Piracy in the Ancient World:
from Minos to Mohammed

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This thesis is an historical analysis of the phenomenon of piracy in the ancient world from the Bronze Age to the Arab conquests. It is based on detailed examination and discussion of the ancient sources. There is a short introduction (Part One) which establishes the scope of the enquiry, defines the subject and surveys modern scholarly literature.

Part Two (The Image of Ancient Piracy) consists of a study of the Greek and Latin vocabulary for piracy, and six separate studies of Classical literature, from Homer to the fourth century A.D. These studies analyze the development of the literary image of pirates and piracy, from the ambivalent attitude of the Homeric poems, to the wholly negative presentation of pirates and piracy found in the works of later writers. Part Three (War and Piracy) analyzes the early similarity between warfare and piracy, the gradual emergence of distinctions between the two, warfare as a promoter of piracy, and the involvement of pirates in warfare. Part Four (Trade and Piracy) is an analysis of the relationship between piracy and various forms of trade. The importance of piracy as both a contributor and a threat to long-distance maritime trade is analyzed, as well as the involvement of pirates in the slave trade. The link between trade and the suppression of piracy is also discussed. Part Five (The Suppression of Piracy) examines in detail attempts to suppress piracy from the Classical period to the end of the Roman Empire. Emphasis is laid upon the practical and political implications of suppression, and the relative ineffectiveness of most measures until the Late Republic and Early Principate, when piracy was suppressed with considerable success. There follows a brief statement of the general conclusions (Part Six) and suggestions for further research. One map and a bibliography are included.
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Preface

The idea of studying ancient piracy was first suggested to me by Susan Sherwin-White in 1985, when I was considering topics for an M.A. dissertation. I did not initially choose piracy, but circumstances forced me to abandon my first choice, and piracy seemed an attractive alternative. The resulting dissertation, "Piracy and Trade in the Ancient World", was submitted in September 1986 and a copy now resides somewhere in the University of London’s storage facilities. I do not advise anyone to bother reading it. It is nearly six years since I completed that piece of work, and my ideas about piracy have been greatly transformed in the interim. In a large part that transformation has, of course, been the result of my own personal study of ancient sources and reading of modern scholarly works, but I have also benefited enormously from the advice, encouragement and assistance of many others. I take this opportunity to acknowledge my debts.

Tim Cornell has been a kind, cheerful and patient supervisor of my work since 1985. If this thesis has much intellectual merit then it is largely thanks to him. John Carter was my first tutor in ancient history and has continued to be a source of inspiration and sound advice ever since. Parts of the thesis were also read by Michael Crawford, John Rich, Graham Shipley, and Paul Tweddle. Their comments and suggestions have been invaluable. Other scholars who discussed particular matters with me and/or generously provided off-prints of their work include Jean-Louis Ferrary, Maurizio Harrari, Paul Millett, Ellen Rice, Tony Spawforth, Hans van Wees, Michael Vickers and Hermann Wallinga.

This is very much a London University thesis. I count myself fortunate to have been a postgraduate student of ancient history in the capital city. The atmosphere of mutual assistance and support provided by my fellow students has often sustained me in the face of numerous practical difficulties, and the opportunity to talk to other research students has improved my scholarly efforts. Thanks to Richard Alston, Hugh Bowden, Margareta Debrunner, Kate Gilliver, Sophia Karasouli-Milobar, Christiane Kunst, Helen Lund, Karen Stears, Hans van Wees, and especially to Paul Tweddle. In addition, the opportunity to meet and speak to scholars from all over Britain and the World in the Institute of Classical Studies, and the Institute of Historical Research makes London a great place to work on ancient history.

For two years of my research I was funded by a British Academy Major State Studentship, thereafter I was partly supported by work at the Institute of Historical Research, Royal Holloway and Bedford New College and the (now sadly defunct) Classics Department
of Leicester University. In the latter institution I was also fortunate to be among sympathetic and learned people, including Philip Beagon, Duncan Cloud, Nicola Hudson, Norman Postlethwaite, Graham Shipley and Greg Woolf. More recently I have been blessed with fine colleagues in the Classics Department of St. Mary's College, Strawberry Hill. David Bellingham, Marilynne Bromley, Stephen Instone, Susan Pattison and Margaret Williamson have supported my efforts to finish this project in many ways.

No research can be done without good libraries. Thanks to David Ward and the staff of Royal Holloway and Bedford New College Library, to University College Library, University of London Library, Leicester University Library, Dr. Williams's Library, the British Library, the British School at Rome, the Warburg Institute, the Institute of Historical Research, the Institute of Archaeology and, above all, the Joint Library of the Hellenic and Roman Societies and the Institute of Classical Studies.

I have drawn on the practical assistance and moral support of many people. Thanks to Terry Lau, Naomi Summer and Bob and Marion Cocksedge. My parents have helped in many ways over many years, as have my three sisters. Lastly I would like to thank Debra Birch for her help, without which I do not feel I could ever have finished this thesis.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(Some very common abbreviations are omitted)

A.B.S.A. Annual of the British School of Archaeology at Athens.
Ach. Tat. Achilles Tatius, Kliophon and Leukippe.
A.E. L'Année Epigraphique.
A.H.R. American Historical Review.
A.J.A. American Journal of Archaeology.
A.I.P. American Journal of Philology.
Amm. Marc. Ammianus Marcellinus, History.
Andok. Andokides.
App. Appian:
    B.C. Civil Wars.
    Illyr. Illyrian Wars.
    Mith. Mithridatic Wars.
    Sic. Sicily and the islands.
    Syr. Syrian Wars.
Athen. Athenaios, Dons at Dinner.
B.C.H. Bulletin de correspondance hellénique.
B.E. Bulletin épigraphique (Contained in vols. of Revue des études grecques).
        " B.H. The Spanish War.

Cic. Cicero:

Ad Att.  Letters to Atticus (All letters of Cicero are cited according to their traditional division into books, and by the new numbering of D.R. Shackleton-Bailey's Cambridge editions, signified by S.-B.).

ad fam.  Letters to his Friends.

Brut.  Brutus.

de Dom.  On his house.

div. in Caec.  Divinatio against Caecilius.

Flacc.  On behalf of Flaccus.

Font.  On behalf of Fonteius.


Inv.  On Rhetorical Invention.

Leg.  Laws.

leg. agr.  On the Agrarian Laws.

Off.  On Duties.

Orat.  On Oratory.

Phil.  Philippic Orations.

Pis.  Against Piso.

Planc.  On behalf of Plancius.

Post red. in sen.  Oration to the Senate on his return.


Rab. perd.  On behalf of Rabirius on the charge of treason.


Tusc.  Tusculan Disputations.

I Verr.  Verrine Orations (Actio Prima).

II Verr.  Verrine Orations (Actio Secunda).

C.I.L.  Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.


cos.  consul.

C.P.  Classical Philology.

C.O.  Classical Quarterly.
C.R. Classical Review.
Dem. Demosthenes (all works in the Demosthenic corpus are referred to by the standard numbers of the Teubner edition).
de vir. ill. De Viris Illustribus (Lives of famous men).
D.H.A. Dialogues d'histoire ancienne.
Dig. Digest of Roman Law.
Dio Cassius Dio, Roman History.
Dio Chrys. Dio Chrysostom, Orations.
Diod. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History.
Epic. Epictetos, Lectures.
Eutr. Eutropius, Handbook of Roman History.
fr. fragment.
G.R. Greece and Rome.
G.R.B.S. Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies.
Heliod. Heliodoros, An Ethiopian Tale.
Herod. Herodotus, Histories.
Hor. Od. Horace, Odes.
Hydat. Hydatius, Chronicle.
I.Cret. Inscriptiones Creticae.
I. Delos Inscriptiones de Délos.
I.G. Inscriptiones Graecae.
I.G.S.K. Inschriften griechische Städte aus Kleinasiens.
Il. Homer, The Iliad.
I.L.L.R.P. Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae.
I.L.S.  Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, ed. H. Dessau.
J.E.S.H.O.  Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient.
I.O.A.I.  Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes.
Jos. B.J.  Josephus, The Jewish War.
J.R.A.  Journal of Roman Archaeology.
J.S.  Journal des Savants.
Lic.  Granius Licinianus, Histories (fragments).
Livy Per.  Livy, The Histories (Periochae, or Summaries).
L.S.I.  Liddell, Scott, Jones Greek-English Lexicon (9th edn.).
Lyk. Leokr.  Lykourgos, Against Leokrates.
Lys.  Lysias, Speeches.
M.D.A.I.  Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Institutes.
M.G.H. S.S.R.M.  Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum.
M.H.  Museum Helveticum.
M.H.R.  Mediterranean Historical Review.
N.C.  Numismatic Chronicle.
N.D. Occ.  Notitia Dignitatum, Western sections.
Nepos Them.  Cornelius Nepos, Life of Themistokles.
Nov. Val.  Novels of the Emperor Valentinian III.

Od.  Homer, The Odyssey.


Oros.  Orosius, History against the Pagans.

Pan. Lat.  Latin Panegyrics (various authors); I have cited these by (probable) date of delivery, numbering varies in different editions and translations.

Paus.  Pausanius, Description of Greece.

P.B.S.R.  Papers of the British School at Rome.

P.d.P.  Parola del Passato.


Petr. Sat.  Petronius, Satyricon.


Philost. H.E.  Philostorgios, Ecclesiastical History.

P.I.R.  Prosopographia Imperii Romani.

Plaut.  Plautus:

  Mil. Glor.  The Boastful Soldier.

  Poen.  The Little Carthaginian.

Pliny N.H.  The Elder Pliny, Natural History.


Plut.  Plutarch:

  Aem.  Life of Aemilius Paulus.

  Alk.  Life of Alkibiades.

  Ant.  Life of M. Antonius.

  C. Gracc.  Life of C. Gracchus.

  Crass.  Life of M. Crassus.

  Luc.  Life of Lucullus.

  Mor.  Moralia.

  Per.  Life of Perikles.

  Phok.  Life of Phokion.

  Pomp.  Life of Pompey.

  Pyrr.  Life of Pyrrhos.
Sert. Life of Sertorius.
Sulla Life of Sulla.
tranq. anim. On the Peacefulness of the Soul.
Polyain. Polyainos, Strategems.
Polyb. Polybius, Histories.
Pos. Poseidonios.
P. & P. Past and Present.
pr. praetor.
Q. Curt. Quinus Curtius Rufus, History of Alexander the Great.
R.F.I.C. Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione classica
Rh.M. Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.
R.M.S. Reading Medieval Studies.
Sall. Sallust, The Histories.
S.E.G. Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.
S.H.A. The authors of the "Augustan Histories":
  Trig.tyr. The Thirty Tyrants.
  v. Claud. Life of Claudius.
  v. Gall. Life of Gallienus.
  v. Marci Life of Marcus.
  v. Severi Life of Severus.
Str. Strabo, Geography.
Sud. The Suda (Lexicon).
Suet.   Suetonius:
   Aug. Life of the deified Augustus.
   Claud. Life of the deified Claudius.
   Jul. Life of the deified Julius.
Symm. Rel. Symmachus, Official Correspondence.
Tac.   Tacitus:
   Agr. Agricola.
   Ann. The Annals.
   Germ. Germania.
   Hist. The Histories.
T.A.M. Tituli Asiae Minoris Antiquae.
T.A.P.S. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society.
Theoph. Chronog. Theophanes, Chronographical History.
Thuc. Thucydides, History.
Trog. prol. Pompeius Trogus, Prologues to the History.
tr. pl. tribune of the plebs.
Vell. Velleius Paterculus, Roman History.
Xen. Hell. Xenophon, Hellenika.
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

Subject

I define piracy as armed robbery involving the use of ships. This definition embraces three important elements. Violence, acquisition and maritime travel. Piracy combines all of these elements and it is this combination which distinguishes it from other forms of violence, especially banditry, which is armed robbery on land and lacks the maritime dimension.

Ships require harbours or anchorages, crews and materials to maintain and operate them. They are potentially expensive items in terms of money, men and resources. They provide mobility and range, allowing pirates to attack and plunder far away from their homeland.¹ Pirates are also likely to enjoy considerable surprise as result of their mobility. Even if a constant watch is kept out to sea, rugged coastlines and poor weather may hide pirates approaching the land. Similarly, the ships of antiquity, which almost invariably sailed as close to land as possible, would have found it difficult to detect pirates at sea until the last moment. The subject of piracy is, therefore, a distinctive one and capable of analysis and discussion in isolation from banditry.²

¹ Note that piracy can be conducted in small craft. Some examples of pirates using relatively small boats are included below. In the Far East small motor-launches are often used to attack huge cargo vessels.

² This does not mean to say that there is not a close correspondence between piracy and banditry. Linguistically and practically they were closely related in the ancient world, but the distinction is important. Time and space also do not allow me to treat banditry in any detail, but it is not ignored in this thesis.
Scope

Within the general subject area described in the title I have chosen to concentrate on particular themes and to explore them through the detailed analysis of specific periods. The process of selection has been guided partly by the demands of time and space - I could not possibly hope to study equally all aspects of piracy in all periods from Minos to Mohammed! Another consideration has been the existence of the work of other scholars whose research has concentrated on certain periods and/or societies.

The most obvious area for which I cannot claim to be at all comprehensive is the Hellenistic period. In the first place there is the matter of the enormous range of epigraphic material to be examined. Ormerod's discussion of Hellenistic piracy\(^3\) was the result of many years spent studying the inscriptive evidence, and Ziebarth, too, was an epigraphist of high standing.\(^4\) Since the publication of their works there have appeared a number of specialist studies of piracy and related topics in the Hellenistic period.\(^5\) Readers are referred to these in my footnotes for a more complete review of the evidence. I have tried to select some particularly important and informative examples of inscriptions which relate to the main themes of my analysis.

Since the vast bulk of the evidence comes from the Classical period and after, I have concentrated my research here and made only brief references to the Bronze Age and the Archaic period. The truly historical sources only begin to appear after the development of history as a form of literature, in the fifth century B.C. As a result, although previous scholars have devoted a great deal of effort to the period before 500

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\(^3\) Ormerod (1924), esp. chpts. IV, V and VI.

\(^4\) See Ziebarth (1929), chpt. 4.

\(^5\) Note especially Benecke (1934); Ducrey (1968); Gauthier (1972); Brulé (1978). The latter, for example, contains an extremely detailed discussion of the epigraphic evidence relating to both the Cretans and the Aitolians. There is also much of value in Jackson (1969a), although this is unfortunately unpublished, but see Jackson (1973) for a briefer treatment.
B.C., I have been very brief in my treatment of it. Considerations of length have also played a part here.

Quotation and translation

Detailed analysis of the ancient sources is fundamental to my treatment of the subject of ancient piracy. A large part of this thesis consists of discussion and analysis of the way piracy was written about in histories, philosophical works, letters, inscriptions and works of fiction. I have tried to present as much as possible of the written sources in the text of my thesis, so that the reader is clear as to the contents of the particular passage under discussion. This approach has resulted in the inclusion of many quotations from the ancient sources, both literary and epigraphic. So that the thesis may be intelligible to as wide a readership as possible, I have made it my policy to present such quotations in a translated form, rather than in the original Greek or Latin. Only where the original language of the ancient source is the subject of my discussion or analysis have I included untranslated quotations, and these instances are few in number. Unless I have indicated otherwise, all the translations are my own. Where it has seemed appropriate, I have included in a footnote selected words and phrases in the original Greek or Latin, in a transliterated form for the Greek words. The texts of a few very important inscriptions are given in appendices. These practices are, not surprisingly, the result of compromise between providing as much information as possible, and keeping the text as short and as readable as possible. Since this thesis has been typed by me on

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6 In a few cases the original language was neither Greek nor Latin. These quotations are given in the translated form in which I have read them.

7 I have used other people's translations mainly for very extended passages, or in cases where I felt there was nothing to be gained from making my own. Since the translation of the Greek and Latin words for pirate and piracy is often uncertain there are only a few cases where I have been able to quote another person's translation without making minor alterations. I have not always bothered to indicate these alterations.
a word processor which does not have an easily used Greek character set, it has also
seemed better to keep the Greek text to a minimum.

Inscriptions

I have quoted from a number of inscriptions in the text of my thesis. In most cases
I have given only a translation, providing in the footnotes a transliteration of the original
words at key points. Where an inscription is particularly important, or the interpretation
is unclear, I have also tried to show the extent to which the text is deficient and/or
restored through the use of the following conventions:

[ ] enclose words restored by editors to fill gaps in the original text.
( ) enclose words or phrases included to make the translation more intelligible.
[[ ]] enclose gaps created by deliberate erasure in Antiquity.
—— indicate a (probable) number of missing letters, one for each letter.
.... are used for lacunae of varying length, with further information in footnotes.

Obviously this method is not exact, and for a couple of inscriptions I have provided a full
text in an appendix.

Although inscriptions are an extremely valuable source of information, it must be
emphasized that they only provide glimpses of life in the ancient world, from a certain
perspective. Even for periods and places where large numbers of inscriptions have
survived there is usually very little epigraphic evidence which relates directly to piracy,
and much of it requires interpretation on the basis of other inscriptions and the relevant
literary sources. The following document illustrates some of the limitations which are
encountered when dealing with this kind of material.

To Zeus Ourios and Astarte of Palestine and Aphrodite Ourania, the gods who
listened (to him), from Damon, son of Demetrios, of Askalon, having been saved
from pirates\textsuperscript{8} in payment of a vow. It is not allowed to produce a goat, a pig, a
cow for sacrifice.

This short inscription, on a piece of white marble, was discovered on Delos, near the
building known as "la Salle Hypostyle" on Delos in 1907\textsuperscript{6}. It is clearly a dedication in
thanks to the gods mentioned. The word translated as pirates could also refer to bandits,
and it is only the fact that Damon must have travelled over the sea to reach Delos which
suggests pirates as the better translation. Who was Damon? He could have been a
merchant, travelling the Mediterranean by ship, and this is, I think, the most likely
explanation, but it is no more than a guess. Who were the pirates? That depends partly
on the date, which the editors suggest is after 166 B.C., but cannot specify any further.
Ormerod connects this text with Cilician pirates and assumes that it belongs to the second
century B.C.,\textsuperscript{9} but that also is only a guess. Inscriptions which seem to record an incident
of piracy are often vague about the identity of the pirates. In this case, since Damon
survived the attack, it is likely that he never had the chance to find out where they came
from, so Ormerod's assumption that Cilicians were involved is virtually groundless. I
have tried to be more circumspect in my use of such evidence. Nevertheless, given the
relative importance of inscriptions as evidence for the Hellenistic period and the Late
Roman Republic, it is necessary to make as much out of them as possible. Some of my
interpretations are, therefore, to be viewed as possibilities, rather than attempts to provide
a definitive view. Where alternative views have been suggested I have indicated the more
important ones, but the notes are far from comprehensive. Readers are recommended to

\textsuperscript{8} sotheí apò peiratón. \textsuperscript{6} \textit{I. Delos}, no. 2305

\textsuperscript{9} Ormerod (1924), pp. 204-5. The dating of inscriptions is often very imprecise or
uncertain. I have indicated a date for all the inscriptions referred to in the thesis, but
only occasionally have I discussed the criteria for dating, usually in cases where the
date is closely related to the interpretation of the document.

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locate further references in S.E.G. and B.E., where fuller bibliographies and discussions can be found.

The plan of the thesis

Part Two is an analysis of the image of piracy in ancient literature. It includes a study of the language of piracy in ancient Greek and Latin, and six studies of the image of piracy in ancient literature from Homer to the fourth century A.D. These sections trace the historical development of this image and discuss how a variety of sources present pirates and piracy.

Part Three is an analysis of the relationship between piracy and warfare in the ancient world. It begins with the Bronze Age, when piracy and warfare were indistinguishable, and goes on to the gradual emergence of a distinction between the two in the Archaic and Classical periods. The close relationship between piracy and warfare is then analyzed from the Classical period to the end of Antiquity.

Part Four discusses the relationship between trade and piracy, from the Archaic period to the seventh century A.D. It concentrates particularly on the Hellenistic period and the Principate. The antagonistic relationship between piracy and maritime trade is analyzed, as well as the extent to which piracy depended upon trade and could exist in harmony with it.

Part Five is an analysis of the suppression of piracy, from the legendary king Minos to the time of Mohammed. This part analyzes the ideology of suppression as well as practical attempts to suppress piracy. The political context of suppression is discussed from the Classical period to the seventh century A.D. Particularly close attention is paid to the Late Republic and Principate.

Part Six draws together the themes of the previous four parts and makes some conclusions about the history of piracy in the Ancient World.
Scholarly literature on piracy

The earliest studies of ancient piracy were little more than collections of references from literary sources and a few inscriptions, arranged in chronological order. The entry in Pauly-Wissowa's Real-Encyclopädie, by W. Kroll and the book by Sestier are the main examples of this approach. Such analysis as these authors attempted was relatively simple. Piracy was viewed as a product of uncivilized societies, which was gradually suppressed by the civilizing powers of the great Classical states, especially Athens and Rome.

A considerable step forward was made by H.A. Ormerod, when he published his Piracy in the Ancient World. The scope of Ormerod's book was very wide (he went back to the Bronze Age looking for early manifestations of piracy) and he included a vast amount of material, especially inscriptions. He also tried to discuss the nature of piracy, concluding that the geography of the Mediterranean and the frequent wars were the main "causes" of piracy. The greatest deficiency which I find in Ormerod's book is the lack of a critical approach to the sources. Although he was thorough in his search for information, he tended to take it at "face value" and rarely wondered what lay behind the use of the label "pirate". As a result, the bulk of his book is generally an uncritical narrative, a patchwork of references with little regard for the nature of the sources or appreciation of historical development and change. The first three chapters, with their mixture of modern, ancient and very ancient references convey the impression that there

10 Sestier (1880); Kroll (1921).
11 Ormerod (1924).
12 Note the reference in Ormerod's preface to a paper by E.C. Semple, whose views are expounded at length in Semple (1932), a worthless synthesis of secondary works.
13 Ormerod's book remains the most comprehensive compendium of references to ancient piracy, and has been an invaluable aid to my own research.
was no difference between pirates in the time of Homer and those in the time of Byron.\textsuperscript{14}

The same faults can be found in Erich Ziebarth's book.\textsuperscript{15} He also presents ancient piracy as essentially unchanging and uncomplicated. The fact that he is using piracy as a way of studying trade hints at some kind of complex analysis, but his approach is far too simplistic. He assumes that piracy preys mainly on seaborne trade, and that Greek seaborne trade was originally dependant upon piracy, but later flourished in spite of it.\textsuperscript{16} His format allows even less analysis of the sources, which he presents in the form of appendices of texts.

No further attempt has been made at a wide-ranging, detailed historical study of ancient piracy since the work of Ormerod and Ziebarth, although several studies of particular aspects and/or periods have been published. Benecke's short dissertation on the Aitolians concentrated on the epigraphic material, and was too ambitious in its interpretation of the political aspects of Aitolian piracy, but it also remains a useful work.\textsuperscript{17} Rostovtzeff's two great works contain a certain amount of information and comment on piracy, much of it apparently based on Ormerod, as does Magie's book on Roman Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{14} Note especially the attempt to elucidate the Late Bronze Age through a study of the third century A.D.; Ormerod (1924), pp. 90-3.

\textsuperscript{15} Ziebarth (1929). It is, nevertheless, another useful collection of material. Ziebarth is careful in his appendices to point out references not in Ormerod!

\textsuperscript{16} This is what I take to be the import of the apparently contradictory statements in Ziebarth (1929), p. 1.

\textsuperscript{17} Benecke (1934).

\textsuperscript{18} Rostovtzeff (1941) & (1957); Magie (1950). Several works on Greek and Roman history published in the 1960s and 70s include discussions of particular aspects of piracy or related subjects, note especially Dell (1967), Ducrey (1968), Garlan (1972) and Gauthier (1972).
A series of articles by the Hungarian scholar Egon Maróti, published between 1956 and 1971, and followed in 1972 by a short book (in Hungarian), all suffer from a lack of critical analysis of the sources, and the additional handicap of a Marxist approach to ancient history which forces the author to overstress the importance of Roman corruption and immorality. 

The next major landmark in the scholarly bibliography of ancient piracy was the publication of Jackson's essay in the Festschrift for J.R. Western. This short study of Greek "privateers" represents a considerable step forward in its analysis of the nature of piracy and its relationship to warfare. It remains the best treatment of Greek piracy in English. In 1978 two related items appeared in French. Brulé's major study of Cretan piracy and Garlan's analytical article. Brulé's thesis is based on a detailed analysis of the relevant literary and epigraphic sources. He aims to show how and why the Cretans practised piracy, and places the study of piracy in the wider context of Cretan economic and social history. A weakness of his approach is his tendency to over-interpret the inscriptions, looking for Cretans behind every stone. He is especially good on the links between Crete and Aitolia, the relationship between the slave trade and piracy, and the importance of proxenia, isopolitela and other interstate agreements. His analysis of the development of Cretan piracy emphasizes the concentration of wealth and land in the

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19 See Bibliography under Maróti, E. I have not read the book, nor have ever met anyone who has, but I am led to believe that it is a synthesis of the articles. Some of Maróti's work is discussed in detail below in parts Two, Three and Five.

20 Jackson (1973).

21 See also Jackson (1969a), his unpublished Ph.D. thesis. I have avoided using the term "privateer" (for which there is no equivalent Greek or Latin word) because it seems to me to be too much of an anachronism. Privateers operated, from the fourteenth century onwards, according to specific legal conditions, only in times of war, usually with written permits. See Katele (1988); Andrews (1964); Ritchie (1984).

22 Brulé (1978); Garlan (1978). The latter will be dealt with below, in its revised form in Garlan (1989). Garlan was one of the examiners of Brulé's thesis.
hands of the aristocracy, which led to piracy being promoted as a way to provide access to external sources of wealth. This book, now very hard to find, is an essential companion to the study of Hellenistic piracy.

Of the numerous works which have discussed aspects of Greek and or Roman piracy in the last 10 years I will only single out two for particular mention. McKechnie's book on "outsiders" includes a chapter on leistai which discusses some topics very well, but he has a highly inconsistent approach to the sources and a dubious historical method. His desire to present pirates as "outsiders" leads him to stretch the literary texts too far, and he sometimes uses very late sources in an impossibly naïve fashion. Garlan's collection of essays on war and the economy contains a revised version of an article from 1978. He discards an overambitious attempt to create five "categories" of piracy but retains most of his synthesis. His references to the sources are sporadic and brief, and he seems to me to rely too much on the interpretations of secondary works of dubious quality, especially those of Maróti.

I shall move briefly on to medieval and modern history to review some of the important studies which have been published in the last 25 years. No-one has attempted

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23 See Walbank (1980) for comments on the general thesis. See also below Parts Three and Five for specific criticisms, esp. p. 23h.


25 E.g. pp. 109-111 (with notes) on "towers", a topic which I have omitted because ideas about the link between piracy and towers seem to me to be without serious foundation.

26 E.g. p. 112 where the entire point about leistai and "legitimate states" rests on a couple of obviously fictional anecdotes. Also pp. 114-115, where a lack of proper analysis of the literary references seems to me to render most of the interpretation invalid.


28 The latest of W.K. Pritchett's studies of Greek Warfare, Pritchett (1991), appeared in this country too late for me to make proper use of it, but it seems to have a good collection of references to pirates and ransom.
a synthesis of piracy in the early or high Middle Ages, and two recent studies have indicated the complexity of the subject in different periods. Reuter's analysis of the Carolingian Empire demonstrates the difficulty of drawing a dividing line between plundering and exacting tribute. The difference between Frankish officials or armies and Northern pirates is far from clear in the light of his enquiries. Katele, drawing on the wealth of documentary evidence available in Venetian archives, analyzes a crucial period for the history of piracy, when the difference between pirate and privateer (or "corsair") began to emerge. The piratical practices of the Venetian captains supposedly engaged in suppressing piracy illustrate a persistent problem in maritime history.

Since the prevailing image of piracy in modern times is that of the privateers and buccaneers of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is tempting for the ancient historian to use comparisons and analogies between these celebrated pirates and those of Antiquity. Such comparisons are, however, likely to be misleading, especially if they are based only on the "popular" literature. Andrews' and Bromley's work on privateers has shown how their effectiveness could vary considerably, and stressed their relative lack of importance in warfare. Tenenti has brilliantly outlined the complexity of sixteenth and early seventeenth-century piracy in the Mediterranean, and the practical and

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29 See Scammell (1981) for an excellent synthesis which has a lot to say on the subject of piracy. His bibliographies are also very useful.

30 Katele (1988).

31 See below Part Three on War and Piracy. The situation described by Reuter seems to resemble ancient conditions quite closely, but the increasing sophistication of the fourteenth century highlights the rapidly changing nature of the Mediterranean world in the Later Middle Ages. The further on one goes the less there is to compare and the more there is to contrast.

32 E.g. Defoe (1724); Thrower (1980).

political difficulties faced by the Venetians in their attempts to suppress it in the Adriatic.\textsuperscript{34} Finally, mention should be made of two books on the "Golden Age" of piracy in the early eighteenth century. Botting's Time-Life volume gives particularly good outline,\textsuperscript{35} and the analysis of Rediker reveals the restricted nature of the Anglo-American maritime world, highlighting the origins of the pirates (mostly naval personnel and merchants) and their close ties with each other.\textsuperscript{36} Comparisons with the ancient world may still be made, but it is important to emphasize the vast differences between the pirates of Antiquity and their modern counterparts.

\textsuperscript{34} Tenenti (1967). This book is based on many years of study among the relevant archives.

\textsuperscript{35} Botting (1978).

\textsuperscript{36} Rediker (1987).
PART TWO: THE IMAGE OF ANCIENT PIRACY

Introduction

The purpose of this part of the thesis is to analyze the way that piracy is presented in the ancient literary sources. In my opinion it is essential to study the ancient sources as works of literature in order to be able to understand them properly as historical sources. The variety of attitudes and ideas concerning piracy which they contain are the product of changes and developments over time, and they reflect the changing and developing nature of piracy in the ancient world. This part begins with a discussion of the language used by ancient authors to describe piracy, concentrating on ancient Greek words for pirates and piracy, with a short discussion of the Latin vocabulary. The next five sections are devoted to particular authors whose works are very important for the study of ancient piracy - Homer, Demosthenes, Polybius, Cicero and Strabo. A sixth section analyzes the presentation of pirates in ancient fiction from the first to the fourth century A.D.

Each section is a separate study, but collectively they demonstrate an historical development in the literary image of piracy. Homer is the earliest written source which mentions pirates and his presentation of them reveals an ambivalent attitude to them, which continues to appear in Classical literature until the end of Antiquity. The works of the Demosthenic corpus provide an opportunity to see how contemporaries thought, spoke and wrote about pirates and piracy in the fourth century B.C., a period for which there is plenty of historical source material, and to see how the image of piracy has changed since the time of Homer. Polybius represents a more historical perspective, and provides a unique insight into the image of piracy in the Hellenistic period. He also introduces the Romans and some of their attitudes towards piracy. Cicero, a politician and orator, like the authors of the Demosthenic corpus, is given very close attention
because his works contain a wide range of attitudes towards piracy and deal with it in a variety of contexts at a crucial time. Strabo is an extremely useful source both for the history of piracy before his own time and for contemporary attitudes to piracy and the Roman empire. Finally the novels and other fictional works from the first four centuries A.D. show how the image of piracy has developed since Homer. They present a picture of piracy which is more familiar to modern readers than that which is found in the earlier authors, but which comes at the end of a long historical development.
PART TWO: THE IMAGE OF ANCIENT PIRACY

LANGUAGE

Introduction

Piracy is a modern English word for armed robbery involving the use of ships. It is complementary to banditry or brigandage, but does not embrace the whole range of activities and ideas which the neutral term plundering can cover. As in the title of this thesis, piracy conveys immediately a maritime context. Banditry (a wholly land based activity) is excluded from the present study. It has been excluded partly because of factual distinctions between the two, arising from significant differences in the practice of piracy and banditry, and partly because of a conceptual distinction. Banditry has a different image, both popular and academic, from piracy.¹

The conceptual and linguistic dichotomy was not as strong in the ancient Greek and Roman world as it is in the modern world. Piracy and banditry were more closely linked in both language and perception, although differentiation was not wholly absent. The purpose of this section is to explore the ancient language of piracy and banditry, to show how far it overlaps and how far it is possible to distinguish between the two in ancient writings. The main concern is with ancient Greek, since the Latin vocabulary for piracy presents few difficulties or controversies.

The meaning and use of leistés and peiratés

Ancient Greek has two common words which can be translated as pirate, leistés and peiratés. The former is attested in Homer² in the forms leistér, leistés, leistós and leístor, and it continues to be used by Greek writers throughout the period covered by

² See Ebeling (1885) pp. 98ff.
this study. It derives from the same root as ἅλς (meaning booty or plunder), i.e. the Indo-
European root lai or lau and its essential meaning is armed robber or plunderer, for
which the common English terms are bandit or pirate.

The second word, peiratés, is a later arrival in the vocabulary of the ancient Greek
sources, not being found in Homer or any of the writers of the Classical period.

The earliest datable occurrence of the word peiratés is in an Attic inscription from
Rhamnous. It is a deme decree in honour of Epikhares, who was elected as strategós with
special responsibility for coastal defence during the archonship of Peithidemos,3 and
undertook vigorous defensive measures during the Chremonidean war. The decree
mentions a ransoming or exchange of prisoners arranged by Epikhares and also indicates
that the prisoners were taken by peiratai, who had been brought into the area by people
described as "from the city", i.e. Athens. Epikhares held an enquiry and punished the
guilty (S.E.G. 24 (1968) lines 21-3):

...ἐκολασε δὲ καὶ του/ς κραθευομένους
eἰς τῇ/ν χώραν τοὺς πειράτας, λαβὼν καὶ
ἐξετάσας αὐτοὺς, ὄψι/ς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως,
[ἄξιως ὄν ἐπιραττον].

(...he also punished those who had introduced the pirates/bandits into the land, men
from the city, arresting and interrogating them [in a way that was fitting] for what they
did.)4

The episode took place in a time of war, when Athens was supported by the
Ptolemaic forces against those of Antigonus Gonatas, but it was not itself a significant act

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3 The date of Peithidemos' archonship is disputed, but must fall in or near to 267
B.C., that is to say during the Chremonidean war, with the dating of which it is
suggests 265/4 for Peithidemos' archonship.

4 Translation from Austin (1981), no. 50.
of war. It may be that the *peiratai* were allied in some way to Antigonos, but their identity is not known, possibly because it was not clear to their victims. Speculation about them is pointless since the inscription is too badly damaged to yield any further information, and it is our only source for this event. The simplest and most logical interpretation of the use of *peiratés* is that it is a pejorative term for a plunderer, as in later texts.\(^5\)

The word *peiratés* also occurs in an inscription from Aigiale on the northern coast of the island of Amorgos, (L.G. XII.7386), describing a raid on the town which took place at night (lines 4-5):

```... ἑπελόη πειρατῶν εἰς τὴν ἕωραν ἐμβαλόντων νυκτὸς...```

(...since, when pirates made an incursion into the countryside at night...)

During the raid a variety of people from the city were captured and two of the citizens managed to negotiate their release (lines 15-17):

```... οὐνέστεψαν τὸν ἑπὶ τῶν πειρατῶν ἐπιπλέοντα Σωκλείσαν ἀπολύσας τὰ τ' ἐλευθέρα...```

(...they persuaded Sokleidas, the captain of the pirates, to release the free persons...\(^6\))

\(^5\) Whether pirates or bandits should be used to translate the word *peiratai* here is not entirely clear. Rhamnous is a coastal town, but it is close to Boiotia and it could be penetrated quite easily by land. Later references to men called *peiratai* show that they can be bandits or pirates (see below) and insufficient context is provided by the inscription itself. M.M. Austin (1984), no. 50 translates "pirates". See also *B.E.* (1968), no. 247.

\(^6\) Translation from Austin (1981), no. 87.
The editor of *Inscriptiones Grecae* vol. XII.7 dates the inscription to the third century B.C. from the lettering. Other editors agree. There is no reason to question the translation of *peiratan* as "pirates", although any attempt to identify the perpetrators can only be speculation. Attempts to date the inscription more exactly on the basis of such speculation are futile. The fact that there may have been similar raids by Aitolian pirates in this area in the middle of the third century B.C. does not mean that this incident can be attributed to them and dated to a particular period of Aitolian piratical activity. The inscription can, therefore, only be dated to before 200 B.C. on the basis of the lettering.

A word derived from *peirates* does occur in an Attic inscription which can perhaps be assigned to an earlier date, permitting the conclusion that this word was in use at the same time as it occurs in the noun form in the Epikhares inscription discussed above. The relevant decree is in honour of Herakleitos of Athmonon who protected Salamis from piratical attacks from the direction of Epilimnion (*S.I.G.*, no. 454 = *I.G. II* (2nd edition) 1225, lines 12-13):

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... καὶ πολέμου γενομένου τοῦ περὶ Ἀ-
λεξάνδρου καὶ πειρατικῶν ἐκπλεοντων ἐκ
τοῦ Ἐπιλημνίου...
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(...and when the war of Alexander broke out, and pirates were sailing out from Epilimnion...)

Herakleitos was the Macedonian *strategos* of the Piraeus. The attacks occurred during the revolt of Alexander of Corinth, son of Krateros, which means that the

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8 Ziebarth (1929), chapter 4, does just this, associating the Aigiale raid with a decree of nearby Naxos relating to "Aitolian piracy" (*I.G. XII.5.36*). See also Tarn (1913), pp. 208-215, and Benecke (1934).
honorific decree should be later than c.250 B.C., but not necessarily much more than a few years later, which would also be consistent with the lettering of the inscription.9

The Greek word peiratés is, therefore, first attested in inscriptions from the middle of the third century B.C., the earliest of which can be dated to 267 B.C. There is nothing in these inscriptions which indicates a different meaning from that found in later literary and epigraphic sources.10

This view is not generally accepted, however, and it is necessary, before continuing to discuss the early use and meaning of peiratés, to consider alternative explanations which have been advanced in recent scholarly works.

In an appendix to a recent article on Athenian involvement in the war of Agis III,11 D.S. Potter put forward the view that it is possible to discover the earliest use of the word in Book 20 of Diodorus' Universal History.12 He is of the opinion that, since the text of Diodorus books 18-20 is based mainly on Hieronymus of Cardia, and since peiratés first appears in Book 20, with the alternative leistés being used earlier, Diodorus is following the linguistic usage of Hieronymus. Since all the references to peiratés occur in connection with an Antigonid king's army, Potter takes them to refer

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9 Alexander of Corinth's revolt is usually dated before Aratos' liberation of Sikyon (251 B.C. see Walbank (1957), pp. 235-6) on the basis of the order of events in Pompeius Trogus Prol. 26. An alternative date of c.249 is favoured by some scholars who do not accept that Trogus' order of events is strictly chronological. The most obvious reading of Polybius II.43 would place the liberation of Sikyon in 251 because it must be four years after the generalship of Margos of Karyneia, which is dated by Polybius to twenty-five years after the re-constitution of the Achaean League (280 B.C. according to Polybius II.41.11). The events are discussed in Will (1979-82), I pp. 316-8 and by Walbank in C.A.H. VII.1 (2nd Edition), p. 247.

10 See below for the meaning of peiratés in Greek authors.

11 The attempt of Agis to throw off Macedonian control of the Peloponnese while Alexander was in Asia in 331 B.C.

to some kind of special mercenaries, engaged in a "respectable entrepreneurial activity".\textsuperscript{13} He also believes that the inscriptions from the third century discussed above refer to people who are, "'naval mercenaries' operating under some legitimate authority ... synonymous with polémios"(!).\textsuperscript{14} Potter does not believe that the word has a pejorative sense at this time, but that it acquired one later. Thus for him it is a late fourth century term for a naval mercenary, possibly coined and almost certainly first used by the historian Hieronymus.

The idea has several weaknesses. In the first place, Hieronymus' influence on the text of Diodorus is not as simple as Potter would like to think. His authority for Diodorus' preservation of Hieronymus' language, Jane Hornblower, suspects that Diodorus did not use Hieronymus' original work, but a later recension, probably by a Rhodian scholar of the 2nd century B.C., who reworked the text of Hieronymus, adding some material and changing some of the original. "Direct comparison between Diodorus and his source for xviii-xx as yet eludes us......".\textsuperscript{15} Secondly, Potter's interpretation rests on the assumption that peiratés first appears in Diodorus at 20.82.4, in a list of the forces of Demetrios Poliorcetes at the siege of Rhodes in 305 B.C. Unfortunately he has not read the text of Diodorus very carefully. Diodorus has just used the same word in the previous chapter, during his description of the high esteem of Rhodes in the eyes of the Greeks (Diod. 20.81.3):

\begin{quote}
\textbf{ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ προελησθεὶς δυνάμεως ὡς θ' ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐδίκα τὸν πρὸς τοὺς πειρατὰς πόλεμον ἐπανασφαλεῖσθαι καὶ καθαρὰ παρέχεσθαι τῶν κακοφρύγων τὴν θαλατταν,...}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} Potter (1984), p. 235.

\textsuperscript{14} Potter (1984), p. 231.

\textsuperscript{15} Hornblower (1981), pp. 276-7. See also Sacks (1990) who argues strongly against the view that Diodorus was a slavish copier of his sources.
(Indeed, she attained such a position of power that she took up the war against the pirates by herself, and cleared the sea of their evil manifestation). This passage may well reflect the language of a Rhodian version of Hieronymus' history, but could not possibly have been written by Hieronymus himself, because it refers to the exploits of the Rhodians in the third and early second centuries B.C.

For Diodorus there was no doubt that peiratés was a pejorative term, as it was for his contemporary Strabo. The passage cited above makes no sense if it is simply a term for some kind of "naval mercenary" who is completely "respectable" and whose activity is "legitimate". As a general point about Diodorus' vocabulary, it should be noted that Diodorus usually tries to bring his sources closer to his own clear, simple style. Hornblower cites the case of his use of Agatharkhides in Book 3. "He prefers the more modern Hellenistic usage, .....and in general replaces unusual with usual words". The fact that Diodorus is using the word in a military context repeatedly in Book 20 is indicative of the nature of Hellenistic warfare at this time, rather than the nature of the word itself.

Another suggestion is that peirates is a fourth century creation to provide a distinctive word for seabome plunderers (pirates) as a supplement to leistés. The idea comes from entries in the Suda (Sud. 1454 & 474):

\[\textit{πειρατής: καταποντιστών, κατὰ θάλασσαν λῃστῶν... ὅθεν καὶ πειραταί ὦ κατὰ θάλασσαν κακοῦργοι.} \]
\[\textit{λῃστής: καὶ λῃστής μὲν ὦ ἐν ἡπείρω πειρατής δὲ ὦ ἐν θάλασση.} \]

16 See below on Strabo's vocabulary for piracy.
18 The use of pirates in Hellenistic warfare is discussed below in Part Three, pp. 124-46.
While these entries make it perfectly clear what the Byzantine lexicographer thought were the appropriate meanings, they should not be taken as indicators of the fourth century B.C. usage (peiratés is not attested in any fourth century sources), nor can they be used to indicate later classical usage, since they are not borne out by examination of any other writers. Later authors continue to use both of the words leistés and peiratés as synonyms. For example, Achilles Tatius, writing in the third century A.D., uses both words together in the following passages:

(Ach.Tat. 2.17.3: A servant is described as,

..... ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως εὐρωστὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ φύσει πειρατικός...

(....he was exceptionally strong of body and by nature piratical). The adjective is from peiratés. The sentence continues, .... ταχὺ μὲν ἐξεύθει ληστᾶς ἀλείς ἀπὸ τῆς κόμης ἐκείνης.

(...he quickly sought out some pirate sailors from that village). The obvious translation of both words here is pirate rather that bandit, the meaning being made perfectly clear by the phrase leistᾶς ἁλίκης, which is equivalent to the Latin expression praedones maritimos (E.g. Nepos Them. 2.3.).

(Ach.Tat. 5.7.6.); The pirates in this passage have captured the heroine, Leucippe, and are being pursued by the hero, Cleitophon, and his companions:

..... ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ λησταὶ μᾶλλον ἐφισμενέστερον ὡς ἦν δὲ ἡμεν πάλιν πλησίον, ἐφώνον οὗ λησταὶ ναῦν ἐτέραν, καὶ γυναῖκας, ἐκάλουν πρὸς βοήθειαν. Πορφυρεῖς δὲ ἦσαν πειρατικοί.

20 See below, pp.34-7.
Meanwhile, the pirates rowed with even greater vigour; we were again nearing them when they sighted another ship, and, on recognizing it, called to it for help; its crews were purple-fishers, also pirates. In the passage above the pirates themselves have been referred to as leistai, but in the next section they are called peiratai (Ach.Tat. 5.7.7.):

καὶ γὰρ οἱ πειραταὶ τοῦ φυγείν ἀποταξιόμενοι προκαλοῦντο εἰς μάχην.

(.....and the pirates indeed had already desisted from their flight and were challenging us to give battle). Achilles Tatius makes fuller use than any other Greek author of the words leistés and peiratés and their derivatives. This is hardly surprising considering the importance of pirates in the ancient Greek novels as a whole.

Peiratés and words derived from it (peiratikós, -térion) continue to be used in the sources right up to the end of our period, and have a meaning synonymous with leistés and its derivatives. The derivation of peiratés is probably from the word peira and it may be connected with peiráo to make an attempt at something. An alternative derivation from the word prássō, to pass through, achieve, is also possible, but unlikely.

The earliest surviving author to make considerable use of the word peiratés is Polybius. He uses it to describe a variety of individuals and groups ranging from the bandit Dorimachos and his gang, to a flotilla of pirate ships chased by the Romans in 190 B.C. during the war with Antiochos. A brief look at some examples of his usage and that of Strabo, writing in the first century A.D., will suffice, along with the passages of Achilles Tatius cited above, to illustrate the common practice among Greek authors.

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21 See L.S.J. s.v. peiratés and above.
22 See L.S.J. s.v. peiratés and P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire Étymologique, p. 878 s.v. peíra.
23 See L.S.J. s.v. peiratés.
(When a newly formed gang of bandits came to him [Dorimakhos the Aitolian] at Phigaleia, not having a justifiable project to provide them with the plunder....he was at a loss, and finally allowed the bandits to raid the livestock of the Messenians, who were friends and allies [of the Aitolians]).

Polybius cannot possibly be referring to pirates in this context so the translation of *peiratai* must be bandits. At another point he mentions some pirates who are involved in the battle of Myonnessos (Pol. 21.12):

...οὲ δὲ πειραταί Θεασάμενοι τὸν ἐπίπλον τῶν Ῥωμαίκων πλοίων, ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀναχώρησιν.

(The pirates, seeing the Roman fleet bearing down upon them, changed course and fled). Again the obvious translation of *peiratai* is pirates, and this can be confirmed by referring to the text of Livy, Book 37.27.4, which goes into greater detail than the fragment of Polybius.24

In Book 4 Polybius uses *leisteia* to describe the plundering activities of the Cretans (4.8.11) and the Aitolians (4.9.10). He refers in these instances to plundering both by land and by sea. Strabo is even freer in his use of *leistés* and *peirates*. He also treats them as

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24 See Walbank (1957-79), III p. 105. Livy's text reads *apparuit deinde piraticos veloces et lembos esse* (Then it became clear that they were fast pirate *lembi*). On the *lembos* see Casson (1986), pp. 125-7.
synonyms and even employs them both in the same sentence, when contrasting the Lycians with their neighbours the Pamphylians and the Cilicians.

(Str. 14.3.2): ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι μὲν ὁμοιοτέρεις ἔχουσαντο τοὺς τόπους πρὸς τὰ λυστήρια αὐτοὶ πειρατεύοντες ἢ τοὺς πελατώτες λαμπρὸτεύλεια καὶ ναύσταθμα παρέχουσι.

(But the former used their places as bases for piracy, when they practised it themselves, or made them available to other pirates as markets for their plunder). 25

From the texts cited above it can be seen that πειρατές is a synonym for λειστές. They both mean pirate or bandit, can both be translated by either English word, or by the neutral term plunderer.

The word πειρατές is first attested in the third century B.C. and is apparently a common word in the Greek world by the end of the century. In literary sources either or both may be used. Suggested specific meanings for πειρατές are not borne out by its usage and the precise circumstances of its appearance in the ancient Greek language are not ascertainable. It is possible that, since Greek was a spoken language with a strong oral tradition, the "newer" word may have been in use for some considerable time before its earliest occurrence in any written context. The habits of Greek epigraphy are generally conservative, with innovations only being incorporated very slowly.

Differentiation between pirates and bandits in Greek sources

As has been stated above, the modern English words pirate and bandit are both possible translations of the Greek words λειστές and πειρατές. The clear semantic

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25 The word λειστέρια is a noun meaning the practice of piracy or banditry, derived from λειστές.
difference which is found in modern English, that pirates operate mainly at sea and use ships, and that bandits always operate on land, is not obvious in the ancient Greek sources. This does not mean, however, that ancient writers could not distinguish between the two, when they had reason to do so, by using either a qualifying description, or by use of another (less common) word which means pirate.

An example in Greek of the former is found in Strabo’s description of the Bosporan peoples near Colchis (11.2.12):

\[
\text{εἰωσίς ἐν ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ Θάλατταν λῃστηρίων.}
\]

(They live by plundering at sea - i.e. piracy).

There is only one word in Greek which means pirate, not a bandit: katapontistès. It is translated by L.S.I. under the verb from which it derives, katapontidzo, which means "throw into the sea, plunge or drown therein," as "one who throws into the sea". It is used almost exclusively to mean pirate. It is not a commonly used word in Greek literature, possibly because, although useful for specifying pirates as opposed to bandits or plunderers in general, it is a long and rather inelegant one. There can be no doubt that even those authors who did employ it were reluctant to make continuous use of it, for whatever reason. Isokrates uses it only once in the Panegyrikos and twice elsewhere (Isok. Paneg. 115; Panath. 12 & 226). He also uses leistès (E.g. Panath. 226). Demosthenes also uses both katapontistès and leistès. At one point he employs both as a pair of pejorative terms to describe conditions on the island of Alopekonnesos (Dem. 23.166):

\[
\ldots λῃστῶν δὲ ἦν μεστὴ καὶ καταποντιστῶν.
\]

26 Pausanias (8.52.3) uses this word metaphorically, saying of all who fought against Athens in the Peloponnesian war:

\[
\ldots ραίη τις ὃν κατόχεσας καὶ ὅτε ἐγγύτατα καταποντιστὰς εἶναὶ σφᾶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος.
\]

(…they may fitly be described as the assassins and almost the ‘wreckers’ of Greece. Trans. Frazer).
(...swarming with plunderers and pirates). Pausanias prefers to use *leistés*, (E.g. Paus. 1.7.3 *leistás*).

The only author who makes regular use of *katapontistés* is the historian Cassius Dio, writing in the third century A.D. He prefers *leistés* to *peirates*, which he never uses. He employs *katapontistés* as a specific term for a pirate because he wishes to make a distinction between seaborne and land based activities. His use of it is concentrated round his discussion of Pompey's early career and the *Lex Gabinia* of 67 B.C. (Chapters 20-37 of Book 36). The reason for his making a distinction between pirates and bandits becomes clear in the opening part of this section (Dio 36.20.1):

*ο*κ *καταποντιστα*ι *ελύπουν μεν αει τοις πλέοντας, ωσπερ και τοις εν τη γη οικούντας* 
*ο*κ *τα*ς *ληστείς* *πολούμενος*.

(The pirates had always attacked shipping, just as the bandits did those who live on the land.) Having differentiated between the two types of plunderers, Dio explains why, with the continual wars providing cause and opportunity for many to turn to armed robbery or plundering (*leistēs*), it was piracy which had caused the greatest concern at Rome at this time (Dio 36.20.3-4): *κα*ι *τα* μεν εν τais ἡπείροις ληστείας, οτε και εν οφθαλμοις των δημοιων μιαλλων άντα, και πην τε αύσθησιν της βλάβης έγγυθεν και την σύλληψιν ου πάνω χαλεπτην έχοντα, γράφων πως κατελύτεν, τα δε εν τη Θάλασσαν επε πλειστων έπηνεσθην των γηρ.Ρωμαίων προς τους αντι-πολέμους άσχολων αγόντων επε πολυ ἡ μακαρων πολλαχώσε τε περίπλεοντες και πάντως τους δμοίους σφός προστεθεμενοι, οιστε τινας αυτων και εν όμολαχω οιων συμβαλλοντος έπικουρησα.
(While the bandits' plundering on the land, being under the very eyes of the locals, who could discover the injury nearby and apprehend the bandits without much difficulty, were easily stopped, the plundering by sea (i.e. piracy) had increased dramatically. For while the Romans were occupied against their enemies, the pirates were flourishing, sailing all over the place and all joining together as groups, so that some of them came to each other's aid like regular allies). Dio stressed the pirates' ability to operate everywhere again (36.22.4). It is the range and comparative strength of piratical activity which makes it different and allows it to become a serious menace. Dio does not use only the specific term katapontistés to refer to pirates in this section. For example, at 36.24.1 he has:

υπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν.

At 36.36.4: καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς λῃστὰς

is closely followed by:

ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν καταποντιστῶν προφάσει,

He initially employs it to make a clear distinction between pirates and bandits. Then, when he has established that it is the pirates who will be the subject of his narrative, he alternates it with leistés. Thus it can be seen that Dio could use a specific term for pirate rather than bandit, but did not always feel it necessary to do so, allowing the context to make it clear which was meant (as at 36.20.1). At other times he might leave it up to the reader to decide the significance of leistés. At 39.56.1ff., Dio explains that Aulus Gabinius (cos. 59) had been a rather disastrous proconsul for the people of his province of Syria. In 55 B.C., when he toyed with intervention in Parthia and then turned instead to an invasion of Egypt, he left behind him a province bereft of soldiers. Dio says of him:

ὁ Γαβῖνος πολλὰ μὲν καὶ τὴν Συρίαν ἐκάκωσεν, ἐώστε καὶ τῶν λῃστικῶν, ὡς καὶ τότε ἤκμασε, πολὺ πλεῖσος φίλοι λαμηνασθα όμως...
(Gabinius did much to ruin Syria, so much that he caused more harm to the people than
did the pirates, who were flourishing still...). He repeats the point at 39.56.5. The irony
of the situation is apparent only if the translation is pirates, for it was Gabinius who, as
tribune in 67 B.C. proposed the law which gave Pompey his famous command against
the pirates. Dio's subtle humour is well served by his choice of words.\footnote{27}

It was possible, therefore, to differentiate between pirates and bandits in ancient
Greek. From at least the beginning of the fourth century B.C. there was a word available
which could mean pirate (i.e. katapontistés). It was always possible to add a qualifying
adjective or participle or phrase to the words leistés and peiratés in order to make the
meaning clear. Alternatively it could be obvious from the context of the particular
passage which of the two was meant. There remained, however, the inherent ambiguity
of meaning in the two main Greek words for plunderers which reflected a close
association of the two in the minds of the Greek-speaking peoples of the ancient world.
It has been suggested to me\footnote{28} that peiratés first appeared at a time when piracy had
become a distinctive phenomenon in the Greek world in contrast to the plundering of
Archaic and Classical times. But this does not account for the fact that it is clearly a
synonym for the older word leistés, which it is supposed to supplement. The choice of
English words to translate the two Greek terms must, therefore, be made with great care,
in order to reveal both the conceptual and factual similarities and differences between
piracy and banditry in the ancient world.

\textit{leistēs} and \textit{leίdzomai}

The noun \textit{leistēs} is obviously closely connected with \textit{leistés}. It is used mainly in
connection with piracy, but can also refer to activities which are not best described in this

\footnote{27} See Part 5 for Pompey's 'suppression' of piracy.

\footnote{28} By Professor Michael Crawford.
way. As will be seen below, the ancient Greeks did not always differentiate between war and piracy, at least, not as clearly as we do now. I shall demonstrate some of the range of meaning which can be covered by *leisteia* with a few examples from Thucydides and Polybius.

One of the most important passages for an appreciation of Thucydides' usage is an early chapter of the Archaeologia. Having just claimed that piracy (*tò leistikòn*) was suppressed by king Minos, Thucydides goes on to explain the nature of this phenomenon among the Greeks and barbarians in ancient times (Thuc. 1.5.1-2):

When they achieved a better command of travelling by ship from one place to another, they turned to piracy, led by the most powerful men, for the sake of their own gain as well as the sustenance of the weak.

He then describes their habit of attacking unprotected settlements for their livelihood.

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29 See below Part Three, pp. 105–109

30 Thuc. 1.4. See below Part Five for discussion of this claim and its significance.
(...there was no shame attached to such deeds in those days, and indeed they brought them much prestige. (2) This can be shown even now by some of those who dwell on the mainland and who consider such activity a fine thing, and the old poets all ask the same question of those arriving by sea, inquiring whether they are pirates...).

Thucydides further suggests that neither the questioners nor those questioned assume that admitting to being a pirate would be at all shameful. Then, after mentioning that plundering (leizomai) also occurred on land he specifies where on the mainland of Greece the same holds true (Thuc. 1.5.3): 

καὶ μὲν ἔχοι τοῦθεν πολλὰ 
τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῷ πολεμῷ τροπῷ νέμεται 
περὶ τῆς Λοκρῶς τούς Ὀξολᾶς καὶ Αἰτωλῶς καὶ 
Ἀκαρνάνας καὶ τῆς ταύτῃ ὑπερεῖ.[...]

(And nowadays among many of the Greeks the old ways are still respected, by the Ozolian Lokrians and Aitolians and Akarnanians and that region of the mainland).

This passage implies several things about the meaning and implications of the words leistés, leistea and leizomai in the Classical period. leistés means, in a maritime context, an armed robber whose actions nowadays are likely to be disapproved of by most of the Greeks, although there are still places where such disapproval is not the norm. What a leistés does can be described as leistea, in which case the translation "piracy" is appropriate when it is clear that the leistés is a pirate, and the verb leizomai can be used for the activity.

31 This old poetical question is discussed below, p. 52-3

32 Plundering on land is also the meaning of leistea in Thuc. 8.40, referring to Chian "slaves" in 411 B.C. For an unusual use of leistés to mean plunderers on land, in the context of warfare see Xen. Hipparkh. 7.7, though I think there is a pejorative tone here, as Xenophon is referring to "timid" cavalrymen.
The range of activities covered by these terms is, however, greater than this one chapter would suggest. In Book Three, after his famous description of the stasis which occurred in Corcyra in 427 B.C., Thucydides tells his readers what happened to the defeated "oligarchic" faction among the Corcyraeans (Thuc. 3.85.2):

(Thereafter the Corcyraean exiles (for around 500 of them had got away) took the fort on the mainland, gained control of the Corcyraean possessions in the straits, and operating out of these bases they plundered those on the island and did a lot of damage, bringing about a great famine in the city).

A similar use of leidzomai is found in Book Four, recounting events after the capture of Spartans on Sphakteria and the garrisoning of Pylos with Athenians and some Messenians from Naupaktos (Thuc. 4.41.2): ἐλήφθοντο τῇ τῇ

(They plundered Lakonia and did a great deal of damage, since they spoke the local dialect. The Spartans had never before experienced plundering and this type of warfare,
and with the Helots deserting them, they also feared a spread of these new developments over their territory,...).

Why had the Spartans never experienced this kind of plundering before? The most obvious reason would be because no-one had been able to establish a suitable base on or near Spartan territory before, which was the great advantage of Pylos. It is noteworthy that this passage appears to suggest that Thucydides classed leisteia as a form of warfare.33

Some distinction between warfare and leisteia does seem to be made by Thucydides. In Book Five, after reporting the brutal subjugation of Melos and the Argive invasion of Phlias in 416 B.C. he continues (Thuc. 5.115.2): καὶ οἷς ἐκ τῆς Πυλίου Ἀθηναίων Λακεδαίμονων πολλὴν λείαν ἔλαβον. καὶ Λακεδαίμονιοι δὲ αὐτὸ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς οὐδ' ὡς ἄρετες ἐπολέμουν αὐτοῖς, ἐκήρυξαν δὲ εἰ τὰς βούλεται παρὰ σφᾶν Ἀθηναίους λύσεω Θαλ.

(And the Athenians from Pylos took a lot of booty from the Spartans. Yet even this did not make the Spartans abandon the treaty and go to war with them, but they announced, for any of their own people who wanted to, plundering against the Athenians).

Here Thucydides seems to be implying that plundering is not the same as warfare. The Spartans are stopping short of going to war, but they are encouraging their own citizens (and their allies) to take booty from the Athenians. The important point to note about this use of leidzomai is that it comes as a consequence of the Athenian plundering

33 See below Part Three on the close relationship between war and piracy in the ancient world. This passage can be compared with Thuc. 7.27.3, where Thucydides says of the results of the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia: pollὰ ἐβλάπτε τοὺς Αθηναίους, a choice of words which emphasizes the similarity with the occupation of Pylos.
from Pylos. In effect, the Spartans are announcing that there will be raids in reprisal for the Athenian attacks.\(^\text{34}\)

Although many of the occasions on which Thucydides uses leistès, or words which derive from it, have a maritime context he can also describe banditry or plundering on land with the same words. There are clear cases where he implies that such plundering is a shameful activity, and not to be approved of, but it also seems to be a common way in which the wars of the last quarter of the fifth century B.C. were conducted.

Polybius uses leistésa in Book Four, as has already been noted, to describe the piratical habits of the Cretans (Polyb. 4.8.11):

\[\text{Κρητές δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ Θάλατταν πρὸς μὲν ἐνέδρας καὶ ληστείας καὶ κλοπᾶς πολεμίων... ἀνυπόστατος...}\

(The Cretans (are) unbeatable by both land and sea at ambushes, raiding, and deceiving the enemy...).

He uses it in a similarly general fashion when speaking of the relationship between the Aitolians and the Eleans (Polyb. 4.9.10):

\[\text{αἰὲ γὰρ ποτὲ τῆς τῶν Ἡλείων ἀντείχοντο φρεῖας Αἰτωλοὶ χάριν τοῦ δὲ τοῦτων ἐπιπλοκὰς λαμβάνειν ἀπὸ πᾶς ἀρσαγας τὰς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ ληστείας.}\

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\(^{34}\) See below Part Three for more on reprisals. Note also Thuc. 6.1.5.2 where Athenian leistésa from the base in Pylos is listed as a breach of the treaty. In 7.18.3 Thucydides uses the less common verb leisteüo to refer to this activity. In 7.26.2 the plunderers are referred to as leistai, along with the Helots established in 413 B.C. in the part of Lakonia opposite Kythera.
(For the Aitolians have long cultivated the friendship of the Eleans, as they provided them with a way into the Peloponnese for their ravaging and plundering).

Similarly, in Book Thirteen Polybius uses leisteia when accusing Nabis of cooperating with the Cretans in acts of piracy, but here he qualifies the noun to make it clear that piracy is intended (Polyb. 13.8.1):

\[ \varepsilon \kappa \omicron \omicron \upsilon \nu \nu \epsilon \lambda \upsilon \nu \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \nu \gamma \dot{\alpha} \rho \tau \omega \zeta \kappa \rho \eta \varsigma \tau \nu \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \omicron \omicron \chi \tau \alpha \nu \lambda \omicron \sigma \tau \alpha \nu \lambda \eta \sigma \tau \epsilon \lambda \omega \nu . \]

(For he took part in piracy with the Cretans)

leisteia can be on land or on sea, or both, for Polybius and Thucydides. The terms piracy or banditry are both reasonable translations, for specific contexts, but the more neutral term plundering has the advantage that it can refer to maritime or terrestrial operations in one word. It does, however, lack the sense of disapproval which I consider to be inherent in leisteia, potentially, at least, and which is clearly to be read into what Polybius has to say, as well as some of the references in Thucydides.\(^{35}\)

The verb leidzomai has already been translated as "to plunder" in the passage from Book Four of Polybius describing the activities of Dorimakhos and his bandits. One of Polybius' earliest uses of leidzomai in a maritime context occurs in the translated version of the second treaty between Rome and Carthage, which he quotes in Book Three. Among the conditions is a ban upon plundering past a certain point (Polyb. 3.24.4):

\[ \tau \omicron \omega \ \kappa \alpha \lambda \omicron \upsilon \ \alpha \kappa \rho \omega \tau \eta \rho \omicron \iota \omicron \sigma , \ \zeta \alpha \varsigma \varsigma , \ \tau \alpha \rho \sigma \eta \omicron \omicron , \ \mu \eta \ \lambda \acute{\iota} \acute{o} \epsilon \sigma \sigma \omicron \upsilon \ \epsilon \pi \acute{e} \kappa \epsilon \xi \upsilon \alpha \ \rho \omicron \nu \mu \alpha \iota \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \ldots \]

\(^{35}\) A recent article has advocated the use of "guerrilla warfare" as a translation of leisteia and leidzomai; Macdonald (1984). I note that Warner seems to have already tried it in his Penguin translation of Thucydides; Warner (1954), e.g. p. 290. The idea has some merit, but it is best to treat each instance separately, and try to discover the author's intentions.
(The Romans are not to go plundering beyond the Fair Promontory, Mastia and Tarseion...).³⁶

It is not clear what Latin word is being translated here, but there seems to be little reason to assume that the plundering envisaged is also disapproved of by the authors of the treaty. The Romans are perfectly entitled to plunder, provided they respect Carthaginian territorial claims. This would appear to be a case where there is little or no pejorative sense to be read into leIdzomai.

In Book Five Polybius has a lot to say about the depredations of the Illyrian king, Skerdilaidas. He had been "employed" as an ally by the Macedonian king Philip V, who had cheated him of his rewards. So Skerdilaidas decided to do some unauthorized plundering (Polyb. 5.95.4):

\[ \text{μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος, καὶ πλεύσαντες ὅσα ἐπὶ Μαλέας, ἔληψοντο καὶ κατῆγον τοὺς ἐμπόρους.} \]  

(And after this, they made their way out of Leukas, and sailing on to Malea, they began to plunder and to seize the merchant ships).

This would appear to be piracy, and worthy of condemnation, but there is at least the possibility that Skerdilaidas had some justification for what he was doing, since he had been "robbed" himself by the Macedonian king, and was trying to make up for his lost revenue.³⁷ Nevertheless, I am certain that Polybius is voicing his disapproval of Skerdilaidas here. It should also be noted that there are several other forms of plundering and raiding in the course of Book Five, which partly illustrate the range of

³⁶ See Walbank (1957-79), ad loc. on the significance of the terms of this treaty. Polybius uses the same term when he is summarizing the treaty just before this passage.

³⁷ See below Part Three on "reprisals".
terms employed by Polybius. In the next paragraph the Aitolian Euripidas is ravaging Tritaia, expressed by the verb *katasüro*. At 5.96.1 the Aitolian army pillages Epiros, for which the word *porthéo* is used. A little further on Polybius again refers to Skerdilaidas' plundering of ships with the word *leídzesthai* (Polyb. 5.101.1). When he is attempting to recover his money from attacks on Pelagonia, however, the word used for his plundering is *diarpádzo*.\(^3\)

*leisteía* and *leídzomai* are often, but not always, used to refer to acts of piracy or banditry by Thucydides and Polybius. The language of these two authors can, I believe, be taken as reasonably representative of the vocabulary and ideology of their own times. They use these words usually to refer to plundering which meets with their disapproval, for one reason or another, but the variety of contexts in which they are to be found, even in the few examples quoted above, are a strong warning against simply placing all such references under the heading of "piracy", and assuming that they have a correspondingly negative image in the eyes of contemporaries. Hence the importance of approaching piracy through a detailed analysis of the sources, and what they are trying to say, rather than simply a collection of references.

It might seem legitimate at this stage to wonder what marks piracy out as different from any other form of violence among the Greeks. Linguistically this is done by referring to war and warriors with a distinct words. A good example from the fifth century B.C. is the inscription recording a treaty between Athens and Halieis.\(^3\)

\[\ldots\text{παρέξεν ἡλεύς Ἀθεναῖος ναύστα Θέμον καὶ προσδέμος φρελένθυ Ἀθεναῖος καὶ Λασοτάς μὲ}\]

\(^3\) See also 8.32.1 for the noun *diarpágé*. Compare Thuc. 7.18.3 where he uses *leísténio* and *deío* for plundering and ravaging carried out by ships. On plundering and ravaging in Greek warfare see Jackson (1969a). Note also the specific study of *deío* in connection with the Delian League in Jackson (1969b).

\(^3\) I.G. I (3rd edn.) 75, lines 6-10 (424/3 B.C.). See Meritt (1935).
The people of Halieis are to make available to the Athenians their harbour and to help them readily. They are not to admit pirates, nor to practise piracy, nor are they to join in a campaign with the enemy against the Athenians...

The inscription clearly differentiates between pirates and enemies. This does not mean, of course that enemies do not plunder, but the Athenians' opponents in warfare (who, in the context of this treaty would be the Spartans and their allies) are described by a different word (poiemioi) to the one used for pirates (leistai), who might also plunder the Athenians, as, indeed, might the people of Halieis.

If bandits and land-based plunderers in Greek warfare can be depicted in the same language as pirates, however, what is there about the pirates that is different? The answer, which has already been provided, but is worth emphasizing, is that piracy involves the use of ships, which require a greater initial commitment of resources and offer a greater range and freedom of opportunity to the would-be plunderers than can be obtained from wholly land-based activities. Ships also need harbours or anchorages, so that the pirates' bases become an important factor in their success.

Latin language

The Latin vocabulary for piracy is similar in some ways to Greek. There are two main words for pirate: praedo, derived from praedia (booty/plunder), which is the one most commonly found in Latin literature, and pirata, which clearly derives from the Greek word peiratés. Praedo is similar to leistés and peiratés in that it can mean "bandit" or "pirate". In addition, the Latin word latro is sometimes used to mean "pirate". In its
earliest usage, in Plautus, it seems to have meant "mercenary", but it quickly became a synonym for praedo.⁴⁰

Pirates could be differentiated from bandits with the use of an adjective or qualifying phrase, as in this extract from Nepos' Life of Themistokles 2.3:

qua celeriter effecta primum Corcyraeos fregit, deinde maritimos praedones conquestando mare tutum reddidit.

(This being quickly achieved, he first humbled the Corcyraeans, then, by pursuing the pirates, he made the sea safe). Piracy, or banditry, is usually signified in Latin by the word latrocinium.⁴¹ There are no major controversies or academic debates over the meaning of these Latin words.

⁴⁰ On latro meaning mercenary see O.L.D. s.v. latro (1). Both latro and pirata are used to mean pirate in Aug. de civ. dei. 4.4, quoted (in translation) below Part Three, p. 105.

⁴¹ E.g. Livy 37.13.11-12; Cic. II Verr. 1.89. See below for further examples and discussion of the vocabulary of piracy in Cicero's works.
PART TWO: THE IMAGE OF ANCIENT PIRACY

HOMERIC WARFARE AND PIRACY

The Homeric poems are the most important works of ancient Greek literature. The ideals and values expressed in the Iliad and the Odyssey were admired by the Greeks for many centuries after the composition of the poems. The poems provided models for behaviour and topics for debate and discussion from the Archaic period to the end of Antiquity and beyond. They are also the first written sources which actually contain words for pirate. It would be possible to write an entire thesis on the subject of Homeric piracy alone, but that is not my purpose here. I intend to present a brief study of piracy in the Homeric poems to illustrate certain fundamental points.

Firstly, pirates and piracy are, from their earliest appearance in ancient literature, regarded with disapproval. Secondly, this disapproval is by no means universal, and it does not preclude admiration for the pirate. Thirdly, piracy is so closely related to warfare in both aims and methods that they are virtually indistinguishable.

The passage which best illustrates the disapproval of pirates in Homer is a formulaic greeting used twice in the Odyssey, and also once in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo. The first time the greeting is encountered is at Pylos, the second in the cave of the Cyclops.

See above, p. 17.

It is customary when dealing with the Homeric poems to opt for a date of composition. I incline to the view that the Iliad and the Odyssey date from the second half of the eighth century B.C., in more or less the form which they are now. Even if they are not by the same poet, I am certain that both the main epics share a similar set of values. For further comments on their historical value see below Part Three, pp. 109-110.

Hymn. Apoll. 452-5. These Hymns, composed at intervals after the two main epics, are of no real importance for this section.
O strangers, who are you? From where have you come along the sea lanes? Are you travelling for trade, or are you just roaming about like pirates, who risk body and soul, bringing evil to other people? (Od. 3.71-4 = 9.252-5)

The first time the greeting is used, after Nestor has welcomed Telemakhos and his companions to a feast, dispels any sense of realism in its use. If they were pirates the king and his followers would all know the answer by now, and probably have died as a result.

The essence of the question seems to be not "are you friend or foe?", but rather, "are you good or bad?" There can be no doubt that this elaborate formula implies disapproval for the activities of pirates, they are "bringers of evil".

Some specific persons are called pirates in the Odyssey. Odysseus himself, when he is pretending to be the son of the Cretan Kastor, describes his companions on plundering raids as pirates (Od. 17.425). The swineherd Eumaios says that his nurse was captured in Phoenicia by "Taphian pirates" (Od. 15.427). It should be noted, however, that no individual Akhaian hero is directly called a pirate, and especially not Odysseus.

What do pirates do in the Homeric poems? The best illustration of this is provided by Odysseus' Cretan guise.

Farming I never cared for, nor life at home, nor fathering fair children. I revelled in long ships with oars; I loved polished lances, arrows in the skirmish, the shapes of doom that others shake to see. Carnage suited me; heaven put those things in me somehow. Each to his own pleasure! Before we young Akhaians shipped for Troy I led men on nine cruises in ships to raid strange coasts, and had great luck, taking rich spoils on the spot, and even more in the division. So my house grew prosperous, my standing therefore high among the Cretans. (Od. 14.222-34)
But Zeus the son of Kronos brought me down. No telling why he would have it, but he made me go to Egypt with a company of pirates - a long sail to the South - for my undoing. Up the broad Nile and in to the river bank I brought my dipping squadron. There, indeed, I told the men to stand guard at the ships; I sent patrols out - out to rising ground; but reckless greed carried my crews away to plunder the Egyptian farms; they bore off wives and children, killed what men they found. (Od. 17.424-33)\(^7\)

In short, pirates set off in their long ships to distant shores to plunder and kill. The Homeric poems, especially the \textit{Odyssey}, contain a large amount of robbery with violence. It is significant that Odysseus makes his Cretan claim that he earned high status among his countrymen because of the booty he obtained from his raids. This same idea can be seen in the way that Zeus ensures Odysseus himself will have a suitable amount of "booty" with him when he finally returns to Ithaka, although in this case it is not the result of warfare, but of the generosity of the Phalakians.

They will send him in a ship back to his own country with gifts of bronze, gold and many garments, even more than he would bear if he had returned unharmed from Troy, laden with his share of the booty. (Od. 5.37-40)

Booty can consist of metals and objects of value, as in this quotation, but it can also consist of cattle or slaves.\(^8\) It is an essential aspect of Homeric warfare that the heroes should amass plenty of booty. As well as the wealth which this brings, there is also a direct equation with booty and status, hence the deeply damaging quarrel between Akhilleus and Agamemnon is over a woman who is part of the spoil. Without his booty an Homeric hero is incomplete. Homer does not, however, neglect the other side of the

\(^7\) Both passages are quoted from the translation by Fitzgerald (1961), with minor alterations.

\(^8\) See Il. 18.28; Od. 1.397-8 for slaves. Od. 23.356-8 for cattle.
story, the victims of plundering are taken notice of by the poet as well. It should not be forgotten that Odysseus, in his attack on the Kikones (Od. 9.39-52), or the raids of his fictional Cretan, brings misery to the victims. It is noticeable that most of these raids seem to go wrong because of the greed of the "pirates", which gets them into trouble. It seems to me that this represents a feeling of moral indignation against such actions - they deserve to suffer for what they have done.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the acquisition of booty through violence brings prestige and status to most of those who engage in it. It is contrasted implicitly with trading, an activity which also involves the accumulation of wealth through maritime expeditions, but which is unsuitable as an occupation for a hero. The story of the kidnapping of Eumaios, who became Odysseus' swineherd after he was taken from the island of Syrie (Od. 15.403-84), shows the Phoenician traders who abducted him in the worst possible light, as liars and cheats, rather than warriors. If it comes to a choice between trader or pirate, as in the greeting quoted above, the more honourable and prestigious title is the latter. But the ambiguous and potentially disapproving label "pirate" is never applied to Odysseus. That which is honourable and will confer prestige and status in Homer can be defined as that which is done by the heroes.

It has been argued by some scholars that there is a clear distinction between war and piracy in the Homeric poems. Piracy or raiding for plunder is considered by Nowag to be less important than warfare, which confers a higher status on the (successful) combatants. He contrasts small raids with the sacking of major cities, such as Troy. But the Iliad, because it focuses on the siege of Troy in such a spectacular fashion, is bound to make all other raids appear "petty" in comparison, although, as

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49 See Od. 8.159-64 for Odysseus being insulted with the label "trader" (prektép); Od. 14 & 15 for the low status of Phoenician traders.

Nowag acknowledges, they are conducted in a very similar fashion. Most of the warfare in the Odyssey is on a smaller scale, and it is this poem which seems to me to present a wider and more comprehensive picture of Homeric values.

More recently van Wees has argued that there is an important distinction between what he calls predatory warfare (carried out by "freebooters") and status warfare (carried out by heroes). I do not think that this distinction is very strong either. A crucial case for the demonstration of van Wees' argument is the Cretan guise of Odysseus, the son of Kastor. Van Wees argues that the reluctance of this Cretan to participate in the Trojan war (Od. 14.235-9) is due to his preference for predatory rather than status warfare. Yet the passage quoted above shows that his plundering raids, which in van Wees' scheme must be predatory warfare, have earned him high status. He goes to Troy because, if he does not, he will lose that status, which also seems to indicate that he is just as involved in status warfare as he is predatory warfare; the two cannot be easily separated.51

It may have been Helen's face that launched a thousand ships, but it was Homer's poems that launched a thousand academic debates. Alternative interpretations of piracy and warfare in Homer can be argued just as persuasively as my own. I am confident however, that the main points are valid. Pirates and piracy can be, and are, looked upon with disapproval in the Homeric poems. Piracy is an evil business, especially from the victims' point of view. Yet it can, for the heroic practitioner, bring high status and prestige, largely because of the booty that is obtained. Warfare and piracy are virtually indistinguishable in Homer. The ingredients of violence and booty are equally important in both, and the methods of war and piracy are essentially the same.52


52 Note that no Homeric pirate (or hero) attacks ships at sea.
Although Homer is a valuable source for understanding the image of ancient piracy, and the attitudes which Greeks of the Archaic period (and later) had towards it, there are considerable difficulties in the way of an interpretation of his works. The Demosthenic corpus, on the other hand, is easier for the historian to deal with, because the speeches come from a relatively well documented historical period. In addition, the speeches, having, for the most part, been written for immediate public reception, are likely to reflect closely current ideas and attitudes. They are, therefore, an exceedingly important source for our understanding of the nature of piracy in the Classical period.\(^53\)

The purpose of this section is to present, briefly, the image of piracy as revealed by the Demosthenic corpus.\(^54\)

The authors of the speeches make numerous references to leistai and occasionally to katapontistaI, sometimes in contexts which make it clear that these words mean pirates, but at other times in contexts where the translation is unclear.\(^55\) A further complication is the difference between public and private speeches, since the latter tend to mention pirates and piracy only in passing, usually for specific events, whereas the former are more likely to address the general problem of leistai.

An example of piracy in a private oration comes in the speech Against Kallipos.

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\(^53\) This does not mean, of course, that the speeches present no difficulties, nor does it imply that they can be used to understand piracy in isolation from other sources.

\(^54\) I have concentrated on the Demosthenic speeches for the sake of convenience, and also because they are a well known collection of contemporary works. The other Classical Attic orators are not to be ignored, however, and I shall also make reference to them in the course of this section.

\(^55\) See above on Language, p.38.
In about 369 B.C. Lykon of Herakleia, having deposited some money in the bank of Pasion in Athens for payment to his partner Kephisiades, set out on a voyage to Libya. But misfortune befell this Lykon, so that as soon as he had set out on the voyage across the Gulf of Argos he was attacked by pirate ships, his goods were taken to Argos, and he was shot with an arrow and later died. (Demos. 52.5)

The property which Lykon had with him when he reached Argos was handed over to the Herakleote proxenos, but a dispute arose over the money paid by Pasion to Kephisiades, out of which a court case developed, for which the speech was written.64

It is in public speeches, however, particularly those which refer to matters of "foreign policy", that most is said about the nature of piracy and attitudes to it.

In his speech On the Crown, for example, Demosthenes claims that his strong policies towards Philip II of Macedon have prevented terrible disasters for the Athenians. For example, if his opponents had had their way:

The sea would have become unnavigable due to the pirates based in Euboia.

(Demos. 18.241)

That Philip II of Macedon could be held responsible for pirates is also shown by what happened to Phrynon of Rhamnous in 348 B.C. (Demos. 19.189 & 229). His story is related in a speech of Aiskhines, Demosthenes' great political rival.

A short time after this, Phrynon of Rhamnous was captured by pirates during the truce for the Olympic games, as he himself testified. And when he had been ransomed and returned here, he persuaded you to select an ambassador to go to Philip on his behalf, in order that, if it were possible, he might recover the cost of the ransom. (Aiskh. 2.12)

Phrynon claimed that the pirates were Macedonian, and that they had violated the sacred truce which marked the period of the Olympic games. Philip appears to have

64 Compare also the casual reference to capture by pirates in Demos. 53.6.
accepted responsibility in this case. Another orator whose work is found in the Demosthenic corpus, Hugesippos, provides a useful "definition" of what pirates are when talking about the island of Halonnesos, captured by Philip from the pirate Sostratos.

All pirates, having forcibly seized other peoples' territories and made them into strongholds, then proceed to do harm to others. ([Demos.] 7.3)

This passage clearly expresses the negative image of piracy, and helps to explain why it was something which provoked a great deal of complaint in this period, becoming an important topic for invective in political oratory. Accusations of being a pirate or behaving like a pirate, or of promoting piracy were commonplace in the fourth century.

Demosthenes made the use of piracy by Philip II a major point of criticism in his speeches against the Macedonian king and his supporters. As early as his First Philippic, written in 352 B.C., he advocates using naval forces to blockade the Macedonian ports.

They will easily place themselves off the coasts of his territory and at the entrances to the seaports. (Demos. 4.32)

The purpose of this is to cut off Philip's revenues, because:

He makes war on you by supplying himself from your own allies, attacking and carrying off their seaborne traffic. (Demos. 4.34)

The Macedonian monarch is here accused of acting like a pirate, preying on commercial shipping to provide himself with resources, but it is also true that Demosthenes is advocating a strategy which calls for much the same tactics on the Athenian side.

But of necessity we must begin by conducting the war in the fashion of plunderers. (Demos. 4.23)

Unfortunately for Demosthenes, the difference between war and piracy was often only

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57 In the Fourth Philippic Demosthenes actually calls Philip "the pirate of the Greeks" (hupêr...tou leistoû tôn hellénon; Demos. 10.34). As an invective term leistés was even applied by Aiskhines to Demosthenes (Aiskh. 3.253).

58 Demosthenes uses the verb leistergein, a cognate of leistés.
a matter of opinion, and the Athenian generals could themselves come in for criticism over their indiscriminate plundering in order to supply themselves.

Thus in 342 B.C. he was called upon to defend the actions of Diopeithes, an Athenian strategos who had been in command of some mercenaries escorting kleroukhoi to Thrace. In the course of defending the Athenian settlers against the Kardians, he carried the conflict well into Thrace and ravaged some of Philip's territory. Philip wrote a letter to the Athenians in which he complained about Diopeithes' actions ([Demos.] 12.3-4). Demosthenes, in his speech On the Chersonese, imitates the criticism which is being levelled at Diopeithes back in Athens.

It's terrible what the mercenaries are doing, laying waste the Hellespontine area, and Diopeithes should know better than to hijack ships; shouldn't be allowed!

(Demos. 8.9)

It seems that he has also been stopping ships in the Hellespont and exacting "contributions" from them. Demosthenes argues that he is only doing what is necessary in order to maintain an effective army. The Athenians have not granted him any resources for his pay, so he has to manage as best he can (Demos. 8.24-34). Nor is he doing anything unusual, claims Demosthenes.

All of your generals who have ever sailed from here (or, if not, may I suffer any penalty) take money from the Khians and Erythraians, from whomsoever, I say, they possibly can among the people living in Asia. Those who have only one or two ships exact less than those who have a more powerful fleet. The providers do not give their small or large contributions for nothing (they are not so crazy) but on the understanding that they will not be harmed when they leave harbour, nor

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plundered, or that their ships will be escorted, that is the sort of thing expected. They speak of «favours» being granted, and that is what they call their gifts.

(Demos. 8.24-5)

In other words, the Athenians are regularly exacting "protection money" in order to finance their naval expeditions. The Hellespont was, of course, a particularly vulnerable area, especially in the Fourth century B.C. Philip accused the Athenians and others of allowing pirates to operate from bases in the area in his letter.

Then, when the Thasians allowed Byzantine triremes and any pirates who wanted (to use their harbour) you looked the other way, when the treaty specifically says that such actions are regarded as hostile. ([Demos.] 12.2)

In addition, Philip points a finger at Kallias of Euboia who captured numerous cities allied to Philip, in spite of the peace treaty between Athens and Philip which included these cities. Nor was this all he did.

He captured and sold as slaves all those sailing to Macedonia, treating them as enemies. And you decreed him a vote of thanks! So I find it hard to imagine how things could be worse, if you were actually to declare war on me. For when we clearly had our differences you also used to send out pirates and make slaves of those sailing to us, you helped my enemies and did harm to my territory. ([Demos.] 12.5)

It is, therefore, clear from the works of the Demosthenic corpus that pirates and piracy could be used to describe a variety of persons engaged in a wide range of

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60 mè sulâsthai.

61 eunôias.

62 See below Part Three for more on generals exacting money to pay for fleets. See below Part Four on the Hellespont and Black Sea trade.

63 Presumably they were sailing to Macedonia to trade.
plundering activities. Demosthenes and the Athenians were just as happy to excuse (or even reward) Athenian generals and allies for "piracy", in the interests of Athens, as they were to accuse Philip or others of piracy when it was against those same interests.\textsuperscript{64}
Polybius is rightly regarded as one of the finest historians of the ancient world. His Histories were published around the middle of the second century B.C. and provide the most important source for the history of the Hellenistic period and the rise of Rome to a position of dominance in the Mediterranean. Polybius has a lot to say about pirates and piracy in the course of his work, much of it highly informative and important for the study of ancient piracy. In order to appreciate the value of Polybius, however, it is necessary to consider carefully his attitude to piracy and the way in which he uses piracy to present his moral and historical arguments. I shall pay particular attention to his presentation of the Aitolians and their associates.

Polybius and the Aitolians

One of the most revealing books of Polybius, as far as his attitude to the Aitolians is concerned, is the fragmentary Book 13.\(^{65}\) In the course of describing the events which led to Roman intervention in the affairs of the Greeks at the end of the third century B.C., he deals with the activities of the leaders of the Aitolian League around 205 B.C. He criticizes the new legislation of Skopas and Dorimakhos, both of whom figure prominently in events connected with piracy and banditry, by saying they were motivated by (typical Aitolian) greed and corruption to change their older (i.e. better) laws (Polyb. 13.1-2). He then contrasts the treacherous behaviour of Philip V of Macedon, Dikaiarkhos' "employer",\(^{66}\) with earlier rulers and with the Romans, who do not stoop

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\(^{65}\) See Walbank (1957-79) ad loc. for suggestions as to missing contents and the relationship of fragments.

\(^{66}\) Polyb. 18.54.7-8. See below Part Three on Dikaiarkhos.
to tricks or deception in warfare or public affairs (Polyb. 13.3). Then he describes a
degenerate renegade called Herakleides, whom Philip uses to stir up the Cretans against
the Rhodians (Polyb. 13.4-5). Next he describes the evil nature and deeds of Nabis, the
Spartan tyrant and an ally of the Aitolians (Polyb. 13.6-8). The last few surviving
paragraphs go on to the affairs of Asia.

In this book there is no mention of piracy, or pirates, but what makes it significant
is the invective and criticism which Polybius heaps upon the Aitolians and their
associates. There can be no doubt that he hated and despised the Aitolians, blaming
them, in part, for the troubles of the Greeks from the Social War of 220 B.C. onwards. It
is important to bear in mind this attitude of Polybius constantly when using him as a
source for the study of piracy. He is likely to paint many people and events far worse
than they might actually have been.

Nabis the Spartan "tyrant"

The ruler of Sparta from c. 207 -192 B.C., Nabis, son of Demaratos, is a good
example of a victim of Polybius' character assassination. He may, or may not, have been
a legitimate king. The sources are unclear on this point, as they are on many others
concerning his fifteen-year period of domination. Polybius calls him a tyrant, and it is
clear that he has no sympathy for Nabis or his rule. He introduces him in the following
way.

Nabis, the tyrant of the Lakedaimonians, having already been ruling for two
years, had so far tried nothing of any consequence, the defeat of Makhanidas by

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67 The level of abuse is maintained throughout by Polybius. See, for example his
description of the deaths of Skopas and Dikaiaarkhos (Polyb. 18.54).

the Aitolians being a recent occurrence, but he was busily laying the foundations
of a long-lived and oppressive tyranny. (Polyb. 13.6.1-2)

This part of the Histories continues with a catalogue of Nabis' crimes and outrages. He
murdered or drove into exile leading Spartans, encouraged mercenaries, thieves and
assassins and generally behaved in the manner appropriate to an oppressive tyrant.

Polybius next provides a particularly salacious description of an "iron maiden" device
which Nabis used to torture rich citizens in order to obtain their money.\(^9\) Having
finished with this he continues by saying:

The rest of what he did during his rule was much the same as this. For he took
part in piracy with the Cretans;\(^\text{70}\) he filled the Peloponnese with temple-looters,
robbers, murderers... (Polyb. 13.8.1-2)

The catalogue of wickedness continues in the same vein, with more spicy details.

Polybius' bias in the case of Nabis is obvious and undisputed, but historians have, on the
whole been prepared to believe the accusations of piracy. Livy, after all, makes
Flamininus accuse him of the same.

You arranged not only an alliance with Philip our enemy, but, if the gods may
allow, you even fixed a close union through Philokles, his prefect, and waging
war against us, you made the sea around Malea unsafe with pirate ships, and you
captured and killed almost more Roman citizens than Philip, and the coast of
Macedonia was safer than the promontory of Malea for the ships carrying
provisions to our armies. Refrain, therefore, if you please, from boasting about

\(^9\) On the nature of this description, slightly garbled by the epitomator, see Walbank
(1957-79), ad loc.

\(^\text{70}\) ekoinônei men gar tois Kresi ton katà thálattan leisteiôn. Note that at 4.8.11
Polybius comments on the preference of the Cretans for leisteia (by land and sea)
but not for open battle.

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trust and the rights of alliance, and, putting popular oratory aside, speak as befits a tyrant and an enemy. (Livy 34.32.17-20)

Livy has already made Flamininus repeat some of the accusations brought against Nabis in Polybius' description, and there is no doubting that Polybius is the ultimate source of this speech. Livy has taken the opportunity provided by the appearance of Nabis in his narrative to work in a fine display of historical rhetoric, but the accusation of practising piracy has even less weight here than it does in Polybius. The function of the charge of piracy is to discredit Nabis, to make him very clearly a "bad guy”.

Brulé argues that during the First Cretan War Nabis sided with the Rhodians and their allies, against Philip V and the Cretan cities grouped around Gortyn. This might appear to place him on the side of the anti-piratical forces in the Aegean, although consideration of the nature of Rhodes' Cretan allies suggests that there was no such clear divisions. Later on in the second century Nabis is clearly siding with the Aitolians, and Polybius' attitude to him is likely to be coloured by this, as well as his pro-Achaian bias. Nabis also had connections with Delos, where he was acknowledged as a benefactor of the sanctuary, which was also a major trading centre. There is a danger of reading too much into this kind of thing. While a large number of the dedications and inscriptions of Delos in the third and second centuries relate to the Rhodians and speak of order and peace, there are also plenty that are dedicated by or to Aitolians. The point is that

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71 See Briscoe (1973-81), ad loc.
73 See below Part Five on Rhodes and the suppression of piracy.
74 S.I.C. 584 = Durrbach (1921), no. 58. See Rostovtzeff (1941) on Delos as a trading centre.
75 See below Part Five for some examples.
76 See Durrbach (1921), pp. 273-6 for a list of dedications arranged geographically.
Polybius' picture of Nabis as wholly bad is not necessarily borne out by other sources. He was a leading figure in the violent and often unprincipled world of Hellenistic politics, so he cannot be viewed as any kind of saint, but then neither can most of his contemporaries.

**Aitolian piracy and plundering**

There is no doubt that the Aitolians deserved, at least in part, the poor reputation they have as a result of their activities in the third century B.C. Thucydides says that plundering and piracy were still held in high esteem among them in the fifth century B.C. (Thuc. 1.5.3). Little seems to have changed in the intervening years. The early chapters of Polybius' Book Four are a catalogue of Aitolian piracy and banditry, featuring shocking incidents like Dorimakhos' plundering of the sanctuary of Dodona (Polyb. 4.6.7). All the Aitolians are portrayed as sharing a predilection for plundering, so that, for example, Dorimakhos is able to persuade Skopas in 221 B.C. to back his idea of a war against the Messenians, by appealing to his baser instincts.

But, this being the most effective argument to use with the Aitolian, he held up before his eyes the prospect of the huge amount of booty to be gained from the territory of the Messenians, as they would have no warning, and in addition their country was the only one in the Peloponnese which remained unscathed after the Kleomenic war. (Polyb. 4.5.5)

The result is that the Aitolian leaders declare war against the Messenians, Epirotes, Akhaians, Akarnanians and Macedonians without even consulting their own people.

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77 The revisionist view of Cartledge & Spawforth (1989), chpt. 5 is most important for all of the above. See pp. 69-72, where Cartledge argues strongly that Nabis promoted trade and the development of harbour facilities on the coastline of Lakonia.

78 See also Polyb. 9.34 for a catalogue of Aitolian crimes.
Polybius presents the Aitolians as the aggressors and love of plunder as their only motive, a picture which needs a considerable amount of modification to arrive at a balanced explanation. The Aitolians were under considerable political pressure from the Akhaians, and their intervention in Messenia cannot be explained purely in the terms Polybius uses.\(^79\)

In a later section Polybius uses the set piece of a meeting between Flamininus and various Greek leaders in 197 B.C. to present a critique of Aitolian attitudes to piracy and plundering. Philip V complains to an Aitolian representative:-

"As for the people of Kios, it was not I who made war on them, but when Prusias did so I helped him to exterminate them, and all through your fault. For on many occasions when I and the other Greeks sent embassies begging you to remove from your statutes the law empowering you to get booty from booty,\(^80\) you replied that you would rather remove Aitolia from Aitolia than that law." When Flamininus said he wondered what that was, the king tried to explain to him, saying that the Aitolians have a custom not only to make booty of the persons and territory of those with whom they are themselves at war, but if any other peoples are at war with each other who are friends and allies of theirs, it is permissible nevertheless to the Aitolians without any public decree to help both belligerents and pillage the territory of both; so that with the Aitolians there is no precise definition of friendship and enmity, but they promptly treat as enemies and make war on all between whom there is a dispute about anything. (Polyb. 18.4.7-5.3)\(^81\)

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\(^79\) See Walbank (1957-79) ad loc., Will (1979-82), pp. 71-2, and Fine (1940) for the background to this war and the wider context of relations among the Greek states after the death of Antigonos Doson.

\(^80\) ágein láphuron apó láphúrou.

\(^81\) I quote from the translation of Paton (1922).
Polybius is here trying to portray the Aitolians as unrestrained and driven only by a lust for plunder. The Greeks had many customary laws which allowed plundering, especially in the form of "reprisals," but the Aitolians went much further than anyone, allowing and encouraging indiscriminate plundering. In effect he is saying that piracy and banditry are second nature to them. The Aitolians represent the unrestrained side of Greek plundering. They do not restrict themselves to "proper" warfare, but act without justification and against those who are not their enemies. It is, as already mentioned, Aitolian excesses, catalogued in Book Four, which in Polybius' view are responsible for the Social War (220-17 B.C.).

For Polybius, then, piracy and banditry, what might be described as "reprehensible plundering", rather than the acceptable plundering of justifiable warfare, are the result of greed and degeneracy, particularly in the Aitolians and all who associate with them. I do not mean to imply that Polybius has invented the Aitolians' shortcomings and vices, nor that he is exaggerating them beyond all reason, but only to emphasize that he is selective and partial in his presentation of them. As will be discussed below, the difference between war and piracy was often only a matter of opinion, and there was plenty of war in Polybius' time.

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82 See below Part Three on reprisals.

83 The closest comparison seems to be with the Illyrians. See below Part Four on their permissive customs regarding piracy. Here again Polybius might be accused of distorting the facts, see Dell (1967). Note also the comment on the Cretan love of wealth at 6.46.3.

84 See, for example Dorimakhos and Skopas activities in Polyb. 4.3-6. Note that the first thing which Polybius mentions after the declaration of war is an act of piracy involving a Macedonian royal ship, embroiling young Philip V in the trouble they have stirred up (Polyb. 4.6.1).

85 Not all piracy in Polybius is attributed to the Aitolians, of course; see below Parts Three and Five on the Cretans. Sometimes we have no idea who lies behind a particular action, e.g. Polyb. 23.6 - the capture and murder of some Spartans by pirates in 183 B.C.
PART TWO: THE IMAGE OF ANCIENT PIRACY

CICERO ON PIRACY

This section will examine the images of piracy which are to be found in the works of Cicero. The aim is to establish some simple models for the analysis of the numerous references to piracy which Cicero makes, and which form a major source of information about piracy in the Late Republican period.86

Language

As a preliminary to the detailed examination of selected passages, it is necessary to show that pirates and piracy can easily be distinguished from references to robbers or bandits in the works of Cicero. Cicero mentions pirates in a variety of contexts, using two words - praedo and pirata - which can be translated as pirate. He also uses latrocinari to mean the practice of piracy, but he only uses latro when referring to bandits or robbers in general, never in a specifically maritime context.

An example of praedo used to mean pirate is found in the second book of the Tusculan Disputations:

Ut enim si cui naviganti, quem praedones si insequantur, deus qui dixerit: "Elice te e mari: praesto est qui excipiatur, vel delphinus..." (Tusc. 2.67)

(As if, for example, a god were to say to a sailor who is being pursued by pirates: "Throw yourself overboard into the sea: there is something there to rescue you, either a dolphin..."

Another example is in the second speech of the Actio Secunda against Verres:

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86 The use of Cicero as a source for the history of piracy in the Late Republican period (and other periods) has often been based on uncritical approaches to the type of evidence which he provides. For example Maróti (1956).
non ego a Vibone Veliam parvulo navigio inter fugitivorum ac praedonum ac tua tela venissem,... (II Verr. 2.99)

(I would not have come from Vibo to Velia in a small boat through your attacks and those of runaways and pirates,...)

Pirata is used less often than praedo by Cicero, but cannot be said to be a rare word in his vocabulary. He seems to prefer it as an alternative to praedo which avoids repetition, as, for example, in a celebrated passage from the work On Duties, beloved of modern writers on piracy: 87

Ut si praedonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus sit, ne si iuratus quidem id non feceris; nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus... (Off. 3.107)

(If, for example, you do not hand over to pirates the amount agreed upon as the price of your life, that is not perjury, not even if you have sworn an oath and do not do so, for a pirate is not included in the category of lawful enemies...)

In the actio prima of the Verrine orations we can see pirata used alongside praedo, where the intention is apparently to distinguish between pirates and bandits:

...portus munitissimi, maximae tutissimaeque urbes, piratis praedonibusque patefactae; (I Verr. 1.13)

(...well fortified harbours and the securest of cities lay open to pirates and bandits;)

Cicero also uses the adjective piraticus in the Verrines to describe pirate ships which embarrassed Verres by their attacks, e.g.:

87 See Defoe (1724), introduction. Cicero does not always find it desirable to avoid repetition, e.g. II Verr. 1.90 where pirata is repeated. In II Verr. 5. 42-80 where Cicero has to repeat both praedo and pirata several times, because he is talking about an episode involving pirates, it is noticeable that he switches between the two a lot.
O spectaculum miserum atque acerbum! ludibrio esse urbis gloriam, populi Romani nomen, hominum conventum atque multitudinem piratico myoparoni!

(Il Verr. 5.100)

(What a sad and sordid spectacle! The prestige of the city, the name of the Roman people and the huge crowd of onlookers made a laughing stock by a pirate galley!)

An example of the use of latrocinari to signify piracy, rather than banditry or robbery in general, comes in Cicero’s discussion of the ideal location of the city of Rome: nam e barbans quidem ipsis null! erant antea maritimi praeter Etruscos et Poenos, alteri mercandi causa, latrocinandi alteri.” (Rep. 2.9)

(For, indeed, among the barbarians there were in former times none who were seafarers, except the Etruscans and the Phoenicians, the one on account of trade, the other for the sake of piracy.)

The use of pirata by Cicero seems to be restricted by two factors. Firstly, it is not a common Latin word, but rather a derivative from the Greek word peiratés. Consequently he does not use this word as often as praedo, which is, by his time, a common word for robber, bandit or pirate. Secondly, a word like pirata might not be intelligible to those who have not had the benefit of a Graeco-Roman education, like Cicero and his peers. Thus, in his speech to the populace of Rome On the Command of Gnaeus Pompeius, although he makes numerous references to pirates and to the campaign against pirates which Pompeius has recently concluded, he does not use pirata at all, sticking instead to the more familiar praedo, even where there is repetition involved, e.g.:

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86 The earliest use of praedo comes in the plays of Plautus. E.g.: capiunt praedones navem illam ubi vectus fui... (Pirates captured the ship I was a passenger on...) From Miles Gloriosus, produced in 204 B.C.
Quam provinciam tenuistis a praedonibus liberam per hosce annos? quod vectigal vobis tutum fuit? quem socium defendistis? cui praesidio classibus vestris fuistis? quam multas existimatis insulas esse desertas, quam multas aut metu relictas aut a praedonibus captas urbes esse sociorum? (Imp. Pomp. 32)

(What province did you keep free of pirates in those years? What revenue of yours was safe? Which allies did you defend? Whom did you protect with your fleets? How many islands do you think were deserted, and how many allied cities were abandoned in fear or captured by the pirates?)

In a speech addressed to a jury of senators, or a philosophical discussion for the cultured elite, Cicero can display his wide vocabulary and his rhetorical technique, but in a speech intended to secure votes from the plebs he keeps things simpler and more direct.

It can also be shown that the image of pirates and piracy which Cicero presents varies according to the audience he is addressing and the demands of the particular circumstances. These variations can be seen clearly in the Verrine Orations, the speech On the Command of Gnaeus Pompeius and in some of the works of his later years.

Verres and the pirates

The prosecution of Verres in 70 B.C. was Cicero’s entry onto the grand stage of Roman politics. His lengthy speeches touch on many of the most important issues of the last half-century of the Roman Republic. The immediate concern of this section is to show how Cicero employs references to pirates and piracy in order to present the object of his attack in the worst possible light. The historical significance of the episodes concerning pirates will be considered elsewhere.

Gaius Verres was born in about 115 B.C. His father was a senator and the younger Verres entered the senate in the mid-eighties. His career, according to Cicero, was as
dishonest and self-serving as any in the history of Republican politics. In 84 B.C., he was quaestor to the consul Cn. Papirius Carbo, a colleague of Cinna. Verres deserted Carbo, taking much of the financial resources with him, and joined the forces of Sulla. After the victory of Sulla, Verres went to Cilicia as legate to Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (pr. 81) and remained with him until 79 B.C., eventually becoming legatus pro quaestore. Cicero makes a great deal of the way in which the propraetor and his legate plundered the Greek East together, only for Verres to prosecute Dolabella in the quaestio repetundarum on his return! His next office was that of urban praetor in 74 B.C. His propraetorship in Sicily, in 73 B.C., was extended to 71 B.C. because his successor, Q. Arrius (pr. 73), was diverted to the war with Spartacus, providing Verres with a greater opportunity to plunder and abuse his province than he might normally have expected. On his return to Rome, he was prosecuted by Cicero on behalf of the enraged Sicilians. The overwhelming strength of Cicero’s prosecution compelled Verres to retire into exile in Massilia before the trial was over.

The structure of the Verrine orations reflects the peculiar nature of the trial. Cicero only delivered two of the published speeches in a form similar to that which we have now. These were the divinatio in Caecilium, in which he established his right to prosecute Verres, and the actio prima in which he presented his witnesses, and their damning evidence against Verres, for consideration by the jurors and examination by the defence. Cicero was short of time, due to the manoeuvres of his opponents, who were trying to get a more sympathetic president of the court, so he passed over the opportunity to display all his rhetorical abilities and concentrated on a swift result. He published his

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89 The details of Verres' career are well established. For a full set of references see M.R.R. II pp. 61, 64, 81, 85, 102, 112, 119 & 124.


91 For a reconstruction of the events see Stockton (1971) pp. 43-8.
attack on Verres' career and character in a full form later. The actio secunda is not, therefore, a written up version of the speeches he delivered in court, but a combination of the speech with which he might have opened the proceedings, under normal circumstances, before the witnesses had been heard, and the speech with which he would have taken up the attack on Verres after the witnesses had been heard.

The first book of the actio secunda deals with the career of Verres up to the end of his praetorship, establishing the rapacious and deceitful nature of the accused governor. The second book deals with his administration of justice in Sicily. The third is concerned with his handling of the corn supply, a major aspect of the governor's work in this province. In the fourth book Cicero details Verres' plundering of statues and other works of art from Sicily. Finally, in the fifth book Cicero describes how Verres conducted his military duties and the manner in which he mistreated Sicilians and Roman citizens, building up to a climax with his unlawful executions.

There are several ways in which Cicero exploits the theme of pirates and piracy in his condemnation of Verres. In very straightforward terms he calls the praetor a pirate (as well as a bandit and a thief). Verres' associates are referred to as pirates and bandits. Cicero also on several occasions compares what Verres has done to what pirates have done, or might do, in order to suggest that he is a worse evil than pirates. On a slightly different tack, Cicero makes a lot of the way Verres handles the problem of piracy in his capacity as a Roman magistrate, especially during his governorship of Sicily, with the clear implication that a praetor is expected to do much better than Verres did.

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92 The speech begins thus: "I come now to that subject which Verres himself calls an interest (studium)... but which the Sicilians call piracy (latrocinium)."
The praetor as a pirate

One of the main points which Cicero makes about Verres in the course of the speeches, is that he has "plundered" the inhabitants of all the places he has been to in his political career. In the first speech of the actio secunda, Cicero says of his career:

Not one hour was free of theft, wickedness, cruelty and disgrace. (II Verr. 1.34)

Yet it is not enough to describe Verres as a thief:

For it is no ordinary thief, but a plunderer... whom we have brought before your court. (II Verr. 1.9)

Cicero's favourite way of describing Verres, when referring to his plundering, is with the word praedo, which, as I have said, can mean bandit or pirate. As will become clear, it is probably correct to translate it as pirate on most occasions, in order to convey Cicero's intention.93 The term is introduced very early on:

He has stolen from the treasury, harassed Asia and Pamphylia, presided over the city like a pirate (praedonem), and was like a plague of devastation in the province of Sicily. (I Verr. 1.2)

Verres is referred to as praedo in every book of the actio secunda94 except the final one, in which the activities of other pirates play a major part.95 He is also called pirata96 and there are several references to his latrocinium.97

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93 II Verr. 4.23 refers to Verres as both praedo and pirata, which is best read as "bandit and pirate".

94 II Verr. 1.46, 154; 2.141; 3.76; 4.23, 80.

95 He is called an "ally of pirates" (praedonem sociorum) at one point (II Verr. 5.122).

96 II Verr. 1.90, 154.

97 II Verr. 1.57, 89, 129, 130; 2.18; 4.24.
Verres is not alone in being depicted in this way. The Mamertines, who were the only people of Sicily to support Verres at his trial, are described by Cicero as his partners in crime, as the people of Phaselis were to the Cilician pirates:

Indeed, this city was the Phaselis for that Sicilian bandit and pirate. (II Verr. 4.23)
That town was the receptacle for your booty, those men were the witnesses and receivers of your stolen goods... (II Verr. 5.59)
They also provided the pirate-praetor with a ship to convey his plunder. Cicero describes it as "navem onerarium maximam" (a huge cargo ship) and he chastises Verres for his inappropriate behaviour:

What you ought to have done was exacted a ship which could be sailed against pirates, not one for use in piracy; a ship to defend the province against plundering, not one to carry off plunder from the province. (II Verr. 5.59)

In some respects, Cicero tells the jury, Verres' behaviour is even worse than that of pirates. The example of the island of Melita (Malta) is selected. Its temple of Juno was the repository of many valuable objects which, says Cicero, not even the Carthaginians dared to remove:

On a promontory not far out of the town is the ancient sanctuary of Juno, which has always been held in such reverence that it has been kept inviolate not only during the Punic Wars, which were fought mainly by naval forces in this area, but even in the face of the hordes of pirates to be found there. (II Verr. 4.103)

98 Verres' retinue are called latrones (II Verr. 5.114) and share in the plundering (praedor) of Sicily (II Verr. 2.29).

99 For the whole story of Verres and the Mamertine ship see II Verr. 5. 43-59.

100 II Verr. 2.13. See also II Verr. 5.44 for a more elaborate description. In II Verr. 1.46 Verres deposits ancient and sacred statuary stolen from Delos "in onerarium navem suam" (in his cargo ship). The implication is that in Sicily he requires a larger ship because he has become a bigger pirate. The first vessel is also described as "navis illa praedonis" (that pirate's ship) when a storm wrecks it and the statues are recovered.
For Verres, however, nothing is sacred:

The envoys sent by the people of Melita say that the Temple of Juno was ravaged.
Nothing was left in that most holy of shrines; they say that a place where enemy
fleets have often put in, where pirates spend the winter year after year, but which
no pirate has ever before violated, no enemy ever touched, has been so plundered
by this one man, that nothing at all is left. (II Verr. 4.104)101

The praetor and the pirates

Piracy was a serious problem for the Romans in the first century B.C. The
governor of Sicily could expect to have to deal with attacks at sea and on land. As Cicero
says in the passage quoted above, it was the Romans' usual procedure to require their
allies and provincial subjects to furnish ships which could be used to combat pirates.102
Cicero interweaves the theme of combating pirates with the theme of Verres' piracy in
a deliberate fashion, designed to bring out the contrast between what Verres ought to
have done, as a Roman magistrate, and what he actually did with regard to pirates.
Verres' mishandling of this aspect of his responsibilities in Sicily is announced early in
the actio prima:

(During Verres' governorship)... well fortified harbours and the securest of cities
lay open to pirates and bandits; Sicilian sailors and troops, our allies and friends,
were starved to death; the finest and most excellently turned out fleets were lost
and destroyed, bringing great disgrace to the Roman people. (I Verr. 1.13)

101 Compare Cicero's characterisation of L. Cornelius Chrysogonus, Sulla's freedman
in his defence of Sextus Roscius "Was there ever a bandit so wicked, a pirate so
cruel as, when he could get his booty intact without bloodshed, to prefer to take
spoils dripping with blood?" (Rosc. Am. 146).

102 Measures against piracy are dealt with below in Part 4: The Suppression of Piracy.
Before detailing these crimes, Cicero takes the opportunity to show how irresponsible "Verres the pirate" has been in the past when it comes to the business of combating piracy. In the first book of the *actio secunda*, he tells the jury a long tale about a warship which was supplied to Verres by the city of Miletus in Asia.  The ship was one of ten which the Milesians built on the orders of L. Murena, Sulla's legate, in 83 B.C. The other cities of the region did likewise. After he had used it as an escort to Myndus in Caria, Verres dismissed the crew and sold the ship. Cicero casually introduces pirates into the story when he describes how the Milesians accounted for the loss of the ship in their public records:

Therefore, they have entered into their public records that one of the ten was lost, not through a sudden attack of pirates, but through the piracy of a legate... (II Verr. 1.89)

Piracy is brought up again when Cicero concludes this section, by presenting his Milesian witnesses:

They will make it clear that C. Verres, with regard to the fleet that was built to fight the pirates, himself played the part of the wickedest of pirates. (II Verr. 1.90)

This is very rousing stuff, although it might be somewhat exaggerated. Murena's ships might have been used to combat pirates, but that was not the reason for their construction. Murena's prime concern in 83 B.C. was Mithridates, not pirates.  It

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103 II Verr. 1.86-90.

104 The buyers, two Romans living in Miletus, used it, so Cicero says, to communicate between Sertorius and Mithridates! (II Verr. 1.87).

105 See App. Mith. 64. In chpt. 93 Appian includes Murena among those who prepared to attack the Cilician pirates before 67 B.C. All he achieved was the annexation of Cibyra (Str. 13.4.17; de vir. ill. 74.2). Memnon calls him "the governor sent by the senate", but this is a mistake (F.Gr.Hist 434. fr. 1.26). See below Part Five for details.
enables Cicero create a neat rhetorical effect to mention pirates here, even if he is not being strictly accurate. Summing up at the end of this book Cicero repeats his word-play:

Do we also inquire what Verres has got up to in deepest Phrygia, or in the furthest parts of Pamphylia, how in the war against the pirates he has played the pirate himself, he who was found to be an abominable pirate here in the Roman Forum? (II Verr. 1.154)

Cicero deals with Verres' own contribution to the war against the pirates in book Five of the actio secunda. In brief, he accuses Verres of mishandling affairs in several ways. Firstly, he neglected to keep a proper fleet of warships ready to deal with any attack, pocketing the money which the Sicilian cities set aside for this, and then accepting bribes from them to discharge most of the sailors. Cicero is quick to point out how ill-advised such behaviour was:

And this most insane of men, when there was so much piratical activity about, and so much danger to the province, did it so openly that the pirates themselves were aware and the whole province witnessed it. (II Verr. 5.62)

Not all the ships are empty, since a squadron does capture one pirate vessel. Verres cannot restrain himself:

The whole night is taken up with emptying out the ship. The pirate captain himself, who ought to be executed, is seen by no-one. To this day everyone believes - you may judge for yourselves what truth there is in this conjecture -

106 Verres' adventures with the pirates are first mentioned at II Verr. 5.42 (After the war with Spartacus) and concluded at 5.138. They comprise approximately half of the fifth book of the actio secunda.

107 II Verr. 5.60-62.

108 II Verr. 5.63. Cicero does his best to play this success down: "While P.Caesetius and P.Tadius were cruising around in their ten half-empty ships, they led away, rather than captured, a ship laden with pirate's booty, clearly overcome and sinking under its own weight."
that Verres secretly accepted money from the pirates in exchange for their captain. (II Verr. 5.64)\textsuperscript{109}

The rest of the pirates are gradually spirited away to Verres' own house, and other prisoners, some of whom are Roman citizens, are executed in their place.\textsuperscript{110} It should be noted that, in the course of his indignant recounting of these events, Cicero says of the pirate captain:

What is the law in this case? What do custom and precedent say? Could any one, private individual keep within the walls of his own house the bitterest and most dangerous enemy of the Roman people, or, rather, the common enemy of all peoples. (II Verr. 5.76)

Secondly, Verres handed the command of his fleet over to a Syracusan called Cleomenes, whose conduct was not much better than his superior's. The undermanned vessels were laid up in idleness at Pachynus, while their starving crews looked for food.\textsuperscript{111} Thirdly, when an attack of pirates did occur, the fleet was humiliatingly defeated, many of the crews captured or killed, and most of the ships were burnt at

\textsuperscript{109} Maróti (1956) suggests that Verres used the pirate captain as a bargaining counter with the pirates to persuade them not to transport the slave army of Spartacus across to Sicily. He bases his conjecture on a passage of Plutarch (Plut. Crass. 10) which is discussed below in Part Three. I find it incredible that such a deal could have gone unnoticed by all the other sources, especially Cicero.

\textsuperscript{110} Cicero contrasts Verres' treatment of pirates with that of other Roman magistrates, notably P. Servilius Vatia (cos. 79), whose campaign against the pirates in Cilicia had recently brought him a triumph. "He captured more pirate leaders alive than anyone before him", but they did not get away from him later (II Verr. 5.66 & 79).

\textsuperscript{111} II Verr. 5.78-87.
Elorus.\textsuperscript{112} The pirates, led by a captain called Heracleo, sailed on to Syracuse and entered the harbour itself.\textsuperscript{113} Cicero sums up the episode:

While you were praetor, Sicilian soldiers were fed on the roots of palm trees, and pirates on Sicilian corn! What a sad and sordid spectacle! The prestige of the city, the name of the Roman people and the huge crowd of onlookers made a laughing stock by a pirate galley! In the harbour of Syracuse a pirate celebrates a triumph over the fleet of the Roman people, while the cowardly and worthless praetor gets his eyes splashed with water from the pirates' oars! (II Verr. 5.100)

In a sad aftermath, Verres turns against his own naval captains and has several of them executed, though not the infamous Cleomenes. Those who survive are the ones who were captured by the pirates and afterwards ransomed.\textsuperscript{114}

Piracy is, therefore, a major theme of the Verrine orations. Cicero presents Verres as a despicable pirate who has robbed and plundered Asia, Achaia, Sicily and even the city of Rome. "Verres the pirate" is the antithesis of a good, Roman magistrate. The piratical characteristics which are emphasised by Cicero, lust for plunder and disregard of proper behaviour, present an image of piracy which is familiar to readers in any age. In his military dealings with real pirates Verres is shown to be incompetent and contemptible, his disgrace being compounded by the fact that he is not facing proper

\textsuperscript{112} II Verr. 5.87-95.

\textsuperscript{113} II Verr. 5.95-100. As Cicero reminds his audience, not even the Carthaginians and the Athenians in their heyday were as successful in the Syracusan harbour as mere pirates in the praetorship of Verres (II Verr. 5.97-8). This episode is anticipated in the fourth book, where Cicero makes similar comments (II Verr. 4.116). Oros. 6.3 seems to identify a certain Pyrganio, who was defeated by Verres' successor as this captain.

\textsuperscript{114} II Verr. 5.101-138. Note especially 137: "In your praetorship, for the first time since the founding of Syracuse, pirates sailed around in the harbour which no enemy has ever penetrated." Cicero even adds a few more mentions of pirates before the end of this speech, to remind his audience of the earlier pirate themes (II Verr. 5.144, 146, 156, 157). See below, Part Five, for achievements of Verres' successor L. Metellus against the pirates.
enemies, but pirates. The implication is that Verres cannot even deal with people as worthless as himself. The main function of all the references to piracy in the Verrine orations is to belittle Verres, not to inform us about piracy in the first century B.C. Even casual mentions are calculated to add to the overall impression of the worthlessness of Verres. It is important to consider this carefully when attempting to use the Verrines for historical analysis of piracy.

Pompey and the pirates

In the few years following Cicero's prosecution of Verres, the problem of piracy seems to have become even more acute for the Roman authorities. In spite of a series of campaigns by Roman magistrates in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cilician pirates extended their attacks even as far as the coast of Italy itself.\textsuperscript{115} The Roman response came in the form of an extraordinary command for Cn. Pompeius against the pirates, proposed in 67 B.C. by the tribune A. Gabinius, covering the whole Mediterranean for three years. Pompey's swift conclusion of his mission\textsuperscript{116} left him in the East in 66 B.C., in a perfect position to take over the war with Mithridates VI Eupator, king of Pontus. The tribune C. Manilius proposed a motion in the popular assembly to appoint Pompey to this command, in place of M'. Acilius Glabrio, who had just succeeded L. Licinius Lucullus.\textsuperscript{117} Cicero, aligning himself with Pompey for the first time, spoke to the assembly in favour of this motion. The published version of his speech \textit{On the Command of Gnaeus Pompeius} goes into considerable detail about Pompey's military record, especially the campaign against the pirates. This section will show how Cicero uses the war against the pirates to present his subject in the best possible light.

\textsuperscript{115} See below Parts Three, Four and Five.

\textsuperscript{116} Pompey's campaign against the pirates is discussed below in Part Five, pp. 322-41.

A "naval" war

Cicero never calls Pompey's campaign "the war against the pirates". Instead he refers to it as "the naval war" (bellum maritimum).\textsuperscript{118} This contrasts markedly with his references to "the war against the pirates" in the Verrines.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, in a speech delivered in the senate, some ten years later, he refers to Gabinius' proposal as rogationem de piratico bello (the measure concerning the war against the pirates).\textsuperscript{120} It is not simply a different turn of phrase which can be observed here, but a change in emphasis. In spite of the amazing things which Pompey had achieved in his early years, there was relatively little which could stand comparison with the great Republican leaders of the past. Put bluntly, all his successes had been against Romans and Italians, with the exception of the war with Spartacus, and that was against slaves. Cicero invites the people to compare Pompey with Scipio Aemilianus and C. Marius, both granted special commands in contravention of customary Roman practice.\textsuperscript{121} Scipio and Marius, however, were facing foreign enemies - Carthage, Numantia, Jugurtha, the Cimbri and Teutones. Pompey's opponents have to be displayed with similar credentials.

What form of warfare can there be, in which the fortunes of the Republic have not made use of his abilities? The Civil War, the African War, the Transalpine War, the Spanish War (against a mixture of citizens and men from the most warlike of

\textsuperscript{118} Imp. Pomp. 44, 58; also 28 (navale bellum). It is interesting to note that a translator of this speech has found it necessary to insert the phrase: "war against the pirates" several times where it does not occur in the original, in order to clarify what Cicero is talking about, Grant (1969) pp. 33-70. Appian uses the phrase tà pen tèn thállassan to describe the campaign against the pirates (App. Mith. 91).

\textsuperscript{119} E.g. II Verr. 1.154; 5.42; and see above, pp. 70-83

\textsuperscript{120} Post red. in sen. 11. Cicero is being less than complimentary about Gabinius and his proposal; see below, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{121} Imp. Pomp. 47 & 60. Cicero is attempting to rebut the arguments of Q. Catulus and Q. Hortensius by finding precedents for the extraordinary nature of Manilius' proposal.
nations), the Slave War, the Naval War, represent a tremendous variety of conflicts and enemies. They were not only conducted, but concluded by this one man, whose experience can be said to embrace every possible form of military endeavour. (Imp. Pomp. 28)

It should be noted that Cicero enumerates the exploits of Pompey as the senate's henchman in terms of their location - the African War was against Cn. Domitius, the Spanish War against Sertorius. In this form, however, they appear more like the Punic Wars, or the Gallic Wars of Scipio and Marius. Nor is Cicero being scrupulously honest when he gives Pompey sole credit for the completion of these wars. His contribution to the Civil War was marginal, and against Sertorius in Spain he was sent out to reinforce and assist Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, who celebrated a triumph in 71 B.C. on his return from Spain. To claim that Pompey finished the war with Spartacus is a considerable exaggeration, but in keeping with Cicero's intention. Only the campaign against the pirates can truly be said to have been conducted and concluded by Pompey himself. Similarly, he magnifies the importance of this campaign by calling it a naval war, and depicting the pirates as the most powerful of Rome's enemies.

122 Some editors and translators have found the words mixtum ex civitatibus atque ex bellicosissimis nationibus problematical. The phrase is clumsy, but this seems to me to be due to the awkwardness of what Cicero is trying to do, namely to demonstrate that Pompey's dubious credentials are sound.

123 See Richardson (1986).

124 See II Verr. 5.5 where Cicero shares the credit between Pompey and Crassus.

125 Cicero uses the same term "navalis" to refer to operations in the Punic wars around Sicily (II Verr. 4.103, quoted above).
Pirate power

In order to make Pompey into a great Republican hero, Cicero has to find him a "dragon" of suitable stature to slay. The pirates whom Pompey defeated in 67 B.C. are, therefore, shown to have wielded enormous power.

For, in the past few years, what part of the coast has been so well defended that it was safe, or so well concealed that it escaped disaster? Who could set sail without running the risk of death, or capture and slavery. Except for the winter season, the sea was full of pirates. (Imp. Pomp. 31)

Cicero chooses a few recent events to remind the people of the extent of the pirates’ influence.

I need not dwell on the dangers which the sea holds for merchants, when two praetors and their retinues have fallen into the power of the pirates. What is the point of reminding you of the capture of Cnidus, Colophon or Samos, along with many other famous cities, when you know that your own ports, the very harbours which provide you with life and sustain you, have been controlled by pirates? Who does not know that the celebrated port of Caieta, full of ships, was raided by pirates while a praetor was making his inspection? Or that, at Misenum, the same man who had earlier fought there against the pirates, had his children kidnapped by them? (Imp. Pomp. 32-3)

The apparently impossible task of defeating these pirates and rendering the seas safe for the Romans and their allies is Pompey’s great act of "dragon -slaying".

Immortal gods! Was it not the incredible, divinely inspired ability of this one man, that was able, in so short a time, to give such help to the state that instead of

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126 See also Imp. Pomp. 32, quoted above, p. 73

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seeing the Tiber's mouth full of enemy ships, you hear that the seas are empty of pirates as far as the Ocean? (Imp. Pomp. 33)\textsuperscript{128}

Cicero goes on to explain how even the mention of Pompey's name was enough to bring down the price of corn in anticipation of his victory.\textsuperscript{129} The "naval war" has formed the climax to Cicero's exposition of Pompey's military credentials, and he proceeds to advocate that he be given the command against Mithridates, so that he can continue in the same vein.

Cicero uses the campaign against the pirates to establish Pompey as the saviour of the Roman Republic, in the tradition of Scipio and Marius. It is the crowning achievement of his military career. Everything which he says about it is intended to glorify Pompey. In order to impress upon his audience the magnitude of the victory, the pirates are portrayed as powerful enemies.\textsuperscript{130}

After Pompey

In 59 B.C. Cicero defended L. Valerius Flaccus against charges of maladministration in the province of Asia in 62 B.C. In the course of this defence he had to deal again with the war against the pirates. Flaccus had levied money from the Greek cities to provide oarsmen for a fleet. Cicero needed to show that there was some good reason for this fleet's existence, without "diminishing the glory" of Pompey who was supposed to have removed the threat of piracy.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{128} Imp. Pomp. 54-6 is very similar in tone and content.
\textsuperscript{129} Imp. Pomp. 44. See below Part 5 for more details.
\textsuperscript{130} Cicero also refers to the pirates as hostes. Imp. Pom. 33 & 46. In an earlier work, however, he notes that L. Licinius Crassus (\textit{cos.} 95) was denied a triumph for his victory against bandits (\textit{latrociniiis}) because they were not worthy of the title hostes (Inv. 2.111).
\textsuperscript{131} Flacc. 28-33.
For it is to the eternal glory of Pompey, firstly, that those pirates who engaged
him in the naval war were dispersed, wandering across the seas, all of them
overcome by the power of the Roman people. Secondly, Syria was ours, we held
Cilicia, King Ptolemy of Cyprus did not dare do anything. In addition, Crete was
ours, thanks to the endeavours of Metellus. The pirates had no base, nowhere to
run to; every bay, promontory, shore, island and coastal city was enclosed within
our imperial power. Even if there were no pirates on the seas in the praetorship
of Flaccus, his diligence is not to be chastised, for it is because he had provided
a fleet that there were none.\textsuperscript{132}

Having saved the glory of Pompey and excused the excesses of Flaccus, Cicero then
proceeds to have his cake and eat it by explaining the way Flaccus’ successor dealt with
the pirates.

But you deny that my brother, who succeeded L. Flaccus, demanded any money
at all for rowers. Indeed, I delight in hearing praise of my brother Quintus, but
I prefer it to be for other, more weighty and important matters. He had a different
attitude, he took another point of view. He thought that whenever he should
happen to hear of some pirates, he would be able to put together a fleet as quickly
as he liked. (Flacc. 33)

The tribune who proposed that Pompey be given the command against the pirates
in 67 B.C., A. Gabinius, was consul in 58 B.C., along with L. Calpurnius Piso. Angered
at their failure to assist him in his struggle with Clodius, Cicero spoke out against both
of them on his return in 57 B.C., calling them \textit{non consules sed latrones}\textsuperscript{133} and played

\textsuperscript{132} Cicero goes on to deal summarily with the suggestion that a renowned Olympic
victor had been killed by pirates who were not caught. "At sea things are subject
to chance" - Verres might well have agreed (Flacc. 30-31).

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{latro} is a term frequently applied by Cicero to M. Antonius in the \textit{Philippicse.g.}
Phil. 6.12; 12.20; 13.26.
on Gabinius’ piratical associations in a fashion similar to that which he employed against Verres.

Were it not that in his magistracy he carried the measure concerning the war against the pirates, he would have been forced by his own destitution and immorality to turn to piracy himself. (post red. in sen. 11)

In his speech in 66 B.C., on behalf of Pompey, Cicero had heaped praise upon Gabinius.134

In his famous work On Duties, while discussing the question of the conflict between moral duty and expediency, Cicero criticises Pompey’s generous treatment of the Cilician pirates of Soli, comparing Rome with Athens.

They were far better than us, for we give immunity to pirates and make our allies pay tribute. (Off. 3.49)

Pirates figure at several points in this work, as examples of immoral people.135 Sometimes, however, they get the best of the comparison, as when Cicero comments on some sharp practice by the Roman senate concerning the allies.

The faith of pirates is better than the senate’s! (Off. 3.87)

Pirates and politics

In Cicero we find an image of piracy as a form of cruel, violent plundering.136 Pirates are not worthy of the same respect as might be shown to recognised enemies in warfare, for they are immoral and faithless, deserving the enmity of the whole human race. It is the duty of the representatives of the Roman people to destroy pirates wherever

134 Imp. Pomp. 51-8.
135 See above, p. 71.
136 There is nothing in Cicero to contradict the general definition of piracy employed in Part 1 above (i.e. armed robbery involving the use of ships).
and whenever they can. Piracy is assumed to be a common phenomenon in the Mediterranean during the career of Cicero, as his casual references to pirates make clear. It was also a very difficult phenomenon to deal with, as the Romans found out. A series of magistrates in the Late Republic attempted, with varying degrees of success, to suppress piracy in different parts of the Mediterranean. The extent to which Cicero makes piracy an issue in the Verrines is an indication of how seriously he and his audience regarded the governor's duty in this respect. Unfortunately for him, the very persistence of piracy can present problems, as is seen in the speech on behalf of Flaccus. The campaign of Pompey may have been spectacular, and it may have been swift, but even Cicero cannot pretend that its success was total.

It is not surprising, therefore, that piracy is a recurrent theme in Cicero's political speeches, and that the problem of dealing with piracy is part of the political debates of Cicero's time. Equally unsurprising is the fact that Cicero uses his considerable rhetorical talents to make political capital out of piracy. On a basic level, he uses pirate (and bandit) as a term of abuse, as can be seen most clearly in the Verrine orations. He can compare a rapacious governor or an overambitious freedman to a pirate. On a higher level, he can attack the integrity of another political figure by questioning his attitude towards piracy, or his conduct in "the war against the pirates". He can also make piracy work to the advantage of those he wishes to support, Pompey or Flaccus, for example. The fact that Cicero may devote so much attention to the subject of piracy is an indication of its importance in Roman politics. But the different emphasis which he employs to suit each occasion shows that it mattered not only what he said, but how he said it.

Cicero does not have to be consistent in his treatment of piracy. He does not analyze or discuss the subject for our benefit. Consequently, we must be aware that no reference he makes to piracy is politically neutral, or lacking in moral overtones. In using

137 See below Part Five, pp. 248-352.
Cicero as a source for the history of piracy we must not forget that his evidence is biased in many different ways.
PART TWO: THE IMAGE OF ANCIENT PIRACY

STRABO ON PIRACY

Strabo is a very important source for the study of ancient piracy. He was born c. 63 B.C. in the city of Amaseia in Pontos, and he died some time after A.D. 21. He was thus a contemporary of the first Roman emperor, Augustus, and his life spanned the period which saw the collapse of the Roman Republic and the establishment of the principate by Augustus and his successor, Tiberius. Strabo seems to have lived in Rome in the 40s and 30s B.C., to have been in Egypt in the late 20s B.C. and probably returned to Amaseia c. 7 B.C. He wrote 47 books of Historikà hypomnénata (Historical notes), which are lost, and a Geographia (Geography) in 17 books which has survived.\(^{138}\)

A certain amount of Strabo's work is based on autopsy, some of which is particularly good, such as his description of Rome in Book Five (Str. 5.7-8), which is a valuable eye-witness description of the city in the first century. The bulk of his Geography is, however, clearly based on a wide variety of written sources, including Homer, Eratosthenes, Polybius and Poseidonios. He lists those places which he has visited himself, and which he has not, acknowledging that his dependency upon written sources means that he is at the mercy of much "oral" information and hearsay in them (Str. 2.5.11).

The general plan of the work is a "tour" of the known world, stretching from Britain to India. He begins with Iberia and ends with Egypt. It is essentially the Roman world which he describes, although he does venture beyond the boundaries of the Roman Empire in some places, and his comments reflect a view of the world as the dominion of the Romans.


92
This, then, is the lay of the different parts of the inhabited world; but since the Romans occupy the best and best known portions of it, having surpassed all former rulers of whom we have record, it is worth while, even though briefly, to add the following account of them. (Str. 17.3.24)

Strabo is an admirer of the Romans and what he says about piracy largely reflects that admiration. His purpose in writing his Geography is to provide a useful work for the philosopher and the statesman, particularly commanders and men of high rank, who will benefit from studying that which is grand, honourable, practical, worth remembering and entertaining (Str. 1.1.23). It is my opinion that his intended audience was both Greek and Roman men involved in public affairs.

Strabo concentrates particularly on maritime affairs. He describes coastlines and harbours in detail, but is rather brief and vague about the inland regions. In his account of Attica, for example, he goes into considerable detail about the coastal demes and the harbours at Mounykhia and Peiraeus, but he cannot be bothered to waste any time on the inland ones (Str. 9.1.15-22). Sea power, or thalassocracy, is an historical element which he makes a lot of, recording the succession of maritime domination among the Greeks, from the Athenians to the Spartans and on to the Thebans (Str. 8.5.5).

He is also much interested in harbours as the destinations of merchants. Trade is a major theme of his work. The advantages that Turdetania in Iberia enjoys stem partly from its trading links with Rome (Str. 3.2.1). It is important to note that maritime trade between Spain and Italy is, in Strabo’s view particularly facilitated by the current peaceful conditions under Roman rule, with the seas clear of pirates (Str. 3.2.5).

Among of the major sources of his Geography were the authors of accounts of harbours and coastal itineries, whom he criticizes in Book One for their lack of theoretical

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139 He then proceeds to give a general account of the Roman Empire and the lands around it. I quote from the translation of Jones (1917-32). See Nicolet (1988) on the Roman "world view" of Strabo.
content (Str. 1.1.21), but who have obviously left their mark on large parts of his work. It appears that Books Eight and Nine are particularly indebted to the admiral of Ptolemy II, Timosthenes, who compiled ten books on harbours in the Eastern Mediterranean (Str. 9.3.10). The availability of good harbours can also promote piracy, however, as Strabo remarks concerning the Illyrians, whose coastline has many natural harbours (Str. 7.5.10), and the harbour at Jaffa, is described as a pirates’ lair (16.2.28).

In the West the barbarians, according to Strabo, were overwhelmed by the Greeks and the Carthaginians because of the lack of co-operation and trade among them (Str. 3.4.5).

Piracy and banditry are another constantly recurring theme in Strabo’s work. In one of his earliest comments about the work of the Hellenistic geographer Eratosthenes, whom he constantly refers to and corrects, he approves of Eratosthenes’ comment that the early seafaring of the Greeks was done for either piracy or trade (Str. 1.3.2). Piracy and trade are closely linked, of course, by the activities of pirates who prey on maritime trade (e.g. Str. 13.1.32).

One explanation which Strabo offers for the practice of piracy (and banditry) is poverty. Thus the victors of the Trojan war, and the descendants of the ancient ruler of the sea, king Minos, turned to piracy because of their poverty, having been deprived of their gains from the war as well as their possessions at home (Str. 1.3.2). The link between the two is made again in Book Two, where he comments that the Romans have brought even the regions where deprivation and piracy are found under good administration (Str. 2.5.26). Rough and mountainous country leads to banditry also. The

160 pleίν mèn katà leístèin è èmporìan.
141 See below Part Four.
142 aporiás. On the language of piracy and banditry in Strabo see above, p. 37.
mountain-dwelling Artabrians, for example, were constantly practising banditry\textsuperscript{143} until the Romans stopped them (Str. 3.3.5).\textsuperscript{144}

The absence of strong, unified rule among a particular people is likely to result in piracy, as was the case with the Etruscans, whose *hybris* was especially annoying to the Greeks (Str. 5.1-2; 6.2.2). The Cilicians are another example of how the absence of strong rule, in this case due to the internal struggles of the Seleucids, can result in piracy becoming dominant (Str. 14.5.2).

Piracy can also be the result of corruption and the bad influence of others. Even the Greeks are not exempt from Strabo's criticisms. It is their bad influence on the Scythians, the result of trading contacts, which he blames for the piracy of these people, who have also "taken to the sea" (Str. 7.3.7; 7.4.2).\textsuperscript{145} Pirates are cunning and impious as well as corrupt, a good example being the Cilicians, who not only broke into the temple of Samothrace and robbed it, but did so secretly (Str. 7. fr. 50a).\textsuperscript{146}

Just as the rule of the sea can pass from one people to another, so pre-eminence in piracy is seen by Strabo to have changed hands, passing from the Tyrrhenians to the Cretans and thence to the Cilicians. But the progress was halted by the Romans whose destruction of the Cilicians has ended the "history" of piracy (Str. 10.4.9).\textsuperscript{147}

Those who prevent or suppress piracy, and keep the seas clear for navigation and trade earn praise from Strabo, like the Greeks of Massilia, who established strongholds

\textsuperscript{143} en leisterfois.

\textsuperscript{144} This is probably an idea taken from Poseidonios. See also the Cilicians in Book 14.2, the Corsicans in Book 5.7., the Frentani, who live on cliff-tops in Book 5.4.2. Note also the differentiation between piracy and banditry, and warfare (e.g. 17.3.15).

\textsuperscript{145} Compare 1.3.2 on the earliest seafaring of the Greeks, for piracy or trade.

\textsuperscript{146} Compare the impious bandit Kleon in Str. 12.8.9.

\textsuperscript{147} But note the revival of banditry in Cilicia when it passes out of direct Roman rule Str. 12.1.4. See Hopwood (1983) and Shaw (1990) on Cilician banditry.
along the coast to keep the sea free (Str. 4.1.9), or the Rhodians who preferred trade to piracy (Str. 13.2.5). Similarly those who refrain from piracy, while their neighbours practise it, are worthy of special mention.

The Caeretani were highly praised among the Greeks both on account of their bravery and their righteousness. For they did not practise piracy, although they were well equipped to... (Str. 5.2.3)\textsuperscript{148}

The pirates of Italy are all non-Roman peoples, including the Etruscans of Tyrrhenians, and the Volscian inhabitants of Antium (5.3.5). When these people, who were under Roman domination, did practice piracy and were "caught in the act", the Romans quickly responded by suppressing their activities.

But in earlier times the people of Antium used to possess ships and to take part with the Tyrrheni in their acts of piracy, although at that time they were already subjects of the Romans. It was for this reason that Alexander, in earlier times, sent in complaints, and that Demetrios, later on, when he sent back to the Romans what pirates he had captured, said that, although he was doing the Romans the favour of sending back the captives because of the kinship between the Romans and the Greeks, he did not deem it right for men to be sending out bands of pirates at the same time as they were in command of Italy, or to build in their Forum a temple in honour of the Dioscuri, and to worship them, whom all call saviours;\textsuperscript{149} and yet at the same time to send to Greece people who would plunder the native land of the Dioscuri. And the Romans put a stop to such practices. (Str. 5.3.5)\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{148} Compare the Phoenicians of Arados, who refrained from piracy in favour of trade (Str. 16.2.14), and the Lycians (Str. 13.3.2). See also below Part Five, pp. 257-258.

\textsuperscript{149} On the Dioscuri as suppressors of piracy (!) see Lucius Ampelius' 3rd century A.D. Handbook of Knowledge (Amp. Lib. Mem. 2.3).

\textsuperscript{150} See below Part Five on Antium. Translation Jones (1917-32).
For Strabo the march of Roman imperialism has been a civilizing and ordering process for the whole world. His summary of Roman history at the end of Book Six includes praise of the physical advantages of Italy, which have enabled the Romans to rise to such great heights, and a eulogy of the achievements of the Romans up to and including Augustus and Tiberius (Str. 6.4.2). Those parts of the world which the Romans do not control, are dismissed as the homes of nomads and pirates, unworthy of Roman rule.

Similarly also, the entire Mediterranean coastline of Asia is under their control, unless you include the lands of the Akhaïans and the Zygoi and the Heniokhoi,¹⁵¹ who live as nomads and pirates in narrow and barren territories. (Str. 17.3.25)¹⁵²

Strabo ends his Geography with an account of the Roman provincial system, which taxes the legitimate activities of its subjects. In very simple terms, for Strabo the Romans have installed order and prosperity throughout the world, and one of the important ways in which they have done this is by suppressing piracy and encouraging peaceful use of the sea for trade. As for those, barbarian and "uncivilized" peoples who do not recognize the "correct" way of life and the "civilized" practices which he singles out for praise, they do not deserve to be a part of the Roman world!

¹⁵¹ See 11.2.12 and below Part Four, p. 192-3.

¹⁵² Note, however, the rather apologetic tone with which Strabo recounts the long failure of the Romans to deal with Cilician piracy (Str. 14.5.2). This seems to represent a stain on their clean record, which Strabo feels compelled to excuse.
PART TWO: THE IMAGE OF ANCIENT PIRACY

PIRATES IN NOVELS AND OTHER ANCIENT FICTION

Ormerod began his book on ancient piracy with an attempt to conjure up the image of piracy from "true" accounts of travellers and adventurers.\footnote{Ormerod (1924), chpt. 1. He cites a variety of authors, both ancient and modern, but shows little regard for the veracity of his sources.} He closed his account with a few pages on "the pirate of ancient fiction".\footnote{Ormerod (1924), pp. 260-70.} It is my intention in this section to present, briefly, the fictional image of ancient piracy early in my analysis, because I believe that it has some bearing on the study of the more "historical" sources, and that the stories in the ancient novels can tell us more about ancient piracy than the volumes of the Hakluyt Society and their like.

It cannot be denied that pirates add spice to a story. They can be romantic, exciting, repulsive and generally more interesting than other figures because of the nature of their activities. They also represent a very convenient plot device, enabling people to be suddenly transported to far away places, or turned from respectable citizens into slaves.

The earliest "fictional" pirates I want to consider here are those in the rhetorical works of the Elder Seneca. These exercises, especially the Controversies, written in the early first century A.D., include several "cases" involving pirates on which the invention and ingenuity of famous orators is tried out. Pirates figure in several cases in the Controversies (1.2; 1.6; 1.7; 3.3; 7.1; 7.4). They create legal and moral problems on which the speakers try out their rhetorical powers. Pirates are useful for these kind of exercises because they are outside the conventions of civilized law and their actions, usually capturing people for ransom or sale, create awkward situations.
The comic novel *Satyricon* by Petronius Arbiter, who wrote around the middle of the first century A.D., contains several adventures involving bandits and pirates. Similar experiences are found in Greek novels of the first four centuries A.D., including Xenophon’s *Ephesian Tale*, *Daphnis and Cloe*, by Longus, Khariton’s *Khaires and Khallirhoe*, Achilles Tatius’ *Klitophon and Leukippe*, and the greatest of all the Greek novels, Heliodoros’ *Ethiopian Tale*, dating probably to the mid-fourth century A.D.\(^{155}\)

Pirates separate hero and heroine and put their lives in danger. They also condemn them to slavery and despair, testing the limits of their love and devotion. The story of *Klitophon and Leukippe* is a good example of this genre and the role of pirates within it. One of the earliest perils which the heroine faces is an attempted kidnap by a gang of pirates, who take the wrong woman (Ach. Tat. 17-18) Later on both hero and heroine are captured by various bandits and pirates (Ach. Tat. 3.10; 3.20; 5.7). One of these incidents includes a night attack by pirates to seize the heroine on land, followed by an exciting chase and grisly death at sea:

> When the pirates saw our vessel closing in and us prepared to fight, they stood Leukippe on the top deck with her hands tied behind her, and one of them cried out in a loud voice, "Here's your prize!" and so saying, he cut off her head and toppled the rest of the body into the sea. (Ach. Tat. 5.7)\(^ {156}\)

There is no doubt that pirates will stop at nothing in the novels. In Khariton’s novel Khallirhoe is removed from Syracuse by pirates who have come to rob a tomb (Kharit. 7-10). They escape with the maiden and her funeral gifts.\(^ {157}\)

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155 Note also the bandits in Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*, and *The Golden Ass*.  
156 Needless to say it is not the heroine who has been killed. Quotation from Reardon (1989).  
157 Note also the image of greedy and bloodthirsty pirates in Alkiphrion, writing in the 2nd or 3rd century A.D. (E.g. Alk. 1.6.8).
As well as violence and greed, pirates represent lust. Seneca's Controversies 1.2 is the case of a virgin who was captured by pirates and sold into slavery as a prostitute. She kills a soldier to defend her virginity, is acquitted and seeks to be a priestess. The function of the pirates in this scenario is to place the virgin into situations where her virginity is likely to be lost. Several of the speakers suggest it is unbelievable that she could have remained pure while among pirates, who are notorious for their cruelty and lust. The unlikely idea that a virgin can preserve her virtue among pirates is, however, found in the novels (E.g. Ach. Tat. 6.21). Achilles Tatius also uses the image of a pirate plunging a sword into the heroine, Leukippe, to represent Klistophon's first attempt to have sex with her (Ach. Tat. 2.23).

The pirates of the novels and the Controversies live outside civilization and cities. Theron, who steals Khallirhoe from her tomb does so at night, and then takes her away from the city. When he does approach a city to sell his prize he is cautious and secretive (Kharit. 1.12-14). Pirate crews are recruited away from cities, among fishermen and ferrymen (E.g. Kharit. 1.7; Ach. Tat. 2.17). Their "lairs" are in deserted and lonely places, also away from cities (E.g. Kharit. 1.12; Xen. Eph. 1.14).

Another point to note about these fictional pirates is that as barbaric outlaws they are likely to suffer severe punishment. In the opening section of the Satyricon the writer claims, ironically, that "pirates in chains standing on a beach" are among the ordinary things that young men who have had too much schooling miss out on (Petr. Sat. 1). Khariton's principal pirate, Theron, is saved by the gods for a public execution in Syracuse (Kharit. 3.3-4).

A final point to note is the way that the pirate's way of life is presented. Everything from recruitment (E.g. Ach. Tat. 2.17) to execution (Kharit. 3.4) can be found.

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158 See also Ach. Tat. 3.13, Xen. Eph. 2.13 and Heliod. 3.32 for bandits and pirates getting their just desserts in a massacre.
Ransoming (Sen. Contr. 1.6; 7.4) and sale of captives as slaves (Kharit. 2.12) are very common, but pirates also take a great deal of booty which is divided, hoarded and quarrelled over (Heliod. 5.30; Kharit. 1.10). They pursue and attack ships at sea (5.22; Ach. Tat. 5.8), and also raid coastal sites (Kharit. 1.7-10). The activities are generally presented in a realistic and believable fashion, although the tendency of the chief pirates to fall in love with the heroines clearly owes a lot more to romance than to realism. I also note the way that their behaviour seems to resemble the famous Anglo-American pirates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\(^{159}\)

Academic debate about the ancient novels has raised the question of whether the social and political conditions which are portrayed can be taken as representative of any historical period. It is clear that the periods in which the authors set their works are not serious candidates.\(^{160}\) Some scholars have argued that the Greek novels are essentially products of the Hellenistic period, and reflect the conditions of the third and second centuries B.C.\(^{161}\) There are clearly some contemporary references (e.g. the eirenarkh in Xen. Eph. 2.13), which might suggest that a better general context is the first four centuries A.D.\(^{162}\) But, like the other forms of fiction discussed in this section, they have a "timeless" quality, since they are stories for entertainment, and not historical narratives.

As far as the treatment of piracy is concerned however, it seems to me that they are most

\(^{159}\) See Defoe (1724); Botting (1978); Thrower (1980); Rediker (1987).

\(^{160}\) E.g. Khariton's and Heliodoros' Classical settings. Petronius is an obvious exception.

\(^{161}\) See Hägg (1983); Reardon (1971).

\(^{162}\) See Millar (1981) for a detailed argument in favour of "contemporary" conditions for The Golden Ass.
likely to reflect the attitudes of contemporaries and the nature of piracy after the establishment of the Principate.\textsuperscript{163}
PART TWO: THE IMAGE OF ANCIENT PIRACY

Conclusions

The words most commonly used for pirates and piracy in ancient Greek and Latin are closely related to those for plunder. There are synonyms derived from other terms as well. Although both languages have words which can only mean "pirate" (the Latin word *pirata* and the Greek *katapontistés*), the most common terms can also be used for bandits. It is easy to make a distinction between the two however, and most authors do so whenever necessary. The vocabulary of piracy is often found in the context of warfare, but with limited connotations and only for specific practices.

The earliest literary presentation of pirates in the Homeric corpus shows an ambivalent attitude towards them. There is disapproval for their activities, and the evil which they cause for their victims, but they are also engaged in an activity which cannot be distinguished from warfare and which can bring them considerable wealth, prestige and power. The label "pirate" has both negative and positive associations in Homer.

In the Demosthenic corpus the negative associations of pirates and piracy are stronger. There is still a close relationship between piracy and warfare, but the two can also be distinguished and, to a certain extent, contrasted. The political connotations of piracy are very important in these works, and the idea that piracy is an evil which should be curbed or suppressed is clearly there. Also worthy of note is the way that "pirate" can be a term of abuse in political rhetoric. Nevertheless, there is an ambivalent attitude to the practice of piracy, especially in relation to warfare. Piracy is acceptable if the right people are doing it for the right reasons.

Polybius shows little approval for pirates and piracy. The associations which his work reveals are almost entirely negative. He uses pirate as pejorative term, presenting those who practice piracy in the worst possible light. Their behaviour is deliberately
contrasted with that of people whom Polybius favours and admires, especially the Romans, who are beginning to appear as the enemies of pirates. It is, however, still clear that piracy and warfare are closely related and that the practices of war are often piratical. Piracy as a political issue is prominent in Polybius.

Cicero presents piracy in a wholly negative light. He also makes a great deal of political "capital" out of the attitudes of others towards piracy, and uses "pirate" as a pejorative term in his political invective. He also presents the Romans as the enemies of pirates, saving others from their menace, and hails Pompey as the suppressor of piracy.

Strabo takes the Romans vs. pirates image even further. For him the Romans have done a great service for the "civilized" world by suppressing piracy. The relationship between piracy and war is more prominent in Strabo than in Cicero, but this is largely in his "historical" sections. Piracy and warfare appear in Strabo as formerly closely associated, but now this is no longer the case, because the Romans have subdued those who practised piracy. He also discusses the reasons why people turn to piracy in his own day and presents it as an ignoble and "uncivilized" activity, carried on by those who are "outside" the Roman world.

The fiction of the first four centuries A.D. is remarkably replete with pirates. They are, for the most part, "outsiders" who are beyond the normal conventions of "civilization". They are violent and rapacious, but there is also a strong "romantic" element in the literary image of piracy in these works. The pirates of the ancient novels are realistic in their practices, but very "romantic" in their relationships with the other characters. They do, however, add considerable interest to the stories, and perform important functions for the plots.

The way that the development of this literary image corresponds to the history of piracy is discussed in Part Six.
PART THREE: WAR AND PIRACY

It was an elegant and true reply that was made to Alexander the Great by a certain pirate whom he had captured. When the king asked him what he was thinking of, that he should molest the sea, he said with defiant independence: "The same as you when you molest the world! Since I do this with a little ship I am called a pirate. You do it with a great fleet and are called an emperor."¹

Introduction

War and piracy are variations on the same theme - organized violence carried out by groups of men in order to obtain economic or political goals. The definition of piracy employed in this thesis (armed robbery involving the use of ships) stresses the acquisitive or predatory aspects of piracy, but these aspects were certainly not absent from warfare in pre-industrial societies.² It should also be noted that political goals are not necessarily peculiar to warfare, but may be shared by other forms of violence.³

This overlap between war and piracy has encouraged some historians to see them as variations of the same thing. Foremost in this aspect is surely Fernand Braudel, who described piracy in the Mediterranean of the sixteenth century as "a substitute for


² The acquisitive nature of armies and the economic goals of warfare in pre-industrial times have been the subject of many modern studies. Two recent articles which bring out the point clearly are Austin (1986) and Reuter (1988).

³ An obvious example of this is terrorism, which cannot be classified as warfare, although some terrorist organizations call themselves armies: e.g. the Irish Republican Army, the Rote Armee Faktion. See Wardlaw (1982), chapter 1 and Stohl (1979).
declared war*. It is possible, however, to distinguish fairly clearly between war and piracy in modern history. It is my opinion that, for a long time in the ancient world, they were the same thing. War and piracy only become distinguishable from each other with the appearance of states, which organize their fighters into armies and have a clear political identity. This did not happen suddenly, however, nor was the development one which occurred in all parts of the ancient world at the same time. Piracy and war continued to be closely linked for a long time. Even when the social and political conditions allowed a clear distinction to be made between the two, the similarity in the nature of these two forms of violence made the boundary between them one which was easily blurred.

The early history of piracy

It could be argued that the earliest records of piracy are the legends preserved by the Greeks about Minos, the powerful ruler of Crete. Both Herodotus and Thucydides claim that Minos ruled the seas, and the latter says of him:

It is likely that he cleared the sea of piracy as far as he was able, to improve his revenues. (Thuc. 1.4)

Herodotus also associates the Karians with him, saying that they were his subjects and that they manned his ships, thus acquiring a reputation for prowess in war (Herod. 1.171). The Athenians preserved a tradition that they had once paid tribute to Knossos, a tribute which they associated directly with Minos and the story of Theseus. Some

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4 Braudel (1972) p. 865. Braudel notes the distinction between piracy and privateering (p. 866), but argues that it is of little importance for his purposes. See the passage from Philo (de leg. 146) quoted below, in Part Four, which contains a similar division between open and undeclared war.

5 See Garlan (1972), chpt. 1.A. on the importance of the state to differentiate war from other forms of violence.

scholars have argued that the so-called "Minoan Thalassocracy" can be associated with the period of Minoan cultural pre-eminence in the Aegean in the second millennium B.C., perhaps around the periods Middle Minoan II, IIIA and IIIB, (c. 1700-1400 B.C.). If so, then the fact that Minos and his successors "ruled the sea" could be held to show that they had the power to suppress piracy.

I do not subscribe to this view. The explanation of Thucydides' claim which was advanced by George Grote still holds good today.

Here we have conjectures, derived from the analogy of the Athenian Maritime Empire, in the historical times, substituted in the place of fabulous incidents, and attached to the name of Minos. In short the Minoan Thalassocracy is a myth, and it has no sound historical basis. Legends of the Greeks reported in the authors of the Classical period cannot be taken as evidence for the history of piracy in the Bronze Age.

In any case, what is meant by piracy in this period? The scanty written sources for the history of the Mediterranean in the second millennium B.C. contain no mention of piracy, because there was no such concept. Warfare and piracy had not come to be differentiated in this early period. Ormerod and others have taken Egyptian and Near Eastern records which speak of the Lukka and the Sea Peoples as evidence of piracy in the 14th, 13th and 12th centuries B.C. Yet it seems to me that there is no distinction between piracy and warfare in these records. For example letters from the king of Ugarit, Hammurabi, to the king of Alashiya (probably Cyprus) speak of ships and attacks by sea.

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7 Buck (1962); Hägg and Marinatos (1984).


9 See Starr (1955).

10 Ormerod (1924), chpt. 3; Sandars (1985).
In one letter the Ugaritic king says that he has no ships available to defend his city against the ships that have been sighted off the coast.

My father, did you not know that all my troops were stationed in the Hittite country, and that all my ships are still stationed in Lukka and have not yet returned? So that the country is abandoned to itself...

This letter has been associated with a tablet of the Hittite king Shupilluliumash II, recording a victory at sea, and the two assumed to refer to piracy against Ugarit.

The ships of Alashiya met me in the sea three times for battle, and I smote them; and seized them; and I seized the ships and set fire to them in the sea.11

While it is tempting to associate these references to sea fighting with an attempt to suppress piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, it seems to me that there is no other possible label for this activity than warfare. It might help if some motivation could be established for these conflicts, whether they were attempts to obtain territory, or just to plunder? But in general the sources are not full enough to analyze them in this manner. Similarly, attempts to find in references to the land of Ahhiyawa and its people an early record of Mycenaean piracy and raiding, of the kind "echoed" in the Homeric poems, also encounter the lack of any criteria for differentiating piracy from warfare.12 There cannot be piracy in the historical records without some distinctive terminology. People using ships to plunder coastal settlements are not called pirates, so they cannot be said to be practising piracy.


12 See Sandars (1985); Bryce (1986) and (1989). Note also Catling (1975) and Barnett (1975) on Sea Peoples, Alashiya, and Ahhiyawa. See below on the Homeric poems and history.
The Archaic period

It is only in the Archaic period of Greek history, roughly 800-500 B.C., that the concept of piracy can be seen to have started to emerge. As was noted above, the Homeric poems contain references to pirates, and their activities are sometimes spoken of with disapproval and censure, although it is also possible for a pirate to achieve high status as a result of his plundering, so that piracy was not necessarily a shameful activity, as Thucydides noted in his Archaeologia (Thuc. 1.5). The Homeric poems were probably composed around 750 B.C., in Ionia. They portray a society and a culture that is based upon the poet's contemporary world, but which has fantastical elements in it, particularly the attributes of the gods and heroes. It is my view that the values and ideals of the Homeric poems also reflect contemporary society, so that, in general terms, the poems can be used as a reasonable source of evidence for the social history of the Greeks of the eighth century B.C. An obvious difficulty is that separating "fact" from "fantasy" is not an easy thing to do, since even what seems plausible may not necessarily be true to life. Comparison is possible with a few references in later literature to the activities of the early Greeks, and the comparison seems to indicate that the picture of plundering and raiding which emerges from Homer was at least partly based on contemporary conditions.

According to a brief remark in Thucydides' Sicilian "Archaeologia", the city of Zankle (later called Messana), which can be dated to about 730-20 B.C. on archaeological grounds, was founded by pirates (leistôn) from the existing settlement of Kyme (Thuc. 6.4.5). They were later joined by people from Khalkis and other parts of Euboia. What can a reference like this mean? Were the founders of Zankle looking for a base from which

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13 On the fantasy world of Homer see van Wees (1992), chpt. 1.

14 See above Part Two on Homer, pp. 52-6.

15 See C.A.H. III.3 p. 162.
to practise piracy, and chose this one because it was situated on the straits between Italy and Sicily? Or did they found a city first, and then turn to piracy? Such references, fascinating though they are, cannot easily be interpreted. It seems to imply that piracy was common among the colonising Greeks of the eighth century, as does Strabo when he reports the claim of Eratosthenes that the Early Greeks sailed abroad for both trade and piracy (Str. 1.3.2). Herodotus also mentions Greeks from Ionia voyaging to Egypt for plunder in the time of Psammetikhos (c. 669 B.C.). These particular men, equipped with bronze armour, stayed and were recruited as mercenaries (Herod. 2.152). In slightly different circumstances, the Phokaians who settled in Corsica in the mid-sixth century B.C. began to plunder their neighbours, until they provoked war as a reaction from the Carthaginians and Etruscans which culminated in an inconclusive battle at sea (Herod. 1.166).

There is abundant archaeological evidence for Greek trade and settlement across the Mediterranean in the Archaic period, but a general lack of reliable and clear literary evidence makes it very difficult to assess to what extent piracy was also practised by these people. Nevertheless it seems clear, on the basis of the Homeric poems and the later literary references, that not all interaction between Greeks and non-Greeks in the Archaic period was of a peaceful nature.

It begins to be possible to differentiate between warfare and piracy in the Greek world towards the end of the Archaic period. The general trend from the Archaic into the Classical period is towards the development of organized states with citizen and/or

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16 See above Part Two on Strabo.
17 See also Lloyd (1975-88), ad loc.
18 Language is of little value in the analysis of these references, since they are written in the language of the fifth century, when developments had gone much further; see below.
19 See C.A.H. III.3; Boardman (1980); Wells (1980).
mercenary armies which engage in more sophisticated and large-scale forms of warfare. The activities of Polykrates, tyrant of Samos (c. 546-22 B.C.), characterized in Herodotus as plundering, seem to amount to a kind of early imperialism.

All his campaigns were victorious, his every venture a success. He had a fleet of a hundred fifty-oared galleys and a force of a thousand bowmen. His plundering raids were widespread and indiscriminate - he used to say that a friend would be more grateful if he gave him back what he had taken than if he had never taken it. He captured many of the islands and a number of towns on the mainland as well. Amongst other successes, he defeated at sea the Lesbians, who had sent their whole fleet to the help of Miletos; the prisoners he took were forced to dig, in chains, the whole moat which surrounds the walls of Samos. (Herod. 3.39).

Polykrates' capture of many cities and his large fleet and army seem to be appropriate to warfare, and not to piracy. It is also around this time that sea battle begins to be reported in the sources, here among Greek states, in the earlier reference to the Phokaians among Greeks and non-Greeks. By this time warships with rams were commonplace in the Aegean, sharply differentiated from cargo ships, powered usually by sails alone and of a rounder, fatter shape.

The inadequacy of the methods of piracy in this context are illustrated by the Ionian revolt (499-94 B.C.). The plundering raid against Sardis in 498 B.C., conducted by

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20 Garlan (1972), chpt. 1A distinguishes a political form of warfare from "la forme 'sauvage'."

21 On the nature of the Polykratean regime see Shipley (1987), chpts. 4 & 5. I feel he overestimates the extent to which Polykrates' plundering can be usefully termed "piracy".

22 Translation de Sélincourt (1972).

23 See Casson (1986), chpt. 4; esp. f.g. 81 & 82.
an allied force of Ionians, Eretrians and Athenians, serves only to aggravate relations with the Persian king (Herod. 5. 97-101), and the various piratical enterprises of Histiaios of Miletos achieve nothing of value either (Herod. 6.5 & 26-30).

It seems to me that a greater variation in warfare develops strongly in the fifth century B.C. Some campaigns and expeditions are more politically motivated than others. Clashes of city-states with each other, and with the Persians, produce organized violence on a very large scale. Plunder can still be an important motivation, however, and there is still a close correspondence between piracy and some types of warfare. In 490 B.C. the unsuccessful expedition of Miltiades of Athens to Paros seems to have combined a political motive (or excuse) - to punish the Parians for their alleged medizing, with a less noble motive - to obtain money for the Athenians (Herod. 6.132-5).

The point at which the distinction between warfare and piracy can be most clearly marked is, perhaps, the creation of the Delian League in 478 B.C. Some scholars have mistakenly tried to characterize this as an association of Greek states to practise piracy against the Perian Empire by plundering the king's lands. The early campaigns of the League produce far more than just plunder, however, they involve conquest of territory, and the members soon become involved in inter-state warfare, and the imperialist ambitions of the Athenians take precedence over the idea of exacting reparations from the Persians. Warfare and piracy are no longer the same thing in the fifth century B.C., although, as will be seen, there is still a certain area of "overlap" between the two.

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24 See Herodotus Books 6-9 and Thucydides.

25 próphasis, who argues that

26 E.g. Sealey (1966), the original purpose of the League was piratical. But see Jackson (1969b) on the language used by Thucydides at 1.96.
After the Archaic period

From the fifth century onwards ancient warfare is generally considered to have provided many opportunities for pirates to "ply their trade". They are seen as the maritime mercenaries of the ancient world, allying themselves with particular states or rulers to plunder in the name of war. There was, indeed, very little difference between war and piracy in the Archaic period and earlier, and it is not always easy or useful to make a clear distinction between the two forms of violence. It seems to me, however, that, from the Classical period onwards, the significance of pirates as a particular group of participants in ancient warfare has been overstated and misunderstood. Pirates were often involved in the organized warfare of ancient societies but when they were, their contribution was not always very significant. In some cases closer examination leads to the conclusion that the "pirates" of the ancient sources are not pirates at all. Instead, a pejorative label has been attached to the combatants on one side in order to deride and illegitimize them for the benefit of their (victorious) opponents. Thus, study of occasions when pirates are mentioned in ancient warfare sometimes reveals more about the attitudes of the sources and their contemporaries to the status of the combatants, than about the nature of ancient warfare itself.

27 Ormerod (1924); Ziebarth (1929); Badian (1970); Jackson (1973); Garlan (1989) Maróti (1962a).

28 See above.

29 An interesting modern comparison has been pointed out to me by my colleague Mr. Paul Tweddle. During the Second World War it was common for the R.A.F.'s Bomber Command to be referred to as "Air Gangsters" in Germany. At the time of writing, events in the Persian Gulf have provided examples of one side in a conflict attaching the label "piracy" to what the other side would justify as "warfare".
"Piracy" in the Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War was, according to Thucydides, the greatest war in Greek history, and the Athenian historian makes a lot of the scale of the warfare, involving thousands of soldiers and sailors. His description of the Athenian expedition to Sicily, for example, is punctuated at crucial points by assessments of the size of the forces involved, which are intended to back up his claim that it was the largest overseas expedition ever undertaken.\(^3\) It is, however, clear from his account that the war was not only a clash of large armies and navies, but also comprised many small scale conflicts, and warfare of a different kind \(\text{from} \) pitched battles. Several examples of plundering by forces described as "pirates" (\(\text{leistai} \)) have already been discussed above.\(^3\)

Various places on the coast of the Greek mainland were used as bases for pirates who plundered and ravaged the opposing side. In addition to the places already mentioned there was the Megarian port of Minoa, which Thucydides describes as a base for triremes and pirates from the Peloponnese (Thuc. 3.51). The Athenians, especially in the early stages of the war, were very conscious of the threat of \(\text{leistai} \). They used Naupaktos as a base to guard against them from the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.32), and to attack shipping in the gulf of Corinth, and Atalante was fortified to help guard Euboia (Thuc. 2.69). Also worthy of note is the comment of Andokides that in the years after the Sicilian expedition, when Athenian ability to take countermeasures was reduced, pirates infested the seas and many people were being captured and sold as slaves (Andok. 1.138).

It was not only these "pirates" who were engaged in plundering during the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians, as they became more and more desperate for funds, appear to have resorted to the methods of piracy to obtain them. The unfortunate victims tended to be the Greeks of Asia and the Hellespontine cities. The renowned politician

\(^3\) Thuc. 6 & 7, esp. 6.31; 6.43-4; 7.42.

\(^{31}\) See above Part Two on Language, pp. 41-7.
Alkibiades is a prime example of the general turned plunderer. Plutarch says that in 410-09 B.C. he plundered the territory of the Persian satrap Pharnabazos. Although he generously allowed priests and priestesses to go free without demanding a ransom, he attacked Khalkedon with the intention of obtaining as much money as he could, but found that the wealth of the city had been sent to Bithynia for safekeeping.

Hearing that all the booty in the territory had been collected together and placed in the care of their friends the Bithynians, he came up to the borders of Bithynia at the head of his army, and sent a herald to them with his demands. The terrified Bithynians turned over the booty to him and concluded a treaty of friendship. (Plut. Alk. 29.3)

After defeating both Pharnabazos and the Spartans outside Khalkedon, he sailed to the Hellespont to collect money. His purpose was both to impress upon the Athenian allies the importance of staying loyal, and also to obtain funds to keep his forces going. Diodorus puts it more bluntly than Plutarch when describing Alkibiades' action in 408 B.C., after the capture of a stronghold on Andros.

He then sailed off with his forces to ravage Kos and Rhodes, he also collected huge amounts of booty for the maintenance of his soldiers (Diod. 13.69.5)³²

Alkibiades clearly benefited from the mobility of his ships and the intimidating size of his army. He can scarcely be called a pirate, but the familiar theme of piratical methods in warfare is clear to see.

Fourth century pirates and generals

Athenian generals continued to plunder for funds in the fourth century. For example, leistai were used by Iphikrates in the Hellespont during the Corinthian War (Xen. Hell. 4.8.35), and there were other cases of generals being accused of operating like

³² Compare also 13.73 - a raid on Kyme in 406 B.C.
pirates throughout the century. They were not the only ones, however, who earned the label "pirate". Alexander of Pherai, a minor player in the power politics of the mid-fourth century B.C., gets a poor press from the Greek historians.

At this time (361/0 B.C.) Alexander, tyrant of Pherai, sent out pirate ships against the Cyclades islands, captured some by storm and took many captives...

(Diod. 15.95.1)

What does Diodorus mean by "pirate ships"? The word he uses for ships is also applied to warships, such as triremes or quinqueremes, not just to typical pirate vessels. Does he mean, therefore, that Alexander used ships "of the kind pirates use", or that he used ships "for piracy"? The answer depends to a certain extent on how one views Alexander of Pherai. Xenophon dearly thought of him as a pirate, with all the pejorative force of the term leistés. He might reasonably be held to reflect the view of Alexander's enemies, especially the Athenians. Alexander may, however, have considered his actions to be the acceptable and normal usages of war.

After the conclusion of the Peace of Philokrates in 346 B.C., Athens and Philip II of Macedon continued to clash over affairs in the Northern Aegean. A letter of Philip sent

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33 There is a useful collection of evidence in Pritchett (1974), chpt. III. See esp. pp. 82-5 on Khares and 85-9 on Kharidemos. See also above Part Two on Demosthenes, p. 57-68.

34 leistrída naús.

35 See also Xen. Hell. 6.4.35: he conducted himself on land and sea like a lawless pirate (leistés).


37 Compare the treatment of Evagoras of Cyprus in Diod. 15.3. (386 B.C.). He is also at war, and simply using the methods of piracy.
to the Athenians in 340 B.C. complains about the use of leistai by the Athenians and the capture of merchants travelling to Macedonia ([Demos. 12.5]).

Demosthenes in his speech Against Aristokrates paints a fascinating picture of the military and political "career" of Kharidemos of Oreos, who has risen to favour with the Athenians, but, in Demosthenes' opinion, has proved untrustworthy. In his earlier "career" he was a soldier and he operated as a pirate for a while (Demos. 23.148). In the course of a campaign which the Athenians were conducting in Perinthos, he turned against his friends.

After this, when we sailed on - not to attack any place or district in Thrace, for it cannot be claimed by anyone, "By Zeus, the only harm he did us was in self-defence" - far from it, for we did not go anywhere in Thrace, but it was to Alopekonnesos, a place in the Chersonese which was yours that we went. It is a promontory pointing out towards Imbros and away from Thrace, and it was full of plunderers and pirates. Then, when we had got there and laid siege to the place, he marched straight through your Chersonese, attacked us, and helped the plunderers and pirates. (Demos. 23.166-7)

It is worth posing the question, when did Kharidemos cease to be a pirate? The answer would appear to be, when he was hired to fight for the Athenians (Demos. 23.149). The Athenians at this time were quite reliant on the assistance of small groups of mercenaries and others whose first concern is their own profit. If they plunder Athens' enemies that is fine. When they turn against the Athenians, however, they cease to respectable allies and turn into barbarians and pirates. 39

38 See above Part Two on Demosthenes. Note also Phokion's capture of Macedonian ships (Plut. Phok. 14).

39 See below Part Five on the dispute with Philip II over Halonnesos. The "pirate" Sostratos may have been an ally or former ally of the Athenians. On Demosthenes' portrait of Kharidemos note the sceptical view of Pritchett (1974), p.89.
It is difficult in cases such as these to be at all clear about how or why particular individuals have received the label pirate. The term definitely has pejorative overtones, and it is not a precise description, since it refers as much to a method of conducting warfare as to a way of life.

Reprisals

The ancient Greeks accepted the idea that anyone who had suffered an injury of some kind could take reprisals against the injurers. The growth of city-states, and the clearer definition of communities in the Archaic period seems to have encouraged the development of the idea that reprisals could be taken against any member of another community, whether or not he was responsible for the original injury. The word sylan is often used to describe the right or action of reprisal by modern scholars, although the Greeks used a variety of expressions, all of which implied the same activity - the taking of booty (by force) in reprisal for some injury suffered at the hands of members of another community.

This customary practice was, however, open to abuse in various ways. The scale of the reprisal might heavily outweigh the original injury, action might be taken without real cause, or reprisals might be taken against "innocent" third parties.

The earliest clear mention of action taken in reprisal occurs in the eleventh book of the Iliad, where Nestor tells a story of a raid on the Epeians in which he and his companions are "taking things in reprisal." The raid escalated into a small war between

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41 Pritchett (1991) collects a large number of passages and comments on them. See also Pritchett (1974), chpt. III. There is extensive discussion of selected passages in Bravo (1980), although his arguments are often very difficult to follow and some of his interpretations seem rather unusual. See also Jackson (1973) and Gauthier (1972).
the two sides, when the Epeians decided to retaliate. It is likely that this scenario was a common one in the Greek world of the Archaic period. For example, Herodotus says that the Spartans and the Corinthians cited several "injuries", including the theft of a corselet and a krater, inflicted on them by the Samians as justification for their attack on Polykrates in 525 B.C. The practice clearly had a long history, but most of our information about it comes from the Classical and Hellenistic periods, when the almost constant warfare and inter-state rivalry among the Greeks was accompanied by a great deal of activity in the form of reprisals. It is clear from literary and epigraphic sources that forcible seizures of goods and persons were very common, especially at sea, or in harbours, and that they were often viewed with disapproval. Not surprisingly, therefore, the vocabulary of piracy and banditry was often applied to such actions. Reprisals are a significant aspect of the overlap between piracy and warfare in the ancient world.

On at least one occasion in the Peloponnesian War the plundering which was a common feature of the conflict took the form of reprisals against one of the main parties (Thuc. 5.115). In the next century reprisals seem to become a considerable problem.

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42 Il. 11.674 ρήσια ελαύνειν. See above Part Two on Homer. This raid is discussed by van Wees (1992), pp. 195-6. He suggests the translation "compensation" for ρήσια, a word not found anywhere else in Homer.


44 A bronze inscription from the middle of the fifth century B.C. gives details of an agreement between Oiantheia and Khaleion, forbidding seizure of the property of citizens of either city as booty συλαν in the harbour of the other. Out to sea anyone is fair game (Tod (1946), no. 34).

45 See above Part Two, pp. 45-6.

46 There is a brief discussion of selected examples of raids in reprisal in Pritchett (1991), pp. 358-63; see also the appendix to that volume, providing a list of accounts of booty in Greek historians.
An example (which does not involve piracy) can be found in the list of Athenian financial problems around 399 B.C. in Lysias' speech against Nikomakhos.

"What is more he has done this even though he could see that the polis was desperate for money, that the Spartans were making threats whenever we refused to send them payments, that the Boiotians were taking reprisals because we were unable to repay them two talents. (Lys. 30.22)\textsuperscript{67}

During the Corinthian War the Spartans seem once again to have declared reprisals against the Athenians.

Eteonikos (the Spartan harmost) was back in Aigina, whose inhabitants had previously enjoyed normal trading relations with the Athenians. With the war now being openly fought at sea, however, and with the full agreement of the ephors, he invited those who were willing to plunder\textsuperscript{48} Attika. The Athenians, beset by these attacks, sent hoplites under the strategos Pamphilos to Aigina. They built walls to contain the Aiginetans and blockade them by land, and ten triremes to cut them off by sea. (Xen. Hell. 5.1.1-2)

The Spartan admiral Teleutias was able to drive off the Athenian triremes, but the fortifications were held for several months (Xen. Hell. 5.1.3-5). In 374 B.C. there is another reference to the Athenians suffering due to leistēa from people based on Aigma (Xen. Hell. 6.2.1). In these instances it would appear that the plunderers are Aiginetans, taking advantage of the war to obtain Athenian goods through piracy instead of trade. They may even have used the same ships for both activities. The Aiginetans, it should be noted, do not seem to have had any specific dispute with the Athenians. Xenophon is careful to point out that they have been trading, not plundering, on their voyages to Attika. Now, however, there is a justification for piracy - a Spartan declaration of

\textsuperscript{67} The translation is by Stephen Todd.

\textsuperscript{48} lýidzēsthai. The same language is used in Thuc. 5.115.
reprisals. The Aiginetans can expect Spartan support for their actions, and this is just as well, since they also run the risk of Athenian retaliation, which sweeps them into the mainstream of the war.

The Spartans themselves were not above employing the methods of piracy to fight the war, as can be seen in a later chapter of the same book, describing an attack on the Peiraios led by Teleutias.

Now, when they were rather less than a mile from the harbour, he stayed quietly where he was and rested his men. At the first sign of dawn he led the way forward. His instructions were that they were not to sink or damage any merchant vessel with their own ships, but they were to disable any trireme which they saw lying at anchor; they were also to take in tow merchant ships which were loaded, and to board, where possible, the larger ones and carry off the people on board. In fact, some of his men actually jumped ashore at the Exhibition wharf, seized hold of merchants and shipowners and carried them off.... Meanwhile Teleutias was sending the captured merchant ships to Aigina. He had instructed three or four of his triremes to escort them there. As he was sailing out of the harbour he was also able to capture numbers of fishing craft and ferry-boats full of people coming in from the islands. When he reached Sounion he also captured some trading vessels, some carrying corn and others various kinds of merchandise. (Xen. Hell. 5.1.21 & 23-4)

This is clearly on a larger scale than any pirate raids by way of reprisals from Aigina, although Teleutias proceeded to sell his booty in Aigina, where there must have been

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49 I quote from the translation of Warner (1966).
quite a market for Athenian plunder by now.\textsuperscript{50} The proceeds were used to pay his forces and keep his operations going.

The fact that reprisals might not even have been declared against a particular state would not necessarily prevent the seizure of property, since opportunists would strike (in the best tradition of pirates) wherever the chance arose. This would tend to make everyone at sea, or in a harbour, "fair game". In the speech \textit{Against Timokrates}, an incident which occurred in 355 B.C. illustrates how the "rules" could be bent. Some Athenian ambassadors who were on their way to Mausolos of Karia in a trireme captured a ship from Naukratis and seized 9½ talents worth of property. It was decided by the people that, although the Athenians and Egyptians were not at war and had no current disputes, Athens' friendly relations with Persia, from whom the Egyptians were in revolt,\textsuperscript{51} justified the seizure of Egyptian plunder (Demos. 24.11-12). The goods became the property of the state and a tithe was paid to Athena (Demos. 24.120). It does not seem to have been difficult to find excuses, especially with large sums involved.

In his criticism of the decree in favour of Kharidemos proposed in 352 B.C. by Aristokrates, which sought to make it a crime to harm him, Demosthenes argues that it prevents someone from resisting Kharidemos should he make an unjust\textsuperscript{52} attempt at seizure. This, says Demosthenes is very likely, since generals are constantly taking by force people or property. Thus, someone may legitimately be resisting Kharidemos and

\textsuperscript{50} A very unfortunate victim of pirates a little later in the fourth century was the Athenian Nikostratos. Chasing some runaway slaves, he was captured himself and sold as a slave in Aigina (Demos. 53.6).

\textsuperscript{51} See Olmstead (1948), chpts. XXIX & XXX.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{adikos}.
kill him, only to be arrested for contravening Aristokrates' proposed decree (Demos. 23.60-1).53

Reprisals in the Hellenistic period

There is much evidence for raids in reprisal in the sources for the Hellenistic period, especially Polybius.54 In some cases the reprisals were taken in response to provocative raids or piracy by persons from another state. In other cases they appear to have been chosen as a method of compensation for injuries of a less violent nature. Often a declaration of reprisals by one side might be a prelude to open warfare on a large scale. In 220 B.C. numerous Greek states made accusations against the Aitolians as a result of various acts of plundering, especially of sanctuaries, and piracy (Polyb. 4.2-6). War was declared, as well as reprisals.

The Akhaians, meeting at the scheduled time for their League synod, all agreed to the decree55 and announced plundering in reprisal against the Aitolians.56 This was the beginning of the so called "Social War", which lasted from 220-217 B.C.57 Polybius describes this quarrel from the Akhaian point of view, and is at pains to justify the reprisals and the declaration of war against the Aitolians. The legitimacy of a declaration of reprisals could be a matter for debate however, and Polybius provides one good example of a declaration that he does not approve of in his account of the deeds of

53 See above Part Two on Demosthenes. Note also Demos. 51.13 for the claim that trierarchs are constantly carrying off people and property, thus provoking reprisals against Athenians everywhere.

54 See Jackson (1973), esp. pp. 252-3.

55 Declaring war against the Aitolians (Polyb. 4.25).

56 Jackson (1973), p. 252 & n. 75 suggests that the term used here for declaring reprisals (tô láphyron epekéryxan) represents a form of official announcement. See also Polyb. 4.36.6 - Spartans and Eleans declaring reprisals against the Akhaians.

57 See Will (1979-82), pp. 69-77.
Nabis the "tyrant" of Sparta. As a result of the intervention of the Megalopolitans in a dispute between Nabis and some Boiotian mercenaries, Nabis made raids by way of reprisal into Akhaian territory and captured some cattle. But Polybius claims that this was just an excuse (prophasis) and that there was no justification for the act, which led to war between Sparta and Megalopolis (Polyb. 13.8.3-7). Here he may be suspected of a bias against the Spartans, although it is not surprising that the two sides would have different views about such matters.

Declarations of reprisals were made unilaterally, simply by the announcement that plundering was permitted. It was, therefore, an easy and common recourse for those who felt that they had not got satisfaction in a dispute, or, when the system was abused, when someone was looking for an excuse to justify piracy or banditry. In 217 B.C. Skerdilaidas, the Illyrian prince, decided he had been cheated by his "employer" Philip V and determined to get some compensation. So he gathered a force of 15 lembloi and sent them to the harbour of Leukas, where they were treated as allies. They promptly attacked the other vessels in the harbour.

They attacked the Corinthians and captured these and other ships, sending them back to Skerdilaidas. After this, having made their way out to sea from Leukas, they sailed to Cape Malea and began to plunder and capture merchant ships. (Polyb. 5.95.3-4)

Skerdilaidas had failed to get what he wanted from Philip V, namely money, so he took reprisals against whomever he could. His intention was presumably in part to put pressure on Philip to pay him, but above all to make up what he felt was owing to him from the proceeds of his plundering.58

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58 Note that in the previous chapter Polybius shows Aratos of Sikyon financing the Akhaian war effort from plunder, but there is no hint of the disapproval found in his account of Skerdilaidas. See also above Part Two on Polybius, pp. 63-9.
The connection between reprisals and piracy can be seen at work in the relations between Rhodes and several of the Cretan cities at the end of the third century B.C. According to Polybius the Eleutheraianis declared reprisals against Rhodes some time after 220 B.C. (Polyb. 4.53.2). According to Diodorus the Cretans' continuous plundering of merchant vessels caused the Rhodians to declare war upon them (Diod. 27.3). Was the Cretan plundering simply a continuation of the acts of reprisals mentioned by Polybius? Or did the Rhodians make war on the Cretans by way of reprisal? Both or either of these may be correct, but unfortunately the sources for this whole episode are too scanty to be sure.

It was apparently difficult to reconcile the customs and practices of all the Greeks in the matter of reprisals. Although most states accepted that a declaration of reprisals was a necessary preliminary to any actual plundering, this does not seem to have been the case for the Aitolians in the Hellenistic period. Polybius has Philip V of Macedon complain that they have a custom which permits plundering without any public announcement (Polyb. 18.4.8-5.2). It was also apparently a local custom of permitting plundering without "official" sanction that was partly responsible for the excesses of the Illyrians, in the latter part of the third century B.C.

It was possible, therefore, for citizens of most states to get some kind of official sanction for piracy if it was in reprisal for a slight or injury. In some places there was not even a requirement for any injury to have been suffered. Effectively these custom meant that acts of piracy would often not be treated as piracy by the authorities of a city or League, because the perpetrators could claim to be "within their rights". Disputes might

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60 The First Cretan War, c.206-04 B.C.

61 See above Part Two on Polybius, ff. 63-9.

62 See below Part Four on the Illyrians. Also Dell (1967).
lead to further piracy by way of reprisals. When this is considered in conjunction with
the considerable amount of plundering in warfare that was common in the Greek world,
it is obvious that institutionalised piracy was likely to be a widespread problem.63

The Aitolians and their "foreign policy"

By the middle of the third century B.C. the Aitollan confederation included not
only cities from Aitolia proper but also many other states, whose inhabitants were not
Aitolians, but who were persuaded, one way or another, to join the alliance. They
dominated the Delphic Amphiktyony for a long time, which gave them a certain amount
of political influence beyond their immediate region. When, in the late 270s B.C., the
Aitolians gained access to the Aegean via Central Greece, they also achieved the
capability of involvement in the politics of the Greek world beyond the mainland.64
Their naval power grew at the same time as that of the Ptolemies was on the wane, until,
by the end of the 250s B.C. they were a force to be reckoned with in the Aegean and
around the coasts of Greece.65

The nature of Aitolian "sea power" has been discussed at length by Benecke, who
argues that they used their lax customs and laws regarding plunder and reprisals to
terrorize many of the smaller states of the Hellenistic world into establishing "diplomatic
relations" with them. In effect, they employed piracy as a means of increasing their
political power. The extent of their influence is known mainly from inscriptions which
record the conclusion of treaties and agreements between the Aitolians and various states.

63 See Davies (1984), pp. 287-8: "...the boundary between reprisal and unprovoked
attack was thin enough at the best of times and could easily be crossed..." (p. 287).


65 See Benecke (1934); Flacelière (1937); Will (1979-82), esp. vol. I pp. 325-8. The
festival of the Nikoleia on Delos, founded in 252 B.C. by an Aitolian called
Nikolaos, is often taken as an indication of the high status of the Aitolians in the
Hellenistic world by this time (IG XI.2.287B). See Benecke (1934), p. 20.
Some of these record the granting of freedom from reprisals and general guarantees of safety to sanctuaries and communities.66

One example, the granting of asylia for the sanctuary at Smyrna c. 246 B.C., shows the involvement of Seleukos II Kallinikos in the process. He proclaimed the immunity of Smyrna and then the Delphic Amphiktyony (effectively the Aitolians) confirmed this position by a decree.67 Other examples seem to indicate that it was the individual cities or communities which came to the Aitolians and asked for a recognition of their immunity, or a guarantee of safety, as the Teians did c. 260 B.C.68 Some places seem to have gone even further, as is shown by an inscription which records a grant of asylia and also isopoliteia to Khios, as well as admission to the Delphic Amphiktyony. In return the Aitolians gained Khian citizenship.69

...since the [Aitolian] League, because of the ancestral kinship and [friendship] which exist between [our] people and the Aitolians voted to grant us citizenship [and] forbade all to plunder the property of [the Khians] from whatever starting base... for this the people voted that the [Aitolians] should be citizens and share in all the rights the Khians share in...

The decree gave to the Khians a certain amount of security, with regard to Aitolian piracy, but it also gave them a notable diplomatic advantage, the vote on the Amphiktyony. Was it a deliberate policy of the Aitolians to use the fear of piracy to

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66 These treaties usually asylia or aspháleia. See above for examples. For a full list see Benecke (1934) pp. 17-29. It may be that similar treaties were also concluded with communities closer to home in the Classical period.

67 O.G.I.S. nos. 228-9; see Benecke (1934), p. 23.

68 I.G. IX.1 (2nd edn.) no. 191; see Benecke (1934), p. 21.

persuade the people of Khios (and others) to obtain concessions from them, in return for joint citizenship or other privileges?°

The difficulty which I see with an affirmative answer to this question, is that there is only a small amount of evidence which can be used to show the Aitolians practising piracy in the Aegean in the period before the 220s B.C. Of the evidence cited by Ormerod and Benecke, only the inscription from Naxos, recording an attack by Aitolians on the town of Aulon c. 280 B.C.,° belongs to the period before the middle of the third century, and the tales of Aitolian piracy in Polybius, while they must have a certain amount of validity, mostly relate to the Social War and after."° There are agreements which date to the period of the Social War, or later, but they represent only a small proportion of the documents cited by Ormerod and Benecke.°° The most significant period of Aitolian plundering and aggression seems to be in the last quarter of the third century B.C.

Early on there may have been a considerable amount of piracy and plundering which induced several places to form agreements with the Aitolians to limit the damage that might be done to them, but I am not convinced that this was deliberate policy. The political aims of the Aitolians are, it seems to me, less significant here than the desire of the smaller states of the Aegean to preserve their safety and maintain good relations with a variety of "powers" in the chaotic political world of the third century. Alliance with Aitolia might supplement, or even offer alternatives to the protection of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies. Unfortunately we lack a complete list of "alliances" for any of these states,

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°° See above for other examples. Note also the list of proxenia decrees in Benecke (1934), pp. 31-3.

°°° S.I.G. 520; Ormerod (1924), pp. 139-42; Benecke (1934), esp. pp. 11-29.

°°°° See above and Part Two on Polybius' attitude to the Aitolians.

°°°°° E.g. S.I.G. 522 (c. 220 B.C.); S.I.G. 554 (c. 207 B.C.).
but the example of Smyrna shows that a city would seek the protection of more than one power at a time.\textsuperscript{74}

Pirates as soldiers?

If piracy and warfare tended to overlap so much in ancient times, might not some individuals and groups combine the two on a regular basis, acting as some kind of naval mercenaries in the pay of monarchs or states, and living by piracy between campaigns? It is clear that Ormerod and Ziebarth thought so, from the way they present certain episodes and individuals in their works.\textsuperscript{75} Soldiers could easily turn to piracy, simply extending their operations to take in "unofficial" objectives. It appears, for example, that during the latter stages of the First Punic War, some Roman ships were used by private persons to plunder Hippo and set fire to some Carthaginian ships in the harbour. They were allowed to keep the plunder, but had to return the ships (Zon. 8.16 = Dio Bk.12; 247 B.C.). Where did they get the crews? How did they know how to handle the ships, where to go, and so on? If this story is true, then the persons involved must have been part of the Roman naval forces. They had no official campaigning for that year, so they did a bit of unofficial plundering.

Demetrios Poliorcetes and the Siege of Rhodes

The unsuccessful siege of Rhodes in 305-4 B.C. provides a good opportunity to examine the participation of pirates in ancient warfare. In this case, they are usually considered to have been naval mercenaries:

\textsuperscript{74} See above.

\textsuperscript{75} See Ormerod (1924), esp. chpts. IV & VI; Ziebarth (1929), esp. Chpt. 4. Mention of pirates often leads to comments along the lines of "X was a pirate in the service of...." or, "These pirates were working as mercenaries for....". I do not feel it is profitable to give bibliography for such comments; they are found in a wide variety of scholarly works. See below.
The armies under Demetrios seem always to have consisted partly, if not mainly, of mercenaries... At the siege of Rhodes he was helped by the pirates, and used Cretan archers for shooting from his engines of war: Cretans were adepts both at piracy and at mercenary service as bowmen.76

The famous siege seems to provide an obvious role for pirates as mercenaries. Diodorus Siculus, whose Library of History is our main source for the events, opens his account with an appraisal of the Rhodians' naval strength and prestige among the Greeks, which made their island a major prize for the warring successors of Alexander in the late fourth century B.C. (Diod. 20.81).77 The island and its mainland territories (the Peraia) could only be conquered and controlled through a major amphibious campaign, for which large forces would be required.

The conflict begins with what seems like an act of piracy on the part of Antigonos Monophthalmos, Demetrios' father. He had already been supplied with warships by the Rhodians in 315 (Diod. 19.57.4), but they refused to send any forces to assist Demetrios in his war against Ptolemy I Soter, the ruler of Egypt, in 307 (Diod. 20.82).78 Thereafter, Antigonos provoked a war with them.

When they did not agree, he sent one of his generals with some ships. The plan was to bring to land ships sailing out of Egypt for Rhodes and to seize the cargoes. This general having been driven off by the Rhodians, he (Antigonos)

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76 Griffith (1968), p.52. See also Jackson (1973) and Gabbert (1986). I do not use the term "privateer" because it is drawn from a modern context and is dependent upon finer legal distinctions than were ever applied in the ancient world. See above Part One.

77 See Berthold (1984) for a recent synthesis. The account of the siege in Diodorus seems to be based upon the History of the Successors by Hieronymus of Cardia, a follower of Demetrios, although the version of this work which Diodorus uses for the siege is probably a later (Rhodian) recension. See Hornblower (1981).

78 The best modern narrative of this period is Will (1979).
threatened to besiege the city with great forces, saying that they had started the war unjustly. (Diod. 20.82.2).

It should be noted that this initial act of provocation (which could hardly have been expected to make the Rhodians give in by itself) is specifically said to have been carried out by one of Antigonos' generals (tìn tôn strateòn), not by mercenary pirates, although it is an obviously appropriate task for them. The methods used are clearly piratical, but the place of this action in the wider strategy of Antigonos is a good enough reason to class it as an act of war.79

The Rhodians at first tried to conciliate Antigonos, but, after Demetrios demanded 100 noble hostages and use of the Rhodian harbours against Ptolemy, they realised war was inevitable (Diod. 20.82.3). Demetrios arrived at the city with a large army (some 40,000 soldiers, plus cavalry) and a mixed assortment of ships, 200 warships and about 170 lesser ships (Diod. 20.82.4).

Apart from these, a little less than 1,000 private cargo ships belonging to traders had assembled. Since the territory of the Rhodians had not been ravaged for many years, there came together a crowd of those who are accustomed to regard the misfortunes of war as an opportunity for their own profits. (Diodorus then describes the ships as they approached the island)... finally, there were the cargo ships of the pirates and those of the merchants and traders, an exceedingly large number, as I have already said. (Diod. 20.82.5-83.1).

Once he had set up camp, Demetrios sent out "pirates and others" to plunder the island by land and sea. According to the way his forces are described by Diodorus, the pirate

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79 Exactly why Antigonos decided to pick a quarrel with the Rhodians is not clear. Plutarch, in his Life of Demetrios says it was because they were allies of Ptolemy, but this is not a sufficient explanation. For discussion see Will (1979-82), pp. 67-74 and Hauben (1977), who emphasises the Rhodians' self interest. Note that Antigonos is apparently acting in reprisal for the Rhodians' injury of "attacking" his ships.
contingent are less like mercenaries than "hangers on", who have joined the attacking army in search of plunder. What modern historians would call "camp followers". They provided a market for the besieging army and would have expected the opportunity to participate in looting the captured city and its territory.\footnote{See Pritchett (1971) on the way Greek armies were supplied and paid in the fourth century B.C.}

A similar group of people can be detected accompanying Demetrios in 302 when he invaded Thessaly. Diodorus describes his forces as follows:

Demetrios was followed by 1,500 cavalry, not less than 8,000 Macedonian infantry, 15,000 mercenaries, 25,000 from the cities throughout Greece, and light-armed companies and bandits (peiratôn) of all sorts, gathered for the fighting and the plunder, not less than 8,000. (Diod. 20.110.4).

Demetrios had sailed to Larissa, where he landed, but that is not enough of a maritime context to translate peiratôn as pirates, bandits being a more appropriate translation.\footnote{See Jackson (1973), p. 249 and n.48. Griffith (1968) seems to count these camp followers and bandits as mercenaries.}

The large number of "irregulars" who were attracted to Demetrios' camp at Rhodes need not have been recruited directly by him, nor need they have been in his pay. Their presence was surely voluntary and inspired by the prospect of rich pickings from the defeated Rhodians. Diodorus refers to them as traders and merchants, to distinguish them from the more "professional" mercenaries who would be expected to play a major role in the fighting and would be well paid for their work.

The size of the undertaking which Demetrios had embarked upon seems to have forced him to make use of as many of these camp followers as he could. The island of Rhodes is very large, and it is close to the mainland, where the Rhodians had established harbours and settlements by this time. In order to maintain an effective siege, Demetrios had to try to blockade the Rhodians by sea as well as by land. They were well equipped.
with ships and experienced sailors, and had help from Ptolemy in Egypt. Thus, we see the pirates and some of the merchants in action. Their efforts were not very impressive, however, in spite of their apparently large numbers.

Demetrios tried to send out ships to intercept supply vessels coming to Rhodes from Egypt, but the weather defeated this enterprise (Diod. 20.96.1). A Rhodian admiral called Amyntas, sailing out towards the Peraia, also encountered some of Demetrios’ pirates.

These pirates had three undecked ships, they were apparently the strongest of those who fought alongside the king’s forces. But the Rhodians overpowered them in a brief sea fight, capturing the ships and their crews, among whom was a certain Timokles, the "archpirate". (Diod. 20.97.5).

It is particularly revealing that these pirates are supposed to have been the strongest of Demetrios' pirate allies. They used undecked ships, however, and were no match for the proper naval forces of Amyntas. He also captured some of the "merchants" who were bringing grain to Demetrios' camp and diverted their ships to the city (Diod. 20.97.6). The incident shows that those pirates who did participate in the action at the siege of Rhodes were no match for the Rhodian navy, and should not be considered a significant component in Demetrios' forces. They are also clearly to be distinguished from the mercenaries in his employ.

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82 See Casson (1986), pp. 88 & 116 for the difference between decked and undecked ships in the ancient world. Essentially, the former are ships specifically designed for warfare, the latter includes merchant vessels and smaller rowed ships which might be used by pirates. The specialized Cretan archers referred to by Griffith in the passage quoted above should not be confused with pirates. They were mercenaries, soldiers for hire whose expertise lay in warfare. Brulé (1978), pp. 2-3 shows that there is no evidence for the celebrated piratical exploits of the Cretans as early as the fourth century B.C.

83 Gabbert (1986), pp. 157-8 sees no distinction between hired mercenaries and "pirate allies". But she does not properly consider the part played by the latter in the action, nor does she appreciate the significance of camp followers. In general, her "career" pirates are not pirates in any meaningful sense of the word at all, and
Demetrios presumably hoped that the pressure of numbers would make up for the inadequate nature of his "hangers on" as naval combatants. He simply did not have the forces to mount a proper blockade at sea. It was obviously cheaper and easier to use merchants and pirates than to construct and man a large navy for the task. There have been few occasions before the advent of modern navies when this kind of warfare has proved successful, although blockades and raiding were sometimes a useful addition to more conventional forms of conflict.\(^4\)

The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate how ineffective the pirates accompanying Demetrios were in the siege of Rhodes. They were not a significant part of his army and navy, and their presence was determined by the prospect of easy booty, which failed to materialize. That we hear no more about them after the capture of Timokles (the "archpirate", as he is called by Diodorus) may indicate that they took no further part in the action. It is certainly clear that, for them, piracy and warfare proved to be very different activities. This example illustrates a situation where pirates accompany major armies, but play only a relatively minor part in their operations.

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the kind of upward mobility which she detects is an anachronistic fantasy. Ziebarth (1929), pp. 20-1 claims that the pirates were reacting against Rhodian "police measures" in joining Demetrios. Berthold (1984), p. 67 suggests that the pirates were only there for the plunder. See below Part Five on Rhodian attempts to suppress piracy, only in the third and second centuries B.C.

\(^4\) See Jackson (1973) for further examples, although I do not agree with the validity of all the instances he cites. A notable case of successful blockade and raiding tactics is discussed below. Andrews (1964) is the standard work on the famous sixteenth century English privateers and their foreign counterparts. A briefer treatment is found in Andrews (1985). Both he and Bromley (1987), on the seventeenth century, show how the impact of the privateers and pirates on events was often insignificant when compared to the serious warfare. I suspect that the same was true in ancient times, when sea power was a much less potent factor in warfare than it has been since the late Middle Ages; see de Souza (1990).
Andron

"Pirates" appear again in connection with Demetrios' forces in the siege of Ephesos (287 B.C.). In this case it is Demetrios' general Ainetos who is besieged, and the forces trying to take the city are those of Lysimakhos.

When Ainetos, the general of Demetrios, was defending Ephesos and ravaging the environs with many pirates, Lykos, the general of Lysimakhos, bribed the "archpirate" Andron with money and took possession of Ephesos. The "archpirate" led into the city some of Lykos soldiers, unarmed, in cloaks and rough garments and with their hands bound, as though they were prisoners, and getting near to the citadel he issued them with daggers, which they kept hidden under their arms. Having killed the gate keepers and the guards on the acropolis, he raised the signal to those with Lykon. These men marched in, laid hold of Ainetos and occupied Ephesos. And, having given the pirates their reward, straightaway escorted them out of the city, believing that their faithlessness towards their former friends made it unsafe to have them around. (Polyain. 5.19)

According to Gabbert, Andron "apparently ceased being a pirate and became instead an ordinary mercenary commander", employed by Lykos. If he was an "ordinary" commander, why did Lysimakhos' men not trust him any longer than it took to capture the city? Surely he and his men remained "pirates" all the time they were helping to betray Ephesos. Gabbert says that Andron "served under Demetrios' commanding general", but this is hardly appropriate terminology. It seems clear to me that Andron and his men were operating out of Ephesos in much the same way as the pirates at the siege...

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85 *kal pollois peiratês*. There is no necessity here to translate "pirates", since ships are not mentioned by Polyainos, but they are in the version of this incident in Frontinus (Front. Strat. 3.3.7). Gabbert (1986), p. 157 fails to cite Frontinus, and does not appreciate the range of meaning of *peiratês*.

of Rhodes. Ainetos was prepared to allow them to come and go because they were causing harm to his opponents, hence they were admitted to the city with what seemed like another bunch of captives for sale. Andron and his men were "camp followers" looking for an opportunity to profit from the conflicts of the warring Hellenistic monarchs. When Lykon offered a better way to make some money than selling captives they immediately changed sides. Lysimakhos' experienced general, however, knew better than to trust them even as much as ordinary mercenaries.

Ameinias

Another person who, like Timokles and Andron, bears the dubious honour of the title "archpirate" is Ameinias. His most famous exploit is recorded in the fourth book of Polyainos' _Stratagems_ (Polyain. 4.18). In 277/6 B.C., after Antigonos Gonatas had been besieging Kassandreia for ten months without success, he sent in Ameinias, who got himself accepted as a friend by the tyrant Apollodoros and used his position to allow 2,000 soldiers over the walls. Antigonos was then able to capture the city. Polyainos calls Ameinias an "archpirate" and says that he was accompanied by 10 Aitolian bandits. They were led by a certain Melatas. A mention of an Ameinias as a _strategós_ in the army of Antigonos a few years later (Plut. Pyrr. 29.6) presumably refers to the same man. Gabbert assumes that Ameinias had "pursued a career as a pirate or brigand" before joining Antigonos and rising to a position of great trust and authority. But what evidence is there for this suggestion?

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87 Or "archbandit"? The Greek word is _archipeiratés._

88 _stratiōtai diskílloi kai metà toúton AitoloI peirataI déka_. In the absence of any nautical context I would translate _peirataI_ as "bandits".

89 Gabbert (1986), pp. 158-60. Her claim that Ameinias commanded the garrison at Corinth seems totally without foundation. Nor is there any value in her attempt to turn a few so-called pirates into "political and military entrepreneurs" (p. 162).
The term archipeiratés could have been attached to Ameinias by whoever Polyainos used as his source, perhaps a Hellenistic historian. The Aitolians may also have been the victims of some rhetorical embellishment. Casual references like this are highly untrustworthy, especially when they are in sources like Polyainos and Plutarch, who are writing about events from long before their own time. Gabbert encapsulates the problem when she says of Ameinias, "our sources, though late and lacking in detail, must have had some basis for labelling him an 'archpirate'." But unless we can be clear about what that basis was, then it is rash to read anything specific into such labels. At least Timokles the "archpirate" can be seen to have been a leader of pirates from Diodorus’ account of the siege of Rhodes, but Ameinias looks more like a general than a pirate or bandit. His only fault may have been to incur the displeasure of a rash historian.

Dikaiarkhos

The origins of the First Cretan War are not fully presented in any of the surviving ancient narratives, they are unclear and seem to go back to earlier rivalries among the Cretan cities and disputes which led to the involvement of their allies.90 It appears that an important development in this war was the decision of Philip V, president of the Cretan koinon since 217 B.C.,91 to take an active part through the Aitolian Dikaiarkhos.

Philip, the king of the Macedonians, persuaded Dikaiarkhos the Aitolian, a bold man, to practise piracy92 and gave him twenty ships. He gave him orders to raise money from the islands and to assist the Cretans in the war with Rhodes. In

90 On the origins and course of the Cretan war see Brulé (1978), pp. 29-56; van Effenterre (1948), pp. 213-24; see also above, and below Part Five on Rhodes and the Cretans. Polybius makes Philip responsible for the war, claiming that he sent Herakleides to incite war between Rhodes and the Cretans (Polyb. 13.5). I can see nothing of value in the dubious story about Herakleides' "ruse" in Polyain. 5.17.2.

91 See Will (1979-82), vol. II pp. 75-7.

92 peirateúein.
accordance with these instructions he plundered merchant shipping and extorted money from the islands by raiding. (Diod. 28.1.1)

Dikaiarkhos' main purpose, according to Diodorus, was to raise money for Philip. The most likely explanation for this mission is that Philip needed funds in order to provide himself with a suitable navy for his ambitious foreign policies.94

Was Dikaiarkhos a pirate, or was he simply engaged in warfare, and the victim of pejorative labelling? The answer to this question depends on your point of view. To the victims of his raids and his attacks on merchant shipping the answer would probably have been that he was a pirate. If it is assumed that he was paid for his efforts, then he could be called a mercenary, and from his employer's point of view he was presumably just collecting revenue, and assisting his allies in their war with the Rhodians.95 He was provided with ships by the Macedonian king. Were they, therefore, in some way a part of the Macedonian navy? Unfortunately, this kind of question is impossible to answer. It may be that Philip operated through an "agent" in order not to be held directly responsible by the Greeks for the piratical attacks of Dikaiarkhos and the Cretans. It is clear from the comments in the sources that what they were doing could be widely disapproved of, although the systematic seizure of plunder was an integral part of Greek warfare.96

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93 See also Polyb. 18.54.8-10, where he also specifies the Hellespontine cities among Dikaiarkhos' targets.

94 "Pour faire une politique maritime, il faut une flotte: Philippe n'en a pas, ni de finances suffisantes pour s'en procurer une; il lui faut d'abord se procurer de l'argent." Will (1979-82), vol. II p. 104. The fleet duly emerged and took its place on the stage of international relations at the turn of the century. The date of Dikaiarkhos' expedition is uncertain, Brulé (1978), pp. 44-6 suggests 205 B.C.

95 Polybius' mention of the Hellespont suggests that Dikaiarkhos could have concentrated his attacks on vessels trading between the Black Sea and Rhodes, though he need not have been too selective. See below Part Four on trade with the Black Sea peoples.

There is a certain similarity between the methods of Dikaiarkos and some of the activities which were engaged in by several "generals" of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., particularly those who come to the historian's notice in Xenophon and the speeches of Demosthenes.\textsuperscript{97} The extortion of wealth through the use of (or the threat of) armed force was a commonplace in ancient warfare, and continued to be during the Middle Ages. The scale of Dikaiarkhos' operations and their political purpose make warfare seem a more appropriate label than piracy, but the distinction is a fine one. Polybius' attitude towards him clearly indicates that he could be (and was) perceived as having no more justification than any other pirate, an attitude which is taken up by Diodorus in the passage quoted above. In short, the activities of Dikaiarkhos show how far the practices of piracy and warfare could be combined in this period.\textsuperscript{98}

Rome and pirates in Hellenistic warfare

The fleet which Philip V put into action in the Aegean during the last few years of the third century was not particularly successful.\textsuperscript{99} His allies continued to use piracy as a means of disrupting the operations of their enemies, however, and the Roman commanders who had started to make regular appearances in the Aegean were called upon to counter these measures.

\textsuperscript{97} See above on collection of "tribute" and the "supplying" of armies in the Classical period. Benecke (1934), p. 33-44 attributes the appearance of Aitolians like Dikaiarkhos in "foreign service" to a changing political climate which is restricting their opportunities for plunder. I find this too simple and "Polybian" an explanation.

\textsuperscript{98} A similar case from earlier in the century is that of Agathokles. According to Diodorus, after his capture of Kroton in 295 B.C., he allied himself with the Iapygians and Peuketians of Apulia, providing them with "pirate ships" (nafis leistrikàs) in return for a share of their booty (Diod. 21.4).

In 200 B.C. the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, who was wintering at Apollonia, despatched one of his legates, C. Claudius Centho, to Athens with some Roman triremes to deal with raids by land and piratical attacks on the coastline from Chalkis.

Their arrival at Piraeus brought much needed relief for the allies, who were in a desperate state. They had been subjected to regular attacks on their territory out of Corinth and Megara, which now ceased; and the pirate ships from Chalkis, which had not only infested the sea, but also all the coastal lands of the Athenians, would neither sail past Sounion nor dare to venture beyond the Straits of Euripos into the open sea. There also came an additional three Rhodian quadriremes, and there were three undecked Athenian ships, all gathered to defend the coastal lands. (Livy 31.22)

Who was operating these pirate ships? Was it allies of Philip V, or were they merely the vessels of independent pirates, exploiting the state of war to raid one state's territory from the relative safety of another, which was held by enemy forces?

In the peace settlement between Flamininus and Nabis in 195 B.C., a major concern of the Romans seems to have been to limit the potential of the Spartans to interfere in naval activity by freeing the coastal settlements of Lakonia from their control.

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100 M.R.R. I, pp. 323 & 325.

101 See Briscoe (1973-81) ad loc. An inscription referring to Rhodian and Athenian ships protecting shipping around Delos (S.I.G. 582) probably does not refer to this episode, but see below Part Five. This passage is a reminder of the often close correspondence between armed robbery involving ships, and armed robbery on the land - piracy and banditry. For more examples of the latter in Hellenistic warfare see Jackson (1973).

102 Chalkis was Philip V's last major stronghold on Euboia; see Will (1979-82), p. 167; Errington (1989), chpt. 8. See above for earlier examples of pirates operating from bases in "enemy hands" during a war.
severing Nabis' ties with Crete and limiting him to only two small galleys (Livy 34.35-6). Thus he was left with neither the ships nor the bases to engage in "piracy".103

Philip V was not the only Hellenistic monarch to benefit from the participation of pirates in warfare. In 190 B.C. the Seleucid king Antiokhos III was engaged in a naval struggle in the Aegean against the forces of Eumenes of Pergamon, the Rhodians and a Roman navy. His admiral Polyxenidas defeated the Rhodians, under the command of Pausistratos, at Panhormos, in which engagement a certain Nikandros was a prominent figure on the Seleucid side.

Then he ordered Nikandros, a certain pirate chief, to make for Palinurus with five decked ships, and then to lead the soldiers by the shortest route across the fields to the rear of the enemy, while he himself made for Panhormos, dividing the fleet in order to hold the harbour entrance on both sides. (Livy 37.11.6)104

Nikandros' arrival forced Pausistratos to abandon his plan to attack on land and attempt a breakout by sea, which was defeated by Polyxenidas. Nikandros captured some of the Rhodian ships on a beach, while they were still trying to embark (Livy 37.11.7-13). Nothing more is said about this pirate chief in Livy's narrative. He seems to have been a competent commander, and one trusted by Polyxenidas, but the significance of the term archipirata which Livy applies to him is difficult to determine. Does it mean that Nikandros was in command of a large force of pirates? Or, does it merely mean that he had once been a pirate leader?105

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103 See above Part Two on Nabis. Also Cartledge and Spawforth (1989), pp. 75-7.

104 The same events are reported by Appian, who calls Nikandros a peiratés (App. Syr. 24-5).

105 See above for other "archpirates". Note the reference in S.I.G. 521 to a pirate leader as "the one in charge of the pirates on ship" (tōn epi tōn peiratōn epipléonta). Why not use the term arkhipiratēs? Perhaps, given the date of all the sources which use it, it was a late Republican invention? Is it conceivable that it comes from a phrase which had the meaning "formerly a pirate" - (en arkhēi peiratēs)? Probably not, since there are no obvious parallels.
Shortly after the battle of Panhormos the Roman fleet commander, C. Livius Salinator, had to send a small force to deal with pirates who were attacking shipping off the Western coast of the Peloponnese.

Then the praetor sent two allied triremes from Italy and two Rhodian ones under the command of the Rhodian Epikrates to guard the straits of Kephallenia. The Spartan Hybristas was practising piracy\(^\text{106}\) there with Kephallenian young men, and the sea was now closed to supplies from Italy. (Livy 37.13.11)

This seems to be a case of the methods of piracy and warfare coinciding. There is little difference between attacking passing merchant ships and the disruption of enemy supply lines through attacks on shipping. Hybristas had apparently enlisted the Kephallenians onto the side of those who were opposed to Rome and her allies, providing him with men and (perhaps) ships as well as a convenient base\(^\text{107}\).

In fact, Epikrates and his ships only got as far as the Piraeus before they were redirected back to the coast of Asia by the new Roman naval commander, L. Aemilius Regillus (Livy 37.14.1).\(^\text{108}\) Nothing more is said by Livy about the Kephallenians and Hybristas. It must be assumed that the problem was only a temporary one. Possibly another force was sent to deal with them, and was successful, or it may be that they decided that they had achieved enough and ceased their attacks.

Later on in the same year, an encounter between Roman ships and some pirates who had been plundering the island of Khios, resulted in the faster pirate vessels fleeing

\(^{106}\) latrocinium.

\(^{107}\) See Errington (1989), chpt. 8 on the alliances in the Syrian War.

\(^{108}\) He may have stopped off at Delos on his way back, hence the honorific inscription which appears to refer to him as removing those who were practising piracy from the island (S.I.G. 582); see below Part Five for more detailed discussion of this inscription.
at the approach of Aemilius and his ships (Livy 37.27-8; Polyb. 21.12). Were these pirates attached in any formal way to the forces of Antiokhos? They may have been, or they may have simply have seized an opportunity to raid the island while the Romans and their allies were busy with the war.

There seems to have been quite a lot of piracy going on in conjunction with the wars in the Eastern Mediterranean around this time. The participation of pirates in warfare was on several different levels. There are pirates whose identity is unclear and whose contributions to the fighting are very small, while others appear to be an important part of someone's forces. The major difficulty in the way of any analysis of their activities is the nature of the available information. The literary sources are concerned with major aspects of warfare and politics than with the relatively trivial matter of raiding and piracy. It merits occasional mention, but there is usually very little information about the people involved, their loyalties and their motives. Only when some rhetorical or moral point is being made does the motivation and organization of piracy in the wars of the Hellenistic period become a suitable subject for the ancient historians. As the example of Polybius shows, when more attention is paid by an ancient source to the subject, it is still necessary to be very circumspect in dealing with it. Nor do inscriptions provide an easy source of material for the study of the relationship between piracy and warfare, since they also often prove very enigmatic and difficult to interpret.

It is also important to remember that the ancient sources are unlikely to be explicit about matters which would be taken for granted by their readers. One such matter is the importance of booty. In seeking to understand the role of pirates and piracy in Hellenistic warfare its essential object - the acquisition of booty - must be given prime consideration. Raids on coastal area and islands, as well as attacks on shipping and supply routes were

109 On Regillus see M.R.R. I, p. 356. Note also Livy 37.14, a report by the Rhodian Timasikrates of dangers to merchant shipping off the coast of Asia. Briscoe (1973-81), ad loc., suggests that this was the result of pirates, or "privateers".
carried out primarily for the plunder that could be obtained. When Hybristas led the young men of Kephallenia out to attack ships coming from Italy he might have been concentrating on disrupting the Roman war effort, but the Kephallenians must have been more interested in capturing goods and slaves.

This "booty first" explanation helps to account for the presence of pirates at sieges and along with the mercenaries and other regular forces on Hellenistic campaigns. It can also explain the apparent reluctance of pirates to confront large military forces. Demetrios Poliorcetes' pirates at the siege of Rhodes found the Rhodian navy too strong for them. The pirates who fled from Regillus in 190 B.C. had no wish to engage in a fight with the Roman navy, especially since they had apparently had their fill of plunder from Khios.

A further point to emphasize is the function of any form of warfare as an outlet for violent instincts. Men would be prepared to engage in piracy not only because of its potential profits, but also for the excitement of the fight. The two greatest works of Hellenic literature, the Iliad and the Odyssey, both glorify violence, and both give a leading role to the acquisition of booty through violence.\(^\text{110}\) Robbery with violence was, as has been suggested above, deeply ingrained in Greek culture. Jackson has pointed to the Aitolian personal name Laistas, derived from leistés, which occurs in an inscription of the late third century B.C., as an indicator of the extent to which piracy or raiding could be a prestigious and respectable activity.\(^\text{111}\) Providing ships and the bases to operate them from required a certain amount of effort and expenditure, but there would be plenty of willing hands to man them.

The specific examples discussed above seem to indicate that, while piracy and warfare were closely connected and might overlap in the Hellenistic period, the essential purpose of piracy, the acquisition of booty, meant that pirates would strike when and

\(^{110}\) See above Part Two on Homer. Also van Wees (1992), chpts. Three and Four.

where opportunities arose, but they would be unlikely to play a major part in fighting. For all the trouble which the pirates operating out of Chalkis in 200 B.C. caused to the people of Attika, they seem to have represented only a minor diversion in the war with Philip V of Macedon. When pirates do seem to play leading roles in warfare, as in the case of Dikaiarkhos, or Nikandros, then the term "pirate" begins to look inappropriate, and suspect, especially in the works of writers like Polybius and Livy.

Diodotos and the Cilicians

A further case of the participation of pirates in warfare also marks the arrival on the Mediterranean scene of those most infamous of pirates, the Cilicians. According to Strabo it was the warring rivals for the remnants of the Seleucid kingdom of Syria who first made them a force to be reckoned with, in the late 140s B.C.

The first place in Cilicia, then, is the stronghold of Korakesion, perched upon a steep rock, which was used by Diodotos, called Tryphon, as a base, at the time when he was in revolt from the kings of Syria and was making war on them, meeting sometimes with success and sometimes with failure. (Str. 14.5.2)

Tryphon was using Korakesion as a rebel stronghold because of its situation beyond the immediate reach of the Seleucid monarchs, but close enough to organize campaigns against Syria and Judaea. The Peace of Apamea had established severe limitations on the size and types of ships in the Seleucid fleet, and on the distance which they might sail from the coast of Syria, as well as the territorial limits on the kingdom itself. Korakesion lay well beyond the limits of Seleucid power as defined by the treaty.\(^{112}\) It was, therefore, a logical place for a pretender or rebel to hold out. Strabo has very little to say about the operations of Tryphon, and only a little can be learned from other sources, but

\(^{112}\) See McDonald (1967) and McDonald and Walbank (1969).
it seems that he used his small fleet and the aid of pirates from Cilicia in an attempt to browbeat the coastal cities into submitting to his rule.\footnote{113}{See Maróti (1962b) for speculations about Tryphon from the very meagre sources. His desire to rule a unified kingdom seems to have run up against opposition from the prosperous coastal cities which preferred weak kings, or no kings at all.}

However, having been blockaded in a certain place by Antiokhos, son of Demetrios, he was compelled to take his own life. But for the Cilicians this was the beginning of organized piracy, Tryphon being responsible for establishing them, along with the incompetence of the succession of kings who ruled over both Syria and Cilicia at that time. (Str. 14.5.2)

What Strabo appears to be saying here is that Tryphon was initially responsible for the establishment of pirates operating out of Cilicia; perhaps he furnished them with ships, in the manner of Philip V? Thereafter the political chaos which followed his rebellion, as the Syrian kings fought amongst each other, made it easy for "undesirable elements" to take control in Cilicia, and allowed piracy to continue unchecked, from fortified bases.\footnote{114}{See Will (1979-82), vol. II, pp. 404-13 on the political situation.}

The piratical activities of the Cilicians probably had little effect on the outcome of Tryphon’s wars. They would have raided the rich cities of the Syrian and Phoenician coastline, and the shipping which passed into the Aegean for profit. After his demise they continued to do so, with considerable success.\footnote{115}{See below Parts Four and Five. See Str. 16.2.19 for Diodotos raiding Berytos.}
PART THREE: WAR AND PIRACY

THE LATE REPUBLIC

Given the long history of the involvement of pirates and the use of the methods of piracy in warfare in the ancient world, it is hardly surprising that pirates appear in the sources which narrate the numerous wars of the Late Roman Republic. The campaigns of the first century B.C. extended throughout the Mediterranean world, as the Romans fought first against the monarchs and states of the East, and then among themselves. The scale and the nature of these wars, which often involved huge armies and covered large areas, shows even more than in the previous few centuries that pirates were becoming a less prominent feature of ancient warfare, and that where once piracy and warfare were closely related and at times hard to distinguish, they now appear to be more clearly differentiated from each other. As a result, the mention of pirates or piracy is more likely to indicate the presence of "irregular" forces, at the margins of conflicts, or the employment of "pirate" as a term of abuse, directed against the combatants of one side by sources favourably disposed to the other side.

The Mithridatic Wars

The idea that the Mithridatic wars represent the next significant phase in the development of Cilician piracy was current in ancient times. Appian, in the course of his account of these wars, describes the sorry state of the province of Asia after the end of the first war, and the Sullan settlement:
There sailed against her great hordes of pirates, more like navies than pirate bands. They were initially established on the sea by Mithridates when he was despoiling all those regions, which he did not hold for long... (App. Mith. 63)\textsuperscript{116}

Appian also discusses the growth of piracy in Southern Anatolia in an extended passage which introduces the campaign of Pompey in 67 B.C.:

When Mithridates first went to war with the Romans and conquered Asia (Sulla being busy with Greece), believing that he could not hold on to Asia for long, he despoiled it one way and another, as I have mentioned, and sent out pirates on the sea. At first they harassed people by sailing around in a few small boats, as pirates do, but, as the war dragged on, they became more numerous and sailed in larger ships. Having acquired a taste for rich plunder, they still did not cease their activities when Mithridates was defeated, made peace and retreated. For, having been robbed of their living and their homeland on account of the war, and having fallen into hardship and poverty, they harvested the sea instead of the land, first in myoparones and hemioliai, then in biremes and triremes, cruising around in squadrons, under the command of archpirates just like generals in a war. (App. Mith. 92)\textsuperscript{117}

These statements of Appian are the basis for modern scholars' assumptions about the role of pirates in the Mithridatic wars. The most detailed discussion of this subject is to be

\textsuperscript{116} In the previous chapter, Appian makes Sulla list the various ways in which the Asian communities were "punished" for doing Mithridates' bidding. These include the pillage and slaughter of the inhabitants, redistribution of land, cancellation of debts, freeing of slaves, the establishment of tyrannies, "and piracy all over the land and the sea" (\textit{kai leistēria pollā anā te gēn kai thālassan}). This seems to me to represent a generalized catalogue of the worst crimes that a despot could commit, in Appian's view.

\textsuperscript{117} The suggestion that it was Mithridates who gave the pirates an initial boost is also to be found in Plut. Pomp. 24. Appian repeats the point in his final comments on Mithridates (App. Mith. 119).
found in a paper by Egon Maróti. He sees the relationship between the king and the pirates as one of mutual assistance. Mithridates could not manage to control the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean unaided, and the pirates needed "freedom" for their activities:

"Deshalb liess Mithridates den Piraten freie Hand auf den Meeren und diese vergalten ihm sein Wohlwollen durch kleinere oder grössere Gegendienste, vor allem durch Angriffe auf römische Flotteverbände und Störung des Nachschubs und den römischen Truppen-, Waffen-, und Lebensmitteltransporte."

This seems at first to be a reasonable interpretation, but when the evidence cited by Maróti to back it up is examined, it seems to me that the generalizations lose much of their credibility.

The suggestion that Mithridates gave the pirates a "free hand" should not be taken seriously. How was he supposed to prevent them from going where they pleased and doing as they wished? Appian and Plutarch may, in fact, be repeating the hostile propaganda of earlier Roman sources, aimed at Mithridates. It would be easy to blame Mithridates for the problem of piracy in the Late Republic. Sulla may even have done so after the Peace of Dardanus, but the theme of promoting piracy was nothing new in political invective. Given the confused political situation in large parts of the Eastern Mediterranean at this time it is quite likely that pirates were better able flourish, but they did not need anyone's permission to profit from the chaos of war.

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120 Maróti (1970) typically fails to consider the possibility that the ancient sources might be distorting things. Mattingly (1980) and Jackson (1973) are, however, aware of the dangers of believing everything that Appian and Plutarch say.

121 See above and Part Two.
What about the "little favours" that the pirates performed for Mithridates in return for his generosity? Maróti cites the adventures of L. Licinius Lucullus, Sulla's quaestor, as evidence of the co-operation between the king and the pirates during the first Mithridatic war, but there is no specific evidence to back up his supposition that Mithridates employed pirates against the Romans at this time. The first episode for which we have any details occurs in the third Mithridatic War, long after the supposed "establishment" of the pirates by Mithridates. In 73 B.C. the king of Pontos was forced to abandon his siege of Kyzikos and flee by sea back to his own country.

When Mithridates was sailing towards Pontos another storm blew up. About 10,000 men and 60 ships came to grief and the rest were dispersed according to where the wind blew them. Mithridates, his flagship having been holed, went aboard a pirate ship, although his friends tried to dissuade him, and the pirates brought him safely to Sinope. From there he was taken on to Amisos... (App. Mith. 78.)

The (apparently fortuitous) intervention of a pirate ship at this point was timely, as it saved Mithridates from a watery grave, but it hardly constitutes a major collaboration between the king and the Cilician pirates, as Maróti would like to think. Both Appian and Plutarch suggest that Mithridates was unwise to trust pirates with his safety. Why should this be so, if they were his long-time allies? It seems unlikely that he was rescued by

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122 See below Part Five for a detailed examination of the Lucullus episode. Aside from the generalizations cited above, there are no references in our literary sources to pirates operating with or for Mithridates during the first Mithridatic war. Maróti also cites App. Mith. 115, 117 & Justin 38.3.6. There is nothing of relevance in these passages.


124 The same episode is described, in slightly more dramatic prose, by Plutarch (Plut. Luc. 13.3): "...boarding a piratical myoparo and placing his life in the hands of the pirates; in desperation and at great risk he was brought safely to Herakleia in Pontos." See Maróti (1970), p. 487 n. 24 for other versions in the ancient sources.
"allies" in this case, but rather that some pirates happened to be near and helped him out, presumably expecting a reward.\textsuperscript{125}

A few years later, when he had finished settling affairs in Asia, Lucullus renewed the offensive against Pontos.

But when Appius came and it was clear that he must go to war with Tigranes he passed again into Pontos and, taking his forces with him, he laid siege to Sinope, or rather to the Cilicians who were holding the city for the king. They slaughtered many of the Sinopians and then, setting fire to the city, they fled in the night. Perceiving this Lucullus also entered the city and killed 8,000 of the Cilicians who had been left behind. (Plut. Luc. 23.2)

Memnon also describes the end of the siege, and names the commanders of the garrison, Kleokhares and Seleukos, referring to the latter as "Mithridates' general".\textsuperscript{126} Orosius gives different details:

Lucullus had besieged Sinope and was about to take it by storm. Seleucus the archpirate and Cleochares the eunuch, who were in charge of its defence, plundered and set fire to the city, then abandoned it. (Oros. 6.3.2)\textsuperscript{127}

Strabo, on the other hand, refers to a commander of the garrison appointed by Mithridates as Bakkhides (Str. 12.3.11).

\textsuperscript{125} It seems to me quite likely that the pirates in this instance were operating in a similar fashion to those discussed above who accompanied Demetrios Poliorcetes. On the unsuccessful termination of the siege of Kyzikos they probably departed along with Mithridates and were caught up in the same storm. Ormerod's statement that Mithridates "had no hesitation in transferring himself to a pirate vessel" (1924), p. 211, is based on Orosius brief account (6.2.24), but ignores Appian and Plutarch.

\textsuperscript{126} F.Gr.Hist. 434 fr. 1. 37-38.1.

\textsuperscript{127} Orosius, in the passage cited above, is the only source to name the commander of the pirate vessel which rescued Mithridates, "in the myoparo of the pirate Seleucus".

151
Memnon gives an account of an incident during the siege involving the capture of some supply ships commanded by the Roman navarch Censorinus, whose 15 escort triremes were defeated by Seleukos and the Sinopian triremes:

...they defeated the Italians and took the cargo-ships for their own as booty.\textsuperscript{128}

Maróti, on the basis of these references, comes to the conclusion that the Cilician pirates operated extensively for Mithridates by disrupting Roman communications and attacking their supply and transport vessels.\textsuperscript{129} While it is true that the sources do mention both pirates and Cilicians, the nature of these few references does not suggest that Cilician pirates were a particularly significant part of Mithridates' forces. The (large) garrison of Sinope was more likely to have been made up of mercenaries, many of them no doubt of "Cilician" origin.\textsuperscript{130} The only ancient source who mentions any pirates is Orosius, and he reserves the label for Seleukos. This may be a term of abuse taken from his sources, and it is hardly good evidence for the conclusion that all the cities of the Pontic coast were held for Mithridates by pirates.\textsuperscript{131}

These kinds of references, sometimes in agreement, sometimes conflicting, are typical of the sources for the history of this period, particularly where piracy is concerned. It is possible, by taking the approach of Ormerod and Maróti, to fashion a relatively detailed narrative which "fleshes out" the skeleton provided by Appian's generalizations. Thus, for Maróti, Seleukos is a leading Cilician pirate whose alliance with

\textsuperscript{128} F.Gr.Hist. 434 fr.1 37.2-3.

\textsuperscript{129} Maróti (1970) as quoted above, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{130} See Polyb. 30.25.4 for Cilicians serving in the army of Antiokhos IV. Note that Mithridates seems to have recruited mercenaries in Crete, that other notorious nest of pirates (Flor. 3.6; Memnon F.Gr.Hist. 434 fr.1.33).

\textsuperscript{131} Maróti (1970) p. 487. Jacoby argues that Strabo is most likely to have the correct information about the commander of the Sinopian garrison because his source for this war was a very good one (F.Gr.Hist 434 Kommentar ad loc.). See above for earlier examples of commanders labelled "pirate" or "archpirate".
Mithridates makes him an important figure in the Third Mithridatic War, and he is but one example among many such pirate-mercenaries.\textsuperscript{132} It is not even clear, however, that the term "pirate" is correctly applied to Seleukos. Only Orosius uses it to describe him (Oros. 6.2.24 & 3.2), and he is hardly a reliable or unbiased source, since his aim was essentially to narrate "pagan" history in an unfavourable light.\textsuperscript{133}

If Seleukos was not a pirate, but rather a mercenary leader, or even a general, then his activities are of no significance in relation to the growth of Cilician piracy. It is impossible to choose the "true version" among the conflicting accounts of the Sinope episode, but it seems to me that the main source for the inclusion of this episode among the activities of the Cilician pirates is also the one least to be relied upon. The only clear evidence of the involvement of pirates in any specific part of the Mithridatic wars is the rescue of Mithridates in 73 B.C., in circumstances which suggest that the pirates were "hangers on" rather than important allies.\textsuperscript{134} This does not mean that pirates did not benefit from Mithridates' wars against the Romans, but it would seem to me that their activities were marginal to the conflicts.

\textbf{Sertorius - rebels and pirates}

The Sabine senator Q. Sertorius, who went to Spain as praetor in 83 B.C. is one of the most famous "rebels" in Roman history. In his life of Sertorius, Plutarch describes his adventures after withdrawing from Spain in 81 B.C. to avoid the forces of the pro-Sullan magistrates who were sent to replace him. After a brief excursion to Mauretania he tried to return to Spain.

\textsuperscript{132} Maróti (1970), pp. 486-8.

\textsuperscript{133} See Momigliano (1963). Note also that only Orosius supplies the detail that Kleokhares was a eunuch (6.3.2). In his selection from a variety of earlier sources (completed very quickly) Orosius was more interested in "spice" than accuracy.

\textsuperscript{134} See below Parts Four and Five for more on the Cilician pirates.
Here he was once more driven away from the coast, but, after joining forces with a number of pirate ships from Cilicia, he attacked the island of Pityussa (Ibiza), overpowered the garrison which Annius had placed there, and forced a landing. Soon afterwards Annius arrived with a large fleet and a force of 5,000 infantry, whereupon Sertorius ventured to engage him in a full-scale naval battle, even though his own ships were frailly built and were designed for speed rather than for fighting. (Plut. Sert. 8)\textsuperscript{135}

A storm blew up and scattered Sertorius' ships, which eventually headed out through the straits of Gibraltar and round the coast of Spain to the Guadalquivir delta. Here he was tempted by glowing reports of the "Isles of the Blest" to settle his men there.

But his allies, the Cilician pirates, had no desire for peace or leisure; their interest was all in spoils and riches. So as soon as they discovered Sertorius' intention, they sailed off to Africa to restore Askalis the son of Iptha to the throne of Mauretania. (Plut. Sert. 9)

Sertorius then decided to join the opposing side in this Mauretanian civil war, and was duly victorious. Nothing more is said about the pirates by Plutarch. They seem to have been a relatively small force, apparently trying their luck away from the Eastern Mediterranean. They were prepared to engage Roman forces with Sertorius, and to join in a civil war, but their interest was clearly in the booty to be obtained. It should be noted that they disappear from Plutarch's account just before the arrival of Paccianus with Roman forces sent by Sulla to help Iptha (Plut. Sert. 9). Too little is said about them to draw any general conclusions, but they do, at least, illustrate the possibility of pirates acting as "mercenaries" in this period, although how effective they were is impossible to assess. It is important to note that Sertorius was a marginal political figure at this time,

\textsuperscript{135} I quote from the translation by Scott-Kilvert (1965).
and apparently desperate for support, but only able to obtain allies of a very unreliable kind.

From a literary point of view, it seems to me that Plutarch is trying at this point in his biography to illustrate the decline in Sertorius' fortunes. He has sunk so low that he has to associate with pirates. A comparison might be made with the story of Spartacus and the pirates in Plutarch's *Life of Crassus* (Plut. Crass. 10), which connects Spartacus and Cilician pirates, but is not mentioned in any other source for the events of the Slave Revolt of 73-1 B.C. The story is included by Plutarch to show the change in Spartacus' fortunes, leading eventually to his defeat at the hands of Crassus and his army. It seems to me unlikely that Cilician pirates would have risked a confrontation with the Roman forces in Southern Italy, and the story may even be an invention, an attempt to blacken Spartacus' name even further by associating him with pirates.

**Sextus Pompeius and the Sicilian War**

I made the sea peaceful and freed it of pirates. In that war I captured about 30,000 slaves who had escaped from their masters and taken up arms against the republic, and I handed them over to their masters for punishment.


In these few words of his *Res Gestae* Augustus deals with the Sicilian War of 42-36 B.C. against the last of the republican or "Pompeian" leaders - Sextus Pompeius. The son of Pompey the Great is not mentioned by name, nor does Augustus include the war in his account of the "many civil and foreign wars by land and sea throughout the world" at the start of the *Res Gestae* (ed. Brunt & Moore (1970), p. 19). There is no doubt that he

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136 I follow what has become the conventional practice by referring to Augustus as Octavian when dealing with matters before 27 B.C., and as Augustus thereafter.
is referring to the Sicilian War, sub but he has made it an affair of pirates and runaway slaves. It is often said that the history of any war is written by the victors, and historians of the ancient world need to take particular account of this truism in their own treatment of events.

While modern writers are prepared to acknowledge that the importance of the Sicilian War in the establishment of the principate is greater than Augustus makes it appear, they nevertheless accept his characterization of the war, assigning a leading role to the slaves and the pirates. In the light of what has been suggested above, concerning the participation of pirates in ancient warfare, the idea of a war against pirates and slaves is worthy of some suspicion. We should ask, how realistic is this version of the Sicilian War? How important were the pirates (and the runaway slaves) in this episode of Roman History?

There are several ancient accounts of the exploits of Sextus Pompeius and the Sicilian War, but none of them is written from a standpoint which is entirely independent of Augustus. They all date from the first or second centuries A.D. and are influenced to some extent by the "propaganda" of the Augustan regime. Nevertheless, it is possible to assess the evidence for the involvement of pirates (and slaves) in the Sicilian War, and to show how Augustus came to write his victor's version.

Through a detailed discussion of this episode I will attempt to show three things. Firstly, that the war with Sextus Pompeius formed a major part of the Civil Wars of the 40s and 30s B.C., which culminated in the campaign of 31 B.C. and the Battle of Actium. In terms of scale and political significance it can be ranked alongside any of the conflicts of the period following the death of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. Indeed, it was vital for

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137 See Syme (1939); Brunt & Moore (1970).

138 Ormerod (1924) pp. 250-2; Hadas (1930); Maróti (1961).
Octavian to emerge victorious if he wanted to assume the full mantle of his deified father as master of the Roman world.\textsuperscript{139} Secondly, it was not a mere "pirate war", either in terms of the nature of the combatants or their aims and methods. Nor is the term "slave war" appropriate. Thirdly, the prevailing view of the war, which is based upon pro-Augustan sources, reflects an important "propaganda war", waged by both sides, with Octavian/Augustus getting the final say in his attempt to discredit Sextus Pompeius and to legitimize his own conduct of the war.

The most comprehensive single account of the Civil Wars of the Late Republic is contained in the five books of the Civil Wars which comprised part of Appian's Roman History. Having dealt with the history of the Republic in a series of books which showed how the Romans fought and conquered various peoples to gain control over the Mediterranean region, Appian proceeded to tell the story of how they then fought among themselves. The Civil Wars begins with Ti. Gracchus' tribunate (133 B.C.) and ends with the defeat and death of Sextus Pompeius (36 B.C.). Thus, for Appian, the Sicilian War was not only an integral part of the Civil Wars, it was, in fact, their climax. He preferred to place the struggle with Mark Anthony in an account of the Egyptian Wars of Augustus, which does not survive.\textsuperscript{140}

Similarly, Cassius Dio makes the war with Sextus Pompeius an integral part of his account of the rise of Octavian in his Roman History (Books 46-49). And Suetonius, who calls it the Sicilian War, says, "It would be safe to say that the Sicilian was by far his most dangerous campaign". (Suet. Div.Aug. 16).

\textsuperscript{139} For a full, thoughtful account of this period, see Carter (1970).

\textsuperscript{140} See Goldmann (1988) for a more favourable assessment of Appian than has been the norm in modern historiography. I have not always highlighted differences in the versions of Dio and Appian. I should like to thank John Carter for allowing me to read an as yet unpublished introduction to a translation of Appian.
There is also a strong historical tradition which follows Augustus' version (in the 
Res Gestae as we have it and probably also in his official biography), playing down the 
status of the war, though not its seriousness, and making it a conflict against pirates and 
runaway slaves. The Livian sources (based upon the now lost later books of Livy's 
History of Rome), including the Periochae, Orosius' History Against the Pagans and 
Florus' Breviary, and Velleius Paterculus all demonstrate this tendency with a highly 
moralising tone to their accounts. Plutarch and Suetonius are similar in their tone.

It is Appian and Cassius Dio who give us most of the detailed information on 
which my own interpretation is based. Both agree that Sextus Pompeius was drawn into 
the war with Octavian as a result of his proscription in 43 B.C.

When, however, he discovered his name was on the tablet and he knew that he 
was being proscribed, he prepared for war. He began building triremes and 
received deserters, he took the pirates on to his side and brought the exiles under 
his protection. (Dio 48.17)

Leaving aside the mention of pirates for the moment, the course of events is typical of 
many of the political struggles of the Late Republic. One side seizes control in Rome and 
proscribes leading opponents, who then gather together in order to continue the struggle. 
Sextus Pompeius had already been recognised as a legitimate commander of Roman 
forces, with the title of "Commander of the fleet and the coasts", which he received from 
the Senate in 43 B.C.\(^ {141}\) He was outlawed under the Lex Pedia of August of the same 
year and then proscribed, as were many others, including Cassius and Brutus.

Based in Sicily and Sardinia, he collected many republican exiles around him.

The wealthy citizens fled from a country that they could no longer consider their 
own and took refuge with Pompeius, who was nearby and greatly loved at that 
time. (App. B.C. 4.5)

\(^ {141}\) See Crawford (1974), no. 511 for coins proclaiming this.
These men were to play a major part in determining the course of his actions. He waged war on Octavian and the other triumvirs by raiding the coasts of Italy and blockading the city of Rome, cutting off its vital grain supply. Our sources tend to condemn him for his timidity and failure to press the attack more vigorously. His aim was to put pressure on Octavian through famine and popular unrest, so that he could extort concessions for himself and his fellow republicans. Hindsight may enable us to doubt the wisdom of his long-term strategy, but there can be no doubting the effectiveness of his immediate tactics. His naval victories and his raids on the Italian coast produced a feeling of unease and dramatically reduced the prestige of Octavian in Italy. They encouraged Mark Antony to consider the idea of an alliance with him against Octavian. It was, however, his disruption of the grain supply which had the most spectacular effect.

And famine laid hold of Rome, for the merchants of the East were afraid to sail out because of Pompeius, and his forces in Sicily, while those in the West were baulked by Sardinia and Corsica, which were held by Pompeius' men, and those in Libya were kept in check by the fleets which controlled both sides. (App. B.C. 5.67)

The gravity of the situation was brought home to Octavian by the populace at Rome who rioted and even attacked him personally.

As soon as he appeared they stoned him furiously, and they did not relent even when they saw how he stood up to them, and endured the wounds. (App. B.C. 5.67-8)

The version in Dio (48.31-32) is only slightly less dramatic!

There had been crises over the grain supply before, but, as a recent study notes:
These riots were more serious and prolonged, and the situation more desperate, than in any earlier food crisis.\(^{142}\)

The tactics worked. Octavian and Antony were forced to make peace and negotiate a treaty - the "Misenum Accord" of 39 B.C. The terms of this treaty reveal the significance of the "Sicilian War" and demonstrate very clearly that it was an integral and important phase of the Civil Wars. The terms were as follows:

1. All slaves who had deserted to the republican side were to be free.
2. All exiles were to be restored with \(\frac{1}{4}\) of their property. (Julius Caesar's assassins were excepted).
3. The exiles were to get political offices immediately - praetorships, tribunates and priesthods.
4. Sextus Pompeius was to become consul and augur.
5. He was to receive 70 million sesterces from his father's estate.
6. He was to be governor of Sicily, Sardinia and Akhaia for five years.
7. He was to receive no more deserters, obtain no more ships and keep no garrisons in Italy.
8. He was to devote his efforts to securing peace for the Western coast of Italy.
9. He was to send a stated amount of grain to the city of Rome.

(Dio 48.36; App. B.C. 5.72).

Point (1) indicates that slaves did form part of the forces under Sextus' command, though they had been given their freedom when they joined him, a grant they were anxious to have confirmed. Thus, they were not considered slaves by their commanders. Point (7) is clearly intended to reduce the power of Sextus by removing him from the Italian mainland and curbing his ability to recruit. He already had a considerable

advantage in ships. Octavian had his own uses for the manpower of Italy.\(^{143}\)

Points (2) and (3) were the main aims of Sextus Pompeius' republican followers. With the deaths of Brutus and Cassius in 42 B.C. Sextus Pompeius became the last resort of the republicans. We have no impressive list of names, consuls, ex-praetors and leading senators, such as might be compiled from the adherents of his father on the eve of the battle of Pharsalus in 48 B.C. This is because many of the exiles with Sextus Pompeius were senators who had not had the chance to pursue normal careers and obtain the higher offices. They wanted to get back into the political arena which the Civil Wars had driven them out of, and they needed wealth to do so. For the reconciliation of the two sides to be effective and lasting their demands had to be met. Points (4), (5) and (6) created a fourth partner in the triumvirate. In return for his cessation of hostilities, Sextus Pompeius obtained the rich prize of Akhaia, in addition to his Western holdings. This was a major concession by the triumvirs. The role envisaged for him in points (8) and (9) did not require him to hold Akhaia, and the province was to be a stumbling block for the process of peace. It is doubtful whether Octavian and Antony really intended to be bound by the agreement in any case, the negotiations being to some extent forced upon them by their own followers and popular pressure.

A brief review of the Sicilian War up to 39 B.C. brings us to the following conclusions. Sextus Pompeius was forced into a position as leader of the surviving republicans, firstly through his proscription by the triumvirs, and secondly as a result of

\(^{143}\) See Brunt (1971), pp. 498-500 & 507-8 for calculations of the relative strengths of the two sides in terms of legions and ships. Note that Sextus had seven legions in 43 B.C., in Spain (Cic. Att. 16.4.2). He presumably brought them with him to Sicily and his force was further augmented by surrender of Octavian's troops and republicans like Stalus Murcus. In 36 B.C. he had ten legions which surrendered to Octavian and his commanders. The freed slaves and other men recruited in Italy and Sicily (App. B.C. 4.85; Dio 48.17.6), as well as the various republican additions and "deserters" would mostly have gone to the crews of his ships. Kromayer (1897) suggests that he had 350 ships in 36 B.C., but many would not have been warships.
the battle of Philippi. From his Sicilian base he put military and economic pressure on Octavian at Rome to wrest concessions from the triumvirs. His successes brought about a treaty which met the main demands of his republican followers, in return for an end to the pressure he was exerting.

The Misenum accord was a recognition of the strength of Sextus Pompeius' position. Dio says that he called the shots at the meeting because his forces were far larger and records the suggestion of one of his admirals that he assassinate Octavian and Antony (Dio 48.38). He had no reason to do this, however, since his demands were apparently being met. Why, then, did the war continue after Misenum?

According to Dio and Appian, it was because his demands were not met. The exiles were not restored, as had been agreed, and Akhaia was not handed over by Antony (Dio 48.46; App. B.C. 5.77). In reply, he renewed his attacks on the Italian coasts through his admiral Menekrates. Octavian also complained that Sextus Pompeius had broken the treaty by accepting more "deserters" and building triremes (App. B.C. 5.77). Whatever the truth of these accusations (I shall consider the "propaganda war" below), it seems clear that neither side trusted the other. The struggle for supremacy had to continue. Antony returned to the East and left the heirs of Caesar and Pompey to slug it out. Octavian needed a lot of manpower and expertise (and luck) to defeat Sextus, but his eventual victory signalled the final demise of the republican or "Pompeian" side and (according to Appian), the end of the Civil Wars.

If the Sicilian War was, as I have shown, another chapter of the Civil Wars, why did Augustus (and many others) call it a pirate war? What part did pirates play in the conflict? In order to answer this question it is first necessary to show that the label "pirate war" is an inappropriate one.
The case for pirates playing a major role in the Sicilian War is argued most fully by Egon Maróti.\(^{144}\) I will summarize his article. He begins by pointing out that piracy was still a problem after 67 B.C., in spite of the extravagant claims made concerning Pompey's successes. Pirates, he claims, only played a significant part in Roman History once more, as the adherents of Sextus Pompeius. He makes various points to justify this view. All the sources agree in calling it a "pirate war", they confirm that pirates (and slaves) were very important in deciding the outcome. The methods employed by Sextus Pompeius were very similar to those of pirates. This (according to Maróti) is because his admirals were all ex-pirates. Their influence waxed as that of his republican followers waned, partly because of conflicts over what to do. Maróti traces Sextus Pompeius' connections with the pirates back to his change of location in 43 B.C., and his reaction to being proscribed. It was the pirate admirals who forced him to take a stand against a peaceful settlement of grievances in order to plunder Italy.

Dieser Konflikt ist aber vor allen Dingen auf den Einfluß seiner raubsüchtigen Piratenadmirale und auf den Bedarf an Rudermanschaften für seine Flotte zurückzuführen. Diese beiden Komponenten führten also zur Plünderung Italiens, zu den Versuch des Aushungerns der römischen Stadtbewohner und zur Aufnahme der geflüchteten Sklaven.\(^{145}\)

The unanimity of the sources will be dealt with below. To argue that Sextus Pompeius' use of piratical methods justifies the label "pirate war" is too simplistic. I have already considered other cases of piratical methods (and pirates themselves) being used in ancient warfare, but there is no question, for example, of calling the siege of Rhodes a "pirate war". Sextus Pompeius' blockade of Italy was on a far larger scale than the

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\(^{144}\) Maróti (1961).

blockade of Rhodes. It was also largely effected by the possession of vital territory - namely Sicily, Sardinia and places in Italy. Such raiding as was carried out (E.g. App. B.C. 5.77ff.; Dio 48.46ff.) was intended to put pressure upon Octavian by stretching his military resources, damaging his prestige and undermining his support in Italy. It is also the aims rather than the methods which count in deciding such cases, as I have shown above. To ascribe eight years of sustained conflict to a lust for plunder is going too far.

The recruitment of exiles, deserters and (possibly) runaway slaves on Sextus Pompeius' part is not evidence of the influence of pirates. It seems likely that many of his "recruits" came to him in Sicily from local towns and cities, or from Italians who preferred his side in the Civil Wars. There is also the likelihood that many of the "exiles" would have brought clients and dispossessed tenants with them.

On the subject of slaves it is worth noting that Octavian himself was not above recruiting servile oarsmen into his fleet. He "requested" a large number from his friends, and took them when he was not offered enough (Dio 48.49; Suet. Div. Aug. 16). His levies of money and men were also on a large scale.

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146 See Garnsey (1988) and Rowland (1990) on the significance of Sicily and Sardinia for the food supply of Rome.

147 The scale of Octavian's response is indicated by Brunt (1971), who calculates that Lepidus sent him about 35,000 men in 36 B.C. for the war, and Octavian invaded Sicily with 12 legions. See Paget (1968) for the impressive harbour works undertaken at Cumae to accommodate Agrippa's fleet which were then abandoned as soon as the war was over.

148 See Brunt (1971).

149 I note that the number given for these slaves in Suetonius Life of Augustus is 30,000. The same as the number "returned" to their masters from the runaways recruited by Sextus (Res Gestae 25). It is tempting to see the runaways as convenient replacements for those conscripted in 37 B.C. Brunt (1971), p. 507 reckons the number would have manned less than half of Octavian's ships. Maróti seems to want to connect slaves and pirates in a way which I feel is due to the Augustan bias of our sources and the reputation of pirates as slave dealers.
I would see in the association of Sextus Pompeius with slaves and pirates a deliberate attempt to illegitimize him and to justify Octavian's war against him.\textsuperscript{150}

Another point which Maróti overlooks is the activity of Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, who acted in a very similar fashion to Sextus Pompeius in the Adriatic. For Domitius was one of Caesar's murderers, he escaped after the battle of Philippi, gathered together a small fleet, and made himself master of the Gulf for a while, and did a lot of damage to the cause of his opponents. (Dio 48.7.5). Domitius, who is never accused of piracy, or even of associating with pirates, eventually defected to Antony, through the agency of Asinius Pollio (Dio 48.16; App. B.C. 5.55). He was consul in 32 B.C. and managed to switch sides at the crucial moment in 31 B.C. His better reputation must be partly due his ending up on the side of the victor.\textsuperscript{151}

It is claimed by Maróti that two of Sextus Pompeius' most important admirals were ex-pirates. Menekrates and Menodoros (called Menas by Dio) are names which could have a Cilician origin. Both are credited with considerable naval expertise and both are described as freedmen of Sextus Pompeius.\textsuperscript{152} In the account of Appian, in particular, Menodorus is portrayed as his main confidant, until he defects to Octavian in 38 B.C. The two freedmen encountered each other in a naval battle soon after and Menekrates was killed. It is possible that they could both have been enslaved as pirates by Pompey in 67 B.C. and subsequently freed, but their previous histories are not

\textsuperscript{150} See below for the "propaganda war" of the time and its effects on later historians.

\textsuperscript{151} His forces were quite considerable, see Brunt (1971).

\textsuperscript{152} Menodoros/Menas is also said to be a former slave of Pompey the Great. Mark Antony is said to have claimed him as a fugitive slave because Pompey's property had passed to Antony (App. B.C. 5.79). Velleius (2.73) says that both were Pompey's freedmen.
commented on in our sources, a strange omission if they had been pirates.\textsuperscript{153} What is more significant about the pair is their skill in \textit{naval warfare} (E.g. Dio 48.46ff.), which they are unlikely to have acquired as pirates. They were both admirals and it was as admirals that they were important to Sextus Pompeius and the republicans. Until Menodoros defected Octavian was at a serious disadvantage due to a lack of experience among his own commanders. He was lucky to have the services of the remarkable M. Agrippa, whose skills helped to turn the tide of the war in his favour after the disastrous experiences under Salvidienus and Calvisius Sabinus (Dio 48.47-9).

Menodoros had ambitions far above the possibilities of an ex-pirate (Dio 48.45). He changed sides twice more, ending up with Octavian. He died in Octavian's service in Pannonia in 35 B.C. There was obviously considerable rivalry in the camp of Sextus Pompeius between his various commanders. One casualty of this was Lucius Statius Murcus, a former legate of Julius Caesar. He joined Sextus after Philippi, but was murdered in 40 B.C. (Dio 48.19; App. B.C. 5.70).\textsuperscript{154}

If, as I have suggested, the connections made between Sextus and "the pirates" are the result of propaganda on the part of his opponents, it remains to be explained why they would choose to do this, and to show how he was discredited and illegitimized.

There was nothing remarkable about an attempt to make a political enemy out to be a pirate, or the associate of pirates. In 70 B.C. Cicero used every opportunity he could

\textsuperscript{153} Plutarch does call Menas a pirate, and describes them both as being in charge of a "pirate fleet" (Plut. Ant. 32) but this is the only explicit statement and is probably there for literary effect. Menas is acting dishonourably (unlike Sextus Pompeius) and Sextus has just undertaken to clear the sea of pirates in Plutarch's version of events. I find the silence of Appian and Dio on this point more compelling than the sole explicit testimony of Plutarch.

\textsuperscript{154} The "admirals" in the service of Sextus Pompeius exhibit characteristics which are similar to those found in the \textit{condottieri} of the 15th and 16th centuries A.D. See Mallett (1974). They had the skills (in naval warfare) which were needed at the time, hence their rise to a certain prominence in the Civil Wars.
to discredit Gaius Verres, the former governor of Sicily, when he prosecuted him in Rome.

Do we also inquire what Verres has got up to in deepest Phrygia, or in the furthest parts of Pamphylia... he who was found to be an abominable pirate here in the Roman forum? (Cic. II Verr. 1.154)\textsuperscript{155}

There was a strong image of pirates as "the enemies of all mankind" in the first century B.C.\textsuperscript{156} This was not diminished by the campaign of Pompey in 67 B.C. In the 40s B.C. there are also examples of political opponents being labelled as pirates or bandits. Julius Caesar, in his description of the forces arrayed against him at Alexandria in 48 B.C. says they were "collected from the pirates and bandits of the provinces of Cilicia and Syria" (Caes. B.C.3.110). Cicero and his correspondents in 44-43 B.C. constantly refer to Mark Antony as "the Bandit".\textsuperscript{157}

In the case of Sextus Pompeius there was, of course the added irony that his father had been the most successful of a series of Roman generals who campaigned against pirates in the first century B.C. His "piratical" tactics lent themselves to the accusation that he was employing pirates himself. The point is brought out by the ancient sources.

O how unlike his father! He exterminated the Cilicians, his son supported the pirates... (Florus 2.18.1)\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155} For further examples see II Verr. 1.90, 4.29 & 5.5 and above Part Two, \& Part Three.

\textsuperscript{156} See Maróti (1962b) although I am not convinced by his arguments for a "common war" against pirates. See also Ormerod (1924), chpt. 2.

\textsuperscript{157} Cic. ad fam. 10.5; 10.6; 12.12; 12.14 = S.-B. nos. 259, 370, 387 & 405.

\textsuperscript{158} Note that Cilician can be a synonym for pirate. This may help to explain the identification of Menodoros as a pirate. If he was from Anatolia, that was practically Cilicia, and all Cilicians were pirates! See Plut. Ant. 32. Plutarch seems to like the association of pirates and Sicily. He is the only source to refer to a deal between Spartacus and the Cilician pirates in 72 B.C. (Plut. Crass. 10). This episode is probably a literary invention.
Through his father's freedmen, Menas and Menekrates, the commanders of his fleet, he infested the seas with raiding and piracy, using plunder to support himself and his army. Nor was he ashamed to plague with the wickedness of piracy the very sea which had been cleared of it by his father's arms and leadership. (Velleius 2.73.3)

Sextus Pompeius and the triumvirs were involved in a competition for the support of the Roman World. In order to maintain their challenge for the supreme position in the Roman Republic they needed men and materials. Dio says of Sextus in 43 B.C.

He anchored off Italy, and sent agents to Rome and to the other cities, offering among other things, a reward to those who saved any one which was double that announced for murdering them, and he promised the men themselves a place of safety, help, money and honours. As a result many came to him. (Dio 47.13).

He recruited in Sicily and Italy, making his own position stronger by demonstrating that Octavian was vulnerable and offering a choice between himself and the triumvirs (App. B.C. 4.85). His "plundering raids" should be seen as an attempt to undermine the position of Octavian in Italy. It was hardly a gentle form of persuasion, but they were not gentle times. He portrayed himself as the son of Neptune, the lord of the seas, both on coins and in public spectacles (Dio 48.19; App. B.C. 5.100)\(^\text{159}\)

Sextus was undoubtedly popular, for his own sake as well as for his father's. The popular approval which was demonstrated for him in Rome in 40 B.C. must have seriously worried both Octavian and Anthony (Dio 48.31; App. B.C. 5.67). It is at this point, in my estimation, that the "propaganda war" can be most clearly seen in operation.

\(^{159}\) See Crawford (1974), no. 511. Staius Murcus also issued coins of a similar kind, possibly an indication of their rivalry. See Zanker (1988), chpt. 2, esp. pp. 39-42 on the similar images used by Octavian and Sextus on coins proclaiming naval victories over each other.
Sextus, on his part, noised it abroad that Antony did not think he was being treated justly, and pursued his own projects more eagerly. Finally he sailed to Italy, made many landings, inflicting and suffering a great deal of damage (Dio. 48.46).

Accusations and recriminations had been flying back and forth on both sides over the Misenum Accord. Octavian was very unpopular in Rome, where the effects of Sextus’ tactics were most keenly felt. In order to revive his fortunes and gain the support he needed he tried a "smear campaign".

Octavian captured and subjected to torture some bands of pirates, who said that Pompeius had sent them out, and Octavian announced this to the people and wrote about it to Pompeius himself, who rejected the claim and made his own protest about the Peloponnesos. (App. B.C. 5.77)

Sextus had been accepted into a kind of partnership with the triumvirs. In order to justify turning against him, it was necessary to illegitimize him in Roman eyes. By accusing him of harbouring slaves and making him into a pirate, Octavian could justify breaking faith with him, and ignoring a treaty which had been deposited with the Vestal Virgins in Rome (Dio 48.37). Escaped slaves had long been a nightmare image for the Romans, especially in Sicily. The pirate was not a proper enemy, and so no promise to him was binding (Cic. Off. 3.107). Maróti is right to say that all the sources agree about the importance of pirates in the Sicilian War, but that is because they have all been influenced (directly or indirectly) by the "propaganda" of Augustus and his victor’s version. It should be noted that the references to pirates in the sources tend to be very vague. "The

160 tina leistéria.

161 The only modern scholar whose view of Sextus Pompey as a victim of propaganda agrees with mine seems to be Starr (1941), pp. 6-7.

162 nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium. See above Part Two, p. 71.
Pirates and warfare

This examination of the involvement of piracy and pirates in ancient warfare from the Classical period to the Late Republic has demonstrated that piracy and warfare might often overlap. The part that pirates played in Demetrios' seige of Rhodes was, like their contribution to the Mithridatic Wars, a very marginal and insignificant one. Some of the wars of the Classical and Hellenistic periods, however, particularly in the fourth, late third and early second centuries B.C. seem to show piracy as a common aspect of warfare, with some pirates apparently operating alongside of one side or another. On other occasions pirates appear as independent opportunists. There are several cases of the methods of piracy being used in warfare, but the term "pirate" is not used of any of those involved, or is an inappropriate translation for the relevant Greek or Latin words.

It is important to be sensitive to the deliberately hostile language used by many ancient sources to describe opponents. In the case of Sextus Pompeius the pirates are the product of a successful "smear campaign" by his victorious rival Augustus, reflected in many of the sources for this period. The period after Augustus is marked by much less warfare in the Mediterranean and also less piracy. There is, however, still some scope for the defeated in war to turn to piracy, and some cases where the vocabulary of piracy is applied to the combatants in warfare.
The Jewish pirates at Joppa

In the latter part of the Jewish rebellion of A.D. 66-74, after the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, some of the survivors gathered together in the coastal city of Joppa and decided to turn to piracy:

And so they built themselves a fleet of piratical ships and engaged in raids on the coastline of Syria and Phoenicia and the sea route to Egypt, making those seas unnavigable for all.164

Vespasian sent a force of cavalry and infantry to attack the city. The inhabitants took to their ships rather than resist the Romans, but the rough coastline and the bad weather wrecked many of them. Some died in the sea and many others were killed by the Roman legionaries on the shore. The city itself was occupied to prevent its further use (Jos. B.J. 3.9.1-4).

The pirates of Joppa are another example of a group turning to piracy after being defeated in war. Their initial success, possibly exaggerated by Josephus, stemmed from the potential of Joppa as a place from which to attack the prosperous coastline and shipping of the Levant and Egypt. The Roman response seems to have been swift, however, and was relatively easy to effect because there were large forces already in the area.165

The third century A.D.

There were numerous occasions during the third century A.D. when warfare and piracy seem to have come closer together than at any time since the Hellenistic period. The various barbarian raids of the middle of the century are difficult to classify as either one or the other. To call the barbarians "pirates" is too simplistic, and does not adequately

164 Jos. B.J. 3.9.2.
165 See Part Five below for further discussion of the suppression of piracy at Joppa.
reflect the nature of the threat which they posed to the inhabitants of the Roman Empire. They often employed the methods of pirates - moving from place to place by sea, attacking and plundering relatively unprotected targets, aided by the unexpectedness of their action. The scale of their raids varied considerably, in the North Sea as well as in the Black Sea and Mediterranean.

Rebels and pirates

At least one of the "pretenders" or "usurpers" who challenged the established emperors in this period was called a pirate. The *Augustan History*, when referring to Trebellian, one of the rivals for imperial power in the reign of Gallienus, says:

> He gave himself the title of emperor, although others called him an archpirate.166

(S.H.A. Trig. tyr. 26.2)

It is probably no coincidence that Trebellian's power base was in Isauria, a region which was famous for its bandits and pirates. The label "pirate" could still be used in the third century as a term of political abuse which implied that an opponent was not politically legitimate, in much the same way as it could in the Late Republic.167 Another example of the same phenomenon is the rival to the tetrarchs in the late third century A.D. Carausius, who, although he was originally commissioned to deal with piracy on the coasts of Gaul and Britain, ends up being called a pirate himself.168

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166 *quem cum alii archipiratam vocassent.*

167 See above on Sextus Pompeius and Part Two on Cicero. See Amm. 14.2; 19.13; 27.9 for references to banditry in Isauria in the fourth century A.D. Ammianus also accuses the Persians of banditry (*furta et latrocinia*) in describing their border raids in A.D. 356 (Amm. 16.9). See also Hopwood (1983).

The Vandals

The occupation of Africa by the Vandals began in A.D. 429, when they crossed from Spain, probably using a variety of fishing and merchant ships taken from the local ports of Spain and Mauretania. In A.D. 439 they captured Carthage and used the annona fleet to carry out maritime raids. They may have built some vessels while they occupied Carthage, but essentially their fleet was a merchant one used for military transport and piracy.\footnote{\textsuperscript{169}}

It should not be thought, however, that the Vandals were only interested in piracy and plunder. In the first place, the period during which Vandal pirate raids were a serious menace in the Mediterranean seems to have been only about 35-40 years from the capture of Carthage. Secondly, the label "pirates" is not sufficient to describe a people who ruled a considerable empire during the fifth century A.D. In his monograph on the Vandals C. Courtois makes an important distinction between raiding carried out by Gaiseric and his followers for plunder, and operations conducted for conquest and the establishment of control over certain places.\footnote{\textsuperscript{170}} In some areas it is clear that strategic considerations lay behind the Vandals' attacks, to others they came only as pirates, in search of plunder and slaves.

Sicily, for example, was one of the first places that they raided and was fought over by the Vandals and the Ostrogoths for a long period. In A.D. 468 it seems that the Vandals established control of the entire island, but an agreement was made in A.D. 476 between Gaiseric and Odovacer in which the latter received Sicily as a tribute-paying

\footnote{\textsuperscript{169} See below Part Four on the extent of the Vandal raids. The nature of their "navy" is discussed by Courtois (1955), pp. 205-9 and Diesner (1966), pp. 123-8; see also Reddé (1986), pp. 647-50. The suggestion of Morales Belda (1969) that they had a regular navy before A.D. 439 is without serious foundation.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{170} See Courtois (1955), p. 197 and pp. 212-4; the latter section is mainly concerned with the economic basis of the Vandal "empire".}
vassal of the Vandal monarch (Vict. de Vit. 1.14).\textsuperscript{171} In A.D. 491, however, Gunthamund was forced to abandon the tribute claims on the Ostrogoths and recognise their possession of almost all of Sicily (Cassiod. Chron. 1327). Vandal interest in Sicily remained strong for strategic reasons, but their presence was reduced to a small area around Marsala.\textsuperscript{172} The island is the closest to Carthage and has obvious strategic importance.

In A.D. 474 Gaiseric concluded a treaty with the emperor Zeno by the terms of which his authority in Africa was recognized, in return for a cessation of Vandal attacks on the Eastern provinces (Procop. Bel. Vand. 1.7.26). There were no attempts to conquer or control territory in the Eastern provinces, and the Vandal raids on Greece and in the Aegean can only be termed piracy.

Spain was another place which seems largely to have escaped the wrath of the Vandals. If the raid on Galicia recorded by Hydatius in 445 (Hydat. Chron. 131)\textsuperscript{173} was not carried out by the Vandals, then their only activity on the Spanish mainland would seem to be the defeat of Majorian's expedition at Alicante in A.D. 460.\textsuperscript{174} Similarly, the Vandals' occupation of the Balearic islands can be accounted for by their concern about Majorian's fleet. Sardinia and Corsica were conquered under Gaiseric and used as bases for raids on the Italian mainland, but also for the exiling of recalcitrant clergy and political opponents from Africa.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{171} See also Courtois (1955), pp. 190-3 for detailed discussion of the chronology and the interpretation of the crucial passage in Victor's History of the Vandal Persecution.

\textsuperscript{172} See also Courtois (1955), p. 193.

\textsuperscript{173} See Tranoy (1974) ad loc. for the alternative suggestion that it was Herulians who carried out the raid.

\textsuperscript{174} See below Part Five, p. 386.

\textsuperscript{175} See Courtois (1955), pp. 185-90 for the details. Victor of Vita records numerous banishments to these islands.
From c. A.D. 476 the Vandals were at peace with most of their neighbours and devoted their energies to consolidating their position in Africa. Their political achievements were considerable. Gaiseric had forced the Byzantine emperor to recognise his control of Africa and the rulers of Italy were, at least for a time, his vassals. The territories which the Vandals controlled by the end of the third quarter of the fifth century A.D. constituted a substantial part of the main grain producing areas of the Western Empire. It can be reasonably assumed that part of Gaiseric's political "muscle" resulted from this advantageous position. Piracy had been a profitable activity for Gaiseric, but it was only one aspect of the "foreign policy" of the Vandal kingdom in the fifth century.

The Arabs

After the Byzantine reconquest of Carthage there was a resurgence of "Roman" seapower which lasted for nearly a century. In many cases it was only the ability of the Emperors in Constantinople to dispatch large forces overseas that kept their Empire together. The distant enclaves of Carthage, Dalmatia and Campania were maintained against their foes by the dromons of the imperial fleet, which had no rivals in the Mediterranean.

This situation changed completely with the arrival of the forces of Islam in the seventh century. Within a few years of the death of Mohammed they had reached Syria. Akre, Tyre, Sidon, Beyrouth and Laodikea all fell in A.D. 637, Jerusalem and Antioch a year later, and in A.D. 640 Caesarea was captured. The remorseless advance continued.

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176 See Courtois (1955), pp. 213-14 on the pursuit of power through control of "l'empire du blé".

177 See below Part Four on Vandal piracy and trade in the fifth century. See below Part Five on attempts to suppress it.

westwards until Cyrenaica was taken from the Emperor’s hands in A.D. 642, the same year in which the long siege of Alexandria was brought to an end by the Arab commander Amr. Northwards the penetration of Syria was slowed and although Cyprus was lost in A.D. 649, Anatolia was largely preserved, but by A.D. 674 an Arab army was encamped opposite Constantinople, across the Sea of Marmora at Kalkhedon.\textsuperscript{179}

Warfare at sea was also a chapter of disasters, ending in the defeat of Constantine III’s fleet in the Aegean in A.D. 655. Contact with Carthage was maintained almost until the end of the century, but the main preoccupations of the rulers were with the land battle in the East, and a determined effort from the base of Kairouan in the Sahel resulted in the conquest of Carthage in A.D. 698. By A.D. 711 the armies of the Prophet were poised to cross the Straits of Gibraltar and enter mainland Europe through Spain.\textsuperscript{180}

Some of the early attacks on Anatolia and the Aegean were made by small flotillas and in a manner which can be described as "piratical". Within a few years of the conquest of Egypt it is also clear that regular raids were being made from there against the Christians. These expeditions, known as the koûrsa, are mentioned in numerous papyri from the seventh century and were organized by the authorities of the Kaliphate.\textsuperscript{181} This form of institutionalized piracy lasted long into the medieval period.

\textsuperscript{179} See Butler (1978); Kennedy (1986).

\textsuperscript{180} See Collins (1989), chpt. 1.

\textsuperscript{181} See Brooks (1898), a summary of excerpts from the major chroniclers, including al-Yaqubi and al-Tabari, on the raids against Syria and Anatolia; Bell (1910) on the koûrsa, as revealed by the Aphrodito papyri.
Conclusions

In very early times piracy and warfare were indistinguishable. In the Archaic period there developed an image of pirates as evildoers worthy of censure, but warfare and piracy continued to be essentially the same thing - obtaining plunder by violence. Towards the end of the Archaic period, however, a difference begins to emerge between piracy, which is on a smaller scale and lacks political objectives, and warfare, which may still involve plundering but has additional motives. The growth of city-states with imperialist ambitions was instrumental in this process.

From the Classical period onwards an interest in plunder continued to be a common factor in ancient warfare and piracy. Plundering in war may be carried both by members of the warring communities, and also by others who are not directly involved in the conflict. Plundering by way of reprisal is a form of violence which seems to cross the divide between war and piracy, it may be politically motivated, or it may be carried out purely for plunder. Nevertheless, the involvement of pirates in warfare was marginal, since the methods of piracy and warfare overlapped less as the scale of the conflicts increased. In some cases the appearance of pirates in war may be ascribed to "name-calling" in the sources.

In the latter part of the Hellenistic period and into the Late Republic piracy and warfare become more dissimilar. The part played by pirates in the wars of the Late Republic was very marginal, although accusations of piracy, intended to "illegitimize" opponents in warfare, were still common.

During the Principate war and piracy were less prevalent in the Mediterranean region, largely as a result of the establishment of firm political control by the Roman emperors. Most cases of piracy reported in the sources refer to those defeated in warfare, or rebels and usurpers. The latter may be the victims of political invective, not pirates at all. On the fringes of the Roman Empire, and beyond, piracy seems to have been fairly
common. Periods of great political instability allowed some barbarian "pirates" to penetrate into the heart of the Mediterranean.

The collapse of the Roman Empire from the fifth to the seventh century created conditions in which piracy flourished.¹⁸² War and piracy continue to overlap, but the greater scale and political objectives remained a distinctive feature of warfare.

¹⁸² See below Part Five, pp. 382-9.
Introduction - Trade and piracy

Trade and piracy are both forms of economic activity. They can have a similar motive (the accumulation of wealth) and achieve similar results (the movement of goods and/or persons across long distances). The difference between them is that piracy involves violence and the forceful obtaining or transfer of property. Trade is a non-violent activity, flourishing best in times of peace and political stability.

Maritime trade has a longer history than piracy. The oldest known shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, found off the coast of Turkey at Ulu Burun and Cape Gelidonya, were almost certainly trading vessels, operating between the coasts and islands of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 14th and 13th centuries B.C. They carried mixed cargoes of basic necessities and luxuries, as well as all the paraphernalia required to trade in several different lands and with several different peoples. There is, however, little that can be said about the relationship between trade and piracy until the end of the Archaic Period.

By the sixth century it seems that there was a clear distinction in the Mediterranean between cargo ships, short and rounded in most cases, and warships, longer and slimmer, with a ram on the prow. The Greeks began to use specific words for merchants, and to create institutions for the facilitation and practice of trade. An Athenian law attributed to the time of Solon and preserved through a quotation in the Digest (Dig. 47.22.4), recognizes the swearing of oaths for associations of citizens for the

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2. See, for example, Casson (1986), figs. 81 & 82 - a sixth-century Athenian Black Figure vase showing a cargo ship and a warship (B.M. no. 436).

conduct of religious rites, burials, revelling, trade and plundering. Trade was becoming more organized and more important.

Thucydides says that the Corinthians were among the first to put down piracy in order to help traders (Thuc. 1.13), but there is no secure date for this remark, which may be an invention on the basis of the contemporary attitudes to piracy and trade. Mention has already been made of the distinction between pirates and traders in Homer, the latter apparently not receiving the same high status as the former, although this may not reflect a prevalent attitude among the poet's contemporaries and his upper-class audience. As the Greeks expanded their trading connections and colonized many places in the Mediterranean, it is likely that the status of traders could have become higher and relatively better in moral terms than that of pirates. There is plenty of evidence from the Late Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic periods that piracy could be a considerable threat to merchants and long-distance trade. Mention has already been made of the piratical colonists of Zankle (Thuc. 6.4.5), the depredations of Polykrates of Samos in the sixth century B.C. (Herod. 3.39), and Histiaios of Miletos during the Ionian Revolt. The latter seems to have preyed particularly on merchant ships (Herod. 6.5 & 26-30). Merchant ships were particularly vulnerable in times of war, since even "neutral" vessels would not be spared by plunderers who sought to profit from hostilities. The plundering and piracy of the fifth and fourth centuries seems to have claimed many victims among merchants, and maritime trade was clearly a major target for all kinds of pirates.

Diodorus says that Evagoras was able to stop supplies from reaching the Persian army on Cyprus in 386 B.C. by intercepting the ships at sea, and so discouraging

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4 eis emporian.
5 epí leian oikhómenoi.
6 See above Part Three and Below Part Five, pp. 223-23.
7 See above Part Three for examples.
merchants from sailing (Diod. 15.3.1). Demosthenes claims that pirates (leistai) were successful in blockading the ports of Macedon in the fourth century (E.g. Demos. 18.145; 19.315). Although it is not clear whether they were Athenians, or allies of the Athenians, or others acting on their own initiative, this hardly mattered to the Macedonians or the merchants who were being attacked and prevented from trading. The Athenians themselves also suffered from attacks on their shipping, especially the grain fleets which regularly sailed to and from the Pontos, and needed a naval escort.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the financial arrangements undertaken by seafaring merchants and traders were more elaborate and restrictive than those commonly used in Classical Athens. Maritime loans (and the interest on them) were only repaid if the ship arrived safely at its destination and the cargo was sold. If not, the lender had to bear the full cost. As a result the interest rates were very high, because of the dangers of shipwreck and piracy, and the contracts were sometimes very specific about the conduct of the voyage to try to minimize risk. In the fourth century, with so much warfare and piracy, there was plenty of risk.

Even in places where no-one was actually at war, there might still be a gauntlet of pirates for cargo ships to run. For example, Diodorus claims that in the middle of the fourth century the Adriatic was particularly dangerous for merchants because of the Apulian pirates who attacked ships crossing from the coast of Greece to Italy (Diod. 16.5.3). This appears to have nothing to do with any wars at the time. In the early third century, when Agathokles supplied some of the Apulians with ships for piracy, the situation presumably became even worse (Diod. 21.4). The dedication by a man from

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8 See above Part Three for more examples of piracy and plundering in warfare directed against merchant ships.

9 E.g. J.G. II (2nd edn.) nos. 408 (c.330 B.C.) and 1628, lines 37-42 (326/5 B.C.). See Garnsey (1988), chpt. 5 on Athenian grain supply from the Black Sea region.

Askalon quoted in Part Two was probably a merchant who fell foul of pirates and had a lucky escape in the second or first century B.C.\(^1\) Perhaps this man had escaped from the pirates whose bases were around Mt. Korykos, near Erythrai, who, according to Strabo, reconnoitred the harbours and ports to find out which merchants were going to sail, and with which cargoes, then they attacked them at sea and plundered their ships (Str. 14.1.32).

There was, however, another side to the relationship between trade and piracy, which should not be overlooked. As has already been observed, piracy itself could be considered as a form of trade. Pirates, like merchants, are engaged in a "commercial" activity, trying to make some kind of profit from their plunder. Agathokles did not merely expect friendship or alliance from the Apulians in return for the ships which he supplied to them, he also got a share of their booty (Diod. 21.4).\(^12\) A similar relationship existed between Philip V of Macedon and Dikaiarkhos the Aitolian - ships being supplied in return for the plunder they were used to obtain (Diod. 28.1.1).\(^13\) Skerdilaidas, cheated of his profits by Philip V, endeavoured to make up for this by his raids on merchant ships. He seems to have met the initial expense of the plundering he undertook on Philip's behalf from his own resources, so he had even more incentive to obtain a quick profit (Polyb. 5. 95; 101).\(^14\)

Another example of a quarrel over booty is an inscription from Thera which deals with captives taken by pirates from Allaria in Crete. It seems that some of the pirates’ associates were originally from Thera and they objected to the sale of the captives, who were presumably Therans, and had tried to get the intervention of a Ptolemaic officer to

\(^1\) I. Delos no. 2305; see above Part One on inscriptions.

\(^12\) τὰ μέρη τὸν λείον εἴλαμβανε.

\(^13\) See above Part Three on Philip V and Dikaiarkhos.

\(^14\) See above Part Three on Skerdilaidas and Philip.
help them in their negotiations. The inscription is a letter from this officer, in which he
gives a brief history of the Therans.

...on their side the Allariotes say that they (the Therans) were originally captives
and that they spent three years with the Allariotes who gave them a share in their
home and freed them as not merely assistants, but partners in their struggles. But
no promise was made that they should receive any booty...15

These Therans seem to have been slightly more than slaves but slightly less than free
partners. They did not become Allariote citizens, and their labours on behalf of their
former masters were not rewarded with any booty. It is impossible to say what were the
normal practices of plunderers and pirates, but the reluctance of the Allariotes to share
their booty is striking. It suggests some kind of hierarchy among the Cretans, with only
an élite being granted a chance to benefit directly from the profits of piracy.16 The
essential point is that booty is highly prized. The matter was eventually settled by an
exchange of prisoners, the Allariotes not being prepared to lose out in their dealings with
the Therans. The Ptolemaic officer's letter concludes:

...the persons who were with us we yielded up. Of these there were —— Greeks
and the rest, being 45 in number, were foreigners.17

These unfortunates were presumably sold as slaves by the Allariotes.

An important element in the success of piracy was often the availability of a
suitable market for the pirates' plunder. Slaves could be sold at a number of major
markets in the Mediterranean, including Athens, Rhodes, Crete (especially Polyrhenia),
and Delos.18 Some places seem to have provided facilities for certain groups of pirates

16 See Brulé (1978), pp. 12-16 for further discussion and bibliography.
17 J.G. XII.3.328, lines 18-20. The number of the Greeks is not preserved.
18 See below for further discussion of the slave trade and piracy.
to dispose of their plunder. Aigina figures in several accounts of plundering and piracy in the fourth century B.C. Its proximity to both Attika and the Peloponnese may have made it an ideal place for the disposal of booty obtained from piracy and plundering in reprisal during the many wars which plagued the Greeks at this time.  

Although there are no explicit statements to this effect in any of the ancient sources, it seems reasonable to assume that the declaration of reprisals by one state or city against another implied that any mechanism for recovering property which had been plundered by pirates and sold would not apply. Conversely, there is considerable evidence to suggest that both people and property were regularly recovered after attack by pirates through the intervention of proxenoi or citizens of the victim’s own state in the place where they had been sold. When plundering in reprisal is the reason for piracy, therefore, it seems most likely that the pirates would dispose of booty in their home port.

Where there was no "legal" justification for piracy, however, legal, moral or political difficulties might be overcome by those unscrupulous enough to deal in "stolen goods", especially if the trade was a valuable one. Some of the cities of Pamphylia, Cilicia and Eastern Lycia were notorious in the last two centuries B.C. for their co-operation with pirates.

But they (the Pamphylians and Cilicians) made use of such places as bases for the practice of piracy, either being pirates themselves, or else furnishing the pirates with markets for their plunder and docking facilities. In Side, at any rate, a city of Pamphylia, the docks were set up for the benefit of the Cilicians, who used to

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19 See above Part Three on reprisals.

20 See below on ransom and recovery of prisoners. Pritchett (1991) collects references to ransoming. Brulé (1978) discusses in detail the various ways that victims of Cretan piracy could be recovered by their own cities or representatives acting on their behalf. Decrees of isopoliteia would be particularly useful in this respect since they could provide access to courts and arbitration. See also Gauthier (1972).
sell their captives there by auction, admitting that they were free men. (Str. 14.3.2)²¹

Delos was also famous as a pirates' market, but the island is also an example of the truth of the old adage that there is no honour among thieves, since it was sacked by pirates in 69 B.C., and never recovered its old prosperity.²²

It would seem logical that if a city or port could flourish as the result of trade, as in the case of Rhodes, then it could also do so as the result of piracy. Unfortunately there is little evidence, beyond the rather vague comments of the literary sources, to indicate that any particular place might have owed its prosperity to the ill-gotten gains of pirates. For example, the relative wealth of the Cilician and Pamphylian cities, which were so important to the Cilician pirates, cannot be properly assessed because of the lack of both archaeological and literary evidence.²³ In any case, few places are likely to have "specialised" in the handling of piratical loot to the exclusion of other forms of trade and the proportion of revenues which were obtained in the former manner would be impossible to estimate.²⁴ My own impression is that the profits of piracy would be unlikely to account for any dramatic changes in prosperity over a long period of time, such as might make some impression on the archaeological record of a particular city. The contribution of piracy to the economy of any region or place is unknowable, because it cannot be detected.

²¹ See also Cic. II Verr. 4.21 on Phaselis and its co-operation with pirates.

²² See below Part Five, pp. 325-6.

²³ That is not to say there is no possibility of forming some kind of a picture of the economy of the Cilician and Pamphylian coastal cities, in the last two centuries B.C. Such an attempt would, however, be far beyond the scope of this thesis.

²⁴ Even for historical periods where the documentation is of a far higher quality only rough estimates are possible. See, for example, Ritchie (1984) on New York in the seventeenth century, or Rediker (1987) on the home ports of the pirates in the "Golden Age" of the early eighteenth century.
A good example of the difficulties inherent in trying to assess the profitability of piracy is the city of Phalasarna on the Western coast of Crete. Phalasarna's harbour has been exposed for excavation by the uplifting of the Western end of Crete since Antiquity. The excavations currently in progress there have revealed a greater degree of prosperity than might have been expected, especially evident in the fine quality of the harbour facilities and fortifications. Phalasarna seems to have been a wealthy place in the Hellenistic period, although it is likely that the campaign of Metellus Creticus brought this to an abrupt end around 67 B.C.26

The excavators of Phalasarna seem confident that they have uncovered a prosperous "pirates' port". There is, however, no specific literary evidence to connect Phalasarna with piracy in the Hellenistic or Late Republican periods. Other sources of revenue, such as agriculture, trade in stone, links with Polyrhenia and later with Egypt, and the service of mercenaries overseas are all attested in some form, and seem to provide adequate explanations for the sources of the city's wealth. Phalasarna may have been a port used by pirates, but there is no clear evidence to suggest that it ever was, much less that piracy contributed in any significant way to the city's revenues.

25 See Frost and Hadjidaki (1990) and Hadjidaki (1988a & b). These reports are far from complete, however, and recent work has revealed much more. Elpida Hadjidaki has presented some of this at recent conferences and colloquia; further publication can be expected soon. I am also grateful to Julie Hunter for up-to-date information on Phalasarna.

26 See below Part Five on Metellus Creticus.


28 All these are to be found in Hadjidaki (1988a). Nevertheless she expends a great deal of (misguided) effort in trying to make Phalasarna into "a pirate's port".
Rhodes and the importance of long-distance trade

The Rhodians were merchants, obtaining a great deal of their revenue from the practice and promotion of long-distance trade. Rhodes' most important trading partner was the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt.

They were especially inclined to honour Ptolemy. For it was the case that the majority of their revenues came from merchants sailing to Egypt, and the city was largely fed from that kingdom. (Diod. 20.81.4)

Egypt was, however, far from being the only source of income. There was a substantial slave market on the island, and it was a major entrepôt in the Hellenistic period, particularly for the grain trade from Egypt, providing several harbours for merchant ships, and the Rhodians themselves were famous as maritime traders whose pottery is widely dispersed, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea region, indicating the extent of their trading connections.  

Early evidence of Rhodian concern to protect merchant shipping comes from one of the Attic orators, Lykourgos, in his speech against Leokrates. The Athenian statesman says that after the Battle of Khaironeia his opponent falsely reported to the Rhodians that Athens had been captured by the Macedonians and the Piraeus blockaded. The Rhodians' reaction was to despatch warships to escort their merchant vessels into port (Lyk. Leokr. 18). Diodoros also mentions Rhodians driving off the ships sent to attack their cargo vessels on the way to Egypt by Demetrios Poliorketes, just before the siege of Rhodes, which suggests that the Rhodians either used escort ships, or had armed merchantmen (Diod. 20.82.2). It was, however, during the third and second centuries B.C. that the

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30 See below Part Five on the Rhodian navy.
Rhodians established their reputation as the friends of merchants and the enemies of pirates through their attempts to suppress piracy.

The most celebrated case of Rhodian intervention to ensure the freedom of merchants is the war against Byzantion in 220 B.C., which came about because the Byzantines tried to impose tolls on ships passing in and out of the Black Sea.

The tolls levied by the Byzantines on all goods coming in and out of the Black Sea were beginning to cause a great loss of profits and general discontent, and, as things were getting worse, all those who operated on this route complained to the Rhodians, by virtue of their pre-eminence in maritime affairs. This was the origin of the war the history of which I now intend to relate. (Polyb. 4.47.1)

This passage shows not only how far the Rhodians were prepared to go in order to protect their trading activity, but also the extent to which the other Greeks looked to them for leadership. In 202 B.C., when Philip V of Macedon's aggressive actions threatened the Black Sea route again, the Rhodians were the first to declare war on the Antigonid monarch (Polyb. 15.23.6).³¹

The Rhodians reacted in a similar fashion when Cretan piracy threatened long-distance trade a little earlier in the century.

With seven ships the Cretans began to engage in piracy by attacking shipping, and they plundered many vessels. And on account of the discouraging effect which this was having on traders, which they decided was likely to affect them adversely, the Rhodians declared war upon the Cretans. (Diod. 27.3; 205 B.C.).

Diodorus is explicit here about the damaging effect piracy could have on trade. Even if the Cretans had plundered only a small proportion of the ships which were actively trading in the Aegean, it is likely that the possibility of attack would discourage many others from making their journeys, perhaps persuading them to sail elsewhere to trade.

Hence the concern of the Rhodians to suppress the Cretan pirates. Rhodes and Crete are close enough for the pirates to have presented a major problem for the Rhodians, who needed a continuous flow of ships through their harbours. The Rhodians were not the only ones whose navy was active in protection of traders, and there is some evidence for Ptolemaic protection of ships and cities from pirates, but I do not think that this amounted to the same kind of commitment as the Rhodians appear to have made.

The Black Sea and the protection of merchants

Reference has already been made to the importance of trade between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, in both Classical and Hellenistic times. Although they came under pressure from the Rhodians and others in the third century for imposing tolls, the Byzantines were also anxious to protect the shipping which passed through and was the source of much of their revenue. Polybius praises their efforts to prevent attacks on traders, slavers and even fishing vessels by local tribes from the coast of the Black Sea (Polyb. 4.50.3). In this respect the Byzantines were in a similar position to the Rhodians - they had an interest in suppressing piracy in order to allow trade to continue.

Greek cities could only be expected to offer protection in a relatively small area. Beyond the Hellespont and along the coast of the Black Sea some monarchs and communities seem to have valued their trade with the Aegean Greeks highly enough to take measures to protect merchant shipping. Diodorus, in his encomium of Eumelos, king of the Cimmerian Bospóros, singles out for special mention his reputation as a protector of merchants against pirates.

On behalf of those who sailed to the Pontos he waged war on the barbarian tribes who were accustomed to plunder them, the Heniokhoi and the Tauroi as well as

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32 See below Part Five, on the Rhodians and Cretans at war.

33 See below Part Five, pp. 243-5.
the Akhaians. Thus he cleared the sea of pirates, so that not only within his own
kingdom, but throughout nearly the whole world his magnanimity was
proclaimed by the merchants, enabling him to receive the very finest of rewards
for his good deeds. (Diod. 20.25.2; 310 B.C.)

Doubtless Diodorus is exaggerating, but the benefit for a Hellenizing monarch of a policy
of supporting merchants and opposing pirates would not just be increased opportunities
for trade, but also prestige and recognition within the Hellenic world. In a similar passage
Polybius praises Kavaros, king of the Thracian Gauls.

Kavaros, the king of the Thracian Gauls, being by nature both kingly and
magnanimous in his actions did much to ensure the safety of the merchants
sailing to the Pontos. (Polyb. 8.22).

A letter from the king of Bithynia to the people of Kos, inscribed about 240 B.C.,
reflects the mutual concern of both kings and Greek states to safeguard their
"commercial" links.

Ziaelas, king of Bithynia to the Council and people of Kos, greeting. Diogitos,
Aristolokhos, and Theodotos, your envoys, came and asked us to recognize as
inviolable the temple of Asklepios in your city and to befriend the city in all other
ways, just as our father Nikomedes was well disposed towards your people. We
do in fact exercise care for all the Greeks who come to us as we are convinced
that this contributes in no small way to one's reputation; especially do we
continue to make much of our father's (other) friends and of you, because of his
personal acquaintance with your people and because king Ptolemy, our friend and
ally, is friendly towards you, and still further because your envoys expressed with
great enthusiasm the good-will which you have for us. In the future, as you may
request, we shall try for each one individually and for all in common to favour
you as much as lies in our power, and as for your seafaring citizens to take
thought for those who happen to enter territory under our control, so that their safety may be assured, and in the same way also for those who are cast upon our coast because of an accident in the course of their voyage, we shall try to make sure that they are injured by no one. We recognize also your temple as inviolable, as you have requested, and concerning these and other wishes I have ordered Diogotos and Aristolokhos and Theudotos to report to you.

Farewell.

This letter provides a fascinating glimpse of the problems which Greek states might encounter in the quest for "safe" trading routes. In the first place it should be noted that the Koans are the ones who have sent an embassy to Ziaelas, and the initial request which has come from them is that he recognize that the temple of Asklepios is inviolable. Next he is requested to continue the policy of his father, Nikomedes, towards the Koans themselves, which is likely to require a little more effort on his part. Whenever there was a change of monarch in such places it would be necessary to ensure that there was no change of attitude towards the Greek traders, with (probably) each city sending its ambassadors to the court of the new king to renew whatever agreements had been made with his predecessor. In the case of Bithynia the situation had been complicated by the division of the kingdom, after the death of Nikomedes, among his sons.

The mention of Ptolemy III of Egypt shows how the influence of a powerful monarch could be beneficial to a small state like Kos. The delicate nature of Hellenistic diplomacy meant that the Koans had more than one king to placate, however, and it

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34 ásylon. 
35 Welles (1934), no. 25. I have slightly adapted his translation. See Welles' notes for details of the dating and the political situation at the time of the letter. 
36 See Will (1979-82), pp. 246-7 on the political problems of this period in Bithynia. 
37 Compare the role played by Seleukos II in obtaining an asylia decree for Smyrna from the Aitolians - O.G.I.S. 228 & 229.
appears from another inscription that the same Diogitos also visited king Seleukos in order to obtain his favour for the temple and the Koans, possibly as part of the same diplomatic mission.\textsuperscript{38} Ptolemy and Ziaelas were both enemies of Seleukos at this time.

Trading concerns appear to have been of greater importance to the Koans than the monarch, from the evidence of this inscription, and the assurances from the king, while no doubt welcome for the Koans, do not necessarily amount to much more than a promise that they will not be plundered while they are in Bithynian harbours, or wrecked upon the Bithynian coast. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Koans, whose merchants travelled regularly to this region, sought any kind of protection they could find.\textsuperscript{39}

Strabo and Arrian provide evidence that the barbarian tribes continued to be a problem for the Hellenistic Greeks and the Romans.

After the Sindic territory and Gorgipia on the sea, one comes to the coast of the Akhaiai and the Zygoi and the Heniokhoi, which for the most part is harbourless and mountainous, being a part of the Caucasus. These peoples live by piracy... At any rate, by equipping fleets of kamarai and sailing sometimes against merchant vessels and sometimes against a country or even a city, they hold the mastery of the sea. And they are sometimes assisted even by those who hold the Bosporos, the latter supplying them with mooring-places, with a market place, and with means of disposing of their booty. ...they readily offer to release their captives for ransom, informing their relatives after they have put out to sea. Now in those places which are ruled by local chieftains the rulers go to the aid of those who are wronged, often attacking and bringing back the kamarai, men and all. But the

\textsuperscript{38} See Welles (1934), no. 26.

\textsuperscript{39} See Sherwin-White (1978), pp. 243-4 on Koan trade with the Black Sea area. She gives a list of proxenia decrees as evidence of the variety of places where traders from Kos were regular visitors.
territory that is subject to the Romans affords but little aid, because of the negligence of the governors who are sent there. (Str. 11.2.12)\textsuperscript{40}

In addition to the Heniokhoi, Arrian says that in the second century A.D. it is the tribes who dwell between Trapezos and Sebastopolis who are among the most warlike and hostile.

...they live in strong fortresses and their tribes have no kings. Formerly they did not pay the tribute that they were subjected to by the Romans, preferring plunder to tribute. But now, with the gods' help they will pay up, or I will drive them out.

(Arr. Perip. 11.1-2)

This seems to be the kind of strong action that Strabo claims was lacking from earlier Roman governors.

The Hellenistic slave trade and piracy

There is plenty of evidence to indicate that piracy was a major source of slaves in the Hellenistic period.\textsuperscript{41} Literary evidence includes New Comedy, where pirates can be found capturing people and selling them as slaves. This example is taken from the opening prologue of one of Menander's comedies.

...his daughter, I say. And when they [the pirates] had all three persons in their power, they decided it wasn't worth their while to take the old lady, but they carried off the young girl and the servant to Mylasa, a town in Caria, and there they put them up for sale in the market.

\textsuperscript{40} Translation Jones (1917-32). I have omitted some sections on the nature of the light boats or kamaraL and the names of these peoples.

\textsuperscript{41} The same may well have been true of the Classical period, as some of the cases of piracy noted above in Part Three would indicate. I have, however, confined my main discussion of the connection between piracy and the slave trade to the Hellenistic period because of the developments which some scholars have suggested were occurring in this period.
The fact that it was pirates who captured and sold the girl and her servant is shown by another fragment from the same play.

Theron: They say that you lost your daughter from Halai when she was four years old, along with Dromon, a servant.

Kichesias: Yes, I did. Theron: Good!

Kichesias: She was kidnapped by pirates. You have reminded me of sorrow and suffering, and of my poor child.

Other examples are to be found in Plautus (Plaut. Poen. 896-7; Mil. Glor. 118) and Terence (Ter. Eun. 114-5).

Inscriptions also indicate a close association between pirates and the slave trade. The following are a few examples of the acquisition of slaves by pirates, and what might happen as a result.

An inscription which records a decree of the people of Amorgos from the mid-third century B.C. gives details of an incident which may very well have been typical for the Hellenistic period.

Resolved by the council and the people; Soterides, son of Phidias, of Kosyllos was president, Philoxenos, son of Philothemis of Alsos moved: since, when pirates made an incursion into the countryside at night and captured a total of more than thirty girls, women and other persons both free and slave, and scuttled the ships in the harbour and captured the ship of Doreios, in which they sailed off with their captives and the rest of their booty; when all this had happened Hegesippos and Antipappos, the sons of Hegesistratos, who were themselves prisoners,
persuaded Sokleidas, the captain of the pirates, to release the free persons and some of the freedmen and slaves, and volunteered to act as hostages on their behalf, and showed great concern that none of the citizen women should be carried off as booty and be sold, nor suffer torture or hardship, and that no free person should perish; thanks to these men the prisoners were saved (and returned) home without suffering harm...4

The gallantry of these two young men appears to be directed principally towards preserving the lives and the virtues of the free citizens. It should also be noted that the inscription fails to indicate how they persuaded Sokleidas to release his prisoners, although I suspect that some kind of a deal was reached offering either safe passage to the pirates (if they needed it) or, possibly, a ransom for the free persons.4 If the efforts of the negotiators had not been successful, then the captives would have been sold as slaves, possibly at one of the main slave markets in the Aegean - Rhodes or Delos. A comparison might be made with the inscription from Thera quoted above, in which a Ptolemaic officer’s letter reports an incident involving some Allariotes and their Theran "partners". It would appear that in this case some prisoners (presumably Therans) were freed, but others were given in exchange, these included both Greeks and foreigners.48

An inscription from Delos, dating to some time in the late third century B.C., records how the people of Theangela in Karia honoured Semos son of Kosimados for freeing some Theangelan women who had been bought in the slave market. There is no mention of piracy here, but the inscription does show how captives could be transported

45 ῥον επι τον πειρατων επιπλεοντα.


47 See below on ransoming of prisoners from pirates.

48 I.G. XII.3.328, see above.
across the Aegean to be sold far from home. Only the lucky ones could expect the kind of intervention which honorific inscriptions record.

Individuals relied heavily upon their cities and states to protect them from capture and sale as slaves. Ties of proxenia and isopoliteia between various communities are very well attested for the Hellenistic period. There developed, in effect, a network of agreements and alliances which could offer some chance of "rescue" for the victims of piracy. A particularly good example of the efforts of a community to safeguard its citizens is a treaty between Miletos and various Cretan cities, found in Miletos and dated to some time between 260 and 230 B.C.49 The inscription is a record of a decree of the Knossians, in response to an embassy sent by the Milesians. Firstly a formal agreement was concluded between Knossos and Miletos, which remained in force even though it was lost in a fire. Thereafter, as a result of an embassy from the Milesians inquiring about this agreement, a new copy of the treaty was drawn up for display in Miletos.

And so that the other Cretans should themselves make a treaty with you with greater willingness, we think it necessary to make a treaty as you have requested. A Knossian shall not knowingly purchase a Milesian who is a free man nor a Milesian a Knossian. Anyone who purchases knowingly shall forfeit the price paid and the person (bought) shall be free. If he purchases unknowingly, he shall return the person and get back the price he paid. If anyone buys a slave, he shall get back the price he paid and return the person. If he does not return it, he shall be brought at Knossos before the kosmoi and at Miletos before the prytaneis. The magistrates in each state shall compel him to return the person to whoever (rightfully) claims him, in accordance with the agreement.50

49 S.d.A. III.482 = I.Cret. I Knossos, no. 6. The quotation below is from lines 16-29.
50 I quote from the translation by Austin (1981), no. 89.
The inscription continues to outline procedures for disputes and convictions. Finally the names of nineteen other Cretan communities are appended as parties to the same agreement. Two further treaties of a very similar nature with Gortyn and Phaistos were added below this one.

The effect of these treaties would have been to provide some security for Milesians who were captured as a result of piracy (or war) and taken to Crete for sale. Citizens would be freed and slaves returned to their masters. This would only happen, however, if the people involved in the transactions were from cities party to the agreements, and there is nothing in the treaty to prevent goods being seized. Nor would such an agreement prevent the sale of Milesians away from Crete. The Milesians could not prevent the seizure of people by pirates in this way only moderate some of its effects.

There can be no doubt that large numbers of men, women and children were moved around the Mediterranean as a result of the slave trade in the Hellenistic period. Many of them were foreigners, from the Black Sea area and from the "barbarian" margins of the Greek world. It is clear from the sources, however, that many were Greeks, and that they were commonly bought and sold by other Greeks. There was a certain amount of philosophical and moral opposition to the practice, but little was actually done to prevent it. The need for slaves was just too great.

There has long been an assumption about the connection between piracy and the slave trade, especially in the Hellenistic period.

The pirate had a most useful place in the economy of the old world; he was the general slave merchant.

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51 See Finley (1962).
53 Tarn (1913), p. 88.
Statements such as this imply two things. Firstly, that piracy was a major source for the slave supply in the ancient world, and, secondly, that most pirates were after captives to sell as slaves. As Garlan has observed, the ancient Greeks were rather reticent about the slave trade, especially after the development of the ideas of citizenship and equality in the Classical period.\(^{54}\) Slave merchants are rarely heard of, and the nature of the slave supply system is often misunderstood. Pirates may appear to be major suppliers of slaves, but that is because the sources are willing to mention the slave trade in connection with piracy. Pirates, after all, are already disapproved of for their piracy, the fact that they deal in slaves just confirms their low status and enhances condemnation of them.

It is, however, unlikely that pirates provided a high proportion of the slaves to be found in the Hellenistic world. Many were of "barbarian" origin, not Greeks, and the main sources of supply were probably outside the Mediterranean.\(^{55}\) Warfare and piracy may have been contributors, but they were not the main sources. It is also likely that the numerous agreements about immunity, guarantees of safety and treaties providing for the return of citizens sold as slaves would have tended to reduce the effectiveness of piracy as a means of supplying slaves. It seems to me to be likely that many of the slaves who were sold by pirates were, in fact, slaves when they were captured, so that the pirates were not supplying new slaves but simply "redistributing" old ones. Citizens could be ransomed or reclaimed more easily and with greater urgency than slaves.\(^{56}\)

Things may have changed to some extent with the arrival of large Roman armies making large numbers of Greeks, and others, slaves from the third century B.C. onwards. The market at Delos seems to have boomed after the arrival of the Romans, and the trade

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\(^{54}\) See Garlan (1987).

\(^{55}\) See Finley (1962) on the Black Sea region as a source of slaves.

\(^{56}\) See the inscriptions cited above and below; see also those in Part Three.
in slaves was a principal contributor to its success. "Barbarians" would still have accounted for many of the slaves being sold to the Italians and Greeks, as is suggested by the complaint of Nikomedes III recorded by Diodorus, that the publicani had seized most of his people as slaves (Diod. 36.3). Strabo seems to imply that the growth of Cilician piracy in the second century B.C. and the large market for slaves were happy coincidences.

The export of slaves greatly encouraged them in their wickedness, since it became profitable for all concerned. The slaves could be obtained easily, and not far away there was a big and prosperous market, Delos, capable of taking in and sending out 10,000 slaves every day, hence the saying which arose: "Merchant, sail in, unload, everything has been sold." (Str. 14.5.2)

The sources also give the impression that slaves were a major source of income for the Cilicians, although here too I suspect that it was "used" slaves that were the usual objects of pirate attacks. In the Late Republic as in the Hellenistic period, "fresh" slaves came from outside the Mediterranean area, or from its "barbarian" margins. What may, however, have been different in the case of the Cilicians was the extra demand for slaves which was produced by the Romans, which they helped to satisfy.

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57 See above on Strabo and the Cilicians. Note also the arguments of Coarelli (1982) that the Agora of the Italians on Delos was basically a slave market.

58 The figure of 10,000 (myrios) is not to be taken literally. It simply means "a huge number".

59 See Crawford (1977) on the shift away from Anatolia as a source of slaves after 63 B.C.

60 Str. 14.5.2. See Hopkins (1978), chpt. 2.
Ransom

A mid-third century inscription from Rhamnous, on the North East coast of Attika, honours a certain Epikhares for his help in rescuing people who were seized by pirates around the time of the Chremonidean War:

...and he also made a deal about the prisoners who had been captured, that they should be freed through the mediation of a herald on payment of a ransom of 120 drachmas (each), that none of the citizens should be carried off and that the slaves should not be made away with; he also punished those who had introduced the pirates into the land, men from the city, arresting and interrogating them [in a way that was fitting] for what they did.

The details provided in this honorific decree are both fascinating and alarming. It would appear that some people from the city of Athens had tried to take advantage of the confusion brought about by the Khremonidean war to engage in a bit of kidnapping and extortion. Clearly the actual perpetrators of the incident, the pirates, were not caught, but the Athenians who encouraged them, and perhaps showed them where to find their victims, were. The close relationship between ransoming and the slave trade is also neatly indicated here. The pirates were prepared to negotiate for a ransom, but if the negotiations had not been successful, then the prisoners would have been taken away and sold as slaves. Presumably the Athenians who brought the pirates in hoped to share in their profits, but were caught out and suffered for their betrayal.

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61 kai melde exakhthei ton politon mede ta doula somata aphanidzetai; Austin (1981), no. 50 translates the last word here as "killed", apparently on the basis of "tuer" in B.E. (1968) no. 247, but I am inclined to disagree. Why should the pirates carry off the citizens but kill the slaves?

62 S.E.G. XXIV.154, lines 19-23; dated to 264/3 "vel paullo post". I quote from the translation in Austin (1981), no. 50, to which I have made a couple of changes. See also B.E. (1968), no. 247.

63 The suggestion of Hammond and Walbank (1988), p. 283 that the pirates were in the pay of Antigonus Gonatas seems to me to be unnecessary.
Another Athenian inscription reveals what might happen to captives who were taken by pirates. In 217/6 B.C. the Athenians passed an honorific decree for Eumaridas of Kydonia, a Cretan.

Gods. In the archonship of Heliodoros, in the eleventh prytany, of the tribe of Kekropis, in the month Thargelion; Lysistratos, son of Phylarkhides, of Oenoe proposed: since Eumaridas both previously, and at the time when Boukris overran the countryside and carried off to Crete a large number of the citizens and of the others from the city, performed many great services for the people and contributed money from his own pocket for the twenty talents that had been agreed (as ransom) for the prisoners; and (since) he lent money to the captives for their travel expenses; and (since) now, when the people (of Athens) has sent ambassadors so that good relations may be preserved with all the Cretans and so that this might be achieved, if anywhere the right to plunder has been given to those who sail against the shore (of Attika), this right is ended, he pleaded his case so that everything should be done in the best interest of the people; and (since) he also took part in an embassy to Knossos and her allies, and also gave letters to the ambassadors for his friends in Polyrhenia, so that they would cooperate with him over the interests (of the people); and (since) he undertakes to

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64 S.I.G. 535 lines 1-20. The translation is basically that of Austin (1981), no. 88, with alterations and additions where necessary. See especially Brulé (1978) pp. 17-20(i & ii) for discussion and suggestions for translation. N.B. there are two page 20s in Brulé, apparently a typist’s error.

65 ei pou láphyron apodédotai tois katapléousin. katapléin here clearly indicates sailing into the shore, for attacks on Attica, rather than sailing out from Crete, as Austin seems to think, which would be rendered with something like anapléin or ekplein. See L.S.L s.vv.

66 Austin omits the phrase arthei touto, in lines 13-14, from his translation. See Brulé (1978), pp. 19-20(ii) for a survey of the various interpretations of this section and its meaning.
show every care to ensure the preservation of good relations between the people
(of Athens) and all the inhabitants of Crete...\(^{67}\)

The Boukris mentioned in this inscription might have been an Aitolian, perhaps
the son of another Boukris who was honoured at Delos in the middle of the third century
B.C.\(^{68}\) The connections between Aitolians and Cretans are well attested for this period,
so it is no surprise to find the Athenian captives being disposed of in Crete, even if they
were taken by Aitolians rather than Cretans.\(^{69}\) Their fate was not, however, sealed from
the moment they were captured. As has already been noticed above, the choice before a
pirate with prisoners was to have them sold as slaves or to attempt to obtain a ransom.
The latter option required a suitable go-between and the availability of funds for the
ransom. This was obviously where Eumaridas came in. He was resident on Crete and
apparently had considerable wealth at his disposal. He used it to help the Athenians and
was accorded honours and influence as a result. Good relations between Athens and
Kydonia seem to go back at least to the late fourth century B.C.\(^{70}\)

Eumaridas' then went on to play a crucial role in negotiations between Athens
and various Cretan cities which seem to have been aimed at reducing the incidence of
attacks on the Attic coast by pirates emanating from Crete. It would appear that certain
cities had been allowing their citizens to take booty from Attika, and the people of Athens

\(^{67}\) The rest of the inscription is concerned with the honours to be given to
Eumaridas. S.I.G. nos. 536-7 are two more inscriptions put up with this one in
honour of Eumaridas and his son Kharmion. The family was apparently of
importance to the Athenians into the early second century.

\(^{68}\) Durrbach (1921), no. 42. The identification is far from certain. If not, then he was
presumably a pirate.

\(^{69}\) See Brulé (1978), pp. 21, who accepts the identification of Boukris as Aitolian and
thinks it unlikely that any Cretans participated in his raids.

\(^{70}\) See Brulé (1978), pp. 16-17 on I.G. II (2nd edn.) 399, honouring Eurylokhos for
ransoming and returning Athenian prisoners c. 320 B.C. See Potter (1984) for
discussion of the context.

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were making a concerted effort to prevent further occurrences. It is impossible to tell how successful they were, although there is plenty of further evidence for the capture of Athenian citizens by Aitolians and others, over whom the Cretan cities would have no control.71

Obviously inscriptions are more likely to record instances when pirates did not sell their captives as slaves, thus providing the opportunity for someone to be honoured for helping in their ransom. Brulé has demonstrated the significance of Crete, and Polyrhenia in particular, as a place where captives could be disposed of easily, which made it very useful for cities and states to have good relations with the island, if they wanted to have some chance of recovering the victims of piracy, or possibly of diverting the perpetrators.72

Rome and the Illyrians

The first Illyrian War (229 B.C.) was the occasion of Rome’s first military intervention on the Greek mainland. It is often said that the main motive for Roman intervention was the protection of Italian traders.73 Not surprisingly, this war was the subject of a detailed discussion by Polybius in which the protection of traders against pirates figures prominently. He describes the rising power of the Illyrians under their

71 Note also I.G. II (2nd edn.) 1130, which records Athenian ambassadors complaining of the same problem to another Cretan community, of unknown identity, in the second century B.C.; Brulé (1978), pp. 23-4. See S.I.G. 520 = I.G. XII.5.36 for another case of capture by pirates (Aitolians) and ransom, earlier in the third century on Naxos. I.G. II (2nd edn.) 746 is a fragmentary Athenian decree also recording the return of persons captured by Aitolians; see Brulé (1978), pp. 22-3.

72 See Brulé (1978), esp. pp. 16-29 & 70-105. He draws attention to the usefulness of grants of asylia and isopoliteia by Cretan cities (usefully tabulated on p. 103). The former would clearly reduce the threat of piracy, as in the Aitolian cases mentioned above in Part Three; the latter would be useful in providing access to Cretan courts and tribunals, where redress and assistance might be obtained.

king Agron, and their defeat of the Aitolians at Medion in Akarnania (232 B.C.), which vividly demonstrated their military potential to the rest of the Greeks (Polyb. 2.2-4). According to Polybius, the king died soon after and was succeeded by his queen Teuta. She suffered from a typically feminine weakness, that of taking a short view of everything; she could see no further than her people's recent success and thus had no eyes for events elsewhere. First of all she granted permission to her own people who plied off the Illyrian coast to plunder any ships they met, and next she collected a fleet and a body of troops of as large a size as the earlier expedition, and sent it out with orders to the commanders that they should treat all states alike as their enemies. (Polyb. 2.4)

The Illyrians next made their way to the territory of the Epirotes, where they captured the city of Phoenike. The arrival of an Akhaian force persuaded the Illyrians to withdraw, but not before they had engaged in a bit of piracy, using Phoenike as a base.

For some time previously it had been the custom of this people to prey upon vessels sailing from Italy, and at this moment, while they were occupying Phoenike, a number of them, operating independently of the Illyrian fleet, had attacked Italian traders; some of these they had robbed, some they murdered, and a large number were carried off into captivity. In the past the Roman government had always ignored complaints made to them about the Illyrians. But now, as more and more people approached the senate on this subject, they appointed two commissioners, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to travel to Illyria and inquire into what was happening. (Polyb. 2.8)

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74. The Illyrian forces were funded by king Demetrios II of Macedon (Polyb. 2.2).

75. léidzesthai.

76. The quotation is from the translation of Scott-Kilvert (1979), with a few changes.
The ambassadors found the Queen besieging Issa, an island off the coast of Dalmatia, where they were assured that the Illyrian monarchy meant no harm to Rome, but that it was not their custom to restrain their subjects from practising piracy. The younger of the Coruncanii told her that Rome would take steps to make the Illyrians reform their customs.

After this plain speaking, the Queen gave way to a fit of womanish petulance, and was so furious at the ambassador's words that she cast aside the civilized convention that governs the treatment of envoys, and as the delegation were leaving on their ship, she sent agents to assassinate the Roman who had uttered the offending speech. (Polyb. 2.8)

The result was war with Rome and defeat for the Illyrians at the hands of a major force of 20,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 200 hundred ships, led by both the consuls of 229 B.C.

Polybius' rather sexist account places the blame for the war on Illyrian piracy and a lack of civilized restraint by the emotional Queen. The senate seems to be acting to protect Italian traders, and although there is an obvious need to retaliate for the treatment of its ambassador, the younger Coruncanius' speech in Polybius is virtually a declaration of war.

With the gods' help we shall do our utmost, and that very soon, to make you reform the dealings of the Kings of Illyria with their subjects. (Polyb. 2.8)

This version of events differs markedly, however, from that given by Appian. In his Illyrike the later author includes several details which are not in Polybius and which indicate that there were other pressures coming to bear. According to Appian, Agron was still alive and had captured a large amount of territory including Korkyra, Epidamnos,

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77 For an imaginative reconstruction of these events as involving "blockade-running" by the Italians, which puts the Romans in the wrong when war is declared, see Badian (1952).
Pharos and parts of Epiros, when he began the siege of Issa. It was the people of Issa who appealed to Rome, and the embassy never reached its destination, but was attacked by "Illyrikoi lémboi" and forced to retreat. The casualties included an Issaian called Kleemporos, as well as one Coruncanius. In addition, Appian says that Agron, who died after the attack on the Roman and Issaian ambassadors, left an infant son, Pinnes, whose stepmother and regent was Teuta (App. Ill. 7).

These differences cannot be fully reconciled, and a choice has to be made as to which of the accounts is closer to the truth. Although Polybius is traditionally given more credit than Appian in such matters, the argument in favour of the latter is far stronger. Appian’s brief account is less rhetorical and moralistic than Polybius’, but this is probably because Polybius did not have good information for these events, but was very aware of their symbolic importance for the wider theme of his Histories - the rise of Roman power in the Mediterranean - hence his desire to make them into a major "set-piece" in his work.

The course of the war which followed seems to indicate the Romans main concern was to protect the straits of Otranto and the coastline of Italy, rather than help Issa, which had to wait almost a year until the siege was lifted. The subsequent settlement with Teuta, which bound the Illyrians not to sail in force beyond Lissos, on the river Drilo, thus keeping them away from the Epirotes and Rome’s other allies in this area, also barred them from the narrowest part of the straits. The military strength of the Illyrians

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78 See Casson (1986), pp. 141-2 on lémboi and liburnai as ship types commonly used by pirates. The use of such ships does not, however, automatically indicate that they were operated by pirates.

79 Most strongly put by Derow (1973), whose conclusions are accepted by Errington (1989). Note also the reappraisal of Appian in Goldmann (1988).

80 See Walbank (1957-79) ad loc. On the other sources for this war, which do not offer anything more than Appian or Polybius, see Derow (1973), pp. 123-4. See above Part Two on Polybius attitude to pirates and piracy in his Histories.
was certainly worth respecting, especially since they could be easily persuaded to fight for others. If nothing else, the experience of Pyrrhos must have made the Romans wary of having strong neighbours across the Adriatic.\footnote{1}

Did protection of trade play any part in the affair? Harry Dell has argued that serious Illyrian piracy was a relatively recent phenomenon, the result of a population growth and the disappearance of the restraining influence of the Epirote monarchy. The main threat was not really to Italian traders, but to the Greek cities and the local tribes of the area to the South of Illyria. What is called "piracy" by Polybius is characterised by Dell as "large scale raids for booty and incipient imperialism".\footnote{2}

On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Polybius, for all the weaknesses of his account, should include the mention of attacks on Italian traders if these did not take place, or had no significance. This leads to the question, was trade across the Adriatic important enough to warrant Roman military intervention in order to protect it? Michael Crawford has argued that coin hoards found on the Eastern side of the Adriatic contain too little Roman coinage to suggest that it was circulating as a medium of exchange in Illyria or neighbouring regions,\footnote{3} although the 3rd century B.C. bronze coins found in hoards from the Mazin area might have been exported as metal, rather than coinage.\footnote{4} Crawford suggests that Phoenike shows the most numismatic evidence for contacts with the West in general, and Derow argues for the prominence of Issa and the Dalmatian

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\begin{enumerate}
\item On all of this see Errington (1989), pp. 88-91. For further examples of Illyrian "piracy" see above.
\item Dell (1967); quotation from p. 358. The Illyrians would seem to be practising warfare in a fashion which was becoming less acceptable to the Greek world as a whole, although it had still not entirely disappeared. See above Part Three. See also Str. 7.5.10 on the supposed long tradition of Illyrian piracy.
\item See Crawford (1978).
\item Discussion in Derow (1973), pp. 125-6. The problem with these hoards is that they contain much later material which could indicate that the aes coinage was brought across long after it was minted.
\end{enumerate}
islands in cross-Adriatic exchange. Since these two places both figure prominently in accounts of the war I would, hesitantly, propose that Italian traders did have some influence on the proceedings, but that Polybius has magnified the extent to which they were a reason for Rome going to war with the Illyrians. The war was not about the protection of merchants against pirates, but rather the curbing of the Illyrians' aggression against their neighbours in an area strategically important to Rome.85

The Ancient Economy - Trade and Piracy

Rostovtzeff considered the Classical period to be one of economic growth and progress, but he also thought that in the Mediterranean world a peak was reached in the fourth century B.C.,86 and Heichelheim suggested that there was a decline in economic activity in the Eastern half of the Mediterranean at the end of the Hellenistic period, which was never fully compensated for by "growth" in the economy of the Western half.87 Hopkins, however, has argued that from c. 1000 B.C. there was a period of (gradual and uneven) economic growth, during which the volume of surplus production in the Mediterranean region gradually increased, reaching a peak in the first and second centuries A.D. He suggests several reasons for this development: political change, especially the growth of empires, culminating in the Roman Empire, diffusion of technical innovations, and the spread of social institutions, particularly absentee landlordism and chattel slavery.88

85 See Derow (1973) for an explanation of Polybius' reticence in this respect. He argues that Polybius is more interested in presenting the Romans as acting in the interests of the Greeks, rather than for their own, less altruistic, reasons.

86 Rostovtzeff (1941).

87 Heichelheim (1965-70).

88 Hopkins (1983). See also Hopkins (1980) on the stimulation of trade in the Roman Empire through the exaction and expenditure of taxes.
Empire which is, in my opinion, complementary to Hopkins', is that put forward by Greg Woolf. He argues that the Roman Empire can be viewed as an early form of World Empire, with a core and periphery, defined in both economic and political terms along the lines proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Both these analyses of the Roman Empire necessitate a period of economic and political development during which the principal features may not have evolved fully. That transitional stage ought to extend well back into the Hellenistic and Classical periods, and it follows that any long-term developments should have their origins in these periods, or be present in an early form.

Among the components of the strong upward trend in economic activity in the first two centuries A.D. Hopkins identifies the "Roman peace" as an important factor:

For more than two centuries, the Roman peace more or less freed the inhabitants of the Roman world from major military disturbances; the Mediterranean was free of pirates, major roads were usually clear of brigands; tax burdens were by and large predictable. I do not wish to eulogize the grandeur of the Roman Empire. But it seems likely that these conditions allowed the accumulation of capital. Hopkins also argues that long distance trade, particularly, but not exclusively maritime, was stimulated by the Roman peace and the taxation system of the Roman Empire. The probable increase in the quantity and frequency of maritime trade in the Principate cannot be properly measured, but it is a logical companion to the other components

89 Woolf (1990).


I am sceptical about the attempt made by Hopkins (1980) to quantify the increase in maritime trade through a "head count" of shipwrecks in the Mediterranean. His own graph (p. 106) indicates a large number of undated "Roman" wrecks, many of which might easily be assigned to the periods before or after his "boom" period. The explanation which he seems to favour for the discrepancy between the last two centuries B.C. and the first two centuries A.D. is also very dubious. Warfare and piracy are largely irrelevant as causes of shipwreck. In addition, the location and rate of discovery of ancient wrecks in the Mediterranean is by no means random. There is a bias towards the Western Mediterranean, as well as a tendency
outlined by Hopkins. This long-term trend should have been already well under way in the Classical and Hellenistic periods.

The statement that the Mediterranean was "free of pirates" is an exaggeration. Piracy may still have been very common in the Principate. The ancient novels suggest this is so, as do several references in historical literature and some inscriptions. For example, a second century A.D. inscription from Olympia, concerning regulations for the Sebasta at Neapolis includes the following clauses:

If someone arrives after the deadline given in the announcement, he must report the reason for the delay to the contest officials; valid excuses shall be, illness, piracy or shipwreck...\(^2\)

The literary sources do, however, provide numerous indications that the period from the reign of Augustus onwards was perceived as one of peace, stability and prosperity. Relative to the preceding centuries, it is reasonable to characterise the Principate as a period in which piracy was a lesser problem, in the Mediterranean at least. The same is obviously not true for the Classical and Hellenistic periods, although the Late Republic was a time when piracy was gradually beginning to be suppressed, becoming a less serious menace to trade and to economic production in general.

It would appear to follow from these points that piracy and trade are far from being mutually antagonistic. Although piracy often disrupts maritime trade, the two can exist side by side, as they did from the end of Archaic period onwards. The slave trade

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\(^2\) I.\(v.\) O. 56, lines 24-6 as restored by Merkelbach (1974); see S.E.G. XXII no. 334. I think piracy is a more likely translation than banditry because of the mention of shipwreck, leistela, the word used, could indicate both or either; see above Part Two. See below and Parts Three and Five for more references to piracy during the Principate.

pp. 357-75
is an example of how trade and piracy can be harmonised, to a certain extent. However, while it can be said that piracy "needs" trade, the opposite is not true. Without the danger of piracy long-distance maritime trade in particular is better able to flourish.

**Pax Romana**

As he nears the end of his life of Augustus, and recounts the last days of his subject's life, Suetonius includes the following anecdote:

After coasting past Campania, with its islands, he spent the next four days in his villa on Capreae, where he rested and amused himself. As he had sailed through the gulf of Puteoli, the passengers and crew of a recently arrived Alexandrian ship had put on white robes and garlands, burned incense, and wished him the greatest of good fortune - because, they said, they owed their lives to him and their liberty to sail the seas: in a word, their entire freedom and prosperity. This incident gratified Augustus so deeply that he gave each member of his staff forty gold pieces, making them promise under oath to spend them only on Alexandrian trade goods. (Suet. Aug. 98)

This charming story illustrates one of the major benefits which the Principate brought to the Mediterranean world. An increasing volume of trade was conducted in the relative security of the Roman Empire. As well as political stability there was less danger from piracy and banditry, in those areas where Rome had "pacified" potential marauders. Outbreaks of piracy which might threaten the security and prosperity of the Roman peace were usually suppressed quickly. The scale of piracy seen in the last century of the Republic was unlikely to arise again as long as the political structure of the Principate remained intact. In times of crisis there might be isolated occurrences in places where the Roman army and navy were absent, or their presence action not effective, but

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93 This quotation is from the translation by Robert Graves (1957).
examples show that order was generally restored as soon as possible. The enthusiasm of the Alexandrians was not misplaced.

It was, of course, one of Augustus' claims in his Res Gestae to have pacified the sea and cleared it of pirates (R.G. 25.1). Similar sentiments can be found in works of ancient literature, from the Augustan period and later. Strabo, in his description of Iberia, remarks on the advantageous conditions for trade between Spain and Italy, including the absence of piracy, which has been suppressed by the Romans (Str. 3.2.5). Praise of the Augustan maritime peace can be seen in Horace (Hor. Od. 4.5.17-20) and Propertius (Prop. 3.4.1 & 11.59). Inscriptions proclaim Augustus as supreme ruler over both land and sea, a theme also found in Suetonius' biography (Suet. Aug. 22).

After the death of Augustus the ideology of the Roman Imperial Peace continued to be applied to maritime conditions. Philo, in his invective against the Emperor Gaius, praised Augustus and his successors for opening up the seas to commercial navigation by removing the threats of war, banditry and piracy:

He it was who abolished wars, both open and of the hidden kind, which result from the attacks of pirates. He it was who managed to empty the sea of pirate vessels and fill it with cargo ships. (Philo de leg. 146)

The same idea is contained in the second book of Pliny's Natural History (Pliny N.H. 2.118). Even Epictetus was prepared to grant that the emperors might be able to make life better in these respects:

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94 See below Part Five for examples of the suppression of piracy during the Principate.
95 See above Part Three on the specific context of this claim.
97 See paragraph 141 for similar praise of Tiberius.
For see how Caesar seems to provide us with a great peace, so that there are no longer any wars, or battles, nor is there much banditry or piracy, but it is possible to travel at all times, to sail from sunrise to sunset. (Epic. 3.13.9)98

The philosopher goes on to enumerate those things which the emperor cannot prevent, like shipwreck, fire and earthquake, but the common theme is clear. It is the imperial peace which enables men to travel and trade, without much fear of piracy and war. The repeated praise of this peace in various forms of ancient literature served two purposes, it both thanked the providers and exhorted them to continue their efforts. Suetonius' Alexandrians and others were certainly reflecting the real conditions when they said that they owed their liberty to sail to the emperor, but they also communicated their desire that this liberty be maintained.

Were there any restrictions on the liberty of ancient mariners? Starr maintains that the Roman attitude to commercial activity was one of "laissez-faire".99 Reddé cites a small amount of evidence which suggests some control of navigation, at Alexandria, at Ostia and along the rivers and coastlines away from the Mediterranean itself.100 It is, however, unlikely that the ideology of rule over land and sea extended to any practical attempts to regulate the use of the Mediterranean. There was little that could be done away from ports and river stations to prevent anyone who wished from building boats or ships and using them. Only when violence threatened the security of Rome or her subjects did the imperial authorities take steps to suppress certain forms of maritime activity.101

98 Compare also Antipater of Tarsus in Plut. tranq. anim. 466e.

99 Starr (1941), chapter VIII.

100 Reddé (1986), pp. 399-412. He cites Strabo (2.3.5) on control of entry/exit at Alexandria and various instances of military personnel connected with trade, especially the corn supply of Rome.

101 See below Part Five, pp. 253-255.
Wreckers

At one point in Petronius' Satyricon the three adventurers, Giton, Encolpius and Eumolpius, are on the ship of Lichas when it is caught in a storm and badly damaged. Their plight is observed from the nearby shore:

Some fishermen in small boats rushed out to seize the plunder. Then as they saw people prepared to defend their belongings, they turned from cruel thoughts to come to our aid... (Petr. 114)

This was probably a common situation on the shores of the Roman Empire. The fishermen can hardly be classed as pirates, since they do not intend to fight for their plunder, but rather to take it from those who are unable to retain it as a result of storm or shipwreck, in which case "wreckers" seems a more appropriate term. Plundering wrecks is quite a common theme in the literature of the Principate, and it was also the subject of imperial legislation. Ownership of goods from a shipwreck is discussed by Callistratus in the Digest, and seizure of such goods was prohibited by an edict of the Emperor Hadrian (Dig. 47.9.5-7). Hadrian also authorised those whose goods has been seized to take their case to a prefect. The penalties for unlawful seizure were the same as those for piracy or banditry.

Wreckers were probably a great menace to merchants and seafarers, as the section of the Digest cited above implies, because of the extremely hazardous nature of ancient seafaring. Evidence of deliberate wrecking, using false lights or other signals to lead ships onto rocks or sandbanks, cannot be found in the literary sources, although it is referred to in the Digest (47.9.10). I suspect that it happened only rarely, as ancient ships

102 See, for example, Sen. Contr. 1.6 & 7; 7.1; Dio Chrys. 7.31.; For a definition see Dig. 47.9.10.


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were much less reliant on coastal signals than their more modern counterparts. On the other hand, shipwreck was a commonplace occurrence, witnessed by the numerous ancient wrecks which have been located around the coasts of the Mediterranean and other seas. During the Principate (and at other times) it might be a major cause of losses in terms of both goods and people. Emperors, as Epictetus observed (3.13.9), could do nothing to prevent shipwrecks, but they could afford some protection and redress for merchants and travellers against the "wreckers" who preyed on the unfortunate victims.

**Troxoboros and the "wild Cilicians"**

In his account of the notable events of the year A.D. 52, Tacitus includes the following episode:

Soon after this, under the leadership of Troxoboros, the Cetae, one of the wild Cilician tribes, a constant source of trouble, set up camp in the rough mountains and made descents from here to the coast, or to the cities. They dared to use violence against farmers and townspeople and even to attack merchants and shipowners. They laid siege to the city of Anemurion and defeated a cavalry force under the prefect Curtius Severus sent to relieve it. (Tac. Ann. 12.55)

The peace and prosperity of the Cilician coastal plain, and the safety of passing ships was once again threatened. Damage was done to the local rural population, but the impression which Tacitus gives is that it was the threat to traders and seafarers which provoked Roman intervention. Anemurion was a coastal city, a convenient staging post on the voyage to or from Syria. The problem was eventually dealt with by the local dynast Antiokhos IV Epiphanes of Commagene, who used treachery and bribery to split up the Cetae and capture their leader.

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104 See map of "Cilicia" no. 16.

105 See Part Five below, pp. 353-5.
The Red Sea

Outside the empire things were different. Where the Romans did not even nominally control the coastline, and the local population were hostile, navigation could be extremely hazardous at all times. The Red Sea was one such place. The author of the Circumnavigation of the Erythraean Sea, describing the voyage from Egypt to India, is careful to inform his readers of points on the journey where piratical attacks from the natives are likely, like the Ichthyophagoi, who prey on passing vessels and the victims of shipwreck (Per. M. Eryth. 20) or the inhabitants of the islands off the coast of India itself:

Then come the Sesekreinai Islands, as they are called, the Islands of the Aigidioi, the Island of the Kaineitoi, near to the so-called peninsula, which places abound with pirates, and after them is the White Island. (Per. M. Eryth. 53)\textsuperscript{106}

Strabo also mentions the piratical methods of the Nabataeans, who used rafts to attack ships, and who were the object of a punitive expedition launched by one of the Ptolemies (Str. 16.4.18). In order to protect themselves and their cargoes merchants carried armed men in their ships.

Indeed, all year round the Red Sea was navigated with cohorts of archers placed in the ships, for it was greatly infested with pirates. (Pliny N.H. 6.101)

The coast of Africa was liable to be equally dangerous, for anyone who was bold enough to venture so far:

The rest of the ancient writers do not consider it possible to sail here on account of the heat of the sun; but, indeed, the trade here is attacked by Arabs from the islands, called Ascitae, who, riding rafts made of inflated ox-hides, practice piracy using poisoned arrows. (Pliny N.H. 6.167)

\textsuperscript{106} Casson (1989) plausibly suggests that the author of this work was a Greek merchant from Egypt, writing for other merchants at some point in the middle of the first century A.D.
The Vandals and Trade in the Fifth Century A.D.

In a celebrated discussion of the work of Henri Pirenne, Norman Baynes laid the blame for the disruption of the Roman peace not on the Moslems of the seventh and eighth centuries, but on the Vandals:

My own belief is that the unity of the Mediterranean world was broken by the pirate fleet of Vandal Carthage and that the shattered unity was never restored.107

Neither the original "Pirenne thesis" nor Baynes' counter proposal are much favoured by modern historians,108 but it cannot be denied that the Vandals did have a profound effect on the Mediterranean world in the fifth century A.D. The piracy practised by Gaiseric and his followers was widespread and highly disruptive. It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider its possible effect upon maritime trade in this period.

The Vandals captured Carthage in A.D. 439 and were able to take control of a substantial fleet of ships, not warships, but merchant vessels.109 The main areas which they attacked were Sicily, Italy, Sardinia and Corsica, the Balearic Islands, Southern Greece, Illyria and the Cyclades.110 It seems that Sicily was first attacked in A.D. 440, when Gaiseric launched a major expedition against the island (Prosper Chron. 1342; Hydat. Chron. 120). The Vandals continued to campaign in Sicily throughout the 440s, 450s and 460s A.D. until, by 468 A.D. they controlled virtually the whole island.111 They used it as a base for further attacks on Italy and other places in the Western

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107 Baynes (1955), p. 315. The original review was published in J.R.S. in 1929.

108 For a recent discussion of the breaking of the unity of the ancient Mediterranean see Collins (1991), especially chapters 8, 9 & 13.


110 For detailed discussion of the extent of the Vandal raids see Courtois (1955), pp. 185-205.

Mediterranean, and also exploited its economic resources, but were in competition with the Ostrogoths for control of the island.

Italy was also an early target for Gaiseric and his followers. A novel of the emperor Valentinian III indicates that Italy was put on the defensive in anticipation of their attacks after the fall of Carthage.

Gaiseric, the enemy of our Empire, was reported to have led a large fleet from the port of Carthage... and although the care of our mercy arranged defences throughout many places... however, because there is in the summer good weather for sailing, the ships of our enemy were able to reach that shore.\textsuperscript{112}

The emperor was virtually powerless against the highly mobile Vandals. Raids on Italy are recorded in A.D. 445, 458, 461 and 463.\textsuperscript{113} After A.D. 468 the raids on Italy seem to have ceased. Courtois explains this partly through the growth of Ostrogothic power, which later manifested itself in the treaty over Sicily,\textsuperscript{114} and partly through the lack of money and manpower available to Gaiseric.\textsuperscript{115} As a result he turned to the potentially more lucrative Eastern provinces (Procop. Bel. Vand. 1.5.22-5; Vict. de Vit. 1.51).

In A.D. 474 there is evidence of raids on Zakynthos (Procop. Bel. Vand. 1.22.16-18) and Nikopolis in Epiros (Malkhos fr. 3 \textit{F.H.G.}, IV p. 115). It also seems likely that Rhodes was raided by Vandal pirates at about this time.\textsuperscript{116} In A.D. 474 the emperor Zeno brought about an end to the Vandal raids by agreeing to recognise Gaiseric's possession

\textsuperscript{112} Nov. Val. III.9 (June 440).


\textsuperscript{114} See above Part Three, \textit{pp.} 173-5.

\textsuperscript{115} See Courtois (1955), p. 196.

\textsuperscript{116} Nest. Herak. II.2.
of Africa. It is clear that Vandal piracy was a far less serious problem in the Mediterranean thereafter.\textsuperscript{117}

Did the Vandal occupation of North Africa seriously disrupt trade in the Western Mediterranean? To some extent it may have done. The grain fleet no longer made regular journeys between Carthage and Rome, and any merchant vessels which were accustomed to accompany it would have had to make other arrangements, but that would not have been too difficult. The Vandals do not, however, seem to have attacked or hindered shipping; their raids were made against places on land. The impact of no longer having to supply the \textit{annona} on the North African provinces must have been considerable and have had some consequences for overseas trade. Courtois detected evidence of an agricultural decline in the region following on from the Vandal conquest,\textsuperscript{118} although some African (and Sicilian) grain was being sent to Constantinople in the sixth and seventh centuries.\textsuperscript{119} Nor did the African provinces have to produce the surpluses needed to pay taxes to Rome, and rents to absentee landlords in Italy. On the other hand, the majority of the 80,000 or so Vandals seem to have lived apart from the local population, as a kind of occupying elite, and would have needed to have been fed and supplied by local producers and traders.\textsuperscript{120} It could be argued that the Vandals created an independent and relatively wealthy state out of what had been a dependency of

\textsuperscript{117} See Courtois (1955), Part 2 chpt. III; see above Part Three on the settlement with Odovacer over Sicily.

\textsuperscript{118} See Courtois (1955), pp. 316-23. See pages 209-11 on the importance of Africa as a supplier of food, especially grain, to other parts of the Mediterranean.

\textsuperscript{119} See Teall (1959), esp. Appendix C. He makes no use of archaeological evidence, relying on literary sources and numismatics only.

\textsuperscript{120} See Courtois (1955), Part 2, chpt. II; Courtois et al. (1952).
imperial Italy. Gaiseric’s raids brought slaves and booty to Carthage and its hinterland in large quantities.\(^{121}\)

The concentration of wealth and power ought to have encouraged both production and trade. Evidence is difficult to find, but it seems from the wide dispersal of North African pottery, especially “red slip ware”, in Italy, Southern Gaul, Spain and even parts of Greece, that the activities of North African traders were not curtailed in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D.\(^{122}\) The picture seems to be one of continuity in this area of trade at least. It is also worth considering that the Vandal fleet need not have been used solely for piracy and conquest. This fleet of mainly merchant ships was surely used in overseas trade, from time to time in the 450s, 60s and 70s A.D., and to a greater extent thereafter, when piracy ceased to be a major Vandal activity.

There is some evidence to suggest that Vandal Carthage was a major destination for the products of other regions. Excavations carried out in the 1970s seem to indicate that the city was a prosperous trading centre which only ran into trouble after the Byzantine conquest of A.D. 533.

Imports of all main classes of pottery increased during the later Vandal period, reaching a peak about A.D. 525-50, followed by a gradual decline from c. A.D. 550-75 until the mid-7th century when they registered only as a slight trickle.\(^{123}\) The Vandals did not, as far as can be seen from our meagre sources, direct their piratical activities against merchant ships. The threat of raids on coastal areas of the Mediterranean might have acted as something of a deterrent to free movement of shipping. The possibility of arriving at a harbour in the middle of a raid would not have been relished

\(^{121}\) See above Part Three on the political aims and achievements of Gaiseric’s “foreign policy”.

\(^{122}\) See Hayes (1972), pp. 128-50; dispersal of African pottery is plotted on maps on pp. 162-3.

by many, but such considerations are unlikely to have prevented the movement of goods for long periods of time. The knowledge that there were markets in Carthage and other Vandal controlled places, with potentially rich customers, should have compensated for the occasional fear of piracy. The period of "growth" in imports would appear to coincide with a period of relative security and peace, after the initial 30 or so years of warfare and piracy.

Indeed, the period of about a hundred years after the reconquest was one during which the importance of maritime links, if not actual trade, increased. Carthage was one of several Byzantine enclaves in the west which were maintained and supplied by sea in the sixth and seventh centuries. But, as the pottery finds indicate, time began to run out for Carthage in the middle of the seventh century. The final conquest was certainly delayed, but by the end of the century the Arabs were in control of the whole of the North African coastline. The political changes which were wrought from c. A.D. 634-698, were what caused the "rupturing" of the unity of the Mediterranean. Conquest of territory on a scale unheard of since the Late Roman Republic, brought with it a change in emphasis for trade in the Mediterranean. ¹²⁴ Piracy certainly flourished again, beginning with the raids of the Arabs on the coast of Anatolia and the Aegean islands, but it was never on a scale to stifle trade entirely, as was also true of the piracy of Antiquity.

¹²⁴ See above Part Three, also Collins (1991), chpt. 9; Crone (1987).
Conclusions

Piracy can be, and in the ancient world it often was, a serious menace to trade, since pirates may choose to prey upon traders. But trade and piracy are not mutually exclusive. Ancient pirates depended to a certain extent upon traders in order to flourish, since they required markets where their booty could be sold or exchanged. The slave trade in the Classical and Hellenistic periods provides an example of how piracy and trade could co-exist in a mutually beneficial relationship, although pirates were almost certainly not the most important suppliers of slaves.

Piracy probably inhibited long-distance maritime trade in the ancient world, acting as a potential barrier to "growth". Suppression of piracy in the interests of traders can first be detected in the Hellenistic period, and was most significant in the Principate. A long-term and gradual increase in "production" and trade in the Mediterranean region, reached a peak in the first two centuries A.D., at a time when peace and political stability also helped to keep piracy to a minimum.

Conditions on the fringes of the Roman Empire were worse, however, and occasionally internal problems threatened the security of trade in and traders in particular parts of the Empire. When the political and economic system of the Roman Empire broke down, piracy became once more a major hazard to trade, although it never reached such levels as would have made long-distance trade impossible.

125 See below Part Five.
Suppression in the fifth century B.C.?

The suppression of piracy only becomes a subject for historical analysis in the Classical period, when it becomes sufficiently differentiated from warfare and perceived as a threat to trade. It is often assumed by modern scholars that the fifth century saw a concerted attempt to suppress piracy in the Aegean, and possibly further afield, on the part of the Athenians. The Athenian navy and the Delian League are thought to have been the main instruments of this policy of suppression of piracy.

The protection which the Athenian empire guaranteed to Greek traders and to the weaker inhabitants of the Aegean coasts was one which had never been enjoyed since the mythical days of king Minos. Yet this very real benefit is passed over almost in silence by our authorities.\(^1\)

It is significant that Ormerod observes the lack of comment on this remarkable Athenian achievement in the ancient sources. Nowhere in the fifth century sources is it claimed that the Athenians have suppressed or even reduced piracy in the Aegean. What is the evidence that led Ormerod to make this statement?

The mention of king Minos is a reference to Thucydides’ suggestion (Thuc. 1.4) that he suppressed piracy in order to increase his revenues. This is clearly a piece of speculation, but it could be argued that it is based on the assumption that Minos would have behaved in the same way as the Athenians of the fifth century B.C.\(^2\) This is,

\(^1\) Ormerod (1924), p. 110. This view is still treated as the orthodox one by modern historians: "The positive advantages to the allies of subservience to Athens included security from Persia... and from piracy." Hornblower (1991), pp. 30-1.

\(^2\) See above Part Thre for a quotation from Grote (1888) to this effect. Note also the reference to the Corinthians (Thuc. 1.13). These references indicate that piracy could be thought of as detrimental to trade at this time. See above Part Four.
however, only evidence for the idea of suppressing piracy, not the reality. Ormerod also refers to Athenian expeditions against pirate bases. The first of these is the expedition under Kimon to the island of Skyros, which occurred in 476 B.C. The conquest of the island is mentioned by Thucydides (Thuc. 1.98) and described most fully by Plutarch in his Life of Kimon (Plut. Kim. 8).

According to Plutarch the island was inhabited by Dolopians whose constant plundering of ships, including those which were trading with the island, eventually resulted in a request for Athenian intervention, addressed directly to Kimon. The story is not very credible, and looks like an attempt to justify Athenian "imperialism". Thucydides' version of events is less elaborate than Plutarch's. He simply says that the Athenians enslaved the local population and colonized the island for themselves. The report in Plutarch that the bones of Theseus were recovered on Skyros and returned to Athens makes the "piracy" story look even less credible.

Plutarch also mentions an expedition to the Thracian Khersonese c. 447 B.C., led by Perikles, to establish new colonies and to deal with what are referred to as "groups of bandits" (Plut. Per. 19). This is likely to refer to natives who were fighting against the Athenian settlements in the area. Even if it was directed against pirates, and there is nothing in the text to show this, then it was certainly intended to protect Athenian interests, rather than those of the Delian League allies or any other Greek states, although it may have been indirectly beneficial to other states.

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3 Ormerod (1924), p. 108. Even Ormerod doubts the genuineness of the claim made by Nepos that Themistokles cleared the seas of pirates (Nep. Them. 2.3), quoted above Part Two, p. 51.

4 leidzómenoi.

5 leisterion. Ormerod (1924), p. 108, seems to think that this refers to piracy.

6 On this expedition see Meiggs (1972), pp. 159-61. Plutarch is a very unreliable source for these matters because he is deliberately trying to present the Athenians, and Perikles in particular, as saviours and benefactors of all the Greeks.
Shortly before he describes the expedition to the Khersonese, Plutarch gives an account of what is usually known as the "Congress Decree" (Plut. Per. 17). Among the items supposedly on the agenda for this conference of Greek states was the safety of navigation. I am of the opinion that this decree was a forgery, and that no such congress was ever proposed. In any case, inviting discussion of the safety of the seas is not the same as proposing to suppress piracy.7

There are three Athenian inscriptions from the fifth century B.C. which may refer to pirates and piracy. The earliest one is a fragmentary decree of c. 446 B.C. which concerns the Athenian kleruchy on Histiaia. Early editions of this decree indicated that some kind of reward was being offered for capturing pirates, but the latest edition makes it clear that this is not the case. The inscription mentions leistaL, but the context is unascertainable, because it is too fragmentary.8

A fragmentary inscription, which probably records a treaty between Athens and Mytilene, made c. 427-4 B.C., includes a clause in which the Mytileneans promise not to admit pirates, nor to practice piracy, nor to fight with Athens' enemies against her.9 A similar treaty between Athens and Halieis, dated to 424/3 B.C., has the same clause in its text.10 Do these inscriptions indicate an Athenian policy of suppressing piracy?

I do not think that the mention of piracy in these treaties need refer to anything

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7 See Seager (1969). Various attempts have been made to determine a specific fourth century context for the forgery, but I do not find any of them convincing. See below on the ideology of suppression in the fourth century. See also Macdonald (1982). There is no point in rehearsing all the arguments here.

8 LG. 1 (3rd edn.) no. 43. The new length of line determined by the editor (D.M. Lewis) results in a reorganization of the fragments which supersedes all previous readings. See also Macdonald (1984), who still seems to think that the older conjectures are valid.

9 LG. 1 (3rd edn.), no. 67, lines 7-8. The treaty may well have been agreed soon after the revolt of Mytilene in 428-7 B.C.; see Thuc. 3.2-50.

10 LG. 1 (3rd edn.), no. 75, lines 6-10; quoted above in Part Twg. See Meritt (1935). Both these inscriptions are quite heavily restored, but the restorations seem sound.
more than plundering by way of reprisals, which was common in the period of the Peloponnesian war. The Athenians were both victims and perpetrators of this kind of "piracy", and it would certainly make sense for them to try to prevent Haliéis from being used as a base for pirates who might be plundering around the coasts of Attika. The phrase involved appears to be a standard one in Athenian treaties of this period, which might suggest a concerted policy of preventing, or at least trying to prevent piracy, but once again it is the protection of Athenians which appears to be of paramount importance.

On the basis of this review of the evidence I conclude that the Athenian Empire did not afford any significant protection to its subjects/allies against pirates. It is, I think, particularly significant that Thucydides, who has so much to say about piracy, never suggests that the Athenians have done anything to suppress it. The idea that Athens suppressed piracy in the fifth century B.C. is a myth, perpetuated by many modern historians. Such mythmakers also conveniently ignore the evidence that piracy was a common problem for many Greek states in the heyday of the Athenian Empire.

Again it is inscriptions that provide the best indications of conditions. An inscription from Teos, dated to c. 470 B.C. details curses to be pronounced against the betrayal of the community by the aisymnetes, an important local magistrate. The death penalty (for families as well as magistrates) is prescribed for several offences:

...whoever in the future commits treason or brigandage, or takes brigands under his protection or commits piracy, or takes pirates under his protection, with

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11 See above Part Three. The references could, of course, be to plundering by both land and sea.

12 It should be noted here that there were plenty of Athenians on Lesbos and the mainland opposite after the revolt of 428-7 B.C.; Thuc. 3.50. There was plenty of piracy as a direct result of the Peloponnesian war; see above Part Three, pp. 114-5.

13 The inscription uses the comparatively rare word kixállês for brigand (to provide an alternative to leistés, for pirate); also used is a verb derived from this noun.
full knowledge, (men) who from the territory of Teos or from the sea bear off plunder..."14

The text is very specific, differentiating between pirates and bandits. From this text it would appear that the Teians were likely to be troubled quite often by pirates plundering their territory. Presumably the neighbouring islands also experienced this problem. Another, slightly different practice, the taking of plunder by way of reprisal, is mentioned in an inscription of c. 450 B.C. recording an agreement between Oiantheia and Khaleion, which restricts the custom to the seas outside the harbours of the two cities.15 Seizures made there are "lawful". This form of "justified" piracy was apparently very common in the fifth century B.C.16 Both of these inscriptions suggest that piracy was likely to be a serious problem in spite of the existence of the Athenian Empire.

As has already been mentioned, the idea of suppressing piracy, in the interests of traders and of increasing revenues, was apparently current in the fifth century B.C. Thucydides seems to think that both Minos and the Corinthians would have tried to do this. At the very least this shows that piracy was considered by him to be an evil and that it was worth suppressing. It can also be assumed that he was not alone in this attitude, but there is no evidence to suggest that anyone, even the Athenians, in the fifth century tried to turn thoughts into deeds. One obvious reason for this is the impracticality of such an enterprise. The only way to prevent piracy was to remove the pirates. This would require the identification of the perpetrators of piracy and their bases, followed by military action to destroy them. Since there were many people who would be engaged in piracy in the Mediterranean World at this time, it would need an enormous effort to

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15 Tod (1946), no. 34.

16 See above Part Three, pp. 118-9.
tackle even a few of them. No-one had the resources to suppress piracy "on their own" at this time, and, as the political history of the period amply demonstrates, co-operation among the many states and peoples was out of the question.

The fourth century B.C.

Nevertheless, the idea remained an attractive one to many in the Classical period. When the political rivalries of the mid-fourth century B.C. were at their height the issue of the safety of navigation was raised by Philip of Macedon and his Athenian opponents. The political significance is brought out in the speech On Halonnesos, probably written by Hegesippos c. 343 B.C. The island of Halonnesos had been captured by Sostratos the "pirate", who was in turn expelled by Philip. The king offered to give the island to the Athenians, even though it "belonged" to him. The Athenians claimed it as their own and sent an embassy to Philip to demand, among other things, its return.

Hegesippos warns the Athenians that Philip wishes to demonstrate to all the Greeks that his superior power has won Halonnesos, and that the Athenians could get it back only because of him. This amounts to a recognition that Athens is not strong enough to protect even her own possessions from pirates ([Demos.] 7.6-8). Hegesippos also shows more concern for the preservation of Athenian prestige than for the suppression of piracy.

Regarding pirates, Philip says that you and he are duty-bound to co-operate in guarding against evildoers at sea, but what he is really after is to be established at sea, by your agreeing that without Philip you do not have the strength to mount guard at sea, and, furthermore, by giving him free reign to go sailing from island to island, stopping off on the pretext of guarding against pirates, corrupting

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17 This debate may, perhaps, provide a context for the "Congress Decree".

18 See also Demos. 58.53, and above Part Three, pp. 116-7.
the exiled islanders and taking them away from you. ([Demos.] 7.14-15)

Suppression of piracy had become a political issue, but there is little evidence for positive action.

After the Macedonian conquest of Greece there was a period of relative political stability and unity. A mission to deal with pirates in 331 B.C. is mentioned by one of the historians of Alexander's reign, but it is unclear what the admiral Amphoteros was supposed to do (Q. Curt. 4.8.15). I think it most unlikely that this refers to a wide-ranging campaign in the Aegean.

The Athenians seem to have made some efforts to suppress piracy at this time, although their naval activities were very localized and sporadic. An entry in the records of the naval magistrates for 335/4 B.C. mentions the despatch of some triremes under the command of Diotimos, "to take guard against pirates",19 but there is no further information about the nature of this expedition.20 In an inscription honouring Phaidros of Sphettos (c. 274 B.C.) mention is made of the expedition led by his father, Thymokhares, in 315/4 B.C. against Glauketas, who had captured the island Kynthos and was using it as a base. This action is said to have made the sea safe for sailors.21

It would appear that the heyday of Athenian power in the fifth century B.C. did not see any concerted effort to suppress piracy in the Aegean. Only in the fourth century is there evidence for action against pirates, by the Athenians or anyone else, and this is

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19 I.G. II (2nd edn.), no. 1623, lines 276-85.

20 I do not think that this was some kind of regular "patrol", because such an arrangement would be impractical. Triremes could not simply sail around looking for pirates. It may be that Diotimos was being sent away from Athens to prevent Alexander getting his hands on him (Arr. 1.10.4). The suggestion that Diotimos is honoured for successful completion of this mission in an inscription (I.G. II (2nd edn.), no. 414A; Plut. Mor. 884a) is pure fantasy. See also Hesperia 9 (1940).

21 S.I.G. 409 = I.G. II (2nd edn.) 682, lines 9-14. Note also the colony on the Adriatic founded by the Athenians in 325/4 B.C., partly to provide a safe haven in the face of attacks by Tyrrhenians (I.G. II (2nd edn.) 1629, lines 217-33). Once again it is the interests of the Athenians which are important here.
sporadic and localized. Suppression of piracy was a political issue in the Classical period, but there was little enthusiasm for the concerted action which would have been required for it to become a reality. The close relationship between piracy and warfare must be partly responsible for the problem of piracy in this period. The political situation which produced this warfare also hindered any attempts at suppression. A similar situation prevailed well into the Hellenistic period.

22 See above Part Three on war and piracy in the Classical period.
Rhodes

The Rhodians were famous in antiquity for their resistance to piracy. Diodorus prefaces his introduction to the siege of Rhodes in 305 B.C. with the following remarks:

Indeed, she had attained such a position of power that she took up the war against the pirates by herself, on behalf of the Greeks, and cleared the sea of their evil infestation. (Diod. 20.81.3).

Diodorus is, of course, exaggerating here, possibly because he is using a pro-Rhodian source, but there is plenty of evidence to back up the claim that the Rhodians went to war with the pirates in the Hellenistic period.

The Rhodian navy

Berthold claims that the Rhodian navy was "designated as an antipirate force". This is rather an overenthusiastic statement, especially in view of the fact that most of our information about the Rhodian navy comes from accounts of its activities in warfare, often alongside Pergamon and Rome. The Rhodians used a variety of ships, including triremes, quadriremes and quinqueremes, but their most distinctive vessel was probably the trihemiolia. This was a fast, decked ship which (unlike the trireme) did not have several levels of oarsmen, but was capable of dealing with the larger warships of the

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23 See above Part Two of Diodorus' source for this section. See also Trog. Prol. 35 on Rhodes and piracy.


25 See Schmitt (1957), passim. Thiel (1946), esp. chpt. III.
Hellenistic monarchs. Speed would be useful when chasing enemy ships, whether pirates or not, and decks allowed plenty of marines to be carried, including archers and heavily armed infantry for amphibious operations. It should not be forgotten that one of the principal uses of any ancient warship was to transport soldiers to fight on land, as well as at sea. There is, however, some direct evidence which shows elements of the Rhodian navy in action against pirates.

An inscription found on the island of Rhodes and dated to the early third century B.C. records the names of three Rhodian brothers who died fighting with the Rhodian navy.

The earth shrouds these brave [men] in death: ——— son of Timakrates, acting as a bow officer [on a trihemio]lia he died fighting against [the Tyrrhenians]. ———es son of Timakrates, sailing on the [guardship] among the rowers(?), he died fighting against the Tyrrhenians. [Polemarkhos son of Timakrates, [having been sent out] as a detachment leader he died fighting against the pirates(?). The damos of Kasareis (erected this).

The Rhodian custom of erecting public monuments to their war dead is attested as early as 305 B.C. by Diodoros (20.84.3). It has been suggested that this monument records casualties suffered in attempts to combat Tyrrhenian (i.e. Etruscan) pirates. The third

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26 See Morrison (1980).

27 On all of this see the brief but excellent treatment of the Rhodian navy in Rice (1991).

28 syntagmatárkhos; the meaning of the term is unclear.

29 S.I.G. (3rd edn.) 1225. See also G.V.I. no. 41. Discussion in Hiller (1895); Blinkenberg (1938) pp. 14 & 45; Torelli (1975); Rice (1991). There are several lacunae and restorations are indicated by [-]. Precise line lengths are difficult to determine. The date is uncertain and could be much later.

30 See Ormerod (1924), p. 130; Zeibarth (1929), chpt. 4. Hiller’s supplement in line 5, [nauarkhídl], might indicate an escort vessel of some kind, possibly intended to guard merchant ships against pirates.
of the brothers, Polemarkhos, is the only one who is specifically said to have been killed by pirates. His brothers’ opponents may also have been pirates, but with the difference that their identity was more clearly established than was the case with Polemarkhos.31

The identity of Polemarkhos is suggested by another inscription in which a Rhodian officer called Polemarkhos, son of Timakrates, of the deme of Kasareis, is honoured for his participation in an attack on Aigila, the modern Antikythera.

Decided by the people. Since (the following) were assigned by the people to the expedition to Aigila: Skyllios, son of Epikrates, of Physke, detachment leader of the foreigners, Polemarkhos, son of Timakrates, of Kasareis, catapult man, Damokritos, son of Ergoteles, of Istane, marine on a quadrireme, Philtatidas, son of Sopatros, of Argeis, marine on a guardship...32

This might also have been an anti-piracy expedition, since there is no other obvious reason why the Rhodians should be interested in Aigila at this time. There is no foundation for the suggestion that the first brother was killed fighting on Aigila.33

Why would the Rhodians have been fighting Tyrrhenian pirates? If the name Tyrrhenians is not taken too literally, then it could refer to any “pirates” from the Italian peninsula. Rome had had to deal with complaints about pirate raids in the fourth century, most notably the people of Antium, whose ships were all confiscated or burnt in 338 B.C. (Livy 8.12-14; Str. 5.3.5).34 There is further evidence for concern among the Athenians about the Tyrrhenians towards the end of the fourth century from the titles of

31 The possible alternative is bandits, but Tyrrhenians would presumably have to have been pirates (operating in ships) in order to have reached a place where they could come into conflict with the Rhodians. It seems to me unlikely that all three brothers died on the same expedition.

32 C. Rhod. 2., p. 169 no. 1; see Rice (1991) on the prosopography.


34 See above Part Two on Strabo and the significance of this story.
two speeches by Attic orators. Also in 298 B.C. it was necessary for the Delians to borrow money from the temple of Apollo "for protection against the Tyrrhenians". A speech included among the works of Aristeides has a comment about the magnificent collection of booty taken from Tyrrhenian pirates to be seen in Rhodes (Pseud-Arist. 25.4). All these pieces of evidence can be put together to indicate that "Tyrrhenian" pirates, originating from Italy, were a major problem in the Aegean during the early third century B.C., and that Rhodian ships and men were involved in attempts to suppress them.

Rhodes and the Cretan cities

The First Cretan War (c. 206-203 B.C.) was itself partly the result of piracy carried out by certain Cretan cities against the Cycladic islands, perhaps in response to Rhodian anti-piracy expeditions, and aggravated by the aggressive policies of Philip V of Macedon. The Rhodians held a position of prominence among the islanders, by virtue of their maritime power. While they did not, at this time, control the Nesiotic League, it is clear that the lesser islands looked to them for leadership and protection. A Delian

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36 I.G. XI.2.148 line 73; eis phylakên tôn tyrrenôn. How the money was used is unclear - perhaps to help finance expeditions against the pirates?

37 See Torelli (1975) for an alternative interpretation of the references to Tyrrhenians. She thinks they are an Aegean people, perhaps from Khalkidike.

38 See above Part Three on Dikaiaarkhos. The origins of the war and its progression are discussed in great detail by Brulé (1978) pp. 29-56. There can be no clear-cut explanation of the conflict. It would be pointless to review the evidence here, though I think that Brulé rather overdoes the extent of Rhodian "policing" of the Eastern Mediterranean in the third century B.C., for example on pp. 30-2 where he argues that the inscriptions discussed above and I.G. XI.4.596 all relate to Rhodian suppression of Cretan pirates.
decree of the second half of the 3rd century B.C. honours a Rhodian navarch and three trierarchs.

Decided by the Council and the people. — Hierombrotos proposed: Since Antigenes, appointed by the people of the Rhodians as navarch for the protection of the islands and for the safety of the Greeks, and the trierarchs Timaphanes and Dionnus and Hegesandros of Rhodes are good men.\(^3\)

The nature of the mission that these men were carrying out is unclear. It could have had something to do with piracy, but in that case why does the inscription not say so? On the other hand, the language of the inscription illustrates nicely the Rhodians' rather grandiose attitude to their position as a naval power. The Cretans were challenging this position by their piratical attacks as well as threatening the safety of the islands.\(^4\)

The hostility between Rhodes and some of the Cretan cities goes back several decades into the third century. An early alliance seems to have existed between Rhodes and Knossos. In 305 B.C. Knossians gave help to Rhodes against Demetrios Poliorketes (Diod. 20.88.9), and in 220 B.C. the Knossians successfully appealed to Rhodes for assistance in their war with Lyttos:

At around this time the Knossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians and persuaded them to send the ships under Polemokles with an additional three undecked vessels. This having been done, when the ships arrived in Crete, the Eleuthernaians, being under the impression that one of their citizens, Timarkhos, had been taken away (and killed) by Polemokles to satisfy the Knossians, first

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\(^3\) *I.G. XI.4.596* = Durrbach (1921) no. 39. See also no. 40 for a dedication of booty to Apollo by a Rhodian navarch and his men. On the date of no. 39 (c. 250-220 B.C.?) see Fraser & Bean (1954), p. 158.

\(^4\) Earlier in the century it was the Ptolemaic forces which seem to have done most to protect the islands, (see Ormerod (1924), pp. 132-6; Shipley (1987), chpt. 12) although there is very little evidence of their direct opposition to piracy. On the relative prominence of Egypt and Rhodes in the Cyclades see Will (1979-82), vol. I. pp. 231-3 & 239-41; Fraser and Bean (1954), pp. 94-108.
declared reprisals against the Rhodians and then began a war with them. (Polyb. 4.53.1-2)

The almost continuous warfare among the Cretan cities in the Hellenistic period provided several opportunities for the Rhodians to play one group of cities off against another in an effort to control the extent of Cretan piracy. Knossos seems to have been a loyal ally of Rhodes throughout the First Cretan war, her main opponents being Gortyn, Eleuthernai and Hierapytna. It is known, for example, that Rhodes made a treaty with Hierapytna in about 200 B.C. which included clauses relating to piracy, because a copy of the treaty has survived:

(X) And if pirates establish bases in Crete and the Rhodians wage war at sea against the pirates or those who provide shelter or assistance to them, the Hierapytnians shall take part in the operations by land and by sea with all possible strength and at their own expense. The pirates who are captured shall be handed over to the Rhodians together with their ships, while each of the allies shall take half of the rest (of the booty).

(XVII) And if during a campaign which the Hierapytnians are waging with the Rhodians to destroy a pirate base, any of those who provide shelter or assistance to the pirates wage war on the Hierapytnians because of this campaign, the Rhodians shall come to the help of the Hierapytnians with all possible strength, and anyone who acts in this way shall be an enemy of the Rhodians.

The treaty, probably concluded at the end of the First Cretan War, envisages that the Rhodians may recruit mercenaries in Crete as well as requiring the Hierapytnians to

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41 See Willetts (1955), pp. 234-41 for a brief account of the internal "Social wars" of the Cretans.

assist them in trade and (defensive) warfare. The Rhodians are clearly the more powerful of the partners, and the provisions concerning the suppression of piracy are very one-sided. The Rhodians are effectively making demands, from a position of strength, which the Hierapytnians must accede to, in return for the promise of Rhodian help if they fall foul of their Cretan neighbours.\(^\text{43}\)

The provisions of the treaty provide very good evidence of the main objectives in the suppression of piracy - bases and ships. The Rhodians are concerned to deny bases to pirates in Crete, and will wage war to destroy any that are established. They will also confiscate ships to prevent their further use for piracy. Without ships or a base to operate from, pirates are rendered impotent.

Fragments have also been discovered of a similar treaty which was drawn up between Rhodes and Olontos, at about the same time as the Hierapytnian one. There are corresponding passages on warfare, but nothing survives about the treatment of piracy.\(^\text{44}\) It is, however, a reasonable assumption that clauses relating to piracy were included similar to the ones in the treaty with Hierapytna. Brulé suggests that the Olontians requested the treaty from the Rhodians in order to establish themselves on the same footing as other cities.\(^\text{45}\)

Although the Rhodians had been the victors in their war with the Cretans, and were able to detach several cities away from the koinon headed by Philip V, they had neither the resources nor the opportunity to bring the island's many communities under

\(^\text{43}\) Compare the treaty between Miletos and the Knossians which was concluded earlier in the century, and was clearly a favour granted to the Milesians by the Knossians (S.d.A. III.482). See above Part Four, pp.196-7.

\(^\text{44}\) S.d.A. III no. 552; See Garlan (1969) for details of the corresponding clauses, partly restored with help from the Hierapytna treaty.

\(^\text{45}\) Brulé (1978) pp. 54-5.
their control. In short, unlike the Romans in the first century B.C., they could not beat
the enemy into total submission. Treaties with former enemies were only a step towards
the suppression of Cretan piracy. They certainly could not guarantee that it would not
be a problem in the future. Knossos was a good ally, but there was a large group of cities
whose sympathy lay with Philip V. Changes in the political alignments of the Cretans
could easily wreck the Rhodian arrangements.

In the short term, however, the prestige of the Rhodians was greatly increased in
the Aegean. Their chastisement of the Cretans enhanced their position among the
islanders, while, in the early years of the second century B.C. they embarked upon a
series of campaigns as allies of the Romans, culminating in the defeat of Antiokhos III in
189 B.C., following which the Rhodians were rewarded with increased possessions on the
mainland and trading privileges.

Further evidence of Rhodian interest in the suppression of piracy comes from
another Delian inscription, dated to the early second century B.C.

Decided by the Council and the people. Telemnestos, son of Ariteides, proposed:
Since Epikrates, son of Polystratos, of Rhodes, sent to war by the people in decked
ships, accompanied on campaign by the triremes of the islanders and the

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46 Roman intervention in mainland Greece was about to change the "rules" of

47 See van Effenterre (1948) pp. 213-21. "Il apparaît que Cnossus était liée à ce que
nous avons appelé le parti de l'ordre, désireux de faire régner la paix et la
tranquillité du commerce dans l'Egée. Au second siècle tout change. Les Cnossiens
sont sans doute parmi les amis de Nabis; ils vont adopter une ligne de conduite
favorable à la Macédoine et hostile à la puissance romaine." (p. 214).

48 See van Gelder (1900) pp. 450-64 for a series of honorific inscriptions for Rhodians
in the Aegean. On the revival of the Nesiotic League c. 200 B.C. under Rhodian
direction see Fraser and Bean (1954), chpt. V; Will (1979-82), vol. II p. 80; Berthold
(1984) pp. 142-4. This is the period Diodorus refers to (20.82.3).

49 See Schmitt (1957); Will (1979-82) vol. II chpts. II & III; C.A.H. VIII (2nd edn.)
chpts. 4, 8 & 10.
undecked ships of the Athenians, took care of the safety of shipping and the protection of the islands, with due reverence for the sanctuary, passing an edict that the ones practising piracy\textsuperscript{50} against the enemies should base themselves in their own ports, and that no-one should use Delos as a base, in accordance with the manifest wishes of the people,\textsuperscript{51}....

The date of this inscription has been the subject of some debate. It is impossible to assign an exact context from internal evidence, and external evidence is inconclusive. Some scholars believe that it refers to events of the time of the Second Macedonian War,\textsuperscript{52} while others prefer to assign it to the period of the Syrian War between Rome and Antiokhos III.\textsuperscript{53} Evidence to support the latter view includes the mention of undecked Athenian ships among the vessels accompanying Epikrates mentioned in Livy 37.14.1. It seems to me most likely that this Epikrates is the one honoured in the Delian inscription. If so, it would appear that he visited Delos at some time, while he was on campaign, and that he took some measures to prevent "pirates" from using the island as a base for their operations.

Who were these pirates, and who were the enemy they were practising piracy against? For all the reputation of the Rhodians as suppressors of piracy at this time, it seems that the victims of the pirates were the enemies of Rhodes. Epikrates appears to be forbidding those who are practising piracy against his enemies to use Delos as their base. There is no sign of any military action, but it can be assumed that the Rhodian commander's decree would be backed up by the threat of force against anyone who

\textsuperscript{50} hoi pelirateúlontes.

\textsuperscript{51} S.I.G. 582 = Durrbach (1921) no. 67, lines 1-17. The last few lines speak of the importance of good order and justice.

\textsuperscript{52} E.g. Ormerod (1924) p. 133; Briscoe (1973-81), nn. to Livy 31.22.

\textsuperscript{53} Durrbach (1921), pp. 89-91; Jackson (1973), pp. 252-3; Berthold (1984) p. 155.
disobeyed it. The perpetrators may even have been allies of the Rhodians. Perhaps their home ports were in Crete, as is suggested by Brulé. There is nothing in the treaty between Hierapytna and Rhodes which prevents the Hierapytnians from practising piracy against Rhodes’ enemies.

Epikrates is not actually suppressing piracy in this instance, he is merely restricting the operations of pirates for the benefit of the Delians and those who come to their island. The opportunity to dispose of booty on the island was, perhaps, a major attraction for its use as a base. Delos was already a thriving market for all kinds of trade at this time.

An even more compelling reason is suggested by a fragmentary decree of the Aitolians dated 250 B.C.

Decree of the Aitolians. The Delians are guaranteed security as far as the Aitolians and their cities are concerned...

In other words, the Delians are safe from piracy or attacks by the Aitolians and (probably) anyone associated with them. The sanctuary may also have had a specific grant of inviolability from the Aitolians, although no inscription has been found stating this specifically. Delos might be thought to offer, therefore, a safe haven for pirates operating against the Aitolians and their allies. In order to preserve their security and a

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54 Brulé (1978) pp. 31 & 48-9 on the alliances of the Cretan cities at this time. Rhodes’ principal ally was Knossos, but she now also had alliances with Hierapytna and several other former enemies; see above.

55 S.I.G. 581. See above on restrictions relating to piracy practised against the Rhodians.

56 I.G. IV.1050 = Durrbach (1921), no. 41. See Durrbach for the date, which is fixed by a mention in another inscription of payment to the engraver of the Aitolian decree.

certain degree of neutrality in these matters, therefore, the Delians seem to have requested Epikrates to persuade those who were using Delos as a base for piracy at the time of the Syrian War to return home. Thus they avoided possible counter-action by any of the pirates' victims.

Laudable though their efforts were, it is important to realize that the Rhodians could not hope to suppress piracy over a large area, or for a long time. As was pointed out in the introduction, the advantage which pirates have over bandits is the freedom of movement that their ships provide. No amount of successful campaigning on Crete or anywhere else could be expected to remove the menace of piracy from even the Aegean area. There were too many places for pirates to operate from, and too many targets for them to attack. Even at the height of their power and vigilance it is likely that the Rhodians were barely scratching the surface of a deep-rooted problem.

An inscription from the Athenian colony on the island of Imbros, dated to some time before 166 B.C., shows the kind of sudden attack which exposed coastal settlements were constantly in fear of in the second century B.C.

Decided by the people. Teleas, son of Aristokratos, of Kholargos proposed: Since Lysanias is benevolent towards the people, and, there being a hostile attempt by some people against the island, he did not make light of it, nor shrink back from the danger to himself, but stood firm and brought news of the descent of the pirates. Therefore, so that the people may show their gratitude it is proposed: With good fortune, it has been decided by the people that Lysanias, son of Aristokratos, of Deradiotai, is to be praised, and he is to be crowned with a crown of gold....

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58 I.G. XII.8.53, lines 1-13. The inscription continues with further honours for Lysanias. The dating proposed by the editors (see I.G. XII.8, p. 4) is to be preferred to Ormerod's suggestion of the first century B.C.: Ormerod (1924), p. 139. Note the anonymity of the pirates.
The enthusiastic praise of Lysanias seems to reflect a mortal fear of the sudden descent of pirates and the panic and suffering which they might cause. The warning may not have prevented the attack, but at least the people had a chance to defend themselves, or to flee from the coast, which might have discouraged the pirates. There is no sign in this inscription of any protection by one of the naval powers of the Mediterranean.

Rhodes in the later second century B.C.

The problems of coping with Cretan piracy, which was fuelled by both the external political policies of the Cretan cities, and social tensions among the Cretan communities, remained a serious problem for the Rhodians.\textsuperscript{59} Their own problems with reluctant subjects on the mainland absorbed them in long bouts of warfare, as did commitments to their Roman allies. After 164 B.C., when the senate removed the Rhodians from their privileged position in the Aegean, making Delos a free port and freeing several cities of the Peraia, two of the mainstays of the Rhodian economy, maritime trade and exploitation of the mainland, were severely reduced, as was the republic's ability to suppress piracy (Polyb. 30.31.10).

When, having failed to get satisfaction by diplomatic means (Polyb. 29.10), which suggests that the treaties of the third century were still valid, they went to war with the Cretans again in 155-3 B.C. They were defeated, apparently on more than one occasion, but they did begin to repulse the Cretans from the Cyclades (Polyb. 33.17; Diod. 31.43-5). This time the conflict was brought to an end by Roman intervention, underlining the

\textsuperscript{59} For discussion of the nature of Cretan piracy see Willetts (1955) and Brulé (1978) passim. His conclusions are fascinating, but see Walbank (1980).
humiliating status of Rhodes, which had gone from being a considerable maritime power in the Aegean to a dependent ally of Rome.\footnote{See Brulé (1978), pp. 57-66 on Cretan raids in the second century and the second Cretan War. The sources are no better than those for the first, in some ways worse, since Diodorus clearly depends on Polybius. See also Schmitt (1957), pp. 145-51. See below for further Rhodian activity against pirates, under Roman supervision.}

The Ptolemaic kingdom

It is necessary to deal briefly with a few scraps of evidence for activity by the forces of the Ptolemaic kings of Egypt against pirates. An Athenian inscription from c. 286 B.C. honours a Ptolemaic naval commander who escorted grain ships coming to Athens:

\ldots in order that the supply of grain might be brought with utmost security to the people.\footnote{IG II (2nd edn.) 650 lines 15-16. Was this a regular occurrence? I think not, since the Ptolemaic navy had other duties to perform, besides helping the Athenians with their grain ships. There is no explicit literary evidence to the contrary.}

Another Ptolemaic officer is honoured in an inscription from Thera dated to about the middle of the third century B.C.\footnote{IG XII.3.1291.}

\ldots decided by the council and the people; decree of the council: since Hermaphilos son of Philostratos of Rhaukos who was sent by king Ptolemy as \textit{phourarkh}\footnote{Reading \textit{phourarlakhos}; the editors restore \textit{naûlakhos}, but see Bagnall (1976), pp. 132-3.} and general of the city has been responsible for a great many very good things for the citizens, and when there was an attack of pirates in long ships\footnote{lais[\eta]ploiois makroïs.} against the North harbour at Oia and the temple, while a crowd of women and children and other persons were staying there, not less than 400 of them, and having launched...
an attack against the pirates he drove them off in the night... who, coming
down into the harbour by night with the citizens beat off the pirates and pursued
them closely to their ships, and running considerable risks....

The intention of the pirates seems to be to capture people as slaves. The Ptolemaic forces
on Thera are clearly decisive in driving off the pirates, but it is noticeable that the local
population are also involved, and that the island seems to have been prepared for some
kind of attack. Perhaps the incident occurred during one of the wars of the third century
B.C.?

Many islands in the Aegean and some mainland sites were used as bases by the
Ptolemaic navy and army, especially in the third century B.C., but this was because of
their strategic importance in the wars with the Antigonids and other monarchs. As a
result there were opportunities for Ptolemaic forces to deal with attacks like this one,
or to carry out convoy duties, but I do not think that the Egyptian kings pursued a major
anti-piracy policy in the Aegean, in the manner of the Rhodians.

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65 The text is too fragmentary too be understood for about 2½ lines. It resumes with
the actions of Hephaistios of Myndos, a subordinate officer, and his soldiers.

66 The inscription continues by detailing the honours to be paid to Hermaphilos and
Hephaistios.

67 See Bagnall (1976). For an example of a Ptolemaic base see Shipley (1987) on the
strategic importance of Samos in the third century.

68 See also S.I.G. 502 = I.G. XII.8.156 which honours a Ptolemaic governor of the
Hellespont who provided soldiers to protect the island of Samothrace (c. 228
B.C.?) Pirates are not mentioned in this inscription, although Tarn (1913), p. 87
thought they were the reason for the garrison. Ormerod (1924), pp. 129-30
connects this incident with S.I.G. 372 = I.G. XII. 8.150 (late fourth century B.C.).
See also Bagnall (1976), pp. 159-68.

69 Ormerod (1924), pp. 130-35 thought that there was a Ptolemaic "policing" of the
Aegean, but that the evidence does not survive. He cites some inscriptions which
cannot be shown to have any connection with piracy, and argues that, because the
Rhodians were active against pirates and headed a League of islanders, then the
Ptolemies must have done the same. I do not find such arguments at all
persuasive.
Piracy was not, of course, confined to the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Wherever there were ships and places or people to plunder there were likely to be pirates in the Hellenistic period. The majority of the literary sources for the period, and almost all of the inscriptions deal with a relatively small region. Beyond this area there were some attempts to suppress or reduce piracy, in the interests of trade or the security of coastal settlements.

In the Black Sea region local hellenizing monarchs and some of the Greek cities are credited with trying to suppress piracy e.g., Eumelos of the Kimmerian Bosporos (Diod. 20.25). The problems of this area, however, continued well into the period of the Roman Empire.70

The Roman Republic

The Romans had a considerable reputation as the enemies of pirates by the end of the first century B.C., and it was not due entirely to their campaigns against the Illyrians and Cilicians.71 As early as 338 B.C. the Romans seem to have tried to reduce the plundering raids of the people of Antium by barring them from using the sea and founding a citizen colony there (Livy 8.14).72 The seizure of "Etruscan" pirates in the harbour of Syracuse by Timoleon c. 339 B.C. might be part of the same problem (Diod. 16.81.3), but "Tyrrenian" pirates continued to operate in the Eastern and Western

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70 See above Part Four and below, pp. 357-62.
71 See above Part Two on Cicero and Strabo, Part Four on the Illyrians and below pp. 268-353 on the Late Republic.
72 Colonies were also founded at Tarracina in 329 B.C. (Livy 8.21) and Sinuessa in 313 B.C. (Livy 9.28). The main purpose of these colonies was to help protect the Latin coast against attack by sea. See Salmon (1969), chpt. 4.
Mediterranean well into the third century B.C. Livy also records attacks of Greek pirates on the coast of Latium around 350 B.C. (Livy 7.25).

The attempt to deal with piracy by founding colonies has been noted in the case of the Athenians. This does not necessarily amount to the suppression of piracy, since, if it was established in "hostile" territory, a colony might only provide a safe haven for ships, rather than a place from which to launch attacks on the pirates. The Roman "solution" of occupying the pirates' territory and depriving them of their bases was the most effective, but it should not be assumed that prevention of piracy is the motive behind all maritime colonies. The Roman colonies founded on the Italian coast in the 190s B.C. might have had the effect of discouraging pirates, but other, more convincing reasons can be advanced for them (Livy 32.29.3; 34.45.2-4).

The Romans seem to have become further involved in the suppression of piracy during the third and second centuries B.C. Polybius' claim that their intervention in Illyria in 227 B.C. was to protect traders against pirates may be doubted (Polyb. 2.8), as may the explanation of the Istrian war of 221 B.C. (Eutr. 3.7; App. Ill. 8), but one result of these campaigns may well have been to reduce the dangers to shipping and coastal settlements in this region.

73 See above. The pirate leader apprehended by Timoleon was called Postumius, which suggests a Latin origin.

74 See above. Note also the two cities supposedly founded by Dionysios II of Syracuse in Apulia, to make safe havens for merchant ships coming across the Adriatic from Greece (Diod. 16.5.3). These are placed in hostile, barbarian territory.

75 See above and Salmon (1969), pp. 96-9; Briscoe (1973-81) ad loc.

76 See above Part Four, pp. 203-7.

77 See Dell (1970), pp. 34-6. He prefers Appian's explanation of the aggression of Demetrios of Pharos as a motive for Roman intervention.

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The Ligurians also had a reputation for piracy which is advanced by the sources at several points to explain Roman campaigns in the second century B.C. Roman armies were active against them from 197 B.C. onwards (Livy 37.57.1-2). In 182 B.C. complaints about both the Histrians and the Ligurians were received at Rome.

When the consuls had been inaugurated, the provinces were assigned as follows. Liguria went to the consuls... the Histrians were added on because it was announced by the people of Tarentum and Brundisium that their coastal territories were under threat from pirate ships from across the sea. The people of Massilia made the same complaint about the ships of the Ligurians. (Livy 40.18.3-4)

After a defeat by L. Aemilius Paullus, Livy says that the Romans rounded up the captains and crews of the Ligurian pirate ships, and the duumvir C. Matienus captured 32 vessels (Livy 40.28.7; Plut. Aem. 6.2-3). There were many more campaigns against the Ligurians who continued to resist Roman domination (and to practice piracy) well into the first century B.C.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{78} See below; also Harris (1989), esp. pp. 114-18.
The year 67 B.C. is usually considered to mark a turning point in the history of ancient piracy. Pompey's campaign against the pirates is thought of as the beginning of an era of maritime security which only came to an end in the third century A.D.\textsuperscript{79} There have, however, been few attempts to place this campaign in its wider historical context, both in terms of the suppression of piracy and in the context of Roman political and economic concerns during the last century of the Republic.\textsuperscript{80} It can be seen as the culmination of a long series of campaigns against pirates which are associated with several leading players in the political drama of the period. This section presents and discusses the evidence for these campaigns and attempts to draw some general conclusions about the efforts of Rome (and others) to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean at this time.

**Quintus Metellus - Naked Aggression in the Spanish Sun**

The year 123 B.C. was a momentous one in the history of the Roman Republic. The first tribunate of C. Gracchus saw much political activity and the introduction of a series of measures which affected the lives of millions of people across the whole of the Roman world. At the same time one of the consuls, Q. Caecilius Metellus, probably


\textsuperscript{80} Ormerod (1924) is descriptive but not analytical. Marótí has contributed several small studies, but his rather naïve approach to the sources and his overtly Marxist interpretations mean that his contributions are of little value.
taking the *provincia* of Hispania Citerior (Nearer Spain), campaigned successfully in the Balearic Islands and celebrated a triumph on his return in 121 B.C. His conquest of the islands even earned him the title "Balearicus". The Epitomator of Livy, more concerned with the excitement surrounding Gracchus than "foreign affairs", is very brief in his reporting of this event:

Another thing contained in this book is the achievement of Q. Metellus against the Baleares, whom the Greeks call "nudists", because they spend the summer lying around naked. They are called Baleares from the missiles they sling, or on account of Balius, a companion of Hercules whom he left behind when he sailed off after Geryon. (Livy Per. 60)

The crucial detail which the Epitomator omits is the reason for Metellus' conquest of the islands. Fortunately this is supplied by other sources. Orosius gives a brief notice:

Metellus, having gone to the Balearic islands to make war, conquered them and, in the course of quashing an outbreak of piracy which had arisen there, killed many of the inhabitants. (Oros. 5.13.1)

This account is further supplemented by Florus who, after describing Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus' exploits, continues the story of Metellus triumphs:

Since the house of Metellus Macedonicus was becoming accustomed to assuming surnames from wars, another of his sons was not slow in following the example of Creticus, this one being called Balearicus. At this time the Balearic islanders were plaguing the seas with their ferocious piracy. (Florus 1.43.1-2)

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81 See Richardson (1986) p. 157 n. 5 and Appendix III. The other known magistrate active in Spain in this year was Q. Fabius Maximus. He could have been praetor in Hispania Ulterior, but our only source (Plut. C. Gracc. 6) is not specific.

82 Florus' chronology is more than a little wayward. Creticus and Balearicus were certainly not brothers. His accounts of wars against pirates in Book One are arranged "geographically" - Cilicia, Crete, Balearics, Cyprus.
Florus explains that the islanders, who were primitive people, used roughly made rafts to attack passing ships. They employed their famous slings against Metellus’ fleet and soldiers, but to little effect.

A slightly different version of the events is given by Strabo in the third book of his *Geography*. In the course of a discussion of the peaceable nature of these people, which is apparently due to the fertility of their soil, he says:

On account of the dealings between a few of their worse elements and the pirates, they were all falsely accused, and Metellus, who was surnamed Balearicus, came against them. He it was who founded the cities. (Str. 3.5.1)

Strabo also mentions the fact that Metellus settled 3,000 "Romans" (probably veterans) from Spain in the islands. They formed two settlements on Mallorca. He adds the comment that the islanders have always suffered from the desire of others to possess their fertile land.

Most modern historians have made little of this episode in the Romans’ suppression of piracy, being content simply to mention it or to pass over it entirely.

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83 Strabo’s Greek here is *toûs en toîs pelágesi leístás* which the Loeb translation of H.L. Jones renders as "pirates of the high seas". Morgan (1969) bases a lot of his argument on this over-elaborate translation. It is simply a case of Strabo using a qualifying phrase to indicate that *leístés* in this instance means "pirate", rather than "bandit". Strabo has used *leístés* and words derived from it several times already in Book Three. In each case he has been referring to bandits and banditry (3.3.5; 3.3.8; 3.4.15). Hence his change of emphasis requires clarification. See above Part Two.

84 Strabo’s comments on the peaceable life of the Baleares need not necessarily be believed. His brand of geographical determinism requires that "piratical" peoples inhabit sterile and unproductive areas. See Str. 11.2.12 & 17.3.24 on the Heniochi and others.

85 E.g. Scullard (1982) p. 41 who discusses the military reasons for the conquest, and the economic motivation of the colonisation. Piganiol (1949) p. 148, without comment. Harris (1979) does not mention this apparent example of imperialism. Stockton (1981) omits the whole episode, although it is the only thing included by Greenidge and Clay (1960) under "External History" for the year 123 B.C., p. 40. Ormerod (1924) is the obvious exception.
The only recent attempt to analyze Metellus’ conquest has sought to explain it in terms of a sudden outbreak of piracy, caused by “the pirates of the high seas” being driven out of their bases in Sardinia and Transalpine Gaul by the Romans, and escaping to the Balearics. The decision of the Romans to send a consul to conquer the islands is explained by pressure from the people of Massilia. Morgan wants to absolve the Baleares of blame for piracy, and sees the campaign of Metellus as a continuation of Roman efforts to drive out pirates along the route from Italy to Spain. This is possible, but there is no clear evidence of any pirates being driven out of these areas at this time. Morgan seizes upon Orosius’ description of piracy having “arisen” in the islands to claim that it was “a sudden outbreak of piracy”, which “provided the Romans with an excellent reason for taking action when they did and as they did.” A passage in Diodorus’ description of the islands, however, indicates that pirates had been active there for some time. Florus indicates that there was no sudden influx of pirates. Since both Florus and Orosius are likely to have derived their accounts from Livy, and Florus’ account, in spite of his mistake about Metellus, is the longer one, it seems to me that he cannot be brushed aside in favour of a rather forced interpretation of Orosius. The sources do not agree, either, as to who the pirates were. Florus is quite clear that it was the Baleares themselves who were to blame, and his description of their

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86 Morgan (1969). His discussion of the sources places a heavy emphasis on Poseidionios as the probable source for Strabo’s account.

87 Morgan cites Ormerod on this matter, but there is nothing in the pages to which he refers to back up his claims.

88 Morgan (1969) p. 223. Orosius’ word is “exoribatur”.

89 Diod. 5.17.3 referring to the, apparently, common problem of pirates sailing in and stealing women. Diodorus also includes the “nudist” story, and several other salacious “facts”, also perhaps derived from Poseidonios, about the islanders’ loose morals. It may be appropriate to compare piracy in the Balearic islands to the use of Malta as a winter base, described by Cicero in the Verrines. See Part 2 above.
methods is a perfectly credible one. Strabo seems to be sure that only a few of the islanders were involved in piracy. This may be true, but it does not follow that any pirates based in the islands were recent arrivals from the Southern coast of Gaul. In addition, I think that Strabo’s main concern here is to make the situation conform to his theory that piracy is the product of poor lands.

Why did the Romans choose this moment to conquer the Balearic islands? In the first place, it would seem reasonable to associate the move with a real concern to remove the problem of pirates emanating from these islands. Their methods were strikingly effective. Florus describes the natives fleeing from the Romans “like bellowing cattle”, and mentions a prolonged “search and destroy” operation among the hills. The effectiveness of this aggressive Roman action, and of the subsequent “garrisoning” of Mallorca, seems to be borne out by the fact that we hear nothing more about pirates from the Balearics in the Late Republic after Metellus’ campaign. Pompey stationed one of his legates

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90 “You might think that these savage woodsmen would not even dare to look out to sea from their rocks. Yet they also used to board simple rafts and terrorise passing ships with their sudden, unexpected attacks. Indeed, when they observed from on high the approach of the Roman fleet, thinking of plunder, they even dared to launch an attack...” (Flor. 1.43.2-4). Compare the description of the Uskoks’ methods in Tenenti (1967).

91 Morgan (1969) argues that it is Poseidonios’ theory on the peaceable nature of the inhabitants of fertile lands which is behind Strabo’s account. According to Morgan, Poseidonios wrote an account of the Baleares which was “apologetic” in tone and based on interviews with the islanders. The problem with this approach is that it is too conjectural. The version which we have is Strabo’s, not Poseidonios’. Whatever the latter may have written or done, it is poor methodology to prefer guesses about non-extant writers over the testimony of extant ones.

92 Florus 1.43.6. Compare Orosius’ reference to many deaths among the inhabitants.

93 In 81 B.C. Sertorius and his Cilician “allies” briefly captured Ibiza, but left after a battle with the forces of C. Annius (Plut. Sert. 7-9). Plutarch claims that Sertorius wanted to stay on the island, but the Cilicians deserted him. I am suspicious of the reliability of this whole story. See above Part 3, pp. 153-5.
there during the campaign of 67 B.C., but there is no indication of any action.\textsuperscript{94} Communities of Roman citizens were being established in Southern Gaul at this time, partly to consolidate the route from Italy to Spain.\textsuperscript{95} Campaigns against the Ligurians had been a regular feature of Roman military activity since early in the second century B.C., with piracy a complaint made against them by the Massilians.\textsuperscript{96} It should also be noted that archaeological evidence indicates that the volume and intensity of trade between Italy and the Southern Coast of France was increasing in this period. Finds of amphorae and especially shipwrecks suggest that there was plenty of shipping for the Baleares to attack.\textsuperscript{97}

Metellus' campaign is best seen as part of this process of conquest of the Western Mediterranean. Piracy may have been particularly troublesome at this time, but the establishment of veteran settlements at Palma and Pollentia on Mallorca ensured that Roman control was secure.\textsuperscript{98} It should also not be overlooked that Metellus gained a triumph and the resultant prestige from his victory. This aspect of Roman military action was just as important as any strategic considerations.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{94} Flor. 1.41.9 and see below.

\textsuperscript{95} Aquae-Sextiae (124 B.C.); Narbo Martius (c. 118 B.C.) There was some political opposition to these colonies at Rome. See Scullard (1982), pp. 39-41; Drinkwater (1983), pp. 5-7; Salmon (1969), pp. 121-36. See also Stockton (1979), App. 1 on the Gracchan colonies.

\textsuperscript{96} See above, p. 247.


\textsuperscript{98} Morgan (1969) tries to link the episode with C. Gracchus' tribunate. He suggests that the senate was anxious to prevent Gracchus "exploiting the situation for his own ends" (p. 226), by stirring up the equites who might be thought to be affected by interference in the commercial development of Hispania Citerior. I do not find this idea plausible.

\textsuperscript{99} See Harris (1979). Note the phrasing of Orosius' account, "Metellus, having gone to the Balearic islands to make war". See below for further attempts to deal with piracy in the Western Mediterranean.
The pirates of Cilicia - a rough country for Romans

The eradication of the pirates in the Balearic islands was the first definite move made by the Romans of the Late Republic to deal with the serious problem of piracy. The whole episode is only briefly reported in a few sources, making it very difficult to establish clearly what happened. The method used by the Romans in suppressing piracy should, however, be seen as a precursor of later operations. Its effectiveness can, I think, be ascribed to the relatively small size of the islands, and the ease with which a controlling garrison could be established to prevent their continued use as a base for piracy. It was not so easy to deal with piracy on a larger scale in some of the more inaccessible areas of the Mediterranean Sea, especially Cilicia, where pirate bases appear to have been numerous. Nor, it seems, were the Romans particularly willing to deal effectively with the threat to trade and security which the Cilician pirates posed. A detailed investigation of attempts to suppress piracy should indicate why this was so.

The evidence which is available concerning the suppression of piracy in this period relates almost exclusively to large scale actions by Roman magistrates in command of fleets and armies. Their object is usually a particular region where a number of pirate bases are concentrated and could be held to represent a serious threat to the security of the Romans and their friends and allies. The prolonged series of campaigns against the pirates of "Cilicia" are the most important examples of this phenomenon, and they tend to dominate modern accounts.

100 On the growth of Cilician piracy see above Parts 3 & 4. The term "Cilician" covered a multitude of sinners including Pamphylians and Lycians. See Maróti (1968) and Ormerod (1924) chapter VI on the groups included. It should be noted at the outset that many of our sources for this period are of imperial date. Their assumptions concerning "Cilician" piracy and its suppression were influenced by developments during the 1st century B.C. and the very different conditions in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. or later. They tended to call all pirates in this area "Cilicians". See above Part 2 and below.

Astypalaia and Ephesos - friends in need

It should not be thought that pirates roamed freely in the Mediterranean during the second century B.C. except when they were checked by the Romans in the campaigns outlined below. The friends, allies and subjects of Rome were not wholly dependent on Roman initiatives when it came to dealing with piracy. Unfortunately, because of the highly selective nature of the historical records available to us for this period, it is difficult to document the kinds of action which might be taken. Only occasionally are we given glimpses of actions against pirates which do not involve Rome.

One such glimpse comes from an inscription recovered from Astypalaia. It is an honorary decree of the Ephesians for the Astypalaians, dated to the end of the second century, when Ephesos was part of the Roman province of Asia.\textsuperscript{102}

Decided by the Council and the People. Moskhion son of Menetos proposed, following the motion put to the Council by the \textit{strategoi}, concerning the honours for the people of Astypalaia; since the Astypalaian men have conducted themselves like good and faithful friends of our People, having fought bravely against\textsuperscript{103}...(1 line)...the pirates... and wickedly...(3 lines)...from the sea...(½ line)...and\textsuperscript{104} after the pirates sailed here and made an attack on our territory at Phygela and carried off persons from the shrine of Artemis Mounikhia,\textsuperscript{105} both free people and slaves, and plundered their property and many places in the

\textsuperscript{102} The inscription is I.G. XII.3.171; published in I.G.S.K. Ephesos 1a no. 5, which is the text I have translated here. Numbers in \textsuperscript{1} brackets refer to the length of the lacunae. See also Ziebarth (1929) p. 40. It is dated fairly certainly on the basis of letter forms.

\textsuperscript{103} There is little of lines 6-14 which can be made out. I have translated only those words which seem clear. \textit{peilatb} on lines 5-6. \textit{kal anoslos} on lines 10-11 and \textit{ek têthall} on lines 13-14.

\textsuperscript{104} The text is virtually complete for the next ten lines (15-25).

\textsuperscript{105} These places are on the coast to the South of Ephesos.
surrounding area, the Astypalaians, drawn up for battle in response to the earlier reports from the Ephesians, sailed out against the pirates and, risking their lives, sparing no effort of mind or body, but exposing themselves to great danger in the ensuing fight, put to flight all their opponents\(^{106}\) ...(2½ lines)...among the ships...(½ line)...having driven the pirates and wrong-doers into the city of the Astypalaians, and having punished them on the spot, in accordance with their hatred of evil-doers, and having rescued the ones who were snatched away from our territory, and having discovered them to be our citizens, they looked after all of them and received them into their homes, providing each and every one with all that they needed for their daily care and bodily sustenance, caring for them just as for their own children. Similarly, they cared also for the dearly beloved children of free persons, protecting and nursing them...\(^{107}\)

It is clear that pirates have raided Ephesian territory and then been intercepted and defeated by the Astypalaians. The inscription implies that a message or report reached Astypalaia ahead of the pirates, and enabled the islanders to make military preparations. The sequence of events is obscured by the lacunae in the inscription. I would hazard a guess that the pirates might have been making for Crete, perhaps to dispose of their captives and their booty. Astypalaia is the "last stop" before Crete, so it could have been a logical step to assume that the pirates would head that way, but this is only speculation.\(^{108}\) The Astypalaians appear to have had some ships at their disposal, but this need not have been more than a handful.

\(^{106}\) The text is fragmentary again for the next three lines (25-7).

\(^{107}\) The remaining 5 lines are very fragmentary and cannot be deciphered.

\(^{108}\) See below on Cretans and piracy in this period. The summary justice meted out by the Astypalaians is no great surprise, but it would have prevented the pirates from "explaining" how they came to be there if the circumstances were at all "suspicious".
I would stress two points which arise from this episode. In the first place, there is nothing in the inscription to connect events with "Cilicia" even in the widest sense of that term. The identity of the pirates is a mystery, since it is no more than a guess that they were connected with Crete. So the point to be made is that, in this period, not all pirates were necessarily Cilicians (or even Cretans). Secondly, the actions are carried out independently of any Roman authorities. Ephesos was part of a Roman province, and it is possible that this inscription dates from after 105 B.C., when Astypalaea had a treaty of alliance with Rome, which included provisions to resist the enemies of Roman allies and subjects, by land and sea. This particular episode concerns only the Ephesians and the Astypalaeans, however, who seem to be capable of dealing quite effectively with piracy on a small scale. The point to be made, then, is that the suppression of piracy was the concern of both Romans and allies. Indeed, "allied" involvement was vital at all stages and in all areas, as will be seen in the rest of this section.

Rome against the Cilicians - the first encounter

The earliest evidence we have for military action by Rome against the Cilician pirates is the campaign of M. Antonius (cos. 99) in 102 B.C. An attempt has been made by J.-L. Ferrary to argue that there was a campaign against the pirates in 103 B.C., which may have been led by Marcus Antonius. He bases this idea on a pair of undated inscriptions from Messene (IG. V. I. nos. 1432 & 1433). The inscriptions were set up in honour of Aristokles, secretary (grammateus) of the Messenian synedrion. They praise his skill and honesty in rendering the financial accounts for a special tax, and record the

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109 I.G. XII.3.173; Sherk (1969) no. 16. It is conceivable that the treaty was prompted by Roman recognition of the strategic importance of Astypalaea as revealed by the sort of incident recorded in this inscription.

The tax itself was a 2% levy on individual and institutional wealth. It would appear to have raised the sum of nearly 100,000 denarii, encouraging two Romans, Memmius and Vibius, to give Aristides a gold ring. Although both soldiers and oarsmen are mentioned in the accounts, they only figure as people from whom payment is outstanding. Ferrary plausibly identifies the Memmius mentioned as C. Memmius (tr. pl. 112) who could have been governor of Macedonia somewhere between 106-102 B.C. He appears to have been prosecuted in 103 B.C. on a repetundae charge, perhaps even for irregularities connected with the levy recorded on the Messenian inscriptions. There is, however, nothing in the inscription to connect the levy with an expedition against pirates, nor any mention of an expedition before that of M. Antonius in the literary sources. Ferrary’s suggestion is speculative. The only candidate for the leader of such an expedition would be M. Antonius himself, but the evidence indicates that his campaign was in 102 B.C. and not 103 B.C. It is also

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111 See Wilhelm (1914) for discussion of the details of the inscriptions and the tax itself. Giovannini (1978), pp. 115-20, has tried to establish an imperial date for these inscriptions. I find his arguments unconvincing. Hopkins (1980), p. 121 n.59, cites this inscription as evidence of the normal method of tax collection in the principate. I do not find this credible, the inscriptions seem to me to indicate an exceptional situation. I have benefitted from discussion of these inscriptions with Tony Spawforth.

112 See M.R.R I pp. 559, 562, 564, 566. Memmius was the consular candidate killed on the orders of Saturninus in 100 B.C. (App. B.C. 1.32-3; Livy Ep. 69). He would therefore have been a praetor around 104 B.C. Giovannini (1978), p. 117, suggests a P. Memmius who was governor in the reign of Tiberius.

113 Val. Max. 8.5.2, Cic. Font. 24.

114 "... et si la taxe de 2% sur les fortunes exigée de Messene par les Romains était destinée à financer une expedition contre les pirates..." Ferrary (1977) p. 657 n. 138. Ferrary’s purpose is to explain the "vacancy" in the province of Cilicia in 100 B.C. which is necessitated by redating of the lex de provincis praetoris (but see further below).

115 Obseq. Prodig. 44. The date is given by Obsequens as "In the consulship of C. Marius and Q. Lutatius", or 102 B.C.
possible that in 103 B.C. he was in Rome for the trial of the tribune C. Norbanus.\textsuperscript{116} What remains certain is that the only date which we have for his campaign against the pirates is 102 B.C. It seems to me that Ferrary's suggestion is plausible as far as it explains the use to which the levy was put, but not the dating of Antonius' expedition. It is probable, given the enormous military pressure that the Romans were under at this time, that the expedition was financed almost entirely from provincial sources.

Marcus Antonius the Orator - a fleeting success

The precise nature of his command has been the subject of some dispute.\textsuperscript{117} The Epitomator of Livy records his activity:

M. Antonius, praetor, pursued the pirates into Cilicia. (Livy Per. 68)\textsuperscript{118}

as does Julius Obsequens, under the year 102 B.C.:

The pirates of Cilicia were destroyed by the Romans. (Obseq. Prodig. 44)

An inscription from Rhodes which honours a naval officer who served under Antonius calls him proconsul,\textsuperscript{119} and he is referred to as proconsul in a Latin inscription from Corinth.\textsuperscript{120} He must have been praetor in either 103 or 102 B.C. I would opt for the former, which means that he went out to his province immediately after his praetorship.

\textsuperscript{116} Cic. Orat. 2.107. It is more likely, however, that Norbanus' trial was in 95 B.C. see Badian (1964) pp. 34-70.


\textsuperscript{118} The precise wording of the Latin is of interest here: "M. Antonius praetor in Ciliciam maritimos praedones id est piratas persecutus est." It seems that the Epitomator thought his readers might not understand the true significance of "maritimos praedones", Livy's usual way of saying pirates, and so he added the word "piratas" to clarify his point. This would suggest that the text of Livy is being quoted directly.

\textsuperscript{119} I.G.R.R.P. 4.1116 (stratagoi anthupateu).

\textsuperscript{120} I.L.L.R.P. 342; Taylor & West (1928), (pro consule). This is the usual terminology for provincial governors at this time.
His triumph is mentioned by Plutarch, and was possibly the reason for his presence outside Rome with troops in 100 B.C.\textsuperscript{121}

The extent of Antonius' campaign is not easy to establish, nor is it possible to be certain of the circumstances which led to his appointment.\textsuperscript{122} He may have been assigned the province of Asia, rather than Cilicia, although it is evident that he did campaign in Cilicia.\textsuperscript{123}

It seems to me that there is no need to depart as far as some have done from the apparent meaning of the few references to this campaign which we do have.\textsuperscript{124} The date of 103 B.C. for the praetorship fits perfectly well with Antonius' career pattern. Two years between the end of a praetorship and the beginning of a consulship was common at this time. It is quite understandable that he should have attempted to boost his chances of being consul by gaining a triumph from his provincial assignment, and this may even have been the main objective of his campaign.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{121} Plut. Pomp. 24, referring to the capture by pirates of his daughter, and describing him as "a man who had celebrated a triumph". The same incident is mentioned by Cicero Imp. Cn. Pomp. 33. His presence outside Rome at the time of Saturninus' death is mentioned by Cicero Rab. perd. 26, who says he was there "cum praesidio". See below.

\textsuperscript{122} Ormerod (1924) p. 208 suggests that the main impetus came from the Eastern allies. Sherwin-White (1984) p. 101 would see a connection between this campaign and the desires of "the Roman business class of tax-farmers, bankers and merchants". Bensabou (1985) considers that it was the result of the Romans' gradually facing up to their maritime responsibilities in the region. We lack precise information.

\textsuperscript{123} See Sherwin-White (1976) p. 5. Coarelli (1982) provides a more extensive list of governors of Asia, drawing on some unpublished inscriptions, which indicates that Antonius could not have been assigned to Asia.

\textsuperscript{124} E.g. Magie (1950) II p. 1161 and Ferrary (1977). Ormerod's interpretation (1924) pp. 208-10 is only partially obsolete as the result of new evidence.

\textsuperscript{125} See Harris (1979), Additional Note VII for the success rate of praetorians triumphatores in the consulship.
This does not mean that the problem of piracy was not a reason for the assignment of M. Antonius' province. I do think, however, that he did not expect or even intend to eradicate the problem. His objective was to mount an attack on some "pirates" in "Cilicia" with a combined naval and land operation, demonstrating the willingness of Rome to act, and obtaining sufficient military credit to further his career back in Rome. This appraisal is based on the following interpretation of the evidence.

**Antonius' provincia**

The sources refer to M. Antonius as both praetor\(^{126}\) and proconsul.\(^{127}\) The obvious interpretation of this is that he was praetor (in 103 B.C.) and that he was sent to Cilicia in 102 B.C., where he held proconsular imperium as a governor.\(^{128}\) There are two possibilities for the title of the province which was assigned to Antonius. Either it was Asia, or Cilicia.\(^{129}\) If Asia was the province assigned to him, it would have been intended as a base for his operations outside the normal territorial area of that province. Sherwin-White argues that it would be virtually impossible for a Roman magistrate to carry out a military campaign in this area without using Asia and its resources.\(^{130}\) This is probably true, but it does not mean that Asia had to be the provincia which was designated for him. The picture of his activities which is presented

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\(^{126}\) Livy Per. 68.

\(^{127}\) Cic. Orat. 1.82; J.L.R.P. 1.342; I.G.R.R.P. 4.11.16.

\(^{128}\) This is the explanation suggested by Michael Crawford, as part of his new interpretation of the *lex de provinciis praetoris*.

\(^{129}\) Sherwin-White (1976) & (1984); Ferrary (1977); Benabou (1985). Sherwin-White is rightly critical of Magie (1950) vol. II p.1161, who suggests a maritime command with no territorial basis. Such roving commissions were a later development, as shown below. Antonius was given a geographical area, with a specific mission against pirates in that area.


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by the available evidence is very clearly centred on Cilicia and the immediately adjacent areas, with no suggestion that he was in any of the main areas of the province of Asia. Literary references can be combined with epigraphic evidence to show where Antonius campaigned against the pirates.

There are two contemporary inscriptions which indicate the operational sphere of Antonius' forces. The Latin verse inscription from Corinth, mentioned above, commemorates a crossing of the Isthmus of Corinth by a Roman fleet, "Under the auspices of [[Marcus Antonius]] proconsul," the name having been erased and restored by the editors. The verses continue:

...the fleet was transported across the Isthmus and despatched over the sea. The proconsul himself set out for Side. Hirrus, his propraetor, because of the season of the year, stationed the fleet at Athens. (lines 4-6)

The verses were inscribed on a block which had previously been used for an inscription in Greek. The lettering and the language indicate that a date between 146 B.C., the destruction of Corinth by Mummius, and 44 B.C., the establishment of a new Caesarian colony, would be appropriate. Consequently, there are only two likely candidates for the identification of the erased name, M. Antonius the Orator, and M. Antonius Creticus, respectively the grandfather and father of M. Antonius the triumvir, whose damnatio memoriae would account for the (accidental) erasure of the name.

Although it is known that M. Antonius Creticus was active in Greece and in the Eastern Mediterranean, there is nothing to suggest that he ever went as far as Side. M. Antonius the Orator, on the other hand, is known to have visited Athens on his way to Cilicia:

131 I.L.R.P. 342; full text, translation and discussion in Taylor and West (1928). The letter 'I' at the end of the proconsul's name was not erased, permitting the restoration of "Auspicio [[Antoni Marc]i] pro consule," in the third line.

132 See Foucart (1906) and below.
...when, on my way to Cilicia as proconsul, I came to Athens, I was delayed there for several days on account of the difficulties in putting to sea; (Cic. de orat. 1.82)

Furthermore, it is much easier to understand him setting out for Side, in Pamphylia, than his son. If Pamphylia was, as Sherwin-White has suggested,133 part of the Roman province of Asia at this time, and Side was not a haven for pirates, as in later years,134 then it would have made a good base for a maritime expedition against Cilicia. The fact that the proconsul went ahead of his forces is odd, if these were the only naval contingents involved, but there is evidence to suggest that Antonius used forces from several different parts of the Roman world. Tacitus, in describing a speech attributed to some Byzantine ambassadors who tried to get on the right side of Claudius, says:

...They recalled the forces they had sent against Antiochos, Perseus, Aristonikos, and the help they gave to Antonius in the war against the pirates...(Tac. Annals 12.62)

Also to be considered is the unusual presence of a propraetor in the proconsul's retinue, which is unusual, but not impossible at this time. Thus, I would argue that the Corinth inscription says that M. Antonius the Orator set out from Greece for Side, in Pamphylia, and Cicero adds the further detail that he called in at Athens on his way.135

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133 Sherwin-White (1976) pp. 1-3. A precise distinction between Pamphylia and Cilicia is not to be expected in this context, but see below on a Rhodian inscription.

134 See Str. 14.3.2, and Part 4 above. See map of "Cilicia" no. 13.

135 Sherwin-White (1976) prefers to assign the Corinth inscription to M. Antonius Creticus. He thinks that the presence of a propraetor in the proconsul's retinue makes this more likely to refer to Creticus, but his argument does not account for the journey to Side. Sherwin-White argues that the details of this journey do not fit with what is known about M. Antonius, i.e. that he visited Athens, but there is no reason why the composer of the Corinth verses (Hirrus himself?) should have mentioned this. The inscription seems to have been erected in great haste, probably near the Diolkos, so Hirrus and the fleet may not even have known that their commander was delayed at Athens when they put it up; see Taylor and West (1928).
In addition, the inscription from Rhodes mentioned above honours a naval officer who served under Antonius in Cilicia. Rhodians were probably involved in all the Roman campaigns against pirates at this time. While these two inscriptions do not "formally" designate M. Antonius' provincia, they do give a clear indication of the area in which he was active. Taken in conjunction with the passages from Livy, Obsequens and Cicero quoted above, they provide adequate evidence for the conclusion that the provincia was Cilicia, with specific instructions to campaign against the pirates operating from that region.

Antonius' campaign

The scrappy nature of our sources makes it impossible to reconstruct M. Antonius' campaign of 102 B.C. in great detail. The following points are, however, reasonably well founded upon the evidence.

We know that Antonius and his propraetor Hirrus transported a fleet across the Isthmus at Corinth from the inscription which commemorated this event. The inscription was probably set up by Hirrus himself, hurriedly, before he followed Antonius to Athens. He stationed the fleet here "because of the season of the year". Hirrus'

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136 I.G.R.R.P. 4.1116 ...[Mjárkou Antoníou stratagoû anthúpa[tou kal] Aúlou Gabeiníou t[a]mía Rhomaíon is [K]ilikían... Sherwin-White (1976) p. 4, rightly points out that in a Rhodian inscription Cilicia would be a precise geographical term, i.e. "Rough" Cilicia. See below on Rhodian involvement in Roman campaigns.

137 As Sherwin-White points out (1976), p. 5, only a few years earlier, although the consuls who fought Jugurtha were based in the existing province of Africa, their own provincia was designated as "Numidia" and their specific task was the war with Jugurtha.

138 I.L.L.R.P. 342; see above.

139 See Taylor and West (1928).

140 Lines 5-6.
actions, taken in conjunction with Cicero's mention, quoted above, of the difficulty in sailing which Antonius encountered, are consistent with the interpretation that all this took place in the early Spring, before the best of the sailing weather. The fleet may have come from Italy,\textsuperscript{141} and the impression given by Hirrus' boastful inscription, as well as the number of naval officers under Antonius' command, is that it was quite large.\textsuperscript{142}

The Byzantine contingent in Antonius' forces, mentioned above, may have joined this fleet at Athens, but it is more likely that it, along with other allied forces from the Eastern Mediterranean, joined up closer to Cilicia. Side would be an obvious place to collect maritime contingents for a campaign aimed at Cilicia. The port is sheltered and the mountains separate it from Cilicia itself, but the sea distance to the Cilician coast is relatively short. The fleet could have "shadowed" the land forces using the coast road to approach Cilicia, or even transported a large force for an amphibious operation. It is highly unlikely that Antonius brought a large army from Italy. The Cimbri and Teutones still menaced Italy at this time. He probably relied on levies from allies and the provinces.\textsuperscript{143}

What did he do with his forces? Most of our information about them is concerned with naval contingents, and the relatively high rank of Hirrus (propraetor) would make most sense if the fleet was the most important element of Antonius' command. It is possible that some kind of naval battle was fought, since a prefect, M. Gratidius, who was serving under Antonius, was killed in action.

\textsuperscript{141} Reddé (1986) p. 459.

\textsuperscript{142} "In a few days all this was accomplished with little confusion, and at the same time with great skill and security." Lines 7-8. Another inscription, IG XII 5.841 from Tenos, honours a prefect called Q.(?) Calpurnius who may well have been one of Antonius' naval officers.

\textsuperscript{143} See Brunt (1971), p. 431 and Sherwin-White (1984), pp. 99-101. The Rhodian mentioned above would have been but one of many allied officers. On the similar composition of Sulla's Asian army in the 90s B.C. see Plut. Sulla 5.
My uncle M. Gratidius was a man who really knew his Greek! He was born to be an orator. He was a close friend of M. Antonius, whose prefect he was in Cilicia when he was killed. (Cic. Brut. 168)\textsuperscript{44}

The description of his campaign in the Epitome of Livy, saying he "pursued the pirates into Cilicia", suggests that little of his activity actually took place within the borders of Rough Cilicia. Antonius' campaign against the pirates was probably an attack on one or more coastal positions, with some fighting on land (and possibly at sea). The main thrust of his operations would appear to have been against actual, or possible, pirate bases, with the intention of denying the pirates the necessary safe havens from which they could operate. He was successful enough to gain a triumph (at the expense of at least one prefect), which he probably celebrated in 101 B.C.\textsuperscript{145} There were good reasons for him to return quickly to Rome in order to campaign for the consulship in person. The elections for 99 B.C. were hotly contested!

Antonius did not "destroy" the Cilician pirates, as Obsequens' exaggerated notice claims. The apparent prominence of allies in his forces, and in the lex de provinciis praetoris discussed below, indicates that it was Rome's allies in the Eastern Mediterranean (above all the Rhodians) who were pressing for some positive action against the pirates in Cilicia. Through Antonius, Rome had shown her willingness to act against the perceived problem of Cilician piracy, and that action could be effective, but there was to be no short, simple solution. Further campaigning was required against the Cilician pirates almost immediately, as the law discussed below shows.

\textsuperscript{44} Cic. Leg. 3.36 adds the detail that M. Gratidius was Cicero's great-uncle, his grandmother's brother. If praefectus here means "prefect of the fleet", then a naval battle would be a likely context, but this does not seem very likely.

\textsuperscript{145} The usual dating of Antonius' triumph, to 100 B.C., depends on the assumption that he was still outside Rome with his triumphant army in this year at the time of Saturninus' death. But the phrase "cum praesidio" (Cic. Rab. perd. 26) on which this assumption is based, does not have to refer to Antonius' triumphant forces; see M.R.R. III p. 19. and Ferrary (1977).
The *lex de provinciis praetorii* - unfulfilled promises

This law has been known about since the end of the nineteenth century, when fragments of it were found inscribed on the monument of L. Aemilius Paullus at Delphi. The discovery in 1970 of a further, slightly different translation at Knidos has rendered all earlier discussions obsolete, as a far greater proportion of the text is now available for study.\(^4\)

The date of the law cannot be fixed precisely, but it must fall after the election of the consuls for 100 B.C., that is C. Marius and L. Valerius Flaccus, who are named in the text, and before the allocation of the praetorian provinces for 100 B.C., a measure which cannot have been long delayed.\(^5\) It should also be noted that, at the point at which the Knidos translation was made, the status of the kingdom of Cyprus was rather doubtful, hence the careful phraseology employed to describe its ruler.\(^6\) The choice of date among recent commentators has varied from late 101 B.C. to 99 B.C.\(^7\) The most likely date seems to be early in 100 B.C.\(^8\)

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\(^4\) See Hassall, Crawford, Reynolds (1974) for first publication of the new text. I am especially grateful to Michael Crawford for providing me with a copy of his latest edition of the law, not yet published. See Appendix 1 for this text. I have also benefited from a brief discussion with J.-L. Ferrary and the guidance of John Carter at a much earlier stage of my study.

\(^5\) See Lintott (1976) pp. 66-9 for an attempt to place the law precisely at the very end of 101 B.C.

\(^6\) See Hassall et al. (1974) p. 198. The law requires the governors of Asia and Macedonia to publish its provisions. As a result, the two surviving copies represent different translations of the Latin original, presumably made locally, soon after its passage.

\(^7\) Only Giovannini and Grzybek (1978) have suggested 99 B.C., but this is unlikely due to the nature of the terminology employed to describe different magistrates, see Lintott (1978) pp. 66-7. Their argument that the law is a piece of optimate legislation, designed to keep Marius away from an Eastern provincial command, and therefore later than 100 B.C., has no real foundation. Similarly, Sumner (1978) has no firm basis for his dating of the law to the very end of 100 B.C.

\(^8\) Hassall et al. (1974) argued originally for late 101 B.C., but now prefer the suggestion of Ferrary (1977) that early 100 B.C. is most appropriate.
To a certain extent, the date of the law must be determined by considering its purpose and the intentions of those involved in its promulgation. Lintott argued that it "seems to be filling a lacuna in senatorial business."151 On his interpretation it is essentially a collection of pieces of routine administration, which would normally have been dealt with by senatus consulta, and which have had to be carried through by legislation at the end of the year, because "the senate was likely to be less active and in that year lacked consular leadership."152

The researches of Ferrary have attempted to place the law within the wider context of popularis legislation.153 He has shown that the law is formally a lex de provinciis praetorii and not, as is assumed by most commentators, a collection of measures passed per suatum in a fashion which was forbidden by the lex Caecilia Didia of 98 B.C.154 He draws particular attention to the provisions for Cilicia which are found in both versions.155

The senior consul is to send letters to the peoples and states to whom he thinks it fit, to say that the Roman people is taking care, that the citizens of Rome and the allies and the Latins and those of the foreign nations who are in a relationship of friendship with the Roman people may sail in safety, and that on account of

151 Lintott (1976) p. 72. He is seeking to explain the nature of the law's contents, which he describes as "humdrum" (p. 71).

152 Lintott (1976) p. 72. He fails to provide adequate support for this view, and it cannot be easily reconciled with the popularis nature of the enforcement clauses at the end.


154 See Cicero de Dom. 53. for a definition of this practice.

155 I quote from the translation supplied to me by Michael Crawford. The Knidos copy (col. III lines 28-37) is the main source for this passage, but the Delphi text clearly included the same clauses (Block B lines 5-7).
this matter and in accordance with this statute they have made Cilicia a praetorian province.\textsuperscript{156}

If Cilicia had been made a praetorian province in 102 B.C., and allotted to M. Antonius, it would seem strange that the Roman legislators found it necessary to explain their reasons for doing the same again.\textsuperscript{157} If, on the other hand, M. Antonius' \textit{provincia} in 102 was Asia, with special instructions to deal with Cilician pirates, as suggested by Sherwin-White,\textsuperscript{158} then the purpose of this part of the law becomes much clearer. Cilicia is to be, for this year, a \textit{provincia} for a Roman magistrate of praetorian rank, and the local rulers are being informed of this extension of the Romans' sphere of military action. I find it unlikely, however, that Asia was the province which M. Antonius held. All the sources speak of his activity in and around "Cilicia", with little mention of places in Asia. It is also possible that he spent only one year, or less in his province, campaigning long enough and hard enough to gain a triumph and lose a prefect, but not doing enough to secure Roman control over Cilicia. This might only require him to be active in his command for a few months. He could, therefore, have left the province by the end of 102 B.C. and returned to Rome. This hypothesis would allow Cilicia to be "vacant" in the year 101 B.C., and hence provide a plausible reason for legislators in 100 B.C. to need to explain its designation as a province for that year. It is also noticeable that no references are made in the law to M. Antonius or to his earlier campaign in Cilicia. This would be less remarkable if they had ended a year before the law was promulgated. The victories of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[156]{Sherwin-White (1976) argues that the Greek term used here (strategikós) means only "military" and not "praetorian", because the status of the magistrates governing the provinces of Macedonia and Asia is elsewhere left open (e.g. Knidos copy, column II, lines 12-13).}

\footnotetext[157]{The possibility suggested by Hassall et al. (1974), that the territory of Cilicia is being "annexed" would partially explain the need for this pronouncement, but this explanation lacks any supporting evidence and does not accord with the course of events in the following 30 years. See Sherwin-White (1984) p. 99.}

\end{footnotes}
T. Didius in Macedonia were, on the other hand, much more recent, and so they receive a special mention in the text of the law, which gives detailed instructions to the new praetor of Macedonia on how the conquered territory is to be administered.

There are also several references to the current and future governors of Asia and Macedonia, both of which have been held as provinciae for many years. They are required to swear an oath concerning the law's provisions, but the same is not required of any magistrate holding Cilicia - because there is no-one in this position. Nor is Cilicia the only province with which the law is concerned.

An alternative solution to this problem is, however, proposed by Professor Michael Crawford in his new edition and commentary on the lex de provinciis praetoris. He argues that the law is concerned with the designation of one of the six praetorian provinces, namely Cilicia, and that the specific purpose which it fulfills is to make Cilicia one of these six provinces for the first time. Previously it had been held by a former praetor (M. Antonius) after his year of office in Rome. From now on, it will be held by a current praetor during his year of office. I am persuaded that this hypothesis fits some of the evidence better than my own, and I am, therefore, accepting it. In any case it does not greatly affect my conclusions about the nature of Antonius' campaign.

159 T. Didius was praetor in 101 B.C. and must have defeated the Scordisci in Thrace in this year (Cic. Pis. 61; Flor. 1.39; Jer. Chron. ad ann. 100). At the time of the law's promulgation, he may not yet have celebrated his triumph. M.R.R. I pp. 571, 573 & 575.

160 Knidos copy Col. IV II. 5-30. Prof. Crawford is of the opinion that these newly conquered territories are referred to only because they are part of a definition of the provincia of future governors of Macedonia.

161 Delphi copy Block C II. 8ff.

162 If it was the case that Cilicia became an annual praetorian appointment, then this situation apparently did not last very long. Prof. Crawford kindly explained his hypothesis after seeing a draft version of this section. It will be published in his forthcoming volume of Republican laws. I have altered the text of this section at a very late stage in order to incorporate it, but I have retained my own comments and speculations on the law and its purpose.
It is necessary at this point to summarise the contents of the law, as it survives on the two copies from Delphi and Knidos.\textsuperscript{163}

The preamble to the law does not survive. The first few lines of the Delphi copy (Delphi Block A) may be part of a preamble but they are unintelligible.

(i) Provisions for the suppression of piracy, including, possibly, the denial of a base (aphormé) to the pirates? "...according to this statute so that in the case of the [pirates it may be impossible for any of them] to cause trouble or for [a base] to be available..."\textsuperscript{164} I do not wish to over-emphasise this restoration, but it would fit well with my interpretation of M. Antonius' campaign of 102 B.C., and all the campaigns of this period.

(ii) Limitations are imposed upon the consuls in office concerning troops stationed in Macedonia.

(iii) A list of matters which are not affected by the law. Reference is made to a statute concerning troops in provinces passed on February 3rd by M. Porcius

\textsuperscript{163} The division into sections used below is my own. See Hassall et al. (1974) for the different proportions of the law which survive at Delphi and Knidos. Some new readings and restorations from the edition supplied by Michael Crawford are included. Full text in Appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{164} Knidos copy, col. II, lines 2-4 as restored in the new edition.
Cato. At the end of this section mention is made of the province (eparcheía) of Lykaonia, which is part of the province (eparcheía) of Asia.

(iv) Next come the instructions to the senior consul to write to various persons informing them of the designation of Cilicia as a praetorian province.

(v) Further instructions follow, telling him to write to:

...the king ruling in the island of Cyprus and to the king [ruling] in Alexandria and Egypt [and to the king] ruling in Cyrene and to the kings ruling in Syria [who all] have friendship and alliance [with the Roman people and] is to [send letters] to the effect that it is also right for them to see that [no] pirate [uses as a base of operations] their kingdom, land or territories [and that no officials or garrison commanders] appointed by them harbour the pirates and to see that, as far as is in their power, the Roman people [has in them zealous contributors to the safety of all.] The senior consul is instructed to give the letters to the Rhodian ambassadors. The section ends with a general proviso that all magistrates see to it that the law is obeyed.

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165 Ferrary (1977) is encouraged by this date to place the law in early February 100. The identity of Cato is unclear.

166 It is clear from this section that eparcheía is being used to translate provincia, and that it has both meanings of the Latin word, i.e. the sphere of activity of a magistrate and a territorial area. This dual meaning is important for understanding the provincial designations of the next three decades.

167 Quoted above, pp. 268-9.

168 The Knidos copy here has "the king holding power in the island of Cyprus" - see above.

169 Delphi copy Block B, lines 8-12. The restorations are less tentative here, and enough of the text survives to leave no doubt as to the basic intent.
(vi) The consuls are also very clearly instructed to give a special senate audience to the Rhodian ambassadors.

(vii) There then follows a series of orders to the governor of Asia (who has apparently already received this province for 100 B.C.) The governor is instructed to see to the publication of the law and to the delivery of the consular letters.

(viii) The governor of Macedonia (whose identity is not yet known) is given more specific instructions, relating particularly to the territory "which Titus Didius took by force in his campaign." The instructions which survive in the Knidos text relate to the arrangement and collection of tribute from these areas. The law begins to deal with the possible resignation of the praetor or quaestor in Macedonia, but the text is incomplete.

(ix) The law next orders the governors of Asia and Macedonia to "take an oath to do everything that he is required to do in this statute and not to do anything contrary to its provisions with malice aforethought."

(x) The final section of the law is a complex jusiurandum in legem intended to see that the law is obeyed, with a detailed set of provisions for the enforcement of fines for non-compliance.

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170 Knidos copy col. IV lines 8-10. These clauses are a strong indication of the popularis nature of the law - see Hassal et al. (1974) p. 219.

171 Delphi copy Block C lines 8-10.
It is clear from the contents of the law that it is concerned with three of the praetorian provinces for the year 100 B.C. - Asia, Macedonia and Cilicia. Ferrary has argued that this law was intended to designate three out of the six praetorian provinces for that year, the other three being the two *jurisdictiones* (Urban and Peregrine) and the presidency of the *quaestio repetundarum*.\(^\text{172}\) Crawford modifies this by suggesting that it designates only one, new province out of the six. This is a more persuasive argument, and seems the only one which would account for the wide range of the law’s provisions.\(^\text{173}\) As a result of the law a praetor will be sent out each year to "Cilicia". This apparently was intended to build upon the achievements of M. Antonius in 102 B.C., and is an indication that his success was very limited. It would be interesting to know who the first praetor was and whether he achieved anything of note.

The possible praetors of 100 whose names we know are:\(^\text{174}\)

1. L. Cornelius Dolabella.
3. P. Licinius Crassus.
5. ? Tremellius.

Of these men nos. 1 and 4 can be discounted. Dolabella seems to have celebrated a triumph from Further Spain and Glacia could not have been out of Rome for the year. Nos. 2 and 3 were consuls in 97 B.C., and their praetorships are assumed for this year since it is the latest possible date under the *lex Villia*. No. 5 is a shadowy figure, the son


\(^{173}\) See above. Since at least one of this year’s praetors seems to have gone to Spain, it is unlikely that Asia and Macedonia were designated as praetorian provinces in addition to Cilicia.

\(^{174}\) See *M.R.R.*, I under 100 B.C., pp. 574-5.
of a quaestor of 142 B.C. and the father of a quaestor of 71 B.C.\textsuperscript{175} There seems no obvious way to decide if any of these men did receive Cilicia as his province, but it would perhaps be most likely that it was either an unrecorded sixth individual, or the almost unknown Tremellius, since we have some further information about Crassus and Lentulus.\textsuperscript{176} It does not appear that this praetor, or any of his immediate successors, achieved anything remarkable during their praetorships, since none of our sources have anything to say about Cilicia until the praetorship of Sulla. In spite of the promises enshrined in the law and the furious letter-writing of the senior consul, piracy must have remained as serious and unresolved a problem as it was before the law was promulgated.

It is worth noting, however, that the law is the earliest clear statement of the position of Rome concerning pirates. They are effectively being declared enemies of the Roman people and their friends and allies.\textsuperscript{177} The prohibitions on assisting pirates in sections (i) and (v) are similar to the prohibitions placed upon Roman allies with regard to the enemies of Rome.\textsuperscript{178} The Romans are "spelling out" their opposition to piracy.

**The Rhodians - friends and allies**

The clauses relating to the Rhodians indicate that they were most concerned of all the allies and friends of Rome about this problem. The fact that they are to be granted a special audience with the senate, and are to be given copies of the letters instructing or urging the kings to keep their kingdoms free of pirates, leads to the suggestion that they were, in some sense, behind the creation of Cilicia as a praetorian province. It seems safe

\textsuperscript{175} As mentioned in Varr. R.R. 2.4.2.

\textsuperscript{176} See M.R.R. II pp. 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 & 15.

\textsuperscript{177} I use the term "enemies" loosely. See above Part 2 on the exact distinctions between pirates and \textit{hostes}.

\textsuperscript{178} See, for example, the treaties between Rome and Methymna (I.G. XII.2.510) and Astypalaia (I.G. XII.3.173), which are from the second century B.C.
to assume that many Rhodians participated in M. Antonius’ campaign, and they had plenty of opportunities to discover how serious the problem was. It has been suggested that the Rhodians were "fulfilling the maritime role of the praetor of Cilicia at this time".\(^{179}\) This is an exaggeration of the island’s importance. The lex de provincis praetorii makes it very clear that the Romans, through their consuls and other senior magistrates, are responsible for initiating and organising any action to deal with pirates in this region. The Rhodians, like the kings and cities to whom the consul is to write, are merely agents of the Roman people in this matter. It was only the Romans who had the authority and influence to organise the necessary manpower to launch any effective attacks on Cilicia, or anywhere else. The impression which I get from the law’s provisions concerning the Rhodians, is that they are to be reassured that Rome will continue to take her responsibilities in this matter seriously, and that everything possible is being done. It is open to doubt whether they would have believed this to be true.

Also worthy of note is the method by which piracy is to be combated, according to this law. The most important thing is to deny bases to the pirates, wherever they may be. Some scholars have suggested that vast maritime commands were envisaged at this time as the most effective way to suppress piracy.\(^{180}\) It is clear from this law, from the activities of Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus, and, I would argue, from the campaign of M. Antonius the Orator, that the Romans were aware at this time that the most effective way to deal with pirates was to tackle them on land. This might involve some naval fighting, in order to approach certain bases or strongholds, but the real test of the Romans’ determination to ensure the safety of the seas for their friends and allies was their willingness and ability to overcome pirates in their lairs.

\(^{179}\) Sherwin-White (1977b), p. 5.

\(^{180}\) Ferrary (1977); Magie (1950).
The law found at Delphi and Knidos is, therefore, a *lex de provinciis praetoriis* dating from the early part of the year 100 B.C. It contains several provisions which show the Romans' concern for the safety of seafarers and the suppression of piracy. In particular, a repeat of M. Antonius' campaign of 102 B.C. is envisaged with the designation of Cilicia as a praetorian province. Little or nothing seems to have resulted from this promise of action, however, and, as will be shown below, the problem of piracy in Cilicia (and elsewhere) seems, as far as we are able to tell from the surviving sources, not to have had as high a place again on the list of political priorities at Rome for a considerable time.

After the passing of this law we are very much in the dark about the course of Roman magisterial activity in Anatolia for nearly ten years.\(^{181}\) Marius was touring the East in 99/98 B.C., for the expressed purpose of fulfilling a public vow,\(^ {182}\) and may have made some observations on the problem when he returned to Rome on the completion of his mission. There is, however, nothing in the sources to indicate this, nor would pirates have been as enticing as Mithridates for Marius' military ambitions.\(^ {183}\) Indeed, for the next twenty years, it was the King of Pontus whose depredations were to be the Romans' main cause for concern in the Eastern Mediterranean. In most cases pirates only make appearances in our literary sources in conjunction with Mithridates.\(^ {184}\)

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\(^{181}\) See Sherwin-White (1984) whose chapter headings "jump" to 95 B.C. and whose text moves even more abruptly forward. The 90s B.C. are a lean decade in terms of available source material. Since piracy was a marginal topic for the ancient authors anyway, it is hardly surprising that so little is known about Roman policy towards piracy in this period.

\(^{182}\) Plut. Mar. 31 says that he had an ulterior motive, which was to try and stir up trouble with Mithridates.

\(^{183}\) See Luce (1970) on the Eastern designs of Marius.

\(^{184}\) See Part 3\(\text{above on the involvement of pirates in the Mithridatic wars.}\)
Sulla's Asian command

It has been suggested that further campaigning against pirates was carried out or was, perhaps, intended with L. Cornelius Sulla as praetor of Cilicia in the 90s B.C.\textsuperscript{185} Sulla was praetor in 96 B.C. and for his praetorship in 95 was assigned the province of Asia.\textsuperscript{186} His immediate task, given to him by the senate, was to restore Ariobarzanes, the senatorial nominee, to the throne of Cappadocia.\textsuperscript{187} Some of the sources make Cilicia his province.\textsuperscript{188} It is clear, however, that he campaigned in Cappadocia and there was no reason for him to stay long in Cilicia.\textsuperscript{189} His army was mostly supplied by Rome's allies.\textsuperscript{190} There is no indication that he had any naval forces under his command.\textsuperscript{191}

To see pirates lurking behind every mention of Cilicia or adjacent regions, is to misunderstand the Romans' priorities in Anatolia during this period. On both the national and the personal level, there was far more prestige and profit to be gained against the


\textsuperscript{186} Badian (1964) p. 214. See Sherwin-White (1976) pp. 8-9 & (1977a) for an alternative proposal, based on the regnal years of the Cappadocian coinage. The unreliability of this method means that his dating (pr. 93 and proconsul 92 B.C.) must be rejected.


\textsuperscript{188} App. Mith. 57 Kilikías árchon; de vir. ill. 75 "praetor Ciliciam provinciam habuit."

\textsuperscript{189} Plut. Sulla 5 and Livy Per. 70 name only Cappadocia. The former, probably deriving from Sulla's autobiography is likely to be reliable on such matters.

\textsuperscript{190} "The force he brought with him was not large, being eagerly reinforced by the allies." (Plut. Sulla 5). See also Brunt (1971) p. 434.

\textsuperscript{191} Contra Reddé (1986), p. 461, who can cite no evidence for his opinion.
likes of Mithridates, and other dynasts, than any campaign against pirates could hope to yield.\textsuperscript{192}

\textbf{Q. Oppius - nothing to do with Cilicia}

One of the conditions of Sulla's peace settlement with Mithridates in 85 B.C. was the return of a Roman commander who had been captured during the early stages of the war, Q. Oppius.\textsuperscript{193} The role played by Oppius in the war is not very clear. He seems to have been in charge of the southern parts of Asia as praetor, which would mean that a second praetor had been introduced to handle the affairs of the province at this time, the other magistrate being C. Cassius.\textsuperscript{194}

It is just possible that Oppius' provincia was not Asia but Cilicia, although he is not known to have been active in any area which might be considered Cilician territory.\textsuperscript{195} This possibility has led to the suggestion that he was one of a series of commanders, whose task was to continue the struggle against pirates in Southern Asia Minor at this time.\textsuperscript{196} The connection between Oppius and Cilicia comes from his coinage, possibly minted in Laodikeia, which has been found in Cilicia, among other

\textsuperscript{192} See Sherwin-White (1977b) and (1984) on the beginnings of what he calls "the aggressive imperialism of individual army commanders of the late Republic", (1977b) p. 75.

\textsuperscript{193} Lic. 26F.

\textsuperscript{194} See Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 112-122. Oppius was praetor no later than 89 B.C. His title is variously given as legatus (Lic. 26F), proconsul (Livy Per. 78), strateôs Pamphulis (Posid. ap. Athen. 5.213A, F.Gr.H. 87F 36.50), strateôs anthúpatos (Reynolds, (1982) no. 2 pp. 11-20). This latter, being an inscription, is most likely to be correct.


\textsuperscript{196} Reddé (1986) pp. 459-63. The series begins with M. Antonius the Orator and ends with Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus.

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places. This suggestion is based on very little supporting evidence, however, and there is no indication at all that Oppius had any naval forces under his command, nor is there anything in the sources to connect him with pirates. It is far more credible that he was praetor in Asia, while Cassius dealt with the affairs of Bithynia and Cappadocia. The only Roman naval contingents mentioned before the arrival of Sulla in the East were stationed in Byzantion, "watching over the mouth of the Pontos" (App. Mith. 17) under the command of Minucius Rufus and C. Popillius. Following the defeat of the Roman army in Phrygia, they surrendered, handing their ships over to Mithridates and adding to the imbalance in naval forces which hampered Sulla's efforts.

Lucullus - the unlucky wanderer

The lack of ships under Roman control in the Eastern provinces provides the background to the first occasion on which pirates intrude into the action of the first Mithridatic war, involving Sulla's legate L. Licinius Lucullus. In 87 B.C. he was sent out by Sulla to round up ships for the next stage of the war. He did not return until 85 B.C., having had several "adventures" on the way. It was partly Mithridates' naval forces which were responsible for his problems, but he also suffered at the hands of "pirates".

Sulla's lack of ships, and the advantages which Mithridates enjoyed as a result of his naval supremacy were of major importance to the course of the war. Sulla was not able to corner Mithridates because of his ability to escape by sea, nor, in the early stages of the conflict, could he prevent Mithridates from reinforcing his generals on the Greek

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197 Crawford (1974), I pp. 545-6 no. 550. Crawford is tentative in his association of the coinage with Laodikeia. It bears the legend "Q. OPPIUS PR."


199 Lucullus was legatus pro quaestore under Sulla in both Greece and Asia from 87 B.C. to 80 B.C. M.R.R. III p. 121.
mainland at will. It seems that an important aspect of Mithridates' command of the sea was his isolation of the Rhodians, Rome's most important maritime ally.

It is assumed by Ormerod that Mithridates was partly reliant on pirate allies for his naval forces. But the wanderings of Lucullus, and the terms of Sulla's treaty with Mithridates do not suggest that there were any pirate elements in the Pontic fleet. Nor does it follow that, when pirates were active in the Eastern Mediterranean at this time, and come to our attention in the literary sources, e.g. Appian, because of the Mithridatic war, they must have been closely involved in that war.

The course of Lucullus' "Odyssey" can be reconstructed in some detail. Sulla, hampered in his attempts to take the Piraeus by a lack of ships, tried to obtain naval support from the Rhodians. Owing to the presence of Mithridates' fleet they were unable to help. Sulla had to find his own ships, so:

He ordered Lucullus, a Roman of great renown and the general who succeeded Sulla in this war, to make his way secretly by sea to Alexandria and Syria, to assemble a fleet from the kings and the cities who had maritime resources. With this fleet he was to escort the Rhodian ships. (App. Mith. 33)

Sulla cannot have expected Lucullus to take as long over the task as he actually did. He departed in late 87 B.C. and did not rejoin his commander until early in 85 B.C. Both Appian and Plutarch mention his encounter with pirates, as well as his clashes

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200 Ormerod (1924) pp. 209-212. The evidence which he cites is either inconclusive, or refers to events in the third war. See above Part 3 for full discussion of the role of pirates in Mithridates' forces.

201 Too much has been made of the mention of pirate raids in chapter 63 of Appian's account of the Mithridatic Wars. Appian's arrangement of the Mithridatic book of his Roman History is not strictly chronological.

202 Appian says that he had "several times been in danger of being captured by pirates" (App. Mith. 56). Plutarch is more specific, placing the danger on his departure from Cyrene: "From there he put out to sea, heading for Egypt, but he lost most of his boats to an attack of pirates" (Plut. Luc. 2.5).
with the naval forces of Mithridates, but neither author suggests that any pirates attacked
him on Mithridates' instructions, or even on their own initiative to help Mithridates' cause.

Lucullus, it would appear, was simply the victim of some pirates who were based
on the coast of Libya, somewhere between Cyrene and Alexandria. Pirates seem to have plagued
this area in the 90s, after the death of Ptolemy Apion in 96 B.C., as is indicated by an inscription
in honour of a certain Apollodoros, whose actions helped to restore some degree of stability
to the city of Berenike.

...Later, when the city was lying unwalled and had already twice been sacked by pirates sailing
against it in a fleet, he was placed in authority as ruler over the city
and its territory... 203

Lucullus stayed long enough in Cyrene to be considered by the Cyrenaicans as their lawgiver. 204
He had apparently come from Crete, where he may also have tried to establish some kind of "order".
He does not, however, seem to have made any attempt to deal with local pirates in these places. Indeed,
after leaving Egypt, he went out of his way to avoid pirates.

Then he proceeded to sail around, collecting a large number of ships from the coastal cities, except
for those which practised piratical misdeeds... (Plut. Luc. 3.2)

Lucullus' reluctance to become embroiled with pirates is understandable, especially after his mishap
on the way to Alexandria. His job was to counter Mithridates' naval power, not to waste his
resources by relieving places like Berenike of the threat of further attacks by pirates.

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203 Reynolds (1977) pp. 234-6 no. 3 lines 13-15. The inscription explicitly describes events "after the death of the king" (lines 5-7) and so must be dated later than 96 B.C., but before the annexation of Cyrene in 75 B.C. Reynolds draws attention to the similar mention of pirate fleets in App. Mith. 63. See also Reynolds (1973-4).

204 See Braund (1987). In his absence Sulla was forced to begin his own shipbuilding programme. (App. Mith. 51).
Sulla's embarrassing lack of ships in the struggle with Mithridates was only partly rectified by Lucullus' mission. He also demanded the surrender of a substantial part of the Pontic navy as part of his peace terms. He needed ships for his next task, the return to Italy and the continuation of the Civil Wars.

Murena - military and naval organisation

As I have mentioned above, the most effective method of dealing with piracy in this period was to attack the pirates in their bases on land. This would often entail some maritime action on the part of the attacking forces in order to secure the approaches to the base, and to prevent their opponents' from escaping by sea. Similarly, military action against Mithridates, or any other enemy whose territory was partly coastal, could only be effective with a fleet to support the land army. It is, therefore, important to try to determine the object of any campaign conducted by land or sea, or both in Anatolia (or anywhere else) at this time. It does not follow that all maritime activity implies the suppression of piracy, nor can it be assumed that exclusively land-based operations could not be directed against pirates.

Sulla's successor in Asia, L. Licinius Murena, decided to continue the war with Mithridates on his own initiative. In 83 B.C., claiming that Mithridates was preparing

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205 70 warships, fitted out for action were to be handed over (Lic. 26F; App. Mith. 55). Some of these may have come from the Roman fleet stationed at Byzantium, which had surrendered to Mithridates (App. Mith. 19).

206 This was demonstrated most vividly when Fimbria was forced to allow Mithridates to escape his dutches because Lucullus refused to use his recently assembled fleet in conjunction with the rival Roman army (Plut. Luc. 3.4-7).

207 Reddé (1986) pp. 461-3, and, to a lesser extent, Sherwin-White (1984), chapter V, both tend to follow this simple pattern in their interpretation of the military activity of Roman governors in Asia and Cilicia.

208 It seems that he was appointed by Sulla to govern Asia by virtue of his imperium pro praetore which he had held since 87 B.C. M.R.R. III p. 123. The appointment would have been validated later, along with most of Sulla's other acts, but see
for war, he invaded Pontus from Cappadocia with his two Roman legions, ostensibly in support of Ariobarzanes. After being told to cease by a senatorial envoy, he did the same again in 82 B.C. Eventually Mithridates repulsed him and a settlement was arranged between Ariobarzanes and Mithridates in 81 B.C.\(^{209}\)

The preparations for war, which Murena construed as directed against Rome and her allies in 83 B.C., included the assembly of a fleet which Appian says Mithridates intended to use against the Bosporan tribes.\(^{210}\) Murena also organised naval forces, requiring the cities of Asia to furnish ships as part of their tribute to Rome.\(^{211}\) Cicero suggests that they were intended for use against pirates, but it is more likely that Murena wanted to avoid a repeat of Sulla's experiences by assembling his fleet in advance of any clash with Mithridates.\(^{212}\) Sulla took all his available ships away when he returned to Italy, but it may have been on his instructions that Murena gathered a new fleet.\(^{213}\)

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\(^{209}\) Murena held the province of Asia in 84, but initially deferred to Sulla, who left for Italy in 83 B.C. He celebrated a triumph in 81 B.C. M.R.R. II pp. 61, 62, 64, 70 & 77; Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 148-152.

\(^{210}\) App. Mith. 64. After the Murena episode, Mithridates carried on with the subjection of these peoples unhindered; App. Mith. 67.

\(^{211}\) Cic. II Verr. 89. This arrangement should be seen as separate from the payment of indemnities and taxes which were imposed by Sulla, the collection of which was Lucullus' responsibility (Plut. Sulla 25.2; Luc. 4.1; App. Mith. 62-3).

\(^{212}\) Cic. II Verr. 1. 86-9. The mention of pirates in this connection fits in with Cicero's attack on Verres at this point. It may reflect the subsequent use made of these ships by Murena's successors, but I do not think that it is sufficient on its own to show that Murena's fleet was not organised primarily for use against Mithridates. See above Part 2 of Cicero and Piracy. Sherwin-White (1984) p. 154 thinks that the fleet was intended to "check" pirate raids on Asia, but does not consider how this might be done.

\(^{213}\) Plut. Sulla 25. Inscriptions from Samothrace, Rhodes and Delos honour A. Terentius Varro, a presbeutês, along with Sulla, Murena and Lucullus. He was a legate in charge of a fleet, presumably that which Murena had assembled, with numerous Rhodian officers I.G.R.R.P. 1.843; L.L.S. 8772; C.I.L. I (2nd edn.) 2.738. Sherwin-White (1984) p. 154, claims that he "cleared the pirates out of Aegean waters at about this time", but there is no mention of pirates in any inscription
Rhodes

The importance of Rhodes in Roman naval organisation is again very noticeable at this time. Lucullus appears to have relied heavily on Rhodian ships and officers in his victories over Mithridates' fleet. An inscription from Rhodes records honours voted to Sulla, Murena, Lucullus and the legate A. Terentius Varro. In the years following Murena's departure, it is possible to detect a greater degree of difficulty in obtaining ships for Roman magistrates in the Eastern Mediterranean. This may be due to the considerable demands placed on the available resources, above all Rhodes, by Sulla, Lucullus and Murena, not to mention the activities of Mithridates himself. The sort of demands which Rome's military activities might make upon their "maritime allies" are illustrated by a passage from Memnon, describing how the city of Herakleia sent ships to assist in the Jugurthine war. The ships and their crews did not return for eleven years! On the other hand, naval service with the Romans could be rewarding, as is seen in a bilingual inscription from the city of Rome which records the honours granted by the senate to three Greek naval officers in 78 B.C.

referring to Varro.

214 Plut. Luc. 3-4; App. Mith. 56. As was noted above, the essential aim of Lucullus' mission was to help the Rhodians come to Sulla's aid, which was what Mithridates' siege of Rhodes was long able to prevent.

215 I.G.R.R.P. 1.843. The names mentioned in the text are followed by a long list of naval officers. See also C.I.L. I (2nd edn.) 2.738 from Delos, honouring the same A. Terentius Varro.

216 Reddé (1986), pp. 463-6, is right to see the late Republic as a time of improvisation and temporary arrangements, but I think he goes too far in his attempts to show that the East was better provided than the West. It was never easy for the Romans to obtain the ships they needed in the wars of the 80s and 70s B.C.

217 F.Gr.H. no. 434 fr. 20 p. 351.

218 I.G.R.R.P. 1.118; Sherk (1969) no. 22; C.I.L. I (2nd edn.) 518. The men were from Klazomenai, Karystos and Miletos. They had apparently been involved in the Social War, or the Civil wars of the 80s, so they too may have seen a long period of service before being allowed to return home.
Murena’s victories

Appian credits Murena with some success in the war against the pirates in Southern Anatolia. In a section which introduces Pompey’s campaign of 67 B.C. he describes how the problem of piracy had worsened during the Mithridatic wars, and the difficulty which the Romans had in dealing with it.219

Murena took them on, but he had no great success, nor did Servilius Isauricus who came after Murena... (App. Mith. 93)

This brief notice is difficult to interpret, however, since it is clearly intended to make Pompey’s campaign seem all the more remarkable by comparison, and is both selective and misleading. Servilius was not Murena’s successor, as Appian implies, nor is it reasonable to say he was not successful. Appian probably chose to mention Murena and Servilius at this point because, in addition to Lucullus, whom he had already dealt with, they were the two best known Roman commanders who were active in Southern Anatolia after Sulla.

The only evidence we have for the nature of Murena’s exploits in Southern Anatolia is Strabo, who says that he captured Kibyra and overthrew Moagetes, the tyrant who ruled this South Asian tetrapolis and handed two of the cities over to the Lycian League. There is nothing to link Kibyra with piracy, however, and it is more likely that Murena was trying to re-establish Roman control over the area.220 It is difficult to see

219 See above Part 3 for a more detailed assessment of this particular passage of Appian. See below for the tendency to distort previous campaigns against pirates as a result of the apparently overwhelming success of Pompey.

220 Str. 13.4.17. Magie (1950) p. 242; Sherwin-White (1984) p. 152. I would tentatively date Murena’s campaign to the summer of 84 B.C., before Sulla left for Italy. Murena was using the title imperator in 83 B.C., according to Greek inscriptions (M.R.R. II p. 64). He could have begun to do so as a result of his victory in Karia. Reddé (1986) claims that this action was in preparation for a campaign against the pirates, but it is difficult to see how this could be so. Kibyra is in an inland region, far from the coast, and does not block any obvious route to the “pirate coasts” of Pamphylia and Cilicia.

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when he might have "taken on" the pirates in any case, since he was mostly concerned with Cappadocia and Pontos. He did not even bother to deal with Mytilene, which was still in a state of revolt, leaving it to his successor, Minucius Thermus, and Lucullus.\textsuperscript{221}

Cilicia again

Minucius Thermus was praetor in 81 B.C. and probably went to Asia as governor in that year.\textsuperscript{222} It was under his command that Mytilene was captured after a siege.\textsuperscript{223} He was succeeded by the proconsul C. Claudius Nero,\textsuperscript{224} who was active in the South.\textsuperscript{225} An inscription from Ilion, is thought by Ormerod to record measures he took against pirates.\textsuperscript{226}

Since the proconsul Gaius Claudius Nero, son of Publius, instructed the Poimanenians to send us, for the protection of the city, some soldiers with their own commander, the Poimanenians, being our friends and well disposed towards our people, sent the soldiers and Nikandros, son of Menophilos to command them...\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{221} Plut. Luc. 4; Livy Per. 89; Sherwin-White (1984) p. 149. In my view Murena was doing what Sulla had told him to in his Kibyran campaign, namely to establish firm Roman control over the region, but he departed from his orders to campaign directly in Pontos as soon as Sulla was gone.

\textsuperscript{222} M.R.R. II pp. 76 & 81.

\textsuperscript{223} Suet. Jul. 2.1; de vir. ill. 78.1.

\textsuperscript{224} M.R.R. II pp. 76, 80 & 84.

\textsuperscript{225} Cic. II Verr. 1.71-6 & 83.

\textsuperscript{226} Ormerod (1924) p. 206. Ormerod here cites this highly dubious case as the only example for a general point about the Romans' measures against piracy. Magie (1950) pp. 240 & 1120 n. 25 follows suit.

\textsuperscript{227} I.G.S.K. Ilion no. 73 lines 1-6; I.G.R.R.P. 4.196. The event can be dated to either 80 or 79 B.C.
While it is certainly possible that the soldiers were intended to guard against the incursions of pirates, we cannot be sure that there was not some other danger, which we are not informed of by the inscription.\textsuperscript{228} There is no further evidence to suggest that Nero did anything about piracy during his proconsulship.

The picture of activity in Anatolia is complicated by the establishment of a new province, which was called Cilicia, but did not include any Cilician territory at this time.\textsuperscript{229} The first person to hold this province was Cn. Cornelius Dolabella.\textsuperscript{230}

It is clear from Murena’s campaign in Kibyra that some parts of the new province were not properly under Roman control at this time. The war with Mithridates must have contributed to the problem, interrupting a long period of Roman domination in Western Anatolia, and making it necessary for magistrates to "reconquer" certain areas on the fringes of the Roman province, especially those which had never before been fully absorbed.\textsuperscript{231} In some parts this would involve confronting the pirate communities which were established along the coast of Pamphylia and Cilicia. The expansion of the new province of Cilicia was, therefore, part of a process of consolidation after the Mithridatic war.

\textsuperscript{228} Appian notes the attacks made on islands and coastal cities in 83 B.C., while Sulla was still in Asia (App. Mith. 63). If similar attacks were continuing, then garrisons in selected places could help to deter them. See above Parts 3 \textit{pp. 147-53}

\textsuperscript{229} Sherwin-White (1976) pp. 10-11 and (1984) pp. 152-5. The addition of territory in Pamphylia and Rough Cilicia eventually made the name of this province a partial reflection of its extent. The province in the time of Cicero was very much larger than the one which Dolabella received.

\textsuperscript{230} M.R.R. II pp. 76, 80 & 84; III p.65. It is not clear whether Broughton believes that Minucius Thermus and Claudius Nero were both governors of Asia in 80 B.C. Sherwin-White (1976) and (1984) assumes that Nero was Thermus’ successor and that a division of Asia took place, with the new province being created out of territory formerly included in Asia, or recently added.

\textsuperscript{231} See Sherwin-White (1976) p 10. See above Part Three on possible benefits accruing to pirates from the Mithridatic wars. There is, perhaps, some similarity between the situation in Anatolia at this time and that which prevailed in Spain during the second and first centuries B.C. See Richardson (1986).
Dolabella's main task was probably to pacify Pamphylia, continuing a process which Murena had started by campaigning against Kibyra, but had abandoned in favour of renewing the war with Mithridates. According to Cicero, he was involved in this war when he was called away to Asia to sort out Verres' problems.

...he did something for which he has been greatly criticised, that is he left his army, his province, his war, and, for the sake of a worthless man he entered Asia, another man's province. (Cic. II Verr. 1.73)

It has been suggested that Dolabella campaigned against pirates at this time. This may be so, but we have no direct evidence that Dolabella's enemies were pirates. He despatched Verres to Bithynia on an unspecified mission, which might have been to obtain some ships or crews, as Caesar did with Minucius Thermus in 81 B.C., but this does not mean that the purpose of such aid was to deal with pirates.

Lycians and Pamphylians - the pirates' friends?

Strabo, in his description of the coastline and the harbours of Lycia, is at pains to distinguish between the civilised, decent behaviour of the Lycians, and their less civilised, piratical neighbours.

For that matter the nature of their territory is more or less the same as that of the Pamphylians and the Rough Cilicians. But they (the Pamphylians and Cilicians) made use of such places as bases for the practice of piracy, either being pirates

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233 Earlier in this speech, Cicero accuses Verres of plundering Aspendos and Perge, two cities on the Pamphylian coastal plain, presumably while he was on "active service" with Dolabella. Cicero compares Verres' behaviour to that of famous Roman commanders who had captured cities in war; Cic. II Verr. 53-8.


235 Cic. II Verr. 63; Suet. Jul. 2.
themselves, or else furnishing the pirates with markets for their plunder and docking facilities. In Side, at any rate, a city of Pamphylia, the docks were set up for the benefit of the Cilicians, they used to sell their captives there by auction, admitting that they were free men. The Lycians continued to live decently, according to the way of a polis \textsuperscript{236} so that, in spite of the good fortune which made their neighbours a sea power even as far as Italy, they did not lust after shameful booty, but stayed in their fatherland under the Lycian League. (Str. 14.3.2)\textsuperscript{237}

Not all the Lycians seem to have lived up to the ideals which Strabo attributes to them. The claim that they did not enter into any kind of an arrangement with pirates is contradicted by what Cicero says about the city of Phaselis, in the Eastern half of Lycia. That Phaselis, which P. Servilius captured, had not always been a city of Cilician pirates. It was the Lycians, a Greek people, who inhabited it. But, because of its situation, and because it projected so far out to sea that the pirates often had cause to call in on their expeditions from Cilicia, both on the outward and the return journey, they made the city their own, first through commercial ties, then also by an alliance. (Cic. II Verr. 4.21)\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{236} Strabo here employs the virtually untranslateable terms politikōs kal sophrónos to describe the Lycians' way of life. As has been noted above, he is generally of the opinion that rugged or inhospitable countries are the abode of "uncivilised" peoples (See Part 2). The Lycians, therefore, constitute something of an exception to this rule, which is explained by their (typically) Greek way of life; they live in póleis and are organised into a sistema, usually known as the Lycian League. See Part 4 on the commercial aspects of this passage and its implications for piratical society.

\textsuperscript{237} Note also 14.3.3 where Strabo mentions that the Romans allowed the Lycians to be free on account of the good government (eunomouménois) which they lived under.

\textsuperscript{238} This passage throws an interesting sidelight on the practical aspects of piracy, which are too often overlooked by modern scholars. The journey by sea from Cilicia towards the West is not an easy one. Phaselis is one of the last suitable landfalls before the difficult journey around Cape Gelidonya. Pirates are bound

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The East Lycian cities of Olympos and Korykos are also attested as having been captured by Servilius in his campaign against the pirates, both by Strabo, and other sources for the period. Should Strabo’s comments be discounted, therefore, as an invention?

It is likely that Strabo drew upon Lycian sources for the history of that region. Lycian writers would, of course, be concerned to portray their homeland in the best possible light. Cicero, however, was commenting upon recent events, which had not yet been subjected to the reassessment of historians. He is only talking about one city, and Strabo’s list of Lycian cities which were captured by Servilius does not include any of the major cities of Lycia, those on the Western side of the mountains. The existence of such divergent views on Lycian attitudes to and participation in piracy in the first century B.C. suggests that Strabo’s comment may reflect the truth with regard to some of the Lycians, but not all of them. In other words, it is possible that there were divisions among the Lycians over the practice and support of piracy.

Aikhmon the admiral - more than a footnote?

Internal Lycian divisions seem to lie behind a group of late second or early first century B.C. inscriptions from Xanthos, which celebrate the deeds of a Xanthian Navarch called Aikhmon. Two of these inscriptions seem to have been part of a tropaeum which

by the laws of navigation just as much as ordinary sailors, hence Cicero’s mention of frequent landfalls at Phaselis on the part of the pirates.

Str. 14.5.7. Strabo seems unconcerned by the contradiction which his notice of their capture implies. He says that Olympos was the "pirate’s nest" of Zeniketes (to Zenikétou peiratérion), and that Korykos and Phaselis were also his. This may be partly explained by the fact that his sources for the Lycian part of his Geography are different to those for the Cilician part. See below for more observations on Strabo’s description of Olympos.

Sall. Hist. 2. fr. 81M; Oros. 5.23.22; Eutr. 6.3; Cic. leg. agr. 1.5 & 2.50. See below on Servilius.

Although he refers to the testimony of Artemidoros of Ephesos for some details concerning the Lycian League (14.3.3).
was built into the wall above the city gate. The third was found lying close to this location. The most informative inscription describes his achievements.

Aikhmon, son of Apollodotos, (of the tribe of) Sarpedon, having commanded in war the fleet of all the Lycians, and having fought a naval battle around Khelidonia against the enemy, and having disembarked and invaded their territory and laid it waste, and having met them in battle three times, and been victorious in all battles, to Sarpedon and Glaukos the heroes, in token of thanks.242

The inscription on the reverse of this block gives further details of Aikhmon's command and provides some clues about the nature of the enemy.

Aikhmon, son of Apollodotos, (of the tribe of) Sarpedon, having been elected by the Lycians to command over their assembled war fleet, and having persevered against the ones having been in a state of opposition to the nation, for the entire duration of the campaign, industriously and boldly, having prevailed against the enemy, to Ares in token of thanks.243

A third inscription, found near the other two and clearly relating to the same episode, is much shorter, being simply a dedication to the two heroes on behalf of Aikhmon by those serving in his fleet.244

Dittenberger draws attention to the peculiar phrase used in the second inscription to denote the Lycian's opponents. Why not simply "the enemy", instead of the tortuous

242 O.G.I.S. 552 = I.G.R.R.P. 3.607 B. The date of the entire group is deduced from the lettering, and the absence of anything to indicate the period of direct Rhodian control. I date the events to the first century B.C., but without any convincing proof.


"the ones having been in a state of opposition to the nation"? He suggests that the terminology is an indication that the enemy involved were Lycians also. In support of this idea he points out that the location of the sea battle, off the Khelidonian islands, would indicate that the subsequent landfall effected by Aikhmon was in the same region, i.e. Lycia, but in the eastern half, on the coastal plain. It is in this part of Lycia that Phaselis, Korykos and Olympos are located, all cities which were associated with piracy and felt the wrath of the Romans during Servilius' campaign.

Magie may be correct to see this action as independent of the Romans, since no Romans are mentioned in any of the inscriptions, but this need not mean that it dates to a much earlier period, as he thinks. It seems to me that the campaign, for which Aikhmon received the praise of the Lycians in Xanthos, may well have been an attempt by some of the Western Lycians to curtail the piratical activities of their Eastern neighbours. A further indication of the possible nature of Aikhmon's opponents is provided by the fact that the sources for Servilius' campaign all list Olympos, Korykos and Phaselis as pirate cities which he captured. Aikhmon's campaign must, I think, date to before 78 B.C., but it may not be any earlier than the beginning of the century and could be dated to the 80s B.C.

For the Lycians to be conducting a campaign of this sort without Roman assistance or supervision is unexpected, but not inconceivable. A possible context is the apparent

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245 i.e. τὸν πολεμίον instead of τὸν τὰ enantla praxánton τοῖ ἑθνεῖ. See O.G.I.S. nos. 552-4 for Dittenberger's comments.

246 High mountains running North-South effectively divide Lycia in two. They reach right down to the peninsula of Cape Gelidonya. See map of "Cilicia" (Gelidonya = Khelidonia); Olympos, Korykos and Phaselis are nos. 6, 7 & 8.


248 See below for further details and discussion of Servilius.

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period of inactivity in terms of the suppression of piracy following the campaign of M. Antonius the Orator, and after the passing of the *lex de provinciis praetoriis* in 100 B.C., which promised Roman action on the problem of piracy, but also enjoined Rome’s allies to act themselves.²⁴⁹ In spite of the extravagant tone of the inscriptions, Aikhmon’s campaign may not have been a complete success, but it is worth more than a mere footnote in the story of the suppression of piracy. If it was against other Lycians that Aikhmon achieved his military successes, and if the internal divisions which the inscription implies were caused by disagreement over their piratical ways, it was a remarkable display of initiative and determination on the part of the "Western Lycians". The protestations of the Romans and the partiality of our narrative sources can easily lead us to overlook the communities who were most likely to have suffered from the activities of pirates in this period.²⁵⁰

**Syedra - caught between Romans and pirates**

Epigraphic evidence also indicates that Strabo’s comments are less than entirely fair to the Pamphylians. He implies (14.3.2) that all the Pamphylians behaved like the citizens of Side, entering into partnership with pirates. An inscription found on the site of the ancient city of Syedra shows that such generalizations cannot be accepted at face value. The inscription was discovered by G. Bean and T.B. Mitford during their exploration of "Rough Cilicia" in the 1960s, and published in the second volume of their

²⁴⁹ See above on the "quiet" decade of the 90s B.C. It may well be that this campaign has escaped the attention of our sources for this period precisely because the Romans were not involved.

²⁵⁰ This interpretation of the Aikhmon inscriptions is a very hypothetical one. I am conscious that on several occasions I have chastised others for seeing piracy where none is mentioned, or even for being too eager to believe in pirates whose mention may be a literary invention. Nevertheless, I think that the peculiar phrasing which attracted Dittenberger’s attention needs to be explained, and the apparently strong body of opinion against piracy in this region provides a reasonable context. See above on Rhodes and below on the Syedrans.
findings. It is in hexameters, and is apparently an oracular response, of unknown origin, advising the Syedrans on how to deal with the problem of piracy.

The Pamphylians of Syedra, who share common lands, living on the ground which is the homes of mixed peoples, offer a sacrifice, setting up on the summit of the city an image of Ares the bloodstained slayer of men, held in the iron chains of Hermes. On his other side may Justice, laying down the law, give judgement upon him. And may he become like one who begs. For, in this way, he will be at peace with you, driving the hostile horde far away from the fatherland, and he will call forth the prosperity your shores have longed for. And, in addition, you should take up the violent battle, either driving away, or binding in unbreakable chains, and do not, through fear, pay a terrible penalty

251 Bean and Mitford (1965). The inscription was built into a tower on the summit of the ancient site. It is of imperial date, but must, as the editors suggest, be a copy of a response received while Syedra was still an independent city. This should be before 67 B.C., which I find preferable as a terminus ante quem to Bean and Mitford’s suggestion of the triumviral period. Map ref. "Cilicia" no. 14.

252 The restoration of Robert (1966), epixunōi en arouürej, is adopted, as it has a reasonable basis in II. 12.422.

253 Maróti (1968) restores E—ATA in line 2 as e—dómata. The missing letters might be some adjective agreeing with dómata, but the sense is clear without them.

254 Reading ékhontos as referring to Hermes with Robert (1966). Maróti (1968) prefers ékhontes, referring to the Syedrans, but the text is in need of amendment at this point.

255 This rather imaginative translation is based on the suggestion of Maróti (1968), p. 234 n. 7.

256 Translating dómenai, epic, second aorist infinitive, as an imperative, Goodwin (1894), p. 331.
because of the pirates,\textsuperscript{257} in this way you will certainly escape all punishment.\textsuperscript{258}

The text of this inscription, which evidently accompanied a relief or statue group, dates to the period before Pompey's campaign of 67 B.C.\textsuperscript{259} It seems that the Syedrans, troubled by pirates, have sought the advice of an oracle, possibly Delphi, or Didyma.\textsuperscript{260} The reply is relatively straightforward in its intent. They must resist the pirates in armed struggle, or suffer the consequences. Two questions arise from this oracle. (a) What is the nature of the armed struggle? (b) Whose retribution are the Syedrans seeking to avoid?

The answer to (a) is, surely, provided by the \textit{lex de provinciis praetoriiis} discussed above, and the general pattern of Roman attempts to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean in the Late Republic. It is the responsibility of Rome's provincial subjects and allies to assist the Roman magistrates in their efforts to suppress piracy.\textsuperscript{261} The reply could be connected with any of several episodes already discussed, including M.

\textsuperscript{257} Or: "...do not, through fear of the pirates pay a terrible penalty". The sense is only very slightly altered if the inscription is translated this way.

\textsuperscript{258} Bean and Mitford (1965) translate "thus you will escape all humiliation" (p. 22). It is, of course, possible to translate bandits, instead of pirates, but the location of the city seems to favour pirates. I am indebted to Stephen Instone for his help in translating this difficult inscription. See Appendix 2 for text.

\textsuperscript{259} Maróti (1968) and Robert (1966) both seem to prefer a date in the first half of the first century B.C. Bean and Mitford's only reason for rejecting 67 B.C. as the latest possible date is that nearby Korakesion was a strong pirate base, so the same must be assumed for Syedra. This argument does not seem compelling to me.

\textsuperscript{260} Bean and Mitford (1965), p. 23, think that the strange imagery of Ares in chains precludes the possibility of a mainland Greek source for the oracle. Maróti rightly rejects their arguments. The "pro-Roman" nature of the oracle could even point to Delphi as the likely source. In any case, the verses were probably nothing more than an elaborate "working up" of a simple answer to a simple question: "Should we fight the pirates, yes or no?"

\textsuperscript{261} Bean and Mitford (1965) p. 22 draw attention to Dolabella's and Servilius' campaigns in this region. They, like all the other Roman governors and generals discussed in this section, expected allied cooperation. See also Part 2 above on Verres and the Sicilian fleet in action against pirates.
Antonius the Orator’s campaign of 102 B.C., some unrecorded activity of the Cilician praetor of 100 B.C., or even Dolabella’s "war" of 80/79 B.C. Alternatively the consultation of an oracle could have been prompted by the events of the 70s and early 60s B.C., especially Servilius’ extended campaigns in this area, which might have forced the Syedrans to side with either the Romans or the pirates.

It is impossible to be certain, however, although I think that the likely answer to (b), that it is the retribution of Rome which the Syedrans must escape, suggests a period when Roman forces were closing in on the Pamphylians and their Cilician neighbours, forcing many of the coastal cities to opt for one side or the other. In the case of Phaselis, it was the pirates, in the case of Syedra, as the recording of this reply implies, it was the Romans. The statue or relief of Ares, Hermes and Justice and the inscription which went with it represent, therefore, the Syedrans’ decision to co-operate actively with Rome against the pirates. It might be argued that the Syedrans would not put up an inscription which speaks of avoiding the possible retribution of Rome at this time, but this text is deliberately vague and ambiguous, so that the message is implied rather than stated. I think it unlikely that they engaged in any independent action; instead they probably refused to allow pirates to use their harbour and town, and probably contributed men or ships to the forces of Servilius or Pompey. There is a tenuous connection between the latter and Syedra, which could be used to favour the early 60s B.C. as the date when this oracle was received.²⁶²

It was not only the Rhodians, therefore, who were anxious to do something about the Cilician pirates. The anti-piracy measures contained in the lex de provinciis praetorii assume that the subjects and allies of Rome in the Eastern Mediterranean will be actively

²⁶² Bean and Mitford draw attention to Lucan’s mention of Syedra as the place where Pompey held his last council of war before going to Egypt in 48 B.C. Florus also mentions the town, placing it in Cilicia (Luc. 8.259-60; Flor. 2.13.51). Exactly when the oracle was received is less important than the Pamphylian “resistance” to pirates it indicates in this period.
engaged in the suppression of piracy, with or without firm direction from Roman magistrates. The campaign of Aikhmon (if it does refer to action against pirates) and the Syedran oracle are evidence that, even in the regions most closely associated with piracy, there were some cities that were prepared to take up arms against their piratical neighbours. The depredations of "Cilician" pirates were probably felt most keenly in this area. In any period of history pirates have tended to conduct most of their operations "close to home". While it is for attacks across the other side of the Mediterranean that they have become infamous, the likelihood is that Cilician pirates claimed most of their victims in and around the coastal regions of Anatolia.263

Neither the Romans nor their allies devoted all their available resources to the suppression of piracy in this period. War with Mithridates and others drew heavily on the materials and manpower of both. It is only to be expected that campaigns against the powerful, well organized pirate communities of Lycia, Pamphylia and Cilicia were sporadic. It was one thing to join the chorus of disapproval which called for something to be done, quite another to turn words into deeds. The position which the Romans held as the leaders in a common war against the pirates left the onus on them to organize and conduct effective campaigns.264 Individual kings, cities or groups of cities which acted on their own initiative would surely have been few and far between. Roman-led action, when it came, had always to take second place to more important considerations, like the barbarian threat from the North at the end of the second century B.C., or the menace of Mithridates in the first. Thus, the next major campaign against pirates which will be considered, that of P. Servilius, had limited objectives and lasted only a couple of years.

263 See above Parts 3 & 4.

264 See Maróti (1962a) on the idea of a common war against piracy. I am not convinced by his interpretation of the phrase ho koinôs pólemos as it is used in certain inscriptions; see below.
The need to establish a strong strategic position with regard to Mithridates was a more pressing concern.

The menace of Mithridates

The threat posed by the King of Pontus to Roman dominance in the East had been clearly demonstrated in the 80s B.C. The uneasy truce which prevailed after Murena's withdrawal in 81 B.C. was not controlled by a formal treaty, because the terms of the Peace of Dardanus were never formally ratified by the senate. Murena had used this as an excuse in 83 B.C. and it appears that in 78 B.C., with Sulla dead, Mithridates' ambassadors in Rome were still trying to obtain access to the senate so that the treaty could be confirmed.265

Sherwin-White is right to stress the need for the Roman magistrates in Anatolia to recover lost ground, and establish a strong strategic position against the kingdom of Pontus. Fundamental to this strategy was the need to dominate Mithridates' Southern "flank". Murena had made some efforts in this direction with his Kibyran campaign, and Dolabella seems to have continued his work.266 Ormerod has suggested that there was a grand strategy for tackling piracy, devised by Sulla, which lay behind these campaigns,267 but Sherwin-White correctly plays down the importance of pirates in Roman considerations at this time. Nevertheless, a magistrate of consular rank, P. Servilius, did conduct an extensive series of campaigns in this region in the early 70s B.C.


266 That is Cappadocia, which was the Romans' "buffer" against Mithridates, and the two regions which provided access to it from Asia - Pisidia and Lykaonia. See Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 155-8 for discussion of the strategic considerations.

267 See above, p. 293-4.

268 Ormerod (1922) pp. 36-7.
and he has been credited with considerable success against the Cilician pirates. It is his operations which must be discussed next.

**Servilius - the earlier promises fulfilled?**

There is general agreement among historians about the broad outline of events relating to the campaigns carried out in Southern Anatolia by the proconsul P. Servilius Vatia in the years 78-74 B.C. In an important article, published just two years before his book on ancient piracy, H.A. Ormerod concluded that, after a year spent in preparations, Servilius conducted a campaign in Pamphylia and Eastern Lycia in the years 77-6 B.C., and then attacked and defeated the Isaurians and the Orondeis in the years 76-5 B.C.\(^{269}\) In 74 B.C. he returned to Rome and celebrated a triumph, taking the cognomen "Isauricus."\(^{270}\)

Servilius was consul in 79 B.C.\(^{271}\) and went to his province of Cilicia as Dolabella's successor in 78 B.C.\(^{272}\) The appointment of an ex-consul as governor is itself an indication of the importance which was being attached to operations in Cilicia at this time. The forces which Servilius had under his command included a fleet, which according to Florus contained "heavy" warships,\(^{273}\) among which may have been some of the ships handed over by Mithridates as part of the Peace of Dardanus.\(^{274}\) His army

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\(^{270}\) Cicero (II Verr. 3.211) speaks of Servilius commanding an army for five years, presumably from 78-74 B.C.

\(^{271}\) M.R.R. II p. 82.

\(^{272}\) M.R.R. II p. 87. Cilicia refers, of course to the provincia which at this time did not include any territory which was geographically Cilician.

\(^{273}\) Flor. 1.41.4 *gravi et Martia classe*.

\(^{274}\) See above.
was, perhaps, five legions strong, some of whom had been in Cilicia or Asia since the early or mid-eighties.\textsuperscript{275} The crews of the warships were, most probably, drawn from Rome's allies. It is a reasonable assumption that Rhodians once again played a prominent part in the campaign.

One individual who is known to have been part of Servilius' retinue is the young C. Julius Caesar. According to Suetonius he was with Servilius "in Cilicia" when he heard of the death of Sulla.\textsuperscript{276} Since Sulla died in 78 B.C., Caesar's service under Servilius must have been brief. He probably returned to Rome before the action started.\textsuperscript{277}

The naval aspect of Servilius' campaign against pirates included at least one battle, followed by attacks against bases on land, as is clear from what Florus says:

Publius Servilius was sent against them and, although he overpowered their light and elusive galleys with his heavy warships, his victory was not a bloodless one. But, not content with having driven them off the sea, he overcame the strongest of their cities, filled with long accumulated booty, Phaselis, Olympos and Isauros, the very citadel of Cilicia, whence, in recognition of the greatness of his achievement, he took the cognomen Isauricus. (Florus 3.6)

The course of this campaign - a gathering of forces, a sea battle followed by attacks on land bases - conforms to the typical pattern of an anti-piracy action in this period.\textsuperscript{278}

\textsuperscript{275} See Sherwin-White (1984) p. 157 and Brunt (1971) p. 452. There are references in Appian and Plutarch to the legions of Flaccus and Fimbria being used in the Third Mithridatic War (App. Mith. 72; Plut. Luc. 7). Servilius must have brought some of his troops back to Rome in 74 for his triumph. Sherwin-White suggests that it was only one legion.

\textsuperscript{276} Suet. Jul. 3. Suetonius adds that Caesar saw the disturbances after Sulla's death during the consulship of Lepidus as an opportunity for rapid advancement and so he returned to Rome.

\textsuperscript{277} See below for more on Caesar and pirates.

\textsuperscript{278} Compare the campaigns of Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus in 123 B.C. and M. Antonius the Orator in 102 B.C. (discussed above)\textsuperscript{279} as well as Pompey's Cilician campaign in 67 B.C. (discussed below), \textsuperscript{280} \textsuperscript{281}.
Florus' geography may not be perfect, and, as will be seen, the Isaurians should not be numbered among the pirates, but Servilius' early activity shows that he knew his business and that the Romans were making a serious attempt to deal with pirates in Southern Anatolia at this time.

Although most of the sources speak of Servilius as defeating pirates in "Cilicia", it is clear from the details we have concerning his campaign that he began by tackling the pirate strongholds of Eastern Lycia. The places which are most commonly mentioned by the sources are Phaselis, Olympos and Korykos. The following passage, taken from Eutropius, is typical of the way that Servilius' campaign is described:

Publius Servilius, an energetic man, was sent to Cilicia and Pamphylia after his consulship. He subdued Cilicia, attacked and captured the most famous cities of Lycia, including Phaselis, Olympos and Cilician Korykos. He also marched on the Isauri and forced them to surrender, bringing the war to an end in three years. He was the first of the Romans to journey into the Taurus mountains. On his return he was granted a triumph and took the name Isauricus. (Eutr. 6.3)

Strabo goes into detail about Olympos, describing it in the following terms:

Near to the mountain ridges of the Tauros is the pirate base of Zeniketos - Olympos, the mountain range and the citadel having the same name - from where the whole of Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia and Milyas can be seen. The mountain having been taken by Isauricus, Zeniketos burnt himself along with his household.

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279 E.g. Str. 14.5.7; Oros. 5.23.21-3; Eutr. 6.3; Sall. frr. I.127-32M (Phaselis, Olympos & Korykos). Cic. II Verr. 1.21 (Olympos); II Verr. 4.22 (Phaselis); Leg. Agr. 2.50 (Olympos and Phaselis); Florus 3.6 (Olympos and Phaselis).

280 Eutropius describes Korykos as "Cilician" (Ciliciae), but this is either a mistake, or it refers to the city being allied to the Cilicians, see below.
He also controlled Korykos and Phaselis and many parts of Pamphylia, but Isauricus took them all. (Str. 14.5.7)\(^{281}\)

Zeniketos emerges from this passage as a powerful local ruler, similar in some respects to Moagetes, the tyrant of Kibyra in Western Lycia, who was overthrown by Murena, perhaps in 84 B.C.\(^{282}\) The crucial difference is that Zeniketos controlled a substantial part of the Lycian and Pamphylian coastline and is directly accused of piracy by Strabo. Further evidence of the piratical activities carried out in this area is provided by Cicero.\(^{283}\) He implies that piracy was a relatively recent problem in Phaselis, when Servilius captured the place. Olympos was one of the six largest cities in the Lycian League (Str. 14.3.3), so the domain of Zeniketos must have been a large and powerful one. In defeating him it may be that Servilius was removing not just a troublesome nest of pirates, but also a dangerous enemy of the Roman order in Southern Anatolia. We have few details of the campaign, but it must have been a hard one, and Cicero describes the booty which Servilius took from Olympos in elaborate terms, suggesting that Zeniketos and his subjects had profited well from their piracy.\(^{284}\) It would also appear that Servilius took some territory in Pamphylia, since in another speech Cicero says that he added "lands of Attaleia and Olympos" to the property of the Roman people.\(^{285}\)

\(^{281}\) Strabo places this account of Olympos and Zeniketos in the Cilician section of his Geography, between Seleukeia and Soli. This would appear to be the result of his confusing Korykos with the Korykos in Cilicia (See map of "Cilicia" nos. 18, 19 & 20). Ormerod (1922) identifies the correct locations of Phaselis, Olympos and Korykos.

\(^{282}\) Str. 13.4.17, and see above, p p. 183-7.

\(^{283}\) Cic. II Verr. 4.21, quoted above, p. 290.

\(^{284}\) Cic. II Verr. 1.56-7. Cicero is, of course, making a point against Verres here, so his account of Servilius’ spoils may be exaggerated, although he does call for the treasury catalogue of the booty to be read out. See above Part 4, on the economic prosperity of the "Cilician" pirates.

\(^{285}\) Cic. de leg. agr. 1.5, agros Attalensium atque Olympenorum, hos populo Romano P. Servili, fortissimi viri, victoria adiunxit. See map of "Cilicia" no. 10.

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In the Verrines Cicero pays particular attention to the pirates whom Servilius captured alive, contrasting Verres' dubious handling of captured pirates with that of the conqueror of the Isaurians:

One man, P. Servilius, captured alive more pirates than all the previous commanders put together. And when did he ever deny to anyone the pleasure of seeing a captured pirate? On the contrary, wherever he went he displayed the most enjoyable spectacle of captive enemies in chains to all and sundry. And so they came from all around, not just from the towns through which the pirates were being led, to behold the sight. (Cic. II Verr. 5.66)

Later in the same speech we are told that one pirate leader, "the celebrated pirate Nico", escaped from Servilius, but was recaptured (Cic II Verr. 5.79). No further details are given about Nico, but it is possible that he was an associate of Zeniketos, perhaps a powerful pirate leader in one of the Lycian or Pamphylian cities which Zeniketos controlled.

In his first two years as governor of Cilicia, therefore, P. Servilius Vatia gathered strong forces, defeated pirates in at least one sea battle, attacked and captured several cities in Lycia and Pamphylia, in particular the territories which contained the bases of the pirate leader Zeniketos. Considerable amounts of booty were obtained. There may have been some previous attempts to deal with pirates operating out of Eastern Lycia, but Servilius' campaign was the most successful attempt to suppress piracy in this area so far, and his achievements were more substantial and longer lasting than those of M.

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286 Cicero goes on to boast about the executions of pirates which followed in Servilius' triumph. He says earlier in the Verrines (II Verr. 1.56) that he witnessed this triumph and it seems to have made quite an impression upon him.

287 See above on Aikhmon.
Antonius in 102 B.C.288 Indeed, Servilius did what might have been expected of the praetor of 100 B.C., according to the lex de provinciis praetorii.

Commendable though all this is, it should not be allowed to disguise the longer term considerations of Servilius' governorship. He was reasserting Roman control over a strategically important region which had previously been allowed to go its own way, and which had been "lost" to Mithridates in the First Mithridatic War.289 The next part of Servilius' campaigning, in Isauria, demonstrates the overriding strategic concerns which governed his actions. He spent another year or more fighting in rugged, mountainous country far from pirates and the sea, securing control of the overland route to Cappadocia. Ormerod suggested that his purpose was to prepare for an attack on Cilicia proper, a final thrust into the very heart of the pirate country.290 As events were to show, however, the major consideration was Cappadocia, which Sherwin-White calls "the soft underbelly of the Pontic Empire".291 In 74 B.C., when war with Mithridates was imminent Lucullus was perfectly placed in the newly acquired part of the province of Cilicia to counterattack.292 Servilius defeated some pirates, but not in Cilicia itself; that was to come later.293

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288 Antonius celebrated a triumph, but there is no mention in the sources of his capturing any cities.
290 Ormerod (1922). He sees this move as a continuation of Murena's "pacification" of Kibyra (p.45), but this is nonsense, as a glance at the map of "Cilicia" will show. Kibyra is no. 1 and Isaura (Vetus) no. 15.
292 See Sherwin-White (1984) for the slight difference between the theory and the practice in this regard!
293 Note that Cicero also uses the term loosely, but he does not misplace Cilian or Pamphylian cities in the same way that Florus and Strabo do.
The involvement of pirates ("Cilician" or otherwise) in the Mithridatic wars is dealt with above, so I will not enter into any discussion of that subject here, but simply restate my main conclusions, that the part played by pirates in the wars of this period was relatively unimportant, their most significant recorded action being the "rescue" of Mithridates by pirates in 72 B.C. (App. Mith. 78), and that the chaos of the wars is likely to have benefited the pirates indirectly by giving them greater freedom of action. It is also likely, however, that the Romans were persuaded of the need to take action against the Cilician heartland partly in response to the anti-Roman stance which the activities of some Cilicians alongside Mithridates represented.

M. Antonius Creticus - the dangers of under-resourcing

M. Antonius Creticus was the son of M. Antonius the Orator and was elected praetor in 74 B.C. He was assigned to a special command. His official title may possibly have been curator tuendae totius orae maritimae, which reflects the general

294 See above Part Three. Note the distinction made there between Cilician mercenaries and pirates. Not all pirates were Cilicians, and not all Cilicians were pirates.
295 See below on Metellus Creticus, Pompey and the pirates.
297 Antonius's supposed imperium infinitum has been the subject of much scholarly literature, but detailed discussion of it is not needed here. It is clear that he operated in more than one provincia. His command was prorogued in the usual way in 73, 72 & 71 B.C. (M.R.R. II pp. 102, 108, 111, 117 & 123). For discussion see (in rather poor English) Marót (1971) and Jameson (1970).
nature of his command and is not specifically directed against piracy. His imperium may have been only valid up to 50 miles inland, as was Pompey’s in 67 B.C.

A justification for Antonius’ early campaigning in the Western Mediterranean can be found in the fragments of Sallust’s Histories. A fragment of Book II refers to a shortage of corn in 75 B.C. which provoked riots and threatened the safety of the consuls (Sall Hist. fr. II 45M). Soon after, in a speech to the people, the consul of 75 B.C., C. Aurelius Cotta, says:

You have elected us consuls, citizens of Rome, when the state faces the severest difficulties both here and at the front. Our commanders in Spain are asking for pay, soldiers, weapons and food, and circumstances compel them to do so, since, with the defection of the allies and the flight of Sertorius over the mountains, they can neither come to grips with the enemy nor lay their hands on necessities. We are keeping armies in the provinces of Asia and Cilicia because of the excessive strength of Mithridates, Macedonia is full of enemies, and so are the coastal regions of Italy and the provinces, while in the meantime our revenues, small and unreliable because of the wars, barely meet even a portion of our expenses: thus the fleet we have at sea, which used to protect our food supplies, is smaller than previously. (Sall. Hist. fr. II 47M 6-7)

Ps. Asc. p. 121; a fragment of Sallust appears to refer to M. Antonius as a worse guardian of the coasts than the pirates had been: Qui orae maritimae, quo Romanum esset imperium, curator <nocent>ior piratis (Sall. Hist. fr. III.2M). Marótí (1971) suggests that Pseudo Asconius got the title from Sallust.

Vell. 2.31.2-3. See Marótí (1971) and Jameson (1970) for different views. Jameson must be right when she suggests that the idea of imperium infinitum is absurd.

I quote the fragments of Sallust from the translation by Carter (1970). The references are to the edition of Maurenbrecher.
In the same book, also referring to 75 B.C. there is a letter from Pompey to the Senate in which he accuses the senators of rewarding his achievements by reducing him and his army to starvation (Sall. Hist. II fr. 98M).

It is argued by Garnsey that shortages of grain in Rome were exacerbated by the need to supply the armies operating in the provinces, and he cites the shortages of 75-3 B.C. as examples of this problem. Cicero claimed to have done his bit to relieve the problems by sending grain to Rome in 75 B.C., when he was quaestor in Lilybaeum, and he says that Verres was ordered to make extra grain purchases during his propraetorship in Sicily, although he misused the funds provided by the senate.

These references to problems with supplies indicate that both overland and maritime supply routes in the Western Mediterranean were under serious strain at this time, as were the sources of the grain supply. As far as the maritime aspect of this problem is concerned, there are numerous references in the accounts of Sertorius' activities to his use of ships. At one point Plutarch mentions a naval battle in the Straits of Gibraltar (Plut. Sert. 12; 80 B.C.) and seaborne operations against the supply-lines of Metellus and Pompey (Plut. Sert. 21; 75 B.C.?). At an earlier stage in his "career" as a rebel Sertorius tried to occupy one of the Balearic Islands, but was driven away by C. Annius (Flor. 2.10; Plut. Sert. 7; 81 B.C.). In his dealings with Mithridates it was in return for ships that he promised to hand Asia and Bithynia over to the King of Pontus (Plut. Sert.

301 Garnsey (1988) pp. 203-4 "Campaigns overseas had the effect of diverting grain from civilian to military consumers." For the large number of legions maintained by Rome during these years see Brunt (1971) p. 449.

302 Cic. Planc. 64. In 74 B.C. the praetor C. Licinius Sacerdos, Verres' predecessor, was able to lower the price of Sicilian grain, suggesting that the crisis had eased a little (Cic. II Verr. 215).

303 Cic. II Verr. 3. A great deal of this speech is taken up with Verres' embezzlement of 1,300,000 sesterces from the funds which Verres was supposed to use to buy Sicilian grain for Rome. It is clear from the speech that this "extra" purchase was an extraordinary measure and not a regular occurrence.
23-4; Cic. Imp. Pomp. 46; App. Mith. 68; 75 B.C.). His intention was to prevent supplies reaching the two Roman generals in Spain by sea. There can be little doubt that he was meeting with some success. I would also suggest that pirates who had no connection with Sertorius were adding to the problem, since there is plenty of evidence in Cicero's Verrine orations to show that piracy was a serious problem in the Western Mediterranean in the late 70s B.C. The items mentioned by Cotta in the speech quoted above - food, weapons and money - would obviously have been attractive targets for pirates as well as Sertorius and his allies. Antonius' initial task must have been to secure the Western supply routes by attacking the bases of those who were disrupting them, whether they were "rebels" or pirates.

The evidence for M. Antonius Creticus' activities in the Western Mediterranean is fragmentary. Cicero has cause to mention him several times in the Verrines. In the speech against Q. Caecilius he says that one of M. Antonius' officers appropriated some slave musicians for his fleet from a Sicilian woman, who got no help from Caecilius, and only a little from Verres. Why an admiral should want slave musicians I am not sure. Antonius himself comes in for some criticism from Cicero. It seems that his high-handed behaviour was not to Cicero's liking. He includes him among those magistrates other

304 Although Plutarch does include a story about Sertorius acting in alliance with some "Cilician pirates" (Plut. Sert. 7-9), this is before he comes to Spain, and has no bearing on his activities there. In any case, I am inclined to be suspicious of episodes which link anti-Roman "rebels" and "Cilicians"; see above on Spartacus and the pirates in Part 3, p. 155.

305 See above on Cicero and Piracy in Part 2, pp. 70-91.

306 See above Part 4 for ways in which pirates might disrupt supply routes without necessarily attacking the supply ships themselves.

307 Cic. div. in Caec. 55 (praefectus Antonii quidam). I would date this incident to early 73 B.C., soon after Verres' arrival in the province (see II Verr. 1.149).
than Verres who have oppressed the Sicilians, and pours scorn upon Hortensius for trying, by citing Antonius as a precedent, to defend Verres' actions in respect of the grain requisitions and purchases.

And so, out of all the praetors, consuls and generals of the Roman people, you have chosen M. Antonius, and it is his most infamous deed which you would imitate... Antonius, while he was doing and plotting many things contrary to the well-being of our allies and of no benefit to the provinces, was cut short by death in the middle of his injustices and pilferings. (II Verr. 3.213)

The particular injustice which Verres is accused of imitating seems to have been to do with a requisition of grain. Instead of the grain, however, he demanded a high cash equivalent at a time of very low prices, presumably because he was interested in obtaining other things with the money. Cicero points out that Verres did a similar thing but for a far longer period of time. The action occurred in the year in which Sacerdos was governor of Sicily (74 B.C.).

Say rather, since you have a suitable authority for it, that he did for three years what Antonius did once when he arrived, and scarcely for a month's supplies.

It would appear, then, that Antonius visited Sicily in 74 B.C. and took a sum of money from the inhabitants which was the equivalent to a month's supply of grain. Some time in the following year one of his prefects requisitioned some slaves for his fleet. Cicero implies that Antonius was making the most of his authority as proconsul at the expense of the Sicilians, which might indicate that he was short of adequate resources for the task in hand.

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306 Cic. II Verr. 2.8 "... and afterwards they felt the power of that unlimited authority of M. Antonius." (et postea M. Antonii infinitum illud imperium senserant).

309 II Verr. 3. 214-5. See below for further discussion of Antonius' "abuse" of provincials.
Sallust's *Histories* provide the only detailed information about the course of Antonius' Western campaigns. Unfortunately their fragmentary nature does not offer more than a few glimpses. Two episodes of reasonable length survive from the third book. In the first, Sallust describes an abortive attempt against a Ligurian harbour, after which Antonius and forces proceed to Spain, to tackle Sertorius.\(^{310}\) While it appears that he was unable to capture the place, he did succeed in preventing it from being used, for a while at least. Once again the practice of depriving pirates of their bases is the most effective way of suppressing piracy. The second fragment is worth quoting in full.

... divided from the enemy by the deep river Dilunus, which even a handful of men rendered impossible for him to cross, he pretended to make some crossings not far away and ferried his army over with the fleet, which he had recalled, and some flimsily put together boats. He then sent his officer Manius on ahead with the cavalry and some of the warships and reached the island of [......], thinking that unexpected panic might make it possible for the town, which was conveniently situated for the receipt of supplies from Italy, to be recaptured. But the enemy, relying on the strength of their position, remained unshaken in their resolve; indeed they [fortified with a double wall] a small hill whose sides rose steeply on the seaward side and rear and had in addition a narrow sandy approach from the front. (Sall. fr. III 6M)

The location of the river Dilunus and the island mentioned is unclear. Some historians have suggested one of the Balearic islands might fit the bill.\(^{311}\) The mention of a fleet, warships and an army which includes cavalry, suggests that Antonius had considerable forces with him, but it is the description of the town (also unidentified) as

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\(^{310}\) Sall. Hist. fr. III 5M. The Ligurians seem to have had a sizeable fleet and were able to hold Antonius off before retiring into the mountains. See below for more on Ligurians and piracy.

\(^{311}\) See Foucart (1906).
suitable for receiving supplies from Italy which is most significant. There seems to me to be little doubt that Antonius was at this point engaged in securing the supply lines to the armies in Spain, in response to the requests of Metellus and Pompey.

Foucart has suggested that the Spanish operations took up most the campaign season of the year 73 B.C.\(^{312}\) In 74 B.C. Antonius was mainly concerned with preparing his forces. His exactions in Sicily (and the seizure of slaves by his prefect) suggest that he lacked adequate resources for the task in hand, having to demand things from the neighbouring provinces. Although the preserved fragments of Sallust and the general comments of later writers portray him as incompetent,\(^{313}\) I think it likely that he was reasonably successful in the first part of his commission, namely to enable supplies to reach Spain from Italy. He discouraged the Ligurians who must have been harrying the route along the coast, and he secured landing points for the supplies in Spain. His command was prorogued several times, which is unlikely to have been the case if he was making a complete of mess of things.\(^{314}\) The war against Sertorius was brought to a successful conclusion in 73 B.C., but Antonius' command was prorogued for another year. This time he was to campaign in Crete.\(^{315}\)

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\(^{312}\) See Foucart (1906) pp. 571-5.

\(^{313}\) See, for example, Plut. Ant. 1; Livy Per. 97; Flor. 3.7.

\(^{314}\) It is instructive to compare the fates of the commanders in the early stages of the war against Spartacus, they were not given the opportunity to repeat their mistakes!

\(^{315}\) Ps. Asc. p. 259. It was the Cretan campaign which attracted the attention of later writers like Livy, Florus and Appian, because it provided some interesting moral anecdotes and a contrast with the successes of Pompey (Livy Per. 97; Flor. 3.7; App. Sic. 6).
Marcus Antonius Creticus - how not to make a name for yourself

Why did M. Antonius turn his attention to Crete in 72 B.C.? Piracy on Crete had a long history by the time Antonius came on to the scene,316 but there had been no attempt made by Rome to "suppress" it previously. Indeed, during the First Mithridatic War, Lucullus had apparently been able to "win over" Crete while on his quest for ships (Plut. Luc. 2.3). Appian indicates that there were two charges which were levelled against the Cretans by Antonius.

For it seemed that Crete had from the start been well disposed towards Mithridates, the king of Pontos, and it was said that Crete provided him with mercenaries during his war with the Romans.... It also appeared that, as a favour to Mithridates, they provided assistance for the pirates and openly took their side when they were fleeing from Marcus Antonius. (App. Sic. 6.1)

The charge of co-operating with Mithridates is also found in Memnon and Florus.317 Like the claim that they were supporting pirates it may well have had some foundation, though perhaps not for all the cities of Crete. The Mithridatic War was finally going Rome's way, and it may have been that the Romans wanted to reassert their control over the Aegean. Only two years earlier the Romans had finally decided to take over the administration of Cyrenaica, and it has been suggested that the need to suppress pirates operating from this area was part of the reason for doing so.318

Florus suggests that it was purely out of a desire for conquest that the Romans attacked Crete. In the context, however, this ignoble motive seems to function as an

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316 See above and Parts 3 & 4, 125-6; 137-9; 182-4; 189.

317 Memnon F.Gr.H. 434.48; Flor. 3.7.1 is very similar to Appian (favisse Mithridati videbatur). See above Part 3 for further discussion.

318 See Reynolds (1962) and Badian (1965) for differing views. Note also Harris (1979) pp. 154-5 & 267.
First Marcus Antonius invaded the island with such confidence, and so overwhelming an expectation of victory, that he carried more chains than arms in his ships. And so he paid the penalty for his folly. (Flor. 3.7.2)

Appian, Dio, Florus and Diodorus together preserve only a few details of the campaign. Antonius sent legates to the Cretans, but they got no satisfaction (App. Sic. 6.1). He attacked Crete and was defeated, the leader of the Cretans being a certain Lasthenes (Flor. 7; App. Sic. 6.1; Dio fr. 108; Diod. 40.1). A peace treaty was concluded, although it was later repudiated by the Romans (Diod. 40.1). Appian adds that he acquired the surname "Creticus" for his pains.

Foucart, in his lengthy discussion of Antonius' campaigns, drew attention to two inscriptions from the Peloponnese which indicate that he was active on the Greek mainland. One, from Epidauros, honours a certain Euanthes, the agoranomos, who obtained exemption for Epidauros from the requirement to furnish soldiers to Antonius in 72 B.C. Nevertheless a garrison was installed in the city, which made it particularly difficult for Euanthes to carry out his duties and satisfy the needs of the population. The other inscription is from the port of Gytheion. It honours two Romans, Numerius and

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319 The motivation of Roman campaigns against Crete is discussed further below.

320 I have not included all the lurid details which are to be found in the scanty sources for this campaign. See Ormerod (1924) pp. 225-7. A further fragment from Sallust may refer to the Cretan campaign (Sall Hist. fr. III 8). It mentions the loss of a cohort to an attack at sea by pirates.

321 Foucart (1906). I do not accept all his conclusions concerning the nature of Antonius' campaigns or his activities in the Peloponnese.

322 I.G. IV.932. See Foucart (1906) for discussion of the date, given according to the Achaian era.
Marcus Cloatius, who have helped the city to cope with various debts incurred over a period of several years.\textsuperscript{323}

...and in the year of Timokrates' magistracy, when Antonius had come here and our city had need of cash and nobody else was willing to enter into a contract with us, they loaned us 4,200 drachmas under contract at interest of four drachmas per mina per month...\textsuperscript{324}

There is a familiar ring to what this inscription has to say about Antonius. He turns up in a province and starts ordering the provincials about, the kind of behaviour for which Cicero saw fit to censure him.\textsuperscript{325} As in the case of Sicily, it seems to be cash which is his main concern. With money he could buy supplies, feed and perhaps even pay his men. The garrison at Epidaurros could have been a precaution against pirates, or it could have been a way of billeting some of his forces before proceeding to Crete.\textsuperscript{326}

The exemption from providing troops indicates that Antonius, like many other Roman magistrates in this period was dependent upon locally recruited men for his military personnel. Indeed, it may be that all his men came from allies and subjects of Rome.\textsuperscript{327}

There are several legates mentioned in the Gytheion inscription, including Gaius Julius Caesar, which would suggest that Antonius had considerable "staff" to cater for, all at the

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\textsuperscript{323} I.G. V.1.1146; S.I.G. 748. I quote from the translation in Sherk (1984). Six eponymous magistrates are mentioned, so the dealings mentioned in the inscription spanned at least six years.

\textsuperscript{324} Sherk (1984) no. 74 ll. 32-6. Gytheion is the main port of Lakonia.

\textsuperscript{325} See above.

\textsuperscript{326} Ormerod (1924) p. 226 n. 5, thinks it unlikely that the garrison was for the Epidaurians' protection.

\textsuperscript{327} Brunt (1971) p. 455: "I can discover no evidence that M. Antonius... had any legionary force."
expense of the local population for whom the campaign must have been a considerable burden.  

There are two ways of looking at M. Antonius Creticus' campaigns. His four years of activity could be seen as a major attempt to suppress piracy, a logical follow-up to Servilius' "Cilician" campaigns and a rather sorry prelude to the more successful operations of Pompey. On the other hand, it could be argued that he was given his extraordinary imperium as a result of certain problems facing Rome in the mid 70s B.C. - Sertorius, grain supply difficulties, Cretan "resistance" to Roman domination in the Mediterranean. It seems to me that M. Antonius had no single plan of action because he was called upon to perform several operations in succession, for which he lacked adequate resources. Firstly he had to secure the supply route from Italy to Spain, in order to help with the war against Sertorius. This involved driving the Ligurians away from the coast and capturing suitable landing places in Spain. It is obvious from the problems which Verres had in Sicily that he did not succeed in "clearing" the Western Mediterranean of pirates, even for a brief spell. After the death of Sertorius he was despatched to sort out the recalcitrant Cretans. In spite of a year spent gathering forces in the Peleponnese he was defeated by the Cretans and forced to abandon his campaign. He died soon after.

In his build-up to the campaign of Pompey against the pirates, Cassius Dio remarks that the Romans had not been greatly concerned by the problem.

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328 Given Caesar's recently acquired experience against pirates (see below) it is just possible that he was included as an "expert" to advise Antonius.

329 This is how Ormerod (1924) sees it, see also the campaign of Metellus Creticus discussed below.

330 See above Part 2 on Verres and the pirates, and below on his successor, L. Metellus.
But they used to send out fleets and generals, as and when they were prompted by specific reports. Nothing was achieved, except that the allies had to suffer even greater hardship as a result of these attempts, until their situation became quite desperate. (Dio 36.23.2)

The Cretan campaign of M. Antonius Creticus seems to be what Dio has in mind here. The almost desperate tone of the inscriptions from Epidauros and Gytheion, as well as Cicero's biting condemnation of his intervention in Sicily, are a further indication that most Roman attempts to suppress piracy in this period were carried out largely at the expense of the friends, allies and subjects of Rome.

**Metellus Creticus - the hard line**

The embarrassing defeat suffered by Antonius was bound to have serious repercussions at Rome, and it seems that many of the Cretans realised this at the time. They tried to forestall retaliatory action by giving their side of the story, and appealing to the senate to renew their status as allies of Rome (Diod. 40.1.1-2). Unfortunately, a more bellicose group led by the tribune Lentulus Spinther[^331^] opposed the deal which was put forward, forcing the senate to take a hard line with the Cretans.

The senate, looking favourably upon their explanation, attempted to pass a decree which cleared them of all charges and declared them friends and allies of the leading power (Rome). But the decree was vetoed by Lentulus, surnamed Spinther, and the Cretans departed. (Diod. 40.1.2)

The Cretan ambassadors seem to have been given some kind of ultimatum to surrender all their ships and provide 300 hostages, including the "pirate" Lasthenes who was...

[^331^]: The motion must have been put forward after the restoration of the tribunician veto in 70 B.C.
responsible for the defeat of M. Antonius Creticus.\(^{332}\) This proved unacceptable (as was probably the intention) and war followed.\(^{333}\) In Diodorus' account the senate are informed many times of the Cretans' collusion in piracy,\(^{334}\) and this prompts them to declare war. It seems that the piracy element had been conveniently overlooked until Spinther intervened. Velleius does not mention pirates at all in his account (Vell. 2.34, 38-9). He does, however, say that Crete was punished (multata est) by Metellus (Vell. 2.38.6), which might refer to accusations of piracy, or of siding with Mithridates. Neither does the epitomator of Livy refer to pirates (Livy Per. 99). The conquest of Crete should not, therefore, be seen simply as a further measure to suppress piracy. Florus is, perhaps, to be taken seriously when he says that desire for conquest was what spurred the Romans on after the defeat of Antonius. Nor should it be forgotten that an extended campaign of this kind offered numerous opportunities to obtain booty and, for a victorious general, prestige and influence in Rome. The attempt of M. Antonius in 72-1 B.C. can be compared with the successful annexation of Cyrenaica in 75 B.C., which seems to have netted a lot of money for the public coffers at Rome.\(^{335}\) It is not unreasonable to think that some Romans saw Crete as another potential treasure-chest.

The seriousness of the situation is reflected in the decision to make Crete a consular province for 69 B.C., as a fragment of Dio reveals (Dio 36.1). The lot fell to

\(^{332}\) Diod. 40.1.3 & Dio 30/5.111; App. Sic. 6.1-2. According to Appian the senate declared war first, then demanded the ships and hostages. Diodorus' account seems more likely (why demand hostages when you have already declared war?), and Appian's allows no role for Spinther. It is Dio who combines the embassy and the ultimatum.

\(^{333}\) Technically, of course, it was the Cretans who chose war with the Romans. They refused to accept the senate's "terms" and so they were in the wrong.

\(^{334}\) Diod. 40.1.3 pollakis lògou genoménon hóti koinoontois tèis leistias tois peiratais.

\(^{335}\) See Crawford (1974), II p. 705: "The money brought from Cyrene by P. Lentulus Marcellinus as quaestor in 74 seems to account for the large issues of that year." There was, of course, no fighting to be done in this instance.
Hortensius but he declined in favour of his colleague Q. Caecilius Metellus. Metellus' campaign in Crete lasted three years. It is worth looking at in some detail because of the strange contrast it affords with the more celebrated campaign against the pirates conducted by Pompey in 67 B.C. It is apparently a continuation of M. Antonius' attempt to subdue the Cretans, although Metellus had better resources and was ultimately more successful.\(^{336}\)

Velleius says that Lasthenes and Panares had collected together an army.

24,000 young men assembled into a swift, tough, well trained force, renowned for their skill as archers.

(Vell. 2.34.1)

This number seems rather high, but there should have been no shortage of fighting men on Crete, where rigorous military training was still sponsored by many cities. Mithridates probably recruited mercenaries on Crete, as did many others in the Hellenistic period.\(^{337}\)

It is difficult to assess the situation in Crete at this time, but it seems that the two leaders mentioned were supported by a substantial part of the island's population, including most of the main cities, which were controlled by aristocracies.\(^{338}\)

The early stages of Metellus' campaign seem to have been centered on Western Crete. Livy dealt first with his siege of Kydonia in book 98 (Livy Per. 98) and Kydonia is the site of his first victory in Appian's version of events (App. Sic. 6.2). The sources all lay heavy emphasis on the arduous and protracted nature of the Cretan War, making it

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\(^{336}\) He had at least three legions, according to Phlegon of Tralles 12.12 (F.Gr.H. no. 257).

\(^{337}\) See above Part 3. The chapter in Willetts (1955) remains the best treatment in English of Cretan mercenaries, supplemented for piracy by Brulé (1978).

\(^{338}\) On the nature of Cretan Society and politics at this time see Willetts (1955). Although Crete was still politically volatile, the cities seem to have banded together to resist the Romans. This may have come as a surprise to M. Antonius in 71 B.C., if he was counting on exploiting inter-city rivalries to his advantage.
essentially a series of sieges.\textsuperscript{339} Only one battle is mentioned, at Hierapytna, which seems to have taken place at sea and resulted in defeat for L. Bassus, a legate of Metellus at the hands of Aristion and Octavius.\textsuperscript{340} Aristion is an otherwise unknown Cretan leader, Octavius' part will be discussed below.

Recent excavations in Western Crete have uncovered what seems to be "hard" evidence of Metellus' efforts to overcome determined Cretan resistance. The ancient harbour and city of Phalasarna, on the North-Western tip of Crete, has been uplifted along with the rest of the area so that it now lies well above sea level. Excavations were begun in 1986 and have revealed that the harbour, which was approached via a narrow rock-cut channel, was deliberately blocked by large pieces of masonry. The excavators have plausibly associated this with Metellus' campaign. The blocked harbour and nearby finds indicate that Phalasarna was besieged and blockaded by land and sea. The inhabitants probably surrendered, either to Metellus or to one of his lieutenants, although it is possible that the place had to be taken by storm, its fortifications are impressive.\textsuperscript{341}

The exact number of cities which were taken by Metellus is not known, but a list of the places mentioned in our literary sources gives a good idea of the extent of his campaign.

Eleuthernai (Dio 36.18.2; Florus 3.7.5) Dio says that it was taken through treachery (ek prodosías); presumably someone opened the gates.

\textsuperscript{339} Velleius 2.34.1; App. Sic.6.2; Dio 36.18-19; Florus 3.7.4-6; Plut. Pomp. 29.

\textsuperscript{340} Dio 36.19.1; M.R.R. II p. 147. Dio uses the verb antarázó referring to Bassus. This often means "to put out to sea against someone", but could simply mean "attack."

\textsuperscript{341} See Hadjidaki (1988a & b), Frost (1989) and Frost & Hadjidaki (1990). The latest sherds of pottery found at the site date from the first century B.C. Several catapult stones have been found in the midst of the harbour complex. What I have learned from Dr. Hadjidaki concerning more recent work at Phalasarna confirms rather than contradicts what is said here and elsewhere about the site.
Hierapytna (Dio 36.19.1) The city was abandoned to Metellus by Aristion, after his defeat of L. Bassus.

Knossos (Livy Per. 99; App. Sic. 6.2; Florus 3.7.5) According to Appian there was a siege and Livy says that the city was taken by storm.

Kydonia (Livy Per. 98-9; App. Sic. 6.2; Florus 3.7.5) Livy says it was stormed but Appian claims that Panares surrendered the city to Metellus in return for good treatment.

Lappa (Dio 36.18.2) Stormed, while Octavius was there.

Lyktos (Livy Per. 99) Stormed.

Three of these cities are located in Central Crete (Eleutherai, Knossos and Lyktos), two in Eastern Crete (Hierapytna and Lappa) and the remaining one, Kydonia, along with Phalasarna, is in Western Crete. The fullest accounts of the campaign come from Appian and Dio. The former says that Kydonia was taken before Knossos and the latter gives a sequence of Eleutherai, Lappa and then Hierapytna. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that Metellus began by securing the Western part of the island and then moved Eastwards, pursuing his remaining enemies and laying siege to those places which sheltered them or offered resistance. The Cretan leaders Aristion, Lasthenes and Panares were most probably aristocrats from the leading cities, all three being associated with Kydonia at some point in the various literary accounts. This city seems to have been the main focus of Cretan resistance to Metellus.

It may be easier to understand why Metellus’ campaign was launched by looking at what he achieved. He conquered the whole of Crete and brought the island under Roman control. Its harbours were no longer open to pirates, its mercenaries less readily available to Rome’s enemies. The victorious proconsul was saluted as imperator, one of

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342 Appian (Sic. 6.2) speaks of Lasthenes fleeing from Kydonia to Knossos. Dio (36.19.1-2) has Aristion abandoning Kydonia and Hierapytna in succession.
the most desirable achievements of a political career in the Republic. Metellus and his army must also have gained some booty from the capture of so many cities, and a great deal more would have gone into the public coffers in Rome. Metellus' triumph is mentioned by several sources, largely on account of the quarrels with Pompey over captured generals, but it seems to have been an impressive show. On a less tangible, but still very important level, the ignominy of Antonius' defeat was cleansed.

He celebrated a triumph and took the name Creticus, more deservedly than Antonius, having conquered the whole island. (App. Sic. 6.2)

It seems that Metellus was disinclined to strike deals with the Cretans. He prosecuted the war vigorously, making sure that all the cities surrendered to him. In 67 B.C., however, he came up against an unexpected problem, the "rival" campaign of Pompey. Their encounters will be discussed below in the context of Pompey's commission to "clear the seas."

Pompey - how to deal with pirates?

In 67 B.C. Cn. Pompeius was appointed to clear the seas of pirates. He was given wide-ranging powers and enormous resources. The suppression of piracy had become so urgent a matter that the Romans risked, in the eyes of some at least, creating another.


344 See Harris (1979) and North (1981) on booty as a motive for Roman imperialism, though it should not be seen as an important one in this case. See Willetts (1955) on aristocratic Cretan prosperity. See above Part 4 on the "economics" of pirate communities.

345 Vell. 2.40.5; App. Sic. 6.2; Dio 36.19.3. Appian mentions the great wealth of Lasthenes kept in Knossos, and Dio accuses Metellus of extorting money from Eleuthera.
Marius or Sulla in order to deal with it. Why did the Romans choose to act in this fashion at this time?

In the first place it seems that there was a growing recognition at Rome that piracy had become so widespread, and the pirates so great a menace, that the practice of requiring allies and subjects to be largely responsible for the suppression of piracy, backed up by occasional, large-scale campaigns directed at specific targets ("Cilicia" or Crete), was no longer adequate. There are several episodes and events recorded in our sources which can be used to illustrate this growth in the menace of piracy.

Caesar and the pirates - actions speak louder than words

In late 75 or early 74 B.C., C. Julius Caesar was sailing to Rhodes, where he was to study rhetoric, when he was captured, off the island of Pharmakussa, by pirates who held him for about 40 days until he was ransomed. Having been released, he collected together a small fleet in Miletos and went after the pirates, whose base he could locate, and captured them. In accordance with a promise made to them during his captivity he had them crucified. Plutarch says that he initially detained the pirates in Pergamon, and went to the governor of Asia to demand that he deal with them, but getting no satisfaction Caesar ordered the executions himself. On what authority he acted is unclear. It would appear from the Ephesian inscription, mentioning the execution of

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346 See Dio 36. 21-37; Plut. Pomp. 25-7; App. Mith. 92-6; Cic. Imp. Pomp. for the political uproar caused by the Gabinian law. See also above Part 2, pp. 93-7.

347 Suet. div. Jul. 4.1; Val. Max. 6.9.15; Plut. Caes. 2. The incident is also mentioned by Velleius (2.41-2) with some variations, such as crediting the pirates with a fleet, instead of one ship. See Ward (1977) for a detailed chronology.

348 Suet. div. Jul. 4.2; Val. Max. 6.9.15; Vell. 2.42; Plut. Caes. 2. Plutarch adds the detail that the pirates were found at their base. Caesar did not have to hunt for them.
some pirates on Astypalaia, that no "conviction" was necessary in such cases.\textsuperscript{49} Caesar may have had the status of a legate, although he was not travelling on any mission at this time, but the fact that he approached Juncus, the governor of Asia, suggests that he lacked any real authority.\textsuperscript{50} The incident shows that pirates could strike against anyone,\textsuperscript{51} but it seems to me that it demonstrates once again the pattern of Roman "leadership" of allies or subjects against pirates, since Caesar must have used local forces to attack the pirates' base. There is no clear indication of where the pirates came from, but it does not seem to be "Cilicia".

**Sicily - Verres and after**

The attacks of pirates on the island of Sicily during the governorship of C. Verres have already been discussed.\textsuperscript{52} There is nothing in the sources to indicate that these pirates should be associated with "Cilicia" either. The problem of piracy in this area was not the main concern of M. Antonius Creticus in 74-3 B.C. and the measures undertaken by Verres to deal with it were not very successful. It appears that his successor, L. Metellus, was more effective in suppressing piracy. Livy recorded his achievement in the 98th book of his history (Livy Per. 98) and Orosius goes into some detail about the matter, claiming that one of the pirate leaders he captured, called Pyrganio, was the same

\textsuperscript{349} See above. The pirates lacked recognized status as citizens of a polis, or a Roman province. They were "outlaws" - see above Part 2 on Cicero and piracy.

\textsuperscript{350} See Ward (1977) for discussion. Velleius specifically says that Caesar had no authority, but he may be exaggerating for effect. Plutarch says that Juncus wanted to obtain the pirates' loot, so he delayed a decision on their case. He neglects to say what happened to the plunder after they were executed. Perhaps it payed for Caesar's rhetoric lessons?

\textsuperscript{351} A similar incident, dating to 67 B.C., is the capture by pirates of P. Claudius Pulcher (later P. Clodius) who was ransomed with the reluctant help of Ptolemy Auletes (App. B.C. 2.23; Str. 14.6.6; Dio. 36.16.3).

\textsuperscript{352} See above Part 2, p. p. 73-83.
man who had earlier embarrassed Verres by sailing in triumph into the harbour at Syracuse and mocking the efforts of the Roman governor to capture him (Oros. 6.3.5). The name which Cicero gives to this leader is Heracleo, so it may be that Orosius was guilty of a flight of fancy here. Metellus' victory must have been reasonably spectacular to merit a mention in Livy's account, although it could be argued that his success was made all the more impressive by the scale of Verres' failure.

Delos, Aigina and Tenos - unguarded islands

In his speech to the assembly of the Roman people on the Manilian law in 66 B.C., Cicero recalled for his audience how the friends, allies and subjects of Rome had been left at the mercy of pirates until Pompey drove them away. One of the places he described was Delos.

...situated so far away from us in the Aegean sea, where people from all over gathered together, bringing their wares and cargoes to trade, crammed full with riches, small, unwalled, accustomed to fear nothing... (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 55).

Cicero goes on to contrast the position of Delos in former days with the vulnerability of Rome in more recent times. He must have had some particular reason to mention Delos at this point. The explanation of his reference is provided by a fragment from the Greek historian Phlegon of Tralles.

And Athenodoros the pirate, having reduced the Delians to slavery, shamefully desecrated the statues of their gods. But Gaius Triarius rectified the damage to the city and built a wall round Delos.

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353 See Cic. II Verr. 5.95-100.
354 Cic. Imp. Pomp. 31-5 & 54-7.
355 F.Gr.Hist. no. 257 fr. 12.13. The event can be dated to 69 B.C. on the basis of the inscriptions mentioned below and the reference to Metellus Creticus which precedes it.
The remains of Triarius' wall have been excavated at Delos, along with inscriptions bearing dedications to him.\textsuperscript{356} It was probably this event, occurring only a few years earlier, which prompted Cicero to mention Delos in his speech. Triarius was a legate of Lucullus involved in naval campaigns against Mithridates' fleet.\textsuperscript{357} An inscription of 58 B.C., a law of the consuls Aulus Gabinius and Lucius Calpurnius concerning the restoration of shrines and temples on Delos, also refers to the piracy which "troubled the whole world for many years".\textsuperscript{358}

An inscription from Aigina in honour of one Diodoros, who was agoranomos in the year 69 B.C. mentions an attack by pirates.\textsuperscript{359}

... during the recent war, when the pirates overran and laid waste our territory, and at the same time we were greatly in need on account of the tax, he provided enough grain for the whole period to those who required it...

This inscription indicates that there was a crisis on Aigina, partly as a result of an attack by pirates, in the same year that Athenodoros sacked Delos. It is tempting to see some close connection between the two. Perhaps the attack on Aigina was also carried out by Athenodoros? If not, then it is clear that piracy was a problem in the Aegean at this time, in spite of the presence of Triarius and a Roman fleet. His concern was obviously the war, mentioned in the Aigina inscription, and not the suppression of piracy.

\textsuperscript{356} See Rostovtzeff (1941); I.L.S. 8774; Maier (1959) nos. 41 & 42. Coins hoards found on Delos which has been dated to 69 B.C. indicate that considerable loss of life and property may have resulted from Athenodoros' attack. See Hackens and Lévy (1965), pp. 503-17.

\textsuperscript{357} See M.R.R. II pp. 113, 120, 125, 130 & 134; vol. III, pp. 214-5.

\textsuperscript{358} S.E.G. 1 no. 355 (from Mykonnos).

\textsuperscript{359} I.G. IV.2 lines 9-14. The date is given in lines 4-5 as the 64th year of the era. The editor, M. Fraenkel, believes that the first year of this era was 133 B.C., so the 64th year is 69 B.C.
A similar crisis on the island of Tenos is indicated by another inscription from this period, this time honouring a Roman banker, L. Aufidius Bassus, the son of Lucius, for remitting interest on loans owed by the people of Tenos. The inscription refers to events at the time of the first Mithridatic war, involving the elder Lucius. He reached an agreement concerning loans which were particularly onerous "when the war was going on and the island was continually under attack from pirates". His son had to be generous in much the same way, apparently because the circumstances had not improved.\textsuperscript{360}

In more general terms there are several references in the literary sources to the attacks of pirates on islands and cities of the Eastern Mediterranean in this period. Cicero, in his speech on the Manilian law, picks out Knidos, Kolophon and Samos, as well as mentioning Delos.\textsuperscript{361} Plutarch lists 13 plundered sanctuaries and claims that pirates captured 400 cities (poleis) at the height of their power (Plut. Pomp. 24). Dio is less specific in his description of the pirates' depredations, saying that they began by attacking shipping and then became bold enough to raid harbours and cities (Dio 36.20-21). Appian paints a similar picture of the increasing boldness of the pirates who attacked ships, harbours and even fortified cities until they dominated the whole Mediterranean (App. Mith. 92-3).

It is not clear from these literary sources exactly when particular places were plundered by pirates. Appian, Plutarch and Cicero mention several cities and islands which seem to have been notable victims of the pirates shortly before Pompey's campaign. Samos is mentioned by all three, Samothrace by Plutarch and Appian, and the list of sanctuaries given by Plutarch covers a considerable part of the Eastern Mediterranean. The context in which Appian mentions Samothrace and Samos, however,


\textsuperscript{361} Cic. Imp. Pomp. 31-3 & 55. See above Part 2, pp. 83-7.
is the end of the first Mithridatic war, while Sulla is still in Asia (App. Mith. 63).\(^{362}\) It may be that the lists of specific locations attacked by pirates, which are given by our literary sources in the early parts of their accounts of Pompey’s campaign, cover many years of piracy, rather than just a few, as they seem to imply. Thus, although it is reasonable to infer from Cicero’s speech On the Command of Gnaeus Pompeius that the Romans were concerned about the vulnerability of their allies and the Eastern provinces, I am reluctant to see a sudden, dramatic wave of piratical attacks across the whole Mediterranean, encompassing hundreds of cities and islands as the primary motivation for the Gabinian law. The allies themselves were also very concerned, and Cicero speaks of them as requesting Pompey’s appointment in 67 B.C.\(^{363}\)

That is not to say that piracy was not a very serious menace in the years leading up to 67 B.C. The kidnapping of Julius Caesar, the piratical activity around Sicily in the time of Verres, the inscriptions from Aigina and Tenos, and the sack of Delos, taken together with the statements of all the main sources that piratical attacks were widespread and numerous at this time, are clearly enough a cause for concern. But they do not seem to me to represent a worsening of the situation since the 70s B.C. The attacks on Delos, Aigina and possibly even Tenos might be ascribed to pirates operating from Crete. In this case Metellus’ appointment in 69 B.C. to the war with Crete\(^{364}\) seems to be a similar response to the commands of M. Antonius the Orator in 102 B.C., Publius Servilius in 78 B.C. and even Marcus Antonius Creticus in 74 B.C., though in Metellus’ case piracy was a less important reason for his campaign than “imperialist” warfare.

\(^{362}\) As noted above, however, Appian’s account is not strictly chronological, so chapter 63 of his Mithridatic Wars may refer to events of the 60s and 70s B.C.

\(^{363}\) Cic. Imp. Pomp. 67 “(the people of) the coastal regions” (ora maritima).

\(^{364}\) The circumstances of Metellus’ appointment are discussed above in Part 3, as are the details of his campaign, except for those which have a direct bearing on Pompey’s campaign of 67 B.C.
Something more "dramatic" is needed to explain the sudden change of approach which the appointment of Pompey represents. It is clear from the various sources which describe the immediate build up to his appointment, and the discussion which Gabinius' law provoked, that it was the threat to Italy and Rome itself which finally stung the Romans into more drastic action.

Not in our back yard

Cicero, recalling the dire straits which the Romans found themselves in before Pompey's campaign against the pirates, contrasted earlier days of maritime tranquility with the current period of insecurity.

We used to guarantee not just the safety of Italy, but were able, through the prestige of our imperial power, to preserve unharmed all our far-flung allies... yet we are now not only kept out of our provinces, away from the coasts of Italy and its harbours, but we are even driven off the Appian way!\textsuperscript{365}

The places in Italy which Cicero says have been attacked are Caieta, Misenum and Ostia (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 33). Velleius speaks of pirates plundering "certain cities of Italy" (Vell. 31.2), Florus mentions Sicily and Campania (Florus 3.6). According to Appian the pirates attacked Brundisium,\textsuperscript{366} and Etruria (App. Mith. 92) and Dio says that they pillaged and burned Ostia and other cities in Italy (Dio 36.22). It has been suggested that evidence of burning and destruction found in some of the houses excavated at Cosa should be attributed to pirate raids in this period.\textsuperscript{367} While such an explanation is possible, I do not find it particularly plausible, especially in the case of the town of Cosa, which is a

\textsuperscript{365} Cic. Imp. Pomp. 55. I have omitted the reference to Delos quoted above. See above pp.245-7 for the protection of shipping and coastlines in the earlier Republic.

\textsuperscript{366} See also Cic. Imp. Pomp. 32.

\textsuperscript{367} Brown (1980) p. 74 n. 112. See also McCann (1987) p. 28.
very defensible site and unlikely to have seemed worth attacking to pirates. Low-lying, prosperous places like Ostia and Brundisium are a different matter.368

Indeed, according to some of the literary accounts, the pirates had singled out Italy and the Romans as targets for their attacks, raiding cities, harbours, roads and villas. Plutarch, in an often quoted passage, describes the humiliation and insults which pirates enjoyed inflicting upon their Roman victims (Plut. Pomp. 24). As well as general comments he includes two specific examples.

On one occasion they seized two praetors in their purple trimmings, Sextilius and Bellinus, making off with them, servants, lictors and all. They also captured the daughter of Antonius, a man who had celebrated a triumph, as she was on her way to the country, and ransomed her for a great deal of money.369 (Plut. Pomp. 24)

These examples are also mentioned by Cicero (Imp. Pomp. 32) and Appian (App. Mith. 93). Another shocking event to which attention is drawn by Cicero and Dio is the destruction of a consular fleet at Ostia by pirates.370

Fear of famine

Plutarch concludes his long description of the growing menace of piracy in the following fashion.

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368 The full report of the Cosa excavations is still awaited. It may well be that the "evidence" Brown refers to can be explained more appropriately by another hypothesis. See Part FOLAR above for discussion of the problems of interpreting archaeological evidence in terms of piracy. p. 186 in 207

369 Presumably the daughter of M. Antonius the Orator.

370 Cic. Imp. Pomp. 33; Dio 36.22. It is often asserted, on no particular evidence, that this fleet had been prepared specifically to fight the pirates. It would be wrong to imagine a huge fleet of pirate ships waiting off the mouth of the Tiber to pre-empt a Roman strike against them. Only a few pirate vessels would have been needed. The mission of the Roman fleet is unknown.
Their power was felt in all parts of the Mediterranean, so that it was impossible to sail anywhere and all trade was brought to a halt. It was this which really made the Romans sit up and take notice. With their markets short of food and a great famine looming, they commissioned Pompey to clear the pirates from the seas. (Plut. Pomp. 25.1)

It would seem that the one thing which no-one could ignore at Rome was a threat to the grain supply. Dio mentions that there had been periodic interruptions caused by pirates before 67 B.C., and one such occasion has been discussed above. Appian also stresses the threat to the grain supply as a factor in provoking the Romans to respond to the pirate menace. He blames the enormous population of the city for the distress which resulted (App. Mith. 93). Livy also recorded that the supply was cut off by pirates in 67 B.C. (Livy Per. 99).

The response was a tribunician proposal for a major campaign aimed at "clearing the seas" of pirates. "Someone" would be appointed with authority to raise troops in all provinces, to override other magistrates anywhere within fifty miles of the sea. Up to 25 legates were proposed for the commander and a large budget to pay for the outfitting of a huge fleet and army. In the end Pompey did not make use of all the resources that were offered to him, and once again allied forces were prominent. The political

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372 Only 15 were used M.R.R. II pp. 148-9. Brunt (1971) p. 456 n.10 thinks there were only 14.

373 The figures given by Appian and Plutarch for the forces allotted to Pompey seem far too high (App. Mith. 94; Plut. Pomp. 26.2). "Within so short a time he could not have raised the huge forces of which Appian and Plutarch tell." (Brunt (1971) p. 456). Also the suggestion of unlimited funds, men and ships (Dio 36.37.1) is incredible. Appian puts the number of ships at 270, which might be possible. Groebe's (1910) attempt to rationalise the figures is simply guesswork.

374 See Flor. 3.6.8 on Pompey's Rhodian allies; also S.I.G. 749.
uproar caused by Gabinius' proposal forms the longest part of two of our major accounts of Pompey's campaign, and is referred to by Cicero in his speech of the following year on the Manilian law. Although Pompey was not named in the law, it was clearly intended for him, and the urgency of the matter was reflected in the way that the people shouted down the opponents of Gabinius. All they wanted was someone to restore their food supplies. If Cicero can be believed, when the appointment of Pompey was confirmed the grain "crisis" disappeared.

On the day he was appointed by you commander in the naval war, a period of scarcity and high prices for corn was immediately followed by such cheapness and abundance as had scarcely been possible in times of peace, all inspired by this one man's reputation. (Cic. Imp, Pomp. 44)

Pompey's early activity confirms that securing the grain supply was his first priority.

In spite of the unsuitability of the weather for sailing he crossed to Sicily, checked out the coast of Africa, took his fleet to Sardinia and established military and naval garrisons to guard these three granaries of the state... The two seas around Italy were secured with huge fleets and strong armies. (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 34)

Plutarch's account of the campaign also demonstrates this point. According to him Pompey gathered his naval forces and concentrated them in the Western Mediterranean. Plutarch picks out exactly the same places as Cicero - Africa, Sardinia and Sicily - as well as

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376 See Plut. Pomp. 25; Dio 36.30. The opposition to Gabinius' proposal concentrated on the wide scope of the imperium which the appointed commander would have, enabling him (theoretically) to override other holders of imperium. It is difficult to say whether these powers were vital to the job. Their most conspicuous use was in Crete, where Pompey's intervention was unnecessary. p. 73-91

377 See above Part 2 on the interpretation of his speeches.
as Corsica and the Tyrrhenian Sea (Plut. Pomp. 26.4).\textsuperscript{378} Most of the sources agree that the first part of his campaign was completed in 40 days (Livy Per. 99; App. Mith.95). The remarkable speed with which he "cleared the seas" before heading for Cilicia makes it unlikely that a thorough operation was carried out.\textsuperscript{379} He divided up the seas among his legates, assigning each to a particular area. The forces which they had at their disposal are not known, and there are no details in the sources of their activities, only generalisations.\textsuperscript{380} In short, it is unclear whether they did much at all. Plutarch's account of the procedure is one of the fullest.

Notwithstanding this achievement, he divided up the coasts and seas into 13 regions, assigning a number of ships to each one, with a commander. His forces were spread out, threatening the pirate hordes from all sides so that they were swiftly caught and brought to land. The more elusive ones were driven together towards Cilicia, like bees swarming to their hive. Pompey made ready to move against them with 60 of his best ships. (Plut. Pomp. 26.3)

The sources are equally brief in what they say about the Cilician part of the campaign. Cicero sums it up in one sentence.

He himself, however, set out from Brundisium and in 49 days he had brought Cilicia into the Roman Empire. (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 35)

\textsuperscript{378} I think it quite likely that Plutarch had read Cicero's speech On the Command of Gnaeus Pompeius. He also read other sources which provided details of the political wrangling before the appointment and the course of the campaign. The general "bias" of the sources is discussed in the next section. Some attempts have been made to identify the contemporary sources used by the various writers for the campaign, but there is not much that can be said with any certainty. There is little variation in the information our literary sources provide, but some, e.g. Plutarch go into much more detail than others.

\textsuperscript{379} According to Florus it took him 40 days to complete the entire commission, including the conquest of Cilicia! (Flor.3.6.15).

\textsuperscript{380} Breglia (1970-1) discusses the legates and the sources at length, but can only conclude that Appian is more reliable than Florus (!).
A few more details are given by some of the later sources, particularly those writing in Greek, but they do not suggest that there was a hard struggle, or even that there was much fighting.381

Pompey - the secret of his success

In spite of the numerous superlatives that have been used to describe Pompey's campaign of 67 B.C., a close scrutiny of the sources leaves the distinct impression of a "rush job".382 Even if it is allowed that the first stage, clearing the seas around Italy to secure the grain supply, could have been carried out so quickly with reasonable thoroughness, the conquest of Cilicia in 49 days seems incredible, especially in the light of previous actions by Roman magistrates in this area.383 I think that a clue to understanding this "miracle" is provided by the cursory way in which the Cilician part of the campaign is treated by everyone from Cicero to Orosius.384 Once the grain supply had been secured, the people of Rome were far less interested in the progress of the "pirate war". What Pompey did after his initial "forty days" was a matter of little interest to them, and thus of less interest to the ancient sources, especially as his part in the Mithridatic wars was much more significant.

381 Dio's account in Book 36 of his Roman History. The operations themselves occupy less than 30 lines of Greek text (in the Loeb volume), as compared with the 16 pages (incomplete) devoted to the story of the rise of the pirates and the debates at Rome over the Gabinian law.

382 The sources are unanimous in their opinion that Pompey's campaign was as outstanding as it was swift. Modern authorities have tended to follow suit. E.g.: "It was a spectacular operation, brilliantly conceived and magnificently executed. In three months Pompey had accomplished what no power had been able to do for centuries." Casson (1991), pp. 182-3.

383 See above on M. Antonius the Orator, Murena, Servilius.

384 Appraisals of Pompey's campaign are to be found in the following writers: Cic. Imp. Pomp. 31-6; Livy Per. 99; Str. 14.3.3; Vell. 2.32.4; Plut. Pomp. 26-8; App. Mith. 95-6; Flor. 3.6.15; Dio 36.37; Eutr. 6.12; Oros. 6.4.1. There are others, but they are much shorter and not worth considering here.
After the 40 days Pompey went directly to Cilicia, pausing only to stop off at Athens and tell its population how wonderful he was (Plut. Pomp. 27.3). It would seem logical that the most difficult and demanding part of his job should now have been about to begin. All the remaining pirates were gathered in their "lairs" waiting for him to arrive. Having "ruled the seas" and successfully resisted the Romans for 35 years, since the brief campaign of M. Antonius the Orator, they could hardly be expected to give up without a fight.

Astonishingly, according to some sources this is exactly what they did. Florus and Appian claim that there was no need even to spill blood! Pompey's reputation, and his earlier successes were enough to make the Cilician pirates surrender to his army and fleet on sight.

His reputation and his preparedness reduced the pirates to panic, and in the hope that, through not fighting, they would make him benevolent towards them, first those who held Kragos and Antikragos, the largest strongholds, surrendered, and after them those who lived in the Cilician mountains, and, eventually, all the rest followed suit. (App. Mith. 96).385

Even those who admit there was some fighting can find very little of it. There was a naval battle off Korakesion, followed by a siege of the city (Plut. Pomp. 28.1; Vell. 2.32.4).386 How many troops and ships Pompey had it is impossible to tell. He may have been entitled to recruit as many as 120,000 men and around 200 ships (App. Mith. 95 Plut. Pomp. 25.3), but the best modern estimate of his actual army strength in 66 B.C., just before the passing of the lex Manilia transferring the Mithridatic war to him, is 30,000,

385 Appian then proceeds to contradict himself (or, perhaps, to correct himself) by saying that 10,000 pirates were killed in fighting. See also Florus 3.6.13-14.

386 Other sources (Dio, Livy, Eutropius, Orosius) clearly assume some fighting took place, but give no details. Appian appears to have confused places in Western Lycia (Kragos and Antikragos) with pirate strongholds in Cilicia (App. Mith. 96). See Ormerod (1924) p. 240 n. 1. Karakesion is no. 26 on the map of "Cilicia".

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including the army of Q. Marcius Rex, whom he had superseded in Cilicia. I would estimate Pompey's fleet in Cilicia to have been about 100 strong, with 60 good-sized warships. Part of his forces had been posted to guard various points on the grain supply route. While this force is not insignificant, it hardly seems enough to inspire terror. How did Pompey "conquer" Cilicia so quickly?

The answer is that famous Roman virtue clementia, something more often associated with Pompey's political rival C. Julius Caesar. For he had at his disposal great forces, both in his fleet and his army, so that at sea and on land he was irresistible. Just as great was his clemency towards those who made terms with him, so that he won over many of them by this policy. For those men who were beaten by his forces and experienced his great benevolence, put themselves at his disposal most readily. (Dio 36.37.4)

According to Plutarch, Pompey never thought of putting any of his prisoners to death, the punishment which others regularly meted out to pirates (Plut. Pomp. 28.2). Appian claims that he was able to distinguish between pirates who were "wicked" and others who had been driven to piracy by poverty (App. Mith. 96). In effect, Pompey offered the Cilicians another chance, giving them land in exchange for their ships. He settled them in various cities of Cilicia and also in Dyme, a city of Achaia.

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388 See Caesar, The Civil Wars passim.

389 Dio uses the Greek word philanthropia.

390 See above on Verres, Servilius, Caesar and the Astypalaians.

391 Plut. Pomp. 28.4; App. Mith. 96 & 115; Dio 36.37.6; Str. 8.7.5 & 14.3.3; Livy Per. 99; Vell. 2.32.5-6. Velleius is the only ancient source to mention any criticism of this policy, which he dismisses by saying that it was so good it would have made the reputation of anyone!
This philanthropic attitude contrasts strongly with that of Q. Metellus Creticus. Indeed, it was the cause of a violent disagreement between the two. Some of the Cretans, fearing the approaching army of Metellus, offered to surrender to Pompey, on the basis that his imperium could override Metellus'. There had already been problems over jurisdiction in the early stages of the campaign, when the governor of Gallia Narbonensis refused to allow Pompey's legates to recruit in his province (Dio 36.37.2). In Metellus' case it came to blows.

The legate Pompey sent to Crete to accept the surrenders, Octavius, went so far as to use his troops, and those of the governor of Achaia, to fight for the Cretans at Lappa and Hierapytna against Metellus (Dio 36.19; App. Sic. 6.2). The capture of Lappa neatly demonstrates the opposing sides' attitudes to prisoners. Metellus, finding some Cilicians among Octavius' men, had them executed. Livy recorded an exchange of letters between Metellus and Pompeius (Livy Per. 99) and Dio even suggests that Pompey was on the point of going to war with Metellus, when news of the Manilian law made him change his plans (Dio 36.45.1; cf. App. Sic. 6.2). It appears that the two Cretan leaders, Lasthenes and Panares, both offered themselves to Pompey, but were captured by Metellus. Pompey later insisted that they be withdrawn from Metellus' triumphal procession, as they were not his prisoners (Vell. 2.40.5; Dio 3.19.3).

In his speech on the Manilian law Cicero mentions the Cretans' offer to surrender to Pompey, using it to emphasise his reputation among Rome's enemies.

All pirates, wherever they were, suffered capture and death, or handed themselves over to this singularly powerful commander. Even the Cretans, when they sent emissaries to him in Pamphylia to plead their case, learned that there was hope for their surrender, and were ordered to give hostages. (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 35)
Although Cicero is careful to say that Pompey did not spare all his prisoners, it is, nevertheless, clear that the only reason the Cretans had for turning to him was the chance of a better deal. They obviously thought that surrender to Pompey would be easier for them than giving in to Metellus. They must have reached this conclusion fairly soon after Pompey arrived in Cilicia, if not before, otherwise there would have been no time for negotiations before he turned to the matter of Mithridates. Pompey’s policy of clemency must, therefore, have been advertised from the beginning of his campaign. In other words, the secret of his remarkable success lay in his declared willingness to come to terms without a fight. He was able to "conquer" so quickly because he did not act in the same fashion as previous Roman commanders, who behaved as Florus depicts Metellus in Crete: "he exercised the rights of the victor over the vanquished." Pompey, to put it simply, was "soft" on his opponents. Thus he was able to complete a three year mission in less than three months.

What shall we do with a former pirate?  

Pompey’s resettlement policy is explained by the sources as an attempt to convert pirates into farmers, by removing them from the sea and giving them land to farm.

Therefore wisely weighing with himself that man by nature is not a wild or unsocial creature, neither was he born so, but makes himself what he naturally is not by vicious habit; and that again, on the other side, he is civilised and grows gentle by a change of place, occupation, and manner of life, as beasts themselves that are wild by nature become tame and tractable by housing and gentler usage,

392 Flor. 3.6.6 in hostes ius victoris exercuit.

393 A further indication that the pirate war was not properly finished comes from the comment Dio makes about Pompey, after he heard about the Manilian law, "Crete, and the other maritime places where something still remained to be done, he considered as nothing," (Dio 36.45.2).
upon this consideration he determined to translate these pirates from sea to land,
and give them a taste of an honest and innocent course of life by living in towns
and tilling the ground. (Plut. Pomp. 28.3)394

Florus also praises Pompey for the remarkable intelligence which he showed in adopting
this policy of removing the pirates far from sight of the sea (Flor. 3.6.14).395 The places
he chose for settlements were thinly populated or deserted places, some as a result of the
Mithridatic wars (App. Mith. 96; Dio 36.37.6). On the face of it this seems be a brilliant
way of solving the problem of piracy, worthy indeed of a statesman like Pompey. Even
sober modern scholars have been generous in their praise.

Yet more striking than Pompey’s military success was his treatment of his
prisoners. His wisdom and humanity are thrown into relief by certain remarks
made a few years earlier by Cicero in the Verrines. By common consent a more
humane man than most Romans of his age, Cicero nevertheless makes it clear that
captured pirates could expect the harshest treatment and that he himself entirely
approved.396 Pompeius did not share the prevailing attitude. The captured
pirates were settled at various points in Asia Minor; Pompeius removed
temptation from their path by shifting them away from the sea to inland sites
more suited for agriculture.397

Where were the places which Pompey gave to the pirates- turned farmers? Most
were in the region of Cilicia itself. All those ancient writers who mention particular sites

394 I have quoted this passage in the elegant translation of Dryden, revised by Clough

395 a conspectu longe removit maris.

396 See above Part 2/on Cicero and Piracy.

include Soli, which was renamed Pompeiopolis, as one of the two main locations. The only others specifically referred to are Adana, Mallos and Epiphaneia. In addition, a large number were transferred to Dyme, in Achaia. Even the most cursory glance at an atlas reveals, however, that the idea of taming the pirates by moving them away from the sea is nonsense. Dyme is on the northern coast of the Peloponnese, close to the mouth of the gulf of Corinth. Soli is on the coast of Cilicia, North-East of Seleukia. Adana and Mallos are not coastal, but both lie close to the sea on navigable rivers, and Epiphaneia, the most distant of these places from the sea, is less than 15 km inland. It is abundantly clear that Soli and Dyme, the main cities turned over to the pirates, are ideally situated not for farming, but for piracy. No wonder the Cretans were so anxious to surrender to Pompey!

Pompey and Metellus compared

The campaign of Cn. Pompeius Magnus against the pirates in 67 B.C. was intended to reach a conclusion as swiftly as possible. It was vital for his prestige at Rome for him to secure the corn supply, and this he did by committing substantial forces to the Western Mediterranean to guard the approaches to Rome. With regard to the notorious pirate stronghold of Cilicia he was trying, to a certain extent, to "follow up" the successes of Murena, Dolabella and, especially P. Servilius. It was only necessary for him to subdue the pirates of Rough Cilicia, but he had to be swift in order to obtain his coveted posting

398 Plut. Pomp. 28.4; App. Mith. 115; Dio 36.37.6; Str. 8.7.5, 14.3.1,3 & 5.8. See map of "Cilicia" no. 20.

399 App. Mith. 96. See map of "Cilicia" nos. 23, 24 & 25.

400 Plut. Pomp. 28.4; App. Mith. 96; Str. 8.7.5, 14.3.3.
to the war with Mithridates. To this end Pompey avoided long, hard sieges in Cilicia and instead agreed generous terms with the pirates.

Metellus, embarking upon a campaign in the wake of an humiliating defeat inflicted on the Romans by the Cretans, and operating with limited resources, did not have such short-term political objectives in mind. As a result he scorned the idea of negotiated settlements, in favour of beating his opponents into submission. His Cretan war was a thorough, hard-fought affair, which followed in the tradition of previous campaigns, in being an attempt to suppress piracy and achieve political and economic gains for the general, his army and the people of Rome. The contrast between the two in style and approach is remarkable.

The politics of suppression

For the sake of convenience the effectiveness of Pompey’s and Metellus’ campaigns will be assessed in the next section, which examines the suppression of piracy during the Imperial period. Before proceeding to do this, however, it is appropriate to draw some conclusions about the nature of attempts to suppress piracy during the Late Roman Republic. Firstly, although there were some attempts by local communities, particularly Rome’s allies in the Greek East, to deal with piracy, the initiative rested with the Romans. They made extensive use of their allies in all operations connected with the suppression of piracy, but the leadership and organisation was their responsibility. Rome inherited the position of the Classical Athenians, the Ptolemies and the Rhodians in this respect. Whether or not they were capable of being effective, they were regarded as being

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401 Although some may have thought in 67 B.C. that the war was nearly over, Cicero, in the speech on the Manilian law, and Dio (36.45.1-2), describing Pompey’s joy at the passing of the law, suggest otherwise. See also Sherwin-White (1984), p. 188.

responsible for the suppression of piracy. This was a responsibility that the Roman people took seriously only when their own interest (or honour) seemed to be directly threatened.

It is surely no coincidence that the political circumstances of Pompey's appointment bear some resemblance to those of Metellus Creticus' three years earlier. "Popular pressure" led by a tribune, overcomes senatorial opposition and results in action against pirates, in the interests of the Roman people. While it is possible to explain away the two cases to a certain extent by pleading the special circumstances, there remains the persistent impression that, in spite of the good intentions voiced in the lex de provinciis praetoris and echoed eagerly by Cicero, the senate was reluctant to suppress piracy in this period. Why was this so? It seems to me that the explanation must be connected with the method of suppression. It was abundantly clear in the first century B.C. that only through controlling the regions where the pirates had their bases could piracy itself be controlled. The suppression of piracy required the conquest of territory. Indeed, it required more than that, because the territory had to be firmly controlled in order to prevent a recrudescence of piracy.

The senate's reluctance to "annex" territory in this period has been the subject of much debate in recent years, and there is no need to rehearse all the arguments here. The Roman aristocracy of the Late Republic were constantly competing among themselves for military glory, and the economic and political rewards which accompanied it. As the

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403 I find the theory of a "common war" against piracy in this period, advocated by Maróti (1962b), unconvincing. He makes too much of a dubious connection between the language of one inscription and Cicero's rhetorical and philosophical pronouncements.

404 See above, pp. 317-18.

405 Itself a piece of tribuniciam legislation.

406 See Harris (1979); North (1981).
stakes got higher, so the competition became more intense and more destructive to the political order. Pompey's career was extraordinary only in the sense that it represented, in an exaggerated form, the inherent contradictions of city-state politics played out on a Mediterranean-wide stage. There was a great fear among Roman senators, vindicated by the likes of Marius and Sulla, that individuals might become too powerful to be controlled by their peers, if they were given excessive authority and large armies for long periods. Yet this was precisely what was needed in order to campaign effectively against piracy. All that the authorities at Rome were prepared to permit, however, was the occasional, brief operation in a specific area, with definite strategic objectives and limited "annexation" of territory. While an operation like that of Metellus Balearicus could be effective on a small scale, the campaigns of M. Antonius the Orator and P. Servilius Isauricus serve to indicate how ineffective localised actions were against piracy on a large scale. At the same time, it was the turbulent political atmosphere of the period which was partly to blame for the prevalence of piracy. The ultimate solution, both to the problem of piracy and the political troubles of the Late Republic, had to be Empire-wide.
After Pompey - Flaccus and the Asian fleet

According to Cicero the effect of Pompey's campaign was dramatic. The pirates were completely removed from the seas and Rome's food supply was restored. He was, of course, exaggerating when he claimed this. His portrayal of Pompey the "pirate slayer" in the speech on the Manilian law was intended to convince people that Pompey was the right man to finish off Mithridates.\(^{407}\) A few years later, however, when he was defending C. Valerius Flaccus on a repetundae charge, although he was forced to admit that Pompey's success had not meant an absolute end to piracy, the political situation still did not permit him to be entirely candid in admitting the inadequacy of Pompey's campaign of 67 B.C. The great man (and his supporters) had to be mollified with due praise for his success against the pirates.\(^{408}\)

Flaccus had been urban praetor in 63 B.C. and aided Cicero in suppressing the "conspiracy" of L. Sergius Catilina.\(^{409}\) In 62 B.C. he went out as governor to Asia. His period as proconsul lasted only one year, after which he was succeeded by Cicero's brother Quintus.\(^{410}\) Flaccus' association with Cicero made him a suitable target for a politically motivated prosecution, though this did not actually take place until 59 B.C. Among the accusations made by the prosecutor, Decimus Laelius, was the suggestion that Flaccus had extorted money from the cities of his province for a fleet, a measure which

\(^{407}\) See above, pp. 322-43.

\(^{408}\) See above Part 2 on Cicero and Piracy, pp. 87-8.

\(^{409}\) M.R.R. II p. 167. See also vol. III.

\(^{410}\) M.R.R. II pp. 177, 178 (Flaccus), 181, 185 & 191 (Q. Cicero).
was either unnecessary, or else it was merely an excuse for obtaining money, because the sum raised was not used for this purpose.\textsuperscript{411}

Cicero makes the most of Pompey's prestige to support Flaccus in this speech. Having reminded the jury that Pompey's \textit{auctoritas} was particularly strong in Asia at this time, as a result of his liberating the province from the menace of pirates and kings (i.e. Mithridates and Tigranes), Cicero explains that a fleet is needed in Asia both to maintain Roman prestige, and to protect the province against pirates. He rebuts objections to the latter idea as follows:

"There were no pirates." Indeed? Who could be sure that there might not be some in the future? "You are diminishing Pompey's glory," he says. On the contrary, you are adding to his troubles. For he destroyed the pirates' fleets, their cities, their harbours and refuges. He bestowed peace upon the maritime world through his great courage and incredible speed. But he never undertook, nor should he have undertaken, to be held responsible if a single pirate ship should happen to appear somewhere. Therefore he himself, when he had already brought an end to all the wars on land and sea, nevertheless ordered those same cities to provide a fleet. (Cic. Flacc. 29)\textsuperscript{412}

Cicero goes on to explain that Pompey also proposed a fleet for the protection of Italy in 62 B.C., and that the following year 4,300,000 sesterces were spent on protecting the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian seas, presumably with a fleet stationed on each.\textsuperscript{413}

\textsuperscript{411} See Cic. Flacc. 27-33. The precise nature of the accusations is hard to discover. Cicero seems to be deliberately avoiding or skipping over potentially embarrassing details.

\textsuperscript{412} The implication is that Flaccus was simply following Pompey's wishes. See above on Sulla and the Asian fleet raised after the first Mithridatic war.

\textsuperscript{413} Flacc. 30. Cicero also mentions cavalry stationed on the coasts. This arrangement seems to correspond to Cicero's description of the forces protecting Italy during the campaign of 67 B.C. against the pirates (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 35).
According to Cicero, Pompey's undiminished "glory" comprises the prestige gained from two things. Firstly the fact that the pirates are no longer free to wander at will over the seas, and secondly, that Syria, Cilicia, Cyprus and Crete are controlled by Rome.\footnote{The last two, of course, are controlled by Rome thanks to Ptolemy Alexander and Q. Metellus Creticus.}

There is no place whence the pirates may set out, nowhere for them to return to; every gulf, promontory, shoreline, island and coastal city is securely enclosed within our empire. (Cic. Flacc. 30).

Cicero argues that even if there were no pirates at all, a cautious approach on Flaccus' part would not merit criticism. In fact, as several witnesses of impeccable equestrian rank would testify, piracy was rife around Asia in 62 B.C.

...should Flaccus still be censured for his conscription of rowers? Even if a member of the aristocracy of Adramyttium was killed by pirates, someone whose name is familiar to almost all of us, Atyanas the Olympic boxing champion? (Cic. Flacc. 31)

In reply to the point that no prisoners were taken by Flaccus' fleet, Cicero reminds the judges that such things are a matter of luck, for it is a difficult job to find and pursue pirates across the sea. In this way he neatly restores the "glory" of Pompey, whose luck in 67 B.C. must have been outstandingly good.

It remains for Cicero to counter three further points made against his client. Firstly, that the fleet never actually put to sea, which he flatly denies, claiming that all of Asia knew there was one flotilla operating above Ephesos and one below, following the pattern established by Sulla and continued by Pompey. He also claims that Flaccus spent far less money on a fleet than either of these two (Cic. Flacc. 32). Secondly, that there was no entry in the governor's accounts, a point which Cicero brushes aside as a mere technicality. Finally, he has to face the fact that his own brother, Quintus Cicero,
who succeeded Flaccus as governor of Asia, did not find it necessary to obtain any contributions at all from the cities of Asia. This Cicero explains as a difference of approach. His brother preferred to wait until the pirates made their presence known before he raised a fleet (Cic. Flacc. 33).415

Several important points emerge from this section of the speech On behalf of Flaccus. Even in 59 B.C. Cicero is still very careful to maintain the impression that Pompey completely defeated the pirates in 67 B.C. and that his mission was a great triumph. He also provides a few scraps of information about further measures to protect the coasts of Italy and other important areas.416 He is unable to deny that piracy has continued to be a serious problem in recent years, in spite of Pompey’s efforts. The measures employed to suppress it are similar to those adopted before and during 67 B.C. We can be fairly sure that Cicero is not exaggerating the continued extent of piracy in this speech, as it would not help his case to do so.

There is also no reason to doubt what Cicero says about Pompey’s arrangements for fleets in Asia and Italy. Rome had no obvious maritime enemies other than pirates in the 60s B.C., so it is reasonable to conclude that these fleets were intended for use against them. The Adriatic fleet may have been on guard against pirates operating from Illyria and Dalmatia, areas which Rome did not properly control until the first century A.D.417 The Asian fleet might have been needed to respond to pirates operating out of Cyprus, Anatolia or the Aegean islands, wherever local authorities were not strong enough to prevent them.

415 See above Part II for a quotation from this section.

416 For the importance attached to the security of Asia at this time see Cic. Imp. Pomp. 14-16.

417 See below, p. 354.
The expenditure of 4,300,000 sesterces on a fleet in one year indicates a considerable naval commitment by the Romans, perhaps enough to equip and maintain more than 100 ships. Do these commitments amount to the establishment of a "standing fleet" in Italian waters? Starr points to the gradual increase in the amount of ships available since 88 B.C. and suggests that, by confiscating ships and constructing some new vessels, the Romans had amassed a considerable reserve in Italian docks by 67 B.C. Ships are much less costly in dry docks than when they are in the water, especially if they are manned and operational, and what Cicero says only accounts for two years of expenditure. It may be that their period of active service was brief, although there seems to be no particular reason why the years 62-1 B.C. should require such activity. The problem for any modern historian is that the kind of details which Cicero provides in his speech for Flaccus only cover a small period. Thus it is impossible to reconstruct Roman naval policy in the last few decades of the Republic with any degree of certainty. I think it is unlikely that there was any time in the Late Republic when the Romans did not have some warships operating in Italian waters, based at Ostia.

418 There are no figures which can be used to estimate the cost of building, equipping and crewing ships during this period, and I have simply taken a guess at the size of fleet which could be maintained from the money mentioned by Cicero. Neither Starr (1941) nor Reddé (1986) makes any attempt to discuss the financial arrangements of the Roman navy.

419 Starr (1941) pp. 1-4, following Kromayer (1897) and citing Cic. Imp. Pomp. 33 & 67 and Dio 36.23.2 on new constructions; the latter is irrelevant since it refers in only the most general terms to "fleets being sent out from time to time".

420 Caesar describes how some ships which had been used during Pompey's campaign of 67 B.C. and beached at Utica were recommissioned by P. Attius, after they had been repaired (Caes. B.C. 2.23.2). This was probably common practice at the time.

421 Starr (1941) p. 4. Compare the naval "reserves" of Athens in the 4th century B.C. and the difficulties of commissioning an operational fleet. The years after 61 B.C. are not directly relevant to Cicero's point here, which may explain his "silence". Reddé (1986) pp. 463-70 is of the opinion that Roman naval efforts at this time were sporadic and concentrated on the Eastern Mediterranean.
and other commercial ports. I do not, however, think that it is appropriate to see these
as representing a standing fleet.422

Piracy before the Principate - how big a problem?

Unfortunately, there are only a few references to piracy in the sources for the rest
of the first century B.C., so it is very difficult to estimate its relative significance after 67
B.C. I think that it would be wrong to ascribe the lack of information to a lack of pirates.
The literary sources are much less concerned with piracy after Pompey's campaign, and
they therefore devote little space to it. That is not to say that it has ceased to be an issue
in Roman politics, but the Civil Wars and the build-up to them overshadow everything
else. Nevertheless, from the occasional references which can be discovered, it seems clear
that piracy was a major concern during the last few decades of the Republic and at the
beginning of the Principate.

Gabinius and the pirates

A. Gabinius was governor of Syria from 58 to 55 B.C. He carried out a
reorganization of Judaea, but his proconsulship is chiefly remembered for checking the
activities of the publicani and for the restoration of King Ptolemy XVII Auletes to the throne
of Egypt, apparently in return for an enormous bribe. The account of his actions in Dio
contains repeated accusations that he left his province at the mercy of pirates while he
was away in Egypt (Dio 39.56.1,6; 59.2).423 If there is any truth in this claim, then it is
likely that the pirates were operating out of Cilicia or, possibly, Cyprus. The latter had
been added to the province of Cilicia by the Romans in 58 B.C. (Dio 38.30.5; 39.22-3),

423 See above Part Two (on Language) for the identification of the leistaī in this
chapter of Dio as pirates.
supposedly because the king, Ptolemy, had been aiding pirates, but it seems that financial reasons were uppermost in the mind of Clodius when he proposed the "annexation". Piracy seems more like a convenient excuse than a serious reason for Roman intervention, but that does not mean that pirates were not operating from bases in Cyprus. The Syrians may have been exaggerating the seriousness of the piracy, but Dio also says that they were unable to pay the publicani what they owed as a result (Dio 39.59.2). If this were so, then the pirates' raids must have been on a considerable scale.

A further indication that piracy was still a serious problem in the 50s B.C. comes from the other side in the Gabinius story. In his speech in defence of Gaius Rabirius Postumus Cicero deals briefly with the legitimacy of Gabinius' actions in Egypt.

Gabinius said that he had done it for the sake of the Republic, since he was worried about the fleet of Archelaus, because he thought that he would fill the seas with pirates. In addition, he said that it was permissible for him under the law. (Cic. Rab. Post. 20)

Archelaus was a son of Mithridates' general of the same name. He had been made High Priest of Comana. In 56 B.C. he married Aulettes' daughter Berenike and ruled as her consort. It was on Pompey's instruction that Gabinius drove him out of Egypt and restored the king. That Gabinius should accuse him of piracy, or, at least, the threat of piracy, and that Gabinius himself should be accused of abandoning his province to pirates, are indications that piracy was still a great menace in this region, in spite of Pompey's campaign ten years before. If it were not, then none of the accusations made

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424 See Oost (1955) and Badian (1965). Garnsey (1988) pp. 215-6 stresses the connection between grain supply costs and the revenues raised from Cyprus. Note that Cicero may be referring to pirates in Cyprus in the speech On behalf of Flaccus quoted above.

425 See Sherwin-White (1984) pp. 271-5. The law referred to by Cicero is presumably the Lex Clodia which gave Gabinius Syria as his province, instead of Cilicia which was originally assigned to him.
would have had any force. It is also worth noting that the historical literature of this period also appears to reflect a greater concern with the suppression of piracy. Two writers of the last decades of the Roman Republic who present the ideal of the great leader supressing piracy are Nepos, who (implausibly) credits Themistokles with the suppression of piracy (Nep. Them. 2.3) and Diodorus, also a product of the political and moral values of the Late Republic, who praises Dinysios II, Timoleon, Eumelos and the Rhodians for supressing piracy at various times (Diod. 16.4.3; 16.82.3; 20.25.2; 20.81.3).

Civil War and piracy

Such accusations continued to have force, and to be used, in the 40s and 30s B.C. On several occasions in his Civil Wars Caesar accuses his opponents of acting like pirates or of having pirates, bandits and slaves in their armies. Sextus Pompeius was accused of employing pirates by Augustus in the 30s B.C. (App. B.C. 5.77). Little credence should be given to such accusations; they are, as has been shown above, commonplace in the political invective of the period. This does not mean, however, that these

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426 Cicero defended Gabinius in 54 B.C., but in 56 B.C. he was arguing that he needed to be replaced (Cic. Prov. Con. 1-17). It is likely that a lot of false accusations were being flung around at this time. What is significant is the extent to which the problem of piracy is still a useful weapon in political invective.


428 For the ideology of supression in the early Principate see above Part Two on Strabo, pp. 92-7.

429 E.g. Caes. B.C. 3.110 (quoted in Part Three above); 1.24 & 34 (slaves and shepherds). He also accuses the inhabitants of the island of Pharos of behaving like pirates B.C. 3.112. See also B.H. 40.2.

430 See above Part Three on Sextus Pompeius.

431 Compare Cicero calling Mark Anthony a "bandit" and saying that he is hated by everyone except bandits in his correspondence of 44 B.C. (Cic. ad fam. 10.5; 10.6; 12.12 = S-B. nos. 359, 370, 387). Strabo preserves another example of "bandit" (tön
references are worthless as evidence. What they do indicate is that piracy can still be assumed to be prominent in the Eastern Mediterranean at this time, especially as some, more reliable, evidence is available to substantiate this point.

Cicero mentions one group who appear to be practising piracy in a letter of 44 B.C. to his friend Atticus.

It is not surprising that the Dymaeans, having been driven out of their land, are making the sea unsafe. There should be some protection in a joint voyage with Brutus, but I imagine it will only be a matter of very small craft. Cicero is referring here to the inhabitants of Dyme, which is one of the places settled by Cilician "ex-pirates" after Pompey's campaign of 67 B.C. Their expulsion from the land seems to have resulted from the establishment of a Caesarian colony there, as at Buthrotum. The Cilicians appear to have reverted to their old practices, if, indeed, they had ever abandoned them. It is tempting to believe that the numerous "pirates" who were resettled by Pompey in cities in Cilicia itself also resumed their former practices. As I pointed out above, the claim that they were prevented from practising piracy by their removal from the coasts is patently absurd. They might account for some of the pirates who are referred to in the sources for the 60s and 50s B.C., especially by Cicero, who would be at pains to conceal or ignore their origins, if they were known.

Another case of piracy in the period of the Late Republic may be recorded in an inscription from Syros in the Cyclades. It is an honorific decree for a Siphnian called

leisterion hegémon (a term of abuse in his account of the Lycian petty dynast Kleon, who served both Anthony and Octavian (Str. 12.8.9).

*Cic. ad Att. 16.1 = S-B. no. 409. I quote from Shackleton-Bailey's translation. The Latin reads: "Dymaeos agro pulsos mare infestum habere nil mirum."


See above, pp. 344-9.
Onesandros. He had assisted a slave from Syros who was the victim of a pirate raid.\textsuperscript{435} Scholars who have edited and commented on this text have been inclined to assign it to the period before 67 B.C., in spite of the indications of a later date which the letter forms provide.\textsuperscript{436} They presumably did this on the assumption that pirates could not have been active in the Aegean after 67 B.C. because Pompey had eradicated piracy. Since this was not the case, as has been shown above, there is no reason to date the inscription earlier than the second half of the first century B.C., in which case it may well be from the 40s or 30s B.C.\textsuperscript{437}

### Suppression of Piracy during the Principate

Pompey's campaign of 67 B.C. did not rid the Mediterranean of piracy, even for a short while. Nor, in my view, did any subsequent activities of Roman generals or magistrates. The period commonly referred to by modern historians as the Principate does, however, seem to be one during which piracy was kept at much lower levels in this region than at any time previously. It is, however, impossible to quantify this statement, but the sources for the Principate make fewer references to piracy, especially in the Mediterranean itself, than those for the preceding periods. Claims are made that piracy has disappeared, in both literary and epigraphic sources, but they are not a new development.\textsuperscript{438} Why then, should piracy have been a less serious problem during the Principate?

\textsuperscript{435} I.G. XII.5.653.

\textsuperscript{436} E.g. Ziebarth (1929) Appendix I no. 111 and p. 40. Ormerod (1924) p. 206 n. 5. See the comments in I.G. ad loc. where it is included among inscriptions of imperial date.

\textsuperscript{437} Compare I.G. IX.1.873, an epitaph from Corcyra which appears to mention pirates. It is dated to before 227 B.C. by the editor because the Romans had suppressed Illyrian piracy by this date!

\textsuperscript{438} See above.
In the first place there is what has been called the "Pax Romana". For over two centuries the Mediterranean region was part of a single political unit, with a reasonably stable government. The ultimate providers of this stability were the armed forces. The territory of the Roman Empire was conquered and pacified by the armies of the Republican generals and later by those of the Emperors. Peace was maintained by the use or potential use of force. By the end of the reign of Augustus virtually the whole of the Mediterranean coastline was under direct Roman control. Those areas which were not directly ruled by Rome were "satellites" of the Empire, the so-called "client kingdoms", whose rulers were politically subordinated to the Emperors. I have stressed at several points in this thesis the importance of attacking the pirates' bases in order to suppress piracy. The Emperors could call on huge forces for the suppression of piracy in almost any part of the Roman World. There is evidence that they did, on several occasions, to good effect. I suggest, though I realise this cannot be proven, that there were many more occasions when they did so, for which no evidence has survived, probably because such activities were not particularly remarkable or significant, in the eyes of contemporaries.

Secondly, and this point is closely linked to the first, the inhabitants of the region were less likely to choose piracy as a means of obtaining what they wanted. There were, it can be argued, greater opportunities for prosperity through peaceful activities, as well as less incentive to attempt violent seizure of people and property, as a result of the establishment of Roman rule. The impulse to turn pirate was less likely to be found among the relatively prosperous inhabitants of the Roman provinces, and the armed might of Rome was a powerful deterrent.

Who did practice piracy during the Principate, and why? Some must have found piracy attractive because of the excitement and risk. This is a phenomenon which can be

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439 See above Part Four on Trade and Piracy during the Principate.
seen in many periods of history.\textsuperscript{440} Others may have turned to piracy through desperate need, or as a way to supplement meagre resources. Fishermen and merchants, already equipped with boats, would be obvious candidates for "occasional" bouts of piracy.\textsuperscript{441} Finally, it is clear that those who did not have easy access to the "benefits" of Roman rule, either because they were outside the Empire, or because they were "outsiders" within its territory, would have found piracy an attractive option, as a way of plundering the riches of the Empire.\textsuperscript{442}

The suppression of those pirates who were active during the Principate was carried out mainly by the considerable armed forces which the Roman Emperors maintained, for their own security as well as that of their subjects. The standing army was a creation of Augustus, but there had already been many legions in existence at the same time in different parts of the Roman Empire before the Principate, so that the step to a professional, standing army was not so great as might at first be thought.\textsuperscript{443} The Roman imperial navy is, however, a new thing in this period and its role merits some discussion.

The Roman imperial navy

Octavian recovered from the naval disasters of the early 30s B.C. with the able assistance of M. Vipsanius Agrippa. The same naval forces which were used to defeat Sextus Pompeius at Mylasa and Naulokhos were victorious at Actium in 31 B.C., and eventually formed the basis of the Augustan Navy. Its principal units were the praetorian fleets based at Misenum and Ravenna, with further squadrons stationed in other parts

\textsuperscript{440} See above Part One.

\textsuperscript{441} See above Part Four.

\textsuperscript{442} See below for examples of both of these groups.

\textsuperscript{443} See Keppie (1984).
of the Mediterranean, especially in the Eastern half. Our literary sources pay very little attention to the development of the navy of the Principate, giving the impression that it was not thought to be at all important and that the establishment of standing fleets in numerous bases was not considered a remarkable act.444

By the middle of the second century A.D. the imperial navy was a large, widespread force, extra squadrons having been added under several emperors. There were fleets in Syria, Egypt, the Black Sea, Africa, Britain and on some major rivers, like the Rhine and the Danube.45 The size of the navy is difficult to establish, but the Byzantine scholar John Lydus reckoned that the navy of the reign of Diocletian comprised 45,000 men, compared with 800,000 for the army (Lyd. Mens. 1.27). Such figures are a poor guide for the first and second centuries A.D., but, if they reflect relative sizes at all well, then it is easy to see why ancient writers found little to say about the navy.

The main function of the navy was to carry out maritime tasks in times of war. It is at such times that we most often hear of it in our literary sources. Although direct combat was rare, logistical support and the conveyance of troops and their equipment formed the main part of naval activity. In addition, naval forces might take action to ensure freedom of movement for civilians and military personnel, protect coastal settlements and prevent navigation by hostile forces within the area of Roman influence. Such activity would include the suppression of piracy.46 Roman forces can be observed

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444 Tac. Ann. 5 and Suet. Aug. 49 refer briefly to the fleets at Ravenna and Misenum, but disregard any others. Surprisingly, there is no mention of any fleets in the Res Gestae.

45 See Reddé (1986) for the most comprehensive and up-to-date account, especially parts 2 & 4. This excellent study has replaced Starr (1941) as the main authority on the Roman imperial navy.

46 See Reddé (1986), Part Three, for a thorough survey of the duties of the imperial fleets. He is more positive than Starr (1941), chapter VIII, about the "security" role of the navy, but both seem to be looking for "excuses" to explain the rather uneven distribution of the fleets. It seems to me that a neglected aspect is the extent to which a fleet was deemed to be essential for Roman prestige in certain
responding to disruptions to the maritime security of the Empire on several occasions during the first, second and third centuries A.D.

The Black Sea region

An early example of the suppression of piracy by Roman authorities during the Principate is found in an inscription from the reign of Tiberius, found at Ilion.

The council and the people (of Ilion) honoured Titus Valerius Proclus, the procurator of Drusus Caesar (for) destroying the pirate groups in the Hellespont and guarding the city in all ways without burdening it. This inscription seems to refer to a special operation (or series of operations) undertaken in the reign of Tiberius to root out several groups of pirates operating in the Hellespont. It is unclear whether the procurator himself directed the military action, which would be unusual in this period, or was simply responsible for financial arrangements and organisation. The relatively unprotected and vulnerable site of Ilion is well illustrated in an inscription of 80 B.C., quoted above.

This whole region was a potential "weak link" in the chain of the Roman frontiers. The point at which the Black Sea communicates with the Mediterranean had to be guarded, and some protection afforded to the cities on the long coastline of Northern Anatolia against the marauding tribes from across the Black Sea. In the early part of areas, especially where royal fleets had previously existed, e.g. Pontus.

The word used is leistéria which may refer to bandits, but seems in context to refer to pirates. See also the Aelius Alexander inscription from Rhodes discussed below.


The editor of I.G.S.K. Ilion, P. Frisch, suggests (pp. 208-9) that he put his slaves at the disposal of the cities, but I cannot see why.

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the first century A.D. Strabo described the piratical ways of the people of the Eastern seaboard of the Black Sea, especially the Heniokhoi:

They live by piracy, using small boats which are lightly built, narrow and agile, holding twenty-five men, though occasionally they can manage up to thirty. The Greeks call them *kamarai*. And so by fitting out fleets of these *kamarai* and sailing against merchant ships, coastlines and even cities they dominate the sea.

(Str. 11.2.12)⁴⁵¹

The raids of the Heniokhoi were resisted and even punished by the local dynasts, but, according to Strabo, the Roman governors of his time were ineffective against them (Str. 11.2.12).⁴⁵² The military action undertaken by Antiokhos IV Epiphanes of Commagene, in the reign of Claudius, against a group of Cilician pirates led by Troxoborus is a good example of a local ruler suppressing piracy. In this case the pirates had defeated a Roman force sent from Syria to relieve their siege of the city of Anemurion.⁴⁵³

After the Roman take-over of the Polemonid kingdom of Pontos in A.D. 63, the Royal fleet of the Polemonid rulers was to have been maintained as the basis of the *Classis Pontica*. This fleet, based at Trapezos, seems to have been partly intended for use against such raiders.⁴⁵⁴

The potential vulnerability of the region was illustrated soon after the establishment of Roman rule when the former commander of the Royal fleet, Annicetus, a freedman of king Polemo, raised a force in the name of the emperor Vitellius and

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⁴⁵¹ Compare Arr. Perip. 11.1-2. See also Part Four above on the Heniokhoi and other tribes in this region.

⁴⁵² Arrian seems to be suggesting that he would be more effective than his predecessors (Arr. Perip. 11.2).


attacked the city of Trapezos. He defeated the forces there and captured and burned what remained of the Pontic fleet (Tac. Hist. 3.47). The main fighting ships, the "liburnians", had already been removed to Byzantium under the command of one of Vespasian's supporters Mucianus (Tac. Hist. 2.83).

Having eliminated the immediate naval presence, Annicetus and his men turned to piracy, using kamaral. Vespasian eventually got to hear about them and sent Virdius Geminus to deal with them. Having no ships he was compelled to build a fleet of "liburnians" and use them to hunt down Annicetus. He attacked and defeated some of the opposing forces and tracked Annicetus to the territory of the Sedoehezi, whose king had been bribed by Annicetus to protect him. This worthy monarch was persuaded that peace with Rome was better than pirate gold and so he betrayed his allies (Tac. Hist. 3.48). Tacitus closes his account with the words: "And so an end was brought to this slave war."55

It is significant that Annicetus had military experience, of a naval character. He turned from war to piracy after a change in the political situation which was obviously not to his liking. It was not a difficult step to take, since he was able to recruit a sizeable following and take advantage of the crisis of A.D. 69 and the removal of Roman forces to profit from piracy. Presumably the advent of direct Roman rule had created a certain amount of discontent among the former subjects of Polemo.466 In effect, Annicetus and his comrades had become, or had made themselves "outsiders" by refusing to accept the

455 "belloque servili finis impositus." Although Tacitus never uses the words praedae, or latro, or pirata in recounting this incident, it can, nevertheless, be described as piracy.

466 Tacitus says the soldiers defeated at Trapezus were from the royal army and had recently received Roman citizenship. There seems to be some rivalry between those who benefited from the annexation of Pontos and those who suffered as a result.
terms on which they were being brought "inside" the Roman Empire. The use of kamarai for piracy seems to be common in this area, as can be seen from Strabo's comments. Geminus seems to have attacked the pirates on land, driving them away from the vulnerable cities, and then to have constructed ships to pursue them. If ships of the Classis Pontica had been available he would not have needed to do so. In the second and third centuries A.D. the importance of a strong naval and military presence in this area became apparent.

Reddé has described the development of what he calls the Pontic "limes" as follows:

Le système pontique est donc bien une route stratégique fortifiée en même temps qu'un système de points d'appui pour la navigation, comme l'atteste le Périple d'Arrien, une ligne de comptoirs commerciaux, sans profondeur territoriale, et un foyer de romanisation. Certes la défense globale des côtes du Pont Euxin, particulièrement celles du Pont Polémoniaque, s'appuie sur ce «limes» dans la mesure où il contrôle une partie du littoral, offre des relais à la flotte, et interdit le passage à des bandes pirates. Il est clair, toutefois, qu'il s'agit là d'un système bien particulier, unique, apparentemment, dans le monde romain, dans lequel la présence naval joue un rôle considérable...

The Classis Pontica not only provided facilities for transport and communication in this region, it also played an important role in protecting those parts of the provinces which were open to the sea. At the point where the European provinces met the

457 Compare Arrian's threat to "drive out" the piratical barbarians of the Southern coast of the Black Sea if they will not submit to Roman rule and pay tribute (Arr. Perip. 11.2).

458 See above.

459 Reddé (1986) pp. 442-3. A comparison might be made with the "Saxon shore" system in the English channel during the Late Empire; see below.
Anatolian ones, the approach to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea was well guarded, but once it could be breached, or circumvented large areas were exposed for plunder. The raid of the Kostoboki, who came from the North Western shores of the Black Sea, in A.D. 170 was the result of a failure of the landward defences, from the Danube to the Aegean, which allowed them to penetrate as far as Southern Greece, before they were defeated by local forces under the command of the Olympic victor Mnesiboulos.460

Joppa

The brief outbreak of Jewish piracy on the Levantine coast which followed the sack of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 has already been described above.461 The circumstances of this particular episode meant that it was unnecessary to employ any naval units in its suppression. The pirates' base was not difficult to locate and there were plenty of Roman forces in the area which could approach directly by land. Vespasian sent cavalry and infantry to attack the city. The inhabitants put up no resistance, but tried instead to escape in their ships. The weather and the inhospitable coastline were their undoing (Jos. B.J. 3.9.1-4).

The operation was completed by the occupation of the former pirate base by the Roman army.

Starr argues that a naval squadron to watch the Levantine coast would have been essential after Augustus' pacification of Cilicia.462 If this squadron was in existence, then there is no clear record of it. Some ships are to be found operating here in the first century A.D., but the earliest attestation of the Classis Syriaca, based at Seleukeia in Syria

460 Paus. 10.34.2 on Mnesiboulos; see also C.I.L. VIII.14667; C.I.L. VI. 31856 on part of Pontic fleet sent to help deal with them under L. Julius Vehilius Gratus; P.I.R. 4. no. 615.

461 See Part Three, p.171.

462 Starr (1941) pp. 114-5.
comes from the reign of Hadrian. It may be that the fleet which was formed by Augustus out of the remainder of the Ptolemaic navy after Actium, the Classis Alexandrina, was felt sufficient to fulfil any naval duties in the area, with the occasional help of praetorian detachments from Italy. The suppression of piracy might involve some naval operations, but, as several of the examples in this section demonstrate, this was by no means always the case. The one unchangeable facet of anti-piracy operations in this period was the paramount importance of depriving the pirates of a base, which usually involved extensive use of land forces.

The Northern Barbarians - outsiders trying to get in?

Piratical raids on the provinces of Gaul by "barbarians" from outside the empire in our literary sources. In A.D. 41 the Chauci, who lived in the area around the mouth of the River Weser, attacked the coast of Gallia Belgica and were driven off by the governor, Gabinius (Dio 60.8.7). According to Suetonius Gabinius assumed the surname Cauchus as a result of his victory over the Chauci (Suet. Claud. 24.3).

In A.D. 47 the Chauci were on the rampage again, this time attacking Lower Germany:

At the same time the Chauci, free from internal quarrels, and taking swift advantage of the death of Sanquinius, attacked Lower Germany while Corbulo was still on his way. Their leader, Gannascus of the Canninefates tribe, an auxiliary of long service, had now deserted and was using light ships to plunder and lay waste to the coasts, especially of Gaul, which he knew to be wealthy and pacified. (Tac. Ann. 11.18).

Gannascus was defeated by a detachment of the *Classis Germanica* which came down the Rhine from its base at Köln. He escaped and fled back to the territory of the Chauci, but Corbulo persuaded the Chauci to betray him into a trap, which Tacitus remarks was not a dishonourable thing as he was a deserter. He was killed by the Chauci (Tac. Ann. 11.19).

It is probable that such raids continued to be a problem in this area, although there is very little evidence and nothing to suggest that the Roman provinces were being constantly attacked in the first century A.D. The main attraction for the barbarians would have been the prosperity of the Gallic and later the British provinces. A group of auxiliaries from the Usipi, who came from the East bank of the Rhein, deserted in A.D. 83 while on service with Agricola in Scotland. They captured three "liburnians" and used them to sail round the Northern Coast of Britain and across the North Sea to the German coast, plundering for supplies as they went South. They were eventually shipwrecked on the Frisian coast and captured by the local people, who assumed they were pirates. Some of those who survived were sold as slaves to Romans and so their story became known (Tac. Agr. 28; Dio 56.20). The attitude of the Frisians to the shipwrecks suggests that they were used to pirates appearing on their shore at this time.\(^{64}\)

It is noteworthy that the Chauci seem to be raiding the empire because of the comparative wealth and vulnerability of the provinces. Their resources were limited, hence the "light ships" mentioned by Tacitus, and they probably found their neighbours the Frisians easier victims than the Romans. Internal quarrels may also have hindered the organisation of attacks. The special knowledge and military skills of barbarians who had served as auxiliaries seems to have encouraged such raids. The function of the Roman

\(^{64}\) Haywood (1991) pp. 5-7 & 25 credits the Usipi with considerable experience of rowed ships and navigation on the high seas, on the strength of this episode. It is not clear, however, whether the auxiliaries had learnt their maritime skills in service with the Romans, or even if they had captured the crews of the "liburnians" as well as the vessels.
army and navy as protectors of the provincials is clear from the way that they are
defeated and driven off by Roman forces. Once outside the empire, however, they are
dealt with by local tribes rather than by punitive expeditions. Claudius is said by Tacitus
to have rebuked Corbulo for provoking an uprising among the Chauci as a result of his
trapping of Gannascus, and ordered him to desist from his operations immediately (Tac.
Ann. 11.19-20).

The Chauci, mentioned in Tacitus' *Germania*, described as a peaceful people,
although this does not necessarily mean that they had by Tacitus' time entirely ceased
to raid the rich provinces of the Roman Empire, or their neighbours. In the reign of
Marcus Aurelius, some time around A.D. 170, the governor of Gallia Belgica, the future
emperor Didius Julianus, had to raise local auxiliary troops in order to defeat a raiding
party of the Chauci, but there is no other record of their activity before or after this
incident.

In a recent work, John Haywood has argued that they continued to attack both
Gaul and Britain from this period until the middle of the third century A.D., until their
position as the main pirate menace in the North Sea was usurped by the Franks and the
Saxons. He bases his conclusions on the evidence of coin hoards in Northern Gaul
and destruction by fire or other means of buildings and settlements here and in Southern
Britain.

Haywood's book is a bold new approach to the maritime history of the Northern
Barbarians and this is not the place for a detailed criticism of it, but it should be pointed
out that the pattern which he claims to have detected in the archaeological evidence has
no basis in the literary sources. He is attempting to write a "comprehensive history of
barbarian Germanic seafaring", laying particular stress on the (previously unnoticed)

465 Tac. Germ. 35.

466 Haywood (1991) chapter 1, especially pp. 11-14.
"continuity of barbarian seafaring activity";⁶⁶⁷ (i.e. piracy) from the end of the first century B.C. to the Carolingian period. Faced with a lacuna in the literary sources he attempts to manipulate the archaeological evidence, in order to continue the historical narrative of Germanic piracy at this crucial point. He also tries to argue that exposed coastal areas of Britain and Gallia Belgica were provided with forts and other defences in order to create a "Chaucian Shore", specifically intended to repel Chaucian pirates, who were raiding the prosperous provinces of Britain and Gaul with increasing intensity.⁶⁶⁸ I cannot agree that the evidence should, or even might fit this hypothesis, especially when it is borne in mind that the raid of c. A.D. 170 is the only indication that the Chauci were active as "pirates" in this period at all.⁶⁶⁹ Haywood has gone far beyond what is reasonable in his interpretation of the archaeological evidence.⁶⁷⁰ The raid defeated by Didius Julianus is best treated as an isolated incident, included in the Historia Augusta not for its intrinsic importance, but because of the identity of the Roman governor. There may have been others, but the evidence for them is lacking, and cannot be compensated for by a false interpretation of archaeological data. There is clearly a similarity between Haywood's argument and that which I have advanced above with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean after Pompey's campaign of 67 B.C. The crucial difference, however, is the almost total absence of literary evidence for Germanic piracy in the period which


⁶⁶⁸ "While the first-century raids of the Chauci were apparently limited in range, the second-century raids seem to have been more serious affairs, foreshadowing in their tactics the later raids of Saxons, Franks and Vikings." Haywood (1991) pp. 21-2. But the only evidence for their tactics is the raid defeated by Didius Julianus!

⁶⁶⁹ It is conceivable that the raid was not even carried out in ships, although this is not the most obvious interpretation of the notice in the Historia Augusta.

Haywood is dealing with, whereas there is evidence for piracy in the Mediterranean during the (shorter) period after 67 B.C.

Mauri

Other "barbarians" who appear in the literary sources as pirates in the reign of Marcus Aurelius are the Mauri from North Africa. Two mentions are made in the Historia Augusta of their attack on the province of Baetica, probably both referring to the same incident, which may have taken place about A.D. 171:

When the Mauri were laying waste to most of Spain, good deeds were done by the legates. (S.H.A. v. Marci 21)

After his quaestorship he was allotted to the province of Baetica, and he went next to Africa in order to settle things after his father's death. But while he was in Africa he was reassigned to Sardinia because the Mauri were devastating Baetica. (S.H.A. v. Severi 2)471

It has been suggested that piracy was a common problem in this area, but there is little evidence to back this up beyond the references quoted above. Starr says that there was a permanent fleet stationed at Caesarea in Mauretania to cope with the local tribes, whom he describes as "addicted to piracy".472 This fleet is assumed by Starr to have been established in the reign of Claudius, after the annexation of Mauretania in A.D. 40. Reddé argues, more persuasively, that there was only an occasional naval presence, with detachments of the Classis Augusta Alexandrina stationed there from time to time. In about A.D. 170 a vexillation from the Classis Syriaca seems to have reinforced them.


472 Starr (1941) p. 119, citing also Calp. Sic. Ecl. 4.40, "trucibus Mauris".
perhaps to assist in the suppression of the piratical Mauri.\footnote{Reddé (1986) pp. 224-8 & 561-7 with full references. There is no clear evidence that Caesarea was a naval port.} If so, this would suggest that the attack on Baetica was a unique, or very rare occurrence. A \textit{Classis nova Libyca}, apparently founded in the reign of Commodus, might be interpreted as a response to the recently perceived threat of piracy in this area, but this can only be speculation.\footnote{This fleet is mentioned in an inscription (\textit{C.I.L. VIII.7030}) of the period A.D. 180-88 and perhaps also in the \textit{Historia Augusta} v. Commodi 17. See Reddé pp. 566-7.}

The third-century crisis - piracy resurgent?

It has been suggested that piracy became a more serious problem in the early third century A.D. than it had been at any time since the establishment of the Principate. Several scholars have found evidence of a rise in the level of piratical activity in the Mediterranean, indicated by extraordinary measures undertaken by the Roman authorities to suppress it.\footnote{Starr (1941) pp. 191-7; von Domaszewski (1903); Courtois (1939) pp. 43-4.} An inscription from Rhodes, dated to the Severan period, perhaps around A.D. 220, honours Aelius Alexander, who was charged with suppressing piracy at this time.\footnote{B.E. 1946-7 pp. 337-8 no. 156.III; \textit{A.E.} 1948 p. 78 no. 201. This inscription was unknown to the three scholars mentioned in the previous footnote.}

The people of the Rhodians and the council... Aelius Alexander... \textit{prytanis}, having been \textit{strategos} in the city justly and with integrity, having been \textit{limenarch} honourably, carrying out the duties of treasurer... frequently having been an overseer of public works faithfully, and in all things being praised by the council... and in his period as \textit{strategos} acting with justice and integrity also in the Chersonese, during which period he provided safety and security for sailors,
seizing and handing over for punishment the piratical band active at sea, in return for which the people and the council, by reason of their good will towards this man (dedicated this) to the gods.

The scope of Alexander's activity is hard to estimate. He was clearly a local magistrate, in charge of the security of a small area, presumably for only a brief period. His achievement was, perhaps, comparable to that of Valerius Proclus in the reign of Tiberius, although Alexander is likely to have been directly responsible for the capture of the pirates mentioned.

In A.D. 232 an extraordinary command was given to P. Sallustius Sempronius Victor, an equestrian of the rank of ducenarius, as is recorded on an honorific inscription from Cos, describing him as:

...the most excellent praefectus vehiculorum, praeses and ducenarius of Sardinia, charged with establishing peace over all the sea with the power of life and death, procurator Augusti for Pontus and Bithynia. (I.G.R.R.P. 4.1057 lines 11-20)

477 Lines 16-17 as restored by Robert in B.E. 1946-7: poti k[ò]/lasin.

478 The language is precise if rather tautological; lines 17-18: to sustàn katà thàlassan/ piratikòn leistérion. Compare I.G.R.R.P. 4.219 (Valerius Proclus) quoted above, which also mentions a leistérion.

479 The lacunae indicated are between four and seven spaces only.

480 See above on Valerius Proclus. For strategoi of the Chersonese and Syme in the same period as Alexander see I.G.S.K. Rhodischen Peraia nos. 161 & 163.

481 I.G.R.R.P. 4.1057. See also P.I.R. p. 160 no. 69. For the date see von Domaszewski (1903) and Pflaum (1960-1) vol. II pp. 840-2.

482 tòn kràtiston éparkhon beikoùlon hegémôna kai doukenárion sardonías lines 11-15.

483 tês eπí pàsan thàlassan hegesámenon eirénès met' exousías sidérου line 15-18.
What was the nature of Victor's command? Starr concludes from his rank, and the location of the stone, that it was a local commission to suppress piracy in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{484} M. Christol, in a more recent study of the period, has suggested that he was only in charge of securing maritime routes in connection with Severus Alexander’s Parthian campaign of A.D. 232.\textsuperscript{485} The inscription is inconclusive and there is very little other evidence to compare it with.

A few years later C. Julius Priscus, brother of the future emperor Philip, and also a ducenarius, was put in charge of vexillations of the praetorian fleets from Ravenna and Misenum in the Mediterranean, possibly also to deal with piracy.\textsuperscript{486}

An inscription from the city of Oinoanda of the Termessians in Pisidia honours Valerius Statilius Castus, a praepositus vexillationum, "...who provided peace by sea and by land..." during the reign of Gordian III.\textsuperscript{487}

All these persons may have been involved in the suppression of piracy in the Mediterranean, but in only one of these cases (Aelius Alexander) is it absolutely clear that pirates were the main concern of the person mentioned. Indeed, it could be argued that none of the others had anything to do with the suppression of piracy, because it is not mentioned explicitly in any of their inscriptions. If mention of providing peace by sea and land does refer to measures taken to suppress piracy, the level of activity need not be taken as unusual.\textsuperscript{488} These inscriptions do not have to be interpreted as evidence of a "crisis", they may simply be a group of references to run-of-the-mill activities, which

\textsuperscript{484} Starr (1941) p. 206.

\textsuperscript{485} Christol (1978) n. 28, followed by Reddé (1986).

\textsuperscript{486} According to Starr (1941) p. 193; C.I.L. VI.1638. A date of around A.D. 240 seems most likely. See also Reddé App. I p. 678; P.I.R. 4 no. 488.


\textsuperscript{488} See above on the conventional nature of the expression "by land and sea."
simply happen to come from the beginnings of a period of political instability and a
decade or so before the "Gothic" raids of the middle of the third century A.D.

The breakdown of the Pax Romana?

The height of the third century crisis, in terms of piracy, is usually placed in the
period A.D. 250-270, when several large groups of "Gothic" barbarians penetrated deep
into the Mediterranean region, plundering and destroying as they went. The extent to
which this resulted from a collapse of Roman naval defences has been the subject of some
debate. If the Roman navy was principally responsible for the suppression and
control of piracy during the first and second centuries A.D., it may well be that the
successes of the Goths should be blamed upon Roman naval weaknesses.

According to Courtois' interpretation, the Mediterranean navy in the third
century decayed, through neglect, until there was virtually nothing left. The proof of this
decay is to be found in the resurgence of piracy in the third century. Starr puts it this
way:

...the Augustan navy collapsed, but only on the Northern frontiers did a solid
substitute take the place of its fragments. Hampered by universal war, the
emperors of this period tended to abandon the Mediterranean to pirates and
barbarians.

Kienast, however, has used much of the evidence cited by Courtois and Starr to
demonstrate almost exactly the opposite. He finds abundant evidence for the

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489 See Courtois (1939); Starr (1941), pp. 194-8; Kienast (1966), pp. 124-57; Demougeot


491 Starr (1941) p. 194.

492 Kienast (1966) pp. 124-57. Reddé accepts Kienast's arguments and adds some
comments of his own.
continued activity of the imperial navy during the third century and into the fourth. I cannot accept that naval weakness/decline is a major factor, especially as there is evidence of Roman naval forces involved in serious attempts to hinder the barbarians. A prime example of the difficulty of interpreting evidence for this period is an episode which is mentioned by Zosimus and one of the Latin Panegyrics. During the reign of Probus some Franks who had been settled in Pontus by the Emperor decided to return to their homeland. They obtained some ships, quite possibly from a Roman naval base on the Black sea, and set out across the Mediterranean, attacking and plundering several places on their way (Zos. 1.71; Pan. Lat. IV.18.2). According to Haywood:

The failure of the Romans to intercept the Frankish fleet at any point on its voyage is a measure of the extent to which Roman sea power had been allowed to decay in the Mediterranean after more than two centuries of unchallenged dominance following the suppression of the Liburnian and Cilician pirates at the end of the first century B.C. 4

This may seem a reasonable assumption, but the Franks had several advantages over their would-be interceptors. They had a clear idea of their destination and seem to have made steady progress towards it. As a result, although they seem to have stopped several times on the way, they did not establish themselves in a base and launch attacks from there. Had they done so the Roman authorities could easily have located and dealt with them. They sacked Syracuse, but were defeated by a Roman force from Carthage when they tried to land in Africa. Their earlier pillaging of Greece and some parts of Asia Minor was probably helped by a lack of military forces in the area and, of course, the element of surprise. The Roman navy could not have expected to intercept the Franks, because no-one but they knew where they were going. To see this strange episode, all the more unusual for being reported in our sources at all, as a sign of naval decline is to

misunderstand the nature of the Roman navy. It was never meant to be patrolling the Mediterranean "looking for trouble" all the time.494

The "Goths" and the "Scythians"

The "Gothic" raids of the third century varied considerably in both their nature and their scale. The Goths, like the Chauci, came from outside the Empire. Some of their raids were carried out entirely by land, and so cannot be considered as piracy at all. While they attacked only the "fringes" of the Empire they were not considered a great problem, and were not easy to suppress, since they did not operate from easily accessible bases. The attacks of the Boranes, from the coast of the Sea of Azov, upon the trading port of Pityous, and other cities along the Black Sea coast, are a good example of this. In about A.D. 254 they were defeated and driven away from Pityous by Successianus (Zos. 1.32).495 They returned in about A.D. 258 and this time were more successful. After capturing Pityous they sailed along the coast as far as Trapezos, capturing the city with a large amount of booty and many slaves (Zos. 1.32-3). Their mobility was a big problem for the Romans, since they had initially obtained ships from the inhabitants of the Bosporan region, but later, probably after the capture of Trapezos, they seem to have been using Roman naval vessels.496 An earlier raid in A.D. 253, perhaps also carried out by the Boranes, had got as far as Ephesos, moving mainly by land (Zos. 1.27 8).

494 On the inappropriateness of patrolling as a means of suppressing piracy see above. Note also Reddé (1986), Troisième Partie, on the operating methods of the navy.

495 See Demougeot (1969) vol. I for a detailed account. The chronology of these invasions is uncertain. I have followed what seems to be the most widely accepted version of events in the period A.D. 250-70; e.g. Millar (1981) pp. 216-7. See Salamon (1971) for discussion and a proposed chronology (summarised on p. 139), which I have not followed in all respects.

According to Zosimus, the example of the Boranes encouraged other barbarians to try their luck at building boats and raiding the Roman Empire:

When the neighbouring Scythians saw the Boranes' spoils, they were anxious to follow this example, and so they built a fleet with the assistance of their prisoners of war and the merchants who lived among them. They determined, however, that they would not sail the same way as the Boranes, which was long and difficult, and past places already plundered. (Zos. 1.34)

The scale of some of these raids was clearly much greater than the relatively petty piracy which was a common problem in the principate, but in some cases it seems little different. In A.D. 266 Herakleia Pontica was attacked by "Scythian" ships:

At a time when Odaenathus was engaged in war with the Persians, and Gallienus was indulging in his usual trivial pursuits, the inhabitants of Scythia built some ships and attacked Herakleia. They returned from there to their own country with their booty, although many of them were lost in shipwrecks and defeated in naval engagements. (S.H.A. v. Gall. 12.6)

This notice suggests that the attack was only a small raid, and that some, at least, of the Roman naval units in the area were active in defence of the city and territory of Herakleia.

In A.D. 267 the maritime defences of the Mediterranean were put to the test by the Herulians and their allies, who came in much greater numbers than ever before. In a naval battle in the Dardanelles a Roman fleet, commanded by Venerianus and Cleodamus, was victorious (S.H.A. v. Gall. 13). A return engagement resulted, however, in defeat and the death of Venerianus. The Goths broke through into the Aegean, with

497 This quotation is from p. 11 of the translation by Ridley (1982).

498 Zos. 1.42-5; S.H.A. v. Claud. 2 & 9; v. Gall. 13; Amm. 31.5.16-17; Syn. p. 717. See Millar (1969) on Dexippus' "eye-witness" account of the invasions. On the scale of the invasions see Demougeot pp. 422-8.

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devastating results. The city of Athens was sacked and the barbarians were pursued around the coast of Greece by Roman naval forces. Other battles were fought on land and at sea, with the large numbers of the Goths being gradually depleted. The Herulians came through from the Black Sea again in A.D. 268, this time reaching as far as Crete, Cilicia and Cyprus (Zos. 1.46; S.H.A. Claud. 6-12).499

There is obviously a considerable difference between barbarian as "invaders" and barbarians as "pirates". A large raid causes similar problems to a small one, but on a much greater scale. The ability of the Roman authorities to deal with these raids is, however, bound to be dependent on their size. The attack on Herakleia Pontika in A.D. 266 was, it could be said, repulsed and partly defeated by the naval forces in the area. On several occasions the Herulians or Scythians were unable to plunder cities because they were met with sturdy walls and determined defenders (e.g. Tomi and Markianopolis Zos. 1.42; Byzantion S.H.A. Gall. 13.6 & Claud. 9.7). The great invasion of A.D. 267 was only able to penetrate into the Aegean after a fierce naval battle in the Dardanelles. In addition, all of this occurred at a time when other external pressures and internal struggles had significantly weakened the defenders of the Empire. Even Zosimus, who looks for disasters and debacles throughout his history, does not hide the fact that the invading barbarians could not plunder as freely as they wished.500 These raids were serious and damaging for the Eastern provinces of the Empire, but they do not indicate a complete breakdown of the military framework which had kept piracy to reasonable levels for over two centuries. The Pax Romana was cracked, but not wholly shattered. When political stability was restored, the military and naval authorities were able to

499 See also A.E. (1934) no. 257, which may be a reference to piracy on the coast of Mamarica. The author of the Historia Augusta includes a letter, supposedly written by Claudius himself, in which he claims "We have destroyed 320,000 Goths and sunk 2,000 ships." (S.H.A. v. Claud. 8.4). Similar numbers in Zosimus 1.42.

500 See Goffart (1971) on the character of Zosimus' history.
return to the suppression of piracy in the same fashion as before, until more damaging
ingusions destroyed the framework of Roman control entirely.

Piracy and the Principate

It should be clear from the events discussed in this section that, in spite of the
relative peace and prosperity of the Principate, piracy did not disappear wholly from the
Mediterranean and its surrounding seas in the Principate. The Roman military authorities
expended a lot of energy in keeping piracy to a minimum, which was a great benefit to
the inhabitants of the Empire, especially traders.501 In times of civil strife, and under the
pressure of barbarian invaders, the maritime peace of the Roman Empire could appear
very fragile, even to the point of disappearing at certain times and in certain places, but
it was maintained with a considerable degree of success from the reign of Augustus to
the late third century at least. The relative success of the Romans in this period must be
largely attributed to their superior resources. At no time previously did any state
maintain such huge forces, military and naval, to be used not exclusively, but in large
numbers, to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean and adjacent regions. The political
unity of the Empire, preserved in spite of power struggles among the élite, enabled the
Emperors to harness its economic resources effectively, financing army and navy through
the taxes extracted from the provinces. As has already been suggested, there was an
element of co-operation between Emperor and subjects, who both benefited from the
tranquillity which the suppression of piracy produced.502 When the Empire began to
disintegrate, however, the circumstances which had enabled piracy to be kept to a
minimum were altered, and piracy became once more, a great menace in the
Mediterranean region.

Later Roman Empire

I have followed common practice among English-speaking ancient historians who label the period after A.D. 284 the "Later Roman Empire". A terminal date for this period is less easy to establish than its inception. I have continued my research into the early seventh century A.D., but I have only made a brief study of the period after the reign of the emperor Justinian.

The Saxon Shore

Was the system of fortifications and harbours which existed along the English Channel and around the coast of East Anglia in the third and fourth centuries A.D., created as a direct response to the threat of piracy? The case for a positive answer is quite strong. Several scholars have argued that the forts of the so-called "Saxon Shore" can only be explained in this fashion.

The most certain indicator of the seriousness of the pirate threat faced by the Romans is the great extension of the system of coastal fortifications between c. 250 and c. 280 on both sides of the Channel.\(^{503}\)

It seems most likely that the forts of the channel coast were established as naval bases, with harbours or beaches from which the ships of the Classis Britannica (or a new command of the late third century) and the units of the army stationed with them could be despatched, either to attack hostile ships at sea, or, possibly, to cut off raiders on land,

\(^{503}\) Haywood (1991) p. 34.
before they could return to their ships. The concept of an integrated system of fortified bases, containing naval and military units (on both sides of the channel) to protect the provinces against pirates is not explicitly attested in any surviving literary or documentary sources. Nevertheless, the modern arguments for the existence of the Saxon shore system are persuasive ones, and I am satisfied that the bases were intended to be used for the suppression of piracy.

How did it work? I have already had occasion to remark on the impracticability of seaborne patrols to "detect" pirates in the Mediterranean region. It may be, however, that the Saxon shore is an exception to this point. Squadrons of ships operating out of the bases at Richborough, Dover, Lympne and Pevensey, as well as Boulogne and Etaples on the French coast could, possibly, have patrolled the channel at its narrowest point, on the look-out for pirates.

It is, however, more likely that the main intention behind the establishment of the Saxon shore was to provide bases from which units could be despatched quickly to attack or intercept raiders whose location had already been discovered, or whose route was predictable. The label "Saxon shore" clearly refers to the coastline which was liable to be attacked by the Saxons, and also by the Franks, who crossed the North sea to attack the coast of East Anglia, or sailed down the channel to plunder the shores of Britain and Gaul, possibly even reaching as far as Spain. Their routes were, more or less,

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504 See Johnson (1976) and Maxfield (1989) for details of the individual forts and the military units. The term "Saxon shore" (litus saxonicum) comes from the Notitia Dignitatum of 408, but the forts and, presumably, the defensive system are third century. On the possible continuity of the Classis Britannica from third to fourth century see Reddé (1986) pp. 622-8; contra Maxfield (1989) pp. 18-22.

505 See above, pp. 371-2.

506 See Haywood (1991) chpt. 2 for detailed discussion of these raids. Haywood is on slightly safer ground for his reconstruction of the seafaring activities of the third and fourth century Franks and Saxons, than he is for the Germanic barbarians during the Principate. Nevertheless, I think that he has overestimated the extent to which long-range raiding expeditions were conducted by these peoples.
predictable, either they had to cross the North Sea to East Anglia, or they had to sail along the English Channel, and it was in precisely these areas that the forts were constructed.

That there were such raiders in mid-third century A.D. is easily well known. Several of the narrative sources for this period mention raids by the Franks and Saxons in the 260s, 270s and 280s A.D. (Aur. Vict. 33.3; Eutr. 9.8 & 21; Oros.7.22.7-9 & 25.3). The impact of the raids is difficult to assess. There is some evidence of "depopulation" in Belgica and Armorica, mainly the disappearance of villages and villa sites being abandoned. Some have argued that the location of Romano-British coin hoards can be interpreted as evidence of the widespread problem of Frankish and Saxon piracy, especially when taken in conjunction with evidence of destruction by burning on certain villa sites, e.g. Fishbourne and Lullingstone. Attempts have also been made to interpret the distribution of coin hoards in Spain along similar lines. These forms of evidence are extremely difficult to interpret, however, and they do not amount to a clear indication that Frankish and Saxon piracy was causing havoc in the region, necessitating the building of the Saxon shore forts. Nevertheless there is some evidence from the 280s A.D. for the importance which the tetrarchs attached to this problem, and the way in which it was to be dealt with.

507 See Haywood (1991), chpt. 2, for detailed discussion of these raids. He identifies three contributory factors: changes in the tribal structure of the barbarians, the political problems of the empire, and the start of a marine transgression in Belgium and N. France.


510 See Balil (1959), especially p. 270 on the difficulty of using Spanish coin hoards as evidence of piracy.

511 See Robertson (1974) on the wide dispersal of 3rd century coin hoards, especially those from the reign of Tetricus or later, which does not fit well with the idea that many of them can be accounted for by the activities of pirates.
Carausius

In A.D. 285 the Caesar Maximian appointed Carausius to a maritime command in Gaul and Britain, based in Boulogne.\textsuperscript{512} His duties are described by Eutropius:

At this time Carausius, who, although of very low birth, had achieved a high reputation through his military career, was put in command at Boulogne to clear the seas along the coasts of Belgica and Armorica, which were plagued by Franks and Saxons. (Eutr. 9.21)

Such a command presupposes that there was a serious piratical threat which had to be countered. The authority given to Carausius was considerable, extending to both sides of the English Channel. This was something of a risk for the tetrarchy, especially in the light of the recent career of P\'ostumus.\textsuperscript{513} Carausius was quickly successful,\textsuperscript{514} and the report of his activities in Eutropius seems to give some indication of how the anti-piracy defences were supposed to work:

Often he captured many barbarians and did not return their plunder in its entirety to the provincials, nor did he send it to the Emperor, which made people start to suspect that he was deliberately allowing the barbarians through, so that he could catch them as they came back with their plunder, and make himself rich in the process. Maximian ordered his execution, so he assumed the purple of an emperor and took control of Britain. (Eutr. 9.21)

This passage suggests two ways in which the Saxon shore system could be operated. Either the pirates could be intercepted before they had passed through the Channel, or they could be caught on their return journey, laden with plunder. Either method would

\textsuperscript{512} For a full account and discussion of Carausius see Salway (1981), pp. 285-313.

\textsuperscript{513} On the rise and demise of the Gallic Empire see Drinkwater (1987).

\textsuperscript{514} Diocletian assumed the title \textit{Britannicus Maximus} as early as A.D. 286, presumably as a result of Carausius' operations, Barnes (1982), p. 9.
depend upon the use of signalling stations and scouting ships to give the naval and land-based units sufficient time to mobilise. If this is indeed how the system was intended to work, then it indicates a strategic approach similar to the "Pontic limes" discussed above.515

Carausius' rebellion was eventually put down by Constantius Chlorus, but only after the pretender himself had been assassinated by one of his own officers. It is ironic that the panegyric addressed to Constantius in A.D. 297 refers to him in the following fashion:

Indeed, by this wicked act of piracy the fleeing pirate first of all commandeered the fleet which had up to that time been protecting Gaul... (Pan. Lat. (A.D. 297) 12)

In the Later Roman Empire as in earlier periods the pejorative force of the term pirate was a useful tool, to be employed in "propaganda", both legitimising the victor and illegitimising the vanquished in an internal struggle.

The Fourth Century A.D.

There is very little evidence of piracy on the Northern provinces or in the Mediterranean region during the first half of the fourth century A.D. A panegyric of A.D. 321 addressed to Constantine refers to Frankish raids on the coast of Spain, some time in the first quarter of the century (Pan. Lat. (A.D. 310) 17). Constantine's campaign of A.D. 314 against the Franks may in part have been a punitive expedition in response to these. Although our sources are not very good for this period, it is reasonable to suppose that the measures taken by the imperial authorities were meeting with some success. The Saxon shore may have proved its worth in this period, without the narrative sources leaving any record of its success.

In the second half of the century, however, the raids of the Franks and Saxons, and possibly the Scots and Picts seem to have become a greater problem, beginning in the 360s A.D. (Amm. Marc. 26.4.5). During the so-called "Barbarian Conspiracy" of A.D. 367\(^{516}\) mention is made of a *comes maritimi tractus*, who may have been carrying out the same duties as the *comes litoris Saxonici* of the Notitia (N.D. Occ. 28).\(^{517}\)

Valentinian had left Amiens and was hurrying to Trier when he heard the news that Britain was in dire straits as a result of the plundering attacks of the united barbarians; also that Nectaridus, the count of the coastal area, had been killed and that duke Fullofaudes had been captured by the enemy in an ambush. (Amm. Marc. 27.8.1)

Valentinian eventually sent Count Theodosius to deal with the problems in Britain, especially the Picts and Scots. He also made a punitive attack on the Saxons, though nothing is said about the Franks (Pan. Lat. (A.D. 395) 5; Claud. Carm. 8.30-2). After his successful campaigns nothing more is heard of imperial action to suppress piracy in the North Western Provinces. The decline of Roman authority in Britain and the settlement of the Saxons created severe problems for the inhabitants of the Western Provinces, but it became the responsibility of the Visigoths and the Merovingians to deal with piratical raids in the fifth and sixth centuries.\(^{518}\)

There is a brief mention of pirates ravaging the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in the *Ecclesiastical History* of Philostorgius, a continuator of Eusebius (Philost. H.E. 11.8), probably in the late 370s A.D. He does not say anything about attempts to suppress them. Ammianus and Zosimus make a great deal of the banditry which afflicted

\(^{516}\) See Blockley (1980) for the date of the conspiracy.

\(^{517}\) See *P.L.R.E.* I Nectaridus vi.

\(^{518}\) See below on the Visigoths. For the Saxon settlements and the Frankish response to piracy see Haywood (1991), chpts. 3, 4 & 5.
both Eastern and Western provinces in the same period (Amm. Marc. 14.2; 19.13; Zos. 4.20; 5.15-20), and it is possible that a reference in Symmachus concerns the use of an imperial fleet (from Ravenna) to protect grain convoys to Rome in A.D. 384 (Symm. Rel. 9.7), but no general conclusions can be drawn about the ability of the imperial authorities to suppress piracy on the basis of these references. In the West it seems that the imperial fleets were no longer active by the end of the fifth century A.D.\textsuperscript{519} Most of the military forces had also disappeared, or been superseded by barbarian "allies".

The Visigoths and Fifth Century piracy

The inhabitants of Spain and Gaul were troubled by piratical raids from the North and East during the 5th century A.D. The chronicle of Hydatius mentions a sudden attack by "Vandals" on the coast of Galicia in A.D. 445 (Hydat. Chron. 131). They carried off numerous families as prisoners.\textsuperscript{520} In A.D. 455-7 the North coast of Spain was attacked by Herulians:

A considerable force of Herulians, had been conveyed to the shore at Lugo in seven ships, and almost 400 men were got ready to meet them. On the arrival of the assembled crowd they fled, with only two of their number killed. Returning to their own land they plundered several coastal places around Cantabria and Vardullia with great cruelty. (Hydat. Chron. 171)

At about the same time Saxons raided Armorica, then under the control of the Visigoths (Sid. Apoll. Carm. 7. 369-71), it is possible that by this time both groups were operating from bases in Britain.\textsuperscript{521} The Herulians were clearly anxious to avoid a fight, and it would appear that nothing could be done to prevent them raiding settlements further

\textsuperscript{519} See Reddé (1986), pp. 647-52.
\textsuperscript{520} See above Part Four on the identity of these barbarians.
along the coast once they had been driven away from Lugo. In A.D. 459 they were back again:

The Herulians attacked several coastal places in the territory of Lugo with great cruelty and then proceeded on to Baetica. (Hydat. Chron. 194)

Once again the entry in the chronicle is brief but clear. The Herulians use the main advantage of the pirate, mobility, to plunder their way around the coast of Spain. It seems unlikely that they met with much resistance.

Another source records a raid carried out by Saxons in the region of Bordeaux, some time in the fifth century:

It happened that on a particular occasion a multitude of hostile Saxons barbarians, with many ships, attacked a place called Marsas, driven on by the lust for plunder. (Vita Viviani chpt. 7).522

Marsas is a place near the River Garonne, in the territory which the Visigoths settled during the fifth century A.D. The only evidence of counter-measures taken by the Visigothic kings to deal with piracy in this period concerns a naval establishment on the Garonne. It comes from a letter of Sidonius Apollinaris to Namatius, a Gallo-Roman who is a naval commander, some time in the reign of Euric (A.D. 466-84):

Joking aside, let me know at last what you and your family are doing. But look! just as I want to finish this letter, which has rambled on too long, suddenly a messenger comes from Saintes. During a lengthy conversation with him about you, I obtained his repeated affirmation that you had sounded the war trumpet for the fleet, and, taking the part of both soldier and sailor, that you were cruising the sinuous shores of the Ocean against the curving galleys of the Saxons, who

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522 This incident can be dated to the reign of either Theodoric I (A.D. 419-51) or Theodoric II (A.D. 453-66). See M.G.H. S.S.R.M., III (ed B. Krusch) p. 92.
make one think that for every oarsman you see you can count an arch-pirate: thus
do they all issue orders at once, giving and receiving instructions in piracy.

Indeed, right now there is very good reason for a strong warning to you
to take the greatest care. Those enemies are the worst. They attack without
warning and disappear as soon as they are seen. They avoid those who oppose
them directly and strike down those they catch unawares.\textsuperscript{523} If they chase they
catch, if they flee they escape. They are not afraid of being shipwrecked, it is
something they exploit, being not merely acquainted with the dangers of the sea,
but even accustomed to them. Since a storm, whenever it comes along, makes
their victims incautious of them, and hides their approach, they revel in the perils
of the waves and the jagged rocks, risking all in the hope of a surprise attack.

\textsuperscript{524}

(Sid. Apoll. Ep. 8.6.13-15)

From what Sidonius says about Namatius' duties it would appear that he is supposed to
use his fleet to find and defeat Saxon pirates. It would seem that their raids on the coasts
of France and Spain are sufficiently regular and troublesome to make a naval detachment
based in the Garonne Estuary a worthwhile counter-measure. The size of Namatius' fleet
and its effectiveness in the suppression of piracy can only be guessed at, but it does seem
to indicate that the Visigothic kings were prepared to try to fulfil the role of protecting
the Atlantic and Channel coastline from pirates, one which they had inherited from the
Roman imperial authorities.\textsuperscript{525} The manner in which Sidonius describes the Saxons in

\textsuperscript{523} This is what I take to be the meaning of the Latin which reads: \textit{spernit obiectos, sternit incautos}.

\textsuperscript{524} To get a better English version I have translated singular as plural in the second paragraph.

\textsuperscript{525} See Wallace-Hadrill (1962), pp. 28-9 for the suggestion that the Visigoths were
settled in this area precisely in order to defend it against the Saxons. Namatius' fleet was presumably in existence before the arrival of the Visigoths in Aquitaine. Reddé (1986) takes no notice of it.
his letter suggests that he was well acquainted with their reputation, which he doubtless exaggerates, through the rumours of their raids. The letter would also indicate that they had been attacking that part of Gaul for a long time on a regular basis.

There is some evidence for the activities of Visigothic naval units during the sixth and seventh centuries, although none of it refers specifically to the suppression of piracy. An obvious but important difference between the fifth and fourth centuries is that there are no longer any attempts to make punitive expeditions against the pirates in their bases. The Herulians and the Saxons in Britain or Germany and Denmark were far beyond the reach of Namatius and his small fleet.

The Vandals

The extent of the Vandal raids has been discussed above. In this section I shall outline briefly the measures taken to deal with Vandal piracy in the Mediterranean. Although the rulers of Italy were faced with a series of Vandal raids in the 450s and 460s A.D. they seem to have taken relatively few measures to defend against them, and did not attempt, at first, to suppress them by attacking the Vandals at their base in North Africa.

Ricimer, the Germanic patrician and "kingmaker", seems to have organised some resistance to the Vandals in Italy, although this was only in the form of land based forces (Sid. Apoll. Carm. 2.348-56; Procop. Bel. Vand. 1.5.22). Courtois characterises the imperial reaction up to the reign of Majorian (A.D. 457-61) as, "une politique de capitulation

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526 See Haywood (1991), pp. 58-61 & 171-2. Isidore in his History of the Goths chpt. 70 seems to suggest that it was in the reign of Sisebut in the seventh century that the Visigoths first "took to the sea". There is some reason to doubt the reliability of Isidore on this point, however, as he was inclined to overdo praise of Sisebut; see Wallace-Hadrill (1967), pp. 123-5.

527 See above Part Four, pp. 2(7-2)1.

528 For what follows I am heavily indebted to Courtois (1955), especially Part II.

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In A.D. 460, however, Majorian organised an expedition against Carthage. The account of this in Procopius (Bel. Vand. 1.7.5-14) is an obviously invented tale of daring espionage and deserves no credence whatsoever. It is, however, possible to establish what happened from the annalistic sources. Majorian assembled about 300 ships at Cartagena in Spain with the intention of crossing over to Mauretania, and presumably of marching overland to Carthage. Unfortunately, Gaiseric seems to have been warned and was able to capture the assembled fleet at Cartagena, before it had a chance to set out.

In the Month of May, the Emperor Majorian arrived in Spain. The Vandals, having been warned by traitors, snatched a number of ships at Cartagena, which he had prepared in order to cross over and fight against them. Thus Majorian returned to Italy, frustrated in his designs. (Hydat. Chron. 200)\textsuperscript{530}

It is possible that the "traitors" who warned Gaiseric were ship owners or merchants operating between Africa and Spain or Italy.\textsuperscript{531} Majorian was forced to recognise the Vandal kingdom and was himself assassinated the following year.\textsuperscript{532}

In A.D. 468 the Eastern Emperor, Leo I (A.D. 457-74) launched a maritime expedition against Carthage. After reaching the Gulf of Tunis unopposed the Byzantine forces headed for the Eastern headland (Ras Addar). Here the Vandals approached them from the rear with fire-ships and were able, with the help of a following wind, to destroy

\textsuperscript{529} Courtois (1955), p. 199.

\textsuperscript{530} See also Priskos fr. 27 F.H.G. 4 p. 103. Further references in Courtois (1955), p. 199.

\textsuperscript{531} See above Part Four on commercial contacts between the Vandal kingdom and other parts of the Mediterranean.

\textsuperscript{532} See above Part Three and Courtois (1955), pp. 199-200 on the negotiations between Italy and Carthage.
or disperse most of them.\textsuperscript{533} Leo made another attempt in A.D. 470. This time his troops managed to land in Africa and attacked the city of Carthage, forcing Gaiseric to negotiate. After this promising start, however, he was compelled by political problems back in Constantinople to recall his men (Theoph. Chronog. a. 5963; Procop. Bel. Vand. 1.6.9 & 11). No further expeditions were launched against the Vandals until Belisarius' successful campaign in A.D. 533.

The Ostrogothic king Odovacer was also able to negotiate with Gaiseric for control of Sicily, which had been "conquered" by the Vandals by A.D. 468.\textsuperscript{534} In A.D. 476/7 it was mostly ceded to Odovacer as Gaiseric's tribute-paying vassal.

After Valentinian died he gained control of the coastline of all Africa, and with his customary arrogance he also took the large islands of Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, Ibiza, Mallorca and Menorca, as well as many others. (14) One of these, namely Sicily, he later conceded to Odovacer, the King of Italy, by tributary right. At fixed times Odovacer paid tribute to the Vandals, as to his lords; nevertheless they kept back some part of the island for themselves. (Vict. de Vit. 1.13-14)\textsuperscript{535}

Vandal raids seem to have decreased greatly in the last quarter of the fifth century A.D. Courtois has drawn attention to the difference between raids carried out for the acquisition of booty and slaves (i.e., piracy), and the larger expeditions against islands in the Mediterranean near Carthage, mainly intended to secure control of these places for

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\item Priskos fr. 42 F.H.G. 4 p. 110; Hydat. Chron. 247; Procop. Bel Vand. 1.6.11; John Lydus de magis. 3.43. See Courtois pp. 201-3 for a detailed discussion and reconstruction of this expedition. The numbers of ships given in the sources are clearly an exaggeration, e.g. 1,100 in Priskos fr. 42!
\item See above Part Four, pp. 27-19.
\item I quote from the translation by Moorhead (1992). His interpretation of the crucial part of (14) is in accordance with the suggestion of Courtois (1955), p. 192; the edited Latin text is given there.
\end{itemize}
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strategic reasons (i.e., warfare). Gaiseric's kingdom was founded on a combination of these two forms of raiding, both using the same personnel and the same fleet of transport ships, but launched at different targets and with different results. The imperial response to piratical attacks on Italy and the Aegean was a series of unsuccessful expeditions against Carthage. The usual approach of destroying the pirates' at their home base having failed, both Eastern and Western leaders were compelled to negotiate settlements with the Vandal king which provided recognition of his authority and a cessation of hostilities in return, it would appear, for a reduction or possibly even a complete abandonment of piracy. The suppression of piracy by force had become something which Roman authorities could no longer manage, due to the shrinking resources and fragmented organization of the Empire in the fifth century A.D.

In the period after the reconquest of Carthage, however, there was a revival of "Roman" seapower which enabled the Byzantine Emperors to maintain something of a maritime Empire. The suppression of piracy did not occupy their time however. The Adriatic was made dangerous by Slav pirates who operated from the mountain-shielded coastline and numerous islands of Dalmatia. Imperial dromons were hard pressed to maintain their own safety and could do nothing to prevent this menace, which was to continue long into the modern period.

The conquest of the North African Coastline and part of Anatolia by the Arabs in the Seventh century brought a far greater menace. Piracy, partly organized by the Khaliphs, afflicted the coastline of Greece, Anatolia and the Aegean islands. It was

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536 See above Part Three, pp. 173-4.

537 While it would be unwise to assume too much on the basis of a lack of evidence, I do think that the general absence of mention of Vandal raids (or piracy of any kind) in sixth century sources seems to indicate that the Vandals had been "bought off".

538 See Eickhoff (1966), pp. 11-13; Tenenti (1967).
effectively beyond the power of the rulers of Constantinople to prevent, since they were engaged in a desperate struggle to keep the Moslems out of Constantinople itself, and could not contemplate attempts to deal with the pirates in the only way that worked - attacking their home bases. There was some sporadic and often unsuccessful naval activity. A reorganization of the military might of the Roman Empire in the late seventh century created a force capable of intervening across almost the whole of the Mediterranean, but the availability of so many potential bases made suppression of piracy impossible. The political structure of the medieval Mediterranean, with Christians to the North and Moslems to the South and East, provided ideal conditions for the "endemic" piracy which Braudel described in his work on the sixteenth century.

539 See Ahrweiler (1966), pp. 19-35 on Byzantine naval resistance to the Arabs, and the organisation of the karabisianoi.

540 Braudel (1972).
Conclusions

The suppression of piracy can only really be achieved through the elimination of pirate bases. It is erroneous to think that "patrolling" is an effective way to deal with pirates. The idea of suppressing piracy is first encountered in the literature of the Classical period, but there is very little corresponding action. Even at this early stage some "historical" figures were credited with suppressing piracy, although it is unlikely that they ever did. The fifth century Athenians did not suppress piracy in the Aegean, although some efforts were made in the fourth century. In the late Classical and Hellenistic periods suppression seems to be linked with the protection of trade, but attempts to suppress piracy were localised and on a small scale.

In the Late Republic the Romans began to accept responsibility for the suppression of piracy in the Mediterranean region. Their activities were, however, sporadic and on a relatively small scale. Because suppression required military action it was usually given a low priority, unless it happened to coincide with other political interests. The need to conquer territory in order to deprive pirates of their bases further complicated matters. Gradually the growth of the area under Roman control, and the imposition of political stability meant that pirates were eliminated from a considerable part of the Mediterranean by the early Principate.

The military power of the Roman army and navy was a major factor in the continued suppression of piracy in the first few centuries A.D. When Roman control began to fail, however, piracy became a greater problem, and when the Empire collapsed, piracy flourished again.
APPENDIX ONE
THE LEX DE PROVINCIIS PRAETORIIS

The text of this law given below is that of the new edition. It is taken from *I.G.S.K.* Knidos I. Professor Michael Crawford assures me that it is identical to that which he will be publishing shortly. The references used above are to blocks (letters for the Delphi copy and numbers for the Knidos copy) and lines. Note that the lines on the Delphi copy are more than twice as long as those on the Knidos copy.
APPENDIX TWO

THE ORACLE CONCERNING PIRATES FROM SYEDRA

The text is that of Bean and Mitford (1965) with additions and alternative restorations supplied by Robert (1966) and Maróti (1968).

Πάμφυλοι Συνεσπης ἐπίζυν̣[ν ἐν ἀγορῇ] ναίοντες Χθόνα Παμμηγέων ἔ[δωσεν] ψιτῶν Ἀρης δεκαλοὺν ἐναμείος ἀνδροφόνουσιν στήοντες μεσάτω πόλοις ἡ[ξα] ἔρευ[εν] Θόσθαλα, δεσμοῖς Ερμείας οἰκορείοις μιν ἔχοντος· ἐν δء'
PART SIX: CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this part is to draw together the threads of the preceding sections into some general conclusions about the nature of piracy in the ancient world.

My analysis of the vocabulary of piracy in ancient Greek and Latin has shown that piracy can be distinguished from banditry and other forms of violence in both languages, although the common words for pirate can also mean bandit.

The earliest literary presentation of pirates (in Homer) reveals an ambivalent attitude towards them. Piracy does not seem to be a disreputable activity, but the term "pirate" can have a pejorative meaning. Analysis of the Homeric poems as sources for the Archaic period, does not indicate any great distinction between piracy and warfare, both of which continued to be closely related in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, and into the Late Republic. The constant warfare of these periods tended to encourage and even promote piracy. Although the methods of war and piracy overlapped, however, it gradually becomes possible, through careful analysis of the ancient sources, to differentiate between them, and the personnel involved.

The close relationship between war and piracy is reflected in the literature of the Classical and Hellenistic periods. There is further development of the pejorative implications of "pirate" and "piracy", especially in rhetorical invective, with political enemies being labelled "pirates" in order to illegitimize them. This development continues in the Late Republic and reaches a climax with the image of pirates as violent, rapacious "outsiders" in the fictional literature of the first four centuries A.D.

The threat which piracy posed to maritime trade encouraged some attempts at control and suppression in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, but it was not until the Late Republic that a concerted effort began to be made by the Romans. Their assumption
of the role of suppressors of piracy is clearly reflected in the works of Cicero and Strabo. The close links between piracy and the slave trade did not hinder this development, but the political implications of suppression, which required the conquest and control of territory, made progress slow and uneven. The peaceful conditions established in the Principate enabled a considerable reduction in the amount of piracy, a situation which is praised by Strabo and many other writers. Roman control of territory and military dominance continued to promote maritime trade and discourage piracy, until the gradual collapse of the Roman Empire, which enabled piracy to flourish again because of the increasing difficulties of suppression.

Further, detailed research into the nature of maritime communities in the ancient Mediterranean, especially their social and economic organization, may help to broaden this picture of the history of piracy in the ancient world.
"CILICIA"

1. KIBYRA
2. BUBON
3. BALKURA
4. DENOANDA
5. APAMEA
6. OLYMPOS
7. KORYKOS (IN LYCIA)
8. PHASELIS
9. TERMESSOS
10. ATTALIA
11. PERGE
12. ASPENDOS
13. SIDE
14. SYEDRA
15. ISAURA
16. ANEMURION
17. LARANDA
18. SELEUKIA
19. KORYKOS (IN CILICIA)
20. SOLI (POMPEIOPOLIS)
21. TYANA
22. XANTHOS
23. APANA
24. MALLOS
25. EPHIPHANIA
26. KOKAKESION
This bibliography contains books, articles and essays arranged in alphabetical order, by author's name. Collections of articles or papers by one individual appear under that person's name only. Items published in collections of articles or papers by several people appear under the author's name, with a reference to the full collection, which appears separately under the name(s) of the editor(s). See also list of abbreviations.

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