Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust.
In: Blaze, M., (ed.)
(pp. pp. 87-101).
Springer Verlag: Berlin/ Heidelberg, Germany.
We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller S, an auction authority A so that unless 5 and A collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, S will not get any information about the bids, while A will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding S and A can do, and to construct (m + l)st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the S and A in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.
|Title:||Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust|
|Additional information:||6th International Conference, FC 2002 Southampton, Bermuda, March 2002 Revised Papers|
|Keywords:||Cryptographic auction schemes, homomorphic encryption, range proofs, Vickrey auctions|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Adastral Park|
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