Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance.
The Economic Journal
Olivella-Vera Full submission.pdf
Available under License : See the attached licence file.
We test for asymmetric information in the UK private health insurance (PHI) market. In contrast to earlier research that considers either a purely private system or one where private insurance is complementary to public insurance, PHI is substitutive of the public system in the UK. Using a theoretical model of competition among insurers incorporating this characteristic, we link the type of selection (adverse or propitious) with the existence of risk-related information asymmetries. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we find evidence that adverse selection is present in the PHI market, which leads us to conclude that such information asymmetries exist.
|Title:||Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance|
|Open access status:||An open access version is available from UCL Discovery|
|Additional information:||This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Olivella, P; Vera-Hernandez, M; (2013) Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance. The Economic Journal, 123 (567) pp. 96-130, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02520.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.|
|Keywords:||Substitutive Public Insurance, National Health Service, Adverse Selection|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences
UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics
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