The Common Cause
The Life and Death of the Anglo-Swedish Alliance against France, 1805-1809.

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THE COMMON CAUSE
The Life and Death of the Anglo-Swedish Alliance
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Add. MSS Additional Manuscripts
Addpap Addington Papers. Devon RO
Adlerbeth Jörn Adlerbeth, Historiska anteckningar. vol. II. (Lund, 1892)
Anglica RA. Diplomatica Collection. Britain
Aspinall Arthur Aspinall (Editor). The Later Correspondence of George III. vol.V. (London, 1970)
ASS Gunnar Fagrell, Admiral Saumarez and Sweden. (London, 1974)
Bailleu Briefwechsel König Friedrich Wilhelm III's und der Königin Luise mit Kaiser Alexander I. (Leipzig, 1900)
Barnes H. Barnes, Canning and the Danes, 1807. History Today, XV (1965)
Barton H. A. Arnold Barton, Count Hans Axel von Fersen. (Boston, 1975)
Beskow Bernhard von Beskow, Historiska anteckningar rörande Gustaf IV Adolfs tid. Vol. I. (Stockholm, 1854)
BFA Bernadottiska familje arkivet.
BFK Gustaf Björlin, Finska Kriget 1808 och 1809. (Stockholm, 1882).
Bingham A Selection from the Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon. Edited by D.A. Bingham. vol. II. (London, 1884)
Björlin Gustaf Björlin, Sveriges krig i Tyskland åren 1805-1807. (Stockholm, 1882)
BLA RA. Diplomatica. Beskickningen i Londons arkiv.
Black Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions, 1783-1793. (Cambridge, 1994)
Bond Gordon C. Bond, The Grand Expedition. The British Invasion of Holland in 1809. (Athens, Georgia, 1979)
Borelius Hilma Borelius, Carl Gustav von Brinkman under diplomatåren 1792-1810. (Stockholm, 1918)
Bonsdorff Carl von Bonsdorff, Armfelt. vol. II. (Helsingfors, 1931)
Brandenburgica RA. Diplomatica. Prussia
Brown John Brown, Original Memoirs of the Sovereigns of Sweden and Denmark. vol. II. (London, 1818)
BSLSF Bonsdorff, Svenska litteratur sällskapet i Finland.
Bååth Cecilia Bååth-Holmberg, Förråderiets spel i kampen om Finland. (Stockholm, 1912).
Cambo Nordiska Museumet. Lord Kellies Archive. Cambo House. (Microfilm)
Carlsson Sten Carlsson. Gustaf IV Adolf. (Stockholm, 1945)
CC Correspondence, Despatches and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry. Edited by His Brother, Charles William Vane, Marquess of Londonderry. vol. V. (London, 1851)
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Sam Clason, Gustav IV Adolf och general Moore, Historisk tidskrift, XXXII, 1913.

Connelly
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DE

Derry

DNH
Edvard Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie daen Store Nordiske Krigs slutning til Rigernes Adskillelse, 1720-1814. vols. I-VII. (Copenhagen, 1891-1912)

Dropmore

DSH

Duffy
Michael Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower. The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France. (Oxford, 1987)

Ehrman

Ekedahl
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Emsley
Clive Emsley, Napoleonic Europe. (London 1993)

EnSO
KB. Engström samling. Osigerade.

ESKB

Fedorak

Finley

Flayhart

Fletcher

FO
Foreign Office

Fortescue

Fouché
The Memoirs of Joseph Fouché. (London, 1892)

FRAG
Finska riksarkivet. (Finnish National Archive).

Fregosi

Fremont

Ga
Gotländska arkiv, Meddelanden från Gotlands fornvänder. Årgång 66.

GAF
Sten Carlsson, Gustav IV Adolfs fall. (Lund, 1944)

Ga. Fåhraeus

Gallica
R.A. Diplomatica. France

Gash

Gasslander

Gates

Germanica
R.A. Diplomatica. Austria and Germany

GLG
| **Klemming** | Sven Klemming, General S.B.de Suremain. Ett emigrantöde i Sverige under Napoleontiden. (Stockholm, 1961) |
| **KrA** | Krigsarkivet. Stockholm |
| **KUDHA** | RA. Kabinettet. UD. Huvudarkivet. E.I. A:39 |
| **KWAIH** | Kungliga Wendes Artilleriregementes historia 1794-1994. Editor Sven Scheutz. (Kristianstad, 1993) |
| **LAGS** | RA. Lagerheimska samlingen. |
| **Larsson** | Hugo Larsson, Sveriges deltagande i den våpnade neutraliteten 1800-1801. (Lund, 1888) |
| **Lindeberg** | Lars Lindeberg, Englandskrigene 1807-1814. (Copenhagen, 1974). |
| **Livermore** | H.V. Livermore, A New History of Portugal. (Cambridge, 1969) |
| **Longford** | Elizabeth Longford, Wellington. (London 1992) |
| **Lundh** | Herbert Lundh, Gustav IV Adolf och Sveriges utrikespolitik 1801-1804. (Uppsala, 1926) |
| **Madariaga** | Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great. (London, 1981) |
| **Malmesbury** | Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury. vol. IV. (London, 1844) |
| **McGrew** | Roderick E.McGrew, Paul I of Russia 1754-1801. (Oxford, 1992) |
| **Metcalf** | Michael Metcalf, Russia, England and Swedish Party Politics, 1762-1766. The Interplay between Great Power Diplomacy and Domestic Politics during Sweden's Age of Liberty. (Stockholm, 1977) |
| **Minto** | The Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto. 1751 to 1806. Vol. III. (London, 1874) |
| **MP** | BLMC. Moore Papers |
| **MuP** | NLS. Murray Papers |
| **Muscovita** | RA. Diplomatica. (Russia) |
| **Nilsson** | J.W. Nilsson, De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och Frankrike under Gustav IV Adolf. (Uppsala, 1899) |
| **Nylund** | Martin Nylund, G.A. Reuterhohn under förmyndareidten 1792-1796. (Uppsala, 1917). |
| **Odelberg** | Wilhelm Odelberg, Viceamiralen Carl Olof Cronstedt. (Helsingfors, 1954) |
| **Palmer** | Alan Palmer, Bernadotte. (London, 1990) |
| **Palmer. DFOE** | Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. (London, 1992) |
| **Palmer NR** | Alan Palmer, Napoleon in Russia. (London, 1967) |
| **PAP** | Paget Papers. BLMC. |
| **Persson** | Anders Persson, 1808. Guerillakriget i Finland. (Stockholm, 1986) |
| **Porter** | Robert Ker-Porter, Travelling Sketches in Russia and Sweden during the years 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808. II. (London, 1813) |
Pratt


PRO

Public Record Office. London

RA

Riksarkivet. National Archive. Stockholm

Ramel


RDMF

RA. Russian Documents on Microfilm

Reilly


Reuterholm

R.A. Reuterholmska samlingen. Reuterholms dagbok (Diary)

RO

Record Office

Roach


Robertson


Rock


Rose

*The Diaries and Correspondence of Rt. Hon. George Rose*. vol. I-II. (London, 1860)

Ross


Rothenberg


Rudorff


Russell

*Memorials and Correspondence of Charles Fox*. Edited by Lord Russell. vol. IV. (London, 1854)

Ryan


Sandström


Saraiva


Sbornik

Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Obschestva. Documents published by the Imperial Russian History Society in St.Petersburg

Scaevola

K.A. Strömbeck, *Utlandiska diplomaters Minnen från Svenska Hofvet. Skildringar samlade ur deras anteckningar m.m.* (Stockholm, 1885)

SCGD

Sten Carlsson, *Gardesdegraderingen 1808*. Historisk Tidskrift. 6. (1943)

Schama


Schinkel


Schom


Schroeder


Schück

*Excellensen Greve A.F.Skjöldebrands memoarer*. Utgifna af Henrik Schück. vol. III. (Stockholm, 1904)

Seton


Sheehan


Sherwig


Simms


Sjövall


SKN

Hjör, Torvald T:son, *Carl Johan i den stora koalitionen mot Napoleon från landstigningen i Stralsund till stilleståndet i Rendsburg*. (Uppsala, 1935)
SKÅ
Generalstabens krigshistoriska avdelning. Sveriges krig åren 1808 och 1809.

Smith

SNA

SPBC

Spencer Robertson
W. Spencer Robertson, The Life of Miranda. (North Carolina, 1929)

SRE
H. Arnold Barton. Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760-1815. (Minneapolis, 1986)

SSC

SSK
Alan Sandström, Sveriges sista krig. De dramatiska åren 1808-1809. (Örebro, 1994)

SSKB

SUPH

Svensson

Säve
Teofron Säve, Sveriges deltagande i Sjöliga kriget, åren 1757-1762. (Stockholm, 1916)

Søby

Tangeraas

Tatischev
Sergei Tatischev, Alexandre I et Napoléon d'après leur correspondance inédite, 1801-1812. (Paris, 1891)

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Tegnér
Elolf Tegnér, Gustav Mauritz Armfelt. vol. III. (Stockholm, 1887)

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Tillotson

Tingsten
Lars Tingsten, Gustaf Wilhelm af Tibell. (Stockholm, 1924).

Trolle

TSLUB.C
Tolliska samlingen. Lunds Universitetsbibliotek. C.samlingen

TSLUB.D
Tolliska samlingen. Lunds Universitetsbibliotek. D.samlingen

Unger

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VÅFH
Vårt folks historia. V. Ed. Axel Coldvin. (Oslo, 1963)

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Wheeler
| **Wingårds** | Johan af Wingård, Minnen af händelser och förhållanden under en lång lifstid IV. (Stockholm, 1847) |
| **Willers** | Uno Willers, Ernst Moritz Arndt och hans svenska förbindelser. (Stockholm, 1945) |
| **Wiselgren** | P. Wieselgren, Essen. (Malmö, 1885) |
| **WO** | War Office |
| **Wynne** | The Wynne Diaries. Edited by Fremantle. Volume III. (London, 1940) |
| **Ålvsjö** | RA. Lagerbjelke samling. E.4450 |
Preface.

This thesis will view the Napoleonic War from three distinct angles. Firstly, as a world war that was fought beyond the narrow confines of Europe where events on other continents were as important as those taking place in Europe. Secondly, the thesis will view the war from an Anglo-Swedish angle with an emphasis upon the northern and Baltic regions of Europe. This region of Europe is often forgotten when the Napoleonic War is written about despite the fact it was of vital economic and strategic importance to Britain. Thirdly, this military contest between the Great Powers will be viewed from 'below' or in other words from the perspective of a minor power unable to influence events as much as these powers.

One good reason for Anglo-Swedish friendship was the strong trade links between the two countries, which led to their successful but neglected economic sabotage of Napoleon's Continental system. Yet economic factors, though vital, did not primarily account for the creation and continued life of the 'common cause'. Instead geopolitical and ideological factors gave rise to the 'common cause'. Firstly, although seeing themselves as nations apart from the continent Sweden and Britain's independence and strategic security depended upon no one power being able to upset or usurp the European balance of power. Secondly, in the eyes of Swedish and British conservatives (they ruled both countries for most of the alliance's life) Napoleonic France was not only a direct threat to their external security but Napoleon also came to symbolise everything they disliked about the new European order. To the architect of the alliance, Gustavus IV, and his fellow conservatives, Napoleon had to be defeated at all costs if Sweden, Britain and all of Europe was to survive.

But the conservatives had a monopoly on neither political power nor the truth, for powerful groups in both countries opposed the war with Napoleon. These groups, in opposition during most of the war in both countries, believed an accommodation with Napoleon was possible. In 1806 the British Whigs tried and failed to find a peaceful accommodation with Napoleon. Following defeat at Russian hands and the diversion of British interest to the Iberian peninsula, the Anglo-Swedish alliance was almost dead when in early 1809 the Swedish opposition took power through a coup. They managed, unlike their British colleagues, to get peace with Napoleon, but at a high price. Defeat, despair and domestic
turmoil the following year led to the election of marshal Bernadotte as ruler of Sweden. Within two years Bernadotte had begun rebuilding the 'common cause' with Britain, and in 1814 Sweden finally saw its great protagonist Napoleon defeated. The pro-war line had showed itself to be the only realistic and viable long-term option for either country.
Chapter One.

The Legacy.

Anglo-Swedish Relations during the Eighteenth Century and the Beginning of the 'Common Cause'.

I. Sweden's Eighteenth Century Legacy.

By the early eighteenth century when Britain was poised to become the paramount world power Sweden's great power era had already ended due to her catastrophic defeat in the Great Northern War (1700-1721). Having blamed Sweden's defeat upon autocracy Sweden's nobility opted to establish a parliamentary regime dominated by two parties, the Caps and Hats, but ruled for most of the time by the latter party. The Russian threat was a constant Swedish foreign policy theme as was the issue whether Sweden should remain isolated from continental politics by observing strict neutrality or reassert Sweden's pretensions of power by meddling in European politics. In 1757 the Hats believed (as did Gustavus IV in 1805) that the time was ripe to intervene on the continent against Prussia on the side of a powerful allied coalition that they hoped would be victorious. Both interventions led to revolution and the fall of the regimes that had risked an intervention in the dangerous waters of continental politics.¹

Sweden's king, Gustavus III (Gustavus IV's father), exploited the failures of the discredited parliamentary regime to overthrow it on 19 August 1772. The Russians and Danes, united by their enmity of Sweden, feared that Gustavus III would preside over a resurgent and therefore threatening Sweden. Their planned pre-emptive invasion of Sweden a year later however came to nothing because France intervened to prevent it. The price Sweden paid for France's timely intervention was to give her ally limited support in the American war against Britain. But Gustavus III, the

revolutionary royalist, gave his support only reluctantly, because he believed that the American republican 'contagion' would spread to Europe.2

While Gustavus III was no friend of republicans or revolutionaries he proved willing to exploit international turmoil to fish in troubled waters. In 1783 Gustavus III saw a chance to realise his old ambition of acquiring Norway by invading Zealand. Norway would not only prove a valuable economic addition but also eliminate the need for dividing Sweden's military forces between the defence of Finland and manning a western front against the hostile Dano-Norwegian army. (As we will see this ambition was inherited by his son who continued Swedish attempts in 1801 and 1808 to annex Norway by force or guile). Catherine II of Russia, Gustavus III's crafty cousin and match in the art of Machiavellian statecraft, had no interest, however, in seeing the entire Scandinavian peninsula dominated by Sweden and intervened to put a stop to Gustavus III's plans. In 1788 Gustavus III had his revenge by attacking Russia, but the failure of the Swedish fleet to defeat the Russians in June 1788 put an end to his hopes for a rapid descent upon St. Petersburg and a short summer war. By the autumn Gustavus III seemed about to share the Hats' fate as he had to contend with deteriorating finances, domestic discontent, the 'Anjala' mutiny in the Finnish army and a Danish declaration of war. But Gustavus III, unlike his son in 1808-1809, was at his best when he stared disaster in the face, and by early 1789 he had staged a remarkable recovery by overcoming his previous problems. That recovery was crowned with complete success when the Swedish navy won a stunning victory at Svensksund in July 1790 which paved the way for peace based on the status quo.3

During the course of the Russian war Gustavus III had to throw worried side glances at the disturbing situation in France. The chaos in France not only undermined her ability to aid Sweden, but could spread as far as Sweden itself.4 Gustavus III advocated harsh methods to crush the French 'trouble' claiming that 'The only remedy for all this is steel and cannon. It may be that at this moment the king

2 SRE. 80-85, 107, 114, 117-118, 121.
and queen are in danger, but this danger is not as great as that to all the crowned heads that are menaced by the revolution.\textsuperscript{5} Gustavus III, therefore, saw the warning signals from Paris earlier than most Europeans. His former enemy and fellow conservative Catherine II shared his fears and formed an alliance with Sweden in 1791. His successes in gaining Russian support was not matched by his endeavours to foster a French counter revolution.\textsuperscript{6} In fact, Gustavus III had more to fear from the Swedish opposition (radicalised by the French revolution) which managed to murder him in March 1792 during a masquerade ball in Stockholm.\textsuperscript{7} The conspirators failed to take power but duke Charles did and he ruled with the help of his friend and favourite, Count Gustav von Reuterholm. Aptly named the 'Grand Vizier', Reuterholm was the real power in Sweden and managed to make himself as hated a figure as Gustavus III had ever been by the time he was forced to resign with Gustavus IV's coming of age in November 1796.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{II. The Tranquility of the North}

\textbf{Britain's Baltic Interests and Northern Policy, 1701-1796}

During the seventeenth century Britain and Sweden remained apart and hardly touched upon each other's zones of influence. Britain did not interfere with Swedish hegemony in the Baltic, while except for some short-lived colonial experiments in America and Africa\textsuperscript{9}, Sweden chose not to challenge Britain's growing overseas dominance. Anglo-Swedish relations, therefore, remained peaceful except for occasional disagreements about trade or maritime rights. That changed drastically in 1700 when William III (preparing for a showdown with Louis XIV over Spain) did not want a northern war to distract his allies. He gave Sweden some naval support. George I of Hanover chosen as king of Britain in 1713 had no Spanish distractions and wanted Bremen for his Electorate to get access to the sea and used Britain's growing resentment over Swedish control over the Baltic to fight a short and victorious war against Sweden. Once he had achieved what he wanted George I maintained

\textsuperscript{5} SRE. 194
\textsuperscript{6} Barton. 146.
\textsuperscript{8} Nylund. 1-52.; SRE. 216-217, 227; DSH. IX. 222-229.
the Baltic balance of power to secure the vital supplies of naval stores by intervening against Russia during the latter stages of the Great Northern war.\textsuperscript{10}

With the return of peace and the uninterrupted flow of Baltic naval stores, British interest in Sweden declined. The few British travellers who went there complained about Sweden's Francophile sympathies and culture which did not serve to endear the country to the British.\textsuperscript{11} The Swedes in turn dismissed the British as a nation of shopkeepers, while they gave grudging respect to British naval power, commercial clout, industrial superiority, and scientific advances.\textsuperscript{12} Britain was also Sweden's most important export market (iron, tar, pitch, wood, herrings being her main exports). On the British side there was always the uncomfortable fact that without Baltic naval stores her vast merchant fleet and navy would be paralysed. An even more uncomfortable fact was that these supplies were a virtual monopoly of Russia, the primary power in the Baltic. This was both an economic and political weakness which put Britain at a disadvantage in relation to Russia. However, Russia's dependence upon Britain for trade and investment was even greater than Sweden's, which reduced the potential risks to Britain of being economically or politically blackmailed by Russia.\textsuperscript{13}

Mutually beneficial trading relations should have provided Sweden and Britain with a sufficiently strong base for a political alliance. Indeed those relations provided Gustavus IV's apologists among the historians with an argument for his British alliance. But strong trading links, as the Anglo-Russian cases showed, did not provide a strong enough base for an alliance without shared political interests and objectives. (Gustavus IV's later alliance with Britain rested mainly upon shared ideological, political, and strategic interests as well as common trading interests) Indeed the opposite could be argued since Sweden's ambition to expand her textile industry could only be made at the expense of British imports. Sweden also wanted her share of the rich oriental trade, which could only

\textsuperscript{10} Chance. 25-49, 58-73, 82-97, 116-130, 147-156, 185-276, 294-397.
\textsuperscript{12} Sven Rydberg, Svenska studieresor till England under frihetstiden. (Uppsala, 1951). 100-137, 139-343.
mean competition with the British. The Swedish East India Company (1731-1806) became a minor, but successful, competitor to its British counterpart.¹⁴

Instead, Sweden remained a French ally right up to the revolution because of their shared political objectives and interests. Economic interests were of secondary importance. In fact the Franco-Swedish alliance existed for reasons of mutual convenience, the shared desire to keep Russia in check, and tradition rather than realpolitik. The French alliance made Anglo-Swedish relations frostier than they need have been and placed them on opposite sides in the Seven Years War. In fact normal diplomatic relations remained broken between 1748 and 1764.¹⁵ But there were no actual hostilities between Sweden and Britain during the war.¹⁶ Britain's need for Swedish exports outweighed the benefits from attacking her since Sweden's contribution to the allied war effort was minor. Britain's introduction of draconian wartime regulations against neutral trade, seen as an attempt to damage competition (the suspected long term aim) rather than strangling French trade, backfired when the Scandinavian powers laid aside their mutual enmity to defend their common economic interests against the British. Only moderation on both sides prevented the maritime conflict escalating into serious crisis.¹⁷ But moderation would not stand in the way of Britain making use of the economic blockade, her strongest weapon, in the war against France. The French in turn tried to circumvent the blockade by enticing the neutrals into smuggling for them. Using the neutrals in this fashion had the added benefit for France of embroiling them in political conflict with Britain which diverted their enemy's attention. But Britain obliged her enemy by treating the neutrals in an arrogant manner based on her navel supremacy. It was only during periods of relative weakness, such as during the American War, that the British used a softer tone towards the neutrals. There was therefore an established pattern of antagonism between Sweden, which upheld the view that a neutral flag protected the cargo from British seizures, and Britain, the only power to maintain the opposite view, that an enemy cargo onboard a neutral vessel was contraband (which was given the widest possible definition). Neither side could afford to yield much ground, since the British contraband list

¹⁴ DSH. IX. 44-53.
¹⁵ Metcalf. 40-62.
¹⁶ Safe. 5, 11, 110, 323, 358, 360, 442, 536-7, 559-560, 570.
contained almost all of Sweden's main exports, while for the British to give in to Swedish demands would damage the effectiveness of her main economic weapon against France.

In 1765, when peace returned to the North, the British were presented with an opportunity not only to restore full diplomatic relations but even make an alliance with Sweden. The Francophile Hats had been replaced by the Caps who believed Sweden could become a British ally. But for Britain the great northern prize was Russia, not Sweden, for obvious economic and political reasons. Opposed to paying peacetime subsidies the British government failed to exploit Cap goodwill to cement closer Anglo-Swedish relations. The Gustavian revolution came as an unpleasant shock to Britain and she persisted in viewing Gustavus III as a French puppet and a threat to the 'Tranquility of the North'. But that perception changed when Gustavus III showed greater political independence vis-à-vis France than Britain had expected, especially when he kept Sweden out of the American war. Before the outbreak of the Russo-Swedish war Gustavus III offered the surprised British an alliance. Pitt declined the alliance but he was becoming increasingly aware of the Russian threat to both the Balkan and Scandinavian peninsulas. Pitt was prepared therefore in September 1788, with Prussian backing, to force Denmark out of the war with Sweden. Pitt had no interest in seeing Sweden weakened so much that it could not act as a counterweight to Russia and fulfil its role in maintaining the delicate balance of power in the North. But he limited his intervention to ensuring Sweden's survival and nothing more. A calculated minimum effort which his political protégé, George Canning, was to practise twenty years later under similar circumstances with Gustavus IV. The British viewed the outbreak of the French revolution with the similar indifference which was in marked contrast to Gustavus III's immediate recognition of its dangerous potential. Pitt only belatedly realised that revolutionary France represented an even greater danger than Bourbon France had ever done and that Gustavus III's remedy, of brute military force, was the only one that would either contain or destroy this threat.18

When Britain declared war on France in February 1793 it was inevitable that the old arguments concerning neutral maritime rights would flare up again. Neither side was likely to give way since Britain had regained her political confidence following her American debacle, while the success of the Armed League of Neutrality (1780-1783) had given Sweden a false sense of strength. The new Anglo-Swedish conflict was triggered by the British seizure of two Swedish convoys in the English Channel that they suspected were sailing for French ports. Gustavus IV’s demand that the British release the convoys was refused and the two countries would be locked in an acrimonious dispute over the two convoys for the next five years.

In 1799 the Anglo-Swedish crisis escalated when the British prize courts condemned the Swedish convoys and emperor Paul I of Russia ended his alliance with Britain over the failure of the Second Coalition. During the summer of 1800 Paul I began to build an Armed League of Neutrality built around Russia with Denmark, Sweden and eventually Prussia as members. The aim of this league was to curb Britain’s ‘tyranny of the seas’. Gustavus IV gave his wholehearted support to the aim of curbing Britain’s ‘arrogant’ maritime pretensions but opposed Paul I’s greater political aim of crippling Britain by co-operating with France in invading India. Gustavus IV had no wish to weaken Britain so much that she could not keep France, a far greater threat to Europe, in check. He made, therefore, last minute efforts to avoid war in December 1800. But the British, suspecting him of collaborating with Russia, broke off the negotiations. Gustavus IV, to avoid being left isolated, joined Paul I’s armed League. By then the British were already making military preparations against the League. Pitt brushed aside opposition claims that his government was making war on friendly powers, pointing out that Britain’s vital grain imports from the Baltic and her blockade against France were

19 Svensson. 347-349
20 McGrew. 287-313; Jupp. 152, 253, 257, 260
22 Larsson. 48, 58.
equally threatened by the League's claims. In January 1801 an embargo was imposed on the League members' shipping. 24

Despite a change of government to the more 'moderate' Addington administration in February 1801, British preparations for war continued. 25 The new administration, like the previous one, failed to be impressed by the naval strength of their adversaries which no doubt encouraged the British to press on with their naval mobilisation. 26 But the first British blow fell on the defenceless Swedish and Danish colonies in the West and East Indies, which were easily occupied in March and May respectively. 27 The British believed that only a British battle fleet in the Baltic could force the northern powers to capitulate, but they could not however decide if the fleet should attack Denmark or Russia first. 28

Unaware that the fleet was not aimed against Sweden's long, vulnerable coast, Gustavus IV mobilised his navy and coastal flotillas in March 1801. 29 He displayed the same fervent support of the allied cause as he was to do during his war against France four years later. He tried therefore to get a common Scandinavian defence of the Sound to be organised but it foundered on the Danish suspicion that he might use such military preparations to invade Zealand at a later date. 30 The Sound was therefore left open to a British attack that Gustavus IV expected would lead to a rapid Danish capitulation. As in 1806-1807, the Scandinavian powers failed, to their mutual detriment, to unite against a common threat. 31

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30 Larsson. 99-100.
31 Odelberg. 247-248.
Events moved with unexpected and devastating speed against the League. On 23 March emperor Paul I was murdered and a week later, on 2 April, Nelson defeated the Danes outside Copenhagen. Both events forced Denmark to sign an armistice with Nelson and prematurely abandon the alliance, which aroused Gustavus IV's angry suspicions. Even if Denmark and Russia abandoned the allies' 'common cause' against Britain, Gustavus IV had no intention to change his political views. (He displayed the same uncompromising attitude a few years later in the allied war against Napoleon). This time his determination to continue the struggle against Britain forced him to overcome his revulsion for the French Republic and he appealed to Napoleon for an alliance. Nothing came of these overtures since Napoleon was keen to open peace negotiations with Britain. Russia shared that desire and Alexander I, for the first but not last time, reversed Russia's foreign policy at a stroke leaving his allies stranded to pick up the pieces. On 13 June 1801 Russia agreed to British maritime demands, such as pre-emption rights and the humiliating process of British naval searches of convoyed merchant ships, which had been opposed all along by the League and thus secured a total victory for Britain.32

IV. Between Enemies and Friends.
Sweden's Troubled Relations with the Great Powers, 1801-1803

Sweden was therefore diplomatically isolated and it was crucial for Gustavus IV to break that isolation by rebuilding his relations with the British. In November 1801 Gustavus IV therefore appointed Jöran Silverhjelm as envoy to London, with the task of getting Sweden's West Indian colony (St.Bartholomew) back, a separate Anglo-Swedish commercial convention signed that would secure Sweden's exports from British seizure, and finally, compensation for the seized convoys. No mean diplomatic task in other words. Silverhjelm's negotiating partner, Lord Hawkesbury, the British foreign secretary was torn between a wish to normalise relations with Sweden and to force Gustavus IV to accede to the St. Petersburg convention. Hawkesbury's reception for Silverhjelm was polite but he demanded that Sweden accede to the above treaty without preconditions. When Silverhjelm met

he demanded that Sweden accede to the above treaty without preconditions. When Silverhjelm met Hawkesbury again on 12 January 1802, the foreign secretary made it clear that if Swedish demands for a separate and more favourable commercial treaty were to be accepted, then it would have to be matched by Swedish tariff concessions. (Such British demands were to be made during the next couple of years without success.) Hawkesbury remained adamant and Silverhjelm agreed to accede to the St. Petersburg treaty on 26 February 1802.33

Gustavus IV had hoped that his concession would be reciprocated, but Hawkesbury remained ominously silent about the convoys, commercial concessions or the return of St. Bartholomew. There was of course a more indirect channel of communication that had opened up with the arrival of king George III's son, the Duke of Gloucester, in Russia. The Swedes believed, quite rightly, that Gloucester was on a personal goodwill and fact finding tour to rebuild Britain's shattered relations with the northern powers on behalf of his government. Gloucester was, therefore, invited on 16 July to Finland where he was given a warm welcome from the king. Yet, despite the two princes striking up a warm friendship, nothing concrete was achieved. Gloucester's strong overtures for common action against Napoleon were ignored by the king (with strong approval from his private secretary, Baron Gustav Lagerbjelke) while his own equally strong demands for the restoration of 'his' convoys and colony could not be met by Gloucester, who had no authority to do so.34

This failure to reach an agreement with Britain would have mattered less to Gustavus IV had his relations with the other great powers been more satisfactory. Relations with Russia were of the greatest concern since they had remained tense since Russia's unceremonious 'desertion' of the armed League had left a strong residue of Swedish resentment. What made matters worse was Gustavus IV's orders to repaint a border bridge at Abborfors in the Swedish colours during an inspection tour of the border areas in the summer of 1802. A farcical competition to repaint the bridge broke out, but it was only in February 1803 that count Alexander Vorontsov, the Russian foreign minister, gave the Swedes

33 Lundh. 93; Clason. 27-28; Anglica. 484. Ehrenheim to Silverhjelm, 10, 13 Nov.1801; ESKB. IV. Lagerbjelke to Engeström, 4 Dec.1801.; Anglica. 478. Silverhjelm to Gustavus IV, 25 Dec.1801, 5, 8, 12, 29 Jan., 2, 26 Feb., 2 Mar. 1802; Lundh. 95.; Johnson. 120, 123.
Swedes an ultimatum to repaint the bridge in the Russian colours one final time or face war. On 28 March, the Russian government decided to invade Finland if Gustavus IV refused their ultimatum. On 9 April, the Russian ambassador in Stockholm, David Alopeus, warned Gustavus IV about the consequences of a refusal. As the crisis with Britain had shown, Gustavus IV loathed to be seen to give in to a superior force. It was only on 13 April that he reluctantly gave in to the Russian demands. But he had displayed a petulant brinkmanship that was to cause him and Sweden much trouble in the future. 35

In the past, when Sweden had faced the Russian threat, she had been able to rely on French support. By 1803 that support could no longer be counted upon. Napoleon refused to treat weaker states as equal negotiating partners and, unlike the Bourbons, Napoleon was keen to accommodate Russian expansionism against Sweden and the Ottomans in order to create a Franco-Russian alliance (as he had sought in 1801) than contain it. Napoleonic France, unlike Bourbon France, could therefore not be relied upon to keep Russia in check. As Gustavus IV could not overcome his ideological aversion to France, and Napoleon showed scant interest in the alliance, the talks proved a complete failure. In January 1802 the Franco-Swedish trade talks collapsed and in October the French placed a stiff tariff on Swedish iron exports. Obviously the two states' different objectives, priorities and economic interests prevented them from becoming allies, both in 1802 and later. 36

V. The Road to the Treaty of London, September 1802 - June 1803.

Sweden's unsatisfactory relations with Russia and France made it imperative to rebuild normal relations with Britain as quickly as possibly. A good opportunity to do so arose in September 1802


36 Lundh. 54, 57-58, 79-80, 84-88; Johnson. 155-156; SUPH. III.(1). 68-71.; Nilsson. 80-84, 87-88, 90-91; Schinkel. 140-141, 143.
when Charles Arbuthnot, the new British envoy, arrived in Stockholm. Unfortunately, Hawkesbury, who was as pre-occupied with Russia as Napoleon was, only furnished Arbuthnot with limited instructions that left the initiative in any talks to the Swedish side. The Swedish foreign minister, Fredrik Wilhelm von Ehrenheim, met Arbuthnot for the first time on 7 October. Ehrenheim posed exactly the question Arbuthnot had no instructions concerning: when the convoy compensation would be paid. Arbuthnot could only stall, but he expected the worst when, some time afterwards, he was invited to a private dinner with Ehrenheim. Instead of being interrogated about the compensation question, he was astonished to find Ehrenheim proposing, on the king’s behalf, an unofficial Anglo-Swedish alliance to stem Napoleon's encroachments in Germany which, indirectly threatened Swedish Pomerania, in north Germany. Gustavus IV had seen with growing anxiety how Napoleon had undermined the Holy Roman empire. He believed both Sweden and Britain had a common interest to prop up the Empire and preserve, as far as possible, the status quo in Germany. This proposal made it clear that Gustavus IV was a committed opponent of Napoleon well before his German trip.

Arbuthnot’s mission had therefore taken a sharp turn towards an Anglo-Swedish reconciliation, which seemed to improve further when Gloucester, leaving Russia for home, arrived in Stockholm on 10 November. Both the envoy and the duke were shown every sign of consideration, which aroused Napoleon's anger. His envoy's protests were angrily refuted by Gustavus IV, who in his turn furiously denounced Napoleon's expansionistic plans in Germany. 37

Thus not only was Gustavus IV showing growing signs of enmity against Napoleon, but he seemed keen on an alliance with Britain to put a check to French expansionism. Arbuthnot and Gloucester's optimism would not last, since Gustavus IV was no dupe and he insisted as a precondition for any such rapprochement that Britain pay unconditional compensation for the convoys. Gustavus IV always insisted upon securing the best financial deal from the British however tempting the political objectives of an Anglo-Swedish alliance. The British were to find out, to their cost, how determined the king was on that score and how hard a bargain Gustavus IV drove. His envoy Silverhjelm, feeling that his earlier accession to the Anglo-Russian treaty was a mistake since Hawkesbury had not

reciprocated, refused to yield to the British demand that in return for paying the convoy compensation Sweden should lower her tariffs on British goods. The negotiations remained stalemated during the whole of the winter 1802-1803 as neither side budged an inch on their relative demands. The impatient Gustavus IV became frustrated with British procrastination and decided to take out that frustration upon the nearest available British person. (He was to repeat this 'method' twice later on.) In March 1803 Gloucester was forced to leave Stockholm under a cloud of mutual recriminations that seemed to herald a fresh Anglo-Swedish crisis. The renewal of the Anglo-French War in May 1803 prevented such a crisis from escalating. Hawkesbury realised Britain's bargaining position had weakened and that British exporters needed access to Europe through Swedish Pomerania, to circumvent the French controlled coastline. Nor was it wise that a diplomatically isolated Britain make an enemy of Sweden. Hawkesbury therefore gave in to Swedish demands and on 25 July 1803 signed the Anglo-Swedish commercial convention, which exempted Sweden's exports from the British list of contraband, secured Swedish shipping from seizures, and gave generous compensation for the confiscated convoys. Swedish shipping and overseas trade had gained the security it had sought for well over a century and the convention was viewed, quite rightly, as a diplomatic triumph. It also removed any financial or commercial impediments to an Anglo-Swedish alliance. Thus, by granting important economic concessions to the Swedes, the British government could reap considerable political benefits from such generosity.38

VI. The Fatal Journey.
Gustavus IV's German Journey and the Renewal of the Anglo-French War, 1803-1804

By July 1803, as the Russian crisis was over and relations with Britain were about to be normalised in Sweden's favour, Gustavus IV set out to visit his in-laws in Baden. The trip was made for personal and political reasons. Queen Frederika wanted to see her family after a long separation and Gustavus

IV wanted to gain first hand experience of Napoleon's inroads upon Germany. The aim, given his earlier proposals to Arbuthnot, was no doubt to see what role he could play in putting a stop to Napoleon. His Francophile private secretary, Baron Gustav LagerbJelke, opposed the trip, therefore, on both counts. He feared that the queen would postpone a return journey to Sweden indefinitely and that Gustavus IV would indulge her wishes and the journey would become an agonisingly long stay. But above all Ehrenheim and LagerbJelke feared that a prolonged stay in the troubled south-western corner of Germany, so close to Napoleonic France, could embroil Sweden in all sorts of unwanted political turmoil due to Gustavus IV's anti-French principles and passionate temper. Their worst fears were to be amply realised.39

Both the portents and the timing for the journey could not have been worse for preserving Sweden's neutrality. The king's stormy crossing to Pomerania was an ominous sign of the storms that lay ahead for him and Sweden. Gustavus IV had in fact sailed straight into a new war that now lapped at the edges of Sweden. After almost 20 months of peace, the Anglo-French war had broken out again in May 1803. Some 14,000 British merchants and travellers were interned across French occupied Europe, and on 5 July the French army occupied George III's defenceless Electorate of Hanover. Neither the Prussians nor the Austrians lifted a finger to prevent this violation of the Empire but the Prussians had no wish to defend Hanover on behalf of a state they both distrusted and disliked.40

Prussian apathy stood in sharp contrast to Gustavus IV's strong reaction to the French occupation of Hanover which occurred almost simultaneously with Gustavus IV's arrival in Pomerania. Gustavus IV mobilised the Pomeranian army and ordered reinforcements from Sweden to strengthen it. This timely precaution was thought of as an over-reaction by the Swedish governor of Pomerania, general

Henrik von Essen, and an 'unnecessary provocation'. In hindsight Gustavus IV's precaution was not only prudent but as the latter conflict would show appeasement only encouraged Napoleon to further aggression. That aggression, as yet, was still not aimed against Sweden but Gustavus IV was worried that the smaller German states would be swallowed up by the client states of France and Prussia. He approved of the British blockade of the Hanoverian coast and took the initiative, despite the just recently ended Abborfors crisis, to enquire whether Alexander I would collaborate with Gustavus IV to protect Germany against the Franco-Prussian threat. After all, the emperor had dynastic links with Baden (he was married to Elizabeth, the elder sister of the Swedish queen) and Russia was a guarantor of Germany like Sweden. Unfortunately Alexander I failed to support his brother in law's plans to shore up the Holy Roman empire since that seemed to him and most other European statesmen as trying to keep a sinking ship afloat.41

General Gustav Mauritz Armfelt, an old confidant of the king's father and the Swedish envoy in Vienna, resided in Carlsruhe with the royal couple and found the extended stay there as trying as Lagerbjelke. He blamed the queen and her mother for this unsatisfactory state of affairs and denounced the former as the 'obstacle' and the other as the 'oracle'. He believed that the interminable stay would damage the king's popularity in Sweden. Armfelt's criticism was well founded, as the public was showing open discontent with Gustavus IV's prolonged absence. One citizen hung up a 'rooms to rent' sign on the Palace gate. The humour masked deeper resentment against the government and Gustavus IV's 'tyrannical' rule. Lagerbjelke, and other Francophile critics of the king, believed Gustavus IV anti-Napoleonic policies were due to the 'dangerous' influence French royalist émigrés in Carlsruhe. Other observers believed that Gustavus IV's later problems originated with the stay in Carlsruhe. In fact, he had already in September 1802, over half a year earlier, made his antipathy against Napoleon quite clear, including an alliance against him. Nor were Lagerbjelke's hopes for a Franco-Swedish alliance realistic, since it took Talleyrand months to send a French...

41 TSLUB C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 15 July 1803. See Carlsson. 85; ibid. Essen to Toll, 7 July 1803; ibid. Lagerbjelke to Toll, 15 July 1803; Anglica. 484. Ehrenheim to Silverhjelm, 3 June, 8, 14, 18, July 1803; ibid. Lagerbjelke to Silverhjelm, 14 July 1803; Adlerbeth. 316; Lundh. 225-229; SUPH. III. 88.
negotiator to Carlsruhe. By the time he arrived there, in late 1803, Sweden and France were already on collision course. 42

Lagerbjelke persisted to believe that such a Franco-Swedish alliance was possible, even desirable, and that it was only Gustavus IV's ideological prejudices that prevented it from becoming a reality. There is some truth in Lagerbjelke's analysis but there existed 'real' reasons for Franco-Swedish alienation. How far were in fact the king's policies guided by his background, personality and ideological perceptions? The simple answer was that these had a very strong influence upon his foreign policy, yet so many lies and legends surround this little liked and little understood king that it is very difficult to disentangle fact from fiction. Gustavus IV kept no diary and he never wrote down his ideas on paper. All of which proves a great hindrance in assessing his plans. Nor is it any easier to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of his character. His aunt, Duchess Charlotte, believed his many good personal qualities were ruined by his lack of patience or sound judgement. Count Hans Axel von Fersen, another old confidant of his father, believed the king's honesty and self-discipline were outweighed by his 'frivolousness in regard to matters of state and a lack of familiarity and ability of such'. [and]. 'for allowing the state secretaries [to] lead him because of his lack of foresight, industriousness and interests in state affairs'. 43 Gustav von Brinkman, one of his more capable diplomats, claimed that 'We possess without doubt no greater and more conscientious patriot than him. Enlightened, thoroughly honest and dependable', rare qualities in any man, even more so in a monarch, according to Brinkman 44, who remained a staunch admirer and supporter of Gustavus IV without sharing his ideology.

Because of his temper and personal peculiarities he was accused (like king George III) of being mad and of being illegitimate as well. Both of these unsubstantiated accusations were to haunt him during his reign and did much to undermine his authority and standing in Sweden. Nevertheless, his childhood was tragic and lonely enough to cause major psychological problems. When he was only

43 Barton. 304.
44 SSKB. XVI. f.178. 12 Dec. 1799 Brinkman to Silverhjelm.
fourteen years old his father was murdered, and this instilled in him, for the rest of his life, a fervent hatred for revolutionaries and radicals. No doubt his father's fate haunted him and contributed to his intense, almost paranoid, suspiciousness of his surroundings. Gustavus IV came to cherish his father's memory, which included his political objectives and his father's intense hatred of the French revolution and everything it stood for. That was established at an early age, as was his honest and blunt outspokenness, since he told the French republican envoy in October 1793 that the execution of Marie-Antoinette was a barbarous act. Through these troubled political times and his own personal turmoil, his religious beliefs gave him comfort, support and sustenance. But his beliefs were unusually intense, fatalistic and old-fashioned almost more Catholic than Lutheran. He had in his religiosity, violent temper, passion, fatalism and stubborn pride, something of the proud, haughty Castilian about him (as one British observer noted) rather than the sombre, cool tempered Swede. In fact, besides Charles XII, the other great hero whom he resembled, was Don Quixote, and Quixotism was a phrase that was often to be used to describe him. Another was that of the restless crusader and he had, like Emperor Paul I, an inordinate respect for the Order of Malta, which he offered a permanent base on the Swedish island of Gotland. A love of heraldic chivalry was not the only characteristic that Gustavus IV shared with his distant relative Paul I. They were both conservative autocrats in an age of violent revolutionary change, and their undoing at the hands of their nobility came about because, as Paul I so aptly put it, they preferred to be hated for fighting evil rather than for condoning it.45

That evil, in Gustavus IV's eyes, was symbolised by revolutionary France and later personified by Napoleon. That ideological prism, coloured by his personal and political prejudices, guided his foreign policy, but the revolutionary contagion had to be fought, as in his father's day, on the home front too. The two were closely linked, and for Gustavus IV part of the same struggle against the political plague from Paris. He used a fairly well organised secret police, bequeathed to him by Reuterholm, and a very efficient censorship system; not only to quarantine Sweden from that 'plague', but also to silence the Swedish opposition. The two main centres of opposition, Stockholm and Uppsala, both dominated by the disaffected nobility, were strictly controlled by troops and police. He

45 HECD. VII. 128 (July 1801).
stayed away from the capital as much as possible since he hated being there. The rest of the country remained loyal, but that could change if Sweden went to war. His protracted and unpopular German trip was not only the beginning of Sweden's road to war, but also the road to revolution.46

46 Holmberg. 10-19; Jackson. 129-130. (4 Mar. 1803); Carlsson. 47-49.
Chapter Two.

The Road to War.

The Creation of the Anglo-Swedish Common Cause, the Third Coalition and the Preparations for War against Napoleon, March 1804-October 1805.

I. Murder Most Foul.

The Death of Duc d'Enghien and the Beginning of the European Coalition against Napoleon, March-July 1804.

The Napoleonic War, like the First World War, was triggered by the assassination of a single, royal figure. Unlike his twentieth century counterpart the Duc d'Enghien was politically unimportant. But his tragic death came to symbolise what was wrong with Napoleonic France and united her enemies against her ruler. D'Enghien's death was the result of the failure of the French royalists, led by Georges Cadoudal, and military conspirators to overthrow Napoleon. Their arrest in March 1804 Lagerbjelke predicted with uncanny accuracy would engulf Europe in flames. ¹

Napoleon saw a perfect opportunity in the failed coup d'etat to strike terror in his French émigré enemies and discredit the British. On the night of 14-15 March 1804 French cavalry crossed the border to Baden and seized d'Enghien in his home in Ettenheim. The duke was taken to Vincennes where he shot for his alleged role in the planned coup. ² Napoleon justified himself by claiming that d'Enghien's death was a 'great and necessary blow'. When Fouche, his chief of police, dared to question the wisdom of this decision, Napoleon retorted that the duke's guilt was obvious, since 'is he

not a Bourbon and the most dangerous of all of them?.. I am surrounded by plots; I must imprint terror or perish'. 3 Indeed, to survive against domestic and foreign enemies Napoleon had to act with ruthlessness but executing d'Enghien and violating Baden's territory was going too far. No doubt Napoleon found his justification from the appalled British reaction to such a 'horrid act' 4 and shocked reaction of Paris society. 5

Napoleon's blatant disregard for international law created shock waves throughout Europe and new enemies in its wake. None were more affected than Gustavus IV, who not only knew d'Enghien, but was staying only a few miles from d'Enghien's residence in Ettenheim. His warnings to the duke and attempts from 17 to 29 March to have d'Enghien released proved equally fruitless. It was only by 28 March that Gustavus IV knew the duke was dead. The king was both infuriated and stunned by d'Enghien's fate, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that he was dissuaded from breaking off diplomatic relations with France. His protests won him not only surprising support from his ministers, but also, since it contrasted to Europe's general passivity, from the British. d'Enghien's death began the transformation of Gustavus IV from hostile spectator to active opponent of Napoleon. If Napoleon could murder royalty by criminal abduction with impunity then no state or individual was safe from his power. Gustavus IV took up Napoleon's challenge with an enthusiastic fervour which lasted with undiminished power for the next five years. 6

The king's strong protests on the duke's behalf earned him Napoleon's enmity and he demanded that Gustavus IV be thrown out of Baden. Gustavus IV retaliated by recalling his ambassador from Paris. In May, when Napoleon assumed his imperial title, Gustavus IV thought the act typical of a criminal regime that challenged every legitimate monarchy in Europe. 7 Napoleon was infuriated at Gustavus IV's loud and open denunciations of his assumption of the imperial purple. He claimed he could

4 Minto. 314-5. 10 Apr. 1804.
5 ESKB. V. Brinkman to Engeström, 10 Apr. 1804
7 HECD. VII. 290, 298. Apr., June 1804.; Jackson. 205. 13 May 1804; ESKB. V. Brinkman to Engeström, 5 May 1804; Schinkel. 161. Gustavus IV to Ehrenheim, 28 Mar. 1804.; Schinkel. 175.
remove Gustavus IV by 'ordering' Sweden's neighbours to divide Sweden between them.\textsuperscript{8} It took Napoleon four years to realise his boast.

Given that Gustavus IV was in Karlsruhe on the French border could not he be kidnapped the same way as d'Enghien had? Napoleon, who preferred brutal action to diplomacy, was tempted to give Gustavus IV the martyrdom he seemed so keen to attain. But saner counsels in Paris made Napoleon realise that the abduction of a monarch, unlike that of a refugee, would have brought the wrath of Europe upon their heads.\textsuperscript{9} Napoleon, however, did not share his advisers caution telling one of his cronies that 'I regret that I followed your advice concerning the King of Sweden; you will see what the consequences of that will be; ...in politics one should never hesitate to eliminate our enemies'.\textsuperscript{10}

Gustavus IV's ministers shared their French counterpart's task of trying to keep their hot-headed ruler under control and prevent an open conflict with France. If Napoleon had to be challenged then this was the 'task' of the Great powers and not poor and 'distant' Sweden.\textsuperscript{11} However, they realised that this would not be an easy task since the king, Ehrenheim argued, 'Located on the border of France the king has moved Sweden there with him, and thus lost the neutrality that his [usual] residence gives him, where events are seen from a distance, are felt with a delay and only judged after others have judged them first; where every condemnation and utterance of ill-will can be as quickly known in Paris as in Karlsruhe'.\textsuperscript{12} He feared the presence of the equally hot-headed and Francophobic Armfelt would encourage Gustavus IV to pick a quarrel with Napoleon. What Ehrenheim feared was that Britain and Russia would seduce Gustavus IV into a damaging alliance against France by fair words of generous subsidies that would embroil Sweden in a war that would then be fought for reasons totally alien to Sweden's 'true interests'.\textsuperscript{13} This was the first time but not the last time this dubious expression were used by Gustavus IV's ministers to work against the king's foreign policy.

None proved more critical of the king's posturing than Lagerbjelke who blamed Gustavus IV for the

\textsuperscript{8} Schinkel. 172. Brinkman to Engeström, 15 Sept.1804.
\textsuperscript{10} Schinkel. 173.
\textsuperscript{11} Jackson. 197. 12 Apr. 1804; Álvsjö. Ehrenheim to Lagerbjelke, 10 Apr.1804.
\textsuperscript{12} Álvsjö. Ehrenheim to Lagerbjelke, 18 Apr.1804.
\textsuperscript{13} Álvsjö. Ehrenheim to Lagerbjelke, 1, 29 May, 5, 9, 12 June, 3, 13, 27, 29, 31 July 1804.
state of tension in Franco-Swedish relations. Lagerbšlke exaggerated the influence upon Gustavus IV which he claimed French royalist émigrés supposedly had upon the king in Carlsruhe and opposed Gustavus IV's justified precaution of reinforcing Stralsund in the face of Napoleon's growing hostility.14

II. The Shadow of St. Petersburg and the British Quest for Allies.

Alexander I's Reaction to the d'Enghien Murder, Russia's European Role and Proposals for a European Coalition against Napoleon, 1801-1805.

Lagerbšlke remained an uncritical admirer of Napoleon until the end of the war and never recognised that Napoleonic France posed a severe threat to the established order and peace of Europe. He also failed to recognise that the Franco-Swedish conflict stemmed more from Napoleon's violation of Baden and killing of d'Enghien than Gustavus IV actions after these actions had taken place. These violations provided common ground of grievance against France by both Alexander I and Gustavus IV since the Russian Emperor shared his brother-in-law's revulsion at the violation of Baden territory and the death of the duke. In April and May 1804 Gustavus IV urged Alexander I to declare openly his intention to protect their common interest in the preservation of the Holy Roman Empire against Napoleon's aggression. The Emperor did not go as far as the king wished but he did offer military aid to defend Swedish Pomerania against the French. Gustavus IV praised Alexander I's strong protests against Napoleon's actions, which contrasted with the cringing response from the German states, including Austria and Prussia, which had more to lose from Napoleon's aggression than either Russia or Sweden.15 Under Prince Czartoryski's influence, Alexander I transformed his previous admiration for Napoleon to an ever deepening hostility, even to the extent of proposing a Russo-Prussian alliance against France in 1803. In April 1804 Czartoryski urged the Russian government to break all

14 TSLUB. C. Lagerbšlke to Toll, 14 Mar., 21 Apr., 16 May, 5, 13 June, 26 July 1804; ESKB. V. Brinkman to Engeström, 16 June 1804; Jackson. 208. 3 June 1804.; TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 13 June 1804; Carlsson. 128-9, 131.
diplomatic relations with France, whose government he denounced as a 'den of brigands'. His ministerial colleagues agreed. Only Count Rumyantsev argued that the fate of Baden and of d'Enghien did not effect Russia's direct interests. Gustavus IV's ministers would have supported Rumyantsev's reasoning but they did not share their king's new found enthusiasm for Russia. Unlike Gustavus IV they had apparently not forgotten the earlier Russian threat against Finland. (They did not seem to have noticed that another outlying possession, Pomerania, was similarly threatened by Napoleon's invasion of Hanover). They viewed the possible landings of Russian troops in Pomerania as a national 'humiliation' that could trigger war with France and increase domestic discontent.

Britain, Gustavus IV's would be ally, pinned its hopes upon Russia as well. While the British cabinet appreciated Gustavus IV's gestures of defiance against Napoleon, they questioned his basic goodwill because of the long drawn out convoy crisis. They also realised that Sweden could not, on its own, make up for Britain's own basic military weakness on land. Without Russian military might to back it up, an Anglo-Swedish alliance would lack credibility, and ability to make an impact on the continent. An Anglo-Russian alliance (despite their shared interests with Sweden) in maintaining and strengthening the European balance of power by containing Napoleon's expansionism, remained an elusive goal. Despite Hawkesbury's exhaustive efforts to achieve an offensive alliance with Russia from 1802 to 1803 to contain Napoleon, the Russians left his overtures unanswered. Despite Napoleon's aggression and numerous provocations, Russia maintained her neutrality. In May 1804, however, a limited defensive pact was signed with Britain.

That same month Pitt returned to office and set about building an Anglo-Russian pact. Like Gustavus IV Pitt preferred to act as his own foreign minister. The Russian alliance became Pitt's most important diplomatic goal and one that he set out to achieve with his customary single-mindedness. He used Britain's large reserves of ready cash to lure allies to her side. On 31 July Pitt offered his

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16 Zawadzki. 36-60, 63-7, 70-71, 73-77, 100-6; Zawadzki. 245-6; Hartley. 58-64; 70-71; Palmer. Alexander 1.82; Seton. 83-85.
potential European allies £5,000,000 to be shared between them. Austria, which would shoulder the
main military burden and the brunt of a possible French counter-offensive, was to have the lion share
or half of the subsidies, some £2-2,500,000. Russia's share was £1,000,000, Prussia's £1,000,000,
leaving £400-500,000 for Naples and Sweden to share. Czartoryski, Russia's new foreign minister,
was not impressed with the British offer. But Russia's bargaining position had worsened considerably
during the summer when Napoleon took offence at Russian demands that he evacuate Italy and
Germany. In September 1804 Russia broke off diplomatic relations with Napoleon, who remained
unimpressed as long as Austria remained uncommitted to the allies. Napoleon concluded therefore
with his customary arrogant self-confidence that his enemies were isolated and that 'that madman, the
King of Sweden, is the only one who is really in understanding with England against me'.

Napoleon's claim was almost accurate for once since the alliance, even with Russia's support, would
remain impotent as long as the Germanic great powers remained outside the allied camp. To reach
the French, the Russian army needed access to France through either Prussia or Austria and neither
seemed keen to grapple with Napoleon. Of the two powers Austria seemed the more likely to join the
allied cause. The Austrians, like the Prussians, were sharply divided about the correct foreign policy
to pursue. The so-called neutralist party wanted a postponement of the inevitable showdown with
Napoleon until such a time the Austrian army had recovered from the trauma of the last coalition and
the allied powers were more united and stronger. The war party shared the ultimate aim of the
neutralists but its supporters believed that Austrian neutrality could be exploited by Napoleon to
extend his power and undermine Austria's security yet further.

If procrastination and political confusion characterised Austrian policies then it was even more
characteristic of the muddle that reigned in Berlin. Prussia had suffered less at the hands of France
than Austria, and in Berlin a French alliance was a realistic option in return for territorial expansion.

Yet with Russia and Austria bordering her while the French had made an unwelcome appearance in

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19 Fremont. 58, 63, 65-70.
21 Fremont. 95-97, 101; Malmesbury. 311-314. 20 May 1803.; Schroeder. 234-235, 251-252, 259.;
Hanover, Prussia's foreign policy choices were far from clear. Both Napoleon and the allies could punish Prussia severely if she made the wrong choice. So her timid ministers, reminiscent of their Swedish colleagues both in lack of spirit and clear policies, opted for neutrality, inactivity and a 'wait and see' approach. This supposedly safe option carried the risk of alienating both sides and in fact both the British and Napoleon had little but contempt for Prussia. On their part the Prussians were sceptical about the British, fearful of Russia and hostile to Austria. The Prusso-Austrian conflict was the key to much of Napoleon's runaway success up to 1813 when the two German powers joined, at last, the Anglo-Russian-Swedish coalition simultaneously.22

III. The Dresden Dialogue.

The First Anglo-Swedish Negotiations, March-October 1804.

Once the Anglo-Russian defence alliance had been signed, Britain could turn its eyes to Gustavus IV who had earned their admiration for his courageous stand against Napoleon over d'Enghien's brutal death. In July 1804 Harrowby appointed the twenty-four year old Henry Pierrepoint, as British envoy to Sweden with instructions to seek out and to propose to Gustavus IV a far-reaching Anglo-Swedish alliance.23 Pierrepoint caught up with the perambulating king (who was returning from Baden) in Dresden, the Saxon capital. Pierrepoint conveyed his government and people's fulsome admiration for Gustavus IV's courageous stand against Napoleon. Gustavus IV, in return, proposed an Anglo-Swedish alliance (as he had two years earlier) as the foundation for a European wide coalition against Napoleon. Pierrepoint pointed out that Gustavus IV's plans coincided with Britain's intentions.

Hence these tentative and preliminary talks had established a vital platform on which to build the Anglo-Swedish alliance. The only problems, which were to haunt the entire life span of the alliance, were differences of opinion between the king and British, over his high demands for subsidies and his

22 Fremont. 123-124, 126; Jackson. 137. 30 Apr. 1803.; Simms. 101-114; Schroeder. 234-236, 256.
insistence that the restoration of the Bourbons was to be an allied war aim. The British feared that the latter demand would undermine the appeal of the alliance.24

The king's growing enthusiasm for a confrontation with Napoleon and understanding with the British did not have the support of his ministers, least of all Lagerbjelke, who claimed that 'I fear the worst consequences. It is not given to all the supreme confidence to see war against a tenfold enemy with prospects of victory and glory. A victory in itself would be a misfortune for a country in Sweden's position since it will cost both in blood and silver'.25 Lagerbjelke called Britain and Russia untrustworthy and selfish.26 In Stockholm (Ehrenheim, whose only interest in the talks with Pierrepoint was to find out what subsidies Britain was willing to offer) supported his colleagues strenuous efforts to prevent the creation of an Anglo-Swedish alliance. Lagerbjelke collaborated with the Swedish chargé d'affaires in Berlin, Brinkman, to delay communications between Gustavus IV and Pierrepoint, to prevent them causing 'mischief'.27

Such sabotage had to be undertaken so discreetly that it would not arouse the suspicions of the volatile king. There is no doubting that Brinkman opposed an alliance with Britain, as he wrote to Engeström in mid-August, that 'In strictest confidence: We are in the deepest of negotiations with England. They offer everything we could wish for - or possibly should not'.28 In Berlin, George Jackson, younger diplomat brother of the British envoy Francis Jackson, distrusted Brinkman as 'an unrepentant Jacobin'. Jackson extended that distrust and dislike with good reason, to most of the Swedish diplomatic corp. 'It is one of the ... extraordinary circumstances of the King of Sweden's

25 Wieselgren. 76.
26 Wieselgren. 78.
27 Anglica. 484. Ehrenheim to Silverhjelm, 20 Aug. 1804.
28 ESKB. VII: ff. 75-76. Brinkman to Engeström, 14 Aug.1804.
situation', noted Jackson, 'that most of His ministers in foreign courts are advocates for that cause which their Sovereign appears to have in abhorrence'.

No one supported Lagerbjelke's diplomatic sabotage campaign as diligently as Silverhjelm. He realised, however, it had to be done so subtly that it did not arouse Gustavus IV's suspicions. In fact Silverhjelm put Gustavus IV's own proposals and demands to good use'. He hoped, no doubt, to wreck the negotiations by presenting them to Harrowby in such a strident tone that the British would break off the talks. When he met Harrowby on 20 August Silverhjelm therefore claimed that Gustavus IV insisted upon retaining command of the Swedish troops if they became part of an allied contingent and the restoration of the Bourbons. Silverhjelm knew these demands were unacceptable and that Harrowby would take offence at Silverhjelm's arrogant tone. He also presented his personal view, that Sweden had nothing to gain by making war on France, as the established view of Gustavus IV and his government. It was not, of course, and Harrowby knew that from Pierrepont's talks with Gustavus IV at Dresden. Gustavus IV had both a personal and political conflict with France and Sweden could gain security for itself and its exposed province of Pomerania by contributing to the defeat of Napoleon. Silverhjelm's claims were therefore exposed as the Francophile lies that they were. Silverhjelm tried also to poison Gustavus IV's mind against the British by claiming equally falsely that they were unreliable allies that only wanted control over Swedish troops and would make peace with France when it suited them without reference to Sweden's interests.

This last falsehood was to be repeated by Swedish ministers regularly hereafter. It is also remarkable that Silverhjelm who had been in London for three years could believe this claim himself as he must have observed the resolution of the new Pittite administration to fight on and not negotiate with Napoleon. Harrowby lost all confidence in Silverhjelm and denounced his sabotage to Pierrepont. He wanted Silverhjelm replaced as quickly as possible with a trustworthy diplomat, who not only agreed with king's policies, but was also in the king's confidence. To the horror of Harrowby and

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30 Fremont. 158-159.
Pierrepont, Gustavus IV chose to retain Silverhjelm, the very man who (besides Lagerbjelke) was doing his utmost to undermine his policies. Not for the first or last time Gustavus IV was badly advised by his unreliable ministers who rallied around to defend one of their own.32

IV. Building and Burning Diplomatic Bridges.

The Franco Swedish Cold War, the Dispute with Prussia and the Deepening European Crisis, October 1804-April 1805.

While Anglo-Swedish relations improved dramatically during the summer of 1804 those with France deteriorated sharply. Napoleon, infuriated by Gustavus IV's defiance, retaliated the only way he could when his enemy was out of reach: by insults and threats. In late August his newspaper mouthpiece the Moniteur published an article that insulted Gustavus IV and sought to divide him from his people's loyalty. The king responded in kind, first by breaking off all diplomatic relations with France, and then, on 25 September, by mobilising Pomerania's defences.33

A month later followed yet another incident that led to further deterioration in Franco-Swedish relations. The most important one was part of Napoleon's shadowy secret war against British intelligence. Suspecting Sir George Rumbold, the British chargé d'affaires in Hamburg, of being head of British intelligence in north Germany, 240 French dragoons crossed the border from occupied Hanover to Hamburg and seized the diplomat. Marshal Bernadotte, the commander of the French occupation army in Hanover (whom we shall meet again) assured the terrified diplomat that he would not be harmed. In fact he was imprisoned in Paris until Prussia intervened to secure his release. His d'Enghien style abduction was not only a major blow to Prussia's declining prestige since it made a mockery of her self-proclaimed role as 'protector' of north Germany's neutrality but it also made clear to Sweden and Denmark that their German provinces were not safe from the French. Napoleon's violation of yet another harmless German state not only undermined the security of the German states

(including Pomerania) but also threatened Sweden's international finances which were transacted through Hamburg. Thus the Rumbold affair escalated the Franco-Swedish cold war further.34

But Napoleon's actions was not the only one to escalate the Franco-Swedish conflict since Gustavus IV chose to invite the exiled French Bourbon King, Louis XVIII, to Calmar in southern Sweden, in October. Louis XVIII who had been a friend of Gustavus III was given a warm welcome by Fersen, standing in for the absent king, and the Calmar populace. Gustavus IV was determined to further the Bourbon cause by extending his full support to Louis XVIII. The Swedish ministers believed that Louis XVIII's visit was part of a Anglo-Russian plot to embroil Sweden in a war with France.35

These suspicions were unfounded since it was Gustavus IV who invited Louis XVIII to Calmar and there was no need for any elaborate schemes to escalate the Franco-Swedish conflict. Nor was it fair to blame that conflict on Gustavus IV's 'war mongering' since it was Napoleon that was the main culprit behind it. Ehrenheim and his fellow ministers were equally mistaken in blaming general Armfelt for the king's bellicosity against Bonaparte. They were blinded by Armfelt's violent temper, Francophobia, loud denunciations of Napoleon's and other similarities with Gustavus IV, to Armfelt's general ambiguity. He proved a willing collaborator at Carlsruhe with Lagerbjelke to prevent a conflict with France, he shared the other ministers suspicions of Britain and he believed Gustavus IV, the 'Swedish Leonidas' (as Armfelt called him) cut a ridiculous figure on the European political stage with his posturing. Pierrepont, often a shrewd judge of character, found that Armfelt's true character, behind the facade of bluff bonhomie, was one of egotistic vanity, conceit and ambition.36

Outside Sweden and France the king's loudest critics and denouncers of his 'Quixotism', as they put it, were to be found, to no one's surprise, in Berlin. The Prussian ministers feared that Gustavus IV's open defiance of Napoleon would not only jeopardise their north German neutrality zone but could

36 Tegnér. 45-46, 155.; Bonsdorff 165; Tegnér. Engeström. 79; Ramel 246-247.
also lead to a continental war which would only serve Britain's selfish interests. Prussia's shortsightedness paralleled that of Swedish ministers. Unlike Sweden, where the king's strident will overrode his ministers' caution, the Prussian king, Frederick Wilhelm III, did not have the willpower to do the same with his ministers. Prussia's ministers took a high tone with smaller powers, including Sweden, which earned them the enmity of most Swedes. Gustavus IV tried, in September, to placate Prussia but he instructed Armfelt (his less than diplomatic envoy) to ignore the Prussian government and deal directly with the Prussian king which only made matters worse. The Prussian government, terrified at the prospect of war on the continent in general and in north Germany in particular, protested strongly against Gustavus IV's mobilisation of Pomerania's defences. They claimed that Pomerania would be given sufficient protection by Prussia's north German neutrality zone. The blatant invalidity of that exaggerated claim was burst like a balloon by the Rumbold incident, proving once and for all that Pomerania's defences really needed to be strengthened. Jackson mused what Europe would be like with Gustavus IV as king of Prussia since he believed Gustavus IV would put the powerful Prussian army to good use against Napoleon. In fact with his bellicose Francophobia Gustavus IV was more in tune with Prussian popular sentiments than Frederick Wilhelm III, who would have been a more suitable ruler of the cautious Swedes.

Sweden's conflict with Prussia was to rumble on for years and served to undermine the allied coalition. It was, however, the conflict with France (not Prussia) which was the major cause of concern to Gustavus IV. He was especially worried about the security of Pomerania which was the only part of Sweden that was exposed to a direct French attack from Hanover. The Swedes realised that Pomerania could not be defended properly without Russian support. In October Alexander I offered Gustavus IV 12,000 troops to defend the exposed but strategically vital bridgehead against either a French or Prussian threat. Stedingk, like Gustavus IV, hoped that this would end Russia's neutrality and herald the beginning of a new Russo-Swedish alliance. Ehrenheim failed to support such an alliance. Overestimating, as usual, the potential enemy's striking power he was convinced

37 Bailleu. 291-2.
Pomerania would be overrun well before the Russians set foot in Pomerania. He questioned Russia's reliability and intentions, dismissed her offensive plans as a 'web of absurdities' and Stedingk as a 'warmonger' for supporting them.  

Stedingk was in fact a sensible statesman with a realistic appreciation of Sweden's strategic choices. Sweden could not afford to antagonise Russia when the possibility of war with France was rising and if Sweden jeopardised Russian plans by denying them access to Stralsund then Russia might want to remove a threat on her exposed north-western frontier before facing Napoleon by invading Finland. Stedingk believed that Swedish membership of the allied coalition would not only remove any reason for Russian discontent with Sweden and thus remove the threat against Finland but could also contribute to the defeat of Napoleon which was to Sweden's ultimate benefit. But Prussia threatened to deter Gustavus IV from giving Russia access to Pomerania since this would threaten their neutrality zone. Alexander I's protests in Berlin silenced Prussian threats but Gustavus IV thought the emperor was too indulgent with Prussia. Unlike his allies who counted on Prussia's eventual membership of the coalition Gustavus IV had no such illusion. To him Prussia was Napoleon's proxy in northern Europe and therefore a hostile state. Differences between Gustavus IV and Alexander I over Prussia complicated the Russo-Swedish military talks and delayed the signing of a treaty until 1 March 1805. In that treaty Sweden pledged to send 25,000 troops to Pomerania while the Russians were supposed to furnish twice that number in a combined offensive against the French forces in northern Germany.  

But the pact only became operational when Russia got access to Pomerania and that depended upon Sweden receiving 'adequate' British subsidies. What was meant by adequate differed widely between the Swedish and British definitions. Pierrepont agreed to sign a temporary subsidy treaty (in December 1804) for the upkeep of Stralsund's fortifications. But even this was subject to long and

heated discussions. Pierrepoint was at loath to hand over money to Sweden without some Swedish reciprocation. This reflected his government's aversion to pay out peacetime subsidies. In return for the paying £60,000 for Stralsund's defences the British were allowed to establish a trade depot (vital for her exports to Europe) and a recruiting depot (useful to keep her foreign regiments up to strength) in Stralsund. The depots, however, could only be established after Sweden was at war with France. But that seemed a long way off since Pierrepoint had only reached his limited agreement with some difficulty. What problems would not be encountered when it came to settling the main subsidy question. There was a huge gap to bridge between the level Britain was willing to offer, £12 per man and year, and Sweden's maximum subsidy demand: a staggering £75. Ehrenheim believed Britain would accept the Swedish demands since it was still cheaper for her to subsidise others to do her fighting for her than pay for her own defences.  

Ehrenheim did not remain unenlightened by Britain's real views about Sweden's high subsidy demands. When Pierrepoint arrived in Stockholm in January 1805 he made it clear to Ehrenheim that Gustavus IV had to be persuaded to reduce his enormous subsidy demands. Unless they were at least halved (ca. £30-35) there would be no point in continuing further talks. As yet Pierrepoint had not realised that such an impasse and eventual breakdown in the talks suited Ehrenheim and his fellow ministers. They wanted, of course, the talks to fail and to prevent Gustavus IV dragging Sweden into war. Knowing full well their demands were unacceptable, Ehrenheim claimed that the subsidy level had to remain so (inordinately) high to prevent the war expeditions from crippling Sweden's precarious finances. Pierrepoint hoped that direct talks with Gustavus IV could reduce Sweden's unrealistic subsidy demands. Gustavus IV returned to Stockholm in early February 1805 to a surprisingly warm reception from the capital's population which had grown tired of his long absence. On 15 February Pierrepoint saw Gustavus IV (who was ignorant about financial matters and trustingly relied on his ministers) who simply repeated Ehrenheim's unsubstantiated claims.

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Pierrepont had come to despair, by March, of ever reaching an acceptable subsidy agreement with the Swedes.43

V. The Edge of War.
The Creation of the Common Cause, the Third Coalition and Allied Preparations for War, April-October 1805.

Two months later Pierrepont had good reason to hope that things could improve the prospects of his mission, since the hostile and obstructionist Lagerbjelke was at last removed from his sensitive post. Gustavus IV, unaware of Lagerbjelke's role in trying to sabotage the talks with the British, had nevertheless grown tired of Lagerbjelke's constant criticisms of his policies. Lagerbjelke's place was taken by a young Finnish nobleman, Baron Gustaf of Wetterstedt, who was to play an important role in this story. Wetterstedt was immediately thrust into the political maelstrom because of yet another one of the king's symbolic acts of outdated chivalry born of his strict principles. When Frederick Wilhelm III accepted the Legion of Honour from Napoleon Gustavus IV promptly sent back his Prussian Order of the Black Eagle. Gustavus IV claimed that it was meant as a private gesture but given the tense state of Prusso-Swedish relations the Prussians took the medal's return as a deliberate and gratuitous insult that provoked them into recalling their minister from Stockholm.44

Many found the king's action honourable but futile since he had no real power to impose his will on Prussia.45 Brinkman who had to deal with Prussian protests found nothing but trouble in the king's action. Since Brinkman believed in Swedish neutrality and good relations with Prussia, he deliberately toned down Prussia's strong protests in his reports to Gustavus IV.46 Gustavus IV too wanted no conflict with Prussia when he was preoccupied with his negotiations with Russia and

45 HECd. 352. May 1805; Jackson.289-290. 26 May.1805.
46 Borelius. 180-182, 185.
Britain. He hoped Prussia would restore diplomatic relations with Sweden. Gustavus IV had a
disconcerting habit of taking unexpected and unwelcome actions that upset all diplomatic calculations
and plunged Sweden into sudden crises. While the Prusso-Swedish crisis continued it had
overshadowed the more important question of British subsidies for Sweden. In mid May, having tired
of waiting for an answer from London to his inquiries, Gustavus IV informed Pierrepoint that he
would be withdrawing troops from Pomerania to Scania to reduce costs. Pierrepoint told Gustavus IV
that this was no time to think of financial prudence. Such a troop withdrawal was doubly damaging
since it not only exposed Pomerania to a French invasion but implied allied disunity when they were
trying to form a coalition. Gustavus IV ignored Pierrepoint's warnings, departed for the Swedish
army manoeuvres in Scania on 30 May and on 7 June gave orders for the troops to be withdrawn from
Pomerania.

Gustavus IV explained a week later to Pierrepoint and the Russian envoy, Alopeus, that the troops he
had withdrawn from Pomerania would be returned to the province once the manoeuvres were over.
Gustavus IV asked why it took Mulgrave, the new British foreign secretary, so long to reply to his
subsidy enquiries. In the meanwhile Gustavus IV in order to put more pressure on the British told
Pierrepoint on 20 June that unless the British extended and increased their subsidies he would reduce
his army in Pomerania yet further. To remove any impression in Mulgrave's mind that Gustavus IV
was any less keen on the alliance Pierrepoint made it clear that Sweden's unchanged demands was due
to ministerial pressure. The real culprit and the strongest opponent of a war and an alliance with
Britain was the finance minister, Carl Erik Lagerheim, whose incompetence, according to Pierrepoint,
had reduced Sweden to the very financial chaos that reputedly forced her to make such exorbitant
financial demands upon her ally. There seemed little hope that the subsidy question would be
resolved since neither side yielded an inch. The British were not about to be cajoled into paying out
huge subsidies. What was it that made the Swedish soldier so good or horribly expensive that he had

47 HECID. VII. 357. May 1805.
48 Anglica. 492. Ehrenheim to Rehausen, 24 May 1805.
49 Muscovita. 502. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 10, 17, 20, 29 May 1805; FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to
Mulgrave, 14, 21 May 1805; Anglica. 492. Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 12 June 1805; Anglica. 484.
Ehrenheim to Silverhjelm, 4 June 1804.
50 FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 12, 20 June 1805.
to cost the British taxpayer £75 when a Russian or an Austrian made do with £12.5? Mulgrave refused to be blackmailed by Sweden and made it quite clear to Pierrepoint that he had only authority to negotiate with the Swedes at the standard rate. 51

The hard bargaining could therefore begin on 3 July when Pierrepoint informed Gustavus IV of Mulgrave's veto. Pierrepoint was only authorised to negotiate subsidies at the standard rate (£12.5k) and told Gustavus IV that was some way off from the king's absolute minimum of £18. And even more so the maximum level of £75). That Swedish minimum was one that was acceptable to Gustavus IV because he was so keen to join the allies. It was not one that Lagerheim or his other ministers endorsed. Otherwise, the only way to reduce total costs was simply to reduce the Swedish contingent in the allied forces from 25,000 to 15,000. On 9 July Pierrepoint, having considered the king's suggestion, told Gustavus IV that neither was acceptable. Two days later Gustavus IV returned with slightly trimmed figures which failed to meet Pierrepoint's demands and the latter threatened to break off the talks because of what he termed Swedish intransigence. The negotiations had reached what seemed an impasse that could lead to total breakdown. Ironically, it was neither Sweden or Britain that would suffer the most from such a diplomatic stalemate but their ally Russia, whose entire plans for a northern flanking attack against Napoleon's northern army in Hanover, hinged upon using Pomerania as a bridgehead. Alopeus, under increasing pressure from St. Petersburg to resolve the subsidy issue and access to Pomerania, supported Pierrepoint's arguments but to no avail. Gustavus IV, suspicious of an uninvited third party's interference in his negotiations, ignored Alopeus and grew angry about British 'intransigence'. But slowly he began to give way on details that made his ministers, indifferent to his aims and hostile to his alliance plans, fear that Gustavus IV would give Russia permission to land before the subsidy question had been settled. 52

Pierrepoint was as keen as Alopeus to find an escape route out of the diplomatic quagmire he was stuck in and tried to find a Swedish mediator to convince Gustavus IV to sign a subsidy agreement at something like the British level and allow the Russians to land while sending a sizeable Swedish army

51 FO 73/33. Mulgrave to Pierrepoint, 25 June 1805.
52 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 3, 10, 14 July 1805.; FO 73/33. Mulgrave to Pierrepoint, 3, 9, 11 July 1805; Ehrman. II. 786.
to the continent. There was no point in appealing to Toll, since it was his dubious calculations that lay behind the huge Swedish demands. By using Gustavus IV ignorance of finance and pride in Sweden's new won solvency Toll hoped by presenting unrealistically high subsidy demands to sabotage the negotiations with Pierrepoint and Sweden's chances to join the allies. Nor was there much point in appealing to Wetterstedt who was a willing collaborator in Toll's plots and thus proved to be no major improvement upon Lagerbjelke. Only general Armfelt and colonel Baltazar von Platen were willing to support Pierrepoint but more out of individual opportunism than support for the allied cause.53

The Swedish ministers persisted in viewing Sweden, even as late as 1805, as a pristine neutral power that had unfortunately got entangled in dangerous negotiations with foreign powers that manipulated their monarch's ideological prejudices to achieve their own selfish aims. Throughout the Anglo-Swedish alliance the ministers maintained that misconceived notion and persisted in their political guerrilla campaign against the alliance to frustrate king's pro-allied policies in the mistaken belief that Sweden could return to the dubious sanctuary of strict neutrality. They failed to grasp that monarchical Sweden and Napoleonic France were poles apart and would come to blows sooner or later due to their conflicting interests in Europe. Gustavus IV's conflict with Napoleon had only brought those differences to the boiling point and it was clear that Sweden had more to gain, than lose, by supporting an allied victory over Napoleon. In the meantime the ministers debilitating interventions almost managed to wreck the incipient alliance in 1805, contributed to Sweden's defeat three years later and was exposed, as we shall see, as a dangerous delusion after the king had been removed from power. Had they succeeded the consequences for Sweden could have been quite serious as she tried to return to neutrality when she was viewed as enemy in Paris and Berlin, and an ally in London and St. Petersburg. The British would not have taken kindly to being swindled out of their subsidies, nor to Sweden making a hasty but belated return to neutrality. The disappointed British might have taken out that frustration by retaliating against Sweden's vulnerable overseas trade and

shipping. No doubt the Russian response would have been even more hostile than Britain's had their German plans been sabotaged by the Swedish ministers.

The main stumbling block to an agreement remained Sweden's subsidy demand. But were these demands too high? Sweden was being asked after all to abandon her neutrality and provide Pomerania as an allied military base. That may have been true but Sweden's excessive demands verged on the absurd. For the use of 25,000 troops the Swedes were asking for £1,880,000 to pay their campaign costs and £322,000 in equipment costs. Or in other words the same amount as for putting 200,000 Austrians in the field.\(^54\) Nothing could have illustrated the minister's efforts to exact as high a price as possible for Sweden's services but that price was unacceptable to the British. Gustavus IV persisted in supporting these demands in the mistaken belief that his minister's cost estimates were correct. The other was his fear that if he had to dip into Sweden's own pockets he would have to call a Diet (Riksdag) to get approval for the necessary tax increases. Given the unpopularity of war among the Noble and Burgher Estates of the Swedish parliament that support was unlikely to be forthcoming. He never put that message properly across to the British in order to explain that constitutional shortcomings forced him to make such high subsidy demands. From this point of view the deadlock in the negotiations could only be broken if Britain compromised on the subsidy levels. His ministers hoped Britain would not be willing to compromise. With rumours, in early August, of a Franco-Danish alliance that could threaten the Sound (a common Anglo-Swedish area of interest), Gustavus IV made new proposals to Pierrepoint. By 19 August when no answer had arrived from London (not surprising given Mulgrave's earlier uncompromising line to Pierrepoint), Gustavus IV's attitude towards Britain hardened.\(^55\)

Again it was the Russians, with most at stake, who tried to break the deadlock by intervening in the talks, this time by taking the Swedish side. On 23 August Alopecus informed Gustavus IV that he was authorised by the emperor to sign a Russo-Swedish subsidy treaty that guaranteed Gustavus IV the subsidies he sought. Nothing could have illustrated better how desperate the Russians were growing.

\(^54\) Ehrman. 744; Ham. 26, 27.
\(^55\) KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 21, 25, 26 July 1805.; FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 8 Aug 1805.
To his disappointment, the Swedes remained unimpressed with Alopeus's proposal since they realised that the British (and not the cash-poor Russians) would have to foot the final bill and were unlikely to do so. This Swedish prediction failed to materialise because Pierrepoint realised that time was running out fast if Russian and allied operations were not to be jeopardised. On 24 August Pierrepoint signed a temporary extension of the 'secret' December treaty (signed in December 1804 to provide funds for the defence of Stralsund) which enabled Gustavus IV to increase his Pomeranian army to 8,000 men. The following day, Pierrepoint agreed to negotiate with the Swedes without authorisation from London. He would give in to Swedish subsidy demands (i.e. Sweden's minimum demand of £18 per man) if this concession on his part was matched by equally generous Swedish commercial concessions. Pierrepoint hoped this would placate his superiors expected disapproval of his unauthorised concessions. Gustavus IV failed to reciprocate Pierrepoint's bold move by re-appointing Toll as negotiator. Toll's appointment came as a rude shock to Pierrepoint and did not bode well for the success of the talks. Nevertheless on 27 August Pierrepoint handed Toll his formal proposals to pay Sweden £18 per man/year for the 4,000 strong Stralsund garrison and £500 for transport subsidy per 100 men. The day after Toll handed him the Swedish commercial counter-proposals that granted Britain no real concessions. Pierrepoint, who was risking his career by making any concessions at all, was not pleased by Toll's intransigence and told him that the British Parliament would not accept such a large subsidy without real commercial concessions.56

Pierrepoint's appeal could not expect to get much sympathy from a hostile partner such as Toll who opposed the Anglo-Swedish alliance. Beside his immediate political concerns to steer Sweden clear of a 'dangerous' and 'unnatural' connection with the allies, Toll was also determined to keep Britain's cheaper and higher quality goods out of the Swedish market. He and other mercantilist minded ministers feared such imports would destroy Sweden's own fledgling industries. (On this point, therefore, Sweden and Britain lacked a common commercial interest to unite them politically). On 29 August, as expected, Toll rejected any commercial concessions to Britain. Pierrepoint's position was unenviable. As a junior diplomat he could expect a severe reprimand for exceeding his instructions.

On the other hand Alopeus's ever more urgent calls for a resolution of the impasse were a growing
distraction. Pierrepoint dared not, however, go much further beyond the extension of the previous
Stralsund subsidies which he had granted with the justification of preserving Anglo-Swedish relations
and possibly getting permission for the Russians to land without granting substantial subsidies. 57

Nevertheless Pierrepoint's last minute injection of subsidies had enabled Gustavus IV, despite the
opposition of his ministers and his generals, to put Pomerania's defences in a state of much needed
readiness. His generals were as pessimistic as the Pomeranians were terrified at the prospect of war.
Armfelt, in command of one of the Pomeranian divisions, believed neither the army nor the Swedish
nation were ready for war. 58 Maybe Armfelt's view was correct. Most Swedes had expected their
country to stay out of the new continental war and as in 1788 it was the noble-dominated Swedish
officer corps that opposed such a war most strongly. That their 'esprit de corps' was poor can be judged
by their superiors lack of leadership and openly defeatist sentiments. Unfortunately no one
personified these weaknesses more than the commander in chief of the Pomeranian army, general von
Essen, himself. Essen, showing a daring streak that he did not display on the battlefield, questioned
the king's policies by writing to him that 'No mortal could defend Stralsund with a few thousand men,
and if that man existed, then I would ask Your Majesty to be so good as to send him to us and I would
gladly serve such an obviously talented man'. 59 Gustavus IV, who did not appreciate having his
orders or policies questioned, was infuriated by Essen's sarcastic letter. His intention to have Essen
sacked was deflected by Toll and Wetterstedt's intervention on Essen's behalf. 60 His decision not to
sack Essen was an unfortunate mistake since Essen was a lacklustre military commander, a defeatist
whose views spread demoralisation and showed too much enthusiasm to negotiate rather than fight
with the enemy. By not making an example of Essen, Gustavus IV encouraged his domestic noble
enemies to continue their subversive campaign, safe in the knowledge that their careers would not
suffer.

57 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 29 Aug. 1805.; Sherwig. 168.; FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to
Mulgrave, 1, 5 Sept. 1805; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim 30, 31 Aug. 1805; Anglica. 492.
Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 2 Sept. 1805.
58 FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 8 September 1805.; RA. Skrivelser till Konungen. Serie II. Vol
A-G. Armfelt to Gustavus IV, 2 Sept. 1805; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6, 8 Sept. 1805.
59 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim 19, 21 Sept. 1805.
60 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 22 Sept. 1807.
Meanwhile the all important subsidy question had still not been resolved and with Pierrepont cautious about going beyond paying for Stralsund's garrison and defences, the initiative to resolve the long-standing impasse would have to come from the Swedish side. On 14 September Gustavus IV, as keen as Pierrepont to bridge the gap that existed between the two sides, proposed to cut Swedish costs to the bone. Pierrepont offered payment for 15,000 Swedish troops at the standard rate and three months additional subsidies. Toll, however, was on hand to undermine the prospects for a resolution of the subsidy question and he claimed that the British level of subsidies would lead to a 'massive deficit' even if the Swedish contingent was reduced to 10,000 troops. Two days later Pierrepont had to reject Toll's unchanged subsidy demands. Toll had managed to sabotage the talks yet again. But Wetterstedt began to fear that Gustavus IV's determination to join the allies would prevail over 'his country's interests and finances'.

Wetterstedt's definition of 'interest' was very limited. When the other allies, except Britain, had poor finances why should Sweden not make some financial sacrifices in support of her own salvation instead of relying on Britain to cover all her costs? Pierrepont, however, refused to give up his quest for a subsidy treaty when the gap was narrowing and an Anglo-Swedish subsidy treaty could be of such value to the allied cause. On 24 September Pierrepont proposed a compromise between Swedish and British claims. Wetterstedt now hoped that the late season would prevent active military operation before the subsidy issue was resolved. He feared that Gustavus IV would give way on 'the great question of the Deficit, and if so then the [allied] cause is won'. Toll proved as persistent a protagonist as Pierrepont and stubbornly maintained that Pierrepont's latest proposals would still lead to a deficit of 150,000 riksdaler, even if the Pomeranian army was reduced further and the costs of the reserves were not included. At last Pierrepont realised that he had to cut the ministerial screen that separated him and Gustavus IV by bypassing Toll. He travelled to Beckaskog in Scania where Gustavus IV was residing and managed to persuade the king to conduct the talks himself. Once that was done the talks proceeded with a speed that alarmed Gustavus IV's ministers. The king drove as hard a bargain as Toll but moderated his pecuniary demands. He demanded that the British pay him

61 KUDHA Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 19 Sept. 1805.
62 KUDHA Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24 Sept. 1805.
for 12,000 troops (but that he only mobilised 10,000) and one year's subsidies in advance and another at the end of the campaign. Pierrepont managed to reduce this to six months at each end of the campaign.63

Thus at the eleventh hour the Anglo-Swedish subsidy treaty had finally, on 29 September, been signed after months of haggling. Despite Pierrepont's satisfaction at reducing Gustavus IV he was still paying £25 per soldier per year for 12,000 troops when in fact only 10,000 would be fielded by the Swedes. His justification was that Sweden was now an ally instead of a friend of France or a semi-hostile neutral hovering on Russia's north-western flank and that the treaty had not only secured Pomerania's use as an allied base, a secure bridgehead for a Russian landing, but that Sweden would also provide a sizeable contingent to the northern army of the coalition. It was only Pierrepont's and Gustavus IV's combined persistence that overcame the Swedish ministers energetic sabotage and made the 'common cause' possible. The forthcoming campaign would show if their efforts had been wasted.64

63 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 26, 27 Sept. 1805; Anglica 492 Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 28 Sept. 1805.
Chapter Three.

The Great Offensive.

The Allied Campaign of the Third Coalition, October 1805-February 1806.

I. The Grand Encirclement.
British and Allied War Plans to Defeat Napoleon, April-October 1805.

Sweden was now finally, due to Pierrepoint's efforts, part of the allied coalition that was destined to be overshadowed by two titanic battles: Austerlitz which represented the height of Napoleon's generalship and confirmed his European dominance; and Trafalgar where Nelson confirmed the supremacy of the Royal Navy. Yet the results of these two victories, beyond confirming the military superiority of France on land and Britain's on the seas, were widely different. Austerlitz proved an indecisive victory since the defeated allies fought on. Trafalgar on the other hand confirmed Britain's naval hegemony and established her global dominance for almost a century. This chapter does not focus upon these well known events but upon the allies peripheral operations.

These widely dispersed operations, combining allied landings in southern Italy and northern Germany, were part of the allied plans for a huge encirclement and entrapment of Napoleon's overextended armies. By landing in North Germany, the British hoped to liberate Hanover, defeat the French northern armies, threaten Napoleon's northern flank and eventually occupy the Netherlands (their most important strategic objective in north-western Europe). The British continued to be haunted by the fear that Napoleon would use the Scheldt and Rhine estuaries to invade southern or eastern England. The British were, however, supremely confident that they could achieve their objectives and bring relief to the allied armies in central Europe. They were supremely confident of victory and their allies appreciation of their unprecedented efforts on their behalf. British expectations were mistaken on both counts. Napoleon's Grand Army had achieved an unparalleled level of discipline and fighting spirit not matched by the allies. (In fact allied planning for the 1805 campaign was a classical example of how the best laid plans, so brilliant on paper, led to muddled disaster when put into practice). Nor were the allies as appreciative of their efforts as the British could have hoped for. The Austrians believed that the landings in Germany and Italy were too far from the main front to be of actual benefit to them as diversionary relief for their armies. They
also believed that peripheral operations were an easy and low risk option for the British which left the brunt of the fighting to her allies. These claims were quite unfair. Having only a small regular army which was unused to large scale operations on the continent, peripheral operations were not a luxury, but a necessity for the British. The continental powers never grasped the complexity of Britain's combined operations (which caused delays) or the risk entailed by such operations. If a British force was attacked at the initial stages of landing the French could defeat it with ease. In fact Pitt stripped home and colonial defences to the barest minimum (which aroused the anger of his own supporters and the opposition) in order to send the largest possible British expeditionary army to the continent.1

Pitt may have set out the government's broad strategic priorities and objectives but it was his hardworking minister of War and Colonies, Lord Castlereagh, who dealt with the military details and transformed Pitt's ideas into practical operations. Castlereagh originally wanted to send the British German expedition to the relative safety of Stralsund where it could operate in conjunction with her northern allies. Unfortunate delays meant that the long lines of sea communications between Britain and Pomerania were exposed to interruption by bad weather as the season grew ever later. Castlereagh chose therefore to divert the expedition to Cuxhaven which was not only closer to Britain but also to the allied objective of Holland. The British cabinet saw before them the allied northern army group sweeping across north Germany and occupying Holland with ease.2 (Or in other words the reverse of their unsuccessful landing at Den Helder in 1799). Castlereagh's plans contained two fatal flaws. It relied upon the irresolute Prussians joining the allies when no such resolve existed in Berlin and by dispersing British troops at either extremity of Europe ensured that neither force was strong enough to defeat the French. The British government should have reinforced the landing in Germany rather than sent an expedition to Italy.3

No one criticised Pitt's war plans and the war in general with more venom than the opposition. Fortunately for Pitt the opposition was badly fractured between the Whigs and disgruntled Tories, led by Grenville, Pitt's former foreign secretary and Addington, the former Prime-minister. Of these,

1 Mackesy. 69-71; Derry. 131-132; Hall. 78, 116.
2 CC. 6-8; Hall. 119.; WO 6/13. ff. 62-64. Castlereagh to Don, 19 Nov.1805; Björlin. 74.
3 Holland. 535; Fortescue. V. 281.
Charles Fox, the leader of the Foxites, was Pitt's foremost and most uncompromising critic. He firmly believed that Pitt's efforts on behalf of the coalition would only lead to further allied defeats. 'I think the most probable event is the success of the French, and a second treaty of Campo Formio in a few months', noted a glumly accurate Fox on 10 October. He had come to the conclusion years ago that the war against Napoleon could not possibly be won and that Britain, if she was not to avoid complete disaster, had to establish a permanent peace with France. He realised that many of his countrymen opposed this but it was the only way to end an unwinnable and stalemated war. So like his Swedish oppositionist counterparts Fox knew what his objective was but he had no clear idea, just like them, how to achieve peace. Fox persisted, like Lagerbjelke, to view the established government's war policies as high risk and disastrous without pausing to think that Napoleon might be even more dangerous unchallenged. Given the poor state of health of the government and its leader, Fox hoped to take power by forming a coalition government made up of Foxites, Grenvillites and Addingtonians. In the meanwhile, Fox hoped to find a formula that would satisfy his more sceptical coalition partners and at the same time give Britain long-term peace and security. That task was not easy since Grenville, his main partner in a new government, believed, at least at the outset of the allied campaign, that a lasting peace could only be built upon the foundation of a decisive allied victory.

II. Victory at Sea. Defeat on Land
Nelson's Victory at Trafalgar and Napoleon's Triumph at Ulm, October 1805.

While the politicians plotted and planned back in London, Nelson triumphed over the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar on 21 October. With one blow, Nelson had removed the French invasion threat and the only obstacle to Britain exercising supreme and unchallenged naval hegemony, not only along Europe's exposed coastline, but across the world. A naval victory even on the scale of Trafalgar could not, however, compensate for a serious allied setback that took place simultaneously in southern Germany. The Austrians had recognised Napoleon's Achilles heel in his extended lines of communications and sought to cut these from their base at Ulm, but it backfired when Napoleon

4 Russell. 103-104. Fox to Lauderdale, 27 Oct.1805; ibid. 117. Fox to Adair, 6 Oct.1805.
5 Russell 118. Fox to Lauderdale, 10 Oct.1805.
6 Ham. 10, 67.
7 Wynne. 216-217. 7 Nov.1805; Schom. 307-356.
swung around his armies and encircled the Austrians at Ulm. On 20 October they were forced to capitulate and Napoleon could claim a victory despite his initial miscalculations about the Austrian position. Hence the news of Ulm cut short British celebrations. But Ulm might be only a temporary setback if the main allied army managed to defeat Napoleon and Pitt was confident that news of Trafalgar would 'counterbalance the impression of Ulm'. His cabinet colleagues were equally confident since they expected the tide of war would turn in their favour with the expected military intervention of Prussia.

III. Italian Imbroglio.
The Anglo-Russian Campaign in Southern Italy, October 1805-January 1806.

Allied setbacks in central Europe were not offset by any greater success on the periphery of the continent. In fact operations in the Mediterranean only served to deepen Anglo-Russian rivalry. Russia resented Britain's occupation of Malta while the British feared that Russia's ambition was to undermine the Ottoman empire which might threaten the security of India. Nevertheless a substantial Anglo-Russian army (20,000 troops) landed in Calabria by late November and made some progress against the enemy. Unfortunately Austerlitz cut short any further advance of the allied forces in Italy (like in northern Germany as we shall see) and the allies were forced to evacuate Calabria by mid January.

IV. The Elbe Expedition
Generals Don and Cathcart's Expeditionary Army in Hanover, October 1805-January 1806.

The Italian expedition remained a sideshow to Britain's main continental effort which took place in northern Germany (we shall be looking at the Swedish operation in the next section) and had a
twofold aim. The first was to liberate Holland, using Hanover as a bridgehead, and the other was to coax the reluctant Prussians into the war with an impressive display of British military power.

Castlereagh had therefore resolved, as seen before, to send 10,000 troops to the Elbe by landing at Cuxhaven and that force would eventually (by January) have increased to 25,000 which was a considerable armed effort when compared to Britain's overall army strength.14

Castlereagh's first choice for command of the expedition, general Sir George Don, displayed a healthy respect for the French and wished that Castlereagh had chosen fortified Stralsund where his army would have allied support rather than landing it next door to the French with only defenceless Cuxhaven as a base.15 His deputy, general Decken, a Hanoverian officer in British service, found Don's fears about a strong French military presence in Hanover to be groundless. The only French he had found was 4,000 troops surrounded by the Prussians at the city of Hameln and their nearest potential reinforcements would have to come from Boulogne. The greatest threat, in fact, to the success of the allied operations was not the French presence but the Prussian advance into Hanover undertaken deliberately to sabotage the allied advance on Holland and keep the war as far away from Prussia as possible. Britain's actual allies were not much better than the Prussians since the Russian commander threatened to resign if Gustavus IV took over command of his forces.16

Decken's report could not have made pleasant reading for the British government since it showed them the extent of allied disunity and that Castlereagh's hope for a Prussian intervention on the allied side was groundless. Castlereagh was as yet unaware of these developments and Prussian permission for the Russian army to cross Silesia to link up with the Austrian army increased his confidence concerning Prussia.17 Unfortunately Castlereagh's entire planning depended upon Prussia and his choice of commander to supersede Don, general Lord Cathcart, was made more with Cathcart's

14 WO 6/13. ff. 5-7,10-19, 62-64. Castlereagh to Don, 10, 14, 16 Oct., 19 Nov. 1805
16 WO 1/186. ff. 109-114,116-120. Decken to Castlereagh, 12, 16 Nov. 1805
diplomatic skills and title in mind than his military skills. To put additional pressure upon the
Prussians the cabinet appointed Lord Harrowby to head a special mission to Berlin.

As yet unaware of his demotion Don had landed and occupied neutral Cuxhaven in November, to find
the Swedes in open conflict with the Prussians a state of affairs which could not only jeopardise the
invasion of Holland but also Prussia's membership in the coalition. Don appealed to Harrowby to
intervene in the damaging Prusso-Swedish conflict which coincided with news that Brune was
sending 15,000 troops to Holland thus dashing British hopes of an painless occupation.

In early December this ominous news was still unknown to Castlereagh, who predicted Prussia's early
inclusion in the coalition, the fall of Holland and Napoleon's total defeat. Castlereagh's optimism
should not be judged with hindsight since in early December the signs were, despite Ulm, good for the
allies. Napoleon's armies suffered from the weather and lack of supplies, they were outnumbered by
the allies and Napoleon was hard pressed from several flanks. Instead of following the original plan
to retreat further east, Alexander I's premature offensive ensured that the allies failed. A much larger
Russian army, fighting closer to home and with shorter supply lines, might have defeated Napoleon,
as happened at Eylau in February 1807. Had the Prussians simultaneously attacked the French flank
in Bohemia, while the allied Northern army took Holland, then Napoleon would have faced almost
certain disaster on all fronts as he did in 1813-14. But allied plans hinged too much upon the
irresolute Prussians.

Cathcart, who arrived at Cuxhaven on 15 December, initially shared Castlereagh optimism, and
hoped that he could accomplish close co-operation with his allies. Despite the fact that Austerlitz
made Prussia even less enthusiastic about a British alliance, the cabinet persisted in their hopes for

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1 Dec. 1805.; Björlin. 76.
22 Ehrman. 797-798.; Ham. 45-46.; Hall. 120-121; Fortescue. 282.
15, 26 Dec. 1805.
such an alliance. Hence Castlereagh's orders on 23 December for Cathcart to remain in Hanover until the Prussians declared war on Napoleon. Harrowby, having spent weeks trying to pin down the elusive Prussians to make some kind of commitment to the allied cause, had come to the conclusion a fortnight after Austerlitz that they would never join Britain. He recommended that the Elbe force evacuate Hanover at the first opportunity. Cathcart faced, therefore, the unpleasant prospect of facing the French on his own, as the Swedes refused to advance into Hanover, while the Russians had placed themselves under Prussian command.

On 1 January Cathcart's small army was isolated and alone, mainly, as he saw it, due to the Prusso-Swedish conflict that had flared up concerning the security of Stralsund. This petty, but damaging, conflict had prevented the allied advance, Cathcart claimed, on Holland and at least officially he blamed the Prussians for it. His private view was quite different, as he blamed the quarrelsome Gustavus IV for the dispute with Berlin and thus the failure, also, of the allied offensive. But Cathcart could not be seen to criticise Gustavus IV too harshly, as he wanted to avoid an ignominious evacuation back to England, and to remain on the continent by retreating and ensconcing his army in Stralsund. He could either remain in Hanover in the (forlorn) hope that the Prussians would come out to fight Napoleon, which carried the risk of his force being trapped in Hanover, or return home, at the risk of losing the last hope of a Prussian alliance. In early January Cathcart compromised by occupying Stade, to secure his escape route home; and holding Bremen, to be in a position to cooperate with the Prussian army in Hanover.

Castlereagh had by now lost all faith in Prussia because 'from past experience, I do not feel much confidence in the Firmness and decision of Prussia'. A curiously late conversion to reality for a statesman, who had only a week earlier pinned his inflated hopes upon Prussia's support. One could

24 Hall. 121.
29 WO 1/186. ff. 343-359. Cathcart to Pierrepont, 2, 3, 6, 8 Jan. 1806.
already sense that Castlereagh was preparing his excuses to parliament for another disastrous continental foray in the face of Foxite denunciations of the government's failures by putting the blame on the allies. Despite Gustavus IV's inability to co-operate with the Prussians, Cathcart hoped that he might be able to patch together some kind of workable alliance between them and his own army on the ground. If so, then he would occupy Hamburg to establish a line of communication with the Swedes, neglecting the fact that Hamburg was a sovereign, neutral state. Castlereagh, previously so overoptimistic held out no further hopes for continental operations and ordered, in mid January, Cathcart to return home. Cathcart had in fact already by 10 January concentrated his forces in Stade for a rapid evacuation and return to England. The former was achieved by late January and the troops saw home again by mid-February. When they returned home they had a new government and the war with France seemed to have ended, in fact, if not in word. The departing Pittites blamed Britain's military misfortunes on her allies' bungling.

V. The Forgotten Ally
Sweden's Role in the Third Coalition, Gustavus IV's Conflict with Prussia and the Russo-Swedish Campaign in North Germany, October 1805-January 1806.

In the wake of the allied defeat mutual recriminations flourished giving truth to the claim that while a victory may have many fathers, defeat is an orphan. The British blamed their continental allies in combination for the allied debacle without considering that their delayed expeditions played an important part in it. The British had learnt to treat subsidised allies either as mere vassal states, as Naples, Sicily or Sardinia were, or with intense suspicions, as they did Austria and Russia, whom they suspected in late November of wishing to collude with Napoleon against British interests. Sweden was treated as something between the two by the British but still seen as sharing some of the blame for the defeat. The British were disappointed to have Sweden at her side rather than Prussia and dismayed when Gustavus IV decided to provoke trouble with their vital potential ally. The British blamed this conflict for contributing to Prussia's absence from the coalition. Sweden was seen,

33 FO 334/12. Cathcart to Pierrepont, 2, 8 Jan.1806
therefore, as no substitute for Prussia, with her weak contingent, unreliable ministers and questionable strategies. 36

After all, it was only with great reluctance and under Russia’s recent pressure that the British ratified the Beckaskog treaty that Pierrepont had signed with Gustavus IV in the hope that the rapid advance of the Russo-Swedish army would occupy the Netherlands, thus justifying this huge British expense. In other words, in return for unprecedented generosity the British expected Gustavus IV to exert himself and his small army to the fullest in support of the allied offensive. 37 Everything began with such high hopes and optimism as the Russians landed on Rügen on 4 October and Sweden officially declared war on France. 38 Without pausing for a single moment the Russian advance guard pressed on towards the Elbe by 17 October, occupying Mecklenburg-Schwerin on the way. On 22 October general Tolstoy’s main Russian army landed on Rügen, followed two days later by the Swedish advance guard led by general Cardell. On 1 November the energetic and fiery Cardell set out after Tolstoy’s army which had reached Lüneburg, where Cardell linked up with him on 14 November. His advance was so rapid that general Morian’s division (2,800 troops) could not catch up with him, opting to occupy and secure Lauenburg on the north bank of the Elbe instead. The allied northern Army group was an impressive force on paper and numbered, at least officially, some 29,000 troops - 17,000 Russians and 12,000 Swedes. The Russo-Swedish army was not only a professional force of regular troops, with an excellent esprit de corps, but if it kept up its impressive rate of advance, it would not only occupy Hanover but also Holland, faster than they could have expected and maybe Castlereagh’s hopes would not have proved so unrealistic after all.39

Pierrepont’s optimistic reports could not hide some serious underlying problems. These problems only increased his discomfiture and heightened his fears that the government might not accept his excuse that allied operations and Russian demands compelled him to yield to Swedish demands and sign the

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37 FO 73/34. Mulgrave to Pierrepont, 8 Oct. 1805.
38 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 10 Oct. 1805; Carlsson. 144.
39 FO 73/34. Pierrepont to Mulgrave, 5, 14, 22 Oct. 1805; Björnlin. 75, 77, 81, 84-85, 87, SRE. 268.
treaty. The fact that Swedish troop numbers - (officially Sweden was fielding 12,000 troops, in the
secret clauses of the treaty she only put 10,000 troops in the field) - were considerably lower than
stipulated, or some 8,600 troops, alone could have posed a major problem. If the British government
repudiated the treaty then Swedish funding would dry up and its operations cease.\textsuperscript{40} Pierrepont had
worried in vain. Once allied operations had begun, his government was unlikely to rock, let alone (if
they had repudiated the Beckaskog treaty) sink the allied boat. Mulgrave endorsed and ratified the
treaty, but not without some minor changes. He reduced the advance payment due to Sweden from 5
to 3 months, since his government had already paid the Swedes £60,000 for Stralsund's defences and
he wanted the city's garrison to join the main field army. He also wanted, to forestall parliamentary
protests, that Sweden reciprocated British financial generosity with trading concessions. A much
relieved Pierrepont sought, without much success, to include such clauses in the treaty.\textsuperscript{41}

A graver threat to a successful Swedish contribution to the north German operations was the mutual
suspicions that existed between Sweden and Russia. A shallow friendship based on comradeship in
arms could not hide the deep-seated animosity that existed between these two traditional foes that
found themselves, as during the Seven Years War, fighting a common enemy. Mutual suspicions and
jealousies flourished especially between general count Tolstoy, the Russian commander, and Gustavus
IV. The former represented being under Swedish command and the king suspected Tolstoy of
insubordination and disrespect of his position. An actual crisis of command was only just averted.\textsuperscript{42}

Such a crisis would have suited Gustavus IV's Swedish domestic critics, for although 'his' war was
disliked in general, it was his Russian alliance that was most unpopular in particular. To them the war
was an unnecessary conflict, quite alien to Sweden's true interest and only due to their king's personal
vendetta against Napoleon.\textsuperscript{43} Although most Swedes hoped their army would perform well\textsuperscript{44} the

\textsuperscript{40} FO 73/34. Pierrepont to Mulgrave, 5 Oct., 14 Nov. 1805; Björn. 30, 74-77.
\textsuperscript{41} FO 73/34. Mulgrave to Pierrepont, 8, 18, 23 Oct., 27 Nov. 1805; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to
Ehrenheim, 10, 13 Oct., 8 Nov. 1805.
\textsuperscript{42} FO 73/34. Pierrepont to Mulgrave, 3, 9, 14 Nov. 1805; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 1
Nov. 1805.
\textsuperscript{43} Adlerbenth. 346.
\textsuperscript{44} ESKB. V. ff. 207-208. Brinkman to Engeström, 7 Nov. 1805.
officer corp displayed the same sort of disaffection with this war as they had in the Seven Year War.\textsuperscript{45} Even officers who were not necessarily oppositionist opposed the war and were to complain about the chaotic German campaign.\textsuperscript{46} More worrying than the disaffected officer corps at this stage (it was to become more dangerous as the war progressed) was the lack of support for the king and the war among his ministers. What possible hope was there for the Gustavian regime if an arch conservative such as count von Fersen was opposed to the war and lukewarm about the king's policies.\textsuperscript{47}

As if to confirm his opponents' every prejudice about the dangers and inconsistencies of autocratic rule, where whims of the king decided matters of life and death, Gustavus IV had not gone to war with Napoleon, but also provoked Prussia. As seen earlier, the Swedes and Prussians were long-standing opponents in north Germany and had conducted a war of nerves since 1804. Despite the fact that it was Prussia that had threatened to invade Pomerania if the Russians landed there both his allies and domestic critics claimed that it was Gustavus IV who had provoked the Prussians into an open conflict. In fact Prussia was a dangerous, predatory state whose territorial ambitions at the expense of Holstein and Pomerania aroused equal Danish and Swedish hostility. Thus Gustavus IV was not alone in disliking Prussia\textsuperscript{48} In fact Gustavus IV more than most European rulers distrusted Prussia since he believed that power was secretly collaborating with Napoleon against the allies and this made him doubly resentful of his allies' favouritism of such an 'unworthy' nation. He also believed that Prussia's partial occupation of Hanover was only the prelude to an occupation of Pomerania and part of Franco-Prussian collaboration.\textsuperscript{49}

Thus Gustavus IV's hostile suspicion of Prussia was not merely based on personal whim. His assessment of Prussian duplicity was far more realistic, in part, than his allies', who persisted in viewing Prussia as a friendly, would-be ally. He feared his allies would double-cross him in relation to Prussia whose great military power,\textsuperscript{50} in comparison to Sweden, made her a much more attractive

\textsuperscript{45} KWAH. 113.
\textsuperscript{46} ESKB. V. ff. 376-377. Mörner to Engeström, 1 Jan. 1806.
\textsuperscript{47} Barton. 329.
\textsuperscript{48} SRE. 268; Björnlin. 78; SUPH. III. 100.
\textsuperscript{49} TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 5, 21 Nov. 1805.
\textsuperscript{50} Barton. 332-333.
ally. He was convinced that the Prussians, in return for flattering Anglo-Russian attention would repay the allies by brokering an Austro-Russian armistice with Napoleon at the expense of Sweden and Britain. Despite his misgivings and reluctance, Gustavus IV engaged in diplomatic talks with the Prussians, to resolve their difference both territorial and political. 51

When he found the Prussians slow in replying to his query about their intentions Gustavus IV was only just prevented by Pierrepoint from sending an angry personal letter to Frederick Wilhelm III which replaced by a friendlier one carried to Berlin by count Löwenhjelm. 52 The Prussian government procrastinated and refused Löwenhjelm’s request to hand over the king’s letter. He was ordered back by an infuriated Gustavus IV. 53 This show of temper was due to, in Wetterstedt’s opinion, the fact that ‘The King’s noble soul is so beyond all considerations of political calculation that He will not consider the slightest deviation from what he considers to be a strictly honourable conduct’. 54 Swedish diplomats, who favoured good relations with Prussia, deplored the sending of an inexperienced officer on such a delicate mission which failure could lead to an open Prusso-Swedish crisis. 55 The failure of the Löwenhjelm mission coincided with news of Ulm, which heightened Gustavus IV’s suspicions of his allies betraying him. Gustavus IV was sure that they would prevent his exercise of real commander over the northern army group and chose therefore to resign as commander-in-chief, claiming that ‘I prefer to be alone with my few Swedes than command a Larger Army over which I do not have the freedom to dispose as I see fit’. 56

On 14 November (Löwenhjelm had returned to Pomerania meanwhile) Gustavus IV called Alopeus, Pierrepoint and Tolstoy to his HQ where he told them that his limited patience with Prussia had run out. Gustavus IV denounced Prussia as an enemy of the coalition and declared unless he had a swift response with a written guarantee that they would not invade Pomerania or threaten his army’s advance, then Gustavus IV would call a halt to the allied advance. 57 Gustavus IV’s decision remains

51 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 16, 20 Oct., 8 Nov. 1805; Björlin. 78.
52 FO 73/34. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 28 Oct. 1805.
53 GLS. Wetterstedt to Löwenhjelm, 3, 4 Nov. 1805; Björlin. 80.
54 GLS. Wetterstedt to Löwenhjelm, (private), 4 Nov. 1805.
55 ESKB. V. ff. 211-212. Brinkman to Engeström, 9 Nov. 1805.
56 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 5 Nov. 1805.
57 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 21 Nov. 1805.
one of the most controversial he ever made in a long career richly sprinkled with idiosyncratic
decisions and policies. At the time, and well after, he was heavily criticised for halting the advance on
his own, personal initiative without consulting his ministers. In fact, his military advisers
recommended, no doubt out of genuine fear of a Prussian invasion, but also because of their collective
opposition to the war, such a halt or even a Swedish retreat back to Stralsund. Yet again
Pierrepoint exercised damage control by preventing Gustavus IV from sending a new angry letter to
Berlin, which could only have the situation worse. He prevailed on Gustavus IV to allow at least half
his army to advance. Even the combined efforts of Wetterstedt, Armfelt and Tolstoy failed to
persuade Gustavus IV to let his entire army advance, the latter replying to their desperate entreaties
that 'I will do what I have to do whatever the cost'. In one sentence, Gustavus IV summed up his
entire raison d'etre in the face of what he saw as the outside world's opposition to his designs,
preordained by destiny, and why his ministers despaired of preventing a Prusso-Swedish conflict.

'He does not understand', noted Fersen in his diary. 'that politics does not include matters of knightly
honour' and why, therefore, the allies would not rally to his personal crusade against Prussia.
Pierrepoint gave full vent to his fury at Gustavus IV on 20 November in a private letter to Paget the
British Envoy in Vienna claiming that

After having given more trouble in negotiating for 10,000 men than all the Powers of the
Continent for their united force, the King of Sweden has now found out that his honour (mark
the word) prevents him from marching forward in support of the Russian troops which are
under his command, till he has obtained some assurances that he shall not be attacked by
Prussia, who is allied to the common cause & has not a soldier within a week's march of his
paltry province, and whom he has insulted in the most gross manner.

Prussia was in fact not a friendly power at all, least of all from the Swedish point of view, and
Pierrepoint's implied claim that it Gustavus IV's fault that Prussia did not join the allied powers is
overstated and one sided.

58 Klemming. 39-40. 42.
59 FO 73/34. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 14, 24 Nov. 1805.
60 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 14 Nov. 1805.
61 Barton. 330
62 Barton. 331
Nevertheless Pierrepoint persevered to prevent a Prusso-Swedish conflict and prevailed on Harrowby to get the Prussians to make a public assurance that they did not have hostile intentions against Sweden. Harrowby suggested that Gustavus IV placed his troops under Russian command to avoid a conflict with Prussia. But unless Gustavus IV advanced, Harrowby threatened to end the British subsidies. Wetterstedt had feared from the beginning of the conflict with Prussia that the British would react angrily to Gustavus IV using British subsidies in a conflict with Prussia. Not only could Sweden face financial ruin, but the king's order to halt the Swedish advance could be blamed for the subsequent failure of the allied operations. Pierrepoint's threat to end the subsidies was deemed to be so arrogant that an infuriated Gustavus IV (always conscious of not being treated as a vassal by his 'paymaster') asked if the subsidy treaty was still in force. Meanwhile in Berlin Harrowby had been assured by Hardenberg that Gustavus IV's fears were (naturally) without foundation. Pierrepoint, and Harrowby, hoped this 'assurance' would suffice for Gustavus IV to renew the Swedish advance. Gustavus IV was singularly unimpressed by a casual remark during talks between Harrowby and a Prussian minister. That did not constitute any sort of 'guarantee', especially as Pierrepoint and Harrowby did not have the authority to guarantee a verbal assurance. Gustavus IV, unsatisfied with the British 'efforts', was determined to demand a written Prussian guarantee. Pierrepoint believed this demand was not only counter productive but would only worsen the crisis further. Gustavus IV agreed that Brinkman, the Swedish chargé d'affaires in Berlin, was a better medium of communication with the Prussian government than Löwenhjelm. On 27 November, growing worried about his isolated position, Gustavus IV ordered his army to advance. When news reached him that Prussian troops were requisitioning supplies from Hanover he countermanded his order immediately, which paralysed the Swedish army's advance. In Berlin the Prussians could not be brought to a firm answer by Harrowby, which exhausted the usefulness of a British intervention for Gustavus IV and left the Russians to prevail upon Gustavus IV to renew his offensive. Given Alopeus' unpopularity with Gustavus IV, only Alexander I, despite Gustavus IV's anger at the emperor's alliance with Prussia which the Russians failed to inform him about, could now make the king end his sulky isolation from the rest of the coalition. The Emperor promised to keep Prussia in check and urged
Gustavus IV to advance for the sake of the common cause. On 1 December Gustavus IV finally ordered his remaining 4,000 troops to advance on the Elbe and Lüneburg.  

His decision came too late. The day after his orders for the Swedish army to advance, the Russians and Austrians were defeated at Austerlitz. He left Pomerania on 16 December and his army advanced rapidly and crossed the Elbe three days later, but on 20 December the allied Northern army learnt about the Franco-Austrian armistice. Thus Hanover was threatened by a French invasion which made the allied position untenable. This tragic news seemed to justify, in Swedish eyes, Gustavus IV's previous caution about advancing. The Swedish army also faced deepening financial problems by December 1805. Despite Pierrepont's assurances of rapid resumption of the subsidies when the Swedes advanced, he only managed to pay the October subsidy by mid-December, which was diminished in value by currency fluctuations on the Hamburg exchange following Austerlitz. The Swedes imposed double tolls in those areas of Hanover which they had occupied, much to the irritation of the Hanoverians and British. But these stop-gap measures could not save the army from an acute cash crisis by January, compounded by the failure of the British subsidies to arrive as fast as promised by Pierrepont.  

By early January financial problems were added to new political ones. Cathcart's request for sanctuary in Stralsund for his troops seemed to indicate that the coalition was falling apart and the war was lost. Wetterstedt was convinced that the British intended to evacuate Hanover at the first opportunity instead of continuing their presence in north Germany. A fast escape by sea was not open to Britain's land bound allies, noted Wetterstedt sourly. In mid-January the rapid British retreat to the coast convinced Wetterstedt 'that Messrs. British are seeking a fast return to safe home ports', which the Swedes should emulate as a prelude to leaving the collapsing coalition.  

64 FO 73/34. Pierrepont to Mulgrave, 22, 24 Nov., 6 Dec. 1805.; ibid. Pierrepont to Harrowby, 24 Nov. 1805; ibid. Harrowby to Pierrepont, 18, 28 Nov. 1805; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 17, 19, 20, 24, 27 Nov., 1, 3 Dec. 1805; TSLUB. C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 3 Dec. 1805; Björnlin. 90-91.  
66 FO 73/34. Cathcart to Pierrepont, 10 Jan. 1806.  
67 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 25 Dec., 1, 12 Jan. 1806.  
68 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 16 Jan. 1806.  
69 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 15 Jan. 1806.
seemed to share, for once, Wetterstedt's cynical views on the alliance and was determined to evacuate Hanover 'now that this unhappy coalition through a series of the most unbelievable mistakes and most selfish actions will probably be dissolved'.\(^{70}\) He did not dwell on his own share in the allied debacle, and his decision was probably more to do with his pique at not being told that the Russians had placed their troops (to avoid being captured or encircled by the French) under the detested Prussians' command\(^{71}\) instead of under continued Swedish command.\(^{72}\) This double insult to Gustavus IV heightened his discontent.\(^{73}\) Despite the approaching French menace, Gustavus IV refused to place his own army under Prussian command.\(^{74}\)

Allied favouritism towards Prussia was viewed with growing distaste by Gustavus IV and he wanted to avenge his wounded pride by postponing the evacuation from Lauenburg, where his army was situated, to avoid being seen to retreat before the Prussians. For the Swedes to remain in Lauenburg suited Pierrepont in early January. A few weeks later, with Cathcart's evacuation of Hanover, this no longer suited British designs. While the bulk of the Swedish army retreated back to Pomerania by 17 January the same Löwenhjelm who had headed the futile mission to Berlin was left behind in Lauenburg with 1,800 troops. Pierrepont, Armfelt and the Russians all exerted the greatest pressure on Gustavus IV to evacuate the province. On 26 January he told them that he would not evacuate the province without hearing from London what the British government wished him to do. Knowing that Gustavus IV took no one into his confidence, Pierrepont realised how difficult it would be to get him to change his mind. Pierrepont told Armfelt that only God knew what the king was up to, since one could not get him to advance earlier when there was an enemy in the field but now that there was none, one could not get him to retreat. Pierrepont had yet to grasp that in Gustavus IV's view the political situation since while the war against Napoleon was dormant, the struggle against his ally, Prussia, had to continue and he urged his neighbours, Russia and Denmark, to join an Anglo-Swedish alliance against a suspected Franco-Prussian pact in defence of north Germany. Pierrepont was not convinced by Gustavus IV's reasoning and he believed the king only wanted personal revenge against

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\(^{70}\) TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 31 Jan. 1806.  
\(^{71}\) KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 28 Dec. 1805.  
\(^{72}\) FO 73/34. Pierrepont to Cathcart, 2 Jan. 1806.  
\(^{73}\) FO 73/34. Cathcart to Pierrepont, 10 Jan. 1806.  
\(^{74}\) FO 73/34. Pierrepont to Mulgrave, 1, 10 Jan. 1806.; Björlin. 96-97.
Prussia humiliating her with Russian aid. He predicted dire consequences for Europe from a Prusso-Swedish conflict. A view shared by Wetterstedt, who believed that the Swedish occupation of Lauenburg would lead to war with Prussia. He was convinced that the British would not support Sweden trying to retain a province the British had already given up as lost. British support was even less likely from the incoming Grenville-Fox administration, which would seek peace with France. If Prussia remained calm, then Sweden should not only withdraw from Hanover, Wetterstedt argued, but also emulate Fox's example and withdraw from the war. But Sweden's policy decision in favour of war or peace, in early February, would depend upon Russia's foreign policy. Should Russia join the Franco-Prussian block, Wetterstedt argued, then Sweden would lose Finland and Pomerania at the same time. Wetterstedt had predicted with uncanny accuracy Sweden's fate a year later, and how the failure of the Third Coalition would undermine the independence and security of the European powers vis-à-vis the expanding Napoleonic empire.

VI. Austerlitz, Austria and the Demise of the Alliance
The Bohemian Campaign and the Allied Debacle at Austerlitz, October-December 1805.

The Third Coalition had not failed because the British did not exert themselves sufficiently or because the Swedes did not advance early enough to the Elbe, nor even because Prussia, the missing piece in Pitt's alliance puzzle, declined to join the allied cause. The real fate of the coalition rested with the performance of the Austrian and Russian armies. The allied campaign in central Europe proved a dismal failure, as the French, bolstered and emboldened by their success at Ulm, invaded Austria and occupied Vienna. The fall of Vienna led to demoralising Austrian arguments with the Russians, who were more concerned about keeping the allied field armies intact, than defending the Austrian capital.75

The Austrian retreat aroused British fears about the reliability of their ally, who showed signs of defeatism.77 The British hoped that the Russian army could defeat Napoleon and turn the tide of the

76 Horne. 120-123, 126-127.; Chandler. 404-405.
war in the allies' favour. But an allied victory would very much hinge upon Prussia's intervention on
the allied side but that proved a forlorn hope since by November, with the failure of Harrowby's
special diplomatic mission to Berlin, the British finally accepted that Prussia would not be joining the
'common cause' against Napoleon. Clearly that the fate of the allied cause would be decided by a
mighty clash of arms. Unfortunately the allies miscalculated their strength by challenging Napoleon
on the battlefield of Austerlitz where, on 2 December, they suffered massive defeat which shattered
the coalition and forced Austria to make peace on Napoleon’s terms. Any hope for a Prussian
intervention was now lost as she rapidly returned to neutrality.

VII. Death and Demise
The End of Pitt and his Political System, December 1805-January 1806.

On 29 December London had received accurate news of Austerlitz which both shocked and
dismayed the British public since they had such great expectations from the allied campaign. Now
another 'Austrian catastrophe' had turned initial news of a Russian victory into stunning defeat. As early as 29 November Pitt's bright protégé, George Canning, had predicted that Pitt's government
would be forced to resign if it presided over another continental fiasco. Canning's prediction proved
devastatingly accurate. But the bad news also took a personal toll on Pitt, whose health, which had
been undermined already by overwork and a brisk consumption of alcohol, deteriorated further as the
Prime minister took on a new cadaverous 'Austerlitz look'. He was, quite unfairly, blamed for yet
another failed coalition. Pitt, ever the optimist, shrugged off the criticism and persisted in his hope
that the Prussians, his last faltering military card, would intervene on the allied side. When the

79 GLG. 131.
81 GLG. 141-142, 151-152; Horne. 133-134, 146, 151-182.
82 Simms. 224-229.
83 Rose. 551; Hall. 121.
84 The Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester. Speaker of the House of Commons. II. 22.
85 Wordsworth. 241. 1 Jan. 1806.
86 Holland. 331.
87 Mackesy. 98; Hall. 126.
88 Gash. 64-65.
Prussians, true to form, failed to oblige the Prime minister's last hope had gone and his health began to deteriorate very fast. By the morning of 23 January Pitt, the great and long serving British Prime minister (in war and peace) was dead. Pitt's death deprived a weak, often disunited and by now discredited administration, of its last hope of political survival. No senior Tory politician could be found to head a new administration and the alternative, much against George III's wishes, would be one that included the Foxites. The king was almost as much out of tune with public opinion in Britain as Gustavus IV was in Sweden since both countries had become disillusioned with continuing to fight 'an unwinnable war'.

Count Fersen no doubt expressed public opinion in both countries when he stated in his diary that 'Thus a dismal year has finally come to an end. A year that saw the coalition dissolved at the expense of Austria and Italy while north Germany is not united enough to erect a barrier against further French expansion and at the mercy of Prussia's base policies. May we not in the new year therefore see an even greater extension of France's monstrous power'. Unfortunately the count's fervent hopes went unheeded as 1806 and the following years saw further allied set-backs and the expansion of that 'monstrous power'.

89 Reilly. 339; Rose. 552-553, 555; Hall. 121-122.
90 Reilly. 343; Minto. 276. 22 Jan. 1806.
91 Gash. 67.
92 Gash. 308; Gray. 54.
93 Mackesy. 98; Hall. 126; Tegnér. Engeström. 113-114; HECD. VII. 391-393, 403-404. Dec. 1805, Jan. 1806.
Chapter Four.

Phoney War and Phoney Peace.

The Anglo-Swedish 'War' with Prussia and the Anglo-Russian Peace Negotiations with Napoleon, February-September 1806.

I. A New Diplomatic Direction.
Fox's New Foreign Policy System.

The death of Pitt was not merely the end of a great statesman but the end of an entire system of foreign policy. The new government made up of disgruntled Tories led by Lord Grenville and Addington together with the Foxite Whigs were only united by their opposition to the Pittite system which had been discredited by the complete failure of the third coalition. When they took power in February 1806 the Talents, as they were known, desired an end to the war, a return to peace and prosperity. Neither Britain's allies nor her political public were much impressed with the calibre or unity of the Talents.¹

II. The Phoney Peace
The Anglo-Russian Peace Negotiations in Paris, April-September 1806.

The first priority for the new foreign secretary Charles James Fox was to open peace talks with France and in early 1806 this seemed the ideal time to do so. Despite Grenville's lukewarm support Lord Yarmouth was appointed as special envoy for the peace talks in Paris by early June.² Yarmouth refused to be browbeaten by the French, like his Russian colleague d'Ouubril who signed a highly disadvantageous treaty with the French, and give up Sicily in exchange for Hanover.³ In August the ineffectual Yarmouth was replaced with Lord Lauderdale. The French had been chastened by Alexander I's refusal to ratify the d'Ouubril treaty, lowered their pretensions but still insisted upon Sicily being exchanged in return for peace. British attitudes hardened after Fox's death in mid

¹ Harvey. 619, 621, 632-633.; Mitchell. 222-227.; Smith. 84, 87, 101, 104; Taylor. 50, 56-57; GLG. 177-178; Wordsworth. 246; Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 21 Feb.1806.
² FO 27/73. Fox to Talleyrand, 18 Feb., 26 Mar., 8, 21 Apr., 1806; ibid. Talleyrand to Fox, 7 Mar., 1, 16 Apr., 2 June 1806; Taylor. 67
³ FO 27/73. Fox to Yarmouth, 26 June, 4, 26 July 1806; ibid. Yarmouth to Fox, 21 June, 1, 9, 19, 20, 24, 27 July 1806.
September and by this time the French were preparing to invade Prussia the talks collapsed due to their mutual intransigence over the fate of Sicily. On 6 October Lauderdale returned to London.4

III. The Phoney War
The Lauenburg Crisis and the Anglo-Swedish Conflict with Prussia, February-August 1806.

Fox was in the paradoxical position during his short tenure as foreign secretary of pursuing peace talks with Britain's enemy while making half-hearted war on a power considered the most desirable of allies only a few months earlier. This ludicrous situation arose from Prussia's mutually insincere alliance with France in February 1806 which led to the occupation of Hanover.5 Gustavus IV too was in conflict with Prussia since he refused to evacuate Löwenhjelm's force from Lauenburg.6 Prussia, wishing to remove the allied forces from north Germany as quickly as possible to eliminate any cause for a French intervention in an area of great security importance to it and secure its western border by occupying Hanover outright,7 urged the British to remove the Swedes from Lauenburg.8 Berlin had overestimated British influence with Gustavus IV who believed he was fulfilling his obligations as a British ally by defending Hanover against the ally of their common enemy, Prussia.9 These were his immediate reasons for confronting Prussia, but they only reflected his long-term opposition to any Prussian annexation of Hanover and his conflict with Prussia during the 1805 campaign.10 Nor had he any wish to hand over Lauenburg to Prussia's tender mercies.11 However, beneath a surface of sentimentalism and political reason lurked more base motives. He threatened to remain in the province as long as the British did not pay their outstanding debt of £75,000. Pierrepoint, on London's orders and no doubt motivated by the wish to get Gustavus IV out of the province, promptly paid the sum on 27 March.12 This was not the first, nor the last, time that Gustavus IV succeeded in

4 FO 27/74. Fox to Lauderdale, 2, 8, 23 Aug., 4 Sept. 1806; ibid. Lauderdale to Fox, 6, 9, 11, 16, 17, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31 Aug. 1806; ibid. Spencer to Lauderdale, 26, 30 Sept., 4, 6 Oct. 1806; ibid. Lauderdale to Spencer, 18, 19, 26 Sept., 4, 6 Oct. 1806.
5 Simms. 231-232.
6 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6 Feb. 1806.
7 Simms. 235-236.
8 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24 Feb. 1806.
9 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 6 Apr. 1806; Carlsson. 146.
10 GLS. HLL. Fersen's proclamation, 27 Apr. 1806.; Carlsson. 147.
11 Carlsson. 146.
getting the British to pay him subsidies promptly by using crude blackmail. His motivation in using such dubious methods was his army's financial plight and Sweden's inability to shoulder the cost of the war itself, arising from Gustavus IV's refusal to levy war taxes which would require the Riksdag's approval. Fearing this could call his unpopular war policies into question, Gustavus refused to call the Swedish parliament into session. His financial weakness undermined his war effort and bargaining position vis-à-vis the British.

Pierrepoint did not believe that Gustavus IV would, or could, make war on Prussia with Löwenhjelm's puny force, numbering 1,600 men in February 13 and even less so in March, when only 400 cavalry remained there, after the withdrawal of the infantry to strengthen Pomerania's defences. 14 Pierrepoint urged Gustavus on 11 February, during an audience at his Ratzeburg HQ, to evacuate the province, but the king's adamant determination to occupy it at all cost convinced Pierrepoint that Gustavus IV intended deliberately to provoke war with Prussia. 15 This view was shared by Gustavus IV's advisers, 16 who were as keen to remove the troops as was Pierrepoint. In February Wetterstedt combined his efforts with Pierrepoint to get the province evacuated. Pierrepoint argued that the Swedish occupation, however well intentioned, 17 only prolonged Hanover's agony, 18 since the French would remain in Hameln as long as the Swedes remained in Lauenburg. 19

While Gustavus IV's civilian advisers urged him to evacuate Lauenburg to return to a peaceful, neutral state of affairs with the outside world, his military advisers wanted an end to the continental war, in order to fight another, more profitable war. The end of active fighting in northern Europe in February 1806 seemed to be an ideal time to seize Norway from Denmark. This was an old Swedish dream that Gustavus III had worked hard to achieve during his reign but had failed to realise. Gustavus IV followed in his father's footsteps. But he would, like his father, be careful about choosing the right time to do so. The Norwegian project's most persistent advocate was the French

13 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 10 Feb. 1806.
14 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 28 Mar. 1806.
15 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 14 Feb. 1806.
16 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 15 Apr. 1806; Barton. 340.
17 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6 Feb., 1 Mar. 1806
18 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 21 Feb. 1806.
royalist émigré colonel Charles de Suremain, who had been planning an invasion of Zealand since 1798, and who urged Gustavus IV between February and April to seize the island before Napoleon did and exchange it for Norway. 20 Armfelt added his greater influence to this idea and seemed even less bothered than Suremain about the implications of abandoning her allies in favour of attacking a peaceful neighbour and robbing it of her most valuable possession. That Russia might take offence or emulate the Swedish example in relation to Finland 21 did not seem to either influence or worry these cynical expansionists. On 27 February Armfelt expounded his theories to Wetterstedt, and claimed that

If Sweden seeks to increase her dominions then Norway would be a far more important possession than Pomerania; under present conditions that task would not present any major problems. To become again what we once were, and (what is more important) to- preserve our influence and power then we have only to reduce the circumference of our activities. The Peace of Westphalia has in fact been suspended since Prussia and Russia entered their respective roles in the European balance of power. Let us [therefore] leave the continent to wallow in its crimes, baseness, filth and blood; let us avoid even touching its accursed soil 22

If one could trust this to represent the real views of Armfelt, who was notorious for changing his views with alarming frequency and ease of mind, it was an extraordinary transformation from only a few months before when he was a strong advocate for a European crusade against Napoleon. The change can only be explained by the mood of defeatism that naturally followed the Austerlitz campaign and spread in early 1806 among the allies. His views carry, in isolationist aspirations, abandonment of continental interests and 'safe' expansion beyond the confines of the continent to restore the nation's imperial vigour, an uncanny similarity to Grenville's and Windham's views in London.

Ehrenheim was horrified when he heard about Armfelt's imperialist speculations, since he wanted good relations with Denmark, possibly for mutual defence of Northern neutrality, which Ehrenheim aspired to restore once the king's passions for war had passed. On 11 February Ehrenheim expounded his sceptical views to Wetterstedt in their private correspondence, claiming that

20 Klemming. 42.
21 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 11 Feb.1806.
22 Tegnérr. 85.
Should we burn our fingers after a few, failed campaigns, so much the better for the Russians. Should we gain and hold Norway, then it would soon be viewed as a compensation for Finland which we would no doubt have to cede [to Russia]. Our entire peace and happiness depend upon peaceful concern for our commerce and agriculture, and Armfelt would do better to direct HM's passions in that direction. 23

Ehrenheim's fears were quite justified and prophetically described what happened to Finland and Norway between 1809 and 1814. No doubt such projects, if known in St.Petersburg, would have aroused Russian opposition. As it was, the Danes believed that Swedish mobilisation in southern Sweden, ostensibly for the defence of Scania, were in fact preparations for an invasion of Zealand. 24

While Gustavus IV found the Danish allegations ridiculous, 25 it did not stop his suspicious neighbour rejecting his overtures for a Nordic alliance against Napoleon for the common defence of the Sound. 26 There is no direct proof that Gustavus IV heeded either Ehrenheim or de Suremain's contradictory advice. Gustavus IV's eyes were firmly upon the fate of Europe as a whole and supporting the allied cause. (It is of course possible that Gustavus IV hoped that his loyal support for the allied cause would be rewarded by Denmark being forced by his allied to cede Norway to him by peaceful means. If that failed then Gustavus IV would probably use force). In early 1806 Gustavus IV's main priority was defending northern Germany against the Franco-Prussian threat, 27 where Denmark played a vital role. The Danish rebuff to his overtures not only weakened allied defences but also thwarted his aspirations for Denmark's inclusion in the 'common cause'. 28 Again Gustavus IV suspected Prussian sabotage, possibly in spreading rumours about Norway to the Danes, to prevent such alliance putting obstacles in the way for their own expansion in northern Germany. In early 1806 Wetterstedt hoped that Sweden would leave the war as soon as the British subsidies ran out 29 and not renew the alliance with her. Wetterstedt believed the British were more interested in making peace with France than supporting Sweden's unsolicited Lauenburg occupation which might provoke a French advance into an area of special economic interest to Britain. 30

23 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 11 Feb. 1806.
24 FO 73/35. Pierrepont to Fox, 28 Apr. 1806.
25 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 26 Apr. 1806.
26 FO 73/35. Pierrepont to Fox, 28 Feb. 1806.
27 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 3 Mar. 1806.
28 FO 73/35. Pierrepont to Fox, 9 May 1806.
29 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 28 Feb., 20 Mar. 1806.
30 TSLUB.C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 20 Feb. 1806.
Ehrenheim shared Wetterstedt’s peaceful aspirations and doubts about their British ally, especially Fox and the continued flow of subsidies, which, if they failed to arrive promptly, could be used as a convenient excuse to end the British alliance. But Ehrenheim realised that Gustavus IV’s support for the alliance was unchanged and his trust in his British ally unquestioning. Like their British counterparts, Ehrenheim and Wetterstedt seemed to have blithely underestimated the difficulties in achieving a lasting peace with Napoleon and the serious consequences of a rapid Swedish desertion of the coalition. But they had support from Armfelt, who again on 18 March voiced his opinion to Engeström, the arch Francophile: 'My God, if the king would only return home and forget thinking about what is going on in Europe, until the circumstances there have changed'. Armfelt seemed to have believed that events on the continent would change on their own, and ignored the argument that unless Napoleon was checked by the allies, including Sweden, then they would not. Having blamed Gustavus IV for the failure to make peace with Napoleon (Pitt was similarly blamed by the Foxites), the Swedish oppositionists were only to find out how difficult and long the road to peace was after they took power.

Meanwhile, the initially undecided, but positive, British reactions to Prussian ‘protection’, instead of a French occupation of Hanover, was transformed by the Prussian proclamation that their North Sea ports had been closed to British shipping. On 4 April Fox informed Rehausen that the Prussians had also made their occupation of Hanover permanent (thus realising Gustavus IV's earlier suspicion that the Prussians would eventually annex the country). Fox was visibly enraged by the Prussian action which he interpreted as a de-facto declaration of war against Britain and, should her loyal ally Sweden be threatened by either France or Prussia, then Britain would give all possible assistance. This message was re-iterated by Fox on 15 April, during another meeting, where he also promised to pursue the war against Prussia with all vigour, with the help of Russia. In fact, beside Alexander I’s far too close relations with Berlin, rumours of Franco-Russian plans to divide the Ottoman empire

31 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 11, 14, 18, 25, 28 Feb., 5 Mar. 1806
32 Tegnér. 86.
33 Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 7 Mar. 1806.
34 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 2 Apr. 1806.
35 Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 4 Apr. 1806.; FO 73/35. Fox to Pierrepoint, 8 Apr. 1806.
made Fox doubt Russia's usefulness and reliability in the Prussian crisis.\textsuperscript{37} When Fox's declarations of support prompted Pierrepoint, on 12 April, to renew his recommendations to Gustavus IV to evacuate Lauenburg (to concentrate upon the defence of Pomerania) Gustavus IV refused to budge and declared that he would take any Prussian violation of the province's territory as an act of war.\textsuperscript{38} In fact Gustavus IV's Prussophobia was fed by the growing Anglo-Prussian crisis which reduced his ministers hopes for a return to peace in Europe.\textsuperscript{39}

Gustavus IV's bellicosity was more than matched by Fox who was a lifelong opponent of what he saw as Prussian aggression and autocratic tyranny. He convinced his cabinet colleagues to declare immediate war on Prussia and put its ports under blockade. But his apparent militancy was tempered by political calculation, since to take a strong line against Prussia would always prove popular with George III, yet another Prussophobe. The king refused to cede Hanover to the Prussians and was as jealously possessive about the Electorate as Gustavus IV was about Pomerania. Fox could therefore gain the king's trust and confidence (especially when he claimed that Hanover was as British as Hampshire), which improved his general political image, and at the same time used the Prussian 'war' as a convenient smoke screen for his Parisian peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{40} In public Fox denounced Prussia's policy eloquently as combining 'everything that is contemptible in servility with everything that is odious in rapacity',\textsuperscript{41} while in private telling Howick that not enough could be done to harm Prussia.\textsuperscript{42} This was all part of his political play-acting since he settled for a limited blockade of Prussian occupied North Sea ports,\textsuperscript{43} hoping it would cripple the Prussian economy sufficiently for Frederick Wilhelm III to evacuate Hanover.\textsuperscript{44} This blockade failed to impress the Swedes since it left Britain's vital Prussian imports from the Baltic untouched so as not to provoke Russia too much.\textsuperscript{45} Wetterstedt's cynical analysis of Fox's response to the Prussians was correct up to a point. Fox had

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 9 May 1806.; FO 334/10. Thornton to Pierrepoint, 24 June 1806.
\item \textsuperscript{38} FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 12 Apr. 1806.
\item \textsuperscript{39} KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 9, 16 Apr. 1806.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Taylor. 70.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Agatha Ramm, Europe in the 19th. century, 1789-1905. (London, 1967). 105.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Mitchell. 230.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Anglica. 489. Fox to Rehausen, 8 Apr. 1806.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 24 June 1806.
\item \textsuperscript{45} KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6 May 1806.
\end{itemize}
indeed no wish for a real war with Prussia, but he sincerely hoped to cripple Prussia's trade for political reasons.

The blockade was more effective than Fox could have hoped for, as the complacent Prussian authorities had failed to forewarn their ship owners and merchants about the possibility of a British embargo in response to their own blockade. Berlin had in fact not expected such a forceful British reaction, and by early April over 300 merchant ships had been captured by the British. The blockade, meanwhile, crippled Prussia's exports in general, but especially her grain and timber trade for which Britain was the largest export market. Soon the Prussian merchant class and the finance minister were protesting that the blockade was bankrupting both them and the nation. The Prussian government remained unmoved since, in a world of narrowing choices and smaller margins for error, they chose the lesser of two evils: slow economic strangulation by the British, in preference to military annihilation by Napoleon's army. Better a British blockade than French troops in Berlin, in other words. This capitulation to Napoleon had come about after the failure of pro-allied policies to yield result and the amorphous balance in the Berlin cabinet shifted to the 'French Party' who adopted the above policy. But the Prussians believed that the British would not take such umbrage at their occupation and blockade simply because of a mere matter of honour. Blinded by its own cynicism the Prussian government convinced itself that other governments' political motivations were guided by the same lack of principle as its own. This unimaginative approach translated itself not only into economic, but political losses, and Wetterstedt ridiculed Prussian incredulity at British 'incivility'.

If the British sense of moral outrage at their actions remained a mystery to the Prussians, then Gustavus IV's crusading zeal against them proved an even greater puzzle. Gustavus IV's fears for Pomerania and Lauenburg, both of which he was determined to defend, were immediately aroused and he intended to blockade Prussia if she occupied Lauenburg. Ehrenheim, whose advice was rarely

46 Mitchell. 230.
49 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 26 Apr. 1806.
acted upon by Gustavus IV, urged the king to stay neutral in the Anglo-Prussian war and instead take economic advantage of it. This piece of crass and selfish commercialism not only promised to embroil Sweden in a trade dispute with her most important ally (since the British had a strong aversion to other powers, especially paid allies such as Sweden, taking unfair advantage of her state of war to increase their trade at her expense); but his advice was also patently against the spirit of the alliance since Britain and Sweden faced a new common foe: Prussia, allied to their arch enemy France. Ehrenheim's advice for Gustavus IV to end his self imposed role as Lauenburg's protector and await his allies policies towards Berlin, was far more perceptive. However, against all the experience of the past, he still advised Gustavus IV to leave the war. Ehrenheim, sidelined in Stockholm, was very much ignored by the king, and his private correspondence probably expressed his private wishes more than any real intention to influence Gustavus IV's actual policy orientation.  

Wetterstedt needed no prompting to end the alliance with Britain, prevent a conflict with Prussia and get Sweden out of the war. But his efforts were undermined by what he perceived as Prussia's deliberate efforts to provoke Gustavus IV into hostilities. An officer in Löwenhjelm's corp, count Mörner, believed that Russia would invade Prussian Poland, in support of Sweden, if the Prussians invaded Lauenburg. This cataclysmic scenario, which would have seen the allied powers making war among themselves without Napoleon, was unlikely to occur since Alexander I had no wish to go to war against a friendly power on behalf of either Britain or Sweden. Pierrepoint did not share Swedish sentiments, which grossly exaggerated Sweden's influence in St. Petersburg and the perceived weakness of Prussia. Pierrepoint believed the Prussians were determined to occupy Lauenburg, and that the weak Swedish force there would be unable to prevent it. This state of weakness no doubt influenced Löwenhjelm's orders from Gustavus IV not to risk an encirclement, but retreat as quickly as possible to Pomerania. Gustavus IV, when faced with the hard choice of war or peace, opted, like Fox, to avoid an unwinnable land war in favour of a blockade of Prussia's ports. In the spring of

50 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 7 Apr. 1806; KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 8, 11, 15, 18, 23 Apr. 1806; Simms. 231-232.  
51 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 9, 13 Apr. 1806.  
54 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 19 Apr. 1806.
1806 Britain and Sweden could have embroiled themselves in a disastrous war with Prussia that would have had the potential to pull other powers into the maelstrom.

When the Prussian 'invasion' took place on 19 April, with 1,800 troops crossing the Elbe at Neuhausen, Löwenhjelm's force (400 men) made token resistance, losing one dead, before retreating to safety in Pomerania. After this farcical operation, would the Prussians follow up their empty 'victory' with an invasion of Mecklenburg-Schwerin or Pomerania with the 17,000 Prussian troops massed along the Peene river? Both the Swedes and the British were convinced that this army was there as a threat and not as an actual invasion force. Two days before Lauenburg was occupied Jackson, following Fox's orders to cut all diplomatic links with Prussia, left Berlin without taking leave of the foreign minister, pointing to an escalation in the crisis between Britain and Prussia as well.55

In early May, with rumours of war with Prussia, Gustavus IV announced to Pierrepont, during an audience, his blockade of Prussia's Baltic ports in retaliation for Prussia's occupation of Lauenburg. His suggestion to occupy the neutral ports of Travemünde, Wismar and Rostock, to forestall the Prussians, was flatly turned down by Pierrepont, who believed his government would never agree to such a callous violation of neutral territory. Gustavus IV also asked for increased British subsidies (as he was prone to do when there was a crisis to be dealt with), to increase his Pomeranian army from 10,000 to 15,000 troops. Both Pierrepont and Ehrenheim believed the Swedish blockade would hurt Swedish commerce more than Prussia's. Fersen, who feared that Prussia might be provoked into invading Pomerania by the blockade, wanted Gustavus IV to appease them by only leaving a small garrison in Pomerania. Fersen's supine advice would not only have violated the terms of the alliance with Britain, but probably encourage further Prussian aggression. Fersen was at a loss to understand Gustavus IV's strong objections to his proposals. Wetterstedt supported Fersen's proposals, shared the count's and the Pomeranians' exaggerated fears of the Prussian army, especially as Wetterstedt believed Sweden's 'unreliable' allies would not come to Sweden's aid. Nor could there be much

55 FO 73/35. Pierrepont to Fox, 5, 25 Apr.1806; FO 334/10. Thornton to Pierrepont, 4, 8, 11 Apr.1806; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 26 Apr.1806; GLS. HLL. Tibell to Löwenhjelm, 6 Apr.1806.
support to be expected from the Pomeranian aristocracy, which had been alienated by Gustavus IV's land reform and abolition of the province's autonomy. 56

An even greater threat than an escalation of the conflict with Prussia, was the fear held by the king's ministers that it could embroil Sweden in conflict with her allies. Ehrenheim feared, with experience of the conflict five years earlier, that the blockade would give the British an excuse to violate Sweden's hard won maritime rights elsewhere. 57 Both he and Pierrepoint were relieved when Gustavus IV, in late May, cancelled his plans to bombard Prussia's ports, which would no doubt have provoked the Prussians beyond endurance. At least Pierrepoint was assured on 22 May that Gustavus IV had no offensive plans against Prussia beyond the blockade. 58 The Swedish blockade of Prussia's Baltic ports, by trapping 2,000 ships, added to her economic woes. Pierrepoint's request that Prussian ships in British ports be allowed to return home was politely, but firmly, declined by the Swedes, since it would have undermined the entire purpose of the blockade. 59 Pierrepoint's increasing protests made Wetterstedt nervous that Britain would join a Russo-Danish protest which could lead to British threats, such as those made during earlier maritime conflicts between her and Sweden. 60

In fact Wetterstedt believed that Fox would make peace with France at Sweden's expense, stating on 24 May that 'It seems that all England wants to do is to gain time, using us as a convenient target, as long as the wrath against Prussia lasts, and then in their own good time leave us to save ourselves as best we can'. 61 The Swedes were in fact very disappointed with Britain's failure to support their blockade and their endeavours to end it with diplomatic pressure being applied to Sweden with the assistance of Russia. 62 The British lack of support for the Swedish blockade comes as no surprise, since Fox had limited the British blockade in order to minimise British merchants' losses and inconvenience, while securing Britain's vital imports of Prussian grain. The cabinet simply found

56 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 1, 8 May 1806; KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 2, 6 May 1806; Dalgren. 100-186; TSLUB.C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 26 Apr., 2 May 1806.
57 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 11, 20 May 1806.
58 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 23 May 1806
59 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 10, 14, 21 June 1806; Simms. 246.
60 TSLUB.C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 10, 28 June 1806;
61 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 10 June 1806.
62 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24, 31 May 1806.
Gustavus IV's blockade 'troublesome' and wanted it to end as swiftly as possible. As early as late May British merchants supplying the navy had inquired if they could get naval stores out of the blockaded ports. It was only two months later that Gustavus IV allowed £80,000 of stores through the blockade. Gustavus IV, aware how annoying his blockade was to the British, was therefore willing to relent. But the stoppage of Prussian grain imports into Sweden was causing widespread distress in his own country, and his ministers (like the British) no less ardently wished it to end. They praised his moderation in applying it, and his decision to send a naval mission to Berlin to defuse the situation.

The gravest threat to the blockade did not however, come from Britain, but from Russia, whose relations with Sweden had cooled considerably since the failed 1805 campaign. Alexander I had only renewed his alliance with Sweden to placate her over the issue of the Finnish border while he was embroiled in war against France but had already in March warned Gustavus IV not to provoke either Russia or Prussia over territorial disputes. Relations between the two allies, and ancient enemies, were therefore far from friendly, even before the blockade promised to worsen them yet further. The Swedish suspicion that Prussia would shield behind Russia to protect herself against an Anglo-Swedish attack was soon realised. The Prussians complained to the emperor that the British hoped to rekindle the continental war, to their sole benefit, by encouraging Gustavus IV's incomprehensible crusade against Prussia. They argued that Gustavus IV was a British puppet, doing the bidding of his sinister paymasters in London. In fact the British shared Prussia's frustration with Gustavus IV's blockade which was his and not their idea. The Prussians' self-justifying accusations of a diabolical British plan to rekindle the continental war seem far fetched. It not only overestimated the British cabinet's talents for Machiavellian intrigue, but also ignored the 'Talents' pre-occupation with the pursuit of peace and overseas expansion. Under these circumstances a continental war would

64 FO 334/10. Thornton to Pierrepoint, 30 May 1806.
65 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 8, 24 July 1806.
66 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 4, 13, 15, 17 July 1806.
67 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 17, 21 May 1806.
68 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 14 Mar. 1806.
69 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 26 Apr., 2 May 1806.
70 Bailleu. 102. Frederick Wilhelm III to Alexander I, 1 May 1806.
71 Simms. 259-260.
distract Britain from its main priorities as much as it would Napoleon. Not surprisingly the emperor found the Prussian arguments unconvincing and urged them to end the conflict with Gustavus IV.72 Like the Swedes, the Prussians found Alexander I uncommitted and difficult to pin down when they were in need of Russia's support.73

Gustavus IV was angered by Russian ambiguity,74 which contrasted with Britain's praiseworthy support and hard line against Berlin.75 His ministers feared that a Russian intervention to the Prusso-Swedish conflict would favour the Prussians.76 Prussian enthusiasm for such an intervention seemed to justify their suspicions.77 Alopeus intervened against what he claimed were Swedish hostilities towards a 'peaceful' Prussia claims which were refuted by an indignant Gustavus IV.78 His rebuff reinforced the impression of Sweden's diplomatic isolation79 and Ehrenheim feared that Gustavus IV, like his hero Charles XII, could soon find himself facing the combined enmity of Russia, Prussia and Denmark.80 'God knows what our negotiations will achieve', Ehrenheim claimed on 18 July, 'they drag on until we are embroiled with both Russia and Denmark, and the prospects before us are even more disquieting than ever before, especially as there is threatening and real food shortages in several provinces, while trade is in fast decline'.81

By 1 July Ehrenheim believed that Sweden was balancing finely between war and peace, as Prussia prepared for war with Sweden, while feigning a willingness to negotiate.82 Much depended upon the political survival of the Prussophobic and warlike prince Czartoryski's political future in St. Petersburg, where he had been a support for Sweden, among a strong body of anti-Swedish opinion. But Austerlitz had undermined his warlike policies, as it had Pitt's, and by early July it seemed evident that his days as foreign minister were numbered, which could not bode well for

72 Bailleu. 105. Alexander I to Frederick Wilhelm III, 12 May 1806.
73 Simms. 260.
74 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 11 May 1806.
75 FO 73/35. Pierrepont to Fox, 8 May 1806.(2)
76 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 13 May 1806
77 FO 73/35. Pierrepont to Fox, 8 May 1806.
78 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Gustavus IV, 3, 4, 7, 10 1806.
79 TSLUB.C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 10 June 1806.
80 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 27 June 1806.
81 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 18 July 1806.
82 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 1 July 1806.
Swedish influence with the Russian government. 83 By the end of the month Sweden's worst fears were confirmed as Czartoryski gave way to Count Andrei Budberg, who bore their country a strong personal ill will since his days as envoy in Stockholm. 84 Under these circumstances, Wetterstedt believed, it was not impossible that Russia would return to her pre-1805 'neutrality system', which could be dangerous for Sweden if Gustavus IV continued his war against Napoleon. 85 Ehrenheim failed to be convinced that Budberg's elevation beyond his abilities would change policy, since he expected Czartoryski to continue to be the de-facto leader of the Empire's foreign policy. 86 Ehrenheim's scepticism was shared by British diplomats, but the question was which side Russia would support in the Prusso-Swedish conflict. 87 The first signs from St. Petersburg seemed ominous as Budberg intimated to a shocked Stedingk that the Russo-Swedish alliance was coming to an end, while there were rumours in St. Petersburg that a Russian squadron was being readied to break the Swedish blockade. 89 Should the Russians in addition to this ratify the d'Oubril treaty with France, this would signal a return to the pre-1805 neutrality. 90

Just as Sweden had lost a vital support in the east, she seemed, through Fox's growing ill-health, to be about to lose another in the west. Fox had, like Pitt, provided much of the cabinet's force, energy and direction, proving to be a steadfast opponent of Prussia and admiring friend of Gustavus IV. His death would also signal a cabinet reshuffle, crisis, or even collapse; so vital was his role and personality for the cabinet's survival. 91 Rehausen feared that the Franco-Spanish threat against Portugal would divert British attention away from the Baltic and put their promised military assistance, if the Prussians invaded Pomerania, in jeopardy. 92 Should the Talents fall apart following Fox's death, this would leave Sweden alone against Prussia. Would Alexander I be convinced by the Prussians' argument that the British wanted a continental war so as to leave her free to pursue

83 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6 July 1806.
84 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 24 July 1806.
85 TSLUB. C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 24 July 1806.
86 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 18 July 1806.
87 FO 334/10. Thornton to Pierrepoint, 18, 25 July 1806.
88 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 29 July 1806.
89 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24 July 1806.
90 FO 334/10. Thornton to Pierrepoint, 1 Aug. 1806.
91 Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 18 July 1806.
92 Hilt. 165.
93 Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 12, 15, 18 Aug., 19 Sept. 1806.
overseas expansion and world domination without hindrance? The emperor failed to give a clear indication about his intentions.

The Prussians were thus left to their own devices, but their own attempts at negotiations with Gustavus IV proved unsuccessful. A blunt Prussian request, in May, for an end to the blockade was flatly refused. A similar request a month later, in return for the evacuation of Lauenburg, failed to change Gustavus IV's mind. When general Kalkreuth was chosen for a special diplomatic mission to Pomerania, and met the king at Anclain on 21 June, both sides asked for too much, which ensured that the talks failed. Gustavus IV was convinced a Swedish temporary occupation of the Prussian islands of Usedom and Wollin (until the Prussians evacuated Lauenburg) could end the long Prusso-Swedish dispute. Prussia refused to consider Gustavus IV and continued to play for time.

However, the time for Prussian procrastination was almost over as Alexander I, to his allies relief, not only failed to ratify the d'Oubril treaty but also refused to give Prussia any support against Sweden. Having failed to get Russia's unequivocal support, and facing a growing French menace to her western border, the Prussians had to give in to Gustavus IV's demands which were quite simple and stark. As a precondition for any normalisation of relations, the Prussians would have to evacuate Lauenburg, which was to be re-occupied by the Swedes. There was no hope that Gustavus IV would moderate these demands since Gustavus IV, according to Pierrepoint, never gave up his standpoint except under the most extreme pressure. Therefore the only way to resolve the dispute was for the Prussians to give way, and they only yielded with reluctance due to the threat of war with France, a threat that Pierrepoint believed (wrongly) would not lead to war. Facing that real threat in deepest isolation and in desperate need of Anglo-Russian succour Prussia decided to give in to Swedish demands in order to reduce their number of enemies. They evacuated Lauenburg, which was re-occupied by the Swedes, in return for which (as promised) Gustavus IV lifted the blockade. Delighted

95 Bailleu. 112-115. Alexander I to Frederick Wilhelm III, 7, 16 June 1806.
96 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 8, 18, 23 May, 23 June, 7, 9, 17 July, 10, 21 Aug. 1806; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 22, 23, 24, 28 June, 1, 5 July 1806.; TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 1, 17 July 1806; Bailleu. 108-110. Frederick Wilhelm III to Alexander I, 12 June 1806; FO 334/10. Thornton to Pierrepoint, 13 May 1806.
with his 'triumph' Gustavus IV exclaimed in a letter to Toll on 27 August that he had answered his conscience and that his victory was due to God. Gustavus IV saw the re-occupation as a victory of international law and order over an immoral and aggressive predatory power such as Prussia. 97

IV. The Buenos Aires Blunder and the 'Miracle' of Maida.
The British Expeditions to South America and South Italy, July-August 1806.

While Gustavus IV celebrated his hollow victory over Prussia the British seemed to have been smitten with a fever for overseas expansion due to the adventurist antics of a buccaneering naval officer by the name of Sir Riggs Home Popham. Popham had commanded the naval squadron which transported the British troops that captured the Cape in January 1806 and in April he persuaded general Beresford, with 1,600 troops, to accompany him to the Plate. Beresford's army captured Buenos Aires with ease a month later and Popham could return to London, in September, with a rich booty and be treated by the public as a national hero. No one knew in London that Buenos Aires had been re-captured shortly after Popham's departure. The government saw Popham's conquest of the Plate as an opportunity to expand trade in a new colony and compensate for military and political setbacks in Europe. Only Howick, the new foreign secretary to be (who was appointed in October), opposed these south American ventures as a dangerous distraction from the war in Europe where the struggle against Napoleon would be settled. After all conquering Spain's colonies would make no major impression upon Napoleon's resolve to fight Britain to the bitter end and he could prevent, with armed might, should Spain try to make peace with Britain in order to save her colonial empire. 98

While the occupation of Buenos Aires only lead to further setbacks and humiliations for Britain her army had scored a significant victory on another front in a very different part of the world. On 30 June general Stuart, commanding 5,000 British troops, had landed on the coast of Calabria and a few days later encountered an evenly matched French force at Maida. The French, holding their enemy in

low esteem, rushed at the British lines without artillery support and were cut to shreds by British fire power. For the first time in the war the British army had truly showed the discipline and valour that would eventually, after long and hard years of war, secure its share of the victory over Napoleon's hitherto victorious legions. 99

V. A Friend in Need or just Old Perfidious Prussia?
Prussian Preparations for War against the 'Common Foe' and the Allied Response, August-October 1806.

It may seem strange and out of place in a study of bilateral diplomatic relations to devote any time to military operations as far removed from Scandinavia as the Plate and Calabria. But in wartime military and diplomatic efforts go hand in hand and form two different, but equally important sides to the same coin: political leadership. Britain, fighting a global war, placed less importance on Sweden than on these far flung operations, which may have been justified, but which crippled her ability to intervene decisively at a crucial phase in the war. That new phase was about to begin, as Napoleon challenged the last remaining undefeated military power in Europe: Prussia, which at last seemed prepared to abandon a decade of devious diplomatic juggling to preserve her neutrality in favour of a direct military confrontation with Napoleon. 100

Prussian discontent with Napoleon had reached a boiling point in the late summer of 1806. Apart from his contemptuous treatment of them in general, and their king in particular, Napoleon's territorial ambitions in Germany, especially his creation of the Confederation of the Rhine on 25 July, set off the alarm bells in Berlin, since it challenged their own territorial plans and North German Confederation. Too late the Prussians had realised that two expansionist states could not live side by side indefinitely without a confrontation. The last straw came when Napoleon, ignoring Prussian possession of the country completely, showed a willingness to hand over Hanover (Prussia's only and inadequate reward in its 'alliance' with Napoleon) to the British in return for peace. This was probably a deliberate provocation by Napoleon, who distrusted and disliked the Prussians as much as Gustavus IV and the British, in order to punish the Prussians for their armed and hostile 'mediation'

99 Finley. 1-15, 36-46, 49-58, 63-78.
100 Chandler. 444.
in 1805, and establish once and for all who was master in Germany. By August both sides were a state of 'cold' war with the each other, and when Franco-Dutch troops occupied East Friesland the Prussians responded by secretly mobilising their army along their vulnerable western border.

Prussia's *volte-face* brought to a head the on-going dilemma of her old enemies, Sweden and Britain: should unreliable and changeable Prussia be treated as enemy or potential ally? Neither powers self-interest would be served by seeing Prussia defeated, conquered by the French and left unaided in her hour of need. After all, Prussia was the bulwark against a French invasion of the Baltic littoral, including the vital Stralsund base, and a vital ally to have in any war against Napoleon. Yet, on the other hand, could she be relied upon? Unfortunately the rulers in both countries were deeply hostile to Prussia's previous policies and needed actions, rather than mere expressions of goodwill, from the Prussians to convince them of their trustworthiness. In mid-September Grenville dismissed Prussia as Napoleon's tool and that he would demand the evacuation of Hanover before normalising relations with Berlin. Windham agreed that any European operations at the time was pointless, since 'Our forces in the present case can be little in the scale of continental armies, and the expense is enormous'. It is interesting to note that he seemed to have plenty of troops and cash available for his overseas adventures. Lauderdale, still in Paris in September negotiating with the French, argued more soundly against a Prussian alliance 'since in addition to my doubts of its honesty I have doubts about its power'. Grenville, however, balanced the cabinet's understandable suspicion of the Prussians with the need to assist her against a common foe. Hence, while he sent Lord Morpeth to Berlin in September, Grenville did not believe there was any rush to accommodate the Prussians' increasingly desperate call for British aid against the French. When Balan, a senior Prussian diplomat, arrived in London on 26 September to negotiate openly and directly with the British, his overtures were met with cold caution by the cabinet. Rehausen could not believe that the Talents

101 Chandler. 449, 452-453; Simms. 291-303.
103 HMC. Dropmore. VIII. 324-326. Grenville to Stuart, 12 Sept.1806.
104 HMC. Dropmore. VIII. 353. Windham to Grenville, 22 Sept.1806.
105 HMC. Dropmore. VIII. 358-359. Lauderdale to Grenville, 26 Sept.1806.
could negotiate with their deadliest enemy rather than with a potential ally such as Prussia.\textsuperscript{108}

Grenville persisted with his suspicions against the Prussian government and its fighting resolve, arguing, on 1 October that 'if they are actually engaged in hostilities against a common enemy, one may assist those whom one can neither esteem nor trust. Still it will require strong proof to convince me that Prussia really is disposed to bring things to this extremity'.\textsuperscript{109} The Prussians, through their hazardous foreign policy twists and turns, had managed to alienate a vital potential ally and thus faced the Napoleonic war machine without effective British financial support.

The Prussians could equally not expect much succour from Sweden, whose government (but not king) was as cynical about their fate, and uninterested about European affairs, as the British. They believed, like Grenville, that the Prussians would buckle under French diplomatic pressure before it came to a serious war, and that their only, narrow-minded interest was to keep their mercurial king from aiding the Prussians.\textsuperscript{110} 'May Sweden be a mere spectator to the coming war as long as it does not touch Sweden directly', Ehrenheim exclaimed with fervent hope in September.\textsuperscript{111} From Ehrenheim's hopes one would have thought that Sweden was some distant neutral power, like the USA, an ocean away from the war, when in fact she was allied to Napoleon's enemies; one of her provinces, Pomerania, was about to be engulfed in a war only a short distance away, if the allies, including Sweden, did not give the Prussians their immediate and greatest assistance. Prussia had shielded not only Pomerania, but also Sweden, from the real repercussions of war with France, and deserved some Swedish assistance.

Pierrepont, like his Swedish colleague in London, displayed more support for Prussian than either of their governments. On 14 September, during an audience with Gustavus IV, he tried to convince him of the need for Sweden to aid Prussia with all force available. To his consternation Gustavus IV not only refused to co-operate militarily with Prussia and limit his role in the Franco-Prussian war solely to the defence of Lauenburg. Afterwards Pierrepont reflected that the hostile Swedes would not have

\textsuperscript{108} Anglica. 493. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 26, 30 Sept.1806.
\textsuperscript{109} HMC. Dropmore. VIII. 358-359. Grenville to Lauderdale, 1 Oct.1806.
\textsuperscript{110} KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 1, 4, 8, 25, 29 Sept.1806.; KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 2, 5, 9 Sept.1806.
\textsuperscript{111} KPA: Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 12 Sept.1806.
have been proven a reliable ally of Prussia anyway nor, with only 7,000 troops in Pomerania, able to play any role in the war, making him doubt the entire value of the Swedish alliance.\textsuperscript{112} In defence of Gustavus IV's attitude, one can simply note the Talents' own indifference to Prussia's plight. In addition, their decision not to increase Sweden's subsidies crippled Gustavus IV's ability to aid Prussia militarily had he chosen to do so. Pierrepont's views were without doubt coloured by the unedifying delight of Swedish ministers in Sweden's \textit{de-facto} neutrality,\textsuperscript{113} typified by Ehrenheim's statement to Wetterstedt on 19 September that 'I savour more than anyone the joy at the news that have been conveyed that H.M. has separated from coalitions and war projects and will remain at home'.\textsuperscript{114} Their joy turned to bitter disappointment when Gustavus IV offered Alexander I his co-operation in defending the Elbe on 25 September.\textsuperscript{115}

Gustavus IV realised only too late the importance of aiding Prussia if the French were to be held at bay and his inability to assist Prussia. The situation was far from bright for the allies and a defeat now, at the hands of Napoleon, could spread his influence into hitherto untouched parts of the continent. Taking Prussia's place in 1805, the Austrians did not re-enter the alliance, Russia had not recovered from her previous defeat, Britain was distracted and aloof, while Sweden was unable to assist Prussia. Prussia was in October 1806 practically alone, but supremely confident that her formidable army, untried in battle against the upstart Napoleon, would finally put a check to his meteoric ascendancy. As will we will see shortly their self confidence was completely misplaced.

\textsuperscript{112} FO 73/35. Pierrepont to Howick, 14 Sept.1806.
\textsuperscript{113} KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 16 Sept.1806.; KPA: Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 16 Sept.1806.
\textsuperscript{114} KPA: Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 19 Sept.1806.
\textsuperscript{115} KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 25 Sept.1806.
Chapter Five.

The Beginning of the End.
Napoleon's Campaigns against Prussia and Russia, October 1806-March 1807.

I. Napoleon Crushes the Northern Sparta.
Napoleon's Prussian Campaign and the Threat to Swedish Pomerania, October 1806 to January 1807.

The autumn campaign of 1806 between France and Prussia was a clash of military titans. On the one side the upstart Napoleon and his brash legions while on the other side the much vaunted Prussian war machine. Napoleon had therefore a healthy respect for this army and most Europeans expected Prussia to defeat him. In fact the Prussian army was an anachronism which had rested on its laurels since the days of Frederick the Great. While Prussia's military leaders had not reformed the army to keep pace with France her political leaders had alienated her potential allies (except for Russia) and chosen the worst possible time for a single-handed confrontation with Napoleon. After Jena-Auerstädt 14 October both the Prussian army and state had ceased to exist enabling Napoleon to occupy Berlin without resistance on 27 October.

The immediate effect of the war was to fill the roads to the north and east with terrified Prussian refugees. For Sweden this was not a war in the distance, like 1805, but a frightening display of French armed might on Sweden's very doorstep, which left the country in a state of shock. One Swedish witness to Jena claimed the consequences of Prussia's collapse would be as great as those of the French revolution and would spell the end of Gustavian Sweden since, in his opinion, "The All Highest was about to punish the Nation, which was ruled by a king with unlimited power to rule according to his own blockhead, combining Arrogance and Stupidity in equal measure." More intelligent Swedes must realise, he argued, that it was long overdue for Sweden to leave the war.

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1 Rothenberg. 86-104, 134-158; Chandler. 444-445, 447, 452-453.
2 Weigley. 391-392; Connelly. 95, 99.
5 Reuterholm. 14, 19, 20, 21, 27, 29, 30, 31 Oct. 1806.
6 Reuterholm. 23-24 Nov. 1806.
The expatriate Swedish observer found support among the 'blockhead's' advisers. Ehrenheim, safely in Stockholm, was more worried about French privateers making an unwelcome appearance in the Baltic than by the strategic implications of the vacuum left by Prussia's collapse, which French soldiers were filling with alarming speed. He wanted Sweden to remain a spectator to the unfolding drama.\(^8\) Wetterstedt, being further south and closer to the events took a less 'Olympian' view of events than Ehrenheim and he was concerned for the safety of Morian's force trapped in Lauenburg and of Pomerania itself, as the French armies swept northwards like a tidal wave against the shores of the Baltic.\(^9\) Unlike the complacent Ehrenheim, Gustavus IV, who had received news of Jena on 23 October, was shocked by the news but soon regained his usual optimism. He wanted to support Prussia by sending the Pomeranian army to the Elbe but he was discouraged by Toll, who told him the river had already been crossed by the French.\(^10\)

Enormous pressure was put upon Gustavus IV to prevent him from coming to Prussia's aid but how could Sweden remain a passive spectator of Prussia's ruin? By occupying Prussia Napoleon became the undisputed master of Germany and he destroyed what remained of the continent's balance of power and could now threaten Russia, Denmark and Sweden with invasion. All three states, hitherto relatively insulated against the French threat by the Prussian bulwark, became front-line states. It also made the Baltic a theatre of war and raised the stakes for both the allies and Napoleon in their struggle. In fact Jena was a far more important battle than Austerlitz because of the strategic implications and the intensification of the war, raised yet further by the Berlin Decree issued by Napoleon a few weeks later. Sweden's future now for the first time hung in the balance, her margin of error and room for manoeuvre having been drastically reduced, allowing no scope for Ehrenheim's fanciful hopes. Sweden looked to her ally to give the lead in relations with Prussia. The earlier Morpeth mission had collapsed in October, and it was not until late November that a new British mission, under general Hely-Hutchinson, was appointed. Hutchinson was chosen more for his political loyalties than for his diplomatic abilities, and thus personified the Talents' lack of interest in European affairs. That impression was reinforced on 21 November when Rehausen met Howick, who

\(^8\) KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 7 Oct. 1806.
\(^9\) KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 19 Oct. 1806
\(^10\) KWAH. 117; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 21 Oct., 16 Nov. 1806.
told Rehausen that his government would only pay subsidies for offensive operations. The Swedish ministers noted sarcastically how keen the British were to get Sweden into the war but not pay for it.  

As we shall see, Howick was acting on behalf of his sceptical colleagues, who wanted to reduce Britain's subsidy bill to faltering allies in whom they had little or no confidence. But British coldness towards her allies was fully reciprocated and prevented the coalition from functioning properly. Britain, by her government's short-sighted economies, scepticism and overseas adventurism, lost her opportunity to aid Prussia and fight Napoleon. This failure to act contributed to the collapse of the allied coalition and therefore prolonged the agonies of war by several years.

II. Russia Comes to the Rescue
The Bennigsen's Counter-Offensive in East Prussia, and the Russo-Swedish Subsidy Crisis, December 1806-March 1807.

Russia, like Sweden, faced the French for the first time on their very doorstep, in an escalation of a war which was not only becoming more intense, but also more widespread. Jena was a catastrophe for Prussia but a severe setback for Russia and required her, despite her weakened state of her army since Austerlitz, to rescue her neighbour before the French had occupied the entire country. On 9 November Russia announced her intention to send 56,000 troops to East Prussia. This was the beginning of a period of improvement for the allied cause and increasing trouble for Napoleon who, no doubt with Austria in mind, had expected Prussia to beg for peace before Russia could muster her army. Prussia's determination to continue fighting, and Russia's equal determination to aid her, ruled out a swift end to a war which was proving unpopular with the French people, whose response to Jena had been lukewarm. It also gave an opportunity for Spain and Austria to conspire against Napoleon from behind the scenes. Jena proved in fact to be an indecisive victory as it did not lead to peace but to only prolonged war. Neither Napoleon or his army relished the prospects for a prolonged winter campaign against the Russians and the French did not prove adept at fighting a winter war since

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12 Hilt. 164-9.
Bennigsen inflicted a severe setback to Napoleon's reputation for invincibility by defeating him at Eylau in February 1807.\textsuperscript{13}

The Russians had every justification to feel proud about their troops performance at Eylau.\textsuperscript{14} Their troops had avenged their country's humiliation at Austerlitz and they had proved to the world that Napoleon was not invincible.\textsuperscript{15} An army under his personal command had been checked for the first time on an open battlefield and their operational capacity, so far from home bases, had reached their utmost limit.\textsuperscript{16} The winter campaign in East Prussia and Eylau had given Napoleon a due warning what would be in store for his army should he be bold enough to invade Holy Mother Russia itself.\textsuperscript{17}

If Russia was to exploit her victory over the French then she needed allied aid; not only British arms and subsidies, but a Swedish diversionary offensive against Napoleon's vulnerable northern flank, possibly supported by a British expeditionary army. Neither ally showed much goodwill towards the hard pressed Russians who were exhausted by Eylau and the burden of shouldering the war against Napoleon almost single-handedly. The Talents, driven by internal dissension, suffering from a lack of direction, seduced by South American visions of wealth (as we shall see) and with false economy more in tune with peacetime budgets than a world-war, cold-shouldered Russia's desperate pleas for succour. Russia's relations with Sweden were even worse because of the British failure to pay out subsidies to Gustavus IV drove the king to undertake desperate gambles. He was infuriated by British niggardliness and by the Russians for their inadvisable re-opening of the contentions issue of the Russo-Finnish border in January 1807, since that border had not been properly delineated, the issue in general raised Swedish fears for the security of Finland and had brought the two countries, as seen earlier, to the brink of war four year before. Gustavus IV dealt a serious blow to both his allies a month later by seizing £80,000 worth of silver in Gothenburg which was destined for Russia. This seizure was a violent protest on the king's part against the total inadequacy of British subsidies and their interest in the Swedish alliance. Instead of co-operating with Russia, who had similar

\textsuperscript{13} Weigley. 399-403; Chandler. 509-510, 513-5, 517-8, 527-548.; Connelly. 110; Horne. 202-213.
\textsuperscript{14} Sbornik. Vol. 54. 246. Kotchubey to Richelieu, 10 Feb.1807.
\textsuperscript{15} Chandler. 551.
\textsuperscript{16} Weigley. 403.
\textsuperscript{17} Connelly. 110; Chandler. 739-861.
grievances against Britain, Gustavus IV claimed the sum seized was due to Sweden since the Russo-Swedish Drottningholm alliance of 1791. Wetterstedt and Ehrenheim, understandably worried, had strongly advised against this rash act, and justifiably feared an open conflict with both Britain and Russia because of it. Stedingk was instructed to tell the Tsar, that the seized subsidies would be spent on fighting for the 'common cause'. This seemed to have mollified the Tsar who had no wish to add to his enemies over some paltry piasters. But there was a sting in the tail. On 1 January Alexander I had warned Gustavus IV that, while he would continue fighting the French with all his might, circumstances beyond his control could force him to change political course. 18

Both Gustavus IV's and British short-sightedness and mistakes had alienated the ruler of the country which was the continental and military backbone of the coalition. Britain's ability to fight against France depended upon Russian bayonets and Sweden's security, especially regarding Finland, depended upon Russia's foreign policy orientation. The failure of Britain to give Russia adequate support would lead to Tilsit and the Swedish seizure of the British subsidies for Russia was one of several reasons for Alexander I to occupy Finland a year later.

III. The Old or the New World?
British Strategic Dilemmas in a World War, October 1806-March 1807.

Russian and Swedish resentment at British neglect of European affairs was understandable but their overseas interest were either limited or non-existent compared to Britain. The news of the British capture of Buenos Aires, which arrived in September 1806, opened up prospects to rebuild Britain's American empire on the Plate, which seemed a better prospect than supporting Prussia. On 9 October General Auchmuty, with 3,000 troops, set sail for the Plate to achieve this ambitious aim. Hence the British failure to send an expedition to the Elbe or Holland to aid Prussia. 19

The decision to reinforce Beresford was not unanimous as Howick, leading the 'European' wing of the cabinet, opposed the expedition while most ministers, including Grenville, could not make up their minds. The cabinet decided to adopt a compromise 'system' which gave minimal support to the allies, passive defence against France and weak expeditions overseas. Or, in other words, the cabinet failed to prioritise any of its stated strategic aims, which eventually ensured failure on all fronts.20

Windham, who led the wing of the cabinet which wanted to abandon Europe almost completely and concentrate on overseas expansion, entertained ever wilder and more ambitious plans for conquest, including occupying the Philippines, Chile and the Orinoco. Not surprisingly cabinet discussions became very heated. At cabinet meetings on 7 and 12 January Howick urged the cabinet to give Russia a realistically large subsidy instead of squandering precious funds on overseas expeditions.21

At the latter meeting Howick told his colleagues that by allowing Britain to divert her attentions away from Europe, and to overseas expansion, the cabinet would permit France to destroy Britain's remaining allies piece-meal and thus dominate the continent. This British lack of interest was destructive to the resolve of these remaining allies to resist Napoleon and stay loyal to Britain, whose reputation as a reliable ally suffered from this deliberate neglect.22 Unfortunately Howick's eloquence did not change the government's policy. The Talents' neglect ensured that Russia deserted the 'common cause'. Howick only managed to get limited relief expeditions against Egypt and the Dardanelles. Unfortunately the troops were sent to Egypt while admiral Duckworth's fleet of 8 ships of line, which arrived at Constantinople in February 1807, were lucky to escape with most of the fleet back through the straits between the Turkish batteries (supervised by French officers). These operations not only failed to aid Russia, but aroused Russian fears for their own interests in the Levant and the Caucasus.23

20 Jupp. 383, 392, 411; Smith. 111-114.
22 Grey. SALG. 135.
While the British floundered in the Middle East, general Auchmuty had arrived at the Plate and had captured Montevideo in February. On 5 July general Whitelocke captured Buenos-Aires, but lost it again on 7 July to the Spanish forces. By the time these disastrous news arrived in London, September 1807, the Talents had been out of office for over six months. It represented the final proof of their policies' bankruptcy, which led to Alexander I's desertion at Tilsit. Their strategy was the more surprising since Grenville had seen the result of Pitt's campaign in the Caribbean in the 1790's and his Whigs colleagues' violent opposition to it, especially the costly occupation of St. Domingue (1793-1798). 24

IV. Defeatism, Discontent and the Great Diversion
Gustavus IV's Plans for a Great Allied Offensive, his Discontent with The British and an Anglo-Swedish Pre-Occupation with Denmark, October 1806-March 1807.

On 10 October Howick, Britain's new foreign secretary, pledged full British support for Prussia, ending previous ambiguity. He urged Gustavus IV to put aside his previous aversion for the Prussians and order the Swedish army forward to the Elbe to assist the hard pressed Prussians. Pierrepoint found it difficult to see that Gustavus IV would follow Howick's advice, but he raised it with Wetterstedt who dashed British hopes by making it clear that the Swedish army had been ordered back to defend Pomerania. This was probably just as well since that very same day French troops pursuing fleeing Prussians had crossed the Pomeranian border. Fortunately they were expelled with great ease. 25

Pomerania's exposure was as nothing compared to Lauenburg's where the Swedish expeditionary force had just recently marched in. Lauenburg resembled an isolated island in a swirling sea of fighting. Despite Gustavus IV's personal wish, and British requests, Morian's corp had no realistic option but to retreat to Lübeck, which was occupied by the Swedes on 3 November. Three days later the Swedes were caught in a Franco-Prussian crossfire and a thousand men were humiliatingly forced to

capitulate to the French. Morian escaped to Stralsund with only some 450 men, and escaped a court-martial by a hair's breadth. Swedish public opinion was outraged at his incompetence and the ignoble end of their king's ill-advised re-occupation of Lauenburg.26

Morian's fiasco only served to strengthen the opposition in the Swedish government and in influential upper class circles. In the former, Pierrepoint believed that his old nemesis from the earlier subsidy negotiations, Toll, was behind a strong campaign to persuade Gustavus IV to abandon the allied cause. Toll's efforts were backed by the Swedish ministers remaining in Stockholm, who used financial arguments, which Gustavus IV had little understanding of, to argue for a return to neutrality. Public opinion in the increasingly oppositionist influenced capital blamed Gustavus IV for the continued war and military setbacks. Pierrepoint believed that their belief in an easy return to neutrality was mistaken.27 A lone voice of support came from a Swedish admirer in London, praising the king for his bravery and championship of the 'common cause'.28 This was the opinion of a tiny minority of Swedes, and the unpopular alliance was viewed with ever greater hostility by the Swedish ruling classes. This would not bode well for either Sweden or Britain's alliance with her. Pierrepoint therefore requested that, after years of hard service in Sweden that he should be allowed to leave for home.29 Howick, greatly worried about increasing domestic and foreign threats to Gustavus IV's regime, requested that Pierrepoint remained at his post.30

Given this level of domestic discontent, Napoleon's offer of peace in November 1806 from various channels was probably welcomed by many upper class Swedes. The French generals Grandjean and Bernadotte had intimated Napoleon's strong desire for peace with Sweden. Bernadotte had told count Mörner, who was his well cared for prisoner in Lübeck, that Norway should belong to Sweden, and peace between Sweden and France should be restored. Bourienne, the French chargé d'affaires in Hamburg, had given his Swedish colleague, Netzel, the same message during a highly private

26 Björlin. 126-135; FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 11, 18 Nov.1806.
conversation at the Hamburg Bourse. That Netzel, despite direct orders from Gustavus IV that there
should be no diplomatic contact with the enemy, dared to hold talks with his colleague shows clearly
how much the Swedish diplomatic service disapproved of the king's policies. Gustavus IV would not
be bribed by the Norwegian morsel and Netzel was recalled for his labours. Napoleon's offer may
have been made in good faith, but one cannot avoid sharing Gustavus IV's suspicion of a similar
territorial offer having been made to the Danes, at Sweden's expense, in order to cause dissension in
the allied camp. (In fact it seems no such deal was made to Denmark). 31

If Napoleon could not bribe or seduce Gustavus IV to the negotiating table, then an invasion of
Pomerania could force the king to come 'to his senses', as he and many Francophile Swedes put it.
The fate of Pomerania seemed to be a matter of great indifference to most Swedes, except its governor
Essen and the king himself. 'The common consensus in Sweden seems to view the present war as that
of the Duke of Pomerania (i.e. Gustavus IV) fighting with the aid of British subsidies, and that
Sweden should remain a calm spectator to the fate of a province that was both ruined and lost forever',
noted a disgusted Essen. 32 Napoleon's hopes to take Gustavus IV to the negotiating table, by
occupying Pomerania, seemed hopeless. The stubborn king would simply fight on, even if the
province fell to the French. Amassing 12,000 French troops on Pomerania's border (against 9,000
Swedes), marshal Mortier failed equally to intimidate Essen into informal diplomatic talks at the
military level. 33

Opinions about Essen's abilities, and the chances for an effective Swedish defence of Pomerania,
varied greatly. Swedish and Pomeranian opinion rated Essen poorly when compared to the apparent
fighting spirit of Armfelt. Swedish chances of withstanding the French were therefore rated as quite
low. British and Swedish observers in Pomerania were, however, no more impressed with Mortier's
army, described as 'boys in uniform'. They also believed that Stralsund would be more staunchly
defended than the Prussian cities, which had fallen with such suspicious ease to the advancing

31 HEDC. VII. 479-481. Dec. 1806.; Beskow. 130; FO 73/36. Pierrepont to Howick, 18, 27
Nov. 1806.; Palmer. 136-137.
32 Wieselgren. 109-110.
33 Björlin. 137.
French. In January they believed that Mortier's preparations for an attack upon Stralsund was only designed to mask a severe French setback in Poland. Their views were confirmed by events. Between mid December and late January Mortier remained frozen in ice on the frontier. Meanwhile, Gustavus IV was more worried about French privateers cutting off Sweden's vital Russian grain supplies across the Baltic when the weather thawed. He would soon have more acute worries, as Mortier suddenly invaded Pomerania on 28 January, and began besieging Stralsund. His young recruits, (a tell tale sign that Napoleon was running out of seasoned troops), failed to take Stralsund by storm between 12 and 20 February. The Swedish defenders, reinvigorated by the tonic of Eylau and the strong hopes of a British expeditionary force arriving in the near future, had scored a major defensive victory. However, in a rush of overconfidence a costly frontal assault on the French lines on 14 March failed to dislodge the French, and left the troops demoralised.34

Indeed what were the British up to? Would they actually stop their 'wait and see approach' to Europe, or see the coalition flounder completely? Gustavus IV was not interested in the mere defence of the Pomeranian bridgehead, but in taking the offensive in northern Germany, relieving pressure on the Russians and inflicting a possible defeat on Napoleon. The main stumbling block to this, according to Gustavus IV, was continued British indifference in the continental war, and failure to give him adequate pecuniary and military support. Howick's only response had been to give tacit support for an unofficial mission by French émigré general Dumouriez to enlist Swedish support for his plans to launch a diversionary landing in Normandy. Without official backing, promises of subsidies or any real proof of influence with the British government, Gustavus IV politely ignored Dumouriez's schemes. Dumouriez's case was neither helped by Gustavus IV's support for the Bourbons, his own plans, or his suspicions about Dumouriez's revolutionary past.35


The king was left even more unimpressed by the attitudes of the British government itself. On 9 November Pierrepont told a bitterly disappointed Gustavus IV that the British would only co-operate in the patrolling of the French occupied Prussian coast. The king told the envoy that he had hoped for serious British aid in defending northern Germany properly. Pierrepont formed the opinion that this was only a ruse on behalf of Gustavus IV to increase subsidies. Two days later Gustavus IV was even more blunt in questioning British assurances of aid to Sweden. Pierrepont did not hide his growing irritation over the king's questioning and accusatory tone. Gustavus IV, however, assured Pierrepont that the province would be defended with the utmost vigour and that same day both military and naval reinforcements were sent to Pomerania. This new sign of Swedish vigour, coupled with the painful fact that Stralsund was the only German port remaining open to British shipping and trade, prompted Pierrepont to urge Howick to increase Sweden's subsidy by whatever amount possible. On 11 November Howick sent assurances, which crossed Pierrepont's despatch, that the British would honour Fox's earlier pledge to defend Pomerania, but when the British treasury was facing rising expenditure it could not be expected to pay for troops that remained inactive.36

During a conference with Pierrepont on 18 November Gustavus IV seemed be under the misapprehension that Pierrepont had been given plenipotentiary to negotiate about increased subsidies. Howick believed that 'misunderstanding' had arisen during talks between himself and Rehausen on a private level, at a Holland House dinner a week earlier. They had discussed Gustavus IV's plans for the defence of northern Germany, including an alliance between Denmark and Sweden, which Howick supported, but he told Rehausen that his government could not accept Swedish subsidy demands.37 He was even more forthright, probably to placate Whig opinion in Parliament opposed to increasing subsidies to the allies, in his public despatch on 2 December, telling Pierrepont that 'You will represent that their own Interests, their own territories, their own safety are at stake and that these they are called upon to defend by every consideration of Duty & Patriotism—that in fact they have no choice left, that Resistance is now become absolutely necessary—but should the Swedish army be

36 Anglica. 493. Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 13 Nov.1806; FO 73/36. Pierrepont to Howick, 10 Nov.1806.
required to move beyond its own borders & not have the means then British would supply Sweden with money'.

Following a conference with Howick on 2 December Rehausen formed the distinct impression that the British were loath to risk either precious money or troops on uncertain projects. Gustavus IV was infuriated at this nonchalance and doubts about the sincerity of his plans, and lashed out against the British whose subsidies had not even been adequate in the first place. He tried to enlist Russian and Prussian support for a diversionary offensive from which they stood most to gain but Ehrenheim doubted that the king's efforts would succeed since their British ally seemed to be both cold and indifferent towards continental affairs.

Ten days later Gustavus IV and Pierrepont had yet another acrimonious debate about the lack of British interest in the king's plans. Gustavus IV was in no mood to compromise or mince his words. Either the British, whose pledges of support he doubted, paid Sweden adequate subsidies, thus proving their renewed support for their long neglected ally, or Gustavus IV would return Sweden to strict neutrality. Pierrepont could not believe that this was the views of Gustavus IV and blamed this state of defeatism on the pernicious and damaging influence of his ministers. He told Gustavus IV that Britain's payments of huge subsidies to her various allies during the war proved more than adequately that her pledges were fully honoured. Pierrepont argued that neutrality was hardly a viable or an easy proposition for Sweden to pursue, as Gustavus IV well knew, since it depended upon the goodwill of Napoleon. In Pierrepont's view, Gustavus IV's desperate attempt to threaten and bluster was due to his dire financial straits, caused by the ending of British subsidies. While Pierrepont could not increase the subsidies, he had authority to renew subsidy payments, but at the old level, which could alleviate some of Gustavus IV more acute financial problems.

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38 FO 73/36. Pierrepont to Howick, 2 Dec. 1806.
40 FO 73/36. Pierrepont to Howick, 12, 16, 18 Dec. 1806.
However, Pierrepoint's fears about a Swedish desertion from the 'common cause' were not stilled by his own reasoning or arguments with the king. Perhaps Gustavus IV, grown exasperated with British procrastination and delays, had really meant what he said. On 22 December he handed an official note to Wetterstedt which enquired openly and frankly if Gustavus IV had abandoned the common struggle against France (as no doubt his ministers wished) in favour of neutrality. Gustavus IV could assure a much relieved Pierrepoint two days later that he had in fact not abandoned his alliance with Britain and had no intention of doing so but that Britain needed to devote more attention to European affairs and treat his plans with more seriousness. Howick did not heed his warnings and rejected any notion, on 7 January, of Sweden's subsidies being raised for 'purely defensive' plans, and warned Pierrepoint to keep a very cautious line on the whole thorny issue of subsidies. A month later Gustavus IV had still not raised the matter of increased subsidies, or even mentioned any reversal of alliances. But when Gustavus IV was told in mid-February of Howick's decision not to raise the level of Sweden's subsidies, the king did not hide his disappointment, but, given Pierrepoint's previous fears, assured him that this would not affect his attachment to the alliance. During Pierrepoint's last conference before his departure on 14 February, Gustavus IV wanted Pierrepoint to assure his government that he would rather die fighting the French than submit to Napoleon. But if he, for the benefit of Britain and the alliance as a whole, was to carry out the diversionary offensive against Napoleon, then the British had to send an expeditionary force to Stralsund. Gustavus IV claimed that the false 'economy of England' had to end, was it not to wreck the allied coalition.41

On 19 February Alexander Straton, Pierrepoint's replacement, presented his credentials making a speech praising the king's attachment to the British alliance. Gustavus IV reciprocated by praising the British government and Pierrepoint personally. Three days later, during a customary dinner after the military parades, Gustavus IV studiously avoided all talk of the subsidies.42 Rehausen had not avoided that subject or that of British military aid in general, which prompted Howick, on 10 March, to address himself specifically to these issues. Straton was to state that the British government was extremely interested in Gustavus I\'s plans for a diversionary offensive from Pomerania. But Straton

needed to ask how many troops the king would mobilise for the offensive and what subsidies and military assistance Britain could provide. The British government believed that no less than 25,000 Swedish troops would be needed. Howick offered one paltry brigade of dragoons and to pay the same level of subsidies as Austria had been paid in 1805. If that was not enough to kill any Swedish interest in Howick's proposals, the British foreign secretary would only pay these when operations commenced and only for two-three months at a time.\(^{43}\) Given the conditions that Howick made for the granting of subsidies, one has to support the Swedish suspicion that Howick was, yet again, only stalling for time. Since Gustavus IV had not made any specific suggestion about the offensive, Howick seemed to have believed it was only a ruse to increase Sweden's subsidies. On 26 March Straton, having just received Howick's instruction, met Gustavus IV, who did not accept Howick's terms. He was willing to accept the 'Austrian' subsidy level officially but they would have to be increased, with additional secret clauses, far in excess of the actual numbers mobilised.\(^{44}\)

V. The Neutral Nuisance

Danish Foreign Policy, the French Threat and Allied Fears about Danish Neutrality, October 1806-March 1807.

Allied plans for a diversionary offensive in northern Germany relied on, or hoped for, Danish co-operation, which was unlikely to be forthcoming since Denmark had remained neutral during the last few years of the war. But, given her strategic position at the entry to the Baltic and on Napoleon's northern flank, both he and the allies were interested in getting Denmark onto their side. Hitherto, virtually protected by Prussia's own neutrality and military strength, Denmark had been able to maintain her neutrality without major risks or dangerous choices. Prussia's collapse removed foreign policy security and the tremors from this debacle were most strongly felt in an increasingly beleaguered Copenhagen, which had observed strict neutrality since 1803. Danish satisfaction from her unprecedented prosperity during the next three years was always tempered by her strategic vulnerability to a French military threat against her continental provinces and a British naval threat to her capital, Zealand, her trade, merchant marine and overseas colonies.\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\) FO 73/39. Howick to Straton, 10 March 1807.
\(^{44}\) FO 73/39. Straton to Howick, 26 Mar. 1807.
The British envoy in Copenhagen, Benjamin Garlike, was convinced that the Danes could be relied upon to maintain strict neutrality and defend herself against aggression from all sides. This line was maintained and defended stubbornly by Frederick, the Prince Royal of Denmark, who resembled Gustavus IV, his cousin, in political prejudices, ideology and character. Like Gustavus IV he faced ministers, led by foreign minister count Christian Bernstorff, who were willing adapt Denmark's neutrality according to the vagaries of international events and the fortunes of the opposing camps in the war. All these factors were to ensure that Denmark's foreign policy would not be easy to maintain on course in the choppy seas of wartime Europe.46

With Prussia occupied by the French, the allies were not about to allow Denmark to go on living in her peaceful oasis undisturbed. Britain, who had most to lose economically from the French occupying the Sound and shutting it against British trade and shipping, was increasingly worried about the security of Denmark. While Howick and Garlike believed the Prince Royal was as good as his word, they found Bernstorff too weak towards the French, and the government in general too pro-French in views to stand up to the threats and siren voices from Paris. Nor could the Russians, according to Garlike, be relied upon to support British demonstrations in Copenhagen because of the long-term alliance between them and Denmark. An added liability was that their ambassador in Copenhagen had stayed too long at his post, as many Russian ministers were prone to do, and had gone 'native' in his views and loyalties.47

Gustavus IV shared Howick's suspicions of secret Franco-Danish collaboration based on Sweden's long held rivalry with Denmark and his fears that such an alliance could threaten Scania and Pomerânia's security. Gustavus IV's hopes for a Dano-Swedish alliance were dashed when the Danes pulled back their 'Army of Observation' from Holstein, confirming, in his eyes, Danish collaboration with Napoleon. He believed a personal meeting with the Prince Royal, whose conservative views and honest character he admired, could prevent a budding Franco-Danish alliance.48

46 Tangeraas, 65, 68-78.
It did not take long, however, for Gustavus IV to abandon such moderation in favour of more drastic measures against the Danes; who had become his neutral *bête-noire* (replacing the Prussians in that respect) when they failed to protest at the French occupation of Hamburg on 25 November. He told Pierrepont of his plans to send a diplomatic mission to pin down the 'slippery' Danes and get a firm answer to the blunt question as to their relations with Napoleon. Should the answer prove unsatisfactory, then a British fleet should aid a Swedish landing and occupation of Zealand. (Similar to Canning's plans a few months later.) Pierrepont pointed out that this would throw Denmark into the arms of Napoleon and thus achieve what Gustavus IV hoped to prevent. (Pierrepont did not apply the same logic for obvious reasons to Canning's blunt strategy the following year). Despite his objections, Pierrepont urged Howick to give Sweden his fullest support should she face a Franco-Danish invasion.49

Howick meanwhile experienced a similar metamorphosis in relation to Denmark as Gustavus IV did. From trusting the Danes, in late 1806, he had come to question their neutrality and their government's honesty. In December 1806 Howick was still assuring the Danes of his trust in their strict neutrality and discouragement of Swedish aggression before diplomatic means of reconciliation had been exhausted. Underlying this conciliatory line was the British desire to maintain its European trade via Denmark. But by March 1807 Howick's attitude had hardened, due to Anglo-Danish clashes over the British implementation of the Orders in Council (January 1807), Howick's umbrage at the Danish chargé d'affaires' strident protests about them and Rehausen's constant undermining of British confidence in the Danes. Howick's attitude was further hardened toward the Danes by what spies reported was alleged mobilisation of the Danish navy. But by March time had run out for Howick and it was his Tory successor who had to act on this intelligence50

Chapter Six.

The Watershed.

Tilsit, the Battle of Copenhagen, the Franco-Russian 'Continental' Coalition against Britain and Invasion Plans against Sweden, March 1807-March 1808.

I. The Return to Europe
The Portland Administration and Canning's New Pro-European Orientation, March-July 1807.

On 26 March the new Portland administration took office with Castlereagh returning to his familiar duties at the War Office while Pitt's protégé, George Canning, became foreign secretary. Under the latter's energetic leadership Britain returned to its European orientation which had been abandoned by the Talents. Canning, like no other British statesman, was to put his stamp upon the 'common cause' and the conduct of the war which probably explains why his coming to power was seen as such a watershed.¹ Canning, determined to rebuild allied trust, offered Britain's allies £2,600,000 to share, and promised 30,000 British troops to contribute to the war on the continent. On 30 April he blamed the delays in giving the allies more military aid upon the Talents dispersal of effort across the world which left Britain short of troops and tonnage for an intervention on the continent. This was a justified criticism but Canning perpetuated the mistakes of the Talents by not heeding Russian demands for increased subsidies and by not loosening Britain's purse strings Canning contributed to Russia's further alienation from Britain.²

II. The Anglo-Russian Crisis, 1806-1807.

That alienation had begun in late 1806 when Canning's predecessor had rebuffed Russia's attempts to rebuild their British alliance. Russia retaliated by refusing to renew the Anglo-Russian trade treaty, which gave Britain unreciprocated and unprecedented trading privileges in Russia, unless Russia's subsidies were increased. Neither Howick or Canning gave in to blackmail.³

Political difference and economic grievances only hid deeper Anglo-Russian rivalries which had escalated during the latter part of the century and by 1807 were quite sharp, marking a transition from

¹ Gray. 91, 97, 98, 105; Hinde. 153-157.
³ Roach. 188-189, 192; GLG. 244-245. Stuart to Gower, 7 Mar. 1807.
being natural allies to imperial rivals during the subsequent decades. The British, concerned with India's security as the new heartland of their Asian based empire, opposed the Russian advance into the Levant and Balkans by retaining Malta, invading Egypt and propping up the Ottoman empire. These British tactical moves aroused Russia's opposition and contributed to their alienation with Britain.  

III. The Last Victory.

The Sweden's Pomeranian Counter-Offensive and British Anxiety about the Franco-Swedish Armistice, March-June 1807.

By late March the siege of Stralsund was a diversion of effort that Napoleon could ill afford and Mortier's army was recalled for service on the main front in east Prussia. The Swedes rejected Mortier's armistice proposals on Straton's recommendation since it was only made to cover his retreat and on 1 April the Swedes took the offensive with 6,000 troops. Within ten days the Swedes, ably led by generals Cardell and Armfelt, had not only captured 1,700 French prisoners but several towns including Rostock and Wismar. While Gustavus IV plotted to unleash a royalist crusade against Napoleon with Louis XVIII's help Armfelt was planning to capture Stettin on his way to Berlin. The victory gave Gustavus IV's popularity a temporary boost as the Swedes celebrated and the Russians praised the king for giving their hard pressed armies vitally needed relief from the French.  

The very stunning and unexpected nature of the Swedish victory proved its undoing as the French realised that they could not leave this secondary but important stretch of front unguarded. The French cut short Swedish celebrations by regaining most of the lost ground and pushing the Swedes back into Pomerania. Essen was forced to agree on 20 April to a disadvantageous armistice which deprived Colberg and Danzig, besieged by the French, of much needed Swedish naval support. Canning denounced the armistice as a disgraceful capitulation to French demands which damaged Sweden's reputation and on 26 April Straton warned Wetterstedt that if his government officially endorsed the

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4 Roach. 181, 190; Pratt. 82-90; Saul. 185-187.
armistice this could damage Anglo-Swedish relations. But neither Straton or Canning believed the armistice signalled a change in Swedish foreign policy. 6

British fears about Sweden's reliability as an ally were not unjustified since what Straton termed the 'peace party' penetrated the army's officer corp, the Swedish government, the Pomeranian bureaucracy and even the advisers surrounding the king. He was equally aware of this that since 'party' hoped the Franco-Swedish armistice talks would lead to the establishment of eventual peace with France and an end to the British alliance which they were making every effort to undermine. Gustavus IV always quashed these hopes and in late May he ended these talks to prevent any damage being done to his alliance with Britain. But his decision on 6 June to conduct talks with Mortier's successor, general Brune, made the British needlessly nervous that Gustavus IV may have, after all have succumbed to the siren voices of peace, coming from his advisers. The Brune talks did not lead to any political decision since Gustavus IV had spent his time trying to convince the bemused officer to serve Louis XVIII. Straton could therefore assure Canning that Gustavus IV remained an implacable foe of Napoleon. 7

IV. Tilsit.
The Fall of Danzig, the Battle of Friedland, the Emperors Reconciliation on the River Raft and Russia's 'Desertion' from the Dying Common Cause, May-July 1807.

British suspicions were misdirected since it was not Sweden but Russia that was faltering in its fighting resolve. The long-term causes of Russia's eventual abandonment of the allied cause have already been analysed and only contributed to Russia's desertion from the coalition. It was Russia's military setbacks which, in fact, paved the way to Tilsit. It began in May with the fall of Danzig which prompted fears about French peace overtures to Russia. Shrewder observers expected, however, Napoleon to 'avenge' his partial setback at Eylau by defeating Bennigsen's army in battle in order to open negotiations with Alexander I from a position of strength. Bennigsen obliged Napoleon

7 FO 73/39. Straton to Canning, 20, 25, 27 May, 4, 6 June 1807; ibid. Straton, 'Head of the King of Sweden's Conversation with Mr. Straton on the 11th. June 1807; FO 73/40. Canning to Pierrepont, 30 May 1807; Harewood. 43. Canning to Pierrepont, 25 Apr., 31 May 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 14 May 3, 8, 12, 16 June 1807.
and facilitated an outright French victory by placing his army with its back to the Alle river at Friedland where he suffered a major defeat on 13 June at the hands of Napoleon. The extent of the Russian debacle could be judged by Russian losses of 20,000 men to 8,000 French. Napoleon had through his enemy's mistakes not only spectacularly avenged Eylau but also with one hammer blow brought the campaign begun at Austerlitz to a swift end.  

It would be deceptively easy to convince oneself that Alexander I intended to betray his allies from the very beginning of the period that followed Friedland. Alexander I seemed, however, to hope for a considerable time that a British or Austrian intervention would turn the tables on Napoleon but as this hope faded the emperor had to turn his morally flexible mind to negotiations with Napoleon. His lack of major scruples or ideological distaste for the French ruler (which contrasted with Gustavus IV) helped him to overcome whatever qualms that he had. (This may have made him a better statesman but also made him an unreliable ally). The guns of Friedland gave him a loud warning that it was time to talk peace before it was too late as his defeatist officers claimed. On 24 June Alexander I wrote a flattering letter to Napoleon which prompted Napoleon to attend talks in Tilsit where Napoleon could play the role of the attentive host to perfection on the raft in the Niemen river. Napoleon, often a destructive and ham-fisted political actor, showed enormous skill and finesse in seducing Alexander I into abandoning his allies and siding with France. Having just fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war the two rulers, hitherto deadly enemies, transformed themselves into apparent friends by their shared hatred of Britain and fascination with each other.  

But it was not all camaraderie since Tilsit was also about dividing up the European continent between Russia and France. Napoleon was willing to give Alexander I lenient terms for peace with France since he had respect for Russian power, did not relish the prospects of a campaign deep inside Russian territory and faced growing demands for peace from a disgruntled French home front. The only reward for peace that Napoleon asked for was for Russia to cede her Ionian and Dalmatian territories to France which seemed a small price to pay. Though small the Ionian islands were of great strategic

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9 Grade. 4-6, 9, 20.; Hinde. 165-166; Horne. 225-229; Hartley. 75-76.
value to Russia. They were the key to Russia's naval presence in the Mediterranean and Balkan aspirations. Ceding them to France deprived the Russian Mediterranean Fleet of its operational bases and doomed it to eventual capture by the British. Furthermore it was Prussia, not Russia, that paid the rest of the price for peace by seeing her population and territory halved by the creation of Westphalia in the west and the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw in the east while what remained of the gutted Prussian state was effectively occupied by France. Alexander I had in fact paid a high price for his peace with Napoleon by sacrificing Russia's strategic interests and strategic security in return for vague French promises of compensation. The Napoleonic empire had expanded to the very doorstep of Russia by Alexander I allowing Prussia to be dismembered and to become useless as a buffer for Russia against France. Alexander I had given his country's deadliest enemy carte blanche to dominate Europe without Russian interference. His popularity in Russia reached rock bottom as St. Petersburg circulated with rumours of revolution and discontent among his nobility (as Stockholm did against Gustavus IV). His alliance with France also earned him the distrust of the British who could prove formidable opponents especially as Alexander I had agreed to join the Continental system as well.10

V. Too Little and Too Late.
Anglo-Swedish Subsidy Negotiations, General Clinton's Mission to Sweden and General Cathcart's Expedition to Pomerania, March-July 1807.

As seen, the failure of the British to send adequate military support to the allies was used by Russia as an excuse to leave the war. Although he did not do the same to leave the war Gustavus IV had kept reminding the British about the value of a diversionary offensive from Pomerania against French occupied Prussia and complained bitterly when the British continued to procrastinate.11

The main reason for this supposed procrastination was that Castlereagh, in addition to an acute shortage of tonnage, only had 16,000 troops available for continental service.12 The British refused
anyway to act before they knew exactly what Gustavus IV's plans were and how many troops they would be called upon to subsidise. 13

This continued indecisiveness on the part of the British disappointed Gustavus IV greatly since he had hoped the new administration would prove more active than its predecessor. As a sop to Swedish feeling Castlereagh decided to send general Henry Clinton to assure the Swedes that the expedition would be sent as soon as he returned to England from his fact finding tour in Pomerania. 14 Gustavus IV gave Clinton, when he arrived in Stralsund on 16 May, a cold reception and asked him where the long promised British army was? Straton defended Clinton's mission and his own government by claiming that Gustavus IV failure to provide any concrete proposals prevented the British to act more decisively. 15

It was not surprising that the Anglo-Swedish talks were less than friendly since Clinton's arrival coincided with the height of British fears about the Franco-Swedish armistice. Was Gustavus IV perhaps only using the diversionary offensive plans to provide a convenient mantle for his eventual betrayal of the British? British suspicions were fully reciprocated by the Swedes who disapproved of Clinton's fact finding work, which they took for badly concealed spying. 16 Wetterstedt believed his real mission in Pomerania was only to check that the numbers of troops claimed to be in the field by the Swedes tallied with the numbers that the British paid. Clinton voiced his opinion about the difficulties of landing in Pomerania and, if Wetterstedt is to be believed, the general was supposed to have claimed that the continental war was lost following the fall of Danzig. Clinton's unfortunate opinions and remarks provided Wetterstedt with plentiful arguments why the British could not be trusted to send any expedition at all. 17 One ally that could be relied upon was, most surprisingly, Prussia who agreed to send 4,000 troops under the command of the redoubtable general Blücher to Pomerania. Although a gratifying gesture of allied solidarity, sending a Prussian army to Pomerania

15 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 14 May 1807; Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 22 May 1807; FO 73/39. Straton to Canning, 10, 16 May 1807.
17 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 17 May 1807.
was counterproductive since it only served to weaken the main allied front line armies in Poland and east Prussia.18

The delay in any news about the arrival of the British expedition aroused the hope among Gustavus IV's ministers that the British had either cancelled or diverted the expedition following the fall of Danzig.19 On 30 May Straton was recalled and Pierrepoint was re-appointed to his old post. Canning wanted Pierrepoint to assure Gustavus IV that as of 2 June the British had decided to send the expedition after all under general Lord Cathcart's command. While this must have been welcome news to Gustavus IV, Canning failed to be so forthcoming on the issue of subsidies. Nor did he give in to Gustavus IV's expected demands for actual command of the British force. On 19 June Rehausen signed a treaty with Canning which kept the British forces under Cathcart's separate, independent command at all times and reserved the right for the British government to recall Cathcart's army at any time.20 That very same day Pierrepoint had his first audience in Stralsund with Gustavus IV who was delighted with the news of the expedition being sent at last. This positive reaction probably accounted for the fact that Toll did not object, to Pierrepoint's equally delighted surprise, to being paid the standard British subsidy rate plus 4 months additional subsidies paid as a sweetener by Canning to keep Sweden at Britain's side.21

At last all the obstacles to sending the British expedition to the Baltic had finally been removed but even though, as late as 3 July, no accurate news or confirmation of a Franco-Russian armistice had arrived in Pomerania this was hardly the most opportune time for such an expedition. The expedition might have been able to bolster Russian morale had it been sent just before or after Friedland. After that battle such an expedition could have much less impact on Russia's fighting spirit. Indeed if Russia made peace with France then this would free Napoleon to attack Pomerania where Cathcart's


19 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 3, 12 June 1807; KUDHA: Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 8 June 1807; Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 16 June 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon 12, 16 June 1807.

20 FO 73/40. Canning to Pierrepoint, 30 May, 2, 9, 11, 16, 19 June 1807; ibid. Castlereagh to Cathcart, 9 June 1807.

21 FO 73/40. Pierrepoint to Canning, 19, 24 June 1807.
army might be trapped and forced to surrender.\textsuperscript{22} It was now too late to put a stop to operations since on 5 July the first British division landed on Rügen and Gustavus IV requested that it be immediately detached for the defence of Stralsund. The division's commander, general Drecksell, politely declined the king's request but detached 3 infantry battalions under colonel Duplat's command for Stralsund defence.\textsuperscript{23}

The king's ministers failed to share Gustavus IV's enthusiasm for the British presence in Pomerania since they were convinced that Sweden should follow Russia's example\textsuperscript{24} and on 10 July Ehrenheim complained in a letter to Wetterstedt that 'What I told H.M so many times when we were still neutral has now come to pass. In an alliance with the powerful, the weak must suffer. England has already caused us to make great sacrifices while Russia has made an armistice with the enemy without informing H.M.'\textsuperscript{25}

Whatever the truth to Ehrenheim's claim it was Gustavus IV, not his peace inclined ministers, who set the course of Swedish foreign policy and that course was for a continuation of the war against Napoleon whatever Russia did or did not do. The ministers were convinced that Pomerania would fall to the French without the British lifting a finger to save the province.\textsuperscript{26} On 9 July the second British division landed bringing the number of Anglo-Swedish troops in Pomerania to 18,000, which gave Gustavus IV the requisite military muscle to cancel the ongoing armistice with the French with the defiant words 'I cannot treat with the Chief of the French Nation or one of his Delegates - if you attack - [then] I shall beat you'.\textsuperscript{27} Gustavus IV thought mistakenly that his foolish bravado would either bolster his allies fighting morale or shame them to pick up their weapons, but of course it did nothing of the sort. It was not just the British or the Swedes who were shocked by the king's decision. It left their enemy stunned too and Napoleon is supposed to have said 'that arch-madman, the king of

\textsuperscript{22} KPA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 3 July 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 16 June, 3, 4 July 1807; Björnín. 201-202; Fortescue. VI. 57.
\textsuperscript{23} GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 8 July 1807; Beamish. 104, 106.
\textsuperscript{24} KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 7, 14 July 1807.
\textsuperscript{25} KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 10 July 1807.
\textsuperscript{27} GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 15 July 1807.
Sweden, has seized this opportunity to denounce the armistice. It is a pity that they cannot put the fellow in a lunatic asylum.\textsuperscript{28} At least the renunciation gave the French the opportunity to defeat the Swedes, which forced Essen to ask for an armistice. Mosheim noted sarcastically on 15 July 'Thus much for the campaign in Swedish Pomerania' and, if Essen got a new armistice, then 'the comedy may be looked upon as concluded.'\textsuperscript{29}

When Cathcart finally arrived in Pomerania on 18 July he failed to see the farcical side to the Swedish situation in Pomerania. The French had amassed 40,000 troops in the province, Stralsund's defences were weak and neither the Swedish army or the Pomeranians showed any fighting spirit. On 20 July Cathcart withdrew Duplat's force from Stralsund (which Cathcart expected would fall to the French with ease), but his intention from the moment he arrived had been to evacuate his army from Pomerania altogether.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{VI. Canning's Copenhagen Coup.}

\textit{The British Invasion of Zealand and the Occupation of Copenhagen, July-October 1807.}

If Cathcart succeeded in withdrawing his army from Pomerania, the question arose what to do with it and where it was to be sent? Its original mission, to take part in an Anglo-Swedish diversionary offensive against Napoleon's vulnerable northern flank, appeared to be redundant after Tilsit and the only alternative was to return home. This might have happened, had not Canning convinced himself that the French were about to invade Denmark, seize her considerable fleet (17 ships of the line, 12 frigates and 43 smaller vessels) and launch an invasion against Scotland or Ireland. In July came (exaggerated and unverified) reports that the Danes were readying their fleet at the same time that the French were preparing to invade Jutland. This seemed to confirm Canning's worst strategic nightmare (in addition to his fears the French might close the Sound and invade Sweden) and he was in no mood, following Tilsit, to take any chances with Britain's strategic situation. He

\textsuperscript{28} Bingham. 323-324. Napoleon to Fouché, 10 July 1807.
\textsuperscript{29} Gp. Mosheim to Gordon, 15 July 1807.
sent Francis Jackson to Denmark while admiral Gambier set sail for the Sound with a large fleet to confront the Danes.31

In addition to the 16,000 troops that Castlereagh sent directly from Britain to Zealand he also ordered, on 19 July, Cathcart to leave Pomerania and support the British invasion of Denmark. That very same day Pierrepoint warned Gustavus IV informally that the British army might be withdrawn for service elsewhere. Gustavus IV took this in the worst possible way and claimed this was an act of desertion on the part of his ally and in violation of the British commitment to assist in the defence of Pomerania. Everything seemed set for a violent confrontation therefore when Castlereagh's orders for a withdrawal arrived on 3 August. Pierrepoint had the unenviable task of breaking this bad news to Gustavus IV and convincing the infuriated king to give his formal permission for a British evacuation. It was only with the greatest of reluctance that Gustavus IV did so by 6 August which enabled Cathcart (who had anticipated Castlereagh's orders) to evacuate his army by 18 August.32

While the British armed forces converged on Zealand, Jackson had arrived in Denmark for talks with the Danes. Jackson seems to have forgotten Canning's offer of subsidies and naval and military assistance if the Danes agreed to hand over their fleet for the duration of the war in British custody. Instead Jackson simply rammed the British demand for the surrender of their fleet down the throat of the Danes. Neither the Prince Royal or the foreign minister, Christian Bernstorff, were in a mood to give in to threats or brusque British demands that not only violated their neutrality but humiliated their proud sense of sovereignty. As in 1801, the Danes did not shy away from a military showdown with Britain if forced to it. Nevertheless Denmark's situation was worse than six years earlier. She faced an unenviable choice between having Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein invaded and occupied by the French (thus losing some of her most valuable provinces) or seeing Zealand invaded, her commerce destroyed, her small but rich colonies occupied, and her economy ruined by the British, if

31 Trulsson. 320, 322, 323, 326, 328, 334-335, 351, 354, 356; Ryan. 39, 46-48, 51-52; Hall. 57; Gray. 163-164; Barnes. 530, 534-536; Derry. 202.
32 FO 73/41. Pierrepoint to Canning, 20 July, 5 Aug. 1807; WO 1/188. Cathcart to Castlereagh 6, 13 Aug. 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 5, 19 Aug. 1807; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 4 Aug. 1807; Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt to Stedingk, 8 Aug. 1807, ibid. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 1 Aug. 1807; Grade. 56-57, 60; Atkinson. 82-83; Longford. 88-89; Beamish. 108; WO 1/188. ff. 67-75. Cathcart to Castlereagh, 6 Aug. 1807.
they rejected Canning's demands. Denmark was truly caught between the 'Devil and the Deep Blue Sea'. By rejecting the British ultimatum the Danes chose the marginally lesser of two bad evils.\textsuperscript{33} Given Jackson's tone and Canning's perfunctory demands, that outcome seemed to have been expected and this gives the impression that this diplomatic overture was only a political fig leaf to camouflage the inevitable use of brute force and justify an unprovoked attack upon a hitherto neutral power. That impression seems correct since Canning, while probably preferring to get custody of the Danish fleet without bloodshed, at the same time probably thought that a short, sharp shock administered to this old Russian ally would have a sobering and salutary effect in St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{34}

With the diplomatic interlude over the British could get down to the real business on the agenda and on 16 August some 30,000 regular British troops landed on Zealand. Since almost the entire regular Danish army (25,000) were in Schleswig to keep an eye on the French, the British only faced 13,000 armed men (only 8,000 of whom were regulars). This motley force was defeated and the British laid siege to the well fortified capital while Gambier's ships threw an iron ring of ships around Zealand's shores to prevent any supplies, reinforcements or relief reaching Copenhagen. Cathcart preferred to let time take its course or storm the city, but he was prevailed upon by less patient officers and Jackson to bombard the city into submission. The British shot 14,000 projectiles into Copenhagen in three days (2-5 September) which killed 2,000 of the city's 100,000 inhabitants and destroyed 400 houses. The Danes capitulated and the British agreed to an armistice that left Copenhagen occupied by the British between 7 September and 17 October. The British captured a rich booty. In addition to the entire Danish fleet, £2 million worth of naval stores and hundreds of merchant ships on the high seas, the British also occupied Heligoland, the Danish colonies in the West Indies and finally in January 1808 the Danish colonies in India. Quite sensibly they left Denmark's north Atlantic territories in peace for reasons of economy.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 18 Aug. 1807; SRE. 275-276; Ryan. 52-54; Barnes. 536-537; Hall. 160; Trulsson. 329-330.
\textsuperscript{34} Trulsson. 338, 341.
Britain had therefore scored an easy victory over a weaker power and reaped rich rewards. While the Tories congratulated Canning on a job well done that compensated somewhat for Britain's setback at Tilsit\textsuperscript{36}, the opposition (as in 1801) found no justification for the attack on Copenhagen which transformed a former neutral into an implacable British foe.\textsuperscript{37} Canning had also handed Napoleon an excellent propaganda weapon to turn against Britain and justify his plans to avenge Copenhagen by attacking Britain's only remaining European ally: Sweden.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed Canning's Copenhagen operation had branded Sweden, by simple association, as co-conspirator against Denmark and it was not Britain, in safe isolation across the seas and inaccessible to the enraged French and Russians, that now faced the wrath of the continental coalition that had been formed between Napoleon and Alexander I. Ehrenheim's sharp criticisms of Britain were for once justified, since he contrasted the delays and procrastination that Britain had displayed during the first half of the year when she was called upon to aid the allies and the speed in which she defended her own interests when these were at stake. He was convinced (in contrast to Canning) that the Copenhagen operation (far from having a sobering effect upon the Russians) would in fact lead to a full scale Anglo-Russian war that he desperately wanted Sweden to stay out of. If Gustavus IV managed, despite his ministers best endeavours, not to stay neutral in such a war Sweden faced as unenviable a choice as Denmark had done between having her maritime and commercial interests ruined by Britain or having Finland invaded by Russia if she chose the 'wrong' side by staying belligerent.\textsuperscript{39}

**VII. Sweden's Last Stand.**

The Fall of Stralsund, Swedish Officer Conspiracies, the Retreat to Rügen and Final Evacuation of Pomerania, July-October 1807.

The British attack upon Copenhagen not only overshadowed but also, in Swedish eyes, contributed to the fall of Pomerania. Its eventual loss was not lamented by the king's ministers (who saw it as a strategic liability that embroiled Sweden in continental turmoil, and who did not share Gustavus IV's

\textsuperscript{36} Harewood. 63. Hawkesbury to Canning, 17 Sept. 1807; Harewood. 37. Cumberland to Canning, 17 Sept. 1807.
\textsuperscript{37} Hinde. 175-176.
\textsuperscript{38} Bingham. 330. Napoleon to Savary, 26 Aug. 1807.
attachment to the province or his determination to defend it all cost against Napoleon's equal
determination to eliminate this irritating enemy bridgehead once and for all. Ehrenheim's view was

clear: 'We have not yet seen the full extent of our bitter fate while H.M is standing with his army on a
patch of foreign soil, which must eventually be given up.' Gustavus IV was as out of tune with his
people's feelings as much as he was with his ministers'. When Swedish hopes for an early peace
following Tilsit were not realised, discontent among the nobility and opposition circles rose
considerably. Even those Swedes who had supported the king's war policies two years earlier had
become disillusioned by Tilsit. Instances of actual treasonous contacts with the French remained,
however, low. The strongest opposition was to be found in the noble dominated Swedish officer
corps, especially in the Pomeranian army, where they seemed not only apathetic about defending
Pomerania but were openly defeatist, discontented and seemed to connive in the province's demise at
the hands of the French. This dangerously low esprit de corps among the officers was not helped by
being led by such uninspired and defeatist leaders such as Toll and Essen. Pierrepoint informed
Canning privately that 'I do not see a single person here capable of making a vigorous and well
conducted defence'.

Pierrepoint's critical views, which mirrored those of Cathcart, were fully justified and even cautious
when compared with the actual situation in the army. When Gustavus IV took over personal
command, exercised some exemplary leadership to inspire Stralsund's defenders and tried to inject
some much needed vitality into its defence, his officers responded with a threat to resign en masse as
a protest at the continuation of an increasingly unpopular war. As usual the king's efforts were to no
avail in the face of his advisers', ministers and officers sheer despondent defeatism. They managed
unfortunately to convince Gustavus IV that Stralsund had to be evacuated in the face of overwhelming

Oct. 1807; Björlin. 214-216.
41 KPA: Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 18 Aug. 1807.
42 Harewood 44. De Lobo to Arauio, 9 July 1807.
43 FO 73/40. Pierrepoint to Canning, 24 June 1807.
44 RA. Miscellanea. 42. Lövenskjöld to Toll, 17, 24, 31 Jan., 4, 10 Feb. 1807; ibid. Hjärta to
45 FO 73/40. Pierrepoint to Canning, 24 June 1807; FO 73/41. Pierrepoint to Canning, 27 July, 10
46 Harewood. 43. Pierrepoint to Canning, 15 July 1807.
French superiority. To Pierrepont's disgust the Swedes evacuated Stralsund, a proud symbol of Sweden's great past and Charles XII's heroic resistance a century earlier, without a single shot being fired by 21 August.47

Between 22 and 25 August the city was occupied by the French who proceeded energetically to make preparations to invade Rügen, the only part of Pomerania which now remained in Swedish hands. But the French hoped to take the island without a fight and requested that the Swedes capitulate a demand which Gustavus IV rejected out of hand. His proposal for Pomerania's neutralisation were in turn rejected by the French, and on 5 September an ill Gustavus IV left Pomerania for good. His parting instructions to Toll were to save the army from capture by any means, which Toll acted upon with speed and success by concluding a surprisingly favourable armistice with Brune two days later. By 25 September Toll had managed to evacuate the entire army to Sweden and was rewarded for his diplomatic skills by a grateful king with the field marshal's baton.48

It is easy when viewing events in Pomerania or assessing the two year campaign there as an unimportant sideshow without importance to the general conduct of the war. Such overly critical views are unjustified for several reasons. The Pomeranian front provided an important diversion for Napoleon's armies and was a constant thorn in his side. In 1810 Napoleon admitted that the Pomeranian army and the threat of a British landing tied down indirectly some 50,000 of his troops.50 The other was that the siege of Stralsund prevented, in Pierrepont's opinion, the French from offering Denmark military aid during the siege of Copenhagen since they were preoccupied with their own siege of Stralsund.49 That may seem a less than plausible explanation for Pomerania's importance but it did release vitally needed troops for operations at Copenhagen that might not have been available at all or only from further afield. However there was one final and more sinister reason why events in


50 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 9 Feb. 1810. See Scaevola. 93-94.

49 FO 73/41. Pierrepont to Canning, 10 Aug. 1807.
Pomerania especially during the summer months of 1807 were of such importance. Pierrepoint discovered in September that some Swedish officers intended to arrest Gustavus IV on the pretext that his was out of his mind and declare duke Charles Regent of Sweden instead, a role that the scheming duke seemed to have prepared himself for. Pierrepoint had got some but not all of the picture. Some Swedish officers had in fact approached generals Essen and Wrede to lead a regular army coup against Gustavus IV, but the timid generals declined the offer not out of loyalty to the king (whom they failed to inform about these treasonous plots) but because they did not believe the time was ripe for such drastic actions. But dangerous germs had been planted in the minds of junior Swedish army officers that bore fruit eighteen months later when two other generals proved more decisive and overthrew Gustavus IV.

VIII. Colonies and Conquests.
Canning's offer of Colonies, the Occupation of Zealand and Gustavus IV's Plans for Expansion, September-November 1807.

The fall of Pomerania was inevitable, given the deplorable defeatism in the Swedish army's officer corps and sheer French military and numerical superiority. The loss of the province was humiliating and a major blow to Gustavus IV's prestige and his British alliance. But his ally was determined to soften that blow by several means and give her one remaining ally all possible assistance in the face of the inevitable French, Danish and Russian threats against Sweden if she remained a British ally. On 4 September Canning proposed to Adlerberg that Sweden share in the occupation of Zealand. Zealand was, Canning pointed out in his instructions to Pierrepoint, a vital, common objective to Britain and Sweden. Not least of all to Sweden, since the importance of the Sound and Zealand to Britain had declined with the discovery that the Great Belt was deep and broad enough to allow the passage of larger war and merchant ships. Canning's offer was, therefore, an altruistic one, based on his desire to give as much succour to Sweden as possible. An Anglo-Swedish occupation of Zealand would not only reduce, but also possibly even remove the threat of a French invasion, and would bring the two allies closer together following the removal of Cathcart's army from Pomerania. If Sweden

51 Harewood. 43. Pierrepoint to Canning, 8 Sept. 1807.; EnSO. XIII. Charles to Engeström, summer 1807. [No exact date]
52 GAF. 207-210.
54 Anglica. 495. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV, 4 Sept. 1807.
participated in the occupation by providing 14,000-20,000 troops, Britain would pay her new subsidies, which had ended with Toll's evacuation of Rügen. Furthermore, Zealand could be used as a bargaining counter in future peace negotiations with their enemies. Canning would only restore the island to the Danes if Hanover and Pomerania were restored to the allies' respective control and Denmark was restored to full sovereignty, with no French troops present in the country. Canning admitted, however, that his plans rested upon the assumption that Zealand had not been, nor was it going to be, restored to the Danes by the British commanders.55

But that was exactly, as seen earlier, what the British commanders did, and it was not the last time that British officers were to cause Canning great diplomatic trouble or sabotage his carefully laid plans. This plan made more sense than most. It would have rendered the Danish contribution to the French cause a huge, crippling blow since the British would have controlled not only the Sound, but the Great Belt. Zealand would have been transformed into a huge naval and military base for the British to control the entry to the Baltic and neutralise the Danish gunboat threat to her convoys, but also lessen the effectiveness of French privateers in the Baltic. An allied occupation of Zealand would not only lessen the invasion threat against Scania, but also lessen the economic burden on Sweden, since the Swedish occupation force would be fed and supplied by the Danes. Zealand's considerable economic (especially agricultural) resources would, possibly together with the Sound dues, be at Sweden's disposal.56 Now Cathcart's armistice had of course secured Copenhagen for the British, but also pulled the rug from under Canning's feet, and Wetterstedt concluded that the British proposal was only made to compensate for the loss of Pomerania.57 Gustavus IV on the other hand was very interested in the Zealand plan,58 but while appreciative of Canning's solicitous offer, he wondered, quite sensibly, how it could be compatible with the terms of the Anglo-Danish armistice.59 He also wanted no new subsidy treaty until the old one had run its course.60 Canning regretted that the military had been given powers to negotiate with the Danes without any reference to London, but

55 FO 73/41. Canning to Pierrepont, 4 Sept. 1807.
56 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24, 27 Sept. 1807.
58 Anglica. 495. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 24 Sept. 1807.
59 FO 73/41. Pierrepont to Canning, 19 Sept. 1807.
60 Harewood. 43. Pierrepont to Canning, 19 Sept. 1807.
perhaps there would be no need to occupy Zealand since Canning hoped to secure Danish neutrality by sending a special mission to Copenhagen. He hoped to secure Danish neutrality with the help of Russia and asked for Swedish diplomatic assistance.\(^{61}\) Gustavus IV expressed his scepticism about Canning's hopes for Russian mediation since Stedingk reported their deep hostility to Britain. The king did, however, support Canning's neutralisation plan since he believed it would preserve Swedish security more than an Anglo-Swedish occupation of Zealand. The main reason was that a neutral Denmark would be a buffer state between Sweden and her enemy.\(^{62}\) Swedish scepticism was quickly confirmed, not only about Russia which rejected its assigned role as a mediator, but also by the Danes, who were in no mood to listen to overtures from the British after their brutal attack. Nor were they willing to alienate her soon-to-be allies, France and Russia, by accepting a return to neutrality. In a post-Tilsit, post-Copenhagen sort of world the kind of neutrality that Canning outlined was a dangerous day-dream. The Swedish government proved no less sceptical about Canning's schemes than the Danes. Sharing in the Zealand occupation would implicate Sweden in Canning's 'crime' at Copenhagen and provoke her neighbour's hostile reactions.\(^{63}\)

Canning did not give up his quest to assure Britain a vital presence on the Sound which also provided Sweden some protection against an invasion. Canning had, therefore, already on 17 September proposed an alternative, second plan to the Zealand one, by placing an army in Scania and a British squadron in Gothenburg.\(^{64}\) On 1 October Pierrepoint made a formal proposal to land 10,000 of Cathcart's troops in Scania\(^{65}\) and to use them, at a later stage, to re-occupy Zealand.\(^{66}\) The Swedish ministers were aghast at the very idea and Wetterstedt (for once) dared to raise political objections to British proposals. By admitting troops that had taken part in the Copenhagen operation, Sweden would be implicated in that 'episode' which would arouse both domestic and foreign discontent. He also dared to claim that the British presence in Scania would undermine Sweden's independence by handing over the security of a strategically and economically vital province to a foreign power.

\(^{61}\) FO 73/42. Canning to Pierrepoint, 1 Oct. 1807.
\(^{62}\) FO 73/42. Pierrepoint to Canning, 11 Oct. 1807.
\(^{63}\) KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 10, 13, 24, 27, 30 Sept. 1807; KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 28 Aug., 8, 15, 18, 27 Sept. 1807.
\(^{64}\) Harewood. 43. Pierrepoint to Canning, 17 Sept. 1807.
\(^{65}\) FO 73/42. Canning to Pierrepoint, 1 Oct. 1807.
\(^{66}\) Anglica. 495. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV, 1 Oct. 1807.
Gustavus IV rejected Wetterstedt's dubious arguments that stationing a mere 10,000 troops belonging to a friendly power could undermine Sweden's independence. Nor did he think it any business of foreign powers whom Sweden allowed to stay on its soil. The ministers counter-attacked (since they had obviously lost the political argument against a British landing in Scania) by hitting Gustavus IV where it hurt the most. His reforms of Scania's agriculture had transformed the province into the bread basket of Sweden and Gustavus IV was inordinately proud of his achievement. Toll claimed that Scania's agriculture could not supply the British (which contradicted previous claims) and trying to do so would ruin the province's economy.\(^{67}\)

On 14 October Gustavus IV told Pierrepoint that he had to decline, with the greatest reluctance, Canning's Scania plan since the province would be unable to supply the British army. This was clearly his negative ministers talking through the mouth of the king and Pierrepoint tried to convince Gustavus IV to accept a plan which would bolster Sweden's long-term security. (Unfortunately the Swedes, in Pierrepoint's opinion, did not anticipate events, but merely reacted to them.)\(^{68}\) But Pierrepoint persevered and entreated Gustavus IV to reconsider. Gustavus IV took issue with Wetterstedt, claiming that subsidies would cover the expense of their stay in Scania and provide valuable protection against a French invasion. Wetterstedt failed to grasp this point and claimed (in a letter to Ehrenheim on 18 October) that 'The entire cause of our precarious position is the king's determination never to move close to France. England knows this and makes [such] a union ever more difficult [to achieve]'\(^{69}\). Gustavus IV's and his ministers' perceptions were therefore completely at odds. The former recognised the benefits of British protection against Sweden's hostile neighbours and France, while the latter saw such protection as the very cause of such threats. On 20 October Pierrepoint made his final unsuccessful bid. Gustavus IV turned it down, to the relief of his ministers and Scania's population, which persisted in viewing a British presence in Scania as a direct provocation against Denmark. Pierrepoint disagreed viewing that same presence as a valuable deterrent to future Danish (or French) aggression, and a valuable addition to Sweden's long-term

\(^{67}\) KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 8 Oct. 1807; FO 73/42. Pierrepoint to Canning, 11 Oct. 1807; SRE. 256; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 11, 15 Oct. 1807.

\(^{68}\) FO 73/42. Pierrepoint to Canning, 14 Oct. 1807.

\(^{69}\) KUDHA. Wetterstedt/Ehrenheim, 18 Oct. 1807.
defensive security\(^70\). A few months later both Gustavus IV's ministers and his Scanian subjects, who opposed British protection with such vehemence, would be clamouring (with equal vehemence) for that very same protection and blame the British for not providing it.

Mistaken ministerial interference had not only succeeded in undermining Sweden's long-term security but crippled Gustavus IV's plans against Norway. The autumn of 1807 seemed an opportune time to strike a pre-emptive blow against Denmark, but also, by occupying Zealand, force the Danes to exchange the island for Norway.\(^71\) He had lost a golden opportunity to invade Zealand with British military aid and a year later, when he tried to rekindle plans for an Anglo-Swedish invasion of the island, it was too late. Neither his ministers\(^72\) nor the Swedish public\(^73\) were sympathetic to his Norwegian plans, while Pierrepoint avoided the issue since he (mistakenly) thought Britain had ambitions against Norway herself.\(^74\)

Norway could have proved a valuable, long-term addition to Sweden, both from an economic, but even more from a strategic point of view - by eliminating the need to defend a long, straggling western frontier and gaining a long western coastline facing Sweden's ally and main trading partner, Britain. To compensate for this potential loss, the real loss of Pomerania, economic losses (which alienated the Swedish merchant classes) and to serve as a bargaining counter in future peace talks, Canning offered the Dutch colony of Surinam to a delighted Gustavus IV in October. Even the ministers did not oppose this safer expansionist option (compared to the higher risk Norway-Zealand plans), but Ehrenheim preferred the Dutch islands of Saba or St. Eustace to Surinam or the adjacent colonies of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice.\(^75\) On 20 October Ehrenheim outlined his objections to


\(^{71}\) KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 4 Aug. 1807.

\(^{72}\) Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt to Stedingk, 3 Dec. 1807.

\(^{73}\) Trolle. 78-80. Oct. 1807.

\(^{74}\) Harewood. 43. Pierrepoint to Canning, 25 Aug. 1807.

Sweden acquiring any colony, particularly Surinam, by claiming that: 'I am fearful of Colonies in
general, they demand great Capital, the odious Slave trade, and emigrants, who will either be
corrupted or die in an unbearable climate. Surinam has not made any profit for Holland since 1770
while costing huge sums to defend. Ehrenheim's objections were valid up to a point, but Surinam
could have boosted Swedish overseas trade and be seen a small gain from the alliance. But yet again
ministerial opposition had deprived Sweden of this prize as well.

IX. War across the World.
Napoleon's Strategic Choices and Plans, October 1807-1808.

The Swedish rejection of British military aid in October was doubly unfortunate since Napoleon (who
hoped that Gustavus IV might come to his senses and make peace with France) had turned with some
reluctance to planning an invasion of Sweden. But he preferred that his Russian and Danish allies
should carry out this task for him and displayed unusual tardiness in issuing the French invasion force
under the command of marshal Bernadotte (situated at Hamburg with 18,000 French and allied
troops) with orders to advance. Napoleon's uncharacteristic lack of interest in the invasion was quite
deliberate. He had no interest in seeing Sweden defeated too fast since he hoped to divert both his
main ally and enemy's attention towards Sweden while he concentrated on dealing with problems
further south.

Napoleon's eyes were in fact on Portugal and not Sweden. The former, unlike the latter, was an
ancient British ally which had the temerity, in the eyes of Napoleon, to continue that alliance under
the cloak of bogus neutrality. Like her northern counterpart (Denmark), neutrality had served
Portugal well, since her foreign trade had quadrupled between 1789 and 1807. This Portuguese
prosperity, however, was built on perilously insecure grounds since it depended upon the belligerents'
goodwill. Such goodwill was not forthcoming from Napoleon, who warned the Portuguese (on 19
July) that they had to shut their ports by 1 September or face a French invasion. The Portuguese faced

76 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 20 Oct. 1807.
the same deadly dilemma that Denmark had found only a few months earlier. If Portugal accepted the
French demands, her flourishing trade, her economy and her colonies, especially the rich prize of
Brazil, would be in direct peril from the British. The Portuguese government was also acutely aware
that Lisbon (like Copenhagen) was open to a British naval attack - as was the rest of her long exposed
coastline. At the same time her equally long and indefensible land boarder with Spain made Portugal
especially vulnerable to a Franco-Spanish invasion. When Portugal prevaricated, Napoleon recalled
his embassy as a warning not to delay in answering his demands. 79

Napoleon lowered his Damocles sword over Portugal’s head by ordering general Junot’s army (25,000)
into Spain and on 27 October signing a treaty with that power to divide up Portugal between them.
Portugal’s ruler, the Prince-Regent Don John placated the British and assured their envoy in Lisbon
that he would evacuate his government, treasury and fleet to Brazil should the French invade. Don
John’s assurance was not to be trusted, however, since he did not relish the prospect of an Atlantic
crossing or a long-term residence in Brazil. Canning could not afford (as in the Danish case) to see
the Portuguese fleet (12 ships of the line and 26 other vessels) fall into French hands. He sent the
meddling, but ruthlessly decisive admiral Smith, therefore, with 6 men-of-war to the Tagus to ensure
that prince John kept his word, or else see his fleet either sunk or captured by the British. Smith
managed only a few hours before Junot’s entry into Lisbon on 29 November to evacuate the entire
Portuguese court, fleet and treasury. Canning was delighted with another coup that had snatched
another fleet from under Napoleon’s nose, but the French had reduced yet another country to
submission. 80

Napoleon could now, with Portugal safely in Junot’s hands, shift the focus of his avaricious territorial
appetite to Portugal’s next door neighbour and long-standing adversary, Bourbon Spain. If there was
remarkable similarity between Portugal’s and Denmark’s position in 1807, then their respective

79 Livermore. 244-247; Chandler. 596-597; Emsley. 59; Maxwell. 4, 6-9, 16, 38-42, 51-55, 111-120,
124, 126-128; Saraiva. 144; Hilt. 8, 118-124, 267, 283; Rudorff. 21; Pedro Martinez, Historia
diplomática de Portugal. (Lisbon, 1985). 205-220; David Francis, Portugal 1715-1808. Joanne,
Pombaline and Rococo Portugal as seen by British Diplomats and Traders. (London, 1985). 215-244.;
80 Chandler. 230-245, 597-599; Palmer. ENE.; Duff Cooper, Talleyrand. (New York, 1986.). 163-
neighbours, Spain and Sweden, shared some similarities too. Although having been imperial powers in the previous century, by the eighteenth century only the support of Bourbon France and the formidable efforts of King Charles III of Spain and Gustavus III of Sweden to reform their autocratic states entitled either country to claim a secondary power status. The revolution deprived both states of French support and France was seen as an ideological threat to their domestic tranquility from 1792 onwards and forced them to adopt neutrality. Both Spain and Sweden, by their relative peripheral position in Europe and isolation from the rest of the continent, behind the Pyrenees and the Baltic respectively had managed to escape the worst effects of the war. That this was about to change by late 1807 and early 1808 was blamed by Spaniards and Swedes upon their unpopular rulers. 81

In both countries the nobility's opposition to their respective rulers, Don Manuel de Godoy and Gustavus IV, was fuelled by domestic and foreign factors. They resented their rulers' exercise of unfettered autocratic power at home and their extremely unpopular foreign alliances that embroiled Sweden and Spain in wars that were not 'theirs'. (Spain had been an ally of France since 1804 and that alliance was as unpopular with the Spaniards as the British alliance was with the Swedes). Napoleon was therefore assured of noble support should he chose to invade either country. Having come to mistrust Godoy, Napoleon chose to overthrow Spain's 'dictator' and replace him with Napoleon's elder brother, king Joseph of Naples. Exploiting Godoy's greed, Napoleon offered southern Portugal as a personal principality for the prince in return for a French occupation of Spain north of the Ebro. But he failed to get Joseph, in December 1807, to rule Spain in place of Godoy, since Joseph recommended that Napoleon use king Charles IV's popular son, Don Ferdinand as a French puppet instead. Unfortunately for Napoleon he failed to follow his brother's sensible advice. 82

Godoy remained oblivious to these Napoleonic plots until February 1808 when he belatedly realised that he was not going to secure his Portuguese principality while the French tightened their grip on Spain. In late February (at about the time the Russians invaded Finland) Godoy urged the Spanish government to mobilise the army and evacuate the court to the safety of Mallorca (which could be

82 Hilt. 197-198; Rudorff. 25-26; Ross. 132, 135.
protected by the British) or the Americas (as the Portuguese had). Neither the government nor the Spanish people at large heeded his recommendation. Spain, like Sweden, was hampered by political divisions on the home front from putting up an effective resistance against their ancient foes (France and Russia respectively). In fact the Spanish response between 16 and 18 March was to overthrow Godoy. The French took full advantage of Spain's trouble with Marshal Murat's 23,000 troops occupying Madrid.\(^{83}\)

What reconciled the Spaniards to this alien presence, symbolised by Murat's Mameluke cavalry that reminded the Spaniards of an earlier invasion, was their mistaken belief that Don Ferdinand's simultaneous arrival in Madrid with Murat was due to French support. Napoleon had concluded, in fact, that Ferdinand and his supporters posed an even graver threat to his control over Spain than Godoy ever did. Napoleon arrogantly assumed that with force the Spanish people would accept whatever ruler he chose to impose on them. He had committed three major errors of judgement. Firstly, he had erroneously concluded that the Spanish people was as pliable as its spineless government and secondly, that he could solve a complex political problem (ruling Spain) by an exercise of brute military force. Finally, he allowed himself to be seduced, like the British had been earlier, by prospects of conquering Spanish America. His decision to occupy the Iberian peninsula contributed to his eventual downfall in two crucial ways. It provoked Portugal and Spain to fight him for years and opened up a secure front for the British to grind down his armies. A less apparent consequence of his diversion into Spain was his inability to invade Sweden. Sweden was far from the centre of French power and did not hold the same prospects that Spain seemed to offer. Yet Sweden held one of the main keys to the ultimate failure or success of the Continental system which could only succeed if Napoleon managed to strangle Britain's all important commercial artery into the Baltic where her exports to Europe were smuggled in and where her vital supplies of tar, hemp, wood and other naval stores came from. Only by occupying Jutland, Funen, Zealand and Scania could Napoleon, with long range artillery, privateers and large gunboat flotillas, hope to shut the British out of the Baltic. Napoleon's attempt to make the Continental system succeed without bottling up the

\(^{83}\) Hilt. 179-186, 199-207, 213-223; Rudorff. 24-28.
Baltic was like trying to fill a bath tub without putting in the plug first. But in March 1808 that was as little apparent as was the growing Spanish disenchantment with the French occupation of Madrid.84

Should Spain become unruly it could prove very problematic to Napoleon since the Iberian peninsula was only a paving stone on his road to world domination. Napoleon hoped to use Spain to launch an invasion of north Africa that might extend as far east as Egypt which might assist his invasion plans against India (as in 1801 when he hoped to cripple the British by threatening their most valuable colony) where Russia's participation would be ensured by offering her Finland as a reward. Napoleon also wanted Austrian support and with these forces at his command Napoleon hoped to reach India through the Ottoman and Persian empires.85 On 2 February 1808 Napoleon revealed his plans to cripple Britain by invading India and Sweden simultaneously. A month later Bernadotte was ordered to invade Sweden.86 Neither the British87 nor Gustavus IV88 took these grotesquely grandiose projects seriously. The Swedish ministers, however, took them at face value, which to them would require a large British effort in the Baltic to stave off such a catastrophe.89

X. Before the Storm.
Sweden and the Russian Invasion Threat, September 1807-March 1808.

It was the effects of an Anglo-Russian conflict in the Baltic, rather than India, that was a cause of concern to both Sweden and Britain. Canning remained complacently confident that Russia would not prove hostile to Britain. In October the Russians reinforced their Baltic coastal defences while the newly appointed Francophile foreign minister, count Nicolai Rumyantsev, made unsuccessful proposals to Sweden to revive the 1801 armed league of neutrality. A month later history repeated

84 Bingham. 347. Napoleon to Alexander I, 7 Dec. 1807.; Rudorff. 29-31; Cole. 91-92;
87 Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 17 Nov. 1807.
88 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 19 Nov. 1807.
89 Anglica. 503. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 19 Nov. 1807.
itself again when the Russians placed an embargo on British ships and goods in their ports.\textsuperscript{90}

Obviously, as both Budberg and Alexander I had already warned Stedingk in August, the British alliance put Sweden in great danger from a Franco-Russian coalition, which the two Russians suggested Sweden should join without delay. Stedingk did not care for the implied threat and pointed out that with her long vulnerable coast the British could do great damage to Sweden, even do to Stockholm or Carlskrona what they had done to Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{91}

The Swedes were deeply divided how to meet this threat. Was Sweden to stand up to Russia in the hope of deterring an invasion of Finland or appease her? Gustavus IV and Stedingk believed in deterrence rather than appeasement. Gustavus IV believed Russia’s peaceful overtures for a new armed league or friendship were only made to gain time; time to prepare for an inevitable invasion. In early November Gustavus IV proposed therefore to his horrified advisers and ministers a pre-emptive Swedish strike against Cronstadt.\textsuperscript{92} Stedingk (while not supportive of such an attack) took an equally realistic view of Russian intentions. Alexander I was determined to invade Finland whatever the political, military or economic costs of such an invasion. Appeasement of Russia under these circumstances was therefore not only counter productive, but downright dangerous. Nor could one realistically hope for a revolution against Alexander I despite his unpopularity. Stedingk, therefore, hoped that the Finnish army would be mobilised in time to meet a Russian invasion that he expected to be launched before the spring.\textsuperscript{93}

Unfortunately it was not this line that prevailed in Stockholm or decided Swedish foreign policy towards Russia. It was the appeasement line that dominated Sweden’s Russian policy. Ehrenheim was the main exponent of this policy and he believed that if Finland’s army and defences were put on full

\textsuperscript{90} Moscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 16 Oct. 1807; Anglica. 503. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 17, 29 Sept. 1807; Anglica. 503. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 29 Sept., 5 Oct. 1807, Platen. 241; Carr. 57; Anglica. 503. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 2 Nov. 1807; Moscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 3 Nov. 1807; Moscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 24 Nov. 1807; FO 73/43. Bathurst to Canning, 19 Nov. 1807.

\textsuperscript{91} Platen. 242-244.

\textsuperscript{92} KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 25 Oct. 1807; FO 73/42. Pierrepont to Canning, 27 Oct., 4 Nov. 1807; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 5 Nov. 1807.

\textsuperscript{93} Platen. 245-254; Carr. 57-58. Stedingk to Gustavus IV, 17 Jan. 1808; RDMF. (FO 35/31026). Rumyantsev to Alofeus, 5 Feb. 1808; Anglica. 504. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 4 Jan. 1808; Zlobin. 93, 95, 97; SSK. 31-33.
alert it would not only brand Sweden an aggressor, but also provoke a Russian attack. If instead
Russia invaded Finland, then Alexander I would be the one to be branded an aggressor and
Napoleon's tool.\textsuperscript{94} Ehrenheim also hoped that Russia would be deterred from invading Finland by the
consequent ruination of her remaining foreign trade, which used Sweden as a conduit to Britain.\textsuperscript{95}
Ehrenheim's reasoning was as flawed as it was dangerous. In the post-Tilsit world there was no longer
any room for the kind of strict neutrality Ehrenheim advocated. If Sweden was not to find herself
invaded by Russia then she would have to join the Continental system and submit to the absolute will
of the continental coalition. Anything less would provoke a fearful retaliation. Gustavus IV had no
intention, as Ehrenheim well knew, to submit to either. The poor state of Finland's defences and its
army, which was blamed upon the king, was a direct result of the ministers', especially Ehrenheim's,
mistaken policies. Sweden's domestic political situation would not be improved by military setbacks.
As for Russia victories in Finland would appease the emperor's critics. Finally, had Alexander
I's policies been motivated by economic interest, then Russia would hardly have become a member of
the Continental system. What made appeasement more puzzling was that the Swedes were aware of
the large scale build-up of Russian strength at Viborg.\textsuperscript{96} By February it was also obvious that
Ehrenheim's policy had failed since Swedish appeasement encouraged Russia to be more aggressive
(not less),\textsuperscript{97} and Gustavus IV, who mistakenly had followed Ehrenheim's advice, was reduced to
asking his Alexander I if his previous loyalty as an ally would be rewarded with a Russian invasion of
Finland.\textsuperscript{98}

Indeed what was the Russian motivation for making an unprovoked attack on a much weaker
neighbour and former ally? Alexander I could, and did, excuse his actions by blaming it on
Napoleon's insistence that Sweden be defeated. This coincided with Alexander I's own wish to avenge
himself indirectly upon Britain by attacking its last European ally. He also hoped that an easy victory

\textsuperscript{94} KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 27 Sept. 1807.
\textsuperscript{95} Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 27 Nov. 1807.
\textsuperscript{96} Anglica. 503. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 7, 14 Dec. 1807; Anglica. 504. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 28
Jan. 1808; ESKB. VI. ff. 132-133. Bergstedt to Engeström, 12 Feb. 1808; Palmer. Alexander I. 140-
141.
\textsuperscript{97} Anglica. 504. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 8 Jan. 1808; Muscovita. 506. Wetterstedt to Stedingk, 11
Jan. 1808; KPA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 5 Feb. 1808; Muscovita. 506. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 6,
12 Jan. 1808.
\textsuperscript{98} Muscovita. 506. Gustavus IV to Stedingk, 6 Jan. 1808.
over Sweden would prove popular, restore some of his army's morale and reconcile his critics by adding Finland to the Russian empire. (Most Russians found Finland a meagre reward of the Tilsit pact.) At least annexing Finland would remove once and for all the Swedish threat against St. Petersburg. 99

But in Ehrenheim's view Alexander I still seemed to hope that by building up his invasion army at Viborg Sweden would abandon the British alliance. 100 Even when it became apparent that Sweden would not yield to Russia's demands, Alexander I wanted to avoid a purely military solution (unlike Napoleon) to his political problem (subjugating Sweden and conquering Finland without too much bloodshed). Swedish oppositionists, in Russian exile, gave sound advice. Göran Sprengporten, the longest serving of Russia's Swedish 'advisers', wanted Finland to be given virtual independence under Russia's protection, while Carl Klick urged outright annexation. Both urged Alexander I to lower taxes, preserve Finland's structure, woo the nobility to his side and placate the peasantry by assuring them that serfdom (which they dreaded) would not be imposed on the conquered. This advice was sensible and subtle, but undermined Russia's military plan. By only amassing 24,000 troops against Finland the invasion, set for 21 February, would be too weak to defeat the Swedes outright. 101

Thus poor advice to Gustavus IV was matched by similar mistakes on the Russian side. If the Russian army was in poor shape after its defeat at Friedland and the Russian nation as a whole hostile towards a war against Sweden, then its enemy to be was in even more parlous shape. Sweden had considerable material resources and far from negligible military muscle. The army could muster 70-100,000 troops while Sveaborg and the Finnish field army gave good protection against a Russian invasion. But the Kymmené river, the Savolax lake system and even Sveaborg were affected by winter conditions. The weather, however, was the least of Sweden's worries. What really reduced Sweden's military potential was the lack of leadership in the Swedish government, and the political disunity and discord that prevailed among her nobility and upper classes. That was Sweden's greatest weakness. 102

99 FO 73/43. Bathurst to Canning, 7 Dec. 1807.; Palmer. Alexander I. 140, Josselson. 46; Zlobin. 89-91; Bååth. 60.
100 Anglica. 503. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg. 7, 14 Dec. 1807.
101 Bååth. 59-63; SSK- 14.
October Armfelt exclaimed that 'Discontent and despair have reached new heights while Sweden is approaching a [foreign] crisis that will decide the final fate of Sweden: Death or continued Life'.

Few Swedes believed their army, after its poor showing during the latter stages of the Pomeranian campaign, would be able to stand up to the Russians. Gustavus IV believed Sweden's resources for war were adequate, but that the Swedes lacked the will to fight for their survival.

Of greater interest than the state of Sweden was the state of Finland itself. One British traveller, Robert Ker-Porter, who left St. Petersburg found all roads towards the Finnish frontier choked with Russian troops, but when he crossed the Kymmene there was no military activity whatsoever to be seen anywhere in Finland. He concluded that it had to be a consequence of deliberate Swedish policy. 'I was totally at a loss how to account for so unguarded a security. Whatever the occult reason for the present tranquility all is at perfect rest in Swedish Finland. Liberty and comfort smiles everywhere. Peace sits in every countenance, and decorates the landscape, as if it had been her chosen to reign for many a year.' Having seen what the Russians were up to Porter pressed on towards Stockholm. One Swede did not remain complacent about the looming Russian threat: Stedingk. On 28 January he sent the latest intelligence reports about the Russian invasion plans to Sveaborg with the old courier Nils Östbom. The question was if there would be any commanding officer at Sveaborg who would be able to act upon Stedingk's warnings. The Finnish army's commander, general Mauritz Klingspor, was absent on his estates in Sweden when Finland faced its gravest crisis ever. To the disgruntled Finnish nobility the appointment of this courtier as their Generalissimo only heightened their discontent of what they saw as deliberate neglect of Finland. It did not help that they had remained since the days of Anjala the largest hotbed of opposition to the Gustavian regime.

103 Bonsdorff. SLSF. 228.
104 ESKB. VI. ff. 68-69. Liljecrantz to Engeström, 1 Sept. 1807.
105 FO 73/43. Bathurst to Canning, 25 Nov. 1807.
106 Trolle. 78-80. 10 Oct. 1807.
107 Porter. 80-82.
108 Porter. 82.
109 Porter. 86-119.
110 Platen. 254-258.
111 Willers. 375.
Both they and the Finns in general would have preferred to have had Armfelt (who declined the post), a fighting Finn, than the universally reviled Klingspor, as commander of the Finnish army.\footnote{112}

Östborn arrived at Sveaborg on 1 February with Stedingk's warning. The acting commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, general Nathaniel Klercker, issued an order for general mobilisation on 7 February. Klercker had at his disposal 11,000 troops along the Kymmene, 6,500 inside Sveaborg, 400 in Svartholm and 4,000 in Savolax, or in other words almost equal to the numbers the Russians had. Klercker wanted therefore to make a stand along the Kymmene but his defeatist colleagues disapproved of such a bold idea.\footnote{113} In Åbo, Finland's capital, the population was convinced that Sveaborg\footnote{114} and the Finnish army would be able to halt the enemy's advance.\footnote{115} In fact Sveaborg, the supposed 'Gibraltar of the North' was far from impregnable.\footnote{116} In Stockholm the government shared the Finnish public's over confident hopes and saw the ominous silence along the frozen Finnish frontier as a re-assuring sign of continued calm.\footnote{117}

The sign the Finns were waiting for was that Gustavus IV was prepared to return to Stockholm\footnote{118} in order to rally the nation against the Russians. His ministers failed to fill the gap in his absence and he did not seem to be in any hurry to leave his beloved Scania. When he did return he not only deliberately snubbed a delegation awaiting his arrival at the city gates (he detested the capital) but he failed to provide desperately needed leadership. When he returned to Stockholm in late December, Gustavus IV deliberately avoided meeting the assembled inhabitants and the city's leaders who had gathered to met him.\footnote{119} Bathurst, the British chargé d'affaires, was appalled that Gustavus IV failed to rally his people, many of whom were generally loyal to the king, to his side. 'The people of Stockholm were never amongst the most zealous advocates for His Majesty's interests, but this late occurrence has left an impression which will not be easily effaced, and converted an occasion that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[112] ALS. Albom to Alstedt, 18 Feb. 1808; Bonsdorff. SLSF. 229.
\item[113] SSK. 7-13, 33; Platen. 256-257.
\item[114] ALS. Albom to Alstedt, 4, 18 Feb. 1808.
\item[115] FO 73/46. Thornton to Canning, 20, 23 Feb. 1808.
\item[116] Nils Cleve. Dagbok hällen under en resa från Borgå till Stockholm 1806 av Joachim Cleve. SLSF. Vol. 54. 1979. 91. 6 July 1806.
\item[117] HBATL. 210-211. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 1, 19 Feb. 1808.
\item[118] Willers. 368, 371, 375; Beskow. 21; HECD. VIII. 127.
\end{footnotes}
seemed favourable for recovering their attachment into a source of fresh discontent'.

By residing in the deepest isolation and inactivity at Gripsholm outside Stockholm, Gustavus IV continued to snub the capital and failed to provide wartime leadership.

His lethargy and inactivity made some ministers (forgetting to mention or blame their own) claim that the king was incapable of ruling the country. Despite the looming danger in the east the government and Gustavus IV seemed oblivious to its existence. False rumours circulated that Gustavus IV was indifferent to Finland's fate. Nothing could have been further from the truth and it was his ministers who were mainly to blame for the state of Finland's defences. By early January 1808 Gustavus IV finally took issue with his ministers' shortcomings and denounced Essen and Wrede as traitors who should have been court-martialled for their military failures in Pomerania. (Had he known about their part in the officers' plots against him, this would have doubly justified court-martiaalling the generals.) Of course there were other generals who were over-ripe for replacement and by not removing them Gustavus IV ensured Sweden's eventual defeat and his own demise. (Klingspor should have been replaced by Armfelt, and admiral Cronstedt, the defeatist commandant of Sveaborg, by an army general.) The king should have dealt similarly with weak spirits in the government, mobilised the armed forces, prepared for war and rallied the nation to his side. By not doing so, Gustavus IV had undermined both Sweden and his own position, as he failed to provide leadership to a disunited nation that faced the worst threat to its existence for over a century.

Swedish public opinion (i.e. the rich, politically conscious and the nobility) blamed this acute threat upon Gustavus IV's alliance with Britain. Both were equally unpopular with those Swedes who, like Ehrenheim, preferred neutrality or an alliance with Napoleon, such as Lagerbjelke. Both groups of opinion would probably have agreed with the latter's claim on 6 November that 'Our only dangerous

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121 Trolle. 81. 19 Nov. 1807.
122 ESKB. VI. Anonymous to Engeström, 15 Dec. 1807.
123 Trolle. 82. 12 Dec. 1807.
124 Trolle. 85-87. 1, 14 Jan. 1808.
125 Willers. 368, 371, 375; Beskow. 21; HECD. VIII. 127.
neighbour is now allied to our present enemy; Our only so-called Ally is through the latest events [i.e.
Copenhagen] divided from us in political interests.126 The departure of British officers at
Gothenburg was greeted with relief and claims that at last Sweden was returning to neutrality.127 In
mid-September a British visitor to Stockholm, Henry Crabb Robinson (on his way home having
escaped from the continent) became quickly aware how equally unpopular Gustavus IV and the
British were. When he tried to defend the alliance or praise the king's heroic policies against
Napoleon his remarks were met with stony silence or outright hostility, especially when it became
apparent that he was English. 'This anti-English feeling was so general in Sweden at this time that I
was advised to travel as a German through the country', noted Robinson.128 Not all Swedes saw
Britain as an encumbrance to their conspiracies against Gustavus IV (maybe their country's ally would
support their plans) and on 15 January Bathurst (who was quite sympathetic to such plans) informed
Canning privately that the 'neutralist party' in Sweden had approached him. This 'party' or parties
wanted to call a Riksdag, possibly dethrone the king and end the British alliance to avoid a Russian
invasion.129 Canning made no comment on this approach, nor would he support any anti-royalist
(and therefore anti-alliance) conspiracies in the future.

As long as these were the sentiments of private individuals neither Gustavus IV nor the British had
much to fear. But Anglophobia and criticism of the king's policies permeated all the Swedish
ministers and the government. These emotional prejudices were a private reflection of the Swedish
government's conscious policy of trying to establish Sweden's neutrality in the Anglo-Russian war.
The first part of this precarious political platform was to appease Russia even at the expense of
Finland's security and in order to appease Russia yet further distance Sweden as much as possible
from Britain. Hence the negative response to all of Canning's various offers of aid, colonies, support
and subsidies. This policy would only have made sense had the Swedish government been in charge
of the country's foreign policy and Gustavus IV had been deprived of all power and influence. Even
then the policy was extremely risky since it could have left Sweden (as she was to be in 1809 when

126 ESKB. VI. ff. 51-52. Lagerbjelke to Engeström, 6 Nov. 1807.
127 ESKB. VI. ff. 118-119. Åkerholm to Engeström, 14 Dec. 1807.
128 Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson. Edited by T. Sadler.
Gustavus IV was removed from power and that very same ministry was in charge) isolated, deprived of British aid and at the mercy of her enemies. With Gustavus IV in sole charge of foreign policy and as determined as ever to continue the British alliance (which could only lead to a Russian invasion), the ministers' neutrality schemes could only lead to disaster. Unfortunately, by isolating himself at Gripsholm, refusing to lead the country or impose his contrary views upon his ministers, Gustavus IV allowed a vacuum to appear that his ministers could fill. It was they, not he, who decided what little policy there was in Sweden, and Ehrenheim, the chief architect of the 'return to strict neutrality' policy outlined it as pulling 'ourselves from a falling England without it falling on Sweden first; and then managing to avoid being embroiled in a conflict with her on the side of Russia and France'.

Thus Sweden had to avoid renewing the British alliance (by signing a new subsidy treaty) at all cost since it would only lead to 'storms on all sides' and Ehrenheim praised Toll for preventing the British army from being stationed in Scania. But perhaps Sweden would be 'spared' a new alliance with Britain since he believed that the Portland government was about to fall and be replaced by the isolationist Whigs. Wetterstedt, unfortunately, simply parroted Ehrenheim's mistaken views and believed Sweden had to make peace with Napoleon on French terms. Otherwise the future would 'see us implicated in a series of mishaps and attacked simultaneously on two fronts. We will be separated so far from England, through our precarious situation and the usual English inactivity in aid of Her allies, that we will only hear the distant thud of their fall while we lament our own'.

This kind of defeatism and negative criticism of Sweden's one single support did not bode well for the survival of the Anglo-Swedish alliance or the vigorous defence of Sweden. In fact by persisting too long in their neutral daydreaming the ministers had brought Sweden into a dangerous watershed between war and peace where Sweden was left without British support but unable to rebuild relations with her hostile neighbours and French enemy. The ministers did not have the courage to confront Gustavus IV directly with their political objections to the Anglo-Swedish alliance since they knew he

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130 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 16 Nov. 1807.
131 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 13 Oct. 1807.
133 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 30 Oct. 1807.
135 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 19 Nov. 1807.
would reject any notion of neutrality towards Napoleon. Since they knew how adamantly opposed
Gustavus IV was to this and the fact that he had total, undisputed final powers to decide foreign policy
it beggars belief that they even persisted in such futile speculations as neutrality. Neutrality was never
a realistic option for Sweden, even less so by late 1807, and it was only far too late that the ministers
woke up to reality and accepted that their neutrality schemes not only had no hope of life but had also
undermined Sweden's strategic and military security. On 15 November an agitated Wetterstedt, who
had finally sobered up to reality, told Bathurst that Sweden expected her ally to furnish all possible
aid. Bathurst assured him that Britain was not in the habit of running out on allies in need without
specifying what Britain would furnish to Sweden.136 Wetterstedt wanted more specific assurances137
such as some £2,000,000 in subsidies, 6 ships of the line and troops by the spring.138

The Swedish ministers had changed their diplomatic tune completely. Instead of accusing Canning of
deliberately embroiling Sweden in Britain's (not their shared) conflict with the continental powers
with his offers of aid, they were now accusing him of being tardy in assisting Sweden. Canning could
therefore be excused for being sceptical about the Swedish change of heart139, especially since
Ehrenheim, as late as 25 December, persisted in believing a British alliance would expose Sweden to
'unnecessary dangers'.140 Of course the opposite was true since without a British alliance Sweden
would face her enemies bereft of all outside support and Ehrenheim had yet again undermined British
confidence in Swedish reliability. The Swedish ministers support of the alliance was only made as a
last resort, a parallel strategy to their futile neutrality hopes and was wholly opportunistic and
insincere. Canning was not impressed with Ehrenheim's views. But he knew that Sweden
desperately needed support and that Gustavus IV was completely committed to their 'common cause'.
He offered £1,000,000 in subsidies, a strong fleet to protect the Swedish coasts and troops when they
became available.141

136 FO 73/43. Bathurst to Canning, 15, 19, 25 Nov.1807.
137 Anglica. 503. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 19 Nov.1807.
138 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 3 Dec.1807.
139 Carr. 58.
Gustavus IV’s pleasure at Canning’s generous offer was not shared by Wetterstedt since it did not meet his earlier demands.\(^{142}\) The new British envoy, Edward Thornton, had therefore a far from easy task to overcome ministerial disapproval of the alliance and defeatism. His first and most delicate task was to find out if Gustavus IV shared these views and if so to support the establishment of harmonious relations between Russia and Sweden but without arousing Gustavus IV’s fears that Britain meant to abandon her. If Gustavus IV did not then Thornton was to sign a subsidy treaty, a commercial treaty and assure the king that he had the full support of his ally.\(^{143}\) Thornton arrived in Stockholm on 22 January and it was evident from his initial talks with Gustavus IV that he intended with all force to continue the common cause with Britain. By 26 January Thornton put Canning’s assurances of support for Sweden to the test by suggesting that the British subsidies be increased to £1,200,000 to be paid even before the outbreak of hostilities, since Thornton judged Sweden’s situation to be very precarious and this cash injection would improve Swedish chances of resisting a Russian invasion.\(^{144}\) Thornton’s zeal for the ‘common cause’, the increase in the subsidies and his wish to conclude the subsidy talks met with the full approval on the Swedish side.\(^{145}\) Thornton seems to have been equally impressed with Ehrenheim but did not share his complacent hope, as late as 26 January, that Russia would not invade Finland after all.\(^{146}\) The subsidy talks progressed speedily under the pressure of what seemed like an ever increasing threat of war and Swedish counterproposals were of form rather than substance.\(^{147}\) Thornton’s optimistic reports failed to mention that, although he may have built up a good rapport with the Swedish government, he had not made a good impression upon his surroundings. One very hostile Swedish observer claimed that Thornton had the look of a criminal,\(^{148}\) while an equally scathing British observer claimed that Thornton’s ‘looks and manners were not calculated to conciliate the hostile or confirm the friendly’.\(^{149}\) Gustavus IV’s gloom was therefore not lifted by Thornton’s presence and the king treated the British envoy like a physician who

\(^{142}\) KPA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 1 Jan. 1808.

\(^{143}\) FO 73/45. Canning to Thornton, 15 Jan. 1808.

\(^{144}\) FO 73/46. Thornton to Canning, 22, 25, 26 Jan., 2 Feb. 1808; Anglica. 504. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 8, 20 Jan. 1808.

\(^{145}\) Anglica. 504. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 28 Jan. 1808.

\(^{146}\) Harewood. 43. Thornton to Canning, 26 Jan. 1808.

\(^{147}\) FO 73/46. Thornton to Canning, 4, 9 Feb. 1808.

\(^{148}\) Trolle. 89–90. 8 Feb. 1808.

\(^{149}\) Brown. 283.
had come to tell him that a good friend was dying.\textsuperscript{150} Thornton and Gustavus IV may therefore have failed to build up a good relationship, a factor which was to have importance for the future but there was no doubting Thornton's abilities as a trusted and capable diplomat.\textsuperscript{151}

Nor was there any doubt about his support for Sweden since in February Thornton urged both Canning and the Admiralty to send a strong squadron as early as possible into the Baltic to protect Sweden's long and exposed coastline.\textsuperscript{152} At the same time Thornton offered the Swedes 35,000 muskets and large supplies of gunpowder.\textsuperscript{153} Thornton had also negotiated a new subsidy agreement with Sweden whereby Britain provided £1,200,000 in subsidies, a strong naval squadron and, at some future, unspecified date, troops as well. In return Sweden pledged to fight their common foes with all their strength and both sides undertook not to pursue separate peace negotiations with those same foes. So at the eleventh hour the 'common cause' had at last been restored but it was not a minute too early since on 3 March came unconfirmed reports that the Russians had invaded Finland and it seemed that the storm had broken at last.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{150} Brown. 284. \\
\textsuperscript{151} Hinde. 379. \\
\textsuperscript{152} FO 933/34. Thornton to Barrow, 9 Feb.1808; Harewood. 43. Thornton to Canning, 23 Feb.1808. \\
\textsuperscript{153} Harewood. 43. Thornton to Canning, 26 Feb.1808. \\
\textsuperscript{154} FO 73/46. Thornton to Canning, 11, 16, 19, 20, 23, 26 Feb., 1, 3 Mar.1808.
Chapter Seven.

Peninsular Priorities.

The Anti-Climax of the Common Cause, the Futile Expedition, the Peninsular Campaign and the Finnish Front, February -September 1808.

I. The Finnish Front

The Invasion and Occupation of Southern Finland, February-May 1808

The Swedes had lived with their country being at war for well over two years by the time of the Russian invasion. But that war was being fought a long way off on the continent and had failed to affect daily life too much (Pomerania excepted). All that was about to change with frightening force as the Russian army was about to march into Finland. The Russian invasion army, under general Buxhöwden, numbered 24,000 troops and was divided into 5 divisions. Two of the Russian division commanders, general Barclay de Tolly and prince Bagration, were to achieve great fame some years later. On 21 February the Russians crossed the bridges over the frozen Kymmene river with orders to occupy southern Finland as quickly as possible.¹

Those orders reflected the Russians's low opinion of their enemy since they were more concerned with occupying territory than defeating the Swedish army which they did not expect would resist their advance with much force. The Russian suspicion was quite accurate since Klingspor had no intention to resist their advance at all which enabled them to occupy the southern and most heavily populated part of Finland without much opposition. This boosted Russian self confidence and undermined Swedish morale. General Löwenhjelm, Klingspor's most energetic and capable officer, urged him to counter attack at the first opportunity or at least harass the long and exposed Russian invasion columns.²

¹ Hornborg. 6, 13-14, 18, 20-26, 35-36, 47-50; KWAH. 120-122; SSK. 16; BFK. 18-24.
² Hornborg. 51-52, 54-58, 213; SSK. 16-23, 62-67; KB. D 1054. Mörner to Duke Charles, 10 Mar. 1808; SSKB. XV. f.58, 62 Adlermark to Silverhjelm, 8 Apr. 3 May. 1808; ESKB.-VI. ff.132-
Given the orders of the Russian army their main objectives were to occupy Finland's main cities as quickly as possible. On 26 February the Russians marched into Helsingfors which exposed Sveaborg to an attack and then Bagration, who spearheaded the invasion force, advanced on Åbo where the retreating Swedes set fire to all the military stores. As the troops departed the population, in anger at the poor performance of the army and the supposed treason of the nobility (and officer corps), rioted.

It was therefore with some relief that the city's governor received Bagration's arrival in the city on 22 March. Åbo and Åland were occupied without bloodshed which convinced the Russians that the conquest of Finland was almost over and Alexander I to issue a manifesto which demanded of his new subjects that they swear an oath of loyalty to him.  

It was not only in Finland where the Russians encountered feeble resistance. The Russians feared that the British might establish a naval base on Gotland from where they could threaten St. Petersburg, Cronstadt and the Russian Baltic coast. Admiral Nicolai Bodisco was ordered to set sail on 19 April with 7 transport ships and 1,800 troops from the port of Libau. General Erik af Klint, Gotland's military governor, wanted to mobilise the peasant militia to resist the invaders but his plans were aborted after the island's nobility and bureaucrats vetoed the project. Visby, Gotland's capital city, therefore capitulated on 24 April and yet another part of Sweden had been conquered by her hereditary enemy without any resistance.  

Unfortunately the defeatism so evident in those who governed Gotland and Finland was amply matched by their colleagues in Sweden proper. By 2-3 March it was known, in Stockholm, that the Russians had invaded Finland. Yet despite the rapid Russian advance the Swedish public was confident all was not lost as long as Sveaborg held out. Those few officials who supported Gustavus IV believed Sweden would share Prussia's fate and lose the war unless the nation rallied around the

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4 SKÅ. IV. 117-123; BFK. 89-91; Ga. 185-187.; Ga. Fähreus. 48; Hornborg. 108.; SSKB. XV. f.64. Adlermark to Silverhjelm, 6 May 1808.

king. (A prediction that unfortunately came true). The hope for unity was never realised and no little part was due to the king's failure even after the war had broken out to provide direction and leadership to the war effort. Gustavus IV, unlike his theatrical and oratorical father, could not rally the nation around him by making rousing speeches to the Diet had he called one. He was not fond of public speaking and feared (not without reason) that a wartime Diet could become an embarrassing forum for the nobility to oppose the war. Others who had opposed an unwinnable war all along believed their predictions of disaster would come true. Such defeatism seemed to be confined to the upper classes and Stockholm while the peasantry which constituted nine tenths of the populations remained patriotic. Provincial Sweden complained, however, about the fall of Gotland and Klingspor's retreat which damned the performance of both the Swedish navy and army. It also dreaded the prospects of enemy invasions from the west and east, the 'crippling' war taxes that the government had imposed without in return showing any clear leadership or ability to mobilise the country's defences exemplified by the inadequacy of the home guard units.

Morale in Sweden itself was therefore no better than in Finland but rumours that duke Charles was about to lead a revolution against his nephew were false. To those that knew the duke it seemed preposterous that this decrepit and frivolous man could be thought of as capable of leading such an enterprise. It cannot be proved if such conspiracies existed but what was an undeniable fact by early 1808 was that both Gustavus IV and other Swedes pinned their hopes for Sweden's salvation far too much upon British aid. Ker-Porter hoped that the arrival of British troops would silence Swedish claims that the British did not support Sweden enough. This was part of a widespread Anglophobia and distrust of an ally that many Swedes dismissed as a nation of shopkeepers.

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7 HBATL. 211-212. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 4, 8 Mar. 1808.
8 ESKB VI. f. 230 Lagerbjelke to Engeström, 22 Mar. 1808.
10 SSKB. VI. ff. 47, 53-58, 62-64. Adlermark to Engeström, 11, 18, 29 Mar., 1, 5, 8, 12 Apr., 3, 5, 6 May 1808.
14 Porter 183, 213. March-April 1808.
II. Mistrust and Misunderstandings.
Gustavus IV’s War Plans, Armfelt’s Invasion of Norway, the Wrangel-Wingård Missions to London, and General Moore’s Plans, February-May 1808.

For Sweden the paramount question that needed to be answered, even before British military aid arrived, was how the country was to meet the challenge of the invasions that she faced. The secret War Council set up in January 1808 had endorsed Klingspor’s plans to retreat to Ostrobothnia, while the Swedes remained on the defensive in the south and west.16 This general plan was as cautious and unenterprising as the men who proposed it and it was no surprise that Gustavus IV rejected it in favour of a bolder approach. Gustavus IV believed that Sweden, surrounded on three sides by enemies, had to defeat the weakest, Norway, first by taking the offensive on her western frontier, secure in the knowledge that Klingspor and Cronstedt’s respective forces were sufficiently strong to keep the Russians occupied. On 14 March Gustavus IV ordered that the Reserve and Western armies should be merged under the command of general Armfelt who was to invade and conquer Norway.17 Thornton, who shared Gustavus IV’s view that the best defence was to attack urged Canning in late February to send both arms and troops to aid Gustavus IV’s plan. On 15 March Ehrenheim, having only a few months earlier rejected British assistance to take Zealand, had changed his tune, urged Thornton to prevail on Canning to send troops as quickly as possible to take the island. (Had he accepted the troops in late 1807 then the enemy threat he feared so much would have been neutralised). Thornton chose not to remind Ehrenheim of his previous opposition to British troops being stationed in Scania which was now under threat. Instead he asked the Royal Navy to send additional warships to block the Sound against the Danes.18

Wetterstedt tried frantically to get Adlerberg to put maximum pressure on the British to aid her hard-pressed ally with all the means at her disposal.19 On 17 March, three days after Denmark declared war on Sweden, Wetterstedt abandoned all constraint by writing to Adlerberg that ‘Now is the time to

16 TSLUB.D. Defensionsplanen 30 Jan. 1808; TSLUB.C. Toll to Gustavus IV, 31 Jan 1808; Tingsten. 24-37.
18 Harewood. 43. Thornton to Canning, 15 Mar.1808; FO 73/47. Thornton to Canning 21, 26 Apr. 1808.
19 Anglica 504. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 17 Mar. 1808.
push England without fail since Sweden has never been in a more perilous position than the present
[and] England should [therefore] send massive aid quickly, quickly, both troops and ships, and more
money, of course. This aid is imperative if Sweden is to survive at all. Wetterstedt's hysterical tone
was in sharp contrast to his cynical cold shoudering of Britain in late 1807 and his present panic was
in no little way caused by his earlier mistake. Wetterstedt's demands were not trifling since he wanted
the subsidies raised from £1,200,000 to £2,800,000 while Gustavus IV wanted 10,000 British troops
to assist his plans to invade Norway. Last but not least the Swedes also wanted a powerful British
fleet to protect their coastline against invasion and conduct, in conjunction with the Swedish fleet,
operations against the Russian navy and its Baltic installations.  

Britain's immediate response, as agreed earlier, was to send 25-30,000 muskets, powder, shot and
thousands of swords to the Swedes by mid-April. Canning continued, however, to be cautious about
furnishing Sweden with military aid on the scale that Gustavus IV wanted or giving premature
promises which could raise false Swedish expectations that then turned to disappointment and
complaints about British indifference to her ally. On 15 March Canning instructed Thornton to be
very circumspect about promises of any military aid since it would take a long time to work out the
usual command problems when dealing with Gustavus IV. Canning also rejected Sweden's unrealistic
subsidy demands which would never be accepted by either the British Parliament or public. Nor would
they be keen to denude Britain's own defences by sending a large army to conquer either Norway or
Zealand.

As in Pomerania the year before Gustavus IV was too impatient to wait for British support which
could have ensured the Swedish offensive succeeded and he cajoled Armfelt in to invading Norway as
soon as possible. Gustavus IV's haste ensured that Armfelt attacked Norway with only 6,000 troops
without the benefit of the support of his entire army or adequate artillery. The element of surprise,

20 Anglica 504. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 17 Mar 1808.
21 Anglica 504. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 17, 24 Mar., 11, 16, 19 Apr. 1808; ibid. Wetterstedt to
Adlerberg, 3 May 1808; ibid. Lagerheim to Adlerberg, 14 Apr. 1808.
22 GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 17, 21 Mar. 1808.; ESKB. VII. ff. 251-252. Lagerbjelke to Engeström,
12 Apr. 1808.
23 FO 73/46. Canning to Thornton, 14, 15 Mar.1808; ibid. Thornton to Canning, 15, 17, 21
Mar. 1809; Harewood. 43. Canning to Thornton, 1 Apr.1809.
however, compensated for the inadequate preparations as Armfelt defeated the startled Norwegians at Lier on 17 April, two days after his invasion, and the general was confident that he would capture Christiania in a matter of days. In Christiania the civilian population shared Armfelt's belief and expected the Swedish invaders to arrive at any moment. The Swedes were heartened by the victories in the west, the sight of glum Norwegian prisoners and the expected fall of Christiania. Perhaps losses in the east could be compensated by gains in the west but most Swedes believed the Norwegian offensive was a dangerous diversion from the eastern front. Then in late April the overconfident Armfelt suffered two serious reverses, losing 600 prisoners to the Norwegians. Armfelt, furious at this unexpected setback, blamed his reverse on the withdrawal of Bergenstråhle's northern detachment to Umeå and on the British for failing to support his offensive. Premature Swedish jubilation at their initial Norwegian successes turned to bitter disappointment as Armfelt's offensive ground to a halt.

Meanwhile, the Anglo-Swedish military talks in London had not been able to resolve what role, if any, the British were to play in the operations in Norway. Captain Johan af Wingård and Armfelt's ADC, Colonel Henning Wrangel, arrived in London on 4 and 26 March respectively. Wingård was to supervise the delivery of British arms while Wrangel had come to discuss Anglo-Swedish operations in Norway. Wrangel, as hot-headed as Armfelt, had meetings at the War Office in late March and early April, with generals Stewart and von Decken, where he in his optimistic and outspoken way, similar to his superior, tried to persuade the British to land in Norway as early as possible to support Armfelt's offensive. An Anglo-Swedish invasion of Norway, simultaneously, from the east and the south or west would ensure the country's early reduction assured Wrangel. The British, with good reason, were not convinced by Wrangel's arguments which prompted Wingård to intervene in the

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stalled military talks and this self-confident young officer saw Castlereagh himself on 14 April to
convince the British to aid Sweden militarily. He claimed that Norway could (like Finland) fall
through a combination of an Anglo-Swedish invasion and rising Norwegian discontent. Once
Norway had been reduced, Wingård proposed turning the victorious Anglo-Swedish army against the
Russians by retaking Finland. Castlereagh was not convinced by Wingård's enthusiastic and
oversimplified arguments and he showed the same marked reluctance as his colleagues to use British
troops on offensive operations against Norway. Five days later Wingård and Wrangel saw Decken
again. This time they discussed plans for an occupation of Zealand. Again the British preferred to
blockade the island and use Marstrand as a base for such limited defensive operations. Neither
Swedish officers relished the prospect of the British controlling the entry to their country's main port
and second city. Nor were they pleased about the passivity of the British plans.30 Most Swedes had
hoped that the British would intervene actively in the Russo-Swedish war and help Sweden retake
Finland.31 To them it was only natural that the British should aid their last ally and the best way was
to send an army to fight against the Russians in Finland. Such plans were not part of Canning's
cautious northern policy. The Anglo-Swedish talks, therefore, remained inconclusive and
unsatisfactory from a Swedish standpoint. On 14 April Canning told Adlerberg, the Swedish envoy in
London, that if a British expeditionary force was sent to Sweden it would have to be limited to coastal
operations, remain under British command and be free to be recalled at a moment's notice.32

It was an almost incredible oversight, by both sides, that the designated commander-to-be of the
Swedish expedition, general Sir John Moore, never had any talks with either Wingård or Wrangel. If
he had, then some of the later misunderstandings might have been avoided. Despite not having
any contacts with the visiting Swedish officers Moore went ahead with his own plans. In late March
and early April, Moore had predicted that an unsupported Swedish invasion of Norway would fail. He
believed, however, that if he had 25,000 men operating in combination with the Swedes then the
country would fall. An alternative plan of more limited scope was to seize Christiansand, fortify it
and garrison it with 10,000 troops to convert it into a 'Northern Gibraltar'. Thus the British would

30 Anglica. 497. Wingård's reports, 15, 19 Apr. 1808; MP. V. Baltic Plan of Operation. (Undated);
32 Anglica. 497. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV, 15 April 1808.
have a secure base near the entry to the Baltic whatever happened to Sweden or Norway. On 17 April Moore, now officially made commander of the 'Northern' expedition had his orders which were, firstly, to secure Britain's vital communications with the continent and the Baltic. Secondly, to provide a secure base for his troops and the British navy to use. Finally, by taking up a defensive position along the coast to release Swedish troops vitally needed for duties in Finland. Moore had anticipated Castlereagh's wishes by drawing up plans to convert Marstrand into a British base. Moore finally received his instructions concerning Norway three days later and Castlereagh did not want to risk the British army by invading Norway. Castlereagh was even more cautious about Zealand. Yet if Gustavus IV could spare the troops from other fronts without jeopardising the Swedish war effort, then the island's occupation could be desirable. It is difficult to believe that Gustavus IV would have accepted a British army's presence in Sweden which was to remain out of his control and limited to a strictly defensive role.

III. The Fall of Finland's 'Gibraltar'
The Cronstedt Conspiracy and Sveaborg's Capitulation, February-May 1808.

Gustavus IV's plans rested upon the dangerous assumption that Finland's defences were sufficiently strong to withstand the Russians without reinforcements from Stockholm leaving the bulk of the army free to fight on other fronts. Unfortunately this assumption was proven false when, on 17 March, the fort of Svartholm capitulated to the Russian without a regular siege. Svartholm's capitulation raised Russian hopes that Sveaborg, the lynchpin of Finland's fixed defences, would fall with similar ease. Both the Russians and Swedes realised that southern Finland would never be truly conquered unless Sveaborg fell into Russian hands. But the fort would be difficult to subdue since it had a garrison of 6,500 troops, 1,200 guns and six well fortified forts to protect it.
The Russians did not however intend to storm Sveaborg since it was considered one of the strongest forts in Europe. They hoped instead to undermine the garrisons morale by using their Swedish advisers, such as Klick and Hagelström, to persuade disgruntled officers inside the fort to capitulate. Hagelström and Klick opened correspondence with colonel Jägerhorn, who despite his known anti-Gustavian political opinions, had been allowed to become the deputy commander of Sweden's most sensitive military installation. Jägerhorn, exploiting admiral Carl-Olof Cronstedt's bitterness against Gustavus IV for his demotion to command the fortress in 1802, persuaded Cronstedt to hand over the fort with its troops, supplies and installations intact to the enemy's control on 5 May.39

This treacherous capitulation totally undermined the Swedish ability to counterattack and resist the Russians. As long as Sveaborg had remained in Swedish hands the Russians would continue to be vulnerable to a counteroffensive from the north while the garrison attacked the Russian positions in and around Helsingfors. Then, as if this was not bad enough, Cronstedt had allowed 110 gunboats to fall into Russian hands which strengthened their ability to threaten the Swedish east coast. The Swedish public was stunned by the news from Sveaborg and for once they wholly agreed with Gustavus IV's denunciation of Cronstedt and his fellow officers as traitors. British confidence in Sweden was completely undermined by the news from Sveaborg which in British terms would have been equivalent to Gibraltar capitulating without a fight.40

Unfortunately news of Sveaborg's capitulation coincided with the arrival of Moore's quartermaster general colonel Murray's in Stockholm on 13 May. Castlereagh wanted Murray to find out first hand what he could about conditions inside Sweden and its army. The Sveaborg affair could not have improved Castlereagh's misgivings about any Anglo-Swedish offensive plans.41 Murray did not form


40 SSK. 59-60; Odelberg. 410-411; FO 73/47. Thornton to Canning, 5, 6 May 1808; ESKB VI ff. 185-6. Brinkman to Engeström, 13 May 1808; ibid. ff. 255-256. Lagerheim to Engeström, 17 May 1808.; GP Mosheim to Gordon, 13 May 1808.; FO 73/45. Canning to Thornton, 20 May 1808.

a very favourable opinion about the Swedish military capability due to Sveaborg, Klingspor's retreat and the widespread defeatism among the upper echelons of the Swedish army command and government. He feared that the Swedes would leave the real fighting to Moore's army. To him it seemed the Swedes were only waiting for the British to their rescue without making efforts on their own behalf. Murray formed an equally unfavourable impression of Gustavus IV during an audience on 17 May where he insisted upon exercising real command over Moore's army and occupying Zealand at all cost. 42

IV. Spain's Savage War
The Second of May Massacre in Madrid, the Siege of Saragossa and the Beginning of Spain's War of Liberation against Napoleon, May-July 1808.

Another dangerous assumption that Gustavus IV's plans rested upon was that the British would be willing to support his military efforts. In early 1808 that assumption seemed valid since only Sweden and Sicily could provide the British with a bridgehead for operations in Europe. Unfortunately the news of Cronstedt's treachery coincided with that of Spain having risen against Napoleon. Both had a devastating effect upon the alliance and Sweden's military survival. 43 Napoleon's Spanish trouble began on 2 May when the Madrileños revoluted against the presence of their French occupiers who retaliated with great brutality. For the moment Spain was quiet but for how long? 44

The silence lasted less than two weeks when in mid May one province after another revolted against the French who suffered the added humiliation of seeing one of their armies capitulate on 19 July at Baylen to the Spanish army. No city in Spain resisted the occupiers as violently or heroically than Saragossa (the capital of Aragon) which came to symbolise Spain's determined defiance of her invader as much as Sveaborg became one for Swedish submission to hers. 45

42 WO 1/189. Murray to Castlereagh, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18 May 1808.
43 Rudorff
44 Hall. 168.
45 Rudorff. 41-44, 49-83, 87-171; Carr. Spain. 88-91.; Gates. 34, 36, 50-64, 71-74, 76-77.
V. The Futile Expedition.
Moore's Expedition to Sweden, May-July 1808.

The Spanish were now in an open state of war with their former ally. But the British were as yet not prepared to support them since they had committed the lion's share of their disposable military strength to operations in Scandinavia. Murray's critical reports, coloured by Sveaborg, failed to arrive before Moore left England on 10 May. A week later Moore arrived in Gothenburg to a less than warm welcome from his hard-pressed allies. Despite Adlerberg's assurances, Moore's troops were refused permission to land while their presence was blamed for creating supply problems and driving up prices. Moore was irritated with Swedish surliness, ingratitude and refusal to co-operate with his army. He grew increasingly disillusioned with his task, the planned operations and the ally whom he distrusted, following Sveaborg, as much as the Swedes distrusted him and the British in general.46

During his enforced inactivity in Gothenburg Moore was briefed by a Hanoverian officer, Ludwig von Mosheim, who was head of the recruiting depot at Gothenburg, about conditions in Sweden. Mosheim believed that Sweden was a terminally ill patient infected with the gangrene of defeatism and Francophile sympathies that had ensured the fall of Sveaborg and the failure of Armfelt's Norwegian offensive.47 When Murray returned to Gothenburg on 21 May he too must have given Moore his gloomy reports about the Swedes in general and their intransigent king. Moore now questioned Sweden's military capacities and her reliability as an ally which meant that Britain would have to shoulder the main military burden. That burden could become quite heavy should the allies undertake offensive operations.48 Moore concluded that 'the Swedes have no right to look to conquests, the danger to be apprehended is that they will be overpowered and invaded, and unless they themselves are enabled to make far greater efforts in their [own] defence, I doubt if a corp such

47 GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 13, 16 May, 3 June 1808.
48 MP. XIV. Moore to Castlereagh, 21, 22 May 1808. See Clason. GAM. 48; ibid. Moore to Thornton, 23 May 1808.
as the one I command, limited to operations on the coast, can either render them essential services, or
for any length of time protect their fall'. He dismissed Thornton's support for the occupation of
Zealand as unfeasible, since he did not share the envoy's belief in Sweden's military capabilities.

Back in London the War Office and Horse Guard's (the Army High Command) began to share
Moore's misgivings about the Swedish expedition. At the same time they grew impatient with
Moore's lack of progress and recalled Murray to London to account for this. Murray defended Moore
by blaming the lack of progress since 17 May upon Gustavus IV's intransigent refusal to allow the
British to land in Gothenburg. Colonel Gordon, the Duke of York's ADC and the recipient of
Mosheim's critical intelligence reports, drew up a memorandum for the cabinet on 29 May which
claimed that Finland was lost after the fall of Sveaborg leaving Sweden in a hopeless position.
Gordon concluded the government had to decide if Britain was 'either to abandon our ally in his
greatest extremity, or to be compelled to undertake an operation beyond our means and the issue of
which may be very doubtful'. Having dismissed Zealand as a possible offensive target Gordon
claimed that Spain offered better possibilities for a victorious campaign than Sweden. Moore was
therefore issued with a new set of instructions that only repeated previous British demands to be
allowed to land and station troops around Gothenburg.

Time was running out if Anglo-Swedish operations were to be completed during the short
Scandinavian summer so Moore left Gothenburg on 12 June and arrived in Stockholm four days later.
The day after he had a blunt meeting with the king who pulled no punches and showed clearly how
the British pre-emptive (as he put it) demands to land had irritated him already. He asked if Moore
would agree to partake in operations against Zealand which Moore declined. Gustavus IV then
claimed he would undertake the operation without British aid. That was a calculated bluff since

49 MP. XIV. Moore to Castlereagh, 19 May 1808.
50 FO 933/35. Thornton to Moore 27 May 1808; ibid. Moore to Thornton, 30 May 1808.
51 MP. XIV. Gordon to Moore, 1 June 1808.
52 WO 1/189. Murray to Charles Stewart, 1 June 1808.; Anglica 498. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV, 3
June 1808.
53 MP. XIV Military memorandum upon affairs in Sweden and the expedition under Sir John Moore.
Gordon, 29 May 1808.
54 WO 1/189. Castlereagh to Moore, 2 June. See Fortescue. VI. 130 and Grade. 31; Granberg. 47-49.
Thornton to Ehrenheim 16 June 1808; Clason. GAM. 237.
Gustavus IV's own general staff believed such an operation was beyond Sweden's military strength and therefore unfeasible without British support. On 18 June Gustavus IV suggested to Moore that he land in Finland. Regaining Finland was as important (if not more important) to Sweden than taking Zealand. He even sent his chief of staff major general Tibell (who had opposed both the Norway and Zealand plans) to Moore's quarters to persuade the general to land in Finland. Tibell, who was the personification of the Swedish army's Francophile sentiments, proved an unsuitable messenger and contributed considerably to Moore rejecting Gustavus IV's suggestion for a British landing at Viborg in conjunction with a Swedish offensive against the Russians in Savolax. A rejection that both dismayed and angered the king.55

Until now Moore’s and Gustavus IV’s talks had been civil, if cold, but when they met again on 20 June the atmosphere was much more heated and sharp. Gustavus IV was extremely irritated by Moore’s rejection of his offensive plans of military action. They had a final and stormy meeting on 23 June that left both men even more hostile to each other. Moore grew tired of the long drawn and acrimonious dispute about the merits of the king’s different plans and projects. Moore promised to stay in Stockholm until he had new orders from London but then the day after changed his mind and he informed the Swedes that he intended to return to London. When he was told of Moore’s resolve, Gustavus IV lost his patience and caution completely by ordering Moore to be placed under house arrest. Thornton’s forceful endeavours to end Moore’s involuntary confinement only caused a diplomatic rift and Murray’s talks with the king on 26 June were equally counter-productive. Moore managed to escape and made his way to Gothenburg where he arrived on 31 June. (He sailed back to England with his troops on 2 July). Gustavus IV was infuriated by the escape, which to him typified the underhanded way Britain had treated Sweden since the Spanish rebellion begun. For once his opinions and views were fully shared by his ministers who distrusted British motives for insisting

upon landing at Gothenburg. In London, Canning's spontaneous reaction had been to retaliate against Sweden with all possible force, short of war, but George III's suspicion that Moore was to blame for the expedition's failure as much as Gustavus IV was soon confirmed. Canning's temper cooled but the Anglo-Swedish alliance had been given a fatal blow from which it was never to recover. In fact from now on the life and soul of the 'common cause' was gone, to be replaced by a less than warm formality of a mutual commitment.56

VII. Peninsular Priorities: Sweden or Spain? Britain's Strategic Choices in a World War, Intervention in Iberia and Lost Opportunities in Scandinavia, April August 1808.

Gustavus IV believed, as did many other Swedes and even George III, that Moore had deliberately provoked a rift in Anglo-Swedish relations in order that he could use his army in Spain.57 (Indeed Moore was urged by his friends in London in late May to return home and try to get command of the expeditionary force being prepared to be sent to Spain58). Ehrenheim believed Britain had 'abandoned' Sweden because it had not proven itself to be as lucrative a base for smuggling contraband to the continent as they had imagined. But the main reason for Britain's 'desertion' of her Swedish ally was their growing preoccupation with Spain. 'In Spain there are fleets to win, trade to revive, colonies to raise and a mass of power to direct against points far more sensitive to Bonaparte than Russia and Denmark', noted Ehrenheim sourly on 7 July.59


58 MP. XIV. Brownrigg to Moore 31 May 1808. See Maurice 211-212.

59 Anglica. 504. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 7 July 1808.
Ehrenheim had put British reasoning and ambitions in Spain, which mirrored Napoleon's grandiose schemes, in a nutshell. Yet that was only apparent by July and not earlier. The British had kept a close eye, through their Gibraltar post, on Spain since December 1807. As Napoleon's legions marched into Spain Britain's only main concern was to defend the straits of Gibraltar against the French. If the French managed to reach the Straits, or worse, cross over to Morocco, then they could begin to cut British communications with the Mediterranean. Had Napoleon aimed his armies against the Gibraltar straits, instead of being diverted into Portugal, and if Bernadotte had been given the right support to shut the entry to the Baltic, then the British would have been facing a very real prospect of being shut out of the Baltic and Mediterranean simultaneously. It would have taken great effort to conquer Gibraltar but if it fell into French hands (supplemented with a French occupation of Ceuta and Tangier) then Napoleon would have been able, slowly and painstakingly, to build up gunboat, privateering and regular flotillas of ships to make the passage through the straits as difficult as possible. Had he managed to make it increasingly difficult then British exports to Europe via the Austrian and Ottoman empires would have been severely crippled. But Napoleon was more interested in flashy and easy conquests than the meticulous and painstaking process of crippling Britain's war economy and strategic position. A crisis on such a scale might have forced Britain to negotiate on Napoleon's terms. The British had the same limited, but vital strategic concerns in the Baltic. Sweden's fate was less important to her ally than keeping the Belts and the Sound open. Hence their support for Sweden and eventually Spain for the same reasons. In early 1808 (before Spain was in open state of war with France) the British planned to occupy Tetuan, Tangier, Ceuta and the Balearics. It was only after the Madrid massacre and the provinces' state of war with Napoleon that the British realised how their enemy's fatal mistakes had given them a fine opportunity to revive the war on the continent. When delegates arrived from Asturias and Galicia in June-July they were feted as heroes, while the British gave themselves up to euphoric support for the Spanish cause. For once, and only for a brief moment, His Majesty's Government and 'loyal' opposition were united in one cause: aiding Spain. Adlerberg noted with astonishment how the British handed out huge sums to the Spanish, which contrasted to their usual subsidiary prudence. By the end of the summer of 1808 the British had given the Spanish over £1,000,000 in silver. Britain paid since they knew that the Spanish would use it to fight the French with all possible force and Canning had made a thunderous
speech in the Commons that made it clear that any nation, even former enemies, were Britain's automatic allies the moment they made war on Napoleon.\textsuperscript{60}

But money was only one way to aid Spain. The British had to find troops quickly if they were to strike at Napoleon while the Spanish iron was hot. The most obvious and available action was to recall Moore, which had been done on 5 July.\textsuperscript{61} But it would still take weeks for Moore's army to be available for service in Spain and in the meantime, therefore, other troops had to be found. In early 1808, as they lacked a bridgehead in Europe (besides Sweden) the British had planned to send general Sir Arthur Wellesley with 9,000 men against South America. The Portland administration was saved from emulating their predecessor's folly by the outbreak of the war in Spain. But the Spanish were as unenthusiastic as the Swedes were about a British army on their soil. In Spanish eyes the British were as dangerous as the French and who was to say they would not arrive, as the French had, as allies but end up as enemies? With suspicious enthusiasm and speed, the Spanish delegates suggested that Wellesley land in Portugal instead of Spain. Fortunately for the British the Bishop of Oporto had declared 'his' region in rebellion against the French which ensured that Wellesley could land at Mondego Bay on 8 August in relative safety. He set out southwards to Lisbon with 18,000 Anglo-Portuguese troops. Wellesley's French counterpart, Junot, had thought the better of trying to control Portugal and concentrated his 25,000 men in Lisbon. One of Junot's deputies was defeated on 17 August at Rolica which enabled a reinforced Wellesley to defeat Junot at Vimeiro on 21 August. There seemed to be nothing to stop Wellesley from throwing the French out of Portugal and invading Spain too. Back in London, the British hoped that Italy (if the Pope could be saved from French imprisonment) would follow the Portuguese and Spanish example. Canning, showing clearly how the Spanish situation had got the better of his judgement, hoped even Napoleon's Danish and Russian allies would follow suit.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{60} Hinde. 195-97; Mackesy. 265-66; Anglica 498. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV 31 May, 3, 7, 10, 17, 21, 24 June 1808.; Hall. 168-170.

\textsuperscript{61} WO 1/189. Castlereagh to Moore, 30 June 1808.

\textsuperscript{62} Hinde. 198; Longford. 93-102; Hall. 170-173; Gates. 82-92; Mackesy. 267-275, 277, 279, 285-288; Harewood 43. Canning to Thornton, 10 June 1808.
There was however yet another and more unusual way for Britain to assist her Spanish ally and that was to provide Spain with much needed regular Spanish troops from northern Europe. These 15,000 Spanish troops, under general Don Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marquis de la Romana's command, had been handed over by Godoy (Romana's patron) as hostages for Spain's continued loyalty to Napoleon and a way of weakening Spain's resistance should Napoleon need to occupy Spain. But in this increasingly complex war and web of intrigues Napoleon used Romana's army to spearhead his invasion of Sweden by stationing them in Denmark with Bernadotte's polyglot force. Thus a potential enemy was used as cannon fodder to subdue an existing one. Unlike his troops who showed their dislike of the French quite openly, Romana was only biding his time since some news, despite the best French efforts to keep the Spanish isolated, had filtered into Denmark about the outbreak of the Spanish rebellion. Romana hoped to contact the British so that his army could be rescued but his French 'allies' kept a close eye on his troops.63

The British shared Romana's wishes for contact in order to send his vitally needed troops back to Spain and thus boost the rebellion with reinforcements from the most unlikely quarter. In April Canning had showed great interest in evacuating Romana's army from Denmark.64, and this was repeated in late June by Castlereagh.65 But how were the British to establish contact with Romana without arousing French suspicion which could lead to their capture and imprisonment in France? In May Wellesley introduced Castlereagh to a Father Robertson, who undertook, disguised as a merchant, the perilous journey through Denmark to Romana's headquarters in Funen. He was given a cold and suspicious reception from Romana but he managed to convince him that he was a Catholic priest in the service of the British. Once he had broken down the wall of suspicion Robertson told the delighted Spaniards that the British were doing everything possible to rescue them.66 In June the British knew that Romana was aware of their efforts and that they hoped to use, a month later, the Asturian delegates to accompany the rescuing flotilla to establish contact with Romana's troops many

64 FO 73/46. Canning to Thornton, 1 Apr. 1808; Harewood 43. Canning to Thornton, 1 Apr. 1808; SKÅ VII. 358.
65 WO 1/189. Castlereagh to Moore, 30 June 1808.
66 Robertson. 4 - 64.
of whom were from this same region of Spain. To organise the rescue, in stage two, Canning sent a special agent, captain MacMahon, to Scania to organise the actual embarkation of the Spanish.\textsuperscript{67}

Once Romana had established contact with Parker's squadron in the Great Belt he ordered his troops to Langeland where he managed to concentrate 10,000 troops by 13 August. Despite admiral Saumarez's appeals to the Swedes to aid in the rescue, they proved quite uncooperative. Nevertheless Parker managed to rescue Romana's forces, but 4,000 were unfortunately captured by the French in Jutland and on Zealand. Parker realised that if Romana's troops were to be fit to travel all the way to Spain and then begin an arduous campaign against the French, then they had to have a rest, or least somewhere on shore where the wounded and ill could be cared for. Naturally the British assumed that Sweden, as an ally of Britain and now Spain, would provide that sanctuary for Romana's men. As usual Gustavus IV was a loyal ally who approved of landing the Spanish troops in Scania but Parker, for ease of passage back to northern Spain, wanted to land the Spaniards in Gothenburg. Gustavus IV was not so keen on that idea but his officials in Gothenburg took that as a signal to deny the British permission to land the Spanish in large numbers. Only 700 of the most sick Spanish troops were allowed to land and then, as if they were plague carriers, only under strict quarantine. Neither Parker nor Saumarez appreciated the limited and begrudging assistance Sweden was willing to extend to their brave allies (who could aid their common cause in Spain) and this cannot have served (after the Moore affair) to reconcile the two estranged allies. The Swedes on their part resented Britain's favouritism towards Spain and Saumarez's pre-occupation with Romana's rescue when it meant that the allies had lost the chance of inflicting a potentially crippling defeat on the Russian Baltic fleet.\textsuperscript{68}

The rescue of Romana's Spanish troops clearly showed how the Napoleonic War by 1807-1808 had become a true world war where each front, however widely separated, was inter-connected and inter-dependent. It also showed the breadth and width of Britain's remarkably flexible naval power and

\textsuperscript{67} Harewood. 58a. MacMahon to Canning, 24, 29 June 7, 8, 13 July, 21 Dec 1808.

how it could be used to good effect against her land bound enemy. The tragedy for Sweden was that Britain's growing pre-occupation with Spain coincided with her own remarkable recovery on the Finnish front. As in Spain it was a combination of the regular army's counter offensives and the spontaneous action of armed peasant partisans which accounted for a series of solid successes. The regular army led the recovery when Klingspor finally stopped his retreat northwards and found how overextended the Russians were because of their rapid advance. Klingspor's more energetic deputies, generals Adlercreutz and Löwenhjelm, led the Swedish counter-offensive leading to limited but morale-boosting victories over the Russians at Pykäjoki, Siikajoki and Revolax. Unfortunately Löwenhjelm was captured and his leadership and drive was to be sorely missed during the following months. 69

But the most spectacular Swedish counteroffensive was made in eastern Finland under general Sandel and captain Wilhelm Malm's command. Sandel was a veteran of the 1788-1790 war against Russia and he had seen the potential the Savolax bulge had as a bridgehead for an attack on Russia before the invasion. Having made proper reconnaissance along the intended main route he let Malm with 800 regulars and peasant partisans begin the advance on 2 May. Savolax was lightly garrisoned by the Russians and Malm's mixed force took Kuopio, Savolax's 'capital', on 12 May. A week later Sandel's main force (1,500) marched in. Since the Russians thought they were being attacked by a large Swedish army, their troops fled across the border into Russian Finland. Rumours spread that the Swedes were about to take Viborg and threaten St. Petersburg itself. It was only by reinforcing Barclay de Tolly's 6th Division to 8,000 troops that Sandel's 5th brigade (1,500) was brought to a standstill. Sandel decided instead to divert Malm's force into Swedish Carelia where his small force forced 2,000 Russians under general Alexeyev's command back across the Russian border. It was not until a year later that this wild and sparsely populated province was finally occupied by the Russians. 70

69 Homborg. 87-99; SSK. 77-81; BFK 44-46.
But it was not only in Finland that Sweden had retaken the initiative. On 28 April Gustavus IV ordered colonel Fleetwood, supported by admiral Cederström's small squadron, to retake Gotland.

Some 2,000 troops in 7 warships set sail from Carlskrona on 11 May and disembarked at Slite on 14 May. Bodisco, thoroughly demoralised, capitulated on 16 May and his army, allowed to return home on parole, reached Libau three days later.\(^71\)

Across the Baltic in the Åland archipelago the Russians were, almost simultaneously, thrown out.

The 13,000 independent minded islanders had not taken kindly to the Russian oath of allegiance nor Troil's 'orders' for them to collaborate with the Russians like he had. Instead on 8 May they took up arms, captured the 700 strong garrison and arrested all collaborators. By 15 May they had retaken the entire archipelago and a small Swedish garrison was sent over to retake control. The collaborators (like the Gotland ones) were treated leniently and were spared Spanish revolutionary justice.\(^72\)

On the Finnish mainland, in the staunchly anti-Russian province of Ostrobothnia, trouble had been simmering for similar reasons since late April. Here the peasant uprising was triggered by a landing at Wasa by the Swedish army. Hundreds of armed peasants attacked Russian transports, lines of communications, guard-posts and smaller garrisons. Mixed forces of regulars and peasant partisans were operating by June-July as far south as Tammerfors, under the guerrilla commanders Feiandt, Spoof and Rooth. Like the French in Spain, the Russians reacted with a mixture of terror, impotent fury and bloodlust. Entire villages were burnt to the ground, suspected partisans shot where they stood and to top it all when Wasa rose against the Russian, general Demidov the commander of the surrounding Russian army allowed his troops to sack the town. Had Demidov been a French officer fighting in Spain he would not have been reprimanded but the Russians were shocked and humiliated at his barbarous conduct. He was demoted and never given an independent command again.\(^73\)

\(^{71}\) SKÅ. IV. 126-132, 134-142; SKÅ. VII. 306-315; BFK. 89-91; Hornborg. 108-109.; Unger. 203; Ga. Fähreus. 48; Ga. 188.

\(^{72}\) Hornborg. 106-109; SKÅ IV. 215-233; BFK. 82-89; Persson. 21-24, 28-40, 42-46, 48, 50, 76-94.

\(^{73}\) Persson. 125-143, 145-165; BFK. 116-123, 131-132, 139-141, 161, 172, 185, 199-204; Bladh. 25-33, 35-41. Apr.-June 1808.; Hornborg. 116-118, 128-129.
The Swedish high command was completely divided about the opportunities these successes offered them. Tibell who had opposed the king's strategic plans of offensives in the west urged Gustavus IV on 19 May to send 15,000 men, released by the cancellation of the Norwegian offensive to the Finnish front. As Buxhöwden's 34,000 troops were stretched to the limit by occupation duty in the south and watching the coast there a possibility of defeating them Gustavus IV felt such reinforcements would be unnecessary, as he pinned his inflated hopes on a general uprising in Finland 'à la Espagne' which could be supported by limited landings on the coast. The first of such landings took place at Wasa on 24-25 June when colonel Bergenstrålehe landed near the city. It failed to cause a national insurrection in Finland and further landings failed as well. To Tibell and other critics of Gustavus IV's 'penny-packet' strategy, this vindicated their criticism. But was that criticism justified? The king should probably have sent a large contingent of troops to support Sandel's Savolax offensive, which threatened the Russians communications with St. Petersburg, as Tibell suggested. But it was wrong to ignore the Finnish guerrilla forces. Malm, Sandel and Döbeln had all used peasant partisans in combination with regular troops to good effect against the Russians. In Spain the combination proved lethal but there, as in Sweden, it was the often lacklustre performance of the regular army that let the side down. Klingspor's failure to advance quickly enough against Wasa ensured the failure of Bergenstrålehe's landings. Yet another opportunity to inflict a major defeat had been lost as by late August the Russians had 50,000 in Finland - enough to ensure a victory over Klingspor's army. The Swedes lacked one final ingredient for an Iberian-style success: a British army at their side. The Swedes believed that Moore's presence could have turned the Finnish war in their favour. They might have been right. The British had squandered their initial triumph in Iberia by agreeing to transport Junot's 25,000 intact back to France by the convention of Cintra on 23 August. The British had their own Cfonstedt's and Klingspor's in the shape of Messrs general Burrard and Dalrymple who preferred to parley with the enemy instead of pursuing him. The British public and government were all infuriated by Cintra. Wellesley was lucky not to be cashiered for his part in the treaty.74

74 SKÅ. VIII. 54-114; BFK. 234-243; Hornborg. 112-115, 118-128,133-137; Longford*103-105.
VIII. The Shield of Sweden.  
Admiral Saumarez’s First Baltic Expedition, May-October 1808.

The farcical outcome of the Moore expedition which did such damage to both allies reputations and interests overshadowed the Royal Navy’s successful work in the Baltic. In fact the British Baltic fleet would remain from now on the one tangible support (besides subsidies) that remained to Sweden. It had rendered and would continue to render invaluable support to Sweden from 1808 onwards. In late February the Admiralty appointed admiral Sir James de Saumarez, a distinguished naval officer of great integrity, intellect and ability to the Baltic command taking the ‘Victory’ and 12 other ships of the line into his squadron. It was an excellent choice since Saumarez was not only a first rate naval commander but a skilled diplomat as well. He would be in need of both during 1808 and the subsequent expeditions he headed in the Baltic. In March admiral Parker had already prevented the Franco-Danish army from crossing the Sound and accomplished one of the tasks the Admiralty had set up for Saumarez. When he arrived with Moore’s forces in mid-May the British admiral reached a binding agreement with his Swedish counterpart, admiral Rajalin, which divided the Baltic into two parts. The British concentrated on the western part leaving the east, or the naval war with Russia, solely to the Swedes. Saumarez was more interested in seizing Bornholm to be used as a British naval base in the Baltic than getting entangled in the Russo-Swedish naval war. After all the British government did not really want to start a real war with its former ally Russia. Britain’s war, unlike Sweden’s, was with Napoleon and his Danish underlings. But Saumarez did send his ‘Nelsonian’ subordinate, admiral Hood, with two ships of the line to keep an eye on the Russians and assist the Swedish navy. He kept well out of the Moore crisis by assuring the Swedes, whatever happened, that he would continue to keep watch on their coastline.75

The rescue of Romana’s expeditionary force from the beaches of Langeland delayed Saumarez’s sailing into the eastern Baltic until late August. In the meantime Hood had in good Nelsonian fashion sunk a Russian ship of the line while he chased the Russian Baltic fleet into Baltischport. When, on 31 August, Saumarez turned up at the blockaded port he found it well defended and the Russian fleet

well ensconced behind numerous coastal batteries. Worse still was the deplorable state of the Swedish fleet. Since Sveaborg Gustavus IV had a justified suspicion of his higher naval officers, which included the defeatist commander of the Swedish blockading squadron, admiral Rajalin. The fleet itself was suffering from scurvy, which spread from ship to ship. Saumarez decided therefore that a frontal assault was out of the question and to attack with fire ships too time-consuming, when the campaigning season was nearing its end, and too uncertain. Thornton who had become persona non grata with Gustavus IV because of his involvement in the Moore crisis, joined Saumarez at Baltischport and convinced the admiral that they might try some unofficial diplomacy based on Canning’s hopes that the Russians might follow the Iberian example. Their overtures to Alexander I and admiral Chichagov, the Russian naval minister, had no effect however. To the chagrin of the Swedes, who had hoped to put a check to Russia’s advances in Finland by destroying the enemy’s fleet with the help of the British, they saw Saumarez abandon the Baltischport blockade and return home in late November vowing to return in the spring to destroy the Russian fleet. To the Swedes this was yet another blow to their chances of survival.76

Chapter Eight.

Endgame.

The Decline and Fall of the Common Cause, October 1808-March 1809.

1. Friends Fall Out.
The Final Anglo-Swedish Crisis, October 1808 - March 1809

In October 1808 it was imperative for Sweden to rebuild relations with Britain if her financial problems were not to overwhelm her. Gustavus IV chose the capable Gustav von Brinkman for this task. In late September when Brinkman accepted this demanding post he believed that nothing could save Sweden from disaster but he accepted his unenviable task out of loyalty to the king. Gustavus IV had few such diplomats and Brinkman earnestly sought to rebuild the 'Common Cause' with Britain. He was therefore given a warm welcome from Canning when he arrived in London on 21 October since the British shared Brinkman's wish to rebuild the alliance.1

Assurances of renewed friendship could not heal the deep rifts revealed by the Moore crisis or resolve further causes of rift between the allies. One issue which the Swedes had taken great offence to and which could cause serious problems allied relations was the agreement that the British had struck with the Russians concerning the fate of the Russian Mediterranean fleet. At Tilsit this fleet, commanded by admiral Siniavin, had been deprived of its base on Corfu and Siniavin decided in September 1807 to sail for what he supposed was a safe sanctuary in the Tagus. But this fleet was engulfed by the French invasion of Portugal and for a year the Russians remained on their ships to observe the Peninsular campaign unfolding. Finally in September 1808 admiral Cotton, commander of the British Tagus squadron, made a deal with Siniavin which left his ships in British ports for the duration of the war. So far the agreement was no cause of concern for the Swedes, but Cotton had also agreed to release Siniavin's sailors and this left them free to return to Russian service which including fighting in the Baltic fleet against Sweden. Siniavin's experienced sailors could prove a valuable addition of strength to Baltic fleet to the detriment of Sweden. Cotton had ignored that Russia was not only Britain's enemy but that of her ally, Sweden, too and this kind of nonchalance

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(reminiscent of the Cintra agreement that infuriated Britain's Iberian allies) only served to arouse Swedish fears about an Anglo-Russian peace at her expense. Again an event in Iberia had a direct effect on Sweden's war with Russia and showed yet again the scope of the war. Canning who realised both the political and military consequences of the Tagus treaty denounced Cotton's shortsighted measure and assured Brinkman that the British would delay the Russian sailors return home as long as possible.²

Sweden's unfounded fears about her ally betraying her to her enemies were heightened yet further by the appeals for peace that Napoleon made to Britain during the Erfurt congress (27 September-14 October). On 12 October Napoleon offered Britain peace if Russia could retain Finland and Napoleon Spain. Napoleon's terms were of course completely unacceptable to Canning, who assured Brinkman that unless Spain's full restoration to independence and Sweden's security was assured the British would not entertain any similar peace overtures from the continental coalition. Canning's assurances must have sounded hollow in Brinkman's ears since he failed to mention Finland's restoration as a precondition for peace talks with enemy. At the same time rumours, that later turned out to be untrue, came out of Erfurt that claimed that Russia and France had agreed to divide Sweden between themselves. To those unacquainted to the Byzantine workings of the Tilsit alliance, these rumours and proposals seemed to indicate Franco-Russian harmony and a continuation of the deal made a year earlier on the Niemen. In fact the situation was quite different and from Napoleon's perspective, since he had been in control at Tilsit, most unsatisfactory since with Spain still defiantly resisting in the south, he had to ask Alexander I to keep Austria in check while he dealt with the Spanish once and for all. Russia's new found bargaining position, which led Alexander I to regain some of his former self confidence and independence, also led to the first, fine hairline cracks in the Tilsit alliance that would eventually destroy the entire alliance.³

Swedish fears about Britain making a deal with their common enemies at her expense mirrored those that Canning had about Sweden. Brinkman quite wisely kept quiet about the armistice with Russia at Lohtea in northern Finland that Ehrenheim hoped, following the peace overtures to Britain at Erfurt, would lead to a Russo-Swedish peace. Canning shared Ehrenheim's hopes so long as such a peace did not jeopardise Britain's vital trade conduit via Sweden to the continent or closed Sweden's ports to her shipping and Baltic fleet. Mutual fears remained groundless as long as Gustavus IV and Canning were left in charge of the foreign policy rudders of Sweden and Britain respectively since they had no intention to parley with the enemy. On the surface the steady course towards continued war seemed to be assured since both the Swedish or British opposition groups were far from retaking power in either country.4

Gustavus IV had ambitions to launch a major spring offensive against the Russians but this required that the southern and western fronts remained quiet. He therefore sent colonel Borgenhjerna to Elsinore where on 20 October he met with king Frederick VI. Gustavus IV offered his cousin two alternatives. A long-term armistice to their mutual benefit or generous peace terms whereby Britain returned Denmark's colonies and fleet. Denmark would thus have the benefit of peace and a return to commercial prosperity as before the war. This time Canning had nothing against such a separate peace since he hoped to end Britain's conflict with Denmark too. But when he was told of the Swedish terms Canning proved less than co-operative in handing back the Danish fleet without a peace treaty. The prospects for peace with Denmark seemed good since the war was as unpopular there as in Sweden. Frederick VI did not however share his subjects' dislike of their Franco-Russian allies. He had been given a tempting Russian proposal to invade and annex southern Sweden. By December 1808 the Swedes realised the Danes had only been playing for time since they had revived their plans to invade Scania by crossing the ice covered Sound while the Norwegians and Russians distracted the Swedes further north. By late January 25,000 Danish troops, 6,000 horses and 80 guns

had been assembled on Zealand for the invasion but they were not ready to cross until 20 February 1809 by which time the thaw had melted the ice bridge across the Sound.\(^5\)

The Norwegians who planned to occupy Carlstad and Gothenburg in support of the Danish invasion fared no better. Prince Christian, the Norwegian Generalissimo, made it painfully clear to Frederick VI on 13 January that his army was too weak to invade Sweden. He had therefore agreed a month earlier to sign an armistice with general Cederström the commander of the Swedish Western army.

The Swedes hoped that it would be extended indefinitely thus ensuring that Norway stayed neutral in the war against Denmark. It might also help Gustavus IV to achieve his Norwegian dream by peaceful means. The Swedes therefore kept the Norwegian talks secret to encourage a split between Denmark and Norway. To a certain extent those plans succeeded since Frederick VI begun to distrust his royal cousin and suspected him of harbouring political ambitions that were detrimental to the unity of the double monarchy of Denmark-Norway.\(^6\)

Gustavus IV’s peace endeavours had failed but at least the agreement with prince Christian ensured that the western front remained quiet while he turned his military attentions eastwards. He was, however, to suffer his greatest diplomatic defeat (not at the hands of his enemies) but at the hands of his ally. It was a self-inflicted defeat triggered by Sweden’s desperate financial situation. Aside from their mutual political differences and suspicions the main area of conflict centred upon trade and subsidies. Canning, who had hoped to deflect the opposition’s attacks upon his subsidy generosity to a faltering ally, had grown very irritated with continued Swedish delays. Canning believed that the Swedish delay was due to Gustavus IV’s wish to prevent Thornton from gaining any credit for its signing. The real reasons in fact for the delay was that Sweden wanted to get Britain to grant trade

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concessions such as full and unfettered access to Britain's colonial markets, as well as a lower tariff on
Swedish exports. It was a source of much Swedish resentment that Britain's enemy, Norway, had
lower tariffs on her timber exports than Sweden. Finally, and to Canning's intense irritation, they
wanted to link the commercial talks with the subsidy negotiations. That was an unwise decision since
the British were adamantly opposed to uniting commercial and subsidy negotiations, and Canning
resented such obvious means of pressurising him into giving into Swedish subsidy demands.
Brinkman had realised from Adlerberg that he had to adopt a cautious approach to the subsidy
question. His slow approach to negotiations with Canning did not meet with the approval of his
superior in Stockholm. Lagerheim, who opposed the war and used financial arguments to support an
end to it, claimed that Sweden was facing bankruptcy and economic ruin.\footnote{FO 73/50. Canning to Merry, 19, 20 Dec. 1808.; Anglica. 508. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 25 Oct.,
13 Dec. 1808; KPA. 38. Gustavus IV to Ehrenheim, 20 Sept. 1808; Harewood 42. Canning to
to Brinkman, 3 Oct. 1808; LAGS. VI. Lagerheim to Adlerberg, 8 Sept. 13, 24 Oct. 1808.}

The obvious solution to Sweden's financial situation would have been to raise taxes and increase
domestic borrowing. None of these sensible measures were taken since Lagerheim opposed them and
blamed Sweden's war with Russia on Britain. In Lagerheim's opinion, that obliged Britain to pay for
the Swedish war effort with increased subsidies. As the ministers had tried in 1805 to prevent the
alliance by demanding excessive subsidies, they now tried, three years later, to end it with the same
method. Ehrenheim, taken in by Lagerheim's pessimistic prognosis, savaged Brinkman's 'failure' in
late November to bring up the subsidy question during his first conferences with Canning. In a most
perfunctory manner Brinkman was to bring Sweden's desperate need for increased subsidies to
Canning's attention. Stunned by this unusually sharp rebuke, Brinkman pointed out to Ehrenheim
that Canning had refused to increase the subsidies since neither the British public or Parliament
would support doubling Sweden's subsidies (to £2.4 million per annum). Sweden's subsidies
remained a delicate question made more tense since the Moore fiasco. No British minister, even one
so powerful and influential as Canning, would dare to go against his cabinet colleagues or public
opinion on such an important matter. The British treated such subsidies as mere matters of
commercial and financial calculation. When he saw Canning on 13 December, Brinkman had his
sensible suspicions fully confirmed. Canning made it clear that Sweden's excessive subsidy demands would call for a totally new treaty and new negotiations. When Brinkman asked Canning to increase the subsidies based on political consideration for a loyal ally rather than economic ones, Canning made it clear that he was already criticised for excessive financial generosity to Sweden by his cabinet colleagues, especially the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Increased subsidies to Sweden when she and Spain were faltering in the war against France would only add to the opposition's attacks against the government.  

Since Brinkman's talks with Canning had proven inconclusive, Gustavus IV hoped that he could persuade Canning to give in to his demands for increased subsidies through talks with the new British envoy, Anthony Merry. That diplomat had only with the greatest reluctance agreed to take up the arduous post in Stockholm because Merry believed that his weak nerves would collapse when he confronted the violent temper of Gustavus IV. (His suspicions proved to be amply justified). Canning, who brushed aside Merry's warnings, should have heeded them but there was no one else available at such short notice to take up the post. Canning gave Merry a set of instructions which would be enormously difficult to achieve for Merry given his nervous disposition and Gustavus IV's previous demands. Merry was only to sign a subsidy convention at the 1808 level or £1,200,000 a year to be paid out, as far as possible, in paper pounds and bills of exchange because of the drain of specie to Spain. Both of Canning's terms ran completely contrary to Gustavus IV wishes for over £2,000,000 in silver. As if this was not enough fuel for a violent confrontation, Canning also insisted upon the signing of the commercial convention which Gustavus IV would delay until Canning had given in to his subsidy demands. Finally Canning wanted Merry to promote peace between Sweden and her neighbours without sacrificing Anglo-Swedish interests too much and not arousing Gustavus IV's suspicions that Britain intended to abandon her northern ally.  

In other words Canning wanted a man, who doubted his own abilities and suitability for this diplomatic mission, to perform the Herculean feat of removing all the previous problems that had

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8 Anglica. 512. Ehrenheim to Brinkman, 21, 22 Nov. 1808.  
9 Harewood. 43. Merry to Canning, 26 Oct. 1808.  
10 Anglica. 508. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 2, 6, 13, 23 Dec. 1808; FO 73/50. Merry to Canning, 26 Oct. 1808; ibid. Canning to Merry 10 Nov. 1808.
troubled the 'common cause' for months. Merry's worst fears about violent confrontations with
Gustavus IV were confirmed immediately upon arrival in Stockholm (29 November) since Ehrenheim
immediately asked him if the new subsidies could be paid with a larger share of specie. Merry made
it quite clear that the drain of specie to Spain made this impossible but he did not state this in stronger
terms since he had no wish to provoke a showdown. A showdown, however, was inevitable since
Gustavus IV was determined to considerably increase the British subsidies with every means at his
disposal. On 6 December, a week after his arrival in Stockholm, Merry met Gustavus IV who voiced
his angry disappointment that Merry only had powers from Canning to negotiate a new subsidy treaty
at the old level. The British subsidy level paid out in February was totally inadequate then and even
more so after ten months of war. Gustavus IV voiced his frustration at the futile attempts his
diplomats had made for several months to raise the subsidy level to a more realistic level of
£2,000,000 that would help Sweden overcome her financial problems. Britain placed no value upon
her Swedish alliance, argued Gustavus IV with some truth, since she would not raise her subsidies to
this level when she poured endless millions of pounds into the Spanish war and the king had grown
tired of British indifference and neglect. Unless Merry paid out £300,000 as an immediate advance of
the minimum that Sweden needed or £1,700,000 Gustavus IV would shut his ports to British shipping
and put an embargo on all British shipping. This extreme action was the consequence of Sweden's
desperate situation, argued Gustavus IV, and Britain's failure to come to her ally's rescue in her hour
of desperate need. Merry gave in to Gustavus IV ultimatum since the goods in Swedish ports alone
were worth more than the demanded instalment.

When Canning received Merry's reports on 23 December, his reaction was as uncompromising as it
had been when Gustavus IV had practised similar blackmail upon Moore. The British government
did not accept foreign powers, least of all allied ones, blackmailing its diplomats. If Canning gave in
to Gustavus IV's blackmail then other powers could emulate his tactics to the 'ruination' of Britain's
state finances. Merry would be recalled unless the Swedes agreed to sign the new subsidy agreement
based on British terms. Canning, infuriated at Gustavus IV's clumsy extortion attempt, was in no

11 FO 73/50. Merry to Canning, 1 Dec. 1808.
12 FO 73/50. Merry to Canning, 6, 9 Dec.1808; Granberg. 154-158. Ehrenheim to Merry, 7 Dec.1808;
ibid. 159-161. Merry to Ehrenheim, 8 Dec.1808; SKÅ. VII. 441-443; HSh. 154-155.
mood for compromises but he told Brinkman that Merry's notes would be honoured by the Treasury and that he would not do anything precipitous.13

The threat of a Swedish embargo had its most immediate impact upon admiral Keats's squadron which had remained on the Swedish west coast during the winter. His and admiral Bertie's squadron had played a sterling role in saving Sweden from invasion by the Danes. Keats believed Merry had been too slow to warn him, but once Keats's got Merry's warning he acted immediately upon it. He told his commanders to be on the alert without arousing Swedish suspicion or provoking them into attacking British warships or seizing British merchant shipping or goods in their ports. He withdrew his squadron to Marstrand from Gothenburg's congested port and he declined an invitation to meet Gustavus IV in Stockholm. But neither side could afford to see a total breakdown in British naval protection for the Swedish coast or Swedish co-operation in providing supplies and safe anchorage for the British squadrons. Gustavus IV assured Keats, when his invitation was declined, that British warships would be given unfettered access to Swedish ports whatever the political situation while Keats, on his part, assured Gustavus IV of his fleets continued protection of Sweden's coasts.14

In early January when he saw Brinkman again Canning seemed more sad than angered by the Anglo-Swedish crisis. He admitted that if Sweden closed her ports to British ships, trade and goods, then this would be a serious blow to Britain's economic interests. But could Sweden really make peace with her enemies as easily as Gustavus IV seemed to believe? If Sweden and Britain had to part company, then it was preferable they did so as friends rather than enemies. Canning rejected the argument that Sweden's sacrifices were due to the British alliance as he had advised Gustavus IV, on several occasions, to make peace with his enemies if Sweden's interests required it. Britain did not oppose Sweden making peace if she could and Britain had every interest in preserving unbroken amity with Sweden even after such a peace. Brinkman tried his best to defend Gustavus IV's actions

13 FO 73/50. Merry to Canning 6, 9 Dec. 1808; Granberg. 154-158. Ehrenheim to Merry, 7 Dec. 1808. ibid. 159-161. Merry to Ehrenheim 8 Dec. 1808; SKÅ. VII. 441-443.; HSh. 154-155; FO 73/50 Canning to Merry, 23 Dec., 6 Jan. 1809.
but Canning rejected his argument that Sweden's actions were justified by British negligence.

Brinkman re-iterated the Swedish argument that British indifference had forced Gustavus IV to his
desperate acts which fuelled widespread rumours of imminent war between Sweden and Britain that
Brinkman had only been able to suppress with great difficulty.  

The Swedes lived in blissful ignorance of the British government's reaction to Gustavus IV's threats
because the bad weather had prevented the packet boats across the North Sea reaching Gothenburg. It
was only by late February therefore that a courier arrived with news of Canning's reaction and his
fears that the Swedes were engaged in secret peace talks with the enemy. On the evening of 22
February Merry informed Ehrenheim of his recall unless the Swedes signed the new subsidy treaty on
the old terms. Ehrenheim was conciliatory and suggested a personal meeting with the king. That
meeting took place at the Palace two days later when Merry tried to persuade Gustavus IV to agree to
the subsidy treaty. The king repeated his grievances and then, having used up his limited reserves of
patience, interrupted Merry.

The measures which I took cannot be considered as an offence. It was a natural consequence
of no attention having been paid to the repeated representation I had made for additional
succour. The Opposition in your Country had already taken notice of it. You will feel severely
the Effect of your Refusal to grant me what I have demanded. Is your trade to the Baltic and
your intercourse with the Continent through Sweden of no consequence to you? Will you not
feel the Sound being shut against you, or do you think that your Commerce to the Spanish
Colonies will indemnify you for loss of that in Europe? I am much reduced as to my Means,
but I can still do much Harm and you will feel it.

When Merry refused to overstep his instructions given the sharp reprimand he had suffered on the
previous occasion Gustavus IV lost his temper and ordered Merry out of the audience chamber.  

Gustavus IV had threatened to do what he had set out in 1801 to do; shut out the British from the
Baltic with the aid of Russia and Denmark. It was not an idle threat. That same day Gustavus IV
gave orders for an embargo to be imposed upon British shipping at Gothenburg which caused a
sensation. All British ships, including the Marstrand packet boat, were put under embargo for 48

15 Anglica. 509. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 3, 4, 6, 10, 13 Jan. 1809; FO 73/50. Canning to Merry, 23
Dec. 1808.
16 FO 73/54. Merry to Canning, 24 Feb. 1809.
hours. Ehrenheim tried to rescind the order but to no avail. The day after tensions had dampened sufficiently for a much calmer Gustavus IV to meet Merry in the afternoon. He repeated, with composed calm, his previous grievances but he was willing to sign if the British government was willing to guarantee him the restitution of Finland. Merry made it clear to Gustavus IV and to Ehrenheim, who came to see him that same evening, that his government would never endorse such a guarantee and would only recall Merry if he agreed to sign a treaty which included this guarantee.¹⁷

Canning was capable of blackmailing Sweden just like Gustavus IV had tried to do with Britain. On 27 February Merry tried to convince Ehrenheim to sign a subsidy treaty based on Canning's demands but without pressing for the signing of the commercial convention. On 1 March the subsidy agreement was finally signed and the Anglo-Swedish alliance had been restored. Merry continued to press for the signing of the commercial convention. In fact the subsidy treaty was destined to be the last and the commercial convention was never signed. In fact British satisfaction at the resolution of their mutual dispute was short-lived. Time had run out for the alliance - on 17 March when Canning wrote to congratulate Merry upon getting the subsidy treaty signed Gustavus IV had already been overthrown and the treaty signed was a dead letter.¹⁸

II. The Last Act.

The Finnish Army's Winter Retreat to Westerbotten, Moore's 'Martyrdom' and the Failure of Canning's Spanish Campaign, October 1808-January 1809.

While the allies almost came to blows over the acrimonious subsidy question which had bedevilled the alliance since the beginning, their respective armies were falling apart under the weight of their enemies military superiority. (The use of the term respective here is justified since Sweden was not fighting the French nor were the British fighting the Russians. Since the summer of 1808 the allies had in fact been fighting separate wars on either side of Europe). In late October, what remained of

¹⁷ FO 73/54. Canning to Merry, 27 Feb., 7 Mar. 1809; Harewood. 43. Merry to Canning, 24 Feb. 1809; Anglica. 513. Ehrenheim to Brinkman, 7 Mar. 1809; HSh. 1. 157-159, 162.
¹⁸ FO 73/54. Merry to Canning, 27 Feb., 1, 7, 10 Mar. 1809; Anglica. 513. Ehrenheim to Brinkman, 1 Mar. 1809.
the Finnish army retreated ever northwards. Northern Finland could not provide the troops with adequate rations and the army left the region as quickly as it could. It was small consolation to the army that the Russians were almost as badly off as themselves or that Klingspor had finally been removed from the command. Adlercreutz, Klingspor's successor, was unable to perform miracles and the only thing that saved the Finnish army from destruction was the enemy's reluctance to invade Sweden north of the Kemi river and Buxhöwden gladly agreed to an armistice until 12 January 1809 which enabled the Finnish army to escape across the Kemi and Ule rivers by 13 November. The army may have escaped from the Russians but its worse enemies, hunger, death, disease and desertion followed it all the way to the sanctuary of Torneå where, by late December, only 5,500 men out of 12,000 in total were fit for duty.\(^{19}\)

Across Europe, in Portugal, command of the British expeditionary army had devolved upon general Moore following Cintra. Without his withdrawal from Sweden the British would, therefore, have been left without adequate forces to pursue, as Canning told Brinkman on 28 October, the war with all possible vigour by supporting the Spaniards.\(^{20}\) Only the future could now tell if Canning's decision to pull out of Scandinavia and pursue the Iberian option by investing all of Britain's disposable field forces there would actually pay off. In early October Moore was ordered to leave 10,000 men behind in Portugal, to secure his all important sea communications, and cautiously advance into Spain. Canning warned Moore that his army was the only field army that Britain had and he was not gamble with its safety. Moore was imbued with unusual self confident optimism by his overestimation of his Spanish ally which contrasted with his gloomy assessment of the Swedes. In fact his optimism was widely off the mark. Madrid had capitulated and Napoleon himself had entered the Peninsula with a huge host of 240,000 troops under his personal command. Napoleon gave orders on 23 December to chase out the British 'invader' from Spain but handed over actual command of the pursuing force to Soult's 25,000 troops.\(^{21}\)


\(^{21}\) Gates. 106-110, 115.
Although it was true that Napoleon faced, in December 1808, a growing threat from Austria he also gave up an opportunity to inflict a crippling defeat upon Britain. Napoleon had the opportunity to trap Moore's army against the sea or if he moved with his usual speed, to defeat and force the British to surrender in the Spanish hinterland where there would be no Royal Navy ships to rescue them. Thus, Britain's only available field army would have been lost, giving the sagging French home front a much needed boost, while dealing a blow to Britain's brittle post-Cintra relations with her suspicious Iberian allies. The chief benefit of such a Napoleonic victory, however, would have been felt in British politics were the opposition would have made good use of a unsuccessful campaign that they had opposed from the beginning in the firm belief that it would end in failure, disgracing their military idol, Moore. Canning had adamantly refused to listen to Napoleon's post-Erfurt terms. Maybe the destruction of Moore's army would make Canning more willing to listen to French peace overtures and accept that the Spanish war was over. He admitted, to Brinkman, that the deteriorating situation in Spain prevented him from devoting enough attention to Sweden (where the situation was no better). A few weeks later Canning told the envoy that the opposition would attack his government's failure in Spain. Canning complained that retreat seemed to be uppermost in Moore's mind when Canning wanted the general to take the offensive at all costs. But even Moore was as much an oppositionist, Canning believed, as his parliamentary colleagues.

Canning was saved from a complete Spanish debacle by Napoleon's fortunate decision to leave Soult to finish off Moore. A younger Napoleon would have stayed in Spain whatever the conditions and pursued Moore himself to a victorious close and a possible political victory as well. Only Napoleon's presence could ensure that the French troops were pushed to the limit to capture the British since Soult was not keen to pursue Moore through the wintry Galician mountains. As it was Moore had enough problems as his troops retreated across the mountains of Galicia suffering from the cold, hunger and desertion as much as the Finnish army was. Moore reached Corunna on 11 January but Soult, displayed a caution alien to Napoleon, only attacked on 16 January. Moore died defending his beleaguered army. His countrymen lamented another continental 'calamity' but a tactical setback hid

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23 Harewood. 32. Canning to Portland, 31 Dec. 1808.
two major strategic successes. Moore had not only saved his 26,000 strong army but Portugal as well. 24

III. Clubs, Conspiracies and Coup-Makers.

The Guards' Degradation, the Åland Army's Assassination Plans, the Cederström Club
Conspiracies and other Revolutionary Coup Plans, September 1808 - February 1809.

It was not just in Britain that military setbacks led to political tremors. In Britain a recognised opposition could at least voice their disapproval but in Sweden, where public disapproval of an unpopular war was even stronger, there was no such safety valve. Unlike Britain, where the will to fight on, whatever the odds or defeats facing the country remained strong, the Swedes grew ever more defeatist and despondent from early October to November. They were not inspired to support the king, the British alliance or even to resist the advancing Russian invasion threat (now moving ever closer both in the north and south). Swedish apathy contrasted to the fighting spirit of the Finns who continued to fight their Russian occupiers. The Swedish public was not inspired either by the Spaniards or the Finnish example to overcome their defeatism or political disunity both fanned by Francophile traitors. Those few Britons who remained in Sweden were the target for strong Swedish disapproval. 25

Since the beginning of the war the most outspoken critics of Gustavus IV were to be found among Sweden's army officers but they had remained surprisingly quiet since the Pomeranian campaign. New conspiracies were triggered by Gustavus IV's justified but politically ill-judged decision on 12 October to demote 3 Guards regiments and their 120 noble officers for cowardice, desertion and fraternisation with the enemy during a landing in Finland back in September. 26 None took more violent exception to Gustavus IV's high-handed decision than major Wrangel (the same officer sent to London earlier in the year on behalf of Armfelt) who was stationed with the Åland army at the time. Wrangel, who had a hot temper, begun to plan to assassinate Gustavus IV but his would be assassin,

25 GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 3-24 Oct., 8 Nov. 1808.
private Blå refused to go along with Wrangel's plans. Wrangel's wild assassination plans failed to get any broad support from his fellow Åland army officers most of whom preferred, after Gustavus IV returned to Stockholm unharmed in November, to stage a regular army coup by marching the Åland army on Stockholm. These loose coup plots had to be abandoned when Gustavus IV appointed the reliable general Döbeln to command the Åland army.\textsuperscript{27}

The army conspirators, most of whom were young, junior officers, realised that their plans would fail as long as they did not have a general to lead them. For some reason they chose to approach Armfelt which seemed a strange choice given his reputation for open hearted honesty and conservative Gustavian loyalism. But beneath the \textit{joie de vivre} and 'hail fellow well met' attitude lurked a darker, more complex and conspiratorial side to Armfelt's character that was fully capable of conspiring against his own king. As early as October 1807, following his Pomeranian fiasco and demotion, both of which Armfelt indirectly blamed upon Gustavus IV, Armfelt had a strange meeting with duke Charles at the latter's palace of Rosersdal outside Stockholm. The two men were lifelong opponents, ideologically miles apart and had always affected deep contempt for each other. Yet here they were, at a crucial juncture in the war, behaving like long lost friends. But it was not until the failed Norwegian campaign that Armfelt, following his unceremonious dismissal from command on 15 August, could be counted among Gustavus IV deadliest domestic enemies. A month later, on 18 September, Armfelt revealed his plans to overthrow Gustavus IV by December to his old crony, d'Antraigues, who worked for British intelligence and Canning. Armfelt asked for British support or at least for recognition for the new Swedish government that would replace Gustavus IV. The sources do not reveal if Armfelt got a reply.\textsuperscript{28}

Armfelt's request for British aid raised the question how much the British knew about these conspiracies and what support, if any, they gave to them. In early 1808 Bathurst, the British chargé d'affaires had definite contacts with captain Björnstjerna, who, like many Swedish army officers, was highly critical of Gustavus IV, an attitude which mirrored Bathurst's discontent with his own

\textsuperscript{27} GAF. 221, 223-224, 227, 229; SSK. 132.
\textsuperscript{28} GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 21 Oct. 1808; Ramel. 266, 270, 274; GAF. 213, 215, 217; SSK. 132; Brown 297.
government’s policies. In April Bathurst made oblique references about certain plans while he urged Björnstjerna not to divulge about his contacts with Bathurst to anyone. Nothing came of these plans. 29 In June, a British adventurer of dubious reputation, John Brown, purporting to be the representative of a ‘Constitutional’ Party in Sweden, claimed to have had talks with Canning. If such talks took place Canning proved most unforthcoming. Nor was Brown more successful with Spencer Perceval, whom he claimed took over the talks. Perceval made it clear that the British would not countenance any plans that would harm or kill of Gustavus IV. Canning, who had no love for meddling in the domestic affairs of other countries, broke off the talks on 11 November 1808 to the consternation of Brown. He could not understand how Canning could show such ruthless ‘disregard for civilised behaviour’ at Copenhagen yet such disinterest in ‘saving’ Sweden. Canning had neither reason nor inclination to lament the demise of Gustavus IV if the alliance or at least commercial relations between Sweden and Britain could be preserved. Gustavus IV had proved an expensive, irritating diversion from the main war in Spain and Canning was probably disinterested whether Gustavus IV survived or not. But he probably drew the line at supporting revolutionaries and dealing with shady characters such as Brown. 30

Since the Swedish ministers were unlikely to use violent means to put an end to Gustavus IV’s reign the initiative to do so had to come from somewhere else. It came from a small group of radical young officers, who met between November 1808 and March 1809 in captain Jacob Cederström’s apartment in central Stockholm. Cederström was an oppositionist by inclination and had become embittered by the failure of the Norwegian campaign, which left him crippled. The Cederström conspirators believed that France and Russia had agreed at the Erfurt congress to divide Sweden between them and that Gustavus IV had to be overthrown before the enemy tore the country apart. On Christmas Eve one of the Cederström officers called on Armfelt at his estate, Nynäs, south of Stockholm. The general proved indecisive and a month later proved his unreliability by protesting his loyalty to the king! Obviously another leader had to be found. On 18 January general Adlercreutz arrived in

29 GAF. 210-211, 217-218.
Stockholm. His contacts in the bureaucratic opposition urged him not to join the younger officers' conspiracies. Adlercreutz heeded the advice for the time being.31

The Cederström conspirators, disgusted at the lack of initiative among their cautious superiors, decided at a meeting on 25 January to kidnap Gustavus IV when he travelled through Norrtull to his residence at Haga. A new meeting on 8 February at the 'Beckens' Inn finalised the plan to kidnap Gustavus IV in Waxholm while Armfelt (having returned to the conspiracies) agreed to act as the city's governor. But one of the conspirators, Hans Järta, persuaded his colleagues to drop the plan which was unfortunate since it might have succeeded.32

IV. Uprising.

The Western Army Uprising and Adlersparre's March on Stockholm, 7-13 March 1809.

The Cederström conspirators had proved as indecisive as their superiors and yet again someone else had to 'save' Sweden from 'disaster'. That someone was colonel George Adlersparre, acting commander of the Western army. Despite his disreputable political past as a radical, Adlersparre had, in April 1808, been made a colonel and acting chief of staff to the Western Army on the recommendation of duke Charles. Despite their political differences, Adlersparre and Armfelt were quite similar in many ways and Adlersparre came to support and adopt as his own Armfelt's plans to annex Norway. It was only in December that Adlersparre belatedly began to plot Gustavus IV's overthrow. What triggered Adlersparre's conversion to conspiracy was his conviction that the Erfurt partition plan was true and that unless the fatherland (fosterlandet) was to be carved up, the Swedish army, the ultimate defender of the Nation, had to remove Gustavus IV from power and open peace negotiations with Russia before it was too late. He probably had the tacit support of his Norwegian colleague, prince Christian, to removing the northern 'Don Quixote' and ending a war that was against their common interests.33

31 DSH. XI. 85-87; GAF. 231, 233-238, 242-243; Ramel. 278; SSK. 131, 133.
32 DSH. XI. 85; GAF. 239; Ramel. 278-279; SSK. 133-135.
33 GAF. 212-216, 218, 244-248, 253-258, 260, 279-282; Sjövall. 7-9.
His opportunity to overthrow the king and save Sweden from its doom came in early March when he became commander of the Western army's Värmland detachment. After some last minute dithering, Adlersparre acted and at midnight (5-6 March) 400 of his insurrectionist troops occupied Carlstad. Sweden's first and last military uprising was under way. He realised, if he was not be branded a traitor, like Cronstedt at Sveaborg, for letting the Norwegians into an undefended Värmland, that he had to have prince Christian August's undertaking not to attack. Yet on the other hand time was running out, if he was to occupy Stockholm, for marching to the east. On 9th March, without a firm Norwegian resolution either way, Adlersparre set out for Stockholm with 1,900 men, leaving barely 800 to defend the entire length of the Värmland border with Norway. 

V. Palace Coup or Civil War?

Adlercreutz's 'Arrest' of Gustavus IV, 13 March 1809.

The dramatic revolutionary events in Värmland were a world apart from the capital which remained calm and unaware of Adlersparre's insurrection for days. Those few who knew about the insurrection kept quiet but someone started a rumour going at the 'Stora Sällskapet' Club in Stockholm. On 8 March Gustavus IV ordered an interrogation of one of the rumour mongers. The Stockholm Chief of Police, Edelcreutz, was probably in sympathy with the revolutionary conspirators. Not only could the Cederström Club remain in 'session' for four months with Edelcreutz's apparent knowledge but he also failed to do anything to confirm the rumours. By 11 March Gustavus IV, relying for too much on the loyalty of Edelcreutz, and with no confirmation of the rebellion's existence, came to the disastrous conclusion the rumours were untrue. He remained in blissful ignorance of the real facts for another day when on 12 March a courier arrived in Stockholm having just escaped from Örebro which was occupied by Adlersparre's troops. Gustavus IV immediately mobilised the capital's regular garrison and burgher militia. These troops patrolled the streets and blocked every exit or entry point into Stockholm.

34 GAF. 283-286; SKÅ. VII. 190-198.
Facing a deadly domestic threat to himself that had been, ultimately, caused by his alliance with Britain, Gustavus IV requested British military and pecuniary assistance blaming the insurrection upon his financial problems due to the British failure to provide adequate subsidies. On 12 March he asked Merry for naval support against the rebels and additional subsidies. His demands were unlikely to solicit much sympathy from his ally. Merry believed that Gustavus IV was doomed and that after he was gone, the new revolutionary government would be hostile to Britain. Canning was likely to agree with Merry's sound analysis of the situation and whatever goodwill Canning still had left for Gustavus IV, already lowered by the Moore fiasco, had been totally dissipated by the embargo crisis only a month earlier. The two allies were in fact quite alienated from each other well before the insurrection, and a change of regime would only accelerate a process that had already begun in December 1808. As a practical politician and statesman Canning would have no problem in a change of government. Given the trouble that Gustavus IV had been causing Canning during the last year, such a change might even be welcome if Britain's basic interests vis-à-vis Sweden could be preserved. These were to keep Sweden (if possible) out of the Continental system and if not to preserve, at all costs, British access to Swedish ports and transit rights for her trade to the continent. Canning would also want to keep Sweden out of the clutches of the Franco-Russian coalition to preserve some of the balance of power in the Baltic. Otherwise Canning had no interest in meddling in the domestic politics of Sweden. He was not willing to support a revolution against the king but at the same Canning was not keen to be embroiled in a futile attempt to prop up Gustavus IV either. The swift events in Stockholm between 12-14 March saved the British from having to support Gustavus IV had a regular civil war broke out in Sweden and the only offer, of naval support from Keats on 17 March, came too late to matter anyway.36

Gustavus IV had, therefore, no British support and he was undecided what he should do. Should he make a stand north of the city with his 2,700 troops facing by now Adlersparre's 3,100 insurgents, as Ehrenheim urged him to do or should he march to Norrköping, make a counter attack upon the insurgents from there, or march all the way to Scania to get Toll's support. The king agonised most of the day (12 March) but resolved by midnight to abandon Stockholm. His attempt to take the gold

36 GAR 304-306, 322-324; FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 12 Mar. 1809.
reserves deposited in the central bank met with fierce opposition. At last the various conspiratorial
groups in Stockholm were willing to act and they turned to the far from committed and decisive
Adlercreutz to detain the king. If Gustavus IV was allowed to leave Stockholm he would plunge
Sweden into a civil war when she was just about to be on invaded by Russia. Count Wachtmeister, a
senior minister and the Lord Chancellor, persuaded Adlercreutz to lead the army coup in Stockholm
before it was too late. Adlercreutz was torn between the responsibility of stopping a civil war and the
justified punishment he would suffer if his coup attempt failed. Not surprisingly Adlercreutz spent a
sleepless night (12-13 March) but at 7.00 the following morning, accompanied by marshal Klingspor
and a small number of conspiratorial officers Adlercreutz entered the Palace. Klingspor failed to
persuade an exhausted Gustavus IV (he had spent the night planning his escape to Norrköping) to
remain in Stockholm and was politely told to leave. Adlercreutz entered and demanded in a harsher
tone that the king remain in Stockholm and Gustavus IV, who was astonished at Adlercreutz’s
insolence, ordered him out of his study. Gustavus IV only realised, after a few moments, the real
reason for Adlercreutz’s insolent intrusion and shouted for help. He was disarmed but managed to
grab a sword and escape through a secret passageway to the Palace courtyard. It was only with great
difficulty the officers apprehended Gustavus IV before he reached the Pomeranian Guards stationed in
the palace barracks. Both the Gustavian regime and its alliance with Britain had come to an abrupt
end.37

37 GAF. 341-346; SSK. 142-144; DSH. XI. 88-89
Chapter Nine.

The Twilight Era.

The End of the Common Cause and the Shadow alliance between Sweden and Britain, March 1809-October 1810.

I. Invasion, Insurrection and Incompetence.
A Divided Sweden caught between Two Fires from East and West, March-April 1809.

Not even during the darkest days of the Great Northern War from 1719 to 1721 had Sweden's position been more precarious than in March 1809 as the new revolutionary regime was beset by foes from all sides. Most Swedes remained loyal to Gustavus IV since he was their rightful king, had scant respect for the men (most of whom were members of the previous government that was really responsible for the same problems they accused Gustavus IV of committing) who led the 'new' government and might support a counter revolution. The government itself (as we shall see) was beset by problems from within which did not bode well for its survival as Stockholm faced the prospect of being occupied within a matter of days by the Russian enemy or insurrectionist troops under the command of a radical and unpredictable officer with grandiose political ambitions.

The most acute and serious threat came from the east where the Russians launched an almost simultaneous and co-ordinated three pronged attack against Sweden's eastern coast and frontier. Three widely separate armies attacked towards Stockholm in the south, Umeå in the centre and Torneå in the far north. In view of the domestic turmoil and incompetence that prevailed in most echelons of the Swedish army and government, the Swedish response to the Russian invasion was feeble. What saved Sweden from sharing Finland's fate was the unwillingness of the Russian army high command to thrust deeply across the frozen waste of Sweden and prolong a war that they opposed once they had secured Finland. (The similarities to the Swedish army's attitude to the war was remarkable). Bagration's occupation of Åland (which was only three-four days march away from the Swedish coast) was an acute threat to the virtually defenceless and unfortified capital. The commander of the Swedish Åland army general Döblen (one of the very few Swedish generals with some abilities) had only managed to save his army across the frozen sea of Åland to Grisslehamn by 18 March by tricking Bagration into believing that the new government had opened peace negotiations with Russia. Bagration, when he discovered the truth, was infuriated with Döblen's low
trick and ordered general Kulnev to occupy Grislehamn with 400 Cossacks. The only thing that stood between Bagration's 17,000 troops and Stockholm was Döbeln's 3,500 exhausted and frozen troops. The Swedes now expected the Russians to occupy Norrtälje and Uppsala in preparation for a march on Stockholm. In central Sweden Barclay de Tolly had crossed the Gulf of Bothnia by 18 March and occupied Umeå without resistance on 22 March. Three days later what remained of the Fenno-Swedish army at Torneå, trapped between Barclay's army in the south and general Shuvalov's, advancing from the east, capitulated to the Russians. The Finnish phase of the war was over and it seemed that Sweden, as seen by its army's dismal performance, would soon be occupied by the Russians. Sweden was saved by orders from the new Russian commander in chief on 20 and 29 March for Kulnev and de Tolly's forces to return to the Finnish coast. Arakchayev's (the Russian minister of war) angry counter orders for the advance to continue only arrived when the armies were back in Finland.1

The new government, aptly named Noah's Ark, instead of dealing with the acute Russian threat were more worried about a possible British attack upon Carlscrona. The naval base was put on full military alert on 18 March yet despite the real Russian threat (rather than imaginary British 'threat') the government decided not to send the Stockholm garrison to reinforce Döbeln's forces on the Uppland coast since they needed to keep an eye on Adlersparre when his army arrived in Stockholm.2 'Noah's Ark' was therefore more concerned to play dangerous games of domestic politics when faced with an acute foreign invasion. To them the most dangerous enemy was not the Russians approaching from the east but Adlersparre's insurgents from the west. The conservative majority in the government, led by Adlercreutz, were most concerned to calm the fears of the Swedish army officers and bureaucrats that there would be no revolutionary purge. Adlersparre, in the eyes of Adlercreutz and his fellow conservatives, a dangerous radical and egoistic intriguer, had very different ideas. Adlersparre had not taken the risk associated with rebellion in order to desist from a full revolution and clean out the government bureaucracy of those officials who had done Gustavus IV's work. On 22 March

1 Hornborg. 233-243; SKÅ. VIII. 275-423.; SKÅ. IX. 44-67.; BFK. 282-310; Matz. 29-34; DSH. XI. 91.; SSK. 102-119; Quennerstedt. II. 123-133.; SSK. 107-112.; DSH. XI. 91; Anglica. 513.
Lagerbjelke to Brinkman, 27 Mar., 3, 13 Apr.1809.

2 SKÅ. IX. 35-41, 115-116, 119-122.
Adlersparre, dramatically mounted on a white charger, marched into Stockholm with 3,500 troops, made the Westman House on Drottninggatan his HQ (which he ringed with artillery and troops), quartered his troops in the adjoining quarters of the city and sent out frequent patrols to instil fear among his numerous enemies. To this ambitious, paranoid would-be dictator and warm admirer of Napoleon, the enemy was the conservatives led by Adlercreutz. Both Armfelt, now a minor and declining member in the revolutionary military-led junta that actually ruled Sweden, and Adlercreutz would both have dearly loved to have sent Adlersparre's arrogant soldiery to fight the Russians. But Adlersparre held the initiative and had the largest army against which the government only had 2,900 troops under Klingspor's command. Adlersparre set up his own police force which dealt roughly and summarily with any suspected Gustavian or counter revolutionary. ³

II. Peace at any Price.
The Revolutionary Regime's Rush to make Peace with the Common Enemies and Cut links with Britain, March-August 1809.

The new regime's preoccupation with internal squabbles when Sweden was on the edge of extinction as a state typified a regime that had no clear policies beyond gaining peace at any cost whatever the sacrifices that Sweden had to make. It has been claimed in the new regime's defence that Gustavus IV had undermined Sweden's position so much that the country had to accept the bad terms that her enemies deigned to present in return for peace. Indeed Gustavus IV may have given the revolutionary regime a bad hand of diplomatic cards in which to play against her antagonists but the ministers were not good poker players. Ehrenheim was the only one of them that had a clear and logical approach to the peace process which, if it was to succeed, had to be gradual and cautious. This way Sweden would manage to play her antagonists off against one another, her terms would be better and the few cards she held on her hand would be played out with maximum effect in the negotiations. The main plank of Ehrenheim's sensible policy was to maintain the British alliance as long as possible until a real commitment to peace had been discerned from the enemy side. Both Ehrenheim and duke Charles assured Merry, therefore, of their unchanged loyalty to the alliance and the friendship with Britain. Merry was unconvinced since Adlersparre (at this time on his way to Stockholm) was known as a

³ Staf. 313-316; Ramel. 280-282.
'dangerous' radical and rabid Francophile of whom only the worst could be expected and Merry was convinced, even prior to Adlersparre's occupation of Stockholm, that the new regime was only playing for time, in order to make approaches to the enemy and avoid a premature conflict with Britain. As if to confirm Merry's worst fears Ehrenheim made the mistake of telling him, on 19 March, that while it would impossible to maintain their previously close political relations Ehrenheim hoped that their flourishing trade relations would be preserved.4

It seems pointless for Sweden to have burnt her bridges with Britain before she had got a firm footing in the peace negotiations with her enemies and to admit this to Merry seems even more pointless at this stage. Almost as soon as Charles was officially appointed Regent he had made appeals to Sweden's enemies to open armistice and peace talks. He hoped that Napoleon would intervene on Sweden's behalf in the Swedish peace talks with Denmark and Russia.5 Nothing could have been more baseless or false than the new regime's shortsighted and narrow hero worship of Napoleon whom they now viewed, despite much previous evidence to the contrary, as Sweden's protector and most viable friend. Napoleon did not view Sweden as a basically friendly power and nor was she important enough to warrant an intervention on Sweden's behalf which could only sour relations with his allies. Charles and other Swedish Francophiles were to persist in this false premise for years to come at the expense of Swedish interests. When Adlersparre occupied Stockholm and gained undue influence with the government that misplaced view would become the guiding star of Sweden's foreign policy. Unfortunately the cautious and sober Ehrenheim was replaced by Adlersparre's new won 'friend' Gustav Lagerbjelke, who thus reinforced his well earned reputation for unreliability and disloyalty. Lagerbjelke became temporary foreign minister and although not without abilities, he lacked character, judgement and basic sound common sense. In Lagerbjelke's eyes all of Sweden's previous problems stemmed from her 'damaging and unnatural' connection with Britain and all connections with Britain had to be severed as quickly as possible but without causing a rupture with Britain. By doing so and putting all possible faith in Napoleon's goodwill and good offices Sweden

4 FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 Mar. 1809; USSUM. 4-6.
5 Granberg. II. 146. Charles to Alexander I, 18 Mar. 1809; ibid. 147. Charles to Napoleon, 17 Mar. 1809; ibid. 148. Charles to Frederick VI, 23 Mar. 1809.
would improve her bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia. On 29 March Lagerbjelke prevailed on duke Charles to send another obsequious letter to Napoleon imploring him to intervene in Sweden's talks with Russia and save Finland for Sweden.6

With a foreign minister with such sentiments and prejudices it was small wonder that Canning, at a meeting with Brinkman on 29 March, failed completely to respond to Brinkman's comments that he hoped that Britain would not do anything premature against Sweden. Brinkman had no further meetings with Canning in April and early May while the British government remained silent about Sweden's increasingly unfriendly attitude.7 In the meantime Lagerbjelke's weakly based pro-French foreign policy 'system' had foundered even before it had been allowed to begin since Napoleon refused, in his reply on 12 April, to intervene in any fashion in Sweden's talks with her enemies.8 Lagerbjelke discovered too late that he still needed Britain since that power was Sweden's only support, unreliable or not, but his efforts to rebuild relations with Merry, who both disliked and distrusted him, came too late and were viewed, quite rightly, as opportunistic and insincere by the British envoy. On 21 April Lagerbjelke met Merry to persuade him not to take his leave of absence but to remain in Sweden indefinitely since his departure would weaken the new regime's standing both domestically and internationally. His departure was deemed so damaging to Swedish morale that duke Charles and Lagerbjelke had kept it secret not only from the general public but even some of the Swedish ministers. This state of affairs Lagerbjelke could largely blame upon his own mistakes. The time seemed ripe, with British support, to overthrow an increasingly unpopular regime. Two counter revolutionary conspirators called at Merry's residence on 21 and 25 April with plans to restore Gustavus IV. Merry, however, made it clear that he did not see that such a regime would be feasible when Gustavus IV's previous period in power had ended in such spectacular failure. How would it, even with massive British support, be able to survive? Merry turned down the conspirators' plans.9 Britain may have had no wish to restore the troublesome Gustavus IV to power but that did not mean that its government was any keener about the new Swedish regime. On 18 May Canning told

6 USSUM. 10-11, 25-26; FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 28 Mar.1809.
8 Granberg. 11.151-152. Napoleon to Charles, 12 Apr.1809.
9 FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 14, 21, 25 Apr.1809; Anglica. 513. Lagerbjelke to Brinkman, 17 Apr., 1 May 1809.
Brinkman that Britain would not recognise the new order in Sweden by replacing Merry with a new envoy. Canning was not pleased at the growing French influence that Lagerbjelke's appointment had signified, but events elsewhere prevented Canning from giving his full, undivided attention to Swedish affairs.\(^{10}\)

Count Lars von Engeström's coming to office as foreign secretary in early June boded well for an Anglo-Swedish rapprochement and Engeström could not believe Canning was as cold as Brinkman reported given the naval support Saumarez had given and was continuing to give Sweden. Engeström claimed that the Anglo-Swedish alliance and its subsidy agreement was still in operation but that Canning had to recognise Charles XIII's new dignity as king.\(^{11}\) In mid June Engeström repeated his attempt to revive the moribund alliance through appeals to Foster and Brinkman simultaneously. Engeström claimed that Canning had to support Sweden to preserve her independence and prevent Russia from gaining hegemony over the whole of the eastern part of the Baltic. Even worse would be for Russia to conquer Sweden too which would make Russia a very dangerous opponent of Britain. That same month the Swedes had finally begun negotiations with the Russians. Stedingk, accompanied by general Skjöldebrand, had reached Fredrikshamn in Russian Finland where they were to hold talks for the following three months with Rumyantsev and the former Russian envoy in Stockholm, David Alopeus.\(^{12}\)

Canning left Engeström's belated overtures unanswered for over two months since he had no meeting with Brinkman at all from May to August.\(^{13}\) He only informed Brinkman by letter that he was not hostile to Charles XIII or the Swedish government but Britain would not acknowledge Brinkman's appointment as envoy of that government. But Canning hoped that Brinkman would remain in London to continue informal diplomatic relations.\(^{14}\) Unofficially Brinkman was told that Britain did not want to be the first European power to recognise the change of ruler in Sweden but that this was

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\(^{10}\) Anglica. 509. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 15, 18, 26, 28 May 1809.
\(^{11}\) BLA. 66. Engeström to Brinkman, 7 June 1809.
\(^{12}\) BLA. 66. Engeström to Brinkman, 13 June 1809; FO 73/56. Foster to Canning, 13 June 1809.
\(^{13}\) KUB: 395. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 15, 16, 20, 23, 27, 30 June, 7, 8, 11, 14, 18, 21, 25, 29 July 1809.
\(^{14}\) BLA.66. Canning to Brinkman, 10 July 1809.
not a sign that Britain did not support the preservation of Sweden's independence or the peace process. On 16 August Brinkman finally met with Canning who assured him officially this time that Britain supported Sweden's independence and that the non-recognition of Charles XIII was only a delay, not an outright refusal. Canning declined however to tell Brinkman when Britain would recognise Charles XIII. In the meantime Canning pledged Saumarez's full naval support for combined operations against Russia when Brinkman explained that Russian demands for the border revision in the north of Sweden and for retaining Åland was unacceptable and would have to be reduced by the resort to arms against her army.

III. Wagram, Walcheren and Wellington.
The Anglo-Austrian War against Napoleon, April-October 1809.

Canning had preserved a minimum of support for Sweden which did not however restore the old alliance with that country. The main reason was his pre-occupation with the conduct of the war in general, which did not leave much time or money to spare for Sweden. Canning was most interested in Austria's growing belligerence against Napoleon. Having made an impressive recovery since Austerlitz, Austria now hoped to exploit Napoleon's pre-occupation with Spain to strike a powerful blow at his German possessions and transform former humiliations into victory. The question in Vienna, from December 1808, was not if but only when Austria would plunge into war with Napoleon. By the spring of 1809 200,000 Austrian troops were amassed along the German border and 140,000 faced Italy and Poland. Alexander I, far from being the pillar of support Napoleon had hoped he would be, had encouraged Austria's belligerence by assuring Vienna that his support of Napoleon would only be of a token nature. The French were taken by surprise by the Austrian offensive across the Bavarian frontier in April and it was only with the greatest effort that Napoleon managed to stem their offensive. His recovery came to a premature end when the Austrians defeated him at Aspern-Essling on 22 May.

17 Bond. 6; Chandler. 663-664, 666-669, 671-673, 676-707; Rothenberg. 159-161, 168-180, 188-199; Gill. 22-33, 39-43.
Austria hoped that this victory would spark a German insurrection on the Spanish scale but Prussian neutrality ensured that it never materialised. One Prussian, Major Schill, did not accept neutrality and left Berlin with a small force on 28 April. His foray into Westphalia did not ignite the insurrection he had hoped and he was forced to flee to the dubious sanctuary of Stralsund where he was killed on 31 May. (Had not Sweden and Britain both been pre-occupied with their own troubles they might have been able to intervene with some effect at Schill's side). Only Tyrol fought the French (and Bavarian) occupation forces with Spanish style ferocity between April and October 1809. The Spanish example had therefore set a precedent for the escalation of the war and by 1809 it was not just mere armies but entire nations that were fighting full scale wars with each other.\(^{18}\)

Napoleon was therefore fortunate that he did not face a full scale rebellion in Germany when his armies were stretched to the limit by fighting simultaneously in Spain and Austria. Had the allies united against him while Germany exploded into bloody insurrection, then Napoleon would have faced the same kind of disaster that overwhelmed him four years later. As it was, the disunity of the European powers ensured that he could defeat them, one by one, year after year. His victory over Austria at Wagram (5-6 July) was dearly bought enough and he was hard pressed to force Francis II to agree to the draconian peace he imposed and this peace did not end of his troubles. For underneath the surfeit of collaborators, Germany remained restless and on 23 October a fanatical German nationalist tried to kill Napoleon, giving him a forceful reminder that Europe chafed under his increasingly tyrannical rule.\(^{19}\)

Austria had hoped that Britain would be able to intervene early and forcefully on the continent against France to divert Napoleon's attention away from central Europe but Britain's pre-occupation with Spain prevented Britain from giving Austria immediate financial and military succour. Nevertheless by late July 40,000 troops landed on the Dutch coast in the largest British landing on the continent (outside Iberia) during the war. Castlereagh hoped to capture Antwerp (thus removing the French fleet there and a potential invasion threat) while giving Austria much needed relief. But the

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18 Gill. 24, 33-34, 44, 46, 35, 45; BLA. 66. Wetterstedt to Brinkman, 7 June 1809.
19 Chandler. 707-735; Rothenberg. 168-218; Gill. 34-43, 44-45, 47-58,60-61.
expedition came too late (after Wagram) and the commander of the expedition, general Lord Chatham, was too old and lethargic to make a good leader of an operation that required speed and force to succeed. The British, nevertheless, made rapid progress up the Scheldt but paused long enough for general Bernadotte to counterattack with 30,000 and on 14 September, having lost 4,000 men to disease, Chatham was forced to withdraw from the Dutch coast (they stayed on Walcheren until December). Neither the British public or Parliament were willing to tolerate another Continental fiasco and as four years earlier a Tory administration had lost the confidence of the nation due to military failure on the continent. To add to the cabinet’s increasing problems, Canning and Castlereagh came to blows about the responsibility for this latest military fiasco. On 21 September the two ministers had a pistol duel on Putney Heath where Canning was wounded. Five days later the entire cabinet resigned as Britain was plunged into political turmoil which enabled Howick and Grenville to plan their return to office (as the Whigs and Grenvillites had done when Pitt fell from power).20

Castlereagh’s failure at Walcheren overshadowed his sounder decision to reactivate the Peninsular war by sending Wellesley back to Portugal where his arrival, in Lisbon on 22 April, was greeted by large crowds carrying banners exhorting their ally to conquer or die. The memory of Cintra faded as Wellesley won the battles of Oporto (12 May) and Talavera (27-28 July). The arrival of news of these victories softened the blow to British morale from allied setbacks in western and central Europe.21 Following the failure of the Buenos Aires operation two years earlier, the British had quite sensibly avoided large scale operations outside Europe but Castlereagh’s expansion of the army allowed Britain to act not only in Holland and Iberia but also take the offensive worldwide. In January and July, respectively, the British occupations of Santo Domingo and French Guyana crippled French power and privateering operations in the West Indies. The occupation of French Senegal on the west coast of Africa and the Indian ocean island of Réunion reduced French power and influence in both regions. In September the British occupied the Ionian islands (except for Corfu) which lessened the French

threat to the Balkans. Only an unauthorised occupation of Iceland (June-22 August) by the Danish renegade Jorgensen failed to lead to a permanent increase in British power. Otherwise the successes in the Peninsula and overseas compensated for British and allied setbacks on the continent.

Sweden, pre-occupied with her own problems, only showed passing interest in these dramatic events. Charles XIII, like his myopic ministers, were only interested in these events in so far as they affected Sweden directly. They feared their naive plans for Swedish neutrality would be jeopardised by increased British hostility against Napoleon following the Walcheren fiasco. It did not occur to them that it was Napoleon rather than Britain that was the greatest threat to their plans.

IV. The Real Price of Peace.
The Failure of the Westerbotten Expedition, the Loss of Finland to Russia at Fredrikshamn and the Peace Treaties with Denmark and France, August 1809 - January 1810.

It was not only Austria and Britain that trusted military operations to improve their political fortunes and diplomatic positions that summer but Sweden as well. By landing behind the Russian army in Westerbotten the Swedes hoped to trap and defeat it, which would strengthen Sweden's bargaining position at the Fredrikshamn peace talks. A successful expedition could save Åland and all the land up to the Kemi river which would give Sweden some security following the fall of Finland to Russia. More hinged upon the Westerbotten expedition for Sweden than the Walcheren one for Britain but the Swedes repeated Castlereagh's mistake by appointing an old, unenterprising general to command the expedition, which ensured its eventual failure. As the expedition set sail from Norrtälje expectations for success were high but both Charles XIII and Engeström were not optimistic. On 16 August some 8,000 troops landed on the coast but they failed to capture Umeå and encircle the Russian army which managed to escape northwards. On 2 September the Swedes were forced to sign an indefinite military truce with the Russians which marked the de facto end of the Russo-Swedish war and despite putting

a brave face on the defeat, the Swedish government realised that Åland and northern Sweden up to Kemi were irretrievably lost forever.25

Sweden's former ally, Britain, had a vital role to play in these operations since it was only Saumarez's naval co-operation that enabled the Swedes to take the initiative against Russia since she was not obliged to disperse her naval forces to guard the coastline against Danish and Russian ships. When, in May 1809, Saumarez returned to the Baltic he continued his full naval collaboration with Sweden as if no revolution had taken place at all. On 18 May Saumarez pledged his full support for Sweden. Sweden could, therefore, with Saumarez keeping an eye on Denmark transfer their gunboats from the Sound to Stockholm to deter a seaborne Russian invasion. Saumarez's support also enabled them to send the expedition to Westerbotten and had it succeeded Saumarez had pledged his support for a landing and occupation of Åland. When it failed, Saumarez was almost as bitterly disappointed as the Swedes.26

As the Swedes had failed to improve their bargaining position by the sword and Saumarez could not compensate this failure with an attack on the Russian fleet bases, the Swedes were forced, reluctantly, to restart negotiations with the Russians. Sweden's bargaining position had been seriously weakened by the Westerbotten fiasco making the loss of Finland more certain.27 Once minor diplomatic matters had been cleared up28, the serious diplomatic business of hard bargaining could begin about the Russian demands for Åland and the Kax river border. At Fredrikshamn Stedingk returned to the diplomatic fray and demanded, on 5 September, that Sweden retain Åland and all the land up to the


26 SPBC. 77-78, 89-90. Nauckhoff to Saumarez, 16 May, 16 June 1809; SPBC. 78-80, 103-104. Saumarez to Foster, 18 May, 8 Sept. 1809; ibid. 80-81. Saumarez to Keats, 19 May 1908; ibid. 81-82. Saumarez to Pole, 20 May 1809; ibid. 84-85. Admiral Stedingk to Saumarez, 4 June 1809, ibid. 85-86. Krusenstjerna to Saumarez, 4 June 1809; ibid. 86-87. Tawast to Bertie, 6 June 1809; ibid. 87-88. Puke to Saumarez, 7 June 1809, ibid. 89-90. Nauckhoff to Saumarez, 16 June 1809; ibid. 95-96. Hahn to Saumarez, 11 Jul. 1809; ibid. 97-98,100-102. Platen to Saumarez, 4, 12, 23 Aug. 1809.

27 Schück. 240-241. Skjöldebrand to his sister, 2 Sept. 1809.

28 RDMF. Alopecus to Rumyantsev, 5 Sept. 1809.
Kemi river. Rumyantsev believed the Swedes were stalling for time in order to prepare another expedition. Caulaincourt agreed and told that him Russia had to keep Åland since to acquire Finland without the archipelago was like buying a trunk without the keys. Caulaincourt's deft analogy was quite accurate since Åland was the key to Finland but the archipelago was also the keyhole that peered straight into the heart of Sweden and had to be plugged if Sweden was to have any security from what was seen as a constant Russian threat to the country's precarious independence. Rumyantsev's solution to the diplomatic impasse, whatever his Francophile reputation, was to make a deal with the Swedes at the expense of the French. He proposed to the Swedes that if Russia retained Åland then Sweden could forego the dubious honour of membership to the Continental system. Both Stedingk and Skjöldébrand were suitably unimpressed with Rumyantsev's generosity since he refused to guarantee Finland's autonomy or for the new 'state' to take its share of Sweden's huge war debts. Both Stedingk, the essence of polished diplomacy, and Skjöldébrand, a temperamental Swedish officer, lost their patience and a furious argument about the border lines ensued. Skjöldébrand, who was an Arctic expert and explorer, suggested that the new border be drawn along the Torne river, between the Kemi and Kalix river. Unless the Torne river became Sweden's new northern land border with Russia he would rather be tortured on the rack than sign a treaty that in addition to Åland left Russia to gain all of Finnish Lapland up to the Kalix river. Under pressure to end a long and fruitless war which weakened Russia's ability to stand up to Napoleon in Europe, Rumyantsev finally relented on 12 September and accepted Skjöldébrand's Torne river border. Five days later the treaty of Fredrikshamn was signed, a month later it was ratified and Stedingk returned to St. Petersburg to pick up the pieces of Russo-Swedish relations.

Peace had returned to the north after eighteen months of the most disastrous war in Sweden's history and one of more successful that Russia had fought. But even for the Russians the war and the subsequent victory was unsatisfactory and left a sour taste in the mouth. Only the emperor, Rumyantsev and fellow Francophile admiral Chichagov saw any reason to rejoice at the acquisition of

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29 Hamnström. 97.
30 TSLUB. C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 3 Oct. 1809.; Hamnström. 97-100.
31 Schück. 241. Skjöldébrand to his sister, 10 Sept. 1809; Hamnström. 103-104.
32 Hamnström. 101-105, 107; Grade. 414-416; SUPH. III. 129-130.
Finland. Their jubilation was not shared by the emperor's subjects or even immediate family (including his influential sister Duchess Catherine). A war that Alexander I had proclaimed prematurely to be at an end in May 1808 had in fact dragged on for another year and a half. This war, that was seen by a majority of Russians as both unnecessary and unfairly waged against a weak neighbour, contributed not only to undermining Russia's foreign trade but also, by diverting precious troops, contributed to the stalemate in the war in the Balkans against the Turks, which most Russians believed was a more important front. Finland was thus the meagre fruit of the unpopular Tilsit pact with Napoleon, instead of the rich Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia that the Russians had hoped to gain from it. Russian disillusionment with the Tilsit pact's meagre results were fully matched by the French, who were angered with Rumyantsev's failure to force the recalcitrant Swedes into the Continental system and Caulaincourt's sarcastic comments unnerved Rumyantsev.

The peace of Fredrikshamn was therefore yet another nail in the coffin for the ailing Franco-Russian alliance. Nor did it resolve Russia's strategic anxieties about St. Petersburg's security or the stability of her vulnerable north western flank. The Swedes were not reconciled to the permanent loss of Finland and, as seen earlier, were resolved with French help, to regain it. Unless Russia found Sweden a territorial compensation for the loss of Finland she would face a vengeful Sweden hovering like a storm cloud about to burst on her new Finnish border. This was to remain a strategic nightmare for the Russians right up to 1812 as the Franco-Russian alliance gradually transformed itself into open enmity. The Russians therefore faced the unpalatable prospect of a two front war should Napoleon offer enough incentives, such as Norway and Finland, for Sweden to join his alliance and a possible invasion of Russia. Many Swedes, including Wetterstedt, relished such a prospect and had pre-empted Napoleon's 1812 plans by wishing for such an invasion of Russia already in late 1809.

33 Grade. 417; Hartley. 96-98.
34 Grade. 417; Hartley. 96.
35 Grade. 418, 421.
36 SPBC. 105-106. Hahn to Saumarez, 14 Sept. 1809.
37 HBATL. 226-227. Wetterstedt to Essen, 23 Sept. 1809.
Once peace had been restored with Russia it was only a question of time and patient negotiations before peace was restored with Denmark and France too. After all there had hardly been any fighting with Denmark since 1808 and none with France at all, except at sea, against French privateers operating from Stettin and Danzig. Peace with Denmark was delayed by the Danish demand that the Swedes shut their ports to British privateers which the Swedes refused since it might complicate relations with Britain and had not been matched by any Danish undertaking to do the same with the French ones which preyed on Swedish shipping. It was only by 14 November, therefore, that the Danish and Swedish peace delegates met in Jönköping in central Sweden. Adlerberg, the former envoy to London who headed the Swedish delegation, was astounded when the Danes failed even to mention Swedish membership of the Continental system. The Danes had shown themselves even more lukewarm adherents of Napoleon's economic blockade than the Russians and on 10 December therefore without a major hitch peace was signed with Denmark on the basis of 'status quo ante bellum'.

Most politically conscious Swedes outside the government realised that Napoleon would not be so easy to make peace with as the Danes. Unfortunately that common sense view did not extend to the Swedish government and it was in vain that Brinkman tried to get his superiors, especially Lagerbjelke and Engeström, to stop looking through their rose tinted glasses and stare reality in the face. He urged them to be more positive about the British, make use of the former alliance to rebuild Anglo-Swedish relations and not place all their diplomatic cards on Napoleon.

It came as no surprise that the Swedish government, which formed reality to fit its ideological perceptions just as Gustavus IV had done, did not heed his sensible advice. In August Lagerbjelke set out for Paris brimming with misplaced optimism and in the mistaken belief that Napoleon would intervene in the Fredrikshamn talks in Sweden's favour. As if that was not enough, he seriously thought that Napoleon would accept that Sweden stayed a real neutral in the Anglo-French war and was allowed to carry on her lucrative trade with Britain. It staggers the imagination where such illusions could have originated but must be a sign that the post revolutionary euphoria lingered on in

38 HSH. III. 138-139. Adlerberg to Adlersparre, 28 Nov. 1809; ibid. Adlerberg to Engeström, 14 Nov. 1809; KB. Autografssamlingen. (Engeström). Engeström to Lagerbring, 12 Dec. 1809; Grade. 444-445; SUPH. III. 131-132.
the government's ranks. Lagerbjelke was in for a rude shock. When he arrived in Paris in September his neutrality proposals, presented on 9 November, were completely ignored. As if to serve to increase French arrogance towards and contempt for the new Swedish government, Charles XIII had agreed to send a private mission under Tibell, who outdid even Lagerbjelke in fawning admiration of Napoleon and obsequious Francophilia. The sending of a private mission led by an amateur diplomat served not only to undermine Lagerbjelke's official mission but showed to the whole world how disunited, disorganised and all too eager the Swedes were to gain peace with France at almost any terms and which the French exploited ruthlessly for their own benefit. Napoleon was not, however, prone to negotiate terms with small powers lacking bargaining power. He simply dictated irrevocable preconditions that had to be fulfilled by the other, weaker part under threat of military force. But the reach of Napoleon's writ and threats only stretched as far as his armies could march and unless his armies could use Denmark for a winter invasion Sweden was beyond his reach. Nor was Russia likely, yet again, to scrape the Swedish chestnuts out of the fire for Napoleon by threatening Sweden so shortly after Fredrikshamn. In fact the Russian envoy in Paris urged the Swedes to resist the French demands (no doubt to use Sweden as a conduit for trade with Britain) and intervened to keep Sweden out of the Continental system. Some Swedes, like the new finance minister Järta, the former member of the Cederström club, believed the Russians were right. With British naval protection, Russian diplomatic support and Danish indifference to Napoleon's northern aims, Sweden might have been able to resist Napoleon's demands. Most of Sweden's new rulers did not care that Pomerania would have remained under French occupation preferring to save her neutrality and British trade instead. Nevertheless, blinded by their fear of Napoleon's exaggerated military power and Russophobia, which prevented them from exploiting Franco-Russian differences for Sweden's benefit, in January 1810 the Swedes signed a peace with France dictated by Napoleon.41

During her talks with the continental powers Sweden had to throw worried side glances at London to monitor possible negative British reactions to these negotiations. The collapse of the Portland administration left Britain without a proper government for a considerable time since it was not until

3 October that Spencer Perceval was nominated as Prime minister. But no politician of calibre could be found to replace Canning who remained as temporary foreign secretary. Canning's fall from power was genuinely regretted by Engeström since he would have wished that such a sharp and cool headed minister would have remained to guide British foreign policy when Anglo-Swedish relations were facing turbulent change. The Swedish government's first worry was how the British would react to the news of the Russo-Swedish peace talks. On 15 September Engeström told Foster that peace with Russia, on Russian terms, was about to be signed which meant Saumarez could still use Swedish ports but that British depots at Gothenburg and Carlshamn had to be emptied as fast as possible. On 24 September Engeström informed August Foster, the British chargé d'affaires, that an embargo would be placed on British ships and goods in Swedish ports on 1 November and that the British trade depots in Swedish ports had to be shut. Foster told them that he had hoped they would have extended the deadline until 1 January and Hierta, who as finance minister was most keen to continue trade with Britain, extend deadline to 12 November which Wetterstedt claimed gave the British plenty of time to escape the imposition of the reluctant Swedish blockade.

On 6 October Charles Bagot, the under-secretary at the Foreign Office, assured Brinkman that the British would not break off trading relations with Sweden just because of the trade embargo. Both regretted that Canning was leaving office when his services were needed more than ever to avert an Anglo-Swedish crisis. That very same day Canning sent Brinkman a letter where he stated his regret at the losses Sweden had made in the peace with Russia but supported Sweden's peace endeavours. Brinkman was in fact relieved and satisfied that the British reaction to the terms of Fredrikshamn had been muted. Brinkman believed that Britain would only announce her trade policy towards Sweden after the signing of Sweden's peace with France and Canning assured Brinkman that Britain would not react with haste. Bathurst became temporary foreign secretary on 13 October. His response to the Fredrikshamn treaty was very moderate and he claimed in talks with Brinkman that

44 FO 73/57. Foster to Canning, 15, 22, 24 Sept. 1809.
the British government did not intend to prevent convoys to sail for Sweden or retaliate against the imposition of the Swedish blockade (forced upon her by the Fredrikshamn Treaty with Russia). But Adlersparre's presence in Gothenburg, to oversee the imposition of the blockade, aroused British merchants' fears that the Swedes would confiscate cargoes and their ships in Swedish ports. If this was carried out then one of the very last links with the continent would be cut and many merchants wanted all-out war on all continental shipping in retaliation. The Swedes in their turn feared that the British would attack Carlscrona. Fortunately neither the Swedish or British governments shared these alarmist views and Brinkman did everything to propagate against them and the view among many British merchants that the loss of Åland had made Sweden unable to defend British trading interests against Russian influence. 48

These exaggerated and unsubstantiated fears were not shared by the British government which was quite pleased with the very moderate terms of the peace with Denmark at Jönköping. It was now the Swedish merchants' turn to get worried about British policies since the British squadron on Sweden's west coast had seized a Swedish vessel in Marstrand and now refused to release it. Swedish ship owners and merchants feared that this heralded a return to British policies in the 1790s prior to the treaty of London. It did not seem so, and the British assured the Swedes this was only an individual case that in no way heralded a general assault upon neutral or Swedish shipping in general. Engeström on his part assured the British that if they refrained from retaliation then Anglo-Swedish trade, which could not be continued openly with the peace with France, could be carried on by smuggling under American or other neutral flag. 49

V. Sweden Between Scylla and Charbydis
The Covert Common Cause, the Anglo-Swedish Circumvention of the Continental System and the Second Swedish 'Revolution', January-November 1810.

Sweden's peace negotiations had naturally completely overshadowed Anglo-Swedish relations and once Sweden had made peace with her former enemies this would obviously affect these relations.

Because neither Russia, Denmark or even France had been too insistent upon forcing Sweden to join the Continental system the Swedish government hoped to avoid a total cessation of diplomatic relations or an open conflict with her former ally. (It was never to be realised nor was it an realistic ambition). Brinkman therefore told Wellesley, when he saw the new foreign secretary on 14 January, about Sweden's reluctant adherence to the Continental system. Both agreed that it would serve neither side's interests if the British retaliated against the blockade by adopting 'search and seize' style of inspecting Swedish shipping as in the past. Wellesley claimed that he was satisfied that the more odious French measures against British trade had not been inserted in the Franco-Swedish peace treaty and that his government was determined to give all possible protection to Swedish shipping which after all carried mainly British goods. But he refused to give a firm answer to Brinkman's request that his government recognise Charles XIII which prompted Brinkman to state clearly that his continued residence in London under those circumstances was impossible since Napoleon could use this as an excuse to provoke a conflict with Sweden.  

On 29 January Engeström met Foster to reveal the terms of the Paris peace treaty which revealed the true state of Sweden's adherence. The few concessions that Sweden had gained at Fredrikshamn and Jönköping had in fact been signed away by the supine Swedes (as Foster saw it) since the initial French leniency, to allow a limited amount of licensed Anglo-Swedish trade, had only been a tactical feint to get the Swedes to sign the treaty. Napoleon insisted upon Sweden's strict adherence to the Continental system but Engeström tried to soften the blow to Foster by pointing out that their mutual trade could be carried on through an elaborate system of smuggling. Engeström was mistakenly and inordinately pleased with the Paris agreement which in his mind had secured Anglo-Swedish trade and he hoped that the British would keep to their promise not to harm Swedish trade or shipping interests in return for France's moderation and Sweden's honourable disengagement from Britain.  

51 FO 73/60. 29, 30 Jan., 2 Feb.1810.  
Engeström was afraid that full diplomatic relations with Britain could complicate relations with Napoleon and he used Britain’s refusal to recognise Charles XIII as an excuse to end Brinkman’s mission to London. 53 On 12 February Brinkman was privately informed that he was being recalled but that he was excuse his return to Sweden for private, not official, reasons since the Swedes had no interest in jeopardising Anglo-Swedish relations even if full diplomatic relations were ended. 54 Brinkman admitted privately that he was glad to end his stay in London but not because of the British government’s attitude towards his status but because of his political misgivings about the new Swedish regime. Many viewed his personal loyalty to Gustavus IV as disloyal to the present regime and some even branded him counter revolutionary. He was especially irritated with the self-congratulatory and arrogant attitude of the new ministers. 55 The government he represented was rocked by dissension within when Adlersparre, ‘Our volatile Achilles’, threatened to resign 56 while outside it was beset by its conservative enemies. 57 Prince Christian August who had been chosen as Swedish Crown prince and changed his name to Charles Augustus, might be able to impose some sort of unity and direction on a divided and quarrelsome group of ministers. He had plans to end the endemic corruption and incompetence that flourished in the government but Foster predicted that he would meet stiff resistance. 58 At least the exile of Gustavus IV, who left Sweden when Charles Augustus arrived, reduced the risk for a counter-revolution. 59 Prince Charles’s arrival and the former king’s exile was very timely since Charles XIII suffered a minor stroke in late 1809 60 which it took the king some time to recover from. 61

In London the final meeting with Wellesley was interminably delayed from January to February. 62 On 6 March Wellesley told Brinkman at a very brief meeting that he had to consult with his

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54 BLA. 67. Engeström to Brinkman, 8, 12, 15 Feb. 1810.
56 HBATL. 316-318. d’Abedyhl to unknown, 2 Jan. 1810.
57 HBATL. 308. Engeström to Essen, 2 Jan. 1810.
58 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 22, 25 Jan. 1810.
60 FO 73/57. Foster to Bathurst, 26 Nov. 1809.; HBATL. 308. Engeström to Essen, 2 Jan. 1810.
ministerial colleagues before he gave Brinkman the final British answer in response to the Franco-Swedish peace treaty. Wellesley had simply agreed to Brinkman leaving the Swedish mission in London in the hands of a chargé d'affaires similarly to Foster had in Stockholm. Brinkman had expressed the hope that the British would not use force against Swedish shipping. Wellesley did not respond. This continued silence on the part of the British with no interview or even hint of a meeting for another month coming from Wellesley worried both the British and Swedes who convinced themselves that this silence was very ominous and heralded, judging by the massive build-up of naval shipping in British ports, of an attack upon Sweden. Brinkman did not share this view and assured all those concerned that the naval armament was not aimed at Sweden but he admitted privately that he could be wrong and if he was then Britain was assured as devastating and overwhelming victory over her weakened former ally. The Swedes believed that if Britain was shut out of Sweden that she would be in need of a safe and conveniently placed base in the Baltic. Gotland seemed to fit the bill well and aroused unfounded Swedish fears that the British would occupy it.

If Swedish paranoia about a British attack upon them had been aroused by Wellesley's studied silence then the arrival of the French chargé d'affaires Desaugiers on 8 April and the almost simultaneous announcement of the full, unfettered Swedish blockade against Britain aroused British fears for her Baltic trade and of a possible war with Sweden. Desaugiers's initial moderation rapidly gave way to arrogant demands that Foster be thrown out of Sweden. Most Swedish ministers, unused to be treated with such arrogance by a junior diplomat, took strong offence to Desaugiers. Their dismay had to be tempered by the fact that arrogant and unpleasant though he was, Desaugiers had the full power of Napoleon behind him. They had to be circumspect without being seen to capitulate too fast to French demands. Foster believed the French diplomat had been sent to Stockholm to bully the Swedes into total submission. Foster was shocked at the weakness of the Swedish government which gave way to everything Napoleon demanded. In his view (which Järta had voiced earlier) Sweden's insularity with

68 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 10 Apr. 1810.
respect to the continent gave her a stronger base than either Russia or Denmark to resist French
demands and her economic dependence upon trade with Britain should have provided yet further
incentive to resist Napoleon's orders. But this kind of risky and hardline stance against Napoleon was
quite alien to the weak, indecisive and divided Swedish government. Engeström therefore informed a
dismayed and disappointed Foster that on 20 April that he would have to leave Sweden.70

The Swedish government however was very keen that a diplomatic break with Britain did not lead to
an end to the trade between their two countries or aroused British suspicions that there were any
secret clauses in the Paris treaty.71 Since Brinkman had been recalled officially months earlier
Engeström wanted the Baron Rehausen to act as 'special agent' after official relations with Britain
were broken.72 Brinkman finally had his last meeting with Wellesley on 14 May where they gave
assurances of goodwill and co-operation on both sides but little concrete was decided.73 Meanwhile
dramatic events had been set off in Sweden by a most untimely death. Not that of the decrepit old
king but of his seemingly healthy heir no less. The continued rumours of a possible war with Britain
in late April and early May had (as in 1809) aroused Swedish fears for the security Carlscrona. (There
had been similar fears in 1801 and 1809 when relations with Britain were uncertain). Prince Charles
set off, in early May, therefore, on an arduous inspection tour of Carlscrona and Scania.74 While
admirals Puke and Cederström disagreed about the best plans for defence the prince seemed to be in
the best of health and very cheerful.75 During his journey to Scania where the southern army
manoeuvres were to be held the prince overcame a slight feverish spell.76 Or that was what the
bulletins claimed. In fact the prince had a weak heart, the fever was not cured and he continued to be
ill during the entire journey.77 On 28 May, during a troop inspection in Scania the prince, already ill
and exhausted, died of a stroke.78

70 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 13, 17, 27 Apr. 1810.
72 BLA. 68. Engeström to Rehausen, 20 Apr. 1810.
74 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 1, 8 May 1810.
75 HBATL. 308-309. Cederström to Adlersparre, 17 May 1810.
77 HBATL. 307. Adlersparre to de la Grange, 31 May 1810.
78 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 6 June 1810; Barton. 365.
Brinkman arrived, therefore, in early June to a demoralised and defeated country, that had already been through the most turbulent phase in its history so far. Brinkman stayed in Gothenburg to conduct private but crucial talks with Saumarez on his flag ship the 'Victory' on 4 June. Saumarez assured Brinkman that he would order his fleet not to molest Swedish shipping but he would retaliate should the Swedes deny him supplies, water and safe (but secret) anchorage on the coast or if the Swedes aided enemy privateers. Brinkman was sure that his government would follow Saumarez proposals and not aid enemy privateers. The same assurances were given to the departing Swedish chargé d'affaires on 11 June by Wellesley. This gentlemen agreement for covert collaboration to maintain their trade and combat the effectiveness of enemy privateers was the basis for Anglo-Swedish collaboration for the next two years.

These assurances could only have provided the troubled Swedish government with crumbs of comfort since they now faced the most serious domestic crisis since taking power. The news of prince Charles's death was known in Stockholm by 31 May and the city's population was shocked by the news. Had Charles XIII died there would have been no surprise but when the relatively young prince died instead, rumours began immediately to spread. Even before the prince had died, rumours of Gustavian poisoning attempts had circulated around Stockholm. The finger of accusation was levelled at count Fersen, his family and political friends. These rumours were spread with stories of general Vegesack planning to overthrow Charles XIII and place Gustavus IV's son prince Gustavus on the throne instead. The nobility was supposed to be collaborating with the Russians to affect this coup. These rumours were spread by the radical and violent anti-Gustavian political intriguer Charles Grevesmöhlen whose activities were sponsored by Engeström who, in addition to being foreign minister, was also minister of the interior. Grevesmöhlen had set up his own secret police which primary task was to crush the Gustavian opposition to the 'new order'. The Swedish government was badly shaken by the prince's death since they had such high hopes for a change in Sweden's fortunes under his rule. Now it was not to be and Sweden had to go through another succession crisis

79 KUB. 396. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 4 June 1810.
80 KUB. 396. Brandel to Charles XIII, 11 June 1810.
81 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 31 May 1810.
82 Barton. 362-365.
83 Staf. 316-319; Barton. 364; Hedman. 413.
at a time when the country was already badly divided. Before he left Stockholm Foster noted the ugly atmosphere in the capital and the pamphlets and placards that accused the nobility, especially the Fersen family, of poisoning the Prince. Foster left in the nick of time since by the time he reached Gothenburg, 15 June, Stockholm was on the brink of revolution. Desaugiers too complained about being surrounded by low intrigue and the unsettling calm before a storm.

That storm broke on 20 June, when in an act of arrogant complacency or a mistaken sense of duty, Fersen, travelling in his luxurious gilded carriage accompanied the prince's funeral procession. His carriage was stoned by a mob amply plied with drink and money by Grevesmühl's 'police' agents. Fersen first sought refuge in an inn and then the guards barracks near the royal palace but a hundreds strong mob pulled him out and proceeded to kick and beat the count to death. What Engeström, Charles XIII and Grevesmühl had hoped would only have served as a lesson to the Gustavian nobility turned into a murder by a furious mob. The three conspirators had bungled badly as they had unleashed a bloodthirsty and uncontrolled mob into the streets of the capital and only a block away from the royal palace. Displaying their incompetence yet again, Adlercreutz and Klingspor, the city's military commanders, failed to control the situation and the mob, shouting abuse at an army that they believed had lost them the Russian war and Finland, stoned the troops. These fired back but the mob just reformed elsewhere. Charles XIII terrified at the prospect of a real, French style revolution showed real leadership for once by firing Klingspor and replacing him with general Skjödebrand. Skjödebrand believed in the efficiency in a whiff of grapeshot to crush a revolutionary mob. He ordered his cavalry units to charge the mobs with drawn sabres and finally by the evening, infantry bayonets and cavalry charges had restored order in the streets. Some 65 civilians and troops were dead, 200 had been wounded, 20 were arrested and 900 were interrogated. The real culprits, not even Grevesmühl, were arrested or interrogated while sporadic street fights and arson attacks were to continue for another month in Stockholm.

84 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 6 June 1810.
85 Barton. 394.
86 Staf. 319-329; Barton. 363-365, 368, 370-377; Hedman. 329, 393-395, 398-400.
Europe as a whole was repulsed and horrified by the gruesome murder in Stockholm and the subsequent violent street battles. Only the events in Madrid a year earlier and in France in 1792 could in any way compare with the bloody turmoil in Stockholm. Most Europeans therefore expected that Sweden would go the way of France. The prospect of a militant, revolutionary regime possibly backed by a new invigorated army, such as France had got after its revolution, was not pleasant for Russia which feared the turmoil could spread to Finland. It was rumoured that Alexander I was prepared to invade Sweden with 40,000 troops and put a Russian prince on the throne. Other rumours circulated that Adlersparre planned to march on Stockholm with 10,000 troops to quash a full scale revolution. In other words the same situation as prevailed in Sweden a year earlier with domestic civil war and a threatened Russian invasion. Napoleon made his displeasure at events in Sweden known to Lagerbjelke, with accompanying threats to intervene with troops to prevent the Jacobins from taking power in a country that now, at least according to himself, belonged to the Napoleonic sphere of influence in Europe. (Had the situation worsened in Sweden, the French and Russian might have intervened simultaneously with an interesting confrontation arising between the two by now antagonistic Emperors). Both Swedes and foreigners expected and hoped that a 'strong' man could take over to restore Sweden to some kind of stability.

The death of prince Charles necessitated that a new Diet was called to select a new heir to the throne to prevent new turmoil and government paralysis induced by Charles XIII's frailty. The predominant Francophile party favoured giving the throne to one of Napoleon's marshals who could pull Sweden out of her political quagmire. None favoured the candidature of such a strongman more than the junior officer corp of the Swedish army. One of these young officer, the 24 year old lieutenant count Carl Otto Mörner, used a courier delivery to Paris to find a likely candidate among the French Marshalate and through a friend, as well as the recommendations of the Swedish General Consul in Paris, Mörner was directed to marshal Bernadotte, who has figured several times in this story. The Marshal was in semi-retirement since his Walcheren escapades had earned him Napoleon's disfavour and he was surprised, if somewhat suspicious, at being confronted at his home on 25 June by an

87 Ramel. 293; Barton. 394.
88 Barton. 394-396.
young Swedish officer's offering him the crown of Sweden. Mörner not only overcame Lagerbjelke's opposition to this schemes but Bernadotte got, after some delay, Napoleon's approval to take the Swedish crown. Back in Sweden the Diet had assembled at Örebro safely distant from the turbulent capital and it was excited to learn, when Mörner returned home on 12 July, that Napoleon had endorsed Bernadotte's candidature. Bernadotte seemed to be the answer to Sweden's prayers and the man that could restore Sweden's much reduced international standing and domestic tranquility. On 21 August Bernadotte was elected Crown prince of Sweden and on 3 September Paris had received the news. News that left Napoleon in two minds. On the one hand he was glad to extend his influence by having a French marshal as eventual king of Sweden but Bernadotte was hardly his first or most ideal choice of candidate. To Alexander I this was yet another extension of French power that threatened Russia's western border. 89

Britain, like Russia, could only stand aside and observe events. By this time Britain had no way of influencing events in Sweden at all and the British government could only register how, step by step, Sweden inexorably slid into Napoleon's clutches. British influence was virtually non-existent with the departure of Foster from Sweden in late June. The Swedish authorities did not want to provoke Napoleon more than necessary by having Foster lingering in Gothenburg. 90 Swedish arrangements was very similar. In place of the regular chargé d'affaires the former London envoy, Rehausen, was appointed as unofficial special agent for Swedish affairs in London. 91 After the Swedish chargé d'affaires departure Rehausen reminded the British government about the trade and shipping concessions they agreed to grant to Sweden. But despite, as the Swedes claimed, previous promises of leniency and co-operation the British refused to give Swedish ships, carrying British goods, unrestricted entry to British blockaded ports on the continent. 92 The news of Bernadotte's election at Örebro, which reached London, by mid September probably convinced the British their former ally was sliding ever deeper into Napoleon's orbit of control and made them even less willing to show

91 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 20 Apr. 1810.
92 KUB. 397. Rehausen to Engeström, 19 June, 3, 13 July, 10 Aug. 1810.
Sweden any leniency. Rehausen's suspicions about a hardening British attitude towards Sweden seemed have been confirmed by their government's refusal to release the Swedish ships seized during inspections by the royal navy.

It seemed like Sweden had returned to the 'bad, old' days a decade earlier when the British seized Swedish merchant ships at their own whim. If Britain carried on like this then it would menace Sweden's flourishing commercial life. Sweden's exports rose from some 7.9 million riksdaler in 1807 to 11.9 million in 1810 while her imports rose even more dramatically in the same years from 5.1 million riksdaler to 16.1 million. Most of this trade was with Britain and constituted two thirds in 1808 falling to 40% on average between 1808 to 1812. These figures do not give justice to the true state of Anglo-Swedish trade and its importance to the general conduct of the war. After 1807 Britain was effectively shut out of western Europe by Napoleon's Continental system which was strengthened by Napoleon's occupation of Holland, East Friesland, Hamburg and Oldenburg in 1810.

The annexations of 1810 showed clearly that Napoleon ignored all the political consequences of his self-defeating economic war with Britain and only diverted Britain's trade and when it began to effect the British economy (1810-1811) the effects of the British, then European recession, were most devastating to France's economy. But even more worrying was that the occupation of Oldenburg increased Russian disillusionment with Napoleon and provoked Alexander I to end his membership of the Continental system. Thus by closing a small hole in his vast European coastal rampart against Britain, Napoleon had opened up an even vaster one. The restoration of peace with Sweden opened up yet another hole in the continental wall that undermined Napoleon's 'System'. Sweden could help Britain pour their exports into Europe through the backdoor right under the noses of the French and Pomerania had now, in a new commercial guise, shown its worth again as a strategic allied bridgehead. The Baltic region was the weakest section of the rampart not least because of the corruption of French agents there and proved the undoing of Napoleon's empire and commercial war.

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96 Schama. 600-622.
with Britain for two years later, as we shall see, Napoleon chose to invade Russia and occupy Pomerania, in his quest to destroy Britain and ended up destroying himself.97

Two Swedish ports played a vital but overlooked role in Britain's circumvention and sabotage of Napoleon's blockade strategy. Gothenburg, on Sweden's west coast, was the port of entry for Britain's contraband smuggling with the continent, either overland, or direct into the Baltic. Not only had the port to handle Sweden's own genuine exports which expanded during 1809-1810 but also handle British exports to Europe under neutral flag or ownership. British merchant houses handled much of that smuggling and made handsome profits. As fortunes were made and lost this period acquired notoriety as the golden 'Continental era' (1808 to 1814) and earned Gothenburg the title of 'Little London'. But not all goods were shipped from Gothenburg directly with licences that proved their 'neutral' origins but much was hauled overland to Sweden's Baltic coast.98 The small Swedish port of Carlshamn on the Blekinge coast played a vital role too as the depot for smuggled goods coming from Gothenburg and for their shipment to Pomerania where they were smuggled into Germany by various routes. But Carlshamn played also an important role as supply base for the British squadron stationed outside the Blekinge coast and in nearby secluded bays British warships found safe anchorage (in contravention Napoleon's ultimatum). The British and Swedish naval officers, the latter stationed in nearby Karlsrona, fraternised and collaborated quite openly having been comrades in arms earlier.99

If the flourishing contraband trade was to continue it was not only the military on both sides that had to co-operate but the Swedish civilian authorities that had to collaborate with the British as smoothly as their military counterparts. A key official was the governor of Gothenburg, where not only another British squadron was stationed off the coast, but where most shipping and goods were dealt with. For once the Swedish government had picked the right man in the young, shrewd and diplomatic Axel von Rosen who built up an excellent rapport with the equally diplomatic Saumarez whom he entertained to dinner almost on a daily basis at his residence. Rosen and Saumarez's personal

98 Rann. 2-15.; FO 73/60 Foster to Wellesley, 29 Jan., 2 Feb., 27 Apr., 15 June 1810.
friendship and close collaboration prevented any major problems in Anglo-Swedish relations on the ground from jeopardising their mutually beneficial and profitable 'trade'. It also ensured that the French consul in Gothenburg was kept in the dark when he wasn't bribed to look the other way.\(^{100}\)

That the official British attitude may have, according to Rehausen's reports, become less accommodating to Sweden but that mattered less since Saumarez was in charge of actual naval policy on the ground. Despite some Swedish officials going by the book in implementing the Swedish 'blockade' against British warships\(^{101}\) Saumarez allowed in September-October 1810 Swedish merchant vessels to proceed to Pomerania without his ships interference.\(^{102}\) In return the Swedes were more than glad to allow Saumarez to use Blekinge\(^{103}\) and Gotland\(^{104}\) for anchorage and supplies.

Just as Anglo-Swedish relations seemed to be reaching a plateau of stability and a working system of collaboration that could help undermine their common enemy Napoleon, Gustavus IV made an unwelcome re-appearance on the political stage. Having left Sweden in December 1809 his original intention had been to settle in Switzerland with his family\(^{105}\) but he then spent several months travelling through Germany. General Skjödebrand, who accompanied the former royal family, was shocked as a anti-Gustavian revolutionary at the warm reception that Gustavus IV got from thousands of Pomeranians when he arrived there in December 1809 and continued German appreciation for a man that symbolised the anti-Napoleonic cause. This pleasant part of the trip was only marred by the permanent rift between Gustavus IV and the queen. Gustavus IV, never to see his wife again, travelled to Prussia and Russia where his presence, as a staunch enemy of Napoleon, proved a political burden and embarrassment. Not only could Napoleon take offence at his most vocal enemy being present on Russian soil, which would lead to a further deterioration of the increasingly tense Franco-Russian relations, but the Swedish government, suspicious about Russian support for a

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\(^{100}\) Rosengren. ibid.
\(^{101}\) RA. Militarica. (M. 1677). Lindman to Commandant of Ystad, 9 May 1810.
\(^{103}\) RA. Militarica. (M. 1677). Swedish Admiralty to Saumarez, 19 Aug. 1811.
\(^{104}\) FO 73/60 Foster to Wellesley, 29 May 1810.
\(^{105}\) FO 73/59. Foster to Bathurst, 31 Dec. 1809; FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 9 Jan. 1810.
Gustavian restoration, would also probably be hostile to Gustavus IV's continued presence in Russia.\textsuperscript{106}

It was therefore with some relief the Russians saw Gustavus IV depart on a British warship on 22 October which removed a potential storm cloud from their shores only to land in the lap of the British. He was given a genuinely warm and respectful welcome from Saumarez when he arrived at the British naval station off the Swedish coast. Rosen was worried that the British would allow Gustavus IV to land or cause other political mischief for the Swedish authorities but Saumarez assured him that Gustavus IV would be sent on to England. Gustavus IV landed at Yarmouth on 12 November from HMS 'Tartarus' to the wild cheer of thousands of common British people who, like their German counterparts, saw him as a champion against Napoleon and a loyal British ally. When he got into his carriage, the masses detached his horses and pulled it to the house where he resided for a couple of days and he was called upon to make several appearances at the window to the wild cheers of the royalist crowds. Pierrepont went up to Colchester to find out if Gustavus IV had any political motives behind his trip to Britain.\textsuperscript{107}

No doubt to Pierrepont's relief and that of his government Gustavus IV claimed that he did not have any political motives or plans behind his arrival in Britain. He only wanted a place of exile where he could be safe from the influence of Napoleon. As usual, however, Gustavus, who had adopted the name of count of Gottorp flaunted convention and ignored his host's wishes by coming to London on 21 November. Nevertheless Marquess Wellesley gave him a warm reception at a dinner which aroused Rehausen's fears that the British were giving the 'count' too much of their flattering attentions, which could only mean trouble for the Swedish government. These fears were heightened when Rehausen called on Gustavus IV on 24 November, only to be politely turned away. A by now worried Rehausen called on Culling Smith the under secretary at the Foreign Office to find out what the British were up to. While he did not believe that the British were conspiring against Sweden he wanted, on his government's behalf, assurances that there was no plans to restore Gustavus IV to his

\textsuperscript{106} Carlsson. 223-235.

\textsuperscript{107} KUB. 396. Rehausen to Engeström, 16 Nov. 1810; Carlsson. 234-235.
throne. Culling Smith calmed Rehausen's fears that the 'count' had no political plans and the British were motive purely by spirit of generosity.\textsuperscript{108}

Given the atmosphere of intrigue and tension that prevailed in Sweden during the summer and autumn 1810 the Swedes did not fully trust British assurances. But these were totally honest since the British had not wish to restore Gustavus IV to power given their experience of having been his ally for four long, hard years. Beyond showing a modicum of civility and generosity to a loyal ally that had fought by their side during the darkest days of the war, the British had no desire to jeopardise the goodwill or security of Sweden, which was a vital cog in their economic machinery of war against Napoleon and one day could become a vital ally. With his volatile temper and his popularity with the masses, Gustavus IV could also be used by the opposition to cause trouble for the British government. It was therefore for both domestic and foreign policy reasons that both governments, equally embarrassed at Gustavus IV's presence in London, with relief saw Gustavus IV depart for the continent in March 1811. While Gustavus IV passed into oblivion and exile in Switzerland his ally and former countrymen were officially at war. Gustavus IV was never again to play a serious political role on the European stage and with his departure the 'Common Cause' was at an end once and for all.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{108} KUB. 396. Rehausen to Engeström, 26 Nov. 1810; Carlsson. 235-236.
\textsuperscript{109} Carlsson. 236-246.
Conclusion.

One has to ask what sort of legacy the alliance left behind and how effective an alliance it had actually been. The historical roots for an Anglo-Swedish alliance seemed to be quite feeble since during the preceding century Britain and Sweden had never been close allies. Their relations were built upon mutually beneficial trading links and economic self-interest. Britain provided Sweden with working capital, investments, technical expertise and its emigrant entrepreneurs revitalised the economy after the Great Northern War which had devastated Sweden's economy. Sweden on the other hand was a supplier of raw materials, such as naval stores, forestry and fish products, and the all important pig-iron from her numerous iron foundries. But Sweden was jealous of British economic and military power which made that power able to determine the terms of trade in her own favour at the expense of Sweden. Unable to match Britain's vigorous economic expansion during the century the Swedes dismissed Britain as a mere nation of shopkeepers who had no business to meddle in either Nordic or European affairs. The British, if they devoted any attention to Sweden, dismissed that country as a Francophile state outside the pale of British foreign policy not worth bothering about. Economic factors and business did not therefore make Sweden and Britain natural allies. In fact Sweden's exports of pig-iron and naval stores to Britain were being replaced by cheaper Russian supplies. Overseas trade was in fact a cause of much conflict between Russia and Britain which led to several conflicts over maritime rights. If trading factors did not account for friendship between Britain and Sweden then one might have expected that they had common political aims. Gustavus III had even before the French revolution began to re-direct Sweden's foreign policy towards Britain. The British remained sceptical and suspicious about Gustavus III's motives and ambitious plans. They did not, like France, share the king's wish to contain or even roll back Russia (a friendly power that Britain depended upon for her vital supplies of naval stores). Nor were the British willing to provide large subsidies to provide Gustavus III for his highly dubious political schemes.

The French revolution turned Sweden's entire strategic and foreign policy on its head. Gustavus III bequeathed to his son and heir an abiding ideological aversion to the new republican France and an equally ideological commitment to restoring the Bourbons if possible by the time he died in 1792. The British shared Sweden's hardline approach to containing the revolutionary contagion but they
never met eye to eye with Gustavus IV's plans for a full, legitimist restoration of Bourbon France. The question of the post-revolutionary regime to be imposed upon France divided Britain and Sweden throughout the alliance. Nor did they, until the treaty of London of 1803, see eye to eye on matters of maritime rights and obligations. Gustavus IV, who took power in 1796, proved as staunch a champion of neutral rights as he did that of Louis XVIII (the exiled Bourbon pretender) and he was an implacable foe of Britain's maritime pretensions. Had revolutionary France not existed then Gustavus IV might have gone down in history as the most stubborn of Britain's many enemies. In fact there were only three strong reasons for Britain and Sweden being allies in spite of their less than cordial and close relations in the past. Firstly, while the two countries perceived themselves as separate from the continent their sovereigns had strong links with Germany (the key to the balance of power on the continent) and as nations, despite their natural barriers of water to protect themselves from continental turmoil, they were dependent upon the balance of power on the continent being maintained to preserve their independence. Secondly, the conservative British government, led by William Pitt (and later on George Canning), shared Gustavus IV's ideological aversion to the French revolutionary and later Napoleonic regimes in France. In the British case this only added to a national aversion to their hereditary foe across the Channel which the Swedes, for historical and cultural reasons, did not share. (Nor did the British share Sweden's paranoid Russophobia for historical, political and economic reasons). Finally, Britain, facing an ever more extensive and effective French blockade, wanted to develop her trade with Sweden and the Baltic region yet further in order to maintain her trade with the continent through Swedish ports and intermediaries.

Despite their shared interests the alliance between Britain and Sweden did not prove an outstanding success during the first few years of its existence. One major reason for its relative failure was that neither the alliance nor the war that Sweden subsequently had to join failed to gain the support the country's nobility, officer class and merchants. The alliance could therefore never be fully effective without their wholehearted support and they proved unsympathetic to Gustavus IV's struggle against France from the beginning. Their aversion to a war and an ideological crusade that was quite alien to their political frame of mind only deepened as the allies suffered one defeat after another. Hence domestic political divisions, which had festered ever since the Gustavian autocracy was established..
back in 1772, only deepened as Gustavus IV made war on France for reasons that most Swedish nobles believed were quite alien to Sweden's intrinsic and true interests. They wanted as fast a return to neutrality as circumstances permitted even if that meant breaking off relations with Britain and leaving Napoleon to dominate the continent. Some, luckily belonging to a minority of noble and upper class opinion, wanted to go one step further by siding with France against Britain and Russia. These sentiments were most strongly represented among many Swedish officers who admired Napoleon's military genius and resented fighting on the side of the so-called selfish British and the Russians, who in their opinion remained the natural enemy. The British government aware of the true sentiments of their ally's upper classes could never feel confident of Sweden's wholehearted support for the allied cause.

In fact Britain's only Swedish ally was Gustavus IV himself but his motivation for his loyal support of the allied cause and the alliance with Britain was less due to him being an Anglophile than his implacable opposition to Napoleon. If a single individual could be called the architect and champion of the 'Common Cause' it was Gustavus IV who put his idiosyncratic stamp on the alliance. Without his single-minded and fanatical opposition to Napoleon the historical barriers to an Anglo-Swedish alliance may not have been overcome. On the other Gustavus IV contributed greatly to the alliance not being as effective as it could have been and its eventual downfall. On more than one occasion his decisions led to allied quarrels and conflicts due to his unbending sense of honour and his principles which were, at least outsiders, only known to himself. Britain's long serving envoy to Sweden, Henry Pierrepoint, had more than one occasion to lament Gustavus IV's inflexibility and how this led to unnecessary conflicts between the allies. (His gratuitous return of Russian and Prussian medals which had been given to Napoleon comes to mind as symbolic of that principled but impractical frame of mind that was at odds with maintaining civil relations with Sweden's most predatory neighbours). On his part Gustavus IV was constantly dissatisfied with the slowness of British decision making and the inadequate levels of subsidies that Sweden was paid by her ally. The question of money was a constant cause of contention between the allies. The British felt that they paid far too much for the services and facilities that Sweden provided while the Swedes felt the British were not only miserly with their money but tardy in paying. The Russians had similar complaints and they came to a head
in early 1807. The Talents, by sending expeditions across the world instead of supporting their European allies, had managed to alienate not only Sweden and Russia.

A change of ministry in March 1807 came too late to save the Anglo-Russian alliance which was the backbone of the allied coalition. For the Russians the last straw came at Friedland when they were defeated by the French without any British or Swedish succour in sight. In the most dramatic change of foreign policy during the entire Napoleonic War Alexander I switched sides. Sweden and Britain were therefore from the summer of 1807 standing alone in the struggle against Napoleon. It seemed obvious to most observers, including Canning and the British government, that Sweden would be forced to change sides too. After all in the past Sweden had to trim her diplomatic sails according to the prevailing wind from the east. Gustavus IV chose not to abandon the British alliance. His decision could not have proven more unpopular with his domestic detractors whose opposition to his rule and foreign orientation escalated yet further. It also gave Russia an excuse to invade Finland since Alexander I was obliged to browbeat Sweden into the Continental system by force of arms if necessary. In hindsight Gustavus IV should probably have changed sides in the war during the early autumn months of 1807 before it was too late. His advisers wanted Sweden to adopt neutrality which in the escalating struggle between Napoleon and Britain was not a viable option. Nor was the Swedish ministers advice that Gustavus IV appease Russia by not preparing Finland's defences properly particularly well thought out either.

Poor leadership, inadequate material and defeatism in the upper echelons of the armed forces characterised the Swedish army during the campaign in Finland. The beginning of the end for the Gustavian regime, Swedish Finland and the Anglo-Swedish alliance may have been Tilsit but the ignominious fall of Sveaborg was just as important. It not only exposed the poor leadership of the armed forces but the undercurrent of defeatism and even treason that seemed to permeate the Swedish nobility and officer corps. If this could not be stemmed then Sweden would suffer the same fate as Prussia but again Gustavus IV's own character flaws (his despondency, wishful thinking and failure to provide leadership) undermined the defence effort. The British chose therefore in the summer of 1808 to divert general Moore's army from Sweden which would embroil them in war with a sought
after possible ally (Russia) to Spain where the Spaniards proved enthusiastic allies in the war against Napoleon. For Sweden the outbreak of the Spanish revolt and then war of national liberation was yet another nail in the coffin to the Gustavian regime and the survival of the alliance. The harsh fact was that Canning had written off Sweden in late 1808 and now only wished to distance himself from the Swedish distraction without causing too much umbrage with Gustavus IV. In a world war on the scale of that Canning was conducting the Spanish front seemed a better choice of arena to challenge Napoleon on the continent than Sweden whose struggle with Russia was of secondary importance to Britain. Gustavus IV took deep offence at British indifference and by March 1809 he almost came to blows with his British ally over the perennial problem of the subsidies.

By that time domestic discontent in Sweden boiled over into outright rebellion and that same month the king was overthrown. Like their opposition counterparts in Britain (the Whigs) the new regime sought to reverse Gustavus IV's policies. This did not work. They were forced to continue not only the war against Russia but in a clandestine form, the alliance with Britain, which provided Sweden with the naval protection her long exposed coast needed. Peace was only bought at the high price of losing Finland and Åland while domestic discontent exploded into a near revolution in 1810. The problems of the past continued to haunt the new Sweden that had been created in 1809 and the country craved law, order and stability after such a long period of near chaos. In October 1810 marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte was elected Prince Royal of Sweden. The men of 1809 who had led the revolution and their Francophile supporters hoped that this Napoleonic strong man would not only provide the country with much needed leadership but also align Sweden close to Napoleonic France. Within two years Bernadotte had in fact restored the foreign policy of Gustavus IV. He established a close alliance with Britain and Russia in order to defeat Napoleon and acquire Norway. Both objectives (from a Swedish point of view) had been achieved by 1814 vindicating Gustavus IV's foreign policy orientation after all.
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