THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN POST-COMMUNIST POLAND

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This study provides a detailed, empirically based examination of the institutional dynamics of the new parties and political groupings that have emerged in Poland, the largest country of the former Soviet bloc, since the collapse of communist rule in 1989. It draws upon and utilises the models developed in the contemporary West European party literature as an analytical framework with which to examine the main parties from a structural and organisational perspective and considers how they approximate to these taxonomical ideals. It examines the six main parties and political groupings around which the Polish party system appeared to be consolidating in the run up to the 1997 parliamentary elections. The study considers: the internal distribution of power and modes of representation with the parties; the role of the party bureaucracy; the relationship between the parties and their electorates; the development of parties as membership organisations; and the relationship between parties and the state. It concludes that the new Polish parties are strong at the level of state institutions and appear capable of fulfilling their role in terms of structuring elections, institutions and recruiting elites. However, they are also likely to develop as remote and somewhat distant institutions that are weak at the societal level. Given that the nature of the links between parties and their electorates are likely to remain fairly shallow, the new parties are likely to prove less successful at aggregating societal interests and relatively ineffective in mobilising the citizenry and integrating them into the political process. The study, therefore, draws broader conclusions about the process of party development in post-communist Eastern Europe at the same time as augmenting the relatively undeveloped literature on internal party dynamics.
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In addition to published sources, much of the data on which this study is based were obtained from documents collected and interviews undertaken by the author during four field trips to Poland between February-November 1997 together with one preliminary trip in June 1996. These included numerous visits to the main Polish parties' and groupings' headquarters and parliamentary offices which included twenty interviews with party officials, particularly: those responsible for developing party organisation and communication strategies; party central office and parliamentary fraction office directors; and the key officials responsible for organising the parties' September 1997 parliamentary election campaigns. They also included interviews with thirty four local party officials in four Polish provinces: Gdańsk, Jelenia Góra, Płock and Rzeszów. Each one of these provinces represented one of Poland’s four ‘historic’ regions and, between them, formed a politically and demographically representative sample of the whole country. All of these officials are fully cited where I have quoted them directly and I would like to thank them all of them (some of whom provided me with two or three interviews) for their help and co-operation.

These field visits also included a series of interviews with Polish academics and commentators working in the field, all of whom I would thank. These included: Professor Stanisław Gebethner, Professor Konstanty Wojtaszczyk and Dr Radzisława Gortat from Warsaw University’s Institute of Political Science and Journalism; Professor Mirosława Grabowska from Warsaw University’s Institute of Sociology; Professor Tomasz Żukowski from Warsaw University’s Institute of Social Studies; Dr Ewa Nalewajko and Dr Irena Jackiewicz from the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of Political Studies; Ewa Czaczkowska, Marcin Dominik Zdort, Eliza Olczyk and Małgorzata Subotić from the ‘Rzeczpospolita’ daily newspaper; and Mariusz Janicki and Janina Paradowska from the ‘Polityka’ weekly magazine.

1 At the time that the fieldwork for this study was undertaken Poland was divided into 49 provincial administrative units, known as województwa, which were generally co-terminus with the Polish parliamentary electoral districts (except for Katowice province which comprised three electoral districts and Warsaw province two). In January 1999 these were replaced by 16 larger provinces and, at the time of writing, a revision of the electoral law is under consideration with the objective of bringing the electoral constituencies into line with this new administrative structure.

Naturally, responsibility for the interpretation and analysis of all the interviewees’ comments and observations lies solely with the author.

I would like to thank the staff at SSEES Library, the Polish Library in Hammersmith, and at Warsaw University (particularly in the Department of Political Science where I was based during the first part of my fieldwork) together with Inka Skłodkowska from the Polish Academy of Science’s Institute of Political Studies Political Parties Archive in Warsaw for all their help. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Polish Centre for the Research of Social Opinion (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej: CBOS) and the Institute for the Research of Public of Opinion (Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej: OBOP).

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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

The existence of autonomous political parties is a central feature in the functioning of almost every contemporary democracy. It is difficult to conceive of a democratic political system in which parties do not play an important, if not decisive, role in the operation of democratic institutions and practices and as a guarantor of political pluralism.1 Although they have proved themselves to be highly flexible and adaptable structures, and some types of party emphasise certain roles more than others most commentators have had few difficulties in documenting a number of core functions which they are thought to perform in the operation of a modern democracy and society.2

Firstly, perhaps their most basic function is thought to be that of putting forward candidates for public office. Parties provide the main source of recruitment for political elites and, specifically, provide the personnel to staff the most important positions in government. By doing so, parties also help to structure the vote at election times and thereby shape citizens’ participation in the electoral process. Secondly, parties help to sustain public institutions in both the parliamentary and governmental arena as well as providing political leaders with the discipline and logistical support essential to shape and control the machinery of government, enact legislation and, when appropriate, provide effective opposition. Thirdly, parties represent and aggregate the demands of various social interests and convert these into more manageable packages of public policy choices on the basis of their ideology or some other set of values or principles. More broadly, this process also involves influencing and structuring public opinion and the content of political discourse itself. Fourthly, as a consequence parties help to integrate citizens into the political system and mobilise both public support and civic participation in the political process, from the relatively straightforward act of voting to more active forms of engagement. Parties can thereby: transform privately-orientated individuals into publicly-orientated citizens, resolve conflicts through institutional, orderly and peaceful channels, and help to generate the political cohesion and stability which can be particularly

important for democratic regimes during times of crisis. Conversely, so-called ‘anti-system’ parties can, of course, exacerbate political instability and thereby undermine and de-legitimise the democratic process.

All these functions are underpinned by the fact that normatively parties operate on the boundaries of, and mediate between, the formal structures of the state and civil society. Consequently, they are thought to provide the mechanism that links the formal structures of political power to the various components of civil society by placing their representatives in positions where they can exercise that power on their behalf. Parties therebey provide a two-way channel of communication which both informs citizens and allows their opinions to be expressed, and potential change to be affected, through institutional channels. As Lawson put it, the party is “the one agency that can claim to have as its very raison d’etre the creation of an entire linkage chain, a chain of connections that runs from the voters through the candidates and the electoral process to the officials of government.”

The development of parties and party systems is, therefore, rightly seen as both one of the most important tests of, and making a contribution to, the strength of an emerging democracy. Consequently, examining the role of the new parties and the shape of the new party systems is seen as one of the central themes in assessing the progress of post-communist East European democratisation. This is reflected in the growing and increasingly rich literature on East European party politics which has developed into one of the most active sub-fields within the study of the comparative politics of the region. The emergence of the new parties and party systems in the post-communist context - including the problematic legacies of the communist and pre-communist periods - empirical studies of the popular attitudes towards the new parties that

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undergird these systems, together with attempts to identify and make predictions about the development of ideological dimensions and cleavage structures have all received considerable scholarly attention. There have also been a number of important studies attempting to account for the re-emergence of former communist ‘successor’ parties as a permanent fixture of the East European political landscape and the implications for the process of democratisation. Although all the studies in these fields have proved useful, there have been considerably fewer major contributions to, and much weaker focus on, the empirically-grounded projection of how parties actually work; their institutional characteristics and, particularly, the question of what type of party structure and organisation is emerging. In spite of a number of recent, valuable attempts to redress the balance, the study of internal party dynamics remains one of the least well-explored areas of post-communist change and most promising territories for further exploration.

This neglect of the empirically-based study of party organisation and lack of interest in party structural development is also a feature of the much larger and more

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extensive literature on the longer-established Western party systems. With party
studies now one of the largest sub-fields in comparative politics, increasingly
sophisticated theories and research techniques have been developed to examine: the
origins, stability and subsequent changes in parties' electoral support;¹¹ parties'
shifting programmatic orientations and ideological dimensions;¹² the role of parties in
government and as public office holders;¹³ the classification of different types of party
systems;¹⁴ and the relationship between parties and other societal structures.¹⁵

In other words, party studies is a sub-discipline that has been dominated by an
increasingly strong emphasis on what Lawson terms the “inter-active components”
of party systems - why they take the form they do, endure, change and what they signify
- rather than by attempts to examine internal party structure and dynamics.¹⁶ This is
not so much evident at the theoretical level were much of the pioneering ground work
in the field of modern party studies, particularly Michels and Ostrogorski's classic
research,¹⁷ was focused precisely on the activities of parties as organisations. Indeed,
notwithstanding a discernible shift of emphasis in recent years, valuable theoretical
projections and discussions on the changing models of party organisation have

¹¹ See: J. La Palombara and M. Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton,
Behaviour. New York: Free Press. 1974; I. Crewe and D. Denver, eds. Electoral Change in Western
Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility. London: Croom Helm. 1985; R. J. Dalton,
S.C. Flanagan, P.A. Beck, eds. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Societies. Princeton:
University Press. 1990; and M. Franklin, T. Mackie and H. Valen, eds. Electoral Change: Responses
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Cambridge University Press. 1987; and K. von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies.

Pridham, ed. Coalitional Behaviour in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986; R. S. Katz, ed.Party Governments: European and
American Experiences. Berlin: de Gruyter. 1987; I. Budge and H. Keman, eds. Parties and

University Press. 1976.

Princeton University Press. 1988; and When Parties Fail.

(108).

¹⁷ See: R. Michels. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern
Democracies. New York: Free Press. 1962 (1915); and M. Ostrogorski. Democracy and the
continued to be produced. Rather, the neglect has been primarily in the relatively sparse availability of empirical data about how party organisations work and, until recently, all but the most rudimentary information on comparative party development was unavailable.

Lawson has correctly identified the main reasons for this bias in favour of studying external rather than internal party behaviour as: visibility, methodological habits and the various motives which guide scholarship on parties. Firstly, given that parties have an "existential ambiguity" and that their most important effects are achieved by their elected representatives there is a tendency for party scholars to treat all parties as "an ensemble" and, ideological questions and parties’ levels of support notwithstanding, focus on the collective characteristics of composite party systems such as elections and parties' role in government. Secondly, it is difficult to study party structure and organisation in the same way as collective party characteristics by using a research methodology which encourages the maintenance of a certain distance from the "hurry-burly of inner party life." Moreover, not only is it extremely difficult to obtain relevant data on internal party life, there is also, as we shall see, the serious problem of separating out formal accounts of how parties operate from what happens in practice. Thirdly, given that the principal motives guiding the study of parties generally relate to questions of efficient government and political stability, the assumption has been that the study of any one single party’s internal dynamics does not really tell us enough about the political system per se. In other words, the question of whether or not these objectives can be achieved is best examined in a wider perspective. Moreover, the general instability of the emerging post-communist East European parties and party systems and the concomitant immaturity of party organisational structures, arising from the fact that many of the newly formed parties were often simply cliques of supporters clustered around individual personalities,

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provide an additional, region-specific factors likely to deter scholars from paying much too attention to parties' structural evolution.

Models of contemporary party

Before considering why the evolution of party structure and organisation has important implications for the progress of post-communist democratisation, it is first necessary to consider some of the contemporary party models which have been developed in the Western literature. These provide us with a potentially useful analytical framework with which to consider what type of party structure and organisation is developing in post-communist Eastern Europe. While other models of the contemporary party have been developed and are available, this study concentrates on the four main West European party types: Duverger's cadre/elite and mass party, Kirchheimer and Panebianco's catch-all/electoral professional party and Katz and Mair's cartel party models. For sure, all of these models also touch on ideological and sociological questions at times. Moreover, the question of just how applicable theoretical models developed to explain party development in the context of more advanced West European democracies are to the newly emerging democracies of post-communist Eastern Europe must remain an open one to which we will return later. Nevertheless, all four models focus primarily or to a large extent on changes in parties' organisational and structural characteristics and thereby represent a useful typology based on a clear, logical and linear historical progression.21 Moreover, while this typology of party development does not necessarily imply a universal process in which one type of party is challenged and axiomatically replaced by another, and although party organisational forms are constantly in flux, some party types are indeed characteristic for particular historical conjunctures.

The first major attempt to develop a theory of party organisation based on a comprehensive account of the nature and development of parties was produced by Duverger in the early 1950s.22 According to Duverger elitist cadre parties dominated the first stages of party development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an era that was characterised by restricted franchise requirements and other limitations on the political activities of the propertyless. There was little need for formal or highly structured organisation in such a context and such cadre parties,

22 Political Parties.
consisting of little more than groupings of local notabilities, served purely instrumental, electoral purposes making little or no formal provision for mass membership. As Duverger put it, "if we define a member as one who signs an undertaking to the party and thereafter regularly pays his subscription, then cadre parties have no members."

As industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded, and the predominance of the old elites came under challenge, the concomitant relaxation of restrictions on working class organisation and the franchise opened up the political system to previously excluded groups of citizens. The mass party, which arose out of the struggles by these elements of society to gain a voice in the ruling structures of the state, had a relatively complex structure but also sought to balance the aims of organisational efficiency with securing the democratic participation of party members. The distinction between mass and cadre parties was not, therefore, simply based on their size and structure, as their respective names implied. Mass parties were both more centralised and firmly knit than cadre parties but they also accorded with an organisational response to a particular view of democracy and an electoral strategy based on the mobilisation and social integration of distinct socio-economic segments of the electorate. According to Duverger, mass parties corresponded to left-wing workers parties in terms of political and social substructure, promoted broad ideological programmes to mobilise the working class and provided it with an elite that could take over the government and administration of the state. Consequently, as the instruments of the newly enfranchised segments of society, mass parties were naturally dominated by their extra-parliamentary elements and their mass membership was "the very substance of the party." Another important way in which this difference found organisational expression was in the field of party finances, which Duverger regarded as fundamental to the process of political change, as mass parties replaced the "capitalist financing of electioneering by democratic financing."

Mass membership parties proved to be an effective means of canvassing, mobilising and organising supporters in newly enfranchised mass electorates and the most successful type of party organisation in electoral terms during this second phase of party development. In his conclusion Duverger confidently predicted that the mass party model would be widely imitated: that "vast, centralised and disciplined" mass membership organisations would increasingly dominate contemporary democratic societies, and in a process of 'contagion from the left', replace the cadre parties'
informal networks as all major parties transformed themselves along these lines. However, although Duverger's analysis provides us with an important starting point, subsequent developments have questioned his conclusion about the pre-eminence of the mass party model. Other scholars soon began to argue that the mass party was losing its comparative advantage and simply represented a transitory and historically bounded phase in a continuing process of party adaptation and change.

Writing in the 1960s, for example, Kirchheimer advanced the hypothesis that Duverger's mass party model was being undermined and transformed by a number of societal changes which had occurred since the Second World War and parties were, therefore, moving into a third stage of development which he termed the catch-all party model. In many respects, according to Kirchheimer's analysis, the mass party became a victim of its own success. The struggles for basic social and political rights which had united the newly enfranchised constituencies underpinning the mass parties had been won. The state began to provide many of the universal welfare and educational services which had previously been the prerogative of the mass party. Together with the concomitant increase in living standards and social mobility and expansion of the mass media, these developments all served to erode traditional social boundaries and thereby confronted mass parties with shrinking core electorates. The mass party's former strength, its direct organisational and political links with a distinctive socio-economic sub-group, not only no longer guaranteed success but actually became a weakness as the relevance of these sub-groups declined. The catch-all party was, therefore, characterised by: a drastic reduction in the party's "ideological baggage"; the strengthening of the party's leadership elites at the expense of the party membership; a reduced emphasis on the party's traditional social class or denominational clientele in favour of seeking to appeal to and recruit the widest possible range of supporters (while simultaneously attempting to maintain its core working class or denominational base); and an attempt to secure access to a wider range of interest groups. Abandoning attempts at "intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses", the catch-all party was turning "more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success." Shrinking, or at least increasingly open, core electorates meant that all mass parties came under increasing pressure to adapt their organisational forms and electoral strategies in this way.

26 Ibid. p427.
27 'The Transformation of West European party systems'.
28 Ibid, p190.
29 Ibid, p184.
However, Kirchheimer's focus was primarily on questions of electoral strategy with the implications for internal party structure and organisation being less explicit. More recently Panebianco developed Kirchheimer's catch-all model while directing greater attention to organisational and structural concerns and concentrating on the emergence of what he termed the *electoral-professional party*. Like Kirchheimer, Panebianco pointed to the electorate's increasing social and cultural heterogeneity as one of the main causes of party transformation and his electoral-professional model was also characterised by: weak vertical organisational ties; appeals to the 'opinion electorate' rather than the 'electorate of the belonging'; the pre-eminence of public representatives over the party's internal leaders; financing through interest groups and public funds rather than members; and a stress on issues and leadership rather than ideology, with a more important organisational role for 'careerists' rather than 'believers'. But while Kirchheimer only treated this issue implicitly, the key distinction between Panebianco's electoral-professional party and what he termed the 'mass-bureaucratic' party was the increasing professionalisation of the party organisation and the central role played by professionalised party elites compared with that of the party bureaucracy, as the party's main focus of activity shifted from enrolling members to winning over the less segmented electorates. Panebianco also directed attention to the re-structuring of political communication systems under the impact of the withering away of the traditional party-owned media, and professional party elites' concomitant preference for obtaining coverage in private or state-owned mass outlets (particularly television), which he saw as one of the key factors driving this increasingly professionalised concept of party organisation, as well as leading to more personalised and "issue-oriented" campaigns.

More recently, Katz and Mair have hypothesised the emergence of a new *cartel party* model by drawing attention to parties increasing dependence on the state as a major source of support and object of political reference, together with a pattern of inter-party collusion to share in these resources. Following a reduction in party involvement and participation, membership levels have failed to keep pace with the escalating costs of party activity in the modern state. Parties have, therefore, sought to maintain themselves by securing the provision, and overseeing the regulation, of state subventions. The combination of the importance of the electronic media as a means of political communication, together with the fact that access to these media is controlled and regulated by the state (and hence by parties in the state) also offers the

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30 *Political Parties.*
31 Ibid, p264.
32 Ibid, p266.
33 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'.
party another important resource. Moreover, the cartel party not only adapts in order to benefit from the privileges and remain a member of the cartel but (in collusion with the other, similarly privileged parties) actually influences the rules in order to privilege insiders and limit the scope for new entrants. Consequently, the links between parties and their electorates become even looser and more remote as the hypothesised cartel party both colonises and actually becomes an integral part of the state:

"No longer simple brokers between civil society and the state, the parties now become absorbed by the state. From having first assumed the role of trustees, and then later of delegates, and then later again, in they hey-day of the catch-all party, of entrepreneurs, parties have now become semi-state agencies."

With the emergence of the cartel party politics becomes a profession in itself. Inter-party competition takes place on the basis of competing claims to efficient and effective management of the state machine and patterns of electoral competition are contained and managed. Organisationally, cartel parties are capital-intensive, professional and centralised relying increasingly on the subventions and other privileges afforded by the state for their resources and on the state controlled or regulated mass media as their principal means of direct communication with their electorates. Cartel parties are also based on a loose and atomistic conception of party members exercising rights as individuals rather than through delegates, together with a powerful and relatively autonomous party elite and a 'stratarchic' internal distribution of power between the central party leadership and local office-holders, with each exercising a relatively free hand in their own bailiwick.

The organisational structuring of parties is not, therefore, merely an object of interest in itself and there is clearly an important relationship between: developments within the parties themselves, the kind of parties that emerge and their changing position within the overall party and political system. Variations in the type of party organisation will, therefore, obviously have a considerable impact on the role which a party can play in terms of shaping the broader political process and fostering a democratic political culture. While none of the party functions listed above is necessarily rendered obsolete by the changing position of parties within the political system, clearly their respective weight and how effectively they can perform particular functions will vary, with some party types clearly emphasising certain functions more than others. In particular, both the capacity of parties to link

34 Ibid, p15.
individual citizens to the process of government and the institutions of the state and
the nature of that linkage is likely to be affected by the character of their organisation.
In other words, certain types of party organisation may be better than others as a
means of sustaining and increasing the legitimacy and stability of democratic political
systems.

As a result of its development as the party best suited to meet the emergence of a
mass electorate, the mass party both originated from and was deeply rooted within
civil society and was, therefore, more than just a purely electoral organisation. The
mass party sought to formally enrol its supporters, who were drawn from a similar
and well-defined segment of the population, and organise them within a broad
network of inter-connected organisations. Consequently, by offering its supporters a
stable political identity, the mass party was particularly focused on, and successful at,
mobilising and sometimes encapsulating major segments of the electorate and thereby
integrating citizens into a stable political system. Moreover, as well as having strong
links with, and a stable basis of support among, certain clearly defined sections of
civil society, the mass party also played a critical role in the stabilisation and
structural consolidation of Western party systems by narrowing down or completely
closing off the electoral market for potential new entrants. In other words, by helping
to structure and stabilise Western party systems mass parties were considered to have
played a decisive role in the functioning of Western democracies.

The increasingly top-down style of party organisational life and greater attention
directed towards electoral competition depicted in both Kirchheimer’s catch-all party
and Panebianco’s electoral-professional party implied an erosion of the strong party-
civil society linkage which characterised the mass party model. By reducing its
ideological baggage and the role of the party membership, strengthening the top
leadership, and broadening out from its core electoral constituency in order secure
access to a wider range of voters and interests, the catch-all party clearly became
more electoral and less societally-rooted than the mass party. Similarly, by
increasingly underpinning its organisations with professionals rather than enrolled
volunteers, the electoral-professional party was clearly based on much weaker ties
with its supporters. Indeed, Kirchheimer expressed concern that the catch-all party
was “too blunt an instrument to serve as a link with the functional powerholders in
society,” while Panebianco warned that the emergence of the electoral-professional
party created a “vacuum at the level of collective identities,” leaving voters more

independent and autonomous but also more isolated and puzzled. Consequently, the representation, mobilisation and integration roles are of much less significance in the catch-all and electoral-professional party types which place much greater emphasis on the electoral and recruitment functions.

With the emergence of Katz and Mair’s cartel model, the party’s relationship with civil society has weakened even further and there is a corresponding intensification of the party-state linkage to the extent that parties no longer act as a bridge between the two but rather become part of the state apparatus itself. Mair has summed up this greater emphasis on the state and concomitant downgrading of the party-civil society linkage thus:

"...parties (have) moved from an earlier, post-suffrage stage (the classic 'mass party' phase) in which they had represented the interests of civil society vis-a-vis the state, to a stage in which they acted almost as independent brokers between state and civil society (the classic 'catch-all party' phase), and in which, in Downsian and Schumpterian terms, they behaved more as competing teams of leaders, to a new and more recent stage, in which they actually move closer to becoming part of the state. The balance of linkage has therefore changed, as have the parties themselves." 37

As we have seen, this process is particularly evident in terms of the resources which are used by parties in order to secure their own legitimacy and survival. Moreover, as party structures become increasingly ‘stratarchical’ in character, with each element of the party organisation becoming more autonomous and stressing its own freedom of manoeuvre, we can even see an erosion of a sense of linkage even inside the parties themselves.

Consequently, by parties adapting and professionalising themselves in this way, the essence of democratic governance and, according to this model, even politics itself is increasingly characterised by elite groups presenting themselves to the electorate as competing teams of leaders and making little or no attempt to develop organic links with their supporters or to involve the public in the policy process. Elite recruitment,

36 Political Parties. p273. In fact, Panebianco foresaw three possible lines of party development: the electoral-professional model proving to be an intrinsically unstable institution leading to parties losing their organisational identity and appearing only as “convenient tags for political entrepreneurs”; an ideological backlash with existing parties resuming their former identities and expressive functions; and “real political innovation” through the creation of new kinds of political movements which transform the whole organisational framework of modern politics.

therefore, becomes by far the most important function in the cartel party model, while the relevance of 'representative' functions and those that stress civic participation such as articulation, aggregation, and particularly mobilisation and integration, tend to be even less applicable than in other models. The evolution of party structure and organisation can, therefore, significantly erode the role that parties used to play as intermediate structures capable of both mobilising and integrating citizens as well as mediating support for and blunting, or even reversing, challenges to democracy.

A number of commentators have argued that this particular combination of developments associated with the transformation of Western parties - parties becoming simultaneously stronger, more privileged and self-sufficient but also more remote and inward-looking - has led to a progressive widening of the gap between electorates and the political class and erosion of party attachment and legitimacy of established party elites. This development has, it is argued, been one of the key elements underpinning the increasingly widespread anti-party rhetoric and sentiment and the attacks targeted on established parties which has developed into a powerful tool for populist politicians, particularly on the far right, who claim to be uncorrupted by the existing party system and appear to have emerged as a new and potentially significant phenomenon in a number of contemporary Western democracies. In other words, this process of party adaptation and change in traditional party roles and strategies has also made the democratic system itself vulnerable to a potential erosion of support and unable to develop a bank of goodwill and diffuse support which may be required during times of crisis.

It is clearly important to bear in mind the difficulties of trying to fit East European cases to models designed for more advanced Western democracies. Nevertheless, given the close relationship between the various party models and the character of democracy, the different strategies pursued by the new parties and the type of party that is emerging will obviously have considerable implications for the nature of the links between parties and society and the functions that they are able to perform in the broader context of post-communist democratisation in Eastern Europe. A mass party with deep, extensive and well organised links with civil society will, for example, be much better placed to perform representative functions such as articulation, aggregation, integration and mobilisation than other types of party based on much weaker party-citizen linkages which will be confined to electoral and elite recruitment functions.

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In particular, if the new parties of post-communist Eastern Europe replicate contemporary Western models and evolve as remote, inward-looking bodies primarily oriented towards the state rather than society then this is likely to re-inforce the underlying distrust of all party-like structures which may already have extensive roots in the region having been fostered by a period of prolonged one-party rule. This, in turn, has important implications for whether the new parties and governing elites can perform an effective role in helping to secure legitimation for the new democracies. In this sense, even if, as some commentators have hypothesised, after the initial period of fragmentation in the immediate post-communist period the new East European party systems are stabilising and consolidating at the level of state institutions this may not provide a guarantee that popular anti-party sentiment will subside in these countries. Consequently, it is, therefore, clearly important to pay much greater attention to parties’ structure, organisation and the institutional dynamics of how parties organise, and not just to the external and more visible aspects of party development in post-communist Eastern Europe.

Party development in post-communist Poland

However, in spite of its significance there have, as noted above, been little more than preliminary projections, together with some fairly rudimentary and general empirical surveys, about what type of party structure and organisation is emerging in post-communist Eastern Europe. Consequently, the time is ripe for, and this study focuses on, a detailed, in-depth, single country and empirically-based examination of the institutional dynamics of the new parties that have emerged in post-communist Poland - the largest country in the former Soviet bloc - which draws upon and utilises the theoretical models developed in the Western political science literature.

Although it was the first East European state to slough off communist rule in 1989, the process of party development in post-communist Poland has been a tortuous one and has suffered from both extreme fragmentation and instability in the early stages of party development. Consequently, one of the most important methodological questions to tackle when approaching such a survey is how to determine a manageable number of relevant parties which can be the used as the basis of case

studies? In order to explain how the sample of six parties and groupings included in this survey was determined it is necessary to briefly examine the historical context of party formation in post-1989 Poland. This process can be divided into six broad historical phases.

Following the spring 1989 round table negotiations between the Solidarity opposition and the communist authorities, which pre-figured the partially-free elections to the so-called ‘Contract Sejm’ held in May-June, freedom of association was dramatically extended to permit the organisation of political parties and a de facto competitive party system began to emerge. These elections saw Solidarity-backed candidates win all 161 openly contested seats in the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of parliament, and 99 out of the 100 seats in the less powerful but completely freely elected upper house, the Senate, and thereby the effective end of communist rule in Poland. A new government emerged in August 1989 led by Solidarity adviser Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland’s first non-communist premier since the Second World War and the first in the region for over forty years. Nevertheless, the process of party formation was initially fairly slow, although it gathered pace somewhat when a new legal framework finally emerged with the passage of the 1990 Law on Political Parties which allowed any party that collected fifteen signatures to be formally registered.

This first phase saw the emergence into legality of a number of parties that had operated in a clandestine fashion during the communist period. The most notable of these was Leszek Moczulski’s Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej: KPN) which had a long opposition pedigree dating back to September 1979 before the emergence of the original Solidarity trade union, but they also included a number of smaller organisations such as the radical libertarian Union of Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej: UPR) established in November 1987 by a group of self-styled ‘conservative liberals’ led by the eccentric Janusz Korwin-Mikke. The period also saw a cluster of completely new parties emerging some of which - like the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna: PPS) and the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe: SN) -


represented attempts to reconstruct historic parties from the pre-war period. This period was also notable for the dissolution of the formerly ruling communist Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza: PZPR) in January 1990 and (at the same gathering) its re-birth as the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polski; SdRP) under the leadership of the young and charismatic Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Similarly, in May 1990 the successor to the former communist satellite United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe: ZSL) amalgamated with a much smaller groupings led by formerly exiled peasantists to form the new Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: PSL). The new PSL attempted to draw on the traditions of the pre-communist peasant movement which had provided the main political opposition to the communists in the immediate post-war years and was initially led by a former Solidarity peasant leader, Roman Bartoszcze.

However, during this period both politics in general, and the process of party formation in particular, were dominated by developments within, and the subsequent decomposition of, the Solidarity movement. A number of small parties soon began to emerge from within the movement, some of which had parliamentary representation in the Solidarity Citizens’ Parliamentary Club (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny: OKP) including: the Gdańsk-based Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyzne: KLD); the Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe: ZChN) linking a number of groupings committed to re-building the Polish state on the principles of the Catholic faith; the more liberal Poznań-based Party of Christian Democrats (Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów: PChD); and the Polish Peasant Party-Solidarity (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Solidarność: PSL-S), an offshoot from the Solidarity Individual Farmers’ union. None of these new parties were of any real political significance and, initially at least, most Solidarity leaders were hostile to the separateness which party formation implied and chose to present themselves as a stabilising force and part of a broad movement representing the whole of civil society. Indeed, Solidarity, together with the other East European political conglomerates which oversaw the democratic transitions and dominated the first phase of post-communist politics, displayed little interest in transforming itself into a political party with some of its leaders questioning whether the formation of Western-style parties in the traditional form was even appropriate in the post-communist context.44 The results of the first free Local Elections held in May 1990 appeared to confirm that it was the social movement formula rather than any of the formally

constituted political parties or established patterns of party politics that appealed most to Polish citizens at this stage.45

Signs of growing dissatisfaction with the Solidarity-sponsored government’s economic programme, centred on Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz’s proposals for rapid liberalisation and marketisation, hastened the process of political division and put ideas of party formation more firmly on the political agenda during the spring and early summer of 1990. As Solidarity leaders began, with reluctance in many cases, to recognise the necessity of developing parties to structure and sustain their new democratic institutions, the simmering tensions within the Solidarity elite worsened. They finally burst into the open in April 1990 when Lech Wałęsa, who remained leader of the now politically marginal trade union, launched a campaign for the presidency around the slogan of ‘accelerating’ political and economic change. Thus began the ‘war at the top’ which led to the decomposition of the Solidarity movement, initially into two broad camps, and the pluralisation of the Polish political landscape with new parties coming into being as the side-effect of this dispute over different strategies of reform and personal conflicts. The first major political grouping to emerge from the Solidarity movement was the Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum: PC) formed in May 1990 by Jarosław Kaczyński as a broad coalition, including a number of existing small right-wing and centre-right parties, to spearhead support for Wałęsa’s presidential candidacy. As a direct response, two rival organisations were in order to create a more coherent organisational infrastructure capable of channelling support for the Mazowiecki’s government (and subsequently for his rival presidential bid) with the inauguration of the Forum of the Democratic Right (Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej: FPD) and the larger Citizens’ Movement-Democratic Action (Ruch Obywatelski-Akcja Demokratyczna: ROAD) in June and July 1990 respectively.

However, the fact that post-communist Poland’s first fully contested national elections held in November-December 1990 were presidential rather than parliamentary did not really provide the most appropriate backdrop for an orderly process of party development. Indeed, the presidential campaign was completely overshadowed by the extremely bitter and personalised conflict between Wałęsa and Mazowiecki’s respective supporters. Nevertheless, as Table 1.1 shows, although Wałęsa finished (as expected) clearly ahead on the first ballot he fell well short of an overall majority (39.96%) and the previously unknown, and somewhat eccentric

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Polish-Canadian emigre businessman Stanislaw Tymiński, made a surprisingly strong showing (23.10%) and pushed Mazowiecki (18.08%) into third place. Wałęsa was, however, comfortably elected to the presidency by a decisive majority winning 74.75% in the second round and the Tymiński phenomenon rapidly faded into political oblivion. While former communist Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who stood as an independent left-wing candidate supported by SdRP and the former communist-sponsored trade union federation, the All-Poland Agreement of Trade Unions (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych: OPZZ), did surprisingly well (9.21%), the two overtly ‘party’ candidates, Roman Bartoszcze (PSL – 7.15%) and Leszek Moczulski (KPN – 2.5%) both achieved disappointing results.

The process of party formation accelerated and the number of parties proliferated during the second phase of party development in the run up to the first fully competitive parliamentary elections held in October 1991. In December 1990 the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna: UD) was established under Mazowiecki’s leadership by his supporters in ROAD, the FPD and his local election committees. Wałęsa’s appointment of KLD leader Jan Krzysztof Bielecki as the new premier following Mazowiecki’s resignation suddenly brought the previously little-known party into considerably greater prominence. The PC also transformed itself from a political conglomerate into a more traditional and structurally coherent individual member-based party at its first Congress in May 1991 - although it failed to gain Wałęsa’s hoped-for endorsement and its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, subsequently lost his job in the Presidential Chancellery and became one of his former mentor’s bitterest critics. Following their failure to conclude an electoral alliance with the PSL, the two ‘post-Solidarity’ peasant groupings - the PSL-S and the Solidarity Individual Farmer’s union - agreed (together with another smaller peasant party) to contest the elections on a common platform as the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Alliance (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Porozumienie Ludowe: PSL-PL). The PSL’s decision to stand independently was one of the reasons for Roman Bartoszcze’s replacement as leader by the 31-year old former ZSL activist Waldemar Pawlak.

The October 1991 parliamentary elections were contested by as many as 111 ‘election committees’ formed by parties and political groupings and provided the first real test of strength for the new parties. The increasingly divided Polish society and differentiated political culture together with the advanced state of party fragmentation and a highly proportional election law combined to produce an even more fragmented

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and polarised parliament than had been feared. 29 different election committees secured parliamentary representation but, as Table 1.2 shows, it was the very even distribution of the vote which confounded all predictions with ten parties and groupings obtaining 16 or more seats in the 460-member Sejm, with the share of the vote for the seven largest ranging between 7.48% and 12.31%.

The largest of these, the UD, accomplished a bare plurality of the votes (12.31%) and won only 62 Sejm seats. The Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: SLD), a specially assembled coalition based on SdRP and the OPZZ together with other unions, youth, women’s and other social organisations that had enjoyed patronage during the communist era (discussed in greater detail in the chapter on parties as membership organisations), finished a close second (11.98% and 60 seats). The other eight parties and groupings obtaining significant parliamentary representation were: the Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka: WAK) committee based on the ZChN, which did surprisingly well and finished third in spite of a modest institutional base (8.73% and 49 seats); the PC-based Citizens’ Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum: POC) (8.71% and 44 seats); the PSL (8.67% and 48 seats); the KPN (7.50% and 46 seats); the KLD (7.48% and 37 seats); the PSL-PL (5.46% and 28 seats); the Solidarity trade union, which decided to stand as an independent grouping led by Wałęsa’s successor Marian Krzaklewski, rather than joining any party-led electoral coalition (5.05% and 27 seats); and the Polish Beer Lovers’ Party (Polska Partia Przyjaciół Piwa: PPPP), an environmentalist and pro-business grouping, somewhat less frivolous than its name suggested (3.27% and 16 seats).

The third phase of Polish party development ran from October 1991 until the September 1993 parliamentary elections and was characterised by the continued disintegration and re-alignment of those parties that had emerged from the initial divisions within the Solidarity camp. The range of parties represented in, and extensive fragmentation of, the 1991-93 parliament led to the formation of unstable coalition governments. Together with the deep antagonisms between the post-Solidarity party leaders and further divisions of the existing parties into various

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47 On the 1991 parliamentary elections see: F. Millard, "The Polish Parliamentary Elections of October 1991", Soviet Studies. Vol 44 No 5. 1992. pp837-855; and T. Żukowski, "Wybory parlamentarne 91", Studia Polityczne. Vol 1 No 1. 1992. pp39-50; and S. Gebethner, ed. Polska scena polityczna a wybory. Warsaw: Fundacji Inicjatyw Społecznych Polskich w Europie. 1993. Of the 460 Sejm seats, 391 were elected in 37 districts proportionally (each containing between 7 and 17 seats) and with the number of seats calculated using the Hare-Niemayer system with no threshold applied. The remaining 69 seats were apportioned nationally on the basis of votes of the total votes cast in all constituencies to parties which had registered candidates in at least five districts and either gained more than 5% of the total vote or had their candidates elected in at least five districts.
factions which characterised this parliament, this provided little by way of example to encourage institutional consolidation.

During the first six months of the new parliament the main focus of political attention and controversy was Jan Olszewski’s radically anti-communist but unstable and short-lived, minority government based on a coalition comprising the PC, ZChN and the PSL-PL. The PSL-PL split almost immediately after the election: with one faction composed largely of Solidarity Individual Farmers’ union activists led by Gabriel Janowski reconstituted as a formally-registered party but retaining the same name; and the PSL-S breaking away and eventually re-naming itself the Peasant-Christian Party (Stronnictwo Ludowo-Chrzeñictwie: SLCh) in May 1992. The most significant haemorrhage of support, however, occurred in the PC following the collapse of Olszewski’s government in June 1992. Although Olszewski was formally a PC member and the party’s leader Jarosław Kaczyñski both engineered his government’s installation and supported the premier in his increasingly acrimonious battle with President Wałęsa, in practice the party exerted little influence over him and frequently criticised and distanced itself from both his government and the premier himself. The divisions within the party came to a head over the so-called ‘lustration affair’ in May-June 1992 when Olszewski’s ZChN-nominated Minister of the Interior Antoni Macierewicz produced a list of alleged communist security service collaborators which included President Wałęsa and several parliamentarians including a number representing parties which had emerged from the democratic opposition. After the ensuing no-confidence vote in his government, and amid mutual recriminations and charges of political disloyalty, Olszewski left the PC with a substantial group of deputies to form the Movement for the Republic (Ruch dla Rzeczpospolitej: RdR). The PC went on to suffer splits throughout the remainder of the 1991-93 parliament as more deputies and members left to join other parties and groupings or simply declared their political independence.

Following an unsuccessful attempt to create a new government around PSL leader and stop-gap premier Waldemar Pawlak, a broad and seemingly-incompatible seven-party coalition government was formed led by UD-nominee Hanna Suchocka, which included the UD, ZChN, KLD, PSL-PL, SLCh, PChD, PPPP and was brokered and supported by the Solidarity trade union. Nevertheless, although they managed to avoid a PC-style implosion, both the main coalition partners in the Suchocka government were also subject to damaging splits. The ZChN entered a period of crisis following the downfall of the Olszewski government and expulsion of Macierewicz (whose list of alleged collaborators included his own party leader Wiesław
Chrzanowski) for his handling of the ‘lustration affair’ which led to the formation of the breakaway Christian-National Movement ‘Polish Action’ (Ruch Chrześcijańsko-Narodowy ‘Akcja Polska’: RChN ‘AP’). Six UD deputies led by Aleksander Hall also defected in September 1992 to form a separate Conservative Party (Partia Konserwatywna: PK) and deprive the party of its status as the largest parliamentary club.

The contrast between the instability of, and caprice among, the post-Solidarity parties and the SdRP/SLD and PSL’s relative cohesion was particularly striking and the two ‘successor’ formations used this period to consolidate their position on the Polish political scene. SdRP/SLD worked patiently to refashion itself as a modern European social democratic formation of constructive reformers with a social conscience and benefited from the impressive performance of its new generation of leaders, particularly Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The PSL also gained both credibility and political re-habilitation from Pawlak’s short interlude as premier in June 1992. Both parties also benefited from increasing disillusion with successive Solidarity-based governments’ perceived failures to deal with the social consequences of liberal economic reforms and the excessive clerical influence on public policy, while the shrill anti-communist fervour of elements of the Polish right seemed increasingly remote from most Poles’ everyday concerns. Consequently, as Table 1.3 shows, the September 1993 parliamentary elections which followed the Suchocka government’s defeat in a parliamentary no-confidence vote in May (ironically proposed by the Solidarity trade union) saw impressive performances by the SLD (20.4% and 171 seats) and the PSL (15.4% and 132 seats). The UD failed to capitalise on Suchocka’s personal popularity and was reduced to third place (10.59% and 74 seats) while the Labour Union (Unia Pracy: UP), a new party formed in 1992 by a number of small social democratic groupings emerging from the Solidarity movement and reformist ex-communists who chose not to join SdRP, also performed well and finished fourth (7.28% and 41 seats).

A new electoral law explicitly designed to favour larger parties and avoid the extreme fragmentation of the 1991-93 parliament magnified the SLD and PSL’s success as

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49 The most important difference lay in the introduction of a 5% threshold for individual parties and 8% for electoral coalitions, but the new law also increased the number of electoral districts from 37 to 52, changing the counting method to d’Hondt and increased the threshold for obtaining national list seats to 7%.
did the divisions within the post-Solidarity camp, particularly the Polish right’s inability to unite around a common electoral platform. This meant that: only six electoral committees secured parliamentary representation (together with a small number of representatives from the German minority who were exempt from the threshold requirements); the two successor parties won nearly two thirds of the seats in the Sejm with only 36% of the vote; and 35% of the votes were cast for parties, mainly on the right, which failed to cross the new thresholds. Of the unambiguously right-wing parties only the KPN (5.77% and 22 seats) and a new, Wałęsa-inspired formation, the Non-party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (Bezpartyjny Blok na Wspierania Reform: BBWR) (5.41% and 16 seats) were able to secure minimal parliamentary representation. Apart from that the remainder of the Polish right and centre-right - the Catholic Electoral Committee ‘Fatherland’ (Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy ‘Ojczyzna’: KKW’O’) comprising the ZChN, KP, SLCh and PChD (6.37%), the Solidarity trade union (4.90%), PC (4.42%), KLD (3.99%), UPR (3.18%), and the Coalition for the Republic (Koalicja dla Rzeczpospolitej: KdR) comprising, among others, Olszewski’s RdR and Macierewicz’s RChN ‘AP’ (2.70%), and the PSL-PL (2.37%) - failed to cross the new thresholds and found themselves excluded from the new parliament.

The fourth phase of Polish party development ran from the September 1993 parliamentary elections through to the November 1995 presidential elections. The new SLD-PSL coalition government which emerged under PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak was the first since 1989 to enjoy a stable majority in the new legislature, although Pawlak was actually replaced as premier by SdRP/SLD-nominee Józef Oleksy in March 1995 (following a budget crisis precipitated by President Wałęsa). However, the only ‘post-Solidarity’ parties which drew the logical conclusion from their 1993 election defeat were the UD and KLD who amalgamated in April 1994 to form a new party, the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności: UW): initially under Mazowiecki’s leadership until he was replaced by his former Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz in April 1995.

There was also a flurry of unity initiatives on the Polish right in the aftermath of their election defeat, the most significant of which where: the Secretariat of Centre-right Groupings (Sekretariat Ugrupowań Centroprawicowych: SUC) comprising a number of small parties associated with Jan Olszewski (who had been ousted as leader of, and subsequently resigned from, the RdR in December 1993); the November 11th Agreement (Porozumienie 11 Listopada: P11L) formed mainly by ‘liberal conservative’ parties such as the KP, SLCh PChD and UPR; and the Contract for
Poland (Przymierze dla Polski: PdP) involving a number of parties and groupings centred on the ZChN and PC but also including other right-wing parties of a more Catholic-nationalist hue such as the PSL-PL and RdR. However, in spite of these and countless other unity initiatives and attempts to put aside personal and ideological animosities this period did not really see any consolidation on the Polish right. None of these blocs succeeded in making much of an impact beyond the narrow circles of committed activists and all of them gradually disintegrated leaving the Polish right hopelessly divided. Even its qualified successes in the June 1994 local elections, when the right managed to win seats in a large number of towns and villages, were achieved as a result of coalitions that were brokered locally and often in spite, rather than because, of national leaders' efforts.

The Polish right reached its nadir in November 1995 when its inability to present a united front and agree on a single, common candidate in the presidential elections paved the way for SdRP/SLD leader Aleksander Kwaśniewski's victory. The most significant attempt to select a common right-wing candidate - the St Catherine’s Convention, a ‘primary’ involving 14 parties and the Solidarity trade union as an observer - ended in fiasco and the four right-wing candidates that eventually contested the first round expended as much energy on attacking one another as they did on Kwaśniewski. As Table 1.4 shows, having ignored the Convention and been snubbed by all the main right-wing parties, it was actually Lech Wałęsa who unexpectedly emerged as the right's standard-bearer, winning 33.11% in the first round (to Kwaśniewski’s 35.11%), although with the post-Solidarity formations unable or simply unwilling to rally their supporters behind him he lost narrowly in the second round by 48.28% to 51.72%. More generally, the 1995 presidential election results highlighted the organisational weakness of even the apparently stronger Polish parties and, with the exception of Kwaśniewski, all the party-sponsored candidates – Jacek Kuroń (UW – 9.22%), Waldemar Pawlak (PSL – 4.31%), Tadeusz Zieliński (UP – 3.53%), Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz (ZChN – 2.76%) and Janusz Korwin-Mikke (UPR – 2.4%) – achieved disappointing results.

Kwaśniewski’s triumph was, however, to prove the SdRP/SLD’s high water mark. The fifth phase of Polish party development, from the November 1995 presidential elections until the September 1997 parliamentary elections, began with the SLD-PSL coalition government immediately embroiled in crisis when premier Józef Oleksy was forced to resign in January 1996 following (unproven) allegations by Wałęsa’s outgoing Minister of the Interior that he had collaborated with Russian security services. Oleksy was replaced by a non-party SLD nominee, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, although as a mistaken act of solidarity, SdRP elected the discredited and increasingly unpopular former premier to replace Kwaśniewski as party leader.

Initially, however, it appeared that the previous pattern of right-wing inertia punctuated by doomed unity initiatives would repeat itself. Wałęsa failed to capitalise on his election result and even the two right-wing groupings represented in parliament, the KPN and BBWR, proceeded to split. The exception to this general pattern on the Polish right was the formation of the Movement for Poland’s Reconstruction (Ruch Odbudowy Polski: ROP) in November 1995, an attempt to capitalise on Jan Olszewski’s relatively good showing in the presidential elections (6.86%). Initially at least, the ROP was able to take advantage of the increasing polarisation of the Polish political scene around attitudes towards the past and garnered significant support. However, the more significant development proved to be the formation of Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS) in June 1996 by 22 parties and other groupings (including the ZChN, PC, both KPNs, one of the BBWRs, the PK, PChD and RdR) spearheaded by the Solidarity trade union. The key difference between AWS and other previous right-wing unity initiatives was that it was not a partnership of equals; the Solidarity trade union acted as the clear hegemon and thereby provided the new grouping with an unprecedented organisational cohesion.53

AWS made an immediate impact on the Polish political scene and was soon running neck and neck with the SLD in the opinion polls. Indeed, in the run up to the September 1997 parliamentary elections, when most of the research on which this project is based was conducted, it was possible to identify six main parties and groupings - AWS, the SdRP/SLD, UW, PSL, ROP and UP - around which the Polish party system appeared to be consolidating. As Table 1.5 shows, these parties and groupings emerged at the front of the pack in the September 1997 parliamentary elections with AWS the clear winner (33.83% and 201 seats) ahead of the SLD who, 53 See: A. Szczerbiak, 'Harmonising the Discordant Right', Transition. Vol. 3 No. 6. 1997. pp44-47; and M. Wenzel, 'Solidarity and Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność. An Attempt At Reviving the Legend', Communist and Post-communist Studies. Vol 31 No 2. 1998. pp139-156.
in spite of increasing its share of the vote to 27.13%, saw its Sejm representation reduced to 164 seats.\textsuperscript{44} The UW was able to pull ahead of the chasing pack winning 13.37% of the vote and emerge as the new parliamentary ‘kingmaker’ with 60 seats, while the PSL saw its share of the vote halved to 7.31% and number of seats slashed to 27. The ROP won just enough support enough to secure parliamentary representation (5.56%) but this only translated into 6 seats, while the UP narrowly failed to cross the threshold (4.74%).

The only other significant developments during this phase were: the defection of a number of right-wing deputies and activists from the UW and their amalgamation with the PK and SLCh into a new Conservative-People’s Party (Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe: SKL), in January 1997; and the brief emergence of the National Party of Retirees and Pensioners (Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów: KPEiR), which at one stage in mid-1997 appeared that the might join the leading group. However, as Table 1.5 shows, the KPEiR, failed to live up to its earlier promise and finished well behind the top six - partly because of the confusion caused by the emergence of a rival pensioners’ party (an AWS-inspired spoiler with a similar name and acronym), although even these two groupings’ combined votes fell well short of 5%. The SKL, on the other hand, contested the September 1997 election as part of the AWS coalition (of which, as noted above, the PK and SLCh had already been members anyway). In other words, neither of these developments affected the essential dynamics of the party system during this phase nor its consolidation around the six main political groupings that form the core sample on which this research is based.

Although the \textit{sixth phase} of party development, which runs from September 1997 to the October 1998 local elections, falls outside the scope of this research it is worth noting that, broadly speaking, it was characterised by the further consolidation of the Polish party system around four out of these six groupings - AWS, the SdRP/SLD, PSL and UW - with the ROP and UP falling behind and in steady, but seemingly inexorable, decline.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Modelling party structure and organisation in post-communist Poland}

The overall objective of this research is, therefore, to examine the six main parties and political groupings that have emerged in post-communist Poland from a structural and organisational perspective by utilising the models set out in Western party theory and to consider how the new parties approximate to these taxonomical ideals. As the first in-depth, single-country study of party structure and organisation in post-communist Eastern Europe, it will help us to draw broader conclusions about the process of party development and thereby shed light on an important aspect of the more general process of post-communist democratisation in the region. At the same time it will augment the relatively undeveloped body of material on internal party affairs in the more general political science literature and make an empirical contribution on which to make broader judgements about the applicability and usefulness of the theoretical models that have been developed on the future of the contemporary party.

Chapter two examines the internal distribution of power and modes of representation within the new Polish parties both in terms of formal power structures and actual practices. In doing so it considers: the relationship between the parties' parliamentary and non-parliamentary leaderships, the party leaders' power and autonomy vis-a-vis their rank-and-file members, and whether power is concentrated nationally, dispersed locally or follows a stratarchic model.

Chapter three considers the role of the party bureaucracy: the size of, and relationship between, the bureaucracies attached to the party central offices and the parliamentary parties, the party bureaucracy at the local level and its relationship with local parliamentarians, and the extent to which the new Polish parties utilise external professional advisers and consultants.

Chapter four looks at the relationship between parties and their electorates, particularly: whether the new parties focus their electoral appeals on specific and clearly defined socio-economic groups or whether they attempt to attract broader and looser constituencies, and whether or not these electoral strategies are reflected in their voting profiles. The September 1997 parliamentary election is examined as a specific case study both of how the parties operationalised these strategies and the degree of ‘leader-orientation’ and personalisation in Polish party politics.

Chapter five considers the development of parties as membership organisations: how many members the new Polish parties have, their levels of local implantation, what extent they are attempting to encapsulate their electorates in party structures and
ancillary organisations, and the role of local party branches. This chapter also examines the related issues of: what priority membership recruitment and local party development are assigned in the parties' organisational strategies, and the incentives and impediments to citizens joining parties in post-communist Poland.

Chapter six examines the relationship between parties and the state, particularly: what kind of state financial and material support the new parties receive and what provisions are made for state-guaranteed party access to the mass media. In both cases the broader question of whether or not there is evidence of a pattern of inter-party collusion to create a cartel of privileged insiders is considered.

A final, concluding section considers the overall similarities and differences between the new Polish parties and the contemporary Western party models, together with the broader implications of the type of party structure and organisation that is developing in post-communist Poland for the process of democratisation. More fundamentally, there is an assessment of just how useful these models really are in helping us to understand the kind of party structure and organisation that is emerging in post-communist Poland in particular and Eastern Europe in general.

The question of how each of these Western models corresponds to each of the various aspects of party structure and organisation under consideration, together with hypotheses about why we might expect to see the new parties' to develop in a particular way, is explored in greater detail at the beginning of each chapter. However, as an overall preliminary hypothesis I would broadly agree with those commentators who have attempted to make structured projections about the way party organisation is likely to develop in post-communist Eastern Europe and have argued that the new parties are likely to develop as: centralised bodies in which elite leadership groups supported by small, professionalised party staffs play a predominant role; with loose electoral constituencies, a low membership base, relatively weak local organisational structures and social implantation; and a concomitant high level of orientation towards, and dependence upon, the state. For example, in a critical examination of the prospects for party development with a primary emphasis on the Czech Republic, Kopecky has argued that the new East European parties are likely to develop as formations with "loose electoral constituencies, in which a relatively unimportant role is played by party membership and the dominant role by party leaders." 56 Similarly, Lewis and Gortat have suggested that the new parties are "not only lacking anything like a mass membership, but they

56 'Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe', p517.
are generally devoid of any developed organisation at all."57 In other words, drawing on Western party models, there seems to be general agreement that the new parties are, in general terms, more likely to resemble the 'post-modern' catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel party rather than the traditional mass party model.

However, as a caveat to this overall hypothesis we might draw a distinction between the organisational 'successors' to the ruling communist parties and their allies (the SdRP/SLD and PSL in the case of our sample) and those newly established parties which have had to develop without the benefit of an organisational legacy from the communist period (AWS, the UW, ROP and UP). Hypothetically, the 'successor' parties are more likely to retain, at least in relative terms and in a post-communist context, some of the former strengths of the traditional mass party model, such as: relatively high levels of membership and structural development; healthy finances and good material resources; and some pre-existing levels of party identification among particular segments of the electorate.

57 Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland', p603.
CHAPTER TWO:

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN PARTIES

This chapter examines the new Polish parties’ internal decision-making structures and the distribution of power between their different elements. Following Katz and Mair, rather than simply analysing them according to a simple ‘parliamentary-extra-parliamentary’ or ‘leader-member’ dichotomy the parties are disaggregated into three, analytically distinct ‘faces’: the ‘party in public office’ (the party organisation in parliament and government); the ‘party central office’ (the national leadership of the party organisation); and the ‘party on the ground’ (party members and activists throughout the country).

Historically, each successive model of party organisation was characterised by a different distribution of power between these ‘faces’. In the cadre party model, the ‘party’ was limited to parliamentarians so that: the party on the ground and the party in public office were almost inter-changeable, there was little need or desire for a party central office and, consequently, the question of the internal distribution of power did not arise. In the classic mass party model the relationship between the three faces was essentially a hierarchical one with the parliamentary party accountable to the extra-parliamentary elite and party membership in whose name it acted. In other words, the party in public office were the agents of, and were controlled by, both the party on the ground, manifested organisationally in the party Congress and other intermediary bodies, and the party central office, embodied in a national executive which was elected by the party on ground to articulate and elaborate the party programme and scrutinise and direct the party in public office on a continuous basis.

With the development of the catch-all/electoral professional party models the pattern of authority remained a hierarchical one but in reverse flow - top-down rather than bottom-up - and these parties were characterised by a centralisation of power and strengthening of the party leadership segment, particularly the party in public office. As the party in public office increasingly dominated the party in central office, the

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3 See: Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activities in the Modern State.
role of rank-and-file intermediary bodies was downgraded and the party on the ground marginalised.  

In the most recent cartel party model power the party in public office remains the dominant of the three ‘faces’ and continues to assert its autonomy from the party central office (and thereby the party on the ground) or even to straightforwardly control it by increasing the ex-officio representation of parliamentarians on the party executive at the expense of the party on the ground. However, while the party on the ground’s input into national party policy and strategy is further reduced, the distribution of power also becomes more stratified, as the party in public office does not interfere in its day-to-day running and it becomes far more autonomous as far as local politics is concerned. The cartel party model is also characterised by an increasing tendency for the party in public office to make a more careful distinction between different elements within the party on the ground and employ circumvention strategies of ignoring the traditionally more troublesome layer of what might be termed the ‘organised party on the ground’ (the middle-level activists who occupy local party offices and serve as delegates to intermediary bodies) by appealing directly to the more passive and disaggregated membership at large. The latter are felt to be more likely to endorse the policies and candidates supported by the party leadership, thereby providing a further disincentive for intermediary bodies to challenge the party leadership.  

So what kind of internal distribution of power might we expect to see developing in the new parties in post-communist Poland?  

Firstly, as Panebianco points out, “charismatic components” are always evident in the early stages of party formation and organisational consolidation and parties are often characterised by a pattern of leader-domination during their “genetic phase.”  

Moreover, most of the new Polish parties were top-down organisations with their origins at an elite level - often formed on the basis of personal relationships or around specific personalities. If not actually ‘internally-created’ within parliament, then they certainly acquired parliamentary representation at a very early stage in their  

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6 Political Parties: Organisation and Power. p52
development rather than being built up on the basis of an extra-parliamentary organisational structure. This - together with the fact that, as van Biezen points out, the new parties in post-communist Eastern Europe had an "institutional rather than a societal origin" and were likely to "primarily focus on their role as institution builders and policy-makers, manifesting themselves as parliamentary (and governmental) actors" - will further enhance the bias towards party leaders, especially the leaders of the party in public office (but also possibly some kind of subordinate party central office) and produce a weak party on the ground. Consequently, in relation to the internal distribution of power between the three faces, the new Polish parties are likely to conform to the more recent catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel models of party organisation with the party in public office enjoying a high degree of power and autonomy over a subordinate party central office, and the organisationally weak party on the ground also playing a relatively unimportant role. Incidentally, the fact that, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, the new parties have developed with access to public funding, and are consequently more dependent on the state, together with the key role played by the public mass media in the new parties' communications strategies further enhances the power of the party leadership, particularly the party in public office.

Secondly, as stronger institutions which inherited at least some of their predecessors' membership and organisational networks, the two 'successor' parties - SdRP and the PSL - may display more of the characteristics of the mass party model with a more significant role played by the party central office which may, in turn, be subject to a greater degree of control by intermediary bodies representing the party on the ground. However, as Kopecky points out, as parties which have also undergone a process of organisational and ideological transformation associated with building a new identity in response to systemic pressures, the leaders of the 'successor' parties also played an important role in the emergence and consolidation of what were, in many respects, also 'new' parties. Consequently, the 'successor' parties may also, although perhaps not to the same extent as in the wholly 'new' parties, be subject to the same logic of party leaders securing an important role within the party structure.

Thirdly, given their overall organisational weakness most Polish parties are unlikely to have a strong enough bureaucracy attached to their party central office to be able to

8 'Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe', p 521.
effectively monitor and intervene in the activities of their local branches other than on a sporadic basis. Consequently, in line with the cartel party model, the new Polish parties are, therefore, likely to vest their territorial structures with a relatively high level of autonomy when it comes to local politics and day-to-day party management.

Fourthly, the new parties are, however, unlikely to correspond to the other key characteristic of the cartel party model of consulting individual party members over the heads of the organised party on the ground. This is partly because of the probable lack of certain necessary organisational resources, such as centralised membership lists, but also, more significantly, because party leaders' lack of knowledge about their own members' ideological profiles will create uncertainty as to whether or not such strategies are likely to produce the desired results in terms of legitimating the position of the party leadership.

So how does one test the above hypotheses and locate where power lies within the new Polish parties' organisational structures? An assessment of the distribution of power between the three party 'faces' requires an analysis of three particular sets of intra-party power relationships. Firstly, the relationship between the party in public office and the extra-parliamentary 'faces', which is examined by focusing on the formal position of the parliamentary fractions within the party rules and the role of the 'faces' in the development of key elements of party policy and strategy. Secondly, the power and autonomy of the party central office in relation to intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground focusing on: the mechanisms for the election and dismissal of party leaders and executive committees; the extent to which one of these 'faces' enjoys an authoritative say on the selection of party candidates for public office and the formulation of the party programme and strategy; and whether or not there is any evidence of party leaders using referenda or membership ballots to circumvent the organised party on the ground. Thirdly, the pattern of local-national relations examining: how much autonomy local party organisations enjoy; whether or not national leaders attempt to influence local politics; and the party central office's powers to suspend local branches and overturn their decisions - particularly in relation to the party leadership's powers to intervene in the selection of, and formally approve, local parliamentary candidates lists.

9 The party bureaucracy is, as noted above, examined in more detail in a separate chapter. 10 While obviously extremely important in terms of intra-party democracy, the question of just how 'democratic' local parliamentary selection procedures themselves actually were, and whether they were simply confined to local elites or involved all party members, is not considered in detail here as it is not of direct relevance to the particular inter-relationship being examined: whether certain decisions are taken at local or national level.
The basis for much of this analysis is what Katz and Mair term the 'official story': the formal organisational models and structures as they are set out in party rules and Statutes - supplemented, where appropriate, by explanatory statements derived from party documents or interviews with key party officials. Katz and Mair make a strong case for using official party rules and statements as at least a useful starting point for analysing the relationship between the party 'faces' and the party’s own conceptions of power, authority and legitimacy. Like written constitutions, for example, party Statutes formally enshrine certain procedures and rights which leaders cannot change without recourse to the relatively complicated procedure of amending the Statute itself.

However, it is important to bear in mind that there are a number of important limitations to an approach based solely on the examination of power structures as set out in the 'official story.' Statutes are often silent on important matters - such as the process for nominating election candidates - or ambiguous on those which are discussed in detail. More importantly, power relationships exist outside the formally documented procedures and if a party body lacks real power and authority in practice then an analysis confined to its formal, statutory position will actually reveal very little about the distribution of power within a given party. Similarly, new non-Statutory organisational structures can often develop, during election campaigns for example, which modify the formal power relationships within the party. Moreover, in practice the three 'faces' may overlap, particularly at leadership level, to an extent that the real power of one of the 'faces' is greater than that the official story would indicate. The national organs of the party central office or the party on the ground may, for example, formally enjoy the exclusive right to determine party policy and strategy - and the number of formal, ex-officio representatives of the party in public office may be relatively small - but the actual persons who are elected to them may, in practice, be drawn mainly or exclusively from the parliamentary leadership elite. It is also important to note that intra-party power relationships are part of a dynamic process and if, for example, the party central office leadership initially comprising non-parliamentarians enter parliament then this could shift the locus of power without any formal modifications to the party rules.

Consequently, it is important, as far as possible, to balance the 'official story' with an analysis of the 'real' story of how the parties’ decision-making structures operate in practice by focusing, where possible, on actual cases of political conflicts which

emerge in the course of policy-making and candidate selection, and the degree to which the individual representatives and senior personnel comprising each of the key bodies of the party ‘faces’ are distinct or overlap. Although elements of the ‘real’ story are introduced into the argument where possible and relevant, this account is, of necessity, heavily skewed towards the ‘official story’. Quite simply, power relations within these parties are only just taking shape and insufficient time has elapsed since their formation (or transformation in the case of SdRP and the PSL) to properly supplement the formal, official sources with anything other than preliminary judgments about how they may operate in practice.

Although this chapter focuses primarily on identifying the locus of power by analysing the party decision-making structures, there are, of course, a number of other dimensions which need to be considered in order to make a full assessment of the inter-relationships between the party ‘faces’. These include: the number of party staff attached to bureaucracies supporting each of the ‘faces’; the distribution of state funding between them; and the possibilities of party access to the public mass media. All of these issues are considered at various points in other chapters and their impact on the internal distribution of power within the parties is incorporated into the general conclusion to this thesis.

Party decision-making structures

Before examining each of these three inter-relationships in detail, it is worth briefly outlining briefly the internal decision-making structures of the six parties and groupings surveyed. In addition to government ministers, the ‘party in public office’ consisted of parliamentary fractions - known as Parliamentary Clubs or Circles - each of which elected a Chairman and Presidium. Four out of the six parties surveyed (SdRP, PSL, UW and UP) enjoyed parliamentary representation during the 1993-97
parliament. It was estimated that approximately 40% of the 171 Sejm deputies and 37 Senators elected as part of the SLD coalition in 1993 were SdRP members, and a number of others subsequently joined to swell the party’s ranks in parliament to 107 by the end of the parliament. SdRP’s hegemony within with the SLD Parliamentary Club was further underlined by the fact that, in June 1997, 15 out of the 29 Presidium members, including the Chairman and five out of the seven Vice-Chairmen, were party members. The PSL and UP Parliamentary Clubs numbered 132 deputies and 35 Senators and 41 deputies and 1 Senator respectively in 1993 - although the UP suffered a large number of defections during the course of the parliament and by the end its Sejm representation was reduced by one sixth to 33. The UW Parliamentary Club was formed at the same time as the party in April 1994 and encompassed the 74 deputies and 6 Senators elected as UD candidates together with one KLD Senator - although a number of UW parliamentarians also defected during the course of the parliament reducing its final tally to 65 Sejm deputies and 7 Senators.

As groupings that were ‘externally-created’ after the 1993 elections neither the ROP nor AWS had formally constituted Parliamentary Clubs or Circles during the 1993-97 parliament. In September 1997, however, 201 AWS Sejm deputies and 51 Senators were elected to parliament and formed an AWS Parliamentary Club, while 9 of the 11 parliamentarians elected on the ROP ticket (6 Sejm deputies and 5 Senators) went on to form a Parliamentary Circle. The SLD (164 Sejm deputies and 28 Senators) and UW (60 Sejm deputies and 8 Senators) both returned Parliamentary Clubs of a similar size, while the PSL’s parliamentary representation was slashed to only 27 Sejm deputies and 3 Senators and the UP failed to cross the required threshold of 5% of the votes and lost all of its seats. It was estimated that SdRP members comprised approximately 60% of the new SLD Parliamentary Club.

Although they used slightly different terminology to refer to them, the party central office leadership structure was broadly similar in all of the parties and groupings

16 Ibid.
17 Although 38 Sejm deputies and 12 Senators were elected in 1993 from the parties and groupings that went on to form AWS, and there were various attempts to organise proto-AWS Parliamentary Clubs and Circles, there was no formal link between these structures and the AWS extra-parliamentary organisation. One Senator elected on the Solidarity trade union ticket in 1993 also subsequently joined the ROP.
18 SdRP’s December 1997 Congress also passed a resolution stating that the offices of SdRP party leader and SLD Parliamentary Club Chairman should be combined. See: E. Olczyk, ‘Leszek Miller nowym przewodniczącym’, Rzeczpospolita. 8 December 1997.
surveyed. The party leader was referred to as the Chairman (SdRP, UW, UP, ROP and AWS) or President (PSL) who together with other party officers (Vice-Chairmen/Presidents, General Secretaries, Treasurers) comprised the party's 'narrow' leadership. The parties' national executive committees were known as: the Presidium (SdRP and UP), Supreme Executive Committee (PSL), Board (UW), Main Board (ROP) or, in the case of AWS, firstly as the Co-ordinating Group and then since April 1998 as the Presidium. Additionally, and confusingly, SdRP and UP also had a separate Central Executive Committee and Executive Committee respectively which were nominally responsible for party organisation as distinct from policy-making, although these functions tended to become blurred in practice, with the party Presidia, in both cases, de facto responsible for all aspects of party management.

The territorial structure of the organised 'party on the ground' was, in most cases, based primarily on Poland's 49 administrative provinces (województwa) - although these provincial organisations were known as districts (okręgi) in the UP and ROP and regions (regiony) in the UW - which encompassed the parties' basic organisational units. The parties' 'intermediary' bodies generally consisted of a national party Congress - which met once every two (PSL, UW and UP), three (ROP) or four (SdRP) years - and a national party Council - known either as the Supreme Council (SdRP, PSL and ROP) or the National Council (UW and UP). In addition, SdRP organised a broader annual party Convention, while the PSL held special National Electoral Conventions to select the party's candidates for national parliamentary and presidential elections.

As a coalition of parties and organisations based on a trade union rather than an individual member-based organisation, AWS's territorial structure and 'intermediary bodies' - and their respective relationships with the party central office - were all somewhat different from those of the other groupings surveyed. At the national level, the AWS National Council comprised representatives from all the grouping's national affiliates rather than from AWS territorial structures. AWS's organised party on the ground comprised Regions which corresponded to the Solidarity trade union's

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19 Before January 1997 also known as the Presidium.
20 The UP actually consolidated its party central office leadership into a single National Executive Committee following a change to its statute approved by the February-March 1998 party Congress. The UW also attempted to achieve such a functional separation by establishing a General Secretariat (UW) - although this was a much looser, less formal and unelected body and, therefore, not strictly analogous.
21 Following local government reforms these were replaced by 16 larger provinces in January 1999.
22 Sub-provincial party organisation is examined in greater detail in a separate chapter.
23 Decisions were taken on the basis of voting through shares with the Solidarity trade union having a guaranteed 50% share, but all decisions required a 75% majority.

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organisational structures (some of which encompassed more than one province) and were made up of representatives from the AWS affiliates' own territorial structures in that region together with other purely local organisations (such as local groupings of right-wing councillors).

Parliamentary-extra-parliamentary party relations

An examination of the relationship between the parties' parliamentary and extra-parliamentary faces, revealed that the party in public office played a much less dominant role than hypothesised. There was a clear, formal division between the party central office leadership and the leadership of the party in public office and, although the status of the parliamentary fraction party was often unclear, varied from party to party and was sometimes not even mentioned directly in the party Statute, it was invariably considered to be in a clearly subordinate relationship to the party’s extra-parliamentary organs.24

Perhaps unsurprisingly given our hypothesis that its inheritance of a relatively robust extra-parliamentary organisational network from the communist era would mean that its internal distribution of power would bear a closer resemblance to that of the mass party model, it was the PSL parliamentary fraction which was formally the most subservient to, and whose activities were most precisely regulated by, the party’s extra-parliamentary bodies. Firstly, the PSL was the only party whose Parliamentary Club’s Procedural Rules had to be approved by, and could not be amended without the consent of, the national party Council. Secondly, both the party Statute and the Club’s Procedural Rules explicitly stated that the parliamentary fraction “implements the PSL programme and policies on the territory of the Sejm and Senate, acting in accordance with the PSL programme together with the Congress, Supreme Council and Supreme Executive Committee resolutions” while the Club Presidium “remains in permanent contact with the Supreme Executive Committee in matters of current PSL policy” and members of the party’s governing bodies “can participate in sittings of the PSL Parliamentary Club with an advisory voice.” Thirdly, the party executive

24 This was confirmed by research undertaken by van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and de Muyzenburg which found that 66% of Polish parliamentarians surveyed felt that the party national executive had the greatest say in determining party policy compared with 27.2% who cited the parliamentary fraction. Interestingly, however, 43.2% of them felt that the parliamentary fraction should have the final say in the event of a difference of opinion, compared with 36.1% who said that it should be the national executive. See: A. van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and M. van den Muyzenburg. ‘Orientation to the State? Parliamentary Parties in Hungary and Poland and their relations with Party in Central Office’. Paper prepared for the International Conference on ‘The New Democratic Parliaments: The First Years’, 24-25 June 1996, Ljubljana, Slovenia.
had the right to present local parties “with an opinion on the parliamentary work of the candidates in the given area” when they sought a renewed mandate.

In formal terms, therefore, the PSL parliamentary fraction was simply responsible for organising the party’s work in parliament rather than developing either party policy or strategy or taking key personnel decisions and there were also numerous cases of how, in practice, such decisions were often taken by extra-parliamentary body. The most striking example of this was the systematic way in which the party central office and intermediary bodies assessed the activities of PSL-appointed government Ministers during the course of the 1993-97 parliament. According to the PSL Statute the party Council “assesses the activity of PSL members in state, local self-government and other social organisations of an all-national reach” while the party executive’s tasks included “determining the principles of and managing the PSL’s personnel policy.” In February 1997, this clause was interpreted to mean that the party executive could remove the PSL-appointed Deputy Premier and Agriculture Minister Roman Jagieliński. Interestingly, although Jagieliński’s supporters challenged his removal they did so on the basis that this decision should have been taken by the party Council and not the party executive - no one argued that it lay within the parliamentary fraction’ competencies.

Although they afforded their parliamentary fractions slightly greater autonomy, the UW and UP party rules also both posited a clearly subordinate relationship for the party in public office to their respective parties’ extra-parliamentary organs. Firstly, both party Statutes described the Parliamentary Clubs as their parties’ “representation in parliament.” Secondly, according to the UP Statute and the UW Parliamentary Club’s Procedural Rules their parliamentary fraction’s function was to “implement the programme and policies” of their respective parties within the parliamentary forum - although the formulation contained in UP Parliamentary Club’s Procedural Rules that the fraction should be “guided in its work by the UP Congress and National Council resolutions” which “represent the basis for the elaboration of the Club’s position” was somewhat weaker. Thirdly, both party Statutes obliged their parliamentary fractions to maintain close contact and consult with their party executives (or, in the case of the UW, with the party leader and deputy leader if this was impossible) “on relevant questions” in the case of the UW and “current policies”

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25 For a useful summary of the official position on the role of PSL parliamentarians see the interview with the then party Council Chairman Józef Zych in: ‘Wybory potwierdziły nasze wpływy’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 July 1994.
in the case of the UP. Moreover, the UW party leader was also automatically a full, voting member of the Parliamentary Club Presidium. His deputy and the party General Secretary had the right to participate in its meetings and the convenors of the UW’s policy commissions, known as the National Secretariats, could also “present the Union’s position at meetings of the Parliamentary Club and its organs.”

Fourthly, while the UP Statute envisaged the party Council “adopting resolutions which are binding on Sejm deputies who are Labour Union members”, the UW Statute actually set out the precise areas in which party Council or national executive decisions were binding on the parliamentary fraction: changes in the constitution, electoral law and local government structure; budgetary and taxation policy, the appointment and dismissal of members of state bodies; concluding parliamentary coalitions; and state security and foreign policy. A good example of how one of these parties’ key strategic decisions was taken by an extra-parliamentary body and not the party in public office was the UP national executive’s controversial and historic decision (by 7 votes to 6 with two abstentions) not to join the SLD-PSL coalition government in September 1993.

As another ‘successor’ party inheriting a sizable grassroots organisational network, we might also have expected SdRP to be characterised by a similar pattern of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary relations to that of the PSL. However, the distribution of power within this party was, in fact, somewhat more complicated with the party in public office in a relatively more autonomous and less subservient position. Firstly, the SdRP Statute contained a much more ambiguous formula in terms of the formal relationship between the party’s parliamentarians and its extra-parliamentary organs. Although, as in the case of the PSL, UW and UP, “the appropriate (SdRP party) councils or their presidia decide which matters require a common position and uniform voting” by SdRP parliamentarians, the latter were only expected to “present” their party’s policies (rather than “represent or “implement” them, or act as the “party’s representation in parliament”) and they were simply bound by “the general principles of party loyalty, links and discipline” rather than being expected to liaise with extra-parliamentary bodies on a regular basis.

Secondly, SdRP’s party in public office operated within the framework of a broader SLD Parliamentary Club which - given that the linkage between the decisions of the

27 Until January 1997, the UW Statute also required relevant party Ministers and Deputy Ministers to take part in the work of the party’s policy commissions, the National Secretariats, if the party was in government.

28 In retrospect, probably the single most important strategic decision in the party’s history. See: ‘Definitywne “nie” Unii Pracy’, Rzeczpospolita. 29 September 1993.
party and Club was an indirect one - meant, theoretically at least, a significant reduction in the SdRP's extra-parliamentary bodies' influence on its parliamentary fraction. For sure, given that it was the most politically coherent element comprising the SLD alliance and, as noted above, both the Club and its Presidium were dominated by the SdRP members, the party's parliamentarians clearly played a hegemonic role in terms of determining Club policy - with many crucial SLD Club decisions taken de facto at meetings of the SdRP governing bodies. Nonetheless, this de facto pattern of submission of SLD Club to party governing bodies was not formalised and, therefore, had to involve at least some element of consultation with the party's coalition partners, thereby acting as a filter between SdRP parliamentarians and extra-parliamentary bodies.

As noted above, the ROP and AWS only obtained formal parliamentary representation after the September 1997 election and, consequently, did not really address the issue of the balance of power between their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 'faces' in the party rules. Neither the AWS Charter nor the amended ROP Statute adopted after the election by the party's February 1998 Congress contained any mention of how their parliamentary fractions should be organised and what their relationship should be with their parties' extra-parliamentary decision-making organs. Moreover, the actual relationship between their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary faces was clearly only at an embryonic stage and there was too little data to make anything other than very tentative judgments about how it would develop in practice. However, in so far as they did attempt to define this relationship, both the ROP and AWS parliamentary fractions' Procedural Rules contained the somewhat weaker formula that they (or, rather, "the Sejm deputies and Senators elected from the Solidarity Electoral Action Election Committee lists" in the case of AWS) were their parties' "representation" in parliament, and implemented their party's "programme" and "co-operate" with - rather than implementing all the decisions, and following the directives, of - their parties' extra-parliamentary organs. Uniquely, the AWS Parliamentary Club was also vested with the power to "confirm candidates to constitutional state bodies put forward by the Club Chairman" in stark contrast to, for example, the PSL national executive committee's powers of "managing the party's cadre policy" which, as noted above, included the power to sack a Deputy Premier. Indeed, some commentators noted how the centre of

29 SdRP parliamentary 'caucuses' effectively took place at meetings of the party's national Council, which all the party's parliamentarians were automatically members of. Information supplied by Maciej Porga, author interview, 28 February 1998.

30 According to one commentator, for example, AWS members of the new coalition government were determined "not by representatives of parties making up AWS but by the very narrow AWS
decision making shifted to the Parliamentary Club and its Presidium, while the AWS party Council and executive committee were increasingly marginalised, after the September 1997 election.  

Nevertheless, while the AWS and, to some extent, SdRP/SLD party rules envisaged slightly greater autonomy for their parliamentary ‘faces’, the general pattern revealed in the ‘official story’ appeared to be that of a much less dominant role for the party in public office than hypothesised. There were, however, two important caveats to this general finding which emerged from an examination of the ‘real story’ of how these organisational models operated in practice.

Firstly, even if in theory (and sometimes in practice) there were many examples of key elements of party strategy and policy being determined by extra-parliamentary bodies, it was simply not feasible for them to determine, or even significantly influence, every proposed piece of legislation being debated and voted on in a given session of parliament, never mind the countless decisions taken by party representatives in government. In practice, most of these were considered and determined autonomously by the party in public office. This was partly because, while extra-parliamentary organs could not be in permanent session, parliamentary fractions and their governing bodies could meet before, and even during the course of, every parliamentary sitting. Moreover, parliamentarians and government ministers were simply much better informed than non-parliamentarians and, therefore, as UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech put it, on many occasions they “take responsibility for the entire party.” This factor was not, of course, unique to post-communist Poland but common to all parties, governments and legislatures operating in modern, complex democratic states.

Secondly, and perhaps even more significantly, every party with significant parliamentary representation was characterised by a substantial overlap between their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary leaderships. Although, for example, the


31 The AWS party Council only met twice in the four months following the election, while the reconstitution of the Co-ordinating Group as the ‘AWS Presidium’ in April 1998 (to include the leaders of all the main parties represented in the AWS Parliamentary Club) was an explicit attempt by the AWS party central office to regain the policy-making and strategic decision making initiative from the party in public office. See: ‘Decyzje potem’, Rzeczpospolita. 3 February 1998; and ‘Prezydium na czele Akcji’, Rzeczpospolita. 16 April 1998.

32 Author interview with Miroslaw Czech, UW Secretary-General, 19 February 1997. For an interesting account on how SdRP extra-parliamentary bodies found it increasingly difficult to hold SdRP-nominated Ministers to account after the 1993 parliamentary elections see: E. Kaszuba, ‘Pozorny spokój lewicy’, Rzeczpospolita. 11 January 1994.
positions of party and parliamentary fraction leader were formally separated, in practice, they were often occupied by the same person. The PSL’s Waldemar Pawlak and the UP’s Ryszard Bugaj, for example, combined the leadership of their respective parties and parliamentary fractions throughout the 1993-97 parliament. Similarly, SdRP leader Aleksander Kwaśniewski was also SLD Parliamentary Club Chairman until he resigned both positions following his election as President at the end of 1995 - although he was succeeded by SdRP General Secretary Jerzy Szmajdziński, and not the new party leader Józef Oleksy, as SLD Club Chairman. Following the September 1997 election, the UP lost all of its parliamentary representation and the PSL divided the party and parliamentary fraction leadership between Jarosław Kalinowski and Janusz Dobrosz respectively, although Leszek Miller once again combined the SdRP and SLD leaderships and the AWS and ROP leaders, Marian Krzaklewski and Jan Olszewski, were also leaders of their respective parties’ parliamentary fractions. An important exception was the UW which has ensured that these two positions remained separate since the party’s formation in April 1994, with Tadeusz Mazowiecki the first party leader and Bronisław Geremek parliamentary fraction leader. Indeed, Mazowiecki was actually replaced as party leader in April 1995 by a non-parliamentarian, Leszek Balcerowicz, and, although Balcerowicz was subsequently elected a Sejm deputy in September 1997, the UW retained a divided leadership, with party deputy leader Tadeusz Syryjczyk assuming the Parliamentary Club Chairmanship.

Moreover, as Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show, in February 1997 83%-100% of the ‘narrow’ leaderships and 75%-92% of the national executives of the four main parties represented in parliament comprised Sejm deputies or Senators. Indeed, as Table 2.3 shows, there was also a large overlap between party and parliamentary leaderships with 36%-75% of party executive members in these four parties also Parliamentary Club Presidium members. Ironically, the fact that for a period of time the UW leader was not even a parliamentarian actually encouraged this party to increase the overlap the membership of the two bodies in order to create a ‘strategic leadership’ that would avoid the fragmentation of party management. Following the September 1997 election, while the proportion of parliamentarians within individual parties’ extra-parliamentary governing bodies changed - with, for example, a significant reduction in the case in the PSL reflecting the substantial reduction in its parliamentary leaderships
representation - the general pattern remained unchanged with Sejm deputies and Senators comprising 80-100% of the ‘narrow’ leadership and 86-90% of the national executives of the three main parliamentary parties. Indeed, the domination of party bodies by parliamentarians even extended, although not quite to the same extent, to the party’s ‘rank-and-file’ intermediary bodies. As Table 2.4 shows, in February 1997 Sejm deputies and Senators comprised 28-52% of the membership of the four main parliamentary parties, and, in the new parliament, the figures remained broadly the same in the case of SdRP and the UW and fell in the case of the PSL and the UP only as a result of their reduced parliamentary representation.36

PSL and UW parliamentarians were also automatically full voting delegates to their party Congresses and, for example, comprised one quarter of the delegates to the 1995 PSL Congress and 15% of the 1998 UW Congress delegates.37 SdRP and PSL parliamentarians were also automatically delegates to the party’s annual Convention and National Electoral Convention for selecting the party’s presidential candidates (although not the Convention for parliamentary candidate selection) respectively. Even where parliamentarians did not enjoy formal, automatic representation, in practical terms they often dominated party Congresses and Conventions through their election as ‘rank-and-file’ delegates and their ability to set the tone of and dominate the key debates through their greater knowledge and political experience.

Indeed, it is interesting to note that, generally speaking, the ex-officio representation of parliamentary fractions on party national executives was minimal. Apart from the UW - where the Parliamentary Club Chairman and his two deputies constituted three out of the twelve party executive members - only the AWS and UP parliamentary fractions had one ex-officio representative each on their respective party executives (the Club Chairman in the case of the latter) while the PSL parliamentary leader was a non-voting member and ROP parliamentarians could attend executive meetings with that body’s consent.38 The fact that there was high de facto rather than ex-officio level of parliamentary representation on extra-parliamentary bodies meant, of course, that

36 As noted above, SdRP parliamentarians and, until January 1997, UW ministers were automatically party Council members.
37 E. Czaczkowska, ‘Czas Pawlaka się nie kończy’, Rzeczpospolita. 17 February 1995; and M. Subotić and F. Gawryś, ‘Czas dla partii rządzącej’, Rzeczpospolita. 2 March 1998. However, UW parliamentarians, together with members of the party’s outgoing governing bodies, could not comprise more than 30% of the total Congress delegates and the proportion of parliamentarians to the 1996 PSL Congress was somewhat reduced following an increase in the total number of delegates from 700 to 1200 and will be further reduced at future Congresses due to the reduction in the size of the parliamentary fraction. Until October 1996, UP parliamentarians were also automatically (and could comprise up to 30% of) Congress delegates and before March 1994 they had unlimited and automatic representation.
38 For AWS see: ‘Prezydium na czele Akcji’. 
parliamentarians were members of these bodies as *individuals* and not *collective* representatives of their party’s parliamentary fractions, and did not, therefore, automatically denote that the extra-parliamentary ‘faces’ were controlled by the party in public office. Nevertheless, the fact that the parties’ parliamentary fractions and their extra-parliamentary decision-making organs were, in many cases, composed of essentially the same individuals must lead one to seriously question the posited formal subordination of the party in public office and made the relationship between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party ‘faces’ an extremely difficult one to unravel for analytical purposes.

Interestingly, most party leaders saw this enormous overlap of party and parliamentary elites as a completely normal and unproblematic feature of Polish politics. The PSL, for example, rejected an attempt to prevent party-appointed Ministers from simultaneously holding party positions and according to the party’s programmatic director Jan Wypych, “even if we had more parliamentarians on our governing bodies then I don’t think we’d think anything of it.” Although admitting concern that too many parliamentarians should not occupy key positions at local level, such as provincial party Chairman, UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech also justified this overlap of elites on the grounds that, “the most active politicians are parliamentarians.” Indeed, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik argued that functional specialisation was a luxury for more established parties while, “in a party that is still developing...such a rivalry between parliamentary and party leadership could be very damaging...We are too young a party...This issue does not arise when you are only at the start of developing democratic mechanisms.” Similarly, his party colleague and fellow national executive member Artur Siedlarek argued that “removing the possibility of uniting party and Parliamentary Club functions...is quite simply suicide in an organisationally weak party.”

**Leaders and members**

In addition to the party in public office being, in formal terms at least, much less dominant than hypothesised, an analysis of the relationship between the party central

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40 Author interview with Jan Wypych, Head of PSL Programmatic Department, 20 February 1997
41 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
42 Author interview with Wojciech Borowik, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs, 19 February 1997.
43 Author interview with Artur Siedlarek, UP Presidium member and Parliamentary Club Secretary, 11 June 1997.
office and the organised party on the ground also revealed a much greater than anticipated role assigned to intermediary bodies representing the party rank-and-file. Given that the relationship between AWS affiliates' rank-and-file members and the AWS national leadership was organised through their own party or organisational structures, the relationship between AWS 'leaders' and 'members' was not analogous to that of the five parties surveyed. In other words, the AWS National Council was an 'intermediary' between the AWS party central office and its national affiliates rather than with its territorial structures and this section, therefore, confines itself to analysing the relationship between the party central office and the intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground in the five individual member-based parties.

Although the pattern varied across the parties, the powers of rank and file intermediary bodies to appoint, hold to account and dismiss party leaders and play a decisive role in the selection of party candidates for national public office was quite considerable. The leaders of all five parties surveyed were directly elected by their party Congresses, and - with one or two exceptions - party national executive committees were elected by party Councils, for two (UW and UP), three (ROP) and four year terms of office (SdRP and PSL). Except for the small number of national executive members elected directly by their party Congress or parliamentary fractions, party Councils had the power to dismiss any or all of their party executives at any point and, in most cases, have actually exercised this power. In December 1995, for example, the PSL's national Council dismissed seven of the party's fifteen national executive members following its defeat in the recent presidential elections, while the UP and UW national Councils also removed party executive members, Jan Maria Rokita and Wojciech Lamentowicz respectively, for failing to support their parties' position during this campaign. In October 1997 the UP Council also dismissed ten out of its seventeen executive members following the party's parliamentary election defeat.

44 The five SdRP Vice-Chairmen and General Secretary were elected by the party Congress and three UW national executive members were appointed and dismissed by the party's parliamentary fraction. Until January 1997 the UW deputy leader was also elected by the party Congress, as was the entire ROP national executive until February 1998. Prospective ROP national executive members, however, still required the party leader's nomination.

45 See: E. Czaczkowska, 'Prezes bez zaufania', Rzeczpospolita. 18 December 1995. Their dismissal was confirmed by the party Council in January 1996, see: 'Negocjować do skutku', Rzeczpospolita. 29 January 1996.

46 See: 'Rokita usunięty', Rzeczpospolita. 4 December 1995; and 'Sąd nad Lamentowiczem', Rzeczpospolita. 4 December 1995. Admittedly both of these moves were instigated by the party leaderships rather than the rank and file.


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Although generally more difficult to initiate, procedures also existed in most of the parties for intermediary bodies to remove party leaders themselves before their term of office expired. The PSL party Council was the most powerful in this respect and could remove the party leader “if at least 50% plus one of the Supreme Council’s statutory members declares this” and was the only one of the five surveyed where an intermediary body had actually removed two leaders during their terms of office: in June 1991 the Council suspended, and convened a special Congress to dismiss, Roman Bartoszcze and in October 1997 the party Council removed Waldemar Pawlak by 64 votes to 42 (63 votes being required). The UP party Council also had the power suspend the party leader “for activity contrary to the provisions of the law or the provisions of the Statute” and transfer his competencies to another Council member by a two-thirds majority, or to shorten his term of office on other grounds either by a three-quarters majority vote or by convening a special Congress - which it did in October 1998 when it shortened Ryszard Bugaj’s term of office by eight months. SdRP leaders could also be removed between Congresses if they failed to secure a vote of confidence at the annual party Convention - although, to date, none of them had done so. The UW and ROP leaders, on the other hand, could only be removed by special party Congresses which could be convened by either their party Councils, one third of the UW provincial councils or one quarter of the entire ROP membership.

The power to select the parties’ presidential candidates was also formally vested in intermediary bodies: the PSL’s Electoral Convention and SdRP, UW and UP party Councils - although, in practice, these three parties actually devolved this decision to the more even more broadly representative party Convention (SdRP) or Congress (UW and UP) during the 1995 presidential election. The ROP, which was formed immediately after the 1995 election, made no mention of the procedure for presidential candidate selection either in its original or, more surprisingly, in its

48 The same Congress also lowered the threshold required for the party Council to remove an incumbent leader from a two-thirds majority to a simple majority. Information supplied by Janusz Gmitruk, Director, PSL Institute of Peasant Movement History, 17 June 1997.
50 See: ‘Rozlicza spokojnie’. Bugaj resigned the party leadership before the subsequent Congress.
51 In fact, all party officers and national executive members had to automatically face an annual vote of confidence at the party Convention although the only example of a member of the party leadership failing to win such a vote was the party Treasurer in February 1992, who had previously been suspended from his position anyway. See: ‘Ani rewolucja, ani rewelacja’, Rzeczpospolita. 17 February 1992.
amended 1998 Statute - although, by implication, this power also lay with the party Council which “confirms the principles for preparing electoral lists prepared by the Main Board.” Similarly, the power to determine the composition of the parties’ national lists of Sejm deputy candidates also lay with either with the party Council (SdRP, UW, UP and ROP) or, in the case of the PSL, the party’s Electoral Convention (excluding parliamentarians) with the party Council determining the order of candidates.52

Intermediary bodies were also vested with considerable formal powers to determine party policy and strategy. In all five cases the party Congress was formally the “supreme” (SdRP) or “highest” (UW, UP, ROP) governing body with ultimate responsibility for “approving the party programme.” Party Councils (and also the annual party Convention in the case of SdRP) were responsible for determining the main directions of party policy, strategy and tactics between Congresses such as, for example, with whom to conclude electoral pacts or governmental coalitions; although the ROP Statute contained a slightly weaker and more ambiguous formulation that the party Council “assesses the political situation and, in relation to this, takes day-to-day decisions together with communicating appropriate recommendations to the Board.”53 Interestingly, the UP party Council was even vested with the explicit right to suspend party executive decisions if they were “contrary to the provisions of the Statute or collide with the provisions of the law or resolutions of governing bodies of a higher level”, while the ROP Council could also “annul the decisions of other Movement governing bodies which are contrary to the Movement’s Statute and programme.” In every party except the PSL, the party Councils also appointed and supervised the work of the expert commissions responsible for policy development and drafting the party’s programmatic documents.54

One key element of the organised party on the ground that performed a particularly significant role within the parties’ overall power structures was the provincial party Chairman. Firstly, provincial Chairmen were strongly represented in party

52 Polish Sejm deputies are elected in two tranches. The first tranche of 391 deputies are elected from 52 local electoral constituencies (one constituency being co-terminus with a province except for Warsaw which was had two and Katowice which had three) by proportional representation among those parties which secure 5% or more of the vote nationally. The second tranche of 69 deputies are also elected by proportional representation from a national list of candidates among those parties securing 7% or more of the vote nationally.
53 Until February 1998 the ROP party Council also “elaborated the basis for co-operation with other political organisations” which it presented to the party executive for acceptance.
54 This was previously also the responsibility of the ROP party executive, but since February 1998 this body could only convene commissions and working groups to deal with “defined organisational problems.”
intermediary bodies. They were automatically delegates to the SdRP party Convention and PSL National Electoral Convention and played a particularly influential role within the national party Councils of which they were ex-officio members in the case of the ROP and (since January 1997) the UW and most of them were de facto members even in those parties which did not make provision for their automatic representation. In February 1997, for example, 35 out of the 49 PSL and SdRP and 14 out of the 33 UP provincial chairman were also party Council members. Secondly, most of the parties held regular, non-Statutory consultations with their provincial Chairmen as a means of two-way communication with the party on the ground. These consultations were particularly influential, and semi-formalised, in the case of the PSL where, for example, the provincial Presidents played a crucial role in propping up the beleaguered party leader Pawlak at the beginning of 1996 but also prepared the ground for his subsequent removal by the party Council in October 1997. Similarly, two consultations of SdRP provincial chairmen held prior to the party’s 1998 Congress convinced the then party leader Józef Oleksy not to stand for re-election. The ROP also organised monthly national meetings of provincial Chairmen and, following his election as UW leader, Leszek Balcerowicz introduced the practice of holding separate meetings for them on the day prior to party Council meetings. Thirdly, in many cases provincial Chairmen were also local parliamentarians which further increased their influence within both the local and national party power structures - although this also made it difficult to identify them unambiguously as the representatives of the party on the ground and provided further evidence of the blurring of distinctions between the three party ‘faces’. Incidentally, although (as noted above) the relationship was not strictly analogous, it is worth mentioning that, as Chairman of the local Solidarity trade union’s territorial structure - and, thereby, an influential figure within that grouping’s largest ‘shareholder - the AWS regional Chairman was also an extremely influential figure within that organisation’s power structures.

55 Every PSL province had the right to automatically nominate two party Council members while the UP provinces had the right to send a representative (often the Chairman) to participate in an advisory capacity. After the 1997 elections and in the run up to the SdRP’s December 1998 Congress the number of provincial Chairmen on the party Council actually increased to 43 out of 49.


59 Information supplied by: Wojciech Włodarzyk, ROP National Secretary, author interview, 14 February 1997; and Wiesław Różycki, Rzeszów UW Provincial Council Vice-Chairman, author interview, 22 April 1997.
However, in a number of cases the formal powers vested in party intermediary bodies were matched, or even exceeded, by the powerful prerogatives which were assigned to the party central office. In particular, the PSL, UW and ROP Statutes in some respects defined the powers of the party leadership in some respects more broadly than those of the bodies which elected them and to which they were theoretically accountable. The PSL leader, for example, “implements and accounts for the PSL’s day-to-day policies”, “chairs the Supreme Executive Committee and directs its work” and is, as the party’s Executive Office Director Marian Zalewski pointed out, “a statutory organ, with very wide, independent decision-making powers and competencies.” Similarly, the UW Chairman “leads the party,” was “accountable for his activities before the National Congress” not the party Council, nominated the other party officers and spokesmen (Vice-Chairman, General Secretary, Press Spokesman and National Secretaries) and had the power to independently convene a special party Congress. The fact that the ROP leader Jan Olszewski played such a significant role in that party’s formation was also reflected in its Statute, according to which the party leader “directs the work of the Main Board”, “represents the Movement externally and delegates powers of plenipotentiary in this area”, nominated and proposed the removal of the members of the party executive committee and the party Qualification Commission responsible parliamentary candidate selection, could nominate a large number of party Council members for co-option and also had the power to convene special Congresses and party Council meetings. As noted above, both the UW and ROP leaders could also only be removed by a special party Congress during their term of office.

The ROP Statute also contained an important ‘enabling’ clause which specifically empowered the party leader to “allocate all essential dispositions and take decisions not confined to the competency of other governing bodies, for the efficient functioning of the Movement.” Similarly, the PSL national executive was vested with the power to take “decisions and considerations in all matters not regulated in this Statute”, while the UW executive possessed only slightly less sweeping powers in respect of “undertaking decisions on Union matters which are not restricted to the competencies of other governing bodies.” Moreover, as well as being the only

60 Author interview with Marian Zalewski, PSL Executive Office Director, 11 March 1997.
61 Until January 1997 the party Statute stated that he simply “acts in its name.”
62 Until February 1998 the ROP Statute also vested the party executive with the power to “interpret the provisions of the Statute” and “decide on matters not expressed in this Statute” which was, in effect, simply transferred to the party leader.
63 The decision to change the name of the UW’s national executive from the ‘National Council Presidium’ to the ‘Board’ was also supposed to reflect that it was not simply a body representing the party Council but was also endowed with independent functions in relation to the day-to-day political management of party affairs.
example of a party executive that formally nominated the members of the party’s expert policy commissions, the PSL national executive also “establishes the basis, and directs, the PSL’s cadre policy” - which, for example, it interpreted to mean that it, and not the party Council, had the power to appoint and dismiss PSL-nominated Ministers, as in the aforementioned Jagieliński case.44

Since January 1997 the UW party executive has also had the power to suspend a party member in the event of a serious “violation of a Union member’s obligation which causes the party serious harm” which was defined as: being a member of another party or grouping competing with the UW or a rival parliamentary fraction; publicly adopting a position opposed to the Union’s policy outside the meetings of the party’s governing bodies or discussion fora; failing to join the party’s fraction in representative bodies; circulating confidential party information or betraying the party to its political opponents; or embezzling the party’s assets. Similarly, the 1998 February ROP Congress expanded the party executive’s powers to expel party members for “repeatedly acting to the detriment of the Movement or also acting contrary to the Movement’s ideological principles” and suspend them for “conduct not harmonious with the honour of a member of the Movement” as well as being empowered to make “pronouncements in membership matters not restricted to other governing bodies.”45

Moreover, as in the case of the relationship between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary ‘faces’, an examination of the ‘real story’ - particularly the practical constraints within which party intermediary bodies operated - revealed that many of the competencies formally attributed to the organised party on the ground were more apparent than real and that the party central office leadership’s de facto powers were even greater than an analysis based solely on the ‘official’ story suggested.

Firstly, the fact that party Congresses met at two, three or four yearly intervals and that even party Councils only met monthly in the case of the SdRP and “not less than”

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44 Given that a compromise was reached on this issue before the party Council had an opportunity to discuss it, we have no experience of how, in practice, a clash between the two bodies on this issue would have been resolved. See: ‘Jagieliński złożył dymisję’, Rzeczpospolita, 3 March 1997.
45 Perhaps “clarified” would be a more accurate description than “expanded” given that in October 1997 the party executive expelled a number of Jan Olszewski’s opponents in the party Council - including one of the party Vice-Chairmen, Antoni Macierewicz - in spite of the fact that the then Statute vested the power of expulsion or suspension exclusively in the party Court, and only empowered the party executive to delete someone from the membership list “for non-payment of subscriptions for more than one year.” See: M.D. Zdort, ‘ROP coraz bliżej rozłamu’, Rzeczpospolita. 4/5 October 1997.
once a quarter in the case of the other parties surveyed\textsuperscript{66} meant that these bodies were practically incapable of influencing party policy and strategy and holding the party leadership to account on a regular, day-to-day basis. In other words, many of their powers and competencies were \textit{de facto} inevitably assumed by the party executives, which generally met at least once a week. Indeed, only the PSL and ROP party Councils had separate chairmen and presidia responsible for organising and planning their activities, while the UP and UW Councils could only be convened by the party leadership and the SdRP Statute, while not explicit, stated that the party executive "plans the Supreme Council meetings."

Secondly, although they may have formally controlled the policy-making and candidate selection processes, given that they were large and unwieldy bodies which met comparatively rarely they often delegated key decisions to - or simply confirmed or made minor corrections to proposals presented to them by - leadership bodies or expert policy commissions. Although, for example, coalition agreements or electoral pacts may have been concluded within the broad parameters set by, and subject to formal approval by, party Councils the actual detailed negotiations were inevitably confined to much smaller groups of party leaders and experts.\textsuperscript{67} While, as noted above, intermediary bodies were formally responsible for approving the parties' national lists of Sejm candidates, at the 1997 elections the SdRP, PSL and UW party executives presented them with proposed lists to which few changes were generally made, while the UP party Council delegated this decision to its National Election Committee comprising the 'narrow leadership' and the ROP's list was drawn up by the party leader himself.\textsuperscript{68} Similarly, while party intermediary bodies may have formally controlled the process of policy and programmatic development, debates were based on drafts prepared by expert policy commissions which undertook much of the detailed work and which they generally simply confirmed or made minor corrections to. Although these commissions were, as noted above, generally appointed

\textsuperscript{66} According to former ROP Vice-Chairman Jan Parys there were no meetings of the party Council held between June-September 1997. See interview in: ‘Nienawiść do mądrych’ in \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza}. 25 September 1997.

\textsuperscript{67} Since February 1998 a ROP party Council meeting could also be convened by one third of its members.

\textsuperscript{68} Indeed, in October 1993 the UP Council even left the \textit{final} decision on whether or not the party should participate in the SLD-PSL coalition government coalition to the discretion of the party executive after it had provisionally voted to join. See: E. Olczyk, ‘UP chyba chce wejść do rządu’, \textit{Rzeczpospolita}. 14 October 1993.

\textsuperscript{69} Author interviews with Dariusz Klimaszewski, SLD National Election Campaign Staffs National Spokesman, 21 November 1997; Jan Wypych, PSL Programmatic Director, 26 November 1997; Pawel Piskorski, UW Election Campaign Staffs Organiser, 25 November 1997; Piotr Marciniak, UP Election Campaign Staffs Organiser, 19 November 1997; and Wojciech Włodarczyk, ROP Election Campaign Committee Secretary, 27 November 1997.

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by party Councils and their drafts were sometimes subject to broader consultation, they operated under the day-to-day supervision of the party central office leadership.

The preparation of party programmes for the 1997 parliamentary elections is a good example of how a key programmatic decision was, in practice, taken by a fairly narrow group of leaders. According to UW Election Campaign Staffs Organiser Pawel Piskorski, for example, the main decisions on the contents of the party’s 1997 election programme were “taken under the supervision of (party leader) Balcerowicz himself...and it was written by a group of experts...by a right of presumptive empowerment granted to the Election Staffs to formulate such a document and develop it electorally.”

Similarly, according to the party’s Election Staffs Organiser Piotr Marciniak the UP election programme was prepared by “a group of leaders...it wasn’t a formally approved programme...(it was) a summary...a sort of brochure...drawn from a lengthier programme adopted by the Congress.” The ROP election programme was also drafted by a group of experts convened by the party’s main economic policy adviser Dariusz Grabowski and confirmed by the national executive not the party Council. The PSL did not even produce a separate election programme but party functionaries simply, as its programmatic director Jan Wypych put it, “translated the party’s general programme into the language of leaflets.”

This tendency for detailed party policy, strategy and lists of national election candidates to be determined *de facto* by the party leadership had an additional dimension in the case of SdRP, which had to engage in consultations with its partners in the SLD alliance on all these matters. So, for example, although SdRP candidates on the Sejm national list were formally determined by the party Council, their position on the SLD national list was confirmed by a non-party body, the SLD National Electoral Committee. Similarly, while the SdRP’s 1997 party programme was preceded by a lengthy period of rank-and-file consultation and finally approved by a special party Convention and party Council (and eventually, although this took place after the election, the party Congress), the actual SLD election programme was prepared by a group of experts and party leaders following negotiations with other alliance members. Given, as noted above in the case of the relationship between SdRP extra-parliamentary organs and the SLD Parliamentary Club, SdRP’s pivotal influence within the SLD this dilution of the party’s influence should not be exaggerated. In 1997, for example, the SLD National Election Committee comprised

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70 Author interview, 25 November 1997.
71 Author interview, 19 November 1997.
72 Author interview, 27 November 1997.
73 Author interview, 26 November 1997.
two SdRP representatives - party leader Józef Oleksy and General Secretary Jerzy Szmajdziński - together with the non-party SLD premier Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and the leader of the OPZZ trade union federation, Józef Wiaderny. Similarly, the chairman and secretary of the SLD programmatic group were both SdRP leaders (Marek Borowski and Leszek Nikolski) and another key member was the chairman of the SdRP programmatic commission, Izabell Sierakowska. Nevertheless, by creating an additional and informal negotiating and decision-making tier outwith the party structures - and, therefore, beyond the direct control of party intermediary bodies the SdRP party leadership’s autonomy was inevitably increased.

Thirdly, not only were many of the key party policy documents, inevitably drafted by small groups of experts under the supervision of the party leadership, but there also appeared to be little interest among the party rank-and-file in taking advantage of the opportunities which did exist for participation, particularly when it came to programmatic and policy questions. Party Congresses, for example, tended to be dominated by internal party elections and personnel matters rather than policy debates, while research on provincial party officials undertaken by this author revealed a general lack of interest in programmatic issues at the local level. When asked to outline which decisions taken by national party officials were problematical or had aroused controversies among local activists, local officials invariably cited internal organisational matters or those relating to personalities such as leadership or candidate selection rather than programmatic or national policy decisions. SdRP officials cited the leadership’s handling of the issue of debts arising from the former PZPR’s assets; some PSL officials criticised the party leadership’s decision to withdraw their support from Roman Jagelisiński; UP officials pointed to disputes over whom should be the party’s candidate in the 1995 presidential elections and the imposition of local parliamentary candidates by the leadership; while ROP officials criticised the party’s decision to collect half-a-million signatures for a petition

74 Information supplied by Dariusz Klimaszewski, author interview, 21 November 1997.
75 Incidentally, the rank-and-file of the parties and groupings which comprised the AWS electoral coalition inevitably faced a similar problem in terms of the dilution of their influence on their parties’ policy making and candidate selection procedures.
76 Author interviews with: Leszek Majewski, SdRP Plock Provincial Council Secretary, 29 April 1997; and Stanisław Gowida, SdRP Jelenia Góra Provincial Council Secretary, 5 May 1997.
77 Author interviews with: Adam Smoliński, PSL Jelenia Góra Provincial Board President, 3 May 1997; and Sławomir Szatkowski, PSL Gdańsk Provincial Board President, 12 May 1997.
78 Author interviews with: Zdislaw Dumowski, ROP Plock Provincial Board Chairman, 28 April 1997; and Janusz Burszy, ROP Jelenia Góra Provincial Board Chairman, 7 May 1997.
79 Author interview with Boguslaw Kaczmarek, UP Gdańsk Provincial Board Chairman, 14 May 1997.
unrealistically calling for the party’s proposals to be included in the forthcoming national constitutional referendum as a waste of time and resources.\textsuperscript{80}

In the case of SdRP this reluctance to engage in vigorous and public programmatic debate was rooted in an organisational culture based on self-discipline and collegiate decision-making in which internal agreement was highly valued.\textsuperscript{81} An excellent example of this was that, in spite of the fact that SdRP was the only party whose Statute openly declared that “it is possible to form factions within the party” and that the party members forming them could “present their conceptions in the party press, putting forward candidates to all governing bodies” and “set up their own publications,” the only factions operating within the party were those set up to organise specific milieu - young people, ecologists, women - rather than to advance specific ideological options. Similarly, while the UP Statute also allowed party members to form “thematic and milieu sections” which “independently determine their organisational structure and tasks”, elected representatives to party commissions and could include non-party members in their ranks, no ideologically-based sections were formed on the grounds that, as the party Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik put it, “we don’t have such great programmatic differences.”\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, given that the lack of opportunities to independent party factions and platforms limits the opportunities for the party rank-and-file to make a serious input into the party policy-making process, it is noteworthy that neither the PSL nor ROP Statutes acknowledged the possibility of factional organisation although differences of opinion on policy and strategy existed and were openly expressed in both of these parties.

Moreover, the only attempt to establish an ‘ideological’ factional grouping in one of the parties surveyed occurred in the UW whose Statute gave its members the right to “form intra-party programmatic platforms in the form of Clubs, fora or groups, whose formation and procedural rules are dependent on confirmation by the Union Council at the appropriate tier.” Although Ecological, Local Government and Business Fora were established and operated as informal networks without any impediment, the party’s national Council prevented UW left-wingers from establishing an ideologically-based Democratic Forum in October 1994 by 45 votes to 32.\textsuperscript{83} The

\textsuperscript{80} Author interviews with: Zdislaw Dumowksi, 28 April 1997; and Danuta Makowska, ROP Gdańsk Provincial Board Spokesman, 14 May 1997.
\textsuperscript{81} See: Protopartie i Protosystem? p186.
\textsuperscript{82} Author interview, 19 February 1997.
\textsuperscript{83} See: J.B. Lipszyc, ‘Zebny nie odeszla od zasad’, Rzeczpospolita. 14 October 1994; M. Subotic, ‘Mazowiecki przestrzega przed rozbiciem’, Rzeczpospolita. 28 November 1994; and M. Subotic and
UW's decision was no doubt strongly influenced by the experiences of its progenitor party, the UD, which not only allowed organised factions to exist but, at one stage, accorded them formal rights of representation on the party's governing bodies, which created suspicions of ideological factions as bodies which, as the party's General Secretary Miroslaw Czech put it, "disturb the normal functioning of the party...The majority of people's time is spent on matters relating to the party's wings and not on the functioning of normal politics." Indeed, the SdRP Statute also contained a proviso that the formation of party factions was subject to acceptance by the party Council that they were "not guided in their activities by principles contrary to this Statute" and an attempt to set up an 'ideological' faction by SdRP members may also have received equally short shrift.

Fourthly, many of the 'rank-and-file' intermediary bodies which were supposed to represent the organised party on the ground were, in fact, dominated by party leadership elites. The leadership of the party central office - together with, as noted above, parliamentarians - were automatically delegates to the PSL and UW Congresses, the SdRP party Convention and Council, the PSL National Electoral Convention and their de facto representation and influence in these bodies was substantial in every party. The ROP Statute contained provisions for the party leader to potentially nominate a larger number of his own nominees as co-opted party Council members with full voting rights than those elected by the party rank-and-file. Only the UP's intermediary bodies were comprised almost exclusively of delegates and members elected by the party rank-and-file following an amendment to the party Statute in October 1996 removing automatic Congress representation for parliamentarians and party leaders - although, as with the other parties surveyed, there was still a very substantial de facto representation of parliamentarians in these bodies before the UP's defeat in the September 1997 elections.

85 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
86 Until the ROP Statute was amended in February 1998, an unspecified number of party leaders and "founder members" were also automatically party Congress delegates.
87 The only proviso was that the party Council's total membership should not exceed 120 so if the 50 members elected directly by the party Congress, included a large number of the 49 provincial chairman who were automatically Council members then, hypothetically, a majority of Council members could be co-optees. In fact, following the 1998 ROP Congress there were 88 elected members of the party Council leaving the leader scope to propose up to 32 additional co-optees. Before amended in February 1998, the party Statute contained even more open-ended possibilities for the ROP leadership to 'pack' the party Council with its own supporters.
Finally, it is worth noting that only the SdRP Statute made any formal provisions for the party Council to organise all-party polls and referenda, although the UW was, in fact, the only party to directly consult its members by means of a ballot - on the question of whom the party should support in the 1995 presidential elections and even the UW was reconsidering the value of using such mechanisms in future selection processes. As hypothesised, then, there was virtually no evidence of Polish party leaders being attracted to circumventionist strategies such as referenda or membership ballots as a means of appealing to passive individual members over the heads of the organised party on the ground. This was partly because for organisational and tactical reasons: no party central office, for example, held a national central register of members, while a drawn out and cumbersome process of consultations and primaries made the formation of coalitions and pacts - an important feature of Polish electoral politics - more difficult. More significantly, party leaders simply did not know their own party members' ideological profiles very well which meant that there was no guarantee that direct membership ballots would necessarily provide them with the desired result and meant that they were reluctant to risk opening up party decision-making processes in this way. Although the UW ballot was, for example, only an advisory one, it did have a very significant influence in helping the party's eventual presidential candidate Jacek Kuron to secure a narrow victory in the selection at the subsequent party Congress - against the wishes of the then party leader, Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

Local-national relations

Although the actual distribution of power between leaders and members was, therefore, more weighted towards the party central office than an analysis based solely on the 'official story' would suggest, there was also, as hypothesised, evidence that the parties' territorial structures enjoyed a fairly high level of sectoral local autonomy. Firstly, the PSL, UW, UP and ROP provincial councils were all formally responsible for determining and implementing their party's day-to-day policies and activities in the given province; and the UW and UP councils were also vested with the power to develop detailed provincial party programmes of activity. Although the SdRP Statute did not specify its provincial structures spheres of competency, according to the party's head of organisation Maciej Poręba, "the autonomy of the local units...is very considerable...the national structures only deal with the strategic matters." Secondly, the PSL, UW and UP provincial bodies were also assigned

89 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
specific responsibility for monitoring the work of, and maintaining day-to-day contacts with, their parties’ parliamentarians, councillors and local representatives in government administration. The UP provincial councils decisions were “binding upon UP councillors” while the PSL provincial executive committee “implements the cadre policy on the territory of the province.” Thirdly, in terms of financing and staffing matters: the UP provincial council approved the party’s local budget, while the PSL provincial executive “carries out independent business activity and the PSL provincial organisation’s financial business on the basis of the Supreme Executive Committee’s powers of plenipotentiary” and “organises and employs staff in the PSL provincial organisation’s Executive Office.” The SdRP Statute also empowered all party cells to undertake trading activity without the right to obtain special powers of plenipotentiary from the party central office. Fourthly, the UW provincial committee was even specifically empowered to take “decisions in regional matters which are not confined to the competencies of other governing bodies.”

This formal autonomy posited in the party Statutes was confirmed by a survey of provincial party leaders which revealed that officials from all six parties and groupings discerned very little, if any, interference from the national leadership in their day-to-day decisions and activities. An SdRP official, for example, said that, “as a provincial Council...we deal with the issues according to our feelings, according to our view of these matters. I don’t see some kind of centralism here, as there was once was democratic centralism in the PZPR when - in many matters - you had to pick up the ‘phone and square everything with Warsaw.”90 One UW official felt that his party’s national leadership, “trusts us and believes that there are many responsible people here who know better in Plock what is better for the Plock area than the national leadership,”91 while an UP official said that although Warsaw tried to “convince us to do certain things and undertake various kinds of activities, there were never any directives that you have to do it like this and not differently.”92 As an example of such local autonomy, one AWS official cited the case of how the grouping’s local leadership was able to refuse admission to the local branches of certain parties whom they felt to be a disruptive influence, in spite of the fact that

90 Author interview with Kazimierz Wójcik, SdRP Rzeszów Provincial Council Secretary, 22 April 1997.
91 Author interview with Eugeniusz Aleksandrowicz, UW Plock Regional Council Chairman, 29 April 1997.
92 Author interview with Ryszard Nowak, UP Jelenia Góra Provincial Council Chairman, 5 May 1997.
these organisations were national AWS affiliates and their local representatives had been approved by their own parties’ national leadership.⁹³

An excellent example of how such local autonomy operated in practice was the fact that none of the parties surveyed issued guidelines or instructions about how or with whom their local councillors should form coalitions, leaving this decision to the discretion of its provincial organisations. According to SdRP’s head of organisation Maciej Poręba, for example, the party’s local councillors “simply come to the conclusion that there is a group of people that they can reach an agreement with and they form a coalition.”⁹⁴ Similarly, PSL party Council Chairman Józef Zych argued that these decisions depended “on the specific situation in a local milieu” and that the PSL “will enter into coalitions with everybody who is guided by pragmatism and the interests of their milieu,”⁹⁵ while the party’s Executive Office Director Marian Zalewski noted “if...there are couple of partners with whom we work well (at the provincial tier) then it doesn’t have to the same (coalition) as it is at the central tier.”⁹⁶

In February 1997, for example, a number of PSL provincial organisations independently broke off their local coalition agreements with the party’s national coalition partner, the SLD.” ROP’s National Secretary Wojciech Włodarczyk justified this kind of local autonomy on the grounds that “the situation is different in local self-government bodies so it is not possible to regulate this through one decision...National policies are a matter for national governing bodies and local matters are for local bodies.”⁹⁷ The only party which had even considered issuing such a directive was the UW when, in June 1994, the party’s national executive committee instructed its local councillors to either form coalitions with other ‘post-Solidarity’ parties or to give prior notification to, and receive the consent of, the party central office for local coalitions with the SLD. Even this directive was, however, rescinded by the party Council which gave UW councillors the de facto right to conclude agreements with any party or grouping as long as they were “guided by the good of the local and national community”⁹⁸ and an amendment to the UW Statute at the

⁹³ Author interview with Wojciech Buczak, AWS Rzeszów Regional Council Plenipotentiary, 21 April 1997.
⁹⁴ Author interview, 28 February 1997.
⁹⁵ ‘Wybory potwierdziły nasze wpływy’
⁹⁶ Author interview, 6 March 1997.
⁹⁸ Author interview, 14 February 1997.
party's February 1998 Congress confirmed that UW provincial organisations were autonomous “in matters of concluding political coalitions in self-government organs.”

However, it is perhaps an exaggeration to compare this pattern of local-national relations to the “mutual autonomy” or “stratarchy” posited in Katz and Mair's cartel party model. While territorial party structures may, indeed, have enjoyed considerable formal and real autonomy in terms of purely local issues, most local officials added the important caveat that they functioned within the general parameters of their national party’s programme and Statute. This was reflected in the fact that most party Statutes contained clauses which empowered the party central office to intervene in the activities of any local party when it was felt that the party programme or Statute were being violated or where the party nationally was being brought into disrepute.

The formal scope for intervention in local matters was most limited in the case of AWS and SdRP. The AWS Charter simply stated that its territorial structures functioned “on the basis of principles determined at the national level” and that “the AWS programme and principles of functioning are binding on Action members at all levels,” while the SdRP Statute specifically prevented the party leadership from overturning “the decisions of a (local) circle or governing body of a lower tier if they are not contrary to the decisions of the Congress, Conventions or the Statute” with disputed matters determined by an independent party Court.

The other four party’s Statutes, however, contained more explicit provisions for the national leadership to intervene in local affairs. As noted above in relation to the constraints on the powers of rank-and-file intermediary bodies, the PSL, UW and ROP Statutes all contained clauses empowering their party central office leadership to take decisions in all matters not assigned to other bodies or not regulated by the Statute which was, of course, equally applicable in the context of local-national relations. In addition, the PSL, UW and UP Statutes also formally stated that party central office decisions were binding on territorial governing bodies, which could not pass resolutions that contradicted them or violated the provisions of the party Statute. Moreover, the UW, UP and ROP Statutes also explicitly empowered their national party governing bodies to intervene and annul certain local decisions or suspend the activities of territorial structures under certain circumstances. The UW party Council, for example, could “annul the decisions of Union regional governing bodies which are in conflict with the law”, while its national executive committee could “in justified circumstances, halt the implementation of decisions, suspend the activities of given bodies of the realisation of specified functions” and establish provisional local
bodies, subject to a right of appeal to the party Council. Similarly, the UP party Council could “annul and suspend the decisions of UP territorial governing bodies” and, by an absolute majority of votes, shorten their term of office if their “activities violate the Statute or are conflict with the programmatic resolution,” while the party executive Committee could also request that the party Council or Court suspended a territorial governing body. Following amendment by the party’s February 1998 Congress, the ROP Statute also incorporated specific provisions for the party Council to annul “the decisions of other Movement governing bodies contrary to the Movement’s Statute and programme” and, on the basis of a proposal from the party leader or executive committee, to suspend provincial governing bodies.

A good illustration of this pattern of broad sectoral autonomy in terms of purely local issues combined with the party leadership retaining certain reserve powers to intervene in relation to matters affecting the party nationally was the issue of local parliamentary candidate selection. The main focus here is on the procedure for selecting the candidates for the first tranche of Sejm deputies elected from the local constituency electoral lists (okręgowe listy wyborcze) for the September 1997 parliamentary elections and, specifically, whether candidates lists were determined locally in the first instance and whether they were subject to subsequent approval or amendment by the national party leaderships? In one sense, this was specifically a basic question of how much autonomy territorial party structures enjoyed. However, given that it did not simply involve the selection of candidates for a local electoral contest but also took place within the context of an election to a national legislature in which a local party’s choice could have a significant impact on the prospects of the party as a whole, local parliamentary candidate selection was clearly also an issue with a national dimension. As an issue, therefore, it highlights one of problems with this particular feature of the ‘cartel party’ model: that of defining what precisely is a purely local issue when any decision taken by a local party branch could, potentially, have wider implications for the party nationally.

In all the parties and groupings surveyed the first stage of the selection process was almost completely decentralised and, although some of the parties such as SdRP issued general national guidelines suggesting the type of qualities which local parties might look for, the initial local candidates lists were drawn up with virtually no interference or specific recommendations from the party central office. The only exception here was the PSL whose national leadership, as noted above, presented

100 Before 1994 UP local branches and their decisions were simply “subject to suspension or annulment by the appropriate governing body of a higher tier.”
101 See Note 51.
local ‘electoral conventions’ with an assessment of the activities of existing parliamentarians representing that province. These assessments, however, only applied to sitting parliamentarians and, although a very negative assessment could obviously have an influence, the party leadership’s recommendations were not in any way binding on local parties which could choose to ignore them. Indeed, the PSL and (as far as the first stage of the selection process was concerned) SdRP were the only parties whose local parties’ parliamentary selection rights were actually enshrined in their party Statutes rather than the procedure being left to party governing bodies to determine.

However, in most cases local parliamentary candidates had to be centrally approved and the final decision on the composition of local lists was taken by the party leadership - although the extent to which the party central office intervened varied considerably between the parties. At one extreme was the ROP where it was made clear to local parties from the outset that they were only selecting provisional lists of ‘candidates-for-candidates’ and, as one local official put it, their local selections “had more the character of a survey.” All local ROP nominees had to be interviewed and approved by the party central office, and specifically by the party leader, who could change the composition and order of candidates lists in a procedure which one ROP official acknowledged was “heavily centralised and sometimes plainly arbitrary.”

This centralised local parliamentary selection process was subsequently enshrined in the party Statute which, from February 1998, made provision for the establishment of a specially-appointed Qualification Commission for preparing candidates lists, although the power of final confirmation was taken away from the party central office and vested with an intermediary body, the party Council. Similarly UP local candidates had to both approved by a national, non-Statutory ‘Group for the Formulation of Sejm Deputies’ Lists’ - which assessed the competence of local nominees on the basis of lengthy questionnaires and interviews and had powers to intervene in, and recommend changes to, the lists drawn up by local party branches - and (on the basis of this Group’s recommendations) subsequently confirmed by the party’s National Election Committee comprising the party’s ‘narrow’ leadership.

It was estimated that the ROP and UP party central offices intervened in approximately one sixth and one third of the provincial selections respectively (in the

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102 Opponents of the then PSL leader, Waldemar Pawlak, accused him of attempting to use this assessment procedure to purge his parliamentary opponents in the run up to the 1997 elections. See, for example: ‘Jak zdobyć mandat’, Rzeczpospolita. 13 June 1997.

103 Author interview with Zdzisław Dumowski, 28 April 1998.

majority of the larger electoral districts in the UP’s case). Both parties justified such a relatively centralised selection process on the basis of fear that their local party structures were infiltrated by irresponsible elements. In the UP’s case, in particular, the high level of national involvement in local selections was primarily a reaction to the party’s negative experiences during the 1993 parliamentary election when a completely decentralised selection process resulted in the adoption of candidates who proved to extremely embarrassing, or with a shallow commitment, to the party, exemplified by the fact that, as noted above, the party lost almost one sixth of its parliamentary fraction between 1993-97.

Local UW and SdRP candidates lists also had to be centrally approved. UW local lists were subject to review by the party’s national executive and final confirmation by the party Council. Meanwhile, as well being subject to negotiations with their SLD coalition partners at the provincial level, candidates selected by SdRP’s territorial structures also had to pass through three additional stages: eight regional consultations involving representatives from the party central office and the leadership of the OPZZ trade union federation; approval by the party Council; and final confirmation by the SLD National Election Committee. Although opinions among local officials varied as to how much interference there was by the UW and SdRP national leaderships in local selections, approval of locally nominated candidates was generally felt to be a formality, and changes tended to involve the order of candidates rather than the actual composition of the lists. Interventions by the party leaderships also tended to much less systematic than in the cases of the ROP and the UP and were generally confined to cases where: the party central office discovered compromising information about a particular candidate; local parties were asked to leave reserved places on local lists for candidates selected by the national leadership (known colloquially as ‘parachutists’), particularly nationally-known leaders to act as ‘locomotives’ in provinces were the head of the list was relatively unknown; or where a sitting local parliamentarian enjoyed the support of the party leadership but was given a low position on the local lists. In addition, the UW party central office also intervened in local selection

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105 Author interviews with: Wojciech Włodarczyk, 27 November 1998; and Piotr Maricniak, 19 November 1997.
107 In Polish parliamentary elections votes are cast for individual candidates within a local list as well for the party list as a whole. Parties, therefore, present their candidates in order of preference and the names that appear highest on the list - particularly the first and second places - are generally (although not always) those who receive the most votes.
processes when there was a dispute between the local party’s ‘Electoral Convent’ and its provincial Council. 108

Of the parties and groupings surveyed, AWS and PSL territorial structures appeared to enjoy the greatest local autonomy in terms of local parliamentary selection. AWS territorial structures could, but were not obliged to, request that a specially-appointed National Electoral Group, as one local AWS official put it, “put our candidates under the spotlight and draw our attention to any prospective candidates who could damage the grouping as a whole” 109 and they generally left one position on their local lists vacant for which the party central office could nominate its own candidate. Although the National Electoral Group also attempted to exert pressure on a number of local branches to change the order of candidates - particularly in order to satisfy national AWS leaders who felt that their party or grouping had been inadequately represented - it only had the power to make recommendations and final decisions were always taken at the local level. 110 PSL local lists, on the other hand, were not formally subject to any subsequent screening or confirmation by the party leadership - although a certain number of seats were also, by mutual agreement, left for the national leadership to fill with their own nominees in some provinces.

Overall, therefore, local parliamentary selection procedures involved a high level of local autonomy in their early stages although, in most cases, national leaders retained certain reserve powers to intervene in, alter the composition of and confirm local lists when it was felt that local decisions could damage the interests of the party as a whole. Even then, these interventions generally tended to be rare and involved minor corrections relating to: screening local candidates’ biographies for compromising information, instructing or encouraging local parties to implement the terms of national electoral agreements, resolving local disputes or - particularly in larger electoral districts - occasionally imposing a national ‘parachutist’ on a local list. This was broadly consistent with the hypothesised pattern of local party structures enjoying high levels of autonomy on matters of an exclusively local character combined with the national party leadership retaining certain, sparingly exercised, reserve powers of intervention and, therefore, resembling - although, except perhaps in the cases of the...
PSL and AWS, falling a slightly short of - a ‘stratarchic’ distribution of power. Indeed, it is worth noting that Polish electoral law stipulates that local parliamentary candidates lists can only be submitted by a nationally-approved plenipotentiary, thereby ensuring that all national party leaders had a de facto power of intervention in, and final confirmation of, local parliamentary candidates lists - even in those parties such as the PSL were there was no formal requirement for local lists to be nationally approved. Such a ‘semi-stratarchic’ pattern of local-national relations, of course, also re-inforced the power and autonomy of both local parliamentarians (who, as we shall see, plays a key role in local politics because of their access to financial resources and organisational infrastructure) and provincial party Chairmen.

Conclusion

An analysis based on the ‘official’ story, therefore, revealed less concentration of power in the party in public office, a more significant role for parties’ extra-parliamentary decision-making organs and, consequently, a greater conformity to the mass party model in terms of the internal distribution of power than hypothesised. Indeed, the responsibility for many key policy and strategic decisions was formally vested in extra-parliamentary bodies rather than in parliamentary fractions. Similarly, intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground also appeared to play a greater role within the new Polish parties than hypothesised; particularly in relation to their formal powers of electing and dismissing party leaders, selecting candidates for public office and approving party programmes and key elements of party strategy. In particular, the leaders of the provincial party organisations emerged as important actors in all the parties’ formal and informal power structures, although the fact that many of these supposedly ‘middle-ranking’ leaders were also parliamentarians made it difficult to unambiguously identify them as a factor strengthening the influence of the party on the ground.

However, there were also considerable variations between the parties, although the hypothesised distinction between ‘successor’ and ‘new’ parties was not really a helpful one in terms of identifying them. While the PSL, for example, certainly appeared to display some mass party characteristics - in the sense that the parliamentary fraction was perceived as simply a vehicle for organising the party’s work within the parliamentary forum and implementing party decisions taken by the party’s extra-parliamentary organs - parliamentarians representing SdRP, the other ‘successor’ party, appeared to enjoy a much more autonomous role. This was partly due to the less subordinate position of the SdRP party in public office posited in that
party’s Statute but also, perhaps more significantly, to the fact that SdRP parliamentarians had to operate within framework of a broader SLD parliamentary fraction. Indeed, this requirement to negotiate with, and secure the co-operation of, coalition partners within both the SLD Parliamentary Club and National Election Committee also increased the power of the SdRP party central office in relation to the party on the ground in terms of both the candidate selection process and key programmatic and strategic decisions. Interestingly, the decisions of the parties and groupings comprising AWS also had to pass through this additional ‘filter’ and AWS’s parliamentary fraction also appeared to be developing as a relatively autonomous party ‘face’. On the other hand, both the PSL and two ‘new’ parties, the UW and ROP, vested their party leaders or national executives with considerably greater formal power and autonomy than did SdRP and the UP, which even attempted to formally separate policy-making and organisational functions into two distinct party central office leadership bodies. There was, however, virtually no evidence of party leaders employing ‘circumventionist’ strategies of appealing to individual party members in order to by-pass intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground.

Moreover, an examination of the ‘real’ story of how party institutions and power relations operated in practice revealed that the new Polish parties’ parliamentary and leadership elites played a more dominant role than suggested by an analysis based solely on the ‘official’ story as set out in party Statutes and rules. This pattern of de facto leader or parliamentary domination was partly rooted in the fact that the fact that, in common with many of the new parties in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe, the incumbents of many formally separate party offices frequently overlapped. In parties with parliamentary fractions, for example, extra-parliamentary organs were invariably dominated by representatives of the party in public office who - together with other members of the party elite - were also strongly represented in ‘rank-and-file’ intermediary bodies. Given that they were generally elected as individuals and not as collective ex-officio representatives of the party in public office, the substantial representation of parliamentarians among the party central office leadership or on intermediate bodies did not, of course, automatically denote that these ‘faces’ were somehow ‘controlled’ by the party’s parliamentary fraction. Indeed, the very fact that key parliamentarians attempted to combine the leadership of the party’s parliamentary fraction with that of the party central office and with membership of intermediary bodies, in some senses actually underlined the importance of the latter within their parties’ internal power structures. Nevertheless, this overlap of elites did make it much more difficult to determine the locus of power
within the new Polish parties and implied that the ‘official story’ set out in the party rules was somewhat misleading.

This pattern of de facto leader-domination also functioned in a more subtle way related to phenomena which are increasingly common to all political parties functioning in modern, complex democracies. Virtually all of the issues relating to ongoing parliamentary business or tactics on a particular piece of legislation - which, obviously, often had much broader programmatic and strategic implications - were, for example, inevitably taken by the parties’ parliamentary fractions. Similarly, ‘rank-and-file’ intermediary bodies were simply too cumbersome and did not meet frequently enough to exercise effective day-to-day control over the party central office and, particularly when it came to policy details, often simply rubber-stamped the recommendations of, or delegated responsibility for key decisions to, party leaders or expert commissions. More generally, this was often a reflection of much greater rank-and-file interest in personnel or internal organisational issues than in matters of policy and programmatic development - or, as in the case of SdRP, a culture of organisational self-restraint - which mean that the party members did not even take full advantage of those opportunities which did exist for influencing party policy and strategy.

It is also worth noting that most of the main ‘fault lines’ within the parties surveyed have, to date, cut across the party faces and not between them. Supporters of PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak and Roman Jagielński, for example, were to be found within all three party faces and were not particularly concentrated in one or another. Consequently, it was impossible to definitively identify the real locus of power within any of the parties until there was a situation when a clear conflict emerged directly between two party ‘faces’ - such as a major dispute between the leader of a party’s parliamentary fraction and the party central office leadership over, say, a government appointment or how to vote in a crucial parliamentary division such as a budget vote.

As hypothesised, generally speaking the parties’ local territorial structures were granted a relatively high degree of autonomy in terms of local politics. Indeed, as we shall see, quite apart from any genuine motivation to de-centralise power and foster intra-party democracy, the sheer weakness of the party central office bureaucracies made it very difficult for any of these parties to effectively monitor and intervene in their local branches day-to-day activities, even if they had the time or inclination. However, to describe this pattern of local-national relations as ‘stratarchic’ or based on ‘mutual autonomy’ would probably be an exaggeration given that, also as

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hypothesised, all party central offices retained (to a greater or lesser extent) certain reserve powers to intervene in local party affairs when these bodies actions were felt to be in conflict with the party programme or Statute - a proviso which party leaders could interpret to mean whenever such activities were felt to have a negative impact on the party as a whole. One of the best examples of this was the process of local parliamentary candidate selection where, although the precise pattern varied from party to party, the initial proposals were formulated at local level but national leaders retained the power of subsequent intervention and final confirmation which they generally exercised sparingly. This relatively de-centralised system of local parliamentary candidate selection also further enhanced the key role of the provincial party leader within the national party power structure.
CHAPTER THREE:

THE PARTY MACHINE

This chapter is concerned with what might be termed 'the party machine': party technical and organisational infrastructure and, specifically, the size and functions of the party bureaucracy. The 'party machine' has been one of the most neglected themes in party research even in the more developed literature on Western political parties. Until Katz and Mair's recent studies, there has been no comparative research on this subject with even the number of paid officials attached to most parties remaining a mystery. In an earlier stage of developing their ideas of parties as being composed of different elements, or 'faces', Katz and Mair aggregated the 'party as bureaucracy' into an independent element. Subsequently, however, they placed greater emphasis on the fact that parties often had several separate bureaucracies and, thus, disaggregated this element into the parts associated with what they termed: the 'party in central office', the 'party in public office' and the 'party on the ground'.

Moreover, Katz and Mair identified the central role played by the bureaucracy attached to the 'party in central office' as one of the defining characteristic of the mass party; as, even more explicitly, did Panebianco in his 'mass-bureaucratic' model. According to Katz and Mair, while elite and cadre parties paid little attention to the need for campaigning, mass parties built up highly labour-intensive organisations financed by membership contributions - which ensured that the bureaucracy attached to the 'party in central office' played a crucial role as the controller and co-ordinator of the party membership while the 'party in public office' was relatively weak. The shift towards what Katz and Mair describe as a more "capital intensive, professional and centralised" type of party work and campaigning in the more recent models of party organisation was to have profound implications for the number, character and disposition of the party staff attached to the 'party in central office' and 'party in public office' respectively. Consequently, in their later 'cartel' and 'electoral-professional' models Katz and Mair and Panebianco identified two important shifts in the organisation of the party bureaucracy.

1 See: Party Organisations; 'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe'; How Parties Organise; and 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'.
2 See: Party Organisations, pp5-6
4 See: Political Parties: Organisation and Power.
5 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p20
Firstly, in the cartel party model, the ‘party machine’ attached to the ‘party in central office’ assumed much less importance with an increasing number of party employees linked to the ‘party in public office’ and party bureaucrats seeing their role much more as servants of the parliamentary leadership than representatives of the party’s two extra-parliamentary party faces. As parties began to shift towards a more capital-intensive approach to campaigning, they came to rely increasingly on subventions and other benefits and privileges afforded to them by the state and the ‘party in public office’ began to acquire its own staff and financial resources. Consequently, it was possible to identify a dramatic reduction in the number of party central office staff compared with growth of parliamentary staff attached to the ‘party in public office’ paid largely, if not exclusively, from state funds. Admittedly, Katz and Mair found a continuing bias towards party central office staff in absolute terms, and the overall numbers employed in the parties parliamentary offices actually exceeded those employed in the central offices in only a minority of West European counties. However, even this growth in central office staff was itself partially explained by the greater availability of state resources to political parties in the form of direct subventions for party central offices and, therefore, underestimated the real bias in organisational resources in favour of the ‘party in public office’. Indeed, Katz and Mair also found that, in practice, in countries where parliamentary subventions remained the only source of state funding, and the ‘party in central office’ lacked the resources to employ its own independent staff, many of the staff who were funded through state subventions actually ended up working for the party central office. Moreover, the ‘party in public office’s’ organisational superiority in staffing terms was further underestimated by the fact that not all of its staff resources were visible and quantifiable purely through analyses of party structures alone - especially when the party in question was in government and could, therefore, appoint partisan advisers and consultants to, often senior, positions in the public bureaucracy. In the cartel party, therefore, according to Katz and Mair, “much of the organisational capacity available to the parties in staffing terms can be traced to resources which are increasingly provided, either directly or indirectly, by the state.”

Secondly, in both Katz and Mair’s cartel and Panebianco’s electoral-professional models there was, more generally, a shift away from paid party officials and bureaucrats towards professionals and other consultants with a much looser relationship with the party organisation. According to Panebianco, Kirchheimer’s catch-all party model (which was the first to identify a shift in the party’s gravitational centre from party members to the electorate) only treated implicitly an

*How Parties Organise, p9
issue which he considered to be the distinguishing feature of the organisational change which political parties were undergoing, namely: the increasing 'professionalisation' of party organisations. This process of 'professionalisation' implied both a decrease in the importance of traditional party 'bureaucrats' - in the Weberian sense of full-time administrators dedicated the maintenance of the organisation - and a concomitant increase in the role of professionals, experts and consultants. It was this distinction, between bureaucrats and professionals, which, according to Panebianco, distinguished the contemporary electoral-professional party from the earlier mass-bureaucratic party model.7

Katz and Mair identified a similar shift of emphasis in terms of the increasing importance of professionals and consultants in their later cartel party model, which they also felt arose from a change in the style of campaigning. The services provided by bureaucrats attached to the party central office may have been indispensable when many of its activities were directed towards the organisation of the party membership and greater emphasis was placed on the party's own independent channels of communication. But as parties' efforts became increasingly directed towards the mobilisation of support in the electorate at large, and their concerns shifted towards competing for access to non-partisan communication networks, many of the services required from the party central office machine could now be secured through alternative means, such as professional publicists and communications specialists. In other words, the party central office bureaucracy may have remained useful in terms of organising and co-ordinating the 'party on the ground' but it was no longer indispensable. But while for Panebianco the shift from 'bureaucrats' to 'professionals' was taking place within the staffs employed by party organisations, Katz and Mair were more explicit that the relationship between parties and professionals was a much looser one (although, Panebianco acknowledged that some of the latter were recruited on a short-term basis). Communication services, for example, could be bought on the open market, "perhaps at a higher price but without the added costs of subservience to a party organisation whose goal priorities may be quite different."8

So what kind of party 'machine' might we expect to see developing in the political parties of post-communist Poland? To recap, given that we expect those 'new' parties that have emerged since 1989 to conform more to the later catch-all/electoral-professional and cartel models, we can hypothesise that they will have: a weak

7 Political Parties, p231
8 'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe', p615
bureaucracy attached to the ‘party in central office’ which acts as the servant of the party’s parliamentary leadership; and a larger proportion of the parties’ staff linked to the ‘party in public office’. Given their hypothesised ‘organisational inheritance’, the two ‘successor’ parties should display more of the characteristics of the mass party and mass-bureaucratic party model. We might, therefore, expect these parties to have a stronger party ‘machine’ and technical infrastructure, together with a comparatively larger proportion of their staff employees attached to the ‘party in central office’. However, given the extremely modest resources which are likely to be available to all the parties in post-communist Poland, it is likely that Polish parties will only conform to an extremely limited extent to the later models in the second respect of the increased ‘professionalisation’ of the party machine and greater utilisation of external experts, advisers and consultants.

In order to test these hypotheses this chapter, therefore, examines three crucial aspects relating to the development of the ‘party machine’ in post-communist Poland. Firstly, the respective size, structure, role of and relationship between the bureaucracies attached to the ‘party in central office’ and the ‘party in public office’. Secondly, the party ‘machine’ at local level, in order to the determine the extent to which the ‘party on the ground’ is dependent on parliamentary financial, material and staffing resources. Although this relationship is not really considered in the Western party models, which tend to focus on the changing relationships between the party ‘faces’ at national level, it is nonetheless a crucial one in terms of the balance of resources between Polish parties’ extra-parliamentary and ‘public office’ faces. Thirdly, the extent to which the new Polish parties have utilised external professional policy experts, public opinion specialists and communications advisers and consultants. As in the previous chapter, the focus is almost exclusively on the five individual member-based parties included in our survey: SdRP, the PSL, UW, UP and ROP - with reference made to AWS only when it is relevant to the general line of argument.

The party central office bureaucracy

The most striking feature of the Polish ‘party machine’ was the extremely modest facilities and tiny number of paid staff attached to the various party central offices. As hypothesised, most parties conformed to the later models of party organisation in this respect. Indeed, in some senses, the parties in this survey could be compared to demobilised military units which generally lay dormant and only activated themselves

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9 Based on interviews conducted with local party officials in Gdańsk, Jelenia Góra, Plock and Rzeszów provinces, April-June 1997.
for ‘battle’ at election times, with the function of the party bureaucracy being simply to keep the national organisations on a care-and-maintenance basis until their next ‘engagement’.

Of the five individual member-based parties examined only the PSL had anything which might with any degree of accuracy be termed a ‘party bureaucracy’ attached to its central office, with the full-time equivalent of approximately twenty paid employees working in the so-called Executive Office of the Supreme Executive Committee. The PSL was able to retain most of the assets of the communist-satellite ZSL, including its large headquarters building, although most of this was rented out to the Bank of Foodstuff Trading and, as one Polish commentator noted, the conditions in which the PSL’s staff operated were “far from luxurious.” The party’s Executive Office was managed on a day-to-day basis by a full-time director and organised into five departments - the Organisational Information Department (responsible for co-ordinating and liaising with the party’s provincial organisations), Programmatic Department, Press Office, Institute of Peasant Movement History, and Administrative-Business Department - each of which contained four or five staff at any given time. Significantly, the PSL was the only party with paid central office staff specifically responsible for policy and programmatic development. However, it is worth noting that about one third of PSL central office employees were purely administrative or clerical, rather than so-called ‘meritocratic’, staff and, as the party’s programmatic director put it, “our office is not some kind of decision-making organ but an executive organ which runs the technical-service side for the party’s governing bodies...It is not a large outpost or cell, it is modest...It is (run) at the basic level so that the party’s main organisational tasks can be fulfilled.”

With the full-time equivalent of ten staff employed in its National Office, the UW had the second largest party central office ‘bureaucracy’ and largest of any of the ‘new’ parties; although still extremely modest for what was then the main parliamentary opposition party with nearly 70 Sejm deputies and Senators. The UW National Office was also managed by a full-time director and organised into three departments - with two employees working in the Regional Liaison Department (responsible for coordinating the party’s provincial structures), three in the Press Office and four in the Service Department (comprising technical, administrative and secretarial support

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12 Information supplied by PSL headquarters, June 1997.
14 Author interview, 12 June 1997.
staff) - together with two or three student volunteers who worked full-time with the party leader.\textsuperscript{15} The main reason why the UW developed such a relatively large party central office staffs - and was, for example, the only party other than the PSL with paid full-time press officers - was the fact that party leader Leszek Balcerowicz was not, unlike his predecessor Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a parliamentarian at the time of his election and, therefore, re-organised the party central office and increased its staff compliment from three\textsuperscript{16} to ten in order to provide him with a separate extra-parliamentary support service.\textsuperscript{17}

Most surprising, perhaps, was the small number of paid employees attached to the central office of the communist-successor party, SdRP, given its hypothesized ‘organisational inheritance’ together with the fact that it was the second largest party after the PSL in terms of membership and the largest component of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Parliamentary Club (with over 100 Sejm deputies and Senators). SdRP was, in fact, able to hang on to much fewer of its predecessor party’s assets than the PSL and, although much controversy surrounds their fate, the party was legally required to divest themselves of them.\textsuperscript{18} While the party central office, known as the Central Executive Committee, was located in a large headquarters building, at least three quarters of the space was rented out to various companies and organisations. As one commentator put, “entering the (SdRP) party headquarters you get the impression that it is abandoned. Politics take place somewhere else.”\textsuperscript{9} In fact, SdRP only employed the full-time equivalent of four full-time paid staff who worked in the CKW Secretariat and Organisational-Information Section (again responsible for co-ordination of and liaison with provincial party organisations) together with one employee who worked directly for the party the then Chairman, Józef Oleksy.\textsuperscript{20} It is worth noting, however, that an (unspecified) number of staff also worked in the party central office ‘voluntarily’ but full-time, including the 13 members of party Presidium (most of whom were Sejm deputies) and the seven-member Supreme Executive Committee (which included, for example, the party’s National Press Spokesman and the head of party organisation). Nonetheless, perhaps more than any other grouping, SdRP most closely corresponded to the idea of Polish parties as ‘sleeping armies’; with an extremely modest central office bureaucracy - arising from the fact that, as the party’s head of organisation Maciej Poręba put it, “we simply

\textsuperscript{15} Information supplied by UW party headquarters, June 1997.

\textsuperscript{16} “Płynanie w mątnej wodzie”

\textsuperscript{17} Balcerowicz was subsequently elected to parliament as a Sejm deputy in the September 1997 parliamentary election.

\textsuperscript{18} ‘Party Funding in post-communist east-central Europe’, p151-153.

\textsuperscript{19} Protopartie i Protosystem? p184

\textsuperscript{20} Information supplied by SdRP party headquarters, June 1997.
don't have that kind of money" - which could transform itself into the organisational backbone for extremely professional (and expensive) parliamentary and presidential election campaigns.

The UP and ROP - the other two 'new' parties included in the sample - ran tiny, absolutely minimal party central office staffs which barely warranted the title 'bureaucracies'. Although it was the fourth largest parliamentary party with over 30 Sejm deputies, the UP ran a very small National Office which consisted of a couple of rooms and employed the full-time equivalent of one-and-a-half administrative staff responsible for liaising with provincial party organisations and providing secretarial support for the party's national governing bodies. The ROP central office, known as the Main Board Secretariat, was located in equally tight and modest accommodation, and employed the full-time equivalent of three staff who were also responsible for providing the party's governing bodies with secretarial and administrative support and liaising with provincial party organisations. Otherwise, a loose and fluid group of around twenty volunteers assisted ROP central office staff with various organisational tasks.

Interestingly, in all four 'parliamentary' parties control of the party headquarters bureaucracy was formally vested in the leadership of the 'party in central office' and, as hypothesised, did not act as the 'servants' of the parliamentary leadership. In the PSL, for example, the party central office bureaucracy was under the direct control of the party President and the party's Supreme Executive Committee, who appointed, and oversaw the work of, the Executive Office director. As noted in chapter two, in the other three 'parliamentary' parties there were even separate party central office leaders and committees formally responsible organisational affairs, which included supervising the party central office bureaucracy: the SdRP Secretary-General and Central Executive Committee, the UW General Secretary and General Secretariat and the UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs and party Executive Committee, respectively. Although most of key organisational decisions in these parties were, also as noted in chapter two, taken by their 'policy-making' leadership, these were also officials elected by, and accountable to, the 'party on the ground', rather than the 'party in public office'.

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21 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
22 Information supplied by UP party headquarters, June 1997.
23 Information supplied by ROP party headquarters, June 1997.
25 See: Statut Socjaldemokracji Rzeczpospolitej Polski; Statut Unii Wolności; and Statut Unii Pracy.
In fact, this formal distinction and separation of powers between the ‘party in central office’ and parliamentary party leaderships in relation to control of the party headquarters - and formal correspondence with the mass party rather than the later models of party organisation - was not as significant as it might at first appear. Firstly, as discussed at greater length in chapter two, the fact that a large proportion of the ‘party in central office’ leadership were themselves parliamentarians meant that the two leaderships were, in most cases, interchangeable. Secondly, although ‘control’ of the party headquarters bureaucracy may have been of some intra-party significance in relation to co-ordination of the party’s voluntary wing and the ‘party on the ground’, given the tiny number of staff involved, it was – with the partial exception of the PSL - a virtually meaningless concept in terms of providing the party leadership with a significant organisational resource. Describing Polish parties central party office ‘machines’ two Polish commentators accurately remarked that:

“What generally strikes one is a kind of aesthetic disproportion between the significance of these people and these parties, which are deciding...our future...and the environment in which they officially function. You frequently come across the liquidators’ labels (Case No Km 413/92) on the furniture in the SdRP headquarters. The PSL’s headquarters on Grzybowska Street has the appearance of time having stood still since around 1970 and not moved on. The UW’s office is completely clean but, on the basis of its appearance, its difficult to believe that this party numbers three former premiers among its members.”

The parliamentary party bureaucracy

In addition to the election refunds paid to the ‘party in central office’ (discussed at greater length in chapter six), the state also provided Polish parties and groupings which secured parliamentary representation with two additional kinds of subventions: firstly, those paid directly to each Sejm deputy or Senator in order to assist them with setting up and running their local parliamentary offices; and, secondly, those paid to a party or grouping’s Parliamentary Club or Circle, depending on its size, in order to run central support facilities in parliament itself. In 1996, for example, Parliamentary Clubs with more than 100 Sejm deputies (SLD and PSL) received 480 zloties per head, those with 50-100 deputies (UW) 530 zloties and those with fewer than 50 deputies (UP) 580 zloties; plus 600 zloties for each Senator regardless of their Club’s size. In addition, each Club received an allocation of funds specifically in

26 ‘Płynanie w mętnej wodzie’
27 In order to be formally recognised as such, Parliamentary Clubs had to have fifteen and Circles three members respectively.
order to commission experts’ reports and analyses either from the Sejm Office of Studies and Experts’ Reports, the Senate Office of Studies and Analyses, or from outside experts and specialists.28

Consequently, there were two kinds of employees funded by the subventions paid to the ‘party in public office’: those employed directly by Sejm deputies or Senators and working in their local parliamentary offices (discussed below) and those staff working in the actual Parliamentary Club offices supporting their party or grouping in the legislature. As Table 3.1 shows, the number of staff working in the parliamentary offices of all four parties with Sejm representation - SdRP (as part of the SLD Parliamentary Club), the PSL, UW and UP - although still relatively modest, outnumbered the number of employees working in the bureaucracies attached to their party central offices - with the notable exception of the PSL were the two figures were broadly comparable.

SdRP, for example, was, to some extent, able to compensate for its meagre party central office bureaucracy by the fact that the SLD Parliamentary Club Office employed twenty five members of staff. These included: an Office director, seven secretarial and administrative staff and seventeen ‘meritocratic’ staff responsible for providing research and analytical support for SLD Parliamentarians, with each employee taking responsibility for a number of parliamentary commissions and/or policy areas together with one employee who assisted the Club’s Press Spokesman. The SLD Club Office director was accountable to the Club Secretary-Disciplinary Spokesman (effectively its Chief Whip) who was responsible, more generally, for co-ordinating all of the Club’s internal organisational activities.29 As one Polish commentator put it, the relative importance of the party central office and Parliamentary Club Office to the SdRP was symbolised by the fact that SdRP General Secretary and SLD Parliamentary Club Chairman Jerzy Szmajdżiński’s parliamentary office was three times the size of his office in the party headquarters building!30

Although not quite as large as the its party central office bureaucracy, the PSL Parliamentary Club Office Club still employed the full-time equivalent of seventeen members of staff including: a director, deputy director, Senate Club Office director, six secretarial and administrative staff and eight ‘meritocratic’ staff. Of the latter, one worked in the Senate, four in the Sejm Expert Advisers’ Group - which, according to the Club’s deputy director Jan Odorczuk, “prepares communications before Sejm

29 Author interview with Jerzy Paprota, Director, SLD Parliamentary Club Office, 10 June 1997.
30 Author interview with Mariusz Janicki, Polityka magazine, 18 June 1997.
sessions on the subject of specific laws which are going to be introduced and discussed...and work with Sejm deputies in various commissions” - and three in the Information Department which assisted with the Parliamentary Club Spokesman by “distributing all the information which comes out of the Club and gathering information of interest to Sejm deputies.” The PSL Club Office director was accountable to the Club Chairman, Waldemar Pawlak, who “employs and dismisses Club employees from their duties in agreement with the Presidium and often receiving the opinions of the Club Convent” and who, at the time the research was undertaken, was also the PSL party leader and, therefore, also in control of the party’s central office staff.

On the other hand, the UW Parliamentary Club office, known as the Club Secretariat, employed the full-time equivalent of fifteen staff, nearly 50% more than the number attached to its party central office. In addition to the Club Secretariat director, these included nine administrative and secretarial staff, two staff working respectively in the Press and International Offices, and three staff in the Expert Advisers Office which, according to the Club Secretariat director Witold Krajewski, “provides Sejm deputies with additional, rather than ‘meritocratic’, help. The workers know where to find experts’ reports, rather than prepare them themselves.” The Club Secretariat director was accountable to the Club Secretary, who was also responsible for the Club’s organisation and financial affairs more generally.

The greatest disparity between the numbers of paid staff attached to the party central office and the parliamentary party could be seen in the case of the UP Parliamentary Club Office which employed the full-time equivalent of ten staff. These included: four secretarial and administrative staff, one member of staff who was responsible for international contacts, one press officer and three additional staff who, according to Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek, “don’t actually work directly for the Club but are responsible for contacts with the party.” The UP Club Office did not employ any staff specifically responsible for providing parliamentarians with ‘meritocratic’ support and the Club Office was managed by a Sejm deputy, the Club Secretary, rather than a separate Office director.

31 Author interview with Jan Odorczuk, Deputy Director, PSL Parliamentary Club Office, 6 June 1997.
32 Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego PSL.
33 Author interview with Witold Krajewski, Director, UW Parliamentary Club Secretariat, 4 June 1997.
34 Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego UW.
35 Author interview, 11 June 1997.
36 Regulamin Klubu: Unia Pracy-Klub Parlamentarny.
However, although, as hypothesised, a large proportion of party employees were linked to the Parliamentary Club offices (a majority in three cases) it was not necessarily accurate to view these staffs as, in some way, directly substituting for the functions which would otherwise have been fulfilled by the party central offices bureaucracies. Indeed, the staff attached to the Parliamentary Club Offices appeared to be orientated primarily towards activities taking place within parliament itself - providing support and back up facilities for Sejm deputies and Senators in relation to their role as legislators rather than ‘party’ politicians - and saw themselves as, at best, complementary or supplementary to the party central office bureaucracies in the functional sense.

According to SLD Parliamentary Club Office director Jerzy Paprota, for example, his Office’s responsibilities were, “in practice, inevitably focused on the Sejm because this is where everything happens.” Moreover, the fact that SdRP parliamentary deputies and Senators comprised only one (albeit by far the largest and most important) element within this parliamentary grouping, inevitably meant that there could be no direct formal relationship between the SdRP party central office and the SLD Parliamentary Club Office. As Jerzy Paprota put it, “(although) there are obviously occasions when the leaderships of these elements (which comprise the SLD) are also invited for consultations on a given matter... it is above all here (in parliament) that the Office’s tasks are focused.”

Indeed, while at one point immediately after the 1993 parliamentary election, the PSL attempted, for example, to “shift the political-organisational back-up support for the party and the Parliamentary Club into one political-organisational section encompassed within the PSL Parliamentary Club Office,” it was subsequently decided at the beginning of 1994 to “return a certain separateness for the PSL NKW Executive Office from the PSL Parliamentary Club Office in this sphere.” Another important indication that the Parliamentary Club Office was to play a role supplementary to, rather than attempt to substitute for, the party central office was the decision to keep the PSL programmatic department located within the party headquarters. As Club Office deputy director Jan Odorczuk put it, “the party’s basic programmatic work is carried out in the PSL head office. Here (in parliament) you

39 Author interview, 10 June 1997.
31 Ibid
simply work on specific things that are happening in the Sejm...everything relating to
the programme is prepared in Grzybowska Street.”

Similarly, according to its director Witold Krajewski, the UW Club Secretariat
functioned quite separately from the party’s National Office and co-operation, “takes
place within a relatively small field...Given that the Secretariat mainly services Sejm
deputies...we operate in different spheres.” In the case of the UW, specifically,
Krajewski felt that this fairly sharp separation of functions between party and
parliamentary bureaucracies originated in the fact that “the Secretariat developed
independently from the party structures” and “there was a period when the Club (and)
specific organisational cells within the Parliamentary Club...fairly clearly underlined
their distinctiveness from the party structures and, as a result, the level of co-
operation was poor.” This was exacerbated by the fact that, whereas previously “all
the party leaders were also Sejm deputies...the Secretariat serviced them and the
National Office was less important,” since the election of a non-parliamentarian as
party Chairman in March 1995 the role of the National Office was significantly
enhanced because it created, “a situation where he (the party Chairman) demanded a
separate service.” This was a view shared the party’s National Press Spokesman
Andrzej Potocki who also argued that, “under Balcerowicz there has been opposition:
parliament here, the party there...close, but operating a little on separate tracks.”
Moreover, according to Krajewski, the type of work undertaken by Club Secretariat,
which primarily involved providing Sejm deputies and Senators with fairly basic
administrative and clerical support, meant that there was a “shortage of people
capable of undertaking more conceptual, meritocratic work” of use to the party more
generally.

Nonetheless, because of the previously noted overlap between the leadership of the
‘party in central office’ and the ‘party in public office’ it was impossible to draw a
clear and simple functional dividing line between the two party bureaucracies. In
other words, many of the staff working for key Parliamentary Club leaders were also
de facto working for party central office leaders. A secretary working for a
Parliamentary Club Chairman who was simultaneously a party leader was, for
example, also clearly providing some kind of a service for the party in central office.

40 Author interview, 6 June 1997.
41 Author interview, 4 June 1997.
42 Author interview with Andrzej Potocki, UW National Press Spokesman, 26 November 1997.
43 Author interview, 4 June 1997.
One of the best examples of this functional blurring between party and Parliamentary Club functions was the way in which many parliamentarians were also key members of their party’s policy-making or programmatic commissions. SdRP National Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, argued that “there are extremely close links between the SLD Parliamentary Club and the SdRP but these are not formalised” and emerge from the fact that “many key members of the SLD Parliamentary Club in various commissions are also on key party commissions...Co-operation and joint work, therefore, flows naturally from the fact that SdRP’s programmatic documents, or sections of them, are often written by SLD parliamentarians who are SdRP members.”

According to PSL programmatic director Jan Wypych, the party’s seventeen Supreme Executive Committee programmatic commissions “co-operate and often overlap with the PSL members of the (relevant) Sejm commissions” and, in spite of the fact that the PSL made a conscious decision to keep its programmatic department in the party in central office, “in recent years you can see that a large section of this meritocratic consideration (of the programme) is really implemented in the Sejm deputies’ sphere of activity.” Similarly, according to UW National Office Director Jaroslaw Robak co-operation between the Parliamentary Club and party central office on programmatic matters “tends to arise from the fact that nearly all of the party’s National Secretaries (its national spokesmen and policy co-ordinators on a given issue) are Sejm deputies” and, therefore, “flows naturally from the fact that there is an overlap in terms of membership...rather than any formal mechanisms.” UP Parliamentary Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek, who was personally involved in the drafting of the party’s most recent programme, also argued that, “the intellectual life of the party is, in all certainty...concentrated here (in parliament)” and that, “de facto this took place here in the Sejm because the basis of the group that worked on it (the programme) were Sejm deputies...(and) it was chaired by a Sejm deputy.” The parliamentarians involved in these policy-making and programmatic groups, in turn, naturally drew on Sejm and Senate facilities in their role of parliamentarians, or even utilised Parliamentary Club funds, in order to obtain experts’ reports and analyses either from parliamentary sources or from sympathetic external advisers and specialists.

Moreover, there was also some evidence of a trend towards greater co-ordination (if not substitution) between the party and parliamentary bureaucracies and even some tentative moves toward the creation joint party-parliamentary office structures. The

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44 Author interview, 12 June 1997
44 Author interview with Jaroslaw Robak, UW National Office Director, 9 June 1997.
47 Author interview, 11 June 1997.
clearest example of this was in the sphere of media relations and the close co-
ordination between the party central office and Parliamentary Club press offices.
According to SdRP National Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example,
there was “fairly close co-ordination” involving almost daily phone contact “between
the various elements communicating our messages - the Government Press
Spokesman’s Group, the SLD Parliamentary Club and the SdRP - in which we co-
ordinate our activities...Certain elements overlap, are common...(particularly)
between the SLD Club and the SdRP.”44 The director of the PSL party press office
Piotr Przybysz worked “federally” running the party and Parliamentary Club press
offices “in tandem”45 and there was also close co-ordination between the UW
parliamentary and party press offices, by dint of the fact that there was one joint party
and Parliamentary Club Press Spokesman, Andrzej Potocki.

Moreover, according to UW National Office Director Jarosław Robak “although there
were initial difficulties in terms of co-operation between the National Office and the
Parliamentary Club Secretariat, with the latter tending to operate independently of the
former...the situation is improving” and he forecast that closer links would be forged
after the 1997 election when he expected the party Chairman to become a
parliamentarian. Indeed, according to Robak, this could even have included the
creation of a single joint National Party Secretary (combining the party General
Secretary and Parliamentary Club Secretary roles) together with a joint Director of
the National Office and Parliamentary Club Secretariat (with deputies responsible for
the day-to-day running of each individual office).46 Indeed, speaking after the
election, UW National Press Spokesman Andrzej Potocki predicted that rather than
going down the road of closer co-operation the “centre of party management” would
undertake a “wholesale shift to parliament” with the party central office staff playing
a much less important role and the “main (organisational burden) being shifted to
parliament.”47

The party where this process of co-ordination and co-operation between party and
parliamentary bureaucracies had advanced the furthest, and even bordered on
straightforward substitution in some cases, was the UP. According to UP
Parliamentary Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek any attempt to “separate out
parliamentary and party (organisational) structures...is, quite simply, a fiction” and
that, in reality, “everything is sorted out here in the parliamentary buildings” even “if,

45 Author interview with Jan Odorczuk, 6 June 1997.
46 Author interview, 9 June 1997.
47 Author interview, 26 November 1997.
as a result of this, it creates certain problems in the actual party itself.” Only rich parties could allow themselves the luxury of functional specialisation while the UP, “with our modest possibilities…don’t have any choice…these cells have to mutually assist each other.”

The entire UP press office function was, for example, run from parliament; with the party’s National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nałęcz a parliamentarian and his press assistant on the parliamentary rather than party payroll. Similarly, the three-man Parliamentary Club Office cell responsible for “contacts between the Club and party organisation” were “de facto working more for the party than the Club.”

The local party machine

Data obtained by the author from a survey of the party ‘machine’ in four provinces, set out in Table 3.2, revealed that the same pattern of a skeletal party bureaucracy and generally modest level of technical and support facilities was also evident at local level. Indeed, most local party ‘offices’ did not really function as such in the bureaucratic sense. They were generally single rooms which fulfilled the basic function of a meeting place, often without a telephone and hardly ever having a fax, computer or photocopying facilities, particularly those located outside the main provincial town. Very few of the offices were staffed by paid employees and practically all party activity at this level was based on volunteers. This pattern of a weak party ‘machine’ at local level was also confirmed by separate research undertaken by Siellawa-Kolbowska on “the organisational conditions for the functioning” of four political parties (including SdRP, the UW and UP) in four small towns and by Pankowski on nine political groupings (including the five political parties in our sample) in five main provincial towns.

Siellawa-Kolbowska, for example, found that while twelve out of the fourteen local party organisations she surveyed had their own local party headquarters, half of them did not have their own telephone, only four were in possession of a fax and only two employed a paid secretary; and concluded that, even after five years of party-building, most of these local organisations “remained plainly in the pre-organisational stage.”

52 Author interview, 11 June 1997.
53 Ibid
55 ‘Partie polityczne w terenie’, p12.
Moreover, whereas at the national level it was only the PSL which had anything approaching a properly functioning party central office bureaucracy which at least bore a passing resemblance to the mass party model, the hypothesised pattern of "successor" party superiority was much more evident in the case of both SdRP and the PSL at the local level. However, as Pankowski points, this was less a function of their "organisational inheritance" (although this was a factor, particularly in the case of the PSL) but rather that "these parties have the largest number of Sejm deputies" and that this factor "currently has a decisive influence on the financial conditions, together with the material base, in the functioning of local party structures."

This high level of dependence on the staff and technical facilities made available to them by local parliamentarians arose from the local parties' weak financial bases, together with the minimal level of financial and material support which they received from their national party organisations. As Pankowski put it, "respondents began every reply relating to the difficulties of the functioning of political parties with reference to financial matters - they talked, above all, about their grouping's material base. Insufficient financial resources to conduct their activities emerged as the dominant subject in nearly every conversation."  

Polish political parties were generally very secretive about their funding sources at both national and local level. However, from the evidence obtained in local research by this author, and confirmed by other studies, local party organisations appeared to have three main sources of income. Firstly, membership subscriptions which, in most cases, provided local parties with their primary (or exclusive) source of regular income. Secondly, larger donations from wealthy local members or sponsors (such as sympathetic local businessmen) particularly 'donations-in-kind', such as second-hand fax machines or photocopiers. These tended be one-offs - either to finance a specific local event (such as a visit from a national party leader) or in the form of election campaign donations (known as 'bricks') - rather than providing a regular, ongoing source of income. Thirdly, particularly in the case of the 'new' parties where subscription income was so modest that it was often felt to have a purely 'symbolic' meaning, local party activities were often financed by party officials themselves making additional donations to, for example, cover the costs associated with running a local office or foregoing travel and accommodation expenses to national party conferences and meetings. Indeed, Pankowski even found that in a few "sporadic cases", particularly in smaller towns, "(party) leadership positions were held by a

56 Polityka i partie polityczne w oczach działaczy partyjnych szczebla lokalnego. p7.
person completely unprepared for this kind of activity, whose competence to fulfill this post was determined by...above all, their financial generosity in the cause of party funds" and, in this sense, certain positions in local parties were, effectively, "for sale." The only exception to this general pattern was the PSL which, in most provinces, had other substantial sources of income either from trading activities or from renting out parts of its party headquarters. Indeed, more than half of the PSL’s provincial party organisations (and also a few sub-provincial organisations) owned the buildings in which their local party headquarters was located, including those in all four provinces included in this author’s survey. Moreover, other than the occasional training session for party activists, local party organisations generally received little direct organisational help and no financial or material assistance from their national party central offices. While local UP officials in two of the provinces surveyed (Plock and Rzeszów) spoke of some financial assistance made available to them in the early stages of party formation, and one local SdRP official (Rzeszów) mentioned a ‘subvention’, the general principle appeared to be that local party organisations were expected to be self-financing. Once again, the only real exception to this was the PSL whose national party leadership established a ‘Party Fund’ in January 1993 to help local party organisations, “regulate the ownership relations of local offices and buildings, essential to the PSL’s political and organisational activities.” Moreover, in January 1994, the PSL leadership also agreed to direct most of the party’s 1993 parliamentary election refund to assist local party organisations with the purchase of their local party headquarters buildings which would allow them to, as PSL Treasurer Alfred Domagalski put it, to “run political activities independently of external conditions.” In all four provinces surveyed by this author, for example, the PSL central office had made interest-free loans available to the local party organisations to help them purchase the real estate for their provincial headquarters building and, in one case (Gdańsk), a second building in another large provincial town. Interestingly, together with SdRP, the PSL also allowed their local party organisations to retain all membership subscription income, while all of the ‘new’ parties provincial organisations were required to pass

60 Author interviews with Włodzmierz Stec, Secretary, UP District Council, Rzeszów, 21 April 1997 and Ryszard Wajszczak, Chairman, UP District Council, Plock, 28 April 1997.
61 Author interview with Leszek Majewski, 29 April 1997.
63 Quoted in F. Frydrykiewicz, ‘Co w partyjnych kasach’, Rzeczpospolita. 21 November 1996
on a proportion to the party central office: 25% in the case of the UW and UP and one-third in the case of the ROP.\textsuperscript{44}

Consequently, given their weak financial bases and minimal or non-existent financial and material support which they received from their national party organisations, it was at this local level that there was much more striking evidence of substitution of 'parliamentary' for party staff and technical facilities. Indeed, most local party activity tended to revolve around, and much of their organisational infrastructure was directly linked to, local parliamentary offices.

In addition to a general personal expense allowance (\textit{dieta}) and a stipend (\textit{ryczalt}) paid to so-called 'professional' parliamentarians, every Sejm deputy and Senator received two kinds of subventions from their respective parliamentary Chancelleries to pay for the functioning of their local offices. Firstly, assistance with renovation, furniture and equipment costs. After the 1993 parliamentary elections, for example, each newly elected Sejm deputy received the equivalent of 4000 new zloties, an incumbent Sejm deputy 3000 zloties and a Senator up to 2500 to renovate and furnish their local offices; together with a supply of essential office equipment such as a photocopier, typewriter, fax machine and a computer with a printer.\textsuperscript{45} Secondly, a monthly allowance to cover staff and local parliamentary office running costs (also, confusingly, sometimes to as the \textit{ryczalt}). In 1997, for example, each Sejm deputy and Senator received 4250 new zloties per month\textsuperscript{46} which could be spent on: rent; telephone, gas, electricity and water bills; office workers salaries\textsuperscript{1}; paper and office materials; repairing office equipment; translation and typing services; insuring the parliamentarian against civil liability; newspapers and publications; and ordering experts' reports.\textsuperscript{47}

These local parliamentary offices were invariably located in or alongside the local party headquarters building. An analysis of the addresses and telephone numbers of the 49 provincial party headquarters revealed that virtually all of them were located in the same building as a local parliamentary office in the cases of: the PSL (46 with another two sharing the same phone and fax numbers), UW (45 again with a further

\textsuperscript{44} Information supplied by national party headquarters, February-March 1997.
\textsuperscript{45} See: 'Parlamentarne pieniędze', \textit{Rzeczpospolita}. 4 November 1993; and 'Pływanie w mątnej wodzie'. Each Senator also received a television, radio and, if a Parliamentary Club had more than 15 Senators, an additional computer with printer and funds for furniture.
\textsuperscript{46} See: E. Wilk, '60 groszy na demokrację', \textit{Polityka}. 8 February 1997.
two sharing phone and fax lines) and UP (47). Unfortunately, SdRP central office
did not provide the addresses of its provincial party headquarters, although one
commentator estimated that around half of all SLD Sejm deputies had their
parliamentary offices located in the same building as a party office which, given that
approximately 40% of them were not SdRP members, this probably included virtually
all of those who were. This was re-inforced by the fact that the overlap between
'party' and 'parliamentary' leaderships at national level was reflected at local level
where local parliamentarians often simultaneously held prominent leadership
positions in their provincial and sub-provincial party organisations. In 1997, for
example, 63% (31 out of 49) of PSL provincial party presidents were
parliamentarians as were 51% (25) of SdRP, 21% (7 out of 34) of UP, 16% (8) of
UW provincial chairmen.

Consequently, these parliamentary office facilities and expense allowances invariably
provided local party organisations with additional funds and material support by
providing them with access to the parliamentarians’ equipment and technical facilities
and subsidising local party bills and running costs. Moreover, each Sejm deputy and
Senator employed at least one full-time employee from their office allowance who
was generally a member of their party, often simultaneously serviced the local party
office and was, therefore, de facto, on the party payroll. The 'union of addresses'
between party headquarters and parliamentary offices also meant that local party
organisations, who often rented their accommodation from their local councils at
preferential rates, could sub-let part of their offices to local parliamentarians for a
substantially higher rent and, thereby, receive additional income for party funds (or
make a clear profit in the case of the PSL which, as noted above, actually owned
many of its local headquarters outright) directly from parliamentary office
allowances. As one commentator put it, "it can't be ruled out that there are places in
which the costs are divided, for example, 'party' telephone conversations are paid for
from party funds and Sejm deputies' conversations from the same telephone are paid
for from the Sejm deputies ryczált. You can imagine that party funds contribute to

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48 Information supplied by PSL party headquarters, February 1996 and UW party headquarters,
49 See: 'Pieniądze przez biura do partii'.
50 Information supplied by the Sejm and Senate Chancelleries, December 1996 and the SdRP, PSL,
1995; and U Progu XXI Wieku.
51 See: 'Pływanie w mętnej wodzie'.
(parliamentary office) workers’ salaries, and that rent, energy costs etc. are paid for jointly. These places, if there are any, are not common."72

These parliamentary office expense allowances were, of course, provided to assist Sejm deputies and Senators in their fulfilling their duties as parliamentarians and not party politicians and their utilisation for subsidising local party activities was, at best, a grey area. According to the Sejm Presidium’s resolution of December 23rd 1994, for example, parliamentary office allowances “may not be utilised for financing the activities of political parties, social organisations, charitable foundations and activities or the activities of the Parliamentary Clubs.”73 But, although parliamentarians had to account for the way they spent their office allowances to the appropriate Chancellery, there were no rules which explicitly prohibited them from locating their local offices in or alongside local party headquarters. In practice, therefore, it was extremely difficult to distinguish expenditure which related to fulfilling parliamentary duties and that which corresponded to stricte party political activities. As one national party Treasurer put it, “if for every ten phone calls which are made from a Sejm deputies’ office, five are related to voters with urgent matters, and the remaining five fall within the realms of their party work, then who is in a position to audit this?”74

Moreover, national party officials made little attempt to conceal the fact that these parliamentary allowances were often used specifically for ‘party’ purposes and recognised that, in many cases, parliamentary offices played a crucial role in underpinning their party’s local organisational infrastructure. SdRP’s head of party organisation Maciej Poręba, for example, acknowledged that his party tried to “take advantage of this by ensuring that the local SdRP headquarters is the also the location of the Sejm deputies’ office” which he described as an “essential link.”75 The PSL was even more explicit and instructed all its Sejm deputies and Senators to “employ a person connected with the PSL in the position of office secretary... submit information on how they spent the sums assigned to them by the Sejm Chancellery to maintain their offices to the PSL provincial Board Presidium” and consult with provincial Board President on “all expenditure.”76 Indeed, PSL Supreme Council Chairman Józef Zych justified this on the grounds that “sometimes it is not possible to precisely separate their (local party and parliamentary) activities”77 while the party’s

72 ‘Pieniądze przez biura do partii’.
73 Ibid.
74 ‘Pływanie w mętnej wodzie’.
75 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
programmatic director Jan Wypych argued that "there is a part of their activity as a parliamentarian which you can see falls within the sphere of party activity given that they were elected as a Sejm deputy or Senator on a PSL party ticket." UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik also recognised this linkage and the fact that his party's, "possibilities are greater in those places where we have strong Sejm deputies' offices with assistants and funding for running an office. The possibilities are very modest in those places where we don't have these kind of resources. We're talking about private houses, private telephones."

The fact that every parliamentarian received the same office expense allowance regardless of how many local offices they had meant that local Sejm deputies and Senators from the same party often pooled their income and expenditure in joint offices and/or opened several local offices. In the case of parliamentarians with several offices, one of these was designated a 'basic' office through which all their income and expenditure had to be accounted for, and in which the full-time paid staff and full range of back-up facilities were usually located. The remainder, referred to as 'branch offices', were generally unstaffed and often consisted of little more than a single room. As Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show, in 1995 these local parliamentary offices provided the four largest parties and groupings with parliamentary representation with a formidable local network of 402 'basic' offices, 789 'branch' offices and 1065 staff. Unfortunately, party central offices did not collect (or were unwilling to reveal) data on exactly how many staff were employed directly by local party organisations as opposed to local parliamentary offices, although - on basis of this author's local research together with interviews with national party officials - it would appear that there were virtually none in the case of the UW and UP, no more than one per province in the case of the SdRP (that is, less than 50) and at least one but no more than five per province in the case of the PSL (between 50-250).

Moreover, the fact that parliamentarians could open several offices, which did not necessarily have to be located in their own electoral district, encouraged parties to deploy these resources to maximum strategic effect by, for example, opening local 'branch' offices either in provinces where had no parliamentary representation or in smaller towns and villages in those where they did. The UW Parliamentary Club Presidium was, for example, responsible (in consultation with the party Board) for

78 Author interview, 12 June 12 1997.
79 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
80 Not all these staff were full-time (or even paid) employees, although many of them were. In 1997 the UP party headquarters, in figures supplied to the author, for example, estimated that the party only employed the full-time equivalent of around 60 staff in its local parliamentary offices rather than the 127 listed as parliamentary office staff in the Sejm Chancellery records.
“establishing Sejm deputies and Senators’ offices those provinces where the party had no parliamentary representation.” Although it was not as well organised and encountered some resistance from Sejm deputies unwilling to pool their resources, the UP, according to the party’s Parliamentary Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek, also, “tried to assign every Sejm deputy with a second electoral district, a second province where he ought to set up something much more modest, a ‘branch office’ but still an office, so that we could somehow cover the whole country with this network...(and) open branch offices in those provinces where there wasn’t anything in the main town.”

The key role which these parliamentary offices, and the staff and technical facilities attached to them, played in the functioning of the local party ‘machine’ was confirmed both by this author’s and earlier local research previously cited. Given that party membership - which, as previously noted, represented the local parties main source of income - was generally low and that most local parties (except for the PSL) received virtually no financial assistance from their national party headquarters, it was not surprising that all four ‘parliamentary’ parties in the provinces surveyed were, to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on the facilities provided by local Sejm deputies and Senators. Those local party offices that had access to any kind of proper technical facilities (fax, computer, photocopier) or were staffed by a paid employee were invariably linked in some way to local parliamentarians’ ‘basic’ offices. All four SdRP local party headquarters, for example, were located in the same building as local parliamentary offices and they all, to some extent, utilised these facilities; with a similar arrangement at sub-provincial level where local party offices often doubled up as, or operated alongside, local parliamentarians’ ‘branch’ offices. There was a similar overlap between the PSL parliamentary and party facilities, with one local PSL official acknowledging that “there is no way of separating out the local Sejm deputy’s support facilities and the functioning of the party.” In the cases of the two ‘new’ parties with access to parliamentary facilities, the UW and UP, the degree of overlap, and straightforward dependence in some cases, was even greater. In one of the provinces (Jelenia Góra), for example, all three local UP offices and their facilities were funded by the local UP parliamentarian and his paid local assistant was, simultaneously, the UP’s local party secretary; while in another two where the party did not have any local parliamentary representatives (Rzeszów and Plock) it was

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81 Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego Unii Wolności.
82 Author interview, 11 June 1997.
83 Author interview with Sławomir Szatkowski, 12 May 1997.
84 Author interview with Ryszard Nowak, 5 May 1997.
only able to open up offices at all because other UP Sejm deputies opened up ‘branch offices’ there and, thereby, provided them with some basic facilities.\(^5\)

The importance of these local parliamentary offices and facilities was graphically illustrated when local officials were asked what, hypothetically, would be the impact of their party losing its parliamentary representation. The impact might be felt in two ways. If a party failed to cross the 5% threshold nationally and failed to secure any parliamentary representation at all then, obviously, it lost access to all parliamentary resources. However, even if its national party crossed the 5% threshold but party lost its local Sejm deputy then it would still lose the facilities associated with a ‘basic’ office. While local SdRP and PSL officials did not feel that the effects would be catastrophic, they all recognized that their local party organisation would suffer to some extent particularly in terms of maintaining a sub-provincial network of offices outside of the main provincial town. According to one local SdRP official, for example, the party’s other sources of income would only allow it to exist at a “much lower level of activity” and it would have to replace its current network of local offices with much more modest “points of contact.”\(^6\) In the case of the ‘new’ parties, however, it was felt that the impact would be much more serious and possibly even terminal. Most local UW officials felt that they could probably only maintain some kind of minimal office in the main provincial town but no other local offices, while local UP officials felt that they would have to revert to the practice of operating out of private houses. One local UP official, for example, said that the party’s “chances of remaining on the political scene and winning seats in such an enfeebled state would be minimal,”\(^7\) while another, putting it even more bluntly, felt that, “without parliamentary representation, the UP will die.”\(^8\) Indeed, speaking after the 1997 election - when the party did, indeed, narrowly fail to cross the 5% threshold - UP National Presidium member Piotr Marciniak, although not as pessimistic as the aforementioned local party official, acknowledged that, “from the point of view of maintaining some kind of elementary organisational infrastructure...we’ll have to re-model this structure...(and) position ourselves on maintaining offices in large regions, rather than in every province.”\(^9\)

Moreover, the importance of access to parliamentary offices (or rather lack of it) could also be seen when examining the staff and technical facilities available to

\(^5\) Author interviews with Włodzimierz Stec, 21 April 1997; and Ryszard Wajszczak, 28 April 1997.
\(^6\) Author interview with Stanisław Kosznik, 12 May 1997.
\(^7\) Author interview with Włodzimierz Stec, 21 April 1997.
\(^8\) Author interview with Bogusław Kaczmarek, 14 May 1997.
\(^9\) Author interview with Piotr Marciniak, UP National Presidium member, 19 November 1997.
parties without parliamentary representation. This factor was, for example, clearly evident in the case of the ROP which, as Table 3.2 shows, lacked all but the most basic organisational infrastructure in three out of the four provinces examined by this author. In the one exceptional case (Rzeszów) the unusually high level of party membership (as noted in the previous chapter) clearly gave the local party a more substantial financial base with which to develop a network of offices and some basic technical facilities. However, given that membership subscriptions only comprised about 20% of the Rzeszów party’s total income, the most important factor was its unusually large number of wealthy local benefactors; including, for example, the provincial party chairman whose company owned the building in which the local party headquarters was located and supplied it with a fax, telephone and computer facilities.* This dependence on wealthy local sponsors could, as noted above, create its own set of difficulties and sources of instability.

By way of an interesting contrast, AWS - the other ‘externally-created’ grouping - had, as Table 2 also shows, a relatively well developed local ‘machine’ comparable (in some cases even superior) to that of the ‘successor’ parties. However, unlike the ROP which had to build up its party organisation from scratch, AWS managed to fill its ‘organisational deficit’ by the utilizing the technical and organisational facilities of its main ‘shareholder’, the Solidarity trade union. In all four provinces the union provided AWS with its core facilities: the AWS headquarters was located in the Solidarity provincial headquarters and all the AWS local groups were based in union’s local offices with the possibility, in many cases, of access to the telephone, fax, computer and photocopying facilities. The AWS regional organizer (pelnomocnik) was always a Solidarity union official, as were most of its local organizers. In one province (Gdańsk), for example, AWS had six full-time staff working for the organisation on secondment from Solidarity.* The contrasting fortunes of the ROP and AWS clearly illustrated the extent to which it was virtually impossible for an ‘externally-created’ party in Poland with no access to parliamentary facilities to overcome its resource limitations and develop an effective party ‘machine’ without recourse to an existing external sponsor or agency with an already-developed organisational infrastructure.

Finally, it is worth noting that there were some benefits which accrued directly to parties at the national level - both the ‘party in central office’ and the ‘party in public

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* Author interview with Andrzej Kucharski, Chairman, ROP Provincial Board, Rzeszów, 20 April 1997.
office' - from Sejm deputies and Senators local parliamentary office allowances. Some parties, for example, required (or requested) parliamentarians to pay contributions from either their stipend, personal expense allowances or office expense allowances into a central fund which was used either to provide additional staff and facilities for the Parliamentary Club or sometimes utilised directly for party central office purposes. In 1997, for example, UW parliamentarians were required to pay 5% of their parliamentary stipends directly to the party central office and a further 5% into the party’s parliamentary election fund;\textsuperscript{92} while the 120 SdRP Sejm deputies and Senators voluntarily paid 200 złoties per month into party central office funds.\textsuperscript{93} The UW and UP Parliamentary Clubs also required their Sejm deputies and Senators to pay 10% and 5% respectively of their office expense allowances into a central fund to provide additional parliamentary support facilities which, in the case of the UP for example, allowed their Club Office to employ two additional members of staff.\textsuperscript{94} The most systematic and extreme case of a party utilising parliamentary funds for national party purposes was the AWS-affiliated Confederation for an Independent Parliament (KPN) whose Sejm deputies were, at one stage, required to hand over their entire office expenses allowance to their Parliamentary Club leadership, which then distributed these funds as it deemed appropriate.\textsuperscript{95}

Moreover, most of ‘parliamentary’ parties also located ‘local’ parliamentary offices in the same building as, or adjacent to, their party’s national central office in Warsaw. There were, for example, three ‘basic’ Sejm deputies’ offices and eight ‘branch offices’ located in the SdRP party headquarters building on Rozbrat Street (with five of the latter clustered together with one basic office) with nine telephone lines, three fax lines and fourteen staff between them; and three ‘basic’ Sejm deputies offices with six telephone lines, three fax lines and six staff in the PSL party headquarters on Grzybowska Street. There were also four ‘basic’ Sejm deputies’ offices with six telephone lines, three fax lines and six staff occupying essentially the same building (although at a different postal address) as the UP party headquarters on Nowogrodzka Street. Of the ‘parliamentary’ parties, only the UW did not have any parliamentary offices located in its national party headquarters on Aleje Jerozolimskie Street, although there were seven ‘basic’ Sejm deputies offices and one ‘basic’ Senator’s

\textsuperscript{92} Author interview with Miroslaw Czech, 19 February 1997.
\textsuperscript{93} See: A. Nowakowska, ‘Ujawni majątek ale jaki?’, Gazeta Wyborcza. 21 February 1997.
\textsuperscript{94} Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego Unii Wolności and author interview with Artur Siedlarek, 11 June 1997.
\textsuperscript{95} See: ‘Pieniądze przez biura do partii’. A system which led, according to some commentators, to the defection of several KPN deputies and, eventually, to the disintegration of both party and Club. See: ‘60 groszy na demokrację’. 98
office with three telephone lines, two fax lines and ten staff in the party’s Warsaw provincial headquarters. 9

Although all these party central offices could clearly have derived some rental income from the presence of these ‘local’ parliamentary offices, it is more difficult to judge how much they also benefited from the staff (not all whom were either paid or worked full-time) and technical facilities attached to them. Given that the Sejm deputies’ offices located in the SdRP and UP headquarters included those of a number of senior party leaders and officials - such as the SdRP Chairman Józef Oleksy and Secretary-General Jerzy Szmajdziński and the UP Chairman Ryszard Bugaj, Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik and National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalecz - it would appear that the degree of overlap between ‘local’ parliamentary office and party central office facilities was greater in these two parties than in the more bureaucratically-developed PSL party central office. If these (ostensibly parliamentary) staff were to be factored in then, for example, the SdRP party central office bureaucracy was not as modest as it originally appeared solely on the basis of an analysis of the number of stricte party employees - although, given that these additional staff were linked to the parliamentary party rather than ‘party in central office’, SdRP still broadly conformed more to the contemporary models of party organisations than the mass party in terms of the profile of the party bureaucracy and the respective importance of the parliamentary and party central office bureaucracies.

The ‘professionalisation’ of parties

So, broadly speaking, in line with the hypothesised characteristics ascribed to the more contemporary models of party organisation, there was clear evidence of both: a weak central party office ‘machine’ together with a large proportion of party employees attached to the parliamentary party; and a high level of dependence on the staff and facilities attached to local parliamentary offices for parties’ technical and organisational infrastructure. Evidence of the replacement of salaried party bureaucrats by external advisers and consultants with a looser contractual relationship with parties, identified by both Panebianco and Katz and Mair in their ‘electoral-professional’ and ‘cartel’ party models, was, however, much more limited.

96 Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, II Kadencja: Biura Poselskie and Lista Senatorów III Kadencji z Adresami Biur Senatorskich. With no parliamentary representation at the time that this research was undertaken the ROP was obviously not included in this analysis. However, it is noteworthy that after the 1997 election when the party narrowly crossed the 5% threshold, a number of parliamentary offices, including the party Chairman Jan Olszewski’s, were subsequently located in the party’s headquarters on Chmielna Street.
There were clearly some indicators of the 'professionalisation' of Polish politics, with party leaders increasingly recognising the importance, and utilising the services, of external experts, advisers and specialists in a number of fields.

Firstly, policy and programmatic experts. SdRP party Chairman Józef Oleksy, for example, was assisted by a group of party members and sympathisers from the academic community and regularly organised meetings with academics based in the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) to discuss key issues such as the development of the party programme. According to PSL programmatic director Jan Wypych the party had "a wide range of contacts and specialists in various areas and intellectual milieu...organised in seventeen...Supreme Executive Committee commissions which are comprised...of specific specialists in the appropriate subject." The PSL also had a separate thirty-strong experts' group chaired by party member and economic experts Professor Władysław Szymański and, if the party did not have an appropriate policy specialist in a given field, then it ordered a specially prepared external experts' report from a non-party member. With its origins in two parties (the Democratic Union and Liberal Democratic Congress) with strong support in the in the academic and intellectual communities, the UW could also draw upon a large number of policy specialists among both party members and sympathisers, organised in twenty 'National Secretariats' responsible for developing the party's detailed policies in the main policy fields such as: the economy, foreign affairs, health, social policy, the environment, rural affairs, national security and education. Moreover, two academic research institutes were also closely aligned with the party: the Gdańsk-based Institute for the Research of the Market Economy established by two former liberals (Jan Szomburg and UW economics spokesman Janusz Lewandowski) and the prestigious Institute for Public Affairs whose governing bodies included the then-UW Parliamentary Club Chairman and foreign affairs spokesman Bronisław Geremek.

The UP and ROP also recognised the importance of utilising 'professional' external policy specialists but encountered much greater difficulties in developing such networks. UP Presidium member Piotr Marciniak, for example, acknowledged that, "a party that wants to survive in the Polish reality has to be built on an intellectual base of support...it has to have foundations, associations...a whole milieu that is its essential to its functioning...as well as an important source of cadres, and a certain

98 Author interview, 12 June 1997.
99 'Partyjni eksperci'.
flow of ideas." However, although the party had "some contacts with the Warsaw-based intelligentsia" it was not, in comparison with the UW, able to systematically develop a base of support among policy specialists and, by 1997, the party had wound up its policy commissions. The ROP encountered similar difficulties in developing support in intellectual and academic circles. Given its image as an extreme and populist party, particularly among the influential Warsaw-based cosmopolitan media, even sympathetic intellectuals and academics were careful about becoming too closely associated with the ROP. Although, according to party leaders, a larger number of sympathetic academics began to co-operate with the ROP as its opinion poll ratings improved during the first half of 1996, the party’s National Secretary Wojciech Włodarczyk acknowledged that assistance from most of these external policy experts was sporadic, informal and did "not have a structured character."

Secondly, Polish commentators have also noted a shift in party attitudes towards sociological and public opinion research. Polish parties came to pay much greater attention to both analysing generally-available, published opinion poll findings and ordering their own, specially-commissioned research; with parties’ election campaign staffs often "creating specialist cells within their (organisational) structures to analyse even the smallest change in the dynamic of their rankings." A defining moment in terms of utilisation of public opinion specialists (and Polish political campaigning more generally) was SLD leader and SdRP party Chairman Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s 1995 presidential election campaign. Kwaśniewski’s election campaign staff, which included the sociologist and director of the Polish branch of the Gallup Institute polling company Sławomir Wiatr, “analysed public opinion research scrupulously and ordered it systematically.” More generally, according to SdRP Central Executive Committee member Krzysztof Janik, the party carried out its own polling researching and sometimes paid for market research companies to attach “one or two questions” to their general surveys - although, according to some commentators, the Gallup Institute’s polling in the run up to the 1997 election was much more intensive and the company, “asked (questions) about the tiniest details of how the SLD is regarded.”

101 Author interviews with: Piotr Marciniak, 19 November 1997; and Wojciech Borowik, 19 February 1997.
102 ‘Partyjni eksperci’.
103 Author interview with Wojciech Włodarczyk, 14 February 1997.
105 Ibid.
Similarly, the UW also utilised the services of sympathetic polling organisations such as the Social Research Workshop (associated with the Gdansk liberal milieu)\textsuperscript{108} and academic sociologists - such as the director of the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Professor Andrzej Rychard who assisted the party’s 1995 presidential campaign.\textsuperscript{109} Indeed, in the 1997 parliamentary election campaign the party prided itself on the fact that had undertaken detailed opinion research before determining how much exposure to give its leader Leszek Balcerowicz.\textsuperscript{110} Even the cash-strapped UP found the resources to fund polling research on the profile of its electorate and potential electorate in the run up to the 1997 election.\textsuperscript{111} Meanwhile, the PSL - which, according to their Parliamentary Club Vice-Chairman Janusz Piechociński, felt the mainstream polling organisations didn’t take into account the specific characteristics of their predominantly rurally-based, electorate - established its own Peasant Institute for Public Opinion Research which comprised sympathetic sociologists and opinion polling specialists and was convened specifically for election campaigns.\textsuperscript{112} The ROP, which shared the PSL’s mistrust of polling companies but for more ideological reasons, also established a semi-permanent unofficial polling workshop called the Centre for Public Opinion Research.\textsuperscript{113}

Thirdly, although this was still very much at an experimental stage, there was also some evidence that Polish parties were becoming increasingly interested in utilising specialist media professionals and communications consultants. In the 1995 presidential election campaign, for example, two commentators noted that “even those campaign staffs which seemed to rely on their candidate’s natural assets, utilised (communications) specialists”\textsuperscript{77,114} and by the 1997 parliamentary elections Polish advertising and media specialists were welcoming the fact that “politicians are starting to increasingly use the services of professionals in order to carve out their own image.”\textsuperscript{115}

The process was furthest advanced in the cases of the SLD/SdRP and the UW and, once again, Kwaśniewski's 1995 presidential campaign was a watershed. According to most Polish advertising specialists Kwaśniewski’s was “the first really, modern

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} ‘Wojna na miny’.
\textsuperscript{110} Author interviews with Andrzej Potocki, 27 February and 26 November 26th 1997; and Paweł Piskorski, 25 November 1997.
\textsuperscript{111} Author interview with Piotr Marciniak, 19 November 1997.
\textsuperscript{112} See: ‘Zasada ograniczonego zaufania’.
\textsuperscript{113} See: ‘Kampania reklamowa’.
\textsuperscript{114} ‘Wojna na miny’.
\textsuperscript{115} ‘Więcej zawodowstwa’, Rzeczpospolita. 1 October 1997.
election campaign in Poland” where the candidate subordinated himself to his
advisers, which included Robert Kwiatkowski, the co-owner of the EBD advertising
agency, and the French Socialist Party and Francois Mitterand’s campaign consultant,
Jacques Seguella. Media specialists and consultants - including Kwiatkowski and,
according to some accounts, the French socialists - were also involved in the SLD’s
1997 parliamentary campaign - although to a much lesser extent. As SdRP’s head
of party organisation, and SLD Election Staffs organiser in both 1995 and 1997,
Maciej Poręba put it, “the time of voluntary activity is ending...there are now several
dozen various types of marketing firms in Poland who do this as professionals taking
advantage of the very great expertise that is available in the West...If we can find
people among these who want to work with us, then we will.” Similarly, according
to the UW’s National Press Spokesman Andrzej Potocki, the party “always uses paid
professional media experts and communications consultants.” Both the UW’s
progenitor parties used external media relations experts in their election campaigns, as
did the UW itself in the 1995 presidential elections when it employed a Polish-
Belgian firm Corporate Profiles together with a number of TV specialists who
offered their services voluntarily. According to Potocki, during the 1997
parliamentary campaign the party also “hired firms that were involved TV
production, billboards, the visual side of the campaign” as well as using a Polish-
American company of media relations experts as strategic campaign advisers.

Professional media and communications specialists were also utilised by the PSL, UP
and ROP, although to a much lesser extent. PSL Executive Office director Marian
Zalewski, for example, felt that “when it comes to TV you have to use experts and we
will use them, there is no doubt about this.” During the 1993 parliamentary
elections the party hired a Polish advertising company, Józef Węgrzyn, to produce
their TV election broadcasts; and in 1997 once again employed specialists to produce
their TV and radio programmes, together with a well-known graphic artist, Waldemar
Śwezy, to design their posters. In the 1997 campaign the UP hired the Polish-

116 See: J. Paradowska, ‘A kolor jego jest niebieski’, Polityka. 9 December 1995; A. Nivat,
‘Convincing voters that Kwaśniewski is “the choice of the future”’, Transition. Vol. 2 No. 8. 19 April
117 See: K. Olszewski, ‘Kampania doradców’, Rzeczpospolita. 1 July 1997 and author interview with
118 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
119 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
120 Ibid.
121 See: ‘Wojna na miny’.
123 Author interview, 11 March 1997.
124 Author interviews with Ewa Czaczkowska, Rzeczpospolita daily, 26 June 1997 and 21 November
1997.
Swedish advertising firm Marketpoint to design their posters and leaflets\textsuperscript{122} and the ROP also employed media specialists to prepare “specific segments” of their election campaign such as their TV and radio slots, together with a group of sympathetic media specialists who voluntarily undertook specialist analyses of the party’s campaign.\textsuperscript{124}

Nevertheless, although there was evidence of parties increasingly recognising the value of external policy experts, public opinion specialists and (to a much lesser extent) media and communications consultants - and attempting to develop networks of sympathisers in these fields - there was also contrary evidence which revealed clear limits to the extent to which such ‘professionals’ were being utilised.

Firstly, it was questionable to what extent most of this activity could really be described as ‘professionalisation’ given that much of it was motivated by political (if not personal) sympathies and supplied to the parties on a voluntary rather than a paid, contractual basis. SdRP Chairman Józef Oleksy’s group of academic advisers, for example, worked voluntarily\textsuperscript{127} and the party’s head of organisation Maciej Poręba pointed out that, “if we ask for (professional polling or media) help from outside then they are aware that they are working voluntarily...we operate on the basis of sympathisers who take responsibility for these matters...but not on the basis of payment. This is simply co-operation within the parameters of common, left-wing interests. We are all on the left and feel we should work together.”\textsuperscript{128} PSL Executive Office director Marian Zalewski also pointed out that, although there were some media specialists “with whom we work on the usual (commercial) basis”, generally external media advice was provided by “journalists who are party members and help us in view of the fact that they are party members”\textsuperscript{129}; while it was also claimed that the party’s expert policy advisers provided their services voluntarily and without seeking payment.\textsuperscript{130}

Similarly, according to UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik his party’s use of specialist advisers was “a voluntary activity and, therefore, not very effective”\textsuperscript{131} a view confirmed by leader Ryszard Bugaj who said that the party “don’t hire professionals” to analyse the results of opinion polling and (until the

\textsuperscript{122} Author interview with Piotr Marciniak, 19 November 1998.
\textsuperscript{123} Author interview, 27th November 1997
\textsuperscript{124} See: ‘Partyjni eksperti’.
\textsuperscript{125} Author interview, 28 February 1998.
\textsuperscript{126} Author interview, 11 March 1998.
\textsuperscript{127} See: ‘Partyjni eksperti’.
\textsuperscript{128} Author interview, 19 February 1998.
1997 election campaign) “don’t order our own research.”\textsuperscript{132} The party’s National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalęcz also pointed out that even the paid work undertaken by the party’s professional communications specialists in the 1997 campaign would be “to some degree, voluntary” with “the payments of a kind that will involve a certain degree of sympathy from people...it will not be...an occasion for these people to make the large amounts of money that they would if they worked for industry or in some other non-political role.”\textsuperscript{133} According to ROP National Press Spokesman Jacek Kurski, the party’s policy advisers also worked for the party voluntarily and were not paid to prepare experts’ reports\textsuperscript{134} while, in terms of media and communications specialists, he felt that “unpaid people will offer themselves” and “we will be in a position to carry the main burden of the (1997 election) campaign.”\textsuperscript{135}

An example of how Polish parties utilised the advice of external advisers and specialists on an unpaid basis was the support provided to them by their Western ‘sister’ party organisations or foundations and from the American Democratic and Republican parties. In terms of the former, in addition to the aforementioned assistance which SdRP and Kwaśniewski received from the French Socialist Party, UP National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalęcz acknowledged that his party benefited from training schools on campaign skills organised by “the British Labour Party and the foundations connected with the European social democratic parties.”\textsuperscript{136} Indeed, according UP’s 1997 election organiser Piotr Marciniak, it was campaign specialists supplied by the Swedish social democratic party who analysed the party’s polling research during that campaign and, “to a large extent, we formulated the concept of our election campaign in contact with them. Intellectually, that is, only in the programmatic sense...they didn’t help us organisationally.”\textsuperscript{137} In terms of the latter, the Polish office of the International Republican Institute, for example, provided unpaid advice to AWS and organised training schools for ROP and UW activists, while the National Democratic Institute’s Polish branch adopted an even more catholic approach and organised training sessions for representatives from the UW, UP, ROP, SdRP youth sections and a number of AWS affiliates, on subjects such as organising local party structures and targeting women voters in election campaigns.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{132} “Zasada ograniczonego zaufania’.
\textsuperscript{133} Author interview with Tomasz Nalęcz, UP National Press Spokesman, 3 March 1997.
\textsuperscript{134} ‘Partyjni eksperci’
\textsuperscript{135} Author interview with Jacek Kurski, ROP National Press Spokesman, 4 March 1997.
\textsuperscript{136} Author interview, 3 March 1997.
\textsuperscript{137} Author interview, 19 November 1997.
\textsuperscript{138} See: ‘Kampania doradców’.
Secondly, the use of paid external consultants and advisers was generally (and, in the case of opinion polling and communications specialists, almost exclusively) confined to the periods running up to national elections. Speaking six months before the 1997 parliamentary election UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech, for example, pointed that while, “these kind of consultants who relate to everyday matters - experts, professionals, sociologists - we are using them all them all the time...only now will we be hiring paid consultants who will be working with us on the question of determining an election strategy.” Similarly, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik drew attention to the fact that, “we are trying to get together the resources so that in the last six months in the run-up to the election campaign we can have professional groups supporting us.” In one sense, of course, this conformed with the notion of parties as primarily election-orientated organisations posited in the ‘electoral-professional’ and ‘cartel’ party models. On the other hand, it also made it difficult to see these parties as somehow ‘contracting out’ large portions of their central office organisational and campaigning functions; and ‘professional’ consultants increasingly replacing and acting as a direct substitute for weaker party bureaucracies.

By far the most important impediment towards the more regular utilisation of professional consultants by Polish parties was the sheer cost involved in hiring them; particularly given that many of the best consultants in the marketing, advertising and communications fields were American or West European and, therefore, very expensive. According to SdRP’s head of organisation, Maciej Poręba, for example, “we have this financial situation and it is difficult for us...at this present time to guarantee people decent working conditions and pay.” The PSL’s programmatic director Jan Wypych pointed out that while the party had been approached by a number of companies involved in media and communications strategy during the 1997 election campaign “the costs involved were of a different level to that which we could put into the campaign...this was the main reason, they were too expensive” a view shared by the party’s National Press Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski who argued that “the large costs associated with this are the most important factor...I don’t think we can afford this.” ROP’s head of information Andrzej Kierylo also argued that “if someone agrees to work with us for nothing then we will happily utilise their advice” but that the party “simply cannot afford...to hire foreign specialists.”

139 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
140 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
141 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
142 Author interview, 26 November 1997.
143 Author interview with Aleksander Bentkowski, PSL National Press Spokesman, 4 March 1997.
144 ‘Kampania doradców’.
Similarly, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik pointed out that while, “we want to begin professional...activities...professionalism depends on...money...(and)... on the basis of our meagre resources most our activity has to be voluntary.” The party’s National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalecz also felt that, “if we had the money then, of course, we would take advantage of them, there’s no doubt about it...(but) it costs a lot...and it is as a result of this impediment, above all, that we will not use Western experts.” Indeed, Nalecz also pointed that it was not simply a question of the cost of actually hiring the consultants but also of implementing their proposals, “because there is no sense in hiring experts in order to get their ideas on the specific means for implementing a campaign and not take advantage of these ideas on the grounds of poverty... So in order to hire consultants you have to have certain material capabilities to implement their plans, at least in some meaningful way if not in full.”

Ironically, the parties with could draw on the largest number of sympathisers with an appropriate level of professional campaigning skills to assist their parties voluntarily were generally those with the strongest financial bases, while the parties with the smallest networks of potential volunteer ‘professional’ sympathisers were, like the UP, also those who could least afford to hire paid advisers.

A secondary factor constraining the ‘professionalisation’ of Polish parties was a residual suspicion of external experts and advisers, particularly advertising agencies and marketing firms, real value. An extremely important factor here was the folklore associated with the disastrous experience of the UW’s progenitor, the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), during the 1993 parliamentary elections. The KLD ran the first truly ‘Westernised’ Polish election campaign under the direction of the well-known British advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi and, in spite of the large sums of money invested in the campaign, produced a derisory result well below the 5% threshold. Although this mistrust was, to some extent evident in all Polish parties, it was particularly striking in the PSL and right-wing parties such as ROP. One authoritative commentator on PSL affairs, for example, explained the party’s reluctance to utilise external communication and media advisers on the existence of “a lot of phobias...the consultant would be suspected that they were dishonest and not working for the benefit of the party” although, according to party’s programmatic director Jan Wypych the “supporters of more traditional methods of mobilising the rural electorate...are not just reactionaries and have a point that there is a large

145 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
146 Author interview, 3 March 1997.
147 Author interview with Ewa Czaczkowska, June 26 1997.
element of the PSL electorate that would be put off by too slick a campaign...indeed, the evidence of the KLD’s 1993 campaign suggests that such a campaign can easily backfire and not just among the rural electorate.”

The ROP also shared many of the Polish right’s traditional suspicions ‘professional’ campaigning techniques, exemplified by two Polish commentators’ quip that, in his 1995 presidential election campaign, the party’s future founder and Chairman Jan Olszewski took “strong support in the ‘Ursus’ (tractor factory - a stronghold of the Polish radical right) as an indicator of his popularity in the country as a whole” rather than rely on more sophisticated and scientific sources, such as opinion polls.

However, not only was this factor very much a secondary one to that of cost in all the parties’ considerations, the greatest hostilities tended to be directed towards ‘Western’ media and communications advisers on the grounds that did not properly understand Polish political culture; and, more generally, in relation to the exportability of Western campaigning models to Polish conditions. Not surprisingly the greatest unease on this score was evident in the PSL and ROP. Although generally a supporter of his party utilising modern campaigning techniques, PSL National Press Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski, for example, also expressed anxieties about the KLD’s experience in 1993 which he saw as “an example of taking advantage of a means of campaigning which is transferred to our conditions from the West without due regard” for Polish conditions where “for obvious reasons...people see a style of campaigning with big business behind it and subconsciously reject this.” Similarly, the ROP’s National Press Spokesman Jacek Kurski said that his party was, “not convinced about...these experts...from Western firms who are paid large sums of money and have already led one Polish political party to the grave...because here in Poland you have to have your own original scenario.”

Such anxieties could also be found in parties who were generally more enthusiastic about professional media and communications advisers. As one commentator noted “although it was often described as American in style and compared to (Bill) Clinton’s (1992 American presidential) campaign” Kwaśniewski’s 1995 campaign was, in terms of “translating general objectives and specific principles into campaign language, into specific elements...implemented exclusively by Polish forces.” Indeed, SdRP National Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski argued that while

144 Author interview, 20 February 1997.
149 ‘Wojna na miny’.
150 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
151 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
152 ‘A kolor jego jest niebieski’.

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"there are certain...experiences...that you can take advantage of" he was "fairly sceptical about hiring an American PR firm...because you have to know the Polish reality, the methods of getting to people and I know that a couple of political parties lost out as a result of doing this...organised its activities in an American style and simply transplanted them here."\textsuperscript{153} Similarly, SdRP’s head of organisation and one of Kwaśniewski’s campaign organisers Maciej Poręba argued that, “certain (campaign) elements are typically Polish and you can’t get round that.”\textsuperscript{154} UP National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalęcz also expressed a preference for using Polish specialists on the grounds that “there aren’t always good results from consulting experts used to operating in countries with a different experience from that in Poland....not all these things are transferable” and cited the 1993 KLD campaign which “ended in catastrophe precisely through trying to transfer certain Western models” as an example of the dangers of non-Polish campaign specialists and the fact “every idea transferred from a different country, different culture or different cultures should be modified in a natural way.”\textsuperscript{155} Even Andrzej Potocki, National Press Spokesman for the UW, a party explicitly committed to using professional Western campaign specialists, admitted that there were “advantages and disadvantages” to “dealing with people who are new to the Polish scene” such as the American firm which the party hired to assist the party in preparing its 1997 election campaign. While, on the one hand, their lack of direct involvement in Polish politics meant they could allow to make more dispassionate and objective political assessments, “the danger, of course, is that it is possible that they won’t know a lot of things about Poland that are worth knowing.”\textsuperscript{156}

Moreover, the greatest anxieties also appeared to be related to fears of losing ‘political control’ to ‘strategic’ campaign advisers rather than hiring individual professional advisers and specialists or specific organisations with particular skills such as TV and radio production, artistic design and copy writing. SdRP head of organisation Maciej Poręba, for example, said that the SLD “aren’t going to make the mistake the KLD made...of hiring special firms...and having a campaign precisely programmed by Saatchi and Saatchi...with no idea of what was required”\textsuperscript{157} while the party’s National Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski pointed that the SLD’s co-operation with media specialists in the 1997 election campaign “did not have an institutional rank, it was more a case of co-operation with specific people.”\textsuperscript{158}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Author interview, 27 February 1997.
  \item Author interview, 28 February 1997.
  \item Author interview, 3 March 1997.
  \item Author interview, 27 February 1997.
  \item Author interview, 28 February 1997.
  \item Author interview, 21 November 1997.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Similarly, according to the PSL's programmatic director Jan Wypych his party “didn't go in the direction of hiring a firm” but rather turned to “experts, directors, artists...hired on an individual basis...whether it was for photos, film, radio, posters or graphics.”159 ROP National Secretary and 1997 election campaign organiser Wojciech Wlodarczyk also pointed out that, “there wasn’t a firm which determined the whole of our campaign...we didn’t turn to advertising firms...apart from those who prepared specific segments....according to the principles that we laid down for them.”160

Even the UW, the only party which actually hired a firm of strategic election campaign advisers in 1997, expressed anxieties about the possible consequences for maintaining clear lines of political accountability and control. According to UW National Press Spokesman Andrzqj Potocki the party was determined not to repeat the KLD’s “basic error of just approaching Saatchi and Saatchi and saying: ‘Run our campaign for us please. See you after the election.’”161 Indeed, according to the party’s 1997 election organiser PawcI Piskorski (who was also involved in the 1993 KLD campaign), “it wasn’t a case of handing over our campaign to one firm and it ‘ran’ the campaign for us...we didn’t depend on any one firm or expert...We had experience of such models from earlier years...and it did not turn out as we had expected.” Rather, according to Piskorski, “this time...we decided the whole strategy, the method of implementation must be in the hands of politicians...it was the Election Staffs that decided on all important matters and we used consultants for help and experts for specific elements - TV, graphics etc - they were the ‘under-executives’ of tasks determined by the Staffs.”162

There was also some evidence of a slow but steady decline in hostility to utilising professional (and even Western) media and communication advisers even in those parties previously most uneasy about political marketing and modern campaigning techniques. At the beginning of 1997, for example, PSL National Press Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski argued that he did not feel that “there will be any opposition to” to using “domestic organisations which are involved in public relations to promote the PSL during the election campaign”163 and his party even toyed with the idea of hiring Jose Maria Aznar’s Spanish Popular Party’s campaign advisers (although nothing, ultimately, came of this).164 Right-wing parties also appeared to be increasingly aware of the need to run more sophisticated and professional campaigns,

159 Author interview, 26 November 1997.
160 Author interview, 27 November 1997.
161 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
163 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
164 See: ‘Kampania doradców’.
as the experience of AWS’s 1997 election campaign (discussed in more detail in a separate chapter) illustrated. Even the ROP’s head of information Andrzej Kieryło acknowledged that his party, for example, took “seriously the indicators provided to us by the (American) International Republican Institute.”

Finally, it is also worth noting a third factor constraining the ‘professionalisation’ of Polish parties, namely the fact that most Polish professional media and communications consultants were, themselves, reluctant to become too closely involved or identified with either a particular party or politics in general. Firstly, working for a political party campaign generally involved an unrealistically high set of expectations on the part of the ‘client’ together with such a small potential campaign budget that such success could be guaranteed (which, thereby, also rebounded on the firm’s reputation). Secondly, most Polish advertising companies and marketing firms were afraid of the potential stigma and damage to their longer term commercial interests which could follow from working for (and, thereby, becoming too identified with) a particular party. Thirdly, political parties were a particularly difficult ‘product’ for a, still nascent, advertising and marketing industry to promote given, as director-general of marketing company ITI McCann Erickson Marek Janicki put it “every other product doesn’t speak” and the fact that, given their lingering suspicions, Polish politicians did not always willingly accept advice from political marketing consultants on how they should present themselves. Lech Wałęsa, who refused to accept his consultants’ advice on changing his appearance during the 1995 presidential campaign, was a classic example of this.

Conclusion

As hypothesized, all the parties surveyed conformed to the later models of party organisation with: generally weak party central office bureaucracies employing only a small number of paid staff and a modest local party ‘machine’; together with a large proportion, or even a majority, of the party’s employees attached to the party organisation in parliament. This pattern was particularly evident at the local level where there was substantial overlap in terms of ‘parliamentary’ and ‘party’ offices, staff and technical facilities. As one Polish commentator accurately put it, “the main organisational unit of Polish politics is the Sejm deputy...political parties are officially poor as church mice....In the meantime party life carries on somewhere else, in other words, in the local offices, cars, hotels which the state provides for the political

165 Ibid.
166 See: ‘Wojna na miny’ and ‘Kampania reklamowa’.
167 ‘Kampania reklamowa’.
Although the party headquarters bureaucracy was formally under the control of the 'party in central office' and not the parliamentary leadership, the two sets of leaders were, in reality, often indistinguishable and, given the tiny number of staff and modest technical facilities attached to the party central office anyway, this 'control' was a largely meaningless concept anyway.

Of the two 'successor' parties, only the PSL displayed significantly more characteristics of the mass party in the sense of having a stronger party 'machine' attached to the party in central office. The hypothesised superiority of the both the PSL and SdRP was much more evident in terms of local organisational infrastructure and technical facilities. However, although 'organisational inheritance' was a secondary factor - particularly in the case of the PSL which was able to retain more of its predecessor's assets - this relative superiority was more a function of the fact that these were the two parties with the largest parliamentary representation, and concomitant access to local parliamentary office facilities.

Moreover, while there was also some evidence of the increasing utilisation of external experts, advisers and consultants, much of this was was on a voluntary rather than contractual basis and Polish parties conformed much less to the electoral-professional and cartel models in this respect. This was partly due to suspicion and a residual hostility towards, particularly Western, professional communication advisers, largely based on one party's extremely bad experience; together with a reluctance on the part of advertising and marketing firms themselves to become too closely associated with political parties. However, the main obstacle to the greater 'professionalisation' of Polish parties was, as hypothesised, lack of resources and the parties' extremely weak financial bases. Generally, therefore, there was no realistic prospect for the foreseeable future that such external 'professionals' as the parties did utilise would somehow develop as a substitute for the weak party central office bureaucracies as envisaged in the electoral-professional and cartel models.

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CHAPTER FOUR:

PARTIES AND THEIR ELECTORATES

Before considering whether or not the new Polish parties seek to organise and encapsulate their supporters within party structures it is necessary, as a first step towards determining what type of party model is developing in post-communist Poland to determine precisely what kind of electorates they are attracting and seeking to attract. As Katz and Mair point out, the mass party attempted to segment the electorate into a series of pre-defined and exclusive socio-economic constituencies and, rather than seeking to represent the ‘national interest’, directed its appeal at, derived the bulk of their support from, and sought to articulate and represent the interests of ‘their’ segment of the electorate. Subsequently, with the emergence of the catch-all and electoral-professional models, the notion of parties as the representatives of pre-defined socio-economic classes was modified as parties made broader appeals and competed to secure a wider range of support from all segments of society. In other words, as parties began defining their bases of support, as Katz and Mair put it, “electorally rather than socially and culturally” defensive electoral strategies based on retaining and mobilising limited electoral constituencies were replaced with more offensive ones which involved competing for voters across the board, and thereby “exchanging effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success.”

Moreover, in order to attract as wide an electorate as possible, catch-all/electoral-professional parties appealed to what Panebianco termed the “opinion electorate”, by concentrating on policy effectiveness and “valence” issues which transcended narrow group interests, rather than to the “electorate of belonging” on a narrowly ideological basis; with a concomitant focus on the competence of party leaders as potential national statesmen rather than representatives of a specific socio-economic class or segment of the electorate. The result was, as Katz and Mair put it, a process which some commentators described as the “Americanisation” of European politics with elections “seen to revolve around the choice of leaders rather than the choice of policies or programmes.”

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2 ‘The Transformation of Western European Party’, p190; and Political Parties: Organisation and Power. p263.
5 Political Parties: Organisation and Power. p263.
This process of party change was, as noted in chapter one, rooted in the emergence of less socially integrated and culturally homogeneous electorates in the 1950s and 1960s which made it more difficult for parties to identify distinct segments of the electorate with collective identities and long-term interests and, consequently, led to a decline in party identification as electorates became more open, unstable and politically independent. At the same time, economic growth and the development of the welfare state facilitated the development of less partisan and divisive party programmes which could be claimed to serve a general rather than particular interest; while the development of the mass media as the primary mode of political communication allowed party leaders to appeal directly to an electorate at large who were learning to behave “more like consumers than active participants.” Consequently, with electoral behaviour “no longer believed to be moulded by predisposition rather than choice” voters were believed to have become “free floating and uncommitted, available to, and also susceptible to, any of the competing parties.”

Interestingly, in Katz and Mair’s more recent cartel party model, the wheel appears to have turned full-circle with a return to the idea of competition as more “contained and managed” and parties more clearly defining ‘their’ segments of the electorate. While parties still compete for voters the posited existence of a party ‘cartel’ means that they do so “in the knowledge that they share with their competitors a mutual interest in collective organisational survival” and “in some cases, even the limited incentive to compete has actually been replaced by a positive incentive not to compete.”

So what kind of electoral strategies and voter profiles might we expect to see developing among the new Polish parties? Commentators such as Kopecky have hypothesised that parties in post-communist Eastern Europe are more likely to resemble the catch-all/electoral-professional models and develop as formations with very loose electoral constituencies which approach “a wider clientele of voters...rather than opt for the representation of well-defined segments of society.” The main reason for this is the lack of a strong cleavage structure underpinning the post-communist electorates which, according to Mair, makes them “almost by definition, more open and available than those of the established democracies.” This openness is, in turn, rooted not just in the volatility which we might expect in any newly

7 Ibid, p7.
10 ‘Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe’, p518.
11 What is different about post-communist party systems? p9.
democratised electorates but also, it is argued, in the homoegenising communist social legacy which is likely to produce undifferentiated societies largely lacking in distinctive and easily identifiable social bases and dimensions. This 'Missing Middle' approach is based on the political sociology of the communist period most of which, as Evans and Whitefield point out, focused on the way that communist societies were atomised by “the combination of repressive and highly centralised state activities and by a reward system which facilitated individual rather than collective action...the operation of egalitarian economic policies and disaggregation of social resources” which led to an absence of stable social cleavages or any intermediate, meso-structures based upon them.12 Polish sociologist Miroslawa Grabowska exemplifies this approach when she argues that the, “totalitarian system destroys organisations and associations: parties, trade unions, business organisations, religious organisations - the post-totalitarian civil society is ‘flat’. This ‘flat’ society causes problems in politics because it is hard to represent amorphous groups.”13

The ‘Missing Middle’ approach has been challenged both by ‘Modernisation’ theorists - who argue that the impact of industrialisation on communist societies created well-developed occupational and other interest-based cleavages which provided a basis for stable Western-style, party competition - and by Evans and Whitefield’s own preferred ‘Comparative Communist’ approach which focuses on the role of country-specific factors - such as cultural differences, the varying patterns of modernisation across the region and variations in the extent of intermediate social organisations - to explain what they see as varied patterns of interest formation and articulation which are developing within post-communist societies.14 Clearly, as Mair points out, the new electorates of post-communist Eastern Europe are not wholly homogeneous nor do they “lack any differentiation based on social stratification, occupation, ethnicity, religion” and “in some instances it is clear that divisions along some or all of these lines are at least as important as the equivalent division in the established democracies.”15 In post-communist Poland, for example, it is possible to identify a number of distinct societal cleavages - or, perhaps, less definitively, ‘points of reference’ - which have their roots in the communist (or even pre-communist) period, need to be ‘factored in’ to qualify the ‘Missing Middle’ approach and may provide the putative parties with potential bases of support. These include: former members of the communist party or other organisations linked to the previous regime

12 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe', pp528-531.
14 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe', pp531-534.
15 What is different about post-communist party systems? p9.
such as the OPZZ trade union federation; the large peasantry and private farming sector which survived as an independent economic sphere of the economy during the communist period; the Catholic Church to which 90% of Poles owe their allegiance and which also retained a measure of organisational autonomy under communism; and the independent Solidarity trade union which enjoyed a brief but spectacular period of legality in 1980-81 and continued to function as a 'mobilising myth' for much of the Polish democratic opposition during the remainder of the 1980s.

However, not only are those societal 'points of reference' - with the exception of the urban-rural cleavage - rooted in ideological or cultural identities rather than socio-economic interests but, as Mair points out, cleavage structures only act to stabilise the electorate slowly over a number of years. Moreover, the existence of a social cleavage also involves a subjective sense of collective identity and not simply the mere existence of distinctive social segments based on a number of objective and observable characteristics. Apart from the obvious point that the long period of one-party communist rule precluded the development of any lasting social loyalties to any of the new Polish parties, given the enormous societal changes which have accompanied the political and economic transitions, post-communist social structures remain extremely fluid. Consequently, it is likely to be simply too early for any of the new, emerging socio-economic interests and identities to have properly crystallised in such a way as to provide a sufficient basis for a stable pattern of party alignments.

We might, therefore, hypothesise, that such an amorphous and uncrystallised set of socio-economic interests and identities, and concomitant pattern of electoral volatility, almost certainly preclude the development of either mass party-type electoral strategies based on appealing to, seeking to represent and maintaining stable links with clearly defined socio-economic segments of the electorate, or the more recent cartel party strategy based on "contained and managed" electoral competition. Consequently, following Kopecky, we might expect the new Polish parties to develop their electoral strategies on the basis of a broad appeal to the widest possible set of potential voters in line with the catch-all/electoral professional party models.

However, given that, at least until socio-economic interests become more crystallised, the main political cleavages are likely to develop around ideological or moral-cultural issues - such as attitudes towards the communist past or the Catholic Church, the new Polish parties are - unlike Western catch-all/electoral-professional parties - not necessarily likely to downplay ideology and concentrate solely (or even primarily) on issues relating to competence and policy effectiveness. We might also expect the one

16 Ibid.
exception here to be the PSL, for whom the large private peasantry provides a substantial segment of the Polish electorate with a reasonably well-defined and crystallised socio-economic interest and collective identity; and which will, consequently, pursue something closer to a mass party electoral strategy focusing its appeal primarily on this segment of the electorate.

Moreover, a number of commentators have identified leader-orientation and, as Schopflin put it, a tendency for citizens “to believe in persons rather than institutions and to accept them as the true target of political attitudes” as one of the key feature of post-communist politics. In other words, voters in post-communist Eastern Europe are, to a large extent, likely to develop their attitudes to the new parties in relation to the key personalities that are associated with them; or, as one Polish party strategist put it, “given that Polish political culture is not too advanced politically...people look at who the leader is” and “if the leader is in order you pull people along to an enormous degree.” Consequently, again in line with the catch-all/electoral professional - but also the cartel - party models, we might expect broad electoral appeals to be accompanied by a high degree of personalisation, or “Americanisation”, with party leaders playing a key role in Polish electoral politics - and for this role to be reflected in party electoral strategies.

In order to test these hypotheses - and, thereby, make a preliminary assessment as to what type of party model is emerging in post-communist Poland - this chapter, therefore, examines four aspects relating to the nature of party links with their electorates. Firstly, based on interviews with party strategists and officials programmes and other written sources, the six parties and groupings overall electoral strategies are considered, particularly the question of whether they focused their appeals on specific and clearly defined socio-economic segments of the electorate as implied in the mass party and (although in a rather different sense) cartel party models or whether, as hypothesised, they attempted to attract the broader and looser electoral constituencies implied in the catch-all/electoral-professional models.

Secondly, the September 1997 parliamentary election campaign is considered as a specific case study of how the parties sought to ‘operationalise’ these electoral strategies. Thirdly, based primarily on an analysis of the 1997 election results - but supplemented, where appropriate, with previous parliamentary and presidential election results and other survey evidence - party electoral profiles are examined in order to assess: whether the actual distribution of party support among particular

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18 Author interview with Jacek Kurski, 4 March 1997.
segments of the electorate reflect these electoral strategies; and, if voting patterns are not rooted in socio-economic interests, then what specific factors account for each of the party’s or grouping’s bases of support. Fourthly, the particular role which each party leader played in their 1997 election campaign is examined in order to assess the level of ‘leader-orientation’ in and personalisation of Polish electoral politics.

Party electoral strategies

As hypothesised, most party electoral strategies were based on winning over as broad a swathe of the electorate as possible rather than appealing to specific and clearly defined socio-economic constituencies. In its 1993 programme, for example, SdRP - which contested elections as the main component of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) - stressed that, “we are not a party of one class or social stratum,” while its 1997 programme was directed at, “all citizens, employees and employers, owners of family businesses and farming enterprises, retirees and pensioners, who, like us, want higher principles to be better achieved and appropriated in public life.” The party was particularly keen to stress the fact that it did not look for support only in classical social democratic socio-economic constituencies but also actively sought the backing of the emerging Polish ‘middle class’. SLD Parliamentary Club Press Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiątkowski, for example, argued that, “we don’t deny our support for the middle class that is forming Poland. Indeed, it is this milieu which we perceive to be a part of our social democratic electorate. The left’s position cannot be built on groups that are pauperised, embittered and permanent losers.” Similarly, SdRP National Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski argued that, “we don’t just have to look after people who can’t cope with the transformation, who lose out... We also have to take care of the development of the middle class. This is the natural social motor in the process of the changes... which, through its active individualism, is able to direct and modernise the economy.”

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19 A finding confirmed by research undertaken by Polish sociologist Miroslawa Grabowska on delegates to the 1995 SdRP, UW, UP and Christian National Union (ZChN - one of the main parties comprising the AWS coalition) conferences which found that that “party elites are unable (or unwilling) to... turn their attentions to specific groups having specific interests with an appeal to represent them” (emphasis in original) and that the majority of delegates at every party conference regarded their party as “the representative of the whole of society” ranging from 81% of ZChN delegates (compared with 15% who mentioned a specific group), 66% of SdRP delegates (25%), 57% of UW delegates (36%) and 50% of UP delegates (41%). See: ‘Partie polityczne’, pp35-38.


23 Author interview with Dariusz Klimaszewski, 27 February 1997.
Similarly - and, perhaps, equally surprisingly, given that it was an electoral formation primarily based on the Solidarity trade union - AWS's electoral strategy was also not aimed specifically at attracting workers but rather, according to its National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek, on winning over "a very, very broad electorate...We are not a party of the kind of, for example, the PSL which, in a traditional way, tries to attract the rural peasant electorate." Tywonek justified this strategy on the grounds that "this is a moment of economic transformation, systemic transformation, transformation of social consciousness" and that, consequently, it was "difficult here to close off some kind of narrow circles" and "to address your programmatic proposals exclusively to the peasants, forgetting about the intelligentsia...young people...or working people." Using similar arguments, the UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki argued that his party had to be "at least in some way, attractive to every potential elector" given that in Poland, "elections are obviously not as closely connected with group interests as they are in countries were democracy has been functioning longer and...an enormous number of votes cast...are not necessarily connected with the interests of that particular voter or member of that social group."25

UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nałęcz also argued that, apart from agricultural workers, "when it comes to other social groups then, in fact, our appeal is very broad" and the UP's 1995 programme stressed that the party felt itself to be the "heir to the traditions of the Polish socialist movement which, on many occasions in its history, has succeeded like no other in harmonising the interests of the nation and the state with the interests of working people." (emphasis added) Similarly, according to its ideological declaration, the ROP was a party which brought together people from "every social and occupational milieu" who were "ready to act in the cause of the reconstruction of the Republic."26

In so far as party strategists did attempt to define more specifically whom their target electorates were, they invariably did so in terms of ideological, cultural or even moral rather than socio-economic categories. Polish sociologist Tomasz Żukowski, for example, has argued that the SdRP/SLD's electoral strategy was based on attracting an electorate that was "as much a community of cultural interests invoking a different set of values as a community of economic interests" and that this was particularly evident in this grouping's attitude to the role of the Catholic Church and religion in

24 Author interview with Tomasz Tywonek, AWS National Press Spokesman, 4 June 1997.
25 Author interview with Andrzej Potocki, 27 February 1997.
26 Author interview with Tomasz Nałęcz, 3 March 1997.
28 ROP. Deklaracja Ideowa. Warsaw. undated.

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In its 1993 programme, for example, SdRP argued that, “we regard separating the Church from the state as a fundamental principle of a democratic state of law” and that the state “should also guarantee the rights of non-believers who are increasingly threatened with intolerance.” The SLD’s 1993 election programme also warned that, “the achievements of democratic theory, the principle of separating the state from the Church, are being broken, (by those) stubbornly advancing the concept of a confessional state in which Catholic doctrine has a monopoly on the truth, justice, morality and ethics, and where the law is brought into line with the requirements of the clergy and religious norms.” Meanwhile, although in its most recent programme SdRP adopted a slightly gentler tone and argued that it was “not a party doctrinally opposed to religion and the Churches” and “in favour of the cooperation of the state with the Churches in dealing with important social problems,” the party nonetheless re-affirmed its support for the “separation of Churches and confessional unions from the state” and the “impartiality of the state towards various ‘worldview’ orientations, Churches and confessional unions, treating them equally favourably without any kind of preferences and without the involvement of the state in the case of any of these orientations.”

Moreover, an important element of SdRP/SLD’s electoral appeal was directed at that segment of the electorate which tended to view the communist period more sympathetically - or, as one 1993 SLD election pamphlet put it shared “a just and balanced assessment of People’s Poland” - although, for obvious reasons, this appeal was generally couched in fairly subtle and nuanced terms. In its 1993 programme, for example, SdRP argued that while the party supported “the just trial and punishment of the guilty, at the same, however, we decidedly oppose attempts to punish and discriminate against innocent people who were politically active during the PRL (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa: Polish People’s Republic) period...Poland must be a home to all its citizens.” Similarly, in its 1997 programme, SdRP said that it had “respect and recognition for all those who reconstructed our country after the wartime wreckage...(and) worked honestly for Poland when it was called People’s Poland. We defend the biographies of these millions of people, their rights to retain their dignity today and their good name in the future.”

Author interview with Professor Tomasz Żukowski, Institute of Social Studies, Warsaw University, 24 June 1997.
30 Socjaldemokratyczna Alternatywa
32 Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej
34 Socjaldemokratyczna Alternatywa
35 Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej
AWS strategists also tended to define its target electorate in ideological and moral-cultural terms although, in contrast to the SLD’s overt secularity, AWS was, as National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek put it, “a grouping which draws on Christian traditions.” Moreover, AWS represented a “contestation of the Poland before 1989 and the last four years (of SLD government)” and the grouping’s electoral strategy was based overtly on appealing to “the broadly understood electorate which, both in 1989 and in later years, voted for groupings emerging from Solidarity roots...anti-SLD, anti-communist...in one measure an ideological, political electorate...an electorate, very broadly defined, from the right side of the political spectrum to the very deep centre...a centre-right electorate.” Similarly, according to its National Spokesman Jacek Kurski, the ROP’s electoral strategy was built upon appealing to “right-wing, traditional Catholic...ordinary Poles who never had any dealings with communists,” or, as he once described it, “the so-called ulaniski patriotic electorate” for whom “the main motivation is patriotism...there aren’t any motivations other than emotional, patriotic ones...There aren’t some sort of interests such as occupational ones...its quite simply...across all groups.”

An important aspect of the UP’s electoral strategy was its appeal to the ‘ideological centre’ of the Polish political spectrum or those, as its leader Ryszard Bugaj put it, who “are neither supporters of sharp de-communisation, nor...agree with forgetting history.” Similarly, although couched in programmatic rather than ideological or moral-cultural terms, the UW also appeared to base its electoral strategy on appealing to an ‘opinion electorate’ rather than an ‘electorate of belonging’ or, as its leader Leszek Balcerowicz put it, “the sizable and growing group of people - currently in every social category - who believe that the changes implemented after 1989 were sensible and positive for them.” (emphasis added)

However, nearly all of the parties and groupings surveyed were also making some provisional attempts to define their core electorates in terms of socio-economic ‘interests’ and nuance their electoral strategies accordingly - or, at the very least, try to ensure that broader messages did not alienate these ‘core’ supporters. This was particularly evident in the case of UW and reflected in the party’s enthusiasm for undertaking detailed research into its socio-economic electoral profile. (See Chapter...
on ‘The Party Machine’). According to the UW’s National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki the party felt that “in line with the old electoral truism ‘in the first place, don’t lose what you’ve already got’”, the party had to define its core electorate and “look after these groups and then these groups will form a base on which we can build.” In other words, rather than making a blanket appeal to all sections of the electorate the UW had undertaken a “preliminary attempt to define our electorate...our basic groups which we are trying to attract” and discover “natural partners” which could form the basis of a putative ‘pro-reform alliance’. These groups were, according to Potocki: the traditional urban intelligentsia (“whose efforts provided the basis for Solidarity...and (although) it hasn’t benefited financially from the changes is involved in the process”); the emerging Polish middle class (“’yuppies’...young people who are entering into the professional world of business and commerce”); the business community (“those people who have decided to work for themselves...and live from their own investments, from their own success in trading activities and handicrafts”); and young people in general and students in particular.

The SdRP/SLD, on the other hand, self-consciously attempted to define itself as a party which particularly expressed the “the aspirations of those social groups and citizens who - for various reasons - don’t have the same opportunities to take advantage from the effects of economic growth.” In the context of post-communist economic transition this meant, according to SdRP National Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, protecting those “social groups who find themselves in the most difficult situation in this transformation” particularly what the party saw as its core electorate based on traditional social democratic constituencies such as: government employees in the so-called ‘budgetary sphere’ of education and the health service, the low paid and welfare benefits claimants, particularly pensioners and retirees and single mothers. In the run up to the 1993 parliamentary elections, for example, SLD Election Committee Chairman Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz argued that his formation would, “to a large extent, address our individual appeals to the retired and pensioner milieu, the ‘budgetary sphere’ - particularly those deprived of the rights to benefit - or tenants who can’t afford to pay their housing rent, than to other, more satisfied groups.”

The other self-declared ‘left-wing’ party surveyed, the UP, defined itself even more unambiguously as “a social democratic party representing the interests of those milieu who through their labour determine the advance of society’

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41 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
42 Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej
43 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
civilisation” and its 1995 programme spoke of the necessity of “building up the UP’s support among the weakest economic groups on whose support we particularly depend.”

Interestingly, the SdRP/SLD was also attempting to carve out an electoral niche for itself among constituencies more associated with the Western post-materialist left, exemplified by its attempts to focus on issues such as sex equality and reproductive rights in order to win over women voters. In its 1993 programme, for example, SdRP declared its opposition to “all forms of social, occupational, customary and political discrimination” and support for the expansion of childcare facilities; and, in its 1993 election programme, the SLD re-affirmed its strong opposition to “legislation denying women the right to make decisions on the issue of their becoming mothers.”

Similarly the 1997 SdRP programme called for the education system and the media to “show greater determination in eliminating the established stereotypes of women’s and men’s roles” and supported the promotion of “modern standards of equality in the occupational and social field.”

There was also some evidence that the ROP was attempting to modify its electoral strategy and define its electorate more clearly in terms of specific socio-economic groups. The first of these was small and medium-sized business people and their families who, according to ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski, were “threatened by...the hegemony of the post-communist economic nomenklatura and post-communist order in the economic administration...and...by the dishonest and privileged competition from speculative Western capital...buying up our access to supermarkets.” A second, considerably more amorphous, socio-economic segment were those voters who, as Kurski put it, “have suffered as a result of the changes” and “allowed themselves to be taken in by the social promises of the UP and the SLD...(and) always orientates towards parties of change” which the ROP was thought to be able to attract because the party could “present the effects of right-wing reform in a manner which is pleasant to the ears of the left-wing clientele.”

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46 U Progu XXI Wiek.
47 Socjaldemokratyczna Alternatywa.
48 Tak Dalej Być Nie Musi.
49 Program Socjaldemokracji Rzeczpospolitej Polski.
50 Author interview, 4 March 1997. See also: M. D. Zdort, ‘Partia ulanów i przedsiębiorców’ Rzeczpospolita. 3 February 1997.
51 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
52 ‘My idziemy po władzę’
As hypothesised, the only one of the six parties and groupings surveyed whose electoral strategy bore a resemblance to the mass party model - in the sense of being directed primarily at winning the support of a single, distinct and clearly-defined socio-economic constituency - was the PSL. According to the PSL’s ideological declaration, the party’s “neo-agrarian” ideology drew upon the “centuries-long endeavours of the peasantry to live in freedom and participate equally in the life of the state” and particularly emphasised the key role of “agriculture as one of the main areas of production and the basis for national existence” with “family farms constituting the foundation for the harmonious development of villages and the countryside” and “the basis of the agricultural system.” The party also argued that the “the peasant and rural community is presently the main source of Nation’s biological revival, the source of its material affluence resulting from the tilling of the soil” and “through its connection with the land, binding the Nation with our territory” was also the “source of precious moral values.” At the same time as recognising “the ideas of solidarity of working people” and “the need to form...political and parliamentary alliances”, the PSL gave “priority to the necessity of maintaining the political unity of the rural community.” (emphasis added) According to party leader Waldemar Pawlak, therefore, the PSL was “above all, the representative of Polish peasants and the interests of this social group are the most important for us.”

However, there was also evidence that a number of PSL strategists increasingly shared the view that, as one party leader put it, the party’s “history as a peculiar trade union for rural residents is ending” and that it was making at least some efforts to modify its electoral strategy and broaden the basis of its electoral appeal beyond its core of small peasant farmers. Firstly, at its most modest, this involved various attempts to transform the PSL into a kind of ‘rural catch-all party’ directing the party’s appeal to, as the 1996 PSL programme put it, “that portion of Polish society which lives in the countryside and the small towns, far-removed from the urban centres.” In other words, “the electorate to which we appeal is not just peasants, but also that section of society of peasant origins which hasn’t forgotten its roots. We appeal to the whole of rural society. The countryside in spite of diversified social and occupational status, is united by common economic, social and cultural interests.”

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54 Ibid. p11.
55 Ibid. p13.
56 Ibid. p13.
According to PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak, this made the PSL the natural party of those “people who live beyond the large agglomerations, because for these people the values represented by the peasant movement are more meaningful.”

Secondly, and more ambitiously, this process involved attempts to develop an electoral strategy capable of attracting “a meaningful part of the urban electorate and not just to those people of peasant origin.” Admittedly, a large element of this simply involved highlighting the PSL’s argument that a strong agricultural sector and prosperous rural communities were in the national interest by, for example, arguing against importing food on the basis that, as PSL National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski put it, “in today’s world a country’s self-sufficiency in terms of foodstuffs is the basis of political sovereignty.” However, the process of developing a broader appeal also involved highlighting other aspects of the PSL programme which, as Bentkowski put it, “strongly underline...the protection of our land” and “placing maximum limits on the possible purchase of Polish land by foreigners” and other ‘patriotic’ themes emphasising the fact that, as another PSL leader put it, the party “has stubbornly defended and will defend Polish interests understood most literally...Polish land, Polish capital and Polish enterprise. When it comes to privatisation with the participation of foreign capital then we always pose more questions and have more doubts than others.”

Thirdly, as well as highlighting broad, national themes, there also was some evidence of the party attempting to target specific, particularly the less well-off, segments of the urban electorate, by promoting the PSL as a party which, as Aleksander Bentkowski put it, strongly believed in the need to “take care of the fact that there are so many poor people” and ensure that “the ‘social minimum’ is enough for everyone.” Indeed, the party’s ideological declaration stated that “although peasants are owners of land and the means of production, they derive their income primarily from work” which “makes their interests converge with the interests of the social groups of hired employees - workers and the intelligentsia.” Consequently, the party “recognises the solidarity of working people” and “the priority of work before capital.” Some commentators, for example, cited PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak’s public declaration of support for the threatened Gdańsk Shipyard in June 1996 as one...
example of how the PSL was seeking to broaden its electoral appeal among the urban working class."

Finally, and overlapping in some respects with the UP’s electoral strategy, the PSL also sought to portray itself as “a party of the ‘golden centre’” able to co-operate and form coalitions with ideological groupings on both the anti-communist ‘right’ and former communist ‘left’, thereby helping to ensure “stable government and limits on extremes” and acting as “the lifebelt of Polish democracy.” As the 1996 PSL programme put, the party’s centrism was rooted in the fact that it “represents a relatively poor electorate of worse perspectives, which together with the historically determined sensitivity of the peasant movement to social affairs, position on the role of the state and critical stance towards the extremes of liberal economic policy - means that our party is situated, effectively, on the left side in socio-economic affairs,” while the party’s “attitude to the Church and religion, respect for private ownership, sensitivity to the threats to our national interest, together with an electorate of smallholders - means that we can recognise ourselves as a centrist option.”

The most radical attempt to fundamentally alter the party’s electoral strategy was the idea of transforming the PSL from an agrarian party into a modern, West European Christian democratic people’s party - which was floated as a possibility by a number of commentators following the virtual exclusion of right-wing parties from the Polish parliament after the 1993 elections. For various reasons this realignment on the Polish centre-right did not transpire and, as one PSL leader who was sympathetic to the case for such a transformation put it in 1997, “during the last four years we went backwards on this road.” Quite apart from the fact that the PSL’s economic programme was considerably more left-wing than that of any West European Christian democratic party, many of the party’s leaders were also reluctant to adopt a too overtly pro-clerical stance and identify so unambiguously with the Catholic Church hierarchy. Moreover, the right was simply too well entrenched among a large section of the Polish electorate, as most of the 35% of voters who voted for parties which did not secure parliamentary representation in 1993 had supported

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67 ‘Dlaczego warto głosować na PSL’.
69 See, for example: K. Naszkowska and Z. Mikolejko, ‘Wszyscy chłopi Pana Boga: Czy PSL stanie się polską chadecją?’, Gazeta Wyborcza. 22-23 October 1993
71 See, for example the interview with PSL Supreme Council Chairman Józef Zych in J. Paradowska and A. Checko. ‘Język czynów’, Polityka. 18 December 1993

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right-wing parties and electoral coalitions. Indeed, the fact that the PSL found itself in coalition with the SLD, together with the increasing polarisation of the Polish political scene between the anti-communist right and post-communist left, made it extremely difficult for the party to develop a close relationship either with the Church hierarchy or with potential co-partners on the Christian democratic right emerging from within the Solidarity tradition.

The 1997 parliamentary election campaign

While all of the parties and groupings surveyed attempted to target certain segments of the electorate during the September 1997 parliamentary election campaign, they did so within the overall framework of broadly based appeals directed to voters as a whole. Setting out his grouping’s election campaign strategy, SLD Election Campaign Staffs Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, argued that while “you can talk about certain electoral preferences...at the level of electoral tactics” in terms of targeting young people, women, retirees and pensioners and rural voters, “the programme, as such, cannot prefer one social grouping at the expense of others. We have to put forward a certain vision of the economy and a vision of society - a vision of political life as a whole...The programme, as a whole, was addressed to all socio-economic groups.” Indeed, while the SLD’s 1997 election programme linked the grouping with the “best traditions of the Polish left and European social democracy” - and, thereby, stressed the fact that it was “particularly sensitive to the problems of those who are benefiting from economic growth to a lesser extent that other groups or are paying a greater price for the changes that others” - it also made it clear that the SLD represented the “interests of various social groups.” Consequently, as one of the SLD’s chief election strategists Marek Borowski put it, while “as a centre-left grouping one of our fundamental values is caring for those people who, to a greater extent than others, have borne the costs of the changes”, the SLD was “not a class party. We also understand the interests of business.” In other words, the SLD sought to “harmonise the necessity of continuing economic reforms, economic integration with Europe, with social awareness, with fighting poverty and unemployment, with aiming to ensure that the widest possible social groups participate in the benefits of systemic transformation.”

72 Author interview with Dariusz Klimaszewski, 21 November 1997.

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Consequently, the SLD ran a broadly-based campaign build around the twin themes of “We Kept Our Word” and “A Good Today, A Better Tomorrow” and focused mainly on underlining the pragmatism, competence and purported achievements of the outgoing SLD-led coalition government from which, they argued, everyone had benefited and would continue to benefit. As SLD strategist Marek Borowski put it, “WE KEPT OUR WORD...we have four years of government behind us, which every objective observer assesses as GOOD YEARS FOR POLAND.” The SLD had a “realistic programme based on our experience” which contained “a guarantee of economic growth” and a “clear social emphasis” which showed that it could “combine faithfulness to our programmatic principles with operating effectively and an ability to reach SENSIBLE COMPROMISES.”

However, the SLD campaign also contained a second, more emotive strand based on contrasting its own ‘competence’ and ‘pragmatism’ with the right’s ‘extremism’ and ‘irresponsibility’. One SLD election leaflet, for example, contained two columns, one outlining the left’s achievements and the other listing the potential threats posed by the right including: “interference by the Church hierarchy in politics”, “strikes and social unrest”, “outlawing abortion”, “dividing people into better and worse”, “social divisions”, a “fall in production”, “continuing growth in the number of jobless” and an “endless war at the top”. According to Marek Borowski the SLD was “a formation of reasonable and moderate people... WE AVOID EXTREMES”, which rejected “utopias, dangerous radicalism or revolutionary bloody-mindedness” and sought to “DEFEAT OUR RIVALS, BUT NOT DESTROY THEM”, compared with the right whom he described as “a chaotic coalition of defeated ‘couch’ parties...formed to remove someone from office.”

An important aspect of this was the recurring SdRP/SLD theme of supporting “the secularity of the state” and treating “all people equally regardless of their ‘worldview’ confessions” which meant that, as Borowski put it, “the SLD speaks out against the Church hierarchy’s statements which are not in line with respecting pluralism, toleration, respect” and in favour of “the aspirations of women to independently decide their own fate” which included their right “to conscious motherhood.”

This second strand also involved a subtle but unmistakable pitch to the SLD’s core electorate of beneficiaries from the communist regime by stressing the grouping’s opposition to “dividing Poles into better or worse, ‘real’ and ‘not real’” and respect

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Dobre Dziś - Lepsze Jutro.
75 ‘Dlaczego warto głosować na SLD?’
“for the generations which rebuilt Poland after the destruction of the Second World War.” As Borowski put it, while the SLD “condemned the crimes...and recognised the system as ineffective” they were not “permanent yesterday’s men” and rejected attempts by the right to “force us to condemn everything that was good in a bad system, what was creative and advantageous to the country and its citizens” and “cut ourselves off from the achievements of millions of Poles who honorably lived through and worked the best years of their lives during the period of People’s Poland.”

AWS’s 1997 election campaign also involved, as its Election Campaign Staff Secretary Andzrej Anusz put it, “certain accents, things related to electoral techniques which emphasised...groups which we tried to get to” and at whom “special and specific elements of the campaign” were directed. The clearest example of this was probably AWS’s attempt to target younger voters which, for example, involved a number of well-known Polish rock musicians declaring their support for AWS and performing special promotional concerts or appearing in its TV election broadcasts. Overall, however, the AWS campaign was, like the SLD’s, directed “very broadly...to the full spectrum of society” or, as AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski put it, “to all people in Poland, given its effects will affect everyone. We are convinced that everyone can find something very specific and attractive. The overall effects, however, will improve the situation for everyone in Poland...nobody, for sure, will be disappointed...everyone benefits and not specific groups.”

However, unlike the SLD campaign which sought to convince Poles that their government had produced a booming economy, AWS attempted to draw attention away from economic policies - on which it was internally divided - and ran what was essentially an ideological campaign particularly focusing on a rather amorphous set of traditional moral-cultural ‘values’ associated with breaking with the communist past, the family and patriotism - and underpinned by the slogan: “Always: Poland, Freedom, the Family.” The AWS election programme, for example, called for a “State built on the patriotic and Christian values” which have “defined our national identity for one-thousand years” together with the need to “finally...break with the

79 *Dobre Dziś - Lepsze Jutro.*
80 *Dlaczego warto głosować na SLD?*
81 Author interview with Andrzej Anusz, AWS Election Campaign Staff Secretary, 24th November 1997.
82 See, for example: ‘Gwiazdy kampanii AWS’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 6/7 September 1997.
83 Author interview with Andrzej Anusz, 24 November 1997.

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An important strand of the AWS’s campaign was its successful attempt to identify with the symbolism of, and build up a certain nostalgia for, the original Solidarity opposition movement. Examples of this included the similarity between the AWS and Solidarity logos and the presentation of ‘21 programmatic tasks’ on the anniversary of the signing of the August 1980 agreements when the then communist authorities agreed to the striking coastal workers ‘21 demands’ which, in turn, led to the formation of the original Solidarity trade union. Such activities, together with other slogans that invoked the idea of ‘finishing the Solidarity revolution’, also involved a clear attempt to draw an analogy between the new spirit of right-wing ‘political unity’ represented by the formation of AWS and the ‘societal unity’ which had characterised Solidarity’s previous anti-communist struggles in 1980-81 and 1989. This became the over-arching theme of AWS’s entire campaign strategy. According to one AWS leader Bronisław Komorowski, for example, AWS had begun “the great task of re-building the unity of the Solidarity camp, opening up the possibility of co-operation between its specific elements” and “stood as a symbol of overcoming the effects of the break up of, and conflict within, the Solidarity camp.” Similarly, AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski argued that, as “the one realistic alternative to the SLD”, AWS opened up the possibility for “the people of ‘August’” to “lead our country into the new century...Together once again in Solidarity, we can given Poland new laws...Let’s be together again.”

The ROP’s 1997 election campaign was also underpinned by a similar, although much less well-conceived, ideological strand. Specific appeals directed at the ROP’s supposed socio-economic ‘target’ electorates of small businessmen and the less well-off - which were evident in the party’s earlier campaigning initiatives such as its economically populist ‘Contract with Poland’ or its campaign against foreign supermarkets - did not really materialise in the course of the campaign proper. Rather, the ROP developed themes that were broadly similar to AWS’s, albeit with a slightly

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88 ‘21 punktów w XXI wiek’
higher emotional temperature and stronger emphasis on the its party leaders’ patriotic and anti-communist credentials. According to the ROP Election Campaign Staffs Press Spokesman Jan Polkowski, for example, the political and economic transition “should not be the responsibility of people of immoral compromises” and required “serious, determined politicians for whom the national interest is the basis of their public activities and not simply one among many phrases.” The ROP’s leaders were, “free from whatever accusations. Our trade mark is the word ‘honesty’. Their biographies speak more than the most passionate declarations thrown around during the course of an election campaign.”

The ROP did recognise that it could not, as the party’s Election Campaign Staffs Secretary Wojciech Wlodarczyk put it, simply “hold on to our permanent electorate...the ‘independence-patriotic’ one and anti-communist one” and had to broaden its appeal. Consequently, as the campaign developed, the party attempted to both ‘soften’ its image and place greater emphasis on socio-economic issues - although not with the objective of attracting any specific socio-economic group. One ROP election leaflet, for example, consisted of a series of general policy slogans such as: “more police on the streets - fewer behind desks”, “universal health care according to modern models”, “lower taxes and insurance collected effectively”, “more jobs in more efficient firms”, “an end to unfair foreign competition”, “a universal house-building programme as the propeller of the Polish economy”, “education bonds for every child” and “modern retirement funds guaranteed by the state” and contained no mention of de-communisation or settling scores with the past except for one reference to “more money for the lowest pensions - less for the communist nomenklatura’s high pensions”. However, as ROP radicals subsequently claimed with some justification, the decision to present a more ‘moderate’ image simply meant that the ROP came across as a less credible ‘AWS Mark 2’ and, thereby, failed to provide a clear alternative around which it could have mobilised even its supposed core, radical anti-communist electorate.

The UW also ran their 1997 election campaign on a programme which, according to party leader Leszek Balcerowicz, “considering things objectively meets everybody’s needs” on the basis that, as National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki put it, “directing

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90 Author interview, 27th November 1997.
91 See, for example: P. Smoleński. ‘Rytualne szukanie winnych po klęsce’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 September 1997.
yourself exclusively to certain groups means that other interest groups are put off. We
didn’t want to do this.” Consequently, the UW placed considerable emphasis on the
party’s moderation and its leaders’ competence and ability. According to one UW
leader Bronislaw Geremek, for example, the party “wants to be a party of the centre”
and “to be clear precisely in its rejection of all extremism, fanaticism, hatreds or
ideological doctrinalness.” Similarly, writing in the introduction to the UW election
programme, Balcerowicz stressed that it was “a grouping which brings together tested
people who understand the burden of responsibility, who consistently, prudently and
securely are in a position to complete the construction of the Third Republic.” The
UW also made a tactical decision to appeal, as Andrzej Potocki put it, to people
“who...have an anti-communist outlook...who have reservations about the SLD
relating to the past, its method of governing” by highlighting its party leaders’ roots
in the Solidarity opposition movement and indicating its preference for a coalition
with another ‘post-Solidarity’ party - the rationale for which will become clear when
we examine the UW electorate’s ideological profile. 

However, above all - and in marked contrast to ideological and moral-cultural themes
which underpinned the AWS and ROP campaigns - the UW’s appeal was rooted in
the supposed benefits that would accrue from the implementation of the party’s
economic reform programme. According to Balcerowicz, for example, the UW’s
campaign was “mainly addressed” at those “people who believe that the (post-1989
economic) changes should be completed.” Indeed, in many ways the UW did appear
to be at least attempting to operationalise the concept of a ‘pro-reform alliance’ by
developing a election campaign strategy aimed specifically at mobilising the socio-
economic groups which were the most obvious ‘natural’ supporters of and
beneficiaries from economic reform - albeit within a broad overall framework. As
Balcerowicz put it, “we are aware that our propositions more easily attract some, and
find it difficult to attract others...Our programme is addressed mainly at these people.
The principal task of the Freedom Union in these elections and the next is to mobilise
these people who want to finish reforms....Young people...(and) people connected
with the new economy...not just owners, but many employees who function in the
new economy.” Similarly, according to the head of the party’s Election Campaign
Staffs Pawel Piskorski, the party “sought our ‘target group’ mainly among young

93 Author interview, 26th November 1997.
96 Author interview, 26 November 1997. See also: ‘Najchętniej widzimy koalicję Polski
pospierniowej’.
97 ‘Najchętniej widzimy koalicję Polski pospierniowej’
98 Ibid.
people, better educated, having an economically stable situation, from large and medium-sized towns” and designed the party’s election programme specifically to “reach some segment of this group of the electorate” together with a “youthful, open, dynamic” campaign aimed specifically at attract younger voters. 99

The UP also ran a campaign focused primarily on socio-economic themes and, to some extent, attempted to appeal to particular segments of the electorate. However, while the UW’s strategy was geared towards targeting and mobilising the actual and potential ‘winners’ from liberal economic reforms, the UP’s 1997 campaign, based on the slogan “You Deserve Better”, was directed, primarily, at the less well-off. Setting out the party’s election campaign strategy the head of the UP’s Election Staffs Piotr Marciniak explained that while “we didn’t give up our attempt to gain a section of the intelligentsia electorate” the main emphasis was on trying to “broaden our influence in this ‘plebeian’ milieu...poor people, those who were poorly situated in society. This was the main addressant.” 100 Consequently the UP emphasised that, as its National Spokesman Tomasz Nałęcz put it, its “specialty” was “a left-wing, social democratic vision of Poland, not just sovereign and democratic, which many other groupings want, but also just - caring to ensure equal chances and suitable conditions for all its citizens.” According to Nałęcz, “the UP believes that further dynamic growth must be linked with caring for the interests of ordinary people...we decidedly wish to link economic growth with the just distribution of its benefits.” 101

However, as with the aforementioned parties and groupings, the UP’s electoral appeal was not directed exclusively at the poorer sections of the electorate and it ran its socio-economic themes alongside broader messages which sought to present the party as honest and uncorrupted and highlight its role as a force for political moderation. The party’s 1997 election programme, for example, argued that the UP had “a philosophy of moderation and implementing changes in an evolutionary way” and underlined the need for measures which it felt would encourage the honest conduct of politics and “increase people’s trust in the democratic system and the state” such as “a law tightly separating public affairs from economics; politicians assets and incomes should be open, political parties can’t be financed by businessmen.” 102 As a corollary, the UP sought to position itself as a ‘centre’ party on the question of attitudes towards the communist past able, as National Spokesman Tomasz Nałęcz put it, “to unite not to divide people” and “the only formation of Polish political scene which succeeded

100 Author interview, 19 November 1997.

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in constructing something beyond the historical divisions of the ‘PRL-world’ and the ‘Solidarity-world’.”

As expected, it was the PSL which ran an election campaign most clearly aimed at securing the support one specific socio-economic segment of the electorate. Indeed, many of the party’s internal and external post-mortems focused on its image as a ‘class’ party exclusively concerned with the interests of those employed in the agricultural sector and its concomitant failure to develop a broader, more ‘national’ character to its electoral appeal. As one of the party’s key election strategists, and subsequent leader, Jarosław Kalinowski acknowledged, “we allowed ourselves, mainly through our own fault, to be categorised as a ‘class party’...because we also took upon ourselves the role of a trade union...As a party we should express our views on the most important issues, such as the stabilisation of production and the growth of incomes, and not concern ourselves (solely) with the price of specific agricultural products.”

In its defence, party strategists, such as PSL programmatic director Jan Wypych, argued that the party “didn’t prevent anyone from voting PSL” and had run a “multi-faceted” election campaign based on a broader programme which covered all the major national issues. Certainly, in its literature and media campaign the party did, as many PSL election strategists had urged, attempt to develop a number of broader campaign themes such as the need to reduce Poland’s trade deficit (particularly in foodstuffs) and its opposition to the sale of Polish land to foreigners and the creation of a third tier of local government. However, although these, and other, broader issues were raised during the course of the campaign the greatest emphasis was placed, as in previous PSL campaigns, on attracting the votes, and representing the interests, of people living in rural areas, particularly peasant farmers. Even Jan Wypych admitted that, “the campaign was, in one way, directed mainly at the countryside and, to some significant degree, at farmers...We were aware that the main electorate would probably lie in the countryside and most appeals were directed at rural residents.” In one PSL campaign leaflet, for example, the section headed “Whom do we serve?” began “we are open to everyone - for those in the countryside as well as in towns” but went on to emphasise that “we will not forget our roots” and

103 Dlaczego warto głosować na Unię Pracy?
106 Author interview with Jan Wypych, 24 November 1997.
107 The PSL was the one party which did not produce a specific 1997 election programme.
108 Author interview, 24 November 1997.
that the PSL was “a peasantist movement...Serving the countryside and peasants is our first challenge.”

Party electoral profiles

As Table 4.1 shows, the preliminary, and often crude, attempts by the parties and groupings surveyed to define and ‘target’ their ‘core’ electorates were not really - with one significant and one partial exception - reflected in their 1997 socio-economic and occupational electoral profiles. As hypothesised, the party with the clearest concentration of support in a particular socio-economic segment - in the countryside and particularly among those employed in the agricultural sector - was the PSL. In 1997, for example, the PSL won 37.9% of the vote among farmers and 17% of the rural electorate compared with its average of 7.31%. On the other hand, in every other occupational group - with the exception of workers (6.5%), housewives (7.0%) and the unemployed (7.0%) - the PSL’s support was substantially below average. The substantially higher levels of PSL support among the least well-educated (12.8%) than those with a higher education (2.8%) was, it may be assumed, simply a reflection of the educational profile of the rural electorate. As Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show, a similar pattern of support was also evident in the socio-economic profile of those voters who supported the party’s 1995 presidential candidate Waldemar Pawlak and of the PSL electorate in the 1993 parliamentary elections - although, in the case of the latter there was also above average support for the party among older voters and vice versa.

The PSL’s image as a ‘class party’ concerned almost exclusively with issues relating to agriculture and the countryside was also reflected in other polling evidence. As Table 4.4 shows, for example, the Institute for the Research of Public Opinion (OBOP) found that as many as 72% of voters felt that the PSL programme best represented the interests of farmers. Indeed, in spite of the party’s efforts to develop a broader electoral appeal, the PSL’s 1997 level of support outside rural areas was derisory - 4% in small and medium-sized towns and only 0.9% in the larger cities - and its electorate was, if anything, more geographically concentrated than in 1993 when the party managed to win 9.4% of the vote in small and medium sized towns compared with its 15.4% average.

Moreover, there was also evidence that even the PSL’s ‘core’ rural/agricultural electorate appeared to be ‘de-aligning’ as the distribution of party support among rural voters, and even farmers, became more diverse. In 1997, for example, although
the PSL remained the most popular party among farmers, its share of the vote fell by an above-average 12.4%, and the party actually finished third behind AWS and the SLD among rural voters as a whole. This confirmed a trend which was already evident in the 1995 presidential elections when its candidate Pawlak won the support of less than 10% of the rural electorate and even finished third among farmers behind the SLD candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the main right-wing candidate Lech Wałęsa. Indeed, it is worth bearing in mind that a PSL rural ‘monopoly’, as such, never really existed and even in 1993, for example, 28.7% of rural voters and 24% of farmers voted for the parties which went on to form AWS; while Kwaśniewski’s electoral profile demonstrated the size of the SLD’s potential base among rural voters.

However, while, as noted above, many PSL election post-mortems focused on the party’s failure to develop a broader electoral appeal, the main cause of its 1997 defeat probably lay not so much in its faulty electoral strategy per se as in what many of its potential supporters perceived to be its argumentative and irresponsible style of politics and, critically, its inability to deliver for this rural/agricultural electorate. In April 1997, for example, the Centre for Social Opinion Research (CBOS) found that respondents cited the fact that the party paid inadequate attention towards its own electorate (13%), placed party interests ahead of societal interests (including the interests of farmers and rural areas) (12%), failed to deliver on their election promises (6%), demagoguery (6%) and ineffectiveness (5%) as the party’s main negative features rather than concentrating exclusively on the problems of the countryside at the expense of the rest of society (7%). Clearly, while the PSL’s rural/agricultural electorate appeared to value the fact that the party placed a high priority on defending their interests, it was also critical of its actual performance in this respect. In other words, the 1997 election results seemed to confirm that, rather than representing some kind of ‘iron’ electorate that simply voted for the PSL as ‘their’ representatives in a disciplined fashion, Polish rural-agricultural voters were, like their urban counterparts, also influenced by factors such as perceived competence and effectiveness.

Table 4.1 also shows - although to a much lesser extent than in the case of the PSL - some concentration of support within the 1997 UW electorate, particularly among those socio-economic groups which the party had identified and targeted as representing the core of its ‘pro-reform’ alliance. There was, for example, clearly higher than average (13.37%) support for the UW among: younger voters (18.6%), residents of larger towns and cities (18.4%), the better educated (25.1%), students...
(22.3%) and the more financially secure occupational groups such as specialists (24.8%), managers (21.2%), and businessmen (19.2%) compared with poorer groups such as farmers (2.5%), retirees (7.5%), workers (7.6%) and the unemployed (8.1%). The fact that, as Table 2 shows, the UW's 1995 presidential candidate Jacek Kuroń's distribution of support was similar but much less pronounced - much lower among businessment, for example - indicated that the UW had made considerable progress in terms of defining and targeting its 'core' electorate. Indeed, as Table 4.4 shows, the party was cited as best representing the interests of the intelligentsia (by 33% of respondents), large private and international firms (19% each), small businessmen (15%) and political elites (13%) - although, surprisingly, only 11% of respondents felt that the UW best represented the interests of young people.110

Interestingly, other research which revealed that the reasons cited for voting for the UW related, above all, to the party leaders' ability, competence and moderation, suggested a more heterogeneous pattern of electoral support. CBOS, for example found in March 1996 found that respondents drew attention to "the presence of many people of high competence and authority in the party" and the UW's "honesty, credibility, responsibility and common sense" as the party's strongest features,111 while in April 1997 the UW's "strongest trump card is...its leaders and politicians, above all their intellectual potential, knowledge and competence."112 Similarly, a December 1996 OBOP survey found that respondents identified the UW's most important positive features as: its experienced leaders (26% - rising to 44% among UW voters), the presence of expert and competent politicians in its ranks (19% rising to 36%) and the party's moderation (17% and 36% respectively).113 These findings do not, however, necessarily preclude a growing tendency for the UW's 'target' electorate to identify the party as the best representing 'their' interests. This is partly due to the likelihood of 'successful' people wanting to vote for people 'like themselves', but mainly because, as the head of the UW's Election Staffs Pawel Piskorski accurately pointed out, "by underlining our competence to govern and the fact that we are in a position to introduce a certain number of reforms then, immediately, by using such slogans you are targeting yourself towards certain groups for whom this is in any way important...Not poor workers in small towns...You have to reach these people through specific language: higher wages, higher pensions...."

110 A December 1996 OBOP survey, however, showed that this figure increased to 15% among young people themselves. See: OBOP. Spoleczne wizerunki partii politycznych. Warsaw. December 1996.
112 Wizerunki Ugrupowaii Politycznych.
113 Spoleczne wizerunki partii politycznych
other words...positioning the UW as good for everybody because it will govern well is (effectively) directing your message to a certain section of the electorate.”

However, no clear trend or obvious pattern of support was evident in the 1997 socio-economic electoral profiles of any of the four other parties and groupings surveyed. As Table 4.1 shows, with the exception of slightly higher than average (27.13%) support among voters aged 50-59 (32.2%), managers (33.8%), office workers (31%) and retirees (32.3%) and below average support among voters aged 30-39 (20.8%), rural voters (20.3%), the least well-educated (21.3%), specialists (21.4%), housewives (21.0%) and farmers (12.7%), the distribution of the SLD electorate displayed only minimal variations between various socio-economic and occupation groups. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveal a similarly heterogeneous electoral profile for the SLD’s 1995 presidential candidate Kwaśniewski and (expect for a higher level of support among the better educated) in the distribution of SLD voters in the 1993 parliamentary elections.

In other words, in spite of ‘targeting’ these various groups during the election campaign, the SLD’s increase in its share of the vote among women (+3.6%), young people (just under 7%) and rural voters (+5%) was not noticeably higher than the its 6.7% increase overall, and its total share of the vote in each of these categories was actually below its national average (25.6%, 22.4% - with students on 23.9% - and 20.3% respectively). Only retirees and pensioners - among whom the SLD increased its share by 9.5% to 32.3% - could be deemed an example of successful targeting. Moreover, in spite of positioning itself as a ‘centre-left’ and ‘social-democratic’ party and placing a high priority on social welfare issues and the needs of the least well-off, the SLD had almost as large a base of support among businessmen (22%) as it did among workers (26%) and the unemployed (25.4%). Similarly, as Table 4 shows, as many or more voters felt that the SLD represented the interests of political elites (28%), the directors of large state firms (26%), overseas firms (16%) and private businessmen in large companies (14%) as they did ordinary people (25.6%), retirees and pensioners (16%), workers (14%) and the unemployed (10%).

Except for a slightly higher than average (33.83%) level of support among voters with an occupational (38.1%) or basic education (37.9%) and slightly lower support among those with a higher education (27.7%), the AWS electorate was also distributed fairly evenly with no significant differences of support on the basis of age, sex, place of residence or among most occupational groups. The only exceptions were

above average support housewives (39.6%) and, as might be expected with a political grouping based primarily on a trade union, workers (40.3%) and lower support among managers (26.9%). However, this, together with evidence set out in Table 4 showing a tendency for a substantial number of voters to perceive AWS as the most effective representative of workers (40%), the unemployed (18%) and ordinary people (22%), did not prevent this grouping from winning the highest share of the vote among businessmen (32.7%). Indeed, as Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show, although it is impossible to make precise comparisons, AWS's electoral profile was even more heterogeneous than the broadly analogous Lech Wałęsa electorate in the first round of the 1995 presidential elections or that of the main parties which went on to form AWS at the 1993 parliamentary elections. In other words, while 'targeting' the youth vote may not have achieved a noticeably higher than average AWS vote among either young people as a whole (32.3%) or students (29.7%), it did make at least ensure that its electoral profile was less skewed towards older voters than was the case with previous right-wing voting blocs.

The variations in the distribution of the 1997 ROP electorate, and that of its founder and leader Jan Olszewski in the 1995 presidential elections, were also too small to identify any kind of pattern of support in particular socio-economic groups. The party’s targeting of the economically disadvantaged, for example, appeared to make no difference to the ROP's distribution of support, with the party enjoying only fractionally lower levels of support among higher-earning specialists (5.4%) and white-collar office workers (5.1%) than among workers as a whole (6.3%), retirees (4.7%) and the unemployed (6.0%); and the same share of the vote among voters with a higher (4.8%) as with only a basic education (4.6%). Similarly, ROP’s attempts to attract small and medium-sized-businessmen appeared to have had only a minor impact with very slightly higher than average (5.56%) level of support among businessmen (6.9%) and, while there was no separate data for voting patterns among small businessmen only, as Table 4.4 shows, only 6% of voters felt that the ROP best represented the interests of this segment of the electorate.

Similarly, in spite of the fact that its 1997 campaign was based on targeting what it termed the “plebeian electorate”, the UP actually obtained below average (4.74%) support among retirees (3.6%) and only a slightly higher proportion of the vote among workers (5.5%) than it did among managers (4.4%), specialists (4.9%) or even businessmen (4.5%). Only unemployed voters (7.7%) identified with the UP to a slightly greater extent than other socio-economic groups. Indeed, compared with the socio-economic profile of its 1993 electorate - when, as Table 4.3 shows, the UP
enjoyed significantly higher than average support among the better educated, urban intelligentsia, white collar workers and students and significantly lower support among farmers, rural voters and the less well-educated - the party’s base of support became, if anything, more heterogeneous and less clearly defined. In other words, the UP electorate only became more ‘plebeian’ in the sense that the party had lost a sufficiently large proportion of its more economically-secure voters to ensure that any previous disparities in its distribution of support had disappeared!

Given that these heterogeneous electoral profiles indicated that the SLD, AWS, ROP and UP electorates did not appear to be rooted in any subjectively felt socio-economic interests, what were the key determinants which determined their bases of support and by which their voters could be characterised?

The SLD and AWS electorates appeared to be differentiated principally by their respective supporters’ attitudes to particular ideological, historical and moral-cultural issues. The first factor distinguishing the SLD and AWS electorates was their ideological self-placement on the ‘left-right’ spectrum. As Table 4.5 shows, 60% of SLD voters identified their political views as left-wing, 22% as centrist and only 3% as right-wing; and on a left-right scale ranging from 1-7, SLD voters were easily the most left-wing with a mean score of 2.7. Meanwhile, 68% of AWS voters identified with the right of the political spectrum, 16% saw their views as centrist and only 2% as left-wing, with a mean score of 5.6. Similarly, as Table 4.6 shows, a CBOS poll taken three weeks prior to the 1997 election indicated that 61% of left wing voters and 42% of right wing voters said they would be voting for the SLD and AWS, respectively, compared with their national averages of 22% and 21%. In this context the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ were generally understood to refer more to a set of ideological and moral-cultural attitudes - which were, in turn, often rooted in, and derived from, different assessments of the communist past - rather than to attitudes to a number of socio-economic issues - which is the sense in which these terms generally function in the Western political science literature. As Pankowski put it, in the context of post-communist Poland:

“...the left is associated, primarily, with the political forces emerging from that (communist) system, and the right is discerned, above all, as all kinds of opposition towards the then political order. The Poles think that the left are those who defined themselves as such during the years of the PRL’s existence and that in the Third Republic this role is now fulfilled by their direct heirs. In the last few years new mental constructs - although derivatives, in fact, from these kind of associations -
have been overlaiden onto these classifications... In 1993 the parliamentary
opposition (primarily the SLD) was defined as ‘left-wing’, given that it was in
opposition to the ‘right-wing’ Solidarity governments... the current (SLD-led)
government is identified with the ‘left’, while the ‘right’ is the current opposition,
particularly the extra-parliamentary one (primarily AWS).”

Detailed attitudinal research undertaken by CBOS in run up to the 1993 election, for
example, showed that SLD voters were no more ‘left-wing’ than others when it came
to their attitudes to economic policy issues such: income inequality, state-guaranteed
full-employment, welfare-dependency or state intervention in the economy. The only
economic issues on which SLD voters’ views were markedly more left-wing than
those of other parties were in their opposition to privatisation and the closure of
unprofitable enterprises which, according to CBOS, was rooted in both an inclination
“to assess the PRL’s achievements in terms of the country’s industrialisation” and a
historical hangover revealed by the “similarity between the opinions of SLD voters
and the views of PZPR members at the beginning of the 1980s” who generally had
more liberal views on most aspects of economic policy than society as a whole with
the exception of privatisation - given that the then communist government’s liberal
economic reform programme did not include changes in ownership structures. At
the same time, although equally detailed and systematic data on AWS voters’
attitudes was not available, a March 1997 CBOS survey revealed that, in spite of
placing themselves on the right of the political spectrum, AWS supporters were
particularly attracted by the grouping’s “social sensitivity, caring about ordinary
people, about the poorest, pensioners and retirees” - a finding, to some extent, borne
out by the figures in Table 4 (cited above) which revealed that many voters identified
AWS as best representative of relatively less well-off and more economically insecure
socio-economic groups.

Incidentally, it is worth noting that, as Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show, 43% of UW voters
located themselves on the right of the political spectrum, 35% as centrists and only
19% as left-wing; and 14% and 13% of right-wing and centrist voters respectively
declared their intention to vote for the UW compared with its national average of 10%

117 Indeed, in the absence of more detailed attitudinal research data, all the conclusions draw here
with respect to the AWS electorate are, of necessity, more tentative than those relating to the SLD.
118 Społeczne wizerunki partii politycznych.
and only 3% of left-wing voters. This pattern of ideological self-placement, together with the tendency of Polish voters to identify the terms left and right primarily in relation to attitudes towards the communist past and derivative factors, helps to explain the UW’s tactical decision during the 1997 election campaign to stress its Solidarity heritage and express a preference for a coalition with a party or grouping originating within from the democratic opposition.119

Given the centrality of attitudes towards the past in determining left-right self-placement, a second major factor distinguishing the SLD and AWS electorates was evidence of past political affiliations with the communist PZPR or membership of trade unions of a communist lineage (such as the OPZZ federation) on the one hand, or identification with the Solidarity movement and the democratic opposition on the other. Based on data collected in October 1992, Markowski and Toka, for example, discovered that membership of an OPZZ-affiliated union and former membership of the PZPR increased the probability of a respondent voting for the SLD by 36% and 13% respectively;120 while an April 1997 CBOS survey found that 58% of those who belonged to the PZPR in 1989 and 49% of those who were members of the communist-sanctioned ‘branch’ trade unions rather than Solidarity in 1981 intended to vote SLD compared with the grouping’s national average of 22%.11 In the same survey CBOS also found that 45% of voters who had belonged to Solidarity in 1981 said that they intended to vote AWS compared with its national average of 24%.122

Incidentally, the fact that a section of the SLD electorate viewed their support for this grouping mainly in terms of defending what they saw as the ‘achievements of the PRL’ - which, in many cases, was directly linked to defending their own actions and ‘personal biographies’ - meant that their support for the SLD was, in one sense, linked with defending a particular set of ‘interests’. A former communist-era security service functionary who risked losing the privileges which accompanied ex-combatant status, for example, had a clear economic ‘interest’ in supporting the SLD. Although such ‘interests’ were not easily identifiable among the general socio-

119 This was an extremely wise decision and probably helped to persuade a number of ‘soft’ AWS voters who had reservations about this grouping’s internal and programmatic coherence to vote UW, as well as protecting the party’s own ‘soft’ right flank against defections to AWS among voters whose first priority was to remove the SLD and who were concerned that the party would be tempted to make a ‘historic compromise’ and form a coalition with the ex-communists. A March 1997 CBOS poll, for example, showed that 30% of UW voters had AWS as their second choice compared with only 6% who chose the SLD. See: CBOS. Elektoraty partii politycznych i możliwości ‘przepływu’ między nimi. Warsaw. March 1997.


121 Elektoraty partii politycznych i możliwości ‘przepływu’ między nimi

122 Ibid.
economic classifications, it was possible to find some evidence in the ‘small print’ of the survey data that pointed towards a degree of overlap between support for the SLD and certain occupational groups which one may assume identified more closely with the previous regime. In June 1994, for example, OBOP found that 49% of soldiers and policemen supported the SLD compared with its national average of 22%.

Similarly, as Table 2 shows, as many as 64.8% of voters employed in the uniformed services voted for SLD candidate Kwaśniewski in the first round of the 1995 presidential elections compared with his national average of 35.11%. Moreover, there was also some evidence given that a section of its electorate associated the SLD with the defence of their ‘personal biographies’, this also provided the grouping with a relatively loyal and stable electoral ‘core’ electorate compared with other parties. A December 1993 CBOS survey, for example, found that SLD supporters were more likely than others to make the effort to vote even if they thought their party had no chance of winning.

In addition to different attitudes towards the communist past, moral-cultural issues more generally - particularly a voter’s level of participation in religious services and their attitudes towards the related issues of abortion and the role of the Catholic Church in politics and public life - were another important basis for left-right self-identification and, therefore, a third important factor characterising the SLD and AWS electorates. Markowski and Toka, for example, found that in October 1992 willingness to vote for the SLD was “stronger among individuals not related at all, or only loosely related, to the Church and religion”, with the likelihood of a voter supporting this grouping being 8% lower among those attending weekly Church services and 5-6% higher among those who supported abortion rights and went on to argue that “non-economic issues” such as the role of Catholic Church “played a more significant role...in the growth of support for the SLD” in the run up to the 1993 elections than an increase in support for “any ‘leftist’ socio-economic ideology.”

A December 1993 CBOS survey also found SLD voters more likely to agree that: the Church had too great an influence, women should have the right to an abortion “at their own requese”, pupils and their parents should have a “genuinely free choice” on

124 Wyborcy Zwycięskich Partii
125 Indeed, according to Miroslawa Grabowska the degree of religiosity is the single, most important crude indicator of left-right positioning and “it is easier to foresee left and right on the ‘clerical question’ than on any other.” Partie polityczne, p38; See also: Ka-Lok K. Chan, ‘Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Poland’, Paper prepared for PSA Specialist Group Conference on Communist and Postcommunist Politics, 8 February 1997, pp15-16.
126 ‘Left Turn in Poland and Hungary Five Years After the Collapse of Communism’, p81.
127 Ibid. p83.
the question of participation in religious lessons at school and that priests should not seek to influence voting behaviour.128

The AWS’s electorate, on the other hand, appeared to be characterised by a more traditionalist approach to moral-cultural issues and a much higher degree of religiosity. Indeed, as Table 4.7 shows, in terms of the relationship between participation in religious services and levels of party support, the SLD and AWS electorates were almost mirror images of each other. 45% of voters who never attended religious services and 34% of those who only attended sporadically declared their support for the SLD compared with its average of 22%, 17% of those who attended weekly and only 5% of regular attendees. AWS, on the other hand, won the support of 36% of frequent attendees and 25% of weekly attendees compared with its 21% average, 12% of those who attended sporadically, only 8% of those who never attended. Similarly, an April 1997 CBOS survey found that 54% of those who never participated in religious services said that the SLD represented their interests and views compared with only 29% who said AWS did; while only 15% of regular participants felt that the SLD represented their interests compared with 58% who said that AWS did.129

So if the SLD and AWS electorates were distinguished primarily by their ideological self-placement - which was itself largely a derivative of attitudes towards the communist past and moral-cultural issues - what were the bases of support and key distinguishing features of the ROP and UP electorates? Given that the ROP itself identified the party’s core supporters as the “patriotic, anti-communist and independence-orientated ulanski electorate” - the radical hard core of what, in Polish terms, was the right-wing of the political spectrum - one might have expected this to be reflected in their voters’ ideological self-placement. However, although many ROP supporters may, indeed, have been ideologically or patriotically motivated and, as Table 4.5 shows, 58% of them declared themselves be right-wing, 32% centrist and 5% left-wing with a mean left-right rating of 5.2, the analogous figures for AWS voters (as noted above 68%, 16%, 2% and 5.6) indicated that this ulanski electorate was certainly not unique to the ROP and that, if anything, AWS supporters were even more right-wing. Indeed, a March 1997 CBOS survey showed that only 6% of voters who belonged to Solidarity in 1981 intended to vote for the ROP - the same figure as its national average - and that while 18% of ROP voters were former Solidarity members so were 17% of the UP’s and even 15% of the SLD’s!130 Nor, as Table 4.7

128 Wybórzy Zwycięskich Partii.
130 Elektoraty partii politycznych i możliwości ’przepływu’ między nimi.
shows, did there seem to be any clear link between religiosity and support for the ROP. Although only 2% of voters who never attended religious services intended to vote for the party compared with its national average of 5%, the other figures varied little between frequent attenders (4%), weekly attenders (5%) and occasional attenders (4%).

The only variable which seemed to particularly distinguish the ROP electorate was its particularly intense degree level of identification which the party’s leader, Jan Olszewski. As a result of his short lived government’s tough anti-communist stance, Olszewski was seen as an honest, trustworthy and uncompromised figure among a section of the right-wing, anti-communist electorate compared with other politicians who failed to live up to their expectations. An April 1997 CBOS survey, for example, found that among ROP voters Olszewski scored more than 80% in 13 out of 20 categories of positive leadership qualities and that the party’s supporters rated him 37% higher on average than voters as whole. Similarly, a December 1996 OBOP survey revealed that the most positive characteristics which voters associated with ROP tended to be those which the party’s own supporters identified with Olszewski himself: honesty (15% rising to 40% among ROP voters), determination (15% and 25% respectively) and credibility in terms of fulfilling promises (12% and 29%).

The UP’s electoral profile was probably the most difficult of the six to categorise and account for. Not only was the party’s electoral strategy not reflected in any disproportionate level of support among poorer segments of the electorate (with the partial exception of the unemployed) but, in spite of the party’s unambiguous self-definition as ‘left-wing’, there was no equally clear pattern of ideological self-placement among its own supporters. While a December 1993 CBOS survey found that UP voters could be characterised by a slight tendency to define their views as left-wing - although “nothing like as significant as in the case of the SLD” - as Table 4.5 shows, by December 1996 its electorate was almost equally divided with: 30% identifying their views as left-wing, 30% right-wing and 25% centrist. This scattering of ideological preferences and dissonance between the party’s and its electorate’s ideological self-placements highlighted the difficulties which the UP


132 CBOS. Portrety Liderów Opozycji. Warsaw. April 1997. The one exception was his “willingness to compromise” - a quality which only 49% of ROP voters felt he possessed - although, as CBOS pointed out, “even this may be assessed as much as a quality as a fault among ROP supporters who don’t themselves necessarily value these qualities (willingness to compromise) unambiguously.”

133 Spoleczne wizerunki partii politycznych.

134 Wyborcy Zwycięskich Partii.
faced in communicating a distinctive message. Given that, as noted above, attitudes towards the communist past functioned as one of the key determinants of left-right self-placements among Polish voters, the UP’s preferred strategy of positioning itself as a ‘left-wing’ party (which it undoubtedly was in terms of socio-economic policy) also gave the impression that it was ‘pro-communist’, thereby contradicting the party’s attempts to adopt a ‘centrist’ position on the ‘historical’ issue.

Moreover, there was also no particular evidence to suggest that, whatever their self-placements, UP voters were objectively particularly more ‘left-wing’ than average on either socio-economic or moral-cultural issues. In December 1993, for example, CBOS found their views on economic policy were somewhat ambiguous and internally incoherent: with a UP voter more likely than average to support active government intervention in the economy and oppose state-guaranteed full employment. Although UP voters showed above average support for women’s abortion rights and opposition to priests attempting to influence voting behaviour, they did so to nothing like the same extent as SLD voters. Indeed, as Table 4.7 shows, while only 2% of frequent attendees at religious services intended to vote UP compared with 8% of sporadic worshippers, the figures for those who attended weekly (4%), several times and month (5%) and never (5%) were virtually the same as the party’s average (5%).

Nor, as in the case of the ROP, did the party leader’s ‘charismatic’ qualities account for an otherwise heterogeneous and random pattern of electoral support. Indeed, an April 1997 CBOS survey revealed a relatively lukewarm assessment of UP leader Ryszard Bugaj’s leadership qualities with his ratings among the party’s own supporters only 7% higher than among the electorate as a whole. Indeed, in some categories - ability to work with others and compromise, modesty and intelligence - they were even slightly lower, which - together with the high number of respondents who simply had no assessment of Bugaj’s leadership - led CBOS to conclude that, “UP supporters identity with their party leader to a lesser extent than supporters of other formations.”

Rather UP voters appeared to be motivated by social awareness and sensitivity arising from a “a certain community of ideas on the question of customs of behaviour rather than political and economic opinions” which “have their roots, in urban liberal culture.” A March 1996 CBOS survey, for example, found that, although they

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115 Ibid.
114 Portrety Liderów Opozycji.
rarely defined it as a ‘left-wing’ party, 37% of UP supporters were, above all, attracted to the idea that it was “the representative of the interests of a defined social group, particularly those who were materially worse-off: workers, pensioners, poor people, ‘those who have the least’.” Similarly, in April 1997 CBOS found that the UP was “regarded as a ‘social’ party, defending the interests of working people (‘It functions like a trade union, not a party’), pensioners and retirees, poor people, aiming to ensure better living and working conditions, reducing unemployment, reducing taxes for the least well-off - generally speaking as the spokesman of the idea of social justice and a welfare state” and its supporters were attracted by a programme “in which the need for the state to support the weakest groups was stressed, together with care for the defence of workers interests.” This was also reflected in the fact that, as Table 4.4 shows, a relatively high proportion of voters believed that the UP best represented the interests of social groups such as workers (16%) and the unemployed (18%). Similarly, a December 1996 OBOP survey showed that voters identified the party’s most positive qualities as the fact that it: meant well for ordinary people (20%), wanted to fulfill its election promises (16% rising to 31% among UP voters), was moderate and avoided extremism (15% and 33% respectively) and that its leaders’ were honest (14% and 31%). In other words, UP voters appeared to be attracted by the idea that it was, as they saw it, an honest party which sought to represent the interests of the poorest and least well-off groups in society without resorting to populism or demagoguery. Given that this was not reflected in relatively higher levels of support among these segments of electorate themselves, it may be assumed that many of the UP’s voters were motivated by altruism and an objective desire for policies likely to produce social cohesion than a perceived need to defend a set of subjectively-felt socio-economic interests.

The role of party leaders

The 1997 parliamentary election sent out a fairly ambiguous message on the role played by party leaders in Polish electoral politics, with only two of the six parties and groupings surveyed - the UW and ROP - running campaigns which focused heavily on their leader’s real or imagined qualities. In the case of the SdRP/SLD, for example, an April 1997 CBOS survey found “evidence of the lack of a clear leader and striking personality among this grouping’s key figures.” Indeed, this grouping’s lack of a single, charismatic leader - and concomitant decision to project a ‘collective leadership’ team - was subsequently acknowledged by party strategists as very

138 Polskie Partie Polityczne.
139 Wizerunki Ugrupowań Politycznych.
140 Ibid.
damaging to the grouping’s internal cohesion and an important reason factor contributing to its poor 1997 campaign. According to SLD Election Staffs Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, “if there is not a leader then there is not a typical campaign that can end in success...Five leaders equals no leader. No leader equals no campaign!” AWS also, as its Election Staffs Secretary Andrzej Anusz put it, “consciously adopted the formula that we are not promoting the leader, that this is not a presidential-type campaign, but this is a programmatic campaign” and the grouping’s (albeit unquestioned) leader Marian Krzaklewski shared the limelight with other key party and Solidarity trade union personalities.

Similarly, rather than simply focusing on its leader Waldemar Pawlak, the PSL also promoted other key party figures. Outlining the its 1997 campaign strategy, PSL National Press Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski stressed that while “obviously the leader is the leader...there will be an additional three of four colleagues who are members of the government who ought to be projected...in the mass media...You (also) have to create a ‘Cabinet’ of twenty or so people so that people know that it is not just Pawlak but also other people whom its worth trusting and for whom its worth voting.” The head of the UP Election Staffs Piotr Marciniak also admitted that his party “didn’t succeed in doing what is the worldwide tendency in contemporary election campaigns: that there is a great deal of dependence by the party on the leader...that he pulls the party along.” Rather, the UP “undertook the conception that we are going to run on the party name and on the fact that we have many leaders and they are all equal.”

The main reason why these four parties and groupings adopted such electoral strategies was the fairly obvious one that, as Table 4.8 shows, none of their leaders could particularly be regarded as electoral assets - or ‘electoral locomotives’ in the Polish parlance. The most extreme example of this was SdRP Chairman Józef Oleksy who, as leader of the SLD’s main component, would have seemed a natural figure to spearhead its 1997 election campaign. Oleksy was, however, elected SdRP leader largely as an act of public solidarity in the wake of his forced resignation from the premiership following spying allegations in January 1996, rather than on the basis of his broader ‘electability’. On the contrary, although the spying allegations were never proven, Oleksy’s public credibility never recovered and, as Table 8 shows, he began 1997 with only 23% of voters regarding his leadership positively and a -51% net

141 Author interview, 21 November 1997.
142 Author interview, 24 November 1997.
143 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
144 Author interview, 19 November 1997.
approval rating and by the end of the election campaign these figures had only improved marginally to 28% and -41% respectively. A possible alternative leader, the popular SLD Election Committee Chairman Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who succeeded Oleksy as SLD premier and began the year with a healthy 54% of voters regarding him positively and a +10% net approval rating, was too much of an individualist and, in the event, proved surprisingly accident prone during the election campaign. Most significantly, he suffered a huge (12%) slump in his personal popularity in August when he criticised the victims of floods which hit many parts of Southern and Western Poland that month for failing to take out private insurance and, in spite of a slight recovery, he continued to make further errors and finished the campaign with approval figures of 44% and -9%.

The PSL, UP and AWS leaders also suffered from poor opinion poll ratings. The PSL’s Waldemar Pawlak, for example, began 1997 with 43% of voters regarding his leadership positively and a net approval rating of -11%, which fell steadily to 34% and -29% by the end of the campaign. Even the party’s own electoral strategists such as National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski recognised that, “Pawlak doesn’t come over well on TV...connects badly with the media and is poorly regarded and, in my view, doesn’t always express his thoughts too clearly.” Similarly, UP leader Ryszard Bugaj began the year with only 33% regarding him positively and a -16% net approval rating falling to 30% and -27% by the end of the campaign; and the head of the UP Election Staffs Piotr Marciniak also acknowledged that even their own research revealed that “our leader’s popularity was worse than the party’s” which - together with the fact that “he is not an elastic person and we didn’t see any chance of changing him” - meant that, although the idea of running on a collective leadership “was a worse concept...we didn’t have any alternative.”

Although AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski improved his ratings slightly during the course of 1997, probably boosted by the overall success of the AWS campaign, by the end of the year only a relatively modest 43% of voters viewed his leadership positively and his net approval rating was -8%. Even AWS Election Staffs Secretary Andrzej Anusz acknowledged that there simply “wasn’t such a possibility to run a campaign around Marian Krzaklewski because...a section of people who support AWS are not at this stage yet. Marian has not been involved in politics for that many

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145 Such as when, for example, he cited security service intelligence reports to support a claim that Western investors where fearful of an AWS victory. See: ‘Co wywiad wie o obawach Zachodu’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 September 1997.
146 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
147 Author interview, 19 November 1997.
Indeed, an April 1997 CBOS survey found that the AWS leader was "regarded, above all, through the prism of his union activity and to a lesser extent in the role of a successful politician" and that while, no doubt in acknowledgment of his undisputed achievement in uniting the Polish right, the majority of respondents considered him dynamic and energetic, he was also felt to be: unpredictable, guided by the interests of his grouping rather than the good of the country, prone to emotion, immodest and stubborn.

Apart from the obvious fact that Krzaklewski was not the grouping’s greatest electoral asset, AWS also avoided running a leader-orientated campaign for the tactical reason of re-inforcing its ‘unity’ theme by promoting the grouping as a ‘team’ in which Krzaklewski was only the ‘co-ordinator’ and, thereby, demonstrating its breadth of support. According to AWS National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek, for example, “a large number of options...exist within AWS...a large role is played by the leaders and other persons who are important in the groupings which comprise AWS...We are a broad coalition.” Similarly, Election Staffs Secretary Andrzej Anusz argued they wanted to run “a campaign in which it was possible to show the unity of AWS” and that focusing mainly or exclusively on Krzaklewski “would, of course, have shut us off from various milieu.”

The only party which chose consciously to project and focus on its party leader in an ‘American-style’, presidential-type campaign was the UW. According to the head of the UW Election Staffs Paweł Piskorski, “we used fifteen people in our campaign but with a very clear and unambiguous accent on Leszek Balcerowicz...So when it came to the exposition of a figurehead and a symbol associating the party with a person, this was a campaign saying: ‘Leszek Balcerowicz equals the Freedom Union’.” The party’s programme was, for example, repackaged and re-launched as the ‘Second Balcerowicz Plan’, harking back to the pioneering economic reforms which the eponymous UW leader introduced as Polish Finance Minister in the early 1990s. This was a risky strategy given Balcerowicz’s rather detached and academic media style and his previous role as a lightning conductor for popular discontent. The gamble, however, paid off - partly because the party’s private polling research revealed that, for all his historical ‘baggage’, Balcerowicz was also viewed as a competent and trustworthy leader and capable of actually ‘delivering’ reform; or, as

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148 Author interview, 24 November 1997.
149 Portrety Liderów Opozycji.
150 Author interview, 4 June 1997.
151 Author interview, 24 November 1997.
152 Author interview, 25 November 1997.
Piskorksi put it, “the person who most reached our ‘target group’...who best symbolised those things which we wanted to say to our electorate.” This was confirmed by an April 1997 CBOS survey which found that “what marks out Leszek Balcerowicz among the politicians surveyed and, at the same, plays the greatest role in creating his social perception, are undoubtedly his intellectual qualities.” He was regarded by a substantial majority of voters from all parties as intelligent (76%), knowledgeable and able (70%), a “balanced person, not prone to emotion” (63%), energetic and dynamic (62%) and effective (58%).

More broadly, UW party strategists felt that projecting a party leader successfully was becoming an increasingly unavoidable aspect of Polish electoral politics. According to UW Press Spokesman Andzrej Potocki, for example, “the party leader is obviously the party’s ‘calling card’ and so needs to be attractive. Its important to improve his image, ensure that his personal ratings are high.” Consequently, Potocki, and other UW strategists, criticised those parties and groupings who passively accepted the idea “that leaders hinder rather than help. This was their mistake because you have to carve out an image for your leader and not rely exclusively on the one already carved out.” Balcerowicz was, therefore, ‘repackaged’ as a warmer and more relaxed personality - “less like an expert and more folksy,” as Potocki put it - beginning in February 1997 with a bravura performance in a high profile television debate with the SdRP leader Józef Oleksy. As Table 8 shows, during the last few weeks of the election campaign Balcerowicz succeeded in increasing his positive and net approval ratings from 42% and -11% in July to 55% and +16% in October.

The only other party which ran a campaign whose objective was, above all, to project its party leader was Jan Olszewski’s ROP. According to the head of the ROP’s Election Staffs Wojciech Włodarczyk, Olszewski’s image featured in all the party’s campaign literature, posters, leaflets and massive ‘mobile billboards’ which were pulled along by taxis in all the major Polish towns; and only a throat illness, rather than strategic choice, limited his involvement in the electronic media campaign to “when it was essential.” However, unlike the UW campaign - in which Balcerowicz was heavily promoted because he was felt to embody particular qualities which made him attractive to certain potential UW voters - the focus on Olszewski was related more to the aforementioned intensity of commitment which he attracted among the

155 Portrety Liderów Opozycji.
156 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
158 Ibid.
159 Author interview, 27 November 1997.
party's existing supporters. As ROP Election Staffs Spokesman Jan Polkowski put it, "all of ROP's constructive characteristics are, to some extent, personified in the personality of the leader... Jan Olszewski is not just the embodiment of the independence tradition in its modern sense. He is also distinguished by characteristics so rarely found in politicians: honesty, consistency, courage... he is the one politician symbolising CHANGE." (capitals in original) On other hand, although this intense commitment to their leader may have led ROP strategists to delude themselves into believing that this translated into broader support among the electorate as a whole, there was no clear evidence of Olszewski's capacity as a broader electoral asset. On the contrary, as Table 4.8 shows, only 39% of voters viewed Olszewski's leadership positively in February 1997, with a net approval rating of -15%, and these figures actually fell to 35% and -23% during the course of the campaign.

Conclusion

There was, therefore, some evidence that all the parties and groupings surveyed had attempted to define their 'core' electorates and, at the very least, to nuance their electoral appeals to attract particular socio-economic groups. Nevertheless, as hypothesised, most of them based their electoral strategies primarily on mobilising loose electoral constituencies either by highlighting their supposed competence, ability, moderation and trustworthiness or by appealing to socially heterogeneous 'ideological' electorates on the basis of moral-cultural issues rather than attempting to appeal mainly or exclusively to particular socio-economic 'interests'. This finding was confirmed by an examination of party strategies during the 1997 parliamentary elections, although there were clearly differences of emphasis: with the UW and UP campaigns the most targeted and focused on socio-economic issues, while ideological and moral-cultural themes predominated in the AWS and ROP campaigns, and the SLD campaign combined elements of the two.

Moreover, these various attempts to define and target 'core' electorates do not necessarily contradict the general conclusion that most parties and groupings more closely resembled the contemporary catch-all/electoral-professional party than the traditional mass party model in terms of their electoral strategies. Firstly, because the high level of organisational and electoral instability which characterised post-communist Polish politics meant that most parties were only really in the preliminary,  

144 Opinion pollsters noted a clear tendency for the party's support to increase when the ROP leader's name was included in the survey. See, for example: R. Wróbel. 'Bez większych zmian', Rzeczpospolita. 28 June 1996. 
144 'Dlaczego Warto Głosować na Ruch Odbudowy Polski?'
and extremely tentative, stages of defining these ‘core’ electorates. Secondly, and more importantly, because in practice no party ever attempts to literally ‘catch-all’ and, as Panebianco put it, the catch-all/electoral-professional party model “was not an organisation whose electoral following was so heterogeneous as to represent the whole social spectrum” because “no party could ever maintain such a position (since no party could ever afford to completely lose its identity vis-a-vis competing organisations).”

An analysis of these five parties’ 1997 electoral profiles also revealed that even when parties attempted to direct and target their electoral appeals at particular socio-economic groups, this was not, with the partial exception of the UW, reflected in substantially higher than average levels of support within that segment of the electorate. In other words, given that there were no significant variations in most of their patterns of support in terms of voters’ sex, age, place of residence, education or occupation, their bases of support did not appear to rooted in any particular socio-economic ‘interests’. Indeed, survey evidence indicated that - particularly in the cases of the SdRP/SLD and AWS - support for a given party was generally determined by ideological self-placement, which was itself a function of attitudes towards the past and moral-cultural rather than socio-economic issues. This suggested both that, as hypothesised, the new socio-economic ‘interests’ which have been emerging as a result of the post-1989 economic transformation had not yet crystallised sufficiently for them to act as a major influence on voting behaviour and that broad electoral appeals which cut across socio-economic classes were, indeed, likely to be the most effective means of mobilising electoral support in post-communist Poland at this stage of the political and economic transition.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to draw a number of important distinctions between the electoral strategies pursued by the Western catch-all/electoral-professional parties and the emerging political parties of post-communist Poland. The most important difference was that while the former were mass working class or confessional parties with a pre-existing base of support engaged in a process of broadening out to a wider clientele, the latter are attempting to develop such a ‘core’ electorate in the first place. In other words, Polish parties are following a very different developmental path to Western catch-all/electoral-professional parties in terms of the evolution of their electoral strategies: with broad electoral appeals aimed at loose and unstructured constituencies being developed at the same time as (or even prior to) tentative attempts to define distinct ‘core’ electoral constituencies. Moreover, although, in line

162 Political Parties: Organisation and Power, p263.
with the catch-all/electoral-professional model, most Polish party electoral strategies were based on appealing to ‘opinion’ rather than ‘interest’ electorates, there was little evidence of the ‘de-ideologisation’ of party politics - and concomitant focus on non-divisive, non-contentious issues and the competence of party leaders - which was an important feature of the contemporary Western party models. On the contrary, the emerging Polish party system appeared to be characterised by electoral strategies based in large measure on appeals to such ‘ideological’ electorates.

Indeed, one of the more surprising features of the party electoral strategies, highlighted by the 1997 parliamentary election campaign, was the relative lack of focus on party leaders, contrary to both recent Western developments and the hypothesised characteristics of post-communist politics. One explanation for this may be that, while the varying degrees of emphases which parties placed on promoting their leaders suggested that most of them were sophisticated enough to realise when they were an electoral asset or liability, most of them were also, clearly, not yet at the stage when ‘electability’ had become one of, if not the, main criteria for leadership selection. Three of the six party leaders surveyed - the UP’s Ryszard Bugaj, ROP’s Jan Olszewski and AWS’s Marian Krzaklewski - held their positions largely as a result of the instrumental role which they played in their party or grouping’s formation rather because of any demonstrable vote-winning qualities. Józef Oleksy emerged as SdRP leader as an act of intra-party solidarity and defiance against what the party claimed was an anti-communist witchhunt, and in spite of the fact that he was one of party’s greatest electoral liabilities. Similarly, although there was a period when Waldemar Pawlak was a vote-winner for the PSL, with the slump in his personal popularity which followed the fall of his government in February 1995, he only retained his position due to skillful intra-party maneuvering. Nor, indeed, with the notable exception of the UW, were parties as yet sufficiently conscious of the importance, or even possibility, of ‘packaging’ or ‘re-packaging’ a party leader in order to highlight his strengths and minimise his weaknesses in the eyes of the party’s ‘target’ electorate. This relative lack of ‘leader-orientation’ - in terms of electoral politics, at least - may, however, only be a conjunctural phenomenon as parties and groupings begin to copy the UW’s successful model of ‘selling Balcerowicz’ and as the requirements of mass electronic news media increasingly personalise, or ‘Americanise’, party politics in Poland - as they have in most Western democracies.

As hypothesised, the one significant exception to this general pattern of broad electoral appeals aimed at loose constituencies - and the only party which bore at least
a superficial resemblance to mass party model in terms of electoral strategy and bases of support—was the PSL. The PSL defined its ‘core’ electorate as, and targeted its electoral appeal principally at, the large proportion of the Polish population which had worked in peasant small-holdings even throughout the communist era and which, therefore, provided the party with a ‘natural’ socio-economic base. Given the steady and increasingly inevitable decline in the size of the Polish agricultural sector—together with the fact that, as the 1997 parliamentary elections revealed, the agricultural/rural electorate was much more ‘open’ than many commentators had assumed—there was evidence that even the PSL was attempting to broaden the basis of its appeal to encompass rural communities as a whole and even, more ambitiously, sections of the urban electorate. Nevertheless, whatever rhetoric the party may have used about broadening the party’s electoral base, as the 1997 parliamentary election campaign showed, there was still a general tendency for the PSL not to stray too far into unfamiliar territory and away from what it saw as its ‘safest’ electoral ground. As one Polish commentator accurately put when summing up the mentality of PSL strategists, the party “has an electorate which is maybe not the largest but is certain” and which “it will never exchange for a larger but less certain one.” Moreover, whatever intentions the PSL may have had of winning over a broader electorate it conspicuously failed to do so and, if anything, became more concentrated in its shrinking rural/agricultural base.

CHAPTER FIVE:
PARTIES AS MEMBERSHIP ORGANISATIONS

We have seen from our examination of the relationship between the new Polish parties and their electorates that they are likely to develop on the basis of weak political cleavage structures. But these cleavages, which proved so important in the stabilisation of west European party systems, were not solely based on divisions in socio-economic characteristics or in ascriptive identities. They also derived, in part at least, from the anchoring created by organisational networks which, as Mair put it, when underpinned by strong and enduring collective social and political identities "effectively segmented many of the electorates into relatively stable and closed partisan blocs." Consequently, having examined what kind of electorates they were seeking to attract, this chapter goes on to consider the precise nature of the links between the new Polish parties and their electorates, particularly whether or not they sought to recruit their voters as party members or encapsulate them in ancillary organisations.

Each successive model of contemporary party organisation related to a different stage in the development of parties as membership organisations and conception of the role of party members in campaigning activities. Given its limited social base and the fact that it paid little attention to the need for campaigning, the membership of the cadre party was small, elitist and almost entirely made up of leaders, and the nature of party activity was largely irrelevant. As Duverger put it, a cadre party consisted of little more than "the grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contact with the candidates...If we define a member as one who signs an undertaking to the party and thereafter regularly pays his subscription, then cadre parties have no members." The mass party, on the other hand, was the logical response to the challenge of mobilising support among the newly enfranchised working class electorates - with the party seen as the agency of linkage between the state and the activated citizenry. According to this model, electoral competition was primarily about mobilisation rather than conversion and the key requirement for a successful party was to increase the level of commitment of

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1 What is different about post-communist party systems? p15
2 Organisational units aimed at specific segments the party’s supporters that have a direct overlap with the party’s structures such as women’s and youth sections.
4 Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activities in the Modern State. pp63-64.
those already pre-disposed to offer it support (that is, members of its ‘natural’
constituency) by turning supporters into members. Consequently, the mass party was
characterised by a large and homogeneous enrolled membership organised in formal
structures; with membership being a logical consequence of one’s social and political
identity. Members were also viewed as potentially valuable electoral assets, with the
nature of campaigning highly labour intensive as mass parties made up in quantity
and collective action what they lacked in individual patronage by pooling large
numbers of small financial contributions and organising volunteers.

Moreover, mass parties were distinguished from cadre parties as much by their
aspiration to enrol as wide a segment of their supporters as possible as by their sheer
size or, as Scarrow put it, “by their strategic goals and formal enrolment procedures,
but not (necessarily) by their success in implementing these strategies.” Indeed, as
well as seeking to enrol them, mass parties also attempted to encapsulate their
supporters by developing networks of ancillary organisations that sought to fulfil a
wide range of social functions by, for example, providing their members with
information, insurance, union representation and other educational and social
activities. Thus the mass party provided itself with mechanisms for both mobilising
its supporters and insulating them from alternative influences. As Katz put it, “the
continued cohesion of social groups provided a solid basis for a virtual party
monopoly on political linkage; parties represented coherent programmes (in a social if
not necessarily a logical or ideological sense) and were supported by a variety of
ancillary organisations that could effectively encapsulate supporters in a socially and
politically homogeneous and all-embracing network.”

Given that they appeared to be a successful response to the challenge of winning
votes in the era of the mass franchise the mass party approach was widely imitated
and membership parties became, as Scarrow put it, “one of the most distinctive and
most successful forms of political organisation in the Twentieth Century.” However,
over time the strong social settlements and unified political sub-cultures which had
underpinned mass parties began to decline and a much looser and more discontinuous
pattern of party-electorate relations began to develop - with voters coming to view
party membership as progressively less attractive and mass parties as increasingly
anachronistic. Consequently, writers such as Kirchheimer and Panebianco began to
argue that, as mass parties lost their competitive advantage, party leaders and

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1 Parties and their Members. p 19.
7 Parties and their Members. p1.

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strategists would also increasingly lose interest in recruiting and encapsulating mass members and develop catch-all organisational strategies, based on much looser relationships with their electorates, to accompany their catch-all electoral strategies.¹

Party membership remained necessary in the catch-all/electoral-professional model - at least in its early stages when the continued prevalence of the mass party made it convenient for party leaders to at least maintain the appearance of, and claim to represent and be accountable to, a mass organisation. Indeed, the character of the membership was actually more heterogeneous as the catch-all/electoral-professional party opened its ranks to a wider range of supporters and recruited on the basis of policy agreement rather than social identity. However, in reality party membership became increasingly marginal to an individual’s identity and the rank-and-file party member’s role was downgraded to something of a historical relic. While they continued to draw on members as a source of finance and a channel of communication with the electorate, catch-all/electoral-professional parties also began to shift towards a more capital intensive campaigning approach and (as discussed in the chapter on the party machine) leant increasingly heavily on professional organisations rather than enrolled volunteers.

Moreover, while catch-all/electoral-professional parties still enrolled members they no longer seriously attempted to encapsulate them by developing networks of ancillary organisations. This process was accompanied by an increased emphasis on working a wider variety of interest groups with much weaker and less regular party ties. The loosening of ties with particular segments of society meant that parties no longer played a unique role in either aggregating and presenting demands from civil society or defending policy decisions to the public and generating support for governments and political systems. As Katz and Mair put it, catch-all/electoral-professional parties were “less the agents of civil society acting on, and penetrating, the state, and are rather more like brokers between civil society and the state, with the party in government.”²

Although catch-all/electoral-professional parties inherited (and maintained at least a rhetorical commitment to) a membership base from mass parties, subsequent sociological and technological changes (discussed in greater detail below) meant that parties found it even more difficult to maintain previous levels of enrolment and

commitment and rendered membership parties “an increasingly imperilled species.”

In Katz and Mair’s cartel party model, therefore, the character of party membership changed to the extent that, although they may still have continued to make a valuable contribution to party life in a number of ways (discussed below), there was a much greater emphasis on party members as individuals rather than as an organised body and the distinction between members and non-members was increasingly blurred as parties invited all ‘supporters’ to participate in party activities and decisions. Consequently, as Katz and Mair put it, “it becomes possible to imagine a party that manages all of its business from a single central headquarters and which simply subdivides its mailing list by constituency, region or town when particular sets of candidates have to be selected or when sub-national policies have to be approved.”

Although, as we saw in the previous chapter, the cartel model involved some reversion to idea of parties attempting to define and segment their electorates, the inherently looser relationship between parties and their members threatened to change the very character of the party as an agency of linkage from being an element of civil society to being part of the state apparatus. In the cartel party model, therefore, citizen control was exercised on parties as elements of the state’s ruling structure rather than through parties as agencies of linkage for particular groups in civil society with demand articulation becoming, to an even greater extent, the province of interest organisations. Consequently, as Mair put it, parties moved “from an earlier, post-suffrage stage (the classic ‘mass party’ phase) in which they represented the interests of civil society vis-a-vis the state, to a stage in which they acted almost as independent brokers between state and civil society (the classic ‘catch-all party phase)...to a new and more recent stage, in which they actually move closer to becoming part of the state, and remain at quite a remove from civil society.” The balance of linkage, therefore, shifted that so that “no longer simple brokers between civil society and the state, the parties now become absorbed by the state. From having first assumed the role of trustees, and then later of delegates, and then later again, in the heyday of the catch-all party, of entrepreneurs, parties have now become semi-state agencies.”

This general decline in parties as mass membership organisations and in the levels of participation and involvement in party activity was, it was argued, inevitable and rooted in a shift in the balance of costs and benefits which made party membership

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10 Parties and their Members. p1.

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less attractive for both party leaders and ordinary citizens. Consequently, the developments which account for the decline of the mass membership party could be divided into what Scarrow terms 'supply side' and 'demand side' factors relating, respectively, to the changing calculations made by potential party members and leaders.14

Supply-side arguments emphasised the growing importance of factors that made citizens less likely to join political parties so that even where party leaders continued to invest resources in enrolling members their efforts were likely to meet with diminishing returns.

Firstly, as noted in the previous chapter on parties and their electorates, the sociological changes which accompanied and gave rise to the catch-all/electoral-professional party model (increased material well-being, more widespread and comprehensive education and the development of mass culture and communications) created more fluid and heterogeneous societies. This breakdown in the communal ties which had formed the basis for party cohesion led to a concomitant weakening of the sociological ties between individuals and parties and, thereby, reduced the pool of committed partisans on which they could draw on in order to recruit members.15

Secondly, parties had fewer incentives to offer their potential members either, to use Panebianco’s distinction, collective benefits (identification with the organisation, its cause or with the other participants’ political and social goals) or selective benefits (the promise of access to power, status or material benefits).16 In terms of collective incentives, the decline in party identification and centrality of the party to an individual’s life meant that it was less likely to be viewed as a potential source of the socio-psychic rewards derived from companionship with like-minded citizens or through the performance of some kind of civic duty. Similarly, the expansion of the leisure industries, state education and the mass media in all the established Western democracies significantly reduced the comparative value of party membership as a provider of such services. In terms of selective benefits, the reform of administrative procedures made it more difficult for parties to attract members through the promise of privileged access to public employment or treatment at the hands of state officials,

14 Parties and their Members, p6.
15 On the demand side, this process of political de-alignment also meant that, confronted with an increasingly unstable and volatile electorate, parties were forced to devote an increased share of their resources to winning over and retaining segments of the electorate at large, rather than attracting and retaining members.
while the post-war expansion of the welfare state reduced the value of the personal material rewards or other party-linked benefits.

Thirdly, the success of the welfare state and the expansion of mass education also created a new generation of citizens who were not satisfied with the fairly limited, marginal and indirect forms of participation that parties traditionally offered to their ordinary, rank-and-file ordinary members. At the same time, citizens turned increasingly to alternative (and apparently superior) channels for influencing and participating in the policy process such as the increasingly wide variety of single issue interest groups, new social movements and other alternative organisations (with which they were more likely to find themselves in full agreement on a narrower range of concerns) or to the mass media.17

Demand-side arguments, on the other hand, highlighted the reasons why party leaders were no longer willing to invest resources into developing and maintaining mass membership organisations. Such calculations represented what may be defined as a party’s ‘organisational strategy’, which Scarrow distinguishes from its ‘electoral strategy’ thus:

“Party’s organisational strategies are distinct from their electoral strategies, though the latter may well influence the former. For a vote-seeking party the electoral strategy is a plan for winning votes from specific segments of the electorate. In contrast, its organisational strategy is a plan for optimising the use of available resources in order to promote the realisation of the electoral strategy...A party’s organisational strategy at least implicitly ranks the value of different resources (money, members etc) and it assesses how each type of resource can most usefully be deployed. An organisational strategy also incorporates judgements about the prices to be paid for each type of resource.”18

According to demand-side explanations, therefore, party leaders modified their organisational strategies because they began to consider enrolled members as increasingly more a liability than an efficient vote-winning tool.

Firstly, as we saw in the previous chapter on the party machine, new communications technologies such as computer-aided direct mail, opinion polls and particularly television offered party leaders alternative means of direct communication with the

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17 This was, of course, reinforced to some extent by the increasing tendency of parties to loosen their links even with those interest groups with whom they had previously enjoyed close ties.
18 Parties and their Members. p49.
citizenry and, thereby, enabled them to employ small and efficient teams of professional organisers to perform many of the campaigning tasks traditionally entrusted to larger pools of volunteers drawn from the enrolled party membership. This increasingly capital intensive approach to political campaigning meant that party leaders came to view organised members as a comparatively worthless electoral asset and an organisational strategy based on their recruitment and retention as a comparatively inefficient use of their resources.

Secondly, the relatively high costs involved in utilising these new campaign tools meant that parties could no longer rely on members as their sole, or even principal, means of financial support and had to seek out other sources of funding. Indeed, the increasingly widespread provision of state party funding (discussed in greater detail in the chapter on parties and the state) provided parties with an alternative source of income, enabling (or even encouraging) them not to invest in membership enrolment.

Thirdly, even if party strategists may have considered them to be of some residual value, it was argued that members imposed other costs that led parties to seek to reduce their organisational dependence on them. Quite apart from the material costs of recruiting and servicing members, together with the provision of non-political selective benefits, they also imposed programmatic costs that constrained the party leadership’s room for manoeuvre. According to some demand-side theorists, such as May, leaders were motivated primarily by the desire for electoral success - and, thereby, more likely to adopt a more moderate policy stance - while party members were generally inspired to join a party by ideological concerns, drawn from the most extreme ideological segment of the party’s supporters and, therefore, had a tendency to demand policy commitments based on doctrinal purity.19 In other words, far from representing an electoral asset, the party’s core activists actually diminished a party’s electoral prospects.

Taken together, it was argued that these supply side and demand side factors meant that party leaders had fewer reasons for wishing to recruit members and found it increasingly difficult to attract them even if they wanted to. However, although these arguments may seem compelling they have been challenged on both empirical and theoretical grounds. In the first place, the scale of the decline should not be exaggerated and, as Mair points out, empirical research on the actual levels of party membership levels in Western democracies suggested that “the most important decline in levels of party membership has been that which has occurred in relative

19 See, for example: ‘Opinion Structure of Political Parties’.
terms” (emphasis added) with the growth in enrolment simply failing to keep pace with the expansion of national electorates.\textsuperscript{29}

Moreover, there were also both counter-arguments why party strategists need not necessarily completely ignore or marginalise the importance of large formally enrolled memberships and counter-examples of cases where party strategists still considered them to be of some value.\textsuperscript{21} Firstly, parties may have continued to consider members as a means of boosting their legitimacy and find electoral value in at least maintaining the image of a mass party. They may, therefore, have continued to recruit even completely inactive members in order to present themselves as popular organisations with significant societal roots and controlled by ordinary citizens rather than purely comprising professional politicians. Secondly, in spite of the fact that party leaders had alternative campaigning techniques and networks of communication at their disposal, members could still be regarded as an important organisational resource in a number of ways. As well as continuing to provide a residually useful depository of free labour during and between election campaigns, they also offered: a potential source of new and innovatory ideas to improve policies and make party practices more effective, an (albeit limited) channel of communication reflecting public concerns and, most significantly, as Mair points out, they fulfilled an essential role as “warm bodies which can occupy official positions” continuing to act as the principal mechanism for parties to identify, recruit and place their personnel in key national and local state offices.\textsuperscript{22} Thirdly, in spite of the widespread introduction of state party funding, members’ subscriptions and donations still constituted an important, albeit declining, source of party revenue for many parties.\textsuperscript{23} Fourthly, commentators have put forward both theoretical and empirical arguments in support of the notion that rank-and-file party members and activists were also motivated by ‘office-seeking’ goals and did not, therefore, therefore impose excessive programmatic costs on party leaders.\textsuperscript{24}

So what kind of relationship between parties and their members might we expect to see developing in post-communist Poland?

\textsuperscript{21} For a useful theoretical discussion of the relative costs and benefits of enrolling party members from the party strategists’ perspective, see: Parties and their Members. pp27-51.
\textsuperscript{22} ‘Party Organisation’. p14.
\textsuperscript{23} Ironically, as Katz points out, one result of the introduction of state party funding was to allow membership subscription levels not to be increased in line with inflation, thereby reducing a potential monetary supply-side barrier to membership. 'Party as Linkage', p156.
\textsuperscript{24} See: ‘May's Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited’. 163
Given that (as we saw in the previous chapter on parties and the electorates) most of the new Polish parties have developed relatively loose and unstructured electoral constituencies which are not rooted in any particular socio-economic interest, we might also hypothesise that the nature of these links will be very weak with parties engaging in only minimal attempts to organise their electorates. In other words the new Polish parties are likely to develop in line with the more recent models of party organisation with a weak membership base, low levels of local implantation and, consequently, much less grounded in civil society than Western parties were in the early stages of party development. There are a number of reasons why we might expect Polish parties to develop in this way: some generic to modern democracies, others rooted in the specifics of post-communist Eastern European politics.

On the demand-side, there was little incentive for Polish party leaders to invest time and resources into recruiting mass memberships and developing local organisational networks.

Firstly, most of the new parties were top-down organisations which originated in parliament or at an elite level — “internally created’ to use Duverger’s terminology” — and, as Mair points out, “like all such parties they are either less likely, or find it difficult, to establish a strong organisational network at mass level.” For sure, there did, at first sight, appear to be a number of “externally-created” parties (which developed mass, extra-parliamentary organisations as a base to secure parliamentary representation and government office) such as those which emerged from within the Solidarity movement. However, as noted in chapter one, the various ‘post-Solidarity’ parties were formed mainly on the basis of divisions within its parliamentary and leadership elites rather than from within the mass movement and should, therefore, be regarded principally as parliamentary manifestations. It is also true that many West European parties which subsequently evolved into mass parties also began within parliament and built up grassroots organisations in response to challenges from their externally-created opponents. But for this process to develop in post-communist Poland would require externally-created opponents to challenge the existing internally-created parties by building strong popular organisations and, thereby, offering a competing model of party organisation which encouraged the latter to imitate this approach.

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25 See: Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activities in the Modern State. pxxiii-xxxvii.
26 What is different about post-communist party systems? p12.
27 Indeed, also as noted in chapter one, the fact that the break up of the Solidarity movement in 1990 was referred to as the ‘war at the top’ illustrated its elite-based character.
Secondly, in line with recent developments in Western democracies, the mass media were likely to provide the main channel of communications between parties and the electorate and the prospect of access to it was likely to diminish the utility of party membership and local organisation as the key instruments for spreading the parties' message.

Thirdly, also in line with Western developments, the financial costs of low party membership levels were likely to be easily offset by state party funding - the principle of which was quickly established in all recent cases of democratisation.

Fourthly, however valuable they may have perceived members to be in terms of providing political legitimacy (or even as an additional organisational resource), it may have been as unappealing to the new Polish party leaders (who in many cases were also the founders of their parties) to construct mass membership structures which could develop into sources of internal opposition or conflict as it was to their counterparts in Western democracies. Moreover, as Mair points out, while party membership remained an important factor in the organisational strategies of many Western parties in spite of the potential danger of rank-and-file militancy simply because they inherited mass organisations from an earlier organisational era, the new post-communist East European parties may have considered building up a mass membership from scratch more trouble than it is worth.

Fifthly, in a self-reinforcing process, the fact that most of the new party leaders were pre-occupied with the tasks of economic and political transformation left them little time to focus on party development; while the lack of a substantial organised presence on the ground was, in turn, likely to have made them feel even more dependent on their role in parliament and state institutions for their legitimacy and even less inclined to orientate themselves towards civil society.

At the same time there were also supply side factors likely to make Polish citizens reluctant to join the new parties; some of them, once again, specific to post-communist Eastern Europe and others part of more secular trends.

Firstly, the fact that (as we saw in the previous chapter on parties and their electorates) communist regimes attempted to atomise society, together with the social upheavals created by the economic transition, meant that socio-economic interests

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\(^{18}\) See: Funding Democratization.

\(^{19}\) What is different about post-communist party systems? p15.
were only slowly and tentatively crystallising and partisan preferences remained relatively unstructured. Consequently, the level of party identification in post-communist Poland was likely to have been every lower than in established Western democracies which, as noted above, were also characterised by 'de-alignment' and increasingly weak party-electorate linkages.

Secondly, given the communist party's role as a one-way transmission belt from the leadership to the masses and its association with forty years of repressive, one-party rule, it was unlikely that Polish citizens would quickly develop an appreciation of parties as agencies of two-way linkage and popular representation. Moreover, given that the primary motivation for party membership in communist Poland was individual career advancement, it was likely that its popular stereotype as a shameful activity to be frowned upon by most decent people would be carried forward into the post-communist period. Indeed, the communist legacy of a lack of civic education and enforced ideological mobilisation was likely not only likely to make people reluctant to identify themselves with parties, but also to discredit the entire notion of 'politics' itself in the eyes of large sections of a population with no experience of thinking in democratic and political categories.\(^{30}\)

Thirdly, Polish parties had even fewer incentives for enrolment and participation to offer their prospective members than their Western counterparts. The socio-economic factors which made it increasingly difficult for parties in Western democracies to attract potential members were all, to some extent, likely to be relevant in post-communist Poland, particularly the lack of privileged access to employment or any other direct material benefits (except from the patronage which flowed from the relatively small number of state political appointments at national and local level). The scope for this was, obviously, much more limited following the abolition of the nomenklatura system which linked all key public appointments to communist party membership. Indeed, given the tiny number of paid party functionaries (discussed in more detail in the chapter on the party machine) even the possibility making a career as a party official was much more limited than during the communist period when the PZPR and its satellites employed extensive local and national bureaucracies.

Fourthly, the dislocation and uncertainty caused by the effects of economic transition was also likely to make Polish citizens focus more on their personal and family lives which, in a relatively atomised society, were probably viewed as more effective

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\(^{30}\) A factor no doubt exacerbated by the lack of an unambiguous democratic tradition from the inter-war Polish Republic which citizens could draw on.
means of achieving material security than time and effort invested in collective, civic-orientated activities such as party membership. Consequently, those people who joined parties were likely to be, as one Polish sociologist put it, “really convinced about these organisations and, in some ideological way, overcome their day-to-day conditions and hardships and try to get involved in party activity.” Given that this phenomenon was linked as much to economic insecurity - which affected all but a tiny segment of the population - as to increased poverty and unemployment, this particular factor was likely to have been equally applicable to both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from the economic transition.

Fifthly, the popular impression of post-communist Polish politics as fractious and obsessed with petty, personality-based squabbles (to some extent inevitable given the relative inexperience of those who were participating in democratic party politics for the first time) was also likely to discourage identification with, and involvement in, party politics.

For similar reasons, the new Polish parties are as unlikely to attempt to organise and encapsulate segments of the electorate by developing ancillary organisations as they are to enrol individual members. Rather they are more likely to act as ‘brokers’ or even ‘semi-state agencies’ organising their relationships with civil society through interest organisations with whom they enjoy only a loose relationship. As noted above, citizens in Western democracies have increasingly turned to other channels to articulate their political interests. Although, given the general weakness of civil society in post-communist Eastern Europe, such organisations are likely to remain weak and under-developed for some time, commentators such as Kopecky have argued that “the dynamics of their development, linked to the speed and depth of the on-going social and political changes, make me wary of ascribing to the political parties an eventually hegemonic role in the representation of civil society.”

Just as the decline in the levels and significance of party membership in Western democracies should not be exaggerated, we can also expect the new Polish parties to organise some organisational structures on the ground; if only to provide them with political legitimacy and a means of candidate recruitment. Nevertheless, we might also hypothesise that these parties’ local branches will be focussed on fulfilling a set of fairly narrow organisational tasks and electoral functions rather than acting as

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31 Author interview with Professor Mirslawa Grabowska, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, June 5 1997.
32 ‘Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe’, p518.

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catalysts for broader and on-going grassroots campaigning activities within civil society.

Finally, as with the other aspects of party organisation examined in previous chapters we might also hypothesise that there is likely to be a difference between those completely 'new' parties built up from scratch following the collapse of communism and emergence of multi-party politics in 1989 and SdRP and the PSL which emerged as 'successors' to the ruling communist party and its former allies and, therefore, had a longer organisational continuity. The latter are likely to have retained, in relative terms at least, higher levels of membership and more developed local organisational networks from their party activities during the previous communist period and, therefore, will display a closer resemblance to the mass party model than the completely 'new' parties.

In order to test these hypotheses this chapter examines a number of aspects relating to the development of the new Polish parties as membership organisations.

Firstly, overall party membership figures are considered together with the level of local implantation among the five individual member-based parties included in our sample (SdRP, the PSL, UW, UP and ROP) in order to compare both the 'successor' and 'new' parties and the Polish totals with those in other European democracies.

Secondly, the question of to what extent the new Polish parties have attempted to encapsulate their electorates by developing networks of ancillary organisations is examined together with the related issue of the party-interest group relations.

Thirdly, the role and function of local party structures in the five individual member-based parties surveyed is examined to determine whether they were active and vibrant organisations, organically linked to their local communities and having an ongoing input into their party's policy and decision-making processes, or whether they were characterised by a more passive, electorally-driven and locally-focussed pattern of activity.

Fourthly, if, as hypothesised, the new Polish parties had (with partial exceptions of the two 'successors') weak individual and collective membership bases together with low levels of local implantation the question of why they developed such organisational structures and found it so difficult to enrol members is considered. This section examines both demand side explanations — the priorities which the new parties
assigned to recruiting members and developing local networks in their organisational strategies – and supply-side factors: the incentives and impediments to citizens joining parties in post-communist Poland. In other words, consideration is given as to whether the parties’ (hypothesised) failure to assemble large, formally enrolled membership organisations was the result of the fact that they were simply not interested in recruiting members, Polish voters were not interested in joining them, or if (as hypothesised) both of these factors were in some way relevant.

While it is relatively straightforward to identify parties’ policy preferences (given that they regularly endorse written programmes) and there is also an ‘official story’ set out in party Statutes about how parties should function and how the internal distribution of power should operate, organisational strategy is not always so easy to locate. Indeed, in many ways, this issue highlights the general difficulties of studying internal party structure and organisation (discussed at greater length in the introduction) given that, Polish parties (in common with most others) rarely (if ever) explicitly and consciously set out their organisational strategies in official documents or in ways that left any traces in party archives – and probably equally rarely in internally party documents. Consequently, this chapter is based almost exclusively on interviews with key party officials in the five individual member-based parties surveyed which - while they often contained high levels of wishful thinking and propaganda - where generally a more revealing source than the occasional party documents that addressed this issue.

**Party membership and local implantation**

Although accurate membership figures were extremely difficult to obtain and claimed totals should be treated with extreme caution, the new Polish parties could be divided into three broad categories.

Firstly, the two ‘successor’ parties whose membership figures, as Table 5.1 shows, dwarfed those of the completely new parties that emerged since 1989. Easily the largest party in pure numerical terms was the PSL, which claimed between 150-200,000 members and was clearly the direct beneficiary of a substantial organisational inheritance from the communist satellite ZSL. The 530,00 ZSL members simply had to indicate a willingness to continue as members of the ‘new’

party of whom about 100,000 initially did so. The second largest party was the communist successor SdRP (60,000) which also benefited from such an inheritance, albeit a much smaller one: at the time of its dissolution in January 1990 the PZPR had approximately 2,000,000 members of whom only 30,000 opted to join the new party.

Secondly, the comparatively larger new parties which claimed more than 10,000 members. The largest of these, RS AWS (30,000), was established in October 1997 to eventually replace the Solidarity trade union as the main component of the AWS coalition (discussed further below). Although larger than any other ‘post-Solidarity’ formation, RS AWS still fell some way short of matching the successors (not to mention its own initial, extremely optimistic projections) and it is too early at this stage to make any firm judgements about how the party will develop given that, at the time of writing, it had not even staged its first national Congress (scheduled for January 1999). The other significant parties in this category were: the KPEiR (27,000), the AWS-affiliated SKL (15,000), and the UW (14,000). At its peak the ROP had claimed 28,000 members but following the dramatic split in the wake of the 1997 parliamentary elections this was reduced to 15,000 in 1998. Similarly, the AWS-affiliated PC and KPN had both once been substantial parties (claiming 40,000 and 35,000 members respectively) but were also the victims of successive and damaging splits which reduced their membership totals (or those of their two successors in the KPN’s case) to approximately 10,000. This category also included a cluster of other smaller parties with between 3-10,000 members including: the AWS affiliated ZChN (6,000), PChD (4,000) and RdR (3,000); Antoni Macierewicz’s RKN (7,000); Lech Wałęsa’s ChDIIIRP (6,000); the UP (which, in spite being the fourth largest parliamentary grouping in the 1993-97 parliament claimed only 3,500 members); the PSL-PL and the UPR (3,000).

Thirdly, although a new Party Law introduced in 1997 drastically reduced the total, there were (at the time of writing) still approximately 65 officially registered parties in Poland and, consequently, there was also a substantial cluster of even smaller parties with less than 3,000 members. Some of them - such as the AWS-affiliated Ruch STU and SLD-affiliated PPS - played a minor but nonetheless significant role

34 First the Polish Peasant Party (Reborn) (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Odrodzone]: PSL[O]) and then, after June 1990, the ‘new’ PSL. Author interview with Janusz Gmitruk, 17 June 1997.
in Polish politics, but the vast majority were irrelevant and little more than ‘couch parties’ (to use the Polish parlance) numbering less than 1,000 members.  

A reasonable estimate of the total number of Poles who were party members in Poland was, therefore, approximately 400-450,000, or no more than 1.5% of the Polish electorate. As Table 5.2 shows this was one of the lowest levels of party membership in Europe and even lower than the comparable post-communist democracies of the Czech Republic (6.4%), Slovakia (3.1%) and Hungary (2.5%) and even these figures should be treated with extreme caution and were likely to have exaggerated Polish party membership levels. Firstly, Polish parties rarely made any efforts to distinguish between the number of ‘paper’ and ‘paid up’ members (most party headquarters surveyed claimed that membership records were not kept in this form). For example, in May 1996 it was revealed that there was a disparity of 8,000 between the ROP’s ‘paper’ and ‘paid up’ figures, while one Polish commentator claimed that only 10% of the PSL’s claimed 200,000 members had actually paid subscriptions. Secondly, these figures were based on the parties’ own claims and there was obviously a natural tendency to exaggerate the totals. The fact that, of the five individual member-based parties surveyed, only the two numerically smallest (the UW and UP) supplied detailed breakdowns of their membership figures in each province suggested that all the other totals were likely to have been massaged upwards. Thirdly, in some cases the lack of accurate data may also have been the result of the parties’ own internal organisational weakness and inability to collect and update their figures on a regular basis. As SdRP’s head of organisation Maciej Poręba candidly admitted “during the initial years we had to become involved in other matters” and “counting ourselves” was considered a low organisational priority compared with the more pressing tasks of basic party development and preparation for election campaigns. The lack of accurate membership data also, of course, made it difficult to make any meaningful temporal comparisons and analyse membership trends.

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38 *Partie kanapowe* - so called because their members could all fit on to one couch!

39 Based on a total of 28,409,054 Poles registered to vote in the 1997 Polish parliamentary elections (Rzeczpospolita, 2 October 1997). This figure was broadly in line with Mair (See: *What is different about post-communist party systems?* p14) and Lewis’s (*Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe*. p 15) estimates of 1.5% and 1.3% respectively and the PBS estimate of 3%. See: R. Wróbel, ‘Partie niepopularne ale potrzebne’ *Rzeczpospolita*, 2 August 1993 and ‘Bezpartyjni i nie reprezentowani’, *Rzeczpospolita*, 1/2 April 1995. The 1995 figure was actually 6%, although this included 3% who said that they were members of the Solidarity trade union which PBS also counted as a party.


42 Author interview with Maciej Poręba, 28 February 1998.
Moreover, these raw national membership totals did not properly reflect the full extent of the ‘successor’ parties’ superiority in terms of local implantation. One way of measuring this was to consider the number of basic organisational units in each of the five individual member-based parties surveyed. At the time this research was undertaken all five had at least two tiers of local organisation. Firstly, at the provincial level of the 49 administrative units (województwa) into which the Polish state was then divided - although party organisations at this tier were referred to as regions (regiony) by the UW and districts (okręgi) by the UP and ROP. Secondly, the basic unit of local organisation known as the circle (koło) in SdRP, the PSL, UW and UP (comprising at least five members) and the cell (ogniwo) in the ROP (with at least seven members and five cells required to establish a district organisation). The total number of basic organisational units provided a broad indication of each party’s level of local implantation, with the PSL (11,000) and SdRP (2,500) having considerably more than the ROP (900-950), the UW (400) and the UP (200).

However, it is important to note that circles and cells varied enormously in both size and territorial coverage. The UW, UP, ROP and (especially) SdRP often had more than one circle or cell organised in a large town which covered the area of one local government district, known as a commune (gmina). At the time this research was undertaken the 2,475 communes were the basic administrative unit and sub-provincial tier of Polish local government and varied considerably in size; with the 142 urban communes analogous to just one larger town or city, while the 2,333 rural communes often covered just a number of small villages. Moreover, the PSL circle was a sub-

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43 It is important to bear in mind that these figures for local implantation did not include any of the AWS affiliated individual member-based parties. As Table 5.1 shows most of these did not have a particularly high overall membership level and, therefore, were unlikely to detract from the general findings about levels of implantation among the ‘new’ parties. The only exception here was likely to be the nascent RS AWS which was still at a formative stage when this research was undertaken and was likely to enjoy a higher level of local implantation than any of the other ‘new’ parties hitherto.

44 See: Statut Socjaldemokracji Rzeczpospolitej Polski; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: Statut; Statut Unii Wolności; UP. Statut Unii Pracy; Ruch Odbudowy Polski: Statut. As noted in chapter two, the 1998 local government reforms are likely to bring about substantial changes in these party structures with the replacement of the 49 old provinces with 16 new ones.

45 10,473 according to the most recent published figures for 1991. See: See: Sprawozdanie z działalności władz naczelnych PSL za okres od Nadzwyczajnego Kongresu do III Kongresu PSL, p23


47 The exact figures were 387 for UW and 204 for UP - supplied by the parties’ national headquarters, February 1997. Indeed, the UP only had local party organisation at district level in 34 out of 49 provinces.

48 The 1998 local government reforms also introduced an additional, intermediate tier of 272 boroughs (powiats) which are also likely to bring about another re-organisation of local party structures.
communal unit of organisation, usually based on a single village with each commune board (zarząd gminny) encompassing three to five local circles.44 A more accurate way of measuring each party’s level of local implantation, therefore, was to consider the percentage of communes in which each party had some kind of organisational structures.

Unfortunately, the PSL was the only party which had an a separate tier of party organisation at the commune level and, therefore, kept national data on this claiming local structures in approximately 2,100 communes (85%).45 In order to make cross-party comparisons it was, therefore, necessary to draw on local research conducted in four provinces in April-June 1997. As well as confirming the ‘successor’ parties superiority in terms of raw membership figures and highlighting how the number of basic organisational units in a given province was only a very rough measure of ‘local implantation’ (SdRP, for example, had up to four circles in one urban commune), as Table 5.3 shows, this local research revealed just how striking the ‘successor’ parties’ organisational superiority was in this respect. For example, these figures illustrated the true extent to which the PSL was the only party with a well-developed organisational network in rural areas: with local implantation in 79% of the communes across the four provinces (ranging from 59% in Gdańsk to 100% in Plock), broadly in line with figures claimed by national PSL officials.46 They also highlighted the fact that although SdRP was, as one national official put it, “by nature, an urban party”47 (in Gdańsk province, for example, it had 250 members in urban Gdynia and only 30 in rural Kościerzyna), the party also had some organisation in small towns as well, averaging 65% local implantation (from 50% in Plock to 80% in Rzeszów). The UW (13%) and the UP (8%), on the other hand, were almost exclusively urban in character and tended to be concentrated in the main provincial and other larger towns, confirming UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik view that his party existed “typically in large towns, sometimes in smaller towns...but in rural areas, in reality, we don’t have circles.”48

However, it is worth bearing in mind that SdRP also had approximately 500 regional councils (rad regionalne) which corresponded, broadly speaking, to the then defunct

44In exceptional cases a single circle could be empowered to function as the commune board.
45Information supplied by PSL party headquarters, February 1997. The last published figure was 1,943 communes in 1991. See: Sprawozdanie z działalności władz naczelnych PSL za okres od Nadzwyczajnego Kongresu do III Kongresu PSL. p23
46The PSL has claimed that 35% of Polish villages had some kind of PSL local branch. PSL. Sto Lat Ruch Ludowego. Warsaw. 1995. p 24
47Author interview with Maciej Poręba, 28 February 1997.
48Author interview, 19 February 1997.
(although, since October 1998, revived) intermediate borough (powiat) tier of local administration in which several communes were clustered around a medium-sized town. Although these councils were intended to act simply as informal, co-ordinating bodies, in fact they ensured that SdRP had some kind of sub-provincial organisational network even in those communes where there were no local circles organised. Interestingly, local research also revealed that AWS (which, at the time of writing, did not have any policy-making structures below provincial level) also had a sub-provincial structure based on the old borough towns which co-ordinated a network of organisers covering almost every commune thereby also ensuring a de facto 100% level of local implantation.

As Table 5.3 also shows, the notable exception to this general pattern was the ROP’s local organisation in the Rzeszów province, whose 700 members and 60% implantation rate were comparable to that of the two ‘successor’ parties. As an ‘externally-created’ party the ROP was, of course, denied access to the state resources which the four ‘parliamentary’ parties (SdRP, PSL, UW and UP) enjoyed (discussed at greater length in the chapter on parties and the state) and, therefore, had a mass party-type strategy of building from the ‘bottom-up’ virtually forced upon it. The ROP Rzeszów Provincial Chairman very much reflected this organisational ethos and argued that he was “never happy with an elitist approach to building a party” and “always thought you had to build local structures.” However, the Rzeszów experience was not replicated in any of the other three provinces surveyed, where the party’s local implantation levels of 11-18% were on a par with those of the other ‘new’ parties, suggesting that it may have been the result of exceptional and specifically local factors. Indeed, another local ROP official claimed the party had reached a recruitment ceiling and that “whoever was going to join the party did so a long time ago...There will not be an enormous increase in the number of members.”

Party ancillary organisations and interest group relations

In addition to low party membership and local implantation levels, there was also, as hypothesised, very little evidence that the parties’ surveyed had attempted to encapsulate their voters by developing networks of ancillary organisations. The party youth sections ranged in size from only 300 in the case of the UP, 1000 in the ROP

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54 Although soon to be revived. See Note 50.
56 Author interview with Andrzej Kucharski, 20 April 1997.
57 Author interview with Zdislaw Dumowski, 28 April 1997.
Youth Federation" to 2,500 in the SdRP Youth Federation and the UW’s Association of Young Democrats. SdRP, the UW and UP also had ecological sections and (together with the PSL) a women’s section – although these seemed to operate more as loose networks of contacts than formal local and national structures. Indeed, there was some hostility to the idea of considering even these bodies as the kind of party ancillary organisations associated with the mass party model - or party ‘annexes’ (przybudówki) in the Polish parlance.

Of the parties surveyed only the PSL appeared to come close to pursuing a variant of the mass party approach by performing what it saw as a more organic role and penetrating deeply into the rural and agricultural communities which it sought to represent. PSL Executive Office Director Marian Zalewski, for example, argued that “as a party we are more of a social movement operating from below, something more than just a party organisation” and the party’s 1995 programmatic declaration stated explicitly that “as a result of adopting a mass party character, the PSL does not wish to limit the remit of its activity only to the sphere of the strictly political, but also wishes to undertake activities within the party and in the wider circles of peasantist movement activities in the field of education, together with artistic and scientific culture – in line with its one hundred year tradition.” It continued, “the PSL wishes to participate not just in political rivalry over gaining participation in the organs of state government, but also wishes to fulfil the role of a co-participant in forming solutions to the different problems of the everyday lives of a wide circle of society and a co-organiser in meeting social needs in the educational and cultural spheres.” Similarly, PSL Vice-President Janusz Dobrosz argued that the party reflected the traditions of the peasant movement that “political parties don’t focus themselves exclusively on activities which are sensu stricto party political.”

One local PSL official, for example, drew attention to the fact that local party organisations in his province were involved in supporting “co-operative banking, farming organisations, the local Farming Chamber, the Volunteer Fire Brigades,

59 Figures supplied by ROP party headquarters, February 1997.
60 Figures supplied by SdRP party headquarters, February 1997.
61 Figures supplied by UW party headquarters, February 1997. The PSL youth section was still in the process of formation at the time this research was undertaken.
62 Author interviews with: Maciej Poręba, 28 February 1997; Miroslaw Czech, 19 February 1997; and Wojciech Borowik, 19 February 1997.
64 Author interview, 6 March 1997.
organising the Rural Youth Movement, producing a monthly newspaper and various other cultural activities such as the harvest festival and peasant Holy Days." Another commentator noted how PSL activists "willingly talk about their activism within the realms of so-called organic work - for example - running village farmers’ wives circles, helping village libraries, helping in specific matters like building schools, cultural institutes, playing fields." Similarly, PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych argued that a local party circle meeting was often "the starting point for a wider group of people to turn up in the village and then it turns into a celebratory meeting of the community."

An important aspect of this was the party’s attempt to root itself more firmly in rural communities by developing links with a wider network of social and cultural organisations including: the Union of Rural Youth (Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej: ZMW), the National Union of Agricultural Circles and Organisations (Krajowy Związek Kółek i Organizacji Rolniczych: KZKiOR), the Rural Housewives Circles (Kolo Gospodyń Wiejskich: KGW), the Union of Volunteer Fire Brigades (Związek Ochotniczych Straż Pożarnych: ZOSP) together with rural sports clubs and educational associations. In 1997, for example, the PSL established a 37,000-stong National Organisation of Village Administrators and even considered setting up a specifically rural teachers’ union, the Union of Peasantist Teachers. This partly arose from the fact that the number of people involved in any kind of civic activity in a small village was extremely small and there was likely to be considerable overlap between membership of the PSL and any local social and cultural organisations.

At one point the ROP also appeared to be displaying mass party characteristics in terms of developing of ancillary structures, although nowhere near to the same extent as the PSL. As we shall see, all the parties and groupings surveyed developed networks of ‘partner’ organisations, primarily as a means of mobilising particular electoral constituencies. However, the ROP attempted to draw a number of these partners - business organisations, veterans and so-called ‘patriotic’ societies, other political parties and groupings and (perhaps most significantly) the Solidarity Individual Farmers’ trade union - more closely into the party’s orbit by establishing a Committee of Organisational Associated with the ROP (Komitet Organizacji Zrzeszonych z ROPem: KOZzR) which enjoyed formal representation in party
decision-making structures. Even more ambitiously, in August 1996 the ROP established the Polish Economic Alliance (Polskie Przymierze Gospodarcze: PPG) as an ancillary organisation for organising small and medium-sized businessmen, craftsmen and shopkeepers and quite explicitly “not just a structure to meet electoral requirements.”

However, even these two exceptions were more apparent than real. None of the various rural organisations with whom the PSL co-operated were in any way formally represented within, or formally linked to, the party other than on the basis of parliamentary electoral pacts concluded at national level in 1991 and local level in 1993 and 1997. ZMW Chairman Karol Dobrowolski may, for example, have argued that “the PSL is the only organised political strength functioning in the countryside and caring about the interests of the countryside” and that his organisation “must be united with the PSL by an ideological-programmatic union.” However, while the ZMW’s 1996 Congress also resolved that, while they regarded the PSL as “our political representative with whom we share ideals and a values system, with whom we are united by certain common aims,” it was not “and don’t want to be the ‘youth section’ of this, or any other, party... We want to be a programmatically, politically and organisationally independent Union of young rural generations. We want to organise our co-operation with the PSL today and in the future on the basis of partnership and respect for the Union’s identity.” Another example of this was the fact that the KZKiOR agricultural circles President and Vice-President actually stood as SLD candidates in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Indeed, PSL Supreme Council Vice-Chairman Roman Jagieliński openly complained that the party’s contacts with all the main rural organisations (except for the ZOSP) had deteriorated.

Moreover, with the exception of the one million-strong ZOSP, most of these rural organisations were actually relatively weak institutions and, arguably, greater beneficiaries from the partnerships than the PSL was. A May 1994 OBOP survey, for example, revealed that 60% of rural voters trusted the PSL but only 36% trusted the

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73 ‘Przymierze Gospodarcze dla 3 mln firm’, Rzeczpospolita. 9 August 1996.
75 Ibid.
77 See: R. Jagieliński, ‘Anatomia klęski’, Wprost. 26 October 1997. The PSL President Waldemar Pawlak was also the National President of the ZOSP at that time.
KZKiOR. As one Polish commentator put it, “the old pre-war PSL passed a lot of its ‘power’ down to organisations like the agricultural circles, the Union of Rural Youth which ran social clubs in the villages, and women’s organisations organised courses in cookery, needlework for farmers’ wives. This was kind of social activity tied in with all aspects of people’s lives.” As result of sociological changes such as the expansion of the leisure industry and proliferation of television and video, those people living in rural areas “tend to do more home-centred activities” and “these social organisations don’t really function in the way they should...There is no longer an appeal directed at the whole of people’s lives.” At the same time, the PSL proved no more capable than any of the other parties surveyed of developing substantial ancillary structures and the party’s Programmatic Director Jan Wypych argued that the party’s youth, women’s and ex-combatant sections were “not significant organisations.”

Similarly, in spite of earlier impressions, it was soon evident that neither the ROP’s network of associated groups nor the PPG were intended to act as ancillary organisations in the normal sense and that both were established primarily for electoral and fundraising purposes. According to ROP National Secretary Wojciech Włodarczyk, for example, the KOZzR was “an autonomous structure” and its procedural rules stated that its members retained their “full subjectivity and identity – the principle of autonomy of each specific Organisation is recognised.” Similarly, ROP Chairman Jan Olszewski stressed that he “didn’t want the PPG to be regarded as some kind of party annexe” and Wojciech Włodarczyk pointed out that it was “not officially represented within the ROP’s structures...We have plenipotentiaries within our provincial structures responsible for the PPG and this is a contact but there is, however, no direct involvement.” It was also questionable precisely how much benefit the ROP actually derived from their association with these organisations. It was widely felt that the Solidarity farmers’ union, for example, played an insignificant role in mobilising support for the party among in rural communities and local officials suggested that the PPG had only between 30-40 members in each province.

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79 Author interview with Ewa Czaczkowska, 26 June 1997.
80 Author interview with Jan Wypych, 20 February 1997.
81 Author interview, 14 February 1997.
82 See: Komitet Organizacji Stowarzyszonych z Ruchem Odbudowy Polski: Regulamin.
83 ‘Drobní przedsiębiorcy łączą się’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 November 1996.
84 Author interview, 14 February 1997.
85 See: ‘Waka o głosy wsi’.
86 Author interview with ROP local officials in Gdańsk, Jelenia Góra, Plock and Rzeszów, April-May 1997.

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As hypothesised, therefore, the new Polish parties were more interested in working through interest groups as a means of linkage with civil society than attempting to develop networks of ancillary structures linked directly to their party organisations. The relationship between the new parties and emerging interest organisations in post-communist Poland is, of course, a topic worthy of separate and much more detailed examination. However, preliminary indications appeared to confirm that Polish parties have developed very loose and informal relationships with a fairly wide range of organisations rather than attempting to enrol them as collective members or tying themselves too closely and formally to any one particular interest group.

The very loose relationship between SdRP and its electoral coalition partners in the SLD was a case in point. As SdRP’s 1997 programme put it, the party attached “great importance to co-operating with trade unions, to co-operating with democratic women’s’ organisations” and supported “varied forms of organisation by people of the left.” Consequently, the SLD was established in the run up to the 1991 parliamentary elections as a “political structure integrating parties, trade unions, social organisations and unorganised people connected with the social democratic ideas of justice and social equality,” initially composed of 17 organisations, but expanded to 27 in 1993 and 33 in 1997. In addition to SdRP, the SLD comprised: trade unions, other smaller parties and political groupings, ex-communist youth and student organisations, women’s organisations, ethnic minority groupings, former communist veterans’ organisations, pensioners’ groupings, and (after 1997) even a Christian organisation, virtually all of whom had their roots in, and emerged from, organisations which had existed during the communist era. (A full list of SLD members in 1997 is set out as in Appendix 1.)

Apart from SdRP – which was the driving force in terms of providing the SLD with both political direction and organisational underpinning – the most significant of these was the OPZZ trade union federation which, following the loosening of martial law restrictions in 1984, had been the only legal trade union organisation functioning during the late communist era with 3,000,000 members organised in 14,500 workplace commissions. Of the 208 SLD Sejm deputies and Senators elected in 1993, 73 were SdRP members and 61 were from the OPZZ. The other 22 SLD affiliates which secured parliamentary representation included only 16 deputies from the Polish Union of Teachers (Związek Nauczycieli Polskich: ZNP), 6 each from the Union of Teachers (Związek Nauczycieli Polskich: ZNP), 6 each from the Union of

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87 Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej.
88 Tak Dalej Być Nie Musi.
Socialist Youth and Students (Zrzeszenie Socjalistycznych Młodzieży Polskiej: ZSMP) and Democratic Union of Women (Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet: DUK) and three from the PPS. 89

However, in spite of SdRP’s de facto hegemony, the SLD was actually based on a very loose partnership between the party and its allies. Firstly, the SLD only existed in the formal sense as either an election committee convened in order to run specific campaigns (and terminated immediately after the financial accounts were settled) or, between elections, as a Parliamentary Club comprising Sejm deputies and Senators elected on the SLD ticket. Secondly, the SLD’s component elements were completely independent and in no way organisationally subordinate to SdRP. Indeed, in line with the catch-all/electoral-professional model, the party used SLD members as a means of legitimising itself and building support among various milieu rather than as mass party-type ancillary organisations and they, in turn, underlined the fact that they were no longer party ‘annexes’. For example, in order to re-build its credibility, the ZSMP went going to great pains “to depart from its image as a party vassal from the times of the Polish People’s Republic.”90

Thirdly, although floated from time to time,91 the various explicit attempts to transform the SLD into a more coherent institutional structure came to nothing. In April 1996, for example, key SdRP and SLD strategist Marek Borowski argued that the “SLD formula can’t last forever” and that its component organisations should be transformed into a single party on the grounds that “a unitary party is easier to operate - it forms a programme and electoral lists which it invites other groupings to join.”92 However, the reactions from Borowski’s party colleagues ranged from lukewarm to hostile exemplified by SLD Parliamentary Club Spokesman Andrzej Urbaniczky who defended the current arrangement on the grounds that “we are more effective and more attractive to people who prefer to identify with movements...the SLD formula has is not yet exhausted.”93

The UP mainly focussed on attempting to build stronger relations with the trade union movement whom it saw as its “natural partner and ally,”94 particularly those unions

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92 ‘SLD nie może trwać wiecznie’.
94 U Progu XXI Wieku.
not aligned with the Solidarity trade union and the OPZZ federations (or with these organisations' local branches or affiliates). However, the UP’s relations with its putative trade union allies were, if anything, even weaker than SdRP’s with the OPZZ (and its affiliates). The party’s formal links were organised through a rather loose Trade Union Forum while, according to its Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik, in terms of day-to-day contacts “there isn’t such a mechanism where they can affiliate to our party. Only things like...agreements that we signed during the election...We have a lot of candidates from the unions.” In 1997, for example, the UP signed national or local electoral agreements with five trade union organisations either at national level or through their local affiliates. This kind of relationship was justified in the UP’s 1995 programme on the grounds that while “the same interests and expectations lie at the root of our activity” the “method of achieving them is different. The natural form of a political party’s activity is in the sphere of public power, trade unions - on the other hand - in business and their relations with the state and private employers.” Indeed the party placed great emphasis on the importance of maintaining a certain distance and autonomy between parties and interest groups and the fact that its “openness to civic activism cannot...develop into forming political annexes.”

On the other hand, as one element of its electoral strategy of constructing an alliance of potential supporters of market reforms, the UW attempted to forge links with its potential allies in the business community organised in bodies such as such as the Polish Business Council, Confederation of Polish Employers and the Business Centre Club. Although the party was quite successful - and established a loosely organised Economic Forum specifically to draw entrepreneurs into the party - once again this relationship was characterised principally by, as UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki put it, “going to the leading business organisations and asking them to support the programme” rather than attempting to set up ancillary organisations to encapsulate this milieu. Indeed, the UW’s difficulties in developing firm links with their putative business allies also highlighted the fact that, as discussed in the previous chapter on parties and their electorates, many of the emerging socio-economic groups in post-communist Poland, such as entrepreneurs, had still not properly crystallised - both objectively as a distinct electoral segments or subjectively in terms perceptions of their own interests - and were, therefore, weakly articulated and poorly organised.

95 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
97 U Progu XXI Wieku.
99 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
Andrzej Potocki, for example, complained that “business voters are the most irrational voters. This is a group that sometimes votes completely against its own interests - for those who increase taxes, increase inflation.” Similarly, according to one Polish commentator, while 50% of all Polish workers were trade union members, less than 1% of family businesses and private investors were organised in business associations and those that did exist had “little political meaning...the same people often appear and only vary by separate personnel configurations or names” and “remind one more of groups of friends than organised political forces, possessing coherent programmatic postulates and that is how party politicians regard them.”

At the same time, the UP’s problems in developing a significant base of support among trade unions arose partly from the fact that both the major union federations were already very closely aligned with the SLD and AWS groupings and, therefore, highlighted another significant feature of party-interest group relations in post-communist Poland: the blurring of distinctions and confusion of roles and functions. On the one hand, there were clear examples of parties which behaved more like interest groups; the most obvious one being the PSL. Commenting on the results of the 1997 parliamentary election, for example, PSL President Jaroslaw Kalinowski argued that it “stuck to us that we also took on the role of a trade union upon ourselves” and according to one local PSL official “many people in the countryside view the PSL as some kind of trade union that looks after their political, economic and business interests.” Similarly, the two pensioners parties which contested the 1997 elections were also examples of parties which were established with the objective of representing one specific and narrow socio-economic segment within the political and parliamentary arena. On the other hand, as the political activities of the OPZZ and Solidarity trade union federations show, there were also examples of some interest groups behaving more like parties.

The most interesting case study of this blurring of roles was that of the Solidarity trade union’s sponsorship of, and subsequent relationship with, AWS. Superficially, apart from the obvious differences of political orientation, AWS appeared to bear a fairly close resemblance to the SLD. It was a broad grouping comprising a range of

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100 Ibid.
103 Author interview with Jan Bury, 18 June 1997.
political parties and groupings, trade unions, youth, ex-combatants, Catholic and so-called ‘patriotic’ organisations, coalitions of right-wing local government activists and research institutes and foundations. (For a complete list of AWS members at the 1997 election see Appendix 2). Moreover, AWS also developed (initially at least) as a fairly loose and temporary structure formed specifically as an election committee (and subsequently as a Parliamentary Club) with collective rather than individual members. However, unlike the SLD - where the hegemonic role was played by SdRP, a political party sensu stricto that used the alliance as a mechanism for building political support among various milieu – AWS was organised around an interest group, the Solidarity trade union, to which the affiliated parties were clearly subordinate.

AWS leaders justified this arrangement on three grounds. Firstly, because, as AWS and Solidarity trade union Chairman Marian Krzaklewski put it, “the (political and economic) system in Poland is in a transitional phase. That’s why the role of trade unions which, after all, stood as the cause of these changes, must be a specific one.”105 Elaborating on this another Polish commentator argued that “trade unions have a different role to play, different functions in Poland than trade unions in countries with a stabilised capitalist system...The Anglo-Saxon model, in which trade unions are only the partners of business and not of the state, although logical, may be unrealistic in Poland.”106 Secondly, because, as the same commentator put it “independent trade unions played a great role in retaining independence and re-building democracy in our country’s history. Solidarity in the 1980s and 1990s had to think, above all, in the categories of the state interest and not just in the interest of employees.”107 Similarly, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the AWS-affiliated PC argued that “if it was a different trade union then the price would be too high. However, we’re talking about Solidarity which has played a great role - not just in Poland...Attempts to form a large right-wing formation without the union will not succeed.”108 Marian Krzaklewski also argued that Solidarity could not be considered an ‘ordinary’ trade union because it was “still as much a social movement as a trade union. That is the reality and it this which is our current role - an institution around which various political forces, social movements, associations integrate.”109 Thirdly, the fragmentation and weakness of the various parties on the Polish right made, as Solidarity and AWS Mazowsze regional leader Maciej Jankowski put it, this continued “state of existing on the borders

105 Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność.
107 Ibid.

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between a union and a political party...necessary." According to Marian Krzaklewski, “if political parties are not in a state to force the process in a way that is in accord with the intentions of the revolution...then the Solidarity union (must) remain a social movement. It remains the ‘emergency exit.’...opposition parties have not proved themselves in comparison with the communists. They are not in a state to fight the post-communists.”

At the time of writing, the question of AWS’s future organisational form remained unresolved. On the one hand, there was widespread recognition that the current arrangement was unsustainable and that, as Marian Krzaklewski put it, “when the political scene in Poland crystallises (so that) the anti-communist, non-communist parties will have an advantage in the balance of forces - we (Solidarity) will withdraw remaining a professional trade union.” Similarly, AWS Election Campaign Staffs Secretary Andrzej Anusz argued that although “when it comes to an election campaign then these unionists will naturally activate themselves...keeping the trade union on full ‘stand by’, fully mobilised over four years, over a whole term from one election to another is impossible. This is a trade union, it has other functions.”

Originally it was intended that, after the 1997 elections, AWS would, as Krzaklewski put it, “remove the union’s current political obligations from it” and “stand as the political representative of the whole social movement, which is today gathered around Solidarity and transform itself into a political coalition and ideally into one party.” Indeed, Krzaklewski continually emphasised during the 1997 campaign that “we have to begin building a strong, well organised efficient grouping being the political representative of those movements and social structures which today, co-found AWS” which would “allow the Solidarity movement and the associations involved in AWS to better share out that which is political, that which is union and that which is social.”

Subsequently, however, a consensus appeared to develop around the idea of turning AWS into a federation with the Solidarity trade union’s hegemonic role being replaced by the a new union-based political party RS AWS. According to AWS Vice-Chairman and Solidarity Gdańsk regional Chairman Jacek Rybicki the union would be linked to the new party by both a “programmatic contract” and “initially, a union

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11 Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność.
12 Ibid.
13 Author interview, 24 November 1997.
14 Cited in ‘Premia za akcję’.
of personnel at the highest levels” although “in practice they will be independent organisations” and “at this point, the union will leave the stricte political stage and it will concentrate on activities of a union character.” However, it is still questionable both how successful the new party will be and to what extent the Solidarity trade union will be content to move aside for it and disappear from the political arena. By December 1997, for example, the initial concept had been modified so that the new party’s adoption of Solidarity’s political functions would take place in phases and, significantly, although Solidarity originally allowed Krzaklewski to combine the union and party leaderships for one year, when the union’s 1998 Congress forced him to choose, it was the union chairmanship that he retained.

The role and functions of local party branches

Local research on the five individual member-based parties revealed a varied pattern of activism and frequency of meetings of their local branches - particularly between urban and rural areas. SdRP circles in Plock and Jelenia Góra provinces, for example, met “not less than once a month” and while the majority of urban circles in Rzeszów province met monthly, those in rural areas only did so “as required...The Chairman does a ‘phone round because some important political event is approaching and this needs to be discussed.” UW circles met monthly in Rzeszów province and fortnightly in Jelenia Góra (with one cell holding weekly ‘open’ meetings) while ROP cells in Rzeszow, Jelenia Góra and Gdańsk provinces all met at least once a month (some twice and others weekly). In Plock, however, while their boards (zarządy ogniwa) often met two or three times a week, the actual ROP cells only met “occasionally, depending on the initiative of the local leader.” Similarly, although the UP Statute stipulated that local circles had to meet at least once every two months, local research revealed a much less regular pattern exemplified by one local UP official’s comments that “if people want to meet, if they have subjects to discuss, then they meet.”

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119 Author interviews with: Leszek Majewski, 29 April 1997; and Stanislaw Gwizda, 5 May 1997.
120 Author interview with Kazimierz Wójcik, 22 April 1997.
121 Author interview with Wiesław Różycki, 22 April 1997.
122 Author interview with Ryszard Grot, Rzeszów UW Regional Council member, 6 May 1997.
123 Author interviews with Ryszard Kucharski, 20 April 1997; Janusz Burysz, 7 May 1997; and Danuta Makowska, 14 May 1997.
124 Author interview with Zdislaw Dumowski, 28 April 1997.
125 Statut Unii Pracy.
126 Author interview with Bogusław Kaczmarek, 14 May 1997.
Although party leaders often paid lip-service to their role in the policy-making process, local circles and cells were generally fairly informal and discursive bodies whose main function was to fulfil certain basic organisational tasks such as registering members. For example, while UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech argued that local circles were the “basic life of the party,” according to the party Statute they were actually quite loosely organised bodies which didn't require a quorum for decision-making and whose activities were open to all party sympathisers not just members. Similarly, while, according to UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik, local circles had “both statutory and discursive functions...they select leaders, collect membership subscriptions...when there are consultations we consult them, when we need their opinion on a particular matter then we gather their opinions” and the party Statute stipulated that they were also supposed to “pass resolutions on all matters relating to the matters of the circles” and “put forward proposals and postulates” to the UP leadership, local research revealed a much more sporadic pattern of activities.

According to the PSL Statute, local circles had an even more informal character with their meetings convened “as the need arises” by the circle’s board (zarząd koła) and being “devoted to discussing current issues, having the general character of an educational meeting.” Elected once every four years, the circle board was responsible for undertaking any day-to-day organisational activities “which are required to further the realisation of the party’s programme and statute” and implementing decisions taken by the party leadership. According to PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych “in certain rural areas, where there are very specific tasks to undertake in a particular village, here a circle exists and can initiate things...In urban areas activities are more ‘political.’ There they don’t deal with tasks such as building a water-supply or road...These circles exist rather more as a centre for registering members and the possibility of contact during the course of an election campaign, rather than on the basis of ongoing party activities.”

The SdRP and ROP Statutes did not actually say anything about how often their local circles and cells were supposed to meet, nor what their powers, responsibilities and functions were. However, according to SdRP head of organisation Maciej Poręba they

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127 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
128 Statut Unii Wolności.
129 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
130 Statut Unii Pracy.
131 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: Statut.
132 Author interview, 20 February 1997.
were responsible for “the party’s day-to-day activities...together with collecting membership subscriptions, checking evidence of party membership cards.” Similarly, according to ROP National Secretary Wojciech Włodarczyk the party’s local cells had “primarily organisational tasks. A cell has to organise meetings, collect subscriptions, prepare polling station agents...If there is no ROP organisation in a neighbouring commune then they take responsible for ensuring that a ROP cell is formed there: they are plenipotentiaries for neighbouring areas.”

Moreover, local party activity was almost completely dominated by election campaigns and driven by the requirements of the electoral calendar. According to PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych, for example, “a sizeable number of our members become personally involved in the course of local and national elections...these people are the ‘arms and legs’ of our campaign and I think that they (local party structures) operate to such a rhythm of life.” Similarly, SdRP head of organisation Maciej Poręba commented that “Poland has the misfortune that there is practically no year without elections” and that “during these periods circles are more of an electoral structure...there is no such thing as a cycle of debates and meetings.”

Drawing analogies with the USA, UP National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalecz compared Polish local party structures to “empty bottles’ which are filled up during the period of election campaigns.”

Local research confirmed this pattern of largely election-orientated activity. When asked to describe their main activities, local party officials invariably cited those associated with election campaigning: collecting signatures in support of candidates, nominating party members to serve on local electoral commissions and as counting agents and distributing campaign literature. As one local SdRP official put it “elections are the almost permanent activity of our local circles and members.” A local PSL official also argued that local organisations “activate themselves at election time” and that “the level of our members ‘activism’ is measured through the prism of elections and how, in a given area, they succeed in encouraging voters to support the PSL.” Similarly, when asked to outline party activities in between election

132 Author interview, 28 February 1998.
134 Author interview, 14 February 1998.
135 Author interview, 20 February 1998.
136 Author interview, 28 February 1998.
137 Author interview, 3 March 1997.
138 Author interview with Kazimierz Wójcik, 22 April 1998.
139 Author interview with Sławomir Szatkowski, 12 May 1997.
campaigns a local UW official responded that "there is some kind of election in Poland every year" and "when one finishes we begin preparations for the next." 

Rather optimistically, some national officials suggested that their local branches were engaged in a more ongoing and regular pattern of grassroots campaigning. UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech, for example, claimed that his party's local circles were "responsible for organising local events, linking up with local foundations, local campaigns and actions...those actions, which help the citizenry. In those communities where they are functioning, I would say that our party structures are one of the most active." However, other party leaders were more candid and a February 1996 UP National Council resolution, for example, acknowledged that "the party as a whole has not undertaken any meaningful actions, and our local cells rarely undertake local initiatives." Indeed, local research suggested that local campaigning which did not relate directly the electoral cycle was very much the exception - particularly outside the main provincial towns where local media and parliamentarians (who tended to provide the focus for most activities) were based. One local UW official, for example, argued that "even if a party leader goes to a medium-sized town, the local media are unlikely to travel there and nothing will come of it." This pattern was confirmed by a 1993 PBS survey which found that two thirds of respondents had not seen any evidence of party activity in their local area in the period immediately prior to that year's parliamentary election campaign, with the proportion rising significantly among those living in small-towns and villages.

At the time this research was undertaken, the only real exception to the general pattern appeared to be the ROP which had, from the outset, placed much greater emphasis on securing member involvement in nationally-initiated and co-ordinated campaigns. According to ROP National Press Spokesman Jacek Kurski, for example, "(in June 1996) we undertook a campaign to distribute two million copies of the 'Contract with Poland', our programme...to personally give it to people outside churches. We are now proceeding with a campaign to send the draft 'Citizen's' Constitution to every parish priest in the country: 10,000 churches in 8,000 parishes." Local research in April-May 1997 also revealed that ROP cells in all four provinces surveyed were actively engaged in a national campaign to collect signatures

140 Author interview with Ryszard Grot, 6 June 1997.
141 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
143 Author interview with Alina Pieńkowska, UW Gdańsk Region Vice-Chairman, 13 May 1997.
144 See: R. Wróbel, 'Partie niepopularne ale potrzebne', Rzeczpospolita, 2 August 1993
145 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
protesting against the Polish parliament’s draft constitution. Each district was set a
target number to collect and it was claimed that the party nationally collected 520,000
signatures in total and distributed over 4 million leaflets calling on the public to reject
the draft.""

Undoubtedly such activity was partly a reflection of the ROP’s founding ethos of
building the party’s organisational structures from the ‘bottom-up’. Although the
constitution petition had no practical chance of succeeding in its declared objective,
party Chairman Jan Olszewski had, according to one local ROP official, insisted that
all ROP local structures participated in this campaign as a way of “building up the
party’s image, checking what grassroots support we had, and if we were in a state to
implement such an activity.”"" However, the ROP’s apparently higher level of local
activism was probably also due to the fact that, quite simply, the initial wave of
enthusiasm surrounding the party’s formation in the aftermath of Olszewski’s
relatively strong performance in the November 1995 presidential elections was
sustained long enough for it overlap with the run-up to the September 1997
parliamentary campaign. Indeed, disappointment at the party’s poor showing in these
elections, together with the subsequent party split, certainly appeared to have led to a
sharp fall in visible grassroots campaigning activity by ROP activists.

Apart from their involvement in election campaigns, the other main focus of party
activity at this level was the local commune council. In the PSL, for example, party
activities were increasingly orientated towards the commune board given that, as PSL
programmatic director Jan Wypych, put it “there are elections to the commune
council and there is something you can relate to.”"" Indeed, one local PSL official,
described sub-communal local circles as “something of a relic...given that a single
village can’t do much on its own” and argued that the circle was slowly being
replaced as the party’s basic organisational unit by the commune board."" Similarly,
according to UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech a local circle “worked well”
when it was “strongly rooted in their local communities and tried to operate from the
level of the local estate to the town authorities.”"" ROP National Secretary Wojciech
Włodarczyk also argued that “they (local cells) obviously have programmatic tasks

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144 See: ‘4 miliony ulotek’, Rzeczpospolita, 21 April 1997; and ‘520 tysięcy nie przekazanych
145 Author interview with Zdislaw Dumwoski, 28 April 1997.
146 Author interview, 20 February 1997.
147 Author interview with Jan Bury, 18 June 1997.
148 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
but they relate - above all - to local self-government affairs because this is a lower tier."

Indeed, local research revealed that the presence of a local councillor seemed to play a crucial role in determining the level of party activity (and even sustainability) at this level. Tables 5.4 and 5.5, which show the number of councillors each of the five individual member-based parties surveyed claimed in the whole country and in each of the four provinces in February 1997, reveal a close correlation between the number of councillors and the number of party members, local branches and level of local implantation. PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych, for example, argued that the level of local activity generally depended on “how many people there are, who have been recommended by that body who are fulfilling various functions - councillors, wójts etc...because if there are more of them then there is real communication with the decision-making tier. There is some kind of participation in the affairs of government. If this exists then the (local) circle’s life is different because that person can then introduce these issues.” Similarly, SdRP head of organisation Maciej Poręba argued that, following the party’s success in the 1994 local elections, “in every circle there is a councillor among the party’s sympathisers and this councillor puts various issues before the circle” so that local politics was now the main focus of many local circle’s activities.

On the other hand, the absence of local councillors meant that circles and cells had no natural focus for their activities between election campaigns. The fact that, for example, UW councillors were only to be found in the larger towns and the UP had virtually no local government representation in the four provinces surveyed helped to explain why these parties were unable to develop and sustain branches in smaller towns and rural areas. As one local UP official put it “if we had some sort of success in the local elections the circle would stand as a natural base for a group of councillors” whereas without any councillors his party didn’t “have the possibility to give our circles any meaningful activities to undertake.”

**Demand side factors: party organisational strategies**

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151 Author interview, 14 February 1997.
152 Except in the case of ROP which was formed after the 1994 local elections and whose only councillors were those elected under a different party banner.
153 Author interview, 20 February 1997.
154 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
155 Author interview with Bogusław Kaczmarek, 14 May 1997.
According to one approach the explanation for the Polish parties weakness as membership organisations and the fact that local party structures only really came to life during election campaigns was to be found on the demand side: in their organisational strategies. Writing in 1993 Polish sociologist Krzeminski exemplified this approach, arguing that:

"A striking characteristic of Polish political life is the lack of concern which Polish politicians show about the development of their own parties. Many of them were formed from small opposition groupings, although they succeeded in gaining numerous 'bridgeheads' for themselves across the whole country. To the surprise of observers-sociologists in the course of the last two years...from the time of the previous election campaign, these parties have (actually) lost branches and influence rather than strengthening their territorial organisation. Party life has shifted to Warsaw and (is) concentrated around Sejm deputies without anything else."154

Nevertheless, as hypothesised, officials from all five individual member-based parties surveyed had not completely discounted the significance of developing a party membership base and at least some basic organisational networks. In other words, they all rejected the model of a purely 'electoral' party, an 'empty vessel' that only came to life during election campaigns. At one point after its 1993 parliamentary election success there were reports, for example, that certain SdRP leaders wanted to change the "formula of party activity...transforming it into an electoral party, activating members around elections - parliamentary, presidential or local - (which it was felt was) the inevitable future of all political parties, particularly governing ones."155 SdRP Presidium member Jerzy Jaskierna, for example, argued that "the future was not just not with mass parties but also with (any kind of) active parties, organisations where members meet regularly. Today the main task is perfecting the programme", while the party's General Secretary Jerzy Szmajdziński argued that local SdRP party structures were increasingly regarded mainly as a subsidiary to the SLD Parliamentary Club.158 However, although (as we saw) election-orientated activity was the main focus for most SdRP local branches, the party did not transform itself thus because, as the party's head of organisation Maciej Poręba put it, it was felt that "the best programmes, the strongest slogans, the best advisers are of no use unless you can implement them. Someone has to go out and put that poster on that

lamppost, organise that meeting, bring the sound equipment, put up the lectern, rustle up some sausages and beer. Someone has to do this! Physically!"\textsuperscript{159}

Similarly, PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych argued that "there are no costs only advantages" to recruiting new members because "the party grows and, to some extent, the intellectual and popular potential increases and, therefore, the actual organisational potential increases."\textsuperscript{160} Indeed, there were even certain overtly mass party elements to the PSL’s approach and most party officials stressed that the party’s membership base and territorial strength were critical to its overall organisational strategy. For example, according to the PSL Parliamentary Club Vice-Chairman Janusz Piechociński “a party which gives up attempting to gain new members and pretends that everything can be sorted out from the position of paper electoral programmes, television appearances and writing newspaper articles is (operating under) an illusion.”\textsuperscript{161} Similarly, PSL National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski argued that the fact that the party had a local circle in almost every commune was “very important and we attach a great deal of importance to it and our leaders, our provincial board presidents, realise this. As a matter of fact, I now see the provincial board presidents taking a great deal of care to ensure that structures should be convened even in those communes where there aren’t formally registered PSL structures.”\textsuperscript{162}

There was even some evidence of party development playing a role in the strategic thinking of national officials from the ‘new’ parties with a considerably weaker membership base. For example, as part of his platform for the UW leadership in 1995 Leszek Balcerowicz called for the development of a “growing network of active and committed members”\textsuperscript{163} while, more explicitly, the party’s General Secretary Miroslaw Czech argued that “if it comes to building our party’s structures, developing the membership base and the structural base of our party so that we have as many local circles and members as possible, then this is a priority, absolutely yes. There is no such thing as a party without members and the more members a party has the more effectively it can endeavour to realise its objectives and gain wider support. The role of members and local structures is of absolutely basic importance for the UW.”\textsuperscript{164} Similarly, according to ROP National Secretary Wojciech Włodarczyk, “the participation of ROP members in the party’s activities...means that we have a certain

\textsuperscript{159} Author interview, 28 February 1997.
\textsuperscript{160} Author interview, 20 February 1997.
\textsuperscript{161} ‘Partia masowa czy kadrowa’.
\textsuperscript{162} Author interview, 4 March 1997.
\textsuperscript{164} Author interview, 19 February 1997.

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indicator of our support. This is very important. These are people who have declared
themselves to be our supporters...The greater the number of members in the localities
then the less likely the party is to be affected by various conflicts because conflicts
most often occur among leaders - whether it is in the provinces or at the national
level. The more people there are at the base who support the programme and the
leadership, the stronger the party’s structure.”

However, while officials from most parties at least paid lip-service to the importance
of membership recruitment and party development they tended to emphasise the
purely organisational advantages and only the PSL and ROP highlighted the
importance of a mass membership as a means of rooting their parties more firmly in
their electorates. The PSL’s 1995 programmatic resolution, for example, argued that
“as the expression of the interests of the broadly understood layer working in the
countryside and the towns, the Polish Peasant Party is and wishes to remain a mass
party. For in this lies one of the principal sources of its potential strength. Similarly,
the PSL rejects the neo-liberal vision of the party based mainly on a narrow circle of
professional politicians and a bureaucratic apparatus, whose main task is obtaining
power and representing above all the interests of the most prosperous and narrow
social groups.” (emphasis in original) PSL Parliamentary Club Vice-Chairman
Janusz Piechociński also argued that while “from the point of view of elections the
number of members was not decisive” and that “cadre parties may be sufficient...for
discharging the functions of government” this was “too little for contacts with society,
fulfilling social expectations.” Similarly, according to PSL Vice-President Janusz
Dobrosz “the role of a party does not confine itself solely to the organisational and
ideological preparation of the act of election...A party shapes views and opinions,
should lead wide-ranging and long-term political educational activities, which are so
often lacking in Polish social practice.”

The ROP also maintained at least a rhetorical commitment to developing a mass
membership base as a means of bringing the party closer to its social base, one of the
few ‘new’ parties in post-communist Poland to have done so explicitly. ROP’s 1997
parliamentary election campaign spokesman Jan Polkowski, for example, argued that
the party was “aware of the basic mistake made by practically every political party in
Poland: complete disengagement from society. Polish politicians have the feeling of

145 Author interview, 14 February 1997.
146 O Kształtowaniu Szans Rozwoju Dla Polski: Dokumenty Programowe. p95.
147 ‘Partia masowa czy kadrowa’.
148 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z dniach 28, 29
lutego i 1 marca 1996. p143.
having a mission, they form elitist associations of an expert character, whose aim is to modernise the country. However, this can’t be done in spite of the people. Being with the people, verifying concepts formulated within the quiet of an office is not populism, but...a politician’s duty. As a grouping, which wants to change the country, ROP began by changing the universally binding style of conducting politics. We are a mass movement.”

Indeed, both PSL and ROP officials ascribed a critical role to members and local branches in their parties’ communication strategies. In the PSL’s case this stemmed from the party’s lingering suspicion of the Warsaw-dominated mass media which they felt simply did not understand the requirements of the PSL’s rural electorate. According to one PSL official, for example, the party 1997 parliamentary election campaign “concentrated on local areas and local meetings with voters” a characteristic, which arose from “the specifics of the party and its mainly rural electorate.” Similarly, PSL National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski argued that when it came to communication with the general public the party’s members and local branches were a “necessity” because “the PSL has never had access to the media” and “only through this method can we reach people.” According to Bentkowski the PSL “always had to depend only on our organisational structure and direct access to our electorate and experience shows that the PSL will be strong when it has a broadly built-up organisational structure in local areas.”

On the other hand, as an ‘externally-created’ party – and, therefore, excluded from both the resources and access to media coverage which flowed from parliamentary representation (discussed in greater detail in the next chapter on parties and the state) – the ROP also attempted to develop a ‘bottom up’ communications strategy which, as noted earlier, included activities such as mass petitions and distributing the party programme outside Sunday church services. For example, ROP Chairman Jan Olszewski argued that “we have to carry out agitation in the workplaces, in the neighbourhood communities. Alongside a local network, we have to build networks in various milieu.” According to Olszewski the party had to “treble its ranks” and “reach people through our own means” because its only access to the mass media was that guaranteed by the electoral law “and, therefore, marginal.” Similarly, ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski argued that the party attached “a great deal of importance to party members and local organisations in our communications strategy

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149 ‘Dlaczego Warto Głosować Na Ruch Odbudowy Polski?’.
150 Cited in ‘Kampania Lokalna’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 1997
151 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
152 ‘Olszewski tworzy partię’.
because...given that we don’t have a particular opportunity in the public media which shows us through a distorted mirror...we are condemned to trying to win people over directly...at the base...In terms of our communication strategy, we attach 40% importance to our structures and 60% to the media.”

However, party members and local structures played a much less significant role in the communication strategies of the other individual member-based parties surveyed. For example, according to SdRP National Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, although local branches did “fulfil a function in the role of communication with society” the party did not “define some kind of a greater or smaller role - the emphases in this area are evenly divided.” Indeed, the UW and UP placed much greater emphasis on the mass media to get their parties’ message across. According to UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki “80% of (our) success is based on the mass media and maybe 20% on local activities...it is absolutely basic. What you find out about political activities you find out through the TV, radio, newspapers and all our activities are geared towards the notion of existing in every communications medium.” Even the UW’s contacts with the local media were organised centrally and, according to Potocki, “we pass it all on to local news agencies and papers from Warsaw because at the local level it depends too on the strength of the local organisation and can involve them in too much effort.” Similarly, UW General Secretary Mirosław Czech argued that even the Western “mass party is currently undergoing a crisis from number of points of view - mainly from the fact that the means of reaching the electorate...have markedly changed. There are now many such sources...the mass media have markedly expanded and developed. The notion of communication with specific groups has undergone a process of far-reaching change and the means of organising within society are various. From this point of view, obviously, in Poland there probably won’t be a similar situation as there is in the West, where even comparatively small parties have hundreds of thousands of members.” Even UP leaders who felt that they had extremely unfavourable access to the mass media, did not consider using local membership structures as a realistic alternative because, according to UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nałęcz, “in practical terms, we don’t have the means to set up our own channels of communication...So, in practice, when it comes to communication with society we are confined to what appears and is said about UP in the mass media.”

173 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
174 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
175 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
176 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
177 Author interview, 3 March 1997.
Moreover, there was little evidence among any of the five individual member-based parties surveyed (with the possible exception of the ROP) of any particular emphasis on actually developing party membership and local structures. On the contrary, most of them generally considered the existence of a wider network of ‘sympathisers’ (who could be mobilised on specific occasions such as elections) as much more important than large ranks of formally enrolled members. For example, SdRP - which saw its members and local branches as having played an important role in the party’s electoral success - did not have an organisational strategy aimed at recruiting more members. This was, in part, a conscious attempt to demonstrate that it was not, as SdRP’s head of organisation Maciej Poręba put it, “a mono-party like the PZPR which needed to demonstrate its strength by the numbers it had. This is not a first and most basic priority. In the structure of the PZPR the number of members was an indication of the strength of the party. Here it is not like that. We try and make sure that the party has representatives from particular social groups like women and young people. But there is no such thing as, let us call it, the notion of ‘building the party at any price.’ If someone doesn’t want to join then there is no attempt to try and convince them that if they don’t sign up there will be problems, as it once was the case. This doesn’t exist anymore.”

Similarly, in spite of its conscious projection of itself as a mass party, the consensus among PSL strategists was that present membership and local implantation levels were sufficient and the party had, what its programmatic director Jan Wypych referred to as, a “natural” strategy towards party development. While “without doubt, the party has to see, in its activities, the need to develop the number of members and, obviously, in those places were people indicate a willingness, are interested in joining and where these people are known to party members, we don’t reject them or turn them away” there was “no great pressure to, broaden the ranks of our membership at any cost. We don’t go around saying to people ‘Sign up to the party’ and we are not particularly pushing anyone.”

With varying degrees of emphasis the UW and UP also adopted essentially passive approaches to party development. UW officials paid lip service to the notion of increasing party membership, while simultaneously being pessimistic about the prospects of achieving such an objective (because of supply side factors - discussed below). The UP, on the other hand, was perhaps the most extreme case among the

^178 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
^179 Author interview, 20 February 1997.
parties surveyed of an almost conscious rejection of the need to enrol members. For example, UP Chairman Ryszard Bugaj made it clear from the outset that his party was not attempting to develop a mass membership organisation numbering tens of thousands of members: partly on the basis of the (self-fulfilling) argument that the UP lacked the financial resources to set up a nation-wide party organisation, but also citing supply-side factors relating to the historical obsolescence of mass parties. However, the UP clearly never had any intention of even attempting to develop a mass membership for the reason that, as the party’s Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik put it, “the ability to involve your sympathisers at times which are decisive or strategic” was more important than “forming fictional structures.” Echoing party National Spokesman Tomasz Nalęcz’s “empty bottles” analogy, Borowik argued that a party’s organisational capacity was “not a question of how many members there are. We don’t have many members nor do we have our structures in the whole of the country...However, during the election they (party sympathisers) will definitely be there in the whole country, in every province.”

Indeed none of the parties surveyed (not even the ROP with its commitment to placing party members at the core of its organisational and communication strategies) had undertaken a centrally-organised membership recruitment campaign or even had any explicit national party development strategy - exemplified by UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik’s attitude that “the only (UP) national strategy that exists is in the kind of image which we are trying to put across in the media.” Summing up the general approach to party development, SdRP’s head of organisation Maciej Poręba argued that “building local structures and recruiting new members takes place at the circle level. Circles have the responsibility for winning over new members. This is a task for structures at the lowest level.” Local research revealed, however, that this decentralised approach to membership recruitment was matched by an unwillingness on the part of most local branches to undertake any kind of pro-active recruitment activities for themselves. For example, one local SdRP official argued that his party didn’t “place such a great emphasis on increasing the size of the membership” because they were “more interested in developing as wide a range of political sympathisers as possible” who could be mobilised during an

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181 Author interview, 3 March 1998. As an example of this Borowik cited the UP’s ability to collect more than 100,000 signatures in the space of ten days in support of the party’s candidate in the 1995 presidential elections. An interesting choice given that PSL officials also cited their ability to swiftly collect signatures for their 1995 presidential candidate as evidence of the importance of the opposite!
182 Ibid.
183 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
Similarly, one local ROP official from the same province commented (regretfully) that most of the ‘new’ parties in his area were content to “operate on the philosophy that you only need a small elite of 30-40 people in a province, which don’t cost much time or money to keep going and only come to life just before every election.”

Supply side factors: popular attitudes to parties

However, although demand side factors were undoubtedly important, the explanation for the new Polish parties’ weakness as membership organisations was not to be found solely in the lack of value which party leaders placed on party development. Other important factors included the extremely modest head office capabilities which all the parties had at that disposal (discussed in greater detail in the chapter on the party machine) which effectively precluded both the organisation of national membership recruitment campaigns and the provision of any meaningful back-up to support local initiatives. Even more significantly, as UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki argued, “a cadre party is not, at the end of the day, a deliberate choice” given that there was little sign that most Poles were actually interested in seeking out and joining the new parties. The same August 1993 PBS survey which estimated that only 3% of Poles were party members also revealed, for example, that only 10% of them had ever approached (or even considered approaching) one of the parties operating in their area and there was no shortage of evidence from both polling data and interviews with local and national party officials to support all the hypothesised supply side barriers to party enrolment in post-communist Poland.

Firstly, the level of party identification among Polish citizens did indeed appear to be very low. As Table 5.6 shows, comparative data revealed that Poles had one of the lowest level of party identification of any voters in post-communist Eastern Europe (18%). Most Polish research suggested that (on average and depending on the

184 Author interview with Kazimierz Wójcik, 22 April 1997.
185 Author interview with Andrzej Kucharski, 20 April 1997.
186 ‘Partia masowa czy kadrowa’.
187 See: ‘Partie niepopularne ale potrzebne’.
188 While it is possible to discern general patterns from this data, it is more difficult to ‘track’ this kind of data temporally. Firstly, it comes from a number of different polling organisations asking slightly different questions not repeated over a regular time period. Secondly, some it was obtained indirectly from newspaper articles rather than from the polling organisations themselves and did not, therefore, always contain information on the number of ‘don’t knows’, whether or not these were excluded and on the overall margins of error.
precise question asked) 60-70% of Poles did not feel strong ties with any of the parties nor did they feel their interests were being represented by them. A July 1993 Demoskop survey, for example, found that 49% of respondents disagreed with the statement that "there are political parties in our country which you can say represent your interests and the interests of people like you," while only 35% agreed and 15% said they did not know. Asking a slightly different question an August 1993 Demoskop survey found that 59% disagreed with the statement that parties properly represented "local interests," while only 30% agreed (and 54% disagreed) with the statement that "thanks to political parties people of various interests can agree with each other" and, by February 1994, Demoskop found that the number of Poles who believed that there was no political party that represented their interests up to 63% against 27%. Similarly, a September 1994 OBOP survey found that 83% of respondents agreed (61% strongly) with the statement that "nothing links me with the current so-called political class" while only 11% disagreed. This pattern was confirmed by a series of PBS surveys in 1995-96, the most recent of which in March 1996 also found that 58% of Poles felt their interests were not being represented by any of the current political groupings while only 38% felt that they were.

However, there was also some evidence that the level of party identification in Poland had gradually increased as the political system began to stabilise and consolidate. As Table 4.4 shows, a June 1997 OBOP survey, asking a slightly different question, revealed a somewhat higher perception of parties as representatives of specific social groups. Indeed, a March 1998 CBOS survey found that only 13% of respondents said that they did not feel that there was a party which (even to a minimal degree) represented to their interests, while 45% said that they fully identified with at least one party. This gradual increase in party identification was probably partly explained by the emergence of AWS in June 1996 which may have provided a more substantial point of reference than any previous party or grouping for the large segment of the Polish electorate on the right of the political spectrum that clearly identified with the Solidarity tradition.

199 See: 'Wyborcy bez swojej partii'
198 See: 'Partie niepopularne ale niepotrzebne' and 'Dzialacze bez zaplecza'.
192 See: 'Dla kogo te partie', Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 February 1994
194 See: R. Wrobel, 'Wyborca slabo reprezentowany', Rzeczpospolita, 6 March 1996. See also: 'Bezpartyjni i nie reprezentowani', Rzeczpospolita, 6 March 1996; and 'W poszukiwaniu swojej partii', Rzeczpospolita, 10/11 March 1995.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Table 4.4 also shows that approximately half of those surveyed by OBOP in June 1997 still did not know which party best represented the interests of young people (46%), women (46%), private businessmen (45%) and managers of large firms (47%) and around one third in the case of ordinary people (31%), the unemployed (35%), the intelligentsia (32%) and so-called ‘budgetary sphere’ workers employed in the public services (36%). Moreover, the 45% of ‘party identifiers’ in CBOS’s March 1998 survey comprised only 28% of respondents who fully identified a single party while 17% felt that their interests or views were represented by two or more parties - suggesting that while overall party identification may have been increasing the level of commitment to specific parties remained fairly shallow.

Secondly, the communist legacy also appeared to have created an extremely negative image of the notion of ‘party membership’ among Polish citizens. Indeed, in 1994 only 8% of Poles expressed confidence in parties which, as Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show, was an extremely low rating even in comparison with the rest of post-communist Eastern Europe and made them easily the least trusted institution in post-communist Poland. However, while many Poles may have considered parties as an ‘evil’ the majority of them continued to regarded them as a ‘necessary’ one. A December 1991 CBOS survey, for example, found that 70% agreed (30% strongly) with the statement that “political parties are necessary in Poland” while only 12% disagreed and an August 1993 PBS survey revealed that 77% of respondents agreed (43% strongly) that “Poland needs political parties” while only 16% disagreed (6% strongly). Moreover, as in the case of increasing party identification, hostility towards parties appeared to be gradually weakening as the political and economic transition gathered pace. The number of Poles who expressed a preference for a single-party over a multi-party system fell from 31% in 1992 to 23% in 1994 and a July 1994 OBOP survey also found 60% of Poles against limiting the rights of opposition parties to criticise the government (27% strongly) and only 33% in favour (9% strongly).

Nevertheless, most Poles continued to hold very negative views about those people that actually joined and became involved in parties. For example, the same December 1991 CBOS survey which found most Poles accepting their necessity also found that

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196 Ibid.
198 See: ‘Partie niepopularne ale potrzebne’.
51% of respondents felt party activists were primarily motivated by a desire to gain power rather than act as a representative of civil society and, altogether, 63% of respondents ascribed this and other 'subjective' motives as the most important ones. Only 25% of respondents felt that party activists were motivated by 'objective' (or "pro-societal") motives such as the desire to further the interests of the country as whole (14%) or those of various social groups (11%). Similarly, the July 1994 OBOP survey revealed that 87% of Poles agreed (45% strongly) with the statement that "whatever they might say, politicians are only really after their own career" while only 9% disagreed (1% strongly). Even 53% agreed (24% strongly) and only 37% disagreed (8% strongly) that "political parties are not necessary for anyone but their activists." A December 1996 OBOP survey also found that, when asked to characterise Polish parties as a whole, most respondents cited overwhelmingly negative features such as: conflict and argumentativeness (46%), unreliability (37%) and the dishonesty of their leaders (31%). Interestingly, however, when asked about specific parties, rather than parties per se, respondents' assessments improved markedly and five out of the six parties and groupings surveyed were ascribed slightly more positive than negative features and the sixth (the ROP) was felt to have more or less the same number of both.

These findings were reflected in the views of both national and local officials from the five individual member-based parties surveyed who also, quite spontaneously, drew attention to the way that the communist legacy had, in their opinion, discredited not just all parties but also the very notion of political activism per se and, thereby, acted as a significant supply side barrier towards enrolment. For example, explaining his own party's inability to recruit a significant number of members, UW General Secretary Mirosław Czech argued that "after the communist period Polish society has a quite strong aversion to membership of a party. The very word 'party' and the notion of belonging to a party has bad associations...and is regarded as untrustworthy by a section of society, a very large section of society." Similarly, one local UW official felt that "in Poland the word 'party' or even 'politics' evinces a very negative reaction," while an UP official also said that "the very sound of the word party creates a picture of untrustworthiness."

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201 Opinia publiczna o miejscu i roli partii w systemie politycznym kraju.
202 Opinie o demokracji i alternatywnych formach rządzienia.
203 Społeczne wizerunki partii politycznych.
204 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
205 Author interview with Alina Pieńkowska, 13 June 1997.
206 Author interview with Paweł Wójcik, Chairman, UP Płock Local Circle, 28 April 1997.

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Thirdly, interviews with local and national officials also suggested that the new Polish parties did not have a great deal to offer their potential members in terms of incentives for participation. Using Panebianco’s typology, officials from all five individual member-based parties surveyed overwhelmingly identified collective rather than selective incentives as the primary motivation of those who had actually enrolled. The most important of these was general identification with the party’s programme or ideology. One local UW official, for example, argued that “the Freedom Union takes a centrist position and people with moderate, calm views who want to have an influence on events so that the country avoids extremes, look to the UW to fulfil their expectations,” while another said people joined her party because they “had reached a certain level of consciousness” and wanted to support a “programme which had some kind of basis in reality.”

A local UP official said that people joined his party because “our programme recognises the need to help weaker people” while another argued that they were attracted by its “moderation with a dose of agitation for a social market economy.” A local ROP official claimed that “people who never previously fought the ‘commies’ in an open fashion see the possibility that this is an organisation where they can fulfil some sort of obligation and will be made welcome.”

An important element in the case of SdRP was the fact that a large proportion of its members strongly identified with the pre-1989 period and that it was perceived to be the only party prepared to defend at least some aspects of communist rule. It was estimated that approximately half of SdRP members were formerly in the PZPR, although the proportion was thought to be even higher among party activists and leaders. One local SdRP official, for example, argued that “there is a group of people who are characterised by a certain sentiment for the past” and that they saw SdRP as a party which “breaks from the past in dishonourable matters, but doesn’t completely tear away from, and values people’s achievements during, this period.”

Another former PZPR official said that she became active in SdRP because, “they (Solidarity) took away my entire biography. It was decided that everything I had done

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207 Author interview with Ryszard Grot, 6 June 1998.
208 Author interview with Alina Pieńkowska, 13 June 1998.
209 Author interview with Ryszard Wajszczak, 28 April 1997.
210 Author interview with Wlodzimierz Stec, 21 April 1997.
211 Author interview with Danuta Makowska, 14 May 1997.
214 Author interview with Kazimierz Wójcik, 22 April 1997.
for Poland was bad. They took everything away from me and told me I was a ‘commie’, a ‘red cobweb’, a thief.” However, local SdRP officials were also careful to distinguish this (albeit significant) section of the party’s membership from a younger, “more ideologically conscious group” which, they claimed, was more “attracted to the idea of social democracy” than by sentiment for the communist past. While recognising that “undoubtedly there was an element of people joining from the old PZPR structures,” SdRP head of organisation Maciej Poręba also pointed out that “at the moment when the PZPR fell apart it had close to two million people and when we were formed and the PZPR was wound up in 1990 we had 30,000. So its not that these structures appeared suddenly, they had to be rebuilt.”

The highest level of identification with the party as an organisation appeared to exist among members of the PSL whose professed roots in the values and traditions of the peasant movement were often seen as very important motives for enrolment. This identification with a certain value system was often re-inforced by family connections with the pre-communist peasant movement and, as one local PSL official put it, the idea of “maintaining the proud traditions and memories of our ancestors.” Another local PSL official, for example, argued that “the PSL is a very ‘generational’ party. My father and grandfather were both peasantists and this has a very important meaning. No other party in Poland has such a generational nucleus.”

It was estimated that approximately 80-85% of PSL members were previously in the ZSL, an organisational continuity which PSL’s National Director Marian Zalewski defended by distinguishing between the former satellite party as an institution (which, he acknowledged) may have been compromised by its association with the communist regime and those ordinary members whose “families have been in the peasant movement from generation to generation” and which “represented...a bastion in defence of the culture, traditions and religion of the Polish countryside.” The PSL was also the only party for whom the benefits of personal inter-action within a collective body were seen as significant motives for joining. This may have been a reflection of the specific rural environment in which (according to the statistics on local party implantation cited above) the PSL enjoyed a virtual organisational monopoly – given that, as noted above, the range of social and cultural activities was

215 Author interview with SdRP Jelenia Góra Local Circle Chairman, 5 May 1997.
216 Author interview with Kazimierz Wójcki, 22 April 1997.
217 Author interview, 28 February 1997.
218 Author interview with Henryk Kisielewski, PSL Plock Proviscial Board Vice-Chairman, 30 April 1997.
219 Author interview with Jan Bury, 18 June 1997.
220 'Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe', Polityka, 10 February 1996.
221 Author interview, 11 March 1998.
much more limited in such communities giving the party much greater scope to fulfil social as well as purely political functions.

Some national officials, particularly in the UW, claimed that selective incentives did play some role in encouraging potential supporters to enrol. For example, attempting to turn the party’s low membership base into a virtue, UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki argued that “an advantage of having an organisation the size of the UW is that the road between members and party leaders appears to be fairly short and a career attractive. You can be a party member and seriously think about standing in the parliamentary elections in your community. Such individual considerations are probably more important in the Union than in any other party...I meet more and more people for whom making a career at their level is what attracts them.” ROP Main Board Secretary Wojciech Włodarczyk also argued that people joined his party both “because they support the party’s ideas, but also because they want to become involved,” with membership offering the possibility of such involvement through “carrying forward their activities into the parliamentary arena or in local government bodies” or “a position in the administration.”

However, these views were not reflected by local party officials who argued that, even where they did exist, selective incentives were very much a secondary consideration and related more to a willingness make a career in politics or achieve some kind of social status or rank rather than the prospect of some direct material benefits. One local SdRP official, for example, argued there was a “smaller” group of members who were “seeking positions as councillors,” while another said that there was a “section of members (who) also have some kind of healthy aspiration to advance in the administrative hierarchy.” A local ROP official also acknowledged that “there are some people who link working for the party with their hopes for some sort of personal advance but this is not a large group of people.” Similarly, a local PSL official argued that “career reasons” were only really an important factor among young people who joined the party in order to “make certain contacts, friendships, which will help them to make a career in government or make some money.” Direct payments for undertaking party activities were never openly cited as motives for enrolment. Although, as one local SdRP official put it, “some older people who have lived through the communist period still remember the time when certain jobs or

222 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
223 Author interview, 14 February 1997.
224 Author interview with Stanisław Kosznik, 12 May 1997.
225 Author interview with Leszek Majewski, 29 April 1997.
226 Author interview with Danuta Makowska, 14 May 1997.
227 Author interview with Jan Bury, 18 June 1997.
positions could only be obtained through the ‘party recommendation’,”228 a PSL official reflected the more widely held view that “there is nothing to be gained financially from membership of the party because no one pays you for anything...You have to spend your own time and money in order to do party work.”219

Clearly, it was difficult to neatly compartmentalise the reasons why any particular individual joined a Polish party and any package of incentives was a complex one. For example, a farmer who joined the PSL may not have derived any explicit or direct material benefits as a result of having done so but, given that (as noted above) many Poles viewed the party as an organisation mainly representing the interests of those employed in the agricultural sector, he may have been motivated by a belief that he would benefit materially from the implementation of the party’s programme. Moreover, from a methodological point of view, it is important to bear in mind that these data involved members having motives ascribed to them by party officials who, inevitably, tended to cite those they saw as more ‘worthy.’ More definitive judgements on why people join political parties in post-communist Poland can only really be made on the basis of more detailed research involving a more representative sample of party members themselves; and even then, as one local UW official pointed it, “the desire to make some kind of a profit and good contacts certainly exists but it’s not articulated by the members.”230 Nonetheless, even accepting those caveats, the general pattern identified by party officials - of collective incentives prevailing over selective ones as the key motive for participation – was likely to be an accurate one. This finding was also confirmed by Pankowski’s January 1996 survey of local party officials from nine parties and groupings (including the five individual member-based parties surveyed) which concluded that “the willingness to make a career, not to mention individual interests, was assessed very negatively and this type of motivation, if not directly discredited, was placed well down the list of motivations as a so-called necessary evil.”231

Consequently, the fact that selective benefits were so rarely cited implied that parties were perceived to have little specific to offer their potential members – with the partial exception of the involvement in a rural social network which flowed from PSL membership. Moreover, the fact that so few local officials cited advancing the interests of a particular socio-economic group as a motivating factor also appeared to confirm that both individual consciousness of objective socio-economic interests and

228 Ibid.
219 Author interview with Henryk Kisielewski, 30 April 1997.
230 Author interview with Ryszard Grot, 6 May 1998.
231 Polityka i partie polityczne w oczach działaczy partyjnych szczebla lokalnego, p2-3

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the identification of parties as vehicles for advancing them were low (although, as
noted above, this may - to some extent - have been implicit in the notion of an
individual joining a party because they ‘supported its programme’).

Fourthly, party officials also lent support to the idea that the uncertainty and
insecurity created by the economic transition meant that even those Polish citizens
who took an interest in public affairs were more focussed on securing individual and
personal goals and that such individual efforts were viewed as a more effective means
of achieving material security than time invested in civic activities such as parties. At
the most basic level, according to the then leader of (future AWS affiliate) the PK
Aleksander Hall the standard of living simply did not allow the majority of Poles to
pay party membership subscriptions regularly.232 More fundamentally, given the
prevalence of collective over selective incentives, most party officials deduced that
members were more likely to be drawn from the most ideologically or
programmatically-driven segments of the population and were, according to UW
General Secretary Miroslaw Czech, “the most active of the active...a particular type
of committed person.”233 Similarly, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs
Wojciech Borowik argued that “the time of voluntary activity has, for a certain time,
been exhausted because people need to work, earn money and keep
themselves...People become involved either when they have the capability, the time
or they have a direct interest in becoming involved.”234

Finally, there was also some evidence to support the hypothesis that the behaviour of
the new political class and its style of conducting politics were both factors in
discouraging enrolment and participation in the new parties. The relative inexperience
of those participating in democratic politics for the first time was re-inforced by an
immature culture of political journalism which re-inforced the negative stereotype of
politics as having little value and thereby (often unwittingly) encouraged many Poles
to unload the frustrations and setbacks associated with systemic transformation onto
the new parties. For example, some commentators noted that the Polish media had
often failed to differentiate between the serious and the more frivolous and eccentric
fringe groupings - particularly during the earlier phases of the emergence of the new
party system.235

232 ‘Partia masowa czy kadrowa’
233 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
234 Author interview, 19 February 1997.
235 See, for example, Zubek’s account of the coverage of the 1991 parliamentary elections in V.
1993. 47-71(59-61)
Conclusion

As hypothesised, then, the new Polish parties had an extremely low membership base and their combined (probably inaccurately high) total represented one of the lowest levels in Europe. The PSL and SdRP were, also as hypothesised, partial exceptions in this respect and there was a particularly sharp contrast between these two ‘successors’ and three ‘new’ individual member-based parties surveyed in terms of local implantation. The PSL was the only party with a significant number of party branches in rural areas and SdRP, while mainly urban in character, also had an organisational network in smaller towns. Even the larger and better organised of the ‘new’ parties were tiny by Polish (and even more so by West European) standards with their local branches concentrated almost exclusively in the main provincial and other larger towns.

The ‘successor’ parties relative superiority was, also as hypothesised, rooted at least partly in the organisational legacies which they inherited from the communist PZPR and its satellite ZSL. Although this needs to be kept in perspective (the PSL’s and SdRP’s 1997 memberships represented less than 40% of ZSL’s and only 3% of PZPR’s 1989 totals respectively) even this relatively modest inheritance allowed them to dwarf the ‘new’ parties. But the PSL also inherited some kind of pre-existing level of identification from its claim to represent a linkage with the pre-war traditions of the Polish peasant movement and, more importantly, from its ability to present itself as the representative of clear and well-defined rural (and, more specifically, agricultural) electorate. Moreover, given the PSL’s virtual organisational monopoly in small towns and villages, where the scope for other social and cultural activities was more limited, it was the only party in a position to offer the social, collective benefits, which stemmed from personal inter-action.

SdRP, on the other hand, provided a clear point of reference for those who identified positively with at least some aspects of the previous communist regime and who had a clear, personal interest in opposing ‘de-communisation’ in its broadest sense. Although this may have only applied to a relatively small segment of the electorate (and created other problems for the party by alienating potential new supporters who did not identify with this tradition), it also gave SdRP a relatively well defined pool of potential recruits. Hypothetically, it may be argued that a party which was able to claim an unambiguous continuity with the original Solidarity movement (which none of the ‘post-Solidarity’ parties had succeeded in doing hitherto) could also provide an equally clear reference point of reference for a section of the electorate on the centre-
right which identified with this tradition. Indeed, there were some indications, given its sponsorship by the Solidarity trade union (and, therefore, its ability to identify with the symbolism of, and represent an unbroken organisational linkage with, the original opposition movement) that the RS AWS may be the first ‘new’ party in post-communist Poland capable of developing a membership base and level of local implantation comparable to that of the ‘successor’ parties. However, at the time of writing, the party was still at the formative stage of its development.

In addition to their low levels of membership and local implantation, there was also very little evidence (with the, somewhat misleading, exceptions of the PSL and, to a lesser extent, ROP) that the new Polish parties had attempted to encapsulate their supporters by developing networks of ancillary structures directly linked to their party organisations. Indeed, again as hypothesised, they appeared more interested in developing a looser and more informal set of relationships with a fairly wide range of organisations rather than attempting to enrol them as collective members or tying themselves too closely to any one particular interest group. Moreover, there was also some evidence of a blurring of distinctions and confusion of roles in relation to interest articulation and aggregation: with some parties (such as the PSL) behaving more like interest groups and some interest groups (such as the Solidarity and, to a lesser extent, OPZZ trade unions) behaving more like parties.

Although the pattern of local activity varied, particularly between urban and rural areas, local party branches generally functioned as fairly loose and informal bodies primarily geared towards fulfilling certain local organisational tasks. Indeed, party life at this level was dominated by national and local election campaigns, with other campaigns a rarity, particularly outside the main provincial and other larger towns. The partial exception here was the ROP whose founding ethos placed a heavy emphasis on developing organisational structures from the ‘bottom up’ and nourishing them through ongoing grassroots campaigning - although the degree to which this ethos was reflected in local practice varied and, even where it did exist, did not appear to be sustainable in the medium to long term. Local government provided the main focus for debate and activity in between election campaigns in the more active of the local circles and cells, with the presence or absence of a local councillor often the key factor in determining their vitality or even viability.

The explanations for this pattern of low individual and collective membership, lack of ancillary organisations, weak local implantation and fairly passive, electorally-orientated basic party structures were to be found, as hypothesised, on both the
demand and supply sides. All the parties surveyed at least paid lip service to, and none of them completely dismissed, the notion of developing some kind of basic membership-based local structures. Indeed, the PSL and ROP both stressed, in rhetorical terms at least, the importance of membership in helping to root these parties in their electorates; and both of them assigned members an important role in their communication strategies. However, none of the parties surveyed had any kind of pro-active party development strategy nor had ever organised a national, centrally organised membership recruitment campaign. These functions were invariably devolved to local party officials who shared the national leaders view that looser networks of ‘sympathisers’ who could be mobilised at election times were as (if not more) effective than large, formally enrolled memberships.

Moreover, although more detailed research was required to properly assess popular attitudes to parties, existing survey evidence suggested that even if parties had actively sought to recruit substantially more individual members, they would have found it extremely difficult to do so. While popular hostility to parties appeared to be gradually declining and party identification increasing, there was still a residual tendency to view the activities of parties and their activists very negatively. Both national and local officials (particularly from the ‘new’ parties) highlighted the enduring negative associations which both ‘parties’, and even the very notion of ‘politics’, still had for the majority of Poles as a result of forty years of one-party rule. These post-communist supply side factors helped to re-inforce the effects of more secular trends which had caused a relative decline in party membership in the more advanced Western democracies. For example, the prevalence of ‘collective’ over ‘selective’ motives among those who joined and became active in their parties (at least according to local officials) appeared to confirm the meagre potential rewards which were available to prospective members. The fact that most members appeared to be drawn from the most ideologically-committed segment of the population and were primarily motivated by an attachment to the party’s programme and ideology also suggested that the effects of the economic transition led most Poles to seek material and job security through personal and individual, rather than through collective, channels.
CHAPTER SIX:

PARTIES AND THE STATE

Having examined the relationship between parties and civil society - particularly the question of whether or not they attempt to encapsulate their supporters as party members or in ancillary organisations - this chapter considers the degree to which the new Polish parties orientate to, and are dependent upon, the state. Although it has tended to be either undervalued or completely ignored in most assessments of party organisational change, as in the case of the themes examined in the previous chapters, the changing relationship between parties and the state also corresponds to each successive model of party organisation. The nature of these changes has been particularly evident in the ways that parties have sought to procure financial and material resources and their main channels of communication with society have evolved.

Operating under a limited franchise, cadre parties were financed primarily through personal contacts and their principal means of communication were inter-personal networks. The boundary between the state and the politically relevant civil society was, therefore, unclear. While the later, post-suffrage mass party also developed its own independent channels of communication (although obviously aimed at a much broader electorate) its main sources of finance were numerous small membership subscriptions and contributions together with the activities of collateral organisations such as party co-operatives and trade unions. Duverger, for example, regarded the changing system of party finances - which he characterised as replacing the "capitalist financing of electioneering by democratic financing" - as fundamental to the differences between cadre and mass parties and interpreted it as part of the broader process of democratisation and political change. The mass party, therefore, belonged to, and represented the interests of, the newly enfranchised segments of civil society vis-a-vis the state.

In the catch-all/electoral professional model, political parties increasingly sought funding from a broader range of interest groups (and, to some extent, the state) rather than their own internally-generated resources and, as we saw in the chapter on the party machine, competed for access to non-party communication networks by utilising the services of external professional publicists and media experts with a

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1 See: 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'.

2 Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activities in the Modern State. p63.
much looser relationship to the party. This model, therefore, implied an erosion of the party-civil society linkage and, to some extent, foresaw the greater emphasis by parties on the state, with the latter offering the potential to compensate for the former. Thus, catch-all/electoral professional parties occupied the position of competing brokers between civil society and the state and, as Mair put it, had shifted “to a stage in which, in Downsian or Schumpeterian terms, they behaved more as competing teams of leaders.”

Katz and Mair carried forward this conception of contemporary parties increasingly seeking to anchor themselves in the state which, they argued, set the stage for the emergence of the cartel party as a new party type. They noted a series of social, cultural and political trends over the last two decades (outlined in greater detail in the introduction) which resulted in a general decline in the levels of involvement and participation, with membership and commitment generally failing to keep pace with the rapidly escalating costs of party activity. Consequently, parties were obliged to look elsewhere for their resources and, in this case, their actual or potential access to public office made it easy for them to turn to the state for the organisational resources required in order to maintain themselves. Katz and Mair's cartel party was, therefore, characterised principally by an increasing orientation towards, and dependence upon, the state as an institutional support structure - both in terms of the legitimacy which public office conferred and the privileges, resources and benefits afforded by it. As the state became unquestionably more important for their persistence and survival, parties ceased to be significant linkages between the citizen and state and became, in effect, almost part of the state itself.

This ever closer symbiosis between parties and the state could be observed in several ways:

Firstly, given the significance of party funding highlighted in previous organisational models, it is important to note the state's increasingly important role in helping parties to secure, and oversee the regulation of, financial subventions and material resources. While the pattern obviously varied from country to country, Katz and Mair found that state subventions often constituted an increasingly important source of party income and that this growth had "come to represent one of the most significant

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changes to the environment within which parties act. An important aspect of this, as noted in the chapter on the party machine, was the fact that parties increasingly drew on state resources to staff both their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organisations.

Secondly, very few, if any, parties still maintained their own partisan channels of communication (such as a party press or broadcasting system) and generally relied, almost exclusively, upon a combination of the independent printed, media, on the one hand, and electronic broadcast media networks on the other. Given that most of the latter were still publicly owned or controlled - and access to them regulated by the state and usually guaranteed to parties by law - they offered parties a resource that was previously inconceivable and meant that the manner and relative frequency with which parties could present their message depended, in large part, on rules and procedures devised and regulated by the state.

Thirdly, there was also some evidence that party patronage exercised through the state offered an expanding, or at least increasingly obvious, source of selective benefits for party supporters, as parties were increasingly willing to utilise public honours of publicly-funded benefits to reward their supporters - although the evidence here was necessarily very sketchy.

Fourthly, much of the character of contemporary party organisation and party life itself was increasingly shaped by pervasive party laws, particularly as parties were increasingly obliged to conform to new rules regarding the receipt of state subventions. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, the very structure of party organisations was often determined, in part at least, by the structure of the state itself, even to the extent that changes in the number of basic party units were sometimes simply a response to local government structural reform.

It should be emphasised that the role of ‘the state’ in these various developments should not simply be characterised as an exogenous factor influencing party life. On the contrary, regardless of whether we are dealing with levels of state subventions, state regulation of media access, party laws or patronage, it is the parties themselves in their role as governors and legislators who were ultimately responsible for determining the rules which determined access to these resources and determined the framework within which they were allocated. Moreover, because, for example, state subventions or access to the electronic media were often tied to prior party

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*Ibid. p15.*
performance or position - whether defined in terms of electoral success or parliamentary representation - they generally helped to sustain existing parties while, at the same time, helping them to resist challenges from those on the margins and creating barriers to the emergence of 'new entrants'. Indeed, hypothetically, parties may become so dependent on continuous access to these resources that, winning or losing an election could - by determining the party's membership of this privileged circle of 'insiders' - affect a party's very political survival. Thus, as Katz and Mair put it, "the conditions become ideal for the formation of a cartel" and this pattern of increasing state dependence on the state was accompanied by inter-party collusion in the division of state resources in such a way that parties could be seen as laying the basis for their own mutual survival.

Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the particular method by which state resources are allocated between the three party 'faces' - particularly the question of whether they are allocated indirectly via the parliamentary fraction or directly to the party central office organisation or party on the ground - will also have implications for the internal distribution of power within party organisations themselves. Katz and Mair, for example, found the distribution of state resources to be an additional factor in helping to underpin the dominance of the party in public office over the party central office in the cartel party model.8

So what kind of party-state relationship might we expect to see developing among the new parties in post-communist Poland?

Firstly, a number of commentators have hypothesised that the growing emphasis on links with the state increasingly evident in Western democracies is likely to be replicated in the Polish - and, more generally, East European - experience.9 Indeed, there are a number of reasons to assume that the newly emerging parties of Eastern Europe are, if anything, likely to be even more orientated towards the state than parties in Western democracies, particularly when they were at a similar stage of party development. The new parties are operating within a political culture where the state was a highly prominent feature of the political landscape and in which it may prove difficult to engender a sense of their being separate.10 Moreover, despite the

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7 Ibid. p17.
8 'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe' p609.
10 The ruling communist parties were, of course, enmeshed in the state apparatus and enjoyed extensive (indeed, virtually unlimited) control over its resources, while the communist state was
substantial progress made in terms of privatisation, the state continued to play a prominent economic role throughout the region during the post-communist period. Indeed, although civil society appeared to assume a particularly important role in the ideology of the East European opposition movements which flourished at the end of the communist period, it went on to have much less political relevance as the new parties’ political focus shifted to the tasks of economic transformation and political re-construction in which the state assumed much greater prominence and many of its potential leaders moved into the realms of party politics. Given the new parties’ structural characteristics outlined in the previous chapter - the lack of a mass membership or any degree of social implantation together with the general weakness of their party organisation on the ground - it was natural that they should focus much of their attention on the state. Similarly, the fact that party leaders played - and, in many cases, continue to play - a central role in party development also seemed likely to incline them towards developing a closer relationship with the state. Finally, as noted in previous chapters, the principle of state support for new political parties - in terms of financial subsidies and guaranteed media access - was quickly established in almost all the recent cases of democratisation and was also, therefore, likely to be considerably more important in terms of party development than the resources derived from society.

Secondly, given their hypothetical retention of some of the main strengths and structural features of the mass party model - such as a relatively strong membership base, well-developed local organisational networks and a robust financial and material base (in the post-communist context) - we might expect the ‘successor’ parties to be correspondingly less orientated towards the state than the ‘new’ parties which did not enjoy this organisational legacy. This was particularly likely to be the case with the PSL which, as previous chapters have shown, appeared to display more of the characteristics of the mass party, and a broadly greater orientation towards civil society, than any of the other parties or groupings surveyed.

Thirdly, however striking the immediate similarities between the cartel party model and the new Polish parties may appear, we should also be cautious in taking these comparisons too far. In the first place, the accuracy of the model itself has been perceived to be the major agent of political repression and obstacle to democracy in Eastern Europe. Consequently, it may be argued that the new parties may be particularly anxious to distance themselves from such a legacy where party and state were inseparable. Indeed, as Lewis points out, “particular care was often taken in drafting legislation to separate new parties from the sources of administrative and economic power that have been a central part of the political establishment under the former regime.” 'Party funding in post-communist east-central Europe', pp139-140.
questioned\textsuperscript{11} and Katz and Mair have themselves cautioned against its general applicability and acknowledged that a party cartel is most likely to develop in those political cultures marked by a tradition of inter-party consensus and co-operation.\textsuperscript{12} It is, therefore, much less likely to emerge in post-communist polities were the emotional temperature and levels of polarisation along the cleavage of attitudes towards the past are likely to be very high for some time to come and parties themselves remain internally fissiparous. More generally, as the three fully-free Polish parliamentary elections vividly illustrate, it is questionable whether the party system in Poland (or other parts of Eastern Europe for that matter) is developed or stable enough either for the key players to be clearly identified or for the likely members of a party cartel to agree on the shared political perspectives and mutual interests that are emphasised in that model. As Lewis points out, the essence of the cartel party model from the point of view of the voters lies in their ability to choose “from a fixed menu of prices” and it is precisely this fixed menu that is lacking in Poland and Eastern Europe more generally.\textsuperscript{13}

In order to test these hypotheses and, more generally, to examine the Polish parties’ level of state orientation and dependence, this chapter, therefore, considers: firstly, what kind of state financial and material support they received compared with other, internally-generated sources of party funding; and, secondly, what kind of provisions were made by for state-guaranteed party access to the mass media. In both cases the questions of what kind of assistance parties actually received and what they believed should be the role of the state are examined - together with the broader issue of whether or not there was evidence of a pattern of inter-party collusion to create a ‘cartel’ of privileged insiders.

There are, of course, other important aspects of the party-state relationship which are worthy of consideration. The role of the state in providing parties with paid staff and organisational infrastructure is considered separately and in greater detail in the chapter on the party machine, although the key findings are cited and incorporated into the general argument in this chapter as appropriate - particularly the fact that most party staff were attached to the parliamentary party, especially at local level, and therefore financed mainly or exclusively from state coffers. The role of party appointments to state bodies is also a key issue although, as Mair acknowledges, a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textit{Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe}, p12
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difficult one on which to obtain ‘hard’ data. Moreover, although state patronage can obviously play a role in terms of providing an additional selective benefits for some party members, it does not relate directly to the specific and central issue under consideration: whether or not parties are drawing upon the state to substitute for their own, internally-generated organisational resources? Similarly, although the regulatory framework within which parties operate has become an increasingly important issue in Poland - and is referred to at various points in this chapter - it is also not of direct relevance to the main theme examined here of party dependence on, and expectations of, the state. Consequently, this chapter, focuses on the two key issues - party funding and media access - which are recurring themes in all the contemporary party models and which can be isolated and examined relatively easily.

The state and party funding

Although, until the passage of 1997 Party Law, direct and ongoing state party funding did not formally exist in Poland, there were certainly other forms of financial support that were made available from the state budget. The most significant of these were: the re-imbursement of election campaign expenses and the provision of diverse forms of support for parliamentary groupings, together with salaries, expenses and other material resources for individual parliamentarians.

Until 1997, refunds for election expenses were the one possibility for financing political parties and groupings directly from the state budget. The 1993 Electoral Law introduced a major innovation into the Polish system of party finances as a result of which certain election committees (and, therefore, Polish parties or coalitions of parties) received a one-off donation from the state budget to refund costs incurred during a parliamentary election campaign. These refunds were only paid to those election committees able to secure parliamentary representation, in proportion to the total number of Sejm deputies and Senators elected from their candidates’ lists - provided that they published a financial report of their campaign accounts within three months of the election day. The amount available for campaign refunds was set at 20% of the total expenditure assigned in the state budget to cover the costs of organising, preparing and conducting the election.

The financial role of the state in Poland certainly became evident after the 1993 elections when every eligible party or political grouping received 14,500 new zloties

14 'Party Organisation', p11
(the equivalent of $7,650) for every seat won in either of the two chambers. Although the refund only went to those parties which won parliamentary seats, it was paid directly to party central offices via the electoral committees submitting the candidates' lists from which the Sejm deputies or Senators were elected. These were either single parties or groupings (as in the case of the PSL, UW, UP, KPN and BBWR) or electoral coalitions comprising a number of organisations (such as the SdRP-led SLD) which then divided the refund between their members.

Moreover, as Table 6.1 shows, there were considerable variations in the amount paid to each of the groupings and while the victorious parties received significant sums of money and election refunds. By providing them with the possibility of earning funds to cover day-to-day political activities, these refunds, of course, further strengthened their position and augmented the relatively extensive organisational resources already at their command, while those parties with only a few parliamentarians barely covered the repayment of the loans they had taken out to finance their campaigns. Indeed, ironically, the PSL, the sole grouping which (in other respects) displayed significant 'mass party' characteristics was one of the prime beneficiaries of 1993 election campaign refunds with nearly 2.3 million zloties, while the SdRP - the other 'successor' and next largest party in terms of membership - was (as the main component of the SLD) an even greater recipient with more 3 million.

The other significant source of state financial support for Polish parties before 1997 was the provision of various forms of support for parliamentary groupings, together with salaries, resources and expenses for parliamentarians. As noted in chapter three, a large part of the Polish parliamentary budget was used to help Sejm deputies and Senators perform their parliamentary duties, both at national and constituency level. Parliamentary Clubs received standard monthly payments per deputy to finance their activities - which were reduced as the size of the fraction increased. Moreover, Sejm deputies and Senators also received: substantial allowances to run offices in their local electoral districts, essential office equipment supplied free by the Sejm and

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14 All figures cited in this chapter are expressed in 'new' zloties which came into circulation on January 1st 1995 and were equivalent to 10,000 'old' zloties.
17Although any surplus from the refund was supposed to be assigned for "publicly beneficial purposes" parties discovered various ways to circumvent this provision. The party could also, of course, also earn bank interest on any excess sums which could then, quite legally, be spent on stricte party activities.
18Parliamentary parties' specialist and expert reports were largely paid for from these funds - although Sejm deputies and Senators who chaired parliamentary committees could also obtain additional sums which could, of course, be utilised indirectly for party purposes.
Senate Chancelleries, together with a general deputies' expense allowance and, in the case of 'professional' deputies, wages in the form of a so-called *ryczalt.*

It is, of course, questionable whether or not all of these sums can be included within the broad definition of 'party funding'. Some of the salaries and expenses, for example, were intended as Sejm deputies and Senators' personal income, while parliamentary directives insisted that the office expense allowance should, in theory, "not be used to finance the activity of political parties, social organisations, foundations or charitable activity nor the activity of the parliamentary club" and it was up to the individual parliamentarian, and not the parliamentary party leaderships, to decide how this particular allowance should be allocated. In practice, however it was extremely difficult to separate the two and parliamentary salaries and allowances were very closely linked with, and inevitably shaded into, the general question of parliamentary club and party funding in general. As we saw in the previous chapter, a portion of deputies and Senators often regularly passed on part of their salaries' and personal and office expense allowances for the needs of the parliamentary club as a whole, or even the party central office, as an established procedure. Similarly, given that many parliamentarian's constituency surgeries often doubled up as local party offices and performed a crucial role in their local organisational infrastructure, it was often difficult to distinguish between the funds spent on constituency work and those used to promote local party activity. They should, therefore, properly be regarded as a *de facto* form of backdoor state financing for parties as a whole rather than for the individual parliamentarian. Indeed, as Table 6.2 shows, the total amount allocated to support the activities of (mostly party-based) parliamentary clubs, together with individual parliamentarians' allowances and expenses, should not be regarded as a form of marginal funding.

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19 Although this term is, somewhat confusingly, also used sometimes simply to describe parliamentarians' office expense allowances.

21 Gebethner's calculation included: the financial resources passed on directly to the parliamentary clubs and circles themselves, Sejm deputies and Senators' personal expense allowances and the total amount allocated to parliamentary deputies to maintain their offices. Only the *ryczalts* - the lump-sums paid to 'professional' parliamentarians who had given up all paid employment to devote themselves to full-time parliamentary work was excluded, since these were supposed to substitute for income foregone. Even these calculations did not include the various services-in-kind enjoyed by Polish deputies and Senators - such as free public transport by land or air and the free use of hotel accommodation in Warsaw - which it was impossible to calculate the exact value of.
The 1997 Law on Political Parties introduced three significant changes to the Polish state party funding regime. Firstly, it established a new system of regular donations (known as 'objective' donations - dotacje celowe) to be paid those election committees which specifically registered themselves as political parties (and not electoral coalitions) in addition to the one-off election refunds (henceforth known as 'subjective' donations - dotacje podmiotowe) which continued to be paid to all eligible electoral committees on the basis of the number of seats won. Secondly, although the level of election refunds and donations paid to each party was still determined by its electoral performance, the regular donations were paid in proportion to the number of votes obtained, and not the number of seats won. Thirdly, the regular donations were paid to all parties that won more than 3% of the votes "cast for all political parties' candidates' lists across the whole country" and not just those whose electoral committees crossed the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation. The overall budget for state subventions remained unchanged with the new regular donations accounting for 60% of the total, paid in four annual instalments: 40% in the first year and 20% in subsequent years (uprated in line with inflation).

This new system of regular donations was accompanied by much greater financial transparency, with parties obliged to submit annual financial reports on "expenditure undertaken on their statutory objectives" or face the risk of losing their entitlement to receive further donations. Moreover, all parties - even those which didn't receive any election refunds or state donations - also had to submit details of any donations to their Election Funds which were ten times greater than the forecast average public sector salary for that year, together with a more general set of financial accounts. Failure to do so could result in the party's Election Fund being frozen or its deletion from the official register of political parties, respectively.

Following the 1997 parliamentary elections, the total amount allocated for all the election committees which qualified for refunds and regular donations was more than 14 million new zloties. As Table 6.3 shows, as electoral coalitions AWS and the SLD were not entitled to regular donations and only received one-off election refunds worth approximately 25,000 zloties for each parliamentarian elected - with AWS earning 6.3 million and the SLD 4.8 million. Meanwhile, those election committees which registered as political parties shared a total of 2.725 million zloties - 25,000 zloties per parliamentary seat multiplied by the 109 seats won by the three political

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
parties which crossed the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation: the UW, PSL and ROP. These three parties also received one-off donations but only worth 10,000 złoties per seat, having to share the remainder set aside for the regular, 'subjective' donations with those parties which had not won any seats but still obtained more than 3% of the vote. Originally it was assumed (and was probably the intention of those who framed the legislation) that these regular donations were only payable to those parties which won more than 3% of the total number of votes cast for all election committees and that in 1997, therefore, only the UP (which won 4.74% of the votes) would be eligible among those parties which failed to cross the 5% threshold. However, it subsequently emerged that the 3% figure related only to the number of votes cast for election committees that were specifically registered as political parties without taking into account the votes cast for electoral coalitions such as AWS or the SLD. This made the de facto threshold for regular donations just over 1% and meant that the two pensioners’ parties which contested the 1997 elections - the KPEiR and the KPEiRRP who won 2.18% and 1.63% of the votes respectively - were also eligible.

Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that the principle of transparency of funding was built into original 1990 Law on Political Parties, detailed information on Polish party funding was extremely patchy and, at the time of writing, only one of the six parties and groupings surveyed, the UP, made its accounts available to public scrutiny. Without access to more than one set of party accounts it was clearly impossible to make any definitive judgements as to how much importance each party attached to the various forms of state support compared with other, internally-generated sources of revenue. Nonetheless it emerged from the UP’s figures, set out in Table 6.4, that the party’s 1993 election refund of 623,500 złoties constituted 83% of its entire 1994 income. When the party’s debts were paid off, bank interest on the remainder represented 64% of the party’s income the following year - by far the largest item and more than twice the amount contributed by membership subscriptions and the levy of parliamentarians (which also, of course, represented another form of indirect state funding). Given its extremely low membership levels the UP was clearly likely to be one of the parties least able to generate significant resources internally. Nonetheless, it is possible to deduce on the basis of the UP’s figures that election refunds, the various forms of material and financial support provided to parliamentary parties and the new system of regular state subventions played a critical role both in helping

\footnote{Indeed, as one Polish commentator presciently pointed out, given that (before the passage of the 1997 Party Law) all the various kinds of state financial support were directed not at parties a such "but various committees, alliances and parliamentary clubs", it was extremely difficult to discuss the finances of any actual individual party. See: 'Lewe Pieniądze'.}
parties to survive the single most expensive activity they were likely to be engaged in (the parliamentary election campaign) and, in most cases, providing them with some sort of secure financial base for their ongoing party activities. Over time, of course, the more rigorous requirements placed on parties to publish financial accounts arising from the 1997 Party Law should help us to properly assess the relative importance of state support - at least as far as identifiable sources of income, such as refunds and donations, are concerned.

Moreover, both the very existence of various state subsidies and parliamentary allowances, together with the rules governing the way in which they were allocated, were likely to make the position of the party leadership - particularly the party in public office and individual parliamentarians - considerably more important and influential to the emphatic detriment of the party on the ground. Although it was the party central office which benefited from, and determined the allocation of, both election refunds and the new regular donations, the generous and weakly controlled system of parliamentary allowances ensured that considerably larger state funds were, in fact, directed to the party in public office. As Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show, the four largest parliamentary parties received more than three times as much funding in this form in 1995, as their respective party central offices received in their entire one-off election refund for 1993. Given that, as noted above, these funds were often utilised to develop local or regional party structures, the long-term effect of this allocation of resources may be strengthen the links of the party in public office directly with the party on the ground, with the party central office being in less of a position to co-ordinate party activity from above - although this was partially mitigated by the considerable personnel overlap between the party central office and party in public office leaderships noted in previous chapters.

Although perhaps no more so than in other countries, Polish citizens were generally extremely hostile to the concept of state party funding - a hostility no doubt reinforced by their more general antipathy towards political parties as such which was, as noted in the previous chapter, to a large extent rooted in their specific experiences of the previous system. A November 1992 CBOS survey, for example, found only 2% of respondents agreeing that party activities should be funded from the state budget with the vast majority supporting internal sources of financing such as membership subscriptions and donations from sympathisers (58%) and the parties' own business and trading activities (23%). Similarly, a more recent March 1998 PBS survey also revealed that 66% of respondents felt that parties should be self-financing - either

from membership subscriptions (66%) or their own trading activities (32%) - with only 8% supporting state funding. Indeed, the same PBS survey even found 58% opposed to the more modest proposal that citizens should make a one zloty donation to the party of their choice as part of filing their annual tax returns - although a March 1998 CBOS survey found public opinion to be more divided: with 48% in favour and 43% against (30% decisively rejecting the idea compared to 25% supporting it).

Nevertheless, although this may have encouraged Polish parties to articulate their views in a slightly more circumspect fashion, such public hostility was not reflected in the attitudes of Polish politicians themselves who consistently supported the introduction and expansion of state funding. The issue was first raised in the context of the debate on the 1993 electoral law when virtually every parliamentary fraction supported the introduction of the election refund. Indeed, all six parties and groupings subsequently surveyed strongly believed that the state should play a continuing or greater role in funding political parties.

The most enthusiastic supporters of greater state financial support were the PSL and UP, both of whom sponsored legislation to introduce regular subsidies in addition to the one-off election refunds which culminated in the passage of the 1997 Party Law. The PSL proposed that parties should be provided with annual state subsidies in proportion to the number of parliamentary seats they held. The UP also supported broadening the basis of state support for political parties to include regular donations, although its proposals also envisaged provisions for: financial support during an election campaign to those committees registering national lists of candidates; the level of regular subsidies being determined by the number of votes and not the number of seats won; and a lowering of the threshold for state support to include non-parliamentary parties which secured at least 2% of the vote.

Given its general organisational weakness - together with the fact that, at the time it put forward these proposals, the party faced the direct threat of exclusion from parliament - the UP’s support for broadening the scope of party state funding was

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27 "O naszej naiwności", Gazeta Wyborcza. 7 May 1998.
28 Ibid.
fairly predictable. However, given its relatively high membership levels and well
developed organisation (by Polish standards at least) the PSL’s enthusiasm for
increasing the role of the state was rather more surprising. Nonetheless, the PSL’s
general level of organisational development was still relatively meagre compared with
analogous parties in Western democracies and its membership probably comprised
poorer, rural dwellers unable to provide the party with a solid financial base on which
a robust party organisation - reflected in the fact that, as the figures set out in Tables
6.1 and 6.3 show, the party spent relatively little on its 1993 and 1997 election
campaigns compared with comparatively smaller membership parties such as the UW.
Some commentators also suggested that the PSL's attitude towards state party funding
was simply a reflection of its more generally state-orientated approach to politics
which focused heavily on placing its supporters with positions in the state
administration at every level.  

Indeed, of all the parties and groupings surveyed it was the PSL which set out the
case for direct state party funding most clearly and comprehensively. Firstly, the party
argued that, although they may be unpopular, political parties were one of the main
foundations of a democratic system and incurred certain unavoidable costs as a result
of having to fulfil a number of essential functions. Consequently, given that weak and
unstable parties were not in the broader public interest, the state had to accept some
responsibility in helping to provide them with resources. As PSL Vice-President
Janusz Dobrosz put it speaking in the Sejm debate on the 1997 Party Law, "political
parties are currently one of the basic elements of public life, an essential cell in the
process of representing state interests as well as performing the government of the
state. Political parties have their specific functions and tasks, which they are not in a
position to realise effectively without subventions." Secondly, without a basic state-
guaranteed minimum level of finances, parties inevitably began to operate like
"businessmen chasing profits" and became pre-occupied with the identifying new
sources of income. In other words, turning one of the traditional arguments against
state funding of parties on its head, the PSL argued that, by relieving them of the
burden of fundraising, state funding actually gave parties greater opportunities to
concentrate on their other functions and involve themselves in broader civic
activities. Thirdly, according to Janusz Dobrosz, the provision of state subsidies
"significantly limits the dependence of parties and politicians on the vested interests

33 Author interview with Ewa Czaczowska, 26 June 1997.
34 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z dniach 28, 29
35 See, for example: Projekt Ustawy o Partiach Politycznych. p14.
of various potential sponsors”36 and “limits corruption and the influence of business, together with that of overseas funds, on the politics of the state.”37

UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalęcz also argued that parties which were not funded by the state became indebted to their financial sponsors which could, in turn, lead to costly public policy implications for the state. According to Nalęcz, it was, therefore, “more cost-effective for the state budget, the ordinary Pole, the average taxpayer, to put aside certain modest amounts openly and clearly for financing political parties than leaving this sphere of obligation in the current actual grey zone.”38 Indeed, if anything, the UP placed even greater emphasis on anti-corruption arguments and linked its proposals for increased state funding with a package of controls on party finances which would have ensured that: parties would no longer have been able to conduct business and trading activities except for those directly linked to their core political objectives (such as publishing); indebted parties would have been ineligible for state subsidies (a measure aimed particularly at SdRP); and all business donations to political parties would have been forbidden.39

Both the SdRP/SLD and the UW also supported continuing and extending the scope of state party funding. Outlining his grouping’s broad support for regular donations to party funds in addition to one-off election refunds, SLD Parliamentary Club spokesman and SdRP Presidium member Zbigniew Zaborowski argued that, “extending the right of political parties to obtain subsidies for their statutory activities will increase the state budget deficit but I think that this deficit is in accord with the interests of society, enables the formation of a transparent, open system of financing political parties.”40 UW Parliamentary Club spokesman Jerzy Ciemnewski also supported extending the scope of state support and argued that “from the point of view of the current requirements of constructing a democratic system” the UP’s proposals were “more appropriate given that they foresee the possibility of financing the activity... (of) those parties which did not enter parliament but obtained a given

36 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28, 29 lutego i 1 marca 1996. p142.
38 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28, 29 lutego i 1 marca 1996. p144.
39 Projekt Ustawy o Zmianie Ustawy o Partiach Politycznych. It was, somewhat ironically, the PSL’s draft which contained the original proposal to delete parties from the official register if they failed to publish annual accounts; although the PSL did also envisage allowing all organisations, including businesses (other than those with foreign shareholdings), to continue to make political donations, and parties to hold shares in any companies except for those in which the government was also a shareholder.
40 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28, 29 lutego i 1 marca 1996. p145.
number of votes in the election” - although he argued in favour of introducing a 3%, rather than a 2%, funding threshold.41

However, although both of these groupings were substantial beneficiaries of state funding, and supported the general principle of extending its scope, neither were as enthusiastic supporters of them as the PSL and UP. The SdRP/SLD, in particular, had to proceed extremely cautiously on this issue for a number of reasons, not least the fact that SdRP was engaged in an ongoing financial dispute with the State Treasury.42 Moreover, as the party which emerged as the successor to a hegemonic organisation enjoying virtually unlimited access to state funds, SdRP obviously had to distance itself somewhat from what may have been perceived as an excessively state-orientated model of party financial support.

Of the six parties and groupings surveyed, the ROP and AWS had devoted the least attention to the issue of state party funding and not set out their policy in any clear and unambiguous way - for the fairly obvious reason that, as relatively new organisations, they were pre-occupied with developing a basic organisational structure and broader programmatic questions in the run up to the 1997 parliamentary elections. However, preliminary indications were that both groupings appeared to be generally supportive of state party funding in principle and their spokesmen echoed a number of the arguments used by other groupings relating to the contribution it could make to reducing corruption and helping parties to concentrate on their basic political functions (although it should be noted that they were often expressing their personal opinions rather than their grouping’s settled policy).

ROP Supreme Council Vice-Chairman and Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski was, for example, one of the main parliamentary sponsors of the campaign to introduce a one zloty annual levy of taxpayers to fund parties. Speaking during the Senate debate on the 1997 Party Law, Romaszewski also argued that parties were fundamental requirement for a democracy and that state subventions were justified on the grounds that, “parties that carry out business activities...are a much greater threat to society than party finances from the budget in an open manner.”43 Similarly, AWS National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek argued that “it is the state that is responsible for

41 Ibid. p149.
42 This was, as discussed in a previous chapter, rooted in the related issues of inherited debts from the former PZPR and the party’s allegedly illegal acquisition and disposal of the former communist party’s assets.
political cadres...in reality it is politicians who then form governments, it is politicians who draft laws and it is politicians who are responsible for improving the lot of the people” and “the state ought to be concerned that these politicians are as well prepared as possible to fulfil their mission.” Consequently, “straightforward state financing is, quite simply, the thing that is easiest to control” with “the state treasury undoubtedly...(playing)...a key role” and, according to Tywonek, the regular state donations envisaged in the 1997 Party Law being “a step in the right direction.”

As hypothesised, the provisions for, and parties' expectations of, state funding contained a mixed message in relation to the creation of a party cartel. In terms of providing financial support, Polish legislation certainly proved to be extremely advantageous to those parties which achieved electoral success. As Tables 1 and 3 illustrate, the most successful parties in the 1993 and 1997 elections received a handsome financial premium for their electoral victories while the less successful - particularly those parties which did not secure parliamentary representation in 1993 - found themselves in a considerably worse situation. This financial premium was exaggerated by the adoption of an electoral system which, although proportional in theory, distinctly favoured the most successful parties in terms of parliamentary representation through: the application of a relatively high (in the context of the highly fragmented Polish party system) 5% threshold for representation in the Sejm (8% in the case of electoral coalitions); the use of the d'Hondt system to determine the final division of seats within the local electoral districts; allocation of additional seats from a national list only to those parties and groupings winning over 7% of the vote; and the creation of a larger number of smaller multi-member constituencies compared to the 1991 Electoral Law. This was, indeed, what happened in the 1993 parliamentary election when the SLD and PSL won 20.4% and 15.4% of the votes but secured 37.7% and 29% of the seats respectively and, thereby, obtained much larger election refunds than they would have done purely on the basis of the number of votes won. At the same time, several parties and groupings fell just short of the 5% and 8% barriers and did not benefit at all from the election refund. This was exacerbated by the electoral system to the Senate, based on the simple majority principle in two or three member constituencies, which led to even greater distortions with the SLD and PSL winning 37% and 36% of the seats respectively.44

Moreover, the consequences of an electoral system which so clearly privileged the strongest parties were not confined solely to the issue of election refunds. The

44 Author interview, 4 June 1997.
45 There were similar distortions in the 1997 Senate election, most notably the fact that AWS won 51% of the seats on the basis of 33.83% national share of the vote.
various, extremely generous additional forms of funding for parliamentary clubs and individual parliamentarians provided those parties represented in parliament with a further obvious advantage over those which were excluded and, thereby, gave election winners a further premium for victory.

On the other hand, the Polish party system was still relatively fluid and even the stringent post-1993 party funding regime did not prevent the emergence of new entrants and ‘freeze’ the existing party system within the existing parliamentary configuration - as the subsequent formation and entry in parliament of both the ROP and AWS clearly illustrated (the latter, admittedly, under the aegis of the Solidarity trade union). Moreover, by actually reducing the threshold for party financial support to 3% - and, thereby, providing the lifeline of continued state funding to some parties which failed to secure parliamentary representation – in some respects the 1997 Party Law actually represented a step away from the creation of a party cartel.

Indeed, some of new Law's sponsors explicitly justified its provisions for broadening access to state funding to include non-parliamentary parties on the grounds that it gave them a ‘second chance’ in what was still evidently a crystallising party system. There was, for example, undoubtedly an element of self-preservation that motivated the UP, one of the 1997 Law’s main sponsors, which was concerned (correctly, as it turned out) that it would not be able to guarantee its own status as a member of the putative party cartel.44 UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalęcz, for example, argued that it “is difficult to demand that parties should only have the right to exist when they reach a mature age. I think that the law-maker’s intention should also be to enable them to have a fair childhood and a period of maturation.”47 UP Parliamentary Club Vice Chairman and party Presidium member Piotr Marciniak also felt that providing state financial support only to parliamentary parties “leads to a sharp contrast between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties, makes the articulation of interests or poorly organised political milieu more difficult, makes the transformation and maturation of the political scene more difficult...”48 Similarly UW Parliamentary Club spokesman Jerzy Ciemniewski argued in favour of the 1997 Law on the grounds that “financing parties which have not found themselves in parliament, but enjoy certain

44The original proposal from the PSL - which was more confident about its ability to retain parliamentary representation - was that both regular donations and election refunds should be confined only to parliamentary parties in proportion to the number of seats won. This would, of course, have had the opposite effect of actually re-inforcing the position of the strongest parties and groupings.
47 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28, 29 lutego i 1 marca 1996. p144.
48 Ibid. p151.
social support does not close off the party system in its current shape and allows other parties the opportunity for development and participation in electoral battles."

The state and party media access

Parties in post-communist Poland were guaranteed a number of opportunities for access to the state broadcasting media:

Firstly, since 1991 election committees (comprising, as noted above, single parties and groupings or electoral coalitions) were able to present their views in special broadcasts appearing in the fifteen days running up to election. According to the provisions set out in the 1993 Electoral Law, election committees which registered local candidates’ lists in at least half of the fifty two electoral districts (and, therefore, qualified to register national candidates’ lists) were guaranteed an equal share of the total amount allocated for free election broadcasts: 15 and 10 hours for Polish TV and 30 and 15 hours for Polish Radio for national and regional programmes respectively. In 1993, for example, this meant that each of the 15 election committees which registered a national list received an hour to present their views - which appeared in three daily ‘blocs’ of programmes on the main channel of Polish TV. The 1993 Law also provided election committees with the opportunity to buy additional air-time on both public and private TV and radio at half the normal commercial rate although this could not exceed 15% of the total free air-time allocated to that grouping.

Secondly, media access for Polish politicians between elections was regulated by the 1992 Law on Radio and TV which stipulated that “units of public radio and TV... (shall) enable political parties to present their position in crucial public matters.”

The provisions of this clause were implemented when the National TV and Radio Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji: KRRiTV - see below) issued a May 1994 directive instructing Polish TV and Radio to produce weekly, 45-minute programmes (broadcast between 4pm-9pm) in which political parties and groupings which obtained at least 400,000 votes in the previous Sejm elections would have the opportunity to present their views directly, with the amount of air-time allocated to

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49 Ibid. p149.
50 ‘Ustawa z dnia 28 maja 1993 - Ordynacja Wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polski’
51 '15 godzin zo.o.', Gazeta Wyborcza. 18 August 1993.
52 It was estimated in 1997 that a 30-second slot at peak viewing time (immediately after the main evening news bulletin) cost a party 96,000 zloties (before VAT). See: 'Mało chętnych na drogą reklamę', Rzeczpospolita. 9 July 1997.
each being proportionate to the number of votes obtained. The air-time allocated to parties which united or divided after the elections was to be allotted to, or divided between, their successor parties or organisations. Consequently, following lengthy negotiations between the TV authorities and the parties themselves, since September 1994 a number of parties have had the opportunity of regular, guaranteed access to state-run TV by appearing in a weekly discussion programme called ‘Forum’. Initially thirteen parties and groupings comprised (or emerged from) the eleven election committees which obtained more than 400,000 votes in the 1993 parliamentary election: the SLD, PSL, UD and KLD (which had merged to form the UW), UP, Catholic Electoral Action ‘Fatherland’ (which actually comprised four separate by parties: ZChN, PK, PChD and SLCh), KPN, BBWR, the Solidarity trade union, PC and UPR. The number of programmes in which each party appeared was proportionate to the number of votes it had obtained in the previous election. For example, an SLD representative would appear in all twelve programmes in any given quarter while the UPR would only be represented twice - although even those parties which were not present for the studio discussion were allowed to record a 45-second statement on the subject under discussion that week. Following the 1997 parliamentary elections only the six parties and groupings surveyed had obtained enough votes to appear on Forum.

Thirdly, it is also worth noting that (in what may prove to a precedent for future pre-election periods) Polish TV organised a series of three hour-long one-to-one debates between the leaders of the six main parties and groupings in the run up to the 1997 parliamentary election. The idea for this series of debates arose initially when, in February 1997, Polish TV agreed to allocate air-time for a one-off debate between SdRP Chairman Józef Oleksy and UW Chairman Leszek Balcerowicz (at the latter’s request). However, following a wave of protests from other other parties at their exclusion Polish TV decided to organise two additional debates involving the leaders of the other four main parties and groupings: Marian Krzaklewski (AWS) and

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56 Of the fifteen election committees which registered national lists in 1993 only Self-Defence, Party X, the KdR and the PSL-PL were excluded from Forum. By the end of the parliament, of course, the KPN and BBWR had split and the Solidarity trade union, both KPNs (initially), one of the BBWRs, the PC and all the parties that comprised Catholic Electoral Action ‘Fatherland’ had formed AWS (and two of these - the PK and SLCh - had merged to form the SKL).
Although it is unclear to what extent the possibility of such instant media access could replace the need for parties to build up local organisational and membership networks, its certainly provides us with an important difference to the earlier stages of party development in Western democracies - particularly given the fact that the two largest Polish broadcasting organisations, Polish TV and Radio, remained in state hands. However, although - as illustrated in the previous chapter on parties and their members - officials from all six parties and groupings surveyed emphasised that the mass media played a crucial role in their communication strategies, differences of emphasis were clearly evident in their attitudes towards the role of the state in helping parties to secure guaranteed media access.

On the one hand, the PSL, UP and ROP were all enthusiastic supporters of a significant role for the state. According to the PSL programme, for example, the party supported the principle of "a constitutional and legal guarantee...of equal participation in TV and radio informational programmes by representatives of political parties in proportion to their representation in society." Specifically, the PSL argued in favour of establishing a link between the number of votes won and a given party or grouping’s level of media coverage. PSL National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski, for example, argued that, "access to these sources of mass communications can only be determined by...parliamentary election results...the three or four parties which secure the best election result should have access to the media" - although he held out the prospect of making exceptions if "in the meantime an unexpectedly strong party, other party should arise, such as AWS."

UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nałęcz also felt that the state had "a fundamental role to play" in upholding "the principle of equal treatment of political parties in the public mass media" which, he argued, was "one of the conditions of developing democracy here in Poland." Similarly, ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski argued that "the role of the state ought to be to guarantee equal access, at the very least in public TV" as well as to "stabilise and guarantee pluralism" among privately
owned broadcasters. The UP and ROP were, however, much less specific what precise principles should underpin such state intervention and determine which parties received how much access. The UP programme, for example, spoke rather vaguely of "formulating legal and political guarantees protecting the means of communication from etatisation and commercialisation," while Tomasz Nałęcz simply argued that "there is a need for legislation on this in Poland... (to ensure) equal treatment of the image of various political milieu in news programmes."

On the other hand, the SdRP/SLD, AWS and UW were all much less enthusiastic about - and, arguably, had a more sophisticated approach to - the state playing such a pro-active role in guaranteeing parties with media access. SdRP National Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, said that he was "not a supporter of giving too much guaranteed air time to political parties, of giving them their own 'space';" while AWS National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek also felt that programmes such as Forum were "horrendously unproductive because we have...this kind of programme where a journalist asks a number of representatives of various political groupings, in turn, their opinion on some subject...This is not...a form of communication that would appeal to anybody." Consequently, SdRP/SLD and AWS policy statements tended to confine themselves to rather oblique promises to 'de-politicise' the publicly owned broadcasting media. The SdRP programme, for example, spoke simply of "guaranteeing freedom and pluralism in the Polish media" and Dariusz Klimaszewski argued that, "all I want is for our TV (reporting culture) to be how it is in England with more discussions of current affairs on their merits." Similarly, the AWS election programme stated that the grouping would "reform Polish TV and Polish Radio, transforming them into truly public, accurate and objective institutions" and "undertake activities to return pluralism in the media as well as raising their ethical level," while (echoing his SdRP/SLD counterpart) Tomasz Tywonek spoke of the need for "good professional journalistic work as an insurance against the influence of politics."

Indeed, in some senses, the UW was actually quite hostile to the idea of the state providing parties with greater media access on the grounds that, given that the Polish

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62 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
63 U Progu XXI Wieku, p5.
64 Author interview, 3 March 1997.
65 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
66 Author interview, 4 June 1997.
67 Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej.
68 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
69 Program Akcji Wyborczej Solidarność.
70 Author interview, 4 June 1997.
media was already sufficiently open and pluralistic, state-guaranteed media access discriminated against those parties which had already developed an effective media strategies by themselves. According to UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki, for example, his party was actually “too satisfied” with the current provisions because, as he put it, the UW “don’t need it and prefer to rely on our own resources. From the moment when you start to make special programmes, when parties participate, as of right, then this does not work to our advantage. We make our own contacts and are against these special types of programmes.” The UW, according to Potocki, wanted a situation in which the activities of the media were “natural, not directed” and, rather than making particular demands from the state, “would prefer the state to keep its hands, as far as possible, from the media.”

There were a number of possible explanations as to why the SdRP/SLD, UW and AWS did not call for the state to take a more pro-active role in helping parties to secure media access. For example, as in the case of the party funding issue, as a grouping with its roots in an organisation enjoying an effectively monopoly on all legal forms of mass communication, the SdRP/SLD was understandably very cautious about arguing openly for greater state intervention in the mass media. The most important reason, however, was probably the fact that, although most of the parties surveyed (except for the UW) complained that they the victims of negative media bias, as Table 6.5 showing the distribution of coverage on the main evening news in one month running up to the 1997 election, the SdRP/SLD, AWS and UW certainly appeared to enjoy more extensive news coverage and were, therefore, less likely to feel a lesser imperative to call for greater state intervention on their behalf.

PSL, UP and ROP spokesmen suggested that the main explanation for their heavily circumscribed media access was the fact that they sought to defend socio-economic constituencies that were under-represented in, or promoted policies were not supported by, those in the higher echelons of Polish mass media. According to PSL National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski, for example, “the TV, radio and newspapers are all in the hands of people whose connections are with urban areas. They are less interested in rural milieu and smaller towns - they don’t identify with this milieu to the smallest degree and its problems do not interest them.” Similarly, according to UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalęcz, “the TV is dominated by the SLD and the UW and it is very difficult for other groupings to get access to it...it is preferential to certain groups and we are not in this circle” because “in attempting to

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71 Author interview, 27 February 1997.
72 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
represent the interests of underprivileged groups in many ways we threaten the well-off journalistic circles." While there may well have been some truth in these allegations, there were probably other, more significant, factors which accounted for the disproportionate coverage. These factors related to each of the parties’ relative proximities to government, and their respective abilities to exploit this proximity.

Firstly, as in most countries, for fairly obvious reasons Polish journalists were generally more interested in communicating with, and providing exposure to, parties that either were, or (because of their high opinion poll ratings) faced the imminent prospect of being, in government. This was the case with SdRP/SLD, PSL, AWS and UW for most of the period that this research was undertaken. Smaller opposition parties, particularly if they were not represented in parliament, generally had to fight much harder to attract media attention and air time. The main exception here was the PSL which did not seem to be able to translate its proximity to power (nor, as we shall see, the fact that it was well represented in the bodies that controlled public TV and radio) into positive media coverage. This was partly due to the fact they were only junior coalition partners in the 1993-97 government, although a more significant factor was probably their own inability to develop an effective media strategy.

According to one Polish commentator, for example, “the PSL does not like journalists, journalists don’t like the PSL” because they “treat them as a means of informing society about the actions of the government...not as a means of democratic control.” Even the party’s National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski admitted that “we are not very good at selling our information...We don’t know how to promote our achievements and we also don’t know how to promote our leaders. Quite simply we lack professionalism in these activities.”

Secondly, it has also been argued that the SdRP/SLD, AWS and UW’s disproportionately high media coverage may have been a reflection of the fact that the bodies which ran Polish broadcasting were controlled by individuals closely associated with these political groupings. This was, in turn, rooted in the aforementioned fact that these groupings either were (or, as in the case of AWS and UW, comprised parties that at one point had been) in government in contrast with, for example, the UP and ROP. ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski, for example, complained that “we are also denied an equal chance because the ‘court’ which should act as the guarantor of equal access...of parties to the media - the National

73 Author interview, 3 March 1997.
75 Author interview, 4 march 1997.
Radio and TV Council - does everything it can to deny us access," while UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nałęcz also stressed the fact that "we have never been a governing party which could place its supporters in the key positions in the public media."

Given the general consensus that coverage in mainstream news and current affairs programmes was a much more significant means of communication than the various forms of guaranteed air-time - together with the predominant view that the level of coverage was determined, to a large extent, by party representation in the various councils and boards which ran Polish state broadcasting - it was not surprising that the issue of nominations to these bodies was the subject of an extremely sharp party political battle. Indeed, it is precisely on this issue of media control that Polish parties state-orientation was most clearly evident - even in the case of the three parties and groupings which did not particularly stress the role of the state in providing them with guaranteed media access.

The 1992 Law on Radio and TV Broadcasting established a new legal framework and elaborate organisational structure with the explicit objective of ensuring the independence of Polish state broadcasting and freeing it from direct interference by the government and political parties. The main feature of the 1992 Law was the establishment of the nine-person KRRiTV to appoint the members and supervise the activities of the public TV and radio Supervisory Councils - together with allocating the licences for regional and private operators. Consisting of four members appointed by the Sejm, two by the Senate and three by the President, the KRRiTV was intended to be an independent and apolitical body with the initial appointees' terms of office lasting two, four or six years (all subsequent appointees served a full six-year term). The KRRiTV as a whole could only be dismissed if both chambers of the Polish parliament and the President rejected its annual report, while the nominating bodies could only replace 'their' representatives during their terms of office if they resigned, fell seriously ill or broke the law - and their dismissal had to be confirmed by the Tribunal of State. The Council was intended to comprise media experts rather than political nominees who would "guard freedom of speech in radio and TV, the independence of broadcasters and the interests of the audience, and ensure the open and pluralistic character of radio and TV."90

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76 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
77 Author interview, 3 March 1997.
78 This was also reflected in its change of nomenclature from 'state' to 'public' broadcasting.
79 The Constitutional Tribunal confirmed this proviso in 1994 after President Lech Wałęsa dismissed two of 'his' KRRiTV nominees before their terms of office expired.
80 'Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1992r o Radiofonii i Telewizji'.

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The 1992 Law also established Polish TV and Radio as independent companies overseen by nine-member Supervisory Councils: with eight members elected by the KRRiTV and one appointed by the Finance Minister (representing the companies’ sole shareholder, the state treasury) for a three-year term. These Supervisory Councils, in turn, elected Polish TV and Radio’s 5-member boards of directors, also for three years. The Supervisory Councils could not (like the KRRiTV) be dismissed during their terms of office and were, in turn, the only bodies which could dismiss or suspend members of the Polish TV and Radio boards at any time, albeit with a qualified majority of votes. In other words, this elaborate structure was designed to introduce various ‘barrier mechanisms’ to protect Polish TV and Radio from direct political interference and to ensure that the personnel charged with the day-to-day running of Polish state broadcasting were not directly accountable to politicians.

However, the practice turned out very differently from the theory and these ‘barrier mechanisms’ proved ineffective at preventing the politicisation of Polish public broadcasting. Polish parties attempted to gain control of these various broadcasting bodies and neither the KRRiTV nor Polish TV were free from political interference. In particular, the 1992 legislation was flawed: firstly, because KRRiTV members were all selected by overtly political bodies and, secondly, because it did not adequately foresee the possibility that active politicians would themselves attempt to become members of the various broadcasting councils and bodies. Consequently, the KRRiTV (which Polish politicians quickly discovered was the key to controlling state broadcasting) was, from the outset, dominated by individuals with very clear connections to particular parties and groupings and these party divisions were translated downwards to the appointments of the Supervisory Councils and boards so that Polish TV and Radio were, effectively, dominated by party appointees at every level.

The first KRRiTV was appointed in March 1993 on the basis of overtly political criteria and the notion of ‘de-politicisation’ was interpreted as meaning simply that the appointees should attempt to reflect a broad cross-section of the parliamentary and party spectrum. Indeed, although subject to various political horsetrading as particular groupings sought to maximise their political influence, the initial appointees were quite politically diverse: the four Sejm representatives comprised one each from the UW progenitors the UD and KLD, the SLD and the RdR; the two Senate appointees

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81 At that time led by future ROP leader Jan Olszewski but subsequently to be one of founder members of AWS.
represented the PSL and ZChN; and the three presidential nominees were all associated with the post-Solidarity right and included one closely associated with the ZChN and one Solidarity trade union deputy. Although the majority were drawn from post-Solidarity formations of the centre and centre-right - and the ex-communist left, in particular, complained that it was under-represented - party political divisions within the KRRiTV were not to begin with so clearly defined and it tended to operate fairly harmoniously and consensually. Indeed, the initial debates centred on disputes between the KRRiTV itself and President Lech Wałęsa rather than within its own ranks and, subsequently - when Wałęsa dismissed two of his erstwhile supporters (including the first KRRiTV Chairman, Marek Markiewicz) - the 'original' Council members and 'new' presidential appointees, rather than on party political lines.41

Gradually, however, the focus of debate began to shift towards the issue of the balance of power within the KRRiTV itself and this, in turn, filtered through to the question of appointments to the broadcasting Supervisory Councils and boards. Following their successes in the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 presidential elections, the SdRP/SLD and PSL began to gain the upper hand within the KRRiTV, with the first important changes occurring in April 1995 when these two groupings used their parliamentary majorities in both chambers to replace the RdR Sejm and ZChN Senate representatives with PSL and SLD nominees respectively. This produced a new party balance of two representatives each from the SdRP/SLD, PSL, UW and ZChN - together with one Wałęsa-appointed independent. By 1997 - when President Alexander Kwaśniewski replaced an outgoing Wałęsa nominee with an SdRP/SLD supporter - the balance of power had shifted decisively enough to give the three SdRP/SLD and two PSL members a clear majority over the two members each from the UW and ZChN (which was now, of course, an AWS member).

The SdRP/SLD and PSL's majority in the KRRiTV allowed them to progressively exert greater influence on, and change the composition of, the Polish TV and Radio Supervisory Councils and, eventually, their boards of directors. For example, through filling a number of vacancies, the SLD-PSL strengthened their position within the Polish TV Supervisory Council so that by March 1996 they were able (with the cooperation of UW nominees) to win over the two-thirds majority required to replace the right-wing President of Polish TV Wiesław Walendziak with a PSL nominee, 

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41 Over issues such as: the appointment of the right-wing, but also young and independent-minded, Wiesław Walendziak as the first head of the new Polish TV; and the granting of the first national private TV franchise to a company of which Wałęsa disapproved. See, for example: B. Modrzejewska and A. Wielopolska, 'Trawnik przedwodniczącego', Rzeczpospolita, 30 June 1994. 236
By August 1997, when the original TV and Radio Supervisory Councils terms of office expired, the two parties used their KRRiTV majority to appoint seven of their supporters to the new nine-member bodies. Finally, in June 1998 the SdRP/SLD and PSL used these clear majorities on the Supervisory Councils to appoint four of their supporters to the new five-member Polish TV and radio management boards - including one of Kwaśniewski's key 1995 presidential campaign advisers, Robert Kwiatkowski as the new Polish TV President - so that all three tiers of tiers controlling Polish state broadcasting were under their control.

Interestingly, given the fact that KRRiTV and Supervisory Council members could not be dismissed during their overlapping and differing terms of office there was a time-lag between the configuration of forces within these bodies and the balance of influence within the main institutions of the state: the parliament and presidency. In 1993, for example, the SdRP/SLD and PSL parliamentary majority had to operate alongside a politically-hostile Polish TV and KRRiTV appointed by President Wałęsa and the previous parliament in which these parties were in a clear minority. In other words, they had to wait patiently before they could, firstly, secure a KRRiTV majority and then, secondly, for enough TV and Radio Supervisory Council and management board members to resign (or for their terms of office to expire) before they could re-fashion these bodies in their own image. By the time the SdRP/SLD-PSL 'take-overs' of public TV and radio were completed in June 1998, the post-Solidarity parties AWS and UW had secured majorities in both parliamentary chambers and the two 'successor' formations were once again in opposition. Instead of 'de-politicising' these bodies, therefore, the new arrangement has simply meant that any new government inherited a KRRiTV, Supervisory Councils and management boards dominated by supporters of the previous parliamentary majority which it was extremely difficult for them to remove.

In terms of media access, then, the process of 'cartelisation' could be seen most clearly in parties various attempts to secure representation on, and exert control over, the bodies which ran state broadcasting. Arguably, this had an important impact on the party’s overall level of media coverage especially in mainstream news and current affairs programmes. Given that these bodies were nominated by parties controlling either the presidency or majorities in parliament, they were, indeed, controlled by a very narrow circle of parties and groupings which were, or (at some point since the

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passage of the new TV and Radio Law in December 1992) had been, represented in
government or held the office of the presidency, namely: the SdRP/SLD, PSL, UW
(through the UD and KLD) and AWS (through the ZChN). These broadcasting
councils and boards appeared likely to remain in the hands of these four parties' and
groupings' for the foreseeable future, with the PSL's influence set to gradually
diminish given its reduced post-1997 parliamentary representation. A good example
of how even a relatively important party was excluded from the narrow circle
controlling Polish state broadcasting was the UP which - in spite of being the fourth
largest parliamentary party in 1993-97 and one of the six main parties and groupings
throughout the entire period of the new broadcasting regime - never had even a single
representative in either the KRRiTV or the TV and Radio Supervisory Councils or
management boards.

Similarly, access to the weekly Forum programme was restricted to those parties and
groupings which had obtained at least 400,000 votes in the previous parliamentary
elections and, therefore, discriminated against any significant new organisations, such
as the ROP, which emerged subsequently and were not formed as a result of a split
within (or merger between) existing parties which had crossed this threshold. Other
obvious examples of the possible emergence of a party cartel were the fact that, as a
result of changes introduced in the 1993 Electoral Law, guaranteed access to free TV
and radio election broadcasts was restricted only to those election committees which
registered national lists, together with the decision to restrict the series of TV
debates organised in the run up to the 1997 parliamentary elections to the leaders of
only the six main parties and groupings.

Obviously, as party media strategists themselves pointed out, extensive and positive
coverage in general news and current affairs programmes was a far more effective
means of communication than specially allocated party programmes or slots.
Nevertheless, the 'agenda-setting' value of, for example, the amount of time allotted
to each party in the Forum programme and election broadcasts (or by dint of being
one of the parties selected for the leader debates) should not be underestimated and
was clearly illustrated by the efforts to which excluded parties went in order to secure
access to these programmes. ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski, for example,
expressed the fear that his party's exclusion from Forum would lead to further

86 Previously every electoral committee which registered a list in more than one electoral district was
granted guaranteed free air-time.
87 The PSL's proposal that the overall level of party media access and coverage should broadly reflect
a party's level of support in the previous elections would have discriminated even more radically
against new entrants.
discrimination against his party because it would be taken as "a kind of signal to all the serious media in Poland...that if they limit ROP's coverage then nothing will happen to them. It's a signal given by the KRRiTV in order to provide the rest of the media with an example.""

On the other hand, as in the case of state party funding, there were also several trends which pointed in the opposite direction. Access to Forum was not restricted solely to parliamentary parties and a number of parties and groupings which did not cross the threshold for parliamentary representation were also entitled to send representatives, namely: ZChN, PK, SLCh and the PChD as part of the 'Fatherland' Catholic Electoral Action coalition together with the PC, Solidarity trade union and the UPR. The fact that equal access to free election broadcasts was not confined to existing parliamentary parties also provided a certain amount of scope for new entrants to obtain guaranteed media coverage. In 1997, for example, five out of the ten election committees which registered national candidates' lists had not been formally organised as fractions within the previous parliament."

As the contrasting fortunes of the ROP and AWS clearly illustrate, the distinction between completely new political groupings and those formed on the basis of existing parties - with an electoral track record, parliamentary representation and (particularly) previous membership of government - appeared to be an extremely significant one in this context. Formed outside parliament and virtually from scratch after the 1995 presidential elections, the ROP had neither access to the Forum programme nor representation on any of the bodies controlling state broadcasting. AWS, on the other hand, was able to take advantage of the fact that it was based on several existing parties and groupings and, therefore, 'inherited' a number of sympathetic broadcasting council members together with access to Forum via AWS members such as the ZChN, SKL, PChD, PC, the Solidarity trade union, both KPNs and one of the BBWRs.

Conclusion

The overall pattern of party activity and attitudes, therefore, fitted broadly with our hypothesised projection that the new Polish parties would replicate the experience of

88 Author interview, 4 March 1997.
89 These were: AWS (although it was, of course, based on some parties which had representation in the 1993-97 parliament such as the two KPNs, SKL and one of the BBWR factions), the ROP, the two pensioner parties and, the UPR. A sixth election committee, the BdP, was based largely on the rump of the BBWR grouping which was represented in the 1993-97 parliament, albeit minimally.
contemporary parties in Western democracies and display a higher level of
dependence upon, and orientation towards, the state than civil society. All the main
Polish parties and groupings surveyed believed that the state should play a continuing
or greater role in providing them with financial support and both the level and scope
of state funding has, indeed, been progressively increased and extended. Although
(with one notable exception) the lack of published accounts made it extremely
difficult to tell exactly to what extent Polish parties were dependent upon such funds,
the various kinds of state financial support - election refunds, subventions to
parliamentary parties, parliamentary allowances and, since 1997, direct, regular party
funding - appeared to indicate that they were of prime and growing importance.

Polish state TV and Radio offered parties various opportunities for access to free air-
time both during election campaigns and between elections, although the parties
surveyed placed varying degrees of emphasis on whether or not the state had a duty to
provide such guaranteed media access and whether or not its scope should be
broadened. Nevertheless, although all the parties and groupings surveyed expressed
broad support for the notion of ‘de-politicising’ the media in theory, in practice even
those parties which did not support the state playing a particularly pro-active role in
guaranteeing media access, went to considerable lengths to influence the membership
of the key bodies which controlled Polish state broadcasting.

Interestingly, in spite of the obvious differences between them in terms of
membership size and density of local implantation identified in the previous chapter,
the distinction between ‘successor’ parties with their roots in the communist period
and ‘new’ parties was, once again, not as helpful as hypothesised in identifying the
varying levels of state-orientation. While it was not too surprising to find that the
relatively small and organisationally weak UP was one of the most enthusiastic
supporters of a very pro-active state role in providing parties with funding and media
access, it was ironic that the PSL - arguably the party that bore the clearest
resemblance to the mass party model in many other respects - was also one of the
most state-orientated of those parties surveyed. On the other hand, the post-Solidarity
UW was considerably less enthusiastic about greater state intervention and even fairly
hostile to the notion of providing parties with state-guaranteed media access.

There was also some evidence to support the notion that a party cartel might be
emerging in post-communist Poland. Polish legislation certainly provided greater
access to certain financial and material resources, the state media and representation
on the bodies controlling Polish broadcasting to those parties which achieved the
greatest electoral success, parliamentary representation and, most significantly, membership of the government. This was exacerbated by an electoral system which discriminated heavily in favour of parties winning the largest percentage of votes in the allocation of parliamentary seats. The existing rules for state access to these resources also, to some extent, limited the scope for new entrants by discriminating against new parties which emerged in between elections, unless they were formed on the basis of existing parties with parliamentary representation and a parliamentary and government track record and, thereby, represented a clear move in the direction of creating precisely such a party cartel.

Nevertheless, although Polish parties were generally in favour of broadening the scope of state support, they were not yet in favour of completely restricting access to it only to a narrow cartel of parties. There was still a general nervousness about and, consensus against, declaring unambiguously who was and who was not a member of the party cartel at this state of the development of the Polish party system - a nervousness which was felt particularly keenly among those parties, such as the UP, which operated on the margins of the 5% parliamentary threshold and were uncertain as to whether or not they could sustain their ‘insider’ status. Access to programmes such as Forum was never limited solely to parliamentary parties and new entrants could secure free election broadcasts on an equal footing with established parties and groupings if they were able to register sufficient local candidates’ lists. Indeed, the 1997 Party Law actually lowered the threshold for state party funding to include non-parliamentary parties and was, if anything a step in the opposite direction: away from the formation of a party cartel. In other words, as hypothesised, the shared political perspectives and notions of how parties could collectively further mutual interests - which underpin the pattern of inter-party collusion emphasised in that model - have simply not been firmly enough established for a relatively stable party cartel to properly emerge,
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

A number of the features identified in the previous chapters obviously fit with Western developments and, in many ways, the new Polish parties do indeed seem to bear a much closer resemblance to the more recent catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel party models than to the traditional mass party model. Admittedly, an analysis based on the 'official story' did reveal much less concentration of power in the parliamentary leadership and a more significant role for party central office leaders and extra-parliamentary decision-making organs than hypothesised. Similarly, in formal terms intermediary bodies representing the organised party rank-and-file also appeared to play a much more significant role within the new Polish parties than anticipated, with the leaders of the provincial organisations emerging as important actors in all the parties formal and informal power structures. However, an analysis based on the 'real story' of how party institutions and power relations operated in practice revealed that the new parties' parliamentary and leadership elites played a more dominant and central role in their internal distribution of power than initially suggested by analyses based solely on the 'official story'. A large part of the explanation for this de facto leader or parliamentary domination was to be found in the fact that the incumbents of many formally separate party offices frequently overlapped, which also made it much more difficult to determine the precise locus of power within the new Polish parties. Moreover, this pattern of de facto leader-domination also functioned in a more subtle way related to phenomena which are increasingly common to all political parties functioning in modern, complex democracies and was, in many ways, simply a reflection of much greater rank-and-file interest in personnel or internal organisational matters than in policy or programmatic development. Local-national relations were also, as hypothesised, characterised by a broadly 'stratarchic' distribution of power with the new parties' territorial structures granted a relatively high degree of autonomy in terms of local politics.

The party bureaucracy was extremely weak, employing only a small number of paid staff and co-ordinating a modest local party 'machine'. The proportion of party employees attached to the party organisation in parliament was generally much larger than to the party central office. This pattern was particularly noticeable at the local level where there was substantial overlap in terms of 'parliamentary' and 'party' offices, staff and technical facilities. Indeed, the sheer weakness of the party central
office bureaucracies made it very difficult for any of these parties to effectively monitor and intervene in their local branches' day-to-day activities, even if they had the time or inclination to do so.

While there was evidence that all the parties and groupings surveyed had made some attempt to define their 'core' electorates and, at the very least, nuance their electoral appeals to attract particular socio-economic groups, these were at an extremely preliminary and tentative stage. Most of them based their electoral strategies on mobilising loose and socially heterogeneous electoral constituencies. Indeed, even when parties attempted to direct and target their electoral appeals at particular socio-economic electoral constituencies this was generally not reflected in substantially higher levels of support within that segment of the electorate. Post-communist social structures were relatively 'flat' and the new socio-economic interests which have been emerging as a result of the post-1989 transformation have not yet crystallised sufficiently for them to act as a major influence on voting behaviour. Given that there were no significant variations in most of the parties' patterns of support in terms of age, sex, place of residence, education or occupation, their bases of support did not appear to be rooted in any particular socio-economic 'interests'. Consequently such broad electoral appeals cutting across socio-economic classes did indeed appear to be the most effective means of mobilising electoral support at this stage of the Polish political and economic transition.

The new Polish parties had extremely low levels of local implantation and one of the lowest overall levels of party membership in Europe. There was also very little evidence that the new Polish parties were attempting to encapsulate their supporters by developing networks of ancilliary structures directly linked to their party organisations. Indeed, they appeared more interested in developing a looser and more informal set of relationships with a fairly wide range of interest groups than either attempting to enrol their supporters as collective members or tying themselves too closely to any particular organisation. Local party branches generally functioned as fairly passive and informal bodies primarily geared towards fulfilling certain local organisational tasks associated with national and local election campaigns; with local politics providing the main focus for debate and activity in between such campaigns. The explanations for these low levels of membership and social implantation and patterns of local activism were to be found both in the parties' organisational strategies and in the reluctance of Polish citizens to join the new parties. None of them had any kind of pro-active party development strategy geared towards supporting the creation and mobilisation of mass membership organisations. Party
leaders generally valued the mass media as a more effective means of appealing to voters than large numbers of formally enrolled members. Both the national and local elites (on whom the burden of membership recruitment generally fell) believed that drawing looser networks of ‘sympathisers’ who could be mobilised at election times more closely into their parties’ orbit was more effective than enrolling them as party members. Moreover, even if party strategists had perceived there to be a link between the mass membership-based party and electoral success, and had actively sought to recruit substantially more individual members on this basis, survey evidence of popular attitudes towards parties suggested that the prospects of them actually doing so were extremely slim.

Lacking a mass membership and any degree of local or societal implantation, the new Polish parties displayed a concomitant high level of dependence upon, and interest in exploiting, the resources provided by the state in terms of both party funding and media access and control - particularly compared to West European parties at a similar stage of party development. The widespread practice of state financial support, particularly that channelled through the parliamentary party, appeared to be of prime importance to all parties and both its level and scope have been progressively increased and extended. Even those parties which did not support the state’s playing a particularly pro-active role in guaranteeing party media access went to considerable lengths to influence the membership of the key bodies which controlled the Polish media, particularly state broadcasting. There was also some evidence pointing to the emergence of a party cartel in post-communist Poland. Polish legislation certainly provided greater access to certain financial and material resources and representation on key media bodies to those parties which achieved the greatest electoral success. Indeed, parliamentary representation and access to government were absolutely critical to a party’s very survival. This was exacerbated by an electoral system which discriminated heavily in favour of the largest parties and the fact that the existing rules for state support, to some extent, limited the scope for new entrants by discriminating against new parties which emerged in between elections apart from those based on parties with existing parliamentary representation.

However, the distinction between the ‘successor’ and completely ‘new’ party families was not necessarily as striking, or helpful as an analytical tool in identifying variations, as hypothesised. Both SdRP/SLD and the PSL certainly bore a closer resemblance to the mass party model in terms of relatively high levels of membership, density of local implantation and more developed local organisational infrastructure and technical facilities. In the case of the latter they were matched only
by AWS which was able to draw on the Solidarity trade union’s sizeable network of local offices and staff. Indeed, there was a particularly sharp contrast between the two ‘successors’ and the ‘new’ parties in terms of their local implantation, with the PSL the only party with a significant rural base and the the new parties concentrated almost exclusively in the main provincial and other larger towns. This relative superiority was rooted partly in the organisational legacies inherited from their predecessors, although their ability to provide clear points of reference to specific segments of the electorate was probably also significant in this respect. This was particularly true in the case of the PSL, whose organisational monopoly in rural areas (where social and cultural activities were more limited) gave the party greater scope for offering its members collective benefits associated with personal interaction. On the other hand, organisational inheritance was, at best, only a secondary factor in terms of local infrastructure and the successors’ relative superiority in this area was more a function of the fact that, at the time the research was undertaken, these were the two parties with the largest parliamentary representation and concomitant access to local deputies’ and Senators’ office facilities.

In other areas it was only really the PSL which displayed significantly more mass party characteristics. For example, both SdRP parliamentarians vis-a-vis the party central office and the party central office vis-a-vis party members enjoyed a high level of autonomy - due to the fact that the party operated within the framework of a broader SLD parliamentary fraction and election committee which involved the party leadership elites negotiating personnel and programmatic matters with its coalition partners. The PSL parliamentary fraction was, on the other hand, perceived as simply a vehicle for organising the party’s work within the parliamentary forum and implementing decisions taken by the party’s extra-parliamentary organs. Similarly, the PSL was the only party where the bureaucracy attached to the party central office was more significant than that attached to the parliamentary party - although the overlap between leadership personnel of these two bodies made this less distinction a less meaningful one. Perhaps most strikingly, the PSL was the one significant exception to the general pattern of broad electoral appeals aimed at loose constituencies and the only party which bore at least a superficial resemblance to the mass party model in terms of electoral strategy and bases of support. The PSL defined its ‘core’ electorate in class terms, and targeted its electoral appeal primarily at, the large proportion of the Polish population which had worked in peasant small-holdings even throughout the communist era and which, therefore, provided the party with a ‘natural’ socio-economic base. Although there was some evidence of the PSL attempting to broaden its base of support, there was a general tendency not to stray
too far into unfamiliar territory and most survey evidence suggested that these attempts had failed and that its base was, if anything, becoming even more concentrated among rural and agricultural voters. The PSL was also the only party surveyed that appeared to come close to attempting to root itself more firmly in the agricultural communities which it sought to represent by developing links with a wide range of rural social and cultural organisations.

Indeed, in some areas the mass party analogy simply did not apply even in the case of the PSL. An examination of internal power relations as they operated in reality revealed that the PSL actually vested its party central office leadership with considerably more power and autonomy than formal accounts suggested. None of the rural organisations with whom the PSL aligned itself was formally represented within, or linked to, the party other than on the basis of parliamentary electoral pacts and it was no more successful than the others at developing ancillary structures such as youth and women's organisations. Indeed, the PSL was actually one of the most enthusiastic supporters of state support for parties and, in this respect at least, actually bore a much closer resemblance to the cartel model than most of the 'new' parties.

These observations point to the need for a number of important caveats and qualifications to be placed on this general conclusion that the new Polish parties bore a closer resemblance to the more recent Western party models. They also raise broader questions about the overall applicability of, and dangers of transplanting, these party models which were developed to analyse West European democracies wholesale into the post-communist Polish context as some analysts have attempted to do. Nalewajko, for example, posits "a tendency for the cartel party to dominate" the new Polish party system,1 while Olson suggests that the emerging party type in post-communist Eastern Europe is a hybrid "cadre-catch-all party" with a "broad diffuse electoral appeal in a 'catch-all party' pattern" combined with a "cadre structure" of "a few active leaders."2 Indeed, Olson has even suggested that parties in post-communist Eastern Europe are actually a more advanced and developed version of the Western contemporary party models and that "the West is joining the East rather than the other way around."3

1 Protopartie i protosystem? p219.
Firstly, while there may be a number of important similarities there are also significant differences and the comparisons between the new Polish parties and contemporary Western developments should not be overdrawn. There was virtually no evidence of the leadership elites employing cartel party-type circumventionist strategies of appealing directly to the mass of party members in order to by-pass intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground. To describe the pattern of local-national relations as 'stratarchic' or wholly based on 'mutual autonomy' would probably be an exaggeration given that all party central offices retained, to a greater or lesser extent, certain reserve powers to intervene in local party affairs when these bodies actions were felt to be in conflict with the interests of the party as a whole, as in the case of parliamentary candidate selection.

While there was some evidence of the increasing use of external experts, advisers and consultants much of this was motivated by political, and sometimes personal, sympathies and provided on a voluntary rather than a paid, contractual basis. Consequently, it was not really accurate or even appropriate to draw analogies with the 'professionalisation' posited in the electoral-professional and cartel party models. Partly because of a residual hostility towards, and suspicion of (particularly Western) professional communication advisers, but mainly due to the parties' chronic lack of resources and extremely weak financial bases, there was no realistic prospect for the foreseeable future that such external 'professinals' as the parties did utilise would somehow develop as a substitute for the weak party central office bureaucracies as envisaged in these models.

Although, in line with contemporary Western developments, most Polish parties' electoral strategies were based on appealing to socially heterogeneous 'opinion' rather than 'interest' electorates, there was little evidence of the 'de-ideologisation' of party politics and concomitant focus on non-divisive, non-contentious 'valence' issues and the competence of leaders which was also an important feature of both the catch-all/electoral-professional and cartel party models. On the contrary, Polish politics appeared to be characterised precisely by party strategies based in large measure on appealing to such 'ideological' electorates. Electoral strategies were often rooted in appeals to, and party electorates were defined in terms of, moral-cultural or ideological values and categories rather than on the basis of competence and policy-effectiveness. Particularly in the case of the two largest electoral blocs, the SdRP/SLD and AWS, support for a given party was generally determined by ideological self-placement which was itself mainly a derivative of attitudes towards the past and moral-cultural rather than socio-economic issues. Indeed, one of the
more surprising features of the new parties' electoral strategies, highlighted by the 1997 parliamentary election campaign, was the relative lack of focus on party leaders, contrary to both recent Western developments and the hypothesised characteristics of post-communist politics. This may, of course, only be a conjunctural phenomena. As parties begin increasingly to copy successful models and adapt to meet the requirements of the mass electronic news media, we may well see the increasing personalisation or ‘Americanisation’ evident in most advanced Western democracies developing as an increasingly important feature of Polish party and electoral politics as well.

While it was possible to identify some evidence pointing to the emergence of a party cartel, there was still a general nervousness about, and consensus against, declaring unambiguously who was and who was not a member of the cartel at this stage of Polish party system development and restricting access to state support only to this narrow group. This was exemplified by the provisions of the 1997 Party Law which actually lowered the threshold for state party funding to include non-parliamentary parties. Given that the new party systems are still relatively undeveloped and the parties themselves are of an unstable, and often transient character, the shared political perspectives and notions of how parties could collectively further mutual interests, which underpin the pattern of inter-party collusion emphasised in that model, have simply not been firmly enough established for a relatively stable party cartel to properly emerge. As Lewis points out, “the essence of democracy in this conception, according to the authors of the cartel model, lies in the ‘ability of voters to choose from a fixed menu of political parties’. It is precisely this fixed menu that is lacking for very obvious reasons in East-Central Europe.”

Secondly, another key issue to bear in mind when considering the difference between the new Polish parties and parties in more established democracies is that of path dependency. The contemporary catch-all/electoral professional and cartel party models were designed principally to analyse party change: the transformation of well-established existing parties rather than, as is the case in post-communist Eastern Europe, the emergence and development of completely new ones. Western catch-all/electoral-professional and cartel parties inherited both pre-existing decision-making structures which they were attempting to adapt, a sizeable party bureaucracy and membership on to which they were attempting to graft an increased utilisation of professionals with looser attachments to the party, and an existing electoral base which they were attempting to broaden out. The new Polish ones have

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4 Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe. p12

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not inherited this initial resource, membership and organisational base, and level of party identification which Western parties accumulated through having operated in a competitive electoral environment over many years. While the new catch-all/electoral-professional parties in Western democracies were formerly mass working class or confessional parties with a pre-existing base of support engaged in a process of broadening out to a wider clientele, the new Polish were attempting to develop such a ‘core’ electorate in the first place. On the other hand, the new Polish parties have much greater access to the state than Western parties at an analogous stage in party development. Even Olson, who draws strong parallels between parties in post-communist Eastern Europe and contemporary Western models, acknowledges that “party development in Central Europe is not so much emulating as by-passing the developmental life cycle of West European parties.” The fact that the new Polish parties are following a different developmental path means that these are not simply straight transplants of Western models and that it is impossible to, as Olson puts it, “leapfrog directly into the mass communications video age” without evolving into something qualitatively different.

Thirdly, it is also possible to identify certain features which appear to be unique to the new post-communist Polish parties and where they are taking a clearly different form than established Western parties. The single, most striking of these was the fact that while, in terms of the ‘official story’, most of the individual member-based parties have very similar structures and modes of internal decision-making and representation, there were various organisational forms encompassed by the term ‘political party’ which is, therefore, an extremely fluid one in the post-communist context. While many Western political scientists have attempted to define exactly what we mean by, and identify the properties that are unique to, a political party, this is a far from academic question in the post-communist Poland. Numerous ad hoc coalitions and electoral alliances have emerged, most notably AWS and the SLD, which contain various different parties and groupings. Some of these were simply temporary electoral expedients, others also existed as party formations in parliament or in local councils, although not necessarily always comprising the same configuration of parties and groupings which competed together in the elections, while others still had separate organisational and decision-making structures operating in parallel with their component parties.

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Moreover, the boundaries between parties and interest groups in post-communist Poland appeared to be extremely porous. Polish trade unions contested elections, secured parliamentary representation, played a role in helping to form and bring down governments, developed wide ranging political programmes, and emerged as significant political players in their own right meeting many of the criteria and functions formally ascribed to political parties sensu stricto. This was particularly true in the case of Solidarity but also, to a lesser extent, the OPZZ federation and others. This confusion of roles in relation to interest articulation and aggregation was also reflected in the fact that some parties, most notably the PSL, behaved more like interest groups.

Nonetheless, although it is possible to highlight particularly striking structural and organisational features in the new Polish parties this is not to say that they represent, some kind of a new and unique post-communist model of party organisation. This is partly because even if such a new model were emerging (which it is far from clear that it is) it would not be possible to identify it solely on the basis of single country study. There are clearly valid questions to be raised about how far it is possible to generalise on the basis of the Polish experience alone and more definitive judgements on this question await further comparative work in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe that will build on the findings of this research. Even more significantly, given the aforementioned instability, immaturity and evolutionary nature of both the party systems and parties themselves, it is quite simply too early to draw such firm conclusions. As even the brief survey of party formation and development in post-communist Poland set out in chapter one shows, many parties which at one stage appeared to enjoy relatively favourable prospects for development looked far weaker just a year or two later, the shifting kaleidoscope of parties and groupings on the Polish right being the prime example. As Olson has accurately pointed out, "the topic of party political organisation in the post-communist countries is a moving target."7

Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that, as pointed out in chapter one, these contemporary Western party models are themselves ideal-types. Moreover, there are always various types of party existing alongside each other at the same time, some of which clearly deviate from the dominant party type, and these models are not, nor should they be, used slavishly even in the Western literature. Consequently, while they are extremely useful as analytical tools in terms of highlighting and helping us to understand some of the new parties' structural and organisational features, it is

important to avoid transplanting these models wholesale into the different conditions of post-communist Eastern Europe or of drawing too direct comparisons or analogies on the basis of similarities in only one or two structural features.

On the basis of the findings of this research, it is, therefore, certainly possible to conclude that although the Polish party system is consolidating and stabilising and that the new Polish parties are both strong at the level of state institutions and appear capable of fulfilling their role in terms of structuring elections, institutions and recruiting elites. However, given their close resemblance in many important respects to the more recent catch-all/electoral-professional and cartel party models they are also developing as remote and somewhat distant institutions, weak at the societal level. The nature of the links between parties and their electorates are, and are likely to remain, fairly shallow and, consequently, they are likely to be much less effective in terms of articulating and aggregating societal interests and even less successful in mobilising the citizenry and integrating them into the political process. Although it is not the intention of this research to consider normatively which is the ‘best’ type of party structure and organisation, the evolution of the new Polish parties along these lines – orientated towards the state with leaders responsive to electorates but not geared towards securing democratic participation by citizens – is clearly of considerable potential significance to the kind of democracy which is developing in post-communist Poland. Consequently, the danger remains that any apparent party system consolidation at the level of state institutions will remain somewhat illusory and that the process of democratisation in post-communist Poland will remain vulnerable to the kind of ‘anti-party’ backlash that we have witnessed in the more established West European democracies.
APPENDICES

AND

TABLES
Appendix 1 - Parties and organizations in the Democratic Left Alliance, May 1997

Bielarussian Socio-Cultural Fellowship
Democratic Union of Women
Federation of Metal, Electrical and Machine Industry Workplace Union Organisation—‘Metalworkers’
Federation of Polish Higher and Scientific Schools Teaching Unions
Federation of Health Service Employees Trade Unions
Federation of Polish State Railways Employees Trade Unions
Federation of Light Industry Employees Trade Unions
National Council of Left-wing Veterans’
National Representation of Retirees and Pensioners
Supreme Co-operative Council
New Democracy
All-Poland Agreement of Trade Unions
Labour Party
Polish Socialist Party
Polish Green Party
Polish Union of Retirees, Pensioners and Invalids
Movement of Working People
Independent European Initiative ‘NIE’
Social democracy of the Polish Republic
‘Generations’ Association
Association of Poles Injured by the Third Reich
‘Watchtower’ Polish Home Association
Secular Culture Fellowship
Fellowship of the Friends of Social Sciences
Christian-Social Union
Polish Students Association
Polish Teachers’ Union
Union of Polish Socialist Youth
‘Builders’ Trade Union
Trade Union of Miners in Poland
Copper Industry Employees Trade Union
Trade Union of Farming Workers in the Republic of Poland
Polish People’s Army Trade Union

Appendix 2 - Parties and organizations in Solidarity Electoral Action,
March 1997

Solidarity trade union
Centre Agreement
Christian National Union
Confederation for an Independent Poland-Patriotic Camp
Polish Federation of Catholic Families
Movement of One Hundred
Conservative-Peasant Party
Confederation for an Independent Poland
Solidarity Electoral Action Youth Committee
Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Alliance
National League
Party of Christian Democrats
Movement for the Republic-Patriotic Camp
Lech Wałęsa Institute
‘Solid in the Elections’ Movement
Non-party Bloc for the Support of Reforms
Party of Polish Democracy
Christian Democratic-Labour Party
New Poland
‘Kontra’ trade union
Conservative Coalition
Polish Patriotic Movement
Polish Borderlands Party
Confederation of Republicans
Centre Agreement-Integration Initiative
Polish Unity
National Right
Party of Real Politics
Polish Western Union
Polish Forum
Polish Ecological Party of Greens
‘Rola’ Movement of Peasant-Agrarian Options
Safe Poland Foundation
Polish Patriotic Forum
Party of the National Alliance
Catholic Laity Union
‘Victoria’ Party
National Conference of Citizens’ Committees
Independent Students’ Union
Solidarity Individual Farmers’ Union-Agreement for Solidarity Electoral Action

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<th>Votes</th>
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<td>Tadeusz Mazowiecki</td>
<td>2,973,264</td>
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<td>Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz</td>
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<td>9.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roman Bartoszcze (PSL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leszek Moczulski (KPN)</td>
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<td><strong>Second round:</strong></td>
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<td>Stanisław Tymiński</td>
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Table 1.2: October 1991 Parliamentary election to the Sejm

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<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union (UD)</td>
<td>1,382,051</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>1,344,820</td>
<td>11.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic Electoral Action (WAK)</td>
<td>980,304</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centre Agreement (PC)</td>
<td>977,344</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (PSL)</td>
<td>972,952</td>
<td>8.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)</td>
<td>841,738</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)</td>
<td>839,978</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant Agreement (PL)</td>
<td>613,626</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity (NSZZ'S')</td>
<td>566,553</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Beer Lovers' Party (PPPP)</td>
<td>367,106</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>16</td>
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</table>

Table 1.3: September 1993 Parliamentary election to the Sejm

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Above the threshold:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>2,815,169</td>
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<td>171</td>
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<td>Polish Peasant Party (PSL)</td>
<td>2,124,367</td>
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<td>132</td>
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<td>Democratic Union (UD)</td>
<td>1,460,957</td>
<td>10.59</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Union (UP)</td>
<td>1,005,004</td>
<td>7.28</td>
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<td>Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)</td>
<td>795,487</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR)</td>
<td>746,653</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Below the threshold:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Electoral Committee 'Fatherland' (KKW'O')</td>
<td>878,445</td>
<td>6.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>676,334</td>
<td>4.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centre Agreement (PC)</td>
<td>609,973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)</td>
<td>550,578</td>
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<td>Union of Real Politics (UPR)</td>
<td>438,559</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Defence</td>
<td>383,967</td>
<td>2.78</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party X</td>
<td>377,480</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition for the Republic (KdR)</td>
<td>371,923</td>
<td>2.70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement (PSL-PL)</td>
<td>327,085</td>
<td>2.37</td>
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**Table 1.4: November 1995 Presidential election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First round:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksander Kwaśniewski (SLD)</td>
<td>6,275,670</td>
<td>35.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lech Wałęsa</td>
<td>5,917,328</td>
<td>33.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacek Kuroń (UW)</td>
<td>1,646,946</td>
<td>9.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Olszewski</td>
<td>1,225,453</td>
<td>6.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldemar Pawlak (PSL)</td>
<td>770,419</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadeusz Zieliński (UP)</td>
<td>631,432</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz (ZChN)</td>
<td>492,628</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz Korwin-Mikke (UPR)</td>
<td>428,969</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrzej Lepper (Self-Defence)</td>
<td>235,797</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second round:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksander Kwaśniewski (SLD)</td>
<td>9,704,439</td>
<td>51.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lech Wałęsa</td>
<td>9,058,176</td>
<td>48.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.5: September 1997 Parliamentary election results for the Sejm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Above the threshold:</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)</td>
<td>4,427,373</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>3,551,224</td>
<td>27.13</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Union (UW)</td>
<td>1,749,518</td>
<td>13.37</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (PSL)</td>
<td>956,184</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Poland’s Reconstruction (ROP)</td>
<td>727,072</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Below the threshold:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Union (UP)</td>
<td>620,611</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party of Retirees and Pensioners (KPEiR)</td>
<td>284,826</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of the Republic Right (UPR)</td>
<td>266,317</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Agreement of Retirees and Pensioners (KPEiRRP)</td>
<td>212,826</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic-Bloc for Poland (ChD-BdP)</td>
<td>178,395</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rzeczpospolita, 2 October 1997.
### Table 2.1: Proportion of parliamentarians in 'narrow' party leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 1997</th>
<th>May 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SdRP</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters, Parliamentary Club Offices, Sejm and Senate Chancelleries.
Table 2.2: Proportion of parliamentarians in party executives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>February 1997</th>
<th>May 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SdRP</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters, Parliamentary Club Offices, Sejm and Senate Chancelleries.

---

1 The figures for the Central Executive Committee were 44% and 42% respectively.

2 The February 1997 figure for the Executive Committee was 44%.
Table 2.3: Proportion of Parliamentary Club Presidium members on party executives, June 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SdRP</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters and Parliamentary Club Offices, June 1997.
Table 2.4 - Proportion of parliamentarians in party national Councils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>February 1997</th>
<th>May 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SdRP</td>
<td>52%(^1)</td>
<td>50%(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters, Parliamentary Club Offices, Sejm and Senate Chancelleries.

\(^1\) Estimate based on figure supplied by Maciej Poręba, SdRP head of party organisation, author interview, 28th February 1997.

Table 3.1: Number of staff employed in party central offices and Parliamentary Club offices (full-time equivalent), June 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Central office</th>
<th>Parliamentary Club office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SdRP/SLD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Local party organisational infrastructure in Gdańsk, Jelenia Góra, Płock and Rzeszów, April 1997

Gdańsk:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SdRP</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
<th>AWS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offices</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Faxes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid staff</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars</td>
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Jelenia Góra:

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<th></th>
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<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
<th>AWS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faxes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid staff</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Płock:

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<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
<th>AWS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Faxes</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars</td>
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Rzeszów:

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<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
<th>AWS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photocopiers</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Cars</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Information supplied by local party officials, April-June 1997

1 These included party facilities of 1 local office, 2 telephones, 1 fax, 2 paid employees, 1 computer and 1 photocopier plus an estimate of local parliamentary facilities based on information in: Kancelaria Sejmu. Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, II Kadencja: Biura Poselskie. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 1995.
### Table 3.3: Total number of Sejm deputies offices, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>‘Basic’ offices</th>
<th>‘Branch’ offices</th>
<th>Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SLD (SdRP)
\(^{1}\) | 164 (76)       | 477 (251)       | 478 (235) |
| PSL        | 128            | 147             | 287       |
| UW         | 72             | 84              | 153       |
| UP         | 38             | 81              | 127       |
| **Total**  | **402**        | **789**         | **1065**  |


\(^{1}\)These figures are based on 1993 data on the number of SLD Sejm deputies who acknowledged SdRP party members and, given that this figure increased from 70 to over 100 during the course of the 1993-97 parliament, certainly underestimates the numbers of offices and staff attached to SdRP parliamentarians.
### Table 3.4: Total number of Senators’ offices, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'Basic' offices</th>
<th>'Branch' offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1Separate figures for SdRP Senators are not available.
### Table 4.1 - September 1997 Parliamentary election voting patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AWS</th>
<th>SLD</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>ROP</th>
<th>UP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting by sex</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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Source: Figures supplied to author by Institute for Public Opinion Research (OBOP), November 1997.
Table 4.2: November 1995 Presidential election
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Table 4.3: September 1993 Parliamentary election voting patterns

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¹ Combined votes for Democratic Union (UD) and Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD).
² The Coalition for the Republic (KdR) was led by future ROP leader, Jan Olszewski.
³ Combined votes for the ‘Fatherland’ Catholic Election Committee (KKW'O’), Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), Non-party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (BBWR), Centre Agreement (PC) and Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement (PSL-PL).
Table 4.4: Parties and groupings best representing socio-economic groups, July 1997

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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious believers&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political elites</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary people</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small businesses</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large businesses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State firm directors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large foreign firms</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>1</sup> These figures were distorted by the temporary emergence of what proved to be the electorally insignificant National Party of Pensioners and Retirees (KPEiR) which was cited by 66% of respondents as the best representatives of retirees interests. More accurate figures are probably those in OBOP’s analogous December 1996 survey taken before the emergence of the KPEiR: AWS (16%), UP (15%), SLD (12%) and Don’t know (37%).

<sup>2</sup> Again the figures are distorted by the ephemeral Non-party Bloc for the Support of Reforms-Christian National Democratic 'Bloc for Poland' (BBWR-ChDN 'BdP') which was cited by 48% of respondents. The more accurate December 1996 figures were: AWS (39%), ROP (10%) and Don’t know (32%).

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Table 4.5: Party supporters' ideological self-placement, November 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left (1-3)</th>
<th>Centre (4)</th>
<th>Right (5-7)</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: Voting intentions according to ideological self-placement, August/September 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: Voting intentions according to Church attendance.
August/September 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>SLD</th>
<th>AWS</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>ROP</th>
<th>UP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Several times a week</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times a month</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times a year</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: Party leader positive (and net approval) ratings, February-October 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Leader</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cimoszewicz</td>
<td>54 (+10)</td>
<td>50 (+2)</td>
<td>51 (+6)</td>
<td>39 (-20)</td>
<td>44 (-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pawlak</td>
<td>43 (-11)</td>
<td>40 (-18)</td>
<td>40 (-16)</td>
<td>38 (-22)</td>
<td>34 (-29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balcerowicz</td>
<td>40 (-13)</td>
<td>41 (-13)</td>
<td>42 (-9)</td>
<td>42 (-11)</td>
<td>55 (+16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olszewski</td>
<td>39 (-15)</td>
<td>38 (-17)</td>
<td>38 (-16)</td>
<td>39 (-18)</td>
<td>35 (-23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krzaklewski</td>
<td>38 (-17)</td>
<td>37 (-21)</td>
<td>38 (-18)</td>
<td>37 (-21)</td>
<td>43 (-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugaj</td>
<td>33 (-16)</td>
<td>33 (-16)</td>
<td>33 (-15)</td>
<td>35 (-16)</td>
<td>30 (-27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleksy</td>
<td>23 (-52)</td>
<td>29 (-40)</td>
<td>28 (-40)</td>
<td>26 (-45)</td>
<td>28 (-41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Total number of party members claimed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>150,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SdRP</td>
<td>60,000 (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS AWS</td>
<td>30,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPEiR</td>
<td>27,000 (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>15,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKL</td>
<td>15,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>14,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>10,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPN-QP</td>
<td>10,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>10,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChDIIIIRP</td>
<td>6,000 (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZChN</td>
<td>6,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PChD</td>
<td>4,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>3,500 (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL-PL</td>
<td>3,500 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>3,000 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RdR</td>
<td>3,000 (1994)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various newspaper articles and figures supplied by national party headquarters.
### Table 5.2: Party membership as a percentage of the electorate, 1989-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Membership (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: All figures except for Poland (author's estimate) are taken from: P. Mair, *What is different about post-communist party systems?* 1996. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. p14.
Table 5.3: Party membership, basic organisational units and local implantation in Gdańsk, Jelenia Góra, Płock and Rzeszów, April 1997

Gdańsk:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SdRP</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circles/cells</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implantation</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jelenia Góra:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SdRP</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>120-150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circles/cells</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implantation</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Płock:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SdRP</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circles/cells</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implantation</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rzeszów:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SdRP</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circles/cells</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70-85</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implantation</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures supplied by local party officials, April-June 1997.
Table 5.4: Total number of local councilors, March 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Councilors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures supplied by national party headquarters, March 1997.
Table 5.5: Total number of local councillors in Gdańsk, Jelenia Góra, Płock and Rzeszów, April 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SLD</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>ROP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gdańsk</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelenia Góra</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Płock</td>
<td>60-70</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeszów</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10-20</td>
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</table>

Source: Figures supplied by local party officials, April-June 1997.
### Table 5.6: Comparative levels of party identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 5.7: Comparative confidence in parties, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level of confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former East Germany</td>
<td>18(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^1\) 1993 figure.
Table 5.8: Confidence in Polish institutions (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Level of confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPZZ</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: 1993 State Election Refunds
(Figures in new zloties)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/grouping</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Income¹</th>
<th>Parliamentarians</th>
<th>Refund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SdRP/SLD</td>
<td>1,870,000</td>
<td>1,787,000</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>3,016,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>1,488,700</td>
<td>1,491,300</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>2,436,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD (UW)</td>
<td>2,047,900</td>
<td>1,954,200</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,131,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>362,200</td>
<td>336,300</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>623,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>841,300</td>
<td>504,800</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>319,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBWR</td>
<td>1,504,000</td>
<td>1,442,300</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>261,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rzeczpospolita, 21 November 1996.

¹ The PSL, UD and BBWR's income included bank credits and other loans or credits of 657,300, 1,153,300 and 270,000 which obviously needed to be taken into account when considering the net profit or loss which each of these grouping's made on the election campaign after receipt of the election refund. See: P.G. Lewis and R.Gortat, 'Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland', Party Politics. Vol. 1 No. 4. pp599-608 (606).
Table 6.2: 1995 Total State Funding of Parliamentary Clubs/Circles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club/circle</th>
<th>Parliamentarians</th>
<th>Amount in new złoties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SdRP/SLD</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>9,792,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>7,920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3,744,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,872,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>768,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBWR</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>720,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity trade union</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>480,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: 1997 Election Refunds and Donations  
(Figures in new zloties)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/grouping</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Refunds</th>
<th>Donations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>11,100,000</td>
<td>9,300,000</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>6,300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SdRP/SLD</td>
<td>9,300,000</td>
<td>9,300,000</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>7,600,000</td>
<td>6,700,000</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>680,000</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>973,000</td>
<td>993,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPEiR</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>475,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPEiR RP</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 December 1997 and Rzeczpospolita, 23 December 1997.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members/parliamentarians</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>35,900</td>
<td>52,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election candidates</td>
<td>59,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election refund</td>
<td></td>
<td>623,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>12,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank interest</td>
<td></td>
<td>87,200</td>
<td>115,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>79,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>748,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>180,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: Party coverage on main evening news, May 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/grouping</th>
<th>News coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>5 minutes 20 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>4 minutes 4 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>3 minutes 52 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>2 minutes 58 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>1 minute 15 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1 minute 10 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 June 1997
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:


Chapters, journal articles and research papers:


Mair, Peter. *What is different about post-communist party systems?* Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. 1996.


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Newspaper articles:


Czackowska, Ewa K. “Konkurenci Pawlaka.” Rzeczpospolita. 9 April 1996.


Paradowska, Janina and Aleksander Chećko. "Język czynów." Polityka. 18 December 1993


**Documents:**


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