Wilson, J;
(2012)
Persons, post-persons and thresholds.
Journal of medical ethics
, 38
(3)
pp. 143-144.
10.1136/medethics-2011-100243.
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Abstract
DeGrazia argues that post-persons have as much justification in believing that they have higher moral status than persons as persons have in believing that they have higher moral status than animals. DeGrazia’s claim presupposes that what Buchanan calls the “moral equality assumption” is false. This article argues that DeGrazia has given us no reason to disbelieve the moral equality assumption. Further, even if DeGrazia’s arguments about moral status were sound, it is unclear that his first-order normative claims about how we should weigh human against animal interests would follow.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Persons, post-persons and thresholds |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1136/medethics-2011-100243 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2011-100243 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Made available via Online First on 3 December 2011. This article has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Medical Ethics. The definitive copyedited, typeset version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2011-100243 |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1332526 |
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