took place in the workers’ community. The first event occurred when the factory gave up its production component and turned its focus to processing, packaging and marketing. The second event happened when the factory eliminated all of the production-line machines. The third occurred when the factory moved its industrial site to the new airport development zone to allow for the development of the Linked Hybrid private estate. The transformation process from the old to the new factory sites and the change in the operational model was described by the Beijing First Paper Mill’s internal document (2009) as “smooth” and “encouraging”.

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91. During the transformation, it was reported that the overall income of the factory was 72 million yuan in 2004 and the figure doubled in 2005. In 2006 and 2007, it reached its apex at 400 million yuan. In 2008, this figure dropped slightly to 330 million yuan. The
The success of the transformation of the factory was justified by new policies that were well adapted to the development tendency of the overall transformation of Chinese society. The advantages of coping with the society’s transformation tendencies did not only bring an increase of income but also better-qualified personnel and staff. This included dealing with the low morale of existing workers and attracting a team of staff with higher educational backgrounds. How was *shi* used in these circumstances, because *shi* is not limited to the philosophical justification of ancient Chinese strategists? It can also be applied to commonly used rhetoric in everyday communications.

*Shi for Persuasion*

In the internal document, the paper mill considered that its size was one of the most important *youshi* (advantages) to be exploited. The author tried to persuade the readers that the factory could expand along with the market: this idea was called ‘*da shichang da wuye*’ (big market, big enterprise property) (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 2). By big market, the author was referring to the factory exploiting the expanding tendency of the demand for new and special paper products and their classic Sanyi copier-machine paper. By big enterprise property, the author was referring to the ability of the new factory site to exploit the potential of the new economic zone’s proximity to the airport and to the new National Exhibition Centre. Following this thinking, the factory management decided to construct a new tower on their new campus for business related to the National Exhibition Centre.

Slight decrease of the overall income was explained in the article by the poor general economic atmosphere brought by the global financial crisis (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 3).
The practice of *shi* involves foreseeing emergent developments and rapidly responding to those anticipated trends. Therefore, actions should be taken before situations actually occur. In this sense, the concept of *youshi* is the anticipation of the global environment and an instrument to persuade changes at the local level. The reason behind the predictions for the future development of the site was threefold.

First, even though the economic benefit from the proximity to the airport had not yet been realised and the exhibition centre was still under construction, the management believed that the area had good potential for development.

Secondly, according to the dynamic understanding of *shi*, once maximum dynamism has been achieved (in this case, the full development of the area triggered by the airport and the completion of the exhibition centre), the potential for development will already have been missed. Consequently, it would be too late to make use of the global-scale development trend to influence local-scale development.

Thirdly, the best time to make changes at the local level is before the global development trend has actually formed. This was why the factory management decided to construct the new building. However, before reaching the top of the development trend, the management should also have had an idea about where the next-to-be developmental trend was heading. By so doing, managements can always gear their approaches to the next-to-be development trends.

*Shi* for Justification

In another section of the same internal document (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009), the author wrote about the ‘hopes and vision’ of the paper mill. He argued that many
measures were needed to realise some *jieduanxing mubiao* (interim objectives) of the sustainable development of the enterprise. For timely objective, the author used the term *shi* to justify the problems in the paper mill’s management. Given that *shi* practice never follows a straight route to solve problems of inadaptability, sacrifice of small benefits to facilitate a comprehensive and common good is generally viewed as a reasonable strategy.

In the document, the author describes three issues that could potentially limit the further development of the paper mill: (a) the inadaptability of older workers and the inexperience of the newer generation of managers, (b) an out-dated management model, and (c) under-qualified staff for the new stage.

The first problem was the inadaptability of the mentality and the attitude of the current workers. The document explained that it was not only the old-generation personnel who could not fully adapt to the new market system, but also the young staff who occupied important positions in the management. The old generation was criticised for continuing to hold out-dated working attitudes and mentalities from before China’s social and economic transformation. They were considered inert, lacking in ambition in their work at the paper mill, limited to following instructions from the senior management, and not actively seeking out new opportunities on their own. In contrast, the young generation of management staff were criticised for lacking real-life experience in society. These workers only knew about theories from textbooks. They were also

92. The document exemplified the argument by research conducted by the management to show how old-generation managers were ignorant of the new market system. Old-generation management were asked to differentiate the concept of *xiaoshou* (selling)—a conventional passive process to promote the product—and *yingxiao* (marketing)—an interactive and active program to promote the product. Unfortunately, many of them could not differentiate these two ideas.
relatively idealistic about their workplace. However, when their ideas collided with the reality of the competitive market, their ideas became useless and inadaptable, even though they showed more initiative than those from the older generation. The author of the report used another example to illustrate his argument. Some of these young staff members were asked to conduct research on the situation of the market. Instead of the accepted way of going out to observe and understand the reality, their whole research report was done on the internet. Strategies were also proposed that were based on knowledge from their textbooks and their ideas. The second problem was the old-fashioned management model, which was unable to keep up with the overall development trend in the larger society. The document stated that even though the management of the paper mill had already anticipated the necessity to upgrade the quality of the staff to keep up with the transformation of the society, many of the measures to achieve this goal only existed on paper. These measures included reforms of the staff evaluation system, a target-oriented management system, and a performance-based rewards system. The last problem was caused by the loss of elites due to shrinking personnel and the relocation of the factory to the countryside. Newly hired staff lacked suitable talents and qualifications, and some experienced old workers were on the verge of retirement.

Shi suggests the idea of xunxu jianjin: the emphasis on a gradual, step-by-step strategy, instead of one-off total change. This also echoes the Confucian ideology against being too extreme and radical. The three problems mentioned above were caused by the inadaptability of the factory management to the larger social and economic environments. Shi rhetoric attempts to persuade critically from a pure instrumental perspective and is
often prioritised over other arguments. For example, in the author’s discussion of the lack of motivation in the old generation and the unpractical ideas of the new generation, the mistakes of both generations were not justified by professionalism or other ethical standards; instead, the author pointed out that these behaviours were simply not compatible with the overall development trend in society.

*Shi for Manipulation*

The inability to follow the development tendency of the larger society is an important problem. If the paper mill’s management could not solve this problem immediately or prevent the factory’s deterioration, the gap between the local and the global tendencies would become wider. In addition, because the global tendency is always transforming, staying the same at the local level also means straying further from the global trend. As the Beijing First Paper Mill internal document mentioned, the ideas of *kuai* (speed) and *shi* (concreteness) (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 4) are very important. The articles suggested several solutions for achieving speed and concreteness.

On the individual level, management cadres, especially those with a Communist Party background, were asked to further liberalise their thinking. More symposiums and discussion panels had to be organised to understand and *zhangwo* (manipulate) the conditions and mind-set of the workers towards the development tendency. The proposal for events was diverse. First, the events would provide a platform for those with

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93. This *shi* (勢) is a different Chinese character than Jullien’s research about *shi* (勢). The two characters share the same pronunciation in Chinese.
management backgrounds to discuss the new ideology behind developing the paper mill with the younger generation. Secondly, the events could also provide suggestions to overcome challenges in the new development tendencies of the larger society. Finally, through communication between the management and the workers, there would be a unified effort towards future development.

At the company level, a more complete institutional system needed to be introduced and more resources had to be invested in the education of the staff. This could help all workers adapt to the new development trend in China. In terms of the institutional system, a mechanism of dissemination of central instruction had to be developed. Once the management released new policies or measures to different departments, department staff needed to interpret the ideas into text and disseminate them to workers. A new evaluation system would help to assess the quality of all staff to reorganise their roles and duties in the paper mill, and a new reward system could help motivate workers (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 4). In terms of education investment, a large survey was conducted to understand the quality of marketing personnel and to prepare suitable training for the workers. The education program was considered good for both individual workers and the enterprise as a whole (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 4). The key of the training program was to teach the workers how to adapt to the new ‘big market, big enterprise’ development tendency in the larger society.

In general, the training solutions focused on a single idea: forming a unified behaviour within the factory’s labour force to adapt to the global scale of transformation in the country. The shi rhetoric emphasises the art of control because the Chinese believe that only through creating a massive collective consensus in society can the
developmental tendency, or *shi*, be controlled. The global-scale collective behaviour of Chinese society was beyond the control of the paper mill’s management; however, the local workers’ community was able to be manipulated by the management. The practice of control included communications with the workers, efficient dissemination of central decisions, a reward system to motivate participation, and training for personnel. All of these efforts were intended to build a strong vertical bond between the management and a skilled team of staff and bring the lower-level employees’ actions in line with the directions dictated by the management.

Following *shi* is a common belief of Chinese people, so the concept can be used for persuasion, justification and manipulation by politicians and entrepreneurs. This chapter introduced this idea during the paper mill’s reform from the 1990s to the early 2000s. In the next chapter, I will further examine people’s reaction to *shi*, using the life histories of two different individuals. One of them is a factory worker who is considered as a model worker for others to follow, and the other one is an entrepreneur who established a model factory for Beijing First Paper Mill to follow. When closely analysing their life histories, I discovered that following or acting against *shi* is a very relative concept.
Model Worker Zhou Guangquan

Mofan is short for laodong mofan, and literally translates in English as ‘worker’s role model’. It is an honour for a worker to be considered as a role model. For an organisation, it is a political strategy to have role models in place as a method of control (Bakken, 2000). Therefore, this Chinese concept involves both compliance and manipulation. Unlike the first generation of private managers who emerged in 1993 and 1994 whom I introduced in the last chapter, the mofan case studies at Beijing First Paper Mill, which I explore in this chapter, concern workers, in order to suggest an alternative model for workers to become different from the rest of the community.

I reconstructed the story of a role model couple of the paper mill from mainly two sources of print media. One is the Propaganda Handbook of the ministerial level Propaganda Department and the other is the internally circulating ministry newspaper, Beijing First Light Industry Bureau (BFLIB) News. The nature of this type of newspaper is having a small circulation with typically compulsory subscriptions for offices under the ministry (Zhao Y. Z., 2000). News shapes ideologies and constructs the social knowledge and worldviews of Chinese people (Chang, Wang, & Chen, 1994). This is not restricted to the national sources, such as CCTV (China Central Television) and the party-organisation newspapers, such as People’s Daily I used in other part of the thesis. The use of the ministerial newspaper to disseminate ideological instructions from the central government is more effective, because its contents can be more customised to specific
audiences about particular political movements. For example, the role model couple I introduce in this chapter were very popular with many other community members in the light-industry ministry and Beijing First Paper Mill. Given that news articles are also a standard of propaganda, the reports of the model worker and his wife’s daily anecdotes were to establish an ideological reference for others to follow.

A worker from the paper mill, Zhou Guangquan, and his wife, Wei Jianzhong, received the model-worker award in 1994 (Figure 63; Zhou G., 1995a). Guangquan was forty-four years old at that time, and he was a team leader in the mechanical-maintenance department in the paper mill. When he received this honour, he had been working at the paper mill for twenty-six years. He had already been awarded the Excellent Communist Party Member and the Advanced Worker Award by the paper mill. He had also received two other awards, Patriotic Merit and Competitive Soldier of Beijing, for four consecutive years. His wife, Jianzhong, served in the Military Construction Bureau in Inner Mongolia until 1973. After that, she was transferred to a transportation company under the Beijing Transportation Bureau (Liu Y., 1995). Jianzhong was also the recipient of numerous awards from her danwei and the government. In the newspaper article (Liu Y., 1995), this couple was called a mofan fuqi (model couple). Their stories were very well known in the workers’ community at the paper mill.

A poem was written by the propaganda cadre Yu Lianxiang to praise the couple. It was published in the internal circulation newspaper of Beijing First Bureau of Light Industry. The poem showed how Zhou Guangquan’s image was related to both ancient moralist teaching and socialist teaching (Figure 64).
Two medals flash,
A couple of labour models they are.
Even though in their years without bewilderment,
In their heart, state and home are both there.
For home, they work hard,
For work, they dedicate themselves together.
Real elites they are in our generation,
How valuable two flowers bloom together. (Yu L., 1995)\textsuperscript{94}

Yu’s description of ‘year without bewilderment’ was related to the classic Confucian book, \textit{Analects of Confucius}.\textsuperscript{95} With this phrase, Yu meant that Zhou Guangquan was literally in his forties and also that he could have easily given in to the temptations around him. This line praised the steadfastness of Zhou Guangquan’s moral standard, his loyalty to his work unit, and his resistance to materialistic life. This line in the poem may also mean that temptation is more difficult to refuse for people in their forties because they have enough work experience and technical training, so it is very easy for them to quit their companies and serve other private firms to earn higher incomes. In Zhou Guangquan’s case, he was indeed asked by his friends and his parents to quit for a better career. I will discuss his reaction to that later in this chapter. Secondly, the poem emphasised the connection between state and family. The image of the role model was poised between both. In the poem, the ‘state’ refers to the state-owned paper

\textsuperscript{94} The Chinese of the poem is, “两枚奖章闪烁，一对夫妻劳模。已是不惑之年，心中有家有国。为家同心操劳，敬业比肩拼搏。真正吾辈精英，难得花开两朵。”

\textsuperscript{95} Confucius described different phases of his growth. When he was fifteen, he aspired to obtain knowledge; when he was thirty, he could be independent and have his own life; when he was forty, he was sensible and not bewildered; when he was fifty, he understood his destiny; when he was sixty, he could accept any praise or criticism; and when he was seventy, his body could fully follow his heart without deviance in etiquette.
Figure 63: Zhou Guangquan’s story was widely reported in many newspapers. This article is from a newsletter of the Chinese Communist Party (Liu Y., 1995). The title translates as ‘model couple’. The article described a few everyday stories about Zhou Guangquan. The image in the right top corner shows Zhou Guangquan and his wife cooking together and the image in the middle left shows Zhou Guangquan’s family (Image captured from Liu Y., 1995).
Figure 64: L. Yu’s poem about the model worker couple (Image captured from Yu L., 1995).
Dedicating oneself to the enterprise relates to the moral standards of loyalty and patriotism, and working hard for family taps into the Confucian ethic of creating good kinship relations.

The Image in the Media

The poem only reflects what Yu thought of Guangquan. However, how did the community perceive his story? In the media, many of the writings were not about the working performance of Guangquan but about his private life. Both private and public performances contributed to the image. Before Guangquan and Jianzhong received role model recognitions, they were living together with their only daughter and with Guangquan’s parents at the dormitory provided by the paper mill. Guangquan would wake up very early in the morning to buy food at the market before he went to the paper mill. Guangquan also needed to come back home during his lunch break to prepare food for his daughter and his parents. At night, he usually bought back some food from the public dining hall at the factory. Because both he and his wife needed to work long hours during the day at their own companies, they shared the housework between them. Sometimes, when Jianzhong had to drive a truck route that kept her out of town for days, Guangquan also needed to take care of his wife’s responsibilities. These included buying the grocery and foods, taking care of their daughter, and go sightseeing with her during the weekends.

In an interview, Zhou Guangquan expressed his esteem for his wife. He also recognised that his wife had a strong character and that she received numerous awards from her work unit (Liu Y., 1995). Zhou Guangquan appreciated her strong motivation...
and decisiveness when she was working and also understood how tired she was when she was driving days and nights. Therefore, he was happy to help with the family care duties that a mother would usually be responsible for: “She is a truck driver. She needs to work from early in the morning until late at night. Her job is more tiring than mine” (Zhou G., 1995b).

Guangquan’s Sacrifice

In 1992, both of Guangquan’s parents were sick at the same time:

Compared to work, family is a heavier and more tiring burden for me. My old father suffered from acute appendicitis and had to stay in a hospital for surgery. Every afternoon, I had to run to the hospital after work and had no time for my dinner. The next morning, I needed to leave the hospital at 5 a.m. and run back to the factory to help with the equipment-modification project (Zhou G., 1995b).

Unfortunately, he was also working on an emergency mechanical-modification project for his work unit. His wife had just been assigned a new job to transport some materials from Beijing’s suburban area to the city. Facing this situation, Jianzhong was very nervous. However, Guangquan comforted her and suggested that if she could take care of the family after she got back home from her work in the night, he could focus on taking care of his parents. The author of the article helped Guangquan to explain his plan: “Zhou knew how important finishing the company’s task was to his wife’s heart, and he made arrangements so that it would not interrupt his wife’s schedule” (Zhou G., 1995b).

In those days, Guangquan participated in the equipment-modification project during the day and went to the hospital directly from the factory to take care of his
parents at night. Because the hospital was far from where he lived, he decided to sleep in
the hospital with his parents. In the morning, he woke up at 5 a.m. to rush back to the
factory and continued his modification work. He continued this routine for a month.

In April, 1993, when Guangquan was working at the paper mill repairing
machines, his colleague told him that his wife was looking for him. Jianzhong told him
that a man who was working as a loader on her transportation team was injured and
needed 2,000 Yuan for a hospital-deposit fee to be able to receive medical treatment
immediately. She wanted Guangquan to help the worker, so Guangquan borrowed money
from his friends and his colleagues. Guangquan’s colleagues asked him why he did not
worry about borrowing money for an unknown migrant family. Guangquan responded
that this was something that his wife wanted, and he trusted her.

Between Family and State

Guangquan’s perfect image was modelled by the media in several ways.
Responsibility was definitely his first priority; in this way, he was able to maintain his job.
Private life was also important to him; however, neglecting family is considered an
acceptable sacrifice if it is done for work. Guangquan also recognised the dilemma
between keeping both the company and the family happy. Oneself is obviously the least
important consideration for a model worker. The story of borrowing money for an
unknown migrant family illustrated Guangquan’s generosity and selflessness. In the story
about taking care of his parents, he even sacrificed his own health to balance work and
family.
On 26 July, 1994, Guangquan’s wife had to take a five-hour train ride for work. The day before she left, Guangquan promised that he would prepare something for her to eat on the ride. However, the night before, he had to stay late at work to provide some emergency repairs on machines that suddenly broke down. His wife had visited him that night, but when she found out that her husband was working hard, she left quietly without telling him. Guangquan did not arrive home until midnight. He did not want to wake up his wife but still wanted to say goodbye the next morning. Unfortunately, Guangquan could not wake up in time the next morning to prepare the food and say goodbye to his wife. His wife left a note on the dining table telling him that she had made lunch for him instead.

Putting personal and family life behind the interests of the public was common to model workers. Because he focused on work so much, Guangquan did not realise that his daughter had health problems. The rhetoric of role models thus needed to justify all the negative aspects of life that were involved. Justifications directly from the mouths of model workers were of course the most convincing. In an interview, Guangquan said:

My daughter told me she had had back pain since primary school, and I did not bring her to the hospital until the problem became serious in her middle-school years. Because her back problems influenced her leg muscles, I had to help her walk. It pained my heart. Although my daughter told me that she did not blame me, in my heart I felt guilty. My colleagues asked me why my wife was not helping me. She was a driver, so she always needed to leave home for a long time. I told them, she was also a national model worker; therefore, as her husband, I needed to be considerate of that (Zhou G., 1995b).
Being a model worker, Guangquan faced serious conflicts between the responsibilities of his family and his work unit. Obviously, he chose to contribute to the work unit, but he suffered from guilt when he discovered that his daughter’s health problem had worsened because of his carelessness. His guilt was also evident from the story above, when he could not wake up in the morning to prepare food for his wife and say goodbye to her.

So, why did the media also report the negative side of being a model worker? The portrayal of the negative side of Guangquan as a bad father and a bad husband was actually the media’s intention—it was part of a strategy to justify those negative impressions. Forgiveness was the key part of the story. Guangquan’s daughter did not blame him, and his wife continually expressed her understanding as well. In this sense, the negative effects were moralised by the positive and supportive reactions by his family members.

In 1993, for a machine-modification project, Guangquan suggested making some mechanical parts himself. He also gave up his holiday and finished the project within three months:

I entered the factory 20 years ago, and I have been working with those machines every day. I would feel uncomfortable if I could not hear the noise of those machines. My team is responsible for the regular maintenance, modification, and periodic inspection of the five production lines and seven sets of important supplemental equipment. I told the workers from the production lines that if there is a problem during the midnight shift, they should go to my home and wake me up. I am ready at any time. Therefore, I usually worked nights and during the holidays to
repair the machines in cases of emergency. Everyone from the factory, even my neighbours, knew that and asked me how I could work for twenty-four hours. My home was very close to the factory and it only took me ten minutes, so there was no reason for me to refuse their requests. As a Communist Party member, I did what needed to be done (Zhou G., 1995b).

Thanks to his sacrifice, he saved the factory 250,000 yuan (Zhou G., 1995b). Despite Guangquan’s passion for his job, on one occasion his body could not keep up. He became ill after working for forty-eight hours straight during an intensive one-month equipment-modification project in 1994. He had a fever for three days, so he was asked to stay at home. His wife could not take care of him, even though she wanted to, because she needed to complete a few jobs for her own work unit. At that time, Jianzhong’s work unit was also facing serious challenges from the market transformations. Guangquan insisted that he could take care of himself and asked his wife to go to work. One of the factory managers found out that Guangquan did not have anyone to take care of him, so he sent two workers to Guangquan’s home to take care of him and cook for him. Gossip developed in the factory, as people thought Jianzhong did not want to take care of her husband. In another example of sacrifice, Guangquan trusted his wife and therefore ignored all the gossip, despite the fact that this became the centre of gossip in his community. Thus the image of role models was established by the media in Guangquan’s case, highlighting positive aspects and rationalising negative aspects to encompass both Confucian moral teaching and Chinese socialist ideals.
**Triply Happy?**

In 1995, Guangquan was honoured when he was named Beijing’s Model Worker, and his wife Jianzhong was honoured even more as she was named the National Model Worker. Guangquan was given an apartment with three bedrooms by his *danwei* as a reward. Before that, Guangquan had been living in a dormitory with his family south of the factory for almost ten years. His dormitory had only one room. He did not even have a sofa. In April, 1995, Guangquan moved to his new apartment in the tower housing north of the paper mill. The first thing he did was to buy a new 5,000 yuan set of composite cabinets. He also bought a new Simmons mattress for his parents. After moving to his new apartment, Guangquan spent almost all his savings. The result of Guangquan’s success would eventually drag him into a poverty that he had never experienced before.

With his success, Guangquan finally became an influential and special worker in his community. His behaviour was followed by others, and his speeches addressed the standards of moral lifestyles because, as a role model in the workers’ community, Guangquan was asked to give speeches in front of many people and to tell his story to the media countless times. In addition to being influential, Guangquan also gained material and personal benefits, such as the apartment and his reputation. It is notable though that Guangquan did not seek out power or rewards; rather, they were the direct result of his subservience and docility towards the party-state.

96. In the early 1990s, mattress with springs was new to China. Simmons mattress was also one of the most famous imported mattress brands at that time. So having Simmons mattress was considered as luxury.
Still, Guangquan’s subservience and rewards were not enough to improve his life. The new apartment, cabinets, and mattress used up all of Guangquan’s savings. This new life presented new financial burdens on Guangquan and his family. After being awarded, he and his wife were invited to participate in many meetings and occasions, so they also had to buy some new formal clothes. His financial situation did not really allow him to buy clothes for both himself and his wife, so he put his wife first and bought her the relatively more expensive clothes.

In the summer of 1995, Jianzhong came back from her work unit and told Guangquan that she had been advised to continue her studies. Her workers’ union could offer her a place to study for an associate’s degree for half a year and then send her to a university for further education. The invitation was very valuable because only national model workers under forty-five years old could qualify for such an opportunity. However, in the end, she had to turn down the opportunity. Guangquan explained in front of the media that this decision was made for two reasons. First, his wife had a very basic level of education, so going back to school would have been a gigantic challenge for her. Secondly, his monthly salary was only around 400 yuan, so his family could not financially sustain his wife going back to school.

Role Model or Victim

Mei Zhang (1998) found that the two political objectives of role model emulation were to promote new policies and to prescribe ideal behaviours for the public. She analysed many cases of model workers from primary and secondary sources. Because extreme images of model workers were often invented and presented in the media, Mei
Zhang searched for criticisms of model workers. Indeed, he found that model workers might lose the opportunity to pursue further study and earn higher salaries. Others perceived the title of model worker to be too heavy a burden. Model workers were also said to be targets of community gossip, and other people who were jealous might isolate them from the community. Finally, working very hard was often reported to put strains on family and marital relations:

I do not consider money that much. I think that money is something you cannot live without, but enough is good. It is not necessary to pursue it. Now, some say that people who do not earn a lot of money are simply not intelligent enough. I do not agree with them. These two years, a construction company where my father had worked asked me to join them. Although they offered a higher salary, I did not accept their offer. My colleagues who have moved to international companies, rural enterprises, and hotels asked me to leave the factory and join them. I rejected all of them as well. I have been working at the factory for twenty years, and learnt the skill of repair work there. The leaders of the factory took care of me, and they cultivated my education and joining of the China Communist Party. So, as a technician and a Communist Party member, I have to contribute my effort to the factory (Liu Y., 1995).

In this case, Guangquan and Jianzhong knew they were going to suffer according to the shi of the declining state owned enterprise. Indeed, they had the opportunity to escape poverty but chose not to. Guangquan gave up the opportunity to leave his company for a better-paid job. Even his friends and his father wanted to recommend him to some private companies. Guangquan’s explanation for his decision was that he knew it was the most difficult period for his danwei; at this time, experienced workers were in
urgent demand. As for Jianzhong, she could have chosen to continue her studies at the university. After graduating, she probably could have found a job with a higher salary. However, because her husband would not leave the factory for a higher salary, they did not have the income necessary to support her studies. Guangquan and Jianzhong felt regretted this because they explicitly said that if their financial situation had been better, they would have gone to school together.

**The ‘Shougang Model’**

As explained in the above section, the core idea is the making of role model images through rhetorical practices in the media. However, how far is the rhetoric from the reality? Shougang is the largest steel and iron manufacturing enterprise in Beijing. The full name of Shougang is the Beijing Capital Iron and Steel Cooperative. It was the model for the paper mill to follow.

In this thesis, two events connect the communities of the paper mill and Linked Hybrid with Shougang. The first, which forms the main discussion of this section, happened in the early 1990s. At that time, Shougang was named the showcase of Post-reform enterprise development by Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, there was a political movement to encourage other companies to emulate Shougang. The second event is more recent. Shougang’s original site was demolished and converted to an industrial park for high-technology innovations. The Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, Li Hu, also participated in the strategic planning competition of that project.

The movement in the early 1990s was called ‘*xuexi shougang*’ (Learning from Shougang). The movement partially stemmed from the managers of Beijing First Paper
Mill, who began to take more active steps to adapt to the new market economy. The paper mill’s management sent staff to Shougang to learn about its organisation as an industrial model, because Shougang was believed to be the most successful enterprise during the market reform and was a heroic example among all enterprises at that time. However, just one year after the ‘Learning from Shougang’ movement was launched, Shougang lost political support when Deng Xiaoping retired, and the financial situation of the company deteriorated. After that, its hitherto praised culture and management style became highly criticised in academia and by professional institutes. The son of the president of Shougang and other senior staff members were arrested for corruption. The role model enterprise was discovered to be pure sham.97

The Emergence of the ‘Shougang Model’

The prelude of the movement can be traced back to the 1980s. At that time, the management of the organisation of the paper mill was extremely bureaucratic and hierarchical. This system began to lose its efficiency and effectiveness during the market reform because it could no longer keep up with its speed of development. News reports documented the failure of the reforms (Du, 1991). In the late 1980s, the local governments were criticised for putting too much investment into infrastructural constructions. In 1986, the central government announced new regulations about economic development. The main measures were to reduce government investment in

national-scale infrastructure, light industry, and unproductive industry. Despite being aware of the predictions of a forthcoming economic recession, the Beijing Commerce Bureau still instructed the paper mill to produce 120,000 rolls of printing paper that year, neglecting the poor economic outlook. In the end, the market could not adsorb such a large supply. The paper mill attempted to lower the price, creating disastrous losses of several hundred thousand yuan. These lower prices could not recoup the manufacturing costs, and the paper mill’s marketing firms could not find enough buyers.

I mentioned in Chapter 4 that the president of the paper mill Guo Chunguang recognised the ineffectiveness of the planned-economy business model. It was then that he started his own research unit to explore new products and markets instead of depending on others or on the Commerce Bureau. Finally, his reform ideas were accepted within the paper mill, and he launched a series of propaganda activities. One of them was ‘Learning from Shougang’:

In 1991, all workers flourished in the entrepreneurial spirit of ‘pragmatism, endeavour, sacrifice, innovation’, and they learnt from Shougang to further liberalise our minds and deepen the entrepreneurial process. Moreover, they also bravely faced challenges from the market, strengthened quality control, and increased efficiency. Judging from our time and considering our situation, the economic efficiency has increased and the enterprise has been developed (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1992a).

The statement above was published in a press-conference booklet by the paper mill in 1992. The ‘Learning from Shougang’ movement was announced as a success to

98. See speech by Wang Bingqian at the Sixth National Representative Congress, the fifth meeting, 26 March, 1987.
the public. This event was planned as early as 1990, with lectures, forums, and exchange programs to learn from the steel enterprise. For example, in 1991, five training courses were organised for core management staff members from the paper mill to work at Shougang and learn about its methods of managerial reform. It was also reported that this movement involved around four hundred department heads, team leaders from different technical disciplines in the paper mill, and mid-level management staff (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1992a). The objective of this program was to explore the paper mill’s plans for reform in the transitional stage between the planned and market economies. These programs were launched by the Chinese Communist Party committee in the paper mill corresponding to the guidelines of the Sixth Beijing Municipal Government Committee Congress (Tenth Meeting). In the press-conference document, the aim was the consensus of all workers in the factory.

Another document, entitled ‘Further liberating our minds, inspiring our morals, and learning from Shougang’, was also released to all workers around the same time. In this document, a new slogan was used, xushijiehe, yixucushi (integrating the intangible and the tangible, using the intangible to enhance the tangible) (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1992b, 1). This slogan advocated the combination of abstract knowledge and learning with tangible everyday working practices, and suggested that the abstract should lead the tangible:

We understand our situation in this way: The core idea of ‘Learning from Shougang’ focuses on learning from their management model. We trained more than four hundred leaders and backbones in the paper mill to facilitate a future, larger-scale extension of the program of learning from
Shougang to the public. Our paper mill is an enterprise with almost a fifty- year history. The enterprise developed from a small workshop with one hundred workers to a large factory with three thousand workers. It manufactures many kinds of mid- to high-class products. All of this is due to the fact that we have a team of fearless staff. With this team of staff as the foundation and the knowledge they learned from Shougang, we plan to learn and realize the reform. Then our transformation process can be speeded up. The improvement of the living situations of many workers as an outcome of the reform will be the best evidence for the rest of the paper mill’s workers who understand the importance, urgency, and necessity of reform (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1992b, 2).

During the market reform period, the management system and the organisational culture of Shougang was widely discussed among academics, politicians, and enterprise leaders. Shougang was described as the pearl of the reform (Xu & Zhang, 1992).

*Shougang-moshi* (Shougang model) also became a model for other enterprises to follow. A Chinese article in early 1991 stated that

Shougang has been operating within the new system of contracting for ten years already. What is the effect of this new contracting system? What are the changes? Does it contribute to the state? Is there any value for us to advocate and learn from the experience of the new contracting system in Shougang? Many of us are concerned with these questions. We went to Shougang with these questions personally and investigated its post-reform structure, especially the changes related to their new management system over the last decade. We also tried to understand how this model contributed to the overall economy and to society as a whole. After understanding the basic managerial framework and actual practices, I was enlightened. The ten years of Shougang’s company practices proved that
with the new contracting system... large enterprises, state-owned institutions, and social productivity could be revitalised. If we can advocate the model of Shougang nationally, the problems in reforming operations and management models in large enterprises will experience a breakthrough (Kong, Li, & Cui, 1991, 10).

The outstanding achievement of Shougang was common knowledge and was recognised by all Chinese workers and company managers at that time. The new contracting system was the key to success. It provided possible ways for other enterprises to gradually become independent from the state and adapt to the market economy. Shougang’s contracting system was described as a measure of balancing ze, quan, li (responsibility, power, benefits) and implanting bao, bao, he (contracting, quality guarantees, verification) to all levels of the work force. In other words, this new system provided autonomy at a new level, but connected all autonomous units together under government contracts that controlled the quality of production. The breakthrough was the realisation of the decentralization of political power and social responsibility from the central government, but still maintaining regulation by the government: a link existed between the market-economy and the social-community perspectives, and the movement also suggested a certain level of democratization.

99. The Chinese characters are, ‘责, 权, 利’ for ‘ze, yuan and li’. They mean responsibility, power and profit. Moreover, ‘包, 保, 核’ for ‘bao, bao and he’. The first bao refers to a contracting system that defines the responsibilities of all departments and individuals; the second bao asks for a guarantee of cooperation between all departments and individuals from different levels, and it refers to the verification of the quality of production.

100. See Kong, Li & Cui (1991, 16): “After the enterprise gains autonomy (zizhuquan), the effect extends to democratization and the scientific governance of the community.
Surprisingly, advocacy for public participation can be found already in the early 1990s, although it was still not then fully implanted in Chinese society. The democratic system mentioned by Kong, Li and Cui (1991) may not be exactly the same as those in the West; rather, it included setting up professional committees composed of leading workers in different professions to participate in the decision-making process of some important events. The enterprise also established a more transparent communication system to release all information about actions taken by the enterprise, including decisions about production strategy, future development plans, and internal personnel affairs. An internal inspection committee, made up of representatives elected by 180,000 workers, was set up to supervise 12,000 leaders in Shougang. Finally, the leaders of the enterprises were requested to submit themselves to elections by workers.

Together with numerous statistics that proved how successful Shougang was in the late 1980s, the new contracting-management system and the democratic workers’ community became the role model for all enterprises. Other than that, Shougang was also the dream place of employment for all Chinese workers in the late 1980s because it was

Workers are allowed to make their own decisions for their community and their enterprise. In the framework of the socialist market economy, the measures to maximise efficiency and sustain active energy are not limited by how loyal the workers and the staff are, but more important it is about how to make the correct decisions in response to the market. It also involves conducting research for new products and balancing between production and workers’ lives. In the large-scale enterprise of Shougang, a minor mistake will cause serious waste and loss. Therefore, after operating in the new contracting system and by establishing a well-developed democratic system, workers were given more power. General participation can then be created and workers will be the main body of the enterprise” (text originally in Chinese, translated by the author).
widely believed that the salaries were two to three times higher than those of other companies.

**Becoming a Private Boss**

Shougang was established as early as 1919 in the western suburbs of Beijing, an area that has become one of the busiest areas of the city today. After 1949, Shougang became one of the largest-scale iron and steel producers for the country. In the 1980s, the company was the flagship of China’s reform and open policy and was the definition of achievement of the Deng Xiaoping era. The success stemmed from the implementation of a system called the contract-responsibility system. Shougang’s rapid development was also due to beneficial policies and resource allocations. ‘Learning from Shougang’ was not a slogan limited to the paper mill; rather, it was a nationwide political movement in the early 1990s.

Located in the western part of Beijing, Shougang was reported to boast a workforce of 220,000 people (Hassard Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). They do not mention the year of this figure, but Stepanke (1992) put the number at 150,000 in the 1990s. Among these 150,000 workers, 135,000 were employed to grow vegetables, rice, and run the school and hospital for the 15,000 manufacturing workers. In the planned economy’s social system, other than manufacturing, Shougang also needed to provide its large number of workers dormitories, medical care, schools, and other welfare facilities.

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101 The new system also relates to the emergence of the ‘private bosses’ in the paper mill discussed in Chapter 4.
102 It is interesting to see the ratio of the numbers of worker to supporting staff was almost 1:9 in Shougang work unit community. See also Stepanek (1992, footnote 61).
At that time, companies took an extremely heavy burden of the public’s economic welfare. This gigantic enterprise was the fourth-largest enterprise and the third-largest steel producer in China in the 1990s. Around that time, Shougang’s ambition was to develop even further into a transnational enterprise. The goal was not brash. The company was successfully quoted on the Stock Exchange in both China and Hong Kong in the late 1990s, and its international investors came from Hong Kong and other parts of the globe. The transformation from a pure state owned and state managed enterprise to an enterprise operating in the contract-responsibility system enabled Shougang to develop dramatically in the 1980s. The realisation of contract responsibility at Shougang started from the sixth Five-Year Plan, which covered the period 1980 to 1985 (Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999).

In the pre-reform period, state-owned-enterprise framework, companies were controlled by the government. After the reform, power was decentralised to company managers, and state owned enterprises were required to sustain themselves autonomously and take more responsibility for their own profits and losses. State-owned enterprises also

103. The billionaire Li Kashing from Hong Kong, the Mesta Engineering Company from the United States, and the Hierro iron-ore mine from Peru, all held shares in Shougang (Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999, 56).
104. The official definition of a state-owned enterprise was a company owned by the whole public. This definition was criticised by Chow (1997) as not descriptive and useful for understanding its meaning. He defined it as a firm that turns over all its profits to government entities, who exercise control over the firm’s enterprise and management functions, including control over matters that are within the normal business scope of the firm (Chow, 1997). This model was how companies were run in the planned-economy social system.
105. In 1978, the president of Shougang could only approve expenditures of the enterprise up to 800 yuan, which was about 95 USD at that time (Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999).
needed to respond to the free market (Hassard, Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). The decentralization process of state-owned enterprises began with the slogan *sheijian*, *sheikong*, *sheiyong* (who establishes, who controls, who utilises) in the late 1970s. Stepanek (1992) interpreted this rhetoric as follows:

‘Who establishes’ refers to the level of government making the initial investment. Thus, if a township government invests in a factory, it basically controls it. The words ‘who utilises’ imply that the township government would also get to keep the after-tax revenues from the factory (Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999, 57).

The reason for selecting Shougang as the model of decentralization was not only its geographic location in Beijing, and not only the scale and significance of the enterprise’s industry, but also the personal connection between the president of Shougang, Zhou Guanwu, and the leader of the state at that time, Deng Xiaoping. Zhou Guanwu served Deng during the war in the late 1940s (Hassard Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). This personal connection eventually became the source of speculations as to why Shougang always seemed to obtain special treatment during the post-reform era.

The new contract-responsibility system was two tiered: state-enterprise contracting and internal contracting. In the case of Shougang, a certain amount of profit needed to be handed over to the state. This rate increased annually. In 1982, the return was supposed to be 6 per cent of the profit from 1981 (Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999). But Shougang’s profit was unexpectedly high, so the State Council decided to raise it to 7.2 per cent (Hassard, Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). The remaining profit would go back to the enterprise. Shougang signed a fourteen-year contract with the state. The
contracted period was extraordinary long, as normally the contract-responsibility agreement would only last for three years (Hassard, Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). With respect to the second, internal level of the contract-responsibility system, Shougang’s vice-president, Luo Bingsheng, said that tasks were contracted by second-level (subsidiary) companies with Shougang. These subsidiary companies could further subcontract some tasks to other firms, including factories, mines, and individuals (Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999; also see Luo B., 1994, 82). The internal-contracting system operated in a hierarchical network with Shougang as the central point.

Role Model Scandals

It is interesting that although the contract-responsibility system made gigantic profits for companies, numerous problems arose during the system’s implementation. One of these problems was triggered by the substantial autonomy granted to enterprises, which caused irreversible social inequality in Chinese society. At Beijing First Paper Mill, I described in Chapter 4 how many workers started to contract different types of business from the enterprise. The Shougang model in the early 1990s introduced the emergence of sirena laoban (private boss) in the paper mill, thus the guoyou siying (owned by the state, 106. The real history of Shougang is still a mystery. On the one hand, the company was reported as the most successful enterprise. On the other hand, it was all a sham and all the figures were invented, and it was all a pack of lies. This is because transparency was insufficient in the early 1990s.

107. Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan (1999) suggest that those problems include disparities between enterprise, short-term thinking, confusion in the taxation system, a lack of responsibility for losses, excessive enterprise autonomy, poor management quality, a failure to resolve the problem of property rights, and the continued social-welfare burden.
operated by the people) idea. The significance of the contract-responsibility also links to the first generation of the upper class in China, who can afford the luxury housing such as Linked Hybrid. However, the majority of the enterprise workers could not share the benefits of the reform, and those workers still living in the workers’ community represent this social class.

Managers of companies operating under the contract-responsibility system often took advantage of the autonomy of the enterprise and the power of decision-making for their personal gain. They also controlled the majority of the country’s natural and social resources. Eventually, private entities stripped the state of its assets. Ding (2000) states that the transformation of state-owned enterprises from the early 1980s to the 1990s was mainly about the transfer of the ownership of a state-owned firm’s assets by obscuring the corporative identity. This was achieved by blurring the organisational boundaries between the state-owned enterprise and other, mostly non-state enterprises (Ding, 2000).  

108 Due to this problematic system, the chairman of Shougang’s Communist Party branch, Guan Zhicheng, embezzled more than 1,500,000 yuan during the late 1980s by running two consortia (Ding, 2000): the Capital Iron and Steel Mine Company and the Beijing Iron and Steel Company. From 1986 to 1989, Guan Zhicheng was the Communist Party’s secretary for these companies. During this period, he made use of his political positions to order steel products from Shougang for other enterprises with cheaper prices in exchange for bribes from these enterprises. The bribes were either paid by cash or sent to Guan Zhicheng through another company bank account controlled by him. In 1990, Guan Zhicheng was arrested for corruption and taking bribes and sentenced to death. After Guan Zhicheng, three other senior managers were also arrested for corruption in Shougang under the contract-responsibility system (Zhao & Wan, 2009). Other evidence about the excessive autonomy problem in Shougang was due to having its own bank. This prestige was believed to be associated with the special personal connection between the president of Shougang and Deng Xiaoping. The banking system in Shougang further facilitated the stripping of the state’s assets.

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In 1993, the financial system of Shougang faced an unprecedented crisis caused by a series of poor investment decisions and the corruption scandal of President Zhou Guanwu’s son. In 1995, Zhou Guanwu was forced to retire, marking the end of Shougang’s heyday in the post-reform era. All of these unfortunate events occurred just two years after the launching of the ‘Learning from Shougang’ movement.

The collapse began in the early 1990s. Shougang found it increasingly difficult to turn over the required percentage of profits to the government, which was increasing annually. To obtain a certain increase, Shougang needed to continue expanding in size and had to use more resources to continue to develop. Deng Xiaoping, the primary supporter of Shougang, retired, but he was still active in the Chinese political sphere. He visited Shougang in 1992, right after his famous nanxun (Tour to the South). Nanxun generated numerous entirely new cities and Development Zones in southern China. Influenced by that trend, Deng’s visit provided courage for Zhou Guanwu to negotiate with the state on behalf of his enterprise. His negotiation included asking for more beneficial policies to further expand Shougang. Moreover, he also asked to extend Shougang’s responsibility contract after 1995, when it was set to expire.

However, things did not develop as Zhou Guanwu expected. In 1995, Zhou Guanwu was forced to resign from his position at Shougang. Right before this, his son was arrested for corruption. Steinfeld (1998) argued that the prosecution of Zhou’s son was a clear sign that Deng Xiaoping’s age and his failing health had significantly weakened his ability to protect Zhou Guanwu and Shougang from its critics and rivals. After Zhou Guanwu resigned, his system, which had originally been praised as a democratic system, began to be referred to as a patriarchal dictatorship (Hassard, Sheehan
& Jonathan, 1999). Eventually, Shougang adapted two new systems—the modern enterprise system and the group-company system—and further involved itself in a series of transformations.

Besides problems with the management process, other criticisms surfaced at the same time. The pollution problem in Beijing’s inner city was blamed on Shougang. After Zhou Guanwu left, the factory was found to lack modern and environmentally friendly equipment, resulting in serious pollution of the city. The problem could be traced to the late 1970s. When Zhou Guanwu was in power and Beijing’s municipal-government officials were not allowed to carry out any inspections of the factory. After the failed inspections, Shougang was moved from Beijing urban core (Wu Y., 2000).

Learning from Role Models

After mentioning Lei Feng, the former Chinese partner of Steven Holl for Beijing Linked Hybrid, Li Hu smiled. Lei Feng is one of the most famous official role models from Mao’s age. Lei Feng was famous for always willing to sacrifice himself for the public good:

I learnt from Lei Feng when I was a child. The city where I spent my childhood was the same one where Lei Feng served in the army: Fushun in Liaoning Province. I was originally from Shandong, but I studied in Liaoning. I attended university at Beijing. At that time, I was the number one student from my city. [Laughs.] I used to have this idea about changing my major [from architecture] to computer science or biology. I regret not doing it now. If I had transferred, I might be a biologist now. [Laughs.] Then I worked very hard on practicing drawing, and finally I
could draw well. In my university, I did not talk to my teachers that much. It wasn’t until my third year that I started to read books by Le Corbusier. My interest in society was not solely from that era. At the time, everyone wanted to make money, but the reading did have some impact on me. I grew up in the 1970s, the age when everyone was learning about Lei Feng. Remember, I learnt about Lei Feng in the hometown of Lei Feng. [Laughs] (Li Hu, personal communication, 15 July, 2009).

In this chapter, I reconstruct two cases of role models during the social transformation of the workers’ community.

The Use of Role Models

The role model mentioned by Li Hu, Lei Feng, was a classic case of a model worker. Lei Feng was politically powerless and poor, but his absolute loyalty to Mao and his willingness to sacrifice himself for others made him an important model in modern Chinese history. Because of some of Mao’s essays and the publication of Lei Feng’s dairy after his death, Lei Feng’s image was elevated to near sainthood among the Chinese people (Larson W., 2009). Mei Zhang (1998) suggested that the image of Lei Feng was part of the political propaganda for the mass mobilization of citizenry, a symbol of the Communist Party’s highest ideals and its modernization agenda. Therefore, we can consider the two aspects of Lei Feng as a role model. One is to understand the construction of the individuality of Lei Feng by being loyal to the party-state. The other is

109. Lei Feng was formally named a role model after his death at the age of 22, in Mao’s essay, ‘Learn from Comrade Lei Feng’, on 5 March, 1963.
to understand the strategy of fabricating Lei Feng as a role model to manipulate a larger group of people in the society.

When Chinese society was undergoing social reform in the 1990s, rhetorical practice about role models was again an important tool to stabilise society and justify the negative effects brought by the reform (Bakken, 2000). In addition, behind the role model rhetoric was the Confucian tradition of the Chinese people (Pines, 2002). Role-model rhetoric in the socialist and reform age made use of the traditional Chinese culture to fabricate a moral ideals and thus effective society to fuel the production industry, this argument is particularly obvious in the model worker Guangquan’s case. The use of role models was definitely not new in Chinese politics. Long before modern communist role-model rhetoric, Confucian teaching had already made use of ancient moral figures and stories as role models for people from different social classes to follow (Boden, 2008). In this sense, the development of Chinese society is always based on a certain imaginary ideal of the past due to the moral nostalgia for Confucian tradition (Zhang L., 2005).

After Lei Feng’s death, Mao formally named him as a role model. Lei Feng’s legend was constructed through the publishing of his diary. The credibility of the 200,000-word diary, with half the text praising Mao and the other half-documenting Lei Feng’s voluntary contribution, was controversial, and it is very possible that the legend of Lei Feng was totally invented for the sake of propaganda (Zhang M., 1998). Indeed, Guangquan’s and Jianzhong’s stories are very believable and demonstrate the power that rhetoric can have on reality. However, the title of role model actually constrained their development. Wang Ji, one of my ex-worker informants, was also named as a model worker in the 1990s, probably just a few years after Guangquan’s recognition. Wang Ji
was still living in the workers’ community. Having been laid off from his job at the paper mill in the late 1990s, he used to work as freelance electrician, contracting himself to other private enterprises. Currently, he manages the food orders in a restaurant. The title of model worker does not seem to be helping him to improve his life in the age of the market economy. The consequences of Guangquan and Wang Ji explicate the use of role models in contemporary China. It is a political and rhetorical device, but does not actually help individuals. Mei Zhang (1998) suggested that two types of role models coexisted in the post-reform age. One type was composed of role models who actively engaged in the reforms. These people broke the rules of the planned economy and introduced competition and a system of material rewards. This type of model was made up of the first generation of *siren laoban* (private boss) discussed in Chapter 4. The other type of role model consisted of people such as Guangquan, who resisted giving up his loyalty to his socialist work unit. The former type complied with the social structures of the new market economy, whereas the latter complied with the old socialist structures.

Following the discussion about *mofan* (role models) of this chapter, I will argue in the next chapter that the concept of *mofan* is closely related to the *shi* (development tendency) philosophy that I explored in Chapter 4. In this Chinese way of thinking, the subservient model workers who remained within the old social structure for the sake of moral integrity to the party-state were, on the one hand, called *shunshi* (following the trend); but, on the other hand, when they refused to participate in the new market economy society, they were considered as the most rebellious agents in the workers’ community or *nishi* (against the trend). Moreover, the Shougang entrepreneur was subservient to other powerful political figures in order to manipulate his company.
However, this subservience became ineffective once the political figure he depended on lost power. These two cases also demonstrate the complexity, relativity and intriguing interrelatedness of the concepts of subservience and rebellion, compliance and manipulation, in the Chinese system of cultural and social relationships.

In order to further develop the complex connections between shi and mofan, I will explore the ideas of shunshi (following the trend) and nishi (against the trend) to analyse how the practitioners of Linked Hybrid, and the specific design process of Linked Hybrid, fit into this indigenous cultural context.
Designers of Linked Hybrid

In this last chapter, I would like to examine closely the different practices of the American architect, Steven Holl, his Chinese partner, Li Hu, and the Chinese architects from the Local Design Institute. These three types of architectural practitioners all worked closely with each other and played very important roles in the designing of Linked Hybrid. Moreover, all of them contributed to some important developments in the evolution of the design process. However, based on their attitudes about how to respond to the what they saw as reality, they behaved quite differently. I discussed in Chapter 1, Holl’s critical thinking about Chinese urbanism and his attempt to transform it with his design. However, alongside Holl’s critique, architects from the local design institute constantly transformed, or appropriated, Holl’s design according to the overriding desire of the market and the residents. This appropriated and altered design eventually set up a model for others to follow. Using the two indigenous terms I discovered from the last chapter, nishi (against the trend) and shunshi (following the trend), Holl’s practice belongs to the nishi category and the local design institute’s practice belongs to the shunshi category. It is even more interesting to notice that Holl’s Chinese partner, Li Hu, took a middle path between Holl’s nishi and the local design institute’s shunshi practices. On the one hand, Li Hu intended to comply with the Chinese community perception, but, on the other hand, he also attempted to bring changes to it. Li Hu’s practice involved a
collective design process involving the general public. It is these ideas and practices that I will discuss in this chapter.

Steven Holl

In Holl’s recent publication (2010), he addressed two concepts different from the conventional architectural model of practice: combined methods to confront a dynamic, diverse and intermittent system and a recognition of multiple types of urbanism. In addition, his apparent intention of always being sceptical about his work is related to his stated intention of always undertaking a reflective process about his professional practice:

Today, working with doubt is unavoidable; the absolute is suspended by the relative and the interactive. Instead of stable systems we must work with dynamic systems. Instead of simple and clear programs we engage contingent and diverse programs. Instead of precision and perfection we work with intermittent, crossbred systems, and combined methods. Suspending disbelief and adopting a global understanding is today a priori condition, a new fundamental for creative work in science, urbanism, and architecture. Working with doubt becomes an open position for concentrated intellectual work. The research and preparation required for any integrated urban success is quite different from previous periods that imposed classical styles or sought to fulfill the absolute aim of modernist functional clarity. We aim for twenty-first century architecture in contrast to the empirical kitsch of the postmodern. We aim for an architecture that is integral: landscape/ architecture/ urbanism, an architecture of deep connections to site, culture, and climate, rather than an applied signature style. Working with openness and doubt at the outset of each project can yield works engaged on levels of both site and culture: many different urbanisms, rather than single urbanism (Holl, 2010, 13).
I will depart from the specific case of Linked Hybrid and explore the bigger picture of Holl’s reflections on Chinese urbanism. In my interview, Holl gave a very explicit answer to the question about ethical concerns about international architects designing experimental architecture in contemporary China.\(^{110}\)

Is there a bigger meaning to the word ‘ethical’? Let’s get into the heart of that word. Personally, I am very enthusiastic about any culture on earth to push the envelope for architecture. I think the entire development of the earth is suffering under conservatism all the way around. We have a few moments in history where someone did great projects. The history of architecture also suffers from [people who are] ultra-conservative and greedy, only interested in money, or only interested in aesthetically recreating the past. So anywhere that sort of terrible retardation can be broken is a blessing to the history of architecture. I disagree with [using the ethics concept to examine contemporary architectural designs in China], and I don’t think the word ethics connects to that. On issues of human rights, I do think there is an ethical question. But I also believe that

\(^{110}\) The context of this answer is specific. I was asking what Holl thought about ethical concerns when designing experimental architecture in China in recent years. The question stemmed from the vigorous debate that followed the construction of the CCTV headquarter in Beijing by Koolhaas. The criticism by Chinese conservative scholars focused on the exploitation of Chinese natural resources to test radical ideas. One of the many criticism during the design and construction process of CCTV headquarter was a newspaper article called, ‘Sentence the architect of CCTV to be hanged: Criticisms of the competition winning design of CCTV headquarter’, by a Chinese scholar called Qing He, published in a Chinese local newspaper. This article was then rapidly disseminated and posted at many news websites and online discussion boards. The critique not only focused on the lack of understanding of Chinese culture and society, more importantly, the author also disagreed with the huge budget of construction. He explicitly criticised the project that as a waste of China’s resource to fulfil the personal achievement of the Western architect. When Holl heard that question, he was slightly agitated. His response mainly focused on the ethical issue of experimenting with new architectural ideas in China.
architecture has to stand the test of time... This experimentation... you need this experimentation for years. If they don’t like something, tear it down. Look at the money that is wasted on other things. They can just tear it down. If the experimentation is that tragic, recycle it. They can use aluminium, and recycle it. I think the potential to push the envelope of architecture is necessary if there is to be any growth in architectural history. We have seen it in various cultures and various times. That is why Asia in general is important (Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 October, 2009).

I quote Holl’s response about experimental architecture in China for two reasons. The first is that the answer explains Holl’s critique of Chinese urban development by his proposal for a different typology of housing, which he thought was more appropriate to the Chinese situation, being Linked Hybrid. The second reason, which is more closely related to the discussion of this chapter, is that Holl’s answer reveals his attitude against current trends in Chinese society. By this, Holl’s practice is comparable to the nishi (against the trend) of the model worker, Zhou Guangquan, as I introduced in Chapter 5, who refused to change his job when everyone else was leaving the factory.

The construction of Linked Hybrid directly pitted two cultural systems against each other: that of an American architect’s endeavour to influence the sustainable development of a society from his perspective against that of the local practitioners’ and users’ Confucian-oriented community model of hexie guanxi (harmonious relationship). I have presented how the social and spatial orders of the site were disrupted and then appropriated by guanxi and mianzi in Chapters 3 and 4. When the Linked Hybrid residents and developer chose to close the open community designed by Holl, this incident brought the complex and hidden Chinese cultural systems of compliance and
manipulation to the surface. Liang Jingyu, a Linked Hybrid user, explained that walling or gating was the *defacto* reaction to the design of residential communities. This reaction is a social norm, which people follow without knowing its meaning. He also argued that due to this spontaneous action of walling, the phenomenon is beyond the arguments of the American gated-community crisis (Liang Jingyu, personal communication, 14 September, 2010). Indeed, as I have already shown in Chapter 1 and 3, open communities are intrinsically alien to social norms in China.

With Linked Hybrid, Holl finally had the chance to realise his ‘edge of the city’ (1991a) idea. Experimentalism, in the sense of being able to critique and take action, was the origin of Holl’s intention. However, in the special social and political culture of China, architectural experimentalism was constrained. Why? The understanding of the role of the local design institute in the design process helps to explain the above question.

**The Local Design Institute**

The transformation of the Linked Hybrid site from a socialist paper mill is a process of transformation of the state’s resources and government’s power. The process involves the decentralisation of the social power system and of the transformation of social control. Certainly, such decentralisation enables individual entrepreneurial activity to emerge, although regulation inevitably limits its expansion. In the area of professional architectural practice, the decentralisation process also contributes to emerging private architectural firms or local design institutes with government background. In the decentralisation process, architects in local design institutes also obtain more autonomy to set up design studios with their own name under the larger umbrella of the local design
institutes. Because social regulation is still the most important issue in urban
development in contemporary China, local design institutes with government
backgrounds have become the most powerful design entities in China: they obtain the
final legal rights to justify and certify architectural designs; they are the official
regulatory bodies that all other design practices must submit to. With this professional
practice model, the state retains the most economically profitable position in the
urbanisation process and the most effective control over the design of every corner of the
city. The position of local design institutes in Chinese architectural practice is
fundamental, but is insufficiently discussed outside China.

It is interesting to note that some of the local design institutes have been
privatised, such as the in-house design institute of the developer of Linked Hybrid,
Shoudu Sheji (Beijing Capital Design). This state-owned design institute was established
in 1992 and used to operate under the Beijing Planning Bureau. The institute was
restructured and eventually owned by the Modern Group development company in 2002.
Still, the institute’s government background continued to play a key role in construction
certification and project management.

Ke Jin is the general manager of this institute (Figure 65). He graduated from the
University of South California with a Master of Architecture degree and a Master of Real
Estate Development degree. With this in-house design institute, since 2002, Ke Jin and
the development company were able to monitor the progress of Linked Hybrid’s
architectural design. However, it is difficult to determine where the origin of power is in
professional architectural practice of China, even though administratively local design
Figure 65: Ke Jin’s name card from Modern Green Development Company and Beijing Capital Design Institute titles. (Photo the author, 2 August, 2009).
institutes gave the right to make decisions about their own designs. A common reaction from non-Chinese design entities is to regard local design institutes as xiangpi tuzhang, or rubber stamps in English. On the one hand, local design institutes are given administrative power in their professional practice; on the other hand, some professionals recognise them only as a tool to realise government agendas.\textsuperscript{111} From a professional-practice perspective, Steven Holl’s architectural firm is still part of the mianzi (face) engineering in this kind of practical system. The American architectural office design team in Beijing needed to work with the local design institute, Shoudu Sheji, because Shoudu Sheji is the direct representative of the developer. All the changes of Linked Hybrid, including the new wall and the Chinese-style decorative features, were facilitated by this local design institute. In addition to those changes, this local design institute also facilitated the dissemination of Linked Hybrid ideas to other projects. Local people call such dissemination process shanzhai. I will closely examine the implication of this shanzhai process by the local design institutes in the next section of the thesis, in which I will argue design practice in China is also guided by another form of knowledge accumulation and transfer system.

\textbf{Li Hu’s Third Path}

Holl’s Chinese partner, Li Hu, who has been working on the Beijing Linked Hybrid project on site for half a decade, has a somewhat different reaction to the new wall. Instead of considering the problems introduced by suburbanisation and gated

\textsuperscript{111}. I believe that there is an urgent need for in-depth ethnographic research on both private architectural offices and local design institutes in China.
communities as Holl did, he focused on how the recent, rapid urban development has destroyed the public realm. He is concerned that, without immediate action, over-privatisation will erase the vital urban public space for social interaction, and that the very meaning of the city as a place for collective living will be rendered obsolete. Li Hu calls for new communal spaces to bring relevance back to the city and has suggested that the future of public space will be parasitic within existing structures and boundaries of the private domain. His idea, which, as we will see, can be considered close to activism, also contributes to the realisation of public space in development projects. He has described himself as always trying to subvert political obstacles put up by the developer, government officials, and various consultants involved in the Linked Hybrid project (Li Hu, personal communication, 17 December, 2009).

Li Hu's thinking presents an alternative strategy to the design of Chinese communities. In particular, he demonstrated an ability to take action and transform the gated community model with his Red Line Park project, which was conducted by his own architectural office, OPEN Architecture (Figure 66, Figure 67, and Figure 68). In a presentation he said:

Recent urban development, especially in China, threatens to destroy the public realm altogether. Without immediate action, over-privatisation will erase the vital urban public space for social interaction; the very meaning of the city for collective living will be rendered obsolete. Radically new communal spaces are required to bring relevance back to the city. The future of the shared city lies within existing structures and boundaries of the private domain. Architects must courageously lead a
Figure 66: Image of Red Line Park portfolio in Li Hu’s office. The diagram shows how Li Hu perceived the strategy of converting a typical gated community wall into a Red Line Park. The drawings show Li Hu’s idea about how to transform a gated community, by adding programmes on the wall, to an open community. (Unpublished internal OPEN Architecture document).
Figure 67: One of many imaginary variations of public participatory design of Red Line Park. (Unpublished internal OPEN Architecture document).
Figure 68: Red Line Park. The idea was realised in the Shenzhen/Hong Kong Architectural Biennial 2008/09. After the biennial, Vanke Development Group agreed to move the installation to a real community at Guangzhou, China. (Photo captured from OPEN Architecture website, http://www.openarch.com).
movement to artfully and forcefully fold/inject/carve/merge public space right into the heart of private developments. Gated community walls that once cut up the urban fabric are to be transformed into a system of public parks. A zero footprint park that is everywhere. So this is what we see as a gated community wall. This is a system of grassroots, self-initiated transformation that we call Red Line Park building to gradually displace existing walls (Li Hu, speech at Megablock Urbanism conference, 23 March, 2009).

The project used the example of one of the newly developed housing areas of Beijing, Wangjing, to demonstrate how he could transform very limited public space into an unlimited amount of linear parks with community participation by turning walls into parks. Li Hu further explained that he used to be very radical about removing all of the walls, but now he tries to work more indirectly, transforming walls to blur the boundaries of space. He also tries to balance the benefits of investors and of residents; he designs with financial and user considerations in mind. Eventually, he attempted to convince the developers from one of the largest development companies of China to take on this project. He explained how the development company was very interested in this idea because it was something new for them:

At the very beginning, I was very radical in my hope to remove all the walls. But later on, I worked in a more humorous and softer way: transforming the wall to blur the boundaries. I first discussed this idea with the development company, and they were very interested in it because they had not imagined that walls could be used like that. So, I think we have to change our ways to solve the current problem. In other words, if we cannot solve the problem directly, we have to change ourselves. Anyway, I believe the walls will eventually be removed, as
society is always changing. As architects, we can indirectly solve this problem. This kind of solution can balance the investors and design concept in reality, and it is more practical. We can make developers do something for the public, and it is a win-win situation (Li Hu, personal communication, 14 January, 2010).

Li Hu’s shift from removing the walls to transforming them demonstrates local and cultural sensitivity. Although this strategy requires some compromise, architects can still contribute their style and voice to their designs. The strategy introduced new concepts to attempt to transform the cultural and social consequences of prevailing closed communities in China. So he attempts, in an activist way, to call for general participation from the public and convince developers to build his wall and to transform the closed community mentality in China. The design strategy and operating method are interwoven and involve sociological research, participatory encouragement in the design process, and persuasion of the developers. All of these processes are as important as the design, since they are linked together. Li Hu’s Red Line Park project is experimental, and is still a design on paper.

I would like to use the Chinese concept, yidu gongdu (using a poison to fight against a poison), to understand Li Hu’s strategy. The Red Line Park project suggests a completely different approach to the desire to open up Chinese superblocks. This way of confronting reality is indirect, subtle, and tactical. Red Line Park attempts to gradually convey the new notion of open community by awakening the consciousness of the existence of the walls and gates first. The additional programs added to the wall are all intended to be public and trigger interactions between and within communities. After this process, a more open community may be introduced. Red Line Park project also
facilitated alternative working relationships between the architect and developer. It is about how to make use of the developer-oriented urban-development model to develop new ideas. The marketing of the scheme also raised the awareness of the privatized gated community phenomenon in China and disseminated the idea of collective design effort to the residents. After understanding the practices of Steven Holl, the local design institute and Li Hu’s Red Line Park idea, how can we rethink the professional practice of architecture in contemporary China?

Who Was Designing?

The most important questions to ask about the different practice models of Holl and the local design institute are how this Chinese design model works and how the Chinese perceive this it. The Linked Hybrid research shows how Holl’s design practice has developed within the Chinese context.

Thanks to the employment of big-name foreign architects to produce mianzi (face) architecture, Chinese architects have thus been able to introduce their own individuality in terms of architectural forms, novel community lifestyles and even their own public images. The social and economic changes in China have triggered the emergence of small-scale, independent architectural firms, which have introduced private-sector architectural innovations in China. There are three main generations of this kind of private-sector Chinese architect. The first generation involved the architects who were born in the late 1950s or the early 1960s, who were educated and practiced in China after the Cultural Revolution (1977 and onwards), but who have also experienced studying, teaching, or practicing abroad. The second group involves a generation of younger
architects who emerged during the economic boom after the year 2000. They are currently in their early and mid-thirties, were educated after the reform age in 1980s China or overseas in leading architectural schools in America and Europe, and practice in well-known design firms worldwide. Firms in this generation, including MADA s.p.a.m., Urbanus, Atelier Zhanglei, Standardarchitecture, and MAD, do research and design for urban and architectural developments in China. Both generations of architects bring their critical ideas to China. Zhu (2007; 2009) suggested that critical ideas about architecture flow in two directions since the 1990s:

On the one hand, a new generation of Chinese architects have brought Western ideas of reflexivity and autonomy into China, ... on the other hand, some Western architects and theorists—or at least some of the most ‘edgy’ ones—have begun to bring ideas of efficiency and ‘constructivism’ from China and Asia into the West (Zhu, 2007, 301).

He argues that the outflow of Chinese ideas challenges the critical tradition of the West in that it also exports China’s urban development paradigm—based on speed, market economy, and mianzi gongcheng (face engineering)—to the West. Zhu called this urban paradigm ‘postcriticality’. In order to evaluate Zhu’s concept of ‘critical dialogues between the East and the West’ (2007; 2009), meaning the exchange of methods of design, it is necessary to develop a larger context for this concept. The Chinese architects and architectural offices that I mentioned above have indeed brought novel and critical

112. For a detailed discussion of the young generation of architects in China, see Liauw (2009).
ideas to China. However, local design institutes essentially dominate the professional practice in the country.

Ren (2011), in her most recent publication about urban developments and professional transformations of the practice of architecture in contemporary China, suggested that scholars usually examine contemporary Chinese urbanism from the institutional perspective. Therefore, in her research, she attempted to use ethnographic research methods, such as interviews with practitioners and users, observational fieldwork at development sites and at architectural offices, so that she could establish a theory about what is happening from a Chinese perspective. Her argument is that the increasing numbers of transnational individuals, who consume, produce, and interpret Chinese urbanism, are constructing the global cities of China. By ‘transnational’, she refers to the flow of knowledge, ideas, and people across national borders. The negotiation processes between all these individuals provides the context for the construction of the built environment, including the urban scale.

However, Ren’s (2011) argument about ‘transnational architectural production’ and Zhu’s (2009) argument about ‘postcritical practice’ are both based only on studies of a few individual architects and their intentions. Ren and Zhu assume that individuals and architectural practices in China operate the same way as in Western society. The limitation of this research assumption is that it neglects some important actors in the construction processes of contemporary Chinese urbanism who are not considered agents,

113. By institutional perspective, Ren (2011) refers to the study of the social and political order for the rapid development. The critique is that there is insufficient study about the practitioners.
such as, in my research, the community members from Beijing First Paper Mill. This directly links to the next part of my thesis – the introduction of *shanzhai* creativity.

**Implications of Zhang Lian’s Routine Bus Tour**

In the summer of 2008, I needed to quickly wrap up my interview with Zhang Lian in his office to catch the shuttle bus back to the city. Three twenty-six seat buses were scheduled to leave at 4:45 p.m. to avoid the rush hour. The passengers of the shuttle buses were usually administrative staff because the manufacturing workers were all hired locally as per the conditions established by the development zone. Zhang Lian had forgotten to bring some of his documents when he arrived to catch the bus. The driver, a local resident, told me that to minimise expenses, the shuttle bus drivers were asked to drive on the local roads instead of the Jingcheng Highway, thereby increasing the driving time by over an hour. He said he would definitely wait for Zhang Lian because he was one of the important cadres in the factory. Zhang Lian went and retrieved his documents, and when he returned he sat in the first row of the bus. As the bus began moving, four of the senior cadres sitting at the front began to play a poker-style game called *doudizhu* (fighting landlords), which has been very popular in China for the past few decades. Other workers sat quietly in the back (Figure 69). A junior accountant in his twenties was sitting behind me. He called himself Jack. He began to speak to me in English after realising I was an architectural researcher from London. He told me he was from Beijing and that he had witnessed many changes in the city. His childhood courtyard house had been demolished. He admired the freedom and human rights in the West. This was a
Figure 69: Poker-style game in the shuttle bus from the new paper mill campus to the workers’ community. Zhang Lian and three other factory cadres played poker on the front of the shuttle bus. I sat on the second row. The rest of the passengers were quietly sitting at the back. (Photo the author, 18 July, 2009).
The bus made three stops between the factory and the workers' community. Half of the workers stayed on the bus until the last stop. I got off the bus with the workers, but Zhang Lian stayed with the driver to do some maintenance on the bus.

The paper mill’s move from the city centre to the suburban area changed the residents’ daily life patterns. Having to spend two hours on a shuttle every day is a direct consequence of the spatial development of the city. It generates new spaces for the factory workers. First, to adapt to the new lifestyle, playing doudizhu on the bus became an everyday practice for Zhang Lian. The workers also recorded the final score at the end of each day so that they could continue the game the next day. Secondly, the shuttle bus time became a time of discussion for the workers. The criticism from the young accountant, Jack, indicates a transformation of ideology in Chinese society. Jack was educated in China but his English language skills allowed him to read news from international websites. My fieldwork on the shuttle bus highlighted two different aspects of the emerging social order. The first aspect was represented by the doudizhu game on the shuttle bus: community reactions always arise to cope with socio-political transformations, thus triggering new daily experiences for ordinary citizens. The second aspect was demonstrated by Jack: the dialogue between the East and the West had

114. The ‘post-1980s generation’ is one of the most popular terms used in China. It means one was born after the 1980s. This term was quickly disseminated after the state used it in the 60th Anniversary military parade in 2009 to describe the new generation of soldiers. The emergence of this term is also derived from the emergence of new ideologies in the younger generation in China.
entered the everyday lives and conversations of ordinary people. Jack’s individual response to China’s contemporary politics and society is not only his own emergent criticism of the market-oriented development model, but reveals also the attitude of a whole new generation of Chinese.

In this very last chapter of the thesis, I relate these two practices to a modern Chinese concept, *shanzhai*, which is not simply an emergent practice of adaptation, compliance, and conformity, but also one that critically reacts to the market-oriented development model and to the new modernist realities. I will extend the discussion of this reaction and of *shanzhai* to its application to urbanism and to the dissemination of design knowledge. Indeed, *shanzhai* continues to develop concepts of collectivism both of ancient China and of socialist China as a reaction against the new market-oriented economy of China. This concept, *shanzhai*, is different from the Maoist or communist collectivism, in which the emphasis was on the identities or sameness of individuals. The fundamental coherent force of that kind of collectivism came from the central government’s politics, education and propaganda. However, the *shanzhai* type of collective emphasises that a diverse collection of people can act against the homogenising force of the market-oriented development monopoly and even against centralised government ideology. In Chapter 4, I introduced *mofan*, or role model. It was understood as the political rhetoric to showcase some ideal behaviours to be emulated. *Moshi*, which can also be translated into *model*, refers to an effective system of manipulation. The extension of these two social practices to a large-scale trend in the market economy

115. This form of criticality by the young worker is different from that of the older generation of Wang Ji and Zhang Lian, who tended to express their views more subtly.
constitutes the practice of *shanzhai*. *Shanzhai* literally means ‘mountain cottage’. It implies the informal and unofficial location of production and the independence from the legal system; therefore, a *shanzhai* economy or a *shanzhai* culture originally refers to the unofficial production of legally registered products. The emergence of *shanzhai* culture is the reaction to the hegemony of the market economy and to the domination of global enterprises. Ironically, the reaction is still highly consumerist or even more market-oriented: the practice makes use of the unregulated sector of the market and of the consumerist behaviour fabricated by it, in order to counteract the markets with their monopoly domination. This follows the *yidu gongdu* (using poison to fight against poison) idea I introduced: using consumerism to fight against consumerism.

**Developer’s MOMA Production Lines**

The Chinese name for Linked Hybrid is Dangdai MOMA (当代 MOMA or Contemporary MOMA in English). The explanation for the Chinese name was the developer’s attempt to associate the community with the image of the Museum of Modern Art in New York MoMA. A Beijing architect Hui Wang (2009) pointed out that the Chinese name implies the notion of *shanzhai* behind the practical logic of the developer. The identification with MOMA became very popular after the design of

116. There is only a very limited literature about the concept of *shanzhai*. Y. J. Lin (2011) in her fieldwork research about fake cell phones, showed that it is very difficult to predict the future development of this kind of informal economy due to its complexity. She suggested it is impossible to judge the limit between illegal counterfeit products and innovative products.

117. The connection was emphasised when the Linked Hybrid salesman explained to visitors why Linked Hybrid is called MOMA. The architectural tour was part of an event in the Linked Hybrid theatres in 2009. I was asked by the developer to organise the event.
Linked Hybrid. It meant a special serial product of the Modern Group with innovative green-building technology and a sustainable quality of life.

Holl was retained by the developer after a first-round competition provided conventional and unsatisfactory responses to their call for ‘green architecture’ (Chen Yin, speech at the Megablock Urbanism symposium, 15 March, 2009). It is notable that the architect’s own design remained effectively unchanged throughout the design and construction processes. Five different types of sustainable technologies are employed: constant interior humidity and a slab-embedded, temperature-controlled system; air exchangers; exterior walls with thermal mass; geothermal wells; and a grey-water treatment system. The first two building technologies had already appeared in the previous phases of the development, but the last three systems were introduced by Steven Holl. Through this process, the developer’s perception of green architecture was transformed from simple energy-saving techniques to more holistic sustainable systems. This transformation of insight also changed the firm’s image and differentiated it from conventional developers; in 2005, the company even reformed its internal structure and changed its name from Modern Group to Modern Green Development. This process has been recognised by Ke Jin, the in-house architect at Modern Group:

If you look at our projects, there are changes from Phase 1 to the present. The changes are about the transformation of our products. And we also changed from a general developer to the leader of sustainable development and architectural design (Ke Jin, personal communication, 18 December, 2008).
The branding strategy of the project has also changed from ‘an international artistic community’ to ‘an artistic endeavour heralding sustainability’. “Technology builds a wonderful life” became the slogan in the developer’s latest internal publication, ‘Dangdai Ren’ (Jiang P., 2009). As the development concepts have been changing, the architects’ ideas have also been disseminated and have influenced the developer’s production process. Speaking from one of the Beijing Linked Hybrid’s bridges during a conference, the director of the technological research department, Wang Zhengyu, introduced the firm’s ten production lines (Wang Z. Y., 2009; and see Figure 70). The primary line is generated by ‘Dangdai MOMA’ (Linked Hybrid), an experiment in mega scale housing developments, new ecological technologies, and new communities and lifestyles (also see Ren, 2006 for more cases). The hybrid community model has also been taken up as a unique line of research by the developer. In this sense, Linked Hybrid becomes the prototype to follow. The local development of this community successfully transforms an object of architecture into a set of ideas. Thus, with this process the architects have introduced new ideas to challenge the perceptions of the developer. Some of these ideas have ultimately been ignored by both developers and residents in favour of conventional design, but some of them have had a major impact on the future projects and even on the strategic direction of the developer.

There are three layers of meaning in the case of shanzhai MOMA or Linked Hybrid. First, Linked Hybrid, or more precisely the Chinese version of Linked Hybrid as Dangdai MOMA, is a ‘fake’ (shanzhai) copy in the Chinese community of the MoMA brand from New York. Through its Chinese name, the developer markets the community with an artistic and high-end international lifestyle to the public. Thus, on this level, the
developer intended to project a model of lifestyle. Second, the appropriation of the project design, either by the residents, the developer, or the local design institute, transforms Steven Holl’s design into a *shanzhai* product of Holl’s original intention. So the process is more about adopting and adapting the original design. One can straightforwardly criticise the taste and design of Chinese residents and developers; however, I argue that this second layer of *shanzhai* is actually more productive, because the transformed Linked Hybrid is able to respond to local needs. Regardless of whether this style moves Chinese architecture in a positive or negative direction, Linked Hybrid becomes easier to accept within a local cultural and societal context. Thirdly, when Linked Hybrid becomes the MOMA prototype for the developer, the knowledge, ecological concerns, and eco-technology solutions are actually disseminated in China. This is the unintended consequence of Holl’s design and the process helps to bring large-scale changes in China.
Figure 70: Prototyping MOMA (Diagram the author, based on Wang Z.Y.'s speech on 16 May, 2009).
Community Intervention

The three levels of *shanzhai* process, which I introduced above, involved only a limited social circle of practitioners. In addition to these, how did informal community activities further change the new architecture and the new community in terms of *shanzhai*?

The most obvious community intervention was the development of an informal market between Linked Hybrid and Wanguocheng MOMA (see Figure 1), located under the bridge of the airport expressway and along the canal (Figure 71). Currently, three types of activities take place in this informal market. The first is the commercial activity of illegal hawkers. They sell second-hand books, fake antiques, and second-hand domestic appliances. Some hawkers are amateurs. They bring their used things to sell at the market. Some of them are professional. They collect materials from different communities and nearby demolition sites to sell them at the market. Inspectors from the city management bureau come every day to stop the illegal activity. According to a second-hand book vendor, the inspectors usually come at 2 p.m. There are some very interesting dynamics between the vendors and the management bureau officials, which I will discuss later. The second type of activity is the recreational activity of local residents and workers. This includes fishing along the canal, playing musical instruments, and sleeping under the bridge. One of the musicians in this area is an old saxophone player. He indicated that the acoustic conditions under the bridge are the biggest reason that he plays there (Figure 72). The canal cools down the temperature and the bridge shades him.
Figure 71: Informal market under airport expressway in front of Linked Hybrid. Under the shade, illegal vendors were selling second-hand goods on the ground. The photograph was taken around 10 a.m. Residents from surrounding areas stopped by and shopped. (Photo the author, 21 June, 2009).

Figure 72: Resident playing musical instrument along the canal. (Photo the author, 30 June, 2009).
from the sun. Many workers from construction sites around this area also come to this place to take a nap in the afternoon. The third type of activity is the parking and resting of taxi drivers. At some moments in the day, hundreds of taxi-drivers park their cars in the shadow of the bridge. Some drivers even park their cars and sleep overnight. The history of this market was recalled by Qiu Lai. The market used to be one of the most famous marketplaces in the district. Fresh meats, fish, and vegetables could also be found there. The new unofficial practices formed in the late 1980s and became well developed in the 1990s:

The piece of land used to belong to our paper mill, on the two sides of the canal... But we did not use the land. In the past, the property’s owner was not clear: it belonged to whoever was using it. Our paper mill did not use it and did not wall it. So it gradually became an informal marketplace...In the beginning, there were just a few stalls; then many other people joined. Afterwards, the Hebei Province Beijing office built a wall and started to manage the market and charge them management fees. Then it became semi-official... When the paper mill was demolished, the market was also demolished (Qiu Lai, personal communication, 14 July, 2010).

However, after the paper mill and the marketplace were demolished, vendors came back to continue their businesses. Qiu Lai explained this phenomenon in the interview as well:

The market used to be gigantic, but many of them were forced to move away. All of them are not licensed, so the city management bureau is working on the situation. How can this area remain as an informal market? It is a place beyond the control of the government. This side is the Dongcheng District, but that side is the Chaoyang District. So this place is
the intersection of two municipal districts... Sometimes inspectors from the Dongcheng District may come and sometimes those from Chaoyang may come. The hawkers know about this. So when those from Chaoyang come, they will move to the other side and vice-versa. They just need to move their goods by pulling the clothes under them (Qiu Lai, personal communication, 14 July, 2010).

The uncertainty of the ownership of the land was settled by the redevelopment of the site, but the ambiguous municipal responsibility was another reason that the hawkers were able to remain on the site. Apart from the institutional reasons, I found another reason for the market to remain on the site—an informal network of guanxi. This informal network exists between the hawkers and the city-management inspectors. The relationship between the hawkers and the inspectors is not purely between those who hold power in the community and those who do not; instead, they know each other personally. I found that not every inspection caused a serious hindrance to the informal market. On some days, the inspectors came and chatted with the hawkers like friends, and no one moved away. Some hawkers even revealed the fact that they sometimes give free goods to the inspectors to maintain their relationship.118

The resilience of this informal urbanism between the two housing communities is an intriguing phenomenon of the site. The informal and unofficial activities colour an entire superblock community. Qiu Lai and other vendors told how they use various tactics to continue the informal market. Indeed, those concepts I introduced in this thesis, 118

118. The hawkers did not use the word ‘bribe’ in the interview. However, they mentioned sometimes that the inspectors would take away their things and they were forced to concede.
including *guanxi* and *mianzi*, are all common strategies for taking action against the total control and privatisation of the area. Secondly, the findings from my market fieldwork put in question the state bureaucratic structure and emergent individual behaviour. Politics are ineffective in this type of social organisation.\(^\text{119}\) Finally, the informal market blurs and deconstructs the territorial boundaries. In terms of spatial organisation, the two separated superblocks were reconnected by the sharing of the in-between space. This community de-territorialisation process suggests an alternative form of construction of public space in what is otherwise a highly institutionalised city structure in China.

**Upgrading Workers’ Community**

Like the *chai* character on the wall, which we saw in Chapter 3, the *dakong* characters can also be easily found in all old housing units, including some one-story *danwei* dormitories (*pingfang*) and tower dormitories (*loufang*) built in the early 1990s (Figure 73). However, they have different ideologies behind them. *Chai* was introduced as a representation of institutional power enabling rapid urban development by demolition, based on the assumption that the living conditions of the demolished housing are well below the standards of modern life. *Dakong* operates from the other end: it represents a continuous improvement to the living conditions of poorly designed housing in a sustainable way.

*Dakong* (打孔) literally means drilling holes. The two characters are usually printed in the hallways of old-style residences. I also found these markings at the paper-

\(^{119}\) This finding also closely relates to what T. Gold (1998, 222) meant by Chinese society being regulated by social order, instead of law.
Figure 73: Dakong advertisement outside Wang Ji’s flat. Before entering Wang Ji’s flat, I found the advertisement on the wall outside when I left. The advertisement is translated as ‘Installing AC, hole drilling, piping’. Wang Ji said the advertisements were vandalism. The residents’ committee had already cleaned the wall once before, but the advertisements came back very quickly. (Photo the author, 1 September, 2010).
mill housing units of both Wang Ji and Zhang Lian (Figure 73). Wang Ji’s tower is slightly newer than Zhang Lian’s, but both severely lack infrastructure. At the time when the two types of housings were being built in the early and mid-1990s to solve the living problem of the workers, the housing designs were severely underdeveloped. Some of the basic domestic infrastructures, including air-conditioning systems, hot-water supply systems and telecommunication cables were not integrated into the construction of the housing. Within no more than twenty years, the living environments and building technologies in this kind of housing were considered backwards and unacceptable. Therefore, a pervasive and informal network of businesses evolved to help residents to drill holes in their concrete walls to install pipes for air conditioning, water, and electric systems. *Chai* and *dakong* signs are the two concepts that are emerging in Chinese society to deal with new, rapid urban development—total redevelopment and gradual renovations. Linked Hybrid took the first approach by totally replacing an industrial site. The workers’ community, without any financial support, used the second method through *ad hoc* hole-drilling activities.

When I visited Zhang Lian’s home in September, 2010, he had just moved back to his new apartment after a two-month renovation job. He explained that his son rented a place near his office and lived alone, so Zhang Lian and his wife decided to use the opportunity to reorganise the space in their own apartment. They had new air conditioners and a hot-water boiler installed. These additional installations required the assistance of the hole-drilling workers. They did not contact these people directly, but their renovation team coordinated it for them. At Wang Ji’s tower, hole-drilling advertisements were glued or printed everywhere on the walls of the hallway. When
Wang Ji installed his air conditioners, he asked the people, whose adverts they were, to drill holes in his walls.

The informal marketplace and the hole-drilling businesses are considered antithetical to the notion of a modern city, which is why both are considered illegal. Can the hole-drilling businesses fulfil the rapidly increasing expectations for obtaining higher living standards? The short answer is a disappointing no: the environmental impacts of the air-conditioner installations by hole-drilling businesses lag far behind the high-tech sustainable building technologies of places like Linked Hybrid. As long as Linked Hybrid remains an exclusive community for the rich, sustainable-building technology is no more than a branding instrument for the developer to please a trendy ‘low-carbon’ culture. Thus, sustainable building technology is only accessible to the higher class, while gradual renovations are marginalised and become the only expedient for the lower class. The advanced technology may always be only accessible to the wealthy. But what I would like to address in this section is that the dakong business, specifically as a kind of community-oriented building upgrade strategy in China, actually suggests a more efficient and sustainable way to handle the massive scale urban redevelopment practice in contemporary China. Different from chai, which takes the tabula rasa strategy, dakong involves the idea of adding new infrastructure to old buildings.

**A Community for Netizens**

Due to the particular political atmosphere, explicit critiques and direct confrontations of different ideas are still limited and inaccessible to the public in China. Critical dialogue between different views and ideologies only takes place in some
architectural forums in the city. However, in recent years, the proliferation of digital communities in China seems to provide an alternative and more accessible sphere. Technological communities are capable of providing the infrastructure for the emergence of new voices to be heard within superblock spatial organisations.

China is the country with the world’s largest population of ‘netizens’—nearly 300 million Internet users in 2008, which represents a 56 per cent increase over 2007. Indeed, the China central government has perceived the Internet as a platform for facilitating a ‘harmonious society’. On a societal scale, some individual reactions will be ‘harmonised’ by the market or political means, such as in the chai story I introduced in Chapter 3 about how the power of signs on wall controlled residents. But recent events indicate that perceptions may be shifting towards enabling the development of ‘harmonious society’ via the safety of Internet expression.  

Secondly, the development of a virtual society is also a response from society’s grassroots in reaction to the market-economy oriented society. The popularisation of virtual technology, such as the internet and its applications in third-generation cellular phones, are becoming an emergent and gigantic force of globalisation.  

However, from the community perspective, it allows communities to

120. A Chinese sociologist, Li Y. (2007), suggested two moments in the development of virtual communities in China: the lack of coherence and the uncertainties of approved ‘freedom’. He suggests that virtual communities can allow the public a discussion of the injustices and inequities they face in actual society. This allows a temporary catharsis by the people, while the forum administrator can delete some communications to avoid their dissemination.

121. Apart from the Internet, cell phone SMS communication is also an important subject of study to understand the phenomenon of digital social activities in China. It is argued that the proliferation of SMS communication is because the Chinese are deeply influenced by Confucian education to desire a more indirect way of communication. See Ning (2007).
form and therefore enforces local identities. This allows local closed communities to form in opposition to large-scale developments. Thirdly, the intentions behind virtual censorship, which involves a series of defensive policies undertaken by the Chinese authorities, is to prevent China’s domestic cyberspace from being merged with foreign cyberspace, and to keep the apolitical and political domains of computer-based communications separate (Qiu, 1999, 3). This censorship is similar to mianzi engineering: to hide the zang luan cha (dirty, messy and poor condition) areas of the city. Finally, the rapidly developing cyber domain in China is not any slower than the speed of urbanisation. We can even imagine another layer of digital urbanisation mirroring the actual urban-development process in the Chinese cities: the organisation of virtual space follows the organisation of physical space into superblocks. This means that the wangshang xiaoqu (virtual micro-community) websites have already established individual virtual communities according to all actual communities in China and that they wait for the residents to join. If a critical mass of residents joins the virtual communities, it becomes a platform for residents from the same community to share information, organise activities, and even generate collective decisions of governance. Therefore, on the on hand, virtual space helps to connect the fragmented territories of community by providing channels of communication, but, on the other hand, it also reinforces the concept of the territory by following the physical gated community model. Numerous virtual platforms have been developed in different fields, creating gigantic database exchange networks, such as Zhulongwang and architectural discussion-board

systems in the architectural field. Therefore, the virtual community in China becomes an emerging source of power to generate more community participation in politics, society, and governance.

The virtual activity of the Wanguocheng MOMA communities is active on the Sohu Focus website (http://house.focus.cn). The website was established by a real-estate trading interface company. There are more than four thousand people registered on the community’s online discussion board. Among these four thousand netizens, many are real-estate agents, interior designers, and local community-service workers. Below is a discussion from the online community about an accident that occurred in the MOMA communities, including Linked Hybrid:

A [Resident]: On 27 June, at 19:00, what happened to the person who jumped from the eighth floor? Armed police, 110, and 119 all came. Accidentally fell from the eighth floor.
B [Nonresident]: I heard it was someone who repaired the A/C and accidentally fell down.
A [Resident]: Actually, someone just accidentally fell down.
C [Resident]: There were four or five armed policed cars. Someone forgot to bring the keys. Seems like the thing he grabbed broke, then…
A [Resident]: Foreigner tenant, the keys were lost on the eighth floor, so he tried to climb from the seventh floor, but fell down.
A [Resident]: I saw it personally. Someone fell down from the seventh floor.
D [Nonresident]: It seems like a Chinese person. Not fatally injured, only

broken bones; [I saw him] still using his phone. He must be a tenant from the eighth floor.\textsuperscript{124}

The residents speculated about what actually happened in their community. In the virtual community, residents comment on issues, promote their services or ideas, operate businesses, and call for general participation to protect their legal rights. Adam Greenfield’s (2009) concept of ‘technosocial organisation’ attempted to explain similar phenomena. Greenfield (2010) clarified the concept of ‘technosocial’ with five characteristics:

- The use of data visualization by municipal government to refine the delivery of services, more precisely target interventions, and otherwise realize latent efficiencies;
- The use of data visualization to deepen the collective understanding of the spatial distribution of issues and resources in cities;
- The use of networked informatics to connect citizens directly with municipal government;
- The use of networked informatics to support initiatives in deliberative democracy, and other forms of collaborative problem-solving;
- Citizens using networked informatics to coordinate their own activities, and supplant the inadequate measures of underfunded or entirely absent government (Greenfield, 2010).

My case study fulfills the last four of them. The development of virtual Chinese superblock contexts transforms consumers to constituents and communities to social networks. This digital social network may potentially develop into a feedback system that

\textsuperscript{124} http://house.focus.cn/msgview/122/192940038.html, accessed on 14 April, 2011.
will become more attuned to its constituent parts, both to expand interactions and to provide real-time responses to service availability and allocation. Another *ad hoc* term on the Internet, *digital socialism*, creates a contrast to the traditional political socialism of pre-reform China. The difference between new digital socialism and traditional Chinese socialism is the recognition of individual agency. The new digital socialism provides an open platform for individuals to act and react. It is a collective of different behaviours and ideologies. In the old socialism in China, authority and agency was centralised among elite officials. Another posting was found on the same bulletin board:

Since Zhaoshang Housing Management was replaced by Savills Property Management, property owners have been tortured. Today they rebuild the gate, tomorrow they dig the ground, the day after tomorrow they change our resident card and add 100 security guards. (Interestingly, the new cards are the old cards with a sticker, but they were portrayed as something high-tech.) The nice 40 meters wide gate has been closed, leaving just 10 meters for people to use. They explain this as tight management. Regrettably, they rent out the basement to the migrant workers. Their big families freely walk in and out of our towers and our elevators. Even with more security guards, there are more burglaries, and finally we had to depend on the police. Now we are not even allowed to enter the gate if we do not have our resident card. Originally it cost 10 yuan, but now it costs 60 yuan...Once the new gate was constructed, each household only has three cards. If you ask for more, they will tell you too many cards slow down the system. If you lose your card, do not complain—it is too expensive to replace one at 60 yuan. The guard will only recognise the card but not your face. If you feel upset, they will only

125. For further discussion about digital socialism, see Kelly, 2009.
tell you to speak to their supervisors. If you really talk to them, they will only tell you that these are the rules to see if you will get angry or not. (Wangguocheng MOMA resident).

Internet communities are constructed from residents’ subjective opinions and personal whims, so virtual space is an emotional and often irrational space. Rumours, reactions, and conflicts between social groups disseminate faster and exaggerate easily. The above quote is from a resident who responded to the newly constructed gate at Wanguocheng MOMA in 2009. Over one year, there were 3,449 clicks on this angry comment. The direct link between digital-community and physical-community transfers the subjectivity and uncertainty of the digital world to the actual built environment. Once more residents become the constituents of the community; they take ownership over the design, use, and definition of the space.

*Shanzhai Culture and Urbanism*

I have discussed the practice of *shanzhai* as being more than a simple criticism of Chinese illegal counterfeit production in recent years. I borrow the explanation from IDEO, a creative marketing firm in America who introduced this concept in one of their company publications. IDEO argued that the practice of *shanzhai* is about enlarging the range of design strategies by the practice of prototyping:

*Shanzhai* mobile phones have at least 2 SIM card slots. This may not be an award-winning design concept, but it effectively addresses the needs of

Chinese residents who often use an additional local number when they travel. *Shanzhai* is about implementing resident needs in a short period of time. It runs on the spirit of ‘put it out there and see how it goes’. Production cycles are very short and quality may be compromised, but over time the product is improved and becomes more stable (IDEO, 2010).

Thus, model emulation in China developed into the design idea of prototyping (adapting or adopting prototypes for specific design contexts): the prototypical transformation adapts products to the current needs of society, such as the fake iPhone design with 2 SIM card slots.  

I argue that two essential notions make up the idea of *shanzhai*. The first one has to do with the informal side of urban evolution and transformation. Mehrotra (2010) proposed that informal urban developments go beyond the normal understanding of poverty and marginalisation. The informal city creates the essential conditions for correcting or compensating for the unequal distribution of resources and that it is more about tactics, innovation, and long-term survival than merely participating in an

127. James Leach (2004) suggested two modes of creativity. The first is called ‘appropriative creativity’. This type of creativity is mainly based on the Euro-American perspective on individual agency, hence the ideas of appropriating from nature (man over nature), producing objects and owning the objects. Therefore, law is set up to protect the rights of an individual’s creative work (e.g., copyrights) and fake products are prohibited. Leach called the second mode ‘distributed creativity’. This mode of creativity was discovered his research in Melanesia, where he observed indigenous people making a type of artwork by developing their ideas based on other people’s ideas. According to the Chinese practice of *shanzhai*, or reproducing or adapting other people’s designs, Linked Hybrid’s design can be broken down into many ideas that became prototypes of architectural form, ecological strategy, branding, and real estate model for developers and designers to follow nationwide in China. In addition, Chinese designers evolved with the study and application of Linked Hybrid’s methods. Therefore, the design of Linked Hybrid evolved through the collective efforts of many ‘designers’ in China. Therefore, studies of *shanzhai* can further develop the idea of ‘distributed creativity’ with the Chinese context.
unofficial system. In the case of Linked Hybrid, the informal market I introduced previously is the reaction of institutionalised urban control and *mianzi gongcheng* (face engineering). If urban control and *mianzi gongcheng* represent the institutional appropriation of the space and the aesthetics of the city, then the resiliency of the informal market enables the suppressed use of space and reaction to this political idealism and challenges the institutionalisation of urbanism. Mehrotra understood the fundamental essence of informality as tactics, which are also related to the practice of *guanxi* and *mianzi*, which I introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.

The second notion (and particularly the informal essence) of *shanzhai* urbanism is related to the discussion of civil society in China. Chamberlain (1998) used the expression ‘civil society with Chinese characteristics’ in his review of Brook and Frolic’s book (1997) on civil society in China. Chamberlain (1998) also noted that Brook’s chapter (Brook, 1997) expressed ambivalence about the connection between Chinese and Western civil society, and argued that the internal logic of socialist propaganda is not a real component of civil society. This argument reflects the self-organised community activities I introduced in Chapter 2—for example, when the workers came together to donate money and help the victims of a fire accident in their community.

I would also like to emphasise the difference between the Western idea of civil society and equivalent ideas from China. The criticism of the majority of current

128. Many other terms are used by the Chinese to talk about what they see in Chinese history as the equivalent to civil society (Des Forges, 1997), such as ‘civilised society’ in the seventeenth century, ‘city people’s society’ (*shimin shehui*) in the nineteenth century, and ‘public people’s society’ (*gongmin shehui*) in the twentieth century. Walker (1999)
research on Chinese civil society is that it puts too much emphasis on formally organised and voluntary institutes and not enough on informal associations (Walker, 1999). Frolic (1997) suggested Confucian teaching emphasised service to the state, and then communist practices during Mao’s age further reinforced this idea. Therefore, Chinese civil society is defined more by elites persuading the state to implement certain reforms instead of a critical mass of dissidents challenging the state. In this way, civil society in China is expected to lubricate the state system. So, this again reinforces the idea of a Chinese culture of compliance and manipulation that I explored in Chapter 4, or of how to effect changes without rebelling.

From an anthropological perspective, S. Lu (1999) discovered a special civic activity created by residents in a Chinese community, called *kandashan* (literally translated as fervent talk about random topics), which seems to add a civil society element to Chinese communities. This kind of community activity aims at two objectives: one is to simply to amuse, and the other is to express individual influence by showing off knowledge about politics. In S. Lu’s study (1999), she discovered that a group of people speculated about which political leader had more power than others. The shuttle bus story I described provides a new environment for residents to indulge in ‘fervent talk’. The young accountant’s critique of the disappearance of historical urbanism exemplified this argument. Nesbitt-Larking and Chan (1997) argued that Chinese youth has recently developed the idea of cynicism, or scepticism, of ideologies and social values. Specifically, an increase in the support of tradition and a decrease in the support of

also suggested that the idea of civil society comes from a set of problematic theoretical assumptions and historical connotation rooted in European philosophy.
government leadership has occurred. It is interesting that Chinese civil society reverts to the interpersonal relationships, or *guanxi*, that I introduced in Chapter 2. As Hjellum (1998) suggested, Confucian-oriented Chinese society is not composed of discrete associations, like Western society, but of layers of interpersonal networks of different categories of social relationships.\(^{129}\)

How does the discussion of civil society in China relate to the specific *shanzhai* phenomenon? Yang (1994) pointed out in her research about *guanxi* the Chinese notion of *minjian*, which means non-governmental and interpersonal regime in Chinese society. *Minjian* can be translated as ‘within people’s space’. This Chinese term also describes the community order that is on the reverse side of the official social order. Yang’s idea of *minjian* opened up a novel and profound field for further research about the Chinese equivalent to civil society in the Western world. The *shanzhai* practice fits with the description above and, in Yang’s words, would be a pure *minjian* practice. In the above section, I reviewed the stories of informal urbanism in the Linked Hybrid area with their *shanzhai* and *minjian* implications. They are the results of the resiliency of the informal economy, the social upgrading old-style superblocks, and the digital assembly of critical voices. These three stories demonstrate a community appropriation of the political, social and architectural aspects of Chinese urbanism. These three stories also help to further define Chinese civil society and its impact on urban development and architectural practice.

129. Hjellum (1998) further argued that the difference between Chinese and Western civil society is based on the difference between individual autonomy in the Western case and multiple linkages of self in China.  

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CONCLUSION

AFTER LINKED HYBRID

Practices of Adaptation

In the morning of 2 July, 2009, a group of police officers entered the Wanguocheng MOMA community, the first phase of the overall development.\textsuperscript{130} I saw them patrolling the community and checking if foreigners had obtained a legal registration card from the local police station. After that, they also checked all apartments in the towers. A group of six police officers knocked on the door of my flat and asked politely if there were any foreigners in the apartment.\textsuperscript{131} They also asked if I knew any foreign neighbours living in the building. The inspection of the community took several hours that morning. Afterward, the police officers went to another community to continue the inspection. According to Chinese law, foreigners should report to a local police station within forty-eight hours after entering China. They need to register their address if they are not living in a hotel, as hotel staff will send guests’ information to the police station if required. Police notices about this rule are usually located on the bulletin board.

\textsuperscript{130} Linked Hybrid is the fourth phase of the development. See label ‘Phase 1-3 of MOMA Development’ in Figure 1.
\textsuperscript{131} The story happened on 23 July, 2009. At that time, I was staying at the Wanguocheng MOMA community for research. During my stay, I worked closely with the Linked Hybrid’s developer to help them organise academic events and the Chinese partner of Steven Holl, Li Hu. I usually left the apartment at 9 a.m. On the day of the inspection, I was on my way back to the apartment from a breakfast restaurant at 8:30 a.m. Other than meeting with the architects from Steven Holl’s office and the developer’s company, I also visited the workers’ community almost everyday. I spent a week in the paper mill new factory in Shunyi, from 6 July to 10 July, 2009. During that period, I took the paper mill shuttle bus from the workers’ community.
Figure 74: Notice on MOMA community elevator’s wall. During my fieldwork stay at the MOMA community, I found this notice was posted in all elevators and lobbies. (Photo the author, 13 July, 2009).
in the elevators and the lobby (Figure 74). The notices were in three languages: Chinese, English and Russian.

This experience of mine shows the tension between the centralised politics and changing forms of communities in contemporary China. So, at the end of this thesis, I will relate the transformation of Chinese communities to the larger political context. With respect to the political dimension, I will relate the different ideas of community with four generations of political leaders in China, including Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Starting from Deng Xiaoping, the political leaders recognised that two (or more) ideologies can exist at the same time: the new market economy and the old socialist legacy. This transformation directly influenced urban space and community forms. But, more importantly, I would like in this conclusion to explore how individuals during these four generations of political leaders adapted to those ideologies by examining their lived-in spaces. I hope this last part will not only provide a conclusion for the thesis about the context of architectural design in China, but also open up the thesis to other potential research topics based on these findings.

*Pingfang in Mao’s Socialism (Pre-1976)*

Prior to 1976, Chinese communities were based on the *danwei* model, which had become the basic residential zone under a highly institutionalised spatial organisation. Each *danwei* was responsible for its production work, as well as the housing and social

132. During this period, there is no bureaucratic or urban fragmentation, because the *danwei* system was indeed an excellent coordination apparatus in a bureaucratic society.
welfare of the workers. As an urban strategy, *danwei* implied a spatial zone defined by walls and gates, including collective workspaces, residential areas, and other social-service facilities (Lu D., 2006a). It was an autonomous unit within the urban region, but its mixed programming was very different from the current situation of distinct districts for financial, economical, administrative, and industrial zones. The communities within the *danwei* were classified and systematised: one community included a number of ‘street offices’ in charge of two thousand to ten thousand residents; street offices were the lowest class of government office, each responsible for around eight hundred residents (Lu D., 2006a, 50). During the pre-reform period (before 1976), Chinese cities and society were more unified due to this system, and social harmony was attained through the *danwei*’s strong spatial structure. Individuals, institutions, and the government were all connected by the *danwei* system.

In my case study, the *pingfang* (or workers’ single-story dormitory) community in the paper mill’s *danwei* superblock was demolished to create an image for the Olympics (Figure 75). This process is relevant to the Maoist pro-production ideology and the *danwei* urbanism of the early age. *Pingfang* can be translated as ‘flat house’. It refers to a one-story welfare-housing community or a traditional courtyard house area. My interviewee, Wang Ji, who spent more than ten years in the *pingfang* area, recalled that his original flat was around 30 square meters and that he shared this space with a migrant worker from rural Beijing (Wang Ji, personal communication, 15 September, 2009; Figure 76). Families were provided with a private room, such as the flat of the model worker Zhou Guangquan (see Chapter 5). Zhou Guanwu lived with his wife, his daughter, and his parents in a small room at that time. A Communist Party publication, *Beijing*
Zhibu Shenghuo (Liu Y., 1995, 1-2), reported that they did not have much furniture in their room. Guangquan could not even find a place to sit down in the night after his tiring work. The concepts of ‘public’ and ‘collective’ dominated the overall setting of the community; all infrastructures were shared, including water, lavatories and cooking spaces. Even within relatively more private spaces, such as in the rooms of Wang Ji or Zhou Guangquan, everyone had to share the space with other family members or roommates. Ex-factory worker Shao Xiao recalled her memory of the living environment of Zhang Lian when Zhang Lian and his family lived in the Pingfang area in the early 1980s. Shao Xiao could not remember the exact year of her visit, but she thought that happened on March, when the weather was still very cold. At the same time, she also drew me a sketch of the area and the floor plan (Figure 77):

On one afternoon in March, she [the wife of Zhang Lian] asked me to follow me to her home, so that we could chat and she could also collect her bed sheets hanging outside her house. That was the first time for me to see her house. In the past, they lived in single sex dormitories. I remember their door is facing towards the north. The structure [of their house] was an extension structure from an existing pingfang, which was facing South. Originally, the distance between rows of pingfang was wider, but after adding the extension, there was only a narrow alley leading to everyone’s home. Fortunately, her house was at the edge, so at the left hand side of her door was the public corridor, therefore visually it was more spacious. To the left-hand side of her house, there was a metal string [for hanging clothes or for clothes to soak sunshine]. Under her eaves, there were some charcoals for the hearth.
Figure 75: Beijing First Paper Mill *pingfang* dormitory. (Photo Cressica Brazier, 6 July, 2006).

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Figure 76: Household registration form of the demolished workers’ community. The handwriting is the monthly rental cost of space. The size of the unit is usually from 15 square meters to 20 square meters. (Historical household registration document provided by Qiu Lai).
Figure 77: Shao Xiao’s sketch of Zhang Lian’s pingfang flat in 1980s. During my interview with ex-factory worker Shao Xiao, she tried to remember the living environment of the pingfang area. One of her visits to Zhang Lian’s flat gave her the deepest impression. She drew the above sketch when she tried to explain the situation to me. (Label translations: 1. Xiangheyuan road; 2. West; 3. North; 4. Public lavatory; 5. Zhang Lian’s home; 6. Metal wire for hanging clothes; 7. South; 8. East; 9. Double bed; 10. Window; 11. Door; 12. Bookshelf; 13. Folded table; 14. Wash basin rack; 15. Earth; 16. Wardrobe; 17. Dish cabinet. (Sketch by Shao Xiao.)
After collecting the bed sheets, we entered the house. I think it was about 10 square meters. Even though it faced the north, the west sunlight was shining in the room so that I did not feel it was too dark. In front of the door, there was a metal stand for a washbasin, a cooker, and a cabinet for dishes and bowls. Next to the cabinet, there was a big wardrobe. A metal double-bed was placed to the right, in the south-north direction. There was probably a small bookshelf in the small space between the bed and the wall. A folding table was placed by the door. The room was simple but tidy (Shao Xiao, personal communication, 13 April, 2011).

This description also echoes the dayuan memories of Wang Ji in Chapter 1. The lifestyle of Zhang Lian and Wang Ji clearly demonstrates the community lifestyle of a socialist work unit, or, more precisely, a dayuan community.


In 1978, the introduction of the market economy began to transform urban spatial organisation. On the one hand, the ideology of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” preserved the institutionalised social outlook that focused on the former proletarian class and the centralisation of authority (Chen J., 2001). On the other hand, the transformation provided society with the alternative possibility of a market-oriented and economic focus. In terms of city development, both domestic and private developers began to

133. Dirlik (1989) suggested the transformation from socialism in Mao’s age to ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ in Deng Xiaoping’s age is the transformation from socialism to post-socialism in the form of ‘market socialism’ or ‘planned commodity socialism’.
In terms of domestic space, I will discuss how private space became better defined from *pingfang* to *xiaoku* to *gongyu* in this section. Chinese cities fragmented and became increasingly complex. The privatisation of some state-owned units and foreign developers also played a role in these urban transformations. Privatised, gated communities (*xiaoku*) and some *danwei* communities became autonomous, coexisting in the same area.

In Deng Xiaoping’s era of urban and social space restructuring, the political rhetoric of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ involved social duality, with one segment of society seeking a materialistic lifestyle and pragmatic development, while others remained within the former socialist lifestyle (Qiu, 2000). By allowing some people to get rich first, the parts of the city inhabited by the new wealthier class became closed.

Chinese scholars also suggested that the existence of the massive demand for housing in China is due to the self-motivation of Chinese people and the volume of their consumption (Zhang P., 2004). Unfortunately, this point of view was not thoroughly discussed. First, the self-motivation can be understood as a reaction to the shortage of urban housing and the Chinese traditional mentality towards property ownership. The housing shortage is not a new issue; it can be traced far back to the *danwei* era of the 1950s when housing was categorised as a non-productive and therefore low-priority

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134. For how developers transformed Chinese urbanism into private cities, see Pow (2007) and Webster (2001).

135. One of the Chinese economists and the architects of the reform, Xue (2011) argued that more people recognised that there are multiple forms of socialism according to national characteristics, allowing socialism to retain its validity.
expenditure (Zhang X. Q., 2000). In the years of reform, the government was unable to increase the housing investment and eventually the severe housing shortage stimulated the growth of the real-estate market (Zhang X. Q., 2006, 333).

The Chinese traditional mentality towards property ownership is very different from the European one and the contemporary Chinese market economy. Schurmann (1956) tried to understand the concepts of ownership, possession and occupancy in the Chinese traditional context:

It is well to point out that the terminology we [European] are using, such as ‘property’, ‘ownership’, ‘possession’, are creations of our own society. … In [Chinese] land deeds, statutes, and other sources on property relations, the terms used to designate landed property to be transacted or transmitted as inheritance generally do not connote ownership but productiveness. Such terms are, for example, t’én [tian], ‘cultivated fields’, ch’án [chan], ‘productive medium’, yeh [ye], a term denoting cultivation in the abstract sense. … Possession was expressed by the term yu [you], ‘hold’ and chan [zhan], ‘to appropriate for oneself’. Whereas the distinction between possession and occupancy was known, the European distinction between ownership and possession was unknown in China (Schurmann, 1956, 508-509).

As Schurmann pointed out, “[in the Song and Yuan dynasty], other things than land were ownable in China, but land represented one of the most important objects of possession (1956, 508)”. In contemporary China, this statement is still valid, because the land is always owned by the Chinese central government and leased to developers, and individuals can only possess the buildings on the land, but not the land itself. The market and social reform in modern China opened up channels for individuals to possess
buildings on the land, but not the land. Moreover, the traditional idea of ‘productive inheritance’, purchased and inherited, is still very obvious in the contemporary real estate market.

Second, the volume of consumption and the rising culture of consumerism were triggered by the country’s rapid economic development. The increase in average household income, driving economic growth, resulted in a high consumption rate. In 2001, every hundred urban households owned 165 bicycles, 170 electric fans, 91 washing machines, 81 refrigerators, and 120 colour televisions (Zhang X. Q., 2006). Housing too became one of the products of the consumer market. There were around sixty thousand residential apartments on the real-estate market in Beijing in October 2009, and each day there were around six hundred new apartments on the market. However, statistics also show that in 2006 the vacancy rate of housing in China reached 26 per cent, compared to the international standard of 10 per cent. Additionally, 50 per cent of those housing units had been vacant for more than one year (Zhang X. Q., 2006). Housing properties became both investment and speculative tools. I suggest this phenomenon was related to the immature financial and banking system and the lack of investment products in China.

The traditional idea of ‘productive inheritance’ and the new consumerism combine and form a disastrous social consequence in contemporary China: people purchase multiple properties but do not live in them. This phenomenon is slightly different from the investment or speculation in real estate markets in the West, because

136. In 2009, real-estate investment constituted 20 per cent of the overall investment of China, and it was 10 per cent of the national GDP.
the concept of ownership is lacking in China, and the Chinese may treat the property as an inheritance to keep.

Supporting evidence was found in my research at Linked Hybrid to demonstrate the interesting phenomenon when property is just possessed, instead of used. One Linked Hybrid user, Wang Zhenfei, who told his life story at the beginning of the thesis, recounted another interesting fact about Linked Hybrid. He learnt from his friend, who worked in the development company, that the developer’s original intention of constructing Linked Hybrid was to create an ‘inheritance’. He agreed with his friend that an apartment of only 250 square meters with two bedrooms but three bathrooms is not reasonable. He agreed that Linked Hybrid became an inheritance for rich people to collect as they collect expensive antiques (see Figure 78, Wang Zhenfei, personal communication, 10 December, 2010).

The domestic environment and the concept of loufang (multiple-story housing, such as the welfare housing in the northern zone of the paper mill) was the spatial product of Mao’s socialist and collective ideology in work units (Figure 79 and Figure 80).137 This type of housing was not only a solution to increase the density of Chinese cities with multiple-story welfare housing, but was also the result of the transformation from Mao’s socialist welfare society to Deng’s market-oriented society. Indeed, loufang housing is the only type from the socialist era being privatised by its residents. The difference between loufang and pingfang is that the former went through the process of privatisation

137. Even though loufang, a denser typology of housing was widely built in Urban China, there was still the problem of housing shortage (Song, Chu, & Chen, 2004; Groves, Muris, & Watson, 2007). This was due to the undeveloped housing allocation system based on rank, seniority, and the availability of public housing stock (Song, Chu & Chen, 2004).
Figure 78: Advertisement To Possess Linked Hybrid. The translation of the title is that “Dangdai MOMA (Linked Hybrid) set up the collection order of luxurious space”. On the right hand side, the developer tried to compare fine art with the delicate interior space of Linked Hybrid. (Image captured from marketing booklet, Modern Group, n.d., Dangdai MOMA, n.p.).
Luofang

Zhang Lian, when the factory (northern industrial zone) was being demolished for the construction of Linked Hybrid. (Photo Zhang Lian).

Figure 80: Workers’ community. The image shows the six-story tall loufang in the workers’ community. This type of loufang, with concrete and brick structure, is the commonest type constructed in the 1970s and 1980s. The loufang in the image was the oldest workers’ housing in the paper mill community. (Photo the author, 16 June, 2009).
(through buy-out of the property by the users) in early 2000, but the latter was mainly demolished during the same period (such as the demolition site I introduced in Chapter 3). Both the ex-worker Wang Ji and the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian eventually participated in the privatisation process (or buy-out scheme in their own words) of their welfare housing in the early 2000s. This also represents the transformation of the danwei welfare dormitory to an actual private xiaoqu.\textsuperscript{138}

After buying their properties, Wang Ji and Zhang Lian had a greater interest in putting money into the renovation. The renovation personalises the home, which was never the case in pingfang spaces during Mao’s period. Wang Ji’s flat is located on the sixth floor of a nine-story building. The flat is a two bedroom, one living-room (liangshi yiting) unit (Figure 81). The size is around 60 square meters with private bathroom and kitchen. A small living room is located right near the entrance of the flat (Figure 82 and Figure 83). Wang Ji put a small dining table, a shelf, and a big refrigerator in this room. Two rooms are located at the southeast and southwest corners of the flat to obtain maximum sunlight. Wang Ji’s bedroom is on the southeast corner, with a balcony facing east (Figure 84). This room is bigger than the living room, and Wang Ji can put a sofa, a small table, a king-size bed, a cupboard, and a television in this room. The balcony is enclosed with aluminium windows to give extra space to the flat. The other room at the

\textsuperscript{138} Forrest (2008) also showed that the privatisation movement of welfare housing in China demonstrated the political and ideological change of the Chinese government towards new social and economic structures. For Forrest, the change involved housing providers becoming enablers, and tenants becoming customers; moreover, government gave more freedom to private and semi-private development agencies or institutes. In my research at Linked Hybrid, the former change relates to the dramatic change of lifestyle in the workers’ community while the latter relates to the redevelopment of the factory and the very opportunity to construct Linked Hybrid.
southwest corner is occupied by his daughter, who is a high-school student (Figure 85). This room is relatively smaller, but it is big enough to have one single bed, bookshelves and a desk for study. A linear kitchen is between these two rooms.

Another factory worker, the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian, lives in a different building in the same community. His tower was built slightly earlier than Wang Ji’s. The tower is a slab building facing east. Zhang Lian and his wife live on the ninth floor of this fifteen-story building. Their son has just moved out and lives by himself in another rental flat closer to his workplace at Wangjing on Northeast 4th Ring Road. The western side of the building is made up of linear corridors connecting the flats (Figure 87). Therefore, only the eastern side of each flat has windows.

Zhang Lian’s flat measures approximately 60 square meters (Figure 86). The size and arrangement of the rooms are similar to Wang Ji’s flat, consisting of a small living room with no windows, a private kitchen and bathroom, and two bedrooms on the eastern side of the flat. The master bedroom also has an enclosed balcony facing the buildings of Linked Hybrid (Figure 89 and Figure 90).139 Zhang Lian recently removed the wall of the kitchen to enlarge the living room. A small dining table, some chairs and a small cabinet almost occupy the entire living room. As Zhang Lian’s son has just moved out, he converted the master bedroom to a living room so that he could put a full-size sofa bed and a television in this room (Figure 88).140 The balcony is used as a storage room for his

139. This is the side of the apartment that was influenced by the construction of Linked Hybrid.
140. Zhang Lian’s son was living with his parents until 2010. Zhang Lian explained that the reason he moved was that his son would like to live closer to his place of work in the Wangjing area. They had no choice but to rent their apartment. Zhang Lian and his wife
son’s things. He explained that they will clear this space later when his son has settled down. Zhang Lian and his wife sleep in the smaller bedroom, which used to belong to their son.

The layout of these two flats at the workers’ community represents a transitional stage from the collective and open lifestyle of *pingfang* to the privatised and consumerist lifestyle of the new community. Residents tend to reverse the public and private zones in their flat, such as using the private master bedroom as a public gathering space. The limitation of the size of apartment might influence such actions. Moreover, in terms of a northern Chinese culture, the bed, or *kang*, functions the same way as a sofa in the West, serving as a seat for guests. Small living rooms and big bedrooms also reflect the utilitarian functions in this type of flat, because, first, social gatherings may take place in the community space in the factory and, secondly, they facilitate two families sharing one flat.¹⁴¹ Wang Ji’s flat keeps most of the original settings, whereas the changes made by Zhang Lian show how domestic life has changed. The two main changes, opening up the

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also complained to me about the unaffordable real estate prices in the area. Forrest (2009) suggested that one of the unintended consequences of neoliberalisation on housing policy is that the younger generation will enter homeownership at a later stage than did their parents. His research focused on analysing cases from Japan and the UK. His study may also apply to the Chinese case, even though Zhang Lian’s case is more complex due to the situation in Beijing. Zhang Lian and his wife entered homeownership through the overall privatisation of the welfare housing. So this meant the purchase of their property was still affordable and regulated: and this process did not change Zhang Lian’s family’s financial situation. When their son tried to buy a home, he was confronted with a free market that lacked regulation.

¹⁴¹ As Zhang Lian pointed out, there are still many flats in his building with the same layout as his that are shared by two families. In this way, each family can have a bigger bedroom, while the living room, kitchen and bathroom are used as shared communal spaces.
Figure 82: Entrance of Wang Ji’s entrance. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009).

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Figure 83: Living room. Wang Ji is standing in the photo. The interview with him was done on the glass table at the bottom left corner of the photo. In the photo, Wang Ji was walking toward his bedroom to talk to his wife. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009).
Figure 84: Wang Ji’s bedroom. The master bedroom is the largest room in the apartment. There was a sofa at the bottom right corner, a dining table at the bottom left corner of the photo. Sometimes Wang Ji invites friends to chat in his bedroom, because the living room is too small. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009).

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Figure 85: Bedroom of Wang Ji’s daughter. Wang Ji’s wife is standing at the left-hand side of the image. She was cleaning the room. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009).
Figure 87: Corridor to Zhang Lian’s flat. In the photo, Zhang Lian is walking towards his apartment. The window at the right is facing east. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).

Figure 88: Zhang Lian’s converted living room. This room used to belong to Zhang Lian’s son. The window at the end of the room is facing Linked Hybrid. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).
Figure 89: Zhang Lian’s master bedroom. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).

Figure 90: View from Zhang Lian’s living room. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).
kitchen to have a bigger living room and converting a bedroom to a gathering room, met one larger goal: to have a bigger public space separate from his private space.

_Xiaoqu_ Space in Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represented Interests’ (2002–2005)

In 2002, Jiang Zemin proposed the ‘Three Represented Interests’ ideology and expanded the constitution of China’s Communist Party from the representation of only the proletarian vanguard to the representation of the fundamental interests of the Chinese majority (Killion, 2006). In other words, this repositioning recognised the overarching market-oriented system. However, because of the rapid economic development, an overemphasis on market returns, and the focus on economic construction and development among multiple economic systems, social coherence became fragmented. The right to shape space was placed in the hands of the private developers of the old closed communities of the danwei work units. _Xiaoqu_ became independent, private territories synonymous with concrete urban and social restructuring. In this transformation, the immigrant population became an important component of the social structure within the _xiaoqu_, bringing about a number of problems due to social stratification and injustice.

In Jiang Zemin’s era of social and urban restructuring, the ‘Three Represented Interests’ ideology was an attempt to take advantage of the market-oriented development

142. This transformation of ideology also justified the concern for wealth. As in the ‘Three Represented Interests’ ideology, economic development and wealth became benefits to the general public. This ideology is different from Dengist ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, in which socialism is still superior to capitalism (Xue, 2011). In Jiang’s ‘Three Represented Interests’ ideology, the relationship between capitalism and socialism became more ambiguous.
to further restructure the social order (Solinger, 2004). In other words, the central government shifted from absolute domination with a primary centre to absolute but invisible domination with multiple centres. The central power was influenced to a greater degree by individual citizens. The city became even more dynamic with the weakening of the government centre in the era of Deng Xiaoping—from state-owned housing to private developments to the urbanisation of rural zones. This dynamism broke through the rigidity of historical systems of plans and statistics, leading to an even more mixed and diversified urban China (Wu F., 2004). The remains of historical development schemes have led to arbitrary decisions by developers and lack of overall social cohesion.

*Xiaoqu* or small zone, which was used by Wang Ji in the workers’ community to describe the new private development of their factory, is relevant to Jiang Zemin’s pro-market ideology. In the case study, the first three phases of the MOMA development at the southern zone of the original paper mill campus represent the concept of *xiaoqu*. *Xiaoqu* emphasises the notions of total privatisation, community management and engineering of superblocks, to show the social prestige of the residents, and consequently results in disconnected superblock urbanism.

143. C. T. Huang (2011) argued that the China Communist Party is learning to face this reality.
144. I have mentioned the privatisation of the welfare housing by socialist workers Wang Ji and Zhang Lian. For more information regarding the new dynamics of rural China’s urbanisation, see D. Zhou (1997) and Fan, Heberer, & Taubmann (2006, especially Part 4).
145. This definition of *xiaoqu* is based on my research materials; it may not be the same as in planning theory—microraion (microdistrict, see Lu D., 2006a, 37).
The housing manager, Qiu Lai, gave his explanation about the differences between the workers’ welfare housing (dayuan) and private housing (xiaoqu), such as the MOMA developments:

I am living at Tiantongyuan. My flat over there is basically the same as the flats here (gongfang). They were all from the early 1990s. The housing of the 1990s usually shared a similar layout: no living room and two bedrooms. The living room, bathroom, and kitchen were very small. The modern housing units are different. They have big bathrooms, kitchens, and living rooms, but small bedrooms. They also have a bigger average size. In the 1990s, flats with 80 to 90 square meters could be considered large. But now, the size of the average flat is around 130 to 140 square meters, and some of them can be up to 190 square meters (Qiu Lai, personal communication, 14 July, 2009).

Qiu Lai’s explanation focused on the changes in spatial organisation, instead of the political transformations. He pointed out some of the major changes of apartment design in China, such as the increase in size and the prioritisation of the living room (Figure 91). Wangguocheng MOMA (Figure 92), which is located at the southern industrial zone of the factory and was built in 2000, seems to be the new type of housing described by Qiu Lai. In Wangguocheng MOMA, the unit size ranges from 88 square meters for a one-bedroom flat to 337 square meters for a four-bedroom flat. For the biggest flats, the entire floor of the building belongs to one flat, and the elevators go straight to the flat. New programmes have also been introduced in these flat designs, such as a laundry room, a domestic helper’s room, and an ensuite master bathroom. Public and
Figure 91: Wanguocheng MOMA 120 square meters flat floor plan. This was the rental flat of my fieldwork stay in the community during the summer of 2009. The flat used to be rented by a Taiwanese girl, who worked in Beijing. The layout was set up by the previous tenant. 1. Entrance; 2. Living room; 3. Sofa; 4. Television. (Drawing the author, not to scale).

Figure 92: Wanguocheng MOMA Xiaoqu. (Photo the author, 07 June, 2009).
private zones have been defined more clearly by locating all public spaces close to the entrances.

Linked Hybrid Space in the ‘Harmonious Society’ (2005–Present)

President Hu Jintao coined the term ‘harmonious society’ to describe the new basic principle of Chinese society in 2005 (Zheng & Tok, 2007). In the context of discord in contemporary China, S. J. Liu (2005) suggested that Hu Jintao attempted to reconcile social contradictions and to re-establish social order via highly institutionalised methods. President Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious society’ increased the complexity of urban space and its social systems even more. This new institutionalised power closely linked private community zones to central authority. But, then, a new form of criticism of this new institutionalised power due to the globalisation and development of information technology introduced a whole new dimension to this situation by the formation of a completely new and powerful media platform. The voices utilising this platform often ran counter to the centralised concept of ‘harmonious society’. This platform demonstrated the emergent uncertainties in contemporary China. But this platform also heightens the importance of community-development strategies, allowing us to explore the possibility of new styles of communities, such as at Linked Hybrid. However, these experiments also brought on a series of more complex social problems, causing China to reconsider the social, cultural, and ecological sustainability of the new conception of community. These reconsiderations became particularly important after the global financial crisis of 2008. At Linked Hybrid, for example, the developer became more aware of the fragility of the market. As Li Hu mentioned to me in the interview, he believed that the developer
would not have accepted the innovative design of Linked Hybrid if it had been proposed after the crisis (Li Hu, personal communication, 14 September, 2008).

In Hu Jintao’s era of social and urban restructuring, ‘harmonious society’ was a reaction to the weakening of institutionalisation. The weakening institutionalisation is leading spatially to two distinct outcomes: the formation of many closed xiaoqu, and attempts at developing special, alternative and completely open xiaoqu by developers trying to distinguish themselves from other numerous competitors.\textsuperscript{146}

Linked Hybrid (Figure 93 and Figure 94) was constructed in 2003. This type of real estate development went beyond the typical modern housing development and those common housing typologies I introduced previously. Steven Holl introduced China to the concept of ‘hinged space’, which emphasises movable interior spatial partitions and a continuous spatial experience.\textsuperscript{147} In Linked Hybrid, several partitions can be folded or closed to create more open space. The introduction of this architectural idea also allows social transformations to lived space in contemporary Chinese domesticity.

Liang Jingyu is an architect, and his office is located in one of the seven towers at Linked Hybrid. The open plan resulting from the hinged space design facilitates this kind of home-office. Liang Jingyu’s flat is a three-bedroom, 170 square meters unit located in

\textsuperscript{146} In China, Jianwai SOHO is a completely open residential and commercial hybrid community. The community was built around the same time as Linked Hybrid.\textsuperscript{147} ‘Hinged space’ is the idea of Steven Holl using moveable partitions to separate space. This design strategy further sets free the floor plan, which can be transformed according to particular programs during different periods of the day. Holl (2000, 226) explained this idea that “beyond autonomous, room-by-room space is interactive space, where ‘participating walls’ reorder domestic environments”. Holl also tested this idea in projects in the Manhattan Cohen Apartment, MoMA Tower and Theological Apartment, and in his Fukuoka housing design.
the first tower of the Linked Hybrid complex (Figure 95). His office has three long tables and four staff members working in the living room (Figure 96 and Figure 99). He converted a smaller bedroom into a closed office. However, the movable walls allowed an opening of this private space on some occasions (Figure 97). Liang Jingyu covered the larger bedroom into a meeting room (Figure 98). He explained that he chose his flat for the office because “the size is a reasonable working space” (Liang Jingyu, personal communication, 16 September, 2009). The increase in the average size of flats in the new market economy satisfies both the luxury lifestyle and the operational needs of small-scale offices.

However, Liang Jingyu’s decision to relocate his office to Linked Hybrid was made in 2008, when the residences were still considered an open community. During my interview with him, he explained that the closing of the community in July of 2009 was inconvenient for his home-office (Liang Jingyu, personal communication, 16 September, 2009). The conversion of the residential space to office space follows the ‘hybrid’ programme concept initiated by Steven Holl to allow people to live and work within a superblock. But this adaptation of the residential building to home-office works best with the original open community design. And so, coming to the end of this thesis, I showed in Chapter 1 and the beginning of this Conclusion, how the residents of Linked Hybrid
Figure 93: Linked Hybrid courtyard. The highlighted part is the workers’ community. It is the housing where Zhang Lian is living. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2009).

Figure 94: Linked Hybrid’s new proposed typology for housing. (Photo the author, 17 December, 2008).
Figure 96: Living room used as model-making area. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009).

Figure 97: ‘Hinged’ space in Linked Hybrid. The highlighted area is a small room enclosed by folding panels. When I was visiting the office, the room was totally open and was part of the working space. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009).
Figure 98: Guest bedroom as meeting room. The interview took place in this room. The highlighted area is the small room I mentioned in Figure 97. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009).

Figure 99: Living room as office space. The right-hand side of this space is an open kitchen. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009).
broke down and adapted its architectural design, its ideas and its interior spaces in many ways in accordance with Chinese society and culture, and according to the Chinese practice of *shanzhai* (reproducing or adapting other people’s designs).

In addition, this is leading to still more and new developments according to *shanzhai* practices. Linked Hybrid’s design has been broken down into many ideas that have become prototypes for new architectural forms, ecological strategies and branding, which developers and designers follow and adapt and develop nationwide in China. Thus, the design ideas of Linked Hybrid continue to evolve through the collective efforts of many designers in China. Furthermore, this process is based on a trial-and-error strategy, so that the more appropriate and adaptive ideas are being reused and developed by others; conversely, inappropriate ideas are not being disseminated. This raises a question: though some *shanzhai* practices are considered illegal and inappropriate according to contemporary law and professional ethics, does the example of Linked Hybrid show that the indigenous cultural system of *shanzhai* is an alternative mode from which we can learn? After all, it is an efficient knowledge dissemination and accumulation system, through which Holl’s Linked Hybrid has become an open source of knowledge. Indeed, after Linked Hybrid, Steven Holl is working on another housing design, ‘Sliced Porosity Block’, at Chengdu, a city in the interior of western China (Figure 100), but Li Hu has left Steven Holl’s office and is not working on this new project. Instead, he has set up his own architectural office, OPEN Architecture, and is currently working on projects outside China, for example in India. Recently, Li Hu even moved his office into Linked Hybrid (Figure 101).
Thus, to conclude this thesis, Holl’s, Li Hu’s, the developer’s and the residents’ involvement with Beijing’s Linked Hybrid were just the beginning of another stage in an on-going and continuous design evolution process. The case study of Linked Hybrid and its design evolution process questions existing theories of ‘postcriticality’ (Zhu, 2009) and ‘transnational architectural production’ (Ren, 2011), which are based on non-Chinese concepts, by the exploration of the indigenous Chinese concepts of dayuan, guanxi, mianzi, shi, mofan and shanzhai, and their relevance to Linked Hybrid.

The findings of this thesis about these Chinese concepts of dayuan, guanxi, mianzi, shi, mofan and shanzhai, and about how they have affected, and continue to affect, the built environment in one case study only in Beijing today, Linked Hybrid, adds another complex cultural and social layer to explain urban development paradigms in China today.
Figure 100: Sliced Porosity Block design at Chengdu. (Image Steven Holl Architects website).

[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]

Figure 101: Li Hu’s OPEN Architecture office in Linked Hybrid. In the image, the highlighted floor is occupied by Li Hu. (Image captured from OPEN Architecture website, http://www.openarch.com).
APPENDIX

METHODS AND THESIS STRUCTURE

The ethnographic research methods and the related thesis structure itself, which are used in this thesis for studying a case of building production and inhabitation, differentiates this research from conventional architectural history and theory studies, bringing it closer to standard ethnographic studies, and thus making it interdisciplinary. Following ethnographic conventions and procedures, my involvement in the analyses, and my presence in the writing, plays a strategic role because in fieldwork the researcher constantly and necessarily participates in order to explore and test theoretical and methodological hypotheses. For example, I needed to carefully practice guanxi (interpersonal relationships) with the local residents and the architects enabling me to participate in daily life in my chosen building, Linked Hybrid (see pp. 76-88). However, besides applying guanxi as a specific research technique to the Chinese context, I was also able to test existing understandings of guanxi through my practice of it. Another example is that I organised a forum to create an opportunity for the Chinese architect, Li Hu, and the developer of Linked Hybrid to confront each other directly (see pp. 274-275).

My personal connections to the factory workers and to the architects, whom I introduce at the beginning of Chapter 2, allowed me to study the case in greater depth. Ethnographic studies of contemporary Chinese architecture are lacking because

148. An example of the ethnographic study of architecture is Blier (1995). In her research into the architectural traditions of the Batammaliba in Africa, she studied the meanings and symbolisms of the designers and the occupants. Blier called her methodology of studying the everyday life and the ceremonial life around the architecture ‘the anatomy of architecture’.
researchers need such personal connections, which most do not have. \(^{149}\) While language skills and cultural sensitivity are two main barriers that prevent Western researchers from conducting such research, lack of guanxi is a barrier to all, including native, researchers. In Chapter 2, I discuss ways of becoming an insider in China. Practicing guanxi, recognising and interpreting ganbu-nese and baixing-nese are keys to these research strategies. Paradoxically, and in a circular way, all these strategies require the researcher to have a profound understanding of Chinese language, culture and society in order to gain further access to study Chinese language, culture and society in greater depth. In all ethnographic works, indeed, the researcher habitually treads a fine line between being an insider and an outsider by playing, and switching between, the roles of insider and outsider.

\(^{149}\) There are two ethnographic studies of contemporary architects outside China, which I would like to discuss. One is the study of the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (Yaneva, 2009) and the other one is the study of Kengo Kuma (Houdart & Chihiro, 2009). For both studies, researchers approached the architects (Koolhaas and Kuma) personally and proposed their research idea. After approval by the architects, they arranged day-to-day research activities in the architectural offices. Methodologically, these two research projects are quite similar: the researchers conducted many interviews with the architects and studied their design process and wrote about specific stories in the architectural offices. A major methodological difference between these two research projects and my Linked Hybrid research is my use of guanxi in the research process to extend the discussion of architecture from only architects’ intentions to the study of the total process of production and inhabitation of the built environment. They focus on only the architects, thereby contributing to the mythical view of the design powers of architects. I explode this mythical view of architects by bringing in the entire context of building production and inhabitation from the point of view of all the people involved, including even those who have been displaced and discriminated against.
Writing Emic Insights

The ethnographic approach explores culturally specific perceptions that are meaningful to the social actors involved. The ethnographic approach also relies on oral history into how ordinary people experience changes in their built environments. Oral history in this thesis, again following ethnographic procedures, was collected through rumours and gossip, which also allowed insights behind the image of social harmony promoted by the establishment. In Chapter 3, I discuss the rumour about how politicians made decisions about demolishing workers’ dormitories while driving by Linked Hybrid. Such rumours represent ordinary people’s perceptions and derogatory interpretations of political realities and of newly built environments such as Linked Hybrid.

Researching the oral history of Linked Hybrid is based on the standard ethnographic premise that people act strategically on the basis of their cultural and social beliefs, preferences and structures, and not on abstract and objective facts. In the writing, I therefore let people speak through quotations (sometimes necessarily long) and paraphrases of my interview transcripts. These paraphrases and quotations are also meant as historical records of their time for other researchers to examine in the future. In order to analyse these paraphrases and quotations, I situate them in their Chinese cultural

150. See Gluckman (1963) on the relevance and importance of gossip in ethnography. Gluckman explored how gossip about scandals is highly functional. He pointed out a few uses of gossip, such as the maintenance of the morality and unity of communities. The use of gossip is thus an important component in the very making of communities. Gluckman particularly discussed the role played by gossip to define insiders and outsiders of communities. My approach of using guanxi to conduct research and to become an insider in order to hear baixing-nese, because much baixing-nese is gossip about scandals, follows this ethnographic tradition.
contexts. But I also use them to critically address and question what other researchers have written about Chinese cultural contexts. The quotations and paraphrases are therefore not merely reflections or illustrations of contexts described by others, but provide evidence from which contexts can be explored and analysed, and the findings of other researchers can thus be refined and/or critiqued. My primary source quotations and paraphrases are, in other words, used as evidence. For the social actors involved in Linked Hybrid, including residents and architects and developers, all operate strategically in a dynamically transforming society. In order to understand their reactions within and to their cultural contexts, I analyse the relevancy of the shi philosophy (see Chapter 4). But the interpretation of the paraphrases then required yet another insider and native point of view, which, as it turned out, was very relevant to Geertz’s classic ethnographic idea of ‘thick description’ (1973). Geertz’s notion of ‘thick description’ attempts to confront the problem of hidden meanings of apparently incomprehensible behaviour patterns in foreign cultural contexts. Geertz writes about his “constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to” (1973, 9). In my case, when the dayuan community is discussed in Chapter 1, I suggest that the intention behind Wang Ji’s emphasis on the details of the government officials’ visit was to express his criticism of the mianzi (face) engineering of such a visit, even though he did not openly do so. With this hypothesis in mind, I intended to search for supporting evidence when I interviewed Wang Ji again. Then I found that Wang Ji was also critical of the seemingly harmonious community when he told me the story about how a neighbour of his community died but no neighbours were willing to help. The process of research including its developing methods and theories, in the very process of writing the thesis, is,
according to standard ethnographic procedures, iterative. Therefore, again respecting and following standard ethnographic procedures, my methods and theories form part and parcel of the research findings and the on-going research process, from which they cannot be artificially separated into discrete chapters.

**Advantages and Limitations of Methodology**

The emic insights from native people challenge and enlarge conventional perspectives about architectural agency. Architects are no longer the only intentional and conscious agents in the making of the built environment; instead native people and their ideas, which are usually considered immaterial (see pp. 87-90), become relevant, as well as local cultures and their symbolic systems. I consider Steven Holl as only one of many agents who participate in the production of the architecture. The paper mill workers and the residents of Linked Hybrid are as important as the architect, Steven Holl.

However, a methodology based on *guanxi* networks and practices is necessarily limited to the personal connections of the researcher. At the outset of the research process, I planned to include voices from government institutions about the new developments in the Linked Hybrid area. In contrast to my connections with the paper mill community and with the architectural office, I found no channels to connect with the highest governmental and planning institutes. Without strong *guanxi* connections, it would also be difficult to make such people speak *baixing*-nese to me. From the methodological perspective, the missing voices of the government and planning institutes is proof of the *guanxi*-oriented research methodology, which clearly defines its limits. Because *guanxi* is
personal and relative, the limitation of the methodology is also personal and relative to different researchers. So one needs to clearly understand these limitations before designing the research method and defining the scope of the research.

**Thesis Structure**

The thesis sets out to explore native theories collected during fieldwork in order to understand existing processes of contemporary Chinese urbanism and society. Therefore, I develop the thesis not in a chronological order (commission then design then construction then inhabitation), but in an iterative sequence that is based on six Chinese cultural concepts. The thesis therefore departs from a narrow analysis of architects and architectural design in order to aim at analysing the Chinese cultural and social systems involved in the entire process of production of the architecture, including its reception. I keep many Chinese terms in the writing of the thesis, in turn making use of the fieldwork evidence to explore and further refine our understanding of those terms, some of which have been the subject of previous studies. This use of Chinese terms allows the thesis to be more sensitive to seemingly ordinary Chinese expressions and concepts, thereby avoiding misinterpretations and the loss of specific meanings through translation.

The six concepts were chosen from among many Chinese native concepts from the field. The choice of these particular concepts is based on their significance and relevance to the study of Chinese urbanism, culture and society and to my particular case study. These terms are also closely related to, and sometimes challenge, existing research and theories. There are two sources for the selected concepts. The first source consists of local residents and local media materials. The study of this type of source, therefore,
relates to native perceptions and knowledge about urban regeneration in contemporary China. The first five terms – dayuan, guanxi, mianzi, shi and mofan – belong to this type. The second source is myself, the researcher. The last term – shanzhai – is the only one of this type. At the end of the thesis, I conclude by theorising the native concepts. This term is also widely used in contemporary Chinese society, though not by my informants.

Structure of Thesis

The thesis uses the six emic Chinese concepts, which I found through my ethnographic research, to explain the practices and behaviours of the social actors in the production and inhabitation and use of the architecture. In Chapter 1, dayuan originally refers to the specific collective lifestyle of socialist China. This term also describes a way to define the territory of a large scale community for a particular group of people for the sake of effective governance, management and factory production. The discovery of this term in the Linked Hybrid case study was a big surprise to me, because before going to the field, I did not expect to find so many socialist legacies in contemporary architecture. Wang Ji’s memories about his paper mill community help to define some important notions of dayuan spatially and socially. Li Long’s travelling journals reflects the emergent modernity in the paper mill community. I suggest that the modern vision, or xiandai, described by Li Long is an indigenous one to the paper mill community. In Li Long’s way of thinking, the other side of this indigenous modern vision is xiangzhen, a term to describe rural conditions. The making of the urban environment was the major driving force for the replacement of the factory and the commissioning of Linked Hybrid. However, Steven Holl, the American architect, proposed a design beyond the imagination
of the developer and the local residents – a housing complex with no walls and many spatial connections. Ironically, after the building was completed, the developer and the local residents asked to add a wall to enclose the community. Thus, Linked Hybrid became a typical Chinese *dayuan* (big compound).

In order to understand the dynamics between the two intentions, that of the architect and that of the locals respectively, I study two very important terms, *guanxi* (interpersonal relationships) and *mianzi* (face). The former refers to interpersonal transactions and the latter refers to the social values. These two concepts reveal many intangible and complex connections and negotiations between the workers’ community and the Linked Hybrid community. The study of *guanxi* also has many methodological implications. I experiment and analyse my interactions with the local residents, to further examine this idea iteratively. Besides that, the idea of *guanxi* is also used to explain how conflicts were resolved between the two different communities during the construction of Linked Hybrid, and why the open community of Linked Hybrid needed to be appropriated by the locals.

In Chapter 3, the idea of *mianzi* is used to understand two political statements found in the field during the construction of Linked Hybrid. The sign of *hexie* (harmony) was printed on the wall of Linked Hybrid; and the sign of *chai* (demolition) was printed on the wall of some workers’ dormitory. These two signs represent two different practices of the urban regeneration process at the site. The former is a practice to rhetorically emphasise social consensus; the latter is a practice to publicly label and avoid disharmony during the redevelopment process. *Mianzi* engineering is the term widely used to describe such phenomena.
In Chapter 4, I intended to further study how ordinary people reacted to such big transformations of their living environments. Many workers chose to jump into the ‘sea’, or leave the state-owned enterprise to work for private enterprises. Many of them became siren laban (private bosses). Then eventually the paper mill declined and was replaced by the development of Linked Hybrid. I discovered the philosophical concept of shi (situation tendency) in an open letter from the paper mill. Shi implies a specific way of thinking about following, or complying with, the perceived general tendency. This concept was used to justify the decline of the factory. Shi philosophy originates from Chinese military culture and is still commonly used in contemporary everyday life. So this chapter also links the contemporary practices to traditional thoughts. Such links between past and present, individual actions and cultural structures, also arose iteratively and unexpectedly during the research. Lastly, this chapter therefore plays a critical role in also linking the discussion of contemporary social phenomena to the discussion of historic cultural systems in China.

The objective of Chapter 5 is to discuss in detail two specific cases of how people face social changes. The first case is about a worker who received an award and became a model in the community. The second case is about an entrepreneur who privatised his business and this privatisation strategy became a model for other enterprises to follow. Ironically, both of them suffered in the end. The model worker struggled due to poverty and the entrepreneur was forced to give up his position because his guanxi network was no longer able to support him. The idea of mofan (role model) is meant to create the seeds of large scale trends in the society. The use of those role models explains how particular
political practices were developed on the basis of the specifically Chinese culture of compliance.

In the last chapter, I extend the discussion of the culture of compliance to the contemporary phenomenon of *shanzhai*. I propose this indigenous concept to further examine the Linked Hybrid case. *Shanzhai* refers to the informal social practice of following, and also adapting, existing products or models to Chinese local culture and lifestyle. This idea challenges the conventional notion of design agency, which originates from a centre and is protected by the legal system. Linked Hybrid was transformed by adding walls to adapt to local cultural expectations, thus becoming a case of *shanzhai*. Moreover, my discovery of the dissemination by developers and other native architects of the altered and appropriated Linked Hybrid model also supported my *shanzhai* hypothesis. The study of the *shanzhai* processes at Linked Hybrid then develops the idea of Chinese appropriative agency, thereby challenging the relevance of the application of modernist ideas of sole authorial agency in architecture to the Chinese context.
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GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS

baixing. 百姓 ordinary people.

balinghou. 八零后 post-1980s generation.

chai. 拆 demolition.

chuangguan.闯关 breaking through the barriers.

da shichang da wuye. 大市场大物业 Big market big enterprise property.

dagong. 大公 Large public.

daguofan. 大锅饭 big wok rice.

dajiefang. 大街方 superblock.

dangci. 档次 social hierarchy.

dangdai moma. 当代 MOMA Contemporary MOMA.

danwei. 单位 work unit.

dayuan. 大院 big community compound.

dazhishang hexie. 大致上和谐 generally harmonious.

dazhong shuiping. 大众水平 popular standard.

doudizhu. 斗地主 landlord (a kind of Chinese bridge).

fajia. 法家 Legalism.

fazhan xingshi. 发展形势 development trend.

ganbu. 干部 government official.

gongyu. 公寓 condominium.

guanshang sixiang. 官商思想 bureaucratic business perception.

guanxi. 关系 relationship.

guiding de. 规定的 regulatory.

guojixing xiandai daduhui. 国际性现代大都会 International modern metropolis.
guoyou minying. 国有民营 state owned people operate.

hexie. 和谐 harmony.

hexie aoyun. 和谐奥运 harmonious Olympics.

hutong. 胡同 alley.

jia-da-kong. 假大空 fake big empty.

jicengfang. 基层房 grassroots housing.

jiechulaoziguanxi. 解除劳资关系 eliminating employee-employer relationship.

jiedao banshichu. 街道办事处 street office.

jieduanxing mubiao. 阶段性目标 stage objective.

jumin weiyuan hui. 居民委员会 residents’ committee.

kang. 炕 bed in northern China.

kaogongji. 考工记 Book of Craft and Technology.

kexue fazhan. 科学发展 Scientific development.

laodong-mofan. 劳动模范 model worker.

laomo. 劳模 model worker.

lian. 脸 face.

linli. 邻里 neighbourhood.

maiduangonglin. 买断工龄 buy-out of labour service.

men-hu. 门户 door and windower.

mianzi. 面子 face.

mianzi gongcheng. 面子工程 face engineering.

minying qiye. 民营企业 people owned enterprise.

mo-fan. 模范 role model.

mo-shi. 模式 model.
nanxun. 南巡 south inspection of Deng Xiaoping.

ni-shi. 逆势 against the megatrend.

pingfang. 平房 row houses.

qu-shi. 趋势 trend.

renyuan fenliu. 人员分流 dismissal of staffing.

rujia. 儒家 confucianism.

shanzhai. 山寨 mountain cottage (fake products).

shequ. 社区 community.

shi. 势 trend.

shirong. 市容 the appearance of city.

shougang moshi. 首钢模式 Capital Steel model.

shun-shi. 顺势 following the trend.

siren laoban. 私人老板 private boss.

tandabing. 摊大饼 making a big pancake.

tiefanwan. 铁饭碗 iron rice bowl.

toutou-momo. 偷偷摸摸 secretly.

wangshang-xiaoqu. 网上小区 internet small zone.

xiahai. 下海 get into the sea.

xiangzhen. 乡镇 county-village.

xiaoqu. 小区 small zone.

xiaoshou. 销售 selling.

xing-shi. 形势 situation and tendency.

xingxiang gongcheng. 形象工程 image engineering.

xingzhengke. 行政科 administration department.
xunxu jianjin. 循序渐进 gradual development.

yezhu. 业主 property owner.

yingxiao. 营销 marketing.

youshi. 优势 advantageous trend.

zao-shi. 造势 creating trend.

zhangwo. 掌握 manipulate.

zhengji gongcheng. 政绩工程 political achievement engineering.

zijiren. 自己人 our own people.

zimo zhiye. 自谋职业 self-developed employment.

zizhuquan. 自主权 autonomy.

zuankong. 钻孔 drilling holes.