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Persons, post-persons and thresholds

Wilson, J; (2012) Persons, post-persons and thresholds. Journal of medical ethics , 38 (3) pp. 143-144. 10.1136/medethics-2011-100243. Green open access

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Abstract

DeGrazia argues that post-persons have as much justification in believing that they have higher moral status than persons as persons have in believing that they have higher moral status than animals. DeGrazia’s claim presupposes that what Buchanan calls the “moral equality assumption” is false. This article argues that DeGrazia has given us no reason to disbelieve the moral equality assumption. Further, even if DeGrazia’s arguments about moral status were sound, it is unclear that his first-order normative claims about how we should weigh human against animal interests would follow.

Type: Article
Title: Persons, post-persons and thresholds
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2011-100243
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2011-100243
Language: English
Additional information: Made available via Online First on 3 December 2011. This article has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Medical Ethics. The definitive copyedited, typeset version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2011-100243
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy
URI: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1332526
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